1-1-1978

The biography of a campaign strategy, management, result : McCarthy in New Hampshire, 1968.

David C. Hoeh
University of Massachusetts Amherst

THE BIOGRAPHY OF A CAMPAIGN
STRATEGY, MANAGEMENT, RESULT

McCARTHY IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 1968

A Dissertation Presented

By

David Charles Hoch

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

September 1978

Political Science

THE BIOGRAPHY OF A CAMPAIGN
STRATEGY, MANAGEMENT, RESULT

McCARTHY IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 1968

A Dissertation Presented

By

David Charles Hoeh

Approved as to style and content by:

John H. Fenton, Chairperson of Committee

Glen Gordon, Member

James D. Wright, Member

Glen Gordon, Department Head
Political Science

FOR: Sandra, Christopher,

Jeffrey, and Jonathan

Preface

The New Hampshire Presidential Primary of 1968 was a unique political event. The opportunity to account for how that event occurred may also be unique. The author brings to this study something more than the perspective of an observer or reporter. He was, with several others, an organizer, motivator, strategist, and total participant in that campaign from its inception until its conclusion. To this account he brings a point of view of New Hampshire politics that provided a practical basis for developing the strategy of the campaign and seeing that the plan was executed. As a political scientist, he brought to the 1968 campaign earlier political experience in New Hampshire as well as an applied synthesis drawn from his exposure to the literature of his discipline. In his mind he continually related his studies to his experience to shape the political effort. It is from this dual perspective that he drew the concept of the campaign and that he now offers this account.

In the preface of his book, The Management of Election Campaigns, Robert Agranoff wrote:

> This book is devoted to the principle that political science does have something to contribute to those who are interested in practical politics. Too often the practitioner has ignored the academic as unconcerned with the real experiences and problems that politicians confront on a day-to-day basis. (xiii)

He went on to bemoan the fact that there are few studies of elections and the ones there are are "of elections held long ago." To bridge the gap between students and campaigners, Agranoff feels, "...it seemed necessary to compile, for the campaigner, that which is relevant from the past quarter-century of research

into campaigns, elections, voting, political parties, communications, and other socio-political processes..." (xiii). To help in this bridge building a new case study is in order. A case study of a campaign that was managed by a person standing on the bridge who feels that the case study and analysis that follows strengthen the structure.

In this case study care has been taken to develop the material from what was experienced and what influenced decisions during the span of the campaign. The author has attempted to re-create the selected events of the campaign as they happened rather than from the perspective of hindsight. In this way the structure of the bridge becomes more evident. For the reader familiar with Agranoff's "quarter century of research" one will find evidence of the impact of that material in the strategy and decision-making of the campaign. For the campaign participant that reader will sense the relationship between the science of politics and the imprecision of the art that the worker feels. For the scholar the case study offers an account of a campaign, resembling a documentary, that can be probed and questioned with the recognition that the details have been preserved and the subtle interactions recorded.

This profile shows that McCarthy's New Hampshire success came not from an after the fact evaluation but as the consequence of a series of pre-planned strategies suited to New Hampshire's unique political environment. The impact of the campaign was immediate. McCarthy had won what was held to be a significant victory over President Lyndon B. Johnson. How that victory was accomplished, what steps were taken, how the campaign evolved, and how the confrontation was stated is the setting of this case study. What went on in the organizers' minds,

what information they had and used to make their decisions, what events they had to react to with their strategy, what campaign techniques were used have been reviewed in order to select those that respond to the questions of impact and effectiveness.

The irony of the event was that the successes of the campaign came inspite of the fact that Lyndon Johnson was an undeclared write-in candidate in New Hampshire. Primaries were viewed as of limited importance to the re-nomination of an incumbent president and thus it was thought possible to avoid direct participation. The advantages of incumbency and a campaign operated by surrogates would be sufficient to demonstrate party unity.

One consequence of the 1968 primary experience was that when the 1972 presidential primary season came around, President Richard Nixon did not hesitate to participate actively. He broke tradition and announced his re-election intentions early in 1972. He then entered the New Hampshire presidential primary and came to New Hampshire as a candidate. Taking nothing for granted, the Nixon strategy of insuring both his re-nomination and his re-election led to his downfall when carried to the extreme -- Watergate.

It must be noted that for the leaders of the New Hampshire McCarthy campaign the decision to challenge the incumbent president of their own party was a difficult one. As the author contends, that like himself, many of the individuals both inside and outside of New Hampshire had to make difficult choices. To become involved in a campaign against the re-nomination of an incumbent with whom many, if not most, had some measure of respect, was most difficult. The cross pressure of President Johnson's civil rights efforts, legislative program

to end poverty, his concern for the problems of the cities, and his emphasis on educational and employment equity presented those who were to become his political challengers with wrenching personal decisions.

To lend their names, energy, their experience, and their personal political capital to a challenge based on a deepening concern about the impact of the administration's Vietnam war policy called for deep personal examination of one's values, a measuring of the consequences, and finally a commitment. For some it meant becoming involved in the McCarthy campaign. For others it meant sticking with the President to work from the inside to modify his administration's foreign policy. To others the choice was made on personal priorities. Domestic accomplishments and the trend Johnson had set were more important than the skirmish in Vietnam, or the opposite, where one argued that Vietnam involvement had made further domestic advances improbable inspite of the "guns and butter" rhetoric of the administration.

The personal decision-making that brought together the formidable organization that eventually became the McCarthy campaign must not be overlooked as an important part of the 1968 political context. For this case study it will be necessary to note its importance as both an accomplishment of the New Hampshire campaign and an aspect of the impact of that campaign and to direct readers to other accounts (see bibliography). The depth of personal commitment, as translated into political energy, while not unique in American politics, was certainly an important contribution to the success of McCarthy in 1968. It is hoped that the analysis survives with the above notation and the recognition that every political campaign has its commited participants. The author more than recognized

that in 1968, at least as it began in New Hampshire, the commitment was less to the candidate himself, than to the issues and concerns which he represented. This difference may account for the intensity and unusual breadth of participation in the campaign but this difference is not felt to invalidate the subsequent analysis.

Observing the tenth anniversary of 1968 the American Broadcasting Corporation prepared a documentary of the events of that year entitled, "A Crack in Time." The program, aired during the spring of 1978, was a summary of the headline events of 1968 beginning with Senator McCarthy's surprise showing in the New Hampshire presidential primary. To go beyond headlines and to assess the total political, social, institutional impact of that year or even of the New Hampshire presidential primary reaches beyond the scope of this study. For the record and perhaps to challenge other researchers, it is worth noting at least some of the political consequences of McCarthy's New Hampshire success.

Briefly, and not in order of importance some of these are:

1. Ineffective anti-Vietnam war protest was organized into votes which led to the de-escalation and eventual end of United States military involvement in Vietnam.

2. An incumbent president was challenged effectively in a primary which contributed to his decision not to seek re-election.

3. The presidential primary as an institution and as a viable route to a presidential nomination was not only recognized but widely instituted.

4. The presidential nominating process was thoroughly examined and extensively reformed to assure timeliness, equity, and openness.

5. A revived sense of the vitality of American political institutions and processes came as the result of widespread participation in the campaigns and a commitment to see reform carried to logical conclusions.

6. A convergence between the practitioners of politics and the students of political science began leading to a greater appreciation of ones contribution to the other.

7. The emmense abyss known as the "Generation Gap" began to close as political activities led to shared experiences and attitudes.

8. Double standards for the sake of national security that led to official secrecy, a lack of accountability and a presumption of official perogatives were challenged. Widespread institutional and societal reform has resulted.

Reviewing the foregoing and recalling other events of that time, has the effect of pushing time back. It may be presumptuous to mark such widespread change back to the McCarthy New Hampshire primary of 1968, but whether it is or not something happened at that time that did serve, as ABC television felt, to be "A Crack in Time."

The assumption that the event itself was significant, not only a point of departure for change, but as an important political happening is the principal justification for this study. The contribution of this work is intended for the student of politics and to urge an appreciation for the campaign in the electoral process. The historical significance of the event should be seen as enriching the value of the study for those who might choose to examine the genesis of an era of significant societal change.

ABSTRACT

THE BIOGRAPHY OF A CAMPAIGN
STRATEGY, MANAGEMENT, RESULT
McCARTHY IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 1968

September 1978

David Charles Hoeh, B.A., University of New Hampshire
A.M., Boston University, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor John H. Fenton

Eugene J. McCarthy entered the New Hampshire presidential primary in 1968 as an obscure U.S. Senator supported by a cadre of unknown individuals. He ran against an incumbent President of his own party who was sufficiently assured of renomination and popular support that he did not become an active candidate.

March 12, 1968, Senator McCarthy captured 42 percent of the Democratic Party vote against 48 percent for the incumbent President. Senator McCarthy also attracted enough voters to elect twenty of the twenty-four convention delegate seats alloted to New Hampshire. This case study documents how this electoral success was accomplished.

The author was one of the principal organizers of the campaign. He brings to the case study an extensive background in New Hampshire politics preceeding the McCarthy candidacy. This perspective coupled with his studies as a political scientist offers a unique view of a benchmark political event.

The conceptual background for the study is an assessment of the view of political science toward both presidential nominating process and political campaigning. The author finds that 1968 serves as a watershed between an era

when political scientists viewed with distain presidential primaries in favor of the brokerage function of nominating conventions and saw political campaigns as contributing little more than entertainment to the electoral process.

The study reveals how the McCarthy organizers responded to events and opportunities in their quest to attract a candidate and then to produce votes for that candidate. The scene shifts from that of a small New England state to the national and international stage as both the campaign and events interact to produce an electoral result. Issues, candidates, organization, strategy, and campaigns are pursued in a way that reveals interactions that are lost to both the strict empiricist and the journalistic observer.

The headline events of the campaign are not simply recorded but are placed in a context that shows the nature of the contribution of each to the result. The candidate McCarthy, the issues of war, credibility gap of the Johnson administration, generation gap of the late 1960's, conditions of economic uncertainty, and the misconceptions of New Hampshire politics are recorded and analyzed as each functioned within the campaign.

The nature of the coalition of individuals that first, became the McCarthy organization, and second became the McCarthy vote, is carefully assessed. The strategy that guided the organization of the campaign is pursued to demonstrate how a campaign was organized and how closely the result matched the intentions of the strategists. How the strategy was implemented, what techniques were used to reach voters, what messages were developed to communicate the issues and personality of the campaign, and how the print and electronic media responded to these efforts are documented to substantiate the strategy.

To test the validity of the campaign as an influencing factor on the voter's decision, an empirical test of effectiveness was used. A puzzling observation was made. McCarthy attracted more votes among Democrats residing in predominantly Republican voting districts than he did in predominantly Democratic voting districts. A careful analysis of this observation found that while the strategy called for an emphasis upon primarily Democratic voting districts, the socio-economic status of the voters in Republican districts permitted them to absorb the non-transferable information costs more easily and to make the vote decisions without direct campaign contact. The analysis went further to measure the effectiveness of quantifiable campaign techniques as contributors to a vote decision.

The impact of McCarthy's candidacy in New Hampshire was both immediate and of continuing duration. President Johnson withdrew from contention. De-escalation of the Vietnam War began. Social conflict began to subside. Of continuing impact have been major changes in the presidential nominating process, wider participation of individuals in public decision-making, an openness in public affairs, and finally, an appreciation for the contribution that campaigning makes to the electoral process.

1968 marked profound political, social, institutional, cultural, and even economic change in the United States. McCarthy's New Hampshire surprise may be said to have touched off a decade of change the consequences of which may not be fully understood for a generation. The purpose of this study is to document and analyze that period prior to March 12, 1968 in a way that permits others to examine both the campaign and the consequences that have become its descendents.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF CHARTS AND TABLES

CHAPTER I

THE CONTEXT FOR A CASE STUDY

Presidential Candidate Selection

Determining how the head of the executive branch of the federal government was to be chosen produced one of the more famous compromises of the Constitutional Convention. The Convention delegates debated between methods which included direct election by the people, election by the state governors, election by Congress, and election by an electoral college. Election by Congress was favored in two votes by the Convention. Arguments that such a selection method would make the president subserviant to Congress and thus weaken the office were eventually pursuasive. Toward the end of the Convention a famous compromise was concluded. The president would be elected by an electoral college with membership apportioned in accord with representation in the Congress.[1] The key aspect of the compromise was to be that selection of the actual electors was to be placed in the hands of the states to determine.[2]

Fortunately, the fledgling Constitution and the government that it contained were not faced with an immediate test of the presidential selection compromise. George Washington was selected by the Electoral College as the first President. As his second term was ending the test of the succession system began. The first steps in a continuing trend toward the democratization of presidential selection began with the action of the states. Soon after the adoption of the Constitution the states individually adopted the process of direct election of presidential electors. What had been intended by the Constitutional framers to be a deliberative model for presidential selection was quickly changed to that

of a representative model. The republican form of government that the framers had created with the Constitution began to change. Among the steps in this mutation was the modification in the process of presidential selection. Instead of a gathering of notables, representing various interests, much like the framers themselves, there emerged a pattern of voter mandated Electoral College representatives. The trend toward democratizing presidential selection was underway.

A Constitutional Convention that feared royalty, that was uncertain about direct democracy, and skeptical about political parties, found that in less than eight years after the adoption of the Constitution, a measure of democracy had been inserted to overcome the deliberative model of the Electoral College. By 1796 political parties had emerged representing differing philosophies concerning the role of the federal government. Both of these trends seem to have mitigated against the rival of the most feared of all tyrannies that of royalty.

With the end of Washington's second and final presidential term in 1796 the backers of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson had split to form their own parties: from that time until 1824 the candidates for the presidency were determined by caucuses of the respective party members in the Congress. The caucus was the next step in the democratization process. Another institution, the political party, not desired by the framers came into being and used the congressional caucus as the means to validate a party role in the presidential selection process.

To reach beyond the clique of congressional power, Andrew Jackson's supporters advised assembling a national convention to demonstrate Jackson's grass roots popularity. This first convention was the model for all subsequent conven-

tions. Delegates were elected from the various states to convene for the purpose of nominating a candidate for the presidency. Delegates were apportioned among the states in accord with their representation in the Electoral College and chosen according to the state party's own system.

> The values of deliberation, bargaining, and direct democracy were reflected in the structure of the nominating process in a proportion which remained approximately static, at least in form, until the end of the nineteenth century.[3]

The convention provided a means to facilitate communication between interests and sections of the nation that would not be rivaled until the invention of the telegraph, the mass circulation newspaper, and the telephone. Delegates gathered in convention, could bargain for the protection of their regions and their economic interests. For more than seventy years conventions of delegates selected by state party caucuses or conventions determined the respective party candidates. With increased mobility, made possible by the railroad, and communication, made possible by electronics, a new challenge for democracy occurred. Candidates could travel and meet not just delegates but voters. The interests could organize on behalf of their own needs. The convention, once seen as a major step toward democratization of presidential selection itself faced wide criticism as being a step child of the trusts, monopolies and giant national interests. From the Populist struggle of the late nineteenth century arose a demand for direct participation in the presidential nominating process.[4]

A new wave began to grow. Joint pressure from late 19th century Populists and Progressives led to another modification in the nominating process. Without constitutional mandate the parties had formed and a process for the selection

of presidents had been created. Now that process would be modified to allow more extensive popular participation. Unlike the earlier reform, the nominating convention was not scrapped. In the states where the Progressives and the Populists gained political strength delegate selection became the target. Depending upon the political strength of the Progressives and their ability to wrest power from the old guard, delegate selection primaries were enacted during the period 1900-1910.[5] In some states delegates were selected directly by primary open only to members of the respective political parties (i.e., New Hampshire). Others set no party membership requirements for participation in primaries (i.e., Wisconsin). Others permitted some delegates to be selected by primary while others were selected by convention or appointment by elected office holders and party leaders (i.e., New York). The high water mark of the early twentieth century democratization effort was reached when nineteen states adopted primaries prior to the 1912 contest for the presidency.[6]

The penalty for not having allowed the primary reform to extend further was quickly brought to the attention of the Republican Party leadership by the end of that political year. When former President Theodore Roosevelt challenged the incumbent President, William Howard Taft, for the nomination, he amassed broad popular support but was unable to gather sufficient convention delegate votes to displace Taft as the nominee. Roosevelt rejected the convention decision and ran as a third party candidate. The split among Republicans made it possible for Woodrow Wilson to gather sufficient electoral votes to become president at the same time the country was casting a majority of its votes for his opponents.

Commenting on the consequences of the 1912 election, Louise Overacker wrote, "If the primary had been in more general use in 1912, Roosevelt probably would have been the nominee of the Republican Party and the schism of 1912 would have been avoided."[7]

Almost as an anti-climax three more states enacted primary legislation prior to the 1916 presidential elections. With the debacle within the Republican Party in 1912 and its failure to defeat Wilson in 1916, the First World War, and post-war desire for "normalcy", the wave of progressive reform receeded. The primary would not be eliminated from the nominating process, but since it had failed to dominate presidential candidate selection at its peak, it was gradually circumvented by modifying legislation, ignored by candidates, disregarded as a result, and always produced far less than a majority of the convention votes needed to nominate a presidential candidate. Although more than one half the states did, on occasion, elect convention delegates by direct ballot or solicit a presidential preference ballot, the much heralded democratization of the Progressives languished for more than fifty years. In the interim, sectional politics and resurgent party organizations managed to keep presidential nominating politics sufficiently close to the will of the populace to prevent a renewal of the earlier call for reform.

During the period between 1945 and 1968, the remaining presidential preference primary laws were gradually wittled away. Incumbent Presidents avoided the primaries retaining contact with the public via modern media and with the party leadership through the perquisites of office. President Truman once called presidential primaries "so much eyewash" and refused to participate in them.

The presidential primaries that did survive caused minor embarrassments during the post war period. The New Hampshire presidential primary of 1952 is credited with launching the presidential candidacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and ending the aspirations of Robert Taft. The Democratic primary in the same state and that same year saw Senator Estes Kefauver challenge President Truman who had not then announced his intention of not seeking a second full term.[8] Few other primaries were contested as the respective candidates maneuvered like soldiers through a minefield, to avoid triggering disaster at the hands of a capricious public while at the same time attempting to demonstrate vote getting strength.

In 1960, only sixteen states and the District of Columbia retained some form of presidential primary. John Kennedy entered six of these and campaigned aggressively in three: New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. When the political year of 1968 began states with primaries had dwindled to fourteen excluding the District of Columbia. Not since John Kennedy's success in selecting decisive primary contests had the primaries led to a convention decision and then only when accompanied by broad state-level party leaders' support.[9]

Students of presidential nominating politics tended to down grade the importance of presidential primaries as being of little importance to the ultimate convention decisions. As rebuttal to the Progressives' arguments in favor of direct participation in presidential candidate selection, scholars tended to favor the brokering function of conventions composed of party leaders, elected officeholders, sectional delegations, and some directly elected delegates. These students saw the convention as a vital institution capable of incorporating diverse views within one decision making setting and producing not simply a

nominee for the presidency, but also a unified party capable of electing that candidate. Against this view were those few who recalled the failures of the conventions to reach a unifying consensus.[10] The selections of the Republican Conventions of 1912, 1936, and 1964, and the Democratic Conventions of 1920 and, eventually, 1968, were scattered points in the primary proponents' favor.

In her study of the presidential primary, Louise Overacker wrote in 1926:

> It should be noticed that the primary has served the useful purpose of forcing candidates to use more open methods and of abandoning subterranean methods in the primary states.
>
> In conclusion. we may say that although the presidential primary has seldom controlled the decision of the convention it has often affected the course of national politics .... The effectiveness of the presidential primary as an instrument of control over the convention is limited by the fact that it is not in operation in all of the states, or a considerable majority of them.[11]

With that work, the decline of the institutional reformist sentiments of the early twentieth century, and the restoration of party leadership in the Populist-Progressive states the primary was left as evidence of the good intentions of a historic but misguided reform effort. The proponents of the convention, as a gathering of party leaders unemcumbered by the direct participation of the electorate in their deliberations, created their own straw man to counter advocates of wider use of the presidential primary option. This straw man was the national presidential candidate nominating primary. If direct participation in the selection of a presidential nominee was what the reformers sought, then a national preference primary should be the logical objective of those favoring widespread public participation in the selection of presidential candidates.[12]

Public support for a national primary has remained high giving credence to the arguments put forth by those arguing the virtues of convention decision making as opposed to a national primary.[13] The debate between proponents of the intra-party brokerage function of the national convention and concept of a national primary, left the surviving system of state primaries without either proponents or students. The hodge-podge of preference primaries, delegate selection primaries, open or closed primaries continued without proponents nor careful analysis.

While it is not the purpose of this section to provide a comprehensive review of the presidential primary institution, it is important to establish the condition of that institution as the political year of 1968 began. Little serious attention had been given to the process of nominating presidential candidates since Louise Overacker and Charles Merriam's work in the 1920's.[14] James W. Davis analyzed the presidential primaries in his 1967 work but neither the earlier studies nor the later ones, prepared prior to 1968, comprehensively evaluated the consequences of a nominating system that contained a separate selection system for each of the fifty states. It was not until after 1968 that the disarray of the nominating system was discovered.[15]

As Louise Overacker observed after the devastation of the Republican Party in 1912, the same might be said of the Democratic Party in 1968. As with 1912, the speculation as to a different result will continue. The importance of the presidential primary had been neglected by students and underestimated by even such astute politicians as Lyndon B. Johnson. Louise Overacker's question concerning 1912 had even more meaning following 1968 than it did in the earlier

context. If the reforms that have occurred in the presidential candidate selection process since 1968, had been in place in 1968, would Eugene McCarthy have been the Democratic Party's nominee? What can be said is that without the reforms that came after 1968 George McGovern and Jimmy Carter would not have been the nominees of the Democratic Party.

The New Hampshire Primary

The New Hampshire presidential preference primary has retained significance by being the first such event to be held in a given political season. The choices offered to the voters take two forms. The first is the presidential preference section of the ballot. The voters may select or write-in the candidate of their choice. This so called "beauty contest" has no connection with the delegate selection portion of the ballot. Names of state residents are listed in the delegate selection portion of the ballot and run for delegate or alternative delegate slots as apportioned to the state by the respective Democratic or Republican National Committees. A delegate or alternative delegate candidate's name is listed with place of residence and candidate allegiance.

TABLE 1.01: PROLIFERATION OF PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES 1968-1976[16]

COVERAGE	1968	1972	1976
Number of states using a primary for selecting or binding national convention delegates	15	23	29*
Number of votes cast by delegates chosen or bound by primaries	983	1,862	2,183
Percent of all votes cast by delegates chosen or bound by primaries	37.5	60.5	72.6

*Does not include Vermont which held a non-binding presidential preference poll but chose all delegates by caucuses and conventions.

Three options are available to the candidates. The person may run as an independent, run as favorable to a candidate, or, with the permission of the candidate, run as pledged to the candidate. Participation in the primary election was limited to those who had either declared a party preference upon registering to vote, had voted in a previous party primary, or those independents who had not either declared a party preference or had not voted in an earlier primary.[17] The New Hampshire presidential primary is an example of just one system. In 1968 it had no duplicate.

Primaries and Pre-Convention Politics

V.O. Key, Jr., reflected the pre-1968 attitude toward presidential nominating politics when he wrote:

> The process of nomination of a presidential candidate begins long before the convention in campaigns to sell a potential candidate to the party to obtain the selection of delegations instructed to support him at the convention. These preconvention maneuvers fit no set pattern and cannot be easily described in general terms.[18]

No predictable route was identified for a candidate nor was an entry point to the contest, such as a presidential primary, listed as the beginning. If selling the candidate to the convention would be adied by showing a vote attracting capability presumably a candidate should enter a primary. If the candidate's vote getting power were sufficiently demonstrated, i.e., winning an elective office, then convincing party leaders as to one's presidential stature would be more important than wasting time in a primary contest. In fact, Key noted that preconvention manuevers could be best understood "...if they were observed with an awareness that the task of the convention is to unite the party in support

of a presidential candidate."[19] The emphasis on retaining or creating a unified party are clear in Key's view.

> The character of the preconvention campaign to round up support for aspirants for the nomination thus becomes a function of the tensions and cleavages within the party. Durable bases for conflict exist within each party.[20]

The primary was not viewed by Key as making a significant contribution to the evaluation of a candidate or to the objective of securing a nomination. The primary as a part of the nominating process, had receeded to such a low level of regard that even as perceptive an observer of American politics as V.O. Key Jr., did not identify it as important to the success of a potential presidential nominee.

Louise Overacker characterized presidential primary campaigns as having three stages: the preparation or stimulation period; the active campaign for presidential preferences and the support of delegates, and the post-primary activities.[21] While not unlike the activities for any campaign she connected these pre-convention efforts to the option of the primary. V.O. Key, Jr., writing decades later, noted five pre-convention aspects that tended to structure his analysis of the nominating process. First, he looked upon the pre-convention campaign as a rehearsal for the presidential campaign itself. A candidate needed to show his skill at maintaining the dominant coalition within the party in order to accomplish the same when facing the general electorate.[22]

Secondly, the possible presidential candidate faced a tactical problem, that being when to announce a candidacy. A valid consideration for the candidate was also whether or not to promote a draft, that is to be solicited as a candidate rather than seek the office directly. Should this strategy be used prior to the

convention or should the candidate wait until all other candidates had faded and the convention would draft.[23] While a draft might be an attractive alternative, without Key's third activity, that of enlisting the support of state and local political leaders, such a result would be merely a fantasy. Any candidate, avowed or subrosa, to succeed in a convention would need at least the recognition if not the active support of the political power structure of the party.[24] This obligatory tactic could be accomplished with a direct appeal or via Key's fourth pre-convention ritual, appealing to the wider public.[25] Appeals to wider publics, Key noted, presented certain hazards. Candidates are advised to make policy speeches on current issues at "widely separated points in the country to let themselves be seen and heard and to gain national attention." But to make speeches could not only gain supporters but also make enemies. Key reminds,

> One speech may be enough to demonstrate that a man cannot capture popular favor, and his boom is deflated early in its career.

While risking one's presidential aspirations on the political stump is a serious step, but obligatory in Key's mind, entering presidential primaries offer similar uncertainty without the obligation.

> A question of strategy that vexes managers of would-be nominees is whether to enter the presidential primaries that are held by about half the states from March to May to select convention delegates. An early victory in a pivotal state may win the delegation and impress the party in other states with the aspirant's vote-pulling power. On the other hand, a defeat may bring the boom to a premature end. Yet a refusal to enter the primary may be interpreted as a manifestation of lack of confidence.[27]

While not being compelled to enter presidential primaries was certainly a valid option, entering primaries was conditioned by the then contemporary view as to how presidential primaries functioned. Key reflected that view when he wrote:

> Since the primary choice is to a large extent governed by the wishes of the state organization, it would be rash to enter a primary unless the candidate has the support of the organization or of an important faction, or felt that he could defeat the state machine.[28]

He might well have added to his concluding phrase "...or whether defeating the state machine would be in the interests of his candidacy." Conceding some importance to presidential primaries Key noted that primaries probably make some men presidential hopefuls who would not have been considered as such in earlier days.[29]

To conclude, as late as 1968 Key's account of the route to the presidency was the prevailing reality. Presidential nominations were a perquisite of the political parties. State party organizations, national party leadership, and party elected office holders were managers and keepers of the presidential selection process. Party conventions and the selection of party nominees were vehicles by which sectional conflicts could be ameliorated in order to maintain electoral coalitions. Since no great politically divergent issues were evident during the post war period to disrupt the alignments or to challenge the processes of coalition building or maintenance, no serious pressure for change in the nominating process was seen. Even the sectional conflicts over civil rights legislation that threatened the Democratic Convention of 1948 or the conservative take over of the 1964 Republican Convention were not reflected back as evidence of a need for nominating process reform. Not until the McCarthy challenge in New Hampshire and the subsequent lessons of the 1968 Democratic National Convention was the

selection method for presidential candidates given the complete examination that led to the delegate selection reforms of the 1970's. With Jimmy Carter's nomination via the newly established primary route in 1976, it seems fair to conclude that first, primaries are once again in the ascendency as a part, if not the major part, of the presidential nominating process, and secondly, no candidate for the presidency will be able to avoid entering at least some of the primaries in the future. Understanding the background of this political system change is at least a part of the reason for the case study of the 1968 McCarthy candidacy in New Hampshire. The democratization of presidential selection that begin in 1796 reached a new plateau in the 1970's. While the possibility of a national primary remains as part of the democratization debate the proliferation of primaries seems to have, in part, lessened its vibrance. In its place has emerged a scheme of staggered regional primaries leading to the convention validation.[30] The debates will continue but unquestionably a major reform has been accomplished.

A Context for Presidential Nominating Campaigns

In 1968 instead of a candidate seeking a constituency, an issue with an implied constituency went looking for a candidate. Along with the search for a candidate went a search for a contest, a place appropriate for the contest, and people to organize a campaign. Along the way much was learned about the American political system. The microcosm of the New Hampshire primary provides a glimpse of how this change was begun.

James W. Davis writing in the middle 1960s noted that politics were becoming nationalized.[31] In that process he saw two phenomena emerging. The first which was in distinct contrast to the views of his academic colleagues, concerned the role of the presidential primary. The second, while less clearly stated by Davis, is manifest in the first.

> Political scientists and newspaper commentators have been long preoccupied with the mechanism of the presidential primary -- the types of laws, the scattered election dates, the advisory mandate of many primaries, and the limited number of states holding such elections. They have mistaken the form for the substance of the primary system. It is no longer important whether there is a mandate binding the delegates to vote for the winner of the primary. The vital point is that a presidential candidate challenge and defeat rival contenders in the primaries to demonstrate to uncommitted convention delegates and the American public that he, the candidate, is a powerful vote getter.[32]

The thesis which Davis espoused contrasted sharply with that offered by Nelson Polsby, Aaron Wildavsky, Paul David, and other proponents of the brokering function of the nominating convention. Davis identified the importance of the campaign in the context of a direct and meaningful appeal to voters, voters that could participate in a presidential primary. In contrast David, Goldman and Bain wrote:

> A nominating campaign is a connected series of operations; it involves a great deal of talk, but it is made up of much more than talk. Like a military campaign, it involves movement, supply, attack, defense, and all requisite maneuvers. The candidates and their managers are continuously involved in decisions and expressive acts. The voters, on their part, are given an exposure to persons and events as well as to the words the candidates say.[33]

"Exposure" is the key concept in the David, Goldman, Bain thesis. Opportunities to "display personality" and to "discuss issues" were the central elements of the nominating route outlined by Davis.[34] While Davis would contend that ex-

posure in the context of a meaningful political event, such as a presidential primary, would have greater meaning, David, Goldman, and Bain would write: "...changing patterns of nominating campaigns are increasingly under discussion. Much of the discussion focuses on the presidential primaries, with proposals to curtail their influence as well as to extend it."[35]

As a reference for their position that the presidential primaries did not contribute meaningfully to the ultimate nominating decision, the authors quoted a prevalent view.

> In the course of a television interview on June 1, 1958, Adlai Stevenson commented that the presidential primary "is almost a useless institution." He went on to note the difficulties imposed on governors and other busy executives when required to campaign in the primaries. He commented on the small turnout in most primaries, and on the confusion and lack of uniformity in the rules. Stevenson concluded, "Finally it is terribly expensive; it's exhausting physically; you burn up yourself, you burn up your ammunition, you burn up your means. I think that it's a very, very questionable method of selecting presidential candidates and actually it never does. All it does is destroy some candidates.[36]

Stevenson's comments and what David contended were "Sober afterthoughts"[37] following the 1952 and 1956 primaries, led to the repeal of primary laws in Minnesota and Montana. Those preparing candidacies for the 1960 presidential contests discussed a way to avoid the hazards of the primaries.

> ...The presidential aspirants, by mutual agreement, would cut up the primary states among themselves according to geographical or ideological divisions...only one candidate would enter in each state. The alternative would be to stay out of primary states and let them elect favorite sons.[38]

While the 1960 candidates seemed to fear contested primaries, what appears most interesting is a commitment to seek popular support for a candidacy while at the same time, shying away from primaries as a means of organizing that support. Presidential candidates needed to be tested prior to nomination but a valid test was not seen as being a primary. With the exception of James Davis's contention that primaries did serve an important function, others favored what appears to be a combination of party responsibility for nominations and an assumption of voter interest, i.e., national commitment, outside the confines of an electoral context.

> The intensification of campaigning for popular support that has already occurred may rest on underlying changes in sentiments and conditions that are too powerful to resist. At any rate, public criticism of the primaries is noteworthy for the lack of any tendency to question the desirability of campaigning for popular support. It seems to be taken for granted that some appeal to the people is required to assure the legitimacy of the nominations, and that popular mandates, to the extent that they exist, must be given weight in the nominating choice as a condition for popular favor in the election campaign to follow.[39]

Somewhere in the extensive analysis of the nominating process conducted by David, Goldman, and Bain the connection between campaigning for public support and campaigning in a presidential primary was lost. Louise Overacker's chide concerning the 1912 election did not register in the analyses of the 1950s and 1960s. Perhaps there just were not enough primaries to offer the range of contests that would make the presidential primary a meaningful contribution to the nominating process. If they could be avoided without political cost to a presidential candidate then they could not be considered as being meaningful to the ultimate decision. To many observers the presidential primaries were simply

capricious minefields, well marked, to be entered only with knowledge of the risks and to be avoided if at all possible. When a candidate entered the primary minefield, as did John F. Kennedy in 1960, he did so with great precision. Kennedy entered New Hampshire to show he could attract votes and to test his organization. Wisconsin was entered as a test of his midwestern - large industrial state appeal and his ability to campaign against his Minnesota opponent--Hubert Humphrey. West Virginia was entered to test voters' reaction to the barrier of his Catholism. After those three popular appeals, Kennedy went to the brokers. Lyndon Johnson avoided the primaries as did Stevenson in the same year. Both hoped their national reputations would secure support from the uncommitted, non-primary state delegations. Their tactic failed.

What emerged from 1960, in spite of the contentions of those opposing the use of the presidential primary, was the route to the presidency that James Davis would later describe. Before leaving this subject it is important to note another aspect of the view of politics prevalent at that time. Political scientists were taken by the idea that the American political party should be intrinsically integrated as a vehicle for national policy positions and as a means by which adherence to those positions could be assured. Those party organizations and those officials, elected under a party label would be expected to support the party position, carry out the party program, and stand before the public with a commonly enunciated party program. Sectional differences would fade, a national political party structure would emerge, and a clear distinction between national party philosophies would be evident. The choices would be clear between candidates representing the parties. Elections would produce party mandated policy charges.[40]

Reflective of this discussion is the desire of many political scientists to make candidate nominations a function of the party. Instead of permitting a candidate to appeal directly to the voters via a candidate selection primary, a would-be candidate would have to demonstrate his or her allegiance to the party, its leaders, and platform before being permitted to carry the party label into an election. Summarizing the view relative to presidential primaries Paul David wrote:

> The issues of the primaries and of their relationships to the party organizations are far from generally resolved, but once strong tendencies to curtail party responsibility for candidates selection seems to be undergoing reversal.[41]

The common element that emerges from the preceeding discussion is the importance of some popular appeal by a presidential candidate. While many reject the presidential primary as a way to direct that appeal, James Davis sought to establish some rules that would shape a candidate's attitude toward the primary route to the presidency. His rules were:

1. A combination of several presidential victories against strong opponents, blended with solid organizational support in a number of populous convention states, will usually give a candidate such an imposing lead that he can't be overtaken.[42]

2. Winning uncontested or contested presidential primaires without some committed delegate support in states electing delegates by party convention is a futile exercise and will not open the door to the nomination.[43]

3. Once defeated presidential candidates campaigning for a second chance must let voters in several primary states pass judgement on their candidacy before asking the convention to nominate them again.[44]

4. Opposing a first term president in the primaries is fruitless, for the incumbent is never overtaken.[45]

5. The presidential candidate must be careful in choosing primary contests to try to avoid serious defeats; but, at the same time, he must appear to be a fearless candidate, prepared to tackle all comers in the primaries.[46]

Davis made a persuasive case for using the primary route to a nomination. In his view entering primaries was obligatory as a means of testing a potential nominee, reviving a defeated nominee, and manifesting a candidate's popular appeal. To him the flaw in the analysis of those advocating party responsibility and convention brokering, was the lack of a measurable, accepted, and structured public appeal that could rival the recognition of a presidential primary contest. Shaping such an appeal would be the challenge. As the democratization of the presidential nominating process has continued there appears to be no substitute for the process where citizens cast votes.

Political Science and Campaigns: An Uneasy Marriage

The party responsibility debate that dominated political scientists' thinking during the 1950s and early 1960s not only reduced serious discussion about the role of presidential primaries, but also diverted attention from examining the role of campaigns in elections. The argument follows that if parties were properly charged with the responsibility for candidate selection and adherence to party platforms, then election campaigns become much less significant as translators of the party message. The print and electronic media could carry the news of the party based upon the statements of its candidates, its leaders, and the details of the party's stated positions.

While this scenario was attractive to the political rationalist two other images of the political process were beginning to develop. The first was the one that would preoccupy political scientists to the present, voting behavior. The other was the evolution of the modern political campaign, which went almost un-noticed by political science.

The earliest voting behavior studies employed sophisticated research methods in a sociological context to profile voting behavior.[47] These studies were criticized because they failed to consider the psychological reality of the voter and to place the elections in an appropriate political context.[48] As the methodology evolved with it came an understanding of the relationship of present influences and past experiences on the way individuals perform politically. This became the main objective of voting behavior research. The conceptual bridge that advanced voting behavior research was the definition of "party identification."[49] What was discovered was that "party identification" is "...a psychological identification, which can persist without legal recognition or evidence of formal membership and even without a consistent record of party support."[50] Taken with socio-economic status as background descriptions of the individual voter and related to a present political need to make a choice, the voting behavior researchers found that the individual could orient oneself to make a voting decision.

What becomes important between a review of voting behavior and the role of campaigns is that party identification helps sort political images for the voter. The objects of elections are party images, candidate characteristics, and perceptions of issues.[51] These are the "proximate" forces that may influence election outcomes.[52]

The survey research model, that attracted behavioralists' attention, was seen as a way of explaining election outcomes by focusing on the dominant vote determinant, party identification. With such a powerful variable operating to explain an election outcome, it became less necessary to discover and analyze other contributing variables of a voting decision.

The literature that developed around the party identification vote determinant, concerned itself with elections where party labels were evident. Consequently, in elections where party labels were absent, i.e., non-partisan elections and primaries, other factors might be of importance in explaining election outcomes. Because of the predictive power of party identification and a general disregard for non-partisan elections, the importance of many campaign variables (e.g., canvassing, direct mail, types of media, or direct candidate contact) was not assessed. In fact, it might be said that the preoccupation with party identification as a principal explanation of vote outcome has tended to mask the importance of these other influences.

Subsequent research has begun to identify the importance of campaign variables as determinants of the vote decision. Among these, as mentioned above, are the role of the candidate and the effectiveness of particular campaign techniques. Neither of these general groups of variables are solely dependent upon a party identification mechanism. This situation becomes especially evident when party identification is removed from an electoral contest as it is in the non-partisan or primary election. The literature that has evolved concerning such elections has tended to identify alternative explanations for voting behavior.

Both bi-variate and multi-variate analyses have been conducted to assess the individual effectiveness as well as the relative effectiveness of campaign techniques. This evolving experimental research has begun to explore those other than party identification factors that contribute to vote decisions.[53]

Voting behavior research of the 1970s has determined other characteristics of the voter's field that relate significantly to election results. Both short and long-term influences of party identification and immediate political events have been assessed as well as rates of participation, characteristics of elections, and the institutional aspects of elections, to mention a few. While considerable attention has been paid to the behavior of the voter in partisan contests and some also to the vote in non-partisan elections, little attention has been devoted to presidential primaries. This results partly from the low esteem such events were held from 1945 to 1968 by political scientists and partly from the relative insignificance of the contests. There were few states with primaries, the pre-1968 and especially pre-1960 impact of the primaries on presidential candidate selection was limited, and, further only a small number of delegates were selected by the primary states. The result was that what attention the presidential primaries did receive came as part of the journalistic tradition. Even these accounts were encompassed in a comprehensive discussion of the total presidential election campaign. The details of such contests were lost or blurred as the limited discussion of a particular primary became almost a footnote to the ultimate contest.[54]

In addition, other trends were also becoming evident. While voting behavior research was making significant progress in helping to explain the American voter, the advocates of party responsibility were losing ground.

At the same time that party identification was being revealed as an important determiner of voting behavior, loyalty to the institution of the political party and to the stated philosophies of the party was declining.[55] A less intensely committed partisan was emerging which undercut those seeking to subsume political images and objects within vertically integrated national parties and those seeking to explain voting behavior or the basis of party identification. What emerges is a more fluid portrait of the voting public which increases the likelihood of intra-party contests. As party loyalty declines, so does party unity and those aspects of political attachment that mitigate against family fights within the ruberic of the political party. The primary election, whether presidential or otherwise, is an institution that works as a safety valve for venting such conflicts. As a result of a combination of factors and trends electioneering is no longer centered in the party organization but has now entered the era of the candidate centered campaign. The party no longer plays the main role as the organizing intermediary in the campaign; as the style of campaigning shifts to mass media, advertising, and public relations.[56] The result is that candidates create their own organizations to attract voters. The primary offers the candidate a route around or through the party. Modern mass media have reduced, if not all but eliminated, the information translating function of the party, while the socio-economic complexity of modern living cross-pressures the voter to an extent that the party as a single source of vote instruction is no longer relevant.[57]

What the contemporary literature of campaign management tells us is that while some political scientists were exploring voting behavior and others urging the reformation of the American political party, at the same time, candidates were organizing, outside of the party, direct appeals to the voters. To do this those with experience drawn from advertising, public relations, organization management, motivational research, as primarily applied disciplines, were being drafted by the candidates to organize the political campaigns.[58] As a result an experiential literature has been produced by those who aided candidates to chart their political destinies outside the institution of the party.[59]

Campaign management evolved as an eclectic profession drawing broadly from sociology, psychology, political science, and economics. The amalgum relies most heavily upon the application of the social sciences as transmitted into various professions such as public relations counseling, advertising, motivational research, marketing, and organizational management. From campaign case studies, and accounts of campaign tactics that worked or failed, has evolved a guide to campaign organization that is reaching the point where tests for effectiveness may be made. The marriage remains uneasy because the background for conducting such research is still not well understood. Documentary evidence of campaigns tends to be fragmented, concentrating more on the campaign headlines rather than upon the subtlties of the campaign's field.[60]

Robert Agranoff writing in his important study of election campaign management, summarized why he felt campaign processes and management have been neglected as product research subjects for political scientists. He noted first that it was assumed that "party organizations, were the exclusive agents for

election campaigns" and that when voters were staunch party supporters, "the greater emphasis in electioneering was the mobilization of the faithful behind the ticket" -- something party organization did well.[61]

His second point was that "campaigns are short-term operations." As result campaigns are not a "continuous or evolving process."[62] What he might have added is that the significance of a campaign is not always known at the beginning nor does a serious campaign lend itself to experimentation in a manner that would allow analysis of the effectiveness. The applications and the research modes are not easily maintained during the heat of a campaign contest. The manager must manage at the expense of possible research opportunities if the campaign is to be more than an empirical test. Nothing can be worse than for a candidate to discover that the election was lost because of adherence to a research objective rather than the objective of winning the election.

Agranoff's third point is that "campaign personnel (party workers, volunteers, managers, and candidates) change from campaign to campaign." This lends "inexperience and discontinuity -- few records are kept, procedures are rarely codified, and techniques are passed on haphazardly."[63] When the election campaign is over the workers have traditionally either gone on to be reapers of the rewards of the victory or have returned to the pursuits they abandoned to join the campaign. Only rarely have participants taken the time to reflect on their campaign experiences in a way that would provide the researcher with useful insight as to how campaigns are managed. Only recently, with the advent of the political campaign management specialist, has there evolved a recorded technology of campaign management.

As Agranoff points out as his fourth observation, "Campaigns are usually characterized by an aura of secrecy and self-interest because it is thought advantageous to keep one's strategy and techniques within the organization."[64] The similarities between traditional campaign management and the practice of witchcraft cannot be overlooked. As a cadre of campaign management professionals has emerged, and now with the existence of an increasing number of campaign management consulting firms, sharing trade secrets has become a part of establishing the professional character of the practice.

Agranoff's fifth observation holds that "until recently, a functional body of scientific knowledge for the purpose of gaining insights and making useful inferences for planning campaigns did not exist."[65] In no small part does Agranoff credit the change to the "development and application of technology in the form of television, computers, and opinion polls..." to this advancement. To him "...campaign management has more closely resembled a cottage industry rather than a business availing itself of modern technology."[66] To a considerable degree this consequence can be laid at the doorstep of political science for having disregarded the role of campaigns in the political process.

Agranoff concludes:

> The advent of campaign technology has produced a corps of new technologists concerned with the art and science of campaigning. These new campaign specialists are developing a new technical field of applied campaign management. Thus, new political forces and advances in knowledge and technology are contributing to an emerging tradition of campaign management.[67]

Pre-1968 Views of the Political Campaign

In the 1950s one of the most perceptive observers of American political processes, V.O. Key, Jr., wrote of elections:

> Presidential elections constitute decisions of fundamental significance in the American democratic process. The trooping of millions of voters to the polls symbolizes self-rule and legitimizes the authority of government. But beyond such mystical functions of the electoral process, elections are pivotal decisions which in turn control many lesser determinations in the name of the people.[68]

He went on to categorize types of elections:

> Some elections...express clearly a lack of satisfaction with the performance of the crowd that has been in charge.... Other elections may be plausibly interpreted as a vote of confidence. More commonly the electorate may bring in a mixed verdict; some voters are happy with the course of affairs and others are deeply dissatisfied. Even these confused elections may, in their situational context, be meaningful decisions.... A series of elections may fix the contours that guide the broad flow of public policy. Specific elections may give an unmistakable mandate for a change of direction. Others may approve a newly instituted order of affairs. Still others may record a majority of support for the status quo but the mumblings of the minority may be a portent of a growth of discontent.[69]

This categorization led Key to his important theory of critical elections. Key's observations are important to the McCarthy in New Hampshire case study in two ways. First, Key reveals with his theory the prospect of important societal change-producing political events. Secondly, he opens to question the then assumed relationship between voting behavior and politics. This opening may be seen as the door through which contemporary attention to campaign management has walked. The "mystical" nature of what leads to these events remains as an underlying theme of Key's writing. The study of campaigns is beginning to shed some light on this discussion of the political process as well. As Key wrote:

> A concept of critical elections has been developed to cover a type of election in which there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties, although the techniques as employed do not yield any information of consequence about the mechanisms for the maintenance of a new alignment, once it has formed.[70]

While the theory may be useful as a general means of organizing types of elections Key conceded that "the actual election rarely presents in pure form a case fitting completely any particular concept." He then observed that "In truth, a considerable proportion of the study of electoral behavior has only tenuous relation to politics."[71] At this point it might have been possible to show a connection between electoral behavior and politics. It may be that this link is the political campaign as students of campaign management now contend. Key stood back from his observation puzzled, "...what characteristics of the electorate or what conditions permit sharp and decisive changes in power structure from time to time?"[72] There are three types of voters in Key's view, the "standpatters, the switchers, and new voters." The way these voters respond tends to determine election outcomes.[73] How these voters were influenced to participate in elections escaped his analysis. Part of the problem was Key's view, and that of others, concerning the role of the political campaign. The studies conducted to profile Key's three voter types relied upon pre-election and post-election surveys. In fact, much of the analysis depended upon pre-election surveys which reflected voting intentions rather than the actual vote.[74] An attempt to determine the function or impact of the campaign did not enter the analysis. In part, Key reflected this view when he wrote, "An American presidential campaign is one of the most awesome spectacles known to man; the fate of a nation may hinge on the outcome of what seems to be a donnybrook among demagogues and Madison Avenue types."[75]

Observing further Key did concede a role for the political campaign, but offered little that would assist in analyzing the functions of campaigns.

> Campaigns are likened to the appeals of opposing counsel to a jury. They are said to be a means of educating and informing the people about candidates and issues. They are classed along with soap-selling operations as systematic manipulations of the mass mind. They are treated as a ceremony by which a party obtains popular consent to govern. They are cynically dismissed as a ritual through which politician, tools of the interests, profess a love for the people and humbug them. A presidential campaign may contain all of these elements, but whatever its precise nature, it moves the electorate to a determination of who shall govern.[76]

While Key and others could not overlook a major artifact of American politics they tended to treat the electoral campaign more as an artifact than as a substantive element of the electoral process. When discussing campaigns, Key reflected the prevailing attitude of the time which ranged from a view of campaigns as pure hucksterism to a more respectful view of campaigns as having a mystical quality that somehow contributes to electoral decisions. What he did contribute was a categorization of campaign methods that revealed aspects of the electoral role of campaigns.

> A presidential campaign may be thought to be the work of a tightly knit organization spread over the entire Country and directed by cunning men wise in the ways of managing the multitude. In truth, the campaign organization is a jerry-built and makeshift structure manned largely by temporary and volunteer workers who labor long hours amidst confusion and uncertainty.[77]

With this statement, Key introduced both a note of humanity and realism to the campaign. Reduced from the august and yet raised from the depths of demogogery it was now possible to sort out the contents of a campaign.

> A prime necessity in the management of a presidential campaign is the achievement of sufficient unity of command at the top level of the party organization to permit the execution of a coherent and considered campaign strategy.[78]

Two basic ingredients of campaigns emerge, "management" and "strategy." Charles Merriam had discussed both much earlier but in a different context. To him "...campaign management does not rest with organization, speeches, literature and canvasses..." but "it undertakes the tasks of influencing groups of interests of various types by various means."[79]

In part, this contention is supported by Merriam's view of the manager as one who seeks to influence groups. The "campaign Merriam saw was not one that reached directly to the voters but one that in the name of party and candidate sought to "...reach the nests and groups of voters through their leaders great and small, and by means both direct and devious, as occasion may require."[80] To Merriam the campaign manager was not the contemporary strategist and tactician of a campaign, but rather a person with "superior acquaintance with men and interests, quick and accurate evaluation of them, untiring energy, diplomacy, shrewd judgment, prompt decision, coolness and balance amid wild confusion..."[81] While there is a certain universality concerning the qualities of the manager, Merriam's image of a manager as one who bends groups and interests to a political cause shapes his view of a campaign. One may conclude that "organization, speeches, literature, and canvasses" for him are the hucksterism of American politics.

> Each campaign consists of two parts. One is directed upon an appeal to the common interest, or the theory that there are no classes, no races, no religions, no sections, no special interests, but that the common interest of all will be the criterion by which each voter will decide his party allegiance. The other section of the campaign is based upon the opposite theory that the whole electorate is made up of a long series of special interests which must be shown their special advantage in the support of the particular party and its candidates in order to obtain their support.[82]

The mechanisms of a political campaign were, in Merriam's view, "organization, propaganda, and finance." The organization was of the "regular nationalistic groups, and specialized groups (lawyers, doctors, etc.)." The propaganda mechanisms were the press, demonstrations, or meetings, radio, canvassing, and the "conference," the latter being his characterization of campaign management. Finance, as a campaign function he allocated as strictly a party activity. But as has been noted above, his true image of a campaign was one of direct pursuasion of blocks of voters by reaching their leaders.[83]

Key began to break down Merriam's campaign elements reflective of the post-World War II shift from party dominated politics to candidate organized campaigns. To Merriam's list of campaign activities Key observed a considerable change. The campaign leadership now was seen as being responsible for "planning the broad lines of campaign strategy." Strategy that included speech writing, wide ranging propaganda activities, a changing role for media as television emerged as significant, major intra-party communication and mobilization efforts as stimulated by the candidate and finally, the involvement of non-party organizations.[84]

For a nation emerging from the victory of World War II it was not surprising to find the rhetoric of political management resembling that of a military campaign. "Commentators on politics have borrowed from the military the concept of strategy," Key wrote. "A presidential campaign, as a military campaign, may be conducted in accord with a broad strategy or plan of action." The plan Key alluded to was to "fix the principal propaganda theme to be emphasized in the campaign," to define the chief targets within the electorate," to "schedule peak output of effort," and to "set other broad features of the campaign." The campaign strategy, Key commented, would serve as a "...framework to guide propagandists, speech writers, funding, scheduling, and activities of organization."[85] The ultimate comparison to politics as military strategy came with a book entitled Politics Battle Plan.[86] "The inexact science of reaching the voter and prevailing upon him to choose 'the right man' or make 'the right decision' is the social science of political campaigning."[87] This statement rather than the notion of politics as war demonstrated the changing concepts of campaigns. Beyond the use of an effective campaign strategy the authors identified "the desire of the winning side - the side that most fiercely wants to win; sometimes the side that has been 'out' the longest; the side that is most driven, most determined, most dedicated. David beat Goliath, and Alexander conquered the world of his time...."[88]

From Key's observations the campaign strategy began to take on significance that would be important as political scientists and political campaigners began to converge. If the impact of campaign efforts were to be evaluated then the specific activities would have to be not only identified but placed in a context

capable of valid measurement. At one time it was held that the "active campaign begins when the candidate or his friends put him forward as an avowed contender for the nomination." As the next step "an organization of some kind is essential ....someone must arrange for filing the candidate's name, for pre-primary meetings or speeches, and for the distribution of literature." And, finally, "there must be some central headquarters to which inquiries may be addressed, if nothing more."[89]

Key noted that often the outlines of a campaign strategy are "scarcely visible amidst the noise and confusion of the campaign." The strategic plans Key saw were sketchy. "The preparation of a reasoned and comprehensive strategy requires more of a disposition to think through the campaign in its broad outlines than often exists around a national headquarters."[90] Key's focus remained on the political party as the presidential campaign's strategic planner rather than on the candidate or candidate organization. But his observation about the plan itself was perceptive. "Once the plan is made, its execution requires an organization sufficiently articulated to respond to general direction in accord with the plan..." Of more importance he noted, "And even when a campaign is blueprinted in advance, a flexibility must be built into it to take advantage of the breaks and to meet unexpected moves by the opposition."[91] The ability of a carefully drawn campaign plan to anticipate events and to accommodate the unexpected has become an important principal of campaign management. Agranoff noted, "campaigns must be planned, but sufficient leeway must also be allowed for contingency situations. Campaigns must not only consider what they will do, but also what an opponent is likely to do."[92]

A study of the 1964 campaign organization of Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater demonstrated the contrast between the military-like model used by Goldwater and the more flexible campaign plan that guided the Johnson candidacy. Goldwater's image of a successful campaign was of national decisions being made at the top of a pyramid, "with each decision-maker cognizant of their role, rank, and responsibility."[93] In the model, defined as the "comprehensive ideal model," each step of the campaign would be precisely planned and researched, and once the plans were set, they were to be faithfully executed. The implementation would be similar to a coordinated blitzkrieg of air power, landing force, infantry assault and decisive armor.[94]

What the researchers found was that the rigidity of the model made it difficult to reach operational campaign decisions, information needed to make strategic decisions was excluded if it had not been included in the original plan, and that decisions once made were hard to enforce. The conclusion was that a campaign plan analogus to a military strategy locked the managers into prearranged decisions they were unwilling to adjust. The level of detail and the operating complexity of the plan left no room for resiliency.[95] The Johnson campaign, on the other hand, did offer operational flexibility within a structure of overall management. Objectives could be set but in such a way as to permit modifications that could take advantage of opportunities without jeopardizing the ultimate goal.

Key recognized that there were what he described as "Situational Limitation on Strategy."

> The characteristics of the situations within which presidential campaigns operate set limits on, or conditions, the kinds of strategy that may be employed in the battle for the voters' affections.[96]

While, as Key noted, "campaigns have their unlovely aspects, the mores of the democratic order as well as the particular circumstances of individual campaigns place bounds on the types of strategy that may be profitably pursued." Like Merriam, he noted the importance of groups' targets -- classes, races, and religions but unlike Merriam, he went further to reflect the evolving mode of the then contemporary campaign. To group targets he added "geographical targets" to be followed by a discussion of the concept of campaign timing and resources allocation.[97] This final addition was the concept of the campaign theme. A campaign strategy had created a "dominant theme or themes" for a campaign. The theme would be used to capsulize the campaign meaning and objective. "It extends to the creation of a tone or a spirit for the campaign, an auro that envelopes the entire operation and gives a distinctive character to the undertaking in all its details."[98] With the notion of timing and of theme, Key reflected the impact that the public relations, advertising, media, and organizations management professions were having upon politics. He noted that "public relations specialists" had developed the Eisenhower campaign strategy of 1952.[99] The documentation of their effort, written by Stanley Kelley, Jr. and titled Professional Public Relations and Political Power, was an early effort to reflect the impact of this new actor on the political campaign stage.[100]

Kelley found that from advertising and corporate public relations management had emerged several organizations that had become skilled in the organization of political campaigns. The success of these cultures had led to a shift in the emphasis of a firm from politics as a sideline to political campaigns as a major component of a practice. The firm that led this transition was the California

based firm of Whitaker and Baxter. Formed in the 1930s as a public relations consulting organization, by the 1950s they had evolved to the point where their reputation had been made in politics. Their success coincided with the media revolution of the 1940s and 1950s that was especially evident on the West Coast. For Whitaker and Baxter political campaigns were a business, not just a sideline of an advertising agency or the periodic activity of a volunteer but a business. Their tenet was:

> We do our utmost, in every campaign, to get a dollar's value for every dollar spent, just as we would if we were merchandising commodities instead of selling men and measures. We use campaign funds, not to dispense favors, but to MOULD PUBLIC SENTIMENT, to present our candidate, or our issue, in the most favorable light possible.[101]

As the public relations and the advertising specialists, and, more recently, the campaign management specialist, came upon the scene the image of the traditional electoral functions of the party, the partisan workers, and the campaign faded. As Kelley pointed out, "...the public relations man is in part, calling attention to the rapid growth of population, the rising level of popular education, the achievement of universal suffrage, changes that together have increased the difficulty of settling political issues by understandings reached among members of a limited ruling group." As importantly he observed that the "...development of the mass media of communication has brought a fundamental change in politics."[102]

The public relations professional began to introduce to political campaign management a methodology that contained empirical research antecedents. At the same time as Key wrote of campaign strategy, behaviorial research was converging, outside political science, in the applied practice of the market researcher and public relations specialist. Key observed:

> One may speak of grand campaign strategy, nationally formulated and executed with precision, but a great deal of campaign management rests on hunches that guide day-to-day decisions. The love of politics includes rules of thumb that are supposed to embody the wisdom of political experience as guides to action.[103]

Described by Key as the "Art and Artifice in Campaigning" he left the campaign in a mystical state. Rather than examining the various campaign techniques to sort out those that were effective from those that are repeated because of the dictates of tradition, he classified activities without documenting according to impact. The Whitaker and Baxter message that it was possible to allocate dollars in a campaign on the basis of predictable impacts was beginning to prevail as the preferred method of the contemporary campaign manager. Campaign planning was beginning to form as a means of allocating scarce resources, (money, energy, and people) to accomplish specific electoral objectives. Commenting on this change, John M. Bailey, then Democratic National Chairman, said, "The key elements of winning politics are sound planning, strong field organization, and communication, that carry your campaign into the minds and hearts of the voters. Communications means more than making noise. It means actually transferring your ideas and emotions to the electorate."[104] What the modern campaign manager was seeking was a guide to effectiveness so that if a campaign could not do everything it could at least pick those tactics that offered the greatest potential impact.

Key's approach was to chronicle the collection of time-honored tactics and candidate dilemmas.[105] Key did note the importance to campaigning of the communications revolution. The first use of political television, he noted, coincided with the advent of the first modified New Hampshire presidential primary of 1952.[106]

He saw the dramatic advances in communications technology as profoundly altering the character of the campaign and perhaps also changing as well the "fundamental bases of political power."[107]

As for the impact of campaigns, Key observed, "the hard knowledge about the interaction between campaigner and voter is thin, yet enough operative inquiry has been done to help put the role of campaigning in perspective." He conditioned this observation by noting that the efforts of campaigners are "limited by the loyalties of the party faithful." He held that as much as three-fourths of the voters remained loyal to the same party's candidate from one presidential election to the next.[108] While the number of voters converted during one election campaign may be small, Key realized that this swing vote could be sufficient to change an electoral result.

The state of campaign impact research had reached the point where it was possible to identify three campaign effects. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet's 1944 study, The Peoples Choice had found that campaigns produce re-enforcement activation and conversion results. Re-enforcement was found to strengthen the loyalty of partisans and motivate them to participate. Activation alludes to the effect of the campaign upon those who are indifferent at the beginning of a campaign but are eventually induced to vote. And finally, conversion is the effect of the campaign upon voters who were inclined to do something other than participate as the campaign suggests.[109] Each successful campaign must observe the three effects in both its strategy and the tactics that are used to implement the strategy. Instead of recognizing the contribution to the understanding of campaign methodologies, Key expressed a fear as to the consequences for

American politics resulting from the marriage of communications with campaign techniques. Key felt to identify with "fair precision" the effects of campaigning could lead to "a complacent view of the state of the practice of democracy." The result, he suggested, might be that the "capacity of the people to govern themselves and of popular institutions to shape questions for popular decision will...be subjected to far more severe tests than they have been in the past." Dependence on the media was thought by Key to be the root of this concern as the voter was asked to react to problems beyond one's immediate experience.

> The controllers of the media, as well as political campaigners, come to be equipped with both instruments and propaganda techniques more suited to manipulation of the mass from central points of power. These and other tendencies will doubtless make the maintenance of civic intelligence of profound continuing significance.[110]

This fear has not been realized partly because no one was able to corner the market. "Central points of power" have emerged, to some extent, as Key found but countervailing forces have tended to retain a balance within the political process. As experience has increased, instead of leading to greater simplification and manipulation, the result has been some considerable dispersion of decision-making, greater participation, an appreciation for the complexity of the electoral process, lessened prospects for manipulation, and an increased appreciation for the public ability, even willingness to evaluate and respond to information beyond one's own experience. This result came in no small part from the events of 1968 led by the McCarthy candidacy in New Hampshire. That venture helped shape the marriage between political science and campaign management. Each showed the failures and the contributions of the one to the other.

On the one side the prospects for a party dominated political process came to an end as did the notion of the electorate as being irrevocably determined by past evidence of political behavior. On the other side the relevance of the campaign, its ability to process information and to focus decisions in a way that would elicit voter response began to emerge. The view of the campaign as hucksterism with little to contribute to national decision-making began to decline. The empirical studies of the political scientist and the applied experiences of the campaign manager began to converge. A new group of political process students and practitioners also shared an appreciation for the validity of each others view and ability to contribute. The result has been an increasing sophistication about campaigns and their relationship to the electoral process. This sophistication has not led to increased capability to manipulate a sheep-like public but rather an unusual sensitivity to the capacity of the public to respond to issues, candidates, arguments, and complex choices. Modern campaign management contains, as Agranoff writes, both art and science.[111]

It is difficult to plot the precise causes of the change that has occurred in both the attitude toward and the structure of the modern political campaign. For reasons other than a fascination with politics, many skeptics were prompted to become involved in political campaigns in 1968. Those individuals, many social scientists, shed their distain for partisan politics in order to express their concern about the directive of national policy. The war in Vietnam, the urban civil disorders, a perceived social and institutional disintegration forced many to face a difficult choice, find a way to express concern or stay

out and suffer the consequences. For many who had never entertained the thought of being involved in politics participating in a 1968 campaign was the lesser of several evils. Because participation was so widespread and deeply felt in 1968, the impact upon social disciplines was also widespread. For political science, the determinism of the behavioralists seemed less absolute and predictable. A populace could be motivated by political events, even by a political campaign, to violate long held tenets of political behavior.[112] The New Hampshire presidential primary success of Senator Eugene McCarthy sparked many changes; among them was a change in the perception of the political campaign and its place within the electoral process.

The Contemporary Campaign: Some Introductory Comments

Fascination among academics with John F. Kennedy's tradition defying campaign for the presidency in 1960 led to a recognition that a technology of campaign management was evolving. The brief campaign organization manual prepared by Kennedy worker and former publicist Lawrence O'Brien began the shift from art to science. The manual was a how to organize statement but it contained important summations drawn from voting behavior studies welded with experience and a sense of the political art.

Overcoming formidable odds to win in 1960, the John F. Kennedy organizers and especially their tactics gained an immediate popularity among the campaign practitioners. The next to contribute to an emerging body of campaign management literature was Stephen C. Shadegg, an Arizona Republican leader and organizer of Barry Goldwater's senatorial campaigns. His book, How to Win an Election: The Art of Political Victory,[113] was much less a how to organize manual than was

O'Brien's. Shadegg combined a sophisticated understanding of public relations strategies with a perceptive view of political processes and behavior. The result, How to Win an Election, not only explains what to do in a campaign, but when and why the advised tactics should be employed. Shadegg challenged his reader to be more than a practitioner of a cookbook of political recipes but to reach to the art, if not yet the technology, of campaign management. He asks his reader to develop an understanding of the political process represented by the campaign. From that understanding Shadegg challenged the reader to develop a conceptual and intellectual understanding of the campaign dynamic. In his introduction he wrote:

> ...I can document the following conclusions:
>
> Only a very few successful candidates have any real understanding of why they were victorious.
>
> The segment of the population which is least interested in politics decides the outcome of most elections.
>
> The party organization can help a candidate tremendously, but, it cannot elect him.
>
> Party labels are misleading and party registration is never the key to a candidate's strength.
>
> Millions of dollars are wasted in every political contest.
>
> Elections are more often lost than won -- by that I mean the error or mistakes committed by the loser have a more profound effect upon the outcome than does the positive performance of the winner.
>
> There is no surer way to lose an election than to think you have it in the bag.
>
> Virtue in politics is not its own reward. And while the big issues count, more often than not the little things make the difference between defeat and victory.[114]

As an introduction to the McCarthy campaign of 1968 in New Hampshire it would be possible to stop right here and begin the case study. Shadegg's eight observations are documented by the events of that campaign. To leave the Shadegg discussion at this point would not serve to illustrate the change in campaign management from art to technology or from generalist to specialist.

When he wrote Shadegg noted that "all sorts of people get asked to manage political campaigns" but that "there are almost no professionals in the field." He observed that with the "exception of the national committees of the parties, there is no full-time employment opportunity." With "43,000 people running for office every two years" and the "wise candidate has a manager," there are "no schools for candidates or for campaign managers." There are "thousands of excellent text books on political science, but there is very little written about campaign management."[115]

To begin to fill this considerable void, Shadegg wrote and others have begun haltingly to follow. With a nod toward the discipline of political science, Shadegg offered to analyze campaign management, campaign techniques, and procedures. What he promised were "opinions and conditions" not "theory." His basis was not "abstract discussions," but techniques "documented and supported by...use in actual political contests ranging from Massachusetts to Arizona."[116] A brief review of the importance of the "undecided" voter as playing the pivotal role in elections introduced Shadegg's concepts and examples of effective campaign activity.[117] Shadegg produced the first list and

thorough discussion of the importance of the campaign manager, image of the candidate, campaign expectations, timing, knowing the opposition, targeting voter populations, organizing the campaign, using public opinion surveys to develop campaign strategy, and modern communication technology. He concluded with the practical advice don't "...let them steal" the election from you.[118]

With each subject he developed approaches that had been successfully used, illustrated each with appropriate examples, and indicated what was of generic value to subsequent campaigns. The work was concise, experiential and offered a new discussion to the earlier how-to-do-it and anecdotal accounts of campaigns. Shadegg offered a rationale that demonstrated his own synthesis of the other current work on voting behavior, motivational research, marketing, communications, and political institutions. While the work fell short of establishing the technology of campaign management, it did provide a contextual background for the next steps.

Following Shadegg and stimulated by the events of 1968, has evolved an increasingly sophisticated literature on campaign management led by Robert Agranoff's book The Management of Election Campaigns, published in 1976. As if in response to Shadegg's complaints there are now campaign management consultants who have sufficient business to occupy themselves with campaign assignments on a full-time basis. A national campaign consultants organization has been established which holds conferences, and runs seminars in campaign management techniques, financing, and communications as well as serving an increasing

body of recognized practitioners of campaign management and candidate counseling.[119] Candidates are now reaching for the professional political consultant in increasing numbers when not too long ago, as Shadegg noted, the function was being filled as a seasonal sideline of some public relation or advertising firms.

CHART 1.02
Number of Campaigns in Which Professional Services Were Provided 1960-1970. (143 firms reported activities during this period.)[120]



The public relations counsel was the generalists, the immediate predecessor of the specialist, the campaign management counselor. The contemporary campaign, Marjorie Randon Hershey found, "...is not composed of generalists but of specialists." She observed that the "candidate and the manager play reciprocal roles. The activities of each depends upon the activities of the other."[121]

In addition to the manager there are other specialists in campaigns, the fund raisers, the publicists, the organizers, the schedulers, and others who have come to fill rather definite niches in almost all serious campaign efforts. As Hershey noted, "no matter how broad their interest in politics may be, persons who become actively involved in campaigns tend to specialize. They specialize because it is an efficient method of handling election tasks and because they are more interested in some aspects of campaigning than others."[122]

As a transition to what has become known as a technology of campaign management, it is important to note that the context for the technology has important social characteristics. Hershey notes, "...We see both traditionalism and the spread of innovations in campaigning. Both can be explained by looking at campaigns as a learning process." She suggests that, "the diffusion of new campaign methods is part of the process by which new and underdog campaigners seek successful models of campaigns on which to pattern their own efforts." She concludes, "...behaviors that work will be retained, and behaviors that fail will probably be dropped..." Learning is a form of adaptation, she notes, in which both campaigners and campaigns adapt. "It adapts not only to its environment but to the experience, attitudes and personality traits of the candidates and managers."[123] As such the campaign, its participants and its constituency are part of a social field that must be understood as the context for analysis. What subsequent work begins to tell us is that the learning process can be accelerated and some of the mistakes and waste avoided by testing the efficiency and the effectiveness of the techniques of the campaign.

As the latest work on campaigns and with the stated objective of "...bringing together political trends, knowledge, and experience..." Robert Agranoff best summarizes the state of campaign management.

> Similar to its counterparts in other fields of management, it contains both art and science. It is predicated on the following assumptions:
>
> 1. That one must understand campaigns and attendant political processes before one can manage them;
>
> 2. That management of campaigns involves a blend of the best information obtainable and the wisest judgment about that information;
>
> 3. That campaign strategies and campaign tactics are situational -- one must understand the situation and supply relevant knowledge;
>
> 4. At present, campaigns are among America's most poorly managed enterprises; and,
>
> 5. They can be better managed with information and insight.[124]

The case study follows that is intended not only to chart the evolution of a campaign but is intended to demonstrate the nature of both the art and the science of campaign management. It responds to Agranoff's assessment that "A campaign is a coordinated effort to achieve some objective, such as electing a candidate to office, connecting various operations that organize and use environmental, human, social, and material resources."[125] It is this connecting function that has the potential for bringing the political scientist and the campaign manager together. A dependency of one discipline upon another profession offers the chance to respond to Agranoff's five assumptions that will lead to a better understanding of the electoral process and to management of more

efficient campaigns. The observation that offers this opportunity is that, "In election campaigns the campaigner tries to win by connecting operations that deal with idiomorphic forces: basic premises about the nature of the constituency, political resources, assets and liabilities, and advantages."[126]

Methodological Notes

As primarily a case study, the account of the 1968 McCarthy Campaign in New Hampshire has two methodological antecedents. Both are drawn from the research approach described as participant observation. The approach evolved from the anthropological field studies of the past several generations where researchers joined communities to record their social and cultural characteristics. With the evolution of the discipline of sociology, the participant observer methodology of anthropology, primarily a descriptive methodology, was used as a basis for a scientific analysis of social and cultural phenomenon. Precise rules for the conduct of field research and data collection evolved which offered the observer the chance to quantify, compare, and to evaluate the social and cultural phenomena that were experienced through participation within social communities.

Through several generations of researchers and field studies it is now possible to state three principal axioms with corollaries of participant observation methodology.

> Axiom 1: The participant observer shares in the life activities and sentiments of people in face-to-face relationships.[127]

The axiom places the observer not in the traditional scientific role of a neutral observer but expects the observer to share in the live activities of the social community being observed. What distinguishes the researcher as a partici-

pant observer is an expected scientific role of "conscious and systematic sharing..."[128] The participant shares in the "life activities" of a group of persons with the research objective of observing, quantifying, and analyzing the community. Not simply participating for the sake of participating, nor observing in a detached manner, but accounting for the characteristics of the social group by systematically recording, even quantifying the social behavior shared and observed. From this axiom comes a corollary.

> The role of the participant-observer requires both detachment and personal involvement.[129]

The researcher joins a social community for the purpose of study which requires a certain detachment but to be totally detached would not produce the opportunities for evaluation that come with personal involvement. In most cases involvement means more than joining a community, but actually finding and assuming a proper role — one which offers the maximum opportunity for participation that will produce thorough and accurate observations.

> Axion 2: The participant observer is a normal part of the culture and the life of the people under observation.[130]

The researcher must find a role, a site within the community, that is not "forced" or "artificial" to the "ways of the people under study." The objective is to study the normal processes of the life and culture of the community and not to distort that culture by introducing the research objective in a manner that would be disruptive. To some proponents of participant observer research, this implies some concealing of the observer's research objective in order to keep that objective pure, while to others stating the research objective becomes

part of the honesty, the confidence building process of creating the research context. For each researcher within a study situation the question of whether to announce the observer aspect of the activity and the intended research is fundamental. Each participant-observer must answer the question for oneself and then relate accordingly to the community being studied.[131]

The corollary of the second axiom states:

> The scientific role of the participant observer is interdependent with his social role in the culture of the observed.[132]

The participant observer is a social scientist who distinguishes oneself as an observer of social communities conducting that observation through the use of scientific methodologies and analyses. The participant observer is obligated to design a study, state hypotheses, and evolve an evaluative context that responds to the situation being observed as well as to the requirements of sound scientific methodology. Unlike the scientist working from a laboratory, the participant observer recognizes that the dual role is an interdependent role which produces research strength that might otherwise not be available if one were detached from the other.

The final axiom validates the methodology as a contributor to a further understanding of society.

> Axion 3: The role of the partitipant observer reflects the social process of living in society.[133]

The research objective of the participant observer extends beyond understanding the social and cultural characterisitcs of a particular community. It is from these understandings that it becomes possible to broaden the understanding of social processes for all communities. To distinguish between the artist using

a local setting for the basis of a social account and the work of the social scientist is that the "latter seeks certainty outside oneself by following rules and procedures for verifying one's findings." While the process for interpreting the "collective symbols is an intuitive process (as much as rational)" it is a "process that can be scientifically verified."[134]

It is from these axioms and corollaries that the scientific method of the participant observer descends. To summarize, Severyn T. Bruyn wrote:

> Since the observer plays a natural, interdependent role in the culture he studies, sharing in the life and becoming involved in the activities of the people he observes, new methodological problems are necessarily set up to be solved which have not been previously encountered. Unlike the traditional empiricist, the participant observer must view a culture just as the people he is studying view it, including reflecting on the social process in which he is inwardly engaged. This means he sees goals and interests of people in the same way that the people see them, not as functions or experimental causes as would the traditional empiricist; it means that he sees people in the concrete reality in which they present themselves in daily experiences, not as abstractions as would the traditional empiricist; it means he senses that these people act freely within the scope of what they see as the possible, not as determined agents of social forces as the traditional empiricist would see them.[135]

What the methodology of the participant observer presumes is that the researcher enters a social situation for the purpose of study. Participation is incidental to that research purpose and is extended to facilitate the research objectives rather than to contribute inordinately to the condition of the social community. Given this as a precept, it then becomes possible to organize for research, within the setting, an empirical evaluation that responds to the principals of such research. Hypotheses are drawn, data is collected and analyzed, hypotheses tested, theories drawn, and results verified. The principals sought

are those which assess some universal character from the community researched which when tested in other settings may be found to be valid as descriptors of social condition.

The problem with this strict methodology when applied to the McCarthy campaign case is that participation dominated observation until after the event was completed. The author did not enter the campaign with a research motive, but, rather, with a political objective. He did not plot a research direction, nor organize a sequence of observations, nor assume a role for the sake of observation. His objective was to organize and manage a political campaign designed to have a political result. Only after the fact did he consider the contribution that a thorough accounting of that campaign might offer.

While the methodological requirements of a participant observation study are less strick than those of classic empirical research, even these requirements exceed the evaluative possibilities of the New Hampshire McCarthy campaign. This, however, does not mean that the author must reject the methodology of the participant observer but it does mean he must place his study in either its own context or in a context that has been recognized previously.

To help with this task Bruyn has described a series of sociologically important studies that do not fit his methodological structure as "the stylistic study." To define this term Bruyn writes:

> Although the scientific process predicts what appears to be an unknown future, it does so within closed systems; and, although it purports to study change in the world, it does so by abstracting laws or patterns of phenomena which are historically repeatable and are based upon the relatively permanent character or structure of the world. This is reality discovered through the scientific tradition.

> Social science, however, cannot ignore still other facets of reality in its studies. Therefore, another type of research has earned a place of special value within the field --- that study which does not follow the systematic traditions of science, but rather has a particular style of its own. It functions to reveal new meanings in data as well as new meaningful possibilities in theory.[136]

Bruyn lists as styles found in past studies as being: romantic, realistic, poetic, factual, analytic, satiric, journalistic, and existential.[137] Of the eight, Bruyn has described the final three; satiric, journalistic, and existential appear to relate most closely to the case study of the McCarthy campaign. Satiric studies have tended to account conditions in "total institutions" and to use an informal style to relate the conditions and circumstances of those housed in institutions, as Bruyn notes.[138] To a certain extent, a political campaign might be analogous to an institution and to account for the activities and behavior of those within campaigns in the satirical fashion of certain participant observer studies, seems reasonable.

Secondly, the journalistic style is especially well suited for accounting, as a case study, a political campaign. Although Bruyn contends that "journalistic reporting shows no interest in the sublteties of satire... it is nevertheless the same in its interest in commenting socially on affairs of everyday life."[139] Reporting becomes an important aspect of the analysis of the McCarthy campaign. Developing the stream of events, the inter-actions, and the consequences fits well into the journalist's demand that facts are the gist of the news, the who, what, when, where, and sometimes the how of the reporter.

Thirdly, Bruyn notes that "authors of research studies have recently begun to report their own existential orientation, that is, their own personal interests and relationships with their subjects."[140] This latter perspective is important in the account of the McCarthy campaign since the author does feel his own

situation and circumstance led to his participation in that political venture. If his situation had been different, so might either his involvement and even the outcome. He also suggests that the existertial situation for himself and the decision process which he experienced may well have described the situation of many others who became involved in the McCarthy candidacy. While the study does not presume to draw existential generalizations from the particular role of the author, it does suggest that such generalizations might be drawn if the existential question were pursued.

To summarize his definition of the stylistic study of social phenomena Bruyn writes:

> The stylist ideally finds his home more in the cultural world of man than in the structural world. He assumes that the phenomena he studies have quality and are rich in meaning. He assumes that what he studies contains innumerable possibilities for interpretation, of which his is only one. He assumes that man's nature is of infinite variety and that man is to be explored in this light.[141]

While this may be a satisfactory description of a less constrained researcher within the sociological interpretation of participant observation, it does not account for a political science perspective. To provide a context for a political study of the McCarthy campaign sort and to suggest a methodological antecedent that does recognize the range which Bruyn reports, is difficult. The closest that one can come is to the first study of a presidential campaign written by Theodore White in 1960.[142]

White observed as a journalist and political analyst. He participated as an associate of the principals, especially as a friend and counsel to John F. Kennedy. He brought to his work a refreshing insight which came from his familiarity with the institutions and processes he was observing. While prin-

cipally a journalistic effort, the case study that he produced contained perceptions of the political processes that functioned during the political year of 1960, these insights provided a useful basis for subsequent studies of elections and electoral processes. It is this model that seems to fit the case study objective of the 1968 New Hampshire McCarthy campaign. It is a model that recognizes the perspective of participant observer as stylist, the author's own existential perception, while reaching further than White reaches, to test, empircally, questions that are not answered in the recounting of the observations and events. The case study of the McCarthy campaign must of necessity, be eclectic in its methodology. Its purpose is to describe in detail as a journalist might, but also to describe as a participant observer would do with greater precision than the journalist. Its purpose is also to explain events and to examine outcomes. Finally, the study will conclude by empirically testing hypotheses in order to explain observations that otherwise would escape explanation or be misunderstood in their implications.

To demonstrate through Bruyn's words how this methodology applies, the following quotation, as revised by the insertion of a few words (in parenthesis), concludes:

> The larger truth will appear in the judicious combination of those partial perspectives which, on the one hand, can predict the behavior of man (political behavior), on the other hand, can enlighten his (the political) world of choice by disclosing its variety, thus increasing his (society's) freedom of (political) action. Man is truly a paradox steeped in irony (as are man's political processes). He is predictable and he is unpredictable (as are man's politics). He is individual and he is communal (as are man's politics). He is, indeed, richly endowed (as are man's politics).[143]

Notes

[1]Robert K. Carr, et.al., American Democracy in Theory and Practice, (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 3rd edition, 1956), pp. 68-69.

[2]United States Constitution, Article 2, Section 1.

[3]Harold Hughes, (Commission Chairman), The Democratic Choice: A Report of the Commission on the Democratic Selection of Presidential Nominees, (Washington, D.C.: The New Democratic Coalition, 1969), p. 10.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Louise Overacker, The Presidential Primary, (New York: MacMillan, 1926), pp. 10-24.

[6]Peter H. Odegard and E. Allen Helms, American Politics, (New York: Harper and Bros., 2nd edition, 1947), pp. 76-123; V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th edition, (New York: Crowell, 1964), pp. 168-178; Wilfred E. Binkley, American Political Parties: Their Natural History, (New York: Knopf, 4th edition, 1962), pp. 301-358. Hughes, Op.Cit., p. 11-12.

[7]Overacker, Op.Cit., p. 171.

[8]William R. Keech and Donald R. Matthews, The Party's Choice, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 33.

[9]Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1960, (New York: Atheneum, 1961).

[10]The Principal work of this school was written by Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman and Richard C. Bain, titled: The Politics of National Party Conventions, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960).

[11]Overacker, Op.Cit., p. 171.

[12]Nelson W. Polsby, "Decision Making at the National Conventions," Western Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 13 (Sept. 1960), William R. Keech, "Anticipating the Consequences of a National Presidential Primary," Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 2 (Summer 1974), pp. 274-279; Nelson, W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Presidential Election Strategies of American Electroal Politics, 3rd edition, (New York: Scribners, 1971).

[13]It is favored by some 72 percent of Americans. See Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, July 8, 1972, p. 1651, noted in Keech and Matthews, Op.Cit., p. 243. Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, and Richard C. Bain, The Politics of National Party Conventions, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 489.

The basic vice of all the proposals for a national primary, in the opinion of the present authors, is either general failure to recognize the essential characteristics of the nominating process. The nomination differs in many important respects from a general election...the most critical aspects of the nomination process arise from the fact that the alternatives of choice must be discovered as a part of the process. The choices must somehow be reduced to a manageable number; and in open nominating situations, even after a considerable amount of clarification has occurred, the number of genuine availables is seldom as few as two.

[14]Overacker, Op.Cit.; C. E. Merriam and L. Overacker, Primary Elections, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928).

[15]Hughes , Op.Cit.

[16]Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 21, 1976, pp. 225-242.

[17]New Hampshire Primary and Election Laws of 1968.

[18]V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 4th edition, (New York: Crowell, 1958), p. 437.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Overacker, Op.Cit., p. 171.

[22]Key, Op.Cit., p. 446.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid., p. 441.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid., p. 450.

[30]Robert Bendiner, "The Presidential Primaries are Haphazard, Unfair, and Wildly Illogical," The New York Times Magazine, (February 27, 1972), pp. 11, 40-46.

[31]James W. Davis, Presidential Primaries: Road to the White House, (New York: Crowell, 1967), p. 13.

[32]Ibid., p. 42.

[33]David, P., et.al., Op.Cit., p. 290.

[34]Ibid., p. 292-293.

[35]Ibid., p. 296.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Ibid., p. 297.

[40]_____, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," American Political Science Review, special report (1950).

[41]David, P., Op.Cit., p. 185.

[42]David, J. W., Op.Cit., p. 249.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid., p. 250.

[45]Ibid., p. 251.

[46]Ibid., p. 252.

[47]Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

[48]Samual J. Eldersveld, "Theory and Method in Voting Behavior," 13 Journal of Politics, February 1961, pp. 70-87; Peter H. Rossi, "Four Landmarks in Voting Research," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, American Voting Behavior, (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 5-54; Morris Janowitz and Warren E. Miller, "The Index of Political Predisposition in the 1948 Election," 14 Journal of Politics, 1952, pp. 710-727.

[49]First published in George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy," 15 Public Opinion Quarterly, No. 4, Winter 1952, pp. 601-623; see also Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), pp. 120-167.

[50]Campbell, A., et.al., Op.Cit., p. 121.

[51]Ibid., pp. 120-145.

[52]Donald E. Stokes, Angus Campbell, and Warren E. Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision, " 52 American Political Science Review, 1958, pp. 367-387.

[53]The following is a selection of references from the experimental literature that has emerged principally during the late 1960s and 1970s. The exceptions are the two early studies by Samuel J. Eldersveld of propaganda techniques and impact on voters. These studies are: Samual J. Eldersveld, "Experimental Propaganda Techniques and Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review, (March 1956), pp. 154-165; and Samuel J. Eldersveld and Richard W. Dodge, "Personal Contact or Mail Propaganda?: An Experiment in Voting Turnout and Attitude Change," in David Katz (ed.), Public Opinion and Propaganda (Drieden Press, 1958).

Recent experimental studies are: Adams, William C., "Candidate Characteristics, Office of Election and Voter Response," Experimental Study of Politics, Vol. 4, (July 1975), pp. 76-88; Robert Axelrod, "Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, 1952-1968, American Political Science Review, 66, (March 1972), pp. 11-20; Ballenger, Gregory and Bernard Hennessy, "Door-to-Door Canvassing Pays Off: An Experimental Study in a Nonpartisan Suburb," Experimental Study of Politics, Vol. 3 (1974); Richard W. Bond, "Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting Defection," American Political Science Review, 63 (June 1969), p. 498-514; Brownstein, Charles N., "Communication Strategies and the Electoral Decision Making Process: Some Results from Experimentation," Experimental Study of Politics, (July 1971), pp. 37-49; Coombs, Fred S., John G. Peters and Gerald S. Strom, "Bandwagon, Ballot Position, and Party Effects: An Experiment in Voting Choice." Experimental Study of Politics, Vol. 4, (February 1974), pp. 31-55; DAvid W. Flectas, "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Minimal-Information Elections," American Political Science Review, 65 (June 1971), pp. 434-435; Stanley Kelley, Jr., Richard E. Ayres, and William G. Bowen, "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First," American Political Science Review, 61 (June 1967) pp. 359-379; Jae-On Kim, John R. Petrocik and Stephen N. Enokson, "Voter Turnout Among the American States," American Political Science Review, 69 (March

Footnote 53 Continued
1975), pp. 107-123; Douglas Rose, "Comment on Kim, Petrocik and Enokson: The American States' Impact on Voter Turnout," American Political Science Review, 69, (March 1975), pp. 124-131; Nanda, Krishan, "An Experiment in Voting Choice: Who Gets the 'Blind' Vote?", Experimental Study of Politics, Vol. 4, (February 1975), pp. 20-35; Miller, Roy E. and Dorothy L. Robyn, "A Field Experiment Study of Direct Mail in a Congressional Primary Campaign: What Effects Last Until Election Day?", Experimental Study of Politics, (December 1975), Gerald M. Pomper, et.al., "Issue Voting", 66, American Political Science Review, (June 1972), pp. 415-428; Austin Rainey, "Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections," American Political Science Review, 66 (March 1972), pp. 21-37; Scioli, Frank P., Jr., and James W. Dyson, "Attitude-Behavior Congruence in Varying Situational Environments," Experimental Study of Politics, Vol. 2, (1973), pp. 39-60; Herbert F. Weisberg and Jerrold G. Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluations," 64, American Political Science Review, (December 1970), pp. 1167-1185; Zinser, James E., et.al., "The Rational Analysis of Voter Participation: A Recursive Model of Household Behavior with Applications to Voter Turnout," paper prepared for delivery at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 1 - May 1, 1976 (Chicago).

[54]For examples see Theodore H. White's 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 accounts of the presidential campaigns also see Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson and Bruce Page, An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of 1968, (New York: The Viking Press, 1969). The latter is an excellent account but still lacks a thorough treatment of the role of the primary.

[55]John P. Robinson, Jerrold A. Rusk, and Kandia B. Head, Measures of Political Attitudes, (Ann Arbor, MI: Survey Research Center, 1968), p. 496.

[56]Frank J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, (Boston: Little, Brown Company, 1964), p. 108.

[57]Virginia Andreoli and Stephen Worchel, "Effects of Media, Communication, and Message Position on Attitude Change," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 42 (Spring 1978), pp. 59-70.

[58]See Robert Agranoff, The New Style in Election Campaigns, (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1976), for a discussion of this point.

[59]Also contained in Agranoff, Op.Cit., is a discussion of the how to do it campaign literature that evolved during the 1950s and 1960s. (See footnote No. 100).

[60]Robert Agranoff, The Management of Election Campaigns, (Holbrook Press, Inc., 1976), p. XIV.

[61]Agranoff, Op.Cit., pp. 1-2.

[62]Ibid., p. 2.

[63]Ibid., p. 2.

[64]Ibid., p. 2.

[65]Ibid., p. 2.

[66]Ibid., p. 2.

[67]Ibid., p. 2.

[68]V.O. Key, Jr., Op.Cit., 4th ed., p. 589.

[69]Ibid., p. 590.

[70]V.O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," The Journal of Politics, 17 (February 1955), p. 16.

[71]Ibid., p. 17.

[72]Ibid., p. 18.

[73]V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960, (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1966), Chap. 2.

[74]Ibid., p. 26.

[75]V.O. Key, Jr., Op.Cit., p. 501.

[76]Ibid., p. 502.

[77]Ibid., p. 502.

[78]Ibid., p. 502.

[79]Charles E. Merriam and Harold Foote Goswell, The American Party System, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1933, revised edition), p. 328.

[80]Merriam, Op.Cit., p. 324.

[81]Ibid., p. 324.

[82]Ibid., p. 323.

[83]Ibid., p. 309-344.

[84]V.O. Key, Jr., Op.Cit., p. 507.

[85]Herbert M. Baus and William B. Ross, Politics Battle Plan, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1968).

[86]Ibid., p. 6.

[87]Ibid., p. 6.

[88]Overacker, Op.Cit., p. 119.

[89]V.O. Key, Jr., Op.Cit., p. 507.

[90]Ibid., p. 507.

[91]Agranoff, The Management of Election Campaigns, Op.Cit., p. 15.

[92]Ibid., p. 15.

[93]Karl A. Lamb and Paul A. Smith, Campaign Decision-Making, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1968)., p. 20-21.

[94]Ibid., p. 37.

[95]V.O. Key, Jr., Op.Cit., p. 507-508.

[96]Ibid., p. 510-511.

[97]Ibid., p. 512.

[98]Ibid., p. 508.

[99]Stanley Kelley, Jr., Professional Public Relations and Political Power, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956).

[100]Ibid., p. 39. In an address before the Los Angeles Area Chapter of the Public Relations Society of America, 7/13/48.

[101]Ibid., p. 226. A series of writers chronicled the changes and the emerging roles of the new participants in campaigns. Paul P. Van Riper, Handbook of Practical Politics, (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1952); a "how-to" book that reflected the changing nature of the political campaign and showing how the citizen could become involved. Stephen C. Shadegg, How to Win an Election, The Art of Political Victory, (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, Inc., 1964); a synthesis of how to advice with case examples and axions derived from familiarity with the literature of voting behavior research. D. Swing Meyer, The Winning Candidate, How to Defeat Your Political Opponent, (New York: James H. Heineman, Inc., 1966). Emphasis on the importance of public relations. The steps Meyer outlined are:

1. Turning an otherwise dead possession into a function.
2. Carrying the function into the area of public opinion.
3. Breaking down public opinion into specific target audiences.
4. Researching the past voting behavior and current opinions, of each target audience.
5. Selecting the most powerful ammunition to present to these targets.
6. Priming the media or delivery systems with the most appropriate communication tools., p. 12.

[102]V.O. Key, Jr., Op.Cit., p. 512.

[103]Meyer, Op.Cit., p. 12.

[104]Key's list of tactics were descriptive of time honored strategies such as how much a candidate should travel and speak, how the candidate should be pictured in public, what posture the candidate should take in public (above partisanship or an effective position), whether to respond to charges or reply, how to separate a candidate opponent from his supporters, use of ridicule, and finally, the cost of the smear. Each was discussed with both successful examples and warnings but more were subjected to tests that would remove some of the mystery from the devices as being other than like tubes of paint to be spread across the canvass of a campaign by the campaign manager artist.

[105]V.O. Key, Jr., Op.Cit., p. 522.

[106]Ibid., p. 521.

[107]Ibid., p. 529.

[108]Ibid. The studies that Key listed as considering the effect of campaigns summarized by these effects are: Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The Peoples Choice, (New York: Duell, Sloan & Rease, 1944); August Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides, (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954); Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent, (Ann Arbor: Bureau of Government, University of Michigan, 1956).

[109]V.O. Key, Jr., Op.Cit., p. 530.

[110]Ibid.

[111]Agranoff, Op.Cit., p. 2.

[112]An argument frequently heard during late 1967 and early 1968 was that an incumbent president could not be displaced as a party nominee if he chose to seek re-nomination. The fact that no sitting president since Franklin Pierce in 1956 had failed in a quest for re-nomination was used as the precedent. To challenge President Lynson Johnson would be, they held, an exercise in futility.

[113]Stephen C. Shadegg, How to Win an Election: The Art of Political Victory, (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1964).

[114]Ibid., p. 8.

[115]Ibid., p. 10.

[116]Ibid., p. 10.

[117]Ibid., pp. 11-24.

[118]Ibid., p. 183.

[119]David Lee Rosenbloom, The Election Men: Professional Campaign Manager and American Democracy, (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973), p. 87-88.

[120]Ibid., p. 53.

[121]Majorie Randon Hershey, The Making of Campaign Strategy, (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath and Co., 1974), p. 112.

[122]Ibid., p. 115.

[123]Ibid., p. 121.

[124]Agranoff, Op.Cit., p. 2.

[125]Ibid., p. 3.

[126]Ibid., p. 3.

[127]Severyn T. Bruyn, The Human Perspective in Sociology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 13.

[128]Ibid., p. 14, and Florence Kluckhohn, "The Participant-Observer Technique in Small Communities," American Journal of Sociology, 46 (November 1940), p. 331.

[129]Ibid., p. 14.

[130]Ibid., p. 15.

[131]Ibid.

[132]Ibid., p. 18.

[133]Ibid., p. 20.

[134]Ibid.

[135]Ibid., p. 22.

[136]Ibid., p. 244.

[137]Ibid., p. 245.

[138]Ibid., p. 250.

[139]Ibid., p. 251.

[140]Ibid.

[141]Ibid., p. 252.

[142]Theodore White, The Making of the President 1960, (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961).

[143]Bruyn, S., Op.Cit., p. 254.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE 1968

A Beginning

A political event, like the McCarthy pre-convention campaign in New Hampshire, has many, perhaps even thousands of beginnings, as many in fact, as the individuals who become involved in the campaign. The beginning for many occurred with the returns of the New Hampshire Presidential Primary on the evening of March 12, 1968. For those who were involved in making that evening possible, the beginnings occurred long before March 12th.[1] Later it would be said that many were caught up in the events and were moved by changing conditions to join the movement, but in the early stages what was to become the McCarthy campaign, and even later the "New Politics" movement, was made up of persons who deliberately took a different direction from that of their friends, neighbors, colleagues, and even families.

At the time these personal decisions were made, the goals seemed unobtainable. No incumbent president had been denied a nomination in modern times,[2] and no essential policy embodied by an incumbent president had been changed as a result of renomination challenges. The objective for those who were concerned about the state of national affairs in 1967 -- to get the president to change Vietnam policy or to replace the incumbent as the nominee of the Democratic Party -- was not considered to be politically realistic. The personal decision to oppose, politically the policy and/or the President became a decision of personal vindication, almost an act of private absolution.

Instead of hand-wringing frustration and, perhaps, implied complicity with contemporary events, people sought methods to absolve themselves, to clean their hands, not merely by expressing their opposition to policies and actions they did not like but by actually creating organizations through which they might be absolved.

In the back of many minds was a lingering question reflecting a lingering guilt: would our children in the future ask, "Where were you during 1967 and 1968 when the war in Vietnam was being escalated? Where did you stand on that war? What did you do to affirm yourself as an American capable of speaking out and working to change such policies? How did you spend those years? Were you the quiet generation of your youth (the 1950's) or the progeny of a new quiet generation? What did you do to grasp control of your destiny?"

New Hampshire Political Demographics

Although New Hampshire is a small state with an estimated 1968 population of 700,000 persons, the distribution of that population and the diversity of its information sources makes it politically unique. To many political observers that very diversity is a microcosm that reflects and represents the political dynamics of the United States.

By working within the political process of this peculiar state and gaining experience with the variety of its political and voting populations, the future McCarthy campaign leaders came to know the breadth and limitation of each political situation. From the fire of the several campaign experiences of the 1960's, a generation of New Hampshire Democratic Party activists

became aware of the extent to which a political situation was elastic, capable of manipulation, and when a situation would be unresponsive, at least in the context of a campaign. They learned that the rules, mostly unwritten, for each electoral event were distinct, each campaign, for each office, and each election (local, statewide, primary or general) produced its own particular political ethos. An ethos that had to be understood in order for an electoral objective to be reached.

For presidential primary politics the state conveniently divides into Democratic areas and Republican areas. Democrats tend to be concentrated in the states 13 cities and larger urbanized towns, while the Republicans are dispersed to the suburban towns and rural areas. The first Congressional District is the more urbanized of the two and contains an almost equal share of registered Democrats and Republicans. Its information sources tend to be intra-state daily and weekly newspapers and radio stations. Television is Boston-based as are several regional newspapers, principally the Boston Globe. The population of the first district is relatively dense with major growth centers occurring adjacent to the Massachusetts border. The area of the district is approximately one third of the total state.

The western and northwestern cities and towns of the 2nd Congressional District are dispersed over a much larger geographical area and tend to be more isolated than those of the more dense 1st District. The economic ties and media sources of the 2nd District are less linked to Boston and more to their own regions. Vermont, New York State, Maine, and even Canada provide the external media that supplements the coverage of the radio and the

District's daily and weekly press. As an example, the newspaper with the largest circulation in Berlin, the state's most northerly city, is the Lewiston Sun, published in Lewiston, Maine.

The combination of geography, both physical and political, as well as economic and social demographics produce from the relatively small New Hampshire population an unusual microcosm. It is both urban and rural, working class and middle class, provincial and cosmopolitan. There are strong religious and ethnic ties, deeply held political traditions and areas of great change. While the state contains only a small non-white population ethnic rivalries of several generations in length have produced social responses not unlike those experienced between racial groups. For reason of location, tax policies (the only state without a sales or an income tax), preference and available land, New Hampshire's growth and patterns of social change have tended to keep pace with those of the nation. As the years have passed, instead of being less representative as a microcosm it has tended to maintain its position. For this reason and for the reason that it holds the first in the nation presidential primary, it has maintained its stature as an important political bellweather.

New Hampshire Politics: Pre 1968

New Hampshire's Presidential politics duplicates its state traditions. Political credits have often been amassed through working for the right candidate (the eventual winner) in the Presidential Primary and then cashing these credits in for jobs or favors should the candidate actually win.

To maximize this strategy, New Hampshire created, on purpose or by accident, its Presidential Primary which, by its very existence, gave New Hampshire politicos the chance for direct contact with potential presidents. Through this contact and appropriate political work a political tie could be established. The better debt payoffs are the federal rewards, such as postal jobs, judgeships, contracts, and access, those who wanted such jobs or rewards tend to support the perceived winner -- the frontrunner. Under such circumstances ideology is an inconvenience. The appropriate role is that of the broker or facilitator. The local political operative puts oneself in the position of delivering votes, rather than trying to influence policy.

For the majority of New Hampshire's urban Democratic party organizations, delivering votes was accomplished by contacting and then appropriately rewarding, promising to reward, or actually paying for the services of the individuals who made it their business to produce "the vote." The model was not unlike that of urban machine politics in other cities; only the scale was different. As insignificant as 3,000 to 4,000 Manchester votes might be when compared to the output of a Tammany or a Daley machine, under the magnifying lens of the national media, New Hampshire's early returns have always meant more than their actual numbers.

The New Hampshire Presidential Primary

The New Hampshire Presidential Primary is a product of Yankee frugality. The early date is set to coincide with the first Tuesday in March, the same day as the annual town meeting. Two elections on the same day saves considerable time, money, and results in a larger vote.

The Presidential Primary was legislated in 1913 as New Hampshire's participation in the "New Democracy." Its function was to select the various parties' representatives to the National Conventions by popular vote rather than State convention. By act of the 1948 New Hampshire Legislature, the presidential preference section of the ballot was added, which has since become known as the "beauty contest" - a poll of the electorate's choice of Presidential candidates.

The addition of the presidential preference section of the ballot ended the localized popularity contest for convention delegates. Before 1948, delegate candidates popular in the State at the time of the election usually represented their party at the National convention, regardless of their personal preference for President. By adding the preferential section, the importance of the Presidential candidate and his delegate candidates transcended the local popularity of the state's politicans.

The presidential preference section of the ballot made the New Hampshire primary a national attraction. A presidential candidate could benefit from the publicity of New Hampshire's "first in the nation" primary and do so at relatively little cost.

Several factors make New Hampshire a key State also. The first is the early date of the Presidential Primary. The second is the relatively high voter participation. The third, although a rural New England state by image, New Hampshire is, in fact, heavily industrialized, second only to Connecticut in the percent of its population holding industrial jobs. The fourth,

New Hampshire is a "bellweather" State. Within its borders there is one of the five counties in the nation which has voted for the winning Presidential candidates since William McKinley. According to a study by Professor Robert Dishman of the University of New Hampshire,[3] the barometer counties reflect the thinking of the American public and do so on almost every index that political science can devise. Therefore, it is possible to state and show by voting patterns that New Hampshire's nine other counties do not deviate greatly from the norm of Strafford County, the bellweather county.

The politics of the mass media transforms the trickle of New Hampshire votes into an avalanche of national significance. Dwight D. Eisenhower and Estes Kefauver did it first in 1952. Richard Nixon saved his political neck in the 1956 New Hampshire primary, and insured it in 1960 and 1968. John F. Kennedy scored an initial triumph by gathering his unheard of 40,000 vote total in the Democratic primary.

Others have seen their political hopes die in the voting booths of this primary. Robert Taft suffered a defeat at the hands of the Eisenhower people in the 1952 primary. Although Harry Truman chose to ignore the New Hampshire primary, the 1952 boost given to Kefauver may well have influenced the President to make his final journey to Independence, Missouri. In 1956, Harold Stassen made an attempt to dump Vice President Richard Nixon from the ticket by urging the candidacy of Massachusetts Governor, Christian A. Herter. A 73,000 write-in vote for Richard Nixon ended Herter's chances and also the political career of Minnesota's "boy wonder," Harold Stassen.

In spite of the national implications of the early primary, it is still a New Hampshire phenomenon. The organization, strategy, issues and methods need to fit the New Hampshire political mold. The results bear the mark of the state's electorate, and when it comes to the Presidential Primaries that electorate is at least as sophisticated as any other.

New Hampshire has a large and accountable weekly press. The small circulation papers reflect the political activities of the people in the local communities. Their greatest impact is on the way local affairs are conducted and by conveying certain community social norms and mores. Coverage in a weekly paper, on a regular and favorable basis, can be of great assistance to any political candidate.

Six of New Hampshire's seven daily newspapers are responsible, moderate-to-liberal Republican in tone. They are distributed geographically in seven urban centers and, with the exception of one, maintain regional circulations. In no case is there more than one daily newspaper in a given city. Both the Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI) maintain wire service offices in the state. One or both of the services is purchased by all the daily papers and radio stations.

The exception mentioned above is the Manchester Union Leader. Owned since the mid-1940's by William Loeb, this paper has continually supported a series of right-wing and conservative causes. The paper is consistently partisan and will use all the tricks of "yellow journalism" to support its

positions. It has long been anathema to sensible political discussion and journalistic responsibility. Skillfully propagandistic, the paper has perfected the front page editorial and adjusted its news stories as best serves its interests. President Kennedy said, while speaking in Manchester during the 1960 campaign, that he though there might be a more irresponsible newspaper in the nation than the Manchester Union Leader, but he had never seen it.[4]

The Union Leader has an uncertain impact on New Hampshire politics. It claims a state-wide circulation in excess of 60,000 papers. At least half of this circulation is in the state's largest city, Manchester. Whether Mr. Loeb is an arbiter of Presidential candidates is questionable. He does however, frequently determine the issues of a political contest.

The 1960 Kennedy Delegate Strategy

The 1960 Kennedy strategy for New Hampshire was to begin assembling a New England block with as tight a delegate to candidate tie as possible. This meant that a carefully selected slate of "pledged" to Kennedy delegate candidates would have to be placed on the ballot and then elected. Those seeking the spoiler or broker role contended that to be "pledged" was antithetical to the concept of a self-nominated, freely elected, and voter-selected delegation. A pledged delegation to the Los Angeles Convention would have no room to maneuver and, therefore, could not effectively barter for the interests of New Hampshire. On the other hand, a delegation composed of representatives elected as "favorable" to the nomination of John F. Kennedy would have room to maneuver should the Kennedy candidacy weaken as the convention approached.

The 1960 Kennedy primary was not the automatic victory that it appeared once the votes were counted. Although no serious opposition materialized during the weeks prior to the March election, the problem of turning out a significant vote, when almost no contest existed, was the first test. The second test was to put life into the New England delegate bloc strategy by electing the full slate of pledged to Kennedy delegates. On both counts the Kennedy forces, led by Bernard Boutin and William Dunfey were successful. An unprecedented 40,000 votes were cast for John F. Kennedy and the total pledged slate of Kennedy delegates was elected. The Kennedy candidacy had passed through the exceedingly hazardous waters of the New Hampshire Presidential Primary not only unharmed but battle-wise and confident as well. Kennedy's New Hampshire leaders, Boutin, Dunfey and others who had helped gain the victory played important roles in other pre-nomination contests. They were eventually to hold numerous state and federal offices as testimony for their services and ability.

During that same presidential primary the role of New Hampshire's most powerful state-wide newspaper, The Manchester Union Leader, became clear. The newspaper, a durable critic of John Kennedy and the Kennedy family[5] did all in its power to torpedo his presidential candidacy at the New Hampshire stage.

Long an opponent of party endorsements and pledged delegations, the Manchester Union Leader supported the disruptive-to-Kennedy activity of the Democratic Party old guard. Their strategy was to slate "favorable" to Kennedy delegate candidates in opposition to the "pledged" slate picked by

The New Hampshire Kennedy leadership. The presidential candidacy of a Chicago ball-point pen manufacturer, Paul Fisher, was identified by the Union Leader as a major and substantive challenge to the junior Senator from Massachusetts. The Union Leader even prompted its surrogate, the Governor, Wesley Powell, to charge Kennedy with being "soft on communism" and encouraged Powell to announce that Kennedy would have to exceed a 20,000 vote total in order to justify the continuation of his candidacy beyond New Hampshire. Kennedy responded by calling upon Vice President and presidential candidate, Richard M. Nixon, to repudiate the remarks of his New Hampshire campaign manager, Governor Wesley Powell, and to advise Powell to apologize for his intemperance. Nixon responded that Powell was not speaking for him and that he, Nixon, certainly did not share Powell's opinion of Kennedy. The hazards which William Loeb, (the Manchester Union Leader's publisher and frequent editorialist) had placed in Kennedy's path were successfully navigated. Kennedy carried the Democratic preference ballot by 20,000 more votes than Governor Powell said would be required to be a significant vote. The Kennedy "pledged" slate of convention delegates was also elected.

The results accomplished for Kennedy in New Hampshire by the young and aggressive new Democratic activists in the 1960 Presidential primary further reduced the liveliness of the "Old Guard" New Hampshire Democrats. During the next few months they would become themselves strong supporters of President Kennedy's nomination and election. The irritation of that 1960 primary contest would remain and the experience would be one that would return in 1968 to bother its principal New Hampshire leader, Bernard Boutin.

New Hampshire: A Conservative State

The status quo in Northern New England is not paradise, but it is a known condition. Change as a political promise is only attractive in New Hampshire when the status quo has itself become uncertain. Hard work is perceived to insure not only survival but a modicum of prosperity. Sudden riches are not part of the northern New England experience. Conservative governments, churches, schools, and philosophies have dominated as the institutional backbone of New Hampshire for too long to respond to a sudden call for change. In the 1960 presidential election, political change for its own sake was not seen as a virtue in New Hampshire. Whatever desire there was within the state to change national leadership it was not strong enough to overcome the habit of voting straight Republican Party ticket, nor was it strong enough to overcome an underlying resistance to electing a Boston Irish Catholic, President of the United States. That year, 1960, Richard Nixon carried New Hampshire by a wide margin while H. Styles Bridges for U.S. Senate smothered his opponent, Dartmouth Professor Herbert Hill and Wesley Powell, Governor, proceeded to swamp even the spunky candidacy of Bernard L. Boutin.

The 1964 Presidential Primary

The 1960 presidential primary contest of John F. Kennedy had been instructive to the future McCarthy campaign organizers in terms of managing delegate selection and campaign organization. The 1964 version of the New Hampshire presidential primary provided a further education in campaigning but this time from the contest on the Republican side of the ballot.

The contest was between two announced and agressively campaigning candidates, Nelson Rockefeller and Barry Goldwater, and two unannounced absentee candidates, Henry Cabot Lodge and Richard Nixon. The latter two were represented by small local organizations trying to stir up a write-in vote for their respective candidates. When the votes were counted, Henry Cabot Lodge's organization had succeeded in attracting enough write-in votes for the non-candidate, then Ambassador to Vietnam, to win the contest and elect a full slate of delegates to the 1964 Republican convention. The election was instructive to those who would eventually organize the 1968 McCarthy campaign both in terms of the result and the organizational methods. It would also influence those who would manage President Johnson's candidacy and even those campaigning for Republican candidates.

The Rockefeller vote followed the pattern of a friends' and neighbors' vote coupled with support among liberal organization Republicans. The town of Hanover recorded a strong vote for Rockefeller as evidence of their friendship and his association with Dartmouth College. Berlin, in Coos County, was carried by Rockefeller. An industrial Democratic city, Berlin was affected by a resurgent liberal Republican organization which responded to the wishes of an announced and campaigning candidate rather than the independent spirit of a write-in. Rockefeller also found support in the upper middle class towns where a sophistication, either intellectual or cultural, encouraged the voters to overlook the issue of divorce and remarriage.

Senator Goldwater carried thirteen of Manchester's fourteen wards, and most by substantial pluralities. Other communities in which Powell had had strong organizations also gave Goldwater considerable support. The Union Leader was Powell's most ardent supporter until its disaffection with him in 1962. The split between the Nixon and Goldwater votes revealed that Powell's support was dissipating and that the Goldwater strength was less related to the pull of his prominent supporters, but rather to the effectiveness of the Union Leader.

The Lodge vote was a more difficult phenomenon to identify. It was partly a negative vote and partly a neutral vote. There are many New Hampshire voters who are nominally registered as Republicans in order to vote in the Republican primaries. For most of the past 40 years the Democratic Party has been unable to elect its candidates to major office. Only once prior to 1958 had a Democrat been elected Governor and that was in 1922. The gubernatorial election (the only elected constitutional office) was decided in the Republican primary. Moderates, who in other states would be Democrats, registered as Republicans to vote in that Republican primary.

This bloc of moderate swing voters would not vote for Goldwater and many would vote against him. Many in this bloc also held a deep dislike for Wesley Powell and, therefore, would not vote for a candidate receiving his endorsement. Nixon had not been an appealing candidate for the moderates, especially since his defeat in 1960 and again in 1962. New Hampshire swing voters also have a high regard for the power of their votes and will attempt to direct support where they think their vote will have the most impact.

Rockefeller did not appear strong enough to win the primary or the nomination. A vote for Rockefeller could well have been a wasted expression. In balancing the alternatives, Henry Cabot Lodge appeared even more attractive to the nominal Republican voter. They could vote for him as an expression of protest and as a means of making their votes count in the scheme of national politics.

The Lodge vote in New Hampshire came from the communities in which considerable independence has been shown in recent years. The Democratic Party had received an increasing vote in these communities as the internal Republican Party conflict increased. The best example of voter independence was the City of Concord. In the 1962 Republican primary, incumbent Governor Powell lost in Concord to his opponent, John Pillsbury, by a considerable margin. In the general election, Concord gave the Democratic candidate, John W. King, a good majority towards his convincing victory. Lodge carried every ward in Concord by large margins in spite of the work of both the Rockefeller and the Goldwater committees.

The New Hampshire voter had weighed the alternatives, had rejected the advice of the state's most prominent elected Republican leadership and the campaigning of the announced candidates, to write in the names of Henry Cabot Lodge and Richard Nixon on their presidential primary ballots. The Lodge organization had detected a vacuum developing in the candidate field, (something that former Governor Powell also saw somewhat later) and they, with considerable imagination, devised a strategy to suggest an alternative to the undecided voters. Without much money, with little time to prepare

the campaign, and with almost no organization except the mail return pledge card to attract voter interest, they succeeded where Goldwater's endorsements and Rockefeller's campaigning had failed.

The vote returns revealed the existence of four types of New Hampshire Republicans. The first were the conservative party leaders and those establishment voters who responded to suggestions of those leaders and, in this election to the voting advice of the Manchester Union Leader, in their support of Senator Goldwater. These voters were scattered throughout the state but tended to predominate where the conservative establishment of the Republican party was the strongest.

The second bloc of voters were those of the more liberal Republican establishment. These voters and their leaders tended to support the candidacy of Governor Rockefeller and to receive the endorsement of the liberal Republican press for their activities in the state. Like the conservative Republican establishment vote, this vote was widely dispersed throughout the state but was strongest in those communities where the newspapers and the leadership had been relatively more liberal.

Neither of these two blocs would play a role in the 1968 Democratic party or have particular influence on what occurred that year. The conservatives would vote for Richard Nixon and the liberals tended to support Governor Romney and then to write-in the name of Nelson Rockefeller. It is the last two voter types that are of interest.

The first of these were the voters who responded to the suggestion of former Governor Powell that they write in the name of Richard Nixon on their ballot. These voters tended to predominate in the high circulation communities of the Manchester Union Leader. Loeb and Powell had been a political team for more than ten years until a split in 1961. Powell had attracted an anti-establishment Republican vote in his primary contests and had won his two terms as governor with the support of moverick Democrats from these Union Leader dominated communities. The strong Powell communities also tended to be of middle-lower socio-economic status.

Loeb could not overcome Powell's residual appeal and failed to hold Powell's loyalists for his candidate Barry Goldwater. Powell's vote bloc tended to be the mavericks of New Hampshire politics, and, therefore, not persons closely aligned with either political party.

Although the 1964 Republican presidential primary did not show Powell's strength among the maverick Democrats, it had been these same mavericks who had elected him twice over his Democratic gubernatorial opponent Bernard L. Boutin. When Powell endorsed John King in the 1962 gubernatorial election this bloc shifted to King. The anti-establishment views of these Democrats would be found again in the 1968 Democratic presidential primary. Without Governor Wallace as a presidential candidate (a politician much like Powell in his appeal) these mavericks shifted to McCarthy, a candidate they perceived as anti-establishment.

The final bloc of voters were those independent Republicans that contain Democrat-like liberals, non-organization Republicans, and tended to be of a higher socio-economic status. These were the Lodge voters who were able to make a vote decision with a minimum of campaign provided information, and to register that decision in the more demanding manner of the write in and

through the selection of delegate candidates. These voters, their communities, and their similar Democratic voter counterparts are of particular importance to the explanation of the outcome of the 1968 presidential primary of the Democratic party.

In summary the 1964 Republican presidential primary gave the observer two basic insights to the dynamics of such elections. The first was the tactic which the Lodge organizers had used to attract a vote for their candidate. The pledge card, the use of direct mail and the careful timing of their strategy were especially attractive to those organizing campaigns for 1968. Secondly, the way the voters broke into blocks and how these blocks responded to changing political conditions attract considerable interest. The possibility that Democratic voters might respond, like the Republican voters had responded, to the various options, indicated a potential in the Democratic electorate to produce a surprise result like that which the Lodge organizers had accomplished. The 1964 presidential primary was a reference point that helped the campaign planners of the 1968 primary to judge the potential of their strategies. It gave them new options that, because they had worked in 1964, might be made to work again in 1968. Without that reference point much of what happened in 1968 might not have happened. To experiment, as the Lodge organizers experimented, would have been much too risky given the issues that were at stake. There had to be some feeling that an effort to test public opinion on the war issues would be politically viable. The Lodge success was a political reality. Something like it might work again was the conclusion of those considering options for 1968.

The Johnson Image Fades

To many observers and political activists alike, Lyndon Johnson was omnipotent. His political skills and his legislative acumen led many to believe that he was capable of directing the destiny not only of the nation but also of his political party; that he could control those who had produced his legislative victories.

A creeping cancer was beginning to nibble at the facade of Johnson's leadership. Early in 1965 the military build-up in South Vietnam had begun. As the casualties increased, draft quotas grew, war expenditures cut the funding of the Great Society programs and the credibility of the administration began to decline. Those who had worked for the election of Lyndon Johnson as the "peace" candidate in 1964 questioned the wisdom of their loyalty.

Through the spring, summer, and fall of 1966, many of the Congressional Class of 1964 maintained their loyalty to the administration they had supported during the previous two years, expecting that some break would occur in Vietnam policy.

The rising insecurity among politicians and the public took several significant forms in New Hampshire. The first was that in the 2nd Congressional District, Eugene S. Daniell, a former Franklin Mayor, State Senator, State Representative, and 1960 Congressional candidate, announced his candidacy for Congress. The unusual part of his announcement was that he would run in opposition to the continuation of the war policy in Vietnam.

In addition to the two Congressional seats to be filled in the 1966 election, Governor King would be seeking an unprecedented third term and, Thomas McIntyre, (elected to a short-term U.S. Senate seat in 1962), would stand for election to his first full term. 1966 was to be the high watermark of the New

Hampshire Democratic Party with incumbent candidates in Congress, the Governor's office, U.S. Senate, and for all five seats of the Governor's Council. Daniell's candidacy, avowed opposition to the administration's policy in Vietnam and possible nomination would be an embarrassment to the unity thrust of the New Hampshire Democratic incumbents.

At that stage the opponents to the war in Vietnam were viewed as a ragged fringe of anti-social malcontents who had little faith in the capaicty of Lyndon Johnson to control the Vietnam situation and to manage U.S. involvement. The same was the case in New Hampshire. With the exception of Daniell, who had an extensive though controversial political history, the scattering of dissidents were, for the most part, non-political, politically inexperienced, without party ties, and with limited organizational interest or capaicty. From the perspective of the Democratic Party organization these malcontents, represented by Daniell, could not be allowed to disrupt the Party's drive to consolidate the 1964 electoral gains. To create the unity ticket a Nashua attorney, William Barry, was drafted to challenge Daniell for the 2nd Congressional District nomination. This he did successfully. Daniell and the Anti-war activists were once again shunted to the fringe of New Hampshire politics.

On election night King was re-elected Governor by his Manchester friends and neighbors and McIntyre was re-elected by approximately the same margin as the Governor. The list District incumbent Democrat, J. Olive Huot, lost his seat to Louis Wyman who he beat in 1964. Huot would be one of the 40 plus members of the class of 1964 to be defeated that election eve. The Barry contest in the 2nd Congressional District never got beyond the blush of the primary victory. Lacking resources, manpower, a sufficiently clear image, Barry lost by more than two to one to the incumbent Republican.

Democrats lost their seats in the Governor's Council and resumed their former minority position in both houses of the Legislature.

Election eve 1966, produced a quantum increase in the depth and breadth of the Vietnam dissenters. Lyndon Johnson had not succeeded in producing the Vietnam miracle that might have saved at least some of the outstanding members of the Congressional class of 1964. During the last weeks of the fall campaign, Lyndon Johnson seemed to be running away from those Congressional loyalists who had delivered the landmark legislative calendar of the 89th Congress. Instead of staying to help with the political fight or to produce the Vietnam policy change, the man who had appeared omnipotent, the consummate politician, the creator of the 1964 landslide, vanished from the political stage. In fact, during those final weeks of the campaign, he seemed to retreat inside the White House. Toward the end, Johnson actually left the country on a tour of the Pacific. When his power was needed most at home, and in the face of a pre-election faith in his ability to make politically right the gloomy international situation, Lyndon Johnson, by his withdrawal, symbolically jumped ship. He was leaving the sinking class of 1964 alone while he, their skipper, fled to safe ground.

For those political activists who had accepted the notion that Lyndon Johnson could manage Vietnam with restraint and that he would protect the political fortress of the Democratic Party, election eve 1966 was a major blow. Those who supported William Barry against Eugene Daniell, those who accepted the party unity strategy for the re-election of Senator Tom McIntyre began to feel that they had been duped, not only had they been taken

in by the idea of the strategy, but even more by the argument that those who were re-elected in New Hampshire reflected the state's support of the administration's war policy. An added consequence was the fear that those who were re-elected, King and McIntyre, would interpret their success as the result of their unquestioning support of the administration's policies in Southeast Asia. To bring them back to a happier political day in 1964, when they joined Lyndon Johnson on the platform in Manchester, and applauded their President's commitment to keep our boys out of Vietnam, would be a difficult, even impossible, task.

The chronicle of the escalation of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam from late 1966 through 1967 has been recounted, examined, and dissected in numerous accounts.[6] Those accounts do not need to be re-stated except as personal recollections of events that influenced individual decisions to actively oppose the war policy and, eventually, the leadership of the New Hampshire Democratic Party.

During the 1966 election year, the administration's war rhetoric increased. Deliberate allusions to the memories of a period of national unity which had accompained United States participation in World War II were used to cloud the public consciousness of the Vietnam war. Increased draft quotas, escalating war costs, increasing casualties, and a growing uncertainty as to the utility of that war policy countered point by point the administration's attempts to wrap U.S. involvement in a blanket of patriotism. Skepticism, distrust, and disillusionment were re-manufactured with each full-color television evening news report from Vietnam. A steady rise of protest was also being broadcast from the nation's universities and colleges as student protests increased.

Many had thought that the defeat of Senator Barry Goldwater by the landslide vote in 1964 had buried once and for all the slogan, "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice." Quickly they began to realize that extremism in the defense of administration war policy was acceptable, and with it they began to feel that extremism in defense of personal liberty might also be necessary. In fact at one point during this period, old phrases re-discovered in early state and national founding and organizing documents were dusted off for reconsideration. As an example, the New Hampshire Constitution, one of the nation's oldest state constitutions, contains a section headed; "The right of revolution." [7] When all else fails, the article implies revolution is an acceptable policy when used to secure liberty and human rights--at least in the State of New Hampshire. During the months following the 1966 elections, it was clear the high watermark of the Democratic Party in New Hampshire and the "Great Society" had been reached and had passed. Disillusionment and frustration began to sink in as those who had labored to bring the New Hampshire Democratic Party its successes faced 1967.

Governor George Wallace Visits New Hampshire

The first evidence of the depth of the frustration came in the Spring of 1967 when Governor George Wallace of Alabama visited New Hampshire to sound the starting gun for the 1968 presidential primary. While not an avowed candidate for the presidency, Wallace had run as the candidate of the American Independent Party in 1964. He had attracted impressive crowds and recognition in his forays into the industrialized north. New Hampshire seemed a logical first stop in a renewed effort to attract votes and thereby to influence national civil rights and social policy. The Manchester Union Leader

had long been sympathetic to Wallace and his positions. The paper's readers and political constituency could be expected to respond well to a Wallace candidacy in New Hampshire. A successful "water-testing" visit to New Hampshire could well encourage Wallace to enter the New Hampshire presidential primary and ust that vehicle as a means of attracting the votes of the politically alienated, frustrated, and confused.

For the Spring 1967 New Hampshire trip Wallace scheduled a visit ending speech at Dartmouth College. He had been to Dartmouth several years earlier and had received a friendly if not serious response. He had charmed his Ivy league audience with quips about Dartmouth's Ivy league rivals, life on an isolated campus, and his standard speech of anti-federal government, anti-intervention states rights themes. It was a show, a southerner outside the south saying things that seemed more for entertainment than to be taken seriously. To northerners during the early 1960's Wallace was an outrageous oddity of little consequence outside his own state. He had not begun to threaten the politics of the north as he would in subsequent years.

The Dartmouth Wallace visited in the spring of 1967 was quite a different institution than he had visited earlier. The civil rights movement had been taken seriously in the years since his earlier visit. Dartmouth had enrolled a significant number of Black students. Wallace had become a major national political force. The war in Vietnam was now reaching the college student. Wallace now represented a solid political threat by his anti-civil rights position and his support of the war in Vietnam.

Wallace was perfunctorily introduced by the editor of the Daily Dartmouth and then began his usual speech. The 1967 Dartmouth Audience was tense, not receptive to Wallace's attempts at humor, and, while not obviously hostile, were cool to his performance.

Part of the Wallace style was to confront heckling by baiting the hecklers. A part of his notoriety came from the success of this technique--especially before regional audiences and most especially before the national television cameras. Although the heckling, response and increasing agitation of the audience made interesting theater, it did not make good politics in New Hampshire. Wallace brought his speech to a somewhat abrupt close, refused to answer questions, and left the stage. The audience, both inside and outside, listening to snatches of the speech through open windows, were upset by the chain of events. A large crowd formed between the building and the street where Wallace's two cars were parked. Leaving the hall, Wallace was rushed to the car inside a phalanx of his guards and the local police. The crowd surged around the cars, climbed on them, and prevented Wallace's quick escape.

Photographs and television clips of the exit showed two slowmoving cars, covered with students, being rocked and trying to get away from the hall to the Green and Main Street. This task was ultimately accomplished, but not before local police and college officials had some exceptionally nervous moments.

Wallace left New Hampshire that night. National television and the national press devoted considerable footage and space to the incident.

Although the impact of the evening on Wallace's national ambitions were given mixed evaluations Wallace has never returned to New Hampshire. Whatever his intentions had been for scheduling the visit and, perhaps, beginning an early presidential drive in New Hampshire, these were dashed by the reception he received in Hanover.

The fact that Wallace did not eventually enter the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary was important given subsequent analysis of the election results and the level of frustration with conventional political choices harbored by many New Hampshire voters. Whether Wallace would have attracted a winning vote against President Johnson is not possible to know.

Controversy, and Politics in New Hampshire

If there is one prevalent characteristic in New Hampshire politics, it is opposition to controversy. Perhaps because the state's media does not make the elements of a controversy intelligible, controversy and the controversial rapidly lose the attention of the voting public. In simple terms, if someone is said to be "controversial" and then behaves in a controversial manner, the level of public uncertainty increases and the credibility of the person or the issue represented by the person declines. New Hampshire's media situation is such that political reporting tends to be highly personalized. Personality is far more important to the New Hampshire body politic than are the issues which a person espouses. To a considerable extent this condition is attributable to the small size of the state and the inconvenience that issue polarity presents in the conduct of daily affairs in small communities. Credibility is a function of acceptance, for which the avoidance of controversy is necessary--especially controversy generated by the Manchester Union Leader.

