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# Scholar versus statesman : the record of Henry Kissinger; the United States, and western Europe.

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# SCHOLAR VERSUS STATESMAN: THE RECORD OF HENRY KISSINGER THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE

A Dissertation Presented

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## PREFACE

When Henry Kissinger assumed responsibility in 1969 for directing the National Security Council in the new Nixon administration, he probably did not fully anticipate how important, even decisive, a role he would play in determining American foreign policy in the next several years. I am concerned with the divergence between the ideas of Kissinger as a scholar and the policies of Kissinger as a statesman. An almost unique case affords the opportunity to examine how the ideas of a scholar undergo modification as they are implemented in actual practice.

By the late 1960's, it was evident that the postwar bipolar global structure of power was rapidly disintegrating. Military bipolarity persisted, though in a less pronounced form, but political multipolarity increased. The independent foreign policies of France and Rumania, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and Third World nationalism confirmed this trend.

Since the late 1940's America's position in the world had been buttressed by its many alliances. Its ties with Western Europe and Japan had been essential to the maintenance of its power and prestige in the world. But in a period of profound political and ideological change, would

the relationships with Western Europe and Japan continue to be so important? Would the new Nixon administration articulate and implement new principles in alliance relationships that stressed coalition and cooperation?

This study will examine Kissinger's policies toward Western Europe from 1969 to 1976. Kissinger's scholarly publications were of high quality and most of his writing was concerned with the relationship between the United States and Western Europe. The most thorough and comprehensive presentation of his views on Western Europe can be found in his two books; The Necessity for Choice (1961), and The Troubled Partnership (1965). Both are highly critical of America's Western European foreign policy in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. However, none of the books published on Kissinger as a statesman deal in a comprehensive manner with his policies towards Western Europe.

ABSTRACT

Scholar Versus Statesman: The Record of Henry Kissinger
The United States and Western Europe

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The assessment of a contemporary statesman presents difficulties. The primary problem is that the ultimate outcome of policies cannot be foreseen. The secondary problems include unavailability of documents and literature. However, it should still be possible to analyze the policies that shall, eventually, determine whether a statesman will succeed or fail. Every statesman must have a vision and act to implement that vision. Henry Kissinger placed the highest priority upon the development of détente with the Soviet Union and China but the relationship between the United States and Western Europe was not as important. The ultimate wisdom of his vision is a matter of serious concern to both contemporary and future analysts.

I am concerned with the divergence between the ideas of Kissinger as a scholar and the policies of Kissinger as a statesman. An almost unique case affords the opportunity to

examine how the ideas of a scholar undergo modification as they are implemented in actual practice. The first two chapters examine the principal tenets of Kissinger's philosophy of international relations and the relationship between the United States and Western Europe. I then focus upon the theory and practice of American foreign policy with respect to its multilateral and bilateral relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community (EC); West Germany, France, and Britain. Each chapter presents a summary of Kissinger's writings and an analysis of his policies probes the specific circumstances that account for modifications of his policies.

NATO's Strategy, NATO's Organization and the relationship between the United States and its NATO allies are examined with respect to Kissinger's previously elucidated views as a scholar and the subsequent practice of his diplomacy.

The European Community and its external relations and economic and political problems between the United States and the EC were of concern to Kissinger both as a scholar and a statesman.

The central themes of Kissinger's work on Germany are examined with respect to specific problems in United States-

West German relations. West Germany and the EC, The Offset Costs Issue, Energy, and American troops in Europe are discussed with regard to their bilateral and wider implications.

France merited considerable attention in Kissinger's work, and the relationship between the United States and France was particularly important to him. However, the central themes of French foreign policy today should be considered within the framework established by de Gaulle and modified by his successors. The Atlantic Alliance, Europe and the Middle East are the areas in which Franco-American differences are examined with respect to the Gaullist legacy and the ideas and policies of Kissinger.

As a statesman Kissinger must deal with Britain both as a European power and in terms of the uncertain relationship with the United States.

In the concluding chapter I discuss the central tenets of Kissinger's philosophy of history and the impact of his statesmanship upon the world with respect to: Détente: The Soviet Union and China, the Middle East, Japan, economic issues, and morality and foreign policy. I then examine the relationship between the world of the scholar (the realm of theory) and the world of the statesman (the realm of practical solutions) and assess Kissinger's successes and failures in reconciling the worlds of the scholar and the statesman.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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# CHAPTER I

## KISSINGER'S PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

My objective is to assess the record of a contemporary statesman, Henry Kissinger, who is both a scholar and a statesman. Prior to his tenure in public office, Kissinger had become an outstanding scholar in the field of international relations and a trenchant critic of American foreign policy. Few statesmen and no twentieth century American Secretaries of State have produced scholarly works of high quality that have articulated the central tenets of their views on international relations prior to their tenure in office. Consequently, the case of Kissinger presents a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between the ideas of the scholar and the policies of the statesman.

This study will be limited to Henry Kissinger's policies toward Western Europe. I shall try to determine how the ideas of a scholar undergo modification as they face the needs of the world of action. Both multilateral (NATO and the European Community) and bilateral relationships (West Germany, France, and Britain) will be examined.

Henry Kissinger is an extraordinarily able scholar of international relations. He has written perceptively and

with imagination on the subject of international relations, particularly on problems of the trans-Atlantic relationship between the United States and Western Europe. In 1969, Kissinger became Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and in 1973 was named Secretary of State. From 1969 to 1976, when a change of administration occurred, Kissinger's influence on American foreign policy was considerable, at times perhaps even predominant. His extraordinary influence upon American foreign policy is acknowledged by most analysts. However, a definitive assessment of the extent of this influence will have to wait until documents and other supporting material become available. Thus, it will not be possible to answer every question concerning Kissinger's influence upon various aspects of American foreign policy.

Kissinger's importance is all the more surprising when the relatively powerless position of either of his two posts from 1969 to 1976 is compared to the powers of the President. Certainly no one can acuse Richard Nixon of letting someone else guide American foreign policy. Nixon's primary interest was in foreign policy and, given his reluctance to share its execution with a broad range of interested parties, it is surprising and yet understandable--considering the domestic and international circumstances of Nixon's presidency--that Kissinger should have achieved such extraordinary influence.

To some extent Kissinger's importance arises from the tragic events that surrounded the American involvement in Vietnam. Considering the highly adverse diplomatic situation of the United States when the new Nixon administration assumed its duties, it is understandable that the Nixon team did not succeed in withdrawing the United States from Vietnam unscathed, causing an excessive strain upon the presidency. This strain manifested itself in the "Watergate" syndrome which seriously weakened Nixon's position and finally resulted in his resignation in August of 1974. Gerald Ford, a man of limited experience in foreign affairs and faced with a delicate domestic situation, became the next President.

Vietnam, Watergate, Nixon's resignation, and the badly weakened presidency of Gerald Ford were all complex, interrelated events that were to make and unmake many a career. The one leading figure to emerge relatively unscathed from the turmoil of these events was Henry Kissinger. Although, according to one commentator, Kissinger "was a bureaucratic infighter of superlative skills," I do not wish to pass judgment upon his responsibility in the crisis that was to cause the resignation of a president. What is pertinent here is that as Nixon's star waned, Kissinger's waxed. Moreover, an inexperienced President Ford found that he had to rely most heavily upon the advice and authority of a now very influential and uniquely important Secretary of State

for ensuring the continuity of and implementing American foreign policy.

In considering the factors that led to Kissinger's influence upon American foreign policy, it is appropriate to realize that, as Raymond Aron states, both Kissinger and Nixon saw the world through the same lenses.[1] This is also true of the presidency of Gerald Ford. Indeed, one may categorize all three as tactically flexible conservatives, although this may apply to a lesser extent to Ford. Diplomatic circumstances, a severe domestic crisis, an unusual personal rapport between two men--these factors, when linked with Kissinger's extraordinary talents, explain the preeminent influence of Henry Kissinger upon American foreign policy.

## The Scholar-Statesman

It is the major theme of this paper to trace the connection between the scholar--operating in the realm of ideas--and the statesman--operating in the realm of practical solutions. Obviously these areas of endeavor are connected and interrelated. And yet, to know is not necessarily to do. It is one thing to know the solution to a problem, it is quite another to garner the necessary support, overcome obstacles, and actually implement and successfully conclude policies.

Moreover, a combination of the best qualifications for

these two areas is rarely found in a single individual. A brief glance at American history will confirm this. In the 19th century, there were no scholar-statesmen who attained eminence.[2] In the 20th century Woodrow Wilson occupies a prominent place. Yet, while Wilson was an acknowledged authority on Congressional matters, the wisdom of his guidance of American foreign policy during and after World War I is open to serious question.[3] Wilson's ideals were laudable, and yet he manifested a serious lack of political judgment in their implementation.

Another prominent scholar-statesman was George F. Kennan. However, Kennan's scholarly activities were far more important than his activities as a statesman. He has published a number of notable books and yet, while he served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and as Chairman of the State Departments Policy Planning Committee after World War II, he never had a major role in the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy,[4] except for the Policy of Containment, which was perhaps Kennan's most notable contribution to the formulation of American foreign policy. Unfortunately, other than in Western Europe, his policy of containment was never implemented as he wished.

President Kennedy brought a number of scholars into his administration and, while they were influential in certain respects, the President generally exercised a strong

control over foreign policy.

When in 1969 Henry Kissinger was appointed Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, President Nixon hoped that his abilities could help to resolve successfully the ever worsening crisis over Vietnam. However, given the circumstances of the Vietnam war, it is not surprising that his performance in office has had mixed results. Knowledge alone does not guarantee that a problem can be solved, but assuredly no solution can be successful without some degree of knowledge. Are certain problems in international politics intractable? To what degree are the problems of international politics subject to rational control and resolution? It is the task of the analyst of political affairs to recognize the limitations of the rational approach and to determine the precise amenability of each problem without excusing the failures or lapses of judgment of statesmen.

## Kissinger's Perspectives on International Relations

Before discussing the reasons for Kissinger's policies towards Western Europe, it will be useful to review the more general aspects of his view of international relations. But a word of caution must be introduced. All statesmen have preconceived ideas prior to assuming power. However, when they are faced with the actual responsibilities of power,

many of these ideas undergo modification or are abandoned. It would be an injustice to Kissinger to deny that he might be similarly affected. Men are self-conscious beings, and prior knowledge of individual perspectives does not guarantee certain knowledge of subsequent actions. However, the case of Kissinger raises the particular question of a profound student of international relations, having the opportunity to implement his ideas in practice; to what extent were his thoughts applicable and when and how did they have to be modified?

## A Psychological Inquiry

An examination of Kissinger's world view may reveal some general precepts from a psychological perspective. Again limitations germane to the subject matter must be borne in mind. However, some initial observations can be made.

It should be noted that while Kissinger arrived in this country at an early age, his outlook has been colored by his European experience. At Harvard, Kissinger studied Europe's past, present, and future to the virtual exclusion of all else. Thus his formative impressions were reinforced by the tensions of the thirties, which Kissinger experienced in Germany, and were further strengthened by his intense immersion in European studies in this country.

One may be tempted to see a psychological parallel in

the saga of Joseph in Egypt. Joseph too arrived in Egypt at an early age, and became an Egyptian as he rose to become the second most powerful person in Egypt. And yet Joseph remained an Israelite as well. Kissinger also reflects this duality; he is a European in America. Many Europeans are more aware of the element of tragedy in international relations than most Americans. The European Continent is strewn with the wreckage of dreams. Kissinger himself was personally touched by tragedy; moreover, he was a student of European diplomatic history; therefore, the awareness of tragedy is an important aspect of his statesmanship.[5]

It is not only a greater appreciation of the role of tragedy in international relations that separates Kissinger from the mainstream of American views. He also has a greater understanding of the hydra-headed nature of power. He is at once more willing to use power qua power divested of the political and moral confusion that often surrounds and obscures the American usage of power. He is also less naive about the efficacy of power in attaining political goals, less certain than Americans that power will once and for all resolve political problems.[6] Therefore, Kissinger would not hesitate to apply force while simultaneously maintaining diplomatic contacts with the adversary. Force and diplomacy are two interrelated aspects of international relations in Kissinger's view.[7]

Interwoven with American ideas on the use of force are

American ideas on morality. It is a rare occasion when America's use of force in the international realm was not accompanied by a moralistic statement distorting, warping, or obscuring the rationale for using force. To Kissinger international morality has centered upon the need for the state to survive intact. Americans too often develop a moral edifice that basically views the use of force as a very regrettable incident in international relations. Morality, for Kissinger, centers upon the survival of the state; therefore, the occasional resort to force should elicit no surprise.[8]

Tragedy, power and force and morality are all important elements of international relations. Men can and do differ about the relative meaning of these terms. Moreover, differing perceptions of political reality do exist between Europeans and Americans. Thus Kissinger is a European, his ideas on vital aspects of the international order are European. It required exceptional diplomatic circumstances and the election as President of a man whose international views were on the periphery of American thought before Kissinger finally obtained the influence that he sought.

Kissinger's sensitivity to his experiences in Germany, his immersion in European studies and his basically European outlook all conditioned and influenced his acts as a statesman. One example will suffice to illustrate this point. In extracting the United States from Vietnam, Kissinger probably agreed with Nixon on the need for applying force often on a

massive scale after 1969. But, simultaneously, intense negotiations were carried on with the North Vietnamese while both of Hanoi's allies, the Soviet Union and China, were the subjects of a very active diplomacy. Finally, Kissinger made clear to all three powers that the United States would not and could not be humiliated; it would only withdraw on the basis of a negotiated peace. To the American public Kissinger spoke of the need for "honor" in meeting America's commitments. The liberal use of force when required, the active all-inclusive diplomacy, the careful limitation of international morality, and Kissinger's knowledge of the ever present abyss of tragedy, all highlighted an essentially European diplomatic response to an American crisis.

## Kissinger's World View

However, as a scholar, what ideas did Kissinger express concerning morality, the statesman, and diplomacy? Kissinger's general outlook on international relations is best expressed by the term Realpolitik.[9] However, he has also displayed a concern for the moral element in international relations.[10] Indeed the avoidance of nuclear war has to him always been the highest moral imperative. He has also been concerned with human rights and the plight of the undeveloped countries.[11] A close examination of Kissinger's world view may well reveal more continuity than is usually thought to exist between his ideas as a scholar and his actions as a

statesman. However, regarding areas that were, for various reasons, of secondary concern to him - such as Western Europe - the discrepancy between what he wrote and what he did is considerable. I now wish to turn to an examination of the primary and secondary ideas on international relations that he has expressed as a mature scholar.

## Morality

To Kissinger, "The ultimate test of morality in foreign policy is not only the values we proclaim but what we are willing and able to implement."[12] This statement contains the essence of his views on morality, ranging from nuclear weapons to human-rights problems. In his view "peace is a fundamental moral imperative in the nuclear age."[13] Consequently, he has written extensively on the problem of arms control and nuclear weapons. He has been highly influential in, and indeed, one of the architects of détente with the Soviet Union. For him the greatest moral imperative is the avoidance of nuclear war. He has consistently upheld this position and it is not surprising that relations with the Soviet Union should have been the cornerstone of his foreign policy.

With respect to human-rights, Kissinger is also aware of limitations. He has pointed to "Quiet Diplomacy" as aiding hundreds of political prisoners and enabling many Jewish emigrants to leave the Soviet Union. With respect

to American support of regimes that practice repressive policies, such as South Korea and Iran, Kissinger posed a series of questions: "If we insist that others accept all our moral preferences, are we then ready to use military force to protect those who do as we urge? And if those who refuse our prescriptions are deprived of our support, what will we do if the isolation of those governments tempts external pressures or attack by other countries even more repressive? Will we have served moral ends, if we thereby jeopardize our own security."[14]

Kissinger is concerned with morality, but only to the extent that it can be realized. He is certainly not a Wilsonian idealist but has a more modest, prudent view of morality that is no less sincere in its conviction but recognizes greater limitations in its implementation.

## The Statesman

Kissinger was greatly concerned with the role of the statesman; this is particularly evident in his work as a graduate student. His doctoral dissertation, A World Restored, contains perceptive and trenchant views on the obligations of the statesman.[15] Another paper, also written when he was a graduate student, is concerned with Bismarck.[16]

The importance he attaches to the statesman is evident from the quantity and quality of his writings on the subject. Nor would he affirm that the role of the statesman (and by

implication the nation-state) is of diminished importance in the modern world. The acid test of a "statesman, then, is his ability to recognize the real relationship of forces and to make this knowledge serve his ends."[17] Thus, neither Castlereagh, Metternich, nor Bismarck fare well in his estimation. "A statesman who too far outruns the experience of his people will fail in achieving a domestic consensus, however wise his policies, witness Castlereagh, a statesman who limits his policy to the experience of his people will doom himself to sterility; witness Metternich."[18] As for Bismarck, Kissinger correctly points out how his policies brought great tragedy on Germany: "In the end the things Bismarck had warned or fought against occurred; any alliance with France was impossible after 1871, Germany was increasingly tied to Austria, and the requirements of the national interest were highly ambiguous after all. Thus Germany's greatest modern figure may well have sown the seeds of its Twentieth Century tragedy."[19]

Kissinger thus takes a rather critical view of each of these great statesmen; he applauds their successes, but, based on the merits that are the hallmark of true greatness, none of them pass the test. None fully recognize the "real relationship of forces" and thus made "this knowledge serve his ends." Most importantly, none built a structure that was lasting.[20] For Kissinger, these are the acid tests of true greatness in a statesman.

## Diplomacy

For Kissinger, there was simply no substitute for a sound, well-ordered diplomacy. For conducting relations among nations, the skills and intelligence of the diplomat were at a premium. Thus Kissinger's views on diplomacy are what could be expected of a student of 19th Century European diplomacy. However, even in an age of modern communications, Kissinger considered the diplomats' skills to be indispensable. Indeed, his general view of diplomacy closely parallels that of Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan. Consequently, diplomacy is a useful tool for carrying on the business of nations; to engage in diplomatic activities, it is not necessary also to extend one's moral approval.

Associated with these main themes are Kissinger's concerns with stability, his distaste for violent, revolutionary change, a dislike of moral absolutes, his insistence on the stark reality of tragedy, and the need to insure the survival of the state.

Stability is absolutely necessary in the nuclear age. Vast upheavals in the international order pose an immense danger because of the presence of nuclear weapons. Thus his remark that if he had to choose between injustice and order and justice and disorder, he would always choose the former.[21]

Kissinger disliked Communism on similar grounds because

it posed a serious threat to the stability of the international order through its emphasis upon violent, revolutionary change. He was vehemently opposed to the (more irresponsible) policies of the Soviet Union and China, but he did not think that this ruled out the need for negotiations between the West and the East. The need to avoid moral absolutes, the omnipresence of tragedy, and the harsh necessities of survival are imperatives of the international order that cannot be ignored.

These are the primary and secondary ideas in Kissinger's world view. What type of intellectual framework is the result? Is it possible to discern in Kissinger's world view the ideas that he would later put into practice?

Kissinger's view of international politics emphasizes the clash and compromise that occurs among the real movers of world politics: the nation-state, the single most important unit in world politics.[22] But other transnational actors exist. It does an injustice to a thinker of Kissinger's caliber to imagine that he does not understand the importance of multi-national corporations and other transnational actors. But the survival of the nation-state and its way of life are of supreme importance.

The task of guiding the state falls to the statesman, necessitating a rather wide range of discretionary powers. The necessity for maneuver, for diplomatic surprises (many of which may be unpleasant), for secrecy and the need for

rapid, quick adjustments - if the diplomatic situation warrants - these exemplify the actions that may have to be undertaken by the statesman.

This is a sobering picture of Kissinger's view of international relations. Yet, it is entirely possible to have foreseen much of the future direction of his foreign policy. A perceptive observer in 1969 - acquainted with the main tenets of Kissinger's views - might have predicted some of his policies. Thus I agree - with qualifications - with those who contend that he wrote one thing and did another.[23] As regards his policy towards Western Europe, there was a divergence between his ideas as a scholar and his practices as a statesman. Was his scholarship faulty? Or were his judgments - as a statesman - the result of incorrect assessments? Yet Kissinger's rationale for his often callous actions towards Western Europe and Japan would be that the very desperate diplomatic situation of the United States necessitated placing - for the time being - the highest importance upon American interests. The penchant for secrecy, the dislike of the bureaucracy, the virtual exclusion of the public and others interested in foreign policy, the increasing centralization of foreign policy decisions in the White House, the often brutal tactics with respect to alliance diplomacy, the seemingly unrestrained use of force in Indochina, the emphasis upon relations with adversaries who could aid in extricating the United States from Vietnam, the

preoccupation with "high politics" that caused Kissinger so badly to underestimate the intent of the Arabs to use the oil weapon,[24] all these views and policies are entirely consistent with Kissinger's world view. Implicit in this view is the potential for some or all of the above policies depending upon the circumstances. Nixon and Kissinger thought that the war in Vietnam was tearing American society apart while America's ability to maintain its power and prestige in the world was being seriously undermined.

Since the survival of the state and its way of life are the supreme objectives of statesmanship, a non-doctrinaire approach by the practitioner of Realpolitik is called for. Their personal predilections; for example, their distrust of the bureaucracy and their dislike of delegating serious responsibilities to subordinates reinforced Nixon's and Kissinger's ideological perspectives. Odd as it may seem, Kissinger's greatest success was with the Soviet Union (and China) and his greatest error the excessively prolonged withdrawal from Vietnam (and the tendency to minimize the importance of Western Europe and Japan). None of these policies was inevitable, but to a serious student of Kissinger's perspectives on international relations, they occasioned no great surprise.

## Footnotes

1. It is really very difficult to separate the two men. This was an almost unique relationship of unusual rapport, and both must have a share in the successes and failures of their policies. See Raymond Aron "Richard Nixon and the Future of American Foreign Policy," Atlantic Community Quarterly Winter 1972 Vol. 10 #4 p. 442 and Anthony Hartley, American Foreign Policy in the Nixon Era, Adelphi Paper #110, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter, 1974-75, p. 1.

2. I am concerned with Scholar-Statesmen whose activities could only have occurred after the United States became a major state in world politics.

3. Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962, pp. 401-402.

4. George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967, pp. 467-468.

5. Kissinger will very seldom discuss his early experiences in Nazi Germany as a child. However, he was aware of the collapse of the "secure and stable" and the "enormous turmoil" and "fantastic insecurities" that occurred to many people he knew. Certainly these impressions influenced his view of tragedy. See Bruce Mazlish, Kissinger, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976, p. 19.

6. Kissinger asked whether the all-out war strategy was not an attempt to resolve by force the frustration produced by the fact that foreign policy seems much less tractable than domestic policy. See Steven S. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1973, p. 78.

7. John G. Stoessinger, Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976, p. 22.

8. Ibid., p. 22.

9. This is the term that Raymond Aron uses to characterize the Nixon-Kissinger policies. See Aron, The Imperial Republic. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974, p. 147.

10. Kissinger's essay, "America and the World: Principle and Pragmatism," Time, December 27, 1976 and his article, "The Spirit of American Foreign Policy" in Kissinger,

American Foreign Policy, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1974, pp. 241-252.

11. Graubard; Kissinger, Portrait of a Mind, p. 273.

12. New York Times, October 20, 1976, p. 12.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Kissinger's discussion of Metternich is very good. See Kissinger, A World Restored, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973, pp. 7-29.

16. "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck," Daedalus Vol. 97 #3, Summer 1968, pp. 888-924.

17. Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 325.

18. Ibid., p. 329.

19. Kissinger, "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck," p. 922.

20. James P. Sewell, "Master Builder or Captain of the Dike? Notes on the leadership of Kissinger." International Journal Vol. XXXI #4, Autumn 1976, p. 649.

21. Stoessinger, Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power, p. 14.

22. Ibid., p. 45.

23. Mazlish, Kissinger, pp. 233-234.

24. James Chace, "The Kissinger Years," New Republic, Vol. 171, #19, Nov. 9, 1974, p. 32.

# CHAPTER II

## AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SEVENTIES

It is not easy to assess the record of a contemporary statesman. It is always difficult to arrive at balanced judgments; this is particularly true in a period of rapid change. Not only has the United States suffered a disaster in Vietnam, but the failure of American statesmen to anticipate and take appropriate measures to lessen a growing dependence on a vital necessity of the industrial state - oil - must be considered as an important failure of American statesmanship. These disasters have occurred in a period that marks the demise of the Cold War order while the nature of the newly emerging configuration of world politics is not clear.

By the beginning of the Seventies the American public displayed a considerable sophistication and maturity concerning foreign affairs that many earlier observers would have been reluctant to predict. This development was all the more remarkable in view of the oil embargo and the quadrupling of prices that occurred in 1973 and the fall of Saigon two years later.

Nevertheless, there still remain some unanswered

questions concerning America's role in the world. More than 100 years ago de Tocqueville pointed out that consistency of purpose, foresight, secrecy, and maneuverability were qualities that were necessary for the successful conduct of foreign policy.[1] He was remarkably prescient in his vision; in general, the United States still remains deficient in the characteristics that are necessary for the conduct of a successful foreign policy. However, democracies very often are deficient in these characteristics even though these qualities are no less important today. Moreover, the historical record is clear. The United States drifted into two world wars without adequate military preparation, it ended these wars with inadequate political preparation, and it suffered two major and related disasters in the Seventies in Vietnam and the Arabs' use of the oil weapon. Were these events merely failures of statesmanship? It seems that the roots are far deeper than mere lapses of judgment. They have to do with the very manner in which the government of the United States is organized for the conduct of its foreign policy and with the values and objectives cherished by the American people.[2]

Both domestic and international conditions should make cold war protagonists as well as advocates of world leadership for America aware of the limitations imposed upon foreign policy by democracy in general and the United States democracy in particular.[3] The decade of the Seventies has

been confusing and tumultuous, climaxed by two major foreign policy disasters for the United States. The task of analysis is to determine whether these disasters could have been avoided and to what extent they were caused by the failures of statesmen and governments. The theory and practice of American foreign policy towards Western Europe should provide conclusions that are not only germane to that topic but have more general application.

## American Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe

To understand American foreign policy toward Western Europe I should like to cite, however briefly, Soviet-American relations.

The central problem of American foreign policy is its relationship with the Soviet Union. Despite the presence of serious economic and environmental issues in world politics, a general nuclear war between the two superpowers is still the supreme catastrophe that threatens mankind. The nuclear arms race between the superpowers is thus far restrained only by rather tenuous, limited agreements. No steps have been taken actually to reduce the vast nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. Both have vast conventional armaments as well, particularly in Central Europe, the most heavily armed area of the globe. I do not wish to enter into the arguments over Soviet capabilities and intentions. Suffice it to say that when a superpower faces a group of

medium and small powers and that superpower is potentially capable of hostile actions of varying kinds, then prudence demands that the other superpower neither exacerbate nor ignore that potential. Thus, geopolitical factors suggest an assessment of the importance of Western Europe in the world today.

Today the relationship between the United States and Western Europe (and Japan) is a vital concern of American foreign policy.[4] Americans and West Europeans are linked by many sentimental and strategic bonds. Western Europe is a leading center of economic, technological, and political power in the world. The European Community (EC) also is potentially the most important experiment of our era in overcoming the political fragmentation of a world of sovereign nation-states. Arnold Toynbee has stated that overcoming the division and fragmentation of the global order should be one of the foremost priorities of statesmen everywhere.[5]

Consequently, there are a collection of states on each side of the Atlantic that, for historical and contemporary reasons, should cooperate on the many issues of mutual concern that confront them both. But politics often confounds logic. Towards the end of the Johnson administration and more markedly in the Nixon administration, serious strains became apparent in both the multilateral and bilateral relations of America and Western Europe.

The NATO organization seemed to continue on a course of slow decline while increasingly intractable problems appeared to diminish further its future capabilities. The EC became mired in internal problems while the Americans treated Brussels almost with contempt at various times. Bilateral relations were little better. The state of West German-American relations remained generally good and yet a few problems, concerning West Germany and the EC, the offset costs issue and American troops in Europe, inflamed passions on both sides to a considerable degree.[6] The Franco-American relationship at least grew no worse than previously and in certain respects perhaps even improved somewhat. Yet very serious differences remained between the two, particularly over the problem of energy. The once vaunted "special relationship" with Britain continued to fade. Britain's domestic preoccupations and gravely weakened economy limited its ability to influence world affairs and, though Britain (and Denmark and Ireland) entered the EC in 1973, doubts and hesitations remained concerning Britain's commitment to that organization.

There seemed to be a cloud of mutual suspicion, even animosity, that reached a peak in 1973-74, over Euro-American relations in general.[7] Ill temper and spiteful rhetoric were particularly apparent on the American side.[8] These frictions occurred in a period when Americans and Europeans were facing many problems that could only be resolved by mutually

supportive efforts. Thus in a period of rapid change, when economic and environmental issues have assumed a new importance, Western Europe remains an area of vital concern for American foreign policy.

Here I shall briefly discuss some of the general problems that are part of the Euro-American relationship. The place of Western Europe in American foreign policy has never been the subject of a particularly searching analysis.[9] European interests often automatically concorded with those of the United States. However, there have been occasions when they have diverged and even clashed with disastrous consequences for both sides.

Americans and Europeans - as indicated earlier - are joined by a number of unique sentimental and strategic ties. Yet, in viewing the historical record, the frequency of serious differences between Americans and Europeans is striking. The results of such differences were apparent before, during, and after both world wars. The Mideast October war in 1973 again brought to light very serious disagreements between Americans and Europeans.[10] Despite their strength and long duration, Euro-American ties have been greatly strained. It is quite possible that similar incidents might recur, with tragic consequences for all involved.

Since the end of World War II Euro-American relations in NATO and other multilateral institutions and in bilateral

relations have generally been conducted - with only a few serious lapses - in a spirit of partnership. All members of the coalition recognize the wisdom of mutual cooperation in the attainment of shared objectives: 1) to defend Western Europe against the Soviet threat, 2) to reconstitute the economic and political life of the European states that were devastated in World War II, 3) to enable Western Europe to regain its place in the world and the industrial democracies to advance their mutual global interests. But in the 1970s these objectives have changed. To some extent the Soviet threat remains, but all Western European countries have recovered from World War II and through the EC are increasingly able to advance their own interests in the world. It therefore seems necessary to reassess the importance of the Euro-American relationship.

In a period such as the Seventies, when turmoil and profound change mark the demise of one order while the outlines of the emerging order are but dimly perceived, three additional factors add to the uncertainty of the situation. The social, economic, and political problems that emerged in the European states before World War I have reappeared and rendered their internal equilibrium more precarious at a time when a high degree of international stability is needed.[11] Social fissures in Britain, Italy, and France have reached the point where class animosity and conflict are at the highest levels in many years. Especially in Britain it

is difficult to see how some of these problems can be resolved without incurring the risk of inflicting serious wounds upon the democratic-constitutional order.

Economic stagnation coupled with inflation has also dealt a serious blow to the economic systems of Britain and Italy, and to a lesser extent France. To find solutions to the economic difficulties of these states is no easy matter. The economic disparities between members in both NATO and the EC have widened, making agreement on common policies much more difficult. The result is added centrifugal pressures that already plague Europe.

Political activity has greatly increased at either end of the political spectrum. Groups on the political fringe are increasingly willing to use force to attain their political objectives and pose a grave threat to the constitutional order. The problem has been aggravated by political fragmentation. In pre-World War I Britain, this difficulty was apparent in the Irish question. Today, not only the situation in Northern Ireland but separatist demands in Scotland and Wales are raising serious questions about the political unity of the United Kingdom. Nor is Britain alone. Spain (Basques and others) and France (Bretons and Basques) face similar problems. Finally, the possibility exists of the Euro-Communists' participation in or control of a Western European state.[12] Are the Euro-Communists really ready to accept a pluralistic political system and

legitimation by the electoral process? How will NATO deal with the problem of cooperation with a European country where Euro-Communists participate in or control the government? Can NATO retain credibility as a defense against a Soviet (Communist) threat when Euro-Communists are members of NATO? How can this be explained to Western publics? To summarize, will domestic problems make it difficult or impossible to maintain the position of the European states in NATO? How will the domestic problems of the states affect the further integration of the EC? Western Europe must insure against an adverse tilting of the balance of power while defending - increasingly through the EC - its interests in the world.[13]

The second major problem has already been alluded to. What will be the attitude of the Western public towards military expenditures and the support of NATO if in ten years even the Cold War is but a dim memory? Inflation, the rising cost of military equipment, the lack of real military and other integration in NATO are all taking an increasing toll of NATO's capabilities. With pressures mounting everywhere to cut military budgets, will public indifference towards the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe increase? NATO is the expression of the West's resolve to maintain the balance of power in Europe. However, far reaching reform and a more mature, balanced perspective on the part of the political leadership and the public is a

prerequisite if the military balance in Europe is to be maintained. Potentially hostile policies and geopolitical realities can be ignored only at the peril of all concerned.

There is a final problem, more subtle, perhaps more complex, than most. It has to do with the psychological consequences that the Europeans have suffered as a result of the destruction and chaos of two world wars. The constant need - more acute in some periods than in others - of the West Germans for reassurance and support by the United States; the often exaggerated posturing of France in its quest for grandeur, particularly under de Gaulle; and Britain's increasing loss of self-confidence have all been manifestations of this same problem. When considering, for example, the ramifications of the Suez crisis and the Skybolt affair, can it be said that Americans have conducted themselves with due regard for these various difficulties? Probably, Americans, in no small measure, have contributed to the partial demise of self-confidence that is part of the profound crisis affecting Britain today. Wars are catastrophes that are often unambiguous signals of the decline of civilizations. Will future historians consider that the world wars marked the inevitable decline of Europe that was only temporarily arrested by the intervention and thereafter diminishing support of the United States? Has the Europeans' belief in themselves been irreparably damaged to the extent that their capacity to govern themselves and

to contribute to the betterment of the world is doubtful? There are no certain answers to these questions.

These are some of the more general problems in Euro-American relations. During the latter part of the Johnson administration and during Henry Kissinger's term in office, relations between nations on both sides of the Atlantic worsened. It must be admitted that Kissinger himself - that most perceptive observer of European affairs - contributed greatly to this state of affairs.[14] If the present difficulties lead to a reaffirmation of the vital role of the Euro-American relationship - Europeans as well could recognize and reaffirm the importance of this relationship from their side - then present difficulties can be resolved. If this period, however, represents a prelude to - perhaps even a worsening of - the situation, then there may be no further chances to restore concord between the United States and Western Europe.

## Footnotes

1. Democracies, particularly the United States, cannot or should not withdraw from world politics and yet would it not be wise to scrutinize contemplated policies with specific regard for their unexpected or adverse consequences.

2. Alastair Buchan believes that by the third century of the Republic's existance, a major reorganization of the American government will be imperative and unavoidable. See Buchan "United States Foreign Policy and the Future" in R. Rosecrance, editor, America as an Ordinary Country, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977, pp. 29-30.

3. During the thirties - the period of isolationism - too little attention was paid to foreign affairs; in the sixties too much attention was paid to foreign affairs. A balance must be achieved between domestic and international needs; inherent in the idea of balance is the need for moderation - the recognition of limitations.

4. This is the opinion of George F. Kennan in his latest book on American foreign policy, The Cloud of Danger, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977, p. 114.

5. Toynbee states that since Western Society has been politically fractured since the fall of the Roman Empire in the West that it is unlikely that the (necessary) political and spiritual unification of the world will occur under a western agency. See Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, revised and abridged by the author and Jane Caplan, New York: Weathervane Books, 1972, pp. 443-444.

6. The problem of choosing a new main battle tank for NATO and West Germany's sale of nuclear reactors to Brazil also caused controversy on both sides.

7. The New York Times, April 24, 1973, p. 3.

8. David Landes states in his conclusion that the reintroduction of graciousness would be a very valuable first step to take in the improvement of trans-Atlantic relations. See Landes, editor, Western Europe, The Trials of Partnership, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977, p. 394.

9. Kissinger has stated that (American) pragmatism is based on the conviction that the context of events produces a solution; so there is a tendency to await developments. See Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974, p. 29.

