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POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXPLANATION:
A SUGGESTED HEURISTIC APPROACH

A Dissertation Presented

By

JAMES ABBOTT THOMPSON

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POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXPLANATION: A SUGGESTED HEURISTIC APPROACH

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April 1974

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXPLANATION: A SUGGESTED HEURISTIC APPROACH

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Directed by Drs. Gerhard Braunthal and Howard Wiarda.

This essay is an attempt to further the development of general explanations in the political and social dimension of life by focusing upon a central component of modern society--the political party. This task is assumed to be worthwhile and is held to be possible, because men seek to explain the world around them, and because explanations of social phenomena are neither totally normative nor empirical but exhibit a gradual shifting of emphasis from what ought to be to what is. This shift is facilitated by the construction of analytical frameworks which advance empirical theory development because of their utility in independent variable recognition and classification.

It is our contention that the three broadest attempts to explain the phenomenon political party, the Marxian theory, the democratic responsible-party explanation, and the taxonomies of Maurice Duverger are each a step toward eventual general party theory. However, each of these explanations contains serious weaknesses of orientation, inclusiveness, range and level of conceptualization. The

Marxian and responsible-party explanations are mutually exclusive and of high normative content. The Marxian explanation is general while the responsible-party or mandate theory is of the middle range. Both exhibit inconsistencies of conceptualization.

The "preliminary general theory of parties" of Maurice Duverger is clearly empirical and is inclusive of both the Marxian and mandate party explanations but is of little use in explaining the parties and party systems of the Third World. He gives us a conceptualization of parties primarily as collectivities of individuals rather than patterned human interactions producing consequences. As a result, his classification schema are static rather than dynamic. They are useful in development of a general party theory but as Duverger himself modestly claims, only a preliminary step in this direction.

The epistemological bases of the three explanations of parties are analyzed from a positivist--subjectivist perspective. It is our position that general explanations of human phenomena must be cognizant of both epistemological traditions. Both Marx and Duverger largely ignore subjectivism but for different reasons while Woodrow Wilson, as a representative of the mandate party explanation, is quite ambiguous.

A suggested heuristic bridge between traditions is the development of a model which is based upon commonalities of function of all manifestations of the phenomenon party. This search for shared functions, if successful, then allows us to search for common variables and to trace out the interplay of these variables upon parties and party systems.

The functional bridge appropriate for our task is the dynamic model of social stratification of Gerhard Lenski in which he utilizes the concepts of both class and class system. Lenski suggests that any society consists of dominant and subservient class systems, each of which is comprised of different classes. Every member of any society is both a member of all class systems and also a member of a class or power class within that system. This class membership and the ranking of the class systems determines the allocation of societal rewards of power, privilege and prestige.

It is our contention that political parties are the result of struggles for dominance in the allocation processes of a society and that these struggles are of three major types, (1) between class systems, (2) between classes, and (3) between class systems and classes. Viewed from this perspective, the static approach to party explanation of Duverger is supplemented with a dynamic element of social struggle over the distribution of rewards. Political parties

are prime actors in these struggles in contemporary societies. From this perspective, new variables concerning many dimensions of party and party system organization and activity patterns can be isolated. This essay is presented as a beginning in this direction.

PREFACE

The original motivation for this study evolved from my dissatisfaction with the mutually exclusive nature of the "democratic" and "communist" explanations of political parties. This situation became apparent to me during my graduate student study at Amherst. I explored the limitations of these explanations of political parties in a master's thesis which in turn led to the present study.

It is my belief that empirically based explanations of social science phenomena are possible and will eventually be generated when the process of variable recognition is more developed than at present. But this endeavor must be guarded by a theoretical framework which both structures the search and points the way to fruitful avenues of exploration. This essay is an attempt to move forward in the accomplishment of the second objective. The static taxonomies of political parties provided by Maurice Duverger are supplemented by the dynamic insights into social evolution of Gerhard Lenski--insights resulting from his focus upon the social division of societal rewards.

I feel a deep sense of appreciation toward Professors Glen Gordon and Philip Coulter whose graduate seminar in Political Sociology at the University of Massachusetts

developed in me an appreciation of the possibilities of using sociological variables to explain political phenomena. Professors Gerard Braunthal and Howard Wiarda have patiently sustained my efforts over the years to complete this study. Their suggestions have proved of great value to a student who, in the beginning, failed to appreciate the magnitude of his chosen task.

When ideas do not emerge, scholars can become short-tempered and morose. My wife Norma has borne this with little complaint. In addition, daughters Sharon and Michelle have refrained from sarcastic remarks as I stared at the ceiling. For these and other supports and motivations such as "When are you going to finish that thing?", I offer sincere thanks to all.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
PREFACE.....	iii
I. POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXPLANATION.....	1
Introduction.....	1
Basic Questions and Assumptions.....	4
The Study of Political Parties.....	8
Political Groups in Society.....	12
Analytical Party Studies.....	13
An Analytical Framework of Critique.....	16
Orientation or Theory Type.....	17
Theory Inclusiveness.....	18
Theory Range.....	19
Level of Theory Conceptualization.....	21
Summary.....	24
II. THE MANDATE-RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND MARXIAN- COMMUNIST-MAOIST EXPLANATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES....	26
The Mandate-Responsible Government Explanation of Party.....	27
The Party Responsibility Explanation of Political Party.....	30
The Marxian Explanation of Political Party.....	36
Lenin's Theory of Party.....	37
Mao Tse-tung and Communist Party Theory.....	44

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(cont.)

CHAPTER	PAGE
Theory Orientation.....	49
Theory Inclusiveness.....	51
Range of Theory.....	52
Conceptualizations of Political Party.....	54
Summary.....	59
III. THE DUVERGER APPROACH TO PARTY THEORY.....	61
Duverger and Methodology.....	62
The Classification Scheme of Duverger.....	63
The "Theory" of Political Parties.....	67
Theory Orientation.....	69
Theory Inclusiveness.....	70
Duverger and Party Conceptualization.....	71
The Range of Duverger's Theory.....	73
Duverger and the Functionalist Approach to Party Theory.....	75
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF EMPIRICAL PARTY THEORY DEVELOPMENT.....	79
Epistemological Considerations.....	80
The Scientific Method.....	83
Deductive Reasoning and Social Sciences.....	86
The Epistemology of Marx and Duverger.....	88

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(cont.)

CHAPTER	PAGE
Meaning and Social Action.....	92
Epistemology of the Responsible Party Theory.....	94
V. POLITICAL PARTY EXPLANATION: SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.....	99
Definition and Heuristic Model Explanation.....	101
Functionalism and Explanation.....	103
Functionalism and Individualism.....	105
Are We All Functionalists?.....	106
Functionalism and Teleology.....	107
Toward a Definition of Political Parties.....	109
Basic Party Characteristics.....	112
Definitional Scope.....	114
Power and Party.....	115
Membership and Party.....	118
Society and Party.....	121
Political Party Defined.....	124
The Psychological Dimension of Power and Party....	125
VI. PARTY AND POWER: A DYNAMIC HEURISTIC MODEL.....	130
Material Surpluses and Social Dynamics.....	135
Surplus Distribution and Social Evolution According to Lenski.....	137

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(cont.)

CHAPTER	PAGE
Partisan Groups, Power Classes and Class Systems..	142
The Rise of Political Parties.....	147
Classes, Class Systems and Parties.....	149
The Political Class System.....	152
Ideologies and Political Class Systems.....	155
Class and Distributive Systems.....	158
Party Participation and Membership.....	163
The Dynamics of Political Development.....	164
Retrospect and Prospect.....	165
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	168

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXPLANATION

Introduction

The primary purpose of this study is to advance our understanding of one of the central components of political life, the political party. Some voices are now being raised concerning a possible excess of emphasis with regard to the direct attention which this aspect of political life has been attracting.¹ It is our contention that parties are an integral part of government and politics in post-primitive societies and are thus a necessary subject of continued study if Political Science is to move toward more general explanations of the political aspects of man in society. We are herein attempting to advance the discipline two steps further toward the eventual goal of a general empirical theory of parties. The first step consists of an analysis and critique of the work of contemporary general party theorists, and the second step is a suggested means whereby we might begin to surmount some of the methodological problems of party studies stated by

¹Anthony King, "Political Parties in Western Democracies: Some Sceptical Reflections," Polity, Vol. #2, (Winter, 1969), pp. 111-114.

such students of modern parties as Maurice Duverger² and Sigmund Neumann.³

Explanation and understanding in political science, like understanding and explanation in any field of inquiry, is a cumulative enterprise. The development of a general theory of parties must build upon prior relevant work. We will examine the three explanations which have the most valid claim to be regarded as general explanations of political parties. Methodological standards of assessment to appraise these explanations will be developed and applied to the "mandate, responsible-government," and the "Marxian-Communist," and the Duverger party explanatory frameworks.

The second or methodological problem has been well outlined by both Duverger and Neumann. Duverger states: "We find ourselves in a vicious circle: a general theory of parties will eventually be constructed only upon preliminary work of many profound studies; but these studies cannot be truly profound so long as there exists no general theory of parties."⁴ Neumann assesses the problem in similar terms when

²Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. by Barbara and Robert North, (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965), p. xiii.

³Sigmund Neumann, ed., "Why Study Political Parties," Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

⁴Duverger, p. xiii.

he states:

The question of a proper approach to a meaningful theory of political party structure poses a dilemma because the overwhelming data of our material world fall into a conceivable pattern only if seen through the controlled order of a conceptual framework, which in turn can be conceived only in a full appreciation of the rich texture of reality. The task of attempting to systematize our knowledge therefore, is confronted by almost overwhelming difficulties and can proceed only by a simultaneous attack on both theory and practice.⁵

This essay suggests an escape route from the "vicious circle" of Duverger by presenting a heuristic model as one means of surmounting the pitfalls inherent in reliance upon either ideographic and descriptive case studies or the logico-deductive mode of explanation in the Social Sciences, a mode upon which Duverger relies and which he, and others, defend as being appropriate to the present stage of development of Social Science explanation.

The ultimate goal in inquiry, both in natural and social science, is explanation. It is our contention that, because of the nature of the subject matter of social science, complex social man, exclusive reliance upon the deductive approach to party explanation at the present stage of our knowledge of the

⁵Neumann, p. 4. In a more recent discussion of the search for a general party theory, Lawrence C. Mayer is perhaps less optimistic than Neumann. See his Comparative Political Inquiry: A Methodological Survey, (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1972), Chapter 11, "The Search for a Theory of Parties."

phenomenon will inhibit our search for empirical theory. We do not plead a case for normative theory, but rather suggest and describe a middle course approach, that of analytical modeling as a means to carry us toward our eventual goal of a general empirical theory of political parties.

Basic Questions and Assumptions

The basic questions to be explored are: Why study political parties? What are the limitations of various current approaches to a general explanation of parties? What difficulties does the social scientist encounter in attempting to develop an empirical general theory of parties? What are the alternatives available to enable the researcher to surmount these apparent limitations?

The first of these questions will be dealt with below and those remaining will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. Parties will be presented as a central component of modern society--a resultant of the mass participation ethos which has been developing for the past two centuries--ever since revolutionary France of 1789 institutionalized the "democratic" idea of popular, legitimate influence upon the ruling strata of nation-states.

The inherent explanatory limitations of present approaches to an understanding of parties will be presented within an

analytical framework of critique which emphasizes the implicit values of the individual theorist, or, in the case of Duverger, the lack of sufficient empirical rigor in what he presents as his most valid generalization.

In order to develop a valid deductive theory it is necessary to recognize and give valid weight of influence to all variables seen as shaping in any way the dependent variable which we are attempting to explain and understand. Thus, the use of this methodological approach in the study of parties--an approach which is presently advocated by many philosophers of science,⁶ is premature in the study of the phenomenon political party. We are not yet able to recognize many of the independent variables much less quantify them. Our approach to party explanation is to utilize a method which we believe will not only break out of the "vicious circle" of Duverger, but will also help to overcome the problem of relevant variable recognition which inhibits the fully effective utilization of the logico-deductive mode of explanation as applied to the study of parties.

We will suggest that one way to circumvent the problems of method in the study of parties is to utilize a functionally

⁶See, for example, Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (New York: Wiley, Science Editions, 1961).

based heuristic model. This device should allow us to bypass the inherent difficulties in both the narrow deductive heuristic such as that employed by Anthony Downs,⁷ and the explanations of a general but value-laden type such as those employed by Karl Marx and the "mandate" party theorists.

A basic assumption of this approach to party theory is that most, if not all parties share certain functional characteristics and that by emphasizing these functions by means of a heuristic model and then their psychological and sociological functions, conceptualization of similarities in independent and intervening variables might be fruitful. These concepts should then point to more hidden variables which have heretofore been neglected and ignored.

A clarification regarding our use of the ambiguous words "function" and "functional" is necessary if we are to avoid the sort of criticism leveled by Robert E. Dowse⁸ against one of the leading proponents of the functionalist mode of

⁷Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

⁸"A Functionalist's Logic," World Politics, (July, 1966), pp. 607-622. A similar criticism is also developed by Eugene J. Meehan in Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study, (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 176.

explanation, Gabriel A. Almond.⁹ Dowse alleges that Almond gives us a universal generalization regarding the seven functions which all political systems perform but he does not attempt to define his use of the term function so that:

If the basic concept is not defined, it follows that there is no conceptual limitation upon the proliferation of categories: the classes of activity ascribed to the political system are not derived from a basic conceptual or propositional framework. . . . There is no reason why the number of functions suggested for the political system should not have run into hundreds, with only nomenclatural infertility imposing a limit.¹⁰

Ernest Nagel¹¹ has delineated six usages of the term function, a list to which Meehan has added a seventh possibility.¹² Some of these usages appear to emphasize overly fine distinctions but two of them, in the realm of social science inquiry, require clear differentiation. We refer to the use of function to imply either (a) a necessity for systemic maintenance, or (b) the agent producing certain consequences.¹³ Following

⁹Gabriel A. Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

¹⁰Dowse, World Politics, pp. 608-609.

¹¹Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1961), pp. 520-535.

¹²Meehan, p. 113.

¹³King, pp. 118-119.

the lead of King we will adhere to the second usage, not only because it has the analytical flexibility of allowing for both intended and unintended consequences, but also because this latter usage avoids the technological connotations inherent in viewing functions as indispensable components of the system chosen for study.

The Study of Political Parties

Why study political parties? The most obvious answer to this question is: Because parties exist! The modern world contains social entities to which conventional wisdom assigns the label of political party and with the positive value which is commonly attached to the concept "democratic," parties are regarded as a vehicle by which this desired condition can be realized. With certain ideological differences to be discussed below, this state of affairs is as valid for one-party as for two- and multi-party politics. If it is the task of the student of government and politics to describe and explain political realities, then such a widespread phenomenon cannot be ignored. Some contemporary scholars are prone to list specific reasons why the study of parties should be continued and expanded. Some appear to suggest that one of the primary justifications for studying parties is because of the rise of a competing ideology to democracy as we know it in the West--

an ideology which until very recently has been regarded as generating a one-party monolith.¹⁴ Such a justification is suggested by both Neumann¹⁵ and Neil A. McDonald¹⁶ as one of the primary reasons for the study of parties. Neumann additionally justifies his work by claiming that "political parties are the lifeline of modern politics,"¹⁷ and that "Political Parties are the main agents of public affairs."¹⁸ Attitudes such as these have been brought into serious question by both Anthony King and Howard A. Scarrow¹⁹ who suggest that the role in government and political processes which is commonly assigned to parties may, in fact, be exaggerated because of scholarly assumptions rather than empirical investigation. If the wish is father to the thought, empirical explanation cannot be delivered from a union of fervent desires

¹⁴For exceptions to these attitudes see the discussion of the Polish "hegemonic party system" by Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 4, (December, 1970), pp. 1239-1245.

¹⁵Neumann, pp. 1-2, 5.

¹⁶Neil A. McDonald, The Study of Political Parties, (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 4.

¹⁷Neumann, p. 1.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁹See King, Polity, and Howard A. Scarrow, "The Function of Political Parties: A Critique of the Literature and the Approach," Journal of Politics, No. 29, (November, 1967), pp. 772-774.

and isolated rationally. It is our contention that excessively normative and/or rational studies of parties do little to further explanation of them.

Why then should one engage in the empirical study of political parties? If this question is adequately answered, another is then generated: How should parties be studied?

The answer to the first question is that a social phenomenon called parties exists and that the furtherance of comprehension of the political aspect of human social life requires that parties be understood--not in the normative context of superior and inferior political ideologies and systems, but from the point of view of value neutral understanding. Our position concerning party studies has no ethical overburden. It is justified instead on the grounds of man's apparent desire to empirically explain as much as he can of the world around him. In striving for understanding of political life, parties are permanent appearing social institutions, at least in the short run, and thus can be considered one of the relevant variables which must be recognized, studied, and perhaps eventually fully understood.

How then should the study of the phenomenon political party be approached? Duverger has summarized a central problem of the study of parties when he refers to the "basic contradiction" inherent in a field of study which consists,

for the most part, of single polity description and analysis. Such a narrow gauge approach does not encourage the formulation and testing of general hypotheses applicable to a cross-polity general party investigation. But, such general questions can only be generated in a meaningful way by the use of a theoretical framework. Thus the question then becomes: Why theories about political parties?"²⁰

All political communities which have reached the socially differentiated stage of political development contain two primary political classes, the rulers and the ruled. This division of responsibility raises questions concerning:

. . . the fundamental roles of rulers (politicians), and their recruitment and selection, the personal, social and organizational basis of their influence, and how their political organizations affect the making of important public decisions.²¹

The political party has been called a link between the governors and the governed:

The political party is a strategically critical concept for understanding, in any developed political system, the practices that permit and justify the exercise of political authority, that regulate the effective choice and removal of political rulers, and

²⁰This question has been explored by Avery Leiserson in "The Place of Parties in the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, (December, 1957), pp. 947-950.

²¹Ibid., p. 947.

that prescribe and delimit the authority of the government in power; as well as the processes by which public policy-makers are guided by and subject to the broad movements of popular sentiment and the balance of inter-group pressures.²²

There is a wealth of data available which describes the characteristics of individual parties and party systems. A theoretical approach to the study of parties can describe interrelationships among parties and organize and clarify the available information in order to increase comprehension and possibly predictability.

Political Groups in Society

Entities referred to as political groups are a part of all differentiated societies. Decision makers, and groups seeking to influence, control, and often displace them, have existed since the beginning of recorded history. Observation of, comment upon, and analysis of the processes whereby political power is attained, influenced and controlled, has continued for at least the past 2,500 years.²³

Until almost the present century, the study of political groups in society has consisted of a stated or implied

²²Ibid., p. 948.

²³The Politics of Aristotle is an example of such observation and analysis. See especially Book V, trans. by Ernest Baker, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

measurement of the observed actuality against a highly normative ideal type of political organization. Observers often posited a particular end for man in political society to attain. Groups and/or group systems would then be discussed in terms of how they contributed to the attainment of a particular polity, or how they fell short of the posited ideal.²⁴ Following the development of a specific phenomenon referred to as party, analytical studies of these entities began to appear.

Analytical Party Studies

The first steps in the direction of an analytical approach to the cross-polity study of parties was the turn-of-the-century work of Roberto Michels²⁵ and Michael Ostrogorski.²⁶ One scholar states that prior to the attempt of Maurice

²⁴For example, many Medieval philosophers strongly criticized any group in society seen as circumscribing the functioning of the Church in many, if not all aspects of civil society.

²⁵Roberto Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. by Eden and Cedar Paul, (New York: The Free Press, 1966; originally published 1915).

²⁶Michael Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, edited and abridged by Seymour Martin Lipset, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1964; first published 1902).

Duverger to construct a general theory of political parties in the early 1950's, ". . . only Ostrogorski and Michels had written analytical stasiology."²⁷ This is an overstatement unless it is not intended to refer to the analytical study of parties and party systems in specific polities such as the work of V. O. Key and Elmer E. Schattschneider in the United States, or G. D. H. Cole and R. T. McKenzie in Britain. These scholars are representative of observers who looked behind and beyond the formal and legal structure of governments to seek answers to such questions as: How does government really operate? Their inquiries were not of a broad and inclusive scope to the degree that they might be called general party theorists but they, and many others in the past fifty years, have amassed a vast body of empirical data concerning specific parties and party systems, leading one observer to note that there is "an embarrassment of riches" which awaits the general party theorist.²⁸

Both Michels and Ostrogorski directed their attention toward a comparison of formal and actual power structures of the

²⁷Frederick C. Englemann, "A Critique of Recent Writings on Political Parties," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3, (1957), pp. 423-440.

