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The international relations of the French communist and socialist parties: 1968-1975.

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THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST PARTIES: 1968-1975

A Dissertation Presented

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ABSTRACT

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Collaborations between the two large parties of the Left in France have generally collapsed because of outstanding differences in international politics. So it was in 1939 and again after the war in 1947. This work examines the years 1968-1975, when Communists and Socialists were once again joined in collaboration, constructing a Union de la Gauche. Drawing upon data from those years, it is argued that the central factor is the particular power-bloc identities of the respective alliance partners. This factor is seen to be the ultimate determinant of the success or failure of the domestic alliance, since each of the two Parties is identified with its own world movement. The thesis explores the international policies of the PCF and PS - regarding defense, European integration and the Third World - to establish the viability of their alliance. The idea is developed that because each of the Parties identifies with - and has internalized the value system of - a rival power bloc, the long-term viability of the Left coalition is problematic. However, domestic factors of compelling force do suggest that the two Parties will remain allied for the short term, muting their more abrasive differences.

French Communists early in their development transferred their revolutionary élan to a new international, or foreign, identity. Today, there is much evidence that they continue to conceptualize in internationalist categories within the overall framework of bloc interests, namely the anti-imperialist "camp of peace and socialism." Paradoxically, Communists continue to hold themselves forth as a national, even patriotic, entity, carriers of a Jacobin legacy reaching back to 1789. Whether or not this contradiction or double identity can be resolved, remains to be seen. It is shown here, however, that without links to its world movement, the Communists lose much of their force. They and the world movement have reciprocal needs for each other. Since 1968 the PCF has, however, established a critical distance from its historic model in the East. Furthermore, it remains independent of other European Parties, rejecting any regional identity or Eurocommunist designation. This has put it at odds with some of the more autonomist Southern axis Parties of the Continent. Without seeking to establish a misleading symmetry, the idea is further developed that French Socialists are also asserting their own critical distance from classical European social democracy.

Exploring foreign policy behavior of the two Parties, the thesis identifies some significant role reversals from earlier periods. Thus the pre-war Socialists, embedded in pacifism and neutralism, have since the war, reversed this perspective. And in

recent years they have become articulate advocates of a formidable national defense policy. Communists, who rallied to the bourgeois Republic in the inter-war years, urging rearmament, today insist upon an independent France outside the blocs. They are even begiming to lead an embryonic disarmament campaign. It is shown that these reversals from long-held positions can be explained by the respective bloc identities of the two Parties. The PCF, despite Soviet actions in Afghanistan, Prague, consistently denies an aggressive intent to the USSR. For the Socialists, a bloc identity with a more social democratic Europe has legitimated for them the construction of Europe. Communists, who once heralded internationalism in their outlook, reject this construction. The thesis develops the idea that the PCF has not yielded its revolutionary élan. Rather, the realities of power-bloc politics have imposed themselves over earlier nineteenth century categories of class struggle.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the international policies of France's two major "socialist parties" from 1968 to 1975. Any study of Parti communiste français (PCF) and Parti socialiste français (PS) international behavior is at the same time an exploration of the link between domestic and international policies. Hence, from time-to-time the discussion here will cross the line between domestic politics and international relations. The two major opposition parties considered here are, after all, intimately involved in electoral and alliance strategies, while simultaneously entwined in complex international links. Thus the PCF continues to maintain ties to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the world Communist movement. The Socialists, too, have maintained some relationship to the Soviet Communists, but retain their basic affiliation with the Internationale socialiste. These interactions persisted during an era when the PS and PCF were themselves seeking an alliance. Thus the two parties engaged in their domestic role while simultaneously confronting the international environment. This raised questions regarding defense, Europe, national sovereignty, the world Communist movement, events in Czechoslovakia, Portugal, Chile and the Middle East, to cite only a few.

The Communist Parties of Western Europe have been largely excluded from participation in government for over thirty years. But by the nineteen seventies one could no longer assume that they would remain on the margins of power, or that they would always be in an opposition-party-role. Donald Blackmer, for example[1], considered it unlikely, but hardly impossible that they would one day return to participate. This would surely project their views and actions into significance for policymakers. It was an outcome which was not unthinkable if America's role in Europe declined, if Soviet influence were to grow on the Continent, or if détente were to be reestablished.

As Blackmer notes, the Communists of Italy and France have been active for well over half a century, and it is as yet undetermined where their ultimate allegiance lies. In some ways, "they are without question European parties, well rooted in their native soil and remarkably well adapted to the political and social context in which they operate."[2] In other respects, they have often behaved like foreign bodies whose heritage, organization and ideological loyalties have reflected the duality of their Leninist and Stalinist origins on the

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[1]Blackmer, "The International Strategy of the Italian Communist Party", in Blackmer and Annie Kriegel, The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France (Cambridge, Mass.: Center of International Affairs, Harvard University, 1975), p. 3. And six years later the PCF held several ministries in the Mitterrand Government that arrived in the Spring, 1981.

[2]Ibid., p. 3.

one hand, and native roots on the other. This ambivalent behavior will be seen througout the analysis here.

Given the scope of the subject, what can be learned from a study such as this? It is perhaps interesting to know PCF views towards nuclear defense, a supranational Europe and the German question. Or it is useful to know how the Socialists respond to European integration or issues concerning the Third World. But these policy investigations alone are not sufficient to understand the broader directions of the two Parties and their possible ability to govern jointly. Broadly stated, I shall seek to explain the foreign policies, attitudes and strategies of the respective parties, in order to determine the origins and rationale of their international behavior. I will seek to establish the historical givens that have shaped party attitudes and caused the current stresses and forces that have led to significant transformations in their international orientations.

The French Socialists, of course, operate as an independent entity. While they have their international affiliations, they have never been subject to a centrist organization abroad that could impose discipline and determine policies. The Communists present a different problem. Yet if it was once reasonable to assume that the European Communist Parties were mere extensions of Soviet diplomacy, such was no longer the case by the end of the 1960s. Too many intervening

variables have upset old relationships of earlier decades: de-Stalinization, the relaxation of East-West confrontation in Europe, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the economic resurgence of Europe, to cite only a few. All of these factors have compelled the European Parties to rethink old positions and loyalties to the original center in Moscow. These are aspects to be explored.

Significance of the Study:

1) There is an intrinsic value in locating and contrasting the world views of the mass social democratic and Leninist parties operating on the Continent. These are parties which intend, or put forth the pretension, to achieve power and enact political transformations.

2) The two parties are major forces in the French polity. During the eight years examined here, the PCF and PS formed an electoral alliance, and later a governmental program, under a unity of the left strategy, which by 1978 brought them close to a narrow margin of electoral success. In other words, Western European communism nearly emerged from its post-war opposition status into a governmental role.

3) Even in opposition, the two parties strongly influence the international environment.

The PCF throughout its history has tended to assign primacy to questions of foreign policy. Yet some have argued that despite this priority, French Communism has essentially failed in its efforts to influence and determine the major international issues of this century. Jacques Fauvet, in an anniversary essay marking the 50th birthday of the PCF on Christmas, 1920, presents the case.[3] He cites a list of historical political circumstances in which PCF positions were unable to prevail. Thus the Communists, despite widespread efforts, were unable to halt the Rif colonial war in North Africa in the 1920s. They were unsuccessful in preventing France's occupation of the Ruhr following World War I, an internationalist position they maintained in support of the German Communists of that time. The PCF could not prevent France's participation in the Munich accords; nor was it able to reverse the non-intervention policy of the Blum Government during the Spanish Civil War. All these were high priority goals of PCF international policy during the interwar years. Fauvet's list continues: Following the Second World War, the PCF failed in such major objectives as blocking French participation in the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Alliance and the EEC. They could not prevent France's wars in Indo-China and Algeria, nor could they reverse her ultimate support for the rearming of Germany.

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[3] Le Monde, December 25, 1970, pp. 1 and 11.

Do these historical failings justify Fauvet's conclusion that the French Communists have been mere marginal bystanders unable to influence foreign policy? Have they been constantly defeated on the salient international questions that have arisen for France in this century? This will be a central inquiry of this dissertation.

Generally, it will be argued here that the French Communists have a significant policy influence that must be reckoned with. In fact, one could cite an equally long list of postwar PCF international goals which have ultimately been realized. If the PCF was unable to prevent the rearming of Germany, its actions did contribute significantly to the defeat of the European Defense Community in the 1950s.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the PCF sought such goals as a French rapprochement with the USSR, establishment of ties with China, withdrawal from NATO, a slowdown in the construction of a united Europe, recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), destruction of the Franco, Salazar and Greek-Colonels' regimes in Southern Europe, a Communist victory in Indo-China. If these were idle dreams and wishful thoughts in the 1960s, they had become reality by 1975. The point is not that the PCF necessarily brought about all these results (clearly the policies of Gaullism were significant). But they were influential. These were tangible policies repeatedly and often urgently demanded

over the years in the pages of L' Humanité and in the resolutions of the Communist Party apparatus itself--all of which were ultimately realized. The point is a simple one: if much of the international political framework which French Communists once sought ultimately became reality by the 1970s, then it would be imprudent to dismiss lightly the international programs and aspirations urged by Communists today. This does not mean that the international framework envisaged by the PCF today foreshadows outcomes in coming decades. The point is that their policies bear watching.

One can note certain attributes of non-ruling European CPs which endow them with special significance and distinguish them from other parties in Western Europe: for example their access channels to certain power centers. Thus in 1968 the de Gaulle Government was powerless in urging the Soviet Union not to invade Czechoslovakia. (In fact it was a frequent Gaullist complaint that France was never in a strong enough position to influence the policies of the superpowers.) But the French Communist Party (and the other CPs of Europe) are at times positioned where they have leverage unavailable to the government parties of their respective states. It will be shown that the PCF and the Italian Communists (PCI) initiated powerful efforts in the summer of 1968 to discourage the Soviet invasion. Even though they failed, one cannot deny the force and significance of their efforts. It is the ability of

European CPs to invoke leverage such as this, coupled with their privileged access to Soviet policymakers, which helps to explain the force of the ties that continue to bind them to the CPSU.[4]

It is even simpler to make the case for the influence of the Socialists: they have been an active government party at various times since the 1930s and during the post-war years up until the early years of the Fifth Republic. In electoral strength, they were the leading party on the left during the period reviewed here.

Methodology. The task of gathering data and information for this inquiry has been essentially one of determining policy positions, decisions and outcomes sought by the two parties in question. Do the Communists accept a forward defense strategy in Europe and the emplacement of Pluton missiles? Have they derived any conclusions from the failure of the peaceful road to socialism in Chile? Will the Socialists accept a tout azimut nuclear defense? Have they particular views on the role of U.S. multinational corporations in Europe? Answers to questions such as these will constitute much of the data here. The span of the inquiry is the respective positions of the two parties (or possible factions within them) on the hundreds of policy questions arising in the eight-year period. I will confine the inquiry to a

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[4]This access role is further shown by the ability of the PCI's Sergio Segre to facilitate the several years of discussions that occurred between Willy Brandt's delegation from the SPD and that of the SED (the Communists of the GDR). See Le Monde, October 28, 1970, p. 3.

finite, workable number of policy areas. This inquiry can not provide an exhaustive compendium of the positions of the two parties on all conceivable foreign policy areas; this would present a staggering and unmanageable bulk of data. The criteria in determining critical policy areas are my own. I identified those policy areas which appeared important, because of the heat and debate they generated, or because of the attention they received in party publications and Central Committee resolutions. The international questions I shall address concern defense, Europe, relations with the super powers, relations with respective international movements and policies regarding the Third World (particularly Africa, where France continues to be engaged politically and economically).

Given the nature of the data, most of the sources used were official party sources, resolutions, programs, national congresses, and the party press, such as L' Humanité, Cahiers du Communisme and others, all of which are detailed in my bibliography. Of particular value has been Le Monde, since it provides a chronicle of the major policy issues and debates that have surfaced in French public life. I have sought to gain a deeper understanding through interviews with officials of the respective parties, US and French journalists who covered these parties, Embassy people, and a half a dozen scholars and authors in the field who have provided me with insights on two European political parties which,

at the outset, were rather arcane to me. The interviews I obtained in Paris with officials of the Communist and Socialist Parties were invaluable not so much for the substantive information they provided (it is unlikely that such persons will deviate significantly from official policy), but for the opportunity to discuss, probe and debate. This highlighted certain aspects, emphases and passions often unobtainable from the printed pages of party resolutions.

The PS is a lively, democratic political party, fraught with factions and tendencies that often present a morass of policies. At an earlier stage of this inquiry I asked a Socialist official his party's policy on an issue of national defense. His reply: "Which Socialist Party?"

When dealing with the Communists it is easier to find a definite line, but attempts to derive PCF beliefs exclusively from their resolutions, texts and party press can be misleading. It is an oversimplification to attribute views to a party leadership that is conceived as monolithic or of one mind on major issues. However, simplifications are necessary to ascertain the world view of the PCF. Nevertheless, the world view that the PCF projects is a coherent one, that is it is generally consistent during a particular period. It is this consistency which allows limited generalizations. Views of Party intellectuals, historians and others in Party forums and journals will be treated as essentially

valid reflections of official thinking, since even minor divergencies from orthodoxy are rare when dealing with Communist Parties.

CHAPTER II

FRENCH SOCIALISM: ITS INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES SINCE 1870

The early Third Republic, although occupied with domestic issues, such as the Dreyfus Affair and the clerical problem, faced two major international questions:

- Relations with an assertive and now unified Germany.
- Attitudes towards expansion of the French Empire.

These foreign policy issues compelled the newly formed socialist groupings and parties to design international strategies and perspectives going beyond earlier exhortations of working class brotherhood.[1]

The next section will briefly survey and explain the international behavior of the various French socialist movements and factions during what Robert Wohl has termed the "muddy waters of the pre-war period."[2]

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[1]The revolutionaries of that era could not isolate themselves from international currents. French and European socialists were part of (or loosely affiliated with) an international organization, the Second International, lending them a more worldly perspective.

[2]Wohl, French Communism in the Making, 1914-1924 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. VI.

Early Socialist Formations and Parties

Before the formation of the Section française de l'internationale ouvrière (SFIO) in 1905, France lacked a single, disciplined Socialist Party, such as existed across the Rhine (or would later form in Britain). Rather, a variety of contending movements had emerged out of the chaos of the Paris Commune.

French working class parties, unlike the British Labour Party, for example, did not grow out of the unions. Trade unions were not legal until 1884 in France, well after the various socialist groups were functioning. This contrasts with Britain, where unions appeared first, and themselves helped form the Labour Party. In France, many workers had grown alienated from traditional party politics and distrusted their socialist politicians. Many turned towards syndicalism, which urged direct economic action in the workplace itself, rather than political or parliamentary methods. The General Strike was their strategy for both gaining reforms and ultimately seizing power for social transformation.

The historic dispute between anarcho-syndicalists and Marxists, then, was largely over whether the class struggle should be expressed through insurrectionary trade unions or through political parties. The

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[3] See David Thompson, Democracy in France Since 1870 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 48-49. He contrasts the Confédération Générale du travail and British trade unions. German workers organizations were well controlled by the Social Democratic Party.

latter, around whom were grouped Jules Guesde and Paul Lafargue, had organized the Parti ouvrier in 1883, a faction oriented towards traditional class struggle.

Socialists believing in parliamentary action were further split over the question of ministerial participation. Should the working class parties owe allegiance to the existing Radical (that is non-socialist) ministries? The more reformist factions urged cooperation with bourgeois ministries. The more doctrinaire Guesdists rejected such arrangements.

Jean Jaurès, a more reformist-minded leader of the left, would ultimately issue his passionate call for a "defense of the Republic" strategy, particularly when the events surrounding the Dreyfus affair appeared to endanger the Republic itself. When the reformist Socialist, Millerand, actually joined the Radical Ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau, many on the left interpreted this as a betrayal.

The dispute over ministerialism split the Jaurès and Guesde blocs and remained an obstacle to the elusive unity sought by Jaurès.[4]

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[4]Wohl, French Communism in the Making, p. 11. Guesdists and Blanquists went on to form their own party, the Parti socialiste de France, while Jaurès formed his Parti socialiste français. For a discussion of syndicalism, see G.D.H. Cole, Socialist Thought: The Second International, vol. III (London: MacMillan and Co., 1967), pp. 382-388. Syndicalists assimilated George Sorel's notions of heroic class war. It is often termed the direct heir of the unfulfilled egalitarianism promised by the Revolution of 1789, evoking a strain later co-opted by the French Communists.

Jaurès, a towering figure of the socialist movement, argued for the conversion of capitalist property relations into social property, but he advocated a transformation within France's humanistic and democratic tradition. Socialism could not be installed by a minority. Guesde, also a major figure in French socialism, adhered to a more rigid, Marxian approach: working class politics should not seek gains through employer bargaining, but should actually seize the means of production and the state. He visualized a party organizationally similar to the German Social Democrats, centralized and strictly disciplined.[5]

In 1904, the Second International supported Guesde on the issue of ministerialism and instructed the various factions of French socialism to seek unity. A year later, at the Congress of Unity in Paris, the Parti Socialiste (SFIO) was formed, marking an alliance of Guesdist revolutionaries and Jaurèsian reformists.

Yet there remained basic differences with deep theoretical roots tracing back to the rival Jacobin conceptions of democracy that had

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[5]Harvey Goldberg, The Life of Jean Jaurès (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), pp. 242 and 261. The German Social Democrats had immense prestige in the years before World War I. By 1914, they had a membership ten-times larger than the SFIO. See Wohl, p. 19. Jaurès was not overwhelmed by the prestige of these Social Democrats: they lacked the democratic revolutionary tradition of France. Because they "never conquered universal suffrage on the barricades," they could not comprehend the collaborationist strategies of French Socialists in their "defense of the Republic" position. p. 328.

emerged from the French Revolution. These contending notions continue to haunt the relationship between French Marxists. Ronald Tiersky identifies one segment of French marxism which developed with Jacobin roots. It based itself on a General Will theory of democracy--volonté du peuple.[6] Any political group representing this general will would attempt to invoke its inherent rectitude. And, such a group saw no need for an internal structural opposition. Any embodiment of this will could overrule all opposition. This form of one-party conception clearly clashed with classical bourgeois democracy deriving from the British Liberals and Montesquieu, who argued that tyranny would inevitably follow from arrangements lacking a structural opposition. Disputes arising from these rival conceptions form a recurring motif among left parties.

Early Socialist International Perspectives

Described thus far is a brief background on different Socialist groups. After 1905 the earlier disputes over Millerandism and syndicalism declined in significance. If Guesde first appears to be the victor at the Congress of Unity, it is ultimately Jaurès who emerges as the dominant force in French Socialism between 1905 and World War I. During that decade, a new issue surfaces: national defense. On one level, the argument over defense repeated in another form the issues raised by

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[6]Ronald Tiersky, French Communism: 1920-1972 (New York: Columbia Univeristy Press, 1974), pp. 8 and 9.

Millerandism. It posed the question of what obligations, if any, the working classes had to support bourgeois regimes. At the same time, it confronted the Socialists with their national and international identities.

Socialism's classical outlook had been internationalist. The very lives of the uprooted intellectuals of post-1848 Europe, exiled from one country to another, fostered an internationalist perspective. For these revolutionaries the struggle for socialism implied an international proletariat whose components had stronger ties to each other than to any national entity. In Schumpeter's glib formulation, "having no country himself, Marx readily convinced himself that the proletariat had none."[7]

Despite these internationalist perspectives, many of the leaders accepted the reality and force of national identity. Harvey Goldberg has pointed out that Jaurès "accepted the nationstate as the basic unit in world politics, and neither as socialist nor as internationalist did he anticipate that it would soon wither away.[8]

> In the present state of humanity, where our only organization is on the basis of nationality, social property will take the form of national property. But the action of the proletariat will assume more and more an international character. ... but for a

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[7]Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 312.

[8]Goldberg, op. cit., p. 304.

> long time to come the nation as such will furnish the historical setting of socialism: it will be the mould in which the new justice will be cast.[9]

The German question. Much of the French foreign policy debate in the 1890s focused on Germany. Revanchards urged the repossession of Alsace-Lorraine by force. Various Republican ministries sought Russia as an ally to balance German power. The Socialists, however, had doubts about an alliance with Tsarism. Guesde thought it risky for France to throw herself into the arms of Russia in order to purchase security from Germany. Jaurès at first invoked "defense of the Republic" as the rationale for a flirtation with Russia. But as his parliamentary career matured, he, along with other Socialists, sought an accommodation with Germany, rather than a revanchiste solution. Alsace-Lorraine was not to be recovered by force; this violated Jaurès' deep commitment to peaceful solutions of international problems.

> Jaurès now looked across the Rhine to the militants of German socialism. Here, he felt was the real hope for the future of Franco-German relations; for once the Social Democrats had won power, he predicted, old disputes would be resolved and the damage of 1870 repaired.[10]

The Confédération générale du travail (CGT), too, which we have

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[9] Jean Jaurès, Studies in Socialism (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1906), p. 8. Jaurès, despite a basic pacifism, affirmed Marx's view that the revolution might be preceded by decades of strife.

[10] Goldberg, p. 199.

seen was quite independent of political parties, had strong feelings about a rapprochement with Germany, as the war threat mounted. Its hope was that the concerted actions of French and German workers, acting through their unions, could thwart any efforts of the European ruling classes to launch a war.[11] However, the syndicalists of the CGT could not enlist the cooperation of their counterparts in the German unions. German unions lacked the political independence of the CGT. Such international coordination, they insisted, had to be arranged on a party-to-party level.

While important segments of French public life, from conservatives to Radicals, were eager to settle the score with Germany, the socialists of all factions were largely immune from this national obsession. Most envisioned a reconciliation with Germany, looking to the growing success of the working class parties across the Rhine and a possible entente of friendly proletarian states in Western Europe.[12]

Colonial expansion and the parties of the left. The early socialists were often ambivalent regarding the question of imperialism.[13] One might

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[11] Cole, op. cit. p. 363.

[12] Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 380.

[13] Marx himself had at first viewed colonialism as a progressive historical force, since it would raise the level of productive forces in the backward lands. Later, as in his writings on India, he would reverse this position.

say that the response of the various socialist factions towards France's expansion into the realms of Equatorial Africa, Morocco, Madagascar and Indo-China varied from a kind of benign indifference in the 1870s and 1880s to one of opposition thirty years later. As late as the 1890s, Jaurès did not oppose colonial ventures. His position had reformist overtones: he would oppose further expansion; at the same time he would campaign to improve conditions in the existing colonies.[14] The Socialist leader did not speak out on the Moroccan venture until late in 1903, when he attacked the military groups and the colons who sought to seize forcibly large slices of North Africa. But opposition was not absolute. As Goldberg notes, "he accepted as valid both a French interest and a French mission in North Africa. It was important 'to police the Sud-Oronais vigorously and vigilantly,' and then to carry to Morocco the benefits of Western Civilization." Jaurès apparently had some belief in France's ennobling, civilizing mission.[15]

It was only by 1907 that various socialists opposed expansion into Morocco. But the impetus was not a basic anti-colonialist commitment to self-determination. Rather, it was a fear that such adventures could lead to a general European war. If there was any moral revulsion,

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[14]Goldberg, p. 340.

[15]Ibid., pp. 343-344 and 203. Jaurès and other socialists, in their desire for Franco-German reconciliation, were prepared to tolerate colonial ventures. Empire building was legitimate if done with German approval: as quid pro quo for France's having yielded Alsace-Lorraine.

it stemmed from occasional shared notions of injustice. Note Jaurès' address to the Chamber on June 28, 1912, at a time when France was consolidating its protectorate over Morocco:

> All of those peoples, who have seemed inert ... and sunk deep in an eternal sleep, are now awakening, demanding their rights, flexing their muscles. The races of Africa and Asia, the peoples of Japan, China, and India, now linked to the rest of the world through railroads, are stirring .....[16]

The Revolutionary Syndicalists took a more anti-colonial line than other parties: this derived more from their basic anti-militarism. They saw little gain from adventures into African expansion. To support such ventures only enmeshed political parties in the schemes of the bourgeois state.

The question of national defense. The issues that surfaced over colonial expansion foreshadowed many of the disputes that later arose among socialists regarding the question of war and national defense--which were to haunt the socialists until the outbreak of war in 1914. The syndicalists took the most extreme stand against defense. Their Manifesto of 1902 urged army conscripts either to desert or to propagandize against war directly in the barracks. In 1908 the syndicalists of the CGT committed themselves to a general strike if war were to break out. But such strategies were extreme in the view of many socialists. Even

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[16]Cited in Goldberg, p. 427.

Jaurès held that socialism required an essential loyalty to the nation as well as to the brotherhood of man. After all, the nationstate was still the basic unit claiming attention. Furthermore, the nationstate would remain even after the revolution: men still derived their basic identities from language, culture, and common historical experiences. Therefore, even the working class stood to lose if its nation were conquered. It was not a realistic policy merely to oppose invading armies from abroad with general strikes and insurrections, as Gustave Hervé was urging.[17]

These disputes gathered force as the threat of war grew in Europe. The Socialists were arguing among themselves a key strategic-ideological question of priorities: should they expend energies to prevent a war--or should they direct their actions towards the social revolution? Fear of an all-European war gradually nudged Jaurès into the camp of the internationalists. He believed that the Second International should increasingly divert its efforts to the preservation of peace. Such a view directly conflicted with other factions within the SFIO in the years preceeding World War I. Hervé, of course, articulated the sentiments of the most radical of the "anti-patriots" within the recently merged party:

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[17] Paradoxically, Jaurès was capable of uttering the rhetoric of proletarian internationalism. Thus at the Stuttgart Congress in 1911: "Il n'y a ni socialisme français, ni socialisme allemand, ni socialisme belge: il y a un socialisme ouvrier, un socialisme prolétarien commun à tous les pays où la civilisation industrielle développée a marqué nettement l'antagonisme des classes." Annie Kriegel, Aux Origines du Communisme Français: 1914-1920 (Paris: Mouton, 1964), p. 41.

outbreak of war would be the signal to change the social system.[18]

Guesde took a third position. He dismissed the Hervé stance as anarchistic, that could only lead to a futile, romantic insurrection. He also characterized Jaurès' campaign against war and imperialism as a waste of effort. Operating within his own narrow framework (a kind of crude Marxism), he quite logically pointed out that since war and imperialism were endemic to capitalism, they would disappear only when capitalism did. Thus anti-militarism was a diversion. Working class parties should devote themselves to opposing capitalism.

Given these disagreements, Jaurès could only seek to bridge the gaps in the socialist movement. His was a struggle to reconcile a profound wish for peace with an inherent instinct of patriotism. By 1906 at the SFIO's Congress of Limoges, he, along with Edouard Vaillant,[19] set forth a resolution that foreshadowed ideas that would later be expressed in his L'Armée Nouvelle. It pledged patriotic working class support of a defensive war, but not of an aggressive war launched by

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[18]Hervé's position was one of total anti-patriotism and anti-militarism: the "workers would lose nothing if their nation were conquered." is how Goldberg formulates it. op. cit., p. 351. Those who had the greatest love affair with revolutionary violence, seemed to be the most passionately anti-military. Hervé's appeal was to those most under the influence of Sorel, who appeared to want to drown every rationalist advance from the Enlightenment onward in a revolution of violence.

[19]Vaillant was a veteran of the Paris Commune; thus he endowed Jaurès' position with solid revolutionary credentials.

France. The latter would be opposed by all means: parliamentary action, protests and even insurrectionary strikes.

A year later, European socialists gathered at the Stuttgart Congress to formulate a position on the recurring question of war and revolution. Did a fundamentally anti-capitalist position free the socialists of Europe from the responsibility to defend their respective nations? A celebrated compromise resolution was devised, incorporating the collective wisdom of some of Europe's leading revolutionaries. While it did not go so far as to endorse the extremist Hervé line of anti-patriotism, it did not reject the general strike.[20]

Jaurès and L'Armée Nouvelle. Anti-militarism had been an instinct of left politicians and Republican thinking generally. The army was suspect since it represented basically authoritarian aspects of France.[21] The Dreyfus Affair heightened these instincts. Yet defenders of the Republic could not realistically ignore the ultimate need for a defensive arm to contend with the latent threat of war with Germany. This was Jaurès' dilemma. Much of his intellectual and political effortwas an attempt to

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[20] Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg insisted on a clause to the effect that if war nevertheless arrived, the duty of the working class was to convert the ensuing chaos into an all-out assault on capitalism. See Goldberg, p. 383 and Cole, pp. 59-69.

[21] "Every sou spent on increasing France's military power seemed to strengthen the social classes most dangerous to the survival of the Republic," according to David Thompson, op. cit., p. 129. Note, however, that the Radical Party of the late ninteenth century largely renounced its earlier Republican anti-militarism. Many radical ministries actively supported aggressive overseas expansion policies.

bridge the gap between patriotism and opposition to war within the socialist movement, certainly a prerequisite to any form of unity. Hence in his celebrated book of 1911, L'Armée Nouvelle, he envisioned the formation of a popular army to replace the standing army. Such a people's militia, rallied in times of national defense, could not serve as an instrument of aggressive wars. The threat to France was from Germany, whose forces would launch a quick, decisive, offensive war. Hence, the existing professional army on the frontiers would be of little value. Rather, France required a vast, popular army of trained reserves with genuine ties to the people. It did not need a military sect, remote from the people. Jaurès' plan had the further advantage that the defense force could not be used for repression against the people.[22]

Jaurès' conception had deep historical roots. The notion of "every citizen a soldier" reached back to the Revolution, when it had been invoked to assure the defense of a free nation. In theory, all the sons of France were to be enrolled in her defense. The "nation in arms" concept is Jacobin in origin, since by suppressing the permanent armies, it represented a genuine arming of the people. It has been argued by some that acceptance by the socialists of the "nation in arms" concept

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[22] G.D.H. Cole claims that Jaurès' proposal was unworkable in isolation, but had to be part of a world-wide socialist arrangement (which presupposed the victory of socialism in Europe). France's unilateral creation of a people's militia would have been an impotent step given the scale of great power defensive preparations in the year's following 1911. Ibid., pp. 376-377.

could only have occurred when the party was starting to grow reformist. Richard Challener points out that class solidarity was starting to wane and socialists were beginning to distinguish between nations. In many ways Jaurès' book derived from his earlier views. Recall that he had inspired the view that all French workers indeed had a patrie.[23]

Today, it is interesting to note, Communist historians of that period embrace Jaurès' conception. Louis Baillot states that when the Jaurès book first appeared, "Anarcho-syndicalist currents and anti-militarist conceptions prevailed within the working class .... impregnating it with bourgeois ideas. But it was Jaurès who courageously restored ideas of patrie and an armed nation."[24]

Socialist doctrine and war. In reviewing the pre-World War I period, one would have to acknowledge that the Jaurèsian synthesis triumphed in its major domestic objectives: it prevailed in the Republican

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[23]See Richard D. Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms: 1866-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 70-71.

