

1-1-1974

Turkish foreign policy through the United Nations.

Deniz Erden
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation

Erden, Deniz, "Turkish foreign policy through the United Nations." (1974). *Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014*. 1908.
<https://doi.org/10.7275/fe4j-m457> https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1908

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

312066013292803

1511
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS

A Dissertation Presented

By

Deniz Erden

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

June

1974

Political Science

(c) Deniz Erden 1974
All Rights Reserved

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS
1960-1970

A Dissertation


By

Deniz Erden


Approved as to style and content by:



Prof. Gerard Braunthal, Chairman



Prof. Ferenc A. Vali



Prof. Thomas O. Wilkinson



Prof. Glen Gordon, Chairman
Department of Political Science

June, 1974

PREFACE

The basic reason for making this study is to reach an understanding and explanation of the phenomena that occurred in relation to the Cyprus dispute in 1964. As far as the impact is concerned, the failure to obtain the political support of the United States, Turkey's main ally, and of a majority of the states in the United Nations marks a turning point in Turkish foreign policy. The study seeks to establish the interdependence of these two events by arguing that in basing its entire foreign policy on an exclusive and excessively close political, military, and economic relationship with the United States, the Turkish government was singularly ill-prepared for any contingency that might involve a conflict of Turkish and American interests. The alienation she faced in the United Nations is explained in terms of the outspoken role Turkey had assumed in pursuing pro-West and pro-American policies in its relations with the neutrals and the newly independent countries which later formed the Third World group in the United Nations.

The study focuses on the changes affected by the Cyprus crisis in Turkish foreign policy. In order to do so, it covers the post-World War Two years during which several definite patterns were established. These, then, are contrasted with the modifications adopted after the Cyprus conflict between 1964 and 1970.

Turkish Foreign Policy Through the
United Nations 1960-1970
(June 1974)

Deniz Erden, B.A., Robert College

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Prof. Gerard Braunthal

The foreign policy of Turkey in the post-World War Two years has been shaped most by her alliance with the West. Focusing on the sixties, the study first traces the established patterns in foreign policy; second, it places major emphasis on the ramifications of the Cyprus conflict of 1964 for Turkey; and third, it covers the changes and modifications of policy adopted as a result of this conflict between 1964 and 1970. In each of the three phases, the analysis is carried both at the level of general policy, and at the level of its reflection in the United Nations.

Until the Cyprus crisis, Turkey had pursued a policy which had placed a premium on her ties with the United States and NATO. Apart from the fact that the nature, extent and specifics of this multisided cooperation were never critically evaluated or specifically determined, it also encouraged Turkey to embark upon ventures that were not required by her needs, and in some cases were harmful as far as the state's interests were concerned. Assuming an overly anti-Soviet attitude, and belittling the efforts of some states to maintain a neutral foreign policy were major examples.

The significance of the Cyprus crisis was that it confronted Turkey

not only with a crisis in foreign relations, but also with the realization that her interests differed from those of the United States, and that within the United Nations she was backed only by a handful of states. This failure to obtain the political support of her main ally, and of a majority of states in the United Nations marks a turning point in Turkish foreign policy. The study seeks to establish the interdependence of these two events by arguing that in basing its entire foreign policy on an exclusive and excessively close political, military, and economic relationship with the United States, the Turkish government was singularly ill-prepared for any contingency that might involve a conflict of Turkish and American interests. The alienation she faced in the United Nations is explained in terms of the outspoken role Turkey had assumed in pursuing pro-West and pro-American policies in her relations with the neutrals and the newly independent countries which later formed the Third World group in the United Nations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	iv
INTRODUCTION	1

PART I. BACKGROUND

CHAPTER I. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 1945-1960	12
--	----

Political Democracy: From Single to Multi-party
 Political Oppression: Corruption of the Ruling Party
 The Economy: From Etatism to Laissez-faire to
 Bankruptcy
 The 1960 Revolution: Return to the Rule of Law

CHAPTER II. PATTERNS OF FOREIGN POLICY 1945-1960	26
--	----

Major Policy Developments
 Initial Interpretation of the United Nations
 Compatibility of Major Policy Developments
 and the Charter
 Participation in the United Nations

PART II. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UNITED NATIONS 1960-1970

CHAPTER III. SUGGESTIONS OF CHANGE 1960-1963	46
--	----

Reaffirmation of the Ties with the West
 Limited Improvement in Relations with the Soviet
 Union
 The Third World Policy and the United Nations

CHAPTER IV. THE CYPRUS CRISIS	65
---	----

Background 1571-1960
 Highlights of the Conflict 1963-1967
 Turkey, the United States and the Conflict
 Turkey, the Soviet Union and the Conflict
 Turkey and Cyprus in the United Nations

	Page
CHAPTER V. RE-EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 1965-1970. . .	109
A Reassessment of Policy Toward the United States and NATO	
Normalization of Relations with the Soviet Union	
New Emphasis on Turkish-Arab Solidarity	
Modification in Policy Toward Non-Aligned States	
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS.	132

INTRODUCTION

A brief sketch of the foreign policies of the Republic from its inception in 1923 until 1960 will contribute to our understanding of the Turkish participation in the United Nations from 1960 to 1970. It will be argued that the foreign policy of the nation evolved through two phases guided by two principles of policy during the first four decades of its existence. From 1923 until roughly the end of the Second World War, policy makers adhered to the principle of neutrality. As will be remembered, the Ottoman Empire had participated in the first World War on the side of the Germans, and was dismembered up to its inner core, Anatolia, by the occupation forces of the victorious states. The next four years saw the formation of a national struggle movement which decided not to fight for the outlying appendages of the Empire, declaring instead Asia Minor as the homeland of the Turks. In the ensuing war, the military presence of the Greeks, the British, the French, and the Italians were terminated. Thus, when the Republic was proclaimed in 1923, it was in the face of Western animosity. Consequently, for the next two decades the leadership of Mustafa Kemal worked hard to maintain a place for the new Republic among the other nations. Their decisions in regard to Turkey were closely linked with the existence of the state

as well as the survival of its people. In other words, the independent existence of the Turks and their state was the fundamental goal.

In contrast to the shaky ties with the Western world, the Republic enjoyed the early material and spiritual support of its neighbor, the Soviets. In fact, a treaty of friendship was signed in 1921 which enabled the Turks to concentrate on their altercations with the West. This included the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact as a party on an equal footing with other signatories, the eventual entry to the League of Nations once the country realized that this organization would no longer be used as a tool of imperialist expansion directed against itself, and use the mechanisms of the League as well as other diplomatic negotiations to settle mutual problems with Great Britain, France, and Greece. At the same time, Turkey emerged as the champion of regional agreements aimed at preserving the status quo, and became the leader in the creation of the Balkan Entente. The fruits of such endeavors were reached eventually in the form of an alliance with Great Britain and France in 1939 although Turkey was to stay out of the ensuing war.

If the sovereign existence of the Republic was the primary goal determining the policies formulated by the statesmen, an equally demanding aspiration was the vision of a modern, developed Turkey that has "caught up with the civi-

lization level of Europe." Attempts at reform had a history of two centuries in the Ottoman Empire, but they were comparable to those of Mustafa Kemal neither in scope nor in nature. Ever since the Republic, there has always been wide-ranging agreement on the need for reforms which are linked to progress, but the disagreement arose on the rate and extent of change to be introduced. What is significant, however, is the strength of the desire to be on par with the countries of Europe, and to be treated as such by the latter.

In contrast to the initial policy of neutrality, the period from the end of the second world war up to the present has been guided by the principle of alignment. The decision to strengthen the ties with the West was based on Moscow's change of heart in regard to Turkey. Between March 1945 and September 1946, the Soviet Union denounced a previous treaty of nonaggression, and, suggesting a change in the Montreux Convention, asked for the control of the straits as well as some land along the Eastern frontier of Turkey. Soon after, the isolation of Turkey was painfully underlined by the uninformed manner in which Truman approached the question of the straits in Potsdam in July 1945. Turkish diplomacy went to work immediately, and within a year the policies of Great Britain and the United States were coordinated with those of Turkey. Soviet pressure eased off in the fall of 1946, and the situation was regarded as stable. While Turkey was trying to acquire increased military aid

from the United States around this time, it certainly could not have foreseen the latter's decision to provide urgent aid along with that given to Greece. Greece was, however, in a critical situation, and probably the inclusion of Turkey in the Truman Doctrine "was assured primarily because of association with concern over Greece."¹

In the cold war atmosphere of the post war era, the Truman Doctrine officially signaled that Turkey was considered to belong to the Western pole. Relations with the West and especially with the United States grew dramatically, and achieved not only a dominant but exclusive character within Turkish foreign policy over the next two decades. Since the Turks wanted to be the beneficiaries of the United States military strength while sitting at the doorsteps of the Soviets, to be included in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was regarded with utmost urgency. However, the West showed initial reluctance and resistance to extend membership to this unindustrialized Mediterranean country burdened by non-European land and sea borders with the Soviets, a Moslem population, and an unclear status possessing neither a fully Eastern nor a fully Western character. In overcoming this unreceptive attitude the diplomatic efforts of Ankara were much aided by the eruption of the Korean war

¹George Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945-1971, AEI-Hoover Policy Studies (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), p. 26.

which enabled the Turks to show the fighting caliber of their army to their Western friends. In the final analysis, the advantages to be accrued by the Turkish membership, namely, opening another front the Soviets have to contend with, using an outlying strategic base, and bolstering the lagging European defense with a huge, soldier-intensive army must have outweighed other considerations, for in 1952 Turkey became a full member of this regional defense organization.

In fact, this membership contained the seeds of yet another regional organization, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), for Great Britain had acceded to include Turkey in NATO only on the condition that the latter agree to defend the former's oil interests in the Near East. That the government carried out this task over-enthusiastically in the following years is in fact a manifestation of the less than prudent foreign policies pursued by the Menderes governments between 1950 and 1960. Even the relations with the United States, which after the second World War constituted the basic pillar of Turkish foreign policy, were conducted on a level of untenableness which proved to be damaging to the relationship itself, compromising the best interests of the nation, and provocative in the eyes of the Soviets. It would be legitimate to assume that, along with the political oppression at home, the bankrupt economic policies at home and abroad, the unenlightened foreign policy of Menderes

played a crucial role in the development of events leading to the first dramatic upheaval in the domestic affairs of the Republic, the revolution of May 27, 1960.

Turkish Participation in the United Nations

In order to become a charter member of this organization, Turkey had declared war on Germany shortly before the defeat of the latter. Although Turkey joined other nations in expressing genuine hope that the United Nations would be an important contribution to the maintenance of world peace and order, she deemed it necessary to by-pass the organization two years later when the United States aid to strengthen the security forces was accepted under the Truman Doctrine. ". . . in so far as Turkey unilaterally decided that the Soviet claim constituted a threat to the peace and appealed directly to the United States for military help in order to protect its security, this action was incompatible with the spirit and the collective security provisions of the Charter. Under Article 39 of the Charter, the right to decide that a threat to the peace exists is given to the Security Council."²

In general, however, Turkey has been interested in strengthening the United Nations, preferring to settle disputes in accordance with international law and the provisions

²Mehmet Gonlubol, Turkish Participation in the United Nations 1945-1954 (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1965), p. 163.

of the Charter. Professor Gonlubol has studied the Turkish reaction to the more important matters brought to the United Nations through 1954. He concludes that Turkey had block-voted in every important "East-West" issue, and more frequently than not had aligned herself with the developed colonial states at the expense of numerous underdeveloped and anticolonial Asian, Arab, and African ones.³ Coming from a nation which had won its independence from the hands of the same West, this record was indeed disheartening, and would take an exacting toll later at a conjuncture of events critical for Turkey.

Primarily, this dissertation will focus upon the Turkish foreign policy and its reflection in the United Nations during the course of the decade 1960-1970. Observers of Turkish foreign policy agree that the eruption of the Cyprus conflict constitutes the most important development during this period. To date, there has been no in-depth examination of this crisis partly because matters relating to the issue are still considered highly sensitive by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, access to official documents and communications is effectively hindered. Another reason is that although peace has returned to the island, the matter is regarded as unsettled since the talks between the communal leaders of the Greek and the Turkish peo-

³ Ibid., p. 160.

ples have been continuing for years without reaching a final agreement. Consequently, it is necessary to emphasize that in this study only a minimum attention will be paid to the whys and hows of this regional crisis. Rather, the emphasis will be on the repercussions of the conflict. First, the significance of the Inonu-Johnson letters will deserve some deliberations in so far as this exchange marks the turning point in the Turkish-American relations. Second, an attempt will be made to place within perspective the painful isolation that faced the Turks when the Cyprus issue was brought to the United Nations. Briefly, it will be argued that bloc-voting, a reflection of the heavily American oriented and inflexible Turkish foreign policy, was contrary to the best interests of the nation. It was the Cyprus crisis which forced the reality into the awareness of the generally unsuspecting leaders. Whether this in turn led to policy revisions observable in the Turkish vote in the United Nations is an open question that will be eagerly pursued.

The Cyprus conflict occurred around mid-sixties. It is hoped that analyzing the Turkish foreign policy in the years before (1960-64) and after (1964-1970) the crisis will highlight any trends as well as changes. At the same time, the 1960 revolution, the related Khrushchev-Gursel communications, and the Cuban missile crisis of the early sixties will also be mentioned.

Method and Concept

The basic model to be employed in this study will be a variant of the so-called Rational Actor model. The classic model assumes first, that "what must be explained is an action, i.e., behavior that reflects purpose or intuition; second, that the actor is a national government; third, that the action is chosen as a calculated solution to a problem."⁴ Two theoretical modifications will be introduced. First, abstaining from action, i.e., the decision not to act, and second, explaining national behavior as departures from the rationality norm will be given equal consideration.

The concept of national interest will be the linchpin of this study. For students of politics the concept is crucial yet difficult to work with. Here, the conviction is that to formulate a universal definition of "national interest" that could be fruitfully operationalized in widely varying circumstances for different states would be useless even if it were possible. Consequently, concentration will be on the goals and the aspirations identified as those of the country by its leaders: a) perpetuating the independent existence of the Republic, b) peaceful development toward modernization. With these main tenets "national interest"

⁴ Graham Allison. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1971), p. 13.

will be treated essentially as a norm. The performance of the government will then be explained and evaluated as approximations to choices expected by the tenets of the concept.

PART I. BACKGROUND

CHAPTER I

DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 1945-1960

Political Democracy: From Single to Multi-Party

From the inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923 until the end of the second World War, the People's Republican Party established by Ataturk and later led by Inonu, the former comrade-in-arms of Ataturk, was the only formal political organization outside the Grand National Assembly. The regime was authoritarian, intolerant of opposition, but remarkably free of repression or surveillance, the hallmarks of dictatorial rule. The unity among the political elite enabled the government to enact drastic reforms guided by the principles of nationalism, secularism, and modernism. This relentless drive for change must have frustrated the traditionalist, fatalistic, and quite religious peasants. The masses were at the receiving end however, and the rigid one-party system did not provide them with opportunities to express their viewpoints.

Inonu, at the end of the War, announced the decision to liberalize the regime, and indicated the need for an opposition party. This decision has received varying interpretations. Three cynical views hold that it was due, first, to a miscalculation on the part of the party of its own strength; second, to a desire to please the West at a

time when Turkey found itself isolated and exposed; third, to direct American intervention. There might be a touch of truth to each of these explanations. Certainly the prestige of the United States was at its peak after victory in the world war, and foreign developments must have influenced the decisions of the ruling party while encouraging the opposition. Bernard Lewis rejects the thesis that liberalization was exclusively "a piece of window-dressing designed to please and flatter Turkey's Western allies",⁵ and contends that a new generation which had matured under the intense Westernization of the Kemalist regime naturally inclined toward application at home of the liberal traditions of the West. Similarly, Dogan Avcioglu, while taking note of the foreign pressures, thinks that the truth would be reflected more fully if the main reasons for the relaxation of authoritarianism were to be found within the domestic conditions. He maintains that the seeds of the democratic tradition were contained in the progressive principles of Kemalism, and that in 1945 the right moment to actualize this potential had been reached. He also underlines the wide-ranging complaints among the populace due to the difficulties brought by the War, and the harsh attitude of the bureaucracy

⁵Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 313-314.

during the Inonu years.⁶

Whatever the combination of factors affecting the decision of the leaders of the Republican Party to liberalize the regime, a small group within the party flanks seized on the opportunity to form the Democratic Party in 1946. Two of the leaders of the new party were Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes. Bayar had served the leaderships of Ataturk and Inonu, and by 1946 had come to represent the commercial interests of the new middle class. Menderes, on the other hand, was a lawyer better known as a major landowner in the Aegean area. The Democratic Party campaigned on a platform of unrestricted civil liberties, laissez-faire economics, relaxed secularism, and a better standard of living for the impoverished peasants. The appeal of the party was enormous probably because it provided an alternative to the two decades of the Republican Party rule, and was not burdened by a record of past performance. In four years, the party expanded its organization from the cities to towns and villages, and won an astounding victory in the 1950 elections. With 89.3 per cent of the eligible voters participating, 396 out of 487 seats in the Assembly went to the Democrats, and 68 to the Republicans.⁷

⁶Dogan Avcioglu, Turkiye'nin Duzeni [The Order in Turkey] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968), p. 249.

⁷Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 241.

The significance of this election is not so much that it took place at all, or that it was completely free and orderly, or that the Democratic Party was voted in by a landslide. Rather, its uniqueness lies in the fact that the Republican People's Party accepted the results calmly, and Inonu assumed the leadership of the opposition. Nothing could have been further removed from the political traditions of the country, and it is said, this lesson in democracy impressed the people very deeply.

The next few years saw a normal relationship between the Democrats and the Republicans. Unfortunately, the "honeymoon" period was shortlived. Although the Democrats were returned to power in the elections of 1954 and 1957, they became increasingly hostile toward criticism and corrupt in management of state affairs.

Political Oppression: Corruption of the Ruling Party

Kemal Karpat thinks that enabling the Democratic Party to come to office was "a great mistake in a country in which the principles of democracy had been only barely touched upon and the checks and balances of government's powers had not been properly regulated."⁸ While the first part of this assertion is open to debate, it is commonly accepted that the 1924 constitution, in force until 1960, ill-fitted the features of a multi-party regime. Deeply committed to the Rousseauian theory that national will is

⁸Ibid., p. 181.

represented only by the legislature, the 1924 Constitution granted extensive powers to the National Assembly without providing for the necessary checks. Furthermore, it continued the unicameral legislative system, without the moderating influences of an upper house. With no institutional restraints, the majority party and the government exploited the system blatantly for their own partisan purposes at the expense of the basic rights of the opposition and the citizens.⁹

In fact, from 1954 to 1960 the defining characteristics of the political scene was the accelerating polarization between the Democrats and the Republicans. One of the three main issues of contention was the role of religion in Turkish life.¹⁰ By 1949, the Republican Party had come to allow religious instruction in schools, and a Faculty of Divinity was established for the purpose of providing educated religious leaders. Quantitatively, the Democrats did more on these accounts and qualitatively, they permitted the new developments to take on a conservative coloring. Less formally, religious publications and suppressed mystic sects began to reappear along with more public celebrations of the

⁹ Suna Kili, Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961 (Istanbul: Robert College Research Center, 1971), pp. 6-8.

¹⁰ Walter Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963), pp. 8-11.

religious holidays. Profoundly symbolic of the clash between the reformist-secular and the conservative-religious mentalities was the return to the Arabic in the call to prayer instead of the Turkish translation as stipulated by a 1932 law.

