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Parties and factions in Korean politics.

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PARTIES AND FACTIONS IN
KOREAN POLITICS

A Dissertation Presented

by

Chulsu Kim

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in
partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May

1973

Major Subject

Political Science

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PARTIES AND FACTIONS IN
KOREAN POLITICS

A Dissertation

By

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PREFACE

I would like to name several individuals whose assistance and encouragement have been instrumental in completing this dissertation. Aside from giving me many helpful suggestions with regards to the substance and the style of this study, Professor Franklin W. Houn has gone far beyond the call of his duty as Chairman of my Guidance Committee in offering his valuable time and assistance. Professors ^{Richard Minear} John M. Maki, and Gerard Braunthal have also given me the benefit of their valuable criticisms and suggestions. Of course, I alone am responsible for any errors and inadequacies contained in this study. The writing phase of this study was completed in large part while I was serving with the Korean Army, and I would like to thank Colonel Tong-hui Lee of the Korean Military Academy for his moral support.

Although I have done my best to exercise scholarly impartiality in the course of doing this study, I realize that I may have done some injustice to specific individuals and groups that appear on the pages to follow. I would like to make it clear that this is not what I had intended. In the transliteration of the Korean, I have adopted the Reischauer-McCune System, although some familiar names such as Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee were put in the usual form.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Yusoon, who has shown admirable patience and understanding. It is to her that I dedicate this study.

Seoul, Korea
April 15, 1973

PARTIES AND FACTIONS IN KOREAN POLITICS (May 1973)

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Like many developing countries of Asia and Africa, Korea was first introduced to the alien institution of political parties in the wake of her independence from colonial rule. This study probes into the performance of political parties in the Korean political process from 1945 to 1969 by utilizing the historical-institutional approach along with select aggregate and survey research data.

The ruling parties in Korea have been externally created parties. The Liberal Party was founded by the decree of an authoritarian President who saw it indispensable for consolidating his power against the National Assembly; the Democratic Republican Party was organized preemptively by military men after they seized power through a coup. As externally created parties, they have tended to be identified with the executive branch rather than the legislature. The opposition party, during the Rhee era, on the other hand, was created in the legislature more or less as a response to President Rhee's assault on the legislature. Other than that,

however, it had little or no common denominator which guaranteed unity of action and thought within it.

The conservatism of Korean parties was assured when her international position dictated the elimination of the leftist and progressive parties. This in turn has produced party politics to struggle for power and confined the political dialogue to the procedural matters rather than the substantive ones. Institutionalization of party structure and leadership has been delayed by personality-centered political parties. At the rank-and-file levels, the commitment to a political party is rarely made on the basis of ideology or policy, but for reasons of money, personal power, special interest, blood relations and the like. Although there has been a conscious attempt made on the part of the founding members of the present ruling party (DRP) to overcome the past ills of Korean parties, it is much too early to tell whether such an attempt has met with complete success.

Since the associational interest groups in the Korean context lack autonomy from state power, they have tended to shy away from taking independent political actions. The strength of the institutional and anomic interest groups in Korea may be viewed as a consequence of the failure of party politics. Where the legitimate interests cannot be articulated into government policies, the likelihood that

the public discontents and social maladies explode beyond the prescribed procedures are increased.

The imported system of liberal democracy and political parties appears to be on the way of earning legitimacy through some twenty-five years of challenge, opposition, acceptance and adaptation. The "gap" evident in Korea between the urban and rural voters in terms of party preference, political participation and the other aspects of electoral behavior has substituted the ethnic, religious, and class cleavages evident in other political systems.

In the legislature, the militant struggle and confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties have been the norm. This has been eloquently expressed in the frequent opposition walkout and the so-called "one party National Assembly." Through a number of years of confrontation in the National Assembly, the Assemblymen from the two major parties appear to have internalized distinct value systems; the different life-styles have often resulted in the paralysis of the legislative process and the domination by the executive branch in the lawmaking function of the National Assembly. The consequence has been that the politicians have lost touch with the general public and the party politics have become a "game" among the elites.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CASC	The Comrades Association for Safeguarding the Constitution
CEMC	The Central Election Management Committee
CIA	The Central Intelligence Agency
CPKI	The Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence
CRP	The Civil Rule Party
DNP	The Democratic Nationalist Party
DP	The Democratic Party
DPF	The Democratic People's Front
DRP	The Democratic Republican Party
KDP	The Korean Democratic Party
KFTU	The Korean Federation of Trade Unions
KIP	The Korean Independence Party
LDP	The Liberal Democratic Party
LP	The Liberal Party
MP	The Mass Party
NACF	The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation
NARKI	The National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence
NDP	The New Democratic Party
NKP	The New Korea Party
SCNR	The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction
UNCURK	The United Nations Commission on Unification and Reconstruction of Korea
UNTCOK	The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea

INTRODUCTION

Since Korea emerged from the four decades of Japanese colonial rule in 1945, she was introduced to the idea of Western liberal democracy and its institutional apparatus, including political parties. Needless to say, the constitutional government established in 1948 was an alien form of government, and the values it represented were different from Korea's traditional political culture, if not in direct opposition to it. In some twenty-five years since the liberation, the Korean political system has performed well short of the standards of a stable democracy. One most obvious failure has been its breakdown of constitutionalism: since her independence, the transfer of political power from one group to another has never been effected through constitutional means.

In 1960, the Liberal Party regime of Syngman Rhee was ousted by the April Student Uprising. It was followed by a brief interim regime under Hŏ Chŏng. In May, 1961, the Second Republic of the Democrats was overthrown by a military coup d'etat. After two years of rule by men in military uniform, the Democratic Republican Party government of Park Chung Hee came to power with the resources and advantages accrued during the military rule and with the help of the preemptive organization of a new party. Under various pretexts, the rule of each of these regimes has been facilitated by resorting to constitutional, legal and political manipulations of dubious

merit. By the time of the writing of this study, martial law has been declared five times; constitution has been revised six times.

The apparent failure of the constitutional government in Korea demands explanations and solutions. Students of the Korean political system have described such failure in terms of "trial of democracy," "the triumph of personalism over institutionalism," "instability," "authoritarian rule," and so on and so forth. The burden of this thesis is to argue that the roots of such failure lie in the defects of Korean parties and party systems.

In the chaos of the post-liberation era, a kaleidoscopic number of parties emerged overnight. These "parties" were not parties in the strictest sense. They resembled the cliques, clubs and groups of notables. These political groupings had little durability and practically no structure other than paper organizations required by the United States military authorities. In this period, these parties reflected the fragmentation of the Korean nationalist movement. With the coming of independence and the election of the Constituent National Assembly, these parties were no more than parliamentary negotiating groups without any social base. The groupings split and merged in a confusing series of permutations and combinations. The competition among them was a "closed system" in which the actors continually shifted partners and antagonists without ever enlarging the number of participants.

The attempts to perpetuate power though constitutional amendments polarized the politicians. This polarization is significant in the context of party development in Korea and eventually helped to bring about a fairly stable division of the electorate. With the third party having been eliminated for various reasons, a modified version of two party politics has been the norm of Korean politics at least since 1954.

The aim of this dissertation is to probe into the place of political parties in the Korean political process from 1945 up to the time of 1971 elections. The word "place" is carefully chosen. The massive recent literature on political parties notwithstanding,¹ political scientists have failed to agree on the most desirable methodology on approaching the problems of political parties. The chief difficulty arises as to whether the operations of political parties and party systems should be seen as functions in the course of political development, or whether the general course of development has instead shaped parties and party systems, or simply whether

¹Recent monographs and articles on political parties are too numerous to mention. But to name a few: Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); William Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); William Chambers and Walter Burnham, The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development(New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Kenneth Janda, "The International Comparative Political Parties Project" (Prepared for delivery at 65th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 2-6, 1969).

parties can serve as an organizational setting for the occurrence of political behavior. At one juncture, according to William Chambers and Walter Durnham, "parties may be viewed as the outgrowth of a development process-- the culmination as it were of process of social, economic and political change,"² thus confirming their dependent role. At another juncture, however, they "can be seen as an independent institutional force affecting political development itself." "Thus the capacity of a society to cope with the crises of integration, participation or distribution... may in large measure be affected by the kinds of parties which have materialized. Parties may thus be seen here as independent variables which have profound effects on the process of political, social and economic change."³

In this study, the author chooses to approach the problem of Korean political parties both as dependent and independent variables. The development of political parties in Korea should be seen within the framework of the series of crises the country was subjected to in the postwar era.⁴ Like many new nations of Asia and Africa, a series of political, social and economic crises descended upon Korea

²Chambers and Burnham, op. cit., p. 4 and see also Janda, op. cit., p. 5.

³LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit., pp. 41-42.

⁴The concept of "crises" is discussed in Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), pp. 62-67. Also see Leonard Biner, et. al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 3-72.

overnight. Inability to deal with these crises in an orderly and leisurely manner spelled problems for achieving stability. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner have hypothesized that the configuration of political parties will continue to be strongly conditioned by the manner in which historical crises, subsequent to the onset of parties, materialize and are responded to.⁵

Second, it should be important to probe into the role of Korean political parties as an institutional force affecting the course of political development and the question of democracy itself. Among the earlier writers of political parties, there had been a tendency to equate democracy with political parties. There seems to be a good reason for this assumption for the rise of political parties in the West roughly coincided with the democratic impulse. Although Roberto Michels' "iron law" questioned this assumption, many political scientists nevertheless have come to argue that the study of political parties is synonymous with the study of democracy itself. Competition among parties was held to be necessary, if not sufficient proof of democracy. Perhaps the strongest statement regarding the inseparability of parties and democracy has been made by E. E. Schattschneider in his Party Government.⁶

⁵LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit., p. 2.

⁶E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 1. Emphasis mine. Perhaps Schattschneider overstated his case. It may be safe to say that when democracy is considered to be in crisis, a considerable portion of the blame is assigned to political parties.

The parties, in fact, have played a major role as makers of governments, more especially they have been makers of democratic government. It should be stated flatly at the outset; this volume is devoted to the thesis that the political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties.

In light of the importance accorded to political parties in the functioning of democracy and political development, it should be fruitful to make a study of political parties in the Korean democratic process.

In accordance with this broad guideline, Chapter I will be devoted to a discussion of several themes in Korean political tradition that set the framework for the modern Korean political parties and processes. I fully recognize that there is an inherent limitation in discussing such a vast topic in so limited a space, but I also realize that some attempts must be made to provide the historical, cultural and social profile of premodern Korea from which modern Korea has emerged.

In Chapter II, I shall probe, in a rather detailed fashion, the origins and the stages of development of political parties within the peculiar context of postwar Korean politics. The Korean parties are seen here as dependent variables. For convenience's sake, I have divided the period under study into four sections, one each for the three republics and a separate section on the period of the American military occupation. Here, I shall explore the functions and operations of Korean political parties relating to significant political events.

In structural terms, a party can be said to be composed of three sectors, which are unevenly and differentially involved in various activities: the party organization which includes, among other things, party leadership and formal as well as informal machinery or hierarchy; the party in the government, which is that part of the party structure in the executive and the legislative branches of the government; the party in the electorate, composed of individuals or groups of individuals who have varying degrees of loyalty to the party. I call this trinity of party sectors party structures.⁷ These structures have, in turn, sub-structures and they perform certain activities in the pursuit of power. We shall use this scheme in discussing Korean political parties as an independent variable.

In Chapter III, the major existing parties are discussed from the perspectives of ideology, organization, and leadership. The nature of the variables such as ideological orientations, the formal structure, the locus of power, the degree of centralization, the patterns of decision-making, the recruitment of resources, and the values and goals of the individuals will be the subject of scrutiny.

Chapter IV will examine the party in the electorate, including such problems as the nature of the ties between interest groups--

⁷Here, I owe my ideas to Frank Sorauf, Party Politics in America (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968), pp. 1-25.

of associational, institutional and anomic variety-- and political parties. An attempt will be made to sketch a profile of the Korean electorate with the help of the available opinion surveys and aggregate data-- the electorate's view about democratic institutions, political parties, the differences between the urban-rural and regional voters in all aspects of voting behavior. Unfortunately, I did not possess the resources sufficient to conduct my own opinion survey of the Korean electorate.

In Chapter V, a case study of the 1971 presidential election is made in the belief that the activity and the vitality of the party can be best discerned in times of electoral campaigns. I shall discuss the strategic environment, the procedures for selecting candidates and the campaign activities themselves.

Chapter VI discusses the hold of the party in terms of the degree of cohesion, the conception of representation and the style and the intensity of oppositions in the legislature. In this chapter, the emphasis is placed upon the social and psychological differences between the ruling and opposition party legislators.

Finally, some clarification of terminology seems to be in order. A "political party" in this study will be understood simply as any "organization that pursues a goal of placing their avowed

representatives in government positions."⁹ A "faction" is used as a value-free word, as opposed to such synonyms as "clique," "cabal," or "sect," and simply means a grouping within a political party regardless of the basis of cohesion. The "mainstream" or the "maincurrent" faction is defined as that grouping within a political party which controls most of its decision-making agents and the "anti-maincurrent" or "anti-mainstream" faction is used to mean that minority grouping within the same party.

⁹This is the definition provided by Janda, op. cit., p. 6. To list but some other definitions of a political party, LaPalombara and Weiner say: "An organization that is vocally articulated, that interacts with and seeks to attract the electoral support for the general public, that plays a direct and substantive role in political development, and that is committed to the capture or maintenance of power, either alone or in combination with others." LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit., p. 29. The same co-authors list additional characteristics which a political party should have: (1) continuity in organization; (2) manifest and presumably permanent organizations at the local level with communications with national units; (3) self-conscious effort to gain power; (4) a concern on the part of the organizations for seeking followers at the polls or in some manner striving for popular support. Ibid., p. 6. Sigmund Neumann defines political party as "the articulate organization of society's active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for popular support with another group or groups holding divergent views." As such, it is "the great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies to official governmental institutions and relates them to political action within the larger political community." Sigmund Neumann, Modern Political Parties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 396.

CHAPTER I THE SETTING

The Legacies of Premodern Korean Politics and Society

The twenty-five years of party politics in Korea must not be viewed in isolation from the political tradition and cultures that have preceded this period. The introduction of party politics and liberal democracy was in fact a superimposition of one kind of political system upon another which had existed for centuries. It is important, for this reason, to explore those characteristics of the traditional Korean political culture which have helped mold the environment under which the republican form of government has functioned. In particular, I shall closely examine the political culture of the Yi Dynasty(1392-1905) which was heavily influenced by Confucianism, and the characteristics of the Japanese colonial rule(1910-1945) because these legacies seem to have had a greater impact on the post-war socio-political milieu. I shall also examine socio-economic change since 1945.

It is widely agreed that Korea's heritage of Confucian thought and social pattern has had a strong indirect influence on Korean society.¹ During the early years of Yi Dynasty, Chu Hsi's(1130-1200)

¹See George McCune, Korea Today(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 93; Cornelius Osgood, The Koreans and Their Culture (New York: The Ronald Press, 1951); p. 124; Kim Doo-hun, "Confucian influences on Korean Society," Korea Journal, Vol. III(September, 1963), pp. 17-21, 40-41; and Yim Myonggu and William A. Douglas, "Korean Confucianism Today," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XI, No. 1(Spring/Summer, 1967), pp. 43-59.

Neo-Confucianism was adopted as the state cult replacing decaying Buddhism. The Confucian hold on the Yi society for nearly five hundred years had affected practically every sphere of Korean life then and, to an important degree, up to the present time.

The ethical system of Confucianism in a form practised during Yi Korea was particularistic and family-oriented as opposed to universalistic and state or religion oriented. The elaborate social ethics based on sankang wulun, or the "Three Bonds and Five Relationships," defined the individual's proper conduct in a hierarchically arranged natural order in human relationships and society. By preaching the virtues of obedience, loyalty and remonstrance, the Confucian system played a significant role in maintaining social order and stability. However, these precepts were essentially conservative ones and tended to be status-quo oriented. Aside from having an authoritarian undertone in human relationships, this ethical system has had the effect of ^{the} atomizing/individual's loyalty and heightening his reliance on small groups.

In its political aspects, the atomization of the individual combined with the social conditions that prevailed during Yi Dynasty precluded the development of social groups and other organizations that could check the central power of the state. As a homogeneous state, no substantial cleavages and loyalties existed in terms of religion, language or ethnicity to allow for pluralism in society. As Gregory Henderson has put it, "the [Yi] system gave the development of pluralism no prop and tended to cantilever society... powerfully

toward central power."² In addition, Henderson has said:

Exclusion of foreign trade and the control and derogation of commercial functions by the central bureaucracy prevented the development of business class, ports or specialization that could serve local strength. Local institutions were weak, diffuse...³

The existence of an all-encompassing central bureaucratic power and the concomitant lack of social organizations meant that nearly all aspects of people's lives were controlled by the state power. The relationship between the ruling elites and the masses was defined in the idea of kwanjon minbi, "Respect the Officials and Despise the Commoners," in which the officials demanded unconditional obedience and loyalty from the masses. When the quality of administration deteriorated to an intolerable degree in the latter half of the Yi Dynasty, such servile masses could not help but be alienated from the state and its agents. Generally speaking, the government bureaucrats, central or local alike, were a feared lot who extracted unreasonable levies and labor services from commoners. This fear of bureaucrats, intensified to a significant degree during the Japanese rule, has persisted to the present day.⁴ Meanwhile the

² Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of Vortex (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 24.

³ Ibid., p. 195.

⁴ For a brief but interesting discussion of centralization in Korean history, see Gregory Henderson, "Centralization and Korean Political Development, Report (International Conference on the Problem of Modernization in Asia) (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1966), pp. 309-322.

existence of a powerful central bureaucracy inhibited local initiative. In an agrarian society, all local matters of agriculture and marketing were supervised by the state bureaucracy. As the peasants were discouraged from taking an independent action, they were in the habit of waiting for the state to recognize problems and present solutions. The lack of local initiative, again greatly accentuated under the Japanese colonial administration, presents itself as a problem in Korea today.

The Yi society was divided into four distinct classes: the yangban, the aristocrats composed of higher echelon officials of the government and their families and descendants: chun'in, or ajŏn, lower echelon officials and clerks in both the central and provincial administration: sangmin, mostly peasants: chŏnmin, the lowest social stratum comprised of butchers, peddlers and servants.⁵ The social status and occupations of these classes were patrimonially fixed for their posterity, although in rare instances, a rise or fall in status did occur.⁶ The top positions in the government were open only to the members of the yangban class, and the latter found the precepts of Confucianism a convenient tool to perpetuate

⁵Han T'ae-su, Hyŏndae Hankuk Chŏngch'iron (Contemporary Korean Politics) (Seoul: Huimun Ch'ulpansa, 1968), pp. 36-37.

⁶For social class system during the Yi Dynasty, see Han Woo-keun. "The Stratification of Yi Dynasty Society and the Process of Its Change," Korean Affairs, Vol. II, No. 1(1963), pp. 38-43.

their power. Hence, the traditional society in Korea was marked by a dual cultural system-- that of the yangban and of the masses. The ruling elites, by holding political power, held and monopolized economic resources as well. Therefore, the history of the Yi Dynasty was, in a way, that of struggles among the members of the top social class to maintain and gain access to officialdom, which was the single and the only source to power, wealth and social prestige.

Competition among the members of the yangban contributed toward the widely condemned phenomenon called factionalism during the Yi Dynasty. As one student of Korean history has put it, "the causes of political factionalism in Korea are a lot more difficult to explain than its characteristics."⁷ No one has come forward with a satisfactory causative theory of factions during the Yi Dynasty and subsequent periods of Korean history. As a pervasive phenomenon then and later, it is imperative that we make an attempt at explaining the causes of faction. Han Wu-kun had explained the origin of faction in the following manner:⁸

The yangban in the ruling stratum, because of their hereditary status, eventually increased as time passed. Since the prime purposes of the yangban was to occupy civil public offices, whose number was fixed at approximately 500, it became obvious that there were not enough offices for the number of officials.... Competition among the yangban for the limited number of public offices led to strife within

⁷Edward W. Wagner, "Korean Modernization: Some Historical Consideration," Comment, No. 20, 1963, p. 24.

⁸Han Woo-keun, op. cit., p. 41

their class. In fact, the political conflict among the mid-Yi Dynasty can largely be attributed to this fundamental social condition.

It could further be hypothesized that the fragmentation of the ruling elite during the Yi Dynasty had been a product of kwakŏ, the Civil Service Examination System, which emphasized mere recitation of Confucian Classics. The successful candidates recruited into officialdom hence were generalists in their functions and roles, which became highly undifferentiated. This fact made few persons indispensable.

The origin of factional disputes during the Yi Dynasty was related ostensibly to the question of correct interpretation of Confucian doctrines and decorums. Gradually these disputes degenerated into a political controversy on such small and insignificant matters as⁹ whether the queen should be mourned for a year or for three years.⁹ Starting toward the middle of the sixteenth century, the factional rivalries were stabilized in Sasaek or "Four Colors", representing four factions, members of each having distinguishing colors and dress styles.¹⁰ Each of these factions was formed usually along clan or provincial lines to recruit individuals in the struggle

⁹For issues of factional disputes, see Kim Dŭk-hwang, Hankuk Sasangsa (A History of Korean Thought) (Seoul: Namsandang, 1958), pp. 140-143.

¹⁰For Yi factionalism, see Choi Suk, "The Factional Struggle in the Yi Dynasty of Korea, 1575-1725, "I and II, Koreana Quarterly Vol. VII. No. 1(Spring, 1965), pp. 60-91; and No. 2(Summer, 1965), pp. 70-96.

to place their members in influential positions. Each consanguinary faction gathered around one dominant personality, and this pattern of personal factionalism has its present-day manifestations in all Korean organizations.

Personal factionalism has had other consequences. Organized vertically and horizontally by blood relations, the victory of one faction meant that the members of that faction would be recruited to minor positions in the central or a provincial administration. Under a recruitment policy based virtually on lineage, the chokbo, lineage register, played an important part in the factional battles. The confrontation of the cliques for the purpose of gaining power was in a way a fight of one lineage clique against another, and this was, in another dimension, one region against another where each of these lineage cliques was concentrated.¹¹

Regional or sectional factionalism actually dates back to the time of the Three Kingdoms and the struggle among the three kingdoms of Kokuryō (37 B.C.-668 A.D.), Paekche (18 B.C.-660 A.D.), and Silla (57 B.C.-935 A.D.) for hegemony in the peninsula. The confrontation between Silla and Paekche, which roughly occupied the present-day Kyōngsang and Chōnra provinces, was especially prominent and the past animosities were carried over to the present generations, albeit in

¹¹Yi Ki-baek, "Hankuksasangŭi Chiban; Taerip," (Regional Confrontations in Korea History), in his Minjokkwa Yōksa (The Nation and the History) (Seoul: Iljogak, 1971), pp. 88-89.

a different form.¹² In present-day Korea, regional origin often becomes an important criterion for appointments to key government posts. Charges of preferential treatment for certain regional groups and persons are often heard.

If the causes of factionalism in traditional Korea are yet to be explored, it is relatively easy to discern its consequences. In this regard, Edward W. Wagner says:¹³

The most striking consequence may be summed up, though all too mildly, in the word maladministration. In terms of mechanics of government, this meant administrative paralysis, bureaucratic inertia, irresponsibility and insufficiency, crisis government. In the realm of political morality, it meant corruption, nepotism, character assassination, opportunism, toadyism. Elsewhere in the Korean value system factionalism brought an excessive emphasis on individual, clan, school, and regional loyalties, it brought an overriding concern with individuals rather than with issues, with minutiae rather than with matters of substance; and it brought the concept of dissent into dangerous proximity with that of treason. Some of these features of traditional Korean political life, this heritage of factionalism have in some measure passed from the scene. But many of them still today hamper the Korean effort to build a healthy, modernized society.

To summarize several themes in the political tradition in premodern Korea, it can be said that the rigid social class system prevented the

¹²One of the ten testaments proclaimed by the founder of Koryo Dynasty(936-1211), Wang Kōn, reads as follows: "The topographic features of the territory south of Kongju and beyond the Kongju River[presently the Chōnra provinces]are all treacherous and disharmonious, and its inhabitants are also treacherous and disharmonious. For that reason, if they are allowed to participate in the affairs of the state, to intermarry with the royal family, aristocracy, and royal relatives and to take power of the state, they might imperil the state or injure the royal safety-- grudging the loss of their own state which used to be the Kingdom of Paekche and being resentful of unification. Quoted and translated in Hahn Pyong-choon, The Korean Political Tradition and Law(Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1967), pp. 49-50.

¹³Wagner, op. cit., p. 25.

masses from participating in the political process in any form, and that in the homogeneous socio-cultural environment, no viable intermediary organizations were able to survive, with the state power being comprehensive and authoritarian. The Confucian precepts defined the relationship between the masses and the state in a hierarchical, authoritarian manner: the state was paternalistically authoritarian and the masses were obediently submissive.

Toward the end of the Yi Dynasty, the social class system based on the Confucian ethical values was difficult to maintain. The number of yangban increased tremendously without the corresponding increases in government posts. This caused a great number of the members of that class to be unemployed and impoverished. As conflicts between Western Powers and Japan and China were mounting during the latter part of the nineteenth century, many of the impoverished yangban members took part in several extragovernmental attempts to awaken the decaying kingdom to modernity and to the outside world. Non-governmental groups, such as the Independence Club, founded by Sŏ Jae-p'il (Philip Jaesohn) in 1896, emerged to counter encroachments by foreign powers, but they failed to attract widespread support from the masses.¹⁴

¹⁴ The Independence Club is regarded by some Korean political scientists as a forerunner to political parties that emerged after 1945. That the founder of the Club regarded it as a political party is revealed in his autobiography: "Since I believed that it would be difficult to spread the reform ideology of liberal democracy only through the medium of a newspaper Independence Press, published in 1896, I have decided to organize a political faction and to spread that idea with the help of many persons. Herein lay my motive for organizing the Independence Club." Quoted in Han Hŭng-su, "Toknip Hyŏphoeŭi Chŏngch'i Jiptanhwakwachŏng," (The Politicization of the Independence Club), Sahoekwahak Nonjip No. 3, Yŏnse University, (Seoul: Institute of Social Sciences, 1970), p. 29.

The Colonial Situation

After Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910, a highly centralized and authoritarian colonial rule was imposed on Korea. Korea was ruled by decree under a line of active and retired Japanese generals and admirals. In what amounted to a police state, the Government General of Korea(Chosen Shotokufu) and its Japanese and Korean agents were the objects of fear and hate. As far as the masses were concerned, the image of the government was one of exploitation and extortion.

Introduction of a public educational system, industry and a modified administrative system had the effect of weakening the stratified social structure inherited from the Yi Dynasty. In fact, the social class system of Korea had been in the state of disintegration even before the Japanese came to Korea. During the Japanese rule, the social class system was abolished by law, but many of the former yangban were able to retain their high social status because of their land base. During the Japanese rule, although many of the former yangban class were forced to sell their land for use by the Japanese, many were allowed to retain it. It was principally those sons of the landed aristocrats who could afford higher education either at home or abroad. With better education, they were able to keep their high social status which the commoners could not achieve.

The Japanese policy called for the domination of the government by Japanese personnel. Including a small number of the Yi cabinet ministers who were made Japanese peers, only about one-half of all

government employees were Koreans by 1945. Most Koreans were appointed to clerical and other minor posts. In 1936 there were altogether 87,552 government employees in the various bureaus of the Government General's office and in the provincial, municipal and educational offices. Of these, 35,282 were Koreans and the rest Japanese.¹⁵ More than 80 percent of the top grade officials (chokunin and sonin) were Japanese; about 60 percent of the officials in the intermediary ranks(hanmin) were Japanese: Koreans occupied about 50 percent of the clerical, secretarial and other minor posts in the colonial government. The only all Korean body allowed by the Japanese was the Central Advisory Council(Chushuin), nominally representing Korean interests in advising the Governor General. Composed of sixty-five Councillors, who were appointed by the Governor-General and who were predominantly former yangban landed aristocrats, this body had no substantive power. The council could offer advice only at the request of the Governor-General and then upon a specific subject.¹⁶

The oligarchical rule by the yangban class during the Yi Dynasty was replaced by the Japanese bureaucrats. The development of a modern transportation system and modern communication channels allowed the colonial bureaucracy to penetrate deeply into the rural population.

¹⁵ George M. McCune, Korea's Postwar Political Problems (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947), p. 4. See also Pak Tong-sŏ, Hankuk Kwanrychedoŭi Yŏksajŏk Chŏnkae (A Study of the Korean Bureaucratic System) (Seoul: Hankuk Yŏn'gu Tosŏkwan, 1961).

¹⁶ McCune, op. cit., p. 4.

The massive bureaucracy affected the everyday lives of ordinary peasants. The image of the exploitive and oppressive Yi Dynasty administrators was replaced by the ordeal of the repressive alien rulers. In the beginning of the Japanese era, a village administrative structure based on kinship groups was introduced for better control, increased production and more efficient collection of taxes. In so far as the Koreans were concerned, the structure of power in the society remained unaltered, though power itself was in alien hands. The "reforms" carried out by the Japanese failed to alter the traditional oligarchical pattern of distribution of power in society. It is no wonder that almost half of the members of the 1948 Constituent National Assembly listed their occupation as "farmers." It is easy to see that most of these farmers were actually landlord by background and possibly descendants of yangban families.¹⁷

Korean nationalism budding with the Tonghak Rebellion of 1894, went into full gear during the Japanese rule.¹⁸ That the nationalist movement, having been suppressed by the omnipotent and omniscient Japanese police, remained ineffectual inside Korea left a serious problem as far as the post-liberation politics was concerned. The main thrust of the nationalist movement was forced to operate abroad,

¹⁷Bae Ho Hahn, "Nature of Social-Political Change in Contemporary Korea," Korean Affairs, Vol. I, No. 2(May/June), 1962, pp. 152-153.

¹⁸For history of Korean nationalism, see Chong-sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963). For the programs of reform and nationalist organizations that had existed from the 1890's up to 1945, see Yi Ki-ha Hankuk Chŏngdang Paltalsa(A History of Korean Political Parties) (Seoul: Uihoe Chŏngch'isa, 1961), pp. 4-49.

with China, Russia and the United States as its main centers. On April 9, 1919, the Korean Provisional Government was established in Shanghai with Syngman Rhee as its first President. But the failure to make headway in the 1920's and 1930's left the leaders of this "Government" deeply divided and frustrated, hence unable to provide the sorely needed unified leadership in the critical period after the liberation, during which the major criterion of leadership was one's anti-Japanese record. A writer has made the following sarcastic remark:¹⁹

Any persons who returned from China or Manchuria enjoyed the reputation of being ardent anti-Japanese nationalists. Almost all of those who were freed from prisons in Korea transformed into patriots and received fabulous treatment from the populace. It was indeed difficult to pick out a true patriot.

The Japanese surrender brought these exiled nationalist revolutionaries home from abroad. They were men of various backgrounds with varying claims of contributions to the nationalist cause. They included, among others, rightist revolutionaries, socialists, Communists, anarchists, syndicalists, and liberal democrats of various levels of commitment. Samuel Huntington once noted that the importance of the political party in providing legitimacy and stability in a modernizing political system varies inversely with institutional inheritance of the system from traditional society.²⁰ The above analysis of the

¹⁹Kang Chin-hwa, Taehanminkuk Kōnkuk Sinnyōnji (A Ten Year History of the Republic of Korea) (Seoul: Taehanminkuk Kōnkuk Sinnyōnji Kanhaenghoe, 1956), p. 186.

²⁰Huntington, "Political Development and Decay," World Politics, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (1965), pp. 386-436. By "institution," Huntington means "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior."

premodern Korean political traditions and the colonial situation clearly shows that such "institutions" of great variety have cast their shadows upon the post-liberation period and beyond.

Social Change After 1945

As was discussed earlier, the Confucian ethics combined with the centralism of Yi Dynasty prevented the rise of organizations that could stand between the atomized individuals and the all-inclusive state power. This tradition was reinforced during the bureaucratic rule by the Japanese colonial overlords. In a society which is homogeneous ethnically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously, the cleavages that are attendant upon other "new" states do not exist in Korea. Cleavages occur along the lines of urban-rural, industrial-agricultural, modern-traditional, or educated-uneducated. The social class system, already in a state of disintegration in the last one hundred years or so of the Yi Dynasty, was undermined legally by the Japanese and then further shattered by the land reform program immediately after independence, by the impact of the Korean War, and by the availability of mass educational opportunities. The only social class that possibly inherited its status from the premodern era and the Japanese rule was the peasants.

By the time of liberation, there were large number of absentee landlords who were left alone by the Japanese colonial administration. During the Japanese period, some of these landlords, many of whom were former members of the yangban class or their descendants, sold

their land and redirected their resources to business where the Japanese industrialization program left open many opportunities. The social base of the Korean Democratic Party that emerged at the wake of liberation was largely this landlord class. The economic base of these men, however, deteriorated when the land reform program was initiated by the American occupation authorities and finally carried through by the new Korean Government in 1949. The Agrarian Reform Act that year redistributed close to 25 percent of the total farming area in South Korea to more than a million and a half farm households which represented about 70 percent of all farm households in South Korea.²¹ The absentee landlords were compensated by installment payments in cash from the national treasury. As the value of money was eroding rapidly by postwar inflation which came immediately after the implementation of the program, the landlord class reinvested what was left of their resources in other endeavors-- such as in education of their sons, or in business. By weakening the economic base of the landlords, this land reform had a levelling effect on the society.

Another factor at work was the newly arrived opportunity for education. In a rigidly stratified society like the Yi Dynasty, educational opportunity was severely limited to the yangban class and few others. "Letteredness" was the mark of yangban and this cultural tradition helped the Koreans to respond enthusiastically to the newly

²¹Hahn-Been Lee, Korea: Time, Change and Administration. (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968), p. 51.

opened opportunities for higher education. Public educational system was introduced during the colonial rule, but opportunities ^{were} in fact severely limited. Only the first sons of the well-to-do landlords could afford a university education, and some attended colleges abroad, particularly in Japan.

A compulsory public educational system was introduced at the elementary school level by the American military authorities in 1945 and it was formally adopted by the Korean Government in 1948. This system was accompanied by a tremendous rise in secondary and university level school population throughout South Korea. As the following Table 1 indicates,²² the school population increased from 1.5 million in 1948 to 3.8 million in 1955 and six million in 1964.

Table 1. School Population in Korea, 1945-1964

	1945	1955	1964
Elementary	1,382,000	2,959,000	4,744,000
Secondary	85,000	748,000	1,066,000
Higher	8,000	87,000	143,000
Total School Population (a)	1,475,000	3,774,000	5,953,000
Total Population (b)	16,000,000	21,000,000	28,000,000
(a) as percentage of (b)	9	18	21

The spectacular rise in the school population reflected the people's awareness that in the newly established order of "equality", the only

²²Ibid., p. 49.

chance for upward mobility lay in education. Preoccupation with education was so great that even many of the not-so-well-to-do farmers sent their sons to Seoul for a university education, even at great sacrifice to their financial status at home. Eventually, the consequences of such preoccupation were expressed in the great many educated unemployed who could not be absorbed into the labor force, thus creating social problems of a serious magnitude.

The effects of the Korean War(1950-1953) were far-reaching in many respects. The human casualties and physical damages broke up families and brought in refugees from the north. Through a universal conscription system, young men from the rural villages were introduced to the army camps' modern technologies and organization modeled after the United States Army. The Korean Army, now with some 600,000 men in uniform, has served as the nation's largest educational system, contributing significantly to reducing widespread illiteracy rate in Korea. The military forces also provided great educational opportunities to those of peasant background, who were otherwise without means to receive a civilian education. Through various programs at home and abroad, principally in the United States, a strong corps of modernizing elite in uniform was born. As a student of Korean society has observed, "Korea today comes close to having no class structure at all."²³ From the perspectives of the political parties, this situation hinders a party from having a distinct class base. This

²³William A. Douglas, "The Current Status of Korean Society," Korean Affairs, Vol. I, No. 4(1962), p. 390.

is why the interest group activities based on socio-economic growth have largely been ineffectual.

One significant social development in the postwar period has been the tremendous impact of urbanization. Impacts of modern education centered in Seoul and large cities, industrialization which has occurred in the vicinity of large cities, the Korean War which has created a tremendous exodus from rural areas, and also the agrarian reform, fragmenting average farm size and aggravating rural poverty--^{these} are some of the reasons for the growth of urban population. The following table recapitulates the trend of urbanization (Table 2).²⁴

A more recent survey by the Korean Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry indicates that as of 1970, 55.3 percent of the total population

Table 2. Urbanization in Korea 1940-1960

Administrative Subdivisions with Population of:	Percentage of the Total Population			
	1940*	1949	1955	1960
50,000 and Over	11.2	28.3	25.3	28.5
20,000 to 49,999	19.5	27.5	33.9	40.9

*The figure for 1940 includes both North and South Korea.

lived in the cities of 50,000 or over. Compared with the figure 28.5 percent ten years ago (1960), this has meant a 27.8 percent

²⁴Adapted from Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook (Seoul: Economic Planning Board, 1965), Table 27, p. 17.

increase in a short span of ten years.²⁵ The city is defined in Korea as an administrative area with a population of 50,000 or more. There were fourteen such cities in Korea in 1950. This number grew to 28 in 1960 and 32 in 1970. Similarly, the proportion of population living in large cities of 100,000 and more was only 8.7 percent in 1940. However, the same proportion increased to 14.7 percent in 1949, 19.6 percent in 1955, and 20.1 percent in 1960. The rate of annual increase in the size of urban population is as high as 6.4 percent. In the metropolitan area of Seoul, the population increased by 55 percent in the five year period from 1955 to 1960. From 1960 to 1970, the figure for the same ^{period} was 220 percent.²⁶ As has been suggested, such a tremendous tempo of urbanization has not been effected with concomitant changes in other socio-economic variables, but it was a consequence of rural dislocation caused by the war, the educational revolution, the agrarian reform and the industrial development in recent years. This unbalanced growth has had a significant political implication, which we will discuss in a later chapter.

²⁵For the characteristics of Korea urbanization, see Lee Taikwhi, "Urbanization and Its Political Implications in Korea" Korean Affairs, Vol. III (December, 1964), pp. 304-314.

²⁶The Dong-A Ilbo, June 30, 1971, p. 2.

CHAPTER II THE GENESIS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 1945-1969

Liberation and the American Military Government, 1945-1948

In the delirium of liberation the expected onrush of political activities commenced with various political groups and personalities claiming their past virtues and presenting their vision for the liberated country. Coming together of groups and personalities on the political stage in this critical period of Korean history was dictated largely by the circumstances of the liberation. When the Japanese defeat in the war was imminent, the Japanese colonial administrator in Seoul, Governor General Abe Nobuyuki, began to make overtures to prominent Koreans in his quest to protect Japanese lives and property. Abe and his Political Affairs Bureau Chief Endo Ryusaku approached Song Chin-u, a well known conservative publisher of the Dong-A Ilbo, the oldest and the most prestigious daily newspaper, to form a caretaker government and to accept the transfer of authority in return for the guarantee of the safety of Japanese lives. Song declined the proposal on the grounds that the American occupation forces would arrive shortly and that any cooperation he would give would be to these forces and not the Japanese.¹

The Japanese authorities then turned to a leftist publisher of the Chung'ang Ilbo, Yŏ Un-hyŏng, who had taken part in the Korean

¹Chung'ang Sŏn'gŏ Wiwŏnhoe(Central Election Management Committee), Taehanminkuk Chŏngdangsa(A History of Political Parties in Korea), (Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1967), p. 76.

Provisional Government in the early 1920's and who was equally well known as Song. Yŏ, who had anticipated the Japanese defeat and secretly organized the Korean Alliance for Independence inside Korea as early as 1944, accepted only a few days before the surrender was announced, the Japanese proposal under several conditions. They included, among other things, the immediate release of all political prisoners from Seoul cells; provision of food and supplies for Seoul citizens for the month of August, September and October; and no interference with Yŏ's organizing activities among students, laborers and farmers.² The decision on the part of the Japanese was a critical one for this period, the rationale for which can only be speculated. Yŏ's reputation among Koreans was an important factor but the Japanese authorities, lacking information on the Allied agreement on the 38th parallel and apparently believing that Seoul would be occupied by the Russian troops shortly,³ turned to the leftists.⁴

On August 15, when the Japanese surrender was announced, Yŏ called a meeting of his allies, including prominent Communists, many of whom had been freed from Seoul cells, socialists and progressives. He also invited rightist nationalists to work with him during the period of transition. The result of this effort was the creation

²Ibid.

³On August 16, Endo called on Yŏ to tell him that the Americans would occupy only the extreme southern part of Korea, and the Russians the rest of the peninsula. This is a rumor that had been said to have originated in the active Soviet Consul-General in Seoul. See Henderson, op. cit., p. 115.

⁴Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 67.

of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence(CPKI). Although some rightists joined this organization, most of them refused to join the CPKI on the grounds that Yŏ should await the return of the Korean Provisional Government and its leaders from Chungking and also that it would be unwise to cooperate with the Japanese. During the interval between the Japanese surrender and the return to Korea of such recognized leaders of the independence movement as Syngman Rhee who had been in the United States, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik(Kim Kiusic) who had been in China, Yŏ's CPKI had no rivals in the first three weeks of the liberation. Having partially taken over the existing administrative machinery, it was in far better position than any other group to wield power. In the opening days of the liberation the CPKI proceeded to organize "local committees" throughout South Korea, effectively maintaining law and order.⁵ Its representatives told the Americans at their September 8 Inchŏn landing that 135 such local committees had already been established.⁶ Without the participation of the rightists, the CPKI proceeded to hold a "national convention" on September 6, two days before the arrival of American occupation forces. By then, the CPKI was already bearing progressively to the left. Three moderate leftists were ousted from its Central Executive Committee on September 3. The intention of the CPKI leaders was unmistakable:

⁵Ibid., p. 68.

⁶Henderson, op. cit., p. 118.

it was to present the General Hodge's entourage with a fait accompli that a "government" in South Korea was organized. The proclamation that emerged on September 6 stated, among others, that more than a thousand delegates comprising of "nationalists from all walks of life" had decided to "establish a Korean People's Republic and that the delegates were chosen to run the government."⁷ It went on to say:⁸

From this day forward, by the demands of the Korean people and their delegates, it is our intention to overcome any difficulties on our way to eliminate all the remnants of the Japanese imperial government, and to struggle against all foreign elements who stand in the way of establishing an independent nation based on democratic principles.

In the "cabinet" announced on the same day, the delegates, most of whom were leftists, elected, in accordance with an almost universal sentiment, Syngman Rhee as Chairman and Yŏ as Vice-Chairman. One significant development was the election of Hŏ Hŏn, then a non-Communist leader who later became a North Korean leader, as Prime Minister. Most of the ministerial portfolios were given to extreme leftists and Communists, and only a few ministries were headed by rightists.

Alarmed at the inroads the leftists were making in the rapidly changing political scene, the rightists countered with the organization of the Korean Democratic Party(KDP) which sought to win the support of any non-Communists at the time. To this party flocked many who

⁷Central Election Management Committee, Taehanminkuk Chŏngdangsa (A History of Political Parties in Korea), p. 77.

⁸Ibid.

had collaborated with the Japanese rule over Korea. The beginning of September saw the formation of two other rightist parties, the Korean Nationalist Party and the Korean People's Party. In addition to these, Song Chin-u, who had refused to cooperate with the Japanese authorities and the CPKI earlier, organized a group of rightists in the Welcoming Committee for the Korean Provisional Government. The Welcoming Committee, in its proclamation stated that the nation "has felt a clear presence and received spiritual guidance of Korean patriots abroad," and that the government which should replace the colonial government was the "Korean Provisional Government which has existed continuously from 1919."⁹ On September 8, the rightist groups issued a joint statement deploring the CPKI: "We solemnly oppose any group or organization purporting to exercise governmental authority in Korea, except the Korean Provisional Government, which was the climax of our independence movement and which has been so recognized by foreign nations."¹⁰

In addition to these relatively coherent and lasting groups, the internal political scene in the first weeks of the liberation witnessed a kaleidoscopic proliferation of parties, committees, youth groups, farmer, labor and student organizations. These organizations were unstable alliances, some of which organized one morning and were extinct by nightfall. Organizations were made, remade and unmade as their leaders switched their alliances. The

⁹ Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁰ Ibid.

confusing alignment of political forces in the early weeks and months of the liberation is well attested by the common joke current during this time that whenever any five persons met to discuss the future of Korea, they formed a new political party.¹¹

When General Hodge arrived in Seoul with his entourage on September 8, he was ill-equipped to handle the complex political picture.¹² He immediately ran into difficulties and back tracked the first few moves he had made. The source of his difficulty was varied and the roots of all problems lay in the vague framework of directives he carried with him from his home government. It is, therefore, essential to sketch the outline of the United States policy toward Korea and the state of preparedness for occupation prior to the conclusion of the war. All evidence seems to indicate that the United States had not clearly formulated its objectives and policies with regards to liberated Korea.

The decision to make Korea an independent nation was first reached in the Cairo Conference on December 1, 1943 by the United States, Great Britain and China. The Cairo Declaration took note of the state of "enslavement of the people of Korea" and stated the three powers' "determination" that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." In the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, setting out the terms of Japanese surrender, the three powers

¹¹ Cornelius Osgood, The Koreans and Their Culture (New York: The Ronald Press, 1951), p. 303.

¹² For American "comical" preparation for Korean occupation, see, Henderson, op. cit., pp. 120-125.

reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration regarding Korean independence and the Soviet Union expressed its adherence to the Potsdam Declaration in her declaration of war against Japan on August 8, 1945.

The primary duty of the occupying forces was to demobilize the Japanese military forces and to liquidate the Japanese administration. The former turned out to be a relatively easy task but the latter was a painstaking process since it necessitated establishment of a substitute regime. The directives General Hodge carried explicitly instructed him to superimpose an American Military Government upon the framework of the Japanese Government General in Korea and to oust the Japanese personnel by substituting them with Koreans wherever possible, but he was not to recognize any Korean group as having governmental authority.¹³ One of the first declarations of the American Military Government read: "United States policy prohibits official recognition or utilization for political purposes of any so-called Korean Provisional Government or any other political organization by the United States Forces."¹⁴

The initial Korean reaction toward the occupation forces was a series of hostility and dismay. An official publication of the

¹³The Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew stated on June 8, 1945 in reference to the Korean participation in the United Nations Conference that the "'Korean Provisional Government' and other organizations do not possess at any time the qualifications requisite for obtaining recognition by the United States as a governing authority." He went on to say: "It is the policy of this government in dealing with groups such as the 'Korean Provisional Government' to avoid taking action which might, when the victory of the United Nations is achieved, tend to compromise the right of the Korean people to choose the ultimate form and personnel of the government which they may wish to establish." Quoted in George M. McCune, Korea Today, , p. 42.