10. The October, 1973 crisis revealed how vulnerable Western Europe's economy is to disruption and how little real strength and willpower there is in Bonn, Paris or London. See Lothar Ruhl "The Nine and NATO" in Peter Ludz, editor, Dilemmas of the Atlantic Alliance. New York: Praeger, 1975, p. 249.

11. The problem is to reconcile the need of the international system for stability and of domestic societies for change. To reconcile these two contradictory tendencies, it is necessary to enact a policy of flexible containment. See Pierre Hassner "Europe and the Contradictions in American Policy" in Richard Rosecrance, editor, America as an Ordinary Country, Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1976, p. 85.

12. The way in which the problem of PCI participation in the Italian government was dealt with by the Ford administration is not reassuring. At the June 1976 Puerto Rican Summit Meeting, Ford obtained the confidential agreement of the leaders of West Germany, Britain, and France to deny financial aid to any government that included communists. If the PCI had won in the 1976 parliamentary elections, what would have occurred? Lieber indicates a possible collapse of the economy and consequent civil war with a right or left-wing dictatorship finally emerging. See R. J. Lieber "The Pendulum Swings to Europe" Foreign Policy #26, Spring 1977, p. 50.

13. In an excellent article Karl Kaiser warns that greater cooperation and consultation is vital between the United States and Western Europe as it integrates, both with respect to developing new energy resources as a group and concerning other raw materials and with respect for the future of democracy and détente. See "Europe and America: A Critical Phase", Foreign Affairs Vol. 52 #4, July 1974, pp. 740-741.

14. Kissinger's tactless and undiplomatic remarks at the end of the October war were unnecessary. His statement that "the Europeans had acted as though the Alliance did not exist" and his remark "I do not care what

happens to NATO, I am so disgusted" were widely reported and resented by Europeans. See article by "Z", "The year of Europe?" Foreign Affairs Vol. 52 #2, January, 1974, p. 237.

# CHAPTER III

## MULTILATERAL RELATIONS: THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

### The Scholar
### NATO and European Security

Kissinger thought that one of the most profound questions concerning international relations centered upon the ability of the West to cooperate in the attainment of its political objectives.[1] Two objectives - security and cooperation on common goals - were of the utmost importance. Kissinger warned that if the Western powers became disunited, "sooner or later, these states on the fringe of the Eurasian land mass would be drawn into the Communist orbit."[2] Americans then would be truly isolated, they would live in a foreign world.

However, there are other reasons for the West to attain cohesion, for neither Americans nor Europeans alone can hope to deal individually with all the concurrent revolutions and challenges of our times. To build a world order based on the inherent values of Western civilization, the closest cooperation between America and Europe is necessary.

Yet Kissinger thought that neither the Eisenhower nor the Kennedy administrations really demonstrated that they

could effectively deal with the issues of NATO strategy, arms control, nuclear weapons, German unification, or European security.[3] He was pessimistic and highly critical of the responses of both administrations to these problems and thought that "unless the North Atlantic group of nations develops a clearer purpose, it will be doomed."[4]

Strategic doctrine, political cohesion, and NATO's future are three areas that reveal Kissinger's concerns on the problems facing the Atlantic Alliance.

## Strategic Doctrine

Kissinger was greatly concerned with strategy. Over the years he has devoted a great deal of attention to strategic matters, and it was his work in this area that first brought him national recognition with the publication of Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy in 1957.

Strategy was a vital concern for the United States in the nuclear age. Faulty strategic doctrine could inhibit or bring disaster. Indeed, Kissinger demanded that "it should be the task of our strategic doctrine to create alternatives less cataclysmic than a thermonuclear holocaust."[5] This is why he was uncompromisingly opposed to the doctrine of massive retaliation for "the penalty for doctrinal rigidity was military catastrophe."[6] What he advocated was a strategic doctrine that provided the maximum room for diplomacy and recognized that the nuclear age contained not only risks but

opportunities.

Yet Kissinger thought that Americans had very often failed to understand strategy and deal adequately with strategic problems. They were "more comfortable with technology than with doctrine." There can be little doubt that for Kissinger strategy and its attendant problems were of foremost concern.

In the three books that he published between 1957 and 1965, Kissinger was a trenchant critic of American strategic doctrine: Eisenhower's policies with respect to Europe were bankrupt; indeed since the founding of NATO and the creation of the Marshall Plan there had been no really promising American efforts to inspire the North Atlantic nations to develop a clearer purpose.[7]

Common strategy was a shambles. The allies depended to an excessive degree upon the American nuclear deterrent. The whole NATO deployment in Europe was faulty, being "too strong for a trip wire, too weak to resist a major advance." This could tempt Soviet pressures and obscured from many Americans the fact that it was the presence of the U.S. in Europe that deterred the Soviet Union.

There were other adverse effects of NATO's sole reliance on a retaliatory strategy. First, America's allies saw themselves protected by the United States which (subsequently) released them from the need to make their own military effort.[8] Second, some of the European allies had doubts about

America's behavior in a crisis and its future dependability; consequently, they sought to develop their own independent retaliatory capability. These circumstances and policies had equally adverse consequences; local defense efforts were weakened while the independent retaliatory forces were virtually worthless.

This indicated that the British and the French either lacked confidence in the American understanding of its European interests or they were concerned that the United States would not run certain risks on behalf of Europe. For Kissinger both of these policies were signs of the early disintegration of NATO. And the United States - often self-righteous and critical of France and Britain - was doing nothing to rectify this increasingly dangerous situation.[9] The Europeans were constantly seeking reassurance that they would not be abandoned.

Kissinger considered American strategic doctrine after 1961 as particularly inept.[10] He saw no military reason for the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal that proved to be such a bone of contention among the allies during the early sixties; he recognized the inadequacies of NATO's conventional defense posture, continuing problems with NATO's organization, and the deficiencies of troop deployment and logistics structure. He also criticized policies of the Eisenhower administration. The stationing of intermediate-range missiles (IRBM's) in Europe and the so-called double-veto

system were "panic measures" brought about chiefly by the need to do something to counter the Soviet Union's success with Sputnik. These were merely technical responses to what were the far more essential political problems of the Atlantic Alliance.[11]

## Political Cohesion

Kissinger clearly saw that with the completion of post-war reconstruction and the decline of the Soviet threat differences would emerge between the United States and Europe. He never assumed that an integrated Europe would find its interests to be identical with those of the United States.[12] In fact, he argued that differences between America and Europe should be recognized for then "it may be possible to agree on a permissible range of divergence." Each partner should regain a measure of flexibility. Europe should also assume a greater responsibility for its defense and its future course in the world. Excessive centralization of decision-making in the hands of the Americans relieved the allies of their responsibilities. At the same time this could create great differences of opinion when a conflict of interests became apparent.

Kissinger recommends "an allied structure which makes possible a variety of coordinated approaches on some issues." The problem was to restore some measure of responsibility to America's allies. The decade and a half of American hegemony

must not beguile Americans into believing that they always best represent the general interest. Kissinger thought that some autonomy of decision-making was essential for the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance.[13]

These adjustments are vital for the future of the Alliance. Excessive paternalism will destroy it. What is needed is to "require wisdom and delicacy in handling the transition from tutelage to equality." Assertions of distinctly European interests are to be welcomed as they are really the growing pains of a new and healthier relationship. Here Kissinger also criticizes America's style, its ingrained optimism, excessive attention to abstract models and technological solutions that express themselves in a restless quest for "new" solutions and technological remedies. Finally, for the sake of its own stability, America could benefit from a counterweight to impetuosity and supply historical perspective to many "final" solutions.[14] Kissinger calls for "the establishing of a psychological balance between us and Europe." The basic problem is to strike a balance between unity and respect for diversity. Excesses on either plane can have adverse consequences. He asserts that "to strike this balance is the big unsolved problem before the Western Alliance."[15]

It is evident that Kissinger has a profound concern for the political problems facing the Alliance. And, as mentioned above, he recommended an organizational change that

should not be confused with a final solution but does attempt to provide a new structural balance in Euro-American relations.

This "allied structure" should be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council. There would be six members, five of whom would be permanent (the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Italy); the sixth non-permanent rotating member would represent the smaller NATO countries. The NATO Council (excluding the permanent members) could elect the rotating member. A two-thirds vote would be binding. Members of the Executive Committee should be no lower than Deputy Foreign Ministers, who would meet at least bi-monthly.

The role of the Executive Committee would be to formulate common Atlantic purposes, to give guidance on military matters, and to develop a common strategic doctrine.

But there would have to be provision for dissent. Each ally - whether or not a member of the Executive Committee - could appeal its decision to the NATO Council, where a two-thirds majority would carry. Each country could dissent and for an interim period refuse to be bound by such a vote. Thus provisions for dissent would be maintained along with mechanisms for carrying out the will of the majority.

Given this framework the European countries might wish to form a closer union. A closer union could become a reality if, for example, the Western European Union were given

responsibility for the European component of the Allied Nuclear Forces. For Kissinger "Atlantic partnership and increased European cohesion thus could be pursued simultaneously with no advance commitment to giving priority to either course." The course of European evolution could be left to the Europeans while Americans could make their main contribution in the reconstitution of Atlantic relationships.[16]

## NATO's Future

Kissinger clearly attached the utmost importance to NATO as a manifestation of the Western powers' determination to ensure their collective defense. But he was aware that collective defense is difficult to maintain in an era of détente, when the external threat has diminished but not vanished. He also realized that organizational structures such as NATO were not sufficient to ensure unity among the Allies. Consequently, he attached the highest importance to the maintenance of NATO while recognizing that NATO's efficiency depended upon a consensus on political objectives.[17]

These circumstances would rule out the use of NATO as an instrument for détente as well as for defense. For Kissinger a military alliance simply did not have the necessary diplomatic flexibility.

Neither military nor legal obligations are sufficient to assure an adequate NATO response to Soviet aggression.

Under prevailing conditions no statesman will risk a catastrophe simply to fulfill a legal obligation. What is important, indeed vital, is that the necessary "degree of political cooperation has been established which links the fate of each partner with the survival of all the others."[18]

In an era of East-West diplomacy and rapidly changing circumstances, it is obvious that Kissinger did not neglect NATO's problems. Yet he was also aware that the Western allies stood at a crucial juncture in their history. Underlying all the problems of strategic doctrine, rapidly changing conditions and the many difficulties faced by the West is the challenge of the times. This challenge centers upon the need to move beyond the political fragmentation caused by the nation-state and to find political forms that will meet the needs of the times. The central question concerns the ability of the West to move "from the nation-state to a large community and draw from this effort the strength for another period of innovation."[19] For Kissinger this challenge is vital, as the ability to master this problem will largely determine whether the West will remain relevant to the rest of the world. The dynamic periods of western history have occurred when unity was formed from diversity.

Kissinger argues that "the deepest question before the West may thus be what kind of vision it has of its future."[20] The disagreements that have occurred on both sides of the Atlantic must be turned into a source of strength. The West

must manage to "relate diversity to community." This generation need not surrender to the doctrine of historical inevitability. Indeed, history derives its meaning from the "convictions and purposes of the generation which shapes it."

## Multilateral Relations: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

### The Statesman NATO in the Seventies

Several themes emerge from Kissinger's writings on NATO. He is concerned with NATO's strategy and its organization, with the problem of defending Europe in an era of détente, with political cooperation and cohesion among the allies, and the long-range necessity for the Alliance to move beyond the confines of the nation-state to a true level of community. Once again the West would be instrumental in demonstrating the potential of new forms of political organization that would have a decisive influence on world politics.

From 1969 to 1976 Kissinger, as a Statesman, was in a position to implement the ideas that he had written about as a scholar. I shall deal with his efforts under three headings: NATO's strategy, NATO's organization, and Alliance relationships.

### NATO's Strategy

Kissinger was never exclusively interested in strategic

problems. Though his reputation was initially founded chiefly on his criticism of and recommendations for American strategic thought, in later years he became much less preoccupied with strategic problems. While he completely disagreed with the strategy of massive retaliation, he found the doctrine of flexible response less objectionable. He did not agree with certain aspects of flexible response (such as the problem of tactical nuclear weapons), however, he accepted the central premise of the doctrine.[21]

While Nixon and Kissinger were preoccupied with the Vietnam negotiations, with the SALT talks, and with the Middle East, European problems (with the exception of the treaties signed in 1971 and 1972 involving Berlin and West Germany) by contrast, did not seem to be as important. John Stoessinger writes "During his first three years in office, however, Kissinger paid little attention to America's allies in Western Europe and even less to Japan. Most of his time was taken up with Indochina, the Soviet Union, and China. The fate of Europe, which had occupied him so much during his earlier days, had virtually drifted from his range of vision. He was aware, of course, of serious strains in NATO, and criticized the new economic competitiveness, the selfishness, and the growing nationalism of the Western European countries. Many of Europe's leaders seemed weak and ineffectual to him, and when they were strong, like Charles de Gaulle, they appeared opposed to the U.S. To Europe, in

turn, the U.S. seemed to have lost its sense of priorities and gotten bogged down in a suicidal war in Indochina. Many European leaders found Kissinger's attitude high-handed and accused him of placing the interests of U.S.-Soviet détente before the interests of Europe. By 1973, it was quite clear that America's main military alliance was in serious disrepair and that the relationship with Western Europe was drifting from respect and friendship into mutual resentment and hostility."[22] However, the administration was aware of this neglect of Euro-American relations. Consequently, it was announced with great fanfare that 1973 would be the "Year of Europe."[23]

During a famous speech in April, 1973, Kissinger discussed some of the more general problems that troubled America's relations with Europe. I shall later on refer to this speech in greater detail. Here I wish to discuss what Kissinger had to say about NATO's strategic doctrine.

He agreed that the policy of flexible response was, in principle, the basic strategy for NATO. But he warned that the requirements of flexibility are complex and expensive. There must be sensitivity to new conditions, and this requires continued consultation among the allies in response to changing conditions.[24] An adequate defense posture must also be maintained and "it must be seen by ourselves and by potential adversaries as a credible, substantial and rational posture of defense." He also discussed: 1) defi-

ciencies in important areas of conventional defense that should be rectified, 2) in terms of doctrine unresolved questions still remain such as the role of tactical nuclear weapons, 3) in NATO deployments and in its logistic structure problems still remain.

Kissinger affirmed that "we owe to our people a rational defense posture at the safest minimum size and cost, with burdens equitably shared."

NATO has serious inadequacies in its conventional defense; anti-tank weapons are insufficient, a new, main battle tank is needed for the late seventies and eighties (the United States and West Germany are developing a new tank),[25] the number of front-line troops is inadequate, inventories of ammunition and spare parts are "critically low",[26] reinforcements are often insufficient or improperly organized, and NATO's conventional defense posture is deficient. A very serious problem for NATO planners is how to utilize their forces with the greatest efficiency in view of steadily increasing costs. If the number of front-line troops were to decline, NATO planners may wish to add mobility and firepower to existing units. Reserves would then acquire much greater importance. The border units would hope to slow the thrust of an invading force long enough for the very mobile regular units and rapidly mobilized reserve troops to stop the invasion force completely. But can enough first-rate reserve troops be trained? The reserve

forces would have to supplement the regular units. Moreover, this strategy is not one of forward defense but envisages stopping the invader on West German territory where this force will still be in possession of considerable West German territory. Thus if NATO will have to manage with fewer troops its strategy must reflect this reality.[27]

However, it is probable that in a conventional war, future technological developments will favor the defense. Anti-tank weapons can now be managed by one soldier and are increasingly accurate. "Bomblets" shot from artillery can delay or halt invading armies or tank columns. Helicopter gunships are another lethal addition to NATO forces. And laser and wire-guidance systems make all weapons systems increasingly accurate. Consequently, invasion forces may have to exceed by considerable margins the ratios that were historically necessary to achieve breakthroughs. This, of course, may lessen the advantage conferred by surprise attack and perhaps allow more time for diplomacy to avert conflict.[28]

NATO's doctrine also suffered from two weaknesses concerning conventional strategy and tactical nuclear weapons. Its conventional defense posture was predicated upon the idea that a conventional conflict in Europe would be of long duration. The model envisaged is World War II. There would be time for reinforcements, time for the superior manpower and material of the West to be mobilized. Moreover, this

doctrine influenced the organization of Western (and, particularly American) divisions which have too many men engaged in logistics and insufficient front-line troops. In an era of rapidly rising military costs, this strategy becomes increasingly questionable.

What is questionable or inefficient under some circumstances may become a serious concern in a different situation. It is generally recognized that the Warsaw Pact Forces are equipped for a lightening-war; to force a quick breach of NATO's defenses, with heavy armor, and then to achieve rapid penetration of NATO territory. The potential danger of the situation is readily apparent. NATO needs to be guided by a new strategy that "establishes a new defense pattern, emphasizing immediate firepower, greatly reduced support and long-lead reserve forces, strengthened logistics for a short conflict, and quick deployment of combat units."[29] In November, 1974, a small step was taken in this direction with the announcement by Defense Secretary Schlesinger that two new combat brigades would be established in Germany. The number of troops would remain the same in Europe while there would be a reduction of comparable support troops.

Beyond this step nothing was done by Nixon and Kissinger to alleviate the increasing imbalance between NATO's conventional defense strategy and the deployment of its forces. At present there is a rough balance of power in Central Europe. The West is even superior in firepower and the quality of

its weapons systems, but in rapidly changing circumstances, can the present balance of power be taken for granted? The question is not if change will occur but how NATO's major deficiency, the strategy for conventional defense, should be rectified. However, not enough was done by Kissinger to garner the necessary political support to remedy this deficiency.

Concerning the role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine, little has been done to clarify matters. Through the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, European members can influence the manner in which nuclear weapons are to be used in Europe. However, no attempt has been made by Kissinger or anyone else to clarify the role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO's doctrine.[30] Does the present ambiguity concerning tactical nuclear weapons best serve as a deterrent? Are 7000 tactical nuclear weapons really necessary in Europe? As plans for force stabilization and then force reductions acquire greater importance in Europe, the role of tactical nuclear weapons will have to be fully clarified with respect to both quantity and Doctrine.

NATO's troop deployments and logistic structure continue to cause problems for the Alliance.[31] After the drain placed on men and material in NATO by the Vietnam War, trained personnel and material stocks needed to be rebuilt to former levels. And in 1977 troops were still inadequately deployed to represent a true forward defense of NATO territory

for too many American troops were concentrated in Southern Germany, somewhat removed from potential invasion routes on the plains of Northern Germany. Consequently, it is still questionable if a credible defense of NATO territory could be made by the allies without the use of nuclear weapons. Diverse logistic structures still represent a major problem for NATO planners. While the United States - West German main battle tank may ease the situation somewhat, formidable problems remain.[32]

It is not at all surprising that the resolution of the preceeding problems did not have a very high priority on the administration's agenda. Kissinger was well acquainted with all of these problems, but in the Nixon-Kissinger years - when foreign policy was centralized in the White House - sustained attention to NATO's secondary concerns was rare. The view was that the administration's diplomatic concerns were centered upon adversaries and, furthermore, Kissinger's often tactless behavior in Alliance relationships undercut many of his policies. Stanley Hoffmann writes that "Ominous threats, such as those President Ford and Kissinger uttered concerning Portugal's participation in NATO, or the presence of U.S. forces in Europe, can be double-edged and are of uncertain effect."[33] Nixon's and Kissinger's policies were uncoordinated, conflicting, and excessively unilateral.[34] Their often abrasive diplomatic style amid the general acrimony surrounding Euro-American relations almost ensured that

they could not garner among Americans and Europeans the necessary support that was vital to initiating the policies required for changing NATO's strategy and tactics. Instead, charges and counter-charges were hurled back and forth across the Atlantic. Some positive steps were taken, but more could have been accomplished by the man who, as few others, was so well acquainted with NATO's problems.

## NATO's Organization

For many years, scholars (including Kissinger) have lamented the weaknesses of NATO's organization. My comments will be brief. The ossification of the central institutions of the Alliance is a serious problem. Alastair Buchan has discussed this problem as well as the usefulness of the Atlantic Council as a diplomatic forum.[35]

Others have warned that the military command structure should be modernized and that a European should hold the position of Supreme Commander. Drew Middleton suggests that the headquarters organization "would require weeks of warning and preparation before it could function effectively in war."[36]

It is clear that NATO's organization is in need of modernization in rapidly changing circumstances. One positive step, taken with the direct encouragement of the White House, was the announcement in 1970 of a European Defense Improvement Program where the members of the Eurogroup

(except for France, Portugal, and Iceland) pledged to spend an additional $1 billion over the next five years to improve the European forces as well as the NATO infrastructure. This initiative was followed by similar efforts of the Euro-group.[37]

However welcome such initiatives are, they cannot compensate for the increasingly serious organizational problems of NATO. Modernization of the NATO organization will require a large cooperative effort by both the Europeans and the Americans. Was such a major effort possible in the acrimonious and suspicious atmosphere surrounding Euro-American relations in the Nixon-Kissinger years? David Landes has stated that, he would, "pinpoint an area, single out the improvement of image and interpersonal relations to help restore the sense of community and affection that once existed on both sides of the Atlantic."[38] NATO's organization will always reflect varying degrees of imperfection. But the time is fast approaching when major reforms will become imperative. In an age of détente and increasing East-West contacts, the Western allies must retain the political determination and organizational means to ensure their collective defense.

## Alliance Relationships

If there is a single theme that may be found in Kissinger's scholarly writings and in his numerous speeches

after 1969, it is the emphasis placed upon political co-operation. It is understandable that after 1969 Europe did not have a very high place in Nixon's and Kissinger's diplomacy. Serious domestic turmoil occurred over the administration's slow withdrawal of American military power from Vietnam. American diplomacy was directly engaged in Vietnam and intensive efforts were also directed at Hanoi's allies; the Soviet Union and China.

Consequently, differences between the Americans and the Europeans were becoming more acute as the Americans first became involved in Vietnam and then attempted to withdraw while Europe became increasingly preoccupied with its internal problems and construction of the European Community (EC). These differences are cause for serious concern according to Fritz Stern who states "the balance between unity and discord is precarious. There are not only substantive differences between the U.S. and its European allies; there is - at least on the nongovernmental level - a growing impatience on both sides. The roots of discord go deep; to ignore or underestimate the shifts of power and attitudes might heighten the dangers of drifting apart. In the past an external threat has always served to unite the alliance. Now we cannot count on the automatic reappearance of solidarity."[39] Thus rapidly changing circumstances in a more complex world required that more, not less, time and attention be given to Euro-American relations. Nixon's and Kissinger's pro-

longed diplomatic attention to adversaries occurred at the expense of relations with America's major allies. Actually adversaries and allies should have received more equal attention as time and circumstances allowed. However, by the time Kissinger realized that trans-Atlantic relationships were increasingly acrimonious and corrective measures needed to be taken, it was really too late. Shortly after Kissinger announced "The Year of Europe" in his speech in April, 1973, the administration was caught unprepared by the sequence of events that began in the Middle East in October and culminated in a severe crisis in Euro-American relations. Thus 1973, "The Year of Europe", ended with an alliance debacle that was exceeded by only two other crises in the Atlantic Alliance: the Suez crisis in 1956 and the Skybolt affair in 1962. There would be no purpose here in ascertaining which of these crises had the more serious consequences. Each was avoidable and each has done considerable and lasting harm to alliance relationships. However, it is probably safe to say that the crisis in Euro-American relations in late 1973 will not have such serious or prolonged effects on the Western Alliance as did the two previous crises. It is, nevertheless, paradoxical that Kissinger himself, who was so trenchant a critic of the events that led to the crises of 1956 and 1962, should have been involved in an almost equally serious crisis.[40]

Kissinger's "Year of Europe" speech was "a plea for

partnership" in which he asked that Americans and Europeans partake of "mutual efforts on mutual issues."[41] He stated that the United States planned to build "a new Atlantic Charter" with its European allies in 1973 to overcome the economic, military, and diplomatic strains that had recently developed. It was apparent that the United States and Europe "had reached another critical point in their relationships"; consequently, America, Europe, and Japan needed to define anew the common political interests and ideas of the old and the new world. The speech was not well received in Europe. Kissinger and the National Security Council (NSC) staff were quite surprised at the discord it produced.[42] Moreover, according to the London Economist: "The Atlantic Alliance was in worse shape than in any time in its 24-year history, and not just because of that row about the Middle East war, not just because détente erodes defense budgets, not just because of the different impact the oil embargo has had on America and Europe. The heart of the matter is that 1973 has been the year when the nine countries of the EC wanted to define what binds them to each other, and Mr. Kissinger has simultaneously wanted it to be the year when they defined what binds them to the democracies on the other side of the Atlantic."[43]

During the early seventies a number of monetary, economic, and political problems plagued the relations between Americans and Europeans. Then, from 1973, the Watergate

crisis began to take increasingly large amounts of Presidential time and energy. Despite Kissinger's intentions, no United States-European declaration was to be forthcoming; only an eventual NATO declaration largely on security and political affairs (in June of 1974 at Brussels the United States and its European Allies signed a declaration that obligated them to achieve increased consultation).[44]

However, in the Middle East, a crisis was rapidly developing. Kissinger had always warned that threats to American security "may not always take an unambiguous form." And this is precisely what was to occur when the October war led to the oil embargo and the subsequent quadrupling of the price of oil. The White House ignored a State Department (Office of Fuels and Energy) warning in early 1973 concerning the possibility of an impending oil crisis and underestimated the political will of the Saudi's to use the oil weapon.[45] Kissinger's behavior toward the Europeans was less than circumspect both during and after the crisis. His negative comment "I don't care what happens to NATO, I am so disgusted" was widely reported, and resented, in Europe. In December, Kissinger had further words for the Europeans' behavior during the crisis referring to them as "craven," "contemptible," "pernicious," and "jackal-like."[46] Again, these remarks were not uttered discreetly, but they were widely disseminated by the press.

NATO's role as the collective manifestation of the

West's determination to achieve and maintain a collective defense was further imperiled by the first public breach between the United States and West Germany during the October War. The press discovered the shipment of war material from West Germany to Israel, and Bonn asked that this cease at once.[47] James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, then made an overt threat to move American military equipment out of Germany, and there were also bitter American recriminations that its European allies had deserted it in its hour of need.[48]

During the October War American actions were, all too often, not preceeded by adequate consultation. Its allies were not informed of its plans. To illustrate the point: "in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 President Kennedy dispatched special envoys, envoys known to and trusted by European statesmen to explain his position. Nothing of the kind occurred on this occasion."[49] An astute commentator has summed up the Nixon-Kissinger policies to 1974: "Aside from Gerard Smith's careful briefings regarding Salt I, the record of this administration in serious consultation has been miserable."[50]

The October War (could an Administration less obsessed with Vietnam have begun a diplomatic effort sufficient to avert or mitigate the outbreak of war?), the failure of the administration to consult or even inform its NATO allies, the serious public breach in United States-West German

relations, the previously noted accusations hurled by the Americans at the Europeans, could any of these occurrences have aided the cause of allied solidarity?

NATO was placed under severe pressure by American demands to use NATO facilities to pursue its policy of supporting Israel in the war. But was it wise for the Americans to have insisted on European participation in such an effort when Europe was so vulnerable to the use of the oil weapon? Europe's economic and political weaknesses were evident from the moment the oil embargo reached serious proportions. Did Nixon and Kissinger appreciate how vulnerable Europe was to the "oil weapon?" Moreover, the Arab oil embargo and subsequent price increases have contributed to a critical inflation, "the end results of which are incalculable."[51]

Since this crisis in Alliance relationships, some degree of harmony has been restored. But Europe's political and economic margins for maneuver have been greatly narrowed. Suspicions persist on both sides of the Atlantic. In less favorable circumstances and in an often acrimonious atmosphere, can Americans and Europeans find anew common grounds to pursue and resolve the great challenges that can only be solved by their common efforts?

## Summary

The splintering of the Western Alliance can no longer

be ignored. Was the strength of the Western Alliance and growing European unity in the post-war era a natural development or the result of unusual conditions?[52] Consultation and cooperation among the democratic states is vital if the values of Western Civilization are to be maintained in today's dangerous and uncertain world.

In the areas of NATO strategy, NATO organization, and alliance relationships many weaknesses are apparent. The administration did not try to remedy very many of NATO's secondary deficiencies in view of its more important concerns elsewhere.

Nixon and Kissinger did not deliberately undertake to damage NATO and trans-Atlantic relations. But in an era of rapidly changing conditions, were they excessively concerned with stability? As Stanley Hoffmann writes "Hence Kissinger's predicament and the contradiction between his call for a pluralistic "legitimate" order accommodating change in the world and his interpretation of NATO as a kind of Holy Alliance based not only on a common interest in external security, but also on a common constellation of political forces. Indeed both his failures and his successes in the business of preserving American primacy show an obsession with stability, which puts him far closer to Metternich than to his own criticism of the Austrian Statesman and also quite close to his predecessors' policy."[53] Hoffmann then asks "Metternich's excuse was the

fragility of his country, its desperate dependence on the status quo outside. Is the social and political order of the U.S. equally brittle and tied to conservatism everywhere?"[54]

Moreover, from 1971 to 1975, their policies often were too calculating, insensitive, and undertaken with little or no prior consultation. With respect to détente and increased East-West contacts as well as the problems faced by the allies, an active diplomacy that emphasized consultation and cooperation was vital. The Berlin Agreement of 1971 and the intra-German accords of 1972 represented the kind of diplomatic effort that the administration could successfully conclude in Europe. Both of the superpowers were either directly or indirectly involved in the negotiations. Moreover, except for some particulars, both superpowers are in basic agreement with the status quo in Central Europe.

Unfortunately, there has always been considerable sympathy in the United States for limiting or otherwise greatly constraining the role of the United States in Europe. Every year, until recently, a large number of Senators voted to reduce the number of American troops in Europe unilaterally. Labor unions concerned with economic competition from Europe, are increasingly protectionist. Nor are the ranks of academicians free from advocates of withdrawal or "disengagement" from Europe. The European balance of power must be maintained, and that presupposes American engagement in

Europe. This is the lesson of the inter-war years.[55] Moreover, the continuation of détente presupposes a balance of power. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in the London Economist states "if you want to have continuity of détente you have to have continuity of the balance of power, the equilibrium. Continuity of détente cannot persist if you let the military equilibrium deteriorate."[56] A large, diverse organization such as NATO will inevitably be imperfect, particularly from the perspective of military strategists and planners. However, if NATO is to serve as the allies' mechanism for their collective defense, it is vital that the West's determination is always apparent to the Soviet Union.

The danger is that many of the imperfections and deficiencies in NATO could - over a considerable period of time - prove to be of such magnitude that the means and therefore the determination of the allies to defend themselves might be imperiled. Thus another administration has lost the opportunity to achieve reforms in NATO; with the further passage of several years, future changes will be all the more difficult to achieve. Moreover, the alliance debacle of 1973 and Kissinger's often tactless behavior will make it that much more difficult to achieve once again that atmosphere of mutual trust and harmony that must be re-established before the Western Allies can transcend their differences and develop new political organizations that

will reflect a trans-Atlantic community. A scholar named Henry Kissinger once called this the preeminent challenge of our times.[57]

## Footnotes

1. This must be done without overemphasis on either over-centralization or excessive diversity. To achieve a balance between these two extremes is the major unsolved problem before the Alliance. See H. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, p. 236.

2. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, New York: Harper, 1961, p. 99.

3. Ibid., p. 101.

4. Ibid., p. 101.

5. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969, p. 14.

6. Ibid., p. 15.

7. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind, p. 130.

8. Kissinger constantly warns of the necessity for the allies increasingly to assume more responsibilities. See Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, pp. 234-236.

9. Kissinger recommended that the United States aid France in the development of its nuclear program. See Graubard, p. 187.

10. Ibid., p. 213.

11. Ibid., p. 141.

12. Kissinger, however, does not seek identical policies but states that for a world based on the values of human dignity and freedom, the closest cooperation between North America and Europe is essential. See Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, pp. 99-100.

13. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 234.

14. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, p. 175.

15. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 236.

16. Americans should recognize that a unified Europe could take any of several different forms and this choice is for the Europeans to make. See Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 244.

17. Kissinger's Essay, Time, December 27, 1976.

18. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, p. 76.

19. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 249.

20. Ibid., p. 251.

21. Kissinger's Speech, New York Times, April 24, 1973, p. 1.

22. John Stoessinger, Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1976, p. 138.

23. Kissinger's important - and frank - speech on America's problems with Europe was received with various expressions of public politeness, private irritation, and some frank and serious reservations. New York Times, May 21, 1973, p. 1.

24. Kissinger's Speech, New York Times, April 24, 1973, p. 1.

25. New York Times, October 21, 1977, p. 3.

26. New York Times, January 6, 1978, p. 2.

27. Kenneth Hunt, The Alliance and Europe: Part II: Defense with Fewer Men, Adelphi Paper #98, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973.

28. Trevor Cliffe, Military Technology and the European Balance, Adelphi Paper #99, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972.

29. Philip H. Trezise, The Atlantic Connection, Washington: D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975, p. 50.

30. There are also serious deficiencies in the American Air Force's strategy that are causing dissention among the allies. The Air Force is still predicating its air defense on slow-paced infantry operations using heavy firepower. It is ignoring the fact that Europe's terrain lends itself to fast-paced armour and maneuvers. The Royal Air Force also feels more coordination with ground forces is necessary. See article by Drew Middleton, New York Times, October 28, 1977, p. 12.

31. Ibid.

46. Ibid., p. 32.

47. F. Duchêne "The United States and European Community" in Rosecrance, editor, America as an Ordinary Country, p. 117.

48. Article by Buchan "The United States and European Security" in Landes, editor, Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership, p. 322.

49. Article by "Z", "The Year of Europe?", Foreign Affairs Vol. 52 #2, Jan., 1974, p. 239.

50. J. Robert Schaetzel, "Some European Questions for Dr. Kissinger", Foreign Policy #12, Fall, 1973, p. 72.

51. Mazlish, Kissinger, pp. 292-295.

52. Article by James Chace, New York Times, May 6, 1977, p. 17.

53. Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order, p. 70.

54. Ibid., p. 70.

55. Annette Baker Fox, "Domestic Pressures in North America to Withdraw Forces from Europe" in William T. R. Fox and Warner R. Schilling, editors, European Security and the Atlantic System, New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, pp. 197-239.

56. The Economist, October 6-12, 1979, p. 54.

57. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 251.

# CHAPTER IV

# MULTILATERAL RELATIONS: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

## The Scholar

As noted in his work as a scholar Kissinger devoted much thought to NATO's problems and the broader problems faced by the Atlantic Alliance. He recognized the importance of the movement for European unification; however, the scope and depth of his work on the EC is not comparable to his efforts on NATO. However, he was aware of the potential seeds of discord that could develop between a united Europe and the United States basically because he never assumed a complete identity of interests. I shall examine two areas that were of concern to Kissinger: the movement for European integration and the relations between the United States and an integrating Europe.

## The Movement for Integration

Kissinger indicates that American policy towards postwar Europe was remarkably consistent in its support of the movement toward European integration.[1] The United States advocated a European organization to allocate

American economic aid in the early days of the Marshall Plan. In this it was greatly influenced by such eminent Europeans as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. American support for European unification also extended into the military sphere as was manifested by its support of the abortive European Defense Community (EDC).

But even though Secretary Dulles threatened an "agonizing reappraisal" of American foreign policy if the treaty failed, American policy did not change when this occurred. From 1955 to 1957 when the delicate process of reviving the Community approach and endowing it with structure and substance was occurring, the United States welcomed this development. It even resisted British efforts to dilute the emergent Community by turning it into a free trade area.[2] The Americans supported the dream of Monnet and Schuman to move from economic to political union. They opposed the attempts of the Scandinavian countries and Austria (and Britain) to treat the EC simply as an economic enterprise and encouraged these countries to make a firm commitment to the EC's political unity.

In the early days of the Kennedy administration, the President proclaimed the doctrine of Interdependence between the United States and a united Europe, considering European political unity a prerequisite to the formation of an Atlantic community. Kennedy's goal was an economically and politically integrated Europe as an equal partner

with the United States. The burdens and obligations of world leadership would be shared by both.

