The politics of civil service reform : the search for responsible administration in Great Britain and the United States.

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THE POLITICS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: THE SEARCH FOR RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATION IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

A Dissertation Presented

By

David L. Dillman

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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THE POLITICS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: THE SEARCH FOR RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATION IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: THE SEARCH FOR RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATION IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

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This dissertation is concerned with the problem of securing and maintaining a responsible public administration. Its focus is civil service reform, particularly reform directed at the top levels, which is a primary expression of changes in the notion of administrative responsibility. Civil service reform is viewed as fundamentally a political debate between individuals and groups holding alternative notions of the nature of responsible government.

It is argued that civil service reforms in democratic polities are complex webs of responses to social and economic forces, reactions to changing political values and intellectual trends, and initiatives by interested groups.
Reform represents a temporary political consensus. To illustrate this thesis an examination is made of the political dynamics of reform in Great Britain and the United States. A brief discussion of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and Pendleton Act is followed by a more detailed examination of the reform efforts associated with the Fulton Committee, Second Hoover Commission, and Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.

Although important differences may be noted between British and American reform proposals, the similarities of the reform processes are more striking. Each of the reform efforts studied is characterized by a high degree of interest group politics. Each reform has attempted to make the higher civil service more representative of the outlook of the reform leaders. In the twentieth century reformers, concerned with the growth of bureaucratic power, have emphasized the need for responsiveness to political leadership. Reform proposals have placed stress on managerial competence and market incentives.

The Fulton and Carter reforms made important contributions to problems specific to each civil service, yet both wandered off the track to a responsible administration. By stressing political responsiveness, the independence and initiative of the senior civil service may have been compromised. More importantly, their emphases on external controls and economic incentives may have a negative impact
on both performance and public service attitudes.
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INTRODUCTION

In the process of researching and writing a dissertation, inquiries are made frequently by well-meaning friends and acquaintances about the topic that has distracted one from normal social intercourse. The very mention of the topic here—civil service reform—usually evokes a cavernous yawn or a glassy stare. Yet in the political arena, an institution so seemingly dull—the civil service—generates a surprising amount of interest and even passion. It is perpetually being condemned, reformed, and condemned. Each successive round of condemnation typically points out a vice contrary to that earlier alleged and the later reform response is likely in a direction contrary to or at least distinctly different from that earlier essayed. Why so much attention to this supposedly anonymous, routine, deadly boring institution?

In short, the answer is that civil service reform is fundamentally a political debate between individuals and groups holding alternative notions of the nature of responsible government. The outcomes of these debates are of crucial significance for establishing a civil service which is politically neutral and yet responsive to executive leadership, accountable and yet capable of initiative, professionally competent and yet representative and sensitive to public ethics. The outcomes of these debates are
significant for deciding who rules and to what effect.

As the British civil service enters the 1980s it finds itself in the midst of such a political debate. Much of the condemnation flows from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's war on waste and inefficiency led by the Prime Minister's adviser on government management, Sir Derek Rayner, the joint managing director of a chain of large department stores. Thatcher and Sir Derek want to cut almost 100,000 jobs by 1984 and streamline the service by abolishing the rank of under-secretary and "hiving-off" functions currently performed by the public sector to the private sector to realize huge savings in expenditures on the civil service. Yet at the same time, it is not so clear to many observers that the civil service deserves to be attacked nor is there full agreement that economy and efficiency are the proper criteria to apply to it.

The 1980s, of course, is not the first attempt to reform the British civil service. In the mid-nineteenth century a concern for civil service reform became a passion for a small number of public officials and informed citizens and progressively grew to become an item on the political agenda. Yet by almost all accounts, Great Britain by the 1850s had developed a civil service that was loyal to the Crown, a career service, and in some departments reasonably competent. It is also clear that the post-World War II higher civil service in Britain could be characterized as a
corps of well-educated, honest, politically neutral career officials capable of being moved quite freely throughout the top jobs of the civil service. Why then did Britain experience criticism of the civil service, beginning just after the war and reaching its zenith in the late 1960s? And what were the new standards, criteria, or values by which the civil service of the 1960s was being judged?

It is clearer why civil service reform was placed on the political agenda in the United States in the late nineteenth century. Yet it is not so clear why the American civil service assumed the shape that it did nor why in the 1950s an attempt was made to change this shape to resemble the image of the British civil service. Indeed, why, in the 1970s, when the British have found the strengths of the American higher civil service to lie in its professional competence, political responsiveness, and openness, did the Carter Administration bring the efforts of past Democratic and Republican Presidents to change the civil service to fruition? Who, besides the President, has found the civil service wanting and how have they brought about reform? And further, what are the new criteria or values that underpin the reforms of the 1970s? The answers to these questions form a complex web of pressures, interests, motivations, and values that can be said to characterize the process of administrative reform.
The Problem of the Higher Civil Service

Why is civil service reform so often the object of attention? Why is reform of the higher civil service habitually a key target for those groups advocating a more responsible administration? According to Brian Smith, "reform originates in a belief that ... the adaptation of existing structures, expressed in terms of functions and responsibilities, to new objectives, technology, resources and environmental factors" and, it might be added, to new concepts of responsible administration, "cannot take place given the existing methods of recruiting, training, deploying and managing the organization's human resource."¹ In other words, civil service reform is motivated by the belief that the type, quality, and structure of the organization's personnel does make a difference in achieving organizational objectives and in establishing and maintaining a responsible organization. Yet this does not answer the question of why the focus of reform is so often on upper levels of the civil service. Undoubtedly, part of the answer lies in the observation that higher civil servants have three main functions which put them at the center of concern:

first, to keep the machinery of administration in good order so that it is readily useful for the political leadership of the departmental systems; second, to operate the administrative machinery so as to accomplish

the aims of the political leadership, and third, to advise that leadership about the best ways and means of using the administrative machinery for the accomplishment of its aims.1

In carrying out these functions, the top administrator is concerned with the traditional "POSDCORB" activities of planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, budgeting, and, it might be added, evaluating.2 In carrying out these tasks, the administrator has a pivotal role in translating political goals into administrative practice, a role which calls for technical-managerial skills. In this pivotal capacity, "the importance of the higher civil service springs from the fact that collectively the upper ranks represent the bureaucracy's outlook for most purposes." Top civil servants influence the attitudes and work patterns and habits of those below them, and, "indeed, the characteristics of the top group have generally formed the model for the civil service at large."3 Furthermore, in the execution of these administrative functions the scope of discretion is broad and the exercise of responsibility takes


3 Marx, The Administrative State, pp. 11, 46.
on real meaning. Although it is not always clear that higher civil servants have more discretion in the implementation of policy than mid-level and "street-level" bureaucrats, it is generally the case that their use of discretion has a wider impact—in terms of the effect on people, finances, or area. The potential for disaster or for benefit that comes through their use of discretion and their influence on the administrative machine gives political leaders and the public cause for concern as to the nature of the higher civil service.

Being pivotal officials, the top permanent bureaucrats not only translate policy choices into administrative action, but they also have a fourth function of making policy choices through giving political and technical advice and initiating and formulating public programs. Certainly the top civil servant, if any public administrator, does not work in a purely administrative environment. On the contrary, he or she operates in the politicized atmosphere of interest groups, political executives, congressional leaders, opinion polls, political parties, and the press. Thus, in addition to managerial skills, indeed, before managerial

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skills, the top administrator requires political sense.\(^1\) As the top civil servant performs these political functions, his personal and organizational perspectives are brought to bear on policy-making.

Carrying this notion of the higher civil servant as a pivotal actor further, Hugh Heclo contends that "the relationship between political and administrative officials persists as one of the linchpins of effective government performance" and therefore "goes to the heart of a modern democratic government."\(^2\) In Heclo's view, democratic government depends not only on a supply of competent politicians and administrators, but more importantly on developing and maintaining a relationship between the two sets of actors that facilitates political control of the bureaucrats while at the same time allowing them to exhibit individual initiative and positive performance. To achieve this kind of balance requires that political leaders and civil servants be closely linked so that bureaucratic power can serve political ends and be controlled by political leaders. At the same time, the two groups must maintain a degree of separation so that bureaucratic leadership will not become

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ascendant over political life and so that personal political power will not become entrenched in the machinery of government.¹ For Heclo, the search for the proper balance raises two questions: "First, what sort of central authority, if any, should guide the civil service system as a whole? Second, how should responsibility for protecting the civil service from political partisanship be organized?"² Thus, for Heclo, achieving a responsible administration requires structural reforms of the higher civil service which reflect the constantly changing political balance between executive leadership, political responsiveness, and neutral competence.

Similarly, Peter Self argues that it is the nature of the blend between the top political and administrative elements of the public service which determines its effectiveness.³ Like Heclo, Self points to the structure of top management—the dividing line between the political executives and career executives, its rigidity as well as the sharpness and clarity with which these roles are differentiated—as a key to securing a responsible administration. For Self, the classic problem of responsible administration in democratic societies is the tension between the

¹Ibid., p. 8.
²Ibid., p. 24.
requirements for an administration accountable to political executives and an administration which can take effective action.\(^1\) Part of the resolution of this tension focuses on the relations between top political and bureaucratic officials. In Britain, the line between the two sets of officials "is marked most clearly and rigidly, and associated with a definite and well understood differentiation of roles. Moreover, each of the groups principally concerned is highly cohesive."\(^2\) American government, on the other hand, "produces neither a clear differentiation of politics and administration, nor a cohesive pair of political and administrative elites."\(^3\) Each approach to defining the nature of the higher civil service contains its own special problems since that nature is a political accommodation over the rules of access to the top positions, the kind of individuals in these positions, the political values which are stressed, and the higher civil servants' relationship to political executives. Both Heclo and Self, then, correctly point out that the nature of the higher civil service and the appropriate mechanisms for changing its nature are central concerns for the reformer attempting to make administration more responsible.

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 277-78.  
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 163.  
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 173.
The Problem of Power

Perhaps the crux of the problem of the higher civil service and responsible administration is the issue of administrative power. For example, in Great Britain in the early 1960s, many members of the Labour Party observed that administrators exerted an enormous amount of power in the initiation and formulation of public policy through their continuity, expertise, and control of information. Many of these Labourites believed that bureaucracy should be held responsible primarily through reducing the preponderance of Oxford and Cambridge graduates in the top administrative positions, politicizing top appointments, and decreasing the anonymity of administrative advice. Others in the Labour Party who perhaps shared the assessment of the source of power but who disagreed on its extent, continued to hold to the view that the bureaucracy's actions could be made responsible by the strict anonymity of politically neutral, competent (Oxbridge) civil servants. More recently, the concern for the civil servants' alleged power to thwart the goals of Conservative Party manifestos is behind the Thatcher Government's attempt to cut and reorganize British central administration. Thus it is that differing explanations of the source or amount of bureaucratic power give partial impetus and content to the reform debate.

The theme of administrative power is ubiquitous. For instance, common to the elite perspective of C. Wright Mills
who argues that power resides in the very few interlocking corporate, military, and state leaders;\(^1\) the ruling class perspective of James Burnham who claims that modern managers control access to the instruments of production and therefore form a ruling class;\(^2\) and the pluralist perspective of J. Leiper Freeman who contends that bureaucrats share power with interest group leaders, congressional leaders, and political executives,\(^3\) is a concern for the problem of power. But to ask, "do bureaucrats really have power?," and "what is the nature of the power they possess?," involves an investigation into philosophical and theoretical issues of real complexity. For example, emerging from the despair of Robert Michels, who concludes that bureaucracy is inevitably undemocratic,\(^4\) and F. A. Hayek who believes that public bureaucracy necessarily restricts liberty;\(^5\) the ambiguity of Max Weber who, on the one hand, claims that bureaucracy is a


tool subservient to its owners, but, on the other hand, believes it is indispensable and thus omnipotent;¹ and the optimism of Alvin Gouldner who posits that bureaucracy is not inevitable,² is a hint of the complexity that surrounds discussions of bureaucratic power. Complexity arises from the writer's own ideology as well as the historical, economic, and social context of the bureaucracy under consideration.

In his review of the fundamental approaches to achieving administrative responsibility, Arch Dotson shows the complexity of bureaucratic power through assessing the sources, nature, and extent of that power. He argues that administrative officials have "an extensive and vast political power" which is derived from five major areas: 1) the origination of legislation, 2) the collaboration with legislators and legislative committees, 3) the collaboration with pressure groups and special clienteles, 4) the influence upon the chief executive and his assistants, and 5) the interpretation of law. Beyond this, the nature of bureaucratic power is that it is conferred, "not merely in a formal, but in a substantive sense, [by] the representative assembly, the chief executive, the courts, and other parts of the political


system" due to the "role of the state in economic and social affairs" and "the inadequacy or unsuitability of the rest of the political system to that role." Thus the source of bureaucratic power may be located more precisely in the bureaucrats' specialized knowledge or expertise. Dotson concludes that given the nature of bureaucratic power, attempting to control it and attain administrative responsibility is a problem for the entire political system.

In a rare instance of bureaucratic candor, Lord William Armstrong, after his retirement as Head of the British Civil Service Department, gave credence to Dotson's conclusions. Lord Armstrong confessed,

Obviously, I had a great deal of influence. The biggest and most pervasive influence is in setting the framework within which the questions of policy are raised. . . . We set the questions which we asked ministers to decide arising out of that framework and it would have been enormously difficult for my minister to change the framework so to that extent we had great power.

But not only does the ability to set the framework provide administrators with power, power is also claimed by the default of legislators and executive leaders. Lord Armstrong went on,

We were very ready to explain it to anybody who was interested, but most ministers were not interested,

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1 Arch Dotson, "Fundamental Approaches to Administrative Responsibility," Western Political Quarterly 10 (September 1957): 720-21.


3 The Times (London), November 15, 1976.
were just prepared to take the questions as we offered them, which came out of that framework without going back into the preconceptions of them.  

Finally, Armstrong suggests that expertise and continuity are sources of bureaucratic power. In choosing top civil servants, "I wouldn't say to the Prime Minister 'there is A, B, C, D and it's up to you to choose' because I think I knew them better than he did and so in that area I reckon I had greater power in that sense." Lord Armstrong naturally assumes a well-intentioned, reasonable use of the power that fell to the civil service. Other observers are not so charitable.

Tony Benn, Labour M.P. and former minister, confidently asserts "that the power, role, influence and authority of the senior levels of the civil service in Britain . . . have grown to such an extent as to create the embryo of a corporate state." This power is seized by bureaucrats through intentionally misleading ministers, maintaining a veil of secrecy, withholding information, delaying decisions, and so on to maintain their own elite positions. Benn's critique receives support not only from the political left but from the right as well, and juxtaposed to Lord Armstrong's more

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1Ibid.

2Ibid.

3Tony Benn, "The Case for a Constitutional Civil Service," lecture given by Tony Benn to the Royal Institute of Public Administration (Nottingham Institute for Workers' Control, 1980), p. 1.
pluralist view exemplifies the widely varying views with respect to administrative power.

Frederick Mosher's premises, as outlined in Democracy and the Public Service, provide working assumptions regarding administrative power.

1. governmental decisions and behavior have tremendous influence upon the nature and development of our society, our economy, and our policy;

2. the great bulk of decisions and actions taken by governments are determined or heavily influenced by administrative officials, most of whom are appointed, not elected;

3. the kinds of decisions and actions these officials take depend upon their capabilities, their orientations, and their values; and

4. these attributes depend heavily upon their backgrounds, their training and education, and their current associations.1

Thus, the existence of administrative power in contemporary democracy may properly be taken as a given without specifying the precise extent and nature of that power. Yet its very existence suggests that with few exceptions "the most important social question we face today is that of the conditions of bureaucratic responsibility."2

It is clear then that one's perception of the power of the higher civil service is closely interwoven with one's assessment of the direction reform should take. Those who


2J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy (Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1944), pp. 263-64.
believe that civil service power should be reduced may question the predominance of higher civil servants with an education in the classics, for example. In political disputes over civil service reform, the view of administrative power that each group holds is part of the background that shapes that particular group's orientation with respect to securing a responsible administration.

Civil Service Reform and the Nature of Responsible Administration

Responsible administration is a political concept widely shared in democratic society. And yet it is a concept often at the center of political disputes because it is shared imperfectly. Among its varied meanings particular political participants in particular disputes may find just that connotation which best serves their purposes. Thus, it may be that when "responsible administration" is invoked differing connotations and values are being expressed.

For example, in both the United States and Great Britain, differing notions of responsible administration have been alternatively stressed according to the social and political context. Herbert Kaufman has shown the cyclical nature in the United States of three administrative values—representativeness, politically neutral competence, and executive leadership.¹ He argues that while one value is

being stressed, political discontent associated with the neglected values grows until enough political pressure has been generated to support a change in institutional forms. No political value is totally achieved and no value is totally neglected. In this way, a constant movement in political values and institutional reform is taking place.

Frederick Mosher has identified the evolutionary character of the American governmental administration. Dividing American administrative history into six periods--government by gentlemen, government by the common man, government by the good, government by the efficient, and in the post-World War II period, government by administrators and government by professionals--he has shown how each turn of the evolutionary cycle emphasized different values of responsible public administration. Mosher has also pointed out that in European countries, since World War II, reform efforts have emphasized three values: first, representativeness, through democratizing "their higher civil service by opening its gates of entry to larger segments of the population"; second, competence, through strengthening "their capacities to deal effectively with the social, economic, political, and technical problems in a period of accelerating change" through professionalizing the civil services; and third, executive leadership, through enlarging "their

capabilities in the areas of administration, management, and broadly, politics."¹ The point that both Mosher and Kaufman make is that administrative values are shaped by changing societal, intellectual, and political trends.

Similarly, James Q. Wilson identifies five goals or values which characterize a responsible government.

First, there is the problem of accountability or control--getting the bureaucracy to serve agreed-on national goals. Second is the problem of equity--getting bureaucrats to treat like cases alike and on the basis of clear rules, known in advance. Third is the problem of efficiency--maximizing output for a given expenditure, or minimizing expenditures for a given output. Fourth is the problem of responsiveness--inducing bureaucrats to meet, with alacrity and compassion, those cases which can never be brought under a single national rule and which, by common human standards of justice or benevolence, seem to require that an exception be made or a rule stretched. Fifth, is the problem of fiscal integrity--properly spending and accounting for public money.²

It is clear that the values Wilson mentions may contradict each other. For example, the goal of responsiveness or making compassionate exceptions may conflict with the desire for equity or treating everyone the same. Likewise, the problem of efficiency may contradict efforts to pursue national goals. Because the various values which fall under the rubric of responsibility may work against each other, political debates about the meaning of responsible administration are complicated and ambiguous.

¹Democracy and the Public Service, p. 37.

If the values that embody "administrative responsibility" are political, it is also the case that the administrative reforms that institutionalize these values are political. Indeed, Dwight Waldo persuasively argues that "administrative devices are relative to the economic and social composition and ideological complexion of the societies in which they exist."¹ And the British student of public administration, C. H. Sisson, asserts that administrative techniques and procedures "are essentially not solutions to administrative problems--if indeed such things as purely administrative problems may be said to exist at all--but responses, more or less slow, coming from sources more or less deep in the histories of the countries concerned, to particular political problems of a more or less enduring sort."² Likewise, his British colleague, Brian Smith, argues that "reform aims to make administrative structures and practices compatible with broader political goals."³

Institutional reform of public bureaucracy, therefore, is a response to changing political values and goals. It should be added, however, that to view reform as the well coordinated pursuit of agreed-on goals would be too


simplistic. Civil service reform "is not necessarily a developmental one towards a clearly defined goal known in advance, but a complex matter of acceding to pressures, communicating and discussing ideas, stimulating comments from groups with potential interests, and making judgments within the administrative system about tactics and timing for the introduction of particular changes."¹ Reform, then, is a complex web of reactions to changing political values and responses to political pressures from groups outside and inside bureaucracy as well as initiatives by interested groups. It is only by identifying these deeper pressures and values that one can explain the moral fervor and political turbulence which often surrounds civil service reform movements.

Looking Ahead

The chapters which follow will examine several significant reforms of the British and American civil services beginning with the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and Pendleton Act. Particular emphasis will be placed on the post-World War II reform periods associated with the Fulton Committee, the Second Hoover Commission, and the Carter Presidency. An attempt will be made to identify and describe the assortment of factors contributing to a reform environment, the

interests that participate in reform, the recommendations of the reforming bodies and the problems of implementing those recommendations, and the political, economic, and social values that characterize the reform period. In essence, then, an attempt will be made to identify and describe the political dynamics of administrative reform and the problem of securing and maintaining a responsible public administration in two contemporary democracies.

Chapter I will examine the creation of career civil service systems in both Great Britain and the United States. The focus will be on the political, economic, and social dynamics of the reform process which resulted in the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms and the Pendleton Act.

Chapters II and III will investigate the great post-World War II American reforms. The creation and recommendations of the Second Hoover Commission and its implications for a responsible civil service will be the focus of Chapter II. Chapter III brings the presidential fascination with higher civil service reform up to date. This chapter is a case study of the Carter Administration civil service reform and asks why this presidential fascination continues, what forces or pressures have stimulated and shaped the reform process and proposals, and how the Carter reforms have affected the nature of the higher civil service.

Similarly, Chapters IV and V will examine the post-war British civil service, with a primary focus on the work of
the Fulton Committee. Specifically, Chapter IV will discuss the political, social, and economic dynamics that played a role in the creation of the Fulton Committee. Chapter V will discuss the work of the Fulton Committee, its recommendations, the response of the government, the civil service, and the press and the impact of the Fulton reforms on the higher civil service.

Chapter VI pulls together the threads running through the various reform efforts in the hope that such an assessment may contribute to a better understanding of the nature of reform in democratic polities. Finally, it asks whether the reforms that are investigated here are on the right track to a more responsible civil service in the belief that thinking about such a question may provide insight into the nature of a truly responsible public administration in contemporary democracy.
Chapter I
Creating the Civil Service in Great Britain and the United States

The reform movements in Great Britain and the United States which resulted in the creation of unified, career civil service systems were marked more by their similarities than by their differences. For although the pressures which stimulated the reforms and the practices which characterized the civil service in each country can be in some ways sharply distinguished, nonetheless both reform efforts were fathered by a concern for politically neutral competence and mothered by a concern for responsible civil service subject to democratic control. It is also true that administrative practices in both the United States and Great Britain were shaped by external social, economic, and political pressures as well as by internal administrative pressures and initiatives. Immediate causes of reform may differ, but the similarities lie in the fact that in both countries civil service reform processes and the consequent administrative structures are responses to these pressures. This chapter will trace the pressures leading to the creation of civil service systems in the mid-nineteenth century in Great Britain and the United States and discuss the implications for administrative responsibility.
Pressures for Change in Britain

Unlike the Genesis account of creation, a unified Home Civil Service based on career employment was neither created ex nihilo nor was it the work of one creator. For while the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of November 23, 1853, stands as a significant landmark, its historical antecedents along with the social, political, and administrative post-Northcote-Trevelyan developments form a continuous web of creative activity.

As England entered the 19th century its civil service was neither unified, permanent, nor much of a service. At best there existed a departmental service, not a unified public service.¹ "Each public office carried on its business in its own way, using whatever methods of organization its traditions or its necessities dictated and the public tolerated."² Thus, each office determined its own criteria for selection and tenure. There was not a clear distinction between the civil service and the political service to the Crown; even low-level officials had political tasks to perform. Nor was the civil service permanent in the sense

¹Henry Parris, "The Origins of the Permanent Civil Service, 1780-1830," Public Administration 46 (Summer 1968): 143. Also see J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy (Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1944), chapter 1, for description of the British civil service in the early 19th century.

that officials enjoyed tenure for good behavior.

The result of this state of administrative affairs was that attempts to provide services were not coordinated, and there was no "supervision of public offices, and therefore no means of ensuring that the public business was performed at as low a cost as possible."\(^1\) There were no examinations or other "objective" selection standards; positions were secured through patronage, either political or personal, and positions often degenerated into sinecures. Patronage was largely in the hands of Parliament, although the Treasury was exercising more and more control over the appointment and promotion of patrons.

One late 19th century American student of British government, Dorman Eaton, was led to conclude that it was inevitable that "grave abuses" existed. Patronage "caused a vicious activity and rewarded demoralizing intrigues in Parliamentary and even municipal elections. . . . The practice was also fatal to economy and disastrous to the character and efficiency of the public service."\(^2\) Misappropriation of public funds for private use was prevalent and bribery was common. Yet, by the 1830s an administration had developed that was to a great extent distinct from Parliament and


the Crown. "And, at the same time, it had, by the force of public opinion, without any law on the subject, come to be the rule, almost universally acted upon, that those in the civil service below cabinet ministers and a few political assistants should not be removed except for causes other than political opinions."¹ Whether due solely to the force of public opinion or to some help from top administrators who found a spoils system a hindrance to their attempts to provide services, it is the case that a spoils system, on the American model, had vanished from British administration early on.

Permanent tenure of officials during good behavior became the normal practice, although this did not preclude the use of political and party considerations to fill vacancies. In addition, reformers, motivated largely by a desire to introduce probity and economy into government finances, and department heads, looking to make their own job easier, had secured an end to the practice of sinecures. For the same reasons, opportunities for embezzlement and conflicts-of-interest had been closed through establishing new auditing and accounting procedures in the Treasury and subordinate offices.²

Following these developments which were aimed at preventing corruption and waste, pressures continued to grow

¹Ibid., p. 146.
during the 1830s and 1840s, slowly, but steadily, against the use of political patronage as the sole vehicle for access to the civil service. The new focus on political patronage signaled a change in the reformers' perspective of a responsible civil service. By mid-century, many reformers were confident of the civil servant's character or at least convinced that checks had been instituted to protect the public purse against officials of weak morals. And although economy continued to be the focus of many members of Parliament, the emphasis of some reformers was shifting to a concern for administrative efficiency through improving the quality of the personnel selected. Requiring a candidate to demonstrate fitness for public service through competitive examinations was emphasized as the best approach to securing competent officials. Eaton points out that the demand for examinations as a condition for admission to the service was so great during the Melbourne administration (1834-1841), from both higher officials and thoughtful public opinion, that Lord Melbourne "yielded so far as to allow pass examinations to be instituted in some of the larger offices."1

The number of departments requiring some type of examination

1Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain, p. 157. In the pass examination system each candidate is examined against some prescribed standard and does not actually compete with anyone. The candidate merely has to meet a standard which, incidentally, can be manipulated to select the desired appointee or lowered to a point that no barrier really exists. The pass examinations instituted by the Treasury in 1836 tested the candidate's ability to read, write and do simple arithmetic.
to be taken or standard to be met increased steadily up to 1853.

Thus by 1853 the character of British administration was such that:

1. Neither political assessments nor any other form of extortion, by the higher offices from the lower, or by partisan leaders from any grade of officials or governmental employees, existed.

2. Officers were not removed for the purpose of making places for others; and, so long as official duty was properly performed, no one was proscribed by reason of his political condition.

3. In the great departments of customs and internal revenue (and in a large way, as a general rule, in other departments also), the higher places were filled by promotions from the lower.

4. The law of Queen Anne, which prohibits post office officials trying to influence elections, and the laws of George III, which prevented them and nearly all others in the civil service from voting, were still in force, and they effectively protected the freedom of elections from invasion by executive officers.

5. There were pass examinations ... and very generally, a six-months probation. In addition, competitive examinations were being enforced (in mere self-protection) by the heads of some of the offices.

6. Personal corruption in office had, for a considerable period, been of very rare occurrence.¹

It should be pointed out that Eaton's generous assessment was from the perspective of an American reformer seeking a model for reform of the United States public service.

Yet, even by Eaton's admission, all was not well. The growing use of pass examinations did not prevent positions being awarded on the basis of the needs of the incumbent

¹Ibid., pp. 182-83.
political party or an individual member of Parliament or the political opinions or family name of the candidate for government service. Since the Reform Act of 1867, which extended the electoral franchise, had not yet appeared, it is clear that for the Prime Minister and Parliamentary leaders patronage still played a part in controlling the House of Commons and holding electorates.¹ Patronage was the single, most important "defect" that reformers of the mid-nineteenth century were out to remedy. For in the estimation of reformers, patronage allowed position in the civil service to be filled by the unambitious, the indolent, and the incapable, rather than those with superior qualifications. As a consequence, the efficiency of the public service suffered; there were "complaints of official delays, official evasions of difficulty, and official indisposition to improvement."² That such complaints were not unanimous throughout the civil service was an indication that some departments were reasonably competent. Thus, the task of unifying the civil service departments under a single system also lay before the reformers. For not only were some departments setting quite high examination standards while


others were administering weak pass exams or none at all, there was also a diversity of pay scales in the different departments and differing age limits for entering and retiring from the service.¹ For example, examination practices ranged from none in the Home, Colonial, and Foreign offices to simple arithmetic examinations to a real qualifying examination in the Admiralty.² In most departments, promotion was based on seniority or political criteria. Whether or not it was entirely justified, the charge of administrative inefficiency, in the form of patronage, departmental fragmentation, and incompetent officials, was the rallying cry of the reformers.

The Northcote-Trevelyan Report

It should be noted again that the reforms of the mid-nineteenth century, and indeed reforms at the beginning of that century and those to come later, were initiated by executive officials, primarily from the Treasury, rather than members of Parliament. For while the department leaders had much to gain in terms of facilitating their day-to-day jobs, if the patronage system were dismantled, the elected politicians, until after later electoral reforms, had much to lose.


²Moses, The Civil Service in Great Britain, p. 72.
in terms of political power to reward supporters. However, if Members of Parliament were not interested in securing efficiencies through abolishing patronage, they were interested in securing economies in public expenditure. Thus it was that "frequent Parliamentary expressions of dissatisfaction with the rising cost of administration led in 1848 to the appointment of a Select Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure to seek economies."¹ In April 1853, W. E. Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Aberdeen Administration, appointed Sir Charles Trevelyan, assistant secretary to the Treasury, and Sir Stafford Northcote, Secretary at the Board of Trade, to prepare a report on the organization of the permanent civil service to present to the Select Committee. The report appeared on November 23, 1853.

Where the Select Committee sought to reduce the cost of the civil service through lowering salaries and reducing the number of positions, the Northcote-Trevelyan report, citing a, by now, familiar litany of defects and abuses, argued that patronage was the root cause of inefficiency and waste. To remedy the defects of the service, Northcote and Trevelyan advocated the general principle,

that the public service should be carried on by the admission into its lower ranks of a carefully selected body of young men, who should be employed from the first upon work suited to their capacities and their education, and should be made constantly to feel that their promotion and future prospects depend entirely on the

industry and ability with which they discharge their duties, that with average abilities and reasonable application they may look forward confidently to a certain provision for their lives, that with superior powers they may rationally hope to attain to the highest prizes in the Service, while if they prove decidedly incompetent, or incurably indolent, they must expect to be removed from it.¹

This guiding principle of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report is often termed a radical departure from the past; more accurately it appears to be a rather long step in a direction the civil service was already moving.

To implement its general principle the report called for six innovations: 1) a system of open competitive examinations before appointment. The key to eliminating patronage was to make the examinations competitive. Those finally selected must score higher than their competitors, not simply pass a minimal educational standard. At the same time the examinations were "to be open to all persons, of a given age, subject only ... to the necessity of their giving satisfactory references to persons able to speak of their moral conduct and character, and of producing medical certificates."² There was to be no test of political loyalty. 2) Academic examinations. The examinations themselves were designed to "test the intelligence, as well as the mere attainments, of the candidates."³ Although the subject

¹N-T Report, p. 111.
²Ibid., p. 113.
³Ibid., p. 114.
matter of the examinations was to be as numerous as possible to secure a varied amount of talent for the service, it was also recommended that the examination ought to include some problems directly related to the official's work. Yet the emphasis was on recruiting officials of university age with general ability who could be trained. For the "superior situations" or higher positions in the service, the examinations were to be on a level equivalent to the highest levels of education in the country.

3) Division of the service into higher and lower divisions. To insure that only men of the highest quality reached the top positions, the Report recommended "establishing a proper distinction between intellectual and mechanical labour."¹ Not only would this type of distinction prevent the unqualified from reaching the top but it would encourage those below to do their best to reach the top levels.

4) Promotion by merit. In order to encourage initiative and ambition, Northcote-Trevelyan advocated the use of merit as a criterion for promotion from class to class rather than seniority or favoritism.

5) Probation. Although the use of a probationary period was already common, the Report reiterated the need to take probation seriously if a competent service was to be achieved.

6) Creation of a central examination board. To provide unity to the fragmented nature of departmental examinations, Northcote-Trevelyan recommended an independent, central

¹Ibid., p. 115.
board to develop and conduct examinations and to certify those candidates having passed.

Though it has been emphasized that these remedies were recommended in the pursuit of efficiency, it would be wrong to suggest that the reformers' concern was merely technical. Eaton makes it clear that the question of civil service reform in 1853 "was not regarded as a mere question of administrative details or as having its greater interest in its probable effects upon a general election, but as a vital issue of principle and national policy, of which the influence would be felt to the very foundation of government and of social order."¹ Northcote and Trevelyan were products of a nineteenth century liberal philosophy that prescribed not only limited government activity but government that is capable of attaining a high degree of internal efficiency through reason and one that thrives on competition. Certainly there is much of this flavor in the Report. Beyond this there is also in the Report a notion of responsible administration that reflects the liberal political ideals of the late 1800s, "namely the political supremacy of the House of Commons, ministerial responsibility to Parliament, and electoral politics determined by issues rather than vested interest."²

¹ Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain, p. 175.

A factor of equal magnitude in shaping the reform environment of the 19th century was the displacement of the old landed aristocracy by the middle and commercial classes as the predominant political force. In Kingsley's interpretation, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report was but one in a series of measures which "destroyed the aristocratic monopoly and cut away the roots of aristocratic power."\(^1\) In particular, the Report's emphasis on open competition reflected the desire of the growing middle class for entry into the civil service. Given the influence of these forces, one aim of Northcote and Trevelyan "was the purification of political life, in particular the heightening of the tone of Parliament and the conduct of elections, and the furthering of meritocratic as opposed to hereditary values."\(^2\)

In its opening paragraphs, the Report asserts that "the Government of the country could not be carried on without the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers, occupying a position duly subordinate to that of the Ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient independence, character, ability, and experience to be able to advise, assist, and to some extent, influence, those who are from time to time set over them."\(^3\) Thus for Northcote and Trevelyan, a

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\(^1\)Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy, p. 48.

\(^2\)Chapman and Greenaway, The Dynamics of Administrative Reform, p. 16.

\(^3\)N-T Report, p. 108.
responsible civil service was one that is efficient or in some sense technically competent, politically neutral though representative of emerging middle-class values, and accountable to Parliament through the Ministers. Yet at the same time, the authors saw a policy role for administrators through influencing Ministers. Responsible administration, then, to some extent, must be able to take initiative and provide leadership. It was in this notion, if in no other, that the Report was far ahead of its time.¹ The Report embodies a notion of responsible government that both reflects its authors' particular historical circumstance and, at the same time, envisions enough of the future to make the Report a significant document.

Reaction and Change

Reaction to the Northcote-Trevelyan Report was predictable; early support from Parliament and London society was almost nonexistent. Naturally members of Parliament were reluctant to give up their prerogatives of filling vacancies in the civil service. Furthermore, "the House of Commons could find little enthusiasm for measures which promised no savings at once, were of doubtful value in producing large economies later, and might give rise to chaos in Government

¹See Wheare, The Civil Service in the Constitution, pp. 16-19 for a discussion of the significance of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report along these lines.
offices during the interim period of reorganization.¹ Thus in Parliament, those who benefited by patronage or who saw change as an attack on privilege were united against the Report.

