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## Political and social structures as determinants of voter participation : a comparative study of American cities.

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
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POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES AS DETERMINANTS  
OF VOTER PARTICIPATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF  
AMERICAN CITIES

A Dissertation Presented

By

C. VERNON GRAY

In partial fulfillment of the requirements  
of the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts  
for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

July 1971

Subject: Political Science



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
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
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July 1971

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES AS DETERMINANTS  
OF VOTER PARTICIPATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF  
AMERICAN CITIES

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ABSTRACT

**Hypotheses**

The basic hypothesis of this study is that form of government, type of electoral system and socio-economic characteristics influence voter turnout rates. The forms of government used as the basis for analysis in this study are the mayor-council and the council-manager. The commission form of local government has been omitted because there were too few commission cities in the sample to prove of value in the analysis. The types of electoral system are partisan and nonpartisan. The legal definition for nonpartisan and partisan is utilized, i.e., whether or not the party affiliation of the candidate appears on the ballot, not whether there exists any actual party activity. The socio-economic characteristics are divided into three categories: (1) population growth and mobility, (2) population homogeneity, and (3) social class. Population growth and mobility refer to percent population change 1950-60 and percent of migrants from different county, respectively. Population homogeneity refers to the

percent of non-whites, and ethnicity (proportion of foreign-born persons and percent of persons of foreign and mixed parentage). Social class refers to occupation, education, homeownership, and income.<sup>1</sup>

### Subsidiary Hypotheses

A related subsidiary hypothesis of this study is that form of government is related to socio-economic characteristics.<sup>2</sup> Because earlier studies have found varied relationship existing between form of government and socio-economic environment, it is necessary to re-examine their findings as form of government and socio-economic characteristics are both hypothesized as being related to voter turnout. Consequently, a clearer understanding of the relationship between voter turnout and form of government and socio-economic characteristics should be provided.

Thus, the following are subsidiary hypotheses to be investigated:

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<sup>1</sup>For relevant material on participation of social class, see Edgar Sherbenou, "Class, Participation and the Council-Manager Plan," Public Administration Review, 21 (Summer, 1961), 131-135; Robert Alford, "The Role of Social Class in American Voting Behavior," Western Political Quarterly, 26 (March, 1963), 180-194; and Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Sources of Local Political Involvement," American Sociological Review (December, 1968).

<sup>2</sup>John Kessel, "Government Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about American Cities," American Political Science Review, 56 (September, 1962), 615-620; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-economic Characteristics of Suburbs," Administrative Science Quarterly, 8 (June, 1963), 1-17; Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political and Socio-economic Characteristics of Cities," Municipal Year Book, (Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1965).



1. Manager governments are likely to manifest a more rapid population growth and population mobility than mayor-council governments.
2. Manager governments more than mayor-council governments are likely to have a higher percentage of college-educated persons, a higher percentage of white-collar workers, a lower percentage of persons earning \$3,000 or less, a higher percentage of persons earning \$10,000 or more, and a higher percentage of homeowners.
3. Mayor-council governments are likely to be located in communities with higher non-white and a higher ethnic population than manager governments.

#### Basic Hypothesis

Subsequent to the analysis of the above subsidiary hypotheses, the basic hypothesized relationship between voter turnout and form of government, electoral system and socio-economic characteristics will be investigated. The specific propositions are:

1. The mayor-council form of government is more likely to encourage and witness greater voter participation and turnout than manager governments.<sup>3</sup>
2. Voter turnout is likely to be greater where partisan elections exist than where nonpartisan elections take place. Thus, nonpartisanship has the tendency to reduce voter turnout.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960); and Lee and Alford, op. cit.

<sup>4</sup>Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship, op. cit.

3. Voter turnout is likely to be greater where partisan elections are combined with the mayor-council form of government than where other combinations of electoral systems and forms of government exist.<sup>5</sup>
4. Cities with rapid population growth and high mobility will experience low voter turnout.
5. Voter turnout is likely to increase in cities as the percentage of well-educated (college) persons in the population increases.
6. Voter turnout is likely to be higher in those cities with a higher percentage of white-collar employees, homeowners, and a higher percentage of high income persons than in cities with high percentages of opposite characteristics.
7. Voter turnout is likely to be low in cities with a high percentage of non-white population.
8. Voter turnout is likely to be low in cities with high ethnic population (i.e., foreign born and population of native-mixed parentage).

## Methodology

This study is an offshoot of a larger, more comprehensive study.<sup>6</sup>

Although the present study is a study of voter turnout in American cities, all cities in the United States are not a part of this analysis. A random sample of cities in four states was drawn. These four states are California, Illinois, New York and Texas. These particular states were chosen because: (1) each has a large number of cities with over 100,000 population; and because (2) they

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<sup>5</sup>Lee and Alford, *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voting Turnout in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 62 (September, 1968), 796.

represent different regions of the country, i.e., the Far West, North Central, Northeast and South, respectively. This does not mean, necessarily, that each state is "representative" of other states in that region.

The cities range in population size from 5,000 to 250,000. To facilitate the collection of data they were categorized in population ranges of 5,000-10,000, 10,001-50,000, and 50,001-250,000. In each of these categories a maximum sample of 75 cities was drawn. In cases where the maximum sample could not be drawn, all cities for that population size were utilized. The total number of cities came to 558, from which data for cities were able to be included in the actual study.

This study was undertaken to explore further the phenomenon of voter turnout in municipal elections. The attempt has been to analyze certain forms of government and socio-economic characteristics which may act as stimulants or determinants and inhibitors to municipal voter turnout. Most of the previous studies on voter turnout have been conducted on national elections; therefore many of the assumptions concerning causal elements of turnout were derived from such studies. However, a few studies have investigated voter turnout locally with similar assumptions as a basis. This study not only investigated and tested previous assumptions about the local electorate, but introduced region as an intervening variable. In most cases, the findings confirm those of earlier works, but in some cases they differ.



Generally speaking, socio-economic characteristics were insignificant in positively affecting the level of voter turnout in municipal elections. In every instance, they accounted for well below 50 percent of the variation of turnout in all cities. But within the limited parameters of accountable variation, some pertinent associations between such socio-economic characteristics and turnout developed. Following are some conclusions resulting from the analysis of socio-economic characteristics:

1. A rapidly growing population led to a reduce voter turnout.
2. Cities with a highly mobile population did not necessarily experience low voter turnout.
3. Cities with a higher percentage of well-educated persons did not necessarily have a larger turnout than cities with a high percentage of less-well-educated persons. In general, education (well educated and less well educated) decreased coter turnout. In mayor-council cities, however, a large less-wll-educated population reduced turnout.
4. Basically, a high percentage of white collar workers and homeowners, factors normally associated with high voter turnout, had a negative effect upon turnout. Income (high and low) resulted in increased turnout.
5. Cities with a large non-white population did not necessarily have low voter turnout. But in manager cities, non-white population was negatively related to turnout, while in mayor-council cities a large non-white population increased turnout, especially in mayor-council partisan cities in the Northeast and North Central.

6. Ethnicity (i.e., foreign-born and native-mixed parentage persons) in large proportions in the population led to increased turnout in elections. Also, a substantial foreign-born and native-mixed parentage population resulted in a larger turnout in manager cities than in mayor-council cities.

The conclusions derived from this analysis were:

1. Cities with mayor-council governments have a larger turnout than cities with manager governments, except in the Northeast, where manager cities had a slightly higher turnout than mayor-council cities.
2. Basically, manager governments had the effect of discouraging a large turnout.
3. Cities with nonpartisan elections had a lower voter turnout than cities with partisan elections.
4. Cities with mayor-council-partisan governments had a higher turnout than cities with other forms. But when this relationship was viewed within regions, only in the North Central was it likely that mayor-council-partisan cities had a higher turnout than cities with other combinations of governmental forms and electoral systems.
5. Region as an intervening variable had greater significance as an explanatory factor for assessing political structures as determinants of voter turnout than socio-economic characteristics as determinants of turnout.

## DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my lovely wife, Sandra for  
her untiring devotion, patience and assistance;  
and to my parents, Major and Virginia Gray.



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. . . . .	i
LIST OF TABLES. . . . .	ii
Chapter	
I.	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <p>URBAN POLITICS AND THE LITERATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE . . . . .</p> <p>Introduction. . . . .</p> <p>Reformism . . . . .</p> <p>Community Power Studies. . . . .</p> <p>Structure, Process, Environment and Policy Outcomes. . . . .</p> <p>Summary. . . . .</p> </div> <div style="text-align: right;"> <p>1</p> <p>1</p> <p>5</p> <p>10</p> <p>21</p> <p>32</p> </div> </div>
II.	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <p>MUNICIPAL VOTER TURNOUT DETERMINANTS: REVIEW, CONCEPTS, HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY. . . . .</p> <p>Review. . . . .</p> <p>Comparative Municipal Election Literature. . . .</p> <p>Concepts. . . . .</p> <p>Hypotheses. . . . .</p> <p>Methodology . . . . .</p> </div> <div style="text-align: right;"> <p>33</p> <p>33</p> <p>35</p> <p>37</p> <p>41</p> <p>45</p> </div> </div>
III.	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <p>AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS. . . . .</p> <p>Introduction. . . . .</p> <p>Political Structures . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Forms of Government . . . . .</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Electoral Systems. . . . .</p> <p>Socio-Economic Characteristics and Their Relationship to Government Form and Electoral System. . . . .</p> <p>Summary. . . . .</p> </div> <div style="text-align: right;"> <p>48</p> <p>48</p> <p>49</p> <p>49</p> <p>73</p> <p>81</p> <p>91</p> </div> </div>

Chapter		Page
IV.	THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS. . . . .	93
	The Relationship Between Population Growth, Mobility and Form of Government . . . . .	94
	The Relationship Between Social Class and Form of Government. . . . .	98
	Population Homogeneity and Form of Government. . . . .	103
	Summary. . . . .	107
V.	VOTER TURNOUT IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS . . . .	111
	Determinants of Voter Turnout. . . . .	112
	Form of Government. . . . .	112
	Electoral System. . . . .	113
	Socio-Economic Characteristics . . . . .	114
	Findings. . . . .	116
	Form of Government, Electoral System, and Voter Turnout Part I. . . . .	116
	Socio-Economic Indices and Voter Turnout - Part II . . . . .	124
	Form of Government, Electoral System, Socio-Economic Characteristics and Voter Turnout - Part III. . . . .	144
	Summary. . . . .	146
VI.	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. . . . .	151
	BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .	165
	APPENDIX. . . . .	178



# LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
I.	Commission Government in Cities over 5,000 Population Since 1940. . . . .	61
II.	Growth of Council-Manager Plan. . . . .	66
III.	Council-Manager Plan in Cities Over 5,000 Population. . . . .	67
IV.	Form of Government in Cities over 5,000 Population. . . . .	72
V.	Nonpartisanship in Cities Over 5,000 Population. . . . .	75
VI.	Nonpartisanship and Form of Government . . . . .	76
VII.	Regional Distribution of Types of Government . . . .	94
VIII.	Comparison of Mean Population Growth and Mobility by Form of Government. . . . .	95
IX.	Comparison of Mean Population Growth and Mobility by Region. . . . .	96
X.	Comparison of Mean Population Growth and Mobility by Region and Form of Government . . .	97
XI.	Comparison of Mean Social Class Variables by Form of Government. . . . .	99
XII.	Comparison of Mean Social Class Variables by Region. . . . .	100
XIII.	Comparison of Mean Social Class Variables by Region and Form of Government. . . . .	102

Table		Page
XIV.	Comparison of Mean Population Homogeneity by Form of Government. . . . .	104
XV.	Comparison of Mean Population Homogeneity by Region. . . . .	105
XVI.	Comparison of Mean Population Homogeneity by Region and Form of Government. . . . .	106
XVII.	Mean Voter Turnout by Form of Government. . . . .	117
XVIII.	Mean Voter Turnout by Region. . . . .	118
XIX.	Mean Voter Turnout by Region and Form of Government. . . . .	118
XX.	Mean Voter Turnout by Electoral System . . . . .	119
XXI.	Mean Voter Turnout by Region and Electoral System. . . . .	120
XXII.	Mean Voter Turnout by Form of Government and Electoral System. . . . .	121
XXIII.	Mean Voter Turnout by Region, Form of Government and Electoral System. . . . .	123
XXIV.	Correlation Coefficients of Voter Turnout and Population Growth and Mobility. . . . .	125
XXV.	Correlation Coefficients of Voter Turnout with Population Growth and Mobility by Form of Government. . . . .	126
XXVI.	Correlation Coefficients of Voter Turnout with Population Growth and Mobility by Form of Government and Electoral System. . . . .	127
XXVII.	Correlation Coefficients of Voter Turnout and Population Growth and Mobility by Region, Governmental Form and Electoral System. . . . .	129

Table		Page
XXVIII.	Correlation Coefficients of Voter Turnout and Social Class Variable. . . . .	132
XXIX.	Correlation Coefficients of Voter Turnout with Social Class Variables by Form of Government .	133
XXX.	Correlation Coefficients of Voter Turnout with Social Class Variables by Form of Government and Electoral System. . . . .	135
XXXI.	Correlation Coefficients of Voter Turnout and Social Class by Region, Form of Government and Electoral System. . . . .	137
XXXII.	Correlation Coefficients of Voter Turnout and Population Homogeneity. . . . .	138
XXXIII.	Correlation Coefficients of Voter Turnout with Population Homogeneity by Form of Government .	139
XXXIV.	Correlation Coefficients of Voter Turnout with Population Homogeneity by Form of Government and Electoral System . . . . .	140
XXXV.	Correlation Coefficients of Voter Turnout with Population Homogeneity by Region, Form of Government and Electoral System. . . . .	143
XXXVI.	Form of Government, Electoral System, Socio- Economic Characteristics and Voter Turnout by Region . . . . .	145

## CHAPTER I

### URBAN POLITICS AND THE LITERATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

#### Introduction

Robert Daland has contended "that political scientists have been slow to study seriously the impact of urbanization on our governmental institutions and political life" and that "the field of urban politics has been investigated only in the most fragmentary way."<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, studies done were often descriptive and prescriptive with hardly any explanatory details.<sup>2</sup>

One of the first critics of the state of affairs in urban politics was Herson, who in referring to municipal government as a "lost world" wrote in 1957, "in conceptual construction and in execution, most of the research in this field falls short of the minimal requirements for a systematic political

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Daland, "Political Science and the Study of Urbanism," American Political Science Review, 51 (June, 1957), 507.

<sup>2</sup> For a bibliography on studies of this nature, see Allen Richards, "Local Government Research: A Partial Evaluation," Public Administration Review, 14 (Autumn, 1954), 271-277; L. J. Herson, "The Lost World of Municipal Government," American Political Science Review, 51 (June, 1957), 330-345; Daland, Ibid.

science: for the literature of municipal government is studied with an array of facts that have been gathered with little regard for the construction of general theories; and at the same time, it is beset with theories that have been advanced without ever being checked against available empirical data."<sup>3</sup>

The significance of theory construction to systematic research in political science in general and urban politics in particular is well recognized for theory helps to determine the kinds of empirical phenomena which is to be investigated and it provides the guideline for the types of instruments or tools which will be utilized in the investigation. As Easton stated "research untutored by theory may prove trivial, and theory unsupportable by data, futile."<sup>4</sup> Thus, the failure to unite theory with facts or vice versa have been one of the major shortcomings of political scientists in their study of urban government.

Since Herson's critique in 1957, much has been written in the field of urban government and that which has been written has been directed towards redressing the deficiencies cited by Herson. A review of this literature, however, reflects the uneven nature of the research. For example in 1967,

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<sup>3</sup>Herson, op. cit., 330.

<sup>4</sup>David Easton, "The Current Meaning of Behaviorism in Political Science," in James Charlesworth, The Limits of Behaviorism in Political Science, The American Academy of Political and Social Science (October, 1962), 8.



Norton Long stated, "while the discipline has made some progress in tolerance since the earlier dogmas of reform, it has shown only fitful concern with making explicit the hypothesis underlying its prescriptions and submitting them to empirical test." He continued, "Herson's strictures in his essay. . . seem still applicable."<sup>5</sup> However, writing one year later, Herbert Jacobs and Michael Lipsky stated that "state and local politics as a field of political science is no longer a 'lost world' or site of 'dullsville'. Rather than being the laggard of the discipline that some political scientists perceive it to be, the study of state and local politics has reentered the mainstream of political research."<sup>6</sup>

Could the study of local politics have progressed so astronomically that in one year it has "reentered the mainstream of political research?" Was Long being overly pessimistic about the state of affairs or were Jacobs and Lipsky exaggerating their optimism for future research in urban politics? It is more probable that the actual state of research in urban politics lies somewhere in between the above two views.

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<sup>5</sup>Norton E. Long, "Political Science and the City," in Leo Schnore (ed.), Social Science and the City (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968), 244.

<sup>6</sup>Herbert Jacobs and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structures, and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local Politics," in Marian Irish (ed.), Political Science: Advance of the Discipline (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1968), 220.

Although Jacobs and Lipsky made an unqualified statement about the progress of state and local research, they were compelled to admit that "there remains an unfortunate aridity to the discussion of community politics."<sup>7</sup> Indeed their article is evidence of this point in that it reviewed an abundance of research studies on the state level, but little at the local level. Of course, this was due partially to the authors' desire to present materials in specific areas of state and local government. But regardless, it raises the possibility that political scientists may not be researching certain areas of local government. One of these areas is local municipal voter turnout.<sup>8</sup>

Theories and hypotheses derived from national election studies and narrow-based municipal election studies have not been subject, with one or two exceptions, to the kind of broad-based comparative test that is required for a better understanding of municipal voter turnout. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to clearly delineate by review of the literature, the areas of urban research which political scientists have concentrated upon and to suggest that the present study is an attempt to shed some light on one neglected area - comparative municipal voter turnout.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 235.

<sup>8</sup>For a review of this literature see Chapter three.

<sup>9</sup>One study which does systematically examine local elections comparatively is Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voter Turnout in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 62 (September, 1968), 796.

The areas in which substantial urban research has been conducted are:

- (1) the reform movement with its accompanying principles and institutions;
- (2) community power studies; and (3) structure, process, environment and policy outcomes. The study of "metropolitan government" is not dealt with in this review.<sup>10</sup>

### Reformism

The area of municipal government reform is replete with studies which are long on description and prescription, but short on empirical proof.<sup>11</sup> In an

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<sup>10</sup>The following is an indication of the range of materials on metropolitan areas: John Bollens and Henry Schmandt, The Metropolis (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); Vincent Ostrom, et. al. "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," American Political Science Review, 55 (December, 1961), 831-42; Daniel Grant, "Metropolitics and Professional Political Leadership," The Miami Metropolitan Experiment (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1966); David Booth, Metropolitics: The Nashville Consolidation (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development and Services, Michigan State University, 1963); Frank Smallwood, Metro Toronto: A Decade Later (Toronto: Bureau of Municipal Research, 1963); and Michael Danielson, Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965); Phillip Coulter, Politics of Metropolitan Areas (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1967).

<sup>11</sup>Some studies of this type are: L. S. Rowe, Problems of City Government (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1908); John A. Farlie, Municipal Administration (New York: MacMillan Co., 1920); Frank Goodnow, City Government in the United States (New York: The Century Co., 1904); William B. Munro, Municipal Government and Administration (New York: MacMillan Co., 1930).

era when municipal government was diagnosed as permeated with evil and corruption, reformers who valued efficiency, economy, and democracy in government, promulgated certain principles which they envisioned as the proper treatment for the ills of municipal government.<sup>12</sup> These principles, derived largely from administrative theory, were elevated to the position of what Charles Hyneman calls a theology and metaphysics.<sup>13</sup> But, the curious inexplicable fact is that while administrative theory began to change in the 1940's, local government research in general and reformist philosophy in particular remained attached to a theory which was being questioned in its own field.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>An abundance of literature which describes the activities of bosses and machines exist. Bosses and machines were, supposedly corrupting influence. Dayton D. McKean, The Boss: The Hague Machine in Action (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940); J. T. Salter, Boss Rule (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1935); Harold Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937); Harold Zink, City Bosses in the United States (Durham: Duke University Press, 1930); Edward M. Sait, "Machines, Political," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 9 (Chicago, 1908), 658: For a description of corruption in several cities see Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York: McClure, Phillips and Co., 1904); Steffens provides a more perceptive view of the prevalence of corruption - the indifference and dual standards of the citizenry - in Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1931); Bosses and machines provided certain necessary needs of the people. This view is treated superbly by Robert Merton, "The Latent Function of the Machine," in Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. 1957).

<sup>13</sup>Charles S. Hyneman "Administration Reorganization," in A. N. Christensen and E. M. Kirkpatrick, The People, and the Politician: Readings in American Government (New York: H. H. Holt and Co., 1941).

<sup>14</sup>The change in administration theory was probably signaled by Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1945).



Some of the principles of reform which provided the foundation for much political research in municipal government were: (1) that politics should be taken out of local government: (2) that there should be a separation of politics or legislation from the administration of local government; (3) that the "business" of city government should be separated from state and national politics; and (4) that local government should be made more democratic. The institutional arrangements which were thought to be conducive to accomplishing these principles were nonpartisanship elections, council-manager government and the short ballot.

These principles and many others have come under acute scrutiny by political scientists using empirical data. For instance, nonpartisanship, presently used in 67% of the cities with populations greater than 5,000,<sup>15</sup> was thought by the reformers as the answer for extricating "politics" from city government. But, nonpartisanship became a camouflage for actual partisan activity. Also, groups not previously influential became politically influential and other unanticipated effects resulted.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1969).

<sup>16</sup> J. Leiper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and A Case Analysis," American Journal of Sociology, 64 (1958), 282-289; G. W. Pearson, "Prediction in a Non-Partisan Election," Public Opinion Quarterly, 12 (Spring, 1948), 115; Charles Adrian, "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections," Western Political Quarterly, 12 (June, 1959), 449-458; Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections," American Political Science Review, 46 (September, 1952), 766-76; Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics Under the Non-Partisan Ballot," American Political



Under the council manager system, politics was supposed to be separated from administration. The council was to be responsible for the legislative aspect of government while the manager, a neutral, competent, corporate model executive, was to be liable for administrative functions. Council manager government, upon close scrutiny, has not lived up to what was expected of it.<sup>17</sup> Banfield and Wilson stated that "the expectation that the plan would reduce cost of local government has been sadly disappointed. Generally taxes have gone up, not down, after its adoption."<sup>18</sup> Administration has not been

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Science Review, 53 (December, 1959), 1052-63; Charles Gilbert, "Some Aspects of Nonpartisan Elections in Large Cities," Midwest Journal of Politics, 6 (1962), 345-62; Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal Elections," Public Opinion Quarterly, 30 (Spring, 1966), 79; Robert Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and party in Partisan and Non-Partisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," American Political Science Review, 57 (December, 1963), 584-592; Marvin Harder, Nonpartisan Elections: A Political Illusion? (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1958); Eugene C. Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1960); Charles Gilbert and Christopher Clague, "Electoral Systems in Large Cities," Journal of Politics, 24 (1962), 323 and Robert Morlan, "The Unorganized Politics of Minneapolis," National Municipal Review (November, 1949), 485-490.