¹⁴The United States Military Government in Korea, Summation of the United States Army Military Activities in Korea, No. 1, p. 177.

military government frankly admitted that the initial step of the American Command to retain Japanese administrators created intense dissatisfaction.¹⁵ This prompted an explanation by President Truman on September 18: "Such Japanese as may be temporarily retained are being utilized as servants of the Korean people and of our occupying forces only because they are deemed essential by reason of their qualifications."¹⁶ Immediate steps were taken to remedy the trouble, and, in a few days, General Hodge had removed the high Japanese officials and begun the process of de-Japanization.

In the political realm, General Hodge's difficulty hardly improved. Having proclaimed the "People's Republic", the leftists refused to drop the word "Republic" and function as a political party as General Hodge requested them to do. Despite Hodge's repeated press statements that the "military government is the only government in southern Korea," the "Republic", now almost exclusively controlled by the well-known Communists began to label the military authority as "American imperialism" and publicly questioned the sincerity of American intentions for Korean independence. On December 12, Hodge's patience ran out: "I feel it necessary to the public understanding to announce that, regardless of what it calls itself, the Korean People's Republic is not in any sense a 'government'."¹⁷

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶The United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII (September 23, 1943), p. 435.

¹⁷Quoted in, Cho, op. cit., p. 49.

On that day he directed that the activities of any organization "in any attempted operations as a government" were to be treated as unlawful activities.

This was a fateful decision and perhaps indicative of the pro-rightist inclination of the American occupying forces. As one participant in the Military Government put it, "... it was no secret that it [the Military Government] favored the right and was anxious for the parties of the right to acquire strong popular support."¹⁸ When, on October 5, an eleven-member Korean Advisory Council was announced to help the United States Commander, it called the "Republic" an "irresponsible political group."¹⁹ This advisory group was composed mostly of the rightists and headed by Kim Sŏng-su, then the most prestigious rightist in Korea and the owner of the Dong-A Ilbo. In hiring personnel for the government care was taken to exclude leftists.

In the opening struggle between the rightists and the leftists which had taken the form of confrontation between the followers of the Provisional Government and the Republic, the former gained an upper hand in winning the favor of the American Military Government. It was no secret, however, that the Republic's main source of support lay in the well organized support of the Communists at the time of the liberation. The history of Korean Communism dates back to 1918 when the Irkutsk Communist Party established a Korean section by

¹⁸Quoted in ibid., p. 50.

¹⁹Bertram D. Sarafan, "Military Government in Korea," Far Eastern Survey, November, 1946, p. 350.

January of that year. The Koryŏ Communist Party was established in Kharvosk in January, 1921, and the movement spread first to some 60,000 Korean residents in southeastern Siberia, and then the party under the direction and financial support of the revolutionary regime in Russia began to gain supporters in Manchuria and other parts of China as well as inside Korea. Although the Communist Party was forced to operate underground during the Japanese rule, the party nevertheless came to possess a well-knit hierarchy of leaders. Pak Hŏn-yŏng, its acknowledged leader who had little foreign bonds, arrived in Seoul on August 17 from brick-laying in Chŏnra Province, carrying party lists and plans for reorganization. On September 12, he revived the party and was elected Chairman of the Korean Communist Party.²⁰

As a well organized group, the Communists became the heir of the sudden emancipation from the Japanese rule. In the opening weeks of the liberation, the Communists and their affiliated organizations had no rivals. The "peoples' committees" in both North and South Korea collected taxes: they also took over many Japanese factories. One writer concluded that the Communists who controlled the "people's republic" in the opening months of the liberation "was imperium in imperio in South Korea, unquestionably the country's most important single force for at least the first

²⁰ Henderson, op. cit., pp. 312-324.

year."²¹ At the grassroots, the left continued to gain strength. The New York Times report on January 5, 1946 stated that the conservative elements had "fallen far behind liberal as well as radical factions" and that the People's Republic "continues to gain strength in rural areas." The Christian Science Monitor article of January 3 of the same year stated that "the so-called People's Republic, composed of socialist and Communist elements, enjoys far more popular support than any other single political grouping."²² Until the reappearance of the Dong-A Ilbo on December 1, most of the newspapers were leftist inclined. The gain by the Communists was impressive. From roughly 4,000 members at the time of liberation, Pak Hŏn-yŏng, its leader in South Korea, claimed 29,000 on March 1, 1946. The Military Government itself estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Communists during this period.

The rightists' position was strengthened considerably by the return of Syngman Rhee on October 16, 1945 and the arrival of some twenty other leaders of the Provisional Government on November 23, including Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik. This trinity of leaders later split, but in the early months of the liberation, they rendered the rightists tremendous prestige and legitimacy. The most famous of the three was Syngman Rhee. His popularity was based on the fact that he was the first President of the Korean Provisional Government

²¹ Ibid., p. 322.

²² Quoted in McCune, Korea Today, p. 50.

and almost single-handedly agitated for Korean independence abroad. Rhee, on his return from the United States, disavowed any connection between him and a political group. Rhee stated that "... the reason that I come home without prior notice is not because I was on any secret mission or I had any previous arrangement with any particular political party. My wish is that all political parties and factions unite and cooperate for independence of a free nation in Korea."²³ He seemingly stood above the political turmoil and later organized the National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (NARKI).

Kim Ku, another aging revolutionary, was one of the original members of the Provisional Government, and, at the time of liberation, its President. His fame was based primarily on the fact that he was a moving spirit behind the most successful assassination plot ever undertaken by Korean exiles in China. In the Shanghai bombing of 1932, which was plotted under his direction, several Japanese generals were killed or wounded. The incident made him a hero in the eyes of most Koreans and his eminence was further emphasized by his marriage to the daughter of An Chung-kŭn, the assassin of Prince Ito Hirobumi at Harbin in 1909.²⁴ He became the leader of the Korean Independence Party (KIP). The last of the three leaders, Kim Kyu-sik, joined the Provisional Government in 1919 and represented it in

²³Quoted in Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1954), p. 370.

²⁴For his autobiography, see Kim Ku, Baekbŏm Ilji (Member of Kim Ku), 8th Ed., (Seoul: Chŏnpung Publishing Co., 1969).

his last position the Paris Peace Conference. A recipient of a doctorate degree, in the provisional Government was Vice President.

Given the political situation at the time, any form of unity of political groups was conceivable only under Rhee. A poll taken by the Dong-A Ilbo on January 23, 1946, which asked questions of passers-by on four street corners of Seoul, showed that Rhee was a definite front-runner as the "first President of Korea" with 29 percent (out of some 7,000 respondents.) Kim Ku was a distant second with 11 percent; Kim Kys-sik 10 percent; and the moderate leftist leader of the "Republic" Yō Un-Hyōng with another 10 percent.²⁵

When the decision on December 27, 1945 by the Moscow three-power conference to impose a five-year trusteeship over Korea was announced, the Korean reaction-of all political groups- was immediate and hostile. The Korean press condemned it and variously characterized it as a "Second Munich," "mandatory rule," "insult to Korea," "international slavery," and "violation of international treaties."²⁶

²⁵ The Dong-A Ilbo, July 24, 1946, p. 1.

²⁶ The key passages in the Moscow declaration which dealt with the Korean question stated in part: "It shall be the task of the joint Commission (U.S. Command in South Korea and the Soviet Command in North Korea), with the participation of the provisional Democratic Government and of the Korean Democratic organizations, to work out measures also for helping and assisting the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.... The proposals of the joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultations with the provisional Korean Government, for the joint consideration of the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China... for working out an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea for a period up to five years." Quoted in Report of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, Vol. I, General Assembly, Official Records: Third Session, Supplement No. 9 (A/575), Lake Success, New York, 1948, p. 8.

Without waiting for the clarification of the reports, the rightists organized a general work stoppage and mass demonstrations throughout the country. They attempted to take over the police force and the judicial system and whipped up public hysteria in opposition to the Moscow decision. The movement was impressive and the following among Korean employees of the Military Government gave them additional power. The leftists joined in opposition to the trusteeship proposal,²⁷ but on January 3, 1946, they suddenly reversed their position, allegedly under instructions from Cominform, and came out in support of the trusteeship. On the same day, the rightists held a mass rally in Seoul in protest of the Moscow decision.²⁸ Any prospect of bringing about the unity of the left and the right was now foreclosed.

As provided for in the Moscow Declaration, the first session of the United States-Soviet Joint Commission was convened on March 20, 1946 at Dōksu Palace in Seoul. Before the representatives from both sides got down to substantive matters, however, a considerable number of differences arose with regards to the procedure to be followed in consulting with Korean "democratic parties and social organizations" referred to in the Moscow Agreement and the meeting broke down finally on May 8. Each side blamed the other for the deadlock. The United States Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring explained that the

²⁷For the leftist statement opposing the trusteeship proposal, see Han T'ae-su, Hankuk Chōngdangsa (A History of Korean Political Parties) (Seoul: Shint'ae-yangsa, 1961), pp. 66-67.

²⁸Haebang Yisipyinyōnsa (Twenty-two Years Since Liberation) (Seoul: Munhaksa, 1967), Vol. I, p. 234.

cause for the deadlock was the Soviet contention that "all Koreans who had opposed in anyway the terms of the Moscow Agreement should be excluded." Since the Communists were the only group supporting the agreement in question, "the Soviet criterion would have effectively limited the Commission to consultation with one minority group."²⁹ The Soviet explanation blamed the United States for proposing the inclusion of "seventeen political parties and social groups of Southern Korea which opposed the Moscow Agreement and only three democratic parties which supported the agreement,"³⁰ and further claimed that certain parties and social organizations had been debarred for purposes of consultation by the Military Government in Seoul.

Another session of the Joint Commission did not convene until May 21, 1947. After lengthy discussions, the Commission was deadlocked again on the requirement of consultation with Korean parties and social organizations. The United States delegation took the position that all parties and organizations willing to uphold the Moscow Agreement and abide by the decisions of the Commission should be consulted. The Soviet counterpart, however, insisted that the representatives of parties and organizations belonging to the so-called "anti-trusteeship committee" formed by Kim Ku should not be eligible unless they had officially announced withdrawal from this committee.

²⁹ The United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XV (March, 1947), p. 545.

³⁰ Report of the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea,

Among other issues that divided the American and the Soviet delegates were that the United States objected to the alleged exclusion from the Soviet list of consultees of twenty-four political parties claiming a total membership of over fifteen million. The Soviet delegates, on the other hand, countered with the argument that democratic parties and organizations which supported the Moscow Agreement were being subjected by the Military Government to the "severest restrictions" including seizure of their premises, arrest of leaders and suppression of press organs.³¹ On the problem of establishing a provisional Korean government, the American representatives proposed that a provisional representative legislature should be elected by universal suffrage in each zone as a means of constituting a national provisional legislature, to be made up of representatives selected from the legislature of each zone in proportion to its population. The national provisional legislature would then establish "a provisional government for a united Korea." The Soviet delegation, on the other hand, proposed that a provisional All-Korean People's Assembly, constituted of representatives of democratic parties and organizations having 10,000 or more members, and which were known to "sincerely support the Moscow decisions and not be opposed to the Joint Commission or to the Allied Powers," should be established. In the Soviet scheme, representation of the two zones in the Assembly was to be equal.³²

³¹Ibid., p. 11.

³²Ibid.

In the face of these irreconcilable differences, the fate of the Joint Commission was sealed. On August 26, 1947, the United States Government proposed that the question of implementing the Moscow Agreement should be referred forthwith to the Four Powers adhering to that agreement. The Soviet Union announced the refusal to participate in the Four Power discussions on September 4, 1947. The United States, convinced that further efforts to reach an agreement on the basis of the Moscow plan would be futile, brought the question of Korean independence before the United Nations on September 17.³³ The General Assembly, on November 12, despite Soviet opposition, adopted a resolution calling for a general election in all of Korea before March 31, 1948, representation of which was to be based on population and created the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK).

The question of trusteeship drove the nation into a deepening political turmoil. Any chances of reconciliation between the followers of the People's Republic and the Korean Provisional Government now appeared to be doomed. Adversary organizations in this battle took on different names in these rapidly moving times, but the battle line was drawn between the leftists and the rightists. On January 19, 1946, the leftists including the Communists met to discuss the formation of a united front. The resulting Democratic People's Front (DPF), organized on February 15, brought together

³³ George M. McCune, "Postwar Government and Politics of Korea," Journal of Politics, Vol. IX (November, 1947), p. 608.

leaders of four leftist organizations which kept separate entities throughout the opening months of the liberation. Kim Wŏn-bong of the Revolutionary Party, Hŏ Hŏn of the South Korean Labor Party, Pak Hŏn-yŏng of the Communist Party and Yŏ Un-hyŏng of the Korean People's Party were elected to the Supreme Committee of the DPF.³⁴ The leftist strategy was to use their support of the Moscow Agreement as a stepping stone to political power. They tried to discredit the rightists, branding them as pro-Japanese and "national traitors" and contrasting their own support of the Joint Commission to the rightist opposition.

The leftist chances for gaining an upperhand deteriorated rapidly. After having been suspected of a massive counterfeit scandal involving Communists, which was heavily publicized by the Military Government authorities, the leftists', especially the Communists' image suffered considerably. The incident gave the military authorities pretext to tighten the control of the leftists and Communists. The latter, as the most powerful group in the early post-liberation period, was an anathema to Hodge and his military government. The rightists under the protection and encouragement by the military government were beginning to gain popular support. The military authorities lost no time to capitalize on the scandal. On May 8, 1946, two days after the

³⁴ Haebang Yisipyinyŏnsa (Twenty-two Years Since Liberation), p. 236.

scandal was revealed to the public, the military authorities searched the Communists' headquarters in Seoul. This act was followed by a series of moves which tended to vitiate the Communists. On May 18, the occupation authorities proceeded to close the Haebang Ilbo, an official Communist daily, and closed six other semi-official Communist newspapers on September 6. To make the Occupation authorities' displeasure with the Communists complete, the Military Government ordered the arrest of Pak Hŏn-yŏng, the head of the Communist Party in South Korea.³⁵ The leftist movement was now captured by the Communists. With Yŏ's assassination in June, 1947, any hope of the moderates holding the reigns of the leftist movement was doomed.

The rightists, on the other hand, united under the name of the Emergency People's Committee (on January 21) and proceeded to lead the protest movement against the trusteeship. The leadership of this group included all prominent rightists including Rhee, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik. This committee soon dissolved itself in favor of the NARKI under the chairmanship of Rhee. This loose federation of rightists of various backgrounds and experiences, however, had to endure another realignment when the first session of the Joint Commission folded amid differences between the participants. The differences among the rightists emerged over the question of whether to establish a government south of the 38th parallel or for all of Korea. The line was drawn as a military expediency for the Soviet and the American troops to disarm the Japanese.

³⁵Ibid., p. 238. See Also Henderson, op. cit., p. 322.

Syngman Rhee, who had been travelling throughout Korea in his campaign against the trusteeship, announced on June 3, 1946 that he was considering "some sort of a provisional government or a committee in South Korea alone."³⁶ This marked the departure of Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik from Rhee's camp. Kim Kyu-sik, who had been advocating one government for all of Korea, flatly refused to cooperate with Rhee on his proposal from the beginning. Kim Ku at first consented, but announced withdrawal shortly thereafter, stating that he favored a "unified government of North-South, Left-Right."³⁷ The NARKI, however, received the support of the KDP, whose leaders were principally those nationalist leaders who had been in Korea at the time of liberation, and who were under special favor by the American military authorities. Rhee's political line was also supported by those rightists who served in the Japanese bureaucracy. Hence the rightists were divided into two large camps-- the followers of the NARKI and its leader Rhee on the one hand and the Provisional Government circles and their leaders, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik on the other. With the birth of the Korean Independence Party in April, 1946, this division was to endure right up to the time of independence.

While the right wing groups were beginning to drift apart, the moderates of the left and some right wing elements attempted to bring about some sort of unity. One such movement was organized

³⁶Ibid., p. 237.

³⁷Ibid.

on the initiative of Kim Kyu-sik and Yŏ Un-hyŏng in July, 1946. However, the so-called Left-Right Unity Conference stalemated after a month of discussion due to the participants' widely diverging views.³⁸ At any rate, the refusal by both Rhee and Kim Ku to participate in such a venture foreclosed the fate of the Unity Conference. The Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, a half-elected and half-appointive organ formed in December, 1946, was largely a consequence of the efforts by Kim Kyu-sik and those others who favored the union of the leftists and the rightists. Here again, many prominent political leaders refused to participate in the Occupation sponsored Assembly with advisory functions.³⁹

As of June, 1946, political parties registered with the American Military Government numbered 107 and a year later, this number increased to 344 in South Korea. When the Joint Commission invited the political parties and social organizations to file applications so as to determine their qualification to be consultees, some 463 parties with a massively inflated membership of 60,000,000 responded.⁴⁰ The Korean population at the time was hardly 26,000,000.

³⁸ Haebang Yisinyŏnsa (Twenty Years Since Liberation), p. 239. For the composition of this assembly, see United States Military Government in Korea, Summation, No. 13 (October, 1946), p. 13 and No. 14 (November, 1946), p. 17.

³⁹ For insistence by both sides, see Kim Chong-hun, Hankuk Chŏngdangsa (A History of Korean Political Parties) (Seoul: Seoul Koshinhakhoe, 1969), p. 25.

⁴⁰ Pak Mun-ok, Hankuk Chŏngburon (A Study of Korean Government) (Seoul: Pakyŏngsa, 1963), p. 377.

When the second session of the Joint Commission was deadlocked toward the end of August, 1947, the NARKI began to push for the establishment of a government in South Korea alone. The United Nations General Assembly resolution introduced by the United States representative called for a general election on March 3, 1948 and a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, composed of representatives from eight nations, was created to implement the resolution and to oversee the election. As the UNTCOK members were refused entrance to North Korea by the Soviet Occupation Forces, the decision was made by the Commission to hold a general election in South Korea alone on May 10, 1948. This decision by the Commission practically sealed any hope of uniting the three prominent rightist leaders, who, previous to that, had generally acted in unison in their confrontation with the leftists through the second Joint Commission. Rhee reiterated his position on September 18, 1947 when he called for "an immediate establishment of a provisional government in South Korea with a right to negotiate directly with Soviet Russia and America on matters of occupation of Korea..." and he added that the "American forces... should stay in Korea until the Soviet forces are withdrawn from North Korea."⁴¹

Kim Ku's position on the future of Korea diverged widely with Rhee's. In the statements he made to the UNTCOK hearings on January 28, 1948, he called for "a unified, sovereign, independent government...

⁴¹Quoted in Lee, Joung-sik, "Some Characteristics of Korean Political Culture: A Study of Korean Political Leaders' Statements, 1948-1960," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 3(Autumn, 1966), p. 66.

established through a general election for the entire country;" "Immediate withdrawal of US-USSR troops from Korea... with the United Nations taking the responsibility for maintaining public peace during the interim period;" and "A meeting of prominent leaders from North and South Korea [in order that] the Korean problem could be solved by the Korean people."⁴² The hardening of Kim Ku's position was manifested in several concrete steps he took jointly with the leaders from the moderate rightist camp such as Kim Kyu-sik. In early March, 1948, it was announced that both Kims' had sent a letter, which was later made public," to Kim Il-söng, Chairman of the North Korean People's Committee and Kim Tu-böng, Chairman of the North Korean Labor Party, outlining their proposal for a North-South Korean Leaders' Conference. In this letter, they reaffirmed that the Koreans themselves should settle the problem of Korea and that the measures for the establishment of a unified and democratic government should be discussed through a conference of political leaders of both zones. In the event that the proposal was accepted by the North Korean leaders, the representatives from South Korea to attend the conference were to be elected from those political parties of South Korea which were in favor of holding such conference.⁴³ On March 13, seven prominent South Korean leaders including Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik issued a joint statement calling

⁴²Summation, February, 1948, p. 171.

⁴³Ibid., March, 1948, p. 153.

for a unified independence of Korea and vowing never to participate in the election in South Korea, which, they claimed, would perpetuate the division of Korea.⁴⁴

When the invitation list was announced by North Korea, it mostly included leaders of organizations of moderate and leftist inclination despite the fact that the initiative came from Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, both rightist leaders. The so-called National Unity Conference was convened with some 540 members of 46 organizations from North and South Korea in P'yŏngyang from April 22 to 23. Upon returning from there, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik issued a joint statement on April 30. It claimed that the leaders' conference "has pointed the road to construction of a united, democratic nation," and it was a "further testimonial that Korea, freed of foreign interference, can begin a prosperous national life in peace." The basfs of the national unity envisaged by the unity conference were:⁴⁵

1. Withdrawal of the two occupation forces from Korea.
2. The organization of a provisional government by a national political conference immediately after the withdrawal of troops.
3. The adoption of a national constitution and the formation of a united national government by representatives to be elected through a national election.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Donald G. Tewksbury, ed., Source Materials on Korean Politics and Ideologies (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950), p. 96.

The last minute efforts by some rightists notwithstanding, the hour for a unified government for all of Korea had already passed. There was nothing achieved as a result of the Unity Conference except that it had a tremendous propaganda boost for the Communists. The UNTOCK^{an} decision to hold/election in South Korea alone proceeded with the blessing of rightist groups headed by the eventual victor in the three years of political turmoil since liberation.

Without the participation of the leftists and those organizations that had gone to P'yŏngyang for the Unity Conference, both of which urged the boycotting of the election, 91 percent of the eligible^{the} voters went to/polls on May 10, 1948 to elect their representatives to the Constituent National Assembly. Amid the reported incidents of interferences by the leftist organizations, especially in the rural districts of Cheju Province and the southwestern provinces where the police was unable to establish and maintain order, 198 members were elected on the basis of the single-member district system, with two electoral districts in Cheju Province unable to hold elections due to riots created by the Communists.

In the election that was participatedⁱⁿ/by some 942 candidates, the NARKI candidates showed remarkable strength. The NARKI won 59 seats. The Korean Democratic Party, whose support of Rhee was instrumental to the eventual victory of his political line, followed with 29 seats. Next came the candidates of two youth corps: the Taedong Youth Corps of Yi Ch'ŏng-ch'ŏn won 14 seats; the Nationalist

Youth Corps, lead by Yi Bŏm-sŏk, won 14 and 6 seats respectively.⁴⁶ The nation's first election saw the proliferation of independents. Some 85 men without party affiliations were elected to the first National Assembly. The voting criteria seemed to have been the candidate's record as an independence fighter and as an anti-Japanese. Where parties were organized and dissolved overnight, the party label could not provide the voters with meaningful images that could guide the voters. One surprising result of the election was the small number of winners for the Korean Democratic Party. As the most highly organized and wealthy political group among the rightists and having accrued advantages as an extensive participant in the American Military Government, it was expected to have a better showing. But it is noteworthy that the KDP had by far the highest ratio of candidates to winners (32 percent), considerably higher than the national average of 21.1 percent.⁴⁷

The election brought to a close a turbulent chapter in Korean politics. The shape of politics in the post-liberation era was more or less determined by the extent to which the two superpowers agreed or differed. Liberation having been attained through their hands, the American-Soviet occupation of the Korean peninsula had left a

⁴⁶The Secretariat, National Assembly, the Republic of Korea, Kukhoe Sipnyŏnji (Ten Years of National Assembly) (Seoul: The Secretariat of the National Assembly, 1958), pp. 2-3.

⁴⁷The figure for the independents was 20.4 percent. This seems to indicate that being a member of a political party or groups brought no appreciable benefit for the candidates in this election.

deep imprint on the course of political development in Korea. Independence was achieved, but the price to pay was dear.

The First Republic and the Shaping of
Party Politics, 1948-1960

Syngman Rhee, as the oldest member of the newly elected Constituent National Assembly, convened its first session on May 31, 1948. On the opening day, Rhee was chosen as Speaker and Kim Tong-won and Shin Ik-hi as Vice-Speakers. The new Assembly immediately proceeded to write a constitution and an organic law for the forthcoming government. The Constitution Drafting Committee was said to have favored the cabinet system as were the leaders of the KDP. Having supported Rhee through the turbulent post-liberation politics and having supported Rhee in securing the speakership, the KDP leaders expected to share the spoils of power with Rhee. The cabinet system would have been more amenable than a presidential system to suit their purposes. It was also known that Rhee himself had been in favor of the cabinet system at one time.⁴⁸ But he seemed to have a change of heart overnight, believing that a cabinet system would entail sharing power with the KDP, which had deeper roots in Korea at the time than himself. At any rate, when the draft constitution was reported out of the drafting committee, it called for among other things, a presidential system,

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See Yu Chin-o, "Reflections on the Days of Drafting the Constitution," Kukhoebo, No 2 (1958), p. 32. See also Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, Hankuk Chŏngch'i Ch'egye (The Korean Political System) (Seoul: Koryo University, 1961), pp. 115-116.

a unicameral legislature, and indirect election of the President by the National Assembly.

The new Constitution was promulgated by Rhee as Speaker of the National Assembly on July 17; and there was no doubt as to who was going to be the first President of the Republic of Korea. Rhee won one-sidedly, obtaining 180 out of 196 votes. Next came Kim Ku who won 13 votes despite the fact that he boycotted the first general election. Rhee's prominence was widely recognized, and the loose political groupings of the first general election were not a factor in Rhee's election. The vice presidential post went to the octogenerian Yi si-yŏng, the former Vice Chairman of the Korean Provisional Government at the time of liberation. On July 24, Syngman Rhee was inaugurated as the first President of the First Republic.

Public attention now turned to the appointment of a cabinet. Rhee's inauguration speech was indicative of what was to come: "... regardless of party affiliations or personal relations, men best able and best suited to administer the enacted laws in accordance with the wishes of the people will be chosen to governmental positions."⁴⁹ When the cabinet was announced on August 6, the KDP hopes to dominate the new cabinet were betrayed. Kim Sŏng-su, the head of KDP was given no government post at all, and only one of the active members of that party was given a

⁴⁹Quoted in The Dong-A Ilbo, July 25, 1948, p. 1.

ministerial post. Kim Sŏng-su was later offered a post as Minister without Portfolio, which he declined.⁵⁰ Reactions to Rhee's choices were unfavorable. Newspapers in general felt that the cabinet was nothing but a gathering of Rhee's friends and followers, most of whom were mainly mediocre men. One paper criticized that the criterion for the appointment seemed to be the ability to speak English. More than half of the cabinet appointees were educated in the United States or in Great Britain. For the KDP and its members, power in the newly established nation appeared to go elsewhere, particularly to the Nationalist Youth Corps: its leader Yi Bŏm-sŏk received simultaneous appointment as Prime Minister and Defense Minister. Another influential ministry, the Home Ministry, went to Rhee's, another loyal follower who had a previous connection with the Youth Corps in question.

Deeply disappointed by having been blocked in their expectations to share power with Rhee, the KDP revived the issue of a cabinet system they had favored. From late 1948 on, the party was launched on the steady road to becoming the first opposition party

⁵⁰ According to Rhee himself, Kim Song-su was the "most appropriate person to become the Prime Minister" due to his "integrity, personal virtues and patriotism." The reason why he avoided designating Kim Sŏng-su as his Prime Minister, he stated, was because of the fact that Kim was a leader of a political party. In 1948, he also repeated his fundamental distrust of political parties in his message to the nation. See: Cho Il-mun, Sae Chŏngdangron (New Theory of Political Parties) (Seoul: Samhwa Ch'ulpansa, 1971), pp. 23-24. In the initial stages of his presidency, Rhee appeared to have a deep distrust of political parties, an inclination which is consistent with his populist proclivities.

in the republic. The party platform announced at the conclusion of the October, 1949 party convention included a program for a constitutional amendment in favor of a cabinet system. At first such constitutional issue attracted very little public attention, but it did win the sympathy of some Assemblymen who later joined the party. As Rhee's authoritarian rule became manifest in time, the issue of the constitutional amendment gradually became synonymous with the "anti-dictatorship issue."⁵¹ As Rhee battled the Assembly on such post-independence issues as punishing the collaborators, land reform, local autonomy and the disposition of the culprits of the unsuccessful Yosu rebellion, Speaker of the Assembly Shin Ik-hi led a large part of his 70-member confederation of minor politicians into the KDP on the issue of cabinet responsibility. The new group, now renamed Democratic Nationalist Party(DNP), became the first Korean group formed with ^{the} explicit purpose of being an opposition party.⁵²

The prewar period also saw the beginnings of political amalgamation on the government side as well. In 1949 Rhee ordered that all youth groups combine into the Taehan Youth Corps and that all ^{combine} unions/into the Korean Federation of Trade Unions. They led directly into party politics in 1951, when both of these organizations became ancillary organizations of the Liberal Party(LP). In the National Assembly, Rhee quietly moved to absorb into his own circles independent

⁵¹Henderson, op. cit., p. 291.

⁵²Ibid.

legislators and legislators belonging to splinter groups with the objective of weakening the opposition in the Assembly. He began to win the support for his policies in the legislative body.

Even before the 1950 general elections, a large number of independent legislators in the Assembly, in the course of deliberating various important bills, had begun to form friendship circles and associations. Starting out strictly as a grouping based on personal relations and goodwill, it became not uncommon for each friendship circle to win more legislators on the basis of agreed policy, and this also provided the basis for a new circle. The amalgamation process received a tremendous boost when on September 29, 1949 the Assembly passed a law concerning negotiation groups within the National Assembly. A negotiation group was defined as a group of twenty or more legislators, who, as a group, were given the privilege to "negotiate" on the Assembly floor.⁵³ The adoption of such system brought a tremendous change in the power configuration of the Assembly. Lesser friendship circles were forced to fold and its members found their places in the larger negotiation groups.

⁵³Han Ch'öl-yŏng and Kim Jin-hak, Jehŏn Kukhoesa(A History of the Constituent National Assembly) (Seoul: Shinjo Ch'ulp'ansa, 1954), p. 227. Initially, the negotiation group appears to have been created as a way of expediting business on the floor of the Assembly. The assignment of seats, selection of standing and ad hoc committees and the designation of speakers during the Assembly sessions were made according to the negotiation groups. Later, the negotiation groups were made to consult on the agenda of the Assembly session. See The Secretariat, the National Assembly, Kukhoerŏp Haesŏl(A Commentary on the Laws Governing the National Assembly) (Seoul: The Secretariat of the National Assembly, 1968), pp. 64-65.

By the fifth session of the Constituent National Assembly, the floor was composed of five "clubs" and political parties. The Independent Club had 29 Assemblymen: the Sinchŏnghoe (the New Politics Club), 23; the Taehan Nodongdang (the Korean Farmer-Labor Party), 23; the Ilmin Kurakbu (the One People Club), 55; and the DNP, 70. By the final session of the Assembly, the number of negotiation groups was reduced to four. The Independence Club had 28 legislators: Taehan Kukmindang (the Korean Nationalist Party), organized by Rhee by uniting members of the New Politics Club, the Korean Farmer-Labor Party, and a portion of the One People Club, 71; the One People Club, having lost 25 of its members to the Korean Nationalist Party, now had 30 members; the DNP's strength numbered 69.⁵⁴

Confrontation between Rhee and the Assembly reached its climax when the DNP members, along with several independents, introduced a constitutional amendment bill in favor of a cabinet system on January 27, 1950. The bill also included a provision in accordance with which the term of the Assembly could be prolonged for one year in case of "emergency." The 1947 Constitution provided a two year term for the National Assembly. The adoption of a cabinet system would be clearly advantageous to the DNP at that time, and by elevating President Rhee to a ceremonial post and transferring the locus of power from the executive branch of the government to the

⁵⁴ Han T'ae-su, Hanguk Chŏngdangsa (A History of Korea Political Parties), pp. 118-119.

Assembly, the DNP wanted to emasculate Rhee's power. A cabinet system, its supporters argued, would be a superior system than the presidential system as responsibility could be more easily located. A cabinet system would also better foster party politics on the basis of political platforms or policies. The presidential system, on the other hand, invites factionalization of parties, with each faction vying for the confidence of the President, and results in the degeneration of political parties, because there is a danger for the political parties to degenerate into an arm of the executive branch headed by the President.⁵⁵ Rhee's supporters held on to the principle that any amendment to the Constitution should be effected only after the unification of the country. The proposed amendment, moreover, would be an invitation for political instability and would encourage "thirst for power" on the part of the political parties. While the adversaries were engaged in the exchange of naive constitutional volleyball, the amendment bill reached the floor of the National Assembly but failed to receive the required two-thirds vote, despite the fact that it received 79 favorable votes to 33 opposing votes. The fate of the bill was decided by 66 abstentions.⁵⁶ This marked the beginning of the vicious cycle of the politics of constitutional amendment which prevailed through most of Rhee's Liberal Party regime.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 118.

⁵⁶The Dong-A Ilbo, March 15, 1950, p. 1.

In response to the inability of the government to deal effectively with the confusion, terror and spiraling inflation which affected everyone's life in the first two years of the republic, the May 30, 1950 General Election returned only 31 members of the Constituent National Assembly. The two major parties which were the adversaries in the amendment struggle fared badly. The opposition DNP's strength was reduced to 23. The Korean People's Party, which sided with Rhee toward the end of the Constituent National Assembly, won 24 seats. Once again the independents won most seats, or 127 to be exact.⁵⁷ Once again, a new alignment of Assemblymen was in the offing. The new Assembly opened just 9 days prior to the start of the Korean War on June 25, 1950.

The Assembly moved six times as the fortunes of the war changed during the next six months. When it reconvened in March, 1951 in Pusan, the war-time capital, the battle between the Assembly and Rhee was renewed. With few exceptions the negotiation groups registering with the Assembly now had taken different names. The New Politics Club had the largest membership with 70; the DNP had 40; the Konghwa Kurakbu(the Republican Club), 40; the Minuhoe(the People's Friends Club), 20; the independents, who numbered to 127 at the time of election, were now reduced to five. In crucial votes, the New Politics Club and the Republican Club sided with the government,

⁵⁷Central Election Management Committee(CEMC), Yŏkdae Kukhoewiwŏn Sŏn'ŏ Sŏnghwang(The Status of the Past National Assembly Elections) (Seoul: Central Election Management Committee, 1967), pp. 173-174.

whereas the DNP could count on the help of the People's Friends Club.

The battle line was drawn again for a showdown. The DNP fired the first shot when its members exposed and criticized the conduct of the Korean army and its high ranking officers in the so-called Kŏch'ang and Defense Corps incidents.⁵⁸ The turmoil, accusations and counter-accusations that prevailed over these incidents were heightened by the resignation of Vice President Yi Si-yŏng on May 9, 1951. His letter to the public on the following day scored a hit for giving his Vice President no role, and explained that his resignation was tendered to the National Assembly because he wanted to assume "the moral responsibility for the sad state of affairs this nation is in."⁵⁹ In the ensuing election of a new Vice President, the pro-government candidate lost to Kim Sŏng-su, the former head of the KDP by 73 to 151 votes. The deadlock between the government and the opposition in the Assembly continued. For Rhee, the situation could no longer be tolerated.

⁵⁸Kŏch'ang incident involved the killing of more than five hundred innocent civilians by a Korean army unit after the latter failed in a guerilla sweeping operation behind the battle lines. For details, see Haebang Yisinyŏnji (Twenty-two Years Since Liberation), pp. 319-322. The Defense Corps incident was of far greater seriousness than the incident at Kŏch'ang as it involved graft by the Corps Commander and his aides, resulting in hunger deaths of thousands of militiamen waiting to join the regular Korean army. Several Assemblymen in the New Politics Club were also allegedly implicated, as the Assembly investigation team disclosed. For further details, see ibid., pp. 315-318.

⁵⁹For his resignation statement, see ibid., pp. 321-322.

On August 15, 1951, Rhee took the first major step in order to do away with the troublesome National Assembly, or at least to tame it for easier manipulation. In his independence day speech on August 15, 1951, he announced his intention to form a new political party:⁶⁰

So far I have considered premature to install a party system until the people can fully understand the meaning of a political party.... But the time has come to organize a large party covering the whole country on the basis of farmers and working people, in order to promote national welfare and to protect the common interests of the people. We shall have to make such a political party a permanent base upon which the government can firmly stand.

The independence day proposal drew immediate response as soon as Rhee's intention was clarified through the Office of Public Information. On September 3, representatives of various social organizations organized a preparatory committee for the establishment of a new political party. These steps by social

⁶⁰ Rhee's independence speech is translated in Hahn-Been Lee, op. cit., p. 72. For a different translation, see Henderson, op. cit., p. 293. Yi Jae-hak, later Vice Speaker of the National Assembly, and then of Konghwa Minchŏnghoe (the Republican Democratic Society), the largest negotiating group and the supporter of Rhee, stated in his memoirs that he and another member called on Rhee in early May of 1951 to win support for their intention to form a new party. Yi reports that Rhee at first told them that the formation of a political party at that juncture would be inappropriate for the exigencies which required the "unity of the people." However, the two visitors finally convinced President that such a move would help stabilize the political scene and to "normalize" Assembly politics. Rhee gave them blessing and assurance of assistance. See Yi Jae-hak in Sasilŭi Jŏnpurŭl Kisulhanda (All Truths are Told: Collected Memoirs of Nine Political Leaders) (Seoul: Himang Ch'ulpansa, 1966), p. 183.

organizations were matched by a similar initiative in the National Assembly on September 6. Finally on November 13, these two separate groups, each with 95 delegates, met to discuss the establishment of a new party, and on November 30, the delegates of both groups had adopted a temporary organizational framework.

While these steps were being taken, Rhee introduced a bill for a constitutional amendment in favor of a bicameral legislature and the direct election of President. It is not certain why the government proposal for the constitutional amendment was announced while the efforts were being made to create political parties. Of the two groups that were simultaneously undertaking the organization of a new political party, Rhee hinted on several occasions that he inclined toward the extraparliamentary group. On November 15, Rhee stated that a democratic nation should be ruled by the majority of its people and that as farmers and workers were in the majority in Korea, "the party membership should be constituted of these strata," whereas "the wealthy and the powerful should be prevented from becoming wealthier and more powerful."⁶¹ This statement must be considered as an appeal for gaining support among the extraparliamentary group. Considering Rhee's distaste for the Assembly, the timing of the proposal for the constitutional amendment might be viewed as a move to discredit the Assembly and its constitutional viewpoint.

The seeds of discord between the two groups that were vying for Rhee's favor, however, were laid during the preparatory stage. The

⁶¹The Korea Times, November 15, 1951, p. 1

group outside the Assembly insisted on the direct election of President and the adoption of a bicameral legislative system, whereas the Assembly group was singularly opposed to such proposals.⁶² Each group went about its own way to found a party with a new name: the Assembly group announced the founding of the Liberal Party(LP) on December 13; the extraparliamentary group followed with the same four days later. The extraparliamentary group elevated Rhee as Chairman of the new Liberal Party and the vice chairmanship went to Yi Bŏm-sŏk, Rhee's first Prime Minister, and the head of Jokch'ŏng, the neofascist youth corps. The parliamentary Liberal Party left the chairmanship of the party's Central Committee vacant, should Rhee want it; and elected two leading Assemblymen, Yi Kap-sŏng and Kim Tong-sŏng as Vice Chairmen. Some 93 members of the National Assembly left their negotiating groups to join the Liberal Party. Other groups in the Assembly lined up as follows: the DNP, 39; the People's Friends Club, 25; the independents, 18.

Although it was understood from the beginning that the two separate Liberal Party organizations would come together, the issue of the constitutional amendment still pending in the National Assembly precluded such possibility as the two groups were sitting on the opposite sides of the fence on this issue. On January 14, 1952, in his statement to political parties, Rhee expressed his satisfaction

⁶² Han T'a~~e~~-su, Hankuk Chŏngdanŏsa (A History of Korean Political Parties), pp. 189-190.

for establishing a party which was based on Ilminism⁶³ and, which would pave the way for the realization of democracy, "sovereignty of the people," and prevent the "tyranny of minority over the majority."⁶⁴ When the extraparliamentary party held its first National Party Convention, March 30, 1952 and reaffirmed the elevation of Rhee to its chairmanship, Rhee stated that his "life-long dream has been realized."

Meanwhile the amendment bill on the floor of the Assembly provided a good test for the diagnosis of Rhee's strength in the parliamentary Liberal Party. The motives behind the proposed amendment were clear to all. First, Rhee's reelection, which was forthcoming in several months, would be guaranteed by such a move, as the popular vote could be canvassed easily by the ubiquitous police, the armed forces and the well known terrorist youth group, Jokch'ŏng. The second amendment was designed to dilute the strength of the National Assembly under a bicameral system as it would be possible to manipulate one house against another. In its explanation of the amendment, the government argued that the adoption of the unicameral legislature as provided for in the 1948 Constitution

⁶³ Ilminism, translated as "One People Principle" represents the core of Rhee's political thinking. Similar in some respects to Sanminchui of Sun Yat-sen, this was rather a vague set of political thinking. For detailed treatment of this, see Koh Kwang-il, In Quest of National Unity and Power: Political Ideas and Practice of Syngman Rhee (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1963).

⁶⁴ Ministry of Defense, Republic of Korea, Hankuk Chŏnran Yinyŏnji (Two Years of the Korean Conflict) (Seoul: Ministry of Defense, 1954), Section C, pp. 143-144.

was dictated by the need to expedite the parliamentary procedures in the face of tremendous pressing tasks in the initial phase of the country. The advantages of a bicameral system, it argued, lies in its inherent ability to avoid rash mistakes, and to minimize abuse of power by a majority party. As for the direct election of President, it is more in keeping with the democratic principle of popular sovereignty and the principle of separation of powers. The forces opposed to the amendment led by the DNP, on the other hand, insisted that a bicameral legislature would only succeed in dividing the popular will, weaken the National Assembly and delay the performance of ^{the} nation's business. The direct election of President is not suitable for the people with insufficient political experience and knowledge and only helps to aggravate partisan feelings among the people.⁶⁵

Rhee's fears were realized when most of the parliamentary Liberal Party members voted with the opposition in defeating the proposed amendment in an overwhelmingly one-sided tally, 143 to 19 on January 18, 1952. Rhee had no intention of having the Assembly play the trump card. He retaliated on February 16, when he declared:⁶⁶

The presidential elections should be conducted by the voting of the people... I believe our assemblymen will come to understand where the will of the people

⁶⁵Han T'ae-su, Hankuk Chōngdangsa (A History of Korean Political Parties), pp. 121-122.

⁶⁶Quoted in Han T'ae-su, "A Review of Political Party Activities in Korea: I(1945-1954)" Korean Affairs, Vol. I, No. 4(1962), p. 426.

lies and immediately and voluntarily reverse their previous decision and present a new bill for the revision of the Constitution. Or if otherwise the voters in each electorate decide by votes to call back their representatives and notify the National Assembly of their decision, the legislative body will have to act in accordance with the decision.

These were strong words. In pointing out the possibility of "recall" of defiant Assemblymen, he was clearly overstepping the bounds of the constitutional framework. He seemed to be encouraging extra-legal methods to change the minds of opposing legislators. On the morning of February 18, some 200 members of the Jokch'ong, first of the "political action groups", surrounded the Assembly hall in a planned demonstration. For forty minutes, they were heard to shout: "Let us have a new election for the opponents of the amendment bill" and "Throw out those National Assemblymen who disregard the will and the fundamental rights of people."⁶⁷ The Assemblymen immediately resolved to call Rhee to the session for an explanation, but, two hours later, Rhee informed the Assembly that he was ill and unable to attend.

That these demonstrations were undertaken under Rhee's blessing was made evident in his written responses on February 26 to a list of twelve questions the Assembly submitted to the President. The recall of the Assemblymen demanded by the demonstrators, Rhee explained, was "a genuine expression of the public will" to rectify the opposition to the amendment bill which runs counter to the

⁶⁷The Dong-A Ilbo, February 18, 1952, p. 1.

"spirit of Constitution."⁶⁸ He continued to state that no one could stop the recall of Assemblymen, if the public so demanded, and that he would like to see the amendment passed. On February 29, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in his testimony before the National Assembly stated that while he would like to avoid comment on the overall issue due to its "complex political implications," he believed that recall of legislators, to be effected, must be "clearly prescribed in the Constitution" and that the detailed procedures should be defined by law.⁶⁹

The extraparliamentary party in the mounting crisis resolved to support the government amendment proposal which was reintroduced in the Assembly on May 14, but it disclaimed any connection with the "recall" movement. The parliamentary Liberal Party, however, was now divided into two factions: the unity faction composed of 43 members advocated accommodation with the extraparliamentary party; the remaining 48 members opposed such move and joined the other opposition forces to the amendment on April 17.

The political crisis deteriorated when the Assembly had before it for deliberation three bills on constitutional amendment. The government bill was essentially the same one that was defeated in January earlier that year: the Assembly bill introduced by 122 opposition legislators and others was for instituting a cabinet

⁶⁸Quoted in Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "Kwŏnwijuijŏk Kwŏllyŏk Chochŏngkwa Chŏngdang Hyŏngsŏng," (The Authoritarian Power Manipulation and the Party Formation in Korea), Asea Munje (Journal of Asiatic Studies) Vol. IV, No. 2, December, 1961, p. 72.

⁶⁹Ibid.

system; and the third bill was a "compromise" plan introduced by Prime Minister Chang T'aek-sang on May 4. The last bill, which was claimed by its author as ^{an} "eclectic" plan called for an unlikely combination of a bicameral legislature, direct election of the President and Vice President, and the provision giving legislators of the lower house the right to cast a vote of non-confidence against cabinet ministers.⁷⁰

While the bills were being reported, the rallies and demonstrations in support of the government proposal continued outside the Assembly hall. Rhee, on May 24, appointed Yi Bŏm-sŏk, the head of Jokch'ŏng and Vice Chairman of the extraparliamentary Liberal Party, Home Minister, and on the following day proclaimed martial law under the pretext of anti-guerilla operations, which, the government claimed, was a "military exigency."⁷¹ That in proclaiming the martial law Rhee had designs on the defiant National Assembly soon became evident. A series of arrests of Assemblymen was made under the various accusations of "murder" and "international conspiracy." A warrant was issued for former Prime Minister Chang Myŏn (John M. Chang) for having conspired with Communists. In the atmosphere of terror ruling the day, many Assemblymen went into hiding. Despite the UNCURK (The United Nations Commission on Unification and Reconstruction of Korea) statement

⁷⁰For details of three amendment proposals, see Han T'ae-su, Hankuk Chŏngdangsa (A History of Korean Political Parties), pp. 129-131 and pp. 134-135.