²⁸McDonald, p. 3.

democratic aspect of parties and found a wide divergence between democratic theory and actual practice. One current observer has stated that both of these analysts attempted to move from the particular to the general by examination of specific systems, and from this examination to move in the direction of general laws or generalizations.²⁹ This approach was confined to few parties and party systems and only to those of an alleged democratic leaning.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the only cross-polity general theoretical frameworks developed were what will here be called the "mandate" theory and the Marxian theory of parties.

Nearly half a century later, Maurice Duverger, in his groundbreaking work,³⁰ sought to enlarge the scope of the analytical study of parties by inclusion of both democratic and authoritarian parties within the same explanatory framework.

Our field of interest in this essay is in furthering the efforts to develop a general empirical party theory and we will suggest a framework of analysis with which the mandate, Marxian and Duverger contributions to such a theory can be assessed.

²⁹Englemann, The Journal of Politics.

³⁰Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State.

An Analytical Framework of Critique

In order to effectively judge the contribution made to the understanding of the phenomenon political party by existing theoretical constructs, it is necessary to devise an analytical framework. This tool of analysis will then allow us to assess the value of these offerings to determine their validity as general empirical theories of parties.

The criteria used as a standard of judgment in this essay are: (1) the orientation or type of theory--Is its foundation primarily normative or empirical? (2) the inclusiveness of specific manifestations of the relevant phenomenon to be explained, (3) the range, scope, or reach of the proposed theory: Is it of narrow or middle range, or a general theory? (4) the level of abstraction at which the entity called party, by the theorist, is conceptualized. Is the theorist's conceptualization of party one step removed from the empirical reality--the human actor--or is it a distance of two conceptual steps in that party is being conceived of as a patterned complex of human actions or behaviors? These four criteria are presented as valid means of evaluation to determine the utility of party theories as general tools of explanation.

Orientation or Theory Type

Our first standard of theory evaluation is the determination as to whether the emphasis of the theory is based upon a foundation of normative value judgments or empirical facts. This is not to suggest that it is possible to conduct political or any other research which is value-free. The very choice of phenomena to be explained is in itself a value judgment. But the influence of a value foundation:

. . . does not mean, however, that the validity of empirical research depends upon the kind of values with which one approaches his data; validity still is determined by the correspondence of a statement to reality.³¹

Normative (ethical or moral) and empirical (descriptive, behavioral or operational) theories rest upon fundamentally different bases. The former is based upon propositions which express ". . . the emotional response of an individual to a state of real or presumed facts."³² Such propositions usually contain elements of both value and fact. The factual portion can be tested as to its validity--the value portion cannot be so tested. "It indicates whether, and the extent to which, an individual desires a particular state of affairs to exist."³³

³¹David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), pp. 225-226.

³²Ibid., p. 221.

³³Ibid.

Empirical constructs have as their basis only real facts. We are continuously confronted with an uncountable number of empirical facts--facts which are, or have been, observed to exist as descriptions of properties which are ascribed to realities. "It is by experience alone that information about the world is received."³⁴ Thus an empirical fact is independent of all other knowledge. It is a "claim to knowledge which is independent of, and not a derivative from, existing knowledge."³⁵ Political parties exist as viable entities and vital components of the political systems of most of the world. To attempt to explain their factual existence, structure and function, in other than a frame of reference which fully recognized the empirical aspect would appear to this observer to be moving away from reality.

Theory Inclusiveness

If a theory is to be a valid general tool of explanation with reference to a particular phenomenon (in this instance political parties), then the theory must be broad enough to include all those entities which should be included in the

³⁴ Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, (San Francisco: The Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), p. 4.

³⁵ Eugene J. Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis, (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1965), p. 38.

nomenclature which has been chosen to establish the characteristics and the boundaries of the phenomenon under investigation. If the specific manifestations of the phenomenon which are perceived by the investigator to exhaust the relevant class of observables do not in fact do so, then the utility of the theory as a general explanatory construct is open to serious question. This is especially true if the excluded but relevant manifestations are later demonstrated to exhibit characteristics which are at variance with the basic assumptions which the observer made in the formulation of his theory. Thus inclusiveness of all relevant occurrences of the phenomenon is a necessary attribute of a valid general theory.

Theory Range

This proposed yardstick to measure the effectiveness of theory as an explanatory device is concerned with the level of explanation. If theory in the broad sense can be defined as "any kind of generalization or proposition that asserts that two or more things, activities or events covary under specified conditions,"³⁶ then the theories which the generalizations make possible can be classified as narrow, middle-

³⁶David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1965), p. 7.

range, or broad (general) theories, depending upon the level of explanation which each of these types of theory provides.

A theory that is narrow in scope, according to Easton, is one which is a statement "of observed uniformity between two isolated and easily identified variables."³⁷ From such a construct few generalizations are possible because of the limited number of variables present in this type of conceptual explanation. Such hypotheses are relatively easy to verify empirically. When taken alone they do not lend themselves to extension to theories of a higher level. This is the task of middle-range theories such as Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy." This type of theory allows the observer to transcend the limits of his observations--to generalize as did Michels about all groups in society which are formed for specific ends. Michels did not feel it necessary to confine himself to his own verification of direct observation. Middle-range theories are based upon a number of singular generalizations which are then brought together within a conceptual framework.

The third level of theory is that of broad general theories--conceptual frameworks in which are located the tools

³⁷Easton, The Political System. The above evaluation and classification of theories follows Easton's, pp. 55-59.

of explanation for either all of the phenomena which are seen as the province of a particular academic discipline, or one of the primary components of a discipline such as political parties within the study of government and politics. With regard to parties, such a general empirical theory would be cognizant of party origin, structure, and function,³⁸ as it seeks to explain the concept political party.

Level of Theory Conceptualization

The goal of this essay is to contribute to an eventual empirical theory of political parties. We have suggested that party is an empirical entity which can be perceived, analyzed and eventually explained within a general theoretical framework. Any theoretical explanation is only as strong as the explanatory power of the concepts which the theory employs.

It is often held that the maturity of science is reflected in the status of its theory. Given the fact that theoretical development is contingent upon conceptual definition, the significance of

³⁸At least one observer, Neil A. McDonald in The Study of Political Parties, suggests that in addition to these aspects, the legal status and the "object," the entity upon which the party acts, are also "theoretical approaches" to the study of party. He has not convinced this observer that these two aspects of the study of parties are necessary components of a general empirical theory of parties since no two legal systems are alike and all are normatively based and ideographic.

conceptual definition is obvious for the growth of the behavioral sciences.³⁹

Thus, any suggested theoretical explanation should be scrutinized as to the nature of the conceptualizations which it employs.

Concepts are not in themselves empirical but rather they are the individual observer's imposition of intellectual order upon the raw sense data to which the researcher's attention is directed.⁴⁰ They imply a value judgment on the part of the observer and a trained observer has an increased chance of peer acceptability of concepts which he employs. However, the act of peer acceptability of concepts within a theoretical framework suggests the emphasis upon specific values.

Concepts specify the form and content of the variables which one's general sociological orientation defines as important.⁴¹

³⁹Gordon J. Direnzo, "Conceptual Definition in the Behavioral Sciences," in Gordon J. Direnzo, ed., Concepts, Theory and Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences, (New York: Random House Inc., 1966), p. 16.

⁴⁰See, for example, Arthur S. Goldberg, "Political Science as Science," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith, eds., Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political Behavior, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 26-35.

⁴¹Alex Inkeles, What is Sociology? An Introduction to the Discipline and Profession, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1964), p. 100.

This orientation is a result of choice on the part of the observer and as such is an expression of a value preference. It is therefore impossible to totally divorce fact from value in explanation. Thus, a wholly acceptable explanation of a social science phenomenon is a function of its expression of widely held peer values within a historical context.⁴² We will thus assess the three general explanations of parties from the perspective of the contemporary values of society which they express or imply.

Another question with regard to conceptualizations is the basic unit chosen as the dependent variable for which the theory is intended to provide an explanation. If the theory is an attempt to explain the phenomenon political party; Is party shown by the definition used by the observer, a low level, intermediate or a high level abstraction? As King⁴³ has demonstrated, the level of conceptual abstraction utilized by the theorist has important implications for the nature of the questions which the theory is designed to provide answers. If party is conceived as a cluster of human actors, then the explanatory emphasis of the theoretical construct is focused upon party ideology, structure and organizations. If party

⁴²See Eugene J. Meehan, Value Judgment and Social Science: Structures and Processes, (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1969), especially Chapters II and III.

⁴³King, pp. 113-116.

is conceived as patterned human interactions, then the emphasis of the explanation shifts to a stressing of the:

. . . consequences of parties and party systems--their existence, structure and behavior--for political systems as a whole.⁴⁴

If parties are a central component of modern government and politics, we would expect that valid general explanations would conceptualize parties in the second sense, as patterned interactions.

We shall analyze the three explanations of party to determine both which dominant values, if any, they express and also the level of abstraction at which the phenomenon political party is conceptualized.

Summary

We have presented four analytical standards with which to determine the validity of an explanatory construct as a general empirical theory of parties. If the proposed explanation fails to meet the tests of orientation, of inclusiveness, of range, or of conceptualization, then its claim to the status of a general empirical theory is invalid even though it may qualify under one or two of our posited standards of validity.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 115. See also Scarrow, Journal of Politics.

Up to the present time, three explanations of the phenomenon called political party have been developed which have some degree of legitimacy in their claim to be called general theories of parties. Chapter II will briefly sketch the essentials of two of these constructs. Chapter III will deal in a similar manner with the Duverger approach to general party theory, as far as our analytical framework of theory range, scope, base and conceptualization allows. Chapter IV will spell out some of the major difficulties inherent in the subject matter with regard to theory construction in the Social Sciences, and Chapter V will provide a definition of party and additional discussion concerning the conceptualization of this phenomenon. Chapter VI will suggest some variables of a heuristic model as the path along which fruitful work toward a general empirical theory of political parties might proceed.

C H A P T E R I I

THE MANDATE-RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AND MARXIAN-
COMMUNIST-MAOIST EXPLANATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Prior to the "preliminary general theory of parties" suggested by Maurice Duverger, the two most inclusive explanations of parties were the Marxian-Communist, and the mandate-responsible government theories. The mandate theory of parties was implied in the works of Woodrow Wilson, Henry Jones Ford and Frank Goodnow,¹ and refined by Joseph Schumpeter² and Elmer Schattschneider.³ It continues to exercise considerable influence in the study of some aspects of government. The Marxian-Leninist-Maoist or communist theoretical concept of party also enjoys extensive utilization as a method of organization of the data concerning political parties and as a tool of explanation.

¹The mandate or responsible government concept was developed by Wilson in Congressional Government, (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Co., 1964; originally published in 1885) and in his Constitutional Government in the United States, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908).

Henry Jones Ford's most explicit formulation of this explanation of the functioning of parties in mass democracy was his The Rise and Growth of American Politics, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1898). The contribution of Frank J. Goodnow to the model is primarily developed in his Politics and Administration, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900).

²Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 2nd ed., 1947), see Chapters XXI and XXII.

³Elmer E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), and Party Government, (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942).

The Mandate-Responsible Government Explanation of Party

This explanation of political parties has, for the past one hundred years, continued to attract a great deal of support both from the general public and from students of government and politics. It has been referred to both as the "responsible government" explanation and also as the "mandate" theory of parties. Some observers have used these labels interchangeably but the tendency has been to apply the label "responsible" because of its implication of wider applicability to specific manifestations of the phenomenon party than the "mandate" designation has been felt to suggest.⁴

Political commentators have continued for centuries to differ as to the essence of the concept democracy but a measure of agreement is evident to the extent that democracy implies some degree of ruler control by the ruled. It is our contention that the use of the words "mandate" and "responsible" imply a subtle but important shift in emphasis concerning the

⁴See, for example, Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 26 (Winter, 1962), pp. 531-546. "The notion of responsibility generally is understood to mean that the parties play a mediating role between the public and its government, making popular control effective by developing rival programs of government action that are presented to the electorate for its choice. The party whose program gains the greater support takes possession of the government and is held responsible to the public in later elections for its success in giving its program effect." p. 532.

relationship between rulers and ruled with respect to the roles which these two societal elements are assigned in the democratic party explanations of the political aspects of society.

Most students of parties agree that party is the institutional link between popular desires and governmental policies.⁵ The early observers of the phenomenon political party, no doubt heavily influenced by assumptions of the rationality and desire to participate in his own governance on the part of the ruled, held that parties operating within an electoral choice context were bound and constrained to engage only in courses of action whose purpose was to effect their pre-election promises. These parties, in this early view, were committed to narrow and specific programs, deviation from which was sufficient justification for mass public adverse reaction. The reaction could vary from loss of electoral support, to popular revolution.⁶ This narrow view of the scope of allowable party activity was a result of the classical liberal position as to the proper role of government in the affairs of the ruled.

⁵Most authors of basic texts, as well as some more advanced and specialized commentators share this view. See, for example Footnote #4, above.

⁶John Locke and Thomas Jefferson are examples of democratic theorists who defended popular revolution as a check upon those rulers who appeared to ignore the direct linkage between the popular will and governmental policy outputs.

Both of these words continue to be used in a highly normative context but it is our contention that the label "mandate" is the more normative of the two since it has been applied to a state or condition of political affairs which could only exist in a theoretical sense. Since man has not, and will not exist in a world of perfect information, it is not reasonable to expect that in any existing or anticipated representative form of government, the rulers can have no flexibility whatsoever to exercise even a minimum degree of individual initiative. The totally instructed delegate representative is a utopian figment of the imagination of such political philosophers as John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau.

The concept "responsible parties" suggests that there is a degree of direct connection between electorate desires and official public policy outputs but that this connection does not restrict the choice of policy alternatives of rulers to nearly the same degree as does the mandate designation. Thus, on a continuum of extent of governed control of the governors, Wilson, Ford and Goodnow appear to fall within the middle range of the mandated party-----responsible party, scale. Schumpeter and Schattschneider are much closer to the responsible party end of the continuum.

The Party Responsibility Explanation of Political Party

This explanation of parties was initially developed by three Americans around the turn of the century, Wilson, Ford and Goodnow.⁷ It has enjoyed continued use as an explanatory framework for the phenomenon party; has been utilized by some democratic theorists to "explain" some parties and party systems, and has been justified by others as "the conduit or sluice by which the waters of political machinery and set to turn those wheels."⁸ The mid-century work of a committee of the foremost professional association of American Political Science attests to its durability.⁹

The model evolved as a result of the inquiries of these men into such basic questions as the resolution of the conflict between majority rule and minority rights. They utilized a theoretical approach to the study of the American party

⁷As discussed by Austin Ranney in The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government, (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1962). Chapter 6, the mandating or party responsibility of Frank Goodnow was a party leader-member relationship but like both Wilson and Ford, he was not at all explicit in his definition of party membership.

⁸Ernest Barker, Reflections on Government, (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 39.

⁹"Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," American Political Science Review, XLIV Supplement (September, 1950).

phenomenon and in so doing asked themselves the questions: What is the essential nature of democracy? How can democracy realistically be operated within the legal limitations of the United States form of government? They looked beyond the formal legal constructs and discovered the alleged necessity of political parties. Parties were then defended as the most effective, if not the only practical way, to unite formal government and the majority desires while preserving a substantial segment of minority rights.

The reconciliation of majority rule with minority rights, a continuing dilemma for democratic theorists, was solved to the satisfaction of Wilson, Ford and Goodnow by means of the doctrine of responsible parties. Such parties would ensure a collective responsibility to the electorate on the part of the governing members of the party. These authors implied that collective (party) responsibility such as they thought they saw in Great Britain, insured that at least vocal and influential constituencies would be heeded by the party seeking electoral support. Because the apex of political power was dependent upon a successful search for support, the rights of minorities would be recognized in the party attempts to forge a winning coalition of popular votes. To these three observers of the American political scene, the lack of party responsibility was an open invitation to the possible suppression

of the rights of minorities since neither the Democratic nor Republican parties had either election platforms or programs to which elective office-seeking party members were bound to adhere after their successful contest for office.¹⁰

The responsible government explanation of American parties was a result of the efforts of Wilson and his contemporaries to chart a path for the United States to move toward a more democratic form of government. They called for parties which would be responsible to the electorate. They thought that the way to accomplish this desired goal was for the party which was successful in attaining office to regard itself as having a commitment to put into effect the campaign promises by means of which it had successfully sought electoral support from the voters.

¹⁰A. Lawrence Lowell, a contemporary student of American parties of Wilson, Ford and Goodnow, made similar observations of the United States' party system--but in the tradition of James Madison, John C. Calhoun and John Fischer, among others, Lowell alleged that Americans wished to stress minority rights, if necessary at the expense of majority rule. Thus Lowell argued that the doctrines of Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances--both as written by the Founding Fathers and as defended by the public--were an integral part of, and an expression of, the peculiarly American theory and practice of government. See Lowell's Public Opinion and Popular Government, (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1913), John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government and Selections from the Discourse, (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1953; originally published in 1853), and John Fischer, "Government by Concurrent Majority," in Bishop and Hendel, Basic Issues of American Democracy, 6th ed., (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 432-442.

These observers compared the British and American functions of parties and thought that they saw in Great Britain a system of responsible party government at work. The later studies of some scholars such as Lewis Namier suggest that the mandate concept was similar to the Montesquieu description of a separation of powers in the English governmental system, that neither construct in fact existed when it was observed to exist by those scholars who thought they were engaged in describing an observed reality.¹¹

The mandate explanation assumes that there is an aware electorate and that its political preferences exist and are not created. In addition, while party positions may be the same on some issues, on others a clear alternative course of action is presented to the voter. The party which is successful in attaining office by virtue of winning a plurality of the seats, because of an acceptance by many voters of the party's campaign promises as being desirable courses of action for government to engage in, has a covenant or mandate to enact its campaign pledges into law.

The mandate construct was attractive as a means of explanation because of the positive connotations of the word "responsible" in the fulfilling of campaign promises. This concept thus provided an excellent standard of measurement

¹¹The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III, (London: The Macmillan Company, 1959).

with which to gauge the behavior of politicians. Perhaps its most powerful appeal is that it brought under one explanatory umbrella the actions of voters and prospective office holders, the transformation of majority desires into legislation, and the ultimate dependence of those in power upon the electorate. Those holding a minority position on a question of public policy were allowed an institutionalized means to strive to become a majority and thus to have their wishes enacted into law. In addition, as outlined above, the rights of minorities were felt to be protected through the "invisible hand" of disciplined and responsible party competition for elective office by means of coalition building.

In this explanation of the functioning of parties within a framework of democratic government, the wishes of the people were deemed more important than the selection of leaders or representatives to carry out those wishes. The explanation was primarily backward-directed in that the chosen leaders were held to be obligated, because of their electoral mandate, to enact into law their campaign promises made to the people.¹²

Joseph Schumpeter criticized the position of Wilson, Ford and Goodnow that program enactment was more important than leadership selection. This criticism was based upon:

¹²Class notes: Political Science 361, Political Parties, Professor Roger Marz, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan. Summer, 1966.

. . . the proposition that "the people" hold a definite and rational opinion about every individual question and that they give effect to their opinion in a democracy by choosing "representatives" who will see to it that opinion is carried out.¹³

Schumpeter suggested that the emphasis upon the two elements of democracy, the deciding of political issues by the electorate and the selection of leaders, be reversed so that the element of leadership selection be primarily emphasized. This explanation for representative democracy then becomes forward directed in that the elected are now primarily concerned with remaining in office and will trim their political sails with this end in view.¹⁴ Their mandate has shifted from a fulfillment of past election promises to the personal one of occupational self-preservation. Schattschneider suggests much the same approach when he defines democracy as:

. . . a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process.¹⁵

The essence of the mandate explanation of parties is that it is the only practical way in which to reconcile majority desires and minority rights within a framework of government

¹³Schumpeter, p. 269.

¹⁴An excellent theoretical exploration of the implications of this support maximization is Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

¹⁵Elmer E. Schattschneider, p. 141.

referred to as representative democracy. The primary function of party is that of peaceful reconciliation of divergent views within a framework of choice of leadership.