<sup>17</sup> For a good study on function and office of manager government see Leonard White, The City Manager (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927); also an extensive study of manager government is provided by Harold A. Stone, Kathryn A. Stone, and Don K. Price, City Manager Government in the United States (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940).

<sup>18</sup> Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 185.

separated from legislation, for the manager, although publicly shunting a policy role, has been a chief policy innovator.<sup>19</sup>

The short ballot, which would allow voters to personally know their candidates, was thought to be the mechanism for making local government more democratic. Having only the council held politically responsible for its policies by the people was also thought to aid the democratizing process. However, these efforts to make local government more democratic seemed to have eluded the reformers. Banfield and Wilson noted that "it is not clear that it (council-manager government) has always accomplished what its innovators mainly intended - namely by centralizing authority to make local government an effective instrument for carrying out the popular will."<sup>20</sup>

This brief review of research in reformism indicates that only in recent years have the principles and/or theories of the reform movement been

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<sup>19</sup> Charles Adrian, "Leadership and Decision Making in Manager Cities," Public Administration Review, 18 (Summer, 1958), 208-13; Karl Bosworth, "The Manager is a Politician," Public Administration Review, 14 (Autumn, 1954), 253-8; C. A. Harrell and D. G. Weidford, "The City Manager and the Policy Process," Public Administration Review, 2 (1959), 101-107; and Gladys Kammerer, et. al., City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure Termination, (Gainesville: University of Florida Monograph Social Sciences, 13 (Winter, 1962).

<sup>20</sup> Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., 186. The democratic aspect of reform government is discussed also in the following: Kent Mathewson, "Democracy in Council-Manager Government," Public Administration Review, 2 (1959), 183-185.

subjected to empirical investigations. These studies open up possibilities for other such research which would examine the effects of reformism up many other areas and aspects of local government.<sup>21</sup>

### Community Power Studies

The local community has always been a convenient and natural setting for researchers. The many areas of community life could be studied and restudied with minimal expenditure of money and little required time. Community decisions on taxes and bonds, community organization, participation, and leadership have long been of interest to many researchers, especially sociologists. However, there was always the problem of generalizing the findings from the study of a single community to other communities. Replication is difficult because communities can be atypical, therefore, caution must be employed in generalizing findings.

Political scientists were slow to take advantage of the community as a natural setting for studies of political leadership and power structure. Answering the question of who rules or - to use Harold Lasswell's words "who gets

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<sup>21</sup>Indicative of this trend are the following: Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 706 and Robert Lineberry, "Political Structures and Public Policies in American Cities," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1968).

what, when, and how" seemed to have been the special province of sociologists.<sup>22</sup>

Much of the research in community leadership and power has been characterized by basic methodological difficulties and implicit ideological positions. When political scientists entered the area in mid-1950, there ensued more than a decade of interdisciplinary controversy between the pluralist-minded political scientists and the elite-minded sociologists, each utilizing different methodologies. This struggle between the discipline obscured the real substantive issues at hand - community leadership and power.

Sociologists have almost unanimously used the positional or reputational approach to discovering community power.<sup>23</sup> The assumptions of these studies were: (1) that an economic elite class rules in the local community; (2) that

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<sup>22</sup>Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Meridan Books, 1958).

<sup>23</sup>Some of these studies are: Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958); Warner, Yankee City (New Haven: Yale University, 1941); Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, Middletown (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1929); *ibid.*, Middletown in Transition (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1937); August B. Hollingshead, Elmtown's Youth (New York: John Wiley, 1949); Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structures (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1953); W. Loyd Warner, Democracy in Jonesville (New York: Harper, 1949); E. Digby Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentleman (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1953); for application of the positional approach nationally see, C. Wright Mills, Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956) and G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

the political and civic leaders occupy a position subordinate to this economic elite class; (3) that this economic elite class dominate the many facets of local community life; (4) that this economic elite class rules selfishly - only in its own interest; and (5) that social conflict takes place only between the economic elite class and the subordinate non-elite class.

The positional approach assumed that in order to discover the power elite, one merely determined who occupied the top echelons in the economic, political and social realm and also who were most important in influencing policies in the private organizations.<sup>24</sup> The methodological difficulty with this approach is that those holding power are a priori defined as occupying top positions with no attempt to empirically determine whether or not power can be considered synonymous with position. Consequently, "potential" power holders were located, rather than "actual" power holders.

An example of the reputational approach is the pioneer study of Atlanta by Floyd Hunter.<sup>25</sup> Hunter developed a list of "knowledgeables" (a panel of 14 judges) and asked them for names of persons whose opinion would influence them the most on various issues or topics. This technique resulted in a list of one-hundred seventy-five influentials from which forty were arbitrarily

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<sup>24</sup>The seminal studies using this method are two studies of Muncie, Indiana by Robert and Helen Lynd, ibid., and the study of a New England community by Lloyd Warner, Yankee City, ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Hunter, op. cit.



selected as the top influentials. A variety of social background information was collected on these influentials. Hunter assumed that these influentials had shared interests which they desired to protect or promote. Consequently, they were interviewed to determine their exercise of power and the degree to which they interacted with each other. Hunter's methodology led to his finding a dominant economic power elite who controlled "Regional City."<sup>26</sup>

Hunter's study served as a catalyst for propelling political scientists into the area of community power studies, most often as critics of Hunter's methodology. One of the first, and more critical analyses, was that by Jones and Kaufman which labeled Hunter's method as intuitive rather than scientific.<sup>27</sup>

Thomas Anton, commenting on the Jones and Kaufman critique noted that:

The review of Hunter's book by Kaufman and Jones was in some ways an important milestone for political science. Although, the book was challenged on both substantive and methodological grounds, the devotion of so much space to a sociologists work in the Public Administration Review constituted a recognition of the relevance of this kind of inquiry for those who labored in the vineyards of political science and public administration. Indeed, lurking between every line of the review was an implicit exhortation to political

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<sup>26</sup>For a view favorable towards Hunter, and a review of the contribution of these power studies to political science by sociologists, see Lawrence Herson, "In the Footsteps of Community Power," American Political Science Review, 55 (December, 1961), 817-30.

<sup>27</sup>Victor Jones and Herbert Kaufman, "The Mystery of Power," Public Administration Review, 14 (Summer, 1954), 205-212.

scientists to start working on this problem, if only to substantiate the belief that Hunter was wrong about Regional City.<sup>28</sup>

It did not take political scientists long to "start working on this problem," for within a few years a spate of articles appeared challenging Hunter's methodology and findings.<sup>29</sup> Some of the criticism directed at Hunter's methodology were: that his approach produced only "reputation" for power not actual power exercise; that the approach generalized the scope of influence,

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<sup>28</sup>Thomas Anton, "Power, Pluralism, and Local Politics," Administrative Science Quarterly, 7 (March 1963), 425-427.

<sup>29</sup>Delbert C. Miller, "Decision Making Cliques in Community Power Studies," American Journal of Sociology, 64 (November, 1958), 299-310; Robert O. Schulze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite City," in Morris Janowitz (ed.), Community Political Systems (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961); Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review, 52 (June, 1958), 463-469; Nelson W. Polsby, "The Sociology of Community Power: A Reassessment," Social Forces, 37 (March, 1959), 232-236; *ibid.*, "Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Power," American Journal of Sociology, 25 (October, 1960), 636-644; Peter H. Rossi, "Community Decision Making," Administrative Science Quarterly, 1 (March, 1957), 415-443; Harry M. Scoble, "Yankeetown: Leadership in Three-Decision-Making Processes," in Janowitz, *ibid.*; Robert E. Agger, "Power Attributions in the Local Community: Theoretical and Research Considerations," Social Forces, 34 (May, 1956), 332-337; and William H. Form and William V. D'Antonio, "Integration and Cleavage Among Community Influentials in Two Border Cities," American Sociological Review, 24 (December, 1959), 804-814; Norton Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," American Journal of Sociology, 64 (November, 1958), 251-61; Peter Rossi, "Power and Community Structure," Midwest Journal of Politics, 4 (November, 1960), 394-401.

i.e., Hunter assumed that influence in one area meant influence in another area; that it is doubtful whether the panel of judges and the interviewer could be in agreement on basic concepts and standards of "top influentials"; and that by asking 'who is the most influential,' the assumption was that there was a small elite. The result is that such research is biased towards finding a monolithic power structure.<sup>30</sup>

It is commonly recognized that the equivalently significant word by political scientists in community power analysis to the Hunter work is Dahl's Who Governs. Dahl's approach, unlike Hunter's, introduced the 'pluralists alternative' or the decision-making approach to the study of community power.<sup>31</sup> Dahl thought that by investigating the process through which decisions are made, it was possible to more effectively discover the locus of power. Thus his methodology required the selection of 'key' issues; the identification of people who took part in the decision-making process; and account of the actual behavior of individuals while the issue-conflict was being resolved; and the determination and analysis of specific outcomes. With this technique, Dahl

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<sup>30</sup>In addition to the sources in footnote 29, see Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), and Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).

<sup>31</sup>Dahl, ibid.

found that, at least, in New Haven, there was no identifiable monolithic power elite, but many elites, that is a pluralism of elites which were executive-centered. In addition, Dahl found that the influence of each elite changed with each issue under consideration.

The publication of Who Governs sparked another flurry of articles and books in which political scientists utilized the decision-making approach.<sup>32</sup> However, fundamental and important criticisms of the pluralist model were also raised.<sup>33</sup> For instance, Bachrach and Baratz were concerned with the

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<sup>32</sup>Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); Heinz Eulau, "A Review of Who Governs?" American Political Science Review, 57 (March, 1962), 144-45; H. Douglas Price, "A Review of Who Governs?" Political Science Quarterly, 77 (June, 1962), 269-71; Nelson Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, op. cit.; Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960; Paul A. Smith, "The Great Game of Community Politics," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 9 (February, 1965); Wolfinger, op. cit.; Scoble, op. cit.; Norton Long, "The Local Community As an Ecology of Games," op. cit.; Roscoe Martin and Frank Munger, et. al., Decisions in Syracuse (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965).

<sup>33</sup>However, some fundamental criticisms of the pluralist alternative are found in the following sources: Thomas Anton, op. cit.; Anton, "Rejoinder Letters to the Editors," Administrative Science Quarterly, 7 (September, 1963), 257-68; Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework," American Political Science Review, 57 (September, 1963), 632-42; Ibid., "Two Faces of Power," Administrative Science Quarterly, 6 (March, 1962), 517-19. Some research in community power areas has been criticized for being ideological. See these articles for this type of criticism: Jack Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," American Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 285-295; and Robert A. Dahl, "Further Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of Democracy'", American Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 296-305.



question of 'nondecision.' They argued that by focusing on the processes of decision-making, the pluralists ignore the pervasive extra-processes by which issues are also resolved and the results brought to bear on the formal process. Thus, they asked whether "the researcher over-looked the chance that some person or association could limit decision-making to relatively non-controversial matters, by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals, notwithstanding that there are in the community serious but latent power conflict."<sup>34</sup> The pluralist approach requires that 'key issues' are selected. But, what are the criteria for determining the 'key issues'? Is it those issues that are most controversial, salient, popular at the moment, or of interest to the researcher? Dahl does not in his study of New Haven define what he means by 'key issues'. Thomas Anton criticized the pluralist for placing undue emphasis on individual power in an attempt to measure community power.<sup>35</sup>

In recent studies of community power, an attempt has been made to synthesize parts of the decisional and reputational approaches.<sup>36</sup> This

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<sup>34</sup>Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," ibid.

<sup>35</sup>"Power, Pluralism and Local Politics," op. cit.

<sup>36</sup>Robert Presthus, Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Robert E. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley, 1964); Aaron Wildavsky, Leadership in a Small Town (New Jersey:



synthesis has led to a different way of looking at community power-comparative community study.

Linton Freeman and his associates studied leadership in the Syracuse metropolitan area by comparing the different methods for finding leadership. Since the type of leaders discovered depended to a large extent on the methodological approach, Freeman and his colleagues concluded that "the various differing approaches to the study of community leadership seem to uncover different types of leaders. The study of reputation, position or organizational participation seems to get at the "Institutional leaders." Studies of participation in decision-making, on the other hand, tap the "Effectors" of community action. And studies of social activity seem to seek out the "Activists" who gain entry by dint of sheer commitment, time and energy.<sup>37</sup>

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Bedminster Press, 1964); M. Kent Jennings, Community Influentials (New York: The Free Press, 1964); Linton C. Freeman, et. al. "Locating Leaders in Local Communities: A Comparison of Some Alternative Approaches," American Sociological Review, 28 (October, 1963), 791-798. For another theoretical scheme, see Rossi, "Power and Community Structure," op. cit.

<sup>37</sup>Linton Freeman, ibid.

Men at the Top<sup>38</sup> by Presthus is a study of two small communities in New York, Edgewood and Riverview. A series of decisions were studied using both the decisional and reputational methodological approaches. Presthus assumed "that the decisional method would prove to be superior to the older reputational method," but after deciding to compare his findings by each approach, he realized the "both methods had something to contribute. Each had its peculiar strengths and weaknesses."<sup>39</sup> He found political leaders dominant in Riverview and economic leaders taking the initiative in Edgewood. But, Presthus felt that the reputational method should not be used independently and that some of the assumptions of pluralism were not supported by his findings, e, g., "the expected measure of individual and organizational participation in major decisions." However, in testing both methodological approaches, Presthus concluded that "each method, in effect became a foil against which the evidence provided by the other could be tested and modified. It soon became clear that the reputational method had a great deal to contribute in refining the somewhat gross power ascriptions provided by the decisional technique."<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup>Robert Presthus, op. cit.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 59.

Wildavsky's study of Oberlin, Ohio was undertaken to replicate Dahl's New Haven study and also, like Presthus, to prove the superiority of the decisional approach. He studied all major decisions in a given period. Based on his findings, Wildavsky saw the reputational method as having a fifty-fifty chance in not naming the 'leaders'. Therefore, in testing both methodological approaches, Wildavsky selects the decisional as being more effective in naming the leaders and concludes that the pluralist model is representative of most cities in the United States.

M. Kent Jennings's Community Influentials<sup>41</sup> is a re-study of Atlanta in order to check on Hunter's findings. Jennings, however, used both the decisional and reputational approaches. Based on his investigation, Jennings did not find an elite structure in Atlanta, especially, a dominant economic elite.

In the Rulers and the Ruled,<sup>42</sup> Agger and his associates attempted a more systematic approach to the study of community leadership by devising typologies of power structures and 'regimes'. The four types of power structures which they delineated were consensual mass and consensual elites and competitive mass and competitive elites. Consensual and competitive represented the extent of ideological agreement or disagreement, while mass

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<sup>41</sup>Jennings, op. cit.

<sup>42</sup>Agger, et. al., op. cit.

and elite referred to the breath of participation. In studying changes in the decision-making process over a period of fifteen years in two western and two southern cities, Agger and his colleagues found that both the reputational and decisional approaches could be effective in studying community leadership.

In summary as the study of community leadership has advanced, political scientists have become more systematic in their investigation and have attempted to devise theoretical schemes and models in an effort to better understand community power.

#### Structure, Process, Environment and Policy Outcomes

Research in state and local politics witnessed a marked innovation in the 1960's with political scientists attempting to show a relationship between various political and socio-economic variables and certain policy outcomes. Hypothesizing that policy outputs are, in part, a function of the political-socio-economic environment, political scientists, utilizing aggregate data and multivariate analysis, have found positive correlations between such public policies as taxation and expenditures and the political-socio-economic environment. However, there have been few attempts on the local level, employing aggregate voter turnout as an outcome of the political-socio-economic environment.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Studies which comparatively examine voter turnout in substantial number of cities are: Eugene Lee, "City Elections: A Statistical Profile," Municipal Year Book, (Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1963), 95; and Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voter Turnout in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 62 (September, 1968, 796.

## Literature On State Policy Outcomes

This research innovation has been most noticeable in its application to state government.<sup>44</sup> But, such research findings has also been instructive to the study of urban politics.

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<sup>44</sup>Two early works were V. O. Key, Jr. Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951) and Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). An initial systematic study was that of Robert T. Golembiewski, "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political Party Strength," Western Political Quarterly, 11 (1958), 494-513; Studies which have posited environmental factors as important are: Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics, 25 (May, 1963), 265-289; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," APSR, 60 (March, 1966), 73-82; Thomas R. Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11 (August, 1967), 353-380; Ira Sharkansky, "Economic and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant Cases," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11 (May, 1967), 173-92; Thomas Dye, Political, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Ira Sharkansky, The Politics of Taxing and Spending (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969); Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics and Public Policy," APSR, 63 (September, 1969), 867-879. Studies which have emphasized political factors are: Herbert Jacob, "The Consequence of Malapportionment: A Note of Caution," Social Forces, 43 (December, 1964), 256-61; Thomas Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," Journal of Politics, 27 (August, 1965), 586-601; John H. Fenton, People and Parties in Politics (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman and Co., 1966); Charles F. Cnudde and Donald McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in American States," American Political Science Review, 63 (September, 1969), 858-868; Duane Lockard, "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs," in Oliver Garceau (ed.), Political Research and Political Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 190-220; Glen W. Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local Government Expenditure," in Robert E. Crews, Jr., State Politics (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1968), 501-519. One article offers ways of measuring non-expenditure legislation, e.g., Civil rights legislation: Charles F. Cnudde and Donald McCrone, "On Measuring Public Policy," in Robert E. Crews, Jr., (ed.), State Politics (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1968), 523-530.



In the state literature, Key, Lockard and Fenton have concluded that the degree of party competition contributes to a variation in the type of public policies. Key in his study of southern politics found that multifactional one-party systems correlated highly in a positive way with conservative policies which favored those at the upper end of the socio-economic strata; bifactional competitive systems, on the other hand, were related to liberal policies which favored the poorer or lower classes. Lockard discovered similar correlations in one party and two-party competitive systems respectively in his study of New England state politics. Fenton also discovered that greater expenditures for welfare and education existed in those states with two-party competition rather than a one-party system.

On investigating welfare policies, Dawson and Robinson, utilizing measures of inter-party competition and urbanization, income, industrialization and ethnicity, discovered that the socio-economic factors had more of an impact on policies than did political factors.<sup>45</sup> Their findings have been corroborated by Dye, Hofferbert and Sharkansky.<sup>46</sup> In each case, these researchers have used socio-economic characteristics as independent variables; have used welfare and education policies as dependent variables; and have concentrated on taxation and expenditures as measures of these policies.

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<sup>45</sup>Dawson and Robinson, op. cit.

<sup>46</sup>Dye, Sharkansky and Hofferbert, op. cit.

However, many important policies cannot be measured in terms of expenditures and taxation. McCrone and Cnudde have, for instance attempted to demonstrate how civil rights legislation can be examined.<sup>47</sup>

The measures of inter-party competition have also come under attack. Inter-party competition has usually been defined as percentage of vote for particular offices received by each party; length of control of office and whether or not control was divided between the parties. Sharkansky and Hofferbert have stated that "electoral balance or alternation in office is not 'inter-party competition' except in the most mechanical sense."<sup>48</sup> They attempted, in their study, to conceptually clarify inter-party competition and the ways in which it is measured.

Thus the literature of public policies is instructive for what it omits as for what it includes. Particular socio-economic and political factors have been chosen for a variety of reasons. Important variables were probably omitted which resulted in magnifying the significance of those variables included. Based upon their research, Sharkansky and Hofferbert concluded that "There is no single answer to the question: 'Is it politics or economics that has the greatest impact on public policy?' The answer varies with the

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<sup>47</sup> McCrone and Cnudde, "On Measuring Public Policies," op. cit.

<sup>48</sup> Sharkansky and Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," op. cit., 867.

dimensions of each phenomena that are at issue."<sup>49</sup> A similar sentiment was echoed by James Clarke when he noted that "it is probable and certainly worthy of further research that the explanatory importance of socio-economic and political process variables will vary with the type of policy being considered."<sup>50</sup>

### Literature on Urban Policy Outcomes

Beginning in early 1960, researchers began to explore the significance that governmental structures had upon certain urban policy areas. Some of the initial literature posited a relationship between structural variables and environmental factors, i.e., socio-economic characteristics.<sup>51</sup> These studies have concluded that young, medium-size, white, high socio-economic status, low ethnic and rapidly growing cities are more likely to have council-manager governments than cities with opposite characteristics. The assumption in

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<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 878.

<sup>50</sup>James W. Clarkes, "Environment, Process and Policy," American Political Science Review, 63 (December, 1969), 1181.

<sup>51</sup>John H. Kessel, "Government Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about American Cities," American Political Science Review, 56 (September, 1962), 615-620; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-economic Characteristics of Suburbs," Administrative Science Quarterly, 8 (June, 1963), 1-17. Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Cities," The Municipal Year Book, (Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1965); Edgar Sherbenou, "Class, Participation and Council Manager Plan," Public Administration Review, 21 (Summer, 1961), 131-135; and Phillip Cutright, "Non-partisan Electoral Systems in American Cities," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 5 (January, 1963), 212-226.

this analysis is that cities which are inhabited by people of a certain socio-economic mold will experience a demand on the part of these people for the establishment of a particular kind of governmental arrangement. However, because governmental structures are more or less static and have endured over decades while environmental factors fluctuate, it could be that people with certain socio-economic characteristics, preferring a particular type of government locate in cities which have that type of governmental arrangement.

The linkage between structural variables and socio-economic factors have been statistically demonstrated, but these correlations must be tempered by the fact that cities are not always free to choose their structures of government because of state requirements and because of individual political behavior of city inhabitants. These are intervening variables which are sometimes overlooked.

There have been several studies which have attempted to relate governmental structure and socio-economic characteristics to various policy outcomes.<sup>52</sup> Utilizing socio-economic characteristics as the independent

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<sup>52</sup>Maurice Pinard "Structural Attachments and Political Support in Urban Politics: The Case of Fluoridation Referendums," American Journal of Sociology, 68 (March, 1963), 513-526; Amos Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," American Journal of Sociology, 68 (January, 1963), 422-431; Sherbenou, op. cit.; Donald B. Rosenthal and Robert L. Crain, "Structure and Values in Local Political Systems: The Case of Fluoridation Decisions," Journal of Politics, 28 (February, 1966), 169-196; Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 701-716;

variables, governmental structures as the intervening variables, and policy outcomes as the dependent variables, researchers have endeavored to demonstrate the impact of various socio-economic factors upon different policy areas. Policy areas most often employed in analysis have been welfare, education, taxation, fluoridation and urban renewal.