A united Europe, most American commentators assumed, would have only one form. There would be supranational federal institutions controlled by a European Parliament. Not surprisingly the main reason for the preference for supranational institutions was the American example. Many Americans were convinced that their Federal system was directly applicable to Europe, and prominent spokesmen, among them President Kennedy, urged that Europeans adopt the American Federal system.[3] Moreover, the nation-state was becoming obsolete; therefore, if the individual nation-states of Europe were to exercise any real power and influence in the world, they should follow the American Federal model.

Kissinger thought that the American proponents of European integration were guilty of several errors of judgment. He questioned the applicability of the American Federal system in foreign settings. The American Federal system had developed on a new continent. The new states had a common historical experience and were of approximately the same size. Cultural and linguistic factors had a common origin. Moreover, the states had no past tradition of sovereign independence and had just jointly conducted a successful common war against a now defeated but still powerful enemy: Britain.

The situation in Europe was fundamentally different. Each European state, great and small, is a product of many centuries of historical development. A strong sense of national identity was often acquired only at the end of centuries-long struggles against the attempts of other European states to achieve domination. Moreover, foreign policy and national defense, two vital attributes of sovereignty, developed from the European states struggles. Kissinger also pointed out that attempts to establish supranational institutions in Europe today involve a far cleaner break with their past than was true of the American states when they formed a federal union.

Kissinger also warned that the attitudes of the European states towards supranational institutions vary greatly. The countries that suffered most in the war, Germany and Italy, are perhaps more willing than others to become parts of a larger entity. The smaller states too are more willing to adopt supranational institutions as historically they have often been dependent on others. Moreover, they can achieve greater influence in a supranational organization than their resources and size would permit if they were to act individually. The most reluctant countries are those with the longest history as great powers: Britain and France.[4]

During the Kennedy administration it became apparent what factors were responsible for the slackening of the

European drive for integration. Europe had largely recovered economically and politically from the war. The threat of invasion from the East had also diminished, in part as a result of American policy. Moreover, Europe's desire and need to unite in order to play a global role was diminished by the process of decolonization, which reduced its interest in world affairs. Finally, it became increasingly obvious that progress toward economic integration is not necessarily paralleled by progress in political integration. Economic questions often involved matters of a more technical nature that could be resolved fairly easily. Political questions involved considerations of power and prestige and on many issues compromise was very difficult or impossible. But, as Kissinger pointed out, the most difficult question of all was still unresolved: whatever the structure, origin, or degree of European integration, what kind of policies would such a Europe pursue, and would its policies be consistent with the interests of the United States?

## The United States and the European Community

Kissinger was unrelenting in his criticism of those who accepted the thesis that European integration - with supranational institutions - would bring about a complete harmony of interests between the United States and Western Europe.[5] Moreover, many of these American spokesmen assumed that a united Europe would involve itself in remote areas of the

globe. Americans seemed to assume that their goals represented the common interest and were, therefore, beyond challenge.

This argument was rejected by Kissinger. Americans really seem to be more concerned with sharing costs than discussing foreign policy objectives. Thus American spokesmen have continually endorsed the theme that a fragmented Europe must mobilize its resources before its voice and influence can be felt in support of the common effort and the common view. Kissinger's criticism rested on two grounds. First he questioned that availability of resources is related to willingness to assume global responsibilities. Indeed, the experience of the United States itself would seem to contradict that thesis. He emphasized how during the greater part of its history, the United States possessed the resources but not the inclination to play a global role.[6] Many European states, on the other hand, played a global role when their resources were much less than they are today.

Second, the United States has, by an often intemperate emphasis upon decolonization, forced the European states to relinquish their role abroad. Decolonization, following the traumatic effects of two world wars, has lessened European interest in other areas of the world. The European states were also confident that long before their interests were directly threatened, the United States would become involved.

As Kissinger said "in other words, they treat America's extra-European concerns in much the same way that the United States looked at Europe's quarrels until 1941."[7]

Nor does Kissinger agree that the constant invocation of "interests versus responsibilities" by American spokesmen is helpful. Europeans do not have world responsibilities because in the period following World War II they were forced to give up their global interests. The global involvement of the United States has tended to reduce the incentive of the Allies to assume their share of global responsibility.

Consequently, Kissinger warns that European unity is not a cure-all for either trans-Atlantic disagreements or for lessening the burdens of America's global role.[8] Indeed he warns that the reverse may be true. As Europe unifies, its differences with the United States may increase. Both have a common interest in the defense of Europe but, in other areas, a common unity of interests is less clear. Thus Kissinger warns that a wise alliance policy will not insist on common perspectives. It will take account of the fact that different positions may well be normal when global concerns are scrutinized. It is thus vital for alliance policy to allow for differing perspectives on global questions.[9]

Kissinger warns that in the coming decade an increasingly powerful China may well exploit tendencies toward

turmoil in various parts of the globe. Moreover, the complexity of global change is such that if the United States insists on remaining the sole trustee of policy everywhere, the strain on America's resources may be too great. The United States should encourage the Europeans to develop a measure of autonomy. Kissinger warns that "it is not always the least responsible allies that wish to reserve some measure of control over their destiny."[10]

The central fact is that the interests of the United States and Europe are not identical in all situations. The common recognition of this fact should make possible agreement on a permissible range of divergence. Americans must choose between immediate convenience or long-term vitality. Centralization of decision-making is always attractive, but there are long-term costs. The excessive concentration of decision-making authority in the hands of the senior partner deprives the allies of a sense of responsibility. But the most dangerous aspect of this policy is that when a conflict of interests does become apparent, the resulting fissures may be irreconcilable.

## Multilateral Relations: The European Community
### The Statesman
### The European Community in the Seventies

The nation-state is a type of political organization of Western origin that has spread throughout the globe. It has served as the model of political organization for most of

the human race, particularly in the period following World War II. By the seventies it was clear that while the nation-state was not quite obsolete, new forms of political organization were necessary eventually to supersede the nation-state in part or in whole.

By 1977 the magnitude of national and international problems in every sphere often exceeded the resources of even the continent-states such as the United States. Trans-national cooperation on a broad range of issues is a vital necessity if the aspirations of the majority of the human race are to be fulfilled. The immense tasks that confront every society today cannot be resolved in one or two generations. Yet, an impressive beginning has been made by Europeans in overcoming political fragmentation.

The desire of the Europeans to cooperate politically manifests itself most clearly in the EC. Cooperation does not, of course, guarantee the successful resolution of problems. But, while cooperation is no panacea, it is more difficult to resolve the problems that confront societies today without a major effort at cooperative endeavors.

This is why the EC is so important not only to Europe but to the world. By 1977 the optimistic goals of only a few years ago appeared beyond reach. Indeed, the period was marked by such difficulties that consolidation appeared to be the necessity of the hour.[11] The EC was beset by political and economic problems, by difficulties with its chief

rival, the United States, and by the difficulties inherent in its cumbersome structure. Problems large and small seemed, at times, to threaten the very existence of the EC.[12] Among these its relationship with the United States loomed large. Andrew Pierre notes that "The first half of the 1970's has been marked by ungainly disputes among the Atlantic countries which have weakened the fiber of the present Atlantic relationship and opened its continuation to serious question. Relations with Europe will, however, remain a central component of American foreign policy."[13] Thus it is often said that America can or should do nothing to promote the cause of European unity; that what the Europeans do with respect to the EC is something that only they can and should be concerned about.

Kissinger rejects that view. He was well aware that the United States could seriously damage the EC by, for example, insisting upon retaining centralized decision-making powers. As a statesman, then, one should expect that he would allow the EC to assume increased responsibility. Moreover, it would also be reasonable to assume that he would understand why the EC could not, for example, endorse and support American policies in the Middle East. Consequently, the benevolent and, at times, actively beneficial policies of the United States, are needed if the EC is to achieve its objectives. The EC can perhaps flourish under the encouragement, even the neglect of the United States. Even in the

event of full American support, the successful conclusion of this great experiment cannot be taken for granted. But, in case of United States hostility, the EC probably could not survive the consequences.[14] At this stage in Europe's development, given the vulnerability of the European states, it is not surprising that the policies of a trans-Atlantic superpower would have a profound effect on the efforts of a group of small and medium sized European states to form a larger collective entity. Kissinger, as few others, was well aware of the EC's vulnerability. Yet he showed little inclination to share decision-making with the EC. Moreover, as will be demonstrated, he expressed considerable annoyance with the EC's often slow and cumbersome procedures.

It is essential for American policy-makers to realize that while they can exert limited influence on Europe's quest to unite, they can, as Kissinger warns, cripple the efforts of the European states to unite in a larger collective entity. I shall next examine in general terms the role of the EC in the world. Then I shall discuss the United States and the EC focusing upon economic problems between the two and the emergence of serious political differences between Washington and Brussels as a result of Nixon's and Kissinger's foreign policy.

## The EC and the World

Scholars disagree regarding the prospects for the EC.

To some it has demonstrated an unusual degree of resiliency and strength after the "oil crisis"; thus they see grounds for a guarded optimism. Others see the actions of the EC after the oil crisis as reflecting grave weaknesses because of the member's unilateral and selfish policies.[15] Any experiment as ambitious as the EC is certain to present ambiguities. The EC is an expression of Europe's contemporary needs and circumstances and, while it may be difficult to determine precisely where it is going, there is no doubt of the impact of a new kind of foreign policy in one of the strategic areas of the world.

## A Civilian Power

François Duchêne has applied the term civilian power to the EC. He states that the EC is a new type of political power that stresses the use of economic power and legal and contractual norms in its foreign policy.[16] It is not and does not aspire to be a military power; instead, it hopes to appeal to high ethical standards in its external relations.

The EC is a customs market, 60% larger than the United States. Almost 40% of world trade emanates from it. There is no doubt of its present and potential impact in an area that is becoming increasingly vital to the entire world: the development of economic relationships, not only within the developed nations themselves but between the developed and the underdeveloped nations of the world.[17]

Moreover, the individual member nations of the EC are becoming increasingly dependent upon external markets for sustained economic growth. This dependence stands out most clearly in the case of Belgium; which derives almost 40% of its Gross National Product (GNP) from community trade. While Belgium is exceptional in this respect, the Netherlands, West Germany, and indeed all the other members are increasingly dependent upon exports. This has meant that slowly but surely the members of the EC have been forced to eschew unilateral economic moves that violate the organization's spirit and intent. The members are interdependent in the economic sphere as never before. The crisis of 1965, inspired by de Gaulle, and the oil crisis of 1973 have been surmounted by the EC. And the community has grown with the addition of a reluctant Britain and two other members, Ireland and Denmark.

Today the EC is a factor of major importance in world economic relations. But it is not completely identified with Europe. West Germany can promote economic agreements with the Soviet Union and the East European states. France can do the same with its former colonies in Africa. A number of European states are not yet members, thus the process of identifying Europe with the EC is not yet complete. This is why a powerful economic competitor like the United States can, by divide and rule tactics, inject elements of disharmony into the developing economic and political relation-

ships among the members of the EC.

The EC is particularly vulnerable to tactics of divide and rule because of the unique nature of its organization. Its structure, including the Brussels bureaucracy, is often slow and cumbersome in reaching compromises. In an age of rapid decisions and active diplomacy, the process of negotiating with Brussels appears as the diplomacy of inaction. This is understandable but may - at times - severely test the patience and restraints of foreign governments.

From January 1973 on, the external trade of all members had to be conducted by the EC Commission in Brussels.[18] Although this has not been strictly adhered to, this action does represent the very real and active steps that the EC has been taking in the area of economic diplomacy. Agreements have been negotiated with a number of underdeveloped countries in the Lomé Convention signed in February, 1975. An active Mediterranean policy has been initiated that promises to make the EC a major influence in that region. Greece, Turkey, and Spain have either concluded association agreements with the EC or are interested in becoming members as soon as possible. While the EC has not had an Eastern policy, it is very much aware of its potentially important impact on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Russians and the East Europeans tend to be rather ambivalent about the EC. The Russians have been very cautious but, in March, 1972, Brezhnev told the Soviet Trade Union Congress that the

Soviet Union had no wish to undermine the EC; furthermore, he hinted that the Soviet attitude towards the EC might depend upon the EC attitude towards the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).[19] In 1975 the first formal meeting between officials of the Commission and the CEMA Secretariat occurred.

The East Europeans are ambivalent about the EC; however, external trade is generally more important to them than to the Soviet Union. In the case of Hungary, for example, foreign trade is vital to its plans for economic growth.[20] In addition, there are numerous other attractions of trade and economic relationships with the West for the East Europeans. But the East Europeans have to be aware of the dangers of too pervasive an impact of the West. At the same time they must resist economic subordination to Russian and CEMA plans for their national economies. Thus the East Europeans are faced with difficult problems. But there is little doubt that in the future the impact of the EC in this region will be important.[21]

The EC thus is a new force in world politics, particularly in the realm of economic relationships. There are difficulties in dealing with an entity that represents a collection of diverse states with often conflicting interests. Will the EC gradually assume complete responsibility for the conduct of its members' foreign economic policy and perhaps eventually foreign policy as well?[22] Or will it

and its member states retain sovereignty in certain areas, creating an often uneasy internal relationship with each member claiming jurisdiction in specific areas.

## The United States and the European Community

Kissinger was aware of the adverse as well as the positive aspects of European integration. But he never wrote as extensively about the EC as he did on NATO. His writings on the EC were basically completed by 1964. Since then the EC has become a more tangible force in Europe. As François Duchêne suggests "the European Community is slowly taking root as an important part of the international system and that American policy should cooperate with it for that reason, notwithstanding the demise of yesterday's grand designs."[23] With a knowledge of Europe equalled by few Americans, Kissinger also tended to be skeptical, at times extremely so, of the thesis that a united Europe would in the short-term share America's burdens both in Europe and the world. Thus he was very much aware of the fact that, for an American statesman, dealing with the emergent EC could be an exhausting and trying experience. With the administration beseiged domestically because of its excessively delayed withdrawal from Vietnam, the crisis in the Middle East and other problems, is it to be wondered at that, in the words of one commentator, "occasional activity regarding Western Europe was predominantly secretive and bilateral, also

Nixon avoided the EC Commission and paid undue deference to de Gaulle."[24]

I shall turn first to economic issues between the United States and the EC: general problems, the Monetary Crisis of 1971, and energy and raw materials. Then I shall focus upon the political relationship between the United States and the EC. While the interrelationship of economics and politics is obvious, this division of subject matter should provide a better means to obtain a complete analysis of the totality of relationships that exists between the United States and the EC.

## Economic Problems: General

It was obvious that America would have to sacrifice short-term economic for long-term political gains that would accrue from a united Europe. This was not particularly difficult to see prior to America's involvement in Vietnam. But the Vietnam war exacerbated the inflation that subsequently placed a heavy strain upon the American economy. Moreover, by the middle of the sixties, the economy was experiencing difficulty in competing with the often more modern and efficient economies of Western Europe and Japan. With an adverse diplomatic and domestic situation to contend with, Nixon and Kissinger (Kissinger had little knowledge of and not much interest in international economics) were less prone to sacrifice American economic interests in

the hope of eventually benefiting from a united Europe. Moreover, due to the excessive degree of centralization and secrecy that developed with respect to foreign policy in the White House, complex economic issues often received inadequate attention compared to more pressing political issues.

In the three areas previously mentioned, the administration's performance was not very good. Economic groups in the United States who were ostensibly suffering from European and Japanese economic competition were quick to register their complaints with the White House. The administration, seldom in a very favorable situation domestically - due both to its and its predecessors' policies - was glad to provide some means to dissipate domestic fears against foreign competition.

The United States complained of economic damage in three areas - tariff discrimination, agricultural protectionism, and preferential trade agreements with third countries.

The United States complained that the EC was becoming an inward-looking trading bloc raising a tariff wall to discriminate against outside exports. Strictly speaking, there was some truth in this contention. However, any large nation or group of nations may well have preferential tariff arrangements. Indeed, the EC has maintained high tariffs on a much smaller range of goods than the United States.[25]

Moreover, the EC is the only major industrialized area of the world in which the United States had a trade surplus in the early part of the seventies.[26]

Much American criticism has also been leveled at the EC Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It is claimed that the CAP is protectionist. Due to the fluctuations in agricultural production, this may be true at times. There have been disputes over wheat and chicken and other products. However, the basic problem is that since farmers are a potent political force on both sides of the Atlantic, in years of surplus there are clashes over markets. Admittedly, this is a problem for which there are relatively few short-term solutions. But over the long-term, with a decline in the world surplus of food, there should be sufficient markets for farmers on both sides of the Atlantic.

American complaints about preferential agreements by the EC with third world countries also appears exaggerated. Despite the agreements with ex-colonies in Africa, American exports to these countries rose by 158% between 1958 and 1971.[27] More serious are American charges that the EC's Mediterranean policy is preferential. The arrangement of preferential terms for each others' exports by both the EC and the Mediterranean countries (including Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Spain, Malta, and Israel) does violate the precepts of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In response to American charges, the EC announced in May,

1973 that the policy of seeking reverse preferences with the EC's trading partners (particularly the Mediterranean countries) would be abandoned.[28]

It was not to be expected that issues affecting various powerful economic groups on either side of the Atlantic would be resolved easily. In some respects, as in the case of the CAP, no real solution is readily available except to wait for long-term trends to reduce the often excessive surpluses of the farmers. In the area of bilateral preferential arrangements, the EC did violate the spirit and intent of the GATT but, as mentioned, this policy has been abandoned. In summary, clash and compromise are unavoidable, particularly when there are economic problems between the EC and the United States. What is deplorable is the manner in which negotiations were conducted by Nixon's Secretary of the Treasury John Connally and the way in which he dealt with the monetary crisis of 1971

## The Monetary Crisis of 1971

One manifestation of America's relative economic decline, exacerbated by the inflationary effects of the war in Vietnam, was an increasingly adverse balance of payments. By 1970 this concern reached a high point. Europeans seemed more prone to debate the matter while patience at the White House ebbed.

In August, 1971 Nixon ended the convertibility of the

dollar into gold and furthermore imposed unilateral restrictions on foreign imports into the United States. By this unilateral move, with no prior consultation or warning, America virtually abolished the international monetary arrangements that had existed since the Bretton Woods Agreement at the end of World War II. Europe's reaction was bitter and hostile. This is not to say that there did not exist in Europe some, even considerable, sympathy for America's financial problems. What alarmed Europeans were the unilateral measures and shock tactics by which the Americans chose to correct their difficulties. Kissinger was not unaware of the dangers of this course of action as he writes in White House Years, "The other industrial nations resented being pressured into adoptions of their economic policies even though they knew very well that without pressure they would almost surely not have acted at all. Many were shocked by the new American assertiveness. We would have to tread a narrow path between maintaining enough pressure to provide an incentive for the adjustments we were seeking, and evoking a trade war as well as jeopardizing political relationships built up over decades. I sought to make my contribution in finding that balance".[29]

Given the administration's preoccupation with adversary relations, Europeans had begun to feel a certain unease about just what direction American policy would take. Europeans were already nervous after the Rome meeting of

finance ministers in the Fall of 1971. Connally, in a none too subtle manner, sought trade concessions and parity realignments from the Europeans. The Europeans lacked the requisite authority but Connally dismissed their pleas as mere evasions. Connally was representative of the aggressive nationalism that many Americans thought was necessary in order to safeguard their interests when dealing with foreigners.

Of equal concern to Europeans was the relationship between Connally and Nixon. Did Connally's aggressiveness represent Nixon's feelings? Were Connally and Nixon preparing to weaken opposition at home at the expense of international cooperation?

The Smithsonian Agreements (1973) - conducted under the aegis of Connally's successor, George Schultz - provided for more flexible exchange rates among the major currencies. Due to vast structural changes in the world economy - currency movements, energy, the Eurodollars - the industrial countries realized that a return to the fixed parities of Bretton Woods was no longer feasible.

It is difficult to fix the precise degree of blame for American actions at this time. Kissinger was almost exclusively absorbed in the Vietnam negotiations. He had limited interest in economics, and as foreign policy was increasingly centralized under the direction of Nixon and Kissinger, when Kissinger was made Secretary of State, he

consented to the transfer of the economic function from his office.[30] But was there really that much of a difference in Connally's, Nixon's, and Kissinger's perspectives with regard to their policies toward Europe? Connally was a more extreme nationalist than Nixon or Kissinger. Yet Kissinger - while often sympathetic to the European viewpoint - often found himself seriously at odds with European policies. Professor Max Mark has written "there is little to suggest that relations between Western Europe and the United States will ever revert to that intimacy which existed in the immediate post-World War II period."[31] It is not surprising that this level of intimacy is unobtainable in the decade of the seventies but must one go to the extreme of aggressive nationalism (as did Connally) and the politics of maneuver and secrecy which always seemed to be facets of the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy?

## Energy and Raw Materials

While relations between the United States and the EC were becoming increasingly acrimonious due to a number of serious economic and political problems, a further blow was delivered to trans-Atlantic harmony. The outbreak of the October war in the Middle East in 1973, the oil embargo, and subsequent quadrupling of the price of oil became subjects of controversy between the United States and the EC. The administration, satisfied with the apparently successful

disengagement of the United States from Vietnam, was surprised by and unprepared for the resumption of conflict in the Middle East and the subsequent oil crisis. It must be recognized that the failure to foresee and prevent the emergence of a situation in which the United States and its allies would be held hostage to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting States (OPEC) constitutes a major failure of American statesmanship.

Unfortunately, the energy issue affected every facet of trans-Atlantic relationships. The EC was dealt a heavy blow and the subsequent disparities between the members of the EC will make the monetary and economic union of the EC by 1980 problematical at best.[32] As Robert J. Lieber has written "it is essential that American policies be based in (sic) the recognition that the European Community has not done harm to fundamental U.S. interests. To this end, it makes sense for the U.S. to encourage further progress toward European unity, even when this may create short-term costs for individual American sectors."[33]

Some commentators have indicated that Nixon and Kissinger may well have encouraged OPEC, prior to the October war, to increase its price for oil in the belief that this would further weaken competition from Europe and Japan as the United States is better situated to provide its own energy supplies.[34] While Nixon and Kissinger undoubtedly regretted the quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973, it

appears that the general problem of oil prices really did not concern them until the October war. Their diplomatic priorities, quite simply, lay elsewhere. And it must be remembered that the advent of the October war and the subsequent oil crisis was entirely unexpected by everyone.

The energy crisis was an unmitigated disaster for the Atlantic nations. The disagreements between the United States and Europe on how to handle the crisis were exceeded only by the acrimonious public exchanges between Kissinger and the French foreign minister Michel Jobert on how to organize Kissinger's proposed International Energy Agency (IEA).[35] Once again Nixon and Kissinger displayed their talent for abrupt diplomacy that seemed more assured of seeking confrontation than cooperation.

Once again, during and after the October war, the allies were treated in a manner reminiscent of the "Connally method." Kissinger has written that "the test of a Statesman, then, is his ability to recognize the real relationship of forces and to make this knowledge serve his ends."[36] However, Kissinger's actions in this period diverged from his views on statesmanship. Why the less than circumspect public confrontations with the French foreign minister? Did Kissinger really think that such tactics would promote French appreciation of the need for the IEA? That such tactics would encourage the French to sympathize with American foreign policy in the Middle East? This seems hardly

likely to be the case.

Kissinger demonstrated that he could do no better than preceding administrations in dealing with the French. Had he forgotten his numerous criticisms of past American policy in dealing with the French? Kissinger and others have criticized the French for their lack of a real commitment to European unity. Such policies as Kissinger's, however, confirmed to many in France that they should seek a more independent role for France and, by implication, the EC.

The most serious charge against Kissinger, however, is that, with his excessive concern for the withdrawal of American military power from Vietnam and the attainment of some stability in Indo-China, the development of serious problems elsewhere could have been given greater consideration than was the case. Kissinger should have realized the great peril to Western Europe, Japan, and the global economy if a Fourth Arab-Israeli war was accompanied by a subsequent oil embargo. Apparently the potentially disastrous effects of an oil embargo upon the allies received little or no attention at the White House.[37] Yet, how could Kissinger have failed to realize the extraordinary vulnerability of both the allies and Japan to an oil embargo or precipitous price increases? How could he have misunderstood the "real relationship of forces" and mishandled a crisis that threatened gravely to damage a quarter-century of American efforts to encourage the reconstruction and development of

the political and economic systems of Western Europe and Japan? The American failure to anticipate the energy crisis is an understandable but major failure of statesmanship whose consequences were of the most serious order. However, what was so regrettable were Kissinger's often needlessly abrupt actions during this crisis. As a scholar, Kissinger wrote that "the closest cooperation between North America - indeed the entire Western Hemisphere - and Europe is essential" and to be encouraged by the United States.[38] In his conduct, in his obvious annoyance at the fledgling EC, Kissinger showed that in the energy crisis of 1973, he was not inclined to be particularly charitable towards America's oldest allies.

## The United States and the EC

François Duchêne has written that "the EC must try to domesticate relations between states and it must be a force for the diffusion of civilian and democratic standards, or it will be more or less the victim of power politics run by greater military and more cohesive powers than itself."[39] The EC is an experiment of singular importance in the contemporary world. Obviously such an experiment has its negative aspects but the importance of the EC does not simply pertain to the present period. Indeed "Europeans are probing ways in which mature nation-states can slowly submerge elements of sovereignty in order to cope with new problems

without losing the cultural values or identity of old civilizations."[40] Kissinger has constantly written of the need to "build a new community of people on both sides of the Atlantic" and for the West to show the way towards the development of new forms of political cooperation that transcend the limitations of the nation-state.[41]

The attitude of the Nixon-Kissinger administration toward the EC was distinctly negative. Stanley Hoffmann writes "The Nixon-Kissinger dealings with allies, until and including 1974, deprived them of confidence and leeway. The European Economic Community has not recovered from the joint shocks of the oil crisis and of American haughtiness, including Washington's unwillingness to let the Europeans play a diplomatic role in the Middle East or Cyprus, its decision to preempt the common energy policy and to be the chief strategist for the industrial powers at North-South meetings."[42] The problem of European subordination to American short-term interests is mentioned by the London Economist: "But the biggest question is whether the will really exists in Europe that there should continue to be the sort of a Community that Mr. Kissinger is talking about."[43] In an alliance of democratic states - when the Euro-American relationship is changing from tutelage to partnership - public opinion and political leaders in Western Europe will eventually question the necessity of supporting an alliance that they think inadequately

reflects their own perceptions and interests.

Earlier American Presidents - with the support of the State Department - had consistently, if not successfully, worked to help the EC achieve its full potential. It is difficult to say that Kissinger continued this policy. The attitude of the administration towards Atlantic institutions was often ambiguous or even hostile. In November, 1972 the American Ambassador to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) resigned because of policy disagreements. In terms of economic relationships, the OECD would have been a very useful forum for consultation; however, for a year and a half, no new American Ambassador was named to the post in order to ensure that the Europeans understood Nixon's basically negative attitude towards the organization. When an ambassador was named, he turned out to be an obscure protégé of Barry Goldwater's.

Questions could also be raised with respect to NATO and other institutions. The American Permanent Representative resigned because of inadequate support in mid-1971 and yet, for nine months, this vital post remained unfilled. When it was filled, the NATO Representative was often poorly briefed (Rumsfeld) or discussed rather irrelevant issues (Kennedy). Hoffmann again writes "Kissinger's style (and the style of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Connally) either undermined established institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)), whose director was sacrificed to Washington's

displeasure and whose role was affected by the demise of the fixed-rate system) or ignored or even interfered with their attempts (weak enough) at coalescing, whenever we deemed it dangerous (as in the case of the United Nations or the EEC)".[44] American foreign policy was basically too secretive and bilateral; there was too little consultation and actions were often taken abruptly. Given the administration's attitude towards the OECD and the EC, many Europeans were concerned about American support for the cause of European unity.[45]

It was not only the prolonged effort to withdraw from Vietnam but also the administration's excessive concern for its adversaries that caused difficulties in the Alliance. As Andrew Pierre has noted "we should remember that the web of contemporary international politics is such that the more we negotiate with the East, the better we must structure our relations within the West."[46] Kissinger ignored this assessment of the international situation; this was a major cause for the administration's debacles in Alliance policy.

Previous administrations had sponsored meetings between top officials, including the President, and members of the EC's Commission. Other contacts subsequently developed; for example, the semi-annual meetings between the United States Deputy Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs and the European Commissioner in charge of foreign affairs and trade policy. Kissinger was indifferent to these contacts. He

preferred to pressure the Council of Ministers to be receptive to American positions and to play a role that constitutionally and procedurally it could not undertake. When Nixon was to travel to Europe in the first months of 1969, only very grudgingly was the Commission invited to an audience with him at his hotel. The Commission headquarters were five minutes from Nixon's hotel but he refused to go there (ostensibly to avoid offending the French). Thus from Nixon's initial months in office it was quite clear that there would be little sympathy for or understanding of the necessity to encourage the development of the EC. With respect to its policies in the circumstances of the early seventies, Nixon and Kissinger apparently were unwilling to regard the EC as anything more than an obstacle in the pursuit of American short-term interests. J. Robert Schaetzel has stated that "both Kissinger's speech and the 1973 Foreign Policy Report of the President stated the traditional litany of support for European unity <u>in the past tense</u> while the references to the present and the future stressed the EC's increasingly regional economic policies."[47] Can there be any question but that the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy with respect to the EC was to subordinate the contemporary and potential usefulness of the EC to the immediate interests of the United States.

## Summary

It is obvious that Nixon and Kissinger had, at best, limited concern for the EC. As J. Robert Schaetzel states "the planning for the President's European Trip (Fall 1973) showed the administration's ambiguous attitude toward the collective European institutions. Brussels was added to the President's provisional itinerary only after Brandt's visit to Washington. While a meeting with the NATO Council was contemplated, the White House refused to make any specific commitment about what European community body or bodies the President would meet with."[48]

It is clear that the Nixon-Kissinger administration would both symbolically and practically render only very grudging support to the EC. The administration made little or no effort to attempt to influence the bureaucracies' traditional belligerency towards the EC. All too often were the EC or its representatives bypassed, embarrassed or even humiliated by the administration's tactics.

The Europeans must bear part of the blame for this state of affairs. Concurrently with the American involvement in Vietnam, they became increasingly preoccupied with the construction of Europe, as was to be expected. An experiment of this kind involving a number of sovereign states will, of necessity, demand a major share of the time and energy of the participants. Is it expecting too much of

American statesmen that during this crucial transitional phase they should realize the reasons for Europe's turning inward?

At the beginning of his administration Nixon reportedly had some degree of enthusiasm for the EC.[49] Kissinger has constantly written of the necessity of a politically unified Europe in helping to solve regional and global problems which cannot be solved by the United States alone. He has also written of the necessity to encourage "new centers of initiative" in world politics.

It is apparent that the EC is increasingly identified with Europe. François Duchêne has found signs of progress in the EC in the economic and political areas. The economic behavior of the EC after the Crisis of 1973 was impressive as most countries switched resources into exports and dampened inflation. Also, politically, there has been increased consultation between the Nine with respect to the European Security Conference and the talks on Mutual Force Reductions.[50]

Alastair Buchan stresses the "linkage between achieving greater efficiency in NATO by rationalizing procurement and the need for parallel progress on a common industrial policy within the EC."[51] Abrupt power plays and excessive unilateral initiatives can shatter or badly erode the still fragile structures of a politically fragmented Europe that is attempting to overcome the divisions of the past and to

demonstrate in the future the manner in which sovereign states can both cooperate to solve common problems and still retain their individual identies. It is unfortunate that Nixon and Kissinger put so high a priority upon America's short-term interests with respect to the Europeans. What is more difficult to understand is how a scholar with a comprehensive philosophy of history should have failed to aid (if only symbolically) the Europeans in a most critical period of transition in the construction of a United Europe.

The problems pertaining to Europe's (and Japan's) economic security will now be of greater importance. Well before the October war tensions in the Middle East were rising with the price of oil. If Nixon and Kissinger had not been so completely preoccupied with extracting the United States from Vietnam, would a major diplomatic effort have averted the outbreak of the October war, the use of the oil weapon, and the subsequent quadrupling of the price of oil? Richard Cooper points out that "the sharp rise in oil prices will necessitate - for some countries - changes in the structure of their national economies and this - as one side effect - will further postpone European monetary unification."[52] Now the goal of economic and monetary unification by 1980 appears to have suffered a setback. Unfortunately, the margins in which the unification of Europe can occur has been narrowed, for now the Europeans are more dependent for their economic security upon OPEC and Washington.[53]

From 1971 to 1975 Nixon's and Kissinger's policies toward the EC were characterized by abrupt, unilateral moves. During the preceding two years and from 1975-76 the administration tried to be more cooperative. Yet the lack of a consistent, coherent policy indicates the lack of a consensus regarding the EC. Policy towards the Soviet Union and China was consistent and often brilliantly innovative. The difference between the administrations views and policies toward the EC is striking. Moreover, Kissinger's claims that the United States had to act alone or nothing could be done lacks credibility. Occasionally this might be a correct assessment but between the extremes of abrupt, unilateral action and doing nothing there exists a considerable range of alternatives. It is not at all apparent that Nixon and Kissinger carefully examined all the available possibilities before initiating their policies.

In an alliance of democratic states consideration of public opinion and democratic institutions is of critical importance. This is even more the case during a period of transition - from tutelage to partnership - between the United States and Western Europe (and Japan). The public must be involved in (through democratic institutions) and understand (the educational aspect of leadership) the policies of their governments. The West European governments are not without blame yet Nixon and Kissinger did very little of a constructive nature in this area. Instead - for

most of the time - their policies of abrupt maneuvers, unilateral moves, and excessively assertive nationalism toward the EC confused and angered both Americans and West Europeans.

In an age characterized by conflicting tendencies and trends, it nevertheless should be a paramount objective of United States policy to educate its citizens (and the members of the EC must do the same) as to the necessity of supporting the EC; for its successful development is a vital concern of American foreign policy. However, in terms of democratic leadership, educating and involving the public concerning the EC, Nixon's and Kissinger's legacy is distinctly negative. Yet in 1964 Henry Kissinger wrote that for the West "its challenge now is whether it can move from the nation-state to a larger community and draw from this effort the strength for another period of innovation."[54] The contemporary problems facing the people on both sides of the Atlantic cannot obscure this fundamental challenge.

## Footnotes

1. However, Kissinger was rather skeptical that the American federal model could be applied to Europe. See Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 38.

2. Kissinger thought that Britain made a serious mistake in not assuming the leadership of the continent in the early fifties. Ibid., p. 75.

3. In reality Kissinger doubted that the American federal model was applicable to very many situations. He was also very doubtful that a partnership among equals could operate very smoothly.

4. Kissinger thought that De Gaulle, in seeking to restore France's self-confidence, often tried to "teach his people and perhaps his continent attitudes of independence and self-reliance."

5. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, pp. 35-40.

6. Ibid., p. 230.

7. Ibid., p. 231.

8. Ibid., pp. 232-233.

9. Kissinger states that we "require wisdom and delicacy in handling the transaction from tutelage to equality" of America's European Allies. American rigidity and paternalism did not make it any easier to deal with Europeans eager to assert their independence, such as De Gaulle. See Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 234.

10. Ibid., p. 233.

11. Economic and political problems in the West are causing serious fragmentation both within nations and multilateral organizations. See James Chace, The New York Times, May 6, 1977, p. 15.

12. Karl Kaiser has cited French obstructionism for preventing even modest steps towards a United Europe. Kaiser fears that further French obstructionism will lead to a Europe of nation-states with all of the attendent weaknesses. See Kaiser "Europe and America: A Critical Phase", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 52, #4, July 1974, pp. 730-731.

13. Article by Andrew Pierre in James Chace and Earl Ravenal, editors, Atlantis Lost, New York: N.Y.U. Press, 1976, pp. 183-184.

14. François Duchêne has warned that the EC could "be more or less the victim of power politics run by greater military and more cohesive powers than itself." See Duchêne's article, "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence" in Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager, editors, A Nation Writ Large? London: Macmillan, 1973, p. 20.