Once a public person is identified as controversial and likely to upset tranquility, then that person tends to lose credibility. In a sense, this is what happened to Wallace in Hanover that April evening. He became controversial as a result of his performance. A possible president, in the eyes of New Hampshire citizens, should not behave that way or elicit that kind of response. While not fully understanding the elements of the controversy, they were disposed to throw the baby out with the bath water. Presidential candidates, at least in New Hampshire, have to look like presidents, speak like presidents, behave like presidents, and earn the respect due a president. With almost complete disregard for what is actually said or for what the candidate represents, the instinctive, almost physical response to personality prevails. George Wallace did not meet that measure on his spring trip to New Hampshire in 1967, and somehow he got the message that it would be unproductive for him to come back. By skipping the 1968 New Hampshire Presidential Primary, he, conceivably became a major factor in its result. In January 1968 Robert Craig found that Wallace held a 5% rating which was higher than McCarthy's at that time. Given subsequent analysis of the McCarthy vote it is probable that McCarthy attracted much of the potential Wallace vote (see Chapter XIV). If Wallace had become a candidate in New Hampshire in 1968 he might have severely reduced McCarthy's vote.

SHIFTING POLITICAL SANDS

What had appeared to be fringe dissent on Vietnam during the pre-1966 election period had, by the Spring of 1967, the appearance of a sustained commitment to see Vietnam policy changed. Political action groups that had long sought to change national policy on issues of nuclear weapons control, military influence on foreign policy, and the expansion of the military establishment, now shifted their emphasis toward stopping the war in Vietnam.

They did so with the objective of bringing about changes in United States policy. Converting fringe dissent into a political force was underway.

An essential part of this conversion was speculation as to what avenues the protest should take to be effective. Petitions were circulated, advertisements placed, solicitations for funds and supporters conducted, and mailings to influential groups and persons distributed. Drives to send letters to congressmen and senators were organized and other tactics, all designed to demonstrate the concern of the public, were tried. Vigils, marches, teach-ins, debates, forums, articles, books and prayers were conducted, written, and sent forth. Even as desperation led to raids on Selective Service records, draft avoidance, desertion, exile, and even personal injury, the impenetrability of the policymakers, the ambivalence of Congress, and the steady escalation of the war was frustratingly evident.

Throughout 1967 the dissenters, now called the "peace movement," flailed at the political system without impact. Strategies were confused. Options were unclear. Leadership was scarce and limited in appeal. Other than two United States senators, Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening, vocal opposition from higher office was limited and timid. None of the leaders with national constituencies had expressed their opposition to the point of breaking with the administration on Vietnam. Vice President Hubert Humphrey was an enthusiastic apologist for the administration. Senator Robert Kennedy, though critical and snide, would not adopt a confrontation posture. Few others had the stature to make a difference. It seemed too early to expect a coalition

of elected officials to confront the President. To be effective, such a coalition would have had to arise from within the President's own party. Even from the point of view of an incumbent senator, the power of the president and his administration is considerable. For a senator anticipating a re-election campaign in the fall of 1968, keeping things in order within one's own house and party was of utmost importance; but from the perspective of a congressman, who must face the voters every two years, the power of the presidency is awesome. For a congressman the necessity to express and maintain loyalty is of the highest order. To have an impact on the mutually reinforcing sequences that shape the dynamics of the American political system, public opinion wedges had to be driven between the Congress, the President, the party, and the electorate. The firm structure of rewards and favors, confidences and re-enforcements that supported the scheme of mutual reliances had to be cracked.

By the end of 1967, the foundations began to shake. Elected officials who as recently as one year before hadn't been concerned with the war as an issue, began to sense the shifting sands not only under their own feet but especially as reported by those close associates elected officials rely upon to do their fund-raising, election, and re-election work. It was still too early for the high office holders even to contemplate abandoning the ship of Lyndon Johnson.

Below the high officials are those individuals who, through their political skills, hard work, money, considerable time and energy sustain those holding the offices. These are the workers, the friends, the professional

colleagues, the law partners, the business associates, the bankers, the union leaders, the industrialists, and the many others who have access to those in public office. When the sands of public opinion shift, they shift first and with the strongest effect upon those diverse individual who are the interpreters, the translators of the political mood. From trusted voices are heard the first hints of political trouble. It is in these circles that the discussion of options becomes meaningful. These are the individuals who are likely to know the options, understand the risks, contemplate the possibilities, and organize within the constraints of the political system.

When, toward the middle of 1967, it was evident that few elected officials of the Democratic Party would be willing to risk splitting with the administration over the war in Vietnam and thus threaten the system of mutual reinforcements, another cadre of converts began to join the peace movement. These were the same people whose importance to the political system was their willingness to work at the day-to-day business of politics. An increasing number of these politically sensitive individuals, such as Richard Goodwin, Bill Moyers, John Gardner, and Roger Hillsman, began to research the options offered in the political system and to speak out against continuation of the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy. What prompted them was first, the result of not being able to convince their elected friends to come out against the war politics; secondly, the result of pleas from their elected friends to demonstrate that there really was anti-war support in the home state or district; and third, out of personal frustration over a Vietnam loss or the sting of the generation gap conflict that was growing over the war issues.

At this stage many had come to the conclusion that the use of pressure against individual congressmen and senators was not particularly effective. One or two congressmen or even a senator or two would respond by being critical of the administration's handling of the war. Very few, however, could maintain this position with enough intensity to have even a marginal effect. Certainly the bloc of committed war opponents in the Congress capable of attracting converts and having an impact on policy did not exist. The likelihood of a bloc forming in the Congress from within the party of the President was small especially since the election year of 1968 loomed ahead on the calendar. Congress felt that the President held the power with respect to the war. Many congressmen and senators were in awe of that power and felt vulnerable should they assert opposition to how the President was handling the war. A change in policy, a victory in Vietnam, or a major intervention by China or Russia, they perceived, would undercut their own election prospects. Getting too far away from the pack for a congressman is an exceptionally rare and unsettling experience--especially when the pack is led by the President of one's own party.

Recognizing how difficult it would be to change a large congressional bloc, those considering political options began to direct their attention to the up-coming presidential election.

Organizing to take hold of the political machinery had promise. In many states, even before the nominating process reforms of the 1970's, the political party structures and the electoral process were open and penetrable. In others, as would be discovered, the party structures were not protected by law and had become closed or so atrophied as to be almost unusable.

Determining the structure of each state's presidential nominating process was the first requirement.

In either case, whether moving into an accessible party organization or developing new organizational vehicles, an acceptable and legally reinforced system was available. To go outside this system, or to neglect to examine this system as the vehicle for political action meant one would have to not only create new organizations, but subject these to tests of legality and community acceptance. By using the same organizational tools and structural arrangements that elected Congress and the President, and then putting these tools to a different purpose was at least legally acceptable. To build barricades and organize ad hoc revolutionary committees seemed extreme when on any night a citizen or group of citizens could meet to organize a campaign or attend a local party committee meeting. If a citizen could not influence the committee decisions he could go off and establish his own ad hoc organization and accomplish almost the same objectives as the so-called party regulars. Even in 1968, there were legally set time-locks opening and closing political system doors that led to party organization and candidate nominations. All those in opposition had to do was learn the laws, determine the sequence and schedule of political events, and organize to participate. The system was so penetrable that the exclusions and confrontations that would lead to extra-legal and even revolutionary tactics were unnecessary.

Through the fall of 1967, Lyndon Johnson appeared uninfluenced by the arguments of the opponents of the war. Those few members of Johnson's party in high office, such as John Gardner, who were staunch opponents were being systematically excluded from either their offices or the prerogatives of office. Opposition within the administration was not wise if officials wished to retain their influence if not their jobs. Even opposition to the war policy anywhere in the political structure of the Democratic Party was viewed as disloyal, devisive, and possibly traitorous.

Eliminating opponents to the war from the party tickets as was done in New Hampshire in 1966, now moved several steps further to exclude dissenters from party offices and councils. Until then, Lyndon Johnson had been successful in diverting, disrupting and disregarding the mounting opposition. He was, for all intents and purposes, invulnerable. His presidency was secure from the threat of dispute from the Congress because the Congress was controlled by his party. He was not vulnerable to the voters because they could not affect him outside a regularly scheduled election.

Lyndon Johnson had one weakness: the election of 1968 was drawing closer. Johnson had a lengthy history of political quick-steps. He had survived and prospered through years of legislative offices where his skill at balancing the needs of his Texas constitutency with the requirements of congressional leadership had made him a legend. It appeared that the peace movement had tried all of its tactics except those that would strike the political nerve of his system. If votes could be cast that would show disapproval for his handling of the war, and at least have some of these votes counted directly against him, then Lyndon Johnson could be made to react.

To work, the votes would have to be cast in a political context that Lyndon Johnson understood.

Options and Alternatives

In 1967 evaluating the options led immediately to the presidential primaries that would be conducted in 15 states. The problem with primary elections is that, in order to make the system work, there must be a candidate in opposition. Although the procedure varies from state to state, it is difficult if not impossible, to register protest in a presidential primary without at least a name to vote for or to write in. Some states[8] list all possible candidates and require a disclaimer of candidacy on or before a certain date prior to the primary election in order to have a name removed. Other states[9] required those wishing to have their names listed on the ballot comply with a filing procedure. Only one state, Wisconsin, in 1968, offered the voter the option of voting "no" to the names listed on the ballot. A vote of "no" would be a rejection of all the candidates listed.

Early in 1967, anti-war groups in Wisconsin began orgakizing with the objective of identifying the "no" option as a protest vehicle for those opposing the war. The option met all the requirements of a political protest; it did not, however, represent an alternative. A significant "no" vote would show the size of the opposition to the war and the lengths to which they would go to manifest their concern. What it would not show was a commitment to a viable political alternative. The possibility that such a vote would be disregarded or only peripherally considered by the President and Congress was high. The movement, however, lent a sense of political responsibility to those considering protest options within the political system. Those organizing

the Wisconsin effort received a great deal of publicity on the possible impact of a large "no" vote. This speculation was the 1967 genesis of news reporters' preoccupation, throughout the presidential primary season, with vote size and significance. In each event, in each primary, a magic number had to be determined, how many votes would have to be cast for the "no" option or for candidate "X" in order to be large enough to be considered significant opposition to President Johnson. Playing the numbers was a strange but ultimately important part of the 1968 political game. It made possible the less than majority win which gave the opposition an important advantage.

In New Hampshire, the site of the nation's first presidential primary, the search for alternatives was underway early in 1967. Eugene S. Daniell, the defeated 1966 primary contestant for the 2nd district congressional nomination, had renewed his anti-war activities shortly after the first of the year. The politically skillful Franklin lawyer, noted as a stump speaker and press release writer, announced the formation of a committee to draft Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

Daniell had been contacted by a New York City group headed by a New York City psychiatrist named Dr. Martin Shepard. Without contacting with Robert Kennedy or any close Kennedy family supporters, Shepard was on his own. The effort had the distinct ring of an amateur venture. Shepard financed the operation from the receipts of a weekly New York City cocktail party. Its visibility was dependent upon Dr. Shepard's ego and penchant for press releases.

Shepard had heard about Daniell as the result of the anti-war position he had taken in 1966, and sought him out to organize the Draft Kennedy drive

in New Hampshire. Daniell, in some respects like Shepard, was not particularly concerned about the reality of a political action that was based on trying to draft an unwilling subject. In fact, both lacked a sense of how to organize effectively. They were content to issue press releases, raise a few dollars, meet others with like interests and rely on the coverage their respective press releases for impact.

In the early stages of any political year, the media is hungry for something to report. Especially in a year when it was certain that Lyndon B. Johnson would seek renomination and would not face serious opposition, anything that varied the set theme was attractive. At the same time, much of what would become politically interesting in the Republican Party was beginning to form. Shepard and Daniell gave the hungry reporters some political hard news to report, and news that was appealing in its populist disregard for usual political conventions. Both Shepard and Daniell were eminently quotable, and both were not above using their self-generated forums to criticize administration handling of the war.

Precisely because both Shepard and Daniell were self-motivated operators who were quick to spot an opening for a printable charge, both were incapable of attracting an effective following. Shepard's cocktail group remained about the same size for weeks at a time, while Daniell's potential disciples were put off by his lack of interest in building an organization and his frequent press release diatribes.

If Robert Kennedy had any intention of sparking or subtly approving a primary-oriented draft, that thought was quickly snuffed out by the activities of Shepard and Daniell. Their repeated letters and press statements calling for his candidacy were set aside by Robert Kennedy. Eventually, the irritation of the press prompted and forced Robert Kennedy's hand. He wrote to both Shepard and Daniell disavowing their activities and stated that he would not be a candidate, drafted or otherwise, in 1968.

A political option which, perhaps, Kennedy would have liked to have kept open in order to apply greater pressure on the administration from the inside, had to be closed. The timing and the auspices of the draft venture forced Kennedy to reveal his position long before it was advisable. Kennedy's flat-footed public and private denial of the Shepard-Daniell overture did not discourage them.

Even with the Kennedy denial, Daniell still had several options open. Since his mission was to express protest against the war, the availability of a popular name was enough. He stated early in his effort that his objective was to manifest dissent on the administration's war policies. Without a "no" option, like that in Wisconsin, Daniell needed a name. He said he would file a slate of delegate candidates favorable to the nomination of Robert Kennedy. In spite of the protestations of Robert Kennedy, both of these actions were within the Eugene Daniell perogative. All he needed was a semblance of an organization and sufficient New Hampshire voters willing to file as delegate candidates. The 1968 edition of the New Hampshire presidential classic was underway.

At this point a digression is in order. As has been discussed in this section the 1960 presidential primary of John Kennedy revealed some of the political dynamics of the New Hampshire presidential primary. The 1964 version of that event revealed additional options. Both experiences were to have an important influence on the planning of the 1968 contest.

What is important to note is that the 1960 primary was principally of interest to Democrats seeking a nominee who could win the Presidency for their party in 1960. The 1964 primary was of particular interest to Republicans who had to select a candidate to face the incumbent President, Lyndon Johnson. Regardless of the party for which the election interest was greatest, the lessons, the experiences of the various primaries are important to those who observe and for those who might be tempted to be involved in planning and managing a New Hampshire presidential primary campaign.

Notes

[1]For a detailed account of other decisions see: Richard T. Stout, People, The Story of the Grass-roots Movement that Found Eugene McCarthy and is Transforming our Politics Today, (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

[2]No incumbent President has failed to receive a renomination he sought since Chester A. Arthur failed to receive the renomination of the Republican Party in 1884.

The most prominent challenge that failed was that of former President Theodore Roosevelt against William Howard Taft in 1912. Some feel that Senator Estes Kefauver's challenge of President Harry S. Truman in the 1952 New Hampshire presidential primary led to Truman's decision not to seek renomination that year. Kefauver received 54.6 percent to Truman's 43.9 percent of the Democratic Party vote and carried all twelve of the delegate seats from New Hampshire. Truman was not a declared candidate in that primary and his name was not listed on the ballot.

[3]Robert B. Dishman and Joseph P. Ford, "The New Hampshire Party System, 1968", (University of New Hampshire, 1968, mimeographed).

[4]Eric Veblen, The Manchester Union Leader in New Hampshire Elections, (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1975).

[5]Kevin Cash, Who the Hell is William Loeb?, (Manchester: Amoskeag Press, Inc., 1975).

[6]Three of the most important studies are:

Roger Hillsman, To Move a Nation, (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967).

David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire, (New York: Random House, 1972).

_____, The Best and the Brightest, (New York: Random House, 1972).

[7]Margin Title: "Right of Revolution"

(ART.) 10th Government being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security, of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family, or class of men; and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.

"Constitution of the State of New Hampshire," New Hampshire Manual for the General Court, No. 33, 1953. (Concord: State of New Hampshire, 1953), p. 79.

[8]For a discussion of the status of presidential nomination processes as existed in 1968 see: "The Democratic Choice, A Report of the Commission on the Democratic Selection of Presidential Nominees," (Washington, D.C.: The New Democratic Coalition, 1968).

[9]See above.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES AND NEW HAMPSHIRE

Early Chronology

Accounts of the national search to find a person to be a candidate against Lyndon Johnson have been well documented.[1] It is sufficient to note that a series of separate and unrelated organizational activities and alternative candidate searches were underway. The searches which had succeeded in attracting attention in New Hampshire were: The Draft Kennedy movement stimulated by Dr. Martin Shepard of New York City; the Wisconsin vote "no" option; the California Democratic Council organization; and the New York Coalition for a Democratic Alternative. Little if anything was known of the activities of Allard Lowenstein, Russel Hemenway, Maurice Rosenblat, Curtis Gans, and others as they went from office to senatorial office trying to convince first Kennedy, then McGovern, then McCarthy to become a candidate against the certain renomination of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

All that has been reported subsequently of Lowenstein's search from one possible candidate to the next inside Washington and elsewhere, was unknown to those who were evaluating presidential primary options in New Hampshire. As September and the political season of 1968 began, the possibility of working with the Draft Kennedy movement in New Hampshire seemed to be the only remaining option. Others in New Hampshire had come to the same conclusion and had already begun to attend the meetings that Eugene Daniell held in various parts of the state.

Once Lowenstein had secured a tentative commitment from McCarthy that he would consider being a presidential primary candidate, Lowenstein and an associate, Curtis Gans, wanted to see what such a candidacy might attract. The two with several others began visiting the various presidential primary states to talk with those who might work in such a campaign. Gans was assigned to visit New Hampshire where he had been given the name of David Hoeh a twenty-nine year old Dartmouth College administrator who had had extensive experience in New Hampshire politics.

Although Hoeh did not recall Gans' name when the meeting had been arranged, when Gans came into the room he immediately recognized Gans as having been an effective proponent of the Democratic Party at a 1959 National Student Association meeting Hoeh had attended. After introductions, the next words from Gans were that there was a possibility that Senator Eugene McCarthy would run for president against Lyndon B. Johnson, and that there was a possibility that he would enter the New Hampshire Primary. Without elaboration Gans then asked what Hoeh thought of McCarthy's prospects as a presidential candidate.

Stunned, Hoeh remembered that in the spring of 1960 a little known U.S. Senator, Eugene J. McCarthy, was introduced to a student audience at the University of New Hampshire by the Catholic Student Chaplian, Father Francis O'Conner. He was speaking in behalf of the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey, then a candidate for the presidency against John F. Kennedy. Hoeh's impression for that brief exposure to McCarthy was indelible.

McCarthy had been an effective speaker and an especially effective respondent to questioning. He sprinkled his answers with facts and disarmed some hostility with humor and subtle barbs. He was quiet spoken, lucid, with a style that tended to bring his audience close to him. From that experience Hoeh felt that McCarthy could campaign well in New Hampshire even upon such emotionally charged issues as the war in Vietnam. Hoeh's reaction to Gans was "yes" he thought McCarthy could be a good candidate but that a successful candidacy would depend upon attracting support from those experienced with the machinery of New Hampshire campaigns.

Gans began the exploratory contacts with a list of names that Hoeh provided. Several meetings of potential McCarthy supporters followed leading to the formation of a New Hampshire committee. In the weeks that followed the October 22, 1967 meeting with David Hoeh, several campaign efforts began in New Hampshire. The first was to assemble a state-wide cadre of potential McCarthy supporters who could become a McCarthy campaign organization. The second was to demonstrate to McCarthy that he should enter the New Hampshire presidential primary. The third effort was to counter the pro-Kennedy write-in drive of Eugene Daniell so that McCarthy would be the only anti-war name with organized support in New Hampshire. A fourth campaign sprang from the others as an effort to keep the New Hampshire Democratic party from converting itself into a campaign organization for the renomination of Lyndon Johnson and an endorsement of his Vietnam policies. By the middle of November 1967, these four efforts were well under way and led by the cadre of supporters that Gans had found and Hoeh had brought together into the McCarthy New Hampshire Steering Committee.

To a great extent the success of the campaign that followed in New Hampshire was dependent upon the lengths to which Lowenstein and Gans had been able to demonstrate to politically experienced individuals that a contest in the presidential primary might have an impact on national affairs.

Without question, the lengthy and fruitless work of those who had first opposed the war policies of the Johnson administration had stirred the consciences of at least some political activists. To those like the emerging McCarthy leadership in New Hampshire, Wisconsin, California, New York and other states, who were looking for a way to express oppostion to the war, a live candidacy by a respected political leader, within the political system was by far the preferable protect route. Their experience, their political skills, and their understanding of the political processes could direct the energy of protest within a political system designed to absorb such discontent. In contrast to those with political expertise were those in the national peace movement who had already written off the possibility of creating a policy change by using the political system. Later, when the success of the political efforts began to show, some of these groups and individuals joined the effort. But even until the very end in Chicago 1968, some substantial and vocal groups did not join, did not see the efficacy of participating in the political system, and felt vindicated by the miscarriage which the Chicago Convention produced.

To support their argument for inside the political system activity, Allard Lowenstein collaborated with a University of Michigan Professor, Arnold S. Kaufman, on a policy statement agruing why President Johnson should be challenged. Gans capsulized the argument in each of his subsequent meetings as he pursued the list of twenty names that Hoeh had given him on October 25th.

To counter the arguments of those who felt that the political system could not produce policy change Allard Lowenstein and University of Michigan Professor, Arnold S. Kaufman, collaborated on a statement titled, "Why Democrats Should Work to Stop Johnson." A verbal summary of this statement became the argument that both Lowenstein and Gans used in their efforts to organize the opposition among Democratic party activists. The statement sought to counter prevalent themes of party loyalty with higher questions of national morality. "...If a president is wrong but popular, political realities may make opposing him difficult, however right; if a president is right but unpopular, supporting him may be a duty, however difficult. But when a president is both wrong and unpopular, to refuse to oppose him is a moral abdication and political stupidity."

They felt that Johnson was bound to be opposed, as they put it, "... whatever liberal Democrats may 'decide' to do. In Wisconsin, does one vote 'Yes' or 'No' when those words appear beside Mr. Johnson's name on the ballot? In California, can one simply avoid the primary contest between the CDC "peace" slate and a coalition of party regulars ...led by Mayor Yorty? And if one does these things is the anti-war cause strengthened by the stronger pro-Johnson vote that would presumably result?"

To these questions Lowenstein and Kaufmann offered alternatives. The first was that there could be "somebody" to counter the "you can't beat somebody with nobody" argument. They wrote, "There will be an acceptable "somebody" as soon as the depth and extent of Democratic dissatisfaction is clear." They de-bunked the idea that achieving a "peace plank" in the 1968 Democratic Party Platform would be a worthy accomplishment, as they did those who attributed to Johnson motives of eventual Vietnam

policy change. To each of these reasons for withholding support for a counter candidacy they offered the long-shot political route, a route, however, that had the potential for at least tapping public frustration with the status quo. For liberal Democrats they offered the prospect of a "new coalition embracing much of the disenchanted left and of the anxious muddled middle - a coalition that would be based on present realities and needs rather than on fading memories of past political victories." They concluded their manifesto by writing:

> The American people are generally appalled by the prospect of a Johnson-Nixon-Wallace choice in 1968. One may hope Republicans will do all they can in their party to avert such a choice.
>
> But it is conceivable that those of us who are Democrats will surrender the party of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt and of John F. Kennedy to those whose policies are shattering our hopes for a just society and a peaceful world. To accept the Johnson record as the basis for a national campaign is such a surrender. It may seem difficult at first to fight for the party against the power of the presidency, but that is how the fight must be made if it is to be relevant.[2]

It became a fact that as the political year of 1968 approached, the possibility of influencing Johnson's war policies within the Democratic Party was remote. New Hampshire Republicans and liberals wanting to attack administration war policies were looking at the Republican presidential nominating contest as being the place to have an impact. If the candidate in the Republican primary who was most critical of the administration on the war were to prevail, then a strong political message would be transmitted to President Johnson. Changing party was then a complicated process in New Hampshire. The possibility that a significant number of these anti-war Republicans would switch to the Democratic Party and thereby be eligible to vote for or against its candidates was negligible.

Pre-Campaign Organization

Although the ready-made organizations of peace activists and anti-war committees were thought to be of value in the ultimate organization of the political campaign, in the early stages these groups presented problems. Most of New Hampshire's anti-war groups were located in the less populous college communities while their impact would be slight and their value to the larger state organization limited. Early contact efforts, therefore, were concentrated in the large towns and cities where a significant Democratic primary vote existed. Generally, these were not the communities that had been politicized by the war. Where anti-war activity had occurred, in Nashua, for example, it had emerged from the less political and the radical activists of the community.

McCarthy leaders did not want to build the possible alternative candidacy on a base of pre-existing anti-war organizations, but rather to create a new organization developed from the disaffections of those with political experience in the Democratic Party. Once the statewide network of politically experienced leaders was established and local groups formed by these leaders, then it would be possible to form coalitions with the existing peace-action and anti-war protest groups. This sequence of organizing was important.

If the McCarthy activity had been built on the foundation of existing anti-war organization before attempting to create a politically experienced cadre, it is probable that the radical public image of the anti-war activists would have kept away those politically experienced Democrats who could make the effort succeed.

A consensus among those making the contacts was that a drive, to be successful, had to be mounted within the Democratic Party. It had to be built inside the structure of the New Hampshire primary election process and it had to be directed toward massing votes that were clearly Democratic Party votes. Only in this way would it be possible to convince President Lyndon B. Johnson that the opposition was not a collection of miscreant radicals outside respectable partisan politics.

The peace-action and anti-war groups in New Hampshire were composed of a conglomeration of some Democratic and some Republican Party activists, resident and non-resident students, radicals, and non partisans. To some, there was a feeling of a "curse on both of the political houses," which made it difficult to be involved in political action tied to a specific party. In contrast there was a view that the Democratic Party, to which they had owed allegiance for some years, was being taken in a direction that was not true to its history. Past involvement in the Democratic Party was important in planning the early McCarthy organization. Once an identity had been established for the group of Democratic Party dissenters, then they felt a coalition could be constructed of others willing to share a common litany of dissent.

Toward the middle of November, a pattern of escalating political events began to emerge. A flurry of reports on the pending McCarthy candidacy dominated the ruminations of the columnists and the dispatches of the wire services.

Various organizations in other states were reporting favorable reaction to a possible McCarthy candidacy. The pro-Johnson organizing effort, active since early in the Fall of 1967, set November 19th as the date when the New Hampshire Democratic State Committee would consider a Johnson renomination endorsement. In order to orchestrate that meeting properly and to repress Daniell's pro-Robert Kennedy activity, Bernard Boutin, the Johnson committee chairman, scheduled an evening social gathering of New Hampshire's Democrats for Friday, November 17th. The star attraction would be Senator Robert Kennedy's younger brother, the senior Senator from Massachusetts, Edward M. Kennedy.

The Kennedy "Endorsement"

The invitation to Edward Kennedy had been extended several months earlier through Kennedy's Senate colleague, Tom McIntyre, on behalf of Governor John W. King and Bernard Boutin and had been accepted by the Senator as a personal gesture to those New Hampshire loyalists who had helped with the 1960 Presidential Primary. The event, scheduled for the ballroom of the Sheraton-Wayfarer Motel, Bedford, was organized as a $5.00 per person reception. The price and the attraction of the star, Edward M. Kennedy, insured that most of the party's leadership and faithful would be attending. A tally of the receipts for the evening showed that more than 2,000 turned out on that snowy November night.

Boutin had scheduled the reception in cooperation with the party chairman, Manchester attorney William Craig, as the first social event in his strategy of organizing and then representing to the public a unified Democratic Party in support of President Johnson. The public reason for the gathering was to pay tribute to several leaders of the party for their years of service.

Because circumstances had begun to change during the last weeks of October and early weeks of November, Boutin saw the social evening as an opportunity to overpower any of those who might be wavering in their support of Johnson. The visual unity of the New Hampshire party's leadership, delivered through Senator Edward Kennedy, he reasoned, should be enough to do that. In fact, in the days prior to the Kennedy visit and in the car from Boston to Manchester, McIntyre and Boutin urged Kennedy to lay to rest any speculation that his brother might be a candidate or that the Kennedy family would lend moral support to any alternative drive for the nomination. Boutin wanted Kennedy to renew Boutin's promise that if a Kennedy came to New Hampshire during the time of the presidential primary campaign it would be for the purpose of endorsing President Johnson, or, actually campaigning for the Johnson write-in.

Kennedy arrived, spoke and shattered the Boutin dream. Not only did Kennedy not endorse the President for renomination in unequivocal terms, he only mentioned Lyndon Johnson's name once and then only among the list of the Democratic Party's presidential heroes.

The visible gap between Robert Kennedy and the President had been widening in the weeks prior to the November 17th gathering. Robert Kennedy had broken with Johnson over the war in a speech delivered earlier that fall. Although his public statements continued to support Johnson's renomination and he had privately refused to consider a candidacy for the presidency in 1968, Robert Kennedy was seeking a policy change on Vietnam through his support of those in dissent.

To the chagrin of the New Hampshire Democratic Party leadership, dutifully assembled behind Kennedy on the platform, he launched into a series of humorous one-line accounts of conversations between himself and his brother, Robert, and comments on the contemporary political scene.

After perfunctory introductory remarks, Edward Kennedy recounted recent conversations he had had with his brother, "When I said I was going to New Hampshire I asked my brother if he wanted me to file a disclaimer removing him as a candidate he said, 'Mind your own business.' When I told him about the write-in campaign he said, 'Robert Kennedy spelled R O B E R T K E N N E D Y is not a write-in candidate.'" In his traditional review of the great names in Democratic Party history, the names of Roosevelt, Truman, and John F. Kennedy drew the loudest response. Johnson was extended courteous but not extraordinary recognition.

The climax of his speech began with a warning, "I have heard in recent days that there is a man considering a campaign in New Hampshire for the presidency. This candidacy poses a serious threat to the Democratic Party. This man, from Minnesota, must become well known to you all so that you will understand the seriousness of his positions. This man, Harold E. Stassen, does not deserve your support." Kennedy's tone, at one playful and yet serious, hushed the audience. The leaders on the platform hung in anticipation of words that would tell the gathered Democratic faithful that Eugene McCarthy was to be feared and could not expect even the slightest encouragement from the Kennedy clan. Those in the room who had begun their early contacts for McCarthy were equally suspended by Kennedy's rhetoric. To the noticable relief of many in the audience and to the visible distress of those on the platform, Kennedy had not singled out McCarthy for his wrath. He had instead taken all

on a rhetorical trip. More questions were raised than answered by Edward Kennedy's performance. No ringing endorsement of the President had occurred. His name was barely mentioned. No great upswelling of emotion had been generated from the crowd to discourage an effort to build an alternative organization from within the party. In fact, to those of McCarthy leaders observing the carefully orchestrated events of that evening, nothing happened that was anything less than reassuring and even encouraging.

The Johnson Endorsement

The Democratic Committee assembled for its previously scheduled meeting at 2:00 p.m., Sunday, November 19th at the New Hampshire Highway Motel, Concord. The meeting was set to closely follow the "unity" reception held the previous Friday evening. Undaunted by the lack of an endorsement of President Johnson by Senator Edward Kennedy, the Johnson leaders now sought to convert the Democratic State Committee into the Johnson write-in campaign organization. In order to do this Boutin had to secure the endorsement of the State Committee.

The Democratic State Committee was then composed of the officers of the ten county committees; additional members based on county population and for counties casting a majority vote for the gubernatorial nominee in the most recent state election; present and past party chairmen; major elected officials, and the immediate past candidates for statewide or national elected office. Of the approximately seventy persons eligible to vote in a State Committee meeting, twenty-eight were on hand for the November 17th meeting.

The resolution drafted by the National Committeeman Joseph Milliment, was introduced by Governor King and seconded by Senator McIntyre. Supporting the resolutions, King said, "Johnson is in the company of greatness and is not the first president to lose public opinion because of an unpopular war. Of course his popularity is dwindling, but he wasn't elected to please all of the people all of the time." King went on to compare Johnson's war problems with those of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. "We elected him because we had faith in his ability to lead this country and to do the right thing, popular or not." He concluded by vowing strong support of the President for re-election, "When the chips are down, the people of this country will realize the fact of life that this man, in four years, has done more in the way of concrete accomplishments for this country than any other president in history. This is the man who has had the tenacity and determination that perservered in the great struggle in Vietnam at the cost of his own personal popularity. And in that situation he is in the company of greatness. For this is not indeed the first time that a president of the United States faced this very same situation."

"I cheer President Johnson for upholding and maintaining that honor in the face of the worst personal abuse any President ever had to endure. In South Vietnam the United States has made a solemn commitment to stop communist agression, and that commitment is a matter of our national honor."[3]

The debate continued for almost an hour. Those opposed to the endorsement resolution argued the issue on two grounds. The first was their disagreement with the administration's war policy and the second was the argument in favor of an open primary and against endorsements.

It was argued that without an endorsement, individuals could support whom they wished and the party structure would remain accessible to all its members. An endorsement would shut out those in opposition at a time when each and every Democrat was needed in order to elect the nominated ticket in the fall.

The endorsement resolution was approved by a vote of 23-5. In spite of the vote a victory of sorts had been won. Five members of the Democratic State Committee voted in opposition to the party leadership's resolution.

What had been a desire to explore alternatives on the part of the McCarthy group now became a resolve. The language of the Democratic State Committee resolution and the arguments of those who supported its adoption grated their sensitivities. The endorsement meant that for all intents and purposes the state Democratic Party was now the Johnson organization. Those not willing to support Johnson's renomination or even those concerned about the issues while still wanting to remain within the party, had no room to maneuver. For those who had been considering a McCarthy for President organization this would be the last time for many months that they would share the Democratic Party as friends.

The Re-Registration Problem

One of the McCarthy Committee objectives was to organize a campaign to encourage the re-registration of Republicans as Democrats during the re-registration period set by law. In 1968 New Hampshire maintained a rather tightly regulated party registration system.

Membership in a party by fact of registration or previous non-participation in a primary and, therefore, status as an independent, were voting requirements. In order for a person registered as a Republican to participate in the Democratic presidential primary that person would have to have re-registered as a Democrat ninety (90) days prior to the primary election date.

The re-registration period opened for the 1968 presidential primary early in December and was to end December 12, 1967.[4] This would be the only time that either Democrats or Republicans could switch their registration in order to make them eligible to vote in the opposite party's primary. In their preliminary planning the committee felt that it would be important to have the McCarthy campaign sufficiently organzied so that they could get some Republicans to change their party registration. The committee hoped that these nominal Republicans might feel that their vote would have greater dissenting impact when cast directly against the administration, in the Democratic primary, rather than for some Republican candidate.

Unfortunately, re-registration was a difficult process. The voting lists are maintained by uncompensated Supervisors of the Checklists who are required to "sit" for the purpose of receiving re-registration requests during periods defined by the law. These periods vary in duration and number, and are determined by the population size of the voting precinct. Also to be considered was the fact that in New Hampshire the voting machinery, with few exceptions, is controlled by locally elected supervisors who are usually Republicans. The closed registration system favored the majority party and changes in that system that would make it more open were resisted by the majority party.

Organizing a significant re-registration drive would have required a major effort on the part of the McCarthy Steering Committee. To be successful there would have to be an actual candidate ready and willing to challenge Lyndon Johnson in New Hampshire. On the Republican side, Governor George Romney was offering that attraction to both the real and nominal Republicans upset with the Johnson administration.

The Committee estimated that they might be able to re-register 4-5,000 Republicans if they were successful in making known the existence of the re-registration period by publicizing the actual times, dates, and places of re-registration. On this latter point, it was not unusual for the supervisors to select difficult times to comply with the law. Saturday evenings and dates in the middle of long-weekend holidays were often the times selected for re-registration. Only the most dedicated and persistent of those wishing to re-register bothered to take the trouble.

The independent is a voter of one of several types. The independent could be a new voter who had just reached the voting age of 21 years and registered for the first time, a recent arrival to the state, or a person who had not previously voted in a primary election. Under the closed primary rules of 1968, an independent seeking to vote in the primary election, had to select a party ballot and thereby became designated as a registrant in that party. Later he or she could change parties by following the re-registration procedure, but independent status, like virginity, could not be restored once it was lost. For reasons, both personal and political, this rule had discouraged participation by the sizable pool of independents who by definition had not previously voted in a partisan primary.

Nevertheless in every primary election, some independents did give up their status to participate in the primary of the party of their choice. To get them to do this for a particular candidate is one of the important strategies that both parties and all candidates attempt during a primary season.

The outcome of the re-registration effort was more successful than the committed had expected. Although Senator McCarthy did not announce his entry into the New Hampshire primary until long after the end of the re-registration period, his November 30th announcement of candidacy did prompt a significant increase in the number of re-registrations from Republican to Democrat. The committee estimated that upwards of 5,000 persons entered the Democratic Party and that a majority of these did so to vote for Senator McCarthy.

McCarthy A Presidential Candidate

While the New Hampshire McCarthy Steering Committee was pursuing its organizational objectives, McCarthy was preparing to announce his presidential candidacy in Washington. E.W. (NED) Kenworthy, writing in the November 25th edition of the New Republic, reviewed what Senator McCarthy had been up to during the period from "November 9 to 13." McCarthy had visited five important states (New York, Minnesota, Michigan, Massachusetts, and Illinois) testing sentiment and gathering pledges of financial support for what McCarthy then described as his "personal confrontation" of Johnson's Vietnam policy. Kenworthy wrote:

> By the end of those five days the Minnesota Democrat had reached, if he had not done so earlier, the point of no return.

He would still be contacting his senatorial colleagues, such as the Kennedy brothers and Wisconsin's Gaylord Nelson who was facing re-election, before

making the final decision. But unless these leaders and his close potential associates objected strenuously McCarthy would announce his candidacy.

Sometime prior to November 30th, McCarthy concluded his preliminary search for support and committed himself to that "personalized alternative." When he entered the Senate Caucus Room to make his announcement at a press conference, it was a sense of the personification of protest that surrounded him. He was a rallying point, a vehicle for dissent on the war, a spokesman with standing and credibility. He was not, however, viewed by himself or by many others as being viable as a candidate for the presidency.

The press conference was notably low-key. He began his announcement by not saying that he was a candidate for the presidency but saying:

> "I intend to enter the Democratic primaries in four states, Wisconsin, Oregon, California, and Nebraska. The decision with reference to Massachusetts and also New Hampshire will be made within the next two or three weeks."[6]

In the remainder of his statement, he set forth the tone of his effort, making clear that he was not a candidate in conventional terms.

> Since I first said that I thought the issue of Vietnam and the issues related to it should be raised in the primaries of the country I have talked with Democratic leaders from about 25 to 26 states. I've talked particularly to candidates for re-election to the Senate--Democratic candidates--some House members and also to students on campus and to other people throughout the country.
>
> My decision to challenge the President's position and the Administration position has been strengthened by evident intention to escalate and to intensify the war in Vietnam and on the other hand the absence of any positive indication or suggestion for a compromise or for the negotiated political settlement.
>
> I am concerned that the Administration seems to have set no limit to the price which it's willing to pay for a military victory. Let me summarize the cost of the war up to this point:
>
> The physical destruction of much of a small and weak nation by military operation of the most powerful nation in the world.

One hundred thousand to 150,000 civilian casualties in South Vietnam alone, to say nothing of the destruction of life and property in North Vietnam.

The uprooting and the fracturing of the structure of the society of South Vietnam where one-fourth to one-third of the population are now reported to be refugees.

For the United States as of yesterday over 15,000 combat dead and nearly 95,000 wounded through November.

A monthly expenditure in pursuit of the war amounting somewhere between $2 billion and $3 billion.

I am also concerned about the bearing of the war on other areas of the United States responsibility, both at home and abroad.

The failure to appropriate adequate funds for the poverty program here, for housing, for education and to meet other national needs and the prospect of additional cuts as a condition to the possible passage of the surtax bill.

The drastic reduction of our foreign aid program in other parts of the world.

A dangerous rise in inflation and one of the indirect and serious consequences of our involvement in Vietnam, the devaluation of the British pound, which in many respects is more important east of Suez today than the British Navy.

In addition, there is growing evidence of a deepening moral crisis in America--discontent and frustration and a disposition to take extralegal if not illegal action to manifest protest.

I am hopeful that this challenge which I am making, which I hope will be supported by other members of the Senate and other politicians, may alleviate at least in some degree this sense of political helplessness and restore to many people a belief in the processes of American politics and of American Government.

The college campuses especially-on those campuses--and also among adult thoughtful Americans, that it may counter the growing sense of alienation from politics which I think is currently reflected in a tendency to withdraw from the political action, to talk of nonparticipation, to become cynical and to make threats of support for third parties or fourth parties or other irregular political movements.

I do not see in my move any great threat to the unity and strength of the Democratic party, whatever that unity may be today and whatever strength it may be.

The issue of the war in Vietnam is not really a separate issue but one that must be dealt with in the configuration of other problems to which it is related. It is within this broader context that I intend to make the case to the people of the United States.

> To say that I'm -- as I'm sure I shall be charged-- I am not for peace at any price, but for an honorable, rational and political solution to this war, a solution which I believe will enhance our world position, encourage the respect of our allies and our potential adversaries, which will permit us to give the necessary attention to other commitments both at home and abroad, military and non-military and leave us with resources and moral energy to deal effectively with the pressing domestic problems of the United States itself.
>
> In this--this total effort--I believe we can restore to this nation a clearer sense of purpose and of dedication to the achievement of our traditional purpose as a great nation in the 10th century.[7]

The statement and McCarthy's response to the questions that followed constitute important political documentation of his attitude toward the venture. As Warren Weaver reported in his New York Times article that day, "During a bantering, low-key news conference, the Minnesota Senator never actually declared himself a candidate for president or contended that he could deprive the President of the nomination."[8] He viewed his function as being that of the vehicle, the personification, that would make it possible to manifest the extent of the national concern--a concern he saw as dividing the young from their parents, the campuses from their communities, the present from the future. It was not possible simply to vote "no" on the issue of the renomination of the President as Wisconsin offered. There had to be a focal point, a name, but not a great deal more, and certainly not a candidate projecting the impression that he expected to displace the President.

McCarthy did say, "...I don't mean to draw off at any point, and I think this challenge would have to go all the way to a challenge for the nomination for the presidency. It may not be me at that point. It may be someone else, but so fas as the end result of the effort, I think it has now to go to the point of trying to change the policy and direction and also the mood of America...[9] It was a modest beginning marked by realistic language tied

to the accepted wisdom that a sitting president was impossible to displace if that president wished to seek renomination. One questioner, in fact, asked if McCarthy's move wasn't actually political suicide, to which McCarthy replied, "not suicide but it might be execution.[10]

The crucible of the New Hampshire primary would change the tone of the McCarthy effort but the essence remained. McCarthy was responding to a call. There was a spontaneous national uprising that needed a point around which to organize. The movement needed someone who sensed the urgency of the time; who could give voice to the senses, who could respond to the vitality of the concern, and would remain solid when faced with pressures to adjust from within as well as from without. McCarthy did not describe a traditional political role for himself. He was there because he was willing to respond to the call. That was the only condition. To become a candidate in the traditional sense was not possible in 1967. To have said, "I announce my candidacy for president and I expect to be nominated and elected to that office" would have been a false and misleading statement totally out of step with the needs of the moment. The insincerity of that statement would have driven away the very support which had created the conditions of the draft. There were those who faulted McCarthy in his announcement for his lack of passion, charisma, and firebrand dedication to the cause. They were seeking a leader to speak with their own sense of urgency, an amplification of their concerns, rather than a political educator, one capable of expanding the constituency of dissent with effective arguments and carefully put questions.

The reaction to the announcement was extensive though widely varied. The New York Times editorialized:

> The decision of Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota to challenge Johnson in the Democratic Presidential primaries now enables those who dissent from the administration's policy in Vietnam to find political expression for their convictions... .
>
> It is highly unlikely that President Johnson can be denied renomination if he wants it. Senator McCarthy's more optimistic supporters argue that if he should be successful in the primaries, such a show of strength might impel President Johnson to withdraw voluntarily to prevent a hopeless split with the party. We believe this kind of reasoning to be based on a complete misreading of Mr. Johnson's temperament. He is not a man likely to quit under fire.
>
> But it is true that the nation's policy can only be changed by political methods. How the Vietnam issue is fought out within each party and between the two parties in the coming year will go far toward determining the shape of American policy in the next presidential term. Since Senator McCarthy is a thoughtful, responsible man, he can be expected to clarify the alternatives in Vietnam and usefully contribute to the complex political process by which the American people make up their minds on great issues.[11]

Not quite believing what they were seeing, the mystics of the national press began to probe immediately for the hidden McCarthy agenda and the personal motives of his action. The first theme, that of the "stalking horse" for some other candidate, usually considered to be Senator Robert F. Kennedy, was the most persistent early press question. McCarthy did not fully allay that contention in his press conference when he said that he had talked with Senator Kennedy about his decision to oppose the President and Kennedy "had not tried to dissuade him." He indicated that Kennedy was his second choice as a Johnson challenger. "I would have been glad if he had moved early. I think if he had, there'd have been no need for me to do anything."[12]

The New Hampshire and regional newspapers gave McCarthy's announcement prominent coverage. Major stories appeared in the Boston and New Hampshire newspapers. The Boston Herald-Traveler ran a large headline, "McCarthy Tests LBJ in 4 Primaries," with a column head "Seeks Reaction on War Policy." The Christian Science Monitor headline read, "McCarthy Rallies War Critics." The New Hampshire newspapers ran page one stories with headlines like that in the Valley News, "McCarthy is Going to Run" or the Daily Dartmouth's headline, "McCarthy Challenges LBJ for Presidency." But inside stories often concentrated on other themes such as Raymond Lahr's UPI article headed in the Valley News, "Is McCarthy Running Interference for Challenge by Bobby Kennedy?" His lead paragraph read, "Democratic leaders wondered today whether Senator Eugene J. McCarthy's presidential candidacy was simply clearing the way for Senator Robert F. Kennedy to challenge President Johnson in 1968." In Relman Morin's article in the Herald Traveler, dated 12/1/67, headlined "McCarthy Offers a Choice" the lead read, "Senator Eugene J. McCarthy's decision to challenge President Johnson in four Presidential primaries could polarize the movements of dissident Democrats already under way in a number of states to block the renomination of the President next year."

The announcement had been received well. It was serious news from a serious man who was challenging the President. The "stalking horse" theme was carried with the story but as a minor element. Editorial reaction reinforced the seriousness of the announcement. The tone was one of the "test" which McCarthy was prepared to make rather than promulgating an aggressive candidacy. Even the "stalking horse" theme took on a jaded aspect when surrogates for the administration, accused McCarthy of being a front runner for Kennedy. The

New York Post carried a story headlined, "Connally Hits McCarthy as RFK Front." "Gov. Connally of Texas charged today that Sen. McCarthy is a "stalking horse" for the Presidential aspirations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.... His (Connally's) charges came after his White House meeting Wednesday with Johnson."[13] "The stalking horse" theme did stimulate interest in the McCarthy activity. It is possible that without the sub-plot and the reportorial sniffing for intrigue, the McCarthy story might well have died during the next month when there was little for the reporters to cover except the preliminaries of a newly born political venture.

Newsday's Nick Thimmesch in a December 1, 1967 column headlined "McCarthy Aides the Crux," identified an ultimately more important theme:

> The "McCarthy for President" movement has an attractive candidate, a lively issue, the promise of plenty of money and the immediate problem of developing an effective campaign apparatus.
>
> The celebrated Minnesota Senator made his big splash yesterday by announcing that he would enter four primaries...Today, his staffers and supporters are busy arranging schedules and organization in a score of states in addition to those where he will definitely be on the ballot.
>
> Until that organization is formed, McCarthy must rely largely on the Conference of Concerned Democrats and similar groups which have been pushing a "Dump Johnson" movement for two months....
>
> The Senator has not signed on any issues specialists and relies on staffers and friends in universities and in the military for advice on his principal issue, Vietnam. At this point he does not have a staff of the dimension usually required for a presidential primary campaign. . . .
>
> At the end of McCarthy's announcement session yesterday, where the Senator showed good wit and poise, a man long associated with liberal causes remarked: "Gene was great today, but he's so casual about organization. Vietnam is the big issue and lots of people are for him. The question is whether he can get well enough organized to make some impact."[14]

Later in this campaign, as in most others, to show that one was an early supporter of a candidate became a form of intra-campaign one-upmanship. In the McCarthy campaign, two themes were important. The most prominent was

FMBNH or "for McCarthy before New Hampshire." The highest order of merit was to be "for McCarthy before McCarthy."

Thimmesch and others inventoried the support that existed in each of the states where McCarthy would definitely run. What they found was impressive. McCarthy would have to "rely" as Timmesch put it, on these "groups" until he built his own organization. What he missed was that building his own organization had, to a great extent, already been accomplished. This was a legitimate draft. Organizations were really seeking a candidate, whereas usually candidates stimulate organizations to support what they already have firmly in mind.

Thimmesch wrote:

> On the West Coast, McCarthy's initial support is the California Democratic Council, headed by Gerald N. Hill and Edmond Gerald Brown, Jr., son of former Governor "Pat" Brown; California Congressman Don Edwards, and former Oregon Democratic State Chairman Howard Morgan.
>
> In Wisconsin, where McCarthy is popular, Donald O. Peterson, Democratic chairman of the 10th Congressional District Committee, is the organizer.... The key men in the New York effort are reformers--Atty. Allard K. Lowenstein, Assemblyman Jerome Kretchmer, City Councilman Ted Weiss and Ronald Eldridge. McCarthy also has the backing of Michigan's most publicized dissenter from Johnson's Vietnam policy, Zolton Ferency, who recently resigned as state chairman.
>
> A "Citizens for McCarthy" group is active in New Hampshire under the leadership of David Hoeh (sic), former assistant to Gov. John W. King and Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre....
>
> He (McCarthy) would also like to get supplemental support in the form of favorite son candidacies from three sympathetic Senate colleagues: Indiana's Vance Hartke, Ohio's Stephen Young and South Dakota's George McGovern. Invitations to speak are pouring into McCarthy's office. His first campaign speech will be delivered to the Conference of Concerned Democrats, who are already believers, in Chicago tomorrow.[15]

Both Governor John W. King and Senator J. McIntyre were contacted for their reaction to the McCarthy announcement. King was asked whether he agreed with Senator Robert Kennedy when Kennedy said he thought McCarthy's decision "would be good for the party." King said he disagreed with Kennedy. "My inclination is to support the President. I have complete confidence that the man who has led this country with vigor and determination and unshakable courage for the past four years will be re-elected for another four year term."[16]

McIntyre said that, "he, Governor King, and the members of the New Hampshire State Democratic Committee will 'do our best' to make sure Senator McCarthy 'gets as few votes as possible' if he enters the state presidential primary. The only McCarthy New Hampshire people know about is the late one"--referring to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin.

"It poses the threat of early injury to the President," McIntyre noted, "it doesn't take too much for the news media to read into the results a possible threat to the President." But he added, "his own polls and readings indicated New Hampshire was quite hawkish though he did sense some build-up for a move to get out of Vietnam." He estimated a turnout of 40,000 of the state's 87,000 registered Democratic voters and thought that would be a good showing.[17]

Earlier, McIntyre had projected that the most McCarthy could expect to receive in the primary was "3,000 to 5,000 votes."[18] This statement became an early target for the McCarthy campaigners who could then say that anything above McIntyre's prediction of 3-5,000 votes would have to be considered significant.

Status of the Campaign: Early December

The combination of the announcement of McCarthy's national candidacy, the surge of various state activities for McCarthy and the publicity given the December 1st weekend Conference of Concerned Democrats began to stir the smoldering dissident Democrats' fire.[19] The Conference of Concerned Democrats had brought the activities and individuals of the state organizations in contact with the national press. Reports and columns were written about the conference. As an example, Paul R. Wieck (one of the more perceptive of those reporting the early months of the campaign), wrote in the New Republic:

> In many respects, the Chicago weekend offered a study of the strenghts and weaknesses of the McCarthy movement punctuated by a series of "ifs."
>
> "If" the mood of the electorate is really such that a major effort can be made to deny renomination of President Johnson, a good start has been made.
>
> This will be answered early -- by the working class Catholics in Massachusetts and, possibly, New Hampshire; by the farmers in Wisconsin and Nebraska; by the Negroes in the ghettoes of Milwaukee and Boston; by the white collar workers in the Boston suburbs.
>
> If the answer is "yes, the mood is there," Senator McCarthy will assuredly return to Chicago next summer with a sizable block of delegates in as much as the Democratic Party's structure, outside Chicago and a few machine-oriented states in the Northeast, is, at best, a shell. It wouldn't resist a massive, well-funded effort riding the crest of a voter mood. Thanks, in part, to the way President Johnson has run, or failed to run, the Democratic National Committee.
>
> If the answer is "yes" one can expect top officials in the party to come forth as the months roll by.
>
> Its long-range significance could be to recharge the batteries of a tired party structure and convert it in many areas into a vehicle responsive to the will of the electorate.
>
> If Senator McCarthy accomplishes nothing more than this, he will have made a valuable contribution. Much now rests with him.

> Even if all the "ifs" turn out right, he must still throw himself into a hard-hitting, personalized campaign that will arouse the interest of the voters if all this is to be translated into convention delegates.
>
> The beginnings -- by just beginnings -- were to be found in Chicago the first weekend in December.[20]

When uncertain campaign workers read encouraging stories, such as above, in influential national magazines and they began reading similar analyses in the columns of their daily newspapers and saw the networks extensively cover their early national meetings, confidence was created. When the New Hampshire travelers returned home from Chicago to find editorial support in their local newspapers the recharge was immediate. Under the headline "An Overnight Phenomenon," the Concord Daily Monitor wrote in its lead editorial December 5, 1967:

> A person can rise to national prominence in this country in a surprisingly short time.
>
> The latest example is Senator Eugene McCarthy, endorsed as a Democratic candidate for the party's nomination for President by dissenters to the policies of President Johnson....
>
> Accentuating the rapidly spreading awareness of his presence as a national figure is the degree to which it has evoked concern by the Democratic regulars who support the President's presumed ambition to succeed himself.
>
> The loud cries of pain, especially from Senator McIntyre of New Hampshire, and Governor King's studied efforts to dismiss Senator McCarthy as a nonentity, belie their expresses confidence in the President's cause.
>
> Related is the release of Secretary of Defense McNamara at this particular moment and the subtle drawing back of Senator Robert Kennedy from his unconditional endorsement of President Johnson's candidacy.
>
> McCarthy has been boosted by those with whom he dissents to the position of stalking the nomination for Senator Kennedy, whether he planned it that way or not....

> Whatever McCarthy does, he is encouraging Democrats to change horses, something a lot of them have been thinking about, as the popularity polls reveal.
>
> He favors free choice by Democrats of their party leadership and he is capable of using inspirational language in support of such freedom.
>
> His personal political future seems to be of no concern to him, which is one reason he has already attracted a respectable following.[21]

On the same day, December 5th, Louis Harris released his latest poll which showed that "Senator Eugene McCarthy would lose a nationwide primary battle against President Johnson for the Democratic nomination for President by almost 4 to 1 if it were held today".[22]

The survey showed that a national cross section of Democrats preferred Johnson by 63 percent to McCarthy with 17 percent and 20 percent were undecided.

The story went on to say:

> McCarthy runs weakest in precisely those regions where his backers have been urging him to confront Mr. Johnson. In the East, including New Hampshire and Massachusetts, McCarthy trails by 72 to 11 percent. In the Midwest, including Wisconsin, the Senator has a 67 to 19 percent disadvantage....
>
> Mr Johnson makes his poorest showing against McCarthy in the South, where LBJ leads by 54 to 20 percent with 26 percent undecided....
>
> It should be pointed out that the results represent the situation at a time of weakness for any challenger --before he has had an opportunity to develop as a serious alternative in the public mind. How much the Senator could gain on the President would depend partly on the kind of campaign he waged, the support he could organize and what happened to the prevailing mood about the Vietnam war, likely to be the principal issue of any such confrontation.
>
> The potential for which McCarthy might aspire was recorded by Senator Robert Kennedy of New York in the Harris survey when he led President Johnson in preference for the Democratic nomination by 52 to 32 percent. The gaps between McCarthy's initial support and Kennedy's demonstrated support are greatest among young people, Negroes, women and Catholics.

> If McCarthy could rally support among such voters in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Oregon, or California primaries, he might make a contest of a campaign against President Johnson.[23]

From these accounts could be read important implications. The first was that a 17 percent level of favorable recognition was reported five days after an announcement of candidacy which was not preceded by the usual pre-announcement build-up. This indicated an important foundation of support. The sizable undecided percentage was also encouraging, considering a campaign had not begun. Thirdly, the early comparison between Johnson and Kennedy indicated that Johnson's 63 percent against McCarthy was anything but rock hard. In fact the hard commitment to Johnson was only at the 37 percent level. The fourth, and most important implication, was that to strike an early blow McCarthy would have to enter and do well in one of the states where he was perceived by the poll to have a difficult contest. Given the size of the swing vote to Kennedy and percent undecided, such a contest, even if in conservative New Hampshire, might be impossible for McCarthy. Certainly a campaign could succeed beyond the 10 percent or "3,000 to 5,000" vote level that Senator McIntyre predicted would be necessary in order to be considered significant. The problem remained one of convincing McCarthy to run in New Hampshire.

McCarthy's December 14 and 15 New Hampshire Visit

At the Chicago meeting with McCarthy the New Hampshire delegation pressed an invitation to him to visit New Hampshire and to do so as a lecturer in a University of New Hampshire sponsored series. He accepted the invitation and came to New Hampshire December 14. His first contact with the New Hampshire public was through a lecture before an audience of 1,500 at the Wayfarer Convention Center, just outside Manchester. His second was a meeting with potential supporters and the McCarthy for President Steering Committee. As he entered the living room in which the meeting was being held, McCarthy said, "This looks like a government in exile."

David Hoch introduced McCarthy by saying, "Tonight we have had a chance to hear you speak, now we would like to tell you what we see are your chances in New Hampshire and what we would like to do for you in this primary."

The Steering Committee had been working hard during the past several weeks. The news from the Chicago meeting, McCarthy's announcement and the New Hampshire Democratic State Committee's endorsement of the Johnson renomination had stirred great interest in McCarthy in New Hampshire. One of the first persons Hoch asked to speak was Dennis Sullivan, recently elected as Mayor of the city of Nashua. A maverick Democrat who had taken a leave from his job as a postal clerk to run for Mayor, Sullivan professed to reflect the view of the New Hampshire workingman. Sullivan was the senior elected official in the room. Although he had not been involved in the McCarthy activity, he was attracted to the meeting by his opposition to the Johnson administration and the renomination endorsement of the Democratic State Committee. His comments about the impact of a possible New Hampshire McCarthy effort were disjointed and confusing. He was clear, however, in his view that it was desirable to confront the Democratic Party organization of the State. He concluded by saying that he did not want to give McCarthy a bum steer. He did not think McCarthy's anti-war position would be well received in New Hampshire and advised him not to stake too much on a New Hampshire race. Issues of intra-party "fair play", and adverse reactions to the Johnson administration and New Hampshire Democratic Party heavy-handedness, he felt, were more likely to produce results.

Others, like David Underwood of Concord, Jack Holland of Bedford/Manchester, Paul McEachern, Deputy Mayor of Portsmouth, Jean Wallin, Nashua State Representative, Joseph Welton, Nashua Democratic Party Chairman, Ron O'Callaghan,

Democratic Party activist of Laconia, were basically positive toward the prospects of a live candidacy and about the organizations they could generate for such a candidacy in their communities. John Wiseman, a Keene State College history professor, recounted the independent organizing efforts that were already well under way in his city. Without prodding from outside, Keene Citizens had begun a series of activities aimed at focussing public opinion on the impact of the Vietnam war and toward expressing that concern through the New Hampshire Presidential Primary. Petitions were being circulated, teach-ins held, and anti-war activities were regularly scheduled. A broad organization of community and college persons was already spreading outward from Keene to the smaller towns of surrounding Cheshire County.

Wiseman wanted McCarthy to enter and said that his organization was prepared to support the effort. He said that a live candidacy was more attractive to his committee than the write-in campaign for a reluctant Robert Kennedy. His account of the Keene effort showed that such activity would also increase the size of the sympathetic audience even though their early activities had been met with serious establishment resistance.

The most startling comments of the evening came from John Teague, member of a prominent New Hampshire Republican family. Teague, an Amherst College senior, head of the Amherst College McCarthy for President group, had become a Democrat much to the surprise of his conservative Republican father. "Students" he said, "are tired of protests. They are tired of sit-ins and women pushing baby carriages in protest marches. They are tired of burning their draft cards, and all of the usual kinds of war protests. We want to push the political system just as hard as it can be pushed to see if we can accomplish anything." He concluded by urging Senator McCarthy to be

a serious candidate for the presidency and to say that he is running for president. "If this happens and young people get the message clearly, then thousands will join the campaign!"[24] With these words, Teague had captured the mood of the evening. Perhaps having McCarthy as the personification of the war issue, the focal point of protest, would not be enough. McCarthy had to become a serious candidate for the presidency. If he entered the New Hampshire primary he would need to understand that that would be a consequence.

Macy Morse, a Nashua mother of eleven sons, two of whom had served in Vietnam, recounted how disturbed her boys were with what was going on over ther and how concerned she was about the fate ahead for others of her family if the war continued. She urged McCarthy to run in New Hampshire, but, more importantly, to run hard.[25]

A Manchester man who introduced himself as a Republican said that he would support McCarthy, if McCarthy ran in New Hampshire, and that he expected many other Republicans would do the same. In reply the Senator said, "Yes, at this point there is no indication that the Republican Party will come up with anyone better than the present administration."

"My purpose in announcing my candidacy in November was threefold. First, I want to challenge the administration's course in Vietnam and to bring about a public debate or discourse on the issue. Secondly, I want to bring about a change in the present administration. And third, I want to be elected President of the United States."[26]

McCarthy's voice dropped a bit when he added his third purpose as though the words were not as familiar to him as "challenge" and "debate." Perhaps this addition came as an immediate response to John Teague's direct challenge to McCarthy himself.

With the exception of Mayor Sullivan's early comments, the tone of the remarks had been serious, positive, and encouraging. Little had been glossed over. McCarthy had to know from the comments that New Hampshire would be tought but that he could count on the support of a considerable group of experienced workers. With this as background, Hoeh felt safe in turning to the Steering Committee's skeptic, Peter Freedman.

Freedman began by telling McCarthy that he didn't think McCarthy would do well among the blue collar New Hampshire workers. He recounted conversations he had had in the past weeks with Manchester Democratic millworkers who thought McCarthy was Joe McCarthy, and that the best solution to the Vietnam situation would be to "bomb it off the face of the earth."[27] McCarthy responded by saying, "No, I don't imagine I will do well with the labor vote. I don't think I will do well with them in Minnesota either, but I don't think it will be much of a problem." But in the final analysis, if he did get the Democratic nomination, we felt the labor vote would go either to him or George Wallace, rather than to the Republican candidate. McCarthy also said that he would not consider running as a third party candidate and was not at all interested in that prospect.[28]

Freedman went on with his account of the informal polls he had taken among his workers in both the Democratic cities of Manchester and Claremont. Both samplings showed that his workers held "hawk" positions on the war. He

concluded with the question, "Senator, don't you think you should have a poll before deciding whether to enter the New Hampshire Primary?" McCarthy reflected a moment, then said, "No, I don't think so, I think a poll would be very discouraging." This comment seemed to capsulize the nature of his effort and unified the gatherings' commitment to him in one quite prophetic response.[29]

The Senator then asked several questions concerning when a decision on entering New Hampshire would have to be made. David Roberts, Dartmouth College professor and member of the Draft Robert Kennedy Committee, said that an organizational meeting would be held on December 28th and that that would be the final date before their organization would be fully committed. Roberts added that he felt that organizing two conflicting anti-Johnson efforts could not work. In his mind it was clear that if McCarthy entered the New Hampshire Primary the Draft R.F.K. movement would shift to the McCarthy candidacy.[30]

In response to a question concerning New Hampshire specifically, McCarthy said, "You know the New Hampshire electorate is known to be somewhat michievous in nature. I don't really know how we would do here. My time is very much committed to the Wisconsin campaign and I planned to make a trip to the Far East stopping over in Saigon and Japan. I will have to let you know later."[31]

Hoeh was about to bring the session to a close when McCarthy said that he greatly appreciated the meeting and that it had given him a great deal to consider. He then said, "I had better leave before I do something rash."[32] The meeting ended.

The New Hampshire leaders had thought that the meeting had gone exceptionally well. The right tone had been maintained. A frank discussion of New Hampshire, its political problems and potential had been accomplished in a way that showed McCarthy the sincerity of those who would be the activists. All of the hard questions concerning McCarthy himself as a candidate, and New Hampshire as a test of his candidacy had been raised. McCarthy's responses were thoughtful, perceptive, and reassuring, not concerning his decision as to whether he would enter New Hampshire, but his competence as a candidate. The big question remained —— were they closer to a positive decision from McCarthy about New Hampshire?

The Campaign Strategy and Schedule Proposed to McCarthy

Inspite of the success of the December 14 and 15 visit to New Hampshire McCarthy was overheard to say to David Halberstam, then writing for Harper's magazine, that he was not inclined to enter the New Hampshire primary. Hearing this David Hoeh and his co-leader, Gerry Studds, were determined to present the argument once more as to why McCarthy should enter the New Hampshire primary. They had been urged by McCarthy's Administrative Assistant, Jerry Eller, to contact McCarthy's newly named campaign manager Blair Clark. McCarthy, Clark, and others would be making final decision regarding which primaries to enter in the days remaining before the end of the year.

Studds agreed to draft a memorandum and schedule summarizing how the campaign might be conducted. Hoeh agreed to telephone Blair Clark.

To make contact with Clark was difficult. No campaign headquarters had been established, nor were there campaign telephones. Clark was travelling

extensively to meet with campaign committees in the states where McCarthy had said he would campaign, and spending the remainder of his time between his New York City apartment and the Senator's Washington office. Hoeh left messages in all conceivable places hoping that Clark would return a call or that with luck Hoeh might catch him at one spot or the other. Failing in these attempts, Hoeh then placed all of their hope in the arguments of the memorandum that Studds was drafting.

Hoeh received the draft of the memo from Studds on approximately December 20th and reviewed it with Studds on the telephone. It contained all of their contentions and the schedule and was titled, "Senator McCarthy and The New Hampshire Primary". Hoeh mailed it to Senator McCarthy December 22 with the following covering letter. A copy of the memo and the letter was also addressed to Blair Clark in care of the Senator's office. The letter read:

> Dear Senator McCarthy:
>
> Since your recent visit to New Hampshire Gerry Studds and I have discussed the possibility of your campaign in New Hampshire and have attempted to summarize the time requirement and the mechanism of such a campaign.
>
> Gerry is responsible for the statistical work enclosed and for drafting the analyzed schedule. We think that this schedule coupled with strong internal and external media support, direct mail, and telephone canvass will produce the desired result. The organization is ready to go and prepared to program each of the campaign elements.
>
> Since the enclosed was prepared, the New Hampshire Attorney General ruled that permission must be secured from a candidate before funds may be solicited or expended in a Presidential Primary in his behalf. This ruling effectively eliminated the write-in campaign planned by the LBJ committee. They will not be able to expend funds to stimulate the write-in and will either have to shift to a "stand-up" candidate or concentrate on the delegate section of the Primary ballot.[33]

We hope the enclosed reaches you in time to assist you in forming your campaign strategy and that you will enter the New Hampshire primary with the intention of winning. Please be in touch with us if there are questions on the enclosed. We are willing to meet with you or your staff at any time to discuss your potential effort in New Hampshire.

Sincerely,

David C. Hoeh, Temporary Chairman, McCarthy for President Steering Committee

The memorandum read:

Senator McCarthy and The New Hampshire Primary

The following factors (listed in no particular order of priority) ought to be given consideration:

- We already have the nucleus of an experienced, broadly representative, and committed organization--several of whom are prepared to take partial leaves of absence in order to give the N.H. campaign professional guidance.[34]

- We already have done statistical research to a degree without precedent in this state--we have pinpointed the Democratic primary vote with considerable precision, both statewide and by congressional district.

- We have already acquired the voting lists for the entire state (all registrants: Democratic, Unaffiliated and Republican).[35]

- We are encouraged about the possibility of a write-in effort for Senator McCarthy on the Republican ballot (particularly given the number of Republicans who were willing to change their registration this month even though Senator McCarthy was not yet a candidate in New Hampshire).

- We envision a massive mailing effort--of the quality and extent of the Lodge effort in 1964--to all registered Democrats and Independents.

- We have access to almost unlimited volunteer help which we foresee utilizing for a) addressing and stuffing envelopes, b) door-to-door canvassing, and c) telephone canvassing.

- Campaigning in Massachusetts and New Hampshire is, in many ways, a single "package"--there is a great overlap of radio, TV and newspaper coverage. Activity in one state is covered in great detail in the other.

- Sen. McCarthy's candidacy in New Hampshire would lead to the almost total dissolution of the RFK "movement" here, most whose Executive Committee have already indicated a desire to work for McCarthy.

- Every minute in New Hampshire in January, February, and March will bring massive, national exposure for Sen. McCarthy; New Hampshire is the principal focus of the national media during this period; the troops in Wisconsin, Massachusetts, California, Oregon, etc. will read of, see, and hear the Senator every day he spends in New Hampshire.

- The stated aims of the Senator's national candidacy lead him logically to New Hampshire--There are many people here, as in every other state, who want, and need, someone for whom they can work and vote.

- Many officials of the New Hampshire Democratic Party have already publicly endorsed Senator McCarthy and hailed his courage. What happens to them if he bypasses New Hampshire?

- An effective campaign here is relatively inexpensive--$50,000 would sustain a major statewide effort of the magnitude and quality we envision.

- There is nothing to be lost - and a great deal to be gained - by coming into New Hampshire:

a) Given the general impression that this is a "hawkish" state and a "conservative" state - plus Senator McIntyre's extraordinary prediction that McCarthy would get 3,000-5,000 votes, anything better than that - can be hailed as a stunning performance (and we can do considerably better than that).

b) The Senator would reaffirm the seriousness of his national candidacy by his willingness to enter against odds (e.g., JFK in W. Va.).

c) A victory here--which we think we ought to shoot for--and which seems to us far more within the realm of possibility than it did a month ago--would have major national repercussions.

- There has been a clear, panic reaction to the threat of McCarthy's candidacy among the Party hierarchy in this state - and with real reason. Many prominent Democrats have quietly refused to serve on the LBJ Committee.

- If we are to move on the Senator's behalf, we must get going yesterday, e.g., in the city of Keene, a McCarthy committee, with 90 adult volunteers, has already located office space for headquarters and is awaiting word from us to install phones and begin operations. Similar efforts throughout the state need rapid encouragement.

Finally, New Hampshire Democrats - just as Democrats everywhere else - are deeply concerned about the present leadership of their party and their country - and they want an opportunity to express that concern.

(Signed) David Hoeh
Gerry Studds for the N.H. McCarthy for
President Steering Committee

The memorandum of arguments was followed by a document entitled, "12 Day Schedule - Explanation" which read:

> The percentage figures for each town represent the average percentage of that town's vote in the last three Democratic primaries (1960,1964, 1966)--computed both as a percentage of the total, statewide vote and as a percentage of the vote in its congressional district. These towns, then represent over three quarters of the total Democratic primary turnout (N.B.: It is far less dispersed than is the Republican vote.)--and they include every single daily paper (9) and three major weeklies in the state.

The full schedule was displayed in the following which considered the time needed (12 days), the places to be visited either by name or by cluster of names, the importance of each place or cluster by the percentage that cluster represented of the statewide primary vote, and percentage of the respective congressional district within which the cluster was located. The schedule, as developed, would cover areas of the state that contained 76.8 percent of the statewide Democratic primary vote, 79.7 percent of the vote in the more compact 1st Congressional District, and 72.4 percent of the vote in the geographically larger 2nd Congressional District. With proper scheduling, advance work, and good local organization supported by well managed statewide activities, Hoeh and Studds thought the schedule would provide Senator McCarthy with enough exposure to draw a meaningful vote. With the exception of the Berlin cluster, all of the others either contained a daily newspaper or were served by one near-by. (The Hooksett-Allenstown-Pembroke cluster is between Concord and Manchester and splits circulation between the Concord Daily Monitor and the Manchester Union Leader.) The twenty percent of the statewide vote not contained in the cities and towns included in their list was scattered widely in the smaller towns of the state.

NEW HAMPSHIRE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY

12 DAY SCHEDULE

SENATOR EUGENE J. McCARTHY

Time	City	% Vote Statewide	% Vote 1st C.D.	% Vote 2nd C.D.
3-1/2 Days	Manchester	27.3	44.8	
	Goffstown	1.4	2.3	
		28.7	47.1	
1-1/2 Days	Nashua	9.9		25.7
1/2 Day	Portsmouth	1.5	2.4	
	New Market	1.0	1.7	
		2.5	4.1	
1/2 Day	Hookset	0.6	1.0	
	Allenstown	0.9	1.4	
	Pembroke	1.2	2.1	
		2.7	4.5	
1 Day	Berlin	6.3		15.7
	Gorham	0.6		1.5
	Northumberland	0.6		1.5
		7.5		18.7
1 Day	Pelham	0.8	1.2	
	Salem	2.2	3.6	
	Derry	0.8	1.4	
	Hudson	1.6	2.7	
		5.4	8.9	
1 Day	Laconia	2.0	3.3	
	Franklin	1.2		3.0
	Concord	1.7		4.4
		4.9	3.3	7.4
1 Day	Rochester	2.0	3.3	
	Somersworth	3.0	4.9	
	Dover	2.2	3.6	
		7.2	11.8	
1 Day	Hanover	0.7		1.7
	Lebanon	0.8		2.1
	Claremont	2.0		5.0
	Newport	0.8		2.1
		4.3		10.9

Time	City	% Vote Statewide	% Vote 1st C.D.	% Vote 2nd C.D.
1 Day	Keene	1.5		3.9
	Jaffrey	0.4		1.0
	Greenville	0.6		1.6
	Milford	0.8		2.1
	Wilton	0.4		1.1
		3.7		9.7
		76.8	79.7	72.4

Reflecting later on the schedule and memorandum, Studds recorded, "That document is actually one of the few pieces of paper that has emerged from the campaign of which we are very proud...." They told him (McCarthy) that they felt rather presumptuous giving national arguments, as they sat up there in the 'woods', but that were McCarthy to wait, if Wisconsin were going to be his first primary, that the months of January, February and March would be rather bleak ones in terms of national publicity for him, that the national media would be in New Hampshire in any event for the primary in March, and this is where the spotlight would be for these three months.

"It would be crucial for the troops in California and Oregon and Wisconsin and everywhere else to be reading and hearing about him at that time and not to have him in Vietnam or God knows where else he was going. We told him that if he meant what he said, he damn well ought to be in New Hampshire anyway because there are people here who feel very strongly and want someone to work for," Studds recalled.[36]

Memo to McCarthy: Basis for Analysis

The strategy outlined in the memorandum to McCarthy contained the two major questions that will be reviewed in this study, questions of how to accomplish the desired political impact and how to accomplish a significant result. The case study that follows describes the most important events of the campaign that were felt to be the ones that contributed the most to the result. While many lesser events and activities are omitted it is important to note that what follows is an abstraction and compression of the totality of a political campaign. The purpose is to identify aspects that were seen at the beginning as being important and evaluating the respective contributions of these to the result. The memorandum to McCarthy is an especially interesting document because it outlined both the method of the campaign and the impact that was intended. Generally, what will be examined are the critical events of the campaign, predicted and unpredicted; the organization of the campaign, principally as outlined in the memorandum; the methodology of the campaign as represented by candidate scheduling, use of media, and voter contacts; and the environment of the campaign that contributed to or detracted from the result.

Not all of these descriptions can be subjected to empirical analysis. Many will stand as descriptions for the reader to assess as to the relative impact upon the result. Five indices of campaign activity will be empirically evaluated. These are campaign visits, local camapign organization, canvassing activity, auxiliary campaign activities, and newspaper attention. As one reads the subsequent descriptions of the campaign and events important to the campaign it will be useful to keep in mind the activities that lead to the empirical assessment of the relative importance of the five selected indices of campaign activity.

To organize the case study and the concluding empirical analysis both a chronology of events and a discussion of campaign operations is necessary. Encompassed in the memorandum to McCarthy are the following basic campaign elements: organization, schedule, resources, issues, media, management, and knowing the opposition. The case study is organized to show how each of these elements was woven into the campaign and then how selected indicators of the impact of the campaign are extracted to provide a measure of effectiveness.

The primary point of reference for both the case study and the analysis is the December 22, 1967 memorandum to McCarthy and the few subsequent operational memoranda prepared by the McCarthy leaders after McCarthy's announcement. In a ten week campaign there was no time to prepare other more detailed campaign plans. The case study serves to document how the campaign evolved, what decisions evolved from the early strategy and what decisions came as the result of unforeseen events. In this latter context, a sound campaign plan is one that also provides for the unforeseen and is capable of responding effectively when an advantage emerges from such events. Part of what made the McCarthy strategy work was that the leaders understood the political environment of New Hampshire and they sensed that the strategy they had outlined was also one that would amplify McCarthy's own assets as a politician. The test was the campaign which tried both candidate and organization. The result makes a review of what happened worthy of analysis.

Notes

[1]Almost all accounts of the 1968 presidential campaign describe the search for a candidate to face Lyndon Johnson in the Democratic primaries. The best report was that written by three English journalists: Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson, and Bruce Page, An American Melodrama, The Presidential Campaign of 1968, (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), pp. 51-102.

[2]Allard Lowenstein and Arnold Kaufman, "Why Democrats Should Work to Stop Johnson," (mimeographed statement, 1967), p. 4.

[3]Union Leader (November 20, 1967), pp. 1 & 14.

[4]"New Hampshire Political Calendar," (Concord: Office of the Attorney General, 1968).

[5]Following the 1968 presidential primary the New Hampshire General Court changed the law to allow voters to regain Independent status.

[6]Eugene J. McCarthy, The Year of the People, (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 265.

[7]Ibid., pp. 265-267.

[8]New York Times (December 1, 1967).

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid.

[13]New York Post (December 1, 1967).

[14]Newsday (December 1, 1967).

[15]Ibid.

[16]Lebanon Valley News (December 1, 1967).

[17]Ibid.

[18]Newsweek (November 27, 1967), p. 28.

[19]As part of the Lowenstein-Gans organizing effort was the national meeting of the Conference of Concerned Democrats held in Chicago, December 1, 1967. The meeting brought together the anti-war, pro-alternative candidate organizations from across the nation. The meetings had the appearance of a national political convention with McCarthy as the presumed nominee. In addition to the visibility that the meeting gave to the emerging McCarthy leadership it also gave the state delegations a chance to meet with McCarthy for the first time. The New Hampshire delegation took advantage of this opportunity to press their argument that McCarthy should enter the presidential primary and that he should visit New Hampshire as soon as possible.

[20]The New Republic (December 16, 1967), p. 11.

[21]The Concord Daily Monitor (December 5, 1967).

[22]The New York Post (Demceber 5, 1967).

[23]Ibid.

[24]Barbara Underwood, St. Chrispin's Day, Gene McCarthy in the New Hampshire Primary (unpublished typescript, 1970), The Locals, p. 26.

[25]David C. Hoeh, "Memo re: Chaplain Meeting," (unpublished notes, December 14, 1967).

[26]Underwood, B., Op.Cit., The Locals, p. 26.

[27]Ibid., p. 25.

[28]Ibid., p. 25.

[29]Hoeh, D., Op. Cit.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Underwood, B., Op.Cit., The Locals, P. 26A.

[32]Hoeh, D., Op.Cit.

[33]At this stage Hoeh and Studds were operating on the assumption that the Attorney General's opinion would apply to the Johnson Committee. The full meaning of the Johnson re-nomination endorsement by the Democratic State Committee was not clear at the time Hoeh wrote the above but was just beginning to emerge through the probing of Eugene Daniell on behalf of his Draft R.F.K. Committee. Their position at that point was to keep the Johnson forces on the defensive while not being particularly concerned about the nature of the actual confrontation. The letter reflects this early naivete on their part.

[34]If McCarthy entered, Gerry Studds hoped to receive a partial leave of absence from St. Paul's School to manage the effort. Senator McCarthy wrote, making such a request of the school's headmaster, but it was denied.

[35]Professor Robert Craig had secured most of these lists for public opinion surveying purposes. He was willing to make the lists available to anyone who asked for them. The McCarthy campaign was the only organization to make such a request.

[36]Gerry Studds, Transcript of a Tape Recorded Interview, (Washington, D.C.: McCarthy Historical Project, Georgetown University, 1969), pp. 11-12.

CHAPTER IV

NEW HAMPSHIRE: A WAITING POLITICAL STAGE

Waiting

Since McCarthy left New Hampshire December 15th Hoeh and Studds had had no communication with him; they had also been unable to make contact with his manager, Blair Clark. The memorandum was mailed; it was their last effort to convince McCarthy and his Washington advisors of the merits of a New Hampshire contest. In the meantime, press accounts of McCarthy's thoughts gave them little to hope for.

On December 23rd, a Boston Globe headline read, "Senator McCarthy to avoid New Hampshire Primary." The continuation headline read, "McCarthy Plans Turn to Bay State Primary." The story's lead read:

> Sen. Eugene McCarthy has made a firm decision to avoid the March 12 New Hampshire primary. The only decision pending is how and when to announce the fact.

And went on:

> McCarthy's decision to stay out of New Hampshire was a concession to the political realities. Some of his supporters had urged that he enter the primary, saying that if he was going to make an issue against President Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam war, he could hardly begin by skipping the first in the nation primary.
>
> But the more cool-headed among his brain trusters suggested that running in New Hampshire could deal a crushing blow to the entire McCarthy campaign.
>
> The Democrats there are showing a unique unity over the primary, and the Democratic vote is so small and concentrated within the few industrial centers that an attempt to overcome the organizations would be difficult.
>
> Besides that, the national spotlight will be on the Republicans in New Hampshire, with Nixon and Romney fighting what might be a death struggle for their party's nomination. McCarthy would risk being depicted as an eccentric loner, a sort of Democratic Harold Stassen with practically no impact on the public or press.

> The further danger is that a big flop in New Hampshire would spill over into Massachusetts, demoralizing the campaign workers and conditioning the Bay state voters to view McCarthy as a loser.[1]

December 23rd was a Saturday, the beginning of the Christmas Holiday, there was little anyone could do to check whether the story was correct. December 28th was the date the McCarthy Committee had given McCarthy as a last day before the plans to organize the Draft-Kennedy effort went forward. A decision to enter the primary much after the first of the year would not provide time enough to organize an effect campaign for McCarthy. Late in the afternoon of December 27th Clark finally called Hoeh. The reason for the call was to assure Hoeh that, contrary to what he would hear on Walter Cronkite's CBS-TV "EVENING NEWS," a decision regarding New Hampshire had not yet been made. Hoeh asked Clark to confirm his call with a telegram. The telegram arrived the morning of December 28th and read:

> It was good to talk to you yesterday and I send you this wire simply to confirm what I said on the phone, that the McCarthy decision on the New Hampshire Primary is still not made, despite press reports, that it is being actively considered from the point of view of scheduling and where the best effort can be made nationally, and that you and your group will be the first to know when the decision has been made within the next several days. Many thanks to you and your colleagues.
>
> Sincerely, Blair Clark

Hoeh immediately prepared a memo which he sent to the members of the Steering Committee and a larger list of those titled "friends." Since the key 28th date was the Thursday before the New Year's holiday weekend, little would happen between then and January 2nd. In his conversation with Clark

Hoeh did discuss the significance of the December 28th date in terms of Clark's planning for the New Hampshire decision. Hoeh indicated that he did not expect anything irrevocable would happen on the 28th and that most of those who would form the leadership of the Draft--Kennedy organization had already agreed to shift to McCarthy if he were to enter the New Hampshire Primary.

Hoeh's memo to the Committee opened:

> The question is, where do we stand? The answer is that we now serve by standing and waiting. This has been our posture since Senator McCarthy's visit to New Hampshire December 14 and 15...
>
> Since his New Hampshire visit, he has taken the important steps to equip his campaign with the necessary national staff to begin the important scheduling work and strategy planning that had not been accomplished at the time of his New Hampshire visit. Numerous meetings have taken place in Washington and the results have been reported in various and sometimes, inaccurate ways. It has been my position to await the outcome of these meetings knowing that the N.H. McCarthy for President Steering Committee had made strong and compelling cases for entering the N.H. primary....[2]

Hoeh then recounted the conversation with Clark and the contents of the telegram. Since up to this point the memo had a rather neutral tone and since Hoeh wanted to indicate that he expected a positive decision from McCarthy, he ended by setting a probable meeting time for the end of the first week in January. He also enclosed petition forms that had to be circulated in each congressional district in order to place the Senator's name on the ballot.

Hoeh's final note was:

> Our organization has grown considerably. It is now expensive to mail and the phone bills are piling up. Any financial help, at this stage, would be greatly appreciated.
>
> A HAPPY NEW YEAR????

That evening Walter Cronkite did report that McCarthy definitely would not enter the New Hampshire presidential primary. Hoeh's memo would arrive the next morning. In addition he had called a number of the Steering Committee members so that Clark's information could be spread among the local supporters.

The Announcement

December 31st, the telephone rang in David Hoeh's home. Blair Clark was calling. He wanted to come to New Hampshire the next day, to meet with members of the McCarthy for President Steering Committee. Hoeh replied that it was Sunday evening, he had a New Year's Eve party to attend, and assumed that most of our committee members would be engaged likewise. He said that it would be impossible to make the calls to set up the meeting for January 1st but that he could do it for January 2nd. Hoeh tried to push Clark for details on the possible agenda for the meeting, indicating that the Steering Committee would not be in the mood for another indecisive review. Hoeh said they would need an answer one way or the other, but Clark said he wanted to meet with the committee before committing himself or McCarthy to a final decision. This was satisfactory to Hoeh, so he agreed to gather as many of the committee members as possible at the Chaplain's home in Bedford, for the evening of January 2nd, 1968. Hoeh made calls to the committee members during the afternoon and evening of New Year's day and was able to contact most of them. Hoeh's memo of December 28th had arrived and was viewed as optimistic news. The members were now ready for the challenges of a New Year.

Sandy Hoeh, Gerry Studds and David Hoeh met Blair Clark for the first time in his Sheraton Wayfarer room. Tall, lanky, and casual appearing Clark immediately made his guests feel comfortable by complimenting them on their persistence. He said that he had come to New Hampshire to make a final assessment and that a decision on whether or not McCarthy would enter the primary would be made within 24 hours. During the discussion Clark was interrupted by a telephone call from Senator McCarthy. While discussing situations in other states and parts of the campaign, Clark suddenly motioned to Hoeh that McCarthy would like to talk with him.

McCarthy's question concerned the status of the LBJ write-in effort. He wanted to be sure that a direct confrontation with Johnson would be possible. Hoeh explained that in the time since he had last written a clarification of the Attorney General's position had been received. The Democratic Party endorsement of the Johnson renomination effort constituted a legal action which allowed them to run the write-in effort without specific approval from Johnson. Daniell was challenging the interpretation for the Draft RFK Committee but if he (McCarthy) entered the primary, a clear contest between Johnson and himself would be possible. McCarthy seemed pleased with this information and ended by saying that he did not want to waste time in efforts that did not present a clear test of the issues.

During dinner with Clark in the Wayfarer dining room that evening Hoeh was called to the dining room telephone. Senator McCarthy was on the line. In barely audible tones he said, "Dave, I have decided that I will enter the New Hampshire primary". Hoeh responded by saying they had been waiting for that work for a long time and that they were ready to go to work. Not wanting to

let the conversation on the decision drop at that point, Hoch said that he would like to announce the decision in New Hampshire at the same time or before McCarthy made the announcement in Washington. Hoch explained that the New Hampshire reporters and wire service personnel had been extremely cooperative in the past weeks and that he wanted to give them the headstart on the story. McCarthy said that this would be okay and that Hoch could hold a press conference the next day before noon and that McCarthy would hold one in the early afternoon. Hoch reviewed the conversations they were having with Blair Clark and asked McCarthy how he should relay the contents of the telephone call to Clark and to the meeting they were about to have at the Chaplain's. McCarthy said that Hoch should use his judgment and that he could handle these things as he wished.

Hoch returned to the table, looking, according to Gerry Studds, "like he had just swallowed a canary", and began by saying to Clark that the telephone call was from "your Boss," Senator McCarthy. "He has just told me that he is going to enter the New Hampshire primary." Blair Clark's chin, according to Studds' "sort of fell into his soup, I (Studds) dropped everything and I (Studds) thought Sandy was going to faint. We were not prepared for it at that time."[3]

Clark recovered from his surprise, muttered that of course he could call McCarthy back and further delay or change his mind, but that since, they had a decision and the details of an announcement had been outlined, they should now plan the announcement, give the news to the committee, and get on with the campaign. That was Blair Clark's style. No point rehashing the events of

the past two hours: too much had to be done and there was little time available.

They agreed that they could not hold a press conference on the basis of a personal telephone call to Hoeh. There would have to be a document of some sort from McCarthy that could be released since they were going to make the announcement in New Hampshire. They concluded that a telegram would suffice and that they themselves had better draft the telegram, check the contents with Senator McCarthy by telephone and ask that he send it to them for the record. Studds and Hoeh drafted a telegram for Clark to review. They then called McCarthy again to check the text of the telegram and the timing of the release. Clark would return to New York in the morning before the announcement press conference.

By 9:30 a.m. Tuesday, January 2nd, Hoeh had called the "Dean" of the New Hampshire press corps, D. Frank O'Neill of the Manchester Union Leader to announce that he would be holding a press conference at the State House Press Room, in Concord, at 11:00 a.m. O'Neil would notify the other reporters and make the arrangements for the conference. In his call to O'Neill he simply said that they would be making an announcement concerning the McCarthy effort. When Hoeh read the telegram, it took a moment for the mind-set of the reporters to change from that of knowing that McCarthy would not enter to actually understanding what Hoeh had just read. There were one or two questions about whether McCarthy was holding a similar conference in Washington or how the message would be confirmed by him. Then they sensed that an important national scoop was in their hands and they rushed to the nearest telephones to call in a story lead and the text of the telegram.

> I have decided to carry my campaign for the presidency of the United States into New Hampshire. I will enter the New Hampshire primary. My name will be entered in the presidential preference section and, with your committee's valuable help, we will run a full slate of pledged delegates.
>
> I plan, as you know, to campaign in five other state primaries, but am now satisfied that I will be able to devote to the New Hampshire primary the time that is required. It is important to give the Democrats of New Hampshire the opportunity to express freely their choice on the grave issues facing our country. I will press my campaign vigorously.
>
> I thank you for what your committee has already done and look forward to working closely with you in the weeks to come.
>
> Addressed to: David C. Hoeh
> Signed: Senator Eugene J. McCarthy
> Dated: January 2nd, 1968[4]

Studds and Hoeh waited in the press room for a few moments to watch the reaction. Within moments a series of return calls came to the press room requesting wire service taped interviews with Hoeh. Within one-half hour the flurry had begun to subside. As they left the press room, Studds and Hoeh looked at each other and almost simultaneously said, "What have we gotten ourselves into now." The full weight of not only the McCarthy candidacy but of the impact a failure in New Hampshire would have on the issues of Vietnam policy suddenly became incredibly real. It was a lonely moment and they mentally inventoried the resources they had at hand to assume the responsibility. Given even an optomistic view they had a total of $500 in their campaign bank account, no headquarters, no telephones, no mailing address, no manager, no materials, and only a tenuous tie to the new McCarthy manager whom they had only met the day before.

Recalling the event Studds said, "We enjoyed this one because it was not particularly well-attended. There were the local reporters of the UPI and the AP and a few others who had obviously come to hear us say, 'Well, we're terribly sorry, but Senator McCarthy is not entering New Hampshire.' Their expressions were rather fun to watch as we read the telegram."

In a campaign strategy designed to have maximum impact the timing and method of the announcement could not have been better. The story drew front page attention across the nation and held the lead position in many radio and television broadcasts throughout that day. The New Hampshire Associated Press version of the story, under the byline of Adolphe V. Bernotas, read:

> Concord, N.H. (AP) Senator Eugene McCarthy, D-Minn. an opponent of President Johnson's Vietnam policy, will enter New Hampshire's March 12 Democratic presidential primary, David Hoeh of Hanover, the senator's chief Granite State backer, told newsmen today....
>
> Until very recently, McCarthy had indicated he would use the Massachusetts primary as his test of New England sentiment. However, Hoeh said today, there was no clear reason why McCarthy changed signals.
>
> "He isn't running just to make tests--he's seeking the presidency", Hoeh added.
>
> McCarthy had called off plans to tour Europe and Southeast Asia, Hoeh said, and would be in New Hampshire within the next two weeks to campaign "in excess of 12 to 15 days."
>
> Hoeh said his group plans to spend $50,000 "to do a good job in the campaign."
>
> He added that the organization expects McCarthy to pull "about a third' of the state's 80,000 Democratic votes...."
>
> Hoeh said the group is already circulating petitions to get on the ballot. Fifty signatures from each of the two congressional districts in the state are required.
>
> Some of the strength shown for Senator Robert F. Kennedy, D-N.Y., will be drawn away by McCarthy's announcement, Hoeh maintained.

He added: 'A number of their members said they would join McCarthy'.

A drive to pick up independent votes will be undertaken, Hoeh said.

McCarthy's campaign, Hoeh added, would require 'close campaigning. You can't substitute media for effectiveness of meeting the people.'

Hoeh said the group has not yet decided on potential delegates.

He added the organization went with pledged rather than favorable delegates because 'it gives us control over the structure of the delegation. We can distribute the delegates where the votes are'.

In answer to a question on how McCarthy would do in the state's two biggest cities--Manchester and Nashua--Hoeh said: 'There is considerable support, especially in Nashua'.

He said that in Manchester 'there is no special love for Johnson'.

"Manchester is the kind of city where McCarthy would have appeal." Hoeh said.[3]

While covering essentially the same New Hampshire news, Ward Just, writing in the Washington Post, reported a capitol view of the story.

McCarthy's aides insisted that the decision to go into New Hampshire did not represent a change in plans. Last week in a radio interview the Minnesota Democrat said the primary was "not a significant test", and indicated privately that he would avoid it....

Organization Democrats in New Hampshire led by Bernard Boutin... have virtually dared McCarthy to oppose the President....

In an interview last month, Boutin predicted that the President would swamp McCarthy in the March 12 primary, even though McCarthy's name would be on the ballot and voters would be obliged to write in the President's. Yesterday, Boutin was unavailable for comment...

"We don't expect a landslide or anything like that," said one of McCarthy's campaign aides yesterday, "but we expect to do well." The New Hampshire test will be the first direct confrontation between the President and his critics since the 1964 presidential election.

> McCarthy aides in Washington said that one of the principal factors in the Senator's decision to vie with the President in New Hampshire was an optimistic report from Hoeh, and from McCarthy's national campaign manager, Blair Clark, who canvassed the state over the New Year's weekend.
>
> Hoeh reported that the President was not popular in New Hampshire, and that support for the McCarthy candidacy was growing. Hoeh reported some defections from the regular Democratic organization, but that group was still regarded as solidly pro-Johnson.
>
> One analysis of McCarthy's decision to enter the primary turns on the criticism of his candidacy as 'non-serious.' Last week McCarthy confessed himself to be "a little disappointed" with anti-war Democrats who have refused to support him with 'the excuse that I am not a serious candidate...."
>
> Political observers here reasoned that if McCarthy did not enter New Hampshire, with its wide newspaper and television coverage and opportunity to challenge Lyndon Johnson, the charge of "Non-seriousness" would grow in currency and plausibility.
>
> A McCarthy aide said yesterday that the fact that a campaign for Mr. Johnson was being organized was a "major factor" in McCarthy's decision to add New Hampshire...."[6]

Although Bernard Boutin was unavailable for comment, Governor John W. King, did issue a brief statement concerning the McCarthy announcement.

> Senator McCarthy is welcome to bring his campaign into the New Hampshire primary. While I do not agree with his political viewpoints, a full discussion of the issues in the great tradition of American politics can only be beneficial.
>
> I am confident that the vast majority of New Hampshire Democrats support President Johnson, and his domestic and international policies justify that support.
>
> On March 12, the New Hampshire Democrats will have the opportunity to conclusively show their support for one of our country's greatest and most successful Presidents, President Lyndon Baines Johnson.[7]

With King's statement, timed to ride, if possible, with the McCarthy announcement story, the battle was joined. The confident Johnson renomination leadership were sure they could demolish McCarthy in New Hampshire. There would be no question but that there would be a direct confrontation between the two in New Hampshire.

New Hampshire Provides the Stage

Now that McCarthy had agreed to enter, the McCarthy leaders could seriously consider organizing the actual campaign. Their preliminary analysis as reflected in the memorandum of December 22nd was the background plan but a further evaluation would be necessary to implement the plan.

As with the ethos of New Hampshire primary elections which dictated party organization neutrality, there was a second ethos concerning presidential primaries. New Hampshire provides the stage, the audience, and frequently, the principal directors of a campaign. The production, however, is paid for with money from outside the state. To some, principally the communications industry, hotel, motel, and restaurant operators, the New Hampshire Presidential Primary is an economic boon during the slack winter period. To others it is quadrennial entertainment relieving the cabin fever of the long winter.

In their meetings with Lowenstein, Gans, and later McCarthy and Clark, the New Hampshire committee had made clear that the state was the stage and its voters the audience but that only a small amount of money could be expected to be raised from the New Hampshire populace itself for use in the primary campaign. New Hampshire's small population, approximately 700,000 persons in 1968 and low per capita income, $3,023, in 1969, meant that the resources to support a presidential primary campaign had to come from outside the state. In this ethos there lay a part of the McCarthy strategy.

Notes

[1]The Boston Globe (Decmeber 23, 1967).

[2]David C. Hoeh, "Memo to the McCarthy Steering Committee, December 28, 1967," (file copy).

[3]Studds, G., Op.Cit., p. 13.

[4]Union Leader (January 4, 1968).

[5]Nashua Telegraph (January 3, 1968).

[6]The Washington Post (January 4, 1968).

[7]The Concord Daily Monitor (January 3, 1968).

CHAPTER V

NEW HAMPSHIRE DEMOCRATS AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Knowing the Opposition

The New Hampshire Democratic Party leadership had assumed that it would be united in its drive to deliver the state to Lyndon B. Johnson in his push for renomination. The Daniell-Kennedy write-in activity was viewed by most party leaders as a fringe operation that could be easily isolated.

A rather elaborate campaign plan had been developed by Bernard Boutin and informally agreed to by the major office holders, principally Governor King and Senator McIntyre. The first public act of the Johnson write-in campaign was to be the discussion of the campaign at the November 5th Executive Committee meeting. Word of Gans visit, the possible McCarthy candidacy, and additional stirrings prompted several changes in the original plan.

New Hampshire presidential primaries are frequently politically perilous times for party leaders and office holders. The quadrennial event is a minefield. For a major office-holder, survival is of ultimate importance and to survive being involved in a New Hampshire Presidential Priamry without collecting scars is a miracle. Because the spectacle takes a different form each time, trying to figure out which way to move to avoid political injury is a challenging game. For King, McIntyre, and Boutin, party unity in support of the President was assumed. As leaders of the party by virtue of their offices and titles, they had every reason to expect that what they said would carry weight with a sizable constituency. On the

other side, they were in no position to differ with the President, since such a move would be costly in terms of present political security and future rewards. Neutrality under the conditions of late 1967 and early 1968 would not have been an acceptable alternative either. In fact, neutrality for a Governor about to seek re-election, election to another office or appointment as a federal judge would be viewed by the President as tantamount to desertion. In 1967-68, one was either for the President or against him. There was no middle ground. The Democratic Party's leadership in 1968 was no more successful in protecting itself from the all but guaranteed surprises of the Presidential Primary than their Republican counterparts had been in 1964.

The Boutin Strategy

After a string of appointments that had kept Bernard Boutin in Washington since the election of John F. Kennedy, he had resigned as the Administrator of the Small Business Administration and returned to New Hampshire. His new position was with Sanders Associates, a Nashua eletronics firm with sizable defense contracts. Boutin's assignment with Sanders was of a public relations nature with responsibility for producing the in-house newsletter and related publically unspecified assignments. Boutin himself had several other missions. The first was to return to New Hampshire where his own political career had stopped with his departure to Washington after his defeat in the 1960 gubernatorial race. A frustrated politician on his own, Boutin sought to resume his interrupted career by re-establishing himself in New Hampshire, and capitalizing on his exemplary record of federal service.

When he returned during June, 1967, to take the Sanders assignment, Boutin had every intention of running for Governor again, assuming that three-term Governor John W. King would either step aside or run for the United States Senate.

The mission which made the Sanders position possible and prompted Boutin to leave the Small Business Administration was his selection by the President to assume management of the President's renomination efforts in New Hampshire. As a major Kennedy operative in the carefully executed Kennedy primary of 1960 and now a confidant of President Johnson, Boutin was the ideal person for the assignment. Furthermore, Boutin had recently assisted in a number of other political ventures for the President including a project in Texas during the 1966 elections.

Boutin saw the chance to combine the gubernatorial objective with the Johnson renomination mission. His success as the manager of the Johnson campaign would bring him back into the limelight of New Hampshire politics, identify him with the fortunes of his sure-to-be-re-elected President, foreshadowing his own gubernatorial candidacy. Such a scenario was not hard to detect, and was immediately determined by the Union Leader Corporation in a New Hampshire Sunday News editorial dated as early as May 21, 1967.

At approximately the time of Boutin's return to New Hampshire, the press carried a series of stories about a mysterious man that President Johnson had sent to New Hampshire to organize his Presidential Primary. The stories had a peculiar flavor that would be repeated as the Johnson effort went forward.

It appeared from the stories that somehow Johnson did not trust his fortunes to the leadership of the New Hampshire Democratic Party. The Manchester Union Leader interpreted this as a slap at its major office-holders. The press search for the mysterious man continued for much of the summer but never successfully labelled a person who fit the description. A similar search went on inside the party for the mysterious man, more as a reaction to the news stories than to evidence that someone might actually have been assigned to New Hampshire. Eventually, both the press and the politicians settled on Boutin as the man, although he steadfastly denied having other than friendly connections with the White House. Boutin alleged that he left federal service to return to New Hampshire because of the challenge of his new job.[1]

Whether Boutin was commissioned to manage the New Hampshire Johnson campaign or not, he arrived in New Hampshire with the plan for Johnson's effort in the primary. Even before he was appointed as the Re-Elect President Johnson Chairman for New Hampshire, Boutin outlined the Johnson campaign to party leaders and probable campaign workers.

The Johnson campaign was to be a total party effort. During a conversation with Sandra Hoeh in August 1967, Boutin sketched out the pyramid that would be the organizational shape of the Johnson New Hampshire campaign. At the top of the pyramid were the names of the titular leaders of the Democratic Party--King and McIntyre. Within the same segment with King and McIntyre was the operating head of the organization, Boutin himself. Beneath that point then stretched downward an organization that would parallel the organizational structure of the New Hampshire Democratic Party.

There would be regional leaders similar to the congressional district chairmen, county leaders, city leaders, town leaders, committee members, and finally, a campaign connection to each of the 90,000-plus registered members of the Democratic Party.

Apparently, some time prior to Boutin's return to New Hampshire, a decision had been made in the White House that Lyndon Johnson would not become an announced candidate for re-election until late in the pre-convention season. By this decision, Johnson took the cautious, more traditional route of incumbent Presidents.[2] The fiction of non-candidacy would be maintained as long as possible for whatever purposes would be served by appearing to be above the political struggle.

The decision left the renomination leadership in New Hampshire with a single alternative. Since Johnson would not be an announced candidate, it would not be possible for his name to be listed on the ballot. The alternative, therefore, would be to ask Democratic voters to write-in Johnson's name on the ballot. Consequently, the Johnson campaign organization's first priority was to stimulate New Hampshire Democrats to turn out in significant numbers and then to write-in the name of Lyndon Johnson. Of secondary importance in the strategy would be the selection of a slate of delegates. Boutin planned to solicit as delegate candidates the state's most prominent political names. These names alone, Boutin felt would attract the votes needed to fill the delegation with Johnson supporters.

Boutin's planning was conditioned by several important experiences. The party reform effort of the 1950's had dislodged the conservative wing of the party from the leadership; however, many of those persons still lurked in the shadows of the party's councils. To Boutin in 1967, these individuals still posed the greatest danger to the unity effort which he had in mind for the Johnson campaign. In his conversation with Sandy Hoeh, that August, Boutin referred to the names of some of the more obstreperous pre-reformers as representing that minority who would probably not join the write-in effort. When Sandy asked how he viewed the Draft Kennedy effort of Eugene Daniell, Boutin responded by saying that first, Robert Kennedy would come to New Hampshire and support the renomination of Lyndon B. Johnson, and that second, Daniell would not be able to generate much support for his Kennedy write-in effort. Only those ancient malcontents and a few "wildeyed" radicals would even consider challenging the renomination campaign of the President in New Hampshire Boutin concluded.

A second occurrence from Boutin's past which influenced his thinking was the John F. Kennedy primary of 1960. He clearly painfully recalled the effort of the party malcontents to abort the election of the full slate of Kennedy pledged delegates. Those same shadowy figures appeared to so occupy Boutin in his planning that he did not recognize the growing opposition to the President's war policies, an opposition composed of some of the same individuals who had helped Boutin reform the Democratic party in the late 1950's.

A further blinding political event in Boutin's recollection was the 1964 effort to secure a write-in on that year's presidential primary ballot for vice president for Robert F. Kennedy. That movement had been generated

in New Hampshire by some of the same persons who had opposed the pledged slate in the 1960 primary. It appeared that this effort was designed to demonstrate a loyalty to the heir Robert Kennedy that was greater than that of John Kennedy's 1960 advocates, like Boutin, who were now Johnson loyalists. An embarrassing situation was developing for Johnson and his supporters early in 1964. Loyalty to the Kennedy family was being placed in conflict with loyalty to the Johnson administration. The conflict left many a Kennedy loyalist, now well connected in the Johnson administration, on extremely shaky ground. A significant vote for Robert Kennedy for Vice President could be embarrassing to President Johnson. Opposition to the Kennedy candidacy would be interpreted in New Hampshire as ungracious if not actually disloyal. Boutin, then in Washington, was caught between the desire of the President to have a free hand in selecting his Vice President and New Hampshire party leaders' desire to suppress a re-emergence of the malcontents. Given the choice, McIntyre, King, Dunfey and other party leaders met and concluded that the only way to contain the divisive threat of the Kennedy Vice President write-in was to join the effort. In a last minute announcement, most of the party's leadership, including the Senator and Governor, enthusiastically endorsed the write-in for Robert Kennedy as Vice President on the 1964 presidential primary preference ballot. Only one of the Democratic Party leadership, Democratic National Committeeman, Hugh Bownes, stated his preference for Hubert H. Humphrey, the eventual nominee.

Boutin was left to explain the reasons for the Kennedy write-in to an outraged Lyndon Johnson. Fortunately, from his point of view, Johnson secured slightly more write-in votes for President in 1964 than Robert Kennedy garnered for the Vice President. That result and the machinations

of the 1964 primary forced Boutin to ally himself fully with the fortunes of Lyndon Johnson and to sever his once strong ties with the Kennedy family.

There appeared to be no room in Boutin's thinking for a strategy that would respond to discontent within the party other than to isolate that discontent, as had happened in 1960, or to smother opposition in a blanket of loyalties as happened in 1964. Boutin's plans were based on his own political experiences and confidence that Robert Kennedy would not allow his name to be used in a way that would be construed as disruptive to the New Hampshire Democratic party organization.

Unfortunately for Boutin, his most recent active campaign experiences had been at the behest of Lyndon Johnson. As a highly placed political operative in the Johnson administration, Boutin had been used by the administration to carry out some its political objectives and had become a part of the White House political operation headed by the Texan, Marvin Watson. On several occasions he had been sent into the field, especially in the south and Texas, to assist in organizing election activities for several Johnson supporters. What Boutin gained from that experience was an indoctrination in unit rule, Texas-style politics.

The unit rule, a Texas tradition, worked to systematically remove from consideration minority views, minority representation and intra-party minoirty accommodation. Complete and unquestioning loyalty to the party and its leadership was a hallmark of the unit rule process. The

The result was that Marvin Watson, and the Texas-originated White House political operation, had little tolerance for another state's experience with minority inclusion and compromise. Boutin had, apparently, assimilated this ethos without question. It can be assumed that if Boutin had raised questions with regard to Texas unit rule politics, his loyalty to Johnson would have been questioned by the palace guard. In many respects, Boutin's own experience in New Hampshire had been similar on the surface to Texas unit rule politics. An obstreporous and destructive element had been removed from the leadership of the New Hampshire Democratic Party by Boutin's work in the 1950's. Boutin, in 1967, could not oppose a renomination plan that carried such heavy overtones of loyalty to the President.

By the time Boutin arrived in New Hampshire he was fully committed to a unity campaign that was designed to prompt allegiance to the renomination of the President. The pyramid of interlocking campaign leaders would be vertically pledged to the support of the President in the same fashion that Boutin himself was pledged to the political operation of the White House. Those not supporting the renomination organization would, by implication, be excluded from the rewards following the re-election. The organization of the New Hampshire Democratic Party and the loyalists of the major elected officials would be unified as one structure. There would be no room in Boutin's campaign concept for anything but total loyalty both to Johnson and to the policies of the administration.

New Hampshire Democrats: Traditions and Ethos

Boutin had been away from New Hampshire politics for more than seven years when he returned in the Spring of 1967. He had lost his sensitivity

to the political climate of New Hampshire. It seemed that Boutin thought the politics of the nation had shifted to the model of the Texas White House, and that allegiance to the White House and the Johnson-dominated party could overpower New Hampshire political traditions of individuality and independence. The campaign that Boutin began to implement for President Johnson was not one that was in keeping with New Hampshire's political traditions. It is from this beginning that the critical weakness of the New Hampshire Johnson renomination effort was revealed.

It might appear obvious that a person with Boutin's New Hampshire experience would outline a campaign responsive to that experience. In fact that may well have been what Boutin did recommend. His experiences with New Hampshire's state primaries and with disorganization of the maverick Kefauver efforts of 1952 and 1956 led him to admire the tight organization of the 1960 John F. Kennedy candidacy. Boutin's own involvement in the revitalization of the New Hampshire Democratic Party was closely tied to the objective of organizing the nomination of a viable Democratic candidate for governor. Such success meant that agressive campaigning and thorough organization were necessary to pull the strong candidate through the primary and on to election.

Too often in the past straw candidates and weak candidates closely tied to the Republican opposition had manipulated the state primary. The ethnic blocs of Democratic voters who voted in the state primaries were played against each other. Weak and often unknown candidates with appropriate ethnic surnames were filed to dissipate ethnic voting strength that was

needed to nominate strong Democratic Party candidates. Often, half a dozen names were listed on the Democratic primary ballot offering an assortment of French-Canadian and Irish surnames. Not infrequently the nominee who was produced from such a crowd of candidates disappeared from political activity after receiving the nomination. The Republican candidate would go on to win an almost uncontested election.

Boutin himself had been one of the rare Democrats to survive the process with his candidacy in 1958. Careful control of the candidate filings, elimination of straw candidates by demanding adherence to state law regarding the authenticity of candidacies, and thorough organization gave Boutin the 1958 gubernatorial nomination by a narrow margin of 3,863 out or 35,391 Democratic primary votes cast. He went on to run the best race a Democrat had run against the Republican nominee in over twenty years. Boutin lost by a mere 6,835 votes out of 206,745 cast.

To Boutin, therefore, primaries were hazardous affairs. To accomplish the desired results, a tight organization would be necessary. Divisive minorities and vote sapping straw candidates were to be avoided as had been accomplished in Boutin's 1958 Democratic reform candidacy.

The Open Primary Tradition

There is, however, an important other side to the story. New Hampshire is a state with a long and engrained primary election tradition. That tradition has produced a widely accepted ethic regarding the open selection of candidates that has endured despite the abuses that ethic was subjected to by some in

the Republican majority. During the era of the leadership of Governor and then United States Senator, Styles Bridges, the nomination of both Republican candidates and Democratic opponents for major offices were regulated through his office. The Democratic primary was carefully orchestrated to produce only nominal opposition while the Republican primary was structured to prevent divisive internecine warfare.

During the period from the middle 1930's to Bridges' death in 1961, a second varible entered the scene. A progressive Republican newspaper, the Manchester Union Leader, changed ownership. William Loeb, the son of President Theodore Roosevelt's secretary, acquired the newspaper from the widow of Frank Knox, former Secretary of the Navy under President Franklin Roosevelt, and a former Republican vice-presidential candidate. As a result, the editorial tone of the newspaper changed from that of progressive Republicanism to one of virilent conservatism. The newspaper became an ardent supporter of Styles Bridges and followed Bridges in his anti-communist foray into both domestic and foreign policy.[3]

Although Bridges exerted considerable influence at the national level as a result of his leadership positions in Congress, he had not been particularly concerned about the progressive Republican bent of the party's leadership in New Hampshire's internal affairs. When Loeb entered the scene he found the liberalism of the University of New Hampshire as a manifestation of a social and political "softness" that eminated from the Capitol in Concord. To sell papers and to sell his philosophy, Loeb began to find and promote candidates for state office who were more to his liking. Loeb's

basic tactic, however was to create controversy.

Loeb's power in New Hampshire rests on his ability to use his newspaper to generate controversy that causes some reaction from the politically active public. The tactic is simply one that takes situations, issues, groups or individuals and casts on their behavior in either a favorable or unfavorable light. Those persons and views that Loeb favors are contrasted with those which he dislikes. Eventually sufficient controversy revolves around the situation to either polarize the public's view and to isolate and, thereby, destroy the effectiveness of the person or the political usefulness of the issue.

Loeb succeeds in this behavior because New Hampshire does not have statewide media alternatives to his newspaper. As he builds his case the other side, the side that might present and legitimize the opposite view, is not presented. To the populace the adage that "Where there is smoke there is fire" aids Loeb in his effort to politically polarize issues and isolate through controversy those he dislikes.

When Loeb found that he could not penetrate the power structure of the State Republican Party with his Conservative philosophy, his bully-boy tactics, or his alliance with Senator Bridges, he began to chip away at the Republican organization with his editorials. To overcome the hazards of internecine primary contests, the state Republican leadership had organized to prevent party-destroying primary conflicts. The controllers of this informal mechanism were a group of party leaders almost exclusively located in the capitol city of Concord. This group had ruled the Republican Party

in a moderate to progressive tradition since the days of the Bull Moose Progressives. In fact many of those in positions of leadership, formal and informal, were descendents of the state's progressive leadership. Loeb objected to the leadership's progressive philosophy. After their success in defeating Loeb's candidate, Senator Robert A. Taft, in the 1952 New Hampshire Presidential Primary, Loeb began his attack in earnest against what he labeled as the "Concord Gang."

The attack focused heavily on the mechanisms that the Republican Party leadership exercised to maintain control. The key to this control was for the leadership to elect the strongest potential nominee for the office of Governor and then to organize the party to support that person with pre-primary endorsements and praise. Not falling in step behind the leadership implied the opposite as retribution--loss of the governorship and loss of access to its perquisites.

Since Loeb found the "Concord Gang" impenetrable and the moderate candidates who it generated unresponsive to his brand of Republicanism he began to attack the "Gang" and their tactics of candidate selection and pre-primary endorsement. In fact, on several occasions and out of frustration, Loeb endorsed and editorially supported candidates of the Democratic Party who were more in keeping with his anti-communist, anti-tax, and anti-public support of social services positions.

Loeb's attack took the form of re-defining the ethics of primary election contests. To him and to the framers of the theory of primary elections, a primary was to be an open process unencumbered by the intrusions

of vested party interests. Loeb objected to pre-primary endorsements by party committees or major party officials such as county chairman, state committee members, or state party officers. He objected to the expenditure of party funds to support the primary candidacies of those endorsed prior to primary elections. He especially objected to efforts by party leaders to march the rank and file membership of the party to the polls to vote for the endorsed candidate.

Although Loeb's motives may have been questionable, his tactic touched an old and responsive nerve in the New Hampshire body politic. The reforms of the progressives that led to the enactment of the primary legislation were founded on the same principles as those which Loeb had begun to espouse. Politics prior to the adoption of the primary system had been closed and dominated by powerful railroad, banking, timber and industrial interests. These interests selected the major candidates for public office, bought the legislature and manipulated the conditions of electoral politics. The early Twentieth Century reforms the progressives legislated in coalition with populist Democrats, had sprung from a perverse, corrupt and exploitative political environment.[4] Enacting primary election laws and legislating the structure of the party organizations had established an ethic of an open party process and individual citizen participation in the selection of party candidates. By reaffirming his commitment to the basic concept of an open primary Loeb simply reaffirmed and revitalized an ethic that had not been restated for more than a generation.

Loeb's motive was to strip away from the "Concord Gang" the respectability that shrouded their successful efforts to regulate the candidate product of the primary. Loeb hoped that by forcing the party leadership to stand back from primaries and by generating legitimate contests between candidates, eventually a person of his liking would win the Republican Party nomination and go on to be elected Governor. By 1958 Loeb was successful. His candidate for the Republican nomination for Governor, Wesley Powell, won the primary and went on to a narrow victory over Bernard L. Boutin the Democratic Party nominee.

At the same time that Loeb was struggling to open the candidate selection process of the Republican Party, he was also looking askance at the Democratic Party. In its quest to produce a viable nominee, the reformers of the Democratic Party sought to control the primary elections much as had the "Concord Gang" of the Republican Party. Following the minor revolution within the Democratic Party in 1956, the new and liberal leadership began to put the party in order. To do this required an organizational effort from the Democratic leadership to pull a strong candidate through the state primary. In the face of this effort even the slightest aroma of pre-primary organization for a specific candidate by the party leaders brought down the wrath of Loeb's editorials on the reformist Democrats.

Since in this case the ends justified the organizational means, in 1958 the reform leadership of the Democratic Party was willing to suffer the bolts from Loeb's pen in order to secure, through party leadership, the nomination of the strongest candidate, Bernard L. Boutin. Although Boutin was the beneficiary of the pre-primary organization and, as such, appreciated the value of a thorough effort, there was a tendency not to appreciate the

the sanctity of the open primary that Loeb was re-establishing. When Boutin and others of the reform leadership sought to regulate in a similar way the campaign for John F. Kennedy, in 1960 New Hampshire Presidential Primary, Loeb renewed his assault on these Democratic party leaders.

What Boutin failed to recognize, when he returned to New Hampshire in the spring of 1967, was that Loeb had been successful. The old ethic had been restored. Primaries were intra-party contests. Office-holders of the party, the party's organization, and the party's treasury were not to be used to support particular candidates in the primaries. The strong sense of fair-play fostered by the chipping process of the Manchester Union Leader now required that the primaries be open. Individuals should be encouraged to participate not by threats, but through an individual desire to respond to the call of a candidate. Pressure might be applied to party leaders, public office-holders, and those needing access to those in power, but such pressure could not be applied to the mass of a party's membership.

Simply stated, the ethic which the Loeb attacks had revived drew on the positive attributes that had been ingrained in New Hampshire: participatory democracy and open political decision-making. The premises of this primary election ethic required the neutrality of party officials during the primary contests, the neutrality of the formal committee structure of the party, equal access to the mechanisms of the party for all candidates, no endorsements and no funds diverted from party accounts for primary election campaigns. The primary was to be an open intra-party contest fought in a manner that would give no participant a special advantage. The end being that after the primary

fight the party could unite behind the victor. As a result of these premises, votes became difficult to deliver. The links that had held the Republican Party together and out of bitter primary fights disintegrated. The old reformers in the Democratic Party like Boutin began to feel the sting of the primary election ethic as they made plans for the renomination campaign of President Johnson. On his return to New Hampshire, Boutin would find a voting population that now knew something about primary election ethics. Loeb's fair play doctrine, together with several vigorous primary contests, had drawn more voters into primary election activity than ever before. Participation, however, was not on the basis of blocs of votes to be delivered by endorsements from the leadership, but rather, as the result of much individual decision-making and ad hoc organization. The Boutin model for the Johnson New Hampshire primary campaign in 1968, was developed out of his earlier New Hampshire experiences and his activities outside New Hampshire while serving the Johnson administration in Washington. Attempting a campaign based on those experiences would run contrary to the independent mood and the primary election ethic now established in Boutin's home state.

The Johnson Campaign Materializes: Strategy and Counter Strategy

From the earliest stage of the Johnson effort in New Hampshire there were rumblings: first, was there a mysterious man from Washington who had come to New Hampshire to run the campaign; second, how much money had the Johnson leaders imported to New Hampshire to spend on the campaign; and third, when would the "heavies" arrive from Texas and Washington to take over Boutin's operation? These questions were generated partly by the press and partly by those already upset with Boutin's strategy of regimenting the

Democratic Party through endorsements of Johnson. In reaction, Boutin stated a policy that the effort on behalf of the President would be "home grown" and "home financed" and that its organization, leadership, strategy, and funding would be the responsibility of New Hampshire people.[5] The vote in the New Hampshire presidential primary would be an expression of New Hampshire gratitude for the accomplishments of President Johnson, a gift to the President.

By reacting this way, Boutin had again violated an essential political ethos. It was obvious that if he and his committee were that concerned about the impact of outside money, personnel and ideas there had to be something to fear. The reporters and numerous political observers could not all be wrong about the heavy-handedness of Lyndon Johnson's domestic politics. Boutin, again, was on the defensive, a position the McCarthy leadership hoped to nurture. They challenged the use of Democratic State Committee funds for Johnson renomination activities and hinted that they expected that large amounts of money smelling strongly of Texas crude oil would start appearing in the state. They intimated that they were expecting plane loads of noisy, Stetson-hatted Texans to start appearing at the local airports and in the local Johnson headquarters. Both the local and the national reporters maintained a continuous search for the money and the hats, which had the effect of keeping both from appearing.

Boutin's only source of manpower, therefore, was that available from inside New Hampshire or through a loan of office staff by Governor King and Senator McIntyre. The only source of money for Boutin's effort was to

be the New Hampshire Democratic Party's miniscule coffers, the pockets of its sustaining contributors and those who could be convinced that they had better contribute if they wished to maintain favorable relations with the sure-to-be re-elected President.

On the other hand, the McCarthy campaign could play by the usual New Hampshire rules. The money would be imported. The national campaign office was expected to provide most of the campaign materials and media resources for the effort. Stretching the ethos slightly, they expected to attract a number of outside workers to assist in the actual operation of the campaign. Most of this was traditional, seen as good for local business, and the campaign's contribution to New Hampshire's economy. There was, of course, a risk in this strategy, especially when it came to importing volunteers and campaign operatives, but for the McCarthy leadership there was no real choice.

If Johnson was to be the issue in New Hampshire the question was asked, "Why didn't the President allow his name to be on the New Hampshire primary ballot?" Boutin answered this in an UPI interview when he said, "It would be a question of equal time on every statement he made. It would be just impossible for him to conduct his office." Boutin then added that he expected up to 50,000 Democrats to vote and "if he gets 60 or 70 percent of that he is doing a fantastic job, realizing that on the one hand you have McCarthy's name on the ballot, and on the other, you write in for President Johnson. Just the logistics make it much more difficult for President Johnson."[6] Johnson would not enter but he would not duck either. His fate was placed in the hands of his political surrogates in Washington and New Hampshire.

There would be no time for politics in the public stance of his administration during the primary contests ahead--at least as far as his personal involvement was concerned. The polls assured him that his direct participation would not be necessary.

Bernard Boutin, however, held an important card that the McCarthy leaders discovered early in their preliminary planning. In the name of the Democratic State Committee, Boutin had blocked, by reservation, the largest hall in the state, the Manchester Armory, for the Thursday, Friday and Saturday evening of March 6, 7, and 8. He would be able to hold this space until a specified period, approximately 10 days prior to the actual reserved date. The question was, how would this space be used? Would the President be brought out of his non-participation stance, fly to Manchester and attempt a dramatic re-creation of his successful 1964 visit? Or was the reservation just good strategy on Boutin's part to prevent the Republicans from staging their own political spectacular, thus completely shutting out the Democrats in the last moments of the New Hampshire primary? This would be just the beginning of the McCarthy forces' tactical joust with the Johnson people, but it revealed two aspects of the contest. The first was that there would be direct confrontation between the campaigns supporting the opposing candidates. The second was a mutual awareness that this was not the ultimate fight. The ultimate fight was still the one that would pit the nominees of the two parties against each other in the November election. As both were Democrats, the Johnson and McCarthy leaders were constantly looking over their shoulders to see what was happening among the Republicans.

Boutin's response to the McCarthy announcement also revealed the beginning of the important numbers game. Would 60 percent be enough for a Johnson victory or would the result have to be 70 percent in order for Boutin to claim victory? What would be the percent of the vote that would mean a McCarthy defeat? Would more than 5 percent but less than 10 percent mean a "victory?" On both sides optimism was necessary in order to reinforce efforts at that early stage of the campaign. Boutin was leading from strength. He had determined that a posture of invincibility was necessary to create the impression of a self-fulfilling prophecy of victory while at the same time making those who questioned the prophecy seem foolish. On the other hand, if the McCarthy strategy had been to talk only in terms of miniscule percentages his leaders would have had considerable difficulty recruiting workers and raising funds. The "real" politicians had to sound the call of reasonable battle, not suicide.

Boutin's error, initially, was that he sought to overpower with rhetoric. He fell into his own confidence gap. Instead of being more modest in his predictions he tended to project absolute certitude in his high projections. Less optimistic language that described the maverick traditions of the New Hampshire Democrats, the difficulty of write-in elections, tied to the usual criteria of an electoral "win" of 50 percent plus one vote would have put Boutin and his candidate in a more defensible position. Starting with a "win" projection of 60 to 70 percent meant that Boutin had almost nowhere to go but down.

To add more energy to the contest between the Johnson and McCarthy campaigns was the use of Democratic State Committee funds to support the Johnson campaign. Having secured the party's endorsement and then having converted the Party organization into the campaign committee for Johnson, the New Hampshire primary ethos of party neutrality had been fully raised. At the McCarthy announcement press conference, D. Frank O'Neil of the Manchester Union Leader asked Hoeh a question concerning the use of the Democratic Party's funds to run the Johnson campaign. His newspaper had seen the intra-party contest between Johnson and McCarthy as an excellent chance to renew their assault on the practice of pre-primary endorsements. The article recounting Hoeh's reply read:

> The decision of the Democratic State Committee to use party funds to support the "Citizens-for-Johnson" effort in the New Hampshire presidential primary was under fire from a second wing of the party yesterday. (The first "wing" being Eugene Daniell.)
>
> David C. Hoeh of Hanover, state chairman of the McCarthy-for-President steering committee, told his press conference at the State House that 'a lot of Democrats are distressed' by this move on the part of the official party organization.
>
> 'Personally, I had my name on a $1,000 note for the State Committee not too many months ago. It's probably spent now. But I certainly wouldn't like to think this was being used for the Johnson primary campaign. Neither would some other Democrats who are members of the 100 Club.'
>
> Asked if this could have a serious effect on party efforts in this state after the primary, Hoeh expressed the opinion that it would 'have a bad effect' on fund-raising 'later on.'[7]

By opening the issue of the use of party funds, the McCarthy leaders were further placing the Johnson effort on the defensive. The press would be watching for reports of heavy media purchase, billboard reservations or other evidence of large amounts of money being available to Johnson's campaign. Boutin was already sensitive to this concern and was, publicly

and to a large extent privately, operating on funds generated internally in New Hampshire. Hoeh's charge now made the use of Democratic State Committee funds equally controversial. Boutin would have to run a conservative campaign, even if extensive funding were available. He certainly could not obligate the Democratic Party of New Hampshire to additional borrowing while a considerable debt still remained to be repaid as a result of the 1966 campaigns. Hoeh had reported that the McCarthy campaign would probably spend "at least $50,000" in the primary and knew that almost all of that amount would have to come from outside of the state. Because of the presidential primary tradition, Hoeh knew that criticism concerning the external-to-New Hampshire source of that money would be insignificant. After all, the McCarthy leaders speculated, what power did Senator McCarthy and his supporters have in the face of the full force of the President and his administration?