[24]Louis Baillot, "L'Armée et la Voie démocratique au socialism," Cahiers du Communisme, March 1976, p. 187. The French Communists by 1920 would reject the "nation in arms", opposing all militarism and conscription. See Challener, p. 165. Today, the Jaurès concept can be reinvoked because it corresponds to current Communist views on defense:

> Far from seeking to destroy the army, as our enemies pretend, we wish to give the nation the army it needs and to assure to it the mission, structure, weapons and working conditions which will free it from the impasse that the policies of the current regime have placed it, Cahiers du Communisme, p. 190.

struggles over church and army, in winning labor's right to organize legally. But in the realm of international politics the Socialists were not destined to triumph. It was not they who were defining France's new world role. And it was international politics that would now dominate Europe on the eve of war and revolution.

The relationship of war to revolution has historically been ambiguous in the Marxian framework. Classical socialists viewed war as a carnage which would only decimate the working class, and the workers had little at stake in such battles because of their essential alienation from the bourgeois state. Later strategists of revolution perceived that war might perhaps have a certain instrumental value. Might it not lead to the social breakdown so vital to revolutionaries? On the eve of war, European Socialists manifested a range of attitudes towards war.

For example, classical Leninists sought to resolve any ambiguity on the issue. They refused to allow any "defense of the nation" doctrine to be confused by non-historical abstractions that could justify any kind of participation. Leninists would decide whether or not to join in a *défense de la patrie* by forming a judgment on the war's efficacy in furthering the revolutionary moment. In other words, they would attempt to apply class notions of the just war, inquiring about the nature of the political relations between the warring states. Was an oppressor fighting an oppressed state? Or was it a war of imperialist

spoils between two equally oppressive states? In the latter case there would be a duty to exploit the chaos, converting it into a revolutionary situation.[25]

European Socialists in the years before 1914 agitated against war and the alliances likely to unleash it. The Second International in 1907 attributed war to capitalism and its "rivalry for world markets". But if capitalism were to launch a war, the proletariat would unleash a revolutionary struggle to conquer peace. The aim, Annie Kriegel suggests, was to bind the bourgeoisie in a dilemma: while the proletariat hardly needed a war to reach socialism, the outbreak of war would only hasten the conditions bringing about the revolution.[26]

Jaurès' position on war was not free from contradictions. As usual, he merged the rhetoric of revolution with reformism; internationalism with patriotism. But the essence of his thinking amounted to a kind of "just war" doctrine: that offensive and defensive wars could be distinguished. Socialists had a duty to revolt if France launched the former. But if attacked, the working class would rally to the Republic as described in his L'Armée Nouvelle.

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[25]Kriegel, Aux Origins du Communisme Français, p. 35

[26]Ibid., see her discussion, pp. 37-38.

The syndicalist-minded CGT had its own point of view. It would oppose any war, regardless of cause, invoking familiar notions of the general strike and the fact that the workers had no country. Guesde very logically rebutted such an argument, pointing out that it would simply condemn the nation with the more advanced working class movement to a defeat by the one with the more backward.

World War I, Bolshevism and the Left

The foregoing represents the range of views held by Socialists; and these views were guaranteed to generate lively debates at party gatherings. But events were to overtake these debates. War intervened. Jaurès was assassinated, and Socialist deputies voted unanimously for war credits. The Jaurèssian synthesis, hammered out in the 1905 Congress of Unity, was shattered. Its two major underpinnings were scrapped:

1) Anti-Ministerialism. Socialists now entered bourgeois government, with Guesde and Marcel Sembat joining Poincaré's national union cabinet.

2) Internationalism. This doctrine was dead for the duration. The SFIO severed all ties with the Socialist Parties of the Central Powers.

"Fifteen years of anti-militarism and talk of insurrection swept away in a few mad hours ...."[27] Perhaps this behavior is less astonishing if one accepts the implications of Kriegel's argument that

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[27] Wohl, pp. 52 and 54.

Guesde, Vaillant and Jaurès were in reality patriots all along. French working class patriotism was hardly born in 1914, but reached back to the Jacobin stirrings of 1792. The point is that these dormant passions were resurfacing in 1914, as the Socialists joined the Union sacrée.

Bolshevism confronts the French left. As the carnage of trench war wore on, anti-war sentiment began to surge, particularly among the disillusioned remnants of class conscious socialists and syndicalists. It was their leaders who travelled to Zimmerwald in September, 1915, the first wartime gathering of Europe's revolutionary socialists. Zimmerwald was significant in that it defied the established leaderships of Europe's Socialist Parties. Even more important, Zimmerwald marked the first step on the road to the creation of the Third International. In fact, this war-time conference in Switzerland marked Lenin's debut on the world political stage. It was there that he implored the French delegates to launch a massive opposition to the war.

Zimmerwaldist opposition spread to the SFIO and CGT; links were established with Trotsky and other Russian exiles in France, who were urging a Bolshevik-style "revolutionary defeatism" on the French left. Most of the left rejected these extremist calls. Yet the Union sacrée was beginning to loom as a terrible tragedy. More moderate Socialists rallied to Wilson's call for a negotiated non-annexationist peace with Germany. Socialists within the government coalition were for the first

time articulating different war aims from France's other political parties.

Russia's 1917 Revolution offered further ambiguities to the moderate leftists. While it was a defeat for autocracy (legitimating Russia as a democratic ally), it threatened a military collapse on the Russian front. SFIO Majoritaires, Pierre Renaudel and Albert Thomas (the two pro-war Socialists in the Cabinet) wanted Russia to remain in the war, urging her acceptance of Wilsonian war aims, rather than signing a separate peace. But Poincaré refused to allow Socialist delegates to meet with their Russian and German counterparts in Stockholm, placing further strains on the Union sacrée.

The October Revolution split the French left even further. Lenin's famous call for general peace talks (made over the heads of governments) galvanized the anti-war Socialists. But the Majoritaires, dreading an imminent Bolshevik separate peace (freeing countless new German divisions to fight France), gave their support to French intervention against Lenin's revolution. Minoritaires, on the other hand, hailed the Revolution and increasingly fell under the sway of Lenin and Trotsky.

Few seemed to notice it, Wohl notes, but an historical corner had been turned; "the mystique of the Russian Revolution had become a weapon

in the internal politics of the French working class movement."[28]

But Bolshevism was more than a mystique. Lenin and Trotsky were setting forth their own priorities for a new international political order to prevail in Europe:

1) Formation of a new International, break with social democracy.

2) An end to Allied intervention in Russia.

3) Revolutionary seizure of power by socialists in Europe.[29]

This summons had a key effect on the French left. In 1919 there was a surge of popular sympathy for the Russian Bolsheviks. This sentiment must be examined, since it led to the historic "grafting of Bolshevik theory and practice into the several powerful and often contradictory traditions of French socialism".[30] Here is how the various factions reacted to the Bolshevik summons:

Majoritaires: The Right Wing of the SFIO clustered around Léon Blum. It opposed the 21 conditions for adherence to the Third International. As social democrats they denied that Bolshevism had any universal value: it was

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[28] Wohl, p. 86. The Bolsheviks inspired admiration on the left, fear on the right. Many now saw two enemies - the national enemy, Germany, and the new social enemy, the Third International, in Moscow. See Thompson, p. 194-195.

[29] The Russians were optimistic about their international political prospects: European-wide revolution seemed likely in the advanced countries, and was in fact spreading from Budapest to Bavaria. See Kriegel, pp. 268-269.

[30] Tiersky, p. 13.

irreconcilable with France's democratic heritage.

Minoritaires: These were traditional style Socialists, wrestling with Jaurès' old dilemma of reconciling patriotism and internationalism. Many of the more democratic and Jacobin elements were quite sympathetic to the Bolshevik seizure of power, but in the long run they probably preferred the ideas of Wilson or the Declaration of the Rights of Man, rather than any serious attempts to universalize the Bolshevik Revolution.[31]

Zimmerwaldists: They derived largely from the pre-war left wing. Well-grounded in syndicalism , they could easily transfer much of their passion to the new Russian reality. They represented tendencies that would be drawn to the new Communist Party to be formed in 1920.

Wohl and George Lichtheim offer interesting psychological interpretations for the left's allegiance to the soviet patrie: according to them, French sympathizers were not admiring the Russian reality so much, "but their own revolution, the one they had failed to make in 1919-1920."[32]

The international prospects for France's once unified Socialists were now in disarray. The policy of war socialism had failed. And when the Communists won a majority of delegates at the Tours Congress in 1920, it aligned a large segment of the left with Russian policies.

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[31] Wohl, p. 127

[32] Wohl, pp. 203-204. Also see George Lichtheim, Marxism in Modern France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 70-71.

Reformism, which had sacrificed so much in the Union sacrée, had received little in return. In fact, none of the international and foreign policy objectives that the SFIO had sought in the Union sacrée were met by Clemenceau:

1) Socialists were unable to moderate French war aims. Their dream of a non-annexationist peace was doomed.

2) Socialists were powerless to prevent intervention in Russia.

In sum, moderate social democracy emerged from the war with no voice in French foreign policy. It again posed the classic Socialist dilemma of collaboration with a bourgeois state. This time collaboration yielded no dividends. The logic of SFIO policies led to the Union sacrée, but class collaboration came tied in a nationalist foreign policy. As Wohl notes, one could not be had without the other. Many on the left wanted to return to an earlier Jaurèssian synthesis, wrapped in Wilsonian trimmings of a new international order. But the intervention of the Bolshevik Revolution unleashed new historical variables, and conferred a mistaken, but powerful prestige on the more extremist and undemocratic portions of French socialism.

The French Left between the Wars

French Communism, despite national roots, was an international creation. Lenin and Trotsky, having concluded that the SFIO was reformist,

hardly a structure to make a revolution, were resolved from the start to split the French left, to drive out the rightists. And after the split at Tours, they would continue to shape the Party towards Bolshevik requirements, despite their changed perceptions on the likelihood of revolution. France, after all, was important to the Russians; it held world power status[33] and had been a natural ally since Tsarist times in the event that an anti-German alliance was needed. Hence, there would always be a special interest in the Parti communiste français. And when the Russian Bolsheviks went through their own bureaucratization, they would impose their organizational maxims on other sections of the International, including the PCF. By 1924, one could describe a PCF that was:

- More proletarian in its values, composition and behavior.
- More centralist, in that its various sections lost initiative to the center.
- More internationalist, in that its leaders would yield to the requirements of the Soviet Union (or the International).

The French Communists were more persuaded than ever of their inherent rectitude, or what Tiersky terms their self-assigned role of the vanguard. Whether inherited from the Bolsheviks or acquired by historical osmosis, the claim was asserted that the pre-1914 mandate to represent the people was given over by history to the Communist Parties: that

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[33] Lenin and Trotsky had always taken a special interest in the young PCF; France was one of the centers of world imperialism, and they recognized her status as a world power. Compare this with the contempt the Soviets held for post World War II France.

a latent revolutionary legitimacy derived from the Party's vanguard and tribune roles in French life.[34]

Given the structural changes in the PCF and its special relationship to the world movement, it will be helpful to examine certain foreign policy positions in these early years.

German Policy. The PCF opposed the Versailles settlement for three reasons:

1) Anti-colonialism: Poincaré's slogan "make the Germans pay" and his later occupation of the Rhineland were construed as a kind of colonialism imposed on the vanquished by the Allies.

2) Revolutionary politics: Comintern policy was now urging solidarity with the German workers. While prospects for revolution had cooled in France, the young PCF would seek to prevent any French intervention against Germany's revolution.[35]

3) Internationalism: The Russians, eager to emerge from postwar isolation, were reaching out to Germany, as evidenced by the ties established at Rapallo. The argument has been made that the PCF was for the first time serving Comintern policies and furthering Soviet diplomatic interests (a recurring argument in nearly all examinations of PCF behavior).

Colonialism. Opposition to imperialism was not a central policy issue of either the PCF or the SFIO in the 1920s. The pre-war SFIO, we

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[34] Tiersky, French Communism, p. 84.

[35] Ibid., p. 34.

saw, came to oppose colonial adventures. But this was more from a fear of war than from a fundamental opposition. The PCF, despite its internationalization of the Leninist stand on imperialism, also gave the issue a low priority.

To understand PCF behavior, one must understand that the colonies of the French Empire had their own embryonic, and often weak federations of socialists.[36] They often had a different perspective from that of the Comintern. Algerian Socialists, for example, although affiliated with the Third International, went so far as to reject the idea of a colonial liberation movement. In their analysis, Algeria's social revolution was derivative; it was tied to the success of the social revolution in France.[37] Hence it was futile to struggle for a Communist Algeria (Tunisia or Morocco) until France fulfilled its own revolution.

It can be said that the PCF was lax on colonial issues because the problem had not ripened fully and would not until after 1946. When the issue did surface, the Party took an anti-colonial stand, as shown in the 1923 struggle for Moroccan independence: the Rif War. Because the SFIO took a weak stand, only the PCF could claim to champion

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[36] Ho Chi Minh was himself present at the Tours Congress.

[37] Marx himself in earlier writings justified colonialism, such as a British rule in India, as a progressive stage, since it raised the level of productive forces towards capitalist levels.

colonial self-determination.[38]

Some broader perspectives. Before examining the Popular Front period, some general conclusions about the international context within which the two leftist parties were operating may be useful.

The Communist Parties of Europe, despite the abandonment of the world revolutionary doctrine, nevertheless comprised a functioning international movement. By contrast, the Socialists (and this surely applies to the SFIO) lacked any universal or world appeal. The latter were urging the parliamentary road to power, implying a model that could advance only on a nation state-by-nation state basis. For example, when the chips were down for the German Social Democrats in 1932-33, they had no allies abroad to call upon. There simply was no mechanism or organization that could summon forth the aid of working classes in other countries.

Such was not the case with the Communist Parties. They at least had the pretense (and quite often the substance) of a world movement behind them, even if it was increasingly rallied to promote Soviet interests. This distinction between the two parties of the Left is important: Communists conceived of themselves as sections or detachments in a world-

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[38] Tiersky, p. 43.

wide movement.

Social democracy not only lacked a movement as such, but it also lacked a world creed. Its strategies and solutions were, in the final analysis, designed for Western states, especially those with well-developed institutions of bourgeois democracy. What universal appeal had it to offer the colonial world? Could the parliamentary road have any meaning to states that had not yet evolved parliaments?

And to pursue this line of reasoning, one could equally ask whether The Soviet model had any meaning to a well-developed bourgeois democracy? It appears that despite the cross fertilization between European revolutionaries in the years 1915-1921, some basic misundertandings persisted: the post-war Bolsheviks misread the revolutionary potential of France. They may have ignited what Kriegel calls a "revolutionary élan", but they could not transform such an élan into a revolutionary situation. And clearly, such revolutionaries as Pierre Monatte, Boris Souvarine and Rappaport misread Lenin's revolution and its applicability to a bourgeois republic.

What I am suggesting is that the historic split at Tours spawned an SFIO that was essentially irrelevant to the underdeveloped world and a PCF condemned to inevitable frustration in a parliamentary democracy.

The Popular Front era. In theory, the post-war years were to usher in a new system of order in international relations: the League of Nations was to replace the pre-1914 world order of alliances and balance of power. Under new collective security arrangements, the aggression by any one nation would be opposed by all. In France, however, collective responsibilities were not taken that seriously. Germany, a potentially powerful and revisionist neighbor, continued to be the obsession of most politicians. In fact, the motive of most mainstream parties in having France join the League was chiefly to obtain protection against Germany and to insure that the Versailles settlement be strictly enforced. France, (like most states in the League) felt little duty to protect other nations from aggression.[39]

The parties of the left were not bedeviled by the same obsessions. The PCF had launched few initiatives in foreign policy before 1934, years of relative isolation. The rift of Tours had hardened. The class-against-class tactic targeted social democracy as the number one enemy.

The Popular Front was a response to new international exigencies, new international forces tugging at the PCF, shaping policies and behavior. Fascism had advanced to the frontier as close as Germany and Italy: by 1936 the frontier with Spain would be in the shadows.

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[39] This argument is forcefully presented by Arnold Wolfers in Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962). See his discussion on pp. 253-262.

It has been said that the Popular Front imbued the Communists with a new vision in the 1930s: it superimposed the conflict of democracy-fascism over the conventional Marxian dichotomy of capitalism-socialism. Destruction of one no longer entailed eradication of the other. This is the view of Annie Kriegel, who points out that the German crisis of 1933 and the destruction of the German Communist Party (KPD) compelled the International and its sections to set new, intermediate stages and objectives. "A revolutionary no longer lived for the future; new conceptions of international politics were formed".[40]

The far left has traditionally criticized the alliance, terming it the PCF's first step towards reformism, a collaboration with the government that reversed the Party's opposition to bourgeois rule. Tiersky, however, claims the Communists throughout this period retained both their intent and capacity for revolutionary action. The alliance was a policy designed to preserve the Third Republic in order to dispute it later on.[41]

The broad goals of the PCF during this period were:

. Protection for France against a German threat.

. Support for Soviet interests.

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[40] Kriegel, The French Communists, trans. Elaine P. Halpern (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 110.

[41] Tiersky. See his discussion on pp. 71, 93 and 372.

Specifically, the goal was a Franco-Soviet alliance, going beyond the Laval-Stalin Pact of 1934.[42]

French Communism was finally reconciled with its patriotic aspect, its Jacobin identity with la patrie: the Party was no longer taking unpopular anti-national stands. To put it differently, international policy was not only aligned with Soviet foreign policy interests, but for the first time, it was aligned with the PCF's own domestic alliance structure.[43]

If the PCF was attempting a défense de la République strategy, where was the SFIO? Like much of European social democracy, it equivocated during the inter-war years: Socialist and Labor Parties did not view the rise of Nazism as an international danger in the same sense that Communists did. While fascism may have been a domestic threat endangering basic democratic structures and trade unions, it was not viewed as a threat to peace and world order by Clement Attlee, Léon

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[42]The Pact was not a binding agreement since it lacked a formal military convention. See Adam Ulam's discussion in Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger 1974), pp. 223-225.

[43]This type of alignment is rare in PCF history. It would only recur during the war years, 1941-45 and in the Tripartite era. See Tiersky's discussion, pp. 372-374.

Blum or Paul Faure.[44]

European Socialists were not urging policies of national rearmament against aggression. In France, the SFIO continued its traditional struggle against the danger of militarists in the government. Socialist pacifism outweighed any resistance to dangers from abroad. The PCF had also opposed military credits from 1920 to 1934, but reversed itself in 1934 when Stalin signalled to Laval his appreciation of France's need for defense.[45]

The SFIO under Blum also hewed a pacifist line towards Spain, fearing any actions that might provoke Germany against France. The PCF, however, cautiously urged military aid to the Republic, and then a more open intervention after Germany and Italy had joined in. The PCF also took a far stronger stand in the French Parliament against the Munich Pact than did SFIO deputies. The ironies are obvious. The PCF

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[44] See Adolf Sturmthal, The Tragedy of European Labor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943). Especially note his chapters on France. His book is a critique of European social democracry between the wars. It argues that democratic socialists stubbornly behaved as narrow pressure groups in protecting the interests of labor during the crisis of the thirties, but had no broad national vision. Blum's pacifist leadership of the SFIO is also criticized. Although Blum sought close links to Britain after the 1936 remilitarization of the Rhineland, it was clear he would do little to thwart aggressions in Ethiopia and Spain. He also accepted the Munich settlement.

[45] The PCF did not actually support a vigorous defense effort until admonished by Stalin. See Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 228.

and SFIO were playing out an intriguing role-reversal. Leninist doctrine had historically rejected national defense as a legitimate goal under a capitalist regime. Yet the PCF was invoking a quasi-Jacobin patriotism, affirming its lineage from Jaurès.

World War II and its Aftermath

The Nazi-Soviet Pact and its trauma to the PCF has often been recounted. For our purposes, the famous reversal it launched in the Party confirmed the reflexive acquiescence by French Communism in furthering internationalist goals so utterly opposed to French interests. Since the drôle de guerre was a war of rival imperialisms, it called for old-style revolutionary defeatism. Tiersky terms such behavior:

> a voluntary allegiance bestowed by the French Communists upon a political leadership and national myth not their own.[46]

Yet it was also behavior which reaffirmed the radical nature and capacity of the Party: it could pursue its radical ideal "through the vehicle of Soviet foreign policy". Only when Germany invaded the USSR in the Summer of 1941 did the PCF enter the war, joining the resistance with what Stanley Hoffmann termed an "extraordinary nationalist fervor , which transcended a mere tactical shift, but took on more of a moral

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[46] French Communism, see pp. 94-100 for a discussion of this period.

fervor and expiation for the dishonor of the years 1939-41".[47]

The PCF, emerging from the war with immense prestige and its patriotic image restored, joined de Gaulle's Tripartite regime. Domestically, it behaved with moderation, urging full production and acquiescing in de Gaulle's order to disarm Communist-led resistance groups in 1945.

Why did the powerful PCF, encompassing a quarter of the electorate, not move for an insurrection? Surely there are many domestic reasons. Yet the focus here is on the international reasons responsible for the inaction. It is a question that will recur and will be discussed in the next chapter. Later, it will be shown that there were fundamental limits set by the international system itself which determined what armed Communists could and could not do in liberated France. At Yalta, the Big Three had carved out de facto spheres on the Continent. It was understood that West European Communists could not upset this balance. The presence of U.S. and British troops in Western Europe dashed any hopes for a successful insurrectionary takeover. Instead, the PCF had to forego such plans in favor of helping the USSR consolidate the already realized gains for socialism in Eastern Europe.[48]

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[47] Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community", Hoffmann et al., In Search of France (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 35-36.

[48] French Communism, see Tiersky's discussion on pp. 227-228, 274 and 374.

Nothing was to be done that might provoke the West into reconsidering the Yalta understanding. Stalin described the situation candidly:

> This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everybody imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.[49]

During the Tripartite years, de Gaulle had his own vision: France as a link between East and West, as an arbiter between Soviets and Anglo-Saxons. This, however, was not to be the case. Instead, a Europe of blocs congealed, creating an entirely new post-war reality, destined to affect the relationship between the PCF and SFIO.

During the Popular Front, Communists and Socialists at least agreed on foreign policy essentials: fascism was the adversary. But with the onset of the cold war, such congruence was out of the question. The two rival parties of the Left now seemed to have their feet planted in different blocs. When the cold war tugged France into the Western camp, the Socialists tilted towards "Third Force" conceptions and a pro-US orientation in international affairs. Leaders such as Léon Blum were now anathema to the PCF,[50] not only because of their pre-war behavior

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[49] Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 114.

[50] Alexander Werth, France: 1940-1955 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 295. Werth holds that it was Blum's mission to the U.S. in 1946 that marked one of the key steps in France's integration into the American sphere. This was towards the end of Tripartisme, when the PCF was being removed from the French Government.

regarding Spain and Munich, but because they were insisting on their democratic model of socialism, a Jaurès-inspired Marxism. This was at a time when Social Democrats everywhere had been severely shocked by the fate of the Socialist Parties in the countries under Red Army domination.

By 1947 the PCF was headed for a complete rift with its SFIO and MRP allies. There were important foreign policy differences over colonial issues. The SFIO was not supporting decolonization in Indo-China. In fact, Léon Blum was Premier when the Indo-China War broke out in October, 1946. Communists were also in the Cabinet. The PCF first equivocated on the Indo-China issue (ostensibly because it did not want to disrupt Tripartisme).[51] Ultimately, the Party did come out in support of the Ho Chi Minh forces (and in Africa it backed a suppressed uprising in Madagascar). These positions helped bring about the expulsion of PCF ministers by Paul Ramadier in May, 1954.[52]

With the collapse of Tripartisme, the PCF entered its years of exile, while the SFIO extended its centrist, "Third Force" role. Once

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[51]There is no secret about this embarrassing episode in PCF colonial policy. For example see Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake (New York: Random house, Vintage Books, 1972), p. 87. She notes that both the "French Communists and Socialists defected to the imperialist cause ...."

[52]These were the important disputes on foreign policy among the left during Tripartisme. On Germany there was no dispute. The PCF supported internationalization of the Ruhr. This was a national policy, at odds with that of the German Communists and Moscow.

again. French Communists were caught in an international system over which they had little control. As in 1920, 1934, 1939 and 1941, powerful events of an international nature would intervene and compel a recasting of Communist strategy, doctrine and behavior.

Since the 1920s, as has been shown here, the USSR had looked upon the PCF as an instrumentality to be projected into Western society. And this was very much the role the Party again played when it was assigned the tasks of agitating against the Marshall Plan or campaigning for "peaceful coexistence". Soviet leaders stressed that US economic penetration of Europe would soon be followed by military domination. A major PCF priority, then, was its campaign to reduce US influence in Europe. Thus the Marshall Plan was the "Trojan Horse" of US imperialism.

Germany and issues of European defense. French foreign policy during the early Fourth Republic clung to many old pre-war patterns. Germany was the major potential adversary; she was to be suppressed by the same pre-war alliance policy of concert with Russia (which had worked so often since the 1890s).[53] But the cold war shattered old patterns. Soviet Russia now appeared as the major threat to France. It was not in France's interests to have the Red Army too close if there was a danger of a

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[53] This policy was aligned with early Gaullist policy as well. De Gaulle had signed a 20-year alliance with Stalin in 1944. See Roy Macridis, Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 81.

Communist takeover, as many thought in those years. Many now felt that Germany had to be integrated into the defensive alliance system of the West. For Frenchmen, it called for some agonizing soul searching. France no longer had a capacity for fully independent self-defense.[54]

The logic of this reappraisal gave birth to the European Defense Community (EDC) proposal. Communists opposed all forms of German re-armament. The SFIO, however, like most segments of French opinion, divided on this issue. Ultimately, it came out in favor of German re-armament, clothed in the slogan of "Europe". This seemed preferable to a revived "Wehrmacht", as the dilemma was posed in those days. Hence the Socialists, their leading newspaper, Le Populaire, and many of their outstanding leaders, such as Guy Mollet, André Philip and Maurice Faure, supported EDC. But National Assembly opposition mounted between 1953 and 1954. Such leaders as Daniel Mayer and Jules Moch remained firm Anti-cédistes within SFIO.[55]

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[54] Many in France (including Gaullists) had a moment of truth regarding traditional alliance strategy. Agreements with the USSR no longer assured France a reliable partner. At Yalta the USSR had been hostile to certain French wishes, especially regarding Germany. Many segments of opinion felt that the danger to France no longer came from Germany, but from the USSR, particularly since there was a fear of a Communist takeover in that period.

[55] It is interesting that German Socialists (the SPD) opposed EDC. Ties between the SPD and the SFIO were poor after the war, and the two parties disagreed on many European issues. See Alfred Grosser's essay "Germany and France: a Confrontation" in France Defeats EDC, eds. Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 62.

The European Army idea was defeated, and it marked the first demonstration that Gaullists and Communists could join as objective allies in certain political actions. This affinity becomes more significant in the Fifth Republic.

The idea of "Europe", or a European Community, took root in France as it became apparent that the nation's destiny no longer lay in overseas Empire or a French Union. Many European-minded Socialists saw EEC and economic integration as a prelude to political integration--a socialist nation of Europe. Gaullists scorned any such arrangement, preferring a Europe of states, perhaps joined in confederation, but retaining full national sovereignty.

Gaullism presented paradoxes to the Communists. At first the PCF opposed the Fifth Republic vehemently, fearing both its constitutional aspects as well as its threat of personalisme. Yet Gaullists' international perspectives oddly converged with many PCF policy positions, on such issues as decolonization, fear of a politically integrated Europe, fear of US domination in foreign policy, and recognition of China. Heightening the ambiguity, much of this was occurring in the mid-sixties, a period when the PCF was starting to reach out to an electoral alliance with the SFIO. This situation would require the PCF to defy for the first time the immediate foreign policy desires of the USSR. These are aspects to be examined further on.

This chapter has provided an overview of leftist perspectives on France's international relations from Jaurès to de Gaulle, leading up to what will be the main focus of this dissertation: the years 1968-1975. These latter years cannot be understood fully apart from their historical antecedents. Hence the foregoing was intended to provide essential background. To grasp current PCF or Socialist conceptualizing on Germany, defense, or relations with the USSR, one must understand past struggles and convoluted events that are often still alive in the consciousness of Frenchmen. From time-to-time it will be necessary to return to these earlier developments.

Discussion here has not dealt with PCF-CPSU relations (except for the formative years around 1920). I have tried to show that the USSR, following World War II, became obsessed with holding on to its furthest European penetrations. Among other tasks, the PCF was assigned that of not disturbing this new state of affairs.[56] Hence French Communists had to defer their revolutionary class struggle, which, after all, comprised so much of their raison d'être.

I have tried to show that doctrinally, war and revolutionary defeatism were the classical Leninist routes to revolution. But this changed utterly with the advent of nuclear weapons in international

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[56] This will be discussed in the next chapter.

relations: if war was now unthinkable, it could hardly provide the road to revolutionary power.

I have not, however, had space in one introductory chapter to deal with de-Stalinization, a process which since 1956 has loosened the ties of European Communist Parties to the CPSU and the world movement, freeing the PCF (and other parties) to launch new, independent initiatives. The implications will, of course, be examined in further chapters.