Rosenthal and Crain explored the impact of political structures upon fluoridation decisions in over three-hundred cities. They found that the mayor's position on fluoridation largely decides the outcome. Fluoridation has a better chance of success if supported by the mayor or a strong manager. Rosenthal and Crain also concluded that fluoridation is more likely to be adopted if "the political structures provide the mechanisms through forms of government and strong parties which insulate mayors and managers from 'irregular' pressures likely to arise on this issue; and that there is a low level of direct citizen participation both as a general rule and specifically on the fluoridation

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Thomas R. Dye "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11 (August, 1967), 353-380; Robert Lineberry, "Public Policies in American Cities," (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, microfilmed, University of North Carolina, 1966); Joseph Cepuran, "Policy Outputs in Council-Manager and Non-Council Manager Cities," Perspectives in Council Manager Government, (Iowa, University of Iowa, 1969). For articles relating other factors to policy areas not commonly studied see: James Wilson, City Politics and Public Policy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968). For a review of some of the literature on public policies see: Lewis Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," Journal of Politics, 29 (February, 1967), 94-108.



decision.<sup>53</sup> Maurice Pinard, on the other hand, investigated the relationship between the community's socio-economic characteristics and fluoridation referenda.<sup>54</sup> His findings led to the conclusions that fluoridation referenda are more successful in a small homogenous, low unemployment, non-middle-class community.

It is obvious that the difference in findings of the two studies is a function of the factors which are defined as independent variables. If, for example, instead of political structures as independent variables, socio-economic factors are defined as the independent variables and in place of socio-economic factors as intervening variables, political structures are classified as intervening variables, with fluoridation remaining the dependent variable, it is likely that the findings of each study would be similar for the same community. That is, communities in which a mayor favored fluoridation and there was less citizen participation were likely to be small, homogeneous, low unemployment and non-middle-class.

Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler investigated the impact of political structures on policy-making in cities over 50,000 population.<sup>55</sup> Two policy outputs - taxation and expenditure - were related to the socio-economic

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<sup>53</sup> Rosenthal and Crain, op. cit., 196.

<sup>54</sup> Pinard, op. cit.

<sup>55</sup> op. cit.

and structural characteristics of cities. The structural characteristics utilized - form of government, type of constituency and partisanship of elections - were divided into reformed and unreformed institutions. Reformed institutions were manager government, non-partisanship and at large elections, while unreformed institutions included mayor-council government, partisanship and ward elections. They discovered that, with the exception of expenditures in partisan, mayor-council cities, reformed cities spend and tax less than unreformed cities. Consequently, Lineberry and Fowler were able to conclude that reformed governments are less responsive to the conflicts and cleavages of politics.

Thomas Dye examined the impact of governmental structure and the structure of the city's school system upon educational outcomes.<sup>56</sup> He, then compared the effects of these structural variables with the effects of the urban environment, i.e., the socio-economic characteristics. Dye concluded that the urban environment was more important than structural characteristics in determining educational outcomes.

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<sup>56</sup>Thomas Dye, op. cit.

In his study of Chicago suburbs, Edgar Sherbenou concluded that higher expenditures, higher property taxes, and a more conservative attitude towards debt were associated with the council-manager form of government.<sup>57</sup> This correlation is partially explained by the middle-class make-up of council-manager cities in which the inhabitants are usually wealthy and can afford and have the willingness to support policies involving high taxation and expenditures. However, Lineberry and Fowler found "reformed," i.e., council-manager governments, less responsive to community characteristics on taxation and expenditure measures than "unreformed," i.e., mayor-council governments.

In addition to analyzing the effects of political and socio-economic factors upon urban policies, some researchers have studied political culture and its effect upon policy outcomes.<sup>58</sup> There have been problems in reaching a common definition of political culture and also difficulty in finding suitable measures of political culture. And even more troublesome has been the dilemma

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<sup>57</sup>Sherbenou, op. cit.

<sup>58</sup>James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public Regardness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review, 58 (December, 1964), 876-887; Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Lineberry and Fowler, op. cit.; Raymond Wolfinger and John O. Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 306-326; and Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy-making (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963).

of linking what is considered as political culture to political behavior. However, Williams and Adrian have advanced a four-part typology on the proper role of local government. They defined the legitimate scope of government as:

(1) "promoting economic growth; (2) providing and securing life's amenities; (3) maintaining traditional services and (4) arbitrating among conflicting interests."<sup>59</sup> These roles of government are conditioned by and also a reflection of a particular kind of political culture.

Banfield and Wilson have shown that a public-regarding culture as opposed to a private - regarding culture favors such policies as civil service, city planning, and urban renewal. The public-regarding culture supposedly embody a "middle-class ethos" in which the concern is for the community as a whole, not the neighborhood as is implicit in the "immigrant ethos" of the private-regarding culture. Therefore, for Banfield and Wilson, ethnicity was the most important variable in defining the expenditure pattern of local government.<sup>60</sup> Lineberry and Fowler felt that it is possible for political culture to become institutionalized and affect taxation and expenditure measures

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<sup>59</sup>Williams and Adrian, op. cit.

<sup>60</sup>However, Wolfinger and Field tested the "ethos theory" and found that it is "irrelevant in the South. . . fares badly in the Northeast. . . inapplicable to the West. . . and the Midwest provides the best evidence for the "ethos theory," but even there the differences between public-regarding and private-regarding cities are small and uneven," op. cit.

in that manner. Once political culture becomes institutionalized, community characteristics, e.g., ethnicity, are less important than political characteristics in policy outcomes.<sup>61</sup> It is clear that there is no definitive or final answer on the role of political culture, which at best calls for further analysis.

### Summary

The foregoing analysis points out the fact that political scientists have at last discovered the urban scene as a genuine and fruitful area for systematic research. By moving into the area of policy outcomes, political scientists move closer to answering Harold Lasswell's dictum about politics: "Who Gets What, When and How" and we might add "Why." However, there are many other areas of local politics which clamor for systematic analysis and explanation. One of these areas is the subject of the present study - comparative municipal voter turnout analysis. This review reveals that substantial systematic comparative analysis of municipal voter turnout has not been conducted. As suggested earlier, the present study is an attempt to partially alleviate this unfortunate state of affairs.

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<sup>61</sup>Lineberry and Fowler, (New York: Knopf, 1955), 8-9.



## CHAPTER II

MUNICIPAL VOTER TURNOUT DETERMINANTS:  
REVIEW, CONCEPTS, HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY

## Review

In a classic analysis of parties and pressure groups in the American political system, V. O. Key observed that "most studies of electoral participation have been microscopic; they focus on the individual and attempt to identify the characteristics or the motives that lead him to vote or not to vote."<sup>1</sup> Key further suggested that even though these studies are of great value, "they throw little light on the larger question of the relation between the extent and nature of citizen participation and the character of the political system in the large."<sup>2</sup> Although Key's challenge was directed towards encouraging scholars to engage in cross-national analyses of electoral participation, there is also an implicit challenge for scholars to study comparatively electoral participation in local as well as state and national elections in the United States.

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<sup>1</sup>V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (5th ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964), 591.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

Cross-national and national analyses of electoral participation are now relatively plentiful.<sup>3</sup> But, as mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a paucity of comparative studies of electoral participation at the local level with only one study dealing comparatively with participation in local elections.<sup>4</sup>

The primary aim of this study is to continue the research trend in comparative analysis of voter participation in local elections as this participation relates to the political and social structures of the community. Lee and Alford accurately point out that "although a number of important studies of politics and

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<sup>3</sup>Some works in cross-national research are: Stein Rokkan, "Cross-National Studies in Political Participation," International Social Science Journal, 12 (1960), 7-14; Stein Rokkan and Angus Campbell, "Citizen Participation in Political Life: Norway and the United States of America," ibid., 69-99; Sidney Verba, "Political Participation and Strategies of Influence: A Comparative Study," Acta Sociologica, 6 (1962), 22-42. Some national studies are: Angus Campbell, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960); Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld and William McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Eugene Burdick and A. J. Brodbeck (eds.), American Voting Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1959); Warren Miller, "The Political Behavior of the American Electorate," American Government Annual 1960-61 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960); and Angus Campbell, "Voters and Elections: Past and Present," Journal of Politics, 26 (1964).

<sup>4</sup>Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voting Turnout in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 62 (September, 1968), 796. For a review of the literature on local elections, see Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Ziegler, Voting Patterns in a Local Election (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964).

elections have emerged in recent years, the data are far from sufficient to permit more than the most speculative generalizations about the nature of the local electorate."<sup>5</sup>

### Comparative Municipal Election Literature

There have been a number of municipal election studies, but they concentrated on investigating elections on a small scale, i.e., studying a certain aspect of elections in one, two or three cities on a comparative basis, but more frequently a single election was studied.<sup>6</sup> In the area of comparative

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<sup>5</sup>Lee and Alford, op. cit.

<sup>6</sup>Some of these studies are: Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, Bureaucracy and Participation: Political Cultures in Four Wisconsin Cities (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), Chap. 4; Lawrence O'Rourke, Voting Behavior in the Forty-Five Cities of Los Angeles County (Los Angeles: University of California, Bureau of Governmental Research, 1953); G. W. Pearson, "Prediction in a Non-Partisan Election," Public Opinion Quarterly, 12 (1948), 112-117; Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting in Non-Partisan Municipal Elections," Public Opinion Quarterly, 30 (Spring, 1966), 79; James A. Robinson and William H. Stanley, "Some Correlates of Voting Behavior: The Case of Indiana," Journal of Politics, 22 (February, 1960), 96-111; Robert Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and Party in Partisan and Non-Partisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," American Political Science Review, 57 (September, 1963), 584-592; Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian, "Insulation of Local Politics Under the Non-Partisan Ballot," American Political Science Review, 53 (December, 1959), 1052-1063.

municipal elections on a large scale, there is a dearth of studies. In an early study<sup>7</sup> Eugene Lee did basically a statistical review of elections in 574 cities with populations over 25,000. Data was obtained through questionnaires on registration, voting, nominating practices and turnover of elected officials. This data was then classified by partisan and nonpartisan elections and by the three major forms of municipal government. The basic purpose of the review according to Lee were twofold: (1) to provide data by which city elections can be compared with elections at other governmental levels; and (2) to attempt, tentatively, to assess the impact of various local governmental institutions upon the city election process. With the compilation of this pertinent, but fundamental data, Lee set the state for further research in this area. The analysis which is undertaken in this study conforms, in part, to Lee's second purpose.

In the second study, Lee in collaboration with Robert Alford examined comparatively, voter turnout in 729 cities above 25,000 population.<sup>8</sup> This was the first comprehensive study of municipal elections on a comparative basis. The basic thesis that the authors examined was that voter turnout is related to the political and social structure of the local community. Lee and Alford

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<sup>7</sup>Eugene Lee, "City Elections: A Statistical Profile," Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1963), 95.

<sup>8</sup>Lee and Alford, op. cit., 796.

concluded that "cities with partisan elections, mayor-council (or non-manager) government, high ethnicity, low education, low mobility, and eastern location, tend to have a higher voting turnout than cities with nonpartisan elections, council-manager government, low ethnicity, high education, high mobility and far western location."<sup>9</sup> But, they issued a warning to those who would be prone to accept this conclusion at face value. They said, "While relationships are suggested between turnout, political and governmental structure, and characteristics of the population, these relationships must be regarded more as leads to future research than as clear and unambiguous findings."<sup>10</sup> It is partially on the basis of this statement that the findings of Lee and Alford are used as a foundation for the present study. It is the intention of this study that the conclusions and findings reached by Lee and Alford be subject to further test.

### Concepts

Political participation involves a multiplicity of factors. It is not simply the act of voting. Participation by the electorate may include such things as the discussion of public issues, financial contributions to political causes, working in campaigns, influencing friends and acquiring information about candidates. And the extent to which these and other activities are engaged in by the electorate

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 809.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 796.



also seems to depend on the differences in the nature of the political system. Since the political system defines and channels the various political acts which the electorate is allowed to perform,<sup>11</sup> it is little surprise, then, that participation by the electorate varies widely from one election to the next and from one political system to another.

Although political participation encompasses any one of a number of factors, the major political act utilized as the basis of this study is voter turnout. "Voting turnout in local elections is the most direct measure of participation in the electoral process and possibly an indication of other forms of political participation."<sup>12</sup> Voter turnout may be influenced by numerous factors and circumstances. Variation in these factors may result in variation in the pattern of voter turnout in any given election in any given city. For instance, empirical evidence has supported the notion that turnout is higher in national elections than in local elections and that "no contest" elections will

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<sup>11</sup>For discussion on municipal political systems, see Chapter III.

<sup>12</sup>Lee and Alford, *op. cit.*, 797.

result in low turnout.<sup>13</sup> When elections for local officials are held at a time different from that for national or state officials, turnout will usually be low.<sup>14</sup> Voter turnout is also influenced by the nature of the party system.<sup>15</sup>

There are numerous other idiosyncratic factors associated with any given election which may affect voter turnout rate. Some of these are the perceived closeness of a contest by the electorate; the excitement brought on by

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<sup>13</sup>Roscoe Martin, "The Municipal Electorate: A Case Study," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, 14 (December, 1933), 193-237; Charles H. Titus, "Voting in California Cities, 1900-1925," Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly, 8 (March, 1928), 383-399; James K. Pollock, Voting Behavior: A Case Study (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Bureau of Government Research, (1939); Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter, op cit.; Robert Lane, Political Life (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959); Lester Milbraith, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965); and Thomas Dye, Politics in States and Communities (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), Chap. 9; Key, op. cit.; Lawrence O'Rourke, op. cit.

<sup>14</sup>Campbell, The American Voter; Lane, Political Life; Milbraith, Political Participation; Dye, Politics in States and Communities; Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups.

<sup>15</sup>Campbell, The American Voter; Lester Milbraith, "Political Participation in the States," in Herbert Jacobs and Kenneth Vines (eds.), Comparative State Politics (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965), Chap. 2; Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley & Son, Inc., 1964); Lane, Political Life, pp. 312-314; Berelson, Voting; Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, "Competitive Pressures and Domestic Consent," in Heinz Eulau, S. J. Eldersveld and Morris Janowitz (eds.), Political Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 275-286; and John H. Fenton, People and Parties in Politics (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman Co., 1966).

the campaign; the issues; and the personality of the candidates.<sup>16</sup> Two other factors of primary significance also affecting voter turnout rate are the demographic or socio-economic makeup of the community and the structural characteristics of the government.<sup>17</sup>

Admittedly, there are numerous ways of measuring turnout. In this study, voter turnout is measured on the basis of the proportion of the potential electorate actually voting, i.e., on the proportion of citizens twenty-one years of age and over voting.<sup>18</sup> Consequently, included in the potential electorate are persons who fail to meet the technical qualifications for voting. For example, many cannot meet the residence requirement, or some have lost the privilege of voting through criminal conviction or of being confined in institutions. However, the use of voter registration as a measure of turnout would similarly be accompanied by problems. For example, states have different laws and mechanisms for registration, which make registration more difficult in one state than another. Therefore, the number of persons registered and the percent

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<sup>16</sup>Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), 397-418; Campbell, The American Voter, Chap. 4; Alford and Scoble, Bureaucracy and Participation, op. cit.

<sup>17</sup>Lee and Alford, op. cit.

<sup>18</sup>States with a lower age eligibility are not part of this study.

of persons voting may actually be, in part, a reflection of the ease or difficulty of registration.<sup>19</sup>

### Hypotheses

The basic hypothesis of this study is that form of government, type of electoral system and socio-economic characteristics influence voter turnout rates. The forms of government used as the basis for analysis in this study are the mayor-council and the council-manager. The commission form of local government has been omitted because there were too few commission cities in the sample to prove of value in the analysis. The types of electoral system are partisan and nonpartisan. The legal definition for nonpartisan and partisan is utilized, i.e., whether or not the party affiliation of the candidate appears on the ballot, not whether there exists any actual party activity. The socio-economic characteristics are divided into three categories: (1) population growth and mobility, (2) population homogeneity, and (3) social class. Population growth and mobility refer to percent population change 1950-60 and percent of migrants

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<sup>19</sup>Campbell, The American Voter, op. cit., 276-282; Stanley Kelley, Jr., Richard Ayers, and William G. Bowen, "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First," American Political Science Review, 61 (June, 1967), 374.

from different county, respectively. Population homogeneity refers to the percent of non-whites, and ethnicity (proportion of foreign-born persons and percent of persons of foreign and mixed parentage). Social class refers to occupation, education, homeownership, and income.<sup>20</sup>

### Subsidiary Hypotheses

A related subsidiary hypothesis of this study is that form of government is related to socio-economic characteristics.<sup>21</sup> Because earlier studies have found varied relationship existing between form of government and socio-economic environment, it is necessary to re-examine their findings as form of government and socio-economic characteristics are both hypothesized as being related to voter turnout. Consequently, a clearer understanding of the relationship between voter turnout and form of government and socio-economic characteristics should be provided.

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<sup>20</sup>For relevant material on participation of social class, see Edgar Sherbenou, "Class, Participation and the Council-Manager Plan," Public Administration Review, 21 (Summer, 1961), 131-135; Robert Alford, "The Role of Social Class in American Voting Behavior," Western Political Quarterly, 26 (March, 1963), 180-194; and Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Sources of Local Political Involvement," American Sociological Review (December, 1968).

<sup>21</sup>Derived from works of Kessel, op. cit.; Schnore and Alford, op. cit.; Alford and Scoble, op. cit.; and Lee and Alford, op. cit.



Thus, the following are subsidiary hypotheses to be investigated:

1. Manager governments are likely to manifest a more rapid population growth and population mobility than mayor-council governments.
2. Manager governments more than mayor-council governments are likely to have a higher percentage of college-educated persons, a higher percentage of white-collar workers, a lower percentage of persons earning \$3,000 or less, a higher percentage of persons earning \$10,000 or more, and a higher percentage of homeowners.
3. Mayor-council governments are likely to be located in communities with higher non-white and a higher ethnic population than manager governments.

### Basic Hypothesis

Subsequent to the analysis of the above subsidiary hypotheses, the basic hypothesized relationship between voter turnout and form of government, electoral system and socio-economic characteristics will be investigated. The specific propositions are:

1. The mayor-council form of government is more likely to encourage and witness greater voter participation and turnout than manager governments.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960); and Lee and Alford, op. cit.

2. Voter turnout is likely to be greater where partisan elections exist than where nonpartisan elections take place. Thus, nonpartisanship has the tendency to reduce voter turnout.<sup>23</sup>
3. Voter turnout is likely to be greater where partisan elections are combined with the mayor-council form of government than where other combinations of electoral systems and forms of government exist.<sup>24</sup>
4. Cities with rapid population growth and high mobility will experience low voter turnout.
5. Voter turnout is likely to increase in cities as the percentage of well-educated (college) persons in the population increases.
6. Voter turnout is likely to be higher in those cities with a higher percentage of white-collar employees, homeowners, and a higher percentage of high income persons than in cities with high percentages of opposite characteristics.
7. Voter turnout is likely to be low in cities with a high percentage of non-white population.
8. Voter turnout is likely to be low in cities with high ethnic population (i.e., foreign born and population of native-mixed parentage).

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<sup>23</sup>Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship, op. cit.

<sup>24</sup>Lee and Alford, op. cit.

## Methodology

This study is an offshoot of a larger, more comprehensive study.<sup>25</sup>

Although the present study is a study of voter turnout in American cities, all cities in the United States are not a part of this analysis. A random sample of cities in four states was drawn. These four states are California, Illinois, New York and Texas. These particular states were chosen because: (1) each has a large number of cities with over 100,000 population; and because (2) they represent different regions of the country, i.e., the Far West, North Central, Northeast and South, respectively. This does not mean, necessarily, that each state is "representative" of other states in that region.

The cities range in population size from 5,000 to 250,000. To facilitate the collection of data they were categorized in population ranges of 5,000-10,000, 10,001-50,000, and 50,001-250,000. In each of these categories a maximum sample of 75 cities was drawn. In cases where the maximum sample could not be drawn, all cities for that population size were utilized. The total number of cities came to 558, from which data for cities were able to be included in the actual study.

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<sup>25</sup>Under the direction of Irving Howards, Professor of Government, University of Massachusetts (Amherst), and Henry Brehm, Chief, Survey Operations, Division of Disability Studies, Office of Research and Statistics, Social Security Administration. This Health, Education and Welfare-sponsored project was undertaken to investigate the relationship between demographic and political variables and public policy outputs in American cities.

It is necessary to clarify a number of points concerning the data:<sup>26</sup>

1. As there is no national agency which collects voter turnout information on American cities, questionnaires were sent to each city in the study requesting voter turnout statistics.<sup>27</sup> Response to questionnaires was over 90 percent.
2. Cities were requested to provide turnout figures from the last two elections, between 1961 and 1968, in which either the mayor or councilmen were elected. Where the mayor was elected directly, total voter turnout for that office was requested. Where the mayor was not elected directly, the total number of council vacancies to be filled and the total votes received by all councilmanic candidates were requested.
3. The voter turnout data are, in some instances, concurrent with state elections, but not with national elections.
4. The data provide no indication of the nature of the office of mayor or manager in each city in reference to power and the exercise of power.
5. Data on political structures, e.g., form of government and electoral system, were obtained from the International City Manager's Association Municipal Year Book, 1965. Therefore, it is possible that some cities may not have had the same political structures in 1965 as they had when the elections were held. However, this shouldn't affect the pattern of correlations.
6. Form of government refers to manager, mayor-council or commission governments. Partisan and nonpartisan are legal definitions used to refer to those electoral systems in which party labels are permitted or not permitted on the ballot, respectively.

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<sup>26</sup>All data utilized in this study are part of the Howards-Brehm project.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid. Questionnaires used by Howards and Brehm are in the appendix. There was over 90 percent return on questionnaires from the cities in each state.

7. Data on the social structure, e.g., occupation, education, were obtained from the 1960 United States Census of Population. Because the adult population for 1960 is used and election figures are for 1961-68, changes in population are not reflected. But it is hoped that the results obtained can be useful and suggestive.



### CHAPTER III

#### AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

##### Introduction

This chapter will provide a brief historical view of urban political structures, pointing out the effect certain factors have had upon existing structures and how new structures were devised to meet new needs and wants; indicating the power relationships which developed with the new types of structures in the population; emphasizing the basic feature of each structure; and pointing up the impact that each structure has had upon urban politics. In addition, the chapter will explore the significance of electoral systems, i.e., nonpartisanship and partisan elections, as well as examine the possible linkage between socio-economic characteristics and mayor-council and manager forms of local government through a review of some of the literature. The ultimate point of the chapter is to provide a clear focus and basis from which it will be possible in the following chapter to attempt to link the "principles" or theories of governmental structures and socio-economic characteristics through the existing empirical data.

## Political Structures

### Forms of Local Government

The nature of political structures apparently has some effect upon the extent to which the electorate participates in various political activities. Political structures define, identify, channel and restrict the sundry political acts which the electorate is permitted to perform. Not only do political structures guide participation, they also affect governmental performance in various policy output areas.<sup>1</sup> "It must be readily admitted that there is a close and direct relationship between the form of government and its performances."<sup>2</sup> Richard G. Childs observed "that differences in political performance in cities can be attributed to one factor - structure."<sup>3</sup>

Robert Salisbury in his study of St. Louis politics found that the structure of local government tends to shape the goals, tactics, and behavior of local parties, interest groups, and the political environment in which they

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<sup>1</sup> Lewis Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," Journal of Politics, 29 (February, 1967), 94-108; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables," American Political Science Review, 60 (March, 1966), 73-82; Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 706; and Charles Adrian, Governing Urban America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 198.