Draft R.F.K. Reactions

McCarthy's announcement took Eugene Daniell by surprise as well. Like the rest of the nation, Daniell thought that McCarthy would by-pass New Hampshire when the RFK organization deadline of December 28th came and passed. Again, Daniell, not one to keep in close touch with his associates, did not realize that many of his best potential workers were holding back in hopes that McCarthy would enter New Hampshire. Press reaction was that the future moves of Daniell's organization were uncertain but "most observers believe Daniell will continue undaunted."[8] Daniell was in the midst of his court contest with the New Hampshire Attorney General concerning the legality of a write-in campaign and had not really considered his options if McCarthy actually entered. Revealing this condition he said "Whatever we do is up

to our executive committee. But I know that we will continue with a slate of delegates. The second committee--the RFK write-in committee--will probably run a write-in effort."[9]

Daniell reported that he admired McCarthy but that he still believed that Robert Kennedy was "the best man for the job of President."[10] Daniell appeared to be weakening under the pressure of his legal battle, a dissolving campaign organization, the limitation that his committee was placing on his own political style and the organizational success of the McCarthy Steering Committee. His reference to a "slate of RFK delegates" did give the McCarthy leaders pause. They had not considered seriously the issue of delegates before the announcement press conference. Daniell's emphasis on the delegate selection issue made them begin to consider what their interest might be in the selection of the delegates and, more importantly, what Daniell's interest was. Was it possible that Daniell, a previous delegate to several Democratic conventions, was at least as interested in being a delegate as he was in pursuing a R.F.K Draft? This would be a question that would reemerge in the weeks ahead. At this time, however, it seemed desirable for the McCarthy leaders to make only oblique, usually complimentary, references to Daniell in order to avoid a confrontation with him. As long as Daniell was attacking the Johnson organization and raising the more radical of the anti-war charges, the McCarthy organization benefited by appearing to be the more reasonable, especially the more moderate, of the two anti-administration movements in New Hampshire.

Notes

[1]Shortly after the 1968 election Boutin left his Sanders Associates job to become the President of his alma mater, St. Michaels College, Winooski, Vermont.

[2]Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and Dwight D. Eisenhower avoided decarling their respective renomination candidacies in the pre-nominating convention primaries. Party surrogates in the respective states managed their affairs keeping the incumbent presidents out of such politics.

[3]Cash, K., Op.Cit.

[4]Churchill, Winston, Coniston, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1906).

[5]An August 1967 conversation between Bernard Boutin and Sandra U. Hoeh as reported by Sandra U. Hoeh.

[6]Union Leader (January 4, 1968).

[7]Ibid.

[8]The Boston Globe (January 4, 1968).

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

THE REPUBLICANS

Republicans and the McCarthy Campaign

In their December 22nd memorandum to McCarthy, Hoeh and Studds had suggested:

> We are encouraged about the possibility of a write-in effort for Senator McCarthy on the Republican ballot (particularly given the number of Republicans who were willing to change their registration this month even though Sen. McCarthy was not yet a candidate in New Hampshire.)

At their first organization meeting after McCarthy announced entry in the New Hampshire primary, the Steering Committee decided not to overtly campaign for either Republican write-in votes or to attract Republican workers away from those campaigning in New Hampshire for the Republican nomination. This decision was based on the New Hampshire political ethic that one should not muddy another party's pond -- an ethic which was especially revered by those who led the McCarthy campaign. Initially, there were two major Republican campaigns. Former Vice President Richard M. Nixon was engaged in what many observers felt was a "do-or-die" effort to erase the loser's image which he had acquired after his loss to John F. Kennedy in 1960, and a subsequent defeat in the gubernatorial campaign of 1962 in California. His principal opponent was then Governor of Michigan, George Romney. Both saw New Hampshire as the first important test and had spent great time, money, and effort preparing for the contest. In the wings were two other prominent political figures, the Governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller, and former General then head of the prominent Cambridge based consulting firm of Arthur D. Little and Associates, James Gavin. Harold Stassen and a clutch of lesser know individuals ultimately filed on the

Republican ballot -- including one man named Herbert Hoover.

Prelude

From the beginning, New Hampshire looked like an important battleground for the Republican Party. Observers assumed that President Johnson would stroll to renomination. But increasing anti-administration feeling, whether focussed on the war policy or other aspects of the administration's record, meant that the nominee of the Republican Party had a chance to defeat the incumbent President. Each candidate approached New Hampshire as if engaged in an artful form of courtship. Neither Romney nor Nixon wished to be tainted by previous negative New Hampshire experiences nor to reenforce negative perceptions of their current candidacies. The courtship took as its first phase attracting supporters to lead their New Hampshire efforts. First there was a scurrying among those who wanted leadership positions in the respective campaigns for their own purposes and to be with a "winner" early in the presidential season. Then there was the courting of those who were seen by the candidates as having valuable political skills and/or followings which would assist the candidates. Each step revealed something of the image which the candidates wished to project and the style of their subsequent campaigns.

Nixon, wanting to avoid the trap which had befallen Goldwater in 1964, carefully avoided re-establishing his ties with many of New Hampshire's prominent conservatives and supporters from his other campaigns. He selected as his state chairman a young, recently elected state representative from Hillsborough named David Sterling. The appointment lent freshness and energy

to the Nixon effort which was a direct attempt to bury Nixon's image as a retreaded loser. Through the appointment of Sterling Nixon's managers had succeeded in avoiding being labelled through association with controversial New Hampshire figures like Wesley Powell or the taciturn former Speaker of the New Hampshire General Court Stewart Lamprey. The new Nixon was alive, even vital, as projected through the activity of his young, sports car driving, attorney, popular state representative chairman. Behind the facade were the same grey politicos but to the public the image was comfortably contemporary.

Romney relied heavily on his ties with Governor Rockefeller in his search for a New Hampshire campaign group. To many Romney appeared as the fresh face in the crowd and the one who could most effectively take on President Johnson in November. He had taken positions in opposition to the administration's war policy and had attracted considerable support from the establishment dissenters in the Republican Party. Romney was viewed as a Republican liberal and attracted as New Hampshire supporters many descendants of the New Hampshire progressives. Romney selected as his chairman William R. Johnson, an attorney, member of the State Senate, and recognized leader of the Republican liberals. Johnson saw in the Romney candidacy a chance to further his own career through a successful Romney campaign in New Hampshire. Johnson inherited as his organization those local supporters and friends of Nelson Rockefeller who had campaigned for the 1964 nomination, also a sizable group who saw Romney as the only viable alternative to the war policies of Lyndon Johnson's administration.

The New York Times reported under the headline "Presidential Warm-Up" on November 5, 1967, that "the political lines in Manchester and Hanover, in Keene and Coos County (sic) are being drawn unusually early this year. The huge "Nixon for President" banner was up on the south end of the New Hampshire Highway Hotel outside Concord, where the Rockefeller bunting hung in 1964, by mid-October.

"David Sterling...quotes a straw poll that gives the former Vice-President 59 per cent, Governor Reagan 16, Governor Rockefeller of New York 12 and Governor Romney 6.

"Hard by the gilt-domed colonial Capitol downtown there was an operating Romney headquarters and a dark untenanted second-floor room that purported to be the action center of a write-in campaign for Gov. Ronald Reagan of California.

"Romney spent three days in and out of New Hampshire a week ago, his first real politicking there..."[1]

This to the press and most observers would be the main event in New Hampshire. The press followed each campaign closely as the respective strategies unravelled.

Each campaign had been carefully planned long in advance. The major strategies, organizational tactics, and logistics were the products of long periods of detailed preparation that had occurred outside of New Hampshire. Only when the primary season was about to open did the candidates bring their campaign

plans to New Hampshire. Behind the scenes were professional managers with extensive experience in political campaign management, media, scheduling, promotion and organization. A manual of operations had been written which spelled out each detail of the strategy. The professional managers were there to guide the local leaders, and to regulate all of the movements of the candidate and the organization. New Hampshire was providing the theatre, the stage, the audience and some ushers. The production was the first stop of a complete campaign roadshow for both Nixon and Romney.

Nixon in New Hampshire 1968

Nixon had always done well in New Hampshire and his nomination organization fell quickly in step behind the New Hampshire and national leadership he had selected. The New Hampshire local supporters knew exactly where the votes were that had gone to Nixon in the past and were ready to dust off these votes for him again in 1968.

The media effort became the most prominent part of the Nixon campaign. Billboards stating "Nixon's the One" with the candidate peering into an open attache case sprang up all over New Hampshire. Nixon surrogates campaigned extensively for him in the small towns and exurban neighborhoods where the Republican vote was scattered. Nixon's few visits were carefully orchestrated appearances where the semblance of access and informality were conveyed to the public, but actual contact with him was totally managed. On February 1st, a page one advertisement announced Nixon's campaign beginning with an Open House.

On the next day William Loeb published one of his famous page one signed editorials endorsing Richard Nixon's candidacy. The story that appeared under a posed photo of Nixon and his family showed how the Union Leader would campaign in New Hampshire.

> Nixon, no stranger to the New Hampshire hustings, will fire his opening guns at a noon press conference today at the Holiday Inn at Manchester, and will remain in the state for the remainder of the weekend.
>
> Highlight of his first campaign swing will be Saturday night's testimonial dinner...in Concord where a capacity crowd is assured for the convention hall. The hall has a capacity of close to 1,200.
>
> The former presidential standard bearer of the Republican Party -- he lost out in a "squeaker" to President John F. Kennedy in 1960 -- will be accompanied to New Hampshire by his wife, "Pat" and his two daughters, "Tricia" and Julie....
>
> This afternoon from 5 to 7 p.m. the Nixons will be hosts at a reception for the New Hampshire press and their families at the N.H. Highway Hotel. This is billed by the Nixon committee as a "non news-making" event. There will be no speeches or press conference at this time.
>
> On Saturday the Nixon family will return to Manchester for a two-hour public reception at St. Anselm's College, Goffstown, just outside Manchester. This will take place from 1:30 to 3:30 p.m.
>
> They will go back to the N.H. Highway Hotel in Concord late Saturday afternoon to prepare for the 7 p.m. Nixon-for-President dinner at the hotel's convention hall.
>
> The former Vice President will stay overnight at the hotel and is expected to remain there most of Sunday working on future plans for his campaigning in the Granite State.
>
> There are no public events on Sunday.
>
> Monday morning the party will leave for Manchester where Nixon is slated to take-off for Green Bay, Wisconsin and more campaigning, at 11:50 a.m.[2]

With that kind of press coverage, a background of vigorous earlier campaigns in New Hampshire, well covered visits from other members of the family and surrogates, Nixon needed little else to maintain the appearance of a vigorous contest in the state.

In his short three day campaign swing in New Hampshire, Nixon conveyed the image of an accessible, human, thoughtful, yet hard working candidate. His schedule had been carefully developed to present each of these facets and to counter lingering doubts as to his capacity to win a rough campaign fight. When Nixon left New Hampshire that Monday morning, he left behind a clear image of a mature and effective campaigner. Although time for a possible return visit to New Hampshire was reserved in his schedule, Nixon did not campaign again -- it was not necessary. Radio and television commercials, surrogate campaigners, newspaper advertising, Loeb's aggressive support and a carefully organized mailing effort carried the campaign for him. He was off to more difficult states with the assurance of a percentage player.

Romney in New Hampshire 1968

Governor George Romney of Michigan, opened his New Hampshire campaign drive first. He hired as his campaign planners the two persons who had organized the Henry Cabot Lodge write-in during the 1964 New Hampshire Primary, John D. Deardourff and David B. Goldberg. Following their surprise success in 1964, Deardourff and Goldberg had formed a consulting firm named Campaign Consultants Inc. Tom Henshaw wrote for the Sunday Herald Traveler:

> The hottest new item on the political shelf in this presidential year of 1968 is the professional consulting firm which, for a flat fee, will show an aspiring mayor, governor or even president how best to run his campaign.[3]

CCI specialized in Republican campaigns and had had some successes and losses but in the process had established a reputation for being effective. The firm had turned down an offer from Richard Nixon earlier and began working on the Romney campaign in February 1967.[4] They assembled a campaign organization for New Hampshire which tied back to Romney's national campaign.

In the organization were a number of campaigners who had had close ties either to Nelson Rockefeller directly, to roles in his administration in New York State or to liberal Republican candidates such as John Lindsey, then a Republican and Mayor of the City of New York.

To give Romney a special and early boost in his New Hampshire campaign, Governor Rockefeller and Governor John Chafee of Rhode Island, came to New Hampshire January 2 to meet with New Hampshire Romney supporters and to give the effort their full support. In addition to giving Romney support, the visit was designed to end contentions that Rockefeller would become a candidate. In commenting on this, Romney's chairman, William Johnson said, "I think the people who attended the meeting are convinced that Gov. Rockefeller is not a candidate and will support Romney."[5] Preceding Johnson's comments in the article was the paragraph; "Rockefeller's appearance in New Hampshire has been interpreted by some political observers as a move by the Romney campaign organization to drum support for the flagging Romney primary effort." Even with the extensive re-planning and methodical organizational effort, the Romney campaign had not attracted the broad interest it needed in order to confront Nixon effectively.

With Rockefeller fully in support of Romney and Romney identified as the ultimate hope of the moderates of the Republican Party, the campaign's managers felt that the Romney energy and personality would attract the support. The next step in the plan called for Romney to blitz New Hampshire in a six day campaign visit.

The Manchester Union Leader paid special attention to Romney in these early weeks. Columnist D. Frank O'Neill wrote:

> In this case (referring to the Lodge write-in of 1964) they (N.H. Republicans voters for Lodge) were "snowed-under" by a cleverly-managed public relations campaign, one that was master-minded by a couple of people who are now trying to sell the same "soap-suds" type of campaign on behalf of Governor Romney of Michigan.[6]

Romney's anti-administratien position on the war in Vietnam gave the Union Leader a special opportunity to criticize Romney while he was engaged in his dawn to dark effort to woo Republican voters. In a famous visit to Vietnam Romney had returned as a supporter of the war effort. Later he changed his position stating that he felt he had been "brain washed" by the Pentagon and the Vietnam-based military. Romney was never quite able to shake the implications of that phrase. Many became skeptical of Romney's ability to make sound policy judgments and to keep from being swayed by advisors and briefings. Senator Eugene McCarthy when asked about Romney's "brainwashed" statement said that he felt "brainwashed" was an overstatement. "All that was needed in the case of George Romney was a light rinse."[7]

The Manchester Union Leader felt that Romney was vulnerable among the New Hampshire conservative Republicans on both his policy position on the war and the implications of the "brainwashed" statement. They also sensed that the Romney leadership was having difficulty exciting interest in Romney. Working with both feelings, the editors began to chip away at Romney.

> Headline: Romney Deals Verbal Cut to Military Effort in Viet.
> Concord: UPI -- Michigan Gov. George Romney yesterday dealt a verbal blow to the military in Vietnam while urging the U.S. and other major powers increase efforts to achieve talks

> between the Saigon government and the National Liberation Front of North Vietnam.
>
> The Republican presidential hopeful told a news conference "my general feeling is we have relied too heavily on search and destroy rather than clear and hold."[8]

Romneys' campaign had been labelled a "peace crusade" which had stressed "peace" and the need for "moral leadership."[9] Such words, when placed in the context of a Manchester Union Leader story, conveyed an image of weakness if not actually traitorous inclinations.

The friendly press had trouble projecting a decisive image for Romney as well. The Concord Monitor ran a story headlined: And Suddenly, Nelson Rockefeller...ROMNEY BEGINS PRIMARY BID, CHALLENGES NIXON TO DEBATE. The column titles for the two stories that ran under the headline read, "Defeat Here Might Bury Romney Bid" and "Candidate Issues Call for Morality." One article held out the hope that if Romney failed in New Hampshire this would "signal the entry of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller." The other led with Romney's challenge to Nixon to debate "on the issues", a challenge that was never accepted.[10] The theme of the Romney effort as reported by the Concord Monitor would be a "new leadership of a new America to discover the old morality."

From the beginning, the Romney campaign developed incredible problems. First, they were unable to stimulate much interest. Secondly, the organization that did evolve was carelessly managed. Thirdly, the press situation for Romney was confusing and those items which the campaign thought would help often backfired. Fourthly, Romney himself was badly scheduled. Instead of

voters by his extensive campaign, familiarity seemed to breed contempt. Because of Romney's campaign impact on the McCarthy effort, it is important to recount some of the details of Romney's New Hampshire failure.

The Romney Organization

Each campaign tried to create an image for itself that was distinct. One of the devices to show imagination and professionalism was to find new ways to organize and attract supporters. The Romney managers created the idea of a series of "home headquarters" that would serve as local organizing centers and provide identity for the candidate at the neighborhood, small town level. Opening these "headquarters" would give something for the candidate to do in places where there was little opportunity for conventional campaigning -- especially in the small towns where the Republican vote resided and during the winter campaign season. An excellent concept, except to be successful it had to be carefully done.

On his campaign travels Romney rode in a Winnebago vehicle which was equipped as a headquarters and place to relax between stops. When scheduled to come into a town an advance group of "Romney Girls," five Colby Junior College students, all various shades of blonde, wearing red, white and blue Romney mini dresses would arrive ahead of Romney and warm the audience (usually in a home headquarters) with several Romney campaign songs."[11] On one of these campaign swings Romney logged more than 2,000 miles of small town stops, plant gate and main street handshaking and home headquarters openings.

The fault with the "home headquarters" came when a list of these locations was announced. On the list were a number of individuals who were not active in his campaign. In fact, the McCarthy leaders screened the list carefully and found several active McCarthy supporters who did have a Romney "home headquarters" or any intention of opening one.

January 18th Romney announced that 25 headquarters had been established in the Concord area, and that these were the "first of 10,000 that will hopefully be in existence before the Republican National Convention next August."[12]

> In New Hampshire Romney forces are nearing the end of an effort to establish 500 home headquarters before the March 12 primary. At last count, they had sevured more than 400, Romney officials said.[13]

On January 20th, William Johnson began correcting, publicly, the list of "home headquarters" he had issued two days earlier. The public relations impact of the original announcement dimmed as the inaccuracies of the list were revealed.

As McCarthy leaders Hoeh and Studds had noted in an organizational meeting, the idea of the "home headquarters" was good and they suggested that the McCarthy Committee borrow the concept. Those communities which would not be able to find or support a storefront headquarters should be organized around "home headquarters." Volunteers would have a place to go, literature could be distributed from the designated homes, and telephoning for election day activity could be organized around the headquarters. They would not, however, be used as Romney had used them, as the focus of his own local campaign stops. For a Democratic candidate other activities took precedence.

The Romney campaign schedule was a masterpiece of how the campaign managers thought Romney could storm New Hampshire. He was known to be energetic and personally engaging. The managers wished to contrast his accessibility, constant energy, enthusiasm, and charisma with the image of aloof and impersonal Richard Nixon. A typical schedule had Romney outside of a factory greeting workers at 6:30 a.m., an 8:00 a.m. breakfast meeting/speech, mid-morning home headquarters visits, a high school or college speech, a noon luncheon with a service club, more home headquarters meetings in the afternoon, street campaigning, a radio interview, a meeting with a local newspaper editor, perhaps a break from campaigning for dinner or a dinner speaking engagement, and often a speech or meeting with workers in the evening. The campaign day ended for him after 11:00 p.m. The next morning began again with the 6:30 a.m. plant gate handshaking. For six days Romney kept the same pace.

The Romney managers wasted their own candidate. On his first campaign day he stood outside of a Nashua factory in 20 degree below zero weather reaching for the hands of workers who were a bit puzzled to see a grown man standing outside in the biting cold and darkness of the early New Hampshire dawn. The hands he was reaching for were mostly those of Democrats.

Mixed in the schedule were what the managers felt were the required media events. New Hampshire skis they thought, thus Romney should be photographed on skis. He did not ski and appeared in a well circulated photograph awkwardly trying to stand up on skis. What his managers did not realize was

that people come to New Hampshire to ski, but most of Romney's potential New Hampshire voters didn't. Romney, well known for his jogging, appeared one afternoon in jogging shorts, sneakers and light shirt ready to demostrate for the curious as well as the photographers along Concord's victorian Main street, the jogging style that had become so well known. For some reason he had to wait in the cold for the event to be orchestrated, lost his temper, did jog, but the whole exercise lost its meaning, if there had been one. Romney succeeded in reenforcing only one image and that was not one that lent any particular value to his campaign. He was energetic, but perhaps it was true that he could be easily led by his managers and "brainwashed." He certainly did not cast an image either of identity with the New Hampshire Republican voter or competence to be the next president of the United States.

As the schedule proceeded, Romney began to tire. When problems cropped up Romney was upset. He was generally pleased with the response to his candidacy he had met on the street, but as Governor King pointed out to Senator McCarthy, "You will find that New Hampshire people are courteous." With Nixon's carefully staged visit early in February, whatever momentum Romney had succeeded in building with his attempted blitz faded by contrast. Nixon appeared like a person these voters, voters who had supported him in large numbers before, would like as their president. Romney's campaign was entertainment, almost a circus except that he was trying valiantly through it all, to say something important about the war policy in Vietnam and the impact of the Johnson administration on the national morality.

Romney's Secret Weapon

The final irony of the Romney candidacy came in the form of that very expertise that had surprised New Hampshire in 1964. Early in January the Romney leadership revealed that they had the capacity to prepare 40 personalized letters per minute and had mailed more than 80,000 letters during the same week. Their "secret weapon" was a computer-driven printer capable of producing 1,200 lines of typewriting per minute. William Johnson reported that the "names, addresses, telephone numbers and occupations of 130,000 Republicans have been put on computer tape, leaving about 15,000 yet to do."[14] The names had come from precinct checklists with city and town directories used to match husbands and wives, and to get occupations.

The Nixon campaign was using a mechnical letter-writer that produced 300 letters a day with a total of 27,000 at that point in the campaign. The battle of the letters was on, and from the early report Romney's computer-based operation was in the lead. The Nixon campaign's reaction to the Romney leaders gleeful report of their sophisticated name, letter, and interest matching system was that they "did not consider using a computer in their mailings." They were using a hand personalizing method for their letters which took longer and did not involve a computer.[15] With Nixon running 3 to 1 ahead of Romney at that point in the polls, they were sticking to tried and true methods.

William Johnson had borrowed student help and purchased computer time on the computer equipment based at Dartmouth College. His delight

at the ability of this system to produce letters, maintain lists, and sort for special interest constituencies was too much for him to contain. In the midst of his candidate's important first campaign visit to New Hampshire major press attention was diverted from Romney to Johnson, his letters and the computer's capabilities. The computer was the campaign gimmick of 1968. William Johnson was the proud father or, more appropriately, midwife.

Unfortunately, the revelation of the "secret weapon" fell into the Union Leader's view of the Romney campaign as a bit of soapselling hucksterism, a bit too slick, sophisticated and unsettling for many New Hampshire voters who saw the "secret weapon" as a device to manipulate voters. It violated the ethic of making an independent choice and raised suspicion. In reality there was no need for Johnson to crow about his voter contacting operation. If the letters had been quietly produced, mailed and read, the impact would have been considerably greater than was the fear Johnson thought he could evoke in the Nixon camp. The fine art of commercial direct mail had long possessed the sophistication that Johnson publicly described.

Johnson deflated the credibility of his letters when he allowed his "secret weapon" to become public. It must also be recalled that this was the beginning of a public concern with who was keeping personal records and why. When Johnson indicated that he had hoped to include data on how frequently each Republican goes to the polls the spector of an invasion of privacy became evident. Johnson's use of the phrase "data bank" coupled with a Concord Monitor headline which read,"Romney's Race Aided by Secret Computer," was enough to raise great concern and suspicion.[16]

Suspicion increased and the letters that were mailed arrived with considerably less credibility. Romney faced controversy at the same that he was trying to establish rapport with New Hampshire voters. The "secret weapon" turned out to be a dud.

William Loeb focussed the suspicion with one of his front page signed editorials which read:

> Us Guinea Pigs in New Hampshire
>
> For the last two weeks the campaign managers of Gov. Romney have told half a dozen national publications -- with remarkable candor -- precisely what they are relying on to win the New Hampshire primary.
>
> The mainstay of their campaign is not the qualifications or ability of Gov. Romney to dig himself out of the quicksand of contradictions where he has been floundering for months.
>
> Their "secret weapon," as Warren Beaver of the New York Times wrote a week ago, "is not even in New Hampshire."
>
> It is a giant computer, an electronic data bank, based in New York City, that will be working overtime to rescue Gov. Romney's flagging political fortunes.
>
> Into that computer the Romney organizers have fed not only the voters' lists of all New Hampshire Republicans and Independents, but also as much personal background as they could dig up in four months of scouring the state.
>
> Inside this "People Bank" in New York City, the voters can be segmented, in seconds, into Catholics, Protestants, Jews, married, divorced, single, rich, poor, old, young, union man and businessman, black and white, male and female, government worker, home owner, renter -- and we don't know what else.
>
> When all this personal data is coupled with analyses of opinion surveys and behavioral studies, the potential for manipulating the electorate of New Hampshire is enormous.
>
> The Romney managers are aware of this potential -- and frank about it.
>
> They have bragged that within a matter of a few hours they can have "tailored" pieces of literature in the hands of any special interest voting bloc in the state.

The letter that goes to the young, Roman Catholic, union worker in Manchester can be wholly different than that sent up to the Protestant, small town, upstate, middle-aged businessman.

Each of these letters would be prepared by social scientists in New York, then mass-produced, inserted, stamped by computer, trucked to New Hampshire and mailed.

Yet, each of these computer-produced letters would appear to all the world to be a personalized note written and signed by either Mr. Johnson, or Gov. Romney or Gov. Rockefeller himself!

A few years back a rather frightening book was written entitled "THE 480."

Its theme was that a small group of behavioral scientists, using a computer and massive personal data on each American voter, could sub-divide the country into 480 "voting segments," make "tailored appeals" to each of these segments -- and elect any man they chose to be President of the United States.

NEW HAMPSHIRE IS TO BE THE TESTING GROUND OF THIS KIND OF X "PROGRAMMED POLITICS" AND YOU THE VOTERS OF THIS STATE ARE TO BE THE GUINEA PIGS.

If Gov. George Romney -- a man almost without comprehension of the magnitude of the crises this country faces abroad -- can be put across to the New Hampshire voter by a complex of data banks in New York City, the lesson will not be lost on other men with similar ideas.

Despite the confidence of theRomney camp in their computer, we don't think it will work. We hope that you cannot sell a presidential candidate the way you sell cigarettes.

The best defense against this sort of effort to manipulate the electorate and exploit the racial, religious, income and regional differences among us -- is the basic good sense of New Hampshire.

From the Romney camp comes word that the first to be hit with the special interest mailings will be the voters over 60.

Maybe this editorial will help them to know beforehand just what they are getting.

Signed: William Loeb, publisher[17]

Romney's Rockefeller Problem

In spite of Governor Nelson Rockefeller's early, continuing, and vigorous support for Romney, their remained a sizable group of skeptics in New Hampshire. When the February 10th closing date had passed, sixteen delegate candidates had filed as being "favorable" to the nomination of Governor Rockefeller. By February 18th the New York Times reported that Prof. John A. Beckett of Durham had been selected chairman of a delegate candidate committee which was organized for a write-in campaign on behalf of the New York governor.

Announcing the effort one of the members of the committee said: "they expected that the write-in would pick up a large portion of the Henry Cabot Lodge write-in vote cast in 1964."[18] The basis for the organizing was the fact that many continued to view Romney as a "stand-in" or "stalking horse" for Rockefeller. If Romney failed, then these analysts were sure that their preferred candidate, Rockefeller, would announce his candidacy. If they could generate a sufficient write-in vote for Rockefeller in the New Hampshire primary they felt that the demise of the Romney campaign would result and Rockefeller would consider challenging Nixon for the nomination.

Until the January 28th release of a Gallup Poll, Rockefeller had been as much as 14 points ahead of President Johnson in these surveys. The January 28th release had Lyndon Johnson running ahead of each of the four most popular Republicans with the highest approval, 48 percent, in some time. Rockefeller remained the candidate supported most frequently by voters against Johnson.[19]

Romney, in spite of his aggressive New Hampshire campaign, did not appear to move either in the straw polls in New Hampshire or in his standing among other Republicans mentioned as possible candidates nationally. He was not able to attract Rockefeller's strong liberal and moderate Republican interest; nor had he been able to show the national strength among all voters that would attract support for his nomination against President Johnson. The Rockefeller write-in organizers perceived this weakness and began actively to hold out hope for a Rockefeller nomination.

February 28th, Governor Romney declared that he was withdrawing from the New Hampshire presidential primary. Several hours before, he had been given the results of the latest private poll conducted by his campaign which showed that he not only seriously trailed in his campaign against Richard Nixon but that his position relative to Nixon was approximately the same as it had been before he began campaigning. His campaign had failed to generate the momentum that would bring him sufficiently close to Nixon so that even if he did lose he could claim a victory, of sorts, in the narrowness of the Nixon margin.

The demise of the Romney campaign released volunteers and local moderate/liberal Republican energy to work on the McCarthy effort. "Republicans for McCarthy" committees were organized, letters supporting McCarthy were circulated to former Romney activists, advertisements urging Republicans concerned about the policies of the Johnson administration were placed by these committees and fund raising began. Isolated and frustrated Republican liberals began to appear at McCarthy campaign stops and express their support for him.

When Romney ended his campaign, some of the media thought the interesting part of the New Hampshire primary was over for 1968. CBS and ABC cancelled their hotel and motel spaces, stopped preparing extensive election eve coverage and left New Hampshire. Other news gathering organizations and several of the major newspapers greatly reduced their coverage of the remaining campaigns. The indications were that Nixon would win easily over the write-in effort for Rockefeller and that Johnson was at least a three-to-one leader in the campaign with McCarthy. Given that prospect, a fait accompli could easily be reported by a few local stringers and the budget rich National Broadcasting Corporation.

By nibbling at the edges of the Romney campaign, the McCarthy organization was able to feed rather well. Until Romney showed his final and considerable weakness as a candidate, the McCarthy workers had hoped that he would succeed with his anti-war position against Richard Nixon. When he failed they were ready to absorb as much of the anti-war anti-Johnson administration sentiment as was likely to move from Republican ranks to a Democrat of any sort.

Notes

[1]The New York Times (November 5, 1967).

[2]Union Leader (February 2, 1968).

[3]The Sunday Herald Traveler (January 7, 1968).

[4]Ibid.

[5]The Concord Daily Monitor (January 6, 1968).

[6]Union Leader (January 10, 1968).

[7]David C. Hoch recollection.

[8]Union Leader (January 12, 1968).

[9]Union Leader (January 11, 1968).

[10]The Concord Daily Monitor (January 12, 1968).

[11]The Concord Daily Monitor (January 17, 1968).

[12]The Concord Daily Monitor (January 18, 1968).

[13]Ibid.

[14]The Lebanon Valley News (January 13, 1968).

[15]Ibid.

[16]The Concord Daily Monitor (January 11, 1968).

[17]Union Leader (January 28, 1968).

[18]The New York Times (February 18, 1968).

[19]The Boston Globe (January 28, 1968).

CHAPTER VII

THE LBJ CAMPAIGN, THE McCARTHY CAMPAIGN: CONTRASTING STYLES

Knowing the Opposition

The Johnson campaign developed according to the plan that Bernard L. Boutin had outlined to Sandra Hoeh during their August 1967 meeting. Following the Democratic State Committee's endorsement of the Johnson renomination bid November 19th, other local and county committees and prominent Democratic Party leaders and officials began endorsing the renomination of the President as well. Each of the significant endorsements received the attention of a press release from the Democratic State Committee headquarters and local or statewide media distribution. In carefully orchestrated succession the Johnson campaign leadership began filing for the delegate places. Again, each of the principal and approved filings was accompanied by a press release that kept the efforts of the committee before the public on almost a daily basis. On January 22nd Governor John W. King and Bernard L. Boutin filed their delegate candidacies while the story that covered the filing indicated that U.S. Senator Thomas H. McIntyre was expected to file later.[1] The stream was properly staggered to insure that the LBJ campaign would gain some press attention even though the major focus was almost entirely on the Republican contest.

Shortly before Senator McCarthy was to make his first campaign visit to New Hampshire, Rowland Evans, the nationally syndicated columnist, called the McCarthy state headquarters inviting Hoeh and Studds to join him for dinner. Evans had been spending the day with Bernard Boutin and other members of the LBJ committee and now wanted to contrast his experience with the McCarthy leaders' view of the contest.

Evans was impressed by what Boutin had told him of the Johnson campaign plan and the extensive list of endorsements which Boutin had gathered. Hoeh responded that he felt if someone were asked for an endorsement that is what would be given. If someone was asked to work then that is what they would do. In the case of the Johnson campaign, Hoeh said that he felt endorsements were contrary to the non-endorsement ethic in New Hampshire and might well hurt the Johnson effort rather than help. As for the campaign plan, Hoeh responded that he did not see it as being particularly unique. It still rested on the hard work of volunteers, who did not seem to be volunteering, and on the backs of those who had endorsed the renomination effort but had done little else. To Hoeh and Studds it appeared as if the endorsers were busier congratulating each other over the endorsements and predicting how badly McCarthy would be beaten than actually stirring up a Johnson vote. An air of self-assurance about the "3 to 1" defeat of McCarthy and the ultimate success of Johnson, not only in New Hampshire but in November as well, kept the energy and volunteer levels low in the Johnson camp. To Hoeh and Studds, the Johnson campaign seemed narrowly based and over confident. Few persons were actually at work in the campaign. The reasons for each of these conclusions they carefully explained to Evans.

They began by reviewing how rapidly the McCarthy organization had developed before McCarthy announced; how it had sustained itself before McCarthy entered the New Hampshire primary; how it had grown since the January 3rd announcement; how dedicated and effective the volunteers had become; the extensive press attention the campaign had already received; and reported that a substantial flow of outside volunteers was beginning.

Evans' column appeared January 25th, the day before McCarthy arrived for his first New Hampshire campaign visit. The headline read "LBJ Turns on Heat to Roast McCarthy," and went on:

> Concord, N.H. -- The real surprise in the campaign for the March 12 Democratic presidential primary is not the disorganized nature of Sen. Eugene McCarthy's campaign but how the much-maligned regular party organization here is building a well-oiled machine to support President Johnson.
>
> On the eve of McCarthy's first campaign visit here Friday for his battle against Mr. Johnson, the state of the senator's campaign is easily depicted: not until this week did his campaign headquarters in Washington send a single advanceman to survey New Hampshire and confer with McCarthy's original supporter and now the manager on the scene, Dartmouth College public affairs man David Hoeh (sic).
>
> In contrast, McCarthy, the only name on the ballot, faces what looks to be the most formidable and highly organized campaign ever fielded in this state, promoting the write-in of Mr. Johnson's name against McCarthy. Headed by Nashua businessman and former Washington bureaucrat Bernard Boutin (who handled Sen. Estes Kefauver's winning primary campaign in 1956 and John F. Kennedy's in 1960) the Johnson organization is developing a campaign concept based on careful organization wholly new to New Hampshire.
>
> If successful, it will undermine the habitual primary campaign approach of non-organization Democrats like Kefauver, who conducted hamlet-to-hamlet, handshaking tours that overwhelmed the voters.
>
> But Kefauver's stunning upset of Harry Truman in 1952 came against the backdrop of a weak, almost non-existent Democratic Party organization. Kefauver filled a power vacuum by going directly to the voters with little if any resistance from the regulars.
>
> Now, however, the Democrats not only have the governorship and one U.S. senator but are also organized. They are breaking down the state's 87,500 registered Democrats into 2000 neighborhoods, with one coordinator for each. Every Democratic voter will be handed a pledge card, with a detachable blank addressed to the White House telling President Johnson why the voter will write in his name on Mar. 12.
>
> Campaign plans seldom live up to advance billing. But if Boutin, backed by Gov. John King, does half as well as his blueprint, McCarthy will be facing a defeat close to annihilation....

Evans' column appeared January 25th, the day before McCarthy arrived for his first New Hampshire campaign visit. The headline read "LBJ Turns on Heat to Roast McCarthy," and went on:

> Concord, N.H. -- The real surprise in the campaign for the March 12 Democratic presidential primary is not the disorganized nature of Sen. Eugene McCarthy's campaign but how the much-maligned regular party organization here is building a well-oiled machine to support President Johnson.
>
> On the eve of McCarthy's first campaign visit here Friday for his battle against Mr. Johnson, the state of the senator's campaign is easily depicted: not until this week did his campaign headquarters in Washington send a single advanceman to survey New Hampshire and confer with McCarthy's original supporter and now the manager on the scene, Dartmouth College public affairs man David Hoeh (sic).
>
> In contrast, McCarthy, the only name on the ballot, faces what looks to be the most formidable and highly organized campaign ever fielded in this state, promoting the write-in of Mr. Johnson's name against McCarthy. Headed by Nashua businessman and former Washington bureaucrat Bernard Boutin (who handled Sen. Estes Kefauver's winning primary campaign in 1956 and John F. Kennedy's in 1960) the Johnson organization is developing a campaign concept based on careful organization wholly new to New Hampshire.
>
> If successful, it will undermine the habitual primary campaign approach of non-organization Democrats like Kefauver, who conducted hamlet-to-hamlet, handshaking tours that overwhelmed the voters.
>
> But Kefauver's stunning upset of Harry Truman in 1952 came against the backdrop of a weak, almost non-existent Democratic Party organization. Kefauver filled a power vacuum by going directly to the voters with little if any resistance from the regulars.
>
> Now, however, the Democrats not only have the governorship and one U.S. senator but are also organized. They are breaking down the state's 87,500 registered Democrats into 2000 neighborhoods, with one coordinator for each. Every Democratic voter will be handed a pledge card, with a detachable blank addressed to the White House telling President Johnson why the voter will write in his name on Mar. 12.
>
> Campaign plans seldom live up to advance billing. But if Boutin, backed by Gov. John King, does half as well as his blueprint, McCarthy will be facing a defeat close to annihilation....

He concluded his column:

> The one bright spot since his entry is that the chance for a large write-in for non-candidate Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, has sharply declined. Eugene Daniell... is still running several candidates for convention delegates pledged to Kennedy. But Daniell is now planning to vote for McCarthy in the preferential primary.
>
> That will help McCarthy, but not enough. A McCarthy vote of more than 20 percent would be a surprise, and a total of less would be an undisguised disaster.[2]

Reading the column the McCarthy leaders feared that on the day before McCarthy's first visit the conclusions of a major national columnist would seriously undercut the fledgling campaign. They felt the campaign was fragile, subject to easy destruction either from the outside or through reactions of those working within New Hampshire. Fortunately, Evans' and Novak's column does not circulate widely in New Hampshire.

As Hoeh and Studds had tried to point out to Evans that while his image of the national headquarters and a centrally directed campaign might be correct, his image of what was developing for McCarthy at the state level was not. What had impressed Evans about the Johnson New Hampshire campaign were the very attributes of that campaign that held the greatest opportunity for McCarthy's success. A tightly controlled, centrally managed campaign organization highlighted the same negative attributes of the Johnson administration that people at the "grass roots" had begun to fear. Hoeh and Studds sensed a basic alienation from and distrust of the Johnson dominated national government. The giant personality of Johnson himself seemed to frighten people. His style and his real or imagined ability to overpower the institutions of the federal government and to stifle opposition had created a considerable reaction. In the early stages of the campaign, this reaction was neither wide

spread nor focussed. Unfortunately for the Johnson campaign leadership, the very structure of their campaign helped to gather the reaction into a political force -- a political force that could be exploited against Lyndon Johnson.

Evans mentioned several details of the Johnson campaign that intrigued Hoeh and Studds. The first was the organizational concept of Boutin's effort which was to depend on "2000 neighborhoods, with one coordinator for each."[3] Boutin, Hoeh recalled, was dusting off a page from the 1960 Kennedy campaign which avoided senseless local struggles over titles in the campaign, e.g. the John Kennedy organizers used the label "Kennedy Secretary" as the means of identifying the local organizer. Boutin revealed by this that he expected difficulty in getting his campaign job done by using only the local Democratic Party organizations -- something that Evans did not appreciate when he wrote his column.

Secondly, Boutin had taken the idea generated by the Lodge write-in campaign of 1964 of a "pledge" card. The impact of Lodge's surprise victory in the 1964 Republican presidential primary had conditioned the organization of all of the 1968 primary campaigns -- Republican and Democratic. Although the McCarthy leaders were not surprised by Boutin's use of a "pledge" card they were interested in what form this effort would take.

A basic element of any political campaign is to know what the opposition is doing. In the case of the Johnson campaign, this became a relatively easy task. First, in their self-confidence the leadership was not reluctant to discuss the organizational concept of the campaign with the press. Boutin

had done this with Rowland Evans. Secondly, close ties and friendships had been built up over the years between the McCarthy leaders and those working on the Johnson campaign. This friendship had long preceded 1968's politics and would continue after March 12th. Dissension within the Johnson camp kept information flowing to the McCarthy camp.

The organizational manual for the Johnson campaign had been developed by Boutin while still in Washington. When he returned to New Hampshire he adopted a rather inflexible leadership role that allowed for little disagreement with his concept of the campaign.

Late in January, the first rumblings of dissension began to come to the McCarthy leaders. Boutin's leadership was demanding, heavy-handed, and in a style that seemed to those who witnessed it to come less from his New Hampshire origin than from too many years in Washington close to Lyndon B. Johnson. Boutin expected all of those who had endorsed Johnson to fall into line behind him and the top leadership of the Johnson effort in New Hampshire. Criticism was viewed by Boutin as a form of disloyalty. To him there were 90,000 Democrats out in the state who had to be reached and told how to support their president by writing-in his name. A New Hampshire success for Boutin's campaign concept would propel Boutin to the national leadership of Johnson's campaign and bestow on Boutin's new campaign concept the mark of genius. The personal investment for Boutin was enormous. Winning was the only acceptable result. To others winning was important but keeping the New Hampshire Democratic Party alive and friendships viable after the primary was at least as important. Boutin was becoming a drill

sergeant in his effort to extort production and unquestioning loyalty.

Shortly after Evans' column appeared, Hoeh and Studds were given a package of the Johnson campaign's organizational materials. One of their volunteers had been given the kit by a disgruntled Johnson supporter. The kit contained a sixteen page mimeographed document titled, "New Hampshire Citizens for Johnson Campaign Checklist for the President Johnson 'Write-In' Campaign, New Hampshire - March 12, 1967 (sic)." With the document were ten attractively presented pictorial brochures titled, "A Strong Man in a Tough Job," five green and white vinyl bumper strips which read "I Support President Johnson," along with a mimeographed slip which said, "Bumper must be wiped clean before attaching;" four pre-addressed and stamped enevelopes; a one page item titled, "Notable Accomplishments of the Vice President, Hubert H. Humphrey;" and twenty, serially numbered three part wallet sized cards. The first part of the card read, "N.H. Democrats Are 90,000 Strong, I have pledged my support to President Johnson, and though he is not an announced candidate, I am writing his name in on my ballot in the March 12th New Hampshire Presidential Preference Primary," with space under the pledge for the voter's signature. Part two of the card was titled "White House Copy" and read "President Johnson, I pledge my support to you and will WRITE-IN your name on my ballot in the March 12th New Hampshire Presidential Preference Primary, Name_____(print clearly) Address_____Tel. No._____ and two boxes: Democrat or Independent, (As an expression of your support this card will be forwarded to President Johnson at the White House in Washington, D.C.)."

Part three titled "Headquarters Copy" repeated the name, address, telephone number, voter status, note space for services needed such as "transportation, baby sitter, and remarks," and, as with the other two parts, the serial numer was repeated. The pre-addressed and stamped enevelopes were for the return of these last two coupons to the Johnson headquarters in Manchester.

The whole package was carefully developed and well presented. The brochure folded out to a sheet of high grade paper with a sample ballot on one side with graphic instructions for writing in the President's name and on the other a selection of pictures with President Johnson in his "Tough Job." Johnson was shown quietly in his office, meeting with Senate leaders Mansfield and Dirksen, with Dean Rusk in a cabinet meeting, a face-to-face conversation with Premier Kosigin of the Soviet Union and listening to a General in some military field situation. The photographs portrayed the burdens of the Presidency and Johnson's thoughtful leadership in that job. The brief text read:

> There is no tougher job in the world than being President of the United States -- and never has it been tougher than it is now.
>
> You, along with 200 million other Americans, look to him for decisive action as we face the most serious challenges ever to confront our nation and the world.
>
> An effective President must avoid weakness ... avoid backing down when the going gets tough... and he must forego the impulse to let loose... because as the leader of the most powerful nation on earth, he can trigger the destruction of civilization with a single word. He must follow the responsible course... enduring the wailings of the peaceniks and those who would surrender.
>
> He must be a man of dedicated strength and President Johnson is ...
>
> A STRONG MAN IN A TOUGH JOB

> The job is made tougher because the courageous course is never easy. He assummed office under the most trying circumstances... and besides carrying out, to the letter, every one of President Kennedy's programs, he has gone beyond as he strives for an ever better America. It is not easy for a President to crusade for expanded opportunities for all Americans ... when most Americans are already living better than any people in history.
>
> President Johnson is a tireless worker.
>
> He has done a remarkable job ... and with our support he will continue as one of our greatest Presidents. Your endorsement will bolster President Johnson's determination.
>
> Both he and the country look to New Hampshire as the first state in the nation to reaffirm its unflinching devotion to convictions of honor.
>
> Your write-in vote can set the pace for the entire nation as an overwhelming endorsement of this strong man in a tough job. Your vote is both the source, and measure, of his strength.

The theme had been carefully chosen to attract feelings sympathetic to a President in a difficult position. The campaign concept from brochure to instructions to pledge cards was one of unifying behind the President to provide security, and national solidarity against potentially destructive forces outside and inside the nation. To defeat such a strategy would mean that the McCarthy leaders would have to pick it apart. The instructions circulated with the campaign materials began to give Hoeh and Studds some help in countering the Johnson strategy.

The introduction to the instructions read:

> On March 12th New Hampshire will vote 50,000 strong for President Lyndon B. Johnson.
>
> There are over 87,000 registered Democrats and over 127,000 "Independents". The goal is attainable -- with hard work.

> But - the job is difficult since the President's name will not be on the ballot and it will be necessary to write-it-in.
>
> That then, is the goal for our campaign - by March 12th N.H. will have 50,000 write-in votes pledged to the President....[4]

The instructions went on to explain that because of the "equal time provision which requires the news media to give equal time to other candidates" it often appears "advantageous for potential candidates who hold public office at that time to delay announcing their actual candidacy until later...." For this reason the "write-in" for President Johnson was necessary. To accomplish a "write-in" the instructions stated that it would be necessary to "educate" the voter as to "what is required and then get him to the polls to vote." The name rules for write-ins in New Hampshire hold that the "voters intent must be clear" so the instructions advised writing in "Lyndon B. Johnson." Instructions on the delegate selection portion of the ballot were included and referenced to the enclosed sample ballot printed on the Johnson brochure.

In a section titled "Tips for Organization" was written: "We are aware that the situation varies somewhat from town to town and ward to ward. We leave to your sound judgment any variations in the suggestions but that you consider the fact that the suggestions are not our own but are based upon long experience connected with the various campaigns." properly warned not to vary the framework, the instructions then outlined the campaign structure.

> 1. The Neighborhood Coordinator: The backbone of the entire campaign is the Neighborhood Coordinator. In most cases these coordinators will be women although there is no real preference.... Each "N.C." will have responsibility only for his or her neighborhood, consisting of a street or streets assigned by the Town or Ward coordinator.

The "N.C." was expected to contact all Democrats and Independents living within the assigned area. Each was responsible for from 35-50 voters. The "single most important activity of the entire campaign will be the Pledge-Card Drive. This will be handled by the Neighborhood Coordinator... and... will be his top priority project prior to Primary Day." The instructions went on to discuss the other roles in the campaign including the (2. the "Town or Ward Coordinator, 3. the City Coordinator, 4. The County Coordinator, 5. The Check List Committee, 6. The Transportation Committee, 7. The Finance Committee, 8. The Baby Sitter Committee, and 9. The Publicity Committee. Item 10 called for "Weekly Progress Reports" to be filed from the "County, City, & Town" on an attached report form.

The instructions outlined the responsibilities of each position in the campaign structure and covered each step in the expected campaign even to the point of including separate telephone messages to be read when contacting a registered Democrat or an Independent voter. The Publicity Chairman was advised that he "must" be responsible for the following:

1. Prepare releases on strictly local activities and local committee appointments.

2. Invite reporters and photographers, well in advance, to all major events in the area.

3. Recommend procedures to State Headquarters in working with newspapers and radio in your area.

4. Encourage letters to the Editor by people in your area.

5. Organize people to call in to "open mike" shows, in support of President Johnson.

6. Organize people to participate in "talk shows" and interview programs on behalf of President.

The last page of the instructions was titled "Committee Roster" which had spaces for listing the city, town, and ward, coordinator's name, and the names of the committee members. This was to be sent to the Manchester Johnson campaign headquarters.

The most intriguing position of the instructions was the page devoted to "The Pledge-Card Drive." The pledge card drive gave the organization an activity that would substitute for the fact that there would not be a live candidate travelling in New Hampshire. Circulating pledge cards and getting signatures would be the principal campaign activity and the cards themselves would be the basis for the election day get-out-the-vote effort.

Harry Makris, Executive Director of the Democratic State Committee, began distributing the kits late in January through county and city organizational meetings. Each meeting sought to fill in the pyramid of coordinators, stimulate interest in the campaign, and distribute the neighborhood coordinator kits.

It was at the Berlin meeting that a McCarthy volunteer received a kit from a Democratic party worker. The worker took the kit to avoid being discourteous but planned to throw it away. He said he didn't like the idea of pledging people to vote in a certain way. He felt such decisions were private and should be kept that way. He especially didn't like having copies of the pledge being sent to the White House or even to Manchester. He also felt it would easy enough to sign the pledge and then vote differently. From this conversation with their Berlin worker, Hoeh and Studds began to see a way to turn the slick new Boutin campaign against itself.

Makris took the Johnson campaign into the field as a technician explaining the campaign concept, recruiting volunteers, and instructing coordinators. Others, principally Governor John W. King and Bernard L. Boutin took a different tack. Given that Johnson was viewed by most as being miles ahead of McCarthy, it was difficult to stimulate much interest in doing the hard work of contacting voters, getting pledge cards signed, or even attending many of the organizational meetings. To drum up interest Governor King and, occasionally, Bernard Boutin, began to stump for the Johnson effort.

As early as January 12th, the McCarthy leaders found it necessary to respond to King's statements. In a January 11th press conference King had asserted that there was strong support for President Johnson in New Hampshire because it was the "patriotic" thing to do in the midst of a war. "This sounds corny to some people, but I think New Hampshire voters are patriotic," King said when asked what he thought McCarthy's chances were in the New Hampshire primary. In the same press conference Governor King said he planned a "person-to-person" campaign for the President in which he would stump the state. In a press release responding to King's remarks Hoeh asked if Governor King finds it unpatriotic to support Senator McCarthy," noting that members of the McCarthy committee had campaigned for John F. Kennedy in 1960 and Lyndon Johnson in 1964. "We are now fighting for Eugene McCarthy. Does the governor find this unpatriotic.?"[5]

King's allusion to what constituted "patriotism" and what did not had an immediate reaction in the McCarthy campaign. If this was to be the style of the New Hampshire Johnson campaign and if this style were in any way

authorized or connected to feelings in the White House then something other than the policy concerning the war in Vietnam was at stake.

Senator McCarthy responded to the same theme when speaking in Athens, Georgia, January 24th when he said:

> "The administration's tendency to equate loyalty to its policies with loyalty to the country is dangerous and self-serving. The Johnson administration's efforts to discourage dissent at home in order to bring false unity has not been successful. Effort to quell dissent is dangerous because it obscures the real military and political cause to give doubtful policies undeserved immunity from democratic debate, and it tries to use American armed forces as a shield for our policy makers against their critics."
>
> "It is proof not of weakness but of democratic vitality that our people reject the contention that debate must end and we must all rally to the struggle regardless of its causes, objectives and consequences. There are differences between one war and another and between one issue and another. The essence of intelligent policy-making is to discriminate among those according to their effects upon our country's interests and values. I intend to do what I can in this election year to make these distinctions clear."[6]

Instead of attempting to clarify these distinctions, the Johnson administration itself and through its surrogates at the state level, sought to cloud the differences and to compel unquestioning loyalty. Governor King speaking January 30th before a group of Sullivan County Democrats urged that McCarthy be rejected and that they unite solidly behind President Johnson:

> "How would President Johnson face the parents of our Vietnam veterans should we pull out? To dishonor our commitment would be to dishonor the memory of those who have given their lives in Vietnam. What people anywhere in the world would believe in our will to protect them against communist aggression if we show that we back down when the going gets tough? The honor of America and safety of the Free World are at stake in this election. Despite a campaign of vilification and abuse that is without precedent in our history President Johnson had continued to lead. In spite of faint hearts and carping critics, President Johnson is keeping faith to our commitments in Southeast Asia."[7]

Attending the meeting were a number of McCarthy supporters. In response Hoeh charged that King, "is clearly frightened." He noted that King was speaking before a meeting of Sullivan County Democrats for the first time in his six years in office and was doing so "not only to line up LBJ support but to pose as a foreign policy expert. In the process, Governor King had willfully and irresponsibly distorted and slandered the position of Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy and the thousands of loyal citizens of New Hampshire who agree with him. For six years he (King) has failed to address a Democratic meeting in Sullivan County which is additional evidence that the governor is obediently jumping through hoops held by LBJ."[8] The Claremont Eagle had headlined the story on King's speech, "Gov. King Rides 'Shotgun' for LBJ at Newport," while carrying on the same page the Concord datlined response from the McCarthy campaign headlined, "McCarthy Aide Declares King 'Is Frightened!"

At the same meeting, Makris distributed the Johnson Write-in Campaign Kits, gave instructions, and then, with the Governor, was forced to respond to questions. The most embarassing concerned whether state committee funds were being used to advance Johnson's candidacy. Makris said, "Money spent on the Johnson drive was raised separately from state committee funds and donors had clearly earmarked their contributions to be used for LBJ."[9]

The Newport meeting set a pattern which kept the LBJ campaign at least neutralized if not actually on the defensive in each of these organizing sessions. The media coverage carried both sides of the story, often in the same article, and the LBJ organizers faced increasingly severe questioning as time went on. The press saw King's state-wide "stumping" for LBJ as an effort to "bolster LBJ's wavering image and shoot down some doves in party ranks."[10]

In his frustration Governor King began to escalate his rhetoric. Speaking in Dover before another gathering of Democrats, King said, "Our President is under violent personal attack and because he is the champion of the free world. That means the time has come for every true Democrat to stand up and be counted -- or from now on, to be counted out. On this field we accept battle. His friends are our friends. His enemies are our enemies and we meet all comers -- inside and out. The battle begins here and we will carry it forward to a great victory next fall.[11]

When asked in a radio interview, if he agreed with Governor King's conclusion, U.S. Senator Tom McIntyre Co-Chairman with King of the New Hampshire LBJ Committee said, "Oh, no, I think John went a little far there." Hoeh picked up the comment, issued a press release in which he said, "Senator McIntyre repudiated the unprecedented way in which Governor King threatened New Hampshire Democrats.... We thank the Senator for disassociating himself from the Governor's remarks and this aspect of intimidation and distortion which has characterized the Johnson campaign in New Hampshire. New Hampshire's Democrats now await an apology from John King himself."[12]

As with McIntyre, other Democrats were beginning to resent the tactics of the Johnson campaign and the vaguely veiled threats coming from King and others who were aggressively supporting the write-in effort. Symbolic of the effort to line up the Democratic Party behind the write-in effort was the pledge card, the same pledge card that was the "top priority project" of the write-in organizing effort. The effort and what it began to symbolize produced a major campaign opportunity for the McCarthy campaign. Not only was the reaction severe outside the Johnson campaign it was growing among

the supporters. Divide and conquer became a surprise but effective McCarthy strategy.

As Governor King's speeches became more intense the dissension inside the Johnson campaign heightened. As Senator McIntyre alluded to in his mild effort to disassociate himself from the Governor's vigorous attacks, the survival of the Democratic Party in New Hampshire was more important than the success or failure of the write-in drive. The ability of the party to close ranks after the primary and to elect Democratic candidates for New Hampshire offices was, to him, the top priority. Vigorous support of the President's political future was one thing; quite another was accomplishing that by driving from the party the very people who had made it possible for a Democrat to sit in the Governor's chair for the first time in forty years and for a Democrat to represent the state in Washington for the first time in twenty years.

McCarthy: Nourishing a Campaign, A Special Style

At some point early in the campaign, Senator McCarthy was asked how he expected to run a successful campaign against all that could be mustered against him by an incumbent administration of his own party. Was there a secret which he possessed or did he have some basic strategy which would prove invincible as the campaign year began to unfold? To this McCarthy responded that no, he did not possess a secret formula for success but that he did have a basic faith in the goodness of the American voting public and that he intended to survive by "feeding off the land." The image of a foraging army or swarm of locusts came to mind immediately, which is not exactly an improper image as things turned out. But what McCarthy had in

mind was his own capacity to make political hay of events and times that could not be foreseen.

To a considerable extent, McCarthy felt that history was made by events and that history did not just occur. His political career had been a demonstration of his ability to reap benefits from events that were not entirely of his making. His campaigns had been successful as the result of individuals being stimulated to work for him, to create advantages for him, and his own ability to grasp a moment and create from it a positive political event. McCarthy had established himself as a formidable national political force when he did what no other congressman of his era would do and that was to confront the Junior Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy. On June 22, 1952, when Joseph McCarthy was at the peak of his national power, the little known two-term congressman from Minnesota, Eugene McCarthy, agreed to meet the Senator from Wisconsin in a one half hour, televised debate on the prominent AMERICAN FORUM OF THE AIR. In so doing, Eugene McCarthy became the first member of Congress to oppose Senator McCarthy in a public debate.[13]

While there is no evidence to suggest that the debate marked the beginning of Joseph McCarthy's eventual decline, at least one observer felt it was the first time anyone had shown that the Wisconsin senator could be successfully debated. "The fallacy of Senator McCarthy's invincibility in debate was exploded on Ted Granik's AMERICAN FORUM OF THE AIR." Harry MacArthur, television critic for the Washington Evening Star wrote afterwards.[14]

To an extent not fully understood by those who had come to know Senator McCarthy in the short time prior to his announced presidential candidacy, Senator McCarthy would build his campaign from the opportunities that occurred as the campaign developed. The New Hampshire campaigners began to understand this during McCarthy's early campaigning, but it was other evidence that began to reenforce the purpose of the campaign. McCarthy liked to see what individuals would on their own. He had become a candidate to "test" the administration concerning the war policy. McCarthy would be the focus, the personification of the "test," but the effort would have to be made by others in the ways which they perceived the "test" could best be made in their own jurisdictions.

The earliest 1968 McCarthy successes came as "tests" conceived and managed by those who welcomed the opportunity to focus their opposition to the war policy through the political system. There were often spontaneous efforts to use McCarthy as the reason for the challenge, but the challenge was theirs to make and manage.

Early Campaign Operations

In a speech before graduates of the Amos Tuck School of Business Administration of Dartmouth College in the Spring of 1968, Hoch said:

> Since the art of politics has not become a structured form, despite the attempts of numerous political scientists and the Kennedys; it is possible to continue the process as a "free-form" almost as varied as the totality of human response. In other words, each campaign has its own conception, birth, life, and death -- a data producing incident, unique in the history of man. That, for the unrestrained mind, is what makes politics fascinating and alluring.

> ...You will find the special art of campaign management more like an infectious disease than an occupational attraction. If you once become involved and the spirit of competition, desire to influence history, or simply a fascination with the political game gets under your skin from that time on your life may well be colored by the disease.[15]

Politics may be "free-form" but also political events, especially campaigns have a "stream of consciousness" aspect that requires special understanding. Studds and Hoch felt that they had identified the limits of the political consciousness for the McCarthy effort and had described these in the December 22nd memorandum to McCarthy. Bringing a campaign into operation would require less encompassing concepts. The campaign was born with the January 3rd press conference announcing McCarthy's entry into the New Hampshire primary. Now that campaign had to crawl before it could walk, and walk before it could run. As with human development, the earliest movements were awkward. They could see more than they could grasp. Accomplishing the first priorities was the ultimate frustration. From the loftiness of a press conference that drew international attention, they had to find a place for a headquarters, find furnishings, order telephones, and make a home for the campaign.

The first major decision they faced was in what city a headquarters should be located. Traditionally, Democratic presidential primary candidates have centered their campaigns in Manchester the city containting the largest number of Democratic Party registrants. The Republicans usually selected Concord which was closer to the center of their constituency.

The McCarthy leaders were concerned about the outward appearance of the campaign. Even at this early stage they anticipated that a number of

young persons would be involved and that their appearance would not always be helpful to the McCarthy image. Long hair, beards, short skirts, and other recently evolved symbols of the "youth culture" they felt might provide the Manchester Union Leader and Manchester's less tolerant public officials with a way to embarrass the campaign without facing the real campaign issues.[16] Concord seemed to be a more tolerant city for the McCarthy headquarters.

In contrast to Manchester's more conservative partisan Democrats, Concord's role as the State Capitol and local progressive Republican climate made it appear as a more favorable location for the McCarthy headquarters than Manchester. Given these social/political realities, tied to the fact that the wire services were located there, Concord was selected. Few decisions are casual decisions in successful campaigns. Even such a simple decision as the location of a headquarters involved the full strategy of the campaign.

It took Gerry Studds more than a wekk to actually locate a headquarters site and then what he found appeared to be far from ideal. What he found was the recently vacated electrical supply store on Pleasant Street Extension. In the heydey of the railroad, Pleasant Street Extension had been a busy thoroughfare. Now it served only as an automobile route to a new shopping center located on the site of the old railroad station and rail yards. The store was away from Main Street, few pedestrians would be passing by. There would be some parking for campaign workers, but little else to make it location attractive. Inside, to quote Gerry Studds, "It was in absolutely wretched condition...There are two to three inches of electrical commotion

all over the place. There were wires hanging out of the wall. It looked like a medieval torture chamber, and it was too big. We didn't know what the hell to do with it. There was a full-length basement and an enormous room behind (the showroom in the front)."[17] There was no furniture, plenty of wires and parts of electrical fixtures but few lights. It was dark, dingy, dusty, and dirty.

With McCarthy's January 3rd announcement the New Hampshire campaign began receiving a number of small checks and offers of help from across the country. The offers and contributions were reassuring, but the money did not constitute an amount sufficient to meet even early bills. Within a little more than a week, two checks arrived each for $2,500 made out to the N.H. McCarthy for President Campaign. The first was signed by Blair Clark and the second by Martin Peretz.[18] Both were drawn on their respective personal checking accounts.

Developing Strategy

Wanting desperately to get the campaign into as many hands as possible, the McCarthy leaders called a meeting of the New Hampshire Committee for Sunday evening, January 7th. The announcement read:

> We now have the chance to pave the way for Senator McCarthy in his campaign for the Presidency. This effort, and our work in the next few weeks, may change the course of history. We, individually, and as a committee, have accepted a considerable responsibility. We must now organize to pursue our goals effectively and efficiently.
>
> Our first step is to put our state organization in order so that we can begin to fully structure the campaign. To do this, the Steering Committee asks that those receiving this notice attend a meeting...at the home of Dr. and Mrs. Warren Eberhart, 110 School Street, Concord, N.H.

The purpose of the meeting is to discuss in detail the steps that must be taken between now and March 12th. An agenda for the meeting will be prepared so that all the important items are covered and that a full perspective on the campaign is made clear to all.

Items needing attention now and/or should be considered by you before attending the meeting:

1. Circulate the nominating petitions as soon as possible. Completed petitions should be forwarded to me.

2. Compile lists of those interested in forming a local McCarthy for President Committee or county committee.

3. We need money -- further instructions on the specifics of fundraising will follow but preliminary contact now will bring better results later.

4. Take a look at a calendar of events for the next ten weeks noting those days when Senator McCarthy could fill a good campaign day in your area. This early work will background the kind of scheduling that will make the best use of the Senator's limited campaign time.

5. Compile lists of volunteers willing to participate in the campaign. Be sure the list is complete with addresses and telephone numbers. This will make it possible for us to move the campaign quickly when the telephoning and mailings must be handled.

6. Look for a good locations for headquarters in the larger towns and cities. Be prepared to staff and support headquarters with volunteers.

A REMINDER -- We are engaged in a rough fight, with people who are skilled in the profession. We must be careful in our activities not to open ourselves to criticisms that will isolate us from being able to wage an effective campaign. We must, however, keep our eyes open and be willing to speak out when the wrong strings are pulled.

Signed: David C. Hoeh, Temporary Chairman

The notice was circulated to more than those of the original Steering Committee membership. The time had come to expand the organization as much as possible. Copies were sent to persons in each of the major primary vote producing cities and towns who had expressed an interest in McCarthy. With the announcement Hoeh and Studds had reason to expect that individual and group anti-war

activities could be brought under the leadership of the Steering Committee to support the McCarthy campaign.

The greatest uncertainty of a New Hampshire campaign is the weather. For outsiders the weather often makes New Hampshire impossible -- impossible to get to and impossible to leave -- but for residents the weather is a fact of life to be enjoyed or overcome. The first organizational meeting of the New Hampshire McCarthy campaign, Sunday evening, January 7th, found people overcoming. Despite a snowstorm contingents of three or four arrived from Nashua, Manchester, Keene, Portsmouth, Durham, Laconia, Hanover, and several others until almost thirty persons were gathered in the Eberhart living room. An agenda was circulated.

N.H. McCarthy for President Committee 1/7/68

AGENDA

- Establishment of Store-front HQ in Top 12 Cities

Nashua	Manchester
Keene	Berlin
Concord (State HQ)	Somersworth
Portsmouth	Claremont
Laconia	Rochester
Dover	Salem

- Assignment of Responsibility
  - A) Opening of HQ
  - B) Formation of local committee
  - C) Responsibilities of local committee

- Establishment of Home HQ in Other Important Towns

1st C.D.	2nd C.D.
Hudson	Franklin
Pembroke	Newport
Goffstown	Milford
New Market	Lebanon
Allenstown	Gorham
Derry	Greenvile
Pelham	Hanover
Hookset	Northumberland
Hampton	Lincoln
Plaistow	Jaffrey
Exeter	Wilton
Merrimack	Littleton
Rollinsford	Winchester
Bedford	Peterborough
Epping	New Ipswich
Seabrook	Lancaster
Tilton	Swanzey
Farmington	Ashland
Londonderry	Troy
Meredith	Hinsdale
Pittsfield	Andover
Durham	Hillsborough
Milton	

- Assignment of Responsibility
  - A) Designation of Home
  - B) Formation of local committee
  - C) Responsibilities of local committee (See separate sheet.)

Hoeh called the meeting to order and began to go through the agenda. The first step was to create an organization that would assume the state-wide responsibilities of the campaign, the candidate schedule and organization of the localities. Studds and Hoeh had given this problem their attention earlier and came to the meeting with a series of specific proposals. Contrary to their argument favoring McCarthy's New Hampshire entry which stated that an organization was "ready and waiting", when the moment of his announcement actually came they realized that the organization they then had and the organization they would need to run a successful campaign were two distinctly different beings. On January 7th they realized how much had to be done, how short the time was, and how thin their organizational base really was. What they did have were good contacts in almost all of the crucial vote producing cities and the larger towns. If properly managed this resource could be expanded into local organizations capable of carrying on a variety of campaign tasks.

Drawing on the scheduling list which he had prepared for the December 22nd memorandum to McCarthy, Studds stated that they should attempt to establish headquarters in the twelve cities, then, in descending order of population and voter turn-out, the larger towns. In some cases Hoeh and Studds advised forming area headquarters to support activities in several cities and the surrounding towns. In the case of the smaller towns, but ones with high voter participation they advised establishing a "home" headquarters borrowing a page from Romney's campaign manual.

A local organization would have to be created; then it would have to find, staff, and fund the local headquarters. Coupled with the organizational objective for these headquarters was also a campaign scheduling priority.

They expected that Senator McCarthy would be visiting New Hampshire within two or three weeks. The campaign's top organizing priority then had to be the cities where McCarthy could campaign without time lost to travel and where the broadest media coverage would be possible. Hoeh and Studds used the following analysis of the most recent presidential preference primary, 1964, to determine the cities and towns that would receive their highest priority attention. The first priority would be the opening and staffing of a state campaign headquarters. The committee agreed with the decision to locate the headquarters in Concord. The next priorities were the cities which, in all but the case of Franklin, had populations in excess of the towns. Then they selected those towns having a population of 2,000 persons or more and ranked them according to their respective size and ratio of Democratic voter participation. The organizational task was to begin moving down the list of cities from Manchester to Franklin and through the list of towns from Salem to the smallest incorporated community in New Hampshire, Waterville Valley. (Tables 7-1 and 7-2 contain the data to rank the organizing priorities.)

Table 7.01: City Democratic Vote Rank Ordered[19]

City	County	Population 1960	Democratic Pres. Primary Vote 1964	Democratic Vote as % of Checklist	Number of Names on Checklist 1964
Manchester	(Hillsborough)	88,282	8,900	18.8%	47,298
Nashua	(Hillsborough)	39,096	3,486	14.8	23,517
Concord	(Merrimack)	28,991	760	4.7	16,148
Portsmouth	(Rockingham)	25,833	442	3.7	11,800
Dover	(Stafford)	19,131	1,760	16.7	10,506
Berlin	(Coos)	17,821	3,306	30.0	10,985
Keene	(Cheshire)	17,562	777	8.5	9,118
Rochester	(Strafford)	15,927	681	7.8	8,722
Laconia	(Belknap	15,288	769	9.2	8,328
Claremont	(Sullivan)	13,563	757	10.0	7,498
Lebanon	(Grafton)	9,299	251	5.6	4,457
Somersworth	(Stafford)	8,529	861	15.2	5,645
Franklin	(Merrimack)	6,742	398	9.7	4,077
CITY TOTAL:	*54.9%	306,064	23,148	13.7%	168,099
STATE TOTAL:	*57.6%	606,921	41,436	11.8%	349,667

* Percent of city population registered to vote.

Table 7.02: County/Large Town Democratic Vote Rank Order[20]

Towns (Pop. 2,000+)	Population 1960	Democratic Pres. Primary Vote 1964	Democratic Vote as % of Checklist	Number of Names on Checklist 1964
Belknap Co. *(60.4%)	28,912	1,509	8.6%	17,483
Belmont	1,953	86	7.6	1,119
Gilford	2,043	67	4.8	1,385
Meredith	2,434	138	8.5	1,619
Tilton	2,137	109	7.6	1,420
Carroll Co. *(72.1%)	15,829	469	4.1	11,416
*Conway	4,298	89	3.2	2,752
Wolfeboro	2,689	74	3.8	1,918
Chesire Co. *(54.4%)	43,342	2,290	9.6	23,621
Hinsdale	2,187	116	10.0	1,159
*Jaffrey	3,154	256	13.4	1,900
*Swanzey	3,626	113	6.5	1,737
Walpole	2,825	77	4.6	1,663
Winchester	2,411	206	16.6	1,239
Coos Co. *(57.4%)	37,140	4,883	22.9	21,321
Colebrook	2,389	114	10.8	1,046
Gorham	3,039	318	18.5	1,710
Lancaster	3,138	163	9.0	1,794
Northcumberland	2,586	376	26.8	1,400
Grafton Co. *(55.3%)	48,857	2,125	7.8	27,021
Enfield	1,867	90	8.3	1,072
*Hanover	7,329	289	10.4	2,762
Haverhill	3,127	63	3.7	1,670
*Littleton	5,003	228	6.6	3,450
*Plymouth	3,210	109	6.0	1,787
Hillsborough Co. *(57.1%)	178,161	16,789	16.4	101,895
Amherst	2,051	67	5.2	1,288
*Bedford	3,636	229	10.4	2,199
*Goffstown	7,230	664	16.0	4,148
Hillsborough	2,310	95	6.9	1,367
*Hudson	5,876	761	23.1	3,285
+Merrimack	2,989	291	15.9	1,826
*Milford	4,863	413	11.8	3,497
Pelham	2,605	400	24.7	1,614
+Peterborough	2,963	180	9.3	1,924
Wilton	2,025	175	14.4	1,215
+Greenville	1,385	338	44.4	760

* Percent of county population registered to vote.

TABLE 7.02 (Cont.)

Towns (Pop. 2,000+)	Population 1960	Democratic Pres. Primary Vote 1964	Democratic Vote as % of Checklist	Number of Names on Checklist 1964
Merrimack Co. *(59.9)	67,785	3,339	8.2%	40,665
*Boscawen	2,181	104	9.2	1,126
*Hooksett	3,713	264	10.3	2,547
Hopkinton	2,225	107	6.7	1,594
*Pembroke	3,514	625	22.9	2,720
Pittsfield	2,419	129	10.1	1,271
*Allenstown	1,789	240	20.4	1,174
Rockingham Co. *(58.1%)	99,029	5,422	9.4	57,613
*Derry	6,987	390	9.2	4,224
Epping	2,006	211	16.6	1,266
*Exeter	7,243	284	6.6	4,267
*Hampton	5,379	288	7.7	3,712
Londonderry	2,457	180	11.6	1,544
Newmarket	3,153	424	23.8	1,779
Plaistow	2,915	307	15.6	1,963
Rye	3,244	76	4.1	1,833
*Salem	9,210	1,104	15.5	7,082
Seabrook	2,209	197	13.8	1,422
Strafford Co. *(55.2%)	59,799	3,097	9.3	33,040
*Durham	5,504	124	7.2	1,710
Farmington	3,287	193	9.3	2,070
Rollinsford	1,935	237	20.3	1,162
Sullivan Co. *(55.2%)	28,067	1,513	9.7	15,592
Charlestown	2,576	52	3.9	1,325
*Newport	5,458	411	13.5	3,044

* Percent of county population registered to vote.

By simply reading the name of the key city or town they were able to list as field organizers those in the room who were willing to begin the work. Strong leads existed in many communities; there were organizations in a few, the nucleus of organizations in others, but almost nothing in the largest city, Manchester, and in three strongly Democratic cities, Rochester, Somersworth, and Dover. There was no contact for Berlin. What they had was the name of a state representative from neighboring Gorham but not a single name from Berlin itself. Berlin, the northernmost city in New Hampshire, was strongly Democratic. Isolated by the barrier of the White Mountains from the populous southern part of the state, Berlin had grown up as a paper-making wood-processing city. A tradition of strong union organization, bread and butter Democratic Party allegiance, and a population composed mostly of French speaking Canadians made Berlin unique among New Hampshire's cities.

Realizing that the campaign had to be developed rapidly in order to work, Hoeh and Studds outlined what was ahead. Ten weeks remained before primary day March 12th. During that time many tasks would have to be accomplished. The first would be to identify local supporters in each of the priority/important Democratic vote producing communities. The second would be to identify or organize events that would be appropriate for Senator McCarthy to attend. A "shelf" of possible campaign activities had to be inventoried for each of the key cities and towns. The local organizations would be responsible for maintaining this "shelf." They, Hoeh advised, should be able to suggest on short notice activities that could be arranged as an effective schedule for the candidate.

The third important local responsibility was to fund the activities they would be assigned. The campaign had to be a confederation of separate local efforts. Each of these local efforts would require a local organization which would be a miniature campaign. There would have to be fund raisers, schedulers, headquarters staff, publicists, and most of the other accouterments of the statewide campaign. Too much had to be accomplished in too short a time to permit centralized management and control of all of the campaign's essential activities. Furthermore Hoeh and Studds felt that without a large central campaign staff capable of organizing and advancing each activity of the campaign, it was necessary to rely heavily on the ingenuity of the local activists. Both had developed an appreciation for the effectiveness of the local groups in the early stages and were impressed by the sensitivity of the local groups to both the needs of a national candidacy and the political traditions of their own communities.

The campaign, therefore, had to be created as a confederation of local operating committees tied by the need for mutual communication and by a common objective to the state and national structure of the McCarthy candidacy. At this stage it should be noted that the local organizations in many states and in a number of New Hampshire communities were further developed than were either the state or the national McCarthy organization. If a local committee felt they could support a headquarters they were advised to find one, install a telephone, put up a sign and go from there. They should not expect the state or the national campaign to be of much assistance with either money or advice.

As an example the Keene area committee was ready to proceed. All they wanted to know was whether they should go ahead, whether their plans were constructive, how they should relate to the statewide effort and whether there would be financial assistance for their headquarters. Further advanced in their efforts than most other communities, the Keene committee set a pattern that would be followed in almost all of the local efforts of the campaign. The local committee could expect little or no financial assistance from either the state or the national offices. The local committees were encouraged to do what they thought they could do effectively and what they could sustain with locally raised money and locally recruited volunteers.

Hoeh and Studds advised those attending not to commit themselves either in terms of activity or expenses to more than they thought they could sustain. Secondly, they warned against careless press statements, speaking for Senator McCarthy, or representing him or the campaign with respect to issue positions or activities other than their own. Any state or national campaign policy questions or issue positions should be directed to the state headquarters.

The meeting ended with several priorities clearly in mind. The first was to return to their communities and begin organizing for a campaign. The first major task for some would be to prepare campaign schedules. The second was to find workers, money, a place to work, and to outline appropriate local objectives for the campaign. The meeting ended with a mild sense of confidence, but with an even stronger feeling of the importance of the tasks ahead.

At best campaigns have difficult early periods. Often the start up problems are reduced through lengthy preliminary meetings that usually precede major political ventures. During the usual pre-campaign preparation scores of tasks have to be accomplished which prepare the participants for the campaign while at the same time providing a testing period. All but the McCarthy campaign had had extensive preparation. For Nixon and Romney planning had been underway for years. Even the Johnson campaign had been carefully developed over months before Boutin arrived in New Hampshire.

For the national McCarthy campaign or the New Hampshire effort no such preparation time was available. Given this circumstance the campaign had to develop rapidly on a number of fronts without the planning, the testing, or the caution that precedes similar events. Ten weeks was an incredibly short period in which to organize an effective campaign for Senator McCarthy.

With a little advice and some cautions, the McCarthy leaders released the local campaigners. Although their experience warned against such loose management, they felt that the bond between the selfless objectives of McCarthy's effort, concern about the war, and a certain desire to be professional would somehow keep the locally based campaigns under control. If the local leadership had trouble, or needed to check an activity or wanted to report something, they were advised to call Hoch or Studds. They were advised especially to call before acting if there was a question. Because of the quixotic nature of the effort, few if any of the New Hampshire committee members, state or local, viewed the campaign as in any way enhancing their own personal or political futures, unlike some persons involved in other campaigns.

As a result of this basic difference, cooperation and communication were the watchwords. No one sought to establish an independent role for oneself at the expense of the campaign or the candidacy. The reward, if there was to be a reward, haunted the shadows of something that could only come from selflessness, joint effort, and careful consideration of each individual action. There were no stars, major personages, or special leaders to flatter or to be dealt with with special deferance. It was a campaign of equals, equally stressed, equally responsible, and equally entitled to taste the success. With that feeling the tone of the campaign was set.

In spite of the early cohesiveness of the campaign, the first several weeks moved ponderously. The meeting at the Eberhart home on January 7th was the first and only organizational meeting of the state campaign. There would be other meetings much later in the campaign but these would be used to present information about a campaign objective rather than to bring together an organization. New Hampshire winter weather and distances make statewide meetings difficult and, in this campaign, such meetings were seen as a waste of valuable time and energy.

Within the first two struggling weeks of the campaign Hoeh and Studds had been successful in giving the effort its own character and vitality. Part of this success came from McCarthy's own unique political posture and part from the growing frustration of the voting public with things as they were early in 1968. But, undeniably, the growing McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire, and nationally was lively news, even optimistic news. It was appealing in contrast to the ponderous news of the LBJ administration and the depressing news from Vietnam and the American cities.

The McCarthy effort was coming to life in New Hampshire. It was beginning to find its place in the public's stream of consciousness. The art form of campaign politics require that a campaign organization project consistency with the public image of the candidate, respond to the ability of the voter to tolerate issue contents, and to adapt to the particular political climate of a jurisdiction. To be successful, each of these constraints had to be carefully observed. Since this campaign began differently, had different objectives, and sought different methods in a time when conformance was becoming oppressive, it started by bending if not actually breaking many of the conventions of political activity. Its success could be insured by continuing to be distinct and continuing to find different ways to organize, and to gain the allegiance of the New Hampshire voters. The importance of the biography of the New Hampshire campaign is that the leaders were able to calculate the risks and then reach out to the voters in a manner that produced the desired results.

Electorial politics is at best a chance. When there is a competitive situation the odds are even. As a result most campaigns are conservative, seek to avoid risks, minimize exposure and attempt to control events. To outward appearances, campaigns are often boring, narrow, lack imagination, concentrate on accepted or acceptable societal standards and fail to strain either the mental or institutional capacities of the population. Under the best of circumstances campaigns create excitement through images, hoopla, style, rhetoric and method, but rarely through serious debate or constructive dialogue. To accomplish anything with the McCarthy candidacy in New Hampshire, the McCarthy leaders realized that many of the rules of campaigns and the lessons of their own campaign experiences would have to be quickly and carefully examined and new rules created in order to make the McCarthy candidacy work.

Notes

[1]Union Leader (January 22, 1968).

[2]The Boston Globe (January 25, 1968).

[3]Ibid.

[4]David C. Hoch file copy of a Johnson campaign brochure.

[5]The Lebanon Valley News (January 12, 1968).

[6]The Atlanta Constitution (January 24, 1968).

[7]The Lebanon Valley News (January 31, 1968).

[8]The Claremont Eagle (January 31, 1968).

[9]The Lebanon Valley News (January 31, 1968).

[10]The Claremont Eagle (January 31, 1968).

[11]Union Leader (February 14, 1968).

[12]McCarthy campaign press release (Concord Headquarters, February 17, 1968).

[13]Eisele, Albert, Almost to the Presidency, A Biography of Two American Politicians, (Blue Earth, Minnesota: The Piper Company, 1972), p. 113.

[14]Ibid., p. 114.

[15]David C. Hoch, "Managing the McCarthy Campaign," (A Speech text, delivered at the Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth College, 1969).

[16]Late in the Spring of 1967 an anti-war demonstration at the U.S. Army induction center in Manchester, had been broken up by the use of questionable police tactics. The Union Leader praised the police for their sterness and the Democratic Mayor, Roland Vallee, and the Democratic Party controlled Board of Aldermen passed a resolution condemning the demonstrators and praising the police action. With this in the background, Hoch and Studds did not want to enter Manchester with the campaign until they were adequately organized.

[17]Studds, Op.Cit., p. 14.

[18]Martin Peretz, a Professor of Social Science at Harvard, peace activist and independently wealthy, was an early and continuing source of funds for the 1968 anti-war and McCarthy political efforts.

[19]McCarthy New Hampshire Campaign Vote Analysis, David C. Hoeh file copy.

[20]Ibid.

CHAPTER VIII

EARLY STATE CAMPAIGN OPERATIONS

Mailing and Volunteers

In the December 1967 memorandum to Senator McCarthy, Hoeh and Studds wrote:

> We envision a massive mailing effort -- of the quality and and extent of the Lodge effort in 1964 -- to all registered Democrats and Independents.

Coupled with this promise was an assumption also stated in the December memorandum:

> We have already acquired the voting lists for the entire state (All registrants: Democratic, Unaffiliated, and Republican.)

Acquiring the lists and making such lists into something usable for mailings were two quite distinct tasks as Studds and Hoeh found out shortly after the State headquarters opened in Concord. Both assumed that the lists would be readily transferable to mailing labels. What they found was that the lists were anything but orderly, most omitted proper addresses, and some important communities were totally missing.

The plan called for two distinct mailings. One would be sent to the registered Democrats and the other to the unaffiliated or independent voters. Therefore, each checklist had to be reviewed twice to produce labels for each class of voters. The major problem was that many New Hampshire communities do not record the address of the voter on the checklist. This meant that reverse telephone directories, regular telephone directories, or city directories had to be used to find the correct address for each voter. This was a problem not anticipated by the McCarthy leaders.

When the first volunteers began struggling with the lists a deep shudder was felt in the young campaign. Approximately 110,000 names had to be taken from the voting lists to construct the mailing file of the campaign. This was expected to be boring but a routine job. As soon as the first checklists were examined and the first label sheets put in a volunteer's portable typewriter, a telephone call was made to Studds. What they thought would be a simple task vanished in chaos.

Much of the campaign had been predicated on the Lodge write-in model. The variation of the model which Hoeh and Studds felt would succeed for McCarthy was that, in addition to the registered Democrats, they expected to attract a significant number of independents into the Democratic column to vote for Senator McCarthy. To have this happen a direct personalized appeal had to be made. The independent voters had to receive a letter from Senator McCarthy urging them to vote for him. The appeal to the Democrats was almost the same as that which had been directed to the registered Republicans by the organizers of the Lodge effort in 1964. There was an alternative to Lyndon B. Johnson and there were substantial reasons for considering a vote for McCarthy. In fact, at the planning stage, Hoeh and Studds seriously considered including a return postage paid card with the letter. A similar card had been included with the Lodge mailing. It had produced the early indication that there was substantial support for the Ambassador among New Hampshire Republicans.

The mailing was essential and it had to be personally addressed. If addresses had been included with the names on the checklists then the job would be manageable. Without addresses the job became something far beyond the capacity of the campaign as originally conceived. The manpower needed to

sort through the lists, the directories, and to prepare labels exceeded the optimistic view of Hoeh and Studds and presented the campaign with its first serious problem.

Weighing alternatives, the McCarthy leaders considered scrapping the mailing as a direct appeal and blanket mailing to the critical cities and towns instead. Such a blanket mailing could be accomplished by using a commercial direct mail house. The effect would be of a blanket, but indiscrete and impersonal. The message could not be specific. It would have to be the same for both Democrats and Independents. It would also arrive at Republican homes who might be irritated by being so carelessly addressed. Any appearance of professionalism on behalf of Senator McCarthy would be lost by such a broadcast approach. Somehow the mailing problem had to be solved and the only way seemed to be to use manpower. At this point the New Hampshire McCarthy Campaign made its first appeal for help to the national McCarthy headquarters. Previously an appeal for a manager and an advance person had been made, but not a request for volunteers.

Obviously there would be a risk. A broadcast call to Washington for volunteer help to carry out New Hampshire based campaign tasks could present the New Hampshire campaign with some serious problems. The risk was not having control over who would be sent to New Hampshire and now knowing how they might behave. Secondly, the logistical problem of supporting volunteers with housing, transportation, and meals would confront the fragile New Hampshire effort with demands that it was not then equipped to handle. At this period in national politics the peace protests were at their height. The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) had created a seriously negative

image for student activists, and New Hampshire's latent xenophobia seemed both real and virulent to the New Hampshire McCarthy leadership.

The risk had to be taken or the campaign would be unable to mail to its targeted voters. Hoeh established several guidelines for out-of-state volunteers. The first was that they should contact him or Studds before coming to New Hampshire so that at least a telephone introduction would be made. Secondly, before doing anything else in the campaign, a volunteer should check in with either Hoeh or Studds at the state headquarters. Both these conditions made it possible to, first, establish in the mind of the volunteer the direction of the campaign and from whom their work would be coming and, secondly, it would give Hoeh and Studds the opportunity to acquaint the person with the political and social sensitivities or, perhaps more appropriately, paranoia of the McCarthy effort. By late January the first trickle of volunteers had begun. The mailing label job was still proceeding at a ponderously slow pace, but between the dedication of local volunteers and the vitality of those willing to come to New Hampshire to help, the right mood for the miserable job was set.

Delegate Selection Strategy

Almost the furthest thing from the leaders' minds was the possibility that delegates would be elected representing McCarthy. The campaign concept was to dent the political armor of Lyndon Johnson by showing that a significant segment of his party was willing to vote against him when given the opportunity. There was no question in the minds of any of those involved in the campaign that if Lyndon Johnson wanted the nomination he had it. From all of the evi-

dence in New Hampshire, Johnson not only wanted to be renominated. but he also wanted a vote of approval for his policy in Vietnam. Johnson, it appeared, would only be vulnerable on the presidential preference side of the two part New Hampshire ballot, and this is where the McCarthy leadership would focus the campaign.

On January 7, 1969 the NEW YORK TIMES published the following editorial which reminded the New Hampshire campaigners of the importance of the delegate portion of the ballot:

> McCARTHY IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
>
> Early in 1952 President Truman had privately made up his mind to retire, but organization Democrats in New Hampshire persuaded him to enter his name in the state's primary. Otherwise, they argued, a slate of political unknowns pledged to Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee would win by default. "If the boss doesn't win that primary," one Truman aide remarked at the time, "those New Hampshire fellows better now show their faces around the White House."
>
> The unexpected happened. Senator Kefauver, with his coonskin cap and tireless handshake, routed the better-known Truman delegation.
>
> Senator Eugene McCarthy can take some comfort from this history. President Johnson today has the backing of the Democratic party organization and of most of the leaders. But party organizations do not count for much in New Hampshire, and leaders can often deliver nobody's vote but their own. Under these circumstances, Senator McCarthy was well advised to change his mind and enter the New Hampshire primary.
>
> President Johnson, taking care to avoid the fiasco that befell President Truman, has refused to authorize the use of his name in New Hampshire. As a result, his supporters are running as delegates "favorable" rather than "pledged" to him and are seeking write-in votes for him on the preferential side of the ballot since his name will not be listed. This cautious approach will enable Mr. Johnson to claim all the credit for a victory and to blur the significance of a defeat.

> The history of Republican primary voting in New Hampshire is likewise encouraging to Gov. George Romney, the G.O.P. underdog. In 1952 in the Republican primary, General Eisenhower, absent in Paris, defeated Senator Robert A. Taft, who campaigned vigorously. Four years ago a write-in campaign for Henry Cabot Lodge swamped the two Republican front-runners.
>
> Against this background of insurgency and independent thinking there is no reason to suppose that New Hampshire voters are particularly conservative or hawkish. Governor Romney can thus afford to discount the polls that show him running far behind former Vice President Nixon and to rely upon his own formidable talent for man-to-man persuasion. New Hampshire is not going to decide the nomination in either party, but no one should underestimate its capacity to manufacture political surprises.[1]

Given this reminder, Hoeh and Studds concluded that a slate of delegates had to be filed in order to show the seriousness of the New Hampshire McCarthy campaign. Without delegates the campaign would be criticized as being just an effort to embarrass the President and to assist the Republican Party win the election in November.

At the same time, the LBJ leadership was filing its slate of delegates. The Democratic State Committee Chairman, William Craig, announced to the New Hampshire press that he was filing as a delegate "favorable" to the nomination of Lyndon Johnson, January 5, 1968.[2] With this followed a series of carefully orchestrated delegate filings of prominent New Hampshire Democratic Party leaders.

Not familiar with the political importance of the delegate filing process, Hoeh called former Democratic National Committeeman William L. Dunfey to ask his advice. Hoeh's question concerned how Dunfey perceived the difference between the two classes of delegates -- those "pledged" and those "favorable." Hoeh and Studds knew the legal difference, but were not aware of the political advantages. Dunfey explained that filing a delegation

"pledged" to the McCarthy nomination would give those making the slate complete control over the number of delegate candidates that would be filed under that label. Each "pledged" delegate had to have written authorization from the candidate before being permitted to file with the label "pledged." He pointed out that anyone could file as a "favorable" delegate candidate by simply paying the $10.00 filing fee. He also noted that the Johnson write-in leaders were so sure of their candidate's vote-getting power that they did not plan to control the number of individuals filing for the delegate and alternate delegate slots. Dunfey then went on to recount a bit of New Hampshire's political history telling Hoch that in 1952 the same situation had existed. The Kefauver supporters had filed a slate of "pledged" delegates and alternates in just the number of available slots. The Truman supporters had allowed their slates of "favorable" candidates to exceed the number of slots by a considerable number. As a result the Kefauver delegate vote was concentrated while the Truman vote was diluted by being spread over the list of candidates. A "pledged" Kefauver delegation represented New Hampshire at the 1952 Democratic National Convention.

With this advice Hoch and Studds adopted the "pledged" delegate strategy and agreed to control the number of candidates. To make this strategy work, however, they had to discourage individuals from filing as delegate candidates "favorable" to the nomination of Senator McCarthy. Unfortunately, even before this decision had been made, two McCarthy supporters from Cheshire County (Keene area) had already filed as "Favorable" to McCarthy. To operate a delegate strategy they had to discourage McCarthy supporters from filing on their own as "favorable" delegate candidates, and at the same time, construct a full

slate of candidates for both delegates and alternate delegates pledged to support McCarthy in the Chicago Convention.

Eugene Daniell, leader of the Draft Robert Kennedy effort, had already promised to file delegates favorable to the nomination of Kennedy. Daniell had been one of the mavericks elected as a Kefauver delegate in the 1952 election. He appreciated the possibility that the magic of the Kennedy name might send him to another convention. His persistence in not only filing himself as a delegate candidate but getting several others of the Kennedy group to file, gave Hoch and Studds another problem.

After Hoch's conversation with William Dunfey, he and Studds concluded that they had to develop a full slate of candidates. The delegates and alternates were assigned to New Hampshire in accord with the rules of the Democratic National Committee which meant first, delegates were to be elected by congressional districts and second, since New Hampshire had been carried by the Democratic candidate in the previous election (1964), it was entitled to a reward -- an increase in the total size of the delegation. The number of slots in each of the state's two congressional districts were twelve delegates and twelve alternates, a total of forty-eight candidate openings.

Gerry Studds agreed to make it his job to fill the forty-eight spots. The strategy they adopted was to attract attention to the McCarthy New Hampshire effort by awarding places on the ballot on the basis of geographical distribution. The usual strategy, the one used in the John Kennedy delegate selection fight of 1960, was to select delegate candidates on the basis of prominence and location. The latter criteria meant that most of the first congressional district candidates came from Manchester, the largest Democratic

Party city, and from Nashua and Berlin, the second congressional district's largest Democratic vote producing centers.

Hoeh and Studds concluded that the likelihood of electing any delegates was remote, so instead of geographically concentrating delegate candidates from a few of the most populous cities of a district, they decided to seek candidates in a manner that would geographically disperse the campaign. They also sought to reward with delegate positions, the prominent who had come out in support of Senator McCarthy.

With forty-eight places to fill, Studds had assumed a considerable task. His first telephone calls brought strange responses. Instead of immediately saying yes or no to his request, many responded by saying they would have to check their plans for the coming summer. They said they would not become candidates unless they were free to attend the convention scheduled for August. It had not occurred to Studds or Hoeh that more than a delegate or two would be elected. The campaign had not become sufficiently strong state-wide to have supporters where Studds and Hoeh felt the delegate candidates should reside. As a result, the job of filling the slate became one of convincing supporters of their value to the slate to allow Studds to add their names to his list.

According to New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated Chapter 57, Section 53:5 "The name of a candidate shall not be printed upon any such ballot unless not more than sixty nor less than thirty days before the primary he files with the secretary of state a declaration of candidacy. . ." The thirty day filing period began January 13th and would close Saturday, February 10th at 5:00 p.m. Studds kept the names of the campaign leaders in reserve and contacted geographically

dispersed campaign workers. Again he faced the problem of having serious voids in the list. These reflected weaknesses in the state-wide organization. Principally, these voids appeared in the southeastern area of the state, Rochester, Somersworth and Dover, and in the north, Berlin and Gorham.

With the state-wide organization paper thin and time slipping by, Studds roughed out a slate from those who were willing to run. It became obvious too that building the ideal slate would take more time than was justified. Consequently, Studds began assigning places in the slate to the leadership, including his own name, Hoeh's and that of David Hoeh's wife, Sandra, as an alternate. There still remained a number of slots unfilled.

A second problem then occurred. The "pledged" delegate candidacy required the written consent of the candidate for president and that consent had to be filed prior to the expiration date of the filing period on February 10th. McCarthy was scheduled to visit New Hampshire late in January and probably would not return to the state again until after the expiration of the filing date. This meant that either the slate would have to be completed before McCarthy's late January visit or some means of getting the slate approved would be needed. Hoeh and Studds gave this problem considerable thought and concluded that it would not be possible to complete the slate before McCarthy's late January visit. Getting the final slate to McCarthy for signing prior to the February 10th deadline would be chancy, given the Senator's possible international travel plans and the vagaries of New Hampshire weather. Hoeh proposed that a blank statement be prepared with space for forty-eight names. An appropriate consent statement and space for Senator McCarthy's signature were added.

This solution received Blair Clark's approval. When Senator McCarthy arrived in New Hampshire January 26th, he signed the blank slate and Studds continued the job of finding candidates.

During the same time as the Johnson committee was announcing the names of the prominent New Hampshire Democratic Party leaders who were filing as delegate candidates "favorable" to the renomination of President Johnson, a large number of spontaneous filings occurred. By the end of the filing period, there would be twenty-six Johnson delegate candidates in the first congressional district and nineteen in the second congressional district for the twelve allocated slots for each district.

Dissolution of the RFK Write-In Campaign

By letter dated January 2, 1968, addressed to Eugene Daniell, leader of the New Hampshire Kennedy write-in effort, Robert F. Kennedy asked Daniell to "cease your efforts in my behalf." Daniell's reaction to what he said was the first communication received from Kennedy, was that the request "had not changed anything."[3] "The Kennedy name and what it stands for is bigger than either you or me," Daniell said while stating that he was "undaunted" in his effort to file delegates "favorable" to the nomination of the New York Senator and to solicit a write-in vote for the Senator on the March 12th presidential primary ballot.

At the same time that Robert Kennedy wrote Daniell asking him to "cease" activities on his behalf in New Hampshire, he stated that he would "remain neutral in the Democratic Presidential primaries. Kennedy stated that he did not think he would 'further the cause' of peace in Vietnam by throwing his

support to Senator Eugene J. McCarthy." In the same statement Kennedy reaffirmed his contention that "Mr. McCarthy's entry into the Presidential race was a healthy influence, because it helped channel protest within the limits of the democratic process. He went on to note that a majority of perhaps only 25 percent of the population backed his position on Vietnam. That in the last analysis, his responsibility was to try to be effective in convincing a majority of more than 50 percent."[4]

This equivocation on the part of Kennedy presented serious problems for the New Hampshire and the national McCarthy campaigns. McCarthy himself had expected that when he took the first step to focus protest toward the political system he would receive the support of his congressional colleagues who had been outspoken in their opposition to the war in Vietnam. As late as his entry in the New Hampshire primary, not one member of the Senate had come forward to support his position. Especially distressing to him and to the evolving McCarthy organization was the fact that Robert Kennedy continued to play a coy game in the political wings of both those opposing the war and those supporting the renomination of Lyndon Johnson.

In a column published January 8, 1968, Mary McGrory alluded to the dilemma of this frustration when she wrote:

> Since November 30, when he (McCarthy) announced his intention to challenge the President, McCarthy has been accused by the Johnson forces of being a stalking horse for Sen. Robert F. Kennedy. The RFK followers, complaining of McCarthy's inertia, have begun to call McCarthy "a stalking-horse for Lyndon Johnson.[5]

Daniell's efforts in New Hampshire perpetuated both sides of this reaction. First the McCarthy announcement had failed to bring with it re-enforcement through the endorsement of prominent congressional leaders in the anti-war

effort which reflected uncertainty on their part as to McCarthy's effectiveness as the protest focus. Secondly, without direct Kennedy support, the option of Kennedy as the ultimate candidate would remain should McCarthy fail.

While the McCarthy leaders tried to ignore Daniell's efforts and avoided direct conflict with him, his activity remained a problem in their effort to unify opposition to Johnson. The same situation occurred nationally and slowed the movement of money and endorsements to McCarthy during those important early weeks following his announcement. Until McCarthy's decision to enter the New Hampshire primary the flow of both money and endorsements had dried to a trickle. No major endorsements had occurred and the campaign was being run out of the pockets of McCarthy's old liberal allies and a few wealthy nouveau political activists who saw McCarthy as the only possibility for political protest. In the four primaries which McCarthy had said he would enter all were almost totally dependent on funds raised locally to support the McCarthy effort.

Kennedy's impact diverted attention from McCarthy as a serious candidate toward his possible role as an RFK stalking horse. During the early weeks of 1968, the influential New York Times concentrated its attention on the prospect of a Kennedy candidacy to the point of all but excluding coverage of McCarthy's budding campaign. The secondary impact of the Times coverage was to distort other media interest in McCarthy and especially the McCarthy effort in New Hampshire. The Times editorial and reportorial emphasis tends to have an important ripple effect in the regional media of northern New England. A number of daily newspapers and many weekly papers carry Times news service items and are edited by close readers of the paper. Consequently, when the Times coverage shifts in a particular direction, then local daily and weekly newspapers tend

to respond in the same manner. Since staff to cover anything but local events and an occasional state event are severely limited in most instances, the regional press takes its cues from as reliable a source as it can find. Beyond that news conditioning was the fact that Robert Kennedy was of special regional news interest.

While perhaps not significant to the casual observer of New Hampshire politics, the Daily Dartmouth, the student run newspaper of Dartmouth College, played a particularly interesting role in the New Hampshire McCarthy campaign. Mentioned earlier was the fact that the Daily Dartmouth was sponsoring a series of candidate forums during the primary seasons to which all of the candidates had been invited. In addition to the forum was the role the paper played within the campus community. The student community is served by two daily newspapers -- the Daily Dartmouth and the New York Times. The Daily Dartmouth picked up the editorial inclination of the New York Times from the beginning. As a result, the Daily Dartmouth speculated as to the impact of McCarthy's New Hampshire announcement on the possible candidacy of Robert Kennedy. In their first interview with David Hoch immediately following the McCarthy's New Hampshire announcement, the Daily Dartmouth headlined the story, "Can McCarthy Lure RFK Backers?" The lead read:

> David C. Hoch. . .head of the McCarthy-for-President movement in New Hampshire, predicted yesterday that support for Robert Kennedy in the state primary will "dry-up" in the wake of Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy's announcement. . .[6]

The article went on to note that two Hanover area RFK supporters, History Professor F. David Roberts and Rev. Malcolm J. Grobe, had notified Daniell that they were resigning from the RFK effort. Otherwise the article quoted Daniell as saying that the New Hampshire RFK committee remained intact.

The illusion that Kennedy might become a candidate appeared especially strong to those readers of the Daily Dartmouth, the New York Times and the listeners of the popular programming of WDCR, the student radio station. Only the few faculty, residents and students who strayed from Hanover to become involved in various 1968 protest or political events were attracted to the McCarthy activity.

On January 16th, Daniell filed himself and five others as delegate candidates favorable to RFK. In the following weeks additional delegate and alternate candidates filed as Daniell tried to keep the write-in effort alive by emphasizing the importance of the delegate filings. There was, however, no substantive organizing on the part of the RFK committee.

Early in February, Theodore C. Sorenson, a former top policy aide of President John F. Kennedy, asked to meet with the members of Daniell's RFK committee. The session was scheduled for February 7th at the Sheraton Wayfarer Motel, Bedford. At that time, Daniell had been successful in filing fifteen candidates for the delegate slots favorable to the nomination of Robert Kennedy. Sorenson came accompanied by William L. Dunfey, former Democratic National Committeeman and a close associate of the Kennedy family.

Dunfey had arranged the meeting in hopes of discouraging the Daniell group from continuing their unauthorized efforts on behalf of Robert Kennedy. He felt that bringing someone like Sorenson to New Hampshire would deliver the message in irrefutable terms. Sorenson met with the group and urged them to "cease and desist" in their efforts to secure a write-in vote for RFK. Sorenson followed the meeting with a press conference in which he described the message he gave to Daniell's committee.

Sorenson described himself as "friend, lawyer, and unofficial advisor" to Senator Kennedy. In his press conference he explained, "New Hampshire Democrats will have a choice in next month's primary between two real candidates, U.S. Senator Eugene J. McCarthy and President Johnson." He noted that "to cast one ballot for a non-candidate is a wasted vote. Therefore, if even one vote is cast for him (RFK) in the New Hampshire primary the Senator will regard it as one vote too many." He concluded by saying, "Senator Kennedy wanted me to persuade everyone supporting him in this drive that they are performing a grave disservice to the senator, his beliefs, and the Democratic Party." With this Sorenson reaffirmed Kennedy's non-candidacy by repeating Kennedy's statement, "I will not be a candidate against President Johnson this year under any foreseeable circumstances."[7]

Daniell's reaction to the instructions from RFK's personal emissary was to say that he would, "press on" with the effort.[8]

Sorenson's visit had its intended impact. Front page coverage illustrated Kennedy's reluctance to be identified with the New Hampshire write-in effort. Dunfey had carefully assessed the situation. Robert Kennedy's political future could be seriously harmed by Daniell's poorly organized effort in New Hampshire. Sorenson was the chosen messenger with authority to speak for the Senator. Kennedy was not running in New Hampshire and no authorization, direct, indirect, by omission or commission could legitimize the use of his name by Daniell and his group. Daniell held his "press on" position but his group began to have serious doubts.

Although Daniell never had a large organization, he began to receive calls from his supporters and even from several of those who had filed as delegate candidates favorable to RFK. With this pressure and Sorenson's visit, Daniell issued a statement Friday, February 9th, one day before the close of the delegate filing period.

> In deference to his (Kennedy's) request we encourage all his many loyal friends and sympathizers not to write-in his name in the coming presidential primary, but as the best means of giving support to his views and in particular those concerning Vietnam, we unanimously endorse and will actively work for the present campaign in this state of Senator Eugene McCarthy. . ..

He concluded:

> We offer our services in any capacity and are united in our complete opposition to Lyndon B. Johnson.
>
> Approved by unanimous vote. Signed: Eugene S. Daniell, Jr., Chairman.[9]

An event of significant political proportions to the fledgling McCarthy effort had transpired. A potentially divisive companion effort had been eliminated without acrimony. The pressure to end the RFK write-in had come from Robert Kennedy himself which could be interpreted in two ways. The first, and least apparent, was that he wished to protect himself from a weak and potentially damaging surrogate-managed political event. But secondly, and of greater importance, was the appearance of support for the New Hampshire McCarthy effort that could be read from Kennedy's request.

Kennedy was a prominent critic of the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy whose early statements had encouraged those organizing the McCarthy effort. Sorenson's only reference to the McCarthy campaign during his New Hampshire visit was that "it speaks for itself."[10] Reacting to Daniell's announcement, David Hoch issued a brief statement dated February 11th, which read:

> We are delighted with this development. It unites all those in New Hampshire who with both Sen. Kennedy and Sen. McCarthy take strong issue with the manner in which Lyndon Johnson has broken the pledges he made to the Democratic Party and to the American people in 1964.

The campaign had now developed sufficient strength not only to draw attention but to capitalize on events that were external to the campaign. On the other hand, the Johnson campaign suffered at least two critical blows during the period. The first was that Robert Kennedy was clearly assuming a "hands off" position. He would not come to New Hampshire to campaign for the renomination of Lyndon Johnson as Bernard Boutin had contended he would eight months earlier. Boutin's trump card vanished. He could not expect help from the most popular political name in New Hampshire. At the same time Boutin also lost the potentially divisive activity, to the McCarthy campaign, of Daniell and his write-in effort. The dissenting forces in New Hampshire were now joined behind Senator McCarthy and under the leadership not of the maverick Daniell but of respected Democratic Party workers and established local, county and state leaders.

The McCarthy Delegate Slate is Filed

Daniell announced that he was ending the RFK write-in effort February 9th. The filing period for delegate candidates closed Saturday, February 10th at 5:00 p.m. Studds had been feverishly trying to complete the McCarthy slate of 24 delegate and 24 alternate delegate candidates as the deadline approached. Two serious problems remained as the last week of the filing period began to close. The first was that, in spite of his best efforts, the slate did not contain names from either Manchester or Berlin. Secondly, in order to file for

delegates each candidate had to present himself or herself personally at the office of the Secretary of State in the State Capitol, Concord. Individual schedules and possible bad weather made this requirement a serious hurdle.

Studds and Hoch had been successful in getting two persons who had filed on their own as favorable McCarthy delegate candidates to withdraw with one subsequently being included in the pledged McCarthy slate. Otherwise, the record of McCarthy delegate candidate filings was clear of all names except those approved by Studds and included in the pledged slate. Unfortunately, as the week came near an end, Studds still lacked a sufficient list of persons willing to file as candidates. Several still were holding back because of potential schedule conflicts with the Chicago Democratic National Convention dates, and others had not yet made the trip from their homes to file in person as required by state law.

In the last seventy-two hours before the filing period closed, Sorenson had come to New Hampshire. Daniell hedged on whether to end the RFK write-in. Studds needed delegate candidates and Hoch wanted to seal the end of the RFK effort as amicably as possible. Daniell had long expressed his interest in the delegate selection portion of the primary rather than the "beauty contest." Hoch suggested to Studds that perhaps Daniell could be encouraged to fold the RFK tent if he and some of those who had already filed as RFK delegate candidates were offered places on the slate of "pledged" McCarthy delegates. In addition, Daniell had filed as delegate candidates persons who resided in Manchester and Berlin. If these filings could be switched to McCarthy, the geographical distribution objective of the McCarthy slate would be accomplished. When contacted by Studds, Daniell was favorable. He agreed to withdraw as a favorable delegate

candidate for RFK and re-file as a pledged delegate for McCarthy. He said he would also call each of those who were filed as RFK delegate candidates asking them to withdraw and to offer those residing in areas where the McCarthy slate was deficient the chance to re-file either as delegate or alternate candidates pledged to McCarthy.

With Daniell's blessing and full cooperation, Studds now contacted those Daniell suggested would want to re-file and offered to help them through the procedures of the Secretary of State. Several were able to make the change Friday, February 9th but the last five or so slots could not be filed until Saturday. All was moving smoothly until Studds awoke Saturday morning to find that it was beginning to snow. By noon New Hampshire was in the midst of a serious storm. Roads were hazardous and the predictions were for increasing snow and freezing conditions. As late as noon several of those who had promised to make the trip to Concord had not arrived. Studds called and found all the late filers were on the road. By approximately 4:00 p.m., the last of the delegate slate had filed. Studds completed the listing of the delegate and alternate names on the signed authorization from McCarthy and filed that too with the Secretary of State. Forty-eight names, no more and no less, were filed for the forty-eight slots on the McCarthy slate. No attempt had been made either to cross file favorable McCarthy candidates for delegate positions or to remove the over filed names on the part of the Johnson organization. The coup was complete. The RFK effort had been successfully folded into the McCarthy organization and symbolically sealed with the additional gesture of filing their geographically prominent candidates for McCarthy. On the other hand, the Johnson organization, unwilling to control delegate candidate filings,

was now stuck with lists of favorable candidates far in excess of the slots available. The strategy had worked better than the McCarthy leaders could have expected.

Early Scheduling and Field Operations

Senator McCarthy's first campaign visit to New Hampshire was scheduled for Friday, January 26th and Saturday, January 27th. Scheduling and related logistics are always a challenge in a campaign but especially in a New Hampshire presidential primary. This results from the fact that both the national campaign and the state organization are usually inexperienced. Campaigns that had extensive preparation, such as that of John Kennedy in 1960, and which had the resources to employ experienced workers tended to move a bit more smoothly in early campaign going, but all must face the test in the field. Furthermore, there is nothing quite like a presidential primary campaign to tax the capacities and capabilities of individuals, organizations, and candidates. Even large state senatorial or gubernatorial campaigns do not match the stakes that are on the block as a presidential candidate begins in New Hampshire.

Beyond the inexperience and nervousness of a usual campaign, venturing into New Hampshire attracts, for the serious candidate, great press and electronic media attention. New Hampshire is the first. Consequently, there is little else for the reporters and columnists to talk about except New Hampshire.

As the McCarthy leaders learned when McCarthy arrived for the December 1967 lecture visit, the reporters were attracted to New Hampshire and could not be discouraged from visiting even with an unannounced candidate. Once a candidate had announced and was scheduled to visit New Hampshire, the

campaign had to consider the media as a factor in its plans and make every attempt to maximize the positive news. Also the campaign had to understand that almost every step, statement and activity would be under the probing scrutiny of the reporters. Schedules must include transportation, rooms, communications and plans to meet deadlines. The campaign needed a full scale press operation to provide copies of campaign schedules, press statements, advanced copy of speeches, and photographs in order to be sure that the media coverage would be adequate and, hopefully, positive.

The media seemed to respond to what had become known as media events. These were either regular campaign activities which attracted attention or staged episodes of human interest value that could be easily encapsulated for television viewing. By 1968 such events had become a fetish of most national campaigns. The media had come to expect, if not actually demand, that the candidate take every opportunity to provide the reporters with these homey, if occasionally foolish, profiles. These had become what amounts to a gray area in many presidential campaigns between what is a legitimate means of attracting public attention and a circus act. The temptation to perform in the center ring of the traveling show of a presidential campaign is strong. Some candidates resist, others succumb. Some succeed by resisting, others by succumbing. All have to reveal their humanity in these media rites or risk being labeled "aloof" or "detached" or "not down-to-earth." The pull to contrive and perform is tremendous upon all involved: candidates, campaign leaders, workers and even the media. New Hampshire is the stage. The stars, the production, the audience and the bit players are conveniently homogenized into a statewide road show that shifts its focus from the stage to the background in one continually flowing

series of events. The question which campaign managers have to consider is: what would be viewed as a legitimate news event? What could be contrived to capture media attention? Relying on the spontaneous would not necessarily produce a noteworthy event. Contriving events, as the Romney managers did, would not always cast the candidate in the proper light. For the McCarthy leadership there was always the seriousness of the underlying reasons for the McCarthy candidacy. It may have been, or even be now, appropriate for some candidates to run for the highest office of the land in the middle of a travelling circus, but from what McCarthy's managers in New Hampshire had seen of McCarthy this was not his style. Nor did they sense that he would succumb to the siren's call of that show.

With only the barest of exposure to McCarthy in Chicago and during his non-candidate visit to New Hampshire, Studds and Hoeh had had no experience with McCarthy as a candidate. They assumed that the contemporary model of the 1960 Kennedy campaign with which both were familiar and which was then the organizational model to be followed for success, would be used to shape the McCarthy organization and campaign.

The New Hampshire leaders wanted to show McCarthy as a candidate in the Kennedy tradition of well-organized, fast moving, diverse and street-level campaign activity. That model meant beginning the campaign day early, working constantly through the day and ending late in the evening. It meant finding a series of activities that would make news, be symbolic, show the candidate's humanity and reveal his intellectual capacities. The spectrum had to be set in a schedule that would both reflect the qualities of the candidate while responding to the political ethos of New Hampshire. With little to guide them,

Hoch and Studds relied on their New Hampshire experience and political judgments to build the schedule for the first day of the campaign.

Hoch recalled that John F. Kennedy began his 1960 presidential drive with a press conference at the City Hall in Nashua on January 25, just eight years earlier. For a campaign that felt its antecedent to be the lost spirit of John F. Kennedy, no better symbolic place to begin the McCarthy drive could be found. The Nashua committee could schedule the appropriate greeting before the statue of the late President near the City Hall steps, a press conference opening the campaign could follow and then, perhaps, a main street hand shaking tour followed by a neighborhood coffee reception.

The populous spine of New Hampshire runs from Nashua on the border with Massachusetts to Manchester, approximately 15 miles north of Nashua, to Concord approximately 20 miles north of Manchester. A convincing first day of campaigning had to cover each of the three principal New Hampshire cities. By doing this the maximum in-state media impact would be available and with the Nashua stop, some Boston television and press coverage would also be attracted.

While Hoch and Studds were confident of the scheduling abilities of those in Nashua and Concord, Manchester had not yet developed its own McCarthy committee. Without an organization to build a full schedule and with the need to get to Concord before the end of the work day, to file McCarthy's candidacy petitions, Studds and Hoch decided to shorten the Manchester visit to the "visible" luncheon, a brief block or two Elm Street hand shaking tour, and then to catch a shift change at one of the plants in the Amoskeag Millyard.

Following the candidacy filing in Concord and a brief headquarters reception, McCarthy would return to Manchester where a major policy speech was scheduled at St. Anselm's College. Studds and Hoch were pleased that a college site was available because there would be fewer audience problems. Also, the conservative Catholic school would be an excellent backdrop for McCarthy's policy criticisms. The speech would end the campaign day. A Friday evening was not the best time to schedule a political speech, but again the risk had to be taken in order to strengthen McCarthy's image.

Both felt a reasonably good schedule had been created for McCarthy for his first campaign day. There was an open question concerning possible campaigning on the next day, Saturday, January 27th, but this remained uncertain in Washington. A Saturday schedule would be difficult this early in the campaign. Winter Saturdays are difficult days. Most campaigning happens during the week when factories are operating, children are in school, and coffee klatches can be arranged. Visits to shopping centers, a winter carnival, ski area, hockey rink, or outdoor recreation activity are possibilities but schedules are heavily dependent on favorable weather, careful advance work and considerable dead time in travelling. The major outdoor winter attractions draw more out-of-staters than New Hampshirites and while this would help McCarthy with the upcoming Massachusetts primary, it was not particularly valuable for the New Hampshire effort. Furthermore, a candidate was expected to try out the sport or activity on show. McCarthy skated, Hoch and Studds learned, and had been a good hockey player, but to put him on skis would have made him a part of a circus act rather than a campaign. Saturday, the 27th, was kept open but without a specific schedule.

Advancing the First Campaign Day

The hallmark of the modern campaign is advance work. The advance person is the scout who is supposed to check all of a campaign day's details, adjust the schedule to meet the personal needs of the candidate, provide opportunities for the media and synchronize both the ethos of the campaign and the campaign locality. It is a demanding and often thankless job. A good campaign day is a work of art which occurs as much by chance as by design, but is always subject to a critical review. The critics are the candidate, the media, the local committee and virtually all others who have a hand in making the events that occupy the candidate's time and project the campaign's message. The best laid plans of the schedulers and advance workers do not always guarantee results. Too often it is the unexpected that will make or break a campaign day, and it is quite often the unexpected that receives the attention of the media to the exclusion of the pre-planned message.

The New Hampshire leaders knew the importance of both good schedules and good advance work. The rough outline that they had developed for McCarthy's first day in New Hampshire would have to be timed, pre-run, checked and adjusted. They suffered in this task from having only brief exposure to McCarthy as a person and even less to him as a candidate. They had no idea how fast or slow McCarthy would work, what kind of reaction he would receive or what activities were his favorites. They knew he had worked hard in his Minnesota election contests and that Minnesota and New Hampshire contained much the same mix of rural small town and urban industrial centers as did New Hampshire. They could only assume that McCarthy would do as well in New Hampshire as he had in Minnesota seizing upon those political opportunities which each state offered.

Since in-state media, especially television, was insignificant, McCarthy would have to meet the voters on the street, in their places of work, in their homes and where they gathered. He would have to handshake his way through a schedule and find a way to communicate his issues and his qualifications through these informal contacts. McCarthy's schedules had to be less what he might like to do in a campaign and more of what New Hampshire required of a campaigner. In other states he might be able to pick and choose, but in New Hampshire their was little choice and for a Democrat running during the winter, the choices were even fewer.

Studds and Hoeh expected that now McCarthy had announced and a major national campaign was in progress, a full blown advance operation would descend on the fledgling New Hampshire campaign before McCarthy's January 26th visit. Again they relied on their only previous national campaign model, that of John F. Kennedy in 1960 and Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey's visits during the 1964 presidential campaign.

Several days before McCarthy was to arrive Studds received a call from New York that Sandy Fraucher would be arriving to advance the Senator's visit. A check with Blair Clark assured Studds that Sandy Fraucher was an experienced advance person and, while young, had developed a considerable reputation advancing John Lindsey's campaign in New York City.

Sandy Fraucher arrived in Concord late in the afternoon of the Wednesday before McCarthy's scheduled Friday arrival. He left his shirts for Studds to have cleaned, called the New Hampshire contacts he was given, and set up several meetings to go through the schedule the next morning. He made some of the local connections but the day was gone before he had been able to

The First Campaign Day

During the night the snow storm ended. New Hampshire road crews are famous for being able to clear the state's main highways to almost bare pavement within a few hours after the end of a storm. About six inches of white, fluffy snow lay on the ground and hung from the branches of the hardwoods and in blankets on the evergreens. The key was that deep, cloudless blue that only follows the air cleansing of the day after a storm. The temperature was in the upper twenties but with the intense sun the air felt warm, almost with a touch of spring -- a day that would begin the maple sugar harvester thinking about preparing to tap his trees.

Hoeh and Studds were elated with the changed weather when they met early that morning at the Concord Headquarters. The cars for the motorcade were waiting. With them were two new faces who had come into town the night before to help with the campaign. Studds and Hoeh were now confronted with a wrenching problem. Both of the new young men were neatly dressed, sport coat and tie according to some perceived dress code, but one had a lengthy beard and the other long hair. Both were about to jump into a car to follow along during the day's activity helping to drive, hand out materials or do whatever was needed. Both Hoeh and Studds had been working with the concerned and serious students who were involved in the anti-war efforts and knew appearances were only a small part of what the generation of the late nineteen sixties was experiencing. Appearances did not particularly bother either of them as long as individuals worked hard and behaved in a way that lent credit to the effort. But this was McCarthy's first day in New Hampshire. Hoeh and Studds were particularly sensitive to the fact that the only television image that might be projected from

New Hampshire would be of bearded, long-haired, mini-skirted, anti-establishment appearing young people. This could not be allowed. Studds took both aside and explained the situation. As much as he hated the task it had to be done and to the credit of the two young men involved they understood. Their response to Studds' request not to come that day was, they had come to New Hampshire to help McCarthy not to hurt him. If Studds felt that their appearance would hurt McCarthy during this campaign day they would not travel. In fact, Studds asked that they not even come close to the campaign that day. He suggested that they remain in Concord, help with preparations for McCarthy's visit later in the day, and when McCarthy arrived, to get out of sight. This was probably the toughest job Studds had to do during the whole campaign. It was not necessary for either Studds or Hoeh to mention appearance again. Like the New Hampshire political history lesson which became required reading during the campaign, volunteers were either "clean cut" and out front or they accepted back room, invisible assignments.

McCarthy's car arrived in Nashua on time followed closely by the press bus. A group of perhaps fifty had gathered anticipating his arrival on the plaza in front of Nashua's City Hall. It was a bit after 9:00 a.m., a little early for the shoppers. But the activity and especially the sight of newsreel cameras, light men, reporters, and sound crews began to swell the crowd. CBS had sent Roger Mudd, the Boston stations had sent reporters well known to Nashua residents and the wire services had sent in their top reporters.

Studds and Hoeh greeted Senator McCarthy and directed him to the place where the bust of President Kennedy stood on a pedestal just in front of the City Hall steps. McCarthy gazed rather solemnly, reading the inscription engraved in gold on the face of the black granite pedestal to himself:

IN MEMORIAM

PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY

ON JANUARY 25, 1960,
THIS CITY HALL PLAZA
WAS JOHN F. KENNEDY'S
FIRST CAMPAIGN STOP
IN THE NATION FOR
THE PRESIDENCY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Still and newsreel photographers clicked and ground away as the message of that precedent became obvious. Then McCarthy shook hands with those who had gathered, exchanged friendly greetings and informal words of welcome. Then he entered City Hall.

The press conference had been scheduled for 9:30 a.m. when McCarthy entered the City Hall auditorium at 9:15 a.m. the camera crews were still struggling to assemble their microphones, lights and cameras, and the audience was almost entirely composed of empty chairs. Almost no one had experienced a candidate who arrived on time much less one who was early. John Kennedy's campaign was notoriously late as were most others that the political observers could recall. There were some awkward moments as the chairs began to fill, the stragglers from outside found their places. Hoch and Studds went to find the Mayor who was scheduled to greet the Senator.

The New Hampshire press office had released a schedule for the day earlier and copies were available for the press, and Hoch and Studds expected that an advance release of the Senator's remarks would be available for distribution. The national advance man, Sandy Fraucher, appeared but he had no advance text nor did he have a copy of the schedule for the day. Hoch and Studds were also looking for their own advance man who was to meet them as they arrived in Nashua. He was expected to guide them through the day.

The Mayor, Dennis Sullivan, finally arrived saying that he had been ill and had just come from his bed for the occasion. In a few words Sullivan extended the welcome of the city but did not offer further encouragement. McCarthy responded briefly and without text. He called the Granite State primary a special challenge, as he put it, "the primary has the reputation of being the harshest political judgment in the country." He went on to note that "some of New Hampshire's Democratic leaders have said the state is so well organized and disciplined that there wasn't any sense in his coming to the state." "Some say that all New Hampshire people are hawks" and his anti-war stand wouldn't win him any votes. He said he wanted the people to deny all those "base rumors."[11]

McCarthy set the theme of his campaign through his response to reporters' questions. One asked, "Why aren't you conducting a more forceful campaign?" "I don't intend to shout at people around the country, I don't think the people in New Hampshire want to be shouted at. The issues I want to get out are not best served by table thumping," he responded.[12]

The press asked how his campaign was going so far, to which McCarthy replied, "All right." Some one asked him to be more enthusiastic but he repeated, "I think all right is an honest statement. We haven't despaired yet. We haven't folded up our equipment and left the room." He concluded the press conference by noting that the prediction was that he would be lucky to get ten or twelve percent of the vote on March 12th. He said that he expected the figure to be far more than what people supporting him say to expect. "We're going to run to win, that's all."[13]

McCarthy, now well ahead of the scheduled time for the end of the press conference, visited several City Hall offices to handshake and chat with city employees, then out to the street, greeting a few more of the early shoppers. A nearby coffee shop had been scouted by the Nashua committee as being the place where McCarthy might meet voters on their mid-morning coffee break. The entourage of reporters, camera men and the local committee jammed in around the surprised customers perched on their stools waiting to hear the reaction of these locals to the likes of Senator McCarthy. For some reason the press had expected McCarthy to receive a hostile reaction from New Hampshire voters. They spent most of that first day quizzing those who shook hands with the Senator and those who were present during his various appearances. In the coffee shop McCarthy quietly introduced himself, excused his interruption, and moved easily from patron to patron. The owner working behind the counter had several opinions about the war which he expressed in a friendly way. He was a supporter of the nation and therefore the war, but he didn't care much for the Johnson administration or its handling of the war.

In spite of the unscheduled tour of City Hall offices and the visits on Main Street, McCarthy was still running ahead of schedule and few people remained on the sidewalks whom McCarthy had not already met. It was time to move on to the next stop, another example of the New Hampshire tradition of campaigning, a coffee party in a local home. The entourage now numbering ten to fifteen cars and the press bus wound through Nashua's residential area arriving at the home. The reporters were anxious to see how McCarthy performed in this domestic setting and proceeded to almost crowd out the neighbors who had come to hear and question Senator McCarthy. Hoeh and Studds did not want the coffee to be

an extension of the press conference, nor did they want the presence of the reporters to repress the neighbors. They had to make a decision between media access to McCarthy or voter access. They decided on the side of the voter and quietly asked the press to adjourn to the kitchen and hold their questions until McCarthy had had his chance to meet voters and respond to their questions.

During the session Hoch and Studds became a bit concerned with the pace that was set during the day. McCarthy was running as much as one-half hour ahead of the schedule. Hoch made a quick telephone call ahead to Manchester to see if the New Hampshire advance man had arrived and to warn that Senator McCarthy would be arriving in Manchester approximately fifteen minutes earlier than planned. Hoch said he would stall as long as he could both in Nashua and on the road, but too slow a pace would be obvious to the reporters and also stretch the coffee beyond the reasonable patience of those who had come.

McCarthy recorded and filmed several interviews for the Boston television stations that were following him that morning. The Boston reporters and crews then left the campaign just before noon in order to process their film and prepare for late afternoon deadlines. Hoch then asked that the Senator's car be brought to the house in preparation for the trip to Manchester. A few moments later the driver returned saying he could not find the keys. A reserve car was called in and led the entourage safely out of Nashua.

In spite of the delay and slow driving, the campaign arrived at the Manchester restaurant fifteen minutes early as predicted. One Manchester supporter was there to greet McCarthy but he whispered to Hoch that the others he had invited to join in the luncheon had not yet arrived. Again people assumed that campaigns always run late and for them to be on time, certainly not early, would be enough.

Studds grabbed Senator McCarthy's arm and began about a one block impromptu handshaking tour of the Elm Street sidewalk. The press tagged along to check on the local residents' reactions to McCarthy in this, the most hostile of New Hampshire territory. Most people were startled, did not recognize McCarthy, but when introduced were friendly, usually wishing him "good luck."