CHAPTER III

1968: THE DYNAMIC OF UNITY

France's post-war years required adjustments to wartime recovery, disintegration of Empire, and acceptance of Germany's new role into the Western Alliance. Gaullism accepted these realities. But by the 1960s it was seeking a new leadership and independence for France within a Europe of nationstates--a Europe described as dominated by the superpower blocs. This was the central historical setting as one approaches the years examined here.

Favorable Perspectives for the Left

1968 marked the tenth year of the Fifth Republic. the Communists had been in opposition for 20 years; the Socialists for ten. The PCF had maintained its post-war level of electoral strength, a little more than a fifth of the French electorate.[1] The Socialists had been declining steadily since Liberation. Yet there was an aura of optimism on the French left at the start of 1968: a moment of potential alignment. For the first time, the Left saw a possibility of defeating a decade of entrenched Gaullism. For several years, the Communists had learned to accept the reality of the Fifth Republic and its constitutional arrange-

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[1] Jean Poperen, L'Unité de la Gauche (Paris: Fayard, 1975), p. 61.

ments; they were no longer rejecting it as a bourgeois dictatorship.[2] Abroad, events appeared to be confirming certain conceptions generally held by the left:

1) Strains in the West. The United States, chief representative of capitalism, was in a drift or decline, symbolized by Lyndon Johnson's decision not to run for the Presidency, balance of payments deficits, and disorders at home. January, 1968 opened up with the Tet offensive in Vietnam, auguring further setbacks.[3]

2) A declining threat from the East. France under de Gaulle had been able to establish reasonably good ties to the Soviet bloc, In Czechoslovakia, Dubcek's new leadership generated much excitement on the left. Frenchmen could increasingly view Communists more favorably now as possible alliance partners, as reform after reform was announced in Prague.

3) The decline of Britain. Britain was reassessing its relationship to Europe. Early in 1968 it had announced its withdrawal from East of Suez, symbolizing a declining world role and a reaching out towards Europe.

4) The world Communist movement. A decade of de-stalinization was encouraging autonomy of parties. At a meeting in Budapest early that year, the Soviets agreed that no parties would be condemned or

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[2]See the discussion in Tiersky, pp. 230-232.

[3]The general optimism of the period is reflected in Rochet's speech at the World Conference of Communist Parties. L'Humanité, June 7, 1969, p. 3.

expelled from the movement. There would be no action taken against the Chinese.

For the left in France, these developments (along with internal factors) were encouraging the momentum towards united action. By February of that year, the Communists and the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (FGDS) were able to sign a Common Declaration.[4]

1968 was not the culmination of Left unity, nor was it the beginning. As early as 1964, the PCF had been seeking some form of united action or electoral alliance with the Socialists in order to break out of its isolation.[5] For several years it had articulated a doctrine of peaceful transition to socialism, fully backed by the Soviet Communists (CPSU). At its 17th Congress in 1964 the PCF declared that the parliamentary road to power, only a remote possibility 50 years earlier, was more likely than ever, because of the new correlation of world forces. But such a development would require a long-range entente between the PCF and the SFIO, which did, after all, share certain doctrinal objectives and a common Marxist heritage.

To facilitate such an alliance, the Communists were prepared to

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[4] Le Monde, February 25, 1968, p. 7.

[5] For a good discussion of the 1964 period see François Fejtö, The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 150-170.

reject the notion of a single party as a necessary condition for the transition to socialism. This had been a false notion, based on the limited experience of the Soviet Revolution, hardly applicable to France. The PCF even invoked the experience in certain East-bloc countries where there existed, at least nominally, other parties of the left. Such a doctrinal concession was not always persuasive to the SFIO which feared being absorbed like the Social Democrats of East Germany or Prague. But the PCF hinted that such alliances might take on new and original shapes, in order to dispel any such fears. The hope was that the SFIO would at least respond.

Along with the PCF's desire for a new opening with the democratic left, was a hope that the Socialists in France would soften their traditional Atlanticism and agree to a loosening of France's postwar ties to NATO. Anything that encouraged the SFIO's perceptions of a peaceful Soviet Union undid much of the rationale for NATO. Success here required the PCF to emphasize the "peaceful road" and "peaceful coexistence" line, that the Chinese Communists (CCP) rejected as a reformist betrayal.[6]

The rationale behind unity. It is sometimes said that the Socialist-Communist alliance originated in a banal necessity: each needed to

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[6]Throughout the 1960s, the PCF accepted the Soviet condemnation of the CCP as splitters of the world movement, attempting to usurp the primary role of the USSR in interpreting Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The Yugoslav and Italian Communists invoked polycentrism--and a desire to restore unity. Hence they resisted attempts to expel the CCP, a view the PCF would later adopt. Fetjö, pp. 185-192.

gather on the run-off elections the other's first round votes in order to protect its parliamentary strength. Practical necessity was concealed behind an ideological façade. More basically, there was a realization that nothing could be done by the left in France without the Communists. There could be no progress towards socialism without the participation of the Communist Party. Neither Party could make transformations in French life without the agreement of the other. Much of the momentum towards unity of the left stemmed from the PCF. To demonstrate their commitment to a parliamentary road, the Communists had backed the Socialist, François Mitterrand, in the September, 1965 presidential election, a historic act of disobedience to the CPSU, since the Soviets had signalled their support for de Gaulle.[7] This tension in PCF-CPSU relations, regarding which candidate the Communists would support, would recur in future years. However the deepening rapprochement between the Fifth Republic and the USSR did not weaken the French Communists' resolve to oppose the personal power represented by Gaullism.

It is the political ambiguity of this situation, compounded by the recurring international differences between the two Parties, that must be analyzed. Thus throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Socialists had con-

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[7]Apparently the Soviets preferred their ties to the existing Government of the right over the risks of a PCF-Mitterrand coalition.

sistently supported the Atlantic relationship to which the Communists were hostile.[8] The Socialists had always inclined towards the construction of Europe, viewing it as a Third Force between the two blocs. The PCF always opposed it. Also to be resolved were questions of policy towards the USSR, Czechoslovakia, defense and other areas of contention. These were major international obstacles as the two Parties of the Left struggled towards their 1972 Common Program.[9]

Pre-1968 Steps towards Unity

The dynamic of unity, as the French often term it, has had a long genesis in post-war France, and 1968 marked an important step along the road. But the concept itself was born well before 1968 and did not reach fruition until the signing of the Common Program four years later.

A Gaullist, Roger Frey, has argued that the concept of a Common Program was originally dreamed up by the Communists exclusively.[10] Claude Estier, a National Secretary of the PS, denies this view. A simple reading of the motion authorizing the program at the Congrès d'

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[8]When de Gaulle withdrew France from the military organization of the Alliance in 1966, Mitterrand, then head of the FGDS, told the Assemblée nationale that the decision was harmful, detaching France without engaging her elsewhere. Le Monde, April 16, 1966.

[9]This paper will not be concerned with domestic differences between the two parties, on such issues as nationalizations, le gauchisme, proportional representation voting, a strong presidency versus the legislature and other sources of disagreement.

[10]Le Monde, March 1, 1973.

Épinay in 1971 demonstrates the point. The purpose here is not to resolve a dispute of paternity. It can be noted, however, that Maurice Thorez first employed the term "common program" as far back as October, 1958 in a speech before the Central Committee.[11] If the Socialists were hardly responsive at this time, it was because they were still participating in the Gaullist Government. Even when the Socialists moved into the opposition four months later, their critical view of cooperation with the PCF remained. In fact, during the important referendum of October, 1962, where de Gaulle sought to legitimate direct elections for the Presidency (a constitutional innovation considered as threatening by the entire left) the SFIO remained hostile to Communist overtures. If the Socialists were being wooed in the early 1960s, they would respond only to arrangements that were purely electoral. There would be no ideological rapprochement. As Guy Mollet, then Secretary General of the SFIO, said:

> There will be no unity of action and no Front Populaire as long as the PCF leaders subordinate the interests of French workers to the foreign policy of the Soviets.[12]

This refrain would be repeated often. And Communist overtures

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[11] Branko Lazitch, L'Echec Permanent (Paris: Editions Roberts Laffont, 1978), p. 72.

[12] Ibid., p. 73.

for Left unity were continually rejected because of the SFIO's historical memories, its basic suspicion of Communist ties to the Soviets, and a conviction that the PCF aspired to operate as le parti unique.[13] It was probably Mollet's falling out with the Gaullists that ultimately made him receptive to PCF overtures. The Socialists were declining seriously as a political force in the early 1960s. Gaston Defferre's failure to direct the SFIO into a centrist alliance in 1965 also argued for unity.

The momentum gathered force. By 1964 the term programme commun was listed as a long-term goal of the PCF at its Seventeenth Congress. Thorez died in July of that year, but his appointed successor, Waldeck Rochet, continued the momentum. A year later, the PCF and SFIO were able to agree on the single candidacy of François Mitterrand to oppose de Gaulle. The challenge was respectable, gaining 44 percent of the vote.

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[13] The polemics were strong in early 1968. Thus the SFIO's Claude Fuzier (editor of Populaire) termed PCF loyalty to the USSR as that of a "Fifth Column", Le Monde, January 6, 1968, p. 6.

Communist spokesman René Andrieu replied that the Socialist leaders themselves had privileged ties to the United States, since they repeatedly followed the U.S. lead, as in expelling PCF ministers in 1947, favoring France's entry into the Atlantic Alliance, and opposing her withdrawal from NATO in 1966. Le Monde, January 9, 1968, p. 6.

These polemics are repetitive and boring, but they do demonstrate that the two political formations perceived each other as residing in opposite world camps. These polemics were proceeding during a period of improved French-Soviet ties.

Frustrated by Mollet and the SFIO leadership in going beyond these electoral agreements, the Communists reached out to other formations of the democratic left. In 1966, first contacts were made between Rochet and Mitterrand's Fédération de la gauche démocratique et socialiste (FGDS), a grouping of non-Communist leftist parties.[14] In June, 1967, the two sides agreed to form a working group to formulate a Joint Declaration. As Tiersky notes, the non-Communist left was now ready for an alliance "at the top", rejecting Defferre's earliest strategy of seeking to absorb the Communists.[15]

The Déclaration Commune of February, 1968

With this declaration, the two sides devised a partial agreement, not a common program of government nor a joint legislative program. Rather, both sides set forth their respective positions: agreements and disagreements on foreign and domestic policy. The document, which opposed the personal power regime associated with de Gaulle, did not speak

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[14] FGDS was a leftist political formation of late 1965, created after the defeat of Gaston Defferre's seeking of the Presidency. Its general goal was to develop unity behind Mitterrand's Presidential campaign in 1965. FGDS sought to link together the SFIO, the Radicals, UDSR, CIR (Conventions des institutions républicaines) and other democratic-left political clubs of the era. Its strategy revised earlier thinking on the left. It followed the Mitterrand line of cooperation with the Communists. The Federation begins its decline after the events of May 1968, and Mitterrand resigned as president in November of that year.

[15] Tiersky, French Communism, chapter five.

of the transition to socialism, although it did define a social program. Its foreign policy aspects will now be considered; they are an early articulation of different international conceptions held by the Communists and the non-Communist left.

The document reflected inherently different conceptions of European unification and supranationality. Thus the Fédération supported a general European framework, but opposed hostile, cold-war era military blocs. A durable peace required that the blocs be replaced by what FGDS described as a "European collective security" framework.[16]

The Democratic Left and European integration. The FGDS was articulating Mitterrand's position: France should be integrated into a political construction of Europe--the only means of insuring genuine independence from the two superpowers. Such an agreement might even lead to a lasting rapprochement between East and West. But lacking such an arrangement, France must not break unilaterally with the existing alliance--as the Communists were urging in their demand that France withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance, due for renewal in 1969.[17] Not only should integration

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[16] It is never fully clear just how European leftists qualify what they describe as collective security. One can assume they are not suggesting the rigorous, automatic, world-encompassing system outlined in the American school of international relations, as, for instance, in Hans Morgenthau and Inis Claude. Communists, too, call for collective security, but it is hard to see how it reconciles with their equally vocal demands for national independence in foreign policy, since the doctrine does require a large surrender of sovereignty.

[17] Le Monde, February 25, 1968, p. 7.

be accelerated, said the FGDS, but Europe should be enlarged to include Britain as well as other European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.) states. Furthermore, sectoral areas of EEC competence should be broadened to include monetary policy, planning and even political competence through a parliament elected by popular, universal suffrage. The FGDS asserted:

> From now on it seems quite possible to delegate a limited but real power, under democratic control, to the current institutions formed at the Treaty of Rome.[18]

The Communist view. The PCF demurred. It viewed national independence as the essential of foreign policy. National security required that France not be led into a war that was not in its own interest (that is through an alliance dominated by the U.S., which was currently playing a "world gendarme" role in Vietnam). While awaiting the simultaneous dissolution of military blocs, France must stay outside the alliance and seek collective security with all European states.

The Communists were in effect arguing that France should withdraw from the framework of Western Europe. Instead of remaining bound to a capitalist Petite Europe, she must develop economic ties to all of Europe on the basis of mutual advantage.

At the same time, the PCF restated its long-standing hostility

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[18] Ibid.

to the creation of any supra-national authority, particularly one dominated by large business interests. The Fédération had no such fears of political union and envisioned a supranational political authority composed of representatives from different states. Again, the PCF objected, such an entity would progressively be invested with all the powers that today reside in national parliaments and governments.[19] As they saw it, Germans, Italians, Belgians, Dutch and Luxembourgers would be able to decide vital issues of French life and destiny, overruling French representatives within the supranational organization.

There were two further aspects of the PCF argument:

1) Such a supranationalEuropean authority dominated by capitalist interests would not in fact unify Europe, but would heighten its division, since it would exclude the East-bloc states.

2) A Petite Europe would not be truly independent since it would be compelled to submit to the hegemony of what in those days was described as an "expansionist and revenge-seeking Germany", itself under the tutelage of the Americans through links to the Atlantic Pact.

The Communists, in rejecting supranationalism, did not reject EEC outright. Because they considered the Community to be dominated by trusts and cartels, they (along with FGDS) insisted that it be given a "democratic content in its institutions" through vague references to

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[19] L'Humanité, February 26, 1968, p. 5.

participation of worker and farmers organizations.

In other aspects of foreign policy, the two signers of the Declaration were able to reach agreement:

- Defense - Both sides renounced France's force de frappe and called for a reduction in arms, denuclearized zones in Europe, and the signing by France of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

- Germany - Respect for postwar European frontiers, particularly the Oder-Neisse line; recognition of the existence of two German states, and acceptance by Federal Germany of its non-nuclear status.[20]

- Vietnam - Both urged a halt to the bombings of 1968, seeking a political settlement under the Geneva Agreement. France was to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The Communists went further, insisting on unconditional U.S. withdrawal as well as total support for the DRV and NLF (the latter being the only legitimate representatives in South Vietnam). FGDS considered the NLF only one of the parties in the negotiations, and argued for the neutralization of much of Southeast Asia.

- Middle East - Both sides sought an arrangement based on Israel's right to exist, yet respecting the national rights of Palestinian Arabs and supporting the UN decision against acquiring territory by force. FGDS held that the Israelis should withdraw to pre-June, 1967 frontiers as vital to any settlement. Here, the PCF disagreed, calling for an immediate, unconditional Israeli withdrawal.

- Rightwing dictatorships - Both sides issued rhetorical condemnations of the regimes in Greece, Spain and Portugal.

- Overseas Departments - The PCF supported demands for

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[20] Perspectives on Germany will be treated fully in Chapter X. At this point it can be noted that the Communists rejected all cooperation by France with Federal Germany until its leaders accepted these policies cited above. The Federal Republic ultimately fulfilled these conditions.

> complete independence of Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guianna. FGDS urged free elections on that issue.

Clearly the outlook for joint action appeared promising in early 1968. The Left was eager to achieve power. And the Communists' doctrine of peaceful transition to socialism was being put to the test in their new understandings with the non-Communist left. But the May-June crisis intervened, undermining the entire edifice. Before the end of the year, FGDS would disappear as a political force in France; Mitterrand would be in retirement.

The Events of May-June, 1968

While the upheavals in May-June in Paris will not be examined in detail, their international relevance cannot be ignored.

To begin with, the student movement itself can be viewed as part of a broader, international phenomenon; not in a formal but in a spiritual sense. Similar disorders were, after all, igniting in Berlin, Prague, New York, London, Madrid and Rome that year - as well as in Paris. Marcel Niedergang even went so far as to speak of a "Youth International", which invoked the same slogans, flags and symbols.[21] In fact, Daniel Cohn-Bendit's movement of March 22 was born on the eve of a large demonstration against the war in Vietnam. Amid all the

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[21] See his essay in Le Monde, May 23, 1968, pp. 1 and 10.

shouting, it could be said that the students were articulating a fundamental awareness of the injustice of international relations. The anarchists were demanding an end to international frontiers. The very existence of Maoists implied some inspiration from abroad. In fact, much of the PCF's hostility toward the Chinese Communists--and its willingness to accept the Soviet critique of Maoism--arose from the Party's fury at domestic Maoist factions seeking to outflank them on the left.

These, then, were certain internationalist aspects of the May-June events which help to frame a context and emphasize that the events were not a purely domestic phenomenon. One might also note that many Frenchmen saw an international aspect to the disorders. There were, for instance, demagogic references to Cohn-Bendit's Jewish origin. Marchais would even refer to "that German".

A basic question is why the PCF failed to act and seize the revolutionary initiative in 1968. While there were, of course, domestic reasons, one cannot ignore the international framework (or what the Communists term the world balance of forces).

The question is a recurring one in Communist behavior, going to the issue of revolutionary pretensions in the Communist Party. Tiersky terms it the dilemma of a revolutionary political formation operating in a historical context that it considers non-revolutionary. The question

relates to the very raison d'être of the PCF. Five general explanations can be given for the PCF's failure to act in 1968. Three are domestic; two are international. The merits of each will be considered.

1) Lack of a "vanguard role". (A domestic explanation): This view concedes that the situation was indeed revolutionary, but since the PCF was not in control of the spontaneous outbursts, it was reluctant to join with political forces, the destiny of which it could not control. Thus Communsits will only seize the initiative in contexts where they are playing what they insist is their vanguard role. This explanation is weak. One would have to note that Communists (in other contexts) have been able to coalesce with other insurrectionary forces when deemed to their advantage. This occurred, for example, in the Cuban Revolution.

2) Lack of revolutionary purpose. The Communists, having grown reformist, are no longer a political group that will make the promised revolution, regardless of the circumstances. Somewhere, runs the argument, the PCF lost its historical élan. This view is often advanced by the far left. Some maintain that the PCF abandoned its revolutionary impulse at the time of the Popular Front, when it renounced its Leninist origins in order to preserve the bourgeois Republic. Others date it at the moment of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Some hold that the reformism of the PCF first manifested itself in the 1944-45 Liberation era. Still others date it at 1968 itself. My purpose now is not to accept or reject this thesis argumentatively. It is an issue that will persist, and one

that preoccupies much of the writings of Tiersky and Kriegel respectively. It is a theme that will recur in this thesis. For the moment, I shall accept Tiersky's formulation that the PCF has not lost its revolutionary purpose and indeed remains a significant force for political transformation in France.

3) Lack of a revolutionary situation. This interpretation is on firmer ground. It is also one that is advanced by the Communists themselves. The point here is not (as in explanation one) that the Communists are incapable of making the revolution, or (as in two) that they could not manipulate it. Rather, that they simply did not define the May-June situation as revolutionary. The classical doctrine has always held the working class decisive. Any group or class outside the working class (and its vanguard) could not make the revolution. Communist analysis of the class struggles in France saw in the spontaneous movement of 1968 no revolutionary situation. Admittedly, segments of workers had linked up with the students, but not for genuinely revolutionary purposes; only to improve their relative economic and social situation within the Fifth Republic.[22]

If the situation was not revolutionary, the PCF was not willing to scuttle its domestic alliance strategy, so carefully nurtured since the early 1960s. It concluded, probably correctly, that French workers

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[22] Soviet perceptions, calling for broad class alliances, are documented in Stiefbold, See pp. 3-5.

would not link political or revolutionary aims to their economic demands (even though some eight million were on strike at one point). Furthermore, French capitalism held preponderant power that could not be shaken by spontaneous movements that lacked genuine vanguard support. These views stemmed from the very logic of the "peaceful transition" doctrine. As Tiersky points out, the general strike and widespread disorders were no longer "the key moment in strategy". The election was significant. "By voting the left into power, the people launch a process with a potentially revolutionary conclusion".[23] At the same time, the Communists would do everything to convert the agitation into more familiar channels of demand for higher wages and new social welfare legislation.

In seeking an alternative government program through a parliamentary majority, Communists were reenacting aspects of the Popular Front policy. Such a perspective required rejection of the May, 1968 disorders as adventurist risks that would cut them off from the non-Communist masses, and assure them a loss of potential allies.[24]

4) Loyalty to the USSR. (An international politics explanation). The argument is that French Communists were pandering to Soviet foreign policy interests, supporting the USSR's satisfaction with the Gaullist

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[23] Tiersky, Journal of International Affairs, p. 202.

[24] This view is summarized by Jean-Pierre Vigier, an expelled member of the Central Committee. See Le Monde, June 7, 1969, p. 6. The PCF line was roundly criticized from the far left as leading to the party's social democratization.

Government. The force of the argument derives from the PCF's Stalinist heritage: that it had often provided a knee-jerk response to Soviet interests in the past. References have already been made to the Soviet preference for continued Gaullist power over the uncertainties inherent in a government of the non-Communist Left. Stiefbold shows that the French Communists grasped fully the significance of the Soviet accommodation with de Gaulle.[25] But the PCF, through the voice of Rochet himself, had stressed that there should be no illusions that the regime's far-sighted realism in foreign policy (friendship with the USSR) would induce Communists to call off their domestic struggle against de Gaulle's personalist power.[26] At this point it seems best to reject the "Soviet loyalty" explanation. There is no direct evidence to support it. This does not mean that the question of whether or not the PCF is an appendage of Soviet policy has been resolved. It will be discussed in further chapters.

5) Unfavorable world balance of forces. This attributes PCF behavior in the Spring of 1968 to its assessment of the international situation. Revolt would have been futile. An essay by André Fontaine provides the rationale.[27] Even if by some miracle the May revolt had

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[25] See her discussion, pp. 12-13.

[26] L'Humanité, December 11, 1967. Cited in Stiefbold, p. 12.

[27] See Le Monde, June 24, 1969.

triumphed over Gaullism, the Communists were convinced that the army, perhaps with the full support of the CIA and the Pentagon, would have formed in Paris a regime reminiscent of the Greek Colonels. This was the nightmare. Such a scenario, said Fontaine, would have presented extreme risks for the PCF. Lending a certain credibility to this theory was the fact that de Gaulle, ironically, and probably hypocritically, attempted on May 24th to link the French Communists with the disturbances.[28]

To summarize, the PCF did not act in May, 1968 for three major reasons:

1) The situation was not perceived as revolutionary.

2) Their domestic alliance strategy based on a peaceful transition would have been undermined.

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[28] Even the Socialists rebutted this charge. Thus Mitterrand said: "The PCF in this serious crisis has not carried out any acts of an insurrectional nature, and it does not deserve Pompidou's invectives, which seek to portray it as a subversive organization. If the PCF, CGT and CFDT had wanted, the state would have disappeared." Le Monde, June 20, 1968.

The Soviets, too, were highly critical of the Government's attempt to pin the unrest on the Communists, although Pravda avoided any direct attack on de Gaulle personally. In inspiring attacks on the Communists, the Gaullist regime was attempting in vain to isolate the PCF from other political formations (probably a reference to the FGDS and the Mollet segment in the SFIO). Pravda did not suggest that the basically good relations between France and the USSR would be disturbed by these events. Pravda, in an unsigned article of June 5, expressed the solidarity of the Soviet leadership with the PCF as the head of the French working classes. Le Monde termed the Soviet critique "the first direct condemnation of the Gaullist government's internal policy". (See Le Monde, June 6, 1968, p. 12).

3) Even without the above two factors, the international environment precluded their acting.

It is item three above which must now be explored more fully. This requires a brief digression to examine pre-1968 periods of possible insurrection.

Revolution and the World Balance of Forces

Earlier it was suggested that certain critics to the left of the PCF date the reformist behavior of the Party to the 1944-45 era: specifically, that it refused to act on behalf of a revolutionary alternative during Liberation. Thus PCF behavior in May-June, 1968 was only a confirmation of earlier practices.

Communist historians justify their behavior by their evaluations of the revolutionary possibility as defined and limited by the international framework imposed on Europe after the Second World War. Thus their reticence to act during the Liberation period is explained by the de facto spheres established at Yalta. (See the discussion in Chapter Two.) And, of course, not everyone accepts the Communist assessment. Claudin has argued that the Communist Parties of Italy and France should have carried out their revolutions in the resistance years. The frustration of this revolutionary possibility in 1945, he argues, was as historically damaging as the betrayal and defeat of Lenin's hopes for revolutions in

Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1918-1919 by social democracy. In other words, the mass Communist Parties of Italy and France played essentially the same role after World War II as did the Social Democrats following World War I.[29] (And by implication, the PCF was confirming that role in 1968.)

In Claudin's analysis, the PCF erred in accepting a Gaullist solution to the war and the Resistance. Even though the PCF dominated the Resistance at the outset, it allowed de Gaulle to include other discredited parties of the Third Republic in the CNR (National Council of the Resistance). Furthermore, the PCF failed to transform the Resistance into the Revolution. In other words, the Resistance should have seized power, not the ersatz resistance of London and Algiers.[30]

The Communists justify their behavior as a necessary action for unity at the time. Furthermore, the sheer presence of Anglo-U.S. troops

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[29] Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement: from Comintern to Cominform, Pt. II (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), p. 317. Claudin was on the Politburo of the Spanish Communist Party for 18 years.

[30] The point is made that the Liberation Committees and popular militias formed everywhere after the Allied landings were centers of power with mass support, formed by a PCF then playing a decisive role. André Fontaine argues it was within power in parts of France. See his A History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean War (New York and London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968), p. 195. (Cited in Claudin, p. 325.) Jacques Fauvet, now editor of Le Monde, termed these organizations the most pervasive resistance force in France. See The History of the Cold War, Vol II, p. 59.

negated any chance for an insurrectionary seizure of power.

Claudin further speculates that an insurrection would not have led to a clash with the liberating Anglo-Americans, but would have confronted the Western Allies with a fait accompli, much as the Communist forces had done in Yugoslavia. But, Thorez had no such intentions. Returning to France from the USSR in November, 1944, he obeyed de Gaulle's order to disband the militias. Thus the mass movement emerging from the Liberation was strangled, and European Communism abdicated at its greatest moment. Nuances of the debate cannot be explored here, as they fall outside the time frame of this thesis.[31] The essential point is that French Communists, from Thorez onward, have justified non-revolutionary action largely by the requirements of the international situation:

1) The wartime need to support the Grand Coalition.

2) The de facto spheres in Europe set forth at Yalta.

3) The presence of mass Allied armies in Western Europe.[32]

And there is no reason to believe that on this score French

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[31]The dispute reopens inside the PCF in 1952, leading to the removal of André Marty from the Party and Charles Tillon from the leadership.

[32]Most sources on the subject dispute the Claudin view here. Thus massed Allied armies in Europe were decisive according to Adam Ulam in The Rivals, America and Russia Since World War II (New York: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 133.

Communist assessment varied significantly from Soviet perceptions. In fact, there is strong evidence that they were conforming to Soviet wishes.[33]

It should be noted that the early post war years under Stalin marked a vital period of consolidation for the Soviet regime and world Communism. As Marshall Shulman emphasizes, it was an era when the Soviet Union was eager to secure its furtherst European penetrations, despite perceptions of a hostile and superior United States with a firm presence on the Continent.[34]

This required the Soviets to seek a period of peace--or peaceful coexistence--until there occurred a new stage or advance in the correlation of forces favorable to them. This was the time of the peace movement, a large-scale campaign embracing all groups and strata opposed to war. By convincing a wide spectrum of Europeans, including Frenchmen, of the Soviet Union's peaceful aims, they hoped to undermine Europe's

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[33] In fact all sources agree that the Western Communists were aligned fully with Soviet requirements. Ironically, when the Grand Coalition of World War II collapsed in 1947, the Cominform severely reprimanded the PCF and PCI for yielding to legalism and parliamentarism during this period. See Claudin, Part II, pp. 384-386.

[34] Marshall Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (New York: Atheneum, 1969). Tiersky also confirms that the PCF acted to forego the revolution in order to further the more certain gains of the socialist takeovers by the Red Army in the East. Thus foreign policy was aligned with their new government role. See French Communism, pp. 121-122.

ties to the Atlantic Alliance and the United States and preclude the possibility of an armed Germany.

Any attempt by Western European Communists to achieve power would have to await some change in what Communists term the "correlation of forces". Hence the post-war era became a period of stabilization for European Communists, a holding action. Their Cominform-assigned role was to weaken the Western bloc to the extent possible, but to reject class struggle and revolutionary politics, since there was a judgment that there was little prospect for revolutionary action by the Western European proletariat after the War. As Shulman notes, instead of revolutionary politics, there would now be power-bloc politices. Communists abroad were enjoined to take a broad national line and seek mass support. This was legitimated by Stalin's thesis that Communist Parties uphold bourgeois democratic freedoms, national independence and sovereignty, "if you wish to be the patriots of your country."[35]

This Soviet exhortation confirmed the PCF's own experience. (It had, after all, been most isolated in 1949 when Thorez declared support for the Red Army in the event of an East-West war.) Now Western Communists could exploit nationalism, peace sentiments and anti-imperialism to strengthen the Soviet bloc, instead of advancing the social revolution. Claudin and others term this revisionism. For Shulman, it

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[35] Shulman, pp. 253 and 247-248.

embodied the movement's adaptation to the great transformation in world politics since the end of World War II. The old classical theory, and hope, that the working classes of industrial countries would be the vehicle of revolution had been repeately frustrated by events, as these classes began to enjoy the fruits of bourgeois life.

It can be concluded that Communist behavior in May, 1968, was consistent with their entire post-war strategy, deriving from their own (and the movement's) assessment of the revolutionary possibility in Western Europe, given the world balance during these decades. France remained firmly anchored to the Western sphere in 1968, as it had been a quarter-of-a-century earlier.