<sup>2</sup> George S. Blair, American Local Government (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 205.

<sup>3</sup> Civic Victories (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), 57.

function.<sup>4</sup> "Form and structure distribute advantages and disadvantages among the participants, authorizing and denying, giving formal opportunities to control areas of policy to some and denying them to others."<sup>5</sup>

The structural components of government are instruments designed primarily for facilitating the attainment of certain objectives. Among these objectives are the provision of services and goods to the people and providing for the overall welfare of the people. When a particular form of government fails to adequately meet the needs and wants of the people, circumstances dictate that it be modified or changed and that a different governmental form be instituted. Historically, as the United States became urbanized and the life style of the people subsequently changed, the structures of urban government underwent alteration or modification in an effort to meet the challenges of increased responsibilities. Each modification in the structure of government had certain political implications for power distribution in the internal framework of government and among the various segments of the population. Although such modifications cannot be considered as definite determining factors in urban political relationships, they must be given their just weight as conditioning factors.

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<sup>4</sup>Robert Salisbury, "St. Louis Politics: Relationship Among Interests, Parties, and Governmental Structure," Western Political Quarterly, 13 (June 1960), 498-507.

<sup>5</sup>Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (New York: Macmillan Co., 1963), 326.

When the United States gained its independence in 1776, only three percent of the population lived in urban or non-rural communities.<sup>6</sup> The percent of population in incorporated areas was even less. Urban political structures were modeled after the type of system with which the colonists had been familiar in England - the mayor-council government. However, the specific pattern which this type of government assumed varied from one city to another as much as it does today. But, basically the mayor had no veto power and practically no executive power. The mayor's primary function was that of presiding over the council.<sup>7</sup> The mayor-council form of government was the universal form prior to the twentieth century.

There emerged in the early nineteenth century, a philosophy affecting very much the existing urban political structures. This was the philosophy of

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 71.

<sup>7</sup>For early development of the mayor-council government, see John A. Fairlie, Municipal Administration (New York: MacMillan Company, 1901), Chapters 5 and 19; Frank J. Goodnow, City Government in the United States (New York: The Century Company, 1904), **Chapters** 3 and 8; Ernest S. Griffith, History of American City Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938); William B. Munro, Municipal Government and Administration, I (New York: MacMillan Company, 1930), Chapter 19; William B. Munro, The Government of American Cities, 3rd ed. (New York: MacMillan Company, 1920), Chapter 1.

Jacksonian Democracy.<sup>8</sup> The principles of Jacksonian Democracy were government by the common man and the belief that any man could hold public office as no special qualifications were needed. This notion led to the development of the idea of universal white manhood suffrage. These ideas were accompanied by the view that public office-holders, as servants of the people, should be elected, not appointed. Inevitably, a proliferation of elective offices occurred. This practice eventually resulted in a further weakening of the already weak powers of the mayor. Consequently, there developed by the middle of the 19th century what is known as the "weak-mayor plan"\* where the mayor was hamstrung by Jacksonian democracy and Madisonian checks and balances. "The structural form of this pattern still reflects the ideology that officeholders should be many in number, have few powers, and that there should be checks upon their exercise of these powers."<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Arthur Bromage, Introduction to Municipal Government and Administration (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957), 14-15; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1945); Jewel Cass Phillips, Municipal Government and Administration (New York: MacMillan Company, 1960), 19; Adrian, op. cit., 73.

\*The characteristic features of the weak-mayor plan are: (1) a council which exercises both legislative and executive powers; (2) a mayor with no control over administration; (3) a small council; and (4) an array of boards and commissions which are independent of each other. Basically, the mayor is weak because he lacks administrative power and he is also restricted by the council. This situation leads to immobilisme. These four points were taken from Blair, op. cit., 206.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.



With the municipal executive immobilized between the Scylla of Jacksonian Democracy and the Charybdis of Madisonian checks and balances in a period when the requirements of governmental action were increasing geometrically, the avenue was paved for another organization to perform the necessary functions of the city. Robert Merton observed that whenever formal institutions fail to discharge their functions, informal institutions developed to perform them.<sup>10</sup> The informal organization which developed was the political machine with a boss as its leader.<sup>11</sup> Political machines were able through informal methods to satisfy those needs which the formal governmental structure was prevented from doing. Sait observed that, "when the people or particular groups among them demanded positive action, no one had adequate authority to act. The machine provided an antidote."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), 72-82.

<sup>11</sup> For an in depth discussion of the machine and its operation see, "City Bosses and Political Machines," The Annals (May, 1964); F. R. Kent, The Great Game of Politics, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1923); W. L. Riordon, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1905); Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York: McClure, Phillips and Co., 1904); and Harold Zink, City Bosses in the United States, (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1930).

<sup>12</sup> Edward M. Sait, "Machine, Political," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 9 (Chicago, 1908), 658.

Although political bosses and machines have been widely vilified and crucified, the fact remains that they did perform necessary social functions in their day. According to Merton, the machine humanized and personalized social welfare; afforded businesses, including illicit ones, privileges that they needed in order to survive; provided an avenue of social mobility for persons to whom other avenues were closed; and was the panacea to the constitutional dispersal of power.<sup>13</sup> The machine made extraordinary use of universal suffrage. It increased electoral participation through seeing that every eligible male was registered and that he voted on election day. The machines performed services for which it expected in return the vote of the recipient on election day.

The excesses of the political machine led to its demise and to what Richard Hofstadter called an Age of Reform.<sup>14</sup> Municipal government had severely declined in prestige as a result of alleged corruption, inefficiency, extravagance and ineptitude. For these and many other "evils," the city boss and the machine were indicted. Motivated by the corruption and mismanagement in government, well meaning but inexperienced reformers "began their efforts

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<sup>13</sup>Merton, op. cit. Also see Adrian, op. cit., 147-150.

<sup>14</sup>Vintage Books, (New York, 1955).

to reclaim city government from the boss and the political machine as early as the 1870's."<sup>15</sup> The ills of city government were diagnosed by the reformers as a natural result of a structure of government which recruited those persons who were susceptible to corruption. The reformers argued that the governmental structure which existed in the cities were those designed for a rural setting with its intimate relationship and that for a complex urban environment, the old political structures were an anachronism, that such structures did not effectively deal with the monumental and difficult tasks accompanying urbanization, and that consequently a political boss could easily capture city government and bring minimum order of the existing administrative chaos.

In an effort to "return government to the people" and make it accountable to them, a national movement of municipal reform was founded. With the founding of the National Municipal League in 1894, the movement was coordinated under that organization. This was a movement spearheaded by the aroused middle-class whose primary goals were eliminating corruption, increasing efficiency, bringing some measure of economy to local government and making local government more democratic. The reformers were guided by a middle-class ethos or ideology "which sees politics as a means of moralizing life and

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<sup>15</sup>Adrian, op. cit., 79.

which attaches great importance to the individuals' obligation to 'serve' the public."<sup>16</sup> The reformers conceptualized their program as: (1) putting the electorate in the position to assert its will despite professional politicians; (2) simplifying the voters' tasks, improving his information and exhorting him to his civic duty; (3) checking the tide of immigration; and (4) separating the "business" of city government from state and national politics; (5) weakening the power of neighborhoods and other partial interests; and (6) strengthening the executive.<sup>17</sup> The reformers assumed that the structures of government could be so manipulated that "good people" would control the government. They believed that reformed structures would allow government to run like a corporation, e.g., on the basis of scientific management and administrative efficiency. Reform was manifested in two basic ways: (1) "through efforts to 'throw the rascals out' and to put honest men in office and (2) through efforts to improve the structure of municipal government and to increase administrative efficiency."<sup>18</sup>

But, the reformers belatedly realized that even if they did elect "good" men as mayors and councilmen, these officials were still hamstrung by the

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<sup>16</sup> Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 139.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 140-141.

<sup>18</sup> Harold A. Stone, Don Price and Kathryn Stone, City Manager Government in the United States, (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), 3.

existing systems of government. The leaders of the reform movement were subsequently aware of the fact that the structures of local government could prevent political and administrative reforms and they therefore attempted to devise a form not amenable to control by party.

In response to the demand for a modern type of government - a government which was capable of meeting the exigencies of a complex urban environment, the reformers proposed, in the first reform, the strong-mayor-council plan.<sup>19</sup> A version of this plan was first put into effect in Brooklyn in 1880. The mayor was invested with the sole power to appoint and dismiss department heads. For the first time, there was an integrated administrative structure. Virtually complete control for administrative responsibility was in the hands of the mayor. The mayor shared policy-making with the council. Furthermore, he was completely responsible for his budget.

The strong-mayor plan was so successful in Brooklyn that it subsequently was adopted in New York City, Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, Denver, and San

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<sup>19</sup> Technically, this form is not considered a reformed structure. But, because it was an effective alternative to the old weak-mayor plan, it is inserted at this point. For discussion of reformed and unreformed structures see Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 706.



Francisco. The reformers considered the strong-mayor plan a much more pragmatic and organized approach to the problems of urbanization. This plan was conducive to the satisfaction of the particular ethnic, neighborhood interests in the city for voters voted for a mayor who shared their policy preferences. The mayor was quite aware of this quid pro quo relationship and governed accordingly. With the diversity of interests represented in the city the strong-mayor plan seemed most amenable to their articulation and satisfaction.

However, the strong-mayor form of government had many weaknesses. Although the mayor had the authority to utilize sound principles and techniques of management and to appoint and remove subordinates without interference, he was somewhat circumscribed by obligations he had incurred during his election. Debts to individuals, parties and various groups were paid in the form of appointments and other favors which severely limited the performance level of the government. Furthermore, the electorate very often elected an amateur rather than professional administrator. Lastly, the strong-mayor plan failed to effect a separation between politics and administration which was thought to be necessary for an efficient, economical, and impartial administration. However, the strong-mayor plan presently predominates in large urban and metropolitan areas.

The notion of improving municipal government through the utilization of business techniques and principles was more closely applied in the development

of the commission plan in the first decade of the twentieth century. The commission plan grew out of an unusual circumstance in the city of Galveston, Texas. In September, 1900, a hurricane all but destroyed the city and in the process of rebuilding the city, local government was suspended by the state legislature. This was done because it was necessary to dispense with the red tape of dealing with the local councilmanic body of fifty-four members. William Munro observed that "while the city lay prostrate its elective officers fell to wrangling among themselves over the awarding of contracts for clearing away the ruins."<sup>20</sup> Substituted in place of the mayor-council government was a temporary government of five local businessmen - the Galveston Commission.<sup>21</sup> This commission stabilized the situation and got the city on its feet. In 1903 in a new charter, an effort was made to retain the commission system since it had been extremely effective. The charter called for a commission composed of five members - three appointed by the governor and two elected by the people. This procedure was ruled unconstitutional by the court, but the legislature subsequently authorized that all commissioners be elective.

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<sup>20</sup>William B. Munro, City Government by Commission (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1914), 13-14.

<sup>21</sup>For detailed information on the commission see Munro, Ibid. and T. S. Chang, History and Analysis of the Commission Municipal Government in the United States (Iowa City: University of Iowa, 1918).

Consequently, the commission form of government was launched as a new type of governmental structure to deal with the problem of urbanization.

Because of the tremendous success of the commission plan in Galveston, other cities were soon attracted to it. Houston, which faced a financial crisis because of mismanagement quickly adopted the plan. But, not only did other cities in Texas adopt the commission structure of government, cities in other parts of the country adopted it. In Des Moines such reform devices as non-partisan elections, referendum, initiative and recall were added. By 1910, 108 cities had gravitated towards the commission system and the number increased to 500 by 1917.

However, following 1917, a dramatic shift took place as municipal reformers lost interest in the commission form of government and its use subsequently declined. This decline might be accounted for, in part, by the creation of the council-manager system of government in 1914 and its subsequent popularity. Many cities which abandoned the commission plan switched to the council-manager plan.<sup>22</sup>

The following table provides a brief picture of the decline of the commission government between the years 1941-1968.

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<sup>22</sup>Adrian, op. cit., 218; Phillips, op. cit., 297-298; Bromage, op. cit.,

TABLE I  
COMMISSION GOVERNMENT IN CITIES OVER 5,000 POPULATION  
SINCE 1940

Year	Total No. of Cities	Total No. of Comm. Cities	Percent
1941	2,033	332	16.3
1945	2,033	327	16.1
1950	2,033	302	14.9
1955	2,527	356	14.1
1960	2,562	309	12.0
1965	3,051	237	7.9
1968	2,985	190	6.4

SOURCE: Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1943-68).

There has been a steady decrease in the percentage of cities which have the commission system of government. Between the years 1941-1968, the percentage decline was nearly 10 percent.

The main advantages of the commission system were considered to be that government could be simple, for all power was concentrated in a few hands; that with the short ballot voters elect only a few officials, which would allow greater control by the citizen, more democracy, and permit the voters to elect better qualified candidates which would result in better government; that government could be run as a corporation for the commission resembled a

corporate business organization; that the elimination of separation of powers and checks and balances would be conducive to the government responding expeditiously to the people's demands for governmental service; that leading citizens would be willing to serve as commissioners, thus elevating the standard for officeholders and providing better government; and that commissioners would be elected on a non-partisan ballot.<sup>23</sup> These professed advantages more than anything else struck a death knell for political machines in municipal politics, for ward elections and party labels would be abolished.

However, many of the features which were worshipped as the commission's strong points turned out to be its most glaring weaknesses. The commission government failed to provide a brake on government spending. The same commissioners who appropriated money spent it as heads of departments. Commissioners were often inadequately equipped as administrators. There was no provision for an organizational distinction between the policy-making function. There was no single person responsible for executive leadership. And lastly, the commission plan was "so conducive to buck-passing that although the voter needs to make only five choices at the polls, he (did) not know whom to

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<sup>23</sup> Adrian, op. cit.; Blair, op. cit.; Munro, City Government by Commission, op. cit.; Thomas Reed, Municipal Government in the United States (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1934); Bromage, op. cit.



blame for bad government or to praise for good government."<sup>24</sup>

Nevertheless, the commission system was an astonishingly radical departure from the prevailing forms of government at the turn of the century. The main feature which distinguished it from traditional municipal politics was the complete abandonment of separation of powers. But, as Adrian observed in discussing the plan, "outmoded structures of government live beyond the time when they are needed, as do all human institutions which suffer the rigidity of being organized on a formal basis. There is no future for the commission structure of government. Those commission cities that remain do so as a result of apathy or because office-holders have a vested interest in the status quo."<sup>25</sup>

The council-manager form of government was devised to meet the deficiencies of the commission system. Although, the commissioners could very easily determine policy, they often lacked the competence to direct the daily complex problems of administration. The council-manager plan was seen not only as a replacement for the commission plan, but as a remedy for the difficulties experienced by other forms of municipal government.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Forms of Municipal Government (New York: National Municipal League, 1939), 4.

<sup>25</sup>Adrian, op. cit., 218.

<sup>26</sup>Story of the Council-Manager Plan (New York: National Municipal League, 1940), 12; Ibid., Forms of Municipal Government (New York: National Municipal League, 1959), 12.

The exact origin of the council-manager system is a matter of some dispute. Both Staunton, Virginia and Sumter, South Carolina claim to be the first city to institute the council-manager form. In deciding on a new form of government to replace its weak-mayor, bicameral council system, Staunton in 1908 chose the general manager type.

However, Richard S. Childs, who at that time was secretary of the National Short Ballot Organization, was mainly responsible for the development and popularizing of the council-manager plan. Childs blamed politicians and the governmental structure for municipal corruption and he believed "that by tinkering with the mechanics of government its control could be taken from the boss and the machine and returned to the people."<sup>27</sup> It has been said that the "city manager plan was the result of the combination of two experiments, the commission plan and the Staunton plan. Richard Childs was the minister who performed the ceremony that united the two."<sup>28</sup>

This ceremony occurred in 1911 in Lockport, New York when Childs drafted a city charter combining provisions for a city-manager with provisions for a commission government. However, this model charter was rejected by the

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<sup>27</sup> John East Porter, Council-Manager Government: The Political Thought of Its Founder, Richard S. Childs (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 21.

<sup>28</sup> Stone, Price and Stone, op. cit., 9.

state legislature, but it "became the basic model for all future manager charters."<sup>29</sup> Therefore, Sumter, South Carolina is credited with putting into effect the first genuine council-manager plan the following year. This new form of government received its greatest impetus and greatest publicity in 1914 when Dayton, Ohio put it into operation. The council-manager system was firmly endorsed by the National Municipal League and with this endorsement, the national movement to gain acceptance for the plan was underway.

The use of the council-manager form of government by municipalities increased progressively until today it is used by 43 percent of cities with over 5,000 population and in more than 50 percent of cities with populations between 25,000 and 250,000.<sup>30</sup>

The following two tables provide information on the growth of the council-manager plan in all cities between 1915 and 1960 and the growth of the plan in cities with over 5,000 population between 1941-1968.

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<sup>29</sup>Reed, op. cit., 205.

<sup>30</sup>Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1968), 54.

TABLE II  
GROWTH OF THE COUNCIL-MANAGER PLAN<sup>31</sup>

YEAR	NUMBER
1915	49
1920	158
1925	297
1930	388
1935	451
1940	506
1945	590
1950	900
1955	1,170
1960	1,682

SOURCE: Information acquired from Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1941-1968).

<sup>31</sup>Adrian, op. cit., 220; Story of the Council-Manager Plan, op. cit., .

TABLE III

## COUNCIL-MANAGER PLAN IN CITIES OVER 5,000 POPULATION

YEAR	Total No. of Cities	Total No. of Council-Manager Cities	Percent
1941	2,033	315	15.5
1945	2,033	350	17.3
1950	2,033	495	24.3
1955	2,527	764	30.3
1960	2,562	931	38.0
1965	3,051	1,202	40.0
1968	2,985	1,283	43.0

SOURCE: Information acquired from Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1941-1968).



The two strongest advantages claimed for the council-manager form of government were that: (1) there is complete concentration of administrative authority and responsibility in the hands of the manager; and (2) there is a separation of politics or legislation from administration for the legislative function is exercised by the council and the administrative function is in the hands of the manager. Other advantages claimed were (1) no separation of powers or checks and balanced; (2) professionalization of administration; and (3) a structure of government which can be easily understood by the people, thereby facilitating accountability from elected representatives.

Harold Stone and similarly-minded colleagues have suggested that the general purpose of the leading advocates of the council-manager plan was to "have the city government devote its energies more effectively toward getting work done for the community and toward wasting less of its money and effort on incidental or factional purposes."<sup>32</sup> To achieve this, the advocates proposed three political ideas.<sup>33</sup> First, the idea that the most capable and public spirited citizens should serve on the governing body as representatives of the city at large, to determine policies for the benefit of the community as a whole rather than for a party, faction or neighborhood. This idea was embodied in the non-

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<sup>32</sup>Stone, et. al., "The Theory of Government," in Edward C. Banfield, Urban Government (New York: Free Press, 1969), 322.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

partisan ballot and in the system of election at large of a small council. Second, the idea that municipal administration should be delegated to a thoroughly competent, trained executive, who should get and hold his job on his executive ability alone. This idea was embodied in the concentration of administrative authority in the city manager. Third, the idea that voters should hold only the councilmen politically responsible and should give the city manager a status of permanence and neutrality in political controversy. This idea was embodied in the unification of powers in the council as a body comprising the only elected officials in the city government.

Reformers have accorded the council-manager plan an inordinate amount of praise, but the plan has also been subject to criticism. The critics argued that various groups, e.g., racial and geographical interests, ought to be represented on the council since a small council consisting largely of renown community leaders was unrepresentative, ergo undemocratic. Critics also argued that the undemocratic nature of the plan was reflected in the fact that the manager was non-elective, thus resulting in the manager being irresponsible to the will of the public and hence beyond public control. The fact that the manager was appointed by and was accountable to a body elected by the people, namely the council, did not pacify the critics. Another objection to the council-manager system was that there was no political leadership - a basic requirement in the

policy formulation.<sup>34</sup> It was assumed that the mayor, usually a figurehead in manager cities, would be the political leader while the manager concentrated on administrative matters, but experience has proven otherwise.<sup>35</sup> There were other objections to the council-manager system, but the undemocratic and lack of political leadership arguments were probably the two most common ones.

From the standpoint of honesty, impartiality, and efficiency, the council-manager form of government seems to be a qualified success, save for a few exceptions.<sup>36</sup> However, advocates of the system erroneously assumed that politics could be separated from administration. In reviewing what happened in Dayton, Childs observed, "politics blew out of the window when Dayton's first city manager blew in."<sup>37</sup> But, no clear and sharp distinction can be made between politics and administration for one blends into the other. Furthermore, if politics is the "allocation of scarce resources" and the manager administers this allocation, he is ipso facto engaging in politics. Karl Bosworth stated that

<sup>34</sup>On problems of political leadership in manager cities see Charles R. Adrian, "Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities: A Study of Three Communities," Public Administration Review, 18 (Summer, 1958), 208-222.

<sup>35</sup>Clyde Snider, American State and Local Government (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), 406-407.

<sup>36</sup>Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics, op. cit., 185.

<sup>37</sup>Childs, Civic Victories, op. cit., 148.

"council-manager government, by placing the manager directly in public view, accentuates public interest in how this kind of bureaucrat operates as a political leader." He went on to say that "where managers are used, let us think of them as officers of general administrative direction and political leadership, for that is what they are."<sup>38</sup>

"The council-manager plan. . . suffers from some weaknesses as do all human institutions. It has, however so satisfied the bulk of voters in cities using it that, once adopted abandonments are rare."<sup>39</sup>

In summary there are three principal forms of municipal government which exist in the United States at present; mayor-council, council-manager and commission. Table IV gives the distribution of forms of government by population categories.

Of the 2,985 cities reporting, 50.6 percent have mayor-council government, 6.4 percent have commission government and 43.0 percent have the council-manager form. Mayor-council governments are quite prevalent in the large and small population categories, while council-manager governments are popular in the middle-sized cities.

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<sup>38</sup>"The Manager is a Politician," Public Administration Review, 18 (Summer, 1958), 216-222.

<sup>39</sup>Adrian, Governing Urban America, op. cit., 228.

TABLE IV  
FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN CITIES OVER 5, 000 POPULATION

Population Group	Total No. Cities in Table	Mayor-Council		Commission		Council-Manager	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Over 500,000	27	22 <sup>1</sup>	81.5	--	--	5	18.5
250,000-500,000	27	11	40.7	3	11.1	13	48.2
100,000-250,000	93	33	35.5	10	10.7	50	53.8
50,000-100,000	215	83	38.6	16	7.4	116	54.0
25,000-50,000	439	116	38.2	40	9.2	233	53.6
10,000-25,000	1,072	511	47.7	73	6.8	488	45.5
5,000-10,000	1,112	686	61.7	48	4.3	378	34.0
All cities over 5,000	2,985	1,513 <sup>1</sup>	50.6	190	6.4	1,283	43.0

<sup>1</sup>Includes Washington, D. C.