Using approximately ten of the extra fifteen minutes in the street tour, McCarthy returned to the restaurant and, followed by the somewhat smaller press corps, was ushered to his table through the main floor to the rear of the crowded second level of the restaurant. Hoeh and Studds had expected that he would move slowly through the restaurant shaking hands and introducing himself or being introduced by the Manchester supporters. It became quickly obvious that McCarthy, unlike many other politicians, did not enjoy interrupting people as they were eating. Hoeh tried to get McCarthy to appreciate that in this restaurant and at noon time, people were there to be interrupted and that in a certain way they expected that McCarthy would pass among the tables and booths greeting each of them. Apparently, this was not McCarthy's style. The luncheon went well but faster than scheduled since McCarthy had not tarried on entering the restaurant nor did he change his ways when leaving. He greeted a few of the other patrons but mostly persons introduced to him by those who had joined him for lunch.

The major disaster of the day was about to occur. In his account of the day Studds recorded the following:

> McCarthy's first campaign visit to the state. . .was a nightmare. David (Hoeh) and I. . .had hired a local advance man who turned out to be some kind of a character who never showed up and that trip was advanced 20 minutes ahead of the Senator's arrival (at each stop) by David and myself. I never want to live through anything like that again![14]

The telephone calling Hoeh and Studds began in Nashua now rapidly increased when they arrived in Manchester. No advance man had appeared and the next stops on the schedule called for McCarthy to be in the Amoskeag Millyard to shake hands with workers changing shifts. A time for this was listed but it had not been confirmed. Holland and the other Manchester local supporters had thought these details had been checked by the advance man. In addition to the need to check the exact shift change time, Hoeh now wanted to add something into the schedule in order to pick up the pace and fill in the extra time that was available.

Studds and Hoeh bounced in and out of the dining room making desperate telephone calls to confirm the shift change mentioned in the schedule, and second, to try to add another event, possibly a plant tour or another shift change. The situation was desperate. McCarthy was about to leave the restaurant for his next stop. Originally, Hoeh and Studds wanted to have McCarthy campaign along Elm Street to the newly rented store front that was to be the McCarthy Manchester campaign headquarters. But shortly after the lease was signed and a day or so before McCarthy was to arrive the ceiling of the main room fell in leaving the place a mess and a hazard. In addition, the young out-of-state volunteer, who Hoeh and Studds had sent to Manchester to set up the headquarters and work with the local committee, was having trouble with the building inspectors' office over the sign that was to be placed over the store front. Apparently he did not realize that to place a sign on the front of a building a permit was needed. As a consequence of the combination of these events, a headquarters opening in Manchester was out of the question.

McCarthy was now out on the street with Hoeh and Studds, still not quite sure what would happen next. Hoeh began a hand shaking walking tour with McCarthy north along the east side of Elm Street while Studds and Manchester supporters went to telephone booths to call in search of more definite shift change times. Although it was reasonably warm and sunny there were not many people on the streets during an early Friday afternoon, so Hoeh began taking McCarthy into several of the larger stores and circulating among the customers. To make sure that no incidents occurred, Hoeh sent a campaign workers ahead to check with the store manager to be sure that he would welcome McCarthy's campaigning. McCarthy also made known his preference. No campaigning in beauty parlors. "Women," he said, "did not like being seen by strangers when under a dryer or wrapped up in towels." He also cautioned about barber shops as being places of strong opinion with little likelihood of being able to counter the barber's view. "It's as hard to argue with a man holding scissors or a razor as it is to talk while in a dentist's chair," he quipped, and the campaign passed by the beauty parlors and the barber shop on this first Manchester hand shaking tour.[15]

The west side of Elm Street was in the shade, with even fewer people on the street and smaller shops. McCarthy moved quickly making his way back to the place where the cars were waiting to take him to the next campaign stop in the Millyard.

Studds was almost sure of the shift change time but still had not been able to confirm it or make another change to his satisfaction. The place, the Brookshire Knitting Mills, was in the middle of the Millyard along a narrow street that had been designed for rail and horse-drawn wagon service. The

cars could enter but not the bus. McCarthy arrived, the press ran to catch up with him from the bus that was parked outside, and all stood in eager expectation for the flood of workers to stream down the steps, past the Senator's outstretched hand. They waited for ten, then fifteen, then twenty minutes, while Hoeh and Studds nervously tried to find out what had gone wrong in their scheduling. The Brookshire Mills were owned by the Sidores, a prominent Democratic family, and under this management were assumed to be friendly. Hoeh and Studds had also assumed that their advance man had been in touch with a member of the family to arrange the visit. As they soon found out no one had checked with the Brookshire management, they asked if the shift were about to change and were told that part of the shift would change soon but that the largest number of the workers had left approximately five minutes before McCarthy had arrived. Quickly Hoeh tried to arrange an in-plant tour but found that permission to do this had to be secured well in advance.

At this inopportune time, one of the lost advance men, Sandy Fraucher, arrived complaining loudly that McCarthy was standing outside of a non-union factory about to greet non-union workers. The reporters finally had something to write about and began taking notes. Hoeh grabbed Fraucher by the sleeve and took him aside explaining in a stage whisper, that John F. Kennedy had toured this factory in 1960 and that the Sidore family offered their workers benefits that most textile union contracts had not even begun to include. Through it all McCarthy chatted with reporters, remained calm, and greeted the few workers who straggled out the door.

Up until this point the day had gone well to the outsiders. The schedule and the logistics seemed professionally handled and what few problems had developed were known only to Studds and Hoch. Now the campaign was lodged on a rock in the Millyard with little or nothing to do but wait.

As Studds recalled:

> We made the famous mistake there. We got him five minutes late to a factory gate and he had just missed the bulk of people which all the national press picked up to show how bad the organization in New Hampshire was.
>
> The organization in New Hampshire had been naively assuming that a candidate for the Presidency of the United States would be preceded by some advance men. Some of us had worked on Kennedy campaigns before and we had some disillusioning still to go.
>
> But we learned after that point that if there was going to be advance work we were going to do it. . .[16]

The doorstep of the Brookshire Mills became a symbol of a low point in the campaign. Every story about McCarthy's first visit to New Hampshire carried at least a paragraph about the doorstep and the key theme of the next two days coverage of the campaign focused on the doorstep either in words or in film. As an example one reporter wrote:

> It also became clear early in the day that McCarthy's New Hampshire organization has a long way to go to take on a patina of professionalism.
>
> Item: McCarthy is scheduled to have dinner in a busy downtown Manchester restaurant, where well-heeled business types eat, with a small group of supporters.
>
> The dining rooms, upper and lower, are filled with people.
>
> McCarthy has lunch, shakes hands with one or two people who come to his table, then walks out without visiting one single table or shaking another hand.
>
> Explains his aide when asked by a reporter what the man is doing: We're behind schedule."

> Item: McCarthy is scheduled to visit a textile plant at 3:00 p.m. to shake hands as the workers get off their shift. He arrives at the plant slightly before 3:00 p.m.
>
> But the shift got out at 2:45 p.m.
>
> So, he stands in the cold and slush, or in the plant entry waiting for another shift to get out half an hour later.
>
> The result -- about 30 minutes spent waiting to shake the hands of less than 20 women who were obviously in a big hurry to go home.[17]

Another caught the same scene but found something in the event that revealed McCarthy's character.

> At Manchester's Brookshire Knitting Mills, a schedule mix-up found the campaigners arriving 10 minutes after a large 2:45 p.m. shift let out.
>
> The next flow of workers was to occur at 3:15 p.m. McCarthy and his staff spent the time between the millyard, where heavy slush from the day's traffic mingled with ruts carved from ice, and the front lobby, where the weather was more clement.
>
> Then only about 15 women came out.
>
> "I'm sorry, Senator," an aide confided. "Our man fed the wrong information about this."
>
> "That's all right."
>
> Later travelling between Manchester and Concord. . .McCarthy noted: "Yes, it has been a good day. Well planned."[18]

McCarthy was not easily ruffled by miscues or schedule mix-ups. Hoeh and Studds were demolished by the disaster in Manchester, but since McCarthy had been so forgiving they promised each other that nothing like that would happen again if they could control it in any way. Other candidates, even several then working in New Hampshire had become notorious for their intolerance of mistakes. Their outrages, while not often seen in public, had become part of

the underground information of that campaign year. To see how McCarthy responded when faced with a debacle was refreshing but more importantly, stimulated complete dedication to insure future perfection.

Quietly, McCarthy said, "Let's go," to Hoeh and Studds. Sensing that the press was let down by the stand in the cold, McCarthy climbed aboard the press bus to ride with the reporters to Concord. Hoeh and Studds riding in the lead car again slowed the pace as the campaign was still ahead of its scheduled arrival in Concord. While fumbling in the front office of the Brookshire Knitting Mills, Hoeh had called ahead to Concord to warn them of an early arrival at the State House. The well organized Concord Committee quickly made the appropriate calls to the local reporters and photographers so that they would be on hand for McCarthy's filing and to local supporters who could be expected to attend the headquarters opening.

Both McCarthy and the reporters who had ridden with him on the bus came off in a jovial mood as if nothing had happened during the previous stop.

McCarthy entered the State House, went directly to the Secretary of State's office where Hoeh and Studds produced the appropriately signed petitions and forms necessary to make the filing official. The reporters asked the number of signatures and the reply from Hoeh was, "Just the number required. We did not attempt to produce more than this number." The filing was official, no questions were asked concerning the names, nor problems encountered in the exercise.

McCarthy then went to Governor John W. King's office to pay a courtesy call. The Boston Globe account of the meeting read:

> It was a courtesy call on the governor, the kind visiting high-level politicians make when on someone else's home ground. The chat between Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy and Gov. John W. King was brief.
>
> "Is this your official start?" King small-talked as they sat on a black leather couch in his office. "Yes," said McCarthy.
>
> "You will find the people here will treat you courteously. You will like campaigning here. I did; I wouldn't have done it three times otherwise. I hope you will say what a beautiful state we have here," said King.
>
> "Yes, it is, I have already said how it reminds me of Minnesota," said McCarthy.
>
> Then, Friday afternoon, the two men shook hands, probably for the last time until March 12. . .[19]

Following the official filing and the meeting with the Governor, McCarthy seemed to catch the spirit of the campaign. His ride from Manchester to Concord in the press bus had been stimulating and his reception in Concord reassuring. Now he left the State House to walk the three blocks to the state headquarters. On his way he greeted people on the sidewalk. Here the reception was more cordial than it had been since Nashua. As he rounded the corner from the State House to Main Street he was met by Vincent Dunn, Jr., the eight year old son of the New Hampshire's Banking Commissioner, who was holding a copy of McCarthy's book The Limits of Power. The boy asked the Senator to autograph the book. Hoeh then took the opportunity to usher McCarthy into the offices of the Banking Commission and to introduce him to Vincent Dunn, Sr. Dunn and his wife were becoming increasingly helpful to the McCarthy effort and would become heavily involved before the end.

As was usual for the day, McCarthy arrived at the headquarters a bit ahead of schedule which meant that things were not completely ready for the reception nor had all the people gathered. Before he left about fifty persons filled the room. Speaking briefly, McCarthy thanked them for their interest and commented on his first day:

> If what I have seen in the three towns I have been in is indicative of a general response, we'll settle for 55 percent of the vote.
>
> I have never had as encouraging a response, even in my own state. And in spite of the "mischievous" New Hampshire voter, I might have a chance to win.
>
> I want you to know the burden you bear, and thank you for working in this common cause.[20]

He made a point of greeting and talking with each person in the headquarters and promised to return again before the end of the campaign in order to meet those who had not arrived before he had to leave for his next stop, a 5:45 p.m. reception, part of the annual meeting of the New Hampshire Bar Association.

Hoeh and Studds delivered their candidate to several members of the New Hampshire Bar who escorted McCarthy to the private reception being held at the Wayfarer Convention Center in Bedford. The press was not included and would not rejoin McCarthy until his speaking date at 8:00 p.m. at St. Anselm's College.

McCarthy's Second Manchester Speech

On January 12, 1968, William Loeb, the controversial editor and publisher of the Manchester Union Leader printed one of his famous front page editorials titled, ADDRESSED TO DEMOCRATS ONLY. It read:

It is good news to all patriotic Democrats that Senator Eugene McCarthy has announced that he will authorize a write-in (sic) candidacy for himself in New Hampshire.

HERE IS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR EVERY PATRIOTIC, SENSIBLE DEMOCRAT IN THE STATE OF GEN. STARK TO INDICATE JUST HOW LITTLE HE THINKS OF ANYONE WHO GOES AROUND GIVING SPEECHES WHICH SERVE TO PROLONG THE WAR, AS SEN. McCARTHY IS DOING BY ATTACKING PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S AND THIS NATION'S COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF FREEDOM IN VIETNAM.

Dissent, of course, is the right of every American. But carping dissent in war time, with the enemy at our throats and killing our boys in Vietnam, is NOT a right.

IT IS A DISGRACE!

It is difficult for this newspaper to believe that Sen. McCarthy doesn't understand that every speech he makes in favor of our withdrawal from Vietnam, in favor of what amounts -- no matter how carefully disguised -- to surrender to Communist aggression, costs the lives of many American boys.

WHETHER SEN. McCARTHY KNOWS IT OR NOT, THOSE SPEECHES OF HIS ARE WRITTEN IN BLOOD -- NOT HIS BLOOD, BUT THE BLOOD OF AMERICAN BOYS WHO ARE KILLED BECAUSE THIS WAR IS PROLONGED BY THOSE SPEECHES.

When the rulers in Hanoi hear a speech by McCarthy, or Bobby Kennedy, or all the other chickens who want to pull out of Vietnam, who want to run home with their tails between their legs like so many licked yellow curs, they say: "All we have to do is to wait long enough and those crazy Americans will be fighting among themselves so hard they won't be able to beat us."

EDITORIALS WON'T BEAT SEN. McCARTHY OR THE WHOLE BARNYARD OF CRAZY CHICKENS, BUT THE PATRIOTIC, SOUND DEMOCRATS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE HAVE A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY IN THIS ELECTION TO SUPPORT OVERWHELMINGLY -- THOSE DELEGATES PLEDGED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND GIVE SEN. McCARTHY AS FEW WRITE-INS AS IS HUMANLY POSSIBLE.

LET NEW HAMPSHIRE, THE STATE WHOSE MOTTO IS "LIVE FREE OR DIE," ONCE AGAIN SHOW THE NATION THAT, DEMOCRATS, OR REPUBLICANS, WE ARE EAGLES AND NOT PLUCKED CHICKENS.

(Signed) William Loeb, Publisher

The question which the McCarthy organizers faced was what impact such statements would have on the turn-out for the St. Anselm's speech, and secondly, what impact would this rhetoric have on the Manchester voter. Would there be a crowd for the St. Anselm's speech? Would the crowd be friendly or hostile? Would the air of controversy which the Union Leader had introduced with its editorial make attending the speech a personally and reputationally inadvisable thing to do? These were the concerns which the McCarthy leaders had as they arrived at St. Anselm's to check the arrangements for the speech.

Studds had gambled in favor of holding the speech in the large gymnasium of the College rather than in some smaller but easier to fill space. He felt the risk had to be taken, even though a political speech on a Friday night was not likely to attract a large audience. After making the decision to use the larger space, Studds sent out the word to the nearby cities of Nashua and Concord and even to the well organized Keene committee some distance away. These committees were urged to contact as many of their allies as possible and encourage them to help fill the St. Anselm's hall.

To their relief, some time before the scheduled 8:00 p.m. speech the crowd assembled. By the time McCarthy arrived most of the seats were filled and some people were standing to the sides and sitting on the floor. This was not to be a lecture but rather it was billed as a major foreign policy address. Hoeh and Studds also wanted it to be a campaign speech if not in fact, then at least the candidate would be received and treated like he was campaigning. They asked the known McCarthy supporters to disperse in small groups throughout the crowd and to be responsive. "McCarthy," they said, "will not shout nor become animated in his presentation. He will make subtle references that should draw a

response and he will draw important illustrations that will be understated. When these occur, they said, the audience should respond. It will be up to McCarthy's supporters to lead that response. And when McCarthy enters, stand and clap and whistle to provide him with as warm a reception as possible.

In those days, before Secret Service protection of presidential candidates, Hoeh and Studds were also concerned about possible hecklers and disruptors. They asked their dispersed supporters to be ready for trouble if something should happen.

McCarthy entered as scheduled, the audience rose, clapped and some cheered. He was introduced by the head of the monastic order which operates St. Anselm's College, with references to McCarthy's own strong Catholic background. There had been little need to prepare the audience for McCarthy on this evening. He quickly brought them close to him and carried them through a speech that was deeply serious but laced with humor and referenced with illustrations drawn from his own understanding of monastic orders, the rites and traditions of the Roman Catholic Church.

The speech ended with a standing ovation that sent supporters and the curious away with a renewed dedication and interest in his campaign. The only two notes of dissent were a banner over the podium that read "Go Hawk Go" but this referred to the St. Anselm's College basketball team, and one older priest who left the room. Hoeh and Studds had planned the event to happen without a question period following the address. They did not want to open the floor to potential harassment which would be the news of the evening rather than the content of the speech.

There had been no advanced text of the speech. Hoeh and Studds had expected that copies of the speech would be available from the McCarthy national office either to be distributed by them for release prior to the speech or to be given to the New Hampshire campaign's press person for distribution. Neither occurred and the reporters, long used to following a speech line by line in a text, noting departures from the text, and marking the text for use in their stories, had to cover the speech as a news event.

Bill Cardoso, the New Hampshire reporter for the Boston Globe complained that McCarthy hadn't said anything new that night. "I couldn't stop the presses on this speech and make them break into the type with a new story. I've already missed my deadline. There were no early press releases available." Cardoso expressed the frustration of his colleagues in the press who look for the advanced texts and press released excerpts of speeches to help them make their deadlines.[21]

The comment frequently heard among the reporters around presidential campaigns is that the candidate didn't say anything, or if they are charitable, much that was new in his speech. The comment reflects the fact that the reporters hear most of a candidate's speeches, read a great deal about the candidate, and are in many ways better informed as to the manner and style of the candidate than is almost any one else in the public. This creates a cynicism that comes from familiarity, a cynicism that tends to be reflected in what they feel is important to report or how they perform their job when there is little fresh to report.

On the other side of this coin is the candidate and an unwritten rule that repetition creates positions, issues and ultimately an image which provides the candidate with recognition and identity. Candidates are constantly searching for themes, ways of using the language to create a response, to convey their thoughts, to reveal their personal qualities. Once those vignettes of an issue, a position on the issue and the style of the candidate have been found to attract audience response they are repeated. Unlike the reporters, each audience is new and each audience wants to be given the opportunity to take full measure of the candidate. Consequently, audiences come not only to expect to hear what they have read that a candidate has said, but also hope that he will use the same phrasing, the same illustrative passages to make the points of his message. There appears to be some element of reinforcement, credibility, in such repetition which gives each medium its particular impact. If the listener has heard and seen the candidate make a particularly valid point on a television interview or speech excerpt, that viewer, when part of the candidate's audience, wants to hear that statement again and, preferably, with the same phrasing, intonation, and emphasis that stimulated interest from the other medium. To the continual displeasure of the reporter, who must find other things to write about when candidates repeat and repeat their speeches, the requirement to repeat remains. What is refreshing about covering the New Hampshire primary is that the candidates are groping to find those themes, phrases and the pace of delivery which will distinguish them from the others. McCarthy was in the process of establishing his style while the reporters were trying to fit him into some familiar mold of what a candidate should be, say and do.

Following the speech McCarthy returned to his downtown Manchester Hotel room where Hoeh, Studds, and the recently arrived Blair Clark reviewed the day with the Senator. McCarthy was genuinely pleased with his reception. Hoeh and Studds were happy that the day had only one serious problem, and the speech had not only drawn a respectable audience but the Senator had been exceptionally well received. They were also delighted with the relationship that was beginning to develop between them and the candidate. Their schedule had been a test for themselves but more importantly a test for McCarthy. If their earlier perception of McCarthy as being able to campaign effectively in New Hampshire were confirmed by his day of activity, then they felt assured that if their own organizational efforts succeeded, McCarthy had a chance in the primary.

Hoeh and Studds learned that McCarthy could work hard, sustain enthusiasm through a long campaign day, that he was effective in press conferences, hand shaking on the street, in stores, at a factory door; that his presence was commanding, that he suffered mistakes without visible irritation, that he could make something out of the unplanned and unexpected; that he was flexible, and that he could stimulate an audience. In short, they felt they had been right. McCarthy would be an exceptional candidate in New Hampshire. He did not create or attract hostility and when he encountered opposition, he turned it comfortably to his advantage.

In response to Blair Clark's questions concerning their view of the day, Hoeh and Studds reviewed their reaction to each event, apologized for the error at the factory, but felt the day had gone better than either had expected. McCarthy felt the same way and at that point showed how he had prepared for

New Hampshire. He rolled up his pant leg to show the bottom of a pair of long underwear which had kept him warm while moving through Hoeh and Studds' mine field of a schedule.

Hoeh outlined a possible schedule for the next day, warned that it was not well advanced, and that he was not sure that the local contacts were sufficiently experienced with campaigning to check out the details. In other words, he felt it would be risky to attempt to create a day of activity from what he had available.

McCarthy made clear that some time in the campaign he would like to skate and even play some hockey. With that he suggested that the day be cleared and that he would return to Washington to prepare for a Sunday trip to St. Louis, Mo. He felt it would be better to end the day on the positive note of his speech and the reception he had received in the three cities visited rather than risk a potentially awkward schedule.

Evaluating the First Day and Field Operations: The Impact

Hoeh and Studds began their review by checking to see how the press had reacted to McCarthy's first New Hampshire visit. The word from Washington was that as far as the national television was concerned the big story had been the mistake at the factory gate. This, according to those who were observing, had been the major image that the nation had seen as a result of McCarthy's first New Hampshire campaign visit. The timing of the mistake had made it even worse because it happened just prior to the evening and weekend deadlines for the networks, a number of the major newspapers and news services. This was the story that they could use; everything else that happened that day

happened too late for their deadlines. And not having an advance of McCarthy's speech meant that it was also omitted from the lead stories.

A sample of newspaper headlines read:

> "McCarthy Roams in Granite State" sub-head: "Low-keyed Approach as Senator Kicks Off Anti-LBJ Drive." (Rutland Herald, 1/27/68)
>
> "McCarthy Leaves N.H.; Romney Still Plugging" sub-head: "McCarthy Bases Hope on Voter Independence" (Boston Herald, 1/27/68)
>
> "N.H. 'Courteous', McCarthy Told" sub-head: "3-1 Defeat Seen for McCarthy" (Boston Globe, 1/28/68)
>
> "N.H. Race Warms Up, McCarthy Meets the Governor" (Boston Globe, 1/28/68)
>
> "McCarthy Moves Through N.H. with the Slow Step of a Priest" (Washington Post, 1/28/68)
>
> "McCarthy Runs Genteel Campaign" (Washington Post, 1/28/68)
>
> "McCarthy Launches 'Challenge' to LBJ" (Manchester Union Leader 1/27/68)
>
> "McCarthy Keeps at N.H. Voters" (Christian Science Monitor, 1/27/68)
>
> "Dove Candidate Warns of Growing Militarism" (Rutland Herald, 1/27/68)
>
> "McCarthy Stumps in New Hampshire" (New York Times, 1/27/68)

Below the headlines an interesting story began to emerge. The reporters were trying to figure out who this man was and how he would fare in New Hampshire. At first they were looking for signs of hostility toward the "dove" candidate from those he met on the streets. In Nashua, practically everyone McCarthy met as he walked was interviewed for their reaction. One reporter wrote:

> McCarthy is a tall, well-built man with silver hair. He dresses in conservative banker-lawyer greys, complete with buttoned vest.
>
> There is no question he is a handsome man, and he did make a hit with many of the people, especially the women, as he strode the slush-laden sidewalks.
>
> "Oooooh," was the reaction from Mrs. Ida Levesque, a late sixtyish widow from Manchester who immigrated years ago to this country from St. Clement, Que.
>
> "Sure, I'll vote for him," she said, after he had passed by. "It was a pleasure to shake his hand."
>
> She added that she was a Democrat, didn't know much about what he stood for, but that he had a "nice personality," and she liked the "way he looks."
>
> In Manchester, one woman who shook his land later said she had no idea who he was -- "I've never met him before" -- that she, too, would vote for him.[22]

Even under some rather intense grilling in front of network sound cameras, Roger Mudd was unable to get a negative response from those who had just met McCarthy. Not many knew him or had heard of him but what they experienced as McCarthy met them on the street was positive. The reporters could not find hostility toward this man who had come to challenge an incumbent Democratic administration and a war.

A point that did give Hoeh and Studds some concern was that several reporters attempted to lump the Romney campaign together with McCarthy and to contrast their campaign styles. Romney had just ended a six day tour of the state a week earlier and was scheduled to return for a two day swing Saturday and Sunday of January 27-28. Romney was attempting to take New Hampshire by storm. A high pressure, professional campaign had been organized for him which had him working long days, travelling extensively, and always acting the booster. His street manner was forceful, quick, and aggressive. He thrust himself into virtually

every situation to the delight of the following reporters and photographers and commanded broad interest and extensive coverage. He was viewed as the candidate most likely to succeed with the issue of an alternative to the Johnson administration's policies in Vietnam. He attracted attention wherever he went in the state and was seen as the man to watch during the 1968 New Hampshire campaign season. Consequently, everything that McCarthy did or failed to do in New Hampshire was contrasted with Governor Romney and what the press felt were Romney's strengths as a campaigner.

Under the heading "McCarthy in New Hampshire," the Rutland Herald editorialized:

> Judging from reports coming from the frozen Connecticut River, Sen. Eugene McCarthy is running a real risk of being mistaken for a Republican, or perhaps just a Minnesota Farm-Labor candidate. This unkind assessment of a loyal Democrat's young presidential primary campaign is based on the facts he is following the Romney trail around New Hampshire (without the folksy Romney touch) and is "opposing" a rival who isn't even entered in the race but whose supporters include the cream of the state's Democratic organization.
>
> McCarthy isn't running against Romney, but it is evident from newspaper and television reports that if the two men were selling vacuum cleaners, Romney would probably sell out before McCarthy made his first sale.
>
> While Romney has glad-handed factory workers and farmers and regaled affluent middle-class New Hampshire with his manly charm over tea cups, McCarthy has opened his campaign with nothing more than polite, professional phrases and a somewhat wan smile. Since both men have hopes of winning some of the state's registered Independent voters, they are in fact rivals.
>
> It seems doubtful McCarthy can rally enough support from the Hanover intellectuals and other groups opposing the Johnson war policy to make even a dent in the state's Democratic cheering section led by the Johnson trio of Gov. John W. King, Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre, and former General Services Administrator, Bernard Boutin.

The editorial went on to concede that McCarthy had made an interesting point in his St. Anselm's speech, "when he warned his audience of a growing militarism in American foreign policy. ...He even cited former Republican President Eisenhower's recent warning that the military establishment was growing too powerful. ..." But concluded:

> It wasn't McCarthy's fault that he stepped into New Hampshire in the shadow of the Pueblo incident. But one wonders if that shadow makes much difference. His campaign seems to be a little shadowy anyway, and his "opponent" is only a write-in shadow.[23]

The story that led to the editorial had picked up the contrast in styles between McCarthy and Romney but had mis-read the reaction.

> It became clear early in the day that the senator is going to run a down-style campaign, free of the usual flowery oratory and American-way-of-life speeches.
>
> The McCarthy approach is low-keyed, intellectual, reasoned -- in a word, amateurish when compared to (the) style of campaigning the public is accustomed to.
>
> He's not forceful when handshaking on the street, if he is compared to Michigan Governor George Romney, who excels in the thrust-pump-and-smile technique.[24]

The contrasting styles presented a problem for the McCarthy leaders in their early campaign management but they had been pleased with what they had seen in McCarthy as a campaigner and were skeptical of the reporters' reaction to Romney. To them McCarthy showed quiet confidence, strength, and resolve. Something that would make it possible around which to build an effective campaign organization.

Ward Just, writing in the Washington Post, had caught a bit of what the campaign would be.

> There will be five more trips like this one before the presidential primary March 12, trips with journalists laughing and asking repetitive questions to which they will receive repetitive answers at the state press conferences, awkward dialogues in living rooms, and meetings with moneymen who will insist on computers to "profile" the vote by ethnic group and religion. In New Hampshire McCarthy will say yes, no, temporize a little, back, fill, and finally decide: No. He will surely say no to the professionals. "You can't package religion and politics" he says.
>
> Of course, he is wrong. You can. Kennedy did. McCarthy has the wrong kind of cool for 1968.[25]

But his conclusion showed that Ward Just was trying to fit McCarthy into a convenient mold as well. After the one day, Hoeh and Studds knew that McCarthy would not tolerate packaging. His theme, which slowly began to emerge during that day, was the word, "reconciliation."

The New Hampshire McCarthy campaigners now had an experiential basis from which to make changes in their view of the campaign. McCarthy was not a Kennedy, dependent upon a staff of writers, researchers, press officers, advance persons and managers. He was independent and remarkably self-reliant. The national campaign had not only failed to provide personnel to support his visit, but it seemed to Hoeh and Studds that they now knew McCarthy's campaign style as well as anyone else, at least as he had shown it in New Hampshire. On this basis they would adjust.

Since there would, probably, not be advanced texts of McCarthy's speeches, each speech would have to be recorded and transcribed for the press. Since the advance operation had failed both in New Hampshire and from the national campaign, Hoeh assigned that job to his new volunteer corps. All subsequent advance work would be based and directed from New Hampshire.

The first day schedule had depended on the work of the two best organized local committees in the state at that time, the Nashua and Concord McCarthy people. The mistake had been in Manchester where the committee was new, inexperienced and thin on members. All subsequent scheduling would be handled through Sandra Hoeh from her home in Hanover. She would coordinate the interests of the national campaign, McCarthy's senatorial office, local committees, and the state campaign in building the remaining campaign days for the Senator.

Blair Clark had still not been able to assign someone to fill the full time manager position for the New Hampshire campaign. Hoeh and Studds were desperate for this assistance as items requiring attention began to pile up. Organization, other scheduling, media preparation, canvassing and support activities were all beginning to reach the point in the campaign where attention was required.

Notes

[1]The New York Times (January 7, 1968).

[2]Union Leader (January 5, 1968).

[3]The Boston Herald Traveler (January 7, 1968).

[4]The New York Times (January 9, 1968).

[5]The Boston Globe (January 8, 1968).

[6]The Daily Dartmouth (January 5, 1968).

[7]Union Leader (February 8, 1968).

[8]The Concord Daily Monitor (February 8, 1968).

[9]Eugene S. Daniell, Draft R.F.K. Press Release, (David C. Hoeh file copy, February 9, 1968).

[10]Union Leader (January 8, 1968).

[11]The Rutland Herald (January 27, 1968).

[12]Underwood, B., Op.Cit., "McCarthy," p. 5.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Studds, G., Op.Cit., p. 20.

[15]David C. Hoeh recollection.

[16]Studds, G., Op.Cit., p. 21.

[17]The Rutland Herald (January 27, 1968).

[18]The Boston Globe (January 27, 1968).

[19]The Boston Globe (January 28, 1968).

[20]The Concord Daily Monitor (January 27, 1968).

[21]Underwood, B., Op.Cit., "McCarthy," p. 12.

[22]The Rutland Herald (January 27, 1968).

[23]The Rutland Herald (January 29, 1968).

[24]The Rutland Herald (January 27, 1968).

[25]The Washington Post (January 28, 1968).

CHAPTER IX

McCARTHY FEEDS FROM THE LAND

Scheduling McCarthy's Second Campaign Visit

To date with no evidence that the national campaign had staff that they would send to New Hampshire to carry out the scheduling chore, Sandy Hoeh was asked by the New Hampshire leaders to prepare McCarthy's schedules. She knew New Hampshire's politics and was familiar with the requirements of a good schedule. Her only liability was that she lived in Hanover, had a young family and would not be able to work from the Concord Headquarters. With a WATS telephone line installed in her dining room, a calendar posted on the wall, the priority places explained to her and both Senator McCarthy's office and Blair Clark's home telephone numbers posted with the calendar, she was in business. Other aspects of the scheduling task were less easily resolved. Sandy now stood between the national campaign, the Senator's Washington office and the state and local campaign in New Hampshire. These four organizations each would play an important role in the scheduling activity.

Hoeh and Studds had assumed that the national campaign and the Senator's congressional office staff would be working as one or at least closely together. As Sandy tried to fix dates on the New Hampshire campaign calendar she found that often more than physical distance between Capitol Hill and the national headquarters in downtown Washington separated the activities. Initially, she would talk with Blair Clark who, when she was first assigned to the task, said that he should be the principal scheduling contact. Eventually she found that McCarthy would work through both Clark and his personal secretary in his Capitol Hill office, Jean Stack. It depended on who was available at the time that McCarthy was ready to discuss his schedule and most frequently that person

was his secretary, Jean Stack.

Following the campaign Sandy Hoeh recorded her scheduling problems in an interview.

> There were a couple of problems. The first was that we very rarely had enough warning, absolute dates....
>
> Originally Blair Clark had promised, he said we'll give you these dates and you'll work with them. But it was more a matter of the Senator coming up and then they'd decide when he'd come again, how long. So this made it difficult.
>
> The other thing was not having a national advance person, which really turned out in some cases, to be disastrous.[1]

Instead of the promised series of definite campaign dates for McCarthy in New Hampshire, Sandy found herself in the middle of a series of negotiations. McCarthy was negotiating with Clark and the campaign with a trip to France and possibly South Vietnam in mind. Sandy was negotiating with Clark for definite dates from which to build a schedule. The local committees were negotiating with Sandy about when McCarthy would visit their areas and what he would do when he arrived.

A lead time of at least a week and preferably more was desirable. Clark would give Sandy a series of dates. She would notify the local committees. They would suggest activities pre-existing or of their own creation that might occupy the Senator's time. Sandy would begin sorting these according to the expected time of arrival, length of the visit and options for his arrival. When she had a preliminary draft of the schedule ready she would attempt to check it with staff in the national headquarters or with Clark himself. At this point the flow became confusing. What she had thought were firm and workable dates often were approximate dates. Until definite times for travel to New Hampshire

had been set by the Senator himself, a schedule was a proposal. This was frustrating for Sandy who was familiar with similar problems in other campaigns, but almost totally disruptive to those at the local level who did not understand the complications.

What each of the actors in the scheduling process had to learn was basic communication. What had been the Senator's office staff procedure for the Senator's schedule could not be followed in a campaign, especially a campaign of the short duration of the one in New Hampshire. Their experience with the Senator's Minnesota campaigning or other national speaking activity could not be duplicated in a state as difficult to schedule as is New Hampshire. Blair Clark had not been able to get the definite time commitments he had hoped because of the competition for the Senator's time. Instead of saying that this was a fact of life and that those scheduling the Senator in New Hampshire would have to work within a floating series of time slots, he continued to assert that he would produce definite dates for the twelve days. Sandy in communicating with local committees relayed what she thought was definite information and the local people began their work with specific days and times in mind. After some serious gnashing of teeth and a lost temper or two as dates and times changed, Sandy and the local organizations began to learn that a good schedule was a flexible schedule, one that could be changed, expanded or contracted without losing the appearance of being professionally planned in advance.

A part of the scheduling lesson came during the first campaign day when Hoeh and Studds found that they were advancing the Senator's activity as little as fifteen minutes ahead of him. They learned that it was possible to make adjustments in the schedule with such short notice if their local contacts were firm and understood why the schedule had to be adjusted. To accomplish such

changes on a regular basis required initiating local workers ahead of time, something that in the early stages of the campaign was difficult to do. Further, neither Hoeh nor Studds realized that such quick adjustments would be necessary once they had organized proper scheduling and advance functions in the campaign. Where they had experienced people working at the local level, people who have been involved in other campaigns, the importance of being able to respond quickly to changes in schedules was understood. The difficulty was with the new workers who broke their hearts creating a local schedule only to get a call from Sandy Hoeh that the date of the visit had been changed or certain activities were not appropriate.

Early in the campaign Hoeh had circulated a memorandum outlining what might be included in a campaign schedule. Under the title "A Day of Campaigning," he advised:

> Note: The following are items that should be considered by you when planning for a visit to your area by Senator Eugene J. McCarthy. This list is not inclusive.
>
> Please add those particular events that are of special importance in your community.

* Visit local newspaper offices.
* Schedule short local radio and TV interviews if possible.
* Coffee parties, open house parties, evening socials, etc.
* Communion breakfasts, other similar gatherings.
* Tours of factories, handshaking at factory gates during shift changes.
* Visits to places where Democrats gather - clubs, etc.
* Supermarkets, shopping centers, etc.
* Opportunities for speeches before local audiences regardless of political composition - preferably Democrats and Independents.
* Headquarters openings, receptions, etc.
* Special community events.

With the closing admonition: "Don't forget to invite the Independents."[2]

While the above list of items to include in a schedule was relevant in any season, campaigning in New Hampshire in the winter required even more demanding scheduling. New Hampshire's usual campaign season is during the summer and fall leading to the September primary and November general elections. During these months there are numerous outdoor spectacles such as fairs, old home days, festivals and sports events which lend themselves to campaigning. In the winter an event must compete with chancy weather conditions and the cold. People leave their home for the necessities of shopping and work but since the advent of television, social or recreational gatherings have much less appeal. To substitute for the fact that people were not often out during the winter nor could they be easily lured to special political events, the campaign had to go where the people were when they did go out, or go to their homes, or use ways of reaching people in their homes. Other than scheduled activities which would be amplified by the media, the scheduler had to send the candidate to the places where people worked, shopped and went to school.

One activity that was especially important for McCarthy in the winter was going to schools. In the days before eighteen year olds were franchised, speaking in schools seemed of little political value. New Hampshire's colleges and universities have large non-resident populations but guaranteed an audience for a speech. To most candidates speaking to groups of elementary and secondary school children had little more than educational value. During the winter of a presidential primary New Hampshire public schools extend invitations to candidates to address assemblies and to meet with classes. In the larger cities the candidates often accept these opportunities to speak because few other opportunities

to address groups exist. If press coverage is allowed the candidate has the chance to show his mettle in a different setting. Without press coverage such speeches were considered as a good civic gesture to be done if nothing else could be found to fill a schedule.

Hoeh and Studds perceived an additional benefit to be derived from scheduling McCarthy before school groups. As educators, they knew that the young people often were better informed about contemporary issues than were their preoccupied parents. They also felt that since most other means of reaching parents as voters were limited, during the winter, a message from a youngster returning home after having heard Senator McCarthy speak or having asked him a question would probably be the subject of the evening's dinner table conversation. There was also a certain sophistication on the part of many students in secondary schools especially if their school had been visited by more than one of that year's crop of candidates. Without exception a school invitation to speak required that the candidate respond to questions. Often classes prepared their questions ahead of the guest's visit and would use the same questions for each visitor. A favorably impressed youngster returning home became an ambassador for the candidate of the highest credibility.

To buttress their decision to accept invitations to speak in the schools and include these in McCarthy's schedule, Hoeh recalled that former Democratic National Chairman John Bailey of Connecticut contended that the most accurate poll that can be conducted close to an election was that of high school students. During his years of political activity Bailey had found that high school students reflect accurately what would be the vote of their parents on election day when asked a poll question. New Hampshire high schools often conduct polls before elections and the results receive considerable local newspaper attention. Hoeh

and Studds wanted McCarthy to do well in these polls.

McCarthy's Early February Visit: A Case Study of a Campaign Schedule

After a considerable struggle, Sandy Hoeh was able to get a definite commitment from both Blair Clark and Senator McCarthy's office that the Senator would campaign in New Hampshire February 6, 7, and 8. Plans for a Europe-Vietnam trip had been cancelled in favor of having McCarthy spend more time campaigning directly rather than through uncertain press coverage of a foreign journey. A three day schedule would test the capacity of the New Hampshire organization and give the Senator a chance to demonstrate to the reporters whether his candidacy could get a response in New Hampshire.

Since his first visit had been in the south central part of the state, Hoeh and Studds felt he should begin in the west and move back across to the center where he could generate statewide media coverage, swing to the northeast city of Laconia, and leave from there. In their minds Hoeh and Studds hoped that they could have McCarthy fly directly to New Hampshire and be welcomed there by a local group rather than landing in Boston to struggle into some meeting point in New Hampshire. There was air service to Keene, Manchester, Lebanon, and Laconia. Keene offered adequate connections and the local committee would be capable of meeting McCarthy on arrival.

At least once during each visit Hoeh and Studds wanted McCarthy scheduled to address a large group. This would be his only opportunity to discuss the issued of his candidacy in hiw own way and in a widely accepted format. There would, of course, be numerous other chances for brief talks and press sessions,

but it was the major address that would attract media attention beyond that of strictly a local or state-wide nature. The larger cities and the college campuses were the best sites for major speeches. Since Manchester had been used twice, other cities had to be selected.

> From Concord there were telephone calls clamoring for the Senator to appear there, as Concord had only one full day of campaigning alloted to it. A strong organization had been started but it needed the Senator's appearance to keep up the momentum. Too many people needed another chance to evaluate him. Competition was strong from the liberal Republican candidate, George Romney, who seemed to be operating a smooth and successful campaign out of home headquarters. The most impressive thing about Romney was that he was willing to stand up and answer the voter's questions in a sincere and direct way.... The Concord committee was handicapped by the lack of time to have a series of home gatherings, but they could schedule one big meeting, where everyone would attend at the same time. The traditional place for such a political gathering was the Concord Community Center.
>
> Understandably, both David and Sandra Hoeh had visions of a McCarthy speech at the Concord community center turning into an utter fiasco. They visualized the press attending a speech by the Senator to which no audience appeared. It was a horrible spectre.
>
> Concord, said David Hoeh, was known in Democratic circles as a political graveyard. No one ever came out in an evening to hear a candidate speak, particularly in February, if it's cold and the roads are icy and dangerous.[3]

Hoeh had lived in Concord for four years prior to moving to Hanover and had watched as Concord struggled to keep its Democratic Committee alive. Concord and surrounding Merrimack county had long been strong Republican territory. Only Ward One, the French Canadian area of Penacook, had been successful in electing Democrats to either city or state offices.

> Furthermore, Concord could not count on students to fill up the bulk of empty seats. Gerry Studds had promised St. Paul's School that the Seantor would speak there. The school prided itself in having every serious candidate come to their campus. In

> addition the headmaster said he would open the meeting to members of the press and outside guests. (Since some at St. Paul's were critical of Studds activity and felt he was neglecting his duties, he had to schedule the Senator for the School as token compensation.)
>
> The local high school had also been promised the Senator, but would allow neither the press nor the public. For this reason the Concord committee argued to break the arrangements with the local high school and ask the public school students to come to the community center speech.
>
> Others argued against this by declaring that more would be lost than gained in refusing the local high school a chance to have their own political speech.... There would be friction caused in town if the private school boys were allowed to hear the Senator in their own school and public school children were not.
>
> This left the Concord Committee the problem of rounding up an audience made up almost entirely of adult voters in a Republican city for a Democratic candidate whose reputation was hardly known.[4]

While noted for its Republicanism, the Concord committee argued that Concord residents tended to be political activists who could be attracted to a political event. The Vietnam War issue, they contended, was crossing party lines and McCarthy was beginning to appear as the most effective spokesman against the administration's policies.

> Sandra Hoeh nervously, and with some misgivings relented and scheduled the Senator for February 6th, Concord Community Center, 7:30 P.M.[5]

Where local committees were well organized and willing to accept risks in their schedule, negotiations, such as those described above, were frequent. The Concord Committee had organizational depth and political experience which meant that they would not suggest activities which they themselves were uncertain about or were not willing to work exceptionally hard to make a success. In other communities, frequently the local McCarthy organization had much less experience, depth or understanding of their own local situation. Many of these

committees were newly formed from well intentioned residents who had little or no previous political, much less campaign, experience. Sandy Hoeh knew where the McCarthy organization had local depth and where it did not and she attempted to protect the schedule as best she could from weak efforts. Unfortunately, a totally effective scheduling effort depended upon extensive advance work, checking and double checking. One advance person and Sandy's telephones were not sufficient to make up for the inexperience of some local organizations or the difficult communications between New Hampshire and Washington. McCarthy's three day schedule illustrates this point well.

Arrival:

McCarthy was scheduled to fly through New York City connecting with a flight to Keene's municipal airport, arriving early in the evening. He would then be driven to Claremont where his campaign would begin at 6:40 A.M. with McCarthy greeting workers at the gate of Joy Manufacturing Co., Claremont's largest employer. Since this would be McCarthy's first airport arrival in New Hampshire, Hoeh called the Keene McCarthy committee to see if they could arrange a press conference for McCarthy at the airport. If they had the time and inclination, Hoeh suggested that they might arrange an airport welcome for McCarthy. Like the porposed speech in Concord, airport welcomes or campaign "whistle stops" at airports have not been particularly successful in New Hampshire. People will step out of their stores or home to welcome a prominent figure in the downtown of a city but few will take the time to gether at an airport to see a candidate.

John F. Kennedy scheduled an airport in Manchester just after he captured the Democratic Party nomination in 1960 but the crowd was disappointing. Since then, few have tried the approach although, occasionally, there will be a small

welcoming crowd. Hoeh was not optimistic about attracting a crowd in Keene but felt that the Keene Committee, perhaps the best organized in the state, should have the chance to do something directly for McCarthy since he was not scheduled to be in Keene until a later campaign tour.

As part of the scheduling job, Sandra Hoeh booked reservations in a motel outside of Claremont for the Senator and those travelling with him. His schedule was typical of what was possible in a small New Hampshire city during a morning. The local committee, composed of few who had previous political experience, had worked closely with Sandy and their community contacts to complete as effective a campaign morning as possible. Because of other demands on his time and with assurances from the Claremont workers this portion of the schedule was not advanced.

Schedule: Tuesday, February 6, 1968

Time	Place	Function
6:40 a.m.	Claremont	Greet workers outside Joy Mfg. Co.
8:00 a.m.	Claremont	Breakfast at Pleasant Restaurant
9:00 a.m.	Claremont	Tour Claremont Paper Co.
9:30 a.m.	Claremont	Claremont Daily Eagle (newspaper)
10:00 a.m.	Claremont	WTSV radio interview
10:30 a.m.	Claremont	Coffee at home of Mr. & Mrs. John Meloney, 95 Winter Street
11:00 a.m.	Claremont	Tour Main Street
12:00 a.m.	Claremont	Address Claremont Rotary, Moody Hotel
1:00 p.m.	Claremont	Drive to Newport

A note at the bottom of the schedule said, "Press Bus Starts in Claremont." A bus had been hired by the campaign to provide reporters with transportation when McCarthy was campaigning.

McCarthy Arrives February 5th

Having made an exceptional effort to avoid incidents such as the Manchester shift change mistake all had every reason to expect that the schedule for this visit would move as planned. McCarthy arrived in Keene to one of the largest airport gatherings in recent memory. The Keene McCarthy committee had worked for days preparing signs, placards, and slogans, recruiting people to come to the airport and even had a small band. The airplane touched down in a light snow shower, taxied to the gate, disembarked a crowd of national reporters, and then a startled McCarthy to a cheering throng. The press conference in the small terminal building went well with the Senator responding to questions, commenting on his surprise at the reception and making several radio tapes that were played throughout the next day in the area. He was then directed to the car which would take McCarthy to Claremont to his motel.

Arriving at the motel was the first tip off that things might not go as well in Claremont as had been expected. Sandy Hoch described the events:

> We knew that the national press was coming. No one told me that the national press like to have their own rooms. So we put them into rooms together and they were very nice about it, but some of the Senator's people were quite upset.[6]

There was even some confusion concerning the Senator's reservations which had been pre-registered. The owner of the motel, of French-Canadian descent, spoke limited English. When the herd of press, the Senator and McCarthy's aide Jerry Eller appeared out of the snow and dark in his lobby to be registered and assigned their rooms, the man lost his ability to cope. Eventually the proprietor

calmed down and registered the crowd, probably more business than his motel had ever experienced in so few minutes.

Disaster struck early the next morning. Sandy Hoeh recalled:

> The next morning he went to a factory gate, which someone supposedly had advanced, but he got there a few minutes late and missed almost everyone. With him were the national press.
>
> Then he went to a hotel to eat breakfast and no one told us that the hotel did not usually serve breakfast. The hotel management said they did serve but did not make clear that it was not part of their regular operation.
>
> They then went to a restaurant to meet people who were supposed to be there for breakfast but the place was empty.
>
> I remember getting a telephone call in the middle of the morning from one McCarthy staff person, who said the morning had been a disaster. I had had only three hours of sleep and the call absolutely shattered me. I called David (Hoeh) and said get someone else, it's not going to work. He said, oh yes it will. And things did begin to improve....
>
> ....I kept saying, the Kennedy's wouldn't go any place without national advance, it was the only campaign I could compare with from what I'd heard. Up here people who knew the kind of thing you advance, what you look for, there had to be split second timing (which had not been learned by the local schedulers or those who had checked the schedule).
>
> I don't know who was responsible for the advancing, but I was after the first morning. I remember shaking. I was too tired to even take a nap and I rushed over to Newport.[7]

Certainly the press could not avoid writing a whole series of new stories concerning the problems of McCarthy's campaign in New Hampshire. Sandy reported that Jerry Eller was furious with embarrassment over the incident and the subsequent problems that occurred in the schedule that morning. As it was reported back while others, including McCarthy were making the best of the situations, Eller kept the discomfort high, especially for the hard working, novice New Hampshire volunteers.

Toward the middle of the morning things began to click closer to what was expected. McCarthy's habit of running ahead of the schedule caused problems, but the interviews went well as did the coffee at the Meloney home. The one hour allotted for a main street tour was too much time. There were few people on the streets or in the shops and Claremont is not a large city, but the major event turned out to be the address at the Claremont Rotary Club. Again the advance work that should have uncovered a preference and, perhaps, have avoided an incident had not been done. The oversight produced an incident with unusual impact. Tom Wicker wrote the first story about the campaign in New Hampshire that received national attention. Under his column heading, "In the Nation: Luncheon at the Rotary Club," Wicker wrote:

> Claremont, N.H. - This is an apt state for Senator Eugene McCarthy's kind of campaigning. Not far from here, along one of the narrow roads that thread New Hampshire's hills, an old, white clapboard house has been restored and painted and a witty weekend resident has placed a sign out front that reads: "The Old Values."
>
> That is the kind of rebuke that Gene McCarthy might make to those who talk glibly about getting back to an earlier simpler way of life that New England somehow is supposed to exemplify. In this postcard state with its frozen lakes and huts of fishermen standing blackly on the ice, it is too easy to believe that there really are old values to which we all go back. It is something about the farms, the hills, the white churches in their serenity.
>
> The Birch-White Hills
>
> In fact, most of the old villages with their church steeples nad their beautifully proportioned white houses and their empty red brick mills are angling for tourists and skiers these days, and the garish supermarkets and sprawling motels with their bleak parking lots lie on the land like a pox; the birch-white hills, tinged with the faint rays of sunlight on winter leaves, rise above polluted streams, intrusive highways and the creeping urban litter of the twentieth century.
>
> Still men have to believe something and no doubt that was why there seemed to be a special quality at the luncheon of the Rotary Club of Claremont in the Hotel

Moody here the other day. Beneath the four glass chandeliers and the stained glass panels of the windows, the Rotarians had gathered to hear Senator McCarthy, who is running for President in the New Hampshire Democratic primary.

The first thing that happened was that President Rodney Brock ordered the television cameras out of the room. He explained that his club was nonpolitical, that Senator McCarthy had come to discuss public affairs, not politics, and that he was not going to have the club meeting exploited either for television or politics.

A solidly built man, with a quick, nervous smile and sparse, sandy hair, President Brock encountered enough argument to make his chin tremble with tension. But he stood by his simple defiance of the television networks, which is something no President of the United States ever has been known to do, and in the end the cameras were packed up and taken out.

After that, the club sang, "L'il Liza Jane" and "Smile, and the World Smiles With You" conducted its regular business, and settled back to hear McCarthy. Apparently untroubled by the absence of television, before which most politicians bow and scrape like valets, the Senator spoke in his relaxed manner and with his corrosive wit ("We don't declare war any more, we declare national defense") and gave the Rotarians -- if not much of a show, by Ronald Reagan standards -- a clear picture of himself.

It was a picture of a man who had set out to discuss what he called "two or three questions of vital importance" and who was deeply earnest about the need for the nation to "turn aside from the war in order to attend to the most pressing problems at home" -- which he defined as the rebellion of Negroes against any longer being "a kind of colonial people in our country."

He was unemotional, undramatic and nothing about his speech or his manner was hoked up for cheap applause or enthusiasm. He even treated his audience as though it would understand his point and allusions, and respond sensibly to his ideas. He said what he had to say, with some eloquence but no particular flourish, and then he sat down.

Self, Not an Image

It is possible that Rodney Brock was legally off base in turning out the cameras, and it is possible that Gene McCarthy is wrong in his stand on the war. Some might question Brock's judgment and others challenge McCarthy's motives, but during luncheon at the Rotary Club nobody could accuse either of showing an image rather than a self.

> That is probably not good politics; all the pros will tell you that. But in an age when the image is the idol, the old values are inspected by avid tourists, and the flagrant falsities and pretension of American life deride verity, two men stubbornly being themselves must be worth something.[8]

Every newspaper that carried the New York Times news service and many that did not, published Wicker's column. Somehow through the haze of scheduling problems, conflicts and even a substantial incident at the expense of television, a setting, accidental in fact, had been created that illustrated the strengths of two individuals.

Once away from Claremont the scheduling problem began to disappear. Jerry Eller regained his composure. Senator McCarthy chortled over the difficulties of the often pretentious television crews and enjoyed a visit with the urbane editor of Newport's weekly newspaper, Edward DeCourcy. By early afternoon Sandra Hoeh's telephone carried a distinctly different message from that she had heard in the morning. The remainder of the day's schedule read:

1:30 p.m.	Newport	WCNL Radio interview
2:15 p.m.	Newport	Tour Door Woolen Co.
3:10 p.m.	Newport	Meet Newport High School faculty
3:35 p.m.	Newport	Argus Champion (meet Editor DeCourcey-tour plant)
4:00 p.m.	Newport	Tour main street
4:45 p.m.	Newport	Drive to Concord
5:45 p.m.	Concord	Arrive NH Highway Hotel
7:30 p.m.	Concord	Address at Concord Community Center

The Newport to Concord portion of the schedule had been carefully timed. The schedule clicked. The reporters saw that the New Hampshire McCarthy organization could create an effective schedule and by the time the entourage arrived in Concord, there was a feeling that it had been a good day.

By the end of that evening in Concord, a major divide in the campaign would be crossed. The risks that had been taken in preparing McCarthy's campaign schedule produced the first positive results. Tom Wicker's column was the first indication of the change. The sense of change would be further strengthened by the response McCarthy received that evening. As will be discussed later.

McCarthy's February 6th Evening in Concord

Of the days that McCarthy campaigned in New Hampshire, Febraury 6th was decisive. From the visit the campaign organization learned how McCarthy campaigned best, how the organization could better support his efforts, what schedules would bring out his personal and political qualities, and how effective McCarthy could be in making issues from the environment of the campaign.

McCarthy was beginning to have an impact. The brief stop at the Keene airport, February 5th, produced the first front page photographs of McCarthy campaigning before an enthusiastic placard waving crowd. Newspaper and radio coverage in each of the cities and towns he visited was extensive. The travelling reporters of the national press and wire services began to feel the spirit as the candidate progressed comfortably through the schedule. The premier event, which made McCarthy a political force to be contended with, was his scheduled speech in Concord on the evening of February 6th.

The speech was scheduled because the Concord McCarthy committee promised extraordinary efforts to make it a success. To insure that the event was well attended the Concord Committee did everything except physically drag people to the Community Center itself.

> In trying to get out an audience for McCarthy's speech the Concord committee made Ward Seven and the other central Concord wards their prime target. Every registered Democratic or independent voter was called on the telephone inviting them to attend. Advertisements were placed in the newspapers and on the radio. The entire membership list of the League of Women Voters was called personally, as was the entire faculty list at St. Paul's School.
>
> If the people were Republicans an appeal was made to their civic pride. "Imagine how Concord, New Hampshire will look in a big picture by Life magazine showing rows and rows of empty seats at a speech by a member of the United States Senate," they said.
>
> Posters advertising the speech were put up wherever they were accepted; however, on Main Street most of the merchants refused to take them. McCarthy was too controversial a figure; he might be bad for business. One stroke of good fortune came at a new little Victorian-styled ice cream parlor called MacKenzie's, located on the corner of School and Main Streets. It was in the center of town... The manager came from the Midwest. He was a Democrat and knew McCarthy. He was willing to put up four posters in his windows advertising the speech. The posters also invited people to come in and join the Senator for breakfast the following morning.[9]

The site and arrangements for the address were carefully advanced. The speaker's platform would face out toward the main door. Bleachers could be pulled out for an audience along the far right. The press should be accommodated by long tables, stretching along the length of the far left. All TV cameras should be kept on the left side. In the middle, chairs should be set up. Only 140 were to be used in case the evening was a flop. The chairs were set up so that they provided a wide aisle. The chairs would be set back from the speaker's platform. Young people were asked to sit up front on the floor between the speaker and the first row of chairs. The senator was at his best before a young audience, and liked to have them around. And it would look good in press photos.[10]

The evening unfolded as envisioned. The reporters occupied the long tables, the television crews set up to the left of the platform, and then a group of girls from Concord High School took positions near the door ready to pass out campaign literature to the audience as they entered. Then came the audience.

> There were enough people so that all the chairs and bleachers were filled. Those who arrived late stood in the rear of the auditorium. David and Sandra Hoeh had driven down from Hanover and they smiled in relief at the turnout. Some 150 people was all that had been hoped for; instead, more than 400 were showing up.[11]

The Senator arrived to be joined by the McCarthy Concord Co-Chairman.

> A nervous sense of expectation seized the Concord McCarthy Committee. Would the audience stand for McCarthy? Would they boo or would they clap? The Concord chairman escorted the Senator, who looked tall and distinguished, down a wide aisle between scores of standing, cheering and applauding voters. Even the press hoted the power of suggestion. Here was a tribute to a potential president.[12]

Someone recalled that McCarthy had described his campaigning to a Time magazine reporter as, "fighting from a low crouch. You wait for events to develop." His speech that evening demonstrated how effective a fighter he was. The story of the LBJ campaign strategy and principally the use of their pledge cards had broken several days earlier. McCarthy had seen these clippings during his earlier campaigning had picked up comments on the street that gave him the feeling that the pledge card idea might backfire. Frank B. Merrick, New Hampshire State News Service writer and Time magazine stringer, had written in his column distributed widely in New Hampshire on February 3rd:

> A more public move that smacks of potential arm-twisting was initiated this week when Citizens for Johnson kicked off a three or four-week campaign to get Democrats publicly committed to Johnson.

> The committee began distributing "pledge cards" to Democrats and Independents, asking them to pledge their support to Johnson and state their intention of writing in his name on the primary ballot.
>
> The cards are in three parts: one to be signed and retained by the voter "as a record of his endorsement of the President," one to be sent to the White House in a "shower of support" and the third to be kept on file by the state Johnsonites.
>
> The cards are numbered (the one sent to us bore the number 29998) on all three sections, so it should not be hard for the Johnson Democrats to keep track of who was and who was not on their side.[13]

The pledge card issue was smoldering near the surface in the campaign but no one had quite yet been able to frame it as an issue. McCarthy entered the hall to a standing crowd and quickly began his speech with a brief summary of his reaction to New Hampshire campaigning.

> I have been campaigning two days in New Hampshire, today and one day about a week and one-half ago, and unless you're more mischievous than I have been led to believe, I've had a very good response....
>
> If the response has been genuine in these two days and, if anything, it may have led me to be a little overconfident about my campaign for the nomination of the Democratic Party.[14]

He then went on into a discussion of political parties and specifically the the Democratic Party. He first chided the state for its peculiar treatment of Independent voters which may have been prompted by an editorial he read before coming to the Community Center. The editorial appeared in the Concord Monitor and was a speculation on how Richard Nixon expected to win the Republican primary by attracting the Independent voter. The section of interest to McCarthy read:

> Democrats can't vote in the Republican primaries. Independents can stay home in the primaries, as they have done in the past to maintain their independence of political parties, or they can choose to identify with one or the other.

> Independents may participate in the New Hampshire primaries but probably not in large numbers. There is little reason to believe that those who do will vote for Nixon.
>
> Two motives may cause Independents to join in the primaries. One is anti-war sentiment, which is more likely to cause them to vote Democratic, for Senator McCarthy.
>
> The other is desire for a change, and that would cause them to vote Republican, but probably for the most electable Republican, Nelson Rockefeller.[15]

McCarthy picked up the theme of the dilemma of the Independent when he said:

> I know some of you are Republicans, I assume that, and some of you are Independents, and that in New Hampshire, you lead a rather strange life. As Independents, once you commit yourselves, you're committed either to the party which you identify with or to the other, which is a terrible prospect, it seems to me.
>
> If you decide to be Democrats, you ought to have some other choice than to become Republicans if you want to change. I hope we could work something out on that matter, as a matter of a new civil rights bill, I think, which we could take up.[16]

With this brief analysis McCarthy touched a point of inequity in the New Hampshire primary system. Few had been concerned about the Independent's problem before. Prior to the 1972 presidential primary the registration law would be changed to allow a voter to recover Independent status.

But of special concern to McCarthy was what had become of the institution of the American political party.

> A political party is really the essential element of American politics, and it is important for us... in presidential election years... to give some thought to what a party is. We're inclined to -- and I think quite properly,... ridicule them and to joke about them most of the time, but there are occasions when we ought to give some thought to what their real purpose is and how they ought to function and what role they play in determining policy for the United States.
>
> I would suggest, first, that we ought to be clear about what a political party is not. It is certainly not a club, not a kind of last-man club or something set up to ensure jobs for those who hold them by patronage or by other devices.

> It's not really a labor union or an extension of the labor movement.... It should not be looked upon as an instrument of propaganda because it has a role beyond that. It has a role to propagandize some and to educate some, but it has a practical political purpose beyond propaganda, and if that was all that I was concerned about or that you were concerned about, the Democrats here, why, we could be off with a third party movement of some kind... and there are some people who seem to want to do that, in this country, with the issue of the war in Vietnam... who would, as I've said, rather light bonfires on the hill, instead of coming down into the valley where the real political action... and the real political fight must be carried out.
>
> A political party is not even an organization, and we Democrats know that to be true, but it shouldn't be an organization. This is the point. It ought to be organic. It's not something to be taken over and controlled and directed, but it's something which must be alive and which must grow and which must have its own vitality.[17]

He then looked around the room a moment before illustrating his point saying that he hoped he did not offend any Republicans but "back in Minnesota, we say that the Republican Party is like the lowest form of plant and animal life. We give them credit for being alive, but like moss on a rock. It doesn't have much vitality at its highest point, but on the other hand, it never dies out, and," he concluded "we credit it with having some organic existence and some organic purpose."[18]

"A party," he noted, " is really set up to develop the issues, consider the problems of the country and to pick candidates, and then to go on from that to gain control over the government of the country, and that's not a very modest objective in these United States.... The important thing to keep in mind is that once you gain control, it's not supposed to rule for the good of the majority but by the determination of that majority, but to rule for the good of all."[19] Here he revealed the essence of his philosophy toward the role of the political party and his view of the purpose of his campaign.

> In our party, the Democratic Party, through the years, we've been able to put together what seemed to be complete contradictions. We were the party that supposedly represented the country and, also, the city. We claimed that we could represent labor and, also, agriculture.
>
> We said that we could represent both the North and the South; we could represent the Baptists and, also, the Catholics who were supposed to be beyond any kind of mixing, but all of these, somehow, put together in the party, each one a kind of separate minority, each one having a position which was antagonistic in some ways, if they pursued only their self-interest... taken all together, this kind of majority, made up of all these different groups and different forces and different interests, could make determinations which would be good for the country as a whole.
>
> I think, really the basis upon which great things have been achieved in this, the 20th century, by the Democratic Party-- we were the party which gloried in dissent and in disagreement.[20]

McCarthy then recalled the bitter civil rights battle within the Democratic party during the 1948 National Convention, as a time when the issue was one of "great moral significance" but one that threatened to "tear the party to pieces." The party "did take a chance," McCarthy noted, "and...the Nation and the party, both, were well-served, in consequence of that decision."[21]

Taking the analogy further McCarthy asked, "But where do we find our party today? What is the position of the Democratic Party leadership in Washington and, I might say, New Hampshire, on the matter of dissent? Well, generally, they say, 'let us have no dissent.' The cry is for unity. I think, on the record, in our party, the request for unity usually comes about the last day of the National Convention and sometimes, not until two or three weeks after." "But to be out, as Democrats," McCarthy chided, "saying in January and Febraury, that we ought to have unity on an issue of vital moral significance, even before we've gone through any primaries, and even before we've anticipated a convention... is, I'd say, contrary to every tradition of the Democratic party, and really, contrary to the tradition of politics in the United States."[22]

McCarthy then challenged his audience, "I think it all important, here in New Hampshire, that you make the first stand, Democrats, Independents, and Republicans, insofar as you can help, to stand against that suggestion and to prevent the establishment of what might develop into a wholly undesirable tradition in American politics." He then began feeding from the New Hampshire political landscape to frame an issue that illustrated what was happening to the democracy of the political party.

> I was somewhat surprised to find out what devices the Democratic Party organization here is proposing to use in order to ensure a write-in for the candidate of the party's choice -- a matter of assigning numbers in triplicate so that they know who has the number and who gave it to you and, supposedly, where you go with the number.
>
> If this were to be carried out, it would seem to me, it would really tend to destroy the whole reputation that this state has in the Democratic Party for free and open primary elections.
>
> This proposal, with the numbered pledges, comes closest, I think, to denying people the right of a secret ballot in a primary, of any suggestion that I've seen or heard of in the country, and I hope that you will all stand boldly against it.[23]

The audience exploded with applause. Surprisingly the cheerleaders were the reporters seated at the press table. Hoeh and Studds, standing at the back of the room grinned like the proverbial Cheshire cats knowing that not only did they have a candidate of substance, but they now had an important issue which could frame in the context of the New Hampshire politics. With it they could create the sort of political effort that would put the Johnson campaign on the defensive by embarrassing the leaders on the central strategy of their campaign and make controversial the symbol of that strategy, the pledge card.

McCarthy went on to note that in Wisconsin a similar effort had been made and it had been rejected. Although a pledge card was not used, an effort was made to have all of the party officials declare themselves before the presidential primary. The State Central Committee of Wisconsin he reported,

"voted down the proposition. You evidently don't have a chance to do that here... but I do hope that you will keep it in mind, as you go along the way towards the primary."[24]

Since McCarthy had hit a responsive chord in his audience, he did not let the subject die until he had added one of his favorite illustrative themes.

> It's more or less as though the whole Democratic Party in this country were being asked to submit to rather - a kind of single identification, as though we were all to bear a particular brand and there was to be no independence of spirit, no independence of judgment, and no independence of action.
>
> Out in the Midwest, and I might say, also Texas, it helps some in understanding the administration in critizing it, to have some knowledge of how cattle are handled.
>
> It creeps into the language of the administration, these figures of speech and the metaphors of the administration, things like 'cut and run.'
>
> Well, 'cut and run,' if you're dealing with cattle, is a pretty good thing to do, if you're being stampeded. It's the only way you can get out, and if you're being stampeded over the cliff or into the shipping yards, why, the best thing to do is to 'cut and run.'
>
> We make a distinction out home, also, with reference to particular kinds of brands which, I think, ought to be explained to you.
>
> They have what you call a 'hair brand' and, also a 'hide brand.' Now, if it's a hair brand, it doesn't really get into the hide. It grows out in one season. I hope most of you have no more than that, as Democrats, and that it will grow out before the next primary comes along, and you can vote as independent Democrats. You haven't been burned into the hide and, therefore, committed to a particular purpose or to a particular program, as it has been suggested by some of your party leaders here in New Hampshire.[25]

McCarthy then made the transition to the essence of his campaign and the serious concerns of those who had come to consider him. "Taken all together, of course, the issues are too important for any of us to yield to this kind of --

it's not really compulsion, in the strict sense of the word, but it's a kind of pressure, a kind of move to limit the freedom of choice and the freedom of action, on the part of the electorate in this state and, beyond it. I think all of you know, what I think are the important issues, basically the question of the war in Vietnam."[26]

McCarthy approached the issue of the war by not discussing the facts of the war itself but by discussing the consequences of the war. His first concern was that the issues be adequately presented and discussed "in such context that they (the people) can make a judgment on it," not simply a debate by the United States Senate or plank in the platform of the Democratic National Convention, but to take the issue directly to the people and to let them respond in the primaries. He saw little validity to the notions that "if you raise questions about a military policy, you're unpatriotic," and "that patriotism stops at the water's edge." A concept "which we cannot accept because the obligation to be patriotic and a loyal critic of national policy applies to domestic programs; it applies to international programs; it applies to the Pentagon and to the Central Intelligence Agency and to the State Department, just as it does to the Treasury Department or the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or the Department of Agriculture or Labor."[27]

His second concern related to the consequence of the war as it distracted the nation from its "pressing domestic problems;"" but the issues which he was to discuss in detail that evening was, what he considered of "almost equal importance...of even more importance and that is the growing militarization of American foreign policy, the growing influence of our military establishment....[28]

The audience visibly relaxed as McCarthy continued not with a strident litany of the horrors and atrocities of the way but with a carefully developed thesis of how war had grown as the consequences of post-World War II foreign policy and international strategy. McCarthy had anticipated the mood of his audience well. There would be little tolerance for militant dissent or verbal pictures of the ugliness of war. Probably no one in the audience liked war, but few would say that they would not support a war if it was necessary and just. What had brought them to hear McCarthy that evening was questions not yet fully formed or capable of articulation. Questions that revealed skepticism, uncertainty, insecurity and even a fear that for the first time in many of their lives they were not committed to what their national government had pledged them. McCarthy understood the nature and even the scope of this concern. He understood that this was a new concern, something unfamiliar and personally disturbing. It tended to disrupt not only a person's view toward the government but also relations with friends, neighbors and even more distressingly, one's own family.

To have talked about the field operations of the war, its civilian and military leadership, its consequence at home with specifics of draft resistance or street protest, McCarthy would have made his audience uncomfortable, even hostile. What he did instead was establish a dialogue between himself and his audience. His discussion was slightly abstract, tied to times, events and personalities, not immediate, but through logical connections to illustrations that could be supplied in the listener's mind. He was reassuring with respect to his faith that the nation's political institutions could be made to work; he challenged his listeners to act through these institutions, and he outlined the rewards. He concluded his quiet dialogue breaking the spell only with his closing words:

> This, as I see it, is the total complex and context of issues with which we have to deal in the year 1968, and I hesitate to say that this is a most critical year, or the most critical year for American politics. There may have been times in the past in the early history of this country, or at the time of the Civil War when the decisions which were made were more significant when the threat of some kind of deterioration and collapse of the Republic were more pressing than they are now.
>
> But I do think that this is a most important campaign because America is on the verge of becoming a great world leader. The question that we have to decide, at least in part, is whether we will give direction to that leadership by continuing a kind of militaristic policy, which now seems to be in the ascendency, or whether we will attempt to blunt that thrust. To suggest -- and -- not to suggest -- but to make a reality -- by injecting into American politics and into American government the acceptance that this nation is not to make its record in the history of the world as a military power, but by demonstration all of those things which we claim for ourselves. The right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and a basic belief in a non-military approach, and a basic belief in freedom and self determination, that these are the real strength of America and that these are the gifts that we have to offer the rest of the world.[29]

McCarthy's argument, his language and his tone worked with his audience much like the measured beat of a pendulum. With each swing it punctuated a point and with each point the swing of the argument or the illustration became ever-so-slightly more forceful. With each speech after the Concord address, McCarthy found his audience willing to accept more of the national policy critique, until toward the end of the campaign, they had accepted much of his indictment, wanted more and stated in ever stronger language.

An open question session followed Senator McCarthy's address where the enthusiasm grew. The questions showed that McCarthy had tapped the deeper concerns of his audience and would now deal with the specifics of issues which were on their minds. His answers were thoughtful yet precise and were often followed by prolonged applause as if an expression of relief, even gratitude that there was, at last, someone believable and deserving of their attention.

The Concord Monitor had carried a letter to the editor that day which when read afterwards captured the spirit of the evening.

> Sir: I submit the following recipe for your readers: Take one middle-aged, lukewarm Republican -- get him thinking about the war in Vietnam until he is worried sick; cause him to be vitally concerned for the survival of mankind; deny him an acceptable presidential candidate in his own party -- leave him groping in a twilight zone of confusion without safe or sound leadership -- expose him to the Democratic presidential hopeful, Senator Eugene McCarthy -- let simmer until March 11th.
>
> Elanine D. Finch -- Henniker[30]

To end this extraordinary campaign day, Senator McCarthy would then play hockey for twenty minutes.

Hockey is the sport of many New Hampshire people. It is the big school boy winter sport and is especially popular among the strongly Democratic French-Canadian populations of most of New Hampshire's cities. In fact, Berlin, New Hampshire, calls itself "Hockey Town USA."

The New Hampshire leaders had now had enough experience with McCarthy's schedules to know that something like skating could not be confirmed ahead of time but if the option where open then McCarthy might do it if he was in the mood.

That night a Concord "Old Timers" game was scheduled in the local skating arena. Two of the Senator's Concord supporters regularly played with the team. When asked whether McCarthy could join the game if he wished, they consulted the other team members who said yes and also said they could provide suitable equipment.

Obviously pleased by his reception during the long day of campaigning and by the reaction to his speech, Senator McCarthy would now demonstrate a further facet of his character, one that would not lose in comparison to George Romney. He would not only skate but he would don protective gear and play hockey. What none seemed to know was that the "Old Timers" team was made up of "old timers" mostly under thirty who had played hockey in high school and college, with a few having played semi-professionally as well. When McCarthy came on the ice he was treated like another member of the opposition. He beat the opponent in face offs, was checked, skated hard, handled the puck well, and fell to the ice in the tumble of the play. After about twenty minutes of the game McCarthy left the ice, but not before the few reporters and photographers who had followed him to the arena had recorded the event.

The Impact of February 6th

For the reporters and for McCarthy observers outside New Hampshire, February 6th marked the first day of substantial campaigning. In the space of fourteen hours McCarthy had successfully eliminated any further comparisons with the campaign style of ex-Governor George Romney. McCarthy had shown his own effectiveness as a diverse campaigner. He was capable of eliciting favorable responses on the street, at factory gates, inside the plants, from conservative service clubs and before a sizable civic audience. He showed the ability to handle difficult and polarizing issues, in a manner that carried both insight and challenge without being provocative or disruptive.

For his New Hampshire campaigners, McCarthy had shown his ability to provide them with both the issues and the style of a potentially successful campaign. McCarthy had sensed what the political ethos of New Hampshire required. Personal sincerity, a calm, restrained, yet confident presence, a quick wit, and ready smile, when personified by McCarthy's tall, rather gray, presidential

manner seemed naturally to bring people to him. Instead of the tension that often accompanies a political campaign, McCarthy had the ability to relax and then to engage those he met. In addition McCarthy now showed that he was willing to work very hard in New Hampshire, even play hockey at the end of a long day -- not just to produce news but because he wanted to and knew he could skate well. He gave his campaign an important issue when he framed in his speech the potential hazard to the vote which was implied by the Johnson campaign's "pledge card." Both the twenty minutes of hockey and the brief comments on the "pledge card" gave the New Hampshire campaign and, especially the reporters items that were uniquely representative of the New Hampshire campaign, and ones that could be used as symbols of McCarthy's energy and political intelligence. Those who would have liked to write McCarthy off as an "intellectual," or "aloof," or "professorial" now had to contend with an image of McCarthy shown slipping slightly on the ice of a Claremont doorstep then playing a rough game of hockey. From these images reporters wrote their stories and supporters began to perk up not only in New Hampshire but across the nation.

A national Associated Press story datelined, "Concord, N.H.," led:

> At a time when presidential aspirants like to show the voters their skill at sports, Sen. Eugene McCarthy has set a new athletic standard -- taking part in a rough game of ice hockey.
>
> In a yellow sweatshirt, black trousers, a red helmet and borrowed skates the Minnesota Democrat -- challenging President Johnson's Vietnam war policies in primaries -- skated out onto the ice rink here Tuesday night to join in a game of hockey....
>
> Before swinging into the hockey game -- a favorite sport with New Hampshire voters -- McCarthy took a shot at the regular Democratic party in New Hampshire, which has not welcomed his challenge of President Johnson....

> The Senator took exception... to a card circulated in New Hampshire under the label of the Democratic state committee....[31]

In every story carried of the day's activities, playing hockey was an important part, and was especially prominent in the New Hampshire coverage of the story. The Foster's Daily Democrat of Dover, New Hampshire headlined their story, "McCarthy Plays Hockey in N.H. Campaign Trip."[32] Newsweek and Time magazines carried the rare photograph of McCarthy scrambling after the puck. His first campaign coverage in these weeklies. Newsweek captioned its picture, "Senator McCarthy: Hawkish on Ice," and led its story with the phrase, "The Iceman Runneth."[33] Time magazine's story led, "On Thin Ice," with a picture caption which read, "Time for the Face Off."[34]

McCarthy playing hockey, or at least a candidate capable of playing hockey, was a valuable symbol for the New Hampshire campaign. The photograph with an appropriate caption would appear in almost every piece of campaign material designed for circulation in New Hampshire.

McCarthy's attack on the Johnson campaign's pledge card provided the New Hampshire leaders with their best piece of ammunition. His remarks during the Concord speech and in subsequent press conferences started a political brush fire that could not be controlled by the New Hampshire Johnson committee. Desperately in need of some campaign literature that reflected a New Hampshire aspect to McCarthy's campaign, a flyer was printed that attacked the Johnson campaign's "pledge card." The flyer read: "What ever happened to the secret ballot?" Then displayed a photograph of one of the serial numbered, in triplicate, pledge cards, with "You don't have to sign anything to vote for Senator Eugene McCarthy. On March 12, let Lyndon Johnson know it. McCarthy for President."

The Press and the Pledge Card

The LBJ Committee's pledge card was an issue ready made for the press. All Senator McCarthy had to do was mention it, provide a context for the reporters to evaluate it, and then almost not mention the subject again except when asked. Thursday, February 8th the Boston Herald wrote an early editorial titled, "Check-Off List for LBJ." which in its lead read:

> Voting in a party primary ought to be as sacrosanct as voting in an election, with no interference, pressure or cajoling to confound the voters.
>
> That principal doesn't seem to prevail in New Hampshire, however, where the Democratic organization is baldly soliciting party members for pledges that they will write in votes for Lyndon Baines Johnson in the March 12.... Sen. Eugene McCarthy...likens the roundup of pledges to cattle herding, although he says the gimmick may be merely a local inspiration to demonstrate loyalty to Lyndon Johnson....
>
> There is nothing illegal about the pledges, though they certainly seem presumptuous and meddling. One would think the regular Democrats would be confident of putting down Sen. McCarthy's challenge to the president without soliciting reassurance beforehand. Why should a Democrat enrolled in New Hampshire be asked directly to pledge his vote to any candidate? If a Democrat fails to sign and return his pledge or refuses to do so on principle, will he be considered disloyal to Lyndon Johnson or to the regular Democratic organization?
>
> New Hampshire Democrats would be wise to discard their scheme of pledges to the President and to spend their energies persuading fellow Democrats that the President's pledge to the nation are worth unsubscribed write-in votes.[35]

The Concord Monitor columnist, Jack Hubbard, began stirring the pledge card issue in New Hampshire with an approach which was pursued frequently by other reporters. He began calling both Johnson and McCarthy supporters for their reaction to the use of the pledge card scheme. In his column dated February 8th he wrote, "The Johnson Democrat's pledge card campaign could backfire." Then he quoted State Representative and McCarthy supporter of Nashua, Jean Wallin, who said, "I think you are signing your right away

to make a decision in the voting booth. It is the people who refuse to sign the cards. I am not saying anything will happen to those people... it is just the idea."

Rep. Wallin went on, "It is a great campaign on paper. They say they have 82 workers in Nashua (where there are 8,000 Democrats), but a lot of these people won't work." Hubbard concluded his column with references to the structure of the scheme as reported by the Johnson Committee, then wrote, "But this idea could be lost in the verbal battle over whether LBJ is twisting arms in New Hampshire's primary."[36]

In an article on the New Hampshire Independent voter and various candidates' strategies to "woo" that vote, a New Hampshire State News Service reporter quoted Bernard Boutin, Johnson Campaign Director, who said, "Attempts have been made in past primaries to attract independent voters" but he did not know how successful they had been. "We'll have a better indication this time than ever before because of the 'pledge' cards being distributed to Democrats and independents."[37]

In a report Boutin prepared for a meeting of the LBJ campaign leaders he said that the pledge card campaign was producing "excellent results" after the first week of operation. In the news story on his report Boutin said that large quantities of the numbered cards were being mailed to President Johnson in what Boutin called "a concrete sign of the support the President has here in New Hampshire." [38]

Richard W. Daly writing in the Boston Herald Traveler, February 9th under the headline, "LBJ Forces Running Out of Gimmicks," said:

> "The teapot tempest in New Hampshire over the crude maneuver by backers of President Johnson to solicit loyalty pledges from voters illustrates once again the difficulties inherent in campaigning without a candidate.... Most significant, they are numbered. It is as if some aspiring Big Brother impatient for 1984 plans to pinpoint just who is faithful and who is not, lest some future postmastership fall into the wrong hands....[39]

In the Christian Science Monitor, Edgar M. Mills, wrote that "Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy is attempting to transform a Johnson pledge card, write-in drive in New Hampshire into a political backlash for his own presidential candidacy....[40] W.J. McCarthy writing a column datelined Laconia, N.H., for the Boston Herald of the same day, picked up the same theme. John H. Fenton New England reporter for the New York Times wrote an article February 9th which began to uncover the attitude of the Johnson campaign toward their pledge card effort now that it was becoming controversial. Fenton reported:

> The first reaction to information kits that are being distributed among Democratic ward and town chairmen is that the White House is engaged in an arm-twisting campaign. Senator McCarthy... commented with a chuckle:
>
> "If there is a difference of one vote between the number of pledges and the number of registered voters, then all are traitors and all must die."
>
> ...But the cries of anguish were being heard among some rank-and-file Democrats over a three-section pledge card that each voter is asked to sign....
>
> 'Are we supposed to go to confession in public?' asked one Democrat who has already filed as a delegate favorable to the nomination of Mr. Johnson....
>
> But Richard Weston, of Gov. John W. King's staff at the State House, said the purpose of the numbering was to make sure that local chairmen and other coordinators distributed the cards....

> As soon as the individual voter's name has been returned to headquarters, he will be sent an acknowledgement that his pledge is being forwarded 'with thanks and deep appreciation' to the White House. The acknowledgement is signed by Governor King and by Senator Thomas J. McIntyre....
>
> A party leader in Hanover, who said he had heard about the pledge cards but had not yet received one, said:
>
> 'I think I am going to write Hubert Humphrey in for President, what the hell.41

When E. W. "Ned" Kenworthy, a New York Times reporter, was travelling with McCarthy in New Hampshire during a factory tour, he found that the LBJ pledge card was already stirring a negative reaction. Kenworthy wrote: "There was evidence (that the pledge card goes against the grain of New Hampshire politics) when Mr. McCarthy visited the plant of the Cott Bottling Company in Manchester. As he approached one worker with hand outstretched, a cry went up from several employees, who pointed at the worker and said, "Look out, that's Johnson's Communist."

"Robert Bergeron, one of those who raised the cry, explained later that the man approached was Robert Durocher, a ward leader who had been distributing pledge cards.

"Mr. Bergeron told reporters: 'I only got a seventh grade education. But I think the pledge is phony. I got a kid brother in Vietnam. I want to find out what it's all about."

"Resentment over the pledge cards, some observers said, had been compounded by a recent statement by Governor King that it would be "unpatriotic" for Democrats not to vote for President Johnson."[42]

The Sunday edition of the Boston Herald Traveler carried a major story on the New Hampshire presidential primary which contained a reproduction of the serially numbered pledge card.[43] New Hampshire newspapers began to print letters-to-the-editor critical of the "pledge card" to an extent where it seemed that there was little else of interest in the campaign. The local leaders of the McCarthy campaign kept the pot boiling with a steady stream of well publicized attacks of the "pledge cards" including one where the Laconia McCarthy chairman expressed the "hope that those Democrats who feel compelled to sign the pledge cards for political or personal reasons will still exercise the right of free choice once they are in the voting booth."[44]

In her nationally syndicated column, Mary McGrory was also captured by the pledge card issue when under the heading, "McCarthy Thrives on LBJ 'Pledges,'" she wrote, "Sen. Eugene McCarthy said enigmatically a month ago that he expected to "live off the land" in New Hampshire, nobody paid much attention.

"But lately, thanks to an issue provided by his opposition, he has been doing just that, and thriving." She then recounted that when signed, it would bring the signer not only "an engraved thank you" from Governor King and Senator Tom McIntrye, but also a "photograph of President and Mrs. Johnson standing on the steps of Air Force 1."

Mary McGrory took the story back to the White House where the President's Press Secretary, George Christian was asked whether Governor King had spoken as "an agent of President Johnson," when the Governor had called McCarthy "an advocate of appeasement" in a counter-attack on McCarthy's successful pledge-card characterization. McGrory reported that Christian, "professed ignorance of the governor's remarks... but elsewhere in the administration, it was conceded that the pledge cards were 'a minor tactical error.'" She concluded her report with a summary that caught the meaning of both the pledge card issue and McCarthy's campaign to that point.

> The violent reaction of the President's managers tells McCarthy that he has struck a raw nerve in opening up the question of presidential coercion. As a critic of the war McCarthy had been tagged "a one-issue candidate." Now he is letting events speak for themselves in Vietnam, and effectively calling on the voters of New Hampshire not to let themselves be pushed around.[45]

In spite of what appeared to observers as a picture of rats fleeing the sinking ship of the pledge card campaign, Boutin persisted. Speaking in Keene, Boutin now "termed the use of the numbered pledge cards as a 'petition to President Johnson to run again,'" contending "the use of the cards was consistent with the First Amendment which allows petition to the government."[46] On the same day Senator Tom McIntyre spoke at a kick-off session of "Pledge to Johnson Week," at a Nashua motel. Boutin, also attending, said, "Do not be fooled by the phony issue being raised by the other candidate when he proclaims we are invading the secrecy of the ballot with our pledge card campaign. The pledge card campaign was no more of an invasion of privacy than when our opponent asks his supporters to wear his campaign buttons or attach bumper strips to their cars."[47]

Now almost totally on the defensive concerning the pledge card and what they had come to represent for many, the Johnson campaign faced a series of highly critical editorials which renewed the assault. The Portsmouth Herald said, "There is growing evidence that New Hampshire's Democratic "party bosses" may have overplayed their hand in their eagerness to promote write-in support for President Johnson...." The editorial went on to suggest that Senator McIntyre, whom the paper had supported, would do well to disassociate himself from Governor King in his attacks on Senator McCarthy. The result, they contended, was giving McCarthy "underdog status" which will "surely win him sympathy."[48]

The Valley News shared the Herald's sentiments but added, "When the Democratic Party can no longer tolerate dissent within its ranks in a primary, it no longer deserves to win elections...."[49]

To make things even worse for the Johnson organizers, the McCarthy workers, then engaged in a door-to-door canvass of registered Democrats and Independents, had found that some people who had signed the pledge card were under the impression that this was a new way of voting. In glee, they kept this bit of information quietly to themselves but it was eventually reported in the press. Dateline "Lebanon, N.H." with a column heading, "The Lady Voted -- On Pledge Card," the story read:

> A new twist in the pledge card campaign for President Johnson came to light here yesterday, posing a new problem for regular Democrats supporting the President.
>
> A door-to-door campaign workers for Sen. Eugene McCarthy said she had asked a lady if she might talk about her vote in tomorrow's Presidential Primary.
>
> I've already voted," said the lady. "I signed the pledge card and sent it back."[50]

So infatuated with the pledge card issue, the press did neglect some of its serious reportorial business. This lack was detected early on when a woman wrote criticizing the Concord Monitor for not covering "the major subject of his (February 6th) speech -- the growth and power of the military-industrial complex.... Your failure to do so in reporting the Senator's talk smacks of editorializing a news item. Also, I am rapidly tiring of the tendency on your part and that of the other media of presenting McCarthy as simply anti-Johnson and anti-Vietnam without giving him credit for creativity or constructiveness. Signed: Diana Anderson."[51]

By the end of February the pledge card issue faded as the Johnson leaders shifted to an aggressive attack on McCarthy's Vietnam policies and the implications of those policies. By then even Bernard Boutin appeared to hope that the pledge cards were forgotten and for almost a two week period they were gone as the stream-of-consciousness of a political campaign moved on. But on March 7th, Marc Drogin, a reporter for the Concord Monitor made a series of telephone calls that produced one of the funny stories of the campaign. It began when Governor King was asked how many of the cards had been sent to Washington and he said that more than "25,000 pledge cards had been sent to the White House."

> As they come in, the New Hampshire Democrats for Johnson keep sending 'em on down.
>
> And the White House keeps mailing 'em back.
>
> If that sounds confusing, it's an improvement over Monday when the Governor's office said they weren't being mailed out, the Director of Democrats for Johnson said they had been for the past week, and the White House said it didn't know anything about it.
>
> Now it seems it does.
>
> Asst. Press Secretary Robert Fleming told the Monitor yesterday afternoon that 'there were a few of those cards around' and that instructions are that they 'go back to Mr. Boutin.'

At the latest count, that's 25,000 little pledge cards going hither and thither.

The Democrats for Johnson know about the hither but the word is yet to get around about the thither.

Democratic Campaign Headquarters in Manchester.... said Gov. King was right about the cards going out.

In fact, said a young lady, 'they're addressed to Mr. W. Marvin Watson... special assistant to the President.'

Could she explain why the White House was returning them?

'They're mailing back all the cards?' She couldn't. Neither could John Barker, a Johnson campaign aide in Manchester. He explained that, 'Hmmmm, that's a surprise.'

Not just surprised but angry are New Hampshireites who have discovered that somebody else has been signing their names to the pledge cards.

Earlier this week Eugene S. Daniell Jr. complained aloud that half the pledge cards in Franklin were forgeries and that counterfeits were cropping up all over the countryside.

At least two were found in Concord yesterday.

The assumption on the part of those not for Johnson... was that local campaigners found it easier to sit home and sign other people's names to pledge cards than to go out and solicit genuine signatures.

William Craig, head of the State Democratic Committee, had replied that such might be the case in part, but he was checking it out and not overlooking the possibility that the pledge card peculiarities could have been a ploy by the McCarthy supporters.

He didn't consider it a laughing matter.

A number of other persons do.

The business of pledge cards, good and bad, being mailed to here and gone, is "most humorous" to McCarthy Headquarters.

'It seems a little bit strange,' David Hoeh, McCarthy's Campaign Manager told the Monitor as he broke into another guffaw....

> 'We're amused by the great difficulties they're having... we think the confusion reflects the inability of the Johnson campaign to register with any substance in the electorate.'
>
> Meanwhile, back at the White House -- why is President Johnson's staff mailing back the pledge cards as quick as they come in? The White House says because its instructions are to return them to Boutin.
>
> The Monitor asked Boutin this morning why the White House has such instructions.
>
> "They don't have," Boutin said.
>
> Boutin sounded angry: "Ask George Christian about that!'
>
> Christian was tied up.
>
> But his assistant Fleming, who wasn't, sounded just a shade annoyed by now:
>
> 'The only people we could find who seemed to know anything about it, said they go back to Boutin.'

Fleming then referred the Monitor reporter to the Democratic National Committee which said that they did not know anything about the pledge cards and, anyway, they don't get involved in primary elections.[52] The great pledge case mystery ended with the voters entering New Hampshire voting booths Marth 12th. There was never a satisfactory answer as to what actually happened to the White House part of the signed cards.

Scheduling Lessons Learned

As the campaign developed, the scheduling became more sophisticated. There would not be another time like the morning of February 6th in Claremont. While McCarthy's habit of completing activities ahead of the time allowed in a schedule caused a few problems, the drivers or travelling staff began to develop ways of coping. It became possible to call ahead and add something quickly or change the route slightly to include a brief visit to a small town, a

campaign headquarters or shopping area. As Hoeh had suggested during the earliest campaign meeting, the local committees developed a "shelf" of potential campaign activities from which they could draw a schedule on very short notice. The Salem headquarters would put together a three hour schedule, including a headquarters full of people, with less than two hours notice on the last day of the campaign. In addition to the tools of the telephone, a fledgling advance activity, local contacts, and the twelve day strategy, Sandy Hoeh had lists of manufacturing establishments that could be contacted for in-plant tours or meeting shift changes; lists of service clubs that might need a breakfast or noontime speaker; newspapers, radio and television stations for interviews; schedules of special events that the campaign could join or greet a crowd; airports where the candidate could arrive or leave without having to come through Boston, and a special notebook in which she could rough out a schedule. The most serious problem other than not having firm dates for McCarthy's visits was to create schedules with good activities within a geographically reasonable area.

While the distances are not great by comparison with other states, the only travel option is the automobile for intra-state campaigning. Occasionally a candidate will fly from southern to northern New Hampshire, but this is an exception. The scheduler had the choice of either building a schedule from one or two strong events, filled in with less useful activities in one area, or having the candidate chase prime events in often widely separated locales. The remaining two days of McCarthy February 6, 7, 8, schedule reflected the problem of filling time, responding to opportunities, broadening the impact of the campaign, and finding a place to depart without having to repeat previously covered ground.

Schedule: Wednesday, February 7, 1968[53]

Time	Place	Function
7:00 a.m.	Concord	Greet workers outside factories
7:20 a.m.	Concord	Great Rumford Press workers outside Rumford Press
8:05 a.m.	Concord	Breakfast, McKenzie's Restaurant, Main Street
8:30 a.m.	Concord	Address assembly and question and answer at Concord High School
9:00 a.m.	Concord	Tour of Concord Monitor building and informal press conference
9:30 a.m.	Concord	Coffee with resident of JFK apartments (Housing for elderly)
10:15 a.m.	Concord	Address at St. Paul's School and question and answer period.
11:15 a.m.	Concord	Greeted by Mayor Gove at City Hall and introduction to city employees
1:00 p.m.	Manchester	Address at Central High School
1:35 p.m.	Manchester	Tour Cott Beverage Co.
3:15 p.m.	Manchester	Coffee at home of Mr. & Mrs. Robert Eschoo 1015 Chestnut St.
4:00 p.m.	Manchester	Tour shopping center
4:30 p.m.	Manchester	Drive to Concord
6:30 p.m.	Concord	Dinner in Concord
8:30	Concord	Drive to Laconia
10:00 p.m.	Laconia	Laconia Tavern

The McCarthy leaders felt that each campaign visit should have at least part of its schedule in Manchester. As the largest city and the hub of Hillsborough County with its heavy Democratic voter registration, McCarthy had to do well in the county if he was to succeed statewide. Unfortunately, the local campaign organization was weak. From the beginning many of those attracted

to McCarthy lived outside the city or had had little previous campaign experience. Their contacts were limited, and their understanding of the political dynamics of the city was less than adequate to crack the community's tough political shell. While Hoeh and Studds were determined to have McCarthy campaign in Manchester once each visit, to do so always strained the best efforts of the state campaign and a shy local committee. In contrast as shown by the detail of the February 7th Concord schedule, a well connected, hardworking, politically sophisticated local McCarthy committee made campaigning in Concord a pleasure not only for McCarthy but for those scheduling his campaign. In fact, the local person who scheduled McCarthy for the Concord Committee, would check each time and detail of the schedule personally then re-run as much as possible with the advance person. To avoid another plant gate miscue the local scheduler was out in front of the Rumford Press plant early one morning to check the flow of workers and the shift change times. He pre-ran each travel link, checked the table location for McCarthy at the restaurant, and made sure that every other event in that morning schedule would work without having McCarthy late or awkwardly standing if he completed an activity too soon.

The Laconia committee possessed much of the same ability as the Concord people. Somewhat younger and broader based in the community, the Laconia Committee's youth and enthusiasm made their city an attractive campaign stop and one which would be used on a number of occasions when an activity was needed for some of those who came later to campaign for McCarthy. Hoeh and Studds used Laconia almost as a "test market" for celebrity visits because they were confident of the Laconia committee's ability to arrange events and then evaluate how a celebrity might be used elsewhere in the campaign. The Laconia schedule for the third day, February 8th, illustrated their skill.

Schedule: Thursday February 8, 1968[54]

Time	Place	Function
6:30 a.m.	Laconia	Greet workers outside Scott-Williams Manufacturing Co.
7:30 a.m.	Laconia	Address Laconia Chamber of Commerce Breakfast (An obligatory performance for all presidential primary candidates)
9:00 a.m.	Laconia	WLNH radio interview
9:30 a.m.	Laconia	McCarthy for President Headquarters
9:45 a.m.	Laconia	WEMJ radio interview
10:30 a.m.	Laconia	Coffee at home of Mr. & Mrs. Ron O'Callahan, 42 Gilford Street
11:30 a.m.	Laconia	Leave Laconia for Lebanon
12:30 p.m.	Lebanon	Address Rotary, Landers Restaurant
1:45 p.m.	Lebanon	Main Street tour
2:15 p.m.	Lebanon	Interview: Valley News
3:10 p.m.	Lebanon	Leave Lebanon airport for Boston.

Because it was possible for McCarthy to leave New Hampshire from the Lebanon Airport and connect with a flight to Washington, the Lebanon schedule was added which took advantage of a newsworthy speech before the Rotary Club and McCarthy's first campaigning in New Hampshire's "North Country." To do this meant that McCarthy had to be driven more than sixty miles across New Hampshire, over a winding, low speed road -- not that comfortable an experience during the beginning of New Hampshire's frost heavy season.

To overcome some of the communications problems between New Hampshire and the national campaign, Grace Bassett, a friend of the McCarthy family, came to New Hampshire to help Sandy Hoeh with the next schedule and also to organize activities for Mrs. McCarthy. An effective political organizer in her own right, Abigail McCarthy agreed to help in her husband's campaign by coming to New Hampshire. Her role in previous campaigns had been largely as a behind the scenes organizer and only occasionally as an active campaigner. Now that their family was older, she and daughter Mary, a Radcliffe sophomore were scheduled for a visit February 14 and 15 with the Senator who was coming for three days, February 13, 14, 15, the scheduling task doubled. The same care in preparation was needed for Mrs. McCarthy as was required for Senator McCarthy, including advancing, transportation and provisions for several reporters. Although much of Mrs. McCarthy's schedule would be arranged by local committees, Grace Bassett provided the important interpretation of what was scheduled to both Mrs. McCarthy and the Senator's office. With Grace Bassett in New Hampshire, date and schedule confirmation through Washington greatly improved.

Building Momentum

Each campaign succeeds or fails on the basis of its ability to attract voters' interest and, ultimately, their votes. A campaign is effective if it has been able to create a sense of progress, excitement, movement, momentum. Campaigns have been said to "peak" too early or "peak" too late or fail to "peak" at all. The chemistry of a campaign contains many variables which, when in harmony, seem to produce the attraction. The variables multiply as the campaign proceeds and their interaction, importance, and identity vary greatly from moment to moment. To assign and assess each, then to test and evaluate would require the ability to control evaluation beyond that which is permissible in such a socially dynamic event. The totality of the campaign becomes greater

than the sum of its parts.

To sort the McCarthy campaign into its constituent elements and to attribute to one or the other a reason for its vitality would be misleading. Of great importance, of course, were the candidate, the issues, the times, the management, the workers, the strategy, the funding, the media attention, the place, the timing, the opponents' mistakes and many other individual, group actions and inactions that created the momentum. There were, however, a few identifiable activities and responses that represented a difference. The difference was that after a number of weeks of uncertainty, hard work, and frustration the campaign seemed to come to life. The work was no less, nor the uncertainty, but there was a spirit, a sense of accomplishment, a feeling that attention was shifting toward the McCarthy candidacy. Evidence of this shift came through the media, from the field activities, from the canvassing, from issue targeting, from the interest of celebrities, from the reaction to McCarthy public relations, to the treasury, and in the commitment of the candidate. In that time, the campaign left the management of a few and became the property of the many. It had become greater in its pulsing energy than individual direction could contain or candidate charisma could sustain. The McCarthy campaign had become what the students in New Hampshire sensed was a happening.

The Reporters

In spite of the best laid plans of campaign managers and political strategists, excitement in a campaign is bestowed, almost as a gift. People meeting in living rooms and discussing candidates, issues, and campaigns cannot of themselves have much impact. It is only when the rumblings have

a context and prick the ears of an inquisitive reporter or two that a heart beat can be heard. More often than not the beat fades before long. There were four names printed on the New Hampshire ballot in 1968 and only one was that of Senator McCarthy. Also on the ballot was a place for the write-in vote. That space could have drawn the attention of other possible candidates not just Lyndon Johnson. Robert Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, John Lindsey, or a local favorite son such as Governor King or Senator McIntyre, might have been the recipient of a surprise vote. Robert Kennedy received a substantial surprise write-in vote for Vice President in the 1964 New Hampshire presidential primary as did Henry Cabot Lodge. If protest was the single objective of the 1968 presidential primary then a vote cast for almost anyone, whether listed on the ballot or not might well have conveyed the message, especially if the non-Johnson vote equalled or exceeded the number who wrote in the President's name. For a multiplicity of reasons such alternatives did not produce more than a scattering of votes. The contest became one between the President and the Senator from Minnesota, but for many weeks it was seen by the populace, through the eyes and ears of the reporters, as being no contest at all.

What Hoeh and Studds found was a certain herd instinct on the part of the reporters. This was especially noticeable when they began meeting members of the national press on the early McCarthy visits to New Hampshire. The national reporters arrived as a herd, moved as a herd, responded as a herd, and not infrequently reported as a herd. The New Hampshire and national leadership of the McCarthy campaign found that the herd instinct also tended to prevail among the editors of the major national newspapers. Few wished to be much in front of the herd. Whether this observation can be raised to the level of a theory purporting to describe the dynamics of the naitonal political media would

difficult, but the observations of the New Hampshire leaders, as they watched media attention change, may have significance in explaining how campaigns are covered.

The analogy to the herd relates effectively to the fact that within a large herd there are sub-groups, families, individuals and mavericks. The news gathering and reporting echelons tend to form and follow in much the same manner. The local New Hampshire reporters, so few in number that they could hardly be labelled a herd, found the the local hot spots of anti-war, anti-Johnson, pro-McCarthy sentiments, stirred among the few who were contemplating an alternative for the New Hampshire voters, and fanned the heat into a fire of public curiosity. For most of the period between the first mentioning of Gans October visit and McCarthy's announcement January 4th, it was the state reporters for United Press International and the Associated Press who kept the possibility of McCarthy before the New Hampshire public. To a certain extent they were also repsonsible for what little national coverage the McCarthy organization received.

If it is possible to describe a small state like New Hampshire in terms of media markets then the coverage of the early New Hampshire McCarthy activity was carried most heavily in Manchester and Concord where newspapers existed with their own capital city reporters; secondarily in the cities of Portsmouth, Laconia, Keene, Claremont, Lebanon, with newspapers that carried one or both of the wire services and the State News Service reports; and thirdly, in Nashua and Dover which carried only wire service items. A fourth level of press coverage was by the weekly newspapers. A number subscribed to the State News Service summary, others would write their own summary of significant state political events especially if a local angle could be developed for the coverage.

A few concentrated their reporting totally on local events. In those cases almost the only way for the McCarthy campaign to receive notice was to have either a local person do something worthy of publication or create a local event that the weekly might cover.

Beyond the newspaper attention there was also the role of the electronic media. For all intents and purposes the only electronic media capable of covering New Hampshire news events were the radio stations of the larger communities. The one television channel, WMUR-TV located in Manchester, was not financially strong enough to support continuous news coverage using video or film inputs. Their one reporter would have to drive considerable distances to cover events outside Manchester, return to the station, develop his own soundless film, write a story to accompany the film, and then read the story during the evening newscast with the film running as a background. Needless to say an event had to be of major proportions to justify that reporter's exertion. Most television news, therefore, was of the "rip and read" variety taken from the teletype machines of the wire service carried by the television station.

Radio reporting was far more important. Local radio stations had often established as their competitive hallmark their respective ability to either get to the heart of a story or to add vitality to their newscasts. Using tape recordings, telephone interviews, and follow-up reports, many stations had become proficient in expanding significantly the stories they received from the wire services. It was this activity, as much as any other, that gave early life to the New Hampshire McCarthy campaign.

All of the radio stations that had news departments carried the United Press International wire service. As soon as a wire service story arrived in the news office of a radio station the most aggressive of the news staffs would call the quoted New Hampshire source for either a repeat of the story for taping or expanded commentary. Often during the campaign David Hoch would receive a 6:00 - 6:30 a.m. call from the UPI reporter who would write a story for the wire. Before 7:00 a.m. Hoch began receiving telephone calls from radio news reporters for actualities. The thirst for state news items using actuality recordings to validate the account had become a fine art. Each of the stations in the major markets would cover the news in this way.

Reporting New Hampshire events was much less a process of gleaning from a number of significant events all competing for scarce newspaper space or air time, than it was an effort to generate news that was worthy of the space available. The McCarthy story was attractive and captured the early attention of the reporters and media news staffs. The people involved were quotable, accessible and straight-forward in their responses. For many the "home-grown" nature of the McCarthy effort was an attractive contrast to the contrived image of the New Hampshire Johnson activity and the usual dismal accounts of New Hampshire's governmental events.

The interest generated by the reporters was expanded by early editorial attention. The Concord, Portsmouth, Keene and Lebanon newspapers, concerned about the direction of the administration's war policy, gave editorial attention to McCarthy campaign events. The Manchester Union Leader and the Dover newspaper, supporters of the war policy, also gave editorial attention. That attention,

however, was not uniformly against McCarthy or the New Hampshire supporters. While a minor herd instinct does prevail among the editors of the anti-Loeb press on certain state issues, when issues separate from the anti-Loeb stance then the editors tend to be quite independent in their analyses. If a herd is to be labelled then the editors of the Portsmouth, Concord, Keene and Lebanon newspapers were its members. The Laconia newspaper did not editorialize, and the Dover, Nashua and Claremont newspapers were not predictable in their editorial reactions to the McCarthy activity.

The fact that a broad spectrum of news gathering and disseminating people in New Hampshire found the McCarthy activity to be worthy of early attention was important to the success of the campaign. On its own and strictly within the confines of New Hampshire media, the campaign received better than usual coverage and editorial attention.

Because New Hampshire is almost entirely under the media shadow of Boston, what has to be described as a regional media activity was also important to the McCarthy campaign. The Boston television stations, recognizing that their market extends deeply into New Hampshire, frequently cover major events there. During several of McCarthy's campaign visits Boston television film crews followed him and carried reports of his campaigning in their news broadcasts. Perhaps as important, however, was that fact that when McCarthy campaigned in Massachusetts or when he landed at Boston's Logan International Airport for New Hampshire campaigning, he was well covered by the Boston television stations. For them it was less expensive to catch McCarthy in an airport arrival and interview than it was to follow him to the remote corners of New Hampshire.

Boston's three major newspapers, the Boston Globe, The Record-American, and the Herald Traveler, as well as the Christian Science Monitor maintained constant touch with the campaign. The Monitor's New England political reporter, Edgar Mills, ran a circuit of the New Hampshire campaigns that meant almost a weekly article summarizing the activities for his paper. The Globe, struggling to become the dominant publication in the Boston market and committed to improved coverage of New Hampshire events, was the most aggressive. The Globe management had re-oriented the rather bland format of the paper toward a stronger editorial and reportorial image. They had been successful in absorbing much of the circulation of the Boston Post, which closed late in the 1950's, and built on that economic base. The management had sensed the political direction which Massachusetts was taking and became an independent Democratic publication editorially. Their reasons for giving attention to New Hampshire activities came from both economic and editorial motivation. Southern and especially southeastern New Hampshire was growing as rapidly as any region in the nation. Many of those living in that part of New Hampshire had migrated to the state from Massachusetts but still retained employment, shopping habits, and social orientations toward Massachusetts.

Editorially, the Globe was offended by the practices and opinions of the Manchester Union Leader and its publisher William Loeb. During labor management difficulties in Boston the Manchester Union Leader would increase its press runs and even prepare special editions of the newspaper for circulation in Boston. Trying to exploit the problems of other newspapers in their own market was not popular with the Globe management. This was but one of a number of instances where Loeb offended New England's newspaper owners with his practices and eccentricities. While not taking the Manchester Union Leader on directly, the

Globe management began to methodically build its circulation in those parts of the state where there were daily newspaper vacuums and among the residents of the southeastern part of the state where it would be economically important to develop an advertising market. The Globe employed a full-time reporter for New Hampshire news. New Hampshire-circulated daily papers carried expanded New Hampshire political news especially, and the Sunday edition contained a special section for regional news with a heavy emphasis on New Hampshire items of broader interest.

The Herald-Traveler, Boston's independent Republican newspaper, was in a struggle for survival. The paper had failed to attract much of the old Post readership and with the changing political and economic orientation of Massachusetts, the Herald was losing readers, advertising and was about to lose the television station that had bolstered its economic position for many years. The Herald had a sizable circulation among New Hampshire Republicans especially for its Sunday edition. Since the Globe was now challenging the Herald at home and in New Hampshire, the Herald sought to improve its New Hampshire coverage as well. Herald reporters regularly travelled with the senator on his visits and then stayed to report campaign activities.

The Record-American, a publication of the Hearst chain, had been in continuing economic difficulty for a number of years. A tabloid with a high circulation, the paper was read by those most interested in race results, the numbers and sports. Its political coverage was confined almost entirely to Massachusetts with only occasional items of regional interest. New Hampshire politics found its way into the paper's summary columns, under the by-lines of the nationally syndicated writers or from wire service stories distributed beyond New Hampshire. Of the four Boston newspapers the Globe was the most important to the McCarthy candidacy.

The Globe's political desk was staffed by a group of "young Turk" reporters led by Robert Healy, who reflected the changing guard in Masshacusetts political leaders and its orientation toward liberal, effective, efficient and corruption free government. In many respects, John Kennedy's election to the Presidency in 1960 had stimulated this broad spectrum of political and institutional reform. Before his election Boston's and Massachusetts' political problems were an embarrassment only to those few in the state who cared. When Massachusetts became the home state of a President, a provincial embarrassment became intolerable to many civic, business and institutional leaders. Remarkably, an important part of that change was the re-constitution of a newspaper into a formidable civic institution. The leadership which the Globe exerted upon the reform of Massachusetts politics during the 1960s, was reflected in a concern about the policies of the Johnson administration in 1967 and 1968. To them something of the heritage that John Kennedy had left had been lost. The energy for constructive good that had been released by his presidency and which had revived the publication itself, was now being wasted in Vietnam. The Globe's editors were early advocates of changing Vietnam policy and when their efforts failed, they sensed the importance of what might be accomplished if President Johnson's political nerve were tapped. The New Hampshire presidential primary offered that opportunity in their view and its pages were turned to that end. Unlike others of the national press that were slow to recognize the New Hampshire McCarthy effort, the Globe threw caution to the winds and vigorously reported the campaign. Their performance was much closer to that of New Hampshire's own daily press than it was to the major national papers.

What Hoeh and Studds had predicted in their December memorandum to McCarthy came true beyond their expectations. Because there was a strong McCarthy organization in Massachusetts, McCarthy's name had been listed on the April

Massachusetts presidential primary ballot, and because of confusion in the Massachusetts Democratic party as to how the President would be represented in the primary, Boston's newspapers were filled with McCarthy news. This was a reversal of what the New Hampshire McCarthy leaders had expected. They had assummed that New Hampshire McCarthy activity would be reported in Massachusetts helping to build support for him in the later primary. By the time the New Hampshire primary was held the decision in Massachusetts had already been made. Johnson's name would not appear on the ballot nor would their be a stand-in or effort to secure write-in votes. The contest then became one of selecting national convention delegates by congressional districts -- a contest that was conceded to McCarthy by the Johnson controlled Democratic State Committee. This series of events released the Boston political writers from having to cover Massachusetts. They came to New Hampshire.

Unlike the local or the regional reporters, the McCarthy leaders observed, the national press performed much like a herd. They arrived in a group, moved as a group, separated only occasionally to gather news, returned to digest their gatherings as a group, and tended to confirm their perceptions as a group. There was social, intellectual, and status re-enforcement by being a part of the herd. This led to preconceptions of New Hampshire politics and heavy reliance on contacts developed and shared from previous quadrennial New Hampshire visits. In their early contacts with the travelling national press Hoeh and Studds found the situation both disillusioning and frustrating. In awe of the names they had read for years in the prominent national press Hoeh and Studds had to struggle first, to overcome reticence and then to attempt to get the herd to shift its attention toward the McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire. Both recognized that unless they were able to convince national reporters that

something was happening in New Hampshire the campaign would have no impact outside the state. Without that recognition the money necessary to sustain the candidacy would not flow. For the combined reasons of money and impact the New Hampshire leaders spent a great deal of their time accommodating reporters in hopes that before March 12th the story of what was happening in New Hampshire would reach the larger national audience.

While they had had moderate success in getting attention prior to McCarthy's entry in the New Hampshire primary, after the initial burst of his January 4th release attention dropped to almost zero.

Often Hoeh would make special trips from Hanover to Concord or Manchester to meet with a national reporter, columnist or for a network interview. The results were almost uniformly disappointing as either the questions or the subsequent story offered only skepticism. The New Hampshire spokesman had difficulty breaking through the pre-conceptions the national press cadre brought with them when they came to New Hampshire. Skepticism came from their view of the McCarthy campaign from their normal Washington base. There it appeared that the campaign had caused hardly a ripple. By comparison with other presidential efforts, McCarthy was poorly organized, financed, staffed, headquartered, led and without allies. It was inconceivable that such an organization could manage a meaningful national candidacy much less dent the political hide of an incumbent president. Since there was so little to interest them from the Washington base it was hard to believe that field operations would be any better. The reporters arrived in New Hampshire to be greeted by what was, in their view, a rookie leadership surrounded by unknown local volunteers and a number of pleasant but naive college kids. When they went to check the local sources they had developed during earlier New Hampshire visits they found that these prominent

political leaders were either committed to the renomination of President Johnson or retired from the action. There was hardly a familiar face in the McCarthy crowd. Certainly there was no one with the elected stature of Governor John King or Senator Tom McIntyre or the political recognition of William Dunfey or William Craig. Bernard Boutin, the Johnson manager, had a respected record as a high Kennedy and Johnson administrator as well as a previous record as a New Hampshire political leader. Hoch and Studds were unknown outside of New Hampshire and untried in the view of the national press.

For all of January and through the early weeks of February the national press remained a herd united in its skepticism and assured that a campaign developed as the McCarthy candidacy had developed could not assault the incumbent president. McCarthy's first several visits were assessed in contrast to Romney. Scheduling and advancing problems, small crowds and McCarthy's quiet approach were seen as confirmations of the early assessment. To the continuing irritation of campaign workers who were attempting to improve the early advancing difficulties, the reporters kept referring to errors. On one occasion a complicated route for a series of evening coffee parties in Manchester was advanced by carefully pre-running and timing the route several days earlier. On the evening of the parties the lead driver missed a turn he did not recognize in the dark and led his small motorcade down a deadend street. David Shomacher of CBS-TV was in one of the cars that had to back up and turn around in order to re-discover the correct route. This mis-cue became the theme of his often repeated radio and television reports of the campaign's status. Being taken down a deadend street was too much for him to resist in his analogy of the progress or non-progress he felt the campaign was making in New Hampshire.

All other aspects of the schedule had gone well and McCarthy's reception had been better than anyone had expected but the story from New Hampshire from that reporter was about the "amateurism" of the advance work. To their continuing frustration the Hampshire leaders could not break the image which the national press had created of them.

With McCarthy's second visit February 6, 7, and 8, the stories began to change. Tom Wicker did write his refreshing column concerning the Claremont Rotary Club's exclusion of the electronic media but the New York Times news columns continued to carry only bits of reports and little that would indicate anything important was happening in New Hampshire. E. M. "Ned" Kenworthy enjoyed McCarthy's wit, use of language and openness. He, like others of the herd began to sense that McCarthy was beginning to get through to the New Hampshire voter and that for some reason, yet to be understood, the campaign was beginning to work. On several occasions he wrote what he was beginning to feel, but the copy failed to get into the newspaper. The McCarthy leaders were understandably upset that the Times was not carrying stories that had been written that were favorable to the Senator. Kenworthy would show them the copy he had telephoned to New York expecting that the coming edition would contain his report. When it didn't both the New Hampshire and the Washington headquarters were worried. It appeared as if a news block at the Times was somehow in operation that prevented news of the New Hampshire campaign from appearing in New York. News in the Times in New York meant both money and volunteers for the campaign. Without coverage the campaign slowly began to starve.

Blair Clark found, through social contacts with the Times editors, that McCarthy was viewed by them not as a presidential candidate but as an "issue candidate." Since in their view, McCarthy was not running for the presidency

but running only to raise the Vietnam War issue, he would not be accorded the coverage in the Times which they normally allocated to a presidential candidate. In outrage that such a conclusion was possible, Clark through many of the same prominent social and political contacts in New York, got the editors to recognize the absurdity of their conclusion. Kenworthy's reports were printed and the editorial page of the Times began to recognize the McCarthy candidacy.

What this experience demonstrated to the McCarthy leaders was the peculiar behavior of the national press establishment. They found that the reporters tended to accept the established versions of the campaign and to view skeptically accounts of the burdgeoning McCarthy effort. Their early reports from New Hampshire tended to be cautious, reflect the problems, and convey the image of a "David and Goliath" contest with David deprived of a weapon and missing his marbles. When the theme changed and David was seen as being at least competent, the editors were reluctant to support their reporters' accounts. McCarthy and his amateur campaign were scoring forcefully in New Hampshire long before the editors of the major nationally regarded newspapers took much notice. The stories that were printed were buried and without editorial recognition. McCarthy's progress which was being confirmed not just by the reporters but by canvassing evidence and growing voter reaction was not receiving editorial recognition. While the reporters had changed their views, the editors, members of a higher herd, were unwilling to say that McCarthy was doing well in New Hampshire until there was a recognized, established source. If the Times had written editorially that McCarthy was campaigning effectively then the Washington Post, the St. Louis Post Dispatch, the Atlanta Constitution, the Los Angeles Times and one or two other prominent publications would follow. The problem was getting the first to break from the herd.

Fortunately there is an important independent source of analysis. To some extent this role is filled by the syndicated columinsts. They, like the editors and the reporters, usually like to forecast with assurity. Robert Evans wrote an early negative column which conditioned many reporters about what they experienced in New Hampshire for a considerable time. Tom Wicker began to open the circle a bit with his refreshing Claremont tale. Most of the other columnists tended to remain a part of the herd until it began to shift from skepticism to belief that something was happening in New Hampshire. The important exception was Mary McGrory whose widely read and respected column gave both reporters and editors the source they needed to change their cautious stance. Unfortunately her columns came relatively late and had the effect of confirming the work of an earlier and exceptionally important writer, Paul Wieck.

Wieck represented an important but perhaps less clearly understood part of the national press, the independent journals of news and opinion. Wieck, basically a free-lance writer, was then working for the New Republic and covering for them the presidential campaigns. He had first met the New Hampshire McCarthy leaders at the Chicago meeting of the Conference of Concerned Democrats and had kept in touch with them since that December meeting. He had caught the flavor of the McCarthy activity in its early days. Without the inhibitions of the national press and writing for a publication that prided itself on being out in front of events, he could take seriously the optimism that came from those involved in the McCarthy campaign. While Wieck travelled with the national press, he had found threads of credibility in McCarthy's campaign that had not been reported by the others. His stories

reflected this anticipation putting his evaluations far ahead of his colleagues. While Wieck's speculation made the news reporters uncomfortable, they were not willing to include his advanced opinions in their own writings until they had more confirmation.

To a degree the independent journal of opinion does serve to lead the larger press establishment. Publications like the New Republic have wide readership among the reporters and editors. Stories often receive preliminary coverage in such publications and through the leads that are revealed, the reporters pursue subjects for their own papers. As an important investigative journalistic outlet, stories are tested that in several weeks often become the objective of wide-spread interest. The independent journals are much like scouts ahead of the herd ranging acorss the terrain in search of new routes and meaningful objectives. They might also be considered as a picket line which tends to draw the early fire. In truth, the early fire may inflect wounds that would be damaging to the credibility of larger publications. An independent journal is expected to be at the edge and is respected according to its ability to both direct reporters toward new subjects and to shape opinion of events.

Paul Wieck performed both roles exceptionally well in 1968. He sensed the flow of events and because he had anticipated well, his evaluations gained high respect as the political year unfolded.

Wieck followed McCarthy to New Hampshire during the Senator's February 13, 14 and 15 visit. He carefully evaluated McCarthy's performance, the response, the status of his organization and the competence of the opposition. When he left New Hampshire he carried an opinion of the campaign that was not widely shared by his press colleagues. Some may have agreed with his assessment but

were unwilling to put in print what they felt and certainly their editors would not tolerate fantasies. Wieck's article titled, "McCarthy: Alive and Well in New Hampshire," appeared in the edition of the New Republic dated March 2, 1968. Datelined Nashua, N.H. Wieck wrote:

> Here, in the snow-covered hills Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy is finding his identity as a presidential candidate as he moves unhurriedly in and out of the endless and often depressing shoe factories, jokes with his supporters at coffee hours, speaks in town halls and on college campuses. He is winning friends. In return he commits more of himself each day. His wit is more incisive, his speeches stronger.[55]

Since this was the New Republic's first major story on the New Hampshire campaign, Wieck went on to review how the Johnson managers had committed the "classic goof" with their pledge card scheme and how the tactic had "backfired so badly it left the state's Democratic organization demoralized." But it was McCarthy's own effectiveness as a campaigner that brought Wieck to his conclusions.

> Simultaneously, (with the pledge card mistake) McCarthy's own performance began to improve. On his first trip to the state in December, he had delivered a dull, academic lecture. When he returned January 26, his supporters were at a low point. Then, he stirred a crowd of some 700 at St. Anselm's just outside Manchester to repeated bursts of applause, and by mid-February, he had succeeded in drawing a sharp contrast between his own style and that of the pro-Johnson hierarchy. Instead of rhetorical excesses, he insisted he would "not shout at the voters of New Hampshire" (and that he hadn't found any who wanted him).[56]

He reported that he had seen McCarthy move effectively among people at their jobs, in small groups, before large audiences and on the street. He noted that McCarthy refused to "demagogue" the issues in spite of the fact that there were clear opportunities to do so. He used the example of Bernard Boutin to illustrate McCarthy's ability to move through the thicket of inter-acting voter concerns and still maintain the basic concerns of his campaign.

> Boutin left the federal service to return to New Hampshire and a position with Sanders Associates, a major employer in Nashua and a rapidly growing firm largely dependent on defense contracts -- $125 million of its current $140 million gross, according to Pentagon figures. But many of New Hampshire's white- and blue-collar workers earn their paychecks from firms with defense contracts and a heated attack upon "the complex," pleasing though it might be to McCarthy's academic following, could cost hundreds, even thousands of votes.
>
> So, when the question came up at a coffee hour, he dealt with specific solutions after sizing up the Pentagon as "about the third or fourth largest nation" in the world. His solutions to bring the CIA under control, as he and some of his Senate colleagues have tried to do; to put some strings on the Pentagon's sale of arms abroad, as they've also tried to do; and to take all nonmilitary procurement (he estimated this would amount to $30 billion of nearly $80 billion in Department of Defense expenditures) out of DOD, a move that could also save billions in that civilian procurement officers would be allowed to wipe out some of the endless duplication in military procurement.[57]

He found during his tour that New Hampshire was still "Nixon country" and that Nixon's cautious approach to the state had the "nation's first presidential primary pretty well nailed down." But in contrast, Wieck felt the "Democratic race is wide open," a conclusion that was not widely shared by his fellow national reporters at the time he wrote it.

> To suggest, at this point, that McCarthy could win would be on the daring side of the ledger. But it no longer seems impossible. McCarthy wears well. His insistence on rational discussion is in line with New Hampshire tradition, which was summed up by Bill Cardoso of the Boston Globe's bureau here: "The quiet, reasoned man is always the first selectman." At the same time, he is showing no relutance to jump on a genuine issue, such as the pledge card.
>
> This is in contrast to LBJ, who has suffered not only in New Hampshire but nationally from too much exposure. On the plane en route to New Hampshire, a young businessman who sat across the aisle from me said he is a McCarthy supporter this season. He explained that his "exposure to McCarthy is "limited" but that his "exposure to Johnson isn't." He predicts McCarthy will do well in his Concord suburb.[58]

Wieck also found a basis for his optimism in the New Hampshire McCarthy organization itself. While other reporters had tended either to dismiss the organization as amateur and inexperienced or to have neglected to consider the organization as important to the effort Wieck wrote:

> A rapport had developed between McCarthy's supporters -- as a group, they are bright, young (in their twenties and thirties), attractive and basically uncomplicated people who are thrilled just to have an alternative to LBJ -- and the candidate. There is an active statewide committee of 300 backed up by at least 250 college students from inside and outside the state. Dave Hoeh, the McCarthy chairman, believes it is as strong as any committee he has seen in his 10 years of New Hampshire politics. They have set up headquarters in 10 towns in addition to many neighborhood headquarters in private homes.[59]

He contrasted what he found in the McCarthy headquarters with the difficulties the Johnson organization was having both in its operations and in its effort to maintain control over a party that had long been proud of its independent behavior. Against Boutin's portrayal of a unified Democratic Party supporting the incumbent president, Wieck recounted the names of a number of local party leaders who were not only supporting McCarthy but were actively involved in the campaign. In communities where "newcomers" to politics made up the committees, Wieck reported that "they are showing indefatigable spirit," with the workers "amazed by the friendly response."

To a picture that seemed to good to be true, Wieck added: "One interesting facet is the amount of Republican support McCarthy is attracting. In several towns, registered Republicans are actively urging a write-in on the GOP ticket." To a woman, a registered Republican who said she might have to choose between Nixon and Johnson in the November election, Wieck reported that McCarthy said "That's like choosing between vulgarity and obscenity, isn't it."[60] As Wieck pointed out that might be the November choice, but in February and in New

Hampshire, McCarthy was becoming an attractive alternative not just for disgruntled Democrats but also for disfranchised Republicans.

In fairness Wieck also recounted some of the problems that had kept his press colleagues from embracing the McCarthy campaign as he did in his article. He noted the "immobilizing" affect of Robert Kennedy's "agonizing" on many potential McCarthy supporters. He felt it was an important sign that most of Kennedy's people had become active in McCarthy's campaign. His second concern was the fact that the McCarthy campaign had had as its goal to win "only a 'psychological' victory rather than New Hampshire's 26 delegates." He wrote, "None of his supporters could bring themselves to talk about a clear-cut victory," but he concluded, "this should be corrected by McCarthy's own decision to go for broke. It could be the very thing needed to maintain momentum at a critical point in the campaign, and if it works, the timing would be brilliant."[61]

In his final assessment before making his prediction, Wieck wrote:

> There are two additional factors working against McCarthy. One is time. As Dave Hoeh... , put it: 'We're trying to do in eight to ten weeks what we should have had six months to do.'
>
> The second is his major issue. McCarthy has been wise enough not to frighten the shoe factory workers by shouting 'brutality' and 'immorality' at them. But he is asking them, in his own words, to make "a harsh historical judgment," to say to the country's leaders via the ballot box that Vietnam is costing -- in lives, money and moral energy -- far more than can be gained, that the decision to make a stand there is not even a good military judgment... that we aren't fulfilling our goal of 'building a nation' but doing just the opposite and that we should summon the moral courage to negotiate for a coalition government that would include the National Liberation Front (NLF) and, if the South Vietnamese government resists this, proceed to deescalate until they're agreeable.