In the Cabinet, support was scarcely higher. Chancellor of the Exchequer Gladstone, although sponsor of the Report, believed that the importance of patronage had been exaggerated.² Some Cabinet members were concerned about a radical republicanism that a board of examiners would exchange for the Crown, believing that a board would substitute talented, but discontented, middle-class bureaucrats for officials with character and loyalty to the aristocracy. Others feared that the examination system would result in more and more recruitment from the middle classes and make the civil service unattractive to the higher classes. Similarly, the Queen was concerned about the "Victorian respectability of appointees."³ However, due to Gladstone's persistence the Cabinet acquiesced to the Report, without any immediate result.

Copies of the Report were widely disseminated. Much of the public comment that was generated was opposed or only grudgingly supportive of the Northcote-Trevelyan version of


²Moses, The Civil Service in Great Britain, p. 84.

³Ibid., p. 85.
reform. The Spectator labeled the Report utopian,\(^1\) while The Westminster Review, usually an advocate of reform, published an unenthusiastic article, in which it was pointed out that, although competitive examinations were preferable to patronage, they might be expected to fill the Civil Service with conservatively minded men, clever rather than able."\(^2\) Many observers believed that securing first-class officials for the higher levels through open competition would bestow upon the service too much power and threaten constitutional democracy. Other critics held the Cabinet's view that open examinations would result in men from the lower social classes holding civil service jobs, while others criticized the Report on the grounds that academic examinations would give preference to aristocratic education. Others merely doubted that competition would attract first-class minds.

Many civil service officials, too, withheld their support for one reason or another. Many officials refuted the charges of inefficiency made against the service, others merely claimed the charges were exaggerated. Civil servants also questioned the efficacy of examinations for securing the best officials or emphasized the uselessness of highly educated men for routine work. Finally, the notion of promotion by merit was attacked on the basis of its conflict

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 74.

with the principle of seniority.

Even Trevelyan recognized the unpopularity of his recommendations. For as he wrote in a letter to Eaton, the "early supporters of it might be counted upon the fingers, and if the matter had been put to the vote in London society or the clubs, or even in Parliament itself by secret voting, the new system would have been rejected by an overwhelming majority."¹ Given such firm opposition, the Aberdeen Government was reluctant to push a bill embodying the reforms in the House of Commons; for the moment the Northcote-Trevelyan Report lay severely wounded. Implementation of the proposed organizational changes did not follow automatically from the logic or persuasiveness of the Report itself.

But the political, social and economic environment outside the immediate debate over the Northcote-Trevelyan Report was changing rapidly, with important consequences for civil service reform. Giving unexpected aid to the supporters of reform was the outbreak of the Crimean War toward the end of 1853. Uncensored reports from The Times correspondent, W. H. Russell, told of mismanagement, confusion, and gross inefficiencies in the administration of the war effort.

¹Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain, appendix p. 430. Indeed, unqualified supporters were few. As Moses points out, The Times alone was a supporter of reform from the beginning. On the other hand, support for the Report was qualitative with J. G. Shaw Lefevre, Rowland Hill, J. S. Mill, and Edwin Chadwick "unstinted in their praise." E. N. Gladden, "An administrative century: 1853-1953," Parliamentary Affairs 6, No. 4 (1953):320.
Readers were also shocked by accounts from Florence Nightingale of the inadequacies of the Government's provision for the troops.\(^1\) The immediate effect of the war was the fall of the Aberdeen Ministry in February of 1855 to a new Government under Lord Palmerston and the creation on May 5, 1855 of the Administrative Reform Association. The avowed purpose of the Administrative Reform Association was to expose the incompetence brought on by patronage and demand civil service reform on the Northcote-Trevelyan model.

Other societal changes during the middle years of the century also helped create a climate for civil service reform. Among other activities was "the establishment of factory inspection by the government, the establishment of an education office and grants and inspectors, the establishment of the metropolitan police force in 1829, of the municipal police forces in 1835, and the county police forces in 1856, the establishment of the poor law commissions, local boards of health, and other reforms of local government, partly depending upon grants in aid."\(^2\) These reforms were placing indirect pressure on leaders to make changes in the civil service. But two reforms which had a

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\(^2\)Herman Finer, "Better Government Personnel," Political Science Quarterly 51 (December 1936): 574-75.
direct impact on the Northcote-Trevelyan Report were those concerned with the administration of India and university education.

Thomas Macaulay, later Lord Macaulay, had taken a long-time interest in creating a unified civil service in India based on the principle of competitive examinations over the subjects that composed the liberal education at Oxford and Cambridge; his report to Parliament recommending such a scheme appeared in November, 1854. Macaulay's plan had had a major impact on the thinking of Trevelyan, who had spent fourteen years in India and was married to Macaulay's sister. At the same time changes were taking place at Oxford and Cambridge in the dispensing of university fellowships and awards. Under the influence of Benjamin Jowett, a famous Balliol Master, competitive examinations were introduced to make awards on the basis of merit rather than patronage. This scheme was not without its influence on Northcote, himself a product of Balliol.

Given the momentum of these reforms, the growing criticism from the Administrative Reform Association and general public opinion concerning the mal-administration of the Crimean War, and the continued interest and discussion of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report among civil servants, Lord Palmerston, knowing the strength of the opposition to civil service reform in Parliament, issued an executive Order in Council on May 21, 1855. Palmerston's action began the
implementation of the Northcote-Trevelyman proposals. Through the Order in Council a Civil Service Commission was established to administer a system of limited competition. That is, the Commissioners' responsibility was to certify that candidates satisfied the minimal requirements of being within the age limits set by the department, of adequate health, and of possessing basic knowledge to do the job. The authority of nominating and appointing remained with the department heads. In effect, then, appointment remained a political gift. Yet, at the same time, the Commissioners "were able to introduce a more uniform standard and a certain degree of co-ordination into the tests . . . to survey all those nominated to the Service" and to issue "an annual report which contained detailed analysis of the results of their work."¹ It was through this report that the Commission and civil service itself could keep pressure on the Government to continue the movement toward a real competitive system.

Indeed, within a year, Parliament had perceived so much favorable support for the new method that it resolved by a vote of 108-87 that limited competition did eliminate the serious defects and recommended to the Queen that open competition be made a condition of entrance to the service.²

²Eaton, Civil Service in Breat Britain, p. 211.
The vote was symptomatic of a changing attitude in Parliament, the public, and the press. It is to some extent possible to hold the power of ideas responsible for these changes in attitudes. Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Carlyle, and J. S. Mill were leading advocates of reform ideas and their advocacy was undoubtedly influential among the political cognoscenti, if not the middle class. The popular fiction of Charles Dickens, Anthony Trollope, and others telling stories of bureaucratic red tape and incompetence found wide audience among the middle class. In addition, Trevelyan, Jowett, Gladstone, and Robert Lowe, Chancellor of the Exchequer under Gladstone, campaigned tirelessly for reform seeking support from every important segment of the community.¹

By 1860 support for reform had grown to such an extent in Parliament that a select Committee on Civil Service appointments was established to enquire into the possibility of expanding selection of lower positions by competition. After the Select Committee's recommendation for a qualified, but significant, extension of the competitive system, Lord Palmerston approved the Select Committee's report. Thus, between 1855 and 1870 opinions regarding open, competitive exams were almost reversed from widespread opposition to widespread support.

There are a number of factors contributing to this perceptible change in opinion in addition to those already mentioned. First, the decade of the 1860s saw the electoral changes of 1832 extended in the Reform Act of 1867 with working and middle class enfranchisement. Not only did the 1867 Act make patronage less important as a tool for controlling Parliament and the electorate, but the Act also made it possible for upper-middle class families without political influence to support electorally members of Parliament who advocated competitive examinations as the route to the civil service for their well-educated sons. Yet this point must not be overdrawn, for it is true that the competitive examinations for higher civil service positions were designed for the products of Oxbridge. At the same time, the newly enfranchised middle class was unified with their more fortunate neighbors in believing in the virtues of free competition and progress—commercial, scientific, and administrative. Undoubtedly, the Reform Act of 1867 had an impact of such force that patronage was a victim of its wake.

Second, it is Herman Finer's contention that the civil service reforms of this period came into existence due to

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the need to be economical. There was economic pressure because the aristocratic statesmen of the period believed that a Government's expenditures should be measured like the expenditures in their banks and factories. In addition, "there was economic pressure, because England was not a rich country compared with the exacting and passionate demands of social reformers." Hence, not only a laissez-faire philosophy but the objective economic condition of society as well provided pressure for civil service reform.

Third, Leonard White suggests that it was the structure of the political system which facilitated the change in public opinion. For example, during this period in British history there was "no strongly organized political party with local branches scattered over the country and maintained in order and discipline by the expectation of mass distribution of patronage." Thus not only were the number of people affected by the change from patronage not large, but, at the same time, the changes primarily affected leaders of two centralized parties who could tacitly agree that the reforms were desirable.\(^1\) This centralization of leadership favored acceptance of reform.

Finally, it is necessary to point to the interaction of educational and societal changes as a contributor to the

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acceptance of reform. Many proponents of the Report, including Gladstone, advocated open competition and the separation of routine work from higher levels as a way to secure top administrative positions for the upper classes. In a letter to Lord Russell, Gladstone wrote that these reforms would "open to the highly educated classes a career, and give them command over all the higher parts of the civil service, which up to this time they have never enjoyed."¹ Thus, it is interesting to note that although the Report itself spoke in tones of a meritocracy and presented the hope of upward social mobility to the middle-class, some of those responsible for implementing the Report held a different concept of responsibility on this issue. In the late 1800s when university education was to a large degree a guarantee of social status, it was possible for aristocrats to support reforms of the civil service which made university education a prerequisite for higher positions. Proponents of Northcote-Trevelyan had a ready response for those who feared that competition would be a leveling force in society; competitive examinations were heavily based on the classical subjects taught at the elite universities, particularly Oxford and Cambridge. At the same time, one must not overlook the strong argument set forth by Kingsley that reform

of the civil service was part of a middle-class bid for power that "aimed essentially to bring about a harmony of outlook between the permanent officials and the new governing class. . . ."\(^1\) From such disparate factors, it is necessary to conclude that reform was the result of the interaction of complex forces and motives.

The culmination of this period of reform occurred in 1870, during Gladstone's first administration, with an Order in Council issued on the fourth of June. It will be remembered that Gladstone had, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, commissioned the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. As Prime Minister he was able to secure the support of his Cabinet for an Order "which directed that for the future all vacancies in a given list of offices should be filled by open competitive examination."\(^2\) The Order was followed by Treasury regulations which provided for a higher and lower division in the civil service, with candidates for the higher division to be tested by examinations of a university standard. Thus it was some seventeen years after the issuance of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report, that its recommendations were accepted substantially intact, a result of growing political pressure, changing social conditions, and strategically located reformers.

\(^1\)Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy, p. 188.

Lessons From the Creation

That the Order in Council of 1870 was not implemented fully and immediately is not of crucial importance. Its importance lies in the fact that, in principle, the notion of open competitive examination and of a distinctive higher division for the civil service had been accepted and made authoritative by the Government of the day. Full implementation and consolidation of the reforms awaited a series of committees and commissions—the Playfair Committee of 1874, the Ridley Commission of 1886-1890, the MacDonnell Royal Commission of 1912-1914, the 1918 Gladstone Committee, the Tomlin Commission of 1929-1931, the Assheton Committee of 1944, and the Priestly Royal Commission of 1953-1955—each a response to its own set of political and social pressures and administrative needs.¹

Herein, of course, lies the significance of the period of reform from 1853 to 1870—that the British Civil Service was not pulled from the proverbial magician's hat, but was the product of a complex assortment of factors that merged into a consensus for reform. It is clear that the reformers were not unified in their purposes or approaches, but that the reform process incorporated a number of different

perspectives of what the purposes of reform should be and what a reformed civil service should look like. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report itself grew out of a concern for economy but its authors craftily adapted it to their concern for more efficient administration through neutral, competent officials. Theirs was a political intent to purify a "corrupt" society and further "meritocracy at the expense of vested interests" in politics and education.¹ Some of those who had a hand in implementing the Report, notably Gladstone, were less concerned about economy and efficiency than in using administrative reform to achieve political advantage by bringing together the interests of the aristocracy and the middle class.² The emerging middle class saw in the reforms an opportunity for increased access to government and more jobs. Others, like department heads, were more narrowly concerned with the administrative convenience that reform would offer. Each of these perspectives of reform was woven into a fabric richly embroidered by nineteenth century liberal, laissez-faire ideology and ongoing social and economic changes.

The Northcote-Trevelyan period left a deep impression on the character of public administration in Britain. The Report's emphasis on politically neutral civil servants of

¹Chapman and Greenaway, The Dynamics of Administrative Reform, p. 51.
²Ibid.
high intellectual and social calibre, who had studied classics at the traditional universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and its role in creating higher and lower classes of the civil service are felt over one-hundred years later. But because the reform process is a continuous bolt of cloth, these same emphases were the objects of attack when new political and social pressures arrived on the scene. In large measure, then, the creative act in Great Britain was a political attempt to make responsible a public service that was perceived by political and opinion leaders to be irresponsible. To what extent this was the case in the creation of the American civil service is the subject to which we now turn.

The Seedbed for U. S. Reform

By the early 1870's the United States had already passed through, what Frederick Mosher terms, "government by gentlemen" and was experiencing reaction to "government by the common man" in anticipation of "government by the good." ¹ The public service during the Federalist period had been characterized by its honesty,² competence, and permanent


²Carl Russell Fish in The Civil Service and the Patronage (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), p. 26 notes that "the best proof of the general integrity of the service is that [Secretary of State] Gallatin, when directed by Jefferson to conduct a searching investigation of the Federalist financial administration, was able to find no evidence to its discredit."
tenure. Washington, Adams, and Jefferson adhered to a rule of "fitness" for office that was defined as possessing competence to perform one's duties and the "correct" political philosophy. Yet during this early period civil servants were spared the obligations to political parties that were soon to follow. The Federalist service was staffed by a decidedly upper class aristocratic caste many of whom held high political and moral ideals regarding public service. Such was the character and reputation of American administration during this period that it was the envy of many British observers.¹

But by 1829, with the benefit of an enlarged electorate, the balance of political power had shifted from the Federalists to the Jeffersonian Republicans and again to the Jacksonians. Accompanying this shift were changed notions regarding the preferred nature of the civil service. Susceptible to charges of being aristocratic, exclusive, and unresponsive to the new political leaders, the Federalist service

was attacked and reshaped to reflect the Jacksonian values of equality of opportunity, social mobility, individual freedom, and popular government.¹ Nowhere were these values more clearly seen than in the practice of spoils.

Rooted in democratic theory as expounded by the Jacksonians,² spoils politics was based on the proposition that long tenure in office resulted in indifference to the public and the promotion of individual interests; that any person of average intelligence could perform the duties of public office; and that government office was not a right of

¹Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, p. 55.

²Jackson's famous defense of rotation in his first annual message to Congress in part read:

"The duties of all public offices are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance; and I can not but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience. I submit, therefore, to your consideration whether the efficiency of the Government would not be promoted and official industry and integrity better secured by a general extension of the law which limits appointments to four years.

"In a country where offices are created solely for the benefit of the people no one man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another. . . . No individual wrong is, therefore done by removal, since neither appointment to nor continuance in office is matter of right. . . . The proposed limitation would destroy the idea of property now so generally connected with official station, and although individual distress may be sometimes produced, it would, by promoting that rotation which constitutes a leading principle in the republican creed, give healthful action to the system."

Quoted from White, The Jacksonians, p. 318.
any single person or group. In practice, these spoils concepts were institutionalized by the systematic application of limited tenure, rotation in office, and personnel appointments and promotion based on party or factional affiliation and loyalty.

The period between 1845 and 1865 was the high-water mark for the spoils system. Officials often were placed on the government "payroll because they had influential political connections, or worked for a partisan newspaper, or distinguished themselves in local politics."  

Appointment of illiterate clerks as a reward for party service was common. Rotation of offices became "ruthless partisan removals" every few years when clerks, messengers, customhouse weighers and measurers were removed along with department heads and second level officials identified as policy makers. Rotation reached into the fringes of the absurd when Democratic President Buchanan replaced Democrats appointed under Democrat Pierce whom he succeeded in 1857. Rotation and partisan appointment "imposed political obligations and duties upon government employees, particularly obligations to pay party assessments, to do party work at election time, and to 'vote right'." From 1829, federal employees increasingly became dependent upon local political machines and

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1White, The Jacksonians, p. 327.

2Ibid., p. 329.

3Ibid., p. 332.
congressional patrons for their survival.

The harmful consequences of the spoils system for administrative efficiency and the prestige and morale of the public service were manifest. With removals ranging from 10% of the civil service during Jackson's tenure to even higher during Lincoln's, advantages of administrative continuity and expertise were lost. At the same time, incumbent officials were filled with apprehension over the next election and harassed and burdened financially by demands to pay political assessments. Undoubtedly, the service lost its attractiveness for the individual who possessed a degree of professional competence. In addition, "the chief executive's appointment and removal burden often reached intolerable proportions," creating personal and political anguish. Finally, associated with the spoils system was a decline in moral standards, as fraud, kickbacks, bribery and other forms of corruption were widespread.

The deficiencies of spoils politics resulted in some few attempts at reform before 1865. The most significant was the Classification Act of 1853 which established a system of pass examinations for departmental clerks, a scheme

\[\text{1It was only after Lincoln's Presidency and certainly during and after World War I when government functions became more and more complex that continuity became a crucial factor in administration. Thus, one must not overdo the negative impact of high turnover during the late 1800s and early 1900s.}\]

\[\text{2Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, p. 50.}\]
to classify clerks according to type of service rendered, and the equalization of salaries in each of four classes. The rigor of the examinations was dependent upon the discretion of the department head; while a few departmental examinations did establish minimum competency criteria, most were merely window-dressing. In one sense it is remarkable that reform was attempted at all, since before 1865 there existed little or no public pressure for reform, the parties were silent on the issue, and there had been no particular scandal to trigger legislative action. What passage of the 1853 Act does show is that reform was demanded by the bureaucracy itself; administrative action required a minimal level of competence and systematization.

Indeed, a balanced assessment of the pre-reformed civil service must show that the service was never as incompetent as the critics claimed. "The burden of administrative work was carried on by a nucleus of permanent clerks who knew what had to be done" and who were relied upon by department heads. Neither was the unreformed service as ineffective as critics claimed. First, it is "extremely probable" that public services were adequately supplied because "the party leaders were only too glad to multiply

3 Ibid., p. 329.
Second, the spoils system was effective in accomplishing the social purposes of the Jacksonian era.\textsuperscript{2} Spoils politics successfully made the public service of the late 1800s more representative of the Jacksonian egalitarian spirit.

Nonetheless, as the United States entered the reconstruction period after the Civil War, the civil service system as a whole was in a primitive state. There was no uniformity in personnel policy; appointment of clerks, assignment to duties, conduct in office (e.g., hours of work), transfers, promotions, pay, discipline, removals were entirely at the department head's discretion. The Classification Act of 1853 provided a skeletal structure for classification, pay, promotion, and selection but was largely a farce. Training was unknown, efficiency ratings were in an experimental state, and retirement policies were nonexistent. In personnel matters presidents had very little actual influence. For although in theory they had authority to advise and direct heads of departments, "there is scanty evidence that they did so."\textsuperscript{3}

Indeed, the civil service reform movement in the late nineteenth century must be seen against a backdrop of a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage, p. 151.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, p. 535.
\item \textsuperscript{3}White, The Republican Era, p. 347.
\end{itemize}
congressional-presidential power struggle. The Civil War had increased the power of the President and heightened the distrust of the Congress. With Lincoln's death the Radical Republicans in the Senate acted quickly to address the imbalance by attempting to control President Johnson's patronage power through the Tenure of Office Act. When Johnson tested the Act by removing Secretary of War Stanton without Senate approval and survived impeachment by one vote, the constitutional integrity of the presidency was saved, but it nevertheless limped along in a subordinate position to Congress until Theodore Roosevelt. During this post-Civil War period Congress participated directly in the administrative process—attending to constituent problems as well as to the details of personnel administration. With a Congress that was looking to exercise its political muscles and a series of presidents unable and/or unwilling to exercise presidential prerogatives, personnel patronage became the domain of Congress. Control of patronage by the Congress was perceived by party leaders as essential to the cohesion of the party organization and ultimately to the survival of the local party machines and their bosses. The exercise of presidential power, on the other hand, depended to some extent upon "wresting control of appointments from Senators,"

1See Ibid., pp. 17-45, and Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage, pp. 186-99, for a detailed discussion of this power struggle.
Congressmen, and local machines."¹ Civil service reform, therefore, because it had to a large extent the effect of redistributing appointment power from the local machine and a decentralized Congress to central leadership, became an integral part of the struggle between the post-Civil War Congress and President.²

In addition to the congressional-presidential power struggle, there were social forces that shaped the civil service reform of 1883. Post-Civil War America was a society, like nineteenth century Britain, that held dear the doctrines of laissez-faire economics, individualism, and political liberty. It was a society congenial to the growth and prosperity of business, particularly big business. In a society growing more complex and pursuing the prosperity of the American industrial revolution, business methods (which, ironically, were more primitive than government personnel and budgeting methods) were seen as solutions to problems in public administration. Yet the post-Civil War era was also characterized by widespread agrarian unrest under the Granger movement and the Farmer's Alliances, recurrent economic depressions, hostile labor-management relations, and popular distrust of powerful railroads and big business, all of which provided counter-points to the predominant laissez-

¹Ibid., p. 278.

faire philosophy.

The postwar period was steeped in the old Puritan ideals of morality, yet it was a period that was rocked by one scandal after another. It was a time when many Americans were turning from a civil conflict to look at the world. And many of these observers saw what they perceived to be the efficient public services of Europe. Indeed, when Senator Charles Sumner, a student of the British civil service and in correspondence with English friends, introduced his civil service reform bill in 1864 it bore very close resemblance to the British model. America of the 1860s to 1880s was an age in which intellectual and social forces were conducive to reform.¹

Overcoming Inertia, A False Start, and Building Support

Although the seeds of reform had been sown and were fertile, the spoils system in 1865 remained the dominant factor in American public administrative life. Not only did spoilsmen see any effort to reduce spoils as un-American, but most Americans saw spoils as necessary and proper.² The task that lay before the reformers was monumental; the years

¹Indeed, the 1880s were years of ballot reform, regulatory reform of business, and municipal reform as well as civil service reform.

between 1865 and 1871 were spent in overcoming the inertia created by a system grown conservative. The Sumner bill had hardly caused a stir, but the effort to control patronage was continued by Republican Congressman Thomas A. Jenckes of Rhode Island who introduced reform bills in 1865 and every year from 1867 to 1871. Jenckes, the archetypical civil service reformer of the period, a man of wealth, a lawyer, from a prominent New England family, brought leadership to the nascent reform movement. Like many other reformers, Jenckes was a student of civil service systems in other countries. Particularly impressed by the British approach, he carried on correspondence with Northcote, Trevelyan, and other British figures and regularly received British newspapers.¹ Not surprisingly, his bills, patterned on the British approach, called for open competitive examinations at the entry level, upper level vacancies to be filled by promotion based on merit, and a board of commissioners to administer exams and formulate rules.

Jenckes' legislative efforts were never successful, but his agitation eventually forced a discussion in Congress and stimulated public attention. By the late 1860s, Jenckes and other reform leaders, including Julius Bing, Carl Schurz, Dorman Eaton, George W. Curtis, Everett P. Wheeler, and Charles J. Bonaparte were receiving broad public support

from newspapers such as the Chicago Tribune, the Boston Post, and the New York Evening Post; magazines such as the Nation, the North American Review, Putnam's Magazine; businessmen such as the National Manufacturer's Association and the Boston Board of Trade; federal civil servants; and civic-minded citizens. From 1867 until 1883 editorial and public support for reform increased dramatically. Even in Congress, Jenckes' proposals received some support. However, at this early date, there was no organized, concentrated, persistent pressure on Congress to effect passage of reform legislation.

Yet, in an amazing turn of events, "on the last day of the last session of the 41st Congress," in 1871 Congress passed a civil service reform bill which authorized the President to make rules and regulations for admitting people into the civil service and to appoint people to administer the rules. The bill came in the form of a rider to a civil appropriations bill. It was briefly but hotly debated, with the reform supporters able to come together long enough to pass the appropriations bill with its rider. Thus, unable to agree on a legislative mechanism to control patronage, Congress grudgingly allowed the President to proceed. Such a concession was less an acknowledgment of Grant's leadership than an indication of the impact of outside pressure

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1See Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, p. 66; White, The Republican Era, p. 270; and Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, pp. 41-45.

and Jenckes' and the other reformers' agitation. Undoubtedly, the widespread belief that Grant would not pick up the gauntlet helped ease the bill's passage.

But to the surprise of many, Grant did appoint an advisory board, later to become a Civil Service Commission, and named George W. Curtis, a leading reform spokesman, as its chairman. Perhaps "part of Grant's surprising personal interest in civil service reform stemmed from the fact that he, too, was feeling the pressure of patronage." Curtis was quick to issue a set of rules and establish the machinery to administer them. The rules, which applied to Washington departments and federal offices in New York, provided for competitive examinations, a probationary period, and the prohibition of political assessments. It was Curtis' view, as well as that of most reformers during this period, that patronage could be controlled by requiring competitive exams; with the ability to fill vacancies by patronage eliminated, the regulation of tenure would not be necessary. The reformers' approach, then, was to close the front door to public service appointments, but to leave the back door open.

The Grant Civil Service Commission soon found itself in trouble. Grant found it impossible to live by the standards set by the Commission and Curtis resigned when Grant made an offensive appointment. Passage of the reform bill

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1Ibid., p. 282.

2Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, p. 69.
appeared to be a moment of temporary insanity for the Congress as during the next session in 1872 opposition to reform and the Commission was as hostile as ever. Making matters worse was a lack of unity among reformers on a number of issues peripheral to civil service reform. With opponents eager to dismantle Grant's Civil Service Commission and proponents less than unified, Congress withheld funding for the Commission in 1874. Grant, unwilling and unable to fight Congress, withdrew his support for the Commission. The examining boards were abolished in 1875.

Despite this false start toward reform, the establishment and operation of the Grant Commission was important for future reform efforts. It provided evidence that the reformers' concepts were practicable and it gave reformers experience in fighting later legislative battles.

For nearly a decade after the defeat of the first Civil Service Commission, the reform forces and their opponents were at a stalemate, nevertheless it was an active stalemate. In 1876 both Republican and Democratic Party platforms called for civil service reform. President Hayes brought a favorable attitude toward reform to the White House in 1876 and showed reformers his good faith by applying merit principles to the New York Customs House and the New York Post Office and appointing Carl Schurz as Secretary of Interior. He also commissioned Dorman Eaton to write a history of the British civil service reform movement which
was submitted to Congress in 1879. Published as a book the next year, Eaton's report had a favorable influence on public opinion. Yet Hayes' administration ended in disappointment for reformers as nothing was accomplished in the way of legislative action.

Nonetheless, opinion was continually stirred by the relatively small, but well-educated and committed, contingent of reformers. Working at both the municipal and national levels to secure new laws and administrative reorganization, the New York Civil Service Reform Association was formed in May 1877, followed in 1881 by the National Civil Service Reform League with Curtis as president. Using their state societies in large cities across the country, these two associations were extremely effective in educating the public through every available form of propaganda. The reformers repertoire was fundamentally the delivery of speeches to professional or business clubs, editorials, and pamphlets in which spoilsmen and the evil consequences of spoils politics


were denounced. The reformers, by and large, products of a New England Protestant background, college educated, club men, entrenched in late nineteenth century society, emphasized what they perceived to be the moral bankruptcy of public life and party politics brought on by spoils.

In this approach they were greatly aided by the exposure of the political scandals of the Grant and later administrations. The Crédit Mobilier scandal, the Whiskey Ring fraud, the Indian Ring and Belknap frauds, the Tweed Ring, and the Star Route frauds were laid before a shocked public. "Each scandal was eagerly caught up by the reformers and published in detail, always with the moral that such fraud could never occur under a reformed civil service."^2

The reforms that were to emerge in 1883 cannot be attributed entirely to the work of the Eatons and the Curtises. The reform process is too complex for that simple analysis. Other groups in society had a stake in a reformed civil service. For example, "as agriculture, labor, commerce, and industry came more and more under the regulation of the federal government, these great pressure groups became increasingly insistent upon regulation by competent personnel divorced from the worst ravages of partisan politics."^3 In

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^1Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, pp. 191-96. See Stewart, The National Civil Service Reform League, pp. 10-18 for brief biographies of reform leaders.

^2Sageser, The First Two Decades, p. 35.

^3Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, p. 133.
addition, public employees were themselves interested in reform—department heads who required competent workers as well as employees who were about to be replaced due to a change in administration. Finally, most presidents in that period, though constrained by party obligations, desired civil service reform and acted to see it extended, if only to be relieved of the pressures of patronage.

Though the reformers had potent allies and live ammunition with the scandals, the final assault on spoils required a spark. It was provided by the assassination of President Garfield on July 2, 1881 by Charles J. Guiteau, a Chicago lawyer who had apparently haunted the capital for weeks searching for a job. Garfield alive had been a disappointment to the reformers. Though a supporter of reform, his actions generally belied his support. Wounded and, two months later, dead, Garfield became a martyr for the cause of reform. "Reformers quickly transformed their concept of Garfield from a weak, spineless fool of [then Secretary of State Jages G.] Blaine's to a fearless crusader for civil service reform." They immediately seized the opportunity to extend their organization and poured forth the message that spoils was responsible for murder. Public indignation

1Hoogenboom, in Outlawing the Spoils, p. 69, notes that Secretary of the Treasury Boutwell, whom reformers regarded as an enemy, was in 1870 the first official to administer a competitive exam in the Treasury in order to secure competent workers.

2Ibid., p. 212.
was raised by the assassination and reformers across the country became intent on channeling that emotional outrage to the reform cause.

If the final assault had begun, Congress remained barricaded. Democratic Senator George H. Pendleton, had submitted a reform bill in December 1880. Convinced by Dorman Eaton that his bill contained a number of weaknesses, Pendleton, with the consent of the Senate, substituted a bill drafted for the New York Civil Service Reform Association by Eaton, John Jay, and William Curtis. The new bill was modeled closely on British example. It provided for a commission to administer open competitive examinations for initial appointment and promotion to higher levels, entry at the lowest levels only, and political neutrality of offices. Resubmitted on January 10, 1881, before the attack on Garfield, the bill predictably died. Pendleton reintroduced his substitute bill on December 6, 1881, four months after Garfield's death, but this bill too was left to die at the end of the session. Throughout most of 1882 the spoilsmen in Congress withstood the barrage of public pressure.

The barricades were finally brought down by the November elections in 1882, in which civil service reform had been perceived as the key issue in a number of states. The Republican majority, after suffering a loss of seats in Congress and fearful of losing the Presidency in 1884, were ready to approve civil service reform. Republicans reasoned
that support of reform now would salvage Republican victories in 1884; if Republicans lost a majority in 1884 a merit system would blanket-in many Republican appointees at high administrative levels. Democrats, on the other hand, smelled blood, but were put in a dilemma. Support of reform perhaps would help make them the majority party, yet, at the same time, passage of the Pendleton bill would remove a large portion of patronage from their control. With the 1882 electoral results in mind the Congress debated the Pendleton bill in December 1882. In Congress the tenor of debate turned from the reformers' moral argument to concerns for partisan advantage and political expediency.

In the House, there was little debate at all; the Pendleton bill sailed through by a wide margin, undoubtedly because the entire House was facing re-election in 1884. In the Senate also, debate was relatively swift and highly partisan, but it did not overlook matters of less partisan concern. Perhaps the Congressional critics' most serious concerns were that competitive examinations would result in a civil service composed of an aristocratic class and that the merit system was not an American product. 

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1 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, p. 237.


3 See the remarks by Senator Woodbridge of Vermont arguing that the merit system is aristocratic and Senator Schenck of Ohio claiming that selection based on merit is democratic, in Hoogenboom, ed., Spoilsmen and Reformers (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), pp. 20-22.
argued, to the contrary, that selection based on competence was democratic and demonstrated that where competition had been used as the basis for selection, appointment of college educated persons remained a small percent of the total. The competitive principle also came under fire because many critics believed that examinations were not adequate as a test of fitness for office. In addition, with entrance limited to the lowest positions, older men and outsiders could not afford to enter the service making it a closed service. While undoubtedly it is true as Hoogenboom argues that "members of each party sought partisan advantage through proposing a number of amendments that would retain or secure offices for its own partisan use,"\(^1\) it also appears to be the case, and not inconsistently so, that many members of Congress were concerned about broader political, democratic consequences.

But the focus of the debate appears to have been on partisan matters. At issue for many critics, particularly Democrats, was the fear that "the in-coming party could only secure the insignificant positions while members of the out-going party would be promoted."\(^2\) Appealing to his fellow Democrats, Pendleton argued that Democrats ought to support his bill because reform is what people want. "I

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\(^1\)Hoogenboom, ed., Spoilsmen and Reformers, p. 37.

\(^2\)Sageser, The First Two Decades, p. 48. Also see Democratic Senator Brown's comments on this possibility in Hoogenboom, ed., Spoilsmen and Reformers, p. 38ff.
believe," he said, "that the adoption of this policy ... will hasten the day of the victory of our party and ... fill many offices with Democrats."¹

Attempting to address both the political and administrative concerns, the British-modeled Pendleton bill was adjusted to "American patterns of thought and action."² For example, while accepting the idea of open competitive examinations for testing the fitness of applicants, the American examinations were to be "practical in their character"³ rather than academic as the British examination tended to be. Rather than permitting entrance into the service at the lowest grades only, the Senate deleted this provision from the Pendleton bill, allowing lateral entry. Congress accepted the British notions of security of tenure and political neutrality. At the same time, the Act left the President in control of removals, subject to the provision that failure to render political service or contribute to a political fund was not just cause for removal. In the same way, the issue of where to draw the line between politics and administration was left to Presidential discretion.

¹Hoogenboom, ed., Spoilsman and Reformers, p. 37.

²Van Riper, "Adapting a British Invention to American Needs," p. 318. See also Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, pp. 98-110 for discussion of how Pendleton Act was adapted from British system to fit the American political and social climate.

³22 U.S. Statutes, 403 (1883). Reprinted in Sageser, The First Two Decades, Appendix A.
Congress did not establish an administrative class, but left the President's appointees unprotected.

Yet despite important differences between the British and American approaches, these distinctions can be overdrawn. The Pendleton Act provided for a three member Commission, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, to assist the President in making rules, supervising examinations, and conducting investigations. The British commission consisted of three commissioners with similar duties and conditions of office. The rules prescribed by the Pendleton Act included the fair apportionment of Washington appointments among the States; establishment of health and age requirements; exclusion of drunkards from the Service; prohibition of political assessments; and a probation period for new appointees. Similarly, the British Civil Service Commission monitored the distribution of appointments between England, Scotland, and Ireland; established rules denying employment to persons habitually intoxicated, prohibiting political information to be used as a basis for employment, and requiring health and age standards; and designated a period of probation for new employees. Through the Pendleton Act only about ten percent of civil service positions were placed in the classified service. Significantly, the Act authorized the President to

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1See Richard E. Titlow, Americans Import Merit, pp. 314-18, for a more detailed discussion of similarities between American and British reforms.
include in the merit system previously unclassified positions. It has been through Executive Order, therefore, that the size of the classified service has expanded and, occasionally, declined and the line between career and political appointees has been pushed upward and, occasionally, downward. Van Riper correctly notes that British civil service development differed from American development in that British growth occurred through Orders-in-Council, which are in reality Cabinet or legislative mandates. Nevertheless, at least in early British development, the initiative for Orders-in-Council was taken by the Prime Minister who is head of the civil service. In other words, civil service extension in both countries appears to have been at the initiative of the chief administrator. Thus, as the Pendleton bill was signed into law by President Arthur in January 1883, the strong influence of the British model is evident.