Not included in this table are 89 cities with town meeting government, 38 with representative town meeting government.

SOURCE: Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1968), Table I, 54.



## Electoral Systems

### Nonpartisanship

One significant political change accompanying the manager plan of government was nonpartisan elections.<sup>40</sup> (As indicated in Chapter 2, nonpartisan elections refer to elections in which party labels are not printed on the ballot.) Nonpartisan elections are used in 64.9 percent of the cities with over 5,000 population. Where the nonpartisan ballot is used, it is most often connected with commission or council-manager governments and with the at-large system of representation. The nonpartisan ballot is found in 82.3 percent of cities over 5,000 population with manager governments, 49.2 percent of mayor-council cities and 69.5 percent of commission cities.<sup>41</sup> Nonpartisanship spread also to judicial offices and even to two state legislatures - Minnesota and Nebraska. However, it is most widely used on the local level for city elections.

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<sup>40</sup>The development of the nonpartisan ballot actually began before the municipal reform movement. For a detailed history of this development see Eugene Lee, Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960).

<sup>41</sup>Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1968).

Tables V and VI provide an indication on the use of nonpartisanship in certain population categories and by the various types of government.

The nonpartisan ballot was adopted by reformers as a means of divorcing local politics from state and national issues. Reformers had argued that city government was primarily a matter of efficiency and "good business" and therefore had nothing in common with state and national politics. If local government was a "business operation," it followed that local officials should be more businessmen than politicians. Therefore, nonpartisanship was an effective means to recruit the "good people" of the city, i.e., those in the upper and middle class, who would not ordinarily associate themselves with local government because of partisan wranglings. "It was. . . assumed that if the boss were denied his chance to use the party ticket to elect his crew, then the boss system would disappear. Thus it was proposed that city elections be held without benefit of party labels so that honest citizens would have a chance to win office without having to win the favor of the minions of the party machine."<sup>42</sup> Childs observed that with nonpartisan elections combined with the short ballot, the "voter can accumulate and carry in his head his brief list of personal preferences and do without guidance of party names and symbols on

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<sup>42</sup>Lockard, op. cit., 226-227.

TABLE V  
NONPARTISANSHIP IN CITIES OVER 5,000 POPULATION

Population Category	No. of Cities Reporting	Percent Partisan	Percent Nonpartisan
Over 500,000	24	41.7	58.3
250,000-500,000	25	24.0	76.0
100,000-250,000	90	41.1	58.9
50,000-100,000	208	31.7	68.3
25,000- 50,000	427	33.3	66.7
10,000- 25,000	1,057	34.4	65.6
5,000- 10,000	1,049	36.9	63.1
All cities over 5,000	2,880	35.1	64.9

SOURCE: Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1968).

TABLE VI  
NONPARTISANSHIP AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Form of Government	No. of Cities Reporting	Percent Partisan	Percent Nonpartisan
Mayor-Council	1,387	50.8	49.2
Council-Manager	1,229	17.7	82.3
Commission	174	30.5	69.5
Town Meeting	62	43.5	56.5
Representative Town Meeting	28	39.3	60.7

SOURCE: Municipal Year Book (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1968).

the ballot or voting machine."<sup>43</sup> Thus, the voter would be able to make a rational, better-informed choice of candidates.

Empirical evidence has failed to support many of these assumptions which endeared the reformers to nonpartisanship. Charles Adrian found that where nonpartisanship existed, the following patterns of elections may be found:<sup>44</sup> "elections where the only candidates who normally have any chance of being elected are those supported directly by a major political party organization";<sup>45</sup> "elections where slates of candidates are supported by various groups, including political party organization";<sup>46</sup> "elections where slates of candidates are supported by various interest groups, but political party organizations have little or no part in campaign, or are active only sporadically";<sup>47</sup> and "elections

<sup>43</sup> National Municipal League, "500 Non-Political Elections," (1948), 172.

<sup>44</sup> "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections," Western Political Quarterly, 12 (June, 1959), 449-458.

<sup>45</sup> Voters in Boston, Chicago and Detroit are well aware of the candidates' party. Therefore, candidates feel free to accept the support of their party.

<sup>46</sup> For an account of this phenomenon see Marvin Harder, Nonpartisan Election: A Political Illusion? (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1958).

<sup>47</sup> See J. Lieper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and 'A Case Analysis,'" American Journal of Sociology, 64 (1958), 282-289; G. W. Pearson, "Prediction in a Nonpartisan Election," Public Opinion Quarterly, 12 (Spring, 1948), 115; Robert Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and Party in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," American Political Science Review, LVI I (September, 1963), 584-592; and Lee, op. cit.



where neither political parties nor slates of candidates are important in campaigns." This latter situation results in what Eugene Lee calls "politics of acquaintance." Candidates will attempt to fashion an organization comprised of friends, neighbors, relatives, business associates and professional colleagues.

Although nonpartisanship has presumably weakened political parties, it has created a situation in which special interest groups and other loyalties influence local government. Gerald Pomper found in Newark that nonpartisan elections changed the lines of electoral cleavage.<sup>48</sup> Instead of cleavage being based on party loyalties, ethnic affiliation of voters were most influential. Pomper stated that "the goal of its advocates - to emancipate municipal elections from 'tyranny of the national and state political parties' - has been fulfilled. On the other hand, nonpartisanship has not succeeded in creating a model electorate, one which makes its decision free of any group influences. In fact the displacement of party ties may simply result in the substitution of other influences."<sup>49</sup> Morlan bluntly stated that "nonpartisanship results in government by pressure groups - labor unions, business associates, etc. -

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<sup>48</sup> Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal Elections, "Public Opinion Quarterly, 30 (Spring, 1966), 79.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 95.

rather than parties at the city level."<sup>50</sup>

Advocates of nonpartisanship also naively assumed that with parties divorced from local politics, local voting could be based upon local issues. But, the fact is that discussion of local issues have been avoided in campaigns. Instead, candidates have spoken only in vague generalities and the personalities of candidates have become of great importance. Because candidates must appeal to the whole electorate, they steer clear of controversial matters, ergo important issues.

Some investigators doubt the separation of partisan politics from local voting<sup>51</sup> with the use of nonpartisan elections. Williams and Adrian, in their study of nonpartisan elections in four Michigan cities, discovered that voters who voted in local nonpartisan election for slates of candidates were also very likely to vote for partisan candidates on the state level. They also found that minority party candidates had a better chance of winning against the majority party candidate in nonpartisan elections than in partisan elections. Also, in nonpartisan cities where Democrats predominate, persons who vote Republican

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<sup>50</sup> Robert Morlan, "The Unorganized Politics of Minneapolis," National Municipal Review (now National Civic Review), (November, 1949), 485-490.

<sup>51</sup> Oliver Williams and Charles Adrian, "The Insulation of Local Politics Under the Nonpartisan Ballot," American Political Science Review, 53 (December 1959), 1052-63; Salisbury and Black, op. cit.; Charles E. Gilbert, "Some Aspects of Nonpartisan Elections in Large Cities," Midwest Journal of Politics, 6 (1962), 345-62.

regularly would gain an "increased voice in local affairs." Gilbert's findings support the latter point of view, at least in large cities. He similarly discovered that nonpartisan elections favored the Republicans and the conservative forces, as a whole, in city politics. Salisbury and Black concluded that despite the nonpartisan format of local elections. . . and despite a relative absence of overt electioneering by party organization or partisan identification of candidates, cleavages are manifested in local campaigns which bear a close resemblance to partisan cleavages in the community."<sup>52</sup>

It is highly doubtful that the aim of 'better' candidates have been achieved. Exactly what is meant by 'better' has never been clarified. However, if 'better' means more representative, clearly experience has not proven this to be the case. If anything, the representative nature of local politics has been narrowed under nonpartisanship.

In his study of nonpartisan elections, Adrian concluded that non-partisanship has the following characteristics which he offered as propositions:<sup>53</sup>

(1) it tends to weaken parties wherever it is in operation; (2) because voters distinguish between partisan and nonpartisan participation, officeholders are divided along these same lines and are required to separate their partisan and

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<sup>52</sup> op. cit.

<sup>53</sup> Charles Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections," American Political Science Review, 46 (September, 1952), 766-76.

nonpartisan activity; (3) nonpartisanship restricts the avenues for the recruitment of candidates for partisan offices and nonpartisan offices alike; (4) funds for financing nonpartisan and partisan campaigns are segregated; (5) methods of fund-raising by candidates for nonpartisan offices are hampered; (6) it encourages the avoidance of issues in campaigns; (7) it does not make allowance for protest voting; (8) nonpartisanship benefits incumbents; and (9) there is no collective responsibility in a nonpartisan body.

Although nonpartisanship may have contributed to the "good government" aim of municipal reformers and is highly regarded today by modern municipal reformers, Nathan Mathews made an excellent point when he commented, "as a city is a political institution, the people in the end will divide into parties; and it would seem extremely doubtful whether the present system (partisanship), however illogical its foundation be, does not in fact produce better results, at least in large cities, than if voters were divided into groups separated by property, social or religious bounds."<sup>54</sup>

#### Socio-Economic Characteristics and Their Relationship To Governmental Form and Electoral System

The prestige of municipal government had plummeted to such low ebb in the late 1800's that Lord Bryce unsympathetically characterized the cities as

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<sup>54</sup>Quoted in Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, op. cit., 154.

"like the sick man who cannot find rest upon his own bed, but seeks to ease his pain by moving from side to side."<sup>55</sup> Indeed, there was hardly one city in the United States unscarred by the tentacles of corruption in the form of kickbacks, extravagant spending and paid officeholders. The muckraker, Lincoln Steffens could appropriately write the book, Shame of the Cities,<sup>56</sup> and Lord Bryce could also speak of the government in American cities as "the one conspicuous failure of the United States."<sup>57</sup>

A half century later, a pessimistic Robert S. Allen stated it more bluntly, although municipal government at mid-20th century was a somewhat different apparatus. Allen wrote that local government "is a reeking shambles of corruption, incompetence, waste and misrule."<sup>58</sup>

However, it cannot be stated unequivocally that municipal government was a total failure, for the much needed goods and services and other functions were provided by the urban political machines.<sup>59</sup> But, in a number of ways urban political machines only benefited the very rich and the very poor. The

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<sup>55</sup> James Bryce, American Commonwealth (New York: MacMillan Co., 1891), 619-620.

<sup>56</sup> Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York: Hill and Wang, 1904).

<sup>57</sup> Bryce, op. cit., 608.

<sup>58</sup> Robert S. Allen, Our Fair City, (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), 3.

<sup>59</sup> For a good discussion on this point see Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1957), 71-81.



middle-class, many of whom were businessmen and professionals were excluded, although they were continuously confronted with increased taxation. Therefore, much of the opposition to machines came from the middle-class. In some cases, this group began to govern the cities and control the machines from the state house.<sup>60</sup> But, in most instances, middle-class leaders initiated local reform movements for the purpose of introducing a style of government with emphasis on efficiency, honesty and economy.

The desire of the middle-class for "good government" did not entirely emanate from what they felt were the evils of bossism and machines. They also had a natural disdain towards the immigrants. Richard Hofstadter provided the best analysis of the clash of these two cultures in the Age of Reform:

Out of the clash between the needs of the immigrants and the sentiments of the natives there emerged two thoroughly different systems of political ethics. . . . One founded upon the indigenous Yankee-Protestant political traditions, and upon Middle-class life, assumed and demanded the constant disinterested activity of the citizen in public affairs, argued that political life ought to be run, to a greater degree than it was, in accordance with general principles and abstract laws apart from and superior to personal needs, and expressed a common feeling that government should be in good part an effort to moralize the lives of individuals while economic life should be

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<sup>60</sup> In Boston, after the Irish immigrants took control of City Hall, the Yankees tried to govern Boston from the State House. For example, the police commissioner was appointed by the governor until 1962.

intimately related to the stimulation and development of individual character. The other system, founded upon the European background of the immigrants, upon their familiarity with independent political action, their familiarity with hierarchy and authority, and upon the urgent needs that so often grew out of their migration, took for granted that political life of the individual would arise out of family needs interpreted political civic relations chiefly in terms of personal obligations and placed strong personal loyalties above allegiance to abstract codes of laws or morals.<sup>61</sup>

The middle-class style of politics which resulted from its particular political ethos<sup>62</sup> was basically different and incompatible from the immigrant's style of politics. Therefore, reform politics - an outcome of the incompatibility between the two ethics - was spearheaded and supported by Anglo-Saxon Protestant middle-class residents of the city.

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<sup>61</sup> (New York: Knopf, 1955), 8-9.

<sup>62</sup> For a treatment of the political ethos theory see, Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963); ibid., "Public Regardiness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review, 58 (December, 1964), 884; and Raymond Wolfinger and John O. Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 306-326.

This clash of ethics was reflected in the different types of political structures favored by the middle-class as compared to those favored by the immigrants. Although, "it would be unwise to assert that there is a simple casual relationship between public attitudes toward a particular governmental feature and the likelihood that feature will be adopted,"<sup>63</sup> it is safe to conclude that there is a proclivity for the "middle-class ethos" to favor one type of governmental form and the "immigrant ethos" another type. It is suggested then that the middle-class conception of politics with its emphasis on honesty and impartiality, implies an institutional arrangement of government of non-partisanship, council-manager government and at large elections.<sup>64</sup> The immigrant's notion of politics, based on familial relationship, idea of neighborhood, private interest to be fulfilled by seeking aid of politician, implies ward elections, mayor-council government and partisanship.

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<sup>63</sup>Wolfinger and Field, op. cit., 311.

<sup>64</sup>I am assuming, as Banfield and Wilson did that the middle-class has a public-regarding ethos i.e., concern for the public or civic interest while the immigrants have a private-regarding ethos, i.e., concern for private or individual interest.

## Socio-Economic Characteristics and Local Government Structures

This historical review has suggested then that there is a tendency for certain types of political structures to be located in a particular kind of socio-economic environment.

But what political structures are likely to be located in a particular kind of socio-economic environment?

Studies by John Kessel, Banfield and Wilson, Schnore and Alford, and Alford and Scoble and Lineberry and Fowler and Liebman have all in some way shown that council-manager governments were likely to be located in environments of low percentage non-white, high income, low proportion of foreign born and persons over 65 years of age, high proportion of white collar workers, high educational level, rapid growth and medium-size cities. Environments where mayor-council governments were found manifested opposite characteristics.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> John H. Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment," American Political Science Review, 56 (September, 1962), 616; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Suburbs," Administrative Science Quarterly, (June, 1963), 1-17; Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political and Socio-economic Characteristics of American Cities," Municipal Year Book (1965), 82-97; Banfield and Wilson, op. cit.; Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 701; Charles Liebman, "Functional Differentiation and Political Characteristics of Suburbs," American Journal of Sociology, 66 (March, 1961), 485-491; Edgar Sherbenou, "Class Participation and the Council-Manager Plan," Public Administration Review (Summer, 1961), 131-135.

Charles Liebman studied thirty-three cities and twenty-one suburbs with over 10,000 population in the Chicago metropolitan area. Liebman wanted to determine whether functional types of cities, e.g., manufacturing and retail trade, vary with respect to manager or non-manager government and partisan and nonpartisan elections. For example, do manufacturing cities have manager governments and nonpartisan elections? He found that there was some variance in functional types with respect to form of government and partisan vote but it was statistically insignificant. Liebman was compelled to conclude that at least some structural and institutional characteristics of governments did not vary with respect to the city's function.<sup>66</sup> To phrase this another way, the form of government and the type of elections did not correlate with the variance in the functional types of cities.

John Kessel studied all cities in the United States between 25,000 and 250,000 population to discern if there was an affinity between the governmental structure and the political environment. The three basic forms of municipal government constituted the governmental structure and indicators of the political environment were community size, city growth rate, percent of foreign born and economic base. Kessel found that there is a correlation between a particular environment, i.e., certain types of cities are likely to

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid.



have certain types of governmental forms. For example, mayor-council governments predominate in large and small cities, while manager government is used largely by medium-size cities. Although, Kessel demonstrated a connection between environment and governmental form, he was unable to prove that connection necessarily follows. His inability to do such results partially from the fact that there are many reasons why a particular environment adopts a particular form of government. Some of Kessel's conclusions are used as hypotheses in the present study.

In a study of three hundred suburbs in the twenty-five largest "urbanized areas," Leo Schnore and Robert Alford related governmental form to social structure, i.e., various social and economic characteristics. The thesis under investigation was that socio-economic factors of a city may partially explain its political structure. They wanted to "determine whether suburbs possessing different forms of government display measurable differences in socio-economic characteristics."<sup>67</sup> This is the reverse of the question asked by Liebman, i.e., do different functional types of cities differ with respect to form of government? A list of some eighteen socio-economic characteristics was compiled for each suburb. Schnore and Alford did find some correlations between form of government and social structure, e.g., mayor-council

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<sup>67</sup> op. cit.

government is likely to be found in a high non-white, high ethnic and low educated area. Furthermore, they conclusively stated that the council-manager environment "does tend to be the natural habitat of the upper middle-class."<sup>68</sup> But exhibiting some degree of uncertainty, Schnore and Alford also stated that they could not "explain the differences in political structures in terms of the above compositional characteristics per se."<sup>69</sup> In other words, the causal connections are blurred. But their findings do suggest that form of government and socio-economic characteristics possibly would make a difference in certain areas of local decision-making, e.g., annexation decisions.

Robert Alford and Harry Scoble extended the findings of previous studies - Kessel, Liebman and Schnore and Alford - which indicated a relationship between the form of government and socio-economic characteristics to all cities over 25,000 population. They attempted to empirically answer (rather than assume the answer) why should political and socio-economic characteristics of a city be related to its form of government? The three major social variables which they used were: social heterogeneity (religion, race and ethnicity); class composition (proportion of persons in white collar occupations or with college education); and population growth and mobility. They found that almost

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<sup>68</sup> op. cit., 15.

<sup>69</sup> op. cit.

all of these variables were associated with form of government. In reaching a possible causal connection, Alford and Scoble concluded that mobility seemingly explains the association of economic and class composition with form. Therefore, they saw mobility of the population - with qualifications - as a significant variable in explaining the interrelationship of socio-economic factors and form of government.

Lineberry and Fowler, in their study of reformed and unreformed institutions, derived conclusions which were at variance with those of Schnore and Alford. Although they acknowledged the fact that 'varying samples may produce varying conclusion,'<sup>70</sup> they concluded that their data did not corroborate the fact that 'reformed' cities (i.e., council-manager) are the 'natural habitate of the upper middle-class.' Furthermore, they concluded the "cities with reformed and unreformed institutions are not markedly different in terms of demographic variables. Indeed some variables, like income, run counter to the popular hypothesis that reformed cities are havens of the middle-class."<sup>71</sup> But, the study by Sherbenou supported the notion that council-manager governments were located where persons of middle-class status resided. He ranked seventy-four suburbs in the Chicago metropolitan

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<sup>70</sup>op. cit., 706.

<sup>71</sup>op. cit., 715.

area according to median value of homes and found that in 18 of the twenty cities with highest home values, council-manager government was prevalent and was not prevalent in any of the 31 cities with the lowest home values.

Banfield and Wilson concluded that ethnicity was the most important independent variable in explaining the differences in local political structures. Manager governments were located where there was a high Anglo-Saxon population while mayor-council governments were found in cities with high percentage of immigrants in the population.

### Summary

The reform movement spawned the alteration or modification of political structures and electoral systems in innumerable cities. Most frequently council-manager governments were substituted for mayor-council governments while nonpartisan electoral systems replaced partisan electoral systems. Although the number of cities which adopted the manager system did not surpass those using the mayor-council system, 43% of cities with over 5,000 population presently operate under the manager system. The institution of the nonpartisan electoral system met with greater success than did the manager form of government. In cities with over 5,000 population, 64.9% utilize nonpartisan elections.

As the reform movement was basically a movement by the middle-class for power redistribution and the establishment of those principles and mechanisms of government which they thought would assure "better, more efficient government," the adoption of manager form of government and the nonpartisan electoral system occurred in environments characterized as middle-class. Several studies concluded that political structures and electoral systems were related to the socio-economic environment. These studies found that cities with high percentages of high income persons, high white collar population, high population growth, low immigrant population, high mobility, high home-ownership and high percentage of college educated persons, were likely to have the manager form of government and nonpartisan electoral system. In other words, there was a high positive correlation between cities with middle-class social indicators and manager governments and nonpartisan elections.

Through the use of new and different empirical data, the following chapter will re-examine some of the conclusions arrived at by the studies cited in this chapter. The attempt will be to further elucidate the apparent relationship between the socio-economic environment and the political structure.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

At this point, it is appropriate to re-emphasize one of the major theses of this study cited in Chapter II, that there is a relationship between form of government and socio-economic characteristics. It will be recalled that this thesis in turn resulted in three subsidiary hypotheses.

HYPOTHESIS I. Manager governments are likely to manifest a more rapid population growth and rate of mobility than mayor-council governments.

HYPOTHESIS II. Manager government more than mayor-council governments are likely to have a higher percentage of college educated persons; a higher percentage of white collar workers; a lower percentage of persons earning \$3,000 or less; a higher percentage of persons earning \$10,000 or more and a higher percentage of homeowners.

HYPOTHESIS III. Mayor-council governments are likely to be located in communities with higher non-white and a higher ethnic population than manager governments.

As also indicated in Chapter II, the forms of government were the mayor-council and council-manager, with the commission form being eliminated because of too few in the sample to prove of value in the analysis. The socio-economic characteristics were defined as: (1) population growth and mobility;

(2) social class; and (3) population homogeneity.

Because forms of government are not equally distributed regionally, region was used as an intervening variable in examining the hypothesized relationships. For example, the Far West has more manager cities while the Northeast has more mayor-council cities. Therefore, some associations of socio-economic variables with form of government may be due to regional variation. Table VII provides the regional distribution of cities in the sample.

TABLE VII  
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF GOVERNMENT

Type	Northeast	North Central	South	Far West
Mayor-Council	105	94	33	14
Manager	19	41	116	136

The Relationship Between Population Growth, Mobility and Form of Government -  
Hypothesis I

Findings of the relationship between form of government and population growth and mobility are presented in Table VIII.

TABLE VIII

## COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Characteristics	Mayor-Council	Manager
% Population change 1950-1960	5.1	8.1
Mobility	46.3	46.7
N =	246	312

The table shows that rapidly growing communities are likely to have manager governments. Although the trend is not dramatic, the difference in the means is statistically significant at the .01 level. Table VIII also suggests that there is no significant difference between mobility in mayor-council and manager cities.