> That is a lot to ask of a shoe worker, long abused by the jingoistic language of the cold war, conditioned to respond to all the cliches about the 'threat of international communism.' Nevertheless, a linotype operator in one of the plants McCarthy visited told a reporter that he plans to vote for him and added that, at the American Legion club, where he does his social drinking, they were beginning to 'talk McCarthy.'[62]

After their weeks of trying to get the message through to the many reporters they had talked with, the McCarthy leaders finally read the complete story as they felt it should be told. Wieck had independently found what they had felt during the six weeks since McCarthy's New Hampshire announcement. The campaign was reaching voters; McCarthy was skillfully developing his positions and his rapport with New Hampshire; the problems were being overcome, and a noticeable change from a candidacy of protest to a candidacy for the office was in the offing. No other reporters or columnists had been so bold as to report what Wieck had reported. It would have been enough to have left his conclusions as they were, considering the questions that still hung over the campaign, but Wieck was willing to walk to the end of his own journalistic plank.

> It would be inaccurate to say the votes for Senator McCarthy were there in mid-February. He might be lucky to get 30 or 35 percent of the vote. But the write-in votes weren't there for LBJ either. On the whole, the press appears ready to award McCarthy a major psychological victory if he gets 40 percent of the vote, which is very possible.[61]

Both percentages were virtually unspoken by the reporters or by McCarthy workers. The reporters were reluctant to predict what McCarthy might have or to project what he would need for the result to be considered "significant." The McCarthy leadership refused to play the numbers game with the reporters. Anything above the 3 to 5 percent figure quoted by Senator McIntyre would be enough to show the folly of Johnson's policies. If the reporters had concluded that McCarthy needed to get 35 percent of the vote they were neither saying nor writing

it for publication. For Wieck to suggest that 40 percent was the figure and to go on to say that such a vote result was "possible" extended everyone's thinking far beyond the reality about which they felt reasonably sure.

The significance of Wieck's prediction was that he wrote a number and by implication attached his assessment of the reality of the McCarthy candidacy to that percentage. In this way he challenged his colleagues to either agree or disagree with his prediction. The numbers game was out in the open. Wieck had made his evaluation, picked a number and was ready to stand by it. Since the number was much higher than the McCarthy leaders expected, the confidence which Wieck placed in the prediction became contagious. The herd shifted direction and began to write in much the same manner as had Paul Wieck.

The article gave the campaign leaders renewed confidence. They had begun to doubt their own evaluations and to feel isolated from a reality which the press reported in spite of their best efforts to the contrary. With the shift in the direction of the herd came new re-enforcement. The optimism that the New Republic story conveyed radiated to those who had been skeptical during the earlier weeks. Money loosened up and offers of important volunteer assistance came. An excitement that had been a part of the campaign from the beginning now seemed to roll across New Hampshire and outside.

As the herd shifted it also dispersed. Reporters visited local headquarters, followed canvassers, accompanied celebrities, visited with volunteers, attended meetings and assessed voter opinions across the state. Beyond a political campaign the reporters found numerous human interest stories. They worte about the candidate's family, the campaign leadership, the volunteers, the local activists, the campaign's logistics and many other subjects which then found their way into sections of the newspapers not usually concerned with

politics.

The impact of this attention was considerable. With it came re-enforcement which strengthened the campaign itself. A cycle of recognition, adding to credibility, adding to excitement, attracting more attention, expanded the reach of the campaign, which further increased its recognition, which made the campaign formidable with national and international significance.[64] The excitement mounted so rapidly after the publication of Wieck's article, that one network which had withdrawn from covering New Hampshire after Governor Romney withdrew, rushed back, with all it could muster, several days before the election. Theodore White who had all but neglected the McCarthy campaign, also hurried back in an effort to catch up with the ten weeks of activity he had missed.

Notes

[1]Sandra U. Hoeh, Oral History Transcript, (Washington, D.C.: McCarthy Historical Project, Georgetown University, 1969), p. 4.

[2]David C. Hoeh, McCarthy Campaign Memo, January 7, 1968, (file copy).

[3]Barbara Underwood, Oral History Transcript, (Washington, D.C.: McCarthy Historical Project, Georgetown University, 1969), p. 17.

[4]Ibid., p. 18.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Hoeh, S.U., Op.Cit., p. 4.

[7]Hoeh, D.C., Op.Cit., Transcript, p. 5.

[8]The New York Times (February 8, 1968).

[9]Underwood, B., Op.Cit., "McCarthy," p. 23.

[10]Ibid., p. 24.

[11]Ibid., p. 25.

[12]Ibid., p. 26.

[13]The Laconia Evening Citizen (February 8, 1968).

[14]Eugene J. McCarthy, Transcript of Speech, (Concord: February 6, 1968), p. 1.

[15]The Concord Daily Monitor (February 6, 1968).

[16]McCarthy, E., Op.Cit., p. 2.

[17]Ibid., p. 3.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[20]Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[21]Ibid., p. 5.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid., p. 6.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid., p. 7.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid., p. 9.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid., p. 18.

[30]The Concord Daily Monitor (February 6, 1968).

[31]The Nashua Telegraph (February 7, 1968).

[32]Fosters Daily Democrat (February 7, 1968).

[33]Newsweek (February 9, 1968), p. 36.

[34]Time (February 16, 1968), p. 32.

[35]The Boston Herald (February 8, 1968).

[36]The Concord Daily Monitor (February 8, 1968).

[37]The Concord Daily Monitor (February 9, 1968).

[38]The Nashua Telegraph (February 9, 1968).

[39]The Boston Herald Telegraph (February 9, 1968).

[40]The Christian Science Monitor (February 9, 1968).

[41]The New York Times (Feburary 9, 1968).

[42]The New York Times (February 11, 1968).

[43]The Boston Herald Traveler (February 11, 1968).

[44]The Laconia Evening Citizen (February 13, 1968).

[45]The Boston Globe (February 16, 1968).

[46]The Lebanon Valley News (February 19, 1968).

[47]The Nashua Telegraph (February 19, 1968).

[48]The Portsmouth Herald (February 19, 1968).

[49]The Lebanon Valley News (February 24, 1968).

[50]The Lebanon Valley News (March 3, 1968).

[51]The Concord Daily Monitor (February 10, 1968).

[52]The Concord Daily Monitor (March 8, 1968).

[53]David C. Hoeh personal file copy.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Paul Wieck, "McCarthy, Alive and Well in New Hampshire," The New Republic (March 2, 1968), p. 15.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Ibid., p. 16.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid., p. 17.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Ibid.

[63]Ibid.

[64]For the first six weeks of the New Hampshire campaign, Hoch and Studds were surprised to find greater interest on the part of the international reporters in their activities than the national media. London Times reporters Lewis Chester and Bruce Page were frequent visitors. Claus Toksvig of Danish national television, interviewed Hoch on sound film on several occasions for re-play in Denmark. A team of Japanese reporters visited the Concord headquarters to report the election returns by wire directly to Tokyo. Occasionally, the international reporters would travel with the press entourage but usually they travelled by themselves finding their own way to the political contacts and stories.

CHAPTER X

CAMPAIGN VOLUNTEERS

The Kids

During his first visit to New Hampshire Al Lowenstein promised that the 1968 campaign would attract the wide interest of young people and that they could be expected to help with the McCarthy candidacy. While both Hoch and Studds shared this feeling, which came from their own work with college and prep school students, they were not sure that New Hampshire possessed the student resources to effectively staff a full presidential primary campaign. The colleges, in most instances, were too far away from the city campaign headquarters to permit the off-hour between classes participation that college students enjoy.

In their strategy, Hoch and Studds had encouraged the widely held view that the Johnson renomination effort might well be dominated by people and resources from outside of New Hampshire. Realizing that the Johnson image of a large, powerful, even omnipotent Texan capable of submerging friends and enemies alike, was not well received in New Hampshire, Bernard Boutin had promised to run the Johnson primary campaign totally with New Hampshire people and New Hampshire money. Neither Texan nor non-New Hampshire Johnson worker ventured openly, or from all accounts, privately, into New Hampshire during the campaign. Bernard Boutin was in charge and did not feel he needed the help. Given the reaction to his pledge card scheme and its representation of the long hand of Johnson, outside involvement in the Johnson effort would only have exacerbated Boutin's problems. His campaign plan and strategy were set and both depended on local New Hampshire Democrats who Boutin had assummed would jump at the chance to demonstrate their support for their President.

His concept of the campaign was totally dependent on the veracity of these inter-personal contacts. The "pledge card" was the medium of the re-enforcing exchange. When the tactic failed it was already too late for Boutin to change his approach. The only notables whom he felt comfortable reaching for were the major governmental or political officeholders of New Hampshire -- Governor King, Senator McIntyre, and Party Chairman Craig -- not imports from the Johnson administration. Boutin was on the defensive with respect to what personnel and monetary resources he could muster for the President. On the other side, the McCarthy leaders knew that both personnel and resources had to be imported or there would not be a meaningful campaign. Importing people to work on a campaign would require care, especially when the public image of protesting youth was far from favorable in New Hampshire.

With caution Hoeh and Studds began to suggest that volunteers would be welcome in New Hampshire. They clearly feared that a sudden flood of outsiders was possible and that it could destroy their efforts. Managing the flow of outsiders became an important early task. To their relief an early flood of hairy, mini-skirted, disestablishment, anti-war, activist youth did not materialize. Perhaps if it had been a different season than winter or if New Hampshire projected a greater tolerance of alternative life styles, the flow might have been greater. What Hoeh and Studds came to understand was that those most anti-establishment in their views, behavior, and actions had been turned off toward politics much earlier. Those who began arriving were typical of those of other generations who had been attracted to politics as a means of adjusting inequities in their societal surrounding or as a vehicle of upward mobility and personal identity.

Coupled with these patterns was, assuredly, a deeper than usual concern directed toward the Johnson administration's handling of the Vietnam war and the impact that policy was having on their lives and the values they held toward society. Prompted by personal frustration and certain despair, the few volunteers who arrived early in January came simply to help. There was little to attract them to what must have appeared to be a cold and bleak situation except that there was a campaign.

The first few volunteers to arrive in New Hampshire were either students who could take time away from their studies, graduate or undergraduate, or pre-career adults who were between school, or work of an interim activity like the Peace Corps. What was not represented was the volunteer who, while older, was able to leave a job or profession to spend time in New Hampshire. These who came later were at least ten years older than the students who came first, and were willing to spend both their time and money to be involved in the effort.

The flow of volunteers, at least in the beginning was less than spontaneous. The few who were sent to New Hampshire were directed to Concord through contacts with Lowenstein, Gans or those involved early in the national campaign. John Teague who had been involved in the December meeting with Senator McCarthy recruited student volunteers at Smith, Holyoke, his own college Amherst, and the University of Massachusetts. He arranged a regular shuttle of cars to New Hampshire on weekends which later became a chartered bus.

Robert Craig wrote in his study of the primary voter's behavior that a schedule for the Dover, New Hampshire headquarters dated January 10, 1968, read: "11:00 a.m. opened headquarters, 5 guys from Harvard arrived, 1 girl

from Boston, 6 typewriters going, finished Wards 1,2,3, closed at 9 p.m."[1] As his recollection shows there were a few student volunteers who worked at the campaign's earliest area headquarters, but with the exceptions of Dover, Keene, Nashua and Manchester, cities near the large Massachusetts student population, the volunteers trickled to Concord and were kept there.

Beside the early arrivals sent from national campaign headquarters, Concord area students returning home for between-semester vacations got caught in the contagion of the campaign. As an example one worker had a Connecticut College friend from Concord, who when she arrived home called the headquarters about the campaign. It was suggested that she attend McCarthy's January 26th speech and help with activities of McCarthy's first day in New Hampshire. With her sister, a Concord High School senior, and several others from Connecticut College and Concord High School, plans for a skiing vacation evaporated as they all spent the next six days in the Concord headquarters typing address labels and sorting lists. Her parents, who had expected her to ski and didn't care much for McCarthy's politics at that time, were happy to provide meals and beds for their daughter's college friends, and to watch their daughters quickly mature as workers in a campaign. Her reaction was, "People were always asking me why I didn't do something more important in the peace movement rather than going around marching in protest, but I neven knew what else to do. I never knew anyone in politics until Senator McCarthy came along."[2]

The week before and week after McCarthy's January 26th New Hampshire visit were periods when college semesters ended and students arrived in New Hampshire to work. To the delight of the McCarthy committee the headquarters bustled with activity. The work on the mailing labels progressed. At last

there were enough people around to take on the variety of tasks that had to be accomplished either to prepare for McCarthy's visit or to sustain daily work after the visit.

Recruiting had been successful in attracting enough students to New Hampshire during the last week of January and the first week of February to build the campaign to a high energy level. It was the first period of the campaign a time during which the McCarthy leaders were reassured of the success of their planning, amazed that vacationing college students would, first come to New Hampshire, and then stick out a week of boring work in the dismal surroundings of the old electric supply store.

In her account Barbara Underwood noted:

> If Greek architecture can be divided into three periods depending on the decoration on the tops of its columns, so the McCarthy campaign can be divided into three periods depending upon the decoration on the walls of its Concord Headquarters.
>
> In the early period, the decoration of the walls was stark and simple, broken only by a few newspaper clippings and the sketches of children made while their mothers (local volunteers) typed or answered the telephone.
>
> In the middle period, the walls were devoted to what might be called college humor. There were sayings tacked up like: "Strange Politics Makes Bedfellows" or in Yiddish the Avis car rental slogan, "We Try Harder," or in German, French, and Spanish, "No Smoking or Spitting."
>
> In the last period, the walls were covered with elaborate election charts, containing percentages and previous precinct results for the entire state. They covered all available space with the exception of that covered by one huge picture of Paul Newman.[3]

While students were involved in all three periods of the campaign it was not until the late January semester break that the tone of that involvement

became something different. Before, and in many previous campaigns, young people have helped but most had been occasional local volunteers working in local headquarters, doing routine tasks without either great responsibility or influence in the direction of the campaign. The phenomenon that Lowenstein predicted and that the New Hampshire campaign began to experience was that of selfless, almost total commitment, to a political adventure where the symbol was the war issue as remotely personified by McCarthy, the candidate.

In the beginning the students were as they had been in previous campaigns, the workers. The between-semester break saw a headquarters busy with what appeared as twenty-five or thirty nameless blurs typing, sorting, organizing headquarters space without complaint or protest. Their task masters were the Concord area local volunteers who kept track of the work flow, and the earlier volunteers who had begun to assume leadership roles in the campaign. Toward the end of the second week of the inter-session when some of those who had come earlier returned again, a murmer seemed to stir the typing. After a week and, in some cases, even more of typing address labels from almost unreadable voting lists, it had occurred to them that this was a peculiar way to end the war. They had come not expecting to do much more than type labels, stuff, and seal envelopes but now after a week or more of the endless drudgery they wanted to know what it was for, how their work fit into the concept of the campaign, and the importance of their contribution. When the unrest was reported to Hoeh and Studds, they stopped the work, gathered everyone in the front room of the headquarters, introduced themselves and explained. They discussed the strategy of the campaign and the importance of being able to mail directly to each registered Democratic and Independent voter in the state.

They put in perspective the miserable typing task and expressed their regret that there was no other way to do the job and that they, bright and valued as volunteers, could make no greater contribution to McCarthy's New Hampshire candidacy than to prepare labels. Following several questions about the campaign, McCarthy's positions and New Hampshire politics, the crew returned to their typewriters, if not with renewed commitment, at least resigned to continue.

The brief meeting accomplished a subtle change in the attitude of the volunteers. Before they had worked without a sense of context and tended to proceed almost blindly as their individual energy and ability to concentrate allowed. After the meeting they sensed that preparing the labels was their job and as such they should become responsible for its organization and efficiency. With the help of several of the long-term volunteers they began to organize the job into separable tasks which could be understood and controlled while at the same time being susceptable to changing personnel as volunteers came and went. Gradually as the students organized, the local volunteers began to lose touch with the work. Their own irregular schedules and other demands on their time made it increasingly difficult for them to keep on top of the schedule and flow of work in the headquarters. In this gradual shift was a sense that the campaign itself had come alive.

Like any organization that is growing, the McCarthy campaign had its pains. Symptomatic of this struggle was the lack of identification with the campaign that the volunteers felt before their meeting with Hoch and Studds, but another symptom was the difficulty the leaders had in finding things for volunteers to do. While this might sound like a contradiction given the

enormity of the task ahead, like any activity of the scale of a campaign, each echelon can employ only those for whom there is support. Keeping the flow of work and the flow of volunteers balanced was difficult throughout the campaign but especially so in the early stages. Barbara Underwood reported, "One weekend at the end of January, the Concord Chairman stopped into the headquarters and was appalled by the number of college girls who were there for one or two days and had no particular work assigned to them. He called his wife, asked her to get a babysitter, then go to the headquarters and start immediately organizing the students into something productive."[4] What she did was send several girls out on Concord's Main Street to hand out flyers announcing McCarthy's up-coming speech, others went to a shopping center to do the same, while still others were assigned to telephones and made calls inviting area residents to hear McCarthy. For this she received criticism from two sides. "One particularly attractive girl from Smith College felt she was wasting her intelligence in coming all the way from Northampton and not being assigned a more useful role in the campaign, while another complaint came from a member of the local committee who commented on what she had seen on Main Street. She thought it 'looked dreadful.'"[5] Between the two criticisms was the fact that the arrival of the voluneers was not expected and the system was not prepared to orient and absorb the sudden arrivals. There were not enough tables, typewriters, chairs or lights and without these the priority work could not be done. And beyond that there was almost no one in the headquarters at the time the volunteers arrived who could provide either the tools or the assignments that would turn the potential energy into a campaign product. The local leader's initiative in sending kids to hand out leaflets was a good ploy for the moment but hardly the best way to apply volunteer energy to the machinery of the campaign. No wonder, as was reported to Barbara Underwood,

the girls on Main Street "were walking around looking tired, bored, and were smoking."[6] They had neither been oriented to the campaign nor welcomed to it. They had simply been given a task to busy themselves without knowing how to behave while accomplishing that task.

Without much method, the McCarthy leaders squeaked through the two week inter-session flood of volunteers letting assignments and events evolve. While serious work was accomplished, it was more an adventure, possibly a lark, for the young men and women who came to New Hampshire those two weeks. To succeed both the leaders of the campaign and the long term volunteers realized that special attention had to be given to accommodating, orienting, assigning and even, occasionally, de-briefing volunteers in order to gain the full potential from the short-term visits.

One of the reasons Hoeh insisted that volunteers who expected to stay in New Hampshire for more than a day or two check in with him, was his desire to provide a basic orientation to the political ethos of New Hampshire and to establish direct communication with the individual. When that person then left for an assignment, either at an area headquarters or to a specific task in the state headquarters, the person knew who to contact if questions arose. When assigned to a local office the person had the responsibility of working closely with the local committee and responding to their suggestions. While this dual responsibility to the state campaign and to the local campaign created some tension it was necessary. Both statewide campaign needs and candidate preferences dictated that the priority response had to be to the state and national campaigns but without being insensitive to local needs.

The flock of volunteers who came to New Hampshire during late January and early February received almost no media attention. Studds and Hoch would sit in their office looking out on the main room of the Concord headquarters, and comment to each other that the room full of volunteers from Amherst, Holyoke, Smith, Connecticut College, Yale, Harvard, MIT and other universities was the important story of the campaign at that moment. In spite of their best efforts to get the media to report the story attention was minute. The first story to appear was written by a UPI Concord reporter who met seven of the college volunteers. His interviews picked up some of the reasons for the visits to New Hampshire.

> 'A lot of young people began campaigning for McCarthy because of the war, Christine Howells from Connecticut College for Women said. 'At first he was just a symbol, but since I've been working for him I now think of him as a president.'
>
> These students try to tell you that McCarthy is more than just an opponent of the war. 'If people would read the speeches McCarthy has given they would realize McCarthy isn't a one issue man,' Peter Sturgis of Harvard said.": 'He points out the symptoms, using Vietnam as his focus.'
>
> .... Susan Solenberger from Smith feels 'the important thing for this nation is to have an alternative. McCarthy is a declared candidate.' she added. 'It would be a sicker country if McCarthy wasn't around'.

The reporters had met these students while traveling with McCarthy during his visit to Laconia February 8th. Neither he nor had others visited the headquarters to see the activity there. These early contacts, first with the local reporters and gradually with the national reporters sparked their curiosity. As one reporter described: "... in New Hampshire it's sometimes a pretty lonely business campaigning for McCarthy. The caravan of two staff cars and a reporter's car headed out of Concord for Laconia into the dark New Hampshire night, looking like a convoy heading into enemy territory."[8]

Without locals to interview on these rides the reporters came to know the students, their reasons for coming to New Hampshire, their expectations and their backgrounds. It was something to do and something to report until the caravan arrived at a rendezvous point where the local guides took charge. It was during these early journeys that the reporters met a few students who gave them the flavor of the campaign that was evolving. It would be sometime later before the reporters discovered the headquarters activity and learned that New Hampshire was becoming a mecca for a new volunteer force in American politics.

Perhaps the reason this discovery took so long in spite of the efforts of the McCarthy leaders was a coincidence in timing which found Roger Mudd and his CBS film crew in an almost deserted Concord office late in January. Mudd had come to New Hampshire to prepare a special report on the primary election and had come to Concord to interview Governor King and visit the McCarthy headquarters. He and his crew arrived at the McCarthy headquarters at noon when both local and student volunteers had left for lunch. Only one volunteer was in the otherwise deserted building. Sensing that CBS was about to carry a film story of an empty headquarters decorated only with a few maps and children's drawings the volunteer frantically telephoned a local home where some volunteers had gone for lunch. The attempt to get the headquarters activity up failed as Mudd interviewed the Concord chairman, who happened by, while the film crew photographed his three year old son drawing another picture to be added to those already decorating the walls.[9] It was hardly the image of a vigorous campaign organizing to challenge the nomination of an incumbent president.

Just as suddenly as the flock of students arrived at the beginning of their semester recess, they left. By Monday, February 12th only the few long-termers remained and even the ranks of these had dwindled. That evening when Hoch joined Studds in Concord, the headquarters was almost empty. Where there had been almost two weeks of constant activity that began early and ended late in the evening, only a typewriter or two clicked and unfinished stacks of checklists remained to be scanned for mailing label addresses. Once again the frightening sense of loneliness and despair that the New Hampshire leaders faced following the McCarthy's New Hampshire candidacy announcement returned. The campaign that had been moving with great speed until then lay dead in the water. Fortunately it was a Monday. The press had left New Hampshire with McCarthy, local reporters were catching up on other news and few noticed that the headquarters of the New Hampshire McCarthy campaign was deserted. Even the simplest tasks of answering a telephone, finding some notes or determining the next priority seemed overpowering. For more than an hour they stumbled around their small office, roamed the empty work room and tried to figure out how they would resolve their predicament. McCarthy's candidacy, they concluded, was a national campaign. To that moment, with the exception of a trickle of money, little national support had arrived. They called for help. First to Blair Clark, then to the people they had come to know before McCarthy entered, such as Curtis Gans and Allard Lowenstein. Then they called those they had constantly pestered for materials and assistance at the national headquarters. The sense of confidence which had grown during the previous weeks was gone. Their own desperation became urgent pleas for new volunteers, long-term staff people and an assurance of adequate financial support. With their plea was a reminder that unless McCarthy succeeded in New Hampshire his campaign and the test which his candidacy represented would

be lost. The McCarthy leaders were not willing to hide their predicament. They desperately needed help. The election was, they reminded those they called, exactly one month from that February 12th date.

Logistics and Volunteers

While it was uncomfortable for Hoeh and Studds to have the February 12th break, it was important for the future development of the campaign. It gave them and the continuing volunteers a chance to assess what could and could not be accomplished with volunteer help, to what stage the campaign had developed, and to manage the next wave of activity. In addition to preparing the mailing labels several other tasks had evolved. Students were traveling with the Senator, helping to advance his visits, working with local committees, aiding the press activity, receiving visitors, preparing campaign materials, doing research and generally performing a multiplicity of tasks that were not always at the direction of either the state or the local leaders. Their initiative was especially engaging and something that Hoeh and Studds found could be used.

With only brief instructions and an outline of what had to be done, the students would develop an assignment fully, come back to the leaders to check their plans and then go ahead with the project. This performance led Hoeh and Studds to conclude that future management of the campaign's day-to-day operations could be turned over to the volunteers as long as they understood that when questions arose they were to check with either Studds or Hoeh before changing an activity. What evolved was a series of departments within the campaign organized around particular tasks. The departments were almost autonomous having their own organization, their own means of communication and their own links to other departments which might share an objective. Hints of this

eventual organization had appeared earlier but now the campaign leaders took full advantage of the opportunity.

Volunteers needed places to sleep, eat and ways to travel. When the flow was one or two volunteer arrivals every few days, local friends of the campaign made room in their homes for volunteers. Even in the days of the semester-recess migration local homes absorbed most of the arrivals.

Stretching the walls of homes went only so far especially in cities like Manchester were the McCarthy locals were few and far between. In desperation, those who were responsible for housing volunteers began contacting churches where a pastor was sympathetic to McCarthy's anti-war position. In Manchester, Nashua, Concord and several other cities where major volunteer campaigning was needed, church basements and activity rooms became weekend dormitories for literally hundreds of kids -- a term which came to describe anyone, young or older, student or not, who came to New Hampshire to work for Senator McCarthy.

The first effort to have the kids arrive ready to work and survive in New Hampshire was a work-of-mouth instruction. Each should bring a sleeping bag and if they had a portable typewriter to bring that as well. Transportation was much less of a problem since most arrived in groups with their own cars nut, occasionally, as with the Amherst shuttle, a bus was hired. In all cases such charters were paid for by those making the trip.

With the exception of those who came and stayed for more than a weekend no expenses were paid. Occasionally a starving student would turn up who could not find money for a meal and the headquarters petty cash would be tapped for a transfusion. In some cases those sponsoring cars and even a bus or two would raise money locally to sustain the volunteers during their journey. The long term volunteers received a modest per diem which covered the cost of meals, car operation if one were used and housing in the case of those who had to rent accommodations. With the exception of a few of the national staff who eventually came to work in New Hampshire and two secretaries, no other campaign workers were paid.

Beyond keeping a "straight-laced" even puritanical image for the campaign, the McCarthy leaders were concerned that New Hampshire might become a haven for those wishing to escape school and parental authority. They feared that someone might report to the press that their son or daughter had been lured away to the campaign much as a legendary circus run-away. Unlike the circus, which enjoys its reputation as an over powering attraction, the campaign could not afford such a charge. To avoid the possibility, they insisted that each person who arrived to work in New Hampshire register through the state headquarters or at the local headquarters. A printed card containing space for the person's name, school, home address, person to contact in case of emergency, home and school telephone, campaign assignment, and where they were staying while in New Hampshire, had to be filled out by each volunteer on arrival. These cards were kept in a master file in the state headquarters to be used in case of emergency but as importantly, to demonstrate to any who asked that the campaign knew its volunteers. When a volunteer returned to the state for other visits the card was pulled, the visit recorded, and then placed

in a special file of those then working in the campaign.[10]

Although no one made the charge which was feared, the file was used to find volunteers in emergencies and also to keep track of persons who, because they returned frequently, could handle more difficult jobs. The whole process of registering and then assigning volunteers to jobs became thorough and sophisticated. Since volunteers came for short periods, usually weekends, they did not want to wait long to be put to work nor did the campaign want them to wait. After the confusion of the semester recess time the housing department in the campaign became the conduit through which requests for volunteers came not only to staff the state headquarters but also to staff the local offices. Where in the beginning almost all volunteers would arrive in Concord and then be assigned elsewhere, the volunteer operation began to anticipate how many people would be needed for the local headquarters and then contact the kids directing them to a local work place. This approach worked especially well when groups of volunteers returned after a first visit. They had become familiar with the campaign, their job, and could be sent directly to a local headquarters without having to be oriented or having to learn an assignment. In a short time these returnees had become professionals. They knew what had to be done, how to do it and how to behave while visiting New Hampshire.

The registration process became a curiosity to reporters because in addition to assignments by skills there was also a sorting by appearance. The campaign had inside jobs and outside jobs. Those who wished to work outside, that is either with the candidate, or representing the campaign, had to be conservative in dress and appearance. In that time long hair male or female, facial hair, short skirts or funky clothing were viewed as symbols of protest.

Those arriving with trimmed hair, clean faces, conservative clothing and neat appearances were assigned the outside jobs. Those who were more casual in their appearance were assigned to the less visable jobs even, on occasion, totally out of sight. With the exception of Studds' order to two bearded men that they not associate with the campaign on McCarthy's first campaign visit, peer pressure prevailed. To be "Neat and Clean for Gene" was the slogan and a fact of the campaign. Enforcement of the slogan rested with the volunteer leaders. Their code was stiff. It was, in their view, a privilege to help and if appearance or behavior did not meet the image they had set then the alternative was simple. Stay out of sight, leave New Hampshire or change appearance.

Once the criteria had been accepted by the earliest arrivals, the rite of passage into the campaign was often more stringent than would have been applied if the local leaders had enforced the code. At first there were a number of hair cuts, beard shavings and hair combings around the headquarters, but as the first weeks passed most volunteers arrived well groomed and often a bit over dressed for comfort in the New Hampshire winter. Sport coats, even ties and dress shirts replaced sweaters, turtlenecks and army jackets.

The Second Wave

As Barbara Underwood noted in her account, there were three periods in the evolution of the student volunteers' participation in the campaign. The first was marked by the surprise arrival of students during the semester recess and departure when they returned to their schools during the first week of February. The second period began during the second week of February when, in response to Hoeh and Studds plea for help, a new stream of volunteers

began. Like many others there were Ben and Rosann Stavis. They planned to spend more time than a weekend in New Hampshire. In the Stavis's account of their experiences he wrote, "...at the beginning of February, Rosann and I had a block of free time. I had just passed my oral examinations and could leave campus and studies for awhile. Rosann was working on her dissertation in home economics education at New York University and could also leave New York. So on February 14th, St. Valentine's Day, we took a bus to Boston and, next morning, another one to Concord, New Hampshire -- almost four weeks before the New Hampshire primary. We walked into the headquarters about 10:30 a.m., suitcases in hand."[11]

Special Projects

Stavis and others, functioned as a small task force to research how canvassing might be accomplished. The McCarthy leaders admitted that they knew little about the mechanics of door-to-door canvassing. They needed a full exploration of the subject before trying it in New Hampshire. Some canvassing efforts had been tried in an effort to reach voters with the anti-Vietnam war message but most of these door-to-door contacts had been concentrated in academic communities such as Cambridge, Massachusetts; Berkley, California; Ann Arbor, Michigan; or Madison, Wisconsin. Canvassing had not been used in any previous New Hampshire campaign that could be recalled. The work of the task force led to forming a canvassing strategy and an important campaign activity.

A Boston recruit, a thirty-year-old lawyer, John Grace, who had been attracted to McCarthy through the activities of the Massachusetts McCarthy Committee made a unique contribution to the campaign. After

McCarthy skated in Concord, February 6th, Hoeh and Studds wanted to capture the event in a way that would tie McCarthy to New Hampshire's hockey mania. Grace thought an ice scraper might be designed to look like a hockey stick and have printed on it McCarthy's name and a slogan. Grace found that it would be expensive to create a new scraper shape and would take too long, but an alternative could be to print a picture of a skater and slogan on the handle of an available scraper. Grace placed an immediate order for about 5,000 of the scrapers each carrying the slogan "McCarthy Cuts the Ice -- McCarthy for President." Most were distributed in Manchester and where local organization was weakest.

Another recruit for the New Hampshire campaign was a recently returned wounded veteran of the Vietnam war, Carl Rogers. His convalescence almost complete, Rogers arrived wanting to help. To use him as a regular volunteer seemed to not quite fit his political potential. When he arrived Hoeh and Studds discussed with him what he might do which would illustrate that the war was not opposed just by the "peace-niks" "weak-kneed" or "lily-livered," as they had been variously characterized, but the war was also opposed by the veterans who had fought it.

Rogers speculated a bit then concluded that he could speak on campuses to help recruit volunteers; speak before local groups and service clubs, and he could bring together a new organization of Vietnam Veterans Against the War, something that had already begun. On the latter point he felt an obligation to his fellow service men both those in and out of the military. Hoeh and Studds felt that of the three the most helpful would be the latter, organizing anti-war opposition among Vietnam Veterans. For Rogers to do this

meant establishing some distance between the McCarthy campaign and that of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. While coordination was important, for the Veterans to act independently of the campaign would give them greater impact and credibility.

Rogers agreed that speaking before church groups, service clubs and in the schools would be useful but he wanted to do more. He felt that he could recruit a number of Vietnam veterans who would welcome the chance to come to New Hampshire to help end the war, and that many of these young men would want to do more than speak occasionally. His idea was to develop a special piece of literature which stated the veterans' reasons for opposing the war, and then distribute this themselves. While the New Hampshire leaders were concerned about having separate groups use the campaign for special interest advocacy, to them if any group had earned the right to state a separate position it was the war's veterans. Regardless of what they did in stating their position it would be difficult to discredit them or to tie the McCarthy campaign to them in a way that would be damaging. In fact, Hoeh and Studds felt that even if the public reaction to the veterans' activity was negative, the fact that a significant number of the war's veterans were willing to take the time to work against the war would be unsettling to the New Hampshire voter at the worst.

While not strictly "kids" in the usual definition of the word as defined by the McCarthy campaign, the Vietnam veterans were contemporaries of the college students but contemporaries whose experiences in Vietnam set them apart. There was kinship between the vets and the other kids but a kinship

that was distinct when the vets began their efforts at anti-war political education. The public perceived that the vets had paid dues, the others had not, and, therefore, deserved a certain respect. For this reason, the Vietnam vets were able to do things which would have been poorly received, given the climate of the time, by their college student peers.

In addition to speaking and campus organizing, the veterans decided to hand out their brochure on the streets and attempt to get passersby to discuss the war. On weekends, during heavy shopping times, and during pleasant weather, the vets occupied street corners carrying a sign which identified them as a Vietnam veteran. There they politely distributed the flyers, talked with people and urged them to support Senator McCarthy's candidacy. Dressed in their old uniforms they had a startling effect on those who had no direct contact with the war. During the last three weeks of the campaign the ranks of the veterans swelled from a few leaders like Carl Rogers, to forty or fifty men. Since Manchester was the problem city for McCarthy and the one with the largest Democratic vote, Rogers concentrated his fellow veterans there. On practically every corner of the city's main thoroughfare, Elm Street, there stood a veteran with his sign, flyers and a cluster of curious persons questioning and listening. Of the group that came to New Hampshire, many were not veterans. John Fitzgerald, a captain recovering from wounds received in action, was at the end of convalescent leave. He and a number of others found ways to come to New Hampshire to support the veterans' activity while still either in some stage of discharge or active duty. For those with time yet to serve, coming to New Hampshire in uniform to protest the war carried serious penalties if reported. Rogers' veterans seemed to melt in and out of the state when needed.

From those who arrived in the second wave of volunteers came the principal leaders and organizers of the major activities of the last weeks of the campaign. Each department in the headquarters was staffed and often led by volunteers who had either come earlier and stayed, or had arrived early in February prepared to remain. Direct mail preparation, press relations, scheduling, canvassing, candidate support, volunteer recruiting and support, headquarters management, media preparation, materials distribution, special group contacts, speakers scheduling and many other activities were staffed with individuals who had little or no previous political experience.

From the weekend volunteers came the workers who carried out the projects that were organized and planned during the week. Often students would return weekend after weekend to work. Since the source of help became reliable, those leading the various departments tended to keep track of their own volunteers and plan projects for them. An informal hierarchy evolved which placed people according to how long they had been with the New Hampshire campaign, how long they could spend during a given visit and how frequently they could promise to return. At the bottom of the scale were those new arrivals who had not been involved in the New Hampshire campaign before and might not be able to return.

In addition to the organizational change of the second period was a change in the relationship of the early leaders to those who came later. Ben Stavis recounted his impressions from the perspective of a volunteer arriving, being assigned to a task and observing from that task the campaign he found.

> The New Hampshire staff included very few New Hampshirites. We did hire a mature local woman to be full-time receptionist; she could say "McCarthy" with the proper New England nasal twang. Furthermore, she helped us find our way around town and the state. The local radical, a seventy-eight-year-old woman who went to world fellowship conferences all around the world, came to stuff envelopes. The Concord co-chairman was Marcie Macey, a young housewife. (The other co-chairman, a doctor, was vacationing in the Bahamas during the last weeks of the campaign.)
>
> ...Another staff member from Concord was a boy of twelve who built tables, desks, sleeping bag lockers, and telephone tables with booths. The state chairman, David Hoeh, thirty years old and an administrator at Dartmouth College, came by from time to time with his wife Sandi (sic). They were concerned with the media, with the Senator's schedule, and with their own relationship with the state Democratic Party. These broad responsibilities meant that neither could supervise the hourly crises in the headquarters. And since they were from Dartmouth, the staff they recruited worked in Hanover. The state headquarters, then, as it developed campaigns both in Concord and in the entire state, was dominated by outsiders.[12]

Stavis had arrived in Concord just at the point when the transition from local operation of the state campaign to operation by the imported volunteers had occurred. In the early weeks the Concord McCarthy supporters had filled many of the state campaign jobs as their personal schedules would allow. No one from New Hampshire had been able to devote full time to the campaign as a volunteer. As the tasks of the statewide effort grew, the local committee members tended to recede to those local tasks that they, and only they, could accomplish. These usually concerned scheduling Senator McCarthy, members of his family, special speakers and visitors with rounds of local events, meetings and publicity. They also were concerned with expanding the local organization to included the ward and precinct level, working with special groups and making election day preparations. What Stavis did not see nor understand was that what had once been a small statewide organization on behalf of McCarthy's candidacy had now become a federated campaign.

The Press Discovers the Kids

As determined as the New Hampshire leaders had been to get the story of the student volunteers told, it was not until the activity had been going for several weeks that the reporters finally became interested. In fact both Hoeh and Studds were concerned that if the influx was not discussed by the press that it might be attacked by the Johnson Committee in a way that could be embarassing. They felt that there was a point at which an incident coming from the student activity, might be picked up by either the Johnson Committee or the Manchester Union Leader. Either could have re-cast the positive impression which Hoeh and Studds felt the students projected into something akin to an invasion of New Hampshire's sacred political rite, an invasion by the same crowd that was then protesting in the streets and occupying university administration buildings. Once the student's positive role had been established by the press, then it would be difficult to change. Hoeh especially feared the Manchester Union Leader's ability to destroy efforts they opposed by raising the activity to one of public controversy. If having students come to New Hampshire to work for McCarthy had been described by the Union Leader as controversial before either the other state media or the national media had had a chance to review the activity for themselves then, Hoeh contended, the old adage "where there is smoke there must be fire" could have prevailed. Instead of being warmly received in the communities as the notoriety of the student activity grew, there might well have been hostility. The campaign would not only have lost its manpower, but also the attributes of energy, charm and sincerity which the students infused. To deny the campaign the manpower alone would have been a death blow to the campaign that had been planned. While both were firmly committed to the involvement of students and other volunteers in the campaign, there were times when some questioned whether the press and the volunteers should get acquainted.

During the latter weekends of the campaign when the flood was nearing its crest the volunteer coordinators would try to soften the rigors of a Saturday of campaigning by holding a party late in the evening in the cities where the volunteers were concentrated. These social events offered the volunteers a chance to relax, warm-up and share their experiences before trundling off to the basement of some church or the rec room of a house to sleep. Keeping the puritan spirit, booze was not allowed nor much else in the way of party fixings, just loud music, milling or exhausted and slumped bodies trying to sort out what their trip to New Hampshire meant and how their experiences could possibly help elect McCarthy and/or stop a war.

McCarthy was scheduled to campaign in Manchester Saturday evening, February 24th. With the exception of the few students who worked as travelling aides of the Senator, until that evening few of the students had seen Senator McCarthy in New Hampshire. As usual a party for the volunteers was scheduled and, on this evening, it was to be in the Manchester Room of the Sherator-Carpenter Hotel in downtown Manchester. The scheduled starting time about 10:30 p.m. was late enough so that the candidate and the reporters would be tucked away after a long campaign day.

McCarthy had travelled to Manchester from Berlin and arrived to tour Manchester's busy ethnic social clubs. His car was followed by a bus load of national reporters who enjoyed watching the urbane McCarthy pass among the startled patrons of Manchester's most prominant social spots. Before the tour began Curtis Gans had ordered the organizers of the student volunteer party to be sure that the party did not begin until after McCarthy's tour was over and he and the press had returned to their respective accommodations. In fact he had

ordered that the party should not begin until after 12:00 midnight when he was quite sure all of the reporters would be out of sight. Gans was deeply concerned that if the reporters stumbled upon the party they would see an unruly mob of young people, listening to rock music and appearing much as did their peers then protesting outside the political system. He felt that if this image were projected the carefully managed effort would be destroyed in a welter of controversy over the appearance and behavior of contemporary youth.

Hoeh had been meeting with Gans when Gans issued his order. As Hoeh drove the short distance from the Sheraton-Wayfarer Motel, where the meeting was held, to the Sheraton-Carpenter he mulled over Gan's order in his mind. When he arrived at the Sheraton-Carpenter he had concluded that contrary to Gans his own view was that the young people were the ones who had the greatest stake in the campaign and their commitment should not be hidden. He immediately found the person who Gans had talked to and said that he should continue with the preparations. The party, Hoeh said, would be held at the earlier hour. He then said that he intended to not only invite McCarthy to meet the volunteers but also to invite the reporters. When the entourage returned to the Sheraton-Carpenter from the social club tour little betrayed the crowd that had assembled inside the Manchester Room. A nervous Curtis Gans had made sure that the large crowd of volunteers was not straggling outside the hotel or even in the lobby leading to the Manchester Room. McCarthy led the throng of reporters and film crews.

Into a darkened room almost packed with young volunteers strode McCarthy to instant applause from the crowd. One of the rare electric events of politics occurred as McCarthy came in view of the several hundred who had come this far to work so hard for him. The television lights followed McCarthy through the crowd to a low platform and microphone. Gans had made sure that those closest to the

door and nearest the platform were among the "neatest and cleanest for Gene." McCarthy spoke briefly, welcoming his workers with the now famous phrase, "you all look like a government in exile," which brought a roar from the crowd. He answered several questions about his candidacy, the war and such, to which he replied with his usual skill. The crowd, the press and Senator McCarthy were delighted. The candidate, especially sparkled. It had been a long day for all but each moment was savored as the rapport between McCarthy, his campaign and the often cynical press blossomed. It had been a risky venture to bring the three together under such inauspicious circumstances. As a result the three were joined into a force of considerable power. McCarthy left for his hotel, the television lights faded, cameras, note pads, lights and microphones were packed, and the reporters, crews and volunteers made friends in the dimness of the Manchester Room. If there was a love-in during the campaign, the evening of February 24th came the closest to it.

The authors of the book The American Melodrama wrote of earlier discussions concerning students in 1968 politics which captured the concern many felt before students, politics, media, campaign and candidate were joined as they were in New Hampshire.

> While McCarthy supplied the all-important respectibility to the enterprise, the students came through with the energy. Back in November 1967, Robert Kennedy had discussed with Professor Galbraith the kind of campaign McCarthy ought to wage in New Hampshire. Kennedy was very emphatic on one specific point, urging Galbraith to tell McCarthy, "Make sure this is a grown-up enterprise. He'll have more Dartmouth undergrads than he could or should use. So let him look out for that." That a campaign could be "grown-up" and yet make lavish use of student volunteers was not part of the conventional political wisdom.[13]

With care on both the part of the students and on the part of those managing the campaign, a "grown-up enterprise" materialized.

Like many of the more successful events of the New Hampshire campaign the volunteers' party and the McCarthy visit were spontaneous. To have staged such

a meeting would have been impossible. If Gans' instinct had been followed instead of Hoch's, the moment would have been lost; the students might have viewed themselves as an embarassment to the campaign, and been less willing to continue. McCarthy, himself, could have vetoed the visit, but he had come to trust the New Hampshire leaders judgment. He also like the sincerity, intelligence and energy of the young people he had met. Saturday evening, February 24th sealed the pact between candidate, issues, campaign and an inquisitive, amazed press. From then on a honeymoon prevailed that could not be dimmed as the press attributed prodigious accomplishments to the nation's youth suddenly aroused to effective political action.

Before February 24th, the reporters had begun to find the edges of the growing volunteer body in the campaign. The student press from the schools whose students came to New Hampshire were the first to run stories about adventures on the New Hampshire campaign trail. The Amherst Student in a February 12th story headlined "The McCarthy Campaign: Students, Speeches, Snoopy," recounted the reporter's travels with the campaign and observation of the "Senator ... up at 6:15 a.m. in 10 degree weather to greet Scott and Williams employees as they arrived at work. Four Smithies, bedecked in cellophane-blue McCarthy hats and holding 'Happiness is McCarthy' posters featuring pictures of Snoopy, told the workers 'Senator McCarthy would like to meet you..." The writer's enticing conclusion for those who might consider heading for New Hampshire to campaign read:

> The day in Laconia and Lebanon may not have been well oiled nor the turn outs overwhelming, but the enthusiasm of the volunteers which McCarthy is banking on heavily, was in great evidence. The four Smith girls had been campaigning with the Senator all week, and they were still vibrant, running alongside the Senator as he toured the downtowns of the two villages, holding signs, handing out literature, and providing the needed spark of enthusiasm.[14]

The reporting by the student press was not always without serious criticism. The Yale Daily News headlined a story about New Hampshire, "Bright Hopes and Dim Realities," which led "Despite a newly-polished campaign style, Senator Eugene McCarthy gave little evidence in his swing through New Hampshire last week that he can launch a major attack there against President Johnson's Vietnam policy." The article went on to note places where the blame for the campaign's failure might be laid. First noting that the "...daily press which tends to ignore a candidate if he doesn't come up with a new and striking statement each day...," and "...McCarthy's organization which has only two full time paid workers in the state."[15] Peter Donham, editor of the Harvard Crimson came to cover the student activity in New Hampshire for his paper. He tried to retain his journalistic neutrality, but eventually he became so attached to the campaign and Senator McCarthy that he gave up not only his editorial position but college as well and ran away to the press staff of the McCarthy political circus.

The New York Times printed its first notice of the student involvement in New Hampshire February 18th with a section heading which read, "College Students Help," followed by:

> The McCarthy campaign has been bolstered, particularly on weekends, by college students from inside and outside the state who have addressed and stuffed envelopes and done other necessary chores as their contribution to the Senator's campaign against the Administration's conduct of the Vietnam war.[15]

As the result of Hoch and Studds' urging a few items concerning the student involvement did appear in the New Hampshire press but these stirred only local interest. Jack Hubbard of the Concord Daily Monitor, wrote in his February 7th column:

McCarthy had become an inspiration for the disenchanted Democrat, and the slogan (At Last, Democrats have a Political Alternative) has become a battle cry for his New Hampshire organization, most of whom are political novices.

The McCarthy campaign perhaps has the least chance of succeeding in New Hampshire but it is by far the closest to the soil of political protest, and it represents a significant grass roots movement.

The backbone of the New Hampshire McCarthy headquarters is the college student, and many of them believe McCarthy is the last bastion of opposition in the existing political structure to President Johnson.

On weekends, these students trek from all over New England, pitching in with the drudge work of the campaign, typing, pasting, mailing, and answering the telephone.

Last weekend, more than 90 students came from Amherst, Smith, Connecticur College for Women, Mt. Holyoke, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard, New York University, and Yale to work on the McCarthy campaign.

Some of them were in Concord, while others were dispatched to storefront headquarters in Nashua, Manchester, Keene, Laconia, Lebanon, and Dover to do office work.

Still other students went hunting for voter checklists in Granite State towns.

> The governor was ready to concede that the student power invasion has assisted McCarthy.
>
> 'They're a good, clean-cut bunch,' he said. 'I hope they come up here and live and become good Democrats.'
>
> The emphasis was on the word 'good.'
>
> 'They have stirred up curiosity and interest, and they have very probably cut down on the President's margin.' he added.[17]

Even in the heat and bitterness of the last few days of the campaign, Governor King, who did not spare his language when it came to McCarthy, knew that the kids had won their way into the hearts of even many who would be voting for President Johnson on March 12th. The fact that the kids had been attacked and the public had come to their defense assured the New Hampshire McCarthy leaders that they could expand the use of outside volunteers beyond headquarter's assignments. To them the role of the volunteers had been legitimized. They had survived an attack and were prospering through the special attention the volunteers received in the press.

Unquestionably columnist Mary McGrory became the godmother or midwife, depending upon one's view, who thrust the volunteers into national prominence. After her first column appeared a flood of reporters, film crews and subsequent articles and television features reported on the volunteers to the point where it almost became the dominant story of the campaign. Larger than life images of an immense "children's crusade" were marched out of New Hampshire by film and typewriter to a confused and cynical national populace. In a time when the generations seemed irreconcilibly apart, the accounts of volunteer activity from New Hampshire were refreshing if not completely reassuring.

> The students are in contrast to the rank and file party pro that populates the "Citizens for Johnson" headquarters in Manchester, and full time campaigners working for Nixon and Romney.
>
> During the week, the McCarthy activity lulls somewhat because classes are in session.[16]

Not until almost a month later would stories of the same depth be written for national press. It was not until the Manchester volunteers party February 24th, and the escalating fortunes of McCarthy in New Hampshire, that the national press sensed there were more stories in the 1968 New Hampshire campaign than those tied strictly to the activities of the candidate.

While Hoeh and Studds were sure that the Hubbard account was not premature, the Johnson campaign saw an opportunity to take a crack at the volunteers coming from outside the state. In a press conference Governor King commented that the McCarthy campaign could not be considered as a serious threat because it had failed to receive broad local support. In fact, he noted, the campaign relies almost totally on college students from outside New Hampshire to support its efforts. Concerned that this change might stir the investigative juices of the Manchester Union Leader the New Hampshire leaders anxiously waited to see what response might develop. Like other tactics of the LBJ committee King's comments seemed to backfire. A number of local people were critical of King's remarks explaining their own involvement in the campaign and defending the assistance the students were providing with their local activities. Toward the end of the campaign Governor King was quoted as having said, "It's those damned kids," when asked why McCarthy was creeping up on his candidate. In an interview published four days before the election David B. Wilson of the Boston Globe wrote:

Mary McGrory, who had been a Johnson supporter in her columns and even his ally on the war, had come to appreciate the critique of Johnson's policies by Robert Kennedy, but was captured by her friend Eugene McCarthy. A skeptic, a realist and believer in the invincibility of an incumbent president, Miss McGrory came to New Hampshire to cover McCarthy as a friend attempting to ease the pain of his Don Quixote quest. She then visited the state headquarters and could scarcely tear herself away to write her column -- a column that became among the most important of the political year. The headline read: "A Success for McCarthy: Closing the Generation Gap." Datline: Concord, N.H.

> Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy is fighting hard here to close the wide gap between himself and President Johnson in the New Hampshire primary next Tuesday. Where he has already been visibly and dramatically successful is in closing the gap between the generations and making good on his promise to civilize dissent.
>
> It was no surprise that students from 100 colleges as far west as Michigan and as far south as Virginia should rush up here week-ends to give their all for an anti-war candidate. What is phenomenal is the reception they have been accorded by reputedly hawkish natives who are traditionally unfriendly to strangers.
>
> Grave apprehension attended the first unleashing of youth three weeks ago. It was widely feared that the senator's 'hippie' friends would deliver the coup de grace to his marginal chances.
>
> But thanks to brilliant generalship on the part of the youth director, Sam Brown, a dropout from Harvard Divinity School, and unexpected docility on the part of the students, the enterprise has developed a spirit and life that has un-nerved the pro-Johnson camp, beginning with Gov. John W. King.
>
> Their parents and professors might not recognize the cheerful, humble, willing volunteers who ring doorbells, sweep floors and lick envelopes for 16 hours at a stretch.
>
> From the moment their buses disgorge them and their sleeping bags at the door of the state headquarters at Concord, they are subject to a selection process that would outrage them under any other circumstances.

The "straights" and the "non-straights" are separated. The "straights" (clean-shaven, neatly-suited and modestly-skirted) are allowed to go out on the wards with file cards and instruction sheets. The beards are put in the back room to fold and stuff literature, as Beatles music boils deafeningly out of the record player.

"Oh yes, I see the logic of it -- be neat and clean for Gene," said a 19-year old Indiana dropout with a straggly growth of chin whiskers and wearing a button that said in Hebrew, "We try harder."

"I realize I would be a shock to a New Hampshire Yankee. I'd be an image-breaker for the senator. Four of the others in the backroom are candidates for PHDs in thermo-nuclear physics at Cornell, so I don't mind at all," he concluded.

One "hairy" made the supreme sacrifice for his candidate. Told at the door of the Unitarian Church in Concord that his beard would keep him from engaging the voters in doorstep dialogue, he asked for a razor and on the spot shaved a four-year-older.

Those who pass muster in gentility, civility and kemptness are given the classic instructions as put down in the Democratic National Committee handbook -- "be nice, pet the dog, help with the groceries."

Their sheet tells them "not to get too wound up on the war" and suggest the argument -- although they are sternly forbidden to argue -- that on the war the "question is not so much to change horses as to change streams."

The greatest coup of the youth movement perhaps was to recruit 40 Yale "Frenchies" -- graduate students in French who could speak in their paternal tongue to New Hampshire's enormous French-Canadian community. One particularly fluent lass straggled in from the wards six hours late. She had been feted at every home she visited and was inundated in wine, coffee, and gallic volubility.

In all, they have knocked on 60,000 doors. They report back a "malaise with Johnson," a feeling of despair that anything can be done, and much grumbling about high taxes.

Some of McCarthy's migrants wish he would speak more forcefully about the war, but they accept him as he is. They feel that his quiet, rational presentation gives the lie to the notion that he is a wild radical with an uncouth following.

He is delighted with them, overwhelmed by their organization, devotion and self-discipline.

"My campaign may not be organized at the top," he said after a conference with an advance man who is editor of the Yale Law Review, "but it is certainly tightly organized at the bottom."

The Concord headquarters, which is managed by Ann Hart, the dissenting daughter of Sen. Philip A. Hart of Michigan, a Johnson supporter, is now engaged in trying to hold back an expected invasion of 2500 for the last week-end of the campaign. They can only handle a thousand.

Several scores of Concord and Manchester families have offered to put up the visitors, and churches have let those with sleeping bags use the floor. St. Anselm's College in Manchester has contributed the beds of students who weekend away.

Sam Brown makes no great claims for the effect of his young army. "I don't know whether we're just having a good time or we could make a difference. All I know is that we're the one thing McCarthy's got that nobody else in this campaign has or could get."

A 17-year-old high school drop out laboriously inscribing a stencil about a McCarthy meeting, said: "Sure, I'll tell you why I'm here. It's the only decent thing to do."[18]

Mary McGrory's remarkable column stamped a permanent label of meaningfulness and legitimacy on the role of the young volunteers in the campaign. While written late in the campaign and long after New Hampshire residents had become infatuated with the student effort, she did mold the activity in language that had a tremendous impact across a distressed nation. Shortly after the column appeared a steady stream of reporters and network film crews arrived at the Concord headquarters wanting to see the backroom and the basement where it was alleged the "hairys, the freaks, and the non-straights" of the campaign were laboring. To their surprise such a "chamber of horrors" did not exist. Even at their worst, those working in the basement on the mailings, were neat, clean, orderly, but with scraggles of beards and only

slightly less than adequate skirts to face New Hampshire's cold. What they found in the 8 Pleasant Street Extension store-front was a beehive of activity, carefully departmentalized, orderly and exceptionally neat for a campaign office. Even the ash trays, the few that existed, were emptied frequently. Whether the order came from a compulsiveness engendered by the selection process that greeted those arriving or because of the real fear of fire in the old wooden building, would be hard to determine; except that almost all of the local headquarters were kept in the same constant orderliness. Each seemed to radiate energy, efficiency and seriousness which had its only counterpoint in the humor of the occasional wall signs and the relaxed ease with which much of the campaign's drudge work was accomplished.

The Third Period

It took more than a series of telephone pleas from Hoeh and Studds to begin the flow of staff and volunteers to New Hampshire. A lag, of sorts, between the time that those who had come to New Hampshire and had returned to school, and when they could convince others to go to New Hampshire developed. Aggressive recruiting coupled with student press accounts of New Hampshire experiences, expanding national press attention to McCarthy and the deteriorating situation in Vietnam turned the trickle of volunteers into a stream that as Mary McGrory noted in her column, reached flood proportions.

In their campaign planning, Hoeh and Studds had expected modest volunteer help and had obligated themselves to tasks that volunteers could do. Their strategy targeted the cities and towns where the campaign would have to be especially effective in order to produce the votes needed. The priorities were set according to population and a reasonable expectation of volunteer

energy. The mailing label preparation was the first priority task. The second, canvassing, something neither Hoeh nor Studds had had experience with, developed as the major volunteer activity as the numbers again swelled toward the end of the campaign.

The logistics came to determine how many volunteers could be usefully deployed. Gradually volunteers, who had come out of a certain Spartan resignation about the effort were replaced by an increasing number who felt that the McCarthy campaign had become an important "happening" and that if they were to be a part of their times, to be contemporary or more among their peers, they had to experience New Hampshire in 1968.

What had been first, an effort to get people to come, now became an effort to sort and assign before they arrived, to an effort to hold back those who could neither be housed nor given meaningful work in the campaign. In the recruiting careful instructions had been given to those on the campuses that they should not head for New Hampshire until they had called telling how many would be coming, how they would be travelling and when they expected to arrive. They also had to have a destination assignment from the volunteer department. As Mary McGrory reported by the last weekend of the campaign, the volunteer department could house only 1000 volunteers, and the canvassing department could only deploy that number in areas that had not been canvassed earlier. Reports that upwards of 2,500 volunteers were planning to be in New Hampshire that last weekend sent the campaign leaders in a panic. They had to stem the flow but still end up with enough volunteers to accomplish the canvassing plans for the weekend. Through a series of telephone calls to the

sources for volunteers, the leaders were able to discourage those coming the greatest distance and regulate the flow of those coming shorter distances. A campaign that might well have been overwhelmed by having too many people to manage was able to protect itself.

When asked to tally the costs of the McCarthy campaign, Hoch replied that he though it was probably one of the most expensive campaigns ever run in New Hampshire. Not because they had spent more money than had been spent before, but because of the number of volunteer hours that had been expended for McCarthy. In one calculation it was estimated that there were over 5,000 individual visits to New Hampshire and that each visit had a work day value of at least twelve hours. The per hour rate of $2.00 could easily be assigned to each hour producing a conservative estimate of $120,000 worth of volunteer energy spent in the campaign. Beyond the actual worth of the work was the incalculable value of the image that was projected by the students seriously at work for McCarthy. Their movement became almost as important as the candidacy itself.

Footnote

What was often lost in the myth that grew larger than the reality of the volunteer involvement in New Hampshire was that an important symbiosis developed that made the happening. First, as Hoch likes to recall, the "kids" were not all that. Almost as many older people joined as did college undergraduates. Many of those who managed the local headquarters were outside volunteers, but volunteers like Arthur Herzog in his middle forties, or Fred Willman, in his thirties, or Jon Grace in his thirties. With almost every

busload of volunteers there would be a mixture of faculty, faculty wives, or older activists from the college towns who came to New Hampshire to help. But of far greater importance was the involvement of scores of local people in each of the cities and towns where the campaign developed. It was these people who created the welcoming port-of-entry for the volunteers. It was these people who guided the work, set the limits, oriented the newcomers, and gave the activity a sense of competence and professionalism. Without this subtle melding of locals and "kids", the effort would have failed. The volunteers would have foundered in a sea of misconceived good intentions. When there were questions, the locals were there to correct, reassure, advise, and encourage. The same was the case at the state level where the state campaign leaders were on hand to set policy, work through schedules and to help keep the campaign in close touch with the political ethos of their state. The campaign avoided both controversy and tragedy because the symbiosis prevailed from the beginning to end. The same feeling that produced an effective working rapport inside the campaign between volunteers and locals migrated outside contagiously affecting the press, the politically alert and ultimately the voting population. While there were occasional differences of opinion between the outside managers and the inside leaders, there was little if any hostility encountered by those working in the localities. It was, unquestionably, a unique and amazing social phenomenon.

Reflecting on the student effort after the campaigns of 1968, Richard Goodwin, who had come to work in the campaign, said, "They were like the Viet Cong. They couldn't be fought in the traditional way." Richard Strout added, "In New Hampshire, there were 'nominal leaders' and 'coordinators' supposedly in charge of one thing or another, but most of these 'led' because they simply

happened to be there first. The demarcation between chiefs and Indians was obscure. Everyone pitched in to do anything." Strout went on to note, "The Children's Crusade emerged just as the candidacy of George Romney died, and reporters from across the country began to focus on it as a new curiosity. And, indeed, it was one of the most dramatic phenomena in the history of American politics. But the reporters paid so much attention to the young people that they missed the broader story of the McCarthy effort," he contended.[19]

Notes

[1]Robert E. Craig, Voting Behavior in a Presidential Primary: The New Hampshire Democratic Presidential Primary of 1968, (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1971), p. 74.

[2]Underwood, B., Op.Cit., "McCarthy," pp. 13-14.

[3]Ibid., "Students," p. 1.

[4]Ibid., p. 4.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

[7]The Keene Evening Sentinel (February 9, 1968).

[8]Ibid.

[9]Underwood, B., Op.Cit., "The Locals,", p. 46.

[10]Ben Stavis, We Were The Campaign, New Hampshire to Chicago for McCarthy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 3.

[11]Ibid., p. 20.

[12]Chester, L., et.al., Op.Cit., p. 96.

[13]The Amherst Student (February 12, 1968).

[14]The Yale Daily (February 13, 1968).

[15]The New York Times (February 18, 1968).

[16]The Concord Daily Monitor (February 7, 1968).

[17]The Boston Globe (March 8, 1968).

[18]The Boston Globe (March 5, 1968).

[19]Stout, R., Op.Cit., p. 165.

CHAPTER XI

CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES

Headquarters Organization

Through January and to the middle of February Hoeh and Studds had attempted to manage the campaign with their volunteers and through the odd moments they could spring from their jobs. They expected the Washington headquarters to supply the essential ingredients of the campaign especially all literature, handouts, media production, graphic designs and to arrange media purchases. As with other campaigns with which both had had experience, these items were prepared or ordered well in advance of the time when they were needed. The timetable Hoeh and Studds had developed for the campaign specified dates when items would be required. Radio time had been reserved, as had billboard space, and some limited television time. Dates to begin canvassing were set as were the dates when the first direct mail would be sent. While there was always a slight margin in the schedule for delays many of the times were critical. When a radio reservation came due it meant that either the copy for an advertisement was ready or the time would be lost along with the time and money used to purchase the space. As the sequence of deadlines neared, Hoeh and Studds realized that little had been done in Washington to prepare the necessary materials. Often when materials did arrive they could not be used because they were not appropriate for one reason or another. Usually the problem was one of tone and content that was not consistent with how McCarthy was campaigning in New Hampshire or what Hoeh and Studds knew of the New Hampshire political ethos. These early problems were frustrating but time remained to have materials reprinted through Washington or substituted with materials developed in New Hampshire.

Working with the New Hampshire based advertising agency of Weston Associates, Hoeh and Studds had begun outlining the media campaign that would be required if McCarthy was to succeed. Their first effort was to have Weston option as many billboards as were available in the key communities. Next he reserved as much of the better radio time and television time available on New Hampshire stations. With each time or space reservation there was a production lead time and usually a time when cash must be produced in order to hold a space reservation. On the word of Blair Clark, Weston was willing to use his agency's credit to hold the media time. Production presented other problems. Billboard space was the first to be available. The national office had not developed a logo, color scheme, or other aspects of a unified campaign image. No official photograph was available. Clark was busy with preparations in other states and Hoeh and Studds were facing the day toward the middle of January when the first billboard space would be available without anything to put on the boards.

Selecting campaign slogans can be among the most frustrating tasks faced in a campaign. Seemingly endless hours are spent by mature adults sitting around in meetings or in offices listing possible slogans that will capture the essence of a candidacy in a phrase. The New Hampshire leaders expected that this task would be performed nationally either in Washington or New York, and that slogan, billboard layout and related graphics would come well set and packaged for use not only in New Hampshire but across the nation. As the deadline for the billboard space neared, Hoeh and Studds realized that a slogan had to be selected, colors and graphics determined and billboard paper printed

or the space would carry the existing message while being paid for by the McCarthy campaign. Without the usual protracted consideration, Hoeh and Studds decided that the phrase "...there is an alternative...McCarthy for President" would run without a photograph. Using the same slogan and graphics, stationary for the New Hampshire campaign was also printed. For Hoeh and Studds the slogan seemed to capture what they sensed was on the mind of the New Hampshire Democrat. To have been more direct and more specific would have been more than the New Hampshire voter was prepared to digest at this early stage in acceptance of dissent.

What the experience represented to Studds and Hoeh was the beginning of a migration of the national campaign to New Hampshire. Through January, New Hampshire--from the standpoint of Studds and Hoeh--was competing for attention at the national level. As the month progressed, and especially in the period of reaction to the first McCarthy campaign visit, New Hampshire began to occupy the top priority position. Slowly, in New York, Boston, Washington and across the nation, those close to the candidacy or sensitive to the issues being tested, saw that if McCarthy failed in New Hampshire their efforts would likewise fail. Clark, the various political coalitions, the national office and others began to realize that the total protest effort of 1968 rested on New Hampshire, and that neither the resources nor the personnel existed to support a national campaign until the political bridge of New Hampshire had been crossed. The first concession to this conclusion was the arrival of a young former Harvard Divinity School student named Sam Brown.

Sam Brown had been working as a volunteer coordinator through the New York based Coalition for a Democratic Alternative (CDA). His ties with Allard Lowenstein went back to National Student Association activities and with Al into the search for an alternative. While Lowenstein had been almost completely detached from the campaign since early December in Chicago, Sam had actively sought to put flesh on his promise that the nation's student population would respond to the opportunity of the McCarthy campaign. Sam Brown was the first of the national staff to come to New Hampshire. He provided the first sustained link with the New York and Washington bases of the national campaign.

Now that Sam Brown had arrived and Hoeh and Studds had poured out their frustrations with Washington and the national campaign, some changes began. Brown had not only Clark's ear but also the confidence of the CDA leaders in New York. He affirmed the New Hampshire leaders' concerns and urged that Clark assign quickly some one to manage New Hampshire who could connect back effectively to both New York and Washington. Clark responded by releasing Curtis Gans from his non-primary states desk. By February 20th, Gans was in New Hampshire to assume the long vacant position as the full-time campaign manager. On his arrival a migration of campaign personnel from Washington and New York began.

Gans realized that the campaign could not meet its objectives unless it was staffed with long term volunteers and the response time between New Hampshire and Washington was significantly reduced. To accomplish both of these requirements meant that almost all activities pertinent to the New Hampshire campaign would have to be based in New Hampshire and that where full-time

staff were not available in New Hampshire, they would have to be brought in from outside. The migration he immediately stimulated practically stripped both the Washington and New York offices of the key desk assignments along with a group of willing volunteers capable of assuming management of most of the local headquarters.

With the exception of two campaign activities, scheduling and fund raising, all else was managed from the Concord headquarters. From Gans' arrival to the end of the campaign, almost the total national McCarthy effort emanated from New Hampshire. Clark remained in Washington with the skeleton of the national staff and, of course, Senator McCarthy maintained his senatorial office's contact with the campaign. Scheduling of Senator McCarthy in New Hampshire was managed by Sandra Hoeh from her Hanover home and campaign financing operated wherever money could be raised. The principal sources continued to be New York although long time friends of McCarthy also became major contributors.

In spite of the staff shift, Gans began to experience the same frustrating delays and inaccuracies which had plagued Hoeh and Studds in their efforts to work through the Washington headquarters. Instead of relying on Washington to produce radio and television materials Gans and his staff began producing them through the Weston Agency in New Hampshire. Ad layout and materials preparation remained somewhat dispersed with preparation occurring in New York as well as in New Hampshire but the communication was direct and responded to the critical media deadlines.

Gans assumed daily headquarters' management responsibilities. Most of the operating departments of the campaign were organized and staffed at least to a limited extent before Gans arrived which meant that most worked smoothly with minimum supervision. Gans completed the area headquarters staffing and made sure that each was supplied with materials and properly tied to people in the headquarters who could respond to requests for help. Hoeh and Studds retained scheduling policy, overview of materials preparation, management of staff vs. local relations, general supervision and press contacts concerning the New Hampshire aspects of the campaign. In addition to Gans' daily management assignments he moved quickly into an important vacuum that had developed when Washington failed to produce suitable radio advertising materials. Gans spent long hours working with Merv Weston and his staff preparing radio advertising copy, lining up celebrity endorsements and assigning the completed material to media markets and time slots.

Perhaps better than anything else, campaign materials preparation illustrated the complications caused by the confusion which resulted from conflict between New York and Washington. The New York City based Coalition for a Democratic Alternative had become a substantial political action organization several months before McCarthy announced his candidacy. With McCarthy's candidacy the locus of political action shifted from New York to Washington. When the CDA was not invited to become McCarthy's national campaign organization or to have much of a role in that organization outside of New York, conflict developed.

The conflict might have faded quickly if the national McCarthy campaign had been able either to preempt CDA's financial base or to create its own. With the exception of the private resources of people like Blair Clark and Martin Peretz, the early McCarthy candidacy drew little substantial financial help. CDA kept its own large treasury and were willing to release it to the McCarthy campaign only upon their own terms. During the early weeks of the New Hampshire campaign CDA was the best, and often the only, source of posters, reprints of important articles and campaign flyers. While this material did not have McCarthy's stamp of approval, it did help the New Hampshire leaders show that a serious campaign was in the making. Eventually, CDA's leaders and Blair Clark resolved their differences. Some of the CDA staff moved to Washington, some to New Hampshire, and the rest continued fund raising and other support from New York. For much of the campaign, however, CDA and Washington remained independent with the result that both produced campaign material for New Hampshire that reflected their respective images of what the campaign should be, rather than what the New Hampshire leaders felt was appropriate.

Early in the campaign a series of one sheet, black and white, 8½ x 11 inch flyers was printed, each with a distinct message, usually a quote from a prominent national or international leader, followed on the reverse with other quotations and McCarthy's responses. While the format was effective, the tone was often not. Avoiding the rule that all materials must be checked before distribution, several flyers escaped from Washington to New Hampshire without clearance. Of the two most controversial, one carried a photograph of General

Douglas MacArthur, braided hat, dark glasses and corn cob pipe with the quotation, "Anybody who commits the land power of the United States on the Continent of Asia ought to have his head examined." The other carried a photograph of Pope Paul VI seated on the papal throne with his hand raised in blessing with the quotation, "We cry in God's name STOP..." On the reverse were quotations from Pope Paul, Richard Cardinal Cushing of Boston and Bishop Fulton J. Sheen, under the title "Religious Leaders Speak Out on Vietnam."

Although a strong piece of campaign material, the McCarthy leaders felt that the MacArthur campaign piece could be used selectively in New Hampshire. The Pope Paul VI piece seemed to them to be questionable under the best of circumstances. Shortly after the materials arrived in New Hampshire, Hoeh received a call from Senator McCarthy then campaigning in the midwest. He had heard about the two pieces and wanted Hoeh's description of them and reaction. When Hoeh finished reading and describing the Pope Paul flyer McCarthy said, "Don't use it." Hoeh said he did not think it was what McCarthy wanted in his campaign and that it would not be well received in heavily Catholic New Hampshire. That night the several boxes were sealed with tape and early the next morning taken to the Concord City landfill and buried under that day's city refuse. A campaign worker watched to make sure the boxes were not broken open but buried intact and completely. The MacArthur flyer was used after McCarthy accepted Hoeh's advice on how it might be effective.

The ultimate irony of the difficulty between Washington perceptions and New Hampshire materials needs came when a long awaited brochure arrived. The carefully developed text had been attractively laid out in a graphically appealing format. There McCarthy was shown meeting voters, in formal poses,

with his family, in uniform as a baseball player, with President John F. Kennedy and, in a 5½ by 14 inch fold at the bottom of the brochure, meeting New Hampshire voters before the Kennedy memorial bust in front of the Nashua City Hall on his first day of campaigning. The New Hampshire leaders had specified how the brochure would be used as a mailer in addition to general street or door-to-door distribution. With the brochure was to be a two page letter and a return mail card,[1] all stuffed into a number 10 envelope. When the brochure arrived Hoeh took two pieces of paper and a 3 by 5 card, folded it together and stuffed an envelope for weighing. He found the package was one and one half ounces in weight. What was expected to be a one ounce first class mailing now would double in cost or have to be changed. To Hoeh and Studds this was the final straw in their frustration with Washington. Together they exploded over the telephone to whoever answered. It was much too late to print a new brochure or to change other aspects of the mailing. What they found was that the weight of the mailing could be reduced below the one ounce limit by tearing off the photo flap with the New Hampshire picture. The next several days were occupied by volunteers tearing off the one part of the brohcure that was New Hampshire.

As the critical deadlines neared, the frustration turned to desperation as the communications between Washington and New Hampshire failed to improve. Neither Hoeh nor Studds seemed to be able to penetrate the barrier of distance or to communicate the urgency they felt concerning McCarthy's fate in New Hampshire. When Curtis Gans arrived he confirmed what Hoeh and Studds had been saying for more than a month. What had been a national McCarthy campaign

with resources and personnel scattered across the other 49 primary and non-primary states quickly shifted to support only one primary, New Hampshire. The Washington headquarters had attempted to staff and organize both primary and non-primary states, develop a national press and research operation, organize scheduling and advance desks, stimulate fund raising, manage primary state campaign media and numerous other national campaign related activities that completely occupied the limited full-time and volunteer staff then available. What Gans did that the New Hampshire leaders had not been able to do was to assert that without a success in New Hampshire there would not be a meaningful McCarthy campaign after March 12th. This meant that New Hampshire had to be the top priority concern of everyone in the Washington headquarters and, for that matter, everywhere else in the campaign.

Within the week of Gans' arrival the shift was complete. Almost all campaign materials, radio advertisements, television material, newspaper ads, and the like were prepared in New Hampshire. Printing was done elsewhere, sometimes, but as the time shortened before the election, so did the lead time. Doing things in New Hampshire gave the campaign managers the highest level of control. The result was that the conflict was reduced to a minimum, campaign materials, advertisements and media production tightly controlled. It became possible to adjust the content of items that were already in production to take advantage of new opportunities. A maximum level of flexibility was possible within the production and distribution constraints of each medium. Cooperative printers, radio and television production personnel and distributors, who themselves caught the excitement of the campaign, made sure that the McCarthy campaigners received the best possible service.

Canvassing

The canvassing priorities were the same as the campaign's other priorities as outlined by the December 21st and January 7th memoranda. The heaviest canvassing efforts would be conducted in the cities with the largest Democratic registration and so on, working down the list by population. They hoped to canvass as many cities and towns as time and volunteer energy would permit. The style of the canvass would dictate how much could be accomplished. If it were to be a simple literature drop, then only a few hours would be needed to cover most communities. If it were to involve finding specific households and contacting pre-identified voters, then the task would be much more complicated. Those involved in the canvass planning concluded that something more than just handing out campaign material had to be accomplished. Principally they agreed that some type of voter contact would be important to provide the campaign with feedback. All agreed that the major canvassing push would have to be during the last three or four weekends of the campaign which allowed approximately one or two weekends to experiment and then to complete the canvassing strategy that would be adopted.

At approximately the same time as these deliberations were in progress, the Keene McCarthy committee began its own canvassing effort. David Hoeh had discouraged them from their original intention which had been to take the issues of the war to the doorstep rather than simple support for Senator McCarthy. Their idea for the issue oriented canvass had come as an extension of the "Vietnam Teach-in" concept. They had thought that if the war were the principal reason for McCarthy's candidacy, not his nomination, then the issue was the

real concern, not promoting McCarthy's candidacy. Hoch advised that most people would not be prepared to discuss world politics on their doorstep and might be offended by the stridency of the contact. He suggested that if a contact at the door was made that it should be directed to the support of McCarthy. The Keene committee adopted this advice, prepared their own canvassing literature and reported considerable success in their efforts.

Several days before a final meeting to adopt a canvassing strategy, Hoch received a call from Dr. Al Shepard, a New York based marketing specialist. Shepard wanted to volunteer some time to the campaign. He profiled his experience as a product researcher and marketing adviser for a number of large corporations and prominent products. He suggested that the campaign might need assistance in identifying issues and strategies that would outline McCarthy's market appeal to New Hampshire voters.

Cautiously, the campaign leaders pursued with Shepard what he might offer the campaign. Shepard indicated that the canvassing concept was much like a marketing study conducted before a new product was introduced or to evaluate the public's response to a product that had been offered. The challenge, he suggested, was to develop ties between the public's mood and Senator McCarthy as an acceptable alternative to President Johnson. The purpose might not be to displace the President as the Democratic party's presidential candidate but rather to demonstrate through votes the public's skepticism. Shepard approached his marketing analysis from the motivational perspective of the buyer or the voter.

Shepard agreed to work with those preparing the canvassing materials, draft instructions for the test canvass, and also conduct a training session in the techniques. Hoeh advised that the test should be made in a city that had political and ethnic characteristics much like Manchester where the percentages of registered Democratic voters was high. He noted that Somersworth, located in the southeastern corner of New Hampshire came close to resembling Manchester. While a small city, approximately 9,000 population, it had a long tradition of strong Democratic Party loyalty, contained a sizable percentage of French-Canadians in its population and was isolated. The city was tucked in between Rochester and Dover without much contact with either city or with the social, political or economic activities of that area or, for that matter, much of the remainder of the state. If the canvassing was successful in Somersworth it could be used in other cities with similar characteristics such as Nashua, Manchester, Berlin, Claremont, Lebanon and Laconia, and perhaps other less Democratic and less ethnic cities as well. Hoeh was reasonably sure that word of the test would not leak far from Somersworth since its links outward were limited, but the city would be a valid test case because the campaign had not received much attention there. If the canvassers did sense a favorable response to their approach, or at least not hostility, then Hoeh felt a canvassing activity statewide would be worth the risk.

During the remaining few days of the week, preparations for the test were made. The maps, voter lists and instructions were prepared with packets of campaign materials that had been selected to state McCarthy's position on those issues which Shepard thought might be most on the voters' minds. When

the volunteers began arriving for the weekend, the most experienced and best appearing of the volunteers were selected to receive Shepard's training. They were told what their assignment would be and found that almost all of those who had been picked were delighted to do something more than prepare mailing labels or sort campaign materials. The canvass would give them a chance to meet New Hampshire voters themselves and to express some of their own feelings about the issues in the campaign.

The fifteen or so selected met with Shepard for the training session early Saturday morning. Shepard, a forceful individual, emphatically described the does and don'ts of the agreed upon procedure. The canvasser was to ring a door bell, offer a pleasant greeting and introduction, hand the packet of McCarthy material to the person at the door and then respond to any questions that might come. If there were no questions then the canvasser was instructed to end the contact with a phrase such as, "I hope you will consider voting for Senator McCarthy, March 12th," and then go on to the next door. Between contacts the canvasser was instructed to note on the address card what the response had been at the door. Had it been positive, negative or undefinable? The volunteers were advised not to become involved in debates or to be trapped in lengthy exchanges. If they met hostility at the door they should end the contact as quickly and pleasantly as possible and move on.

Each canvasser was to receive a package of address cards for approximately 25-30 households. The amount of work time for the pack was expected to be about five hours. Each volunteer was asked to carefully assess each aspect of the contact and to precisely record any reactions that they might encounter at the door. The fifteen got in their cars and headed out of Concord for Somersworth. It was a cold, grey, snowy day when most people found themselves not wanting to venture outside. It was February 10th.

Those who had prepared for the canvass busied themselves in the headquarters but were preoccupied much like the officers of an air squadron that has just sent its planes on a mission. If the canvassers ran into serious problems they were to call for instructions. One of the leaders of the expedition who had had some earlier canvassing experience with civil rights work in Alabama, did call to report they they had arrived and were not meeting hostility. What concerned him was that in the early contacts they had had difficulty determining who the person at the door was supporting. He attributed this non-response to the inexperience of the canvassers and the weather.

In the dark of the late winter afternoon the canvassing volunteers straggled back to Concord. The looks on their faces were unsettling. They were cold, tired, disappointed and frustrated. They reported that it had been almost impossible to detect differences in the reactions from one contact to another. There had been no hostility, but at the same time there was almost no recognition of McCarthy or willingness to discuss him or the issues he represented. People had accepted the campaign material courteously but the doorstep exchanges had been brief as the person who answered hurried to get back inside, out of the cold and away from the door. The canvassers described their own increasing misery as one brief contact led to another, each seeming colder and less personal than the last, with each increasing the depressing combination of being cold and feeling the isolation of being alone in a strange place.

The de-briefing of the canvassers revealed both positive and negative results. While the contacts had been cold and remote there had been no antagonism. Hoeh explained that New Hampshire people are apt to be shy and reluctant to reveal their own feelings. Shepard responded to this observation by suggesting that perhaps the next test should be a bit more challenging. He felt some questions could be asked or analogies between McCarthy and issues raised that would call for a response from the person at the door. Discussing this idea with the canvassers they felt they needed something more than the campaign material and a phrase of introduction to bring a response from the person at the door. They had hoped that they would be able to discuss some of their own feelings concerning the war and related Johnson administration policies. When this did not happen their disappointment increased and with it their own uncertainty. They felt that some local preparation for the canvass might also help to encourage people to express their opinions to the canvassers and to understand why the canvass was being conducted in their community.

Shepard, calling upon his motivational research experience, advised that both leading questions and pre-canvass preparation should be tried to determine whether a useful rapport could be established between the canvasser and the persons being canvassed. He recalled that that week's edition of the Saturday Evening Post carried a cover story written by retired General James Gavin titled, "We Can Get Out of Vietnam." Shepard thought that the Gavin article might be a means of linking McCarthy and the canvasser to a respected national figure, not a candidate, who was critical of the administration's war policy. Twenty copies of the magazine were purchased and Shepard prepared modified instructions. The canvassers were scheduled to return to Somersworth for additional testing Sunday afternoon February 11th.

Shepard's Sunday morning training session varied on two accounts from the one that had been held the day before. First he advised the canvassers to be more active in their contact at the door. As the lead for the contact he demonstrated how the Gavin article should be used. His instructions read:

> I'm from the McCarthy for President headquarters. This week in the Saturday Evening Post, General Gavin has expressed his feeling that We Can Get Out of Vietnam. I'd be very interested in your own feelings about the war from what you have seen on television and read in the papers.
>
> INSTRUCTION: listen to the person's response
>
> Senator McCarthy feels that although we started out to help in Vietnam, since 1963, the war has become more and more an American war. It is our boys who are fighting (mostly). Why?

During this introduction, Shepard advised that the canvasser have his or her copy of the magazine folded to the lead page of the article and that the lead page be clearly in view of the person being canvassed. Following the offer to explain "Why?" the canvasser should mention as reasons a summary of Gavin's argument such as:

Corruption in the government:	Even in their own rigged election, the present government received only about 30% of the vote cast. The people do not support the government--that is why it has become an American war.
Effect on United States:	Over 2 billion dollars a month is being spent in Vietnam - over 70 million dollars a day. This (70 million) is more than the total fiscal budget for 1967-1968 in New Hampshire! The 2 billion a month would keep the New Hampshire government going for almost 30 years.

Result? The request for a 10% tax increase (by the Johnson administration).

After suggesting aspects of the impact of the administration's policy the canvasser was advised to suggest some ways to get out of the war. Again rather than referencing the positions of McCarthy the candidate, Shepard advised that the Gavin article be the source for ways to withdraw from Vietnam.

> How do we get out - how do we stop the waste of tax money and more important, the loss of life?

General Gavin's article recommends much the same thing as Senator McCarthy.

1. Properly support our boys in Vietnam by bringing the scattered planes, ships and forces from North Vietnam and the hillsides to the cities in South Vietnam.

2. Cease fire on our own initiative. Maintain a holding action in the cities. We would fight back if attacked, and the forces and equipment to do it would be there. (See Step #1)

3. Specific offer to mediate the situation. Some specific city, some particular mediator (U Thant, the Pope, etc.)

To conclude the contact Shepard advised linking the issues with the importance of the person's vote and Senator McCarthy's candidacy.[2]

What your vote means:

51% Lyndon B. Johnson:	Lyndon B. Johnson write-in is writing yes, I want my taxes increased; yes, I want more boys sent into Vietnam.
51% Eugene J. McCarthy:	Congress may think twice about tax increase; people in other states encouraged to speak out; open Democratic Convention. Restore the spirit which existed before 1963 -- exemplified by Kennedy.

The canvasser was then told how to record the responses after the contact had been concluded. Instead of a three point scale of favorable-to-McCarthy, favorable-to-Johnson or indefinite, a five point evaluation was advised. The five points would give the canvasser a way to classify all contacts. The headquarters could then analyze areas where additional campaigning might move voters toward voting for Senator McCarthy. The new scale read:

1. Favorable to McCarthy
2. Indifferent but leaning toward McCarthy
3. Totally indifferent
4. Indifferent but leaning toward Johnson
5. Favorable to Johnson.

While all involved felt that a pre-announcement of the canvass in a community would be desirable, in the case of the second test scheduled that same day for Somersworth, it was impossible.

As the canvassers left for Somersworth the canvass organizers began to have second thoughts on what the test might produce. They were concerned that the attempt to engage the voters might produce the hostility that they feared

might be in the background of the New Hampshire electorate. New Hampshire voters, after all, were reputed to be "hawkish" toward the Vietnam policy and to have a strong sense of national loyalty that might not permit the questioning that the new canvassing approach emphasized.

The long Sunday afternoon passed as had the previous afternoon while the canvassers worked and the canvass organizers waited in the Concord headquarters. Late that afternoon the canvassers returned. Their experiences had been the exact opposite of the day before. Instead of the non-response, they had been able to start conversations that revealed not the feared hostility, but a deep concern about the issues that the canvassers raised. Often the canvasser was invited inside to talk and pursue the interview. While few canvassers could report that the contacts led to number 1 or "favorable-to-McCarthy" responses, it was clear that the war was on people's minds and that they were willing to discuss it with a stranger. There had been little or no hostility either to the contact or to the appearance of a young, quite obviously college aged person on the doorstep. Even in working class, isolated Somersworth, the President and his administration's policies had produced concern rather than unquestioning loyalty. The canvassers were stimulated by the effort and had returned warm, anxious to canvass again, and genuinely surprised by the hospitality that they had experienced.

The careful de-briefing of each canvasser discovered little that was not positive about the experience. Shepard's advise had made it possible for the canvasser to get beyond the introduction of the day before. They found that when the did go beyond the introduction, the contact wanted to

talk and appeared almost relieved that someone was willing to discuss their concerns. Occasionally a person would note that they had not been able to talk with their own children and that it was nice to once again speak in friendly tones with someone of their own children's age. The fact that the canvasser was a stranger seemed to be a positive asset. Many said that they had not talked about these things with their friends, neighbors or relatives. They did not want to broach controversial subjects with people who were close to them in their working or personal lives. What appeared to Shepard as he analyzed the de-briefing, was a tread of repression. People had masked or buried their personal concerns about the state of their nation and the unsettling impact of this concern on their personal lives. The canvassers gave them a chance to reveal these concerns without threatening higher valued social communications. The canvasser, obviously from out-of-town, would have almost no way of betraying the momentary trust that the contact placed in the conversation. The canvass contact produced what amounted to a moment of mutual relaxation. The canvasser derived a feeling of at last accomplishing something meaningful in terms of personal opposition to the war, while the contact seemed to enjoy opening a hidden part of his/her own psyche that had been protected from doubt. The test had clearly produced an important new campaign tool. There would be one or two other tests in other communities before a full-scale effort was organized but at least the dimensions of the technique were now known and could be developed.

Joel Feigenbaum, a Cornell graduate student in nuclear physics, jumped on the data that the canvass had produced. He was thirsty for a chance to analyze the canvassers' reports. He drafted charts to record the daily can-

vassing results and to estimate the support such an effort would require. Others could estimate the number of contacts that each canvasser could make during a weekend in New Hampshire, and from that project the number of canvassers that would be needed to cover the priority cities. The job of preparing voter address cards, maps and canvassing instruction packets for the tests then had to expand to cover a much larger effort.

Within a day or two of the tests, canvassing became the major volunteer activity of the campaign. Preparation for a full-scale effort would require the full attention of each of the principal leaders in the test. Shepard refined the canvassing instructions to specific details. Each canvasser would be given a copy of the instructions and be required to sit through an orientation session. Those first volunteers who had canvassed in Somersworth became field operations supervisors. They would conduct the training and then lead a canvassing crew to a priority community. The leaders were responsible for distributing the canvassing packets and then collecting the completed cards at the end of each day. These cards were then to be returned to the state headquarters for analysis.

In many respects the logistics of the canvass became almost as important as the canvass itself. There had to be close coordination between the several supporting departments within the headquarters and then similar coordination between the state headquarters and the area headquarters. Canvassing instructions, materials for distribution, maps and supervisors had to arrive at the right place at the right time in order to be sure that the brief time the volunteers could spend in New Hampshire on a weekend was put to productive

use. To guarantee that the orientation for the canvassers was the same in Berlin as it was in Manchester, and to make sure that the canvassers understood the importance of their role, the supervisors were carefully oriented to their jobs by both oral and written instructions. While the role of the local committees in the canvass was one of logistical support, the supervisors were instructed to check their plans with the local committee and to observe their advice. From the beginning the cooperation between the local committee and the canvassing activity was excellent.

By the third weekend, February 24th, the reporters had discovered the canvassing story. Film crews would follow canvassers and reporters began telling the story of a mystical relationship that had begun to develop between the canvassers and the New Hampshire voters. The stories themselves often served as the means of pre-advancing a canvassing visit. The area headquarters would release canvassing dates to the media with the result that the canvassers were often expected when they rang a doorbell. Residents were ready with their own questions and welcomes. The result was that the canvass showed a major shift favoring McCarthy.

Feigenbaum carefully analyzed the date he drew from the cards turned in by the canvassers. Shepard concentrated his skills on evaluating the debriefing reports from both the canvassers and the field canvassing supervisors. Both evaluations kept the campaign in close touch with its impact and progress. Feigenbaum prepared weekly reports of the canvassing results by area. He began to detect a shift from the "3" group to the "2" and from the "2" to the "1". In some areas the shift was more dramatic than others,

but in all areas the move toward McCarthy was shown and that move increased in intensity as the weekends passed. McCarthy's percentage of the vote crept from 20 to 25 percent when the 1's and 2's were taken together in the first week, to 25 to 30 percent in the second week, and 30 to 35 percent in the third week. Feigenbaum began to project election percentages which had McCarthy approaching the 50 percent figure, a percent that all had thought was impossible in the earliest days. What was of greatest concern was the fact that the movement toward McCarthy was less vigorous in Manchester and in Nashua. Both cities accounted for much of the state's Democratic primary vote. While the Keene, Concord, Portsmouth and Laconia areas were reporting canvassing support for McCarthy exceeding 50 percent, the number of voters in those areas was far less than the expected turnout in Manchester and Nashua.

Shepard accepted Manchester as his challenge. In addition he would keep close tabs on the de-briefings to find what approaches to the voters were most convincing. As he evaluated these de-briefing reports he would formulate changes in the issues to be emphasized and the approach of the canvassers. In this way Shepard was able to monitor the flow of the issues and to adjust the details of the coming weekend's canvass to respond to a new event or issue that had been either produced during the week or was found to be important to the voter.

The instructions that were developed for both the canvass and for the past-canvass reports document the thoroughness of the planning and the execution of the canvass. Under the title "Information for Volunteers" the following mimeographed instructions were given to each canvasser.

INFORMATION FOR VOLUNTEERS[3]

Facts about N.H. politics - Approximate figures on voter registration give Republicans a 2 to 1 lead over Democrats, with Democrats and Independents being even at about 100,000 (very approximate number). Voting patterns, however, give Republicans 54% and Democrats 34%. The Governor, John King, is a Democrat, and the Senate seats are split between Norris Cotton (Rep) and Thomas MacIntyre (Dem). King and MacIntyre are very active on behalf of President Johnson.

"Independent" voter registration means that the voter has never voted in a primary before. Crossing over is not permitted, and a voter can vote in a different primary only if he changes his registration 90 days beforehand.

The primary is a two-part affair. There is the selection of a slate of delegates to the national party convention. These may or may not be pledged to a particular candidate. Then, there is the preferential primary, in which the voter indicates the candidate he would vote for in the election itself. In this part of the primary it is possible to write in the name of a candidate of the other party. These votes do count in the final result.

The Canvass - Part of the purpose behind the canvass is to determine the nature of support for the Senator. There will also be the effect that we have upon the voters as the Senator's personal representatives. Our appearance and behavior will have as much effect as will the fact that he is interested enough about the public to send representatives to answer their questions and solicit their opinions. We also hope to convince them that the Senator is the candidate who will best voice their concerns.

Your approach will therefore be indirect. You are to feel out the voter's opinions before pressing any of the issues (e.g., the pledge card, Vietnam, taxes and inflation, Johnson's credibility). You want to put yourself inside his frame of reference and discover how he comes to the conclusions he comes to. Be a good listener.

The pitch will vary with your own style, but bear in mind certain things.

1) Always mention the name of the person(s) on your card. We want to know if he has moved, died, etc.

2) Always identify yourself as a representative of Senator McCarthy.

3) If the Senator has been in town recently, mention the fact, ask the voter if he has seen him. If he is coming shortly, mention when and where he will be appearing, and that he would very much like to meet the person you are talking to.

4) Never ask if he is going to vote for McCarthy. Your most direct bid will be "I hope you will consider voting for McCarthy."

The following are two different approaches, which you may find useful to consider:

"Hello _____, I am a volunteer for Senator McCarthy, who is offering the people of __(town)__ an alternative to Lyndon Johnson. (Break for conversation of a general nature, about weather, scenery, neighborhood, etc. Mention if Senator has been or will be in town. Conversation should drift soon to Senator and issues. You can produce least controversial piece of literature and discuss it, or ask if he knows anyone who has been sent to Vietnam.)

"Hello _____, I am representing Senator McCarthy, who is running for the Democratic nomination for President. I wonder if there are any questions I could answer for you, any issues you would like to discuss, if I could interest you in some literature...."

Remember that you are there at their service, to answer their questions, and discuss the issues that interest them, not to press your opinions on them or pressure them into voting one way or the other. You may be asked what brings you to New Hampshire. Let them see how urgent you feel it is that everyone consider the issues carefully, and how important the New Hampshire primary is for the whole nation. Being from out of state can be turned to an advantage. Perhaps you do not have a primary in your state so you cannot express your opinion on this question except in this way. A lot of people commented favorably on the interest shown by young people in coming out to canvass.

When discussing issues be sure to state the Senator's position rather than your own adaptation of his views. If you are not familiar with these positions already, consult the pamphlet that has been prepared well before you venture onto the streets. Certain issues will probably recur as follows:

The Pledge Card - You should know that the Democratic State Committee has openly endorsed President Johnson, before the voters of the state had a chance to express their opinion. They have sent out a pledge card to all registered Democrats. These are individually numbered and it is a fair assumption that there is a master list with numbers checked off as they are returned. Voters may express resentment at coercion and thr threat of reprisals, and also feel that the secrecy of the ballot is being violated.

Taxation - You all know that McCarthy is against a tax increase at this time, and that much of the taxpayers money is being used for graft and corruption in Saigon. But did you know that the war is costing every person in the U.S. $150 a year, that more is spent in Vietnam every day than goes into the N.H. General Fund every year, that N.H. taxpayers pay $2 to Vietnam for every $1 that goes into the General Fund. Your voter may not know it. Tell him.

The War - Don't get too wound up in this. You have only a short time in which to deal with a question you have spent a great deal of time and thought on.

- It's not so much a question of changing horses, but of changing streams.

- McCarthy does not support unilateral withdrawal, but rather a negotiated peace. "Never negotiate out of fear, but never fear to negotiate."

- Present the prospect of years of war, in which thousands of young men will die needlessly, without promoting American ideals, in a land which openly regards this as America's war, that did not declare a state of national emergency until the Tet offensive, that is not yet drafting its 18 and 19 year olds. Did you know that a draft exemption in Vietnam costs $300?

Procedure - You will receive a pack of cards with addresses and a map of the area you are to cover. Number the cards before you leave so they will not get out of order. You will notice that these are marked with party affiliation, I=Independent, D=Democrat.

- You will be given a pack of literature for each house. Even if there is no one home, leave this there. Put it between screen and main doors if possible. DO NOT PUT IT IN THE MAIL BOX, IT IS ILLEGAL TO OBSTRUCT DELIVERY OF THE MAIL.

- You will make a note on each card after you leave the house, registering degree of favorability to McCarthy as follows:

1) Favorable to McCarthy
2) Uncertain but possibly favorable to McCarthy
3) No opinion
4) Uncertain but possibly favorable to Johnson
5) Unfavorable to McCarthy

If there is no one at home, mark the card NA and leave literature, if the voter has moved or died, note the fact on the card. Never record information in the presence of the voter.

- Do not get angry or argue with the voter.
- If a voter wishes to do volunteer work or to give money, record his wish and refer him to the nearest local contact. Do not accept money yourself.

The post canvassing instructions not only showed the importance of reporting the results, but indicated how the canvass results would be used to plan the get-out the vote effort.

Instructions: Post-Canvassing

Addressed to: All Regional Offices

After your area has been canvassed, please follow these procedures.

SAVE ALL CARDS. Separate the cards marked ONE and TWO for purposes of listing them in triplicate. Return the ONES and TWOS to their original decks so that follow-up canvassers can visit these later.

Send two copies of the typed list (names and addresses) to the Concord Office, one addressed to "Jessica" and one addressed to "Verlin." Jessica and Verlin are organizing phone canvassing and election day activities respectively. Keep the third copy of ONES and TWOS for your own office.

Separate out all the "moved", "Deceased", etc. and remove. Send these cards to the Concord Office, addressed to Verlin. Some of these will be challenged on election day.

Separate out all cards for convalescent homes, nursing homes, from the rest. Most of these people have not been contacted because an appointment is required. It will be up to the local headquarters to arrange appointments with these people.

If you have many cards which have "old" or "elderly" written on them, these should be separated out also. It would be helpful, if possible, to have local people go to canvass these people. They are not effectively canvassed by young people.

If you have any questions, please contact John Barbaieri, your canvassing liaison at the Concord Office.

Dated: February 28, 1968[4]

These instructions showed that another phase of the campaign was about to begin. As with the earlier phases, the leadership was anticipating and planning activities that would come next in the sequence. Gans assigned his assistant, Jessica Tuchman, and another former Washington headquarters staffer, Verlin Nelson, to begin preparing for the immediate preliminaries of the election. The canvass offered an unforeseen chance to build a get-out-the-vote effort around those who had been identified as inclined toward voting for Senator McCarthy. Since the trend was moving strong in McCarthy's favor, it seemed useful, or at least worth the risk, to follow-up canvassing contacts with second visits or telephone calls. Both were intended to increase the commitment of the potential McCarthy voter, and to increase the probability that the person would actually get out and vote. Where it also

appeared that the trend of the canvassing returns showed especially strong movement toward McCarthy, the THREE's and even FOUR's were re-canvassed in hopes that they might be either encouraged now to support McCarthy or, in the case of the FOUR's (leaning toward Johnson) they might be either neutralized or shifted toward McCarthy.

The canvass produced a number of secondary effects that added important momentum to the campaign. When originally conceived the canvass was intended as a simple contact between a McCarthy worker and the voter. The media hype that the canvass received and the strongly positive response the volunteers themselves received, had not been anticipated. The total venture became a happening. New Hampshire residents were entranced by it and often were reported anxiously waiting for the canvass to arrive in their community and at their doorsteps. The Johnson campaign had neither an alternative strategy to combat the canvassing flood nor a means of attacking it. The McCarthy campaign leaders were less concerned about an attack from the Johnson campaign leaders than some damaging event caused by the behavior of a volunteer. From the first weekend of canvassing to the last the leaders anxiously waited for that telephone call reporting a drug bust, an automobile accident, some sort of violence or any other embarrassment that might sour the public's taste for the canvass. While there were minor incidents, an occasional traffic violation or nervousness on the part of a local police force, nothing developed to the point of an embarrassment. In all cases the volunteers exercised extra caution and courtesy taking to heart the campaign's warning that their behavior was a direct reflection of the campaign. Habitual

speeders cut their speed. Having a McCarthy sticker on a car, especially one with an out-of-state registration, was a heavy burden. It was carried by the driver as if it was a personal credential from the campaign that this person was the Senator's ambassador.

Direct Mail

Although the canvassing activity assumed the spotlight of the campaign during the last weeks, the preparation of the mailing continued. In some cases it became so difficult to extract usable mailing labels from voter registration lists and address sources that other ways had to be found to mail. At first the leaders resisted abandoning the idea that only registered Democrats and Independents should receive the mailing but as the mailing deadlines neared, they considered blanket mailings to all resident addresses. Hoeh had used a commercial direct mail firm in Manchester during earlier campaigns and had been pleased with the cost and the result. From the time Gans arrived he and Hoeh discussed how the mailing should be handled. Both agreed that the laborious process of creating the mailing labels should continue as long as it was feasible and there were enough volunteers to do the work. They also agreed that when the volunteer power was needed in other aspects of the campaign there would have to be a shift away from the mail label preparation. About three weeks before the election Gans saw the mail effort lag in his assessment of priorities. He thought the canvass would accomplish much of what the mailing had been originally conceived to do. He shifted volunteers away from the mailing. Gans concluded that in those communities

where the mailing labels had not been prepared and where the canvass showed trends toward McCarthy that it would be acceptable to blanket mail to all addresses and not be concerned about wasting mailings on Republicans. At the same time the campaign managers reviewed their strategy for the mailing in light of the canvassing returns, especially given the strong returns from many of the smaller communities. These returns showed that the percentage favorable or leaning to McCarthy was substantial. To reach more potential voters tucked away in the less populous towns, the leaders extended the list of towns that would receive mailings. The only way to mail to these towns in the time that remained would be to use a commercial mailing house and blanket all addresses. They hoped that some of the Republicans who received the McCarthy mailing would write-in the Senator's name on their ballot especially since Governor Romney had withdrawn from the Republican contest.

This change was purely one of strategy and did not affect the mail preparation work that had been going on in the basement of the Concord headquarters for more than a month. During that period the labels had been typed, filed, sorted, pasted on canvassing cards and on envelopes. The envelopes were sorted and boxed by city and zip code. A letter that was drafted early in January came back from the printer toward the middle of February. Two versions had been prepared, one addressed to Democrats that other to Independents. A third version for the blanket mailing had to be printed quickly that was addressed simply to voters. Stuffed with the letter was the brochure.

The mailing reached the post office and the commercial mailing house on schedule. The original thought was to have the mailing arrive during the week before the election. For those who had been contacted by the campaign the mailing would reinforce whatever positive impact that contact had had. For those who had not been reached by the campaign the mailing might encourage the recipient to consider learning more about McCarthy in the time remaining. What was omitted from the mailing was a return card. Hoch and Studds had originally intended to enclose a return postcard much as the Lodge campaign organizers had done in 1964. When the "pledge card" issue broke the return card idea was dropped. However, the canvassing results tended to work for the McCarthy campaign much as had the return card in the Lodge effort. The canvass gave the McCarthy manager an approximation of the impact of the campaign that revealed trends more accurately than did the Lodge return cards.

The initial mailing plan was expanded considerably. First, many more towns were added to the priority list than had been advised in the beginning. Secondly, the idea of blanket mailing to parts of the state where the campaign was succeeding better than expected was an important change. Thirdly, something that is usually tried in campaigns that have a longer development period than did the McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire was also accomplished. A number of special group mailings were prepared. The mailing effort worked according to target priorities. First the originally planned mailing, then the additional town mailings, then the special group mailings, and finally reminders to vote addressed to residents in communities that would not have an election day organization.

Preparing materials for canvassing, distribution of materials to area headquarters, special pre-election literature drops, and other distribution efforts were handled by the volunteers consigned to the cave-like environ of the Concord headquarters basement. The space had the appearance of the galley of an ancient Roman ship. Hands moving constantly in steady rhythm, stuffing envelopes, pasting labels or collating canvassing packets. The workers stretched along folding tables with their arms reaching for the work. In the background a stereo played the latest rock. Stavis wrote:

> During the week, we philosophers, theologists, sinologists, lawyers and a few people with only bachelor's degrees all tore mailing labels, pasted them on envelopes, stuffed, sealed, stamped, and sorted by zip code. When masses of volunteers came for the weekend, we learned how to supervise. We did appropriate time and motion studies, developed executive training programs, analyzed the relationship between endurance and commitment, and moved cartons, tables, and chairs. We had seminars in folding, advanced stuffing, elementary sealing and interdisciplinary stamping. All this work was geared to the throbbing rhythm of the hard-rock records.[5]

When the mistake in the weight of the mailing was discovered Stavis recalled:

> A butcher's scale revealed that it was slightly overweight, and the post office would not accept that extra fraction of an ounce without extra postage. Not being able to afford that, we developed new courses in advanced unstuffing, resealing, and stamp saving.[6]

Issue Targeting

Alan Shepard, who had skillfully oriented the early testing of the canvass had shifted his attentions to Manchester at Hoeh's suggestion. What Shepard did was explore what was on the mind of the potential voter and then advise strategies that would orient the campaign to these concerns. His debriefing sessions with the canvassers helped him to plot the issue profile of the voter. He found the voters were concerned about taxes, inflation,

credibility or a general feeling that things had become unsettled since John Kennedy's assassination. His technique was to list those issue subjects that were mentioned most often by those canvassed. He would examine the list noting links between subjects and from that compile strategies that would make the campaign relevant to voter groups. Shepard recognized that for the campaign to succeed in the time remaining, it could not begin an educational effort to get people to respond to issues not uppermost in their minds. He felt that the war was a difficult issue to deal with in the context of the campaign. He sensed that people wanted the war over, wanted it won or wanted the United States to get out, but were not comfortable with a lengthy discussion of the details. Their level of frustration tended to increase when faced with an account of U.S. policy failure in Vietnam. The frustration seemed to produce a defense reflex that was masked with expressions of loyalty to the administration or a form of close-mindedness that expressed hostility to the source of the frustration. To avoid direct and unsettling confrontation with voters on the war policy, Shepard advised an oblique approach.

In Manchester, news of the Johnson administration's proposed surtax on incomes to support the federal budget was greeted with great hostility. The administration was already viewed with considerable suspicion because of the failings of the war, an increasing rate of inflation and a general souring of credibility. The proposed surtax was the final straw. Shepard discovered that the tax proposal was mentioned most frequently by contacted voters. Shepard suggested that a new piece of campaign material be prepared that would tie McCarthy's opposition to the war and the continuation of the war to the voters' opposition to the tax surcharge.

The item that was produced was a card the same size as the Internal Revenue Service's 1040 A form - the short form - of the tax return that most workers in New Hampshire file. The text of the IRS form was screened as a background for the message printed in red ink, "Will LBJ's proposed 10% tax increase put your family budget in the red?" Beneath the phrase was the suggestion printed in blue, "Your 'X' for Senator McCarthy says NO." The card helped re-enforce the tax issue, demonstrate McCarthy's opposition to the tax proposal and open the subject of taxes when McCarthy campaigned. When the cards arrived from the printer Shepard grabbed all the volunteers he could find and sent them to the factory gates to distribute the cards to workers changing shifts. The card was included in the canvassing kits, distributed at factory gates, included in some mailings and was used in all of the cities where there was a concentration of Democratic voters.

Shepard did much of the same thing with a number of other issues that he garnered from his research effort. The feedback which Shepard was constantly monitoring provided intelligence that came as close as the campaign would come to having direct poll information. Shepard spent almost three weeks in New Hampshire checking, testing, researching and then advising campaign approaches. His influence was pronounced in the final pattern of materials, advertising and through the telephone canvass that operated in Manchester especially. He developed the telephone message that was used and adjusted it almost on a daily basis as he perceived that voter issue concerns were changing. He was especially effective in tying McCarthy and his positions back to the things that were on the mind of the New Hampshire voter. To him the voters had to be motivated to vote for McCarthy. To get them to

feel a kinship with McCarthy it was essential that the campaign reach for these concerns. Shepard worked as a consultant to the managers and in that capacity helped shape the themes that would bring McCarthy in closer touch with the New Hampshire voter. To some extent Shepard was able to influence McCarthy's approach during the final weeks. Several of the themes which Shepard identified were given more emphasis in McCarthy's speeches than before. McCarthy, however, had found his own stride. Shepard's work accomplished some minor adjustments. Shepard influenced canvassing, the re-orientation of some campaign materials, the content of the radio and newspaper advertising and press release program.

The Celebrities

During most of the campaign there had been a number of what were described as "secondary speakers." Most of these had been scheduled independently of the McCarthy campaign by organizations concerned about the war policies. Working through church groups, local peace committees and responding to campus invitations, a regular procession of critics had brought their views to New Hampshire cities and towns. Some were more closely allied with the McCarthy effort than others. Allard Lowenstein, Sandford Gottlieb, the Executive Director of SANE; Zolton Ferency, former Democratic Chairman of Michigan; and several others who had been involved early in the search for an alternative candidate came to New Hampshire as speakers. Others, like David Luce, a disillusioned AID officer in Vietnam, or several exiled Vietnamese critics of the current regime in Saigon were not connected to the campaign at all. Their talks and the press coverage which these meetings received did expand public information about the personal and political impacts of the war. Occasionally

during the early weeks of the campaign, the New Hampshire leaders would receive calls from outside New Hampshire from organizations concerned about the war, offering to send speakers to New Hampshire. In all cases they rejected the offers. They felt that their energies were already extended too far to manage other schedules. Further, they did not want to risk additional controversy. If there was to be controversy in the campaign they felt it should come from McCarthy's own activity. They did not want to be in the position of having to defend or deny the comments of secondary speakers. Those who came to New Hampshire at the behest of other sponsoring organizations could not be tied to the McCarthy campaign.

When Curtis Gans arrived to manage the campaign he brought with him from the national headquarters a person to schedule celebrity and secondary speakers, Sandra Silverman. When she arrived the McCarthy managers concluded that the campaign had grown to the extent that it could support this additional activity and that it could also sustain any controversy that might result.

Her first task was to develop campaign schedules for members of Senator McCarthy's family. Mary, the Senator's second child, had just begun her freshman year at Radcliffe. She had become a part of the student group that swirled around the effort to find an alternative to President Johnson in 1968. As Richard Stout wrote concerning McCarthy's decision to run for the presidency:

> Though many people urged him ultimately, his decision to run was a private one. His daughter Mary had been suggesting it for months. Didn't he want to be remembered in history for some nobler act that support of Lyndon Johnson's re-election? she had asked.[7]

Mary arrived for her first New Hampshire visit just before her father was to speak at the Concord Community Center, February 6th. An 18 year old freshman, she seemed shy and an unlikely campaigner, but her reputation as an influence on her father had preceded her. During her short first visit she did say that she wanted to help in any way she could with the campaign, but because of her school work she might have to concentrate her efforts in Cambridge. The New Hampshire leaders hoped that they would be able to encourage the McCarthy family to help with the campaign. They had found from their previous political ventures that New Hampshire people enjoy meeting the families of candidates and that such familiarity helps voters to formulate their opinions of the candidate himself.

Mrs. Abigail McCarthy had been working behind the scenes in Washington, as had been her mode in previous campaigns. Now she was urged to join the campaign. She agreed to visit February 14 and 15. To help her accept her new role as a campaigner she asked Mary to accompany her. Working with the local committees, Miriam Dunn of Concord arranged a two day schedule that had Mrs. McCarthy and Mary visiting Manchester, Nashua, Peterboro and Keene. In Keene, Mary decided there were some things which she could try on her own. Recalling, Barbara Underwood wrote:

> Mary Gregory, the wife of one of the two professors who spearheaded the McCarthy organization in Keene, asked if Mrs. McCarthy could please make a visit to a new community project. There is the New Hope Center for retarded children, she said and 'not one other candidate or his wife has shown any interest in our center, and it really is the pride and joy of our city.' There was, however, a time conflict in Abigail McCarthy's schedule, but Mary said that if her mother did not have the time to go,

> she would be happy to either go alone or with her mother. Mary had spent one summer at the Kennedy Foundation in Washington, tutoring retarded children, so it would be very natural for her. She also said she would substitute for her mother on an open-end radio program at the Keene station. It was the type of program where people telephoned in questions, with the answers given directly over the air.
>
> Steve Cohen reported back to Concord that Mary had been terrific on the radio, and should be scheduled for the same kind of programs throughout the state.[8]

From that time on the quiet Mary McCarthy became one of the most important secondary campaigners for her father in New Hampshire. Sandy Silverman would schedule her to meet with community groups, McCarthy committees, for radio and newspaper interviews, and for school visits as well as to encourage volunteers who had not seen her father in person. Eventually, her time was in such great demand and her own ability to concentrate on her studies had diminished in the excitement of her father's campaign that she arranged for a leave from Radcliffe for the duration.

"It's difficult to assess the exact role played by Mary McCarthy," wrote Barbara Underwood, "probably most important was that she was there in the state of New Hampshire and gave credence to the fact that her father was a decent and intelligent man. Local people who got to know her tended to judge the Senator based on Mary's own intelligence."[9]

While Mary McCarthy was Sandy Silverman's first scheduling subject, the task that brought her to New Hampshire was different. She expected to immediately begin scheduling a parade of notables who had been attracted to the McCarthy candidacy. Shortly after she arrived she met with Hoeh and Studds to discuss her intentions. They told her to be extremely careful and to

clear with them each person she intended to schedule into New Hampshire. They explained that they felt the campaign was beginning to take root. It was succeeding because they had avoided appearing frivolous, dis-establishment, or less than masculine in approach. They had carefully selected as references for the anti-war positions quotations from prominent military officers such as General James Gavin and former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Shoup. They were concerned that Sandy Silverman might now turn this aspect of the campaign into a sideshow. To explain to her what they meant they said they felt that only those celebrities who project strong, masculine images should be scheduled for New Hampshire. They did not want women or performers from the arts who did not associate easily in the public's mind with the masculine aspects of national pride. To be an effective critic of the war policy Hoeh and Studds felt that the celebrity would have to have an image of prowess that was established in the public's mind. To be less than that both felt that the charge which the Manchester Union Leader enjoyed repeating, that all anti-war protesters were "sissies, fags, cowards, or other social deviates" might be re-enforced. Their example of someone who would be an effective celebrity visitor was Paul Newman. To their surprise, Sandy Silverman scrapped the list of actresses and performers she had compiled and began trying to get Paul Newman to visit New Hampshire.

Although the New Hampshire leaders were conservative in their approach to using celebrities they understood the value of the celebrity role. A celebrity created excitement, attracted attention and reached people who

might not otherwise give thought to the campaign. Hoeh felt that McCarthy had too little time remaining to generate enough excitement on his own to bring out a significant vote. If the voter interest level could be increased then, perhaps, more of the marginal voters, many of them young and new voters, might just vote.

Sandy Silverman arranged visits for several academic celebrities, such as John Kenneth Galbraith, who came and went without stirring either much attention or controversy. Late in February she announced that Paul Newman had agreed to campaign in New Hampshire for McCarthy. Sandy Silverman had connections with a group in New York who was soliciting celebrity help for the campaign. When she reported that her first list of notables had been rejected by Hoeh and Studds she explained how important it was to the campaign to have someone like Newman campaign in New Hampshire. The New York group had been soliciting successfully celebrities for fund raising benefits, parties and possible campaign activities. Many had already been used in New York to make recordings supporting McCarthy that would be used as commercials during the closing weeks of the campaign.

The New York committee arranged a private airplane flight for Newman which arrived in Manchester late in the afternoon of Monday, March 4th. Notice of Newman's availability and arrival times were so short that Sandy Silverman had to scurry among the better organized local campaigns trying to find places for him to go and things for him to do on such short notice. Keeping in mind Hoeh's warning about possible controversy, she planned a dinner in Manchester where David Hoeh and Richard Goodwin might talk with

Newman about how he might be effective in New Hampshire. He had admitted that he had not done this sort of thing before and needed some help with his approach. Over dinner Newman was briefed about McCarthy, New Hampshire and what his visit might contribute. He was then trotted out to the airplane for a flight to Lebanon. Then he was driven to Enfield where Sandy Silverman had arranged a reception for him in a private home. Like other tests in the campaign little damage would have resulted if Newman's performance bombed in Enfield. With fingers crossed, Hoeh and Silverman waited for the report of Newman's foray into the New Hampshire winter night.

Shortly after 10:00 p.m. Hoeh received a telephone call reporting that all had gone exceptionally well. With a house full of people, Newman was a bit unsure of himself at first, but after fielding a few questions effectively he relaxed. Even several of the campaign's more skeptical academic members from the Dartmouth faculty found Newman competent and engaging. The test satisfactorily completed, Sandy Silverman began final scheduling plans for a full day of visits in Nashua, Manchester and Dover where Hoeh felt Newman's attraction could greatly help the campaign.

What Newman accomplished was immediately shown by the crowds he drew the next day and by the press clippings from his brief visit to Enfield. The campaign had progressed about as was normal for New Hampshire campaigns. The candidate usually receive good media attention when in a city or town but fade to the inner pages when campaigning outside the state or when surrogates are active. Paul Newman was an exception. He attracted radio and newspaper attention for his visits and, for the first time in the campaign, there were

crowds waiting. What he did and what he said received prominent attention in the local newspapers and more than passing notice in the others.

The Lebanon Valley News carried two photographs of Newman in Enfield. The front page was captioned "McCarthy Supporters -- Paul Newman, tough-guy film star, gave Enfield area citizens a soft-sell pitch for Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy for president Monday night. He said U.S. needs change of policy in Vietnam."[10] The page 3 photograph was captioned, "Female Fans -- Actor Paul Newman is surrounded by the distaff side during brief call at Enfield gathering Monday night...." The story the Valley News carried on his visit described how Newman experimented with his campaign style.

> Newman, who has been nominated for an Academy Award for his performance in "Cool Hand Luke," is also a McCarthy backer and he's here in the Granite State "to do everything I can for him."
>
> When Newman finally arrived, about an hour later than scheduled, most of the crowd pushed into the front hall to watch him come in the door. And that's exactly what happened. A woman or two gasped as he walked in chewing Spearmint gum, but no one immediately uttered a greeting or even shook his hand. They were all spellbound and Newman appeared embarrassed.
>
> But he finally walked on into the house, shook some hands and threaded his way to the front of the living room to say a few words for McCarthy -- very few.
>
> "I'm no public speaker," the actor began, "an in about 30 seconds you'll know why."
>
> Newman spoke softly, thoughtfully, a far cry from the tough guy characters he's protrayed, such as Hud and Harper.
>
> "Coming up today," Newman said, "I realized that Eugene McCarthy doesn't need me, I need Eugene McCarthy."
>
> Newman, his face tan and his hair greying, looked at the floor and fumbled with the Spearmint package in his hand. "I don't want any more of the last four years," he said, "I've had it."

> And this was his reason for coming to New Hampshire to campaign for McCarthy. It was also the end of his few words to all for McCarthy.
>
> Then the crowd surrounded him to ask questions and shake his hand. One young man asked for an autograph.
>
> "That's not what I'm here for," Newman replied, "I don't want to turn this into an autograph party."

Newman would not sign a single autograph while campaigning but would sign McCarthy literature between stops that would be distributed following his visit. Instead of an autograph or a kiss, Newman adopted his own trademark. He would look a stunned admirer in the eyes and quietly say, while pinning a McCarthy button on the woman's coat, "Listen to what Senator McCarthy is saying, that is important." He would move slowly through a crowd shaking hands, pinning buttons on lapels and reminding people that they, like himself, needed Senator McCarthy.

Several days after the first Newman visit, several canvassers were stopped by a state policeman in the western part of the state for speeding. Their car carried an out-of-state plate. As the tropper was writing out their ticket he said, "I'm doing this to show you that Paul Newman isn't the only one who can write autographs." Then as he handed them their warning he said, "By the way I'm a number one."

While serious candidates of presidential caliber, and especially McCarthy, dislike sharing the stage with other stars, the Newman phenomenon in New Hampshire lent celebrity status to the campaign. McCarthy did not meet Newman when he was in New Hampshire and did not want to be photographed with Newman at that time. He did not reprimand Hoeh or anyone else who planned Newman's visit. What McCarthy resisted was having the nature of his campaign changed from that

of one focussing on the issues to one that personalized the effort. To him, at least at the New Hampshire stage, Newman represented what he had hoped to avoid, the hoopla of a conventional campaign. While he would not promote the idea of celebrity visits or lend himself to them, his silence allowed his managers to do what they felt was in the best interests of the campaign. Although Newman was a bit puzzled that he had not met McCarthy during his visit, he too appeared to understand the importance of separating the two images at this juncture.

In the days that followed Newman's February 4 and 5th visit, the size of McCarthy's crowds increased and were noticably more excited and intense. By the mysticism of association, McCarthy had gained some of Newman's celebrity status and was now viewed himself as a celebrity. McCarthy's manner and style had not changed but he had become charismatic. With this status McCarthy thrived. The total pace of the campaign began to quicken noticably at just the crucial moment.

Following Newman came Tony Randall. His style was quite different. His response to questions tended to be brittle, occasionally irritating and defensive. He came to campaign for approximately three days, but after the first day his responses caused concern. He tended to answer questions on the war with emotion rather than reason. His forte as a campaigner was that he kissed every woman at each of the well attended coffee parties and practically every woman that he encountered during his visit.

A separate logistical activity almost exactly the same as that which supported Senator McCarthy when campaigning had to be organized for the celebrities. This meant schedule preparation, advancing, cars, drivers and a host or hostess to accompany the celebrity. Sandy Silverman had to manage as many as three celebrities campaigning in the state at the same time. The heaviest flow of celebrities was during the final ten days of the campaign. During that time Paul Newman returned, Robert Ryan, Rod Serling and Jack Parr came to campaign. Some like Serling and Parr came to assist with the media campaign as well, and would spend much of their time in the recording studio of Weston Associates advertising agency. Each celebrity who came to New Hampshire made an endorsement tape which was added to the tapes recorded by Harry Belafonte, Robert Vaughn, Dustin Hoffman, Lauren Becall, Jason Robards, Lee Remick, Joan Bennett and Joanne Woodward in New York.

Perhaps Newman's most successful visit was the one that was planned with the greatest skepticism. McCarthy volunteer, Marc Kaski, firmly in control of campaign affairs in Berlin, reluctantly agreed to host Newman during the last weekend of the campaign. Kaski recalled:

> Concord was feeling guilty about how little they had done for me. They wanted to do things for me but...I was... way up north of the White Mountains. They kept offering me Paul Newman for a day to campaign in Berlin.[11]

Hoeh and Silverman were offering Kaski Newman because they felt he would be well received in Berlin and would help in the final push before the election. They also were offering him because a plane was available to shorten the trip, an advantage which was not available to the others. Kaski reacted to the offer:

> It just didn't seem like the thing that was needed for Berlin. I wasn't sure that the people in Berlin wanted Paul Newman to tell them who to vote for, so I asked around to find out.
>
> The people I spoke to (asking) do you think he should come, said they didn't think it was a good idea. (They said) the people were making up their own minds, and this would make it just like any other campaign where some labor boss or the mayor comes out for a candidate. It's no longer the people's decision. It's who do you listen to? Do you listen to the mayor or the labor union council or a movie star?[12]

Kaski concluded:

> If what we wanted to do was have them make up their own minds, this was defeating our primary purpose, so I turned Concord down a couple of times.
>
> Then, I found, many did suggest that the people of Berlin usually made up their minds by the last weekend. If Newman were to come up here the last day or two before the primary, no damage would be done. It would sor of be...a fitting climax to the campaign. Frankly, they just thought it would be a fairly exciting thing for Berlin to have Paul Newman there. They also thought that there might be some people who had not been contacted during the campaign and who knew very little about McCarthy who might be swayed by the visit--and many people would.
>
> The reason they figured that Paul Newman would be able to reach some people who hadn't been reached during the campaign was that there was a championship hockey game in town that final weekend. The whole town goes to the hockey game or listens to it on the radio. Most of those who go to it are those from the mills who weren't at home when the canvassers visited.
>
> A radio announcer who had persuaded me twice from having Paul Newman come up said, "Ok. Have him come up that weekend and I'll arrange for him to drop the puck at the hockey game and make a speech over the loud speaker." The radio announcer had not declared for McCarthy himself. He was just being helpful.[13]

When Kaski finally called Sandy Silverman to say Newman could come he outlined a schedule that would scare most candidates much less a novice campaigner like Newman. Not giving Newman a chance to say anything but yes, Sandy Silverman got Dick Goodwin to write a brief speech for Newman to read over the hockey rink's speaker and, incidentally, the radio station covering the hockey game. Newman prepared for the visit with Goodwin's "script" while flying to Berlin.

> Well, Paul Newman came up to Berlin and visited a shopping center, went to the hockey game, spoke on the radio, reaching about everybody, and creating a great deal of excitement in the city. Everybody loved him. He spoke very well and people all kind of looked around and started nodding at each other. "McCarthy is in this thing for real. He's not one of the -- you know, a number of strange candidates enter the New Hampshire primary and they come through town one day every four years and that's all people see of them.
>
> This sort of created some feeling of permanence and determination on the part of Senator McCarthy -- that he was in this seriously, he was not playing games, and that this city was very important to him.
>
> I think his visit, coming at the time that it did was very successful and might even have made the difference in the campaign.[14]

During the evening of March 12th Kaski would report the unexpected. Eugene McCarthy would carry the city of Berlin.

A celebrity of a different sort but of no less importance was Richard Goodwin. At 31 years of age Goodwin abandoned his recently acquired teaching position at MIT to join the McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire. He arrived to meet Senator McCarthy in Berlin Friday, February 23rd. Goodwin had become convinced that Johnson was vulnerable and that since Robert Kennedy would not

be a candidate, the only game remaining was McCarthy in New Hampshire. Goodwin had been a youthful member of the Kennedy administration and was the first of Kennedy's political operatives to support McCarthy. A skillful speech writer and strategist, Goodwin had written an article for the New Yorker under a nom-d'plume outlining how Johnson might be replaced as the nominee of his party. The Tet offensive was the final straw for Goodwin.

> An unlooked-for consequence of Tet was the arrival of Dick Goodwin. Speculation at the time suggested that Goodwin had been cunningly insinuated into the operation to oversee Kennedy's (Robert) interests. He did, of course, but his initial motivation was uncharacterisically impulsive. At home in Boston, Goodwin read about the bombing of the temples in Hue and decided the situation demanded more of him than mere private proddings of Bobby. So he threw his typewriter into the back of his car and motored to New Hampshire.[15]

While the American Melodrama account had Goodwin arriving in Manchester, the fact was that he first met with McCarthy at his overnight stop in Franconia. The next day Goodwin joined Sy Hersh, McCarthy's travelling press secretary in Berlin, where he said, "Sy, with these two typewriters we're going to overthrow the government."[16] Goodwin began writing immediately. He was disturbed that only a small group of the national reporters had bothered to follow McCarthy on his northern swing. He had Hersh place a series of calls to the major national newspaper and wire service editors chiding them for not covering the campaign. Goodwin told Hersh to announce that McCarthy would be making a major policy statement the next afternoon in Manchester and that if they did not wish to be scooped by their competition they better get someone up to New Hampshire to cover the event quickly. Goodwin then sat down to write the statement.

McCarthy's invitational reception in Berlin drew a large and enthusiastic crowd but the next afternoon many times the number of invitations drew a much smaller crowd to the Alpine Club in Manchester. Not a candidate who used a pre-prepared text, McCarthy departed from his norm and read Goodwin's speech. Copies of the speech had been prepared for release once McCarthy began speaking. For the first time in the campaign a McCarthy address received lengthy coverage in the major newspapers across the nation. It was Goodwin's speech, read by McCarthy to a crowd that was approximately one half reporters.