Reaction, Consequences, and the Nature of Reform

Eighteen eighty-three marked the end of a political skirmish for civil service reform, but not the end of the battle. For passage of the bill "betrayed a fundamental opposition to the civil service reform movement."\(^1\) If reform is a continuous web it is important briefly to examine the reaction to the passage of the Pendleton bill. From the

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 238. See also, Stewart, The National Civil Service Reform League, pp. 171-75, for an account of opposition of spoilsmen.
reformers' perspective passage of the Act had mixed consequences. On the one hand, the new law applied only to Washington and to custom houses and post offices in the largest cities. On the other hand, President Arthur appointed Dorman Eaton as the new chairman of the Civil Service Commission and two other members who had the support of the reformers. In the 1884 Presidential election, reformers supported the winner, Grover Cleveland, but at the same time, Senator Pendleton was defeated for re-election and in the new Congress bills were introduced to repeal the Pendleton Act. Although these bills were unsuccessful, Congressional hostility to reform remained vigorous for years to come. Consequently, expansion of the new merit system was left to the initiative of Presidents, not Congress. Arthur set the pattern for the next few Presidents by adding positions to the classified service at the end of his term.

From a longer term perspective, the Pendleton Act planted the seed for future political concerns. While most observers agree that the introduction of competitive exams led to a different type of individual entering the service, there is disagreement over the nature of the new civil service. White, for example, argues that examinations helped replace political and personal favorites with citizens capable of demonstrating their fitness and ability for office—a thoroughly democratic principle.1 Fish contends

1White, The Republican Era, pp. 351-52.
that examinations resulted in replacing opportunities for "clever, sometimes brilliant, men" with a service which attracted "the steady-going and unimaginative."\(^1\) Hoogenboom stresses the view that competitive exams resulted in the recruitment of persons of a higher social status and were thus, by implication, less democratic.\(^2\) At the same time, Van Riper claims that the reform, given the political and social conditions of the late nineteenth century, made the civil service more representative.\(^3\) Whether less representative or more representative, less democratic or more democratic, the representative nature of the public service was changed in a way that left it open to future political questioning.

The character of the civil service was affected in another way. As White notes, for decades the ideal of the administrative system "had been a system political in character, serving the interests of party at an admitted cost in competence and integrity. . . . This ideal was challenged and gradually subdued to the ideal of a 'businesslike' government."\(^4\) A number of consequences ensued. For one, more businessmen were brought into the government. Secondly,

\(^1\)\(\text{Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage, p. 233.}\)
\(^2\)\(\text{See, for example, Hoogenboom, "The Pendleton Act and the Civil Service," American Historical Review LXIV (1958-1959):312.}\)
\(^3\)\(\text{Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, pp. 101-111, 538ff.}\)
\(^4\)\(\text{The Republican Era, p. 387.}\)
business methods and the new disciplines of economics and statistics were introduced to government activities. Thirdly, with the prohibition of assessments, politicians turned for financial support to businessmen who in turn gained political power.¹ And fourthly, civil service protection was pushed to higher and higher levels in the bureaucracy. Thus, while the civil service perhaps became more efficient, the seeds were sown for later reformers to ask whether it had grown politically unresponsive.

But the web of reform is not only continuous, it is also woven out of a complex variety of motives and interests. The predominant view among students of American administrative history is that reformers, motivated by moral outrage, were intent on purifying political life and public administration. Reformers, in the words of Schurz, were attempting "to restore ability, high character, and true public spirit once more to their legitimate spheres in our public life, and to make active politics once more attractive to men of self-respect and high patriotic aspirations."² At the same time, Schiesl persuasively argues that reformers were motivated by a commitment to administrative efficiency.³


³Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency, passim.
Stewart concludes that it was those reformers who entered the reform movement later, as it began to be drained of its leadership in the 1890s and early 1900s, who were "inclined to stress reform as an instrument to improve the efficiency of the administration as well as a moral force for the purification of politics."\(^1\)

If the reformers were concerned with restoring morality to politics, it was partially because they were individuals imbued with a sense of personal morality and integrity, a desire for liberty from the tyranny of political parties, and an impatience for democratic government wherein "offices must be open to all citizens according to their fitness to fill them."\(^2\) Thus, one must question Hoogenboom's view that the reformers were attempting to return government to pre-Jacksonian attitudes and standards. For, "on the contrary, civil service reformers accepted the principles of egalitarianism and of equal opportunity in the public service."\(^3\)

The standard they were seeking to apply to the public service was a mixture of "Federalist" competence and "Jacksonian" democracy. Yet the reformers were political men motivated by more than a moral crusade. For example, it is probably correct that Jenckes, a political foe of President

\(^1\)Stewart, *The National Civil Service Reform League*, p. 258.


\(^3\)Mosher, *Democracy and the Public Service*, p. 64.
Johnson, first introduced his civil service reform bill in 1865 in an attempt to weaken the powers of the President. Furthermore, Hoogenboom's class interpretation lays less stress on the reformers' moral motivation and more on the view that the movement "had resulted primarily from loss of political power." He is undoubtedly correct that seeing themselves and others like them gradually overshadowed by spoils politicians, the reformers attacked the politicians' source of power. One must remember, however, that the reformers never sought to destroy the political party, but to regain their standing in them or to purify them, depending on one's perspective. Whether the primary motive was morality, efficiency, or power, the reform movement was not intended simply to make technical improvements, "rather it sought fundamental political change." Congressional motives were perhaps as complex. A few

1Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, p. 67.

2While it may be true, as Schiesl argues, that reformers sought the destruction of political parties at the local level, there is no indication that this approach was taken at the national level.

3Rosenbloom, "Public Personnel Policy in a Political Environment," p. 450. Jay Shafritz's wisdom is worth noting here. "It is difficult if not impossible to separate the moralistic from the political motivations of people. One can never truly know where moral indignation over patronage abuses ended and a not disinterested concern for denying a power base to the incumbents began. It is a question that lends itself to extensive and pointless philosophic debate." Public Personnel Management, The Heritage of Civil Service Reform (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 32.
Congressmen were perhaps concerned with the moral argument, a few were seeking revenge or redress at being overlooked in the scramble for patronage. Many, maybe most, were troubled by their perceptions of the imminent 1884 election and responded to their political instincts. President Arthur's support for reform apparently proceeded from this source as well as a desire to rid himself of the nightmare of dividing the spoils, rather than from an interest in strengthening Presidential leadership. It is clear that the Congress neither expected nor wanted power to accrue to the President. Although department heads and appointing officers lost their discretionary appointment power, indications are that many were willing to give it up in return for more competent employees. E. L. Godkin, a leader in the civil service reform movement, notes that reform was not "the result of clear national policy."¹ It was, one might add, the result of the coalescing of a number of external pressures, personal and political motives, and administrative needs into a compromise that momentarily served a variety of purposes.

¹Hoogenboom, ed., Spoilsmen and Reformers, p. 50.
In each case the reform process was characterized by interest group pluralism. That is, in both countries public opinion, interest groups, civil servants, reform associations, political parties, legislatures, and heads of government were important actors in the creation. The reformed civil services were the products of the application of political skills by intensely committed reformers in specific social and political contexts. To a large degree the reform processes resulted in civil service systems that reflected a consensus among the major actors and that remain largely intact. In both countries representative bureaucracy was a central concern. In Britain, advocates of reform hoped to replace a hereditary aristocracy with a meritocratic elite, which for many meant an increasingly powerful middle-class. In the United States, Eaton, Schurz, and other reformers sought to make public office more representative of middle-class morality and business competence. Reformers in each country sought to purify government, to secure civil services which reflected their values and attitudes by changing its representative character. Both sets of reformers were extremely successful.

The pursuit of efficiency by both British and American reformers was related inextricably to the effort to make administration more representative. Northcote and Trevelyan perhaps were more clearly concerned with increasing efficiency than the American reformers but, nonetheless, both
sets of reformers believed improved government performance delivered with more economy would result when merit principles were applied to civil service selection.

Thus in the latter part of the nineteenth century both Great Britain and the United States began measuring their civil services by new standards. In both countries reformers were attempting to assert a new democratic doctrine that repudiated the practice of appointment to the public service based on political privilege. Both British and American reformers believed that their reform proposals would enhance democratic government.

Yet, it is clear that the civil service structures and procedures that were created in both countries were not identical. The foundation laid by the Northcote-Trevelyan Report resulted in a higher civil service characterized by a relatively closed, elite corps of liberally educated generalists who were committed to deep-rooted principles of anonymity, nonpartisanship, and public service. The higher civil service that emerged from the Pendleton Act was characterized by its openness, professional-technical competence, and commitment to particular policies and programs. Yet these differences only further suggest that civil service reform in both countries went to the very heart of politics and government.
CHAPTER II

THE SECOND HOOVER COMMISSION: REPUBLICANISM RENEWED

After its creation, the U.S. Civil Service developed through a series of incremental victories and defeats. By the end of World War II the civil service largely had met its basic goal—selection by examination, tenure for good behavior, and political neutrality. It had closed the front door to the service; in its enthusiasm to protect personnel from political pressure and provide security it also had closed the back door, a move the creators of the merit system had not desired. By effectively restricting department heads' discretion to fire, discipline, and manage, the now rule-bound system had become, many critics argued, overly centralized, burdened with complexity, and inflexible. It was criticized through the early 1950s for rigidity with respect to position-classification, the lack of a systematic wage policy, the absence of training programs particularly for higher levels, and weaknesses in other "personnel management" areas such as promotion and transfer, separations and removals, efficiency ratings, and appeals and grievances.

In short, most critics agreed that the system which now overemphasized employee protection and administrative continuity was unable to adequately respond to the stress of depression, war, and public pressure for increased services.

From a managerial perspective, the reams of personnel regulations in place by the early 1950s were contributing to many of the problems they were designed to prevent or remedy. Of particular concern was the shortage of qualified individuals for top executive positions and the related problems of how to secure and retain competent persons in these key positions and the low prestige of the civil service. Even before the second world war many of these problems had received attention from official sources concerned with the chief executive's inability to control and manage the government machinery. The President's Committee on Administrative Management reported in 1937\(^1\) and the Ramspeck Act was passed in 1940 giving the President increased authority over personnel management. The problems continued to receive attention in the postwar period in numerous Congressional studies, the 1949 Classification Act, and from the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (First Hoover Commission, 1946-1948).\(^2\) That the energies of many


academics, businessmen, and professionals were attracted to
the stubborn problem of recruiting and holding competent
higher civil servants is suggested by the stream of studies
that emerged between 1935 and the early 1960s. Binding each
of these studies together had been the common concern for
strengthening the managerial or leadership capacity of the
President by giving him responsibility for personnel manage-
ment and increasing his control of top executive personnel.

Important as these administrative concerns were and
are, they cannot be separated from the social and political
milieu that existed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It
was a time when a large segment of the public, although just
experiencing the benefits of big, positive government, was
reasserting the ingrained philosophy of laissez-faire.
Despite the fact that (or perhaps because) governmental
bureaucracy had come to play an increasingly important role
in society, it was a period in which the dominant public
mood was conservative, wanting reduced public expenditures
for foreign aid but not to homeowners and veterans, less

1For example, Leonard White, Government Career Service
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935); William
Carpenter, The Unfinished Business of Civil Service Reform
(Princeton University Press, 1952); John J. Corson, Execu-
tives for the Federal Service (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1952); Paul T. David and Ross Pollock, Executives for
Government (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1957); David
T. Stanley, The Higher Civil Service (Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1964); American Assembly, Sixth, The Federal
Government Service: It's Character, Prestige, and Problems
(New York: Columbia University, Graduate School of Business,
1954).
government regulation of business and more of unions, and increased attention to the threat of communism abroad and at home.¹

Ignoring the successes of public administration in the depression and war years, many people in the postwar population evidenced a renewed acceptance of the goodness and efficiency of business and scientific management. Government was denounced as wasteful and inefficient while big business was efficient and economy-minded. Public officials were denounced as lazy and timid and, at the same time, intent on securing power. Thus, unlike the Populist period of the 1880s, the public was not just anti-bureaucracy, it was specifically anti-government bureaucracy. The Whitten Amendment of 1951 limiting the size of the career service exemplified the predominant legalistic, simplistic views of the nature of the problems of the public service.² The loyalty and security programs gave clear evidence of the prevailing mood of suspicion and distrust of public administrators.

The public service was under attack and for many of the attackers the issue was the growth of administrative power at the expense of other governmental bodies,


²See Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, pp. 464-66 for description of Whitten Amendment and pp. 468-469 for other examples of the negative approaches taken to control bureaucracy.
particularly Congress, business, and the individual. The mood of those persons moving into positions of power after the election of 1952, and of much of the public putting them there, was caught by MacNeil and Metz.

This vast and rapid [post-war] expansion of Government naturally made for waste and extravagance. Especially it strengthened and expanded the executive branch of the Federal Government and weakened the others. It encouraged the trend toward collectivism... and it went far to discourage and weaken the free enterprise system. It has greatly weakened the position of the individual in relation to his Government. Thus there long has been a crying need for a group of competent public men to resurvey the Government's activities for the purpose of bringing them back into conformity with the principles of the American Constitution.¹

The Second Hoover Commission was just that group of public men to renew what conservatives considered the lost principles of the Republic, to make the now unresponsive public bureaucracy responsive--responsive to standards and philosophies enunciated by leaders in the Republican Party.

From a social perspective, then, the early postwar years were troubled by tensions that reflected uncertainty and disagreement over the proper role of government in society. Was government to be used as a positive force to solve social problems or was it merely a mechanism for social control? The civil service took the main brunt of the tension, uncertainty, and anger, becoming a victim to the lack of consensus in the public policy debate.

"The Politics of Revenge"¹

The outcome of the Presidential election of 1952 was, to some extent, a reflection of the concern among the public for the growth of administrative power. Eisenhower had campaigned on promises to "clean up the mess in Washington," to reduce government spending and size, and to restore honesty to government. Thus, a central political issue confronting the new Eisenhower administration concerned its relationship to the bureaucracy. Perhaps to a greater degree than in any previous transition, the Republican Party in 1952 was faced with this recurring question: to what extent does an incoming administration need to control higher and middle level personnel who are largely protected by civil service rules and procedures in order to effectively direct the agencies that will carry out its policy?² Stated more succinctly, "What is the proper balance between change and continuity in the context of our system?"³ For partisan Republicans, this question took on added significance due to several interrelated developments.

¹This phrase is taken from Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, p. 485, who credits it to Samuel Lubell's chapter 3 in Revolt of the Moderate (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956).


Of both utmost joy and concern for Republicans was the fact that their capture of the White House came after a twenty-year absence. During this time the Federal service had increased in size from 583,196 to 2,603,267 of which 85% were under a merit system. A large percentage of the remaining employees, "although not under civil service had been given the protection accorded classified employees" by President Truman's Executive Order 9712 in 1947. The order provided that an employee in the merit system who left to take an excepted position was still protected from removal. In addition, during the last years of the Truman administration a large number of top positions had been "blanketed-in" the classified service. Van Riper indicates that under Truman patronage consisted of 50,000 plus Post Office positions for attorneys, U.S. marshals, collectors of customs and internal revenue and another 5,000 to 25,000 positions at lower levels for approximately 70,000 positions for patronage purposes. Yet when Eisenhower came into office in 1953 probably only 15,000 positions were immediately available, due to tenure restrictions, though another 50,000 could be anticipated when the incumbents died or retired. At the same time, the federal service was contracting, and Republicans had contributed to the patronage


2Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, pp. 443, 490.
squeeze by promising to reduce the national government even further.

To make matters worse, the twenty-year Republican famine had created a situation where "few Republican leaders with any federal experience were available and many of those who had worked with the Democrats were suspect in the new administration."¹ Republicans it appears had extraordinary reasons to complain of a dearth of political leadership.

Thus not only did Eisenhower and Congressional Republicans have relatively few patronage appointments, but the career civil service had been stocked over twenty years with New Deal-Fair Deal Democrats. Many of these individuals had entered government service because of their commitment to particular policies or programs and, even after attaining permanent status, had remained spokesmen for those programs. Over twenty years close relationships had developed between bureau chiefs, interest group leaders, and congressional committee chairmen that gave bureau chiefs a degree of policy-making autonomy from their department heads. To the incoming Republicans most of the top level civil servants were policy-makers protected by civil service tenure; to Republicans civil service rules had gone too far. In addition, new Republican political appointees found some holdover Democrats in the career service to be overtly partisan. For example, "many career people had attended the $100

¹Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, p. 85.
Jefferson-Jackson Day dinners of the Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{1} Although the Hatch Act did not specifically prohibit such activity, it was certainly highly questionable from a Republican perspective. It is not difficult to understand, then, that the Republican Administration entered office carrying a heavy load of suspicion and mistrust—a "built-in bias"\textsuperscript{2} against top level bureaucrats in addition to an ideological mistrust of governmental bureaucracy in general. A Washington Post and Times Herald article by Walter Trohan in January 1953 expressed the widely held perception,

A powerful fifth column of New Dealers and Fair Dealers will operate in key posts under the incoming Republican Administration. . . .

Republicans will take over the top departmental jobs as Cabinet officers, under-Cabinet officers, agency heads, and various chief deputies, but these offices are largely fronts and top-policy posts.

At the level where policy is carried out and information is supplied for policy making, the New Dealers and Fair Dealers are wired in civil service. The vast majority of these plan to remain under the Republicans to work underground for the Democrats.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1}U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Administration of the Civil Service System, 85th Congress, 1st session, Committee Print No. 2, 1957, Report of Special Consultant, James R. Watson, to the Committee, p. 39.


Fearing that the "Democrats" in the merit system would delay, if not sabotage, the implementation of Republican policy, the new Administration began to search for means to take control of the bureaucracy.¹

It should be noted that the distrust that was generated was mutual. With the civil service itself in a state of turbulence due to the anti-bureaucratic character of the 1952 campaign, the continued loyalty attacks, reductions-in-force, almost continual Congressional investigations into the economy and efficiency of the service, and lists of career persons who had attended Democratic fundraisers being actively circulated as blacklists,² the morale of the service reached a low point with the 1952 election and the succeeding few years.

The Eisenhower Administration entered office in 1953 with the largest popular majority up to that point in the

¹Herbert Emmerich and G. Lyle Belsley in "The Federal Career Service—What Next?," p. 2, add some perspective to the Republican picture of the bureaucracy,

There are no factual bases for believing that there was a preponderance of Democrats in the civil service in the District of Columbia at the close of the Truman Administration. On the contrary, there is strong reason to believe that if one could determine how these civil servants would have voted in the 1952 election, it would be found that they did not vary greatly from the rest of the population. It is significant that the two counties in Virginia and the two in Maryland adjacent to the District of Columbia which are populated by a heavy proportion of federal employees voted overwhelmingly for Eisenhower in 1952.

nation's history and with a slim Republican majority in the House and Senate. Eisenhower, of course, "brought to the Presidency the conviction that the country had had its full measure of new programs during the past twenty years and that it wanted consolidation without undermining past achievements." His was a moderate view when laid beside that of many Congressional Republicans. To win the campaign for less government and for what Republicans hoped would be more competent, honest administration, Eisenhower and his supporters directed much of their attention to the higher civil service. Believing that "administrative talent would have to be found in men with a different social orientation than that which presumably had dominated the executive branch during the previous two decades," the new administration set off to replace the "planners," the "idea men," the "intellectuals" with efficiency engineers, business management experts, and pragmatic business executives. From the Republican perspective, the civil service had become unrepresentative of the values of postwar America; only by an infusion of carriers of the conservative creed could its representative character be restored.

1Eisenhower had a Republican Congress only in his first two years of office (1953-1955). In the 83rd Congress Republicans held a one-vote majority in the Senate, and a seven-vote majority in the House.

2Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades, p. 359.

The Administration also opened with much uncertainty about just how a more representative bureaucracy could be attained. Eisenhower himself was repelled by partisan political fighting and showed himself to be rather naive by agreeing with his political rival, Senator Taft, that he would not discriminate against supporters of Taft in the making of high level appointments. In addition, Eisenhower instructed his staff that friendship with him was not a qualification for office. Thus "Eisenhower early put himself on record as willing to abstain from using one of a president's prime political weapons for the forging of party unity--namely, the manipulation of the patronage." Though it is clear that Eisenhower opposed manipulation of the merit system, it is apparent that he realized the need to control it through appointments. His ambivalence left the issue as to where to draw the line between the career civil service and political administrators in a state of confusion and the civil service, to a large extent, leaderless.

Three Administration actions contributed to the blurred line between the permanent and political executive positions. In 1953 Philip Young, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, was given the dual title of Presidential Advisor on Personnel Management. In this capacity, the Chairman became a personnel advisor to the President in the

1Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, p. 478.
2Ibid.
White House Office. Although this was a move recommended by the First Hoover Commission, many critics saw it as compromising the oversight responsibilities of the Commission.¹

Confusion was further visited upon the politics-administration dichotomy by Eisenhower's attempt to control policy-making jobs by creating a new schedule for positions excepted from the merit system. Schedule C, created by Executive Order 10,440 on March 31, 1953, was to encompass all positions of a confidential or policy determining character and remove them from civil service protection. At the same time, the Executive Order partially reversed President Truman's 1947 Order which gave job security to policy-makers who, although no longer formally in the merit system, had been protected at one time by civil service tenure. The principle behind Schedule C—that policy-making positions ought to be controlled by a new administration—was good. However, as the Second Hoover Commission's Task Force on Personnel and Civil Force found, Schedule C was based on an oversimplified "policy-determining" criterion—just what is "policy-determining"? Because an answer to this question lacked clear criteria, the use of Schedule C resulted in a confusing scattering of political executives up and down the hierarchy. In addition, Schedule C resulted in the conversion to political status of some positions held by career

¹See Ibid., pp. 495-98, for a discussion of the Young appointment.
officials at lower levels in the hierarchy, many of them "at levels where expertness and continuity are essential." ¹
Indeed, the Task Force concluded that Schedule C contributed to "the most significant cut-back of the competitive service in its history." ²

Democrats, of course, were quick to charge the Republicans with undermining the merit system, yet the quantitative importance of Schedule C was not high. For example, out of the total of 1098 positions placed in Schedule C by September 1954, 269 had been transferred from the competitive service, 559 from Schedule A, 2 from Schedule B, and only 268 were new positions. ³ The Civil Service Commission had turned down a large number of agency requests for Schedule C jobs. Thus, most Schedule C jobs were filled by transfer from within the service, perhaps a recognition of the need for continuity or the result of a few qualified

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² Ibid., p. 192.

³ Schedule A includes a wide variety of miscellaneous positions which have never been placed in the competitive service or have been expected for various reasons, in particular, positions that were judged by the Civil Service Commission to be not feasible for either competitive or non-competitive examination. Schedule B includes a small number of positions filled by noncompetitive examination, for example, technical and professional positions.
outsiders. Nevertheless, many Republican Congressmen were highly critical of the Civil Service Commission and Chairman Young. Some even requested Young's resignation on the grounds that by rejecting such a large number of Schedule C requests "he was not supporting 'the Administration in helping to remove those who would sabotage the very Administration who gave you a job'." Republican complaints throughout 1953 and early 1954 that Democrats in the executive branch continued to obstruct policy and leak information to the press led to the issuance of the "Willis Directive" in 1954.

The Willis plan, the third Administration action to blur the relationship between political and administrative executives, was an effort to subject all career appointments and promotions at GS-14 levels and above to political clearance through the Republican National Committee. The plan, otherwise known as Operation People's Mandate, was the product of Charles F. Willis, Jr., then assistant to Sherman Adams, President Eisenhower's Chief of Staff. According to James R. Watson, Executive Director of the National Civil Service League,

The new plan established a special assistant in each department and agency for the purpose of maintaining touch with appointments among the agency, the White

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House and the Republican National Committee. . . . Its purpose was to control vacancies, not only in the political offices, but also in career posts in the top grades of the career civil service. It attempted to establish a system of politically clearing appointments. . . . The job of the special assistant was to see that Republicans were appointed to the upper five grades, including recognized career jobs, on an unmitigated partisan basis.¹

Though the publication of the Willis Directive was an embarrassment to the Eisenhower Administration, there is no indication that it was ever rescinded. Republican partisans were bent on revenge.

The Creation and Work of the Second Hoover Commission

It was out of this environment that the Second Hoover Commission was born. When the 83rd Congress convened early in 1953, many Republican members were motivated by a "politics of revenge" to create a Commission on the model of the popular First Hoover Commission to help restore the "American way of life." At the same time, the impression should not be left that there were no Republican members of Congress who saw a Second Hoover Commission as the best approach to solving serious problems. Yet the evidence is clear that partisan gain was an important motivation.

It is important to note that the idea for and the force behind the Commission were Congressional in origin.

¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, Administration of the Civil Service System, pp. 29, 31. For details and examples from the Willis plan see the Appendix of the Committee print, pp. 83-144.
Shortly after his inauguration Eisenhower had appointed a President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization (PACGO) to provide him with "immediate advice and action on reorganization during his first year in the White House."¹ The Committee, composed of Nelson Rockefeller, Arthur S. Flemming, and Milton Eisenhower, and later Don Price who replaced Rockefeller, apparently operated quite effectively through both of Eisenhower's terms of office. Beyond PACGO, Eisenhower was backing a bill to establish a Commission on Intergovernmental Relations which he believed would overlap with the work of the Second Hoover Commission. Hence Eisenhower was able to say in his diary, "I personally doubt the need for its [the Second Hoover Commission] organization, because of the simultaneous authorization of another commission which will have to do with the division of functions, duties, and responsibilities between the federal government and the several states."² Despite his lack of enthusiasm for another Hoover Commission, Congressional pressure forced Eisenhower to give his support. His diary continues, "Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that these views were carefully explained to congressional leaders, two or three individuals on the Hill were so determined to have a new


'Hoover' commission that I had to accept the Hoover Commis-
sion in order to achieve the other one, from which I expect
much." ¹ Indeed, Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan and Rep-
resentative Clarence Brown of Ohio, seeing an opportunity to
reduce the role of government, were the chief sponsors of a
bill to create the Second Hoover Commission.

The Ferguson-Brown bill passed Congress on July 10,
1953 with surprisingly little opposition or debate,² which
is rather remarkable in view of two major provisions of the
bill. The first noticeable provision, or lack thereof, was
its failure to require an equal number of Democrats and
Republicans as did the bill authorizing the First Hoover Com-
mission. This failure tended to confirm the partisan pur-
poses of the sponsors of the Commission. Like the First
Hoover Commission, the bill did provide for twelve members,
four each, two from public life and two from private life,
to be chosen by the President, Vice-President, and the
Speaker of the House.³ But because partisan equality was

¹Ibid.

²67 U.S. Statutes 142 (1953), created the Commission of Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, known as the Second Hoover Commission.

³Members of the Second Hoover Commission were:
Eisenhower appointments: Attorney General (Rep) Herbert
Brownell, Jr.; former Civil Service Commissioner (Rep)
Arthur S. Flemming; former President of the United States
(Rep) Herbert Hoover; former Postmaster General (Dem) James
A. Farley. Nixon appointments: (Rep) Senator Homer
Ferguson replaced by Republican Senator Syles Bridges;
(Dem) Senator John L. McClellan; Dean of the College of
Engineering at Cornell University (Rep) Solomon C. Hollister;
not required, the Commission was composed of seven Republicans and five Democrats. Only after the Commission reported did Democrats raise much objection to this arrangement. For example, Representative Holifield in a dissent to the \textit{Final Report to the Congress} argued that the value of the Commission was seriously nullified because it lacked a statutory requirement for bipartisanship.\footnote{Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, \textit{Final Report to the Congress} (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1955), p. 27. Hereafter Second Hoover Commission, \textit{Final Report}.} However, as Hoover was wont to declare, there was never a split among the committee based on strictly party lines.

Going beyond the legislative requirements of the Commission's membership, it is clear that as a group those finally selected were most conservative, certainly more so than the members of the First Commission. There were five returnees from the First Commission, none of whom were among the more vocal dissenters on that First Committee. More telling is Eisenhower's testimony regarding Hoover's state of mind: "I was a bit nonplussed to find that the only individuals he wanted on the commission were those whom he knew to share his general convictions--convictions that many of our people would consider a trifle on the motheaten

Dean of School of Law at Southern Methodist University (Dem) Robert G. Storey. Speaker Martin: (Rep) Representative Clarence J. Brown; (Dem) Representative Chet Holifield; Former Ambassador to Great Britain (Dem) Joseph P. Kennedy; Business executive (Rep) Sidney A. Mitchell.
The membership of the Commission Task Forces was heavily composed of representatives of free enterprise and the corporate sector—65 business executives, 40 lawyers, 37 engineers, 8 bankers, 8 CPAs, 3 insurance executives, and 6 public administrators—many of whom had been exempted from conflict of interest laws by special legislation requested by Hoover. Critics have little trouble supporting their contention that the Task Forces were padded to provide the recommendations that the Commission desired.

The second aspect of the Ferguson-Brown bill which later provided canon fodder for attacks on the Commission was the explicit authority the Commission received to make recommendations with broad policy implications. Where the First Hoover Commission, largely for political reasons, was limited to examining approaches to reduce expenditure, eliminate duplication and waste, consolidate services, and achieve efficiency, the Second Commission was charged to

1Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries, p. 247.


3Most observers, however, are more generous with the Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service. Chaired by Harold Dodds, President of Princeton University, it also included such notables as Chester I. Barnard, author of Functions of the Executive, Leonard D. White, Professor of Public Administration at the University of Chicago, and Robert Ramspeck, former Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, along with six business executives. George A. Graham, Professor of Political Science at Princeton, was its Staff Director.

4Emmerich persuasively and, I believe, correctly argues in Organization and Administrative Management, p. 105, that the First Hoover Commission had the authority to examine
eliminate "nonessential services, functions, and activities which are competitive with private enterprise" and to define "responsibilities of officials." The latter two charges made the intent of its sponsors clear. The Commission was not to limit itself to questions of organizational arrangements and efficiency, but to broaden its inquiry to what government should and should not do. That the Second Commission was given such a wide scope is clear from the Senate testimony of its authors. Ferguson pointed out that the terms of reference were

and make recommendation in substantive policy areas and was prepared to do so at the time of its creation in 1947. However, with Truman's unexpected election in 1948, Chairman Hoover restricted the scope of the inquiry to organizational structure, efficiency, and economy questions. The scope was limited to examining means to make government work better, rather than questioning whether a particular government function was needed. The Second Commission was under no such political constraint to limit itself to questions of structure. James W. Fesler in "Administrative Literature and the Second Hoover Commission Reports," American Political Science Review 51, No. 1 (March 1957), p. 148, also takes this position. The distinction between the scope of the two commissions is instructive for what it reveals about the climate of the Second Hoover Commission, yet the dichotomy between structure/efficiency questions and policy questions is a bit forced. That is, one may argue that the study of efficiency and organizational structure is not neutral with regard to policy as the Emmerich and Fesler arguments imply. As Harold Seidman, in Politics, Position, and Power, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 29, asserts, issues of organization and structure are essentially questions of power--who shall control and to what ends?


2See comments regarding this efficiency-policy dichotomy in footnote 4, page 100.
intended to make certain that this Commission has full power to look into the activities of the Federal Government from the standpoint of policy and to inquire, 'Should the Government be performing this activity or service, and if so, to what extent?'

That Ferguson's question was not without bias is apparent as he continues,

the cost and the size of our Government can best be reduced by cutting down the things which Government does. The mere process of reorganization ... cannot reduce the size of Government or its burden on the tax payer by more than a few percent. Reorganization cannot strike at the heart of the problem of big Government.2

The means to strike at the heart of the problem lay in the Commission's "power to recommend a complete elimination or abolition of an activity."3 In his dissent in the Final Report Commissioner Holifield made the first of the Democrats' rather late responses by pointedly declaring that such a sweeping mandate was an "unwise departure from representative government" where the people's elected representatives determine policy.4

Any doubt that the assumptions and purposes of the Commission were grounded in a political philosophy of conservatism were dispelled by Hoover himself. The Final Report announces that "the primary purpose of the Commission

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1U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Senate Report No. 216, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953, Senate Reports 1, p. 4.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Second Hoover Commission, Final Report, p. 28.
was to recommend methods by which savings could be made in the expenditures of the agencies of the executive branch.\(^1\)

"But more important than savings," Hoover declared in a New York Times interview, "was the realization that the whole social and economic system is based on private enterprise."\(^2\)

The creation, organization, and operation of the Hoover Commission of 1953-1955 was motivated by a desire to return government and its relationship to business to pre-New Deal days.

Findings, Recommendations, Assumptions

It is possible that a small miracle could have transformed the work of this ideologically committed, conservatively-biased Commission and its Task Forces into a thoughtful, skeptical analysis. In general, such was not the case. The Commission's studies on public versus private production, mortgage guarantees, agricultural credit, medical services reflected the philosophical position from which it started. However, by almost all accounts, the Commission's report on Personnel and Civil Service\(^3\) was competent and distinguished, an outcome that must be accounted for by the strength of its

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 19.


Task Force. And yet, given the political tenor of the Second Hoover Commission one must ask, what purposes and assumptions lie behind the findings and recommendations on the civil service? Is there any reason to believe that these purposes were out of character relative to the overriding concerns of the Commission?

The centerpiece of the Commission's (and its Task Force's) report was an argument for changing the topmost levels of the administration, by creating a distinctive career senior civil service sharply separated from an enlarged political executive corps. The Commission found that the greatest weakness in the area of personnel and civil service was in "expert managerial direction." Indeed, "increasing the supply of managerial talent available within the Government . . . is the heart of the Federal personnel problem today."¹ The source of this deficiency was to be found, according to the Commission, in the high rate of turnover for political or noncareer executives, the confusion of functions among career administrators and political executives, the lack of systematic recruitment and assignment procedures, low salaries, political executives who are unprepared for their political tasks, conflict of interest laws that discourage competent persons from entering government, and a system which emphasizes positions, not people, at the higher levels.

To address these problems the Commission made nineteen wide-ranging recommendations, only a few of which need be examined here. As the Commission's report to Congress states, its primary purpose was to reach a balance between the need for competent, politically responsive non-career executives and the need for skilled, non-partisan career administrators. In the Commission's view that balance could best be reached by increasing the number of political appointees from 750 to 5,000, concentrating these political executives at the department level, and clearly separating their responsibilities and duties from the career officials below. At the same time, officials with civil service protection were to be restricted to the bureau level and below where they would be relieved of all policy-political duties and would carry out solely technical, administrative responsibilities. The cornerstone of this new relationship was the Commission's recommendation for a Senior Civil Service.

Reportedly the proposal nearest to Hoover's heart, the Senior Civil Service was to be a corps of senior career officials, 1500 to 3000 strong, who were to be nominated by department heads and selected by a Senior Civil Service Board.

1MacNeil and Metz, The Hoover Commission, p. 34. The Hoover Commission Report leaves the amount of increase indeterminate. MacNeil and Metz indicate the 5,000 figure--a seemingly fantastic increase from 750. As the Report's editor and Director of Research they obviously were privileged to some of the Commission's discussions.