⁷¹For details of this period, see Haebang Yisipyinyŏnji (Twenty-two Years Since Liberation), pp. 325-328.

on May 28 urging the lifting of martial law and the release of arrested Assemblymen, Rhee stated that the on-going struggle was "between the Assembly and the People" and that he was not implicated in it. President Truman's and the United Nations Secretary General Lee's concern about the situation conveyed to Rhee fell on deaf ears. Vice President Kim Sŏng-su tendered his resignation on May 29 in protest against Rhee's "assault on the Constitution," but the defiant Assembly refused to accept it. The power configuration in the Assembly was as follows: the LP's unity faction had 52 members; those elements of the LP which sided with the opposition DNP and the Peoples Friends Club bolted the LP to form the Shinrahoe (Shinra Club)^{had 14}; the DNP had 39.

On June 8, Rhee indicated that he would accept a "compromise proposal." If the Assembly would accept the two provisions of the government proposal for the constitutional amendment (direct election of the President and a bicameral legislature), the Assembly "may vote for whom it chooses as the next President" and Rhee would step down "regardless of who may be chosen as my successor." The next day, Prime Minister Chang tried unsuccessfully to negotiate the "compromise." Rhee's position hardened on June 15. Rhee announced that "if the Assembly does not pass the two constitutional amendments we have demanded, I may have to be obedient to the people and declare the dissolution of the National Assembly." "And the question will be easily settled. There will be a general election

for a new Assembly."⁷²

Demonstrators, with or without Rhee's urging, were now demanding the dissolution of the National Assembly, coupled with Rhee's threat to "comply with the public will" if a solution could not be found. "Spontaneous" demonstrations continued. A group of pro-Rhee representatives from local assemblies, agitating near the Assembly hall, called for a hunger strike on June 23, and vowed to continue it until ^{the} President dissolved the Assembly. It was reported on the radio, heavily censored by the government, that President Rhee tried to calm them down but had "admitted" that "something practical had to be done."⁷³ On July 30, President Rhee informed the closing Assembly session that action could not be postponed any longer. After rounding up Assemblymen to achieve a quorum, the government proposal for the amendment was passed on July 5 by a vote of 163 to 0 with three abstentions after a forty-eight hour session during which no Assemblymen could leave the building.

The "compromise" bill, as a measure to pacify the Assemblymen, also included provisions for the legislative confirmation of cabinet appointments upon nomination by the Prime Minister and the power of dissolution of the cabinet by a vote of non-confidence. The Assembly fought defiantly but against overwhelming odds. Rhee's election seemed now virtually assured. There was no person in the Korean

⁷²The Voice of Korea, June 30, 1952, p. 591.

⁷³Ibid., p. 595.

political arena who could match Rhee's charisma and his massive organization. The election date was set for August 5, and by a government decree, the campaign period was restricted to just nine days before the election.

The extraparliamentary Liberal Party nominated Rhee in its convention on July 19 despite the latter's "refusal" to run in the presidential election. Yi Bŏm-sŏk, the party's Vice Chairman, who helped Rhee to weather the storm of the so-called "Pusan Political Crisis" in May and June, was nominated as the vice presidential candidate. Rhee's designs on the Jokch'ŏng members of the party soon became apparent. By refusing to give support to his party's vice-presidential nominee, he hoped to hurt the chances of Yi, who, two days before the balloting day, complained of police interference in his campaign. Rhee's campaign statements and actions indicated that he favored Ham T'ae-yŏng, another octogenerian as his Vice President. In the midst of war, Rhee and his favorite running mate swept the elections.

The popularly elected President now urged his party to draft the members of the Shinrahoe, formerly of the parliamentary Liberal Party who opposed the constitutional amendment, into his party. The question of drafting Chang T'aek-sang, the former Prime Minister, fed additional powderkeg to the already uneasy relationship between the Jokch'ŏng and Kukminhoe factions of the Liberal Party. The former faction saw Chang's entry into the party as a potential threat to its hegemony in the party because Chang could certainly

match Yi Bŏm-sŏk's stature. The latter faction wanted him for the obverse reasons.

Yi Ho of the Kukminhoe convened a meeting of the Korean Social Organizations to criticize the Jokch'ŏng's position on Chang's entry into the party. The meeting resolved to dismiss the Jokch'ŏng Chairman of the LP's Disciplinary Committee who had announced earlier that Chang's entry into the party would be unwise. While Rhee watched the power struggle from the altar, the factional disputes were brought out into the open. The assault on the Kukminhoe and other social organizations ancillary to the Liberal Party was finally undertaken by the Jokch'ŏng faction of the party. On May 10, 1953, during the party's second annual convention, the latter maneuvered to dominate the central and provincial party hierarchy by purging all anti-Jokch'ŏng members. This maneuver by the youth group members coincided with the statement made by the anti-Jokch'ong members that the Jokch'ŏng was engaged in "anti-party activities by reorganizing the party under its hegemony."⁷⁴ Furthermore, the Jokch'ŏng faction was successful in maneuvering the party convention to adopt a resolution that Chang T'aek-sang's entry into the party would be harmful to the party. Chang announced on May 18 that he was going to sever his relations with the Liberal Party.

Alarmed at Jokch'ŏng advances, Rhee proceeded to instruct the reorganization of the party. The most important of these instructions

⁷⁴The Dong-A Ilbo, May 18, 1953, p. 1.

was his order to disband the Central Executive Committee and the Central Inspection Committee, which was dominated by the Jokch'ŏng faction, and replace them by a single Central Executive Committee. Another innovation was the elimination of the post of Vice Chairman (held by Yi Bŏm-sŏk at the time). Finally, the party's Central Executive Committee was to be composed of three members each from the five ancillary organizations of the party (the Kukminhoe, the Korean Youth Corps, the Korean Women's Association, the Korean Farmers' Association and the Korean Labor Association). These instructions could not be enforced immediately, however. Under the pretext of implementing Rhee's instructions, the Jokch'ŏng faction called another national convention of the party on August 20. The extent to which Rhee's instructions were circumvented was evident when the convention resolved to take away the party's Secretary-General's post from Yi Ho of Kukminhoe. The maneuvering by the Jokch'ŏng faction continued. When the Central Executive Committee members were announced, most of them turned out to be Jokch'ŏng sympathizers from the ancillary organizations.

Rhee retaliated with his statement on September 12 which instructed all youth organizations to disband immediately. It was evident to all that Rhee's target was the Jokch'ŏng:⁷⁵

The Jokch'ŏng faction has been bent on expanding its power ever since our Liberal Party was established.

⁷⁵Quoted in The Dong-A Ilbo, September 12, 1953, p. 1.

This runs counter to my idea of administering the party. Its factional activities are not only harmful to the party's unity but it also threatens the spirit of people's unity. Although it may take some time to purge these elements, they must be eliminated. From now on the party must be administered according to my stated intentions.

Rhee proceeded to act. He dismissed two of his cabinet members who were known to have warm relations with the faction in question. Within the party a Committee for the Elimination of the Jokch'ŏng Faction was organized; the provincial party chairman met to declare null and void the decisions of the August 20 party convention; and all party leaders finally submitted their resignations. The emasculation of Yi Bŏm-sŏk, Rhee's friend and supporter during the American military occupation, his first Prime Minister, and an invaluable right-hand man during the political crisis in Pusan, was now complete.

On October 17, the party elected a fifteen member Central Committee according to the instructions given by Rhee in previous May to organize it on the basis of three representatives each from the five ancillary social organizations of the party.⁷⁶ Not entirely satisfied with the selection, Rhee ^{decided} on November 2 to appoint a nine member committee which was given the task of reorganizing the party. The committee was headed by Yi Ki-bung, one-time Rhee's Chief-Secretary and Defense Secretary, who later became his running mate. By November 30, 1953, the reorganization of the party

⁷⁶Quoted in Han T'ae-su, Hankuk Chŏngdangsa (A History of Korean Political Parties), p. 197.

according to Rhee's wishes was realized. Significant in the reorganization was the three-member Executive Committee^{to} which was given the power to control the party through Yi Ki-bung, who was appointed to that Committee (other members were Yi Kap-sŏng and Bae Ŭn-hi). This replacement of the previously existing Central Committee with the three-member Executive Committee had the effect of streamlining the party hierarchy, and making Rhee's control of the party possible by placing his right-hand man second in command.

While the Liberal Party was going through the pains of reorganization, the Democratic National Party was similarly engaged in readjusting its party organization. On November 28, 1953, the party abandoned the collective leadership structure in favor of a single leader under Shin Ik-hi, the Speaker of the National Assembly. The multiple Vice Chairmanships went to Choi Tu-sŏn, Kim To-yŏn, Kim Sŏng-su, Paik Nam-un, Cho Byŏng-ok and Sŏ Sang-il. Having no grassroots support, the party organization was restricted entirely to the Assembly notables. By the end of 1953, its membership in the Assembly was reduced to 20.

As the two parties prepared for the third general election, another constitutional amendment issue loomed large on the political scene. The Liberal Party decided to adopt a nomination procedure for legislators for the first time; and the winning of the nomination was made contingent upon the support of the constitutional amendment, the most important provision of which was to remove the constitutional

barrier forbidding more than two consecutive terms for the incumbent President.⁷⁷ The procedure for the nomination was rather complex. In each of the 203 electoral districts, a nominating convention was held. The candidates selected by the convention were screened by the provincial and central party headquarters. Rhee, as Chairman of the party, finally "approved" the Assembly nominee.

In the general election held on May 10, 1954, the LP won an overwhelming victory. The party nominee won 99 seats in the National Assembly and there were several others who ran under the LP banner, but who failed to receive the party nomination. Together, it had by far the largest number of seats with 114. The DNP, which failed to bring together all opposition forces returned only fifteen. The number of independents elected to the Assembly was drastically reduced in this election to 68.⁷⁸ By the unusually high number of statements(thirteen) he made with regards to this election, Rhee seemed deeply interested in this election. He appealed to the voters to send as their representatives a person who would favor the constitutional amendment. The Liberal Party victory which gave

⁷⁷Other provisions of the proposed constitutional amendment included, among others, a provision sanctioning national referendum "concerning important matters pertaining to a national crisis which might limit the sovereignty of Korea or cause a change in her territory"; a provision to elect half of the members of the House of Councillors every three years and give that body the confirmation power over the appointment of the Chief Justice and other government officials; a provision to authorize non-confidence votes by the House of Representatives against individual ministers; a provision to abolish the office of Prime Minister and have the President preside over the State Council. See Han T'ae-su, Hankuk Chŏngdangsa (A History of Korean Political Parties), pp. 139-140.

⁷⁸Yŏkdae Kukhoewiwŏn Sŏn'gŏ Sanghwang (The Status of the past National Assembly Elections), pp. 251-252.

it 114 seats was not sufficient to pass the amendment bill. The party was successful, however, in attracting many independent legislators, increasing their assembly strength to 130 by the end of June.

Public exchanges of arguments between Rhee and the leaders of the DNP were indicative of what was to come. On October 22, four days after the amendment bill was introduced to the National Assembly, Rhee stated that any person opposed to the amendment bill was tantamount to committing a "treasonous act against the national policy."⁷⁹ Vice Chairman Cho Byŏng-ok of the DNP retorted by saying that:⁸⁰

Within the context of democracy in which we are a part, we are safeguarded in the freedom of speech. The basic tenets of democracy afford any one of us the right to speak against the proposed amendment, if we so desire. A person cannot be labelled patriotic if he favors the amendment and treasonous if he opposes it.

The amendment bill was put to a vote on November 27. Having received 135 votes in favor, Vice Speaker Choe Sun-ju, presiding over the session, declared that the bill failed as the required number was two-thirds of the Assembly membership, or 136 votes. Rhee did not accept the defeat. On the following day, Yi Jae-hak, the majority leader of the Assembly, objected to the arithmetic used by the presiding officer on the previous day:⁸¹ He argued:

⁷⁹The Yŏnhap Shinmun, October 22, 1954, p. 1.

⁸⁰Cho Byŏng-ok, Mijujuwa Na(Democracy and I: Memoirs) (Seoul: Yŏngshin Munhwasa, 1959), pp. 119-120.

⁸¹The Dong-A Ilbo, November 28, 1954, p. 1.

A constitutional amendment as stipulated in Article 98, Paragraph 4 can be effected by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. This means that the accurate number comes out to 135.333.... Since persons cannot be divided into digits, the number should be rounded to 135 which is the nearest whole number. The two-thirds required by the Constitution means, therefore, not that it should be more than 135, but 135 or more.

When Vice Speaker Choe returned to the Assembly floor to "apologize" for the arithmetic mistake he made two days earlier, the floor became a fist-wielding pandemonium. With 60 members who voted against the amendment boycotting the session, Choe declared the amendment bill passed. Another one of Rhee's recurrent constitutional maneuvers had succeeded.

The steam-roller tactic by the ruling party alienated many legislators including those members of the Liberal Party ^{had} who voted [^] for it. On December 6, the first member to bolt the Liberal Party criticized the irregular procedure employed and "the Liberal Party's failure in respecting genuine party politics" as well as "its blind submission to the administration's demands."⁸² Three days later twelve more legislators left the party en masse. Due to this exodus, the LP's Assembly membership was reduced to 123. The controversial passage of the amendment bill had the effect of completely bifurcating the Assemblymen. This bifurcation was an entirely new political phenomenon up to that time. In struggling against the ruling party's steam-roller tactics on the floor, solidarity was achieved among the

⁸² Ibid., December 6, 1954, p. 1.

opposition forces. On December 30, these opposition groups came together to form a new negotiating group within the Assembly under the banner of Commrades' Association for Safeguarding the Constitution (CASC) with a membership of 60. For the first time in its five year history, the Assembly was now made up predominantly of two negotiating groups. The formation of CASC was described in political circles as a healthy harbinger of a "two party system." While introducing censure motions against the Speaker and the Vice Speaker of the Assembly for the "illegal" proceedings, the CASC expedited the plan to organize a "pan-national" political party.

There were initial roadblocks. The principal disagreement among the 18-men founding committee was the extent to which the newly created party should accept progressive politicians as its members. The question of admitting Cho Bong-am as a member delayed the founding of the party. Cho, a former Communist and, then, the leader of the Progressive Party, was considered by some of the members of the committee as dangerous. But, finally on September 19, 1955, a new party under the name of the Democratic Party(DP) was born. Despite the stated intention to draft all prominent politicians, such well-known political figures as Cho Bong-am, Yi Bŏm-sŏk and Chang T'aek-sang were conspicuously missing from the party list. The newly created party was basically a union of three groups. The DNP was, of course, the core of the new party movement; the Liberal Party defectors such as Min Kwan-sik, Hyŏn Sŏk-ho and Yi T'ae-yŏng, formed another grouping; Chang Myŏn and

Chung Il-hyŏng, the former members of the Hŭngsadan, an independence club organized by men of north Korea with Christian background led their followers into the new party.⁸³ When the new slate of officers was announced, most of them were former leaders of the DNP. The five-member Executive Committee elected by the Central Committee ~~was~~ ~~were~~ composed of Shin Ik-hi, Cho Byŏng-ok, Paik Nam-un, Kwak Sang-hun and Chang Myŏn. Kwak was the organizer of the CASC; Chang, a former Hŭngsadan member who was instrumental in bringing in the Liberal Party defectors into the new party, was a valuable addition in enhancing the prestige of the new party. As will be discussed later, however, the new structure had in itself the seeds of discord.

When the two parties collided in the 1956 presidential election, the opposition forces appeared to provide a stiff competition to Rhee and the Liberal Party for the first time in the short history of the Republic. Rhee, citing reasons of health and his belief in "the democratic constitutional dictum of limiting Presidential terms as practised abroad,"⁸⁴ announced that he would not run in this election. "Popular will," however, managed to erupt again and Rhee once again accepted ^{the} candidacy. He chose Yi Ki-bung as his running mate. The Democratic Party nominated Shin Ik-hi and Chang Myŏn as their presidential and vice presidential

⁸³ Mun Chang-ju, Hankuk Chŏngch'iron (Korean Politics), pp. 309-310.

⁸⁴ The Hankuk Ilbo, March 6, 1956, p. 1.

candidates respectively. Their campaign strategy was to attack Rhee's dictatorship. In the largest campaign rally in the history of Korean elections, Shin told the crowd that ^{the} "Government of Korea is [^]one-man dictatorial rule," because Rhee regarded the Constitution and the laws "as his own."⁸⁵ The fate of the Democratic Party was sealed when its presidential candidate died of cerebral hemorrhage on a train on May 5.

The results of the election showed that Rhee's popularity had waned considerably. Despite Shin's death, Rhee was able to garner slightly more than five million votes out of nine-and-a-half million voters. Cho Bong-am of the Progressive Party, a minor party candidate won more than two million votes; another two million votes were ruled void. There was no question for whom this unusually high number of invalidated votes were intended. Another surprising result was the election of Chang Myŏn as Vice President. It was expected that Yi Ki-bung would be an easy winner with Rhee's support and the benefit of administrative power.

The two years following the 1956 Presidential Election were a relatively calm period when the ruling and opposition parties seemed to be finding the ways of accommodation. That the two parties were able to negotiate an election law revision prior to the 1958 general election in the prevailing mood of compromise is a case in point. The law thus obtained contributed to a rather quiet and fair election

⁸⁵ The Dong-A Ilbo, May 2, 1956, p. 1.

in 1958.⁸⁶ The absence of political crisis enabled the major parties to look inward. As for the Liberal Party, factional tendencies were kept at minimum by Rhee's presence at the helm. But the seeds of discord were present ever since the 1954 general election. By the time of the 1954 election and the reorganization thereafter, most of the Liberal Party's leadership positions went to former bureaucrats-- such persons as Yi Ki-bung, Chang Kyŏng-kŭn, Yi Jae-hak and Han Hi-sŏk. Opposing these bureaucratic politicians were the large contingents of Assemblymen who were leaders of the LP's ancillary organizations such as the Kukminhoe, the Youth Corps, the farmers' and laborers' organizations. This group was led by such persons as Cho Kyŏng-ku, Yu Ji-wŏn and Kim Ki-ch'ŏl. As early as 1956, this anti-maincurrent faction demanded a restructuring of the party. When their demand for a collective leadership structure went unheeded, some of the members of this faction bolted the party.

The DP was also engaged in a similar fracas over its leadership. The "old" faction, led by Cho Byŏng-ok and his former DNP colleagues collided with Chang Myŏn's "new" faction (so named because of their recent exodus into the party) over the issue of alleged fraudulent voting maneuvers in the August 1956 Democratic Party Convention held at Kwangju.⁸⁷ This was indicative of what was to come later in the presidential nominating convention in November, 1959.

⁸⁶ Kim Chong-hun, Hankuk Chŏngdangsa (A History of Korean Political Parties), pp. 88-97.

⁸⁷ For details, see The Voice of Korea, August 29, 1958, p. 929.

The nation went to the polls on May 2, 1958 to elect members of the Fourth National Assembly. The election took place in a relative calm and reconciliatory atmosphere between the two parties. The Liberal Party won 126 seats, five fewer than what it held prior to the election. The DP, on the other hand, added 33 to its strength, thus having altogether 79 members in the new Assembly. The independents elected 27.⁸⁸ The voting pattern of this election reaffirmed that of the 1956 presidential election in that the LP was strong in rural districts whereas the DP's electoral strength lay in the cities. The issue of Rhee's dictatorship continued to win the support of the urban dwellers for the opposition party. It now seemed possible that in due time the opposition party might be able to wrest power away from the Liberal Party through the ballot boxes.

The reconciliatory gestures of the government during the 1958 general election took another turn when the government submitted a National Security Law Revision bill in November of that year. The high-handed tactics the ruling party used to secure the passage of the bill reaffirmed the general impression of the opposition politicians and the public that the reconciliatory posture of the government and ruling party was only temporary. That this law was intended only for the suppression of the government's political opponents is subject to speculation. These charges were of course

⁸⁸CEMC, Yŏkdae Kukhoewiwŏn Sŏn'gŏ Sanghwang(The Status of the Past National Assembly Elections), pp. 327-328.

denied by the Liberal Party politicians⁸⁹ and also by the sponsors of the bill.⁹⁰ This bill, introduced on November 18, 1958, included far reaching provisions.⁹¹ Fresh in the memory of those who opposed the bill was the fate of the Progressive Party and its leader Cho Bong-am, less than a year earlier when the party had its license taken away by the government and, ^{when} Cho, one-time presidential candidate, received the death sentence under the existing National Security Law. After forming a Struggle Committee against the Revision of the National Security Law, the Democrats and others labelled it "the Liberal Party's strategy to prolong its rule."⁹²

The Liberal Party railroaded the bill out of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee on December 19 without the presence of its six Democratic Party members. Angry and stunned, the Democrats

⁸⁹See Yi Jae'hak's recollections in Sasilŭi Jŏnpurul Kisulhanda (Memoirs), pp. 154-155.

⁹⁰For comments by the drafter of the bill, O Je-do, see, Kim Chong-hun, Hankuk Chŏngdangsa (A History of Korean Political Parties), pp. 99-100.

⁹¹The provisions of the bill included, among other things: capital punishment or life imprisonment for these who engage in espionage or release state secrets; ten-year maximum sentence for those who collect information on political, economic, cultural, or military matters with the intention of benefiting the enemy; five-year maximum sentence for those who disturb the people and aid the enemy by openly relating or disseminating false information or distorted facts with the knowledge that they are false or purposely distorted; ten-year maximum sentence for the defamation of President, Speaker of the National Assembly and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. For details and comments, see Chŏng T'ae-sŏp, "Kukka Poanpŏp" (National Security Law), Sasangge, January, 1959, pp. 81-91.

⁹²See ibid., p. 82.

countered with a sitdown strike to prevent the passage of the bill on the main floor. Vice President Chang, an odd partner and completely ignored under Rhee's shadow, visited the strikers on December 21 for a round of encouragement. On the following day, the State Council condemned Chang's action as intensifying "political strife" and paralyzing "the functions of the administration." The Vice President's action, the State Council continued, "had greatly undermined the authority of the Assembly, which stands out as a symbol of democracy."⁹³

The Democrats' siege of the Assembly floor continued until the evening of December 24. On that Christmas eve some three hundred "security guards" entered the floor to bodily clear the hall.⁹⁴ On the following day, in the absence of opposition legislators, the Liberal Party Assemblymen passed the revision bill in thirteen minutes. Throughout the day, the Liberals proceeded to pass twenty-two bills to break a legislative record. Among the bills so rushed through were such important ones as the Local Autonomy Law bill,⁹⁵ the House of Councillors Election bill, and the budget for 1959. On

⁹³Quoted in The Hankuk Ilbo, December 22, 1958, p. 1.

⁹⁴Yi Jae'hak reports in his memoirs that the Liberal Party's Executive Committee decided to use this tactic. "What was at stake," Yi reminisced, was the "attitude of the opposition in the National Assembly." "The Party's [LP's] decision was to change it." See his memoirs in Sasilŭi Jŏnpurŭl Kisulhandae (All Truths Are Told: Memoirs), pp. 154-155.

⁹⁵This law made appointive by the central government all officers to the lowest level of provincial administration.

December 26, Vice President Chang made a prophetic public remark:⁹⁶

No matter what excuse he made and no matter who begs excuse for it, the Liberals' deeds cannot be forgiven. If the Liberals perform similar deeds in the future, public unease will grow day by day and the dignity of the Constitution and the peoples' reliance on the government will be severely undermined. For the sake of the nation and the people, corrections must be made at once. In order to make corrections, the House must convene soon so that the ruling and opposition members can discuss again the passed bills with the objective of correcting abnormal and undemocratic provisions.

As hostility between the two parties was reaching its new peak, the political atmosphere for the forthcoming presidential election was ominous. President Rhee once again advocated a constitutional amendment for adopting a single-ticket system to eliminate the "abnormality" of having^a President and Vice President from two different political parties.⁹⁷ Both the LP and the DP alike faced difficult problems. With Rhee's old age(84), the question of succession loomed large within the Liberal Party. As for the Democrats, heartened by the advances they made in the 1958 General Election, were split badly on the selection of the party's presidential candidate.

The ranks of the Liberal Party were split between the "intransigents" and "moderates" as the party began preparations for the election. The former group insisted that the party should

⁹⁶Quoted in The Hankuk Ilbo, December 27, 1958, p. 1.

⁹⁷In fact, Rhee began his campaign much earlier. August 13, 1959, he explained to the effect that the presidential system required a single-ticket system.

take a "hard" stance against the Democratic Party, both in legislative tactics and electoral campaigns; the moderates called for more accommodating gestures vis-a-vis the opposition party. When Yi Ki-bung, Speaker of the House and Chairman of the party's Executive Committee, announced the party line on the occasion of the Ninth National Convention of the Liberal Party, the intransigents appeared to have gained an upper hand. Among other things, he emphasized elimination of factional feuds within the party; party members' strict acceptance of party policy and platform; resolute implementation of party platform; and termination of reconciliatory and compromising gestures toward the opposition party.⁹⁸ Rhee himself did not hesitate to accept the nomination of the party, unlike in 1952 and 1956. Yi Ki-bung, again became Rhee's running mate by a unanimous vote of the convention.

The Democrats, on the other hand, had an agonizing selection procedure for their presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Also entering into the picture was ^{the question} whether the second spot in the ticket ought to be a candidate for a prime ministership's or for the vice-presidency in view of the fact that a constitutional amendment provided for a switch to a cabinet system and would abolish the vice-presidency.⁹⁹ Long before the convention, the party virtually

⁹⁸The Hankuk Ilbo, June 30, 1959, p. 1.

⁹⁹That this consideration emerged indicated the extent to which the Democrats were hopeful of the victory in the forthcoming election.

split in two with almost equal strength-- the "intransigents" supporting Chang Myŏn and ^{the} "moderates" Cho Byŏng-ok. These two men were virtually equal in stature. The intransigents argued that Chang, as Shin's successful vice presidential candidate in 1956, was a logical and proven choice for the presidency. Cho's supporters, more deeply rooted in the Democratic Party than Chang's, as the latter joined the party only after the 1954 constitutional crisis, insisted that Cho had a far more impressive record as an anti-Japanese and anti-Liberal, and that he was far more popular among the electorate.

Having failed to settle the question of nomination informally, both factions agreed to be bound by the decision of the November convention. Both factions exchanged accusations of illegal activities in manipulating the selection of provincial party delegates to the national convention. On November 26, the party delegates elected Cho as the presidential candidate by a slim margin of three votes (484 to 481), and on the following day, in reversal, Chang won the Chairmanship of the Supreme Committee by 70 votes. This marked the beginning of the Democratic tradition of separating its presidential candidate and the party head. The strength of both factions was reflected in the election of the six-member Supreme Committee. Chang Myŏn, Kwak Sang-hun, Pak Sun-ch'ŏn of the "new" faction intransigents and Cho Byŏng-ok, Paik Nam-hun and Yun Po-sŏn of the "old" faction moderates were elected to this committee.¹⁰⁰ As a

¹⁰⁰ For events surrounding the DP national convention, see Autobiography of Kim To-yŏn, an "old" faction leader of the Democratic Party, in Naŭi Insaeng Paeksŏ (Autobiography), (Seoul: Sangsan Hoegorok Ch'ulpan Tongjijoe, 1967), pp. 325-331.

prelude to the fateful election in March, 1960, the administration introduced another constitutional amendment bill for a single-ticket system on which Rhee had pontificated on several occasions. After the bill had been defeated, the Liberal Party took a retaliatory measure by having the government announce that the election was going to be held in March, instead of May as it originally had been scheduled. This was a tremendous blow to the Democrats, as their presidential candidate was in the United States for a surgical operation. While the Democrats struggled to postpone the election, it was reported that candidate Cho had died at a hospital in the United States. It was a fateful repeat of 1956. The attention was now focussed on the choice of Vice-President: the likelihood of succession to the 84 year old President was in the consideration of both parties.

As it was revealed later, the Liberal Party planned to rig the election to ensure the election of its vice-presidential candidate, Yi Ki-bung, who was defeated by his Democratic rival by 200,000 votes four years earlier. When the results of the election were announced, Rhee won by more than 6,400,000 votes.¹⁰¹ It was then charged and later admitted by the Liberal Party leaders¹⁰² that the party instructed the Interior Ministry to carry out its

¹⁰¹ The Dong-A Ilbo, March 17, 1960, p. 1.

¹⁰² See Hankuk Hyŏkmyŏng Chaep'ansa (A History of Revolutionary Trials in Korea), (Seoul: Tong'a Sŏjŏkhesa, 1963). This is a compilation of court records in the early phase of the military junta.

order to stuff the ballot boxes, terrorize the Democratic Party members, use police power to ensure "correct" voting and other methods.¹⁰³

A train of events erupted one after another which eventually led to the demise of Rhee's twelve year rule; demonstrations against election rigging on March 15 which resulted in the death of several students; a series of student demonstrations in all major cities of Korea in March and April, demanding another election as the Democrats had earlier demanded;^a student march on the presidential palace on April 19 which resulted in the firing by the police that led to the death of more than 100 students and^{the} wounding of many others; the proclamation of martial law on the same day^{that the} commander remained neutral;^{the} the resignation of/Rhee cabinet on April 21; an important statement by the United States Secretary of State Christian Herter that the present disorder was a result of oppressive policies in the election and a disregard for the principles of^{an} democracy; announcement by Rhee on April 24 that he had severed^{an} his relationship with the Liberal Party; announcement on the 26th that Yi Ki-bung was dismissed from all public positions he had held and, that if it was the people's wish, Rhee himself would offer his own resignation; the unanimous resolution by the National Assembly,

¹⁰³ These were the charges made by the Democratic Party and reported two weeks before the election in The Dong-A Ilbo, March 3, 1960, p. 1. See also Sin Sang-ch'o, "Kongmyōng Sōngyō Annyōngi" (Fairwell to Fare Election), Sasangge, April, 1960, pp. 221-227.

the Liberals included, which requested Rhee to resign.¹⁰⁴ If there was one genuine expression of ^a "public will" of which Rhee justified many of his political decisions, the April 19 "Revolution" was precisely that.¹⁰⁵ Finally on April 27, Rhee succumbed to the inevitable. In an one-sentence announcement issued through the Office of Public Information, he said, "I, Syngman Rhee, honoring the resolution of the National Assembly, resign as President and wish to devote the rest of my life to the nation and the people as a private citizen."¹⁰⁶

During the short twelve years of Rhee's political dominance, the rough roads treaded by political parties were best indicated by the scores of political parties that emerged and disappeared in the nation-building era. In terms of the development of political parties, the early years of the republic up to the time of the Korean War were marked by factionalism of top political leaders.

¹⁰⁴For a detailed treatment of the events that led to the downfall of Rhee regime, see Eugene Kim and Ke-soo Kim, "April 1960 Korean Student Movement," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. VII (March, 1964), pp. 83-92.


¹⁰⁵The college students' statements on this day, issued by "the Students' Association of Seoul National University, read in part: Our wisdom and intelligence knows that this hopeless situation in this nation is the result of the despotic rule disguised in democracy and liberty. History of democracy is the history of struggle for freedom. We know that all forms of despotic rule is nothing but a 'paper tiger'. Our basic right to vote has been deprived of by the officials who are supposed to uphold democracy and serve the people as public servants. The freedom of speech, assembly, association and belief are in danger of extinction by the ignorant forces of despotic rules." Quoted in Lee Joung-sik, "Some Characteristics of Korean Political Culture," p. 73.

¹⁰⁶The Dong-A Ilbo, Special Edition, April 27, 1960, p. 1.

It was soon made evident to Rhee and his supporters, however, that modern politics needed organization-- a political party. Regardless of the motive for the creation of the Liberal Party, a new party was organized to answer the needs of the ruling elite. Organization of the pro-government forces into a relatively cohesive group, on the other hand, had the effect of bringing together the government's foes as well, hence the polarization of the political arena. From at least the 1956 general election on to the time of the downfall of ^{the} Liberal Party regime by the April 19 Student Uprising, a semblance of a two party system both in form and substance was maintained. Parties had gained legitimacy, regardless of whether they were performing their proper roles for the political system.

The notable characteristic of the party development in the period was the role the political crisis played in the birth, maintenance and splintering of parties. Rhee's continuing attempt to perpetuate his power through constitutional maneuvers and the accompanying attempt to check such moves tended to stabilize the political alignments into two large groupings. At the same time, the institutionalization of parties was adversely affected by the fact that within each party it was mainly personalities rather than policy commitment that held the membership together. When Rhee was toppled, this basis of cohesion also disappeared. The geneology of the Korean parties from 1945 to 1960 may be described by the following diagram (Diagram 1).

Diagram 1. The Geneology of Korean Political Parties,
1945-1960.



The Second Republic and Attempts at
Democracy, 1960-1961

The last governmental decision made by the outgoing President was to appoint his Foreign Minister and good friend Hô Chông to head the caretaker government.¹⁰⁷ The Democrats, having decided not to participate in the interim Government, were now almost assured of power at a later date, but there was the immediate necessity to fill the political vacuum created by Rhee's downfall. The immediate issue facing Hô's government was the question of dissolving the Assembly. It was decided to keep it as a "penitent" National Assembly and as a "committee for coping with current political situation." In the 113 days of the interim period, the Hô government carried out its tasks with vigilance and in strict political neutrality. Among its achievements were the orderly adoption of a constitutional amendment which established a cabinet system, the neutralization of police, and the holding in July 29 of a new parliamentary election. Since the students continued to take to the streets to give vent to their frustrations and demands, and the newspapers urged speedy trials of those who were connected with the March 15 election rigging, the task of the interim regime was to maintain public order and ensure fairness in the selection of representatives who would organize a new government. Hô, himself, stated that his difficulty was "to bring about revolutionary political reforms through unrevolutionary

¹⁰⁷ This succession procedure was prescribed in the Constitution, Article 55.

means."¹⁰⁸ On June 15, the Second Republic was born with the passage and promulgation of the Constitution¹⁰⁹ creating a parliamentary cabinet system. A new election was set for July 29 for the new House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. Any other system would have been inconceivable. A system of cabinet responsibility had been regarded by the Democrats as a consummate standard of a democratic system.

While the caretaker government was preparing for the transition, the two major parties at the time-- the Liberals and Democrats-- began preparations for the July 29 elections. The Liberal Party disintegrated rapidly. Only men still identifying with the Liberal Party were Liberal members of the penitent Assembly. Among the Liberals, two alternatives were being debated: whether they should purge the ranks and reorganize the party or whether they should dissolve the party altogether and organize a new one in cooperation

¹⁰⁸ Hŏ Chŏng, "Imchŏng Paekil" (One Hundred Days of Interim Regime), Chung'ang, July 1969, pp. 84-86,

¹⁰⁹ The major provisions of the new constitution were as follows: the President, as the Chief of State, was not made a head of the administration: he was to be indirectly elected by the House of Representatives for a five year term; the Prime Minister headed the State Council in which all decision-making power was vested; in the event of a non-confidence resolution by the lower house, the cabinet might decide to resign en bloc or it might dissolve the House of Representatives within 10 days. The formal powers and functions of the upper house, the House of Councillors, were narrowly prescribed, with the lower house having the authority to override the upper house's objection to any of its bills by simply passing it once more. Local autonomy was provided by Article 97, Para. 2 which stated that "at least mayors and chiefs of towns and townships are to be directly elected by the inhabitants concerned."

with non-Liberal politicians. On June 1, 102 Liberals in the National Assembly broke with their negotiation group, and its leader, Cho Kyōng-kyu, favored holding a convention and changing the party's name with a view to political survival. Forty-one of the 102 seceders broke formally with the Liberal Party on June 14 and registered with the Assembly Secretariat next day as the Constitutional Politics Society.

The Democrats split badly at the prospect of holding power. The split was along the line of "old" and "new" factions of the party. At the threshold of power, the factional strife paralyzed the party into impotence. As one of the former leaders of the party reminisced regretfully, "failure to resolve this conflict" amounted to "a betrayal of popular expectation."¹¹⁰ By holding a nominating convention on June 25, the Democrats began their preparation for the new government. Each faction of the party supported its own adherents with campaign funds and implemented separate campaign strategies. The Democrats won a landslide victory with 170 seats out of 231; next came the independents with 54.

It was the "old" faction of that party which advocated the split of the party. During the campaign, Yu Chin-san, a controversial spokesman of the old guard, publicly stated that "it will mean another dictatorship if only a single conservative party is allowed to wield

¹¹⁰Yun Po-sŏn in Sasilŭi Jŏnpurŭl Kisulhanda. (All Truths are Told: Memoirs), p. 301.

an absolute majority within the House of Representatives."¹¹¹ This trial balloon drew immediate warning from Chang, the nominal head of the party and the recognized leader of the new faction. Although such a split was not desirable at the time, Chang predicted that "another conservative opposition will grow up in time."¹¹² However, a new party movement by the old faction seemed to be crystallizing after the Democrats' overwhelming victory in the election. On August 4, the old guard members of the party's Supreme Committee issued a statement explaining the desirability of the split. They argued that under the cabinet responsibility system, more than two parties are desirable and that the Democratic Party, which had "overgrown" to a more than two-thirds majority in the Assembly, "should be divided or run the risk of becoming a one party autocracy."¹¹³ The old faction representatives boycotted the party caucus two days later, and, in a symbolic gesture, visited the graves of their former mentors, Kim Sŏng-su, Shin Ik-hi and Cho Byŏng-ok to pay their respects.

Sharing the spoils of power under these unusual circumstances was an agonizing process. Disagreement emerged first on the question of naming the next President and a Prime Minister, with the new

¹¹¹The Dong-A Ilbo, July 11, 1960, p. 1.

¹¹²Ibid., July 14, 1960, p. 1. For a discussion of the split of the Democratic Party, see the newspaper debate between Yu Chin-san and Chu Yo-han in The Hankuk Ilbo, July 12, 1960, p. 1.

¹¹³The Dong-A Ilbo, August 4, 1960, p. 1.

faction insisting that the more powerful position of Prime Minister should be occupied by the leader of the party holding the majority of seats in the House of Representatives. This would ensure Chang's election as Prime Minister. The old faction members, however, maintained that the party had a "collective leadership structure," that Chang, as the Chairman of the Supreme Committee, was merely presiding officer, and, therefore, the party had no single official head. Hence, they argued that the post of Prime Minister should go to the head of whichever party faction had the most seats in the lower house. These two viewpoints collided without the prospect of their ever being resolved.

The task of keeping the party together was left to Kwak Sang-hun, a moderate "new" faction Speaker of the Penitent National Assembly. He announced on July 11 that "it is not the Democrats, but others who should be interested in or care about building up another conservative party than the Democratic Party."¹¹⁴ A few days after the election, he stated that "the democratic landslide victory will not be in danger of deteriorating into a dictatorship, but instead will be a great help in implementing the party's promises to the people," and that the advocates of the split "will betray the people who chose them to realize the party program."¹¹⁵ On August 9 and 10, Kwak sponsored a three-men "summit" conferences (Chang of the new faction, Yun Po-sŏn of the old faction and Kwak himself) in an attempt to

¹¹⁴Ibid., July 11, 1960, p. 1.

¹¹⁵Ibid., August 1, 1960, p. 1.

bring about a compromise, but this and other efforts turned out to be unproductive.

In the whirlpool of power struggle, the joint session of the legislature overwhelmingly elected Yun Po-sŏn as President on August 12. One of the constitutional prerogatives which he was to exercise was the nomination of a Prime Minister to the House of Representatives for its approval. On August 16, President Yun in a surprise move nominated Kim To-yŏn of the old faction for the post.¹¹⁶ Kim was removed from the Supreme Committee in the party's 1959 national convention and replaced by Yun himself. In nominating him for the post, Yun was bypassing Chang Myŏn, who had long made it clear that he felt entitled to that post as the head of the Democratic Party. The House, however, rejected Yun's nominee on the following day by a narrow margin of 111 for and 112 against.¹¹⁷ President Yun was now left with one more choice to make. If his choice was again vetoed, the House would elect a Prime Minister by

¹¹⁶ Kwak, in his memoirs, accuses Yun of breaching political ethics by nominating Kim despite the previous understanding reached by the top leaders of the party to elect a new faction member as Prime Minister. See Sasilŭi Jŏnpurŭl Kisulhanda (All Truths are Told: Memoirs), p. 143. Yun, on the other hand, had written that he simply thought Kim had more votes than Chang at the time. See ibid., pp. 302-304. Kim To-yŏn, on the other hand, stated that he had "expected" Yun's nomination. See his recollections in Naŭi Insaeng Paeksŏ (My Life), pp. 367-368.

¹¹⁷ Immediately after the July 29 election, the strength of the new faction in the House was 83; figure for the old faction was 84.

itself. On August 18, Yun bowed to the inevitable by nominating Chang who won the approval of the House again by a slim margin, 117 to 107.

The burden now shifted to the newly elected Prime Minister to announce his cabinet. He had indicated earlier that he would consider at least five old-guard members to his cabinet provided that the latter would not register as a separate negotiation group in the House, a consequence ^{of} which would be tantamount to a "de facto party split." The "old" faction welcomed the idea of having five members but insisted that Chang accept the prospect of a separate negotiating body and also announced its intention to withdraw its five participating cabinet appointees at any time. These positions could not be reconciled and the negotiations broke down on August 22.¹¹⁸

When the fourteen-men cabinet was announced on August 23, it consisted of only one old faction member and two independents, the rest being new faction members.¹¹⁹ Immediate criticism was heard not only from the old faction but also from some elements of the new faction which claimed that they had been betrayed despite the key role they played in the election of Chang. Chang succumbed to the mounting criticism on August 24, when he stated: "These appointments are more or less temporary. I am prepared to reshuffle my

¹¹⁸ The Dong-A Ilbo, August 22, 1960, p. 1.

¹¹⁹ The younger elements of the new faction led by Yi Ch'öl-sŭng have in fact been very critical of Chang. They have maintained a circle composed of younger new faction members for most of the nine-month Democratic rule.

cabinet whenever it is needed to bring about political stability.^{*120} The old faction retaliated. Led by Kim To-yŏn, the old guard members attacked Chang in a newspaper advertisement for "thinking more about his personal friends than about the nation." On August 31, Minjudang Kup'a Tongjihoe (The Society of Old Faction Commrades Association of the Democratic Party) with 86 members in the House of Representatives registered with the House Secretariat. A statement issued by this group said that the split was necessary due to the differences in "political thinking," and insisted that the "old" faction was democratic in organization while the new faction was high-handed and fascist, and that the old faction put the nation first and political power second while the new faction placed its thirst for political power above the state.¹²¹ The formation of the old faction negotiating group was followed almost immediately by the registration of another negotiation group, Minjung Hoe (The Peoples Club). Composed of 48 independents, this club was a union of four distinct groups: a pro-new faction group led by Yi Jae-hyŏng; a pro-old faction group led by Sŏ Min-ho; a reformist group headed by Yun Kil-jung; and independents like Chang T'aek-sang, Kim Jun-yŏn and Yun Jae-kŭn.

Chang's attempt to keep the party together through reorganization of his cabinet was to no avail. On September 22, the old faction

¹²⁰ The Dong-A Ilbo, August 24, 1960, p. 1.

¹²¹ The Dong-A Ilbo, August 31, 1960, p. 1.

members' caucus resolved to form a new party. On the following day, the new faction members with the strength of 95 legislators finally registered as a separate group with the name Minjudang(the Democratic Party). On September 24, the old faction registered as Shinmindang (The New Democratic Party). The founding declaration of the party created by the old faction attacked Chang's regime for "burying in oblivion the tasks of the revolutionary regime" and "betraying the people's expectation by inheriting the evils and the corruption of the old regime." If these practices were allowed to continue, this declaration said, "the nation's future portends crisis."¹²²

While factional strife among the Democrats was ruining their party, the nation was in a state of chaos. The chaos was not due only to the deadlock of government. The legitimacy of the Democratic rule, from the beginning, was on shaky grounds because the downfall of the Rhee regime was owed to the students. The students continued to take to the streets any grievances they had and the regime demurred on taking a strong action against the student excesses. During the nine-month rule of the Democrats, there were some 1,200 demonstrations reported in various cities and this meant that, on the average, there were four demonstrations on each day of the Democratic rule.¹²³ A common joke current at the time was that "the sun rises with

¹²² Central Election Management Committee, Hankuk Chŏngdangsa (A History of Korean Political Parties), p. 69.

¹²³ Pak Mun-ok, Hankuk Chŏngpuron (A Study of Korean Government), p. 400.

demonstrations and sets with demonstrations." There was no question that the students were the most efficacious group during these months.¹²⁴ The prevailing concern was no longer that of police suppression of the Rhee regime, "but one of freely voiced fears as to whether the popular forces unleashed by the revolution can successfully be kept in check."¹²⁵ The cautious police was unable to maintain order without the politicians' sanctions and the policemen themselves were involved in demonstrations for higher wages and salaries.

In domestic politics, the Democrats in a state of deadlock could not effectively implement policies to solve a host of urgent problems. The Democrats seemed to be in constant bickering over the power that escaped them for many years, and once the "incorruptible" Democrats let corruption flourish and the profiteers were left unpunished. Various factions accused others of scandalous profiteering

¹²⁴The nature of the demands of the demonstrating students was varied. Among others, they demanded resignation of their principals; negotiations with the North Korean counterpart on the question of unification on the basis of neutralization. The most widely reported and condemned was the demonstration by the students who were wounded in the April 19 march on the Presidential Residence. The students, while demanding severe punishment for those responsible for the March 15 election rigging, stormed the Assembly hall and occupied its rostrum.

¹²⁵Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee(Rutland, Vt.: C.E. Tuttle Co., 1960), p. 54.

activities.¹²⁶ Most of the energy was consumed on the reshuffling of cabinets which occurred five times during the nine-month period.

The people's conception of the performance of the regime also deteriorated. There was no question but that with the demise of the Rhee regime, it was expected that the anomalies and paradoxes that had characterized the old regime would disappear overnight with the coming of the Democratic regime. . A public opinion poll, taken by the Hankuk Ilbo immediately after the Chang cabinet was organized, yielded the following results. When asked whether they supported the Chang regime, the responses had been: 34.8 percent "support"; 39.4 percent "will wait and see"; 11.2 percent "oppose". Some five months later the respondents were asked whether they thought Chang's performance was satisfactory. Only 3.1 percent thought so; 34.3 percent saw "no improvement"; 42.8 percent, "will wait and see"; 19.4 percent, "don't know."¹²⁷

The Second Republic of the Democrats was one of open polity in which genuine forces of democracy seemed to operate. Freed from the autocratic rule of Rhee, the nation experimented with democracy

¹²⁶ The most spectacular scandal occurred in February, 1961. Labelled "Tungsten Affair," a high ranking old faction member of the Assembly was charged by a new faction member that the former had taken a million dollar bribe for arranging a consignment sale contract for 4,000 tons of tungsten between a Japanese firm and the Korea Tungsten Company. For details, see Hankuk Hyŏkmyŏng Chaep'ansa (The History of Revolutionary Trials in Korea), Vol. 1, pp. 230-242.