However, the findings in Table VIII may be due to the fact that the effect of region was not considered. For example, growth may be greater in manager cities because manager cities are located primarily in the Far West and the Far West has a greater growth than any other region. And the apparent absence of a relationship between mobility and manager government likewise may be due to the factor of region. Table IX begins to provide insight into these queries by relating growth and mobility with region.

TABLE IX  
COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY  
REGION

Characteristics	Northeast	North Central	South	Far West
% Population change 1950-1960	2.2	8.5	6.8	9.1
Mobility	23.9	22.5	11.8	23.8
N =	124	136	149	149

F = .01 level of significance

The table reveals a statistically significant difference in the means between regions for both variables. Thus, growth is greatest in the Far West, the region with the most manager cities and least in the Northeast, the region with the most mayor-council cities, with a 6.9% difference between the mean population growth in the Far West and that in the Northeast. In other words, population increased over four times greater in the Far West than it did in the Northeast. Mobility, as shown in Table IX, is distributed about equally, with the exception of the South which had the lowest rate of mobility.

Consequently, the introduction of region as an intervening variable in Table IX begins to suggest a more precise association between population growth, mobility and form of government. Since region suggests this

additional perspective, the association of population growth and mobility with form of government was examined within region in Table X.

Table X shows that when the association between growth and form of government is analyzed within region, the apparent relationship of growth with manager cities disappears in the Northeast; is weak but noticeable in the North Central area; and is attained more clearly in the South and Far West - regions which have more manager cities.

TABLE X

COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY REGION  
AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Characteristics	Northeast		North Central		South		Far West	
	M. C.	Man.	M. C.	Man.	M. C.	Man.	M. C.	Man.
% Population change 1950-1960	2.2	1.8	9.0	10.6	3.1	7.9	5.8	8.5
Mobility	23.1	28.4	20.0	34.9	12.8	11.4	16.6	22.4
N =	105	19	94	41	33	116	14	136

F = .01 level of significance

Based on the evidence in Table X, the salient conclusion is that when rapid growth takes place in the Far West, South, or North Central, it is more likely to occur in manager cities than mayor-council cities.



In regard to mobility, Table X suggests that the population in manager cities in the Northeast, North Central and Far West are more mobile than the population in mayor-council and manager cities in the South. In addition, population in manager cities in the Northeast, North Central, and Far West are more mobile than the population in mayor-council cities of those regions. No significant difference in mobility prevails in the South between the two forms of government.

The data from Table X, therefore confirms the hypothesis that when region is included as an intervening variable, population growth is greater in manager cities than mayor-council cities with the acknowledgment that the association is non-existent in the Northeast. Mobility is likewise associated with the manager form of government, when region is included as an intervening variable, in every area except the South.

Implicit in these findings is that region is an important intervening variable in any attempts to explain the relationship of population growth and mobility to form of government.

#### The Relationship Between Social Class and Form of Government - Hypothesis II

Table XI presents the analysis of the relationship between the various social class variables with form of government, without considering region as an intervening variable. The findings offer inconclusive support to the hypothesis.

Thus, Table XI suggests that manager government when compared to mayor-council government does have a higher percentage of population with four years of college or more and does have a somewhat higher percentage of white collar workers. But the difference in the percentage of the population earning \$3,000 or less is inconsequential, while the mayor-council cities have higher percentages of the population earning \$10,000 or more and owning homes.

TABLE XI

## COMPARISON OF MEAN SOCIAL CLASS VARIABLES BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Social Class Variables	Mayor-Council	Manager
% Pop. 4 yrs. of college or more*	17.7	30.9
% Pop. white collar workers /	46.0	48.3
% Pop. earning \$3,000 or less /	46.7	46.3
% Pop. earnings \$10,000 or more *	47.2	43.2
% Pop. homeowners	69.0	66.7
N =	246	312

\*F = .01 level of significance

/ F = .05 level of significance

As in the case of Hypothesis I, additional sophistication was sought in the analysis by introducing the effects of region. Table XII suggests the variance according to region for each of the social class variables without

considering form of government.

The table suggests that the North Central region and higher percentage of population with 4 years of college or more and that the Northeast had the highest percentage of white collar workers, the highest percentage of the population with income under \$3,000 and over \$10,000 and the highest percentage of homeowners.

TABLE XII  
COMPARISON OF MEAN SOCIAL CLASS VARIABLES BY REGION

Social Class Variables	Northeast	North Central	South	Far West
% Pop. 4 yrs. college or more*	11.9	16.4	12.4	11.6
% Pop. white collar workers*	49.5	48.8	43.1	48.3
% Pop. earnings \$3,000 or less *	22.7	16.7	7.0	16.9
% Pop. earnings \$10,000 or more $\neq$	1.3	1.0	1.1	.8
% Homeowners	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.4
N =	124	136	149	

\*F = .01 level of significance

$\neq$ F = .05 level of significance

The South had the lowest percentage of persons employed in white collar occupations and also the lowest percentage of persons earning \$10,000 or

more. The difference in the percentage of homeowners seemed negligible.

The basic issue in terms of this hypothesis, however, is what effect does region have upon the hypothesized relationship between social class and form of government. Table XIII is an attempt to analyze this relationship within region.

Table XIII consequently suggests that in every region more persons with four years of college or more and more white collar workers are likely to be located in manager cities. Therefore, the relationship of these two social class variables to manager cities as revealed in Table XI remains when the association is analyzed within regions.

Table XIII also suggests that manager cities in the Northeast and North Central are likely to be inhabited by a greater percentage of persons earning \$3,000 or under while in the South and Far West more persons earning \$3,000 or under are located in mayor-council cities than manager cities.

The likelihood that more persons earning \$10,000 or over would be located in mayor-council cities, as suggested in Table XI, disappears once this apparent relationship is analyzed within regions. Although the difference is not great, persons earning \$10,000 or more are more likely to be found in manager cities.

TABLE XIII  
COMPARISON OF MEAN SOCIAL CLASS VARIABLES BY REGION AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Social Class Variables	Northeast		North Central		South		Far West	
	M. C.	Man.	M. C.	Man.	M. C.	Man.	M. C.	Man.
% Pop. 4 yrs. college or more *	11.4	14.4	8.7	20.3	6.1	14.2	5.1	16.4
% Pop. white collar workers *	48.8	52.9	44.4	58.7	42.8	43.2	44.1	48.8
% Pop. earning \$3,000 or less *	22.4	24.2	16.2	18.0	75.0	69.0	18.2	16.7
% Pop. earning \$10,000 or more *	1.2	1.6	.6	1.4	.9	1.1	.3	1.0
% Homeowners	2.8	1.8	2.2	2.1	1.4	2.1	2.0	2.5
N =	105	19	94	41	36	116	14	136

\* F = .01 level of significance



Analyzing the relationship of homeowners to form of government reveals that a greater percentage of homeowners are more likely to be found in manager cities in the South and Far West with no discernible difference in the North Central cities between manager and mayor-council cities. The Northeast had more homeowners in mayor-council cities than manager cities.

Therefore, Table XIII presents the following evidence for Hypothesis II: a higher percentage of college educated persons and white collar workers are, as hypothesized, found in manager cities; that income under \$3,000 relates to region rather than form of government; that manager cities do have a higher percentage of persons earning \$10,000 or more in each region; and that homeownership is related more to region than form of government.

#### Population Homogeneity and Form of Government - Hypothesis III

Table XIV, present the relationship between population homogeneity and form of government without considering region. Although the difference is not great, Table XIV reveals a greater percentage of non-white population in mayor-council cities. Only a slight difference is indicated between the percentage of ethnicity of mayor-council cities and that of manager cities.

But again, region is of importance in clearly showing the relationship between population homogeneity and form of government. Population homo-

TABLE XIV

## COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION HOMOGENEITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Characteristics	Mayor-Council	Manager
% Non-whites	46.0	43.3
% Ethnicity	44.8	44.1
N =	246	312

geneity, like forms of government, is unequally distributed in the United States. Table XV presents the relationship of population homogeneity and region without considering form of government.

Table XV indicates that the Northeast has both a greater percentage of non-white population and a greater percentage of ethnicity than the North Central, South or Far West. The difference in the percentage of non-white population in the Northeast and the South however, is slight. The lowest percentage of non-white population is located in the North Central. Excluding the Northeast, the percentage of ethnicity in the North Central, South and Far West is about even.

But additional questions were raised by the findings in Tables XIV and XV. For example, what effect does region have upon the relationship

TABLE XV

## COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION HOMOGENEITY BY REGION

Characteristics	Northeast	North Central	South	Far West
% Non-white	47.7	39.3	46.5	44.7
% Ethnicity	48.3	42.8	43.5	43.5
N =	124	136	149	149

between the percent of non-white population and mayor-council cities? Does region significantly affect the association between the percentage of ethnicity and mayor-council cities? Do mayor-council cities in the Northeast have a greater percentage of non-white population and a greater percentage of ethnicity than mayor-council cities in the South, North Central or Far West? Table XVI provides answers to these queries. Table XVI presents the analysis of the relationship between population homogeneity and form of government within region.

Table XVI reveals that the association of a greater percentage of non-white population with mayor-council cities disappears in the Northeast and South. Only in the North Central and Far West is there a higher percentage of non-white population in mayor-council cities than manager cities. Thus, region is of extreme importance in assessing the relationship between non-

white population and mayor-council cities.

TABLE XVI

COMPARISON OF MEAN POPULATION HOMOGENEITY BY REGION AND FORM  
OF GOVERNMENT

Characteristics	Northeast		North Central		South		Far West	
	M. C.	Man.	M. C.	Man.	M. C.	Man.	M. C.	Man.
% Non-white	47.6	48.1	45.9	41.7	42.3	47.6	44.7	39.3
% Ethnicity	47.3	54.5	44.5	41.8	39.4	44.7	41.2	42.8
N =	105	19	94	41	33	116	14	136

Furthermore, Table XVI suggests that only in the North Central is there a higher percentage of ethnicity in mayor-council cities than manager cities, while in the Northeast, South and Far West manager cities show a greater percentage of ethnicity than mayor-council cities. Therefore, the association of greater percentages of non-white population and ethnicity with mayor-council cities, as revealed in Table XIV, continued to exist only in the North Central when the relationship was analyzed within region.

### Summary

The findings presented in this chapter are supportive in some instances of the three hypotheses under investigation. However, it was also discovered that in other instances, the data did not provide support for the hypotheses. It may be recalled that the three hypotheses were (1) that manager governments are likely to be located in cities with high population growth and high mobility; (2) that manager governments are likely to have higher percentages of college educated persons, white collar workers, and homeowners, persons earning \$10,000 or more and a lower percentage of persons earning \$3,000 or less than mayor-council governments; (3) that mayor-council governments are likely to be located in communities with higher percentage of non-white and ethnic populations than manager governments.

Without considering the effects of region part of Hypothesis I was confirmed - that manager governments were likely to be in rapidly growing communities. However, the difference in the rate of mobility between manager communities and mayor-council was negligible. Also, not considering region as a possible intervening variable, the findings on social class variables (Hypothesis II) were basically consistent with those of Lineberry and Fowler that manager cities have "slightly more educated population and slightly higher white collar population," while mayor-council cities have higher

incomes. Manager governments, as hypothesized, had a lower percentage of persons earning \$3,000 or less although not great, but more homeowners were not likely to be located in manager cities as hypothesized. But, essentially, there was no distinctive difference in demographic composition between manager cities and mayor-council cities. Again, excluding a consideration of region, Hypothesis III was confirmed on both counts, i.e., that mayor-council governments had greater non-white and ethnic populations than manager governments. This finding is similar to those of previous studies.

Based upon additional findings and analysis it is concluded that region is a significant intervening variable in explaining the relationship between socio-economic environment and political structures. Wolfinger and Field findings were similar in regard to region being an important factor in explaining the structure of local government.<sup>1</sup>

When the influence of region was considered, some other interesting findings emerged. Manager governments with region controlled continued to be located in rapidly growing communities, except the Northeast, thus further corroborating Hypothesis I and the previous findings of Kessel, Schnore and

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<sup>1</sup>Raymond Wolfinger and John O. Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 306-326.



Alford, Alford and Scoble, and Lineberry and Fowler.<sup>2</sup> Mobility emerged as being related to manager governments, support for Hypothesis I, in all regions except the South. Also in regard to mobility, the findings were similar to Alford and Scoble that "eastern cities with high mobility are likely to have manager governments."<sup>3</sup> But where they found that "mobility remains important even within regions, the findings from this analysis lead to the conclusion that mobility is important only within regions, otherwise no association between mobility and manager government is demonstrated.

More support was provided for the Hypothesis II that manager cities are likely to be inhabited by the middle-class when the association was examined within regions. But, it cannot be concluded as Schnore and Alford did that manager cities are the "natural habitat of the upper middle-class."<sup>4</sup> Manager governments are likely to have high educated, white collar and income populations and more homeowners only in the South and Far West.

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<sup>2</sup>John Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about American Cities," American Political Science Review, 56 (September, 1962), 615-620; Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-economic Characteristics of Suburbs," Administrative Science Quarterly, 8 (June, 1963), 1-17; Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political and Socio-economic Characteristics of Cities," Municipal Year Book, (Chicago: International City Manager's Association, 1965); Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 706.

<sup>3</sup>Alford and Scoble, ibid, 89.

<sup>4</sup>Schnore and Alford, op. cit., 15.

When mayor-council government was viewed from within region, it was found that the association of mayor-council cities with non-white population held only in the North Central and Far West. John Kessel had found that "when region is controlled, there is no relation between form and non-whites composition."<sup>5</sup> Ethnicity is likely to be associated with mayor-council cities only in the North Central.

In the following Chapter, the effects that social indicators and political structure variables have upon voter turnout rate shall be examined.

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<sup>5</sup>Kessel, op. cit.

## CHAPTER V

### VOTER TURNOUT IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

The preceding chapter was an attempt to demonstrate the relationship between various socio-economic characteristics and the political structure. The present chapter is an effort to relate form of government, type of electoral system, and socio-economic characteristics to voter turnout at the local level. The working hypothesis is that these variables are determining factors in municipal election turnout. Thus, voter turnout is the dependent variable, while the independent variables are form of government, type of electoral system, and the socio-economic indices.

As indicated in Chapter II, voter turnout is measured by the election turnout figures for two mayoralty or councilmanic elections in each city in this study from 1961 through 1968. Form of government constitutes the mayor-council and manager forms of local government, while the electoral system refers to partisan and nonpartisan elections. The socio-economic indices are once more divided into three classifications: (1) population growth and mobility; (2) social class; and (3) population homogeneity. Again, region is utilized as an intervening variable.

For purposes of comparability, those cities on which complete data

could not be obtained were eliminated from the analysis. Complete data constituted having information on voter turnout, type of government, type of electoral system, and the socio-economic characteristics. Thus, the original list of 558 cities was reduced to 551.

### Determinants of Voter Turnout

#### Form of Government

Political structures can inhibit or promote voter turnout. The role assumed by each structure depends on the particular type of structure. It is assumed that the mayor-council form of government provides easy accessibility for the expression of group and individual interests. Furthermore, it allows widespread group representation and it caters to the demands of various elements of the population. It is assumed that manager government limits representation and that in the manager environment there is general and basic agreement on the fundamental issues and principles of society.

HYPOTHESIS I. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the mayor-council form of government is more likely to encourage and witness greater voter participation and turnout than manager governments.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voter Turnout in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 62 (September, 1968), 796. Lee and Alford found that mayor-council partisan governments were likely to have greater turnout than other forms.

In a study of city elections in Kansas, Clarence J. Hein found the voter

## Electoral System

Partisan elections give vent to the various and sundry cleavages which exist in the political system. However, partisan elections may also create cleavages. Partisan elections permit parties to serve as generators of issues, mobilizers of the electorate, and stimulators of interests.

HYPOTHESIS II. Therefore, it is hypothesized that voter turnout is likely to be greater where partisan elections exist than where nonpartisan elections take place. Thus, nonpartisanship has the effect of diminishing voter turnout.<sup>2</sup>

HYPOTHESIS III. It is additionally hypothesized that where partisan elections are combined with the mayor-council form of government, voter turnout is likely to be greater than where other combinations of electoral systems and forms of government exist.<sup>3</sup>

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participation varied with the particular system of government. However, commission cities had the highest turnout, while manager cities had the next highest and mayor-council cities the lowest. See his Voter Participation in City Elections with Populations Between 5,000 and 50,000 in Kansas, (Lawrence, Kansas: Governmental Research Bureau, University of Kansas, 1958). Lee's and Alford's data led them to conclude that form of government was more strongly related to turnout than form of election and that turnout was greater in non-manager cities (mayor-council) than in manager cities. Op. cit., 804. This study challenges Hein's findings and tests Lee's and Alford's conclusions.

<sup>2</sup>Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960); Thomas Dye, Politics in States and Communities (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), 224.

<sup>3</sup>Lee and Alford, op. cit.

## Socio-Economic Characteristics

Population Growth and Mobility. The longer a person lives in a community, the more likely that he will become integrated into the community structure; thus, the more he will participate in the affairs of the community.<sup>4</sup> Persons are also confronted with the task of fulfilling a residency requirement. Ruth Dixon stated that "the high level of mobility in the American population makes residence requirements especially significant as factors barring persons from voting."<sup>5</sup>

HYPOTHESIS IV. Therefore, it is hypothesized that cities with rapid population growth and high mobility will experience low voter turnout.

Social Class. "The more educated person is more aware of the impact of government on the individual than is the person of less education."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.; Robert Lane, Political Life (New York: The Free Press, 1959); Lester Milbraith, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965); Ruth B. Dixon, "Predicting Voter Turnout in City Elections" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of California, 1966); and Harry Sharp's study of Detroit indicated that migration leads to low voter turnout, "Migration and Voting Behavior in a Metropolitan Community," Public Opinion Quarterly, 19, (1955), 206-209.

<sup>5</sup>Dixon, "Predicting Voter Turnout in City Elections." op. cit. 6.

<sup>6</sup>Milbraith, Political Participation, op. cit., 121-122.



HYPOTHESIS V. Therefore, it is hypothesized that voter turnout is likely to increase in cities as the percentage of well-educated (college) persons in the population increases.

White collar employed persons, homeowners, and high income persons presumably have a stake in the community and are highly interested in what is happening. Consequently, they are more likely to turn out to vote.

HYPOTHESIS VI. Therefore, it is hypothesized that voter turnout should be higher in those cities with a higher percentage of white collar employees, homeowners, and a higher percentage of high income persons than in cities with high percentages of opposite characteristics.

Population Homogeneity. Blacks, who constitute the largest percentage of the non-white category, are concentrated at the bottom end of the socio-economic ladder. Persons of low socio-economic rank tend to vote less than others, and it can be expected that those in the non-white group are prone to remain away from the polls.

HYPOTHESIS VII. Therefore, it is hypothesized that voter turnout is likely to be low in cities with a high percentage of non-white population.

The persistence of ethnic voting has been examined by a number of researchers, among them Parenti, Wolfinger and Gabriel.<sup>7</sup> A prerequisite to high ethnic voting is ethnic salience.

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<sup>7</sup>Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," American Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 717; Raymond Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," American Political Science Review, 59 (December, 1965), 896-908; and Richard A. Gabriel, "Ethnic Attitudes and Political Behavior in City and Suburb" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1969).

HYPOTHESIS VII. Therefore, it is hypothesized that cities with high ethnic populations (i.e., foreign-born and population of native-mixed parentage) will experience low voter turnout.

## Findings

The first part of the analysis will be that of the relationship between form of government, electoral systems, and voter turnout, i.e., Hypothesis I through Hypothesis III. This is presented in Tables XVII through XXIII. The second part of the analysis will present the data on the relationship between socio-economic indices and voter turnout, i.e., Hypothesis IV through Hypothesis VIII. This is demonstrated in Tables XXIV through XXXV. Finally, and more importantly, the effect of form of government electoral systems, and the socio-economic indices will be analyzed as they collectively affect voting turnout. Table XXXVI deals with this analysis.

## Form of Government, Electoral System, and Voter Turnout – Part I

Form of Government. Table XVII presents the relationship between voter turnout and form of government. The findings seem to corroborate Hypothesis I, i.e., that turnout is likely to be greater in mayor-council cities than in manager cities. Turnout in manager cities was less than half of that in mayor-council cities.

TABLE XVII  
MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Characteristics	Mayor-Council	Manager
N =	246	312
Voter Turnout	38%	16%

Table XVIII shows the findings of turnout regionally. Cities in the Far West and South had a far lower turnout than cities in the other regions. It can, therefore, be asked which factors were associated with the South and Far West which resulted in a lower number of people turning out to vote in local elections? Why did more people vote in the Northeast and North Central areas? Also, the Far West and South had a greater percentage of manager cities than the other regions. Table XVII showed that manager cities had a lower turnout than mayor-council cities. Was the low turnout in the Far West and the South and in manager cities an expression of the same phenomenon? That is, was turnout lower in the Far West and South because they had more manager cities than the other regions? Or was turnout lower in manager cities because they happened to be located to a greater extent in the Far West and South?

TABLE XVIII  
MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION

Characteristics	Northeast	North Central	South	Far West
N =	124	131	146	150
Voter Turnout	37%	39%	17%	11%

Table XIX attempts to answer these questions by controlling for region and subsequently relating turnout to form of government.

TABLE XIX  
MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT

	Northeast		North Central		South		Far West	
	M. C.	Man.	M. C.	Man.	M. C.	Man	M. C.	Man.
N =	105	19	94	41	33	116	14	136
Voter Turnout	41%	42%	44%	34%	19%	12%	12%	10%

Although low turnout continued to be associated with the South and Far West, it was again substantiated that fewer people vote in local elections held in manager cities with one exception, the Northeast. However, when the effect

of region was considered, the difference in turnout in mayor-council cities and manager cities was not nearly as great as the difference when there was a lack of regional consideration as indicated in Table XVI. The only region which continued to manifest any significant degree of difference was the North Central area, which showed a ten percent difference in turnout in mayor-council and manager cities. Nevertheless, although the findings were not dramatic when the influence of region was accounted for, they do support the first hypothesis that turnout is likely to be higher in mayor-council cities than in manager cities.

Electoral System. Hypothesis II suggested that the type of electoral system affects turnout. What effect does the difference in electoral systems have upon turnout in each region? This hypothesis and question will be investigated in the following two tables.

Table XX shows the overall relationship between voter turnout and the electoral system.

TABLE XX  
MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY ELECTORAL SYSTEM

	Partisan	Nonpartisan
N =	181	370
Voter Turnout	34%	25%

Cities with partisan elections experienced a greater turnout than those with nonpartisan elections, as was suggested in Hypothesis II.

But what effect does region have upon the association between electoral systems and voter turnout? Table XXI presents the relationship between voter turnout and electoral systems by region.

The findings presented in this table cannot be considered as conclusive, but merely suggestive, for there were only sixteen nonpartisan cities in the Northeast, no partisan elections in the Far West, and the North Central area had almost an even division between nonpartisan and partisan election turnout in the one region where partisan and non-partisan cities were almost equal in number.