2Ibid., p. 29.
solely on the basis of competence. Its putative purpose was "to have always at hand in the Government a designated group of highly qualified administrators whose competence, integrity, and faithfulness have been amply demonstrated" and "to make the civil service more attractive as a career."¹ The members of the new service would have their status, rank, and salary vested in them as individuals rather than in their job. At the same time, they would be obligated to serve where needed most. These features would provide the top civil service with flexibility. Senior civil servants would be required to refrain from political activity, making statements or speeches of a political nature, contributing to political campaigns, testifying before Congress on political questions, or identifying publically with a political party. Indeed, the political neutrality of the senior administrator must be such that he avoids "emotional attachments to the policies of any administration."² His incentive would come in the form of higher base salaries and pay increases for satisfactory performance. Though never used explicitly as an example by the Task Force or Commission, undoubtedly the Administrative Class of the British civil service had some influence in the development of the Senior Civil Service

²Ibid., p. 41.
The rank-in-the-man idea (as opposed to the rank-in-the-job) also pointed to American experience in the military and foreign services, where a "corps" model seemed to exist.

Other recommendations of significance include the proposal to allow managers greater discretion to select personnel at middle and upper levels by adopting a "rule of five" rather than the "rule of three." In addition, the Commission recommended opening the back door to the service by limiting appeals of dismissal to one appeal to higher authority within the agency and to tightening the veteran's special right of appeal. Finally, the Commission recommended replacing the then current performance appraisal system with a new system that would make the rating of performance an aid to management rather than end in itself.

That the recommendations of the Commission reflected a particular political ideology can be seen at first instance by noticing those few areas where the Commission disagreed with its Task Force. First, the Task Force proposed ending veterans preference in reductions-in-force and as a factor for appointment to positions above the GS-12 level. The

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1 Leonard White in "The Senior Civil Service," Public Administration Review 15 (Autumn 1955): 237-43, briefly discusses the history of the senior civil service corps concept in the U.S. Suggested first in 1935 by the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, White himself provided details in his Government Career Service (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935). The idea was revived in 1937 in a report to the President's Committee on Administrative Management and recommended again by the President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement (Reed Committee) just before World War II.
Commission failed to support either proposal and recommended a much less severe change in veteran's preference. Second, the Task Force made a strong statement rejecting all forms of political clearance for appointments to the career service; the Commission made almost no mention of this issue. Third, the Task Force recommended an official inquiry into the Government's personnel security programs while the Commission made no reference to the loyalty issue and its negative effects on morale. Finally, the Task Force was critical of the dual position of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, but the Hoover Commission disagreed. In each case, the position taken by the Hoover Commission appears to have been in conformity with conservative thinking.

And what of the nature of political implications of the recommendations themselves? Most decidedly, the recommendations were aimed at securing a greater degree of political control of policy-making by the party in power. Certainly this was the intent in proposing an increase in the number of top political appointees. By drawing a clear line between nonpolitical and political officials and rigidly separating their functions, the Commission hoped to reduce the power of a bureaucracy which was perceived to be under Democratic control. Politically neutering the bureau chief would leave the Congressional committee in firm control of the policy subsystem. As David and Pollock point
out, the Commission's analysis is based on a concept of responsible party government that the party in power will translate its platform into programs. Indeed, the Commission Report on personnel makes very little reference to the President and his needs to control, apparently being more concerned with strengthening the Congressional party's policy-role than the President's. Increasing the number of political appointees at the department level rather than just in the President's executive office tends to confirm this view. In addition, MacNeil and Metz, the Commission's editor in chief and director of research, note that "as a creature of the Congress, set up by it and reporting to it alone, the Hoover Commission in examining every activity of the executive branch was conscious of the rights of the legislative branch and never ceased to protect them." In a very real sense, the Second Hoover Commission, ingrained with the traditional Republican distrust for executive leadership, broke with the predominant administrative doctrine held by the President's Committee on Administrative Management and the First Hoover Commission. From the Commission's perspective, responsible administrators would reflect the views of the party in control of the Congress. In terms of administrative doctrine, the Commission


made a number of controversial assumptions. First, of course, was the assumption that politics and administration could be rigidly separated—a major criticism made by the academics who by and large labeled the notion as unrealistic. Wallace Sayre argued that "the political executive who is all policy and politics, the career executive who is all competence and neutrality, are not portraits from real life." In particular, the Commission's claim that the Senior Civil Service would be a politically neutral corps, devoid of all emotional attachments was described by many critics as nonsense. The Senior Civil Service would make career officials out to be "more neuter than neutral, a pallid creature resembling a hybrid of Little Lord Fauntleroy and an elderly clerk." If the Commission's concern was bureaucratic inertia, Harlan Cleveland noted that "it is not neutrality but vigorous advocacy that overcomes inertia in our big government. Too much emphasis on neutrality would shift the whole government into neutral." In addition, Somers pointed out that neutrality would likely result in


2Ibid.

3Ibid.
government attracting fewer competent administrators not more. "To identify 'good management' in the civil service with indifference to the objects of management and unconcern with the social consequences of policies is to make of public administration a barren, if not nihilistic, affair which seems unlikely to attract the kind of imaginative competence which the Report hopes for."¹ Thus, in the eyes of these academics a responsible public administrator must have qualities of leadership and political savvy. He or she is, in Arnold Meltsner's terms,² an entrepreneur—an individual who possesses both technical competence and political skills. If this is so then public administration is characterized by more bargaining, competition, and compromise in policy-making than a strict politics-administration dichotomy allows for.

Separating political from administrative functions, the Commission believed, and then increasing the number of political executives, would result in a bureaucracy more susceptible to change. Such a consequence is not foreordained. As Heclo warns, simply adding more political appointees in an effort to control the bureaucracy may "further bureaucratize the political layers and accentuate

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initial distrust and the mindless compulsion to change personnel with each new administration, as well as create more nonelected entrepreneurs trying to cut their own swath through Washington.\footnote{Hugh Heclo, \textit{A Government of Strangers} (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 243.} Further, Presidents, to their dismay, have found their political appointments often too willing to take up life with the "natives."

The Senior Civil Service proposal also assumes that there are "broad areas of government activity reaching into and across a cluster of departments and agencies within any part of which a senior civil servant would feel at home."\footnote{Leonard White, "The Case for the Senior Civil Service," \textit{Personnel Administration} 19, No. 1 (January-February 1956): 7.} Like the British Administrative Class, the Senior Civil Service is predicated on the notion that an administrative generalist can be transferred from one post to another without a loss in effectiveness.\footnote{Mosher, \textit{Democracy and the Public Service}, p. 87, discusses this doctrine.} Yet this assumption not only overlooked the technical value of continuity and program specialization, but the reality, in the American system, that administrators (with the support of their colleagues in Congress and interest groups) become attached to particular programs (a reality the Commission hoped to change).

Finally, many academics were critical of various details of the Senior Civil Service, arguing that the career
concept would clash with other important goals. For example, it was claimed that the Senior Civil Service would limit lateral entry and thereby create a closed, elite service; that a rank-in-man system would create tensions when placed along side the rank-in-job system and, further, goes against the concept of social egalitarianism; and that the notion of a generalist corps is impractical in a system which produces and rewards specialists.\(^1\) But perhaps the more important criticism of the Hoover Commission was aimed at its assumption that a career service is built on correct technical arrangements and monetary incentives. Van Riper's observations regarding the First Hoover Commission continued to hold true for the Second;

the problem of our national public service . . . can at best be met only temporarily and partially with recommendations which stress merely financial and procedural solutions to difficulties which are really the reflection of deep and underlying political considerations. At the bottom of the personnel problem of the Federal Government lie the more fundamental considerations of national political policy, and it will take political as well as administrative invention to solve them.\(^2\)

To attract and hold quality public servants requires more than just applying personnel techniques; rather it is a matter of creative political leadership and creating a consensus on the purpose of administration.

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While much of the criticism of the Commission's report on personnel and civil service focused on its public administration doctrine and administrative assumptions, the future of its recommendations rested on the responses of those groups whose interests would be affected by its implementation. In short, the factor determining the disposition of Hoover's proposals was power. For the supporters of a renewed Republicanism, the 1954 mid-term election came as a blow. The Republicans lost their majority in the House and the Democratic majority, reacting partially to the earlier Republican transgressions of "playing partisan politics . . . with our civil service,"¹ gave a cold shoulder to the Hoover Commission proposals when they were reported in early 1955, including those dealing with personnel and civil service. With the 1956 election just around the corner, the Democrats looked forward to using the big business bias of the report to campaign successfully again against "Hooverism" and hoped to tie Eisenhower to the report by pointing out that he had appointed three Republicans that included Hoover and only one Democrat.² Eisenhower responded by trying to distance himself from the Commission's proposals.


himself from the Commission, and many Congressional Republicans indicated that they also found some of the recommendations "too hot to handle." Even Republican Senator Bridges, a Commission member, suggested that the Congress should "not do a hurried job in putting (the recommendations) into action." As a result the proposals fared badly in Congress.

But beyond the strictly partisan electoral interests of Congress was an institutional concern that cut across party lines. The personnel proposals of the Commission were a two-edged sword. On closer examination, some members of Congress saw in the proposals for a Senior Civil Service and an increased number of political appointees the potential for a reduced role for Congress in the administrative process. This consequence could be avoided if Congress were to confirm all political and Senior Civil Service appointments but, among other things, this would result in an unacceptable politicization of the career service. The relationship between bureau chief and committee chairman acting in a policy-making subsystem is one of mutual dependence, and important to a congressman's influence over policy implementation. To force congressmen to deal

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1Quoted in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 13, No. 24 (June 17, 1955):691.

2See David and Pollock, Executives for Government, p. 84, for a discussion of Congress vis-a-vis the Senior Civil Service.
strictly with political executives would interfere with their direct access at the program level. It is perhaps for these reasons that Republican Representative Brown, co-sponsor of the bill establishing the Second Hoover Commission, submitted a strong dissent to the Senior Civil Service concept, arguing that such a corps would "strengthen and further entrench the bureaucracy."¹

Interest group reaction lined up on both sides of the Commission's report on personnel. Not surprisingly the federal civil servants and their unions were skeptical. In the first place the Commission report lacked any treatment of the security-loyalty issue and made almost no mention of employee-management relations. But beyond that, the American Federation of Government Employees was quick to note that, unlike the First Hoover Commission, the second one ignored any role for employee participation "in the formulation and improvement of federal personnel policies and practices."² In addition, top civil servants questioned the selection, promotion, and transfer conditions of the Senior Civil Service proposal and many found the uncertainties and risks not worth the rewards. The Commission's emphasis on performance evaluation was a particular sticky point with the public employees. Others feared that the proposed Senior Civil

¹Second Hoover Commission, Civil Service Report, pp. 89-90.

Service Board inevitably would make selection and promotion decisions based on partisan or ideological grounds.\(^1\) Not least, many career officials questioned the mobility provisions of the Hoover proposal, not necessarily based on any personal inconvenience but on the grounds that their professional commitments lie with specific programs or agencies. Chester Newland concludes from his study of top federal civil servants that very few were generalist managers; "many were expert managers, but nearly all were confined to narrow specializations in specific organizations."\(^2\) Thus again, long established sub-system relationships would prove hard to change.

Other groups upset by the Hoover Commission and ones with clout in Congress were veterans' organizations. The American Legion was opposed to forty-six Hoover recommendations affecting veterans.\(^3\) A number of these were from the Commission's report on Personnel and Civil Service, for example, those limiting veteran's preference in appeals and reductions-in-force. The veterans' groups played an important role in shaping negative Congressional attitudes

\(^1\)See the statement by James Campbell, National President of the A.F.G.E. in The Government Standard 55, No. 8 (February 25, 1955):2, which questions the Senior Civil Service concept and the role of the selection board in particular.


to the overall personnel report.

Support for the Hoover proposals came from two primary sources, besides a dwindling number of Congressional Republicans: the Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report and political executives. The Citizens Committee was a bipartisan organization of businessmen, academics, university presidents, bankers, and former Congressmen and Cabinet members. Its Chairman was Clarence Francis, chairman of the board of General Foods Corporation. Originally formed by Hoover to develop outside support for the First Commission, it continued to perform that function for the Second. Its prominent membership insured public attention to a message that was carried in speeches, news releases, special school courses, and its publication, "Reorganization News." While it claimed a major role in the broad acceptance of the proposals of the First Hoover Commission, political conditions in 1955 were not ripe enough for it to have much of an impact.  

The other major source of support for the proposals of the report on Personnel and Civil Service came from the President and top level political executives. Although Eisenhower showed relative indifference to most of the Commission's recommendations in hopes of avoiding "issues

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packed with political dynamite,"¹ he did take an interest in the Senior Civil Service proposals. Indeed, as David and Pollock point out, it was in his interest to create a corps of top level careerists with a broad understanding of government goals and responsive to the President rather than particular interest groups.² Where the Congress opposed the Senior corps concept because it would break up established symbiotic relationships in the sub-system, the President supported the concept for that very reason. Political heads of departments found grounds to support the plan in the hope that they would obtain a group of more competent, neutral career officials and greater managerial flexibility.

With mounting union and veteran opposition, wide disagreement among academics, and a highly partisan Congress, the Congress failed to act on the Commission's personnel recommendations. Based on the recommendations of a Career Executive Committee appointed by the President in 1957, Eisenhower went as far as he could without legislation toward creating the Senior Civil Service.³ Through Executive Order 10758 a Career Executive Service was established in March 1958. The Order provided for a Career Executive Board


²David and Pollock, Executives for Government, p. 82.

to prepare a roster of eligible career executives who were to be available for flexible assignments. Limited though it was, the House denied appropriations for the Career Executive Service in 1959, leaving a host of political issues and administrative problems unresolved.

The Anatomy of a Failure

Unlike the reform movement which culminated in the Pendleton Act of 1883, the story of the Second Hoover Commission is largely one of failure. Yet, like the prior "successful" reform effort, the motives and forces that contributed to the creation, the recommendations, and the failure of the Second Hoover Commission are complex. The initial impetus for the Commission came from a Republican Congress heady with a new found ally in the White House and a public sympathetic with the goals of securing a smaller government and a balanced budget. The 83rd Republican Congress saw in the Commission's proposals for a clear separation between career and political officials, more political appointees, and the politically neutral Senior Civil Service an opportunity to reduce the power of a bureaucracy dominated by Roosevelt-Truman Democrats. The 85th Democratic Congress, however, seeing in these same proposals a weakening of Congressional influence in administrative decision-making and a corresponding centralization of administrative control in the Republican President, never let the proposals get off the ground and withheld funding when Eisenhower unilaterally
tried to initiate them. Eisenhower, although trying to ignore the bulk of the Commission's proposals, did find the personnel recommendations in his interests. Yet Eisenhower had no investment in the proposals, no programs that would gain from them and no commitment to institutional change. Thus he had no reason to fight with Congress over the Senior Civil Service proposal. Indeed, such a fight would have been an uphill battle, confronting not only a partisan Congress but also a highly skeptical group of top level federal employees and veterans' organizations. His political ally, the Citizen's Committee for the Hoover Commission, had by now depleted its political capital. After all, it took the murder of a President to catapult the original reformers to success.

There were real problems plaguing the civil service: the difficulty of securing and holding competent career and political officials; deficiencies in training programs, pay, performance evaluation, and dismissal policies; the low prestige and morale of the service; and the lack of agreement upon the proper balance and relationship between politically appointed executives and career administrators. The Hoover Commission did not approach these problems with the advantages of the one-eyed man in the kingdom of the blind, but viewed them between large partisan and philosophical blinders. Thus, the standards that guided the Commission were conditioned by its particular vantage point.
Created with the justification of reducing waste and inefficiency, the Commission continued to justify its activities in its Final Report by the need to save money by reducing government activity. Even at the end of its report on Personnel and Civil Service the Commission claimed a savings of $48,500,000 if its proposals were adopted.

But clearly economy was not the sole or even the primary standard to which the Commission wanted the civil service to conform. And, unlike its most recent predecessors, neither was executive leadership. Indeed, the Commission and its creators distrusted a strong executive. Although its personnel proposals had implications for executive control of administration—generally making it stronger—these were implications that finally resulted in the Commission's failure.

The primary criterion by which the Commission judged the public service was whether or not it was politically responsive. From the Republicans' perspective in 1953 it was judged unresponsive to the political will of the American voting public. Diagnosing that the source of the bureaucracy's irresponsibility was the presence of career officials (who, moreover, were Democrats) functioning as policy-makers, the Commission prescribed sharpening the separation between the career and non-career administrators and neutralizing the political and emotional attachments of the permanent bureaucrats in a Senior Civil Service. The Commission believed
this remedy would allow an increased number of political appointees to respond to the will of the people through the political party. It has already been noted that simply adding more political appointees might be counterproductive. In addition, serious problems also may arise from a reform that emphasizes responsiveness to political leadership. In Heclo's words, "without a sense of the civil service's independent responsibility to uphold legally constituted institutions and procedures, political control of the bureaucracy can easily go too far. Any single-minded commitment to executive energy is likely to evolve into arbitrary power."¹ Watergate is a clear example as are executive abuses ranging from partisan involvement in the CIA and FBI to welfare administration.

Accompanying this attempt to secure a more responsive bureaucracy, was the perceived need for a bureaucracy more representative of conservative values. Republican cries for more patronage and Eisenhower's efforts to oblige by ordering Schedule C and supporting the Willis Directive indicate Republicans' perceptions of an unrepresentative administration. Not only were Eisenhower's appointments evidence of the desire for a new business orientation, but the technical, managerial emphasis of the Commission's proposals, such as that calling for a neat, clear line separating politics from administration, also suggests an

¹Heclo, A Government of Strangers, p. 244.
unexamined faith in the application of business techniques to public administrative problems.

Although it is manifest that the standards applied by the Commission were in response to the political conditions of the time, there is no explicit acknowledgment in the Commission's report of its political purpose. Undoubtedly, the Commissioners were well aware of the political implications of their personnel report and one can only surmise that they believed that restricting their analysis, conclusions, and language to a managerial-technical orientation would give the report an aura of objectivity. Yet, herein lie two deficiencies: 1) it covers up the possibility that the problem of obtaining and retaining competent public servants is determined more by the larger political environment and character of leadership than by the technical factors of selection and organizational structure, and 2) it withholds from top administrators--both career and non-career--a clear picture of just what the national policy is with regard to the civil service. Even more devastating, the Commission's Report completely ignored those values which are basic to public administration. As a result, this major effort to solve the key problems of the civil service in the 1950s--selecting and holding competent higher public servants and balancing administrative continuity with political responsiveness--was at odds with the goal of achieving a truly

1See Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the Change of Administration," p. 149.
responsible public administration. Whether the efforts of a new generation of reformers in the 1970s were any closer to this ideal will be the focus of the next chapter.
"I came to Washington," President Jimmy Carter reminded Americans in 1978, "with a promise and the obligation to rebuild the faith of the American people in our government."\(^1\)

It was President Carter's diagnosis that the loss of faith was attributable to "not enough merit in the merit system. There is inadequate motivation because we have too few rewards for excellence and too few penalties for unsatisfactory work." "The sad fact is," his diagnosis continued, "that it is easier to promote and to transfer incompetent employees than it is to get rid of them. ... You cannot run a farm that way, you cannot run a factory that way, and you cannot run a government that way." The Carter prescription for these ills was government reorganization with civil service reform as the "centerpiece." A large dose of this "absolutely vital" medicine would, it was promised, "restore the merit principle to a system which has grown into a bureaucratic maze. It will provide greater management flexibility and better rewards for better performance without

\(^1\)This and the next few quotes from Jimmy Carter, "Federal Civil Service Reform," address to National Press Club, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 14, No. 9 (March 2, 1978):435-38.
compromising job security."¹ After applying this remedy
"and only then can we have a government that is efficient, open, and truly worthy of our people's understanding and respect. I have promised that we will have such a government, and I intend to keep that promise."²

Many people simply dismissed such promises flowing from the mouths of mere politicians as inane rhetoric or vacuous symbolism. Perhaps they were. But by granting Mr. Carter the benefit of the doubt that his promises were made in good faith, more interesting questions are raised. Several questions shall be the concern of this chapter, others will be discussed in Chapter Seven. Here we shall ask first what administrative problems and political forces gave rise to President Carter's promises and what were the political dynamics that resulted in their putative fulfillment in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Secondly, we shall ask what assumptions its sponsors made and what values and standards are sought through this Act, particularly Title IV's provision for a Senior Executive Service. Finally, what have been the political reactions to and what are the political implications of the Senior Executive Service?

²Ibid.
A fundamental administrative question that the Second Hoover Commission had unsuccessfully attempted to solve was how to reconcile the competing needs for continuity and change. The Commission's failure was due primarily to its inability to provide the correct political answers to those individuals and groups that possessed political power. A political consensus on how best to balance the President's need to control the bureaucracy with employee rights and merit protection proved to be elusive throughout the remainder of the 1960s and 1970s.

After Eisenhower's Career Executive Board was starved out of existence by Congress, an Office of Career Development was established in 1961 by the Civil Service Commission to improve the selection and development of top executives, primarily by maintaining a central listing of career officials at the highest levels. This effort was superseded in 1967 by President Johnson's Executive Order 11315 creating an Executive Assignment System. The Executive Assignment System established three types of positions within the supergrades GS-16, 17 and 18: Career Executive Assignments, Limited Executive Assignments, and Noncareer Executive Assignments. It was designed to provide government-wide

career opportunities for executives and broaden senior civil servants' identification with overall government objectives rather than just one agency or program. The Executive Assignment System also included a Career Executive Inventory system which provided biographical information on personnel in grades GS-15 to GS-18, as an aid to agency heads in filling executive vacancies.\(^\text{1}\) The Executive Assignment System was only one approach used by Johnson to meet his staffing needs. Less formally, the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations attempted to establish political control of the bureaucracy by placing politically loyal officials in key senior positions, whether career or noncareer. Like Philip Young under Eisenhower, John Macy under Johnson served as both chairman of the Civil Service Commission and Special Assistant to the President for personnel. And following long established tradition Johnson, just before leaving office, blanketed-in a number of non-career appointees into the career service and "cleared" some loyal Democrats for career appointments.\(^\text{2}\) Thus upon inheriting the Presidency in 1969 Nixon sought to tame a bureaucracy he perceived to be hostile by continuing the trend of politicizing the higher career

\(^{1}\text{See Mel H. Bolster, "The Strategic Deployment of Exceptional Talent: An Account of the Career Executive Roster's Short History," Public Administration Review 27, No. 5 (December 1967):446-451.}\)

levels. The "Malek/May Manual" is a testament to the Nixon Administration's strategy to control executive branch personnel. A part of this strategy was Nixon's proposal for a Federal Executive Service patterned after the Second Hoover Commission's Senior Civil Service. Intended to give the Administration the tools to insure that politically responsive officials held key positions, the proposal evoked intense opposition from federal employee unions and Congressional Democrats and met disaster in 1972 in the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee after passing the Senate.

The abrupt end of the Nixon administration did not reduce the pressures felt by chief executives to control the bureaucracy. The long-term trend of increasingly politicizing the civil service in order to prevent bureaucratic "sabotage" continues.\(^1\) At the same time, a trend traceable to the Civil Service Act of 1883 persists. In the late 1950s Van Riper argued that the civil service system had become overburdened with "red tape, greater procedural controls, more restrictive dismissal procedures, and more and more review and appeals boards—all in the name of justice, security, and fair play for civil employees."\(^2\) This emphasis


on "neutral protectionism" and "legalistic complexity" was
invigorated following Watergate revelations of raids on the
merit system. Yet the irony of these two trends--increased
politicization and merit protectionism--is that neither can
fully succeed without triggering immense pressure to
emphasize the other. Administrations arrive believing that
bureaucratic power constitutes a threat to their political
goals. The number of political executives is increased,
career executives are screened for their loyalty, and "dis-
senters" are banished. Almost simultaneously, efforts to
protect career officials from political influence and merit
abuse are initiated which encourage further politicization.
It is no wonder that the problem of accommodating both
continuity and change has proven to be tenacious.

When Jimmy Carter launched his White House career, he,
no less than his predecessors, was concerned about getting
control of a powerful federal bureaucracy. To an extent
never approached by prior occupants of the Presidency, Carter
made this concern the major platform of his campaign. His
campaign rhetoric seldom got beyond the level of promises to
clean up the "horrible bureaucratic mess in Washington" and
to institute "tight, businesslike management and planning

1See Chester A. Newland, "Public Personnel Administra-
tion: Legalistic Reform vs. Effectiveness, Efficiency, and
Economy," Public Administration Review 36, No. 5 (September/
techniques" in government. The downpayment for such promises was Carter's "success" as government manager and efficiency expert while Governor of Georgia. Yet, though sparse on substance, Carter's criticisms of bureaucracy and promises to reorganize government touched a tender spot with the voting public.

Public opinion polls since the mid-1960s have shown that voters have little confidence in government to solve problems and believe that government programs are not well run, that they are inefficient and wasteful. The breadth and depth of public dissatisfaction with government is seen in Proposition 13-type efforts from coast to coast and the subsequent spending and tax-cutting fever which has overcome Congress. Both popular and academic literature have reflected this public disenchantment by repeatedly criticizing the civil service system for its contributions to the "crisis in confidence." Seizing upon this widespread public opinion polls since the mid-1960s have shown that voters have little confidence in government to solve problems and believe that government programs are not well run, that they are inefficient and wasteful. The breadth and depth of public dissatisfaction with government is seen in Proposition 13-type efforts from coast to coast and the subsequent spending and tax-cutting fever which has overcome Congress. Both popular and academic literature have reflected this public disenchantment by repeatedly criticizing the civil service system for its contributions to the "crisis in confidence." Seizing upon this widespread public


3 For specific criticisms of the civil service system, see Nicholas Lemann, "Seats at the Banquet," The New Republic 177, No. 18 (October 29, 1977): 16-20; "What's Wrong With the Civil Service?", Washington Monthly 9 (April 1977):
agitation, Carter interpreted his election as a mandate to do "something" about the bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, the public's preference as indicated in the polls was "for more restrictive rather than more permissive treatment of government employees."\(^1\)

Once in office, Carter's concern for getting control of the bureaucracy went beyond the level of a campaign theme. The difficulties of persuading a large, professionally oriented bureaucracy with loyalties to Congressional, state, and local clients to respond to the policy directions of a new President became real. One of the first steps for Carter was to call for the implementation of zero-base budgeting throughout the executive branch, ostensibly to require the agencies to justify budget requests in terms of their individual missions. When Congress allowed the National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life to expire in 1978, Carter established a National Productivity Council to replace it.\(^2\) The Council, charged with coordinating federal productivity improvement activities, was an attempt to indicate the Administration's seriousness about

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\(^1\)Davidson, "The Politics of Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Compensation," p. 66.

improving management of government resources. The Administration also established a Regulatory Council, designed to review government regulations with an eye toward making them cost-effective. In addition, a series of government reorganization plans were set forth. But the centerpiece of the Carter administrative reform efforts was the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.

Sorting out the Administration's real intentions behind the vigorous pursuit of civil service reform is no easy chore. They are a mixed bag; in one sense the purpose was purely partisan politics; reform was merely cosmetic. By 1978 the Carter Administration was in desperate need of a legislative victory, having been rebuffed repeatedly by an alien, though Democratic, Congress. In the "nonpartisan" issue of civil service reform, Carter saw the potential for legislative success. From another vantage point, civil service reform and the SES particularly would provide a mechanism to shake-up the subsystem and make the bureaucracy more responsive to future presidential initiatives. Moreover, relationships between career bureaucrats and political appointees have grown more distant and less incestuous, a product of the high turnover of political officials and the growing tendency to get to Washington by running against it. The Carter Administration did nothing to mitigate these phenomena and came into office with a high degree of mutual
distrust and even hostility\(^1\) marking the relationship between bureaucrat and politician. It would be difficult not to conclude that reform was intended to control the army of "mutinous" bureaucrats. At the same time, given Carter's background as engineer and reputation as manager, one cannot overlook the good-faith but naive intent to create an administrative process more on the model of the private sector as a remedy for what was widely perceived as low government productivity.

Indeed, Carter's stated purposes in pushing civil service reform legislation were to increase governmental efficiency, defined as increasing productivity with less inputs while, simultaneously, increasing the protection of employees against political abuse.\(^2\) From the Administration's perspective the merit system was saddled with three major problems: abuse of merit principles, disincentives to

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\(^1\)The story is told by James Sundquist of a top career person in a large bureau entering the office of the bureau chief—a political appointee—and being greeted with: "I hate it every time I see you walk through that door, because you represent everything I despise most—the bureaucracy." Sundquist also quotes an assistant secretary as saying, "I expected on coming to Washington that I would be working intimately with a career staff. But it's surprising, it hasn't been that way. I meet only with other political appointees. We talk to each other." From "Jimmy Carter As Public Administrator: An Appraisal at Mid-Term," Public Administration Review 39 (January/February 1979):8.

effective management, and lack of opportunities for women and minorities. The third problem was attributed largely to restrictive veteran preference rules while the first problem was the product of a Civil Service Commission charged with the contradictory roles of advising presidents and protecting the merit system. The emphasis was placed by the Carter Administration on what Civil Service Commission Chairman Campbell termed the "semi-paralysis in administration" referring to the inordinate length of time it takes managers to fill vacant positions, resolve discrimination complaints, fire employees, and settle adverse action appeals. The culprit was identified as the tangle of rules, regulations, and procedures that "impede the ability of top political appointees to select, motivate and manage their staffs," while also failing to prevent merit abuses. Thus the Carter reforms were an attempt to re-open the back door of the civil service. Perhaps most importantly to the Administration, outstanding performance was neither encouraged nor expected by a system in which pay increases were automatic and performance appraisals pro forma. Using broad public dissatisfaction with government as leverage, Carter presented


Congress in March 1978 a complex reform package that included the provision for a Senior Executive Service. The SES was seen as the key to the Administration's managerial crusade.

Providing additional fuel for a major reform effort were senior career staff and line administrators. Like political appointees, many of these executives also found their work lives governed by an overly centralized system bound by self-defeating rules.\(^1\) Many career officials with managerial responsibilities agreed that the system weakened their ability to do their work by making it impossible to hold employees accountable and to reward outstanding executives or to penalize poor performance. Career and political executives alike agreed that Congressionally imposed pay caps and pay compression in the top levels from GS-16 to GS-18 to Executive Level I provided little material incentive to excel. Civil Service Commission executives were bothered not only with the system's deficient management practices and executive training and development programs, but they also had a long-time concern for the growth in appointments of political appointees to top positions that tended to put a cap on career advancement. In addition, the Commission hoped to bring order to the multiplicity of hiring authorities in the supergrades and more control over the total

numbers in the executive cadre.¹

Career officials in the Civil Service Commission had been working since the Nixon years on proposals to create a corps of professional, government-wide managers in the federal service. When Carter's policy staff made inquiries shortly after the election, C.S.C. personnel were ready with an SES-type proposal. As one participant in the reform process related, the SES Task Force that was charged with developing a proposal had little to do since a well-developed plan designed to meet the needs of career executives already existed.² Another top civil servant noted regarding the Carter reform that "the whole damn thing was conceived by civil servants. . . . The proposals were developed by people in the trenches like me and people who work for me who are career civil servants. They're the ones who have seen what is wrong with the system and proposed what should be done to fix it."³ According to this view, career bureaucrats "are not necessarily dedicated to maintenance of the status quo, but often review programs and procedures to improve their


effectiveness" and seek support of political leadership to carry out their proposals.¹

From the perspective of the professional personnel officials the primary purpose of the SES approach was to "mandate management." Important but secondary goals were to provide for more systematic executive development and managerial training and to bring more women and minority group members into senior positions. Thus, as in earlier reforms, the basic administrative framework was provided by the bureaucracy itself. But it is important to note that the initiative for reform was political, in that a decision was made by the politicians to undertake reform "prior to a detailed analysis and diagnosis of the problems."²

In broad brush strokes, the Senior Executive Service³ created a corps of top government-wide managers, composed of positions formerly in the General Schedule 16-18 and Executive Levels IV and V. It promised a compensation system "designed to attract and retain highly competent senior executives"; and to "recognize exceptional accomplishment";

¹Sally H. Greenberg, "The Senior Executive Service," The Bureaucrat 7, No. 3 (Fall 1978):16.


a performance appraisal system designed to ensure that pay, retention, and tenure are based on successful individual and organizational performance and that executives are held "accountable and responsible" for the performance of employees under them; flexibility to political managers "to reassign senior executives to best accomplish the agency's mission"; and protection to career executives from "arbitrary actions" and "prohibited personnel practices." It promised, in short, all things to all people.

Within the SES compensation includes base pay, performance awards, and Presidential rank awards. Six SES pay levels, ES-1 to ES-6, range from $54,755 to $58,500 per year as of January 1, 1981. However, from 1979 until January 1981, executive pay had been frozen by Congress at $50,112.50 although the rate of executive pay established by the President as of October 1980 ranged from $52,247 for ES-1 to $61,600 for ES-6. Career SES members (non-career SESers are specifically excluded) are eligible for a lump sum performance award of up to twenty percent of their pay. Under the 1978 legislation the number of awards presented were not to exceed fifty percent of the SES positions in the agency. Up to five percent and one percent of the SES members are eligible for Presidential rank awards of Meritorious Executive and Distinguished Executive respectively. Recipients of the former award received a lump sum payment of $10,000 while recipients of the latter award receive $20,000. In no
case may SES members receive more in salary than that authorized for Executive Schedule Level I, that is, Cabinet members. As further incentive SES members are allowed to accumulate annual leave without limit and upon retirement substitute cash, and they are eligible for sabbatical leaves of eleven months no more than once every ten years. The details of compensation have been described here for two reasons: 1) it will be argued that the Carter Administration assumed that an economic model of behavior was appropriate to apply to public administration and 2) it will be argued that the emphasis on economic incentive has contributed to severe problems in the SES implementation.

Closely tied to compensation is the performance appraisal system. The heart of SES is the attempt to link pay, promotion, and awards to performance. To be eligible for an award the executive must receive a "fully successful" rating. Any SES member receiving an "unsatisfactory" evaluation must be reassigned or transferred. If a senior executive receives two "unsatisfactory" ratings in any five year period or two less than fully satisfactory ratings, for example, "minimally satisfactory," in any three year period, removal from the SES is mandatory. When removed because of performance, the SES member has no right of appeal, but must be placed at a GS-15 level or above. The Act specifies that performance appraisal is to be based on both individual and organizational performance and is to include such factors as
improvements in efficiency, productivity, and quality of work, including reduction in paperwork; cost efficiency; timeliness of performance; and meeting affirmative action goals.