> In 1963, we were told that we were winning the war. In 1964 we were told we were winning the war. In 1964, we were told the corner was being turned. In 1965, we were told the enemy was being brought to its knees. In 1966, in 1967, and now again in 1968, we hear the same hollow claims of programs and victory. For the fact is that the enemy is bolder than ever, while we must steadily enlarge our own commitment. The Democratic Party in 1964 promised "no wider war." Yet the war is getting wider every month. Only a few months ago we were told that sixty-five percent of the population was secure. Now we know that even the American Embassy is not secure.[17]

Goodwin brought more than a talented typewriter to the campaign. He brought the experience of one who had been involved in a successful national candidacy and one who understood the dynamics of national politics. His perspective bolstered the efforts of the New Hampshire leaders, none of whom had had previous national campaign experience. Goodwin was himself a celebrity who had lived and worked at the pinnacle of domestic politics. His reputation as the "infant terrible" of the State Department in the period immediately following the Bay of Pigs fiasco gave him both respect and credibility among those concerned about the Vietnam War. His writing had received wide circulation since he left the Johnson administration. Goodwin knew how to attract the attention of the national press. While few, if any, of his

speeches were subsequently read by McCarthy, Goodwin was there to help shape the reporters' reactions to McCarthy's own speaking style. Goodwin became an important advisor in the crucial last days of the campaign who helped the New Hampshire managers to avoid mistakes, to capitalize on the errors of the Johnson organization, and to build on the momentum that was growing.

Notes

[1]Approximately 100,000 return mail postal cards had been printed to be included with the mailing. When the Johnson pledge card backfired, the McCarthy managers decided not to use the return mail card and denied that they had even been thinking about using such a device. Upon orders from David Hoeh the printer burned all the cards, artwork, and plates. The campaign paid for the printing. Doing this saved the pledge card issue for the McCarthy campaign.

[2]McCarthy Campaign, Canvassing Suggestions Memorandum, David C. Hoeh file copy.

[3]McCarthy Campaign, "Information for Volunteers." David C. Hoeh file copy.

[4]McCarthy Campaign, "Instructions: Post-Canvassing," David C. Hoeh file copy.

[5]Stavis, B., Op.Cit., pp. 7-8.

[6]Ibid., p. 8.

[7]Stout, R., Op.Cit., p. 73.

[8]Underwood, B., Op.Cit., "McCarthy," p. 66.

[9]Ibid.

[10]The Lebanon Valley News (March 5, 1968).

[11]Marc Kaski, Oral History Transcript, (Washington, D.C.: McCarthy Historical Project, Georgetown University, 1969), p. 24.

[12]Ibid., p. 24-25.

[13]Ibid., p. 25.

[14]Ibid., p. 26.

[15]Chester, Lewis, et.al., Op.Cit., p. 93.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid.

CHAPTER XII

ADVERTISING, MATERIALS, MEDIA, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCES

Advertising and Campaign Materials

Mervin Weston had been given the go ahead to prepare a media program for the McCarthy campaign by Blair Clark. Through a memorandum that had been developed as a result of conversations with Clark and Hoeh, Weston outlined a "Media Strategy and Plan" which also carried costs for each of the items. The memorandum read:

I. MEDIA STRATEGY

We are planning a short but strong campaign peaking in the final days before the primary. Radio minutes, newspapers and outdoor (signs) will provide continuity, television and radio ID's, the crescendo.

The campaign uses radio minutes, TV minutes, direct mail and large space newspaper ads to build an awareness and understanding of Senator McCarthy's position on Vietnam and present administration policies; television and radio ID's and small space newspaper ads to provide maximum "noise" during the final days of the campaign.

In all media placement we are depending upon continuing news of the Vietnam war to increase the relevance and impact of our messages. In the broadcast media particular attention will be paid to scheduling announcements in news adjacencies.

II. MEDIA PLAN

1. Duration: Four weeks starting Tuesday, February 11 and ending Monday, March 11 (Tuesday, March 12 for morning newspapers).

2. Media Cost: $59,652 Media costs have been reduced by 15% where media are commissionable.

3. Media:

A. Radio ($17,000)

This is the basic medium. We are planning 175 : 60's and 50 : 10's on each of 25 stations during the four weeks. We will attempt to place announcements adjacent to news broadcasts for maximum impact and concentrate in the 6-9 A.M. and

3-6 P.M. time periods for greatest reach. The schedule will build to maximum weight during the final days of the campaign (see flow chart).

Radio costs assume local rates (50% of national). If rates are higher, the per-station schedule can be reduced in the six multi-station markets.

B. Newspapers

Dailies ($8,661)

We are planning four 1750 line ads in each of the nine New Hampshire dailies. This one-a-week schedule will be staggered for the different newspapers to minimize reader duplication. The final ad will be scheduled for Monday, March 11 in evening editions and Tuesday, March 12 (Primary Day) in morning editions. (If copy suggests a larger number of smaller space units, these can be substituted for one or two of the 1750 line ads.)

The local "political rate" has been used for our costing. In some cases the national rate is lower, so contracts will be noted "request lowest available rate."

Weeklies ($3,646)

During the final week of the campaign one 1750 line ad in each of New Hampshire's 25 weekly newspapers will be scheduled.

C. Television ($13,525)

Boston television will be used during the final week to peak the campaign.

We will schedule 10 prime time ID's; 5 early fringe minutes and 5 afternoon minutes during the last half of the final week. The schedule will use all three Boston stations but will be concentrated on WBZ which has the best New Hampshire coverage. The prime ID's will be placed preceding high-rated programs. The fringe minutes will be purchased following the early evening news. The afternoon minutes will also be news adjacencies.

In addition to this spot schedule, two afternoon women-oriented half hour programs are planned. These would feature the Senator discussing his candidacy with groups of local ladies.

D. Outdoor ($2,035)

Twenty-seven 24-sheet posters will be used for the month. These will be located in nine key areas.

E. Direct Mail (414,885)

Two mailings will be made to the entire list of Democrats (89,000) and Independents (120,000). Because of husband and wife duplication, this will be an estimated total of 150,000. The first mailing will be done early in the campaign; the second, in the last week.1

With the proposed Media Strategy and Plan was attached the following Flow Chart which projected each element across the campaign calendar.

CHART 12.01: MEDIA FLOW CHART

FLOW CHART

NEW HAMPSHIRE CAMPAIGN
MEDIA SCHEDULING

2.

	WEEK 1							WEEK 2							WEEK 3							WEEK 4							
	FEB.																		MAR.										
	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Radio ($17,000) 25 Stations 125 :60's 50 :10's	---------- 25 ----------							---------- 25 ----------							---------- 50 ----------							7	8	10	10	10	10	20	
	Buying policy: Seek news broadcast adjacencies 6-9AM, 3-6PM																								10	10	10	20	
Newspapers ($8,561) A. 9 dailies 4 1,750 line ads	---------- 1 ----------							---------- 1 ----------							---------- 1 ----------							---------- 1 ----------							
	Scheduling: Stagger insertion dates in markets because of overlap. Last ad should run on Monday the 11th in evening papers and Tuesday the 12th in morning papers.																												
B. 25 weeklies ($3,646) 1 1,750 line ad																						---------- X ----------							
TV ($13,525) 3 Boston stations 5 early eve. :60's 5 afternoon :60's 10 prime ID's 2 daytime 1/2 hour programs	Buying policy: prime 10's preceding high rated programs. Early fringe :60's following early news. Afternoon :60's following news.																								1 1	1 1	1 1	2 2	
																		---------- X ----------				---------- X ----------							
Outdoor ($2,035) 27 24-sheet posters	----------							----------							----------							----------							
Direct Mail ($14,885) 2 mailings of 150,000	---------- X ----------																					---------- X ----------							

Total Cost $59,652

The media plan proposed what seemed to be the essential elements of the overall campaign strategy that could be funded and would take advantage of the media options available in New Hampshire. Hoeh and Clark accepted the plan and Weston Associates immediately began acquiring options for time. Reserving time or space from New Hampshire radio stations or newspapers is not difficult. Radio stations reduce program time to insert advertising and newspapers will print more pages. Premium placement in some New Hampshire newspapers must be reserved ahead. The Manchester Union Leader sells space on its front page other papers do not. Television scheduling is less flexible. Channel 8 from Poland Springs, Maine, broadcasting from Mt. Washington, and Channel 9 broadcasting from Manchester, were reasonable and covered a useful portion of the New Hampshire market. Channel 6 from Plattsburg, New York penetrated western New Hampshire and was also used for political advertising occasionally in New Hampshire. The Republican candidates, Romney and Nixon, had booked much of the better television space for the New Hampshire aimed stations. Boston television, while predominant in the New Hampshire market, was exceptionally expensive for the time alone disregarding the high cost of preparing effective television advertising. The original plan called for "final" week use of Boston television. In all but the instance of direct mailing and billboard advertising, the MEDIA PLAN and budget specified time or space acquisition not preparation or production of the actual media inserts.

The first item on the plan that opened was the billboard space. Weston Associates was able to acquire most of the billboards they had advised in the "nine key" areas of the state. The billboards were the first media evidence

that there was a McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire. The same slogan, logo type, and colors were used to prepare stationery, envelopes and other printed necessities of the campaign.

Most major campaigns are planned well before the beginning of the actual campaign. During that preparation period an extensive resource of photographs, film footage, draft advertising copy, advertising and materials layouts are developed. This was not the case with McCarthy in 1968.

The file materials that the McCarthy senatorial staff maintained related entirely to his Minnesota constituency. His family had been photographed with farmers, in meetings and with appealing backgrounds, but not New Hampshire backgrounds. Much of the material was dated not having been used since McCarthy's last senatorial candidacy in 1964. When anyone went to prepare New Hampshire advertising materials for McCarthy they had to begin from scratch.

During the early weeks of the New Hampshire campaign and right to the end, McCarthy would have to take time from his campaign schedules to record advertising copy or prepare television materials. In addition to the void in visual material on McCarthy there was also very little that had been recorded. His positions on the critical issues were best described by him in response to questions, as the part of a speech, or in casual exchange while street campaigning. His verbal skills were not translated easily into writing that he could then read for a radio advertisement. To capture vintage McCarthy it had to be recorded as it happened, not as it was contrived in a studio.

Realizing that there was not enough time to prepare, edit and then have McCarthy produce a media piece, a sound film crew was hired to follow Senator McCarthy during much of his early campaigning. In addition, arrangements were made to acquire film that had been taken by the television network crews that had also followed McCarthy. Gradually a library of new film, recordings and photographs built up. It took the New Hampshire leaders some time to realize that the delay in producing campaign media in New York and Washington was because the resource file did not exist.

Weston Associates managed the printing of the mailing portion of the Media Plan. February 9th Weston reported his progress:

> We have now processed 3 mailing programs - and this memo will cover what has been done, and what has to be done.
>
> Re: Status of Mailing Programs
>
> 1. Mailing to solicit funds from colleges
>
> Being printed: 1,500 letters - one page two colors.
>
> 1,000 #6 3/4 envelopes - one color. This has a Business Reply Indicia, which means each return will cost you 8¢.
>
> Outside envelopes being supplied by headquarters.
>
> 2. Mailing to Democratic Party members
>
> Being printed: 60,000 letters - two colors first sheet, one color second sheet.
>
> 60,000 number 9 envelopes
>
> 60,000 folders out of New York
>
> 3. Mailing to Independents
>
> Being printed: 80,000 letters, two colors first sheet, one color second sheet.
>
> 80,000 number 9 envelopes
>
> 80,000 folders out of New York

4. Mailing Procedures

The mailings to Manchester, Nashua, Concord, and Portsmouth go third class, bulk rate of 3.6¢ each.

All other mailings will go first class, at 6¢ each.

Voter breakdown in the 4 third class cities are as follows:

	DEMOCRATS	INDEPENDENTS
Manchester	25,500	8,200
Nashua	8,500	11,100
Concord	1,675	5,428
Portsmouth	1,164	4,750
	36,839	29,478

Concluding his memorandum, Merv Weston advised:

> Total number of Democrats and Independents is 66,317. We guesstimate a shrinkage of 25% because of homes with two adults registered in the same party. We are therefore printing 49,737 (or 50M) third class envelopes for this purpose. The remaining 90M envelopes will be printed with a first class indicia.
>
> Both mailings will have to be stuffed and sealed. The letters are being folded by the printer in a special way so that the second sheet slips into the first sheet, so it will be picked up as a two page letter. This collating of both sheets must be done by hand, i.e., volunteers.
>
> The third class mailings must be addressed with zip code, sorted and tied into zip coded packages, with both address sides faced out, top and bottom.
>
> On first class mailing, zip codes are not necessary, but preferred. They can go out in bulk, but for expediency, have them broken down into cities and towns.
>
> Checks have to accompany deliveries to the post office. The #9 envelops that will be delivered to you are practically free, so don't get mad if they are not perfect. Some of them will stick together in one spot - simply break them open. A few may tear. Discard them. We have supplied an overage.[3]

The envelopes did stick and without the extra patience and energy of the volunteers they would have delayed the mailing. More than a "few" had to be "discarded."

The fund raising letter was to be the New Hampshire campaign's only effort to raise funds locally to support the campaign. Since it was thought that McCarthy loyalists were on the state's campuses a mailing soliciting funds from faculty and administrators might be worth the cost. The returns did exceed the cost of the mailing but the exact total was never calculated. The mailing did stimulate other campus organizing and provided the New Hampshire committee with names that might not have come from other organizing efforts.

Materials for Distribution

Most of the campaign materials used in New Hampshire were prepared and printed either in Washington or New York. The first generation of these materials was composed almost entirely of one sheet flyers developed from text and file photos available in Washington. The first of these to appear in New Hampshire hit an important theme of the 1968 McCarthy campaign, "What's happened to this country since 1963?" The blue printed flyer carried a photograph of Eugene McCarthy with President John F. Kennedy, and read:

> John F. Kennedy got this country moving. Now the fabric of that great achievement is unravelling.
>
> All around us we can see that the last five years have brought decay to replace progress, despair to replace hope, and failure in war to replace success in the pursuit of peace.

> In 1963, the economy was booming and taxes were being lowered. Now, prices are rising, the Kennedy boom is slowing down, and we are being asked to raise taxes.
>
> In 1963, our great cities were relatively tranquil. Now, the streets of our cities are scarred by lawlessness, violence, and desperate fear. Now, the President has projected year after year of continuing violence.
>
> In 1963, the deep concerns of American young people were the peace corps and civil rights. Now there are demonstrations and draft protests.
>
> In 1963, we were at peace, just as we had been at peace for the eight previous years under Eisenhower. Now, we are at war.
>
> Gene McCarthy stood shoulder to shoulder with Kennedy in the Senate, and he will stand head and shoulders above Johnson as President. There is one candidate who can get this country moving again, and carry on the traditions John F. Kennedy began.
>
> That man is Gene McCarthy.[4]

Shortly after the Kennedy flyer appeared, the New Hampshire campaign prepared one of the few flyers generated entirely in New Hampshire. It carried a copy of the Johnson campaign's "Pledge Card" and read, "What ever happened to the secret ballot?" and then a picture of McCarthy with the message, "You don't have to sign anything to vote for Senator Eugene McCarthy on March 12, let Johnson know it. McCarthy for President." A duplicate of this flyer was prepared in Washington for New Hampshire except that it used black ink in reverse and was printed on both sides. Both the "Kennedy" flyer and the "pledge card" flyer were used throughout the campaign and were included in the packet of materials delivered by canvassers.

Another in the first phase series was a simple black reverse printed sheet with a formal photograph of McCarthy which read, "McCarthy for President" in large type with the quote, "This can again be an America of Confidence," below and adjacent to the photograph. On the back side under the heading "The Spirit of America," excerpts of a McCarthy speech read:

> John Kennedy set free the spirit of America. The honest optimism was released. Quiet courage and civility became the mark of American government, and new programs of promise and of dedication were presented: the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress, the promise of equal rights for all Americans and not just the promise, but the beginning of the achievement of that promise.
>
> All the world looked to the United States with new hope, for here was youth and confidence and an openness to the future. Here was a country not being held by the dead hand of the past, nor frightened by the violent hand of the future which was grasping at the world.
>
> This was the spirit of 1963.
>
> What is the spirit of 1967? What is the mood of America and of the world toward America today?
>
> It is a joyless spirit -- a mood of frustration, of anxiety, of uncertainty.
>
> In place of the enthusiasm of the Peace Corps among the young people of America, we have protests and demonstrations.
>
> In place of the enthusiasm of the Alliance for Progress, we have distrust and disappointment.
>
> Instead of the language of promise and of hope, we have in politics today a new vocabulary in which the critical word is war: war on poverty, war on ignorance, war on crime, war on pollution. None of these problems can be solved by war but only by persistent, dedicated, and thoughtful attention.
>
> The message from the Administration today is a message of apprehension, a message of fear, yes -- even a message of fear of fear.

> This is not the real spirit of America. I do not believe that it is. This is a time to test the mood and spirit:
>
> To offer in place of doubt -- trust.
>
> In place of expediency -- right of judgment.
>
> In place of ghettos, let us have neighborhoods and communities.
>
> In place of incredibility -- integrity.
>
> Let us sort out the music from the sounds and again respond to the trumpet and the steady drum.5

The flyers were designed to give McCarthy identity, tie him to the lost spirit of the Kennedy era, and to introduce McCarthy to a public that did not know him. To aid in this process of introduction and legitimacy, the Washington headquarters prepared a weekly flyer called, "Newsbriefs from McCarthy for President." The publication was composed entirely of clippings pasted and reproduced from the original newspaper type. A batch of "Newsbriefs" would arrive at the end of each week in time to be used as the wrapper for the packet of canvassing materials to be distributed that weekend.

With the exception of the "Pledge Card" flyer almost all of the first phase printing carried few photographs or illustrations and a great deal of text. The thinking behind such material was that the campaign literature should provide the recipient with sufficient information about McCarthy for the person to make an evaluation. The extensive text, especially in the "Newsbrief" would substitute for McCarthy's early difficulty in getting print or electronic media coverage. The flyers served as a digest of McCarthy's positions, and a glimpse of his character. During the early weeks of the campaign the objective of the printed materials was to stir interest among

those who might become actively involved and those who, because they read and might follow politics, would become opinion leaders for McCarthy in their communities.

The second generation of printed materials became more specific to New Hampshire and to the issues on the minds of the spectrum of voters eligible to vote March 12th. These were aimed at particular constituencies among the Democratic Party voters of New Hampshire. The first of these was one addressed to New Hampshire union members. The photograph on the face showed McCarthy shaking the hand of a worker arriving at his factory in the darkness of a New Hampshire winter morning. On the reverse under the heading, "Sure, George Meany tells you to vote for LBJ -- but:" the flyer compared McCarthy's voting record on issues of concern to organized labor as opposed to Lyndon Johnson's record on the same issues. Following the summary of the issues and voting records was a quotation under the heading, "For twenty years Gene has been an inflinching defender of the rights of labor!"

> In 1908, the AFL conference headed by Samuel Gompers declared: "We now call upon the workers of our common country to stand faithfully by our friends, oppose and defeat our enemies whether they be candidates for president, for congress or other office, whether executive, legislative or judicial."
>
> What was true 60 years ago is still true today.[6]

Another flyer of the same generation titled "Shrinking Dollar - Growing War" showed a 1964 dollar at full size with a toy-sized battle dressed soldier in contrast. The next panel showed a 1966 dollar crumpled and smaller with a photograph of the soldier growing in size. The third panel labelled, 1968, showed a miniature dollar and head of the same soldier now filling more than half the panel. The text on the reverse, titled, "The Bigger the

War the Smaller Your Dollar," contrasted the economic situation of the United States during the period 1961-1965 with the impact of the war in the years since 1965. From "unprecedented prosperity" the war had produced "inflation" of "10%," shrinking Social Security benefits, a gold drain, trade deficit, which had already set off uncertainty in the dollar not seen since the "Great Depression." The flyer concluded, "Vote March 12th -- McCarthy for President."[7]

Most of the flyers produced in Washington during this period were aimed for use in the New Hampshire primary. One flyer was produced that could be used in other states as well. With a photo of McCarthy backed by people shown waving a McCarthy for President poster on a stick, the text read, "McCarthy for President -- 'Let Us Begin Anew....'" On the reverse, McCarthy was shown photographed in his Senatorial office with bookshelves behind him, looking toward a window. The draperies woven with a presidential-looking eagle, softened the light cast across his face and three piece suit. The text, "McCarthy is the Man...," summarized McCarthy's career under the headings, "Courage and Integrity, Leadership and Achievement, and Time to Act." The latter read:

> America in 1968 is a deeply troubled nation. We need new hope, new leadership. And we need it now.
>
> Eugene McCarthy and the Democratic Party can provide that leadership...in the spirit of Adlai Stevenson and John F. Kennedy. Let us begin anew.
>
> Help stop the War in Vietnam!
>
> We reject the notion that the people's choice will be turned down by the Democratic National Convention.
>
> Eugene McCarthy for President.[8]

The Washington headquarters also reprinted recent articles about McCarthy that had appeared in the major national magazines. The most widely distributed reprinted from the February 6th issue of Look magazine was by McCarthy titled, "Why I'm Battling LBJ." There was a reprint from the Catholic church's weekly publication, Our Sunday Visitor, titled, "The many lives of Abigail McCarthy," which also contained a photograph of the McCarthy's three oldest children. An 18 page mimeographed publication prepared from speech excerpts and biographical material was assembled for New Hampshire titled, "McCarthy for President -- His Record and His Message for America."

Following McCarthy's second campaign tour of New Hampshire beginning February 6th enough photographs of McCarthy campaigning in New Hampshire had been taken to produce a campaign flyer. The first of these was titled, "McCarthy Speaks to New Hampshire," and used a tabloid format. A series of high quality photographs, printed on offset paper rather than newsprint, gave the flyer an attractiveness not typically seen in political printing. Beside or beneath each photograph was a text paragraph on the issue represented by the photo. The photos were large, of New Hampshire people and places, and showed McCarthy as a candidate in New Hampshire. The printing came as the result of New Hampshire leaders' complaints that most of the material prepared for New Hampshire either had too much text or too few photographs, or were not specific to McCarthy as a candidate in New Hampshire. For several weeks afterward, the "McCarthy Speaks to New Hampshire" piece would be the wrapper for the packet of materials used by the canvassers.

Like the canvassing mimeographed flyer prepared for the first canvass in Keene, a number of the local committees prepared campaign items specific to their own communities. Many of these contained quotations from McCarthy and other notables concerning current issues or problems that the local committees felt were of special interest to their area. Occasionally an issue would develop locally that would not be responded to with existing material. In these cases the local committee would find an appropriate response and print the answer. The federated nature of the campaign continued to the end. Usually the response would be cleared through the Concord headquarters before being printed to be sure that it was consistent with what was happening in the campaign elsewhere.

The only major publication and mailing effort outside those authorized and paid for by the McCarthy campaign came from the national organization of Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam. Their six page, tabloid sized mailer was sent to 200,000 New Hampshire homes March 1st. The mailing was announced by press release in Washington which asked, "Who's right on Vietnam?" with the answer, "McCarthy is." Intended as a non-partisan, voter education mailer, when Governor Romney was still a candidate, the organizers of the mailing now aimed it, by press release, at Democrats, Independents and Republicans urging them to vote for or to write-in McCarthy as the only candidate opposed to U.S. policy in Vietnam. An expensive effort that may have aided McCarthy ultimately, it scarcely stirred the political air during the time that it was arriving.

The final generation of printed materials for the campaign evolved in response to what was felt to be the successes and questions produced by the campaign. The final mailing was a tabloid sized, newsprint, two color flyer. It would be sent to those names on the labels prepared by the volunteers and blanket mailed in the larger communities that showed a strong trend for McCarthy as the result of the canvassing. The front had a photograph of Senator McCarthy in a factory surrounded by workers, one with his finger blurred in motion as he emphasized his point. The title read, "Senator McCarthy Answers the Three Questions Most Frequently Asked by New Hampshire Voters." The questions had come from the canvassing and from Al Shepard's motivational research. Opening the flyer the reader found the three questions with an appropriate matching photograph to the left and the answers to the right. Question 1: "Why are you running for President?" (Photograph: McCarthy with President John F. Kennedy). The answer:

> I hope to restore the principles and the sense of hope which guided the Democratic Party during the Administration of John F. Kennedy. In 1963, the country was booming; our cities were tranquil; we were at peace, and we felt that our problems were being solved. America was respected and admired around the world. Today our cities are filled with misery and lawlessness. Our prestige is getting lower every day. Our great problems at home -- the need for better schools and parks, for decent housing and clean air -- are not being solved. We must concentrate our energies on the huge, unsolved problems of American society. In this way we can, perhaps, restore the sense of idealism and high purpose which we knew under John F. Kennedy. The issue is not merely Vietnam or riots. If you share my feeling that there is something wrong with the direction of American society today, then I ask your support. We cannot chart a new direction until we also have new leadership.

The second question, "Do you think it is possible to achieve peace with honor in Vietnam without sacrificing the interests of the country?" had next to it a photograph of McCarthy seated in a New Hampshire living room discussing his concerns with a group of women. The answer:

> Yes I do, but not if we follow the policies of the last five years. After all those policies are a proven failure. Every year the Administration has promised a quick victory, and every year it has increased the size of the war. The fact is that we are now involved in an endless, ever increasing war which our present leadership seems unable to end, either on the battlefield or at the conference table. If we continue what we are doing, then thousands more Americans will die, and yet the war will be no closer to an end than it is today.
>
> It seems clear to me, therefore, that we need a change. Most Americans do not want withdrawal and defeat. Most Americans do want an honorable settlement at the conference table. That is what I want, and what I will try to achieve if I am elected. I think we should make some effort to achieve that peace. Thus it is necessary to take advantage of one of the many opportunities to begin negotiations -- opportunities which have been pointed out by many world leaders such as Pope Paul and Americans such as Senator George Aiken. It is necessary to devise a workable political compromise which will allow all the people of South Vietnam to share in choosing their government. No one can guarantee that new approaches will work. However, we do know the old ones have failed. <u>As you go to the polls, ask yourself if you think we are doing a skillful and effective job in Vietnam.</u>

The final question, "Why do you oppose the President's proposal to increase taxes by ten percent?" had next to it a photograph of McCarthy, talking with a jovial policeman, with the background of Newport, New Hampshire's Main Street. The answer completed the summary of McCarthy's New Hampshire campaign and led to the back page and a reprint of a marked primary ballot. McCarthy responded to the question:

> I believe the tax increase will not only take badly needed income from millions of Americans, but will hurt rather than help the economy. The purpose of a tax increase is to slow down an economy which is growing too fast. Our economy is growing more slowly and higher taxes would only increase dangers of a recession. In addition, an across-the-board increase -- as the President had proposed -- would hit lower income families most severely. It seems to me that housewives and older people have a difficult enough time keeping up with today's rising prices. I don't think we should add to their burden by imposing taxes which are likely to become a drag on the entire economy and thus diminish the total wealth of the nation.

In addition to the ballot that ended the flyer there was a message addressed specifically to Independents. It was a reminder that they too had a stake in the outcome of the New Hampshire presidential primary. "Independents. Vote for McCarthy or You May Have No Choice in November."

> Independence means freedom of choice. Yet New Hampshire Independents may lose their freedom of choice in November if they fail to vote March 12th. There is only one candidate in either party who promises to restore the spirit of John F. Kennedy, and get America moving again. There is only one candidate who promises to bring an honorable peace. That candidate is Eugene McCarthy. If you believe there is a need to change the direction of the nation and its leadership, vote McCarthy, March 12th.
>
> Be sure to ask for the DEMOCRATIC BALLOT.[9]

The last major printed piece of the campaign proved to be controversial within the campaign itself. Besides direct mail, another way to reach the dispersed voters of New Hampshire was to insert campaign material with the regular editions of the newspapers. A special supplement was prepared by a group of volunteer writers, editors and photographers based in New York. It was arranged for the supplement to be inserted in the March 3rd edition

of the New Hampshire Sunday News and March 4th edition of the Manchester Union Leader; the March 5th or 6th editions of the Nashua Telegraph, Concord Monitor, Claremont Eagle, Laconia Citizen, Keene Sentinel, Lebanon Valley News, Foster's Daily Democrat, Portsmouth Herald, and the weekly Berlin Reporter and Northland News. The insert orders from Weston Associates, dated February 26th, said the bundles of supplements would arrive the day before the edition that would carry the insert. While this media device had not been mentioned in the original plan for the campaign the insert cost of $8,896.96 was made possible when the budget for media was substantially expanded during the last weeks of the campaign.

To produce such an insert meant a considerable lead time to assemble photographs, texts, prepare the layout, and publish enough copies for the distribution. To meet mailing requirements the inserts for each newspaper had to carry the name of the newspaper on the supplement which meant at least twelve title changes during the press run.

After the problem which Hoeh and McCarthy had experienced with the flyer that used the photograph of the Pope, McCarthy insisted that all copy and materials used in the campaign should be cleared through his Senatorial Office. Because of the necessities of the campaign a number of items used in New Hampshire were not specifically cleared through the Washington office but were reviewed carefully by Hoeh, Studds, and/or Gans before printing and distribution. The supplement was prepared and printed in New York. The text was changed through Washington but the photographs were not. A number of photos used were from McCarthy office files which had been used in his earlier campaigns or

earlier in the New Hampshire campaign. The exception was the photograph that had been selected for the cover. It showed Senator McCarthy reaching across a work table in a New Hampshire factory to shake the hand of a plump, older worker. It was a sensitive and friendly event capturing the moment of contact between a person who had obviously spent most of her life working in a factory and a presidential candidate who cared enough to come and visit her in her place of work. When the first copies of the supplement were received from the printer one was sent to McCarthy's Senatorial office. There Mrs. McCarthy saw it and reacted negatively to the cover photograph. To her the outstretched, bare-to-the-shoulder, heavy arm of the older woman worker was unattractive. She felt that such an unflattering photo might hurt her husband's candidacy. This reaction filtered quickly back to Curt Gans in New Hampshire, with a specific instruction that the insert was not to be used. Gans was about to call the newspapers that had instructions concerning the supplement telling them to cancel the order when Hoeh arrived. Hoeh took one look at the supplement and said that it was excellent. The front photo, he said, "was a picture of the real Miss New Hampshire -- the one who spends her life working in the state's mills." He told Gans not to place the cancellation calls. Such a call, he said, this late in the campaign would be an embarrassment. Certainly greater than any problems that the supplement might cause as it now stood. Gans responded that he was in charge of these activities and that he had been instructed by McCarthy's Senatorial office to keep the supplement from circulating. Hoeh said he would call McCarthy immediately to give the Senator his thoughts on the matter directly. McCarthy was not in his of-

fice when Hoch placed his call but Hoch did leave a detailed message for McCarthy. A short time later Hoch received a return call from McCarthy's staff saying that the Senator okayed the supplement distribution. The piece circulated as scheduled. Many felt that the supplement was among the most effective items used in the campaign.

For election day itself, a 3 by 7 handout card was printed. On it was the campaign photo of McCarthy, advice to Independents about asking for the Democratic ballot, and on the back the segment of the primary ballot showing Eugene J. McCarthy's name and the phrase, "Vote for all McCarthy Delegates and all McCarthy Alternates." This card was used in the cities where tradition held that something should be handed to the voter as he or she was entering the polls. Most were distributed in Manchester.

Newspaper Advertising

To begin building momentum for the campaign the newspaper advertising schedule and budget proposed by Weston Associates was implemented. The changes were in the size and the number of the ads which increased as the campaign ended and the budget expanded.

Working with Weston's modest initial budget, the first newspaper ads began appearing February 20th with a large, 6 column by 11 inch, ad. The ad reproduced the Johnson campaign's "pledge card" with text advising that the voters didn't have to sign anything to vote for Senator McCarthy. The large ad was followed on alternate days by a 2 column by 3 inch identification ad which read, "Don't Sign Anything! Vote Eugene McCarthy for President."

The next week's series began with an ad of the large size followed by the alternate day sequence of the small identification ad. "What had happened to America in the years since John F. Kennedy's presidency," theme of the large ad was amplified by the small ad which read, "Let's get America moving again! McCarthy for President." In the final days before the election the ad size and sequence increased, but the identification ads remained to re-enforce the theme of the larger ads. One of the most effective of the smaller ads came from a slogan developed by a New York agency, "New Hampshire can bring America back to its senses. McCarthy for President." One ad reflected on the challenge McCarthy had been given early in his campaign when he had been told not to come to New Hampshire because the state was felt to be too "Hawkish." Another dealt with the reasons why he did come to New Hampshire and the importance of the New Hampshire primary. At the same time the Johnson campaign responded by repeating an ad which had a line drawing of Johnson, the slogan, "A Strong Man in a Tough Job," and the text, "to vote for President Johnson you must WRITE-IN his name on your ballot."

The March 6th McCarthy ad read, "This time let's elect a President we can believe. McCarthy for President," with the quotation:

> And as far as I'm concerned, I want to be very cautious and careful and use it only as a last resort when I start dropping bombs around that are likely to involve American boys in a war in Asia with 700 million Chinese...so, just for the moment, I have not thought that we were ready, our American boys, to do the fighting for Asian boys. And what I've been trying to do with the situation that I found was to get the boys in Vietnam to do their own fighting with our advice and our equipment, and that's the course we're following. So, we're not going North and drop bombs at this stage of the game...."
>
> Lyndon Johnson
> September 28, 1964
>
> Campaign Speech in Manchester, N.H.

Each of the following ads pursued major themes of the campaign. The ad that appeared March 8th had a photograph of the New Hampshire State House with the title, "In the next seventy-two hours more money will be spent in Vietnam than the state of New Hampshire spends all year." The explanatory text read:

> 32 billion dollars a year is enough money to eliminate poverty in America, but also to build all the roads, schools, colleges, hospitals, and houses we need. And we'd still have enough left over to invest in underdeveloped countries so we don't have more Vietnams in the future, and maybe enough for a tax-cut after that. In 1952, General Eisenhower promised peace with honor in Korea. He was elected, and he delivered. Senator McCarthy can do the same. An honorable man can bring an honorable peace.

Then a photograph of McCarthy and the line, "McCarthy for President," completed the ad.[10]

In the same edition of the Concord Monitor, there appeared the first advertisement from several special groups that had raised their own advertising money to make appeals for McCarthy. The ad was addressed to "Republicans" and was placed by the Republicans for McCarthy Committee, in newspapers where an independent Republican vote was thought to exist. Concord, Keene, Lebanon and Laconia were the cities selected for the ad which showed the segment of the Republican presidential primary ballot that listed the candidate names, nine names in total, and showed, written in on the ballot, "Senator McCarthy." The text read, "Republicans -- You can vote for Senator McCarthy. Write in his name on your Republican ballot."[11]

The advertising that appeared during the last three press days of the New Hampshire campaign used three formats for what were seen as different political markets. The Monday, March 11th ad for McCarthy in the Concord Monitor, a market with a large Independent voter population, had a photo of

the Statue of Liberty. The text challenged Independents to vote in the primary or lose their freedom of choice in the November election.12

The March 11th edition of the Manchester Union Leader carried ten separate advertisements for McCarthy and a reminder that McCarthy would be speaking that evening. On page 2, the New Hampshire McCarthy Committee had placed its ad offering transportation and babysitting service for McCarthy voters. Also on the page was an ad placed by a private citizen who signed his ad, "A concerned non-New Hampshire Democrat, W. Hirsch, 9601 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly Hills, California." It read:

> An Open Letter to New Hampshire Democrats
>
> The presence of Senator Eugene McCarthy on the primary ballot provides an opportunity for New Hampshire Democrats to directly register their concern or approval of the State of the Union.
>
> Perhaps when the history of the 1968 campaign is written it will record that only the New Hampshire and Wisconsin Democrats had a clearcut possibility to affirm their position as to the main issues.
>
> At this point in the campaign what is being decided is not a contest between two candidates but an answer to the question: "Has this administration handled the problems of Vietnam, civil rights, balance of payment, crime, foreign aid, draft, etc., to your satisfaction?"
>
> Do you have confidence in the administration's progress reports and predictions of future success in solving today's problems?
>
> IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED, YOUR ONLY CHANCE TO BE HEARD IS BY A VOTE FOR SENATOR EUGENE McCARTHY.
>
> The American dream was born in New England and Tuesday the future of that dream will once more be at stake.

> The eyes of all thinking Americans who do not have the privilege of voting in this election will be on the outcome. If the New Hampshire Democrats within the confines of their polling booths show their historic courage and by their action say that things are not right, then perhaps the start of a meaningful change in direction will have been effected through a traditional electoral process.[13]

On page three of the same edition, an ad appeared as the statement of forty-four, "New Hampshire Artists, Writers, Musicians and Craftsmen," supporting Senator McCarthy for President. Their message:

> Because we believe...
>
> That he is a man of integrity, courage and reason.
>
> That he is a man who offers an honorable and feasible solution to America's third war.
>
> That he is a man who understands the issues we face.
>
> That he is dedicated to redirecting our energies toward pressing domestic problems.
>
> That he is putting his political future on the line for the sake of his beliefs.
>
> We support Senator Eugene J. McCarthy for President....

A formal waist-up photograph of McCarthy looking directly from the advertisement was included.[14]

On the same page was another privately sponsored advertisement which filled the other part of the lower portion of the page. It read:

> An Open Letter to All Fellow Democrats:
>
> Our country is in deep crisis, as well as in Vietnam.
>
> Our vote this Tuesday is too serious to be decided by partisan politics as usual.
>
> WE URGE ALL FELLOW DEMOCRATS TO VOTE FOR THE CANDIDATE OF <u>YOUR OWN CHOICE</u>! Disregard any numbered pledge cards, with their "arm twisting" copies to Washington, as an invasion of privacy of <u>your secret</u> ballot; reject any unfair, last minute attacks against a genuine Democrat and distinguished American, Senator McCarthy.

In this time of crisis, make your vote count for the candidate YOU believe best for our country. When YOU decide for yourself, to vote for Sen. McCarthy, or to write-in Johnson, choose the man YOU think can best REUNITE ALL AMERICANS, to meet these real needs of our country:

-- To protect the lives of our boys, while negotiating with determination, for an honorable end to this endless war, instead of escalating in desperation.

-- To defend family budgets against more increases in taxes and prices.

-- To ensure an open Democratic Convention.

-- To restore the spirit of President Kennedy, and to rebuild new hope and confidence in America!

(Signed) Joe Myers, Chairman,

Manchester Democratic City Committee, 1956-1965

G. Allen Foster, Chairman,

Plymouth Democratic Town Committee, Exec. Secty.,
Democratic State Committee of New Hampshire, 1960[15]

This advertisement grew out of the work that Al Shepard was doing in his effort to develop support for McCarthy in the Manchester area. Shepard discovered that the former city Democratic chairman, Joe Myers, was deeply disturbed by the behavior of the Democratic State Committee in their support of President Johnson's renomination. He took special umbrage to the use of the "pledge card" and to the pre-primary endorsement tactics being used by the Democratic State Committee. Shepard suggested that he develop a statement that reflected his feelings that could be run as an advertisement.

The leaders of the New Hampshire "RFK" in '68 Committee placed a one half page ad which appeared on page 6 of the Manchester Union Leader which read, "At the Request of Robert F. Kennedy, we urge that you do not write in the name of Robert F. Kennedy on the March 12th Presidential Primary Ballot. Vote Eugene J. McCarthy for President." Then included in the ad was the complete list of delegate and alternative delegate candidates for the two congressional districts.[16] Across from the RFK ad, on page 7, was a two thirds page ad signed by Governor John W. King and Senator Tom McIntyre which read:

> We urge you...
>
> SUPPORT OUR FIGHTING MEN
>
> We know the communists in Vietnam are watching the New Hampshire Primary to see if we at home have the same determination as our soldiers in Vietnam.
>
> To vote for weakness and indecision would not be in the best interest of our nation.
>
> We urge you to support our fighting men in Vietnam. Write-in President Johnson on your ballot on Tuesday.

The presidential preference portion of the ballot was included with the printed names blurred and "President Johnson" written in the space provided.[17] The same edition of the newspaper contained several other advertisements placed by delegate candidates favorable to the nomination of Lyndon Johnson urging the voters to find their names on the ballot and vote for them.

Page 9 of the same edition carried the advertisement addressed to the "Independent Voters" that had been placed by the McCarthy campaign in the Concord Monitor, mentioned before.

The Maryland Citizens for McCarthy placed an ad that appeared on page 12, addressed, "Fellow Democrats...You are fortunate. We in Maryland have no Primary in which to register our concern. We can only hope that you will speak for us. Vote for Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy."18

A delegate candidate pledged to McCarthy from the 2nd Congressional District, George Marrow, placed a small ad soliciting votes for McCarthy and himself. The ad appeared on page 14. Across from Marrow's solicitation, there appeared an unsigned ad reading: "Is it Unpatriotic to Oppose U.S. Involvement in Vietnam?" The question was answered "No" with quotations from General David Shoup, ret., former Commandant of the Marine Corps; Brig. Gen. Robert Huges, ret., Aide to General MacArthur; Lt. Gen. James Gavin, ret., former Chief of Army Research, and a former Vietnam Green Beret, Master Sgt. Donald Duncan. The ad had been developed and placed by a group of anti-war students and clergy working from Hanover, Concord and Manchester.19

To avoid the crowded political advertising that appeared on the news pages of the edition, and to take advantage of the high readership that the sports sections receive, a group of twenty New Hampshire college students, all enrolled in military officer programs placed an effective ad. Titled, "Don't Call Us Draft Dodgers," it read:

> The undersigned New Hampshire college students all receive commissions as officers in the United States Army this June. We believe in our country. We will all serve. Some of us may die.
>
> But we strongly oppose the war in Vietnam. We think it is tragic for Vietnam and for the United States.
>
> America has its own problems to solve. Our cities face crisis after crisis while we use our resources to conduce a senseless war thousands of miles away.

> We are concerned for America.
>
> We ask New Hampshire voters to show our country the way toward the solution of our problems. VOTE FOR McCARTHY.
>
> This ad is paid for by the undersigned future officers, who believe in America.

The most important advertisement of the last two days was the one placed in the most prominent position for sale in the various New Hampshire daily newspapers. The Manchester Union Leader, the only newspaper in New Hampshire to sell advertising space on its front page, carried the ad there in a space approximating two-fifths of the page. A serene, presidential appearing, photograph of McCarthy in profile, arms folded, looking toward the curtained window of his senatorial office, shrouded with the eagle embossed drapes, was to the left of the ad with the title, "Profile of Courage." The text:

> With the courage to come before the people of New Hampshire and debate the critical issues of our time, Eugene McCarthy brings a fresh approach to securing a swift and honorable peace in Vietnam. He has challenged the national priorities which put improved education and the discontent in our cities at the bottom of the national agenda. He has proposed economic policies designed to restore the Kennedy boom -- a growing economy with stable prices.
>
> The issue is leadership. If you are not satisfied with our present course as a nation -- if you want to return to the principles which got America moving under President Kennedy -- then, Eugene McCarthy is your only alternative. He, and he alone, has come to New Hampshire to give you a choice. That's not only courage. That's what the democratic process is all about.
>
> McCARTHY FOR PRESIDENT

The high readability and sophistication of the advertisement captured the tone of the McCarthy campaign and the importance of the New Hampshire result. It solicited from the voter a demonstration of courage comparable to that which McCarthy had shown by becoming a candidate. The courage to support his candi-

dacy and to reach beyond the uncertainty that plagued their lives as they thought back to the days of the Kennedy administration and then considered the current national state. The ad effectively countered the Johnson advertisement that shared the adjacent front page space. The Johnson ad was the format that had been used in the main brochure, a sketch of Johnson and the slogan, "A Strong Man in a Tough Job."

All New Hampshire campaigns use the informal medium of the Letter to the Editor as a way to state support for a candidate. The Manchester Union Leader has an open letters policy and prints most of the letters it receives. Other New Hampshire newspapers limit the number of letters it prints and will not publish letters that simply reiterate a candidate's position or that add little except simple support for the candidate.

Since the Union Leader's editors are less likely to be selective and the newspaper will publish extra pages just for the letters, a contest begins. Which candidate will receive the most favorable letters? McCarthy attracted more than his share of the letters. A number came from outside the state. For the devotee of the letters-to-the-editor-columns the McCarthy supporters were successful with the numbers in the Union Leader and with the quality that passed by the editors of the newspapers that limited publication.

Radio Advertising

As advised by Weston Associates in the MEDIA STRATEGY AND PLAN, radio would be the "basic medium" of the media campaign. Of the $59,652 media cost budget, Weston had allocated $17,000 to radio time and production. A highly flexible medium and one that was especially suited to New Hampshire communica-

tions habits, radio was inexpensive, easily programmed, and had an almost instantaneous lead time. A message could be changed with a telephone call. The average price per spot advertisement was approximately $5.00 which, given the proposed Weston radio advertising budget, would pay for 3,400 spot announcements. Weston planned to use mostly 30 and 60 second messages but, occasionally, they did program 10 second announcements.

The first radio time purchased was used to announce Senator McCarthy's St. Anselm's College speech. The major radio campaign began by scheduling advertising to coincide with McCarthy campaign visits to particular communities. Thirty second ads were placed during the "adult drive" (commuting) time and adjacent to news broadcasts during the commuting hours.

While originally the radio messages were scheduled to begin February 13th, budget problems and delays in production of expected radio tapes from New York pushed the start beyond the planned date. The first placement orders were written February 15th to begin Wednesday, February 21st. The first tape contained two one minute messages and four thirty second messages. These were scheduled to run from February 21st to February 27th during "drive times" only. The delay meant that the Johnson campaign messages began before the McCarthy ads. This flight of nine Johnson messages which were used intermittently during the campaign dwelt on the "Strong Man in a Tough Job" theme. They used citizen endorsements for the President Johnson write-in effort. Within an hour of the first Johnson messages' arrival at the various radio stations Weston Associates had a complete tape of the ads.20

Cut 1: (Johnson ad)

(Announcer) Listen!

...what do you think would happen to this country if right in the middle of a war we up and changed our mind. Now he knows that surrender in Vietnam would be selling the whole country down the river. He knows that turning our back and running is exactly what every communist in the world would love to see. And believe me they'll chase us just as far as we run. But he's not going to let that happen. I was in Vietnam and I really believe...

(Announcer: voice over: You are listening to John Martine of Kingston. The man he is talking about is Lyndon Johnson President of the United States -- a strong man in a tough job -- the toughest job in the world. On March 12th you will have an opportunity to endorse this man by writing in his name on your ballot in the New Hampshire presidential preference primary.)

...and that is why I'm writing in the name of President Johnson.

Cut 2: (Johnson ad)

(Announcer) Listen!

...I know he's right and sometimes what I see on TV makes me ashamed. I see these draft card burners and peace marchers -- they're nothing but surrender marchers in my eyes -- more than ever when I see all these things I know he's right. If there was a better way or even a faster way in Vietnam or any other place...

(Announcer: voice over: You are listening to Nancy Lorden of Manchester. The man she is talking about is Lyndon Johnson, President of the United States -- a strong man in a tough job -- the toughest job in the world. On March 12th you will have an opportunity to endorse this man by writing in his name on your ballot in the New Hampshire presidential preference primary.)

...and believe me I'm writing in the name of President Johnson.

Cut 3: (Johnson ad)

(Announcer) Listen!

...backbone or all out determination but whatever it is he's not about to throw his hands up in despair and surrender to the communists in Vietnam or anywhere else in the world. He knows that the whole world is watching to see if we are going to turn tail and run for home...

(Announcer: voice over: You are listening to William Knightly of Salem)

...we've never given up yet and we shouldn't start now...

(Announcer: voice over: The man he is talking about is Lyndon Johnson, a strong man in a tough job -- the toughest job in the world. On March 12th you will have an opportunity to endorse this man by writing in his name on your ballot in the New Hampshire presidential preference primary.)

...what we say come hell or high water and that's why I'm writing in the name of President Johnson.

When Hoeh came to "Cut 4" he heard something that did not sound as it was being represented. The voice and the name used did not match and Hoeh recognized the voice.

Cut 4: (Johnson ad)

(Announcer) Listen!

...I don't think any man has ever worked harder for his country and I don't think any man has ever faced more difficult times. I think he's doing a fantastic job and I'm proud he's standing firm and refusing to surrender in Vietnam. One of these days when the history books are written I'm sure people will realize that he, perhaps more than anyone else, knew exactly what had to be done to preserve this country...

(Announcer: voice over: You are listening to John O'Connell of Keene. The man he is talking about is Lyndon Johnson, a strong man in a tough job...etc.)

> ...I'm for him all the way, and I want the world to know that this country still has the stuff that made it great -- and that's why I'm writing in the name of President Johnson.

The voice was familiar to Hoeh and immediately recognized as being that of Charles McMahon, Senator McIntyre's in-state representative, not that of John O'Connell, a Keene school teacher. Hoeh got a volunteer to call O'Connell to ask whether he knew that his name was being used in a Johnson advertisement. O'Connell stumbled a bit, said he would call back later, and hung up his telephone. Hoeh, Studds and Gans then played "cat with a mouse" for several days threatening to release the mis-representation, as the Johnson campaigners struggled to cover-up their error. While not a major flap it did upset the Johnson campaign plan further -- a campaign that was already reeling from the impact of the "pledge card" gaff.

The other five Johnson messages pursued the same themes as had the first four. Johnson would not "knuckle under to the peaceniks, dreamers, fuzzy thinkers, draft card burners, and communists" but was doing his best in spite of the "criticism" and the "terrific pressure" to accomplish peace in Vietnam. One praised his "sticking with men like General Westmoreland and not listening to those peace-at-any-price fuzzy thinkers..." while another said he's "not about to pull out and surrender because he knows as we all should know, that could never mean peace." The war, Johnson's leadership of the war, and the possible consequences of getting out of Vietnam were the only themes pursued in the Johnson messages. There was no attempt to defend the administration against charges of domestic neglect or economic uncertainty that were the substance of the broader issue spectrum of the McCarthy messages.

The first Johnson messages were heard February 17th and continued with increasing frequency through to March 12th. The six McCarthy ads, hurriedly assembled, began February 21st with the following sequence:

Cut 1: (30 sec.)

(Announcer) Whatever happened to the secret ballot?

Do you want to abandon your right to examine all of the issues between now and March 12th?

What does Lyndon Johnson have in the cards for you?

Will the New Hampshire primary be just a formality?

Senator Eugene McCarthy offers a choice, not an echo.

There is an alternative -- McCarthy can get America moving again.

Vote Senator McCarthy for President.

Cut 2: (30 sec.)

(Announcer) Senator Eugene McCarthy has come to New Hampshire because people are concerned. Concerned about higher taxes and rising prices, concerned about riots in the cities and the unending land war in Asia. Concerned because our national leadership is unable to meet these problems. Concerned because it wasn't like this five years ago.

Eugene McCarthy is a proven leader in the tradition of Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy. He is a man who thinks clearly and speaks honestly.

Senator McCarthy can get America moving again.

McCarthy for President.

Cut 3: (30 sec.)

(Announcer) Let's get America moving again.

Senator Eugene McCarthy has come to New Hampshire as a serious candidate and a concerned candidate. Concerned because New Hampshire people are concerned.

You don't have to sign anything to vote for McCarthy.

Help bring America back to its senses. Vote Eugene McCarthy for President.

Cut 4: (60 sec.)

(Senator McCarthy speaking) excerpt from a New Hampshire speech.

"...there are a number of reasons, of course, for my coming to New Hampshire. I want to come here, principally, to talk about the issues which I think are of concern to the country...

(Announcer: This is Senator Eugene McCarthy speaking in New Hampshire)

...there is kind of a special challenge in coming to New Hampshire, to, really, test oneself against what's supposed to be the harshest political judgment in America, and also to find out whether the people of New Hampshire really are what they have been said to be. Some of your Democratic leaders have said that you're all so well organized and disciplined now that there really is no point in my coming in, that the people of New Hampshire will vote pretty much as their party leaders tell them to vote. I doubt that this is true but in any case, this is one of the matters I hope to test along the primary trail.

(Announcer: Will the New Hampshire primary be just a formality?

Senator Eugene McCarthy offers a choice not an echo. There is an alternative -- McCarthy for President.)

Cut 5: (30 sec.)

(Senator McCarthy speaking) ...we are involved, this nation, in what has become a major war, and most of you know what the cost of that war has been and know that those costs are continuing.

(Announcer: voice over: There is an honorable alternative to the continuing drain of men and materials that endless escalation has imposed upon us in Vietnam. Senator McCarthy will not turn away from our responsibilities in Asia but he will explore every avenue to begin meaningful negotiations for peace.

There is an alternative. McCarthy for President)

Unlike the Johnson advertising, the McCarthy messages could and did contain material taken from McCarthy's speeches or specially recorded messages from the candidate. To have used Johnson material directly would have meant Johnson's tacit approval of the write-in activity. The final McCarthy cut in the first flight of radio advertising was excerpted from another McCarthy New Hampshire speech. Like other aspects of the media preparation for McCarthy, the bank of audio tapes available to create messages did not exist. Only a few tapes that had been made of McCarthy's New Hampshire speeches were available during the weeks when the radio material was prepared. Until later in the campaign, when the travelling staff of the Senator expanded to include a taping crew, did the volume of taped material increase to the point where it could provide useful audio material. The best McCarthy material was the spontaneous McCarthy, not the McCarthy reading a prepared announcement. The sixth cut used in the first flight drew on the scanty recordings that existed early in February 1968.

Cut 6: (60 sec.)

(Senator McCarthy speaking) We are involved, this nation, in what has become a major war -- and most of you know what the cost of that war has been and know that those costs are continuing...

(Announcer: voice over:) There is an honorable alternative to the continuing drain of men and materials that endless escalation has imposed upon us in Vietnam. Senator McCarthy will not turn away from our responsibilities in Asia but he will explore every avenue to begin meaningful negotiations for peace. There is an alternative -- McCarthy for President.)

(McCarthy continuing:) ...it has long since past the point in which it can be morally justified, but their conclusion is that the war is not morally justified and, therefore, it must be questioned; it must be challenged, and it must be opposed. And this becomes a basic demand, I think, of patriotism rather than an action which can in any way be labelled as unpatriotic or as un-American.

Eventually recordings made in New York did arrive in New Hampshire and were included in the second flight of radio ads circulated by Weston Associates. In this material was an assortment of taped endorsements that had been prepared by cooperating celebrities. This collection became an audio bank which was used to assemble attractive radio messages for McCarthy. Familiar voices such as that of Harry Belafonte, Robert Ryan, Dustin Hoffman, Rod Serling, Paul Newman, Joanne Woodward and others read messages or made personal endorsements of McCarthy.

Weston Associates bought as much radio spot advertising time as seemed feasible while Gans, working with the graduate student volunteer writers and Weston Associates personnel, turned out ad copy and recorded cassettes for distribution to the 25 radio stations used in the campaign. During the final week, Rod Serling spent several days in New Hampshire recording messages and introducing endorsements from other celebrities. Each celebrity to visit New Hampshire spent at least a few hours recording messages for the McCarthy radio campaign.

The frequency increased from 35 spot announcements per station per week during the period of February 21st to 27th, to a schedule of 28 sixty second spots and 70 thirty second spots to be played between February 28th and 5:00 p.m., March 12th. The frequency per station per day was ordered as two 60 second spots and five 30 second spots per station. The messages shipped with the order mailed February 26th "killed" the preceeding tapes and substituted new material. In the final three days a third flight of messages, to be used up to the election, were substituted for those shipped with the original February 26th order. The final advertising was developed over the last weekend before the election.

The campaign bought more time just before March 12th to run a single new message which was: "New Hampshire voters, Think how good you will feel when you wake up on Wednesday morning March 13th and hear that Senator Eugene McCarthy has won the New Hampshire Presidential Primary. Vote Senator Eugene McCarthy for President." Like the "Profile in Courage" newspaper advertisement used during the last three days, the radio message was the capstone of the campaign.

The total spent for radio advertising time, as tabulated from the remaining invoices, was approximately $23,000. Another $3,000 to $5,000 was probably spent on radio message production and distribution. The radio campaign was intensive and confirmed the emphasis that Weston Associates had advised in their plan. While technical skill and familiarity with the medium were more important in the electronic media work than in other aspects of the campaign, the effort succeeded because of the volunteer cooperation it attracted and the creativity of those involved.

Television Programming

With almost no money available to fund the radio and newspaper campaigns projected to begin during February, television was abandoned as a campaign medium. Weston Associates had originally budgeted $13,646 for television to be used during the final week. The plan was to:

> ...schedule 10 prime time ID's; 5 early fringe minutes and 5 afternoon minutes during the last half of the final week. The schedule will use all three Boston stations but will be concentrated on WBZ which has the best New Hampshire coverage. The prime ID's will be placed preceding high-rated programs. The fringe minutes will be purchased following the early evening news. The afternoon minutes will also be news adjacencies.
>
> In addition to this spot schedule, two afternoon women-oriented half hour programs are planned. These would feature the Senator discussing his candidacy with groups of local ladies.[21]

For each minute of broadcast a production cost exceeding $1,000 was expected in order to make the messages credible. Without the resources to produce such programming in New Hampshire nor funds to underwrite the cost of the time, much less the cost of production, nothing was done to develop a television package. McCarthy received some television attention by arriving and departing through Boston, was interviewed on Manchester's low market Channel 9, and several cable distributed local stations elsewhere in New Hampshire. He did not appear on an "afternoon women oriented half hour" nor did he appear on any of the several Boston-based afternoon "talk" programs that sometimes invite candidates. The yield from such non-prime time programming was not thought to be sufficient for McCarthy's New Hampshire effort to be worth the time he would have had to spend away from the campaign.

A "stand by" package of television messages to fill Weston's plan had been prepared in Washington. Senator McCarthy video-taped several messages as well which dwelt on the major themes he had developed through the New Hampshire campaign. Toward the end of the campaign the McCarthy campaign found its own financial angel. From having hardly the resources to buy radio advertising time, the campaign found that it could not only accomplish the radio program but could also expand its television effort. It was, however, too late to develop sophisticated television material or to begin any programming before the final week of the campaign.

A program of 10 second ID's, 60 second announcements, and five-minute programs was quickly developed from the "stand by" materials and that which Senator McCarthy had video-taped earlier in February. Weston Associates was able to buy time on three Boston television stations and two New Hampshire stations for the shorter announcements. When the option to develop two one-half hour programs came, Weston Associates ran into a problem. They sought to reserve time for the two programs on WBZ-TV. The times they wanted were early evening -- the first, several days before the election, and the second, election eve. WBZ was reluctant to sell the time to Weston for the near prime half hour periods he had selected. He had no difficulty reserving the time slots on New Hampshire stations, but found that the Boston station did not want to sacrifice network programming for a political production of interest to the small portion of its market. When word of this refusal got back to New York, Blair Clark and Howard Stein, the angel, contacted the programming executives of the National Broadcasting System, told them of their problems, and a few telephone calls later, the New Hampshire

McCarthy campaign had its pre-election television time. The program would be aired on WBZ-TV between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m. March 11th and between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. on Channel 8, WMTW-TV broadcasting from Poland Springs, Maine, via Mt. Washington, New Hampshire.

The first of the two one-half hour programs was produced in a Boston studio, with Senator McCarthy discussing his campaign with a group of the volunteers who had worked in his New Hampshire campaign. The objective of the program was to capture visually some of the wide interest that had been generated by the students who had worked in New Hampshire and to use their enthusiasm as a foil for McCarthy's own sincerity and concern. The program was an engaging dialogue that ranged across the major issues of the campaign and closed with McCarthy turning toward the camera with a closing statement.

The second program was taped in Boston on the morning of March 11th, the day it was to be shown. Jack Parr, the recently retired "Tonight Show" host, had been quietly managing the television station he owned in Maine when his daughter, Randy, a student at Radcliffe, became involved in the New Hampshire campaign. She had become one of the weekend volunteers and a regular among the anonymous workers in the backroom and basement of the Concord headquarters. Her accounts of the campaign and concern about the U.S. Vietnam policy had motivated her father to breech his retirement to help McCarthy. Dick Goodwin conceived of the idea of using something like Jack Parr's old "Tonight Show" interview format as the setting for the election eve program. Parr agreed to be the host and the McCarthy campaign had an entertainment event as well as a campaign concluding political program. Parr had been seen only occasionally on television during

the several years since his retirement. His willingness to serve as the interviewing host for the McCarthy telecast meant that the show would attract the curious who had not seen Parr for several years.

A somewhat rusty Jack Parr attempted an interview of Senator McCarthy much as he had done each late evening for almost a decade. Senator McCarthy, more relaxed than Parr, responded to the questions Parr offered, questions that Goodwin had developed from Al Shepard's motivational research. Why was McCarthy running? Why had he entered the New Hampshire Primary? What were his differences with the Johnson administration? What were his concerns about the impact of the war on domestic affairs? And then questions which Parr hoped would probe McCarthy as a personality and as an elected official. Toward the middle of the program McCarthy rose from his chair, walked a few steps to the corner of a desk that had been placed away from the chairs he and Parr had occupied during the interview. He perched on a corner of the desk, settled slightly, and began talking directly through the camera. In the ten or fifteen minutes available, Senator McCarthy explained his candidacy, what the next day's vote could mean, how he would change policy, and what kind of President he would be. It was an effective media moment. The "cool" candidate had met the "cool" medium. McCarthy projected through the camera into the living room as a striking contrast to a harsh Johnson or a tense Richard Nixon -- the two most prominent political figures then on television. McCarthy, the television candidate was in harmony with McCarthy the "Profile" newspaper advertisement and McCarthy the "bring America back to its senses," radio message. Jubilant, McCarthy left the taping session to complete the last day of his New Hampshire campaign.

Financing the Campaign

The New Hampshire political reality is that money for campaigns is limited under the best of circumstances and money to support the primary condidacies of presidential candidates is rarely, if ever, derived totally from the New Hampshire populace. The Johnson campaign sought to fund its activities with locally raised money and felt they could do so since the continuation of Johnson in office meant continued employment for some and potential rewards for others. It was also a part of the New Hampshire McCarthy strategy to make it embarrassing for the Johnson Committee to import campaign money and also to use money that had been raised for the New Hampshire Democratic Party to run the Johnson campaign. The McCarthy strategy worked. The Johnson New Hampshire war chest was limited. Not until very late in the campaign did the Johnson Committee begin to spend extensively for radio, newspaper and television advertising. Until that time almost all of the Johnson campaign was supported by a few volunteers, Democratic State Committee Staff, and staff loaned by Senator McIntyre and Governor King. When their "pledge card" strategy failed, their campaign all but collapsed. Then and only then did they spend money in an attempt to re-coup their losses.

Much like other aspects of the McCarthy campaign the financing pattern fell into three distinct periods. The first, described earlier, was the period prior to and just shortly after Senator McCarthy's announcement of his New Hampshire candidacy. The New Hampshire leaders had been able to collect a small pot composed of one $250 contribution from Sandra Hoeh's Hartford, Connecticut aunt and uncle, and a number of smaller sums that had arrived spontaneously. The first contributions listing from the campaign read:

Rebecca Z. Solomon, 65 Middlebrook Road Hartford, Conn.	$250.00
Robert L. Finley, Tamworth, New Hampshire	100.00
David G. Underwood, 29 Runford Street Concord, New Hampshire	100.00
Elinore M. Adams, Box 101, E. Concord, New Hampshire	10.00
George M. Marrow, P.O. Box 797, Brattleboro, Vermont	20.00
Gerhard Lenski, 404 Westwood Drive, Chapel Hill, North Carolina	25.00
John Stevens, Watkins Hill, Walpole, New Hampshire	2.00
Mary Scott-Craig, 2 Chase Road, Hanover, New Hampshire	10.00
Norman R. Torrey, Jaffrey Ctr., New Hampshire	10.00

(N.H. McCarthy for President Committee contributions report)[22]

This fund of $527.00 was the total resource of the campaign until the second week of January 1968. All previous activities of the New Hampshire McCarthy Committee, principally mailing, travel and telephone calls, were paid for by the individuals involved -- principally, David Hoeh and Gerry Studds. Hoeh had received a personal contribution from a New Hampshire supporter to help pay for his travel and that of his wife to attend the Chicago meeting of the Conference of Concerned Democrats, early December 1967. Gerry Studds financed his own travel to that conference as did the others of the New Hampshire delegation that attended. Studds used his own personal checking account to write deposits for telephone installation, headquarters rental, furniture rental and some of the early equipment rentals needed to open the Concord headquarters. Once McCarthy had announced his entry in the New Hampshire primary the first $527 in the fiscal agent's account was quickly expended.

The New Hampshire leaders had agreed that they would not permit the campaign to spend more than was on hand to pay the campaign's obligations. Studds ventured out on the limb with his checking account as a minor violation of this principle but had reasonable assurance from the National Campaign Manager, Blair Clark, that he would not be stuck. There was, however, a delay between the time that money was needed to begin New Hampshire activities and the time money began to arrive. Until this delay developed, the New Hampshire leaders were under the impression that sufficient money was available from national sources to fund the campaign budget. Allard Lowenstein had referred repeatedly to substantial funds already pledged to an alternative candidacy if only Senator McCarthy would run. There had been press conferences in Chicago during the early December C.C.D. meeting where large contributors had pledged hundred of thousands of dollars to support an anti-war candidacy. When it came time to pay the early New Hampshire bills it came from the personal fortunes of two individuals who had not been involved in the Chicago braggadocio. Martin Peretz, Harvard professor and Singer Sewing Machine heir, and Blair Clark, Clark thread heir, each sent a check for $5,000. Clark's check came through the National Office of the McCarthy campaign and was listed as such on the contributions report filed in New Hampshire. Shortly after the Peretz and Clark checks were received, Ann Raynolds of Springfield, Vermont, and Mabel B. Harrison of Hanover, New Hampshire sent checks of $1,000 each. The second phase, the middle of the campaign financing, was underway.

During Blair Clark's visit to New Hampshire January 2nd and 3rd he met to review Weston Associates' outline of the campaign's media components. From this discussion Weston drafted his first advertising budget. A budget that would be revised again as the MEDIA PLAN AND STRATEGY discussed earlier. The first tabu-

lation for campaign advertising was $43,007. This figure would continue to increase by the time David Hoeh submitted an overall budget to Blair Clark, January 18th. Obviously, the $50,000 figure that Hoeh and Studds had suggested as being the amount required to fund a McCarthy candidacy in New Hampshire, in their December 22nd memorandum, had been exceeded by the advertising budget alone.

Clark had negotiated the essentials of an advertising budget with Weston which Weston then forwarded to Hoeh for his revisions and inclusion with Hoeh's proposed overall campaign budget. In a memorandum prepared by the McCarthy leaders and submitted to Blair Clark, were projected the financial needs of the campaign.

1.	Media budget (attached to the original memo)		$50,500.00
2.	Headquarters:	Costs include: rent, heat (where necessary), activity related advertising, telephones, signs, personnel-limited, transportation, and covering of some costs for volunteers.	
		Concord - State	3,000.00
		Nashua	2,400.00
		Manchester	2,600.00
		Keene	1,000.00
		Laconia	1,000.00
		Lebanon-Hanover	1,500.00
		Dover	1,000.00
		Portsmouth	750.00
		Berlin	1,500.00
		Home headquarters: up to 45 H.H. at $50 per spot	2,250.00
3.	Personnel:		
	Scheduling	$ 1,000.00	
	Advance	2,000.00	
	Press	1,500.00	
	Overall	2,000.00	
	Volunteer coordination	1,000.00	
	Contingencies	2,500.00	
		$10,000.00	10,000.00
4.	Transportation		2,500.00

5.	Television (all should be programmed out of Boston)	$????
6.	All other items that will come up that I can't think of at this moment	2,500.00
	TOTAL:	$82,500.00

NOTE: The headquarters costs are higher than had been expected. We are having difficulty finding store-front locations and probably will not be able to open and support as many as are listed. We do not allocate budget to a headquarters but urge them to raise as much locally as is possible. We will then supplement if they are in desperate need.

The staff situation remains critical. We need full-time people to carry the daily load. We are making some progress but need the bodies as well as the money.[23]

Clark accepted the budget from the New Hampshire leaders. The fiscal agent monitored the obligations according to the budget plan. The middle phase of the campaign followed the expenditure pattern advised in the memo.

One of the early mailings was to a list of approximately 1,500 contacts that it was presumed might contribute to the campaign. The mailing stimulated a modest but steady flow of money and began some local fund-raising initiatives as well. A Dartmouth history professor, F. David Roberts, began organizing the Dartmouth College faculty to contribute to the McCarthy campaign. He recruited colleagues in other departments to help him. Each pay day he would remind his contacts to collect a contribution for the campaign. He then would bring his collection to David Hoeh's office, pouring it like a tribute across Hoeh's desk. With the bills, checks and change, Roberts provided a careful account of the amount and the contributors' names for the records.

Two University of New Hampshire professors raised all of the funds needed to support the Dover Area headquarters. In Keene, a joint Keene State College and local citizen committee raised funds to support their local activities entirely. Other committees submitted budget requests to the campaign but most had raised at least a part of their needs locally.

The Hampton chairman sent his local budget to Concord for approval before going ahead.

> Tentative proposed budget for Hampton area:
>
> | | |
> |---|---|
> | Rental of trailer headquarters (half price) | $100.00 |
> | Advertising | 500.00 |
> | Postage | 500.00 |
> | Paper, envelopes, etc. | 150.00 |
> | Telephone | 50.00 |
> | Lights | 25.00 |
> | Heat | 25.00 |
> | Miscellaneous | 150.00 |
> | TOTAL: | $1,500.00 |
>
> Sound feasible? With adequate funds, we are optimistic that we can do a job in this area. Do we have your approval?
>
> Please send us - as soon as possible - literature, buttons, bumper stickers, large signs and posters for the headquarters, etc. We plan to have our committee organized by next week; and will attempt to get pictures and a blurb in the five local papers that service this area.
>
> Will inform you on our progress.
>
> Sincerely, Dave Morin
>
> Our slogan in this area will have to be along the line: "Be proud to be an American. Vote McCarthy!" (Democrats are virtually non-existent.) [24]

Although a steady flow of contributions was regularly received at the McCarthy headquarters in Concord, the amounts did not keep pace with the proposed budget much less an expenditure pattern that was projected to exceed the budget. Many contributions came spontaneously from McCarthy sympathizers across the country with states like North Dakota, North Carolina, Illinois, Georgia, California, Washington, Ohio and Florida, included with New York, Washington D.C.,

Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia and the other New England states. Some state McCarthy committees, either with no primary or later primary elections, raised and forwarded money to New Hampshire for the campaign. The National Campus Concerned Democrats sent $1,000 and a New Jersey Coalition supporting McCarthy made a special trip to New Hampshire to give David Hoeh a check for $5,000. In spite of the good intentions and hard work, the flow of funds was not sufficiently predictable to commit all aspects of the media plan as each deadline came due. The campaign period, 10 weeks, meant that little time could be devoted to fund raising and without funds, valuable time would be lost. The campaign faced this dilemma early in February.

Early in February the flow of funds from Washington almost stopped. Clark could not supply the New Hampshire campaign with the money to begin the radio and newspaper campaigns, to pay for mailings, to reserve television time, to open headquarters, or to supply the paraphenalia of posters, buttons, flyers, bumper strips, etc. For the first two weeks of February it looked as if the campaign might die of starvation. Volunteers made the money go further, but without money the campaign would die and no one involved in New Hampshire was financially capable of assuming the debt to go forward. Weston Associates had extended their agency credit to the limit. Desperation began to pass over the leadership of the campaign both in New Hampshire and Washington. It was apparent that McCarthy had not stirred sufficient attention in the national media to attract major contributions.

Two struggles were going on among those attempting to manage the campaign outside New Hampshire. The first concerned the dispute between the powerful and well financed Coalition for a Democratic Alternative of New York City and Blair Clark.

The second struggle was between Clark and Russell Hemenway, Executive Director of the National Committee for an Effective Congress (NEC), concerning potential sources of campaign funds. Hemenway, and NEC's principal backer, Maurice Rosenblatt, also was trying to build a campaign organization and funding base for McCarthy. While doing this he had discovered that the young, financial genius, Howard Stein, director of the Dreyfus Fund, was attracted to McCarthy. Under Hemenway's tutelage, Stein became a willing student of national politics opening both his purse and his power to Hemenway's advice. Being a cautious invester Stein was reluctant to release his money or his contacts to Hemenway or anyone else without having a substantial role in the decisions as to how these resources were to be used.

Hemenway brought Stein with him to New Hampshire during McCarthy's first campaign visit. Several days after the visit, David Hoeh received a call from Hemenway saying that Stein would like to help with the campaign and asked Hoeh to find a house that Stein might rent for the duration of the campaign. Hoeh called Clark to check on this offer. Clark advised Hoeh to let him handle Stein and to delay responding to Hemenway. Early in February, Stein himself called Hoeh. Stein said he wanted to help with the campaign and had arranged to bring several professional people with him who could provide assistance to the Senator.

Stein's interest caused concern since the one thing that the New Hampshire leaders feared was having their role in the campaign over-ridden by supposedly expert outsiders. They felt that they had the pulse of the McCarthy potential under their own fingers.

Again Hoeh contacted Blair Clark relaying his conversation with Stein. Clark instructed Hoeh not to have further conversations with Stein nor to make arrangements for him to become involved in the New Hampshire activity. Several weeks passed with no contact with either Hemenway or Stein. Clark feared that Stein would move-in on the campaign in a way that would side-track Clark's efforts to build the national campaign organization. He had convinced McCarthy of possible dangers in becoming too closely associated with Stein and Stein's experts. Both Clark and Jerry Eller, McCarthy's Administrative Assistant, feared that Stein's desire to become extensively involved in the campaign might set off a series of negative reactions that would disrupt the fragile New Hampshire venture and their own efforts to regulate McCarthy's candidacy. The impasse continued. Hemenway tried his best to keep communications open between Stein and McCarthy but was not able to resolve things until the New Hampshire and national campaign practically died from a lack of money.

Early in the third week of February, Hoeh received a series of telephone calls. Hemenway called to say that Stein would be calling again; Hoeh called Clark to find out what he should do, and Clark said that Hoeh should listen and work out something with Stein that suited Hoeh's needs in New Hampshire. Hoeh, feeling a bit like he was walking on eggs, accepted Stein's call, agreed to discuss the campaign's financial situation with him, but promised nothing else.

He assured Stein that the New Hampshire aspects of the campaign were progressing well but what he needed was help paying bills. Stein said he would come to New Hampshire and help as he could -- quite a different posture from that Hoeh sensed in the earlier conversations.

What Hoeh learned later was that Elliot Janeway, a friend of the McCarthy's, had called Abigail McCarthy and suggested that Howard Stein really should be used and that he could help. Through Abigail McCarthy, Senator McCarthy suggested that Clark welcome Stein but do so on a basis agreeable to Clark. Clark, by this time, acutely felt the pressure to get money for New Hampshire, the national office and to meet media reservation deadlines in the other primary states. Stein, his wife, and several friends came to New Hampshire, took a suite at the Sheraton Wayfarer and began quietly helping, much like the many other volunteers.

Clark went through a similar experience with the leadership of the Coalition for a Democratic Alternative. An agreement was worked out where Harold Ickes and Sarah Kovener would have important roles in the campaign and especially in the leadership of the McCarthy effort in the New York presidential primary. Ickes came to New Hampshire to help Gans. The Coalition opened its war chest. The New Hampshire campaign received a check for $9,700. The Coalition printed much of the material used in New Hampshire

Howard Stein's arrival in New Hampshire began the third and final phase of the financing of the campaign. With Clark's caution in mind, Hoeh and Studds arranged to meet Stein to explain the status of the campaign. Stein assured both that he admired what they had accomplished to date and wanted to

assist in ways that they thought might produce a McCarthy victory. Both Hoeh and Studds relaxed as Stein made clear that what he wanted was to find his niche in the campaign and to contribute from that place as much as he could. Hoeh reviewed the campaign plan and their view of its status at the time of the meeting. He noted that his principal concerns were about money and that for some unknown reasons the national campaign had been slow in supporting the New Hampshire activities which were essential to the success of the campaign. Stein said that he felt he could help with the money problem if Hoeh could specify what was needed, how much it would cost, and what priority the items were in the scheme of the campaign.

Several days before, Hoeh had prepared an inventory of the campaign activities and the probable cost of each. He carried the list with him at all times and had brought it to the meeting with Stein. The outstanding balance was approximately $70,000. On the list were items such as printing, mailing, postage, radio time, extra billboard space, newspaper advertising, television programming, headquarters costs, hotel/motel bills, telephone installations and several other major items. Stein thoughtfully listened then took the list and checked a number of items. When he finished he said, "Okay, I'll take care of these. You get Clark to pay for the others." The items Stein had checked were the principal media items, radio, television, mailing costs, postage, and some aspects of the headquarters operation such as the telephone costs. His total exceeded half the value of the list or more than $35,000. Stein said that in addition to what he had checked on Hoeh's list he had gathered approximately $6,000 worth of first class stamps and these would be sent to the headquarters immediately. The items

remaining on Hoeh's list that Stein said Blair Clark should fund were materials, campaign support and operations expenses. These had been included in the original budget for the campaign and had remained the same throughout. What Stein assumed were items that had either been added to the plan or substantially expanded as McCarthy showed increasing strength in New Hampshire.

The brief, approximately one-half hour meeting ended with Stein asking Hoeh to make a photocopy of the list and agreeing to check his progress with Hoeh regularly. Hoeh suggested that Stein meet with Weston Associates as soon as possible to work out the details of the space, time and production orders that Stein now had assumed. Hoeh and Studds had come to the meeting with Stein feeling as if they were referees in a bankruptcy hearing. They left with not only the venture in tact but with almost all of their "wish list" funded.

Hoeh called Clark in Washington to report the details of the conversation. Clark was uncomfortable with the result but agreed that the only other option would be to scale the campaign back significantly and jeopardize McCarthy's chances. He especially did not appreciate being put on the spot by Stein concerning who would fund what. But Clark accepted, recognizing that he had lost a certain freedom of action in his own situation as the result. Hoeh recognized this loss as well but felt that unless McCarthy did well in New Hampshire there would be little after New Hampshire to manage.

Stein recruited several of his friends to assist him in his role of media financier and producer. Among these was a wealthy, young, Boston shoe manufacturer, Arnold Hiatt.

Stein and Hiatt controlled the funding and production of the final media push including newspaper advertising and radio messages, but, especially, the heavy for New Hampshire politics, television programming. They worked directly with Weston Associates, contracting and paying for the advertising they ordered. The content of the messages and the theme of the advertising did receive clearance through McCarthy, Hoeh and Gans in most instances, but for all intents and purposes, the Stein/Hiatt activity was another of the separate departments that evolved in the campaign.

Senator McCarthy once described the financing of his campaign as being like the spending of a poor man. There was never enough money at any one time to plan how it was going to be spent. Consequently, when the money did appear, as it did when Stein arrived in New Hampshire, it was spent with little more than winning the New Hampshire primary in mind. If the money had been available earlier or budgeted smoothly through the campaign, the cost of the campaign might have been reduced. Managing the finances was not a high priority for the campaign at that stage and consequently proper fiscal controls did not occur. The New Hampshire leaders kept close tabs on spending during the early weeks when they were concerned that they might incur a debt that they would be obligated to pay off after the election. They relied on earlier campaign experiences to cut costs, shifted funding of many activities to local communities, and resisted spending when the money was not in the bank. Much of this changed when Stein came to New Hampshire and Curt Gans assumed much of the day-to-day campaign spending.

Contributions

As important to the campaign as Howard Stein's participation was the role of the small contributors and fund raisers. David Roberts' fund raising effort in Hanover produced more than $1,200 through more than fifty individual contributions. Approximately 360 individual contributions were received directly by the New Hampshire campaign. The total sum received and recorded by the fiscal agent was $98,808.39. Of this amount $33,756.27 came to the campaign's fiscal agent from the National headquarters of the McCarthy campaign and $30,700.00 came to him from the New York based Coalition for a Democratic Alternative. The remaining $34,352.12 came from individual contributors ranging from $1.00 to $3,000.00 each. Seven contributions between $500 and $1,500 were received as were five checks above $1,500 to $5,000 not including the early checks from Blair Clark and Martin Peretz.

Expenditures

An exact listing of all expenditures of the New Hampshire campaign does not exist. The records of the fiscal agent only include those disbursements which he handled. He received and spent the $98,808.39 in contributions and transfers that he received and had a debt in unpaid bills as accounted March 26, 1968, of $18,284.80. That figure, as noted in the report, did not include "bills for telephone service and rented autos" which had not yet been received.[25] The telephone bill, when finally received was more than $8,000.00 and the car rental bill exceeded $2,000.00, totalling $127,093.19 as the amount that was recorded. Not included were the costs of supporting the New Hampshire campaign at the national level, nor the printing that was done in New York, nor the obligations that Howard Stein accepted and paid himself or through the national headquarters.

No accounts were gathered from the operation of the local committees nor were contributor records compiled for these committees. A conservative estimate of what the monetary cost of the campaign was would be between $225,000 and $250,000. To this figure it would be reasonable to add the equally conservative value of the volunteer time, $250,000, for a total value of close to $500,000, a sum considerably more than the New Hampshire organizers estimated when they outlined the campaign in December.

Ultimately, it was the money that made it possible to build the momentum of the final weeks of the campaign. Without Stein, the Coalition for a Democratic Alternative, Blair Clark's promise to assume the debt that would result, and the media purchased in the final 10 days, the sense of a building climax would not have resulted. The campaign might well have withered badly, forced to retreat to protect itself from a post-campaign debt. Through the energy of the volunteers and the skillful work of their taskmasters, the impact of a dollar contributed to the campaign grew considerably. Ultimately, however, there could be no substitute for the money that supported the final push of the campaign.

Notes

[1]McCarthy Campaign, "Media Budget and Plan," (from Weston Associates to David C. Hoeh), David C. Hoeh file copy.

[2]McCarthy Campaign, "Media Flow Chart," (from Weston Associates to David C. Hoeh), David C. Hoeh file copy.

[3]McCarthy Campaign, "Memo to David C. Hoeh from Mervin Weston report on the status of the mailing," (February 9, 1968), David C. Hoeh file copy.

[4]McCarthy Campaign, Campaign Flyer: "What's Happened to this Country Since 1963?" (David C. Hoeh file copy).

[5]McCarthy Campaign, Campaign Flyer: "The Spirit of America," (David C. Hoeh file copy).

[6]McCarthy Campaign, Campaign Flyer: "Labor Flyer," (David C. Hoeh file copy).

[7]McCarthy Campaign, Campaign Flyer: "Shrinking Dollar - Growing War," (David C. Hoeh file copy).

[8]McCarthy Campaign, Campaign Flyer: "McCarthy is the Man," (David C. Hoeh file copy).

[9]McCarthy Campaign, Campaign Flyer: "Senator McCarthy Answers the Three Questions Most Frequently Asked by New Hampshire Voters," (David C. Hoeh file copy).

[10]The Concord Daily Monitor (March 8, 1968), p. 8.

[11]The Concord Daily Monitor (March 8, 1968), p. 20.

[12]The Concord Daily Monitor (March 11, 1968), p. 2.

[13]Union Leader (March 11, 1968), p. 2.

[14]Union Leader (March 11, 1968), p. 3.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Union Leader (March 11, 1968), p. 6.

[17]Ibid., p. 7.

[18]Ibid., p. 12.

[19]Ibid., p. 14.

[20]The text of the advertisements was transcribed from the tape which is David C. Hoeh's file copy.

[21]Mervin Weston's "Media Memo," Op. Cit., p. 2.

[22]McCarthy Campaign, "Financial Report," (Report filed with the New Hampshire Secretary of State), David C. Hoeh file copy.

[23]McCarthy Campaign, "Budget Memo, January 18, 1968," prepared by David C. Hoeh.

[24]David Morin, "Letter to David C. Hoeh Proposing a Local Headquarters Budget," (January 18, 1968), David C. Hoeh file copy.

[25]McCarthy Campaign, "Unpaid Bills Statement," prepared by David C. Hoeh, copy in David C. Hoeh's files.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUDING THE CAMPAIGN

McCarthy Adds Campaign Days

Shortly after McCarthy returned to Washington after his middle February visit, he announced that he would increase his campaign schedule in New Hampshire. He was obviously reassured by the welcome he had received and felt that he could best focus the attack on the stumbling Johnson campaign himself. He could think of no better way to support his candidacy than by doing very well in the primary voting.

The expanded schedule meant that more of the larger towns could be included in McCarthy's appearance schedule. Instead of being able to campaign only in the cities and a few of the largest towns, McCarthy could visit most of New Hampshire's regional centers. McCarthy would spend almost all of the time after March 2nd through primary election day, March 12th, in New Hampshire.

Within forty-eight hours of McCarthy's arrival in New Hampshire for the five day schedule, March 2 to 7, most of the campaign's activity that either supported McCarthy in the field or was part of the candidate-related press activity moved from Concord to the Wayfarer Motel just outside of Manchester. A New Hampshire campaign press office stayed in Concord as did all other aspects of the campaign, including the volunteer support, canvass management, mailing preparation, celebrity scheduling and election day planning. The two headquarters worked closely on those activities that required coordination, but much of the campaign was now on pre-determined tracks that allowed only slight modification. Gans headed the Concord activities with the staff which had come from

Washington and New York. Hoeh coordinated the Wayfarer operation with Richard Goodwin. Scheduling remained a three part activity. Sandra Hoeh was the principal manager of the schedule working through Concord and McCarthy office staffer, Grace Bassett, to coordinate the Senator's activities.

The national press, now practically in awe of the McCarthy campaign, became almost part of the campaign. With little to cover except McCarthy, they spent the days traveling with him and the off hours watching the volunteers, finding new stories, and even helping with some campaign tasks. The campaign had become professional almost before their skeptical eyes. With attractions such as Dick Goodwin, a seasoned notable who had been at the national pinnacle, the youthfulness of the McCarthy venture was quickly overshadowed. Goodwin's experience and confidence lent certainty to the work of those near him, especially when crucial decisions had to be made and made without mistake or hesitation.

McCarthy's earlier campaigning was now amplified by wider press attention, the enthusiasm of the local committees, and the excitement that presidential campaigning lends to a New Hampshire winter. It began to manufacture that elusive commodity essential to a successful campaign, charisma. Now when McCarthy arrived in a community he was recognized, people came out of their shops to meet him, went out of their way to shake his hand, and crowds even gathered anticipating a visit. McCarthy had reached New Hampshire's taciturn voters in a way that had not been seen since Estes Kefauver's campaigns of the 1950's.

McCarthy, the candidate, broke into full stride during the final days of the campaign. One night he spoke to thunderous applause and many interruptions in a Nashua High School, the next he spoke before a Dartmouth College audience. It was the same hall that had held George Wallace's hostile audience almost one year before.

McCarthy had been advised that Dartmouth student audiences tended to be reserved in their reaction. If he could stir them to interrupt his speech with applause it would be a significant response, but not to expect other than attentive listening. McCarthy, with the editor of the Daily Dartmouth, came on stage before a packed Webster Hall. The applause was courteous, no shouting, no standing, no signs, just more than 1,500 people clapping. David Hoeh sat next to E. M. "Ned" Kenworthy, New York Times reporter, who had been with McCarthy the evening before in Nashua. Kenworthy leaned over to Hoeh and said that he felt this was a different audience.

McCarthy was introduced and began his speech. Kenworthy leaned over again saying that McCarthy was about to use a speech similar to that he had given the night before. It went on with McCarthy's best illustrations and rhetorical allusions floating out across the silent hall like a breeze in a sound absorbing room -- no response, no reaction, no hand clapping, almost no sound at all. The Nashua speech, which had stirred more excitement than any other McCarthy speech in New Hampshire, seemed almost totally without impact on this Hanover audience. The only noise in the hall came from the outside when a few late arrivals found the door closed. The hall was filled to capacity. No more could be allowed inside.

His speech ranged across the arguments of his candidacy and criticism of the administration's policies and behavior. Inserted in his frequently used arguments were sections that had been prepared by Sy Hersh on the problems of the cities which David Hoeh thought might be of particular interest to the largely urban oriented Dartmouth audience.

> "This priority is not being recognized by the present administration. The time, as the President's Riot Commission tells us, is short if we are to prevent more bloodshed. I believe that this nation can stem future riots and bloodshed -- we have the potential, we have the intellect, and we have the will."
>
> "But we cannot solve any problems if we persist in wasting manpower, money and moral energy in the war in Vietnam."

McCarthy noted that two years before Johnson had said the United States could fight the war in Vietnam and the war on poverty at home. But "the president's recent budget message was nothing more than a signal of surrender, a sign of abandonment of the War on Poverty and the special needs of America."

> "The people of this nation and the Congress have not had a chance to pass objective judgment on this war. As our military component has grown so has our commitment to South East Asia. And no place along the line did anyone pass a reasoned judgment on what was happening in South East Asia."
>
> "I'm a messenger bringing this message and it's not a popular one. In ancient history, such messengers were usually the first ones executed. I may be in that same situation," he said with a laugh.[1]

McCarthy quietly brought his speech to an end as he frequently did, with a series of poetic allusions.

> The message from the Administration today is a message of apprehension, a message of fear, yes -- even a message of fear of fear.
>
> This is not the real spirit of America. I do not believe that it is. This is a time to test the mood and spirit:
>
> To offer in place of doubt -- trust.
>
> In place of expediency -- right judgment.
>
> In place of ghettos, let us have neighborhoods and communities.
>
> In place of incredibility -- integrity.
>
> In place of murmuring, let us have clear speech; let us again hear America singing.
>
> In place of disunity, let us have dedication of purpose.
>
> In place of near despair, let us have hope.
>
> This is the promise of greatness which was stated for us by Adlai Stevenson and which was brought to form and positive action in the words and actions of John Kennedy.
>
> Let us pick up again these lost strands and weave them again into the fabric of America.
>
> Let us sort out the music from the sounds and again respond to the trumpet and the steady drum.[2]

As McCarthy ended and returned to his chair on the stage, the audience rose almost as if it were one person. Their silence during the forty minute speech, as if bottled, was expelled in a sudden rush of extended standing applause. Hands beat against each other as if the action might re-enforce their own conviction so effectively pronounced by the speaker and at the same time somehow vent their own individual frustration with the course of national events.

When at last the applause subsided, the student moderator called for questions. The first to rise was an Army lieutenant, in uniform. The lieutenant asked McCarthy whether he had received any military support during his campaign? His reply was that it was interesting to see "who was willing and free to speak out," and that some retired military officers have expressed views which parallel his own. The lieutenant went on, "Well, I just want you to know I drove two-and-a-half hours to get up here from Ft. Devens, Mass., to show my support for your campaign." (The lieutenant received a standing ovation from about half those in the hall.)[3]

A series of questions followed concerning McCarthy's position on the war, how he proposed to end it, and what might be the effect on the U.S. economy of ending the military effort. On this latter point he said, "This is the first time in our nation's history war has not stimulated economic growth. Economic transition from war to peace is the least of our worries." He then received several questions about the Selective Service law, draft resistance, and conscientious objection policies. To these McCarthy advised, "Act according to your conscience," and stated that he favored a policy of "Selective Conscience Objection." An emotional and polarized subject, McCarthy satisfied his listeners with his responses to these questions without suggesting that the students ignore the Selective Service laws, or promising unconditional amnesty to those who had broken the law. It was on this last point that McCarthy spoke with considerable courage and sincerity. He reviewed his own feeling of qualified support for the notion of war in national self-defense and the idea that

a nation so threatened might compel citizens to engage in defense. He then distinguished this view from what was then occurring in the United States to support the unjustified war in Vietnam. He closed by suggesting that when the war concluded, then a policy of amnesty should be proposed for those who have been jailed or exiled because of their objection to the war. A calmly stated, well reasoned, expression of concern, a gesture toward healing the damage of the war went unreported by those covering the speech. His answers to the questions had brought repeated applause, even cheering and several standing ovations.

Election Day Organization

Several weeks before the election the McCarthy managers began developing the election day plans. As with other aspects of the campaign the first task was to assign one of the volunteers to the job of evaluating what was needed to be sure that the McCarthy vote got to the polls. For this task Richard Norling, a Yale undergraduate student, who had abandoned his education for the campaign, was selected. Rich drafted a get out the vote program which was approved by Hoeh and Gans and sent to the local McCarthy committee chairman February 22nd. The memorandum read:

> Tuesday, March 12, is fast approaching, and it is time to give some thought to preparations for activities on election day itself. Our main activities will include providing McCarthy poll-watchers, rides to the polls and volunteers to get out the McCarthy vote.
>
> We are asking you to appoint one person (it could be yourself) to coordinate election day activities for your local area. This person should plan to spend some time each day getting local volunteers to work for McCarthy on election day, and should be able to spend election day at your local headquarters coordinating these volunteers.

Enclosed is a list of cities and towns with a large number of registered Democrats in your area. Your election day coordinator should be responsible for recruiting and coordinating volunteers in these cities and towns. Obviously, the largest towns are most important, and should be organized first.

Here are some things your election day coordinator should start on right away:

- Call city or town clerks to obtain opening and closing times and addresses of polling places for each city ward or town. Keep a copy of this information for yourself, and please also send me a copy as soon as you get it.

- Find a person in each city ward or town to coordinate drivers on election day. This job can best be handled from a home in each area. The only necessity is a telephone, and somebody who will answer it on Monday and Tuesday, March 11 and 12. Ads containing these telephone numbers will be placed in newspapers prior to the election.

- Find drivers to take people to vote. An approximate guideline for the number of drivers you will need in each city ward or town is one for every 400 registered Democrats -- your own local experience may suggest a different number of drivers. You should also try to have a few extra drivers on hand at your headquarters to help out in areas that need extra drivers.

- Find poll-watchers for each polling place.

- Obtain maps for drivers. The location of the polling place and the driver coordinator's home should be marked on each map. If canvassing is being done in your area, copies of the maps provided to canvassers can be made.

- Find a volunteer lawyer to be available to your headquarters in case of election procedure complaints on election day.

- Stockpile election day supplies, and set them away in a special place reserved for election day. Suggestions: a 3 x 5 note pad for each driver coordinator and several for your headquarters, 2 posters for the sides of each car you plan to have, crepe paper and masking tape for decorating cars, enough McCarthy buttons for election day workers, and enough McCarthy literature to put a small stack in each car on election day.

- As you get volunteers for election day activities, please send me their names, addresses, telephone numbers, and where and what they have volunteered to do. Also keep a copy for yourself. The week before the election, I will send out instruction sheets to the volunteer workers; they will also receive thank-you notes after the election. Your volunteer workers should be on duty all the time polling places are open. You may want to set up shifts for volunteers who can work only part of the day.

Please try to keep me continually informed on your progress in acquiring an election day organization. I shall try to keep in frequent contact with you by telephone.

Your estimates of the number of drivers, poll-watchers, and volunteers to distribute literature outside polling places or to turn out the McCarthy vote are important. We expect to have out-of-state volunteers to fill in gaps where you are unable to obtain your own local volunteers. However, local volunteers are much more effective because they know a large number of voters, known their way around town, etc. In addition, the job of assigning out-of-town volunteers where they are needed most will probably be a large one. For all these reasons, it is extremely important for you to do as much as you possibly can to build your own election day organization.

I expect to be in Concord Headquarters at the following times:

February 26-27	Monday evening through Tuesday afternoon;
March 1-5	Friday evening through Tuesday afternoon; and,
March 7-12	Thursday evening through Tuesday evening.

If my help is required at other times, I may be able to make myself available.

Please appoint an election day coordinator as soon as possible. I shall contact you next Monday evening (February 26th).

Sincerely yours, Richard Norling.[4]

Attached to the letter was the following listing titled, "Election Day Assignment Regions." A note on the list stated, "Numbers in parentheses are the number of registered Democrats in each town or city."

Berlin

Berlin - 4 wards (4,378)
Northumberland (563)
Gorham (547)
Littleton (387)
Whitefield (174)

Concord

Concord - 9 wards (1,680)
Pembroke (903)
Allenstown (648)
Pittsfield (271)
Boscawen (157)

Dover

Dover - 5 wards (2,306)
Somersworth - 5 wards (3,002)
Rochester - 6 wards (2,011)
Newmarket (920)
Rollinsford (483)
Farmington (410)
Durham (255)
Milton (192)

Hampton

Hampton (454)
Exeter (667)
Epping (373)
Seabrook (244)

Henniker-Hillsborough

Hillsborough (199)
Henniker (127)

Keene

Keene - 5 wards (1,353)
Walpole (275)
Swanzey (242)
Troy (218)
Winchester (213)
Hinsdale (164)

Laconia

Laconia - 6 wards (1,958)
Franklin - 3 wards (1,046)
Conway (326)
Meredith (288)
Tilton (226)
Ashland (186)
Belmont (183)
Andover (168)
Alton (147)
Barnstead (157) (?)
Plymouth (142)

Lebanon

Lebanon - 3 wards (854)
Claremont - 3 wards (2,688)
Newport (903)
Hanover (500)
Lincoln (327)
Enfield (133)

Manchester

Manchester - 14 wards (24,549)
Goffstown (1,254)
Hooksett (654)
Bedford (477)
Raymond (196)
Auburn (171)

Nashua

Nashua - 9 wards (8,082)
Salem (2,000)
Hudson (1,444)
Derry (888)
Milford (691)
Plaistow (550)
Pelham (505)
Merrimack (476)
Londonderry (278)
Atkinson (175)
Hampstead (169)
Windham (148)

Peterborough

Peterborough (287)
Greenville (415)
Wilton (402)
Jaffrey (388)
New Ipswich (189)
Rindge (117)

Portsmouth

Portsmouth - 6 wards (1,164)

The strategy that Hoeh and Studds had developed early in the campaign had now been refined into a series of target cities and towns clustered around area headquarters. In addition to the preparations which Norling outlined in his February 22nd letter, area committee chairmen and election day activity coordinators were asked to attend a meeting at the Concord headquarters, Sunday evening March 3rd. There Hoeh and Gans reviewed preparations for election day adding several aspects that had not been covered in Norling's earlier letter. The most important of these additions was the suggestion that each area headquarters organize telephone or canvassing re-contact procedures to remind those who had been canvassed to vote. The basis for this re-contact was to be the canvasser's card and the notation on that card indicating whether the person contacted was a "1", "2" or "3" respondent to the canvass. Those "favorable to McCarthy" (the "1" voter), and those "leaning toward McCarthy" (the "2" voter), would be called or re-canvassed to remind them to vote. The "3" voter, would also be contacted in hopes of convincing them to vote for McCarthy. This re-contact would be made especially in the case of those who had been canvassed earlier in the campaign. The recent escalation in the campaign and McCarthy's extensive press attention was presumed to be having a sufficient effect on the "3" voter to justify the re-contact.

What the election day activity depended on the most was the competence of the respective local organizations. Persons experienced with the political campaigns and the vote production of their respective communities were the key to reaching the McCarthy vote. The canvassing results gave the basis for knowing where McCarthy was strong or weak. In the strong districts the local committees organized to pull voters, concentrating their planning where the work would produce the best returns. Familiarity with the election day ethos of each district gave the local workers the background to adjust their efforts to avoid irritating voters by doing things that would not be well accepted, and at the same time not omitting activities that had come to be expected from a candidate organization on or immediately before an election day.

As the demands on the local organizations for candidate and celebrity schedules ended and the canvassing activity reached its final peak during the weekend of March 9th and 10th, election day preparations took the highest priority. In addition to the advertising blitz on the radio, television and through the newspapers, a number of local committees distributed printed reminders to vote and last minute appeals to vote for McCarthy. For local organizations with extensive manpower and thorough going organization, a number of simultaneous activities could be supported during the final weekend. Those local committees that were less well organized took on only the highest priority tasks as directed from the state headquarters. As had been the case throughout the campaign, the managers had tried to offer a shelf of activities that would stimulate the weaker and more recently formed area organizations as well as challenging the strong and well developed committees.

Only one separate activity was allowed to develop with the sanction of the campaign. That was the effort of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Their members spoke separately to separate audiences. They campaigned in their own way on street corners with leaflets and placards. They organized their own press conferences using their own spokesmen, presenting their own view of the issues, and asserting in their own way, support for Senator McCarthy.

The McCarthy Machine

A few days after the New Hampshire presidential primary vote, an advertisement appeared in the New York Times, sponsored by the Coalition for a Democratic Alternative, soliciting funds for the "McCarthy Machine." A full page ad, the heading read, "McCarthy's Machine Needs Money." A picture showed twelve serious-looking student-aged men and women, coats in hand with a caption, "The Machine." The text of the ad read:

> Senator Eugene McCarthy is backed by the most improbable political machine in American history.
>
> It works for nothing, runs on peanut butter sandwiches and soft drinks, and spends the night in sleeping bags or empty warehouses.
>
> You can't buy a machine like this, even with the offer of money....
>
> And you can't con them either, with a lot of overblown promises.
>
> They're looking for a new kind of leadership for our country and they believe that Senator McCarthy is the only one who can provide it.
>
> That's why they went out and rang every doorbell in the state of New Hampshire....
>
> Unless every person reading this ad sends a few dollars, McCarthy's mightiest weapon will be stilled.

> And the battle will have to be fought by a lone man with a limited staff.
>
> If you've already given, we thank you. And ask you to please give again.
>
> If you've never given, there's no better time than now.
>
> $1 from you will feed one student for one day.
>
> $10 will provide 20 students with lunch.
>
> $50 will feed 25 students for two days or 10 students for 5 days.
>
> And there's also the cost of transportation....[5]

For the last 10 days before the primary the "McCarthy Machine" was in high gear and ready for the critical final days. A mistake, a national crisis, an international incident might shift the voters' attention from an insurgent candidacy back to the President. While a national crisis or international incident was beyond the control of the New Hampshire campaign, the first, a mistake that could cost voter support, was on everyone's mind. It was going to be a close election. The canvass said it; the leaders felt it; and the media had come to recognize it.

As the tide turned in favor of Senator McCarthy, the Johnson campaign leaders fought back. The "pledge card" had become a serious liability by the middle of February. Their remaining alternative was to attack McCarthy's positions. Until this time, the strategy of the Johnson campaign had been to ignore McCarthy, minimize his possible appeal, deny that loyal New Hampshire Democrats would support his insurgency, and refuse to concede more than a

small portion of the vote to him. Senator McIntyre's early prediction that McCarthy would not get more than 3 to 5 percent of the vote -- not more than 3,000 to 5,000 votes total -- remained the party line of the Johnson campaign well into February. A vote total better than McIntyre's projection would, by their own definition, have to be considered significant.

The Johnson leaders had received an analysis of the probable voters in the New Hampshire presidential primary from Oliver Quayle and Associates, public opinion pollsters, that showed first, that the voter was essentially a "hawk" toward Vietnam policy, and secondly, that these same voters did not know McCarthy's stand on Vietnam issues. Quayle's advice to the Johnson leaders was to step up their attacks on McCarthy as an advocate of peace and also to get McCarthy to define his peace plans precisely. The combination of strategies, Quayle suggested, would solidify support behind a write-in effort and at the same time, drive McCarthy into a corner. Quayle's advice justified the Johnson leaders' shift from ignoring McCarthy to attacking him directly. The radio commercials and Governor King began the assault. What both missed in Quayle's advice was that there is a difference between questioning a policy position and questioning one's political and national loyalty. King went for the jugular and concentrated on the question of political and national loyalty. McIntyre, when he actively campaigned, sought to draw McCarthy out on policy differences. Unfortunately, King had jumped the gun and by the time McIntyre arrived in New Hampshire to begin campaigning for Johnson much of the damage had already been done.

Instead of a coordinated and sustained policy attack on the McCarthy campaign, McIntyre had to separate himself from the position King had taken. In addition to the split which had developed in the Democratic Party between the Johnson and McCarthy supporters there was now a split within the Johnson camp between its leaders, King and McIntyre, a split that would be especially troublesome to the Johnson campaign as the election approached. McIntyre and his supporters within the Johnson campaign became increasingly uncomfortable with King's rhetoric.

From the beginning when the Democratic State Committee was asked to endorse the Johnson renomination, the McCarthy leaders had sought to have the machinery of the New Hampshire party remain neutral. When this tactic failed, the leaders saw political advantage in reminding voters that the basic ethos of New Hampshire primary politics was being violated by the endorsement. When Governor King launched his attacks on the loyalty of the McCarthy supporters they in turn felt it was time to again remind the public of the trampled ethos of primary election neutrality.

Once again the McCarthy leaders called upon the Democratic State Committee to reconsider their earlier endorsement of the Johnson renomination and to open the Democratic Party to the organizations of both of the candidates. In a letter from David Hoeh to the Democratic State Committee membership he requested that all Johnson campaign material bearing the Democratic State Committee attribution be recalled and that a complete audit of Democratic State Committee accounts be made in order to determine how the funds were being used. The request was rejected at the February 18th meeting of the Democratic State Committee but the tactic aided the McCarthy effort.[6]

The meeting produced at least two new supporters for the McCarthy effort from the members of the State Committee attending including one, Robert Proulx, Chairman of the Grafton County Democratic Committee, who had previously supported the endorsement of Johnson's renomination. A number of others were deeply disturbed by the behavior of Craig and Boutin, who attended the meeting, toward friends who had shared the earlier battles of the Democratic Party. The net effect of the confrontation was positive for the McCarthy leadership. It illustrated to what extent the Johnson leaders would go to deliver New Hampshire to Johnson, spiting both friends and political sensitivities. The Manchester Union Leader picked up the dispute in an editorial titled, "'Pedigreed' Democrats," with an editorial cartoon. The editorial read:

> Whatever else might be said of the heated controversy currently raging within the Democratic State Committee it should be stated, for the record, that it is completely unnecessary and need not have grown to such proportions.
>
> In any fair contest, President Johnson figures to run roughshod over Minnesota Sen. Eugene McCarthy, whose voice of appeasement falls on deaf ears in a state whose motto is "Live Free or Die!"
>
> What concerns us, and should concern all Democrats, is the unbridled arrogance of those who, despite LBJ's insuperable advantage, nevertheless feel the need to "stack the deck" and to run roughshod over all who disagree with them. Apparently they care not a whit about the party disunity their actions are fostering.
>
> State Chairman William H. Craig of Manchester, who threw the parliamentary book at McCarthy backers at Tuesday night's State Committee meeting in the Queen City, won at best a technical victory. But it could prove to be a costly victory indeed over the long haul.

> As far as parliamentary procedure goes, Craig was correct in ruling out of order several indirect attempts to overturn the State Committee's official endorsement of President Johnson. Craig said he would entertain only a specific motion to "reconsider" the previous action of the committee.
>
> However, it is the Democratic State Committee itself that is out of order in endorsing LBJ and violating the neutrality that all Democrats have a right to expect it will adhere to faithfully.
>
> This newspaper opposes the candidacy of Sen. McCarthy with every fiber of its being, but we cannot help but sense and sympathize with the feeling of outrage of McCarthy's supporters when they see the State Committee attempt to transform the Democratic Party into an exclusive club where only "pedigreed" candidates and their supporters are welcome.[7]

The editorial was merely a minor break in the pattern of editorial attack which the Manchester Union Leader aimed at the McCarthy campaign, but it did revive in the final weeks of the campaign the issues of fairness and party neutrality. Somehow, after the February 20th meeting, the Johnson campaign lost its momentum.

Symptomatic of what the Johnson campaign was encountering was reflected in an Art Buchwald column that appeared February 22nd. He wrote, "A few weeks ago David Brinkley reported that a scientist had programmed all the pertinent military information about the U.S. and North Vietnam and fed it into a computer, raising the question: 'When will the war be won and which side will win?' The computer answered that the U.S. had won the war two years ago.[8] For some peculiar reason, the Johnson campaigners were under the impression that the public was satisfied with the progress of national and international events and that all they needed was an answer.

Like Buchwald's computer, each time the question was asked the computer produced an answer, but the answer did not quite fit the situation. While the administration called on the voters to trust the President and support his policy, the TET offensive produced bloody photographs and frightening casualty lists. In spite of what the public saw, the military leaders proclaimed a victory. At one moment the leaders in Washington and New Hampshire talked of freedom and the right to dissent and the next such expressions were viewed as disloyal, even traitorous acts. The bastion of democracy was embattled. Basic freedoms seemed in immediate danger. The powerful were threatening and the weak were resisting. Battle lines were beginning to form as the rhetoric became strident, the threats more frequent, and the bitterness more intense. The middle ground evaporated. What had been a confident renomination effort on the part of the Johnson leaders in New Hampshire now became a frightened, disorganized and desperate back slide. While Quayle's polling results had provided a basis for a revived campaign, the leaders, principally Bernard Boutin, who had to report his activities to the White House regularly, seemed to panic. He held frequent meetings of the remaining workers exhorting them to circulate more pledge cards, line-up local committee members, and to remind those who had benefited from the party's incumbency to renew their support now. As the Johnson fortunes began to fade the meetings became more and more unpleasant. Boutin would not tolerate disagreement or criticism within the organization any more than Governor King would outside. In the last days only those who had to attend the meetings because of their employment did so while the others drifted to the sides and away

from the hostility. On election night, several of the major Johnson workers would spend the evening at the McCarthy headquarters to await the returns. They had become disillusioned by the Johnson leaders and disgusted by the direction the campaign had taken.

The "Red Herring" Charge and New Hampshire Politics

Legends of New Hampshire politics and especially Manchester politics are filled with tales of how last minute charges changed the results of close elections. Almost a political fossil in the way the city frequently reacts to the last minute charge, Manchester acts as if it were still in the age of the "yellow journalists" and the issue distorters of the late 19th century rather than in the age of multi-media news and skepticism. A charge need not be made through public media to be given credibility. It might simply be a rumor circulated in a few crucial places and spread rapidly in the ethnic communities of the city during the last hours of a campaign. Manchester is a divided city physically, socially, ethnically and economically. The physical barrier is the Merrimack River which separates the city's predominently French-Canadian West side from the commerical district and the Irish, Yankee, Greek and upper income communities of the East side.

A long history of social, economic, religious and especially ethnic conflict has built numerous unseen barriers between neighborhoods, parishes, social clubs and even financial institutions and professional organizations. Each has created its own communications networks and response mechanisms. The most sophisticated of these, of course, was the network within the French-Canadian community. The church, parochial schools and the French language kept the community a tight, provincial and socially regulated entity for generations.

Only since the advent of television in the post World War II period has the tightness of that community begun to crack. The first cracks began to appear in the late 1950's and widened in the 1960's as the younger members of the community sought education, jobs and status outside the traditional community.

In a city like Manchester, which was once dominated politically by the Republican Yankees and then for several generations by the Irish, the French-Canadians were usually at the bottom of the socio-economic-political ladder. As the French-Canadian population grew beyond the 50 percent mark, an inevitable conflict developed between the two principal ethnic populations, the politically skilled Irish and the culturally isolated-French Canadians. In Manchester city politics an eventual accommodation was achieved between the two groups that centered on politically sensitive jobs. If the police chief were Irish his deputy would be French, and the fire chief would be French and his deputy Irish. The scheme carried into the political jobs in the Postal Service, city boards and commissions, and into the Board of Mayor and Alderman. A French mayor usually meant that the chairman of the Board or Alderman would be Irish and vice versa. The unwritten but carefully observed political accommodation preserved harmony within what might have been a seriously fragmented and dangerously tense city.

Politics outside of Manchester were quite another thing. In order for a Democrat to win one of the three statewide electoral offices, Governor or the two U.S. Senate seats, that candidate would have to carry Manchester by a substantial margin. From 1912 until 1962 only once had the Democratic Party been

successful in electing one of its candidates to statewide office and that was in 1932 when ex-Governor Fred Brown was elected to the U.S. Senate. In order to reduce what would normally be expected to be a substantial Democratic plurality from Manchester leaders of New Hampshire's Republican Party had learned to play the Manchester political instrument with great precision. It was possible to manipulate the issues and the fears of the ethnic communities of Manchester in such a way as to reduce the Democratic plurality in almost any election for statewide and even congressional district office until U.S. Senator Styles Bridges died in 1961, and John W. King and Thomas J. McIntyre were elected Governor and U.S. Senator, respectively, in 1962.

The first line of battle for those who sought to play the Manchester political instrument was in the selection of candidates before the state primary. Often the Democratic ticket was loaded with unknown candidates with convenient ethnically recognizable names. For the most part these were "straw candidates" who had entered or been encouraged to enter solely to reduce the vote for the one candidate with the highest potential for seriously challenging the incumbent Republican. In other words the ethnic instrument of Manchester was played by the Republican officeholders to select their own challengers.

If by chance a strong candidate did slip through the maze of the nominating primary, then several other tactics were still available, principally the "Red herring charge" and the "backfire" issue. By generating a plausible rumor and then spreading it judiciously within the communications network of one or more

ethnic communities just before the election, it was possible to change the Manchester vote enough to defeat the Democrat and elect the Republican. The rumor had to be reasonably credible, spread through credible channels, spread so late that it would be impossible to answer, and usually carry some emotional tone such as an ethnic slur or some damned if you answer or damned if you don't aspect.

The most famous of these many final moment rumor campaigns occurred in the tight gubernatorial contest between the Republican H. Styles Bridges and the Democratic candidate, John L. Sullivan. Neither was an incumbent and both were respected in their own parties. Sullivan, a highly regarded Manchester attorney, expected to draw a heavy vote from his home city. Bridges knew that in order to win the election he had to cut Sullivan's Manchester plurality. To do this he found a ready made and classic Manchester problem, the Merrimack River and its bridges. Several bridges had been washed out during a flood. The construction of bridges linking the French-Canadian West side with the Irish-Yankee East side was always an issue that churned political emotions. In the waning hours of the 1934 campaign a rumor was spread in the French-Canadian community that when Irish candidate Sullivan had been asked what he would do about the bridges he had said, "Let the frogs swim." The rumor surfaced in the last several hours before the election, spread throughout the French-Canadian community, could not be answered by Sullivan, and rekindled the always smoldering emotions between Manchester's principal ethnic groups. When the votes were counted Sullivan lost the election because his Manchester plurality had eroded. The margin was 2,362 votes.[9] Bridges went on to a long career in the United States Senate and John L. Sullivan was appointed Secretary of the Navy by Franklin D. Roosevelt.

As the New Hampshire Democratic Party revived during the late 1950's and early 1960's, its principal fear was the rumor problem in Manchester. The last few hours before each election required special vigilance on the part of candidate organizations in order to head off and to neutralize the last moment charge. The difference between what had happened in 1934 and the 1960's was that now William Loeb, using his publications, played the instrument in the open. Loeb has so successfully played the Manchester instrument in his favor that since 1950 no candidate had succeeded to the governorship of the state of New Hampshire who has not taken Mr. Loeb's pledge to veto any state sales or income tax legislation. Even a slight equivocation on the part of a candidate toward the "broad based tax issue" has been enough for Loeb to set in motion the machinery that would destroy the candidate's margin in Manchester.

In fact Bernard Boutin, the Johnson Committee Chairman, had lost his 1958 bid for election when he did not secure a sufficient plurality of Manchester votes to overcome the Republican strength outside the Democratic cities. Loeb alleged that Boutin was a "broad based taxer" and in spite of Boutin's fervent denials, Loeb's view stuck, especially in Manchester.

As the final days of the 1968 presidential primary neared, the Johnson campaign was searching for a way to reach the voters who were slipping rapidly toward McCarthy. They knew the Manchester political ethos and felt that they could play the instrument to their benefit if the right issue could be found. Oliver Quayle's polling revealed a conflict in the perception between the New Hampshire voters' issue profile and the position that they attributed to Senator

McCarthy. The profile showed that voters held "hawk" views toward the Vietnam War solution and yet seemed to be moving toward Senator McCarthy in their support. To counter this trend, Governor King escalated his attack on McCarthy during the last weeks of February. Unable to gain much attention for these charges, especially since Senator McCarthy did not hesitate to explain his Vietnam position, the Johnson leaders shifted their efforts.

First they had to recognize that McCarthy had gained considerable strength in New Hampshire. Boutin began back-tracking from McIntyre's early prediction that McCarthy would have to get more than 3,000 to 5,000 votes in order for the result to be considered significant. Boutin now said McCarthy would have to get more than 30 percent of the vote. On the eve of the election Boutin said he was interested in securing just more than 50 percent of the vote for President Johnson. The convention delegates had always been conceded to Johnson.

Secondly, Boutin's organization had been scouring the record of the McCarthy campaign to find an error, inconsistency, mis-statement, or issue position that they could use to their advantage in the final hours. Their strategy to hit McCarthy hard on his war position was failing. What the McCarthy leaders had discovered was that the New Hampshire voters found McCarthy credible and were willing to support him even though when asked their own position of the war the answer was that of a "hawk." When given the alternative, win the war or get out, the respondents took the win the war position. What seemed to be happening was that even the "hawks" were attributing to McCarthy their own view of how to end the war and because they found McCarthy reassuring as an alternative to Johnson they had become McCarthy supporters. This was baffling to the Johnson campaign leadership.

The Johnson Campaign Fights Back

The first evidence of the increased Johnson campaign pressure came with a blast from Governor King and the first newspaper advertisements placed for the final weekend. The Governor charged that Senator McCarthy was "perpetrating a massive hoax on the voters of New Hampshire by claiming friendship and support for the late President John F. Kennedy." King charged that McCarthy had, "tried to scuttle President Kennedy's nomination at the 1960 Democratic National Convention," and that since then McCarthy was the "biggest thorn in President Kennedy's side." He went on to note that the "Senator has fooled no one who remembers how much damage he tried to do to the late President's candidacy and legislative program of the early 1960's."[10]

The second attack came through a newspaper advertisement that echoed the same theme but added, "Sen. McCarthy promises an 'alternative,' but he refuses to give one significant detail of his alternatives. Because of this he has not gained the support of a single member of the U.S. Senate. Don't vote for indecision and wispy promises...."[11] Both King and McIntyre signed the advertisement.

While King tended to reach for the jugular of McCarthy's issues, McIntyre represented McCarthy as being "vague and oftentimes contradictory in his statements."[12] McIntyre would read excerpts from McCarthy's comments as reported in the newspapers, and charge that McCarthy's statements were "poor substitutes for positive and definitive policies." McCarthy, McIntyre contended, was simply "exploiting the frustration so many Americans feel about Vietnam."[13]

King, on the other hand, ended the final full week of the campaign with the charge that any significant vote for McCarthy in the presidential primary would be "greeted with cheers in Hanoi."

> King's comments, made during a press conference at the capitol, were obviously inspired in part by a McCarthy charge on Wednesday that supporters of President Johnson were using tactics like those employed in the 1950's by the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin, the Republican red-hunter.
>
> "That's political poppycock," said King. "He (McCarthy) is using smear tactics himself."
>
> King's harshest comments were directed to McCarthy's position calling for an early end to hostilities in Southeast Asia.
>
> King said: "The question to be answered is, shall we continue to resist naked Communist aggression with all the resources at our command, or will we say the price is too high, the going is too rough. We are ready to negotiate on terms laid down by Ho Chi Minh.
>
> "That is why the people most interested in this election are Ho Chi Minh and his Communist friends. They will be scrutinizing the returns for signs of a weakening of American will."
>
> King was asked if he thought his attacks on McCarthy might not be a bit strong. "I have always used the hard sell approach," said King. "I am a hard sell person, I guess."

King concluded the press conference by revising his predictions for the election.

> "His earlier estimate that McCarthy would receive only 12 to 18 percent of the Democratic vote" was revised with the Governor stating that McCarthy "could get as much as 25 percent."[14]

Within a day a major controversy began to brew that would splinter the Johnson campaign as it entered the final weekend of the campaign. Governor King had been intemperate in his remarks before, but now the comments revived images of red-

baiting by demanding the sort of unquestioning, unthinking loyalty that Joseph McCarthy had demanded during his scourge of the 1950's.

In response to King's comments McCarthy held a press conference where he played several of the radio tapes, sponsored by the Johnson campaign, that had urged against voting for "fuzzy thinking and surrender" and called for a vote on March 12th in "support of our fighting men." He also showed, as further examples of the Johnson Committee's campaign style, copies of recent newspaper advertisements that repeated the same themes.

"In my twenty years in Congress," McCarthy said, "I have never been the target of such charges from fellow Democrats." He then went on to compare the statements that King had made and that McIntyre had endorsed to those made in the 1950's by the "more irresponsible" Republicans, like an earlier Sen. McCarthy, the late Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin. He added that the same charges could be aimed at his fellow members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee such as the Democratic leader, Mike Mansfield, and Vermont's Republican Senator George D. Aiken. In fact McCarthy noted, "The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was lined up about 2 to 1 against the administration's conduct of the war."[15]

McCarthy charged the New Hampshire Johnson campaign leaders with following Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other administration spokesmen in trying to "prevent free discussion in the United States. There might be people who would resent it some, and I hope so," McCarthy added. It was McCarthy's feeling that the tactics to which he objected could be controlled by the White House and the Democratic National Committee if they wished. Earlier McCarthy had called upon the White House to repudiate the tactics of Johnson's campaign managers in New Hampshire but there had been no response.

Concluding the press conference McCarthy denied advocating surrender and said that he felt his campaign had encouraged voters to ask hard questions about the war. In fact the reaction of the Johnson leaders in the final days seemed to McCarthy to be an indication that he had "thrown a scare" into their campaign and that their tactics would "generate resentment among New Hampshire Democrats" bringing him more votes.

Governor King's attack and McCarthy's measured response gave the press the chance to shape the public view of the last charges of the campaign. To the reporters and their editors, King's attempts to snuff out the McCarthy challenge by tactics reminiscent of those of Joe McCarthy sparked their intense interest at a critical moment in the campaign. Now with the Johnson surrogates apparently unleashed to attack McCarthy at will in a manner that struck a certain horror of the past in the editors' minds, the full power of the press shifted perceptably behind McCarthy. McCarthy stories moved from inside pages to the front page. Value charged wards such as "appeaser" and "surrender" found their way into headlines and sub-heads. It was as if the Johnson leaders and, especially Governor King, had handed the "David" in this contest the rock to slay themselves, the "Goliath." It became the combined function of McCarthy and the press to shape that weapon into something that might actually slay Goliath.

The Portsmouth Herald led the editorial attack.

> Arrogance and Deception -- Editorial Opinion
>
> New Hampshire's Democratic party leaders have shown a boundless capacity for insulting the intelligence of their political brethren; now they seem bent upon a campaign aimed at impunging their loyalty as well.

First there was that arrogant business about the pledge cards. The party's hierarchy triggered understandable resentment among the rank-and-file with this coercive device, and the effort to obtain such pledges has since been all but abandoned.

The pledges were sought, of course as a means of "lining up the troops," so to speak, for a President Johnson write-in movement. Those who signed were made to feel that they were irrevocably committed, while any abstainers were left to wonder about their future standing with the party.

In fact, Gov. John W. King, one of the principal promoters of the pledge cards even went so far as to threaten the laggards. Democrats who didn't join up with Johnson could later expect to be "counted out," he warned.

Such talk obviously didn't give much credit to the mentality of Democrats, nor did it take into account the fierceness of their independence. By and large, they reacted with predictable hostility at such a brazen attempt to regiment them, and the pledge card venture thus collapsed of its own dead weight.

It's a hard-headed hierarchy that presumes to direct the thinking of New Hampshire Democrats, however, and the mischief goes on.

The latest sample of it is even more shocking than what's gone before, since it constitutes an attack upon the patriotism of Democrats who don't happen to agree with the party leaders as regards President Johnson and the extent of American involvement in Vietnam.

U.S. Senator Tom McIntyre and Gov. King are the principals, if not the perpetrators of this particular outrage, for it is they who lend their names to a large, page-deep newspaper advertisement which clearly seeks to trick the reader into believing that a vote for President Johnson is somehow essential to showing "support of our fighting men in Vietnam."

In other words, according to the rationale of the ad, the voter who doesn't cast his ballot with Johnson might be doing his country a disservice. The same reasoning applies, and the doubts that go with it, to any critic of the war.

> It is particularly appropriate that the advertisement was placed with the Manchester Union Leader, since the language of it is strictly the language of Loeb.
>
> The ad, incidentally, lists the Democratic State Committee as the sponsor of record. This means that it probably was paid for out of regular party funds. Hence, all Democrats are made to share the responsibility for it whether they agree with the ad or not. Furthermore, a lot of party contributors of adverse persuasion probably have been charged with the cost.
>
> Interest now forms around the question of how disdainful Democrats will respond to the ad after they realize the ruthless manner in which their right to think differently has been trampled down. Theirs is just cause for violent protest against the excesses of the party's leadership, and it will be surprising indeed if the rebellious clamor doesn't make itself heard from one end of the state to the other.[16]

The Concord Monitor published two editorials restating similar themes, the first titled "Dirty Pool" written by the newspaper's general manager, Thomas W. Gerber, read:

> The activities of New Hampshire's Democratic machine politicians in the presidential primary campaign are little short of revolting.
>
> Their actions and statements are a disservice to their candidate, President Johnson, an insult to the state's Democratic voters and a violation of the democratic process.
>
> The three who are responsible are Gov. King, Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre and Bernard Boutin of Nashua, one time Small Business Administrator.
>
> Their activities hark back to the darkest days of American politics -- big city bossism and the era of the smear and the innuendo characterized by the late Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R. Wis.).
>
> The tragedy of these tactics is that they are invoked at a time when there is an aching need for the injection of ethics, responsibility and statesmanship in the operation of the American system.

The word "politics" still has a derogatory tone. Arm-twisting tactics, implied threats of retribution, and the dictatorial denial of the right to dissent only sour further the public's attitude toward the honorable pursuit of public service.

New Hampshire's Democratic bosses began their bulldozer operation in November.

On a snowy Sunday, they rammed through a meeting of the Democratic State Committee a resolution backing President Johnson in the primary campaign.

State committees of both political parties traditionally have refused to take sides in primary contests. This is because state committees are supposed to represent rank-and-file Democrats or Republicans who support a particular candidate.

Then came the numbered pledge card bit.

While we are confident the original intent was not to twist arms -- a "you support us or else" tactic -- that is just the way it came across.

In the public view, names of loyal Democrats could be associated with numbers, and thus checked upon. The distinct impression was that if you didn't sign, the bosses would get even.

But by far the most disgusting aspect of the Democratic campaign has been the statements of King and McIntyre against the President's opponent, Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy (D. Minn.).

What they say is that a vote for Sen. McCarthy is a vote for Ho Chi Minh, communist premier of North Vietnam.

This is a smear. It suggests that to disagree is treason.

We hope President Johnson can stay aloof, or even disassociate himself, from such irresponsibility. -- T.W.C.[17]

The second editorial written by the assistant editor, George W. Wilson, titled "Short Memories, Convenient Ethics," was especially pointed since it was aimed at the politically vulnerable Senator McIntyre and Governor King. Support from the Concord Monitor and the independent minded Concord voter, had been particularly important to both in their 1966 elections. Wilson wrote:

> Gov. King and Sen. McIntyre, as chairmen of the campaign to corral write-in votes for President Johnson, have stooped to reprehensible smears to discourage votes for Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy.
>
> In advertisements and public statements, the two have suggested it would be unpatriotic not to support President Johnson when the nation is at war, that a vote for McCarthy "will be greeted with great cheers in Hanoi."
>
> King and McIntyre suggest that the normal democratic process of criticizing U.S. policies should be suspended when the nation is at war.
>
> They say "the Communists in Vietnam are watching the New Hampshire Primary to see if we at home have the same determination as our soldiers in Vietnam."
>
> Writing in President Johnson's name is equated with "supporting our fighting men in Vietnam."
>
> With this nonsense, they invoke the flag and primitive enthusiasm to line Democrats up behind the President.
>
> Has it occurred to King and McIntyre that the very purpose of elections is to test the policies of the incumbent office-holder or administration? That Senator McCarthy's dissent and presence in New Hampshire is in the finest tradition of American government?
>
> If they disagree with McCarthy, let them discuss the weaknesses in his proposals. Let them emphasize the differences between the President's Vietnam policies and the Senator's views.

> Statements by King and McIntyre violate "good taste, fair campaign procedures and are a direct insult to voters of New Hampshire."
>
> They seem to feel that anyone who disagrees with them is un-American."
>
> Those sentiments, shared by King and McIntyre, were voiced in September 1966 by Hugh Bownes of Laconia, who now is a Superior Court Judge but then was a national committeeman for the N.H. Democratic Party.
>
> He made the comments in response to signs erected by retired Brig. Gen. Harrison Thyng that said: "Think American, Vote Thyng for U.S. Senate."
>
> Thyng's injured opponent? Senator Thomas J. McIntyre. -- G.W.W.18

Other New Hampshire newspapers echoed the themes stated by the Portsmouth Herald and the Concord Monitor. The Boston Globe joined the discussion with an editorial titled: "McCarthy on the new McCarthyism."