The second issue contributing to the polarization of politics can be summed up as that of political freedom. After 1953 the Democratic Party embarked on the road of enacting laws and regulations with the purpose of restricting the independence and the power of such groups and institutions as the press, the universities, the opposition parties, civil servants, and the Assembly itself. Two Press Laws punished "the spreading of false news; insulting or invading the privacy of public officials; damaging public confidence in or the prestige of the government." Professors were banned from political activity, while the government resorted to the mechanisms of suspension and non-promotion within the universities. In 1953, most of the assets of the Republican Party were confiscated, and in 1956, party meetings were permitted only for a limited duration before elections. Civil servants learned that they could be dismissed without having the right of appeal. In preparing for the 1957 elections, a new law prohibited coalitions, and stipulated that any party winning the "most" votes in a province would receive the entire number of deputies of that province. The same year, the questioning of ministers by deputies was

limited in a series of restrictions on the Assembly itself. Finally, the official results of the elections were never published, feeding the charges that they were rigged.

It was inevitable that such a repressive regime would bring disaster upon itself. Although the military intervention was touched off by a further series of critical developments, there was a third major issue which contributed not only to the polarization between the Democrats and the Republicans, but also to the rapidly worsening prospects of the country.

The Economy: From Etatism to Laissez-Faire to Bankruptcy

For centuries, the capitulations, the system which held the Western citizens immune from Ottoman jurisdiction and permitted them to live under the jurisdiction of their own consuls, had led to the economic exploitation of the Ottoman economy, obstructing the latter's resurgence, and restricting the state's rights of sovereignty over its land. Ever since the foresighted Lausanne treaty which met the demands of Ataturk for complete political, juridical, and financial independence, the successive governments of the Republic have been extremely cautious in their economic relations with foreign states. This closed policy of the Republican Party governments toward outside capital was supplemented by the adoption of etatism at home. Not only did Turkey lack a class of entrepreneurs to bring about the

necessary developments, but political leaders also doubted the willingness of the private sector to finance costly long-term investments.

Neutral during the war, Turkey came out of the crisis with all foreign debts paid, and with a considerable stock of gold and foreign currency.¹¹ It was at this point that the Soviets started to pressure their southern neighbor, a major and counterproductive blunder in terms of their designs on Turkey. This led to the Turkish-American alliance which was promptly reflected in the economic policy of the nation. "There is no doubt," writes Bernard Lewis, "that American pressure was exerted rather strongly in favour of private enterprise and against etatism, and the moves of the People's Party government in this direction were no doubt due in large measure to the terms of American loans and the advice of American advisers."¹² The aid received under the Marshall plan (1948-1951) was prescribed for the development of agriculture so that Turkey could supply a war-torn Europe with food and raw materials in return for which she could buy the industrial products of the Western states.

This clear break from the principle of Atatürk that political independence required a self-sufficient industrial base was accelerated by the Menderes governments which were

¹¹Avcioglu, Türkiye'nin Düzeni, p. 276.

¹²Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 315.

dedicated to the promotion of foreign and private investments. Between 1950 and 1953 agricultural credits for the peasants and infrastructural projects like road building enabled the country to take a sigh of relief. However, as the government had an aversion to the concept of planned spending, it inevitably overextended its activities in relation to its resources. The gaps between revenues and expenditures were filled simply by printing more money, while the resulting acute inflation and insolvency were eased periodically by receiving massive doses of foreign aid, especially from the United States.

Deficit financing finally brought the economy to a complete standstill in 1958. The Western allies agreed to bail Menderes out through an International Monetary Fund loan of \$359 million. In what was called a Stabilization Program the prime minister agreed to devalue the Turkish lira, impose a set of restrictions on, and strive toward coordination of investment. Shortly afterwards, even half-hearted attempts to attain a sensible financial balance were abandoned as Menderes slipped back to his habit of cutting ribbons at showy and unnecessary projects across the country.

Financial chaos accompanied by political repression and religious polarization were enough to force the hand of the army whose devotion to the principles of Ataturk contributes to its well-developed sense of responsibility for the welfare of the Republic. The discontent led to actual

interference in a final sequence of events in the final months before May, 1960.

Twenty days after the May 1960 revolution, to be discussed below, it was revealed that the internal and external debts facing the country amounted to a grand total of \$1,354,604,636.¹³ The unprecedented scale of this bankruptcy prompted the revolutionary leadership of National Unity Committee to launch a program of deflationary austerity measures which succeeded in a year to balance the budget and to restore price stability and the confidence of foreign creditors in extending aid. Perhaps the most important economic achievement of the military leadership was the establishment of the State Planning Organization.

The '60 Revolution: Return to the Rule of Law

Amid rumors that the government would call new elections a year ahead of time, the Democrats passed a law in April 1960 establishing "the Committee to Investigate the Activities of the Republican Party and a section of the Press." The Committee was formally granted wide powers ranging from a ban on political activities supported by penalties to the suspension of civil service, penal, and judicial laws. The law and the expulsion of the protesting Inonu from the Assembly led to immediate student riots in the Istanbul and Ankara Universities countered by police and

¹³Weiker, Turkish Revolution, p. 12.

soldiers instructed to fire. Martial law was declared and most newspapers and magazines suspended, while universities were closed and students sent off to detention camps. The final warning came from one thousand cadets of the Military College and their officers when they marched across Ankara singing military marches. Six days later, on May 27, the Menderes era was terminated by a military overthrow.

The revolution was completed in four hours with no bloodshed. The National Unity Committee, composed entirely of revolutionary officers, ruled the country for the next seventeen months. However, immediately after the takeover, the military asked for the help of the university professors who were asked not only to serve in various positions in the operations of the government, but also were exclusively responsible in formulating the new constitution.

The 1961 constitution provided for liberal provisions on fundamental rights, and incorporated the idea of a welfare state. Furthermore, it introduced new legal-political institutions such as the upper house (Senate of the Republic), the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and the State Planning Organization. Another major change was the adoption of a new electoral system based on proportional representation. The varying drafting committees worked within a Constituent Assembly. In January 1961, new parties were allowed to organize. Six months later, the new constitution was approved in a national referendum which was

followed by the election of October 1961, and the return to civilian rule.

During the seventeen months of the National Unity Committee rule, the trial of over 400 leaders of the Democratic Party government was one major event. It lasted eleven months, watched closely at home and abroad. "Foreign legal observers at the trials at various times were unanimous in their praise and in their amazement that in the heavily charged political atmosphere Basol (the head of the High Council of Justice) was able to keep the trials orderly, surprisingly fair, and with a minimum of political propaganda from any quarter."¹⁴ When the verdicts were delivered, there were four death sentences by unanimous vote of the judges, and eleven by majority vote. The National Unity Committee commuted the death sentences of all except three, approving the difficult decision to send to the gallows prime minister Menderes, foreign minister Zorlu, and finance minister Polatkan.

The elections were held a month later, and with 82% of the eligible voters casting ballots, no one party won control of the legislature. In the ensuing four years, three coalition governments were formed each with different combinations among the parties: the Republican Party, the Justice Party, unofficial heir of the dissolved Democratic

¹⁴Ibid., p. 27.

Party, and the smaller new parties also catering to the ex-Democratic votes. In the 1965 and 1969 elections, the Justice Party received enough votes to muster about 53% of the 450 seat Assembly in 1965 and 56% in 1969.

The mutual interaction between domestic and foreign policies of any given state is a complex phenomenon. Domestic developments are inextricably tied with the elements of national goals, geopolitical considerations, and uncontrollable external events, all of which contribute to what we call the process of foreign policy formation.

In the case of Turkey between the years of 1945 and 1960, the liberalization of the one-party regime, the free elections of 1950 with results respected by the losing side, the thought provoking spectacle of a rigorous new party regrettably abusing its power and thus bringing the country to the brink of disaster in six short years, the intervention of the army to protect the welfare of the Republic arising from a sense of responsibility, yet necessitating the abandonment of its traditionally unpolitical role (if only for a limited period), and the sobering effects of holding the political leadership of the past decade to account for its performance, have been significant experiences within the developing political culture of the Turkish people. For based on their political consciousness the leaders and the citizens embarked, in a matter of a few years, upon a

deep-reaching process of evaluation and criticism of internal and foreign national policies.

Further, it is in this same period from 1945 to 1960 that Turkey, seeking political support as well as economic and military aid from the West, was favored especially by the United States due to world political developments which placed a premium on Turkey's geographical location. Under the Menderes governments Turkish-American relations assumed an exclusively privileged character. In return for total Turkish acceptance of its policies, the United States financed Menderes's spending, equipped the Turkish army, and supported the regime. In short, the American policies, presence, and aid on the one hand, and the Menderes governments on the other, came to be identified with each other, at least in the minds of the educated Turks. Consequently, when Menderes dragged the country and himself into a sorry mess, the United States found itself enmeshed in the same lot. However, anti-Americanism did not begin until four years after the 1960 Revolution. Just as the latter enabled the people to criticize Menderes's domestic policies, so the Cyprus crisis of 1964, to be discussed in Chapter IV, served as the spark which initiated an extensive re-evaluation of "the American element" within Turkish foreign policy.

CHAPTER II

PATTERNS OF FOREIGN POLICY 1945-1960

Major Policy Developments

The end of the second World War also marks the end of Turkish neutrality, the guiding principle of previous policies. It is possible to study the events of the next fifteen years, all developing within the framework of the Turkish-Western alliance, in three conceptual categories. Using as our criteria the needs of the state stemming from the three accepted goals of the Republic: a) independence and territorial integrity; b) economic development; c) a modern, "European" status; then compare and contrasting such needs with those of Turkey's allies in each of the major developments of the era, we obtain the following grouping:

1) Policies entirely corresponding to Turkish needs; 2) Policies that have not originated from primary Turkish interests but fulfilling crucial needs of the West; 3) Policies detrimental to Turkish interests and encouraged by the West.

The Turkish search for and acceptance of Western aid constitutes the first category of policies advantageous to both sides. The Truman aid, formalized by the "Aid to Turkey Agreement" signed by the United States and Turkey in 1947, the joining of the Council of Europe in 1949, and NATO

in 1952 were policies which all contributed to the security, development, and status goals of Turkey. On the other side, the United States and the Western European countries were seriously concerned, at the time, about the progress made by the Communist parties of Eastern and Central European states, followed by the establishment of the Cominform. Europe faced a clear imbalance of power around this time while the situation in Yugoslavia was considered perilous. The United States was the first to come to the conclusion that the defense of the southern corner of Europe had to be fortified. However, the European members of the Atlantic Alliance showed initial reluctance and resistance to extend membership to Turkey, a non-industrialized Mediterranean country burdened by non-European land and sea borders with the Soviets, a Moslem population, and an unclear status possessing neither a fully Eastern nor a fully Western character. In overcoming this unreceptive attitude, the diplomatic efforts of Ankara were aided greatly by the eruption of the Korean war which enabled the Turks to show their willingness to fight for a cause also supported by their Western friends. In the final analysis, the advantages to be accrued by Turkish membership in NATO, namely, opening another front the Soviets had to contend with, using an outlying strategic base which could expose the Caucasian oil and the Ural industry to pressure, and bolstering the lagging European defense with a huge, soldier-intensive army must have outweighed other

considerations for in 1952 Turkey became a full member of this regional defense organization.

Following the NATO agreement, the military cooperation between the United States and Turkey were complemented by a series of bilateral agreements. These controversial agreements dealt with the different facets of the military relationship. Outstanding issues were the joint defense radar installations, cooperation between the Turkish and American Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, certain airfields with joint defense forces, and the jurisdictional status of American soldiers, civilians, and organizations. A few of these were ratified by the Turkish Assembly, and published in the press. Thus, the status of Forces Agreement of June 1954, granting immunities and privileges to all American government personnel and their dependents (apart from the diplomatic corps), had received full exposure. Some others took the form of verbal understandings, not only filling in the gaps left by formal agreements, but also enlarging the sphere of American activity by giving permission to operate the American armed forces postal system, and authority to open schools for the dependents of American personnel.¹⁵

Most crucial, however, were a series of secret agreements, none of which were ratified by the National Assembly.

¹⁵Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 55.

It wasn't until the end of the Menderes regime that the opposition began to challenge the constitutionality of these "executive agreements." Six years later when the American response to the Cyprus conflict caused severe disappointment among Turkish circles prompting a major re-evaluation of this relationship, the bilateral agreements became the focus of much critical attention. Speaking at a press conference in 1970, prime minister Demirel disclosed that "over the 25 years of the alliance, 91 bilateral agreements had been signed and 54 of them had been in force when the Justice Party had come to power in October 1965."¹⁶ Taken together, they are illuminative of the errors committed in the name of an alliance between a small state with specific defense considerations, and a superpower with much wider interests.

A second group of policies can be described as those that had not originated from Turkish needs but fulfilled the expectation of her allies. These can regionally be divided into two: the Balkan and the Middle East policies. Soon after acquiring membership in NATO, Turkey and Greece were encouraged by the United States to form a pact with Yugoslavia in order to stabilize the precarious situation of the latter. The ensuing Balkan Defense Pact of 1954 among the three countries, however, was politically short-lived, al-

¹⁶Ibid., p. 229.

though technically it was to be in effect until 1974.¹⁷ Primarily responsible for this outcome were the problems, first, of harmonizing the defense needs of Yugoslavia and the NATO commitments of Greece and Turkey, and second, the basic differences of foreign policy orientations typified by the Turkish preference for exclusive Western ties, the Greek combination of a more independent attitude recognizing the status of the neutrals, and the Yugoslav determination to stay clear of any East-West contest. A specific disagreement was the interpretation of the change in Soviet foreign policy following Stalin's death. In any case, the 1954 Pact was considered lifeless by the end of the decade.

The developments in the Middle East region, on the other hand, have elicited deeper involvement by Turkey than those in the Balkans. Most importantly, Turkish performance in the Middle East during the 1950's has been a significant contributor towards the country's international image. Briefly, there have been three major developments: a) the Baghdad Pact (later called CENTO); b) the Suez invasion; and c) the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The origins of the Baghdad Pact lie in the Turkish acceptance to play the lead in creating a post-World War II, pro-Western alliance in the petroleum rich Middle East as a condition to secure British approval of her membership to NATO.

¹⁷Ferenc Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 200.

Actually, however, the moving force behind the pact became the United States, intent on establishing a chain of defense organizations directed against the Soviet Union. A mutual defense treaty between Turkey and Iraq (1955) served as the nucleus to which Iran, Pakistan, and Great Britain acceded the same year. The United States, while participating in the committee work and meetings, preferred not to become a formal member in order not to further alienate the anti-pact states of the region, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel on the one hand, and not to provoke the Soviet Union on the other.

It is difficult to understand the military reasoning behind the Baghdad Pact. At the time, there were no Soviet advisors in Syria, Iraq, or Egypt, and no concentration of Soviet ships in the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, of the two regional states bordering the Soviets, Turkey was already covered by NATO, and Iran was pro-West. The third regional and the only Arab state, Iraq, hoped that the pact would bring increased economic possibilities, a position of additional strength vis-a-vis Israel, as well as a possible position of leadership in the Arab world.¹⁸ Pakistan, meanwhile, eyed the pact as a means of getting the upper-hand

¹⁸ Ahmet Esmer et al., Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi 1919-1965 [Events of Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-1965], Ankara Universitesi Siyasi Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari, No. 279, (Ankara: Sevinc Matbaasi, 1969), p. 274.

in its dispute with India over Kashmir. In short, there were no threats of direct Soviet aggression to necessitate a defense organization in the Middle East. Even if there were, the combined military power of the regional signatories, excepting Turkey, was almost negligible. As far as Turkey was concerned, she could neither expect military support from the pact, nor contribute to it while all but two of her divisions were committed to the NATO command. If there was no Soviet military threat, there were, however, vested economic and political interests in the Middle East. With the British and French withdrawal at the end of the War, the resulting power vacuum was hardly compatible with extensive British oil-investments in the area. On the other hand, the United States probably aimed at keeping the area under Western influence, and linking NATO with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization by the Baghdad Pact.

It ought not have been surprising that this ill-conceived cooperation would bring unexpected results. Turkey and her allies soon realized their failure to read the strength of the new Arab nationalism. Egypt bitterly denounced the pact, and the Turkish role in initiating it. The Arab world's condemnation of Turkey as the tool of Western colonialism was echoed in the criticisms from India. In a different vein, Israel claimed that the pact was also directed against herself. The strain in Israeli-Turkish relations was further aggravated when Turkey recalled her

ambassador in Tel-Aviv in order to appease the Arabs, but unsuccessfully. Internationally, the most significant outcome was the introduction of the Soviet presence to the Middle East. The latter was almost forced to counter the Western initiatives, and indeed, arms shipments began to reach Egypt the same year. Thus, Turkey had unnecessarily provoked the neighbor it feared most, besides acquiring the image of a lackey of Western imperialism.

The second major development in the Middle East was the 1956 Israeli attack against Egypt, followed by the French-British invasion of the canal zone. Although Turkey had nothing to do with the crisis directly, it was another blow to both her and the Baghdad Pact's image. Turkish press and politicians as well as the representatives of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan (all pact members except for Great Britain) strongly denounced the aggression, reiterating their support for the 1947 resolution of the United Nations concerning Palestine. It can not be denied, however, that the event marked another demerit for Turkish diplomacy.

The situation created by the gaffes of Britain and France were fully exploited by the Soviets whose prestige was enhanced considerably in Egypt and Syria. In order to counter this, the United States launched in 1957 a diplomatic offensive known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Under this formulation, Congress authorized the President to send Ameri-

can forces, along with economic and military aid, to nations requesting such assistance. Prior to the application of this new policy, however, the contest between the two super states grew sharper over the strained Syrian-Turkish relations. Because these neighbors shared a long border, Turkey followed with apprehension the progress of the Syrian left. There was a heated exchange of notes with Syria which had charged Turkey with massive troop deployments along the border. Turkey issued a denial, the Soviet Union threatened Turkey with retaliation, and the United States reiterated its defense commitments to Turkey. The conflict proved to be short-lived, and Turkish fears subsided when Syria and Egypt formed the United Arab Republic, an alliance much less threatening than a Soviet-Syrian one.

In the same eventful year of 1958, a revolution in pro-Western Iraq brought down the monarchy. The next days American troops landed in Lebanon upon the invitation of President Chamoun, and two days later Jordan asked and received similar assistance from the British. The Baghdad Pact members officially expressed their pleasure at this exemplary crushing of "communist" inroads in the Middle East. Turkey's unconditional endorsement of this joint-venture was in fact much more involved. When it was learned that the United States had utilized the Incirlik air base (southern Turkey) during the Lebanese intervention, there

was an outburst of domestic and foreign criticism directed at the Menderes government. What had happened was that a NATO base, set up for the purpose of defending Turkey against any Soviet aggression, had been utilized by the Americans with Turkish approval, in order to enhance American interests in a conflict which did not involve Turkey in any manner. As far as tracing criticisms of foreign policies are concerned, the following remark by the opposition leader is noteworthy: ". . . This is what we want to know: Have the American troops come to Adana [the town where the base is located] on our government's invitation, or have they applied for the permission of our government?"¹⁹

Such criticisms were, in 1958, mostly directed against the government rather than the United States. A year later, the opposition was once again irritated by a new bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey (the same agreement was acceded to also by Iran and Pakistan, the other members of the Baghdad Pact renamed the Central Treaty Organization, following the withdrawal of Republican Iraq). The United States obligated itself to assist these countries with her armed forces in case of an aggression. Turkey already having had such guarantee under NATO understandings, what fostered attention was a new phrase in the preamble noting the determination of the parties to resist "direct or

¹⁹Ibid., p. 326.

indirect aggression."²⁰ In view of the domestic developments of the last few years (Menderes persecuting his opposition, placing restrictions on press and political activities), the opposition thought that Menderes intended to ask for American assistance to stifle it. "Unaccountably, the government fueled these fears by refusing to define the offending term on the grounds that its meaning had been worked out in secret negotiations with the United States. Foreign minister Zorlu later added that an imprecise definition was necessary to cover new forms of aggression--a not wholly reassuring explanation to the opposition."²¹

It was mentioned above that the events of the fifteen year period between 1945 and 1960 could be studied in three conceptual categories. Moving now to the third group of policies advocated by Turkey, namely those that were detrimental to Turkish interests and encouraged by the West, two sub-sections would define the group: a) Policy toward the Soviet Union, and b) Policy toward the neutrals.