The June Presidential Elections of 1968

Having analyzed some of the revolutionary possibilities in France, we can now return to the unity problem.

The "dynamic towards unity", which originally appeared so hopeful in early 1968, continued to move toward a crisis that Spring. The Communists had hoped to regain lost ground in the June 23 legislative elections called by de Gaulle. Perhaps their responsible behavior during the crisis would legitimate them in the eyes of the voters. Even the Soviets made no overt judgements on the elections, but privately, they were now describing de Gaulle as a man of the past, who

lacked any grasp of working class problems.[36] The June elections, however, were a decisive defeat for the entire left, and especially the Communists, who despite their good behavior, remained identified with the outbreaks of that Spring. But the shocks of that year had only begun. For as Kriegel notes, what was memorable about 1968 to the PCF "was not so much May in Paris, but August in Prague".[37]

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[36] Le Monde, June 11, 1968, p. 2. Chinese commentary attacked both the Soviet Union and the PCF for "extinguishing the flames of revolution" and for urging revisionist electoral solutions that would only lead to a disguised scheme for Rochet to collaborate with the bourgeoisie. Le Monde, July 7-8, 1968, p. 5.

[37] The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France, p. 40.

CHAPTER IV

THE CZECH CRISIS AND THE FRENCH LEFT

General Perspectives

Most observers correctly attribute special significance to the PCF's response to events in Czechoslovakia, terming it the first assertion of French Communist independence from the CPSU. And indeed the Stalinist heritage of the PCF had burdened it deservedly with a reputation for unswerving loyalty to the Soviets.[1] Given this reputation, some observers exaggerate all signs of PCF-Soviet differences as evidence of a rupture in relations. But judgments must be made carefully. A careful historian might note that disapproval of the 1968 invasion was not the PCF's first disagreement with Soviet foreign policy. One could cite others:

- The PCF now claims it conceived of the Popular Front idea in 1934, despite opposition from the Communist International.[2]

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[1]The French Party lacked the initiative of other Parties, which were less ouvriste, or perhaps had undergone longer years of illegality, such as the more innovative Spanish, Italian and Yugoslav Parties. See Donald L.M. Blackmer, "Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Communism", in Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds. Communism in Italy and France (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[2]This is reported by Jean Kanapa, who headed the Foreign Affairs section of the PCF's Political Bureau. See his essay, "A 'New Policy' of the French Communists", Foreign Affairs, January, 1977, vol. 55, no. 2, p. 283.

- Following the Hitler-Stalin Pact, Communist deputies voted unanimously for defense credits when France went to war against Germany.[3]

- Thorez in 1946 opposed Stalin's view that the Ruhr be placed under inter-Allied control. He also wanted the Saar placed under French control, a policy the Soviets did not support.

It is arguable how significant these differences were; none of them persisted very long.[4]

The 1968 challenge to Soviet actions, however, was of historically different significance: it was a strongly articulated objection, which, although modified, has essentially been sustained over the years. The actions of the left during this crisis are at a crucial intersection of international behavior and domestic alliance strategy. They will now be considered.

Responses Prior to the Invasion

Throughout the Spring of 1968, the PCF, in the pages of the Party press and in the deliberations of its leadership, dealt closely

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[3] Fernando Claudin, pp. 317-318.

[4] I have found no confirmation for Kanapa's version of the Popular Front's paternity. Regarding the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the PCF promptly acted to realign policies with Moscow. Disagreements over postwar German policy were trivial in the sense they involved the same goal: preventing German resurgence.

with events unfolding in Prague. Rochet, speaking to the Central Committee on April 18, observed an important democratization of life in Eastern Europe.[5] While changes in process and corrections of past errors were entirely the affair of the Czech Party, international solidarity did justify his touching on certain common problems. For the public record, Rochet stressed that new dramatic practices in no way endangered the socialist basis of Czech society. (We will see shortly that he did have doubts on this subject.) He went on to note that Czech foreign policy remained firmly linked to the Soviet Union. Despite some transformations, the nation remained in the Socialist Camp.[6]

The Socialists, too, were noting events approvingly. After all, developments in Prague did have symbolic importance, and the Czechs were even suggesting that their practices could apply in other states with democratic traditions. Thus Socialist deputy Claude Estier (a member of the secrétariat national), wrote in the Mitterrand-edited Combat Républicain that "the winds blowing from Prague must serve to further cooperation with the Communists".[8] The meaning was clear: the French Communists stood to gain dramatically from the positive image of

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[5] L'Humanité, April 20, 1968, p. 5 and May 9, 1968, p. 2.

[6] Rochet distinguished the situation from Poland, where there was a threat to the socialist order and the alliance with the Soviets.

[7] Le Monde, April 12, 1968, p. 2.

[8] Reported in Le Monde, April 28, 1968, p. 6.

the Prague Spring.

But it was the Soviets who grew increasingly alarmed about "winds from Prague". And the French Communists, in turn, were growing alarmed at possible Soviet reactions. In mid-July the five East-bloc Communist Parties had notified the Czech Central Committee that while they would not intervene in Czech affairs, they would not "accept Czechoslovakia being led away from the path of socialism". This would be a threat to the entire bloc:

> Our parties are not solely responsible before their own working classes, but before the international working classes for their actions.[9]

This was a cliché of old-style internationalism, but it hinted at the Brezhnev Doctrine to follow.

Rochet's view of internationalism held that each Party had to determine its own policies, a principle well-established at earlier international conferences. But a "particular Party could express its own views on this or that aspect of the behavior of another party, particularly if it was a question concerning the common objectives of all parties--that is the international Communist movement".[10]

Fearing the worst--a Czech-Soviet confrontation--the PCF took

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[9] Le Monde, July 18, 1968, p. 3.

[10] L'Humanité, August 7, 1968, p. 1.

certain initiatives internationally. On July 15 Rochet journeyed to Moscow with Luigi Longo, then Secretary of the PCI. Apparently both sought to discourage the Soviet leaders from using force against Czechoslovakia, which would have violated agreed upon norms of non-interference.[11] Two days later, the PCF launched another initiative and proposed a meeting of all European Communist Parties to discuss events in Czechoslovakia.[12] On July 19, Rochet and Jean Kanapa went to Prague. It is clear that the PCF, which had always had solid ties to the Czech Party, was attempting to serve as an intermediary in the dispute. On the one hand, the leadership wanted to caution the Soviets against seeking a military solution (on a domestic level this threatened to destroy the developing ties with the democratic left in France), on the other, they wanted to warn the Dubcek leadership against letting the situation get out of control, as that would provoke Soviet intervention.

A week after urging a meeting of European Communists, the PCF withdrew its proposal and accepted the Soviets' preference for talks at

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[11] In talks such as these with Soviet leaders the prestige of Western Parties is high, particularly the PCI, which had just scored some electoral successes. The PCF's credit was high, too, despite the electoral setbacks in June. See Le Monde, July 18, 1968, p. 3. It is interesting to note that Rochet's trip to Moscow was not without precedent. According to Rochet himself, he journeyed there in October, 1964 to protest the manner in which Khrushchev had been removed. See André Lauren's essay in Le Monde, July 28-29, 1968, p. 1.

[12] The Italian, Swiss, Belgian and Austrian Parties agreed to come. L'Humanité, July 18, 1968, p. 1.

Bratislava between the Czechs and other East-bloc Parties only. (The Soviets were apparently more comfortable in dealing with ruling parties than non-ruling ones, as they had more control over the former.) The immediate crisis appeared defused for the moment, and the PCF registered its approval of the results of this conference.

Much of what is now known about the celebrated Dubcek-Rochet meeting of July 19th emerged a year-and-a-half after the event,[13] with disclosures embarrassing to the PCF. The meeting reveals much about the nature of the game the PCF was attempting to play in those confused days. On a deeper level it is also an interesting glimpse into French Communist operations at the international dimension. Before examining the meeting, a few observations can be made.

To understand the role of the French Communists in these maneuverings, one must grasp Kriegel's notion that the PCF functions as a non-state controlled entity inside the world Communist system. It also functions "as a potentially or 'proto'-state element within the world

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[13] Kanapa apparently took notes for the PCF side. L'Humanité editor Étienne Fajon sent copies of the minutes back to the Czech authorities in November, 1969. It was charged later by Roger Garaudy that the Kanapa notes might have been used to implicate Dubcek at a trial. See Le Monde, May 13, 1970, p. 9, May 20, 1970, p. 7 and L'Humanité, May 18, 1970, pp. 1, 5 and 6.

interstate system". This world system is not merely a territorial entity, "but a multi-dimensional concept embracing at the same time a system of parties, both ruling and non-ruling, as well as a broad system of alliances that reach out into the national movements in the Third World.[14] It is membership in this system that enfranchises the PCF (and other parties in the system) to participate at an almost government-like level at these international forums. Conventional international law notions of non-interference in the internal affairs of states seem to dissolve in these new relationships. We have seen that from its very birth, French Communism has maintained its links to the world movement, yet remaining a part of the domestic French political system. It is this duality which leads Kriegel and others to describe the PCF as a hybrid of pre-1914 French socialism and Leninism. Out of this ambivalence grew the need for an organization that could walk this political tightrope.

> ... to maintain its double identity, the French party has had to construct an ideological and organizational apparatus designed to compensate for its close relationship to the French political system. This unique structure has been successful in preventing the party's "Frenchness" from submerging its internationalism.
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> ... membership in the international Communist movement is the historical and logical basis for the existence of any Communist party. It constitutes a practical corollary to Communism's ideological

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[14] Blackmer and Kriegel, pp. 37, 39 and 54.

goal--worldwide proletarian revolution.[15]

The above should be helpful in understanding the nature of the dialogue that occurs in international discussions among Communist Party leaders. To return to the July 19th meeting:

Rochet began by noting that a serious situation had arisen of concern to all parties. And while the PCF had never interfered in the internal affairs of the Czech Party, a solution had to be found. "Such is the spirit in which I came to Moscow earlier this week and come here today". He went on to note that forces existed inside Czechoslovakia which could exploit a situation for goals hostile to socialism. Then echoing the Soviet assessment, he urged constant vigilance; the leading role of the Party was being challenged:

> The non-Communist press had the right to advance its own erroneous ideas, but it was the role of the Party press, the unions and the state radio-TV to respond vigorously, so that false ideas could be refuted and could not influence the masses.

Rochet was conveying the Soviet point of view, as explained to him earlier that week: the Czechs were not responding adequately to a long-term threat to socialism.

Turning to Czech foreign policy, Rochet emphasized that a

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[15] Ibid., p. 37

deterioration in ties between the Czechs and Soviets was disturbing to French Communists. He conceded that while the Czech party had pledged its loyalty to the Soviets, certain intellectuals had issued declarations casting doubt on the decisive significance of these ties. This did concern the PCF, since it related to peace and security. "Neither of us can forget Munich". He explained that a break with the USSR could expose Czechoslovakia to "all sorts of maneuvers from West Germany and the United States. The relation of forces would be changed, and the security of Europe threatened. The Soviet Union and the Socialist states could not allow such a situation to develop".[16] PCF leaders clearly knew the Soviets were prepared to act.

After painting this gloomy scenario, Rochet urged:

- The search for a "terrain of entente"between Czechs and Soviets.

- Tighter Party control over the press.

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[16]This is the obverse of what was suggested earlier. French Communists determine the limits of policy by their assessment of a relationship which they term the international balance of forces. They are precluded from certain actions in France because of their geographical sphere as defined by Yalta. Similarly, they view the Czech predicament through the same lense: the bloc will impose its own norms, limiting the transformations under the Prague Spring. For an interesting discussion on this theme see Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, World Politics: Verbal Strategy among the Super Powers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). They argue that U.S. behavior in its own sphere provides precedents and justifications for Soviet behavior under the Brezhnev Doctrine. Often the "crises are as symmetrical as a classical ballet ... an extraordinary reversal of roles". Smaller states within a bloc cannot escape the jurisdiction of that bloc; force will insure this jurisdiction.

Dubcek thanked Rochet graciously for his remarks and indicated his understanding that Rochet was transmitting the views of the Soviets. Rochet denied this:

> No, I am in no way charged with translating Soviet ideas. I went to Moscow in full independence. I listened and heard, and concluded the situation was serious.

Dubcek then said that PCF fears of a break with the CPSU were unfounded, since the Czechs had given no pretext or provocation for such a rupture. He did not think Rochet's proposal for a Euro-wide Communist conference devoted strictly to Czech affairs was useful just then, perhaps later.

The French Communists Respond to the Warsaw Pact Invasion

The invasion itself, following so closely after the turbulent events of the Spring, placed the French Communists in still another crisis. The Party responded immediately.

The Political Bureau expressed its "shock and disapproval" on the morning of August 21st,[17] noting that problems between parties must be resolved by "fraternal discussions and bilateral and multilateral meetings". There must be respect for the independence of each state and party within a framework of proletarian internationalism.

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[17] L'Humanité, August 21, 1968, p. 1. The Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) also condemned the invasion of that day.

The Central Committee issued its own statement the following day, repeating many of the same points, yet different in tone.[18] This led many to call it a retreat from the original condemnation. The original wording was modified to an expression of "regret and disagreement". But it did approve the Political Bureau's statement of the prior day, opposing all interference in the affairs of a fraternal party, a position well-defined by the Declaration of 81 parties issued in 1960. Despite the condemnation, the statement indicated that French Communists would in no way relax efforts to promote unity in the movement. They would continue to work with all parties, particularly the CPSU and "would struggle against all anti-Soviet provocations".

The PCF saw no inconsistency in its two statements.[19] Both condemned the invasion. In fact, the latter statement of the Central Committee went further, indicating the Party's basic international

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[18] L'Humanité, August 23, 1968, p. 1.

[19] Georges Marchais also denied any difference between the Political Bureau statement, "sa surprise et sa réprobation", and the later Central Committee text, noting "désapprobation" .... "there is absolutely no difference. The second statement clearly indicated disapproval" Marchais argued it was perfectly normal for a Central Committee resolution to expand its analysis.

The PCI had issued an even stronger statement, urging the removal of Soviet troops. Marchais, however, ruled out any common action between the two European Parties. But the two parties continued to keep close contacts, as evidenced by the earlier Longo-Rochet meetings. See L'Humanité, August 24, 1968, p. 2.

position: namely that it would strengthen ties with all parties. It was this renewed stress upon closer ties to the Soviets that enemies of the PCF were seizing upon, said Étienne Fajon, editor of L'Humanité. Were the Party to "sink into anti-Sovietism, the rallying point of all regressive forces for half-a-century, it would cease to be Communist".

By late August, it was clear that the force of the PCF's initial objection had subtly been softened. The Communists continued to reject the specific Soviet action, but would not loosen their fundamental alliance with the world movement. They were now putting their faith in the "normalization" process so touted at the end of August.

Reactions from the non-Communist left. There was a general scorn for the "normalization" by the democratic left groups. It was considered a Soviet diktat to Prague. The invasion had now become a domestic political problem within the French left. After the invasion, Alain Savary of FGDS went further, terming the events a moment of truth for Western Communists. "Only an immediate and unequivocal condemnation can save their (that is the PCF's) relations with the democratic left".[20] The Socialist International, to which the SFIO was linked, issued its own denunciation, terming it an act of imperialism recalling Hitler's invasions. Condemnations came in from Pietro Nenni and Golda Meir, as the world socialist body urged an emergency session of the UN Security

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[20] Le Monde, August 22, 1968, p. 5.

Council.

Guy Mollet took a more conciliatory line.[21] While denouncing the invasion, he did see major historic significance to the French Communists' condemnation. Unlike many of his colleagues, he saw no significant difference between the two statements cited earlier issuing from the PCF's Political Bureau and Central Committee. He saw no need to interrupt the unity discussions between his party and the Communists. In fact, he welcomed a recent trend among French and Italian Communists.

Mitterrand, however, did not embrace the PCF initiative. The invasion stemmed from Yalta, the classic whipping boy of the Gaullists. It demonstrated that the Russians were still tied to the special privileges of an out-of-date Yalta Agreement which had divided Europe. The logic of this analysis led him to conclude that France had to "hasten the arrival of an independent Europe".

One could go on citing the various reactions from all quarters: Thus the Youth Contingent of the SFIO termed the PCF attitude

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[21] See Le Monde, August 24, 1968, p. 7. Also see L'Humanité of the same date, p. 3. Contrast this with Mollet's statements in the early 1960s, cited in the previous chapter.

"courageous" and a step that could strengthen the process of unity...[22] CIR (La Convention des institutions républicaines) signaled its support and satisfaction to the PCF leadership.

As the weeks wore on, one could discern more critical attitudes in the ranks of the non-Communist left, especially as the Communists appeared to retreat from the original force of their condemnation.[23] The PCF was only temporizing. Evidence for this was the fact that the Communists were repudiating the Garaudy line, which had welcomed the pre-invasion innovations in Prague. Furthermore, the PCF was accepting uncritically the post-invasion accords between Dubcek and the USSR, which were viewed as little more than diktats by the democratic left.

On September 3, the Political Bureau of the PCF issued a new statement, which was somewhat different from its earlier statements.

1) It expressed a strong desire to see the new Moscow-Prague agreement of August 27th carried out satisfactorily, putting the original Bratislava principles into effect: namely that Czechoslovakia

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[22] If many Socialists were responding favorably to the PCF condemnation, the Radicals were more aloof. Maurice Faure and Felix Gaillard saw no reason to embrace the historic action of the PCF. Thus the Radicals were far more sceptical about the possibility of left unity than the SFIO and FGDS. See Le Monde, August 29, 1968, p. 7.

[23] See the SFIO's resolution of September 5th. While welcoming certain actions of the PCF, the "retreat" endangered any hope for true unity. See L'Humanité, September 6, 1968, p. 3.

would uphold socialism and remain loyal to the Warsaw Alliance, and at the same time pledging a withdrawal of Soviet troops.

2) It did not conceal a basic PCF sympathy for the continued development of democratic socialism in Czechoslovakia, as originally envisaged by Dubcek in January of that year. (At this point it had not been revealed that Rochet had been critical of certain lapses in Czech vigilance in his celebrated meeting with Dubcek on July 19th.)

3) It reaffirmed the initial response of disapproval with the Soviet invasion.

It is not my purpose here to analyze Soviet behavior in any depth. Nevertheless, one can state that the Soviets made a trade-off regarding Western European Communists. To gain stability and orthodoxy among East European Communists (who were ruling parties), they would sacrifice the prestige of Western parties (non-ruling). In other words, it was preferable to preserve ruling parties, and take certain risks among those parties without actual power: a sheer calculation of advantage. The Soviets probably sensed that the invasion would be condemned by Western Parties. They had, after all, been warned. One can assume that from the Longo-Rochet meetings in Moscow the prior month.

Some Preliminary Conclusions

Earlier, Marshall Shulman was cited to the effect that in the 1950s the USSR shifted from insurrectionary politics to power bloc politics - and imposed this norm on all Western Parties. The PCF, we saw, acquiesced in this policy, leading it to formulate the doctrine of peaceful transition. In Czechoslovakia, the Soviets were once again engaged in power-bloc politics. This time, however, they were not endangering the insurrectionary goals of the Western Communists. But they were endangering the very objectives of peaceful transition. In asking that the Western Parties approve of its power-bloc moves in Europe, the USSR was in effect condemning the parliamentary strategies and alliance policies of the mass Communist Parties of Western Europe to defeat. If the Western Parties were prepared to make this sacrifice after the war and in the early days of Cominform, they were no longer prepared to do it in 1968. This appears to be a fair reading of the fact that virtually all Western Parties condemned the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia.

Why did the Western Communists sacrifice their purposes to Soviet power-bloc goals 20 years earlier and not in 1968? Probably because they themselves could see the futility of insurrectionary politics in the 1940s. The Soviet argument made reasonable sense. In 1968 the Soviet argument made no sense, because the Western Parties saw alternative and potentially achievable roads to power, which would have been

closed had they identified with Soviet power-bloc methods in Europe. Having rejected the insurrectionary road, the Western Parties could not reject the parliamentary road as well. This would have left them with no strategy at all.

If the above reasoning is correct, it still leaves unanswered the question as to why the Western Parties did not break totally with the Soviet Union. This is, of course, a basic question of the PCF's international relationship, and an attempt to answer it will be made further on.

At this point, some limited conclusions can be drawn about the effect of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia on the world movement.

The phenomenon of Eurocommunism will be discussed later. And it is not being suggested that the Czech invasion gave birth to its rise (although its contribution will have to be considered). At this point it seems reasonable to say that the crisis in Czechoslovakia opened up a new, third pole in the world movement. (The split with China demonstrated a second variety of socialism that spoke to the less developed states, which could assume certain risks that an established power like the USSR regarded as imprudent.)

The invasion of Czechoslovakia revealed a wide gap between

the developed Western capitalist states and the USSR. One thing it made clear was that the USSR could no longer embody the future for the most modern, industrial states. This seemed to be a major lesson of Prague. It served as a moment of truth for the Western Parties: the Soviet Union was no longer a model. By the 1960s, the progress of the mass parties of the West was being retarded by aspects of Soviet reality.

Maurice Duverger argues that the Czechoslovak event had a special meaning.[24] It showed that the Soviets were determined to crush any manifestations of genuine liberty, placing the Communists of the West in a new situation. It was no longer unthinkable that Communists could begin to share power (as, say, in Finland). As social democracy grew more gestionnaire, it became more open to a liberal communism in the advanced countries. Given this situation, the USSR's international position was difficult. On the one hand, as a growing great power, it required a rapprochement with the U.S. to further its own economic development. Hence it had to separate itself from the more revolutionary posturing of the Chinese. But since it refused any genuine liberalization, it justified the birth of a new form of communism in the West. Duverger conceded a certain weight to the basic importance of the USSR since 1917 in furthering a general advance of world socialism. Without Soviet power confronting the United States, capitalism, as

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[24]See his article in Le Monde, September 5, 1968, p. 4.

embodied in the U.S., would be able to expand increasingly. The Western Communists understood, hence they refused to break with Moscow. In this sense, he argues, they were realistic. Duverger goes on to point out that Stalin transformed the Soviet Union from a revolutionary exporter of ideas into a citadel, concerned chiefly with safety and security. And perhaps it had some further lessons to teach the Chinese and the underdeveloped states. But it no longer had anything to teach the Communists of the developed Western states. They were on their own. This stems from the fact that the Soviets refused any liberalization: Communists of the West were only allowed to develop to a level that corresponded with the level of development in the East, which, he holds, was untenable in the long run. In saying "no" to the USSR on the Czech invasion, the Western Communists opened the road to a new development.

Post-Invasion Fallout

After the dust had settled, the August international crisis threatened Communist assumptions and purposes in four areas, 1) foreign policy, 2) Party unity, 3) domestic alliance strategy, and 4) doctrine.

Foreign policy objectives endangered. The PCF was now anticipating these setbacks in Europe:

- Hostile forces would intensify the cold war and blame the Communists.
- The Center and Democratic Left in France would expoit the crisis and urge closer links to the

Atlantic Alliance.

- Germany would now reject the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty.

Indeed, there was evidence to justify these fears. The NATO Council of Ministers had gone on record against further Soviet actions in Eastern Europe.[25] The U.S. had issued strong warnings against possible moves in Austria, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Michel Debré, in the aftermath of the invasion, had told the UN that a "fatal shadow" had been cast over *détente*.[26] Then, too, the prospect of a Nixon Presidency augured a return to cold-war tactics.

But Communist fears of a renewed cold war proved unwarranted. Within a few months, Debré would note that Soviet intervention within its bloc was not a new phenomenon, hardly requiring a renunciation of *détente*. In fact, the invasion only temporarily interrupted the Franco-Soviet relationship.[27]

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[25] At the Council meeting Willy Brandt and Joseph Luns were especially concerned that Western Europe not relax its vigilance to a Soviet threat. See *Le Monde*, November 18, 1968, pp. 1 and 4.

[26] *Le Monde*, January 4, 1969, p. 1.

[27] Shortly after the Prague invasion, Franco-Soviet cooperation continued its advance, proceeding from the basis of de Gaulle's visit to Moscow in June, 1966. By January, 1969, a joint *Grande Commission* was established between the two states to deal with economic, technical and other aspects of cooperation. By early 1969, France ranked as the largest Western supplier of goods to the USSR. *Le Monde*, January 5-6, 1969, p. 6.

PCF fears concerning German behavior were more valid. There was a stronger basis for fearing that Bonn would no longer sign the non-Proliferation Treaty. Bonn's adherence had been a long-term goal of the French Communists. The invasion, and the subsequent proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, heightened fears in Germany (particularly in the CDU) of a Soviet action beyond the bloc.[28]

Internal PCF unity threatened. The international crisis opened a rift within the Party. Roger Garaudy, a member of the Political Bureau (P.B.) and director of the Centre d' étude et de recherche marxiste (CERM), attacked the Soviet action because it seriously ignored the world movement.[29] At the other extreme, a tendance révolutionnaire around Jeanette Vermeersch-Thorez accepted the Soviet rationale for the invasion. Soon afterward, Vermeersch-Thorez resigned from the leadership; Garaudy was expelled in 1970.

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[28]Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger worried about the USSR's assertion of its rights under Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter authorizing an action against a former enemy state. He further argued that the non-Proliferation Treaty had already been violated by the Soviets in their invasion of Czechoslovakia, since the nuclear powers had given a no-invasion pledge to non-nuclear powers. These guarantees were demonstrably meaningless after Prague. This CDU/CSU argument was viewed with alarm by the French Communists. The Social Democrats in Germany argued that the Soviets could never intervene in Germany under cover of the UN Charter: that the United States would never allow it. Le Monde, January 31, 1969, pp. 1 and 5.

[29]Le Monde, August 28, 1968, p. 2. The logic of his position would have ultimately led to a break with the Soviets.

Alliance strategy in question. Mollet, Mitterrand and Socialists generally had welcomed the original "reprobation", (the first signs of appreciable change by the French Communists towards Moscow since 1920).[30] But the PCF's approval of the later "pseudo-agreement" was viewed as a retreat. In effect, the Socialists were compelling the PCF to choose either unity of the left or obedience in principle to the USSR: break strongly and publicly with the USSR or return to the ghetto. Later, it will be shown that the march toward unity recuperated from the temporary traumas of 1968-69, as long-term factors reasserted themselves.

Doctrinal questions. Amid the turmoil of those months, it is hard to isolate any dramatic doctrinal innovations emerging from the Czech crisis. The Manifeste de Champigny, the Central Committee's articulation of Démocratie avancée, followed the Czech invasion by four months, but it owes its origins more to the May-June events than to the August invasion.[31]

But there were stirrings. For example, an essay in Nouvelle Critique, a journal for Party intellectuals, conceded that the entry of Soviet troops into Prague had cast doubt on the ability of Socialism

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[30] Le Monde, September 7, 1968, p. 1.

[31] The Manifesto has more domestic political significance than international. It will be examined further in the next chapter.

to assure basic rights to its citizens:[32] a valid political insight, but hardly novel to those familiar with Soviet repression. The article suggested a crisis in world socialism and spoke of a need to adapt to a new epoch. New democratic forms were arising which called for revised theoretical analyses. No conclusions were reached, but the essay called for further reflection.

More significant than any formal doctrinal rethinking was a gradual restructuring of the Communists' self-identity, a nationalizing of the Party's purpose and scope. Surely there was no break with the USSR. The French Communists continued to accept the decisive role and historical validity of the Soviet Party in the world movement. But the infallibility of Soviet authority had disappeared. The CPSU was only the first among many.

The trauma wrought by Czechoslovakia can perhaps be understood if one grasps the nature and role of the Soviet patrie in the eyes of French Communists. George Lichtheim suggests that historically Communists fell heir to a revolutionary movement in a non-revolutionary situation.[33] Since there could be no genuine proletarian revolution in France, this hope was transferred to the USSR as the "fatherland of

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[32] A summary of the essay appears in Le Monde, October 4, 1968, p. 2.

[33] George Lichtheim, Marxism in Modern France (New York: Columbia Univeristy Press, 1966), pp. 70-71.

the workers". The Soviet Union appeared as the embodiment of a revolution which France had missed. Other observers term this "the misplaced identity of the PCF" or "the adoption of a myth not its own". The point is that events in Prague undermined this relationship.[34]

The Communists have not resolved the nature of their national identity. The Party is capable of fully meshing with a national identity of France, and then reversing. Even after the Czech invasion, René Andrieu could say:

> (The PCF) is not a national party. Our doctrine holds that the workers of the entire world are in solidarity. Even if a nation is a historical reality, it is for us this powerful solidarity of all workers in the world, and this solidarity primarily manifests itself in regard to the USSR, the first socialist state.[35]

Finally, it must be emphasized, French Communists (like all other Communists except the Chinese) had traditionally denied an aggressive, war-like intent to Soviet policies. This, after all, stemmed from the USSR's inherent identity with--and membership in--the so-called "camp of peace". In fact, much of the PCF's defense doctrine

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[34] Jean Daniel, editor of the independent left Le Nouvel Observateur, holds that the lower ranks of the PCF are far more Stalinist than the leadership. Whenever the party makes large shifts, certain cells and federations will resist, and the Soviet myth remains quite alive. André Harris and Alain de Sédouy, Voyage à l'intérieur du Parti communiste (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1974), p. 124.

[35] Ibid., p. 44.

was predicated on a peaceful Soviet Union, a nation which surely posed no threat to the peace of Europe. This assumption, too, was to be undermined by the demonstration of raw force in Czechoslovakia. (The implications of this will be discussed in the chapter on defense policy.)