The Marxian Explanation of Political Party

Karl Marx was primarily engaged in producing a general theory of human history--a theory with political, economic, sociological and historical validity and one which was based upon what were alleged to be scientific or empirical laws of human existence. According to his analysis of man in society, the establishment of a particular type of social organization is inevitable when certain conditions relating to the organization and evolution of the means of production and distribution of material goods have developed. As one expert stated:

It would not be an exaggeration to say that virtually all of Marxism is directed toward demonstrating this inevitability in a rigorously "scientific" manner, toward proving beyond any doubt that social justice must come.¹⁶

The economic foundations upon which industrial society is constructed are subject to recurrent distributive crises which increase the ranks of, and solidify, the workers behind their leaders. These leaders are defected intellectuals of bourgeois origin who are able to foresee the inevitable

¹⁶Arthur P. Mendel, ed., Essential Works of Marxism, (New York: Bantam Books, 1965), p. 3.

collapse of the capitalist society. The function of the Communist Party members in this unfolding of the historical process is stated by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto:

The Communists therefore, are on the one hand, in the sphere of practice, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; and on the other hand, in the sphere of theory, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.¹⁷

Thus, to Marx and Engels, party as the activist core of class is the means by which the masses are able to take full advantage of a situation, the full development of which is held to be inevitable. This view of the function of party has been consistently held, as demonstrated by the 1961 statement in The New Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that "The supreme goal of the party is to build a Communist society."¹⁸

Lenin's Theory of Party

Marx and Engels were not activist revolutionaries in the sense that Lenin was to become and their explanations of the

¹⁷ Lewis S. Feuer, ed., Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, 1959), p. 20.

¹⁸ Mendel, p. 373.

origins, organization and function of political parties was modified by Lenin who, while excelling in both spheres of activity, was an organizer and a conspirator first, and a theoretician second. Lenin was always able to justify his chosen courses of action by reference to Marx and Engels but his participation in concrete human events in an industrially backward nation, necessitated many deviations from what contemporary Marxist scholars often regarded as orthodoxy. One of his most obvious deviations from Marx was in the area of party organization, and to a lesser extent, party function.¹⁹ As will be described below, the Chinese Communist Party under the theory and application of Mao Tse-tung has also differed from the intellectual party theory of Marx. Both the Russian and the Chinese leaders found it necessary to deviate from Marxian orthodoxy because of the prime consideration of attracting support for their revolutionary activities²⁰ in an industrially underdeveloped nation-state which had little in the way of a manifest--or even latent--proletariat. In addition, both Lenin and Mao, as active revolutionaries, found

¹⁹Our reference here is to party function in the pre-socialist revolutionary stage and not after the party has assumed control of a substantial portion of the polity.

²⁰Or, especially in the case of Lenin, a minimum of passive acquiescence on the part of the bulk of the indigenous peasant population.

that the spontaneity and inevitability of the Marxian explanation of party origins were of too extended a time frame for them to accomplish the overthrow of existing social systems and the establishment of at least a socialist, if not a full communist polity, within their lifetimes.

Marx had believed that the party would arise and develop as a natural result of increased tensions between the two great social classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The membership of the party was to coalesce around the magnet of Marx's explanation of the gradual unfolding of social development and would consist of the most astute and aware members of the proletariat class.²¹ This political party would also include: ". . . a portion of the bourgeois ideologists who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole."²² These recruits, presumably because of their capacity to think analytically or dialectically, would then "supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress."²³ Marx

²¹A frequently quoted statement of Marx is one to the effect that: "The emancipation of the working class is the work of the working class itself." Quoted in George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 3rd ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 813.

²²Karl Marx, Communist Manifesto, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954), p. 34.

²³Ibid., p. 33.

provides no explanation as to how one is to reconcile this alleged enlightenment on the part of some elements of the bourgeoisie with his views concerning the class basis of all bourgeoisie knowledge as part of the superstructure of society. A possible reconciliation is that the enlightenment is of a methodological rather than an epistemological nature.

In the realm of party organization, the Marxist party, though revolutionary, is not clandestine. Because of his belief in class antagonisms as the motive force of history, Marx apparently felt that no detailed description of the necessary modes of specific party organization was necessary as long as the existing revolutionary organization believed fully in the function which was its place in Marxian history to perform.

The primary function of the Marxian party was to nurture and develop a sense of class consciousness within the ranks of the proletariat so that this great class would thus be ready, willing and able to act on a united basis when the laws of history dictated that the second, or socialist revolution, was at hand.²⁴

²⁴Marx's ideas of historical evolution to the stage of socialist revolution in countries without a large proletariat were primarily outlined in his "Marginal Notes to the Program of the German Worker's Party, 1875 (Critique of the Gotha Program) published by Engels in 1891 and discussed in Sabine, pp. 801-803. His central idea of "the revolution in permanence" was later utilized by Trotsky and Lenin as being well adapted to the Russian situation of 1905-1917.

In his analysis of the prerequisites and conditions by which a successful revolution could be accomplished in Russia, Lenin believed that there must be created a revolutionary vanguard organized as a political party. This party was to demand strict and unquestioned obedience and loyalty to the decisions of the leadership, once such decisions had been made. The party would be comprised of a:

. . . small compact core, consisting of reliable and experienced hardened workers, with responsible agents in the principal districts and connected by all the rules of strict secrecy with the organization of revolutionists. . . ²⁵

This "vanguard" party was seen by Lenin as:

. . . an intelligent and instructed elite, essentially powerless in itself but capable of infinite power if only it can harness the enormous drive of social mass discontent and mass action. ²⁶

Thus, with minor modifications, the theoretical explanation of the origins of the Party are the same for both Marx and Lenin. The structures as outlined by both are also similar in their surface manifestations to the extent that the party membership was to be drawn from the same social class--the "aware" bourgeoisie and "conscious" proletariat. But Lenin, as the maker of a successful revolution in an

²⁵V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. IV, Book II, (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), p. 194.

²⁶Sabine, p. 816.

industrially backward polity, was faced with the problem of a dearth of potential revolutionaries. Instead, he had masses of peasants. The pragmatic necessity of staffing his movement with dedicated and yet pragmatic revolutionary Marxists forced him to modify both the structure and the functions of the party as these concepts had been developed by Karl Marx.²⁷

On the theoretical level, Lenin met this problem by reference to, and almost exclusive emphasis upon, a single phrase in the Manifesto:

. . . bourgeois ideologists who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending the historical movement as a whole.²⁸

Such people were to be the Party of Lenin. They would lead the "aware" elements of the insignificant Russian proletariat to, and through the socialist revolution and on to the promised land of a communist society. The proletariat and elements of the Russian peasant class were the revolutionary army with the party members to serve as the officer corps. Lenin justified the exclusion of enlightened elements

²⁷ His staffing problems were further exacerbated by the contending schools of Marxian interpretation exemplified in Russia by the Bolshevicks and Menshevicks, and in Western Europe by the Utopian (trade unionist or evolutionist) and the "scientific" or revolutionist interpretations of what Marx "really meant."

²⁸ Marx, p. 34.

of the proletariat from party influence because he argued that the:

. . . proletariat clearly needed to be managed and maneuvered by leaders who are not proletarians but who know what the proletariat ought to want though in fact they rarely do want it.²⁹

Lenin argued that left to themselves, without the yeast of a fully conscious cadre of activist party workers and leaders, the proletariat would develop a "trade union" or evolutionary consciousness but not a revolutionary fervor sufficient to accomplish a successful socialist revolution. He was determined not to see a Russian worker's movement develop along the lines of what he felt was the compromised Social Democratic Party in Germany. The "spontaneity" of worker and peasant social discontent was to be harnessed, channeled and controlled by the consciousness of the Party members, men who one observer has called that:

. . . intelligent and instructed elite, essentially powerless in itself but capable of infinite power if only it can harness the enormous drive of social mass discontent and mass action.³⁰

Thus, the structure of the Party under the guidance of the activist theoretician Lenin was modified when applied to a concrete historical situation. The membership strata of

²⁹Sabine, p. 815.

³⁰Ibid., p. 816.

Marx was changed both quantitatively and qualitatively and the most basic function of the party now became the institutionalization of consciousness of party members and the control and direction of lower class spontaneity. Both were accomplished in Soviet Russia by means of the administrative decision-making principle of "democratic centralism."

Mao Tse-tung and Communist Party Theory

Karl Marx was a theoretician without peer in the realm of the generation of dynamic and general explanations of social man. Lenin possessed a high degree of competence in both theorizing and in actively promoting and accomplishing a class based social revolution. Mao Tse-tung's strengths are less in the field of theory than in the practice of abrupt social change but his ex post facto modifications of Marxian and Leninist party theory have become for many a central component of Communist Party theory. Thus, his acceptance of and deviations from both Marx and Lenin in the areas of party origins, structure and function warrant consideration.

Mao, as Lenin before him, was faced with the problem of fomenting and bringing about a socialist upheaval in a polity which lacked a numerically large industrial proletariat. In China this class was almost totally nonexistent. Lenin had

justified his utilization of the small and weak Russian proletariat class plus a very few enlightened Russian peasants, led by the "vanguard party," by reference to one rather obscure phrase in the Manifesto.³¹ Mao accepted this Leninist interpretation of the origins and membership of the party rather than the Marxian explanation which leaned heavily upon staffing the organization with enlightened and alienated proletarians who had developed a high degree of militant class consciousness. The party of Lenin and Mao was almost wholly a vanguard of dedicated former bourgeoisie. One observer has stated:

. . . Mao's Chinese Communist Party was never a class party of the peasants; it is a totalitarian cadre party which during the civil war relied primarily on peasant support, but as a ruling party has long since proved its ability to manipulate and if necessary, oppress the peasants no less effectively than it manipulates and oppresses China's other social classes.³²

The basic structure of the Communist Party was similar in the thinking of both Mao and Lenin. They both realized that a high degree of discipline and dedication on the part of party members was necessary for the success of the revolution and that acceleration of the inevitable class conflict dialectic of Marx made necessary a clandestine organization

³¹Marx, p. 34.

³²Richard Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 110.

so as to avoid persecution at the hands of agents of the bourgeoisie.

The most pronounced digression in Maoist party theory, both from Marx and from Lenin, is in the primary function which the party is to perform. For Marx the party primarily exists to educate the proletariat to an awareness of the inevitable class struggle, peaceful or violent. For Lenin the most important party consideration is the realization of a Communist society as this concept is understood by party theoreticians who are also expert practical politicians so as to ensure that mass spontaneity is subject to party-interpreted consciousness.

Mao Tse-tung has gradually substituted the elitist interpretations of party function of Marx and Lenin with a populist explanation as to the proper role of the party in a communist society. The vehicle for this transformation has been his idea of the "mass line," and the proper relationship of the party to this concept. Mao's utilization of this idea as the source of party inspiration has given rise to his most obvious divergence from Lenin who stressed the consciousness of party regulars as a check upon mass spontaneity. To Mao, the party must at all times trim its sails in recognition of what the people desire.

The mass line is the basic line of the Party and this line must be followed at all times, by all departments, and for all types of work. During the period of the revolutionary wars, the Party in all its work used the method of integrating the efforts of the leadership and the masses.³³

In assessment of the central importance of the mass line in party policy formation, one observer has stated:

No method of operation is more characteristic of the Maoist era of Chinese Communist Party history than the "mass line" according to which the Party derives its policies from the ideas of the people themselves and then leads the people on the basis of these policies. . . . The greatest guarantee of eventual success in any enterprise is believed to be the support of the masses, and the day-to-day modus operandi for every type of chore is: "Learn from the masses, unite with the masses. . . ." ³⁴

It was the contention of Karl Marx that he had stood Hegel on his head in that he had removed Hegel's dialectical methodology from the realm of epistemology and had demonstrated to his own satisfaction that the dialectic was the driving force in the historical evolution of social man. Now, through his concept of the "mass line" and its relationship to the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Tse-tung has righted Hegel again by maintaining that the primary function of the party is to

³³ Peoples Daily (Peking), February 11, 1963.

³⁴ Chalmers Johnson, "Building a Communist Nation in China," The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals and Achievements, Robert A. Scalapino, ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 52.

discover and follow the wishes of the people.³⁵

The communist theories of political party as developed by Marx, Lenin and Mao are thus similar in their explanations of the origins of parties. Both Lenin and Mao agree as to the structure of the party and their primary divergence from Marx is that, as practical revolutionaries, they saw the necessity of secret organization as a means of protection until the successful socialist revolution has been accomplished. In the area of party theory, Mao differs from both Marx and Lenin when he argues that the primary function of the party is not to lead the masses along the inevitable one true path to Communism as discovered and promulgated by party theoreticians, but rather to act as the agent of the masses in articulation of their inherent capacity to eventually, by trial and error, develop and operate a communist polity. In non-communist polities all three observers share similar views --that the primary function of the party is that of successful replacement of existing governments with one which is dedicated to the realization of a collectivist society.

³⁵There is apparently little to no exploration in Chinese Communist literature as to the political controversy which turns on the question as to whether such an entity as the "will of the people" does in fact exist.

Theory Orientation

As tools of explanation and thus understanding, both of these party models have serious deficiencies. The Communist theory is highly normative and the responsible government theory is ambiguous as to its foundations and orientations.

Marx and Engels developed their explanation of human history as a criticism of the industrial life of their era. They advocated through their theory a means of establishing social justice which is a normative concept. As stated by Riker when he alleges that the inclusion of normative elements in a descriptive generalizations renders it scientifically unfit:

This, for example, is where Marx's endeavor to be scientific went astray. The main proposition of Capital can be summarized as "Capitalism is theft," and since theft--when divorced from a positive legal system--is a normative notion, verification of this sentence as a description of nature is literally impossible.³⁶

The concept of "proletariat," a vital component of the Communist political theory of social change through class struggle is itself a normative concept:

The proletariat is a mythical notion and, at the same time the supreme value, good and justice--a positive power. The distinction between proletariat and the bourgeoisie does not record an

³⁶William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 5.

empirical fact observed as such in actual existence; it is, first and foremost, an appreciation, a (value) judgment.³⁷

Berdyaev adds that Marx could not have based his theory of social change upon class antagonisms without using normative judgments as to the social justice provided by different means of organization of the modes of production. Party, in the vanguard of this social change, engages in a normatively oriented function in working to establish a better life for all.

The responsible government explanation of parties presents no clear answer as to its normative or empirical emphasis. This is because, as Austin Ranney has shown, its advocates have not been explicit in defining whether they are discussing parties as they observe them, or parties as they should be if they are to fulfill their primary task of the reconciliation of majority desires and minority rights.³⁸ Ranney shows this ambiguity to continue to exist as demonstrated by the landmark study of party government in the United States which was published by the American Political

³⁷Nicholas Berdyaev, The Russian Revolution, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961), pp. 68-69.

³⁸Austin Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government: Its Origins and Present State, (Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 8-10.

Science Association in 1950.³⁹ He accurately observes that in most of the writings on responsible government and the mandate concept of parties:

Parties are often referred to in one place as (a) the existing organizations, and in another as (b) some possible future variant of them. Functions (of parties) sometimes means (1) the role the parties are observed performing, and sometimes (2) the role they should perform.⁴⁰

When discussing parties in sense (a) and (1), observations are empirical and when in sense (2), judgments are normative.

Theory Inclusiveness

Both the responsible government and the Communist theories of party are not inclusive enough to explain all of the relevant phenomena. The mandate explanation is primarily an explanation of, and a suggested plan for improvement of, popular control over the leaders of the political community. This theory does not attempt to explain the concept of party as understood by Communist observers who regard party as the active agent of those who are in possession of a cosmic truth which must be implemented as quickly as possible in the

³⁹"Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," American Political Science Review, XLIV, (Supplement, Sept., 1950).

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 8.

political community.⁴¹ The Marxists regard non-communist parties as essentially the tools of the bourgeoisie and therefore not true parties since they are not tuned to the ultimate goals which society must achieve.

Thus, both of these explanations of party are mutually exclusive and since neither is broad enough to include the other, neither can be called a general empirical theory of parties in terms of its inclusiveness characteristics.

Range of Theory

The responsible government model of party is a middle range theory. It incorporates many singular generalizations concerning voter and party activity patterns. These include the desires of citizens, actions of voters, how changes in game rules will affect both voters and office seekers, how aspirants seek and win electoral office, and policy changes. From these singular generalizations, the observer is able to move outside the boundaries of his own observables. He can generalize about other systems that seem to exhibit the necessary conditions or ground rules so as to appear to qualify within the definitional bounds that he has established as the limits of the phenomenon which his theory is attempting to explain.

⁴¹Some qualification is here required to account for the primary function of the party in an established communist polity as interpreted by Mao Tse-tung.

This explanation is not a general theory in terms of theory range since its emphasis is upon function, and the origin and institutional (structural) aspects of party are not dealt with to any significant degree within the explanatory framework which the mandate model provides.

The Communist theory of party is of general range. The general principle of organization is that the mode of economic organization breeds class conflict and this conflict is the force behind social change.⁴² This explanation of the dynamics of human society contains singular generalizations such as the alleged motivation of different groups in the political community. In addition, one is able to move to broader generalizations concerning not only contemporary political communities, but also the prediction of future events. That such sweeping generalizations and extensions of the theory do not always meet the test of validity is not a basis for criticism of the generality of the theory, but rather a criticism of its normative foundations. The theory includes explanations for party origins, structure and functions, and the place of party in the social dynamic. It must be classified as a general theory in terms of range because

⁴²Maurice Duverger, An Introduction to the Social Sciences with Special Reference to their Methods, trans. by Malcolm Anderson, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 239.

of the wide scope of phenomenal characteristics which it attempts to explain.

Conceptualizations of Political Party

The responsible government explanation of political parties is a mental construct which is highly reflective of assumptions concerning man's capacity and propensity to govern himself which were dominant in Western Europe and North America in the century and a half following the French Revolution. The theory conceptualizes party as the vehicle through which political man is enabled to exercise his alleged desire to participate fully in his own governance and his assumed capacity to act rationally within the context of the Utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest number, rather than within a narrower context of individual self-interest.⁴³ The political philosophy supporting this explanation has little room for an economic type of "invisible hand" such as that postulated by Adam Smith.⁴⁴

The widespread and rapid utilization of this explanatory framework for parties--both by influential students of parties

⁴³ This view was dominant but by no means totally accepted as the writings of such observers as Alexis deTocqueville, Edmund Burke, or Alexander Hamilton and James Madison demonstrate. See especially Madison's Federalist #10.

⁴⁴ The Wealth of Nations, (New York: Modern Library, Inc., 1937; originally published in 1776).

and by politicians--plus its generally uncritical acceptance as conventional wisdom until the post World War II methodological revolution in the Social Sciences,⁴⁵ demonstrate that this approach to the explanation of parties comes within the context of what Karl Mannheim called "ideology."⁴⁶ Not until well into mid-century did party theoreticians such as Schumpeter⁴⁷ and Schattschneider,⁴⁸ in advance of the methodological revolution called behavioralism, seriously question the normative conceptual frameworks within which "democratic" political parties were being explained. The 1950 report of the Committee of the American Political Science Association demonstrates that the idea of responsible parties, as a goal to be striven for, was still very much alive.

In contrast to the responsible parties theory of democracy, the theory of political parties developed by Karl Marx is clearly a "utopian construct,"⁴⁹ in the sense that, while

⁴⁵There are many exceptions to this general acceptance of the majority of scholars. See, for example, Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908).

⁴⁶Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., n.d.; originally published in 1936).

⁴⁷Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.

⁴⁸The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy In America.

⁴⁹Mannheim, see especially Chapter 4.

most of the conceptual elements of his explanation of historical development were present in his intellectual antecedents,⁵⁰ his synthesis of conceptual elements and the explanatory function of his philosophy of history were clearly marked deviations from the dominant wisdom of his time. Thus Marx, in his early emphasis upon individual alienation and social disintegration of the family and other primary groups, was reacting to the social thought dominated by an individualistic conception of human motivations. Lenin and Mao, within the context of the specific polities in which they operated in their pre-revolutionary phases, were also clearly on the utopian end of the Mannheim dichotomy.

Both the responsible government and the communist party explanations now express dominant social values for major, but exclusive sections of the globe and the task of contemporary party theorists is, in part, to surmount the normative epistemological relativity of both explanations if a general empirical theory of political parties is to be generated.

⁵⁰ Examples are the dialectic in Hegel and the idea of class struggle developed by men such as Saint-Simon. For discussions of Marx's intellectual precursors see Irving M. Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 3-79, and Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 7-120.