As far as the post-war Soviet-Turkish relations are concerned, the 1945-1946 Soviet demands for the control of the Straits and return of some eastern territories have been

²⁰Ismail Soysal, Turkiye'nin Dis Munasebetleriyle ilgili Baslica Siyasi Andlasmalari [The Major Political Agreements Concerning Turkey's Foreign Relations], Turkiye Is Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1965), p. 459.

²¹Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 69.

most decisive in shaping the Turkish policy for the next fifteen years. Based on historical experience, it was natural for Turks to be deeply frightened by such pressures, and to seek alliances with the West to lessen the disadvantages of their exposed location. In doing so, however, a major error was committed in abandoning moderation, reflecting in fact, a lack of consideration for the long-term interests of the state. Instead of realizing and respecting the sensitivities the Soviets might have as a result of their superpower status, Turkish leaders did not hesitate to embark upon measures which were not only unwarranted by the security and economic goals of their country, but also were clearly provocative in Soviet eyes. Fortunately for the Turks, the new leadership after Stalin regretted the previous mistake of scaring the Turks into a staunchly anti-Soviet alliance, and beginning in 1953, bent over backwards in order to nurse Turkey to a less paranoid perspective.

The Soviets were critical of the Truman aid as well as the NATO and the American bases in Turkey. Moscow pointed out that Turkey had no place in what it considered an offensive, Atlantic alliance. Similarly, it denounced the British idea of a Near East command. A major reversal of attitude by the Soviets occurred in 1953. They issued a text reviewing Soviet-Turkish relations, and stated in part: ". . . the Governments of Armenia and Georgia have found it possible to renounce their territorial claims on

Turkey. Concerning the question of the Straits the Soviet Government has reconsidered its former opinion on this question and . . . declares that the Soviet Union has not any kind of territorial claims on Turkey."²² This major shift was in line with a new phase in Soviet policy declared to be dedicated to peaceful coexistence and economic rather than military competition. For Turkish politicians, this was only a change of tactics, and their response was less than enthusiastic. World peace was indivisible; the security needs of Turkey were identical with, and could not be separated from those of NATO.

The Soviets continued their peace offensive by top-level speeches, through the radio, press coverages, and in notes to Ankara during the next seven years.²³ In 1956, the press stated the NATO could not form an obstacle to the rapprochement between the two countries, and asked for improvement of economic relations. Both of these were new and important elements along the impetus for detente. Relations were strained once again during the 1956-1958 Middle East developments, but Moscow was quick to ease its pressure. Moreover, the Russian reactions to reconnaissance balloons from, and Jupiter missiles in Turkey were rather soft. Tur-

²²Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, p. 174.

²³Esmer et al., Olaylarla Dis Politika, pp. 417-446.

key ignored and was encouraged to ignore all these overtures until she realized that preparations for a summit meeting between the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union meant a relaxation of tension in East-West relations. Out of phase with the rest of NATO, she then sought to better her ties with the Soviet Union, hoping especially for economic cooperation.

Turkey has followed an equally narrow-minded policy toward the non-aligned countries of the world. This again has been a reflection of the "We will take whatever America gives, accept whatever she does"²⁴ mentality of Menderes. An outstanding example of the attitude toward the non-committed nations of Asia and Africa was the 1955 Bandung Conference. In the emerging rift between the pro- and anti-West components, Turkey, followed closely by Iraq and Pakistan (all members of the new Baghdad Pact), championed the Western side. In fact, the clash was led by the Turkish foreign minister on one side, and Nehru of India on the other.²⁵ Dismissing neutrality as a third alternative, Turkish politicians generally belittled those pursuing such a course. After joining NATO Turkey has manifested this policy most systematically within the confines of the United Nations.

²⁴Avcioglu, Turkiye'nin Duzeni, p. 282.

²⁵Esmer et al., Olaylarla Dis Politika, pp. 291-295.

Initial Interpretation of the United Nations

Turkey acquired the privilege of becoming a Charter member of the United Nations by bowing to Anglo-Saxon pressures to abandon its neutrality and declaring war against Germany shortly prior to the end of hostilities in 1945. The new world organization was perceived to be the work of the victorious democracies. An upsurge of goodwill and enthusiasm on the part of the Turkish government, the press, and the people accompanied its establishment. They pointed out the similarities between the principles declared in the Charter and those that were set forth by Ataturk in the National Pact.²⁶ The espoused "collective security" was well received, for Turks were anxious to see the prevention of acts of aggression. However, the veto power of the major states was taken as a sign of the privilege attached to the great powers and to the Security Council at the expense of the smaller states and the General Assembly. Turkey, therefore, submitted amendments to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council. Another amendment sought to keep the recommendations made by the Security Council from interfering with legal procedure in the case of a dispute already submitted for legal settlement. Turks also

²⁶ Institute of International Relations of the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Ankara, Turkey and the United Nations, National Studies on International Organizations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1961), p. 75.

proposed the inclusion in the Charter of some reference to principles of right and justice in maintaining peace and security so as "to provide a safeguard against the settlement of international questions on the basis of the kind of political expediency practiced at Munich in 1939."²⁷

Enthusiasm for the organization started to dampen as the polarization of the world crippled its functioning. Disappointments grew over the meager results achieved in settling the problems in Iran, Greece, Palestine and Indonesia.²⁸ It was observed that important problems were discussed outside the United Nations among the major states. Too, the great powers were criticized both for ignoring the purposes and principles of the organization and for using it as a means to enhance their own political goals. Such pessimism notwithstanding, it was generally agreed that the United Nations was an asset to the international community in so far as it provided a permanent forum where nations could at least attempt to elaborate on solutions to problems, and in the process, define world public opinion.

Compatibility of Major Policy Developments and the Charter

Legally, key developments in Turkish foreign policy

²⁷Gonlubol, Participation in the United Nations, p.4.

²⁸University of Ankara, Turkey and the United Nations, pp. 92-94.

have been in compliance with the principles of the Charter. Acceptance of the Truman aid, joining NATO, initiating regional cooperation arrangements like the Balkan treaty and the Baghdad Pact have all had their basis in the need for attaining a degree of security for the country. Turkey felt that it could not rely entirely on the ineffectual mechanisms of the United Nations. Even at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the delegate emphasized that collective security referred to regional arrangements providing for automatic action as long as the action was of a defensive nature. Turkey has regarded the treaties it signed with the West as vehicles aimed at coordinating the exercise of the right of self-defense specifically recognized in Article 51 of the Charter.

The Turkish reaction to the Security Council decision regarding Korea was to send a combat force of 4,500 men to join the United Nations forces. The decision to resist aggression was hailed as the first concrete application of the collective security principle.

Participation in the United Nations

In general, Turkey did not pursue an active role in the varying bodies of the United Nations. Although both a Middle Eastern state and a partner of the West, it was infrequently elected to represent either region. The Middle East seat was "monopolized" by the Arab states, and Turkey

could be no match for the more advanced and powerful Western states.

As far as the voting records are concerned, Professor Gonlubol's study concludes that "On the questions involving 'East-West' conflict where there was considerable solidarity of the Western nations, (disarmament, regulation of armaments, Korea, Greece, admission of new members), Turkey supported the West. It has never voted with the Soviet bloc in any important issue."²⁹ He also shows that on issues relating to colonialism, Turkey had aligned itself with the colonial, advanced West rather than with the anticolonial, under-developed Asian, Arab, and African states. A few examples are its rejection of including the problem of Algiers on the agenda, its vote against the inclusion in the proposed human rights covenant of the phrase declaring the right of all peoples to self-determination, and its abstention on the questions of French North African protectorates, the treatment of persons of Indian origin, and race conflict in the Union of South Africa. Since Turkey was not a colonial power, and had in fact won its independence from the hands of the West, the consistent preference it gave the West can be explained in terms of Turkey's connection to NATO. After joining this organization, Turkey has somehow felt the necessity to support the views of the other members in each

²⁹Gonlubol, Participation in the United Nations, p. 160.

foreign policy problem they came to face. This careful avoidance of casting votes in non-Western directions was later realized to be the prime cultivator of the isolation enveloping Turkey in the diplomatic world.

PART II. FOREIGN POLICY AND
THE UNITED NATIONS
1960-1970

CHAPTER III

SUGGESTIONS OF CHANGE 1960-1963

Reaffirmation of the Ties with the West

Despite the reputation Turkey enjoyed as a staunch ally of the West, the Revolution of May 27, 1960 was viewed with alarm by the United States. The erroneous reading of the movement as a military putsch rather than a political rebellion was reinforced by the misguided reports received from the American Embassy in Ankara which failed to grasp the meaning of the socio-political dynamics of the Turkish society. The next day, the State Department admitted to being taken by surprise at the turn of events.³⁰

The leaders of the revolution moved quickly to dispel unnecessary anxiety about the international position of Turkey. In a radio message broadcast to the nation and the world, they said, in part:

" . . . We are addressing ourselves to our allies, friends, neighbors, and the entire world: Our aim is to remain completely loyal to the United Nations Charter and to the principles of human rights; the principle of peace at home and in the world set by the great Ataturk is our flag.

We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Central Treaty Organization, and we are faithful to them.

³⁰New York Times, 28 May 1960.

We repeat: Our ideal is peace at home, peace in the world."³¹

It was clear that the military leaders were not planning to introduce substantial changes in Turkey's foreign policies. There were indications, however, that some shifts of emphasis were to be expected. In terms of the ties with the Western states, the National Unity Committee of the revolutionary leadership attached greater importance to the concept of equality within bilateral relationships than the previous regime had. In a press conference in September 1960, the head of state referred to the Status of Forces Agreement signed between the United States and Turkey in 1954. Without being specific, President Gursel indicated an intention to achieve a procedural change in the application of the Agreement. In 1961 a report in the New York Times revealed that the Turkish envoy, Mr. Selim Sarper, while attending the September 1960 General Assembly meeting of the United Nations a year earlier had asked the United States for an increased Turkish role in deciding the duty status of an American soldier committing a crime in Turkey.³² According to the 1954 Agreement, an offender was not accountable to Turkish jurisdiction if his command decided he was on duty, and cleared him by issuing a duty certificate.

³¹Esmer et al., Olaylarla Dis Politika, p. 345.

³²New York Times, 4 June 1961.

Over the years this privilege of defining the duty status and determining it had, in the eyes of the public, been repeatedly abused. The State Department probably did not pay much serious attention to the subject initially, but found its hand forced in face of the bitter anti-Americanism which developed in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis, for it was not until 1968 that a compromise was reached within the framework of a new Duty Status Agreement.

The programs of the first and the second coalition governments of 1961 and 1962 reaffirmed Turkish commitments to political, economic, and military cooperation with the West on the basis of the principles of equality and independence.³³ Economically, Turkey received credits from the United States and Germany for its first Five-year Development Plan. In 1962, aid was institutionalized when the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development created a Consortium to assist Turkish development. A year later, the Common Market and Turkey signed an Agreement of Association which foresaw gradual but full Turkish membership in that organization. In return, Turkey continued its military support of NATO. The Sixth Fleet paid regular visits to Turkish harbors, but more importantly, Turkey became an ardent supporter of the idea to create a new multilateral nuclear force within NATO. Politically, Turkey and its allies

³³Ismail Arar, *Hukümet Programlari 1920-1965* [Government Programs 1920-1965] (Istanbul: Burcak Yayınevi, 1968), p. 312, p. 340.

maintained high-level and frequent contacts, and in 1963 Turkey acceded to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. However, the most striking demonstration of Turkish solidarity with the West occurred during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

The NATO allies of the United States were informed about the Soviet armament deliveries to Cuba in September 1962, and were urged to stop their commercial shipping to Cuba. The Turkish government then intercepted ten ships plying between Soviet harbors and Cuba, "requesting" them to divert their destination. While the promptness of this cooperation with the United States was praised in the Congress, it was learned that Great Britain, reported to have the largest share of Cuban shipments among NATO members, rejected, along with Norway, any interference with its shipping.³⁴

A month later, the American discovery of the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba was followed by the arrival of two letters from Khrushchev. The first letter offered to withdraw the missiles in Cuba if the United States agreed to life the quarantine, and pledged not to invade the island. The second letter, however, introduced a new element into the bargain. The Soviet Union would withdraw the Cuban missiles and pledge not to invade Turkey

³⁴New York Times, 28 September 1962.

provided that the United States withdraw its missiles in Turkey and pledge not to invade Cuba.³⁵

Suddenly, the fifteen Jupiter missiles that had been placed near Izmir with the warm approval of Turkey in 1957, the year of the successful launch of a satellite into earth's orbit by the Soviets, were drawn into the focus of a superpower conflict. Only two other NATO allies, Great Britain and Italy, had accepted to host these nuclear-tipped missiles on their land, and neither was a neighbor to the Soviets. While capable of reaching Moscow and the industrial Urals, these fifteen missiles constituted less than three per cent of the first strike capability of the United States.³⁶ Furthermore, due to their extreme vulnerability they had no potential for a second strike. Finally, in view of the fast developing American military technology, the missiles were considered obsolete long before they became operational. President Kennedy had in fact ordered their removal in early 1961, but as the Turks balked, the matter was dropped at that point.³⁷ Although the crisis gave the Soviets a good opportunity to draw a parallel between the missiles in Cuba and Turkey, the latter did not prove to be the central issue; in any case, they were removed by 1963.

³⁵Allison, Essence of Decision, pp. 221-224.

³⁶Ibid., p. 44.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 141-142.

Nevertheless, the initial Turkish acceptance to host them not only had significant implications but also was quite detrimental to national security. First, since the missiles had no retaliatory potential, they had to be utilized before being hit. This, in fact, was in contradiction with Turkey's official view of NATO as a strictly defensive organization. Second, far from being a deterrent, their first-strike-only capability actually represented an open invitation to the Soviets to precipitate an attack in order to eliminate them. Since in accepting such an option the costs to be accrued would be higher than the advantages, the Turkish General Staff must have acted on a series of assumptions resembling the following: First, more arms meant more strength, and hence, increased security via-a-vis the Soviets; second, the missiles would be used in a confrontation between the Soviet Union and Turkey only; third, the United States would step in to help its ally in such a case; fourth, knowing this, the Soviets would avoid an attack on Turkey. The significance of the Cuban crisis for Turkey is that it exposed the primitiveness of the first assumption, and the naivete of the second. Two years later, the Cyprus crisis shattered the legitimacy of the third.

If the military command learned that possession of arms and weapons did not always bring security, but could jeopardize it very suddenly on account of an issue not even concerning Turkey, the political leaders realized that while

the nation's fate was intertwined with those of its NATO allies, its security interests were not necessarily so. For the first time, the press and the elite engaged in a heated critique of the extensive American role within Turkish foreign policy. Especially the left, newly emerging within the freedom of expression guaranteed by the 1961 Constitution, elaborated on these previously unfamiliar themes.

Limited Improvement in Relations with the Soviet Union

The period beginning with the May 1960 revolution was not marked by drastic changes in foreign policy. Nonetheless, Turkish leaders showed an increased willingness to move toward a policy of limited accommodation with the Soviet Union.

As mentioned before, the de-Stalinization and new foreign policy initiated by Khrushchev after 1953 had included a peace offensive directed to Turkey. Although traditional suspicions and Western disapproval had not allowed Turkey to be enticed by promises of peaceful coexistence, by the end of the decade the Menderes government was prepared to adopt a more flexible attitude. By this time, the Western states had shown an interest in cooperation with the Soviet Union; in fact, a summit meeting between the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France had been set for May 1960 in Paris. Encouraged by this new thaw, and also hoping

to revive the bankrupt economy by securing long-promised Soviet aid, Menderes had asked the Foreign Ministry to initiate the contacts. In April 1960, the two governments officially announced their decision for an exchange of visits by their prime ministers. Menderes's visit had been scheduled for July. As it turned out, the dramatic events of that May 1960, namely, the shooting down of an American reconnaissance plane over Soviet territory, and the army instigated revolution in Turkey, prevented the Paris summit and the Menderes trip, respectively.

In any case, progress toward normalized relations continued. Turkey now felt ready to accept as a basis of agreement the 1956 Soviet suggestion that her ties with the Western alliance ought not to obstruct the improvement of relations between the two neighbors. To the Soviets, the termination of the Menderes era with its excessive closeness to the United States presented an opportunity to sound out the tendencies within the new leadership of soldiers. Khrushchev's letter of June 28, 1960 to General Gursel in part read:

"... it is our deep conviction that the most sincere relations between our two neighbor countries would develop if Turkey embarked upon the road to neutrality. This would only benefit the country. Turkey would receive an opportunity to use her resources, not for war preparations, on which huge funds have so far been squandered, but for raising the level of the country's national economy and the wellbeing of its people. Military expenditures, Mr. Prime Minister, are a bottomless pit and not every country can endure the burden

of them and develop its economy at the same time.

.
 . . . This, of course, is not a condition for beginning the improvement of our relations. . . Nor are we striving to worsen Turkey's relations with America or other Western powers.

. Your desire that Turkey, in spite of the binding nature of the existing commitments and alliances, should pursue an independent policy, meets with the understanding of the Soviet government.

. The main thing is not to search for questions on which we disagree. On the contrary, we must search for points on which our views coincide so as to advance along the road to rapprochement."38

In his reply, General Gursel noted that Turkey's alliance commitments allowed her "enough leeway" for improving relations with the Soviet Union. However, he added:

"I do not think that the pursuance of a neutral policy can free the government from military expenditures. If that were so, then such countries as Sweden, Switzerland or India for that matter would have no military budgets.

. In reality, liquidation, or at least reduction of military expenditures can be made possible, not by neutrality, but by the establishment of a system of universal disarmament with an effective control mechanism, which would ensure the security of all the countries of the world, whether large or small, against any aggression on the part of any state. Until the creation of such a system of international disarmament, no state can renounce

³⁸Documents on International Affairs 1960, quoted in Ferenc Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO, Hoover Institution Studies 32 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 302-305.

the means of ensuring its security. Turkey, prompted by this lawful concern, remains loyal to its policy of membership in collective security systems."³⁹

Despite mutual recognition of a basis for cooperation, the next two years did not produce much progress. The Soviets sent a note of warning when the Jupiter missiles were being installed in 1961, and called again on both the Turkish and Greek governments in 1962 to ban atomic weapons and rockets from the Balkans and the Adriatic.⁴⁰ They sharply denounced the Turkish decision to halt shipping to Cuba in the wake of the October 1962 crisis. And, certainly, the proposal of Khrushchev to barter the withdrawal of their missiles in Cuba with the withdrawal of American missiles in Turkey must have brought home to Turks much more effectively than any Soviet note the acute irritation of Moscow to be ringed by the offensive weapons of its rival along its borders.

During the same period there were constant rumors about Soviet offers of credit. The Turkish government, although very eager to obtain foreign credits in order to get its first Five-year Development Plan off the ground, did not conclude a credit agreement with the Soviet Union at this time. However, the trade capacity reached a new

³⁹Ibid., p. 306.