CHAPTER V

THE POST-DE GAULLE PERIOD

New Perspectives and Preoccupations

In the year following Prague, the parties of the Left inevitably grew preoccupied with new circumstances: the reconstitution of the Socialist Party, the PCF's Manifeste de Champigny and the staging of a World Conference of Communist Parties in June, 1969. By the spring of that year, the Russians themselves were preoccupied with conflict on the Sino-Soviet border, an event which heightened the urgency of their summons for a Conference on Security in Europe. Divisions in the French left over Czechoslovakia receded in significance,[1] as far stronger forces were pushing for united action. On April 29th, de Gaulle withdrew from French political life after 11 years.[2]

Pompidou victorious. The June election of Pompidou was hardly a victory for the Left. The newly reconstituted Socialist Party, replacing the

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[1]There was a brief flare-up in April, 1969, when Gustav Husak replaced Dubcek. The Socialists urged the Communists to speak out, but the PCF refused, arguing that Socialists were only using the Czech issue as a pretext to dismiss the PCF as a political partner. See Le Monde, April 21, 1969, p. 21 and April 24, 1969, p. 11.

[2]A majority of Frenchmen had voted "non" on de Gaulle's referendum for reform. He then renounced his mandate.

old SFIO, did poorly. But the PCF demonstrated its resurgence from the chaotic days of 1968 by gathering 21 percent of the vote for its candidate, Duclos.[3]

It will be useful to examine the 1969 election and Pompidou's victory to determine their effects on PCF behavior and French foreign policy in the early post-de Gaulle period. We will then return to developments within the Socialist Party, itself undergoing a metamorphosis in the wake of Defferre's defeat, and follow the transitions that led to the Unity Congress of Épinay in June, 1971.

The Soviets themselves, speaking through Pravda, viewed the Pompidou election victory as a defeat for Atlanticist strategy.[4] Yet

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[3]The PCF proposal for a candidature unique was rejected. The Socialist candidate, Gaston Defferre, ran without the support of Mitterrand, the CIR or CERES (Centre d'études de recherches et d'éducation socialiste). The Left vote was so splintered, that the campaign was a disaster. The PCF viewed Defferre's candidacy as a move to revive old Third Force notions of the past that would only deliver France into the hands of the Gaullists. The Soviets registered approval of Duclos' success but did render homage to de Gaulle in the realm of foreign policy. He was, after all, the force in France which liquidated the Algerian War and opened up new alternatives to Atlanticism. See Le Monde, May 2, 1969, p. 6. There is evidence that the Soviets feared that France's independent foreign policy was in danger. In fact, Pompidou's new Government had a slight European tone. Maurice Schumann was named Foreign Minister, with Debré moving to Defense and Chaban-Delmas being named Prime Minister. The PCF, too, was suspicious of Schumann's new role in the Foreign Ministry. To them he represented the old Third Force tendencies of the M.R.P. in an earlier era: submission to the United States and the rearmament of Germany. See L'Humanité, June 24, 1969, p. 7.

[4]Thus the Europeanist Pohrer (candidate of the Center) was unable to reinsert France into its old NATO role. See Le Monde, June 24, 1969.

it would be wrong to conclude that the Soviets had simply ordered the PCF to abstain in the Pompidou-Pohrer run-off of mid-June, a strategy which helped assure a Gaullist victory. It has been argued here that the French Communists, since their origins in the era of Lenin, have learned (perhaps intuitively, and without Soviet prodding) to conform their behavior to a worldwide conception of strategy. The leadership of the French Party, given its hostility to all "Third Force" tendencies, did not require instructions to see that the immediate danger was that France might fall back into its Atlantic orbit, undoing much of the Gaullist legacy. This perception, and the behavior flowing from it, demonstrate a genuine and objective affinity between the Soviet and French Communist visions of the international environment. And the PCF's abstention did go a long way towards assuring Pompidou's victory. In this sense, it was a strong rejection of Atlanticism and a European orientation for France.

However, there was a fear that the new Pompidou regime would move in a European direction that would be more receptive to an enlargement of EEC or the entry of Britain.[5] But these fears were offset by the fact that the Pompidou Government essentially retained its

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[5]Communists also feared a rapprochement between Petite Europe and the U.S. stemming from the new post-de Gaulle leadership. See Le Monde, July 26, 1969, p. 11.

Gaullist stance vis-à-vis the Soviets. By the 1970s,[6] one could say that the USSR and France supported:

- Similar positions on Indo-China.
- A European Conference on Security in Europe.
- Israeli withdrawal from territory acquired after 1967.
- The new and historic Soviet-West German relationship of August, 1970.[7]
- An end to blocs in Europe.

Social democracy prevails in Germany. If the Communists welcomed the departure of de Gaulle from the Fifth Republic (viewing it as a further reason for a renewed unity dialogue with the Socialists), they had almost as much reason to applaud events in Germany. In October, 1969, four months after Pompidou's election, Willy Brandt came to power. This marked the first SPD Government since establishment of the Bonn Republic. The policies of the CDU had led nowhere, in their analyses, except to militarization of the regime. Perhaps there would be a Tournant à Bonn.

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[6] In mid-October, 1970 Pompidou concluded further ties in Moscow with the USSR.

[7] This was the Treaty of Cooperation, where the FRG recognized the World War II-imposed frontiers of the Oder-Neisse line and those between the two Germanys, and affirmed its renunciation of nuclear weapons. These, we have seen, were long-term foreign policy outcomes sought by the French Communists. Of course the PCF wanted Pompidou to go further, namely to recognize the GDR and to take positive steps to organize a European Security Conference.

[8] L'Humanité, October 4, 1969, pp. 1 and 3.

It was hoped that the new Government would quickly sign the non-Proliferation Treaty, and renounce the "Hallstein Doctrine".[9] Ten days after Brandt was elected Chancellor (he had just indicated a readiness to negotiate with the GDR), the PCF issued a joint declaration with the DKP (German Communist Party) setting forth common views on these topics.[10] For the French Communists, the significant step was the 1969 settlement between the two German states. This was basic to European security. The Political Bureau (B.P.) welcomed the event - coming 25 years after the end of the Second World War - which offered a hope for a new beginning in Europe. It was now logical for France to display a similar realism and recognize the GDR. One would also note that this rapprochement between Willy Brandt and Willy Stoph in Erfurt had a symbolic significance in that Social Democrats were talking to Communists, which, after all, is precisely what the PCF was proposing inside France.

The discussion thus far has described French Communist reaction to the more significant international events of the 1968 to 1970 period. Where possible, this behavior has been related to the PCF's links to

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[9] The Doctrine required the Federal Republic to sever ties with those states recognizing the GDR (except for the USSR). For the PCF it was a further manifestation of Bonn's pretension to represent all Germany.

[10] German Communists were a mere shell of the pre-war KPD. It was shown earlier that PCF international policies had supported and co-operated with Communists in Germany as far back as the years following World War I.

the Soviet Communists and to its dialogue with the Socialists. It should now be clear that as an opposition Party, the PCF had very definite international policy objectives. Despite their opposition status, the French Communists were capable of behaving as a formidable political actor, invoking leverage where they could.

Next I will examine some newly articulated Communist strategies for achieving power during this period. While the question may appear domestic in scope, it has international dimensions:

1) The very advent of Communists to power inside a Western European state would have international siginificance.[11]

2) Useful comparisons can be made between French Communist conceptions and those emerging in other key West European Parties.

Le Manifeste de Champigny. This document of the Central Committee was issued December 5-6, 1968, a mere four months after Prague and six months following the May-June events. Here, the Communists set forth their program for an "Advanced Democracy", calling for a unity of the left: an announcement of the Party's readiness to work with all working class and democratic forces.

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[11] This was discussed in the sections on the Liberation and on May, 1968, where it was shown that insurrectionary strategy was rejected. Later, the international significance of events in Portugal and Chile will be discussed, in that they affected thinking on the left regarding peaceful strategies for achieving and sustaining power.

Démocratie avancée was not a blueprint for socialism. It was transitional in nature, setting forth an intermediate stage. It did not imply an end to capitalist ownership nor to control of the state by the working class. Rather, it was designed to change the relation of forces between classes and prepare the way towards socialism.[12]

In its specific proposals, the manifesto offered little that was new in foreign policy or domestic social programs. That had all been set forth in the February 24, 1968, Déclaration commune with the FGDS ten months earlier.[13] Apparently May, 1968 had confirmed to the Communists that the class struggle had not been attenuated in advanced capitalist society. What was lacking then, and needed now, was a new and deeper alliance of all forces. The class struggle would follow a peaceful road. This was only a reaffirmation of the thesis emerging from the World Conference of 81 Parties in 1960. But the peaceful road was not just the parliamentary road: it was the class struggle in all forms, short of civil war. While the Communists urged cooperation with

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[12] See Etienne Fajon's report to the Central Committee, L'Humanité, February 7, 1969, p. 7.

[13] It was a reaffirmation of the parliamentary road, embracing all parties of the left, organizations and trade unions. It pledged respect for minority rights. The rhetoric was not too distant from that of the SFIO, which had earlier confirmed its support for a transformation to a society with a socialist character. In Tiersky's words, the PCF was expanding the base of those it sought to be the tribune of. See his essay "French Communism in 1976", Problems of Communism, January-February, 1976, vol. XXV, pp. 38-45.

all elements, they continued to insist on their own decisive role, a reaffirmation of their vanguard position.[14] Further implications of the new Champigny strategies and the suspicions they generated on the Democratic Left will be discussed later.

If the new program had little to offer in terms of new international policy, in what sense did it have international significance? The important point is that the PCF's embracing of Démocratie avancée was reflected interntionally in the sense that it was paralleled by the thinking of other West European Communist Parties, such as the Spanish CP and the PCI, the latter of which would go on to formulate its Historic Compromise. Essentially, the new program was a step deriving from the new logic of the global system and from some reassessment of the role of the working class and its allies as driving forces in achieving power.[15]

The 1969 World Conference

If there was a new logic to the world global system at the time of Champigny, one would expect to see it manifested at the World

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[14] L'Humanité, December 7, 1968, pp. 5 and 6.

[15] This is not to suggest a concerted effort in social policy. The PCF and PCE, for instance, declared their aim to extend the socializing of major enterprises. But the PCI's Historic Compromise had no such plans to extend the public sector in Italy. Jean-Pierre Chevénement, Les Socialistes, les Communistes et les autres (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1977), p. 200.

Conference of 65 Communist Parties held June 6, 1969 in Moscow. Unity did not emerge at this Conference. Nevertheless, the European Communists, despite other differences which will be discussed below, did agree that the era was one in which capitalism might be isolated if they could somehow extend their own forces to the right and integrate their parties into the nationalist reality of capitalism. In France, as we have seen, this would require efforts to open up a democratic perspective and an alternative government program, hoping to gain power with a parliamentary majority - including social democrats.

The Soviet Communists were not entirely persuaded by this thesis. At the Conference, Brezhnev's speech scored social democracy's role, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, where it had mortgaged itself to anti-communism and Atlanticism. The Soviet leader did concede, however, that Western Communists should be prepared to lead a joint struggle with other forces willing to struggle against imperialism.

Another issue at the conference concerned the nature of the World Movement. The Italians prevailed in that the Conference conceded that there was indeed no center to the World Movement. The old-style model of democratic centralism, which once operated globally, no longer applied to the international relations of parties. Questions of principle would not be resolved by votes among various national Communist Parties. One might say that Communist Parties, in asserting their own

sovereignty, were behaving much in the nature of nation states at any world forum. In a sense, the 1969 Conference was not enunciating a new doctrine, rather, it was confirming the new reality of relations then existing between Communist Parties at the dawn of the 1970s. The fact that the PCI refused to sign the major document of the Conference, further confirmed that the World Movement would, in effect, allow an internal opposition. This was the notorious factionalism decried by Lenin. The PCI refused to submit to the democratic-centralist discipline of an international body, under the argument that such an international body no longer existed.

Some differences among the Western Parties. In assessing the relations of Western European Communist Parties to the Soviets and to international questions, one must note certain perceptual and policy differences between the Western Parties themselves. Here, we are concerned particularly with the 1969-1970 period.

Although, both the PCF and PCI agreed on a general need for unity of action, at least where it was possible, the Italian Communists went on to stress certain persistent differences within what they term "the international workers movement". Speaking broadly, it could be said that in 1969 the PCI manifested a deeper distrust of Soviet policies and behavior than did the PCF.

1) Peaceful coexistence. The Italian Communists did not challenge this basic Communist perspective. In fact, their long-term success depended on a normalization of relations between the two blocs. Rather, the PCI feared bipolarity - or the logic of a bipolar concept of the world. But there was a fear that a U.S.-Soviet dialogue might lead to an ultimate bipolarity, which would paralyze the autonomy of other states (and, by implication, political parties).[16]

2) Inter-Party relations. The PCI in arguing for far greater autonomy and independence at the World Conference, went so far as to approve certain of the bold initiatives taken by Czech Communists. In its view, developments in Czechoslovakia concerned not just that country, but posed problems of principle to the entire movement. This view was not openly shared by the PCF.[17]

3) China. The Sino-Soviet dispute was perceived differently by

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[16]This perspective on bipolarity was spelled out by PCI General Secretary Luigi Longo in his speech on the eve of the Moscow Conference. See Le Monde, May 29, 1969, p. 1. In the 1969-1970 period, the French Communists did not especially perceive this danger in Peaceful Coexistence. Later, we will see they became quite emphatic that détente in no way implied a freezing of the status quo in Europe.

[17]The French did not raise the Czech issue at the Moscow meeting. George Marchais, now Acting Secretary General (during the illness of Rochet), explained this by noting that 1) the Czechs asked that it not be raised, 2) to raise it would be an interference in Czech affairs and 3) PCF participation would emphasize common interests with other parties, not differences.

the two mass Communist Parties of Europe. The PCF at this stage was prepared to go along with the Soviet drive to expel China from the world movement. In fact, French Communists had consistently supported the Soviet side in the dispute with China.[18] The point is that the PCF firmly rejected "anti-Sovietism" (although paradoxically, retaining its own right to criticize aspects of Soviet reality).

The PCI of course rejected the idea that Mao was a new Lenin and opposed Chinese efforts to split parties of other nations. But it would not support the expulsion of China from the movement. Rather, it saw a need to seek out and learn the objective causes of the Chinese development. Any effort to remove China would only be an excuse for the Soviets to reinstate the norms and hegemony of the past in inter-party relations.

Europe. The world conference highlighted certain key conceptual differences between the PCF and the Soviets on the one hand, and the Italian Communists on the other regarding Europe. The Italian

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[18] Some hold that this support arose from their own irritation with domestic Maoists operating to their left in the 1960s. But the argument is not entirely persuasive. The PCI also had a Maoist movement to contend with, yet it was far more tolerant of Chinese behavior. Tiersky argues that the PCF is a beneficiary of the Sino-Soviet dispute, since it gains international bargaining leverage with the Soviets by supporting their side. Some argue that the PCF would continue to oppose the Chinese line even if the Soviets reached a truce. The point is made by François Fejtö, who attributes it to a private source (and it is of course highly speculative). See his The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism, p. 192.

Communists saw basically progressive aspects to European integration, although they remained critical of EEC domination by capitalist forces. In fact, by 1969, the PCI was now participating in Community decision-making.[19] The PCI even saw the Common Market as a potentially disruptive force in weakening the U.S. domination of the Continent.[20] The French Communists, on the other hand, viewed EEC as a cover for American interests and cold-war strategy.

Communist-Socialist Relations in the Post-de Gaulle Period

Having reviewed international essentials of the period following the departure of de Gaulle, it is now appropriate to return to the dynamic of unity between the two leftist parties in France. Chapter VI will discuss the unified Socialist Party, born at the Épinay-sur-Seine Congress in 1971, and explore the Programme commun which emerges one year later. Intricacies of the PCF/PS dialogue will be examined only to the extent that they shed light on shifting international perspectives.

The Socialists seek internal unity. Paralleling their unity dialogue with the Communists, the Socialists were also striving to restructure

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[19] See Blackmer in Blackmer and Kriegel, pp. 19-21, which has a good discussion of Italian Communist attitudes towards the European Community.

[20] This latter perception, we will see, places the PCI view of Europe somewhat closer to French Socialist thinking. The SFIO had generally viewed an integrated Europe as an important "third force" between the two superpowers.

their own party, gathering together the various federations and clubs that comprised the democratic left. And the need was compelling indeed, considering that in the Presidential elections of 1969 they could muster a mere five percent of the vote. Ultimate PS emergence as the major electoral force in France by the mid-1970s will be an important sub-theme, explaining much of the reciprocal behavior of the PCF in the ensuing years.

In Chapter II it was shown that the PS was the heir of a certain historical tradition. But not all segments of the Party necessarily agreed on the nature of this legacy. Hence, one must always bear in mind the heterogeneous currents that flow within the Party (even after the unity forged at Épinay). It will be helpful to identify briefly some of the groupings, since they will be referred to in future discussions.

Thierry Pfister suggests three distinct currents that were ultimately grafted on to the old SFIO of Pierre Mauroy and Gaston Defferre.[21]

1) The Mitterrand current. This group combines a radical and Republican tradition embodied in the clubs of the Convention des institutions républicaines (CIR). It developed largely as a response to

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[21] Les Socialistes (Paris: Albin Michel, 1967), pp. 17-20. Pfister is a journalist with Le Monde and has written widely on the French Left.

Gaullism, or what used to be termed the Gaullist coup d'état of 1958 and the personalist regime that followed.[22]

2) The CERES current. Rallying around Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Didier Motchane and Alain Gomez,[23] CERES was once described as a "party within a party".[24] In a sense this is apt, in that it defines its own doctrines, stages its own meetings, edits its own publications and in effect operates as a monolithic, lively and dynamic bloc within the PS. CERES began as a study group of intellectuals during 1966 in the 14th Arrondissement of Paris. Its influence grew significantly, and it played a pivotal role at the historic Épinay Congress by throwing its support to Mitterrand.[25]

CERES remains essentially a Paris-located force, lacking any real base outside the City, but is is a force to be reckoned with. Its

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[22] Its major goal was to establish new institutions with a strong coloration of social justice, but not necessarily to break with capitalism. Mitterrand's political insight was to conceive a new emerging majority encompassing the entire Left.

[23] All of whom are graduates of ENA.

[24] Maurice Duverger, Lettre ouverte aux socialistes (Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, 1976), p. 103.

[25] Guy Mollet and Alain Savary had 46 percent of the votes; Mitterrand and Gaston Defferre had 45 percent. CERES, with 8.5 percent, was thus the balance of power. Thanks to it, Mitterrand became First Secretary in 1971. Chevènement was placed in charge of the Party Program. By the Grenoble Congress of June, 1973, CERES comprised one-quarter of the P.S. Executive Bureau.

international perspectives will be discussed further on. As Pfister notes, it adheres to a Marxist ideology which often approaches sectarianism. Or as Duverger puts it, "it seeks to reconcile a gauchiste temperament with a Communist discipline".[26]

Ideologically and strategically, CERES seeks to transcend a mere electoral alliance with the Communists. Rather, its basic calling is to heal the historic rift of Tours: to reunite the working class movement of France.[27]

3) Current autogestionaire. This derives from the tradition of Proudhon, seeking a decentralized society of worker management, both in the state and the industrial enterprises. Its roots are in the old PSU, and today it unites around Michel Rocard and the CFDT labor syndicate.

The Congress of Issy-les Moulineaux in July, 1969 marked a first stage in the gradual rebuilding of the Socialist left, even though Mitterrand's forces and the other currents described above had not yet been brought into the Party. Alain Savary was named First Secretary of the new PS, replacing Mollet's rule of 23 years. Much of the debate at the time concerned the wisdom of negotiating a unity agreement with

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[26] Duverger, Lettre ouverte, p. 103.

[27] This is often termed "unity at the base, rather than unity at the top". Socialism is impossible in France without this unity, they maintain.

the Communists.[28]

Given these various currents in the French Left, we can now return to the Socialists' dialogue with the PCF and examine points at issue between the two parties.

Many of the obstacles to unity during this period arose from domestic politics disagreements. For example, with their Manifeste de Champigny the Communists had shifted slightly from their earlier electoral and parliamentary strategy, arousing the suspicions of the democratic left. The Manifeste invoked a new, and sometimes ominous rhetoric concerning the struggle of the popular masses, suggesting possible confrontations against the power of the monopolies. This led many Socialists to ask if the PCF wanted power inside a genuine coalition, or if it was merely seeking a new relation of forces in its favor: power with others, or power within the Left? And if the latter, power for what purposes? And there were other ambiguities in the Manifeste. It stated that subversion and violence by "forces hostile to socialism" would legitimate forceful countermeasures by the new regime. Unexpressed was any definition of the true rights of a minority under the future regime. And what possibilities did such a minority have for re-

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[28] Pierre Mauroy argued it was risky to negotiate with the PCF from weakness, when the democratic left was dispersed, especially with Mitterrand's forces outside the fold. Others favored immediate unity discussions.

establishing itself someday as a majority? And what activities would constitute the "subversion" referred to? These were really the old questions that always seemed to arise when the "rôle dirigeant" was invoked, a doctrine the Communists, even today, have never renounced.

The Socialists, in elaborating their own theory of unity, claimed to seek only an alliance of equals.[29] But later, when the Communists began to note steady Socialist successes, they would accuse the PS of seeking hegemony within the alliance.

"Changer de cap". In October, 1971, the Communists, now under the leadership of Marchais, issued their Programme de gouvernement démocratique et d'union populaire, entitled "Changer de cap". Unlike the Manifeste, it offered more possibilities for a dialogue with the PS.

Its foreign policy positions were not a major break with perspectives set forth in the 1968 Common Declaration.[30] Nevertheless,

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[29] Jean Poperen, L'Unité de la Gauche (Paris: Arthème Fayard, 1975), p. 198. Thus Communist alliance strategy was to obtain a leading role. But do other parties behave any differently? Lazitch argues that it is not that they seek hegemony, but their methods of seeking it. Since Lenin considered all alliances temporary, Communists would use their own methods to weaken their partners: placing their own people in the camp of their partners (and future enemies) such as Otto Grottewohl in Germany or Fierlinger in Czechoslovakia. See Branko Lazitch, L'Échec Permanent, l'alliance Communiste-Socialiste (Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont, 1978), p. 108.

[30] See Chapter III.

there was a change of emphasis, a moderation in certain approaches. For example, the 1968 Declaration called for an immediate withdrawal by France from the Atlantic Pact. "Changer de cap" was softer in tone; it only called upon France to take steps to disengage from the Pact. One can debate the true significance of a modification such as this. But in analyzing Communist pronouncements, one must attribute some significance to even subtle changes in emphasis. The policy remained the same, but its mode of expression was softened. Other foreign policy positions, while essentially unchanged, were expressed in a more reasonable manner: France should not break unilaterally with the Common Market, but should strive to revise the Rome Treaty. Regarding the Middle East, it confirmed Israel's right to exist and recognized the national rights of all peoples in the region. These were all positions which at least allowed room for negotiation with the PS, which was itself undergoing a major transformation in the latter part of 1971.

The Congress of Unity at Épinay: June 1971. Épinay marked a major turning point for the Democratic Left. Here, Mitterrand emerged as leader of the new PS, combining the forces of the CIR, CERES and other left currents, and narrowly overcoming the old Mollet-Savary majority. Equally important, the Congress called for a Program of Government

with the PCF, a basic goal of Mitterrand since 1965.[31]

Épinay was not a forum for enunciating new foreign policy initiatives, nevertheless, various perspectives did emerge.[32] Contention arose over the Atlantic Alliance: whether France should stay in it, withdraw unilaterally, or work for the simultaneous dissolution of both blocs.

Mitterrand supported a mainstream position (along with the Savary leadership and Guy Mollet as well as Mauroy and Defferre), urging the simultaneous dissolution of the two military blocs in Europe. To withdraw alone implied neutralism, which was unthinkable, since it would leave France without any defense policy at all. CERES, and a strong current within CIR, urged a unilateral withdrawal, assuming a breakdown of future European security talks. (This was also the

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[31] Épinay oriented the Party strongly to the left: committing it to Socialist change, arising from the more dynamic Mitterrand and his infusion of new forces into the Party, many of whom were radicalized by the upheavals of May, 1968. Frank Wilson argues that on some issues it moved even further to the left than the PCF: autogestion, unionization of the military and a renewed anticlericalism. It is interesting to note that a resolution was narrowly defeated condemning social democracy and calling on the PS to withdraw from the Socialist International. See his "The French Left under the Fifth Republic", unpublished paper issued at the "Two Decades of Gaullism" Conference, SUNY Brockport, N.Y., June 9-11, 1978, p. 24.

[32] Thus certain ritualistic postions of the left were voiced. First Secretary Savary scored French foreign policy, citing the "concealed war in Chad" as well as Government tolerance towards Franco Spain, Portugal, South Africa and the Greek Colonels. See Le Monde, June 13-14, p. 6.

position of the Communists). But the CERES proposal was defeated; a prior collective security agreement in Europe was a condition precedent to any withdrawal from the Alliance. CERES ultimately abandoned its unilateral position.[33]

Regarding Europe, there was no consensus, but all factions agreed that certain guarantees were needed if the powers of the Community were to be broadened.

As a result of Épinay, the path was now clear for a programatic confrontation with the PCF. Nevertheless, Mitterrand chose this occasion to define the limits to the field of negotiations, stating "Nous ne changerons pas de camp".[34]

The 1969 Referendum on Europe

Between Épinay and the signing of the Programme commun a year later, there arose an important test of PCF-PS ability to work together toward common purposes in foreign policy, despite allegiances to rival

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[33] In urging a rejection of blocs and alliances, the PS was now in a position where it had to conceive a new defense policy for France and resolve the issue of nuclear weapons. At this stage the new Party had not yet begun to consider such issues.

[34] Poperen, p. 379. This was the dilemma regarding any reconciliation of international positions by the two parties: their ultimate identifications with the different camps of East and West.

camps. The test came from Pompidou. The Government had, of course, not overlooked these debates on the left regarding Europe and differences with the Communists. Thus Pompidou was able to place the two parties in contention by announcing a Referendum on Europe in March of 1972.[35]

Both leftist parties opposed the Referendum since it amounted to a vote-of-confidence for the regime. Yet the PS leadership essentially supported EEC and could not vote "Non". Hence they called for abstention.[36] After all, EEC had been formed years ago; why vote on it now? The Communists on the other hand, decided on a "Non"-vote. Abstention was hardly a rebuff to the Pompidou Government. It was insufficient because it indicated indifference to the masses of people on what really was a plebiscite. How could the masses be neutral on what they were struggling against?[37] Thus the Referendum became not only

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[35] It dealt with expansion of EEC, British membership, and further steps towards integration. Many viewed it as a device to undermine the delicate PCF-PS negotiations then underway: a domestic politics maneuver to divide the Left, rather than a genuine foreign policy initiative.

[36] The Socialist Party of this period had almost a generation gap in thinking over the issue of Europe. The old veterans of the SFIO from the days of Mollet considered the Treaty of Rome as one of their crowning foreign policy achievements. The new generation suspected EEC of giving free-play to the penetration of Europe by American corporations. For them, any action on Europe had to be linked to the content of the undertaking. They would not yield their options merely to build Europe.

[37] For a summary of these views, see Le Monde, March 29, 1972, p. 7.

a stumbling block between the two parties in their discussions towards a Common Program, but it became a symbolic test of strength as well.[38]

A full discussion of Communist and Socialist attitudes towards Europe will appear in Chapter VIII. Nevertheless, these debates during the post-Épinay period are instructive. They highlight the very different perspectives through which the two parties arrived at political decisions. And to many, these debates raised the question: could the two parties ever hope to govern jointly? There were two separate, but related, issues raised by the Referendum:

- Entry of Britain to EEC.
- Expansion of EEC powers (the issues of French sovereignty).

The Communists advanced four objections to Britain's entry:

1) Suspicions of the reformist Labour Party. The PCF was naturally sceptical regarding arguments that the Left would be strengthened somehow if "the power of the Party of Harold Wilson" joined EEC. Marchais

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[38] The point is that both parties feared any attempt by the other to monopolize the terrain on the Left. Thus Mitterrand had from time-to-time said openly that he sought a new equilibrium on the Left, to demonstrate that Socialists could reconquer a large share of the audience in France. And the Communists would soon begin posing the same question: were their potential alliance partners seeking to gain power jointly, or were they seeking to demonstrate their own dominance in an intra-left rivalry? Some of these issues are addressed by the Socialist Claude Estier. See Le Monde, April 1, 1972, p. 6.

insisted that entry of Britain would only reinforce the Atlantic Alliance.[39] The PCF was prepared to cooperate with Socialists in France (who had been essentially radicalized in recent years). But the reformist social democracy embodied in the Labour Party was another matter; it remained deeply suspect.[40]

2) Britain as an economic threat. The entry of Britain would compel certain non-monopoly sectors of French industry to disappear, creating unemployment and dislocations in France. Furthermore, Britain's presence would place demands on European agricultural producers to lower their prices. This would harm French farmers.[41]

3) The specter of European defense. Entry of Britain into EEC was a prelude to an integrated defense system, integrated nuclear weapons and possibly even a sharing of weapons with the FRG. In Communist eyes it was not far-fetched to think that closer economic and political ties by Britain to the Continent would ultimately draw that nation closer to

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[39] Le Monde, April 14, 1972. p. 9. This was the old "Trojan Horse" argument: that Britain acted as a front for essentially U.S. interests. Like de Gaulle, the PCF distrusted the Anglo-Saxon affinity the so-called "special relationship" with the U.S. It is sometimes argued that France was prepared to accept British entry in the 1970s as a partial offset to the growing power of Germany. See Roy Macridis, Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976), pp. 115-116.

[40] It was unrealistic to expect the PS to share this hostility. Only the CERES faction was hostile to British reformism.

[41] L'Humanité, April 4, 1972, p.5.

Europe in the realm of defense.[42]

4) Anti-plebiscitarian democracy. The de Gaulle Constitution restricted the prerogatives of parliament and periodically made direct, plebiscitary appeals to the public. But to the Communists, these were pseudo-appeals to the general will. The communists, claiming a more Jacobin inheritance, saw themselves as defenders of the Republican representative tradition in France. For example, during this period Marchais emphasized that the Constitution tended to keep the French Parliament away from major decisions of state, "reducing it to a simple chamber of registration".[43] Since the regime also kept its citizens aloof from the state, it was a caricature of democracy to offer them a periodic right to respond on national policy questions, such as entry of Britain, where they lacked any means to be genuinely informed.[44]

Despite their abstention on the Referendum, the Socialists did

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[42] See L'Humanité, April 19, 1972, p. 8, where Jacques Denis cited a British Government White Paper urging just such closer cooperation. In Germany, Franz-Joseph Strauss had also been urging a pooling of nuclear effort by Britain and France. How this would have provided the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons is not clear. But there were fears that the Pompidou Government was covertly promoting a new EDC. See L'Humanité, April 21, 1972, p. 3.