> The managers of the New Hampshire write-in campaign for President Johnson have placed ads in various newspapers, and Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy (D-Minn.) hopes they will boomerang just as some say the famous pledge cards have.
>
> "The Communists in Vietnam are watching the New Hampshire primary," a typical ad reads. "They're watching to see if we here at home have the same determination as our soldiers...in Vietnam. Don't vote for fuzzy thinking and surrender. Support our fighting men..."
>
> Sen. McCarthy charges that these are essentially the same tactics used by the late Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy who was, needless to say, no relation.
>
> And, whether or not one supports him or the administration's war policy, he has a point. It would be better to concede that the motives are good ones on both sides.

> The question of our involvement in the war has been raised in an entirely legal, democratic way and, should be decided in the voting booth on its and the candidates' merits, and not on the basis of name-calling or appeals to emotion.
>
> Almost all Americans support our boys in Vietnam, though they differ over the policy that sent them there. To charge an opponent with lack of patriotism, over an issue that has divided the country so deeply, can only do grave damage to the national interest.[19]

Senator McIntyre Criticizes the Johnson Campaign Tactics

The editorial barrage and the consequences of Governor King's attack began stirring the consciences of several prominent, liberal and fairminded supporters of President Johnson. The protest began to take shape when Sen. McIntyre arrived in New Hampshire to join in the final weekend push for the President Johnson write-in. Under a headline that read, "Wording of Some Ads Regretted by McIntyre," the Senator was quoted as saying he was "sorry about the way certain advertisements pushing for a large write-in...have been worded." The Valley News had editorialized against the Johnson campaign tactics in the same edition carrying McIntyre's interview. He stated that it had not been his intent to "question the patriotism of Senator McCarthy" adding "He sits right behind me in the Senate and I've never known a nicer, more gentlemanly man. And I'd never question his patriotism."[20]

Either before or shortly after his interview, McIntyre received notice that five candidates for delegates favorable to the nomination of President Johnson had signed a statement repudiating Governor King's remarks. Their advanced notice to McIntyre of their action gave him time to disassociate himself from King's charges.

Datelined Hanover, the statement hit the afternoon New Hampshire newspapers with great impact. The Concord Monitor headlined the news, "LBJ Delegates Repudiate King for Statements," and led the story:

> The hard sell Presidential primary pitch of Gov. King was repudiated last night by five Johnson delegates who said they could not claim the President "has cornerned the patriotism market."
>
> In a prepared statement signed by five delegates from Lebanon and Hanover, King's contention that a vote for Sen. Eugene McCarthy, D-Minn., would be a vote for "surrender" was rejected.[21]

The statement was signed by Mrs. Jean Hennessey, Hanover, former head of the Democratic State Platform Committee; Robert H. Guest, Hanover, a member of the Democratic State Executive Committee; Robert C. Elliot, Lebanon, former Democratic City Chairman; Herbert Hill, ex-state Democratic Party Chairman, and former history professor at Dartmouth; and Richard Sterling, a professor of government at Dartmouth. They noted their support for the President in his domestic programs, in foreign policy areas including the handling of the "Pueblo" incident, and his "continuing to seek valid negotiations in Vietnam." They concluded by saying:

> We make clear, however, that in our opinion, those who vote for Sen. McCarthy, will not be voting for "surrender" but for the second best candidate.
>
> In addition, we believe that all New Hampshire citizens who vote Tuesday in accord with their reason and conscience contribute importantly to the Democratic process.[22]

The Concord Monitor account of the statement went on to note that "the statement by the five delegates was mild compared to the private comments."

> "I think the governor has gone way overboard this time," said one highly disgruntled delegate, whose name was withheld.
>
> "Some of us were around when Nixon did this to Stevenson. And we don't like it...."

"it is all over, this feeling," said a spokesman.

"This is no Hanover syndrome. Everybody I know agrees that McCarthy is a good Democrat. Talking about withdrawal is a difference in judgment, not in patriotism."

"The governor is way over his head in foreign policy."

"I don't think the governor has recognized that he has gone too far," said one person.

"When it comes out in advertising from the Johnson committee it makes everybody look like they are supporting this view, and I don't think it is the view that they support."

"There was a lot of people who feel very uncomfortable about the position they have been put into by Gov. King." said a delegate.

"There are a lot of people voting for Johnson who feel very uncomfortable about the war and wish there was a way out of it."

"And they feel very uncomfortable about hurling names at McCarthy, there is no question about it."

The story concluded that "White House and officials at 'Citizens for Johnson' headquarters had no comment on the statement from the delegates."[23]

The controversy prompted additional editorials. The Boston Herald Traveler wrote under the heading, "McCarthy vs. McCarthyism?"

Sen. Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota may be overstating the case when he says that the managers of President Johnson's New Hampshire write-in campaign are using essentially the same tactics that were used by the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy back in the 1950's. But he has a right to complain.

Democratic Gov. John W. King has called Sen. McCarthy "an appeaser" and "a spokesman for the forces of surrender." Newspaper ads tell New Hampshire voters that "the Communists in Vietnam are watching the New Hampshire primary" and caution against a "vote for weakness and indecision." In a spot announcement on radio, William F. Craig, the Democratic State Chairman, advises voters: "Don't vote for fuzzy thinking and surrender."

> Political campaigns have strayed from issues into innuendo before. But the Minnesota senator's foes seem to have strayed especially far. One cannot help but recall the late Sen. Joe McCarthy's charge that Adlai E. Stevenson was "soft on communism."
>
> There is no certainty, of course, that President Johnson is responsible for such tactics. But there can be no doubt that the White House and the National Democratic Committee could put a stop to them if they so chose.[24]

The Portsmouth Herald took the opportunity to hammer away at Governor King again through an editorial titled, "Disgraceful Political Tactics." Noting that it is "customary to make allowance for a certain amount of devilry in politics," the editorial affirmed that within the bounds of usual political exchange it is acceptable to promote a candidate while attacking the record, issues, "flaws" and "shortcomings" of the opponent,

> But these Johnson-minded Democrats are not content to go by the usual rules. They turn their backs altogether on the real issues in the process of inventing trumped-up arguments deliberately calculated to trade upon fear and confusion.
>
> Until today we thought we had seen the worst of it when Sen. Tom McIntyre and his co-conspirator, Gov. John W. King, joined in placing a newspaper advertisement which presumed to show that a vote for President Johnson, because of his war policy, was proof of one's patriotism.
>
> Readers of the ad were led to believe that since the war in Vietnam was in the national interest, and since President Johnson was devoted to continuing the war, it naturally followed that voting for Johnson was also in the national interest.
>
> Further, the inference was made that failure to support the President was tantamount to "letting the boys down" in Vietnam.

> This, of course, was a vicious and cynical repudiation of the whole idea of fair play in politics, since it was born of utter flimflammery.
>
> That Sen. McIntyre would lend his name to such evil tactics was especially reprehensible since he has had so much experience defending himself against the same kind of chicanery.
>
> As for Gov. King, he seems oblivious to any restraints that decency would impose. And he remains so, for the governor struck again only today with a further statement designed to put the national loyalty of voters in question if they dare to make a political choice other than President Johnson.
>
> According to Gov. King, a "significant vote" for Sen. McCarthy in next week's primary would be "greeted with cheers in Hanoi." He said such an illomened event would be interpreted as "a sign that the American people are ready to quit."
>
> What gives Gov. King such strong feelings about this forthcoming political decision? Considering that he never was very active before in advancing the interests of the party which favored him with the governorship, the matter of his present passion arouses interest. There must be something in it for him if President Johnson's good name survives the primary.
>
> Could it be that he hopes by his efforts to clinch that federal judgeship in Concord which is supposed to be awaiting him? If so, it's a rotten bargain when the people of the state have to be deceived as part of the price.[25]

The combination of the editorial assault and the statement of repudiation by the five Hanover/Lebanon Johnson delegate candidates had a considerable impact upon Senator McIntyre. His statement of disagreement with Governor King dominated radio news broadcasts that Saturday afternoon.

The New Hampshire Sunday News printed a front page, in red ink headline, "McIntyre Slaps at King," with a black ink addition, "Rebukes 'Unfair' Attack on McCarthy." To McCarthy leaders and the reporters it now appeared that the long simmering disagreement within the Johnson camp as to how their campaign should be run had exploded to the surface. The McCarthy campaign sat back to watch the fight develop further.

Senator McIntyre was now in a most precarious position. To disagree with King and the approach which King, Boutin and Craig had taken in the campaign meant damaging President Johnson's chances in the election. At the same time many of McIntyre's most vigorous supporters, both Johnson and McCarthy supporters, objected to the tactics being employed. Further, McIntyre was faced with a certain retribution which comes from violating the gentlemanly ethos of the United States Senate. To lend his name to irresponsible attacks on a fellow senator or to engage in such activities could only damage his effectiveness in the Senate. McIntyre had tried to clear himself of this dilemma by standing on the side of decency and the preservation of the Democratic Party organization in New Hampshire. The New Hampshire Sunday News knew how best to damage his record, especially in Manchester where McIntyre had trailed King in both the elections of 1962 and 1966.

> Sen. Eugene McCarthy's campaign to wrest the presidential nomination from President Johnson got a startling boost this weekend from Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre of Laconia.
>
> For Gov. John W. King it appeared to be a deliberate slap in the face....

> In remarks Friday McIntyre defended McCarthy against a series of attacks by the governor -- whom he did not name -- in which Mr. King has been warning that votes for McCarthy will be greeted with cheers in Hanoi, the Communist capital of North Vietnam.
>
> King, in these attacks has been joined by a number of other Johnson leaders, notably State Democratic Chairman William Craig, who has sponsored a series of ads saying "the Communists in Vietnam are watching the New Hampshire primary."
>
> McIntyre called such warnings "unfair" and a grave injustice to the Minnesota senator.
>
> Less surprisingly yesterday, McIntyre was joined in defense of McCarthy by U.S. Sen. Robert F. Kennedy. He called the attacks "baseless" and said they would dangerously increase "the terrible strains and divisions" of U.S. political life.
>
> Like McCarthy, Kennedy is a bitter critic of administration war policy and an advocate of "de-escalation" in Vietnam. Some McCarthy critics have looked upon the Minnesota Senator as a "stalking horse" candidate, with Kennedy scheduled later to emerge as the major Democratic opponent of President Johnson for this year's nomination.
>
> McIntyre, however, has recently paraded himself as a "hawk" and strong backer of the Johnson war policy, although in his campaign last year against Gen. Harrison Thyng he took a pronouncedly "dovish" line against Thyng's proposals to deal bellicosely with the Communists....[26]

In addition to the first page "news" story which the New Hampshire Sunday News carried, the edition also contained two editorials. The first titled "McCarthyisms" led, "New Hampshire Democratic leaders, especially Gov. John W. King, are to be congratulated for getting out their shillelaghs last week to give the peacenik's candidate, Senator Eugene McCarthy, a vigorous belaboring." It went on to congratulate the Johnson leaders for "borrowing"

the editor's description of McCarthy as "The Hanoi Candidate." The editorial contended that the "howls of anguish from the McCarthy camp prove the effectiveness of this attack. We have even the delicious spectacle of a McCarthy lamenting that he's the victim of McCarthyism!"27

The second editorial attacked Senator McIntyre for his "boost" to Senator McCarthy's "flagging New Hampshire campaign." The title "Mac the Knife" cast McIntyre as stabbing the Johnson campaign in the back by criticizing King's characterizations of McCarthy. The editorial contended:

> We would be the last to suggest that McCarthy is less patriotic than McIntyre.
>
> The fact is nobody in New Hampshire -- certainly not Governor King or Mr. Craig -- has impugned McCarthy's loyalty.
>
> It is his judgment which is being questioned. Neville Chamberlain at Munich acted out of the highest regard for his country's welfare -- "peace in our time." But his tactics, like those of McCarthy, were those of appeasement and surrender.
>
> Hitler was overjoyed, just as will be Ho Chi Minh if McCarthy gets a good vote on Tuesday. Indeed the Communists must already be delighted at the boost given their cause by President Johnson's New Hampshire co-chairman!
>
> Bad blood between McIntyre and Gov. King long had been rumored. They are reported to be rivals for the federal judge-ship which LBJ will shortly bestow in this dis-district. This latest bit of back-stabbing by McIntyre will not close any rifts but it should greatly assist President Johnson in making up his mind on the judge-ship.28

McIntyre Recants

When Senator McCarthy returned to the Wayfarer after his campaign visits that Sunday afternoon, he accidently encountered Senator McIntyre arriving for a Johnson campaign sponsored event at the same motor inn. McCarthy thanked McIntyre for his moderation and courage in speaking out against the remarks of Governor King. McIntyre mumbled a response, appeared a bit stunned by the encounter, and hurried off to the reception. Those watching were puzzled by the exchange and especially by Senator McIntyre's reaction.[29] What they would soon learn was that McIntyre had just come from a meeting arranged by Bernard Boutin to get his co-chairman back on the track of the campaign.

From subsequent accounts of the meeting, Boutin, using the full force of his ties with the White House, insisted that Senator McIntyre clarify his earlier statements and re-affirm his full support for not only President Johnson but for the campaign and its leadership. McIntyre, who had been in Washington for most of the campaign and had not been involved in planning the Johnson write-in was obviously shocked by the direction the campaign had taken in his absence. What Boutin made clear to McIntyre, during that Sunday afternoon meeting, was that it was not only too late to change things but that unless McIntyre came fully on board the campaign he would suffer serious political damage in Washington and in his relationship with the White House. What this implied was that the White House was in support of the tactics which the Johnson managers had devised and that McIntyre was the odd man and might well be out if he did not return to the fold.

The next morning the Manchester Union Leader carried a story headlined, "McIntyre Drops Defense of McCarthy," with a sub-head, "Does Complete About-Face, Joins Gov. King."

> U.S. Sen. Tom McIntyre of Laconia, reportedly under heavy pressure from the regular Democratic establishment, last night abandoned his defense of Minnesota Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy against charges by Gov. John W. King that votes for McCarthy "will be greeted with cheers in Hanoi."

McIntyre's clarification press release read:

> Let me make it clear! Gov. King and I are united in our support of President Johnson. Gov. King said that Hanoi is watching the New Hampshire Primary. I say that is the truth. Gov. King said that a 'significant vote for Sen. McCarthy will be greeted with cheers in Hanoi.' I agree 100% -- that is unfortunately true. Gov. King says that McCarthy's charge that we are using foul techniques in this campaign 'is a smokescreen.' I agree with Gov. King.
>
> Gov. King and I have said repeatedly in this campaign that we support President Johnson's stand in Vietnam. We support our fighting men in Vietnam. We say, Gov. King and I, that the people of New Hampshire can best show their support of our troops in Vietnam by writing in the name of President Johnson on Tuesday. We ask that the people of New Hampshire join us.[30]

In response to what the Manchester Union Leader reported as "heavy pressure from the regular establishment here and in Washington," McIntyre not only issued the above statement, which was released at about the time McIntyre had his chance meeting with McCarthy, but had sealed his resolve by making a radio commercial tape. That tape would be aired during the time remaining before the election. It was McIntyre who would be the vehicle for the famous last minute charge of the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary.

In what seemed to many the ultimate irony, Richard Nixon, when speaking in Nashua "deplored" the attacks on McCarthy. "All of the candidates are patriotic Americans. All deserve a respectful hearing," Nixon declared. "There has been a tendency to let the campaign get down to personalities," and this he deplored.[31]

McIntyre's Recording: The Red Herring

A week had passed since Senator McCarthy had spoke before the student audience at Dartmouth College. Saturday morning, March 9th, as McCarthy was campaigning in Franklin, a radio station teletype carried a report of a charge coming from the Johnson campaign which referred to McCarthy's response to the question he had answered in Hanover concerning amnesty. The teletype report stated that McCarthy had promised blanket amnesty to all draft dodgers, resisters, and deserters of the Vietnam period. Hoeh, then traveling with McCarthy, called the Wayfarer press office to get them to monitor the release and also to review the tape of McCarthy's Hanover speech. To him this appeared to be the last minute charge that had been expected as the campaign neared its climax.

Later that afternoon the McCarthy press office issued a release which said that the remarks attributed to McCarthy had been taken out of context and that the correct reading was as transcribed from the tape of the Senator's speech. Since Saturday is a dead news day in New Hampshire the only motion either the Johnson charge or the McCarthy rebuttal received was over the radio.

The matter seemed to have gone the way of many charges during the campaign when it did not prominently appear in New Hampshire's only Sunday newspaper.

That evening David Hoeh received a tip from one of his contacts at a Manchester radio station that Senator McIntyre had recorded a political advertisement that was scheduled to run at a saturation rate Monday and Tuesday. The summary of the message was similar to that which had been picked up Saturday.

Hoeh relayed his information to Richard Goodwin and explained to Goodwin the potential impact of such a last minute accusation on the voter. To Hoeh the charge sounded much like one that had defeated John Sullivan many years before. It was a charge that could not be satisfactorily answered in the time that remained, and further McCarthy's answer as transcribed from the tape did lend at least a half-truth substantiation to the charge.

By the time Hoeh found out where the tape had been recorded it was after midnight. Goodwin said that it was imperative that either the tape be destroyed or that a copy of the exact text be secured. Sometime after 2:00 a.m., Hoeh awoke the station manager who agreed to let him hear the recording. Hoeh met the manager at about 2:30 a.m., and got an accurate transcription of the recording. The manager also showed him the booking schedule for the tape. The heaviest plays were for Manchester, Nashua and Berlin.

The substance of McIntyre's message was that McCarthy had promised blanket amnesty to all Vietnam draft dodgers and deserters. He contended that such an action would undermine the moral fiber of the nation. To vote for

McCarthy, McIntyre contended, would be to turn a back on the boys fighting in Vietnam and could do nothing more than please Hanoi. By implication, a vote for McCarthy would be tantamount to endorsing treason if not actually an act of treason.[32]

The McCarthy managers were stunned by the charge, the distortion of McCarthy's response, and by its potential impact during the last hours of the campaign. They concluded that the message would have a serious impact in Manchester and might also be damaging in Nashua and some of the Seacoast cities. Hoeh advised that the campaign take steps to stop the message from being aired. It seemed to him to be sufficiently inaccurate as to be libelous and the threat of such legal action might be enough to keep stations from accepting the message for transmission.

While Hoeh explored this option, Goodwin reacted differently. The likelihood of stopping the message seemed remote to him and perhaps the consequences of letting the message go would be more destructive to Johnson's candidacy nationally than blocking it in New Hampshire would be of help to McCarthy. As the sun rose on the last full day of the campaign, Monday, March 11th, Goodwin had worked out a strategy.

The McIntyre message contrasted two perspectives of the campaign, that of the New Hampshire leader and that of a person with national political campaign experience. Hoeh felt the message should be stopped in order to keep it from destroying the momentum for McCarthy. Hoeh felt that to let McIntyre's message play without a rebuttal, and no rebuttal was possible, would produce irreparable damage to McCarthy's New Hampshire vote.

Goodwin, on the other hand, saw in the charge the essence of Johnson's national campaign. If the tactics embodied in King's characterizations and McIntyre's last minute message succeeded, then the Johnson managers would reproduce the fear motive, the patriotism image and the characterization of dissent in each subsequent contest. To Goodwin the damage to McCarthy's New Hampshire vote would be insignificant compared to the outrage of the reporters, editors, columnists and television anchor men. To them, Goodwin concluded, the McIntyre charge would be seen as a severe threat to treasured traditions of free speech, free press and civil dissent. Johnson might survive the New Hampshire primary through this strategem but the image of a newly repressive political ethos would destroy his chances in other states, especially the next primary, Wisconsin. It was with this response in mind that McCarthy convened an early morning press conference.

With restrained outrage in tone, McCarthy gave the reporters transcripts of the McIntyre message, read it, then read the statement which had been prepared as his reaction. The message was clear and needed little explanation. What McIntyre represented in his statement was White House ordered and White House approved. This would be just the beginning of a campaign strategy that would be used across the nation unless it was immediately and convincingly shown for what it was. The reporters needed no further prompting. The proof was at hand of what they had felt during the past week. A national reaction against the Johnson campaign tactics and characterizations was growing. Regardless of whether McCarthy succeeded or failed in New Hampshire his service

had been to reveal the nature of the Johnson candidacy and the willingness of its managers to repress dissent, limit debate and cast aspersion on the motives of those questioning administration policies. A full blown image of a national politics shaped according to the model of the Texas unit rule caucus system and the unquestioning loyalty which Lyndon Johnson demanded was not clearly presented to the nation. This would be a difficult, if not impossible, image to shake. Richard Goodwin knew this image would be a consequence. He had the experience to draw this from what might have been simply another in a long history of the infamous last minute, "Red-herring" charges of a close New Hampshire campaign.

Predicting the Impact: What Will Be Significant?

The numbers game had been a favorite topic of the reporters throughout the campaign. Now in the final hours they each had to pick a number, a percentage, which each candidate would have to achieve in order for the results to be significant. For Lyndon Johnson the figure had to be above 50 per cent and to be a decisive victory at least 60 per cent would be necessary. For McCarthy the subheadline of a March 11th Herald Traveler story summed up the problem: "And the Experts Are Still Baffled."

Throughout the campaign the McCarthy leaders had refused to be trapped by the numbers questions of the reporters. McCarthy refused the bait himself, answering that he expected to "win" the New Hampshire primary but refused to define the word "win."

Evans and Novak in their column dated January 25, 1968, said "A McCarthy vote of more than 20 percent would be a surprise and a total of less would be a significant disaster."[33] A mail-in Manchester Union Leader poll, reported February 7th, had Senator McCarthy receiving 28 votes to Johnson's 388 and Robert Kennedy's 36. The Johnson campaign leaders began their campaign with the assumption that almost all true New Hampshire Democrats would be voting for the President, '90,000 Strong' was the theme. To concede even a few votes to McCarthy was upsetting.

By February 18th the New York Times reported: "Neither the New Hampshire Senator nor the Governor seemed unduly concerned...about the possibility of Mr. McCarthy's staging an upset -- the official party estimate is that the Minnesota Senator will be lucky to get 12 per cent of the vote."[34] Boutin commented in an interview February 26th:

> "If we're free of snow storms or sub zero weather, I would guess we'll get a vote of somewhere in the area of 50,000 to 55,000, and I think more than that is well conceivable."
>
> How many of those votes would be for President Johnson? "What we're looking for is a substantial majority. We're out to better the record of 1964 when the President got something in the order of 29,000 and I would hope we could rollup 60, 70 or more per cent."
>
> Does Boutin think a Johnson winning margin of two to one enough to have Johnson look good in New Hampshire? Boutin replied, "I wouldn't couch it in those terms. I say the President should do as well or better than he did in 1964 when he had everything going for him...no opposition...and he got around 29,000 votes.
>
> "Now, I'd say anything 25,000 and up is a very clear victory."[35]

Governor King predicted a Democratic vote of "42,000" with Senator McCarthy receiving "between 12,000 and 18,000 votes."[36] The Boston Globe reported the findings of a Time magazine poll of New Hampshire voting that gave "President Johnson 62 percent, Sen. McCarthy 11 percent, and Robert Kennedy 9 percent." A Newsweek article in the March 4th edition reported "What is disheartening to the insurgent forces is a survey conducted by a McCarthy-prone University of New Hampshire political science professor: it gave LBJ 49 percent of the vote, Sen. Robert Kennedy 21 percent and the Minnesota senator only 9 to 10 points."[38]

When Evans and Novak looked at the New Hampshire situation again just before the election they wrote, "So unpredictable is the size of the voter turnout and the number who will actually write in the President's name that scientific pollsters cannot guess the outcome. But contrary to early boasts by the Democratic regulars here that McCarthy would be held to 10 percent, his total is likely to exceed 25 percent and conceivably could climb to 40 percent -- enough to give him momentum for next month's Wisconsin primary."[39]

To add to the fun, the results of New Hampshire high school polls began to trickle into the newspapers. Remembering that former Democratic National Chairman, John Bailey, held much stock in such polls, the results were encouraging to the McCarthy leaders.

> ...In a mock primary election held yesterday at Concord High School, on the Democratic ballot, Sen. Eugene McCarthy, D-Minn., easily topped the list polling 184 votes while President Johnson, whose name did not appear on the ballot, received 37 write-in votes.
>
> A total of 542 students, 48 percent of the student body, turned out to take part in the mock election.[40]

This was an important indication of the impact that Senator McCarthy had made on the New Hampshire populace. Concord was an important city for him and contained an independent voting population. If his candidacy had been this attractive, the returns in like communities on election day would be encouraging.

With a headline, "McCarthy Drive Snowballs Through New Hampshire," the Boston Herald Traveler concluded, "If McCarthy pulls more than 25 or 30 percent of the vote he is a "winner."[41] Such concluding analyses began to frighten Bernard Boutin and he raised his expectations of what McCarthy would need in order to be termed a "significant" vote.

> Neither the Johnson people nor McCarthy is making any broad predictions. Bernard Boutin...said last week that if McCarthy does not get 40 percent of the vote his campaign will be a failure.
>
> But what will be interpreted as a dramatic win by most in New Hampshire is roughly 35 percent to 37 percent of the vote. With this McCarthy could capture all of the 24 delegate votes to the Democratic convention in Chicago in August."[42]

In this item was the first mention of delegates. Virtually everyone except this writer, Robert Healy, the Globe's Political Editor, had conceded the delegates to Johnson. This was certainly the case among the McCarthy leadership.

Boutin's struggle to escalate his prediction of the McCarthy percentage was reported by the New York Times.

> Two months ago leading New Hampshire Democrats gave Senator McCarthy less than 15 percent of the vote. Two weeks ago a top Johnson Administration strategist raised this to 30. With five days to go, the Johnson campaign director, Bernard Boutin, said it would be "a disgrace if McCarthy gets less than 40 per cent," based on his spending and campaigning.
>
> McCarthy backers said they would be well satisfied if the Minnesota Senator got 25 per cent of the vote.[43]

The New Hampshire Sunday News handicapper set the odds at: "Johnson, 6-5, 'pledged' to win; McCarthy, 3-1, slow starter, but closing ground."[44] James Reston wrote: "If McCarthy gets 25 or 30 per cent of the vote against a President of his own party in that election, the President's victory will not be a triumph but a warning." And in the same issue the Times reported that "49 percent, believe the United States was wrong to have become involved militarily in Vietnam, according to the latest Gallup Poll."[45]

During the final week an advance staff for the NBC coverage of the election had been preparing a background book on the 1968 New Hampshire primary for David Brinkley and Chet Huntley. Part of that assignment was to determine the percentages above which a "significant" result could be ascertained. Into the mysterious "black box" that was used to produce their calculation were numerous interviews, some spot polling, the wisdom of pundits such as Richard Scammon, former Director of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and the expectations of the candidates' managers. The McCarthy managers set 25 per cent as their figure hoping the network would not set its mark much above 30 per cent. Boutin scrammbled to get the networks to accept his threshold for McCarthy as being 40 percent. Late Monday afternoon, March 11th, NBC's conclusion was set

and rumored about the halls of the Wayfarer. Anything above 35 percent for McCarthy was determined by the network as being "significant." Given what the canvassing results had shown, the McCarthy managers protested like Cheshire cats. NBC had placed the figure a bit higher than they had wanted but not unreasonably so. For Johnson, the NBC threshold was 50 percent. No delegate count prediction was included nor a projection of a vote total in the Democratic primary. Now that NBC had come to its conclusion, the election could be held.

New Hampshire Votes

Curtis Gans had learned from the reporters that Waterville Valley would be the first community voting in the presidential primary. As has become a New Hampshire tradition, he arranged a special mailing for those on the Waterville Valley voting list. He suspected that the result would be favorable for McCarthy from what he had learned from those campaigning in northern Grafton County.

Soon after midnight, March 12th, the first returns trickled back to Manchester: for Richard Nixon all eight Republican votes. On the Democratic Party side: eight votes for McCarthy, 2 write-in votes for Robert Kennedy, and not a single vote for Lyndon B. Johnson. With that omen, most campaign workers and reporters straggled off to sleep.

Two activities occupied the McCarthy workers election day. The first was to get out the McCarthy vote. The second was to get ready to tabulate that vote once the polls had closed. At the state headquarters in Concord and the campaign headquarters in Manchester at the Wayfarer, tally sheets, name cards and tote boards were carefully lettered and arranged for those who would later come to watch the returns. Someone had had credential stickers printed that would be distributed to the campaign workers to insure that they would be allowed into the rooms where the excitement would be the greatest. How these would be distributed no one had quite figured out, but each of the principals involved in the campaign were given a pack to hand out to those they recognized when the crowd would arrive that evening.

NBC had reserved the convention hall of the Wayfarer and had been spending the week building sets, erecting computerized tally boards, having installed numerous telephone lines, teletypes, and setting up tally tables with adding machines to aggregate the vote. David Brinkley and Chet Huntley had arrived a day or so before and their evening news broadcast had originated from the Wayfarer studio the previous evening.

CBS, once again interested in the New Hampshire result, had set up a mini-studio in a downtown Manchester hotel where Walter Cronkite would report, "That's the way it is." ABC relied on the primitive facilities of their Manchester affiliate, Channel 9, as their base. Volunteers from the New Hampshire League of Women Voters and university students had been organized to collect the vote at each polling place and report to the wire service pool which then

relayed the tallies to their network, newspaper and radio station subscribers. NBC had commissioned Richard Scammon and Oliver Quayle to select sample precincts for early analysis and projection purposes. These results could be gathered and reported separately. Since with only a few exceptions, New Hampshire voted by paper ballot, the results would take some time to tally. Also, since there were a number of local issues to be voted upon at the town meetings, and town meeting polls do not usually close until the warrant for the meeting has been completed, some towns would not have their presidential vote tallies completed until late in the evening. With all of the local issues, presidential candidates and write-in candidates on both the Democratic and Republican ballots, and numerous candidates for delegates and alternative delegates to the national conventions, completing a vote tally for even the small towns was a demanding and time consuming task. The ballot that faced each voter was the size of a newspaper page.

McCarthy spend the day with friends, chatting with reporters, being photographed watching volunteers preparing placards, posters and trimmings for the evening. He was relaxed, seemed confident that the returns would be favorable, and visibly enjoyed witnessing the final burst of energy that was concluding the campaign. The same thoroughness that had become the trademark of the campaign carried through the preparations for the evening. An image of what had been accomplished in New Hampshire would be projected from the McCarthy headquarters across the nation and even the world that evening. That image had to summarize and exemplify what had been accomplished in New

Hampshire and what the New Hampshire vote should signify in terms of the McCarthy candidacy and the McCarthy position on the issues. What had become an exceptionally exciting political event for the reporters, the volunteers, the professionals and an important part of the New Hampshire electorate now had to be encapsulated for transmission outside New Hampshire. To do this the McCarthy campaign rented the largest meeting room left in the city, an expandable banquet room at the Wayfarer, set up a stage, decorated the stage with tally boards, and a large McCarthy for President banner. The television networks set up their cameras, special telephones and tables were set aside for the reporters, radio connections, and tape recording equipment was installed. With all the electronic equipment, the stage, backdrop, and other paraphenalia, even a few people standing in the remaining space would like like a monstrous crowd.

Each local McCarthy committee and headquarters kept close track of the voting. In the afternoon they began calling those names on the canvassing cards that were identified as number "1" and "2" favorable to or leaning to Senator McCarthy. If time and volunteer power allowed, the "3" were also called in hopes that the last minute Johnson campaign charges and steady McCarthy response might have motivated them toward voting for McCarthy.

To make getting to the polls more convenient for the voters, rides and babysitting were offered. Radio and newspaper ads carried headquarters telephone numbers for voting help. As the final jog to the voter, an advertisement with a message that was also repeated on the radio appeared in the newspapers:

How will you feel Tomorrow Morning?

Just stop and think for a minute. How would you feel if you woke up tomorrow to find that Eugene McCarthy had won the Democratic primary? Wouldn't you feel that suddenly there was new hope for America -- that perhaps we might break out of the dreary circle of rising discontent and continuing stagnation? Wouldn't you be proud that New Hampshire had changed the entire political picture of the nation -- and restored vitality to the democratic process? And, wouldn't you be pleased that the independence of New Hampshire voters had enabled a lone man of conviction to triumph over huge odds and all the prophets? You can make Wednesday that kind of morning...by voting for Eugene McCarthy.

McCarthy for President.[46]

With almost no information about what was happening during the day, except turnout figures from some of the cities' ballot box totals, McCarthy workers busied themselves throughout the day. In spite of the cold, snowy weather, the turnout of voters selecting the Democratic ballot appeared to be ahead of the projected 50,000 to 55,000 total. Spot checks of voters by NBC at selected polling places and reports from McCarthy workers suggested that the McCarthy vote was holding about as had been projected from the canvassing results.

The city polling places closed at 8:00 p.m. Partsmouth, voting by machine, reported first.

Ward[47]	McCarthy	Johnson
1	157	44
2	122	68
3	115	38
4	119	48
5	43	46
6	43	24
	599	268

The Port City, location of two important military installations, had voted more than two to one for McCarthy. The excitement produced by this first serious return rippled through the Wayfarer. As the returns filtered in it soon became clear that McCarthy was solidly above forty percent and had a good chance of electing a majority of the delegates.

In the excitement of the returns, two other surprises emerged. Those arriving from the polling places reported something that had not been assimilated by the networks. McCarthy had received a significant write-in vote on the ballots of Republican voters, especially in communities like Concord, Peterborough, Hanover and others with disaffected Romney supporters and liberals disguised as Republicans. This information led the McCarthy leaders to immediately call for a careful tabulation of all of these votes.

The second surprise came when the results were called in from Berlin.

Ward[48]	McCarthy	Johnson
1	404	429
2	401	361
3	358	294
4	473	440
	1,636	1,524

McCarthy had carried Berlin!

At about 10:30 p.m., McCarthy slipped out of his cottage to drive into Manchester for an interview with Walter Cronkite. McCarthy enjoyed Cronkite's manner and the fact that he had come to New Hampshire during the past weekend to see what was happening himself. McCarthy was also amazed that NBC would go to such elaborate lengths to cover the voting but not really cover the campaign.

As a personal tweak at NBC's extravagance, he let CBS and Cronkite have the first interview. He returned to the cottage in time to be summoned for a live interview with David Brinkley and Chet Huntley on the 11:00 p.m. news. With Blair Clark, Hoeh, Studds and several others, he plowed a path through the snow from his cottage to the rear of the Convention Center, arriving minutes before the live broadcast was to begin.

Introducing McCarthy, David Brinkley said that McCarthy had scored a stunning upset not only in the preferential vote but by the election of delegates as well. McCarthy summarized his own reaction to the results and the meaning which he felt it conveyed. To Brinkley's question as to whether he had talked to Robert Kennedy, he said that he "had talked with Robert Lowell," which McCarthy felt was at least as important that evening as having received a congratulatory telephone call from Senator Robert Kennedy.

As the concluding rite of the campaign, McCarthy then strode across the covered bridge into the Bedford room where his supporters, workers and the curious, waited for their hero. Amidst cheers that erupted with the slightest provocation, McCarthy thanked all for their help, urged them to continue, and expressed the possibility that what had started in New Hampshire now would go all the way to the Chicago Convention and, perhaps, even beyond. In the few hours of that evening, McCarthy had become a serious presidential contender and everyone in the room sensed the importance of the change.

Notes

[1]The Lebanon Valley News (March 4, 1968).

[2]McCarthy, E., Op.Cit., America is Hard to See, p. 289.

[3]The Lebanon Valley News (March 4, 1968).

[4]McCarthy Campaign, Election Day Instruction (file copy).

[5]The New York Times (May 26, 1968).

[6]McCarthy Campaign, Letter to the Democratic State Committee authored by David C. Hoeh (file copy).

[7]Union Leader (February 22, 1968).

[8]The New York Post (February 22, 1968).

[9]New Hampshire Manual for the General Court 1935, (Concord: Secretary of State, 1935), p. 195.

[10]The Portsmouth Herald (March 6, 1968).

[11]Union Leader (March 8, 1968).

[12]The Lebanon Valley News (March 5, 1968).

[13]Ibid.

[14]The Boston Herald Traveler (March 7, 1968).

[15]The Lebanon Valley News (March 7, 1968).

[16]The Portsmouth Herald (March 8, 1968).

[17]The Concord Daily Monitor (March 8, 1968).

[18]Ibid.

[19]The Boston Evening Globe (March 8, 1968).

[20]The Lebanon Valley News (March 9, 1968).

[21]The Concord Daily Monitor (March 9, 1968).

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid.

[24]The Boston Herald Traveler (March 9, 1968).

[25]The Portsmouth Herald (March 9, 1968).

[26]The New Hampshire Sunday News (March 10, 1968).

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid.

[29]David C. Hoeh recollection.

[30]Union Leader (March 11, 1968).

[31]The Boston Herald Traveler (March 11, 1968).

[32]McCarthy Campaign, Transcript of the Tape Recording, (David C. Hoeh file copy).

[33]Union Leader (February 7, 1968).

[34]The New York Times (February 18, 1968).

[35]Foster's Daily Democrat (February 26, 1968).

[36]Union Leader (February 28, 1968).

[37]The Boston Globe (March 4, 1968).

[38]Newsweek (March 4, 1968), p. 22.

[39]The Boston Globe (March 7, 1968).

[40]The Concord Daily Monitor (March 8, 1968).

[41]The Boston Herald Traveler (March 10, 1968).

[42]The Boston Globe (March 10, 1968).

[43]The New York Times (March 10, 1968).

[44]The New Hampshire Sunday News (March 10, 1968).

[45]The New York Times (March 10, 1968).

[46]Union Leader (March 12, 1968).

[47]New Hampshire Manual for the General Court 1969. (Concord: The Secretary of State, 1969), p. 464.

[48]Ibid., p. 452.

CHAPTER XIV

THE VOTE, THE RESULT, AND THE IMPACT

Introduction: What Produces the Impact of a New Hampshire Primary?

Observers assess the results of the New Hampshire presidential primary from two immediately available returns. The first, and most important, is the return from the presidential preference portion of the ballot -- the "beauty contest." In this return there are two aspects which draw attention. The first is the percentage of the total vote, and the second is the actual number of votes each candidate receives.

For these returns the analysts have calculated a significance projection for each of the principal candidates. In 1968 the NBC projections (35 percent for McCarthy and 60 percent for Johnson) were the accepted significance points in the Democratic primary. For either candidate to reach or exceed the significant percentage would mean victory. Beyond the 60 percent for Johnson figure was another agreed upon threshold, that of a normal "win-lose" election, 50 percent. If President Johnson received less than 50 percent of the Democratic vote then it would mark a political disaster for him, at least as elections are interpreted by reporters.

Presidential primary voter turnout helped to determine the appeal of a candidate or of a particular contest. If the total vote was less than that recorded in previous contests then it could be concluded that interest was low and the respective candidate appeal was low; therefore, the significance of the contest was less.

The second significant return examined by election observers is the result of the delegate selection portion of the ballot. Although the New Hampshire delegation to a national convention is minute, the fact that voters would translate their support for a candidate in the preference portion of the ballot, to support convention delegate candidates is a further indication of candidate appeal.

On both accounts (percent of the preference vote and delegate selection) McCarthy scored impressively. As for turnout, the number of votes cast in the preference primary exceeded that of the previous high vote in John F. Kennedy's 1960 presidential primary. For that election a significant turnout for Kennedy had been predicted by Governor Wesley Powell as having to be above 20,000 votes. The total turnout of Democratic voters was 53,652 with 50,899 casting ballots for candidates, a return far in excess of the threshold of appeal that Governor Powell had projected as of significance. Participation in both party primaries in 1960 was 41.5 percent of the total voter registration.

The significance figure for the 1968 election was set at the 40,000 total vote figure which John F. Kennedy had received in the 1960 presidential primary. (Kennedy's vote total was 43,372.).[1] This was the figure both Boutin and McIntyre used as their reference point in predicting primary returns and turn out significance. The total Democratic vote cast for candidates was 55,464 of a total Democratic vote cast of 60,519. The percentage of the total vote cast in both primaries was 46.4 percent although the total number of registered

voters had increased by 9.0 percent from 1960 to 1968. Hoeh had predicted that the intra-party contest would produce approximately 10,000 new Democratic party registrations as the result of new voters and Independent voters selecting the Democratic primary ballot in the election. He had contended that regardless of the outcome of the primary and the fact that the number of registered Democrats in New Hampshire would increase importantly, the primary would be a success for the Democratic Party. When the next tabulation of Democratic Party registrations was made shortly after the March 12th result, the New Hampshire Democratic Party exceeded 100,000 registrations for the first time in its history. Instead of the "90,000 strong" which had been the Johnson campaign's campaign cry in support of the President there were now 10,000 more persons identified as Democrats. The Republican Party, dominant by approximately 60 percent to 40 percent, declined. Both the issues and the contest had attracted increased participation generally and specifically increased participation within the Democratic Party.

TABLE 14.01: Votes Cast, Presidential Primary 1960 and 1968[2]

A. Democratic Vote

Year	Vote cast for Candidates	Democratic Vote	Principal Candidate Vote
1960	50,899	53,652	43,372
1968	55,464	60,519	50,783

B. Voter Turnout

Year	Total Names on Checklist	Total Votes Cast	Percent Votes Cast
1960	325,885	135,216	41.5%
1968	368,503	168,762	46.4%

While the candidates of one party often receive a scattering of write-in votes on the ballot of the other party, the 1968 presidential primary produced a significant Democratic vote on the Republican Party ballot. A total of 7.4 percent of the Republican votes were cast for Democratic candidates with Eugene McCarthy receiving 5.3 percent of that total. On the Democratic ballot 5.1 percent of the vote cast was for Republican candidates with Richard Nixon receiving 4.6 percent (See Table 14.02)

Presidential Preference Vote Analysis

As the principal objective of the campaign the result of the preference portion of the ballot was of the greatest significance in the evaluation of the McCarthy campaign strategy. The totals were what counted on election evening and the next day. The totals caused the impact and the media's evaluation of those totals created the impact. As Table 14.02 shows, Lyndon Johnson failed to achieve even the 50 percent mark. Senator McCarthy's showing of 42.0 percent exceeded the significance projection of 35 percent by 7 points, an accomplishment that gave the election its startling interpretation. When the full returns were available March 13th, the Republican write-in totals for both Johnson and McCarthy added further impact. When the Republican write-in vote was added to the Democratic vote totals, Johnson received 46.7 percent of the total to 45.9 percent for McCarthy, a vote difference of 524 between the two principal Democratic candidates.

TABLE 14.02: Official Results, New Hampshire Presidential Primary, March 12, 1968, By Candidates[3]

Democratic Primary

Lyndon Johnson	27,520 (49.6%)
Eugene McCarthy*	23,263 (42.0%)
Richard Nixon	2,532 (4.6%)
Robert Kennedy	606 (1.2%)
Paul Fisher	506 (0.9%)
Nelson Rockefeller	249 (0.5%)
George Wallace	201 (0.4%)
John Crommelin*	186 (0.3%)
Richard Lee*	170 (0.3%)
Jacob Gordon*	77 (0.1%)
Scattering	154
	55,464 (100.0%)

Republican Primary

Lyndon Johnson	1,778 (1.7%)
Eugene McCarthy	5,511 (5.3%)
Richard Nixon*	80,666 (77.6%)
Robert Kennedy	None
Paul Fisher	374 (0.4%)
Nelson Rockefeller	11,241 (10.8%)
George Wallace	None
George Romney*	1,743 (1.7%)
Willis Stone*	527 (0.5%)
Harold Stassen*	429 (0.4%)
Ronald Reagan	362 (0.3%)
Herbert Hoover*	247 (0.2%)
David Watumull*	161 (0.2%)
William Evans*	151 (0.2%)
Elmer Coy*	73 (0.1%)
Don Dumont*	39 (0.04%)
Scattering	636
	103,938 (100.0%)

* Indicates that name appeared on ballot.

It is not clear exactly where the Republican vote for the Democartic candidates came from except as a product of particular campaign events and suggestions. The principal event was the withdrawal of Romney as an active candidate. Some Republican voters may have intended to vote for Romney as an anti-war gesture but shifted their vote to McCarthy as the only active candidate opposing U.S. Vietnam policy.

Write-in voting suggestions were widely circulated in the campaign. The principal suggestion, of course, was that promoted by the Johnson campaign on behalf of their candidate. A secondary suggestion came from Republicans working for McCarthy who urged Republicans to write McCarthy's name in on their ballot. A third suggestion came from the editors of the Manchester Union Leader to dissatisfied Democrats urging them to write Richard Nixon's name in on their Democratic ballots. The background for each of these suggestions had been the success of the Henry Cabot Lodge write-in effort in the 1964 presidential primary. A potential surprise write-in for Robert Kennedy did not occur on either ballot. Active Kennedy support had been completely incorporated within the McCarthy campaign.

Noting Table 14.03, 1968 Republican Vote for McCarthy and Johnson, the county returns show some relationship between effective McCarthy organization, the activity of Republicans for McCarthy, and the county McCarthy vote as a Republican write-in. With rare exception, where McCarthy did well as a Democrat he also did well on the Republican ballot. The McCarthy campaign was well organized in those counties where McCarthy drew more than 80 percent of the

TABLE 14.03: 1968 Republican Vote for McCarthy and Johnson, by County.[4]

County	% Johnson	% McCarthy	LBJ/McCarthy % of Total Co. Rep. Vote
Belknap	17.0% (65)	83.0% (318)	6.2% (6143)
Carroll	25.4% (53)	74.6% (156)	3.9% (5329)
Cheshire	21.0% (109)	79.0% (409)	7.0% (7430)
Coos	41.0% (166)	59.0% (238)	7.8% (5173)
Grafton	19.9% (129)	80.1% (521)	6.8% (9601)
Hillsborough	28.1 (466)	71.9 (1192)	6.5% (25434)
Merrimack	19.8 (223)	80.1 (899)	7.8% (14355)
Rockingham	24.4 (347)	75.6 (1078)	6.2% (22994)
Strafford	16.9 (88)	83.1 (436)	7.1% (7350)
Sullivan	33.3 (132)	66.7 (264)	8.9% (4464)
	24.4	75.6	6.7%
	(1778)	(5511)	(108,273)

combined Republican write-in vote for McCarthy/Johnson. The impact of the heavy McCarthy vote in the university/college towns of Durham and Hanover is reflected in the totals for Strafford and Grafton Counties. The strong McCarthy organization centered in Concord influenced the total for Merrimack County as did the organization in Laconia upon the Belknap County result. In each instance where the McCarthy campaign was strong the Republican write-in percentage increased. Only in Coos County did this increase not significantly benefit McCarthy.

Of those communities that had been targeted for special attention by the McCarthy campaign and those McCarthy subsequently carried, only in two did Johnson get more Republican write-in votes than McCarthy and was even with McCarthy in three others. (See Table 14.04) The McCarthy percentage of the Republican vote seems to increase with the size of the McCarthy percentage of the Democratic vote. This is indicative of the legitimizing effect of strong Democratic support for McCarthy among those liberals within the Republican Party. While there does not exist a specific study of the McCarthy Republican write-in vote, the fact that the vote tends to be strongest in communities producing significant Democratic results for McCarthy leads to the conclusion that the vote represents that same voting inclination as the Democratic McCarthy vote. It is also possible to conclude that there was little calculated anti-Johnson voting for the sake of harming Johnson as a potential opponent for the Republican nominee. No institutional or editorial source advised voting for McCarthy to hurt Johnson's political future as a Republican opponent. Voting advice when given was straightforward, either based on issue positions or direct candidate preference. While it is possible

combined Republican write-in vote for McCarthy/Johnson. The impact of the heavy McCarthy vote in the university/college towns of Durham and Hanover is reflected in the totals for Strafford and Grafton Counties. The strong McCarthy organization centered in Concord influenced the total for Merrimack County as did the organization in Laconia upon the Belknap County result. In each instance where the McCarthy campaign was strong the Republican write-in percentage increased. Only in Coos County did this increase not significantly benefit McCarthy.

Of those communities that had been targeted for special attention by the McCarthy campaign and those McCarthy subsequently carried, only in two did Johnson get more Republican write-in votes than McCarthy and was even with McCarthy in three others. (See Table 14.04) The McCarthy percentage of the Republican vote seems to increase with the size of the McCarthy percentage of the Democratic vote. This is indicative of the legitimizing effect of strong Democratic support for McCarthy among those liberals within the Republican Party. While there does not exist a specific study of the McCarthy Republican write-in vote, the fact that the vote tends to be strongest in communities producing significant Democratic results for McCarthy leads to the conclusion that the vote represents that same voting inclination as the Democratic McCarthy vote. It is also possible to conclude that there was little calculated anti-Johnson voting for the sake of harming Johnson as a potential opponent for the Republican nominee. No institutional or editorial source advised voting for McCarthy to hurt Johnson's political future as a Republican opponent. Voting advice when given was straightforward, either based on issue positions or direct candidate preference. While it is possible

TABLE 14.04: REPUBLICAN VOTE FOR McCARTHY/JOHNSON in McCARTHY COMMUNITIES[5]

Community	% Mc * Dem. Vote	Total Rep. Vote	REPUBLICAN % Mc	REPUBLICAN % LBJ
Berlin	51.7%	100.0% (1649)	8.9 (146)	7.8 (129)
Rochester	51.0	100.0% (1608)	4.3% (69)	0.8 (13)
Concord	53.9	100.0% (5502)	10.% (539)	2.5% (139)
Portsmouth	69.1	100.0% (1759)	12.5% (219)	5.2% (91)
Salem	56.5	100.0% (2430)	3.1% (75)	1.6% (39)
1st C.D.				
Pelham	57.9	100.0% (597)	2.2% (13)	1.2% (7)
Hampton	57.9	100.0% (1419)	8.0% (114)	+ (1)
Plaiston	60.3	100.0% (707)	5.1% (36)	0.2% (2)
Exeter	57.5	100.0% (2210)	10.5% (232)	5.5% (122)
Seabrook	63.0	100.0% (666)	1.8% (12)	0.3% (2)
Farmington	56.5	100.0% (614)	2.3% (14)	0.8% (5)
Meredith	100.0	100.0% (595)	5.6% (33)	0 (0)
Durham	84.6	100.0% (961)	14.3% (137)	0.4 (4)
Milton	55.4	100.0% (316)	1.9% (6)	1.9% (6)

* Communities where McCarthy received 50% or more

\+ Less than o.1%

TABLE 14.04 (Cont.)

Community	% Mc Dem. Vote	REPUBLICAN Total Rep. Vote	% Mc.	% LBJ
2nd C.D.				
Gornam	51.3%	100.0% (411)	1.0% (4)	2.4% (10)
Greenville	61.5	100.0% (148)	4.1% (6)	0.09% (0)
Hanover	85.0	100.0% (1062)	21.6% (229)	0.9% (10)
Lincoln	51.7	100.0% (157)	1.9% (3)	1.9% (3)
Milton	55.8	100.0% (427)	4.9% (21)	1.6% (7)
Peterborough	57.7	100.0% (1046)	9.6% (100)	1.2% (12)
New Ipswich	60.0	100.0% (267)	8.6% (23)	1.9% (5)
Lancaster	59.9	100.0% (628)	7.6% (48)	0.09% (0)
Ashland	58.8	100.0% (306)	1.0% (3)	2.6% (8)
Troy	51.7	100.0% (160)	4.2% (7)	0.6% (1)
Hinsdale	60.0	100.0% (305)	2.3% (7)	0.0% (0)
Andover	53.6	100.0% (249)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)
Hillsborough	63.8	100.0% (561)	1.1% (6)	0.9% (5)

Source: N.H. Manual of Gen. Court 1969 pp. 325-363

that some voters wrote-in McCarthy's name on their Republican ballot to harm Johnson's political future there is no evidence of a drive to encourage Republicans to write-in Johnson's name on their ballot as a means of diminishing his chances against a Republican nominee.

The 1968 presidential primary was the first election of this sort where votes cast by use of another party ballot were calculated in the election assessment. Previously such votes had been insignificant. John F. Kennedy attracted 2196 votes via the Republican ballot in 1960 and Lyndon Johnson drew an unrecorded scattering of write-votes in the 1964 presidential primary. The New Hampshire McCarthy leaders had anticipated that some Republicans might wish to participate in the Democratic contest to express their concern about the situation in Vietnam. While they had avoided actively soliciting Republican votes until after Governor George Romney withdrew, their anticipation of a Republican contribution to the final McCarthy vote was important to the success of the McCarthy campaign. If McCarthy had announced his New Hampshire candidacy before the end of the primary voter registration period, a number of those who ultimately voted for McCarthy on the Republican ballot might have re-registered as Democrats. Not having re-registered, their only voting option was the Republican ballot.

Preference Results by County

Johnson and McCarthy split the ten New Hampshire counties each carrying five. Of the five that Johnson carried, two, Hillsborough and Sullivan, were carried by more than 50 percent of the vote -- 56.8 and 54.7 percent respectively. McCarthy carried Grafton and Rockingham Counties by more than 50 percent

-- 54.7 and 50.3 percent respectively. (See Table 14.05) In no instance did Johnson carry a county by the 60 percent that had been set as his significance point by NBC prior to the election. McCarthy failed to reach 35 percent target in only one county, Hillsborough, and there missed by 0.9 percent.

With 48.7 percent of the total Democratic vote cast by Hillsborough County, the dominance of that county in the election is shown. Of the total vote cast for candidates, Hillsborough accounted for 40.6 percent of the total and 46.4 percent of the total vote received by President Johnson statewide. As will be shown later, Manchester dominates Hillsborough County Democratic Party voting as does the county in statewide Democratic contests.

McCarthy carried the next most populous county, Rockingham, which sprawls east from Hillsborough County along the Massachusetts border to the seacoast city of Portsmouth. Rockingham County's rapid growth communities, outside the sphere of Manchester and politically tied to Massachusetts, supported McCarthy significantly. Along with Rockingham the surprise counties for McCarthy were Coos, New Hampshire's most northerly county, and Strafford, a county containing three traditionally Democratic cities adjacent to the Maine border.

Other than the two counties which produced exceptional results for McCarthy, the results were relatively uniform, demonstrating the particular dynamics of the Democratic party in each. Other counties that McCarthy carried, or nearly carried, were ones with smaller populations of Democrats or counties not dominated by a single large urban center. Johnson's support came from the city dominated counties such as Hillsborough, Sullivan, and found strength in Merrimack by carrying the populous near Manchester Democratic towns of Pembroke and

Table 14.05: 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary Results, by County

County	% Johnson	% LBJ Total	% McCarthy	% McCarthy Total	% County Total	PARTICIPATION % Total Rep. & Dem. Participation	% Dem of Total
Belknap +	47.0 (949)	3.5	42.5 (858	3.6	3.6 (2020)	46.1	27.1 (2279)
Carroll	44.0 (292)	1.1	+ 45.7 (303)	1.2	1.2 (663)	52.2	12.6 (766)
Cheshire +	45.9 (1220)	4.4	45.5 (1210)	5.1	4.8 (2657)	41.3	27.9 (2868)
Coos	45.6 (2231)	8.1	+48.5 (2373)	10.1	8.9 (4889)	52.4	52.4 (5697)
Grafton	36.5 (1093)	4.0	+54.7 (1639)	7.0	5.4 (2998)	47.0	25.9 (3355)
Hillsborough +	56.8 (12,791)	46.4	34.1 (7684)	34.0	40.6 (22,535)	47.0	48.7 (24,105)
Merrimack +	48.0 (2503)	9.1	43.0 (2242)	9.5	9.4 (5214)	47.6	28.3 (5667)
Rockingham	41.0 (3155)	11.5	+50.3 (3866)	16.5	13.9 (7692)	51.7	27.0 (8501)
Strafford	45.4 (2076)	7.5	+48.9 (2235)	9.5	8.3 (4574)	34.2	39.8 (4865)
Sullivan +	54.7 (1210	4.4	38.9 (859)	3.5	4.0 (2211)	43.2	35.1 (2416)
Totals	49.6% (27,520)	100.0%	42.0% (23,269)	100.0%	100.0% (55,454)	46.4 (168,792)	35.9 (60,519)

+ WINNER

Allenstown. Failure to carry Berlin and Coos County, Portsmouth and Rockingham County, and to dominate in the Strafford County cities was damaging to the predicted totals for Johnson.

Participation in the election as calculated in Table 14.05 is based upon total vote cast (Republican and Democrat) as a percentage of the total checklist of registered voters. Total figures for registered Democrats and registered Republicans are not available. The only way to reach a semblance of a participation index is to use the total vote cast as a function of the total voter registration. To a degree, participation can be shown to be a function of community governmental form. Those units of local government organized as towns held town meetings that coincided with the date of the presidential primary. Town issues are likely to boost election participation in the presidential primary; whereas few if any issues or electoral contests are offered to the city voters. As examples of this effect, Strafford County, with three cities, Sullivan County with one city and a few small towns, trailed in participation with 34.2 and 43.2 percent participation. Cheshire County with 41.3 percent participation reflects the importance of the city of Keene, and the fact that rural Cheshire County is a popular retirement area. March is a good time not to be in New Hampshire and many retirees travel then. Absentee voting was not permitted in the 1968 presidential primary.

Town meeting issues boosted the participation in Carroll, Coos and Rockingham counties especially, and kept it above 45 percent elsewhere.

Participation of Democrats as a percentage of the total vote cast reveals the relationship between Democrats and Republicans in the counties. Of the ten counties only Coos produced more Democratic votes than were produced for the Republican party with Hillsborough's 48.7 percent close to the 50 percent mark. Strafford County with 39.8 percent and Sullivan with 35.1 percent Democratic vote of the total vote cast are next in line. The remaining six counties are dominated by Republican voters with Carroll County the most Republican County in New Hampshire. The relationship between percent Democratic participation to percent Republican participation will be explored later as a means of probing the origin of some of Senator McCarthy's support.

McCarthy Strategy and Vote Production

Hoeh and Studds prepared two vote targeting/campaign resource allocating memoranda. The first of these was sent to McCarthy prior to his announcement and allocated his campaign time to concentrations of Democratic voters. This, the December 22, 1967 memorandum, showed that using ten campaign days McCarthy could campaign in cities or clusters of cities and towns, that would contain 75 percent of the Democratic vote usually cast in New Hampshire. The second memorandum was prepared by Hoeh for the first meeting of the Campaign Committee, January 9, 1968, and listed twelve large Democratic vote producing cities and towns, 23 First Congressional District communities, and 22 Second Congressional District communities in priority for campaign attention. This memorandum became the basis for the organizational time, candidate time, volunteer efforts and other campaign efforts to these communities in relationship to their im-

portance as Democratic vote producers. At least some activity for McCarthy was carried out in each of the targeted communities. The success or failure of the campaign is reflected in the vote result from these communities and is especially important in the case of the twelve large city/town targets.

Targeted City/Large Town Results

The McCarthy leaders' strategy identified the twelve priority Democratic vote producing communities. Of the twelve, eleven were cities and one, Salem, a town. Two other cities, Franklin and Lebanon, had not produced Democratic primary votes in an amount sufficient to displace Salem on the list.

Reviewing Table 14.06, the importance of the target cities to the campaign is evident. 50.2 percent of the total Democratic vote cast in the election is accounted for by the twelve communities. Of the total vote produced by the twelve communities, Manchester accounted for 40.6 percent or slightly more than 20 percent of the total vote cast in the Democratic primary. Manchester produced a 69.0 percent margin against McCarthy with that vote representing 45.9 percent of Johnson's vote among the twelve communities. In spite of McCarthy's difficulty in Manchester, he did receive 14.7 percent of his statewide total from that city. Of the twelve communities, Johnson carried seven, which accounted for 80 percent of the total vote he received among the twelve. The remaining 20 percent was distributed among the five communities that McCarthy carried. Of the twelve only in Manchester did McCarthy slip below the projected 35 percent figure and his victory in Berlin had a dramatic impact on both political camps. With the vote for both candidates cast in Manchester

TABLE 14.06: TARGET LARGE CITY/TOWN RESULTS, 1968
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY

Community	% LBJ	% LBJ Total	% Mc	% Mc Total	% Comm.	Participation: % Dem. Vote of Total Reg.	Participation: % of Total Dem. Vote
Manchester	+ 69.0 (7591)	45.9	31.0 (3412)	29.5	40.6 (12,351)	27.7 (46,921)	21.5 (13,031)
Nashua	+ 59.3 (2585)	15.6	40.7 (1776)	15.3	14.9 (4527)	21.1 (22,579)	7.9 (4,765)
Berlin	48.3 (1524)	9.1	+ 51.7 (1636)	14.2	10.8 (3282)	36.2 (10,398)	6.2 (3,768)
Somersworth	+57.5 (600)	4.0	42.5 (444)	3.8	3.6 (1,103)	21.2 (5612)	2.0 (1189)
Claremont	+ 62.1 (673)	4.1	37.9 (411)	3.5	3.7 (1131)	16.6 (7266)	2.0 (1207)
Dover	+ 52.0 (676)	4.1	48.0 (625)	5.4	4.5 (1352)	11.4 (12,256)	2.3 (1400)
Rochester	49.0 (394)	2.3	+ 51.0 (410)	3.5	3.7 (870)	16.6 (9205)	2.0 (930)
Laconia	+ 60.5 (527)	3.2	39.4 (344)	3.0	3.2 (963)	11.8 (8504	1.6 (999)
Concord	46.1 (606)	3.4	+ 53.9 (707)	6.2	4.6 (1,392)	8.9 (15,736)	2.3 (1399)
Keene	+ 53.3 (470)	2.8	46.7 (411)	3.6	3.2 (979)	10.5 (9472)	1.6 (992)
Portsmouth	30.9 (268)	2.0	+69.1 (599)	5.2	3.0 (924)	12.6 (8586)	1.8 (1080)
Salem	43.5 (597)	3.5	+ 56.5 (776)	6.7	5.0 (1,520)	39.5 (8345)	2.7 (1633)
	58.8% (16,511)	100.0%	41.2% (11,551)	100.0%	100.0% (30,394)	19.7% (164,880)	53.5% (32,393)
	% Total Vote LBJ 60% (27,520		% Total Vote Mc. 49.7% (23,263)		% Total Dem. Vote 50.2% (60,519)	Total Reg. Voters 16.7% (363,503)	Dem. Total Vote 100.0% (60,519)

+ WINNER

removed, McCarthy would have received 47.7 percent of the total for the eleven remaining communities to Johnson's 52.3 percent, a relationship that comes much closer to understanding the importance of concentrating campaign energy among these few communities in a Democratic primary. Manchester, of course, cannot be ignored. It must be dealt with in every New Hampshire political contest in which Democrats are involved.

Participation as evaluated in Table 14.06 presents a contrast to that discussed in Table 14.05. In this case, participation is the percentage that the Democratic vote constitutes of the total of registered voters in the locality. While not as satisfactory a measure of participation as would be the percent Democratic vote of the total Democratic Party registration, it is the only device to assess participation as a function of the Democratic vote cast given the data available. Contrasting participation percentages do reveal something about the nature of the vote cast, a subject which will be explored in a subsequent section of this analysis. Generally, those communities with small percent Democratic vote of the total voter registration are communities like Rochester, Laconia, Concord, Keene and Portsmouth which have substantially more Republican voters registered than Democrats. Those cities with higher Democratic percentage participation are those like Manchester, Nashua, Berlin and Somersworth, where the Democratic Party has traditionally been strong, although less so in the case of Nashua. The anomaly appears to be Salem. There two factors combined to increase participation. The first was the strength of the Democratic Party in the community, but of equal importance is the fact that the towns, with town meetings, had more reason to turnout for the election. Subsequent examination of this factor shows the relationship between increased participation and the communities where the town meeting form of government prevailed.

The McCarthy campaign targeted 23 communities in the First Congressional. In order to be sure that campaign activities were not just concentrated on the basis of priority Democratic vote producers but also related to the geographic dispersion of the New Hampshire population, the congressional districts were selected as targets as well. The strategy related to the delegate selection part of the election which was separated according to congressional districts. If a strict priority ranking of Democratic vote producers had been used to manage the McCarthy strategy, relatively few communities in the Second Congressional District would have received campaign attention. In terms of the final result, the fact that nearly equal emphasis of the campaign was allocated to the priority communities of each district appears to have been important.

The First Congressional District list shows the importance of the radial effect of Manchester on the top Johnson vote producing towns. Pembroke, Goffstown, Allenstown, Hooksett, Merrimack, and to a considerable degree Derry and Londonderry are within the communications and commuting sphere of Manchester. As the participation percentage for each indicates, many of these communities show high levels of Democratic voter participation indicating that Democratic Party registration is heavy if not dominant. The table also reveals the McCarthy ability to attract voters from the academic communities such as Durham, location of the University of New Hampshire, and Exeter, home of Phillips Exeter Academy.

Of considerable significance in terms of where the McCarthy campaign succeeded and where it had difficulty are the returns from communities with strong local Democratic Party loyalties. Old mill communities with sizable

TABLE 14.07: TARGET COMMUNITIES, 1st Congressional District
1968 Presidential Primary

Community	% LBJ	% LBJ	% Mc	% Mc Total	% Comm. Total	PARTICIPATION % Dem. Vote of Total Registration	% of Total Dem. Vote
Hudson	+ 50.0 (524)	12.4	44.0 (412)	10.2	11.4 (1028)	29.8 (3882)	1.9 (1158)
Pembroke	+ 57.4 (359)	8.5	42.6 (267)	6.5	7.7 (698)	33.2 (2548)	1.4 (847)
Goffstown	+ 58.7 (452)	10.8	41.3 (318)	7.9	9.3 (843)	21.3 (4714)	1.7 (1004)
Newmarket	+ 59.6 (308)	7.3	40.4 (209)	5.2	5.9 (536)	30.8 (1880)	0.9 (579)
Allenstown	+ 60.3 (285)	6.8	39.7 (188)	4.6	5.6 (510)	46.4 (1214)	0.9 (563)
Derry	+ 52.5 (256)	6.1	47.5 (232)	5.7	6.0 (545)	10.7 (5319)	0.9 (567)
Pelham	42.1 (183)	4.3	+ 57.9 (252)	6.2	5.3 (480)	27.4 (2007)	0.9 (549)
Hooksett	+ 59.3 (275)	6.5	40.7 (189)	4.7	6.0 (543)	18.5 (3079)	0.9 (569)
Hampton	42.1 (183)	4.3	+ 57.9 (252)	6.2	5.3 (477)	12.1 (4050)	0.8 (490)
Plaistow	39.7 (69)	1.6	+ 60.3 (105)	2.6	2.2 (198)	10.1 (2136)	0.4 (216)
Exeter	42.5 (172)	4.1	+ 57.5- (232)	5.7	4.7 (430)	9.6 (4719)	0.8 (454)
Merrimack	+ 53.2 (195)	4.6	46.8- (172)	4.3	4.4 (398)	14.5 (2844)	0.7 (413)
Rollinsford	+ 51.1 (121)	2.8	48.9- (116)	2.9	2.7 (248)	25.6 (1120)	0.5 (287)
Bedford	+ 52.0 (185)	4.4	48.0 (171)	4.2	4.4 (398)	14.6 (2723)	0.6 (398)
Epping	+64.0 (96)	2.3	36.0 (54)	1.3	1.7 (151)	15.1 (1304)	0.3 (197)
Seabrook	37.0 (58)	1.4	+ 63.0 (99)	2.4	2.0 (179)	15.2 (1599)	0.5 (243)
Tilton	+ 57.6 (103)	2.5	42.4- (76)	1.9	2.1 (195)	14.2 (1498)	0.3 (212)
Farmington	43.5 (70)	1.7	+ 56.5 (91)	2.3	1.9 (177)	10.1 (1843)	0.3 (186)
Londonderry	+ 51.9 (139)	3,3	48.1 (129)	3.2	3.6 (322)	19.9 (1770)	0.6 (352)
Meredith	0 (0)	0	+ 100.0 (82)	2.0	1.0 (84)	11.1 (1671)	0.2 (186)
Pittsfield	+ 62.3 (66)	1.6	37.7 (40)	1.0	1.3 (121)	1.0 (1214)	0.2 (140)
Durham	15.4 (54)	1.3	+ 84.6 (298)	7.4	4.0 (363)	17.3 (2109)	0.6 (364)
Milton	44.6 (53)	1.3	+ 55.4 (66)	1.6	1.5 (132)	17.5 (941)	0.3 (165
	50.9% (4206)	100.0%	49.1% (4050)	100.0%	100.0% (9056)	18.1% (56,184)	16.8% (10,139
	% Total Vote LBJ	% Total Vote Mc		% Total Dem. Vote		Total Registered Voters	Dem. Total Vote
	15.3% (27,520)	17.4% (23,263)		15.0% 60,519)		15.5% (363,503)	100.0% (60,519)

+ DENOTES WINNER

French-Canadian populations and traditionally conservative and loyal Democrats supported the President impressively. Pembroke and Allenstown share the voting population of the old mill center, Suncook, where the French-Canadian community loyally supports Democratic candidates. Similarly Pittsfield, Newmarket, Tilton, and Epping, though isolated from other influences such as proximity to a dominant urban center, contain pockets of Democratic Party identifiers.

The towns where McCarthy's support was shown tended to be those which had experienced considerable growth in the post-war years like Pelham, Hampton, Plaistow, Seabrook and Exeter. The in-migrants were mostly from Massachusetts, many Democrats, and influenced by political experiences different from the older Democratic populations of the declining mill cities and towns. Bucking the trend were towns like Hudson and Goffstown. Hudson, adjacent to Nashua had become the bedroom town for many employed in Nashua as Goffstown had become the bedroom town for many employed in Manchester. Hudson's population tends to be in the tradition of the older Democratic inclined working population of Nashua; a generation or so removed from the original migration to the textile mills of that city but still closely tied by family and perspective to the old city's politics. Nashua is geographically small and if the Merrimack River did not separate Hudson from Nashua it is possible that the area occupied by the two communities would have been one city. Nashua's Johnson vote of 59.3 percent is sufficiently close to the 56.0 percent for Hudson to support these inferences. The difference may easily be accounted for by the recent migration to Hudson from Massachusetts which has also followed the migration to Hudson from Nashua.

The Goffstown explanation relates in part to the fact that Pinardville, an enclave just outside Manchester, votes as does the west of the Merrimack River wards of the city. Goffstown has also become a bedroom community for those leaving Manchester but still retaining strong ties to their former home city.

When the percentage returns for the two candidates are added, Johnson receives 75.3 percent of his statewide vote from the twelve targeted communities (Table 14.06) and the returns from the First Congressional District towns (Table 14.07). On the other hand, McCarthy received 67.1 percent of his total vote from the two targets and came within 0.4 percent of equalling Johnson's vote in the First Congressional District.

The participation calculation shows that there is a slight overall decline in the relationship between the number of votes cast by Democrats and the total number of registered voters. The decline relates to the decline in Democratic Party registrations in the small communities. At the same time McCarthy's vote begins to increase. The smaller towns where the Democratic Party is weaker produced more votes for McCarthy on a percentage basis than did the large communities and a relationship between Republican strength and McCarthy vote begins to appear.

The relationship becomes more evident when the inspection turns to the target communities of the Second Congressional District, larger, more rural and less populated of the two New Hampshire districts. Again, Johnson does well in the old mill cities and towns of the district (Franklin, Newport, Milford, Lebanon, Northumberland (Groveton), Jaffrey, Littleton, Winchester, and Swanzey) but has difficulty in the academic communities (Hanover and Andover), and in

communities with retirement or suburban residents such as Hillsborough, Lancaster, New Ipswich, Gorham, Peterborough and Wilton. As the population of Democratic voters declines, McCarthy's margin increases. The 22 target communities of the Second Congressional District produced 12.3 percent of McCarthy's total vote and a 51.5 percent edge over Johnson.

When the results of the two target community lists are combined with the Second District percentages (Table 14.08) the importance of the 57 communities is shown. 85.1 percent of Johnson's Democratic vote came from the 57 and McCarthy received 79.8 percent of his total. 20.2 percent of McCarthy's total was derived from other than the target cities and towns which raises several interesting questions.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the respective campaigns an assessment has to be made of the result as a product of the effort. It would appear from the results that as the campaign activity of the McCarthy organization decreased, the percentage of McCarthy's vote increased. Where both campaigns concentrated their efforts, in the cities and large towns, McCarthy was the loser. The fallacy in this assessment is a presumption that both candidates started either at zero or equal in their vote gathering appeal. Using this presumption one campaign appears to be more successful than the other in attracting votes in competitive situations. If this is so and the presumption is correct, then the McCarthy campaign produced disproportionately to its effort. In those communities of low priority or without priority McCarthy did better than in those communities of increasing priority.

TABLE 14.08: Target Communities, 2nd Congressional District, 1968 Presidential Primary

Community	% LBJ	% LBJ Total	% Mc	% MC Total	% Comm Total	PARTICIPATION % Dem. Vote of Total Registration	%of Total Dem. Vote
Franklin	+58.7 (302)	11.2	41.3 (213)	7.3	9.3 (567)	14.0 (4244)	1.0% (594)
Newport	+59.9 (260)	9.7	40.1 (174)	6.0	7.8 (480)	15.9 (3300)	0.9% (526)
Milford	+62.0 (245)	9.1	38.0 (150)	5.1	7.2 (436)	12.5 (3653)	0.8 (456)
Lebanon	+51.2 (250)	9.3	48.7 (237)	8.2	8.3 (509)	10.9 (4908)	0.9 (534)
Gorham	48.7 (190)	7.1	+51.3 (204)	7.0	6.5 (398)	25.0 (1874)	0.8 (468)
Greenville	38.5 (100)	3.7	+61.5 (160)	5.5	4.5 (275)	48.4 (756)	0.6 (366)
Hanover	15.0 (86)	3.2	+85.0 (485)	16.0	9.7 (596)	20.7 (2928)	1.0 (605)
Northumberland	+59.3 (178)	6.6	40.7 (122)	4.2	5.8 (357)	31.1 (1400)	0.8 (436)
Lincoln	48.3 (88)	3.3	+51.7 (94)	3.3	3.3 (200)	32.4 (731)	0.4 (237)
Jaffrey	+51.1 (119)	4.4	48.9 (114)	4.0	4.2 (254)	13.5 (2082)	0.5 (281)
Wilton	44.2 (110)	4.1	+55.8 (139)	4.7	4.4 (265)	24.4 (1219)	0.5 (297)
Littleton	+59.7 (129)	4.8	40.3 (87)	3.0	3.9 (236)	9.8 (2905)	0.5 (284)
Winchester	+63.9 (99)	3.7	36.1 (56)	1.8	2.7 (166)	15.6 (1253)	0.3 (196)
Peterborough	42.3 (93)	3.5	+57.7 (127)	4.4	4.1 (247)	12.9 (2079)	0.4 (268)
New Ipswich	40.0 (48)	1.8	+60.0 (72)	2.5	2.3 (138)	18.9 (778)	0.1 (147)
Lancaster	40.1 (59)	2.2	+59.9 (88)	3.0	2.5 (158)	11.5 (1688)	0.3 (194)
Swanzey	+54.5 (78)	2.9	45.5 (65)	2.2	2.5 (152)	9.2 (1814)	0.2 (166)
Ashland	41.2 (42)	1.6	+58.8 (60)	2.1	2.1 (125)	18.7 (829)	0.3 (155)
Troy	48.3 (72)	2.7	+51.7 (77)	2.7	2.6 (161)	23.0 (739)	0.3 (170)
Hinsdale	40.0 (48)	1.8	+60.0 (73)	2.5	2.0 (124)	11.7 (1316)	0.3 (154)
Andover	46.4 (52)	1.9	+53.6 (60)	2.1	2.2 (131)	19.4 (758)	0.2 (147)
Hillsborough	36.2 (38)	1.4	+63.8 (67)	2.3	2.1 (127)	9.2 (1459)	0.2 (134)
	48.5% (2686)	100.0%	51.5% (2851)	100.0%	100.0% (6102)	16.0% (42,713)	11.3% (6,815)

% Total Vote LBJ	% Total Vote Mc	% Total Dem.Vote	Total Registered Voters	Dem. Total Vote
9.8% (27,520)	12.3% (23,263)	10.1% (60,519)	11.8% (363,503)	100.0% (60,519)

+ Denotes Winner

The fallacy is, of course, that the candidates did not start either at zero or at equal shares. President Johnson's share was considerably more than McCarthy's share at the beginning. None of the foregoing data analysis of the returns produces an explanation of whether the campaigns were effective or why McCarthy should draw increasingly from communities with larger numbers of Republicans. Some subjective analysis has been provided based upon an understanding of the political dynamics of the voting in some of these communities but other tests seem to be required in order to test the relationships.

One attempt to find an explanation was undertaken by Robert Craig when he developed a tabular analysis of vote return as related to the size of the voting district. While a similar pattern of increasing McCarthy support with declining vote district size is shown (Table 14.09), the explanation does not go beyond summarizing the data. The questions which need further study concern the relationship between community size or some characteristic related to size and the vote percentages produced for the two candidates. Secondly, it is important to determine whether the respective campaigns had either a positive or negative effect relative to the vote percentages produced for the respective candidates. These questions will be explored subsequently, as will the assessment of where the respective candidates stood relative to each other in the mind of the voting public at the beginning of the campaign.

Delegate and Alternate Delegate Selection

The second mark of electoral success in the New Hampshire presidential primary comes from the tabulation of delegates and alternate delegates selected to represent the parties and the candidates at the coming nominating convention.

Table 14.09: 1968 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY RESULTS, BY SIZE OF VOTING DISTRICT[7]

Size of Voting District (pre-1968 Dem. Registration)	Districts McCarthy Won	Districts Johnson Won	Ties	McCarthy Vote	Johnson Vote	Sub-Total	Percent of total McCarthy Vote	Percent of total Johnson Vote	Percent of total Primary Vote
Districts under 100** (N=140)	58.6% (82)	36.4 (51)	5.0 (7)	48.7 (2428)	41.0 (2043)	100% (4985)	10.4 (2428)	7.4 (2043)	9.0 (4985)
Towns: 100-199 (N=46)	65.2% (30)	34.8 (16)	- (0)	48.2 (2681)	41.5 (2307)	100% (5563)	11.5 (2681)	8.4 (2307)	10.2 (5563)
Wards: 100-199 (N=13)	69.2 (9)	23.0 (3)	7.7 (1)	52.8 (815)	38.9 (600)	100% (1544)	3.5 (815)	2.2 (600)	2.8 (1544)
All Districts: 100-199 (N-59)	66.1 (39)	32.2 (19)	1.7 (1)	49.2 (3496)	40.9 (2907)	100% (7107)	15.0 (3496)	10.6 (2907)	13.0 (7107)
Towns: 200-499 (N=25)	56.0 (14)	44.0 (11)	- (0)	49.4 (2735)	42.2 (2336)	100% (5536)	11.8 (2735)	8.5 (2336)	10.2 (5536)
Wards: 200-499 (N=25)	44.0 (11)	56.0 (14)	- (0)	45.3 (2242)	48.8 (2417)	100% (4951)	9.6 (2242)	8.8 (2417)	9.1 (4951)
All Districts: 200-499 (N=50)	50.0 (25)	50.0 (25)	- (0)	47.5 (4977)	45.3 (4753)	100% (10487)	21.4 (4977)	17.3 (4753)	19.3 (10487)
Towns: 500-999 (N=13)	38.5 (5)	61.5 (8)	- (0)	45.1 (2799)	46.2 (2866)	100% (6207)	12.0 (2799)	10.4 (2866)	11.4 (6207)
Wards: 500-999 (N=18)	16.7 (3)	83.3 (15)	- (0)	41.9 (3021)	53.4 (3855)	100% (7215)	13.0 (3021)	14.0 (3855)	13.2 (7215)
All Districts: 500-999 (N=31)	25.8 (8)	74.2 (23)	- (0)	43.4 (5820)	50.1 (6721)	100% (13422)	13.0 (5820)	24.4 (6721)	24.6 (13422)
Towns (3) and Wards(19): 1000-3100 (N=22)	13.6 (3)	86.4 (19)	- (0)	33.7 (6548)	57.0 (11096)	100% (19453)	28.1 (6548)	40.3 (11096)	35.7 (19453)
Grand Totals 100% (302)	52.0 (157)	45.4 (137)	2.7 (8)	42.0 (23269)	49.6 (27520)	100% (55454)	100.0% (23269)	100.0% (27520)	100.0% (55454)

** Including 3 city wards under 100, (2 Concord; 1 Portsmouth)

As will be recalled, the McCarthy campaign managers opted for the delegate filing control that a pledged slate offered. On the other hand the Johnson campaign managers chose not to control delegate candidate filings. Because President Johnson did not declare his candidacy in New Hampshire, his managers were limited to the "favorable" delegate candidate option. Not wishing to create controversy by selecting those who should file as Johnson delegate or alternate delegate candidates, an open filing season followed. The result was that in the First Congressional District there were 27 delegate candidates listed as "favorable to the nomination of Lyndon B. Johnson as President," 12 candidates for the 12 delegate slots listed as "Pledged to the nomination of Eugene J. McCarthy as President," and one candidate listed as "favorable to the nomination of Robert F. Kennedy." The total list of candidates was 40, with 12 to be selected.

The vote for First Congressional District delegates as shown by Table 14.08 reveals the success of the McCarthy strategy. While Johnson defeated McCarthy 56.6 percent to 43.4 percent in the First District only three LBJ delegates were elected. Two of the three were the most prominent Democratic officials in the state, U.S. Senator Tom McIntyre and Governor John W. King, and the third was the Democratic Party chairman, William Craig. The vote for Johnson favorable delegates was concentrated on the two top Democratic Party elected officials then widely scattered among the other candidate names. On the other hand, the McCarthy vote was concentrated among the twelve with no McCarthy delegate candidate receiving less than 8,395 votes.

TABLE 14.10: DELEGATE SELECTION, 1st Congressional District, 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary

NAME	CANDIDATE Allegiance	PLEDGED	FAVORABLE Other	VOTE
1. Beauvais	McCarthy	X		8729+
2. Blanchard	McCarthy	X		8572
3. Bouressa	Reynolds		X	2110
4. Breton	LBJ		X	8210
5. Bunker	LBJ		X	4336
6. Burke	LBJ		X	6164
7. Cannell	LBJ		X	4420
8. Carrier	McCarthy	X		8722+
9. Connor	McCarthy	X		6694
10. Craig	LBJ		X	8888+
11. Danais	LBJ		X	7550
12. Devine	LBJ		X	7123
13. Dishman	McCarthy	X		8395
14. Dupuis	LBJ		X	7870
15. Ecker	LBJ		X	4603
16. Farrell	McCarthy	X		8852
17. Hall	Kennedy		X	2159
18. Healy	LBJ		X	6176
19. Holland	McCarthy	X		8716+
20. Kanteres	LBJ		X	5807
21. Kelley	LBJ		X	5628
22. King	LBJ		X	9630+
23. Lemieux	LBJ		X	5970
24. Leslie	LBJ		X	4118
25. MacLellan	McCarthy	X		8694+
26. Martel, A	LBJ		X	5554
27. Martel, L	LBJ		X	7029
28. McDonough	LBJ		X	5745
29. McEachern	McCarthy	X		8840+
30. McIntyre	LBJ		X	10315+
31. McKay	McCarthy	X		8419
32. Millimet	LBJ		X	6626
33. Morin	McCarthy	X		8994+
34. Myers	LBJ		X	5686
35. O'Callaghan	McCarthy	X		8675+
36. Preston	LBJ		X	5374
37. Quinn	LBJ		X	7009
38. Quinney	LBJ		X	4440
39. Ross	McCarthy	X		8929+
40. Sullivan	LBJ		X	7965

+ Denotes Election

As Table 14.10 suggests, residence and ethnic background, as revealed by a surname, aided the McCarthy delegate candidates in their voter appeal. David Morin, French-Canadian surnamed, topped the McCarthy delegate list in spite of the fact that he was not from Manchester. All of the McCarthy delegate candidates from Manchester were elected as were the Irish surnamed delegate candidates from outside that pivotal Democratic city. Surname and residence are important vote attractors for the mostly anonymous names appearing on the McCarthy delegate slate. The concentration of votes kept the pack of McCarthy delegates close together with the next closest Johnson delegate, State Senator Henry P. Sullivan of Manchester, placing 16th with a vote 430 less than the 15th place McCarthy delegate, Professor Robert Dishman of Durham.

Delegate voting in the Second Congressional District followed a similar pattern as that in the First. The concentrated McCarthy vote elected eleven of the twelve delegate candidates with only the Johnson campaign manager and former gubernatorial candidate, Bernard L. Boutin, bucking the trend. There were no other Johnson delegate candidates of the prominence of Boutin or with other than localized appeal. It was a contest between relatively anonymous Johnson candidates against similar McCarthy candidates. (Table 14.12)

Although the number of Johnson delegate candidates was less by 8 candidates than that in the First Congressional District (total 19) the preferential vote in the Second Congressional District was almost even -- McCarthy 49.2 percent to Johnson's 50.8 percent. McCarthy voters concentrated their delegate voting while the list of 19 candidates dispersed the Johnson delegate vote sufficiently to eliminate all but one of their delegate candidates.

TABLE 14.11: Delegate Selection, 1st C.D. Elected
Delegate Vote, 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary[9]

Name	Residence	Candidate Allegiance	Vote
1) McIntyre (senator)*	Laconia	LBJ	10,315
2) King (Governor)	Manchester	LBJ	9,630
3) Morin	Hampton	McCarthy	8,994
4) Ross	Manchester	McCarthy	8,929
5) Craig	Manchester	LBJ	8,888
6) Farrell	Manchester	McCarthy	8,852
7) McEachern	Portsmouth	McCarthy	8,840
8) Beauvais	Manchester	McCarthy	8,729
9) Carrier	Manchester	McCarthy	8,722
10) Holland	Bedford	McCarthy	8,716
11) MacLellan	Manchester	McCarthy	8,694
12) O'Callaghan	Laconia	McCarthy	8,675
13) Blanchard	Portsmouth	McCarthy	8,572
14) McKay	Hudson	McCarthy	8,419
15) Dishman	Durham	McCarthy	8,395
16) Sullivan	Manchester	LBJ	7,965

---

* 12 To Be Elected

Results: 3 LBJ, (McCarthy Delegates Elected

TABLE 14.12: DELEGATE SELECTION, 2nd Congressional District, 1968 Presidential Primary [10]

NAME	Candidate Allegiance	Pledged	Favorable, Other	Vote
1) Bouchard	McCarthy	X		7684+
2) Boutin	LBJ		X	7421+
3) Brummer	LBJ		X	4280
4) Burelle	Kennedy		X	2110
5) Coutermarsh	LBJ			5860
6) Danielli	McCarthy	X		7322+
7) Daoust	LBJ			5372
8) Dion	LBJ			5584
9) Farley	LBJ			5219
10) Elliot	LBJ			4607
11) Grandmaison	LBJ			5075
12) Hackett	LBJ			4598
13) Hill	LBJ			5083
14) Hoeh, D.	McCarthy	X		6967+
15) Kennedy	McCarthy	X		7555+
16) Lamontagne	LBJ			5833
17) Leonard	LBJ			5176
18) Marrow	McCarthy	X		6952+
19) Martell	LBJ			5197
20) Meloney	McCarthy	X		7108+
21) Morin	LBJ			5221
22) Nims	LBJ			4641
23) Oleson	McCarthy	X		7240+
24) Proulx	McCarthy	X		6905+
25) Shea	LBJ		X	5383
26) Spanos	LBJ		X	4893
27) Studds	McCarthy	X		6895+
28) Underwood	McCarthy	X		6768
29) Walker	LBJ		X	5444
30) Wallin	McCarthy	X		7108+
31) Whelton	McCarthy	X		7033+
32) Winn	LBJ		X	6366

+ Denotes Election

Source: N. H. Manual for the General Court 1969 No. 41

As Table 14.13 shows, the combination of French-Canadian surname and Nashua residence was the most powerful attractor of votes. Secondly, French-Canadian or Irish surname was the second most powerful attractor, with the third being a measure of prominence either produced by the campaign or derived previous to the campaign. Bouchard was then a Nashua alderman; Daniell a previous congressional candidate in the district; Oleson was a popular state representative and Wallin was a prominent Nashua state representative. Only the perception of Concord as a Yankee Republican city appears to have handicapped the vote gathering of Studds, who was elected, and Dr. David Underwood who was not. The next highest Johnson candidate was Miss Cecilia Winn, a prominent Nashua civic leader and long-time Democratic Party loyalist.

Alternate Delegate Selection

Only for the afficionados of politics does reaching for the essence of an election extend beyond the selection of delegates to the selection of alternate delegates. But when the fate of a presidency is involved in the reading of the electoral evidence, alternate delegate selection gains considerably in importance.

For the First Congressional District the combination of overfiled delegate candidates and dispersed vote that elected nine delegates for McCarthy when he received only 43.4 percent of the vote did not hold up for the selection of alternate delegates. There were a total of 27 candidates filed: 12 McCarthy, 13 Johnson and 2 undesignated. (Table 14.14).

TABLE 14.13: DELEGATE SELECTION, 2nd C.D. Elected Delegate Vote, 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary[11]

Name	Residence	Candidate Allegiance	Vote
1) Bouchard*	Nashua	McCarthy	7684
2) Kennedy	Keene	McCarthy	7555
3) Boutin	Nashua	LBJ	7421
4) Daniell	Franklin	McCarthy	7322
5) Oleson	Gorham	McCarthy	7240
6) Wallin	Nashua	McCarthy	7108
7) Meloney	Claremont	McCarthy	7108
8) Whelton	Nashua	McCarthy	7033
9) Hoeh, D.	Hanover	McCarthy	6967
10) Marrow	Chesterfield	McCarthy	6952
11) Proulx	Ashland	McCarthy	6905
12) Studds	Concord	McCarthy	6895
13) Underwood	Concord	McCarthy	6768
14) Winn	Nashua	LBJ	6366

* 12 to be Elected
Results: 1 LBJ, 11 McCarthy Delegates Elected

TABLE 14.14: ALTERNATE DELEGATE SELECTION, 1st Congressional District, 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary [12]

Name	Candidate Allegiance	Pledged	Favorable, Other	Vote
1) Abbot Jr.	LBJ			8476
2) Barnard	McCarthy	X		8295
3) Beaulieu	___		X	1856
4) Belair	LBJ			8763+
5) Bergeron	LBJ			9607+
6) Chaplain	McCarthy	X		7999
7) Cleveland	McCarthy	X		7691
8) DesJardin, G.	McCarthy	X		8617+
9) DesJardins,H.	LBJ			8708+
10) Eshoo	McCarthy	X		7972
11) Howland	___		X	1080
12) LaCroix	LBJ			9146+
13) LaFleur	LBJ			9336+
14) Lapiante	McCarther	X		8274
15) Levesque	LBJ			9293+
16) Nardi	LBJ			8450
17) Normandin	LBJ			9089+
18) O'Callaghan	McCarthy	X		8183
19) Onigman	McCarthy	X		7770
20) Preston	LBJ			9476
21) Raiche	LBJ		X	9579+
22) Sanders, Jr.	LBJ		X	8522+
23) Simpson	McCarthy	X		8170
24) Spalding	McCarthy	X		7767
25) Tobin	LBJ		X	9881+
26) Weston	McCarthy	X		7982
27) Windhausen	McCarthy	X		7853

+ Denotes Election

As Table 14.15 shows the Johnson vote concentrated, as had the McCarthy vote for delegates. The combination of Manchester residence, Irish, or French-Canadian surname, assured election of the Johnson list with the exception of the Yankee-surnamed Ray Abbott Jr. of rural Jackson. The only McCarthy candidate to slip to election was the French-Canadian surnamed Gertrude DesJardin of Manchester. Robert Preston, a former State Senator, placed high in the voting by the chance of having his name at the top of the alternate delegate ballot.

If the Johnson campaign leaders had exerted control over delegate candidate filings to produce a list which more closely matched the candidates with the slots available, the delegate election, probably would have patterned that for alternate delegates. The fact that the Johnson candidates carried all but one of the alternate delegate seats in the First Congressional District was lost in the amazement produced from the election of the nine McCarthy delegates.

The alternate delegate filing for the Second Congressional District slots matched the number of seats: 24 total candidates, 12 pledged to McCarthy, 12 favorable to Johnson. While the preference vote was almost equal between McCarthy and Johnson the alternate delegate voting elected 9 McCarthy candidates to 3 Johnson candidates. As Table 14.16 displays, the voting clustered with only one candidate, John McCarthy, above 7,000 votes and the Hanover resident, Robert Guest, trailing as number 24 with 6,247.

As Table 14.17 suggests, a Nashua residence attracted votes as did the one surname popular to New Hampshire Democrats. John McCarthy, a political unknown from a northern town near Berlin topped the voting followed by the former chairman of the Hillsborough County Democratic Party, LBJ favorable, Robert Philbrick

TABLE 14.15: Alternate Delegate Selection, 1st C.D., Elected
Alternate Delegate Vote, 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary [13]

Name	Residence	Candidate Allegiance	Vote
1) Tobin*	Manchester	LBJ	9881
2) Bergeron	Manchester	LBJ	9607
3) Raiche	Manchester	LBJ	9579
4) Preston	Hampton	LBJ	9476
5) LaFleur	Manchester	LBJ	9336
6) Levesque	Rochester	LBJ	9293
7) LaCrois	Rochester	LBJ	9146
8(Normandin	Laconia	LBJ	9089
9) Belair	Salem	LBJ	8763
10) DesJardins, H.	Rollinsford	LBJ	8708
11) DesJardin, G.	Manchester	McCarthy	8617
12) Sanders, Jr.	Hampton	LBJ	8552
13) Abbot Jr.	Jackson	LBJ	8476
14) Nardi	Manchester	LBJ	8450
15) Barnard	Goffstown	McCarthy	8295

* 12 To Be Elected
Result: 11 LBJ, 1 McCarthy Alt. Del. Elected

TABLE 14.16: Alternate Delegate Selection, 2nd C.D., 1968 Presidential Primary 14

Name	Candidate Allegiance	Pledged	Favorable Other	Vote
1) Boggis	McCarthy	X		6861+
2) Bunce	LBJ		X	6329
3) Coniaris	McCarthy	X		6442
4) Eberhart	McCarthy	X		6451+
5) Fairbanks	LBJ		X	6346
6) Gallen	LBJ		X	6374
7) Guest	LBJ		X	6247
8) Harrison	LBJ		X	6286
9) Hennessey	LBJ		X	6425
10) Hoeh, S.	McCarthy	X		6482+
11) Makris	LBJ		X	6687+
12) McCarthy	McCarthy	X		7027+
13) Morse	McCarthy	X		6461+
14) Philbrick	LBJ		X	6862+
15) Richardson	McCarthy	X		6462+
16) Saggiotes	LBJ		X	6371
17) Sheridan	McCarthy	X		6447
18) Shortlidge, Jr.	LBJ		X	6433
19) Stanley	McCarthy	X		6768+
20) Sterling	LBJ		X	6424
21) Taylor	McCarthy	X		6725+
22) Torrey	McCarthy	X		6387
23) Wood	McCarthy	X		6568+
24) York	LBJ		X	6569+

+Denotes Election

TABLE 14.17: Alternate Delegate Selection, 2nd C.D. Elected
Alternate Delegate Vote, 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary[15]

Name	Residence	Candidate Allegiance	Vote
1) McCarthy*	Gorham	McCarthy	7027
2) Philbrick	Milford	LBJ	6862
3) Boggis	Nashua	McCarthy	6861
4) Stanley	Nashua	McCarthy	6768
5) Taylor	Nashua	McCarthy	6725
6) Makris	Nashua	LBJ	6687
7) York	Concord	LBJ	6569
8) Wood	Keene	McCarthy	6568
9) Hoeh, S.	Hanover	McCarthy	6482
10) Richardson	Fitzwilliam	McCarthy	6462
11) Morse	Nashua	McCarthy	6461
12) Eberhart	Concord	McCarthy	6451
13) Sheridan	Concord	McCarthy	6447
14) Coniaris	Hollis	McCarthy	6442

* 12 to be Elected

Result: 3 LBJ, 9 McCarthy Alt. Del. Elected

of Milford. The other two Johnson favorable alternates to be elected were Harry Makris, a former Nashua state representative, and Edward York, a long-time state representative from Concord's only Democratic ward, Penacook. The remaining alternate delegate candidates elected as pledged to McCarthy were facing their first electoral experience as political unknowns.

The result supports the notion that a McCarthy voter backed McCarthy with sufficient intensity to carry that support through the list of alternate delegate candidates. That intensity was at least sufficient to cast those few additional votes to elect McCarthy alternates over Johnson alternates in a two to one ratio. Without either strong residence or ethnic attractors to distort the voting, the notation of candidate support was sufficient to concentrate the McCarthy vote once more in the election.

In summary the effectiveness of the McCarthy delegate strategy cannot be over-emphasized. 20 of 24 potential delegates were elected pledged to the nomination of Eugene J. McCarthy and 10 of the potential alternate delegate candidates were also elected pledged to McCarthy's nomination. Not only had McCarthy done unexpectedly well in the preference portion of the ballot, but he had surprised all observers by actually translating his support into delegate strength -- strength that would control a state's convention delegation and elect McCarthy delegates and the next Democratic National Committeeman and Committeewoman.

When this additional success was combined with McCarthy's unexpected strength as a Democrat and surprise support among Republicans, the picture was one of total victory for McCarthy in New Hampshire. That was the message that eminated from New Hampshire the evening of March 12th and in the days following the election as the final details of the voting were compiled.

Who Voted and Why

One political scientist, Robert E. Craig, examined the data gathered through a commercial survey sponsored by the American Broadcasting Company. The survey was conducted by Audits and Surveys, Inc., New York, N.Y., with the consultation of the Survey Research Center, Political Behavior Section, of the University of Michigan. The ABC survey, Craig reported, was conducted in two parts, the first during the week of February 12, 1968 and totaling 581 respondents, and the second during the week of February 19, 1968 and consisting of 562 respondents.[16]

For the purpose of his analysis Craig combined both samples and then sought to duplicate, whenever possible, the approach and measures used by the major voting studies, principally The American Voter, and measures which represent variables found to be influential on voter choice in other non-party competitive elections. He then also examined long-term influences on voting behavior such as party identification and ethnic background as well as short-term influences such as issues and candidate evaluation. He sought to determine the relative importance of these proximate forces in determining candidate choice when party labels are the same. As the conclusion of his analysis he assessed the overall relative importance of influential factors in the psychology voting for a Presidential primary election.[17]

The first part of Craig's analysis was to examine some seventeen social and economic factors which had been measured in connection with candidate preference. He found that less than half were in any way related to candidate preference and of the half these were only moderately related.

> Subjective social class identification, age, marital status, number of dependent children, occupation, number of years spent outside New Hampshire, education and family income, were weakly related to candidate preference.
>
> Size of place of residence, type of occupation (white collar/ blue collar), place of birth, race, sex, membership in labor unions and religion, were all insignificant factors in the preference of Democrats for either McCarthy or Johnson.[18]

Craig concluded that the "generally weak relationships" of the social and economic measures as related to candidate support meant that social explanations of the results were "not sufficient." Craig went on to note however, that this did not mean that these factors played no part at all in an explanation of the phenomenon of the McCarthy insurgency. The unique character of the social base of McCarthy support was revealed in the close examination of the relationships of socio-economic factors and candidate preference.[19]

> The pattern of socio-economic support for McCarthy has two clear features. While the first conclusion about McCarthy support must be that it did not come exclusively from any one group in the population of Democrats, the second conclusion is that some groups did respond to McCarthy's candidacy more than others and that these groups tended to be at opposite ends of the social and economic dimensions which we normally use to analyze social and political phenomena.[20]

Consequently, Craig concluded that McCarthy's support came from many groups not from any one group's disenchantment with President Johnson. The insurgency, therefore, came from "widespread social disenchantment with the course of government," Craig concluded.

Picking apart this conclusion Craig found first that McCarthy attracted increased support from "both older and younger groups" while those of the "middle age group" heavily supported Johnson. The same division Craig found when he

examined education as related to candidate preference. "Those Democrats with high school diplomas tended to prefer Johnson much more than those with less than high school education or those with more than high school education."[21]

A similar finding came when Craig examined for income and occupation relationships. The upper incomed, professional and technical occupations and the unskilled, blue collar workers tended to support McCarthy more heavily than did other occupational and income groupings.[22]

When Craig collapsed the income range the difference vanished, which he noted demonstrated the "crucial nature of the categorization in observing relationships." To an extent he experienced the same problem when he sorted his occupational groupings. The class distinction was less clear when occupations were clustered by whether or not they are self employed. The analysis did show that McCarthy attracted support "despite wide differences in occupational status and work experiences."[23]

Marital status produced a strange mixture of support for the candidates according to Craig. "Those who were single, married with one child, or never married and with one or two children, tended to support McCarthy more than others." The analysis profiles what Craig defined as a "coalition of unlikely colleagues."[24]

Examining "residential mobility" Craig found that McCarthy drew his support more heavily from those who were recent residents of other states and those who had lived in other states one, three, or six years. When he examined the "subjective social class" data he found another mixed pattern but one which tended to support the overall conclusion that McCarthy drew more heavily from

those working-class identifiers than from the middle-class identifiers. When Craig sorted for strength of identification he found that McCarthy's support came from "those who were strong middle-class identifiers and working-class identifiers, weak or strong, but more likely from weak."[25]

Concluding his socio-economic analysis Craig summarized that while such factors did not explain candidate support they did produce interesting observations. "McCarthy support was not isolated among only a few segments of the social groupings of Democrats, but rather drew some strength from almost all social groupings." At the same time Craig noted that McCarthy's support was strongest among "unlikely electoral colleagues" -- the richer and the poorer, the most educated and less educated, the older and the younger, the highly skilled and the unskilled, the middle-class identifiers and working-class identifiers. This was the social base of the McCarthy candidacy.[26]

Reaching for other explanations of the result, Craig searched the political background of what he labelled the "protest."

> Psychological political background factors include partisan attachment, feelings of political efficacy, habits of interest, information and participation, and positions on generalized issues of domestic politics which appear to be an enduring part of American electoral competition.[27]

These political background factors were more directly political in content than the socio-economic factors and yet, as Craig noted, "are not particularly campaign objects and, as such, are factors which might play a prior role in influencing voters' choices between candidates." For two party confrontations Craig said the political background factors are "indirectly influential as screening devices

for incoming information." In this way he suggested they help indirectly to influence the ultimate direction of the vote as well as the decision whether or not to actually vote. The factor which usually serves as a "major referent" for the voter is party identification, Craig noted.[28]

His analysis of the New Hampshire presidential primary of 1968 found that these factors did not serve as major reference points for the voters' decisions. At the same time, Craig found that these factors were significant influences on candidate preference and that an "interesting pattern of such influences emerged."[29] His study showed that while party identification as such had not a "major referent for all vote decisions," he found that Democrats with weaker attachments to the Democratic party were more likely than strong Democrats to support McCarthy in his challenge to the Democratic President.[30]

A Democrat's view of the efficacy of political activity which was less, or one with less political information, or one who participated less in primary voting tended to prefer McCarthy over those "who were more efficacious, participatory, or knowledgeable." At the same time, Craig found that liberals split their vote between the two candidates, as did conservatives, except that the more educated liberals tended to support McCarthy much more than less educated liberals. Craig described the McCarthy Democrat as a "sort of political underclass." What he then found was that those who supported McCarthy came from opposite poles of various social and economic stratification measures. The "lower efficacy blue-collar workers and higher efficacy white-collar workers, lower income, weaker Democrats and higher income weaker Democrats, highly educated liberals and not very educated conservatives, all showed increased tendencies to support McCarthy. Craig concluded that these "disparate groups" produced a

coalition which had a "base in some sort of political underclass but which was joined by what can only be called part of the old Democratic elite structure." Craig concluded that no background factor of a psychologically and politically enduring character served to orient all individual voters to the objects of the campaign in the way that partisan identification does in two party competitive campaigns. Without this factor Craig notes that the "less permanent objects of the campaign itself" are left to explain the major portion of the voting decision.[31]

The voting decision for McCarthy from the standpoint of what Craig called a "social movement" was founded on a "political and psychological underclass" which he saw as reacting favorably to McCarthy as "the underdog." This "underclass" as Craig called it, was joined by some members of the politically dominant class, and this "coalition of under- and upper-class Democrats was a hallmark of the McCarthy coalition." A hallmark that also had socio-economic links as well in Craig's analysis.[32]

Developing this conclusion Craig controlled his data to search for relationships that might reveal the actual dimensions of the McCarthy coalition. As he noted from his review of the voting research literature:

> If early voting research was dominated by a search for social causes of voting behavior, more recent research has been dominated by a psychological approach to the same behavior. And, at the heart of the psychological approach to voting behavior lies the concept of party identification.[33]

Since party identification in a primary election can at the best be considered only as an indirect factor influencing the formation of a voter's decision,

Craig concluded, it might easily be neglected in a search for voting behavior explanations. Instead of skipping the factor, Craig controlled his data carefully to sketch the possible relationships that might exist. Again, the unusual coalition that Craig was finding as the basis of McCarthy's New Hampshire support, demanded that he not overlook any possible explanations.

Using his first finding, that weak Democratic Party identifiers were more likely to support McCarthy than strong Democrats, and that strong Democrats overwhelmingly support Johnson, he went on to control for significant socio-economic factors. He found that strong partisanship was enough to outweigh residential mobility as a candidate preference factor. McCarthy's support came from those with "less residential permanence" and a "weaker" sense of "partisanship," while Johnson's support was the reverse. Craig found similar phenomenon when controlling for occupational type. "Strong partisanship erased differences of support between white and blue collar workers." He found that blue collar Independent Democrats were more likely than white collar workers who were Independent Democrats, to support McCarthy. The relationship was less clear with what Craig labelled as "weak Democrats."[34] The phenomenon of "social opposites" being attracted to McCarthy was revealed again in the occupational analysis. When controlling for income Craig found a different condition. Lower income, less partisan Democrats tended to prefer McCarthy more than the upper income, less partisan Democrats. Among the stronger Democrats Craig found that those of moderate income preferred McCarthy "more than those of lower or higher income levels." The spread favored the conclusion that weaker feelings of attachment to the Democratic Party produced the coalition of "dissimilar socio-economic groupings."

Using a "Domestic Issues Index" to rank respondents according to a seven point scale ranging from "strong liberal" to "strong conservative," Craig sought to reach beyond the emotional attachment to a political party that voters may reflect to a "more broadly cognitive meaning." He found that the voters did use their opinions on the questions that composed the cognitive scale to differentiate between the candidates; although, as he noted, "not in any overwhelming way." The responses showed that the more "liberal" tended to prefer McCarthy than did the more "conservative." The "strongly liberal," he found, "preferred McCarthy less than did the "moderately liberal," and that the "weakly liberal" group showed the strongest preference for McCarthy of all the groups. What remained significant as in other evaluations, McCarthy drew some support from among all groups -- even the conservatives. Something that apparently surprised Craig.[35]

To Craig the use of educational levels clarified the relationship between domestic issues and candidate preference. He found McCarthy's strongest support coming from liberals with "some college education and consistently significant support among non-high school graduates, regardless of their position on the liberal-conservative index." Johnson, on the other hand, derived his support from those with high school diplomas, regardless of their position on domestic issues. Craig found that the ability to differentiate between issues and the candidates and to relate these voting decisions was constant. Those with no high school diplomas supporting McCarthy and those high school graduates supporting Johnson remained consistent regardless of their domestic issues

positions. Both groups failed to differentiate between the two candidates on the grounds of their domestic issue positions. Of this group those with a high school diploma tended to support Johnson while those without shifted toward McCarthy.[36]

Examining further, Craig controlled for voter attitudes toward the efficacy of political participation and candidate preference. To develop the relationship Craig created a "Political Efficacy Index" which scaled responses from "Low Efficacy," in nine levels to "High Efficacy." Again the analysis produced the "strange mixture" of those sensing "fairly high" value in political activity and those sensing "moderate" and "low efficacy" were the McCarthy supporters. The middle levels and the ambivalent level favored President Johnson.[37]

Controlling for social class identification, the relationships shown earlier were repeated. McCarthy retained support among working-class identifiers who sensed lower feelings toward the efficacy of political activity. This led Craig to conclude that "McCarthy's candidacy represented those who felt left out of the political system, either through representation or reward." Craig found that the support for McCarthy was the highest when "low income <u>and</u> lower efficacy converged."[38]

The relationship between socio-economic status, sense of political efficacy, and support for McCarthy remained constant across the analysis Craig developed of factors such as employment status, income and education. The disaffected by social circumstance tended to be higher in their support of McCarthy than those whose sense of political efficacy was higher along with their socio-economic status.

In his attempt to relate the Democratic preference to ethnic background, Craig found that McCarthy's support increased among the Canadian born, lower efficacy, Democrats, but among the non-Canada, foreign-born, he found almost no support for McCarthy "except among the lowest efficacy group." There he found support to be "overwhelming (77.2%)."[39]

Craig's analysis of the religious backgrounds of the voters found that concerning a sense of political efficacy Protestants were more likely to support McCarthy than Catholics except in the lower efficacy scales where a relationship between Catholics and candidate support was shown.[40] Although McCarthy was a Catholic it did not seem to lessen his appeal to Protestants or increase his appeal to Catholics. Religion was not a factor in the campaign.

Craig measured for levels of interest in the primary and knowledge about the primary as a way of further exploring this aspect of efficacy in the voter's preference decision. He found that tendencies to support McCarthy increased with <u>less</u> interest in the primary <u>and</u> with lower efficacy ratings. He found that a similar relationship developed when he controlled for "knowledge as to when the primary would be held." As for participation, Democrats who reported less previous participation more consistently supported McCarthy.

The conclusions which Craig developed from the efficacy analysis showed that McCarthy served to unite Democrats who were less attached to the Democratic Party, were lower in feelings of efficacy about their involvement in politics, had less specific knowledge about this primary, and who had less previous experience in participating in this kind of election. At the same time Craig found that "these Democrats were joined by others who were very unlike the

first group...." These were the most highly educated and politically efficacious Democrats who were drawn together by the McCarthy candidacy, Democrats who ordinarily would be found in opposing camps, separated by their "very different longer-range view of politics and their own political and social experiences."41

To relate political opinions to the voters' candidate preference, Craig used data produced from the survey where the respondents were asked to identify three issues on which they thought the government should take action. The highest responded issues were:

1. Ending the war in Vietnam (7354)
2. Racial problems (1747)
3. Crime (1348)
4. Inflation (906)
5. High taxes (874)
6. Unemployment (190)

The spread between the first issue and the second was so great that Craig concluded that Vietnam was the dominant issue of the campaign. When testing the relationship between "awareness" and "importance" Craig found that Vietnam was held by most (6950) respondents to be "extremely" important with 8535 responses which identified the Vietnam issues as either "extremely" or "very" important while, at the same time, he found that few of the respondents were willing to class any of the issues as "completely unimportant."42

Sorting through the issues as related to candidate preference Craig found that those who thought it was a mistake getting involved in Vietnam tended to support McCarthy. The "pull out" voters supported McCarthy while the "try to

end the fighting" and the "stronger stand" voters tended to support Johnson. As the voter tended to more "hawkishness" Craig found they became less supportive of the President, criticizing him for not being more "hawkish." Craig concluded that "approval" or "disapproval" of the way Johnson was handling the war was more important than the respective voter's specific policy toward the war in Vietnam.

To examine more closely the relationship between "Hawk" and "Dove" opinions, Craig created a "Dove" index and tested the index against background factors and candidate preference. Background factors helped explain partially the "Hawk" support for McCarthy and the "Dove" support for Johnson but not entirely, as Craig noted. Younger Democrats, the least educated, with less political experience, and lower efficacy feelings profiled those "Hawks" who tended to support McCarthy. The same profile of "Doves" produced a mixed result. Craig concluded that the critical measure was "lack of knowledge" about the primary which increased McCarthy's support among both "Hawks" and "Doves."[43] This, he noted, partly explained the relationship between low education and McCarthy support.

Craig discarded civil rights opinions as having little relationship to candidate preference but found that two other issues, credibility and the current financial satisfaction of the voter, were factors. Especially after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, voters' support for McCarthy increased as their sense of the believability of the Johnson administration declined. Those less satisfied with their financial situation tended to support McCarthy while those "pretty well" satisfied leaned toward Johnson.[44] Regardless of their view of the Vietnam situation, Craig found that those least satisfied with their financial situation

supported McCarthy. The reverse was the case with those of higher financial satisfaction, belief in the administration, and war policy approval. A dissatisfied and skeptical "Hawk" tended to support McCarthy, revealing the dissatisfaction and skepticism as dominant over that voter's war view.[45]

Party images and candidate images are related to candidate preference in two-party contests as the American Voter studies revealed. Craig found that a similar relationship occurred in the New Hampshire presidential primary. His analysis showed that as important as the voter's perception of the candidates, perceptions of the Democratic Party were as important if the credibility of the incumbent Democratic administration was included in the party image measures. The anti-Democratic Party voters tended to support McCarthy while the pro-party Democrats leaned toward Johnson. But Craig also found that neither candidate was overwhelmingly embraced or rejected by the Democratic electorate. As for candidate image, the more favorable the image of the candidate in the mind of the voter the more likely that voter was to vote for that candidate, a factor that Craig found to be "slightly more powerful in explaining voter preference than party image."[46]

Craig concluded his analysis of candidate images, party images, and candidate preference by noting:

> Voters' images of the two candidates and their images of the credibility and efficacy of the Democratic party were both major influences on candidate preference in the New Hampshire Presidential primary of 1968.
>
> Voters who favorably evaluated either candidate, relative to the other, were very likely to prefer that candidate. At the same time, voters who saw the Democratic party as credible, as represented by the incumbent administration, and efficacious, in terms of future prosperity and the avoidance of larger wars, were much more likely to prefer President Johnson than were those voters whose opinions did not favor the Democratic party in these areas.

> In general, then, candidate images and party images, at least as measured here, were as influential in candidate preference in this primary as they appear to have been in two-party election contests in the past. Opinions on Vietnam were also important influences, but less than party or candidate images.[47]

Craig then examined "Candidate-Issue Proximity, party images, candidate images, opinions, and candidate preference." While he felt the effort was "less than a total success," he did find it to be the "most powerful variable" he had found "explaining candidate preference."[48] The question used to represent the variable was "Which of the candidates can best handle this issue?" While Craig did see the proximity of the voter to the candidate as being an important evaluator of the result he did feel that its status as a measure was "unclear" because it "measured many things at once but not clearly." The power of the measure seemed to come from the fact that it combined other individual measures into one index which was found to have a higher value than any of the single measures he examined. He then had to condition his conclusion by stating that "other major factors continued to exert influence on candidate choice, altering the effect of candidate-issue proximity on candidate preference."[49] This latter conclusion noted that "Hawk-Dove" opinion, credibility, and handling of the war "continued to influence candidate preference," and with about the same power observed prior to Craig's use of the candidate-issue proximity measure. These three factors, Hawk-Dove opinion, credibility, and handling of the war, must, therefore, be considered the important concerns of the New Hampshire voter in 1968. While the sum of the issues analyzed by Craig may be slightly more powerful than the three individual factors as an explanation of the vote, it is the three factors that seem to relate most closely to the pattern of the campaign and the reason why McCarthy, and the campaign's strategy succeeded.

Craig concluded his analysis of the primary voting behavior by noting that "voters' decisions...were influenced by evaluations of the candidates, largely in personal terms, short and long-range opinions on the Vietnam war, and evaluations of the current and future preformance of the Democratic party." He noted that the "order" of the above is about correct but that the "evaluation of the Democratic party" was about "equal in power" to the "effect of the Vietnam war issues on candidate preference."[50] The voter in the primary "behaved rationally according to their values and their information and understanding to that point." "To this extent," Craig concluded, "the results of the New Hampshire Presidential primary of 1968 did not undermine belief in the rationality of the American voter but reinforced such a belief."[51]

The one factor that Craig's analysis and the data he used did not account for was the role of the non-Democratic party adherent - especially the Independent voter. Without the Independents joining the election in significant numbers the result would have been as Craig's data revealed. Approximately three voters to one would have voted for Johnson over McCarthy. This would have produced a victory for Johnson comparable to that which his supporters had predicted during most of the campaign.

The Polls

Polling is an important part of most political contests and especially presidential campaigns. Most potential candidates make their plans many months before the beginning of the presidential campaign season. Part of this planning is an activity known as "testing the water" -- an activity which is divided

between public and private actions. The public actions are usually visits to a state, meetings with important officials, and overtures designed to stimulate electorate interest. The private actions occur below the surface through polls, selection of voter targets, and determining probable campaign issue content.

The New Hampshire McCarthy campaign did not have the resources or the time to pre-plan the campaign. There were no polls for the candidate, no issue experiments, or even much other "water-testing." There was a perceived vacuum; there were issues that were not being addressed, and there was a candidate willing to respond. The campaign planning and management had to rest on the instincts of the candidate and the experience of its principal managers. All else resembled tinkering with a watch, to make it run a bit more accurately.

Although there were public opinion probes that evolved out of the McCarthy campaign (such as canvassing, Dr. Al Shepard's motivational research, rumors of the results of polls taken by other candidates, and polls taken by academics, and the networks) a complete survey was not available to the McCarthy managers. In this section several polls, taken during the campaign, will be examined. Two questions seem most intriguing since all of the polls missed the final result by a considerable margin. The first is whether the polls did contain an inkling of the result and the analysis failed to bring that result to the surface. The second concerns the adequacy of the survey either as to the questions asked or the sample used for the assessment.

Audits and Surveys Poll Commissioned by ABC News.

This survey is the same as that used by Robert E. Craig in his analysis of voting behavior in the New Hampshire primary. The principal criticism concerns the sample universe. As a descriptor of the electorate and as a basis for analysis the survey appears thorough. The election result and the attitudes which the survey detected show the Democratic vote in the primary to be a product of a number of interacting events and attitudes. When taken together the result was a picture of a voting community making rational decisions. These vote decisions were based upon a perception of events, candidates, party image, and information received. If the survey had been available prior to the election and had been analyzed properly it would have helped refine the McCarthy campaign strategy.

The survey failed in its capacity to predict a relative final position for the principal Democratic candidates. It failed because it did not evaluate the attitudes of those not registered as Democrats. What attracted Independents to vote was an aspect of the 1968 primary that was not probed nor its importance appreciated until after the votes had been counted. A profile of the Independent voter, an assessment of what might or might not prompt voting would have been an important descriptor for campaign planning and for post-election voter analysis.

University of New Hampshire Survey.

A political science class at the University of New Hampshire conducted an early survey to assess issue opinions and voter candidate preference.[52] The survey included a sample drawn from the registered Independents as well as the registered Democrats and Republicans. Taken January 5, 1968, the survey pre-

ceded the public announcement of McCarthy's New Hampshire candidacy and reflects opinions set at a time when McCarthy's candidacy in New Hampshire was seriously in doubt. The findings of this survey are instructive although limited in sample size and, to some extent, in its interpretation.

Two assumptions had been made by the New Hampshire McCarthy leaders. First, anti-Vietnam war sentiment was not strong in New Hampshire as evidenced by the low level of organized anti-war activity.

The second assumption was that Robert Kennedy might well receive a useful protest vote in the primary much as Lodge had done in 1964. This latter assumption was based upon Kennedy's prominent name and regional identity rather than a sense that he would himself broaden and legitimize anti-Vietnam war opinions.

When the UNH students analyzed their survey (see Table 14.18) they came close to predicting the primary election result. With "all voters" included, the percent support for President Johnson was 49.4. The actual return was 49.6 percent of the Democratic vote. What is of special interest is the total percent of "all voters" supporting candidates other than President Johnson as of the January 5th date of the UNH survey. Robert Kennedy, the most prominent name in the survey, received 21.0 percent; Eugene McCarthy, 8.9 percent; and George Wallace, 5.1 percent. The total recorded for the three alternative candidates was 35.0 percent. The "undecided" percentage was 12.8 percent. It may be concluded that the campaign began with 35 percent willing to identify with a name other than that of the incumbent President. Further, an additional 12.8 percent indicated a wait and see attitude. This gave an alternate candidate to Johnson an important early advantage that few recognized.

If the McCarthy leaders had been unable to fold into their organization the Kennedy Write-in effort of Eugene Daniell, and if George Wallace had ignored the embarrassment of his April 1967 visit to Dartmouth College, the final vote might have been badly splintered. McCarthy received 42.0 percent of the Democratic ballots cast. His campaign had been successful in directing those voters dissatisfied with President Johnson toward McCarthy's candidacy.

While the data used in the UNH Student Survey was compiled from all voters and not just Democratic party registrants, Robert Craig concludes that the "...primary was similar to a Presidential election in all respects except that it took place within a party's primary."[53] The data drawn from this early survey and analyzed by including "all voters" revealed important aspects of the 1968 New Hampshire primary environment in 1968. These aspects were omitted in other surveys which focussed on the specific category of voter -- Republican, Democrat, or Independent.

When the data was disaggregated by party label the results were as the Johnson campaign organizers predicted. Table 14.18 shows President Johnson having 60.7 percent support among those "strictly" identified as Democrats, with Kennedy having 25.6 percent; McCarthy 5.2 percent; Wallace 1.7 percent, and 6.8 percent "DK, NA, other." The figures shift considerably when "Independents" and "Republicans" are included. Johnson's percentage drops to 45 with the McCarthy and Wallace percentages increasing considerably, as does the "DK, NA, other" class.

On the one hand when the analysis incorporates "all voters" the finding approximates the actual result of the Democratic primary, while on the other hand, when the analysis excludes the Independents and the Republicans, the result shifts heavily in favor of President Johnson. The Republicans must be excluded from the analysis because they are ineligible by law to vote for a Democratic candidate on a Democratic ballot. Nothing the following table, with Republicans excluded, the relationship again shifts favorably toward the alternative candidates against President Johnson. With the "DK, NA, other" responses dropped, the three alternative candidate possibilities gather 41.5 percent of the responses against 53.1 percent for the incumbent president. Allotting 60 percent of the "DK, NA, other" responses to the alternative candidates' total and 40 percent to Johnson, the gap closes much as did the gap between the principal candidates in the actual primary. McCarthy's appeal to Independents and Republicans showed some early strength in this survey, a factor that became important in the final result. When the Republican write-in votes for McCarthy and for Johnson were added to the Democratic total, the Johnson edge shrank to 524 votes or less than one percent difference in total votes cast on both party ballots. The UNH student survey contained an important prediction of the final result that was not interpreted at the time of the campaign.

TABLE 14.18: DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE PREFERENCE, BY "STRICT" PARTY IDENTIFICATION, NEW HAMPSHIRE, JANUARY 1968[54]

	Johnson	Kennedy	McCarthy	Wallace	DK,NA,Other	Total
Democrats[A]	60.7%	25.6%	5.2%	1.7%	6.8%	100% (117)
Independents[B]	45.5	22.2	10.1	6.0	16.2	100% (99)
Both	53.1	29.9	7.7	3.85	11.5	100% (216)
DK, NA, Other	4.6	29.9	41.5	3.85	6.9	
Allocated	57.7			48.4		

[A]Not including "leaning" Independents including "strong" and "not so strong" party identifiers.

[B]Including "leaning" Independents as well as those with no party identification.

In addition to producing a voter survey that was close to predicting the final outcome of the primary, the UNH survey spotted attitudes on the most important issue of the campaign, the handling of the Vietnam war. Table 14.19 shows the analysis of responses to a scale of three questions from "Pull out" to "Take a stronger stand" in Vietnam. The analysis is based on the "all voters" universe of the survey. Again, the "all voters" aggregation appears not to reflect the actual voting situation, where only the registered Independents had a choice of primary ballots, except that in the end the "all voters" aggregation proved a better predictor of the results than did the strict party registration identification.

TABLE 14.19: OPINION ON "WHAT TO DO IN VIETNAM NOW" BY POLITICAL PARTY, JANUARY, 1968[55]

	"Pull Out"	"Stay but end fighting"	"Take a stronger stand"	DK, NA Other	Total	All Voters
Democrats[a]	7.7%	40.2%	38.5%	13.7%	100% (117)	28.2%
Independents	6.1	37.4	55.6	-	100% (99)	23.9
Republicans[a]	9.2	30.3	48.1	12.4	100% (185)	44.6
DK, NA, Other					100% (14)	3.4
All Voters	8.0	34.5	47.0	10.6		100% (415)

[a]Not including those "leaning" toward political party.

A contention made by the organizers of the McCarthy campaign was that a dissatisfied voting population existed who described their position on the Vietnam war as being "Let's win the war or get out." As Craig wrote in his re-cap of the survey conducted by his students, "The Hoeh group was quite accurate in their perception that strong anti-war sentiment in New Hampshire was rare."[56] (See Table 14.19) While the McCarthy organizers did recognize the rarity of vocal and organized anti-Vietnam War sentiment they also recognized that a statement like "Let's win the war or get out" did not reflect support for the Johnson war policy. To develop a campaign that would capture this sentiment and produce a vote from this feeling would require considerable care. This was the justification for the careful preparations of the pre-campaign and the care which the McCarthy leaders took to develop the early stages of the candidacy.

The UNH survey confirmed that the "Pull out" and "Take a stronger stand" exceeded the percentage recorded for "Stay but end fighting" in every case. While the "Take a stronger stand" might put off less imaginative campaigners, it did not disturb the New Hampshire McCarthy leaders. Their political senses were that the "Hawk" stance was an acceptable way for a New Hampshire person to express concern about the way the war was being handled. It was also an acceptable mask for other concerns which were difficult to express, such as concern about the impact of the war on the domestic economy, impact on U.S. world status, and the success of domestic policies. To "Pull out" represented to many a posture of weakness that they would not verbalize.

When sentiments concerning Vietnam policy were cross-tabulated with candidate preference, the view held by the McCarthy organizers was supported. Johnson gathered only 4.4 percent of those expressing "Pull out" sentiments. The middle position "Stay but end fighting" did not generate even a majority position among Johnson's supporters. While Kennedy and McCarthy gathered the highest percentage of the anti-war expression, they also did well among the "Hawks." Public opinions with which the campaign for McCarthy had to deal, were ones of dissatisfaction with administration policy but a dissatisfaction that leaned toward an aggressive stance. From this the McCarthy organizers felt that a positive alternative to the administration's stumbling Vietnam policy would be welcomed. 55.0 percent of all the voters surveyed endorsed a policy that proposed a change in the current situation in Vietnam.

TABLE 14.20: OPINION ON "WHAT TO DO IN VIETNAM NOW" BY PREFERENCE FOR POSSIBLE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES, ALL VOTERS, JANUARY, 1968[57]

	"Pull Out"	"Stay but end fighting"	"Take a stronger stand"	DK, NA Other	Total	All Voters
Lyndon Johnson	4.4%	39.5%	47.8%	8.3%	100% (205)	49.4%
Robert Kennedy	16.1	35.6	36.8	11.4	100% (87)	21.0
Eugene McCarthy	10.8	27.0	51.4	10.8	100% (37)	8.9
George Wallace	9.5	9.5	66.7	14.3	100% (21)	5.1
Undecided	3.8	30.2	49.1	17.0	100% (53)	12.8
NA, Others					100%	
All Voters	8.0	34.5	47.0	10.6	100% (415)	100% (415)

Given the fact that Eugene McCarthy was little known by the respondents at the time the survey was taken (8.9 percent of all voters January 5, 1968) and the other possibilities (Kennedy and Wallace) receded as McCarthy's candidacy developed, it is not surprising that the "Hawk" and "Dove" sentiments clustered around the candidate offering an alternative. What is striking is that the Johnson campaign organizers neglected to recognize the deep weakness of their candidate as registered by the voters' response to the Vietnam scale. The Johnson managers seemed to have jumped over this soft spot to a strategy transferring the popularity of New Hampshire Democratic Party notables to Johnson.