⁴⁰New York Times, 7 June 1962.

level, and a minor railroad agreement went into effect in 1961 linking the two sides of the Caucasian border.⁴¹

The four coalition governments formed in 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1965 pledged to develop the relations with the northern neighbor based on mutual respect and good neighborliness, and in accordance with the existing international commitments.⁴² In line with this new policy of better relations, and upon an invitation of the Soviet side, a parliamentary delegation, headed by Mr. Suat Urguplu, the Speaker of the Senate, arrived in Moscow for an official goodwill visit. According to the reports in the press, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and the other leaders repeated to the delegation at every opportunity that since the Soviet Union had no demands on Turkey, it was possible to revive the friendship that existed between the two countries during the Ataturk-Lenin era, and that not only could the commercial

⁴¹The Institute of International Relations, University of Ankara, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1961 (Ankara: Ajans Turk Press, 1963), p. 242.

⁴²The new electoral system of proportional representation designed to prevent any party from gaining an overwhelming parliamentary majority coupled with the increase in the number of political parties competing for the votes, and the controversy over the issue of amnesty for the deposed Menderes regime resulted in a series of unstable coalition cabinets. The 1961 coalition was between the Republican and the Justice Parties; in 1962, the Republican party united with two smaller centrist parties; the third coalition was an alignment of the Republicans and the Independents while the 1965 coalition saw a short-lived cooperation between the Justice Party and the two small parties. However, a degree of continuity was provided by the fact that three of the four coalitions were headed by prime minister Inonu.

relations be increased but that the Soviet Union was capable of extending economic aid under much better conditions than was offered by the West.⁴³ After one of these talks, Mr. Urguplu declared: "I told [Khrushchev] that it is not possible to expect an immediate and important progress in the Soviet-Turkish relations."⁴⁴

It will be useful for future reference to note here the developments in the early sixties concerning the establishment of a multilateral nuclear submarine force within NATO. Turkey had shown receptiveness to the American initiative from the start, and evidently regarded it as an appropriate substitute for the Jupiter missiles. In April 1963 a special representative of President Kennedy, Mr. Livingstone Marchand, arrived in Ankara to consult with the Turkish officials on this project. His visit was followed by a Soviet note in May, the contents of which were revealed indirectly within the Turkish reply dated early July. Soon after, the reply to the Soviets was made public by the Information Office of the Foreign Ministry. It rejected the Soviet proposal that the Mediterranean Sea be declared a nuclear and missile-free area, and at the same time, repeated the Turkish desire for a complete and general disarmament under effective control.⁴⁵ The subject might have

⁴³Esmer et al., Olaylarla Dis Politika, p. 454.

⁴⁴The Institute of International Relations, University of Ankara, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations,

been discussed during the visit of the parliamentary delegation in June. Interestingly, after the eruption of the Cyprus crisis, the Turks found it necessary to reconsider their previous enthusiasm for the nuclear submarine force, and in fact, informed the United States of ending their cooperation from the project.

During the four year period from 1960 to the end of 1963, Turkey's relations with the Soviet-guided states of Europe did not register any significant developments. Commercial agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, among others, were signed on a regular basis. Although Turkey has always been interested in the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia due to their geographical proximity to both the Soviet Union and the European Turkey, the area did not receive top-priority attention within Turkish diplomacy. Relations with Yugoslavia and Romania have been friendly. Bulgaria, on the other hand, was regarded as a staunch ally of Moscow. A sprinkling of Turks live in all three countries, a legacy of the Ottoman rule of previous centuries. The treatment of the Turkish minorities has become a sensitive issue in the case of Bulgaria. Whereas the Balkan region did not receive much attention, except for friendly relations with

1963 (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1965), p. 320.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 322.

Yugoslavia, in the foreign policy sections of the four government programs covering this period, both the 1962 and 1963 programs specifically refer to the uncooperative attitude of the Bulgarian government and the anti-Turk propaganda of their press and the leaders.⁴⁶ At one point, Ankara felt it necessary to caution Bulgaria that it would break ties unless the discriminatory treatment of the estimated 900,000 Turks improved.⁴⁷ In 1966, there was a noticeable relaxation of tension with Bulgaria, and in general, an improvement in Turkey's ties with pro-Soviet countries of Europe, all accompanying the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement following the Cyprus crisis.

The Third World Policy and the United Nations

Just as Turkey came to entertain, in the early 1960's, its first doubts about the soundness of having very close ties with the United States, and was prompted to turn a more receptive, albeit cautious ear to the Soviets, the official attitude toward long-time neutrals, newly independent non-bloc countries, and those striving for independence underwent a modest change. During the 1961 budget discussions in the National Assembly, the foreign minister Selim Sarper elaborated first on the situation of the developing countries,

⁴⁶Arar, Hukumet Programlari, p. 372, p. 401.

⁴⁷New York Times, 9 September 1962.

a departure from the customary procedures of official pronouncements. Indicating the closeness felt by his country toward those struggling for independence and freedom, Mr. Sarper denounced the fact that they had become the prizes in a political and military competition sustained by the division of the world into two "fronts." He called for the support of those efforts exerted by the United Nations in order to alleviate the situation, and expressed the hope that the developing countries will be supplied the economic and technical aid they ask for exclusively out of their free will.⁴⁸

Another enlightened note was sounded in the 1961 election manifesto of the Republican Party which failed to achieve a majority in the parliament, but led the three coalition governments of the next three years. The manifesto explained that while Turkey could not lead a neutralist policy due to its historical development and geographical considerations, it would nevertheless follow a policy of friendship with those countries which, based on similar reasoning, are of the opinion that they can adopt neutrality.⁴⁹ This attitude was markedly different from that of the Menderes era of the 1950's when the Turks regarded the neutralist countries with a touch of contempt as demonstrated during

⁴⁸Esmer et al., Olaylarla Dis Politika, p. 346.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 349.

the 1955 Bandung Conference.

There were several attempts at increased cooperation with developing and far-away countries. Good will missions were sent to Africa, representation in Mali was upgraded to the ambassadorial level, Ethiopian and Japanese ships called on Turkish ports, and a Mexican parliamentary delegation was received in Ankara. Earlier, the revolutionary military leadership of the National Unity Committee had declared its solidarity for the Algerian nationalists fighting the French army. A foreign newspaper revealed the news that General Gursel had offered his services as a mediator between France and the Algerians, but that the suggestion had been rejected inferentially by a spokesman of the French Foreign Ministry.⁵⁰ Ankara showed its sympathy for the Algerian cause by aiding the refugees in Morocco. Premier Inonu warmly hailed deGaulle for his decision to grant Algeria independence after a seven-year war.

Successive governments emphasized the special closeness between Turkey and the Arab states. The Libyan ambassador applauded the decision of the revolutionary government to improve relations with the Arabs, and noted the possibilities for cooperation in the fields of economic development and social welfare.⁵¹ Relations with the Middle Eastern Arabs,

⁵⁰New York Times, 18 September 1960.

⁵¹Ankara University, Turkish Yearbook 1961, p. 231.

however, oscillated. Turkey recognized Syria when she withdrew from the United Arab Republic. Regarding this as a rebuke, Egypt broke diplomatic relations with Turkey which, however, were restored two years later. With Iraq, there was a short-lived flareup over the Kurdish problem. In chase of the revolting Kurds, Iraqi planes had bombed Turkish posts at the frontier several times. Turkey retaliated by downing an airplane, and was charged by Iraq of allowing outlaws and criminals to use its territory as a base for creating trouble in Northern Iraq. Ever sensitive to this problem, the Soviet Union warned Turkey, Iran and Syria that their "interference" would constitute a definite danger to the peace in the area. The matter came to a close as Turkey promptly offered to submit the dispute to an international commission for arbitration, and premier Inonu, rejecting any Turkish wish to interfere in Iraq, emphasized his country's good will toward the Arab and Soviet neighbors.⁵²

The foreign policy of Ankara between 1960-1963 with its unchanged basis accompanied by a few minor shifts was faithfully mirrored in the United Nations. The changes were observed in the attitude towards the North African Moslems who were trying to assert their independence at home. Turkey voted at the United Nations to support the Algerians,

⁵²New York Times, 18 July 1963.

one-time subjects of the Ottoman Empire, against the French, a long-time ally. Similarly, on the question of the French occupation of Bizerte, Turkey sided with Tunisia along with many uncommitted nations. In fact, the Turkish delegate, Mr. Turgut Menemencioglu expressing his concern in the Security Council, offered a draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and the opening of early negotiations for peace.

Turkish sympathies for the newly emerging North African states did not stretch to include, for example, Goa and the other Portuguese colonial enclaves in the Indian subcontinent. When India militarily invaded these enclaves, Turkey joined the ranks of the United States, Great Britain, and France in the Security Council and co-sponsored a resolution for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian troops. Such active participation in condemning threats to the overseas possessions of colonial states was in fact a continuation of the imprudent Turkish policy of extending uncritical support to its NATO allies in their problems of foreign policy.

The general tendency to side with the West was also exhibited in such non-urgent questions as the membership of Communist Chinese, and the structural change in the executive branch of the United Nations. Turkey opposed both the Chinese membership, and the Soviet suggestion of replacing the Secretary General with a three-man directorate serviced

by a staff shaped according to the three major political groupings of world states. However, when acting as the president of the Security Council on the basis of the rotating nonpermenant membership, The Turkish representative worked out a compromise on the problem of the Soviet-backed membership of Outer Mongolia, and the American-supported membership of Mauritania. The compromise arrangement was accepted by all sides as not violating the principle against pairing the admission of controversial candidates, and both countries were admitted by the General Assembly.

It can be said that the Turkish participation in the fifteenth to the eighteenth sessions between 1960 and 1963 of the General Assembly did not posit any outstanding marks, but was largely confined to the customary speeches, committee work, and press conferences. The dramatic change in the significance of this international forum to Turkish interests was marked in December 1963 with the sudden flare-up of communal warfare between the Cypriot Greeks and Turks, and the skillful presentation of the ethnic conflict by the Cypriot government to the United Nations.

CHAPTER IV

THE CYPRUS CRISIS

Background 1571-1960

The island of Cyprus lies in the eastern Mediterranean forty miles from the southern coast of Turkey, and 500 miles from Greece. Eighty percent of the population are Greek Orthodox, and 20 percent are Turkish-speaking Moslems. Due to its strategic position the island during its history from 300 B.C. until 1960 had come under the rule of the Ptolemies, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Lusignans, the Venetians, the Turks, and the British.⁵³ The Ottomans took it over from the Venetians in 1571, and were to rule over it for the next three centuries. They restored the supremacy of the Orthodox archbishop, and abolished the system of serfdom among the peasants. In time, the archbishop and the Greek notables enhanced their influence, and enjoyed direct access to the Sultan.

In 1878, when the Empire was fast weakening and had just lost territory to the Russians, the Ottomans signed a Convention with the British consenting to their occupation and administration of the island of Cyprus in return for

⁵³Robert Stephens, Cyprus: A Place of Arms (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 22.

British agreement to defend the territories of the Sultan against Russian encroachments. An annex stipulated the termination of the 1878 Convention if Russia restored to the Ottomans its recent conquests. And thus while juridically Cyprus remained a part of the Ottoman Empire, in reality it offered England control over the island and the sea route through the Suez Canal to India.

Throughout the colonial phase of its history, the Cypriots of Greek origin formulated their call for Enosis--uniting the island with mainland Greece. Predictably, each such call would draw a protest from the Cypriots of Turkish origin who in turn advocated the return of Turkish sovereignty over the island. When Britain introduced the first colonial constitution in 1882, the Turkish Cypriots opposed self-government which would not be based on a complete equality of the two communities on the grounds that this would put them at the mercy of the Greek majority, whose aim of Enosis was contrary to their own interests. Britain, on its part, viewed Enosis as incompatible with its rule over the island. For this reason, she found it expedient to exploit the bi-communal differences in Cyprus. For example, bi-communally administered education not only perpetuated segregation, but also reinforced the historical ties each community shared with its mother country.

The first World War found England and the Ottoman Empire confronting each other. England formally annexed

Cyprus in 1914; this move was recognized by the new nationalist government of Turkey in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. Interestingly, Britain had offered the island to the Greek government during the first year of the War in exchange for Greek participation on the Allied side, but the Greeks had rejected the offer preferring not to expose the newly acquired Balkan territory to further risks in a new war.

Between the two World Wars, Britain emerged as the dominant power in the Middle East. Having now several footholds in the area the strategic importance of Cyprus was no longer very significant. The bi-communal nature of the island continued along with an increased momentum for Panhellenism. This was to be reinforced by the principle of self-determination which was widely accepted by the international community at the end of the second World War. Indeed, the two concepts of anti-colonialism and self-determination were sanctioned by the Charter of the United Nations. However, by then the British power had started its decline, and consequently, the importance of maintaining control over Cyprus was once again on the rise.

During the 1950's the confrontation between the Cypriot Greeks and the British entered a new phase marked by revolts and open violence. The Enosis movement was conducted by the ethnarch of the island, Archbishop Makarios III, and George Grivas, a Cypriot officer in the Greek army who had come back to Cyprus to initiate terrorist activity against the

British. For that purpose, the two men formed an underground guerilla organization known as the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

The political framework of the fighting on the island was widened only when Greece officially adopted the cause of the Cypriot Greeks. So far Turkey had regarded the developments as a domestic matter between the government of the island and its Greek community. She felt obliged to take an active part in the question when Greece submitted it to the United Nations in 1954 as a colonial problem involving the principle of self-determination.⁵⁴ Turkey advanced the legalistic argument of retrocession, indicating that in the event of a change in the status-quo as determined by the Turkish recognition of British sovereignty over Cyprus in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, she would have grounds for asking that the island be returned to her. The General Assembly, due to intense British pressures against having the issue discussed in that forum, simply recommended that it be negotiated by the parties directly involved.

The diplomatic impasse prompted the EOKA to initiate a wave of guerilla attacks directed at the British administration. In 1955, Britain invited Greece and Turkey to London to discuss the situation. Makarios protested the absence of representation for the Cypriot Greeks. Neither

⁵⁴Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, p. 236.

was Greece pleased by the inclusion of Turkey. She pressed for self-determination for Cyprus which was the demand for Enosis presented in a form more palatable to international opinion. Britain refused the application of the principle of self-determination to Cyprus, knowing also the total inacceptability of Enosis for the Turks. In return, Greece rejected the proposal of London for a limited self-government supervised by Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The London conference was suspended in September 1955.

This time, the resumption of hostilities on the island spread along intercommunal lines. Turkey, now determined to take a stronger stand, brought forth the argument that she would not oppose the principle of self-determination for the island provided that it be applied to the Greek and Turkish communities separately. As one study indicated, ". . . the Turkish argument rested on Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, according to which the development of self-government was to be encouraged in accordance with the 'particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples. The 'particular circumstance' of the peoples was, in this case, the existence of two distinct communities, while the 'particular circumstance' of the territory was the island's geographical proximity to Anatolia. According to Article 73, the will of the Turkish community of Cyprus

and the security of Turkey had to be taken into consideration."⁵⁵ Since the application of this reasoning would result in each community's choosing to unite with its respective mainland, the proposal came to be known as Taksim (the Turkish word for partition).

While the fighting continued a combination of factors transformed the conflict to a new phase. Concerned that Makarios, Greece, and Britain may reach a settlement on the side, Turkey changed its stance from retrocession to partition. For Makarios, however, this was certainly worse than British rule. On the other hand, not only did Britain show an interest in the idea of Taksim, but also Makarios could not expect Greece to antagonize a much stronger Turkey beyond a certain limit. Furthermore, not much progress was achieved in the United Nations. In February 1957, the Political Committee of the General Assembly had expressed the hope for a resumption of negotiations. Ten months later, a similar resolution added the hope for the application of the principle of self-determination. The resolution seemed to favor the Greeks although it failed to get the two-thirds majority necessary for a recommendation. By December 1958 however, Greeks saw the defeat of their resolutions in the General Assembly.⁵⁶ Finally, the British on their part, had

⁵⁵ University of Ankara, Turkey and the United Nations, p. 196.

⁵⁶ Stephens, Cyprus, p. 150, p. 152, p. 159.

come to the view that sovereignty over a few bases rather than the whole island would be sufficient for their strategic needs.

Assessing the factors above and realizing that Enosis did not need to be achieved promptly and in one step, Makarios indicated that an independent Cyprus would be an acceptable solution to the crisis. This led, in 1959, to an immediate round of negotiations in Zurich, between the Greek and Turkish prime ministers, Karamanlis and Menderes. The discussions were then moved to London where the prime ministers were joined by their foreign ministers, the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus, and the representatives of Britain. The initialed agreements formed the basis of three multilateral treaties, and a constitution which was drafted within a year, making Cyprus an independent Republic on August 1960.

Before explaining the essence and the basic tenents of these documents, it is necessary to realize that Cyprus is basically a regional problem between Turkey and Greece. A brief look at the historical entanglement of these two peoples will help to underline this dispute as one among many within a relationship of traditional adversity whose roots go back five centuries. The Byzantine Empire had reached the fifteenth century besieged by internal disorder as a result of the bitter feud with the Latins. Its demise came in 1453 when the Ottoman Turks conquered Constantinople.

The Orthodox Christian religion gave way to Islam, although all the non-Moslem subjects of the Ottoman Empire continued to pursue their livelihood under the tolerant institution of millet--a system which allowed the non-Islamic religious communities to administer their own cultural, religious, and private legal affairs. One of the early beneficiaries of this system was the Greek millet whose cultural heritage was intact when nationalism began to spread in the nineteenth century. The Greeks then were inspired to resurrect the former Byzantine Empire, aiming to bring together all living Greeks, a vision known as the Megali Idea. The revolt led to the establishment in 1832 of an independent Greek state which increased its territory at the expense of the Ottoman Empire over the next century. The high point of the vision came during the Turkish war of independence (1919-1922) when the Turkish nationalist government of Ataturk was fighting the British, the French, the Italians, and their collaborator, the Sultan. The Greeks were lured into the war by the British offer of "important concessions on the coasts of Asia Minor." Tempted by the possibility of fulfilling the Panhellenic ideal, and even reacquainting Istanbul, the Greeks embarked upon a massive invasion of Western Anatolia. In the course of the ensuing war, the Allies quickly established truces on several fronts, whereas the Greek army penetrated inland. The result was the decimation of half of its forces, with the remaining half driven back to the

Aegean. Thus the birth of the new Turkish state marked the end of the irredentist Megali Idea.

The independence and the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic was internationally acknowledged by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne which also settled the outstanding problems between Turkey and Greece. The two countries initiated a mass exchange of populations deemed necessary after "the murderous events of the Greek invasion and the subsequent Turkish liberation of Anatolia"⁵⁷ when the safety of the coexisting Turks and Greeks seemed endangered. However, Athens and Ankara agreed not to uproot the Turkish ethnic minorities in Western Thrace and on the islands, and the Greeks in Istanbul. Greece kept the Aegean islands (except for two near the Dardanelles' entrance), but agreed not to militarize four of them lying especially close to the Turkish coast. The Dodecanese Islands remained in the hands of Italy, while Turkey recognized British sovereignty over Cyprus.

Between 1930 and 1933, and under the able leaderships of Venizelos and Ataturk, Greece and Turkey normalized their relationship signing two treaties and a friendship pact. They collaborated further by forming with Yugoslavia the Balkan Entente in 1934.

During the second World War, Turkey remained neutral while Greece was overrun by Germany. The relation was also strained when Ankara adopted and quickly rescinded a tax

⁵⁷Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, p. 221.

measure discriminatory against the minorities. At the same time, however, Turkey sent humanitarian help to Greece and allowed the use of her territory in the support of Greek guerillas. A bitter pill to swallow for Ankara after the war was the cession by Italy to Greece of the Dodecanese Islands including the island of Rhodes. This certainly upset the balance in the Aegean, but in face of the displeasure caused by her wartime neutrality in the eyes of the Allies, coupled by the newly emerging Soviet threats, Turkey could not launch a protest at a diplomatically weak moment.