[43] See his speech to the Central Committee, in L'Humanité, March 31, 1972, p. 2.

[44] For a discussion of direct democracy, see Henry W. Ehrmann, Politics: France (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 9-11 and 127-130.

not share these perspectives. As early as 1968 they had observed Britain's retrenchment, its revised world role, and even a loosening of the historically close ties to the U.S.: a shifting towards Europe. This, in fact, had led the democratic left in France to oppose de Gaulle's earlier rejections of Britain. Socialist opinion in France increasingly felt that the old London-Washington Axis, based on a shared political outlook, military policy and financial viewpoint, was weakening. Perhaps the U.S. had at one time granted Britain a certain privileged position in exchange for its political support, as well as its bases and protection throughout the Commonwealth. But a shrinking Empire and a weakening of the Pound had undermined Britain's value to the U.S.[45]

The National sovereignty issue. The Referendum to broaden EEC was being proposed by a Gaullist Government. But as Debré reminded everyone, Gaullists had always been true to French sovereignty, opposing delegations of authority belonging to national governments.[46] They had always insisted on the strict operation of the unanimity principle in supranational institutions. Europe would continue to be based on governmental

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[45] See Rêné Dabernat's essay in Le Monde, January 14-15, 1968, pp. 1 and 2.

[46] It was de Gaulle, after all, who purged EEC of much of its supranational essence, compelling his allies to renounce the rule of majority voting in the Council of Ministers. See Le Monde, April 14, 1972, p. 9.

agreement wherever vital questions were at issue. Thus the Pompidou leadership hardly needed lessons in Gaullism from the Communists.

But these Gaullist arguments were not sufficiently reassuring to the Communists for two reasons:

1) National independence had always been a rallying cry of the Communists in the post-war years. Reading PCF rhetoric on the topic, it often seemed exaggerated and demagogic. As an opposition Party, they are not the policy-makers of France (and they are a Party whose own independence had often been questioned in the past).[47] But in 1972 they had a genuine stake in the question. Now they saw a possible deliverance from their traditional opposition status, a chance to be projected into a Governmental role. As potential policymakers, they would have to champion national independence. An isolated leftist Government, operating in a supranational European regional body, would require full sovereignty to enact the transformations the Left had in mind for France.[48] Thus a broadened EEC posed a potential threat to

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[47] Of course they were often the derivative beneficiaries of Gaullist assertions of national independence, as in the withdrawal from NATO in 1966.

[48] The 14-member Commission in Brussels operates with supranational powers, representing the Community interest and animating the integration process. Far more powerful is the Council of Ministers, where unanimity is still the rule. Its ultimate approval is required in decision making. But the Commission retains a policy-initiating role and strong inputs in implementation. See Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 82-98.

their social program for France.[49]

2) By 1972, the PCF was beginning to feel, perhaps with a touch of paranoia, that a strong Europe (and an enlarged EEC) was a device or a political maneuver to weaken the large Communist Parties of Europe.[50]

By 1972, Socialists, too, were manifesting disenchantment regarding EEC. A majority felt that the Common Market was unfulfilled. It had not served as a counterweight to the domination of U.S. capitalism, which many had hoped for. Merely to enlarge it into a vast zone of free exchange would serve little purpose.[51] A majority agreed with the PCF on one point: any future Government of the Left would have to retain

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[49]The British policy analyst, Andrew Shonfield, has investigated the effects of supranationality on domestic socio-economic policy. He points out that EEC did expose France "to sudden and unpredictable pressures from the outside". France could no longer set import restrictions to aid its balance of payments or support certain industries that were in difficulty. His point is that planners lost their freedom to resist foreign competition. And he concludes that EEC "could be a major inhibition to the pursuit of national economic policy..." See his discussion in Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), particularly pp. 133-134.

[50]Communist spokesman Roland Leroy spelled out the argument in a special essay for Le Monde: that the designs of the Centrists (such as Jean Lecanuet and Duhamel) as well as the U.D.R. were to seek a supranational Europe in the hope of "reducing the influence of the large Communist Parties". See that newspaper, April 22, 1972, p. 8. This is not the conventional objection to EEC. Usually Communists attack it on economic grounds: as threatening Europe and its working class, or as harming French farmers and wine growers by flooding France with cheap agricultural products.

[51]Some general judgments of the PS on this topic are discussed in Le Monde, January 12, 1972, pp. 7 and 8.

freedom of maneuver in carrying out its social planning and nationalizations within a European community. Perhaps certain powers might be delegated to a European-wide political authority. For example the European Parliament might be broadened with, perhaps, legislative powers to control the Community budget. But any Left Government would be foolish to deny itself the possibility of extending the public sector.

The "Mansholt" memo. Shortly before the Referendum, the Communists were able to bolster their campaign for a "no" vote by adroitly revealing (and distorting) the "Mansholt letter", an internal EEC document suggesting that future policies of the Community would have to envision reduced consumption levels in Europe.[52] As Marchais described it, this was tangible evidence that EEC would lead to an international order where the consumption levels and the well-being of people would be lowered, a "Europe of misery and regressive economic development", as well as lowered population levels. This was the Malthusian solution implied by Pompidou's petite Europe des trusts. The tactic, of course, was to rally as much discontent as possible around a "no" vote. After all, there were important negotiations coming up with the Socialists in a few weeks on the Programme commun, and the Communists wanted to

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[52] Sicco Mansholt was a Dutch Socialist recently named President of the European Commission. In a confidential note to another official in Brussels, he had for the first time suggested that future Commission policies would have to incorporate "limits to growth" solutions that had recently been popularized by the MIT-Club of Rome study. This was before the energy crisis of 1974, but it did call for a reduced consumption of raw materials and energy on a global scale. Le Monde, April 6, 1972, pp. 2 and 3.

demonstrate as much electoral force as possible. In fact, their exploitation of the memo was patently tactical and demagogic, and one could hardly consider it a sincere reflection of their international policy regarding energy and consumption policies. Communist Parties in opposition will normally reject austerity programs. Once in power, they will, of course, restrict consumption to serve any purpose they have in mind, as has so often happened in the East Bloc countries.

Results of the Referendum were ambiguous, allowing all sides to claim victory. The government could point to a "Oui" vote of 68 percent (representing 38 percent of the eligible voters). On the other hand, the number of abstentions and blanks were the highest ever recorded in a French election, prompting Duverger to term it a victory for the Socialists.[53] The Communists described it as a defeat for Pompidou's Europe, since only 38 percent of the French electorate were authorizing an enlarged Common Market, which was less than Pompidou's mandate in the Presidential elections. The "Non" vote was 32 percent (17 percent of the eligibles). On the other hand, one could not term all of the "Non" votes as votes for the PCF.[54]

With the bickering over and the Referendum behind them, the PCF

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[53] Le Monde, April 27, 1972, p. 1.

[54] See Alain Duhamel's analysis in Le Monde, April 26, 1972, p. 9.

and PS were now free to renew their dialogue on the historic programme commun. Perhaps the lesson was that the regime could be opposed successfully, but only if there was unity of action.

CHAPTER VI

LE PROGRAMME COMMUN

It has been said that the Common Program promised American abundance, Scandinavian egalitarianism, Soviet collectivism and Rousseauian democracy.[1] Despite the broad appeal to all men, it did not address two international realities that would be of much concern to governments in the 1970s: the world energy crisis and the recession/inflation syndrome of the industrial West.

Nevertheless, it was a key document. In Communist eyes, the strategy of the Common Program was the logical corollary of the "peaceful coexistence" doctrine. Under the conditions of that era, the working classes could now achieve potential majorities in parliament, transform the state from a tool serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people.[2] Many non-Communists had had doubts about the genuineness of the PCF's commitment to such a doctrine: Could such a historically authoritarian and revolutionary movement pursue a democratic road to power? The far Left had doubts as well: the very act of seeking power in the bourgeois state confirmed

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[1]Alain Bournazel, La Gauche n'aura jamais le pouvoir (Paris: Fayolle, 1978), p. 79.

[2]Tiersky, French Communism, pp. 274-275.

that the PCF was opting for reformism over revolution - much as the SFIO had done in 1905.

Earlier alliances. The Common Program was hardly the first historical attempt by Communists and Socialists to form an alliance directed at governing.[3] One may reasonably assume that the Front populaire and Libération would continue to haunt the negotiators of 1972. There was, after all, a deep hostility between the two parties. In the view of the Communists: social democracy, wherever in power, was incapable of genuine systemic changes. The social democracies of Austria, Sweden or Harold Wilson's Britain were hopelessly reformist. While there were improved aspects of national life, the villain, monopoly capitalism, remained untouched.

Furthermore, European social democracies were anti-Communist, and had, since the end of World War II, essentially subordinated their policies to the U.S. In fact, before and after the war, social democratic international policies were at odds with the Communist line.

- The non-interventionist SFIO refused aid to Spanish Republicans.
- The SFIO supported Munich. The PCF backed the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

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[3] For the first time since Tours the two parties recognized a reciprocal existence. Earlier pacts sought to unite the two into an organic unity. See Bournazel, p. 82. CERES, incidentally, never accepted the finality of the split at Tours. The left must surmount its differences if it is to ever incarnate the national will. Chevènement, p. 19.

- Most Socialists deputies voted to outlaw the PCF at the start of World War II.
- A Socialist Prime Minister expelled PCF ministers from the Government in 1947.
- French Socialists joined with the British Conservatives and Israelis in the war against Egypt in 1956.
- Socialists submitted to (and even participated in) de Gaulle's new Government in 1959.

More currently, the Socialist International was perceived as a Menshevik axis of Bruno Kreisky, Olof Palme and Golda Meir, all dominated by the SPD in Bonn. These Social Democrats were designing a supranational Europe: a device to defeat the mass Communist Parties of the Continent. They would work to block any alliance of Social Democrats and Communists, whether in France, or later in Spain and Portugal.

Socialist suspicions. The Socialists cited an equally long catalogue of Communist misdeeds and crimes, dating back to Tours and the period reviewed in Chapter I. Within more recent memory, there had been the destruction by Stalin of Socialist Parties in Eastern Europe. Fueling the hostility was the Communist's "vanguard" argument: the persistent pretense of serving as the ultimate interpreter and guiding force of France's destiny. The undemocratic implications of such a doctrine were clear. Might they not someday pose a threat to the PS in France?

The Programme commun was not designed to resolve these historic incompatibilities, but to transcend suspicions stemming from them. As Pierre Hassner noted, the left could reach power in a Socialist-Communist alliance "only to the extent that the former would go beyond social democracy and the latter beyond Stalinism".[4] In elaborating the Program, both parties had to transcend their extremes. Once signed, the agreement continued to define the left's position until the breakdown of talks to update it in September, 1977.

The document nowhere speaks of socialism, although the PS termed the 1972 Programme commun as the beginning of socialism (a view rejected by the PCF). Thus the two parties at the outset had a key interpretive difference.

In spite of these differences, the Program did anticipate a Government by the left. It invoked the device of a legislative contract: if it won, the Government was pledged to carry out the program.

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[4] Le Monde, August 17-18, 1975, p. 5. A similar point was made by Maurice Duverger. The alliance permitted the Communists to restrain the Socialists from becoming managers of a less harsh capitalism, while the "Socialists restrained the Communists from sliding into a class dictatorship (such as that of their Soviet friends)". Lettre ouverte aux socialistes, p. 12.

Virtually all left formations (except PSU and the far left) adhered.[5]

During the 1972 discussions, the PS was the weaker negotiator. Having just elected new leadership, it was busy carrying out the renovations of Épinay. CERES was prodding the Party closer to PCF positions. Thus the Socialists probably made the major concessions.[6] But by 1974, the Socialists emerged as the strongest party on the left. With demonstrable electoral strength, they now challenged the post-war PCF dominance of the left.[7] CERES would soon be edged to the sidelines, and the PS could now resist concessions it might have negotiated earlier.[8]

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[5]The term "left" has not yet been defined here. Certainly it reflects a rejection of the existing order. To Charles Micaud it expresses a potentiality and has no other substance than the myth it connotes. "Left means democratic, popular sovereignty, defending the little man, progress, human dignity", all rooted in old ties and struggles. See Communism and the French Left (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 273-274.

[6]The PCF sought language that would keep France out of the Western Alliance and a statement to the effect that France would reject the force de frappe. It got neither. In fact, the PS prevailed, insisting on language that France would retain current alliances and keep its arsenal in its current state.

[7]Thus the Common Program result reversed the electoral pattern of the Popular Front. It was the Communists who doubled their vote between 1932 and 1936.

[8]Marchais confirms this point. By the mid-1970s, the PCF was complaining that Socialist strategy was to strengthen its position at Communist expense. Having done this, they "then took their distance from the Common Program". See George Marchais,"Forward to the Lines set by the 22nd Congress", Report to the Central Committee, April 26-28, 1978, p. 15.

Preliminary negotiations. In a broader context, the Common Program dialogue reflected a new mood in Europe, a thawing of positions internationally. It is interesting to note that the talks between Socialists amd Communists in France were occurring at the very same time that the Social Democrats of West Germany were talking to the Communists of the GDR. People sensed a movement in positions that had been glacially frozen for twenty-five years. Discussions towards the joint program in France began in December, 1970. But differences persisted on international issues such as French sovereignty and national independence, echoing earlier disagreements of the 1968 period.

Socialists affirmed a commitment to national independence, but also favored participation in a European Community. Independence was compatible with partial surrenders of sovereignty (if freely agreed to by a majority). The current generation of Socialists had lived through a nationalism that had torn Europe apart during the Century. A new Europe could bury that nationalism. And, a united European economy might better resist foreign penetrations on the Continent.[9]

The PCF, too, affirmed loyalty to internationalism, but the proletarian variety. Their priority was national independence. EEC was a monopolist enterprise; it would create regional dislocations within France; it was an economic weapon against the Socialist bloc.

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[9]For a summary of Socialist views before the signing see Le Monde, December 24, 1970, p. 10.

To overcome the stalemate, both parties sought a formula to give EEC a new content: to democratize its institutions and free it from the domination of large business interests.

Both parties favored the simultaneous dissolution of blocs in Europe and a European Security Conference. The PCF went even further, and tried to hold out for outright withdrawal from the Alliance. The mainstream of the Socialist Party however, rejected such a unilateral step.[10]

Major Political Positions of the Program

The document that emerged from the negotiations in the Spring, 1972, was inevitably a compromise, with some differences resolved, others unresolved. Common Program language masked many real foreign policy differences between the Parties, with both sides retreating from long-held positions. For instance, the Program softened the basic mainstream Socialist commitment to the Alliance, Europe and a pro-Israeli posture. At the same time, it glossed over the essential anti-Americanism of the Communists.

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[10] The PS program in 1972 called for an end to the Alliance, but within the framework of a European Security Conference, in which all states would sign a non-aggression pact. The Party refused to endorse a unilateral withdrawal. Only a CERES motion (defeated two-to-one) called for France's unilateral withdrawal, if the superpowers refused to withdraw from Europe and eliminate bases abroad.

EEC. This was a sensitive issue. The PCF always saw it as a class alliance (and one endangering French independence). The Common Program committed both parties to a policy of participation in the Community, yet preserving their freedom of action to carry out programs they deemed valid. France under a Left Government would help build EEC, yet work to free it from capitalist interests by democratizing its institutions. Thus a France inside the EEC would retain its freedom of action to realize its radical, political, economic and social program. Such a Left Government would invoke all of the safeguards provided by the Treaty of Rome. It would be free to define and extend the public sector in France, apply its own credit policies and institute its own system of planning. The French Government would continue to be responsible to its own National Assembly.[11]

Despite the language of the text, each Party retained its own interpretations. Mitterrand, for example, went further in his elaboration of the Socialist Party Program, stressing that the European choice of the PS was primordial: that there was an intimate link between the European Construction and the advent of socialism in France. The Communist's Programme pour un gouvernement démocratique d'union populaire did not go that far. While it recognized some changed international realities, and conceeded that modern economies require cooperation at the level of production, such a closed economic bloc as EEC distorted

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[11] Programme commun, Flamarrion, p. 116.

this requirement and blocked genuine international cooperation. The PCF invoked its rhetoric of national independence and sovereignty: large scale capitalism should not expand on the prerogatives of the French nation. This sort of language is quite at odds with the PS view that socialism cannot be based on an outdated nationalism. Communists would not support a "Europe" designed to extricate capitalism from its crisis. Supranationality by nature deprives a government of freedom of action to effect its program.

The Program states that a Government of the Left will be responsible for its European actions before the French National Assembly. Both parties agreed (and the Program stated) that changes would be proposed in the Treaty of Rome to democratize the economic and social bodies. This called for a more equitable representation of trade union representatives on the EEC body.[12]

Disarmament. It called for general, complete, controlled disarmament. But the wording was general, without violating basic principles of either Party. As a distant objective, nuclear weapons would be renounced by France. France would immediately halt building new weapons and stop nuclear tests. While awaiting a world agreement on nuclear weapons, France's force de frappe would not be destroyed, but maintained in its

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[12]Ibid., P. 116.

current state (maintenu en état).[13]

The nuclear weapons clause marked a PCF concession. At this point, (1972), Communists had been calling for a unilateral renunciation until other nations joined in. In this sense, the socialist view prevailed. Later, as will be shown in the chapter on defense policy, the Communists reversed: in true Gaullist fashion, they would hold that such weapons were the essence of national independence.

National defense. This would be stricly national. Tactical nuclear weapons would remain on French territory. Their use would be a national (and Presidential) decision.[14] The tous azimuts strategy would be maintained, with France defending against all aggressors. The Gaullist policy of non-integration into NATO would continue.

European security. Although Communists identify with the world forces of socialism, they do view France as outside the two camps. The PS has never made that leap. They still see France as fundamentally within the Western camp. The Communists failed to negotiate a clause calling

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[13] Mainstream Socialists and left Radicals would not favor destruction of nuclear weapons. As opposition party people, they might utter such rhetoric. Harold Wilson once pledged unilateral disarmament. But he never acted on the pledge.

[14] The PCF urged that the entire mission of the army be limited to territorial defense. Mitterrand rejected this.

for outright withdrawal.[15] The joint Program did call for the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw and Atlantic Alliances. It asked for a European Security Conference, proposing that the U.S. and Canada join in as two Atlantic powers.

The Left Program was also calling for a partial disengagement in Europe, particularly central Europe, as well as the designation of nuclear-free zones of Europe.

In other words France would practice an independent policy outside of all military blocs. Neither of the two European alliances could serve as pretexts for intervention by any state in the internal affairs of another (a reference to Soviet action in Czechoslovakia). Addressing other foreign policy issues of the period, the Program called for a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, and a peaceful settlement of that dispute. In the Middle East, the rights of all to exist in that region were set forth. Support was given to the UN decision of November 22, 1967, on Israeli withdrawal.[16] Regarding other questions, it urged that both German states enter the UN. It called upon France to establish

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[15] The text does allow France to conclude defensive alliances and non-aggression treaties, should the need arise.

[16] This was the compromise phraseology that led many to argue that the Programme commun was vague and ultimately unworkable. Mitterrand sympathized with the Israelis, the PCF with the Arabs.

ties with the GDR and to recognize North Vietnam, Cambodia and North Korea. Nothing was said about China.

Failure of the Common Program

Thierry Pfister holds that the breakdown in the Program five years later had little to do with disputes over social policy or the extent of nationalizations. Rather, he argues, the PCF abandoned the negotiations because it did not obtain from its coalition partners the positions of power and the institutional guarantees it was claiming in various ministries.[17]

Most important of all, were Communist fears of a new equilibrium on the left. During the original 1972 negotiations, the P.S., having just elected new leadership, was weak relative to the PCF. CERES was pushing the PS towards many PCF positions. Hence, it was the PS which made the key concessions in the document. But five years later, at the breakdown, the situation had reversed. The PS was now demonstrating voting strength, CERES had been edged to the sidelines. The PS could now resist concessions.[18]

This conforms to the PCF view that the purpose of the PS in

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[17] Le Monde, December 23, 1977, p. 10.

[18] Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes (Paris: Seuil, 1968), pp. 81-82. Cited by Frank Wilson, The French Left Under the Fifth Republic, issued at the SUNY Brockport Conference. See p. 39.

signing the Common Program in the first place was to strengthen its force to the detriment of the Communists. Each side in the negotiations had suspected the other of hegemonism. As far back as the PS Congress of Unity at Épinay in 1971 Mitterrand had remarked that the Socialist had to be the most representative Party of the Left, that they had to regain terrain lost to the PCF and other parties. This kind of language confirmed PCF suspicions that the PS had signed the agreement to seek gains at Communist expense, to challenge the Communist's vanguard role.

In entering into the Common Program, the PS had to justify its behavior on an international level. It too was a member of a world movement: it had friends and allies in the Socialist International. For example, Mitterrand told the Twelfth Congress of the Socialist International immediately after he signed the Common Program:

> Our fundamental goal is to rebuild a huge Socialist Party on the terrain occupied by the PCF ... that is the reason for the agreement.[19]

This is a most significant remark, uttered in Vienna before the Socialist International, at a gathering where were assembled Harold Wilson, Pietro Nenni and others. Mitterrand noted that for three decades Socialists had appeared less powerful than the Communists. Now it was vital for the Socialists to rediscover their authenticity before

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[19] Le Monde, June 30, 1972, p. 6.

the people and build a great Party in France, "Of the five million Communist voters, three million can vote Socialist", he added.[20]

Not only did the First Secretary reveal his domestic strategy, but he told the delegates (and enraged the PCF) that a Government of Left unity would seek to strengthen the Common Market and would remain a faithful ally of the United States.

Nevertheless, I.S. Conference delegates were still sceptical of the Mitterrand strategy. An Austrian Socialist expressed fear of PCF domination of the alliance. A German representative noted that such an alliance would never be possible in his country.[21] The following day, the PCF registered its "astonishment" that Mitterrand could make such remarks the day after putting his signature to the Common Program.[22]

The elections of October, 1974 produced large gains for the Socialists and setbacks for the PCF. This confirmed Mitterrand's ploy

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[20] Later, at an I.S. meeting in Elsinor in 1975, Mitterrand confided to Helmut Schmidt, "We do not say our union is a happy one, we say it is the only means of reducing the Communist Party to a marginal role". Bournazel, p. 83.

[21] Le Monde, June 30, 1972, p. 6. This was of course prudent. Under Lenin's dicta, Communists consider all alliances temporary. Socialists were always wary of Communist actions against Social Democrats in Eastern Europe.

[22] Le Monde, July 1, 1972, p. 9.

and unleashed a nine-month controversy between the two.[23] Again, the PS was charged with seeking a re-equilibrium on the Left. By January, 1975 CERES had been removed from the Secretariat by Mitterrand. Each Party was now challenging the international links of the other. Thus the PS was tied to Brandt, Kreisky and Palme; the PCF tied to Moscow, being out of step with the more Euro-Communist PCI and PCE.[24]

International policy and the break. Frank Wilson suggests that past alliances between the democratic left and the PCF always disintegrated over international disagreements.[25] Five years after the signing, it was clear that there were important differences of an international nature between the two parties. As Marchais expressed it:[26]

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[23]The PCF abruptly proposed that year a new Front National to broaden the Union of the Left and draw in Gaullists and "other patriots" on an anti-Atlanticist program. The Gaullists rejected it; the PS feared it; the Soviets opposed it (apparently under the theory that it would be a threat to détente). By the October elections, the PCF quietly dropped the idea. R.E.M. Irving "The European Policy of French and Italian Communists", International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 405 to 421.

[24]Mitterrand claims that when he negotiated the Common Program sections dealing with international questions "Communists interrupted themselves every half hour to telephone Moscow". La Stampa, February 9, 1973. Cited in Studies in Comparative Communism, Spring-Summer, 1973, Vol. VI, Nos. 1 and 2, p. 195.

[25]Thus Blum's policy towards Spain was completely at odds with that of both the PCF and the USSR. See Frank L. Wilson, The French Democratic Left 1963-1969 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 212.

[26]Marchais made these charges in a report to the Central Committee justifying the September, 1977 break. See Forward on the Lines Set Out by the XXIInd Congress, issued by the Secretariat of the Communist Group, European Parliament, p. 13.

1) The attempt to achieve a union between Communists and Socialist Parties in Southern Europe had been abandoned.

2) There was a strengthening of ties between the PS and SPD, as well as the adoption of a joint platform between Socialist and Social Democratic parties.

3) French Socialists had veered to the right and violated the spirit of the Program by, among other things, growing more favorable to European military integration.

4) When the PCF finally reversed itself on the issue of retaining the nuclear strike force, it sharply opposed Mitterrand's proposal for a referendum on that issue.

Many of these issues will be more fully discussed in later sections relating to defense and European social democracy. The point here is not to identify all possible reasons for a break in the Union of the Left, but merely to isolate those of international significance. There is one current of thought that has not yet been examined. It holds that the Communists broke off the Program discussion in September, 1977 on instructions from the USSR.[27]

The Soviet Union and the Union of the Left

The Soviets saw a heightening of class struggles in Europe,

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[27] Lionel Jospin, a PS foreign policy expert, espoused this view in a series of articles in Le Monde: The Soviets, fearing a Left victory, instructed the PCF to break off the alliance. With the evidence at hand, the theory remains unproveable. See that journal during the week following September 23rd.

which called for unity of action: trade unions, communists and socialists should all work together.

An interesting, authoritative discussion is given by the Soviet historian I.M. Krivoguz.[28] He makes the distinction that working with social democratic parties is not the same as joining in their government. Lenin gave the idea legitimacy in 1921, when under the Weimar Republic the KPD offered not only support, but offered to enter, under certain terms, a new government headed by the SPD. As the Comintern's 4th Congress noted: these were not truly workers governments, but they too "were capable of objectively accelerating the process of decay of bourgeois authority".[29] He reminds that the PCF never did join the Popular Front (although it offered to, in 1937, by which time the SFIO and Radicals rejected the offer).

The Soviet position seems to be that Communists can enter "progressive" non-socialist governments if, and only if, they retain their

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[28] See his essay "Historical Experience and Current Problems of Participation by Communists in the Governments of non-Socialist Countries," Problems of History, 1975, Vol. XV, No 1., pp. 3-33. He notes that Marx and Engels opposed working class parties in bourgeois governments, if it impaired their revolutionary activities. The question did not arise in the 1848 revolutions, but did occur during the Commune. Generally, it was legitimate to join a revolutionary government, but not just any bourgeois government. The heirs of Marx and Engels strongly condemned Millerrand, the Socialist who, in 1899, joined the Government of General Gallifet, who had been the executioner of the Commune.

[29] Ibid., p. 12.

own identity: that is retain their own programs and the implementation of an independent political line. They must "in no way be subordinated, pushed aside or beclouded by the joint program of the coalition government". Lacking these conditions, they should go into the opposition, as in 1947.

The Soviets, as should be clear by now, regarded the possibility of a Left Government in France ambiguously. This stemmed from both doctrinal and foreign policy reasons. Certainly the Soviets continue to hold their own mode of achieving power as valid. On the other hand, they do endorse the "peaceful transition" doctrine that emerged with de-Stalinization.

The Soviets legitimated a parliamentary road to power. The problem was that some of the Western parties expanded on the dictum and evolved notions of pluralism in the 1960s that went far beyond anything the Soviets were suggesting. To summarize it in a phrase: European Communism created a foreign policy dilemma for the USSR:

> . On the one hand, the new reformist ideas emerging in the Western Parties could not be tolerated: an infection that could spread to the East bloc.[30]

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[30] Plurality of parties, mixed economies, a respect for liberties, movement towards workers management: this socialism of the Programme commun was highly reminiscent of the Prague Spring. It might encourage revisionism in Eastern Europe.

> On the other hand, the classic militant seizure of state power forcefully could not be tolerated in the West. It would arouse the West and undermine the foreign policy goals of détente.

Hence the Soviets urged a middle road: Western Communists should develop broad alliance strategies, but never renounce their leading roles.[31] But how does one build an alliance strategy and still retain a leading role?

Joint Communist-Socialist action was required in France, said leading Soviet leaders Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev to Mitterrand in talks during the latter's visit to Moscow.[32] But there was a caveat a few months later: such political alliances should not "dilute the Communist Party into an amorphous organization ... there should be no 'unity at any price' slogan", said Konstaintin Zarodov.[33]

Soviet foreign policy requirements. Much of the evidence advanced here supports the case that the Soviets (in their relation to Western Parties)

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[31] As Brezhnev said four years later, "... while joining with broad democratic trends, including social democrats and Christians... the Communists remain revolutionaries..." Pravda, June 30, 1976, pp. 1-2.

[32] New York Times, May 5, 1975. See Chapter IX herein.

[33] Pravda, August 6, 1975. Zarodov was an upholder of a cautious, revolutionary line and editor of the World Marxist Review.

repeatedly placed their foreign policy requirements ahead of the needs of particular European class struggles. And during the 1970s, Soviet diplomacy pursued the goal of acquiring the technology of the West. This argued for a prosperous, non-hostile capitalism, not a Europe in crisis that could jeopardize everything.[34] A glance at some of the evidence reveals the following:

. During the Presidential election of 1974 the Russians put much of their hopes in Chaban Delmas, a man who would likely continue the independent Gaullist policies towards the U.S. and Germany.

. The Soviets irritated the PCF by displaying special ties to Giscard d'Estaing that same year. When Soviet Ambassador Tchervonenko visited Giscard between rounds in the May, 1974 election, the Embassy denied the visit had any link to the French elections: it was merely an exploration of economic questions.. But it evoked memories of the celebrated incident of December, 1965 when the Soviet press indicated its support for de Gaulle during a campaign where Mitterrand was running with PCF support.[35]

. The Soviets were growing skeptical about the Alliance of the

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[34] "Our relations with France today are better than those with certain socialist states", said Brezhnev on the eve of a visit to France. Le Monde, October 24-25, 1971, p. 3. This was accurate: trade was up; both sides held close views on the need for a European Security Conference. There was an affinity on issues ranging from the Middle East and Indo-China to NATO and establishing ties to East Germany.