The SES provisions attempt to encourage mobility but, unlike the Hoover Commission proposal, do so in a way which recognizes the realities of specialization and the benefits of continuity. Career executives may be reassigned to any position within the agency for which they are qualified, but may not be involuntarily transferred to another agency. Thus, executives may exercise their preference to remain in their specialist fields when they move to another agency. Yet, because the SES is based on the notion of rank-in-the-person, in theory mobility is facilitated. Executives may be appointed to positions as high as Cabinet rank without losing their SES status. As Chester Newland notes, "SES stops short of creating a government-wide generalist executive corps, but it provides a framework within which professionals with that sort of public service orientation may have somewhat greater opportunities to create such a corps through their own efforts."¹

The SES is protected from politicization in a number of ways. Appraisal of performance is precluded within 120

days of the appointment of the head of the agency or the appointment of the career executive's immediate supervisor who is a noncareer appointee. While removal from the SES for unsatisfactory performance is not appealable, a member is entitled to an informal hearing before an official of the Merit Systems Protection Board (M.S.P.B.). If a career official believes removal is occasioned by the political executive's partisan preferences or is charged with misconduct, the right of appeal to the M.S.P.B. exists. In addition, the Act provides that the total number of noncareer appointments in SES positions may not exceed ten percent of all SES positions and the total number of limited term appointees may not exceed five percent. Therefore, at least 85 percent of SES positions must be filled by career executives. Furthermore, under the Act, the Office of Personnel Management is authorized to designate certain "sensitive" positions as career reserved positions. The latter provisions have moved beyond the attempt of the Hoover Commission to establish a sharp politics-administration dichotomy. The SES structure allows for a flexible intermingling of career and noncareer appointments.

The above summary reflects the final shape of the reform legislation. However, as regards the SES there was surprisingly little amending of the original recommendations of the Civil Service Commission's career staff by the President or Congress. Perhaps the most significant changes made
by the Administration were to reduce the percent eligible for performance awards from the recommended 75% to 50%, to add the Presidential rank awards, and exclude noncareer appointees from eligibility for all awards.\(^1\) Thus again it is notable that the career personnel administrators had a central role in shaping the SES. Changes made in the Congressional process will be noted in the next section.

**The Politics of Reform:**

*Legislative Success*

If not apparent in the early stages of reform, there was no disguising the political nature of the Carter reforms when they were placed on the Congressional agenda. Clothing civil service reform in a management costume makes it no less political. Carter had prepared for his legislative initiative well. In mid-1977 a Federal Personnel Management Project, composed of nine task forces and close to 150 people, was organized to begin the process of garnering the support of the executive branch and Congress.\(^2\) Key roles were played by Alan I. Campbell and Jule M. Sugarman as chairman and vice-chairman of the C.S.C. in developing the support of career employees, Congress and interest groups.

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\(^1\)Sally Greenberg discusses differences between the Carter legislation and the Task Force proposals in "The Senior Executive Service."

Heading the Project was Dwight Ink, a respected federal career executive, and the Task Forces were composed largely of career executives. The Task Force on SES, for example, was composed of three career civil servants. Thus unlike the Hoover Commission Task Force approach, the Carter project attempted to get initial support from the executives themselves.

In addition, the Task Forces served as springboards to generate support among the attentive public. Hearings were held in large cities throughout the country and comments were solicited from close to 1500 individuals and groups in and out of government. To further generate executive support a working group of Assistant Secretaries for Administration from each of the major departments and agencies was established to review Administration proposals. Finally, a legislative task group was established to develop Congressional contacts. Members of the relevant House and Senate committees were briefed and committee staff were invited to participate in the Task Force studies.

President Carter was himself heavily and directly involved in the effort to generate support. Campbell notes that Carter devoted "parts of several Cabinet meetings to the issue and there was active Cabinet discussion." Cabinet members were asked to contact congressional people with whom

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they dealt. Also Carter met personally with congressional committee staff members, both Democratic and Republican members of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, and leaders of the American Federation of Government Employees. ¹

Chairman Campbell was the key Administration spokesman meeting with editorial boards of newspapers, public interest groups, groups of career executives, union leaders, business organizations, civic groups, civil rights organizations, and professional associations. "I met," Campbell says, "with editorial boards of literally dozens of major newspapers across the country. Out of that came overwhelming editorial support from newspapers like The New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Chicago Sun Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times. More than 200 editorials were written in favor of civil service reform. There's no question that helped us, and it helped us because we had some difficulty arousing substantial interest on the Hill in the legislation." ² His work paid off as support for the reforms was received from a wide variety of groups: Business Roundtable and Common Cause, Ralph Nader and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Civil Service Reform League and the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE). But although support


²"Campbell Reflects on Reform Process," p. 3.
was broad, it was not intense; therefore, securing support from the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee was crucial.

As in earlier periods of history, the issue of civil service reform had little salience for Congress. Campbell and the Personnel Project members had to generate interest. On the one hand, civil service reform became for many members of Congress a safe, good government issue. Furthermore, the 95th Congress reflected to a great extent the dissatisfaction with government that existed in the country. Congressional support for public expenditures and for public employees and their unions was down. At the same time, however, there were pockets of potential intense opposition among Congressmen with large civil servant, veteran, and union constituencies, particularly on the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee.

Opposition to the reform legislation by veterans' organizations was fierce. They saw the Administration's attempts to remove veteran's preference in hiring, promotion, and reductions-in-force as "a litmus test of whether they could continue to enjoy strong congressional support."¹ In the end veteran's preference was largely untouched, except significantly in the SES where veteran's preference was eliminated. Equally opposed to the Carter legislation were

public employee labor unions. Only the AFGE leadership supported the bill in return for inclusion of a Title VII which established public sector collective bargaining rights under law. Yet even after securing this modification the AFGE President, Kenneth Blaylock, nearly lost his job due to rank and file opposition to his support of the Carter reforms.¹ Even with the Administration compromise the National Federation of Federal Employees (NFGE), the National Association of Government Employees (NAGE), and the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) remained strongly against the bill, hoping to secure greater concessions for labor. However, support of reform by the AFGE, the largest public sector union, helped to diffuse union opposition.²

The senior executives' skepticism toward the SES was based on the belief that it would open both the front and back doors of the service. In the reassignment feature of the SES many executives saw the possibilities of department heads replacing career officials "with political or other career appointees more to their individual liking."³ At the


same time, top executives were doubtful that a ten percent limit on noncareer appointees would prevent a determined Administration from politicizing far more than ten percent. After all, any system can be manipulated. Some observers, Sundquist for example, hold that even the ten percent limit on noncareer appointments is too high and that a much sharper distinction between career and noncareer must be established to create a competent managerial service.¹

In addition, career civil servants were skeptical that objective performance evaluation was possible, believing that personal favoritism and political bias can never be entirely eliminated. A particular concern of some was that an unqualified political appointee would be making work appraisals which had important career significance. "There is no way," one senior official claimed, "for a political appointee to distinguish between good performance and servile performance of a subordinate."² Many executives agreed with one bureaucrat's view that the SES "is an obvious attempt to politicize the civil service system. Nothing more and nothing less."³ With the removal of rights of appeal to an independent body for separation, reassignment, and reduction


³Ibid., p. 105.
in pay, many executives spoke of a "return to the spoils system."¹ The consequences of politicization, many critics warned, would be a civil service in which technical knowledge and expertise suffered and "yes men" were substituted for "constructively critical and politically neutral professionals."²

The House and Senate debate reflected a variety of political concerns. There were those like Senator Percy who blamed the bureaucracy for the declining reputation of Congress, and others who used it as an all-purpose receptacle for complaints. It is not credible, Percy pointed out, that 95% of the civil servants get satisfactory ratings and 98% get periodic pay increases when bureaucracy is frequently "unresponsive, insensitive, and lackadaisical." It is this kind of bureaucracy that "creates the huge amount of mail, the huge number of phone calls, and the great number of visitors we have."³

Other members appeared to be concerned that the reformed civil service would give the President too much power. Republican Representative Ashbrook argued that Carter and the Democrats were trying to manipulate the civil service, citing what he believed were Carter abuses in

¹Ibid.

²Rosen, "Merit and the President's Plan . . .", p. 302.

personnel actions and intense Administration lobbying for the bill. Republican Benjamin Gilman reminded his House colleagues that the Carter reforms were "remarkably similar to the infamous 'Malek Manual' and noted that Alan May, its author, had not only congratulated Carter on his reforms but had received inquiries from members of the Carter Administration regarding ideas in the manual." Like partisan Congressional debates in earlier reform periods, members supported or resisted increased Presidential control of administration depending on whose ox was being gored.

But others, both Democrats and Republicans alike, argued in support of the bill that every President should have the right to manage the federal government. In replying to Ashbrook, Udall recited the problem of securing a responsive bureaucracy. "When the Nixon people came in, they wanted to make some changes and they found all these Johnson-Kennedy people, who were held over, were holding the reign of power, and they could not get rid of them. Eight years later I am screaming and yelling that the Nixon holdovers are there when Jimmy Carter gets to town. 'President' Philip Crane in January 1981 . . . will get from this bill


the kind of tools you would want him to have to shake up the bureaucracy and make the Government work."¹ Republican Representative Derwinski, the minority floor manager of the bill, agreed that Presidents are prevented "from effectively managing the entities over which they presumably preside." Reminding his colleagues that the "proposition 13 mentality includes frustration over the inability of the average citizen to get proper service from Government," Derwinski argued that this frustration is felt because the civil service bureaucracy often does not respond to the public interest or the directives of a President. "What we are trying to do in this bill," he concludes, "is to give the President the legitimate authority a Chief Executive should have."² In a Congress that was quite aware of the public anger directed toward federal government and in a setting where memories are short, an argument calling for increased Presidential control over bureaucracy was persuasive.

At the same time, there was concern in Congress for the potential contained in the Carter bill, and particularly in the SES provision, for politicizing the civil service. Especially vocal on this issue were Senators and Representatives from districts containing large numbers of federal bureaucrats. Echoing the bureaucrats' fears Senator Mathias

¹Ibid., p. H 8456.

from Maryland claimed that "it would be relatively easy to politicize far more than 10% of these [SES] positions in this service, particularly so because career executives could be reassigned and demoted without cause."¹ Noting that the Nixon White House used attrition in career ranks to place partisan appointments in the civil service, Mathias warned that the SES gives Presidential appointees power to create attrition.² In the end, most Congressmen appeared to be persuaded that there were sufficient protections in the SES to prevent political abuse.

The final issue raised in Congress by the Carter reforms also relates to the issue of the political power of Congress vis-a-vis the President. Congressional actions with regard to supergrade manpower needs have historically been based on the desire to maintain the influence of congressional committees over the executive agency.³ As a result, authorizations for supergrade positions have been ad hoc and chronically slow, a situation that C.S.C. professionals hoped to remedy with the reform legislation. In the debate over the SES the struggle for influence was manifested by attempts of Congressmen to exempt "their agencies" from


²Ibid., p. 14294.

SES requirements. The debate record shows a string of amendments aimed at exempting favorite agencies, all of which were defeated except for amendments exempting the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Congressmen had support from many career executives in these attempts to exempt agencies from SES provisions. Like Congressional committee members and staffs, executives are oriented primarily to specific programs and organizations rather than a government-wide perspective. Though many executives are expert managers, "nearly all [are] confined to narrow specializations in specific organizations."1 Consequently, the SES was seen as an attack on their program orientations and their professionalism.

For political reasons Congress was quite serious about linking performance and rank awards to performance. In order to justify such "extravagance" to their constituency such a linkage had to be made. As future events would prove, Congress did not provide for the award system without an expectation of future legislative or administrative limitations.2

Perhaps the most striking observation about the Congressional debate was its brevity. There was comparatively

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2 Andrew A. Feinstein, speech before the Mid-Atlantic Regional Management Conference, Virginia Beach, Virginia, October 21, 1980, p. 4.
little discussion about the SES and few questions were asked regarding the likely effects of the SES pay and appraisal systems on motivation, morale, or actual performance. No analyses were requested or prepared to test the assumptions implicit in the SES bonus and performance appraisal systems. Indeed, there was no effort to assess the real level of government productivity or to develop alternative approaches for rewarding and motivating public employees. Debate was short because Congress is only rarely capable of a sustained interest in an issue and civil service reform is never high on the Congressional agenda for very long. Members attempted to derive as much political mileage as possible from the reform debate and then moved on to the next crisis. The Carter Administration was thankful for this rapid movement for all along it had feared that delay would be the tactic used to defeat its legislation. To move the legislation through the House committee and floor debate Carter astutely called on Morris Udall, vice-chairman of the Civil Service Committee. All observers agree\(^1\) that Udall's legislative skill and respected reputation were crucial for passage of the bill.

That the Carter Administration in 1978 successfully established a corps of senior government executives where other Administrations had failed is due to a variety of

factors. At first glance the reason Carter succeeded legislatively is quite simple: it was the first time that such a proposal had been made by a Democratic President to a Democratic Congress. But given the failure of most other Carter legislative initiatives, it is clear that other factors contributed to success. From the early planning stages to final passage, reform was supported by intense and sustained presidential interest. Carter needed a victory and had staked much political capital on his ability to reform and manage the bureaucracy. Carter was able to begin his tenure by appointing three new commissioners to the C.S.C. "with no need to defend the past."\(^1\) In Campbell and Sugarman, Carter found energetic and effective spokesmen who were quick to learn the ways of Congress. Campbell successfully captured broad, if not deep, public support. Concomitantly, the SES provisions were almost totally the product of C.S.C. planners, and it was widely agreed among line managers and top career officials throughout the civil service that changes were needed.

Fortuitously, the political climate for reform was ideal. Public pressure to "make government work" was irresistible. Carter and his legislative managers effectively used the Proposition 13 mentality to justify the creation of the SES. When the legislation was presented to

\(^1\) Jule Sugarman, "What the Administration Wanted," The Bureaucrat 7, No. 2 (Summer 1978): 8.
Congress, the Administration lobbyists and Congressional supporters kept the pressure on for a quick passage of the Act, not allowing extraneous issues to divert the reform effort. Because the legislation was considered in the 2nd session, when Congress was pressed for time, debate and polarization was forestalled. Moreover, with the vote on reform taken shortly before the November elections, a safe, good government position to present to constituents was given to Congressmen. At the same time, Congressional attitudes had become less sympathetic to the alarms raised by public employees and more in tune to the notion of squeezing more out of less. As Sugarman points out, civil service reform in 1978 was "a coming together of a great many forces which had previously operated in ignorance of one another. Suddenly a moment seems to arise when all these forces are united and the momentum exists for real change." Whether or not the legislative success of the Carter Administration was responsible for real, positive change remains to be assessed.

The Politics of Implementation: Reaction and Change

In the American governmental system, often there is a wide disparity between promising certain public policies and achieving legislative success. There is even a wider gap

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between the promise and the achievement of intended consequences. That this feature characterizes the American system is due to the uncertainties inherent in making public policy and to the continued play of interest groups and political forces in the implementation of policy. Attempts to implement the Senior Executive Service in the federal civil service illustrate the politics of policy implementation and suggest the tenuous relationship between promise and actual performance.¹

When the SES became effective on July 13, 1979, 98.5% of the approximately 7,000 eligible people "voluntarily" entered the new service. Many, perhaps most, did so believing that the SES was the only alternative for career advancement. Less than a year after the adoption of the SES Lynn and Vaden concluded from their study of senior executives' attitudes that "there does not appear to be a great mandate of support for the Carter proposals."² Clearly, for many top bureaucrats the SES was "the only ballgame in town."


Morale of senior executives in the summer of 1979 was already at a low level due to Carter's "bash the bureaucrat" campaign in support of the reform legislation. With the implementation of the SES, a high degree of uncertainty was added to the lives of the bureaucrats by a new performance appraisal system and the approaching 1980 Presidential election. 1 Indeed, General Accounting Office, 2 Merit System Protection Board, 3 and Federal Executive Institute Alumni Association 4 surveys of senior executives' attitudes toward the SES reveal a serious discontent, if not hostility, in the top ranks. The FEIAA survey of April 1981, for example, found that 24% of its respondents felt that the SES should be discontinued!

The surveys indicate particular sensitive areas. Eighty percent of the MSPB respondents felt that the SES offered insufficient incentives to retain competent

1 Bruce Buchanan, "The Senior Executive Service: How We Can Tell If It Works," Public Administration Review 41, No. 3 (May/June 1981):352.


employees, clearly a response to the Congressionally imposed pay cap and reduction of performance awards. At the same time, many respondents appeared to feel insulted by the bonus system. Twenty-four percent in the FEIAA survey wanted to discontinue the bonus system altogether, while in the GAO survey 40% replied that bonus and rank awards would not improve performance, 30% indicated that it was unlikely that the opportunity for salary increases will increase motivation, and 44% said that the possibility of a salary decrease was unlikely to motivate. Such figures seem to confirm the observation that "a unique characteristic of many in government is that financial reward is not their chief inducement to good performance. A major proportion of government executives has chosen public service for the personal reward found in serving the national purpose. . . . Such individuals will not be inspired to better performance by the remote promise of an annual financial award or bonus." 1 At the same time, it is clear that deep dissatisfaction with regard to compensation exists among SES members.

Performance appraisal is also the source of intense concern among top career officials. Among GAO respondents 41% indicated that performance appraisals were having a negative effect on SES morale and 37% agreed that appraisals would not improve performance. Although it appears that

1 Warren Lasko, "Executive Accountability: Will SES Make a Difference?," The Bureaucrat 9, No. 3 (Fall 1980):6.
most executives support the concept of performance evaluation, specific criticisms are apparent. In the GAO survey, 52% of the bureaucrats believed having a personal relationship with an influential person would influence ratings; 37% believed agreeing with the philosophical beliefs of the current Administration would bias performance ratings, and 69% agreed that one's ability to negotiate with supervisors would influence ratings. A third of the executives in the M.S.P.B. study believed bonuses did not go to the best performers but to management favorites and 50% felt that bonuses go disproportionately to executives at the top of the agency.¹ In general, then, senior executives do not see a linkage between performance evaluations and pay, awards, or other personnel actions. Taking the SES as a whole, federal executives saw little evidence that the promised management efficiency and effectiveness was to be a consequence of its implementation. Thirty-six percent of the FEIAA respondents, for example, believed that the SES had had no effect and 52% believed that it had hindered

¹Recent OPM statistics confirm this tendency to skew bonuses to those executives in the higher ranks of the SES. In 1980 out of the 1,614 individuals receiving performance or presidential rank awards, more than 1,400 were in the top three grades. See Philip Shandler, "The Federal Column, 'Cap' on Pay Skews Bonuses, GAO Reports," The Washington Star, August 3, 1981, p. 4.
management efficiency. ¹ With skepticism and discontent so widespread among executives, reports announcing the early death of the SES would not be surprising. ²

A crucial test for the future of the SES is the transition from the Carter to the Reagan Administration. The law does not allow performance appraisals or involuntary reassignments within 120 days after the beginning of a new Administration or appointment of a new agency head. Many observers were anxious to learn whether or not the Reagan Administration would encourage "voluntary" moves of career executives within the 120 day period or engage in wholesale


reassignments at the end of that period. Most close observers agree that they have encountered no evidence of abuse as of mid-1981. In testimony to the subcommittee on Civil Service in April 1981, Ersa Poston of the Merit System Protection Board claimed that there was "no specific evidence that SES members have been pressured to vacate their positions through resignation, retirement, or reassignment" during the 120 day period nor was there evidence that the moratorium on performance appraisal was being violated.¹ O.P.M. Director Don Devine testified that between Inauguration Day and the fourth week of March only 71 out of 6,800 career SES members had been reassigned and that he had no information that these moves were involuntary.² On the other hand, Congressional Democrats have claimed that some abuses have occurred, citing an inordinate amount of movement at the Departments of Energy and Agriculture and the OPM.³ In defense of these personnel changes, some participants insist that they are the result of minor reorganizations and the necessary replacing of retirees. In general, and surprisingly to many observers, it does appear that the Reagan Administration has not abused the intent of the 120 day waiting period. One suspects that there are two likely explanations. First, in most SES positions expertise is the

²Ibid., p. 3.
³Noted by several interviewees.
name of the game, a commodity which is in short supply. Second, it is likely that the new Administration has found most SES members willing to follow the political leadership when it is provided.

The reactions of senior civil servants have been closely tied to the reactions of Congress to the first round of bonus awards. In the summer of 1980 the first three agencies to give bonuses—NASA, SBA, and MSPB—awarded them to the maximum allowable under law (50% of SES positions). Congress reacted angrily and swiftly. In June 1980, the proportion of SES positions eligible for performance awards was reduced from 50% to 25%. To indicate good faith and protect the bonus system from complete destruction, OPM Director Campbell instructed agencies to limit bonus awards to 20% of those eligible. At the same time, Congress, whose

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2One interviewee noted that a well-placed Congressional staffer in commenting to a reporter regarding the bonuses exclaimed that he would be damned if a bureaucrat made more than he and vigorously sought to damage the bonus system. Perhaps the story is only rumor; it is nonetheless true that Congress was upset not only with the number of bonuses, but also with what appeared to be some misuse. MSPB did not establish performance objectives until well through the appraisal period and in all three agencies members of their Performance Review Boards (those responsible for evaluating appraisals) themselves received bonuses. Washington, D.C., August 1981.
pay is linked to executive salaries, continued to impose a cap on pay.

With the cap in place, pay for Congressmen and Executives increased only 5½% between March 1977 and May 1981 while the cost of living increased by over 47%. Further, it was "estimated that more than 30,000 federal officials in a half dozen levels of responsibility--some of whom otherwise would be paid as much as $61,600--[were] getting the same $50,112." Undoubtedly, many executives entered the SES believing that the bonus awards would alleviate this situation and some few Congressmen supported the award system as a way around the pay cap. When Congress reduced the amount of bonuses available the reaction was predictable.

Morale, which was already low, dipped even lower. Officials were bitter, believing that they had been lured into the SES on false promises and then betrayed, that Congress had reneged on a promise. Almost immediately a Senior Executive Association (SEA) was formed to represent the interests of SES members. Its first act was to file suit in October 1980 in U.S. District Court to overturn Congressional action with regard to the bonuses, an action still pending. The SEA has grown to 800 members, a small percentage, but even its existence is significant.

1Senior Executives Association, "Pay Fact Sheet," May 1, 1981.

2Shandler, "The Federal Column."
That morale is suffering is also indicated by the exodus of senior executives from government. "The retirement rate for Federal Executives [GS-15 to SES Level IV] in the 55-59 year old age group who are at the pay cap was 15.5% in March 1978; 28.9% in March 1979; 74.6% in March 1980 and 94.7% in August 1980."1 As of mid-1981, the retirement rate for SES members only, ages 55 to 59, was 46.1%; for SES members of all ages the retirement rate was 38%.2 Such a loss of expertise and experience will certainly have an adverse effect on governmental performance, perhaps making the establishment of the SES a strange irony.

The reduction in performance awards will likely make it much more difficult to attract qualified executives into the SES. In a system which emphasizes pay as a motivator, why should a GS-15 accept more responsibility in the SES when the chances of a bonus are almost nil. In fact, the M.S.P.B. found that "only about 3 in 10, GS-13 to GS-15, employees say they are likely to join the SES if a job they would like were offered to them."3 Furthermore, with many executives already skeptical of the fairness of the bonus awards, a reduction in the number available has created

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2From Donald J. Devine's statement before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, September 14, 1981. His statement includes supporting tables.

greater doubt that bonuses can be awarded fairly to the large number of deserving executives.1 Finally, the reduction of bonuses confirmed to some executives that Congress had a totally distorted view of SES productivity. Congress' action on that part of the SES which is considered the most innovative and its core, leads many to believe that the SES is destined to be merely a "paper project."2

For Congress, the issue of bonuses and pay was seen in light of two political realities: the widespread mood of budget cutting and the widespread perception that government productivity is low and bureaucrats are unaccountable. In order to justify to constituents spending millions of dollars for bonuses to well-paid bureaucrats, Congress had to link bonuses clearly to improved performance. When the bonus awards turned out to be greater than expected or, more precisely, when through press reports the public perceived that bureaucrats were exploiting them again, and when Congress became concerned that bonuses were not linked to performance,3 the bonus system was put in jeopardy.

1Lasko, "Executive Accountability: Will SES Make a Difference?,” p. 5.

2Interview with participant, Washington, D.C., August 1981.

3In a letter to Representative Jamie Whitten, Representa- tive Patricia Schroeder, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Civil Service notes that "the press has reported that bonuses are going to loyal friends of agency management, to retiring employees as going away gifts, and to exceptionally large numbers of top agency management." Senior Executive Service, Hearings, 1981, p. 161.
Constituency pressure also made raising the pay cap politically difficult. However, by the end of 1981 the crisis of low morale and early retirements in the SES had created such pressure for lifting the pay cap that Congress acquiesced. In mid-December 1981 Congress raised the cap from $50,112.50 to $58,500.\(^1\) Congress, however, did not break the traditional link between executive and congressional pay. Andrew Feinstein, Staff Director of the House Subcommittee on Civil Service, argues that "this linkage exists for two reasons. First, pressure to increase executive pay creates pressure to increase congressional pay. Second, most members of Congress do not think a career civil servant . . . should make more money than elected representatives."\(^2\) If the performance awards are used to get around the pay cap the pressure for pay increases is reduced. "It is not in the interest of Congress to reduce this pressure to raise the cap, and therefore, it is not in their interest to allow a great number of bonuses to be awarded."\(^3\) The

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\(^1\)See Federal Times, January 4, 1982 and Public Administration Times, December 15, 1981. The story behind the pay increase is a case study by itself. It appears, however, that support from the Reagan Administration, particularly OPM, and intense pressure from the Senior Executive Association and Washington D.C. area legislators were the primary forces for change. The fact that Congress recently had voted itself a generous income tax deduction, undoubtedly, softened resistance.

\(^2\)Andrew A. Feinstein, Speech before the Mid-Atlantic Regional Management Conference, Virginia Beach, Virginia, October 21, 1980, p. 4.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 5.
Congressional response to the SES bonus system and pay linkage suggests that any effort to create and motivate a professional corps of executives based on pay, will be extremely difficult. When promises of increased monetary rewards are made, when a system is predicated on economic incentives, it is not unrealistic to expect executives to want these rewards. It is a game in which, under current political conditions, the cards are stacked against executives.

What effect raising the pay cap will have on executive attitudes and performance remains to be seen. Given the already tenuous position of the bonus system, the pay raise may place the bonus system in deeper political trouble. Strong support from the Reagan Administration may keep the system at its present level but to expect an increase in the available awards is fantasy. Breaking the linkage between congressional and executive pay is almost certainly out of the question, although House Speaker Tip O'Neill has indicated he is in favor of delinkage.¹

Another area where change is possible is the 120-day moratorium on performance appraisal and involuntary within-agency reassignments. Although denying that the 120-day period was overly burdensome, OPM Director Divine in testimony to a House Committee raised the question whether the

120-day period might not be too restrictive. Because the 120-day period begins not necessarily on Inauguration Day but when the department head or non-career supervisor is appointed, the 120-day period may be pushed back well into an Administration's tenure. Such a restriction late in an Administration may create a heightened frustration over the inability to change top bureaucrats. The Democratic House, on the other hand, "feels strongly about the 120 days." Any attempt to change the 120-day protection for civil servants would, under the current conditions of a Republican President and Democratic House, precipitate a highly partisan debate.

Reflecting on Doctrine, Assumptions, and Values

In selling the SES to Congress, senior executives, and the public, the Carter Administration stressed the need for better "management." From the Administration's perspective, efficient and effective management had two faces. It would give political managers the tools to secure and reward greater responsiveness and productivity, defined in terms of Administration goals, while, at the same time, giving the individual bureaucrat a greater incentive to strive for professional competence. Better management, to the Carter

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1Senior Executive Service, Hearings, 1981, p. 3.
2Patricia Schroeder's comment to Devine during SES hearings, Ibid., p. 7.
Administration, was the answer for the problem of continuity and change. It is true that the SES does recognize to a greater extent than previous reform attempts the specialist and organizational attachments of senior executives. The SES does not attempt to create a generalist corps, but tries to encourage professional competence while giving political executives more flexibility to move personnel. Furthermore, the SES does provide career civil servants a number of protections against politically motivated action.

And yet, taken as a whole, the emphasis of the SES has been on making the bureaucracy responsive to political leadership rather than on developing a valuable resource to achieve broad public ends. The SES does nothing to reduce the numbers or layers of political appointees at the top of the bureaucracy. Consequently, the most responsible positions remain closed to career officials. It removes from career executives the right to appeal decisions that reassign them to less responsible work, reduce their pay, and separate them from the SES. It institutes a bonus system which may foster sycophancy rather than independent judgment and disciplined skepticism. It does little to prevent those executives who have served one Administration at senior levels from being shoved aside by the next, further discouraging initiative and attenuating institutional memory. At

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best, the SES provides only the skeletal structure on which a professionally competent, politically neutral senior corps committed to the broad public interest may be built. Political acceptance of such a notion remains a major obstacle.

Part of the Carter Administration promise was made to women and minority groups, pledging to increase their proportions in the higher levels of the civil service. Veteran preference was identified as the major obstacle to achieving greater representativeness, and proposals were made to change it in significant ways. Veterans' groups and their congres-
sional supporters won a major victory when veteran preference was eliminated only in the SES. At the feeder levels, GS-13 to 15, there was no change in preference rules. And yet, even without Congressional timidity on this issue, the Carter Administration appears not to have taken its own promises seriously, by rejecting key affirmative action recommenda-
tions of the Personnel Management Project. Undoubtedly, the Administration decided that affirmative action was too controversial an issue and opposition to changes in veteran preference too intense to risk defeat of their bill. Thus representative administration in terms of women and minority group members was not a concern, making administration more representative of a managerial outlook was.

In the Carter Administration the emphasis on "management" translated into an emphasis on political control of administration. Thus, Hugh Heclo's comment regarding the Nixon Administration's concentration on management still holds true; "however apolitical the management concept might seem in theory, operating in the government context of Washington it could be nothing but political."¹ Any approach to securing responsible administration will be political due to the issues of power that are raised by the problems of continuity and change.

If Carter's emphasis on management was not new, his application of particular motivation theories to public administration was. Both Carter's 1978 State of the Union address and his message to Congress transmitting the Civil Service Reform bill made the assertion that senior managers in government "lack the incentives for first-rate performance that managers in private industry have."² In seeking a remedy for the senior civil servants' "inadequate motivation," Carter/Campbell assumed that higher pay is the primary incentive for executives. For the first time, a major civil


service reform hinges upon the promise that peer competition for economic rewards is the key to motivating public service. The point has already been made that the crux of the SES is the attempt to tie money rewards to improved productivity through the performance appraisal. Paul Lorentzen, President of the FEIAA, makes the origins of this approach clear: "The bonus system was based on Taylorism, the economic man, rational man, going back to the 1900's, and private industry's example."¹ One glaring irony is that the SES is based on the myth rather than the reality of private enterprise. Another is that individuals who should have known better failed to comprehend the unique problems and challenges of motivating senior public executives.

What are the implications of making the dollar the primary motivator of senior civil servants? First, many executives deeply resent the approach because it conveys a message that the executives are not working hard enough. Many executives feel they are working to their capacity already.² A GS-18 expressed his feeling this way, "The reforms are based on crass materialism and fail to recognize the performing professional in nonmaterial ways. I work as a professional supergrade civil servant. I do not work for bonuses. I do my work in a professional top quality fashion

regardless of the pay."¹ Thus, the bonus approach implies that the public perceptions of top bureaucrats as nonproductive sloths were true.

Second, the emphasis on monetary awards implies that competitive behavior is better than cooperative. Because awards are large and limited, competitive rather than cooperative behavior is encouraged. Lorentzen observed that special monetary recognition "tends to place an additional premium on self-aggrandizing, 'me first' behavior which is destructive of cooperative team work."² Even though many, perhaps most, executives are not primarily motivated by promises of bonuses, when they see that many competent individuals receive no rewards, or perceive that awards are not fair, then morale suffers and ill-will is created. Competitive behavior may lead to a variety of "bureaupathic"³ responses that are dysfunctional in terms of the goals of the SES. In particular, exaggerated competition may undermine professional objectivity; hinder the objective reporting of facts, especially when they are negative; encourage the


²Senior Executive Service, Hearings, 1981, p. 44.

hiding of mistakes; give rise to a variety of perverse performance measures; and hinder communication.

There is in the SES reform and in the justifications used to achieve it the double-edged presumption that higher civil servants are best held accountable by external checks and by appeals to their possessive egoism. It is one of the vivid lessons of post-World War II America and particularly post-Watergate that though external checks may be necessary, they are neither always desirable nor sufficient for insuring responsible administration. External technical checks carried to the extreme, like exaggerated competition, may create dysfunctions. More importantly, they may hinder the development of a personal sense of responsibility in the public servant. Legal and technical checks can be subverted; one's conscience may be the harder taskmaster.

In his provocative piece on "Official Liberality," Richard A. Chapman argues that "conscience is something that grows and depends upon socialization. If we tamper with the official's socialization process either before or after entry into the public service . . . then we shall be affecting the development of the official conscience."¹ Clearly, the emphasis placed by the SES upon pay incentives and measurable performance standards will affect the development of official conscience. Will SES affect it in ways that are desirable?

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Will the emphasis upon external accountability dull the conscience to values of public morality and the spirit to qualities of imagination and courage? Will motivational techniques that stress individual monetary rewards discourage in the official conscience a commitment of service to a broad public interest and public values? The Carter/Campbell response would undoubtedly be no, but how can one be sure without asking the questions? Certainly the problem of the pay cap on federal executives should be remedied. Certainly executives should receive compensation approaching comparability to their counterparts in the private sector. Equity and the public interest demand such a response. Yet the approach to developing an official conscience compatible with responsible administration will emphasize the personal satisfaction of contributing one's professional skills to achieving public purposes and the dignity of public service.

Finally, the central features of SES suggest that its creators assumed the road to responsible public administration to be technical and instrumental rather than political and purposeful. Wallace Sayre's criticism of administrative reform in the late 1940s remains relevant today: "At a time when the urgency, difficulty, and complexity of governmental performance are daily increasing . . . the public service becomes steadily more dependent upon a cold, impersonal, rigid quantification of human ability and worth in public
employment."¹ In much the same way, the Carter reform represents the "triumph of techniques over purpose." Harold Seidman concurs that Carter saw civil service reform as an end in itself or at most the fulfillment of a campaign promise. Lacking was some conception of larger purposes to be served, purposes tied to policy goals.² Carter's emphasis on pay and bonuses for outstanding performance and threats of removal from the SES for poor performance suggests that his Administration did not understand "that truly effective public administration is, above all, dependent upon effective political action at the policy level."³ Neither did the Carter Administration understand that effective public administration also requires political leadership which inspires and communicates a sense of dignity. As several interviewees commented, the start to restoring confidence in government and morale to public employees is for political officials to take the lead in recognizing the contribution of senior executives and educating the public to that effect. Responsible public administration is developed from the "stuff" of political leaders, not managers.

Taken together these implications suggest that the

¹Wallace S. Sayre, "The Triumph of Technique Over Purpose," Public Administration Review 8 (Spring 1948):137.


primary failure of the Carter reformers was the misplaced opportunity to recognize senior civil servants as a valuable national resource and to institutionalize important public values at the crucial nexus between politics and administration. Hugh Heclo correctly claims that "the civil servant's value lies in his or her capacity to respond effectively to a succession of different political leaders and to offer a service that is more positive and independent than mere passive obedience." To some extent the SES recognizes this resource by creating a corps of senior executives with demonstrated managerial and professional competence. On the other hand, the Carter Administration's emphasis on political-managerial control and the prominence of competitive performance evaluation in the SES do not bode well for the provision of objective, independent judgment. Furthermore, although the SES structure may increase the possibilities of senior executives serving politicians of all partisan colors, the necessary ingredient for this to occur fully—a political consensus that top bureaucrats are valuable resources—is not yet present.


It is possible that within the SES framework professionals with a public service orientation may themselves create a governmentwide-corps committed to public service values, as Chester Newland claims. However, the concentration of the SES on managerial concerns, economic incentives, and measurable performance misses the chance to begin now to systematically socialize career officials into a service characterized by a public service philosophy rather than market motives. Perhaps, ironically, economic pressures will force future changes in that direction. Then the consequences of reform may more closely match its promise.