As Anthony King has demonstrated,⁵¹ the level of abstraction at which political party is conceptualized has important ramifications for the type of question concerning parties which the theorist is motivated to ask. Party, when conceived as a cluster of human actors, generates questions concerning party ideology, structure and organization. When party is conceived as a pattern of human activities, the theorist is able to:

. . . consider the consequences of parties and party systems--their existence, structure and behavior--for political systems as a whole.⁵²

In the writings of the responsible party theorists, parties were conceived of at the higher level of abstraction thus generating questions concerning party as the producer of consequences for the political system as a whole.⁵³ This position is consistent in the writings of Wilson, Ford and Goodnow to the extent that the consequences of the entity party which they wished to establish in the American system of government, were increased levels of, and more direct voter

⁵¹King.

⁵²Ibid., p. 115.

⁵³King suggests that these observers conceptualized party as a group, "as they were bound to do given their reformist aims," (p. 133.) My focus of analysis is upon their theory of party rather than their reformist propensities. In the former or explanatory aspect of their studies, these observers conceived of party in terms of its systemic consequences.

control over, the actions of elected officials. The weakness of this level of abstraction is a failure to ensure that the concept is:

. . . defined at all precisely, with the result that it may be impossible to know how one would go about determining whether statements containing it were true or false.⁵⁴

This conceptual weakness also shared decades later by the Committee of the American Political Science Association,⁵⁵ has resulted in explanatory ambiguities which inhibit this explanation as a contribution to a general empirical theory of parties.

The Marxist-Communist explanation of parties, like the responsible government construct contains both a pragmatic, low level of abstraction where party is conceptualized as a collectivity, and a higher explanatory level where party is regarded as a producer of system-wide consequences. On the one hand party is described as the "vanguard of the proletariat." In other instances in the writing of Marx, Lenin and Mao, party is discussed within the context of the anticipated consequences which the existence of the party will have for the polity. The available evidence suggests that Marx, and to a lesser extent pre-revolutionary Lenin and Mao, conceptualized party as a

⁵⁴Austin Ranney, see especially pp. 8-10 and p. 157.

⁵⁵Report.

special group of dedicated revolutionaries. After their successful revolutions, Lenin and Mao placed more emphasis upon parties as the agent of systemic occurrences. This shift in emphasis to a more balanced approach in their explanation of parties is no doubt due in large part to the unique role which the communist parties of the Soviet Union and China have been called upon to play in the evolving of these socialist polities.

Thus, as an explanatory tool in the understanding of communist political parties, the conceptual level utilized by Marxist theoreticians is weak because of ambiguities of referent.

Summary

The two most comprehensive early attempts to explain political parties, the mandate-responsible government and the communist explanations have been outlined and analyzed in terms of their validity as empirical general theories of parties. Both have been demonstrated to be unsatisfactory, the responsible government theory on all counts and the Communist on three of the four standards of analytical assessment. The responsible government explanation is exclusive, of only middle range, and its proponents are not clear as to whether they are discussing parties in a normative or an

empirical context. In addition, the level of conceptualization of the dependent variable is such that tautologies are encouraged. The Communist theory is a general theory in terms of range but it is of very high normative content, like the mandate explanation is also exclusive in that the full range of phenomena to be explained is not included, and it suffers from inexplicit conceptualizations. Thus neither explanation serves as a valid basis for a general empirical theory of parties.

We now turn to what Maurice Duverger called his "preliminary general theory of parties" to attempt to apply the same standards of assessment in order to judge its validity as a general party theory.

C H A P T E R I I I

THE DUVERGER APPROACH TO PARTY THEORY

We have suggested that for a theorist to present a valid claim to have developed a general theory of political parties, his construct must pass the tests of: (a) resting upon an adequate base of empirical observables, (b) including all of the relevant phenomena to be explained, (c) being of broad range, scope or reach, and (d) demonstrating conceptual adequacy of the dependent variable to be explained. Two major efforts to understand the phenomenon "political party," the responsible government and the communist explanations have been shown to be inadequate as general empirical theories of parties according to the above criteria. The work of Maurice Duverger in explaining parties will now be analyzed.¹ We will suggest that the primary contribution of Duverger is that of providing two empirical generalizations concerning parties, one of doubtful validity, and taxonomies based upon parties and party system structures, but no general empirical theory of parties.

¹Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. by Barbara and Robert North, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1951).

Duverger and Methodology

Many scholars who are concerned with methodology agree with Duverger² that necessary steps in empirical theory construction would include (1) explicit definitions which demonstrate the parameters of, and describe the phenomenon to be explained; (2) taxonomies of specific empirical occurrences of the phenomenon which are useful and valid to the extent that they emphasize independent and intervening variables and demonstrate the allowable ranges of variable influence upon the phenomenon; and (3) generalizations which contain or imply empirically testable hypotheses. It is our contention that the work of Duverger, in his book Political Parties, is at the taxonomic level of achievement in theory building, a necessary step in the process but one which is not yet at the level of "preliminary general theory."³ An assessment of his contribution to analytical stasiology must therefore be concerned with an analysis of the validity of his generalizations concerning parties and party systems.

²Duverger, An Introduction to the Social Sciences with Special Reference to Their Methods, trans. by Malcolm Anderson, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

³Political Parties, p. XIII.

In his later work on methodology of the social sciences, Duverger has stated that the generation of valid generalizations of "sociological laws" requires two preliminary levels and a final level of scholarly activity.

Three levels of scientific research can be distinguished in the physical and social sciences: the levels of description, classification and explanation. Formulation of laws is present only at the last stage
⁴

It is the contention of this observer that Duverger's Political Parties does not contain generalizations which are valid with regard to all parties,⁵ and that his "Law of Party Number" with reference to electoral systems and party systems is valid only part of the time.

The Classification Scheme of Duverger

In Political Parties the author uses as the basis of his classification of parties the structure of the individual party. He is aware of other factors such as ideology, historical context and socio-economic influences, but to him party

organization is tending to become an essential factor in the activity of the party, in its influence and

⁴An Introduction to the Social Sciences. . . ., p. 226.

⁵The work of Duverger is especially weak in any explanation of, or even reference to, Latin American, African or Asian parties or party systems.

its function. These facts explain the general tenor of the book.⁶

Duverger goes on to say that party organization may be considered as superstructure and the other factors as substructure, the influence between these two levels is a two-way street, and that for him modern party evolution is best explained by a study of party structure and organization. He then classifies parties on the basis of his perception of the party organizations and he discovers parties to be "centralized" and "decentralized." He discerns two criteria of membership, "cadre" and "mass" parties and he perceives differences in parties which are based upon the federal as opposed to the unitary geo-political organization of the polity.

Duverger outlines various classifications of parties which are based upon his perception of party structures. He does not give us a "preliminary general theory of parties." One observer has commented that:

Duverger does not keep to his original methodological promise. Instead of a continuous testing of a hypothetical working model, we get sound and methodical classification. . . as the pilot work for further stasiological studies.⁷

⁶Political Parties. . ., p. XV.

⁷Frederick C. Englemann, "A Critique of Recent Writings on Political Parties," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 19, #3, (August, 1957), pp. 423-440 and especially p. 433.

Another observer states that "Duverger seems, at times, to be interested only in description and methodical classification."⁸

To Duverger himself, there appears to be a confusion as to the nature of his contribution to a general party theory; at which of the three levels of explanatory activity his Political Parties should be placed.

In the preface to this work he states that his aim is to sketch:

. . . a preliminary general theory of parties, vague, conjectural and of necessity approximate which may yet serve as a basis and guide for detailed studies.⁹

He continues that his work is designed to introduce objectivity into what he regards as a highly normative field of inquiry, that his work supplies a methodological classification of parties and that it:

. . . formulate(s) hypotheses capable of guiding further research which will one day permit the formulation of authentic sociological laws.¹⁰

Given his goal of the development of a preliminary general party theory which will point the way for further research in

⁸Ferdinand A. Hermens, book review in The Review of Politics, XIV, (October, 1952), p. 558.

⁹Duverger, Political Parties . . . , p. XIII.

¹⁰Ibid., p. XIV. To Duverger, "authentic sociological laws" are valid generalizations.

this area, we must attempt to discover and outline his theory so that it can be measured against the criteria of theory orientation, inclusiveness, range and level of conceptualization, standards which have been presented in this paper as being measurements with which to assess the validity of a general empirical theory of parties.

Political Parties is divided into two sections, the first dealing with individual parties, and the second with national party systems. The most general "sociological law" or generalization is stated in Book II where Duverger is dealing with party systems rather than with individual parties. On the other hand, Book I does not present any generalizations concerning all parties. It is concerned with classification of individual parties in a cross-polity approach but not an approach which is universal in scope. Both sections of the work emphasize the structure of parties and of party systems. In this emphasis Duverger chooses to study parties as institutions. He then implies that structure is the most important variable leading to an explanation of the phenomenon called party.

. . . the principal object of this work (Political Parties) is . . . essentially the study of party institutions and their place in the state. . .
Modern parties are characterized primarily by their anatomy.¹¹

¹¹Ibid., p. XV.

Thus, party structure rather than party function is the aspect of the study of political parties which Duverger chooses to emphasize. He assumes that function will follow from structure of both party and party system and that it can be explained in terms of a comparative study of institutional structure.

The "Theory" of Political Parties

What is the essence of the theory of parties of Duverger? In the opinion of some scholars¹² and of this observer, he has given us no theory of individual parties or of party systems but rather a narrow gauge or singular generalization involving one variable only, that of the individual electoral system or political community within the context of which the party system operates. This generalization concerns the institutional context and the result is Duverger's now famous "Law of Party Number" which holds that ". . . the simple-majority, single-ballot system favors the two-party system."¹³ Duverger adds in the next sentence that

. . . of all the hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this approaches most nearly perhaps to a true sociological law. . . The exceptions are very

¹²See, for example, Frederick C. Englemann, p. 433.

¹³Political Parties. . ., p. 217.

rare and can generally be explained as the result of special conditions.¹⁴

In addition, regarding multi-party systems in specific political communities, he states that:

. . . the simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional representation favor multi-partism.¹⁵

Duverger has himself admitted that there are exceptions to these generalizations, as have other observers who appear to have less faith than he in these "sociological laws."¹⁶

If we beg the question as to the validity of this "Law of Party Number," we must deal yet with the Law as the most obvious example of Duverger's "preliminary general theory of parties." In so doing it becomes obvious that, at least with

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 239.

¹⁶See especially the critique by Aaron B. Wildavsky, "A Methodological Critique of Duverger's Political Parties," Journal of Politics, Vol. 21, (May, 1959), pp. 303-318, and the work of John G. Grumm, "Theories of Electoral Systems," Midwest Journal of Politics, Vol. II, #4, (1958), pp. 357-376. Grumm finds many West European examples which are at variance with Duverger's Law of Party Number. In addition, see Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 108-109.

However, other observers such as V. O. Key and Carl J. Friedrich lend support to the thesis of Duverger who has apparently recognized his critics in that a later work of his, in discussing the alleged relationship between numbers of parties and the electoral system, is less dogmatic. Duverger, The Idea of Politics: The Uses of Power in Society, (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1966), pp. 114-116.

respect to these generalizations, the author is referring to party systems within the context of individual political communities and not to specific parties within a cross-polity frame of reference.

Theory Orientation

We have suggested above that an analytical framework with which to assess a general empirical theory of parties consists of measurement of the explanation by means of the four criteria of explanatory orientation, inclusiveness, level of conceptualization, and theory range or scope. To what extent does the party explanatory work of Duverger measure up to these criteria? There seems little doubt that Political Parties is an empirical effort.¹⁷ Duverger has confined his efforts to furthering the explanation of existing party entities and has not attempted to suggest what parties or party systems should be. His quest for sociological laws of parties has neither a base of highly normative assumptions such as the communist explanation, nor has he demonstrated orientational

¹⁷"The main pioneering work in the systematic empirical study of party systems is Maurice Duverger's Political Parties (1951)." Harry Eckstein, "Political Parties," Part II. "Party Systems," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11, (1968), p. 429.

ambiguity of the type demonstrated by many observers of the responsible party approach to explanation.

Theory Inclusiveness

The "preliminary general theory" of Duverger is more inclusive than either of these other two explanations in that both competitive party systems of the responsible variety, and monolithic parties of the communist variety are included in his taxonomic formulations.¹⁸ However, as stated above, his work includes little of explanatory value to assist us in understanding parties and party systems in the Third World of allegedly politically underdeveloped polities of Latin America, Asia or Africa. Even if we grant legitimacy to his claim of developing preliminary theoretical tools, the omission of many of the parties and party systems of the globe renders invalid any claim to his work being a general explanatory effort. However, on the level of party origins and structure, Duverger has provided a series of incomplete but useful concepts as a preliminary base upon which taxonomies of Third World parties can be constructed.

¹⁸Some critics of Duverger have seen even this degree of inclusiveness as a distinct disadvantage. F. A. Hermens argues that "Duverger's conclusion begins on a pessimistic note and reads almost like what Robert Michels wrote on the 'Iron Law of Oligarchy.' Part of this pessimism may again be due to the fact that he (Duverger) deals with totalitarian parties on the same level as with the others. . ." Hermens, p. 561.

Duverger and Party Conceptualization

With respect to the level of conceptualization of party utilized by Duverger, his work clearly demonstrates that he conceives of parties as clusters of human actors rather than as patterned interactions. This is shown by his explanatory emphasis upon the structure and organization of parties and party systems and his almost total ignoring of the:

. . . consequences of parties and party systems--their existence, structure and behavior--for political systems as a whole.¹⁹

His later diluted "Law of Party Number" does suggest system-wide consequences resulting from particular electoral arrangements but even in this instance the level of conceptualization is of the first order, as demonstrated by his failure to deal with the societal effects which differing electoral modes might, or in fact actually do, generate. In addition, Political Parties contains no recognition of the fact that electoral systems are sometimes devised independently of the desires of party members, the decisive thrust coming in such instances from interest groups, tribal organizations, or

¹⁹Anthony King, "Political Parties in Western Democracies: Some Sceptical Reflections," Polity, Vol. 2, (Winter, 1969), p. 115.

other conglomerates which have a perceived stake in the political processes of the polity.²⁰

We have stated that the act of observer conceptualization is the expression of his value preferences and, in addition, the degree of acceptability of his concepts is a reflection of current conventional wisdom within his discipline. Thus the responsible party explanation enjoyed widespread and quite uncritical success for many decades because of the interpretation of this explanation which emphasized its normative aspects in support of democratic values. The communist party explanation, in the first half-century of its dissemination, was the antithesis of the responsible party government explanation. As such it lacked a geo-political base to support its claim to legitimacy. Over the past half-century, the expansion of this base to include half of the globe has greatly increased its explanatory acceptability.

The Duverger conceptualization of party, because of its greatly reduced normative content in comparison to either of these other explanations, has enjoyed widespread academic support because of the timing of its presentation at the

²⁰Indigenous administrators in newly freed colonies--as the former agents of the colonial power--have exercised considerable influence in the establishment of electoral ground rules. Such rules have often been first established by the colonial power. See Lucian W. Pye, "Party Systems and National Development in Asia," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 369-398, especially p. 383.

beginning of the behavioralist thrust in Political Science which followed World War II. The Duverger explanation presents us with a useful attempt to overcome the normative epistemological relativity of both the responsible party government and the communist explanations of political parties.

The Range of Duverger's Theory

The explanatory framework of Duverger is an example of scholarly effort of the middle range of theory building. In his book Political Parties he has moved beyond the area of singular generalizations concerning the covariance of two variables as described by David Easton,²¹ and has incorporated into his preliminary theory, explanations of both party origins and party structure. Some scholars have argued that Duverger has placed too much emphasis upon the structure of parties and party systems as the single most important explanatory variable. Samuel Beer holds that Duverger tries to explain a rigidly doctrinaire party on the basis of its structure but a complete explanation should also be cognizant of of the possibility of such factors as individual member

²¹A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 7.

beliefs, the constitutional structure of the polity, and the locus of party militants within the geo-political polity.²²

Another observer has criticized Political Parties by suggesting that Duverger assumes that:

. . . political party phenomenon can be largely explained through the independent use of three variables: party structure, party systems and the electoral system. Other factors such as social and economic structure, national history, culture, institutional traditions, geography, climate and so on are either rejected, neglected, or relegated to peripheral roles. . . .²³

Another student of political parties, Sigmund Neumann, in an article in which he discusses political party theory, makes the point that Duverger places exclusive emphasis on formal party structure as the key to party behavior and ignores "... social mass base and ideological commitments."²⁴ A critical question in theory construction is the choice of a basis for the typology to be used.

There is thus wide agreement of opinion among students of parties that a structural approach to party explanation, while

²²Samuel Beer, "Les Partis Politique," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. VI, pp. 9-53.

²³Wildavsky, p. 309.

²⁴Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Theory of Political Parties," World Politics, #6, (July, 1954), p. 559.

useful in the generation of a general explanation, is only another step in the construction of a general empirical theory of parties and not the "preliminary general theory" of parties as offered by Duverger.

One observer has suggested that each major section of Duverger's book contains a single important contribution to the study of parties. Book I offers his classification of party structures:

. . . (in which) he is very successful. Systematic classification done with scientific neutrality, useful categories such as direct and indirect parties, caucus, branch, cell and militia type basic organizational elements: cadre and mass parties and electors, supporters and militants.²⁵

Book II offers his "Law of Party Number." Englemann does not seem to feel that there is an excess of party types and subtypes. In addition, he does not question Duverger's choice of party structure as the critical variable in his taxonomy.

Duverger and the Functionalist Approach to Party Theory

The implied assumption of Duverger appears to be that a taxonomy of parties which is based upon their structures will lead to valid generalizations concerning parties, from which a general theory of parties can then be constructed. However,

²⁵Englemann, pp. 423-440.

parties exhibit not only institutional structures, but also engage in functions and these functions are more universal in nature than are structural attributes.²⁶ Thus it should be possible to devise a functional typology of parties which contains fewer divisions, and fewer exceptions, than the typology based upon origins and structures which is presented by Duverger.

Abraham Kaplan states that:

The function of scientific concepts is to mark the categories which will tell us more about our subject matter than any other categorical sets.²⁷

Without suggesting a blanket negation of the work of Duverger, what is herein suggested is that a structural classification of parties is only a partial step toward a general theory of parties. What is needed in addition is a typology which is cognizant of the functions which parties perform. Such a functional taxonomy should free the observer from the limitations of the individual polity, or special conditions with

²⁶"Recourse to functional typologies is indispensable for the comparative study of very different societies: institutions are too unlike to provide a satisfactory basis for comparison. It is also possible that in some respects the functional approach is more fruitful for the elaboration of general theories than the institutional approach," Duverger, An Introduction to the Social Sciences. . ., p. 235.

²⁷Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), p. 52.

which the structuralist typology of Duverger appears to be prone. Duverger himself, in his work on social science methodology, states that there are three basic foundations upon which a typology can be constructed: (1) institutional or structural, (2) relational, and (3) functional. With regard to the functional foundation he admits that:

Recourse to functional typologies is indispensable for the comparative study of very different societies: institutions are too unlike to provide a satisfactory basis for comparison. It is also possible that in some respects the functional approach (to classification) is more fruitful for the elaboration of general theories than the institutional approach.²⁸

By the time of the writing of this later work on methodology, no doubt Duverger would no longer claim that his earlier study was a "preliminary general theory of parties." His later opinion as quoted above appears to contradict his claim to a theory or perhaps even a preliminary theory of parties in his earlier work, Political Parties.

The importance of party function is also stressed by Almond and Coleman who state that:

If the functions (in a political system such as interest articulation, aggregation, communication, etc.) are there then the structure must be, even though we may find them (the structures)

²⁸Duverger, An Introduction to the Social Sciences. . ., p. 235.

tucked away so to speak, in nooks and crannies of other social systems.²⁹

It thus seems that a strong case can be made for a taxonomy of parties, based not upon structure alone, but primarily upon the common functions in which they are seen to engage. Such an approach, because of its cross-polity characteristics, is more apt to eventually yield a general theory of parties than is the more narrow and unique structural approach of Duverger.

In his perceptive critique of Duverger, Aaron Wildavsky concludes that if the current quest for general party theory is to be advanced, political parties need perhaps to be studied not according to "surface forms" or party institutions but in the functions they perform.

. . . the utilization of surface factors such as the number of parties, the type of ballot, and the type of party structure do not appear to provide the kind of proposition to provide an adequate theory and/or typology of political parties.³⁰

It is to an exploration of the opportunities and limitations upon the search for such relevant propositions that we now turn our attention.