[35] Le Monde, May 10, 1974, p. 3.

Left in France. Soviet spokesmen had hinted that while parties of the Left might win an election, they would not be able to govern together for a long time.[36]

. There were signs the Russians understood that France held too central a strategic position for the U.S. to abandon it to forces of the Left. There would be some move to frustrate it, as there was later in Chile.[37]

. Could Mitterrand, as an heir of Noske and Ramadier, be trusted. His true loyalty was to the bourgeoisie and the Americans. He was only making use of the Communists to pull his own party into power.[38]

. One could cite further evidence, as the 1970s progressed: the increasing distance between the PCF and the CPSU; the declining frequency of Brezhnev-Marchais meetings; Marchais' absence from the CPSU 25th Conference early in 1976; the PCF's growing outspokenness in challenging Soviet human rights violation, and the critiques of Soviet reality being voiced from within the Party, as from Jean Ellenstein.

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[36] See André Fontaine's essay in Le Monde, September 25-26, 1977, pp. 1 and 9. The Soviets noted that the Western economic crisis might well require austerity measures completely at variance with Common Program proposals. These quick, unpopular measures would undermine support, spurring an offensive from the right.

[37] Here again, the source for these Soviet perceptions is André Fontaine. Thus Ford told Brezhnev at Helsinki that the U.S. would never allow Portugal to fall to the other side.

[38] The Soviets were too discreet to utter these suspicions openly. One must rely on journalistic accounts and accept or reject the evidence. An undisclosed East European diplomat reportedly told Le Monde that "Marchais has finally grasped that Mitterrand wanted to use him as a stepping stone..." September 25-26, 1977, p. 9.

. In fact, the Soviets seemed more comfortable with the Italian Communists. Berlinguer's Historic Compromise, a policy of national union, progressively managed to install Communists into the bourgeois state without yielding the leading role to the Socialists. Furthermore, the PCI was less provocative to the U.S.[39]

Some of the above is more journalistic speculation than hard evidence of Soviet feeling toward the domestic alliance in France. For some it is perhaps decisive and cumulative evidence of Soviet opposition to the strategy of the left union. One current even goes so far as to hold that the Russians, in their displeasure, instructed the PCF to break off the Common Program discussions.[40] Others might say that the Soviets hardly need to issue instructions. After all, the PCF and CPSU share a basic interpretation. The USSR remains, to French Communists,

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[39] The PCI was more charitable to the PCF's strategy. Union de la gauche was not an agreement of Republican defense, as in 1934, nor merely an electoral accord, "but a step towards unity in the political struggle for Europe", said Georgio Amendola. In urging a democratized EEC, the Program aligned the PCF closer to the views of the PCI, the Italian Party official noted. Le Monde, July 18, 1972.

[40] That was the Lionel Jospin view, suggesting "la main de Moscou." He argued the Soviets, fearing a left victory, ordered the PCF to scuttle the talks. The theory is not susceptible to proof either way, but it should probably be assigned minimum validity. Even if the Soviets did wish an end of the alliance, the days were long past when they could instruct the French communists to sacrifice in furtherance of Soviet raison d'état. Annie Kriegel attributes PCF stubborness in 1974 to its acceptance of a new international strategy drafted in Moscow. See her "Une Nouvelle stratégie communiste?" Contrepoint, No. 17, November, 1975. pp. 47-67.

"la patrie du socialisme", the fortress confronting the enemy. Earlier leftist alliances collapsed when in conflict with Soviet international requirements. Alliances succeeeded in 1936 and 1945. But by 1939 and 1947 unity was no longer compatible with Soviet purposes. During the period of the Common Program challenge to Gaullism, French Communists had to live with the fact that the Soviets essentially approved the international role played by Gaullist France. Of course, the Soviets always paid lip service to the values of the Common Program. And they never publicly voiced the fear that the West would move forcefully to challenge a Government of the Left in France.

The West and the Leftist Alliance

We have yet to determine whether international realities would have allowed a leftist government to continue. Would the West have tolerated such a government, or would it have moved to de-stabilize it? Such a question (or speculation) cannot be examined fully here, but later events in Chile and Portugal did place the possibility of de-stabilization on the agenda. Some tentative speculations are possible. Ralph Milliband suggested two broad possibilities.[41]

- The new Government would enact minor reforms, but no genuine transformations to socialism. Ultimately, the reformist movement would be rejected: the old order returns.

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[41] Marxism and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 183-186.

- The Left Government would enact deep reforms of an anti-capitalist nature. This would "arouse the fiercest enmity from Conservative forces", says Milliband.

Under the latter possibility, international capitalist interests would move to de-stabilize the offending government. And, argues Milliband, it would be the Social Democrats of other countries that would be the leading conservative forces. Not merely the U.S., but the "Social Democrats of Germany and Britain would try to bring the offending government to heel".

The task here is not to speculate over hypothetical outcomes, only to note that all sides had to consider the possibilities. In these pages, we have referred to (and generally accepted) the "Yalta" thesis: that neither bloc would allow any portion to be abandoned. If a leftist France threatened the entire edifice since World War II, the West could react. Given this possibility, it raised vital questions of national independence and defense policy.

CHAPTER VII

DEFENSE POLICY

Nationalism, Internationalism and Defense

The issue of national defense in World War I generated the historic split in the French working class movement. Communists, echoing Lenin, rejected the SFIO's defense of the bourgeois Republic, as was discussed in Chapter II. Only in the 1930s did the PCF formulate any defense policy, adopting the quasi-Jacobin patriotism of the Popular Front, ultimately expressed in the Resistance.[1]

Communists claim that their defense policies derive from class relations, thus they confer legitimacy on certain struggles, while opposing others. Class loyalty required a defense of the USSR (or the Internationale). And, during the early decades of Bolshevik rule the doctrine perhaps had some validity, because non-ruling parties felt that their existence was often linked to the survival of the vulnerable Soviet state: without the USSR, they risked destruction as a political

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[1]The PCF in its "government" role has played an active part in national defense. In 1945-46 Charles Tillon was Armaments Minister. Francois Billoux was Minister of National Defense in Ramadier's post-Liberation Cabinet. Jean Kanapa, Report to the Central Committee: Défense nationale, indépendance, paix et désarmement, Paris, 11 May, 1977, p. 5.

force.[2] This need to defend absolutely Soviet raison d'état waned after World War II. The new Socialist Camp was hardly the besieged USSR of the inter-war years; it did not require the old-style loyalty. Nevertheless, French Communists continued to identify with a world movement:

> We bring an unfailing solidarity to all people, all democratic and revolutionary forces which struggle against imperialism, for independence and peace, for democracy, socialism and communism. These fraternal ties unite us first of all to the Communist Parties.[3]

To move beyond the jargon, then, French Communists held a dual membership both within the French political system and within the world movement. As Annie Kriegel points out,

> ...membership in the international Communist movement is the historical and logical basis for the existence of any Communist Party. It constitutes a practical corollary to Communism's ideological goal - worldwide proletarian revolution. In that sense, the movement enjoys an absolute priority - a priority which, given the central and unifying purpose of world revolution, has resulted in the primacy of foreign policy in the decision-making processes of the French Party.[4]

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[2]"We must give without reservation to the defense of the Soviet Union, we must identify with it as (our) own defense". Marcel Cachin, The People's Front in France (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1935), pp. 18-19.

[3]George Marchais in his report to the Central Committee at the PCF 22nd Congress, February 2, 1976. See Cahiers du Communisme, February-March, 1976, pp. 64-65.

[4]Annie Kriegel, The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France, p. 37.

The "French Section of the Communist International" may have appeared as an appendage of Soviet diplomacy in the earlier years. Today, the organizational framework is better described as the "Socialist Camp", according to Kriegel.

> ....not simply a territorial, but a multi-dimensional concept embracing at the same time a system of government - the Soviet Union, China, and the popular democracies; Communist and Workers' parties, whether in power or not; and lastly, a dual system of alliances labelled "anti-imperialist" - an alliance of Communist and Workers parties with nationalist movements in colonial countries as well as an alliance for peace.[5]

Earlier, we discussed the limits imposed on the Communists by the de facto Yalta sphere, which Stalin and Thorez well understood. Thus the PCF supressed its revolutionary impulse, while the USSR consolidated the tangible gains of the Red Army in Europe. It was a geopolitical dilemma for the PCF. The most it could do was work to diminish U.S. influence on the Continent. This, then, is a key thesis advanced here: European Communists, frustrated in revolution, viewed success in the class struggle as hinging on the reversal of the

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[5]This is the theory. But the fraternal socialist community degenerated "into a battleground of warring economic, geographical and racial interests ....the socialist camp became the scene of debate, schism, diplomatic, and even armed conflict, recalling the very worst aspects of capitalist international relations". Ibid, p. 39.

relation of forces in favor of the Soviet Union.[6]

Establishing defense policy: defining the peril. In establishing priorities of defense, it seems reasonable to suggest that political parties, in or out of government, first define an outside peril - and then frame policies. But what if each party in a coalition identifies a different peril? This type of situation occurred in the post-war years between the PCF and the SFIO: each perceived and defined a different potential enemy of France.[7] And this created inevitable divergencies on defense. For Socialists, the Red Army was the threat, while the PCF viewed the Bundeswehr or the Americans as the enemy. Given these disagreements, it was difficult for them to frame a joint defense policy.[8]

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[6]Italian Communists differ. Socialism will not advance in Europe because of Soviet global advances. Berlinguer holds that his brand of socialism has a better chance within the orbit of NATO than with that of the Warsaw Pact. Richard Lowenthal, "Can Communism offer an Alternative World Order?" Encounter, April, 1977, p. 22.

[7]The PCF always denied any possibility of aggressive intent on the part of the USSR. Hence it was a genuine shock when Soviet troops entered Prague. It destroyed a key pillar of PCF defense policy: the myth of an essentially peaceful USSR. See Chapter IV.

[8]Thorez once said that if the Red Army had to pursue an aggressor onto French soil, French Communists would not resist. L'Humanité, February 23, 1949. But during talks to update the Common Program, Marchais told J.P. Chevènement that if the Soviets attacked France, the PCF would be in the front ranks defending the nation. Le Monde, September 25-26, 1977, p. 6.

Before the war a similar confusion arose among the parties of the left. Social Democrats, for example, assessed the international peril quite differently from the Communists. To the SFIO Nazism was not an international danger in the early years. The Communists, however, did view the Nazis as a genuine international danger by 1934, but only after the Soviet patrie was endangered.[9]

To help sort out the divergencies and complexities of defense policies on the left, I will employ the foregoing as an organizing principle. I will explain PS-PCF differences by their identities with the two different post-war blocs. Such a framework should help to demonstrate varying attitudes on the left toward such issues as alliance policy, nuclear weapons, targeting, flexible response, tactical nuclear weapons, development of a Navy, forward defense, and a professional army.

An overview of defense requirements. France is sometimes described as

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[9]The British Labour Party, like the SFIO, rejected national rearmament policies against the German threat. Rather, it persisted in opposing the traditional enemy, the militarists in government. Pacifism outweighed the will to oppose an international danger. A good discussion of party policies on national defense during the inter-war years is in Adolf Sturmthal, The Tragedy of European Labor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943). In France, the SFIO also opposed military service. Communists supported it in those pre-War years. It is interesting to note a historic role reversal: today, the Communists of Western Europe support the neutralist-pacifist movements that have sprouted in the 1980s. But mainstream Socialist Parties favor stronger defenses. The SPD and the British Labour Party are seriously split on this question.

a national hexagon,[10] having three maritime sides, Channel, Atlantic and Mediterranean; and three continental sides, Pyrenees, Alps and Rhineland. Defense traditionally focused on a powerful Germany, a danger usually met through the erection of a European alliance structure.[11]

Following World War II, the goals and strategies closely resembled the classic outlook of 1919: defense policies were those of preserving territorial satisfaction in Europe, retaining the French Union, maintaining a weak, dismembered Germany, and continuing the traditional alliance with the Russians. Clemenceau would have approved. But it was no longer 1919, and post-war Governments began to question the traditional alliance with the Russians.[12] We have seen how France reversed itself, joining Germany against the new power of Russian imperialism. Security was provided by the American presence.[13] But if the Atlantic

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[10] Frenchmen remain essentially satisfied with this hexagon of 1815. Governments have rarely sought to extend beyond these frontiers. See Jean-Baptise Duroselle, "Changes in French Foreign Policy since 1945" in In Search of France, Stanley Hoffmann, ed., (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1963), pp. 335-337 and 425.

[11] Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 253-262. The alliances with Russia and Eastern Europe were traditional means of containing Germany between the wars.

[12] They were not proving to be a supportive ally. Russia did not back France on the Ruhr question.

[13] Foreign Minister Georges Bidault actually feared a Soviet takeover of Western Europe in 1948. See U.S. Ambassador Jefferson McCaffery's cable to George Marshall, March 4, 1948, in Department of State: Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1948, Vol. III, p. 629.

link provided security, it simultaneously nurtured dependency.[14] And in the mid-1960s de Gaulle took his well-known initiatives, ousting U.S. forces. Communists, of course, supported Gaullist initiatives towards an independent defense. Nevertheless, it was the Socialists they were courting as a domestic ally, not the Gaullists.

The Evolution of Socialist Concepts of Defense

The SFIO in the early years of the Fifth Republic lacked any dynamic defense concepts, particularly when contrasted with the more innovative Gaullists or the more dramatic ideas of the PCF. There was vague discussion of establishing an independence from the U.S., pursuing a European framework, dismantling the *force de frappe* and dissolving all the blocs in Europe. Much of this was the wishful thinking of a party in opposition, rather than realizable policy.[15] But Gaullist policies were also vulnerable: The attempted Anglo-French-U.S. triumvirate over NATO had collapsed, the Paris-Bonn Axis appeared dead. French influence in the Third World was frustrated. A Gaullist France seemed only capable of rejections: *non* to supranationality, *non* to Britain, *non*

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[14] At least so said the Gaullists. Suez typified the impotence of defense policy. And the U.S. frequently imposed other subordinations. Thus Marines were landed in Lebanon without any consultation with the French. De Gaulle's famous proposal for a tripartite directory of the Western Alliance was turned down. See *Le Monde*, March 1, 1969, p. 2.

[15] Many perceived the left as bankrupt on security issues. It rejected all the basics: a *force de frappe*, a professional army, links to NATO. As Mitterrand was to say, policy could not merely be a series of negations.

to NATO.

Charles Hernu, a Socialist expert on military matters, attributed the failures in Gaullist defense policy to a wide gap between France's pretenses as a world power and the actual power at her disposal.[16] Hernu attempted to broaden the level of debate to a more Jaurêsian level. The true cleavage between left and right resided more in their respective conceptions of the army's role in the nation: all debates surrounding weapons systems, hardware and scenarios were secondary to this framework. Socialists, in the tradition of Jaurês, were hardly pacifists, but the army had to be tranformed into an emanation of the nation. Only this approach could cure the "ghetto" malaise afflicting the forces.

In November, 1973, one month before the Socialists Convention nationale at Bagnolet, Charles Hernu's study commission issued its proposal: France could not continue to reject the Atlantic framework forever. Nor could it accept the other extremes of neutralization or universal disarmament.[17] A Socialist Government could only reach its objec-

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[16] Charles Hernu, Soldat-Citoyen (Paris: Flammarion, 1975), pp. 72-76.

[17] Ibid., pp. 85-88. Hernu, who is Defense Minister in Mitterrand's Cabinet, was probably the most articulate spokesman on defense questions within the PS, and a voice on the comité directeur who carried great weight with Mitterrand. For these reasons his views are significant.

tives within a framework of a l'Europe des neuf. But this European framework was not to be an old-style political-military bloc, such as the Atlantic Alliance or the Western European Union. Rather, he refined it with some general references to Europe-wide collective security, de-nuclearized zones and partial disarmament. Echoing the Common Program, Hernu urged creation of a citizens army organized around territorial units based close to home. But an army for what purpose? Basically, of course, to preserve the nation's security during the envisaged transition to socialism, following the formation of a Government under the Common Program.

Nuclear Weapons and National Defense

France "went nuclear" in the sixties when it judged the two superpowers to be mutually invulnerable from attack, or unlikely to attack one another. However, critics on left and right soon challenged the wisdom and efficacy of such a deterrent in the hands of a middle-range power.[18] But much of the debates over weapons and deterrence missed an essential Gaullist political point: a force de frappe was vital to advance diplomatic goals. Defensive, Maginot-line conceptions had thwarted the ability of earlier Governments to pursue foreign policy

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[18] Challengers, such as Raymond Aron, scorned France's ability to deter a Soviet attack. This was in the days of Mirage IVs, before Plutons. See Aron's The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1965, Trans. Ernest Pawell), p. 82.

before the war.[19] True, the bomb could not provide security from a Russian attack, but it could secure independence from the United States.[20] Furthermore, said some Gaullists, it could serve as an effective triggering device to compel the engagement of U.S. forces, shifting the locus of war-making decision from Washington to Paris.[21]

The Socialists and nuclear weapons. Throughout the sixties and seventies strong anti-nuclear currents existed in the non-Communist left. The arguments advanced were often moral in tone. But there were pragmatic ones as well. Thus the force de frappe seemed impotent next to that of the superpowers. A few Mirage IVs could never penetrate an enemy's defenses. Furthermore, France was highly vulnerable itself. Twenty-five nuclear-tipped missiles could destroy everything within the hexagon. Civil defense was non-existent.[22]

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[19] Thus Daladier could tell Hitler "we will defend if you attack us". But he could not say "we will attack you if you attack Czechoslovakia". The lesson was clear: diplomacy required weapons of the offense.

[20] Alfred Grosser is skeptical. Thus a nuclear-armed Britain received the same treatment as a non-nuclear France at Suez in 1956. In other words the British gained no diplomatic advantages from the U.S. by virtue of having a deterrent. See French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1965, Trans., Lois Ames Pattison), p. 100.

[21] On the shifting of war-making initiative, see Grosser, p. 103. By the 1970s, Giscard was calling on France to rank as the third-strongest nuclear power in the world. Le Monde, June 4, 1976, pp. 14-15.

[22] Pierre Bérégovoy of the SFIO held the weapon to be useless. One, it lacked any second-strike capability. Two, it was blind, since unlinked to any radar and tele-communication system (these being operated by the U.S. and NATO). He urged that it be renounced.

Gradually, however, between 1968 and 1971, many on the non-Communist left and within the PS began to reappraise earlier frozen positions. Some of the classic arguments against the force de frappe were growing outmoded, as new weapons emerged, such as low-level Mirage bombers, nuclear submarines, Albion missiles and the Pluton. Furthermore, de Gaulle's election victories in 1965 and 1969 could reasonably be viewed as mandates for the nuclear program, unquestionably a popular one with Frenchmen. On December 18-19, 1971, a new proposal was submitted to the Comité directeur of the P.S. which said in effect:

> . Nuclear weapons, a reality for 12 years in France, could only be renounced in the framework of world-wide disarmament, not unilaterally. Such weapons were necessary for a middle-rank power such as France.
>
> . Furthermore, possession of nuclear weapons by a Socialist Government could constitute a decisive asset from a diplomatic negotiation point of view.[23]

In other words, a Government of the Left would formulate its own defense policies. As Hernu and Jacques Huntzinger were saying in the early 1970s, a Socialist France would require protection against the direct or indirect manoeuvers from hostile blocs. One might pay lip service to a disarmed world, but in the short run, France under a Socialist regime would have to retain the existing arsenal built up

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[23] Hernu, p. 51. This was a classic Gaullist argument. In fact, the original Gaullist decision to "go nuclear" was as political as it was military. See Stanley Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal: French Foreign Policy since the 1930s (New York: Viking Press, 1974), p. 298.

during the de Gaulle years. These new concepts challenged the strong currents of neutralism that had existed in the old SFIO and the PS which usually urged unilateral disarmament.

In early 1972, Jean-Pierre Chevènement joined the debate: to renounce the bomb was demagogic and irresponsible. He advanced a classic Gaullist view, France did not require an arsenal equal to the superpowers. Comparisons were strictly speculative, since strategic purposes were different. France need only confront a future aggressor with an intolerable risk. (The PCF argued that such a strategy might invite a preventative assault.)

One could say that de Gaulle's great nuclear legacy was now under less threat by policymakers of the Left. Hernu and his team of experts were quite influential with Mitterrand, and ultimately would prevail upon the PS to accept the force de frappe. And the Communists, too, we will see, later reversed their long-standing opposition.

Mitterrand's thinking on nuclear issues over the years indicates that he too was capable of reappraisal.[24] Like many observers in France,

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[24] At a press conference, May 14, 1974, he remarked that philosophically and morally he opposed nuclear weapons for France. "But you are asking me the question in 1974, and I am a politically realistic man..." Hernu, p. 244. Michel Debré reminds us that Mitterrand was a minister in the Mendes-France Government that launched a feasibility study on nuclear weapons in 1954. Le Monde, January 13, 1973, p. 9.

he holds that the superpowers have sanctuarized themselves successfully. But, in any war, Europe, and surely France, would be ravaged. The Socialist leader has expressed serious doubts about the deterrence value of France's weapon, considering the array of weaponry in the arsenal of the superpowers. His point is that France could not inflict sufficient damage on a possible aggressor to prevent an attack. Despite these cogent arguments, Mitterrand nevertheless committed the PS in 1972 to support the force de frappe.[25] To renounce it unilaterally would compel the nation to design an entirely new basis behind its defense policy, a considerable task, since reintegration back into NATO was out of the question.

In assessing his nuclear views, one should also note his evaluation of the disarmament issue. It was de Gaulle who led France away from a policy of disarmament in 1962. Disarmament would have confirmed the U.S.-Soviet condominium and perpetuated the division sanctioned at Yalta. Thus, says Mitterrand, de Gaulle ignored disarmament conferences for much the reason he withdrew from NATO: he dreamed of an independent, self-sufficient France, always retaining basic links to the Alliance (and always clinging to General Ailleret's stratégie tous azimuts). Neither Pompidou nor Giscard ever interfered with the essence of this

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[25] Both Parties under the Common Program agreed to halt production, but not destroy existing stocks. The formula left the basic question unresolved, since it was a policy outcome stemming more from a compromise among opposing tendencies on the left.

Gaullist framework of defense, according to Mitterrand.

The Socialist Party Secretary urged a reorientation. Indeed, France did have a role in such negotiations over disarmament.[26] And the autonomous role of France in the alliance gave her a special position, since she was hardly a proxy for a particular superpower. Giscard, too, took no special initiatives in disarmament, voicing only utopian slogans of general and complete disarmament, but ignoring more practical steps.[27]

The Communists and nuclear weapons. Communists in France, like those in the Soviet Union, considered that the advent of mass destruction weapons had wrought some basic changes in doctrine and had fundamentally altered international politics. Such weapons effectively barred the possibility of war as a prelude to world revolution. Furthermore, they removed the likelihood that capitalist states would war among themselves, as happened in 1914 and 1939.[28] These weapons logically required a policy of co-

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[26] Mitterrand's views are set forth in an article in Le Monde, December 14, 1977, pp. 1 and 19. Many Socialists have been suspicious of disarmament negotiations such as SALT I, viewing them as a conspiracy among superpowers. Hernu, for example, branded SALT I an attempt by the superpowers to designate their respective national territories as sanctuaries, fixing Europe as the site of any future war. The communists, it should be noted, reject this interpretation of arms limitation talks among superpowers.

[27] Complete disarmament is viewed as extremist by Mitterrand. Ambitious, Ghandiesque proposals often render all genuine agreement impossible, he holds.

[28] Only the Chinese Communists still clung to these classical Leninist notions on the likelihood of war.

existence. Given the reality of a hostile capitalist bloc, it was fully acceptable for the Soviet Union to possess nuclear weapons.

However, it was not acceptable for France to possess nuclear weapons, said the PCF. Such at least was the policy until the updating of the Programme commun in the Spring of 1977, when the Central Committee reversed this long-standing doctrine. But throughout most of the years of the Fifth Republic, communists opposed a key tenet of Gaullist national independence and defense policy. This stand aligned them with some of the more pacifist segments inside the PS who, we have seen, always opposed the bomb on principle. Communists, however, did not base their opposition to the weapon as pacifism. They variously employed these arguments:

1) The bomb would not act to deter an aggressor. Such thinking ignored the true (or possible) manner in which wars unfolded. Thus France could well be led into war against its will.[29]

2) The integration of France into petite Europe might transform a national force de frappe into a European one.

3) Nuclear weapons could not be used against non-nuclear states. This would outrage world opinion. Nor could they be employed if French soil was invaded: the French population would be destroyed.

4) Nuclear weapons were not more economical than conventional. In war, ground troops still had to occupy enemy terrain.

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[29] Thus war might have followed from the Cuba missile crisis, particularly when de Gaulle cabled Kennedy full support. Or, war was possible in Central Europe. France could easily be drawn in because she had troops in the FRG. Mere possession of the bomb would not protect her from being drawn in. These various reasons are discussed in Pierre Villon, "Reflections on Gaullist Military Policy", Cahiers du Communisme, No. 3, March, 1969, pp. 24-32.

5) Tactical nuclear weapons were not a deterrent, but a provocation. Giscard was committed to transforming any conventional attack into a nuclear war.[30]

6) France's possession of the bomb, coupled with the Government's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would drive the FRG into developing its own bomb.

The PCF and a nuclear Germany. Item six above requires a closer examination. One might think that the PCF's obsession with the FRG would lead it to the Gaullist view: that the bomb was necessary in solving the "German problem" (namely by giving France superiority).[31] But the PCF rejected this perspective. Rather, Communists emphasized the danger of nuclear proliferation. In 1968 they were strongly critical of de Gaulle's boycott of the Geneva Conference on non-proliferation.[32] The particular, and often explicit fear, was Germany: by not signing NPT, France would induce Germany to develop such weapons.[33]

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[30] See Kanapa's report to the Central Committee, Le Monde, April 17, 1975, p. 10. He later urged a "non-firstuse pledge by France". Le Monde, May 9, 1975, p. 7.

[31] See Antoine Sanguinetti in Le Monde, May 20, 1976, pp. 1 and 13. The last Century demonstrated that France, less wealthy, less densely populated than Germany, could no longer check the historic enemy by conventional means.

[32] The contention of Generals Baufre and Gallois that the spread of such weapons would have a stabilizing influence was "out of touch with reality", L'Humanité, November 14, 1975, p. 8.

[33] Despite the FRG's renunciation of nuclear weapons, there was a Bundeswehr memo of 1960 urging development of such weapons. L'Humanité urged a modifying clause in the NPT: that nuclear powers not employ or threaten their atomic weapons against states on whose territory there exist no nuclear arms, namely those states which did not want such weapons on their soil. The Soviets could not promise to spare the FRG, which had some 6,000 American nuclear weapons on its territory. L'Humanité, November 14, 1975, p. 8.

In 1968 the Communists were asking why de Gaulle refused to sign the NPT. It was understandable, said Yves Moreau, why they did not sign the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning above-ground tests (this would have blocked France's own development of the force de frappe). But his motives in 1968 were more complex. De Gaulle wanted to retain his option of supplying nuclear weapons to West Germany. There was, after all, a Bonn-Paris axis: the force de frappe represented one of the "elements of France's dowry" that France was offering in this marriage.[34]

In the late 1960s, it seems, the Communists were wary of a German plan, articulated by Defense Minister Franz-Joseph Strauss, to establish a European nuclear deterrent force within the framework of "the Six".

The force de frappe legitimated. Despite the arguments cited, Communists, as often in the past, reversed themselves on a national defense issue. After a major review of defense problems, the PCF in May, dramatically shifted gears on its long-standing policy of opposition

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[34] De Gaulle, on September 7, 1962, proposed to the German War College, Hamburg, an organic cooperation between the French Army and the Bundeswehr, suggesting scientific and technical cooperation. France and Germany could strengthen themselves "by merging their possibilities". Ibid. This was half-a-year before the Franco-German Treaty of alliance, January 21, 1963, a period when the U.S. was suggesting German acquisition of nuclear weapons through the MLF proposal.

to nuclear weapons in France.[35] Unquestionably, the bomb was today in France a reality, and did constitute the only deterrent for the nation, even if today it was in the hands of the class enemy - and pointed only at socialist nations. The PCF, of course, would give these weapons a "new meaning", retaining them exclusively on French territory, pointed at all possible aggressors. One could cite several immediate reasons for the reversal:

Military. To assure the army that the sophisticated bases of defense were not dismantled. The nuclear buildup had led to serious neglect of conventional forces. France could not be left defenseless, as Marchais put it.[36]

Electoral. It would be a politically popular step in the upcoming 1978 legislative elections. Independent defense was now a value internalized and mandated by almost all Frenchmen.

Diplomatic. Nuclear weapons could be used to diplomatic advantage in the conduct of foreign policy: the essential Gaullist argument.

Germany. There was no longer the earlier fear that French possession of the bomb would induce the FRG to seek its own.

Alliance politics. To convince wider sections inside the PS to break with their Atlantic orientation, preferred targeting policies, etc.

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[35] See the Kanapa Report, op. cit. The reversal shocked many militants, who only learned about the Central Committee vote on television. The policy shift was done without any consultation with the PCF's mass base. The C.C. defended its volte face in that it considered the issue a year-and-a-half. France Nouvelle, June 6, 1977.

[36] Le Monde, September 25-26, 1977, p. 6.

Were the Communists really reversing themselves on nuclear weapons? They would be the first to claim that they did not pose such issues as weapons abstractly, but within a political context. Perhaps it made sense to oppose these weapons under a right-wing government. But why oppose them if the left achieved power? Why yield a valuable asset when you were about to assume power? Most of all, the Communists, like many on the non-Communist left, had a premonition that a Government of the Left, committed to deep social transformations - and standing isolated in Western Europe - was inherently prone to de-stabilization from abroad. "Socialism in one country", to use Duverger's phrase, would require a potent national defense.[37]

The Communists attempted to attach certain conditions to their acceptance of nuclear weapons in any future, hypothetical Government of the Left, that:

a) French forces remain independent, unlinked to NATO and its warning systems.[38]

b) There be a doctrine of strict deterrence. Dissuasion

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[37] The left's analysis of events in Portugal and Chile heightened fears of outside interference with a Government of the Left.