Do the British have anything to teach in this regard? Is reform of the British civil service on the path to creating a more responsible public administration? It is to these questions that we shall turn next.

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CHAPTER IV
THE FULTON COMMITTEE: MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ATTACK

As was discovered in examining United States civil service reform, it is difficult to attribute reform efforts to any single cause or group of causal factors, but it is possible to extricate, from a complex assortment of political, social, and economic forces, the predominant trends which both give rise to reform and define a responsible public administration and which, consequently, shape the reform's recommendations and actual administrative changes. Before examining the Fulton Committee recommendations, then, it is crucial to discuss, in some detail, the political environment or context in which the Fulton Committee Report was conceived and the major criticisms of the pre-Fulton civil service. Chapter V will then describe the report's proposals and discuss the responses to them.

The Pre-Fulton Civil Service

To understand the reformers' criticisms and to provide a basis for comparison to the post-Fulton service, it is important to describe briefly the structure of the pre-Fulton non-industrial, Home Civil Service. After the Northcote-Trevelyan Report established the civil service on the principles of open competition, division of labor between "intellectual" and "mechanical" tasks, and a unified civil
service, subsequent developments through the remainder of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries added meat to these skeletal principles. By most accounts, the British civil service had reached the culmination of its structural development with the endorsement of the Northcote-Trevelyan principles by the Tomlin Royal Commission of 1929-1931.

The pre-Fulton, modern civil service was characterized by a rigid structure divided into departmental and Treasury or general classes. The departmental classes were composed of jobs restricted to one department, which controlled the conditions of entrance and service in those jobs. In 1968, the 1400 departmental classes ranged in size from 20,000 or more in the Tax Inspector and Tax Officer classes in Inland Revenue to just a handful in the highly specialized inspector classes.

The general classes, on the other hand, were those classes common to all departments, whose conditions of entrance and employment were determined by the Treasury. Those classes responsible for the management of the service were the Administrative, Executive, and Clerical Classes.

The scientific classes were divided into the Scientific Officer Class, the Experimental Officer Class, and the Scientific Assistant Class. There was also the Works Group of Professional Classes for technical officers, engineers, architects and draughtsmen, as well as Legal, Medical, Accountant and Economist Classes and other technical and
specialist classes which comprised 47 general classes in all in 1968. In terms of status and pay all classes, including the Executive and Specialist Classes, were separate and subordinate to the Administrative Class, although the higher Executive grades often performed tasks indistinguishable from those in the lower Administrative grades and the specialists often had educational and experience backgrounds of comparable quality.

Each class had its own grading structure and pay scale and each civil servant was recruited into a particular class depending on his educational background. For example, the Administrative Class was graded into Permanent Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Principal, and Assistant Principal while the Executive Class was divided into Higher Executive Officer, Senior Executive Officer, Chief Executive Officer, and Principal Executive Officer grades. Direct entrants into the Administrative Class were normally university graduates of 22 or 23 years of age, while recruits to the Executive Class and Clerical Class were 18 year old school-leavers with "A-levels" and 16 year old school-leavers with "O-levels" respectively.¹

Recruitment to the Administrative Class in the pre-

¹"O-levels" refers to the General Certificate of Education (GCE) Ordinary level examinations, usually taken at age 16. Recruits to the Executive Class must have passed at least two GCE Advanced level examinations, usually taken at age 18.
classes and direct entry examination of university graduates (about a 40-60 ratio in the mid-1960s). For direct entrants and most promotees from other classes, entrance to the Assistant Principal grade was by one of two examination methods. Method I consisted of a written qualifying examination in general subjects, followed by, for those successful, an interview and a written examination in academic subjects of the candidate's choice covering the main honors courses at the universities. Method II, which was reserved for candidates with a first or second class honors degree, consisted of a qualifying examination similar to that in Method I. But instead of further academic examinations, the Method II candidates were tested by a team of assessors in a series of intelligence and psychological tests and interviews designed to discover the candidate's reasoning power, maturity, composure, and other "soft" criteria. Neither examination method was designed to secure a candidate with any specific body of knowledge. Both were intended to identify the intellectually superior candidate in any academic field.

Of those entering the civil service directly from the universities in the years 1948-1956, 78 percent came from Oxford and Cambridge. The percentage from Oxbridge increased to 85 in 1957-1963. The proportion of successful candidates from fee-paying independent or boarding schools went up from 31 percent to 37 percent, while those from government
supported schools went down from 42 percent to 30 percent. At the same time the proportion of those successful candidates "who took degrees in classics went up from 21 percent to 24 percent, while social sciences fell from 24 percent to 17 percent, and mathematicians, scientists and technologists remained almost negligible, hopping from 4 percent to 3 percent."\(^1\) Thus the period just prior to the establishment of the Fulton Committee appears to have witnessed an upsurge in the social and academic exclusiveness of the Administrative Class.\(^2\)

Once a member of a civil service class, the civil servant's pay, responsibilities, and promotion patterns were largely prescribed by the class. For example, policy-making

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\(^2\)The causes of this increase in Oxbridge successes on civil service entrance examinations are complex. In a letter to the author, Richard A. Chapman suggests that relevant factors might include:

1) Oxbridge students are sometimes slightly older than students at other universities. A year or two of maturity may be a great advantage, especially on Method II type exams.

2) Proportionately, many more students from Oxford and Cambridge tend to apply for civil service admission than from elsewhere. Tradition tends to encourage Oxbridge students to consider the civil service as a career. In addition, teachers at Oxbridge tend to be more informed about the exams, several heads of Oxbridge colleges are ex-Administrative Class officials, and Oxbridge colleges tend to have civil service liaison officers for each college rather than one for the entire university as elsewhere.

3) Students who are constantly told they are superior may be more at ease in the civil service interview and consequently able to give of their best.
and administrative duties were the prerogatives of the Administrative and Executive Classes. Specialists who sought broader administrative responsibilities had to transfer to one of these classes. However, movement from Specialist Classes to Administrative or Executive Classes was rare due to restrictive procedures. Promotion within class followed the established grades. For the Administrative Class, training of the new entrant followed the generalist concept, in that it consisted chiefly of short tours of duty in a variety of different jobs during a two year probationary period. From 1963, short training courses were conducted at the Centre for Administrative Studies. Even after the probation period, relatively rapid movement from post to post was common for members of the Administrative Class. Employment in the service constituted a career, although often the official thought in terms of career in class rather than career in the service.¹ Thus, civil service employment afforded the higher civil servant, for example, great security not only from arbitrary dismissal but also from competition from members of other classes.

In the pre-Fulton civil service, the Treasury's role in the management of the service was of central importance. At the ministerial level this was suggested by the fact that

the Prime Minister was First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was the senior Treasury Minister. In addition, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury was in practice first among equals, receiving a higher salary and more prestige than Permanent Secretaries in other departments. More to the point, the Treasury was responsible for the size, pay, recruitment policy, and structure of the civil service. In addition, it had control of the budget and expenditures of the departments and overall economic coordination and planning. Given its financial and personnel responsibilities it is not surprising that the Treasury was at the center of most political controversies.\(^1\) And in the postwar years it has been the target of much criticism (which will be discussed later).

**Traditional Responsibility and Rumblings of Change**

Also important to understanding the dynamics of reform is an appreciation of the pressures being placed on the traditional notion of ministerial responsibility in the pre-Fulton service. The doctrine, in its idealized form, claims that the minister is completely and fully answerable to Parliament for the actions of his department and the actions taken by his civil servants whether or not he has

authorized them. If the minister cannot defend the actions of his civil servants to the satisfaction of Parliament he is obliged to resign, preserving the anonymity of the civil servant.

In return for this protection from political pressure, the civil servant owes the minister undivided loyalty regardless of the minister's views or party affiliation. Once policy has been determined by the minister it is the responsibility of the civil servant to carry it out whether he likes it or not. While policy is being formulated it is the duty of the civil servant to provide to the minister all the information available regarding the issues, even if it conflicts with the minister's known view. Anonymity or confidentiality allows civil servants "to give their full and frank opinion to the minister."¹ Information does not only include "technical" advice but political advice as well; it is the official's duty to protect the minister from his "enemies"² or from potential adverse political repercussions. The inevitable growth of administrative discretion may produce tensions in the relationship between the minister and his civil servants. But the tensions may be eased somewhat as the official comes to know the minister's position


²The duty of the civil servant was characterized in this way in an interview with a retired civil servant who had spent most of her career as a higher civil servant.
on the issues and his approach to problems.

The higher rank of a civil servant and the more closely he is acquainted with the minister's mind, the more he feels himself at liberty to modify the detailed application of the policy: but no civil servant, whatever his rank, would think it compatible with his duty to take any step inconsistent with it. If he thought such a step to be imperatively required, he would represent his difficulties and ask for instructions.¹

Thus, in the traditional view, the civil servant has no real power. T. A. Critchley, as a higher civil servant himself, argued that the civil servant's "authority is delegated to him and may, at the command of Parliament, be instantly withdrawn." Echoing Dale, Critchley claims that the civil servant "speaks, not with his own, but with his master's voice. He is literally a nonentity. Few persons outside government circles know the name of even one permanent head of a Department. Constitutional theory demands that he shall be voiceless."²

Behind this traditional view of the duties and responsibilities assumed by the civil servant is a prescription for the character and abilities commensurate with those duties. Sir Edward Bridges (later Lord), former Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and Head of the Civil Service, believes that the qualities of the best administrator include the power of rapid analysis, the capacity to


recognize the essential points in a situation, a sense of timing—knowing when to propose solutions to competing groups, the capacity to think ahead, the capacity to hold an even balance between principle and expediency, and the personal qualities of imagination and perseverance and leadership.\(^1\) The civil servant is to bring to his job not only a sense of personal integrity and honesty but also a sense of fairness and justice to guide him in his dealings with individuals and groups. Further, a breadth of judgment will help him to see problems from a larger perspective, to arrive at a balanced judgment in the society's interest. Balance and detachment are also achieved in the traditional view by the application of consistent principles and rules, by the moderation of radical ideas, by a liberal education, and frequent job rotation. Infusing this traditional view is the civil servant's ethic of public service, "selfless service in the national interest, accepting constant abuse from the very public they serve, as a function of their profession."\(^2\)

It follows that in this view of responsibility the administrator can be characterized as a non-specialist, a generalist, although by all means a professional, a


professional in the working of the administrative machine. As a generalist he does not use the tools acquired by the professional training of a lawyer, engineer, or scientist, for example, but abstract knowledge acquired through the experience of doing and observing those already skilled in administration, achieved through frequent job rotation.

Bertrand Russell nicely captures this point of view:

We come here upon one aspect of a problem which is likely to grow increasingly serious as the world becomes more organized. A man who has a position of power in a great organization requires a definite type of ability, namely, that which is called executive or administrative: it makes very little difference what the matter is that the organization handles, the kind of skill required at the top will always be the same. A man who can organize successfully (let us say) the Lancashire cotton trade will also be successful if he tackles the air defences of London, the exploration of Central Asia, or the transport of timber from British Columbia to England. For these various undertakings he will require no knowledge of cotton, no knowledge of aerial warfare, and no acquaintance with forestry or navigation. His helpers in subordinate positions will, in the several cases, require these several kinds of skill, but his skill is, in a sense, abstract, and does not depend upon specialized knowledge. It thus happens, as organizations increase in size, that the important positions of power tend, more and more, to be in the hands of men who have no intimate familiarity with the purposes of the work that they organize.¹

The abstract skill of the generalist administrator partially lies in weighing and synthesizing the advice of the specialists, balancing the interests involved, and judging the impact on the public interest.

In practical terms, then, the traditionalists saw the potentially best administrators as those who receive first class honors degrees at the first class universities in classical subjects. As the 1854 Macaulay Report makes clear,

It is undoubtedly desirable that the civil servant of the [East India] Company should enter on his duties while still young; but it is also desirable that he should have received the best, the most liberal, the most finished education that his native country affords. We think it desirable that a considerable number of the civil servants of the Company should be men who have taken the first degree in arts at Oxford or Cambridge. We believe that men who have engaged, up to one or two and twenty, in studies which have no immediate connexion with the business of any profession, and of which the effort is merely to open, to invigorate, and to enrich the mind, will generally be found, in the business of every profession, superior to men who have, at 18 or 19, devoted themselves to the special studies of their calling.

It should be noted that the Northcote-Trevelyan Report took some exception to this view by opening the possibility of competitive exams based on more specialized studies in the social sciences. The Report again proved to be ahead of its time, as critics of the civil service in the post-World War II period questioned the lack of specialist training for civil service administrators. Postwar criticisms, of course, did not stop with training but attacked the whole traditional notion of ministerial and civil service responsibility.

That the notion of ministerial responsibility was in for a bumpy ride during the 1960s and into the 1970s and 1980s can be seen in a number of case studies of

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administrative decision-making.¹ Perhaps the Crichel Down affair gives the clearest illustration of the growing pressures being placed on the traditional view of ministerial responsibility.² In brief, the affair involved 725 acres of land which had been compulsorily acquired in 1937 by the Air Ministry for use as a bombing range. In 1949 the land passed into the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture. After the war a number of farmers were promised by the Ministry a chance to bid for the land, but the promise was never honored. At the same time the Ministry of Agriculture refused to resell it to a Lieutenant-Commander Marten, heir of the original owner. Instead, the Ministry decided to rent the land as a model farm to a "tenant from some distance away whom they had chosen in a rather arbitrary fashion."³

Marten, after attempting unsuccessfully to secure redress for his grievances through Parliamentary channels, organized local political pressure upon the Minister of Agriculture, Sir Thomas Dugdale, who agreed to ask for a


³Birch, Representative and Responsible Government, p. 144.
public enquiry. The Report of Public Enquiry, published in June 1954, found no trace of bribery or corruption, but it was highly critical of some of the decisions that had been taken, the methods used, and the behavior of five of the civil servants involved (who were named). It noted that many of the decisions had been made with inaccurate information and chastised the civil servants for deliberately attempting to "mislead applicants for tenancies into thinking that their applications had received due consideration," when, in fact, they had not, and for having a hostile attitude toward Marten, "this attitude being engendered solely by a feeling of irritation that any member of the public should have the temerity to oppose or even to question the acts or decisions of officials of a government or state department!"¹

When the report was published Dugdale played down the affair and accepted full responsibility for the actions of his officials. The political heat continued to such an extent that five days later Dugdale resigned and a committee was set up to recommend discipline for the civil servants. Marten was reimbursed costs and given the opportunity to purchase Crichel Down.

The implications of Crichel Down for ministerial responsibility are clear. In the first place, the affair raises the question of administrative power, as a few career

¹Ibid., pp. 144-45.
officials acted arbitrarily and unjustly against an individual to further departmental policy in the name of the Ministry and with the full power of the Cabinet and House of Commons. ¹ No longer can a Minister be intimately, nor perhaps even vaguely, familiar with the large quantities of work, much of it technical, in his department. First, Ministers average only two years in the same job. Second, not only must a Minister, as Head of a Department of State, attend to the demands of administration but he or she remains a member of Parliament. Thus the Minister must attend to his constituency and party responsibilities. Third, the Minister, as a member of the Cabinet, is increasingly involved in inter-departmental discussions. Hence, even when a Minister has the inclination and energy, they are spread too thinly to have sufficient time to be involved in every decision.² It is not realistic to believe that Ministers can be aware of each decision taken in their name.

Given the size, complexity, and positive nature of contemporary government, it is clear that Ministers must rely on civil service officials for advice. Advice from senior civil servants most often takes the form of a


²Heclo and Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money, p. 130. See also, Tesse Blackstone, "Ministers, Advisers and Civil Servants," delivered at the Gaitskell Memorial Lecture, London, no date, for a discussion of the burdens placed on Ministers and the resources available to cope with their jobs.
Minister's briefing. The brief "produced for the Minister is strictly for internal consumption, because it reveals as explicitly as possible the basis of what the department wants and (often) its strategy for getting it."¹ But even with the best of intentions and the best analytic capabilities, the brief is an editing job. By the time the Minister is briefed most options have been circumscribed and most decisions settled by the civil servants. Thus, Crichel Down showed that placing responsibility solely in the Minister is neither fair to the Minister nor adequate protection to the citizen against arbitrary government.

In the second place, the Crichel Down investigation was an attack on the principle of anonymity. Officials' actions were examined in detail, names were named, and their actions were criticized in an official report and on the floor of Commons. Anonymity had perhaps allowed frank discussion, but at the expense of individual justice. The affair teaches that anonymity is likely to allow civil servants to abuse their power and then prevent disclosure of that abuse.

In the third place, the affair illustrates the power of the civil service to pursue its own policies. It appears that the civil servants closest to the Minister continued the policy of their predecessors despite the fact that a new

¹Ibid., p. 138.
Government had come into power. In order to pursue their policy it appears that the civil servants withheld information from the public and their Minister. Thus the Crichel Down episode suggests that civil servants had the power, at least for a while, to frustrate the will of the Government in power (a theme to be taken up more forcefully by the Labour Government of the 1960s). If administrators were not, then, the willing servants of Ministers, regardless of their party, nor politically neutral sources of information and advice, how relevant is the concept of ministerial responsibility?

Since the Crichel Down affair it has been generally agreed that a Minister will not be held responsible for the actions of his civil servants (in the sense of being expected to resign) where he had no prior knowledge of them or where the actions were contrary to his known policy. At the same time, though civil servants have more and more been allowed or even encouraged to take a public role, anonymity of civil servants remains the normal practice and prescription. Where, then, does responsibility lie? The affair is a pointed reminder that the theory and practice of ministerial responsibility is on a precarious pedestal and has led many critics to intensify their questioning of

1 Ibid., pp. 393-94.

whether ministerial responsibility is an adequate device to secure responsible administration in contemporary democracy.

Postwar Pressures for Administrative Change

In addition to the changing nature of administration illustrated by Crichel Down, there were other changes taking place in postwar Britain. Economically, Britain was going through a period of decline. Its share of world trade had declined from 33% in 1900 to 22% in 1937 then to 15% in 1962. From 1950 to 1954, British exports had increased by 6%, while those of the European Common Market countries increased by 76%; from 1955 to 1960 British exports increased by 13%, Common Market exports by 63%, and from 1960 to 1962 Britain's exports increased 18% while Common Market exports grew by 50%.1 In 1964 Britain's rate of economic growth was less than 4% per year, a rate below any major European country; the postwar policies of the Treasury and the Bank of England were widely questioned. Not surprisingly, this poor economic performance stirred widespread self-castigation and institutional criticism and invited comparisons not only with Europe but also with the United States.

Changes were also taking place in education which were to have an impact on society and the civil service. Postwar changes in education beginning with the Education Act of

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1944 that introduced free public education and continuing through the 1963 Robbins Committee on Higher Education that prompted the creation of new universities and technical schools led to an increase in the numbers of students entering and graduating from universities and polytechnic colleges. The consequence for the civil service was increased pressure to find places in the Administrative Class for well-qualified university graduates who were not from Oxbridge and to re-evaluate the practices making it difficult for specialists to enter the Executive and Administrative Classes.

Socially, the country was experiencing a period of pessimism and self-criticism. The reasons for this malaise are, undoubtedly, many and complex. It was partially due to the relative decline in economic fortunes and, perhaps, partially related to a sense of declining empire, as the war and postwar period saw the loss of overseas territories in the Middle-East, Africa, and Asia, "the consequent loss of prestige and an open relegation to second class power status."1 There was also a changing value system which affected all sectors of society--political parties, church, business, and education. Anthony Sampson captures well this ethos of the early 1960s as it relates to the civil service,

Briefly, it is that the old privileged values of aristocracy, public schools and Oxbridge which still dominate government today have failed to provide the stimulus, the purposive policies and the keen eye on the future which Britain is looking for, and must have. The old ethos was moulded by the success of an invincible imperial machine. Its style was to make big things seem small, exciting things boring, new things familiar: but in the unconfident context of today this bland depreciation—and the assumed superiority that goes with it—merely succeeds in dispelling enthusiasms, blunting curiosity and dulling experiment. The groove-outlook, the pragmatic outlook are all totally out of keeping with an age which suffers, unlike the Victorians, from an oppressive lack of innovation and zeal. The old fabric of the British governing class, while keeping its social and political hold, has failed to accommodate or analyse the vast forces of science, education or social change which (whether they like it or not) are changing the face of the country.¹

If the Sampson analysis is correct—that a malaise, brought on by the incongruency between two competing values, infused all institutions and leaders—then, certainly, the civil service and particularly the higher civil service could not escape unnoticed.

Similarly, Subramanian argues that the basic elements of the British administrative system—the Administrative Class, the dominance of the all-rounder or amateur over the specialist, anonymity of the civil servant and the power of the Treasury—were consequences of the social and political dominance of the landed aristocracy and gentry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although these elements "continued undisturbed throughout a period of expanding franchise and mass democracy" in the late eighteenth and

early nineteenth centuries, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, "the discrepancy between the elements of the administrative system and of mass society had become too glaring."¹ Thus, it was widely perceived that bureaucracy was no longer representative of predominant postwar attitudes or of those groups which had emerged after the war as the dominant political force. As Kingsley makes clear, if public administration is to remain democratic, administrative arrangements must reflect the character of the social structure of the nation.² Many critics believed that the time for reform was overdue.

Perhaps in response to this national psychology of pessimism and self-criticism, perhaps in the more positive sense of searching for solutions, many people in the nation turned their attention to science and technology with the hope that they would provide an escape from Britain's malaise. Harold Wilson's often repeated campaign theme of 1964 was that the "white heat of the scientific revolution" would be harnessed by Labour to serve Britain. Scientific and business management techniques applied to public administration were seen by many as a cure for bureaucratic slughishness and inefficiency. Many people were adopting the view of the Confederation of British Industries (CBI) that

²J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy, p. 215.
"'numeracy' is as important as literacy."¹ A model for many true believers was McNamara's Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (P.P.B.S.) in the United States Defense Department. The Fulton Committee reported in 1968 at the height of this faith in science and scientific management, a faith shared by some key committee members who questioned the efficacy of a notion of responsibility that valued judgment over scientific "objectivity."

External Pressure: Critics and Criticisms

These postwar social, economic, and educational changes and the resulting pressures on ministerial responsibility and the civil service, although growing intense, remained rather vague. After all, it must be remembered, Britain's civil service remained basically competent, accountable, and honest (even Crichel Down suggested no criminal wrongdoing) and the object of admiration from reformers in other countries, for example the United States. It was left up to journalists, politicians, and especially, academics to give focus and specificity to the amorphous suspicions and to lead the assault on the higher civil service, a quite visible, but by no means helpless "scapegoat." During the early 1960s, a string of books was published expressing dissatisfaction with Britain's performance and position in the world and laying the blame solidly

on the civil service mandarins. Examples include The Establishment edited by Hugh Thomas and especially Thomas Balogh's article, "The Apotheosis of the Dilettante" in that book (1959); The Ruling Servants by E. Strauss (1961); Brian Chapman's British Government Observed (1963); Suicide of a Nation edited by Arthur Koestler (1963); Michael Shanks', The Stagnant Society (1964); Peter Shore's, Entitled to Know (1966); and The System by Max Nicholson (1967). Each was a biting, often bitter attack on the civil service.

Brian Chapman held the view "that British government is unnecessarily handicapped in dealing with the problems of the modern state by our failure to revise archaic procedures and reform the policy-making institutions; and that, further, our tendency to disguise reality by the use of myths [ministerial responsibility] has made even the ordinary management of affairs more laborious than it need be, despite the strength and quality of the Executive Class." Balogh was more direct,

The abrupt decline of British power cannot entirely be explained by the venality of the voters, the folly of politicians and the harshness of world events. The fact

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2B. Chapman, British Government Observed, p. 44.
is that ministers are often very ill-served by their professional advisors. At best they are not supplied with all the facts; at worst with misleading appreciations.¹

Max Nicholson was even more pointed in his characterization of the higher civil service as a "band of ill-informed, untrained, miscast full-time amateurs, doing a little of everything without any coherent pattern."²

The academic and popular literature focuses on five main criticisms—the skills (or lack thereof) of administrators, their character, the class structure of the civil service, the lack of political responsiveness on the part of the civil service, and the power of the Treasury. Perhaps the most persistent criticism made of the higher civil service was that recruitment and selection procedures for the Administrative Class were based on the assumption that those with a public school and Oxbridge education and certain personal qualities could best govern modern Britain. While administrators may have been educated men they were still amateurs, dilettantes, or, less pejoratively, generalists.

According to the critics there were two consequences of this recruitment bias. First, administrators lacking experience in business and social service fields and training in management techniques, statistics, or economics, failed to be effective managers of resources and manpower


and national planners. A second and related consequence was that administrators did not have the technical or scientific expertise to advise Ministers effectively. The result, Balogh bluntly asserts, is that "whenever any effort had to be organized, indeed palpably threatening disaster averted, outsiders had to be recruited to take charge."¹ The solutions to this lack of managerial and scientific expertise lay in, first, appointing more members of the Professional and Scientific Classes to the top positions, second, allowing Ministers to bring in their own expert staff, and, third, more training in management and economics for administrators.

Many pre-Fulton critics have noted the dearth of training subsequent to entry into the Administrative Class.² The belief that administrators could best learn by practice was prevalent; consequently, the service had little or no systematic training in management or the social sciences.

A second popular criticism made of the higher civil service in the 1960s was that it was inhabited by men who lacked vitality, drive, and initiative. A temporary civil servant during the war wrote that "they are not men of imagination or action. They are slow, cautious, and


obstructive. They are 'shrewd' but not wise, dependable but not creative. They are, too often cynical rather than realistic. They are small men."¹ This cautious, conservative quality was attacked for being inconsistent with the needs of postwar Britain.

Many critics pointed to what they saw as the inhumane nature of the Administrative Class. Administrators were out of touch with the problems of the larger society; they lacked human sympathy and sensitivity for working class problems, possessing "a sense of superiority to humanity at large."² Certainly, the Crichel Down investigation provided evidence that some administrators possessed an "excessive sense of self-importance" resulting in broken promises and the ignoring of "the feelings or the convenience of individual citizens."³

Similarly, the focus of the service was on London, and most administrators lacked experience in other regions. Thus the civil service was viewed as closed and parochial (a view compounded by the secrecy which surrounded governmental decision-making), lacking in interchange with business and universities, and especially as unrepresentative in character.


It has already been shown that in the pre-Fulton civil service a selection bias existed for graduates from Oxford and Cambridge, for former students of independent, fee-paying schools, and for arts rather than social sciences or natural science graduates. One cause for this selection bias, the critics claimed, was the increasing reliance on the oral interview in Method II, where social class biases can creep in, as opposed to the anonymity of written exams. Another cause was the lack of a regular practice of transfer from Professional, Scientific or Technical Classes to the Administrative Class. During the 1950s only six percent of the new recruits to the lowest ranks of the Administrative Class were specialist transfers. Although World War II had the effect of lowering some of the interclass barriers for promotion, the critics argued that informal, if not formal, barriers to transfer remained in the pre-Fulton civil service. The result, critics argued, was a higher civil service which represented only a narrow social class.

A fourth discernible criticism of the Administrative Class, exemplified by the Crichel Down affair, was that it was not responsive to public sentiment or to changes in political leadership. The charge was most often made by

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2Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain, p. 116.
academics with socialist leanings, but not infrequently by Conservative Party supporters, that the civil service thwarted the implementation of party manifestos. Blame was sometimes placed on the bureaucratic structure and red tape, but often critics felt that Administrators made conscious political choices to sabotage manifestos when they conflicted with departmental policy. The solutions most often suggested were to politicize the higher civil service in some way, by either allowing politicians to bring in political advisors or making advice given by top officials public.

Although much of the criticism was directed at the higher civil service in general, some of it was focused squarely on the Treasury. A few critics faulted the Establishments Divisions—the Divisions concerned with staffing—with inefficiency due to a failure to use scientific management techniques. Others faulted specific policy decisions championed by the Treasury, such as on balance of payments. But in one way or another, the criticisms often boiled down to distrust of the Treasury's power. Balogh argues that the power of the Treasury was consolidated in 1919 when the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury was recognized as Head of the Civil Service. This was followed by making the consent of the Prime Minister necessary for any vital appointments in all departments. Since the Prime Minister could not have first-hand knowledge of personnel matters, the power of appointment was given essentially to
the Head of the Civil Service. The effect was to reduce the departmental minister's power in relation to his top civil servants and the Treasury, since career advancement now rested within the civil service structure.

Through the Second World War and postwar period the concentration of power in the Treasury's hands continued until the early 1960s when, as will be noted, the attacks on the Treasury's power resulted in reorganization. Still, to many critics in the years just prior to Fulton, the Treasury possessed a monopoly of policy-making power that should be trimmed by separating its financial and personnel functions.

**Internal Pressures: Civil Servants and Unions**

Certainly a great deal of noise and heat was generated by the academic critics of the British civil service in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but perhaps the rather more quiet pressure applied within the bureaucracy had a greater impact on the actual changes. Richard Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, in tracing changes in the pattern of recruitment and classification and training in the British civil service, observe that "the original impetus for reform [of the civil service] came primarily from high-ranking civil servants.

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themselves."\(^1\) For example, "the proposal for 'one class' was first considered within the service [in 1943], long before it was publicly discussed."\(^2\) Many top civil servants in the early 1960s were taking the unusual step of publicly chastising the civil service and calling for change. For example, an Assistant Secretary at the Ministry of Defence was warning in 1964 that management should be taken more seriously in the civil service.\(^3\) Others, like R. G. S. Brown, a Principal in the Administrative Class of the civil service, called upon his peers to develop a better problem-solving attitude by recruiting more specialists, training administrators in the use of management techniques and in their substantive areas, and breaking down the barriers in communication between administrators and experts.\(^4\)

But perhaps more important than individuals for creating internal pressure for change have been the positions taken by civil service staff associations, particularly those representing Professional, Technical, Executive and Clerical Classes. The early postwar years witnessed a number of departmental committees and informal inquiries into the

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\(^2\)Ibid., p. 161.


possibilities of change, all of which "reflected the dissatisfaction expressed and tensions felt among the various professional groups in the civil service."¹ Each association called for changes in civil service recruitment, selection and promotion practices, class structure, pay, and conditions that would benefit their members. Thus, the Institution of Professional Civil Servants, representing professional, scientific, technical, and most of the specialist grades, in its testimony to the Fulton Committee, complained that "management and administration at the higher levels are still almost exclusively the monopoly of the Administrative Class," despite the fact that "over the last century the Government has become involved in the complex economic, technological and social problems of modern society."² To remedy this monopoly by the Administrative Class, the I.P.C.S. called for the abolition of class divisions in the higher civil service, which would allow top administrators to be recruited from executive, scientific, and professional as well as administrative grades, and an increased flexibility of transfer between classes. In similar ways, other staff associations were urging administrative changes upon the Treasury.

By the early 1960s criticism from within and outside

¹Chapman and Greenaway, The Dynamics of Administrative Reform, p. 162.
the Treasury had reached such a peak that the Treasury was
reorganized so that a Joint Permanent Secretary was made
responsible for finances and economic planning and another
Joint Permanent Secretary for pay and management of the
civil service through the Establishments Divisions of the
Departments. It was reorganized again in 1964 so that it
lost its planning functions to a new Department of Economic
Affairs. In early 1968 a new Management Services Division
was created in the Treasury to perform operations research.¹

Nor was the training of administrators overlooked. In
1963 a Centre for Administrative Studies was established
which, among other activities, started a short course on
economics for Assistant Principals. After the 1964 election
which brought Labour into power, there was a great influx of
economists into the Treasury, although most of these were on
a temporary basis. In addition, efforts were made in some
technical departments to move specialists to top posts,
although again, the success of these efforts may be
questioned. But again the point is that changes were taking
place--some to address administrative needs, others in
response to political pressure; whether these changes were
merely cosmetic or were of substance is a matter for debate.

¹For a more detailed account of these administrative
reforms, see Roger Williams, "Administrative Modernization
in British Government," International Social Science
Into the cauldron of reform already bubbling with academic and popular dissatisfaction, pressures from staff associations, and discontent from within higher civil service itself, was dropped the party politics of 1964. Although change was occurring, largely out of sight, the political personalities and issues in the mid-1960s provided a catalyst that for a moment brought the myriad pressures and actors together for a burst of reforming activity. Whether or not the activity produced a radically new ingredient (as many of the reformers had hoped) or merely a puff of smoke will be investigated in Chapter VI.

If leftist academics were critical of the civil service for its lack of political responsiveness, it is not surprising that Labour politicians were also suspicious of a civil service they thought was powerful enough to misdirect and stifle the Party's manifesto. This suspicion was given vent by The Fabian Society pamphlet issued in 1964, The Administrators. Written by Robert Nield, later to become a member of the Fulton Committee, Shirley Williams, Labour MP appointed to the Fulton Committee only to withdraw when she was appointed Minister in the Government, and Thomas Balogh, an academic economist closely identified with Wilson, The Administrators clearly had an influence on the thinking of

the Labour Government and later the Fulton Committee. Indeed it has been observed that "the Fulton Committee's report looks remarkably like an expanded version of The Administrators."¹

The pamphlet, an update of a Fabian Report issued in 1947² that was itself a precursor of much of the later criticisms, charged that reform of the higher civil service was a prerequisite for the Labour Government or any government to carry through policy changes. The civil service is an anachronism, the report went on, and fails in three basic respects: its amateurism, its negative approach to problem-solving, and its closed and secretive formulation of policy. To make the civil service more professional, more adaptable, and more creative the Fabians proposed widening the net of recruitment, allowing freer movement in and out of the service, creating an expanded and more scholarly training school, abolishing class distinctions between specialists and administrators in the higher civil service, increasing the number of specialists and political appointments and, finally, separating personnel management from the Treasury. As will be seen, their findings and recommendations were in many ways an exact image of the Fulton Committee proposals.

¹Brian C. Smith, "Reform and Change in British Central Administration," Political Studies 19 (June 1971):220.

Harold Wilson gave expression to Labour's suspicion of the civil service by complaining that "whoever is in office, the Whigs are in power." More recently, Labour MP Tony Benn captured the continued frustration with the civil service by arguing that a civil service policy has developed over a long period of time which "draws some of its force from a deep commitment to the benefits of continuity and a fear that adversary politics may lead to sharp reversals by incoming governments of policies devised by their predecessors, which the civil service played a great part in developing." Civil servants prefer a consensus politics which minimizes public controversy and change and thus "it is not a coincidence that governments of both parties appear to end up with policies very similar to each other."3

In its evidence to the Fulton Committee the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party showed how administrators might secure ministerial compliance with the administrator's policy.

An enormous amount of work goes on in a department which the Minister knows nothing of--some of it research work which produces important results which are never shown to the Minister; some of it planning work which may be deliberately concealed from him, either because it might


3Ibid., p. 7.
lead him to support policies which the department does not approve of, or even because it is being done in preparation for a future Government of a different political colour."

Civil service secrecy, its control of information, and its ability to set the framework in which policy is made are only a few ways top civil servants may exert influence over policy. In the view of Labour these characteristics justified their reform efforts.

A key figure in the civil service reforms of the 1960s was, of course, Harold Wilson. Wilson brought to the social and political environment of the middle 1960s a background which gave him sympathy with the attacks on the Administrative Class. Wilson, a chemist's (pharmacist's) son from Yorkshire, was described by one member of the Fulton Committee as a man of "humble background" who had an aversion to aristocrats. He went to Oxford with the aid of an academic scholarship and eventually taught economics there. Yet it is likely that as a statistician in the civil service during World War II he continued to feel the strong class bias of British society as it was manifested in the Administrative Class to specialist relationships. Emerging from what Wilson considered ill treatment by the Administrative Class during these war years was his critical opinion of it.3

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2Characterization given in interview with member of Fulton Committee.

the same time his technical background gave him a belief in
science, technology and scientific management that was the
underpinning for much of Wilson's reformist zeal.