¹²⁷ This newspaper poll did not indicate whether the respondents were the same individuals in both polls. See The Hankuk Ilbo, January 15, 1961, p. 1.

including freedom of the press and the freedom of political activities. But this experiment gave free rein to forces that had been kept in check during the Rhee regime. The nation's leadership defaulted with the newly obtained political power by engaging in endless factional maneuvers to keep power. Political power, which long escaped the Democrats, was now theirs, but they were not ready to exercise it.¹²⁸

The Third Republic: The Trials and Hopes
of Party Politics, 1961-1969

¹²⁸ It is perhaps illuminating to quote Chang Myŏn, the mentor of the Second Republic for the rational and the apologies he made for the performance of his government: "While the DP was still engaged in the bloody struggle against the Liberal Party, the thing that promised to the people was the absolute guarantee of freedom and removal of tyranny. Thus, we reaffirmed freedom when we came to power.... Even though the society was deep in chaos by the daily occurrence of demonstrations, the DP government could not violate its own pledge of freedom that it made before coming to power.... We could not betray the people under the pretext of a time of chaos. Of course, we could have declared a state of emergency on some dubious pretext. But we believed in a 'true democratic order based on freedom,' rather than in a 'superficial order imposed by guns and bayonets.'.... In short, 'Let them once enjoy the unlimited freedom that they had been longing for' was the credo of the DP government. We tried to govern the people by time, instead of by an iron fist even in the face of increasing chaos. In the meantime, we were also preparing some plans for stern measures to prevent degeneration of this social disorder reaching a certain point where it might endanger essential maintenance of national security and welfare." Sasilŭi Jŏnpurŭl Kisulhandae (All Truths Are Told: Memoirs), pp. 390-391. Translated and quoted in K.B. Kim op. cit., p. 127.

In 1955, Shannon McCune made a prophetic observation of the Korean political scene:¹²⁹

A relatively unknown but potentially powerful group in the Korean political scene is the Korean military force.... [I]t is obvious... that in the course of future political crisis (e.g. at the death or retirement of President Rhee) the army could exercise a decisive influence. In part because of the close relationships they have had to the American Army and its tradition of civilian control...(,) it appears that the army leaders will not be an anti-democratic force.

McCune's first observation turned out to be amazingly accurate. During the critical moments of the students' assault on Rhee and his regime the Martial Law Commander and his troops remained neutral and this helped to expedite the collapse of the regime. McCune was somewhat wide of the mark, however, on his second point. A group of young Turks in the Korean Army led by General Park successfully staged a bloodless coup in the early morning of May 16, 1961. This was completed with some 3,500 men and 250 officers within a 600,000-men army. Seoul was captured in a matter of hours, and the Military Revolutionary Council announced

¹²⁹Shannon McCune, "The United States and Korea" in The United States and the Far East, 1st. ed., (New York: Prentice Hall, 1956), p. 93.

six pledges to the nation.¹³⁰

Four days after the coup, the official explanation of the coup was provided:¹³¹

The armed forces rose up, because they just could not bear witnessing the country falling into extreme distress and Communist domination. Thus, they rose up in union to secure our homeland and our people from the Communist totalitarianism, building a new future for the establishment of a genuine democracy in the Republic of Korea.

On May 19, the Revolutionary Council transformed itself into the 40-men Supreme Council for National Reconstruction(SCNR); and by legislating the "Law Regarding Extraordinary Measures for

¹³⁰These were: "(1) Anti-communism will be the cardinal point of national policy and the nation's anti-Communist alignment, which has had thus far been more than a matter of convention and a mere slogan, will be rearranged and strengthened. (2) The UN Charter will be observed and international agreements will be faithfully carried out. The friendly ties with the United States and other free world nations will be further strengthened. (3) All corruption and past evil practices in this country will be wiped out and fresh and clean morality will be pursued in order to redress the degenerated national morality and spirit. (4) The plight of the national life which is on the brink of despair and starvation will be quickly ameliorated and all-out efforts will be made for the reconstruction of a self-reliant national economy. (5) In order to implement the long cherished national desire to reunify the divided land, all out efforts will be centered on making the nation capable of coping with communism. (6) As soon as such talks are accomplished, we will ready ourselves to turn over the reigns of power to new and conscientious politicians and return to our original duties." Quoted in, Park Chung-Hee, "What Has Made the Military Revolution Successful," "Koreana Quarterly", Vol. II, No. 1(Summer, 1961), pp. 18-19.

¹³¹The Secretariat, Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, Military Revolution in Korea(Seoul: The SCNR, 1961), p. 12.

National Reconstruction," it appropriated all executive, legislative and judicial powers unto itself. Along with SCNR, the Cabinet and the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) were established on the same day. The SCNR moved swiftly to carry out its pledges. In reorganization of the administration and replacement of lower-level bureaucrats, in apprehending and punishing gangsters and pro-Communist suspects, and in announcing the five year economic plan, the military government moved with swiftness and determination, and these policies were beginning to earn the support of the people. It was in the arena of politicsⁱⁿ which the military government had to undergo a series of difficulties.

In accordance with its pledge, the SCNR disbanded all political parties(15) and social organization(233) as a first step. On August 12, 1961, General Park confirmed the position of the coup leaders that the military rule would be terminated by the summer of 1963, and the governmental power would be turned over^{to} a civilian administration. With this target and blueprint, the junta government enacted a retroactive "Political Activities Purification Law"¹³² in March, 1962 to pave legal grounds for banning "undesirable" former politicians from taking part in political activities until August, 1968.

¹³²For the complete text of the Political Activities Purification Law, see "Law for the Purification of Political Activities" in Korean Affairs, Vol. I, No. 2(May/June 1962), pp. 219-225. General Park's statement concerning this law is found in Korean Affairs Vol. I, No. 2(May/June, 1962), p. 217.

This law blacklisted more than 4,000 persons,¹³³ including Liberal and Democratic politicians.

The next step in the transition to the civilian rule was the adoption of a new Constitution. On July 11, 1962, a drafting committee was organized and after holding public hearings from August 23. to 30, a draft constitution was put to a national referendum. on December 17.¹³⁴ Having received an overwhelming 78.8 percent support from the people, it was promulgated on December 26.¹³⁵ It was a device to achieve legitimacy, which was to become useful later. It was a return to the presidential system, and one significant innovation was the inclusion of an article on political parties.¹³⁶ The provision on political parties was

¹³³Some two-thirds of the blacklisted persons applied for and received permission to participate in political activities in the beginning weeks of 1963, and by 1963, all but 200 were cleared.

¹³⁴Han Tai-soo, "Results of National Referendum and Its Significance." Koreana Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 1(1963), pp. 7-16.

¹³⁵For the text of the Constitution, see Selected Laws Governing National Assembly of Republic of Korea(Seoul: Committee Bureau, National Assembly, 1970), pp. 7-33.

¹³⁶Article 7 reads: "The establishment of political parties shall be free and the plural system shall be guaranteed. (2) Organization and activities of a political party shall be democratic and political parties shall have necessary organizational arrangements to enable the people to participate in the formation of public will. (3) Political parties shall enjoy the protection of the state. However, if the purposes or activities of political party are contrary to the basic democratic order, the Executive shall bring an action against it in the Supreme Court for its dissolution and the political party shall be dissolved in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court." Ibid., p. 8. Article 64(paragraph 3) and Article 36(paragraph 3) ruled out independent candidacies for both the presidential and National Assembly elections. Article 38 further states: "a person shall lose his membership in the National Assembly when he leaves or changes his party, or when his party is dissolved." Ibid., p. 13.

elaborated in the Political Party Law which passed the SCNR on December 31, 1962. The first comprehensive law on political parties in Korea, it defined a political party as "a voluntary organization... which participates in the formulation of political views of the people by promoting a responsible political assertion or policy and by nominating or supporting a candidate in an election for public office." The law required that a party should have district chapters in more than one-third of the total electoral districts for the National Assembly, and each district Chapter was to be composed of at least 80 members.¹³⁷ Without fulfilling these and other requirements, a political party could not register with the Central Election Management Committee(CEMC), which was created to oversee all activities related with political parties and elections. This law further stipulated that parties could enjoy freedom of activities within the scope of the Constitution and laws; a party could not be financed by foreign governments, groups, individuals or by state or public organizations; a party must make public its income and expenditures once a year. The intention for the political party law was clear. As Colonel Kil Jae-ho, the Chairman of the Legislative-Judiciary Committee of the SCNR stated, the "requirements for the formation of a party aim at preventing the emergence of

¹³⁷Article 25 through 27, ibid., pp. 182-183. The amended version(January, 1969) increased the number to one-half of the election districts, and 100 members. The Korean Republic, December 20, 1962, p. 1.

splinter and progressive parties, and to establish a bipartisan system."¹³⁸

While these legislative measures were undertaken, General Park announced that all of SCNR members would participate in the civilian government by running as civilians in the general election slated for May. The announcement was followed by a heated debate among the members of SCNR as to whether they should run in the forthcoming general election in uniform or retire from active military duty and run as civilians. A group of Supreme Councillors insisted that there was no need to shed the uniform as long as they serve as the nation's legislators. They insisted that military officers were entitled to run in general elections and retain their military status. This reasoning was overridden by the majority of Supreme Council members who feared that candidacy in military uniform would set a "bad precedent" for future elections. The Supreme Council revised its own law to include reservists among its members. This revision enabled the Supreme Councillors to shed their uniform in order to run in the forthcoming election, while retaining their seats in the Council.

¹³⁸The Korean Republic, December 20, 1962, p. 1. It is interesting to note that Yun Po-sŏn, former President, remarked a few days later that such a law would be unnecessary. He said: "I understand the government is worried over the possible emergence of too many splinter parties... I do not think a law is necessary to check the minority parties because, in the past even without such a law, small parties eventually merged into two major parties." See The Korean Republic, December 22, 1962, p. 1. Yun, however, supported the government's move to suppress the "left-wing" political parties.

The year 1963 began with concrete steps to turn over power from the military government to a civilian one. On February 18, General Park again reiterated his pledge of "non-participation in a yet to be established civilian government."¹³⁹ On the same day he lifted the ban on political activities for parties and social organizations and for some 3,000 persons.

That the junta council was badly split over this transitional phase was evident by a series of events whose details remain unclear up to the present time. Kim Jong-p'il, the mastermind of the coup, and the organizer of the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) suddenly resigned as Chairman of the party, and several members of the "maincurrent" members of the SCNR ^{also} resigned. The plot for a military counter-coup by Marine Commandant Kim Tong-ha was discovered on March 11 and the difficulties surrounding the DRP reportedly helped to convince Park to reverse his decision to return to military uniform. His statement on March 16 stated that he would prolong the period of military rule for four more years in order to "establish

¹³⁹ Park made his decision conditional upon acceptance of the following by the civilian politicians. (1) The newly elected government should prove to uphold the spirit of April 19 and May 16 revolutions; (2) The recognition of the justice of May 16 revolution and no reprisals against the military officers; (3) The bureaucrats appointed by the military government were to be retained; (4) Able reserve soldiers should be given preference for party positions wherever practicable. (5) All political parties should eliminate all traces of past evil and corrupt politics; and (6) The new civilian government should support the Korea-Japan talks. See, Mun Chang-ju, Hankuk Chongch'iron (A Study of Korean Politics), p. 346.

a polity that would never invite another revolution."¹⁴⁰ He would put the question of extension before a national referendum, but all political activities would be suspended once more.

The civilian politicians, united in opposition to the extension, demonstrated against the military government on March 20. American pressure was also reported to be exerted on Park.¹⁴¹ On April 8, Park announced that the referendum on the question of whether to extend the military rule or to hold a general election would be postponed until September. On July 27, Park ^{relented} in the face of these pressures and announced the final time-table and election dates. In accepting the DRP's presidential nomination on August 30, Park resolved to "continue and accomplish the task of the revolution for which he feels great responsibility."¹⁴² Among the group of officers who were determined to participate in the forthcoming civilian government was a group of young officers led by Kim Jong-p'il

¹⁴⁰For the complete text of his statement, see ibid., pp. 348-349. Henderson writes that this reversal was made under strong pressure, from the Korean CIA and the young colonels. See Henderson, Korea; The Politics of Vortex, p. 186.

¹⁴¹See Mun Ch'ang-ju, Hankuk Chŏngch'iron (A Study of Korean Politics), p. 348. On March 21, President Kennedy, in an interview, urged the return to civilian rule. On April 2, Kennedy's letter to Park urged the same. There were also unofficial reports that the U.S. would review its policy toward Korea should General Park extend military rule.

¹⁴²Quoted in Central Election Management Committee, Taehanminkuk Sŏn'gosa (A History of Korean Elections), p. 38.

and ~~the~~ members of the eighth class of the Korean Military Academy. Although the Democratic Republican Party was officially organized in February, 1963, the organizing work began in the strictest secrecy as early as January, 1962, only six months after the coup and a year before political activities were permitted.¹⁴³

That ^{the} CIA headed by Kim Jong-p'il funded and organized the DRP was an open secret. Certain key CIA former military officers were in charge of the new party project; they recruited university professors to help them.¹⁴⁴ The procedure for the establishment of the party could only be speculated, and the so-called "Kim Jong-p'il Plan" to organize a new party, which would transcend the military label, and provide the mechanism through which the military could participate in civilian politics, had become the blueprint for the new party. The organizing committee had taken a form of a study group composed of CIA military officers and young political scientists. That the scholars participated in the organizing committee became evident when the party was officially established. Kim is said to have asked these political scientists to study the pathology of former Korean parties

¹⁴³ For background information on the organization of the DRP. See Kim Yŏng-su, "Minju Kongwhadang Sajŏn Jojik" (The Advance Organization of the Democratic Republican Party), Shindong'a, November, 1964, pp. 168-187, and Kang In-sŏp, "Yuksa P'alkisaeng" (The Eighth Graduating class of the Korean Military Academy), Shindong'a, September, 1964, pp. 170-198. For another interesting account of the activities by the organizer of the new political party, see recollections of Kim Jae-ch'un, the former CIA Director, in "Nau'i Hyŏkmyŏng Jŏnfu" (Recollection to the Days of Revolution), Chung'ang, May, 1969, p. 118.

¹⁴⁴ See Henderson, Korea; The Politics of Vortex, pp. 304-305.

and develop a plan which would transcend them. The brain-trust around Kim condemned the former Korean parties as having the following pathologies: the constituency organization had not been a party organization, but largely a personal organization centered around the National Assemblyman; the provincial party organization with its weak administrative capabilities had not contributed much to the constituency organization; the party national headquarters was dominated by the National Assemblymen, and there were no controlling organizations over these legislators. The functions of the party had been executed through personal relations rather than on an institutional basis.¹⁴⁵

On the basis of this analysis, the organizers began to lay the framework for a new party. An important innovation was to divide the organization of the party into representative, executive and policy organs. As a representative organ, the national party headquarters was to have a central committee: the provincial or city party headquarters, a provincial or city committee; the constituency party, a constituency committee. As an executive organ, the party headquarters at all levels were to be staffed with paid party members to perform the executive functions of the party. The legislators and the party functionaries of the party were to jointly perform the staffing function of the party. The crux of this organizational set up was to prevent the domination of the constituency party organization by the legislators.

¹⁴⁵Choe Tan-yŏng, "Kongwhadangwa Kim Jong-p'il Puraen "(The DRP and Kim Jong-p'il Plan), Sasangge, March, 1963, pp. 80-85.

It also recommended an independent policy-making organ within the central party headquarters.¹⁴⁶

This blueprint for a new political party was apparently made known to the members of the SCNR, who had been kept in the dark up to that time. Having political ambitions of their own, they began to oppose the organizational framework of the party. Their opposition was based on the reasoning that the proposed framework would make it possible for the party functionaries to dominate the true representatives of the people. Furthermore, they argued, a maintenance of a constituency party secretariat would be a costly and unnecessary innovation between elections.

Amid these differences, the new party announced the formation of an inauguration committee which met on January 18. In order to transcend the military label the inauguration committee included civilians from various walks of life. Also included were five SCNR members and ten other reserve officers. The party officially came into being on February 26, 1963. The discord was already coming out in the open. General Song Yo-ch'an, former Premier and Park's senior in the army, charged on January 8, 1963 that it was a betrayal of public trust for the SCNR members to shed military uniforms and enter into politics. Similiar charges by other SCNR followed suit. As early as January 21, Kim Tong-ha, a SCNR member and a sponsoring member of the party, declared that the DRP "centered around Kim Jong-p'il,

¹⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 81-82.

is not going to the path that a public party in a democratic society should go," and "because I cannot correct the wrongs evident in the party, I am resigning from all positions."¹⁴⁷ The Supreme Council, during two days of deliberation on Kim Tong-ha's resignation, reportedly decided that Kim Jong-p'il had shown bad judgement and "improper attitude" and demanded that the party's functionary secretariat system at the constituency level be disbanded. The Supreme Council members seemed to have won the first round when Kim Jong-p'il announced his "intention" to resign from the party. In February, he left the country for a trip around the world. As he put it at the time, his decision to go abroad was reached "partly by myself and partly by others." As the situation deteriorated, Park intervened to calm the storm. On January 27, the SCNR members retracted their earlier demand for Kim Jong-p'il's resignation, and Park separated the party and the SCNR by removing those who had connections with the party. The DRP organizers in return asked Kim Tong-ha to retract his resignation from the party's inauguration committee.¹⁴⁸ Now a new party was born, and this was to provide the military officers a bridge to power in the forthcoming civilian government. The founding declaration stated;

¹⁴⁷Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁴⁸In addition to this discord, there seemed to have been a much more fundamental kind of differences. Song Yo-ch'an, the first head of Cabinet of the junta government, demanded, for example, on January 24, 1963 that Park should reverse his intention to participate in the civilian government. On February 14, Yu Wŏn-sik, a former SCNR member, demanded that the military should stay clear of the civilian government yet to be established. See Mun Ch'ang-ju, Hankuk Chŏngch'iron (A Study of Korean Politics), p. 345.

"We are unlike the past political parties in that we are a 'working' political party rather than merely a 'speaking' political party."¹⁴⁹

The DRP ran into immediate difficulties. General Park's oath-taking ceremony, at which he declared his non-candidacy, clouded the future of the party. Soon thereafter, General Park urged formation of a pan-national party that would include all political forces subscribing to the ideals of the military revolution.¹⁵⁰ General Kim Chae-ch'un, then the director of CIA, immediately started to organize a new party, which later became the Liberal Democratic Party(LDP). He was able to recruit various groups and individuals from existing parties and from the DRP itself. General Park's momentary decision in favor of a pan-national party threatened the DRP, but in May, 1963, Park ordered the merger of the two parties by using a slightly modified version of the existing DRP structure and by equitably distributing party posts between the two partisan groups in the merged party. This merger order brought another influx of anti-Kim Jong-p'il politicians into the party. Although the negotiations for the merger proved unsuccessful because the LDP demanded the dissolution of the DRP's secretariat organizations, this had the effect of complicating the factional picture of the future ruling party.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹Quoted in Haebang Yisipyinyŏnji(Twenty-two years since liberation), p. 671.

¹⁵⁰The need for such political party is publicly expressed by Yi Hu-rak's, later Park's Chief Secretary and then the Spokesman for the SCNR. See Yi Hu-rak, "Why is a Pan-national Party Necessary?," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 2(Summer, 1963), pp. 11-16.

¹⁵¹The bulk of the LDP members chose to remain in within their party when the merger negotiations proved unsuccessful; it later turned against Park and joined the ranks of opposition forces.

By the time General Park shed his military uniform and accepted the presidential nomination of the DRP, on August 30, 1963, factional alignments in the DRP were fluid due to the influx of heterogeneous groups into the party. Broadly speaking, however, there seemed to have been two main groupings. The "mainstream faction," so dubbed by the mass media at the time, consisted of those party members who had participated in the creation of the party and those who had commanded the control of the secretariat structure of the party. These were individuals that gathered around Kim Jong-p'il, despite his absence in Korea at the time, and those who weathered the storm and challenge from the Liberal Democratic Party during April and May of 1963. The "non-mainstream" faction consisted of all others who were not members of the inner circle and who joined the party at later stages. These were those SCNR members who were opposed to Kim Jong-p'il and his plan for the DRP; those leaders of the LDP who were pro-Park and former members of the defunct Liberal Party and other parties, who all joined the DRP in time for the 1963 elections.

The civilian politicians hurriedly realigned their forces to challenge the rule by the former men in uniform in the civilian government, after the lifting of ^{the} ban on political activities on January 1, 1963. Their political activities were those of the "old" politicians in merging and dispersing. The group that seemed to show the most viability was composed of those men who belonged to the "old" faction of the Democratic Party, which, toward the end of the Second

Republic, split with the new faction to form the New Democratic Party. Successful in recruiting some elements of the new faction of the Democrats and Liberal Party, a new party-- the Civil Rule Party-- was launched on May 14, and Yun Po-sŏn, former President, became the ^{and}standbearer of the party in the forthcoming election. This group included other important names such as Kim To-yŏn, Yu Chin-san, and Kim Byong-no.

The old Democratic Party under Chang Myŏn was revived under the same name and elected Madame Pak Sun-ch'ŏn as its Chairman, but lost many of its former adherents to Yun and other parties that were emerging. A similar disintegration followed among the former adherents of President Rhee. Yi Bŏm-sŏk, the former Liberal and the head of the controversial National Youth Corps, seemed at first to rally Rhee's cohorts, but a majority of his former colleagues found refuge in the DRP, the Hŏ Chŏng's New Politics Party or the Liberal Democratic Party, which had the support of the anti-Kim Jong-p'il faction in the DRP.¹⁵²

¹⁵²For a detailed development of organization of new parties by civilian politicians, see Mun Ch'ang-ju, Hankuk Chŏngch'iron (A Study of Korean Politics), pp. 367-385.

In all, some twelve political parties registered with the Central Election Management Committee, ¹⁵³ but it was clear from the beginning that the real contest was between Yun and Park with Hŏ Chŏng a distant third. An attempt was made to unite the forces of Yun, Hŏ and Yi Bŏm-sŏk under the umbrella of the Party of the People(Kukminŭidang), but without success. Given only thirty days to campaign, seven opposition politicians registered as presidential candidates. The perennial inability to unite hampered these men once again at the crucial moment and they were no match against the DRP

¹⁵³With the exception of the DRP, the major parties at the time were a coalition of old politicians in different combinations at least on the leadership level. The following table compiled by the Kyŏngyang Shinmun(November 1, 1963) shows the former allegiances of the new party leadership.

Former members of:	CRP (%)	DP (%)	Kukminŭidang (%)	LDP (%)	DRP (%)
NDP	67.7	91.4	-	34	2
DP	6.5	-	18	15.8	2
LP	6.5	-	19	12.6	8
Unification Party	-	-	-	6.3	-
Independents	12.8	-	45	6.3	10
Military	-	-	-	6.3	26
Newcomers	6.5	8.6	16	18.7	50
Others	-		2	-	2

which had prepared for the election on October 15 for some two years. It was not until October 8, a week before the election day, that the opposition candidates were able to present to the electorate a united front against candidate Park. With Hŏ Chŏng and Song Hyo-ch'an¹⁵⁴ withdrawing their names from the presidential race for the sake of opposition unity, the contest was between Park and Yun Po-sŏn, the presidential candidate of the Civil Rule Party(The CRP-- Minchŏngdang).

In a campaign marred by mutual exchanges of mud-slinging and attacks on personalities,¹⁵⁵ the DRP candidate barely won the crucial election by a mere 150,000 votes, winning 47 percent of the votes cast. That the organization of the DRP was strong in the rural areas was made evident when Park won 59 percent of the rural votes, whereas Yun gained only 41 percent. The urban voters, however, gave their overwhelming support to the opposition candidate. Distasteful kunin chŏngch'i, "rule by men in uniform," seemed to have been a motive for the urbanites to sway onesidedly against Park. As compared with

¹⁵⁴General Song, who had been the military government's first Premier, and a severe critic of the junta for its decision to participate in civilian politics as a betrayal of the revolutionary pledge, was arrested by the CIA on August 11 on the charges of executing a subordinate officer during the Korean war and of allegedly ordering troops to fire on students during the April Student Uprising as the Martial Law Commander. He briefly campaigned from a prison cell in Seoul.

¹⁵⁵Park ridiculed Yun Po-sŏn's democratic rule as "disguised democracy" and asserted that his formula was liberal democracy based on nationalism. This prompted Yun to question the very loyalty of Park to the nation, divulging the court martial record of Park in 1949 on charges of organizing a Communist Party in the South Korean Army. Park was reinstated at the outbreak of the Korean War with a suspension of the sentence. See Pak Sŏng-hwan, P'adonŭn Maeildo Ch'inda(Waves will Come Also Tomorrow) (Seoul: Tong'a Ch'ulp'ansa, 1965), pp. 185-199.

Yun's 63 percent of the urban vote, Park was able to garner only 27 percent.¹⁵⁶ In the National Assembly elections held on November 26, the DRP once again demonstrated its organizational strength by returning 110 out of 175 representatives. Eighty-eight of the candidates nominated by the party were elected directly with an additional 22 seats on a proportional representation scheme, incorporated into the Constitution of the Third Republic, thus ensuring a working majority in the Assembly. The defeat at the ballot-boxes was not accepted by Yun and his opposition politicians. They attacked what they called "premeditated election rigging," with Yun declaring, "I won the election in voting but lost in vote counting." The defeated candidate filed two separate law suits with the highest court in a move to invalidate Park's election.¹⁵⁷

The Sixth National Assembly convened on December 17 to inaugurate Park as first President of the Third Republic and to launch a civilian government after two years-and-seven months' military interim. In his State of the Nation Message in early 1964, President Park, in a reconciliatory manner, appealed for the opposition's cooperation, while vowing to do his part to "modify government policies in the light of sound alternative program of the opposition parties."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶For an analysis of the 1963 presidential election, see C.I. Eugene Kim, "Significance of the 1963 Korean Election," Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 3(March, 1964), pp. 765-773. See also Kim Myong-whai, "The Presidential Election in Korea, 1963" Korean Affairs Vol. II(1963), pp. 372-378.

¹⁵⁷See The Chosŏn Ilbo, November 14, 1963, p. 1.

¹⁵⁸The Kyŏngnyang Shinmun, January 10, 1964, p. 1.

No such cooperation was forthcoming from the opposition parties. The CRP's Yun and DP's Madame Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, in the policy speeches of their respective parties, opened fire on what they called a "proforma" civilian rule. Yun even went so far as to advocate the over-throw of the present government by force.¹⁵⁹

In the political situation where the very legitimacy of Park's civilian government was seriously questioned by the opposition politicians and the substantial portion of the electorate, it needed only a catalyst to drive the nation into a political crisis. Such catalyst was provided on the occasion of the ratification of the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty, most of which was negotiated during the military interim.¹⁶⁰ The long, intense political struggle from March 1964 to the time of ratification on September 1965 drove the nation into utter political chaos. The campaign against the normalization with Japan began on March 6, with the organization of the Pan-National Struggle Committee against Humiliating Diplomacy with Japan(henceforth known as the Struggle Committee). Originated in the National Assembly by the leaders of opposition parties, this

¹⁵⁹For Yun's statement, see The Dong-A Ilbo, January 14, 1964. Madame Park's statement is found in The Hankuk Ilbo, January 16, 1964. Both of these statements are partially translated in K. B. Kim, op. cit., p. 123.

¹⁶⁰For the historical background, the roots of opposition, the content and the politics of rapprochement of this treaty, see Chulsu Kim, Korean-Japanese Relations, 1951-1965: A Study in the Politics of Rapprochement(unpublished M.A. thesis, the University of Massachusetts, 1967). See also K. B. Kim, op. cit., especially, Chapters II-V.

Struggle Committee included representatives from various social organizations as well as political parties. The Struggle Committee made a speech-making tour of major cities from March 15 to 21. Despite the snowballing of the opposition forces, President Park reiterated his determination to conclude the negotiations. On March 23, Kim Jong-p'il and the Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira agreed in Tokyo to conclude the talks by early May of that year. This prompted some 5,000 students from the major universities in Seoul to take to streets to protest the "humiliating diplomacy" with Japan. Reconciliatory gestures by President Park who called the student demonstrations "a patriotic act" restored the political calm temporarily and had the students returning to their campuses throughout the country. Some 80,000 students by then had participated in street demonstrations.

In his determination to conclude the talks at all cost, President Park reorganized the cabinet under Premier Chung Il-kwŏn, who immediately announced his determination to conclude the negotiations by the end of the year. Demonstrations erupted again in May and June climaxed by the bloody struggles between students and the police on June 3. On that day martial law was decreed in the area of Seoul; all colleges and universities were forced to close their doors for the remainder of the semester; assembly was prohibited; and the press was censored. For nearly two months, Seoul was under the control of the military. In the National Assembly the opposition forces gave birth to a movement to unite them for more effectively opposing

the ratification of the treaty. Three opposition parties, the CRP, the DP and LDP, under the leadership of Yun, appointed a twenty-one member committee to make plans for a unified opposition party. Madame Pak's Democratic Party members (with 13 members), however, refused to participate in the proposed new party due to differences on the organization of the new party's leadership. The new party was organized under the banner of the existing Civil Rule Party in late November. Now a movement to unite the two major opposition parties, the CRP and the DP, was launched in the beginning of the new year (1965).

The efforts at unification proved difficult. The negotiators from both parties failed to agree on some basic points, the most important of which were the designation of the name of the proposed party and how the leadership of the party was to be organized. After five months of futile negotiations, the two parties agreed, under pressure from the rank and file of both parties, to unite under the name of the Mass Party and ^{in accordance with} the principle of collective leadership. When the new Mass Party (MP) was convened on June 14 to select its leaders, it appeared that the former CRP elements suffered a setback. Madame Pak was elected as the head of the three-member Supreme Council, unexpectedly defeating Yun.¹⁶¹ In a face-saving move, however, Yun was made "Advisor," after he ^{had} refused a seat in the Supreme Council. The other two members were the durable Hŏ Chŏng and Sŏ Min-ho. In

¹⁶¹ For account of this unification, see Sŏ Im-tŭk, "Hankuk Yadangŭi Kebowa Saengri" (The Geneology and Characteristics of Opposition Parties in Korea), Sedae, June, 1971, pp. 106-108.

the election of the twelve-member Leadership Council, Yun's group was able to have only three of its followers join in this powerful committee. Despite its having been the largest opposition bloc in the National Assembly before the unification move, Yun's group suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of Madame Pak's former Democratic Party members who were in alliance with the Yu Chin-san elements of the CRP, whose growing hostility toward Yun since the 1963 presidential election made them turn against their former colleagues.¹⁶² As its predecessor opposition parties had been, the MP was an uneasy alliance of opposition politicians and factions.

When the politicians stumbled in the National Assembly to form a united front against the ruling party, the various groups outside the National Assembly began a series of demonstrations under the guidance of the Struggle Committee. Massive rallies continued from February through June when the hard-pressed government ordered an early summer vacation for colleges and universities and some high schools which had taken the lead in the demonstrations. On June 22, the treaty was signed in Tokyo, ending the twenty years of technical hostilities and some fourteen years of negotiations.

The Struggle Committee immediately declared it null and void and publicly pledged its determination to struggle against ratification of the "treacherous treaty," and the "sell-out of the nation." Amid massive popular protest and scenes of violence between the ruling

¹⁶²For detail of Yun-Yu relationship and roots of hostility, see The Chosŏn Ilbo, July 15, 1971, p. 4.

and opposition party members of the National Assembly,¹⁶³ the ratification bill was placed on the agenda of the Assembly on July 14. Because of fear of a head-on collision, the session of the National Assembly was scuttled only a week later. In a desperate move to normalize the Assembly, a leaders' meeting between President Park and Madame Pak Sun-ch'ŏn was prepared in secret and held at the presidential residence on July 20. They agreed to suspend extreme confrontation between their two parties in order to maintain constitutional order in the nation. They also agreed to close the Fifty-first Assembly session on July 21 without deliberating on the treaty.

This did not seem to have much effect on the opposition strategy. It began to insist on dissolution of the National Assembly and on the election of a new one with specific instructions for dealing with the important question of ratifying the Korea-Japan Treaty. In a desperate move, the opposition legislators warned the ruling party that they would resign from the National Assembly en masse if they failed to achieve the dissolution of the Assembly or fail to block the ratification bill.

The opposition MP, with complex factional alignments, differed sharply on the strategy the party should take vis-a-vis the ruling

¹⁶³The ruling party, in a surprise move, introduced the ratification request to the plenary session where a fist-wielding pandemonium erupted between the ruling and opposition legislators around the Speaker's rostrum as well as on the floor. See The Korea Times, July 13 and July 14, 1965, p. 1. and The Korea Herald, July 13 and July 14, 1965, p. 1.

party in its mission to block ratification.¹⁶⁴ Yun Po-sŏn and his followers, who had failed to win the hegemony of the MP, took the hard line by advocating that the party be disbanded as a first step. The disbanding of the party would mean under Article 38 of the Constitution¹⁶⁵ that all opposition members would be disqualified to sit in the National Assembly. The moderate faction insisted that they should debate and then resign their seats in the National Assembly should the ruling party refuse to yield and try to push the ratification through as the latter possessed the required majority. In a resolution adopted by the MP's Central Standing Committee on July 26, the principle was adopted that "members will resign their seats in the National Assembly" should forcible passage of the ratification be foreseen,¹⁶⁶ and that the resignations be "complete and irrevocable."

¹⁶⁴For the train of events surrounding opposition strategies, see Choe Yŏng-ch'ŏl and Pak Sun-je, "Shinmindang" (The NDP), Shindong'a, May, 1968, pp. 95-97.

¹⁶⁵The article provides that "A person shall lose his membership in the National Assembly during his term when he leaves or changes his party." For the motives of the militants and moderates on the choice of strategy, see K. B. Kim, op. cit., pp. 243-251. The moderates were as much opposed to the treaty as the militants were, but they were also preoccupied with preserving their hegemony of the party. The militants, on the other hand, saw little chance either for capturing party hegemony or for defeating the treaty unless the party was disbanded and joined in demonstrations on the streets. On the streets, the militants could easily regain the hegemony of the opposition in alliance with such extreme groups as the students and the Struggling Committee. See, K. B. Kim, op. cit., pp. 247-248.

¹⁶⁶The Korea Herald, July 27, 1965, p. 1.

This resolution was clearly unacceptable to Yun and his militants. Yun suddenly submitted his letter of resignation from the party on July 28 and other militants immediately followed suit. In the face of the pressures from both militant legislators and the opposition group outside the Assembly, the party's Central Standing Committee met again on August 4 and succumbed to the militant line by passing another resolution that ordered the MP's Assemblymen to submit their letters of resignation from the party by August 18. The majority of the opposition Assemblymen demurred. The party caucus in the Assembly on August 7 modified this hard-line by resolving that it should take advice" of the Central Standing Committee "only when" the DRP rejected the letters of resignation from the National Assembly (to be submitted to the National Assembly as soon as the likelihood of ratification became apparent).

By August 9, only five members, including Yun, had submitted letters of resignation from the party; fifty-three members had submitted the letters of resignation from the National Assembly. Meanwhile the Fifty-Second Session was convened on July 29. The Assembly immediately formed an ad hoc committee of twenty-five composed of seventeen DRP members, ten MP members and one independent for preliminary study of the treaty. The majority faction of MP, previously committed to debate on the bill joined the ad hoc committee, but the mounting pressure from Yun and his militant faction of ^{the}MP made the proper deliberation of the treaty in the ad hoc committee

very difficult when it convened its hearings on August 4. When it was made evident that the opposition members on the ad hoc committee intended to fillibuster the session, the ruling party, in a blitzkrieg move on the late hours of August 11, forcibly concluded the debate and won approval of the committee, sending the bill to the main floor of the National Assembly. Stunned by what they regarded as irregular and undemocratic procedure, fifty-one members of the opposition party informed the Speaker of the Assembly that they were resigning from the National Assembly on the following day. On August 14, in a plenary session attended only by Democratic Republican Party members and one independent, the National Assembly, which had 175 members, ratified the treaty and the related agreement by a vote of 110 to none with one absention.

The steam-roller tactics by the ruling party had the effect of intensifying the internal strife in the opposition camp. The MP Assemblymen resigned en masse from the National Assembly on August 12 in accordance with the resolution of the party caucus of August 7. Nevertheless, the moderates refused both to resign from the party and to dissolve the party when the DRP declined to accept the letters of resignation. Caught between their previous pledge of resignation under pressure from the militants and a strong desire to remain in the National Assembly, the moderates were indeed in a deep dilemma. With the moderates now insisting that the first task of the Mass Party was to normalize the party organization in order to struggle against

the ruling party and to render the ratification null and void, the opposition camp was badly divided. Hŏ Chŏng, a member of the MP's Supreme Council, urged the Assemblymen to return to the National Assembly, pointing out the creation of the party was not predicated alone "on the blocking of the Korea-Japan treaty,... but also in realizing a viable two party system."

The militants in a move to purge Hŏ and other returnees from the party demanded, on August 18, a new national convention and sought forcibly to dissolve the returnees' constituent party chapters so as to force them to lose their Assembly seats. On September 17, the moderates met to agree on the principles of return, in defiance of the militants' pressures. The militants, in a disgraceful outburst of their dissatisfaction, forcibly occupied the party headquarters on September 21, destroying its furniture and other properties. It now became apparent that the two factions of the MP could not share the same bed.¹⁶⁷

After the two months of single party National Assembly, the moderates along with those militants who refused to resign from the Assembly returned to the National Assembly. Madame Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, in an apology, made a self-criticism of her party's disgraceful performance in its attempt to block ratification, blaming the party's failure on Yun's reckless and misguided leadership and promised that

¹⁶⁷ For post-ratification feud in the MP, see Minjukongwhadang (The DRP), Chŏnjinŭn Tangkwadŏpurŏ (Progress With the Party: A Three Year History of the DRP). (Seoul: The DRP Headquarters, 1965), pp. 145-155.

the MP would be a constructive and loyal opposition. With the public image of the MP at its lowest point, the fate of the party had come a full circle as its predecessors had done-- the old Democratic Party and the Party of the People. The return of the moderates and the departure of the intransigents brought the turbulent career of the MP to an end four month after the party was born.

In sharp contrast to the ailing opposition camp during the ratification crisis, the Democratic Republican Party since its inception seemed to enjoy impressive solidarity. Park appeared to rule the party with an iron hand. Underneath this seeming unity, however, the seeds of discord that were sown into the party from the beginning slowly started to crack at the seams. Surely the intraparty maneuvering within the ruling party was less spectacular and operated within limits. Nevertheless the transformations that were taking place were significant ones and hence worthy of note.

As a result of the overwhelming victory in the Assembly elections in 1963, some 110 DRP Assemblymen met to choose their leaders on December 7. The power configuration in the Sixth National Assembly was quite complex with some five factions vying for the leadership positions in the National Assembly. They were; (1) the mainstream faction; (2) the secretariat faction which supported the mainstream faction; (3) the May Commrades's Society faction, which after the initial split with Kim Jong-p'il's organizers of the DRP joined the

party subsequently; (4) the old Liberal Party faction; (5) the former Democratic Party and the New Democratic faction.¹⁶⁸

For the speakership of the newly elected Assembly, two Assemblymen of the mainstream faction, Chong Ku-yŏng, the former Party President and Yun Ch'i-yŏng competed but President Park intervened to have a relatively unknown aging university professor Yi Hyo-sang, who was yet to be identified with any faction, elected to that post. The vice-speakership went to Chang Hyŏng-sun, the leader of the anti-Kim Jong-p'il May Commrades Society. The floor leadership was given to Kim Yong-t'ae who was the right-hand man of Kim Jong-p'il. The chairmanships of the standing committees were distributed according to the factional strength of each group, with six of the twelve going to the mainstream faction. This factional distribution of key posts in the National Assembly reflected Park's concern to check complete domination by the mainstream faction, which, in alliance with the secretariat faction, voted to control all of them.

Despite the concession to other factions in the National Assembly, the mainstream faction nonetheless controlled the party and the key posts in the Assembly and was able to dictate party policies and strategies concerning legislation. The non-maincurrent factions,

¹⁶⁸ For factional alignments in the beginning of the Sixth National Assembly, see Yu Hyŏk-in and Yi Chin-hi, "Minjukongwhadang" (The Democratic Republican Party), Shindong'a, August, 1968, pp. 90-95. See also Chong Song-kwan, "Minjukongwhadangŭi Naemak" (The Inside Story of the DRP), Sedae, June, 1966, pp. 109-110.

having been eliminated from the centers of power in the Assembly, deeply resented the domination by the mainstream faction and awaited the first opportunity to challenge the mainstream faction. The history of the ruling party from this time on may be shown in terms of the confrontation and the gradual and eventual takeover of the anti-maincurrent factions as the main-current faction in the party. The first such opportunity was provided when the Korea-Japan Treaty issue triggered widespread student demonstrations in March, 1964. The mainstream faction and the non-mainstream factions ostensibly differed in their strategies in dealing with the students-- the former favoring a hard line and latter compromise and peace with students-- but the hegemony of the party was the real issue at stake. In several non-confidence motions introduced from March to April in 1964 by the opposition against ministers, the mainstream faction was able to defeat them only by a slim margin despite the overwhelming plurality the ruling party had in the Assembly. This was a clear indication that the non-maincurrent members had voted against the ministers.

As a result of this incident, which has been dubbed "the rebellion by vote," the floor leadership of the National Assembly changed hands several times. The non-mainstream factions were now demanding that President Park retire Kim Jong-p'il from all party posts in a move to pacify the students and the opposition. The non-mainstream faction's strategy seemed to have worked as Kim Jong-p'il

was recalled from Tokyo where he was negotiating the treaty, and later dismissed as Party Chairman and sent to the United States on his second "exile." In Kim's absence, the mainstream faction made the former party President Chŏng Ku-yŏng as Acting Party President, but the non-mainstream factions were making deep inroads into the party apparatus as well. In the reorganization of the powerful Party Affairs Council, the non-mainstream members had come to occupy almost the same number of seats as the mainstream counterparts. President Park, who needed the absolute solidarity of the party to have the treaty ratified, had apparently given in to the demands of the non-mainstream factions of the party. The erosion of the maincurrent faction culminated in the revision of the party charter in February 25, 1965. The anti-maincurrent factions spearheaded the movement to amend the party constitution with the objective of establishing supremacy of the legislators over the party's secretariat organs, where they had little influence. The revision of party charter was aimed at dispersing financial and personnel powers of the Director-General and generally to shift those powers from the Secretariat to the Central Standing Committee.¹⁶⁹

On March 25, a non-confidence motion against Vice Premier, Chang Ki-yŏng, was introduced by the mainstream faction of the ruling party. Although this motion was defeated, it represented the first

¹⁶⁹For details of the revision, see Yu Hyŏk-in and Yi Chin-hi, op. cit., pp. 111-112.

non-confidence vote against a government minister by the ruling party itself and reflected not only the growing schism between the party and the administration but also the mainstream members' discontent over the increasing control of political funds by the non-mainstream factions. The administration's appointments were heavily influenced by Yi Hu-rak, the Presidential Chief Secretary who was sympathetic to the non-mainstream factions.¹⁷⁰

After the Korea-Japan treaty was ratified, the maincurrent faction tried to recover its weakened position by reasserting the old principle of "party supremacy" over the administration. Chŏng Ku-yŏng, former President of the party demanded that President Park dismiss those members of the administration who had refused to work closely with the party. The President's subsequent refusal resulted in Chŏng's resignation as the Acting Chairman of the DRP, who expressed his deep disappointment at the erosion of the original ideals of the party.

On September 25, under pressure from the secretariat members, the Central Standing Committee urged the return of Kim Jong-p'il from the United States and his reappointment as the party's Chairman

¹⁷⁰The unsuccessful non-confidence vote of Vice Premier Chang and the impending need to achieve the unity of party before the ratification of the treaty prompted President Park to issue the Directive for Improving Organic Cooperation Between the Party and the Government on April 8. He instructed the Cabinet to strengthen mutual consultation with the party on matters of appointment of key administrative posts and important government policies. This gave birth to the regular Joint Meeting of the Cabinet and the Party Affair Council members at the Presidential residence. For contents of the directive, see Minjukonghwadang (The DRP), Chŏnjinŭn Dangkwadŏpuro (A Three Year History of the DRP), pp. 34-35.

ostensibly on the grounds that he was the only man who could revive the vitality of the party and provide the necessary leadership. As a last resort the mainstream faction attempted to purge the leaders of the non-mainstream factions in the reshuffling of the Assembly leadership. In a test of strength, Lee Hyo-sang and Chang Kyŏng-sun of the non-mainstream factions, who were the incumbent Speaker and Vice Speaker, barely defeated the mainstream faction's candidates, Chŏng Ku-yŏng and Min Kwan-sik, despite President Park's pleas for party solidarity behind Lee and Chang. Had there been no support from the opposition members who tended to favor the moderate stand of Lee and Chang, their reelection would probably have been unattainable. In what was then known as the "disobedience incident," the rebellion by the mainstream faction, Assemblymen Kim Yong-t'ai and Min Kwan-sik had their party privileges suspended for six months and two others were reprimanded by the party's Disciplinary Committee on President Park's order.

The DRP National Party Convention of December 27, 1965 elected Kim Jong-p'il as Chairman, but it also registered the factional strength of the non-mainstream groups. Kil Chae-ho remained as the Director-General of the Secretariat and so did Kim Sŏng-kon as party's Finance Committee Chairman, both of whom had been powerful figures in the non-mainstream faction. Hence, as a result of the reorganization of both the party and National Assembly leaderships in December, 1965, the non-mainstream factions, had now replaced the mainstream faction

as the majority faction. A new set of terminology was coined. The non-mainstream of faction was now sometimes referred to as the "new" mainstream faction, while the mainstream faction was sometimes being referred to as the "old" mainstream faction.

The badly wrecked opposition camp, having returned to the divided status before the Mass Party was organized, continued to have problems. The five intransigent followers of Yun Po-sŏn, including big names in the opposition camp, had resigned from the party, and hence losing their seats in the National Assembly, were now preparing yet another new "clean-cut opposition party." They had denounced the MP and the returning Assemblymen as "elements of the DRP rule" and condemned the crippled party as a "quasi-ruling party" for its "dishonorable cooperation" with the ruling party in the ratification merry-go-around. The five vacant seats were filled by by-elections in which the DRP chose not to participate in a reconciliatory gesture.¹⁷¹

The defectors met to organize a new political party under the banner of the New Korea Party(Shinhantang) amid little excitement on March 30, 1966, with Yun Po-sŏn as its President and simultaneously its presidential candidate for the forthcoming 1967 election.¹⁷² Initially the new party(NKP) was envisioned to recruit members from

¹⁷¹Minjukonghwadang(The DRP), Chŏnjinŭn Dangkwadŏpurŏ(A Three Year History of the DRP), p. 156.