After 1945, ties of friendship flourished once again. Both countries were covered by the Truman Doctrine, both joined NATO about the same time and cooperated closely within it, and both were recipients of considerable American aid. Together with Yugoslavia, they again established a short-lived Balkan Defense Pact (see p.29) Unfortunately, the two states headed for a confrontation over Cyprus when Greece formally announced her support for the Enosis demands of the Cypriot Greeks and their leader, Makarios. To the Turks, the desire to unite Cyprus with Greece was clearly reminiscent of the previous Megali Idea.

For the period of the 1955-1958 EOKA struggle, the mutual aims of Greece and the Greek Cypriot leadership were first and foremost, to annex Cyprus with Greece; second, to end the British hegemony; and third, to oppose the Turkish

proposal to Taksim (partition). For Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot , on the other hand, Enosis was to be opposed by all means. The Turks would not have objected to continued British rule which perpetuated the bi-communal nature of the island. And the Taksim thesis was open to modification.

The Turkish determination to prevent Enosis was and is grounded in a number of reasons which might be grouped under three categories: A) Strategic, B) Political, C) Historical. A) The strategic reasoning is twofold. First, the geographic location of Cyprus is considered crucial to Turkey's security especially during a time of war. In the words of the minister of foreign affairs (1955), "In case of a war, the defense force of Turkey can be externally supplied only through our southern and western harbors in the Mediterranean. The western harbors of Turkey are unfortunately in the sphere of influence of a probable enemy, so that Turkey can be supplied only through its southern harbors. This situation had clearly materialized during the second World War. Keeping this reality in mind, the starting points of the infrastructure network that feeds Turkey are all located in the southern towns like Antalya, Mersin, Yumurtalik, and Iskenderun. Indeed, even the fuel needs of Istanbul are served by a pipeline from the southern coast. And all these southern harbors are under the protection of the Cyprus island. Whoever rules that island also commands the protection of these Turkish harbors. If at the same time, he also

possesses the Aegean islands, a de facto encirclement of Turkey will be achieved. No country can base its total security on any one state no matter how friendly or allied."⁵⁸

Second, the balance of power between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean and the Mediterranean is at issue. As arranged by the treaty of Lausanne, Greece kept the islands, many of which she had nibbled away from the Ottoman Empire (Crete, for example), but agreed not to militarize those lying within a few miles of the Western coast of Turkey. The disadvantageous position of the latter considerably worsened when a set of islands, the Dodecanese (including Rhodes), was ceded by Italy to Greece after the second World War. Greece can easily use these islands to close the Aegean to navigation, and thus cut off access to the Turkish straits and Istanbul. Ankara feels it has every reason to be adamant that the existing imbalance not be further aggravated by allowing Greece to acquire another strategic foothold in the eastern Mediterranean.

B) The political reasoning follows closely the strategic considerations relevant to the rejection of Enosis. In estimating the political future of Greece, Turkey pursued a conservative line, and assumed that the future developments

⁵⁸Esmer et al., Olaylarla Dis Politika, pp. 368-369.

in her neighbor's politics might be directly contrary to the Western orientation of Turkey.⁵⁹ After all, only a decade earlier Greece was on the verge of a Communist takeover. A regime hostile to Ankara would certainly be in a position to create innumerable difficulties for Turkey, considering the strategic advantages Greece enjoys in the Aegean Sea. If Cyprus were Greek territory, the political climate of Athens would necessarily be reflected in the island; whereas, without Enosis, Turkey could hope to exert some influence over Cyprus even if Greece were to become a political adversary.

C) What can be grouped as arguments based on historical reasoning are more varied. First, the Turks point to the "communal nature" of the island, rooted in the millet system of the Ottomans that has come down to the present from the sixteenth century. The preceding colonial phase was also marked by the British recognition of the presence of two equal communities on Cyprus. The Turks are strongly convinced that neither community should exercise control over the other. The matter rests on a basis of two distinct communities enjoying equal rights and privileges, and cannot, they claim, be approached from the point of view of a majority-minority relationship.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, p. 243.

⁶⁰ A lucid discussion of this issue is to be found in Christian Heinze, "The Cyprus Conflict: The Western Peace System is Put to the Test," Turkish Yearbook 1963 (Vol.IV)p. 52.

Second, the Turkish government is seriously concerned about the safety and the well-being of the island-Turks in case of Enosis. The memory of the Greek performance during the occupation of western Anatolia is enough motivation for not leaving the fate of the Cypriot Turks completely in the hands of the Greeks.

Finally, Cyprus is regarded as a matter of national prestige, and has touched off considerable popular interest in Turkey. Both the political leaders and the people take the position that what had happened to Crete--the Ottoman acceptance to relinquish that island on arguments of self-government, followed by its annexation to Greece--must not be repeated with Cyprus. In Turkish eyes, the healthy Republic of the twentieth century which has replaced the deteriorating Empire of the nineteenth could and should stand firm for its legitimate causes.

The London-Zurich Agreements of 1960 terminated the British rule over the island, rejected both Enosis and Taksim as viable alternatives, and agreed on independence as a solution acceptable to each party concerned. The relations of the new Cyprus Republic with Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey, were arranged by three treaties, while the Constitution of the same year regulated the legal framework within which the two communities of Cyprus would coexist.

In the first treaty, the Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the three states of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey sanctioned the independence of

Cyprus excluding the two base areas remaining under British sovereignty. The parties, along with Cyprus, agreed to "consult and cooperate in the common defense of Cyprus."⁶¹

In the second treaty, the Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus agreed to maintain respect for its constitution, and "not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political and economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island."⁶² Greece, Turkey, and Britain, on their part, guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus. They also agreed to prohibit any activity promoting either Enosis or Taksim, and in case of a breach of the Treaty to consult and take the necessary measures to ensure the observance of the treaty. Article IV provided specifically that "In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take actions with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty."⁶³ During the worst days of the intercommunal crises of 1963 and 1967, Turkey invoked this article as the basis for its threats of intervention, although it never exercised the option.

⁶¹Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish Yearbook 1963, p. 202.

⁶²Ibid., p. 299.

⁶³Ibid., p. 300.

In the third treaty, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus formed an alliance to resist any aggressive attacks on the latter. The Treaty of Alliance set up a military tripartite headquarters on Cyprus to which Greece and Turkey were to assign 950 and 650 men, respectively. The supreme political body of the alliance would be the Committee of Ministers consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. Incidentally, the tripartite headquarters were to be responsible to this political committee.

The domestic political life, on the other hand, was regulated by the Cypriot constitution in an intricate system of checks and balances. The Republic adopted a presidential system of government with the executive power, over all except communal affairs, resting in the hands of a Greek president and Turkish vice-president. The two statesmen were to be elected by their respective communities, and to be aided by a council of ten ministers, seven of whom would be Greek, with one of the three key positions of foreign affairs, defense, and security going to the Turks. Concerning decisions in these three areas, the president and the vice-president would have separately or jointly the right of veto.

The legislature, the House of Representatives, was to have a membership of 70 percent Greeks and 30 percent Turks, with a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president. In matters relating to the electoral law, the municipalities,

taxes or duties, separate majorities were required from both communal members.

In addition to the legislature, there were to be separate and elected "Communal Chambers" to administer religious, educational, cultural affairs, questions of personal status and communal activities, as well as the financing of such matters. In addition, there were to be separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the five towns of the island.

The courts also were based on a bi-communal basis with mixed courts ruling only over cases when parties to the dispute belonged to different communities. The constitution also set up a Supreme Constitutional Court to hear cases concerning contested legislation. A neutral judge who would not be from Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, or Britain would preside, flanked by one Greek and one Turkish judge.

A seventy-thirty ratio between Greeks and Turks was to be applied in the staffing of the civil service, the police, and gendarmarie. However, the army would consist of 60 percent Greeks and 40 percent Turks.

Both Greeks and Turkish were the official languages, and each community could celebrate their respective national holidays.

Thus, duality was the conceptual basis of the constitution reflecting the fact that on Cyprus there are two dif-

ferent communities existing with each other. It was recognized that the new state was not a nation-state, since there was no Cypriot nation. The Turkish side relied on the constitution to almost legislate equity into every phase of political life, indicating a lack of trust in the intentions of the Greek side. If the constitutional provisions provided a system of checks on the power of the majority, then the multilateral treaties gave Turkey the right to intervene in the island if the events were developing in a direction contrary to that established by the three treaties and the constitution. The 650 men Turkish contingent was a further symbolic indicator of the military interest Turkey had for Cyprus. Most importantly, as one of the three guarantors, the legality of the Turkish claims were recognized to be on the same level as those of Greece and Great Britain. The treaties gave Greece the same rights, and by restoring the previous cooperative friendship she had enjoyed with Turkey, strengthened her security. The Cypriot Greek community acquired the right to administer the island with the stipulation to respect the Turkish community's rights. And finally, Britain secured two base areas which met her demands on the island.

Highlights of the Conflict 1963-1967

The best interests of the independent republic required a healthy dose of good will and intentions in order to apply the comprehensive and perhaps cumbersome constitution. Inonu had recognized, as early as 1959, the distance between legality and reality in Cyprus when, as the leader of the opposition, he criticized the London-Zurich Agreements by a prophetic analysis of the treaties: ". . . In confronting an Enosis movement, it is not very likely that Greece will be siding with us. England is not bound by a definite commitment for intervention. Even if she admits a violation of the constitution and the need to intervene, it is up to her to judge whether or not to participate in a military intervention for this purpose. If England acts this way, the intervention will be agreed upon mutually, as stated in the Treaty of Guarantee, but it will not be carried in mutual cooperation. In that case, Turkey will have to move alone against the violation of its cause. Besides, it should not be forgotten that at that time the violator of the Treaty, the Republic of Cyprus, will be a member of the United Nations. The conflict is a matter of shared concern for the World Organization and specifically for the Security Council. In that situation, if Turkey achieves the capability to intervene by exercising its option swiftly, she will succeed by a legitimate fait accompli. However, it cannot be claimed that the conditions are and will always be amenable for a

fast military intervention on our side. Even though this Treaty seems to eliminate an extra-constitutional attempt for Enosis, in reality it has not done so. On the other hand, the thesis of Taksim has been eliminated de jure and de facto. . ."⁶⁴ Regrettably, the constitutional order was challenged at every turn, and within a matter of four years, the turn of events dreaded by Inonu had materialized.

The specific issues of friction were the separate municipalities, the 30 percent Turkish participation in the civil service, the veto right of the Turkish vice-president, and the establishment of the Cypriot army. The Greek side claimed that the provisions regulating such matters were in applicable while the Turks insisted that the constitution, having being drafted voluntarily by the two sides, had to be implemented. In essence, the difficulties were simply a manifestation of the entirely different orientations of the two communities toward the constitution and the status of independence as well as the partnership of the communities that it upheld. This status was not the desired aim of the Greek Cypriot leadership's 1955-1958 EOKA struggle; instead, they had consented to it as a tactical move when they had realized that uniting Cyprus with Greece could not be achieved immediately. For them, the constitutional order was meant to be challenged and molded from the "two communities with equal

⁶⁴ Esmer et al., Olaylarla Dis Politika, p. 397.

rights" to a "majority-minority" basis, leaving the Cypriot Greeks unhindered in the pursuit of Enosis. The Turkish Cypriot leadership felt handicapped from the beginning realizing that independence was to be "used for the same end which it purported to have prohibited as a sine qua non of peaceful cooperation between the two communities."⁶⁵

Toward the end of 1963, Markarios submitted to the Turkish vice-president and the guarantor states a memorandum listing thirteen proposals for amending the constitution. The veto power of the vice-president, and the separate majorities required in the legislature for adopting laws and amendments in the key areas of taxes, municipalities, and the electoral laws were to be abolished. The municipalities, the courts, and the army were to be reorganized on a unitary basis. The civil servants were to be recruited on a 80-20 percent ratio. Clearly, the thirteen amendments represented an open bid to abrogate the rights of the Turkish community. The leaders of both Turkey and the Cypriot Turks promptly and strongly rejected them.

Fighting started within days leading swiftly into a savage massacre of Turks on Christmas of 1963.⁶⁶ This pattern

⁶⁵Rauf Denktas, "The Cyprus Problem," Foreign Policy (March 1971), p. 96.

⁶⁶An emotional but illuminating first-hand account of the violence on the island is supplied by Scott Gibbons, a British journalist living in Cyprus in Peace Without Honor (Ankara: ADA Publishing House, 1969).

was continued over the next two years. The intentions of Makarios were clarified when he announced in January 1964, without prior consultations and unilaterally, the abrogation of the London-Zurich Treaties. The concerned governments came together once again in London, but the diametrically opposed views of the Turkish and Greek sides failed to produce an understanding. A second major Greek offensive on Cyprus against the Turks was launched the next month prompting Ankara to threaten to land its forces in Cyprus. In March 1964, a United Nations force was established and sent to the island. However, its presence stopped neither the violence nor the economic blockade the Greeks had newly imposed on the Turks who by now had withdrawn to a number of enclaves on the island. Having been deterred by the United States from intervening in Cyprus, the Turkish government found itself in the frustrating position of being unable to influence the Greek Cypriots directly. Ankara had to rely on putting diplomatic pressure on Greece to keep Makarios in line. Another device was to retaliate by harassing the Greeks in Istanbul. Turkey terminated a previous agreement and started to expel the Greek citizens while intimidating those Greeks with Turkish citizenship. However, after another particularly bloody Greek attack on the Turks of Kokina, Turkish jets bombed Greek military targets in a limited but effective mission. In 1965, after several mediation efforts were undertaken by the United Nations

and the United States an uneasy quiet marred by occasional fighting settled on Cyprus.

Makarios had a knack for shrewd timing, by having the first wave of violence in 1963 coincide with weak governments in Greece and Turkey, both of which were beset by domestic problems. Similarly, when violence flared up for a second time in 1967, a military junta had assumed power in Athens. In November, the Greeks inflicted heavy casualties in a Turkish village in Cyprus. Turkey issued an ultimatum to Greece accompanied by the full mobilization of her forces. This time, Greece and Makarios gave in.⁶⁷ The illegal army composed of Greek regulars was withdrawn from the island. The economic blockade was terminated. The Cypriot Turks, who since December 1963, had suffered immensely in their enclaves, announced the formation of a provisional Turkish Administration with the aim of managing community affairs. They had now achieved a geographical division of the island.

Intercommunal negotiations started in April 1968, and by September 1970 the fourth round had been resumed.⁶⁸ The Turkish views had evolved toward a Cyprus federated state with the central government in charge of foreign policy defense, and economics, and the two communities enjoying

⁶⁷The Turkish army is stronger than the Greek.

⁶⁸Though there were no further explosions of fighting, the talks have not produced a definitive settlement by 1974.

complete autonomy. This seems to be a reasonable solution since the "dual" system proposed by the 1960 constitution was inapplicable in Greek eyes, and the "unitary" system was not tolerated by the Turks. Whether the Greek Cypriots and Makarios have given up hopes for annexation with Greece is less clear. However, they realize that it is impossible to forcefully impose an arrangement on the Cypriot Turkish community contrary to its and especially Turkey's wishes.

Turkey, the United States and the Conflict

From the onset of the violence on Cyprus, Turkey tried to have the dispute considered by the NATO allies and especially by the United States. The peace-force proposals of NATO were rejected by Makarios, mainly due to his determination to avoid the alliance bargaining context of the organization, but it was the reluctance of her allies to exert themselves toward a settlement of the dispute between two of their members that disappointed Turkey.

Above all, however, it was the refusal of the United States to come out in support of the Turkish side that caused the greatest disillusionment. In the first phase of the conflict, Turkey saw the necessity of intervening in the island on four occasions in order to stop the indiscriminate killing of the Cypriot Turks. It was prevented from doing so mostly by the promises of the United States that the United Nations would act decisively to alleviate the situation.

In June 1964, Ankara warned for the fourth time that it was about to use its right of intervention under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee in order to restore order on the island. President Johnson dispatched a letter dated June 5, 1964 to the Turkish prime minister Inonu which not only halted this first actual preparation for intervention but also changed the very nature of the Turkish-American friendship from then on.

The Johnson letter had two crucial points. First, Turkey was reminded of the bilateral agreement regulating American military assistance (see p. 26). Mr. Johnson said: "Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States' consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. . . . I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances."⁶⁹ This coarse reminder of the less than independent status of Turkey was accompanied by a remarkable assertion concerning NATO reaction: ". . . a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand

⁶⁹Documents, The Institute of International Relations, University of Ankara. The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1966 (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1969), p. 140.

that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies."⁷⁰

On June 14, prime minister Inonu informed the United States that Turkey had postponed the decision to exercise its right of unilateral action in Cyprus, no doubt a painful admission of weakness. After reviewing Turkish and American attitudes in the conflict, he discussed NATO: "Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance. If NATO members should start discussing the right or wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist this member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and, it would lose its meaning. An obligation of assistance, if it is to carry any weight, should come into being immediately upon the occurrence of aggression. That is why, Article V of

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 139-140.

the North Atlantic Treaty considers an attack against one of the member states as an attack against them all, and makes it imperative for them to assist the party so attacked by taking forthwith such action as they deem necessary."⁷¹

Inonu then elaborated on an understanding of law, asking the United States whether it "should not have reminded Greece, who repudiates treaties signed by herself, of the necessity to abide by the precept 'pacta sunt servanda' which is the fundamental rule of international law."⁷²

It was difficult for Turks to comprehend why their best friend would fail to support them in a major crisis in which they judged themselves to be legally right. They realized the delicacy of the situation for the United States since both Turkey and Greece were NATO members. Yet, preventing Turkey from using her treaty-given right while taking no measure against Greece or Makarios to bring about a definite change on the island was interpreted by the political parties, the leadership, the press, and the public as an American endorsement of Enosis.

Professor Armaoglu theorizes that the behavior of the United States had been based on a mistaken assessment of the relative stability of Greece and Turkey; that the church and the monarchy were viewed as the pillars of stability in Greece

⁷¹Vali, Turkish Straits and NATO, pp. 319-320.

⁷²Ibid., p. 317.

while the 1960 coup in Turkey was taken to indicate a precarious situation. By 1965, however, the general elections put a strong majority government in office in Ankara whereas civilian rule was interrupted in Greece by a military coup in 1967.⁷³

At this point, it is useful to note that after Cyprus became an independent state, Makarios adopted neutrality as the foreign policy direction, and carefully cultivated relations with the non-aligned countries. Moreover, Cyprus had a well-organized communist party, AKEL, whose prospects looked much better within an independent Cyprus than within a Cyprus annexed to Greece. Given, further, the interest Moscow exhibited toward maintaining the independence of Cyprus, it is safe to assume that the United States regarded Enosis as a means of perpetuating the pro-West, democratic character of the strategically located island.

In 1964, shortly after the exchange of letters, the United States arranged a meeting between the disputants in Geneva, where Secretary of State Dean Acheson submitted a plan proposing Enosis, except for the northeast peninsula which would become a Turkish-owned military base on Cyprus, and the cession of a tiny Greek island to Turkey along the

⁷³Fahir Armaoglu, "Turkey and the United States: A New Alliance," The Institute of International Relations, University of Ankara, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1965 (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1968), p. 9.

Turkish southwestern coast. Turkey showed a willingness to accept the plan as a basis for negotiations but Makarios rejected the plan because of its recognition of the Turkish demand for partition, and it was dropped.

The next year, the United Nations General Assembly voted on the Cyprus issue. By this time the United States had realized the extent of Ankara's indignation over Johnson's letter. The dashed hopes of Turkey had prompted the government to mend its fences with the Soviet Union. Consequently, the United States voted with Turkey against the 1965 resolution which emphasized the inviability of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, seemingly rebuking the Turkish government's emphasis of the present force of the 1960 London-Zurich Treaties.