TABLE XXI

## MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

	Northeast		North Central		South		Far West	
	P	NP	P	NP	P	NP	P	NP
N =	108	16	67	64	6	140	0	150
Voter Turnout	42%	33%	40%	42%	20%	13%	*	10%

\*Many Far West cities, motivated by the progressive movement around the turn of the century abandoned partisan elections. See Lee, Politics of Nonpartisanship, op. cit.



Nevertheless, when region was controlled, the hypothesized relationship between partisan elections exist in the Northeast and the South (even though the South had more nonpartisan elections than partisan). In addition in the Far West, where there are no partisan elections, voter turnout was (10 percent) smaller than in any other region, regardless of form of election. Thus, partisanship does heighten turnout, as was suggested in Hypothesis II.

Form of Government, Electoral System and Voter Turnout. Hypothesis III suggested that turnout would be greater in mayor-council partisan cities than in cities with other forms. But was turnout greater? Does region affect the hypothesized relationship, e.g., was turnout greater in mayor-council partisan cities in the Northeast than in manager nonpartisan cities in the Far West and South. Tables XXII and XXIII provide partial answers. Table XXII shows the turnout rate by both form of governments and electoral systems without considering region.

TABLE XXII

MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

	Mayor-Council	Manager
Partisan	41% (146)	38% (35)
Nonpartisan	32% (94)	13% (276)

The data in Table XXII apparently substantiates Hypothesis III, that mayor-council partisan cities are likely to have a greater turnout than cities with other political and electoral forms, i.e., mayor-council nonpartisan, manager partisan, and manager nonpartisan, although manager partisan cities did have a turnout rate nearly as high as that of mayor-council partisan cities. Also, indicated in Table XXII is the fact that voter turnout is higher in mayor cities, partisan or nonpartisan than in manager cities, partisan or nonpartisan, respectively. Furthermore, the data demonstrated another interesting fact, i.e., that regardless of electoral form, mayor-council cities still tend to have a higher turnout than manager cities, thus further substantiating Hypothesis I.

Do these findings stand when this relationship is examined within region? Table XXIII, hopefully, provides the answer to this question. This table shows the voter turnout rate for form of government and electoral system by region.

Support for Hypothesis III, that mayor-council partisan cities tend to have greater turnout than cities with other political and electoral forms, diminished when the influences of region were considered. In the Northeast, manager partisan cities had a higher turnout, although by only 2 percent, than mayor-council partisan cities. Turnout in partisan elections, however, remained higher than that in nonpartisan elections whether they were held in mayor-council or manager cities, except in one instance - the North Central. This

TABLE XXIII

MEAN VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION, FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND  
ELECTORAL SYSTEM

	Mayor-Council	Manager
<u>Northeast</u>		
Partisan	43% (91)	44% (17)
Nonpartisan	34% (14)	'
<u>North Central</u>		
Partisan	41% (51)	35% (16)
Nonpartisan	48% (39)	33% (25)
<u>South</u>		
'Partisan	-	-
Nonpartisan	19% (27)	12% (113)
<u>Far West</u>		
Partisan	* -	* -
Nonpartisan	12% (14)	10% (136)

\*No Partisan elections

' Insufficient sample

provides further corroboration for Hypothesis II.

The data in Table XXIII further indicated that mayor-council nonpartisan cities in the North Central has a greater turnout than cities with other types. Higher turnout in manager partisan cities than in manager nonpartisan cities did not wash out when the effects of region were accounted for.

A significant finding which consistently appeared was that mayor-council cities attract a larger turnout than manager cities except in the instance of partisan mayor-council cities in the Northeast, regardless of whether elections were partisan or nonpartisan. Therefore, this fact apparently provides further confirmation of Hypothesis I.

## Socio-Economic Indices and Voter Turnout - Part II

Population Growth and Mobility. Hypothesis IV indicated that cities with rapidly growing populations and high mobility were likely to experience low voter turnout. But was this hypothesis substantiated by the data, and how did form of government, electoral system and region affect the hypothesized relationship? The following four tables investigate this proposition. Table XXIV provides the correlation coefficients of population growth and mobility with voter turnout.

Part of Hypothesis IV is corroborated by the data in Table XXIV, i.e., that cities with growing or expanding populations are likely to have a low turnout in elections. Whether or not this negative influence of growth on turnout

TABLE XXIV

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND POPULATION  
GROWTH AND MOBILITY

Characteristics	All Cities N = 551
% Population change 1950-1960*	-.13
% Migrants from different county	.04

\*Refers to population increase

The standard of measure used herein is the Pearson product-moment coefficient (-). The size of the product-moment coefficient (r) varies from +1 through 0 to -1. It provides two things: (1) the magnitude of the relationship and (2) the direction of the relationship. For the purpose of this study the coefficients may be interpreted as follows: 0-3 = poor; 4-6 = average; 7-9 = very good; 1.0 = excellent. The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of population growth and mobility variables.

disappears when form of government is considered will be analyzed below. The aspect of Hypothesis IV dealing with mobility is not substantiated by the data, i.e., that cities with high mobility were likely to experience low voter turnout. Surprisingly, mobility was positively related to turnout, although not significantly. In Table XXV population growth and mobility will be analyzed with turnout by form of government to ascertain the effect of the latter.

TABLE XXV

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION  
GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Characteristics	Mayor-Council N = 240	Manager N = 311
% Population change 1950-60	-.08	-.07
% Migrants from different county	.04	.06

The coefficients in this Table are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of population growth and mobility variables.

A significant association of population growth and mobility with either form of government was not demonstrated. However, cities, whether they had mayor-council or manager governments, which experienced a substantial growth in population were likely to have low turnout at the polls. The finding, although not significant, did provide support for the population growth aspect of Hypothesis IV. Also, as shown in Table XXV, the negative effect that population growth had upon turnout was slightly less in manager cities than in mayor-council cities.

The positive association of mobility with turnout suggested in Table XXIV, again appeared when form of government was considered. Furthermore, mobility was positively correlated with turnout in both manager and mayor-council cities. Again, although insignificant, this finding provided additional



refutation of Hypothesis IV, i.e., where mobility was high, turnout was likely to be low.

Population growth and mobility will now be examined by form of government and electoral system; and by form of government, electoral system and region in the following two tables. This analysis will attempt to ascertain the effect of the combination of form of government, electoral system and region upon the association of population growth and mobility with voter turnout.

Table XXV I assesses the relationship between voter turnout, and population growth and mobility, while controlling for the effect of form of government types and electoral system.

TABLE XXVI

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Characteristics	Mayor-Council		Manager	
	P	NP	P	NP
N =	146	94	35	276
% Population change 1950-60	-.12	-.07	-.14	-.07
% Migrants from different county	.08	.02	.19	.04

The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of population growth and mobility variables.

As indicated in the table, growing cities, regardless of the combination of governmental form and electoral system, are negatively related to voter turnout. The correlation, however, was stronger in mayor-council partisan and manager partisan cities than in other types. Although these correlations are statistically insignificant, further support was provided for part one of Hypothesis IV.

Mobility continued to be associated positively with turnout, save one instance. The correlation of mobility with turnout was negative in mayor-council nonpartisan cities. Overall conclusive support for the second aspect of Hypothesis IV was not demonstrated.

Because there are certain historical and cultural factors associated with region, Table XXVII will analyze population growth and mobility with turnout by form of government, electoral system and region. The question explored is what effect does region, combined with form of government and electoral system, have upon the relationship of population growth and mobility with turnout.

The data indicated that even with the influence of region controlled, voter turnout continued to be lower in cities with a rapidly growing population (with two exceptions) regardless of governmental form or electoral system. Only in manager partisan cities (.02) in the North Central was a positive association between growth and turnout. Although none of the correlations were

TABLE XXVII

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND POPULATION  
GROWTH AND MOBILITY BY REGION, GOVERNMENTAL FORM  
AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Characteristics and Region	Mayor-Council		Manager	
	P	NP	P	NP
<u>Northeast</u>				
% Population change 1950-60	-.30	-.14	-.43	*
% Migrants from different county	.08	-.50	.12	
N =	91	14	17	2
<u>North Central</u>				
% Population change 1950-60	-.09	-.21	.02	-.15
% Migrants from different county	.03	.20	.13	.33
N =	51	39	16	25
<u>South</u>				
% Population change 1950-60	*	-.09	*	-.06
% Migrants from different county	*	-.11	*	-.08
N =	*	27	*	113
<u>Far West</u>				
% Population change 1950-60	*	-.13	*	-.11
% Migrants from different county	*	.36	*	.12
N =	0'	14	0'	136

\*Insufficient sample

' All elections are nonpartisan

The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of population growth and mobility variables.

dramatic, the highest happened to be located in mayor-council partisan cities (-.30) and in manager partisan cities (-.43) in the Northeast.

Interestingly, the positive relationship of mobility with turnout while continuing in the Northeast in partisan mayor-council cities and in the cities in the Far West, changed dramatically in nonpartisan mayor-council cities in the Northeast (-.50), and nonpartisan mayor-council and manager nonpartisan cities of the South (-.11 and -.08 respectively).

The data point to the conclusion that a rapidly growing or expanding population does not enhance the degree of voter turnout in any type of city. This is true even when the influences of region are taken into account. The only exception was manager partisan cities in the North Central. Thus, based upon the evidence presented, it is concluded that the first part of Hypothesis IV is confirmed on this point, i.e., that a rapidly growing population is likely to decrease voter turnout.

A mobile population does not have a negative effect upon voter turnout rate in either type of city in the North Central or the Far West. However, in non-partisan cities in the South and in non-partisan mayor-council cities of the Northeast, mobility did result in lower turnout. Therefore, the effect of region altered the relationship between mobility and turnout in mayor-council and manager cities, regardless of electoral system.

The conclusion, then, based on evidence from the greater part of the analysis is that the second part of Hypothesis IV is not corroborated, i.e., that mobility is likely to decrease voter turnout, except as a regional phenomenon in the Northeast and South.

Social Class. Hypothesis V suggested that voter turnout was likely to increase as the percentage of college educated persons in the population increased. Also, it was hypothesized in Hypothesis VI that turnout would be higher in cities with a higher percentage of white collar employees, homeowners, and a higher percentage of high income persons than in those cities with high percentages of opposite characteristics. The following four tables will analyze these two hypotheses. Table XXVIII shows the correlation coefficients for the social class variables with voter turnout for all cities.

The data do not provide support for Hypothesis V, that a well-educated population was likely to increase turnout. This finding apparently refutes conventional wisdom, for a well-educated population resulted in low turnout. Subsequent tables will further analyze this finding.

Other surprising findings, which did not confirm Hypothesis VI, were that white collar workers were negatively related to turnout and that low income (% populated earning \$3,000 or less) resulted in increased turnout. Only % earning \$10,000 or more was positively related to turnout, thus providing the

TABLE XXVIII

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND SOCIAL CLASS  
VARIABLES

Characteristics	All Cities N = 551
% 4 years of college or more	-.06
% white collar workers	-.13
% homeowners	.00
% population earning \$3,000 or less	.02
% population earning \$10,000 or more	.03

The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of the socio-economic characteristics.

only partial corroboration of Hypothesis VI. The findings on social class may be altered somewhat once the effects of government, electoral system and region are controlled.

The data in Table XXIX show the effect of social class variables upon turnout in mayor-council and manager cities.

With the exception of one variable, social class factors are positively associated with turnout in manager cities. Thus, in manager cities Hypothesis V and Hypothesis VI are confirmed, except in one instance, i.e., where high



TABLE XXIX

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH SOCIAL CLASS  
VARIABLES BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Characteristics	Mayor-Council N = 240	Manager N = 311
% population 4 years of college or more	.06	.06
% white collar workers	-.33	.10
% homeowners	-.14	.05
% earning \$3,000 or less	.01	.03
% earning \$10,000 or more	.01	-.04

The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of the socio-economic characteristics.

income population was negatively related to turnout, therefore not likely to result in increased voter turnout.

Although the negative findings in Table XXVIII of education and white collar workers with turnout disappeared in manager cities, (with the exception noted), in mayor-council cities only college educated showed a significant positive relationship to turnout with income (both high and low) again positively associated with turnout, albeit at a .01 level.

The data in Table XXX assess the relationship of voter turnout with social class variables while controlling both for form of government and electoral system. Cities with a large college-educated population had an increased turnout rate, whether or not they had mayor-council or manager governments and partisan or non-partisan elections, thus providing further confirmation of Hypothesis V.

White collar workers were negatively related to turnout, regardless of governmental type of electoral system. The negative relationships discovered in Table XXIX of white collar workers and homeowners to turnout in mayor-council cities was still apparent when electoral systems were controlled, except in mayor-council nonpartisan cities where home ownership is likely to increase turnout. Negative relationships also appear (contrary to Table XXIX findings) in manager cities, except for the association between % homeowners and voting turnout in the nonpartisan manager cities.

Table XXX in addition, offers further substantiation of the findings of Table XXIX regarding the relationships between income and turnout. Thus in mayor-council cities the nominally positive association specified in Table XXIX divides according to electoral form; whereas the relationships between income and turnout for manager cities in Table XXIX is additionally confirmed in Table XXX, regardless of electoral form.

TABLE XXX

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH SOCIAL CLASS  
VARIABLES BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL  
SYSTEM

Characteristics	Mayor-Council		Manager	
	P N=146	NP N=94	P N=35	NP N=276
% population 4 yrs. college or more	.04	.04	.13	.02
% white collar workers	-.39	-.32	-.26	.00
% homeowners	-.32	.21	-.20	.05
% earning \$3,000 or less	.08	-.08	.08	.09
% earning \$10,000 or more	.02	-.01	-.16	-.08

The coefficient are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of the socio-economic characteristics.

Thus, when turnout and social class factors are analyzed according to governmental type and electoral system, confirmation of Hypothesis V is provided, i.e., that voter turnout will be higher in those cities with a higher percentage of well-educated (college) persons; however, support for Hypothesis VI is inconclusive.

Because region is posited as an important intervening variable and the social class factors, governmental forms and electoral systems are located in different proportions in different parts of the country, the relationship

between social class factors and turnout will be analyzed according to region. Region may help to account for some of the unexplained variance between voter turnout and social class variables.

The data in Table XXI show the relationship between turnout and social class variables by region, form of government and electoral system.

In the Northeast and South, a large college-educated population was likely to increase turnout in all cities, regardless of government or electoral system. Contradicting this finding, however, are the correlations suggesting that large college educated population decreased turnout in the North Central and Far West. Therefore, only partial support was provided for Hypothesis V.

The negative relationships in Table XXX of white collar and homeowners with turnout continued and was strengthened in the Northeast, North Central and Far West. Furthermore, where percent of homeowners showed a positive relationship to turnout in mayor-council nonpartisan cities in Table XXX, controlling for region in Table XXXI resulted in a negative association in all regions except the South and manager partisan cities in North Central. Also, percent of white collar showed a negative association with turnout in mayor-council nonpartisan cities in the South.

The significance of income remained about the same when region was accounted for, but there were a few exceptions. The negative relationship between high income and turnout was strengthened in manager partisan cities

TABLE XXXI

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND SOCIAL CLASS BY  
REGION, FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Region and Social Class	Mayor-Council		Manager	
	P	NP	P	NP
<u>Northeast</u>				
% 4 yrs. college or more	.24	.30	.40	*
% white collar	-.45	-.57	-.60	*
% homeowners	-.51	-.08	-.32	*
% \$3,000 or under	.11	-.11	-.04	*
% \$10,000 or over	.03	-.08	-.42	*
N =	91	14	17	2
<u>North Central</u>				
% 4 yrs. college or more	-.28	-.10	-.11	-.12
% white collar	-.35	-.60	.00	-.66
% homeowners	-.03	-.23	.26	.00
% \$3,000 or under	.10	-.10	.04	.30
% \$10,000 or over	.00	-.09	.34	-.06
N =	51	39	16	25
<u>South</u>				
% 4 yrs. college or more	*	.12	*	.03
% white collar	*	-.52	*	.00
% homeowners	*	.10	*	.02
% \$3,000 or under	*	.10	*	.15
% \$10,000 or over	*	.08	*	.12
N =	4	27		113
<u>Far West</u>				
% 4 yrs. college or more	*	-.13	*	-.24
% white collar	*	-.49	*	-.13
% homeowners	*	-.16	*	-.15
% \$3,000 or under	*	-.10	*	.06
% \$10,000 or over	*	-.65	*	.06
N =	0'	14	0'	136

\*Insufficient sample

'All elections are nonpartisan

The Coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of the socio-economic characteristics.

in the Northeast and in mayor-council nonpartisan cities in the Far West.

In summary, through controlling for the influence of region, support for Hypothesis V was provided only in the Northeast and South. Hypothesis VI was corroborated only in the South. The overall analysis leads to the conclusion that sufficient evidence to support Hypotheses V and VI is lacking.

Population Homogeneity. As hypothesized in Hypothesis VII and Hypothesis VIII respectively, cities with a high non-white population and a high ethnic population are likely to have a lower voter turnout rate. Tables XXXII, XXXIII, XXXIV and XXXV provide the analysis of this hypothesis. Table XXXII shows the relationship between turnout and homogeneity for all cities.

TABLE XXXII

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT AND POPULATION  
HOMOGENEITY

Characteristics	All Cities N = 551
% non-white	.03
% foreign born	.04
% population native-mixed parentage	.06

The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of the population homogeneity characteristics.



The data indicated that culturally and socially hererogeneous cities resulted in increased turnout at the polls. Although the correlations were insignificant, Hypothesis VII and Hypothesis VIII, i.e., that a large non-white population decreases voter turnout and that a large ethnic population results in low turnout, respectively, were refuted by the findings of this table. Table XXXIII attempts to discover the effect of form of government on these findings. It provides the association between voter turnout and population homogeneity by form of government.

TABLE XXXIII

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION  
HOMOGENEITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Characteristics	Mayor-Council N = 240	Manager N = 311
% non-white	.10	-.09
% foreign born	.02	.05
% population native-mixed parentage	.04	.08

The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual percentage of the population homogeneity characteristics.

In manager cities, a large non-white population was likely to result in a low voter turnout. None of the correlations in Table XXXIII, however, were strong, although a positive association continued to exist between turnout and population homogeneity, except non-white in manager cities.

The findings in Table XXXIII did not corroborate Hypothesis VII and Hypothesis VIII, i.e., that a large non-white population will lower turnout and that ethnicity in great proportions in the population will lead to a low voter turnout respectively. But does it make a difference in turnout whether or not elections are partisan or nonpartisan in mayor-council and manager cities? Table XXXIV deals with this question.

TABLE XXXIV

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION  
HOMOGENEITY BY FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND ELECTORAL  
SYSTEM

Characteristics	Mayor-Council		Manager	
	P N=146	NP N=94	P N=35	NP N=276
% non-white	.15	.01	-.35	-.06
% foreign born	-.08	.14	.18	-.05
% population native-mixed parentage	.02	.02	.18	.07

The corefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of the population homogeneity characteristics.

In those cities with mayor-council government, a high non-white population, foreign born and native-mixed parentage population were likely to increase turnout, regardless of election type, except for foreign born in mayor-council partisan cities where a low turnout resulted. Substantial non-white population in manager cities, whether or not they had partisan or non-partisan elections, depressed voter turnout rate. There was a relatively high correlation ( $-.35$ ) of non-white population and turnout in manager partisan cities. Weak positive relationships existed between turnout, foreign-born and native-mixed parentage population in all manager cities, except in manager nonpartisan cities where foreign-born population did not contribute to a greater turnout.

Hypothesis VII is supported in manager cities but not in mayor-council cities, while part of Hypothesis VIII is not substantiated by Table XXXIV, i.e., that high ethnic population, (foreign-born and native-mixed parentage population) are unequally distributed across regions, the relevant question is what is the relationship of population homogeneity to turnout when the effects of region are held constant? Will support for Hypothesis VIII be provided and/or more clearly delineated?

Table XXXV shows the relationship between voter turnout and population homogeneity by form of government and electoral system while controlling for the influence of region.

The data indicated that non-white population positive association with turnout still appeared in mayor-council cities, both partisan and nonpartisan, except in mayor-council nonpartisan cities in the Far West. In the Far West, a large non-white population was likely to result in a lower voter turnout rate. In manager cities, the negative relationship between non-white population and turnout still existed, regardless of region or electoral system.

A low turnout in mayor-council partisan cities where there was a large foreign-born population again prevailed in Table XXXV regardless of region. The highest correlation was in the North Central ( $-.31$ ). The positive association of foreign born with voter turnout in mayor-council nonpartisan cities indicated in Table XXXIV disappeared in the South and North Central in Table XXXV, but was strengthened in the Northeast and Far West. A sizeable native population was likely to increase turnout only in Northeast mayor-council partisan cities, North Central mayor-council nonpartisan cities.

The analysis of non-white population in Table XXXV confirmed Hypothesis VII in manager cities. But in mayor-council cities, support was obtained only in mayor-council nonpartisan cities in the Far West. It is concluded, then, that a large non-white population was likely to decrease turnout in manager cities but not in mayor-council cities.

TABLE XXXV

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF VOTER TURNOUT WITH POPULATION  
HOMOGENEITY BY REGION, FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND  
ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Region and Population Homogeneity	Mayor-Council		Manager	
	P	NP	P	NP
<u>Northeast</u>				
% Non-white	.20	.14	-.46	*
% Foreign born	-.01	.18	.34	*
% Population native-mixed parentage	-.11	-.21	.29	*
N =	91	14	17	2
<u>North Central</u>				
% Non-white	.10	.03	-.23	-.07
% Foreign Born	-.31	-.06	-.01	-.02
% Population native-mixed parentage	-.06	.17	.09	-.01
N =	51	39	16	25
<u>South</u>				
% Non-white	*	.09	*	-.12
% Foreign born	*	-.03	**	.05
% Population native-mixed parentage	*	-.14	.06	
N =	4	27		113
<u>Far West</u>				
% Non-white	*	-.24	*	-.17
% Foreign born	*	.58	*	-.01
% Population native-mixed parentage	*	-.14	*	-.05
N =	0'	14	0'	136

\*Insufficient sample

'All elections are nonpartisan

The coefficients are product-moment correlations of the actual percentages of the population homogeneity characteristics.

For the most part evidence for Hypothesis VIII was scattered. No support is available in the Northeast and Far West for the foreign-born aspect of Hypothesis VIII, i.e., that a large foreign-born population will decrease turnout. On the other hand, a large foreign-born population in the South and North Central was likely to result in low turnout. Corroboration of the second aspect of Hypothesis VIII, i.e., that a large native-mixed parentage population will lead to low turnout is not provided in Northeast mayor-council partisan cities, North Central mayor-council nonpartisan cities and South mayor-council partisan cities. In all manager cities and other mayor-council cities this aspect of Hypothesis VIII was confirmed. It is concluded that whether or not a large ethnic population decreases turnout depends to some extent upon region and election type, especially in mayor-council cities. Therefore, Hypothesis VIII was not completely supported by the data.