15. The Netherlands, for example, refused to share their natural gas supplies with their Community partners.

16. Duchêne suggests that Europe, instead of suffering the usual fate during its decline, may instead be the exemplar of a new stage in political civilization by stressing essentially civilian forms of power. See Duchêne in Kohnstamm and Hager, editors, A Nation Writ Large?, p. 19.

17. Henry Kissinger, "America and the World: Principle and Pragmatism," Time, December 27, 1976.

18. This does not apply to bilateral aid policies of the nine such as West German trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and French aid to African states. These policies were initiated well before 1973. See Kenneth J. Twitchett, "External Relations or Foreign Policy" in Twitchett, editor, Europe and the World, London: Europa Publications, 1976, p. 23.

19. Ibid., p. 62.

20. The desirability of increased trade with the EC is clearly recognized and desired in Hungary. See Mihály Simai, "Changing Views in Hungary on the European Community" in Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau, editor, The External Relations of the European Community, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath & Co., 1974, pp. 90-91.

21. John Pinder "The Community and the State Trading Countries" in Twitchett, editor, Europe and the World, p. 76.

22. Former Prime Minister Edward Heath has stated that "a foreign policy is not a luxury for our Community, but a plain necessity."

23. François Duchêne, "The United States and European Community" in Rosecrance, editor, America as an Ordinary Country, p. 109.

24. J. Robert Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance, New York: Harper & Row, 1975, p. 52.

25. In 1972 20.3% of American trade items carried a tariff of over 15%, for the EC the comparable figure was only 2.4%. See Roger Morgan, "The Transatlantic Relationship" in Twitchett, editor, Europe and the World, p. 48.

26. Ibid., p. 48.

27. Ibid., p. 49.

28. Ibid., p. 50.

29. Kissinger, White House Years, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979, p. 957.

30. Kissinger should have assigned a strong deputy to foreign economic policy. Instead the function was transferred from his office and a separate assistant concerned with international economic affairs reported directly to the President. See J. Robert Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance, p. 52.

31. Max Mark, "Economic Confrontation: The Hub of US-EEC Relations" in Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau, editor, The External Relations of the European Community, p. 115.

32. Stanley Hoffmann is correct when he mentions that as a result of the October war the EC will be more dependent on the OPEC states for its economic security. See Hoffmann's article "The Headaches of Harmony" in European Community, March, 1975, p. 17.

33. Robert J. Lieber, "Expanded Europe and the Atlantic Relationship" in Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau, editor, The External Relations of the European Community, p. 60.

34. V.H. Oppenheim, "The Past: We Pushed Them", Foreign Policy, #25, Winter, 1976-77, p. 24.

35. At the Franco-American summit in Martinique in December, 1974 a compromise was reached between the two parties. France appeared to acquire in Kissinger's grand recycling scheme to aid those nations with the greatest balance of payments problems. But was there an excuse for Kissinger's theatrics with Jobert?

36. Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 325.

37. James Chace, "The Kissinger Years", New Republic, Vol. 171, #19, November 9, 1974, p. 32.

38. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, p. 99.

39. Duchêne, "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence" in Kohnstamm and Hager, editors, A Nation Writ Large?, p. 20.

40. Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance, p. 3.

41. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, p. 168.

42. Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order, New York: McGraw Hill, 1978, p. 78.

43. The Economist, December 15, 1973, p. 14.

44. Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 78.

45. In his famous speech of April, 1973, Kissinger mentioned that the United States still supports the cause of European unity but expects "to be met in a spirit of reciprocity." New York Times, April 24, 1973, p. 1.

46. Andrew Pierre, "Can Europe's Security be "Decoupled" from America?" Foreign Affairs, July, 1973, Vol. 51, #4, p. 777.

47. J. Robert Schaetzel, "Some European Questions for Dr. Kissinger", Foreign Policy, #12, Fall 1973, pp. 67-68.

48. Ibid., p. 80.

49. Before Nixon became President Senator Brooke (in 1968), after discussions with Nixon, reported that Nixon was committed to the cause of European unity. See Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance, p. 49.

50. Duchêne, "The United States and European Community" in Rosecrance, editor, America as an Ordinary Country, pp. 90-94.

51. Alastair Buchan, "The United States and European Security" in Landes, editor, Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership, pp. 312-313.

52. Richard Cooper, "The United States and Economic Interdependence" in Landes, editor, Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership, p. 336.

53. Nixon and Kissinger cannot really be blamed for the oil crisis. By 1969 American dependence on Arab oil was too real and too readily acquiesced in by all parties. Only an "oil crisis" could generate sufficient alarm to gradually end this dependence.

54. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 249.

# CHAPTER V

# BILATERAL RELATIONS: WEST GERMANY

## The Scholar
## Introduction

Bilateral relations with the major European states are an important aspect of America's relationship with Europe. Early proponents of multilateral institutions such as NATO and, in particular, the EC had placed too much emphasis on the eventual demise of the nation-state. Moreover, during the sixties and seventies nationalism has revived in Europe. The origins of this development are not simply due to such excesses as occurred in France under de Gaulle. This is not to deny the effects of the Gaullist movement, but the revival of nationalism in Europe occurred both because of the "reemergence of the past" and because in the sixties the memory of World War II faded with the success of post-war reconstruction and the development of the welfare state. Furthermore, these developments coincided with and were stimulated by the rise of nationalism in areas that had been under colonial rule.

Consequently, American foreign policy has to deal with both Europe's multilateral institutions and bilaterally with

Europe's major and minor states. Given the multiplicity of problems, this will call for a degree of patience and understanding on both sides that has not always been present.[1] It always was - and still remains - very doubtful that the major European states, with a long history of diplomatic activity, will transfer or merge their sovereign identities with collective institutions. In the foreseeable future Europe's major states are likely to retain considerable room for diplomatic maneuver.

On the American side a complicating factor for foreign policy makers has been the post-Vietnam assertiveness of Congress. Not only did the Vietnam catastrophe undermine America's claim to moral and political leadership but it also weakened confidence in the executive branch. With respect to United States-West European relations, many Europeans are worried about the direction and consistency of American foreign policy. Raymond Aron has mentioned that Europeans tend to be very skeptical and wary of an enhanced foreign policy role for the American Congress.[2] But as neither the executive branch nor the Congress is infallible, someway must be found for both to support an appropriate and consistent foreign policy. For any post-Nixon administration this will be an extremely delicate and difficult task.

Finally, the seemingly intractable nature of many current problems will exhaust patience and understanding on both sides. For many problems such as inflation, energy,

America's enormous trade deficits, the Soviet arms build-up, and restlessness in Eastern Europe, there are no immediate answers. However, long-term solutions to some may be found through consultation and cooperation among the Western nations, but consultation and cooperation must be sustained; it cannot be predicated upon momentary impulses. Can the nations of the North Atlantic basin achieve the necessary cooperation needed to solve problems that transcend the capabilities of any single state? What were the policies of the Nixon-Kissinger administration with respect to the major European states? The next three chapters will deal with American foreign policy towards West Germany, France, and Britain.

## The German Problem

Since at least 1871 the "German problem" has been at the center of European politics. When the long quest of the German people to attain national unity was successful in 1871, this raised the question as to the role a unified German state would play in Europe.[3] The successes of Bismarck's policies secured a place for Germany in the concert of European powers. But Kissinger wrote of Bismarck that all the things he had warned or fought against occurred anyway; no alliance with France was possible after 1871, Germany was increasingly tied to Austria, and it was difficult to specifically determine Germany's national interest.[4]

Kissinger goes on to say that Germany's greatest modern figure may well have sown the seeds of its 20th century tragedy.[5]

Thus, in an age when self-determination and national unity are the driving forces of mankind, are the Germans to be denied the fulfillment of their historic drive for national unity? Two world wars have not answered this question. But thirty-five years after the defeat and collapse of Germany the remnants of the Reich have attained considerable importance in the world. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) is the seventeenth ranking industrial power in the world and the largest trading partner of its ostensible occupier, the Soviet Union.[6] West Germany is economically the strongest country in Western Europe and is trying to define a political role commensurate with its economic power.

The German problem thus presents itself anew: what role and place shall the successor states of imperial Germany have in Europe? Both German states, in particular West Germany, are engaged in the process of redefining their place in Europe. This will not be an easy task. But the post-war era has ended. New political alignments are occurring as states wax and wane. Britain, in an unparalleled manner, has gone from a great to a medium power in only a quarter of a century. France, particularly under de Gaulle, seems determined to be once again in the front ranks of

nations.

Thus, shorn of the excesses of the past, does the German drive for national unity remain a factor to contend with? Can the Western allies - with the East Europeans and the Russians - be sufficiently imaginative to devise structures that will satisfy the Germans in their quest for unity? Have the German people truly learned that their quest for national unity must be conducted in such a way as not to arouse their neighbors' fear and apprehension? Kissinger wrote "it is against all probability that a large and dynamic country can be kept divided indefinitely in the center of the continent that gave the concept of nationalism to the world."[8]

During Kissinger's tenure in office disagreements occurred between the United States and West Germany regarding several areas: West Germany and the EC, the offset costs issue, energy and American troops in Europe. Concerning the EC excessive American pressures upon the West Germans to serve as advocates for American policies often placed Bonn in a difficult position. The offset costs issue, energy, and American troops in Europe were further complicated by economic and political disagreements. Other problems causing tension between the two countries are the United States-West German main battle tank, the shipment of NATO war material from West German bases to aid Israel, the American pressure upon West Germany to stimulate its economy, and the

West German-Brazilian nuclear reactor treaty. Americans and West Germans have had disagreements in the past but in a period of rapid change, when necessity compels cooperation, disagreements may cause major difficulties in the future. It is within this context that the scholarly writings and subsequent policies of Henry Kissinger should be of considerable interest.

Kissinger did almost all of his writing on Germany during the late fifties and early sixties. During this period the Berlin crisis and other aspects of the German problem were of central concern to American policymakers. However, from the late sixties on American policymakers have, through a combination of inertia and neglect, set the stage for potentially serious disputes with the European allies.[9] The state of America's relations with its European allies is still central to the power and position of the United States in a multipolar world. Neither America nor Europe, standing alone, can master the successive challenges of the last quarter of the 20th century without sustained and consistent consultation and cooperation. And of the foremost importance is the relationship between the United States and West Germany.

Kissinger has written that "Germany has held the key to the stability of Europe for at least three centuries."[10] During the period prior to 1871 when Germany was weak and disunited, the other powers sought to perpetuate its

divisions and prevent it from attaining national unity while ensuring that no single power gained preponderance in Central Europe.

Germany's history must be understood against this background for it was the events of its often tragic past that led Germany, after 1871, to identify security with sufficient strength to defend itself simultaneously against all of its neighbors. However, this effort required mobilization of resources and cultivation of nationalism on such a scale that Germany's neighbors feared for their security. But since Germany was situated in the heart of Europe, Bismarck spoke of "the nightmare of hostile coalitions." However, twice in the 20th century, the peace of Europe was shattered by a unified Germany. Kissinger writes that "it was Germany's tragedy that the effort to prevent these coalitions made them inevitable."[11] Thus "Germany has been either too weak or too powerful for the peace of Europe."[12] In other words, Germany should be able to defend itself but not to attack. It should be united, so that its frustrations do not erupt into conflict and its divisions do not tempt other countries. Nationalism should be more mature, not jingoistic.

Kissinger is very perceptive when he writes of the psychological problems facing the Germans. Every German over fifty years of age has lived through three revolutions. Four regimes have existed in this period and each has

claimed to be morally antithetical to its predecessor. In addition, Germany has lost two world wars and experienced the consequences of two terrible inflations. Moreover, not only the older generation has suffered serious trauma. Each German over thirty-five has witnessed the horrors of the Nazi period, World War II, and the subsequent complete collapse of the country. Kissinger writes that "the Nazi experience has been so completely suppressed or sublimated into a vague feeling of generalized guilt that it is no longer a problem as such."[13] But "the rootlessness produced by blotting out twelve years of history is relevant."[14] Thus, while great national prosperity has been achieved, it is incongruous with the loss of national, political, and territorial integrity. Consequently German leadership groups often suffer from a lack of inner assurance, which is often expressed in vociferous and legalistic disputes.

How then could a divided and rootless country, viewed with suspicion and fear, avoid the excesses of either nationalism or neutralism and yet become a member of the Community of nations? It was West Germany's great post-war Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who understood the psychological needs of his countrymen. Adenauer attempted to reintroduce West Germany into the Community of nations, to give the Federal Republic a stake in something larger than itself. He sought to teach his people habits of self-reliance in international politics. West Germany, exposed geographically

and psychologically and politically vulnerable, could not, by itself, pursue an active and vigorous foreign policy.

Adenauer sought to submerge narrow West German interests in a wider community. Of great importance to him were the close ties with the United States and membership in the EC. Of equally great importance was the Franco-German Treaty of January, 1963. For the first time in centuries, Germany had a friend in the West. This was a notable diplomatic achievement. But perhaps Adenauer's greatest achievement was to convey the impression that "conditions in the Federal Republic were as firm and stable as his own policy."[15] But when the Berlin crisis transpired, including the erection of the Berlin wall, it marked a crucial watershed in the Western Alliance for never before had the emergence of serious differences among the allies been such a real possibility.[16] The allies and West Germany would have to agree on new policies (such as détente), and simultaneously ensure the security of West Berlin and West Germany. But if new policies are not agreed upon, the possibility of a serious breach between the allies and West Germany cannot be ruled out.

## The Future of Germany

In both The Necessity for Choice (1961) and The Troubled Partnership (1965) Kissinger wrote at length on the

future of Germany. Generally he was very critical of American policy towards Germany both during and after the Berlin crisis. The Kennedy administration appeared too anxious to negotiate with the Soviet Union and grant concessions while many on both sides of the Atlantic sought stability in the status quo. Since no German leader could accept the abrogation of the drive for national unity, tensions appeared between Washington and Bonn.

An additional complicating factor was the emergent Franco-American rivalry. With the signing of the Franco-German Treaty of Collaboration on January 14, 1963, the United States began an intensive process of wooing West Germany. This was one motive behind the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal that was to be such a bone of contention among the allies. To prevent Franco-German nuclear cooperation, an agreement was signed between the United States and West Germany on November 14, 1964 that "in effect made the German armed forces dependent on the United States for their military equipment."[17] Kissinger was highly critical of these arrangements and of American fears that the Franco-German rapprochment would lead to a new power grouping, a "condition inherently impossible of fulfillment."[18] Furthermore, "American pressure and high-handed Franch actions have placed the Federal Republic in an extremely uncomfortable position."[19] Consequently West Germany runs a serious risk of being isolated. Moreover, "the frequent

changes in American policy on strategic doctrine, nuclear control and the emphasis to be given to various partners must radicalize German political life, whatever the merit of individual United States positions."20

Germany occupies a key place in the Western Alliance. Because of its geopolitical position, French abruptness and American short-sightedness should be avoided. The danger is that Germany will become absorbed in its own unfulfilled national aspirations while it realizes the advantages conferred upon it by its growing power and central location. Kissinger also warns of the 17 million Germans under Soviet control and expresses concern that in the competition between the two German states, West Germany's internal structure may not be equal to the strain placed upon it.

He is also worried about the development of a potential conflict between the Federal Republic and its allies over the division of Germany. Three factors are involved: (1) NATO seeks to maintain the status quo, yet one of the most important members seeks a change in the status quo; (2) none of the NATO allies places a very high priority upon German reunification; (3) Germany's past has left a legacy of mistrust that will create future obstacles. Both the Franco-American rivalry and a relaxation of East-West tensions add to the difficulties. Thus German leaders are often ambivalent about détente. If progress on the German question is blocked, the Alliance may soon have to choose between its

own policy on German reunification or seeing the Federal Republic pursue this goal independently. And Germany's past must not become an obstacle if Germany is ever to be a respected member of the international community.

Concerning the fate of the 17 million people in East Germany, Kissinger takes a rather hard line. He is aware of the complicated and explosive nature of this problem, yet he is against enhancing the status of East Germany which he refers to as "a dangerous course."[22] Both German states would compete for adherents all over the world; moreover, any hope for future reunification would be deferred indefinitely. Splits may occur in the Western Alliance over humanitarian versus political concerns. Additionally the moral cost to the Soviets of maintaining their position in East Germany would be lessened, and this would mean that with the consolidation of the regime in East Germany reunification would be on Pankow's terms. In fact, Kissinger is fearful if East Germany behaves with moderation after it is recognized that "it will have major incentives to seek to undermine the Federal Republic."[23] East German nationalism clashes with the Communist regime, and this precarious situation may prompt measures to attack or weaken the Federal Republic. Thus the end result of West German concessions to East Germany could well lead to an indefinite continuation of two hostile states competing against each other rather than progress toward unification. It is apparent

that Kissinger is against the Erhard-Schroeder policy of "little steps" for he thinks that such policies could have "dangerous results."[24]

A common German policy of the Western Allies is essential not only to retain Germany as a willing member of the Alliance but also to serve the peace of Europe. The permanent division of Germany into hostile, competing states is inherently dangerous. What can the Western powers do to alleviate this highly dangerous situation?

Kissinger envisages that a number of policies are available to the Western powers. Most importantly, the West must show concern for and understanding of the anguish of a divided country. Thus German reunification must be a central common concern of the allies. The Federal Republic should not be urged into bilateral dealings with the East. The allies in turn must adopt a concrete program that envisages specific steps. The issue of German unification cannot simply become an exercise in rhetoric.

Two areas of great concern to the allies are strategy toward East Germany and the problem of Germany's frontiers. Should the Western powers seek to increase contacts with East Germany or should they isolate it? Kissinger recommends the latter course for this "seems the most promising and the one most consistent with a long-term policy on German unification."[25] But the allies and West Germany must agree on the policy towards Eastern Europe. Kissinger in

fact argues that a more active West German policy would help to isolate the GDR and promote its demoralization. Thus to ameliorate the Hallstein Doctrine and to lessen the East Europeans' support for Soviet and East German pressures against Berlin, a more active diplomacy by the Federal Republic in Eastern Europe would perhaps be conducive to a final long-term settlement. But as specific plans for German unification become necessary, they should not move closer to the Soviet position as succeeding Western plans have done.

The second area of concern is the Oder-Neisse line. To Kissinger this is one of the human tragedies of our time, and the reluctance of the Federal Republic to renounce these territories is understandable. However, until this was done through Brandt's Ostpolitik, the failure of Bonn to renounce its claims to this area means that the Soviets were provided with a convenient excuse for maintaining their hold on East Germany. Consequently Soviet hegemony and control of Eastern Europe is also reinforced.

Thus while it was not clear at precisely what point Bonn would have to renounce its claims, still this had to be done. For "it is essential to recognize that acceptance by Germany of its eastern frontiers will have to be part of any responsible program for unification."[26] But Germany's desire for unification, the East European concern for security, and Soviet concern that a united Germany will

threaten its own security all have to be reconciled in any final plan for Germany's future.

However, Kissinger is wary of any formula for unification for "it is improbable that any negotiating formula will advance German unity. The East is likely to reject even the most reasonable program. Therefore, the long-term hope for German unity resides in the unity of Europe."[27] As nations lose their importance, the fear of any one state will diminish. Thus a united Western Europe will become a magnet for the countries of Eastern Europe. Here Kissinger castigates Franco-American rivalry as "the West, which has so often been rent by internal struggles, stands in danger of repeating its historic folly."[28] Germany cannot be used as a balance wheel for this will complete the fragmentation of the Western Alliance.

To prevent the Federal Republic from becoming a menace to the West, it is vital to give it a stake in something larger than itself. Two policies are vital for the future of the Federal Republic: (1) recognition of the psychological and political dilemmas of a divided country and (2) the ability to make the Federal Republic part of a larger community. These "policies are interdependent; to pursue one without the other is to defeat both."[29]

## Bilateral Relations: West Germany
## The Statesman
## The United States and West Germany

In 1969 new administrations assumed governmental responsibilities in Washington and in Bonn. And fears also increased that the United States would neglect its European allies due to its preoccupation with Asia. Undeniably, the United States was in a serious diplomatic crisis. The new Nixon-Kissinger team would have to resolve the crisis in Southeast Asia before addressing itself to its relationship with Western Europe.

With the end of the post-war era, monetary, economic, and political problems in the Atlantic Alliance became apparent. As Lyndon Johnson's presidential term drew to a close, Americans became more involved in Vietnam and Europeans in the construction of the EC. This was the period when "Johnson often put heavy pressure on the European allies, i.e., the Federal Republic was ordered not to take up contacts with Peking or to enter into further joint prospects with France for the development of European military equipment."[30] Johnson, by his impetuous and indiscriminate manner, had helped cause the downfall of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard when the Chancellor was invited to Johnson's Texas ranch in 1965. According to Lothar Rule "At the end of the Johnson administration US-European relations were at an all-time low."[31] Thus, when the new administrations took power

in Washington and Bonn - despite the unifying effect of the Czechoslovak invasion in 1968 - there were grounds for concern with respect to United States-West German relations.

The erection of the Berlin Wall in August, 1961 had been a catalyst in Bonn's thinking. It was apparent that détente and subsequent progress toward German unification would be the only acceptable way to achieve West Germany's national goals. During the sixties the Cold War receded and a new multipolar world, less dominated by the superpowers, began to emerge. The eastern policies of de Gaulle and American involvement with Southeast Asia and its bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union all caused concern among Brandt's entourage. It is not surprising, then, that the new government in Bonn decided to venture forth more boldly into terrain that decisively marked West Germany's emergence as an important political power. With the tacit support of his allies, Brandt began a series of overtures to the East that were to culminate in December, 1972 in the signing of the Intra-German Accords.[32] In effect East Germany achieved diplomatic recognition by the Western powers while the issue of Berlin was resolved or at least greatly clarified by the prior Four Power Agreement of September, 1971. In the space of a few years, Americans and West Germans would begin to develop a new sense of equality.[33]

Thus Henry Kissinger was aware that, backed by their enormous economic power, the West Germans were seeking to

redefine their political role.[34] Yet as Josef Joffe writes "Secretary of State Kissinger was quick to suspect unseeming haste in the West German initiatives toward East-West détente."[35] But for the West Germans détente and Ostpolitik are of vital importance. This idea is emphasized by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in the London Economist: "One of the necessities of the alliance as well as for us Germans is to get along with the Eastern power. We don't want to get back into the Cold War. There is nothing to be gained for the Germans in a Cold War, divided as our nation is, divided as our capital of Berlin is, nothing to be gained from a new Cold War period. A return to the Cold War is still thinkable: I hope it doesn't occur, but we have not passed the point of no return as yet."[36]

However, the record of the Nixon-Kissinger team with respect to West Germany is not entirely satisfactory even though the two countries have always been aware that each has needed the other. It is not too much to say that a special relationship exists between them. Both have been aware of West Germany's exposed position and while occasional frictions have been apparent, no really serious breaches have occurred. What really worries the West German leaders is a certain lack of reliability, of consistency, that has emanated from American foreign policy since the Johnson Administration. As George Ball writes "Kissinger has not consulted with and thus marred European-American relations

since 1969."37

The intent of this section is to discuss the issues that have troubled the United States and West Germany. Certain of Kissinger's policies caused serious, though not irreparable, differences. What alternative policies could he have pursued? Have his policies sought to place the relationship between the United States and West Germany within a framework that stresses mutual consultation and cooperation on issues of common interest? In this period of profound political and social change, has the relationship between the two countries been further clarified? Have new principles been articulated that provide for the security of West Germany yet also seek to impart a new dimension to international relations by imparting a greater concern for moral and ethical actions?

## West Germany and the EC

In January, 1973, the EC welcomed three new members: Britain, Ireland, and Denmark. The Summit meetings in 1969 at The Hague and in 1972 at Paris had endorsed the idea of enlarging and consolidating the EC. This, of course, was bound to involve the Bonn government more heavily in Community affairs and as it turned out also, to provide more opportunity for friction between the enlarged Community and the United States.

I have previously indicated some of the economic

problems between the United States and the EC. Non-tariff barriers to international trade, agricultural trade, and the Community's preferential agreements with Mediterranean and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries all were sources of controversy. However, even though American exports to the EC showed a surplus, "the United States tried, during 1973, to induce the European Community to adopt policies which would do the minimum damage to American commercial, industrial and agricultural interests, and the particular zeal of American officials in attempting to obtain the maximum support from their German allies for this objective (sic)."[38]

West Germany, in accordance with the decisions reached at the two European summits for the consolidation of the EC, was developing new ties with the Community. Thus the West Germans were placed in a very difficult position by the American demands. But the Americans, while willing to pay a price for European integration, often appeared to be highly ambiguous about resisting short-term economic pressures for more intangible long-term political benefits. During the Nixon-Kissinger years this attitude all too often characterized Washington's policies towards the EC. West Germany's membership in the EC imposes upon American policymakers an obligation to resist attempts to take advantage of the special relationship. One commentator writes "the Administration sought to avoid the partnership implications of an

Alliance policy, and to maintain supremacy by setting one nation off against another."[39] American attempts to influence the EC should be undertaken through Brussels and not through the aegis of West Germany. But in 1973, Nixon and Kissinger were to demonstrate on more than one occasion that America's military ties to Europe could be linked to commercial and economic concessions from the West Germans.[40]

On March 8, 1973, Martin Hillenbrand, the American Ambassador to Bonn, began his speech with a remark about the special nature of the relationship between the United States and West Germany.[41] He then went on to discuss some of the differences between the United States and Western Europe that would have to be resolved in the forthcoming General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) conferences. It was apparent that once again the United States, in attempting to influence West Germany, was placing that country in a very difficult position not only with respect to the two forthcoming conferences but also regarding the EC, which has a considerable interest in these issues.

Later in the year the October war and subsequent energy crisis submerged all other issues. By 1974 the Watergate crisis, Nixon's resignation, and the accession of Gerald Ford to the presidency also helped in creating circumstances which militated against the continuation of the pressures brought to bear upon West Germany by Nixon and Kissinger in

1973. But, if these events had not compelled Kissinger to cease in his efforts to have West Germany serve as an advocate for American interests, at what point would he have realized that he was transgressing the line between legitimate influence and pressures that approached coercion? Some pressure and bargaining are inherent in any alliance relationship. But Kissinger's pressures upon West Germany in 1973 went beyond bargaining between two allies. Moreover, this contradicted his previous warnings concerning West Germany's psychological and political vulnerability. In terms of the relationship between the two countries, excessive demands and pressures upon Bonn that exceeded the normal boundaries of alliance behavior are undesirable. More than once Kissinger was guilty of transgressing those boundaries. Moreover, there were no compelling reasons that justified this particular course of action. In Western Europe no one was probably more sympathetic to America's plight regarding its balance of payments, the involvement in Vietnam, and America's subsequent economic and political difficulties than Bonn. While some of Brandt's initiatives no doubt irritated Kissinger, there was every reason to consult and cooperate with the West Germans. West Germany had become more secure psychologically and politically, particularly as a result of the Ostpolitik, but West Germany's particular situation must always be fully considered in any policy. As Michel Tatu writes "improvement of relations with the East

can have favorable consequences for just one state - the Federal Republic - and that solidarity with that state should prevail over all other considerations."[42]

## The Offset Costs Issue

The cost of maintaining troops has long caused difficulties in United States-West German relations. Curt Gasteyger has written that "the offset German-American and German-British payments system should be 'Europeanized' and made multilateral."[43] By 1973 this problem had reached more serious proportions because of the economic problems besetting the American economy. Since the dollar was devalued in February, 1973, the Americans expected Bonn to increase its contribution; however, Chancellor Schmidt refused to comply. Finally, the Americans agreed to make up the difference.

But a more serious American demand was that Bonn meet 100% of the cost of the troops instead of the 80% as specified in the prior agreement in 1971-73. The West Germans sought some support for a multilateralization of the offset payments. Britain's answer was negative for the British considered that they were already supporting their troops in West Germany.

Since both the American and West German budgets were under serious strain in 1973, it should occasion no surprise that bargaining was difficult. The end result, however, was

more or less predictable in that West Germany would have to make most of the concessions. The new agreement signed in the Spring of 1974 was to cover the period from mid-1973 to mid-1975. When asked about the offset costs issue in a press conference in 1976, Chancellor Schmidt, highly irritated by previous controversy on this subject, indicated that he considered the matter closed. The payment in German currency was actually smaller than the previous agreement due to the devaluation of the dollar and the Nixon administration was satisfied that no better arrangement could be obtained. In the future, however, this problem could cause even more difficulty. The presence of American troops in West Germany benefits both the United States and Western Europe. Therefore, the manner in which this issue was handled by Nixon and Kissinger was unfortunate. Certainly, the West Germans resented the pressures they were subjected to. Would it not have been better to try to achieve a greater degree of consultation and cooperation on such a vital matter? Moreover, the polemics surrounding this issue were not helpful for public relations (an important consideration in an alliance of democratic states) for they confirmed the views of many Americans that the West Germans (and the West Europeans) were taking advantage of American generosity and were not contributing enough to defend their own countries. To the West Germans American foreign policy appeared increasingly inconsistent and nationalistic. They

were worried that America's ability to work in concert with and to cooperate with its allies might be seriously effected. Domestic pressures and the crisis in Southeast Asia added an additional element of unpredictability. Consequently the economic crisis afflicting the Western allies has shown that problems such as offset costs, unless accompanied by great tact and patience, can seriously damage relations among the countries of the Atlantic Alliance.

## Energy

United States-West European relations were particularly difficult in 1973. Kissinger's "Year of Europe" speech in April had, to many in Europe and particularly the French, threatening aspects.[44] The link between American military support and the explicit demand for concessions on commercial and economic matters was a matter of serious concern in Europe. America's pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union and China and its activities in Indo-China were cause for additional concern. But, to prepare for Nixon's Fall visit, the West Germans were prepared to work with the other Europeans and reach agreement with the Americans on a new "Atlantic Charter."

But events in the Middle East precluded further efforts to mend United States-West European relations in 1973. The October war and the subsequent oil embargo and the quadrupling of the price of oil were the occasion for a severe

crisis in United States-West German relations.[45] François Duchêne writes "there was a serious diplomatic quarrel between the U.S. and West Germany when the press discovered the shipment of war material from West Germany and Bonn asked that this cease at once."[46] What particularly concerned the West German government was the shipment of war material from West German bases to Israel after the ceasefire of October 22. Prior to that date, American use of these bases to resupply Israel had been ignored but, with the proclamation of the ceasefire, the Bonn government thought that in view of its ties with the Arab states and its heavy dependence on Middle Eastern oil, it could no longer remain silent.

Both the American Ambassador to West Germany, Martin Hillenbrand, and Kissinger expressed little sympathy for Bonn's dilemma. In response to the Bonn government's request that the shipment of weapons cease, Hillenbrand is reported to have stated "that the United States regarded West Germany's sovereignty as limited, and reserved the right to take any action which it regarded as right and necessary in the interests of international security."[47] Kissinger reportedly agreed with the substance of these remarks.[48] Once again we witness that vacillation that characterized both Euro-American relations and the relationship between the United States and West Germany. On some issues Kissinger would consult and cooperate with the West

could not Kissinger have been more sensitive to the effects of an oil shortage upon West Germany's social and political order? As the economic recession of 1965 showed, pervasive economic strains can have a serious effect on the West Germans political order. Furthermore, few West Germans have forgotten the trauma of the inflation and recession of the 1920's and the subsequent effect on the political system. Kissinger is well aware that democracy in West Germany has its vulnerabilities. Why then did he not consider this fact more fully in his policies? There were alternatives. The United States could have responded more generously as regards sharing its energy resources with the allies. The West Germans (and the Europeans) understood America's dilemma as regards the Middle East. Would it not have been better to attempt to enlist European sympathy and cooperation initially while quietly resolving disagreements? Surely consultation and cooperation (in sharing energy resources) would have been a better approach for resolving the oil problem that so suddenly and unexpectedly confronted the Western allies.

Perhaps American policymakers could attempt to anticipate problems and be more magnanimous. If this does not occur, a really profound crisis in United States-West German relations cannot be ruled out. Kissinger was not particularly skillful in reassuring the West Germans about energy supplies. He was rather inept in his initial efforts to

garner support for the proposed IEA. The Kissinger-Jobert confrontations, in particular, did not seem to the West Germans, to be a very good way of securing support. Nixon's increasing involvement in the Watergate crisis, his resignation, the accession of Gerald Ford (who did not appear to condone his predecessor's taste for confrontation politics) to the presidency, and the general improvement of economic conditions lessened the intensity of the energy crisis. At present, under current circumstances, the West German government has little choice but to accede to American pressure. However, careless and self-centered actions could eventually erode the political and moral claims to leadership of the United States. Can it be assumed that in future circumstances, when competition for raw materials may be more intense, West Germany will always be ready to compromise its foreign policy objectives for the benefit of the United States?

## American Troops in Europe

Political actions should never be interpreted in too mechanical a manner. The intangible element can be decisive in determining the success or failure of policies. Witness the intangible effects of Kissinger's policies upon the West Germans. The vacillation, confusion, and self-centered nature of many of Kissinger's policies have, to the West Germans, severely damaged American political and

moral claims to leadership. This is why a new vision of the relationship between the United States and Western Europe is needed.

American troops are both a symbol of America's commitment to the defense of Europe and the means of implementing it. It is, therefore, cause for concern that members of the American Congress should year after year call for large, unilateral reductions in the strength of American troops in Europe. In March 1973 Senator Mansfield, who has perennially directed these resolutions, induced the Democratic members of the Senate to pass overwhelmingly a resolution demanding that American ground troops in Europe be reduced by 50% in eighteen months.[50] However the administration managed to negate the effect of the resolution. In any event, these vacillations indicated that domestic support for American troops in Europe was often ambiguous, that much of the public and many members of Congress did not understand the vital role that American troops played in maintaining the balance of power in Europe. It was precisely this lack of consistent allied support for Germany in the 1920's that contributed so much to the insecurities leading to the demise of the Weimar Republic. Moreover, with talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), that began in Vienna in 1973, it was important that arms reductions would be the result of consultations and not of unilateral measures.

However, the administration did recognize the dangers involved for West Germany in particular in the unilateral reduction of U.S. troops in Europe. The necessity for a cautious approach to this situation is also understood by the Carter administration which has recently pledged to increase America's conventional capabilities in Europe.

## The Berlin Four Power Agreement

When a common allied strategy is agreed upon and implemented, the results can be impressive. The most constructive initiative by Nixon and Kissinger in Europe culminated in the September, 1971 Four Power Berlin Agreement whereby for the first time the Four powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France) accepted legal obligations concerning Berlin.[51] Of almost equal importance was the subsequent Intra-German Treaty of December, 1972 whereby political relations between the two German states were normalized. These two treaties, despite evident imperfections, represent a major advance for the peace and security of Europe. In the context of America's bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union and West Germany's *Ostpolitik*, the allies demonstrated an impressive capacity for successfully negotiating agreements that should lessen the chances of future conflict over Berlin and engage both German states in a more constructive relationship. Both Nixon and Kissinger deserve partial credit for these

achievements. Unfortunately from 1969 to 1974 the cooperative spirit that marked these treaties was absent in other areas of United States-West German relations.

However, beginning in 1974 a slow improvement in United States-West German relations commenced and relations continued to improve. This does not mean that previous problems have been resolved. Economic difficulties have lessened in intensity and Presidents Ford and Carter have attempted to show greater understanding for West Germany. But problems remain and the joint United States-West German main battle tank is an example of an issue that could become serious in the future.

## The United States-West German Main Battle Tank

In a period of rapidly increasing costs for military equipment, the logistic structure of NATO has seemed a promising area for reform. In any alliance standardization of logistic structures has represented an ideal rather than a reality. But as Europe becomes increasingly identified with the EC, trans-national industrial firms and cooperative agreements in the field of defense might become more probable. Such examples as the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) involving West Germany, the Netherlands, and Britain should have considerable potential. The Europeans, who contribute the vast majority of NATO's troops, are interested in providing the most efficient and adequate conventional defense

possible. This will not be possible unless transnational industrial and defense cooperation becomes much more common. Though Western Europe's arms industries have revived since the end of the war, the disagreements over the political direction of the EC and disputes with the United States (powerful lobbies in the United States do not wish to lose lucrative markets to European firms) have meant that NATO has not been able to develop an efficient logistics structure.