²⁹Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 12.

³⁰Wildavsky, pp. 317-318.

C H A P T E R I V

PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF EMPIRICAL PARTY THEORY DEVELOPMENT

It is our contention that the responsible government, the Marxian, and the Duverger explanations of parties are inadequate with regard to both the stated and implied value bases of the theorists, and also concerning some aspects of methodology utilized to explain the phenomenon of political party. We have also suggested that, at the present stage of understanding of parties, a fruitful avenue of further inquiry leading to the eventual goal of a general empirical theory of parties is to be found in an exploration of the functional similarities of parties. The utilization of functional explanations has been strongly questioned by some philosophers of science and has been just as strongly defended by other observers.¹ The philosophical question raised by these conflicting epistemological and methodological viewpoints bears directly upon the adequacy of the existing general explanations of parties and also upon our as yet to be presented path for future theoretical effort.

¹Functionalism has been strongly attacked in its logical and substantive aspects by, among others, Carl C. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," in L. Gross, ed., Symposium on Sociological Theory, (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 271-307. Classic functional analyses include Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), and Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, rev. ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1957).

The two philosophical aspects of greatest concern to our analysis of general party explanations are the epistemological question of the nature of social reality, and feasible approaches to an understanding of this reality. Our exploration of these two concerns serves the dual purpose of demonstrating additional weaknesses in the existing explanations of party and of laying the groundwork for our justification of our proposed methodological approach to a general party theory. We will here discuss the philosophical weaknesses of existing general party explanations and in the following chapter will defend a functional explanation of selected dimensions of the phenomenon political party as a necessary step in the generation of an empirical party theory.

Epistemological Considerations

The observer who is interested in the generation of valid explanations must address himself to the question of what sort of data is adequate to support his theoretical construct. The philosophers of science are divided into two groups on this question, the positivists and the neo-

idealists.² The epistemological question of the nature of the observer's conception of social reality determines to which of these two groups he belongs. The positivists:

. . . contend that prediction is the key criterion for adequate explanation, that the adequacy of one's data relative to one's hypotheses or theory lies in the resulting ability to predict patterns in a given realm. Opposed to this group are sociologists . . . who see understanding as the basis for adequate explanation.³

That valid understanding and prediction are not the same is clearly demonstrated by the capacity of observers in past ages to accurately predict solar eclipses based upon their conceptualization of a geocentric universe.

The positivist position on the question of knowledge of social reality is that there are no fundamental differences between physical and social phenomena and that the methodology utilized to explain the former is also applicable to the explanation of the phenomena of social science. Observers of this persuasion are thus prone to maintain that the most acceptable, if not the only allowable methodology

²Various labels are attached to these different points of view. The Positivists are also referred to as empiricists and logico-empiricists, while neo-idealists are also called intuitionists (Runciman) and subjectivists (Frohock). See Gideon Sjöberg and Roger Nett, A Methodology for Social Research, (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), especially Chapter 11, W. G. Runciman, Social Science & Political Theory, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963), and Fred M. Frohock, The Nature of Political Inquiry, (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1967).

³Sjöberg and Nett, pp. 288-289.

to explain social man, is the logico-deductive approach. This approach, in its ideal manifestation, discovers valid universal generalizations or covering laws and from these deduces the applicability of the generalization to specific occurrences of it. The social order is perceived as being mechanistic to the degree that the actions of men, singly or in groups, are governed by laws which, if they are not constant, change so slowly that long range valid generalizations are possible. The methodology of this approach to explanation has been summarized as:

. . . explanations require the adducing of general laws, with the status of empirical hypotheses about the natural order, from which, in conjunction with statements of initial conditions, we can deductively infer statements about empirical consequences.⁴

This has been a widely accepted methodological approach to the explanation of social science phenomena since its clear elucidation by John Stuart Mill.⁵ Its acceptability is currently defended by philosophers of science such as Nagel⁶ and Braithwaite.⁷ Within the study of Politics and Government

⁴Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, (London: The Macmillan Co., Ltd., 1970), p. 46.

⁵Mill, A System of Logic, (London, 1879).

⁶Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961).

⁷Richard B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960).

its most vocal defender is Eugene J. Meehan.⁸ These observers defend the unity of explanation under the rubric of THE Scientific Method. This method is held to be applicable to the explanation of both physical and social phenomena.

The Scientific Method

The deductivist social scientist who strives to explain political phenomena envies the physical science observers because in the latter area prediction is much more advanced than in other fields of inquiry. The success of physical science inquiry is in no small measure due to the use of what is called the "scientific method" of inquiry.

This method should not be equated with the field of knowledge itself though. As will be argued below, the subject matter with which the physical sciences deal is much more conducive at the present stage of knowledge to the application of the logico-deductive mode of inquiry than is thinking man--the subject matter of the social scientist.

As stated by Ernest Nagel:

It is the desire for explanations which are at once systematic and controllable by factual evidence that generates science; and it is the organization and classification of knowledge on the

⁸Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis, (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1965.)

basis of explanatory principles that is the distinctive goal of the sciences.⁹

He goes on to say that the scientist seeks to formulate general conditions under which events occur and to make statements concerning these conditions as the explanations of the observed happenings. In generalizing about the observed events, the making of statements concerning their alleged causality, the observer is engaged in scientific inquiry to the extent that he seeks to "establish some relation of dependence between apparently miscellaneous items of information. . ."¹⁰ To Nagel this is the heart of scientific inquiry.

Man seeks knowledge of the phenomena surrounding him, and to this end he observes what occurs and inquires concerning the observations which he, and others, have made. The goal of his inquiry is explanation of the phenomena observed.

The kinds of explanations that are considered desirable or possible in a discipline will help determine the approach to the subject matter, the phenomena selected for investigation, the information sought, the manner in which the data are treated and the verification procedures employed in the inquiry.¹¹

⁹Ernest Nagel.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 5.

¹¹Meehan, p. 88.

If we remain within the bounds of formal logic, explanations of occurrences in the field of physical science are more powerful than those of the social sciences in the sense that predictability is more common in many instances. Predictability suggests repetition of at least some attributes of the phenomenon to be explained. Thus, some degree of regularity or duplication of at least a few aspects of the observables is necessary if the phenomenon selected for explanation is to be explained according to the logical requirements of the ideal scientific method of the physical sciences. At the heart of this method is the generalization.

When a science is highly developed, its generalizations can be summarized into a terse code; that is, a set of statements so arranged that a few major ideas serve as premises from which all other propositions or hypotheses will follow. In an immature science the principles may do little more than define and classify characteristics, thus setting the stage for the future development of a deductive code.¹²

The explanatory power of a valid generalization is perhaps best exemplified by Newtonian physics where the concept gravity, the mutual force of attraction between any two bodies, explains an apple falling to the ground and the movement of the planets around the sun.

¹²Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith, eds., Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political Behavior, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 68-69.

Deductive Reasoning and Social Sciences

Deductive reasoning is based upon a general statement or generalization. A generalization attributes:

. . . particular properties to some or all of the members of a well defined, nonvacuous class and thus provide(s) a link among members of that class. . . Clearly, the ability to generalize is in some degree contingent on the nature of the subject matter; some objects are more easily drawn into general statements than others.¹³

Deductive reasoning requires universal generalizations as a starting point and as previously stated, universal generalizations relevant to the subject matter of interest to social scientists are almost, if not totally impossible at the current stage of development of the social sciences. Thus it would appear that for the present, from the logico-deductive perspective, the tool of deductive reasoning as a method of explanation is unavailable to social science. Meehan has outlined five reasons why, on the practical level, political science is unable to make use of deductive reasoning. They are: (1) the complexity of the subject matter; (2) the difficulty of conducting controlled experiments; (3) the human capacity to learn and thus to alter his behavior; (4) the tendency of generalizations to be culture-conditioned; and (5) the influence of personal

¹³ Meehan, p. 91.

values of the individual observer.¹⁴ The phenomena and the environment in which they occur thus would appear to rule out of political analysis and theory building the use of rigid logical deduction.

A possible way to surmount this alleged barrier will be suggested in this thesis. For the present our remarks will be confined within the limits normally used to restrict the conduct of social science inquiry.

With deductive reasoning held unattainable by some positivists, the social scientist is thus forced, according to the logico-deductivists, to use probabilistic or tendency generalizations and inductive reasoning.

When the premises do not suffice to imply the conclusion but nevertheless have some weight as evidence in favor of it, the argument is said to be inductive.¹⁵

Inductive reasoning based upon tendency statements:

. . . provide(s) evidence, not deductive proof for a particular proposition. A more serious short-coming of tendency statements, however, is that they impose no predetermined limit on the evidence; they are exceptionally difficult to verify, for verification is an act of judgment--not the application of a criterion. Taken alone a single tendency statement is almost useless; it must be bound with other statements into a coherent theory

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 105-109.

¹⁵ L. Susan Stebbing, A Modern Elementary Logic, 5th ed. rev., (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd., 1952), p. 5.

before it acquires significant explanatory power.¹⁶

The Epistemology of Marx and Duverger

The explanations of the social phenomenon political party of Karl Marx and Maurice Duverger are in the positivist or logico-deductivist tradition. These two explanations are based upon the same epistemological foundations and demonstrate both the strengths and the weaknesses of the logico-deductivist approach to the generation of theoretical explanations in the social sciences.

The positivistic orientation of Marx is clearly shown in his emphasis upon the unity of methodology of both physical and social science. His proposed dialectical method of inquiry and explanation incorporates a blending of both epistemological and methodological elements and leads to what he called "objective" or "scientific truth"--an eventual absolute truth applicable to the explanation of all natural phenomena.

. . . natural science will in time incorporate the science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate natural science: There will be one science.¹⁷

¹⁶Meehan, pp. 115-116.

¹⁷Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844," as quoted in Marx-Engels, Selected Works II, p. 153.

A contemporary student of Soviet Russian thought contends that the position is yet viable in Russian scholarship. The methodology of the dialectic will enable social scientists to both explain and predict the future course of human events. This source states that:

In the judgment of Soviet writers, the Marxist dialectical method is not merely a scientific method in the strict meaning of the term. In addition to being the ultimate method for studying social phenomena, it represents at the same time a most advanced theory of cognition, a most progressive political ideology, a method for the revolutionary transformation of old social orders into new ones, a method for the conduct of domestic and international policies, and finally a method for foreseeing and predicting the future.¹⁸

Thus, to Marx and to modern Marxists, the unity of natural phenomena is a reality and the same explanatory process, the dialectic, is applicable to both of its divisions, the physical and social elements.

If the criterion of an acceptable scientific explanation is its predictive capacity, then the Marxian explanation of the phenomenon political party has a rather strong claim as to its utility.¹⁹ However, this assessment does not

¹⁸Michael Jaworskyj, Soviet Political Thought: An Anthology, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 3.

¹⁹From the methodological perspective we are not making the assessment in the Marxian dialectical sense. Our emphasis here is upon the alleged empirical ("scientific") but in fact normative generalizations upon which the whole Marxian explanatory edifice is constructed.

recognize the normative foundation upon which the Marxian explanation rests. Unless one accepts specific value judgments with regard to the transitive worth of various modes of social organization and the concomitant evolutionary perspective with respect to social change, the explanation has little claim to the status of a general theory of parties.

The explanatory framework of Duverger is also positivistic in that he is dedicated to a unitary scientific explanation for all natural phenomena.

The first aim of science is to formulate laws which describe constant relations between phenomena. These laws. . . make possible the prediction of the phenomenon "N" when phenomenon "A" is present. . . In practice the discovery of laws is possible only in the most advanced sectors of research: there are still few such sectors in the social sciences.²⁰

Duverger thus suggests that the explanation of all natural phenomena can be accomplished via the same methodology and that the "retarded" level of explanation in the social sciences is a consequence, not of the inapplicability of physical science methodology alone, to social phenomena, but primarily because of a far greater number of independent and intervening variables which affect the dependent variable in a social science explanation. Once the barriers of

²⁰Maurice Duverger, An Introduction to the Social Sciences with Special Reference to Their Methods, trans. by Malcolm Anderson, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 226.

of variable identification and quantification have been surmounted then prediction is possible. To Duverger, prediction is synonymous with explanation.

In principle the level of explanation is also that of prediction. . . In all sciences, however, prediction runs into a certain number of difficulties and these are serious in the social sciences.²¹

The Duverger explanation of parties does not rest firmly upon an obviously explicit value foundation except for a general implication that parties are a good thing, so a critique of its empirical validity is inappropriate. However, it does demonstrate a serious weakness which is a result of the evaluatory emphasis placed upon prediction within a scientific explanatory framework of methodological unity. Many observers deny this unity of method in explanation of natural phenomena and propose a different approach to explanation when the object of explanation is human. The epistemological weakness of the Duverger attempt to explain political parties is contained in, and demonstrated by, the intuitionist or subjectivist critique of positivist philosophy.

²¹Ibid., pp. 227-228.

Meaning and Social Action

The proponents and supporters of the subjectivist epistemology allege that the physical and the social sciences are distinct bodies of knowledge²² and that these differences arise because of the different nature of the phenomena to be explained. To these observers, understanding rather than prediction is the criterion of an adequate explanation of a social, as distinct from a physical science phenomenon. The subjectivists hold that in order to generate an acceptable explanation of phenomena which contain a human element, the observer must be cognizant of both the historical dimensions and of the subjective aspects of human behavior. Unlike the physical scientist, the social theorist is able, and must "get inside" his subject matter in order to include in his explanation the subject's perception of reality--his ideology or frame of reference.²³ The capacity of the object of explanation to engage in perception, cognition and to make value judgments suggests to the subjectivists that prediction is a very incomplete standard by which to judge the validity and completeness of explanations. It is argued

²²Leading examples of this position are Max Weber and Talcott Parsons.

²³In the terminology of perhaps the foremost intuitionist, the subject's "definition of the situation," Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, eds., Toward A General Theory of Action, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951).

that this non-mechanistic view of the social universe requires that proposed explanations demonstrate an "understanding" of the subjective dimensions of human thought and action because of man's active role in the shaping of his environment. In this view, an adequate explanation of the human action of placing a name on a piece of paper requires the observer to know whether the marks on the paper represent a legitimization of a death warrant or an act of judicial clemency.

Thus, in contrast to the logical empiricists, such as Duverger, the intuitionists contend that a valid explanation of social phenomena consists of more than a painstaking and narrow gauge search for an exhaustive list of all possible influencing variables by means of outside observation. Such a methodology can be quite successful in the delineation of structural and historical influences upon the phenomenon to be explained²⁴ but its weakness in social science is that such a restricted methodology does not lead to a systematic search for the subjective variables which are indispensable for an explanation which includes both the necessary and the sufficient conditions or variables. Thus, the Duverger explanation of political parties is a partial

²⁴Duverger's Political Parties: Their Origins and Activity in the Modern State is an excellent example of this logico-deductive methodology.

explanation and the author claimed no more than this status for his efforts. But, in addition, his positivistic epistemology and methodology, while adequate for explanation of the dimensions of the phenomenon which he chose to explore, are not adequate for the search for the remaining (sufficient?) variables which a general empirical theory of parties must contain.

Epistemology of the Responsible Party Theory

The philosophical foundation of the mandate or responsible government explanation of parties, as exemplified by Woodrow Wilson, suggests no clear and consistent position on the epistemological question of the nature of the subject matter to be explained. Wilson demonstrates that he is not a positivist:

I do not like the term political science. Human relationships whether in the family or in the state, in the counting house or in the factory, are not in any proper sense the subject matter of science. They are the stuff of insight and sympathy and spiritual comprehension.²⁵

This passage appears to place Wilson in the intuitionist tradition. But the type of explanation of political parties

²⁵Wilson, "The Law and the Facts," American Political Science Review, #5, (1911), pp. 1-11, as quoted in David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science, 2nd ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), pp. 67-68.

which he offers shows that the dominant thrust of his theoretical work is descriptive and prescriptive. As we have suggested above, the domination of normative values in an explanatory framework is counter productive to the generation of empirical theory. This weakness is particularly evident both in the Marxian and in Wilson's explanations of parties.

The reformative coloration of the mandate theorists continues down to the present era, as the work of the American Political Science Association committee demonstrates.²⁶ The task of the development of empirical party theory is not advanced but is inhibited by the weaknesses of both epistemology and methodology exhibited in both the Marxian and responsible government explanations of political parties.

Duverger and Marx share the same epistemological orientation to the extent that the subjective element of human development is not emphasized by either observer. For Marx, human potentiality is determined by objective conditions of the material environment. Duverger, by his emphasis upon the structures of political parties rather than more

²⁶"Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," American Political Science Review, Supplement, (September, 1950). For a recent study see Bernard S. Broder, The Partys Over: The Failure of Politics in America, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). Also worthwhile is James M. Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), Chapters 9, 10, and 14.

subjective party elements, chooses to explain that aspect of the phenomenon party which falls within what he calls "materially objective facts."²⁷ Thus Marx explains not only political parties, but the all-inclusive phenomenon social man from an epistemological position which he shares with Duverger. This position is that of a unity of natural and social explanation.

Marx and Duverger differ in that Marx does not recognize the basic value position which undergirds his epistemological approach to explanation, while Duverger is aware of values and constructs his explanation so that the subjective dimensions of the phenomenon are excluded. Thus Marx gives us a general but value-based explanation of parties and Duverger, while avoiding this trap, presents us with a value neutral but partial party explanatory framework. Woodrow Wilson is aware of the subjective dimension of human existence but his party theory is at least as value based as that of Marx. He recognizes that human values must

²⁷Duverger states that ". . . certain social facts are only images and have no existence outside consciousness. Others, in contrast have existences external to consciousness and are also something else as well as images. These can be called 'materially objective facts.'" He then gives as an example of a materially objective fact, ". . . the structure of parties or pressure groups. . ." An Introduction to the Social Sciences. . ., pp. 28-29.

be taken into account in the explanation of social phenomena but his explanation of political parties is rendered almost useless by his failure to recognize the introduction of his own personal value system. This weakness is endemic to most of the defenders of this approach to party explanation.

It is our contention that if general empirical explanations of human activity patterns are possible and will eventually be developed, such explanations will be deductive in nature. The arduous task of attaining this goal will require the utilization of preliminary explanatory frameworks which demonstrate an awareness of the subjective dimensions of man. Thus, further work in the development of a general theory of political parties must bridge the epistemological and methodological gap between the positivists and the subjectivists. Neither the Marxian nor the Responsible Government explanations of parties are adequate vehicles for this advance, the former because of the overt value position of its supporters and defenders. The positivistic claims of Karl Marx are somewhat obscured by his emphasis upon the methodology of the dialectic rather than logico-deductivism but a basic premise of his general social explanation is that capitalism is theft and as Riker has demonstrated, when the concept theft is removed from the

context of a specific legal system, then it becomes a normative idea.²⁸

The political party explanation of Duverger is a step in the right direction in that he is aware of the existence of the subjectivist position, but his efforts at explanation are restricted to those organizational and structural aspects of parties where participant values are least in evidence. It is our contention that through the development of a functional model of parties, the epistemological positivist-intuitionist gulf can be bridged and the search for a general and empirical party theory be advanced.

We now turn to an examination of the feasibility of presenting a functional model as a vehicle for the eventual development of empirical theory.

²⁸William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 5.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL PARTY EXPLANATION:
SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

It is our contention that general empirical explanations of human activity are at least theoretically possible. It is further contended that the logico-deductive approaches to a general party explanation of Karl Marx and Maurice Duverger are weak in their explanatory power, the former because of its basic value assumption with regard to the author's ethical judgment on the ownership of property, and the latter because of Duverger's choosing to ignore the subjective dimension of human activity. In addition, in our opinion, the use of the logico-deductive methodology by these two observers, is premature. The responsible government explanation of party is the weakest of the three theories because, as formulated by Woodrow Wilson, this explanation recognizes subjectivism but is so permeated with Western political values such as rationality and political participation as to render it a historically unique and narrow gauge attempt to explain the phenomenon political party. Recent observers on parties have continued to reflect this narrow Western bias.

At the present level of knowledge of political parties, the pressing task in the search for a general explanation is

the identification and, if possible, quantification of, as many as possible of the multiplicity of variables which influence the choice of individual actions by the human actor. When this task is complete or perhaps near to completion we should then be able to describe the necessary and sufficient conditions which generate a human activity pattern. As we approach the possession of a full inventory of these variables, the utilization of the powerful explanatory tool of logico-deductivism will become available to the social theorist,¹ but at the present immature stage of explanation in the social sciences, our energies should be directed primarily toward the search for the unknown, elusive, and for the most part subjective, variables.