¹⁷²Nam Jae-hi, "Shinhantangŭi Kwŏnryŏk Kujo"(The Power Structure of the New Korea Party), Sedae, June 1966, pp. 115-121. As of August, 1966, The Dong-A Ilbo stated that the New Korea Party organized its party chapters in 76 election districts with a total membership of 300,000.

other groups such as the group of retired generals calling themselves the Council to Safeguard the Fatherland. But Yun's partisans' efforts to dominate the party's leadership positions and the party nomination in the forthcoming elections made such a union difficult to achieve.

The MP, whose public image deteriorated badly by its unsuccessful and vacillating strategies to block ratification, had maintained its position as the largest opposition party in the National Assembly with 59 seats.¹⁷³ In preparation for the 1967 elections and in the virtual absence of a leader who could take the reigns of the party and become the standard bearer of the party, the party, now with a membership of 520,000, selected a renowned constitutional scholar and university president, but a political novice, Yu Chin-o, as its leader on October 20. In accepting the party nomination, Yu explained that he did so because he believed it to be in the national interest to bring about a constitutional transfer of power in 1967. The transfer of power was needed, Yu remarked in his acceptance speech, if a less corrupt administration could be secured, if a more equitable distribution of income in what was presently a "Zaibatsu Republic" could be realized, if the abolition of the CIA as secret police could be achieved, if local autonomy stipulated in the Constitution could be implemented, if the build-up of Korea^v forces

¹⁷³Yi Hang-hi, "Minjungdangŭi Seryŏk Punp'o" (The Power Configuration in the Mass Party), Sedae, June, 1966, pp. 122-127.

in South Vietnam could be ended, and if a more positive approach to the problem of reunification could be found.¹⁷⁴

The exigencies of the forthcoming election once again put pressure on the opposition forces to unite. Despite the many difficulties, an attempt was made to bring Yun's NKP and the MP together. After a painfully slow round of eleventh hour negotiations among Yun Po-sŏn, Yu Chin-o and two other prominent politicians, a new party under the name of the New Democratic Party was created on February 7, 1967 with only three months remaining before the presidential election. This union was made successful by both sides accepting the principle that Yun was to be the new party's presidential candidate, with Yu as the head of the party.

The 1967 presidential election saw the participation of the socialists for the first time since the Democratic rule, but attention was focussed on two candidates, Park and Yun, in a repeated confrontation of two archrivals in the 1963 presidential election. The ruling party ran its campaign on the achievement of the First Five Year Economic Plan and on the need to have political stability to continue with the Second Five Year Economic Plan which promised, among other ^{things}, (1) an annual economic growth rate of 8.5 percent; (2) self-sufficiency of food by 1971; and (3) a doubling of personal income. Depicting candidate Park as the champion of Korean modernization, the DRP carefully laid out its campaign strategies as early

¹⁷⁴See, The Chosŏn Ilbo, October 21, 1966.

as mid-1966. With its total party membership reported as 1,555,867, or about 11 percent of the eligible voters, the DRP relied heavily on its quiet organizational strength.¹⁷⁵

Unlike the 1963 election in which the opposition party conducted its campaign mostly on the issue of President Park's "illegal seizure of power," the NDP's strategy now seemed based more on policies. The opposition attacked Park's civilian regime as being a dictatorship and accused it of, among other ^{things}, the abuse of CIA power in politics and the protection of a few large business interests. It criticized the government policy for making "the rich man richer and the poor man poorer." Its own platform promised the guarantee of freedom of speech, the expansion of human rights, and curbing of presidential power by increasing cabinet responsibility, the neutralization of the police, the realization of the local autonomy, the revision of the Korea-Japan Treaty, and the withdrawal of Korean troops from Vietnam. In the economic field, the opposition platform called for a "mass economic system" based on a balanced growth between the agrarian and industrial sectors. It promised a 20 percent decrease in overall tax, a 30 percent decrease in fertilizer price and the

¹⁷⁵For analysis of 1967 elections, see Soon Sung Cho, "Korea: Election Year," Asian Survey, Vol. VIII, No. 1. January, 1968, pp. 29-42, and C.I. Eugene Kim, "Patterns in the 1967 Korean Elections" Pacific Affairs, 1968, pp. 60-70. See also Glenn D. Paige, "1966: Korea Creates the Future," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 1 (January, 1967), pp. 21-30.

abolition of preferential loans to large business.¹⁷⁶

The election returns showed that Park's mandate for the coming four years was considerably increased as compared with the 1963 election. As compared with a 150,000-vote marginⁱⁿ the previous election, Park defeated Yun by more than a million vote margin, with the former receiving 51 percent of the vote, and the latter 41 percent. One of the most remarkable trends in this election was the considerable support Park gained in the cities. For Park the urban areas were his fiasco in the previous election. In 1963, Seoul gave only 30.2 percent of the rural vote.

The Assembly mandate for the DRP was even greater. Taking place one month after the presidential election, the DRP succeeded in securing an overwhelming majority of seats in the Seventh National Assembly. To be exact, it had 130 seats whereas the NDP had only 45 seats. No party in Korean history had dominated the National Assembly with such an absolute majority. The charges of widespread election irregularities in the National Assembly elections and the opposition camp's adamant demand for redress drove the nation into another political crisis. On July 12, spontaneous demonstrations of students erupted in Seoul and these soon spread to provincial towns. The government relied on the old tactic of closing the universities and promised to rectify the situation by punishing those where irregularities

¹⁷⁶ For comparison of two parties' platforms, see Kim Chong-hun, Hankuk Chŏngwiansa (A History of Korean Parties), p. 294.

were discovered. With the opposition demanding the nullification of the election, the ruling party, on orders of President Park, tried to appease the opposition by expelling six of its party's elected Assemblymen and by relinquishing one seat to a NDP candidate, but the opposition was adamant in demanding a new election without which the party would scuttle the forthcoming National Assembly.¹⁷⁷

Having failed to normalize the political situation, the DRP opened the National Assembly without the opposition members, thus starting "one party National Assembly." The constitutional provision which prohibits one party National Assembly¹⁷⁸ was circumvented by the ruling party through an ingenuous method of organizing a negotiation group under the name of Chǒng'uhoe (Political Friendship Society). The ruling party "dismissed" thirteen legislators to form a negotiation group in October 5, 1967, and its name was changed to Chǒng'uhoe on December 25, 1968. The membership of this society was stabilized to ten and was to serve a useful purpose for the ruling party. The hard line taken by the ruling DRP opened another factional wounds in the opposition camp. The NDP was divided on the strategies the party should adopt vis-a-vis the ruling party. The elected members seemed to favor a compromise with the DRP to normalize the

¹⁷⁷ Some 266 election nullification suits were pending in the Supreme Court immediately after the election.

¹⁷⁸ The Constitution (Chapter I, Article 7, paragraph 1) states: "The establishment of political parties shall be free and the plural party system shall be guaranteed." Secretariat, the National Assembly, Selected Laws Governing National Assembly of Republic of Korea, p. 8.

political situation; they demanded new elections only where election irregularities had occurred. They also demanded a change in election laws with a view to guaranteeing neutralization of the police and the government bureaucracy and the punishment of cabinet ministers and others who were responsible for the irregularities. A hard line was adopted by those who were defeated in the elections: they were demanding nothing less than a new general election. As their demands were not satisfactorily answered, the NDP kept its words this time. Until a protocol was signed between the ruling and opposition parties on November 20, 1967, the NDP Assemblymen stayed out of the Assembly. The protocol called for a "guarantee legislation" to safeguard fair elections.

The representatives of the two parties collided on a suitable mechanism to solve the perennial problem of fraudulent elections. In drafting the Guarantee Legislation, the two parties conferred on, among other^{things}, (1) speeding up of election fraud litigation procedure; (2) prohibition of interference with elections by bureaucrats; (3) safeguarding against fraudulent balloting; (4) fair campaign procedure; and (5) redistricting.¹⁷⁹ The result of the negotiations between the representatives of the two parties was a much watered-down version of what was originally contemplated by the opposition party.

¹⁷⁹See, The Dong-A Ilbo, December 17, 1968, p. 1 and 3. For details of the Guarantee Legislation, see The Dong-A Ilbo, December 30, 1968, p. 1.

Writing about the 1967 elections Cho Soon Sung stated:¹⁸⁰

The year 1967 may eventually be seen as one of the most important turning points in the political history of Korea because the elections will have decisively charted the course of future political development in the country. President Park, who has shaped the political character of Korea for the last six years, cannot seek another term in 1971 without amending the Constitution. He will be only fifty-four years old then. But Korea has not yet witnessed governmental change through constitutional means. The viability of a democratic change of government will hinge upon the election outcome. Thus, the presidential and National Assembly elections of 1967 are casting their long shadows beyond 1971.

Despite the important problem of succession to President Park, the DRP had shown a remarkable tranquility through May, 1968 partly due to President Park's order which forbade any activity on the questions of succession until at least 1970. Then on May 30, 1968, the Chairman of the party, Kim Jong-p'il, suddenly resigned from his party post and as an Assemblyman. It was clear to everyone that he was doing so because of his disenchantment over the matter of the expulsion from the party on May 25 of Kim Yong-t'ai. The latter had been one of the former's proteges. His departing remark was rather suggestive: "I am not going to return to politics. I may have an opportunity to reveal the reasons sometimes in the future."¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰Soon Sung Cho, op. cit., p. 29. By 1967 assembly elections, the DRP had thirteen more seats than the two-thirds majority for a constitutional amendment.

¹⁸¹The Dong-A Ilbo, "Political Statements of the Year," December 30, 1968, p. 3.

As it was revealed later Kim Yong-t'ai was purged by the DRP Disciplinary Committee for having carried out an anti-party activity. He was charged with factional activity creating "a party within the party," by recruiting about 900 loyal supporters, most of whom were core members of the present and past party secretariats, under a cover organization known as the Korean People's Welfare Research Institute. A position paper published by this "institute" reportedly advocated that they would oppose any form of constitutional amendment that would make President Park eligible for a third-term.¹⁸² The road to the first constitutional amendment since Park took office in 1963 treaded a rough road and heightened the emotions of the ruling and opposition politicians alike. The original mainstream faction of the party was against it as Kim Jong-p'il seemed to have been the only logical successor to President Park, who was a husband of his niece. Having lost all power position in the party, the Assembly and the government to the non-mainstream men and their sympathizers,¹⁸³ the mainstream faction itself was divided as to what their strategy

¹⁸²K. B. Kim, op. cit., p. 203.

¹⁸³The position of Director-Generalship was held by Kil Chae-ho; the Chairmanship of the Party Finance Committee by Kim Sŏng-kon, the Chairmanship of the Policy Committee by Paek Nam-ŏk; the floor leadership in the National Assembly by Kim Chin-man; the Speakership of the National Assembly by Lee Hyo-sang; and the post of Chief Presidential Secretary by Lee Hu-rak. All of these men, although with varying degrees of commitment, belonged to the non-mainstream factions.

should be. President Park himself remained silent until the crucial moment.

In 1968, the prospects of whether or not the government would introduce an amendment bill allowing a third term presidency was a subject of wide speculation. During the question-and-answer proceedings in the National Assembly, the opposition legislators repeatedly questioned the government's intention on this matter.¹⁸⁴

On December 19, the trial balloon for a constitutional amendment was first lifted by Yun Ch'i-yŏng, the acting party Chairman, in his speech at a provincial party headquarters. Without naming what provisions he had in mind, Yun declared that, in a developing nation "it is important, for the sake of modernization, that one party remains in power for an extended period time." He said further that "the question of constitutional amendment must be viewed in the context of our international situation."¹⁸⁵ The year 1969 began with

¹⁸⁴ Prime Minister Chŏng Il-kwŏn in his answer to the National Assembly stated on July 25, 1968: "The thought of amending the constitution enabling three terms for the President has not entered my mind. I do not believe that it would be fruitful to discuss this matter since the Constitution stipulates a four-year term for President." The Dong-A Ilbo, "Statement of the Year," December 30, 1968. Yu Chin-o, the NDP Chairman stated in an interview on July 5, 1968: "Since President has not answered our party's question with regards to amending the Constitution in favor of three terms for the President, we assume that the President is willing to abide by, and respect, the Constitution." Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ The Dong-A Ilbo, December 20, 1968, p. 2.

leaders of the major parties making contrasting evaluations of the record of the government in the 1960's.¹⁸⁶ Meanwhile, the possibility of introducing a constitutional amendment was indicated repeatedly by certain leaders of the ruling party.

On January 7, Yun reiterated his belief that the current situation in Korea called for strong leadership in order to achieve the "modernization of our fatherland," and that his party was looking into the problems in the Constitution, "including the question of amending the provision which prescribes presidential terms."¹⁸⁷ A day later Vice Chairman of the party's Policy Committee, Kim Chu-in, echoed Yun's view by stating that "it is imperative to change the constitutional provision which forbids a third-presidential term" in order for "a strong leader to guide the nation when it is faced with extraordinary challenges from North Korea."¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ President Park in his New Year message remarked: "The sixties in Korea have been marked by the departure from immobilism and low posture and the progress toward the modernization of fatherland." Chairman of the NDP Yu Chin-o's message struck on a more pessimistic note. "The decade started by the hope of April 19 Revolution has been overturned by the Military Revolution, and we have had the beginning of the period of non-presence of three things: non-presence of individuals' dignity; non-presence of freedom of speech; and non-presence of politics. To the burden of corrupt political power we were asked to endure sabotage." He went on to score "three enemies": excessive exercise of political power, fraud and corruption, and over-reaction to North Korea's aggressive activities. See The Dong-A Ilbo, January 7, 1969, p. 3.

¹⁸⁷ The Dong-A Ilbo, January 7, 1969, p. 1.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., January 8, 1969.

The turn of events prompted an action by the man whom the proposed amendment was to benefit. In his press interview on January 10, President Park stated his belief that "the laws should not be changed without sufficient cause." He expressed the hope that the Constitution would not be amended during his term of office. He failed to settle the matter, however, when he added that "if constitutional changes are absolutely necessary, it should be discussed toward the end of the year or at the beginning of the next."¹⁸⁹ On February 4, the President specifically instructed his party not to discuss the matter of amendment.

But a flurry of activities in the camps of both the ruling and opposition parties continued. The NDP floor leader, Kim Yŏng-sam, flatly declared on January 9 that "we are opposed to any form of constitutional amendment." The party proceeded to organize a "Struggle Committee to Defend the Constitution" and studied the question of whether or not the task at hand should be done in cooperation with other political groups. The ruling party, on the other hand, in disregard of Park's statement of January 10, proceeded to take up the issue of amendment. Despite apparent opposition from the mainstream faction, the party took the view that if public opinion was favorable to such a measure, it would not be necessary to wait until the end of the year or the beginning of the new year as Park had suggested.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., January 10, 1969.

Theoretical arguments, both for and against a third term presidency, were reminiscent of those of the 1954 constitutional amendment which allowed President Rhee a life-long candidacy.¹⁹⁰ The ruling party argued that in underdeveloped countries, strong leadership is a prerequisite to economic modernization, without which there can be no western style political order and stability. "The present situation in Korea demands that President Park should be given another chance to serve his nation," Yun stated, and "the people of this country should eliminate the constitutional obstacles if it is necessary for the good of the future of their country."¹⁹¹ He continued:¹⁹²

The call of the time must be answered faithfully. The transfer of power can be made between political parties or between one leader and another in the same party. It is equally possible that one man can remain in power for an extensive period if necessary. If the proposed amendment is designed to answer the call of the times-- rapid progress-- then it must be carried out at all costs within the framework of democracy.

The opposition argument proceeded from the premise that the proposed amendment ran counter to the principle of constitutional

¹⁹⁰ For arguments in favor of the amendment, see Yun Ch'i-yŏng, "Chokukŭi Naeilŭl Wihae" (For Nation's Better Tomorrow) Chung'ang, October, 1969, pp. 74-78, and also his "Constitutional Amendment is Necessitated" Koreana Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 3 (Autumn, 1969) pp. 1-13. For arguments against, see Yu Chin-o, "Kaehŏnŭn Yŏksaŭi Kongjonida" (The Constitutional Amendment is the Repetition of the Shameful History), Chung'ang, October, 1969, pp. 70-74, and Kim Chae-kwang, "Amendment of the Constitution Lacks Logical Foundation," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 3 (Autumn, 1969), pp. 14-25.

¹⁹¹ Yun, "Constitutional Amendment is Necessitated," p. 2.

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 12.

democracy. Yu stated on January 17 that "it has been a historical lesson that the perpetuation of political power in one party eventually degenerates into a regime of corruption, injustice and dictatorship."¹⁹³ Kim Dae-jung, an opposition Assemblyman and later President Parks' foe in the 1971 presidential election, insisted that the third term presidency would be tantamount to a second "coup" and the strange and illogical notion that, without Park, Korea would not be able to withstand Communist challenges and bring about modernization is a "mere fiction that is reminiscent of the attempts to justify Rhee's political power." He concluded: "Without Rhee, Korea still stands."¹⁹⁴ The NDP, having staked the party's fortune on blocking the constitutional amendment when it was proposed, ordered the formation of a Struggle Committee to Defend the Constitution in each of the party chapters of election districts as well as in the provincial party chapters. The party started on its barnstorming tour in May.

The DRP, with special instructions from the President not to discuss the matter of constitutional amendment, was to have an agonizing time to unify the party. The ruling party had the necessary two-thirds vote in the Assembly, but the possible "revolt" of the back-benchers and the mainstream faction required that the party proceed cautiously on this matter. Some members of the mainstream

¹⁹³The Dong-A Ilbo, January 21, 1969, p. 3.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

faction had earlier expressed the view that they would oppose the constitutional amendment for the sake of democracy, despite the fact that President Park had brought to the nation unprecedented prosperity and pride. A prelude to the oncoming storm was provided on April 8, 1969, when some forty-five members of the ruling party crossed party lines to pass a non-confidence motion proposed by the opposition against Education Minister Kwon O-byŏng for his "disgraceful and perjorative remark about the National Assembly." The crossing of party lines was made despite the fact that both President Park and the party apparatus had given stern warnings and instructions to defeat the motion.

Another "disobedience incidence" resulted in the resignation of the DRP's floor leadership and the purge of five revolting mainstream members from the party on orders by President Park. On April 11, the President expressed his deep disappointment about the division in the party, lamenting at the degeneration of the DRP into the pathologies of the past Korean parties. He ordered the Party Disiplinary Committee to deal with the rebels no matter how many there were.¹⁹⁵ On April 15, the Disciplinary Committee expelled five mainstream faction members of the Assembly in connection with this incident. All five of the expelled Assemblymen had been publicly

¹⁹⁵For Park's statement, see The Dong-A Ilbo, April 11, 1969, p. 1.

opposed to the proposed amendment.¹⁹⁶

Despite Park's discouragement, the amendment issue could not escape public discussion. Kim Jong-p'il, the heir apparent to President Park, broke his long silence and came out in support of the President without specifically mentioning the issue of amendment. He stated on April 19 that "in order to guide this country to stability and prosperity," "it is absolutely necessary to have President Park's strong leadership."¹⁹⁷ On May 9, the spokesman of the Democratic Republican Party urged the people to consider the issue of amendment "with sincerity," taking due consideration of the "twin exigencies of reconstruction and national defense,"¹⁹⁸ In May and June, the ruling party went into a barnstorming tour of the country drumming up support for the amendment. The students erupting again in campuses all over the country; the Ministry of Education ordered early vacations for all schools.

While the New Democratic Party was taking the lead in organizing a pan-national Struggle Committee against the amendment, President Park issued a special statement to the press indicating his plan to hold a national referendum on the proposed amendment. "In the event

¹⁹⁶ On July 12, more expulsion followed. Ninety-three party members including eleven Central Committee members and four chairmen of district party chapters were expelled on that day. See The Dong-A Ilbo, July 13, 1969, p. 1.

¹⁹⁷ The Chosŏn Ilbo, April 20, 1969, p. 1.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., May 10, 1969, p. 1.

that the amendment bill fails in this referendum," the statement continued, "I would regard it as having received non-confidence and my government and I will step down." In the same statement, President urged the ruling party to introduce the amendment bill at an earliest possible date.¹⁹⁹

Having heard the final word from the man for whom the amendment bill was proposed, the ruling DRP Assemblymen spent agonizing seventeen hours in caucus in the evening and the early morning hours of July 29 and 30 in an attempt to bring the dissenting Assemblymen into the fold. In this meeting, many mainstream faction Assemblymen were reported to have spoken against the proposed amendment, but they finally agreed to support the party line on this crucial vote. Meanwhile, despite the repeated assurances by the NDP leader Yu Chin-o that he had sufficient votes(59) to defeat the amendment bill, three NDP Assemblymen came out on July 30 in support of the amendment. In a legal maneuver to disqualify these three Assemblymen, the party decided to dissolve itself temporarily on September 5. Thirteen days later, the party rescinded its action.

On September 9, the amendment bill was introduced on the floor of the National Assembly. After four days of discussion and having determined that there was no chance to block the passage of the bill,

¹⁹⁹The Dong-A Ilbo, July 25, 1969, p. 1. and The Chosŏn Ilbo, July 26, 1969, p. 1.

the opposition Assemblymen forcibly occupied the rostrum in a move to interfere with the parliamentary proceedings. In the late evening hours of September 14, however, the Speaker called the National Assembly into session in one of its annex buildings. Present at the session were 122 DRP Assemblymen who favored the bill. In six short minutes, the bill was declared passed with a vote of 122 votes to none.²⁰⁰ The only DRP Assemblymen who spoke against the bill to the end was aging Chŏng Ku-yŏng, the first President of the DRP. The NDP immediately declared this extraordinary parliamentary tactic as null and void after an angry outburst of emotions.

As promised by President Park, the amendment question was put to a national referendum on October 17. In a referendum marked by a low voter turnout, some seven-and-a-half million voters cast affirmative votes; only three and a half million votes were cast against the amendment. Only in Seoul did the majority of voters vote against the amendment.

Korean politics in the 1960's was marked by two transfers of government through unconstitutional means. First, the Student Uprisings on April 19, 1960 brought down Rhee and the Liberal Party government overnight. The latter was replaced by the government of Chang Myŏn and the Democrats, who, after having been relegated to the role of perennial opposition, had come to find that the burdens

²⁰⁰ The Chosŏn Ilbo, September 10, p. 1. and September 15, p. 1.

of power were as great, if not greater than those of the opposition. At the prospect of power, the Democrats split badly, eventually leading to the break up of the party in two, with almost equal strength. As some argued then this division could have been a healthy phenomenon at the time when the Democrats had an overwhelming mandate to rule the country under the newly adopted cabinet system. Unfortunately, however, the Democrats' effort to deal with the problems of open polity and to manage political conflict was abruptly terminated by yet another extraordinary method of transfer of power-- a military coup.

After a brief period of military rule, the transition to civilian rule was effected through the medium of the Democratic Republican Party to which flocked many former military officers. As a carefully planned and well funded political party, the DRP launched on an ambitious road to realize party politics based on policy commitments transcending personality-centered political parties of the past. In election after election, the party displayed its quiet organizational strength with its salaried party functionaries and unprecedented effective central coordination. Institutional ties were developed in order to have party policies and platforms reflected in the policies of the administration.


It is premature, however, to say that the DRP has completely overcome the past ills of Korean parties. The problem of factionalism

manifested on several occasions represents a major cancer of the party, although thus far President Park has prevented an open split of the party. The original ideal of party politics has been compromised because the party secretariat organization has relinquished more and more power to the party's National Assemblymen.

The opposition parties, however, have shown no internal improvement. The emergence of crisis brought the opposition politicians together on occasion as during the Liberal Party regime, but the party had to endure the perennial problem of factionalism, the struggle for the hegemony of the party, and even an open split of the party. An ineffective collective leadership, one of the notable characteristics of the opposition party structure, continued through most of the 1960's; the party's image deteriorated through a series of bungling and other political errors; it failed to recruit fresh blood to its ranks.

The development of Korean parties in the 1960's is summarized in the following geneological diagram(Diagram 2).

Diagram 2. The Geneology of Korean Political Parties,
1960-1969



Note: 1. Minjungdang
2. Daejungdang
3. Minjungdang

CHAPTER III IDEOLOGY, ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP OF MAJOR KOREAN PARTIES

Ideology

At the time of the liberation Korea found herself divided along the thirty-eighth parallel for the purpose of disarming the Japanese troops by the Allied forces. This military expediency had left a fateful imprint on the ideological and political development in Korea and on the nature of party politics. This military division developed into a political one, with each of the two occupying powers sponsoring a regime to its liking when they could not agree on the method of unification. The division was perpetuated by the continuing inability to agree on the method of unification, by a brutal war, and by frequent military provocations from the North.

In the onrush of foreign ideologies amidst the excitement of liberation, the traditional Korean political thought remained a mere ineffectual echo. Various imported ideologies competed to win the place of the dominant ideology of the nation, but never were these ideologies allowed to compete freely: the adoption of liberal democracy can be attributed more to the vicissitudes of international politics than ^{to} any other factor in domestic politics. In the era of confrontation among weltanschauung parties in the immediate postwar era, there were four discernible policy differences. The first of these was represented by the Korean Democratic Party and the NARKI. An analysis of the platforms and policies of these two groups would

indicate that they lay on the extreme right of the Korean political spectrum. Espousing the ideology of liberal democracy and the freedom of ^{the} individual, they favored a free economic system, equal opportunity for all, particularly in the field of education. As far as their policy of unification was concerned, they advocated unification under a democratic system and through mediation by the United Nations. On the thorny issue of land reform, they were in favor of it, although they insisted on compensation for the distributed land.¹

To the Korean Independence Party, the overriding ideology was that of nationalism, through which the party sought to solve complex problems of the chaotic era. It advocated unification through the efforts of the Koreans under a republican form of government. In economic policy, it favored a planned economy and redistribution of land with compensation. One of its notable social policies was free, compulsory education. Except for its emphasis on nationalism, the KIP's platforms did not differ much from the KDP's.

Of the two class parties, the Laboring People's Party was the party of socialist inclination. It advocated nationalization of the nation's financial and industrial enterprises; redistribution of land without compensation and government ownership of the land; and liberation of laborers through the proclamation of a laborers'

¹For platforms and policies of these parties, see Yi Ki-ha, op. cit., and Han T'ae-su, Hankuk Chōngdangsa (A History of Korean Political Parties) and The Central Election Management Committee, Taehanminkuk Chōngdangsa (A History of Korean Political Parties).

charter. In unification policy, the party, as the KIP, called for a self-reliant unification under a democratic system. The South Korean Communist Party, like all Communist parties, proposed a radical program for the nation, the contents of which were similar to those of the Laboring People's Party. It naturally advocated unification under Communist auspices and constantly supported the Russian position in the United States-USSR Joint Conference.

Never were these differences in policies allowed to bloom in the complex international and domestic situation to which the nation was subjected in the postwar era. Since her independence, the policy of anti-Communism was adopted and elevated to the plane of national policy. This unalterable policy seems to have prevented the development of nationalism for, as one author has put it, "if nationalism were allowed to develop without governmental restraint, it was apparent that it could diminish the importance of anti-Communism to the point of constituting a threat to the stability of the regime in South Korea."² The ideological wasteland thus created failed to evoke participation in politics.

²K. W. Kim, "Ideology and Political Development in South Korea," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 38, Summer, 1965, p. 166. For the treatment of ideological problems in Korean politics, see Yi Yŏng-il, "Hankuk Chŏngch'i Sasangŭi Metaborism" (The Metabolism of the Korean Political Thought), Sasangŭe, February, 1968, pp. 133-143, and Sŏ Jung-sŏk, "Yinyŏm Chŏngdangŭn Tabuinka?" (Are Ideological Parties Taboo?), Chŏngkyŏng Yŏn'gu, December, 1969, pp. 97-104.

From the point of view of party politics, the consequences of anti-Communism may be viewed in terms of, first, the complete domination of the political scene by the right wing conservative parties and the resultant elimination of the socialist parties, and, second, by the restriction of party programs and activities to a narrow, clearly defined political framework. Here, the conservatism of Korean parties does not mean that the parties adhere to the status quo and rejection of the change of it. They are conservative in the sense that they aim at gradual evolutionary process of equalizing political, social, economic, educational opportunities under the banner of liberal democracy without advocating a revolutionary change of the status quo. Also, they are so called because their platforms and policies advocate those which are in direct opposition to the position of the North Korean Communists.

The Rhee government was from the outset beset by increasing Communist agitation and violence. It outlawed the Communist Party and allowed the arrests of Communists and their "fellow travelers." This law has been subsequently strengthened by several amendments. A similar anti-Communist law was enacted in July, 1961 by the military regime to strengthen the anti-Communist posture of the nation. Often, this anti-Communist legislation was flagrantly abused by the government to suppress its political opposition, vocal students, and the press. In the arena of international politics, an advocacy of even a neutralism has been regarded by the succeeding regimes as dangerous

and as in violation of national security legislation. In domestic politics, this absolute commitment to anti-Communism as an unalterable policy made the line very thin between democratic socialism and Communism.

It is no wonder that in the absence of a suitable ideology, such near-ideology as Ilminchui, or "One People Principle" should be introduced by Rhee and his lieutenants in the 1946-1947 period. This "philosophy," a manifestation of nationalism, elevated the principle of national unity as a supreme goal. "Our supreme objective is to carry on our affairs by sacrificing everything and uniting into one." "Special interests," which have been the bane of the nation, were said to deny the "true soul" of the nation, transmitted through heredity, which longed for unity of action and will.³ This ineffective and poorly disseminated "philosophy" never caught fire among the masses and it became a mockery of the intellectuals. At any rate, with Rhee's election as President and the achievement of comparable unity, this philosophy was discarded.

In the absence of a symbol to which party elites and the rank and file members are bound, the only practicable way of holding a party together was to make an all-out appeal to follow the charismatic

³See Koh Kwang-il, In Quest of National Unity and Power: Political Ideas and Practice of Syngman Rhee (Unpublished Ph. D Dissertation: Rutgers University, 1963). See also Gregory Henderson, op. cit., p. 284.

leader. The first of the three provisions of the oath of the Liberal Party, for example, stated: "I uphold and whole-heartedly support Chairman Rhee's spirit of patriotism and independence."⁴ A Liberal Party document published just prior to the 1960 Student Uprising, expounded this non-ideology as follows:⁵

Owing to the brilliant guardianship of our President [Syngman Rhee] and wise leadership of Speaker Yi Ki-bung [Speaker of the National Assembly, 1956-1960 and Chairman of the Liberal Party's Central Committee], our party has made a steady progress and has come to emerge as a stable political force despite insurmountable national problems and crisis. Without the brilliant leadership of President Rhee and Speaker Yi, and in the absence of an all-out effort on the part of our members, it is doubtful whether this party, or, for that matter, our nation could have preserved its identity.

While the ruling party appealed for loyalty to the charismatic leader, it authorized political activity only to such political assemblies or organizations that could be considered to belong to the conservative right. The ideologies of the middle of the road, such as democratic socialism, and the leftist groups were not permitted. That anything approaching leftist ideas was a taboo in Korean politics can best be illustrated by the fate of the Progressive Party and its leader Cho Bong-am. The party was officially organized on November 10, 1956 after its leader Cho Bong-am gained more than

⁴ Jayudang (The Liberal Party), Jayudangŭi Ŏpjŏkkwa Sich'aek (The Accomplishments and Policies of the Liberal Party), (Seoul: Jayudang, February, 1960), p. 267.

⁵ Ibid., p. 11.

two million votes in the May presidential election that year. Though a former Communist, Cho renounced the party in 1945 and was considered an anti-Communist thereafter.

The Progressive Party and its leading members including Cho were implicated in an espionage case in January, 1958. The claims of an extensive contact with the party leaders by an indicted spy prompted the government to carry out a mass arrest of party leaders. The government claimed before the court that the party's platform which ^{called} for the unification through peaceful means was identical with the North Korean slogan and hence "jeopardized the existence of the Republic." It also considered subversive an article written by Cho in the October, 1957 issue of the Progressive Party magazine Chung'ang Chŏngch'i because it supported all-Korean elections as a way of bringing about unification. In addition to the charges of illegal possession of a weapon, Cho was held for accepting large sums of money from North Korea for use in his 1956 presidential election campaign.

Without waiting for the decision of the court, the Office of Public Information cancelled the publication license of the Chung'ang Chŏngch'i on February 24, 1958, and on the following day, it announced the cancellation of the formal registration of the Progressive Party. The Director of the Office of Public Information declared that the action was taken on the basis that the Progressives "advocated means

of Korean unification which are contrary to the laws of Republic of Korea and the resolution of the United Nations"; that the "constant touch" between the Progressive Party and the Communists in North Korea disqualified it as a legal political party; and that the party had sought to elect converted Communists and their fellow travelers to the National Assembly and thus subvert democratic institutions in the republic.⁶

In the court proceedings that began in March, 1958 and ended in February, 1959, Cho was sentenced to death on charges of espionage, violation of the National Security Law and illegal possession of arms. The outlawing of the Progressive Party was to serve as a sober reminder that the government would not tolerate the advocacy of programs and policies that diverged from the officially set policy.⁷

Since the Korean society lacks cleavages along the lines of social classes, the Korean parties may be described as parties of social integration, to use Sigmund Neumann's terminology. In the socio-economic milieu in which anything approaching leftist inclinations are not permitted, the existing conservative parties paid lip service to what a social democratic party elsewhere might espouse. Whatever these conservative parties may say in their platforms they were

⁶The Dong-A Ilbo, February 25, 1958, p. 1.

⁷For a brief history of the progressive movement and difficulties encountered by it, see Yi Sang-du, "Chesam Chŏngch'i Seryŏkŭi Yŏkchŏng"(A History of the Third Political Force), Sasangge, August, 1968, pp. 110-118.

mostly exercises in political rhetoric. Hence the analysis of the party policies and platforms does not offer us a meaningful insight into Korean parties.

The non-issue contents of party platforms on campaign pledges are well illustrated by a comparison of the 1960 campaign pledges of the two major parties - the LP and the DP-in the 1960 presidential election.⁸ The Liberal Party promised, among other things, the "elevation of public sense of morality" and the "development of new ethics" based on democratic ideals; establishment of a self supporting economy, improvement of Korea's international payment position; encouragement of agriculture, fishery and forestry; strengthening the function of agricultural cooperatives; encouragement of small and medium-sized enterprises; encouragement of consumption of domestic products; readjustment of the taxation system; strengthening of international bonds to establish collective security; and strengthening of economic diplomacy.

The Democratic Party, on the other hand, presented their pledges in the following terms: realization of a cabinet responsibility system and abolition of authoritarianism, revision of the new security

⁸ The party platforms and policies are summarized from Han T'ae-su, "A Review of Political Party Activities in Korea , II (1955-1960)," Korean Affairs, Vol. 2., No. 4 (1963), pp. 318-330. See also Park Hee-bum, "Political Parties and Economic Policies in Korea," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer), 1967, pp. 39-43.

and local autonomy laws, removal of political pressures on labor, agricultural, youth, women's and other social organizations, non-interference by the executive branch in the affairs of the judiciary, decentralization of police, fair management of elections, removal of violence and the social vices, abolition of monopolization of economic resources by a limited and privileged class, stabilization of agricultural and fishery economy, fair taxation and the lowering of taxes.

The ruling and the opposition parties alike accepted liberal democracy without apparently believing in the values. The ideology of liberal democracy was a convenient tool to combat Communism. When necessary, however, the processes and the values which liberal democracy represented could be circumvented. Almost an immediate acceptance of the military coup in 1961, even in the intellectual circles, is an eloquent illustration of how superficial the parties' belief in liberal democracy had been. Highly visible and emotional struggles between the parties have not been lacking, but rarely on substantive issues. This has occurred because the opposition parties have questioned the very legitimacy of the way in which the ruling party has come to power and maintain it. Hence the struggles sometimes begin and end with matters of procedure without ever reaching the matter of substantive policies.

In more recent years, the Democratic Republican Party with its ideology of "nationalistic democracy"(sometimes called the Koreanized democracy) tried to fill the gap in the ideological wasteland. The concept was not given full elaboration and the DRP's leaders themselves often disagreed among themselves, but, in its roughest form, nationalistic democracy can be described as a formula which combines liberal democracy with nationalism for modernization under the leadership of a nationalist elite. The principles of democracy, developed in the West, should not be imported to an Asian nation like Korea at the time of modernization. Liberal democracy, this ideology seems to say, should be "Koreanized" to fit the peculiarities of the Korean society and must be based on constructive nationalism. Only through this accommodation, Korea should be able to recover its self-consciousness(or self-identity). In order to do so, at this transitional period, a strong driving force imbued with a nationalism or modernization and dedicated to creating a liberal society should be secured.⁹ The founding declaration of the Democratic Republican Party in its elaboration of liberal democracy stated the following:¹⁰

The liberal democracy which we aim at is not a unidimensional one. By readapting it to the peculiarities of the Korean situation, we should be able to escape from the retarded development of our

⁹See K. B. Kim, op. cit., pp. 204-205. For President Park's political thinking, see Park Chung Hee, Our Nation's Path(Seoul: Dong-A Publishing Co., 1962), especially pp. 207-247.

¹⁰Minjukonghwadang(DRP), Minjukonghwadang Sanyŏn(A Four Year History of the DRP) (Seoul: The DRP Headquarters, 1967), pp. 32-33.

nation. Democracy cannot be achieved through mere adoption of institutions because a successful democracy is contingent upon the fostering of democratic personalities of the members of that society.... Our party proclaims as its guiding principle that our traditional value systems should be recognized; national self-consciousness firmly established; the foundations of a healthy party politics solidified; a healthy political order established; and a truly democratic system guaranteed.

The New Democratic Party, on the other hand, explained its acceptance of liberal democracy in the following manner in 1968:¹

Our party is a political party aimed at safeguarding liberal democracy. Our party regards it as a threat to liberal democracy that the present regime carries out militaristic, fascist information politics and drives the people of this nation into a syndrome of fear under the pretext of anti-Communism. Our party absolutely guarantees such basic liberties as freedom of the press, assembly, and elections. Believing that the development of a healthy parliamentary democracy and the attainment of peaceful transfer of power are the yardsticks for determining the failure or success of Korean democracy, we will struggle to the end....

While advocating the ideology of liberal democracy, both parties have been placing a great emphasis on social welfare policies. In its founding declaration, the DRP stated that it will "uplift the people's standards of living by adopting a free enterprise system and by rational economic planning."¹² The opposition NDP stated

¹¹Shinmindang, Uri Dangŭi Kibon Bangch'im(The Basic Policies of Our Party) (Seoul: The NDP Headquarters, 1968), p. 10.

¹²Minjukonghwadang, op. cit., p. 9.

in its policy paper that the party "aims at the development of an 'economy for the people'."¹³ The conspicuous lack of socialist jargons in the policies of both parties is significant. Factors both internal and external to both parties inhibited them from espousing radical welfare policies.

A comparison of the 1967 presidential election campaign pledges of both parties reveals that the basic policies of the ruling and opposition parties had not had a significant change from the 1950's, although the emphasis had shifted and the policies were better elaborated. The ruling DRP defended its modernization program and the First Five-Year Economic Plan and emphasized the need for having political stability to carry out the Second Five-Year Economic Plan, which promised, among other things, a 8.5 percent annual economic growth rate, self-sufficiency of food by 1971, doubling of per capita income, creation of jobs for two million by 1971, and salary increases for military personnel and public officials. The opposition program was remarkably similar to that of 1960 discussed earlier. It accused the DRP regime of corruption, dictatorship and abuse of power by the CIA in politics, and the protection of big business which tended to make the rich man richer and poor man poorer. It called for the "economy for the people" based on balanced growth between the agrarian and industrial sectors. The rest were familiar: the guarantee of

¹³Shimmindang, op. cit., p. 11.

freedom of speech, the expansion of human rights, neutralization of the police, realization of local autonomy, the curbing of presidential power, revision of the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty and the withdrawal of Korean troops from Vietnam.

Organization

Organizational Fragility. As Maurice Duverger stated, a party organization "constitutes the general setting for the activity of members, the forms imposed on their solidarity: it determines the machinery for the selection of leaders, and decides their powers."¹⁴ The organizational structure of a political party often explains "the strength and efficiency of certain parties, the weakness and inefficiency of others."¹⁵ The absence of a strong organizational base in Korean parties is one of the most widely condemned features of the structure of Korean parties. For example, a student of Korean political parties assessed the weakness of Korean parties in the following terms.¹⁶

Korean parties are almost oblivious to their organization. Subsequently, parties organize their networks in consideration of the fame of their candidates and their personal dignity as recognized in local areas, and the candidates of their party

¹⁴ Maurice Duverger, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ko Yong-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism, Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2(Summer, 1967), p. 16.

try to reinforce their private organizations not on the basis of any manifest political ideology but through human relations with local patrons who, in a varying degree, possess local reputation and authority. At the same time, politicians who have their own organizations, due to the fact that the party headquarters is devoid of such an organization based on rational ideology, seek alliances with influential party leaders in the capital through premodern human relations and thereby identify with a cliquish pedigree in which personal affinity and dignity count more than ideology and organization.

The idea of cohesive political parties with permanent organizations on the central and local levels is a relatively recent development in the Korean political sense. The introduction of the Political Party Law in 1963 which required party affiliation in order/to be ^{for individuals} candidates for both the presidential and National Assembly elections helped to stabilize the number of parties, but previous to that Korean parties were characterized by intra party split. one-man political parties and abundance of independent politicians without party labels.

For example, in the 1948 general election some 48 parties competed for Assembly seats and the astonishing fact was that 25 parties ran only one candidate each. The sheer number of parties participating in the past Assembly elections indicated in Table 3¹⁷ is enough to show the ephemeral nature of Korean parties and party

¹⁷ The Central Election Management Committee, Yŏkdae Kukhoewiwŏn Sŏn'gŏ Sanghwang(1967) (The Past National Assembly Elections), pp. 69-71, 173-174, 252, 327-328, 448-449, 628-629, 756-757, and 871-872(1971 Edition).

systems. Table 4 summarizes the electoral and Assembly strength of independents in the legislature.¹⁸ Up to 1960, close to one-half of the national electorate cast their votes for independents, and 33 percent of the Assemblymen were independents. Table 5 indicates that politicians joined and abandoned political parties almost at will.¹⁹ All of these data seem to point to the fact that the Korean parties lacked institutionalization.

Factionalism. A weak party organization inevitably gives rise to factionalism. This appears to be particularly true in the opposition parties. The reasons are not too difficult to find. The ruling parties, both the LP and the DRP, recruited their members individually and without regard to the latter's previous party affiliations. Their party members were more easily united under the centripetal force of governmental power. The opposition parties -- the DP and the NDP, were formed by splinter groups as a result of a consolidation process in this struggle against the ruling party at the time. As one observer has put it, "an opposition party in Korea is the product of factional power struggles and is largely motivated by resistance."²⁰ Hence

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 71, 174-75, 252, 328, 448-449.

¹⁹Compiled by Cho Il-mun, "Ch'ongdang Knogjik Hubowa Musosok Ch'ulmaikwanhan Koch'al," (The Study on Nomination of Party Candidates and Candidacy of Independents), Hankuk Ch'ongch'i Hakhoebo, Vol. 4, 1971, p. 100.

²⁰K.B. Kim, op. cit., p. 223.

Table 3. Number of Parties Contesting in National Assembly Elections.

	Contesting Parties	Parties Having 10 or less Candidates
Constituent Assembly	48	43
2nd National Assembly	39	30
3rd National Assembly	14	10
4th National Assembly	14	10
5th National Assembly	14	8
6th National Assembly	12	1
7th National Assembly	11	1
8th National Assembly	6	

Table 4. Percentage of Seats and Votes Won by Independents in National Assembly Elections, 1948-1960.

	Percentage of Seats Won by Independents	Percentage of Votes Won by Independents
Constituent Assembly	42.5	40.3
2nd National Assembly	0	62.9
3rd National Assembly	33.4	47.9
4th National Assembly	11.6	21.7
5th National Assembly	21.1	46.8
Average	33.7	Average 43.9

Table 5. Party Crossing in the National Assembly

	Total Number	From Party to Party	Party to Independent	Independent to Party
Constituent Assembly	198	24	3	4
2nd National Assembly	210	250	106	163
3rd National Assembly	203	61	98	161
4th National Assembly	232	6	116	92
5th National Assembly	231	95	1	91
6th National Assembly	175	0	2	1
7th National Assembly	175	0	63	63

the previous ties of the members of the newly created opposition party became the basis of subsequent cleavages. Factionalism in an opposition party made it difficult to have a single leader, and the party often operated under a supreme committee structure, which, more or less registered the factional strength of the party. The opposition practice of choosing different men as the party head and the presidential candidate is a reflection of the factional maneuvering for political rewards. On a slightly lower level, the Political Affairs Council (previously the Leadership Council) had a similar practice of taking note of the factional strength of the party.²¹

²¹ For discussions of factional alignments in the NDP, see Pak Sŏk-chong, "Shinmintang" (The New Democratic Party), Chung'ang, February, 1970, pp. 114-136; and Pak Yŏng-ch'ŏl and Pak Sun-jae, "Shinmintang" (The New Democratic Party), Shindong'a, May, 1968, pp. 82-105.

As we have seen earlier, the ruling DRP has also experienced factionalism. However, in the case of the ruling party, factional proclivities could be appeased or suppressed with sufficient political and economic leverages which the top leadership of the party can manipulate. It has also been curbed to a considerable degree by the presence of the party leader who seems to have a passionate dislike for such tendency. President Park Chung Hee expounded on the need to have a strong discipline among the ranks of party members, especially on the level of party elites. In his speech to the DRP's National Party Convention on December 27, 1965, President Park enumerated ideology, policy and leadership as prerequisites^{for} a "modern" political party and stated that "if any one or more of these prerequisites are missing, we cannot call it a party, and it cannot perform the function of a political party." While he believed that his party had fulfilled the first two conditions marvelously, he stated that the DRP lacked discipline. One should quote him at some length on this point.²²

The question of discipline in the party still remains in the dark. Since a political party is an organization made up of many persons, it is imperative to have discipline in order to maintain order and to

²²Quoted in Sin Pöm-sik, Chungdanhanŭnjanŭn Sŭngri Hajimothanda (Collected Speeches of President Park Chung Hee) (Seoul: Hanrim Ch'ulp'ansa, 1968), p. 223. For another appeal by President Park to establish party discipline and to eliminate middle-level bosses in the party on the occasion of his instruction to purge the dissenting DRP Assemblymen, see The Dong-A Ilbo, April 11, 1969, p. 1.

perform in an organic fashion. It can be said that discipline is the life of any organization. If a party lacks leadership and discipline, it is no exaggeration to say that it is no party at all.... A party member must follow the party guidelines and obey the organization. During the discussion stage, all members can participate in it. Once a party policy is determined, however, all members should follow and obey this policy. This is democracy and a democratic political party.... No political party can stand firmly when its members decide at will to obey when it suits him and disobey when it does not.