Party unity behind its president, led by its U.S. Senator, Tom McIntyre, and its Governor, John W. King, was the strategy which Bernard L. Boutin adopted to cover the weakness. A strategy that did not work against the combination of the flow of events in Vietnam, especially the Tet offensive, and the careful development of the McCarthy candidacy.

Oliver Quayle and Company Survey for NBC News.

Oliver Quayle and Company was commissioned by the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) to survey New Hampshire voter opinion. Quayle's survey was based on the "attitudes and responses of 247 Adult residents of New Hampshire who stated that they were certain to vote in the Democratic Presidential Primary Election...." The respondents were interviewed between "December 9th and 16th" 1967 and were re-interviewed on a "panel basis" between February 22nd and 24th (1968). The panel was composed of 157 of those who had been interviewed in the December survey.[58]

From conversations between Quayle and the author, Quayle implied that these data, or similar data, were made available to the White House. Writing to Hoeh, April 10, 1972, Quayle said, "NBC says OK so I enclose a copy of the survey I did for them in '68. The other earlier survey was done for someone else and is not available." (Emphasis added) Several persons involved in the management of the Johnson campaign stated to the author after the contest that they had used a "Quayle Poll" as the basis of their campaign planning.

The survey that is discussed here was prepared for "immediate internal use at NBC and for use on the air Election Night as NBC sees fit in accordance with its own policies."[59] The report date is "March 1968." While not specifically stated, the survey sample appears to include registered Independents. A note to the effect that "8 percent are Independents and 92 percent are Democrats" appears to confirm the conclusion that the survey reached beyond registered and "certain" to vote Democrats. The analysis was written to assist election night reporting and to suggest how the results might be displayed for television viewing. The internal analysis is instructive, first as a profile of the attitudes evident at two stages during the election period, and second, as an implied basis for campaign strategy adjustments that were made by the Johnson campaign. The word "implied" is used because the author feels that either an identical survey was supplied the New Hampshire Johnson campaigners or a similar survey developing much the same conclusion was produced by Oliver Quayle and Company for their use.[60]

Quayle's polling reached for factors which could serve as useful inputs to campaign planning. His skill in discovering these relationships and then advising a political strategy made him one of the most sought after pollsters in the 1960's. His approach is demonstrated in the NBC poll.[61]

It appears from the first item of the NBC analysis that someone wanted to know whether the interests of the President could be adequately, or better represented in New Hampshire by the state's top political leadership than by the President himself. Although it appeared from Bernard Boutin's conversation

with Sandra Hoch, August 1967, that the President's campaign would be conducted without his actual participation, the survey in December may have served as an additional check for the strategy of having his interests represented by surrogates. It was not too late at that time to change the strategy and have Lyndon Johnson enter his name as a candidate in the primary. Quayle's "Job Rating" scale as of Mid-December read:

TABLE 14.21: JOB RATINGS[62]

	All Democratic Party Primary Presidential Voters as of Mid-December				
	Johnson	McCarthy	Kennedy	McIntyre	King
Favorable	74%	52%	55%	80%	90%
Unfavorable	26%	48%	45%	20%	10%

Quayle interpreted the Mid-December finding as meaning that if "the writeing effort for Mr. Johnson yields a higher percentage of the primary support than is presently indicated in this report, at least part of the credit must be accorded the state's Democratic Senator and Governor."[63] The Mid-December finding tended to re-enforce Boutin's concept for the write-in campaign. King and McIntyre would be the leaders and, presumably, transfer their own popularity to the somewhat less popular President. At the worst Johnson retained "74 percent" favorable, a percentage that may have been the source of Boutin's and McIntyre's early optimism.

What Quayle found when he re-surveyed in February was that "only two Democratic Primary voters took a favorable view of the President's record for every three who had done so two and a half months earlier."[64] The shift in the "Job Rating" showed Johnson declining from his 74 percent December peak to 67 percent favorable three weeks before the election. The unfavorable view had grown from 26 percent to 33 percent in the same period which Quayle interpreted as "a fourth again as many of the same Democratic Presidential Primary voters took a dim view of the job being done by the President in February as those who had held such an opinion in December...." The reason for the "ebb" in Johnson's popularity, Quayle conceded, was because of the "loss of the Pueblo and the enemy Tet offinsive...." He then concluded that since "fully 33 percent of those Democrats who are willing to rate Mr. Johnson give him an unfavorable score. We regard this as a very reasonable potential for McCarthy...or write-in for Robert Kennedy."[65]

In a section titled "Standings" Quayle found that the "write-in support of President Johnson declined more markedly between mid-December and late February than did his job rating."

TABLE 14.22: DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY PREFERENCES[66]

	All Democratic Presidential Primary Preferences Voters			
	With Undecided In		With Undecided Out	
	Dec. '67 %	Feb. '68 %	Dec. '67 %	Feb. '68 %
Lyndon Johnson	65	55	82	72
Eugene McCarthy	7	16	9	22
Robert Kennedy	6	4	8	5
Others	1	1	1	1
Not sure	21	24	-	-

Quayle concluded that "the sharp rise in McCarthy's standing among the Granite State's Democratic Primary voters results at least partially from his active campaigning in the state." The switch of the Kennedy write-in to McCarthy was underway at the time of the first survey. This was credited by Quayle for Kennedy's decline in the second survey. Also, McCarthy had not announced his New Hampshire candidacy in December. To Quayle the movement away from Johnson was "ominous." "Unless his supporters...can halt and reverse the current tide, the anti-incumbent total on March 12th could well add to something over 30 percent." This Quayle surmised would be a "distinct setback to Mr. Johnson's chances for re-election." He then pursued his analysis a bit further by noting, "such an anti-Johnson percentage might be interpreted (falsely, as well shall soon see) as an expression of dove sentiment on Vietnam."[67]

Quayle's reasons for predicting problems for Johnson resulting from the shift were: 1. McCarthy has momentum; and, 2. the increase in the number of undecided usually indicates that more movement in the same direction is to come. The McCarthy canvass analysis had picked up the same shift. The McCarthy campaign strategy also shifted to take advantage of both the momentum and the increase in the number of undecideds that the canvassers were encountering during February.

Using a "Key Group Analysis" Quayle concluded that President Johnson received the "support of less than two thirds of the Democratic Primary voters among only one of the eleven critical segments of the electorate" as of February. Because of this Quayle felt that "subgroup" preferences were of considerable

importance in the contest. It may be that in this analysis Quayle lost sight of the true contest. He wrote, "...if the President runs better than 72 percent on Primary Day it will be due in large part to his strength among Democratic Primary voters of 50 and over and those resident in Hillsborough County." The earlier 72 percent figure cropped up again at this stage when his previous analysis showed strong trends wittling at this figure. This conclusion may be the basis for Boutin's continued optimism and holding to the high percentage for Johnson that he did until the last few days of the campaign. The most Quayle would concede was that the "McCarthy-Kennedy total would be something topping 27 percent" which he felt would come from defecting Johnson supporters among voters under 35 years old.[68]

Examining volunteered responses to a list of 32 selected issues, Quayle found that the New Hampshire voters placed Vietnam as "far and away" the most important issue. Using nine of the thirty-two issues to profile the voter opinion and to relate that to candidate preference, Quayle found that two thirds of all opinions offered included taxes and spending, Vietnam, and racial relations. Of these Quayle found that five Democratic primary voters expressed concern over taxes and spending and racial relations for every three concerned about the war in Vietnam, and "on the fiscal issues of overtaxing and overspending and social civil rights...we find five McCarthy supporters volunteering concern for every three backing the President."[69]

TABLE 14.23: KEY GROUP ANALYSIS[70]

	All Democratic Presidential Primary Voters Voting For:									
	McCarthy		Johnson		Kennedy		Others		(Not Sure)	
	Dec '67	Feb '68	Dec '67	Feb '68	Dec '67	Feb '68	Dec '67	Feb '68	Dec '67	Feb '68
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Overall	9	22	82	72	8	5	1	1	(21)	(23)
Sex										
Male	9	24	81	67	9	8	1	1	(17)	(20)
Female	9	20	83	78	4	2	4	-	(25)	(27)
Age										
21-34	14	24	75	67	11	9	*	-	(24)	(19)
35-49	5	28	83	68	7	4	5	-	(22)	(26)
50 and over	7	19	87	78	4	-	2	3	(16)	(25)
Economic Level										
Upper & Upper-Middle	14	18	78	82	3	-	5	-	(20)	(27)
Middle	8	23	82	71	8	6	2	-	(21)	(23)
Lower	5	25	86	63	9	9	*	3	(21)	(22)
Area										
1st CD	8	24	85	72	5	2	2	2	(25)	(25)
2nd CD	10	21	79	71	10	8	1	-	(15)	(22)
Special Area										
Hillsborough County	5	19	90	78	4	3	1	-	(24)	(26)

* Less than 0.5 percent

When the issues were examined the pattern of "favorable" to "unfavorable" views of President Johnson's performance was more striking than Quyale seemed to perceive. While Vietnam was the top issue, the opinion split between the two reactions was quite close -- 53 percent favorable to 47 percent unfavorable. On

several economic issues the opinion against Johnson's performance was strong: Keeping the cost of living down, "unfavorable 76 percent; holding the line on taxes, "unfavorable" 65 percent; stopping waste in government, "unfavorable" 81 percent.

In his text analysis of the following table, Quayle concentrated on the war issue which he explained with subjective views of his own. For example, "...doves are notoriously more vocal than hawks and frustrates," which seemed to imply the existence of a majority later labelled by President Nixon as the "silent majority." His subsequent discussion of the issues concentrated on voter attitudes toward the war in Vietnam, he did not pursue the economic issues that showed such high levels of "unfavorable" response.

TABLE 14.24: SELECTED NATIONAL ISSUES[71]

	All Democratic Presidential Primary Voters	All Democratic Presidential Primary Voters Rating President Johnson's Job Performance as:		
	Most Important %	Favorable %	Unfavorable %	Not Sure %
Handling the War in Vietnam	47	53	47	(5)
Working for peace and Disarmament	28	65	35	(5)
Keeping the cost of living down	22	24	76	(5)
The War on Poverty	19	54	46	(7)
Holding the line on taxes	17	35	65	(5)
Fighting crime	15	50	50	(11)
Help for older people	15	80	20	(2)
Handling riots in our cities	13	41	59	(5)
Stopping waste in government spending	13	19	81	(18)

In his analysis of the sentiment toward U.S. Vietnam policy Quayle reported that "dove feelings were far outweighed by both hawk and Administration points of view."[72] While he recognized that there had been a shift in "hawk" sentiment since the Tet offensive, he explained by noting, "we must remember that these are the views of Democrats and that they are less hawkish and more in support of our present policies than the general electorate across the nation." How this interpretation related to the New Hampshire situation and the sentiment of the person who would actually be voting in the March 12th primary seems obscure. When Quayle combined the two "dove" questions he found a total percentage of 21 which was less than the 27 percent which he had attributed to the McCarthy/Kennedy group earlier. He concluded then that McCarthy/Kennedy "are attracting more than dove support," but did not reach for a reason for this higher support. Instead he wrote, "Rather surprisingly, Senator McCarthy's campaigning among Democratic primary voters...has thus far left them surprisingly ignorant of his stand on the war."[73] This conclusion when given to the leaders of the Johnson campaign, led them to change their strategy. They attacked McCarthy directly, charging that he had not communicated his policy proposals toward Vietnam effectively. They assumed that if McCarthy did make clear his positions that his support would recede to the "dove" figure of 21 percent.

To determine the accuracy of his conclusion about McCarthy's Vietnam position, Quayle analyzed the McCarthy favorable responses against the below sequence of questions. He reported that "in December only 19 percent of these primary voters identified as a dove -- about one in five." By late February, using the same analysis he found that "more than half" of the voters were "still unaware

of his stance on the war." He then concluded that "this ignorance of McCarthy's position on Vietnam quite startlingly turns out to be the major reason he currently stands so well among this electorate vis-a-vis Johnson."

TABLE 14.25: ATTITUDES TOWARD U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM[74]

	Democratic President Primary Voters' own Views:			
	With Undecided In		With Undecided Out	
	Dec. '67	Feb. '68	Dec. '67	Feb. '68
	%	%	%	%
"We should go all out, fight an unlimited war (short of using nuclear weapons) and either win or force negotiations"	47	35	51	39
"We should do as we are, keep on fighting a limited but increasing military operations as necessary while seeking negotiations"	29	36	31	40
"We should stay in Vietnam but reduce military operations"	5	5	5	5
Not sure	7	9	-	-

TABLE 14.26

Voting for:	Democratic Presidential Primary Voters Who Feel That McCarthy's Position on Vietnam is:[75]				Democratic Presidential Primary Voters Who Don't Know McCarthy's Position on Vietnam:	
	Hawk of LBJ		Dove			
	Dec. '67 %	Feb. '68 %	Dec. '67 %	Feb. '68 %	Dec. '67 %	Feb. '68 %
Johnson	70	31	92	73	90	77
McCarthy	22	48	-	16	4	22
Kennedy	4	21	8	8	4	1
Other	4	-	-	3	2	-
(Not Sure)	(32)	(9)	(5)	(22)	(23)	(25)

Almost as a footnote to this analysis, Quayle returns to the lack of support President Johnson had for his economic policies as represented by voter response to the taxing and spending questions. He noted that if Johnson received less than "72 percent of the vote" then "it will be because New Hampshire's Democratic Primary voters have turned away from him..." on the economic issues. "In other words, if McCarthy/Kennedy come in at better than 27 percent it will be an across-the-board dissatisfaction with Johnson generally rather than on any single issue."[76]

Given the fact that President Johnson withdrew as a candidate shortly after the New Hampshire primary, a reason for his action may well be attributed to this conclusion. While Quayle does offer a campaign strategy for dealing with the voter perception concerning McCarthy and Vietnam policy, he did not offer a strategy for reversing the President's weakness in terms of "across-the-board dissatisfaction with Johnson generally."[77]

Returning to his preoccupation with the voters uncertainty about McCarthy, Quayle found that when asked to volunteer either praise or criticism of Senator McCarthy, 62 percent were "Not Sufficiently Familiar With Him To Comment," and of those who did comment, 16 percent were "unfavorable" because they did not like his stand on Vietnam.[78] Testing this reaction Quayle developed the responses as follows:

TABLE 14.27: ATTITUDES TOWARD STATEMENT "I TEND TO THINK LESS OF EUGENE McCARTHY BECAUSE HE WANTS US TO KNUCKLE UNDER TO THE COMMUNISTS"[79]

	With Undecided In	With Undecided Out
	%	%
Agree	21	43
Disagree	27	57
Not Sure	52	-

Quayle concluded this portion of his analysis by noting "if the Senator is weaker on March 12th than we currently show, it will be in large part because he has not (or Mr. Johnson's supporters have not) made his position on Vietnam clear to these voters. And as an obvious corollary, if McCarthy gains more of the vote than we show, it will be because he has been able to conceal his Vietnam stance from this electorate. (Or the President's supporters have not been able to tag him as opposed to standing firm on Vietnam.)"[80] Again, Quayle prods the Johnson campaign to attack McCarthy as a dove.

Although Quayle tried to determine whether McCarthy's candidacy was viewed as being devisive by loyal Democrats he did not develop the issue to the extent of Robert Craig's analysis. Quayle found that one voter in twelve was dissatisfied with McCarthy for causing "dissension" within party ranks. He did not question for dissatisfaction caused by the way the Johnson campaign was structured or the voters' perception of Johnson's New Hampshire campaign tactics (such as the pledge cards) as these related to voter opinions of President Johnson himself.

Testing for what had been discussed as Johnson's "credibility gap," Quayle concluded, by using a Major words and phrases association test, that the "gap" did "not appear to be damaging the President severely among...primary voters." He noted that only "an eighth of the voters complained that he (Johnson) was not completely honest...."[81]

TABLE 14.28: MAJOR WORDS AND PHRASES ASSOCIATED WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON[82]

	All Democratic Primary Voters
	%
Favorable	
Hard working	74
Honest, has integrity	65
Patriotic	57
Dedicated	55
Responsible	53
A fighter	48
Courageous	43
Unfavorable	
Wheeler-dealer	25
An arm twister	12
Can't be believed	11
Out for himself	10
Hits below the belt	10
Crude	8
Corny	7

Using the same measure Quayle concluded that if Senator McCarthy fell below the "mark assigned to him in this report, a part of the reason may lie in the fact that many of these voters have come to think of him as a fuzzy-minded and over idealistic living-room liberal...this could well cost him votes among hardheaded Granite Staters."[83]

TABLE 14.29: MAJOR WORDS AND PHRASES ASSOCIATED WITH SENATOR McCARTHY

	Democratic Primary Voters Making Associations
	%
Favorable	
Dedicated	47
Patriotic	47
Responsible	44
Hard working	41
Honest, has integrity	38
Forward looking	34
Courageous	31
Unfavorable	
Out for himself	28
Can't win	19
Living-room liberal	19
Fuzzy-minded	16
A dreamer	16
Not entirely loyal	16
Too idealistic	16

Quayle concluded his analysis with a small table representing attitudes in response to the statement, "President Johnson has not been entirely forthright in keeping us informed about Vietnam." 48 percent agreed, 38 percent disagreed, 14 percent were "not sure." Taking out the "not sure", the percentages increased to 56 and 44 respectively. Although Quayle stated earlier that he did not consider the "credibility gap" as "damaging" he concluded his analysis by writing,

"...if Mr. Johnson falls short of 73 percent, some of the shrinkage of his support may be laid to the credibility gap. Indeed, we consider this one of the very dramatic findings of this survey." The "56 percent" response to the question concerning Johnson's forthrightness seems to have startled Quayle in the final stages of his analysis. To offer a possible critique of the Johnson campaign strategy Quayle wrote:

> If McCarthy climbs over the 27 mark the Johnson strategists will have erred in placing too much emphasis on selling Lyndon Johnson (title of basic literature piece is "A Strong Man in a Tough Job") and too little on whether or not the U.S. should stand firm in Vietnam."[85]

Given the thrust of Quayle's survey and subsequent analysis, his comments under the title "A Final Observation" seem to come late in his examination. These observations conflict with his earlier analysis. His identification of Vietnam as the major campaign issue and his lack of attention to the economic concerns reflected in his own data appear at odds.

> Some political observers have called U.S. policy in Vietnam the major issue in the Democratic Presidential Primary Election in New Hampshire; as of late February it was not, and if it should become so the fact will damage Senator McCarthy. There is certainly frustration and unhappiness with the fact of the war, and this certainly is a big factor contributing to the over-all dissatisfaction. But domestic policies, particularly the economy and racial disorders, contributed. And so the President as a person, as witness the credibility gap.[86]

1968 in New Hampshire presented those analyzing the activity with a confusing picture. Quayle's analysis seems to jump from reporting results, to advising on campaign strategy, to interpreting findings for both a news gathering client and to advising a presidential client. The misleading aspect

of the survey is Quayle's frequent reference to a "72 percent" vote for President Johnson -- a percent that, given Quayle's own analysis, should have been softened considerably. If it is true that the Johnson campaign managers relied on this percentage it is not difficult to see how they were misled. Starting a political contest with a large preference bulge is one thing but expecting that bulge to stand up during a hotly contested election campaign is quite another -- especially when one candidate is not actively campaigning.

The Dartmouth College Survey.

Conducted by students in a Voting Behavior Seminar under the direction of Professors Roger Davidson and David Kovenock, this survey assessed voter opinion close to the date of the election. Unlike the UNH Survey, which was conducted early in the election period (January 5, 1968) and was designed to determine voter concerns, the Dartmouth survey was taken between February 16 and 26, 1968 and was designed to anticipate the election result.

The survey sampled 360 cases on an area probability basis which was stratified by county and size of place. 1965 population estimates were used and the results showed general conformity with expectations based on previous census data and professional polls. The interviewers experienced an unusually high "turndown" rate of about 30 percent. This had the effect of slightly inflating the proportion of political actives and slightly deflating the proportion of the less active. This was particularly true among the lower middle-class in the city of Manchester, Kovenock reported. The estimated error based on the likely primary voters was expected to be approximately 8 percentage points.

The poll used as "likely" voters those who were registered, who had voted in the 1964 Presidential primary and 1966 gubernatorial election, and who planned to vote in the 1968 primary. If the voter was too young to have voted in the 1964 Presidential primary then the 1966 state election served as evidence of participation. "Unlikely" voters were all others who were registered but who failed to meet the other criteria as "likely" voters. The Dartmouth student pollsters used a paper ballot that appeared like an official ballot. To cast a write-in vote one had to write-in the candidate's name on the paper.

The principal tabular report of the survey was a preference summary and a choice summary regarding the Vietnam position. The survey covered both party primaries and reported findings for the Republicans as well. In fact, the press release issued by Davidson and Kovenock emphasized the Nixon lead (nearly 75 percent) and the "minimal" effect, on the outcome, of the Romney withdrawal. Romney, they predicted, would get less than "8 percent of the vote."

Less certain of the Democratic primary result, Davidson and Kovenock surmised that Johnson's write-in effort would give him a majority and that "peace candidate Senator Eugene McCarthy should draw between one-fifth and one-fourth of the Democratic primary vote."

TABLE 14.30: CANDIDATE CHOICE AMONG DEMOCRATS, BY LIKELIHOOD OF VOTING[a]

Candidate	"Likely Voters"	"Unlikely Voters"	All Democrats
Johnson	48%	36%	43%
McCarthy	17	9	13
Kennedy	9	6	8
DK, NA, Other	26	50	37
Totals	100% (65)	100% (55)	100% (120)

[a] Registered Democrats plus all Independents who said they planned to vote in the Democratic primary.

For some reason not altogether clear, this survey failed to detect the support of alternative candidates that was found by the UNH students in their January 5th poll or the findings of the McCarthy canvassing. President Johnson's support was at a level close to that which the UNH student poll reported and certainly closer to the vote result of 49.6 percent than the 72 percent that Quayle mentioned in his survey. The softness in the Dartmouth finding must be attributed to the 36 percent turndown of "likely voters" and the 50 percent turndown of "unlikely voters". Why the high turndown rate is not explained.

When Robert Craig examined this survey in his analysis he used it to describe a shift as contrasted with other data that he was examining. He wrote:

> By the end of February, voters were moving toward McCarthy, some simply moving away from Johnson, so that Johnson still appeared to be the likely winner in the primary but his margin was eroding and the "undecided" groups were closer to McCarthy type "protest" voters than Johnson "support" voters. Large-scale shifts began during the TET impact of early and middle February and continued a movement of dissent from the administration's policy handling of Vietnam, either reacting that the policy was not enough or that it was too much. The Independent and undecided voter began to move with the growing shift to "McCarthy as protest."[87]

Referencing an earlier report of Johnson's support at 60 percent, Craig interpreted the findings of the Dartmouth Survey as a major erosion of Johnson's support -- from 60 percent to 43 percent with 37 percent "undecided" among all Democrats.[88] When he examined the second table produced from the Dartmouth Survey relating Vietnam opinion, Craig concluded:

> The "undecided" Democratic voter group (26 percent of all Democrats) was heavily opposed to the "moderate" solution to the Vietnam war and susceptible to a "protest" which combined these points of view as McCarthy's supporters did.[89]

Davidson and Kovenock in their pre-primary election press release highlighted as "other findings," the following:

> * Only 34 percent of the New Hampshirites who voted for Johnson in 1964 and only 23 percent of the state as a whole now favor him for President in 1968. And despite Nixon's commanding lead in the primary, only 36 percent favor him in November.
>
> * Half those surveyed feel the U.S. should take a stronger stand in Vietnam, even if it means invading North Vietnam. Only 11 percent wanted to pull out.
>
> * Surprisingly, none of this "dove" vote favored Romney in the primary.
>
> * Nixon's support, while high in all groups, is heaviest among voters with only a grade-school education and lightest among those college-educated. Johnson is doing equally well among less-educated voters, but loses a considerable percentage of the college-educated Democratic voters to McCarthy.[90]

Declining support for Johnson among all voters should have been a tip off to Davidson and Kovenock that a coalition of protest was developing that would increase McCarthy's support. Romney's departure, while not effecting the Republican primary election, could be inferred to be of help to McCarthy. Independents might have supported a Republican "peace" candidate, but when Romney withdrew there remained only one candidate of the "peace protest" variety. The Dartmouth survey analysis did detect some of what Craig subsequently found when he analyzed the ABC survey and that was the socio-economic split between voters for McCarthy and voters for Johnson. Only the "college-educated" loss to Johnson showed in the Dartmouth survey; whereas Craig found McCarthy drawing from the lower socio-economic strata as well. McCarthy's problem was with the

middle-strata according to the Craig analysis. With the socio-economic code another descriptor, religion, was used in the Dartmouth survey. They found that "Johnson is pulling a clear majority of Catholics, but only 28 percent of the Protestants." This finding related to Craig's evaluation. He found middle-strata support for Johnson among those with more favorable views toward the Democratic Party. In other words, the relationship between being Catholic and being a long-term, loyal Democrat, and therefore, a Johnson supporter, appear to relate; although none of the surveys sought to evaluate these factors.[91]

Perhaps an explanation for McCarthy's appeal among Protestants, traditionally Republican or Independent voters in New Hampshire, was the opposite of that among Catholics. Higher education, higher income, and moderate-to-considerable distain for the Democratic Party may be reasons for less loyalty to a Democratic President and greater support for the critic of Johnson, although McCarthy was a Catholic. If a religious issue had arisen in New Hampshire, McCarthy might have benefited by drawing votes from the large population of middle-strata Catholic Democrats.

As for the Vietnam issue, the Dartmouth students found the same situation that the other pollsters found. There were few respondents willing to label themselves as "Doves" or to identify with a "Dove" policy; but, at the same time, few respondents were willing to support the Johnson policy on Vietnam.

TABLE 14.31: CANDIDATE CHOICE AMONG LIKELY DEMOCRATIC VOTERS, BY VIETNAM POSITION[92]

Candidate	"Doves"[a]	"Moderates"	"Hawks"	DK
Johnson	11%	50%	61%	20%
McCarthy	56	15	6	20
Kennedy		10	9	20
DK, NA, Other	33	25	22	40
TOTALS	100% (9)	100% (20)	100% (31)	100% (5)
All Voters	11% (40)	30% (108)	50% (180)	100% (360)

[a]Respondents' Vietnam position determined by response to the question: "Which of the following alternatives do you favor?"

(1) U.S. should pull out entirely ("Doves").
(2) U.S. should keep soldiers there but try to end fighting ("Moderates").
(3) U.S. should take a stronger stand, even if it means invading North Vietnam ("Hawks").

The McCarthy vote came from voter frustration with the administration's war policy. That same frustration may have affected the turnout of those who identified themselves as Johnson supporters. Participation of the Democratic Party/President Johnson loyalists may have declined, while the participation of new voters, Independents selecting the Democratic ballot, and less loyal Democrats may have increased. This question will be examined later. What is important from each of the surveys examined is that identifying with a "Hawk" position did not prevent voters from marking their ballot for the "peace" candidate. A phenomenon that can be explained by understanding the composition of protest and the ability of the McCarthy campaign to draw that protest to their candidate.

Notes

[1]New Hampshire Manual of the General Court. (Concord: Secretary of State, 1961), p. 382.

[2]Ibid., 1961 and 1969 editions.

[3]Ibid., 1969 edition.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid., pp. 325-363.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Craig, R., Op. Cit., p. 120.

[8]New Hampshire Manual of the General Court, 1969 edition.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Each sample was independent of the other and was a state-wide probability sample of registered Democrats and Republicans, but did not include any independent voters. Each respondent was personally interviewed by a member of the field staff and candidate choices were made by "Secret Ballot," simulating the actual balloting process. Of the total 1143 interviews conducted, 734 (64.2%) respondents were registered Republicans and 409 (35.8%) respondents were registered Democrats, slightly inflating the actual ratio of Republicans to Democrats in the state. (Craig, R., Op.Cit., p. 27.)

[17]Craig, R., Op.Cit., p. 28.

[18]Ibid., p. 123.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid., p. 122.

[21]Ibid., p. 125.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid., p. 126.

[25]Ibid., p. 129.

[26]Ibid., p. 132.

[27]Ibid., p. 137.

[28]Ibid., p. 133.

[29]Ibid., p. 134.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid., pp. 134-135.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Ibid., p. 136.

[34]Ibid., p. 139.

[35]Ibid., p. 145.

[36]Ibid., p. 146.

[37]Ibid., p. 151.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Ibid., p. 155.

[40]Ibid., p. 158.

[41]Ibid., pp. 161-162.

[42]Ibid., p. 166.

[43]Ibid., p. 170.

[44]Ibid., p. 171.

[45]Ibid., p. 175.

[46]Ibid., p. 185.

[47]Ibid., p. 219.

[48]Ibid., p. 220.

[49]Ibid., p. 234.

[50]Ibid., p. 246.

[51]Ibid., p. 251.

[52]Conducted by a political science class, supervised by Professor Robert E. Craig, the survey was a "multi-stage random cluster" design. Each town or city ward was considered one cluster of voters and the clusters were chosen at random from the 232 cities and towns of New Hampshire. The voting lists of those units were sampled from all parts of the state. Subsequently 415 interviews were actually obtained from this sample and form the basis of the analysis of the pre-campaign opinion here. Clustering voters in this way has the disadvantage of slightly increasing the unrepresentativeness of the population so that sampling error must be assumed to be higher than a completely random selection and the usual tests of significance do not apply. Yet the limited number of students available to interview and the relative difficulty of travel make the clustered sample ideal for cutting these "costs", if one needs to. As a result of both the above sets of reasons, no significance should be attached to any differences which are less than 5%. (Craig, R., Op.Cit., p. 36.)

[53]Craig, R., Op.Cit., p. 247.

[54]Ibid., p. 40.

[55]Ibid., p. 36.

[56]Ibid., p. 37.

[57]Ibid., p. 38.

[58]Oliver A. Quayle III, A Survey of Presidential Preferences Among Democratic Primary Voters of New Hampshire: Volume I - Analysis. (Bronxville: Oliver Quayle and Company, commissioned by NBC News, March 1968), p. 1.

[59]Ibid.

[60]The "other earlier survey" Hoeh believes was prepared for the White House and/or the New Hampshire campaign managers. The later findings reported in the NBC survey were also made available to the Johnson managers as he determined from subsequent conversations and from the changes that occurred in the Johnson campaign plan during the final days of the contest.

[61]It should also be noted that Quayle packaged his polling to produce data serving a variety of clients. His visit to New Hampshire during the fall of 1967 was for the purpose of developing one of his survey packages in which he produced analyses for major political figures in Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, as well as private (not confirmed) results for the White House.

[62]Quayle, O., Op.Cit., p. 2.

[63]Ibid.

[64]Ibid.

[65]Ibid., p. 3.

[66]Ibid., p. 4.

[67]Ibid.

[68]Ibid., p. 6.

[69]Ibid., p. 7.

[70]Ibid.

[71]Ibid., p. 8.

[72]Ibid., p. 9.

[73]Ibid., p. 10.

[74]Ibid., p. 9.

[75]Ibid., p. 12.

[76]Ibid., p. 13.

[77]Ibid.

[78]Ibid.

[79]Ibid., p. 14.

[80]Ibid.

[81]Ibid., p. 17.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Ibid., p. 15.

[84]Ibid.

[85]Ibid., p. 16.

[86]Ibid., p. 18.

[87]Craig, R., Op.Cit., p. 108.

[88]Ibid.

[89]Ibid.

[90]Roger Davidson and David Kovenock, press release, (Hanover: David C. Hoeh file copy, March 1968).

[91]Craig conclusions: In sum, the Democratic voter behaved rationally, according to his knowledge at the time, heavily influenced by the fact that McCarthy was not expected to be nominated and Johnson was. The New Hampshire primary vote was more the diselection of a president than an election of a president. The voters behaved similarly to a presidential election with candidate images, party images and political issues influencing their votes in about that order of importance, even when the issue was one of the most inflammatory in a generation. The results of the analysis therefore, support both the meta-theory results of The American Voter studies and the belief in the rationality of the American voter. (Craig, R., Op.Cit., abstract, p. 4.)

[92]Dartmouth College Survey, (Hanover: conducted by Political Science students, February 16-23, 1968), David C. Hoeh file copy.

CHAPTER XV

THE CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

Effectiveness Questions

This case study of the 1968 McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire has had two principal objectives. The first has been to document the origin and progress of the campaign in sufficient detail so that it can be examined by those who may wish to determine the nature of domestic politics at that pivotal moment in United States history.

The second objective has been to examine the impact of such an event, first in the context of how votes are translated into political impact (see Chapter XIV) and secondly, in terms of the effectiveness of a campaign strategy. Together, the case history, the descriptive discussion of vote impact, and now the empirical examination of campaign effect, complete a profile of a political event that has already significantly affected American politics.

To conclude this study the vexing question of the campaign's impact on vote production must be tested. Did all of the activity make a difference and more importantly, does the strategy which guided the campaign offer the political scientist a chance to empirically measure its effect?

The question to be examined in this concluding section is the empirical question of whether the campaign efforts produced the McCarthy victory or whether the campaign was merely ancillary to some larger effect such as a national trend against President Johnson and the Vietnam War.

This question takes on added significance when one examines the aggregate election results. A cursory examination indicates that McCarthy's vote appears negatively related to campaign effort. In those large cities and towns where

the McCarthy campaign was concentrated the percent return for McCarthy was less than in those towns where the campaign effort was less or non-existent. Was there a consistently negative relationship between campaign effort and McCarthy's vote total? Could it be that the more effort the campaign expended the lower the percentage vote for McCarthy? Conversely, could it be that by not campaigning in a locality the vote for McCarthy increased? A second and equally troubling observation was the positive relationship between percent vote Democratic for McCarthy and the obvious dominance of a voting district by the Republican Party. Does it follow, therefore, that where Democrats, as a party, are weakest McCarthy did better and, conversely, where Democrats are strongest McCarthy's percentage declines? The strategy adopted by the McCarthy organizers was to prioritize campaign efforts according to Democratic primary vote output by voting district; a strategy which meant that voting districts with relatively fewer Democrats received less attention from the campaign.

Generalizing from these two descriptive observations it is hypothesized that campaign activities on behalf of Eugene McCarthy were: (1) negatively related to McCarthy's vote in "traditionally" Democratic areas; and, (2) positively related to McCarthy's vote in "traditionally" Republican areas.

The above hypotheses are consistent with the findings of the post-primary researchers who concluded that many of those voting for McCarthy were "hawks" who did not understand McCarthy's position on the war in Vietnam.[1] This conclusion is unsettling in that it appears to refute the role and effectiveness of

the McCarthy campaign. Given these findings no significant relationship would appear to exist between the vote decision of a New Hampshire presidential primary voter and campaign efforts directed toward influencing that vote decision.

This conclusion, however, fails to consider the complexities of voting behavior. Intervening factors may have been operating in the 1968 New Hampshire primary which masked the "real" effect campaign activities had upon voter choice and aggregate election outcome (e.g., party identification, socio-economic factors, etc.). It is these secondary factors which require further study before making any final judgment about the impact of the campaign's activities on voter behavior.

Thesis

There is a significant relationship between partisan vote turnout (i.e., Republican - Democrat) and McCarthy's vote ($r = -.2665$, $S = .001$). This relationship has not been identified in earlier research on the New Hampshire presidential primary. Though negatively related to turnout, McCarthy's vote total was positively related to Republican voter turnout ($r = .2880$, $S = .001$). Conversely, McCarthy's vote was negatively related to Democratic voter turnout ($r = -.2369$, $S = .001$). The fact that McCarthy's vote was highest in traditionally Republican areas (i.e., smaller, rural towns of New Hampshire) and proportionately lower in Democratic areas (i.e., the larger cities and urbanized larger towns of New Hampshire) suggests that party identification played a significant role in the outcome of this election.

To discover the nature of this relationship it is important to distinguish between the rural Republican vote and the rural Democratic vote in New Hampshire. Given the above relationship one might conclude that rural New Hampshire Democrats are distinguished from their Republican neighbors only by party label. Rural Democrats could be seen as voting for McCarthy to weaken the incumbent president rather than to support an actual candidacy. While this would be a convenient way to explain the rural Democratic vote for McCarthy it does not support that conclusion when the characteristics of that vote are examined.

The argument fails for two reasons. First, to vote in a primary election one must have registered to vote not less than 90 days prior to the date of a primary and be either registered as a Republican or Democrat, or be listed as an Independent. Only the Independent voter has the option of choosing one or the other party ballot. This means that a strategy to weaken an incumbent president would have to be well developed before the close of the registration period, which it was not, or be successful in drawing Independents into the Democratic primary as a protest as opposed to a direct vote for a Republican candidate with a chance for nomination. The closed registration of the New Hampshire primary mitigates against cross-over voting for the purpose of weakening candidates. Historically, candidate weakening has occurred in the candidate filing stage of the election rather than in the actual voting (i.e., filing straw candidates to disperse ethnic voting blocks).

The second argument is more difficult to make in that the substantiation for the argument comes, first, from observation and second, from an analysis that will be reported subsequently in this chapter. If the rural Democratic vote were merely a label difference between Republican and Democrat, then that difference would fade in general elections as the Democrats would tend, logically, to vote for the Republican candidate. This does not happen. In fact, Democrats in dominant Democratic Party cities have tended to support Republican candidates in close elections, while the rural Democrats having Republican characteristics, have remained loyal to the Democratic Party. (See Manchester in the calculation of the Republican Normal Vote 1960.) What results from this observation is a sense of both similarity and difference in the description of the rural Democratic voter. There is similarity in terms of shared location and, to varying degrees, socio-economic status, but different in terms of political, even ideological persuasion from their Republican neighbors. A reasonably strong thread of liberalism tied to the national image of the Democratic Party tends to remain among the rural New Hampshire Democrats as opposed to the more conservative tendency of the New Hampshire Democrats residing in Democratic Party dominant voting districts. This distinction was explored by Robert Craig in his examination of the efficacy of being a "loyal" Democrat and also a Democrat more closely in agreement with the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy. (See earlier discussion of Craig findings.)

A part of this examination lies in a conclusion about party ideological orientation drawn by E. E. Schattschneider.[2] He concluded that as one party came to dominate the politics of a state, conservatives tended to dominate the politics of that party. For the South the dominant party was the Democratic and for the North the dominant party was the Republican. In New Hampshire the

phenomenon that Schattschneider identified took several forms. The dominant party was conservative Republican, principally rural in its base. Though the Republican Party had dominated state politics since the Civil War, its influence in the cities declined with the industrialization of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and the migration of ethnic blocks to these same industrial centers. The industrial centers, though conservative in their politics, were Democratic by party label.

As Schattschneider notes, the consequence of a decline in competition and greater conservatism is a decline in turnout and partisan loyalty. While the two party split in New Hampshire left the state with a dominant rural Republican Party and a dominant urban Democratic Party with little inter-party competition at the local level, at the state level (gubernatorial), and especially in elections for national office (i.e., congressional and senatorial) competition was strenuous. Consequently, turnout for both statewide and national elections has traditionally been high, but the success rate of the Democratic Party in electing statewide officials has been low until the 1960s and 1970s. In this century the Democratic Party has controlled the governorship for a total of four terms or eight of the last seventy-seven years. The U.S. Senate has been occupied by Democrats for a total of 22 of the past 154 years of senatorial incumbency in this century. The two congressional seats have been occupied by Democrats for a total of seven years in the last 154 years of incumbency in this century.

What this overwhelming dominance by the Republican Party in actual office-holding masks is the fact that elections for governor, for Congress in the First Congressional District, and for the two United States Senate seats have frequently been close, inter-party contests. Depending upon the candidate and the times these elections were decided by narrow margins. The numerical strength of the urban-based Democratic Party has approached that of the rural-based Republican Party for much of this century. This fact has frequently presented the dominant Republican Party with a substantial challenge in the larger than local elections. To continue to dominate these elected offices the Republicans have had to counter Democratic Party numbers with a variety of vote dispersing strategies, first at the candidate filing stage and then by turning out a higher proportion of their members to vote in the general election. The combination of these strategies kept Democrats out of office and out of the state-based political power structure that might have converted New Hampshire into a more obviously competitive two-party state. Part of the failure of the Democratic Party to win larger-than local elections may also be explained by the fact that the dominant urban Democratic Party and the dominant rural Republican Party have often been ideologically compatible, both shared a conservative philosophy although widely different in terms of ethnic composition and socio-economic characteristics.

New Hampshire is illustrative of an additional explanation concerning its relatively high turnout rate in its elections. Because competition for state and national offices remained intense in spite of the fact that inter-party

competition had all but vanished at the local level, turnout in statewide and congressional district elections had to be sustained in order to preserve the dominance of the Republican Party. Reflecting on the phenomenon of high turnout rates in electoral situations where neither competition or ideological difference would prompt such participation, Flanigan noted:

> The high rate of turnout may not have been the result of political involvement by an interested, well-informed electorate, but on the contrary, may have been possible at all only because of low levels of information and interest. A largely uninformed electorate was aroused to vote by means of extreme and emotional appeals. Presumably these alarming bits of information in the absence of a more general awareness of what was at stake produced firm commitments to vote. But, by and large, the parties manipulated the electorate -- a manipulation possible because the electorate was not well informed.[3]

The political chronicles of New Hampshire are peppered with legends of how information was manipulated to influence voting, how absentee ballots were solicited to expand rural voting, and how candidacies were filed to disperse the ethnic voting blocks that gave the Democratic Party potential strength in statewide elections.[4] Through these tactics and the inability of the Democratic Party to either unify in the face of manipulation or to mount its own counter-offensive, the Republican Party dominated New Hampshire statewide politics through the 1960s. It is still possible to manipulate the Democratic vote in Manchester to prevent a Democrat from succeeding to the governorship or to reduce the vote for a particular candidate, such as McCarthy, by applying the right last-minute charge or presenting the potential voter with a reason to vote against a particular candidate.[5] Instead of the party organization as

the manipulative and vote generating source, the activity now is carried out by candidate organizations, and most especially, the dominant information source in New Hampshire, the Manchester Union Leader.

Given the pattern of party dominance and the description of the dominant party as being ideologically conservative, a number of alternative consequences have evolved which offer a basis for explaining aspects of the vote which Senator McCarthy received in the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary.

First, a liberal vote had survived both within the Republican and the Democratic parties of New Hampshire. In both parties the liberals survived in the minority but existed through re-enforcement that was partially internal and partially external to the state. The liberal minority of the Republican Party survives partially as a vestige of a once powerful progressive movement that developed in New Hampshire during the beginning of the 20th century. The descendants of the progressives tended to remain in the Republican Party for reasons of social status and power. The Republican progressives sporadically influenced and frequently controlled the Republican Party during the period through their activism, financing and administrative skills. In other states where the progressives had been strong, like Wisconsin, they gradually migrated to the Democratic Party as their own party became more conservative and the Democrats absorbed the principal themes of progressivism.[6]

A second aspect of the surviving liberalism within the Republican Party comes as a function of New Hampshire's governmental structure and the closed registration process of the primary system. To have influence in the selection

of a governor, the only state official elected statewide, as has been mentioned before, some liberals, who might otherwise have been Democrats, registered as Republicans in order to participate in the Republican primary. Given that the Democrats succeeded in electing a governor only four times in the last 77 years, the Republican gubernatorial primary was viewed by liberal activists as being the election, not the inter-party contest held in November.[7]

What appears, therefore, is a continuum in which liberal Republicans and liberal Democrats share concerns and issues but not party label, and conservative Republicans and conservative Democrats share political perspectives but not labels. The party label becomes a commodity masking ideology depending upon an individual's need for social-political status (i.e., a lawyer having to work closely with the Republican power structure or an ethnic Democrat seeking a federal appointment), or sense of political efficacy (e.g., being a Democrat is to be on the right side of deeply felt social welfare issues, etc.).

Figure 1

The continuum might also be expressed as a circle with the liberals and the conservatives sharing respective ideological halves of the circle with the principal distinction being party identification.

As an example how the liberals of the two parties responded to the options of the 1968 presidential primary provides a useful case. When Governor Romney withdrew as a candidate, for the liberals in the Republican Party several options remained. One, which was most attractive to the strongly identified

Republican liberal was to write-in the name of Governor Nelson Rockefeller on the Republican ballot. 11,241 Republican voters took this option. Those with what must be presumed to be less attachment to the Republican Party and, probably of more liberal inclination, wrote in the name of Senator Eugene McCarthy on their Republican ballots. McCarthy received a total of 5,511 votes from Republicans. Another 1,778 Republican voters wrote in President Johnson's name on their ballots. While precise evaluation of the motives of these voters does not exist, it seems reasonable to assume that the Republican voter writing-in the name of a Democrat is in some manner and for some reason misplaced in the partisan spectrum of New Hampshire. The reason for this misplacing ties back to the role the respective parties play in the selection of candidates and the control of the state government as discussed earlier.

A second factor which helps to distinguish the rural Democrat from the counterpart rural Republican and which may help explain the McCarthy vote among rural Democrats is the strong pull of the national Democratic Party. Those Democrats who respond to issues and political concerns beyond local and state politics tend to identify more strongly with the policies of the national Democratic Party. While the liberal wing of the national Democratic Party may not be significant in the New Hampshire cities, where conservative Democrats have traditionally controlled local politics, their importance is far more pronounced in Republican dominated areas.

To survive as a liberal Democrat in a rural community where one is in the minority both ideologically and in terms of partisan preference, required substantial ideological re-enforcement. This observation leads to the conclusion that high socio-economic status is a pre-condition determining the survival of the rural New Hampshire Democrat, a status that presumes a national political awareness rather than a more provincial intra-state political orientation. A powerful individualism does survive in the small New Hampshire towns which, while not accounted for by normal indicators of socio-economic status, does sustain a few Democrats in Republican dominant areas for that reason alone. To what extent such pockets of individualism explain a McCarthy vote is not known. The only test available is one of socio-economic status which will be explored more fully later in this chapter.

For a number of rural New Hampshire voting districts population growth has been substantial. A horseshoe of growth communities now extends along the southeastern border with Massachusetts, along the seacoast to Rochester in the east, and northward through the Merrimack River valley to Laconia. Southeasternmost Rockingham County was among the nation's most rapidly growing counties as reported by the 1970 U.S. Census.

Many of the in-migrants are former Massachusetts residents who bring with them a more liberal and, usually, Democratic political orientation. While the Republican Party continues to dominate the local politics of many of these growth communities, a new Democratic Party was growing -- one which had not been influenced by the Democratic Party tradition of the remainder of the state.

These new New Hampshire Democrats tend to be nationally oriented in their political perspective and retain information sources, such as the Massachusetts press and media, that continue their political orientation. It would not be surprising to find a higher percentage of these growth communities supporting Senator McCarthy even though the number of Democrats voting are far less than the number of Republicans voting.

A third factor can only be described as a vote of frustration and dissatisfaction with the status quo (i.e., an expression of alienation, confusion, or cross pressure). It is a vote that went to McCarthy because he was perceived to be an anti-establishment figure, an under-dog. These voters, when registered as Republicans, tend to follow the editorial lead of William Loeb. He strikes out in a random manner that does not reflect a particular consistency nor does he ask his readers to react intellectually. It is gut, yellow journalism which stimulates an emotional response -- especially from those who sense alienation and frustration in their own lives.[8] In state politics these voters have followed Loeb's lead and supported the reactionary, Wesley Powell, in his quest for public office and more recently, Meldrim Thompson in his incumbency as governor. In national politics these same voters tend to support Loeb's favorites: Goldwater in 1964, Nixon in 1968, and most recently, Governor Ronald Reagan.

As Democrats these voters differ with the liberalism of the national Democratic Party preferring as does William Loeb, candidates like Governor George Wallace, Mayor Sam Yorty, or Senator Henry Jackson. In the 1968 presidential

primary Loeb split this bloc of Democrats. He attacked the Johnson campaign for its endorsements and urged voters to reject them as arrogant and establishment oriented. The message which Loeb sent was that if being against the establishment was of a high personal priority then one should vote for McCarthy. Since Loeb could not support McCarthy's anti-war position he garbled this message and urged the anti-establishment bloc to write-in Richard Nixon's name on their ballot. 2,532 Democratic voters did this. An unknown number of these Democrats did, however, vote their anti-establishment view and supported the candidate they felt was anti-establishment, Eugene McCarthy. Robert Craig found a suggestion of this vote within his analysis of the Democratic voter. Both high and low socio-economic status Democrats supported McCarthy more strongly than did middle class Democrats.[9]

The Socio-Economic Status Thesis: An Empirical Test

When Robert Craig examined the outcome of the 1968 New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary he focussed on the relevance of socio-economic status (SES) and the individual vote decision. He did not examine the outcome of the election (in micro terms) nor did he attempt to relate the findings of a pre-election survey to the aggregate election outcome. Three factors did emerge from his analysis that were significantly related to individual vote choices. The first was socio-economic status. McCarthy received proportionately more support among the higher SES and lower SES Democrats than he did from middle class Democrats. This finding is supported by the following table and by the summary of pre-election surveys presented earlier.

TABLE 15.01 CANDIDATE PREFERENCE AMONG DEMOCRATS, BY SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS AND READINESS TO IDENTIFY WITH CLASS[10]

	CANDIDATE PREFERENCE		
SOCIAL CLASS	JOHNSON	McCARTHY	TOTAL
Yes, Middle-Class	69.4	30.6	100% (2020)
No, Middle-Class	87.8	12.2	100% (913)
(Total Middle-Class)	75.1	24.9	100% (2933)
Yes, Working-Class	60.6	39.4	100% (4586)
No, Working-Class	56.2	43.8	100% (1107)
(Total Working-Class)	59.8	40.2	100% (5693)
	X^2 = 307.088, 3df,s.001 C = 0.184		100% (8748)

Secondly, the strength of partisan identification, was positively related to support for Johnson. Those voters with a strong Democratic Party attachment tended to support Johnson while those with a weak Democratic Party attachment and independent voters tended to support McCarthy.

TABLE 15.02 CANDIDATE PREFERENCY BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION[11]

	CANDIDATE PREFERENCE		
PARTY IDENTIFICATION	JOHNSON	McCARTHY	TOTAL
Independent Democrat	63.2	36.8	100% (1455)
Weak Democrat	58.2	41.8	100% (3159)
Strong Democrat	73.8	26.2	100% (3065)
	X^2 = 170.063; 2df,s.001 C = .147		100% (7679)

Thirdly, implicit in the above finding is an additional factor, political efficacy, which Craig found was related to the utility of being a loyal Democrat and Johnson supporter or being an independent Democrat and a McCarthy supporter.

TABLE 15.03 CANDIDATE PREFERENCE BY POLITICAL EFFICACY INDEX[12]

POLITICAL EFFICACY INDEX	CANDIDATE PREFERENCE		
	JOHNSON	McCARTHY	TOTAL
1 Low Efficacy	37.4	62.6	100% (329)
2	62.5	35.5	100% (329)
3	70.2	29.8	100% (999)
4	34.9	65.1	100% (736)
5 Ambivalent	64.3	35.7	100% (1554)
6	80.1	19.9	100% (376)
7	62.5	37.5	100% (2617)
8	36.5	63.5	100% (170)
9 High Efficacy	83.7	16.3	100% (1714)
	X^2 = 783.342; 8df,s.001 C = .286		100% (8824)

Of the factors, socio-economic status appears to be the most useful in explaining McCarthy's strength in Republican Party dominated communities. In order to explore this point the correlation between McCarthy's percent vote and the percent family income $15,000 or more for all New Hampshire cities and towns of 2,500 population or more was tabulated. A second correlation for the same

cities and towns was run for the percent of individuals who completed four or more years of high school. The strongest relationship is between McCarthy vote and income with education supporting the direction of the income finding as shown by the following tables.

TABLE 15.04

Community	1 % Vote McCarthy	3 % Family Income + $15,000	1 Rank Order Vote McCarthy	3 Rank Order Family Income + $15,000
Berlin	51.7	10.3	27	53
Claremont	37.9	12.2	58	45
Concord	53.9	19.6	25	20
Derry	47.5	20.5	36	18
Dover	48.0	18.7	34.5	26
Hudson	49.0	21.2	43	17
Keene	46.7	19.0	39	24
Laconia	39.4	18.8	56	25
Manchester	31.0	15.8	61	35
Nashua	40.7	22.3	50	16
Portsmouth	69.1	13.8	5	42
Rochester	51.0	11.4	30	47
Salem	50.5	23.3	21.5	13
Allenstown	39.7	16.2	55	34
Amherst	58.8	40.7	16	2
Bedford	48.0	35.0	34.5	5
Boscawen	44.3	11.0	42	49
Charlestown	41.9	9.6	47	55
Conway	54.6	11.0	24	49
Durham	84.6	35.6	3	4
Exeter	57.5	17.1	20	29
Farmington	56.5	9.5	21.5	56
Franklin	41.3	14.0	48.5	41
Gilford	61.4	29.9	4	6
Goffstown	41.3	19.3	48.5	21
Gorham	51.3	10.9	28	52
Hampton	57.9	19.9	17.5	19
Hanover	85.0	44.1	2	1
Haverhill	40.6	14.2	51	40
Hillsborough	63.8	11.9	9	46
Hinsdale	60.0	15.0	14	36
Hollis	65.9	23.7	8	12

TABLE 15.04 (Continued)

Community	1 % Vote McCarthy	3 % Family Income + $15,000	1 Rank Order Vote McCarthy	3 Rank Order Family Income + $15,000
Hooksett	40.7	17.8	50	28
Hopkinton	51.1	39.7	29	3
Jaffrey	48.9	15.0	31	36
Kingston	46.8	16.9	37.5	31
Lancaster	59.9	13.0	15	44
Lebanon	48.7	16.6	32	33
Littleton	40.3	9.9	53	54
Londonderry	48.1	19.2	33	22
Meredith	100.0	14.8	1	38
Merrimack	46.8	21.1	37.5	10
Milford	38.0	16.8	57	32
Newmarket	40.4	11.0	52	49
Newport	40.1	11.1	54	48
No. Hampton	66.0	28.8	7	7
Pelham	57.9	22.4	17.5	15
Pembroke	42.6	17.1	44	29
Peterborough	57.7	23.9	19	11
Pittsfield	37.7	9.2	59	57
Plaistow	60.3	23.3	18	14
Plymouth	67.7	17.9	6	27
Raymond	45.8	9.1	40	59
Rye	70.8	28.3	4	8
Seabrook	63.0	11.3	11	47
Somersworth	12.5	19.2	45	22
Swanzey	45.5	13.5	41	43
Tilton	43.4	10.3	4	53
Walpole	53.1	14.5	26	39
Winchester	36.1	6.3	60	60
Windham	55.1	28.3	23	8
Wolfeboro	63.2	9.2	5	57

RHO = .5397

TABLE 15.05

	1 % Vote McCarthy	5 % 4 yrs+ High School	1 Rank Order Vote McCarthy	5 Rank Order 4 yrs+ High School
Berlin	51.7	41.5	27	61
Claremont	37.9	50.6	58	49
Concord	53.9	62.0	25	27
Derry	47.5	61.2	36	31
Dover	48.0	56.7	34.5	37
Hudson	44.0	61.0	43	32
Keene	46.7	61.9	39	29
Laconia	39.4	51.6	56	47
Manchester	31.0	47.5	61	56
Nashua	40.7	56.5	50	39
Portsmouth	69.1	67.0	5	17
Rochester	51.0	46.3	30	58
Salem	56.5	64.9	21.5	24
Allenstown	39.7	37.9	55	61
Amherst	58.8	76.8	16	7
Bedford	48.0	68.6	34.5	13
Boscawen	44.3	47.7	42	55
Charlestown	41.9	56.6	47	38
Conway	54.6	70.5	24	8
Durham	84.6	92.0	3	1
Exeter	57.5	65.5	20	21
Farmington	56.5	46.7	21.5	57
Franklin	41.3	51.9	48.5	46
Gilford	61.4	67.7	4	16
Goffstown	41.3	54.2	48.5	42
Gorham	51.3	50.4	28	51
Hampton	57.9	78.7	17.5	4
Hanover	85.0	87.6	2	2
Haverhill	40.6	53.7	51	44
Hillsborough	63.8	54.2	9	42
Hinsdale	60.0	50.5	14	50
Hollis	65.9	73.1	8	11
Hooksett	40.7	52.5	50	45
Hopkinton	51.1	77.0	29	6
Jaffrey	48.9	59.4	31	33
Kingston	46.8	64.3	37.5	25
Lancaster	59.9	62.0	15	27
Lebanon	48.7	60.3	32	26
Littleton	40.3	54.9	53	41
Londonderry	48.1	58.6	33	35

TABLE 15.05 (Continued)

	1 % Vote McCarthy	5 % 4 yrs+ High School	1 Rank Order Vote McCarthy	5 Rank Order 4 yrs+ High School
Meredith	100.0	65.3	1	22
Merrimack	46.8	66.2	37.5	20
Milford	38.0	68.1	57	14
Newmarket	40.4	49.4	52	52
Newport	40.1	48.1	54	54
No. Hampton	66.0	80.3	7	3
Pelham	57.9	61.3	17.5	30
Pembroke	42.6	57.5	44	36
Peterborough	57.7	75.8	19	8
Pittsfield	37.7	49.0	59	53
Plaistow	60.3	66.9	13	18
Plymouth	67.7	67.8	6	15
Raymond	45.8	58.8	40	34
Rye	70.8	77.4	4	5
Seabrook	63.0	44.0	11	59
Somersworth	42.5	41.6	45	60
Swanzey	45.5	55.8	41	40
Tilton	42.4	51.3	46	48
Walpole	53.1	65.1	26	23
Winchester	36.1	74.2	60	9
Windham	55.1	74.2	23	9
Wolfeboro	63.2	66.6	5	19

RHO = .5205

The voting behavior studies of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, principally The American Voter, and work by V.O. Key, Study on the New England Voter and Re-Alignment,[13] have profiled the socio-economic status of the American voter and are useful as background for the consideration of the effect on the New Hampshire presidential primary voter. The Republican Party remains strong in the rural communities of the East and especially in northern New England. The studies show that while for "most social characteristics Democrats,

Republicans, and Independents are very heterogeneous" the social characteristics of "partisans and independents indicate that in most ways independents look like Republicans." The studies contend that both Republicans and Independents have similar levels of education and income, and the proportions of these individuals from professional and managerial households are about "30 percent" or "almost identical among Republicans and Independents." The proportion from "manual worker households among Independents, about 40 percent, is closer to the proportion among Democrats." The summary notes that Independents are high in both of these occupational categories because they have lower proportions among farmers and retired members of the electorate.[14]

The studies found that the majority of strong Democrats have not graduated from high school, but there are increasingly higher levels of education among each of the party identification categories as one moves toward the strong Republicans. Party loyalists derived from various bases such as ethnic group, religious group and racial group have blurred socio-economic patterns in the past, but as these groupings begin to orient less toward their background and more toward their socio-economic status the impact is less distinct. As Flanigan notes, "old loyalties die hard and provide a basis for continuing to appeal to these groups."[15] A source of political variation in social groups is the possibility that one group may be Democratic in one community and Republican in another.

To summarize, the description of the Republican voter in the dominant Republican voting districts tends to conform to the description of the Republican voter as a homogeneous class. They have been found to have higher levels of

education, higher incomes and to be politically conservative. As a class, Democrats tend to be the opposite, lower income, less educated and more liberal. While this categorization explains traditional voting patterns in general elections, it is not particularly helpful in explaining the behavior of higher status Democrats voting in the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary.

What does appear is a relationship between higher SES communities (i.e., Republican voter dominated) and a higher Democratic vote for McCarthy. The opposite appears also to hold in the lower SES Republican or Democratic Party dominated communities which voted more heavily for President Johnson. What emerges, therefore, is a picture of a higher SES community, producing stronger vote support for McCarthy than lower SES communities. The presidential primary voters, whether Republican or Democrat, tended to vote more strongly by class related conservative/liberal orientation much as they might in a general election, a major conclusion of Robert Craig's analysis.

> In summary, the New Hampshire presidential primary of 1968 appears to have been similar to a Presidential election in many important ways except one: it was not viewed as a Presidential election by everyone but took place within the context of the tradition of the New Hampshire Democratic Party's Presidential primary. Voters behaved rationally according to their values and their information and understanding to that point.[16]

What Craig did not examine was the relationship between socio-economic status and McCarthy's vote output in strongly Republican voting districts.

A clue that when tied to an examination of these higher SES communities, begins to explain McCarthy's success in Republican voting communities.

Party Identification

> The long-run social and political patterns in the American electorate appear related. On the other hand, the short-run impact of social groups on voting behavior appears uneven and insignificant generally. Occasionally social groups appear important nationally...and under certain conditions social cross pressures may operate; but normally we do not expect social factors to show the same consistent, strong patterns with vote choice that we have found with partisanship.[17]

Although the conclusion drawn for the American voter may be correct, conditions in New Hampshire and in the election studies, may not conform to this view of the electorate. The dominant position of the Republican Party in rural and suburban New Hampshire voting districts and its long-term dominance of state political affairs may have produced a particular Democratic voter in these communities as revealed by the socio-economic status of that voter. To check this observation it is important to review party identification findings and the power of party identification as related to the New Hampshire rural Democratic electorate.

First, voters have been found willing to identify themselves on a scale as a "strong Democrat, Democrat, Independent, Republican or Strong Republican." Such identification is useful to the voter as a means of orienting a political position, responding to political information and creating a voting decision.[18] Partisanship is expressed by the strength of party identification. A weakness is expressed by a voter's willingness to shift to vote for candidates of the other party. For primary elections (i.e., New Hampshire), strength of party identification translates into either ideological patterns of liberal or conservative or patterns similar to inter-party contests, of intra-party loyalty or independence, as Robert Craig found.

TABLE 15.06 CANDIDATE PREFERENCE BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND SOCIAL CLASS[19]

PARTY IDENTIFICATION	SOCIAL CLASS	CANDIDATE PREFERENCE JOHNSON	McCARTHY	TOTAL
Independent Democrat	Yes, Middle	73.3	26.7	100% (90)
	No, Middle	78.0	22.0	100% (300)
	Yes, Working	59.5	40.5	100% (773)
	No, Working	53.8	46.2	100% (260)
Weak Democrat	Yes, Middle	60.3	39.7	100% (748)
	No, Middle	100.0	0.0	100% (258)
	Yes, Working	54.2	45.8	100% (1662)
	No, Working	46.3	53.7	100% (484)
Strong Democrat	Yes, Middle	72.9	27.1	100% (922)
	No, Middle	83.3	16.7	100% (269)
	Yes, Working	72.2	27.8	100% (1579)
	No, Working	71.8	28.2	100% (245)
				100% (7590)

As noted previously, independent voters, either Republican or Democrat, tend to be socio-economically similar to higher socio-economic status Republicans. Given the Republican dominance of rural politics in New Hampshire several consequences for Democrats result. Strong Democratic Party identifiers do so as the result of some social or economic benefit which carries a reward or re-enforcement. When the Democrats hold the White House a limited patronage system prevails that socially and economically carries a reward. In state politics minority status may have its rewards through a status conveying appointment as a minority member of a board or commission.[20]

On the other side, dominance of local institutions by the Republicans can mean hardship for Democrats who must work with the power structure of a community. This social pressure leads some who might otherwise be Democrats to register as Republicans or to retain Independent status. These Independent voters are attracted to vote in primaries only when the issues and/or the personalities involved are of special concern which stimulates their participation.

The question of party identity has been found to extend further to a sense of the efficacy of participating politically. While Independents have been found to be less interested in campaigns or concerned with which candidate wins, as is the strong partisan, there appears to be considerable Independent voter interest in election contests. They are not apathetic and disinterested as was once felt. They do view parties and candidates with the same ideological perspective as do partisans. "The only difference between Republicans and Democrats; Republicans with their higher level of education are more likely to view politics ideologically."[21] When this conclusion is extended to the notion of political efficacy, "that is how significantly one views his political activities," the results show "no difference between independents and partisans, but Republicans have a higher sense of political efficacy than do Democrats."[22]

The picture that can now be drawn of the New Hampshire rural Democratic voter who supported McCarthy is that this voter was likely to be an independent Democrat, of higher socio-economic status, have attained a higher level of education, and one who shares residency with Republicans of a similar description. The efficacy of being a Democrat, under the circumstances of minority

party status, must come from other than traditional views of group association, economic reward, or class identification. The source must be an ability to receive and process information derived externally from their local residence. A description of an Independent carries this message most effectively.

> The most nearly correct view of the Independent...is that Independents are not much interested in politics and government and certainly not much concerned with partisan politics -- they are not emotionally involved in party clashes. On the other hand, Independents appear to have the information and the perspective on political affairs necessary for an evaluation of the issues and candidates as competent as could be expected of partisans. Independents are no wiser or more virtuous than partisans; nor are they less so.[23]

Information Cost and Voting

A basic assumption of the rational decision making thesis, as applied to voting, concerns the ability of the voter to receive and process information pertinent to the decision they are to make. Such information bears a cost which Anthony Downs has identified as being of two types: "transferable costs" and "non-transferable costs."[24]

1. "Transferable costs" are simply the costs of gathering information which is most often accomplished by others such as the newspapers, television, and other media, at little or no costs to the users. The information gathered in this manner would be exceedingly expensive for the individual to acquire but as it is prepared for consumption, its cost to the user is limited to the cost of access -- buying the newspaper, having the radio or television, buying the magazine.

2. "Non-transferable costs" are those which come once the information has been accessed and involve the actual reading, assimilating, and digesting of the information once it has been collected. In this situation only the individual who is required to make use of the information can bear the cost of internalizing and absorbing the information.

The thesis assumes that the availability of information is not limited and that the main costs to be borne are those associated with absorbing the information, not getting the information.

The following hypotheses arise from the theory that information access leads to rational decision making.

1. The amount of information an individual has is a function of one's ability to bear non-transferable cost and to a lesser degree the transferable costs of obtaining information.

2. An individual's ability to bear the costs of obtaining information is a function of that person's leisure time -- by leisure time is meant that time not spent in pursuing one's vocational activity.

3. The amount of leisure time an individual has is a function of that person's position in society -- by position is meant the class position, socio-economic status, expressed in terms of material resources which the individual has to command.

The consequence of these hypotheses as related to the functioning of democratic government may be summarized as follows:

> Individuals of a higher socio-economic status will have higher levels of information and, therefore, are more likely to behave rationally.
>
> Conversely, individuals of a lower socio-economic status will be less informed and more likely to act irrationally.

Those of higher socio-economic status will have a greater ability to acquire information as a function of time, and cognitive skills possessed by those individuals. A campaign, therefore, tries to manage both costs. First the campaign attempts to package and deliver information at little or no cost to the voter. Secondly, a campaign seeks to organize the information that the voter receives in a way that will attract attention and be convincing, considering limited resources and time available for absorption.

Given that the ability to bear the non-transferable cost increases with socio-economic status, the ability to acquire information for the purpose of making a voting decision also increases. The implications of this assumption for a campaign are that it must concentrate its energy and resources upon delivering low cost, easily absorbed information to those of lower socio-economic status with limited time, energy or cognitive skills to absorb information. At the same time a campaign must presume that those of higher socio-economic status can better bear the cost of amassing the information they desire to make their voting decision and, therefore, the campaign need not exert as much effort to prepare information that can be absorbed quickly. In fact, a campaign may neglect the preparation of specific materials for the higher socio-economic voters assuming that the normal news gathering machinery will provide the information and analysis which will be most useful to these voters.

From this assessment of information cost and the ability to bear such costs comes a further description of the McCarthy voter. A rural, higher socio-economic status, upper educated, Democrat would have greater ability to bear the non-transferable cost of making a voting decision. That voting decision

might be prompted by the information sources which the individual had or could access easily. These sources would tend to be local, state, national and even international in range. The sources would carry information that pertained to the individual's vote decision which were more extensive than those packaged for consumption by the campaign. A campaign strategy which targeted the traditional bases of Democratic Party support and neglected areas of traditionally limited Democratic Party participation, given the foregoing, appears as an effective and rational strategy. The traditional Democrats, of lower socio-economic status would be aided in their decision making by the information packaging of a campaign. The rural Democrats, of higher socio-economic status, would gather at somewhat greater cost, the information upon which to make their own voting decisions without being specifically addressed by the campaign. From this analysis emerges an explanation of why the observed relationship between high Republican vote and high percentage vote for McCarthy occurred.

Research Design: Campaign Impact

The investigation of the question concerning the impact of the McCarthy campaign on votes for McCarthy must rely upon a combination of data sources. The question cannot be evaluated through a carefully developed research design which examines specific populations which are manipulated for the purpose of testing the effects of the campaign. What can be examined are relationships validated by previous empirical findings tested through the examination of the election results and re-examination of pre-election survey results. Although this is not an ideal situation for the determination of causal effects it may be sufficiently effective to allow inferences to be drawn concerning the effect of the McCarthy campaign.

The data sources for this analysis are the aggregate election results (by voting district) and voter perceptions and attitudes drawn from the pre-election surveys. While it is not possible to compare and contrast the two principal data sources (because the level of analysis in the case of the surveys differs from that of the aggregate election returns), it is possible to subjectively infer an explanation for a community result by describing the community's socio-economic characteristics, characteristics that have been found to be significantly related to individual level voting behavior.25

Research Hypothesis

To test the effectiveness of the campaign, five indicators were selected which represent campaign activities or response to activities that could be assigned and evaluated for each voting district. The indicators were: 1. McCarthy campaign visits; 2. local campaign organization; 3. canvassing; 4. celebrity visit or auxiliary campaign activity; and, 5. newspaper activity relative to the McCarthy candidacy. The indicators were drawn from those aspects of the campaign strategy that could be assigned according to levels of impact. The first four were specific treatments of the campaign which were applied according to the overall campaign strategy of treating in priority those communities with the strongest record of Democratic primary voting. The fifty, "newspaper activity," was selected as a reactive or re-enforcement variable that could be measured in accord with the particular stand a given daily newspaper took or did not take toward the McCarthy candidacy. It was an important strategy of the campaign to seek attention for the candidacy through

New Hampshire daily press and, eventually, editorial sympathy with the candidacy. Together with the four selected campaign treatments and the reactive variable of press attention, a series of discrete variables could be drawn that accurately represented the basic strategy and tactics which put into operation the McCarthy campaign.

To test the strength of the campaign as may be reflected in the vote result the following procedure was employed. Each campaign indicator was operationalized at the voting district level in terms of actual campaign activities, and, therefore, represents a "hard" measure of the conceptualized campaign variables. Vote totals for McCarthy were examined across each level of campaign activity to determine those factors associated with McCarthy's victory in New Hampshire.

Independent Campaign Variables .

A. McCarthy campaign visits:

1. Did not visit or campaign in the district.
2. Visited area cluster of voting districts.
3. Visited the city or town.
4. Spoke or campaigned extensively in the city or town.
5. Campaigned in the city or town more than once.

B. Local campaign organization:

1. No local committee or organization in the district.
2. City or town represented by an area or county organization.
3. Local organization motivated and staffed from outside.
4. Local organization locally motivated to support candidacy.
5. Local organization pre-dated McCarthy candidacy with related political activity.

C. Canvassing

1. City or town not canvassed.

2. City or town canvassed.

3. City or town canvassed with call-back.

D. Celebrity visit or auxiliary campaign activity[26]

1. No celebrity visit or auxiliary activity.

2. Celebrity visit and/or auxiliary activity in the cluster of voting districts.

3. Celebrity visit to the voting districts.

4. Celebrity visit and auxiliary activity in the voting district.

E. Newspaper activity

1. New Hampshire daily newspaper serving the voting district neutral to McCarthy.

2. New Hampshire daily newspaper serving the voting district pro-McCarthy.

3. New Hampshire daily newspaper serving the voting district anti-McCarthy.

In addition to the five campaign variables previously operationalized, a sixth factor which measured the priority assigned the voting district was studied. This variable is operationalized in terms of descending rank, with higher rankings receiving a greater effort for campaign activities.

While there were many other activities of the campaign that related to the campaign strategy, few others could be assigned specifically to voting districts. Much of the other activity, such as radio advertising, either was not sufficiently discrete to allow for even gross measurement at the district level, or was not varied enough to provide a meaningful test of campaign effect.

Using the five indicators as measures of campaign activity, the following hypotheses should be true.

1. Turnout in voting districts where the campaign activities occurred will be significantly higher than in districts where these activities did not occur.
2. McCarthy's vote is positively related to the amount of campaign activity on the candidate's behalf.
3. Campaign activities on behalf of McCarthy's candidacy are significantly related to vote totals for McCarthy in traditionally Democratic voting districts.
4. Campaign activities will have the greatest impact on voter behavior in districts characterized by higher socio-economic status voters.

The second question to be addressed by this analysis pertains to the strong showing McCarthy registered in normally strong Republican voting districts. The following hypotheses offer an empirically testable explanation of the election outcome.

1. Democratic vote percentages for McCarthy are positively related to increased voter turnout.

2. Democratic vote percentages for McCarthy are positively related to increased Republican percentage of the total primary vote cast election districts.
3. Democratic voting for McCarthy in traditionally Republican districts is a function of socio-economic characteristics of the voter.
4. The percent vote for McCarthy is positively related to campaign activities on behalf of the McCarthy candidacy.

The Analysis: McCarthy Vote and Turnout

Examining the bi-variate relationship between percent vote for McCarthy and turnout for all election districts we observe a negative correlation (R = -.2369 P- .001). This evidence suggests that the McCarthy candidacy is more closely patterned after a traditional Republican candidacy in its appeal to Republican like voters. This conclusion is further supported by the correlation between percent McCarthy vote and voter turnout in predominantly Republican areas (R = +.2801 P- .001).

Within Republican communities McCarthy received greater Democratic voter support with higher voter turnouts. As hypothesized earlier (see p. 15-30, Information Cost and Voting), McCarthy's candidacy had its greatest appeal to high SES Democratic voters. These voters were found to be residents of predominate Republican communities, therefore, accounting for McCarthy's relative strength, i.e., among N.H. Democrats, in predominantly Republican communities.

Each of the independent campaign variables was correlated with the percent Democratic vote for McCarthy and with the vote result in each New Hampshire election district (N = 299).[27] In addition to the bi-variate correlations, a multivariate analysis was employed in order to assess the additive and interactive effects of these campaign activities on the outcome of the election.

As the following table indicates (Table 15.07) each of the independent campaign variables was significantly related to the percent Democratic vote cast for McCarthy.

TABLE 15.07 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN McCARTHY VOTE AND INDICES OF CAMPAIGN EFFORT

Campaign Visits	Local Campaign Organization	Canvassing Activities	Auxillary Activities	Newspaper Activity
.5851*	.4562*	.5842*	.5054*	-.1601*

(P significant at the .05 level)

With the exception of newspaper activities all of the independent measures of campaign activity were approximately equal in their relationship to the dependent variable. The effect, however, of local newspaper coverage did not produce a strong relationship to the McCarthy vote total. As expected, the relationship was negative suggesting that the influence of the conservative Manchester Union Leader, though not substantial, did produce a lower percent of the vote for McCarthy.

As mentioned, it is possible that each of the campaign variables does not tap a unique dimension, and thus their collective explanatory power would produce a misleading impression regarding the effectiveness of the McCarthy cam-

paign. Though a reasonable intercorrelation would be expected between campaign indices, it is thought that each activity made a unique contribution to the McCarthy result in New Hampshire. In order to assess the independent effect of each campaign activity the partial correlation coefficients for each campaign activity and the precent of the vote for McCarthy were examined.

TABLE 15.08 PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN McCARTHY VOTE AND INDICES OF CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY

Campaign Visits	Local Campaign Organization	Canvassing Activities	Auxiliary Activities	Newspaper Activity
.7615*	.0231	-.0341	.6673*	-.4675*

*NOTE: Partial coefficients provide for relationships between independent and dependent variables, controlling for all other independent variables, in this case, all other campaign activities.

Based on the partial correlations only three campaign indices (i.e., campaign visits, auxiliary activities, and newspaper activity) were analyzed in a regression model. (Note: Exclusion of the other two was based on the absence of unique contribution in the explanation of the dependent variables.)

TABLE 15.09 REGRESSION EQUATION FOR CAMPAIGN INDICES AND McCARTHY VOTE TOTAL IN NEW HAMPSHIRE

Indice	Beta	Std. Error	Significant Level
Campaign Visits	.4972	.005	.005
Auxiliary Activities	.4765	.113	.003
Newspaper Activity	-.106	.203	.003

Multiple R = .6929

Multiple R^2 = .48012
F = Ratio Sign. .000

As the above table indicates, the three campaign indices account for nearly 50 percent of the variation in the dependent variable -- percent McCarthy vote. As indicated in the previous correlation analysis, campaign visits and auxiliary campaign activity account for most of the explained variance with newspaper activity accounting for less than five percent of the variation in McCarthy vote totals.

For the analysis used in this section it has been possible to select only five of the numerous activities that are presumed to contribute to the outcome of a campaign. The five selected offered measures that could be quantified and related to specific voting district results. Other activities, as described in the case study, may be more powerful, and even more interesting as explainers, but because they were either too discrete or not discrete enough it has been necessary to concentrate on the ones that offer quantifiable variation. To fully explore and, perhaps, understand the impact of a campaign it would be useful to be able to evaluate other variables in a fashion similar to those considered above. The outcome of such an analysis might permit future campaigns to be structured more efficiently.

As Senator Eugene McCarthy discussed with his New Hampshire leaders, it was his hope that his effort in 1968 might change aspects of the campaign in American politics. He noted that since the earliest campaigns, new practices have been added to the process with few, if any, being discarded along the way. As a result, he felt, campaigns have become exceptionally complex, expensive, excessively demanding upon the energy of both candidate and campaign, and with little

concern for how most efficiently the communication process might be facilitated. To McCarthy it appeared that each campaign invented a new device or activity that then became grafted to future campaigns without something being discarded. It is hoped that this analysis and the case study of the McCarthy campaign assist in this effort. First by describing how the campaign developed and was carried out, and second, by analyzing aspects of the campaign in order to test their impact.

When examining the partial correlation coefficients an interesting pattern is identified. The relationships between McCarthy's vote total and those campaign activities characterized as purely local in emphasis (i.e., local campaign organization and canvassing activity) failed to produce significant relationships when controlling for the other campaign indices. Interestingly those factors which remained significantly related to the dependent variable were those campaign activities which can be characterized as external or statewide in impact. Campaign visits and auxiliary activities/celebrity visits were significantly related to McCarthy's vote total independent of all other activities. This would suggest that local campaign activities either were insufficient to produce a McCarthy vote (independent of other activities) or, more plausible, that local campaign activities were merely surrogates of the state campaign strategy and reflected that factor. This hypothesis will be tested later when geographical and partisan variations on the impact of campaign activities are examined. (See page 15-48, "The Campaign Variables and Republican Areas.")

Finally, the effect of newspaper activities clearly was masked by other campaign activities. When controlling for the effect of local and state coordinated activities, it was found that newspaper activities were significantly related to McCarthy's vote. Consistent, however, with the earlier bi-variate findings, the impact of newspaper coverage was generally negative for McCarthy (related by the dominance of the Manchester Union Leader in the principal Democratic vote producing center of the state). The partial correlation which is substantially larger, reflects the significant negative impact newspaper coverage had on McCarthy's candidacy when controlling for the otherwise positive effect of campaign activities.

The five campaign variables accounted for more than 75 percent of the variation in McCarthy's vote total in normally Republican areas. This represents nearly a 25 percent increase over the strength of the same multi-variate model for all voting districts. Interestingly, the betas, i.e., standardized partial correlation coefficients, indicate that those campaign variables characterized by state wide orientation such as campaign visits, auxiliary activities,[28] and newspapers, were most explanatory of the dependent variables -- percent vote for McCarthy. This would suggest that the same factors contributing to McCarthy's candidacy statewide were substantially more effective in adding to McCarthy's electoral showing in predominantly Republican areas.[29]

The effect of newspaper coverage in Republican areas was positively related to McCarthy's vote total, suggesting that editorial and news coverage in Republican areas tended to provide McCarthy with a positive voter exposure. This

finding relates well with the characteristics of New Hampshire's daily and also, weekly newspaper circulations. The newspapers that circulate in the higher socio-economic communities tended to be those that either supported McCarthy or presented his candidacy in a favorable light. The Manchester Union Leader, while being the dominant circulation daily newspaper in New Hampshire, tends to have its impact in its home area, predominantly Democratic Manchester. The higher SES areas, also normal Republican areas, tend to be served by the regional daily press as has been discussed earlier. These regional newspapers, such as the Concord Daily Monitor, Lebanon Valley News, Keene Sentinel, and the Portsmouth Herald, are the dominant news sources not only in their cities but within regions that contain many of the normally Republican communities that supported McCarthy's candidacy heavily. The role of the press is significant as shown by these findings. The impact of the two other variables, campaign visits and auxiliary activities, depend upon the press for impact as well.

The effect of campaign activities on McCarthy's vote in predominantly Democratic areas was significantly less pronounced than either for Republican areas, or for all election districts.

TABLE 15.10 RESULT OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION WITH CAMPAIGN VARIABLES EXPLAINING PERCENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY VOTE RECEIVED BY McCARTHY IN DEMOCRATIC AREAS

Variable	Beta	Std. Error
Campaign Visits	.109	.187
Local Organization	.218	.203
Canvass	.221	.114
Auxiliary Activity	.104	.307
Newspaper	-.308	.001

Multiple R = .5633 P - .05

Multiple R^2 = .44 N = 19

F- Ratio = 13.45

The Campaign Variables and Republican Areas

It was earlier hypothesized that the effect of the McCarthy campaign would be more pronounced in higher socio-economic status Republican areas. This hypothesis would account for the aggregate voter pattern observed earlier. Here, McCarthy's percent of the Democratic vote was positively related to Republican voter turnout.[30] The evidence in the table below substantiates the hypothesis that McCarthy's vote was positively related to high status Republican communities.

TABLE 15.11 RESULT OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION WITH CAMPAIGN VARIABLES EXPLAINING PERCENT OF DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY VOTE RECEIVED BY McCARTHY IN REPUBLICAN COMMUNITIES31

Variable	Beta	Std. Error
Campaign Visits	.548*	.006
Local Organization	.003	.104
Canvass	.105*	.116
Auxiliary Activity	.472*	.065
Newspaper	.394*	.049

Multiple R = .8735 P - .05

Multiple R^2 = .7603 N = 38

F- Ratio = 28.76

As in the case of all voting districts the influence of newspaper coverage tended to be negatively related to McCarthy's electoral performance in predominantly Democratic areas. Other campaign activities tended to have a neutral (i.e., insignificant relationships) effect on the McCarthy vote total. This supports the general thesis that McCarthy's New Hampshire campaign was effective among higher SES voters, which tended to be most numerous in predominantly Republican areas.

Conclusions

The results of the two inquiries are now complete. The analysis of the selected campaign variables demonstrated that there was a significant relationship between the treatments of the campaign and the vote output for McCarthy. Without the information that these campaign activities provided the primary

vote result for McCarthy would have been significantly less. McCarthy would have attracted far fewer votes than he did among voters in Democratic areas, the principal target of the campaign, and among Democratic voters in Republican areas, the surprisingly productive localities for McCarthy.

The second inquiry was the investigation of the strong McCarthy showing among Democrats residing in normally Republican districts. This analysis identified the relationship between higher socio-economic class voting districts and the increased percentage vote for McCarthy. Since only those registered as Democrats or Independents who selected the Democratic Party's presidential primary ballot, could vote in the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary, the analysis led to the conclusion that Democrats and Independents residing in normally Republican voting districts tend to share Republican socio-economic characteristics.

When the analysis was controlled for partisan areas (i.e., Democratic/Republican) the relationship between campaign activities and McCarthy's vote was positive and statistically significant. In the higher SES normally Republican voting districts those campaign variables that related to the information absorbing capacity of higher SES groups were also connected to the vote output for McCarthy. Newspaper coverage, of the five, was the most powerful in normally Republican voting districts -- a variable that relates closely to the ability of higher SES groups to bear non-transferable information costs.

From this conclusion it is possible to state that the relationship between socio-economic status and the ability to bear non-transferable information cost is proven. Downs' thesis concerning information costs, when tested in the con-

text of the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary, proved that the ability to gather and internalize information was essential but also that ability was aided by the efforts of the campaign. The analysis showed that those with less resource strength, who tended to reside in lower SES, and predominantly Democratic areas, were less able to bear the non-transferable costs of vote information. The election returns showed that differentiation. As a result it is reasonable to extrapolate that higher SES Democrats residing in Democratic areas, with independent partisan inclinations, were more likely to be attracted to McCarthy, as were those of similar characteristics residing in normally Republican areas.

Information cost and the ability to bear that cost were important aspects of the McCarthy campaign strategy that the McCarthy leaders devised, although not fully understood. The energy of the campaign was targeted to reach those eligible voters who were concentrated in the predominantly Democratic areas or areas that tended to produce significant Democratic primary votes. The strategy called for the use of campaign tactics that would maximize information flow. As the campaign evolved, this strategy was expanded not just to position papers, speeches, brochures and direct mail, but also to interactive canvassing, auxiliary activities and media programming. While these techniques were concentrated within the predominantly Democratic areas of the state, the campaign was able to reach, both directly and indirectly through the media, most of the more populous voting districts. Without the foregoing analysis, one might conclude that the campaign failed in reaching the targeted Democratic population. McCarthy's percentage of the Democratic vote in the heavy vote producing centers such as Manchester and Nashua was significantly less than that which

McCarthy attracted elsewhere. To have reached this conclusion without looking further at both the impact of the campaign and the vote output would lead the casual observer to surmise that the vote returns for McCarthy were inversely proportional to the effort assigned by the campaign strategy. This conclusion fails. The campaign has been shown to have succeeded. It provided information for those with the resources to internalize that information and use that information to shape a vote decision. The campaign succeeded in attracting voters through its direct efforts, within the predominantly Democratic areas, though with less success than it had within the normally Republican areas.

In conclusion, the campaign that was devised to support McCarthy's candidacy was uniquely suited to its task and, as importantly, to the candidate. The effort was properly conceived, effectively operated, and produced the desired result. If there had been a point of inconsistency in the mix between campaign and candidate or between campaign and voting population the effort would have failed. Both the campaign and the candidate were credible and were conveniently translated into information that was within the capacity of those able to bear higher non-transferable costs to absorb. If it had not been able to find this tone and had not received the interest of those who bear the transferable costs the result would have been much less than significant.

Notes

[1]Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," APSR, Vol. 63 (December 1969), p. 1092.

[2]E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), Chapter 5.

[3]William H. Flanigan, Political Behavior of the American Electorate, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972), p. 19.

[4]See earlier chapter, "The Red Herring Charge and New Hampshire Politics," Section 13, pp. 20-25.

[5]Cash, Kevin, Op.Cit., and Veblen, Eric, Op.Cit.

[6]V.O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 39-40.

[7]Dunfey, William L. Op.Cit.

[8]Cash, Kevin, Op.Cit.

[9]See earlier discussion of Robert Craig's findings. Section 14, p.39-52.

[10]Craig, Robert, Op.Cit., p. 131.

[11]Ibid., p. 138.

[12]Ibid., p. 150.

[13]Key, V.O., Op.Cit.

[14]Flanigan, W.H., Op.Cit.

[15]Ibid., p. 52.

[16]Criag, Robert, Op.Cit., p. 251.

[17]Flanigan, W.H., Op.Cit., p. 71.

[18]The Voter Decides and The American Voter studies support this finding.

[19]Craig, Robert, Op.Cit., p. 141.

[20]In New Hampshire a number of boards and commissions must have minority party members included usually in a ratio of 2 to 1 (majority to minority). These appointments by a governor grant social status and often economic benefit, direct or indirect, to the recipient. Judicious use of the appointing power has been a tool of Republican governors in keeping the Democratic Party in its minority position in gubernatorial politics.

V.O. Key observed that minority party organization tended to "atrophy" as its nominating function was shifted to candidate selection via client primary. In New Hampshire, appointment to a minority position on a state board or commission kept the Democratic Party alive although in a less than vital position. V.O. Key, Jr., Op.Cit., p. 195.

[21]Flanigan, W.H., Op.Cit., p. 45.

[22]Ibid., p. 47.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), pp. 220-237.

[25]Key, Jr., V.O., Op.Cit., pp. 217-265.

[26]Two activities evolving from the campaign strategy were to circulate in priority communities celebrities who had volunteered to help McCarthy's candidacy, and secondly, to organize support or auxiliary activities such as "Republicans for McCarthy" or "educators for McCarthy" or some other group outside the campaign organization for McCarthy.

[27]A New Hampshire voting district is a town or city ward.

[28]Auxiliary activities include visits by celebrities not accompanying McCarthy and organization of support groups especially Republicans for McCarthy.

[29]The following table is a rank order analysis of the vote for McCarthy as related to the percent vote Republican (i.e., the normal vote) by selected voting districts.

TABLE 15.12 VOTE ANALYSIS OF DISTRICTS OF 2,500 POPULATION OR MORE BY PERCENT VOTE McCARTHY AND PERCENT VOTE NORMALLY REPUBLICAN

Community	% Vote McCarthy	% Vote Republican (Normal)	Rank Order Vote McCarthy	Rank Order Normal Republican Vote
Berlin	51.7	38.7	27	55
Claremont	37.9	41.9	58	51
Concord	53.9	45.0	25	50
Derry	47.5	67.5	36	17
Dover	48.0	59.1	34.5	33
Hudson	44.0	49.2	43	46
Keene	46.7	49.3	39	45
Laconia	39.4	49.5	56	44
Manchester	31.0	50.8	61	42
Nashua	40.7	33.8	50	58
Portsmouth	69.1	59.3	5	32
Rochester	51.0	54.2	30	39
Salem	50.5	60.8	21.5	27
Allenstown	39.7	27.4	55	60
Amherst	58.8	74.0	16	9
Bedford	48.0	65.0	34.5	20
Boscawen	44.3	50.4	42	43
Charlestown	41.9	61.1	47	25
Conway	54.6	77.4	24	6
Durham	84.6	49.2	3	46
Exeter	57.5	65.1	20	19
Farmington	56.5	66.8	21.5	18
Franklin	41.3	38.9	48.5	54
Gilford	61.4	59.4	4	31
Goffstown	41.3	60.4	48.5	28
Gorham	51.3	47.6	28	49
Hampton	57.9	69.4	17.5	14
Hanover	85.0	39.8	2	53
Haverhill	40.6	64.4	51	21
Hillsborough	63.8	68.3	9	15
Hinsdale	60.0	59.9	14	30
Hollis	65.9	75.9	8	7
Hooksett	40.7	60.3	50	28
Hopkinton	51.1	56.7	29	37
Jaffrey	48.9	51.9	31	40
Kingston	46.8	77.7	37.5	5
Lancaster	59.9	61.4	15	21
Lebanon	48.7	37.8	32	56

TABLE 15.12/Footnote #29 (Continued)

Community	% Vote McCarthy	% Vote Republican (Normal)	Rank Order Vote McCarthy	Rank Order Normal Republican Vote
Littleton	40.3	67.7	53	16
Londonderry	48.1	71.3	33	11
Meredith	100.0	74.0	1	9
Merrimack	46.8	60.0	37.5	29
Milford	38.0	61.3	57	24
Newmarket	40.4	37.5	52	57
Newport	40.1	55.7	54	38
No. Hampton	66.0	79.2	7	3
Pelham	57.9	51.5	17.5	41
Pembroke	42.6	40.8	44	52
Peterborough	57.7	69.5	19	13
Pittsfield	37.7	61.1	59	25
Plaistow	60.3	64.1	13	22
Plymouth	67.7	79.0	6	4
Raymond	45.8	79.4	40	2
Rye	70.8	69.7	4	12
Seabrook	63.0	74.9	11	8
Somersworth	42.5	33.3	45	59
Swanzey	45.5	48.6	41	48
Tilton	42.4	57.7	46	36
Walpole	53.1	58.4	26	35
Winchester	36.1	58.5	60	34
Windham	55.1	64.4	23	21
Wolfeboro	63.2	81.8	5	1

RHO = .7299

N = 62

[30]Republican areas are defined as those voting districts where the normal Republican vote was 53 percent or greater. For the purposes of the analysis, the 1960 general election was selected to determine the normal Republican vote by voting districts having a population of 2,500 or more persons, U.S. Census of the Population 1970.

[31]Philip E. Converse, et.al., Elections and the Political Order, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 9-40.

Concluding Notes

Students of the American political system have marvelled at the success of the checks and balances built into the tri-partate constitutional structure of the federal government. Recognized as well has been the ability of the party system to absorb social change and to avoid doctrinaire positions that would fragment and polarize society. These systems have been credited with allowing the political structure to change and to respond to an evolving civilization. Unquestionably a remarkable feat given that the government came from revolution and revolution has been held as an appropriate recourse should tyranny sprout from the government.

What has escaped the view of observers are the less obvious safety valves that have evolved as a consequence of both the constitutional structure and the party system. In an area where the constitution was notably imprecise, the selection of the president, there has been continuing democratization. First the congressional caucus, then the national convention, and most recently, the revitalization of the presidential primary. In an earlier period of crisis, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a series of major reforms of the political system occurred, i.e., the direct election of United States senators, women's sufferage, and enactment of the primary election. While the primary was widely adopted for the selection of candidates for lesser offices, its use in the selection of presidential candidates stagnated by 1920. The fact that one state, New Hampshire, preserved the institution and modified it to produce an early media event, appeared of little significance across the broader spectrum of political institutions. New Hampshire

kept the primary because it fit the progressive notion of the electoral process; it could be run efficiently as a part of the annual town meeting, and it offered local politicians access to national politics. From this combination of progressivism and pragmatism there survived the New Hampshire presidential primary; an event because it was the first test of a presidential nominating season and because it responded well to the thirst of the new electronic media.

For most, and particularly the political scientists, the primaries and especially the New Hampshire primary, appeared to contribute little to the final selection of a presidential candidate. True there had been important early tests in New Hampshire for Eisenhower in 1952 and for John F. Kennedy in 1960, but in the sum total of convention politics, New Hampshire's contribution faded considerably as any nominating season progressed.

1968 began with serious national crises. The Vietnam War, the impact of the military draft, turmoil in the cities, the earlier promise of the Johnson administration dimmed, young people were in revolt, and a cloud of repression seemed about to shade the nation. The massive power of the federal government was dominated by what appeared to be an invincible President who headed an administration that seemed determined not to heed the signs of crisis and disaffection. Among many there was a sense of desperation. There seemed to be no way to attract attention, much less to get the government to change its policies. Radical groups, radical politics, and talk of direct action became part of the political currency of the late 1960's. The political system, to many, was bankrupt. The political parties were the same. Officeholders

either didn't listen or were too frightened to act. The system did not work. There would be no time for politics. There had to be immediate results.

In the face of such pervasive pessimism and frustration social upheaval is often the result. Violent actions, venting deeply felt convictions, while not a part of the American political process, were certainly not beyond possibility.

A safety valve works when the normal processes of a system do not. There were safety valves in the American political system of the late 1960's. These were not automatically functioning devices but political structures that required the manipulation of individuals. An important, but unrecognized safety system were the presidential primaries and of these, New Hampshire was the first.

Like a good safety valve, the New Hampshire primary was ready to serve and was easily used. Simply, it just had to be recognized for what it might become. What the New Hampshire primary offered was more than a release of potentially destructive energy, the primary could also divert energy to a productive purpose. The New Hampshire presidential primary safety valve was uniquely suited to its purpose. It was first; it was not expensive to campaign in New Hampshire; the campaign and the results would receive widespread attention; it was easy to be a candidate in the primary; and it was reasonably easy to organize a campaign in the state.

The prerequisites were simple as well. There had to be a candidate or at least the name of a candidate. There had to be an indigenous organization for the candidate, and there had to be at least some money with which to support a campaign. Otherwise the primary offered an open season to the New

Hampshire voter. There were no convoluted party structures, complex rules, massive signature requirements, or conformance with formal or informal do's or don'ts to stand in the way of a contest. That was the way the New Hampshire presidential primary was in 1967 and that is the way it remains. When frustration had reached its peak a few individuals, both across the nation and in New Hampshire, felt that it was worth trying the political system once more. The quadriennal time lock on presidential politics was about to open.

What is important about the preceeding case study is that while a political institution like a presidential primary is a neutral and lifeless form, it has the capacity to produce results if properly used. The key to its success comes from individuals acting alone and together to attract others to respond and to express their own concerns. Without the interpersonal connections that were made in the early stages, without attracting individuals who knew the New Hampshire political environment, it is possible that the political safety valve of the New Hampshire primary might have failed in 1968. It might have been too late to make the test in other primaries.

For the future, the New Hampshire presidential primary remains to be used again to release energy or divert energy, to dissipate ill-conceived ventures, and to revitalize the political system. It may not be called upon to function as it did in 1968 again, but the fact that it succeeded then has not only justified its future but has produced a prodgeny of other primaries and nominating process reforms that may mean redundence for the political safety system.

For the political scientist tied to the theories of party responsibility and convention brokerage, 1968 came as a rude shock. The results of the primaries and the machinations of the Chicago convention uncovered a nominating system that had lost the capacity to respond to the public. Delegates were selected through processes that began as much as four years preceding the convention they would attend. The students of the much taunted responsible party had failed to examine how the party selected its presidential candidates and who actually performed its nominating chores. The hodge-podge of caucuses, conventions, delegate appointments, delegate selection and preferential primaries produced confusion which appeared to defy democarcy. In many states the few who understood the nominating process often held that information as a corporate secret.

For political science it may be said that 1968 marked the end of one era and the beginning of another. During the decade preceeding 1968, political scientists had advocated the vertically integrated responsible political party structure. Almost at the same time as this conception of politics was being pronounced, a noticeable decline in the allegiance of the electorate to a political party had begun. In place of the party had emerged the candidate as an independent personality, capable of translation via the new medium of television. Instead of being a functionary of the party and the recipient of its rewards, the new candidate sought a personal identity, often created a separate campaign organization, solicited separate financial backing, and relied upon the public relations or advertising specialist as the new campaign manager. The phenomenon of the modern campaign evolved without much attention from the political scientist.

After 1968 things seemed to change. Political science and campaign management began to see that one had something to offer the other. Voting behavior research provided a theoretical underpinning for the pragmatism and applied management of the new campaign professional. Campaign techniques that had once been viewed as hucksterism by the political scientist were now being subjected to tests of effectiveness. Campaigns became sophisticated, not simply in their organization and selection of tactics, but also in the allocation of resources and expenditures of energy. Whether it was the widespread participation of social scientists in the McCarthy campaign that brought campaigns to the attention of researchers, or simply a natural convergence, politics before 1968 and after 1968 were viewed differently.

The McCarthy in New Hampshire case study documents events and issues, and the interaction of personalities and institutions across the total fabric of the campaign. In this effort it fills a void by going beyond the headlines back to the people and actions that shaped the news and produced the electoral result. The study attempts to capture the mood of the times, the sense of desperation, and quixotic quest. In hindsight, from the persepctive of the present, 1968 appears almost as an even unreal time. The American Broadcasting System's 1978 program title, "1968 A Crack in Time," captures the essence of that year. Since then there has been a convergence not just in political science between campaign management and electoral process research, but also a convergence in the social condition of the present era. The individual emerged from the fray of the late 1960's with a healthy skepticism concerning policies, personalities, institutions, and the capabilities

of others as well as oneself. Society became both simpler and more complex. Where once institutions were expected to deliver societal benefits the individual found personal responsibility to be as effective. Where problems had once appeared capable of solution, i.e., eliminate poverty, rebuild the cities, assure society's benefits to all, there emerged a resignation that there will be a continuing struggle.

As the individual had come to the fore in New Hampshire, the action of individuals began to replace a sense of helplessness with participation. From the skepticism that generated this new participation has come an era of change reflected by new legislation and attitudes as diverse as open meeting/open information laws, environmental protection statutes, campaign finance disclosure laws, and other evidence of the worth of the individual. The individual has standing before the institutions of society, standing that approaches equity. Since 1968 many safety valves have been inserted in the American body politic. The prospect of a runaway government that loomed awesomely in 1968 is now widely constrained. The countervailing force appears to be the responsible individual. A person much like that which emerged from the heat of the New Hampshire presidential primary and went on to become the phenomenon of the McCarthy movement of 1968.

As the case study documents, transforming a notion of protest into a viable political force requires an appreciation for the unique political climate of New Hampshire, the character of the candidate, the mood and receptivity of the voter, and the ability to construct a strategy that would meld these facotrs into a political campaign. The multi-faceted venture that

became the McCarthy New Hampshire campaign relied upon personality, issues, communications, organization, and especially management. Gaining the attention, cooperation, and full participation of diverse interests and personalities required not only a deeply shared goal, but a willingness to serve that goal with conviction and sacrifice. There was from the beginning but one reward, that being the sense of satisfaction that comes from trying in spite of what seemed to be insurmountable odds. The difference between 1968 and the campaign years before the campaign years after is the sense of deep personal commitment that came from within the individual when he or she decided to join the McCarthy campaign. Before March 12th that commitment was personal. It could not be said that the candidate was the pied piper. The issues of war and social disintegration demanded conviction and sensitivity that extended beyond the attraction of a candidate. It is for this reason that the experience of McCarthy in New Hampshire 1968 was intense. It is also for this reason that the documentation of that campaign survives. The event and the time were unique. The methods of the campaign, its strategy, its tactics, and its management were in many ways similar to hundreds of campaigns both before and since. For the student of the electoral process the case study is transferable with evidence capable of further examination in other contexts. For the political historian the case documents an important political event. For the observer of the American electoral process the case study affirms the vitality of the political system and its ability to absorb social conflict and to channel that conflict in the direction of institutional and even societal change.

The impact of the New Hampshire result contained both an immediate and a continuing response. The nature of the contest between an obscure United States senator, an active candidate, and an incumbent president, a write-in candidate, made a pyrrhic victory possible. In conventional terms 42 percent against 48 percent of the vote would be a defeat, but in the context of a presidential primary 42 percent was a victory for the challenger. A victory that foretold for the incumbent president a trend that would be difficult to reverse. Understanding that political victory may be less than actual victory was an important lesson learned from 1968 in New Hampshire. From a primary, that many had thought to be a meaningless contest, came a message. A message that a distressed public, a substantial minority of the society, had sought ineffectively to convey by other means. Votes cast within a recognized electoral event could not be denied. The message became even clearer as the full results were probed. With Republican ballot write-in votes totalled for both candidates, the result was only a few votes short of the President Johnson's 48 percent total. Protest that had been scrugged aside before March 12, 1968, was now institutionalized as part of the presidential nominating process.

While it might be enough to document the campaign and to assume that it led to the electoral result, for a political scientist that would not be an adequate analysis. There is nothing either in the campaign or in the result that by itself supports the thesis of a cause and an effect. The campaign was not organized to test empirically the causal nature of campaign activity but aspects of the campaign did permit such tests.

In face of the puzzling fact that McCarthy received a larger percentage of his vote from voters residing in predominantly Republican voting districts one might conclude that a campaign targeted toward Democratic districts had failed. The theoretical context for this examination was Anthony Downs' thesis concerning information costs. A distinction was found between Democrats residing in predominantly Republican areas and Democrats residing in predominantly Democratic areas. An examination of the socio-economic characteristics of these two groups of Democratic voters found that socio-economic factors determined the ability to absorb Downs' non-transferable information costs. The Democrat residing in a Republican area shared the higher socio-economic characteristics of the Republican community although not the political orientation. In spite of the fact that these Democratic voters were not targeted as part of the McCarthy campaign strategy, they were able to gather their own vote determining information and in significant numbers voted for Senator McCarthy.

To test the effectiveness of the campaign, five indicators were selected representing campaign activities or the response to activities that could be assigned to each voting district. The findings supported the contention that the strategy of the campaign as measured through the indicators was effective in producing the vote for McCarthy. In other words, without the campaign and the targets selected for priority attention McCarthy's vote would be significantly less.

For the student of the electoral process the campaign effectiveness findings are important. While other factors such as party identification and socio-economic status are important determinants of election outcomes, especially in bi-partisan elections, campaigns and especially quantifiable campaign activities are seen as also contributing to an electoral result. This is especially the case in an intra-party contest such as a primary election.

It is now possible to say that the McCarthy campaign was more than a quest for headlines or a movement to change public policy. For the political scientist the campaign demonstrated both the institutional resilience of the individual American voter. The analysis of the campaign affirmed the importance of the campaign to the electoral decision. As a result of this finding and the word that has evolved on campaigns since 1968, the campaign as a factor in the electoral process must be given a place along with other empirical findings concerning voting behavior.

Notes

[1]Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," APSR, Vol. 63 (December 1969), p. 1092.

[2]E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), Chapter 5.

[3]William H. Flanigan, Political Behavior of the American Electorate, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972), p. 19.

[4]See earlier chapter, "The Red Herring Charge and New Hampshire Politics," Section 13, pp. 20-25.

[5]Cash, Kevin, Op.Cit., and Veblen, Eric, Op.Cit.

[6]V.O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An Introduction, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 39-40.

[7]Dunfey, William L. Op.Cit.

[8]Cash, Kevin, Op.Cit.

[9]See earlier discussion of Robert Craig's findings. Section 14, p.39-52.

[10]Craig, Robert, Op.Cit., p. 131.

[11]Ibid., p. 138.

[12]Ibid., p. 150.

[13]Key, V.O., Op.Cit.

[14]Flanigan, W.H., Op.Cit.

[15]Ibid., p. 52.

[16]Criag, Robert, Op.Cit., p. 251.

[17]Flanigan, W.H., Op.Cit., p. 71.

[18]The Voter Decides and The American Voter studies support this finding.

[19]Craig, Robert, Op.Cit., p. 141.

[20]In New Hampshire a number of boards and commissions must have minority party members included usually in a ratio of 2 to 1 (majority to minority). These appointments by a governor grant social status and often economic benefit, direct or indirect, to the recipient. Judicious use of the appointing power has been a tool of Republican governors in keeping the Democratic Party in its minority position in gubernatorial politics.

V.O. Key observed that minority party organization tended to "atrophy" as its nominating function was shifted to candidate selection via client primary. In New Hampshire, appointment to a minority position on a state board or commission kept the Democratic Party alive although in a less than vital position. V.O. Key, Jr., Op.Cit., p. 195.

[21]Flanigan, W.H., Op.Cit., p. 45.

[22]Ibid., p. 47.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), pp. 220-237.

[25]Key, Jr., V.O., Op.Cit., pp. 217-265.

[26]Two activities evolving from the campaign strategy were to circulate in priority communities celebrities who had volunteered to help McCarthy's candidacy, and secondly, to organize support or auxiliary activities such as "Republicans for McCarthy" or "educators for McCarthy" or some other group outside the campaign organization for McCarthy.

[27]A New Hampshire voting district is a town or city ward.

[28]Auxiliary activities include visits by celebrities not accompanying McCarthy and organization of support groups especially Republicans for McCarthy.

[29]The following table is a rank order analysis of the vote for McCarthy as related to the percent vote Republican (i.e., the normal vote) by selected voting districts.

TABLE 15.12 VOTE ANALYSIS OF DISTRICTS OF 2,500 POPULATION OR MORE BY PERCENT VOTE McCARTHY AND PERCENT VOTE NORMALLY REPUBLICAN

Community	% Vote McCarthy	% Vote Republican (Normal)	Rank Order Vote McCarthy	Rank Order Normal Republican Vote
Berlin	51.7	38.7	27	55
Claremont	37.9	41.9	58	51
Concord	53.9	45.0	25	50
Derry	47.5	67.5	36	17
Dover	48.0	59.1	34.5	33
Hudson	44.0	49.2	43	46
Keene	46.7	49.3	39	45
Laconia	39.4	49.5	56	44
Manchester	31.0	50.8	61	42
Nashua	40.7	33.8	50	58
Portsmouth	69.1	59.3	5	32
Rochester	51.0	54.2	30	39
Salem	50.5	60.8	21.5	27
Allenstown	39.7	27.4	55	60
Amherst	58.8	74.0	16	9
Bedford	48.0	65.0	34.5	20
Boscawen	44.3	50.4	42	43
Charlestown	41.9	61.1	47	25
Conway	54.6	77.4	24	6
Durham	84.6	49.2	3	46
Exeter	57.5	65.1	20	19
Farmington	56.5	66.8	21.5	18
Franklin	41.3	38.9	48.5	54
Gilford	61.4	59.4	4	31
Goffstown	41.3	60.4	48.5	28
Gorham	51.3	47.6	28	49
Hampton	57.9	69.4	17.5	14
Hanover	85.0	39.8	2	53
Haverhill	40.6	64.4	51	21
Hillsborough	63.8	68.3	9	15
Hinsdale	60.0	59.9	14	30
Hollis	65.9	75.9	8	7
Hooksett	40.7	60.3	50	28
Hopkinton	51.1	56.7	29	37
Jaffrey	48.9	51.9	31	40
Kingston	46.8	77.7	37.5	5
Lancaster	59.9	61.4	15	21
Lebanon	48.7	37.8	32	56

TABLE 15.12/Footnote #29 (Continued)

Community	% Vote McCarthy	% Vote Republican (Normal)	Rank Order Vote McCarthy	Rank Order Normal Republican Vote
Littleton	40.3	67.7	53	16
Londonderry	48.1	71.3	33	11
Meredith	100.0	74.0	1	9
Merrimack	46.8	60.0	37.5	29
Milford	38.0	61.3	57	24
Newmarket	40.4	37.5	52	57
Newport	40.1	55.7	54	38
No. Hampton	66.0	79.2	7	3
Pelham	57.9	51.5	17.5	41
Pembroke	42.6	40.8	44	52
Peterborough	57.7	69.5	19	13
Pittsfield	37.7	61.1	59	25
Plaistow	60.3	64.1	13	22
Plymouth	67.7	79.0	6	4
Raymond	45.8	79.4	40	2
Rye	70.8	69.7	4	12
Seabrook	63.0	74.9	11	8
Somersworth	42.5	33.3	45	59
Swanzey	45.5	48.6	41	48
Tilton	42.4	57.7	46	36
Walpole	53.1	58.4	26	35
Winchester	36.1	58.5	60	34
Windham	55.1	64.4	23	21
Wolfeboro	63.2	81.8	5	1

RHO = .7299

N = 62

[30]Republican areas are defined as those voting districts where the normal Republican vote was 53 percent or greater. For the purposes of the analysis, the 1960 general election was selected to determine the normal Republican vote by voting districts having a population of 2,500 or more persons, U.S. Census of the Population 1970.

[31]Philip E. Converse, et.al., Elections and the Political Order, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 9-40.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Adamany, David. Financing Politics, Recent Wisconsin Elections (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969).

Adler, Bill (Ed.). The McCarthy Wit (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1969).

Agranoff, Robert. Elections and Electoral Behavior: A Bibliography (DeKalb, IL: Center for Governmental Studies, 1972).

_____. The Management of Election Campaigns (Boston, Mass: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1976).

_____. The New Style in Election Campaigns (Boston, Mass: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1975, 2nd ed.).

Baus, Herbert M. and Ross, William B. Politics Battle Plan (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968).

Beman, Lamar T. The Direct Primary (New York: The H.W. Wilson Co., 1926).

Berelson, Bernard R., Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and McPhee, William N. Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

Binkley, Wilfred E. American Political Parties: Their Natural History (New York: Knopf, 4th ed., 1962).

Binstock, Robert H. A Report on Politics in Manchester, New Hampshire (Cambridge, Mass.: Joint Center for Urban Studies of Technology and Harvard University, 1961).

Bogart, Leo. Silent Politics, Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972).

Bone, Hugh A. American Politics and the Party System, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

Bruyn, Severyn, T. The Human Perspective in Sociology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966).

Burdick, Eugene and Brodbeck, Arthur J. (Eds.) American Voting Behavior (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959).

Burns, James MacGregor (Ed.) To Heal and to Build, The Programs of President Lyndon B. Johnson (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968).

Campbell, Angus; Gurin, Gerald; and Miller, Warren E. The Voter Decides (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1954).

Campbell, Angus and Kahn, Robert L. The People Elect a President (Ann Arbor, MI: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, 1952).

Campbell, Angus and Cooper, H. Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research, 1956).

_____. Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes (Ann Arbor, MI: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1956).

Campbell, Angus; Converse, Phillip E.; Miller, Warren E.; and Stokes, Donald E. The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960).

Carr, Robert K., et.al. American Democracy in Theory and Practice (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 3rd edition, 1956).

Cash, Kevin. Who the Hell is William Loeb? (Manchester, NH: Amoskeag Press, Inc., 1975).

Chester, Lewis; Hodgson, Godfrey; and Page, Bruce. An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of 1968 (New York: The Viking Press, 1969).

Churchill, Winston. Mr. Crewe's Career (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1908).

Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection. Mandate for Reform (Washington, D.C.: Democratic National Committee, 1970).

Cosman, Bernard. Five States for Goldwater: Continuity and Change in Southern Voting Patterns, 1920-1964 (University of Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1966).

Craig, Robert E. Voting Behavior in a Presidential Primary: The New Hampshire Democratic Presidential Primary of 1968 (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1971).

Cutlip, Scott M. (Compiler) A Public Relations Bibliography and References and Film Guides (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957).

Daniels, Walter M. Presidential Election Reforms (New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1953).

Daudt, H. Floating Voters and the Floating Vote: A Critical Analysis of American and English Election Studies (Leiden, Holland: H.E. Stenfert Kroese N.V., 1961).

David, Paul T. (Ed.) The Presidential Election and Transition, 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961).

David, Paul T.; Moos, Malcolm; and Goldman, Ralph M. (Eds.) Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952. 5 vols (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954).

David, Paul T.; Goldman, Ralph M.; and Bain, Richard C. The Politics of National Party Conventions (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960).

Davis, James W. Presidential Primaries: Road to the White House (New York: Crowell, 1967).

Duncan, Stephen W. Voter Participation and the Modern Presidential Primary: Recent Findings (Hanover, NH: 1969, M.A. Thesis Dartmouth College).

Dunfey, William L. A Short History of the Democratic Party in New Hampshire (Durham, NH: University of New Hampshire, unpublished M.A. thesis, 1954).

Dye, Thomas R. Politics in States and Communities (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969).

Eisele, Albert. Almost to the Presidency (Blue Earth, Minn.: The Piper Company, 1972).

Eisenmenger, Robert W. The Dynamics of Growth in New England Economy 1870-1964 (New England Research Series), (Wesleyan, 1966).

English, David, et.al. The Presidential Nominating Convention 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968).

_____. Divided They Stand (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969).

Epstein, Leon D. Politics in Wisconsin (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958).

Estall, R. New England: A Study in Industrial Adjustment (London: C. Bell and and Sons, Ltd., 1966).

Fenton, John H. People and Parties in Politics (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and and Company, 1966).

Fitzgerald, Stephen E. Communicating Ideas to the Public: A Practical Application of Public Relations Techniques to Everyday Problems in Human Communications (New York: Funk & Wagnals, 1950).

Flanigan, William H. Political Behavior of the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968).

Goodman, William. The Two-Party System in the United States (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1960, 2nd ed.).

Gorman, Joseph Bruce. Kefauver (Fair Lawn, NJ: Oxford University Press, 1971).

Greenstein, Fred I. The American Party System and the American People (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963).

Gusfield, Joseph R. Protest, Reform, and Revolt: A Reader in Social Movements (New York: Wiley, 1970).

Halberstam, David. The Unfinished Odyssey of Robert Kennedy (New York: Random House, 1968).

_____. The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972).

Hall, John W. The Making of a Public Relations Man (New York: David McKay Company, 1963).

Hawkins, Brett, W., and Lorinskos, Robert A. (Eds.) The Ethnic Factor in American Politics (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1970).

Hershey, Marjorie Randon. The Making of Campaign Strategy (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974).

Herzog, Arthur. McCarthy for President (New York: The Viking Press, 1969).

Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1967).

Hunter, Floyd. Community Power Structure, A Study of Decision Makers (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963).

Jacob, Herbert and Vines, Kenneth (Eds.) Politics in the American States (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown and Co., 1965).

Keech, William R. and Matthew, Donald R. The Party's Choice (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975).

Kelley, Stanley Jr. Professional Public Relations and Political Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956).

Kennedy, Robert F. To Seek A Newer World (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967).

Key, V.O., Jr. Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).

_____. American State Politics: An Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963).

_____. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York: Crowell, 5th ed., 1964).

_____. The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

_____. American State Politics, An Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956).

_____. Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).

Larner, Jeremy. Nobody Knows: Reflections on the McCarthy Campaign of 1968 (New York: Macmillan, 1970).

Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Comp. Preferential Presidential Primaries (Washington, D.C.: 1961).

_____. Nomination and Election of the President and Vice-President (Washington, D.C.: 1960).

Lesly, Philip. Public Relations Handbook (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2nd edition, 1962).

Levin, Murray B. The Alienated Voter (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1960).

Lipset, S.M. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960).

Lipset, S.M. and Stein, Rokkan (Eds.) Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

Lockard, Duane. New England State Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

Loeb, Marshall and Safire, William. Plunging Into Politics (New York: David McKay Company, 1964).

Mailer, Norman. Miami and the Seige of Chicago (New York: Signet Books, 1968).

Matthews, Donald R., (Ed.) Perspectives on Presidential Selection (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973).

McCall, George J. and Simmons, J.L. (Eds.) Issues in Participant Observation (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969).

McCarthy, Eugene J. The Limits of Power (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967).

McCarthy, Eugene J. The Year of the People (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969).

McGinniss, Joe. The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Trident Press, 1969).

Meck, John F. New Hampshire: A Guide to the Granite State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938, W.P.A.).

_____. New Hampshire: The Effect of Progressivism on State and National Politics form 1912-1916 (Hanover, NH: Typewritten manuscript 1967).

Merriam, C.E. and Overacker, L. Primary Elections (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1928).

Merriam, C.E. Primary Elections: A Study of the History and Tendencies of Primary Election Legislation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1908).

Meyer, D. Swing. The Winning Candidate: How to Defeat Your Political Opponent (New York: James H. Heineman, Inc., 1966).

Michener, James A. Presidential Lottery (New York: Random House, 1969).

Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

Newfield, Jack. Robert Kennedy, a Memoir (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1969).

Nie, Norman H.; Verba, Sidney and Petrocik, John R. The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976).

O'Brien, Lawrence F. The Democratic Campaign Manual (Democratic National Committee, Washington, D.C.: 1964).

Odegard, Peter H. and Helms, E. Allen. American Politics (New York: Harper Bros., 2nd ed., 1947).

Ogle, Barbury B. Public Opinion and Political Dynamics (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1950).

Ostrogorski, M.I. Democracy and the Party System in the United States (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1910).

Overacker, Louise. The Presidential Primary (New York: Macmillan, 1926).

Parris, Judith, H. The Convention Problem, Issues in Reform of Presidential Nominating Procedures (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972).

Perry, James M. The New Politics (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1968).

Pierce, Neal R. The People's President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968).

Pimlott, John A.R. Public Relations and American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951).

Polsby, Nelson W. Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

Pomper, Gerald. Nominating the President: The Politics of Convention Choices (Chicago, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963).

_____. Elections in America (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1968).

Ranney, Austin and Kendall Wilmoor. Democracy and the American Party System (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1956).

Ranney, Austin. Participation in American Presidential Nominations 1976 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977).

Roseboom, Eugene H. A History of Presidential Elections (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1959).

Rosenbloom, David L. The Election Men (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973).

Rossiter, Clinton. Parties and Politics in America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1960).

Scammon, Richard M. (Ed.) America at the Polls: A Handbook of American Presidential Election Statistics, 1920-1964 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965).

Scammon, Richard M. and Wattenberg, Ben J. The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970).

Shadegg, Stephen C. How to Win an Election (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1964).

Stavis, Ben. We Were The Campaign: New Hampshire to Chicago for McCarthy (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1969).

Stedman, Murray S. Religion and Politics in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964).

Stephenson, Howard. Handbook of Public Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

Stout, Richard T. People (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

Sullivan, Denis G., et.al. The Politics of Representation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974).

Sundquist, James L. Dynamics of the Party System (Washington, D.C.: The Brook-Institution, 1973).

Thomson, Charles A.H., and Shattuck, Frances M. The 1956 Presidential Campaign (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960).

Truman, David B. The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).

Underwood, Barbara. St. Crispin's Day, Gene McCarthy in the New Hampshire Primary (unpublished typescript, Concord, New Hampshire, 1970).

Van Riper, Paul P. Handbook of Practical Politics (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952).

Veblin, Eric P. Newspaper Impact in Election Campaigns: The Case of Two New England States (New Haven, 1969 University Microfilm, 1970 Yale Thesis).

Vidich, Arthur J. and Bensman, Joseph. Small Town in Mass Society (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1960).

White, Theodore H. The Making of the President 1960 (New York: Atheneum, 1961).

_____. The Making of the President 1964 (New York: Atheneum, 1965).

_____. The Making of the President 1968 (New York: Atheneum, 1969).

Wildavsky, Aaron B. and Polsby, Nelson W. Presidential Elections (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964).

Wilson, James Q. The Amateur Democrat (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

Witcover, Jules. 85 Days, The Last Campaign of Robert Kennedy (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1969).

ARTICLES

Adams, William C., "Candidate Characteristics, Office of Election, and Voter Response," Experimental Study of Politics , Vol. 4, (July 1975), pp. 76-88.

Alford, Robert R., "A Suggested Index of the Association of Social Class and Voting," Vol. 26, 3 Public Opinion Quarterly (Fall 1962), pp. 417-425.

_____, "The Role of Social Class in American Voting Behavior," 16, Western Political Quarterly (1963), pp. 180-195.

Alford, Robert R. and Lee, Eugene C., "Voting Turnout in American Cities," 62 American Political Science Review (September 1968), pp. 796-813.

Andreoli, Virginia and Worchel, Stephen, "Effects of Media, Communication, and Message Position on Attitude Change," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 42 (Spring 1978), pp. 59-70.

Axelrod, Robert, "Where the Voter Came From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, 1952-1968," American Political Science Review, 66 (March 1972), pp. 11-20.

Ballenger, Gregory and Hennessy, Bernard, "Door-to-Door Canvassing Pays Off: An Experimental Study in a Nonpartisan Suburb," Experimental Study of Politics, Vol. 3, (1974).

Bendiner, Robert, "The Presidential Primaries are Haphazard, Unfair, and Wildly Illogical," The New York Times Magazine, (February 27, 1972), pp. 11, 40-46.

Bond, Richard W., "Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting Defection," American Political Science Review, 63 (June 1969), p. 498-514.

Brown, Steven R. and Ellithorp, John D., "Emotional Experiences in Political Groups: The Case of the McCarthy Phenomenon," American Political Science Review, 64 (June 1970), pp. 349-366.

Brownstein, Charles N., "Communication Strategies and the Electoral Decision Making Process: Some Results from Experimentation," Experimental Study of Politics, (July 1971), pp. 37-49.

Campbell, Angus, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," 24 Public Opinion Quarterly, (1960), pp. 397-418.

Childs, R.S., "Inside 100 Parties," 56 National Civic Review, (November 1967) pp. 568-571.

Converse, Phillip E., Miller, Warren E., Rusk, Jerrold G., and Wolfe, Arthur C., "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," 63 American Political Science Review, 4 (December 1969), 1083-1105.

Coombs, Fred S., Peters, John G. and Strom, Gerald S., "Bandwagon, Ballot Position, and Party Effects: An Experiment in Voting Choice," Experimental Study of Politics, Vol. 4, (February 1974), pp. 31-55.

Craig, Robert E., "The Protest Coalition: Voting Behavior in the New Hampshire Democratic Presidential Primary, 1968," APSA Convention Mimeo, 1971.

Dauer, M.J., Stephanson, W.A.F., Macy, H. and Temple, D., "Toward a Model State Presidential Primary Law," 50 American Political Science Review, (1956), pp. 138-153.

Eldersveld, Samuel J., "Experimental Propaganda Techniques and Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review, (March 1956), pp. 154-165.

Eldersveld, Samuel J., and Dodge, Richard W., "Personal Contact or Mail Propaganda?: An Experiment in Voting Turnout and Attitude Change," in Daniel Katz (Ed.), Public Opinion and Propaganda, (Dreiden Press, 1958).

Finilter, Ada W., "Dimensions of Political Alienation," American Political Science Review, 64 (June 1970), pp. 389-410.

Flectas, David W., "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Minimal-Information Elections," American Political Science Review, 65 (June 1971), pp. 434-435.

Hacker, Andrew, "Does a Divisive Primary Harm a Candidate's Election Chances?" American Political Science Review, (March 1965).

Harris, Louis., "How Voters See the Issues," Newsweek, (March 25, 1968), p. 26.

Eulau, Heinz, "Perceptions of Class and Party in Voting Behavior," 1952, 49 American Political Science Review, pp. 364-384.

Jaros, Dean and Mason, Gene L., "Party Choice and Support for Demagogues: An Experimental Examination," 63, American Political Science Review (March 1969), pp. 100-110.

Kelley, Stanley, Jr., Ayres, Richard F., and Bowen, William G., "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First," American Political Science Review, 61 (June 1967), pp. 359-379.

Key, V.O., Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics, 17 (February 1955), pp. 3-18.

Kim, Jae-On, Petrocik, John R, and Enokson, Stephen N., "Voter Turnout Among the American States," American Political Science Review, 69 (March 1975), pp. 107-123.

Lapp, J.A., "Presidential Primaries," 10, American Political Science Review (February 1916), pp. 116-120.

Miller, Arthur H. and Miller, Warren E., et.al., "A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election," American Political Science Review, 70 (September 1976), pp. 753-778.

Miller, Roy E., and Robyn, Dorothy L., "A Field Experiment Study of Direct Mail in a Congressional Primary Campaign: What Effects Last Until Election Day?" Experimental Study of Politics, (December 1975).

Miller, W.E., "One Party Politics and the Voter," American Political Science Review, 50 (September 1956), pp. 707-725.

Nanda, Krishan, "An Experiment in Voting Choice: Who Gets the 'Blind' Vote?" Experimental Study of Politics, Vol. 4, (February 1975), pp. 20-35.

Olson, David M., "The Structure of Electoral Politics," 29, Journal of Politics, 2 (May 1967), pp. 352-367.

Overacker, L., "The Presidential Primary Since 1924," American Political Science Review, 22 (1928), pp. 353-561.

_____. "Direct Primary Legislation in 1928-1929," American Political Science Review, 24 (May 1930), pp. 370-380.

_____. "Direct Primary Legislation in 1930-1931," American Political Science Review, 26 (1932), pp. 294-300.

_____. "Direct Primary Legislation in 1932-1933," American Political Science Review, 28 (April 1934), pp. 265-270.

_____. "Direct Primary Legislation in 1934-1935," American Political Science Review, 30 (April 1936), pp. 279-285.

_____. "Direct Primary Legislation in 1936-1939," American Political Science Review, 34 (June 1940), pp. 499-506.

Pomper, Gerald M., et.al., "Issue Voting," American Political Science Review, 66 (June 1972), pp. 415-428.

_____. "The Direct Primary," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 106 (March 1923).

Ranney, Austin and Epstein, Leon D., "The Two Electorates: Voters and Non-Voters in a Wisconsin Primary," Journal of Politics, 28, No. 3 (August 1966), pp. 598-616.

Ranney, Austin, "Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections," American Political Science Review, 66 (March 1972), pp. 21-37.

Ray, P.O., "Recent Primary and Election Laws," American Political Science Review, 13 (May 1919), pp. 264-274.

_____. "Primary Legislation, 1924-1925," American Political Science Review, (May 1926), pp. 349-352.

Scioli, Frank P., Jr., and Dyson, James W., "Attitude-Behavior Congruence in Varying Situational Environments," Experimental Study of Politics, Vol. 2, (1973), pp. 39-60.

Verba, Sidney, et.al., "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," American Political Science Review, 61 (June 1967), pp. 317-333.

_____. "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties," American Political Science Review (Special Supplement, 1950).

Wesiberg, Herbert F. and Rusk, Jerrold G., "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluations," American Political Science Review, 64 (December 1970), pp. 1167-1185.

Wildavsky, Aaron B., "On the Superiority of National Party Conventions, As Mechanisms for Nominating Presidents," Review of Politics, (July 1962).

Zinser, James E., et.al., "The Rational Analysis of Voter Participation: A Recursive Model of Household Behavior with Applications to Voter Turnout," paper prepared for delivery at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 1 - May 1, 1976 (Chicago).