Thus Wilson brought to the 1964 elections not only a
deep rooted suspicion of the British upper-class but a
professional expertise in economics. Robert Presthus\(^1\) has
characterized the election as a confrontation between the
Establishment and Meritocracy. The Conservative, Sir Alec
Douglas-Home, a product of Eton and Cambridge, a believer in
the wisdom of the amateur, and a member of a Scottish family
whose title dated back fourteen generations, representing
the traditional qualities of birth and character was being
challenged by Wilson and Labour who represented progress
through science and management. Accepting much of the
academic and Fabian criticisms of British society and the
civil service, Wilson described the conservative period in
power since 1951 as thirteen wasted years.\(^2\) One observer
has noted that "Harold Macmillan, as Conservative Premier
from 1957 to 1963, seemed to be largely unconvinced of the
need for reform."\(^3\) By contrast, Wilson wanted to be
remembered as an activist, a reformer.

\(^1\)Robert Presthus, "Decline of the Generalist Myth,"

\(^2\)John P. Mackintosh, The Government and Politics of

\(^3\)Frank Stacey, British Government 1966-1975, Years of
During the campaign, Wilson emphasized that he intended to restructure the government machinery. In a revealing radio interview by Dr. Norman Hunt¹ (later to be named to the Fulton Committee), Wilson indicated that as Prime Minister he would increase the number of temporary appointments of outsiders to increase the number of scientists and economists in the civil service, increase the number of political appointees in the Prime Minister's office, give responsibility for economic planning to a new ministry separate from the Treasury, and introduce more scientific management techniques into the civil service.

True to his promise, one of the first acts of the new Labour Government in 1964 was to appoint a number of political advisors and create some new posts for economists and scientists. For example, economist Thomas Balogh was appointed Economic Advisor in the Cabinet Office, Robert Nield became Economic Advisor to the Treasury, the post of Scientific Advisor was added in the Cabinet, and, as already noted, the Department of Economic Affairs was created to make it easier to bring in outside expertise. The spirit of reform quickly engulfed the Wilson Administration. In quick succession between 1965 and 1969 were reports from the Mallaby Committee on staffing local government, the Maud Committee on management of local government, the Seebohm

¹Interview with Harold Wilson by Norman Hunt, "Whitehall and Beyond," The Listener 71, March 5, 1964, pp. 379-381.
Committee on local authority personal social services, the Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission on local government structure in England, and the Select Committee on Nationalized Industry which recommended that the Post Office should become a public corporation. The Cabinet itself was a target for reform as Wilson in 1968 implemented a reorganization scheme. One point is clear, in the mid-1960s the appropriate nature of a responsible public administration was being questioned and the mechanisms to secure responsibility were being sought. Fulton was part of this flood of dissatisfaction and reform.

Wilson was not alone in the drive for reform. During this period Parliament was also trying to reform itself. In 1967 the House of Commons set up three new select committees, in addition to the three already existing Public Accounts, Estimates, and Nationalized Industries Committees, to improve the Parliament's oversight of administration. Also in 1967 was the establishment of a Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, or Ombudsman, to investigate administrative actions on behalf of the Crown. It was in this climate that the House of Commons Estimates Committee investigated the problems of recruitment to the civil service in 1964-65. As Brian Smith observes, "although

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primarily concerned with Civil Service Commission recruitment methods, the Committee, under the influence of the pervading reformist atmosphere, drew attention to the policies underlying recruitment, such as the structure of the Service, the task of Government and the need for expertise and specialized skills."\(^1\) The Committee criticized the Treasury for its lack of change to meet new demands upon government and were specifically critical of the isolation of civil servants from the rest of society, the lack of mobility between government and business and universities, and the lack of specialists. These areas should be investigated, the Committee recommended, and called for "a committee of officials, aided by members from outside the civil service, ... to be appointed to initiate research upon, to examine, and to report upon the structure, recruitment and management of the civil service."\(^2\) It should be noted that Conservative Sir Edward Boyle was one member of the Estimates Committee quite pointed in his questioning of the then Joint Permanent Secretary of the Civil Service, William Armstrong, regarding the need to open up the service and for more interchange with the outside. Sir Edward was shortly to become a member of the committee which he recommended.

\(^1\)Smith, "Reform and Change in British Central Administration," p. 220.

The Creation

Because a head of government may find it difficult to initiate investigations of those agencies and individuals implementing his policies, the recommendation of the Estimates Committee provided Wilson the justification he apparently had long wanted. On February 8, 1966, Wilson announced in the House of Commons the Government's acceptance of the recommendation "that a committee should be appointed to examine the structure, recruitment and management, including training, of the Home Civil Service." Wilson anticipated that these "very broad terms of reference will require a fundamental and wide-ranging inquiry." Was the concept of responsible administration about to change in some radical way? Did Wilson intend to turn the traditional notion upon its head? Wilson went on to say that "the Government's willingness to consider changes in the Civil Service does not imply any intention on their part to alter the basic relationship between Ministers and civil servants. Civil servants, however eminent, remain the confidential advisers of Ministers, who alone are answerable to Parliament for policy; and we do not envisage any change in this fundamental feature of our parliamentary system of democracy."
Thus, the tension inherent in attempts to reform were revealed—tensions between the need to change and the need for continuity. The boundaries for the Committee on the Civil Service were established and a premonition of the nature of its recommendations was given.

The Committee was composed of twelve members appointed by Wilson plus a small staff of civil servants. On first glance the Committee appeared to be a well-balanced group representing a cross-section of society with three academics (political scientists), two MPs, two Permanent Secretaries, two industrialists, one trade unionist, one scientist, and one economist. On closer examination it is clear that the composition of the committee was designed to give Wilson the recommendations that he wanted. Lord (John) Fulton, vice-chancellor at the University of Sussex until 1967, was appointed as Chairman. His active teaching life had been in philosophy and politics at Balliol College, Oxford (providing a threat to Jowett, the Balliol tutor who had influenced Northcote and Trevelyan). More importantly, Fulton had served as temporary civil servant during the war years 1942-1944 as Principal Assistant Secretary at the Ministry of Fuel and Power. He was at the Ministry when Harold Wilson became Director of Economics and Statistics in 1943. It was here, while pulling their night-time "fire
watching" duties,\(^1\) that the two men had occasion to talk about the complaints that each had against the mandarins--Wilson for their mistreatment of specialists like himself and Fulton for their lack of initiative and inventiveness.\(^2\) For Fulton's service to the country, indicated to some extent by his service on numerous boards and commissions, he was made a life peer in 1966 by Wilson's Government. Perhaps because of his wide involvement in other areas or perhaps because by 1966 he had no real interest, Fulton was chairman in name only.\(^3\) Yet his war-time link to Wilson, his sympathy with Wilson's perspective, his public prominence was apparently enough for Wilson.

The second academic on the Committee, Professor Simey, Professor of Social Science at the University of Liverpool, had also recently been made life peer by the Wilson Government. Simey was the only academic member of the Committee who had a special interest in public administration, although this does not appear to have been the primary reason for his selection. The most likely reason was that Simey was a member of Wilson's Lancashire constituency and a

\(^1\)During the war, civil servants took turns watching their office buildings at night to put out fires that might result from German bombing.


\(^3\)Several interviewees noted that Lord Fulton was rather ill-informed and provided no real guidance for the committee.
Labour sympathizer. He had most recently gained notoriety when his wife refused to take the title of Lady. The third academic, Dr. Norman Hunt (later Lord Crowther-Hunt), Fellow and Lecturer in politics at Exeter College, Oxford, was a close friend to Wilson and shared his thinking.

The two Members of Parliament were Robert Sheldon, Labour, and Sir Edward Boyle, Conservative. Boyle had already publicly expressed his criticisms of the civil service as member of the Estimates Committee. Sheldon, a product of technical college with engineering training, shared the thinking of those who believed that civil servants should be individually responsible for their actions.¹

Similarly, Robert Nield, Economic Adviser to the Treasury from 1964 and Chairman of the Fabian Group responsible for The Administrators, was very close to Labour Ministers and highly critical of the "amateurism" of the Administrative Class.

The other members of the Committee included Sir James Dunnett, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Labour; Sir Philip Allen, Second Permanent Secretary in the Pay and Management side of the Treasury; Walter Anderson, General Secretary of the National and Local Government Officer's

¹In Parliamentary debate, November 1968, Sheldon argued that the ability is needed within the Civil Service "to lay blame or give praise upon individuals so that they can be rewarded when they have been successful or be reproved when they have been unsuccessful." Great Britain, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, Vol. 773 (1968):1611.
Association; Sir William Cook, Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Defence, with longtime experience in the civil service; Sir Norman Kipping, retired Director General of the Federation of British Industries; Sir John Wall, business executive, with many years experience in the civil service, who shortly after his committee appointment was made vice-chairman of the Post Office Board. Serving as Secretary to the Committee was R. W. L. Wilding, then a Principal in the Treasury but to become an Assistant Secretary in the new Civil Service Department.

The Committee was large by postwar standards,¹ but its chief characteristics appear to be the strong representation of known civil service critics and the heavy representation of current and past civil servants. All the members were undoubtedly influenced by the mood of the country, the thinking of the new Labour Government, and the recent wave of critical literature. Even the civil servants were pulled along by this wave--afraid to resist its pull for fear of reflecting on the conservatism of the Service.²

The committee appointments and structure gave rise to skepticism among many observers regarding the ability of the

¹Timothy J. Cartwright, "The Fulton Committee on the Civil Service in Britain," Canadian Public Administration 12 (Spring 1969):92, notes that the Fulton Committee had twelve members while the average is eight.

²As one interviewee, a civil servant on the Fulton Committee, noted, he supported the controversial first chapter and many recommendations, lest the skeptics and critics point to the civil service as being against change.
committee to produce an effective reform document. Some critics saw the heavy representation of civil servants as an attempt to sabotage real reform, though others saw it as a tactic to insure that recommendations were implemented. Others noted that the Fulton Committee was a Departmental Committee of Inquiry, not a Royal Commission. Some observers saw this as a downgrading of the investigation into the civil service, since Royal Commissions have more prestige and more authority to call people and papers. At the same time, the departmental committee may have more flexibility and be less threatening to witnesses since oral testimony is not published. Nonetheless, the committee assembled and began its work as a body of prestigious, well-educated, public spirited men and, ironically, largely amateurs with regard to the task at hand.

The Fulton Debate and Emerging Themes of Reform

If it is correct that "administrative responsibility" is a concept that captures the competing values inherent in political debates over civil service reform, then it should be possible to organize the criticisms and actions aimed at the British civil service in the 1950s and 1960s under this rubric. Yet the dynamics of the reform process do not necessarily make this an easy task. It is clear that much of the academic and popular literature in calling for, among

other things, less secrecy in decision-making, more Parliamentary oversight, more specialists, technicians, and social scientists, better management, and abolition of the class structure, was stressing the themes of openness or comprehensibility, political responsiveness, professional-technical competence, and representativeness. But these new standards perhaps left those who were charged with implementing the changes bewildered. For as William Armstrong, Permanent Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service, complained,

The demand that administrative processes should be brought under close and more public scrutiny is made both by those who believe that the civil service is not as efficient as it should be . . . and by those who want to see it brought under closer democratic control. At the same time those whose primary interest is in efficiency . . . deplore the meticulous scrutiny of Parliamentary Committees and the Ombudsman.

"These conflicting ideas and demands," Armstrong went on to say, "are not simply represented by different groups in the population: they can frequently be found together in the same speech or report."¹

Nor were the signals coming from politicians less confusing. While members of Parliament were, on the one hand, attacking civil servants for their lack of initiative and drive, they were, on the other hand, criticizing them for their lack of responsiveness and were establishing more

detailed accountability through Parliamentary committees. At the same time, civil service staff associations wanted to make it easier for their members to move into administrative jobs or to increase their members' status relative to the Administrative Class while simultaneously protecting their own members from competition from either outside or inside the civil service. Thus the themes and prescriptions offered by the various critics, though clear when standing on their own, were often conflicting and confusing to administrators when examined in the aggregate.

Out of this maelstrom of the reform process it can also be observed that the higher civil servants themselves had a role in initiating reforms. By the time the Fulton Committee was appointed, several changes had been made in administrative organization and procedures in the direction the critics were urging. At the same time, however, it is notable that the values pursued by the civil servants were often different than those pursued by the external critics. Those running the machine were often concerned with internal efficiency and keeping the machine well-oiled while protecting the status and character of the Administrative Class and the basic principles of ministerial responsibility. Many external critics, however, were out to provide Ministers with alternative sources of advice and make the Administrative Class more egalitarian.
Thus, the implications for ministerial responsibility of the political debate were confused. Certainly, its major components were under attack, but at the same time, Wilson's charge to the Fulton Committee, undoubtedly reflecting majority Parliamentary and higher civil service opinion, was to preserve the basic relationship between minister and civil servant found in the traditional notion. There was no agreement in society, Government, or civil service about the character of a responsible civil service.

The reform dynamics that culminated in the creation of the Fulton Committee were, thus, a whirlpool of professional, political, and personal motives and values that resulted in conflicting themes of reform. How did the Fulton Committee attempt to reconcile these conflicts? Can they be reconciled? To these questions we shall now turn.
CHAPTER V

THE FULTON COMMITTEE: OPERATION, REFORM, AND REACTION

The Fulton Committee was created in response to a complex set of political events. This chapter will continue to trace the process of reform, focusing on the immediate influences on the Fulton Committee and its findings and recommendations. That reform is a continuous or cyclical, rather than discrete, process can be seen by examining the reactions to the Fulton Committee Report, its implementation, or lack thereof, and the new wave of criticism that followed Fulton.

The Committee at Work

It is clear that the establishment of the Committee was the result of almost inexorable political pressures that coincided quite nicely with the political aims of Harold Wilson. Certainly Wilson wanted the Committee to complete its work as quickly as possible so that he could publicly report that his Government had reformed the civil service. Thus, the Committee was working under political and time constraints. Did the Committee keep the question of the proper nature of a responsible civil service open while examining evidence and exploring options? Was the Committee essentially a political gimmick, a facade, or was it a
thoughtful attempt to secure responsible administration?

During the two and a half years the Committee took to report, there were indications that research and empirical evidence might provide guidance for Committee deliberations. There is almost unanimous agreement that Dr. Norman Hunt (now Lord Crowther-Hunt) made a vital contribution to providing the Committee with research assistance and overall momentum and direction. In an unusual step, the Committee commissioned a Management Consultancy Group to examine the work of the civil service. Serving on the Group were a civil servant who had climbed the clerical and executive ladders to work in the Organization and Methods Division of the Treasury, a management consultant in industry, an executive from British Petroleum Company Ltd., and Crowther-Hunt, who was given leave from Exeter College for over a year. Between October 1966 and April 1967 the Management Group evaluated the jobs of some six hundred civil servants, covering twenty-three blocks of work and twelve departments, and investigated the relationship of administrators to specialists. Serving as liaison between the Committee and the Management Group, Hunt kept the Committee informed of the Group's findings and progress and the Group in touch with the Committee's reactions.\(^1\) According to Crowther-Hunt his tenure with the Management Group served to mold his ideas on a number of issues, particularly the need to abolish the

\(^1\)Interview with Lord Crowther-Hunt, London, July 1, 1980.
class structure and create unified grades. It is significant that Crowther-Hunt cites E. K. Ferguson, the British Petroleum executive, as being especially influential on his thinking. The British Petroleum company personnel were organized into a unified grading system and employed job evaluation and management by objective techniques.

The Management Group found\(^1\) that officials in the Administrative Class were characterized by lack of continuity in the job, relative isolation, lack of management skills and experience (particularly in accountancy and costing, statistics, economics, operational research and computer systems work), and largely irrelevant educational backgrounds. It is not surprising that these inadequacies are incorporated into the Fulton Report since Crowther-Hunt wrote the first draft of the Report. By his own account,\(^2\) the Report would likely have been much different if the Secretariat of the Committee, R. W. L. Wilding, a career Treasury official, had written the first draft rather than himself. That his draft was allowed to act as the working-draft is itself a case-study of Committee behavior. But the crucial point is that the entire Committee was influenced by Crowther-Hunt, who had a key position, a keen interest, and


\(^2\)Interview with Lord Crowther-Hunt, London, July 1, 1980.
perhaps most importantly, the time to devote to the Committee's work, unlike any other member. Crowther-Hunt himself and his draft were strongly influenced by the structure and management style of a private corporation.

There were also other research efforts commissioned by the Committee: a large social survey of the civil service, a survey and interview with selected Administrative Class officials, a follow-up survey of administrative officials to compare progress and to check validity of the selection procedures, and a historical study of reports on the civil service since the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. In addition, Volume 4 provided a mass of factual and statistical material from the Treasury and Civil Service Commission. But it is unlikely that any of those had a great impact on the Committee. The "Social Survey of the Civil Service" was published a year after the main Report; other researchers were not even called in by the Committee for further discussion. Thus "there is reason to wonder how useful for their deliberations the Committee members considered the sponsored research, and how closely the Committee members read the research documents prepared for them."  

If academic research had little or no influence on the Committee, perhaps direct observation and comparison did.

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Between September 1966 and February 1967 groups of the Committee visited France, Sweden, and the United States for four to five days each.\(^1\) Certainly, Committee members were impressed by the youth of civil servants in top policy-making posts, the extent to which Ministers chose their own staff, and the "professionalism" of higher civil servants that they found in each country, and hoped to incorporate these "strengths" into the British Civil Service. Yet one may wonder, along with Richard Chapman, "how firm a grasp the Committee actually had of the experience of foreign countries"\(^2\) or whether the Committee had thought much about the desirability or the difficulties of transferring these characteristics to the British system.

Finally, it is possible that the evidence presented to the Committee was influential in shaping their thinking about the changes needed in the civil service. The evidence was certainly massive--152 written and 250 oral submissions of evidence--and marked by "a remarkable consensus of opinion."\(^3\) Although some testified to the strong qualities of the civil service, "there is a large measure of agreement on the major problems that now need to be solved and on some

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\(^3\)This quote and the following quote from F.C. Report, Vol. 1, Appendix K, "Main Evidence on Important Topics," p. 181.
of the reforms that should be introduced for this purpose." Yet it is also clear that much of the evidence came from staff associations naturally seeking to protect their members' interests. For example, the First Division Association, which represents members of the Administrative Class, opposed integrating the top structure with specialist classes. Professional interest groups furthering their special interests, for example, the Royal Institute of British Architects, argued for the need to give specialists more experience in administrative work. Business firms or associations calling for more efficient, economical government, for example the British Institute of Management, emphasized the use of new management techniques such as management by objectives and the need for internal efficiency audits. There was a great deal of evidence from individuals and groups (e.g., the Fabian Society, the Labour Party) interested in reform for a variety of political, philosophical reasons. And, indeed, there was evidence from thoughtful academics and civil servants or ex-civil servants. Yet, Chapman's assessment that "the main characteristic of all this evidence was that it did not analyze in depth but merely identified the problems from various viewpoints and suggested possible solutions"\(^1\) is correct. There appears to be no attempt to analyze alternative solutions in light of

\(^1\)Chapman, "The Fulton Committee on the Civil Service," p. 23.
the given problems or, indeed, to evaluate the various perspectives of the problem, to assess the impact of solutions upon one another, or to recognize contradictions in the various proposals.

Certainly, it is difficult to know what the immediate influences were upon the Committee's decision-making. It appears, however, that neither research, observation, nor evidence played a crucial part in shaping the Committee's recommendations, with one exception, the Crowther-Hunt Management Consultancy Group. Criticisms and solutions were well-publicized before the Committee was even created (for example, The Administrators) and these pre-Committee arguments, along with the political needs of Wilson, were the primary influences on the Committee's thinking. Also, given that the Committee membership was, to a great extent, politically allied to or sympathetic with Wilson, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the Committee's effort was a political expedient to help Wilson create a reforming image.

Findings and Recommendations

Although the Fulton Committee brought little new evidence or analysis to its Report, perhaps the Report did attempt to integrate the solutions into a clear, radical vision of responsible government. Certainly, the Committee perceived its recommendations to be innovative: "The Home Civil Service today is still fundamentally the product of the nineteenth-century philosophy of the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report. The tasks it faces are those of the second half of the twentieth century. This is what we have found; it is what we seek to remedy."\(^1\) An examination of the Report's findings and recommendations will suggest the nature of the Report and its view of a responsible civil service.

The Fulton Committee's starting point is the finding that "the basic principles and philosophy of the [nineteenth century Northcote-Trevelyan] Report have prevailed: the essential features of their structure have remained," in particular, the tradition of the "all-rounder" or "amateur.\(^2\) In the meantime, the role of government has changed—it is more positive, more technical, more complex, and more international. Yet, "the structure and practices of the Services have not kept up with the changing tasks. . . . The service is in need of fundamental change.\(^3\) The Committee found six main inadequacies:

1. The service is based on the philosophy of the amateur, where the ideal administrator is the gifted layman who, moving frequently within the service, applies his practical knowledge and experience of the government machine to any problem. The cult of the generalist "cannot make for the efficient dispatch of public business" and, thus, "is

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 9, 10.
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 11.
obsolete at all levels and in all parts of the Service."^{1}

2. The system of classes impedes the work of the civil service by hampering its adaptability to new tasks, preventing the best use of individual talent, contributing to inequality of promotion prospects, causing frustration and resentment, and impeding entry into management for qualified specialists and technicians.

3. Scientists, engineers, and other specialists do not get the responsibilities or authority they ought to have.

4. Too few civil servants are skilled managers; they neither see themselves as managers nor have the training in management.

5. There is not enough contact between the service and the community. The civil service is not aware of new developments in business or in the universities, nor has recruitment produced a service with a wide social and educational base.

6. There are serious problems of personnel management. There is little career planning, too frequent movement to unrelated jobs, and little reward for individual initiative and objectively measured performance.

The key principle adopted by the Committee to guide development of the civil service was, "look at the job first."^{2} By this the Committee meant that managers in the

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^{1} Ibid.

^{2} Ibid., p. 13.
service must review the tasks it is called upon to perform and the alternative ways of performing them, then find out what skills are needed and, finally, find, train, and place people in the jobs. That job evaluation was the "one basic guiding principle" to govern the development of the service suggests the strong influence of the Management Consultancy Group and, more importantly, the basic value guiding the Fulton Committee document.

To address the problems the Committee made 158 distinct recommendations--some quite specific, others rather vague. Only the primary recommendations need be noted here. Since the cult of the generalist was the primary evil rooted in the civil service, the recommendation to weed it out was to staff the civil service with "men and women who are truly professional."¹ Professionalism, to the Committee, was "being skilled in one's job--skill which comes from training and sustained experience" and "having the fundamental knowledge of and deep familiarity with a subject that enable a man to move with ease among its concepts." The service should develop greater professionalism among the specialists by training them in management and providing more opportunities to move into administrative positions. For administrators, more professionalism meant greater specialization during their early years in particular areas of

¹This and the following two quotes from F.C. Report, Vol. 1, p. 16.
administration, either areas concerned with social problems or those concerned with economic and financial problems.

Changes in recruitment policies were also recommended to destroy the philosophy of the amateur. A majority, with four dissenters, believed that a "preference for [the] relevance" of the recruit's academic work to his future job should be shown by a heavier weighting of relevant subjects (politics, economics, science) and experience in the entrance examinations. Stress was placed on recruits having a greater understanding of numerical techniques and quantitative methods as solutions to problems.

A Civil Service College whose purpose would be to contribute to increasing the professional nature of the Service was proposed. The College, in the Committee's opinion, would provide training courses in management and administration and conduct research into the problems of administration and policy.

To end the monopoly of the Administrative Class generalists over the provision of advice to Ministers, the Committee advised the creation of Planning Units headed by a Senior Policy Advisor who would assist the Minister in planning future policy and evaluating current policies. The Committee stopped short, however, of recommending that the Senior Policy Advisor would share responsibility for the affairs of the department with the Permanent Secretary; the Permanent Secretary was to remain responsible for overall
departmental activities.

In addition the Committee proposed that late entry into the service should be expanded. Their view was that late entrants from industry, the professions, and universities would bring in new ideas and reduce the isolation of the service. For the same reason, they thought it desirable that there be more movement in and out of the service by specialists, economists, and professionals. Similarly, to strengthen the control of the Minister over his department and to provide alternative sources of advice the Committee supported the increased use of personal political appointments by Ministers.

A key proposal to end the dominance of the Administrative Class generalist was to abolish all classes and to replace the system with a single, unified grading structure covering all civil servants. The proposal would remove horizontal barriers to movement into the Administrative Class by merging the Administrative, Executive, and Clerical Classes into an Administrative Group and vertical barriers by allowing free movement from one occupation (scientist) to another (administrator). The uniformly graded structure, similar to the U.S. Civil Service and British Petroleum, was to enable more specialists to move into policy-making and management positions and to promote better management of personnel and more efficiency.

In the Committee's view the creation of a grading
structure would allow the application of the principles of accountable management. "Accountable management means holding individuals and units responsible for performance measured as objectively as possible." A grading structure, in the opinion of the Committee, would facilitate individual job analysis, management by objectives, and departmental efficiency audits so that performance could be measured against cost or other objective criteria and individuals could be held personally responsible for their performance. Like the Carter reform of 1978, an important component of "accountable management" was the linkage of annual pay increments to performance evaluation. Through reform of the grading structure and use of modern personnel management techniques the Committee believed that more flexible, economical, and efficient use could be made of staff and promotion could be based on merit rather than seniority and class membership.

To implement these proposals the Committee recommended the establishment of a new Civil Service Department which would absorb the functions of the Civil Service Commission and manage the civil service. A new department was needed because many civil servants lacked confidence in the Treasury and many believed too much power was concentrated in a Treasury that exercised both financial and personnel functions. Consequently, the new department was not to be

1Ibid., p. 51.
predominantly staffed by officials who had spent most of their careers in the Treasury.

Finally, the Committee noted that the professionalized civil service must "guard against the danger of isolation" and that "it should remain the servant of democracy and be responsive to the control of Ministers."¹ Thus, a greater amount of openness and wider consultation with societal interests was recommended. This would require eliminating unnecessary secrecy and a modification of the traditional anonymity of civil servants by allowing civil servants to explain publicly what their departments are doing. Closer links with the community were to be achieved with the new recruitment procedures--more in and outers, wider basis of recruitment, expanded late entry. In particular, more preference for relevance would, the Report assumed, ensure that recruits "become more representative, geographically, educationally and socially of the nation at large."² Greater departmental responsiveness to Ministers was to be achieved by the Minister making more personal and political appointments and also by giving the Minister greater freedom to change the Permanent Secretary, Senior Policy Adviser, and Private Secretary when he came into office.

A number of observations should be made about the Fulton Committee's findings and recommendations. First, as

¹Ibid., p. 91.
²Ibid., p. 95.
already suggested, its findings were largely not much more than a compilation of the current fashionable criticisms and were little affected by its own research and evidence. Its criticisms of amateurism, ignorance of managerial skills, class barriers to promotions, and so forth "follow slavishly the political view which had developed and on which the Government was determined to act."\(^1\) Clearly, the Report was a product of and tactic in the larger political debate.

Second, many of the Committee's recommendations "merely confirmed developments which were going ahead in the Civil Service quite independently of [the Fulton] enquiry."\(^2\) Since the war, Prime Ministers had brought in their own political advisors and certainly since the 1964 election departmental Ministers had felt free to make political appointments. In effect, the Committee was just recognizing and blessing an initiative that had already taken place.\(^3\) Likewise, the service had already made improvements in the use of specialist staff, training programs, and recruitment procedures. Thus in under-rating the changes that had already occurred, the recommendations of the Committee, as

\(^1\)Brian C. Smith, "Reform and Change in British Central Administration," Political Studies 19 (June 1971):222.


one member reflected later, were "broadly conservative." In addition, many of the recommendations were consistent with suggestions of the staff associations and even the Treasury. The concern to secure acceptance of the Committee's proposals by the civil service and Government precluded radical change. Furthermore, the limited terms of reference given to the Committee hindered it from examining the civil service's relationship with Parliament or the civil servant's relationship with his Minister. The Committee was constrained from an explicit attack on ministerial responsibility.

The fundamental reforms that the Fulton Committee hoped to secure were also precluded by the ambiguity of their recommendations. The 158 proposals contained something for everyone, with the result that they were often vague or conflicting. Creating a more professional civil service would increase its power vis-a-vis the politicians and conflict with efforts to achieve more political control. Greater use of management techniques and managerial control tends to conflict with a bureaucracy open to public participation. While the Committee expected the higher civil service to remain a career service, it also called for increased late entry, more temporary appointments, more interchange of staff, and more movement in and out of the

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service. Other examples could be cited, but these conflicting proposals are sufficient to illustrate the failure of the Committee to consider its goals thoughtfully and systematically and to pursue them consistently. On the other hand, the pluralistic nature of the Report's recommendations perhaps made for a broader base of acceptance than would have been likely otherwise.

Despite the ambiguous nature of the Fulton Report, it has, at the same time, a clear emphasis on managerial-technical approaches to achieving a more efficient, professionally-competent administration. The Committee found a civil service which was, in their estimation, amateurish, incompetent, and unprofessional. Attempting to apply new standards of performance to the civil service, the Committee adopted the techniques and language of business. A competent civil servant was one proficient in using the techniques of quantitative management and expert in a substantive area of policy. Clearly influenced by the intellectual environment of the mid-1960s and the Management Consultancy Group, the Committee sought to replace informed judgment with positivist techniques and a liberally educated generalist with a technically trained "professional." So although from one perspective the Committee's proposals were rather lackluster, their implications were indeed radical in the context of traditional British democratic politics. Attempting to redefine the prevailing notion of responsible administration,
to establish new criteria for judging the civil service, the Fulton Committee Report challenged the notion of ministerial responsibility and the nature of the political system. Prevented from explicitly discussing and examining ministerial responsibility by its terms of reference, the Committee's recommendations to establish "accountable units" of work, reduce anonymity of administrators, and recruit more technically trained civil servants nonetheless struck at the center of the traditional notion. To implement these proposals fully would possibly require a modification of the political system itself; to a great extent the conduct of public affairs would pass to professional and managerial experts.¹

The failure of the Committee was not necessarily in undermining the notion of ministerial responsibility, but in not discussing nor apparently understanding the implications of their managerial approach for responsible administration. As Parris suggests, if the "Fulton-type technocrats" were adopted, it is possible that the British system would break down because administrators and politicians would not be able to understand each other.² For while top administrators


would speak the language of expertise and presumably come from middle and working class backgrounds, politicians would come predominantly from upper-middle class Oxbridge backgrounds. Essential ingredients of mutual trust and understanding would possibly disappear eroding the policy-making process. The Fulton Committee thus ignores the implication of changing the fragile but crucial relationship between administrators and politicians.

A further question not considered by the Committee is the impact upon the attitudes and ethical standards and behavior of the civil servants of giving preference to those trained in relevant specialties. Fulton left no doubt that pre- and post-entry training for the civil service was weak in a number of respects. Yet, as Chapman suggests in his provocative article "Official Liberality," perhaps the socialization provided by a classical education and traditional on-the-job training "instills acceptable codes which may temper the possible excesses of bureaucratic power."\(^1\)

It is possible that traditional forms of training in the civil service impart a concept of morality or conscience which would be sorely lacking in a public administration dominated by technicians. Is having more statisticians and economists an important concern compared to having civil servants with a high sense of public service and ethical

appreciation? Are the two incompatible? Perhaps not. But Fulton fails in not concerning itself with the moral implications of a more managerial, technical training program, just as the Carter reformers failed to discuss the implications of performance appraisal and bonuses on officials' attitudes.

Finally, like their American counterparts, the Committee was remiss in not understanding that public administration is not just technique, that administration and management are not synonymous. Where the term "management" suggests the application to the problems of government techniques that assume commensurable values and measurable social goals, the term "administration" suggests "a process of balancing and optimizing, in which, by definition, goals can never be exactly fixed, tasks cannot be exhaustively specified and the methods chosen must themselves take account of value judgments on the part of the administrator and in the society at large which affect both priorities and modes of procedure."\(^1\) Where the goal of management is to control and manipulate, administration seeks to "adjust relations in a manner which satisfied a plurality of purposes and values."\(^2\) While no individual member of the Committee would deny their commitment to democratic administration, as a whole the Committee failed to pursue that commitment in a

\(^1\)"Editorial: Reforming the Bureaucracy," p. 372.

\(^2\)Ibid.
consistent and thoughtful fashion.

**Political Reaction--Administrative Inaction?**

If the Fulton Committee was a politically inspired enterprise which produced a political document, it is not surprising that the reaction to the Report was also politicized. The immediate reaction was mixed, ranging from enthusiastic support to enthusiastic denigration. Roger Opie, an economist who had served as a temporary advisor under Labour, argued that the power of the civil service should be curbed by implementing the Fulton proposals at once. On the other hand, Lord Simey, a member of the Committee, issued a reservation to Chapter 1 that pronounced it unfair to the civil service by not recognizing the great contribution the service had made to Britain. The proposals, he argued, were not radical changes but evolutionary in the direction the Service was already moving. Undoubtedly speaking for the Treasury and many higher civil servants, Simey posited that while modern quantitative techniques are needed, they do not "supersede the importance of the fundamental qualities of judgment" and "decisiveness, and the ability to understand how the reshaping of values may be embodied in and implemented by public policy." Likewise, Lord Helsby, former Head of the Home Civil Service, denounced

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the Report and asserted that it had a "rather imperfect understanding" of what a professional is in the British government.¹ F. A. Bishop, a retired Permanent Secretary, noted that Fulton had put "the cart before the horse" by focusing on the lack of professionalism and specialists rather than studying the machinery of government--its size, the proliferation of departments, overlapping functions.² In The Listener, Eric Hobsbawm accused the Committee of "cloudy thinking" because the quality of its analytic work was particularly bad.³

Editorial comment in Public Administration, journal of the Royal Institute for Public Administration, was highly critical of the Fulton Report, arguing that it was a technical, management, efficiency approach to reform which overlooked political constraints and the purposes of public administration.⁴ Similarly, The Times' conclusion was that the Report "is heavy in technical appraisal of immediate practical problems, and light in political reflection."⁵ The Economist was also critical of the Report, specific

⁴ See "Editorial: Reforming the Bureaucracy."
⁵ The Times, June 27, 1968, p. 11.
proposals as well as its generally "rude" treatment of the civil service. "The report is wide open to criticisms as an assault on the whole-time gifted amateurs of Whitehall by a part-time group of gifted amateurs, gathered in that most nineteenth-century of British constitutional mechanisms, an ad hoc investigation by a number of uncommitted gentlemen, meeting about once a week for three years, on a royal commission or committee."^1

The response of the staff associations representing the professional and clerical and executive classes was muted in tone, pledging to study the Report's proposals but disappointed that the Committee found it necessary to caricature the civil service. The First Division Association responded that "the service cannot command respect or have reasonable morale unless everyone recognizes that technical expertise and efficient procedures are not enough."^2

Among the civil service unions there was general support for the creation of a new Civil Service Department, the Civil Service College, and the proposals for better promotion opportunities. Yet there was also deep skepticism about the proposed abolition of classes among Treasury and First


Division civil servants, the Institution of Professional Civil Servants, and the Society of Civil Servants. To convert the top civil servants and unions Crowther-Hunt relates how the Committee held discussions with "Sir William Armstrong (later Lord) long before it was publicly announced that he was to head the new Civil Service Department," with other top civil servants in the Treasury, and with some of the civil service unions. In retrospect, Crowther-Hunt feels that such discussions were counter-productive, allowing the officials to prepare their counter-attack.2

In order to overcome the expected civil service resistance, the Committee also engaged in "high-level ministerial lobbying before the Report was published."3 Yet, in the Cabinet, support for the Fulton recommendations was unenthusiastic. The opposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was assured; the creation of a new Civil Service Department would remove significant power from his control. Other Ministers were cautious. Wilson had at first received the backing of only Tony Benn and Peter Shore. As events would have it, Wilson began a June 25th Cabinet meeting by exploding about a weekend leak on a sensitive political issue by some Ministers. To assuage the Prime Minister's


2Ibid.