In the most visible terms, the organizational fragility of the Korean parties may be shown by the 1969 figures for the number of party offices, general party members, and the district party members.²³ As the following table indicates, with the exception of the incumbent DRP, not a single party was able to maintain its district offices in all of the constituencies(142), although the NDP came close to having this number.

Party membership. Despite the fact that about 15 percent of the eligible voters in 1972 are registered as members of political parties, the concept of party membership in Korea is a baffling phenomenon. Each party has set up an elaborate procedure for acquiring party membership, but these procedures are for the most part paper requirements only. Given the unwillingness of many Koreans to openly

²³Cho Il-mun, op. cit., p. 345. The figures are compiled by the Central Election Management Committee.

Table 6. District Party Offices and Memberships of Parties, 1969.

	Number of District Offices	General Membership	Average District Membership
Democratic Republican Party	132	1,334,892	9,401
Unification Korean Party	48	7,750	162
Justice Party	42	7,005	167
Mass Party	67	497,541	7,425
People's Party	55	24,218	440
Unified Socialist Party	46	10,885	237
Liberal Democratic Party	46	3,026	66
Democratic Party	71	28,254	398
New Democratic Party	121	158,785	1,312
Total	658	2,072,356	3,248

identify with a political party,²⁴ research on party membership has been a most frustrating task.²⁵ In one survey of party membership

²⁴ See Kim Kyu-t'aek, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁵ The Korean voters themselves appear to be baffled by the concept of party membership. One survey asked the question: "Who are the party members?" The results are as follows:
 A person who filed an application for membership(34.5 percent)
 A person who pays party dues(5.5 percent)
 A person who agrees with the objectives and policies of a particular party(38.6 percent)
 A person who is obliged to vote for party nominees(12.2 percent)
 Don't know(9.2 percent). See Cho Il-mun and Yun Kyong-u, op. cit., p. 67.

based on 230 party members, it was discovered that in terms of age, occupational background and religion, there was no appreciable difference between the DRP and the NDP members.²⁶

Party member eligibility in Korea is determined by the Political Party Law. Article 17 of this law defines the qualification of a party member as "any person who is eligible to vote for the election of members of the National Assembly,"²⁷ but, party membership is prohibited to public officials, officers of the state-run corporations and any other "persons whose political activities are prohibited by any other law or decree." The latter provision disqualifies students and the nation's school teachers to become party members. The legal barriers set for these groups are condemned by some as unnecessary and harmful restrictions that should be softened considerably. One political scientist has argued as follows:²⁸

Such legal restrictions prevent many able persons from joining a party solely by virtue of their occupations. Consequences are that the parties have come to be populated by those unemployed and inept and those who are in low estimation in the eyes of the public, damaging the public's image and the trust of political parties. The roads must be opened for some of these able and active intellectuals and youths to join a political party.

²⁶Cho Il-mun, op. cit., p. 425.

²⁷Secretariat, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Selected Laws Governing the National Assembly of Republic of Korea, p. 180.

²⁸Chōng Yo-sōp, "Hyōndae Chōngdangŭi Kinŭngkwa Yōkkinŭng" (The Functions and Dysfunctions of a Modern Political Party), Chōngkyōng Yōn'gu, No. 25, p. 95, quoted in Cho Il-mun, op. cit., p. 334.

The ruling party claims to have as its members about one-tenth of the total electorate, but the indications are that a great proportion of these have not actively sought membership, but passively gave in to the pressure from various sources. At any rate, many of these party "members" do not wish to ^{be} identified as such in public. Under these circumstances it is easy to see how difficult the recruitment of the opposition party members might be.

As of 1969, the DRP registered 1,334,892 members with the Central Election Management Committee and the NDP, 158,785. In terms of activities carried out, the DRP also surpassed the major opposition party, but it should be noted that despite the inferior numerical strength, the NDP had also carried out a fairly wide-ranging activities which are summarized in the following table compiled by the Central Election Management Committee (Table 7).²⁹

The DRP. The most notable characteristic of the DRP is the well developed organizational structure which no other party in the past could match. As discussed in Chapter II, the DRP was launched preemptively before political activities were permitted by the military government, in accordance with the "Kim Jong-p'il Plan." This plan, prepared secretly by some leading political scientists in Korea at the time called for a party that would be operated by a stable, on-going ^{cadre of} party functionaries rather than by members of

²⁹Quoted in Cho Il-mun, op. cit., p. 340.

Table 7. Activities and Meetings of Major Parties,
1969.

	DRP	NDP
1. Activities to strengthen and reinforce party structure	190	112
2. Meetings:		
a. Provincial party conventions	23	32
b. Standing committee meetings	206	74
c. Subcommittee meetings	153	44
d. Party member unity meetings	772	11
3. General activities:		
a. Propaganda activities	228	90
b. Training of party members	1,524	32
c. Reports	87	32
d. Rallies on constitutional amendment	287	211
e. Public opinion surveys	28	2
f. Service activities	148	67

the National Assembly as had been the case of so many previous parties. The organizational ideas contained in the Kim Plan was compromised with the passage of time but the basic features of the original structure has remained up to the present time and the DRP organization still remains a potent machine.

A text published for the members of the ruling party stated the party's organizational principles as follows.³⁰

A political party must organize public opinion and reflect it in the policies of the nation. The direction of the party must be determined through a freely determined will of the party members. In order to fulfill these requirements of the democratic procedure, the party has instituted representative organs.

The policies thus obtained through democratic procedures, however, must be accompanied by a forceful execution. Therefore, the party instituted standing executive organs which can constantly fulfill the expressed will of the party members. This executive power extends to all party members through the existing organs of the party.

Of the two organs-- the representative and the executive-- the original founders of the DRP envisioned ^{to} the latter be the operational headquarters of the party that would control not only the party's local branches but also its National Assemblymen and the government. The Secretariat structure was established on March, 1963 with 1,300 permanent members. Some 300 paid party members worked at the Party Headquarters, 20 to 30 at each of the provincial or city branches, and 6 at each of the 131 district offices.³¹ The Central Secretariat consisted of four departments, one board, one office, one bureau, which altogether had 48 sections.

³⁰ Minjukonghwadang (The Democratic Republican Party), Tangwŏn Kyobon (Manual for the Party Members), (Seoul: Minjukonghwadang, 1970), p. 158.

³¹ K. B. Kim, op. cit., p. 186.

Soon thereafter, however, the Secretariat membership was reduced considerably. This was brought about after the disenchanted Assemblymen in the non-mainstream faction had criticized it. It was originally conceived that party personnel at the center, provincial or district offices be recruited and staffed entirely independently of the National Assemblymen. This single command structure envisaged, for example, that the district party organization might be headed by a person who was not necessarily a member of the National Assembly or a candidate for that body. Even if an Assemblyman served as the party chief in a district, he would be forbidden to have appointive and directive power over party affairs and personnel. All matters concerning the district party offices would be directed and managed by the Central Secretariat, and the Assemblymen's function would be merely that of representing his district in the Assembly. The gradual weakening of the central command structure culminated in the charter amendment of February, 1965 which gave more or less a free hand to the local district party head, usually the Assemblyman from the district, in the operation of local party offices.

The present charter of the Democratic Republican Party designates the National Party Convention, held once every two years, as the supreme governing body.³² Composed of a President, a Chairman,

³² The present charter amended as of June 17, 1971 is found in its entirety in Cho Il-mun, Sae Chongdangron (A New Theory of Political Parties), pp. 581-587. See also Minjukonghwadang (The Democratic Republican Party), op. cit., pp. 137-138.

Party Affairs Council members, the party's National Assemblymen, and delegates from the party's district offices, it elects the party President and approves the President's selection of a party Chairman. It is also empowered to elect the Central Committee, consisting of less than 1,800 members who, in turn, elect the Central Standing Committee made up of 300 to 500 members. The latter body functions as a sounding ^{board} ^ that approves the decision of the party's leadership.

The President of the party supervises and controls all party offices. Having the ultimate decision-making power ^{over} ^ all party personnel, he can request reconsideration of any decision made by the Party Affairs Council. The Party Chairman carries out day-to-day affairs of the party on order of the President. As a presiding officer of the Party Affairs Council, he nominates all important party officers, subject to approval by the President, including the Director-General of the party's Central Secretariat.

The most powerful decision-making organ of the Democratic Republican Party is the Party Affairs Council composed of no more than fifteen members. Ex-officio members are the party Chairman, the Chairman of the Policy Committee, the Director-General of the Central Secretariat, the Floor Leader of the party in the National Assembly, the party's Vice-Speaker of the National Assembly and the Minister without Portfolio. Although its decision can be vetoed by the party President and needs technical approval of the Central Standing Committee, all major party matters are determined by this

Council. Its major powers include decisions on the party's basic policy, finance and budget as well as recommendation of party nominees for the National Assembly to the party President who makes the final selection.

The Secretariat and its Director-General attend to administrative affairs of the central party headquarters and supervise local party secretariats. Initially, the Director-General had the exclusive power to appoint local party cadres. However, he lost this power as a result of the charter amendment in February, 1965. This power was assumed by the local party chairmen. It also became a common practice after late 1964 that the DRP Assemblymen automatically became the local chairmen of the party apparatus. Although considerably weakened, the Director-General of the central party still exercises a considerable influence on local party organizations and cadres whose salaries are distributed by the Central Secretariat.

In order to realize the original aim of making the DRP a "party of policy," the party charter provides for an elaborate set up for this purpose. The Policy Committee, comprised of key DRP Assemblymen, the government ministers belonging to the party, and party members appointed by the party President, is responsible for initiating party policies and advising the Party Affairs Council as well as other party organs and the government. Under the Policy Committee are the thirty-member Policy Review Board and ^{the} Policy Research Office, composed of specialists.

The organization of the Democratic Republican Party is shown by the following diagram(Diagram 3).³³

On the provincial level, the party maintains a Provincial Committee usually headed by the most powerful Assemblyman from the province and a branch of the Central Party Secretariat. On the level of the electoral district, the supreme party organization is the District Committee, headed by a powerful Assembly hopeful or a National Assemblyman representing that district. In the management of the local Secretariat, the District Committee Chairman is aided by a Secretary-General who is ^{the} day-to-day manager of party affairs and who is directly responsible to the District Committee. In each of the ŭp and myŏn(town and township), the party organization is headed by a kwanrijang(Supervisor), who is in turn assisted by multiple jidojang(Leader) on the li(village) level; these Leaders are in turn assisted by multiple hwaldongjang(Functionaries). The organization of the local party hierarchy is shown in Diagram 4.

As far as the policy-making process in the party is concerned, the central role is played by the Party Affairs Council, which, in turn, is dominated by its ex-officio members. The Policy Review Board which maintains relatively well-equipped research facilities

³³ Adopted from Minjukonghwadang(The Democratic Republican Party), Minjukonghwadang Sanyŏnsa(The Four Year History of the Democratic Republican Party)(Seoul: Minjukonghwadang Kihoek Chosapu, 1967), p. 679, and Democratic Republican Party, The Democratic Republican Party of the Republic of Korea(Seoul: The DRP Headquarters, 1965), pp. 91-92.

Diagram 3. The Organizational Structure of the
Democratic Republican Party





Diagram 4. The Organizational Structure of the Democratic Republican Party on the Local Levels



submits its recommendations and supporting materials to the Party Affairs Council for consideration. The decision of the Party Affairs Council then goes to the President for final approval. Ostensibly, the Central Committee has the right of amendment to the policy thus originated and the National Party Congress has full powers on party's basic policies, but in actuality, this power is more symbolic than real.

The party decision to go ahead with the constitutional amendment in 1969, for example, was first reached by a conference of the top party personnel. After that policy had been approved by the President himself, it was officially proposed in the Party Affairs Council and then was sent to the party caucus in the National Assembly where there was considerable dissent. After much work of persuasions had been done by the dissident members, the amendment decision was then relayed to a Party-Government Joint Meeting chaired by the Prime Minister. Finally, the National Party Convention approved the decision in a unanimous show of support.

In this particular case, the party's Assembly caucus played an essential role because the mobilization of the support of the party's Assemblymen was indispensable in the ultimate success of the amendment. It was only after the amendment bill was introduced on the floor of the National Assembly that the party took up the matter with the Party-Government Joint Meeting and the National Party Convention. The latter two organizations' role in the amendment proceedings was merely that of ratifying what the party leaders had decided.

The NDP. The perennial problems of organization in the NDP and its predecessor parties have been to construct an organization that can prevent the domination of the party by one man and to accommodate the leaders of the major factions in order to maintain the unity of the party. This, of course, was necessitated by the complexity of factional alignments in the party. Until the NDP was organized, its predecessor parties had relied on the dual principles of collective leadership and factional accommodation. The organizational structure that could be agreed on was usually a committee form. The Supreme Councils of the past were usually composed of three men, who were the leaders of the three largest factions within the party. One of them was elected to be the head of the Council, i. e., the nominal head of the party. Usually no single faction in the past had an absolute majority of the party's National Party Convention delegates to control the key positions of the party. This situation necessitated compromise among the leaders of the party for distribution of key party posts, both within and outside the National Assembly. Sometimes, this endeavor had taken the form of "position splitting," such as Cho Byŏng-ok and Chang Myŏn in 1959 and Yun Po-sŏn and Yu Chin-o in 1967, who in each case split the posts of presidential candidate and the head of the party. In a non-election year, a powerful leader was elevated to the post of "Advisor" in order to prevent him from bolting the party and organizing a new one.

As we have stated earlier, the factional strength is represented in the top policy making organs of the party. Membership in the former Leadership Council and the Political Affairs Council reflected the strength of each faction at the time of the National Party Convention. The mainstream faction whose leader becomes the head of the party also usually controls such key committees as discipline and finance, and the floor leadership of the party in the National Assembly. Sharing key party posts has been the bane of the opposition party both at the present and in the past. Being preoccupied with factional rivalries at the center, the party has not been able to expend its energies on such matters as presenting a united front against the incumbent party or strengthening party organizations at the grassroots. As of December, 1967, the figure registered with the Central Election Management Committee for the total membership of the party showed 381,500. This figure seems to be a grossly exaggerated one and those party functionaries who retain their membership in a non-election year ^{are} estimated to be about one-tenth of that figure, with many of its local branches staying virtually closed during off-election years.

The current charter of the New Democratic Party is rather a remarkable paper considering the past charters of the opposition parties. For the first time in party history, it calls for a single head of the party, unencumbered by such past posts as the Supreme Council and the plural Vice-Presidents. The principle of collective

leadership was eliminated for the first time, at least on paper. Factional rivalry at the top was replaced by that in the Political Affairs Council composed of twenty-five men who are elected by the National Party Convention.


The Political Affairs Council, has a great deal more power than the DRP's counterpart, the Party Affairs Council, in that it possesses an exclusive power over the selection of party candidates for the National Assembly and the approval of the elected local party chairmen. The executive organ of the party is headed by the Secretary-General, who controls six bureaus. Compared with that of the DRP, the Secretariat organization of the New Democratic Party is an impotent machine with no weapons. The organizational set up of the opposition party is shown in Diagram 5.³⁴

The organizations of major parties in the National Assembly as provided for in the Political Parties Law³⁵ markedly differ from one another. The party caucus of the ruling DRP is considerably weaker than the opposition NDP's. The DRP organization, for example, merely functions as a coordinator of members' floor activities and does not participate in the party's decision-making process including legislative strategy. The latter is determined by the Party Affairs

³⁴Quoted in Cho Il-mun, op. cit., p. 353.

³⁵Article 29 of the Political Party Law states in part: "A Political Party shall, in order to maintain democratic internal order, have... a general meeting of Assembly members, if there are Assembly members affiliated with the political party."

Diagram 5. The Organizational Structure of the New Democratic Party



for the Council's Committee / National Assembly. The selection of the floor leadership of the party rests with the party's President and the latter's selection does not even require approval of the party caucus. By contrast, the NDP's party caucus has the right to approve the floor leadership of the National Assembly; it has the right to veto by a two-thirds vote any decisions made by the National Party Convention, the Central Standing Committee or the Political Affairs Council with regard to activities in the National Assembly.

In the ruling parties of the present and the past, the relative strength of the parliamentary party and the extraparliamentary party varied inversely with the personal power of the country's President. During the early years of the Liberal Party regime, the parliamentary party had been subservient to the party organization outside the National Assembly. In the latter years of the Liberal Party regime, however, when President Rhee chose to exercise his power through Yi Ki-bung, the relative position of the parliamentary party increased considerably. Generally speaking, in the case of both the LP and the DRP, where the initial impetus for organization of the party came from outside the National Assembly, the extraparliamentary party originally exercised supremacy over the parliamentary party. The latter's position increased, however, when the regime decided to extend its rule beyond what was prescribed in the Constitution. Since the Assemblymen's votes were unexpendable, the position of the party in the National Assembly was enhanced.

Leadership

The prevalence of factionalism and the organizational fragility of Korean parties have meant the corresponding importance of the role of elites in Korean politics. It is, therefore, necessary to probe into the nature of party leadership in Korea after 1945. When Korea won independence in 1948, there were basically four groups of individuals from which the top leaders of the government and political parties could be recruited.³⁶ The nationalist elite that was based in Shanghai's Korean Provisional Government and other parts of the Chinese continent was one such group. As the main force of the nationalist movement during the Japanese rule, these men had a built-in support after the liberation. As revolutionaries, however, they possessed neither the political know-how nor administrative skills required as leaders of a modern government. Another group was represented by the Western-educated elite that was oriented more to peaceful approaches to nationalism through diplomacy and propaganda. Although there was also a widespread support for this group, they proved to be in the dark about the Korean situation due to their long absence from Korea. Their Western-oriented value system prevented them from having an effective communication with the general populace. The nationalists in Korea at the time of

³⁶See Chin Dŏk-kyu, "Erit Yironeŭihan Kwŏnryŏkkujo"(The Power Structure Based on Elite Theories), Sedae, July, 1971, No. 96, pp. 116-124.

liberation were potentially a powerful group as they had a solid base inside Korea, but they lacked a prominent leader to compete with those of the above two groups. Finally, the former bureaucrats in the Japanese colonial administration were men of good education and possessed the administrative skills needed. However, because of their collaboration with the Japanese, they were clearly unacceptable to fill the leadership positions either in the U.S. Military Government or in the early years of the Republic. Their value as modern administrators and their potential as a political force became manifest when President Rhee carried out a wholesale recruitment of these former bureaucrats in his government in the early 1950's.

In the U.S. Military Government, the second of these groups, the Western-educated elite was the natural choice to advise the Americans due to their natural affinity with the foreign rulers. Their power, however, was gradually eliminated through Rhee's maneuvering against the National Assembly in the years following independence. Their position was replaced by the former bureaucrats. Before the wholesale recruitment of bureaucrats into the party, the Liberal Party leadership at all levels was a rootless and patternless conglomeration of social, regional and associational groups whose sole basis of cohesion lay in the simple spoils of power. The seeds of disintegration were sown in the nature of the party. Having united under Rhee and his power, the leadership of the party disintegrated rapidly when Rhee was overthrown. The recruited bureaucrats

were former officials of both the central and local governments of the Japanese administration, "not so high ranking as to be termed collaborators nor so low as to be excused from any colonial disobedience."³⁷ And as minor functionaries, they carried with them their previous habit and orientations-- "cautious and lacking in initiative in every respect except deference to authority and guardianship against enemies."³⁸

It appears that the men with bureaucratic background had virtually dominated the Liberal Party hierarchy by 1958. Just prior to the fourth National Assembly elections in 1958, eight of the ten top positions of the party were occupied by former bureaucrats. The only non-bureaucratic leaders were President Rhee himself and Yi Ki-bung, who as Speaker of the House, held the Chairmanship of the party's Central Committee.³⁹ In the Third National Assembly (1954-1958), 28.8 percent of the legislators listed their former occupation as being government bureaucrats. The virtual absence of the opposition legislators with bureaucratic background and the small opposition contingent in the National Assembly suggest that the Liberal Party was dominated by former bureaucrats.⁴⁰

The elites of the Democratic Party on the other hand were a union of essentially two large groups. To the "old" Democrats,

³⁷Henderson, op. cit., p. 295.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Hahn-Been Lee, op. cit., p. 92.

⁴⁰The Dong-A Ilbo, December 9, 1970, p. 1.

composed largely of landed aristocrats based in Chōnra Provinces, a group of men from the Northeast P'yōng'an Provinces was added. The alliance of these two groups was effected as a result of the Liberal Party's assault against opposition and its autocratic control. Whereas these men from the Northeast, principally the members of the Hūngsadan(The Young Korea Academy) were a welcome addition in improving the conservative image of the opposition party, the difficulty of integration of these men into the new party was evident from the beginning. As one student of Korean politics has put it, "in religion, in ties with the independence movement, in class, in occupation and sources of wealth, in region of origin, in ties with the United States, they (the "old" Democrats and the men from the Northeast) were widely diverse and even antagonistic."⁴¹ In antagonism to Rhee, in desire

⁴¹Hūngsadan was a culture group, seeking to inculcate the ideals of independence, organized by an independence movement leader An Ch'ang-ho, who, himself a man from the P'yōng'an Province, drew men from that area in its membership. An and Syngman Rhee had complex exile roots of antagonism which was carried over to independence politics, although An died before the liberation. This group, joining the Democrats in 1952, was a natural antagonist to Rhee. See Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 300. The social characteristics of these men from the Northeast are explained by Gregory Henderson as follows: "Their northern background had given them unusual sources of cohesion. They were not used to deserting their region for the capital, since there had been few officials from the province and very few ch'ōnmin. Favorable location along the trade routes to the continent and the stimulus of discrimination within the Yi system had given them ambition, better distribution of wealth, and exceptional stimulus for economic progress, modernization and change... hence for education and Christianity. Missionaries had found in this province one of the single richest opportunities for propaganda anywhere in the world. Through them, the P'yōng'an middle class of the province developed the closest educational ties with the U.S., the greatest entree to democracy and its ideals of any Korean group." *Ibid.*

for a cabinet responsibility system and in certain prejudices in favor of the encouragement of private property and laissez-faire, the old Democrats and the new addition to the party were able to share the same bed.

Table 8. Occupational Backgrounds of the Seventh National Assemblymen.

	DRP(Percent)	NDP(Percent)
Politics	23.3	56.6
Bureaucracy	8.5	8.9
Military	25.6	6.7
Farmer	3.9	-
Commerce	1.5	2.2
Medicine	3.9	2.2
Law	6.2	4.4
Education	9.3	2.2
Mass Media	3.9	8.9
Business	10.8	2.2
Others	3.1	2.2

The present leadership of the major parties may be analyzed by closely scrutinizing the Seventh National Assembly. Table 8 summarizes the occupational backgrounds of the Assemblymen.⁴²

⁴²Cho Il-mun, op. cit., p. 412.

In terms of occupational backgrounds, the Assembly is composed of men who belong to the upper strata of the social pyramid. When these figures are compared with the occupational backgrounds of the Constituent National Assembly which had 43 percent farmers, 7 percent white-collar workers and 0.5 percent labor unionists, one can see that the political profession has become the occupation of the well-to-do. The social profile of the party leadership is shown in the following table (Table 9).⁴³

Table 9. Social Backgrounds of the Seventh National Assemblymen

	DRP Assemblymen (%)	NDP Assemblymen (%)
1. Age		
Above 50	71.2	50
Below 50	28.8	50
2. Place of Birth		
South Korea	93.2	76.7
North Korea	6.8	23.3
3. Characteristics of Election District		
Rural	63.5	13.8
Mixed	22.2	24.8
Urban	14.3	70.5

⁴³U Byŏng-kyu, Yipŏp Kwajŏngron (A Study of Legislative Process) op. cit., pp. 63-80. This study is based on a structured questionnaire distributed to some 110 Assemblymen in the Seventh National Assembly.

As the above table indicates, the social backgrounds of the ruling and the opposition party leaderships in the Assembly show a marked difference. The DRP Assemblymen are younger, overwhelmingly born in South Korea and tend to be elected in rural districts. In political experience, the same study showed, there was a similar difference: the opposition legislators tend to have served more terms in the National Assembly, acquired interest in politics at a considerably younger age, and participated in political party activities at an earlier age.⁴⁴ The attitudinal differences of these two groups of legislators will be discussed in Chapter VI.

The leadership of the major parties are in the hands of men with ages 40 to 59. Recently about 70 percent of the Assemblymen came from this category. Table 10 shows that the average age of the Assemblymen has decreased considerably with each successive National Assembly.⁴⁵ The injection of new blood, i. e., the military men since the coup, is primarily responsible for this change. The Korean party elite is a highly educated group and its educational level has shown a remarkable improvement with each successive regime as the following table indicates (Table 11).⁴⁶

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 68-69.

⁴⁵The Central Election Management Committee, Yŏkdae Kukhoewiwŏn Sŏn'gŏ Sanghwang (The Status of the Past National Assembly Elections), pp. 72, 176, 253-254, 329-330, 451, 628, 752, and 872 (1971 edition).

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 73-74, 177, 254, 330, 452, 622, 752-753, 870-871 (1971 edition).

Table 10. Age Groups in the National Assembly.

Age Group	LP Regime Constituent- 4th National Assembly (%)	DP Regime 5th National Assembly (%)	DRP Regime 6th-8th National Assembly (%)
25 - 39	23.2	18.5	16.8
40 - 49	31.6	40.3	49.6
50 - 59	27.6	26.6	22.6
60 and over	7.8	14.7	10.4

Table 11. Educational Levels of National Assemblymen.

	LP Regime Constituent- 4th Assembly(%)	DP Regime 5th Assembly (%)	DRP Regime 6th - 8th (%)
Study of Chinese classics	2.4	3	--
Elementary school	8.3	7.3	1.1
Some middle school	3.7	4.3	0.2
Middle school	19.1	6	1.3
High school	--	12.4	7.3
Some 2-year college	2.3	--	--
2-year college	14.7	14.6	8.9
Some 4-year college	4.7	10.3	6.9
4-year college	40.4	40.8	58.0
Graduate school	1.5	1.3	15.3

CHAPTER IV GROUPS, VOTERS AND PARTIES

Major Groups in Politics

One of the most remarkable features of Korean politics has been the virtual elimination of middle groups that could cushion off and mediate the extreme and militant struggles between the ruling and opposition parties. The interest groups of associational variety exist on the national and local level but most of them function as support groups for the administration.

The most prominent interest groups in Korean society are what Gabriel Almond and James Coleman describe as "institutional" interest groups, such as the military and the bureaucracy, and "anomic" interest group such as the students.¹ As a sign of political underdevelopment, the weaknesses of the associational interest groups should be probed with respect to their causes and manifestations.

Labor. The suppression of ^{the} labor movement during the Japanese era gave way to the establishment of many labor organizations in the immediate post-war era. That the labor movement at first was captured by the leftist Chōno'yōng (The Korean Conference of Industrial Unions) was a natural consequence of the labor movement being secretly organized and led by socialists and Communists during the Japanese

¹Almond and Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 33-37.

colonial period.² The labor organizations, as one of the very few organized social force in the immediate postwar political chaos, emphasized political struggles rather than economic struggles during the period in which all problems, social ones included, had direct bearing upon the political. Organized in November, 1945, Chŏnp'yŏng played a key role in the brief period of the CFKI's ascendancy.

With the birth of the Taehan Noch'ong (The Korean Federation of Trade Unions-- the KFTU), which came with the blessing of American military authorities in April, 1946, disputes between rival unions took the form of bloody street battles, murder, sabotage, strikes and the ransacking of each other's offices. Finally in March, 1947, the KFTU succeeded in capturing the labor movement with the help of the national police-- the leftist labor organizations were forced to go underground. After the achievement of national independence, the KFTU fell under the control of government-appointees. Rhee's first Minister of Social Affairs, Chŏn Chin-han, was made chairman of the labor organization. From the very beginning, then, the labor organization owed much of its existence to the government, and this tie was to continue through most of the post-1945 era.

²For an excellent history of the Korean labor movement, see Pak Hyŏn-ch'ae, "Haebanghu Hankuk Nodongundongŭi Chŏnkaekwachŏng" (The Development of Labor Union Movement in Post-Liberation Korea), Chisŏng, Vol. 2, No. 5, May, 1972, pp. 37-59.

A student of the Korean labor movement observed the following relationship between the government and labor unions:³

The government has kept a very close watch over union activities. No union could be formed without the advance approval of the government. Nor could trade union meetings be held without giving prior notice to the police, and the police openly attended any union meeting of any significance. Unions were not allowed to issue publications without submitting advance copies to the governmental authorities.

Governmental intervention was sanctioned by the Labor Union Law. Article 32 of the document gave the government the right to "dissolve a labor union" when "it violates the law or acts against the public interest". This provision was recently amended to read that "if it is so deemed by the government that a labor union violates the laws governing labor union operations or if it acts against the public interest, the government may, with the approval of the Labor Committee order the dissolution of that labor union or call for the election of a new slate of officers for that union."⁴ This all-encompassing provision, clearly in violation of Article 29 of the national Constitution,⁵ which ensures independent association by

³Tak Hijun, "Early Trade Unions in Korea, 1919-1950," Korean Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 (February/March, 1962), p. 79.

⁴Quoted in Pak Chong-yŏl, "Hankuk Nodongundongŭi Kibon Sŏngkyŏkkwa kŭ Banghyang," (The Basic Characteristics and Directions of the Korean Labor Movement), Chŏngkyŏng Yŏn'gu, February, 1971, pp. 140-141.

⁵This article states: "Workers shall have the right of independent association, collective bargaining and collective action for the purpose of improving their working conditions." (Para. 1)

workers, has the effect of outlawing any political action by labor unions that are prejudicial to the government.

As of 1968, the KFTU reported that some 68 percent of the total labor force had not been organized into unions.⁶ In the early years of the Liberal Party regime, the KFTU became an affiliated organization of the Liberal Party. Aside from its weakness in number and organization, the labor movement suffers from the crippling effects of factionalism of labor bosses and from governmental manipulation. Labor unions have been operating under various legal and administrative restrictions which have prevented them from making a genuine collective bargaining and collective action. Significantly, the government decided in 1965, not to allow the KFTU to join the International Labor Organization because it felt that it would be impossible to observe and enforce Article 87 of the charter of the ILO, which enumerates laborers' rights and privileges.⁷

In more recent years, the labor group has tried to shed its long dependence on and intervention by the government offices. On December 28, 1969, the KFTU issued a public statement to the effect that the government and the National Assembly had been ignoring the

⁶The Korean Federation of Trade Unions, Nochongŭi Undongkijowa Hwaltongbangch'im (The Basic Policies and Guidelines for the KFTU) (Seoul: The KFTU Headquarters, 1968), p. 55. This appears to be an exaggerated figure. The Economic Planning Board gives a figure of 74.4 percent of the labor force not organized into the KFTU as of 1970. See The Chosŏn Ilbo, October 24, 1971, p. 3.

⁷See K. B. Kim, op. cit., p. 266.

laborers' interests and that it would forthwith initiate strong and autonomous political activities. In October, 1970, the KFTU reaffirmed its stand of a year earlier, and its new leadership established a special Committee on Political Education in March, 1971. Since then the KFTU has been consistently pursuing this basic policy on political participation, but it has not gone beyond this.⁸ Despite these recent attempts at politicization, the prospects of establishing a meaningful tie between labor unions and political parties are slim. The current charter of the KFTU severely limits the political activities of labor unions: no union can engage in an activity to support a party or candidate; no union can levy political funds on its members; no union can use its funds for political purposes.⁹ The rationale behind the severance of political ties between political parties and labor unions is to prevent parties, particularly the Communists, from attempting to manipulate labor unions.

Farmers. Since the farming population still occupies a large proportion of the total population¹⁰ and since the farmers, more than any other group in Korean society, have retained social and cultural identity, they remain as the most powerful potential interest group.

⁸ See The Dong-A Ilbo, December 14, 1970 and April 22, 1971, p. 3.

⁹ Article 12 of the Labor Union Law.

¹⁰ As of 1970, some 45 percent of total population lived in rural areas. About 40 percent of the G. N. P. is derived from the primary industries.

Here again, governmental intervention from the early years of the Republic has made the farmers' organizations semi-governmental institutions. The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation(NACF) is presently the largest farmer organization in Korea, with 10,000 full-time officials and 20,000 local branches spread out to the remotest Korean villages, allegedly serving the interests of some 85 percent of the farmers. From the beginning, this organization has not been a voluntary organization of farmers themselves. All high ranking officials of the NACF have been government appointees; most of the business it discharges are government sponsored and financed.

Since the NACF is a government sponsored and financed, it cannot be expected to function as a true interest group representing the farmers' interest.¹¹ It has rather functioned as an administrator of the policies formulated largely by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Under the Liberal Party government, the majority of local heads of cooperatives were appointed from among local members of the party. Even today, the National Assemblyman has almost an unlimited power of hiring and firing of local NACF branch officers. Many of the important positions of the NACF are occupied by former military men, and about a half of the local branches are headed by

¹¹No Yung-hi, "Nongch'onŭi Apröyktanch'e,"(The Pressure Groups in the Farming Villages), Sedae, March, 1968, pp. 136-141.

village chiefs, who are semi-government bureaucrats. The most powerful agricultural cooperative in the country, therefore, is a government sponsored and administered agency and most of the farmers view it as such, "if not as outright subsidiaries of the ruling party that provide jobs to its local members and deliver farmers' votes to it."¹²

Business. The most numerous and well-organized interest groups in Korea are those of business, industry and commerce. The outright intervention by the government evident in the laborers' and farmers' organizations is not easily visible in these organizations, but they too have been suffering from the lack of independence from the government and the ruling party. The Korean Business Association, composed of big businessmen who virtually control the economy of the country, and the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, composed of twenty-eight local chapters with 120,000 members, are the most active and powerful groups. The employers' group, however, also depend on the graces of government in obtaining bank loans, government-guaranteed foreign loans, government contracts, licenses, and registration. They are eager to please the high ranking government and party officials through supplying of political funds, supporting government positions, and sometimes delivering votes of employees in elections.

¹²K. B. Kim, op. cit., pp. 266-267.

Lack of independence from government evident in all of these groups-- labor, farmer and business- is a consequence of the all-inclusive power that the government possesses in these spheres. Since the government can easily change the status of any of these organizations, they are capable of taking any action that does not meet the government's approval.

Bureaucracy. The obverse of the coin of weak associational interest groups has been the strength of the government bureaucracy. Numerous legislative attempts to neutralize the bureaucracy and the police force have been unsuccessful thus far. What has made the government so powerful in relation to the interest groups is the centralized state structure. Except for a brief period, the constitutionally envisioned local autonomy has not been implemented. The mayors of Seoul and Pusan and all provincial governors are appointed by the President; mayors of other cities and county(kun) chiefs are appointed by the Prime Minister; the national police is under the firm control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The finances of local governments are heavily dependent upon national grants; upward of 85 percent of the county(kun) level budget, for example is dependent upon national subsidies. All of these ties induce the local officials to be loyal to the government and the party in power.

Immediately after the liberation, a corps of lower-level bureaucrats from the colonial administration existed but they were

a politically unacceptable group to be employed by the Korean government. The lack of any replacement group who had experiences in running the government, the exigencies of the war in matters of conscription, taxes and maintenance of civil order required rehiring of a great many of these colonial bureaucrats, their Japanese ties notwithstanding. This way, the colonial legacies of an all powerful bureaucracy were transmitted to post-liberation Korean politics. Another reason for the ascendancy of the bureaucracy was a political one. President Rhee's battles with the National Assembly prompted him to unite the extraparliamentary forces in the creation of the Liberal Party in 1951. Gradually, many former bureaucrats seized leadership positions in the party.

The presence of so many bureaucrats of the Japanese era in the post-liberation government has helped to enhance the latter's authoritarian character. The extensive network of the government bureaucracy has also been abused by the ruling parties for political ends. The civil servants of the government have often degenerated into the servants of the ruling party. The politicization of the bureaucracy in other developing countries has been noted. For the bureaucrats themselves, this politicization is helpful for self-preservation as well as for seeking advancement in the bureaucratic hierarchy.¹³

¹³For a condemnation of the bureaucracy's role as an agent of the ruling party, see Ōm Sang-sŏp, "Minjuchongdangkwa Kongmuwŏn" (Democratic Political Parties and Civil Servants), Sasangge, October, 1954, pp. 105-108.

At any rate, the ties between the ruling party and the government bureaucracy have always been a close one as one writer has remarked:¹⁴

The characteristic trait of Korean civil servants is their strong bond with [the ruling] political party. Self-preservation and the short-cut to higher positions are dependent on the degree of civil servant's cooperation and involvement in politics on behalf of the ruling party, as demonstrated during the past regimes of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party. It has been generally acknowledged by the general public that the degree of cooperation between civil servants and the party is directly in proportion to the degree of the party's success in elections. To the civil servants, election times are the real opportunities for flattering politicians, and this is the only way for them to stay or advance in the hierarchy of the government.

It could be flatly stated that the close collaboration between the government bureaucracy and the ruling party has been one of the major factors conducive to/continuation of the existing party in power. The opposition party has been making an issue of this reality after every election, but such close ties are seen in the nature of the system and the solutions to this problem are well beyond the realm of legislation. Presently, all civil servants, including the nation's school teachers are forbidden to join a political party or campaign in elections, but this does not deter these men from taking part in politics in a more indirect fashion.

¹⁴No Chŏng-hyŏn, "Anatomy of the Korean Bureaucracy and Elections," Sasangge, April, 1966, p. 72, quoted in K. B. Kim, op. cit., pp. 152-153.

The military. Despite the long political tradition in Korea that men on horseback rarely intervened in politics and government¹⁵ the military officers staged a coup in May, 1961 and many of them have stayed on as politicians in a supposedly civilian government. In fact, they have completely dominated the political scene, holding the top positions in government, political parties and society at large.

The military men's influence in the Third Republic is evidenced by the fact that they now hold 24 percent of the ministerial portfolios and 23 percent of the seats in the National Assembly, in addition to the Presidency, the Prime Ministership, the headship of the CIA, the post of the Presidential Chief Secretary, Chairmanship and the Secretary-Generalship of the ruling party. As of December, 1970, men of military background also served as heads of twenty out of fifty-five foreign missions/ ^{and as} heads of eighteen out of thirty-one government cooperations.¹⁶ It is, as a popular saying goes in Korea, kunin sesang, "the age of military men."

The participation of the military in the politics of new states has been variously explained. Morris Janowitz has argued that the military intervention is usually invited by the corruption of the political elites and groups.¹⁷ Arguing similarly, S. F. Finer sees

¹⁵For this tradition and a historian's reaction to it, see Edward W. Wagner, op. cit., p. 27.

¹⁶The Dong-A Ilbo, December 9, 1970, p. 1.

¹⁷Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 89-91.

military intervention as inversely proportional to the strength and effectiveness of political parties, pressure groups and the civilian political institutions.¹⁸ In addition, such possibility increases as the public empathy with the civilian regime is weak. J. J. Johnson has argued that the possibility of military intervention is weakened when there is a widespread active participation by the public in politics.¹⁹ Edwin Lieuwen sees this development as a result of the increase in political terror-- terror which cannot be kept under control by the police.²⁰ Samuel Huntington, on the other hand, sees it as a result of a political decay caused by the imbalance between social mobility and political institutionality. Political decay, to use his terminology, invites military intervention.²¹

Almost all of these hypotheses seem to have applicability in the Korean situation. But the ascendancy of the military in Korea should also be viewed as a consequence of the steady growth and expansion from a small constabulary force of 65,000 men at the time of the outbreak of the war in June, 1950 to a massive organization

¹⁸S. F. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 115.

¹⁹J. J. Johnson, "Latin American Military as a Politically Competing Group in Traditional Society," in J. J. Johnson ed., The Role of Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 127.

²⁰Edwin Lieuwen, "Militarism and Politics in Latin America," in ibid., pp. 132-133.

²¹Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Decay," pp. 386-430.

of 600,000 men at the time of the military coup. During this process of maturation, the Korean army had developed a modern organization modeled after the United States army; it had achieved ideological unity, i. e., anti-Communism; it had gained administrative and technical expertise not only in military matters but also in areas of civilian concern; it had become a fairly cohesive army with esprit de corps.²²

At the time of the military coup, an official publication of the junta government stated the army's role in Korean society as follows:²³

... there is a universal acceptance by the Korean people of these facts: (1) the Armed Forces, hitherto aloof from politics, were the only remaining organizations which retained the respect of the people; (2) the Armed Forces, by virtue of their training in organizational matters, were alone capable of reorganizing the Government into an efficient body...; (3) The Armed Forces were the only force strong enough to eliminate the corrupt and self-serving interests which had brought the country to the verge of disintegration; (4) only the Armed Forces, in the existing emergency, were able to stop increasing Communist infiltration and subversion and the growth of pro-Communism among some irresponsible elements among the people.

Obviously, some of these claims were exaggerated. Even in relative isolation from the society and in possession of the most

²²For a short description of the development of the Korean armed forces, see Hahn-Been Lee, op. cit., pp. 144-152.

²³Ministry of Foreign Affairs(Korea), The Military Revolution in Korea(Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1961), p. 3.

modern organization, the military also was beset with internal dissention at the top. The basis of promotion of generals during the Liberal Party regime was largely political. The military, too, had not been free of corruption as evidenced by the luxurious life the top generals enjoyed.²⁴ The military was a personal instrument of President Rhee. It was an open secret during his regime that the generals played an important part in delivering votes for his party by installing ballot boxes within the compounds of military barracks in violation of the law, and where the opposition was forbidden to campaign and even denied the right to observe the voting.²⁵

Whereas the top ranking officers of the armed forces were well treated by Rhee and the other Liberal Party leaders, there had been growing discontent among the lower and middle grade officers, especially among the colonels. In the absence of continued open hostilities, the Korean military launched an ambitious training program. This enabled many officers to go to the United States on various training programs and also to attend many follow-up educational institutions within Korea. The effects of these educational programs were not immediately felt, but the officer corps was becoming a

²⁴For a discussion of dissention and other ills within the military before the coup, see Paek Nam-ju, Hyokmyŏng Chidoja Pakchŏnghiron (On the Revolutionary Leader Park Chung-Hee) (Seoul: Inmulkesa, 1961).

²⁵See K. B. Kim, op. cit., p. 272.

well-educated, modernizing agents. The colonels participated in the Korean War as junior rank officers, and the end of war terminated their war-time privileges and created hardships among them. The salary scale for military officers was pitifully low. Their promotional ladder was crowded, if not folded, in the post-war period as practically all the top military ranks were filled with very young generals, who were not about to retire to make room for those working under them.

The military coup was staged by those members of the Eighth Graduating Class of the Korea Military Academy whose prospects for promotion looked bleak because of this situation. Among the ninety-four officers who participated in the coup, there were some seventy-two colonels. Significantly, the members of the Eighth Graduating Class contributed some thirty-six men.²⁶ The organization of the ruling Democratic Republican Party, as noted earlier, was also dominated by men of this class.

The figure for the proportion of former men in uniform in the Democratic Republican Party hierarchy is not available, but the occupational background of the 77 founding members, compiled by Lee Chong-sik is suggestive (Table 12).²⁷

²⁶K. B. Kim, op. cit., p. 275. See also Kang In-sŏp, "Yuksa P'alkisaeng," (The Eighth Graduating Class of the Korea Military Academy), Shindongja, pp. 170-198. Sohn Jae-souk basically sees the Korean military coup as the consequence of an internal disorder of the military organization. See Sohn Jae-souk, "The Military in Korean Politics," Report, pp. 464-466

²⁷Lee Chong-sik, "Political Parties in Korea" (Unpublished Memoograph, Philadelphia, April, 1967), pp. 60-61, quoted in K. B. Kim, op. cit., p. 190.

Table 12. Occupational Backgrounds of
the Founding Members of the
Democratic Republican Party

Occupation	Number
Military	20
Education	13
Politics	8
Press	7
Commerce	7
Bureaucracy	7
Legal Profession	4
Banking	2
Medicine	1
Art	1
Total	70

Despite a conscious attempt to recruit men from outside the military, military men dominated the Democratic Republican Party at its inception. In the ruling party as well as in the government, the military's influence seems so great that it is difficult to imagine the present government except in terms of the military.

The students. The students as a group have been an active agent in shaping the course of Korean politics after 1945. The April Uprising in 1960 eventually led to the downfall of ^{the} Rhee Government;

in the Second and Third Republics. The active participation of students in politics in the form of massive rallies and demonstrations made these students the most important anomic interest group and political force that had to be reckoned with by the party in power. The sense of political efficacy acquired by the students continues to play an important role in the process of politics.

Student movements in Korea have always been the vanguard of popular movements in Korea, at least since the colonial period. Exposure to modern education motivated the students to analyze the contemporary political, social and economic ills, and relegated to themselves the role of national conscience and that of the innovator. During the Japanese period, the students served as the main vehicle of the indigenous nationalist movement. In the March 1 Movement in 1919, the June 10 Incident in 1926 and the Kwangju Student Incident in January, 1929, students spearheaded the struggle against the Japanese. It is no wonder that the Japanese authorities discouraged Koreans from receiving higher education. Nationalism appears to be one of the main, if not the main, ingredient of today's student movement in Korea.

Since 1945, the student population has grown at a spectacular rate. At the time of liberation, there were some 8,000 students in seven colleges and universities in the South. After some twenty years, the number of colleges and universities increased to 110 where about 150,000 students are enrolled. Such a tremendous rise

in student population presented a great social problem by the 1960's. Pouring some 30,000 students annually into the labor market which was already flooded, this created a vast enclave of frustrated intellectuals and made the college campuses a hotbed of discontent. In an average year in the 1960's, about two-thirds of the graduating class^{were} not ensured an appropriate employment in society. A hypothesis about the dislocation of the university students and the university trained intellectuals is provided by John Kautsky:²⁸

The key role of the intellectuals in the politics of underdeveloped countries is largely due to their paradoxical position of being a product of modernization has reached or become widespread in their own country. In the universities, the intellectuals absorb the professional knowledge and skills needed by an industrial civilization.... When they return from the universities, whether abroad or not, the intellectuals find, all too often for their taste, that in their societies the newly acquired skills and knowledge are out of place.... During their studies the intellectuals are likely to acquire more than new knowledge. They also absorb the values of an industrial civilization.... On their return, they find that these values, too, are inappropriate for the old society. To the extent, then, that a native intellectual has substituted for the values of their traditional society (with) those of an industrial one-- a process which need by no means be complete in each case-- he becomes an alien, displaced person in his own society. What could be more natural for him than to want to change that society to accord with his new needs and values, in short, to industrialize and modernize it?