The partial party explanation of Duverger emphasizes the structure of parties and party systems, and because of this emphasis the explanatory power of the Duverger formulation advances our knowledge of the phenomenon to some degree. This advance is made in spite of Duverger's premature commitment to the logico-deductive explanatory framework and thus his lack of emphasis upon the subjective

¹It appears possible that this stage in the development of explanations in social science will be reached when we can begin to develop a valid inventory of "sufficient" variables to explain the occurrences of specific social phenomena.

dimension of social man. It is our contention that this dimension can be explored and clarified through the generation and development of a functionally based analytical theory or heuristic framework which will enable us to identify additional independent variables and thus further explore new dimensions of those specific repetitive action patterns which we have called political parties.²

Definition and Heuristic Model Explanation

It is our contention that the following strategy should be utilized in the search for a general theory of political parties. First, the reality to be explained, the dependent variable, should be empirically defined so as to (a) clearly demonstrate its uniqueness from all other phenomena, and (b) the observer should describe shared characteristics of all instances of occurrence of the phenomenon so as to warrant including specific instances or occurrences of the phenomenon within a single terminological designation.

²The word "action" is used here in the sense that Talcott Parsons uses it. According to Parsons an "action" is restricted to goal-directed or meaningful choices on the part of the individual. Parsons excludes from this concept such human activities as the activation of reflexes. Parsonian conceptualizations have gone through many formulations. This "social action" concept is perhaps most clearly developed in The Structure of Social Action, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1949), and The Social System, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951).

The next step is then to search for independent variables, both the necessary and sufficient conditions, so as to be able to account for the dependent variable. In physical science explanations this step can usually utilize the logico-deductive approach in the use of quantified data. In the social sciences we must often utilize additional explanatory devices such as heuristic models to enable us to unearth previously ignored, or yet to be discovered independent variables. These models are especially valuable when the dependent variable is some dimension of subjective human activity patterns.

When using such models, the criterion of acceptability is not necessarily empirical refutation if the model allows us to discover previously unknown or unrecognized independent variables, the consequences of which can be, at least in theory, empirically tested for their validity. In addition, such heuristic models can disclose new linkages between existing known variables.

Our immediate task then is to empirically define the social phenomenon political party and then to attempt to discover some of the independent variables related to the subjective nature of man so as to further our search for a general explanation of political parties. This will be attempted through the use of an analytical structural-

functional model of individual party-related activity called a Social Satisfaction Level Model of individual party-related activity. Through the generation of such a model we can hopefully spotlight previously neglected process-related variables which have a bearing upon an eventual general explanation of parties, both in their structural and procedural aspects. Our emphasis here is upon the motivations of the individual who is active in a political party, the party seen as a social structure by means of which the individual is able to realize at least some of his action-directed goals. The party is thus functional to the individual as a means by which he is able to increase his personal life-satisfaction level.

Functionalism and Explanation

The utilization of a functionally based explanatory framework is an approach which is fraught with pitfalls, both epistemological and methodological. Many philosophers of science have raised objections to the claim that this approach to explanation can further our understanding of social phenomena.³ The claim is often made that no

³Such objections are most often raised by those philosophers of science who are defending the positivist path to explanation. See, for example, Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis" in Llewellyn Gross, ed., Symposium on Sociological Theory, (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 271-307. Another positivist critics is R. Dowse, "A

functionalist explanation is possible which is not teleological in nature--that is, that an end-state is posited or discovered by the researcher to which the action to be explained then becomes supportive or functional. Thus, some critics allege: no teleology, no functional explanation. In addition, some social theorists have challenged the claim of functionalists that their explanatory approach is unique.⁴ This allegation must be recognized if a useful application of functionalism is to be brought to bear upon social phenomena explanation. A third criticism of the use of functional explanations is contained within the holist/individualist controversy which revolves around the question of the basic unit of social analysis.

Functionalism Logic," World Politics, (July, 1966), pp. 607-622. In his critique of Gabriel A. Almond's use of functionalism, the main criticism of Dowse is that Almond is not presenting a theory as he is alleged to be claiming--Dowse holds that Almond's work is not subject to refutation. However, Dowse concedes that "(structural-functionalism). . . has sensitized students to complex relationships, has drawn attention to the social setting of politics, and has proved a valuable corrective to rationalizing and moralizing." (p. 618). It is for these purposes that we, as did Almond, are using a functional explanatory framework.

⁴See, for example, Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology," American Sociological Review, Vol. 24, (Dec., 1959), pp. 757-772. The argument here is that functional explanations are only a subset of the widely utilized causal chain explanatory framework.

These criticisms contain varying degrees of validity but their durability demands that the observer who utilizes the functionalist explanatory tool clearly present and justify his conception as to how the functional approach to social explanation furthers understanding of social phenomena and, in addition, clearly demonstrate that the valid criticisms of this approach have been recognized and surmounted.

Functionalism and Individualism

The suggestion that an observer is utilizing a functionalism mode of explanation immediately embroils him in the individualistic critique of this explanatory framework. Critics of this approach allege that the only viable social unit which is empirically explainable is the human individual and that it is logically indefensible to ascribe purposes or end-states to a social collectivity.⁵ Opponents of this viewpoint maintain that a social collectivity often possesses characteristics which disappear when the whole is

⁵The most extreme point of this position is that of Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism, (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). Popper argues that the holistic approach to social explanation paves the way for general public acceptance of collectivist social philosophies such as communism and fascism.

broken down into its basic human units.⁶ The development of a "mob psychology" is often cited by holists as an example of a collectivist property which disappears when the group is dispersed by a show of force. The individualists such as Popper and George Homans⁷ appear to ignore the point that in the search for regularities in human actions, social observers are continuously utilizing an analytical fiction, the typical individual rather than the unique.⁸ Thus the observer is seeking common social properties or characteristics and the holist-individualist debate becomes a non-starter.

Are We All Functionalists?⁹

Some social scientists have alleged that the functionalist mode of explanation is pervasive in both physical and social explanation because functionalism is in reality

⁶Although modern sociological studies are usually grounded upon this assumption, the classical statement of this position is Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, (New York: The Free Press, 1951; originally published in France in 1897).

⁷Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), and Popper.

⁸This point is well developed in Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, (London: Macmillan and Company, 1970), Chapter 8.

⁹See Kingsley Davis.

a particular type of causal explanation of the, "if function 'X', then functioning system 'Y' exists," variety.¹⁰ This position is not tenable in social science explanation because social systems are not empirical observables but are analytical constructs which are created to emphasize inter-relationships between and among independent variables. The analytical definition of a system includes the functions which sustain it and thus the chronological separation or temporal space between cause 'X' and resultant 'Y' of a typical causal explanation does not obtain in functional explanations. The heart of a functional explanation is the simultaneous occurrence of both 'X' and 'Y'. Thus, in positing that all explanations of social science phenomena are types of functional explanations, observers such as Davis and Nagel¹¹ are missing the point of temporal space.

Functionalism and Teleology

A third criticism of the functionalist mode of explanation is the allegation by critics that those who utilize

¹⁰Fred M. Frohock, The Nature of Political Inquiry, (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 59-101.

¹¹Ernest Nagel, "Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," Language and Human Rights, American Philosophical Association, (Philadelphia, Penn.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1952), pp. 45-64.

this mode are required to posit or imply purposes or ends as attainable goals for the system. The question is then raised as to the possibility of a system having goals even though it is conceded that an individual human entity can be in possession of such attributes. This question is epistemologically related to the individualist-holist controversy in that holists allege that a social collectivity is greater than the sum of its individual components and that this collectivity can in fact possess purposes or ends which are distinct from those of its individual units.

Those who present the teleological critique of functional explanation are often positivists who are committed to the logico-deductive explanatory mode. At the present stage of social science explanation, what we have described as the variable search stage, observers are fully justified in the utilization of functionally oriented heuristic frameworks if such frameworks enable us to move to new insights in the discovery of independent variables. We share with Talcott Parsons the view that the functionalist explanatory mode is a temporary or second-best form of explanation. Given the present level of development in the explanation of the phenomenon social man, the advantage of the use of this mode is that:

. . . the crucial characteristic of structural-functional theory is its use of the concept system without a complete knowledge of the laws which determine processes within the system.¹²

It is the looseness of fit which is of advantage to us in our attempts to discover a more complete inventory of the laws of social processes. These laws are discoverable when we have available a more complete inventory of the influencing variables. What is now required is an empirically based working definition of the dependent variable, the phenomenon for which a general explanation will no doubt eventually be constructed.

Toward a Definition of Political Parties

The present unorganized state of the wealth of empirical data available on the subject of political parties suggests that worthwhile inquiry into this phenomenon of political life could proceed in the following manner. First, the observer should study the definitions of party which have been proposed by competent scholars so as to arrive at a satisfactory general definition of party. Such a definition

¹²Talcott Parsons, The Social System, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1951), p. 483, as quoted in William C. Mitchell, Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 8.

should be inclusive enough to span the range of the phenomenon, and contain within it similarities of function which are common to all parties.¹³ This definition should also suggest critical variables which, when isolated, might allow the observer to construct a model which will yield empirically testable propositions. Such a model will not be a general theory of parties but only a step in this direction. The structural taxonomy of Duverger should be supplemented by a functional approach to party classification. The ultimate general empirical theory of parties will, no doubt, contain both structural and functional elements.

Following definition and the isolation of the variable(s) for use in the model, a taxonomy of parties which is based upon the chosen variable is possible. From the taxonomy the model can then be constructed and the testable propositions derived.

Because of the broad diversity of entities which label themselves political parties, a label which spans the

¹³In the view of this observer, the structure of any party is primarily a reflection of the functions which the party is seen as the vehicle to perform. Maurice Duverger, in Political Parties, suggests that structure is the critical influence in the determination of what is the entity called party. Our opinion is that functional/teleological explanations of party are more fruitful than causal/genetic, if a general party theory is to be developed because functional similarities of parties appear to be more widespread than causal or genetic (historical) similarities.

spectrum from the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China, to the Prohibitionist Party of the United States, one is tempted to seek refuge in the approach to a definition of party such as that used by Rupert Emerson in his analysis of African political parties.¹⁴ He cites with approval the position of Thomas Hodgkin that:

There is nothing to be gained by attempting a precise definition of the term "party" at this point. . . . For the moment it is probably most convenient to consider as "parties" all political organizations which regard themselves as parties and which are generally so regarded.¹⁵

Emerson acknowledges that this approach suffers from a looseness of terminology but he suggests that this loss is compensated for by "inclusiveness of coverage of African political phenomena."¹⁶ In a work in which the primary aim is description of unique parties or party systems, such looseness of definition is perhaps allowable. However, this avoidance of the establishment of limits for the political entity which is being analyzed will not result in the development of characteristics which are common to most if not

¹⁴Rupert Emerson, "Parties and National Integration in Africa," Political Parties and Political Development, Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 268-269.

¹⁵Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties, (London: Penguin African Series, 1961), pp. 15-16.

¹⁶Rupert Emerson, p. 269.

all other entities called parties, in all parts of the world. The development of a valid theory or model of parties calls for a tighter definition than self-designation as such.

Basic Party Characteristics

At the most basic level political parties are comprised of individuals who seek to derive some degree of personal satisfaction from party membership in return for their support of the organized entity called a party. Sigmund Neumann, in his edited book Modern Political Parties, says that "To become a party to something always means identification with one group and differentiation from another. Every party in its very essence signifies partnership in a particular organization and separation from others. . . ." ¹⁷ He goes on to say that what is common to all parties (democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian), besides partnership in a particular organization, and separation from others, is participation in the decision-making process or "at least the attempt at, and a chance for, such mobilization for action." ¹⁸

¹⁷Sigmund Neumann, ed., Modern Political Parties, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 395.

¹⁸Ibid.

In their definition of modern political parties, LaPalombara and Weiner state that, in contrast to the pre-nineteenth century cliques, clubs, factions and groups of notables who sought to influence, control and often to displace the authorities, modern parties must exhibit:

(1) continuity in organizations. . . (2) manifest and presumably permanent organizations at the local level. . . (3) self-conscious determination of leaders at both national and local levels to capture and to hold decision-making power. . . (4) a concern. . . in some manner (for) striving for popular support.¹⁹

They define a party as:

. . . an organization that is locally articulated, that interacts with and seeks to attract the electoral support of the general public, that plays a direct and substantive role in political recruitment, and that is committed to a capture or maintenance of power, either alone or in coalition with others.²⁰

Observers of an earlier era defined party as a "body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors, the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed;"²¹ that party is organized opinion; or, as Benjamin Constant wrote in 1816 that "A party is a group of men professing the same political doctrine." The current emphasis

¹⁹LaPalombara and Weiner, p. 6.

²⁰Ibid., p. 29.

²¹Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Present Discontents, (World Classics, Vol. II), p. 82.

is upon the political party as an entity reaching out into the local communities, at least in the psychological sense that the masses are aware that a regime and a political community exist and that they must identify with this larger entity, the political community.

Definitional Scope

In attempting to define the concept political party, one pitfall to be avoided is that of linking the definition to one particular philosophy of government. This narrowness appears in the LaPalombara and Weiner definition when the authors speak of the party as seeking "electoral support." The support of the masses does not necessarily have to be of the electoral variety in which there is a choice of power holders. In some non-democratic political communities the vote may be of a plebiscitarian nature or the authorities may dispense with the act of mass voting altogether. The crucial idea is that the masses recognize a particular group of authorities as legitimate.

In the broad sense the parties are comprised of individuals who perceive strength in numbers and who combine with others throughout the political community so that they are able to exert influence upon the incumbents, and to themselves occupy the positions of effective decision making in

the regime. The essence of party is strength through combination and organization and the primary reward is the exercise of political power.²²

Power and Party

The theme of power is a recurrent one in attempts to define parties. Max Weber has defined parties as:

. . . voluntary associations for propaganda and agitation seeking to acquire power in order to . . . realize objective aims or personal advantages, or both.²³

McKenzie, in comment upon this definition says that these "objective aims" may be of greater or lesser importance in providing the basis of association and the motive force for the activity of a particular party. But, he adds, there is:

. . . little doubt that it is the collective pursuit of power which is of overriding importance. It is obvious too that during the pursuit of power, and after it has been achieved, parties mold and

²²For the purposes of this paper the concepts power, authority, influence and control will be treated as synonyms. Some writers such as Max Weber and Harold Lasswell have discussed the distinctiveness of each of these terms--others, in a more general treatment have not attempted to differentiate. See Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral Science, Vol. 2, #3, (July, 1957), pp. 201-215. For the level of discussion and analysis herein attempted, the Dahl approach appears adequate and is used unless otherwise stated.

²³R. T. McKenzie, "Parties, Pressure Groups and the British Political Process," The Political Quarterly, Vol. 29.

adapt their principles under the innumerable pressures brought to bear by organized groups of citizens which operate for the most part outside of the party system.²⁴

It can be argued that those organized groups called lobbies, pressure groups and interest groups which are "outside the party system," fulfill the established criteria for parties in that they are organized groups of individuals who are seeking political power and influence. The critical difference between pressure groups and parties is that pressure groups concern themselves with obtaining outputs from the legitimate authorities which are favorable to their members. They usually operate within the framework of the regime without attempting serious disruptions of the stability of the political system or community. Normally the members do not wish to displace the authorities but to influence them.

In contrast to the narrowness of the aims or goals of pressure groups, parties demonstrate a wide range of demands. They are multi-level organizations with an interest in becoming the legitimate authorities in a political community which has developed to the degree that the bulk of the masses have a least a minimal awareness of the scope and authority of the central decision makers.

²⁴Ibid., p. 8.

The definition of party of Sigmund Neumann is inclusive enough to describe parties in most, if not all differentiated political communities. It is not confined to democratic systems only. It is a functional definition in that the essential activities of parties are included and the use of party as a means of access to positions of political power is emphasized. Neumann states that political parties are:

The articulate organization of society's active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for popular support with another group or groups holding divergent views. . . the great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies to official governmental institutions and relates them to political action within the larger political community.²⁵

This definition, because of its inclusive character, its functional orientation and its emphasis on the power aspect of parties, seems to this observer to be useful in defining, in general and inclusive terms, the concept political party. The primary weakness of the definition is that the scope and degree of "society's active political agents" is not stated so that it is clear what level of activity on behalf of the party is required of the individual in order to qualify him as an active political agent.

²⁵Sigmund Neumann, p. 396.

Membership and Party

Party membership, the degree of identification with, and activity in furthering the party aims and goals is held by Duverger to be primarily dependent upon the formal structure of the particular party. Thus he constructs a taxonomy having "cadre" and "mass" parties, parties of "community," "association," and "order," "direct" and "indirect" parties.²⁶ He recognizes that the individual's identification with, and level of activity on behalf of the party is a characteristic peculiar to each individual, but argues that the aims and goals of the party determine its structure, and that the structure of the party strongly influences the degree of the individual member's active identification with the group. He states that the links which bind the member to the party are a function of the type of membership, "direct" or "indirect." In parties with direct membership the degree of individual member participation divides those who have identified with the group into what Duverger calls supporters, adherents, militants and propagandists. These groupings "form a series of concentric circles of ever-increasing party solidarity."²⁷

²⁶Maurice Duverger, Book I, Chapter II, pp. 61-132.

²⁷Ibid., p. 61.

Thus, both Duverger and Neumann refer to individual member participation as an element in the definition of political party, Neumann makes no attempt to be specific and Duverger suggests that participation, "the link which binds the individual to the party,"²⁸ cannot be measured in terms of degree but should be regarded as different types of participation.

Since party membership spans the spectrum from the extreme of verbal self-identification only, to the opposite extreme of the total commitment of life as required by communist and Fascist parties, fruitful analysis requires that a stable criteria of party membership be established. To relate party membership to the degree of participation is a sound approach to a workable definition in that membership is a voluntary act on the part of the individual and the success of the party in the realization of its aims and goals is at least partially dependent upon the activity level of the membership of the organization. Since we assume that those who voluntarily accept membership in a party are favorably disposed toward the successful realization of the organizational goals, it follows that mere identification with the group, a psychological identification only, with no overt physical activity on its behalf, does not constitute

²⁸Ibid.

active membership in the party. Such persons, in Neumann's terms, are not "active political agents."²⁹

Party members are those who are active in the affairs of the party and who devote time and effort to furthering the aims and goals of the party over a sustained period of time. The Neumann definition of political party is accepted as a working definition for this paper, with the addition that active party membership is comprised of active political agents who engage in partisan activity on a regular basis over an extended period of time. In terms of the taxonomy of Duverger, our use of the qualified definition of Neumann includes Duverger's "militants" and "propagandists" as party members, and excludes "adherents" and "supporters." This differentiation is based upon the degree of party related activity in which the various classifications of party identifiers are thought to engage.

²⁹Lester W. Milbrath in Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965), in establishing his theoretical framework, divides the public into two general classes, the "activists" and the "apathetics." The activists are then divided into "spectator," "transitional," and "gladiatorial" activists. Our definition of party as stated above contains as party members only the gladiatorial activists of Milbrath.

Society and Party

Differences of group motivations are crucial to a taxonomy of parties which is based upon the party functions of providing a means of psychological satisfaction for the power instinct of the individual party member. If, in order to construct a model of parties, this function of party is the most basic, then we must clearly differentiate between political parties and other voluntary, sub-national, power oriented groupings of individuals found within the polity such as those whose efforts are directed toward the attainment of economic, military or spiritual power.

There is in most definitions of political party the implied assumption that there is a boundary of party goal perception which separates those entities which are oriented toward political power from other groups in society which may or may not be referred to as parties. These latter groups may be formed for purposes of fellowship, worship, study, or agitation for reform, but the critical difference between them and true parties is that parties are social organizations, the individual members of which are disposed to act to extend calculated control over a perceived unit of

their more remote environment.³⁰ By this we mean that party members desire to exercise control over the actions of others who are not close to them in either a physical (spatial) or a functional sense:

The most widely and generally perceived unit of more remote environment within which a unified pattern of calculated control activities operates and exists is, in modern times, the nation-state.³¹

Political parties, then, as entities, can be differentiated from other organized social groupings in that parties strive to achieve or maintain legitimate control over the authority apparatus of the nation-state; in short, to exercise political power,³² in contrast to other social groups whose aim is to influence segments of, or the whole of, the citizen body. We are not concerned with the members' personally perceived ultimate ends of either parties or interest groups but we are making a distinction between the instrumental ends of the two groups which is based upon their relation to the

³⁰The concepts "remote environment" and "perceived unit" in relation to the political process are used here in the sense that they have been developed and explained by Neil A. McDonald in his The Study of Political Parties, Short Studies in Political Science #26, (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1955), pp. 77-88.