3Ibid., p. 56.
ire, the Cabinet gave him an easy time on the Fulton Report.¹

The next day, June 26, 1968, the Prime Minister announced to the House of Commons the Government's acceptance of three key recommendations: the creation of a new Civil Service Department, the establishment of a Civil Service College, and the abolition of classes within the civil service. Of the latter, Wilson went on to say that the Government "will enter immediately into consultations with the Staff Associations with a view to carrying out the thorough-going study proposed by the Committee, so that a practicable system can be prepared for the implementation of the unified grading structure in accordance with the timetable proposed by the Committee."²

The first full Parliamentary debate on the Fulton recommendations took place in the House of Lords in July; the dominant issues were the Report's characterization of the civil service as amateurish and the abolition of classes. Lord Snow (C. P. Snow) took the position that "the contemporary stereotype is the very unhappy one that the Civil Service is composed of amateurs,"³ while Lord Robbins argued that the characterization was "intellectually muddled, morally unfair and extremely damaging to the interests of

¹Ibid.


the State."

Regarding the abolition of classes, Lord Trevelyan, nephew of Sir Charles Trevelyan, warned that the Report had a tendency to level down too much and praised the French Civil Service for the creation of an administrative elite. As a reflection of upper social class opinion, it is not surprising that Lord Fulton appeared to be in a minority as he emphasized that "we were right to recommend the abolition of all artificial divisions."2

Debate in the House of Commons was quiet by contrast. In debate in November of 1968, Wilson rejected the Committee's proposal that selection of administrators should favor those who had studied relevant subjects at university on the grounds "that to accept the recommendation would close to the Civil Service a very wide field of possible candidates who have started or who may in future start on their chosen university courses long before they had decided that they wanted to become civil servants."3 MP Winstanley vocalized an interesting and perhaps persuasive argument, at least for Conservatives, in noting that "people who study subjects of that kind [social sciences] do tend, I think, to lean towards the Left in politics."4 Yet for the most part the

1Ibid., column 1129.
2Ibid., column 1169.
4Ibid., column 1622.
Commons acquiesced in the Fulton proposals. Indeed, Edward Heath, leader of the opposition, was in agreement with the main recommendations.¹

Thus it appears that Wilson's political objective had been achieved. A report appeared with considerable fanfare and momentarily received considerable attention. Wilson was able to accept the Report's major recommendations immediately and begin implementation of those recommendations that the primary participants found acceptable. On November 1, 1968, the new Civil Service Department was officially established and in June 1970 the Civil Service College was formally opened. The proposal for the abolition of classes, the most controversial of them all, was ceremoniously accepted and conveniently delegated to the civil service officials and unions to be implemented privately. The politicians' concern to appear to respond to popular demands for reform had been accomplished. As the pressures of more immediate constituent and policy concerns took over, the detailed implementation of the reforms was left to the civil servants.

It is now in vogue, as part of the post-Fulton critique, to argue that the civil service sabotaged the Fulton reforms, that the unions and Treasury officials worked to prevent the change Fulton prescribed. In a 1980 version of this critique, Lord Crowther-Hunt and Peter

¹Ibid., columns 1572-80.
Kellner\(^1\) claim that Administrative Class civil servants not only had the power to block the key Fulton proposals but, at the same time, had the audacity to assert they actually carried them out. A new Civil Service Department was created by Harold Wilson, but, these authors argue, it was staffed by the same Treasury amateurs who always had been responsible for the civil service. Likewise, the abolition of classes was accepted in principle, but the civil service mandarins cleverly maintained a de facto class structure that preserved their power. Increased selection of late-entrants, in-and-outers, and specialists at higher levels was merely proclaimed a fact by the mandarins without any substantive change. Thus it was, in the story told by Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, that the old Administrative Class, largely in the figure of Sir William Armstrong, then Head of the Civil Service Department, simply carried out those proposals that it wanted and ignored the others. The triumph of the amateurs in the battle over Fulton epitomizes for Kellner and Crowther-Hunt the unchecked power of the civil service vis-a-vis Parliament and Ministers.

Another version of the bureaucracy's role in reform is perhaps possible. To discuss, develop, and implement the details of the Fulton Report a Joint Committee of the National Whitley Council was established immediately after the Prime Minister accepted the Report. The Joint Committee

\(^1\)Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants.
was composed of higher civil servants (Official Side) and union officials (Staff Side), including Sir William Armstrong, who, as Joint Permanent Secretary responsible for management prior to and during the Fulton deliberations, and Permanent Secretary of the new Civil Service Department and Head of the Home Civil Service after Fulton, was involved in each stage of the reform debate. He had presented evidence on behalf of the Treasury to Fulton, had been privy to discussions with Committee members during work on the Report, had cautioned Wilson about too hasty a decision on the abolition of classes and counseled that further study was necessary.

Post-Fulton, Armstrong served as chairman of the National Whitley Council Joint Committee. Armstrong was supportive of the Civil Service College and new Civil Service Department but he had reservations about the Fulton proposal for a unified grading structure, believing that such a structure would create staffing problems. At the same time Armstrong believed that change in the civil service was desirable—more flexible career management, less anonymity, better pension arrangements.

Reporting the progress of its discussions and decisions in a series of four pamphlets, the Joint Committee took the

1Interview with Lord Armstrong, London, April 30, 1980.

2Joint Committee of the National Whitley Council: Developments on Fulton (February 1969); Fulton: A Framework for the Future (March 1970); Fulton--The Reshaping of the Civil Service: Developments During 1970 (March 1971); and The Shape of the Post-Fulton Civil Service (March 1972).
view that "all institutions benefit from time to time from a radical review: and the Fulton Committee have provided a major opportunity for this in the Civil Service. These opportunities do not arise often. The Official and Staff Sides of the National Whitley Council are in agreement on the high importance of making the fullest possible use of it."¹ Thus both sides of the civil service appeared ready to use the Fulton Report as an opportunity to make administrative changes. And further, "both sides agree that it is wrong to limit our examination of possible changes to those which the Fulton Committee specifically proposed,"² thereby extricating themselves from being bound by the exact Fulton proposals. According to the Joint Committee, "clearly, this is going to be a long job."³

The main problem for the Joint Committee was to devise a practicable means for abolishing the civil service classes and implementing a unified grading structure. For Wilson this reform meant "that for everyone in the civil service, whether from a college of technology, or from a university, whether he or she comes in from industry or from a profession— all in future, the school-leaver, the graduate, the accountant, the engineer, the scientist, the lawyer— for all of them there will be an open road to the top which, up to

¹Developments on Fulton, p. 1.
²Ibid.
³Ibid.
now, has been, in the main, through the Administrative Class."¹ Although enthusiastic about the goal of abolishing classes, Wilson apparently did not have a clear picture of how this would be done. The Joint Committee was itself less enthusiastic and asserted that "the introduction of a new structure is far too great an undertaking to be completed in a single heave. It will therefore be necessary to approach the task in stages."² Thus on January 1, 1971, the Administrative, Executive, and Clerical Classes were merged into an Administrative Group. This was followed in September 1971 by the merger of the Scientific Classes into a single Science Category and in January 1972 by the merger of the Works Group of Professional Classes and other professional and technical classes into a Professional and Technology Category. The changes went far to remove the horizontal barriers to promotion within the service.

On January 1, 1972, a step was taken to remove the vertical barriers to mobility as the Joint Committee introduced a unified grading structure for the 600-700 positions of Under-Secretary and above which allowed posts to be filled by the most suitable person, whether specialist or generalist. But the change fell short of the Fulton recommendation for a unified system from top to bottom and,


interestingly enough, was just what the Treasury had recommended to the Fulton Committee. Whether this partial reform represents a triumph of the bureaucracy's power to thwart real reform or the best reform possible given the administrative and political constraints depends to some extent on one's view of the nature of bureaucratic power and reform. But it is clear that within the Joint Committee there was very little support for a completely unified grading system. The First Division Association and the Society of Civil Servants opposed the move on grounds that it would disadvantage their members, and the Official Side, led by Armstrong, believed the unification of grades would be detrimental to the efficient use of staff. The unification of grades at the higher levels only was the result of negotiation among civil servants who were responsible for running the machine on a day-to-day basis. Incremental reform was predictable given that the burden of actually making the administrative changes was given to those very officials under attack and, further, given that change was the result of bargaining within the bureaucracy itself. That this particular reform, and by implication many others, was only an approximation of the recommended reform appears, then, to need explaining by more than a "sabotage theory." In reality, the incremental nature of reform was due to the complex interaction of union and official self-interest, lack of clear principles and goals to guide reform, competing perspectives, and lack of
parliamentary-political interest. In short, it may be argued that the Fulton proposals were never implemented in full because there never developed a clear political consensus that these were the correct proposals for shaping a responsible civil service.

Other reforms were implemented by the civil service in the years immediately after Fulton.¹ Systems were introduced for job appraisal reviews between the line manager and his subordinates, thus developing accountable management as recommended by Fulton. Arrangements were made for greater staff movement within occupational groups and between the civil service and industry. New recruitment techniques were instituted and agreement was reached on new arrangements for early retirement. The final Joint Committee report concludes that "the impetus and stimulation derived from the Fulton Report have permanently changed the nature of the Service."² Perhaps, more accurately, it should be said that the momentum provided by external pressure and the Fulton Report was used by those groups and individuals in the civil service most affected by reform and desirous of change to pursue those reforms that served their interests. The civil service cannot be said to have played a role opposed to change; but it appears that the service's role was to

¹See National Whitley Council, Shape of the Post-Fulton Civil Service, pp. 2-3.

²Ibid., p. 3.
accommodate or even create change in order to conserve what a consensus within the civil service believed to be the strengths of British administration. To some extent, then, the picture of responsible administration held by the civil service was different from that picture held by the Fulton reformers. But the picture that emerged was less a single snapshot than a collage of interests and goals.

**Latter-Day Prophets and Responsible Administration**

Because of the incremental nature of the implemented reforms and the nature of the debate about responsible administration, it is not surprising that a new wave of criticism of the civil service soon began to swell. By 1972, four years after Fulton reported, it was becoming clear to many observers that the reform promised by Fulton had been aborted. The tone and nature of the criticisms beginning in 1973 and continuing through the early 1980s fills one with a sense of déjà vu. In late 1973, a new Fabian tract appeared calling for the next step in administrative reform to continue in the direction indicated by the Fulton Management Consultancy Group. Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s editorial comment and letters to the editors began to

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be concerned about bureaucratic spending, overstaffing, inefficiency, and power. "The power system in Whitehall," wrote Michael Meacher, "is in no sense a democracy, but rather a mandarin-dominated bureaucracy with only limited ministerial control."1 Articles calling for reform appeared in popular periodicals—New Society,2 New Statesman,3 The Listener,4 etc.—indicating the civil service for having too much power or for resisting change. Robert Taylor, for example, claimed that "Whitehall is in need of root and branch reform, ten years after the Fulton report. . . . The generalist approach still rules supreme."5 Individual members of Parliament returned to stressing themes of civil service power or laying blame for policy failures on the bureaucracy. Labour MP Tony Benn in a speech to the Royal Institute for Public Administration posited the thesis "that the power, role, influence and authority of the senior levels of the civil service in Britain—especially now we

1"Men who block the corridors of power," The Guardian, June 14, 1979, p. 16.


are members of the EEC—have grown to such an extent as to create the embryo of a corporate state.\(^1\) Former Labour MP Brian Sedgemore continues the theme by asserting that "Two things only can be said with certainty about Parliamentary democracy in Britain today. First, effective power does not reside in Parliament. Secondly, there is little that is democratic about the exercise of that power."\(^2\) For Sedgemore the civil service mandarins are among the establishment figures who govern by secrecy and illegitimate use of power. By 1976 Parliament as a whole had again taken enough notice of the criticisms of the civil service for the House of Commons Expenditure Committee to conduct a review of matters affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the Civil Service.\(^3\)

Latter-day prophets like Benn and Sedgemore are given aid and comfort by the highly visible criticism provided by Peter Kellner and Lord Crowther-Hunt, in a widely-reviewed book, The Civil Servants. "What is at issue," they argue, "is the competence of senior civil servants—and also their power: their power to influence governments and parliaments, their power to select their own successors, and their power

\(^1\)Tony Benn, "The Case for a Constitutional Civil Service" (Nottingham: Institute for Workers' Control, 1980), p. 1.


to resist change. ¹ In their estimation, the Fulton reforms had been sabotaged by the higher civil servants and, in particular, Armstrong, with the result that generalist administrators have more power than ever to the detriment of open and parliamentary controlled government.

While the external critics are building pressure for new reform, internal critics, ingredients which have proved necessary in the past, are contributing to the pressures for change. The civil service unions and higher officials continue to press for changes which will benefit their members and facilitate administrative flexibility and continuity. Thus the debate over the nature of a responsible civil service and the ebb and flow of reform continues. What of the future? Perhaps with the proper political push, such as a return to Labour Government in the mid-1980s, Britain will see the creation of a new committee charged with restoring responsible government.

CHAPTER VI
BRITAIN AND AMERICA:
THE SEARCH FOR RESPONSIBLE
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Presumably both Jimmy Carter and Harold Wilson would
declare that the reforms they championed had gone far to
secure responsible public administration. For as President
Carter stated when he signed into law the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978,

this legislation provides a fundamental and, I think, long overdue reform of the Federal bureaucracy. . . . It puts incentive and reward back into the Federal system. It allows Federal employees to be encouraged, transferred, or discharged for the right reasons if they cannot or will not perform. This bill will make the bureaucracy more responsible. It will build in incentives.¹

And Prime Minister Wilson echoed similar sentiments upon accepting the recommendations of the Fulton Commission in 1968 when he said,

I am confident that the Report will stand comparison with the historic Northcote-Trevelyan Report of more than a century ago. . . . The Fulton Report . . . finds that insufficient attention has been paid to management in the Service, and calls for a new system of training, organization and career management. . . . This Report is an essential contribution to the modernization of the basic institutions of the country.²


The question to be asked is whether these reforms indeed have been on the right track in the search for administrative responsibility. If so, how? If not, why not?

The argument presented here is that responsible public administration in contemporary democracy is characterized by its responsiveness to changing political and social values and forces, its broad representation of the groups it serves, and its balanced commitment to professional competence and ethical, moral ideals. In several important respects the reforms of public administration have shown themselves to be on the right track.

Social and Intellectual Influences
On Reform

Each of the reform efforts studied here has received its impetus from mounting social and intellectual pressures. Reform has not occurred in isolation from the social and intellectual forces of the period. Changes in administrative structure and processes have been made to make administration compatible with newly predominant social values. And although it is true that in the environment of politics, ideas and systematic analysis are often subordinated to bargained agreement among interest groups, "it would be rash to conclude from this that those responsible for initiating and implementing administrative reform in Britain [and the United States] had been uninfluenced by ideas, or that the intellectual climate has had no influence upon
administrators.¹ For indeed, Sir Charles Trevelyan was strongly influenced by the ideas of Benjamin Jowett regarding competitive university examinations for awards. And 19th century American reformers were in turn influenced by British ideas. Both the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and the Pendleton Act were products of 19th century liberal thought. The attack by Northcote and Trevelyan on patronage was rooted in the liberal concept of competition or meritocracy. Similarly, American reformers of the same period based their campaign against spoils politics on notions of political liberty, open competition, and Puritan morality.

After World War II British society was heavily influenced by egalitarian values and infused with intellectual criticisms of the old standards of competence. Responsive to this new climate, the Fulton Committee applied new standards to the selection, training, and organization of senior civil servants. It abolished the civil service class system, eliminating the Administrative Class in favor of a more open Administrative Group. A majority of the Fulton Committee believed that in the selection and training of top administrators a heavier emphasis should be given to relevant subjects such as economics and social sciences rather than the classics studied at "Oxbridge." The Fulton Committee was influenced also by the growing belief in science, technology, ²

and management science to solve the country's problems. It emphasized the application of scientific and business methods to the civil service. Recommendations to select senior civil servants who possessed mathematical skills and to hold these civil servants accountable through quantitative performance assessment were quite compatible with emerging social values.

In the 19th century in Britain the rise of a new middle class to positions of social and political predominance led to pressures for a more representative bureaucracy. Similarly, the emergence of a strong labour movement and Labour Party in the postwar years led to demands for a more representative higher civil service. The effort to replace generalists/amateurs with professionals, managers, and specialists and Oxbridge educated elites with middle and working class graduates of the London School of Economics and red brick universities was evidence of widespread perceptions of the higher civil service as unrepresentative of the outlook of the working and middle classes and their political leadership.

Likewise, in the United States civil service reform has been in tune with the prevailing social-intellectual climate. The postwar years, with the exception of the 1960s to early 1970s, have been characterized by widespread demands for reduced governmental spending and activity and by a pervasive belief that business principles and management
techniques are key remedies for problems in government. The ideologically conservative Second Hoover Commission responded to these trends by proposing drastic overall reductions in governmental functions and a corps of career senior civil servants distinctly separated from the political executives. The 1970s saw the re-emergence of deep distrust in government and the growth of social attitudes that disparage public service and worship the marketplace. Public choice theories and quantitative productivity measurement techniques gained a wide following. In this environment a Senior Executive Service was created to change administrative behavior by stressing monetary incentives and security disincentives. Reformers held up the civil service to a yardstick metered by business performance standards and managerial techniques and found it wanting.

A concern for the representative character of the bureaucracy was linked closely to these changes in social-political attitudes. The work of the Second Hoover Commission can be seen as less a concern for social class representativeness than for the increased representation of conservative business-market values in the higher civil service. It is apparent that a goal of the 1978 Reform Act was to make the senior civil service more representative of the managerial outlook of the Carter/Campbell Administration. It is also clear that concerns for increased representation of women and minority group members was not a major concern,
reflecting the political sensitivity of the issue. To a large extent these public and intellectual attitudes regarding bureaucracy have been rooted in events external to the issue of civil service reform.

The Pressure of External Events

Administrative reform does not take place in a vacuum. Decisions about the ways administration should be changed are often influenced by events external to the immediate civil service reform context. In both America and Britain reform has been a product of multiple external forces or events. Four examples provide evidence for the way external events have stimulated civil service reform: war, economic pressures, scandal, and growth of government.¹

Newspaper accounts informing the public of mismanagement and confusion in the administration of the Crimean War in 1853 provided a stimulus for the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms. Public reaction to these accounts contributed to the creation of a new Government under Palmerston who quickly began implementation of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report.

The Second World War was an event of considerable significance for civil service reform in both the United States and Britain. In both countries the war stretched the

¹This discussion draws from Chapman and Greenaway's analysis of external events as they relate to British reform, in Ibid., pp. 210-15.
capacity of public administration, revealing its weaknesses. Particularly in Britain, serious questions were raised about the professional and managerial competence of senior officials as large numbers of outsiders had to be called into government service at top levels. Some of these temporary wartime civil servants also questioned the personal qualities of Administrative Class officials, claiming they lacked initiative and creativity. Both of these criticisms were taken up by the Fulton reformers. In both the U.S. and Britain the war stimulated experiments to improve efficiency through better planning techniques, performance appraisal systems, and training programs. Subsequent civil service reforms were influenced by these wartime efforts.

World War II and the postwar years have been marked by economic uncertainty and instability. In Britain, for example, widespread academic and popular criticism of the higher civil service was grounded in the inefficiency of the economic departments of central government, particularly the Treasury. And critics blamed the "amateur" character of the Administrative Class for Britain's economic reverses.

Interestingly, economic pressures also were partially responsible for the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. Parliamentary dissatisfaction with rising costs of administration led to a series of investigations by a Parliamentary committee beginning in 1848. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report emerged as one of these investigative reports noting that economic
efficiencies could be gained by civil service reform.

Economic pressures have been important in influencing United States civil service reform. The Second Hoover Commission was motivated by a desire to cut government spending and to reduce the impact of public administration on the economy. The state of the economy was a stimulus to the Carter reforms in ways that are difficult to measure. Clearly the widespread public agitation for reduced taxes and government spending was an impetus for reform. In addition, popular perceptions that government is wasteful and inefficient had a direct impact on the tone and substance of the Carter reforms. Chapman and Greenaway's observation regarding British reform appears relevant to reform in America also: "the interesting lesson emerges that efforts to cut down the cost or extent of government activity have frequently stimulated proposals leading to administrative reform."¹ If this observation holds true, it is likely that Britain and the U.S. soon will experience another round of civil service reform as economic conditions deteriorate and skepticism of government remains high.²

¹Ibid., p. 212.

²For example, a measure recently has been sponsored by Republican Senator William Roth and Democratic Representative Richard Bolling to create an eighteen-member Citizens Commission on More Effective Government. Modeled on the two Hoover Commissions, this time former President Ford has been suggested as possible chairman.
An examination of the reforms studied here suggests that the exposure of political scandal also has incited the movement toward reform. Publication of the details of the frauds and extortions perpetrated in the Grant Administration created public outrage that was tapped by reformers. And clearly, the assassination of President Garfield had a direct impact on the passage of the Pendleton bill. In Britain, criminal abuse had been checked early on, but indignation over periodic cases of maladministration gave the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms some push. Although no particular political or administrative scandal directly influenced the Fulton reform effort, occasional exposure of official abuse, such as the Crichel Down affair, indirectly contributed to the reform climate. In the postwar U.S., well publicized accounts of scandals involving career and non-career officials at all levels of government reinforced attitudes already negative toward government.

A final example of an external event that has influenced civil service reform is the growth of government. In each of the postwar reforms studied, the growth of positive government has stimulated reform in two ways. Pressure has been placed on administrators to find more effective approaches to meeting increased public demands. For example, many of the Fulton Committee proposals were already in the process of being implemented in 1968 and the SES had been incubating in the U.S. Civil Service Commission for many
years just waiting for the appropriate political moment to be hatched. At the same time, among large segments of the population in Britain and the U.S., governmental growth has led to perceptions of a bureaucracy growing increasingly powerful. A concern for bureaucratic power has precipitated political demands for increased administrative accountability and responsiveness.

The Impact of Politics and Political Values

In the postwar years, political leaders, particularly chief executives, also have found bureaucratic power troublesome. Both British and American reformers attacked a bureaucracy which they believed had grown too resistant to change, too closed, and too powerful. Hoover and Republican Congressional leaders in the 1950s, the Labour Party in the 1960s, and the Carter Administration in the 1970s perceived that a powerful civil service threatened achievement of their political goals. Thus reform, in their eyes, was an attempt not only to make the civil service more representative of their various political outlooks, but to change the relationship between the bureaucracy and the political executives so that the politicians would exert more leadership.

To promote political responsiveness the Fulton Committee urged an increase in the number of political advisors, a decrease in the traditional anonymity of career civil servants, and a more exacting standard of accountability
through management-by-objective techniques. For the same reasons the Hoover Commission recommended enlarging the number of political executives who were to be sharply separated from a corps of career officials with rigidly defined responsibilities. And the Senior Executive Service is an attempt to increase the bureaucracy's responsiveness to the President by giving him flexibility to reassign senior career officials, to place either career or political appointees in general SES positions, and to reward senior career executives for "good" performance. Civil service reform in the postwar years, then, has emphasized the value of political responsiveness to executive leadership.

And yet the nature of the reform process suggests that reform has been the pursuit of many political interests and values. The impetus for reform arises from pressure exerted by many political actors, including the chief executive, as well as by social and intellectual forces. The reformed civil service is a result of political consensus, however temporary, among reform participants. The present examination of reform in Britain and the United States points up the central role of interest group, pluralist politics in bringing about administrative change. Civil service reform has emerged from the interaction of seven different political sources: public opinion, individual reformers, senior civil servants, interest groups, political parties,
Congress/Parliament, and President/Prime Minister.\(^1\)

Although broad public dissatisfaction with government and economics often is a stimulus for reform, it seldom is so well focused as to affix itself specifically on civil service reform. Except perhaps when associated with public spending, problems of government organization and civil service do not excite much public interest. They are not "sexy" issues. However, public opinion often has been "educated" by individual reformers and reform-minded groups to perceive that reform of the civil service is the solution for national ills. In 1855 in Britain the Administrative Reform Association helped to focus public agitation with government ineptness in handling the Crimean War on the more specific criticisms raised by the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. Likewise in the U.S., reform leaders such as Jenckes, Eaton, Schurz, and organizations such as the National Civil Service Reform League transformed public disgust with government scandals and the assassination of President Garfield into a more specific demand for civil service reform. In the postwar period, widespread public unrest associated with economic instability, loss of confidence in government, and feelings of lost national prestige was appropriated by reformers to fashion the Carter and Fulton reforms.

Reform leaders, therefore, have been crucial in every

\(^1\)See Chapman and Greenaway, pp. 201-208 for a more detailed discussion of the impact of political pressure on British administrative reform.
reforming effort. Just as the Pendleton Act would not have been possible without the intense commitment of Eaton, Schurz and others, neither would the Carter reform legislation have survived without the leadership of Carter, Campbell, and Udall. The motivations of the individual reform leaders have been as varied as the individuals. Sometimes civil service reform is supported because it yields short-term political advantages, as when President Eisenhower supported the creation of the Second Hoover Commission to placate Congressional Republicans. Reform is advocated by other individuals because it coincides with their broader political goals and view of the public interest. Harold Wilson's support of the Fulton Committee partially emerged from his belief that its recommendations would support his conviction that more specialization in the Administrative Class was in the public's interest. Likewise, the enthusiasm of Jimmy Carter and Herbert Hoover for a senior civil service corps was nurtured by their belief that such a corps would make government more business-like and management conscious. To their minds, the public good demanded such standards. Individual leaders, even with their varied motivations, have given reform efforts focus and energy.

Senior civil servants also have been key participants in civil service reform. They have applied pressure for reform, developed the reform proposals and framework, and
guided its implementation. Personnel administrators in the U.S. Civil Service Commission throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s not only worked to develop proposals for a senior civil service, but also worked closely with Presidential appointees on political strategy and Congressional members and staff on legislative details. It is clear that the response of senior career executives to the new SES will weigh heavily on its prospects for the future. In Britain, civil service officials already had developed and, indeed, had begun implementation of some of the Fulton proposals when the Committee reported. Consolidation of classes and an increased access to top posts for specialists are notable examples. After Wilson accepted selected Fulton recommendations, the senior civil service was responsible for implementing those recommendations. In implementing the Fulton proposal to abolish civil service classes, the civil service modified and moderated the impact of this proposal. To many critics this simply illustrated the unrestrained power of the civil service. For others, however, its ability to guide the implementation of policy in this way suggests the responsible use of power to adjust policy to fit administrative and political realities.

Interest groups, too, have played an important role in the reform process—in initiating the reform, shaping the contents of the reform package, stimulating political support or opposition, and implementing the reform. In the
nineteenth century the Administrative Reform Association in Britain and the National Civil Service Reform League in America were critical to the creation of civil service systems. Similarly, the Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report was organized to generate support for both Hoover Commissions.

In the Fulton and Carter reform debates, interest groups lined up on either side of the issues in typical patterns. For example, civic, professional, managerial, and business groups generally supported Fulton and Carter reform proposals as contributions to more effective government. On the other hand, veterans' organizations and public employee unions offered intense opposition to those components of the reform which conflicted with their members' interests, in terms of job security, promotion opportunities, employee rights, and so forth. This conflict between interests and ideas was reflected in the political dynamics of the reform process.

On the whole, organized political parties have played an ambiguous role in the efforts to reform civil services. Reform planks in the Democratic and Republican platforms prior to the passage of the Pendleton Act were concessions to a few vocal activists rather than a result of party consensus. After all, the attitude of most party members at that time was expressed by Webster Flanagan at the 1880 Republican convention, "What are we here for except for the
offices?" When party fortunes appeared to hinge on the support of civil service reform, the parties were quick to respond.

In post-war American politics, political parties as such have remained generally uninterested in civil service reform. In 1978, legislative support for the Carter reform package was bipartisan. Yet the creation of the Second Hoover Commission was clearly a partisan effort and when the Commission reported to a Democratic Congress in 1954, party affiliation was highly significant in its failure. In Britain, political parties have given scarcely more attention to civil service reform. However, smaller groups within the parties have sustained a longer term interest and made important contributions. For example, the Labour affiliated Fabian Society has remained interested in administrative reform since before World War II, writing tracts on reform of the civil service in 1947, 1964, and again in 1973. Thus despite short periods of intense interest, political parties rarely maintain an interest in civil service reform.

It is equally difficult to sustain an interest in civil service issues in Congress or Parliament as a body. It is only when other reform actors, such as the chief executive and interest groups, apply concentrated pressure

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that Congress momentarily focuses on the reform problem. The pressure emanating from Congress to establish a Second Hoover Commission is an exception to the normal Congressional apathy. However, it is true that some individual lawmakers or committees do maintain a rather more consistent interest in civil service issues. The Civil Service Subcommittee of the United States House Post Office and Civil Service Committee exemplifies such a committee and Representatives from districts with high federal employee constituencies are examples of such individuals.

Because of the diffused nature of the demands on Congress/Parliament and political parties, support and leadership of the Prime Minister or President is vital in the politics of civil service reform. Historically, chief executives have steered away from involvement in reform issues which demand much time and effort and yield little political reward. Yet when the issue of civil service reform can be used as a beneficial political tactic and/or coincides with the chief executive's larger political strategies or policy goals, he may devote limited attention. Both Harold Wilson and Jimmy Carter are examples. Both men wanted the image of reformer and Carter, in particular, needed a legislative success. At the same time, reform was the route for both men to achieve the more fundamental goals of a politically responsive and managerially competent bureaucracy. After Wilson and Carter claimed victory, their
attention was given to more pressing problems. Neither executive devoted time to the implementation of reforms. Yet each has left his imprint on the civil service.

Thus, the politics of civil service reform in contemporary democracy results from the clash of ideas and interests. Individuals and groups seeking to protect their interests are often constrained by other individuals' and groups' sense of the public good. Undoubtedly some self-interested proposals are never offered because they appear selfish, undemocratic, evil. While some public-spirited reforms are fought because they so threaten another's livelihood, self-respect, or status. Often disputes involve some variation of the tension between the need for continuity and the need for change. Conflicts usually occur because notions of administrative responsibility are shared imperfectly. Where consensus fails, proposals for reform are laid on the shelf. Where a favorable consensus is reached, at least some of the reform proposals are accepted. Disputants then return home, only to return another day.

Problems and Prospects

To the extent that civil service reforms in the two democracies under discussion have been stimulated and influenced by the prevailing social, economic, and political forces, responsive to the values of the predominant political leadership, and intent on securing representative bureaucracies, they have been on the right track to securing
responsible administration. Yet both the Fulton and Carter reforms take detours that may seriously impede the search for responsible administration. One of the traditional strengths of British politics has been the ability of the political leadership to regard the civil servant as a national resource. To a greater extent than the United States, Britain has valued the civil servant "for his or her capacity to respond effectively to a succession of different political leaders and to offer a service that is more positive and independent than mere passive obedience."¹ There is some question as to whether the Fulton proposals to reduce the anonymity of civil servants and to increase the number of political advisors do not indicate a reduced appreciation of the civil service as a resource. On the other hand, the creation of a SES in the United States marks a potential contribution to realizing the senior civil service as "a 'third force' that is different from the self-interests of either political partisans or bureaucratic organization men."² However, SES provisions for reassignment of career officials, interchange of career and political appointees in career general positions, and limited right of appeals indicate that a harmonious balance between political responsiveness and neutral competence is quite delicate.

²Ibid.
A second and more important problem relates to the balance between competence and ethics. Another of the strengths of British civil service has been a particular philosophy of administration which combines the pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness with a commitment to ethical ideals. Rosamund Thomas points up three ethical ideals which form the basis of this commitment: 1) administration is a means to attaining a higher form of society; 2) administration should render a service to the community by supplying the public with quality goods and services at a reasonable cost; 3) administration should provide for the happiness and well-being of the worker through the supply of non-economic incentives.¹ Administrators guided by this philosophy of administration are characterized as much by their high personal character as by their professional expertise, by their broad social and political perspectives in addition to their ability to plan ahead, and by their capacity for reasoned judgment as well as by their knowledge of technical skills. From the British philosophy of administration one learns "the importance of a balance between science and ethics."²

Administrative reform seeking such a balance does not focus on external controls and economic incentives. By

²Ibid., p. 242.
emphasizing such approaches reformers may be introducing new organizational rigidities and dysfunctions, such as subservient behavior and risk avoidance. Perhaps more importantly, they may "be undermining what seem to be dying embers of the spirit of public service. The decline in morale and near-elimination of the spirit of public service is a very serious matter."¹ It is perhaps a factor in the unrest in the industrial and non-industrial civil service in Britain and the employee dissatisfaction at all levels of government in the United States.

An emphasis on hierarchical controls as exemplified by management-by-objective techniques, economic incentives, and security disincentives damages the balance necessary for responsible democratic government.² "If there is a choice between the liberal, tolerant mind, and efficiency," Herman Finer argued in 1937, "then efficiency in the harsh and aggressive sense is well lost."³ Both the Fulton and SES

¹Richard A. Chapman, "Training for Administrators in British Central and Local Government," revised version of a paper given in Trent Polytechnic, England, February 1981, p. 11. One SES member in the Office of Personnel Management shared his impression that the attitudes of new SES candidates are different from older senior civil servants. The new candidates, the interviewee suggested, are more concerned about individual safety and not as concerned about the rewards of public service as those who have been in government service longer. Interview, Washington, D.C., 1981.


reformers were remiss, first, in assuming that conduct in conformity with specialized professional education and quantitative performance standards would be sufficient to maintain democratic administrative values. Second, they erred in failing to consider how their reforms would affect administrators' attitudes and behavior toward their work and the public at large.

The new wave of reformers will explore alternative approaches to securing responsible administration. Perhaps "the hope of achieving a responsible bureaucracy lies, rather, in developing internal controls, that is, the emergence of an administrative hierarchy conscious of its role under a democratic system and dedicated to the enhancement of the system."1 Civil servants who are as committed to the search for community well-being as to professional expertise become their own best taskmasters.

If these comments are on track, then it is possible that the Fulton and Carter reforms of the senior civil service have failed to contribute to responsible administration in a most fundamental way. The central moral question for public administration was asked a century ago by Woodrow Wilson, how shall the public administrator be motivated to serve "not his superior alone but the community also, with the best efforts of his talents and the soberest service of

his conscience?"¹ It appears that recent British and American reform efforts have created administrative environments in which civil servants may be more motivated by techniques to serve superiors and self-interest than by a spirit of cooperation and sense of community purpose to serve the wider public. In the contemporary democracies of Britain and the United States acceptance of recommendations for reform along these latter lines will require the development of a favorable political consensus.

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