In political terms, such dislocation becomes manifest in what

²⁸ John Kautsky, "An Essay on Political Development," in John Kautsky, ed., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: John Wiley, 1962), pp. 46-47.

Edward Shills calls "oppositional mentality."²⁹ The student movements in Korea have a long tradition of rejecting existing values and institutions. First, their target was against the colonial rulers and their suppression. Then, it was against the leftist student organizations in the immediate postwar era. The April Uprising started out as a demonstration against illegal election procedures. Under the Democratic Republican Party regime, it sought repeal of the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty and the status of forces agreement with the United States. It also opposed the proposed constitutional amendment.³⁰ Such inclination to oppose is the logical consequence of the student movement starting as an anti-Japanese nationalist movement. For nationalism to be effective, enemies, real and imagined, had to be created. Their denials of the existing social order and the willingness to fight for its rectification caused the student movement to merge with the opposition party's campaigns against the government in the National Assembly. For whatever degree of effectiveness the opposition party achieved in its struggle against the ruling party, the party out of power had devoted, energetic and sometimes violent colleagues in the street.

²⁹Edward Shills, Political Development in the New States(The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1966), pp. 34-36.

³⁰For a critique of the Korea student movement, see Nam Jae-hi, "Haksaeng Undongkwa Ch'ŏngnyŏn Munhwa"(The Student Movements and Youth Culture), in Nam Jae-hi, ed., Hyŏndae Hankukŭi Wich'iwa Kwaje(The Present Situation and the Tasks of Korea) (Seoul: Hyŏndae Sasangsa, 1970), pp. 283-299.

The ruling party was careful from the beginning not to arouse the students. Gestures of conciliation, public relations, group travel abroad have been used to conciliate and appease the students. In more recent years, however, the governments have relied more on punishment of student demonstrators by arrests, forced induction into the army, expulsion from college, and criminal prosecution under the Anti-Communist Law. The government, in addition, has begun since 1964 to tighten its grip on the student movement by infiltrating the ranks of the students who are watched by agents from the CIA, the police, the Ministry of Education and even the Democratic Republican Party.³¹ This has become a widely known fact. On several occasions, the campuses of vocal universities were raided and occupied by men in uniform in the name of restoring law and order. The government evidently has lost its patience with the students. In President Park's own words, the government was determined "to exterminate the idea of students that they should act for politicians on every issue and decision."³²

Despite the lack of a single cohesive nationwide organization of students in Korea, the students have come to exercise a tremendous influence on the nature of opposition politics in Korea. Although a strong tradition of academic activism is harnessed at the present

³¹The government activities on campus are exposed by Maeil Shinmun(Taegu), September 4, 1964. See K. B. Kim, op. cit., p. 287.

³²Quoted in K. B. Kim, op. cit., p. 288.

time through governmental intervention and suppression, it is definitely too early to predict its eventual doom. The students have a sense of historical responsibility and some would risk their future to challenge authorities for the grave problems they see in society.

The Korean Voter

What and how a voter perceives of his political universe is a good yardstick of the viability of a democratic system. The nature of the picture he carries in his head is affected not only by his status in society but also by his perception of how the political universe in which he is a part affects him. In order to understand this process, one must rely on opinion surveys that measure people's opinions and attitudes about politics. Opinion surveying is rapidly developing in Korea, but also beset with shortcomings in the area of question wording, interviewing and analysis.³³

Views about institutions. In order for the imported system of democracy to take root in Korea, it is important that the Koreans themselves accept the system as the most acceptable and suitable for them. As we have seen earlier, one is hardpressed to trace democratic political tradition in Korea's past. In this milieu, the Koreans

³³Ralph Lewis and Helen M. Crossley deal with the development and shortcomings of opinion surveying in Korea. See their "Opinion Surveying in Korea," The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Summer, 1964), pp. 247-272.

have lived with democracy for nearly three decades. It is in this context that we must ask the question of how Koreans perceive democracy. A recent survey asked the question, "What do you think is the meaning of democracy?" to a national sample and yielded the following results:³⁴

Table 13. Understanding of Democracy by Korean Voters

Responses	% Respondents
Don't know	53
Freedom, civil liberties, respect for the individual	26
Majority rule, representative government	14
Equality	4
Rule of law, constitutionalism	.3
Capitalism, private ownership	.2
Others	5

Although it is extremely difficult to generalize from such an isolated data, it could be said that Koreans have a rather sophisticated view about democracy. The "don't know" responses are most numerous, of

³⁴Yi Yŏng-ho, "Hankukminŭi Chŏngch'ikwan," (The Political Views of Koreans), Shindong'a, March, 1970 quoted in Pak Sung-jae, "Hankuk Minjujuŭiwa Sŏn'gŏ" (Korean Democracy and Elections), Hankuk Chŏngch'i Hakhoebo, Vol. 4(1971), p. 67.

course, but of those who gave responses, most of them seem to have a good understanding of what democracy is.

How the Korean voters view political parties in Korea remains a crucial question which may well determine the development of political parties in Korea. Indications are that, through twenty-five years of party politics, the Korean voters seem to accept the legitimacy of political parties as an essential institution in the Korean political system. In a national survey taken in 1971, 70 percent of the respondents replied that parties are "necessary" whereas only 7.2 percent thought them "unnecessary." ^{Another} 10.3 percent felt, on the other hand, that it mattered to them little whether parties existed or not.³⁵ Among the reasons listed by those who answered affirmatively, the reply that the parties represented the "foundation of democracy" was most numerous (21.8 percent) followed by "integration and management of people's will"(15.9 percent), "formation of a stable political order"(16.5 percent), "prevention of proliferation of independent candidacies"(12.9 percent) and "organization of the opposition forces"(7.3 percent).³⁶ Among those who denied the necessity of political parties, the most frequently given reason was that "it is amenable to political corruption"(24.3 percent). Others felt that the parties "look after their own

³⁵Cho Il-mun and Yun Kyŏng-u, "Hankukinŭn Chŏngdangŭl Ŏttŏke Ponŭnka?"(How Do Korean People View Political Parties?), Sedae, April, 1971, p. 58.

³⁶Ibid., p. 59.

interests without due consideration given for the interests of the nation" and still others gave their reason as "the failure of parties to carry out the platforms and policies."³⁷

The Koreans, moreover, seem to favor a two party system. When asked about the preferable number of parties, a two party system was favored by the majority of the respondents(50.4 percent), followed by three parties(31.6 percent) and four or more parties(8.5 percent).³⁸ In a survey of the rural population made just prior to the 1967 elections, the question of whether the people would consider joining a political party was posed. Only 22.3 percent of the respondents felt that it is "all right" to join; 26.5 percent replied that it is "unnecessary" to join; 12 percent felt that it was better not to join.³⁹ Although the results indicated that the more highly educated respondents showed greater inclination to join political parties if opportunities are offered, the fact that only one-fifth of the respondents showed unreserved willingness to join might be interpreted as a stumbling block to further institutionalization of political parties in Korea. The reason for such unwillingness to participate

³⁷Ibid., p. 60.

³⁸Ibid., p. 59. It is interesting to note that the respondents in the same survey felt that the Political Parties Law which prohibits independent candidacies received the support of the majority of respondents(52.1 percent). See ibid., p. 64.

³⁹Kim Kyu-t'aek, "Sŏn'gŏwa T'up'yohaengt'ae,"(Elections and Voting Behavior), (Seoul, Mimeographed), p. 9.

in the political process as a party member is not difficult to find. Their experiences taught them that it is wise to keep anonymity as far as parties are concerned-- in the violent political struggles in the immediate post-liberation era, at the time immediately after the downfall of the Rhee regime, and in the period after the fall of the Democrats, affiliation with a political party, especially with the ruling party, proved to be an unwise venture for their personal well-being.

Another problem is how political parties affect voting behavior? That is, what criteria, if any, do voters use in simplifying the complex political universe about them and reach their decision on whom to vote for? Table 14 summarizes the responses to the question in a national sample survey, "what criteria do you use when you vote for a certain candidate?": The results of this survey indicate that political parties have not been a major determinant of voting behavior. The voters seem to give more weight to personalities in both presidential and parliamentary elections. This makes it doubly difficult to predict an outcome of elections in Korea, where membership in political parties are not encouraged as has been noted earlier.

Whereas a reasonable percentage of the voters accept the legitimacy of the political parties and many view them as a shortcut to voting decision, the Korean voters still tend to identify

Table 14. Criteria for Voting⁴⁰

	National Assembly Election (%)	Presidential Election (%)
Personality	41.4	42.5
Political Party	13.3	12.6
Campaign Pledges	7.1	6.9
Combination of above three	36.7	36.1
Others	1.5	1.9

parties with the individual. When the party supporters were asked about the basis of such support, the most often given (58.9 percent) answer was the "leading personality in the party." Next came such reasons as: the achievements of the ruling party or the opposition party's history of struggle (13.4 percent); policies and campaign pledges (11.6 percent); the strata the party represents (8 percent); and significantly, "because of having supported the party for a long

⁴⁰ Cho Il-mun and Yun Kyŏng-u, *op. cit.*, p. 61-63. Chŏng Ch'ŏl-su's survey used different categories and yielded the following results:

	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Party	20.1	19.5	14.7	14.6
Personality	52.8	57.7	67.9	63.2
Both of Above	23.6	8.6	16.2	6.7

See Chŏng Ch'ŏl-su, "T'ypyohaengwŏ Nat'an Chŏngch'ikwan," (Political Thinking Reflected in the Voting Act), *Asea*, July/August, 1969, p. 110, Table 10.

time," only 3 percent. When asked about whether one should vote for the same party in presidential and parliamentary elections, more respondents preferred to postpone this judgment until election time because the candidates are important(37.6 percent). Respondents were almost evenly split between those who replied one should vote for the same party(23.5 percent) and those who saw no necessity for such(24 percent).⁴¹

The urban-rural gap. As has been noted in Chapter I, despite the rigid social stratification that existed in traditional Korea, it has disintegrated as a result of rapid social change both before and after 1945. Absence of ethnic, religious, linguistic cleavages in the nation further makes an analysis of the party system along these lines meaningless. What then are the basis of the cleavages that exist in Korean society and how are they translated into party politics?

The answer first of all must be sought in the effects of urbanization in Korea. At least since the third National Assembly election in 1954, the Korean electorate has been divided along the urban-rural continuum in their support of the ruling and opposition parties. That is, the more urban the constituency, the greater the support for the opposition and vice-versa. In the general election of 1958, for example, fourteen opposition candidates were elected

⁴¹The question asked was "when you support or oppose a political party, on what basis do you do this?" Cho Il-mun and Yun Kyŏng-u, op. cit., p. 64.

in Seoul compared with a single candidate for the ruling Liberal Party. In the twenty-six other cities, the Democrats led the Liberals 29 to 12 and in the semi-urban towns(up), the Democrats also ran ahead of the Liberals 63 to 56. In the 98 village constituencies, however, the Liberal Party won one-sidedly by capturing 70 seats to the Democratic Party's meager 16.⁴²

Such urban-rural voter alignment has been visible in all elections after 1954. In the Assembly election of 1971, for example, the NDP candidates won 57 percent of the total vote in large cities, compared with the DRP's 40.6 percent; in the medium sized cities, the DRP garnered 50.8 percent to the NDP's 44.7 percent; in the rural constituencies, the DRP ran 22.8 percent ahead of the NDP.⁴³ Compared with the 1958 voting trend, there is a evidence of the ruling party making a tremendous inroad into the opposition's base of strength, but the urban-rural dichotomy in voter alignment is a reality with which both parties are forced to contend in their election strategy.

The roots of the urban-rural cleavage in the Korean electorate must be viewed from the point of view of differential social development that has occurred since 1945. The sum of the social

⁴²Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, Hankuk Chŏngch'i Ch'eke(The Korean Political System), op. cit., Table 7, p. 73.

⁴³Cho Il-mun, Sae Chŏngdangron(A New Theory on Political Parties), op. cit., p. 426.

changes can be shown by the Population and Housing Census in 1960 (Table 15).⁴⁴

Table 15. Some Social Indicators by Administrative Units

	Average Number of Years of Formal Schooling	Percentage Households with Radio
Cities (Shi)	5.63	31.76
Towns(Ŭp)	3.86	15.87
Villages(Myŏn)	2.71	7.73
National Average	3.66	15.50

The urban-rural gap is also manifested in terms of the levels of political information, political involvement and political opinionation. The following three tables are compiled by Yong Ho Lee based on his national survey taken in 1965 (Table 16, 17, 18).⁴⁵

⁴⁴Yong Ho Lee, "Toward a Comparative Theory of Voting Participation," (Publication Draft, Mimeographed, 1970), p. 17.

⁴⁵Yong Ho Lee, The Korean Political Culture Survey, quoted in ibid., pp. 14-15. For persons thirteen years and older, some 28 percent of the Korean population was illiterate in 1960. When the illiterate was further divided into urban and rural areas, the figure comes out to 17 percent and 32 percent respectively. See the NACF, Agricultural Yearbook, 1965 (Seoul: Headquarters, the National Farmers Cooperative Federation, 1965), p. 253.

Table 16. The Levels of Political Information

	Urban Respondents (%)	Rural Respondents (%)
Could name one or more political parties	77.0	59.0
Could name one or more political leaders	59.0	48.5
Could name one or more government ministries	61.0	42.1

Table 17. The Levels of Political Involvement(%)

	Urban Respondents (%)	Rural Respondents (%)
Donated money	1.0	0.3
Influenced national government	5.9	1.0
Influenced local government	17.3	7.6
Attentive to campaigns	26.2	12.4

Table 18. The Levels of Political
Opinionation(%)

	Urban Respondents (%)	Rural Respondents (%)
Have partisan preference	30.9	19.4
Have opinion on the DRP performance	47.9	41.3
Have opinion on pro- portional representation	30.1	14.2

The media through which the voters obtain their information also markedly differ in urban and rural areas. In a survey made in Seoul and small villages in Kyōngsang provinces in 1969,⁴⁶ some 84 percent of the respondents in Seoul replied that they had obtained their information on the election campaigns through various mass media such as newspapers(61.2 percent), radio(14 percent), movies and television(5.3 percent), and pamphlets and magazines(4.2 percent). Less than one percent of the same respondents replied that they obtained their information through members of his family or relatives. In the rural villages, however, there is a marked lessened impact of mass media. Twenty-nine percent of the rural respondents obtained their information from mass media-- newspapers(10.7 percent), radio (17.6 percent), movies and television(0.8 percent). The importance

⁴⁶ Chōng Ch'ōl-su, op. cit., p. 110, Table 10.

of the family ties in the rural area is demonstrated when 26.9 percent of the respondents replied that they gathered their information about the electoral campaign from members of his family or relatives.

Another interesting statistic is the role of party campaign workers in disseminating political information. In the urban areas, 24.8 percent relied on the campaign workers to obtain information on the campaign.⁴⁷

The urban-rural cleavage seems to be expressed also in terms of the sense of political efficacy. The same survey indicated that 51 percent of the urban and 50 percent of the rural voters share the view that the voting act is the people's duty. However, whereas a significant proportion (40.5 percent) of the urban respondents replied that they voted "in order to reflect my will in the national policies," only 24.4 percent of the rural voters replied in the same category. Some of the other inducements listed by the voters were "encouragement of others or because of personal ties," (6.5 percent) and "because others do" (14.5 percent).⁴⁸

If the urban and rural voters differ markedly in terms of socio-economic variables and political awareness, how are they manifested

⁴⁷ The newspaper as the most important source of political information establishes that medium "as a determining factor in voting behavior in Korean elections," as another study concluded. See "Hankuk Ch'ongsŏn'gŏe Itsŏsŏ Mascomŭi Hyŏkwa Ch'ukjŏng," (The Measurement of Mass Communication in General Elections) (Research Institute on Newspapers and Broadcasting, Chung'ang University, Seoul), summarized in The Dong-A Ilbo, April 1, 1971, Special Edition, p. 3.

⁴⁸ Chŏng Ch'ŏl-su, op. cit., p. 105, Table 4.

in terms of their voting behavior? One curious and significant manifestation is the fact that the voter turn-out and the size of community have shown inverse relationship as the following table indicates(Table 19).⁴⁹

Table 19. Voter Participation in National Assembly Elections by Size of Community

	1958 (%)	1960 (%)
Seoul	80.4	75.4
Cities electing two or more Assemblymen	85.9	78.3
Cities electing one Assemblyman	88.4	84.6
Towns(ŭp)	90.7	83.4
Townships(myŏn)	93.3	87.1

One is hard put to explain such inverse relationship between voter turn-out and the community size in view of the fact that in developed countries of the West, voters with high socio-economic status tend to have a higher rate of participation in elections than those with low socio-economic status. In Korea, the answer must be sought in the nature of rural life and in the fact that the rural

⁴⁹CEMC, Yŏkdae Kukhoewiwŏn Sŏn'gŏ Sanghwang(1968) (The National Assembly Elections), pp. 357-439 and 279-324.

voters can be more easily manipulated with meager material inducements. In the relative state of poverty, the farmers have relied heavily on the administration and its agents such as the Farmers' Cooperatives for distribution of fertilizers and other farming related goods. Their livelihood having been dependent upon the graces of the administration, the farmers have been much more vulnerable than the urban voters to administration's demands for compliance. Lack of mass communication facilities and the relatively widespread illiteracy in the farming areas means that what they hear about the outside world is severely limited.⁵⁰ Through the speaker systems which pipe out the programs of the national broadcasting system run by the government, and through the mouth-to-mouth dissemination of information, the rural voters are a great deal easier to be manipulated and made to comply than the urbanites who are able to obtain information more extensively and intensively.

As far as the urban voters are concerned, the lower rate of participation can be viewed from two aspects. First, it may be hypothesized that they shy away from the polls as a result of alienation from the arena of politics. The pro-opposition proclivities of the urbanites have already been mentioned, and it may be stated that they have not been awarded any "pay-back" for this perennial

⁵⁰ The newspapers, for example, are heavily concentrated in Seoul and large cities. As of 1967, there were some 43 daily newspapers in Seoul, out of which 20 were published in Seoul. See Kim Un-t'ae, "Mascomkwa Hyŏndae Chŏngch'i" (Mass Communication and Modern Politics), Chŏngkyŏng Yŏn'gu, April, 1969, p. 96.

voting pattern, resulting in a kind of resignation that the voting act brings no substantial change to their lives. Second, unlike the rural voters who can be easily manipulated and mobilized to come to the polls, the possibility that the same might occur appears to be slim with the urban counterparts. The combination of these two factors-- political alienation and the unlikelihood of manipulation and mobilization-- seems to contribute to the low voting participation in urban areas.⁵¹

The consequence of the urban-rural gap is expressed not only in terms of voter participation in elections or the direction of vote, but also in other areas as well, as Table 20 suggests.⁵² What Gregory Henderson has said about the Korean rural voters appears to have a grain of truth:⁵³

Voting to a villager was little more than the chance to reward a national or local worthy with a personal avenue to power. Except for national

⁵¹A Similar argument is made by Yi Yŏng-ho, "Sŏn'gŏ Sowe kamsŏke Chŏngch'iũisik," (Political Awareness Midst Electoral Alienation), *Chung'ang*, May, 1971, pp. 90-91. Looking at the rate of voter participation nation-wide, the following table summarizes its trend:

National Assembly Elections		Presidential Elections	
Year	Turn-out(%)	Year	Turn-out(%)
1948	95.2	1952	88.0
1952	86.0	1956	94.4
1954	91.1	1960	95.0
1958	90.6	1963	85.0
1960	84.4	1967	83.6
1963	85.0		
1967	76.1		

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁵³Gregory Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-255.

questions like agricultural prices and the need for expanded irrigation, localized interests rarely exerted influence on the daily work of the Assembly or served as basis for groupings parties, programs or legislative compromise. Once elections were over, communication between assemblymen and their districts tended to cease except for the performance of personal favors involving the bureaucracy....

Table 20. Forms of Political Participation
Among Urban and Rural Voters

	Nation(%)	Urban(%)	Rural(%)
Contributed funds to parties or candidates	0.5	1.0	0.3
Try to change things they were doing in the National Assembly	2.5	5.9	1.0
Participated in party activities or campaigns	4.0	6.9	2.7
Membership in a political party	4.4	3.7	4.6
Try to change what they were doing in local government	10.5	17.3	7.6
Watch campaigns with considerable interest	16.6	26.2	12.4
Discuss politics with others	17.4	31.9	11.0
Read magazines	23.0	34.1	18.1
Read newspapers	26.0	51.9	16.0
Listen to radio	50.2	66.9	42.8

ran in all three elections was a kind of "regional" candidate in this context since he was identified with his native province, North Kyöngsang Province. This fact, combined with the opposition's traditional strength in the Honam areas(North and South Chōnra Provinces), might spell a modified "friends and neighbors" effect on voting behavior. The roots of the problem seem to go deeper, however.

The problem of the regional gap has not grown acute until in recent years. The industrialization program started in earnest since the adoption of a series of Five Year Economic Plans in the Third Republic. The Honam area, heavily dependent upon agriculture, did not lag behind other areas of Korea at the time when the nation's economic base still lay in agriculture. The regional gap emerged as a political issue when the Honam area began to lag behind in regional development and in government investment. This effect was popularly known as the "maltreatment of Honam areas" by the government, not only in matters of economic resources but also in the recruitment policy of the government. Of the ten provinces in Korea in 1960, the North and South Chōnra Provinces ranked sixth and tenth respectively in per capita income. In 1966, of the eleven, the same provinces ranked tenth and eleventh in the same category.⁵⁵

Compared with a heavy government investment in oil refineries, textile and steel industries, and construction of the nation's

⁵⁵These figures are quoted in U Byōng-kyu, Yipōp Kwajōngron (A Study of Legislative Process) (Seoul: Iljokak, 1970), p. 422.

longest super highways through the Yŏngnam areas, the DRP government created the impression that it was favoring that region. Anyone traveling through both of these regions is left with an impression that there has been a lopsided^{de} development in favor of the Yŏngnam areas, and this fact made the DRP government vulnerable to the charge that the Honam areas are indeed being discriminated against. Regardless of whether such charges are true, the government has failed to bring home to the people of the Honam areas that their regions are economically unfeasible or unsuitable to bring in industries.⁵⁶ At any rate, these factors tend to reinforce the traditional prejudice complex of the people of the Honam areas. Thus the elimination of regional cleavages remains one of the most important tasks of Korean politics.

⁵⁶Yi Yŏng-il, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

CHAPTER V THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: A CASE STUDY OF
THE 1971 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

The extent and the mode of competition in election campaigns is an important yardstick in measuring the meaningfulness of any democracy. As Joseph Schumpeter put it, the "democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."¹

The major objective of a campaign is to marshall the resources available to candidates and parties and to convert them into votes. How well a candidate converts these resources will determine whether he will become a decision-maker in government. In trying to convert these resources, candidates to some extent work with the political circumstances or environments which are "given", and to some extent with uncertain circumstances which he tries to make predictable and marshall to his favor. The resources a candidate possesses and the ways in which he develops strategies to convert these resources differ from one candidate to another.

For conceptual purposes, one can consider the reasonably predictable elements of an election campaign and the campaign activities by parties and candidates separately. The first we shall call the "strategic environment," to use Polsby and Wildavsky's

¹Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1942), p. 269.

words.² By strategic environment, we mean the following: those aspects of attitudes and habits and behavior of Korean voters which have become known to us through various, though somewhat disjointed, opinion surveys conducted by various persons and institutions; interest groups, both associational and institutional and their loyalties, and other voting blocs; political parties, their organizational and numerical strength, and their ideological and policy commitments; the distribution of campaign funds, the control of information and the control of government.

Other participants in the campaign are, of course, the candidates themselves who are selected by the political parties. The process of their selection, the personalities and images they project are one of those uncertainties which are superimposed on the strategic environment. Finally, the campaign activities themselves affect the eventual outcome of an election. The campaign might then be seen as specific steps and activities taken by candidates and other participants in order to convert all available resources into votes.

The Strategic Environment

Voters. According to the Central Election Management Committee, the number of eligible voters for the 1971 elections totaled 15,178,181.³ Representing a 9.3 percent increase in voting population

²Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Presidential Elections (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1964), p. 5.

³The Dong-A Ilbo, February 23, 1971, p. 1.

over four years ago, some three million young voters were enfranchized as a result of their reaching the voting age of twenty. Of the total, some 31.7 percent were voters who were below thirty years of age.

The Korean voters in general show a remarkable interest in the elections. It now appears that the Korean voters regard the electoral process as one of the vital institutional arrangements of democracy. One recent survey eloquently shows the degree to which the Korean voters are interested in elections (Table 21).⁴

As has been discussed in Chapter IV, the most significant behavior pattern of the Korean voters is the degree to which the urban and the rural voters differ not only in the direction of the vote, but also in the mode and intensity of political participation, the sources of political information and the level of political

Table 21. The Level of Voter Interest in Elections

	Urban Voters (%)	Rural Voters (%)
Very Interested	34.0	26.2
Fairly Interested	54.4	45.7
Not Interested	11.6	28.1

⁴Chong Ch'ŏl-su, *op. cit.*, p. 110, Table 15.

awareness. The issues of regionalism are also a volatile issue in view of the historical and emotional cleavages between the southeastern and the southwestern provinces. And the probability of the deep-rooted antagonism to emerge into the open would be increased if the major presidential candidates came from these areas, as was the case in the 1971 presidential election. Candidate Park Chung Hee, with his southeastern roots, was pitted against Kim Dae-jung who came from the South Chŏnra Province and who represented the city of Mokpo, a southwestern port, in the National Assembly. These urban-rural and regional gaps are a fact of political life with which the candidates and their parties are forced to deal. This meant, among other things, that they have to develop strategies separately for each of these regional pockets at a considerable risk of backlashing in other areas.

Interest groups and voting blocs. It has been noted earlier that the conditions conducive to active and open participation in politics by Korean associational interest groups such as farmer, labor and business have not been present in the Korean context. Monolithic control of such social organizations by the government, often with elaborate legal prescriptions, has been largely responsible for this situation. There have been signs of restlessness on the part of these groups-- especially that of labor, but it did not lead to anti-government action in the 1971 presidential election.

Where farmer, labor and business associations remained silent throughout the campaign, anomic participation of the urban intellectuals

and students occurred. The National Consultative Conference to Safeguard Democracy was organized in March and officially began its activities on the day of the eleventh anniversary of the April 19 Student Uprising. Comprised of some sixty prominent intellectuals from the universities, the mass media, and religious, legal and literary circles, it issued a statement on April 19, encouraging the voters to play a meaningful role in the "revival of democracy." In particular, the statement stated: "we appeal to the people to shun all temptations, resist all pressures and exercise people's sovereign rights solemnly."⁵ The Conference also criticized the government's "cruel oppression" of the students, who were demonstrating against military training on campus. Although not stated in so many words, it was clear to anyone that it was a hasty gathering of pro-opposition groups in the latter half of the presidential campaign. It acted as the command post for various student organizations which participated in the final stages of the campaign as "election supervisors" in an attempt to oversee the fairness of the balloting and ballot counting throughout the country. In addition to the several hastily drawn organizations on various university campuses, the Student League for Safeguarding Democracy recruited some 1,300 students from 13 universities who volunteered to serve as election supervisors. These student groups made themselves available to both parties through

⁵Quoted in The Dong-A Ilbo, April 19, 1971, p. 1.

the Consultative Conference as election supervisors after the Ministry of Education had ruled that such activity did not constitute student participation in politics as prohibited by law.⁶

The press, especially the prestigious newspapers, has had a long tradition of being critical of government since independence. It was an important ally of the opposition along with the urban intellectuals and the students since the Rhee regime. That the editors and reporters of The Dong-A Ilbo, the Seoul daily newspaper with the widest circulation, found it necessary to adopt a Declaration of the Freedom of the Press during both elections indicated that the government had been putting pressure to bear on the press. The tone of the declaration expressed urgency and disgust.⁷

At the forefront of the freedom of the press, we are in sad realization of the fact that the crisis in the press has reached the limit, and we proclaim that the freedom of the press which is the foundation of democracy should not be assaulted by anyone.

The movement by The Dong-A Ilbo newspapermen spread to the Korean Newspapermen's Association whose 3,000 members adopted a resolution on the freedom of the press in April.

The government-owned radio and television networks have played a significant role in supporting the ruling party. The pro-ruling party broadcasting ranged from showing repeatedly on television screens one of the campaign catchphrases of the DRP "Progress without

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

Interruption" to tailoring the contents of the most popular programs to favor the ruling party. These prejudicial treatment of the contesting candidates and parties was visible to even a fairly unsophisticated eye and it was carried out in clear violation of the code of broadcasting ethic.⁸

The government bureaucracy. The role of the government bureaucracy becomes a vital one for the incumbent party whenever an election approaches. In the past, civil service personnel, high and low, openly participated in the campaign for the ruling party, but recently the participation of government officials occurred in a highly sophisticated manner. During the campaign under discussion, one newspaper reported, an extraordinary number of vacations for high and low government officials alike was allowed. The heads of government ministries and corporations often visited their native places under various pretexts. Both of these tactics, this newspaper report complained, were used to propagandize the achievements of the incumbent government.⁹ It was also during the electoral campaigns that an extraordinary number of opening ceremonies for the building of bridges, roads, schools and factories took place. Always present at such a ceremony were the DRP provincial party chairman and the Assemblyman from the district. These strategies were used to impress the people to the fact that the projects under construction would have been impossible without the

⁸The Dong-A Ilbo, April 30, 1971, p. 5.

⁹Ibid., April 16, 1971, p. 3.

support of the incumbent party and its candidates. In addition to this "indirect display of influence," various new promotional associations and neighborhood groups were created, some defunct associations were revived, and the existing ones strengthened in order to revitalize the web of personal relationships leading to the support of the incumbent party. At their frequent meetings, the achievements of the incumbent government were praised, government-produced films were shown and voters were invited to make "study trips" at the expense of the campaign organizations. It was known to everyone, the remotest villager included, that the local government took extraordinary measures to please the local people.¹⁰ Popularly known as the "benevolent administration," the government at the grassroots exhibits unusual sensitiveness to the residents' needs and activities during the campaign.¹¹

Political parties. In terms of organizational strength, a comparison of the two major parties may be analogous to Gulliver and his midgits. Throughout the campaign the performance of the two party organizations showed a painfully striking difference--it was, in effect, one between a well-oiled organizational machine against an individual.¹²

¹⁰Ibid., April 17, 1971, p. 3.

¹¹For a condemnation of the "benevolent administration," see The Chosŏn Ilbo, March 26, 1971, p. 2.

¹²This section is based on personal observation of the campaign by the author and his reading of newspapers, journals and booklets published at the time of the election. See also Cho Nam-cho and Hŏ Jun, "Taet'ongnyŏng Sŏn'gŏ Yangdang Punjŏnki," (The Presidential Election Campaigns of the Two Major Parties), Sedae, June, 1971, pp. 128-145.

The separation of the post of the party leader and the presidential nominee in the opposition NDP seemed to have created disharmony at various points, not to mention the effort to bring together those party leaders-- especially the mainstream leaders grouped under party leader Yu Chin-san. Outward unity was achieved, but later developments proved that it was a false unity.¹³ It was charged both within and outside the party that the party head Yu Chin-san and other factional leaders have waged a half-hearted campaign for the presidential election. Still complicating the picture was the choice of Chŏng Il-hyŏng as the chief of the NDP's

¹³The strains of the factional rivalry leading to the presidential election finally exploded when Yi Jae-hyŏng, once the Vice Chairman of the NDP, announced his withdrawal from the party on February 8, 1971. He explained his reasons as follows: "I reached this painful decision because I came to the sad conclusion that the party has neither the will nor the ability nor the qualification to effect a change of government. Instead of fighting to overthrow the corrupt regime of the ruling Democratic Republican Party, the NDP members are busy satisfying their parasitic appetite in futhering their personal ambitions for the party leadership or a seat in the National Assembly while offering only lip service of opposition to deceive the people and history." The severity of Yi's condemnation was unprecedented whether inside the party or out. He continues to attack the party in the following manner: "The lower echelon members of the party are becoming poorer and poorer while most of its leaders are becoming richer and richer. The party posts, high and low, can be purchased with money or by promises of votes and other favors. The door is wide open to 'yes' men while honest, responsible members are kicked out. It makes me mad to watch the leaders exhorting the front members to wage war against the DRP while behind the scene they are preoccupied with how the leftovers of the battle can best be seized. I have been aware of the chronic illness of the NDP which even the best doctor in the world cannot cure." Emphasis his. Quoted in The Korea Herald, February 10, 1971, p. 3.

Election Headquarters. Chŏng's support of Kim Dae-jung's presidential candidacy at the nominating convention was critical in swaying the convention to support the darkhorse candidate. Under the circumstances where three different factional leaders, Yu, Chŏng and Kim, sought the control of the campaign, one can easily see the roots of discord in the grand task to wrest the power away from the incumbents.

At the election district level, the NDP claimed a membership of 500,000 but it is said that the actual members who could be counted on to help out ⁱⁿ the campaign was about half that number. In many of the district party chapters, even a party office could not be funded. The party relied almost entirely on personal contacts-- the district party head and his subordinates made contacts through blood and school ties.

As such the NDP faced a formidable foe in the DRP and its extensive organization right down to the neighborhood level. In addition to the personal contacts the district chapter president (in many cases, the Assemblyman from the district) had, the party could boast a general membership of 1,350,000, which constituted about 9 percent of the total electorate. The party Secretariat extended its arm through various administrative levels and to the natural villages on the town(ŭp) and township(myŏn) levels, in the form of 3,083 Supervisors(kwanrijang). And 15,109 Vice Supervisors were given the task of overseeing the activities of youth and women at the corresponding levels. There were 60,180 Leaders(jidojang) at

the village(li) or block(tong) level. At the natural village level, there were more than 180,000 male and female functionaries (hwaldongjang). This hierarchy of party officials was under the firm control of the party chairman, and his hold on the party personnel was all the more stronger if he happened to be the National Assemblyman from that district.

Whereas the NDP trained some 500 party officials down to the level of the district party Vice Chairmen and organization and propaganda chiefs for only a few days before the campaign started, since its inception in 1965, the DRP's impressive training center in Seoul had enrolled some 40,000 functionaries who were coached in party activities for two weeks. At the center Candidate Park had a firm control of the party as its President. The Campaign Headquarters was headed by Paek Nam-ok who coordinated the activities of various parts of the party organization and its day-to-day functions were under the direction of Kil Jae-ho, the party's Secretary-General, who headed the campaign office. The newspapers in Seoul likened the campaign office of the incumbent party to a battle operation room full of maps, charts and telephones.

Distribution of campaign funds. According to the law on campaign funds promulgated in February, 1965 and amended in January, 1969, any person or group can make contributions to the Central Election Management Committee which in turn distributes 60 percent of the

money thus raised to the majority party and the rest to other parties in proportion to the percentage of seats in the National Assembly. Since the law was promulgated, the CEMC¹⁴ is reported to have received contributions amounting to 263,000,000 won.¹⁴ This is a meager amount compared with the actual amount spent by presidential and Assembly candidates in a single election year. In the 1967 presidential election, for example, the CEMC set a limit of 270,000,000 won as a sum each presidential candidate and his party could spend for electioneering purposes.¹⁵ It was estimated by observers both within and outside the party that the legal limit set by the CEMC was several times short of the actual sum spent in that election, particularly by the ruling party.

That the opposition party was beset with financial problems was made evident when candidate Kim of the NDP remarked that if his party could afford to spend one-fifth of what the DRP did, he would handily win the election. The party has had a perennial record of publicly appealing for campaign funds and the 1971 election was no exception. The pre-campaign plan for raising funds called for both compulsory and voluntary donations from party members and the general public. The party leaders were subject to compulsory donation ranging from 100,000 won to 10,000,000 won. Besides these official

¹⁴The Dong-A Ilbo, March 19, 1971, p. 3. At the current exchange rate(1972), this amount is equivalent to US \$ 657,500.

¹⁵The limit set by the CEMC for the 1971 election was 962,000,000 won(US \$ 2,155,000).

contributions of the party leaders and members, party representative Yu Chin-san and the presidential candidate-to-be were charged with the responsibility of making up the shortage of funds. At any rate, several leaders of the NDP Campaign Headquarters visited the Korean Business Association on March 18 to request that powerful group to contribute funds to the CEMC.¹⁶ On the other hand, the incumbent party appeared to have no problem raising campaign funds. It was reported that the party was able to distribute some three to four million won to each National Assembly constituency by the beginning of April.¹⁷ While the actual sums spent by the ruling party and the NDP remained a secret, it has been speculated that the NDP spent some 560,000,000 to DRP's 5,000,000 won.¹⁸

Selecting Candidates

On March 17, 1971, the Democratic Republican Party, at its fifth National Party Convention, made official the long expected nomination of President Park Chung Hee as its presidential candidate and adopted a 56-point election pledge. By that time, the party was able to patch up the old wounds in the party-- especially that of the maincurrent party dissidents who had supported Kim Jong-p'il to become the party's nominee, although they never challenged Park's

¹⁶The Dong-A Ilbo, March 19, 1971, p. 3.

¹⁷The Korea Times, April 11, 1971, p. 2.

¹⁸See Cho Nam-cho and Hŏ Jun, op. cit., p. 140.

leadership openly. The ostensible unity of the party was achieved, however, when Kim came out in support of the constitutional amendment in 1969 and then appointed "Advisor" to President Park along with Chŏng Il-kwŏn and Yun Ch'i-yŏng shortly thereafter. At the nominating convention, Kim became the party's Vice President, a step which necessitated an amendment to the party charter.

Through eight years as President and two additional years as Chairman of the SCMR, the DRP's nominee had been preoccupied with bringing about modernization of the country. This iron-willed determination was well expressed in his inaugural speech in 1967 when he stated that his "life-long dream has been to drive out poverty..."¹⁹ Park's modernization program has resulted in a near ten percent increase in gross national product every year during his tenure as President. Although his policies were often criticized as being too drastic at times, he was above criticism as far as his honesty and integrity were concerned. His preoccupation with modernization was accompanied by his determination to provide political stability and strong leadership. As head of the party and the administration, he was in a strong position to enforce discipline in the party.

Born and raised in a poor family of military background, he became a professional soldier early in his youth having graduated

¹⁹Quoted in The Dong-A Ilbo, March 24, 1971, p. 4.

from the Manchurian Military Academy and Japanese Military Academy before the liberation and from the Korea Military Academy after independence. Having participated in the Korean War as a middle rank officer, his rise in the military was less than spectacular. He was reputed to be an extremely competent soldier who refused to compromise with political power. At the time of the military coup which he headed, he was second in command of the Second Army. After he became the sixth President of Korea, he seemingly stood above politics: he projected a father image and that of a common man with an empathy for poor farmers and their problems. He often stated that poverty to which he had been subjected as a youth and as a young officer has been both his "teacher" and "benefactor." Despite the widespread identification of the DRP as a party of military men and big businessmen, he was credibly presented as a champion of the common man.

The party that nominated Park elevated him to the status of the creator of a "new Korea," whose people have rightfully begun to have courage, pride and hope for the first time in her long history. As a military expert, he seemed best suited to lead South Korea in the face of ^a military threat from North Korea. He had been a leader with a vision on the unification of the country. He had also been an administrator par excellence who had responded to his own call of modernization forcefully.²⁰

²⁰For the DRP appraisal of its own nominee, see the statement written by the party's Secretary General, Kil Jae-ho in The Chosŏn Ilbo, March 30, 1971, p. 3.

While the ruling party presented the electorate with an image of a unified party, the opposition NDP faced a series of crises prior to the nomination of its presidential candidate. Soon after the party had suffered a one-sided defeat at the polls on a constitutional amendment on October 17, 1969, the race for the next presidential nomination began. On November 8, the NDP Whip in the National Assembly, Kim Yŏng-sam, declared his intention to enter the race for presidential nomination. In doing so, he also advanced a theory that the only way to improve the party's fortune was to entrust the party leadership to the younger elements of the party and that a man in his forties should be chosen as the party's presidential candidate in the forthcoming election. This idea received widespread support among the younger factional leaders of the party such as Yi Ch'ŏl-sŭng and the eventual winner, Kim Dae-jung.

In the plenary national convention held on January 26, 1970, Yu Chin-san was selected as the head of the Party on the second ballot defeating Chŏng Il-hyŏng and Yi Jae-hyŏng for that post. Political Affairs Council members were to be chosen by consultation among those three who vied for the top leadership of the party. The council structure of the NDP was again assured when the chairmanship of the National Party Convention which had the crucial responsibility of nominating the party's presidential candidate went to a non-maincurrent member, Kim Hong-il, who won over Yu Chin-san's choice.

Yu, while opposing the theory that a man in his forties should be chosen as the party's presidential candidate, declared his non-candidacy on March 10, 1971. He insisted that the three presidential hopefuls, Kim Yŏng-sam, Yi Ch'ŏl-sŭng and Kim Dae-jung should work out a compromise plan which would determine the party nominee and that should these three men fail to agree on a nominee, he should be empowered to make that decision himself. The three youthful presidential hopefuls resisted such^a proposal and vowed to make a fair competition for winning the party's endorsement.

Yu reversed his decision on September 21 when he declared a "conditional" candidacy, stating in effect that he would not "refuse the party's nomination should that be the party's decision." He added, however, that he would withdraw his candidacy if the three youthful candidates could unite behind a single candidate before September 24-- a possibility which Yu apparently discounted. The three candidates persisted in vowing to support the winner at the National Convention. Yu again reversed his stand on the eve of the nominating convention when he announced that he would support Kim Yŏng-sam's candidacy.

When the nominating convention convened on September 29, the race was narrowed down to Kim Yŏng-sam and Kim Dae-jung. The former, having received the avowed support of the maincurrent members and their delegates and of the faction led by Yi Ch'ŏl-sŭng, was a heavy

favorite. Kim Dae-jung could count on the support of Chŏng Il-hyŏng and his followers and appeared to have the support of the rank-and-file delegates to the convention. When the votes were counted, however, Kim Dae-jung emerged a surprise victor.²¹

Kim Dae-jung entered the presidential election as a far less well known personality than his foe, Park Chung Hee. He nevertheless represented the cream of the young intellectuals in the party of old politicians: in this respect, he brought with him a "new image" of the party. Although he had a far less impressive credential than Park, he entered the thick of politics long before Park shed his military uniform, as he often emphasized during the campaign. As a non-maincurrent leader of the party he had ably served as a chief of the opposition party's propaganda section.

The NDP nominee entered into politics early in his youth by participating in student movements after the liberation. After repeated failure in the National Assembly elections, he was finally elected to that body from a rural Kangwŏn Province in 1961. During his term in the sixth and seventh National Assemblies, he earned a reputation as a fine oratorical speaker and an economic theoretician. What he called daejung kyŏngje, or "an economy for the masses," was adopted as the official economic tenet of his party before he won

²¹On the first ballot, Kim Yŏng-sam gained 421 votes to Kim Dae-jung's 382, with 86 invalid votes. With no one winning the majority of vote, Kim Dae-jung edged out Kim Yŏng-sam on the second ballot.

the presidential nomination. As a political figure not well known at the grassroots, he made a conscious effort to project an image as the defender of ordinary citizens from the arbitrary exercise of administrative power while strengthening his ties with the urban intellectuals and students with whom he had a great deal in common. The NDP praised him for his unwavering belief in democracy, and ^{him} described/as an economic theoretician of a high order and a statesman with a will to act.²²

In addition to the candidates of the two major parties, five more parties put up their presidential candidates: Pak Ki-ch'ul of the Democratic Nationalist Party(DNP), Sŏng Po-kyŏng of the Mass Party, Yi Chong-yun of the Liberal Democratic Party, Chin Fok-ki of the Justice Party and Kim Ch'ŏl of the Unified Socialist Party. Of these, Kim Ch'ŏl of the Unified Socialist Party made it clear from the beginning that he offered himself as a candidate not to win the election but to make the public conscious of the party's platform during the election. Of the five minor parties, the DNP, headed by Yun Po-sŏn, who opposed President Park in 1963 and 1967 presidential elections, was the most serious challenger, but the party's failure to come up with a strong candidate sealed any hope

²²For profiles of Kim Dae-jung, see The Dong-A Ilbo, April 24, 1971, p. 5 and The Chosŏn Ilbo, March 30, 1971, p. 3.

of drawing a sizable vote.²³ On the eve of the election day, two candidates of minor parties withdrew their candidacy in the name of "opposition unity." On April 24, Pak Ki-ch'ul of the DNP, however, reversed his earlier announcement that he would give up his candidacy. Throughout the campaign, the minor party candidates drew very little attention.

The Campaign

In accordance with the election laws, the campaign could last for thirty days prior to the election day. The ruling party reportedly took great pains to choose April 27 as the election day. The choice was made on the basis that the selected day would precede a busy farming season and would therefore guarantee a maximum rural voter participation in election. It would also give little time for the opposition to prepare for the campaign.²⁴ The law required that the election must take place sometime between April 21 to May 20

²³The DNP was organized by those former Civil Rule Party members who broke away from the party. To this core element, the party was able to recruit many politicians who were disenchanted with the opposition party. Yun Po-sŏn declined the nomination of the party. There was even a talk of recruiting Yi Eŏm-sŏk to become the stand^{by} bearer of the party, but he showed no interest in that possible offer. The DNP finally nominated Pak Ki-ch'ul, a former Assemblyman.

²⁴This section is based on the personal observation of the author and the following: Cho Nam-cho and Hŏ Jun, op. cit., An Ch'i-sun, "Chŏngch'i Sŏnjŏnkwa Sŏndonŭi Tekŭnik"(Political Propaganda and the Technique of instigation), Sedae, June, 1971, pp. 80-88, and Yi Kang-sik, "Dŭkpyo Jakchŏn"(Vote Getting Operation), Shindong'a, May, 1971, pp. 176-185. See also Ch'a Ji-sŏn, Taet'ongnyŏng T'ansaeng(The Birth of President) (Seoul: Shin Hyŏnsilsa, 1971).

(70 to 40 days before the presidential term ended on June 31, 1971). Hence the official campaign began on March 27.

Even before the official campaign began, however, the two parties began exchanging charges of irregularities. Since the early months of 1971, the NDP stumping team, including its presidential candidate, had been making a nation-wide tour in a drive to collect signatures from 500,000 voters to introduce an amendment bill rescinding the constitutional amendment passed in 1969 allowing a third-term presidency. The incumbent party charged that such activity constituted a clear case of pre-election campaign prohibited by law since it would involve canvassing individual households to collect signatures. On petition from the ruling party, the CEMC ruled that such activity must be considered as constituting a campaign activity, hence unconstitutional.