³¹Ibid., p. 81.

³²As defined by Robert A. Dahl in Modern Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 50, where he refers to power as the possession of coercive influence.

legitimate authority structure. Political parties strive to control the authority structure while the other groups will often seek to influence but do not strive for open control. If these latter groups cross this threshold, they then become political parties. Thus, the Prohibitionist Party in the United States cannot be realistically termed a party even though it is active in the contesting of elections on a national scale. It does not appear to be in a position to even hope to aspire to control of the more remote environment. It uses the electoral process as a platform to gain publicity for the single issue in which it is interested. The most realistic position to which it can aspire is to influence Americans, and one of its chosen means to accomplish this goal is through publicity which it gains by entering active candidates in national and local elections.

In contrast to this group, the Beria faction in Soviet Russia which attempted late in 1953 to seize control of the formal and legitimate political apparatus of the remote environment, was moving in the direction of becoming a political "party." Beria worked in conjunction with his top aides of the Soviet police system and his attempt at forcible take-over was thwarted only at the last minute.³³ By having

³³Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation, (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 181.

as an instrumental goal the propensity to achieve control over the more remote environment and by engaging in activity toward this goal, the Beria group in Soviet Russia became a fledgling political "party." This threshold between party and other groups in society was crossed when the plotters believed that it was possible for them to achieve control of the state governing apparatus and when the bulk of their activities, as a group, was directed toward this end.

Political Party Defined

In summary, political parties are voluntary organizations of active political agents, comprised of those who concern themselves and who are concerned with the control of the legitimate monopoly of coercive power which is located at some level(s) in the organization of the state. They hope sooner or later to compete for popular support with another group or groups with similar aims and not necessarily divergent goals. They are the great intermediary which link or desire to link social forces and ideologies to the official governmental institutions. They must be locally as well as regionally or nationally articulated or actively strive to be, so that the people identify with the larger community.

Parties demonstrate some continuity of stable organization. They exhibit a propensity to desire the organization

and control of those aspects of life which are, by general agreement, felt to properly lie within the sphere of political authority; or they may wish to enlarge or reduce this sphere of authority. The essence of party is a commitment to sustained and organized group activity to achieve the positions of legitimate political power which the nation-state possesses in all post-primitive societies. This activity, at least in the early stages, can be clandestine or open depending in large part upon the nature of the dominant ideology or ideologies concerning the existence of open opposition.

The Psychological Dimension of Power and Party

The common characteristic of all parties is that they relate to legitimate positions of power in the political community such that some individuals are drawn to party activities as an efficient means to gain control of the recognized authority structure. Psychological studies of men suggest that the human need for the possession and exercise of a degree of power, influence, authority and control of at least some of the mental and behavior capabilities of others is almost a universal human trait. This trait is intimately connected with what is here suggested as the primary function of political parties--the function of

providing for the collective pursuit or maintenance of legitimate political power.

Organized society then is comprised of groups of humans who reside in political communities which are developed to the extent that they are perceived as having the capacity to provide material benefits above the level of subsistence only. In order to partake of the material comforts which the community has the potential to, or does provide, the individual must possess and exercise some degree of power. The political community has the monopoly of coercive power which it exercises in an institutional framework which may or may not be separate from the economy, the other basic power center in the community.

This need to attain a power position, to share in the material benefits of society, is complimented by the psychological composition of the individual. Modern psychology has identified three types of individual motivations, biological drives, emotions and social motives.³⁴ The biogenic drives suggested as being shared by all men are hunger, thirst, the need for oxygen, sex, excretion and escape from pain. In addition to these drives which can be satisfied

³⁴Ross Stagner and T. F. Karwoski, Psychology, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952), pp. 35-69.

quickly, are the emotions. These emotions can to a high degree be internalized within the individual.

The third class of motivations which strongly influence human actions are the social motives. These differ from biogenic drives and emotions in that they involve interaction with others for goal attainment, and the relaxation of tensions. The social motives are listed as security, dominance, acquisitiveness, group identifications, and particular values or a personal ideology.

Psychological research has shown that social motives are not inherited but are absorbed and internalized from the cultural environment in which the individual has been reared.³⁵ The social values of the culture in which one develops are at least in part responsible for the determination of social motives, the patterns of social interaction with others within the community. This culture conditioning does not detract from our suggesting the nearly universal power drive of individuals, because the drive to power has been found to exist in any cultural community which we have designated as post-primitive: those which have developed beyond the village or tribal form of social organization.

³⁵ Ibid.

The five social motives of security, dominance, group identification, acquisitiveness and particular values all involve to a significant degree the exercise of some amount of power over others in the community. Thus, the psychology of man and the economic milieu in which he is situated in all present day post-primitive societies, both point in the direction of the attaining and the utilization of power-economic power by means of control over both man and nature, and political power by means of control over other men.

If political power accrues to those who successfully seek it, and since men are mortal, it follows that within the authority group of the political system there is a constant shifting of access to various power positions. In addition, coalitions are recognized as being mutually beneficial. Thus, those seeking to replace and to become the authorities are motivated by aspirations to positions of political power. Access to this power is one means of releasing tensions in the individual occurring as a result of his acquired social motivations. The function of political parties is to provide a power base from which the men who are prepared to act in concert can struggle together to achieve or to maintain their capability to exercise political power.

Thus, within the framework of a power-based functional approach to parties, there are primarily differences of timing and of method of operation between a contest for power in the United States and a coup in Soviet Russia. In most democratic systems men can afford to wait for a chance at the positions of power because of fairly regularized and predictable times of formal struggle while in totalitarian systems the aspirants must act surreptitiously until they feel conditions are right to move into the open and thus to reveal the amount of actual and potential power they control. In both types of systems the functional unit of operation is the group bidding for power or seeking to retain it.

CHAPTER VI

PARTY AND POWER: A DYNAMIC HEURISTIC MODEL

It has been suggested that contemporary man, in his search for valid explanation of the universe of phenomena, stands on the shoulders of giants. This assessment is as correct in the generation of a general theory of political parties as in any other area of explanatory endeavor. We have discussed epistemological and methodological weakness in the Marxian and the mandate/responsible government explanation of political parties and have suggested that the work of Maurice Duverger is useful but narrow in its scope. However, further efforts directed toward the generation of a general exploration must not only be cognizant of, but must build upon the insights into the party dimension of social life which these scholars have provided.

A most significant contribution of Marx to the explanation of social man is his development of the conceptualization that man is a materialistically motivated entity. Explanations of the meanings of social actions are weakened if the economic dimension of life is ignored. The mandate party theorists have contributed to our understanding of parties because of their emphasis on the assumption that man would act in a rationally self-centered manner, within the

context of a democratic form of government. By so doing he would achieve the twin benefits of personal self-development and the general good of society.¹

Maurice Duverger has advanced the explanation of political parties by his emphasis upon variables relating to party and party system origins and to party and system structure. Thus, if general explanations of human social life are possible and if such explanations require the discovery of the multiplicity of variables which influence social actions, then Duverger has contributed to this discovery process. He has directed our attention to previously ignored aspects of party origins, modes of organization, the interrelationship between party ideologies and party structures, and the chronological evolution of types of parties. His typologies of parties based upon these variables provides a basis for the development of insights into the process of party evolution. The task of general party theorizing

¹An early proponent of this view is John Stuart Mill. In his Representative Government Mill takes the position that individual growth and development requires participation in the decision-making process; see p. 203. Modern social theorists of a more empirical bent have, of course, drastically revised the explanation of the operation of democratic systems. Such observers as Joseph Schumpeter, Bernard Berelson and Robert Dahl are representative of the "realists" who describe, and in the case of Dahl and others of a pluralist bent, define the elite-mass conceptualization of modern democracy and the role which political parties play in its operation.

involves a building upon the insights of our predecessors, Marx, Wilson, Duverger and many others.

It is now incumbent upon us to describe and develop a suggestive means by which the search for a general theory of political parties can be advanced. Our vehicle for this advancement is a heuristic model of political man which is based upon specific assumptions concerning his relationship to the distributive process in any society which is sufficiently advanced technologically to generate a surplus of material rewards well above the subsistence level and which has evolved one or more ideologies so as to justify the attempts on the part of individuals and groups to increase their personal share of these materials, and also other derived advantages such as power, privilege, and prestige.²

The eventual general theory of parties will be of broad enough explanatory power to explain all dimensions of party life. It will provide insights into, and generate testable

²Our reference here is to what have been variously called "solidary" and "purposive" incentives or benefits, see Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," in Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 6, (September, 1961), pp. 129-166, and the related concepts of "expressive" and "instrumental" activities as discussed by Peter Blau in Exchange and Power in Social Life, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964). See also the general argument in Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966).

hypotheses concerning the motivations and activity patterns of individual party members, and the relationships between party members and the non-members in a society. In addition, the general explanation must account for the institutional structures and processes within specific manifestations of the phenomenon, the patterns of interaction with the society of which the party is a part, and in the case of dual and multi-party systems, the structure and processes of inter-party competition and co-operation. In the case of multi-national parties such as the various communist parties, both international co-operation among national units, and national difference of tactics and strategy should be explained.

Given a task of this magnitude, the objection can be raised that any plausible explanation would be so abstract and general as to be worthless in furthering the understanding of a specific party, at a given point in time, within a unique national context.³

³This criticism has been made of such theorists as David Easton and Gabriel Almond. See, for example, Eugene J. Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study, (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), Chapter 3. Meehan alleges that the functionalist approach to political explanation can be useful if rigorously applied to specific dimensions of politics or other aspects of social life but the use of this approach by a general theorist such as Easton or Almond is at best, vague, and at worst, circular. This criticism is valid only if the methodology of explanation of both physical and social science are the same. Because of the vast difference in degree of complexity of the subject matter to be explained this is obviously not the case.

One approach to overcome such criticism is to isolate specific characteristics of social man and to relate the emergence, growth, development and perhaps eventual decline of political parties to this basic characteristic. In this way it is hoped that testable hypotheses will be generated from the emphasis upon previously ignored variables. An analytical model of social evolution based upon the distributive process is one possible avenue of explanation. It is the one chosen here because of its dynamism. We present one dimension of an analytical model of party dynamics which will point the way toward tentative answers to questions concerning the origins and structural evolution of parties, what parties do, how they accomplish their goals and when they act. The model will generate hypotheses which can be subjected to empirical refutation in answer to such questions as: How can we account for the appearance of parties and party systems? What functions do parties perform in a society? What accounts for inter-party and inter-societal differences between and among parties and party systems with regard to the frequency, mode, and duration of inter-party struggles for office? In this model, party is the dependent

variable.⁴ Certain assumptions concerning the nature of social man are posited and specific characteristics of the social dynamic are our independent variables. The result is an explanatory framework which emphasizes the dynamic interaction of party and society. This approach is complementary to the static, structural explanatory explanation of Duverger while avoiding the highly normative foundations of the dynamic explanations of the Marxist and mandate/responsible government explanations of political parties.

Material Surpluses and Social Dynamics

The general argument we will develop is based upon the assumption⁵ that the history of post-primitive social entities called complex industrial societies is a dynamic process

⁴Of course, political parties can be regarded as either dependent or independent variables. The choice is a function of the perspective of the researcher in what he is attempting to explain of social reality. In his discussion of political party as a "modernizing instrument," David Apter states that political party "form is determined by the entire sociopolitical framework of the society. . . they depend upon the grouping in the society for their membership. In this sense political parties are dependent variables, with society and governmental organization, election or co-operation procedures, and the like, the independent variables." The Politics of Modernization, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 181-182.

⁵Our argument is essentially an extension of the social stratification theory of Gerhard E. Lenski in his Power and Privilege. We are applying basic elements of his general theory to a specific social institution, political parties. The dynamic element of his explanation remains basically intact in this formulation.

which is dependent upon four main factors: (1) the existence of a national surplus over and above needs as opposed to wants,⁶ (2) unequal allocation of the surplus which divides societies into at least two main groups, elites and non-elites,⁷ (3) the existence of a dominant ideology to explain and justify the division of the surplus between these two groups, and (4) the eventual evolution of counter-ideologies to explain and defend the possibility of changes in the distribution of the social surplus.

Modern industrial society is presented as a generator of large material surpluses. An ideology of increased general participation in the struggle for changes in the surplus distribution has opened the door of political participation to self-motivated members of the non-elite groups.

⁶The difference between "needs as requirements to sustain life (e.g., food) in contrast to "wants" as a choice of need sation entities (e.g., beefsteak or beans) is developed by John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958).

⁷The conceptualization of societies into elites and non-elites or masses has a long history in social explanation. The rhetoric of normative democratic theory does not explain away the empirical fact that in any society the few make decisions for the many, and that these decisions, however ideologically justified their results might be, tend toward a perpetuation of the unequal allocation of the values of the society. For a brief, well stated discussion of attempts by democratic theorists to resolve the tensions between democracy and elitism, see Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967).

These group members attempt to increase their share of the social surplus by means of an increase in the power and privilege they are accorded by the remainder of that society. This struggle is a group effort to advance partisan group interests so as to increase individual pay-offs.

Additionally, any society moves in a cycle of surplus allocation from MIGHT to RIGHT to MIGHT--and the dynamic of this cyclical movement influences the origins, structure and processes of parties. The legitimatizing ideology is one of the powerful variables in explaining the dynamics of societal inter-party interaction patterns. The task then is to amplify and defend our model and to demonstrate how this approach to party explanation is fruitful in the discovery of new variables having a bearing upon the origins, operation and ideologies of parties and party systems. Such an approach should further the search for a general theory of parties by directing our attention to hitherto unemphasized or ignored dimensions of party existence.

Surplus Distribution and Social Evolution According to Lenski

In his general theory of social stratification, Gerhard Lenski has provided the student of stasiology with one avenue to build toward an eventual general theory of political parties.

His landmark work, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification⁸ utilizes the materialistic conception of man of Karl Marx, and the individual self-serving dimension of man which the mandate party theorists incorporated from classical laissez-faire economists. Through application of his broad gauge explanation of the forces generating a gradual evolution of societies, to the political dimension of life in general, and the phenomenon political party specifically, we should be able to supplement the static and structural discussion of parties of Maurice Duverger with a dynamic perspective to give insights into how parties emerge, evolve and interact, with each other and internally.

In brief, Lenski posits that the single most important key to understanding social dynamics is an understanding of how the determinations are made to distribute the surplus material goods which any post-primitive society produces.⁹ How individual man stands in relation to a social surplus distribution process is a key variable in determination of his social power. Lenski adopts the definition of power

⁸Gerhard E. Lenski.

⁹Ibid., see especially the theoretical portions of his work, Chapters 1-4, pp. 1-93.

of Max Weber¹⁰ the power is "the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action." He then postulates that men seek some combination of the intrinsic goals of survival, sustenance, health, status or prestige, creative comfort, salvation and affection and the instrumental goals of wealth, organized office and other institutionalized roles, education and training. In addition, collectivities of people we call societies also have goals which are not necessarily congruent with every member of a given society. Lenski defines these societal goals as:

those ends toward which the more or less coordinated efforts of the whole are directed--without regard to the harm they may do to many individual members, even the majority.¹¹

The two basic goals of any society are then suggested to be (a) the minimization of the rate of internal political change through ruling class emphasis upon some combination of emphasis upon law and order, and national security, and (b) the maximization of material production and the resources upon which such production depends. This latter goal can be

¹⁰From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 180.

¹¹Lenski, p. 41.

accomplished by means of some combination of internal resource development and foreign adventures.

The author then presents what he calls two laws of societal distribution: The first is that, "men will share the product of their labors to the extent required to insure the survival and continued productivity of those others whose actions are necessary or beneficial to themselves."¹² If a social surplus is produced¹³ which is in demand by all or nearly all members of the society, then the Second Law of Distribution holds that "power will determine the distribution of nearly all of the surplus possessed by a society."¹⁴ This second law operates if, as Lenski contends, men are primarily motivated by personal or partisan group interests.¹⁵

Lenski has avoided the many conceptual difficulties encountered in the use of the concept power by defining the term in relation to the individual's standing in the surplus distribution system of the particular society of which he is

¹²Ibid., p. 44.

¹³This criterion is in fact one of the primary characteristics which distinguishes a post-primitive from a primitive society since the relative amount of surplus is related to the degree of institutional complexity.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵See p. 128 for a definition and discussion of this and other empirical terms and analytical concepts.

a member. He suggests that the concepts privilege and prestige are analytically distinct from power but that both privilege and honor or prestige are primarily functions of power.¹⁶ Social power can rest upon two bases, force and institutionalized power. The latter differs from the former in that it is based upon the acceptance of the right to authoritatively allocate social values by groups in a society having the capacity of replace the allocators. To Lenski, institutionalized power is constitutional power. He is here referring to the legitimacy of the existing political regime and suggests that in any society this legitimacy is part of a cyclical phenomenon of power based upon a cycle of force, to legitimate power, and back to force.

The basic units of analysis in his schema are power classes or classes, and class systems. These elements constitute the fundamental concepts of his explanation of stratification and they, along with partisan groups, are

¹⁶While not denying the analytical and even empirical distinction which scholars have made among these terms, for purposes of our party model they will be treated as synonymous. Prestige is defined as "the favorable evaluation and social recognition that a person receives from others. . . the subjective dimension of social stratification." David Popenoe, Sociology, (New York: Appleton, Century Crofts, 1970), p. 221. Privilege refers to individual or group advantages generally recognized by custom, habit or general social consensus. If such recognition is codified into law the possessors of such social advantages then become an estate.

herein adopted as the dynamic element of our model of political parties. Our framework places more emphasis upon partisan groups than does Lenski but the historical sweep and breadth of explanation are narrower since we are concentrating on one dimension of social life, the political aspect, and upon a single component of this dimension, the political party. In addition, from the chronological perspective, parties are a recent phenomenon in the political area of social life.

Partisan Groups, Power Classes and Class Systems

In his discussion of the self-seeking tendencies of human actions, Lenski suggests that some human activity choices are motivated by altruistic considerations but that these are a minor segment of the whole range of human choice patterns. In addition, many of the choices which appear on the surface as being altruistic are, on closer examination, a form of exchange within the primary group--a system of mutually beneficial reciprocal actions.

Many actions appear as sacrifices only when the larger context is ignored. Seen in context, such actions appear as parts of a mutually beneficial system of exchange favors.¹⁷

¹⁷Lenski, p. 28.

Thus, what appears on the interpersonal level to be self-sacrificial action is, when seen in the societal context, not individual self-serving but options chosen by the individual to further his own interests through the advocacy of choice options of benefit to a group with which he interacts on a frequent basis.¹⁸ The defining characteristic of a partisan group is frequent and personal interaction over a range of more than one social role context. Two people who interact in a commercial transaction based upon a cash nexus only, would not constitute a rudimentary partisan group. If the scope of the interaction is broadened to include one or more additional dimensions of face-to-face interactions such as the buyer and seller sharing membership in the same religious, political or other social grouping, then a partisan group is a possibility.

A key component of the explanatory framework of Lenski is that of classes or "power classes." These are defined as:

An aggregation of persons in a society who stand in a similar position with respect to force or some form of institutionalized power.¹⁹

¹⁸An example of partisan group interests is Edward Banfield's The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, (New York: Free Press, 1958), pp. 9-10. The pattern of extended family interests taking priority over the general welfare of the village is well described. In this context the extended family is the partisan group.

¹⁹Lenski, p. 75.

Thus, a power class is not an empirical entity in the same sense that a caste or an estate is since the total aggregate of a society which possess a specific level of power in the surplus allocation process is not a distinct group in terms of any other social characteristic. Lenski holds that "a single individual may well be a member of half a dozen power classes" because "the various forms of power are less than perfectly correlated with one another."²⁰ He is thus suggesting that a class is a collective of power loci in various social institutions, each locus in which the incumbent shares the capacity to exercise a similar level of control over the allocation of social values. Two important aspects of this concept and its use in social analysis are (1) that defining class in terms of power does not imply that all classes have power--the expendables in an agrarian society are given as an example of this case, and (2) a single individual can be an incumbent of a multiplicity of loci and thus of many different social classes.