During the late 1960's it became apparent that NATO would need a new main battle tank for the 1980's. The United States-West German main battle tank, jointly produced, could be an important step in the standardization of NATO's military equipment. A common gun and engine would be used for the American XM-1 and the West German Leopard. The Americans would use the West German 120 millimeter gun while the German Tank would be powered by the American turbine engine. A common logistics structure and standardization of weapons in NATO are synonymous.

However, initially, pressures mounted from the Pentagon for a quid pro quo; the Americans would buy the West German gun if the West Germans purchase the American Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). A Congressional report cited "a curious but nonetheless pervasive relationship between the Leopard-DM-1 agreement and the purchase of AWACS."[52] West Germany now has no intention of purchasing

AWACS and the problems pertaining to the main battle tank have basically been resolved. However, the American intent to purchase the West German gun is an important symbol of the American commitment to work for the standardization of logistic and weapons systems in NATO. But with friction over economic issues often apparent in United States-West German relations, will the need to placate America's powerful domestic interests prevail over the need to assist NATO and the West Europeans in achieving greater transnational cooperation with respect to their requirements for defense?[53] The United States has long advocated West European unity but it has often been ambiguous or even hostile when the opportunity arose for Western Europe to achieve further development of its own defense industries.

## Summary

The relations between the United States and Western Europe generally and with West Germany in particular are emerging from a period of tutelage to one of equality. The new relationship is necessarily afflicted with growing pains. However, as in the case of France when de Gaulle was President, more lasting rifts can occur that threaten the ability of the nations in the Atlantic world to work together harmoniously.

This problem has not yet arisen in the case of West Germany. With some exceptions the United States-West

German relationship since the end of World War II has been and continues to be harmonious (though serious qualifications must be added concerning future prospects).[54] Nixon and Kissinger must be given due recognition in this respect. Kissinger was always concerned both that West Germany should be actively involved with its neighbors in the EC and NATO and that the West Germans should recognize the limitations that exist with respect to reunification.[55] The Treaty clarifying the status of Berlin and the Intra-German accords point to both the constraints upon and the possibilities for the allies.

With respect to United States-West German bilateral relations, it is vital that the Americans appreciate the difficulties faced by West Germany. It is a divided country that while firmly anchored in the West must also be unusually sensitive about its relationship with the East. In the future, the relative importance of some aspects of the two countries' bilateral ties might become less important as West Germany becomes more fully integrated into the EC. However, there will always be certain considerations that are unique to the relationship between the United States and West Germany, since only the United States can secure West Germany's defense and security. And without West Germany, NATO and American positions in Western Europe would be gravely imperiled.

Given the "diplomacy of emergency" of the Vietnam War,

some of Nixon's and Kissinger's shock tactics are perhaps understandable. What is more difficult to condone was the administration's mixture of close (or at least adequate) consultation on a few issues (the Berlin Accords, SALT) and unilateral policies and a lack of (even contempt for) consultation and cooperation on most other issues. The unilateral devaluation of the dollar in 1971 (complemented by the "Connally method") and Kissinger's relative lack of concern for American policies that greatly increased inflationary tendencies are two examples that serve to illustrate this point.

To the West Germans (and the West Europeans) Nixon's and Kissinger's policies appeared as a continuation of the policies of the Johnson administration. American diplomacy was almost exclusively concerned with Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China. Thus (with some already noted exceptions) Bonn, in particular, worried about the consistency and reliability of American foreign policy. Did Kissinger seek to ensure American primacy at the expense, if necessary, of West Germany and the West Europeans? Yet, from 1975 Kissinger returned to a more conciliatory, more cooperative policy. But it was this vacillation, this uncertainty about American motives that, since the Johnson years, have begun to place serious strains upon the Atlantic Alliance and the relationship with West Germany. Too often to West Germany, the West Europeans and the Japanese, Kissinger's policies

were characterized by an assertive nationalism and accompanying unilateral maneuvers and shock tactics; all designed to ensure American primacy.

The policy of "setting one nation off against another" was complemented by Nixon's and Kissinger's disdain for institutions such as the EC. But there is an important connection between West Germany's political and economic stability and the development of the EC. That is why the wisdom of Nixon's and Kissinger's policy toward the EC can be questioned. Kissinger has written that "arrangements in Germany have been the key to the stability of Europe for at least three centuries."[56] He has repeatedly stressed that "the long-term hope for German unity therefore resides in the unity of Europe."[57] But Nixon's and Kissinger's often negative and parochial policy towards the EC has not been propitious for the development of that larger entity that West Germany must identify itself with in the West. Yet, Kissinger wrote that "the future of the Federal Republic depends on two related policies by the West: (1) recognition of the psychological and political dilemmas of a divided country and (2) the ability to make the Federal Republic part of a larger community."[58] But in actual practice, he modified these ideas. His policies (with the exception of the Four Power Agreement on Berlin and allied support for the Intra-German Accords) lacked consistency of purpose and were often poorly implemented. The divergence between the

ideas that Kissinger expressed as a scholar and his policies as a statesman is, in many respects, quite apparent.

Moreover, the politics of unilateral maneuvers, of shock tactics, does not leave any room for that vital component of democratic (and particularly American) foreign policies: idealism. The relationship between domestic values and foreign policy is crucial to the long-term success of foreign policy in a democracy. Here was Nixon's and Kissinger's weakest point; for their overall policies toward West Germany (and the West Europeans and the Japanese) failed to draw upon that great reservoir of American (and its allies) idealism that has been so crucial to the close postwar relationship on both sides of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In an interesting article James Chace "faults Kissinger for a gravely flawed foreign policy particularly with respect to its long-term consequences."[59]

In the future, those who bear responsibility for America's West German and Western European policies will have to be far more discerning with respect to the immediate and long-term consequences of their policies. It is apparent that Kissinger's vacillation between the desire to ensure American primacy and the need for mutual cooperation on a basis of approximate equality has precluded the emergence of new moral and political guidelines to govern the relationship between the United States and West Germany. In a period of pervasive political and social change, there are

certain to be elements of ambiguity in any relationship and yet, as one examines Kissinger's scholarly work and his subsequent policies, one cannot help but be disappointed at his failure to articulate and implement a new set of philosophical and political guidelines that would better serve both countries in a period of profound and lasting change.

## Footnotes

1. Complicating the situation will be what Klaus Knorr refers to as an "inward turning," that is, a shift in the balance between domestic and external concerns to the detriment of the latter. See Knorr "The United States: Social Change and Military Power" Adelphi Paper #71. London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, Sept. 1970, p. 4.

2. Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1974, p. 10.

3. As Hans Gatzke mentions the problem has been that of ascertaining just what position Germany should occupy in Europe. Both subordination or superiority to the other European states are equally dangerous for Germany and for Europe. See Hans Gatzke, European Diplomacy Between Two Wars, 1919-1939. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972, p. 8.

4. Kissinger, "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck", Daedalus Vol. 97 #3, Summer, 1968, p. 922.

5. Ibid., p. 922.

6. East Germany has about 40% of its trade with the Soviet Union. Until the increase in trade elsewhere only a few years ago 75% of its trade was with the Soviet Bloc. See Peter H. Merkl, German Foreign Policies, West and East. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO Co., 1974, pp. 190-191.

7. Former West German Chancellor Brandt has insisted that the formula of two German states in one nation will provide the framework for relations between both Germanies.

8. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 216.

9. Raymond Vernon writes that Western Europeans' belief that the great economic and military strength of the United States will be used in benign and unhostile ways has been badly eroded. See Vernon "Rogue Elephant in the Forest: An Appraisal of Transatlantic Relations" Foreign Affairs April, 1973 Vol. 50 #3, p. 573.

10. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 65.

11. Ibid., p. 66.

12. Ibid., p. 66.

13. Ibid., p. 66.

14. Ibid., p. 66.

15. Ibid., p. 68.

16. However, as Karl Kaiser remarks, the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 caused old policies to be re-examined and the consideration of new strategies. See Kaiser, German Foreign Policy in Transition. London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 120.

17. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 207.

18. Ibid., p. 207.

19. Ibid., p. 207.

20. Ibid., p. 208.

21. The post-war era has ended but what lies ahead? Theodor Sommer discusses some possibilities. See Sommer "Détente and Security: The Options", Adelphi Paper #70. London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, November, 1970, pp. 10-16.

22. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 213.

23. Ibid., p. 214.

24. Ibid., p. 215.

25. Ibid., p. 217.

26. Ibid., p. 220.

27. Ibid., p. 223.

28. Ibid., p. 223.

29. Ibid., p. 224.

30. Lothar Rule "The Nine and Nato" in Peter Ludz, editor, Dilemmas of the Atlantic Alliance. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, p. 245.

31. Ibid., p. 38.

32. One of the most comprehensive books on West Germany's eastern policies is Lawrence Whetten's Germany's Ostpolitik. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

33. It was in the second major monetary conflict of 1968 in November when Bonn successfully resisted pressures from the United States, France and Britain to revalue the Mark. It was clear that West Germany was "no longer a political dwarf." See Roger Morgan The United States and West Germany. London: Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 176-177.

34. New York Times, March 27, 1977, p. 6.

35. Josef Joffe "All Quiet on the Eastern Front" Foreign Policy, #37 Winter 1979-80, p. 161.

36. The Economist, October 6-12, 1979, p. 54.

37. George Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World, Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1976, pp. 159-166.

38. Morgan, The United States and West Germany, p. 235.

39. Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World, p. 9.

40. In complaining of economic problems between the United States and the EC, spokesmen for the administration were outdone by Kissinger's famous speech of April, 1973 in which the links between commercial, monetary and strategic problems were indicated with "unusual directness." See Morgan, The United States and West Germany, p. 237.

41. Morgan, The United States and West Germany, pp. 235-236.

42. Michel Tatu "East-West Relations" in Robert Jordan, editor, Europe and the Superpowers. Boston: Allyn, 1971, p. 179.

43. Curt Gasteyger "Europe and America at the Crossroads." Atlantic Community Quarterly Vol. 10 #2, Summer, 1972, p. 162.

44. New York Times, April 24, 1973, p. 12.

45. New York Times, November 8, 1973, p. 14.

46. Duchêne "The United States and European Community" in Rosecrance, editor, America as an Ordinary Country, p. 117.

47. Morgan, The United States and West Germany, p. 244.

48. Ibid., p. 244.

49. Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World, p. 6.

50. Though many Senators voted for the Mansfield Amendment that was offered annually, Mansfield's views were based on a personal assessment of the situation that was not necessarily shared by others.

51. Karl Birnbaum, East and West Germany: A modus vivendi. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973, pp. 16-18.

52. New York Times, October 21, 1977, p. 6.

53. Adrian Dicks "A German-U.S. Schism?" in European Community, May-June 1977 #201, p. 19.

54. Morgan, The United States and West Germany, p. 247.

55. Even then the eventual prospects for reunification are negligible. East Germany has many reasons for restraint and a great deal will depend upon the attitudes of other states, in particular, the United States and the Soviet Union. See Geoffrey Roberts "The Ostpolitik and Relations between the Two Germanies" in Roger Tilford, editor, The Ostpolitik and Political Change in Germany. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1975, pp. 90-92.

56. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, p. 128.

57. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 223.

58. Ibid., p. 223.

59. James Chace "The Kissinger Years" New Republic, Vol. 171 #19, November 9, 1974, p. 33.

# CHAPTER VI

## BILATERAL RELATIONS: FRANCE

### The Scholar

In any discussion of France and Franco-American relations, the policies of Charles de Gaulle should be clearly understood, for today the Gaullist legacy sets serious constraints upon the conduct and goals of French policy. From his assumption of power in 1958, Charles de Gaulle implemented a number of policies that were opposed to American foreign policy objectives. In 1958 the politically weak, unstable Fourth Republic gave way to the Fifth Republic of de Gaulle. France has, once again, become an important political and economic power whose influence is felt far beyond the boundaries of Europe. But de Gaulle's views on Atlantic partnership and European unity have been in conflict with American conceptions. The result has been a bitter reaction, particularly among Americans, who have considered their formulas as the only workable solution.[1] In 1963 and 1967 de Gaulle vetoed the admission of Britain to the EC. In 1966 he withdrew France from participation in the military structure of the Atlantic Alliance. He sought to improve relations with the East and these major

policies were supported by other moves to increase French influence in Europe and the world.

However, for those angered by de Gaulle's policies, the passage of time appeared to be the only solution to the Gaullist phenomenon. Yet was the Gaullist phenomenon merely an aberration or did it symbolize a broader movement for French and European self-assertation? Despite his abrasive tactics and imperious manner, would the nationalistic spirit that de Gaulle represented really decline or become more amenable with his demise? Were there fundamental problems in Franco-American and United States-West European relations that needed to be rethought? De Gaulle, like Caesar, has come and gone, but his legacy lives on and must be studied and understood if the nations of the Atlantic basin are to overcome their present difficulties.

## France

It is not surprising that Kissinger was greatly concerned with de Gaulle and France. He has written that "European-American relations will never again be the same as they were before de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, which excluded Britain from the Common Market and marked a watershed in European-American relations."[2] To understand France today it is necessary to understand de Gaulle, his thoughts and dreams for France. De Gaulle's successors, Georges Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing, have

modified or abandoned some of de Gaulle's more extreme positions but the Gaullist legacy continues to influence France and French conceptions of its role in the world.[3]

Kissinger gives due recognition to the fact that de Gaulle has introduced "a fundamental change in the United States - European dialogue."[4] But this is, in some respects, fortuitous. For the emergence of a specifically European point of view has now been brought into the open where it can be dealt with in a more positive manner.

Kissinger, judging from his scholarly work, has sympathy and understanding for the French challenge to the American grand design. He states that (a society's) "cohesiveness reflects a sense of shared historical experience and the conviction that it represents a more or less unique set of values. An Alliance cannot be vital unless it conforms, at least to some extent, to the image which the states composing it have of themselves."[5] Kissinger further demonstrates his awareness of how French History influences its current policies for he points out how "few countries have known the travail which France has suffered since it lost most of its young generation in World War I."[6] Since World War I shocks and bitter defeat have been the fate of France. Insecurities concerning Germany and its potential threat were exacerbated by the refusal of Britain and the United States fully to support France. The terrible collapse of 1940 was followed by eventual victory - by the arms

of others. Yet even with the demise of the Nazi threat, France still had to fight two decades of bitter colonial wars that ended in defeat and the collapse of the ailing Fourth Republic. Into this void stepped de Gaulle.

De Gaulle was determined to be his country's savior. He understood the deep malaise and frustration that engulfed France, particularly in the later years of the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle, after the collapse of France in World War II, was the leader of a small group of Frenchmen who cast their lot with the allies. For de Gaulle was determined to restore the soul of France, to restore France to greatness. Thus he would "reestablish the identity and the integrity of France."[7] Kissinger writes that, while Roosevelt and Churchill concentrated on the tangible goal of military victory, de Gaulle's goal was less tangible. Indeed "the conflict between the pragmatic and the intangible that started during the war has continued to this day."[8] While the United States has a stable government, France has not. Therefore, the means to attain a goal have become as important as the goal itself. De Gaulle sought to ensure that policies also contributed to France's sense of identity. Thus, Kissinger wrote "though de Gaulle often acts as if opposition to United States policy were a goal in itself, his deeper objective is pedagogical: to teach his people and perhaps his continent attitudes of independence and self-reliance."[9] This brings us to the point

where it is necessary to discuss Kissinger's views on de Gaulle's perspectives on international relations.

De Gaulle placed the nation-state in the center of his philosophy of international relations. His nationalism was, basically, in the tradition of Mazzini. He sought to achieve greatness, a special place for France, in the world which would reflect the uniqueness of France. But a nation must have a purpose. For de Gaulle, the aspiration to grandeur is not simply a reflection of a nation's physical strength but also of its moral purpose.

For the nation must exist in an extremely dangerous milieu. International life is like a jungle, it is a never recurring battle. For de Gaulle the objective of peace is to be obtained by a more stable equilibrium. This equilibrium is never permanent, it must always be adjusted in constant struggles. Peace is a balance of forces that often, however, can be disturbed by tensions that arise from the dynamics of the system. De Gaulle thought that internal instability was the distinguishing feature of Communist states. There was a constant need to divert attention in the direction of foreign adventures. Thus de Gaulle resisted attempts by the Soviet Union to exploit the weaknesses of the West.

Given the instability, the oppressiveness of the Soviet system, and the unnatural proximity of Soviet power to the heart of Europe, a more stable equilibrium must be sought.

But France and Europe must bring about this balance not as objects of policy but as its author. Thus de Gaulle affirmed his faith in the Atlantic Alliance while he insisted upon the identity of Europe and the unique qualities of France. He thought that if a nation is to serve in the common endeavor, it must mean something to itself and be convinced that its opinions matter to others.

Here are the origins of de Gaulle's disagreements with the United States. Kissinger notes that de Gaulle, with his sensitivity to the tribulations of France, was looking into the distant future when the Americans may no longer be interested in or able to defend Europe because of their involvement in other continents. De Gaulle wished to achieve some measure of control over the destiny of France and his continent. But the United States was concerned with solving immediate problems. However, as a statesman, de Gaulle must prepare himself for the best - and the worst - possible future contingencies. Moreover, de Gaulle's concept of the nation-state and American ideas of its obsolescence were bound to clash. For de Gaulle a united Europe must be responsible for its own destiny, it must emphasize its own unique place in the world. But, unlike the American preference for federal institutions, he persisted in viewing the unity of Europe as depending upon the vitality of the nation-state. For only the states can act legitimately and responsibly. Kissinger makes the important point that if

de Gaulle really did seek to dominate Europe, he had chosen a curious road to that goal. Since a united Europe will make decisions based on a unanimous vote of all members, only political leadership acceptable to the main currents of European opinion could possibly dominate Europe.

Kissinger also indicates that while advocating European unity, Americans have often recoiled from some of its consequences. In military matters, the United States has preferred to deal bilaterally with its European allies or through integrated commands where it can dominate the Europeans. However, for de Gaulle, the question of defense lay at the very heart of his concept of autonomy. No great power can be a lobbyist for another power's views. Nor can a great power forever be under the tutelage of another great power, however benevolent it may be. De Gaulle resisted the idea of organic defense links between the United States and individual European countries. The defense of individual states or Europe itself cannot be exclusively tied to American weapons or American conceptions. Consequently, de Gaulle opposed not the Atlantic Alliance but the concept of integration upon which it is based. No great state can leave decisions about its destiny to another state however friendly. Integration leads to an abdication of responsibility and a sense of impotence which would not only demoralize France's foreign policy and drain the Alliance of its strength, but France and Europe would have to accept

American tutelage forever.

When considering de Gaulle's concepts, it is not surprising that he thought it was more important to integrate the French army into French society than into NATO.[10] This is also why he insisted upon the development of France's own nuclear strike force. For de Gaulle realized the impact that a force would have upon French diplomacy, and upon French political prestige. Of course, to the Americans, with their concern over a centralized command and control structure, the French nuclear force was an object of serious disagreement. It is therefore not difficult to see why the United States, as the leader of the Western Alliance, and France became embroiled in a number of serious disputes, some of which continue to this day.

## The United States and France

The role of the nation-state, the precise form of European integration, and the French nuclear force have all caused considerable difficulties in Franco-American relations. But as Kissinger points out, these very real and difficult problems between the two countries were exacerbated by de Gaulle's abrupt tactics and his imperious style. During the Nixon-Kissinger years Alastair Buchan wrote "that just as Gaullism was a factor in encouraging American unilateralism, so American Gaullism fosters Japanese nationalism and so on."[11] De Gaulle proceeded by a series of

*faits accomplis* which have left no room for the feelings of other statesmen. Too often he acted as if the inherent validity of his positions would overcome all opposition. His policies were often contradictory, if not hostile, to those of the United States.

By his style and the polarization of discussion, de Gaulle proceeded to arouse American self-righteousness. Both America and de Gaulle have wanted a strong Europe, but de Gaulle's tactics often detracted from the substance of his concepts and embroiled him with America. Kissinger thinks that, while history will demonstrate that de Gaulle's concepts, as distinct from his style, were greater than his critics, still a statesman must work with the available material. The dispute over the "American" or the "French" concept of European integration and Atlantic relationships might have drawn attention to these problems. But instead the debate over these two concepts has seriously delayed progress in Europe and thus Kissinger warns that "they may bring on what each side professes to fear most; a divided suspicious Europe absorbed once again in working out its ancient rivalries."[12] Consequently the result for all could be a tragedy whose scope would go far beyond the relationship between the United States and France.

## De Gaulle's Foreign Policies

From 1958 to 1969 the foreign policies of de Gaulle were often a source of unease and discord to his neighbors and the United States. The foreign policy of France may be divided into three periods in the Gaullist era: 1) from 1958 to 1962 de Gaulle generally cooperated in European and trans-Atlantic forums and sought to extricate France from Algeria; 2) from 1962 to 1968 de Gaulle, freed from the albatross of the Algerian war by the Evian Accords of 1962, attempted to assert French independence and other objectives that stressed France's position as the leader of the Six, its increasing opposition to the hegemony of the United States, and the policy of détente with the East; 3) from 1968 to 1969 the events of May-June and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, place limits upon the capacity of France to play a major role on the world stage operating under Gaullist premises.

Kissinger wrote that when dealing with France "outraged pride is not a good guide to policy making."[13] Others have voiced concern over the fruitless and regressive course that France attempted to follow in the de Gaulle years. This period has too often been marked by bitter conflict between these two old allies. De Gaulle has been characterized as an anachronism and his policies as regressive and representative of the excesses of nationalism. Such policies, it was thought, could only lead to a tragic ending.

To understand France fully today, it is necessary to comprehend both the specific conditions in France that gave sustance to the Gaullist movement and the links of Gaullism with the reviving nationalism that occurred in Western Europe and, in particular, France during the early sixties. The increased stress on nationalism, was not confined to France. During the Nixon-Kissinger years American foreign policy would often be characterized by the same tactics of surprise and abrupt maneuvers. De Gaulle, of course, gave to the broader movement of nationalism his own particular imprint. But with the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, détente began to be the major objective of each superpower. Unfortunately, this coincided with the end of the period of post-war reconstruction in Western Europe, when the relationship between the United States and Western Europe - and in particular, France - would need to be re-adjusted to reflect the changing conditions of the early sixties. Thus the French pursuit of grandeur from 1958 to 1969 produced great bitterness and confusion. Consequently, a closer examination of the major themes of Gaullist policy in the previously mentioned periods is necessary.

## Europe and Decolonization

The problem with Alliances is that they do not often readily adapt to changing conditions. The coalition of states that defeated Napoleon and formed the concert of

Europe had ceased to function by 1822. The coalition of states that defeated Nazi Germany broke up rather rapidly following the end of World War II.

But during the first period of Gaullist rule, the Berlin Problem and the Cuban Missile Crisis reinforced the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.[14] Moreover, de Gaulle was faced with a terrible and prolonged war in Algeria that had caused the downfall of the Fourth Republic and - after de Gaulle assumed power in 1958 - three serious revolts led by French Generals against the authority of the French state.

Consequently, de Gaulle, aware of France's serious weakness, initiated cautious policies. He cooperated with the EC when that organization became a reality in 1958. Subsequent cooperation on the part of France with the EC was considerable.[15] De Gaulle did not believe in the federal approach but preferred confederation based on the nations of Europe. He nevertheless recognized that in the fledgling days of the EC, cooperation was important and necessary. Thus, from 1959 exports and trade between the members of the EC increased rapidly.[16] And de Gaulle was well aware of the increased benefits of economic growth for France. But by 1961, when the other members of the EC sought to advance plans leading to the further integration of the Six (and perhaps other states as well), the French were rather insistent that the Fouchet Plan - which urged the confederal approach - be considered as the basis for further discussion. The

Fouchet Plan stood as a clear warning that when discussions concerning the further integration of the Six were considered for the next stage, there would be limits to French support for supranational institutions. When France plunged the EC into the very serious crisis of 1965, Walter Hallstein and his associates in the EC Commission were to regret the fact that they tried to push too far and too fast in this direction to please de Gaulle. However, until 1961 or 1962 - and thereafter in some respects - France did cooperate with the EC even though the Fouchet Plan of 1961 had suggested that there would be limits to that cooperation.

With respect to decolonization, by the signing of the Evian Accords of March, 1962, France ended the Algerian War on somewhat favorable terms. But its experience in two colonial wars had embittered many Frenchmen over the lack of allied - particularly American - aid and sympathy during France's trials. While the United States did aid France in reoccupying Indo-China and during the subsequent war against the Vietminh, France's humiliation and relative isolation in 1954 were resented. The Suez Crisis in 1956 also confirmed to many Frenchmen that on certain issues allied sympathy and cooperation were not necessarily synonymous with the interests of France.

The four long, bitter, and frustrating years of the Algerian War further underlined - to Frenchmen - the often selective nature of allied relationships when French

interests were at stake. Thus, at a time when post-war reconstruction was nearing completion, nationalism reviving, and the threat from the East diminishing, there were those in France who were rather ambivalent about the benefits of allied cooperation. This ambivalence was particularly poignant when cooperation with the United States was under discussion. Had the United States firmly and unequivocally supported France in its two Colonial wars? Why did the United States aid the British nuclear program and not the French? To a formerly great and proud nation, humbled by many recent trials, a reviving sense of its own identity and mission was a reminder that France too had an important role to play in the world.

Europe, the United States, and Détente with the East

Acting on the basis of a philosophy of history that saw nations struggling to preserve a stable equilibrium, de Gaulle rapidly exploited the opportunities presented by the changing conditions of the sixties. From 1963 to 1968 in Europe and the world, de Gaulle sought to pursue French interests on a global scale.

In Europe de Gaulle probably realized, after the Five refused to accept the Fouchet Plan, that his conception of European integration would not be accepted by the other members of the EC. Yet, aware of the political and economic benefits that France derived from the EC (until the EC

Commission forced his hand in 1965) he sought to ensure a policy of cooperation.[17]

De Gaulle was well aware that with the advent of détente there were many people in France and in Europe who would be responsive to a greater assertion of their interests as the Cold War receeded. A number of steps, however, would have to be undertaken if France was to emerge as the leader of Europe qua Europe. In Europe de Gaulle would have to limit the influence of the rising West German political and economic power. He would have to assess the outlook of Britain. He would have to separate specific French and European objectives from undue American influence while ensuring that American military protection would still maintain the balance of power in Europe. Finally, France would have to loosen the grip of both superpowers on their respective parts of Europe so that Europe, under French leadership, while not militarily equal to the superpowers, could still by astute diplomacy attain its objectives.[18]

In his quest for French grandeur, de Gaulle carried on a complex and multi-faceted diplomacy. I shall begin with Europe.

In January, 1963 de Gaulle accomplished two objectives: he denied Britain entry into the EC and concluded a Franco-German Treaty. Probably he was never enthusiastic about British entry into the EC because of the strength of Britain's ties with the United States. Yet if Britain was not

so intent upon maintaining its strategic nuclear ties with the United States and showed some interest in de Gaulle's vision of an independent Europe, de Gaulle might possibly have relented. But at the Nassau Conference in December, 1962, Britain humbled itself before the Americans and proclaimed the sanctity of its trans-Atlantic ties. If there had been any doubt in de Gaulle's mind before Nassau, there was none after it. Britain would not be allowed in the EC.[19]

On January 14 de Gaulle announced that Britain could not enter the EC. One week later the Franco-German Treaty was signed. Again de Gaulle sought the moral, political, and economic leadership of Europe and was anxious to heal the ancient rift between France and Germany so as to channel Bonn's growing political and economic strength into appropriate directions within the Gaullist framework.[20]

De Gaulle's vision of a Europe basically free from the embrace of the superpowers was a vision shared by some but regarded as a myth by others. Belgium and the Netherlands desired Britain's inclusion in the EC. West Germany was not about to channel its strength and energy in the approved Gaullist direction. And the EC Commission under President Walter Hallstein was determined to advance the cause of European integration within a federal framework.

The events leading up to the EC Crisis of 1965 and the Crisis itself have been discussed elsewhere.[21] The result of the Crisis was a stalemate. The Commission abandoned its

ambitious plans for the integration of Europe. De Gaulle realized that he could neither impose his views on the others nor destroy the EC. After the Luxemburg Accords of January, 1966 both sides agreed to return to the status quo ante and mark time until conditions changed.

Concurrently with his attempts to lead Europe in the desired direction, de Gaulle began a concerted attack upon the United States and its positions in Europe and the world. After the Cuban Missile Crisis he viewed the United States as the single greatest power in the world and acted accordingly. He thought that to maintain the proper equilibrium, he should occasionally support the Soviet Union against the hegemonic power. France soon appeared to many Americans as anti-American and as opposing America's designs for Europe and the world.

From 1963 to 1968 Franco-American relations sank to a low point. For America's often heavy-handed paternalism and its ambiguous, indeed often hostile, behavior in France's great colonial wars - not to mention Suez - left many sensitive and proud Frenchmen responsive to the broad thrust of de Gaulle's policies even if they disagreed with his tactics. This was true not only in France but in Europe as well. Too often American leaders and analysts acted as if de Gaulle himself was the exclusive cause of the malaise in Franco-American relations. Once de Gaulle retired, they reasoned, his tragic attempt to thwart American designs

would be ended and things would return to normal. This belief, however, was a serious oversimplification.[22]

France is a great European nation with a long and proud history. Yet few Americans seemed to understand the responsive chord that de Gaulle struck in France and Europe. Nowhere was this seen more clearly than in the case of the *force de frappe*.

Britain's privileged position regarding American aid to its nuclear program had long been resented in France.[23] Moreover, given the symbolic and real importance of nuclear weapons in world politics, could it have been such a surprise when de Gaulle announced that France too would become a nuclear power? The Americans responded with the Multilateral Force proposal (MLF) and rapid condemnation of France's fledgling nuclear force.[24] Would the restructuring of the Atlantic Alliance to allow for more European self-assertion *possibly* have influenced de Gaulle at least to stay in the military alliance even if France reduced its military commitment to NATO?

But Kennedy and his successor, intent on the command and control of nuclear weapons, wanted to centralize in the White House control of the firing of the weapons that would determine the fate of Europe. De Gaulle, who criticized America's leadership in Europe, its involvement in Southeast Asia and indeed appeared hostile to American designs everywhere, was in no mood to compromise. In the Spring of 1966

he abruptly ordered all NATO military facilities out of France and declared that henceforth France would, though remaining a member of the Atlantic Alliance, cease to take part in NATO military activities.[25] Thus France would greatly increase its freedom of action to pursue its own policies while the United States, to maintain the balance of power in Europe, would be obligated, if necessary, to defend France against the U.S.S.R.

While attacking American positions everywhere, de Gaulle initiated his policy of détente, entente, and co-operation with the East. He visited Poland and Rumania in 1967 and 1968 and tried to influence his hosts to assert their independence from Russian control. He visited Moscow in June of 1966 and thus initiated a series of agreements and dialogues with the Soviet Union that were to continue until - and after - the Czechoslovak invasion in 1968.[26] In this manner de Gaulle sought to influence the direction of Soviet policy in Europe and to allow for the development of a new coalition of nations led by France.

## Grandeur or Retreat?

In May-June 1968 a student uprising began in Paris and was accompanied by a series of strikes that symbolized the nature of serious domestic problems threatening the stability and objectives of the Gaullist regime. In August the Warsaw Pact nations invaded Czechoslovakia as that state

sought to attain a greater measure of domestic and international autonomy. In April, 1969 de Gaulle resigned as the President of France when he failed to achieve a majority on a matter of domestic reform.

Did these events prove that the Gaullist design was flawed? To some extent they did. Frenchmen were not so willing to pursue French grandeur and the force de frappe at the expense of domestic needs. Internationally the Soviet Union was apparently unwilling to allow more than a very limited degree of autonomy in Eastern Europe, and relations with the United States were at a low point. Yet de Gaulle, whose conceptions were superior to his tactics, had struck a responsive chord in France and Europe in his quest for greater self-assertion. So the jubilation of de Gaulle's critics at his retirement was somewhat misplaced. On numerous occasions Kissinger has spoken of the need for "new centers of initiative" in world politics. Yet the post-war generation of American leaders - with few exceptions - has had difficulty in adjusting to the concept of a multipolar world. In the early sixties multipolarity began to emerge. By the seventies the post-war era had ended but the emergence of a new order was difficult to discern.[27]

With respect to Western Europe and France, in particular, American statesmen from Eisenhower to Kissinger seem to have experienced considerable difficulty in accepting European self-assertion. De Gaulle must bear his share of

the blame for the serious divisions in both NATO and the EC and the accompanying malaise in Franco-American relations. But American statesmen, with a marked conceptual deficiency and often inept in their personal diplomacy, must also bear a major share of the blame. No one can say with certainty that if either or both sides had been more restrained and less arrogant the problems presented by de Gaulle would have had a different conclusion. Yet perhaps the important thing is that both sides learn from their failures. American hegemony in the Atlantic Alliance must be modified to allow for greater European self-assertion. The French pursuit of grandeur is unobtainable without unacceptable sacrifice. Both sides must ensure, drawing upon lessons learned from this period, that their common endeavors take precedence over that which divides them.

## France After De Gaulle

The distinguishing characteristic of the statesman is the endurance of his work. De Gaulle's successors, Georges Pompidou and Valery Giscard d'Estaing, have had ample occasion to reflect on the limitations imposed upon their actions by the Gaullist legacy. In fact, de Gaulle left his successors with the difficult job of adhering to Gaullist precepts, albeit in a modified form. Many of de Gaulle's concepts were valid, others were questionable. His tactics were open to serious question. In more general

terms, it can be said that his adulation of the nation-state was a serious flaw in a period when transnational cooperation in many areas is imperative.[28] The most serious charge against de Gaulle is that he encouraged those in France and Europe who sought to block further supranational integration.

Undoubtedly, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman were too optimistic in their plans for the development of the EC. But will future historians confirm the fact that, while conditions in Europe in the sixties and seventies were favorable for some advances in integration much more could have been achieved without de Gaulle?[29] De Gaulle dealt a heavy blow to the cause of European integration. Nor was this the only cause to suffer from the excesses of nationalism that have in the past been the cause of so much conflict.

## Europe

Certain Gaullist precepts have been discarded, others still persist. Britain, after de Gaulle twice refused entry, was finally admitted to the EC in January, 1973 (with Denmark and Ireland). But cooperation between France and the eight is often difficult to achieve.[30] Pompidou (who resigned in 1974 due to illness) and his successor Giscard, of the Independent Republicans, have found that they must always be aware of the constraints placed upon them by the Gaullist legacy. Cooperation in the EC is

cautious, and in concert with Britain's hesitation (and West Germany's), the attainment of monetary and economic union by the 1980's, proclaimed at the Paris conference in 1972, seems as distant and difficult to achieve as ever.

Integration no longer appears as a panacea for Europe's problems. There is doubt and hesitation over how best to proceed. But the domestic consequences of Gaullism in France - the polarization of politics between Right and Left - and the international repercussions of Gaullism cannot help but cause considerable difficulties for both Europe and the United States regardless of the manner in which increased cooperation is sought. Stanley Hoffmann writes: "never have consultation, clarity, candor and coordination (as distinct from mere ex post facto information) been more important."[31]

## Security Policy

France has not returned to NATO's military structure but the excesses of the "all-horizon defense" strategy, promulgated in 1967, have been dispensed with. French defense strategy now envisages cooperation with NATO - if Paris decides that it is necessary - in the event of a Soviet attack. In the Mediterranean, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, French air and naval forces have quietly resumed cooperation with NATO forces in surveillance of Soviet activities.

French defense planners no longer envisage independent use of the force de frappe. French warning and intelligence services cooperate with or receive extensive aid from NATO agencies. The force de frappe itself has been scaled down to more modest dimensions.[32] The cut-back of funds occurred as a result of the events of May-June 1968, the subsequent economic crisis, and the reduced emphasis Pompidou and Giscard have placed upon the force de frappe. Regrettably, however, the Gaullist legacy has prevented any real cooperation from developing between France and Britain in strategic nuclear weapons.[33]

Finally some funds, partly derived from the reduced funding for the force de frappe, have been added to the defense budget to strengthen French conventional forces. But security policies are synonymous with state sovereignty and in this area French cooperation is highly circumscribed by the Gaullist legacy.