By the time the second wave of violence broke out on the island in 1967, the United States had reassessed the situation. It realized that Turkey could not be asked to stop her plans for establishing a beachhead on the island a second time. Cyrus Vance worked feverishly as the special United States envoy to quell the hot tempers. Greece was reminded that she would undoubtedly be the loser in any two-sided confrontation with Turkey. This time, Greece and Makarios gave in, and met the demands of the Turkish ultimatum which called for the removal of the illegal Greek army and the recall of general Grivas, the terrorist leader, from Cyprus. Due to the strong objections of Makarios, how-

ever, the National Guard was not dismantled.

Thus, the Cyprus crisis had a profound impact on Turkish-American relations. The special relationship with the United States had been the basic pillar of Turkey's foreign policy after the second World War. Turks had never really analyzed the nature and limits of this friendship critically. Yet in the first major crisis of foreign policy that the Turks faced since the difficult days of the Soviet threats in 1945-46, the close friend failed to deliver. As if this was not enough of a shock, Turkey was told by the United States that the collective security system she belonged to would not respond if she were attacked by the prime enemy. The repercussions of this jolt were to have great significance in the next few years for Turkish-American relations, and Turkish foreign policy in general. More immediately, Ankara turned its attention to the dormant ties with the northern neighbor.

Turkey, the Soviet Union and the Conflict

Ever since the foundation of the Cypriot Republic in 1960, the Soviet Union had been a sympathizer of the determination of Makarios to establish a policy of non-alignment for Cyprus. After the outbreak of violence in December 1963, the Soviets regarded Turkish jet flights and threats of intervention as a prelude to a possible NATO plan to bring the island under Turkish protection. During this period,

the Soviets repeatedly informed Turkey and its western allies that a Turkish intervention will be regarded as an "invasion" of the island, and that the Soviets could not remain indifferent to such an occurrence in the Mediterranean. In fact, the Soviets announced that a military aid agreement had been signed between Moscow and Cyprus in September 1964, and Russian arms had started to reach the Cypriot Greeks via Egypt.

Turkish-Soviet relations had shown a slight improvement after the 1960 revolution in Turkey, but the Turks decided to approach the Soviets only after the arrival of the American President's letter in June 1964. The Turkish foreign minister made a trip to Moscow four months later. The two sides agreed to expand commercial and cultural contacts, but more importantly the communique referred to the necessity for "respect to the undertakings born from treaties," and "adherence to the fundamental human rights."⁷⁴ On the Cyprus issue, it mentioned the existence of "two national communities and their legal rights."⁷⁵ Moscow evidently prized the prospect of improved relations with Turkey. On the other hand, soon after the Moscow visit, Turkey "realized" a loss of interest in the current project of NATO to establish a multilateral

⁷⁴The Turco-Soviet Communique of November 6, 1964, The Institute of International Relations, University of Ankara, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1964 (Ankara: Ankara Basimevi, 1966), p. 170.

⁷⁵Ibid.

force in the Mediterranean (see p. 57). The foreign minister reminded the press that the question was a source of friction between the big powers such as the United States, Britain, and France, and stated: "Let these big powers settle their differences of view first, then we will decide whether or not to join the MLF."⁷⁶ When Turkey formally declined to participate in the force, a State Department spokesman called it a "psychological loss for the West."⁷⁷

More exchanges between Soviet and Turkish leaders followed in 1965. In January, a delegation of the Supreme Soviet paid a visit to Ankara. This was followed in May by the visit of foreign minister Gromyko. Three months later, Turkish prime and foreign ministers returned the call. In each case, the communiques issued referred to the "rights of the two communities" on the island, and a "federal" solution to the problem was endorsed by the Soviet foreign minister. To its credit, by taking the initiative, Turkish diplomacy had brought about a favorable change in Moscow's policy toward Cyprus within a year.

Turkey and Cyprus in the United Nations

Turkish diplomacy was not as successful in influencing the outcome of the Cyprus debates within the forums of the United Nations. Following the outbreak of violence on the

⁷⁶Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1964, p. 245.

⁷⁷Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1965, p. 221.

island in 1963, the Turkish government had sought to have the dispute considered within the allied and regional context of NATO. However, the Greek Cypriots were determined to place the issue within the confines of the world organization where they hoped to find considerable support for their position. Within days after the first massacre of the Cypriot Turks on December 1963, the Cypriot government asked the Security Council to intervene in the matter.

The Cypriot government representing the Greek inhabitants, and the Turkish government representing the island-Turks both presented several legal arguments in support of their respective cases. The Greek Cypriots aimed to undermine the validity of the 1960 Agreements, but more importantly, they sought to have the Security Council take a stance against the treaties. In three basic arguments, the legality of the treaties, the legality of the relationship between the treaties and the United Nations Charter, and finally, the legality of the relationship between the treaties and international law were challenged.

According to the Makarios government, the legality of the constitution and the treaties it incorporated were to be contested because a) they were "foisted" on the Cypriot people; b) they were "inequitable and unequal"; and c) the articles stipulating the intervention of third-party states were incompatible with Cypriot "sovereignty" and "independence". Hence, the constitution and the treaties were to be con-

sidered void on each account.

Although it is true that the representatives of the two communities joined the drafting of the Zurich-London Agreements actively only in the last stages, this writer feels that they certainly were not "coerced" into signing the treaties. Moreover, in drafting the constitution they fully participated in the year-long work of the joint commission. Students of international law indicate the idea that international treaties are not rendered void by reason of coercion. They note that while the 1960 settlement followed a period of violence, it was not obtained by force.⁷⁸ Likewise, they dismiss as legally invalid the suggestions that "unequal" treaties are ipso facto void and that "coercion" is evident when parties must conclude agreements from unequal bargaining positions.⁷⁹ As to the articles of intervention, they were a condition of independence. Such a procedure was not illegal although politically a hindrance to the Makarios government.

On a different level, the Greek Cypriots attempted to discredit the 1960 Agreements by charging that these were in conflict with article 2:4 in the Charter of the United

⁷⁸Linda Miller, Cyprus: The Law and Politics of Civil Strife, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Number 19 (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1968), p. 15.

⁷⁹Ibid.

Nations prohibiting the threat or use of force and Article 2:7 stipulating domestic jurisdiction. The argument was that since Cyprus, as a member of the United Nations, enjoys "equal rights of full independence and sovereignty. . . as prescribed by the Charter--including, of course, the right of self-determination,"⁸⁰ the three guarantor states, in voting to admit the Cyprus Republic as a member of the United Nations, have abdicated any claim to enforce the 1960 treaties. Contrary to such assertions, the Charter neither presumes the automatic invalidation of treaties signed between states before they join the United Nations, nor does it "prescribe" the "right of self-determination."

Finally, the Cypriot government alleged that the right of intervention given to Turkey is not only in conflict with the Charter which prohibits the threat or use of force, but also with "peremptory norms of international law." Despite much maneuvering by the Greek Cypriot representatives, the Security Council has repeatedly refused to pass judgment on the validity of the treaties in question.

The Turkish representatives, on the other hand, emphasized the fact that without the role of Turkey, Cyprus could not have gained independence from Britain in the first place. Secondly they pointed out that the treaties were not open to

⁸⁰Letter of Zenon Rossides, foreign minister of Cyprus, New York Times, 26 June 1964.

unilateral abrogation. Furthermore, the Turks had no doubts that the independence of Cyprus and the Treaties guaranteeing this independence constituted a solution which was in conformity with the right of self-determination, with the principles of the United Nations Charter, and with the need to safeguard the friendship and cooperation between Turkey and Greece."⁸¹ Rejecting the Greek contention that the treaties were "forced upon" the Cypriots, the Turks further disagreed with Makarios on the interpretation of the Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee (see page 79). The Article states that in case of a breach of the Treaty of Guarantee if concerted action among Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom proves impossible, then each of the three states would have "the right to take action" in order to restore the provisions set forth in the Agreements. According to Makarios, "action" signified only nonforceful measures. Referring to the stationing of Greek, British, and Turkish contingents on the island as allowed under the treaties, however, the Turks maintained that the three states had in mind the possible use of some kind of force, and that limited uses of force would not be inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, the Turkish government insistently accused the Greek Cypriots of having failed to imple-

⁸¹Information Office, Turkish Views on the Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus (Washington, D.C.: Turkish Embassy, 1965), p. 2.

ment the constitution; and of having perpetrated calculated and provocative policies of oppression and segregation. It also emphasized the anti-constitutional character of the thirteen amendments proposed by Makarios in so far as these aimed at changing the bases of the status of affairs established by the 1960 treaties. Indeed, such major alterations were specifically prohibited by Article 182 of the Cypriot constitution.

The deliberations in the Security Council had mixed results for the two protagonists. Of the numerous resolutions passed by the Council between 1964 and 1970, two had political significance for the parties concerned. The rest called for routine extensions of period for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force stationed in Cyprus.

The resolution of 4 March 1964 called upon the members to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the "sovereign" Republic of Cyprus. The reference to article two of the Charter which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state seemed to have been directed against Turkey. The government of Cyprus was asked to take the necessary measures to stop violence and bloodshed. The resolution also recommended the creation of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force, and the appointment of a mediator.⁸²

⁸²Document, Turkish Yearbook 1964, pp. 162-163.

The second resolution of importance came immediately after the Turkish jets bombed Greek military targets on the island in order to halt the systematic extermination of the Kokina village Turks. The Security Council urgently appealed to the government of Turkey on August 9, 1964, "to cease instantly the bombardment of and the use of military force of any kind against Cyprus, and to the Government of Cyprus to order the armed forces under its control to cease firing immediately."⁸³ Thus, the Council did not hesitate to take a strong stand against the use of limited force by Turkey despite the fact that she enjoyed such a right under a recognized international treaty. "The Council's 1964 debate revealed that the majority of states regard the Turkish government's unilateral claims under Article IV as in abeyance so long as the United Nations remains seized of the Cyprus conflict."⁸⁴ The Turkish government found this attitude highly unsatisfactory since the Council, while insisting on the suspension of the intervention article, was unable to have Makarios halt the killing in Cyprus.

However, the legal basis of the Turkish case, the principle of "pacta sunt servanda", was never questioned. In fact, by refusing to pass judgment on the 1960 treaties, the

⁸³Ibid., p. 165.

⁸⁴Miller, Cyprus, p. 19.

Security Council frustrated the Cypriot government's desire to obtain a resolution declaring that Turkey had no right to use force under Article IV. Such a resolution would have bolstered the Cypriot renunciation of the Treaty of Guarantee.

Having failed to achieve a pro-Greek resolution from the Security Council, the Cypriot government turned its attention to the General Assembly. It was here that Makarios so skillfully capitalized on prevailing political sentiments. Ever since the upsurge of nationalism in the early sixties, the newly independent states of Africa and other continents had come to command the majority of the votes in the General Assembly. Mostly, these were small states frequently beset by minority problems. In foreign policy, they had joined the ranks of those pursuing a policy of neutrality, and together were referred to as the non-aligned Third World countries.

It was this group that the Greek Cypriot representatives had in mind when they announced their intention to bring the dispute to the attention of the First Committee of the General Assembly during the 1965 session. Prior to the convening of the Assembly, the Cypriot government circulated a memorandum called Declaration of Intention whereby it promised to "(1) adopt a Code of Fundamental Rights to protect the minority; (2) permit the Turkish Cypriots to participate in parliament on the basis of proportional representation; (3) authorize the minority to direct "the education,

culture, religion (and) personal status" of its members; and (4) accept a United Nations Commissioner to oversee the protection of the minority's rights, for a limited period."⁸⁵

This conciliatory approach was coupled with a persistent effort to harp on themes like self-determination, and non-interference. According to the Cypriot delegation's presentation before the First, or the Political Committee,

"The issue before the Committee was not whether Cyprus should or should not be united or associate with some other country but whether it was entitled to its rights under the United Nations Charter, whether interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus should be tolerated and whether Cyprus was an equal Member of the United Nations. If Cyprus was made a second-class Member, that might set a precedent for other States, the cause of Cyprus was the cause of all small States in the United Nations."⁸⁶

Similarly, the London-Zurich Agreements were referred to as treaties established at the end of colonial rule using coercion against the weaker party.

The Turkish side, on the other hand, could not rally much political support for the "pacta sunt servanda" argument. A return to the status quo seemed to be unacceptable not only to the members of the Third World, but also to the Soviet Union and the United States. Despite the fact that the international press coverage of the Cyprus conflict was

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 20.

⁸⁶United Nations, General Assembly, 20th Session, Official Records of the 1407th Meeting: First Committee, 11 December 1965, p. 334.

adequate in exposing the atrocities being committed against the island-Turks, despite also the fact that the legal basis of the dispute gave Turkey a strong case, Ankara found itself politically alienated. If this was partly due to the skilled exploitation of the sympathies of the Third World by Makarios, it was also attributable, in a larger sense, to the general direction of Turkish foreign policy. Since becoming an ally of the West in the post-World War Two years, Turkey had consistently sided with the developed and colonial Western states at the expense of the interests of their non-industrial colonies and the Middle Eastern Arabs. (see p. 43). In contrast, under the presidency of Makarios, the government of Cyprus had carefully cultivated its ties with the neutralists since the inception of Cyprus in 1960.

The Turks were too late in realizing that within the confines of the General Assembly, they looked less appealing than their adversary. In October 1964, however, an indication of things to come at the United Nations emanated from the Second Conference of Heads of State or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo. In a regular press conference in Ankara, the spokesman of the foreign ministry indicated that although two Turkish ambassadors specially sent to the summit were not admitted as official observers, they were closely following the conference.⁸⁷ Furthermore, the

⁸⁷Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1964, p. 236.

communiqué issued at its close mentioned the "unrestricted and unfettered sovereignty and independence" of Cyprus.

Premier Inonu correctly interpreted this as favoring Makarios and Greece over Turkey in the Cyprus issue. A number of goodwill missions were then dispatched to Africa, but evidently no immediate benefits accrued to Turkey in regards to the conflict.

In the meantime, at the United Nations, following the deliberations, the Political Committee submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly. Clearly supporting the Cypriot Greeks, the resolution recalled the relevant parts of the Cairo Declaration adopted by the Non-Aligned countries in 1964, and the March 1965 report of the United Nations mediator submitted to the Secretary-General. The latter had caused such extreme irritation in Turkey because of its pro-Greek one-sidedness that Ankara considered the services of Galo Plaza, the mediator, to have lost their effectiveness, leading to his subsequent resignation. Noting further, the Declaration of Intention circulated by the Cypriot Greeks, the resolution took cognizance "of the fact that the Republic of Cyprus, as an equal Member of the United Nations, is, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, entitled to enjoy, and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference,"⁸⁸

⁸⁸United Nations, General Assembly, 20th Session, Official Records of the 1402nd Plenary Meeting, 18 December 1965, p. 6.

and went on to call upon "all States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter, and in particular, Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4, to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and to refrain from any intervention directed against it."⁸⁹

Resolution 2077 was adopted by the Assembly in a vote of forty-seven to five with fifty-four abstentions. The breakdown of the vote was as follows:

In favor: Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, India, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Albania, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, United States.

Abstain-
ing: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,

⁸⁹Ibid.

Romania, Senegal, South Africa, Spain,
Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia,
Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom,
Venezuela.⁹⁰

Although the large number of states abstaining from the resolution indicated that Turkey's claims were not definitively rejected, the alienation she was confronted with caused sharp reaction in the country. The Third World states were clearly more concerned with principles of "independence" and "sovereignty" than principles of international law. The new prime minister Demirel said the recommendation-resolution was "contrary to justice, law, and international agreements, and for this reason inapplicable."⁹¹

Apart from causing a crisis of major proportions for Turkey, the developments in Cyprus thus had produced first the Johnson letter of 1964 informing Turkey that she could neither use her American supplied weapons nor could rely on NATO in case of a Soviet attack, and then an evidence of non-support for Turkish diplomacy in the United Nations.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1965, p. 265.

CHAPTER V

RE-EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 1965-1970

A Reassessment of Policy Toward the United States and NATO

In itself a low point for Turkey, the Cyprus crisis had several beneficial results for the country's foreign policy. First and foremost was the urgent need to reassess the relations with the United States in light of the startling letter from the American president. That it took a major blunder by the State Department to prompt the Turkish leadership to initiate a careful study, fifteen years late, of its ties with its main ally was, naturally, not to the credit of Turkish diplomacy.

If the pursuant grand debate was practically forced upon the politicians, the intelligentsia, the press and the public, the prevailing conditions in the country were greatly conducive to accomodate such discussion. Ever since the inauguration of the new constitution after the May 1960 revolution, an era of unprecedented freedom of expression and thought had been ushered in. The revolution itself represented a critique of the previous regime's domestic policies. Furthermore, the long-suppressed leftists were staging a comeback not only by influential publications, but also by launching a Turkish Workers Party. As a small but articulate vocal group, the leftists contributed much to the

public debates by their enthusiasm to question and criticize established authority and institutions. Indeed, a "new order" based on "left of center" politics and a "planned economy" became the rallying themes of intellectual discourse.

Despite this atmosphere, the field of foreign policy had not taken a central position within widespread discussions until the eruption of violence in and the consequent developments about Cyprus. One notable exception, however, was the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. As had been pointed out before, the Soviet Union's attempt to bring in the American Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey as another element in a possible bargaining with the United States over the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba had marked the first time Turkish leaders, civil and military, were compelled to realize the risks as well as the security involved in maintaining NATO and American weapons and installations in the country. Although the left had capitalized on the incident in emphasizing the dangers of belonging to a military bloc, the reputation of the United States had remained, in general, mostly untarnished.

The Cyprus conflict proved to be the turning point in Turkish-American relations for three reasons: a) the United States failed to put its weight behind the Turkish side, and in fact, subtly supported the thesis of Enosis; b) Washington denied Turkey the use of American supplied weapons and equip-

ment (that is nearly all of Turkey's military assets) in a conflict directly affecting Turkish national interests but disapproved of by the United States; and c) the United States told Turkey that NATO, the cornerstone on which Turkey's defense rested, would not aid her if she were attacked by the Soviet Union, the official enemy of the collective security system, as a result of the Cyprus conflict.

What ensued amounted to a national outrage directed against the United States. Street demonstrations by university students became a commonplace occurrence, growing violent in protesting the visits of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The foreign policy elite as well as the politicians in the parliament initiated a multi-sided debate that was fully publicized by the press.

The intense interest in evaluating the nature of the Turkish-American ties, and determining the limits of the cooperation and its purposes--both of these directed the course of the debate toward the bilateral agreements signed over the years between the two countries (see Chapter Two, pp.28-29). There were tremendous pressures on the legislature and the political parties to hold public hearings on a series of secret executive agreements that had never been ratified by the National Assembly. Direct negotiations between Turkey and a reluctant United States began in 1967, and two years later the Cooperation Agreement concerning Joint Defense was signed in Ankara. The new agreement tried

to bring some sort of cohesion to the fifty-four bilateral agreements. Tribute was paid to the principle of "mutual respect for the sovereignty and the equal rights" of the parties; it was recognized that the Turkish government retained "property rights" of the base areas, that it could "inspect" these installations, and had to "approve" of their functions and aims.⁹² Military and civilian personnel was obliged to obey the Turkish law. In practical terms, the day to day operations of the bases, now called the joint defense installations, as well as the control over nuclear weapons remained exclusively in American hands. One major base in southern Turkey did not acquire a "joint" character, and is still under the exclusive control of the United States Strategic Air Force.⁹³ Even in times of national emergency, Turkish control was qualified. According to Article Fourteen, in such cases, the government had the right to take "restrictive" measures with regard to American utilization of the bases in question. As to the sensitive issue of determining whether an American soldier committing a crime was on duty or not, the Turkish authorities now acquired a voice in the investigations although not the right

⁹² Haydar Tunckanat, *Ikili Anlasmaların Icyuzu* [Inside Information on the Bilateral Agreements] (Ankara: Ekim Yayınevi, 1969), pp. 334-354.