Each of the major roles he occupies as well as his status in the property hierarchy, influences his choices of obtaining the things he seeks in life, and thus each places him in a specific class.²¹

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid., pp. 75-76.

Each member of a society is a member of various classes, his membership and the class being determined by such personal characteristics as age, sex, race or ethnicity and education. The customs, habits, mores, beliefs and legal systems of his society determines the extent to which specific class members will possess power to influence the distributive process. The conventional wisdom component of the culture of a society thus determines how much power an aggregate of people who share a particular characteristic should exercise in allocating resources for that particular society.²²

Since the individuals who constitute a class in a society can be categorized according to variables with classes such as children, young adults or elderly within the age class, or illiterate or college graduate within the education class, an additional necessary conceptual addition to our heuristic framework is the idea of class systems or institutional systems.²³ Lenski defines these as being "a hierarchy of classes ranked in terms of some single criterion" and adds that:

²²Some societies exhibit a belief in a messianic ideology which suggests to its adherents that the whole world should share the same belief system with regard to class influence on the distributive process.

²³Lenski, pp. 79-82.

As indicated previously, each class system in a society contains within it all the members of that society. Thus every member of American society holds simultaneous membership in some class within the occupational property, racial - ethnic, educational, age, and sexual class systems.²⁴

Lenski maintains that the struggle for power, privilege and prestige occurs in a society between and among individuals, classes, and class systems and that the struggles on the levels of systems involve contests between different principles of distribution. This is an important conceptualization in understanding the dynamic element of a society and the element upon which our party model is based. We argue that characteristics which are generated by industrial societies and those nations dominated by the ideologies of these societies have generated the social organization we call parties and that the study of the struggle for power among classes and class or institutional systems generates fruitful insights into other dimensions of party and party member activity patterns. The theory of stratification as developed by Lenski is applied by him to hunting and gathering societies, simple and advanced horticultural societies, agrarian, and industrial societies. The phenomenon party is unique to industrial societies and to agrarian societies as a special case, where they exist simultaneously with, and are

²⁴Ibid.

exposed to the influence of the productivity, the ideology, and the technology of the industrial societies.

The Rise of Political Parties

It is our contention that the social phenomenon we call political party appeared at a time in history when a religiously generated philosophy of citizen individualism interacted with an explosion in the capacity of societies to provide material abundance. The rise of parties then is largely a result of the Reformation and the Industrial Revolution. In contrast to pre-industrial societies, those nations in the forefront of industrialization such as England, the United States and Germany, were the locus of a new conceptualization of the relationship between the governors and those who were governed.

The idea that the state was the servant of the citizens was generated in part by changes in the nature of scope of warfare--changes introduced by Napoleon Bonaparte. At the end of the 18th century inter-nation warfare began to involve the mobilization of total populations and in return for such participation, the reciprocal nature of citizenship became clear to ever widening segments of some societies' populace. Prior to the rise of pressures to expand the granting of citizenship to greater and greater segments of the

population,²⁵ most inhabitants of a society were not simultaneously subjected to the ravages and sacrifices of war. With additional war-related burdens laid upon them, new groups of the population were motivated to demand a redistribution of the allocation of material benefits and thus of power, privilege and prestige.²⁶ Existing stratification systems came under increasing attack. The development of more rapid and efficient communications networks and the widespread adoption of the idea that literacy was the right of an ever increasing proportion of national populations also facilitated new challenges to dominant distribution systems. Another contributing factor in this trend was the discovery and exploitation of new sources of wealth in the Americas, Africa and Asia. Concomitant with these trends was the interest generated in Europeans and Americans of the myth of the noble savage who was alleged to live in a free state of nature and thus totally responsible for his own welfare. All these factors combined to bring into question the

²⁵This point is developed in Walter Mills, Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History, (New York: Pitman, 1956). For a more general treatment see Stanislaw Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society, (London: Routledge, 1954), specifically Chapter 2.

²⁶As utilized by Lenski, power is conceptualized as the capacity to influence the distribution of the material social surplus. Privilege and prestige are primarily a function of one's distribution power.

conventional wisdoms concerning the right and proper way to distribute social surpluses and thus power and prestige.

A vital element then in the evolution of social life is the constant struggle between the few who dominate the allocation of resources process and the many who at various historical points in time are motivated to seek changes in the allocation process. The many who have a minor share in the value allocation process of a given society by no means constitute all of those who regard themselves as being unfairly situated in the existing social power relationships. We are here making reference only to those who seek changes and combine with others in order to effect these changes in the social surplus distribution patterns. It is our contention that political parties are the means which have evolved to facilitate individual and partisan group striving for increased power in modern industrial society.

Classes, Class Systems and Parties

While any society contains within a multiplicity of class systems, a consistent pattern of stratification has persisted, in that one, or at most a very few of the possible systems, have been generally recognized as being legitimate as dominating influences in the allocation process. In many

cultures, for extended periods, possession of land and, related to it, family lineage, have been the dominant allocating systems. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, economic systems which allocate power, privilege and prestige according to wealth and income first supplement, and later tend to supplant the older institutional justifications. When land, lineage, religion or military might are the dominant class systems then the political dimension of life becomes of secondary importance. Politics is seen primarily as a bureaucratic and administrative class system to sustain existing surplus allocation patterns. The interplay of social forces generated by the interaction of the participation ethos and the vast increase of material goods resulted in the innovative search for new activity patterns on the part of some people, to increase their power and privilege. If the dominant class system(s) in a society are based upon ascriptive characteristics then the individual cannot turn to standards of achievement and to class systems where the hierarchy of power is based upon this latter characteristic. In an achievement culture the relative openness of the system, in contrast to ascriptive cultures, gives the individual opportunities he would not have had in previous eras. It is our contention that, in an industrial society and in those agrarian societies existing in conjunction with

and influenced by them, that the individual party member will seek to advance himself in the hierarchy of power through the political class system and that he will try to accomplish this objective through combination with others of like mind. These combinations are the phenomenon we call political parties. These differ from cliques and factions because the appeal for support from others is made on a class or class system basis rather than on a basis of exclusive and narrower partisan group interests. Such appeals are possible only in those societies where three conditions are present: (1) widespread acceptance of achievement rather than ascription as a basis for the distribution of power, (2) actual or potential massive surpluses made possible by industrialization and (3) general agreement, at least among opinion leaders of the idea of the nation-state as a servant of the public at large. Thus, a significant change in the dynamics of the distribution of power and privilege in societies in the industrial era has been the increasing importance of the economic and political class systems as a locus of power to complement, and in some instances replace, the older socially based class systems. The relative importance of the political class system in this process is one of our key variables.

The Political Class System

The dominant position of the political class system in the processes by which power, privilege and prestige are allocated in any post-feudal independent society is the social characteristic which enables us to move toward an eventual general explanation of political parties. This cross-cultural similarity of function allows the generation of an analytical framework which can lead to new variables bearing upon the phenomenon and also suggests further avenues along which empirical testing of additional hypotheses could proceed. In addition, the concept of class and its posited relationship to the more general concept of class system, provides the basis for a dynamic explanatory element to party explanation which both the Marxist and mandate theories demonstrate but in which the static taxonomy of Maurice Duverger is deficient.

The political class system of a polity consists of all of the social institutions which are primarily concerned with the authoritative allocation of the social values.²⁷ At

²⁷While Lenski defines class systems as "a hierarchy of classes ranked in terms of some single criterion," he does not specify the criterion which defines the political class system even though he makes extended reference to it. Lenski, pp. 79-80.

different levels of economic development this allocation process will be challenged and/or shared with other class systems. In some societies such as Soviet Russia, the pre-eminent allocation role of the political class system is widely accepted. In this latter situation, the inter-system struggle for allocative dominance is muted and clandestine. It is also sporadic in contrast to more regularized electoral type contests in other systems. For industrialized and post-industrialized societies, it appears that the more the emphasis is upon the political class system as the legitimate distributive element for power, privilege and prestige, the more that society will tend toward a one-party state. This proposition is, at least theoretically, open to empirical testing. Contemporary examples such as China and Russia point in this direction.

At least two other possible relationships between the political class system and other class systems are observable. The first is in those polities often called developing nations. In these situations the political class system is dominant because of a felt necessity to discredit more traditional class systems such as family lineage or property,²⁸

²⁸In ex-colonies there is often also a necessity to discredit the native bureaucratic elite which served the colonial power.

and in addition, the need to achieve a rapid absolute increase in material goods dictates strict political control of the economic class system.

The second national pattern of relationships between the political and other class systems is found in those long-time independent nations where vastly increased productivity is of relatively low actual priority. In much of South America, for example, military, property and religious class systems either compete with the political system or dominate and utilize it to insure their class system dominance singly or in coalitions among themselves.

There are many other variables which influence the relative dominance of the various class systems in a polity. Among these are the ideology, and with it the specific historical pattern, modal period to which the ideology has evolved; and the extent to which the status of citizenship is held by the population. Each of these influences also affects the organization, activity patterns and scope of membership of political parties within the political class system. An understanding of the phenomenon party to the point of generation of an empirical theory would require the tracing out of the inter-connections of ideologies, economies and citizenship and in turn these influences upon political class systems and political parties. Such a task is

beyond the scope of this present analysis. Our concern here is to sketch some of the theoretical ranges of variance of these variables as they bear upon power classes and parties in nation-state contexts. Thus, new variables to further eventual general party explanation may be developed.

Ideologies and Political Class Systems

Parties and party systems exist in specific polities within an ideological context of single ideology, dominant ideology, two ideologies in rough equality of competition for dominance of influence, or a fragmented ideological environment. Examples of these different situations are Soviet Russia, the United States, Italy, and France during the Fourth Republic. One important function of ideologies in any system of stratification is to induce members of the society to accept as legitimate a given mode of distribution of the resources of that society. The extent to which a single ideology is accepted as a way to explain and justify a specific distribution pattern is primarily dependent upon the degree to which concerned classes are satisfied at a given point in time with the distributive process which is in effect. Counter ideologies function to generate dissatisfaction with the dominant distributive system. Leaders of dissident groups utilize these counter ideologies to

foment passive resistance and often open revolt. Party is the mode of social organization for such efforts.

As described by Lenski, the "political cycle"²⁹ of a specific regime is, early in its existence, dominated by an effort to transform a rule of might to a rule of right so as to increase its retained share of the social product. This is accomplished by use of a legitimatizing ideology. The two most basic functions of the middle classes are to serve the new elite by articulation of the ideology, and by the performance of administrative tasks which insure that the social surplus is handed over to elite control. But, as Lenski contends, reactions by non-elites will sooner or later develop. These can take the form of individual acts such as thievery, crimes of violence against the elites and individual competition for elite favor. In addition, collective activities which are counter to elite interests may occur. This development, linked by Lenski to the rise of modern mass warfare, as suggested by him:

may well have been one of the major reasons for the extension of the franchise in the last century and for the growing acceptance by elites of labor unions, workingmen's political parties and all of the other organizations designed to promote and protect the interests of the common people.³⁰

²⁹Lenski, pp. 59-72.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 66-67.

Thus, at a point in the political cycle, under certain ideological and productive conditions, the social grouping called parties arises. One of its primary functions is to resist a change in the distributive processes of that society or if this is regarded as an unwise course of action, then to channel the changes so that relative power positions are retained as long as possible by those who are on top of the social structure. These are the internally created parties of parliamentary origin. The reaction to this new phenomenon on the part of those seeking distributive system changes through a change in class system emphasis are the parties of extra-parliamentary origin of Maurice Duverger.³¹ Related to these concepts of party origins are Duverger's "caucus, branch, cell and militia units of local party organization" and his "cadre" and "mass" concepts which refer to the social status of the individual member, his position in the dominant class system(s), and to the size of the local unit of the party.³² Thus the variables of class system competition and ideological cycles provide a dynamic dimension to the

³¹These are the central concepts in Duverger's static explanation of the origins of political parties. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. by Barbara and Robert North, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. V-XXXVII.

³²Ibid., Book I, pp. 4-202.

explanation of party origins, local organization, and nature of basic unit organization which the structural frameworks of Duverger lack.

In addition to these dimensions of party, Duverger discusses both the degree of participation in party activities of the individual member. He suggests that this activity can be seen as consisting of "electors, supporters and militants."³³ In addition, the quality of membership is classified as that of "community, association and order."³⁴ Additional understanding of these elements of party is furthered by the introduction of the concept of power classes or classes as developed by Lenski,³⁵ and the idea of "citizenship as a class-based political resource" developed by T. H. Marshall.³⁶ It is to these elements we now turn.

Class and Distributive Systems

The concept of class or power class is defined by Lenski as being "an aggregation of persons in a society who stand in

³³Ibid., pp. 90-115.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 116-132.

³⁵Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification, pp. 74-79.

³⁶See his essay "Citizenship and Social Class," in Class, Citizenship and Social Development, (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964).

a similar position with respect to force or some specific form of institutionalized power."³⁷ These persons occupy specific class rankings in all of the class systems of the society of which they are a member. In addition, the individual will often be subject to status inconsistency because of differing class rankings within the various class systems. This is especially valid in modern industrial societies because of the multiplicity of class systems in these "developed"³⁸ nations. It is quite possible that this inconsistency is the primary motivational force which pushes men who are in the top classes in a class system which does not give its leaders major access to power, to push for a redefinition of what constitutes the dominant class system for that society. Political parties serve as the institutional framework for such efforts. As Lenski suggests, this motivation goes a long way in explaining the actions of the intelligensia class of the educational class system whom Karl Marx suggests will lead the proletariat in its development of a true class consciousness.³⁹

³⁷Lenski, p. 75.

³⁸The term "developed" is used here in a value neutral sense to describe the characteristic of a society's institutional complexity. This non-normative usage is discussed by Seymour M. Lipset in the Introduction to T. H. Marshall, p. VIII.

³⁹Lenski, p. 88.

One important development in modern industrial society is the universal nature of the class of citizenship.⁴⁰ In earlier periods, when this resource was not shared by all and when there were different degrees of citizenship such as enfranchised, unenfranchised, resident aliens, slaves and regime enemies, citizenship served as a basis for a very important class system. This system dimension has mostly disappeared with the developments in warfare, literacy and communications which accompanied the Industrial Revolution. Citizenship as a resource now becomes almost universal in its distribution; is no longer a class system but a class.

Even though citizenship is no longer the basis for a class system but rather is a single class phenomenon, it continues to generate a high degree of social tension in individual societies because of its potential as a claim for power changes and as a vehicle for organizational attempts to change the legitimate surplus distribution patterns through social organization. This is explained by Lenski as being due to the fact that:

those (in a society) who lack other kinds of resources together with those who, for ideological reasons, believe in social equality, have combined to fight for the enhancement of the value of citizenship

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 82-84, 428-430.

at the expense of those resources which generate inequality.⁴¹

He continues by saying that the conflict normally revolves around the question of emphasis upon the traditional rights of property versus the newer rights of citizenship. This controversy is useful in explaining the existence of two- and multi-party systems in those nations with a capitalistic type of economic ideology and organization. The emphasis in this ideology upon individual and partisan group competition conflicts with the egalitarian tendencies of the values of citizenship. Thus these societies exhibit a pattern of competition which pits an economic class system against a political class. This type of competition is in contrast to the competitive situation described above which occurs in those societies such as China or Soviet Russia where the political class system is dominant and the struggles over distributive patterns are of an inter-class nature. A third possible competitive pattern is that which occurred shortly after the first appearance of parties; the inter-class systems struggles between the economic and the political class systems. This inter-class system struggle also appears present in many nations with developing economies

⁴¹Ibid., p. 83.

where the commitment to socialism does not approach totality and where the political dimension of the society is still at the class system level. In these societies, citizenship as a resource is beginning to be seen by more people as a base from which to demand re-distribution of the social product. Parties are the means of social organization to accomplish this goal. Many parties of Africa and Asia appear to demonstrate this pattern of conflict over social rewards.

A fourth type of social-political conflict is that between different classes which are also part of different class systems. This type of conflict is evident in the party development of much of Latin America. In these situations the upper classes of the property class system dominate an executive centered government while the commercial and professional classes seek power through an expanded role of their party organizations in the legislatures.⁴²

Thus the rise and evolution of modern industrial society has generated four different patterns of political struggle, all revolving around the nature of the distributive system and the institutional means, political parties, by which the status quo is protected, and change is pushed for. These

⁴²See the article by Robert E. Scott, "Political Parties and Policy-making in Latin America" in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 331-367.

four patterns are (1) inter-class system conflict, (2) inter-class conflicts within a single class system, (3) class system versus class conflicts, and (4) class versus class conflicts of an inter class system variety. This simple classification scheme allows us to generate a cross-national, ideological and cultural perspective on parties, a perspective which is lacking in the Marxian and mandate explanations.

Party Participation and Membership

In his analysis of individual party member degree of participation (militant, members and supporters) and the quality of membership (community, association and order), Duverger provides a static taxonomy. By linking these concepts to the ideas of single, dominant, dual competitive, and fragmented ideologies, and the Lenski insight concerning the legitimizing cycle of might-right-might. . . , it should be possible to generate heuristic insights and eventually testable hypotheses bearing upon the individual party member's perceptions and activities, and his degree of personal attachment to the party. This is possible because of the imposition of the dynamism of intra-societal group competition over the nature and/or extent of the distributive system for that particular society. It is perhaps in this area of

inquiry that some of the most fruitful efforts toward a general theory of political parties might proceed.

The Dynamics of Political Development

An example of the utility of our approach is in the area of political development⁴³ as this term applies to the relationship of parties to the broader social processes of modernization.⁴⁴ As LaPalombara and Weiner suggest,⁴⁵ any polity, as it evolves from traditional to more developed governmental forms, passes through crises of legitimacy, integration and participation. These political crises are in turn related to questions of distribution of material wealth.

Mass externally created parties ideologically committed to a greater satisfaction of distributive demands continue to exert magnetic attraction for millions of voters. On the other side, forces unwilling to accede to distributive demands tend to protect what power they have by recommending the suppression of opposition parties.⁴⁶

⁴³See the excellent cross polity study of Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

⁴⁴We use the concept "modernization" in the economic sense of a polity which strives to achieve a level of economic development such that a surplus of wants is readily available and demand creation is seen as being necessary to dispose of both wants and needs.

⁴⁵LaPalombara and Weiner, see especially Chapter 1 and the conclusion.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 29.

This situation is suggested to exist in France and Italy and to threaten the existence of a continued competitive party system. Both of these polities exhibit fragmented ideological patterns and dedicated groups of militants as party members. A different pattern is demonstrated in the United States where a dominant ideological context exists with two large parties comprised mainly of supporters, a few members, and a very few militants. In Italy and France the distributive controversy pits the economic class system against the political class striving for a broader definition of citizenship. In the United States a similar class-system versus class contest in a different ideological context suggests that system stability is not so much a question of the number of parties or the wealth distribution patterns as it is the extent to which a single, or a dominant ideology is successful as a means of legitimizing the distribution of power, privilege and prestige. The next step in variable recognition would seem to be a systematic look at the class and class system struggles from the perspective of the ideological complexion of many diverse polities.

Retrospect and Prospect

We began this essay by suggesting that the existing general theories of political parties were inadequate and

restricted. The explanation provided by Karl Marx excludes those parties and party systems which are non-Marxian. The mandate explanation is also narrow in that Marxian type parties are excluded. Thus both explanations are mutually exclusive. In addition, the Marxian explanation, while of broad or general range, is a normative construct based upon an assumption of private ownership of property as being illegal. But Marx does not recognize that legality is a socially defined legal condition. The mandate explanation is of middle range generality and its supporters are ambiguous as to its epistemological foundations.

The explanatory framework of Maurice Duverger avoids most of the weaknesses of the mandate and Marxian explanations of parties and party systems. It is empirically based, is inclusive in taxonomy, and of middle range. His explanation is, however, static rather than dynamic in that social processes are mainly ignored. Duverger's work does very little to assist us in answering the question, Why?

We have suggested that a possible avenue for advancement toward an eventual general party theory is to utilize the social forces as stated and implied by Gerhard Lenski in his analysis of the structures and dynamics of social distribution systems. This approach bridges the gap between the Marxian and mandate explanations of parties, and in addition, is not

based upon normative assumptions. Our framework for further analysis is still of the middle range of theorizing but provides avenues for variable identification and eventually measurement which the Duverger approach does not. The conceptualization level is analytical in that human activity patterns, rather than persons as entities, are dealt with. Thus our approach should further the efforts at general political party theory generation.

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