## Economic Policy

From 1965 to 1968 de Gaulle strongly attacked the dollar as the medium of international exchange. The events of May-June 1968 and the subsequent economic crisis changed this policy. De Gaulle's successors have sought to ensure a certain degree of French cooperation in monetary matters. France was a member of the "European float" until it was recently forced to leave. But, in general, France has

basically been cooperative in European and world monetary policy.

Pompidou and Giscard have quietly abandoned many of de Gaulle's policies in economic matters. Yet with the quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973, differences have emerged between France and the other industrial states with respect to Kissinger's proposed International Energy Agency (IEA). This will be dealt with in more detail later on but initially, very serious disagreements occurred between Michel Jobert, the French Foreign Minister, and Kissinger. Subsequently, these differences were, at least, partly resolved but the Jobert-Kissinger confrontations do illustrate that in economic and monetary policies, the Gaullist legacy continues to influence French policy.

## Bilateral Relations: France
## The Statesman
## The United States and France

The improvement of relations with Europe and France did not, for the United States, have a very high priority. Since the late sixties the Europeans, absorbed in the construction of the EC and dismayed over American policy in Vietnam, had also given a lower priority to the relationship with the United States. Yet Kissinger, who had criticized the high-handedness and arrogance of past administrations, also had to contend with a serious deterioration in America's economic position. All these problems were sometimes

exacerbated by Kissinger's tendency to ignore or fail fully to understand economic issues. James Chace writes that "Kissinger, in his preoccupation with 'high' politics, let 'low' politics (monetary reform, scientific developments, environmental deterioration, resource supply and demand) suffer from neglect."[34] And the centralization of foreign policy decisions in the White House, at times, overburdened Kissinger as minor problems were not dealt with until they reached crisis proportions and by then a solution was not readily apparent.

Moreover, given the changing conditions that affect the Atlantic nations, it is apparent that the Gaullist legacy could well cause considerable difficulties for any new American administration. Kissinger has written that "Americans showed too great a preference for hegemony; de Gaulle's charge was not unjustified."[35] What would the new Nixon-Kissinger team do with respect to Franco-American relations? How would Kissinger deal with de Gaulle's contention that Americans preferred hegemony to mutual cooperation on a basis of equality? In a period of profound political and philosophical change, would he articulate and implement new principles that would serve as a more suitable framework for Franco-American relations? In addition to the problems between the two countries concerning European and global issues, there were other differences that developed because of each country's theoretical perspective. Americans tended to

work for short-term solutions in the pragmatic tradition. Consequently, the changing circumstances of the early sixties were largely unanticipated, and this was due to certain conceptual flaws in American foreign policy. This, of course, is partly why the United States became so seriously involved in Vietnam during the period when the receding Cold War and the increase of political multipolarity made the outcome of events in Vietnam less important except on a strictly regional basis. Conversely, de Gaulle's policies were predicated upon theoretical assumptions that envisaged changes that would occur far beyond his lifetime.

In 1969 the administration was involved in a major diplomatic crisis in Vietnam that had domestic and international repercussions and required a major share of its time and effort. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the subsequent use of American air and naval power on a massive scale struck a certain note of irony in Paris. Both in Indo-China and Algeria, with France on the brink of defeat, Washington refused further military aid and argued for the necessity of negotiations. From 1969 the situation was reversed, but Nixon and Kissinger paid little heed to Pompidou's advice to limit the use of military force and seriously engage in negotiations with the Viet Cong and Hanoi. Instead they employed air and naval power to an even greater extent (while slowly withdrawing combat troops) concurrently with their program of Vietnamization. It was only when Nixon and

Kissinger thought that the situation was more favorable that they began serious negotiations.

In March of 1969 President Nixon visited Paris to attempt to achieve a reconciliation with de Gaulle and obtain European support for his policy of détente with the Soviet Union. After the events of May-June, the Czechoslovak invasion, and Bonn's flexing of its economic might in the dispute to force revaluation of the Deutschmark, de Gaulle was in a mood to reciprocate. But the following month de Gaulle resigned. However, his successor, Pompidou, returned the Nixon visit one year later and reaffirmed France's friendship with the United States.

As I have indicated de Gaulle's successors have reduced Gaullist pretensions regarding global policy. However, Europe has become far more important for French policy under de Gaulle's successors than it was for de Gaulle himself.

## The Atlantic Alliance and Europe

With respect to NATO and Europe, some problems between the United States and France were solved rather rapidly, others required more time, still others were not resolved at all.

Both the Berlin problem and the proposed Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were dealt with rather successfully. Both Washington and Paris wished to

Moreover, the French were also concerned with something else: the emergence of a West European Defense entity. Pompidou sought diplomatic movement <u>within</u> the military status quo. The French were worried that the talks on MBRF, the military aspect of the CSCE, might well lead to the emergence of a West European defense entity which would probably be dominated by West Germany. And this entity could jeopardize relations with the Soviet Union, and worse yet, perhaps encourage an American military withdrawal or reduction of its forces that would unduly favor the Soviet Union.

Kissinger should have realized that the French were worried about the effects an American defeat in Vietnam would have upon Europe. The French have never forgotten the defeat of the Anglo-American French security treaty in the Senate in 1919. Would an assertive Congress once again force a reduction in the American presence in Western Europe and thus leave France to cope alone with the Soviet Union? Moreover, despite the many ties between the two countries, as West Germany's economic and political power has increased in recent years, a certain sense of unease, of uncertainty, has manifested itself in France concerning possible changes in West German policy. As Kissinger has repeatedly stated history is always a factor to be considered. Yet he did not assure the French that their particular fears and concerns were fully shared and understood by the United States.

Whether it was a question of time, priorities, or his failure to resolve the tension between the administration's desire for hegemony and the need for consultation and cooperation, Kissinger did no better than his oft criticized predecessors in this respect.

However, even though at the ministerial meeting of the CSCE at Helsinki, "Europeans sensed a background of prior, private understanding between Washington and Moscow" according to one commentator,[37] still both the Americans and the French have overcome their initial fears and hesitations and now view the continuing CSCE and MBFR Conferences as a valuable means of improving East-West relations. While the French remain wary of the issue of a separate West European defense entity, European cooperation amongst themselves and with the United States has been adequate. Moreover, the previous concerns expressed by the French have not materialized. Yet both of these conferences have been underway for only a few years. Accordingly, no major issues have yet arisen to cause differences between the United States and France.

With respect to monetary matters, Kissinger kept his word concerning consultation until August, 1971. After the monetary crisis of November, 1968, French attacks against the dollar had ceased. But the new economic and monetary policy that was initiated unilaterally in 1971 did cause resentment and confusion in Paris. In <u>White House Years</u>

Kissinger expressed his concern over the effects of these moves on France (and Europe) as he wrote, "Nixon's unilateral decisions of August 15, 1971 had their desired effect. Allied cohesion has been strained but not broken. At this remove it is difficult for me to assess whether the brutal unilateralism coming so soon after the shock of the secret trip to Peking mortgaged relations unnecessarily for many years to come, or whether our allies, by their immobilism, left us no other option."[38] Yet did Nixon and Kissinger have only two choices? Given the sympathy that existed in London and Bonn for America's plight (in addition to the importance of smoothly functioning monetary arrangements for all concerned) can it really be maintained that - even if there were differences over the specific arrangements - there were no other alternative policies?

Consequently the monetary crises of 1971 and 1973 caused Pompidou to reaffirm, though in a defensive manner, French criticism of the world monetary system and unilateral American moves. Moreover, the quadrupling of the price of oil weakened the narrow basis of France's favorable balance of trade.[39] However, as the section on the Middle East shows, the dispute over Kissinger's proposed International Energy Agency (IEA) made monetary issues less important.

On Berlin and the CSCE and MBFR talks, the United States did manage to work in concert with its allies, including

France. Yet this was not achieved easily and there can be little question that Kissinger's unilateral initiatives greatly complicated things for the French. If consultation and cooperation are not adhered to more systematically, can the Americans and the French avoid a serious, even a disastrous, breach? Monetary and economic matters, moreover, caused considerably more controversy.[40] Particularly vehement were the Kissinger-Jobert exchanges concerning Kissinger's proposed IEA. The French were also highly resentful of Kissinger's contradictory terms stated in his April, 1973 speech that European economic interests should be subordinated within a common Atlantic framework.[41] Kissinger, an astute observer of Western Europe's psychological vulnerabilities, might have anticipated that any references (however implicit) to Western European (and French) military weaknesses were unwise. And to infer that Western Europe should defer to American preferences because of this weakness overlooks two important considerations. That the Nixon-Kissinger administration itself could be in error and that a nation such as France cannot be induced to cooperate by reminders of its weaknesses. As Stanley Hoffmann writes "by bringing down the international monetary system of the post-war era and by exporting inflation, but in different proportions, to its allies, Washington has made the European exercise in monetary unification and coordination of economic policies more difficult, and underlined the dependence

of the European economies on the American market. Kissinger has fully exploited these trends."[42] The exploitation of these circumstances by Kissinger caused serious concern in Paris. Raymond Aron has wondered how long it will be possible for the United States to run huge deficits in its balance of payments and to also heavily invest abroad. The failure of the United States to rectify these difficulties has caused considerable exasperation in France. For these economic issues are no longer of secondary interest but are matters that can seriously affect Franco-American relations. Kissinger's often abrupt tactics and lack of a coherent strategy were reflected in his uncertainty over whether to try to assure continued American primacy or to consult and cooperate to a greater extent with the French. Kissinger has written that "the act of choice - is the ultimate test of statesmanship."[43] Thus Nixon's and Kissinger's uncertainty over policies toward France (and Europe) reflect the partial breakdown of America's consensus concerning the position and importance of France (and Europe) in American foreign policy.

However difficult the controversy was between Kissinger and Jobert concerning the IEA, the real differences between the United States and France were over NATO and the EC.

With respect to NATO Pompidou and Giscard have both refused to return to the Alliance. As previously indicated, de Gaulle's successors have, in certain areas, improved

cooperation with NATO. But this is as far as they will go. Moreover, Kissinger's actions during and after the October war threatened to involve NATO because of the use of its facilities, in the Middle Eastern conflict on - for the French - the wrong side. The pro-Arab policies of France will be discussed later. What is important to realize is that Kissinger's actions have made the French all the more anxious to avoid any substantial identification with NATO. Many Europeans have always been fearful that, if the United States became heavily involved in Asia, a clash would occur between its Asian and European commitments. The rapid rise of the pro-Israeli lobby and its fervent support of Israel have also meant that it has been extremely difficult for American presidents to be more even-handed in the Middle East. By his actions and pronouncements during and after the October war, Kissinger gave the French every reason to remain at a good distance from NATO.

Furthermore, with respect to NATO's strategy and tactics, French leaders saw no more willingness in the Nixon-Kissinger administration to plan joint strategy than in any other American administration. Zbigniew Brzezinski writes that "the basic conceptual framework of Nixon's foreign policy involves an essentially traditional balance-of-power approach but one that is Bismarckian which is based on movement and flexibility, surprising both friends and enemies alike."[44] The shallowness of this approach as a

means of dealing with America's allies should be evident. As was true of the period after World War I the 1970's is a time of pervasive change. During such periods it can be difficult to maintain the balance of power in Europe. Indeed America's failure in this respect after the first world war should be a sobering reminder that the present day balance of power will not continue as a result of divine dispensation but will necessitate considerable wisdom, consistency of purpose, and restraint on the part of all concerned. Has Kissinger consistently followed such policies toward France? Yet without at least tacit French support, the United States will not be able to maintain the balance of power in Europe in the future. The relationship between France and NATO is involved and subject to constraints. The existence of a large and well-organized Communist party that consistently attracts 20% of the French electorate has always been a complicating factor in French attitudes towards NATO. But the problem of the Euro-Communists role in the French government (and elsewhere in Europe) was not always well-handled by Kissinger. John Stoessinger writes "His (Kissinger's) pursuit of overall stability led him to resist the expansion of Communist influence in Western Europe. His usual feeling for nuance did not extend to the European situation. So single-minded, in fact, did his pursuit of stability become that a British editor, in late 1975, compared Kissinger to John Foster Dulles. 'There has been

nothing so vehement since Dulles' time', this Englishman remarked. Kissinger has proposed a new domino theory: the Italian Communists would enter the Rome Government, leading to Communists sharing power in France as well as Portugal and Spain, provoking a withdrawal of American troops from Europe, and the collapse of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."[45] Consequently, in the long-run, it will not be possible to maintain the balance of power in Europe without a more positive commitment by France towards NATO.

Serious differences also remain with respect to the *force de frappe*. Both Pompidou and Giscard affirmed the desirability of a French nuclear force. Yet there is no indication that Kissinger was prepared to aid France as the United States aided Britain for so many years under the provisions of the MacMahon Act. American nuclear cooperation with France would be counter to the American policy of nuclear non-proliferation and appear to be a reward to France for its unilateral efforts. Moreover, what effect would American nuclear aid have upon the West Germans? What would be done about the fact that France's nuclear weapons are not assigned and coordinated with those of NATO? With respect to NATO and the *force de frappe*, certain constraints exist between both countries and - particularly when considering Kissinger's actions - there does not appear to be any way to resolve these differences.

Differences related to the EC also strongly affect

Franco-American relations. Pompidou has placed great importance upon defining and identifying the EC with Europe. The EC would concentrate on developing financial, industrial, agricultural and monetary policies. Thus the French would no longer emphasize strategic and foreign policy matters. As noted (in the section on the EC), Nixon and Kissinger assailed the EC and Kissinger's implicit connection of economic and military issues in discussions between the United States and the West Europeans has meant that the EC has had considerable pressure placed upon it in its most vulnerable areas. According to Stanley Hoffmann the United States would be well-advised to "abandon its attempts to play on intra-European divisions, or its effort to dissolve the EEC common-trade and agricultural policies or its claim to a permanent droit de regard on policies affecting U.S. interests."[46] This statement could equally apply to U.S. policies towards France. This does not mean that the United States should not defend its interests, but it does mean that the often confusing, unilateral policies of the Nixon-Kissinger administration could have been more restrained. The emergence of a "European Europe" should not be constantly perceived as a threat by Washington. Moreover, in terms of the relationship between domestic structures and foreign policy, Kissinger's policies did little to educate public opinion in either America or France as regards the increased importance of consultation

and cooperation between the two countries. By resisting (or denigrating) French expressions of nationalism (which are bound to occur in a "European Europe" but do not thereby automatically preclude cooperative ventures), Kissinger did not bridge (and sometimes made worse) the serious rift in public opinion that has developed between the Americans and the French as part of the Gaullist legacy.

## The Oil Crisis and The Middle East

In 1954 George Kennan had warned that "in many instances our raw material supply hangs on slender threads, and ones over which we have no power of control or even of redress. And I worry lest some day drastic interruptions of this supply should lead to painful crises and tensions."[47] In 1973 Kennan's warning was to become a reality.

Differences between the United States and France over the oil crisis and Middle Eastern policy reveal how important these two issues have become in Franco-American relations. For de Gaulle and his successors, the Suez incident confirmed that France must move away from a policy of supporting Israel. In 1967 a serious clash occurred between the United States and France over Middle Eastern policy. De Gaulle viewed with alarm the increased involvement of each superpower on opposing sides. This could only lead to a reduction of the influence of countries like France or, more serious still, extend the competitive aspects of

superpower politics to the Middle East. Either way France was bound to lose influence, to be able to exert less control and influence in an area that was rapidly becoming vital to France's (and Europe's) economic security because of its vast oil reserves. De Gaulle thus was not only aware of the importance of oil but was also trying to make Franco-Algerian relations a model for France's relations with the rest of the third world. Both of these policies precluded French support of Israel.

The October war, in 1973, and the ensueing oil crisis indicated the depth of differing American and French perceptions concerning the oil crisis and the Middle East. French suspicion and anger had reached a high point in the Kissinger-Jobert confrontations which occurred at the energy conference of February, 1974.[48] According to the London Economist "Mr. Kissinger's apparent quarrel with Europe this year has, in fact, been a fight with France, designed to defeat the French attempt to shape European policy in a way that excludes the United States."[49] Thus, real and serious differences existed between the two antagonists. Kissinger was inclined toward forcing a confrontation between the industrialized nations and OPEC while the French preferred to quietly discuss issues with OPEC. But in the de Gaulle years, when many Americans reacted with rage and frustration to many of de Gaulle's policies, Kissinger was one of the first to counsel prudence and restraint for "rage is

not a substitute for policy." Ironically, in 1974, he chose to ignore or had difficulty following his previous advice. Diplomacy is an art more than a science and how you approach a goal can be as important as the goal itself. Yet despite these disagreements with the French, the IEA was to become a reality. Arrangements to deal with future shortages, to develop new sources of energy and to deal with the financial problems arising from the crisis were agreed upon, however, the French refused to join the IEA.

Kissinger's often excessive pressures upon the Europeans and the French to conform to American positions has meant that "the chance to use the energy crisis as a means of strengthening the Community has been lost, first by the Europeans, but abetted by American indifference."[50]

Under Presidents Pompidou and Giscard, France has sought to keep the Middle East out of the exclusive sphere of the superpowers and to increase French influence in the Mediterranean and Africa. It is, of course, questionable whether France has the capacity to influence events in these areas decisively. But whatever the degree of French influence in these areas, it would appear to be an asset, certainly not a negligible quality. It is curious that American statesmen (and no few scholars) should have so many doubts about or be willing to dismiss entirely French efforts. In the first place, particularly after Vietnam, questions can be raised concerning the ability of the

United States to pursue consistent policies that deal imaginitively and sensitively with the peoples of the Mediterranean and Africa. The Americans simply cannot deal wisely and deal well with all of the areas problems. Moreover, after France's past trials and tribulations, would it not be wise to allow, even encourage, the French (and the other states of Western Europe) to assume a more active role in areas that they consider to be of interest. The French (and West Europeans) could thereby enhance their self-confidence and moral self-assurance as it became increasingly apparent that in this rapidly changing world they too had important contributions to make to their own and mankind's betterment.

With respect to French efforts in the Middle East, however, Kissinger, both before and after the October war, displayed complete indifference and indeed hostility. While the French proclaimed their loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance in 1973, they also criticized the cooperation of the United States and the Soviet Union in halting the October war as weakening the credibility of America's commitment to the security of Europe.[51] Kissinger's sympathy and cooperation with France after the October war might not have produced beneficial results. But did Kissinger not always argue that "if we face the fact that the interests of Europe and the United States are not identical everywhere, it may be possible to agree on a permissible range of divergence?"[52]

His diplomacy was too calculating and callous. His initiatives were designed to force France and the Europeans to accept American positions. In effect, he insisted on a predominant role for the United States with little or no regard for the views of the French. But it was France's (and Europe's) economic security that was at stake. Moreover, the result of Kissinger's policies was predictable; he lost credit diplomatically with the Europeans for what was occurring in fact, i.e., the United States was slowly becoming more evenhanded in the Middle East by supporting Egypt. Yet considerable damage had been done that perhaps by foresight and a more accommodating diplomatic style, could have been avoided.

Unfortunately, as J. Robert Schaetzel states "for the first time in postwar history, an American administration had dealt with Europe precisely as it would a hostile state."[53] The objectives and the style of Kissinger's diplomacy from 1973 to the summer of 1974 were questionable. Thereafter alarm in Europe at America's anger, the departure of Pompidou and Jobert and later Nixon further eased tensions. And the new American President, Gerald Ford, to his credit, did not share his predecessor's propensity for confrontation politics. While, in some respects, Kissinger's influence on foreign policy was enhanced after Nixon's resignation, the delicate domestic position of the new administration - and Ford's desire to avoid confrontations -

meant that more emphasis was placed upon Summit meetings and conferences, such as the Puerto Rican Conference in 1976 to resolve problems between the United States and its European allies.

## Summary

Cooperation between the United States and France would have been difficult to achieve when de Gaulle was president. With Pompidou and definitely with Giscard, the opportunities for cooperation increased. Yet, for Nixon and Kissinger, cooperation with France had never a very high priority. Fernand Braudel, the great French historian, has observed that the centuries long contest between Spain and Turkey for mastery of the Mediterranean occurred at the time when the locus of political and economic power was moving from the Mediterranean to the nations that bordered the Atlantic, thereby ensuring that for both Spain and Turkey, the struggle was increasingly less important. In many respects, Kissinger's prolonged efforts in Vietnam were also of diminishing importance to American objectives while other problems needed attention.

Basically, the future course of relations between the United States and France will depend upon the policies of the United States. In monetary and financial matters, in NATO and Europe, the United States will have to acknowledge French and European interests. The United States can no

longer have a privileged position in monetary matters nor be the sole guide on strategic-diplomatic matters. Kissinger has written that "the dispute between France and the United States centers, in part, around the philosophical issue of how nations cooperate. Washington urges a structure which makes separate action, physically impossible by assigning each partner a portion of the overall task. Paris insists that a consensus is meaningful only if each partner has a real choice."[54] During his tenure in office, Kissinger had the opportunity to attempt to reach some agreements with France if only to set a precedent for following administrations. Instead, we find that, according to Stanley Hoffmann, "in the Nixon-Kissinger policy, tension exists between the wish for self-restraint and an aggressive pursuit of the national interest, between the wish to let the West Europeans build their own entity and the inclination to keep Europe (and Japan) closely tied to the U.S. as permanent allies in a basically tripolar contest, between the objective of preserving NATO and the tendency to consider the emergent European Community as an economic rival."[55]

The present period is one of profound political and philosophical change, when the post-war order is disintegrating while the framework of the newly emerging order can only be dimly perceived. Kissinger understood the pervasive nature of these changes when he recognized that while the world is still bipolar militarily, it is becoming multipolar

politically. Moreover, simultaneously with these general developments, Franco-American relations were also changing. Since the early 1960's France has at times been a serious source of frustration for the United States. The reasons reside in the failure of both parties to bridge ever-widening political and philosophical perspectives. Surely, then, the early 1970's provided circumstances in which new political and philosophical guidelines could have been articulated and implemented. Franco-American relations once again could have been a model illustrating the benefits of a new arrangement that stressed coalition and cooperation, yet also allowed for disagreements.

However, this did not transpire. Instead Kissinger oscillated between attempts to ensure American primacy and the necessity to consult and cooperate. Few, if any, American statesmen have been so knowledgeable concerning France and Europe. Yet his record as regards Franco-American relations falls far short of greatness. His diplomatic priorities lay elsewhere. In many instances this is apparent in his policies. But what will be the viewpoint of future analysts? Did Kissinger miss a crucial chance to redefine America's relations with France and Western Europe? Would he have sought to do this if he had remained in office longer? Was it really necessary (and wise) for Nixon and Kissinger to have been so preoccupied with the Vietnam War and adversarial relations that other areas (particularly

France and Western Europe) suffered from neglect? As Peter Jay writes "But, under the surface, the Alliance foundations - and the foundations not only of NATO, but of the whole political, economic, financial and military order for the West - are being eaten away bit by bit. The catalyst of this corrosion is in part the philosophical vacuum in the West diagnosed by Kissinger 11 years ago and still unfilled."[56]

Kissinger's policies did not prevent (and at times helped cause) a widening of the gap between America and France (and Western Europe). He did not articulate a new order for Franco-American (and Alliance relations) while his shock tactics and oscillation between unilateralism and co-operation confused and estranged public opinion. Yet for the democratic states on both sides of the Atlantic, public support of their policies is crucial. If Western values are to be maintained in a revolutionary world, cooperation among the Western nations is not just desirable, it is vital.

The French and the West Europeans are no longer amenable to American pressures.[57] A major task of the present administration in Washington will be to begin restructuring relations between the United States and France (and Europe) so that partnership, while allowing for differences, may become more of a reality and less of an ideal and, therefore, more accurately reflect the imperatives of a new age.

## Footnotes

1. For many Americans de Gaulle was, consequently, a tragic figure. See John Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons, New York: The Viking Press, 1970, p. 352.

2. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 40.

3. Stanley Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal? France Since the 1930's, New York: The Viking Press, 1974, p. 331.

4. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 40.

5. Ibid., p. 41.

6. Ibid., p. 42.

7. Ibid., p. 44.

8. Ibid., p. 44.

9. Ibid., p. 45.

10. The three Army revolts in 1961 in Algeria were of particular concern to de Gaulle.

11. Alastair Buchan, The End of the Postwar Era, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974, p. 317.

12. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 64.

13. Ibid., p. 40.

14. De Gaulle was against giving any concessions to the Russians during the Berlin Crisis. He also firmly supported the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

15. Miriam Camps, European Unification in the Sixties, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 1-2.

16. From 1958 to 1962 French industrial production rose 23%, trade with its EC partners doubled and Franco-German trade almost tripled. See F. Roy Willis, France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945-1967, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 281-282.

17. Ibid., p. 322.

18. In a famous passage de Gaulle wrote "to persuade the states along the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees to form a political, economic and strategic bloc..." See Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons, p. 344.

19. Perhaps the best analysis of the Nassau Conference is in Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.

20. This treaty was also very important to Chancellor Adenauer both because he had some sympathy for some of de Gaulle's ideas and because at the end of a long career he wished to achieve a notable success in the reconciliation of West Germany and France.

21. John Newhouse, Collision in Brussels: The Common Market Crisis of June 30, 1965, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967.

22. Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930's, pp. 364-365.

23. Britain, however, had been subjected to the McMahon Act of August, 1946 which precluded any further nuclear co-operation between the United States and Britain. This Act was greatly resented in Britain. However, in 1957, at the Bermuda Conference, President Eisenhower contravened the McMahon Act and decided to aid Britain in developing strategic nuclear weapons. See Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: London: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 120.

24. Wilfrid L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 213-214.

25. In 1959 and again in 1961 de Gaulle had withdrawn units of the French fleet from NATO's command but his decision in 1966 concerning French withdrawal from NATO military activities caught many by surprise.

26. There was, however, no real substance in any of the agreements with the Soviet Union. The Russians were well aware of the limitations of French power. See Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons, pp. 290-292.

27. Some of the central features of an emerging international order are discussed by Alastair Buchan, The End of the Post-war Era, pp. 313-320.

28. Edward A. Kolodziej, French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974, p. 22.

29. De Gaulle, while a symbol of nationalism, was not solely responsible for being an obstacle to integration. Hoffmann writes of "the endurance of the nation-state" as also being an important obstacle to integration. See Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930's, pp. 397-399.

30. Karl Kaiser "Europe and America: A Critical Phase", Foreign Affairs Vol. 52 #4, July, 1974, pp. 730-731.

31. Hoffmann "Weighing the Balance of Power" Foreign Affairs Vol. 50 #4, July, 1972, p. 641.

32. After the events of 1968 the proposed force of 36 Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) was cut in half. Plans for a fifth nuclear submarine were postponed.

33. For a good discussion of the problems involved, see Ian Smart "Future Conditional: The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation" Adelphi Papers, London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, #78, August, 1971, pp. 31-45.

34. Chace "The Kissinger Years" New Republic Vol. 171 #19, November 9, 1974, p. 32.

35. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind, p. 201.

36. New York Times, November 13, 1977, p. 10.

37. J. Robert Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance, p. 57.

38. Kissinger, White House Years, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979, p. 962.

39. New York Times, January 21, 1974, p. 1

40. New York Times, May 6, 1977, p. 15.

41. New York Times, April 24, 1973, p. 9.

42. Stanley Hoffmann, "The Headaches of Harmony" European Community, March, 1975, p. 16.

43. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind, p. 229.

44. Z. Brzezinski "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," Foreign Affairs, July, 1973, Vol. 51, #4, p. 715.

45. John Stoessinger, Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1976, p. 152.

46. Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930's, p. 359.

47. George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1978, p. 15.

48. Jobert in particular - but also most of the other members of the EC - favored a more cooperative attitude towards the Arabs. Kissinger, however, seemed more interested in forcing a confrontation with the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). See J. Robert Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance, pp. 76-77.

49. The Economist, April 6, 1974, p. 15.

50. Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance, p. 138.

51. New York Times, December 11, 1973, p. 14.

52. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 233.

53. J. Robert Schaetzel, The Unhinged Alliance, p. 79.

54. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 46.

55. Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930's, p. 359.

56. Peter Jay "Regionalism as Geopolitics", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 58 #3, America and the World 1979, p. 492.

57. New York Times, February 23, 1978, p. 1.

# CHAPTER VII

## BILATERAL RELATIONS: BRITAIN

### The Scholar

Since the end of World War II Britain has faced a dilemma: How can a middle-sized country, formerly a global power, influence the course of events in a world dominated by continent-sized states? Historically few countries have experienced so rapid a demise in their international influence. In less than a quarter of a century Britain has declined from a world to a medium power whose importance is basically confined to a regional context. There are many reasons for this change in Britain's position; however, wars often accelerate changes that are already underway. In this manner World War II marked the rise of the two, extra-European superpowers to world domination while the multipolar Euro-centered world order ended.

Consequently, three choices confronted Britain: to continue as they had in the past with alliances that were prompted by circumstances; to become closely associated with the continent; or to become the junior partner of the United States. To a formerly great power these have been difficult

choices. Thus it is understandable that British statesmen since 1945 have appeared to lack a coherent vision and have often appeared highly uncertain as to where they wished to lead Britain. In the fifties Britain could have assumed the leadership of Europe. Because of the prestige accrued from its heroic efforts in World War II and a stable political structure, the situation was such that "during this period, Britain could have had the leadership of Europe for the asking."[1] But the British preferred to remain aloof from Europe, for their relationship to the Continent has been described as "extraordinarily ambivalent."[2] When they changed their minds in the sixties, it was too late. And in the seventies, once again, Britain is uncertain about the choice between the European Community and going its own way. As to the Americans little of substance remains of their bilateral relationship with Britain. Except in periods of acute crisis, when the nature of the challenge was unambiguous, Britain and the United States have often disagreed. The United States was less than enthusiastic about the reimposition of Britain's Colonial empire at the end of World War II. Consequently Britain's statesmen have made a serious mistake in attributing far too much importance to the special relationship with the United States after World War II. Americans do not work easily with equals in international relations. They are often unaware of or insensitive to nuance, to the more subtle aspects of international

politics. Given the best intentions on both sides and the continuation of an unambiguous challenge (two assumptions that cannot be expected to prevail indefinitely), it is doubtful that a superpower could - for a considerable period - work smoothly with a junior partner. However despite serious disagreements, there still remain elements of a unique relationship.

Today Britain stands at a watershed in its history. Will it cast aside its historical ambivalence towards Europe and join the Europeans in an effort to promote their collective influence in the world through the EC? Or will it continue its present uncertain course; ambivalence concerning the EC with the knowledge that the once vaunted special relationship with the United States grows more and more meaningless?

Kissinger wrote more extensively on West Germany and France; Britain occupied a place of lesser importance. In the future it cannot be said that Britain's contribution alone will be decisive for the eventual success of the West Europeans to achieve greater influence in a world of ever-greater political plurality. But is it possible that the influence of Western Europe on issues that affect its present and future can be increased or even maintained without the contribution of Britain? This is extremely doubtful. If the Western Europeans are to regain the major responsibility for their destiny, it will have to be with the active

support of Britain. In many areas Britain is the leading scientific and technological power in Europe. And its political system is exceptionally stable. Can the unity of the West, forged in the past by a common perception of danger, develop a new sense of purpose from shared aspirations?[3] Britain's hostility or indifference to the West Europeans' quest may prove an insurmountable obstacle.

Britain, The United States and the European Community

Kissinger's major concern was to examine Britain's special relationship with the United States and Anglo-American policy preceding the Nassau Conference. However, his analysis is also of considerable importance for the relationship between the United States and Western Europe during the crucial period from the Nassau Conference (December 1962) to de Gaulle's Press Conference of January 14, 1963. During this period, Britain's protracted and difficult negotiations for entry into the EC were approaching a climax. De Gaulle's veto of Britain's entry into the EC at his Press Conference on January 14 signaled the emergence of differing conceptions between France and the United States concerning the structure and policies of a united Europe.

But the memory of Britain's past proved far too strong for it to, without misgivings, promote European unity. Britain had always sought to prevent the emergence of a powerful and United Europe. Therefore, to abandon its American

and Commonwealth connections would be too much of a break with tradition. Unfortunately, the major exertions during the war had not only exhausted the British, but they were unable to decide which option to pursue: the relationship with the Commonwealth, the United States, or with Europe.

Kissinger states that Britain is not really involved in a search for identity but rather that Britain's identity is "incompatible with an unreserved entry into Europe."[4] Indeed, Britain's views on the organization of Europe as expressed by Churchill, for example, have not been very different from the views espoused by de Gaulle. Both have insisted that sovereignty represents the highest value.[5] Yet Britain's views have been couched in more temperate language and were without the theoretical emphasis placed upon the links between cooperative endeavors and national identity. Moreover, one cannot deny that Britain's strategic and emotional ties have been more pronounced regarding its trans-Atlantic relationships. Finally, Britain was also a world power and not just a European power.

But what exactly is the special relationship between Britain and the United States? A common language and cultural ties have reinforced the more informal aspects. However, the British have often, particularly in the sixties, overestimated their importance. British diplomacy has been quite skillful in giving the impression that American foreign policy is strongly influenced, if not guided, by

Britain. Formal and informal consultation have been sought, for the British never made a practice of publicly disputing American policies as de Gaulle did.

As indicated by Kissinger in the sixties, this policy became much less effective. Memories of Britain's wartime effort faded. As its power declined, many influential Americans thought that Britain was claiming influence that its power did not warrant since it was only a European power and should seek to satisfy its objectives in Europe. Britain should, of course, join the EC.

Two events were of critical importance in signifying the decline of Britain's influence with the United States: The Suez Crisis and the Skybolt missile cancellation. Suez showed that Britain could not act without the concurrence of the United States while the Skybolt missile cancellation revealed the lack of British military autonomy. Both wounds were to some extent self-inflicted but "in both instances, brutal and unfeeling American actions aggravated an already difficult situation."[6]

But while these events signaled the decline of the special relationship, a number of serious misconceptions remained in both countries concerning the Anglo-American relationship. Britain exaggerated its influence in the United States while the Americans may have overestimated the ease with which Britain could change its policies. Thus, "it became an axiom of United States policy that Britain's entry

into a supranational Europe would be a guarantee of Atlantic partnership."[7] However, the anticipated consequences resulting from Britain's entry into the EC could not occur because of de Gaulle's veto. The Americans were outraged over this turn of events. Would Britain have led a Europe that acceded to American interests? Or would the result have been "that Europe would henceforth have conducted de Gaulle's policies with British methods."[8]

By 1962 the only aspect of the special relationship that had any substance was in the nuclear field. In 1957 Britain began the development of a missile called the Blue Streak which, due to extraordinary expenses, had to be abandoned in February, 1960 in favor of a missile under development in the United States called Skybolt. From 1960 on there was an intense debate in Britain between the Conservatives, who defended the purchase of the Skybolt missile, and Labor, who questioned the wisdom of depending on a missile made by another country that was not yet even fully operational. The Conservatives also sought to show the importance of the British deterrent to the Americans, but Labor strongly attacked this position. According to Kissinger, what was at stake by 1962 was a matter of life or death for the Conservative government; was Britain independent with respect to nuclear weapons? It was in this atmosphere that suddenly, in December 1962, the Americans produced an uproar by cancelling Skybolt. A hastily convened conference was held

at Nassau between Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy.

The Nassau Agreement was a complex and ambiguous document forged during the most intimate period of the "special relationship" which attempted to provide Britain with a strategic nuclear force that was, however, basically to be used only in conjunction with NATO's objectives. As Kissinger writes, "it tried to reconcile integration with independence, the American belief in the need for an indivisible nuclear strategy with the British desire for autonomy."[9] This attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable failed. Reaction in Europe ranged from cool to hostile. There were so many ambiguities, so much that was contradictory or ill-defined in the Agreement that it was small wonder that de Gaulle viewed it with suspicion. Even the Labor party thought that the Agreement "proved the validity of their previous contention that British nuclear independence was a sham."[10] If Labor had these views, if many Americans thought that Britain's nuclear forces still were not integrated into NATO, can it be any wonder that de Gaulle resolutely rejected the Agreement? Yet the real tragedy of the Nassau Agreement was its poor timing. Britain's delicate and difficult negotiations to enter the EC were at a decisive point and, by thus reaffirming the primacy of its strategic trans-Atlantic ties, serious doubts were raised concerning Britain's intentions in Europe.