Form of Government, Electoral System, Socio-Economic Characteristics and Voter Turnout - Part III. Table XXXVI presents the combined effects of socio-economic characteristics upon voter turnout for each region by form of government and electoral system.

As the table suggests, population growth and mobility, population homogeneity, and social class characteristics appear to have greater predictive power upon voter turnout in the Northeast and North Central. Evidence for the



TABLE XXXVI

FORM OF GOVERNMENT, ELECTORAL SYSTEM, SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND VOTER TURNOUT BY REGION  
(Multiple R and R<sup>2</sup>)

Region	Mayor-Council			Manager		
	R	R <sup>2</sup>	P	NP	R	NP
Northeast	.65	(.43)		.94	.92	*
North Central	.57	(.33)		.71	.67	.84
South	*	*		.68	*	.38
Far West	3	3	1.0	(1.0)	1	.36

\*Insufficient sample

1 Represents population growth and mobility, population homogeneity and social class variables.

3 All elections are nonpartisan.

NOTE: The multiple R represents the coefficient of multiple correlation which vary from 0 to 1. It is similar to simple correlation. However, in multiple regression analysis, two or more independent variables are correlated with the dependent variable (voter turnout). The utilization of more than one independent variable increases the correlation coefficient, thus providing a better predictive measure.

The coefficient of determination (R<sup>2</sup>) indicated the proportion (%) of the variance of voter turnout explained or accounted for by the socio-economic characteristics. Thus, R<sup>2</sup> represents the total or combined effects of all socio-economic characteristics in accounting for or explaining the variance of voter turnout.

Far West and South was rather inconclusive because in the South the sample size was insufficient for further analysis on mayor-council partisan and manager partisan cities, and the Far West had no partisan cities. The highest degree of variance on voter turnout explained by the socio-economic variables as shown in Table XXXVI was in the Northeast mayor-council partisan cities (89%) and manager partisan cities (86%). In the North Central area, 51 percent of the variation in turnout in mayor-council nonpartisan cities and 71 percent of the variation in manager nonpartisan cities were explained by these socio-economic characteristics.

In mayor-council nonpartisan cities (46%) in the South, these socio-economic characteristics were also significant in explaining the variation in voter turnout. In other cities of the South and in all cities in the Far West, these characteristics were virtually useless as explanatory factors in voter turnout variance.

### Summary

Although region was treated as having an independent effect upon turnout, it was decidedly difficult to separate the influence of region from the influences of form of government and type of electoral system, for these are distributed unequally across regions. However, some distinctive patterns did emerge in the analysis of the data of which note can be taken.

It may be recalled that Hypothesis I indicated that mayor-council

governments were more likely to experience greater voter turnout than manager governments. This assertion was supported by the data in Table XVIII.

Positing region as an intervening variable resulted in analyzing whether or not this relationship also existed within region. Table XIX revealed that mayor-council cities had a larger turnout in all regions except the Northeast. Thus, based on the analysis by region, Hypothesis I is again supported by the data.

In Hypothesis II, it was hypothesized that turnout was likely to be larger in partisan cities than nonpartisan cities. This assumption was corroborated by the findings as indicated in Table XX. Turnout was almost 10% greater in partisan cities than turnout in nonpartisan cities. However, analyzing the association within region (Table XXI) resulted in inconclusive evidence. Nonpartisan cities in the North Central were likely to have a greater turnout (2%) than partisan elections in the North Central, and turnout was the same as that of partisan elections in the Northeast. Furthermore, nonpartisanship in the Northeast and North Central were likely to result in greater voter turnout than either partisan or nonpartisan elections in the South and Far West. The only clear evidence to support Hypothesis II was provided in the Northeast and South. Because the Far West had no partisan elections, it could not be considered. Therefore, based on the analysis it was evident that form of election was more important in the Northeast in generating a large turnout than form of government, while in the other regions form of government was likely

to be more significant. A word of caution is advised. As indicated in Table XVII, the South and Far West had a lower voter turnout than the Northeast and North Central. But, the Far West and South also had, as shown in Table XIX, more manager and nonpartisan cities, factors which depress turnout, than the other regions.

The data in Table XXII confirmed Hypothesis III, that mayor-council partisan cities were likely to attract more people to the polls than cities with other types. But, controlling for the influences of region, in Table XXIII, eliminated this relationship. However, the absence of partisan elections in the Far West and the paucity of manager cities in the Northeast rendered this finding virtually meaningless. In the South and North Central, the type of government appeared more significant in stimulating a substantial turnout than electoral system.

Nonpartisanship did have a negative effect upon turnout. This finding corroborates the results of some earlier studies.<sup>8</sup> Even in cities with manager governments, partisan elections increased turnout much greater than in manager cities with nonpartisan elections. Thus, partisan elections do stimulate greater turnout whether they be held in manager or mayor-council cities.

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<sup>8</sup>Lee and Alford, op. cit.; Lee, op. cit.; Bollens and Schmandt, op. cit.; and Thomas Flinn, Local Government and Politics (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman and Company, 1970), 39.

The data also indicated, as was suggested in Hypothesis I that a growing population resulted unequivocally in a diminution of turnout rate, form of government, electoral system and region notwithstanding. However, confirmation for the second part of Hypothesis IV was lacking as a mobile population did not seem to affect turnout negatively. In fact, where there was high mobility, voter turnout was likely to increase, except in mayor-council nonpartisan cities. When region was controlled only in the South did increased mobility of population result in decreased turnout.

Concerning Hypothesis V and VI, it was found before considering the effect of region that in mayor-council cities, a higher percentage of educated persons in the population, white collar workers and homeowners were likely to negatively affect turnout. Uneven support was provided for the assumption that voter turnout would increase as the percentage of high income persons in the population increases.

These findings were also applicable for the most part, in cities with partisan elections - mostly mayor-council governments - and in nonpartisan elections, white collar workers depressed turnout.

The consideration of region as an intervening variable resulted in a continuing correlation between white collar workers and low voter turnout except in the South. Education (college educated) most often resulted in lower turnout, especially in the Far West and North Central and only in mayor-



council partisan cities of the Northeast and South.

Based upon the data, conclusive corroboration of Hypothesis VII and VIII was not apparent. If anything, evidence providing a partial refutation of these two Hypotheses occurred. Populations which were socially and culturally diverse experienced greater turnout than a homogeneous population. In other words, a high percentage of non-white persons and foreign-born and native persons in the population were not likely to lead to higher voter turnout.

However, because the concentration of a non-white population in manager cities was not great, negative influences on turnout were evident. Substantial foreign-born and native populations (ethnicity) increased turnout at a greater rate in manager cities than in mayor-council cities. But, foreign born populations were likely to decrease turnout in mayor-council partisan cities regardless of region. Although non-white population was positively associated with mayor-council cities, this did not hold true in the South and Far West.

Region as an intervening variable affects the relationship between voter turnout and socio-economic characteristics as significantly as form of government and electoral systems. As explanatory factors of voter turnout and socio-economic characteristics it is, therefore, more useful to rely upon form of government and electoral systems, for as was discovered in the previous chapter certain socio-economic factors are found in particular governmental forms and electoral types more so than others, regardless of region.



## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The local electorate in American society has not been sufficiently aroused to its electoral responsibility and the significance of local politics, or, indeed, it is discreetly and acutely aware that voting is of little value and significance in deciding the real issues of local politics. In this study well over 50 percent of those persons eligible to vote remained away from the polls. Consequently, municipal elections continue to attract only a minority of the electorate - a minority who must vote into office those persons who shall make and decide paramount policy issues concerning all local residents. A study of city elections in Los Angeles over a period of two decades revealed that voter turnout ranged from 10 to 61 percent, with an average of 41 percent of those eligible to vote.<sup>1</sup> However, some find this situation healthy, for it insures that the "better more capable" elements of local citizenry - those who are better educated, better informed, and of higher socio-economic status generally - ultimately decide who shall hold office. But the majority of the local electorate

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<sup>1</sup>Lawrence O'Rourke, Voting Behavior in the Forty-Five Cities of Los Angeles County (Los Angeles: Bureau of Government Research, University of California, 1953).

must be awakened to the fact that it cannot afford to abdicate its responsibility of voting for officials to a few - regardless of how insignificant it considers the mere act of voting for a mayor or for councilmen. Apathy in municipal elections, undoubtedly, must be overcome. There are obviously many reasons for an apathetic municipal electorate. But Charles Adrian states that "the principal reason for apathy in municipal elections, is likely to be a pervasive consensus, i.e., there may be widespread agreement in the community as to the kinds of persons who are wanted in public office, as to expenditure levels and as to public policies. Under such circumstances, there is little incentive for any but the most conscientious voter to go to the polls."<sup>2</sup> Hugh Bone observed that "many cities are controlled or strongly influenced over long periods of time by what is loosely viewed as 'the establishment,' with strong bipartisan composition. Aided by broadly composed municipal leagues and citizens associations, its supporters can be depended on to turn out and to have much to do with the attention or lack of attention focused on the city election. This effort affects both the turnout and the types of voters going to the polls."<sup>3</sup>

This study was undertaken to explore further the phenomenon of voter turnout in municipal elections. The attempt has been to analyze certain forms of government and socio-economic characteristics which may act as stimulants

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<sup>2</sup>Charles Adrian, Governing Urban America (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1961), 93.

<sup>3</sup>Hugh Bone, American Politics and the Party System (3d ed.; New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1965), 528.

or determinants and inhibitors to municipal voter turnout. Most of the previous studies on voter turnout have been conducted on national elections; therefore many of the assumptions concerning causal elements of turnout were derived from such studies. However, a few studies have investigated voter turnout locally with similar assumptions as a basis. This study not only investigated and tested previous assumptions about the local electorate, but introduced region as an intervening variable. In most cases, the findings confirm those of earlier works, but in some cases they differ.

Generally speaking, socio-economic characteristics were insignificant in positively affecting the level of voter turnout in municipal elections. In every instance, they accounted for well below 50 percent of the variation of turnout in all cities. But within the limited parameters of accountable variation, some pertinent associations between such socio-economic characteristics and turnout developed. Following are some conclusions resulting from the analysis of socio-economic characteristics:

1. A rapidly growing population led to a reduced voter turnout.
2. Cities with a highly mobile population did not necessarily experience low voter turnout.
3. Cities with a higher percentage of well-educated persons did not necessarily have a larger turnout than cities with a high percentage of less-well-educated persons. In general, education (well educated and less well educated) decreased voter turnout. In mayor-council cities, however, a large less-well-educated population reduced turnout.

4. Basically a high percentage of white collar workers and homeowners, factors normally associated with high voter turnout, had a negative effect upon turnout. Income (high and low) resulted in increased turnout.
5. Cities with a large non-white population did not necessarily have low voter turnout. But in manager cities, non-white population was negatively related to turnout, while in mayor-council cities a large non-white population increased turnout, especially in mayor-council partisan cities in the Northeast and North Central.
6. Ethnicity (i.e., foreign-born and native-mixed parentage persons) in large proportions in the population led to increased turnout in elections. Also, a substantial foreign-born and native-mixed parentage population resulted in a larger turnout in manager cities than in mayor-council cities.

The conclusions derived from this analysis were:

1. Cities with mayor-council governments have a larger turnout than cities with manager governments, except in the Northeast, where manager cities had a slightly higher turnout than mayor-council cities.
2. Basically, manager governments had the effect of discouraging a large turnout.
3. Cities with nonpartisan elections had a lower voter turnout than cities with partisan elections.
4. Cities with mayor-council-partisan governments had a higher turnout than cities with other forms. But when this relationship was viewed within regions, only in the North Central was it likely that mayor-council-partisan cities had a higher turnout than cities with other combinations of governmental forms and electoral systems.

5. Region as an intervening variable had greater significance as an explanatory factor for assessing political structures as determinants of voter turnout than socio-economic characteristics as determinants of turnout.

The above are the more salient conclusions emerging from this study of municipal voter turnout. As with all conclusions, denuded of the shield of interpretation and explication, they stand virtually meaningless. Therefore, one is compelled to query what they mean or what do they actually say or explain. Consequently, the remainder of this chapter will deal with the implications of these conclusions for voting in municipal elections in particular and voter turnout in general.

Because no distinction was made between cities with the elected mayor and cities with the appointed mayor, care must be exercised in assessing the relationship between mayor-council cities and voter turnout since an appointed mayor may be in a similar relative position as a manager in affecting turnout when compared to an elected mayor. But it can only be speculated at this point that turnout would probably be still larger in cities with appointed mayors than in cities with managers.

Mayor-council cities embody the basic elements of acute social cleavages and tension which leads to heightened social activity in particular. This condition ultimately results in greater turnout in local elections of people using the vote to express their grievances or their support for particular



candidates and policies. Also, the mayor is more visible and more of a focal point for the electorate to rally around and support or on which to vent their spleen and exercise a protest vote. Furthermore, he makes no pretense of being non-political. The competition and conflict which exist between the mayor and not only ambitious mayoralty-oriented councilmen, but councilmen who may be genuinely opposed to the mayor's policies increase the excitement, interest, and turnout in a municipal election.

By contrast, manager governments are located in cities with the basic elements of a middle-class society, factors which supposedly heighten turnout. But, because these cities are essentially homogeneous in character, they are basically consensual and the inhabitants express a certain self-satisfaction with the way things are run which ultimately depresses or decreases the turnout at local elections.

Partisan elections generate cleavages, divisions and tensions which in turn increase political activity and turnout. The interplay of political parties upon the electorate and the exhortation by parties encouraging people to vote, combined with the fact that many people depend on party labels as guides to voting undoubtedly engender a larger turnout for local elections than where non-partisanship exists.

Nonpartisanship may have succeeded in accomplishing some of its goals as part of the reform movement; it unquestionably has not brought about a



more democratic local politics through the encouragement and achievement of greater electoral participation at the local level.<sup>4</sup> It has resulted in a situation in which fewer people turn out to vote in municipal elections than in those elections held under a partisan electoral system. Without the cues provided by party labels and the possibility for a "protest vote," sufficient motivation for voting for some people has been effectively eliminated by nonpartisanship. However, with over 60 percent of cities presently utilizing the nonpartisan ballot, and the prospects that more cities will eventually adopt it, the dichotomy between nonpartisan and partisan elections will become unimportant and lose its validity, if it hasn't already, as a device for analyzing the differences in voter turnout between the two systems. Parties will continue to exist and operate as they do now, in some cases overtly; but other more analytically useful and pertinent political lines will develop, as has been suggested already,<sup>5</sup> which may be more effective in stimulating turnout.

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<sup>4</sup>For some other consequences of nonpartisanship, see Charles Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections," American Political Science Review, 46 (September, 1952), 766-776; Richard Childs, Civic Victories (New York: Harper & Row, 1952); Eugene Lee and Robert Alford, "Voter Turnout in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 62 (September, 1968), 796; Eugene Lee, Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960).

<sup>5</sup>Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group-Voting in Non-Partisan Elections," Public Opinion Quarterly, 30 (Spring, 1966), 79.

Where the mayor and councilmen campaign with the benefit of party label, their character, visibility, and notoriety, to say nothing of the party's image and efforts in their behalf, would undoubtedly be of such a nature that it would stimulate a large turnout. What is also significant is that the mayor and councilman are visible symbols for protest and support. They are also perceived as the holders of power and authority.

The mayor as well as the councilmen campaigning on the party label can generate the necessary interest in the election for a huge turnout. Councilmen give voters a certain personal attachment to the campaign and election. This attachment reflects in various forms of support, but for most people it is the casting of a ballot for their particular choice.

In their study, Wolfinger and Field concluded that "one can do a much better job of predicting a city's political forms by knowing what part of the country it is in than by knowing anything about the composition of its population." They continue: "The reasons for this may lie in certain regional historical experiences related to the influx of immigrants and the responses to their needs reflected in municipal political systems."<sup>6</sup> The conclusion concerning region in this study is similar to that of Wolfinger and Field. Having a know-

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<sup>6</sup>Raymond Wolfinger and John O. Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, 60 (June, 1966), 320.

ledge about the regions of the country provides a clearer and more distinctive picture of the forms of government therein than the socio-economic characteristics, and this in turn tells us more about voter turnout in each region. For instance, the Far West has more manager governments and nonpartisan elections than the Northeast, which has more mayor-council types and partisan elections. Likewise, the Far West has a lower voter turnout than the Northeast. Socio-economic characteristics are more volatile, hence subject to more intermittent change than governmental forms. Therefore, knowing the section of the country says less about socio-economic characteristics per se than governmental forms.

Although this study basically concurs with Ruth Dixon, "that a high level of mobility in the American population makes residence requirements especially significant as factors barring persons from voting,"<sup>7</sup> the findings here suggest that turnout is not necessarily hindered by high level mobility. Residency requirements vary tremendously from locale to locale. In some cities the requirement is reasonably short, while in others it is unjustifiably long. However, given the type of people who are usually highly mobile - white collar workers -

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<sup>7</sup> Ruth Dixon, "Predicting Voter Turnout in City Elections," (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1966), 6.

the suspicion is that they are not deterred from immediately becoming politically active, registered and eventually voting.

With Congress recently passing a law limiting long residency requirement as a prerequisite in voting for the Presidency, it can be expected that in the near future, with increasing mobility among the electorate, that residency requirements for voting in local elections may uniformly be limited to no more than three months or less in many American cities.

The socio-economic variables utilized in this study, variables which are commonly used in such studies, contributed very little to the overall variation in voter turnout. However, it is still possible to comment on the findings, even within this limited area of significance. Some of the findings fly in the face of conventional wisdom. Lee and Alford also found this to be true of education in their study.<sup>8</sup> White collar workers, homeowners, and education were found to be inversely related to turnout in this study. It is suggested, however, as Lee and Alford did, that the relationship may be curvilinear rather than linear. They observed that "although better-educated individuals may indeed vote more frequently than less-educated individuals, less well-educated communities vote more (or at least not less) than well-educated communities."<sup>9</sup>

This same analysis is also applicable to the findings of white collar workers, homeowners, and education in this study. Sufficient motivation

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<sup>8</sup>Lee and Alford, op. cit., 805.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

growing out of discussion of issues and in some cases the appeal of personalities will attract all ranges of voters to the polls in large numbers, regardless of socio-economic status. For instance, it was thought that because homeowners had a stake in the community they would be more apt to vote than renters. But, on the other hand, renters have a stake in the community as well; they pay property taxes indirectly, of course, and they are equally affected by public policies. Therefore, it can be expected that in communities with substantial renters, these renters will contribute substantially to the voter turnout rate - if not more than homeowners, at least equally.

These socio-economic variables did not have much predictive power nor were they significant in explaining a lower or higher turnout in either mayor-council partisan or nonpartisan and manager partisan or nonpartisan cities. However, in manager partisan cities in the Northeast, they did contribute 86 percent to the variation in turnout. In manager nonpartisan cities in the North Central area they accounted for only 71 percent of the variation in the vote. In both mayor-council partisan and mayor-council nonpartisan in the Northeast, these socio-economic variables contributed a mere 43 percent and 89 percent, respectively, to the variation in voter turnout.

The undeniable situation which prevailed in cities with either mayor-council partisan or nonpartisan and manager partisan or nonpartisan governmental and electoral systems was that the greatest variance in voter turnout was

left unexplained by the socio-economic variables. However, given the relative affluency of the American electorate generally, the increasing political awareness and consciousness of the electorate, socio-economic variables should become less relevant and significant as determinants of voter turnout.

The data also indicated that a politically, culturally and socially heterogeneous community resulted in an increased turnout at the polls. Cleavages and conflicts generate spontaneously in highly heterogeneous cities, and they eventually are resolved or ameliorated in the political arena. For the great majority of non-white, foreign-born and native populations, who are the sources of conflict and cleavage, their only contribution to resolution or dampening of conflict may be the ballot box. They therefore rely on influencing policy decisions and the selection of the decision makers through turning out in large numbers.

Large non-white, foreign-born and native-mixed parentage populations increased turnout in cities. Non-white population exhibited the closest relationship. In manager cities, however, only a substantial non-white population led to depressing the turnout rate. The largest single group which comprises the non-white population is the Black American. Some earlier studies have shown that in those cities where Blacks have the opportunity and the necessary encouragement to vote, they turn out in equal or greater numbers than



whites.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, voting may be the primary and, in some cases, the only means whereby Blacks can attempt to influence and affect policy decisions. Whites may find private avenues more conducive to their needs and thus utilize such avenues as a substitute for voting. Mayor-council cities have the tendency to make available the opportunity, and they have the necessary presence of stimuli to vote, more so than manager cities.

An additional finding was that the foreign-born and the native population had a stronger association to turnout in manager cities than they had in mayor-council cities. The expectation was that the native population would be more closely related to turnout in manager cities. It is little surprising, however, to find foreign-born population with a closer relationship to turnout in manager cities than mayor-council. It seems that they would follow the general pattern of non-white voting. However, as some have argued, ethnic saliency may be a thing of the past, for ethnics have been finally assimilated into the American political system.<sup>11</sup> As ethnics rise in socio-economic status they apparently not only move to manager cities but become less attached to ethnic considerations.

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<sup>10</sup>Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), 294-295.

<sup>11</sup>Wolfinger and Field, op. cit.

Turnout should continue to be high where there is a substantial admixture of non-whites, foreign-born and native population, for these are some of the ingredients which make for conflict, sometimes violent, which ultimately electorally expresses itself at the polls. Foreign-born people seem to have adopted or assimilated generally the orientation of the native population in that they, as well as the natives, turn out to vote in greater numbers in manager cities than in mayor-council cities. This also reflects the fact that the foreign-born have placed their fortunes on "non-political" manager cities. Although ethnic voting has not vanished, the probability is that ethnic salience is radically diminished in manager cities.

Forms of government are instituted to confer electoral and political advantages on one group of people over another group. The structures so introduced, therefore, may hinder or encourage full political participation. It is clear that some structures do in fact generate a large turnout while others depress voter turnout.

The basic conclusion drawn from this study is that political structures are very important determinants of voter turnout in municipal elections, and that forms of government are most significant than socio-economic variables as causal elements in voter turnout. Therefore, studies of voter turnout would do well to emphasize more the role and effect of political structures on the electorate and ultimately on turnout.

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## APPENDIX

## VOTER TURNOUT IN LOCAL ELECTIONS

We are interested in voter turnout for the last two local elections.

(PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTION APPROPRIATE TO YOUR FORM OF  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

- A. IN YOUR (CITY, VILLAGE, TOWN) DIRECTLY ELECTS ITS MAYOR,  
record below the total voter turnout in the last two general elections for  
mayor.

Year of Election

Total Voter Turnout for Office of Mayor

- B. IF YOUR CITY ELECTS ONLY COUNCILMEN OR COMMISSIONERS (i.e.,  
DOES NOT DIRECTLY ELECT THE MAYOR), record below the total votes  
received in the last two general elections for council or commission and  
the number of vacancies filled.

<u>Year of Election</u>	Total Votes Received by All Council or Commission <u>Candidates</u>	Number of Vacancies <u>Filled</u>
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