On the other hand, on February 25, the NDP representative Yu Chin-san publicly accused the administration of irregular activities and challenged President Park to rectify these immediately. Among other things, Yu attacked the use of administrative power in elections: oppression of the press; interference in the judicial branch; use of government-run radio and television stations solely for propagandizing against the opposition party; formation of a government inspired third party to disrupt the NDP and to seduce NDP members to desert the party with offers of posts in the government.²⁵

²⁵The Chosŏn Ilbo, February 26, 1971, p. 1.

As far as the issues both parties raised in the campaign, the 1971 presidential election was conducted in the manner of the 1967 election in that the campaign was waged almost free of attacks on personalities. A relatively coherent set of policies was advanced by each of the two parties. The grand strategies to power were formulated one week prior to the official beginning of the campaign. The incumbent DRP was to emphasize the "inevitability" of the constitutional amendment for the third term presidency, the need for securing political stability midst dangers from North Korean belligerence and uncertainties in the international arena. The DRP election catchphrase was "Stability without Confusion." The NDP, on the other hand, was to rely on the familiar issue of the danger of long tenure of power and rampant political corruption in the incumbent regime.²⁶

Throughout the campaign, the policy confrontation of the two major parties was a lively affair with the opposition initiating the attack on the ruling party and its policies and the ruling party providing the explanations and counterattack on the NDP stands. As far as the campaign issues were concerned, the ruling party was clearly on the defensive-- as all incumbent parties in democracies, the burdens of power placed the incumbent party on the defensive.

²⁶The Dong-A Ilbo, March 19, 1971, p. 1.

The two parties differed in six major areas.²⁷

The opposition party insisted that a "mood of peace" was prevailing throughout the world, pointing particularly to the seeming rapprochement between the United States and Communist China. Under the circumstances, North Korea would not attack South Korea, nor would it have the capability to do so in at least ten years. The four big power guarantee of peace proposed by candidate Kim was envisioned to restrain North Korea from provoking war and ease tension in Northeast Asia by making Japan and Communist China play the role of the balancer in Asia while having the United States and the Soviet Russia check one another. It claimed that the ruling party's persistent warnings against the possibility of another North Korean invasion was designed to cover up its scheme to retain political power. The ruling party, on the other hand, retorted that it was irresponsible for the NDP to assert that North Korea would not provoke another war for ten years, and it warned that P'yŏngyang had already completed war preparations. The four big power guarantee, contended the ruling party, was a "dangerous illusion" which not only was unrealistic but constituted a subservient diplomatic posture. The four years to follow would be critical for the current situation, resembling the eve of the Korean War. North Korea would try to take

²⁷ The summary of the campaign issues are found in The Hankuk Ilbo, April 22, 1971, p. 4. See also Yu Kyŏng-hyŏn and Hwang Sŏn-p'il, "Sŏn'gŏ Chaengjŏm" (Election Issues), Shindong'a, July, 1971, pp. 90-101.

advantage of the disorder that might arise due to a transfer of power in the south. The key to national security at this critical moment was to achieve stability through economic growth, argued the ruling party.

Another major issue that was capitalized^{on}/by the opposition was the question of tenure of power. The Constitution, it claimed, was sabotaged as a result of the ruling party's scheme to enforce a perpetual rule. Democracy, contended the opposition party, means ^{the} that a person cannot retain/presidency for more than two terms. If brought to power, the party would not only repeal the amendment that was passed by the ruling party in 1969, but it would restore honor and prestige to the constitutional government. The opposition party also charged toward the end of the campaign that the ruling party was contemplating to install an institution of generalissimo for candidate Park. Should the DRP want to retain power for itself rather than for Park, it could do so with another candidate, suggested the opposition party. The DRP argued, however, that there was no point in wrangling over the matter of tenure of power for candidate Park as the overwhelming majority voted in favor of it in the 1969 national referendum. A twelve-year tenure of power was the minimum period necessary to guide the nation to a high stage of economic development: such examples had been provided by Japan and West Germany where long tenure of power for one party under a strong leader had helped bring about economic rehabilitation and development.

As far as the economic policies of the two parties were concerned, the NDP proposed what its candidate called "an economy for the masses." Whereas the economic policies of the incumbent party had abetted corruption and widened the gap between the rich and poor and between various regions, and between different sectors of the economy, the NDP policy was aimed at achieving balanced development between agriculture and industry by promising to invest at least 20 percent of the gross national product in the agricultural sector. A dual grain price system and a system of taxation favoring the low income groups would be implemented. The DRP, on the other hand, insisted that at the conclusion of the Third Five-Year Economic Plan, Korea would join the ranks of the advanced countries by having a per capita income of 400 dollars. The benefits of modernization would be shared without discrimination. The party also promised to create two million new jobs so as to eradicate the unemployment problem in the country.

Other issues that were presented by both parties were those of corruption, graft and irregularities in government, the maintenance of reserve forces and the military drill for students. The NDP charged that the corruption in government was so widespread that even President Park himself had admitted ^{it.} In addition to a system of registration of private property owned by high ranking government officials, candidate Kim pledged to make public his personal properties and take the lead in eliminating corruption and

irregularities. The DRP argued that corruption would multiply, if the NDP was brought to power. The DRP claimed that President Park had a stringent and concrete plan to eliminate corruption and irregularities, which had been by-products of development.

The opposition party attacked the Homeland Reserve Forces and military drill for students as a violation of the Constitution, as they forced a dual military obligation on the people. Evaders of military service, stand-by service youths and the surplus manpower beyond the annual conscription quota could be better used in other ways than the cumbersome dual military system. The ruling party warned that the disbanding of Homeland Reserve Forces would create too much of a military disparity with North Korea. It therefore insisted that these forces should not be disbanded regardless of whoever might come to power. It also stated that so long as North Korea continued to make war preparations, military drills for college students should not be abolished.

As the campaign wore on, each of these issues received differing emphasis by the candidates and other party leaders. It appears that the opposition party was successful in pushing the DRP on the defensive on almost all issues. As far as presenting the issues to the electorate was concerned, the opposition candidate possessed the ability to criticize the ruling party's policies freely and sometimes

in exaggerated terms, whereas the incumbent candidate was often restrained by his official responsibilities.²⁸

Since such campaign techniques as door-to-door canvassing were prohibited by election laws, both parties relied heavily on the campaign rallies. The two major parties staged altogether some 600 rallies throughout the country involving some 5,000,000 voters, who constituted about one third of the total electorate. Candidate Park of the DRP appeared in only 9 rallies in provincial capitals and Seoul and Pusan. The burden of the DRP's stumping tour was borne by Kim Jong-p'il who was popular among the people. The team headed by Kim held campaign rallies for a total of 75 times throughout the country. Other teams headed by the party chairman, Assembly Speaker Yi Hyo-sang, and Advisor Chŏng Il-kwŏn toured the country simultaneously in different sections of the country. The combined DRP rallies throughout the country numbered 296. The bulk of the opposition party campaign rallies was conducted by candidate Kim himself. Compared with his DRP foe, Kim spoke to crowds at least 110 times. Other party leaders held rallies for another 155 times for a combined total of 265 times. In addition to the campaign rallies where the candidates were exposed to the electorate along with other party leaders, both parties published propaganda material

²⁸ For newspaper debates among party leaders on the major campaign issues, see The Dong-A Ilbo, February 15, 1971, p. 3, April 8, 1971, p. 3, April 14, 1971, p. 3 and April 22, 1971, p. 5.

profusely. At the height of the campaign, the party organs-- the Minjukonghwapo of the DRP and the Minjujŏnsŏn of the NDP circulated some 1,000,000 copies. In case of the latter, the figure represented about ten times the normal size of circulation. Through a series of speaking tours, each party had tried to erase the "footsteps" of the other party. This was particularly true of the opposition party which seemed to rely almost entirely on campaign rallies to create a "boom" for its candidate. The DRP, on the other hand, seemed to have a more well prepared blueprint for victory.

The DRP's Campaign Headquarters made triumph in Seoul as one of its objectives. It established a special Seoul Planning Office under the Central Secretariat and completed the training of some 600 party workers at the Central Party Training School by the start of the campaign. Several days prior to the election day, the DRP staged one of the most impressive campaign rallies ever held by a ruling party in the Capital City. In the rural areas, a peculiar campaign technique, known as the "Drawing Room Discussion Group," was used to lend a more personal approach. Taking place in the house of an active party worker, this discussion group drew people from the neighborhood to discuss all problems related to their lives, including political ones. Each of the party's district offices reportedly held an average of 80 such meetings throughout the campaign. In addition, the party initiated campaigns to build village libraries and create

scholarships with the objective of strengthening the villagers' affinity with the party.

The Results and Aftermaths

The nation went to the polls on April 27 in the midst^{of} relative calm. As many as 81.4 percent of the eligible voters participated in this election. Compared with the 1963 and 1967 voter turnouts there was some decline in the voting rate despite the tremendous interests generated in the campaign. The 1963 and 1967 figures were 85 and 83.6 percent respectively. The two major parties polled 98 percent of the total votes cast; in both the 1963 and 1967 elections, the minor parties polled as much as 8 percent of the total vote.²⁹

The incumbent candidate emerged victorious in a hard fought battle polling 6,342,828 to Kim's 5,395,900 votes. Park polled 54 percent of the votes cast for the two major candidates and had the plurality of some 900,000 votes. The results of the election are summarized in the following table (Table 22).³⁰

The voting pattern of the 1971 presidential election showed once again that there was a tremendous gap between the urban and rural areas in voting patterns. Whereas Candidate Kim led Park

²⁹For an analysis of the 1971 presidential election returns, see Yi Yŏng-ho, "Saich'il Sŏn'gŏŭi Chŏngch'iŭisik" (Political Awareness of the April 27 Election), Shindong'a, June, 1971, pp. 86-96.

³⁰Compiled by the Central Election Management Committee. The CEMC data are quoted in Chŏngkyŏng Yŏn'gu, No. 76 (May, 1971), pp. 20-33.

Table 22. Provincial Breakdown of the Votes
Cast for the Two Major Parties in
the 1971 Presidential Election

	Percentage the votes cast for the two parties	
	Park(DRP)	Kim(NDP)
Seoul	40	60
Pusan	56	44
Kyōnggi Province	50	50
Kangwōn Province	61	39
Ch'ungbuk Province	58	42
Ch'ungnam Province	55	45
Chōnpuk Province	37	63
Chōnnam Province	35	65
Kyōngbuk Province	76	24
Kyōngnam Province	74	26
Cheju Province	58	42
Nation	54	46

by the ratio of 54.6 to 45.4 percent in the nation's seven larger cities, the incumbent overshadowed his opponent by the ratio of 58.6 to 41.4 percent in the rural constituencies. However, it is interesting to note that the DRP and Candidate Park have made strong inroads in cities as well. In the eleven medium-sized cities,

Park was winner over Kim by the ratio of 53.1 to 46.9 percent: in small cities, Park's percentage increased to 56.3 percent, whereas his principal opponent's percentage dropped to 43.7.

In this election, however, the urban-rural cleavage in voting behavior was completely overshadowed by the regional gap between the Yŏngnam and Honam areas. In the Yŏngnam area, which included Pusan, Kyŏngsang Namdo and Kyŏngsang Pukdo, its "favorite son" had a plurality of more than a million and half votes over Kim, who, in turn, beat Park by a little more than 600,000 votes in the Honam area of Chŏnra Pukdo and Chŏnra Namdo. Despite the public pleas made by both candidates to set aside regional sentiments, the sectional vote concentration emerged as the most significant voting pattern in the election. In more visible terms, Park outcast Kim three to one in the Yŏngnam area, whereas Kim outclassed Park two to one in the Honam area. The effects of the regional confrontation erasing the urban-rural gap was naturally the greatest in these two areas; and this was well illustrated by the fact that Kim as the opposition candidate polled 62.1 percent of the rural vote in the Honam area whereas Park won 62.8 percent of the urban vote in the Yŏngnam area.³¹

Park's victory then can be attributed to the fact that his native provinces which constituted the largest voting bloc in the country gave an overwhelming support to their favorite son candidate.

³¹Compiled by Yi Yŏng-ho, "Saich'il Sŏn'gŏŭi Chŏngch'iŭisik" (Political Awareness Shown in the April 27 Election), p. 89.

The same was true with Kim's area of strength. But the low voter turnout of 77 percent in Kim's area³² combined with the fact that there were about a million and a half less voters in the Honam region than in the Yŏngnam area proved fatal for the NDP candidate. In addition, the opposition candidate failed to win in medium-sized and small cities where his predecessors usually gained plurality.

As soon as the ballots were counted, however, the two parties once again diverged widely on the fairness of the election. In what they called "silent election frauds," Candidate Kim and the NDP claimed that they were deprived of "millions of vote" through manipulation by the ruling party and the administration.³³ In sharp contrast, the ruling party claimed that the election just completed was carried out in an atmosphere which even the advanced democracies could envy. While the foreign correspondents' dispatches generally agreed with the ruling party's assessment of the way the campaign was conducted, the observation team of the UNCURK, which was asked to observe the election at/request of the Central Election Management Committee, reported that it could not confirm the opposition charges

³² Kyŏngsang Fukdo and Kyŏngsang Namdo had a voter turnout rate of 85.4 percent and 83.2 percent respectively. Both figures were well above the national average of 81.4 percent.

³³ For the newspaper advertisement entitled "Silent Election Frauds," see The Dong-A Ilbo, May 1, 1971, p. 7. It claimed that the DRP illegally manipulated 3,000,000 votes.

of irregularities and that the election was carried out in calm and in apparent fairness.³⁴

Kim Dae-jung, in his after-election interview on April 30, stated that he regretted the fact that he was unable to send congratulatory flowers to the winner and stated his reasons why the election was a "fundamental fraud."³⁵

The ruling party has used scores of times more money than the legally allowed 920 million wŏn in bribing the NDP members and buying votes, while the NDP could not raise even half of the legal limit.

All out mobilization of administrative power was used in the election.

Government funds were used for electioneering purposes.

Innumerable pro-NDP voters were deprived of the opportunity to vote whereas pro-DAP voters were registered in the voters' list twice or three times so that two or three votes could be cast under a single name.

³⁴The assesment of elections by various individuals and groups, domestic and foreign, are summarized in Nam Jae-hi, "Saich'il Sŏn'gŏ Chŏn'huŭi Chŏngch'i Maekrak"(A Campaign Sketch of the April 27 Election), Chŏngkyŏng Yŏn'gu, No. 76(May, 1971), pp. 98-112.

³⁵See The Korea Times, April 30, 1971, p. 1. The National Consultative Conference to Safeguard Democracy shared the NDP's assessment of the election procedures. In its statement released on April 30, the Conference charged that the "election irregularities were manipulated by unprecedented exercise of money and administrative power" and that such manipulation constituted an "assault on democracy." The association set out to boycott the May 25 Assembly elections. For the statement of the Consultative Conference, see The Dong-A Ilbo, April 30, 1971, p. 1.

Proxy-voting, ballot inserting and replacing, and expulsion of NDP supervisors at polling places have taken place.

The government disclosed voting results first from pro-government party districts to give the false impression that the DRP victory was only a matter of time and then committed various irregularities as the NDP election supervisors were discouraged.

CHAPTER VI THE PARTY IN THE GOVERNMENT

Since the holding of governmental power is a raison d'être of a political party, it is important to probe into the behavior of party's representatives once they are elected to office. In terms of organizational and financial support that candidates receive during Assembly elections, the present ruling and opposition Assemblymen markedly differ.¹ Since these men owe varying degree of graces from the party to which they are affiliated, their perception of the party's role in their election is one of the factors affecting the behavior of Assemblymen in the legislature. In order to understand the peculiar characteristics of the Korean legislative process, it is important to discuss the attitudinal differences of the ruling and opposition party Assemblymen and probe into the sources of such behavior.

In a newspaper survey made immediately after the 1967 Assembly election of the successful and unsuccessful DRP and NDP candidates, it was revealed that they had a sharp difference in their estimation of the role of parties played in their campaign. As far as the successful DRP candidates were concerned, their victory was owed to their political party than to any other factor: party organization, 17.7 percent; support of the affiliated party, 15.6 percent; policies and platforms, 10.4 percent; and the success of the constituency.

¹See The Hankuk Ilbo, June 9, 1970, p. 5, and U Byōng-kyu, op. cit., p. 71.

projects sponsored by the candidate, 14.1 percent. As far as the successful NDP candidates were concerned, only 9.4 percent replied that they attributed their victory to the party organization; 17.6 percent to support of the affiliated party; 12 percent to personal ties; 17.3 percent to name recognitions. These figures seem to indicate that the opposition candidates were definitely more on their own than the DRP counterparts, and consequently tended to exhibit more independent behavior as Assemblymen.²

The attitudinal differences may also be ascertained by each party member's perception of the internal order of the party to which he is affiliated and his relationship with the party in the legislative process. Table 23 summarizes the Assemblymen's view of the internal order of the party in the Seventh National Assembly.³

There was a less marked but still significant difference between the DRP and NDP Assemblymen on their perception of the role of party organization, either within or outside the National Assembly on their legislative voting, as the following table indicates (Table 24).⁴ Although the majority of the members of both parties regard themselves as bound to the party's decision in their legislative voting, such

²The Hankuk Ilbo, June 9, 1970, p. 5. In another survey made on the Assemblymen, a similar result was obtained. See U Byōng-kyu, op. cit., p. 71. This seems to indicate that there is a considerable difference between the two parties as to the hold of the parties on their legislators.

³Ibid., p. 31.

⁴Ibid.

Table 23. The Assemblymen's View of the
Internal Order of Their Party

	DRP Assemblymen (%)	NDP Assemblymen (%)
Very democratic	5.3	63.3
Fairly democratic	14.7	30.0
Slightly democratic	33.3	6.7
Undemocratic	38.7	-
Severely undemocratic	8.0	-

Table 24. The National Assemblymen's Relationship
with Their Party in Legislative Voting

	DRP Assemblymen (%)	NDP Assemblymen (%)
Vote according to decision of the party leadership	16.2	13.3
Vote according to decision of the party caucus	61.3	60.0
Vote according to personal belief	17.5	23.3
Vote according to public opinion	5.0	3.3

tendency was somewhat more evident in the DRP. Similarly, there was also a marked difference between the Assemblymen of the two major parties in their estimation of party sanctions when they voted against the party decision on a bill. About 74 percent of the ruling DRP members thought that it would be "stern," whereas only 43 percent of the opposition legislators thought so.⁵

Although the majority of the Korean legislators hold to the Burkean notion of representation,⁶ with a majority of the Assemblymen in the Seventh National Assembly having felt that they should represent the whole nation, all available evidence seems to indicate that there is also a significant difference on this score between the DRP and the NDP law-makers. In one survey, it was shown that the DRP legislators emphasized the need to behave according to their own "beliefs" rather than according to public opinion. The opposition legislators, however, overwhelmingly endorsed the view that the nation's elites should follow public opinion.⁷

The attitudinal differences between the DRP and the NDP Assemblymen did not cease on procedural matters discussed above. In a recent

⁵U Byŏng-kyu and Kim Chong-rim, "Wŏnnae Ch'ongmuron"(On Party Whip), Shindong'a, February, 1971, p. 104.

⁶Kim Chong-rim and U Byŏng-kyu, "Taeŭi Chŏngch'iwa Kukhoewiwŏn" (Representative Politics and the National Assemblymen), Chŏngkyŏng Yŏn'gu, September, 1970, p. 25.

⁷Yi Yŏng-ho, "Hankukinŭi Kach'ikwan"(The Value Systems of Koreans), Special Series No. 16, The Chosŏn Ilbo, May 4, 1972, p. 4.

extensive survey on the values systems of Koreans and the National Assemblymen, it was discovered that there are major differences on substantive matters.⁸ In ordering the nation's priorities, for example, the opposition legislators tended to emphasize political stability more often than their DRP counterparts, who tended to identify economic problems as the urgent national issue. Table 25 demonstrates this proclivities.⁹

On the liberal-conservative continuum, the opposition legislators leaned consistently to the liberal side on such questions as ecological problems and the distribution of wealth.¹⁰ The ruling party Assemblymen tended to be more conservative than the national sample; the opposition law-makers were far more liberal than the national sample. On the question of their preference between the two conflicting values of the national priorities-- economic growth on the one hand and democracy and freedom on the other, it was discovered that the DRP legislators are for more economic growth oriented than the national sample; the NDP legislators, on the other hand, were for more democracy oriented than the national sample.¹¹ On the question of whether the agricultural sector or the industrial sector should

⁸Ibid. This national survey is the most extensive study of Korean value systems ever made. The study was made between September and November, 1971.

⁹Ibid., Series No. 10, March 16, 1972, p. 4.

¹⁰Ibid., Series No. 1, January 1, 1972, p. 5.

¹¹Ibid., Series No. 4, January 20, 1972, p. 4.

Table 25. Issue Awareness of Korean Voters
and National Assemblymen.

	Nation (%)	Assemblymen (%)	DRP (%)	NDP (%)
Unification	14	16	17	15
Corruption	4	8	1	12
Economic stability	27	19	25	15
Rural development	11	3	3	3
Social stability	7	9	6	12
Ethical stability	7	9	15	6
National integration	2	8	9	7
Political stability	4	17	10	21
National security	6	5	9	2
Diplomacy	1	1	1	1
Education	3	3	4	3
Others	14	2	1	3

be emphasized in setting the nation's priorities, the results of the survey showed a curious result in that the Assemblymen from the rural electoral districts(which tended to be DRP Assemblymen) exhibited a pro-industrial inclination; the urban representative(which tended to be NDP law-makers), on the other hand, showed a proclivity for the agricultural sector.¹²

¹²Ibid., Series No. 3, January 13, 1972, p. 4.

How should one explain the differing attitudes of the ruling and opposition party members in the National Assembly sketched above? The answer should perhaps lie in the fact that through long years out of government, the opposition legislators have internalized the anti-government and the anti-ruling party complex. At least since the Third National Assembly, the nation's legislative branch has been dominated by the ruling party Assemblymen. Having been relegated to the role of permanent opposition, they appear to have acquired a value system which dictated opposition for the sake of opposition. Such oppositionalism is explained by Aristide Zolberg in the following terms:¹³

The incumbent leaders [and] challengers tend to view conflict as an all-or nothing proposition... [since] factors which might make for the limitation of issues are almost non-existent. Whether it begins by asking for better wages or better prices, whether it is dissatisfied with the delimitation of constituencies or with lack of consideration for general claims, the opposition almost always ends up challenging the entire order which the regime is dedicated to build.

What makes for the militant posture of the opposition and the ruling party Assemblymen is the fact that opposition members basically

¹³Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 75. Asoka Mehta argued similarly: "In colonial, as well as ex-colonial countries, the tradition of opposition goes deep. Constructive approaches are limited; the debris of wrongs, real or imagined, is littered all around. National movements usually achieve negative solidarity through opposition to alien rule, while positive agreement remains vague. The posture of opposition tends to become normal...." Asoka Mehta, "The Opposition in the New States," in Democracy in the New States, ed., Office for Asian Affairs of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (New Delhi, 1959), pp. 86-89.

view the incumbent party as illegitimate since the latter gained power through manipulation and illegal means. For example one prominent NDP leader remarked in 1967 that:¹⁴

Only when the ruling party and the opposition recognized that the elections by which they were elected to the National Assembly were fair, would the members of opposite parties have mutually respected each other's political integrity and recognized each other's existence. Only such a National Assembly could be operated smoothly.... From the beginning of its administration the DRP government had been advocating political stability, cooperation, and contest based on issues. But such advocacy had been in vain. The cause of the failure lay in the irregular process through which the DRP gained power.

Another NDF leader compared his party's tactics against the ruling party with a soccer game. He said that the "militant line" is a "reaction to the unconstitutional means employed by the Park government." "Suppose," he continued, "the opponents in a soccer game play the ball with both feet and hands, we should not be unilaterally forced to observe the rule of the game by playing the ball only with the feet."¹⁵

Without any hope of unseating the incumbent party, the opposition remains adamant to deal with the ruling party on its terms. Such extreme tactics-- Assembly walk-out, demonstration in the streets,

¹⁴ Kim Yŏng-sam, Chŏngch'inŭn Kilgo Chŏngkwonŭn Tchalŏta (Politics and Government Power) (Seoul: Sasanggesa, 1967), p. 100. Translated and quoted in K. B. Kim, op. cit., p. 169.

¹⁵ Statement of Kim Su-han, quoted in The Chosŏn Ilbo, October 26, 1965, Translated and quoted in K. B. Kim, op. cit., p. 171.

physical violence on the floor of the National Assembly and caustic public condemnation of the government and the ruling party-- have invited militant reaction from the ruling party. Extremism begets extremism. For the opposition legislators, the struggle against the ruling party is deemed a patriotic duty-- "the more extreme the struggle, the more patriotic the struggle for democracy in the country."¹⁶ One consequence of such extreme style of opposition has resulted in the ascendancy of the militant factions in each of the parties.

The Legislative Party

Since the middle of the Sixth National Assembly, the autonomy of the Assembly has been a subject of wide debate in the country and among the Assemblymen themselves. The degeneration of the legislative branch into a "handsmaid" to the executive branch has stemmed from a host of factors. Except for the nine-month period during which a cabinet system operated, Korea has operated under a presidential system which tends to give the executive branch a superior constitutional status. Under the present Constitution, for example, the President, who is elected directly by the people, is not accountable to the Assembly except in case of impeachment as stipulated in Article 61. The National Assembly has no power to pass non-confidence motions

¹⁶Ibid., p. 170.

against the government as a whole except for individual motions against the Prime Minister and the Members of the State Council. Except for the nomination of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chairman of the Board of Audit which requires the approval of the Assembly, the President can freely appoint all government officials including the Prime Minister. The executive branch can participate in the legislative process by exercising its power to introduce bills(Article 48) and the power to issue ordinances in emergency situations(Article 73 and 74). The President also has the power to return bills passed by the Assembly for reconsideration; he can participate in the Assembly sessions to state opinions and answer questions(Article 58). Moreover, the constitutional requirement that a candidate for the Assembly must first secure endorsement from a political party(Article 36) and the stipulation that a member of the Assembly shall automatically lose his seat if he changes or leaves his party(Article 38), have further strengthened the President's position in relation to those members of the Assembly who belong to his party.

On the other hand, the Assembly is empowered to enact laws to pass on government budgets, to inspect the Administration(Article 57), to impeach the President(Article 61), to cast non-confidence votes against the Prime Minister and the members of the State Council, to require the attendance of the Prime Minister and the members of the

State Council at its sessions for the purpose of answering questions from the Assemblymen. When the relative constitutional status and powers are weighed, the executive branch appears to have an upperhand. This would be particularly so if the President is the leader of the ruling party as is presently the case. The ruling party's unchallengeable majority in the Assembly has also encouraged the government to treat the legislative branch in a cavalier fashion. The Political Party Law, too, ^{has} been utilized to control the Assemblymen. Among the non-institutional factors contributing to the waning of legislative authority is the recent emphasis on policy output in the name of development, which has had the effect to cause the process of conflict and dialogue in the Assembly to recede into the background, as it is believed to be a waste of time.

The impotence of the legislative branch can also be considered from the point of view of the cross-pressures that are exerted upon the Assemblymen in regard to their voting in the National Assembly. The Assemblymen themselves do not seem to feel ^a great necessity to have a close communication with either the interest groups or his constituents. The constituents seem to view their representatives as persons who could do favors for them at the center. It rarely occurs that a voter would take the trouble to either support or oppose certain policy positions that his representative has taken or the way he has voted on the floor. Hence the constituency pressure on legislative

voting is kept at^a/minimum. It is significant to note that about 70 percent of the DRP Assemblymen thought that ^{their} voting in the Assembly would have little or no relationship to ^{their} reelection. Some 45 percent of the NDP counterparts answered similarly.¹⁷

Such a lack of communication is demonstrated between the legislators and the interest groups as well. The majority of both the DRP and the NDP law-makers in the Seventh National Assembly reported that they had either not been approached by any interest groups or had been approached by a few interest groups on very few occasions. Among the very few interest groups that were reported to have contacted some Assemblymen were the Korean Business Association and the Korean Chamber of Commerce. No farmer or labor organizations were included in this list.¹⁸ The majority of the Assemblymen in the Seventh National Assembly thought that the interest groups in Korea exercised no influence on the legislative branch, though many of them saw the desirability of pressure group activities in the Assembly.¹⁹ The reason why the interest groups do not seek frequent contact with the legislative branch is not very difficult to find. As we have seen in Chapter IV, much of their well-being depends upon the graces of the administration. They would obtain their desired results more rapidly if they go to the high levels of

¹⁷U Byōng-kyu, op. cit., p. 33.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 238.

administration rather than the Assembly.

Given the situation where the channels of communication between the legislature and both the electorate and the interest groups are closed and remain largely ineffectual, the only possible non-official channel is that of mass media, especially the daily newspapers. Although several surveys indicated that newspapers exert pressure upon the Assemblymen, and hence affect their behavior in the Assembly,²⁰ their effectiveness in communicating with the legislative branch has also been beset with difficulties-- the most serious of which has been the lack of autonomy from political power in every aspect of their activities.²¹ Newspapers in Korea have had a venerable tradition of dissent since the time of the Japanese colonial rule and the tradition had been kept alive since the independence. Other channels of communications having been virtually closed, the newspapers has remained a potent "potential" interest group. The successive Korean governments, except the short-lived Democratic administration in 1960, have tried to curb the potential influence of newspapers through various means, including the issuance of administrative orders to close their doors, but the newspapers today remain as a powerful

²⁰Ibid., p. 335.

²¹For the role of newspapers in the Korean political process, see Bong-ri Kim, A Brief History of the Korean Press (Seoul: Korean Information Service, 1965), and Choe Chun, "Politics and Press in Korea," Korean Affairs, Vol. 3 (December, 1964), pp. 296-303. A good summary of the problems encountered by the Korean newspapers is found in U Byōng-kyu, op. cit., pp. 349-355.

potential interest group in the context of Korean politics.

Because the opposition party in the Assembly rarely quarrels with the ruling party on substantive legislative matters, the legislative program of the Assembly is always originated, directed and managed by the top leadership of the ruling party in consultation with high government officials. Table 26 shows the status of government-sponsored and individual member-sponsored bills in the National Assembly since 1948.²² The table clearly reveals that both in term of number of legislative proposals and the number of bills enacted into law, government proposed bills had an upperhand compared to the bills proposed by individual Assemblymen. It is also significant that government bills had a far greater chance of passing the National Assembly than the bills proposed by individual members. With the exception of the Third and Fourth National Assemblies, government proposed bills showed a consistently higher rate of passage in the National Assembly than individual Assemblymen's bills. As has been noted by a student of the Korean legislative process a great percentage of the bills proposed by individual Assemblymen are cleared in advance with the appropriate government ministries.²³ This is particularly true under the present ruling party, which, in coordination with the administration, often first drafts a bill in

²² Compiled and adopted from the data presented by Han Chŏng-il, Hankuk Chŏngch'i Haengchŏngwon (A Study on Korean Politics and Administration) (Seoul: Pakyŏngsa, 1972), pp. 62-86.

²³ Ibid., p. 94.

Table 26. Bills Proposed and Passed in the
National Assembly

	<u>Government Bills</u>		<u>Assemblymen's Bills</u>	
	No.	No. passed	No.	No. passed
Constituent Assembly				
No. of bills	145	106	89	43
% passed		73.1		48.3
Second Assembly				
No. of bills	216	137	181	75
% passed		63.4		41.4
Third Assembly				
No. of bills	241	85	169	71
% passed		35.2		42
Fourth Assembly				
No. of bills	202	44	120	31
% passed		21.8		25.8
Fifth Assembly				
No. of bills	108	40	92	26
% passed		37		28.2
Sixth Assembly				
No. of bills	242	155	415	177
% passed		64		42.6
Seventh Assembly				
No. of bills	188	120	162	67
% passed		63.8		41.9

its policy Committee or the Office of Policy Research and then arranges to have one of its Assembly members to introduce it in the Assembly. Such a legislative tactic is adopted whenever the government deals with a sensitive political issue and wishes to evade the responsibility

of formally sponsoring a bill on that matter. During the Sixth National Assembly, for example, two of the most controversial bills were proposed by individual Assemblymen-- the Bill on the Establishment of Committee on Journalistic Ethics and the Bill on Safeguarding the Campuses. Both of these bills were introduced amid highly emotional and militant struggles within and outside the National Assembly over the question of ratifying the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty. The curbing of press activities and those of the students during this period was a sensitive issue which nevertheless required some sort of legislation. Thus two leading DRP members of the Assembly were asked to formally introduce these two bills even though the government itself was their real sponsor.

The gradual weakening of the status of the legislative branch vis-a-vis the executive branch has begun to be felt among the Assemblymen themselves. In a survey of the Assemblymen of the Seventh National Assembly, a great majority of them felt that the Assembly had degenerated into an ineffective body. The following table shows their responses (Table 27).²⁴

The Seventh National Assembly: a case study. The refusal of the elected NDP Assemblymen to sit with the ruling party members for the opening of the Seventh National Assembly marked an ominous beginning for the highest law-making body in the nation. The NDP

²⁴U Byōng-kyu, op. cit., p. 70.

Table 27. Estimation of the Effectiveness of the
Legislative Branch by the Assemblymen

	DRP Assemblymen (%)	NDP Assemblymen (%)
Very effective	2.6	-
Fairly effective	17.9	-
Slightly effective	33.3	20.0
Ineffective	46.2	80.0

charges of widespread election irregularities in the general election on June 8, 1967 were partly redressed by the ruling party's recognition of such election frauds, termed "degrading" by President Park himself, and the expulsion of eight DRP Assemblymen who were allegedly involved in the irregularities. The NDP, while filing a joint election suit with the Supreme Court, boycotted the Assembly for more than five months.

While the negotiations with the opposition for the normalization of the Assembly functions were being dead-locked, the ruling party expelled another eight others and founded a satellite negotiating group called the October Five Club (so named because the group registered with the Secretariat of the National Assembly on that day). This ingenuous method was adopted to circumvent the constitutional provision which guarantees multiparties in the National Assembly.

Even after the return of the opposition law-makers on November 29, the sessions of the Assembly were not normalized. Insisting that the conditions of their return were not faithfully carried out by the ruling party, the NDP legislators staged a sit-in strike while the budget bill for 1968 was on the agenda of the Assembly. The DRP displayed its show of strength when the budget was rammed through on December 28 in one corner of the Assembly floor. The NDP proceeded to boycott several more sessions and it was not until April 29, 1968 that the Assembly was normalized after the it passed a five-point Guarantee Legislation. The one-party National Assembly in the meantime passed many bills, including the important Revised Petroleum Tax Bill which was submitted by the administration just five days prior to the closing of the Assembly session, with a request to pass the entire provisions of the bill without revision. Without having a sufficient time to study the bill and discussion on the floor, the bill was passed two days after it was introduced.

The two major parties entered on another collision course in the beginning of 1969 on the issue of constitutional amendment for the third term presidency. In a disobedience incident which shook the ruling party, the "maincurrent" DRP legislators allied with the opposition to help pass the non-confidence motion against the Education Minister Kwŏn O-byŏng. The incident was followed, as has ^{been} seen earlier, by the expulsion of the rebelling leaders on strong orders from President Park. As has been discussed in Chapter II, the amendment

bill was passed on September 14 during the predawn hours in a highly irregular fashion after the opposition legislators' occupation of the Speaker's rostrum. The opposition party, having resolved to dissolve the party temporarily to disqualify three of its own members who came out in support of the amendment, once again remained outside the Assembly. It took more than eight months for the opposition to return to the Assembly to begin their negotiations with the ruling party on revision of electoral laws.

CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION

The foregoing chapters probed into the development of party politics in Korea since 1945 when Korea emerged from the authoritarian rule of the Yi Dynasty and the subsequent Japanese colonial rule. Circumstances were generally unfavorable to the development of healthy political parties. A low degree of popular participation in politics and severe restrictions on political activities had been the norm of political life. During the Japanese colonial rule, the nationalist movement turned out to be an ineffective and dispersed venture due to internal dissension and external prosecution. In the post-war era, Korea lived under three years of American Military Government(1945-1948) during which the vicissitudes of international politics largely determined the course of domestic politics. Since independence, Korea experienced twelve years of authoritarian rule under Rhee(1948-1960), though there was some competitive party politics in the latter years of the First Republic. The April Student Uprising brought this government down through bloodshed and opened a way for a multiparty liberalism under a cabinet system for a nine-month period. A military coup brought this government to an end, and, for two years, the nation was in the hands of the military, which, however, ^{under} was increasing pressure to reestablish a constitutional government. The ⁿtransition to a constitutional government was made in 1963. Since then Korea has been experiencing growing two party competition under

a presidential system. In the short span of some twenty-five years, Korea has gone through the authoritarianism of one dominant party, multiparty liberalism, military authoritarianism and constitutionalism.

Chapter II has given a detailed account of the origin and development of political parties in Korea since 1945. It has ^{been} clearly shown that political parties cannot be institutionalized simply because the party elites want them to. Both the ruling parties of the past and the present-- the LP and the DRP-- are externally created parties: the former was created by a decree of an authoritarian and charismatic President who saw it useful for consolidating his power; the latter was organized preemptively by military men who had staged a coup before party activities were permitted. This peculiar situation affected the functioning of ruling parties in various aspects. As LaPalombara and Weiner have noted, externally created parties tend not to be identified with the legislature but with the administration, thus foresaking its representative function.

The first major opposition party was created more or less in the legislature as a response to President Rhee's systematic alienation of those who had supported him. To these initially disenchanted former associates flocked many politicians who had been frustrated in their bid for positions of power and influence. Rhee's and the LP's repeated attempts to perpetuate their power gave solidarity to these politicians who otherwise had little in common. A collection of ambitious politicians with little or no positive common denominator,

the opposition party was in fact, a "party of parties" in which several factions with each led by a dominant personality fought for the hegemony of the party.

By the latter half of the First Republic, the form and the substance of a quasi-competitive two party structure were attained, but the prospect of a peaceful transfer of power was betrayed by election riggings and the resultant student uprisings which toppled the LP regime. The collapse of the Liberal Party clearly showed the degree to which the ruling party was dependent upon the power of the administration. With the forceful overthrow of the LP government, the hope of the first ruling Korean party to outlive its dominant personality disappeared.

The Second Republic, as a negation of the ancien regime, operated under an entirely different system. As far as parties were concerned, almost unlimited freedom was accorded in the range of activities and the scope of policies they could espouse. The party in power was badly split into two groups and in endless counter maneuverings to gain ascendancy over each other. The factional struggle had taken its toll when the military staged a coup d'etat in 1961. Political activities were banned for two years, during which the groundwork was laid by some elements of the junta for the organization of a political party to provide for the transition to a civilian government. The party thus created, the DRP, was a product of a careful political engineering, and it has functioned as a cohesive and disciplined

political party quite unlike the LP. As for the major opposition party in this period, it, too, has been a refuge for frustrated politicians.

In this dissertation, Korean political parties are seen as structures which carry out activities in the pursuit of political power. In the manner of Frank Sorauf's study of American political parties, this study has divided the Korean parties for analytical purposes into three sectors-- the party in the electorate, the party organization and the party government-- and has examined their activities.

Chapter III dealt with the party organization proper in terms of the policy orientations, the formal and informal structures and the elites of major Korean parties. Except for a very brief period immediately after the liberation, the international position of Korea dictated the elimination of the leftist and progressive ideologies. A bloody war with North Korea, continued armed provocation from the North solidified the conservatism of major Korean parties. Under these severe restrictions, party programs or policies were advocated within the boundary of the conservative right. This in turn reduced party politics to ^astruggle for power. Rarely have the two major parties fought on substantive issues; such issues as dictatorship, tenure of power, abuse of power-- all procedural ones-- emerged as salient election issues. More often than not, the two

party battle was fought not on the basis of policy but on personalities, not on the basis of substance but on procedures.

More often than not, Korean political parties failed to outlive its founder or the dominant personality. The Korean parties have been groups of individual politicians seeking personal power. Many politicians have deserted their original parties when that would better serve their self-interest. In other words, the organizational fragility of Korean parties is rooted in personalism. Faction and factional politics have blocked institutionalization of party structure and leadership. They have caused discontinuity of party politics and party policy. They have evoked the sense of alienation of the public toward political parties. They have caused corruption. A party generally draws people for reasons of money, personal power, special interest, blood relations, place of origin, and on occasion, involuntarily through abuse of administrative power. It appears that the commitment to membership in a party is rarely made on the basis of ideology or policy. This means the transiency of party membership--when conditions change, one could abandon a party in favor of another. The recruitment problem has been ^{aggravated} by the severe legal limitations on the eligibility to party membership.

If any categorization be made of Korea's political parties, they are all "elite" parties in a sense that ^{each} is exclusively oriented toward maintenance of personal political power. The party elites in the National Assembly tend to be a highly educated group. Since

1963, the DRP's Assemblymen were principally composed of two groups-- the bureaucrats and the retired military men. The opposition party's Assemblymen tend to have a more varied background who have come together mainly to oppose the ruling party.

Chapter IV treated the sector of the party structure ensconced in the electorate. The associational interest groups in the Korean context lack autonomy from state power in their internal affairs and hence in their external affairs. They tend to shy away from taking independent political action since their well-being depend to a great extent on the graces of the administration. In the early years of the LP regime, these groups served as adjuncts to the party in power and a mere accessory to the regime in power. On the other hand, the strength of the institutional and anomic interest groups in Korea may be viewed as a consequence of the failure of party politics. In the political milieu in which the legitimate interests cannot be articulated and aggregated into policies, the likelihood that the public discontents and social maladies explode beyond the prescribed procedures are increased.

How are we to evaluate Korean voters? How have the twenty-five years of party politics affected their political habits and orientations from the long tradition of subjugation to the state and the ruling elites? Available data clearly point to encouraging directions. The imported system of liberal democracy is on the way of earning legitimacy through some twenty-five years of challenge, opposition,

acceptance, adaptation and acculturation. Although the Korean voters are yet to vote the incumbent party out, they seem to have accepted elections as a vital institution of democracy. The rate of voter participation in elections is analogous to that of western democracies. Yet there are disturbing signs as well. While it was discovered that they accept political parties as a legitimate institutional apparatus in the Korean context, they are hesitant to openly identify with a particular political party or become a member of a political party. The "gaps" evident between the urban and the rural areas and between the regions in Korea, and, especially the former, have substituted the ethnic, religious and class cleavages evident in other developing states of Asia and Africa.

The electoral process sketched in Chapter V has provided an outline of the functioning of political parties in the sectors of the electorate and the party organization proper at the peak of their activities. The elections in Korea exhibit characteristics peculiar to many developing countries in that the incumbent power holders have a built-in advantage over the party out of power in the resources they manage-- in terms of membership, political funds, organizational strength and the potential use and abuse of administrative power. Where these resources could easily be translated into votes-- in the rural areas in the Korean case, the incumbent party ^{has} fared consistently well. In the urban areas with their opposition proclivities, the opposition party ^{has} led the ruling party, at least since a semblance of the two party system was established. The election under study

pointed to an encouraging sign that the party battle for the electorate's vote on the whole took the form of reasonably clear-cut policy alternatives. This was a clear departure, for example, from ten years ago when presidential elections were fought basically on the virtues of the personality of the candidates. This can be interpreted as the maturation of both the party system and the electorate which are mutually supportive.

Strictly speaking, elections do not determine the policy of the nation, but decide who shall decide what the government shall do. Korean voters rarely bind their representatives-- both on the presidential and the Assembly levels-- to a certain set of policies, except for the broad mandate the winning party brings into office. The nation has undergone eight general and seven presidential elections(one indirect) and rarely has the losing party acceded to the defeat at the polls. Charges of election frauds and court litigations for annulment of election results have been widespread. This has been of serious consequence for the legitimacy and the stability of the government regardless of the merit of the opposition claims of vote rigging. The presidential election under study has been no exception. This has undermined dialogue and compromise and opened the way for the opposition to take a militant posture toward the party which they regard as having acquired power through illegitimate means. There is no question but that the incumbent party has always been able to mobilize its resources and wage electoral

campaigns from the position of strength. The opposition, at great odds to unseat the incumbents, however, has waged an intensely emotional campaign.

The sector of the party structure in the government is discussed from the perspective of the behavior of the legislators in the National Assembly. The prospective of having a fruitful dialogue between the ruling and opposition legislators has been marred to a great extent by the shared belief on the part of the opposition Assemblymen that the ruling party has come to occupy the seat of government through illegitimate means. The two parties collided on the floor of the National Assembly on issues which appeared to be capable of resolution through compromise and debate. This situation often ended in such militant tactics as opposition walk-out and the "one party National Assembly." Such militant style of politics dominated the life of the National Assembly in recent years, and also in the later years of the Liberal Party regime. The fact that no peaceful transfer of power was made in the post-liberation era strengthens the argument that party politics has failed to resolve conflicts in Korean politics. Repeated constitutional amendments and martial laws are eloquent illustrations of resolving conflicts through physical and not political means. The opposition, on the other hand, responded to the assault by the administration through militant struggle to the point of violating constitutional order. The opposition appeared to be incapable of wresting power.

Without having tasted political power, the opposition party has degenerated into a protest group rather than a responsible political party. On the other hand, its irresponsible behavior has further reduced its chance of taking the reigns of government. 745

Through a number of years of confrontation in the National Assembly, the two major parties' Assemblymen appeared to have internalized value systems peculiar to their own. As was the case with the DP, the present NDP's major plank has been its expressed concern for democracy and the prevention of dictatorship. The DAP's emphasis on modernization and policy output has made the leaders of the ruling party impatient about the militant opposition tactics within and outside the National Assembly. The collision of these value systems and the different life-styles^{has} often resulted in the paralysis of the legislative process, and the domination by the executive branch in the law-making function in the National Assembly. It is no wonder that under these circumstances, the image of the nation's legislature has been deteriorating in the eyes of the public. Most important of all, the National Assembly has failed to resolve the great issues of the time through mediation and dialogue. In their struggle for power, politicians have lost touch with the general public and party politics has become a "game" among the elites.

Ultimately, Korean political parties should be judged on the basis of their contributions to political stability, government decision-making, and the general well-being of the Korean people.

An alien institution cannot be expected to take root in the short span of twenty-five years. It should be remembered that there is no immediate panacea for all the ills of Korean parties. The pathology of the Korean political parties described in the preceding pages has complex roots, and its cure lies in part in a careful examination of the Korean political tradition and an unwavering commitment to the values of liberal democracy on the part of both the leaders and the masses. Any improvement of the party system is likely to be piecemeal and gradual.

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