De Gaulle, already suspicious of British motives for wanting to join the EC, received further confirmation of the importance of Britain's nuclear ties with the United States. Moreover, the Agreement reinforced de Gaulle's contention that Europe must have its own defense. How could integration, he asked, be reconciled with independent disposition? Not only the substance of the Agreement, which aided France not at all for the French had neither submarines nor warheads, but the way in which the Agreement was negotiated created many problems. Moreover, Paris received a copy of the Agreement only after it had been released to the press.

Thus, while the Agreement was probably not the sole reason for de Gaulle's rejection of Britain's bid to enter the EC, still it was a contributory cause and raised anew the question of whether one member of a United Europe should have an exclusive relationship with the United States on so vital a subject as nuclear weapons.

Kissinger states that, "in retrospect, the failure of Britain to consult with France and its other European allies before committing itself to the Nassau Agreement seems a crucial missed opportunity."[11] It seems certain that even if the EC negotiations had failed, Britain still would have been in a less disadvantageous position if it had consulted with its European allies prior to the Nassau Agreement. But on January 14, 1963, de Gaulle vetoes Britain's admission to

the EC and rejected the Nassau offer. For Kissinger, this date "marks an important watershed in Atlantic relations."[12] Several problems assumed a more serious aspect after de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963.

The belief that there would be an automatic progression from economic to political integration was open to serious question. Politics involved questions of values and policy, and a consensus was henceforth much more difficult to obtain. Also, the idea of an Atlantic partnership between the United States and a United Europe, including Britain, was now in need of serious reexamination. It was Kissinger who wrote, "it is clear that conflicting approaches to Atlantic relationships were confronting each other."[13]

The situation was further complicated by the alignments that occurred on different issues. On economic issues, West Germany and the Netherlands tended to side with Britain while in the field of strategy, West Germany favored the United States. Moreover, European opposition to de Gaulle did not automatically mean support of the United States. Many Europeans, including left-wing groups, while objecting to de Gaulle's imperious style, did not necessarily object to Third Force policies or believe in a long-term association with the United States.

The press conference of January 14, 1963 opened a period of frantic diplomatic activity in which, according to Kissinger, the "United States strove hard to vindicate its

previous conception and France aloofly pursued her own course."[14] But the great danger for Britain, the United States, and Europe, Kissinger pointed out, was that "what started out as a dispute about the internal structure of Europe and its role runs the risk of fragmenting Europe or shifting the balance within Europe in unexpected directions."[15]

## Bilateral Relations: Britain
## The Statesman

During the period of Kissinger's tenure in office (1969-1976), no major problems arose between the United States and Britain in contrast to the situation that existed with respect to West Germany and France. The West Germans were engaged in the promotion of Ostpolitik and the development of a political role commensurate with their economic power. At the same time they remained conscious of the need for an active Westpolitik and harmonious relations with the United States. The French, while modifying the more extreme aspects of the Gaullist legacy, still sought to enhance their importance in Europe, in particular, and in the Middle East and Africa.

Yet Britain has not been engaged in any enterprise of this scope and magnitude. Some may disagree, citing Britain's admission into the EC in 1973. But Britain has made no decisive contribution. Moreover, both the United States

and the West Europeans have agreed on the desirability of British admission into the EC. While the 1975 referendum indicated that Britain will remain in the EC, the success of the referendum does not ensure a positive British contribution. Many people in Britain, particularly in the Labor party's left-wing, are still implacably hostile to the EC.

Britain's influence and importance in international relations continued to decline during the Kissinger years. Old social fissures and even class warfare combined with an obsolete industrial plant have meant that there has been a very real decline in Britain's interest in the outside world. Moreover, serious nationalist movements in the British Isles have made the fragmentation of Britain no longer unthinkable.[16] The development of the welfare state has also contributed to British indifference towards the outside world. The more parochial aspects of the welfare state have been reinforced and enhanced by Britain's loss of empire and the decline of its international influence. North Sea oil has meant that, unlike France, Britain has had no serious disagreements with the United States over Middle Eastern policy. But will the bonanza from the North Sea further exacerbate Britain's internal divisions if claims for this largesse mount too rapidly? After paying off its large foreign debt, will the surplus funds be used to modernize obsolete sectors of British industry and reduce taxation or

will various groups make exorbitant claims to satisfy their parochial demands and thus disregard Britain's needs as a whole. If Britain's internal problems are not successfully resolved, can anyone expect that it will be able to make a positive contribution to the EC and the problems pertaining to Western Europe? Today Britain stands at a decisive point in its modern history. It can continue on its present course of doubt and hesitation, particularly with respect to the EC, while being wracked by ever greater domestic problems whose intensity will preclude any major British contribution beyond its shores. Or an imaginative and innovative British government can attempt to resolve Britain's social and economic problems in concert with the other members of the EC, thus inspiring the British with confidence to make a major contribution to the international problems that beset Western Europe. Which course will Britain adopt? That is the question that still remains unanswered. I shall examine three areas that are of decisive importance to Britain in the present context: Britain and the EC; the relations between Britain, France, and West Germany; and the relationship between the United States and Britain. What policies did Kissinger follow regarding these areas? What modifications if any, occurred in his views? Kissinger was an astute observer of Britain's psychological and political vulnerabilities. He recognized that the Suez crisis and the Skybolt affair had been serious blows to Britain's pride and

self-confidence in addition to imposing very definite constraints upon Britain's political options. Therefore, in a period of profound political and social change, with Britain suffering a serious domestic malaise, Kissinger's policies could have aimed at providing new guidelines for the Anglo-American relationship. At the same time one should expect American policies that would attempt, insofar as this is possible, to enhance or augment Britain's confidence so that Britain can make worthwhile contributions to the world.

## Britain and the European Community

Once the British thought that they could choose between the Commonwealth, the United States, and Europe. The choice no longer exists. The Commonwealth is but a symbol of an imperial past that recedes ever further into history. The special relationship with the United States, once the pride of Britain, is in reality an empty shell. Britain has only one place left; Europe. F. S. Northedge writes that "the effectiveness of British foreign policy would be increased if that policy were framed in a community context."[17] There are two areas in particular in which Britain would benefit from a greater involvement both in the EC and with the Western European states: in economics and defense.

## Economics

Britain's serious economic problems have greatly diminished its capacity to conduct a resolute foreign policy. British methods of industrial management are archaic. The industrial plant is badly in need of modernization. With respect to technology, Raymond Vernon writes, "the technology gap is on the side of the U.S., hence, the Europeans are still grappling with a sense of technological inferiority that is deeply disconcerting."[18] Agriculture, now that preferential arrangements with the Commonwealth countries are becoming a thing of the past, is certain to cause problems because of rising prices. The British desire for lower prices will be contested in France, West Germany, and Italy.[19] All of these problems were further exacerbated during the seventies by a very high level of inflation that, by 1976, according to OECD statistics, was 15 percent.[20] Labor relations pose a difficult problem. The failure of the unions to take measures to discipline "wildcat strikers", whether they had a just grievance or not, has time and again seriously disrupted British public life. There must be an equitable balance between business and labor in the modern state. When either business or labor become too powerful, a society's interests as a whole suffer.

Consequently, even with its persistent economic problems, the possibility exists that Britain's membership in

the EC will lead to benefits similar to those that were enjoyed in the economic field by the original Six after the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957.[21] Could Kissinger have done anything to make the EC economically more attractive to Britain? Certainly this should have been his policy. To set an example, he could have stressed the value of consultation and cooperation in solving economic problems. But as I have indicated previously, Nixon and Kissinger's handling of economic policy too often sought to secure advantages for the United States, if necessary, at the expense of the EC. Kissinger might have made more of an effort to curb (after 1971) the balance of trade deficits. But if this problem was beyond his control, his unilateral methods combined with other adverse economic policies meant that the EC was going to have a much more difficult time with monetary and financial problems and economic growth.[22] Thus, partly because of these difficulties the EC presented a somewhat disorderly economic model for Britain. Kissinger's unilateral economic policies also encouraged those in Britain who believed in similar approaches. Behind the ambiguities of his rhetoric and policies was a lack of a coherent and consistent policy as regards Britain and the EC. Membership in the EC could prove of immense value to the British economy. Should the economy fail to change in the areas previously mentioned, Britain's ability to make its influence felt in even a regional context will be seriously

circumscribed. Thus Kissinger's policies, concentrating on American primacy in the short-term, neglected the more important long-term benefits that would accrue to the West as the British economy is successfully integrated into the EC.

## Defense

If Western Europe is to provide most of the means for its conventional defense, a major British contribution will be necessary. The West Europeans already provide 90 percent of NATO ground forces, 80 percent of the Naval forces, and 75 percent of the air forces.[23] However, in a foreign policy speech, Nixon talked of the need for greater European defense contributions claiming that the United States devotes a much higher share of its economic product to defense than the Europeans.[24]

A vital task for Britain will be to ensure that the EC remains firmly committed to the Atlantic Alliance. With the diminished threat from the East, the rise in the cost of defense, and the pressures upon Western economies, many West Europeans favor reducing defense expenditures and commitments to the point where Western Europe's security could be seriously threatened. Such trends are already evident in Denmark and the Netherlands. Moreover, French policy is sometimes too indifferent to the EC and the Atlantic Alliance. According to the London Economist "So far Mr. Kissinger has not told Britain flatly that it is more use to

the Alliance inside Europe than outside it. But in fact British membership is the best way of helping Germany to control French ambition."[25]

Concerning Britain's defense budget, Andrew Shonfield remarks, "that (1) if further cuts in the defense budget are made - of any significance, that is - these will involve a fundamental change in British policy about the defense of the Continent, (2) this defense commitment is concurrent with Britain's political membership in the EC, (3) the crucial relationship with West Germany would also suffer, (4) one could plausibly argue that from the point of view of the U.S., the maintenance of an enlarged EC (with Britain inside) is a major objective of policy in the second half of the 1970's."[26] I have already discussed the basically negative attitudes that Kissinger expressed toward the EC. Obviously his views toward the EC have undergone serious modification and in this respect his policy towards Britain was based on satisfying more ephemeral considerations of immediate interest than in the (long-term) necessity of ensuring British participation in the EC. In addition one must stress the interdependence of the EC and NATO. Britain and the major states of Europe could ensure stable, long-range economic growth by cooperating in the EC through common monetary, industrial, and social policies. Thus only if the West Europeans, under the aegis of the EC, can attain economic growth over the long-term can they provide the

means to ensure their security. Kissinger displayed little or no recognition of the interdependence between the EC and NATO; and the necessity for the major states in Europe to cooperate in each organization. Without sound economic growth and progressive social policies that do not fully engage Britain how, over the long-term, can the West Europeans assume greater responsibilities for their own defense?

The future of Britain's nuclear strike force is also important. Will the British eventually cooperate with France (and will both be aided by West German financial support) in a small West European nuclear entity that, through NATO, was linked to the United States, yet had a certain degree of autonomy (Is a small European nuclear force inevitable or even necessary)? As regards nuclear weapons, Andrew Pierre has written "with Britain in Europe, the special Anglo-American nuclear relationship has become, in some ways, an anachronism."[27] The issue of American aid to Britain's nuclear program is no longer a source of serious contention with the French. But this is due chiefly to the fact that the French have succeeded in their endeavor to build a small but efficient nuclear force with little or no help from the Americans. It remains to be seen what effects a second SALT agreement will have upon Western Europe's potential nuclear forces. Kissinger has, however, done reasonably well in both informing and respecting the Europeans' fears and concerns over this issue.

## Britain, France, and West Germany

There is no guarantee that Britain's internal problems can be resolved even if it is fully committed to the EC. But Britain's membership in the EC could have a decisive influence upon its relations with France and West Germany. At this crucial juncture in European history, the relations between these three major states will have an important influence on the course of events. Furthermore, these states should also have a positive relationship with the United States. For the survival of Western values in a revolutionary world presupposes trans-Atlantic political and economic cooperation.

It is apparent that Britain, France, and West Germany will, in various ways, preserve some freedom of maneuver, while they slowly attempt to strengthen and enlarge the scope of the EC. Yet hesitations and doubts ensure that the EC will have a highly circumscribed role in the future. Relations with the United States also pose a question mark. Will the Americans really support the EC as it slowly consolidates its position and thus threatens to (or actually does) harm American economic interests?

Consequently, London, Paris, and Bonn must conduct their affairs with due regard for their own triangular relationship and with respect to the United States. This means that a very complex diplomatic situation exists with

respect to most issues and this is even more apparent in the seventies when a combination of economic, energy, and political problems add to the difficulties.

There is no question that diplomatic transactions between and with Britain, France, and West Germany in the seventies can be very time-consuming and non-productive. When Kissinger did most of his writing on Western Europe, the situation was not nearly so complex and intractable. Yet even if the adverse diplomatic situation of the United States in the early seventies and the difficult situation of the West Europeans was certain to reduce the opportunities for trans-Atlantic cooperation, was this a sufficient explanation for some of Kissinger's policies?

Some conceptions of the Atlantic world emphasized the nation-state, others the supra-national aspects of organizations such as the EC. As pertains to these opposing conceptions, did Kissinger's policies mitigate the differences between the British and the French, for example? As a scholar, he was emphatic that eventually Western Europe must obtain the highest levels of consultation and cooperation not only between its largest states but also with the United States. On numerous occasions he refers to the schisms or divisive tendencies in the West that precluded or wrecked Western unity to the detriment of all. While recognizing that differences could occur, Kissinger knew that the West must avoid internal schisms if western values

are to be maintained in a revolutionary world. Why then did he feel threatened by the prospects of a European Europe? Why was he insistent upon maintaining American hegemony when it came to diplomatic-strategic matters? In this way Kissinger assured that British (more interdependence with the United States) and French (advocates of a European Europe) conceptions pertaining to Europe would remain unbridgeable. But did his failure in this respect not help perpetuate the very same divisions in the West that he had originally warned against?

Consequently, while some aspects of the Gaullist legacy have been modified, Britain and France still find it difficult to cooperate in many respects. Britain is a member of the EC but uncertainties persist as to the direction that the EC should take; less dependence on the U.S. and more self-assertion or more stress on trans-Atlantic ties and cooperation with the United States.

Consider economic issues. Due to West Germany's "economic miracle", serious disparities already complicate its relations with states in less-favorable economic situations. West Germany has basically sought to cooperate in a trans-Atlantic forum as has Britain to solve economic issues. But Kissinger's unilateral measures have politically undercut Bonn and London when they advocated cooperation. The French, once again, refused to go along with the British and West Germans for they thought that the Europeans

must strive for more economic self-assertion. One example is the French disagreement on Kissinger's IEA and its avowed policy of confrontation with OPEC. The French preferred to work quietly with the Arabs and OPEC. Thus on many economic issues (and energy) the Americans advocated one approach and the French another, while Britain and West Germany were somewhere in between and for the most part helpless to bridge the gap. Again, by his tactics and an often inconsistent long-term vision, Kissinger did not always demonstrate that he appreciated the difficult nature of relations between Britain, France, and West Germany. Yet relations between Britain (France, and West Germany) are further complicated by the necessity for cooperation with the United States.

## The United States and Britain

In a period of pervasive change when men look to the old and the familiar with longing and view the new and the uncertain with apprehension, an opportunity exists for the articulation and implementation of a new framework for political and social life. Anglo-American relations were in need of a new vision. While special ties would always exist due to affinities of language, race, and culture, what effects, for example, would Britain's increasing involvement in the EC have upon its relationship with the United States? As Britain continued to identify itself with Europe, how would this affect its nuclear relationship with

the United States? Did Kissinger address himself to these problems? What did he contribute towards the restructuring of Anglo-American relations?

Andrew Shonfield has a good understanding of the problems concerning the United States and Britain. These problems are (1) British economic nationalism and its attendant economic problems will need to be contained as a potential source of discord in the international system, (2) Britain's international policies - and possibly its relationship with West Germany - could be adversely affected if the West Germans were to replace Britain as the chief partner of the United States in Europe, (3) if there is a resurgence of German nationalist feeling, the situation will be easier to handle if at least one other important European power is committed to NATO and the defense of West Germany, (4) the chances of Britain continuing as a leading and effective member of the Western Alliance will probably depend chiefly on the vitality of Britain's connections with Europe.[28]

How did Nixon and Kissinger deal with these problems? The American record, with respect to economic nationalism, can hardly have been encouraging to Britain. From 1971 on, Kissinger did not set a very good example. In the summer of 1971 Nixon and Kissinger commenced to undertake, without consulting the Allies or giving them advance notice, a widespread change in the manner in which the world conducted its monetary and financial affairs. The United States ended

the convertibility of dollars to gold thus national currencies were no longer pegged to specific values. Fluctuating currencies make international trade more difficult and since the EC is by far the world's largest trading entity, it would have the more difficult problems. Thus the "Nixon shocks" were unpleasant surprises to America's allies. The British and the West Europeans were shocked and angered, and later somewhat puzzled over this unilateral abrogation of arrangements that had been agreed upon by all parties in 1944. Was Kissinger compelled to act in this manner? The Europeans, while often annoyed at Washington's failure to curb certain abuses in its international economic policy, were by no means unsympathetic to Washington's plight. In London and Bonn, in particular, a policy of patent compromise, of attempting to arrive at a consensus on such a vital issue, would perhaps, have led to agreement, even if not as rapidly as some would wish. Nor did the general economic situation justify the measures that Kissinger employed. A world of interdependent economic powers (particularly the United States, Western Europe, and Japan) would seem to require increased consultation and cooperation rather than secretive, unilateral moves. As Stanley Hoffmann writes "there is a growing need for pooled sovereignty, shared powers and effective international institutions in all the realms."[29] The Europeans and the Japanese are as interested as the Americans in a smoothly functioning monetary system. Moreover, was not

the resentment caused by Kissinger's measures more costly than the results he achieved so rapidly?

Of course, economic issues were further complicated by the "oil crisis" but regarding both his tactics and consistency of purpose, Kissinger has room for improvement. Regarding Shonfield's second point, the displacement of Britain by West Germany as America's chief partner in Europe, the dispute with West Germany over American policy in the Middle East and the shipment of war material to Israel from NATO bases in West Germany, energy policy, U.S. troops in Europe, U.S. policy towards the EC, and disagreement over economic issues all ensure that it is unlikely that West Germany will replace Britain as America's chief partner in Europe. The Americans and the West Germans are trying to develop a relationship that will reflect greater equality and allow for disagreements.[30] Yet this new relationship is not meant to displace or threaten Britain's relationship with the United States. Concerning the dangers of a revived German nationalism, Kissinger has often been a bad example. Moreover, his indifference or even hostile policies toward the EC guaranteed that, if a resurgence of German nationalism does occur, it will be more difficult to handle. With respect to the necessity - the vital necessity - of Britain's European connections, Kissinger also set a very bad example. His advocacy of unilateralism, his denigration of not only the EC but the OECD and other multilateral

institutions have encouraged those in Britain who wish to eschew any and all contact with Europe and, in particular, the EC.

Thus, unlike West Germany and France, there were no important direct bilateral disputes between the United States and Britain. Kissinger's failures with respect to Britain were of a more indirect kind - his aggressive unilateralism, the failure adequately to consult, his denigration of the EC and the other multilateral institutions (excepting NATO), and his determined advocacy of American primacy not only increased the very real possibility of fragmentation within Western Europe but also would - if this fragmentation occurs - seriously damage the very fabric of trans-Atlantic cooperation. It is difficult to see how, in these circumstances, Britain could make a positive contribution to overcoming the transnational problems that afflict the nations of the North Atlantic basin.

## Summary

In his writings on Britain Kissinger displayed sympathy and understanding for Britain's plight. He was highly critical of the insensitivity of American foreign policy, particularly in the years before and after the Nassau Conference. The preparation for the Conference itself and the final agreement were all displeasing to Kissinger. He foresaw that, after the Conference prompted de Gaulle to reject

Britain's bid to enter the EC, two competing concepts of Atlantic partnership had emerged and that clashes between these concepts could have the most serious consequences for Britain and Western Europe. But, despite these views, Kissinger's actual policies did not mitigate let alone resolve the breach between Britain and France. Britain's hesitation and doubt concerning the EC reflect disagreements among Western Europe's three major states over the policies and objectives a united Western Europe would pursue. While Kissinger's rhetoric acknowledged the necessity for the United States to accept short-term problems with the EC to justify long-term benefits, all too often his unilateral policies were designed to ensure American primacy. Thus Kissinger's actions aided unilateralists in Britain, France and West Germany.

In the seventies as pertains to Britain's relations with the EC, its relations with France and West Germany, and the relationship with the United States, there exists grounds for concern. In these areas Kissinger's policies added to the difficulties. A great statesman is one who has a vision and transmits this vision to his people. Bismarck had such a vision, so did de Gaulle, and though their tactics varied their objectives were never in doubt; to place Germany and France in the front ranks of nations. One cannot say the same regarding Kissinger's vision concerning Britain and Europe.

In a speech in London in December, 1973, Kissinger said, "but let us also remember that even the best consultative machinery cannot substitute for common vision and shared goals; it cannot replace the whole network of intangible connections that have been the real sinews of the trans-Atlantic and especially the Anglo-American relationship. We must take care lest, in defining European unity in too legalistic a manner, we lose what has made our Alliance unique: that in the deepest sense Europe and America do not think of each other as foreign entities conducting traditional diplomacy, but as members of a larger Community engaged, sometimes painfully but ultimately always cooperatively in a common enterprise."[31]

The relationship between the United States and Britain and the Western Europeans should be restructured to allow the development of real partnership, to redefine relations between a super-power and a number of medium and small powers. To accomplish this task will be no easy matter. It will require statesmanship of a very high order that demonstrates consistency of purpose and moral acceptability. In neither of these measures did Kissinger succeed regarding Britain and Europe. He did not articulate and implement new guidelines that would better serve the Anglo-American relationship in a period of pervasive change. Instead his policies caused doubt, hesitation, and uncertainty, concerning the relationship between the two countries. In many respects

he appeared uncaring or oblivious to Britain's psychological and political plight as the British attempt to find a satisfactory role in an often confusing and harsh world. Considering the brilliant and incisive nature of his scholarly work, Kissinger's performance was indeed a disappointing one as regards Britain. But while Britain's military and economic prestige have declined, Britain's political and moral prestige command widespread respect in the world, for who can envision the alleviation of many of the problems that beset both Western Europe and mankind without a major contribution by Britain? But Kissinger is no longer preoccupied with Britain and Europe; as a statesman, his major efforts were directed elsewhere.

## Footnotes

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4. Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 76.
5. Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-1963, London: Oxford University Press, 1964, pp. 5-6.
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7. Ibid., p. 79.
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13. Ibid., p. 87.
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26. Shonfield "Britain" in Landes, editor, Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership, p. 93.

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29. Stanley Hoffmann "Weighing the Balance of Power", Foreign Affairs Vol. 50 #4, July, 1972, p. 635.

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31. Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, New York: W. W. Norton, 1974, p. 277.

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# CHAPTER VIII

## THE RECORD OF A SCHOLAR-STATESMAN

### American Foreign Policy in the Kissinger Era

The relationship between the United States and Western Europe is rapidly changing. Common perceptions and policies concerning the threat of Soviet power can no longer be assumed on either side of the Atlantic. Moreover, revolutionary changes in the world can cause differing perceptions and responses. It is a world where threats to national security may be ambiguous and reactions to those threats may not elicit common accords. Consequently the challenge for the West is to accept diversity within a framework of partnership. Kissinger frequently pointed to the dangers of debilitating divisions in the West, asserting that in order for Western values to survive in a revolutionary world, the West would have to overcome its divisive schisms and "show the way to a new international order."[1] Thus shared powers and responsibilities would be encouraged as well as an increase in the power and authority of multilateral and international institutions.

The failure to overcome these difficulties could have

grave consequences as Peter Jay writes "What new order does the United States offer the world? And what great principle or principles define legitimacy and guide American involvement? Nineteen seventy-nine was the third year of the Carter administration's effort to supply some answers to the questions identified by Kissinger in 1968 but thereafter almost wholly ignored in the Kissinger years."[2]

Yet, what were the main characteristics of Nixon's and Kissinger's foreign policy? Pierre Hassner writes "Henry Kissinger sometimes uses a rhetoric of cooperative bipolarity, sometimes the rhetoric of a multipolar balance of power, sometimes the rhetoric of the Atlantic Charter and of free world unity reminiscent of the 1940's and the 1950's, sometimes the rhetoric of global interdependence and world community."[3] He then writes "the goal of the Nixon-Kissinger administration was to keep as much of a central role for the United States in world affairs as possible under new conditions that require skilled diplomacy and bargaining."[4]

Concerning the methods of Nixon's and Kissinger's foreign policy, Raymond Aron asks, "how is Nixon's policy different from his predecessors? First in the philosophy of interstate relations and second in the situation itself, hence a diplomacy which openly obeys the rules or customs of Realpolitik or of power politics tries to build a world of one partner-adversary (the USSR) and several partners, allies or adversaries within the various subsystems."[5] Given

the unsavory views associated with Realpolitik among large sections of the public in the United States and Western Europe, was it wise (or merely expedient) to follow such policies?

However, there can be little doubt that from 1969 to 1975, American foreign policy was characterized by a new approach which specifically attempted to preserve a central place for the United States in the world. With the resignation of President Nixon in August, 1974, most of the previously noted aspects of Realpolitik became less apparent. There were several reasons for this. The futility of Realpolitik strategies with respect to Western Europe and Japan were apparent. President Ford, though obviously influenced by Kissinger, did not seem to be so enamoured of Realpolitik as his predecessor. Finally, the new administration was in delicate domestic circumstances, and international events, too, discouraged Realpolitik.

Yet, the question remains, why did Nixon and Kissinger practice their brand of Realpolitik? Would the absence of the Vietnam war have made any real difference in the conduct of their diplomacy?

When the new administration assessed the situation in 1969, events seemed to require, as a top priority, the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam without being humiliated, while ensuring the status quo. Concurrently a strong diplomatic effort was launched to influence Hanoi's

supporters; the Soviet Union and China were to pressure Hanoi to agree to maintain the division of Vietnam; and to link the resolution of America's dilemma in Vietnam with progress on other bilateral issues between the United States and the Soviet Union and China.

Michael Brenner has noted that in the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy view, "(1) the Soviet Union and China are unsatisfied powers, (2) both these countries seek to nurture the impression that the flow of history and the balance of forces in the world is shifting in their favor, (3) hence they try to expand their range of influence, (4) thus they are prepared to make the maximum use of military force as an instrument of coercion, intimidation and symbol of status while exhibiting great restraint in its use (except in areas such as Eastern Europe)."[6] Brenner then places these views on adversarial relations within the overall context of Nixon's and Kissinger's world view for (1) "the world is moving from a condition of bipolarity toward one of multipolarity (Japan, Western Europe and China will exercise greater independence) hence diplomatic flexibility and opportunity for maneuver is one outcome and (2) despite the qualification of bipolarity in these centrifugal developments, the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China (increasingly) will predominate and constitute one another's chief concern."[7]

Nixon and Kissinger also greatly mistrusted or were contemptuous of the State Department, Congress, and the

bureaucracy while relying on a very small staff to carry out their policies. Consequently, they became more isolated domestically and their foreign policy (except for adversaries) often reflected an even greater degree of Realpolitik. In order to thoroughly understand Nixon's and Kissinger's foreign policy and to discuss Kissinger's philosophy of history, an overview of Kissinger's global statesmanship would be useful.

## The Impact of Kissinger's Statesmanship Upon the World
## Détente: The Soviet Union and China

From 1969 perhaps Kissinger's chief priority was to deepen and broaden détente with the Soviet Union and China. Considering his interest in arms control and concern for the nuclear arms race, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union was the keystone for Nixon's and Kissinger's policies. Indeed Lincoln Bloomfield "gives Nixon praise for the development of a relationship with the Soviet Union (SALT, increased trade relations, major outer space and scientific cooperation)."[8] He then "praises Nixon-Kissinger Realpolitik for going a good distance toward deideologizing our vitally important state-to-state relations with the Soviets and China."[9]

Moreover, as James P. Sewell writes, "few observers would deny the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations have changed profoundly in the last eight years. And some modification of

the rest of the international constellation has resulted. For this transformation, Kissinger is largely responsible."[10] But the question remains: does too great an emphasis upon adversarial relations in a rapidly changing and dangerous world not also pose dangers? Alastair Buchan is concerned about this for "it is my own fear, which I think is shared by both Europeans and Americans, that if the Vladivostok Agreements cannot be translated into firm restraints on innovations and, indeed, into reductions of Soviet and American strategic weapons systems, the process of mutual deterrence may become so complex that it will become increasingly accident-prone, difficult to comprehend or operate, and may perpetuate an antagonism whose political motivation may otherwise be ebbing."[11] There is no question that Nixon and Kissinger by enlarging upon the scope of détente and greatly increasing the number of agreements with the Soviet Union have indeed changed the character of relations between the two superpowers.

But Buchan raises the question of balance with respect to adversaries and allies, for he "recommends coalition (with allies) and concert (with USSR) to be defined and emphasized and give substance to concert in an increasingly fragmented, disorderly and dangerous world."[12]

Will future events confirm the wisdom of the Nixon-Kissinger views? Will the deepening of détente between the two adversaries lead to arms control and then arms reduction?

Or will too much emphasis upon détente arouse too many unobtainable expectations? If neglect of America's alliance relationships causes too many problems, America's political and military commitment to the security of Western Europe might be seriously eroded.

With respect to China, Nixon and Kissinger deserve high praise for bringing to an end a situation that might have proved increasingly dangerous. Diplomatic relations do not guarantee peaceful relations between states. But the continued lack of contacts between the United States and China, particularly in a crisis, might contribute to serious misunderstandings between the two countries. Nixon was particularly anxious to bring China into world politics,[13] however, certain actions undertaken during this period, from the extraordinary concern for the impact of international events on American domestic opinion to the failure to inform the Japanese, were regrettable. These actions (except for the failure to inform Tokyo of a change in America's China policy) are not really important when compared to the utter necessity of ending the twenty-year freeze on relations between the United States and China. Except for the maintenance of China's territorial integrity, however, the United States and China have few common interests.

Détente characterizes a mixed cooperative/adversarial relationship with both the Soviet Union and China. But both these countries, and in particular the Soviet Union, tend to

view détente from a rather narrow perspective: the necessity to avoid nuclear war, achieve arms control measures, and perhaps, cooperation on a few other issues. However, most Americans have a much broader concept of détente which embodies the previously mentioned areas and a desire to secure acceptable Soviet behavior in the Third World, for example. There is a difference in theoretical perspective here: the American belief that international conflict (which may involve coercion and the threat or the actual use of force) is an aberration and unacceptable while to the Russians (and Chinese), international conflict in its many manifestations (not precluding the occasional use of force) is an acceptable way to obtain their objectives.

Nixon and Kissinger attempted to influence Soviet policy in one area in a desired direction by implying that progress in another area was contingent upon acceptable Soviet behavior. But each administration must carefully establish the limits of détente and in various circumstances.

Finally, in terms of his policies toward the Soviet Union and China, Kissinger demonstrated consistency of purpose and a concern for moral principles. It is probably only a slight exaggeration to say that Kissinger believed that the prospects for a third world war would depend on how the United States managed its relationship with the Soviet Union. Moreover, he had read de Tocqueville and wondered: could a democratic state such as the United States maintain a

consistent, resolute policy towards the Soviet Union (and later China) that allows for both agreement on issues such as SALT, and for disagreements, i.e., Soviet policy in Africa?

## The Nuclear Balance

Kissinger's concern over Soviet (and Chinese) policies was complemented by his intense interest in strategic nuclear weapons. The arms race and arms control were of the most serious concern. During his tenure in office much of his attention was devoted to strategic nuclear weapons. The first SALT agreement of May 1972 and the follow-up Vladivostok Agreement of November 1974 were the first attempts to place ceilings upon the strategic nuclear weapons possessed by each superpower. The agreements also represented the American acceptance of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union.

It is not my intent to analyze these agreements, but there can be little doubt that both represent important accomplishments. If mankind is ever to resolve the difficult and frightening problems raised by nuclear weapons, both sides must be prepared to engage in a lengthy process of negotiation. Nuclear parity must be the basis for agreements that first set ceilings, then begin the actual task of reducing the nuclear stockpiles of the superpowers. Of course, other countries possessing nuclear weapons must

eventually adhere to the agreement and also reduce their nuclear stockpiles. This will be a long, time-consuming process. But Nixon and Kissinger, building on their predecessors' achievements, made the control of the nuclear arms race a keystone of their foreign policy. They also maintained the nuclear balance, which must be done concurrently with attempts to limit, then eventually reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles.

If in the next decade or two nuclear ceilings are firmly set and nuclear stockpiles reduced, Nixon and Kissinger will receive due credit for their vital contributions. But to accomplish these two objectives, to maintain the nuclear balance, and contend with the problem of proliferation will be difficult. Moreover, how will tactical nuclear weapons and conventional weapons be included in this process? And can all of these issues be resolved within a framework that places primary importance upon relations with adversaries and secondary importance upon relations with allies? A beginning has been made but it is still tentative, still fragile, still very much subject to the destructive vicissitudes of politics.

However, Kissinger's policies with respect to the nuclear arms race were consistent with his ideas as a scholar. The agreements in 1972 and 1974 presupposed a flexible diplomacy that also had consistency of purpose. Moreover, Kissinger had always thought that in "the nuclear age, peace

is a fundamental moral imperative."[14]

## The Middle East

While, in a personal sense, the Arab-Israeli dispute was important for Kissinger, he has written very little on the subject. However, during the October War in 1973, the political and economic dangers became readily apparent. Not only was the threat of superpower confrontation very real, but the subsequent oil embargo and the quadrupling of the price of oil posed a grave and unforeseen threat to the world's political and economic order.

Kissinger's record with respect to the Middle East has both negative and positive aspects. The outbreak of war in October was, despite the buildup of serious tension, unexpected. Even if greater attention by Nixon and Kissinger to the area's problems did not preclude the resumption of conflict, at least the administration could have dealt with the crisis, once it arrived, in a more systematic manner. While war contains many imponderables, the ad hoc manner in which Nixon and Kissinger dealt with the repercussions of the war on Western Europe (and Japan) was less than commendable. With respect to economic security it was evident that in the event of an oil embargo Western Europe and Japan would be placed in very vulnerable positions. Apparently Nixon and Kissinger thought that it was not worthwhile to follow a contingency plan, or if they had planned in advance, one can

see very little evidence of this in the way in which they responded to Western Europe's and Japan's need for assured supplies of oil. Consequently, the West Europeans were placed in a difficult position by the American demand for support in their hour of need. The Europeans, and in particular the French, have not agreed with America's support and arming of Israel, and yet they and NATO were expected openly to support the American position in the Middle East.

With respect to energy, Kissinger also made a number of miscalculations. He had always warned that threats to American security might not always be in an "unambiguous form." But when the oil embargo and subsequent quadrupling of the price of oil occurred, Kissinger was as unprepared as everyone else. Regrettably the parsimonious attitude of the administration regarding the sharing of oil with its allies in Western Europe and Japan was complemented by Kissinger's confrontation politics with Jobert over the founding of the IEA and his rather abrasive behavior concerning the entire issue of energy.

On the positive side Kissinger has to be given credit for taking advantage of circumstances (Sadat's expelling the Russians in 1972) and initiating a more even-handed American policy in the Middle East, particularly after the October War. He gave the Egyptians considerable economic aid; moreover, his "shuttle diplomacy", after the war, stabilized the situation at least temporarily. The process of arriving at a

just and lasting peace in the area proved to be more difficult than expected. In retrospect, it was too soon to achieve an overall settlement. Even in 1981 a comprehensive settlement is not around the corner. But a general settlement should be arrived at soon while specific details will have to be resolved within this general framework. Nixon and Kissinger have tried to ensure that American diplomacy is more even-handed in the Middle East. The United States can no longer unconditionally support just one country but must be able to put pressure on or offer inducements to Israel or Egypt (along with the other Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization) as the situation demands.