⁹³ However, the United States was not permitted to utilize the facilities of this base in its October 1973 air lift to assist Israel against Egypt.

to overrule the American military's claims of jurisdiction. Further negotiations over this and other bilateral agreements are understood to have become a continual operation within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1969.

Together with the different facets of the Turkish-American relationship, the topic of NATO and Turkey's ties to this organization received critical attention. Due to its NATO membership, Turkey had felt its options significantly limited as far as both decision-making and implementation processes were concerned during the Cyprus crisis. First of all, since both Turkey and Greece were members, the West found the prospect of any clash between the two highly embarrassing, and also very detrimental to the stability of its southeastern flank. Second, it was brought home to Turkey that she could use the weapons given her through NATO only against the Soviet Union and with United States approval. In other words, theoretically speaking, Turkey could not be militarily engaged in minor clashes against its non-Soviet sea and land borders. Third, even if she were free to use her military might, Turkey realized that she was actually incapable of executing a beach-landing on Cyprus. For one thing, having "assigned" fifteen out of her seventeen divisions to the command of NATO, she first had to withdraw some of its troops (this was duplicated by Greece). For another, the Navy did not have any lightweight landing gear.

These shortcomings raised previously unconsidered questions. Did NATO meet Turkish defense interests, or was common defense incompatible with national defense requirements?⁹⁴ What were the aims of national defense? Was security the only consideration, or did the furtherance of other national interests and the socio-economic development of the country have to be taken into account? Was it necessary to maintain an unproportionately large army, the third largest in NATO, while being the poorest country within that organization?

Debating the problems of national defense was truly an unprecedented phenomenon in Turkey. With growing awareness of the issues, doubts about the compatibility of NATO and national defense interests increased. These were especially heightened when the guiding strategy of NATO, the "massive retaliation," was abandoned in favor of the "flexible response" principle. The former had envisaged an immediate and all-out response against any Soviet aggression. Due to its exposed frontier position, this was particularly suitable for Turkish defense needs. The new strategy, on the other hand, called for a combination of conventional and nuclear response escalating gradually through several echelons. It

⁹⁴Haluk Ulman, "Turk Ulusal Savunmasi Uzerine Dusunceler" [Thoughts Concerning the Turkish National Defense], Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi (V. xxi, No. 4), pp. 205-213.

was obvious that an attack against the center of NATO would not be countered either slowly or by the use of conventional weapons. It was equally obvious to the Turks that the sparsely populated, mountainous and underdeveloped eastern section of Anatolia would be a much more likely setting for this kind of response. That her territory might be traded against time was a major source of anxiety. Worse, according to Western strategists, the flat lands of eastern Thrace leading to Istanbul and the straits that adjoin the European section of Turkey with the Anatolian mainland were considered indefensible. ". . . in the event of a major Soviet attack NATO planners envisage the abandonment not only of large areas in Eastern Anatolia (the Taurus-Zagros chains lie in the southeast of Turkey), but also of Thrace with Istanbul and the northern Straits areas as well; defense would be concentrated on the Anatolian plateau and the Gallipoli Peninsula."⁹⁵ If that were the aim of its defense strategy, Turkey would have no need to continue with the enormous sacrifices she makes as a NATO member. The question then arises as to whether her interests would not be better served by severing her military ties with NATO. Needless to say, no Turkish government can go along with the defense priorities of NATO mentioned above.

Yet another dimension of anxiety concerning NATO is

⁹⁵Vali, Turkish Straits and NATO, p. 89.

the Turkish observation that in case of an emergency, the defense of the northern and southern outposts of NATO, namely Norway and Turkey, would differ from that of the center, West Germany. "Whereas the center would be defended at its perimeter (forward strategy), the southeast wing (Turkey) would be defended either "in depth"--that is by sacrificing Turkish real estate--or not at all."⁹⁶

These discrepancies between the defense interests of Turkey and NATO still are outstanding problems awaiting solutions. Turkish leaders also show a keen interest in the outcome of the American proposal for a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in mid-Europe. They are mindful of an increase in Soviet forces around their own borders as a possible consequence of such a reduction in Europe.

By convincing the Turks that a) their interests differed from those of the United States, that b) the motives of the latter were suspect, and that c) the military alliance worked better for Washington than for Ankara, the Cyprus crisis has thus marked the beginning of a new stage in Turkish diplomacy best characterized by its increased consciousness of previously unsuspected problems of Turkey.

Normalization of Relations with the Soviet Union

In the fall of 1965, the conservative Justice Party

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 121.

won the elections by a majority. Despite the known pro-American outlook of the party, the government decided to follow the new policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union started a year earlier during the coalition period. In presenting his government's programme to the National Assembly on November 3, 1965, the new prime minister Demirel stated that to be tied to an alliance or ideology did not prevent the development of relations with states belonging to a different alliance or ideology, or with the neutral states who now made up the majority.⁹⁷

The decision to alleviate Turkey's isolation caused by the nonsupport of the United States in the Cyprus affair had prompted Ankara to cultivate its long-neglected ties with Moscow. From 1965 on politicians of both countries exchanged visits. Soviet premier Kosygin's December 1966 trip was returned by Demirel on September 1967. In 1968, Turkish foreign minister Caglayangil returned a previous call by his counterpart, and a year later Turkish president Sunay paid a visit to the Soviet Union. The communiques issued after these exchanges were similar in content. Both sides declared their devotion to the five principles of Bandung, and general disarmament. In addition, there would be references to the situation in Cyprus, Vietnam, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

⁹⁷Arar, Hukumet Programlari, p. 480.

Political detente was reinforced by increased economic cooperation. In 1967, an aid agreement was signed which initiated several major industrial projects in Turkey, and also provided the country with a much needed outlet for its farm goods.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 caused a public outrage in Turkey. Officially, the normalization of the relations continued, but the crushing of the Prague spring certainly raised NATO's credibility in many Turkish eyes.

Turkey's application of the technical clauses of the Montreux Convention regulating the use of the straits by non-Turkish vessels has brought no major complaints from the Soviet Union. According to the Convention, Soviet warships of any size are allowed through the straits provided that they pass singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers, and upon notification of the Turkish government eight to fifteen days prior to passage. On the other hand, non-Black Sea states are limited in the tonnage of war ships they can send to, and the number of days the ships can remain in, the Black Sea. Consequently, one view is that an impetus for revising the Montreux Convention would today come not from the Soviet Union but from the United States.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Haluk Ulman, "Turk Dis Politikasina Yon Veren Etkenler 1923-1968" [Factors Influencing Turkish Foreign Policy, 1923-1968], Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi (V. xxiii, No. 3), pp. 264-266.

The efforts to make the foreign policy more flexible and multilateral have also brought improvements in Turkey's relations with the European members of the Socialist Bloc. From mid-1966 on, the diplomatic traffic between Turkey and Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, and Poland grew dramatically. There were substantial developments in trade, tourism, and cultural fields. Although not to be interpreted in the direction of the Balkan Entente of the 1930s, Turkish diplomacy has definitely embarked upon a policy of active opening in this area after 1966.⁹⁹

New Emphasis on Turkish-Arab Solidarity

The Cyprus crisis was also instrumental in exposing the extent of the rift that had developed between Turkey and many nations of the Moslem world. Despite common historical, religious, and cultural ties, the Arab cooperation with the Western states in the early twentieth century to rebel against the rule of the Ottoman Sultan, the latter's attempts to suppress this movement, the Republican Turkey's total break from its Islamic past, and the close identification of post-1950 Turkish governments with the West which still maintained colonial ties with many Arab peoples were the major factors in shaping Turkish-Arab attitudes. Too, after the initiation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall aid, Turkey

⁹⁹Fahir Armaoglu, "Turk Dis Politikasinda Son Gelismeler" [Recent Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy], Dis Politika (March 1971), p. 11.

had moved swiftly to recognize Israel with whom she had come to enjoy mutually satisfactory trade relations by mid-sixties. The Arab displeasure with Turkish foreign policy was demonstrated not only in the United Nations debates on Cyprus, but also in the summit meetings of the non-aligned Third World states. Commenting on his countries relations with Turkey, the Syrian foreign minister stated the problem clearly in 1965: "Our attitude is related to Turkey's relations with Israel. If Turkey insists on not giving a sincere form to these relations, it would be difficult to establish desired relations between Turkey and Syria."¹⁰⁰ Similarly, the Tunisian president Bourguiba reminded Turkey, during his visit in 1965, that "First of all, Turkey should try to understand the problems of the Arab countries and consider what problems, after having passed the phase of colonialism, these countries have faced and are facing. . . Turkey should put all her weight with the Arab countries and thus make herself accepted."¹⁰¹

Having received the message, Ankara started to reshape its Middle Eastern policy. This was especially easy for the new government of Demirel which assumed power in 1965 by the support of the conservative and religious rural masses

¹⁰⁰Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1965, p. 246.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 232.

of Anatolia. Presenting the program of the government to the National Assembly, Demirel announced that all diplomatic representations have been mutually upgraded to highest levels, and that the Arab countries could rely on Turkey's understanding and support in their legitimate cause.¹⁰²

The 1967 Arab-Israeli war provided Turkey with its first opportunity to display its new policy. The Egyptian paper El Ahram reported that Turkey will not let the United States use her bases, and that she would not mass troops at the Syrian border.¹⁰³ Prime minister Demirel called for Israeli withdrawal and strongly denounced the forceful acquisition of territory by Israel.

Reaction from the Arab world was immediate and favorable, accompanied by top level exchanges. To have their president pay a visit, in 1968 to Saudi Arabia including the holy Mecca was a unique sight for the Turkish people. The numerous joint communiques recorded Turkey's opposition to the use of force as a means of securing political advantages and territorial gains, and the use of such gains to impose unilateral solutions. Israel was asked to withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories. In return, the

¹⁰²Arar, Hukümet Programlari, p. 482.

¹⁰³New York Times, 31 May 1967.

Arab states emphasized adherence to international commitments, and expressed hope for a just solution based upon the legitimate rights and interests of the two Cypriot communities.¹⁰⁴

Turkey, upon being invited, attended the 1968 International Islamic Conference in Rawalpindi, and the 1969 Islamic Summit in Morocco. The latter presented Turkey with the difficult choice of attending the Summit and having to take a position satisfactory to both sides in a probable clash between the progressive and the conservative elements, or not to attend the Summit and risk offending the Arab and other Moslem states.

Indeed, the Turkish-Arab detente was not without its problems. While eager to improve its standing, Turkey refused to modify some of her policies which she deemed to be in her interest. Despite much pressuring from the United Arab Republic in the 1969 Islamic Summit, Turkey did not adopt a more militant policy toward Israel and sever diplomatic relations. Likewise, when the Economic Council of the Arab League adopted a resolution recommending that Turkey replace Israel with Arab countries in her foreign trade, foreign minister Caglayangil stated that his country would be pleased to improve economic relations with Arab countries.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴Chronology, the Institute of International Relations, University of Ankara, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1968 (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1971), pp. 143, 144, 145, 147, 149, 151.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 152.

On another issue, Turkey indicated her concern for the Israeli position on the status of Jerusalem and the plight of the refugees, but saw these as of interest to the whole world, separated from political problems. Ankara was also determined to stay out of strictly inter-Arab conflicts such as those involving the future of the Persian Gulf, or the civil war in Yemen. Further, her secularist tradition as well as the newly found flexibility in her foreign policy made Turkey reluctant to approve of plans seeking to establish a coordinating organization among Islamic nations. In 1968, a proposal by the president of Somali to set up an Islamic Union to examine the military and diplomatic aspects of problems facing the Moslem world drew a cold response from the Turkish foreign minister who stated that no alliance was necessary among the Moslem states.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, in the foreign ministerial conference of Islamic countries in March 1970 Turkey declined to support an initiative calling for a permanent secretariat for Islamic nations.

Outside of these differences, though, the Turkish determination to be more considerate of Arab feeling was once again demonstrated during the critical weeks of warfare between Jordan and the Palestinian guerillas. The latter were openly aided by Syria, but Turkey managed to support Jordan without causing ill-feelings in Syria.¹⁰⁷ It was

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 147, p. 150.

¹⁰⁷ Omer Kurkcuoglu, "Turkey's Middle East Policy", Foreign Policy (June 1971), p. 96.

reported that Turkey, along with Greece, Italy, and Spain had refused to allow American flights to operate from their soil during the Jordanian crisis.¹⁰⁸

With the North African Arab states of Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia, and Libya, Turkey enjoyed good relations. How far she had come in gaining the sympathies of the Arab world was shown at the September 1970 Summit of Non-Aligned Nations. Unlike the 1964 meeting in Cairo, this one not only refused to endorse a pro-Greek recommendation pushed by Makarios, but his fait accompli of having the proposal at least read before the adjournment of the meeting drew wide protests from the Arabs. Turkish diplomacy could take full credit for achieving such results in a matter of six years.

Modifications in Policy Toward Non-Aligned States

The endorsement of the pro-Cypriot Greek resolution in December 1965 by the General Assembly may be viewed as an important turning point in Turkish attitudes toward that body and its main group of constituents, the Third World states. These states, a majority of which were formed out of the continually shifting political lines within Africa, not only sponsored the "independence" and "non-interference" oriented resolution, but in so doing disregarded the implication of nonsupport for the "respect for international treaties

¹⁰⁸New York Times, 1 December 1970.

and human rights" position of Turkey.

Until this event, Turkish perceptions of the United Nations were marked by sympathetic identification with the principles of the Charter, and, at the same time, a realistically low estimate of the political effectiveness of the organization. Turkey had failed dismally in appreciating the changes brought by the sixties: the insecurity felt by the newly independent entities, their resentment of their recent colonial rulers, their desire to find international acceptance, and the importance of the General Assembly as a world forum providing them with an opportunity to express their opinions, and a vote equal in weight to anybody else's. By actively utilizing the mechanisms of this egalitarian political body, they had obliged the others to pay closer attention to it. In the process, the General Assembly had become a genuine mirror of world public opinion.

These changes as well as the gap in Turkey's perception of them were manifested to her in the diplomatic isolation the 1965 vote represented. Twenty-eight African, seven Asian, and nine Latin American countries had supported the resolution.

Resolved to recuperate from this alienated position, Turkey decided to increase its presence in the capitols of these countries, and also to pay closer attention to the issues concerning them in the United Nations. Denouncing

colonialism and racism, the Demirel government of 1965 reaffirmed its allegiance to the United Nations Charter and the principles of the Bandung Conference, and indicated that Turkey should introduce its experiences and thoughts to these aspiring nations.¹⁰⁹ In the years to follow, there were significant increases in cultural, commercial and touristic exchanges between Turkey and the Arab world, but only minor advances as far as the more distant African, Asian, and Latin American states were concerned. First of all, the best diplomatic efforts of Turkey were spent on Cyprus until 1968, and on the problems inherent in her ties with the West after that. Secondly, the financial resources of the country could accommodate the burden of increased representation abroad only up to a certain limit. The foreign ministry tried to help the situation by accrediting one ambassador to more than one country. A similar measure was the visit of the ambassadors of thirteen African states accredited to Cairo as official guests of the Turkish government.

Taking a more active role in the deliberations of the United Nations, on the other hand, did not entail a heavy financial drain on the resources of the country. Her unique position of being a member of both the Western and the Asian Groups afforded her a measure of added flexibility. The

¹⁰⁹Arar, Hukumet Programlari, p. 482.

Asian Group membership in turn enabled Turkey to be a member of the Afro-Asian Group, the largest and most influential in the United Nations, although she was not a member of the original Group of 77 composed of the developing countries, and established after the Cairo Declaration of July 1962 in relation with the First Development Decade and the Conference on Trade and Development.¹¹⁰

The Committee in which Turkey was most active is the Fourth or the Trusteeship Committee. Also called the Committee on Decolonization, it deals with the question of Namibia (Southwest Africa), the territories under Portuguese administration, Southern Rhodesia, activities of foreign economic and other interests impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, educational and training programs for Southern Africa, the numerous non-self governing territories scattered around the globe. Turkey had been a co-sponsor of the important Declaration on Decolonialization in the 1960 session of the United Nations, and had complied fully with the economic sanctions brought by the Security Council against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia. More recently, since its inception in 1967, she has been an active member of the Council for Namibia.

¹¹⁰Yuksel Soylemez, Foreign Policy of Turkey at the United Nations 1966-1972 (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press, 1973), p. x.

Since 1966, the Turkish vote on the issues relating to the Fourth Committee's work has shown a definite pattern. In 1966, Turkey cosponsored with other Afro-Asian delegations a draft resolution [A/L 483], calling on the United Nations to take over the mandate given to South Africa to administer Southwest Africa.¹¹¹ In 1968, she voted with the Third World group in condemning governments with relations to South Africa.¹¹²

Since 1962, problems of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, all territories under Portuguese administration, have been discussed in the Fourth Committee. Turkey supported the freedom and independence of these peoples in principle, but when the draft resolutions condemned the role of NATO allies in encouraging Portugal, Turkey abstained in the 1966 and 1967 votes. This was a middle of the road position between the Third World and a typical grouping of the ex-colonial countries of Europe and the United States.

In votes concerning the trust territories of Nauru, New Guinea, the non-self-governing territory of Papau, the decolonialization of French Somaliland, Ifni, the Spanish Sahara, Equatorial Guinea, and the problem of apartheid in

¹¹¹United Nations, General Assembly, 21st Session, Official Records of the 1419th Plenary Meeting, 27 September 1966, p. 22.

¹¹²United Nations, General Assembly, 23rd Session, Official Records of the 1671st Plenary Meeting, 12 June 1968, p. 7.

Southern Rhodesia, the United Nations blocs have voted in strikingly consistent patterns. One example suffices to make the point. In the twenty-second session (1967), the resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee [A/6884] to denounce the government of Southern Rhodesia, was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of ninety-two to two with eighteen abstentions. Members of the Third World and Turkey made up the ninety-two favoring the resolution: Portugal and South Africa were against it, and Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Great Britain, United States, Sweden, and Norway were among the eighteen that abstained.¹¹³

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkey has repeatedly denounced Israel and endorsed the November 22, 1967 resolution of the Security Council calling for the withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab territories. She has sponsored the Jerusalem Resolution of May 1968 opposing the incorporation of the whole city of Jerusalem into Israel. Except for France and Greece, her votes on this issue differed considerably from those of her other NATO allies.¹¹⁴

Likewise, with regards to the Vietnam war, Turkey has repeatedly pleaded for an end to the suffering of these peoples, and endorsed the 1954 Geneva Accords as a basis for

¹¹³United Nations, General Assembly, 22nd Session, Official Records of the 1594th Meeting: Fourth Committee, 3 November 1967, p. 4.

¹¹⁴Francis Beer, Integration and Disintegration in NATO (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 26-27.

agreement.

On the other hand, Turkey has voted with the West in rejecting Peking as the representative of China, in maintaining United Nations troops in South Korea, and in supporting measured toward general disarmament.

Recently, Ankara has shown an interest in economic and social cooperation between the industrialized and developing countries. In the twenty-fifth session (1970), foreign minister Caglayangil was critical of the rate of growth proposed in the international development strategy in relation with the forthcoming inauguration of the Second Development Decade. At the same time he expressed concern about the effects of progress on the balance of nature.¹¹⁵

In the same session, Turkey proposed the establishment of a new machinery within the United Nations to rapidly organize assistance and materiel to countries stricken with natural disasters. According to the Turkish delegate, such a central and computerized agency would not only be able to deal with the crisis situations more efficiently in cutting out duplicate and unusable aid, but also would avoid the charges of propaganda involved in aid extended by some of the industrialized countries to developing ones. In the Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural problems), more than fifty states joined the Turkish proposal, and it was a-

¹¹⁵ United Nations, General Assembly, 25th Session, Official Records of the 1849th Meeting, 24 September 1970, pp. 33-55.

dopted by the General Assembly.