## Japan

Bruce Mazlish states that "all in all, Kissinger (like Nixon) had no respect for the Japanese."[15] At Harvard Kissinger was almost exclusively interested in Europe, past, present, and future, and had little or no interest in Asia. As a statesman, his relative indifference towards Japan continued and this was no secret in Tokyo where Kissinger was mistrusted and disliked for his actions, particularly after the surprise change in America's China policy in the summer of 1971.

For a scholar particularly interested in philosophy of history, Kissinger showed an acute ignorance of the importance of Japan in East Asia. The unilateral devaluations of

the dollar in 1971 and 1973 surprised and shocked the Japanese. But the unilateral change in America's China policy in the summer of 1971 was an even greater affront. Many Japanese have not, prior to 1971, agreed with America's China policy. But in deference to American wishes Japan's leaders have eschewed almost all contact with China. However, there are few Japanese who would defend the wisdom of this policy. In making such an abrupt and unannounced change in America's China policy, Kissinger ignored the domestic impact upon the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and internationally made it seem as though Japanese interests, on this vital matter, were of little or no consequence to Washington. Thus Prime Minister Eisaku Sato was subsequently eased out of power and replaced by Kakuei Tanaka, who established diplomatic relations with China in September of 1972.

But the damage had been done, and the Japanese never trusted Kissinger again. The Japanese-American relationship is vital for both countries and involves political, security, and economic ties. If Japanese doubts were greatly to increase because they no longer thought they could rely on American military support and protection, can Japan's extensive rearming be precluded? Furthermore, there are asymmetries between the two countries that are compounded by cultural differences. The relationship with Japan must be visualized in terms of a greater measure of partnership than has previously been the case. The danger is that unilateral

policies such as Kissinger's could eventually drain the Japanese-American relationship of all substance.

## Regional Balances and The Third World

Kissinger wrote with interest on the plight of the developing countries; however, this interest was not well reflected in his policies.[16] James Sewell writes; "in practice, if not in precept, the Kissinger order relegated the other foreign relations of the U.S. to subordinate status. The past 8 years have brought contacts with nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa to a state of greater friction than even the Johnson administration had managed to achieve."[17]

For Nixon and Kissinger regional disputes such as the Indo-Pakistan War in 1971 had excessive importance with respect to superpower relations. According to Bruce Mazlish, "Kissinger is simply not attuned to the new world of revolutionary political, social and economic developments and aspirations. His long-range historical and strategic understanding have been faulty."[18] One may not entirely agree with these conclusions. But while Kissinger may have further broadened America's ties with countries such as Iran and, more temporarily, Pakistan, his interest in improving the condition of the people of the Third World was never really reflected in his policies. Certainly Kissinger was aware of the political and moral dilemmas that the United

States faced with respect to the Third World. However, it is possible that he did not have the necessary time to devote to this problem. Faced by so many real and potential crises, it is understandable that statesmen in the seventies simply cannot do everything. Nixon's and Kissinger's global vision, for whatever reason, did not consider the Third World countries to be of very great importance.

## The Emergence of Economic Issues

Both at Harvard and during his tenure in office, Kissinger did not have very much interest in or knowledge of economics. From 1969 to 1976, the American economy moved from a position of hegemony to a position as first among equals in the world. Needless to say the relative decline of America's economic position during this period was often accompanied by considerable strains that were also borne in large measure by America's allies. For example, America's failure to rectify its balance of payments deficit meant that inflation was passed on to America's trading partners. Moreover, as the dollar, still the world's trading currency, declined in value, the international economic system was further weakened.

Theoretically and practically, Kissinger was unprepared for these strains which were, of course, compounded by the Vietnam war. Nixon and Kissinger must be given quite low marks for the manner in which they handled the general

situation. Unilateralism and the aggressive pursuit of the national interest seemed to be, in most cases, the guiding themes of their policies.

Wilfred Kohl writes, "the results of the August 13-14, 1971, Camp David meeting (to terminate converting dollars to gold and the 10% import surcharge) was to inject suspicion and tension such as had not existed for years in Atlantic relations and from which we have still not recovered."[19] From monetary affairs to the halting of soya exports and the energy crises, the record of Nixon and Kissinger with respect to economic issues is a very poor one. Their attempts to link economic concessions from the West Europeans (and Japan) with American political and military commitments was highly resented in Europe and Japan. Once again, as in the thirties when the United States failed to grasp the necessity for exercising world economic leadership, real leadership appeared to be lacking. There did not seem to be any consistent policy. A mixture of contradictory policies were followed that at times sounded the litany of cooperation and at other times reflected the unilateral pursuit of self-interest. Kissinger, in a recent article, has stated that the restructuring of economic relationships is one of the most important challenges facing the United States during the remainder of this century.[20] It is regrettable that he did so little in this respect for it is apparent that in the seventies, the focus will shift to

economic needs within the noncommunist world and these needs will have to be met multilaterally as the unilateral role of the United States declines.[21]

## Morality and Foreign Policy

The relationship between morality and foreign policy is complicated and often ambiguous. For Americans the degree of morality in foreign policy has been the occasion for considerable conflict. Idealists and realists have argued and disagreed for decades over this complex relationship. My concern here is not to analyze every aspect of Kissinger's policies regarding their moral content. Rather I am concerned with the moral legacy Nixon and Kissinger left the American people. To what extent, for example, should the United States support dictatorships that ignore or actively oppress their citizens' rights and liberties?

Michael Brenner writes that, "the most distinctive difference between the Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon periods is the diminution of ideological zeal for the need for an American liberal mission to assist activity (though tailored to circumstances) in the nurturing of democratic societies."[22] This development was almost inevitable as the world becomes more multicultural. American foreign policy has inflicted great damage upon other societies when it has insisted that they live up to or achieve the standards of a democratic society such as the United States. Regarding the "liberal

mission" of the United States, a better balance should be struck than in the past. The desirability of civilized virtues is apparent and yet the outright imposition of one people's views upon another must be avoided.

Kissinger has stated that in the nuclear age "peace is a fundamental moral imperative."[23] Moreover, he maintains that "the ultimate test of morality in foreign policy is not only the values we proclaim but what we are willing and able to implement."[24] Thus Kissinger is indeed responsive to the moral obligations of the state in the 1970's. But he recognizes that circumstances may compel action by the statesman that may transgress moral principles. For not only must a statesman ensure the security of the state but he must also reckon with the consequences for the entire system if a key state loses its stability.

Consequently, these statements on moral purpose do not conflict with the Nixon-Kissinger power-realist approach even though their approach may, at times, be indifferent to the Third World and the handling of Alliance relationships. Of course, the historic relevance of the balance-of-power approach to world politics in the seventies can be questioned.[25]

Anthony Hartley has noted that, "relations with allies are one of the most difficult problems for the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, it is contrary to moral neutrality and the need to maneuver diplomatically."[26] Moreover,

Hartley says that, "Kissinger's own attitude has moved further towards moral neutrality."[27]

Yet tension has developed between the tenets of the Nixon-Kissinger world view and the importance of morality in their policies. This tension was never resolved. Their policies with respect to détente and the removal of the threat of general and nuclear war reflected a high degree of moral purpose. Yet many of their other actions showed a lack of moral principle.[28] However, if the SALT negotiations are successful in reducing the peril of nuclear war, then Nixon and Kissinger will be praised for their concern for the greatest moral issue of the era: the necessity to avoid nuclear war.

But aside from their concern with this issue what moral legacy have Nixon and Kissinger left for the short-term? Here the record is much more ambiguous and, perhaps, negative in some respects. Unilateralism and the aggressive pursuit of the national interest are dangerous precedents. Yet it depends on how far these policies are carried and under what circumstances. Undeniably the crisis over Vietnam was of the most serious order and centralization of decision-making in the White House was probably inevitable. Indeed, since the Continental Congress directed the Revolutionary War, every conflict has resulted in a concentration of power in the executive branch for the duration of the crisis. Furthermore, while one may disagree

with many aspects of Nixon's and Kissinger's policy in Vietnam, a definitive evaluation of their policies is still not possible. Even now, let alone in the 1970's, it is a supposition that is still unproven that the North Vietnamese would have been amenable to different American policies (that stressed less bombing of North Vietnam, for example). Perhaps Hanoi would have come to terms sooner, perhaps not. Yet, while one can, of course, question Kissinger's tactics in Vietnam, he is entirely correct in appreciating that the United States could not suffer a complete humiliation in Vietnam. What effects would a debacle have had upon America domestically and its international obligations? Of course in the end Saigon fell and the United States did not escape humiliation. But would those who urged a complete American withdrawal in the late 1960's and early 1970's have ensured the complete humiliation of the United States without sufficient regard for the domestic and international consequences? The question that will engage historians in the future is: was there a middle way? Did Kissinger remain in Vietnam too long? Would most of his critics have departed too rapidly with little or no regard for the consequences?

However, Nixon and Kissinger failed to overcome or resolve the tension between their balance-of-power approach to world politics which involves secrecy, bargaining, and the need to maneuver with the need to consult and to engage in cooperative ventures. Paul Seabury has written that, "in

more recent times our most effective action in international politics has invariably occurred only when the United States acted in close concert with many others. If this is true, future American action abroad should be grounded in broad coalitions. This need for multilateral legitimation is not without risk. Yet the test of future American policy will be our success in encouraging indigenous coalitions to keep the peace and assure their own defense."[29] Finally, their alleged involvement in Chile (through the CIA), their friendships with dictators such as the Shah of Iran, and their acquiescence in the slaughter of Bengalis by the Pakistanis, all seemed to indicate a curious moral lassitude.

In the seventies there is a growing (though not new) desire to seek to limit, and certainly not to condone, the use of force in international relations. This is particularly true as regards a superpower, such as the United States, and a smaller, weaker country. But this moral and philosophical revulsion against the use of military force in international relations is still ambivalent and inchoate in many respects. Witness the presence of Cuban troops in sub-Saharan Africa which elicits little if any protest from Third World Countries.

With respect to the avoidance of nuclear war, Kissinger's policies were consistent with his previously elucidated political and moral views. However, in pursuit of this objective, was he inclined to deal too quietly with

atrocities such as occurred in Bangladesh? Kissinger's record concerning morality in foreign policy has elements of ambiguity but then perhaps that reflects the real nature of politics which only rarely permits sharply defined moral positions.

## Kissinger's Philosophy of History

It is apparent when considering Kissinger's work as a scholar on Western Europe and his subsequent policies that a considerable divergence exists. Of course to know is not necessarily to do. Some divergence, some modifications in Kissinger's policies were bound to occur. However, as I have indicated, in some respects the difference between the ideas of the scholar and the policies of the statesman was striking. What can account for this difference?

Kissinger's primary objectives were focused upon the avoidance of nuclear war. Consequently the relationship with the Soviet Union had absolute priority over all other concerns. His concerns with the decline of the Western Alliance and the emergence of new centers of power were secondary considerations. Kissinger's was basically a conservative philosophy of history in that while recognizing the revolutionary nature of the present period, he placed the highest importance upon Soviet-American relations. Despite his criticisms of both Metternich[30] and Bismarck[31], Kissinger's philosophy of history was similar to both these

statesmen in terms of his preoccupation with stability. A further characteristic all three statesmen had was their belief in the essentially fragile nature of their state's political order. Yet, was this really true of the United States? Thus Kissinger's concern with stability - apparent in his work as a scholar - became a virtual preoccupation, often to the exclusion of other problems, when he was a statesman.

Basically Kissinger envisaged a world in which two great states had the primary responsibility for world peace. Thus the highest value was placed upon the stability of <u>both</u> the United States and the Soviet Union. If domestic or international problems were severely to effect the stability of either state, the result could, in the nuclear age, perhaps make a global conflict inevitable. This is (one reason) why in the 1950's Kissinger was so opposed to Communism. For Communism necessitates a revolution that, in the nuclear age, may be the prelude to disaster. Consequently, Kissinger greatly feared that the adverse repercussions of the Vietnam war might imperil America's ability to maintain the nuclear balance.

The other states would assume tasks and responsibilities that were commensurate with their capabilities. Kissinger worried, however, that the West Europeans and Japanese were becoming too dependent on the United States, so he sought to prod these countries into assuming increased

responsibilities. He has written that "for the future the most profound challenge to American policy will be philosophical: to develop some concept of order in a world which is bipolar militarily but multipolar politically."[32]

Consequently Kissinger envisaged a hierarchical world in which the primary responsibility for world peace would rest with the two greatest powers while lesser states would assume responsibility for secondary, but still important, issues. Stanley Hoffmann writes, "insofar as there was a new policy in behalf of the old goals, it amounted to a multiple demotion of the alliances, which resulted partly from the new ordering of priorities. The top of the agenda was now occupied by the search for the 'stable structure' and the new triangular relationship."[33] I would differ with Hoffmann only to the extent that I believe that Kissinger placed somewhat more emphasis upon the Soviet Union and somewhat less upon China. But these are not decisive considerations. As Hoffmann writes, "the triangular relationship was seen as more than central to international politics; it was thought commanding."[34]

There are, of course, great risks in Kissinger's vision for, as Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, states, "let me say once again that leadership from the U.S. - financial, commercial, monetary, political - is sorely needed. But the lack of an American response following the fivefold increase in oil prices, and

the inability even to live up to the promises and obligations which had been undertaken....have contributed significantly to the threat of a world depression."[35] Thus one can question whether, in this multifaceted and complex world, an approach that places too much emphasis on adversarial relations and too little on relations with allies is, in the long-run, really adequate. Moreover, what priority would other outstanding global issues receive, few of which can be resolved by only the superpowers or the West?

However, when Kissinger joined the Nixon administration in 1969 he had a long association with many of the nations' political and military elite. Far more than most academics, he had gained considerable knowledge from those who had exercised power. Therefore, he was, prior to his tenure in office, more knowledgeable concerning the complexities inherent in both the academic world and the world of practical experience. He was also aware of the need to modify his perspectives. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, diplomacy, (with the potential for the occasional use of force) an awareness of tragedy, and the political and moral necessity for peace in the nuclear age are enduring attributes of his perspectives on international relations. Yet, Kissinger believes quite strongly in the ability of mankind to influence its destiny in the Twentieth Century. Concerning the disagreements of the West with the rifts in the Communist world,

he writes, "free from the shackles of a doctrine of historical inevitability, the nations of the West can render a great service by demonstrating that whatever meaning history has is derived from the convictions and purpose of the generation which shapes it."[36]

Moreover, as Stephen Graubard writes, "to Kissinger statesmanship was a Twentieth Century possibility. The statesman's talents were mainly psychological, he had to estimate the objectives of societies different from his own, he had to be able to judge correctly the real relationship of forces, he had to possess a vision and know how to translate that vision into reality."[37] Therefore, when he became a statesman, Kissinger was prepared as few others for that role.

Despite his occasional Spenglerian remarks Kissinger's philosophy of history was not rooted in the conviction that vast social and political forces would, regardless of mankinds' efforts, overwhelm all efforts to control them. On the contrary great men could, if possessed of an adequate vision, shape their world and exert some degree of control over social and political forces. Kissinger, then, had a rather activist philosophy of history that assumed that mankind was capable of determining its own fate provided that its leaders possessed adequate intellectual convictions and the courage to act upon those convictions. While he was no believer in the eventual arrival of the millennium, he did

believe that a reasonably just world, free of the scourge of war, could be attained if mankind was equal to the many obstacles that must be overcome.

## Conclusion

By 1969 international changes clearly signaled the beginning of the demise of the post war era. Economic issues had become a major source of contention in the trans-Atlantic relationship. As a result of these difficulties, resistance to international cooperation was on the increase in Western Europe and the United States. International cooperation was politically difficult, if not impossible, to achieve on some issues and this general situation was exacerbated by the oil crisis of 1973. But, as Klaus Knorr states, "international conflicts do not turn more now on economic issues than in the 1920's or 1930's; also interstate conflicts over economic issues are not necessarily conflicts over economic values (i.e. France and the U.S.)."[38]

In Western Europe disagreements continued between nationalists and those who hoped that the EC could transcend the differences between the states and make Brussels the focus for the new Europe. But from the late sixties a serious malaise, a sense of drift had settled over Western Europe. There was hesitation and doubt over how Europe's problems could best be resolved, as George Kennan writes, "the West Europeans are worried not so much about external

power and pressure but to internal weakness - to the lack of vigor in ones own civilization."[39]

Thus it would seem proper at this juncture to briefly summarize the record of Henry Kissinger in a difficult and very challenging decade. His major accomplishments include:

- the improvement of détente, progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), reducing the danger of nuclear war between the two superpowers--still the primary problem of each superpower and the foremost danger that threatens mankind;
- establishment of contacts with China that broke a twenty-year hiatus in relations between the two countries;
- the increased involvement of the United States in the Middle East on both sides and America's emergence as the single most influential power in the area;
- the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam without causing irreparable domestic and international losses.

The other side of the ledger shows rather significant defects:

- the excessively delayed withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, which did considerable damage to the institution of the Presidency

and caused a domestic crisis of the most serious order--whose full consequences are still not completely clarified--diverting attention from other, even more serious concerns of foreign policy such as the Middle East;

- the excessively fluctuating relationships with Western Europe, particularly the European Community, which generally had a negative impact on both sides of the Atlantic and seriously damaged the concept and fabric of trans-Atlantic partnership;
- the inept conduct with respect to Japan; a key country in an area of utmost concern to the United States;
- excessive concern for adversaries in contrast to the relative indifference toward America's allies;
- the signal failure to alert and educate the American public to the threats posed by a broad range of environmental issues (in particular, energy) in world politics;
- the failure to educate the American public concerning the international problems faced by the United States and to transmit to the public adequate guides for the future conduct

of the United States in world politics. This is a list of impressive accomplishments and important failures. Will future assessments dwell as much on the failures as Kissinger's contemporaries have done? Or will Kissinger's failures recede into the background, as Churchill's often mistaken strategies of World War II receded in the light of his accomplishments? Ultimately, this remains the task of future generations, who will be in a position to judge more accurately the consequences of accomplishments and omissions that, from our perspective, appear blurred or fragmented. However, given recognized limitations, the contemporary analyst is also obligated to make judgments. What can be said of the record of Henry Kissinger and the relationship between the realm of the scholar and the realm of the statesman.

As the Soviet threat - though still potent - has become more ambiguous, as other problems (such as energy) have emerged, and the Western European states have gained political stability and confidence, common responses to these problems have become more difficult. Moreover American foreign policy has undergone a change as John Campbell writes, "military and intelligence officials are heavily represented on nearly every committee, symbolizing an important shift that has gradually occurred in American perceptions of the outside world: national security, a conception of permanent crisis, has displaced foreign policy,

a more generalized notion of the more peaceful and only occasionally violent ebbs and flows of international politics and national interests."[40]

Kissinger was well aware of the constraints domestic structures impose upon the foreign policies of democracies.[41] Yet perhaps his gravest error in transatlantic relations was his failure to educate and engage public opinion. His unilateral policies, ignoring or denigrating multilateral institutions, abrupt power plays and his pursuit of American primacy did not arouse the enthusiasm or encourage the commitment of the public, on either side of the Atlantic, towards the goal of infusing the Atlantic Alliance with a new sense of purpose, a renewed commitment to develop a new principle or principles to govern their relations.

The concerns of the Western Europeans are discussed by Fritz Stern, "It is not only Helmut Schmidt who is outraged by what - in his milder moments - he calls America's abdication of fiscal leadership or responsibility. The United States, once the pillar of the postwar economic order, is now viewed as its disrupter, pursuing policies inimical to itself and to its allies."[42]

Yet in White House Years, Kissinger reiterated his previously stated views that (particularly as regards Western Europe and Japan) "A world of more centers of decision, I believed, was fully compatible with our interests as well as our ideals."[43] Given the tumultuous events of the late

1960's and early 1970's and the increased self-absorption of the West Europeans in defining and clarifying their own relationships Kissinger, of course, cannot be blamed for all of the problems of the Atlantic Alliance. Yet, by the 1970's relations with America's most important allies were entering a state of crisis. Alastair Buchan has written, "I do not believe that the European-American (or the Japanese-American) relationship contains the seed of inevitable demise but I do believe that, by a series of careless actions on all sides, both relationships could become so hollow that it would only take an incident to make them seem no longer worth sustaining."[44] In addition, both Nixon and Kissinger mistrusted and disliked working with cumbersome, inefficient bureaucracies and their representatives. Close relations with Western Europe (and Japan) would mean a great deal of this type of contact. Moreover Nixon and Kissinger both had a predilection for the "great statesman" (their mutual admiration for de Gaulle) of an essentially conservative cast. Given their love of the "grand stage" and their own essentially conservative philosophy, is it really credible that, as a statesman, Kissinger would have tolerated a serious dilution of his power? For the reasons previously cited, during the period from 1969 to 1975, alternative policies were precluded by the desire to maintain American primacy.

The Nixon-Kissinger legacy with respect to Western Europe and Japan should be a major concern of the present

administration. The possible fragmentation and weakening of Western Europe and Japan could have the most adverse effects on world politics for, to quote Alastair Buchan, "it has been the West that has been the cradle of political ideas, including Marxism, and seems likely to remain so. However great the power of Russia, however fine and fair the civilization of China or of India, however just the claims of the developing countries, if the springs of political improvisation in the West dry up, then the new agenda of world politics will be a barren one."[45]

However, Kissinger's policies toward the Soviet Union and China were consistent and displayed a recognition of the highest moral imperative of the nuclear age. He also hoped to encourage greater East-West cooperation which in turn might help to promote a greater measure of international cooperation in a badly fragmented world. For each statesman must have a vision and act to implement that vision. And it is in the nature of politics that sharply defined moral positions rarely indicate precisely what measures are necessary to rectify the situation. All agree on the necessity to prevent nuclear war but few agree on precisely how this can be accomplished.

What, then, can be said of Henry Kissinger? In one of the best analyses to appear thus far, Stanley Hoffmann comments upon Kissinger's resilience and flexibility "in East-West relations, he reshaped his theory and consequently

restored the priority of Alliance relations, as was shown by the various moves toward tighter economic cooperation (at summits or at OECD), by closer military coordination with Japan, and by a new emphasis on America's need of a sense of identity and collaboration with other nations who share its values."[46] This coincides with my observations throughout this paper that from 1969 to 1971 and from 1975 to 1976 Kissinger sought a more cooperative relationship with America's allies (or at least the policies of Realpolitik were not quite so apparent). But Hoffmann is, though sometimes ambivalent, basically critical of the Kissinger legacy for "whereas Metternich's foreign policy was dictated by his concern for Austria's vulnerability, Kissinger was a practitioner of the primacy of foreign policy. But one can say of him what he said of Castlereagh: his own country defeated him. His policy has turned out to be simultaneously too complex in execution for the domestic forces whose support he needed, and too simple in design for the present-day world, despite its being far more subtle than the earlier simplicities of containment."[47]

There is considerable merit in Hoffmann's statement. Will history's verdict be more favorable than Hoffmann's? Perhaps, perhaps not. Nixon and Kissinger did seriously misjudge the domestic repercussions of their foreign policy. In the end the path led from Vietnam to Watergate; and the loss of the Presidency for Richard Nixon. Moreover, by

emphasizing extensive military operations and complex diplomatic maneuvers, they (and their predecessors) policies have definitely exacerbated forces whose final outcome cannot be predicted (the revolutionary changes that occurred in American society during the late 1960's were not caused by but were greatly intensified due to Nixon's and Kissinger's policies in Vietnam). The insistence of the Congress over challenging (and even defying) presidential prerogatives in foreign policy, the disenchantment of the intellectuals and the public with rational processes and the denegration of the life of the mind, and the resurgence of parochialism in the United States that extends over the entire country and embraces every group including, most seriously, the intellectuals. The final outcome of these trends, reflected in Europe as well, shall probably have a major influence in determining the emerging structure of world politics.

The attendant demoralization and confusion afflicting intellectuals is most serious. The methods that both Presidents Johnson and Nixon used to resolve their diplomatic dilemmas (and their failure adequately to explain and educate the public concerning their policies) have decimated and confused the intellectuals and the public alike as concerns both the present and future directions of American foreign policy. S. Frederick Starr, secretary of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, has called for "greatly

increased attention to foreign-language study at the pre-university level."[48] He noted that the proportion of American secondary-school students studying a modern foreign language in the mid-1970's - about 16 percent - was no greater than in the 1890's. According to Richard Brod, director of foreign language programs at the Modern Language Association, "Nationwide, Russian is becoming an exotic language and that shouldn't be allowed to happen."[49] At a time when politically and economically the United States is becoming more interdependent with and dependent upon the rest of the world, these figures indicate an alarming degree of parochialism.

However, it will not be easy to determine the legacy of Henry Kissinger, the statesman. Undeniably Kissinger faced serious obstacles, both in the domestic situation and the international realm; however, his tactics and his strategy were, in certain respects, questionable. His gravest error was his preoccupation with Vietnam. He exaggerated or placed too much emphasis upon possible catastrophe in Vietnam and the linkage with America's ability to maintain the nuclear balance. This is not to say that his critics were entirely correct, but to a greater extent than should have been the case, the war in Vietnam dominated Kissinger's concerns to the detriment of developing dangers in the Middle East and the erosion of relations with Western Europe and Japan; the general neglect of the Third World and

his failure to impart to the public a greater understanding of the challenges America must face in the conduct of its foreign policy. In other areas Kissinger has earned a greater measure of success, however, a long-term perspective is necessary to finally determine his place in history.

What, then, can be said of the relationship between the scholar and the statesman. The scholar searches for final solutions, however, the statesman knows that few solutions are final. As Harrison Salisbury writes "The academic mind is trained at problem-solving, at presenting finite solutions to finite problems. Politics is the art of the indefinite. Its best practitioners know that no real-life problem can be neatly or permanently solved on squared paper. They understand that all questions - war, peace foreign policy, domestic policy - are in the end constituency problems, issues of give and take, of fudgy language and accommodation."[50] There are also additional differences between the two, for as Kissinger has written, "the most difficult, indeed tragic, aspect of foreign policy is how to deal with the problem of conjecture. When the scope for action is greatest, knowledge on which to base such action is small or ambiguous. When knowledge becomes available, the ability to affect events is usually at a minimum."[51] Moreover, the demise of the post-war era has compounded the problems of the statesman for "the conjectural element of foreign policy - the need to gear actions to an assessment

that cannot be proven true when it is made - is never more crucial than in a revolutionary period. Then, the old order is obviously disintegrating while the shape of its replacement is highly uncertain. Everything depends, therefore, on some conception of the future. But varying domestic structures can easily produce different assessments of the significance of existing trends and, more importantly, clashing criteria for resolving these differences. This is the dilemma of our time."[52] It is the storm and the passion, objective reality and subjective interpretation, that differentiate the world of the scholar from the world of the statesman.

Thus the connection between the world of the scholar (the realm of ideas) and the world of the statesman (the realm of practical solutions), the theme of this paper, is best characterized by the term interdependence. The relationship between the world of the scholar and that of the statesman is basically analogous to the relationship between intellect and intelligence. As Richard Hofstadter writes "Intellect, on the other hand, is the critical, creative, and contemplative side of mind. Whereas intelligence seeks to grasp, manipulate, re-order, adjust, intellect examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes, imagines. Intelligence will seize the immediate meaning in a situation and evaluate it. Intellect evaluates evaluations, and looks for the meanings of situations as a whole.

Intelligence can be praised as a quality in animals; intellect, being a unique manifestation of human dignity, is both praised and assailed as a quality in men. When the difference is so defined, it becomes easier to understand why we sometimes say that a mind of admittedly penetrating intelligence is relatively unintellectual; and why, by the same token, we see among minds that are unmistakably intellectual a considerable range of intelligence."[53]

However, the scholars ideas can be too abstract. Thus Raymond Aron has written, "By devising a multiplicity of schemata and models, the self-styled scientific study of inter-state relations has often contributed to the decline of the art of analysis rather than to the training of minds."[54] Consequently, scholars (particularly in the Social Sciences) have paid insufficient attention as to how their ideas can be implemented. Conversely American Statesmen have too often neglected the vital role that theory can have in directing policy; they have concentrated too much upon the implementation of ideas that were theoretically inadequate. Thus policies that were successfully implemented were often found to be inadequate. Theory must identify and analyze the problem, it must provide direction, but theory must also recognize that implementation is necessary if the problem or difficulty is to be resolved. In this manner the realm of ideas and the realm of practical solutions demonstrate both their interdependence and their differences.

However, excessive abstraction and inadequate concrete application are accompanied by a third major difficulty; that of professionalised knowledge. The serious nature of these problems (and some of the reasons for the present malaise) are discussed at length by Alfred North Whitehead who has written that:

> "Another great fact confronting the modern world is the discovery of the method of training professionals, who specialise in particular regions of thought and thereby progressively add to the sum of knowledge within their respective limitations of subject. In consequence of the success of this professionalising of knowledge, there are two points to be kept in mind, which differentiate our present age from the past. In the first place, the rate of progress is such that an individual human being, of ordinary length of life, will be called upon to face novel situations which find no parallel in his past. The fixed person for the fixed duties, who in older societies was such a godsend, in the future will be a public danger. In the second place, the modern professionalism in knowledge works in the opposite direction so far as the intellectual sphere is concerned. The modern chemist is likely to be weak in zoology, weaker still in his general knowledge of the Elizabethan drama, and completely ignorant of the principles of rhythm in English versification. It is probably safe to ignore his knowledge of ancient history. Of course I am speaking of general tendencies; for chemists are no worse than engineers, or mathematicians, or classical scholars. Effective knowledge is professionalised knowledge, supported by a restricted acquaintance with useful subjects subservient to it.
>
> This situation has its dangers. It produces minds in a groove. Each profession makes progress, but it is progress in its own groove. Now to be mentally in a groove is to live in contemplating a given set of abstractions. The groove prevents straying across country, and the abstraction abstracts from something to which no further attention is paid. But there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension of human life."[55]

Thus the fact that few scholars have ever become good statesmen and relatively few men of great intellectual ability have profited in a practical sense from their superior capabilities indicates that there are barriers between these realms. Yet at times a person of genius (or great ability) does transcend these barriers. J. B. Bury writes of a great statesman and conqueror of long ago:

> "the untimely deaths of sovereigns at particular junctures have often exercised an appreciable influence on the course of events; but no such accident has diverted the paths of history so manifestly and utterly as the death of Alexander. Twelve years had sufficed him to conquer western Asia, and to leave an impress upon it which centuries would not obliterate. And yet his work had only been begun. Many plans for the political transformation of his Asiatic empire had been initiated, -- plans which reveal his originality of conception, his breadth of grasp, (sic) his firm hold of facts, his faculty for organisation, his wonderful brain-power, -- but all these schemes and lines of policy needed still many years of development under the master's shaping and guiding hand. The unity of the realm, which was an essential part of Alexander's conception, disappeared upon his death. The empire was broken up among a number of hard-headed Macedonians, capable and practical rulers, but without the higher qualities of the founder's genius. They maintained the tolerant Hellenism which he had initiated, -- his lessons had not been lost upon them; and thus his work was not futile; the toils of even those twelve marvellous years amoothed the path for Roman sway in the East, and prepared the ground for the spread of an universal religion."[56]

However, a person of Alexander's capabilities appears only once in an age, a statesman like Churchill appears once in a century. In the modern era (except for occasional flashes of brilliance) the capabilities of leaders often

barely exceed a level of basic competence. Yet the rapid rate of change and the turbulence of the international realm in the modern era confront statesmen with unprecedented problems. Expert opinion may be divided or problems may appear that are insoluable.

Therefore, Kissinger found that, given his diplomatic priorities, most of his ideas concerning the development of a more mature partnership with Western Europe, were often very difficult to even tolerate let alone implement. Thus statesmanship (the realm of practical solutions) won out over scholarship (the realm of ideas) in this case. Yet what general lesson can be learned from a study of Kissinger as a scholar-statesman that can be of value in the conduct of American foreign policy? No matter how carefully crafted,ideas represent finite, abstract solutions that require implementation in an environment that is characterized by an absence of final solutions. In these circumstances a quest for dogmatic certitude is a recipe that will probably end in catastrophe. Increased knowledge is of great value and yet in the statesman's realm there is an irreducible aspect that does not yield to rational analysis. In an age and a society often preoccupied by the search for rational solutions, it is vital to understand both the possibilities for and the limitations upon ideas and reason in the international realm. It is the awesome responsibility of the statesman to correctly

judge the path his nation must take for his ideas may lead to disaster or they may change the course of history. Consequently, the successful statesman leaves behind an enduring legacy which demonstrates that he has understood the connection, the interdependence, between the worlds of the scholar (the realm of ideas) and the statesman (the realm of practical solutions).

In a situation characterized by unprecedented social, economic, and political changes on a global scale, where both ancient problems (war) and new problems (environmental: the destruction of the rain forests) threaten the state, where nationalism is a vital political force for some and dilution of sovereignty a reality for others, the potential exists for both leaders and the public alike to take refuge in simplistic solutions and bellicose rhetoric. Nowhere is this tendency more pronounced than in the United States. In a brilliant essay Kissinger writes, "In a society that has prided itself on its "business" character, it is inevitable that the qualities which are most esteemed in civilian pursuits should also be generally rewarded by high public office. As a result, the typical cabinet or sub-cabinet officer in America comes either from business or from the legal profession. But very little in the experience that forms these men produces the combination of political acumen, conceptual skill, persuasive power, and substantive knowledge required for the highest positions of

government."[57]

What is occurring in the United States is a dangerous widening of the gap between intellect and policy or to put it another way, between the policymaker and the intellectual. Thus, in recent decades, we witness the rise of the national security state, the increasingly beseiged and beleagured attitude of both leaders and the public with respect to world politics. Yet what can be done? Again we turn to Kissinger, "The solution is not to turn philosophers into kings or kings into philosophers. But it is essential that our most eminent men in all fields overcome the approach to national issues as an extra-curricular activity that does not touch the core of their concerns. The future course of our society is not a matter to be charted administratively."[58] A partial solution to this dilemma, Kissinger continues, is that "A way must be found to enable our ablest people to deal with problems of policy and to perform national service in their formative years. This is a challenge to our educational system, to the big administrative hierarchies, as well as to national policy."[59]

For American statesmen, the intellectuals, and the public, the trials of the past ten years reflect the participation of the United States in world politics. As Raymond Aron writes, "It appears as if the intellectuals, academics, and journalists have not yet accepted the fact that it is entirely 'normal' for the American republic to participate

in the play of inter-state relations. In their revulsion from the horrors and absurdities of the Vietnam War they have conjured up, in order to rationalize their detachment from the outside world, an imaginary picture of spheres of influence stabilized once and for all, a Soviet Union permanently satisfied with the status quo, Japan and Europe already great powers, and an armed force never to be used again. Some of them reconstruct an imaginary history in which the United States is supposed to have provoked Stalin, while others attribute urban decay, crime, racial tension, and all the ills with which American society is manifestly afflicted to the cost of exercising power."[60] The Americans should learn that the United States, despite its triumphs and tribulations, is now unquestionably a part of the inter-state system.

The United States can, within the limitations imposed by its political system, provide important leadership in the world community. In the waning decades of the twentieth century, the necessity of resolving international political, economic, and environmental problems will become paramount if a more just and orderly world community is, eventually, to be constructed. The necessity of international cooperation, while avoiding the scourge of war, will impose a heavy burden upon the vision and skills of those responsible for the foreign policy of their countries. The United States will, on many occasions, find this burden onerous. But by virtue of its power and the appeal of its ideals, the Americans

cannot, without a complete abdication of their obligations, avoid the responsibilities of leadership that, in concert with others of similar views, the world so definitely needs. The United States must, therefore, be guided by statesmen whose vision and skills are superior to those of their predecessors. In this never-ending quest for wisdom, knowledge of the successes and failures of Henry Kissinger, who combines to a rare extent the learning of the scholar with the ability of the statesman, should contribute usefully to the great tasks that lie ahead.

## Footnotes

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