The active participation of Turkey in many ad-hoc committees, sub-committees, and drafting committees, her election to boards and councils have helped her to establish herself in the mainstream of the United Nations politics.¹¹⁶ The non-aligned countries' 1965 vote on Cyprus has induced Turkey to change her image in the United Nations from non-committal aloofness to active participation. Since then, she has become a steady supporter of the Third World regardless of the stance taken by her Western allies. In turn, this policy has helped to enhance her respectability.

¹¹⁶Soylomez, Turkey at the United Nations, p. xii.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapters demonstrated the pattern of change within Turkish foreign policy over a period of twenty-five years. While the Cyprus crisis of the mid-sixties, in so far as it led to the Johnson letter (informing Turkey that she could neither utilize the weapons given her by the United States without American approval nor could count upon NATO assistance in case of a Soviet attack) and the General Assembly vote of 1965 (indicating the extent of the alienation that confronted Turkey, was the external factor immediately responsible for a change of course within Turkey's foreign policy, the foregoing analysis aimed to explain the underlying complex interaction between the domestic and foreign policy developments that led up to the climatic events of Cyprus.

The domestic politics of Turkey has evolved from the one party authoritarian regime of the first thirty years of the Republic (1920-1950), through the two-party struggles of the fifties to the multi-party liberalism of the sixties. If it is possible to point to four events and episodes as the most influential in shaping the political culture of the country during the fifties and the sixties, the first one would be the peaceful transfer of power, in

1950, from the Republican Peoples Party to the newly formed Democratic Party as a result of the first elections ever held in the country. The Republican Party had been founded by Ataturk, and upon his death, Ismet Inonu, the much respected "pasha" and seasoned diplomat of Ataturk's cadre, who had then taken over the administration of the state, and the secretary-generalship of the party. After thirty years of non-competition, the party lost heavily in 1950 to the four-year old Democratic Party of Menderes. Much to the astonishment and admiration of his countrymen, Inonu did not resort to any measures to challenge the termination of his rule, and calmly assumed the leadership of the opposition. It was a valuable lesson in the procedures of democracy; but more importantly, it signified an acceptance of the existence of view points different than those pronounced by the official authorities, of their viability, and of the rights of others to hold them. Altogether, it contrasted uniquely with the past political traditions of the country.

However, lessons on democracy seemed to have been lost on the Menderes regime. After reelection in 1954, the Democratic Party government initiated a reign of oppression aimed at smothering its main political opponent, the Republican Peoples Party, and restricting the independence as well as the power of such groups and institutions as the press, the universities, the bureaucracy, and the National Assembly.

The resulting polarization of the political scene was only worsened by the irresponsible determination of Menderes to exploit religion for partisan purposes by dangerously compromising the secularist outlook of the country. Moreover, by the end of the fifties, the economy had come to a standstill as a result of the unplanned and non-production oriented spending of Menderes, and the inflationary deficit financing that sustained it. This somber sight of a popular political party making a brilliant start with promises of political and economic liberalization, then becoming ruthless oppressors and dragging the country to the brink of disaster was certainly an important episode in Turkish politics. Another dimension that should be immediately mentioned is the American role vis-a-vis the Menderes regime. It must be borne in mind that the Menderes regime not only enjoyed the political "patronage" of the United States, but it also was encouraged to manage the economy according to the approved capitalistic model. When that failed, the government was bailed out by huge loans from the American friend. And yet the United States kept silent as Menderes scrapped political freedoms. This American refusal to use its enormous influence on the Turkish Democratic Party leaders to restrain their political and economic recklessness was one of the first germs of anti-Americanism planted by the Americans themselves.

The third event carrying major political significance was the army revolution of May 1960, and the trials of the

deposed political leaders. The coup was aimed at arresting the political polarization approaching civil strife, and the economic unrest. The revolutionary officers took pains to clarify that the movement was not seeking to affect changes within Turkish foreign policy, and was not directed against Turkey's allies. While this was undoubtedly true, it could not have escaped thoughtful observers that the United States had approved and supported wholeheartedly the policies of a regime whose entire leadership was now being held to account for their previous deeds. Thus, while not meant nor perceived to do so by the Turks at the time, the coup, nevertheless, contained an implicit critique of the Turkish-American liasion.

With their revelations of abuses by and the human frailties of once powerful national figures, the trials provided unusual drama in the flow of politics. But more importantly, millions witnessed a process in which the political leadership of a decade was asked to justify the compatibility of many of their decisions and non-decisions with the law of the land in particular, and with the best interests of the nation in general. If the events of the 1950 elections underlined the plurality of interests and views within a country, the 1960 revolution contained implicitly the concept of accountability, and the norm of domestic interests of the country.

The fourth major domestic development of the era in

study, the constitution of 1961 was a direct consequence of the revolution. Determined to modify the system which allowed the previous regime to exploit it for partisan purposes, the National Unity Committee, composed entirely of revolutionary officers, asked a group of respected scholars to draft a constitution. The new document introduced such legal-political institutions and procedures as the upper house (Senate), the Constitutional Court, the State Planning Organization, and an electoral system based on proportional representation. Possessing a pronouncedly liberal character, it strengthened the fundamental rights of the individual and incorporated the idea of the welfare state. Apart from bringing these needed changes, however, the constitution of 1961 is significant for two other reasons. First, although drafted by professors, essentially it embodied the aspirations of a revolutionary group of relatively low-ranking young army officers, reflecting the spirit and direction of progress they envisioned for their country. Second, in fostering a genuine atmosphere of freedom it generated an outburst of public and academic discussions, and a torrent of new publications. A new taste for the critical appraisal of previously little considered issues, such as the means of development best suited for Turkey, in its turn prepared the ground for the concern for and the arguments about the foreign policy of Turkey that were to be manifested in a couple of years.

Unlike the domestic developments which evolved through several phases, the foreign policy of Turkey since the end of the second World War has been consistent in its cooperation with the West. The previous neutrality had to be abandoned due to the necessity of resisting Soviet pressures in the long-run. In particular, Turkey sought to shelter of the American military might in order to counter the Soviet threat. If security and survival were the main consideration in determining Turkish interest in an alliance with the United States, equally important was the hope of securing aid toward the economic development of the country. The United States and Europe, on the other hand, had their own military and political interests in mind in extending aid to Turkey in 1947, and in accepting her as a member of the Council of Europe in 1949, and of NATO in 1952. Eager to secure such assistance, Turkish leaders often neglected to examine important aspects of this alliance with such results as the burden of maintaining an unusually large army, and the numerous advantages and privileges given to the United States in a series of bilateral agreements.

Apart from the fact that not every consequence of cooperation based on mutual needs was beneficial to Turkey, there were other components of the Turkish-American collaboration that did not have their basis in Turkey's needs, and in fact, were clearly detrimental to Turkish interests. By agreeing to assume a leading position in the creation of

CENTO in 1955, Turkey acquired the image of the regional spokesman for American and British interests in the Middle East. This was only worsened when Turkey politically endorsed, and militarily assisted the American intervention in the domestic politics of Lebanon in 1958. By the end of the fifties, Turkey had won the enmity of the Arab world not because she had any contentions with them, but because she had demonstrated an appalling unconcern for their problems and opinions vis-a-vis the Western states.

Turkey followed a similarly short-sighted policy toward the non-aligned countries of the world. For the sake of the American friendship, she again assumed an unnecessarily active role in defense of the Western alliance. Self-righteous in the conviction that no state could stay neutral in a bipolar world, she generally belittled those that were trying to pursue such a policy.

In trying to seek alliances with the West to lessen the disadvantages of their exposed location, Turkish leaders did not hesitate to embark upon measures that were bound to be irritating to the Soviets. Providing the latter's main rival with loosely restricted military privileges was a provocative policy reflecting a lack of consideration for the long-term interests of the state. Fortunately for the Turks, after 1953, the Soviet leadership initiated a peace offensive which, in the case of Turkey, sought to reassure Ankara that the Soviets had renounced their previous terri-

torial claims. Regrettably, due to dogmatic views that world peace was indivisible, and that the security needs of Turkey were identical with, and could not be separated from those of NATO, Turkish politicians failed to take advantage of the new tone in Moscow.

During the 1960s Turkish foreign policy underwent considerable changes, but in the years before the Cyprus crisis these were rather unpronounced as compared to the later years.

Acting as a catalyst as far as its effects on foreign policy are concerned, the Cyprus crisis arose as a result of the breakdown of the political and administrative system foreseen by the 1960 constitution of the island. Never seriously applied, the complex network of checks and balances designed to protect the rights of the Turkish community were officially challenged in a series of thirteen proposals by the Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios. In no time, the rapidly worsening political situation turned into open and violent attacks against the Cypriot Turks who were outnumbered five to one. The intensity of fighting and the losses suffered were highest in 1964 and again in 1967.

The Turkish government in Ankara could not remain indifferent to the physical attrition of its compatriots in this strategically located island. On several occasions between 1964 and 1967, Turkey considered a limited landing operation on Cyprus. She was prevented from doing so by the

blunt reminder from the United States president that in order to utilize her American-supplied weapons Turkey needed to secure the approval of that country. At the same time, Turkey realized that she actually did not possess the landing equipment her navy would have needed. Thus, she was completely frustrated in her attempt to influence the situation in Cyprus by the interference of the United States. The ensuing disillusionment with regard to the Americans were only enhanced as the Cyprus question was discussed in the United Nations. There, Turkey realized that she did not have the political support of a considerable majority of nations mainly due to the past record of its excessively pro-American foreign policy.

There were inklings of change in Turkey's foreign policy before the Cyprus conflict. Both the revolutionary committee and the following coalition governments exhibited interest in a cautious relaxation of fridity toward the Soviet Union. The latter had renewed its offer of rapprochement, and the two sides proceeded on the basis of complete recognition of Turkey's existing international commitments. A parliamentary delegation visited Moscow in 1963, and despite the warm reception the Turks warned their hosts that no immediate and important progress could be possible between the two states. With the sudden outburst of the Cyprus crisis, and the ensuing Turkish disappointment over the letter from the American president, the improvement of Turkish-Soviet

relations took a dramatic turn. The foreign minister's visit in 1964 brought forth a change in Moscow's pro-Makarios attitude, coupled with an endorsement of the Turkish emphasis on respect for the 1960 Cyprus treaties which not only established the new state, but also devised a system protective of the rights of the Turkish community on the island and allowed Turkey, Greece, and Britain to intervene in case of an abuse of the system.

Frequent and top-level contacts between the political leadership of the two countries hastened the thaw. In return for the Soviet understanding of her position on Cyprus, Turkey decided to withdraw its support from the NATO project establishing a multilateral force in the Mediterranean, and also moved closer to the Soviet stance in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Vietnam war.

The political detente was reinforced by economic cooperation as an aid agreement initiated several industrial investment projects by the Soviets, and provided for Turkish export of agricultural products. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 must have supplied a pessimistic note to the constant search for the real motives of the Soviets; nevertheless, the two countries had completely normalized their relationship by the end of the decade.

Between 1960-1970, Turkish attitudes toward long-time neutrals, newly independent non-bloc countries, and those striving for independence also underwent a metamorphosis in

a similar pattern. In the early sixties, this change was characterized by an enhanced awareness of and identification with the numerous problems of the developing nations. Turkey sympathized with and assisted the Algerian nationalists, but mostly, the new consciousness was reflected in verbal official elaborations.

After the Cyprus episode, however, Ankara intensified its efforts toward the Third World. Although trade and cultural exchanges between Turkey and some distant African and Asian states increased, in this respect Turkey was limited by its own financial restrictions. Progress was most dramatic in the case of the Middle Eastern and North African Arab states. Diplomatic representations were mutually upgraded to highest levels along with presidential and ministerial visits as Turkey adopted a decidedly pro-Arab behavior in the 1967 war with Israel. While Turkey was rewarded by the generous political support of the Arabs, she stopped short of severing its political and mutually beneficial commercial ties with Israel. By the end of the sixties, Turkey had become a friend of the Arabs, attending the Islamic summits, and had acquired the Arab support in the meetings of the non-aligned states.

All these changes in Turkish foreign policy were reflected in the United Nations during the same period. Just as the general policy was lopsided in favor of the United States and the West, the Turkish participation in the United

Nations manifested an unnecessarily excessive concern for the interests of her NATO allies and the United States. Apart from supporting the West on issues relating to the inter-bloc rivalry (disarmament, regulation of armaments, Korea, Greece, admission of new members), her vote consistently favored the colonial, advanced West over the anti-colonial, underdeveloped Asian, Arab, and African states in such issues as the right of all peoples to self-determination, the question of the French North African protectorates, race conflict in the Union of South Africa, and Portuguese colonial enclaves in the Indian subcontinent.

In the 1965 vote of the General Assembly over the Cyprus conflict, Turkey realized that her previous attitudes toward the Third World had systematically alienated her from this influential group in the United Nations. Resolved to redress this diplomatic isolation, and also taking advantage of her unique position of being a member of both the Western and the Asian Groups, Turkey assumed an active role in the general deliberations of the Trusteeship Committee, and the Council for Southwest Africa. In contrast to the Western states, including almost all of her NATO allies, which either voted against or abstained from resolutions relating to the territories under Portuguese administration, apartheid in Rhodesia, censoring of South Africa, and the status of the numerous non-self-governing territories scattered around the globe, Turkey systematically cast her

vote with the Third World countries. Thus, by 1970, Turkey had definitely left behind her previous noncommittal aloofness, and managed to locate herself in the mainstream of the United Nations politics.

To sum up, we can conclude that in the years covering her alliance with the West, Turkish foreign policy suffered from several crucial fallacies and omissions. First, despite the legacy of the Ottoman political traditions, and the excellent example of neutrality under Ataturk, Turkey committed the cardinal error of relying exclusively on one state, the United States, in its post-World War II policy. Second, she failed to evaluate the interests of the United States in this partnership, and used poor judgment in balancing what its own best interests required with what and how much to be given to the United States. Third, she repeated the same mistakes in relation to her ties with NATO. Fourth, Turkey neglected to determine precisely the terms of her numerous agreements with the United States and NATO. Fifth, she did not calculate the costs involved in exclusive reliance on the United States and the West for the rest of her relationships with other countries. Sixth, Turkey failed to analyze international politics from a larger, less self-oriented point of view, and therefore, to detect the changes and emerging new patterns. And finally, she failed to appreciate the grievances and problems of those

states with which she was not allies.

On the basis of this performance, the Cyprus affair, in so far as it led to the Johnson letter, and the 1965 General Assembly vote, must be regarded more as a blessing than a defeat. It was the disappointment and the frustration she was confronted with that prompted Turkey to cast off somnolence, and affect the changes and modifications that her foreign policy badly needed.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971.
- Arar, Ismail. Hukümet Programları 1920-1965 [Government Programs 1920-1965]. Istanbul: Burcak Yayınevi, 1968.
- Armaoglu, Fahir. Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959 [The Cyprus Question 1954-1959]. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1963.
- Ataov, Turkkaya. NATO and Turkey. Ankara: Sevinç Printing House, 1970.
- Avcioglu, Dogan. Türkiye'nin Düzeni [The Order in Turkey]. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968.
- Beer, Francis. Integration and Disintegration in NATO. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1969.
- Berkes, Niyazi. Development of Secularism in Turkey. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964.
- Campbell, John. Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958.
- Dodd, C. N. Politics and Government in Turkey. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
- Esmer, Ahmet; Bilge, S., Gönülbul, M.; Sander, O.; Sar, C.; Sezer, D.; Ülman, H. Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1965 [Events of the Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-1965]. Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969.
- Frey, Frederick. The Turkish Political Elite. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965.
- Gibbons, Scott. Peace Without Honor. Ankara: ADA Publishing House, 1969.
- Gönülbul, Mehmet. Turkish Participation in the United Nations 1945-1954. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1965.
- Halil, Ali. Atatürkçü Dış Politika ve NATO ve Türkiye [Atatürkist Foreign Policy and NATO and Turkey]. Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1968.

- Harris, George. Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945-1971. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972.
- Information Office, Turkish Views on the Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus. Washington, D.C.: Turkish Embassy, 1965.
- Institute of International Relations of the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Ankara, Turkey and the United Nations. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1961.
- Karpat, Kemal. Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959.
- Kili, Suna. Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961. Istanbul: Robert College Research Center, 1971.
- Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Linda, Miller. Cyprus: The Law and Politics of Civil Strife. Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1968.
- Ozbudun, Ergun. The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics. Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
- Soysal, Ismail. Turkiye'nin Dis Munasebetleriyle Ilgili Baslica Siyasi Andlasmalari [The Major Political Agreements Concerning Turkey's].
- Stephens, Robert. Cyprus: A Place of Arms. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.
- Soylezmez, Yuksel. Foreign Policy of Turkey at the United Nations 1966-1972. Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press, 1973.
- Tuncakanat, Haydar. Ikili Anlasmalarin Icyuzu [Inside Information on the Bilateral Agreements]. Ankara: Ekim Yaynevi, 1969.
- Vali, Ferenc. Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.

Vali, Ferenc. The Turkish Straits and NATO. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972.

Weiker, Walter. The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963.

Articles

Armaoglu, Fahir. "Turkey and the United States: A New Alliance." The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1965, Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1968.

_____. "Turk Dis Politikasinda Son Gelismeler" [Recent Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy]. Dis Politika (March 1971), pp. 7-15.

Denktas, Rauf. "The Cyprus Problem." Foreign Policy (March 1971), pp. 95-100.

Gonlubol, Mehmet. "Ataturk Devrinde Turkiye'nin Dis Politikasi" [Turkish Foreign Policy During the Ataturk Era]. The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1961, Ankara: Ajans-Turk Press, 1963.

Harris, George. "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics." The Middle East Journal (Winter 1965, Spring 1965), pp. 54-66, pp. 169-176.

Heinze, Christian. "The Cyprus Conflict: The Western Peace System is Put to the Test." The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1963, Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1965.

Karpat, Kemal. "Ideology in Turkey After the Revolution of 1960." The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1965, Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1968.

Kurkcuoglu, Omer. "Turkey's Middle East Policy." Foreign Policy (June 1971), pp. 93-99.

Olca, Osman. "Turkey's Foreign Policy." Foreign Policy (June 1971), pp. 79-84.

Tamkoc, Metin. "Turkey's Quest for Security Through Defensive Alliances." The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1961, Ankara: Ajans-Turk Press, 1963.

Ulman, Haluk and Dekmejian, R. H. "Changing Patterns of Turkish Foreign Policy 1959-1967." The Middle East Journal (Fall 1967), pp. 772-785.

_____ and Tachau, Frank. "The Attempt to Reconcile Rapid Modernization with Democracy." The Middle East Journal (Spring 1965), pp. 153-168.

_____. "Turk Dis Politikasina Yon Veren Etkenler 1923-1968" [Factors Influencing Turkish Foreign Policy 1923-1968]. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi (V. xxiii, No. 3), pp. 241-273.

_____. "Turk Ulusal Savunmasi Uzerine Dusunceler" [Thoughts Concerning Turkish National Defense]. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi (V. xxi, No. 4), pp. 197-225.

Periodicals and Newspapers

Dis Politika (Foreign Policy)

The Middle East Journal

Orbis

Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi (Journal of the Department of Political Science)

The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations

The New York Times

Official Publications and Public Documents

Documents in The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1960-1970.

United Nations, General Assembly Official Records, 1960-1970.

United Nations, Security Council Official Records, 1960-1970.

U.S. Congress. House. Report by the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services on the Military and Political Problems in Spain, Italy, Libya, Turkey, and Iran. 91st Cong., 1970.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Part 7: Greece and Turkey. 91st Cong., 1970.