[38] The French deterrent must not rely on the NADGE air defense and detection data supplied by NATO and the U.S. The nation must develop its own observation satellites, radar system, and surveillance aircraft, plus a capability of orbitting observation and communication satellites.

had to replace the stratégie de l'emploi.[39]

c) Weapons be kept in their current state; new ones were not to be perfected.

d) A collective decision on the "button", rather than an exclusively Presidential decision (as de Gaulle had it). Marchais' proposed state Defense Committee would have included not just the Chief of General Staff, but representatives of parties of the ruling coalition, which would have given the PCF a veto.[40]

e) France join the Geneva Disarmament Talks (which she had been absent from for years) and associate herself with the SALT negotiations.[41]

f) A Treaty of non-Aggression be signed with the USSR.

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[39] In updating the Common Program, Marchais sought to include the phrase défense tous azimut. Mitterrand objected, as he saw no need "to point missiles at our allies". Le Monde, August 9, 1977, p. 1.

[40] This was consistent with the PCF intent to restore a wider parliamentary and cabinet role in Fifth Republic decisionmaking. But Mitterrand rejected this too: collective consultation deprived the weapon of any deterrent value in a crisis. Rather than this broad collegiality, he was prepared to accept compulsory consultation by the President and the Prime Minister. Le Monde, August 19, 1977 and March 13, 1978.

[41] Some Socialists were wary of SALT, considering it an effort of the superpowers to designate their respective national territories as sanctuaries. Thus any confrontation would most likely be conventional, and on European territory.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Forward Defense or Sanctuary?

Nuclear weapons, once accepted,[42] opened up a further array of questions for the defense analysts on the left: tactical weapons, placement of missiles in Germany, targeting and levels of response.

Classical Gaullist thinking articulated by General Ailleret emphasized riposte massive et immédiate and force tous azimut. But some situations did not require a massive response.[43] They called for tactical weapons at the division level. As General Fourquet, successor to Ailleret expresses it, there was a need to demonstrate resistance without invoking a "jeu de l'escalade".[44]

And once one deployed tactical nuclear weapons, it raised the further issue of forward links to the allies and NATO. Giscard had

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[42] In the Summer of 1977, after the PCF turn-around, Socialists and Radicals proposed a referendum on the force de frappe question. The proposal was withdrawn but revived at the celebrated Mitterrand-Marchais summit of September 22, where discussions on the Programme commun ultimately collapsed. Duverger called it illegal, noting that the Constitution would probably have to be amended, since referendums only applied to laws dealing with government organization or ratification of certain treaties. Le Monde, August 2, 1977.

[43] Communists, for example, rejected an anti-cities doctrine; it would convert urban populations into hostages. The Kanapa Report, p. 21. Louis Baillot, director of the Party's Commission on National Defense, proposed a policy of targeting on an enemy's scientific and industrial centers. How one did this without also striking cities was not clear. See Le Monde, March 8, 1978, p. 9.

[44] Le Monde, April 30, 1969, p. 11.

innovated with a forward battle zone in Germany, a significant reversal of policy, as some on the left claimed.

The Méry-Gallois dispute. It was Pierre Gallois who popularized "absolute sanctuarization": the idea that France was untouchable, unconcerned with neigboring states. Under such a policy, the nation would:

- Look to nuclear forces, submarines, silos and bombers.
- Dismantle almost all other forces.
- Keep perhaps a few thousand troops to guard nuclear arsenals.[45]

The problem was, this absolute sanctuarization doctrine ignored all limited war scenarios, those calling for a response below the nuclear threshhold. Under the Gallois doctrine, France might indeed emerge intact, but under Soviet sway or alone in a "Finlandized" Europe.

Speaking for the Giscard regime, Guy Méry challenged the "absolute" doctrine as "neutralism". Even "if all Europe collapsed around us, we could never resist the demands on us", said the Chief of Staff

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[45] To Gallois nuclear war was unthinkable, justified by no political stake. Hence French forces of the future would be a small army of technicians, outside the usual military mould, hardly the sort able to launch a Bonapartist coup d'état, let alone storm the Élysée. See the excerpts from his "A Farewell to Armies" in Le Point, April 12, 1976, pp. 71-74. Also see the interview with Gallois in Paris Match, May 15, 1976, pp. 36-39.

under Giscard.[46]

Instead, Méry proposed an "enlarged sanctuary" or forward battle doctrine: rather than sanctuarize within the hexagon if attacked, France should deploy conventionally, or even nuclearly on the soil of allies (meaning the FRG). While there would be no such forward positions in peacetime, in actual combat, French troops would defend not only northern and eastern frontiers, but fight alongside NATO forces, defending the front line eastern borders of West Germany, if needed. Thus French troops deployed along the Rhine in the 1970s would have shifted eastwards towards the Weser and Elbe.[47]

The Left and tactical nuclear weapons. How did the Left respond to these new doctrines? As a rule, their spokesmen feared any possible entry by French forces into broad conventional tactical nuclear warfare in Europe. This was surely possible if Giscard attempted to reconcile NATO's flexible response.[48] They opposed strategies of early engagement, preferring an "absolute deterrence". The issue was complex, because French military thinking regards nuclear weapons in two

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[46] This is based on Méry's address to students at the Higher Institute of National Defense Studies, March 15, 1976. See Défense Nationale, June, 1976, pp. 11-34.

[47] At the time (1976) two French divisions, totalling 60,000 men were deployed just over the Rhine into West Germany. The New York Times, June 3, 1976, p. 3.

[48] Michael M. Harrison, pp. 29-30.

possible categories:

1) in a stratégie de dissuasion

2) in a stratégie d'emploi.

But when tactical nuclear weapons such as the Pluton arrived, they created ambiguities of doctrine. The deterrence function of Pluton, triggering the strategic bombs hardened into the Plateau d' Albion, had been revised. Tactical nuclear weapons were now seen as "weapons of battle" in a stratégie d'emploi.

The Socialists objected: linking Plutons with conventional forces paralyzed the latter in their maneuverability, creating the illusion that nuclear power could serve as a form of super artillery. Defense experts in the PS further worried that Plutons could engage France increasingly in NATO: that Giscard lost sight of the fact that U.S. strategy of riposte graduée was not one of deterrence, but a stratégie d'emploi - which could convert Western Europe into a vast battlefield.

The PCF and the Méry Doctrine. Communists held that under Giscard, the nation was altering classic defense policies. General Aillert's classic tous azimut was quietly being dropped in favor of Western assumptions about the threat from the East. Méry's innovations were subtly shifting France's defenses from the Rhine to the Elbe,[49] subordinating

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[49] Le Monde, July 20, 1976, p. 7. The Russians, too, were alert to the dangers in these innovations. During Brezhnev's visit to Giscard, he expressed concern over France's broadened participation in NATO. L'Humanité, June 23, 1977, p. 8.

the French army to U.S. forces, and making it a mere forward patrol of the Bundeswehr. Communists had no particular objection to tactical Pluton missiles, but insisted that they be based exclusively inside France. For years, the PCF opposed emplacement of tactical missiles in the FRG.[50] PCF Deputy Louis Baillot even pointed out that these weapons were good protection against Germany.since tomorrow, Germany "could become the enemy of France, especially if a Government of the Left arrives in power here".[51]

Intervention force. Except for les territoires d'outre-mer, spokesmen for the left generally hold that national security extends only to the "hexagon". But in broader discussions of national purpose, experts on the left accept the need for some form of force d'intervention. Indeed, France requires such a capability.[52] And the Communists as well, accept this view.[53] The question, of course, is intervention on behalf of whom.

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[50] It is interesting to note that a campaign had been coordinated with the tiny German Communist Party in protest against delivery of these weapons to Land Hesse. L'Humanité, June 24, 1975, p. 3. Specific modes of PCF cooperations with Parties abroad will be discussed in a further chapter.

[51] Le Monde, March 8, 1978, p. 9. Méry has recently suggested replacing the Pluton with the neutron bomb. The PCF rejects this as a dangerous lowering of the nuclear threshhold. The PS has reached no decision on the neutron weapons. New York Times, June 12, 1978, p. 14.

[52] This was a great lesson of the inter-war years. Non-intervention in Spain did not prevent German aggression in 1939. See Jean Paucot's essay in Une Réflexion Ouverte, p. 48.

[53] Louis Baillot gives the PCF view in Le Monde, March 8, 1978, p. 9.

Such a force already exists, and is often used in operations that the left opposes as neo-colonial. By 1976 there was an intervention force of 35,000 troops in French speaking African states, all under mutual arrangements.[54]

In emphasizing the primacy of the hexagon, Socialists have not overlooked the fact that France's strategic position is at some of the most travelled maritime-zone crossroads, making the nation vulnerable to disturbances in the world. Any realistic defense policy must consider that France depends highly on the Third World for key imports:

- Petroleum from North Africa and the Persian Gulf.
- Uranium and other minerals from Gabon.
- Phosphates and cotton from North Africa.
- Wool from Australia.

Outside of the Third World, France's major suppliers are the United States and the USSR.

Jean Paucot, writing in the 1976 study commissioned by the PS,

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[54] Le Monde, October 20, 1976, p. 15. And these forces are quite active. Thus 400 paratroopers were sent to Zaire to defend Shaba Province. Jaguar jets have attacked Polisario guerillas in western Sahara; troops and aircraft were sent to Chad to aid Government forces opposing rebels aided by Libya and the Soviets. Details are in the New York Times of May 21, 1978, p. 19. For evidence that France is acting "officially, but secretly on behalf of the United States", see Jack Kramer, "Our French Connection in Africa", Foreign Policy, No 29, Winter, 1977-78, p. 165.

argues that France has only two major choices.[55] Either the nation "accepts a satellite status to the American Empire, or, it undertakes, within a European framework, to defend the independence of certain Third World states, namely those with a riparian location on the Mediterranean, those in the Indian Ocean and certain sub-tropical states in Africa". Paucot's study goes on to argue that the superpowers can generate and support local conflicts by sending in armies, weapons and technicians - or act to destabilize regimes. France is directly concerned by this: in fact, risks of confrontation are greater here than in Europe. France's vital need not to be cut off from supplies and lines of communications, leads it to support the independence of peoples of these regions against all oppression.

Further Defense Debates on the Left

We have reviewed some of the important debates of the period, indicating how a Socialist-led France hoped to navigate between the two blocs, avoid wars of remote interest, lead a nuclear (or non-nuclear) defense, defend the sanctuary, conduct limited war or possible interventions abroad.

"Sliding back to Atlanticism". By now it should be clear that all segments on the left embraced the idea of an independent defense -

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[55] "L'Organisation générale de notre défense", in Réflexions, pp. 41-48. Paucot's essay is by no means an official "party line". But it is of interest and significance in that it expresses a general point of view reflective of mainstream thinking within the PS.

the old rallying cry of the Gaullists. But in 1972, the Communists, along with others, launched a campaign accusing the post-de Gaulle-Gaullists (namely Pompidou) of "sliding back into NATO".[56] The evidence consisted of such facts as the regime had discarded tous azimut targeting; it was accepting the "graduated response" doctrine; French units had joined with NATO air and naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean; and defenses were relying on the equipment of the U.S. and NATO for nuclear alert facilities.[57]

This time, the PCF had evidence at hand. And as Kriegel notes, it is the duty of any Communist party

> ... to influence the foreign policy of a particular country in the manner closest to the interests of the socialist camp as a whole. In recent years, the French party has seen itself as a watchdog, working to keep open the variety of options favorable to them by which General de Gaulle guided French diplomacy.[58]

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[56] Thus Pompidou (and later Giscard) was guilty of reinserting France into NATO. Le Monde, January 13, 1972, pp. 1 and 6. The Socialists tended to remain aloof from the Marchais-Pompidou polemics. Le Monde, January 21, 1972, p. 5. As Roy Macridis put it, "...in matters of defense the disagreements between France and virtually every other member of the Atlantic Alliance are being reconciled". "French Foreign Policy" in Foreign Policy in World Politics, p. 112.

[57] See the dispatch in the New York Times: "France's Forces are quietly renewing ties for NATO" May 21, 1978, p. 19. "These arrangements exist", an unnamed French defense official is quoted as saying, "of course we will have to deny their existence in the Chamber of Deputies".

[58] The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France, p. 56.

Whether or not Kriegel is correct, it returns us to the formulation stated at the start of this chapter: that the PCF had a certain identity with the Soviet bloc. However, unlike the PCF, the non-Communist left was ever alert to the historic danger posed by post-war Soviet preponderance in Europe.[59]

CERES and the defense of France. One group which has directed its analysis to many of the questions reviewed was CERES. This faction within the PS (weakened or neutralized by Mitterrand at the Congress of Pau in 1973) accepts many of the Gallo-Communist formulations that have already surfaced in this discussion.

- France requires a national deterrent if it is to transcend the dominance of the United States over Europe - and escape being a protectorate.

- One whose defenses are entrusted to another can never remain free in such matters as trade, monetary policy or foreign policy.

So far, nothing much new: these formulations have the ring of conventional Gaullism.

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[59] As the 1970s progressed, one might say that the fear ebbed: the USSR (although judged harshly in its internal policies and repression) was perceived as more benign, an essentially status quo power. Even Mitterrand had little fear that Soviet tanks would ever enter Paris as they had Prague. See Le Monde, December 10, 1970, p. 8. His point was that the Soviets essentially abided by the Yalta framework. As the Soviet threat appeared to recede during the years of détente, defense policy was often viewed as a political weapon to wrest independence from the dominance of the U.S.

CERES also accepts the Marchais view that Regime policies of the 1970s strayed from basic Gaullist precepts. In particular: Giscard's brand of reintegration revives the possibility (or commits "apocalyptic risks") that France will have to fight a war in Europe she would do better to stay out of. As Jean-Pierre Chevènement views it, France has "lost its margin of maneuver stemming from an independent defense". Méry and Giscard effectively repudiated de Gaulle's legacy of 15 years.[60]

Roundly criticized by the CERES spokesman is the doctrine of la sanctuarisation élargie: that France can intervene in any zone whenever the national territory appears threatened.

Giscardian doctrine has removed all rigorous significance from the concepts of deterrence and sanctuarization.[61] The root error of Giscard was to design a strategy engaging in actual warfare. Such a strategy is based on two pillars:

a) Tactical nuclear weapons.

b) The presence of U.S. forces in Europe.

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[60] Ideas summarized here are from "Stratégie de rupture et indépendance de la défense", which constitutes Chapter 34 of Chevènement's Les socialistes, les communistes et les autres. It was also a communication to the Comité Directeur of the PS on November 7, 1976.

[61] Ideally, deterrence requires some definition of what Chevènement terms a concept of non bataille (ie a criteria of when not to use weapons).

The superpowers do not intend to employ their strategic weapons. But they would invoke theater nuclear weapons. This requires them to call upon their allies to strengthen conventional forces.[62] Giscard acquiesces in all this because he is wedded essentially to the American perspective: that the great danger in the world today stems from destabilization. The role of France is to join, to the extent if its ability, in maintaining the status quo.[63]

In Chevènement's applied Marxism, a confident ruling class, secure in its future, does not allow its vital goals and choices to depend on others. A problem arose because the bourgeoisie of Western Europe, having experienced two world wars, developed valid self doubts about its own viability.[64] In fact, since 1936 France has been living in the hope

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[62] If a conventional war broke out in Europe, the U.S. would have sufficient time to reflect and manage the crisis. Tactical weapons would devastate Europe, the scenario Chevènement cautions against. Ibid., p. 336.

[63] Hence Giscard and Kissinger could apply the same policy to Portugal in 1975 during the revolution. Or they could agree with other Western powers in making credits advanced to Italy contingent upon the exclusion of the PCI from participation in Government. Subordinations such as this are hardly an independent role for France. In fact, they could one day be applied to France itself. And France would be compelled to accept the status of a middle-rank power (une nation moyenne). In effect, Giscard accepts the Kissinger formulation: conceding only "regional responsibilities" to Europe, while reserving global duties to the U.S.

[64] Chevènement makes an interesting point: that Lenin's concept of international politics, which envisaged warring capitalist states, never foresaw the arrival or ascendancy of a single capitalist superpower. Put another way, Lenin did not foresee that Europe (or the capitalist world) would be vassalized to the U.S., a subordination resulting from World War II.

of foreign protection ("Plutôt Hitler que le Front populaire"). Today, the protector has shifted; it is the United States: the French ruling class, says Chevènement, sees its future under the wing of an American Europe. It is not a nation they are defending, but their own privileges.

Where does this analysis of CERES leave the Left? Can it frame a defense policy? Chevènement notes that foreign policy has always been the major arena of confrontation between Socialists and Communists. Historically, Communists could only conceive of the advent of socialism on a world level: they relied on the achievements of socialism as realized in the USSR.[65]

Before signing the Programme commun, as we saw earlier in this chapter, the Socialists had not conceived any new framework for national defense outside the limits of the established international order (that is, the dependency just described). The PCF, before its signature, could only envisage progress towards socialism stemming from some reversal of the relation of forces to the advantage of the USSR. Neither of these two perspectives required France to conceive of policies independent of the two blocs. The Programme commun gave no special priority to national defense questions, contenting itself with general declarations of intent. But the logic of the Program did compel reevaluations

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[65] They only favored French interests if they did not contradict general objectives of global strategy. This was the classic foreign policy subordination imposed by the heirs of Tours.

in the concepts of defense held by the two Parties. For instance, it put socialism on the more immediate agenda in France, breaking with the doomsday notions of socialism which haunted the earlier left. The two working-class parties were thus compelled to reconsider their own strengths and to endow an independent defense policy for France, if their rhetoric about a "Europe of workers" was to rise above pious sloganeering. The ability of the two Left Parties to hammer out a joint defense policy was largely the ability to assume effectively the national destiny. Success would signal a historic maturity, overcoming divisions that could not be healed in 1936 and 1946.

Reading Chevènement in the more detached light of today, one can see that he was unrealistically optimistic about the ability of the two formations on the Left to transcend their world views. Superimposed over the historical split in the working class movement was the division of Europe into blocs. The Parties in France could not resolve this.

In the 1970s, the Communists appeared to be leading proponents of national independence. To the extent that the Party separated itself from the interests of the Soviet state, it was able to revise its classic opposition in principle to nuclear weapons (a legacy of the era when U.S. strategic dominance perhaps justified this propaganda line). In other words, Communist thinking evolved in France to the extent that

it no longer saw nuclear weapons as the ultimate threat to the USSR, but rather as a basic factor in long-term autonomy from the dictates of U.S. diplomacy.

Rocard and the PS. Another tendance inside the PS - to be explored only briefly here - is represented by Michel Rocard, an important, though as yet unsuccessful rival to Mitterrand in Party leadership. A member of the National Secretariat, Rocard's roots reach back to the old SFIO as well as the PSU.[66] He describes France as a middle-range power, but one that is hopelessly outdistanced by the superpowers.[67] Rocard scorns the force de frappe because it serves more as a factor making for vulnerability, making France a target. Such weapons might deter non-nuclear powers, but hardly nuclear enemies. Despite these deficiencies, he still sees the nation playing an international role. Basic to the defense of France (or any socialist state, such as Yugoslavia or Vietnam) is a defense policy capable of denying intolerable provocations from other states. The immediate task, according to the former deputy, is to protect against two forms of war: blockade and ground invasion. The former requires a strong Navy to protect convoys, as well as nuclear-

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[66] Rocard rallied to the PS in October, 1974. He remains highly disliked and distrusted by French Communists.

[67] Le Monde, September 3, 1970, p. 11.

powered attack submarines.[68]

The nation in arms: restructuring the armed forces. After the coup in Chile, half the cadets at the Santiago War College were arrested and condemned for their complicity in Allende's Popular Unity Movement. Over 100 officers were implicated. The lesson was not lost on the Left in France, where it revived widespread discussion and debate on the role of the Army. As advocates of a new social order in the 1970s, reaching toward power in the state, it was only prudent that the Left consider the Army.[69] But the Left had always considered the Army in its calculations. In fact, the one outstanding innovation in defense thinking conceived and originated by the Left was that of the "nation in arms": the idea of "every citizen a soldier". Historically, this concept reaches back to the Revolution: to assure the defense of a free nation, all the sons of France were to be enrolled in her defense.[70] This was the

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[68] Not missile-firing submarines. The latter are vulnerable before they even leave their bases. And, they could never penetrate an enemy's anti-missile defenses. National Assembly debate, October 8, 1970, where Rocard challenged Defense Minister Debré. Le Monde, October 9, 1970, p. 9.

[69] Hence the PS authorised Hernu, Chevènement, some reservists, retired recruits and officers to form work groups and file periodic reports back to the Party on strategy, weapons and the malaise inside the military. Questions of domestic repression were examined from the point-of-view of a future Left Government.

[70] Challaner, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, pp. 68-69. Marx's early followers saw war as a great evil. Conscription was a tool of the bourgeoisie. Challaner argues that Socialists could only accept the "nation in arms" idea when they grew reformist: when they identified with the tangible benefits of the Third Republic. Only then was it worth defending.

classic Jacobin formulation. The Communists, as self-proclaimed heirs of this tradition, embraced the doctrine fully.[71] Socialists, too, consider it basic, yielding such notions as arming the people, and suppressing permanent, professional armies.[72]

Historically, however, the doctrine posed certain problems for the Communists, since it collided with that other well-known Leninist formulation, rejecting all defense of the bourgeois state. The problem of reconciling the dilemma was much like squaring the circle (probably explaining many of the policy shifts, reversals and contradictions in policy described here since the time of Jaurès).[73]

A corollary of the concept - as the coup in Chile seems to suggest - was that of the Army (that is a professional army) as a possible repressor.[74] This theme surfaces often when spokesmen from the Left

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[71]"Far from seeking to destroy the army, as our enemies pretend, we wish to give the nation the army it needs and to assure to it the mission, structure, weapons and working conditions which will free it from the impasse (created by the present regime)". George Marchais, Le Défi démocratique, cited in Cahiers du Communisme, No. 12, December, 1977, p. 114.

[72]Some currents in the PS leaned toward a mobilisation populaire which they felt could replace nuclear weapons in halting an aggressor: Jaurès synthesized into some romanticized Maoism.

[73]Thus in the 1920s the PCF rejected all militarism. In opposing conscription, it was in effect rejecting the "nation in arms". Challener, pp. 165 and 207.

[74]That a rightist professional army might try to prevent them from governing. Better to have a large army of working class conscripts. The Programme commun calls for six-month service for all, suggesting the citizen soldier theme.

discuss defense policy.

When the PCF in 1976 abandoned the classic formulation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, some Party members feared that (assuming Communists ever achieved power) they would be leaving their new workers' state without any means of reacting against activities of the bourgeoisie: that Communists would be yielding up their repressive apparatus and exposing themselves to counter-revolutionary risks, because:

> ....bourgeois exploiters never renounce their plans for domination and for their privileges... They will attempt a recovery through illegality, subversion and violence (making use of)...all possible means within the state apparatus, among which the army will constitute an essential element.[75]

Hyperbole aside, such a view is widely held on the Left. Furthermore, there is evidence that it is not entirely without foundation. Thus Jacques Isnard, a strategic affairs editor for Le Monde, set forth evidence to document the Army's role as an anti-popular force.

> . The army as a possible means of last resort against revolution. For example, during the disturbances of May 1968, de Gaulle withdrew to Baden Baden (where France maintains a military base across the Rhine) for reasons never made clear.[76]

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[75] Louis Baillot, "L'Armée et la voie démocratique au socialisme", Cahiers du Communisme, February-March, 1976, p. 187.

[76] André Fanton, who succeeded Debré as Minister of Defense "never concealed that the D.O.T. (défense opérationelle du territoire) could be used as a means of preventing renewed incidents such as the crisis of May 1968". Le Monde, July 25, 1973.

- The Army as a political intelligence service. Thus the PCF and its derivative organizations are, from all the evidence, followed in close detail by the military authorities.

- Furthermore, the actions of various anti-military groups and revolutionary tendencies (such as PSU) are also monitored, along with anarchists, pacifists and members of the CDFT.[77]

The Left has focused not only on the potential for domestic repression by the Army, but it has also generated discussion of the serious morale problems, particularly among conventional forces, long neglected during the de Gaulle years. J.P. Chevènement describes a strong feeling among Socialists in France of a malaise in the Army.[78] Many of the youth consider it a waste of time. Chevènement maintains that the Army should not be cut off from the people, as shown by experience in Vietnam, Israel, Yugoslavia and Switzerland: a nuclear deterrent has little meaning if not supported by a popular deterrent. As another Socialist, Jean Marceau, expresses it:

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[77] Le Monde, October 17, 1973, p. 16. Isnard's theme is an old one: that the French Army is a conceivable repressive force to be used in possible domestic subversion.

[78] Le Monde, November 9, 1973, p. 12. Chevènement urges an arrangement in which "every Frenchman should be linked to a territorial regiment close to his residence where he could be mobilized in a few hours". His views are not that far from the anti-praetorian ideas of the PCF, which also favors brief military training for all.

> Defense concerns all citizens. It is not an abstract activity cut off in time and place and reserved for specialists. It is a daily activity. The capitalist system has divided men's hearts and spirits and has smothered any sense of personal responsibility. The task of Socialists in a perspective of workers self-management is to in some way recreate these conditions and restore the spirit of defense in our people.[79]

The critique from the Left goes so far as to suggest that through malaise and inertia, France's territorial defense has been overlooked, the nation remains as vulnerable as it ever was in 1870 or 1940.[80]

Marceau's specific recommendations to the National Secretariat call for a regional defense-in-depth to meet all risks of aggression, infiltration and occupation, especially to thwart sabotage in the infrastructure which might paralyze vital installations. This requires a capability to oppose parachutists and light infantry. Civil defense is vital to protect the population.

1) All citizens, of all classes and sexes, must

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[79] Marceau was Secretary of the Socialists' Commission of National Defense. See Le Monde, December 8, 1978, p. 11.

[80] According to one Communist source, lack of a large reserve army led to the defeats of 1870-71 and setbacks in the early days of World War I. Communists invoke not only Jaurès, but their own experiences in rallying resistance in World War II. See Pierre Villon, "Reflections on Gaullist Military Policy", Cahiers du Communisme, No. 3, March, 1969, pp. 24-32.

receive defense training for six months. Cadres would then be scattered for six months, and then spend six months regionally, close to home.

2) Administratively, territorial defense would fall under the Ministry of Defense. But civil defense would be entrusted to local ministerial departments.

It could be said that many of Marceau's formulations are a mix of the practical and the utopian. He believes, for example, that citizen responsibility in defense can only succeed in a structure that is decentralized. This requires a redefinition of hierarchical relationships and traditional modes of discipline in the army. Ideally, (as most "nation-in-arms" advocates urge) a people's defense force would be based on a proximity of residence. Service should be done in a territory that is known and loved by the recruit. Military environment should be an open one, supressing the barracks-like qualities of the past.

Sale of weapons abroad. In concluding this review of national defense issues, we look briefly at the controversial question of arms exports by France. France remains the world's third largest supplier of weapons exports. The Left has generally been critical of arms sale policies, particularly where sales have been to states whose regimes it opposes. In one parliamentary debate Communists charged to Defense Minister Debré that since its inception, the Gaullist government had sold weapons to

Spain, Portugal, Greece, Brazil, Pakistan and South Africa. Furthermore, these weapons were used against liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.[81] Debré defended such actions by pointing out that France was often solicited as a supplier because she "did not attach political conditions" in her sale of weapons, as other powers did. The Gaullist Minister made the further point that France's arms industry would never be able to survive merely on the basis of its domestic sales. Thus without exports, the nation would be deprived of its truly national defense. National independence was, of course, the familiar rallying cry of the Communists themselves.[82]

Despite some of the egalitarian condemnations directed by France against South Africa, sales by France to that nation and Rhodesia have expanded over the years, filling voids in that market left by those U.S. and British suppliers who had honored UN-imposed economic sanctions.

> Over the past five years, the French have sold nearly half a billion dollars worth of arms - from Alouette and Super-Frelon helicopters to Mirage jets - to the South Africans....[83]

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[81] L'Humanité, November 30, 1971, p. 2.

[82] Sales of arms abroad does support the economy. Some 200,000 persons are engaged in weapons systems of one sort or another in the nation, according to Edward Kolodziej, in an oral report at the SUNY Brockport Conference Two Decades of Gaullism, June 9-11. 1978.

[83] Jack Kramer, "Our French Connection in Africa", Foreign Policy, Number 29, Winter, 1977-78, p. 162.

After Liberation, nearly the entire French arms industry was placed under Government control. But today, it is charged by the Communists, it remains dominated by some of the most capitalist industries in France. Thus virtually all aircraft are build by Dassault-Bréguet. This shift from the public to the private sector was, they claim, accomplished under the Gaullist Government in 1961 with the creation of the Délégation Ministérielle à l'Armement (D.M.A.). Since 1933, the Communists have been urging nationalization of the arms industry, including Dassault and Matra. Their arguments are generally posed in ethical terms: that the existence of such power in the hands of private arms merchants is "a challenge to public morality".[84]

France is also an important supplier of arms to West Germany, ranking second, just behind the United States. As Helmut Schmidt noted, "we have imported 18 percent of our armament from France in recent years".[85]

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[84] L'Humanité, November 30, 1971, p. 2.

[85] Le Monde, October 26, 1970. That very month Debré concluded an agreement with Schmidt to sell 1.2 billion francs worth of weapons to the Federal Republic, including Lance missiles and naval equipment.

CHAPTER VIII

COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALISTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

Historical Overview

After the war, differences over the construction of Europe were profound, dividing the Left throughout the decades.[1] Despite all pretensions to internationalism, we have seen that the Communists staked out an early defense of France's independence, posing as a nationalist Party, while Socialists (along with the MRP, Radicals and other centrists) consistently embraced the European idea.[2] These differences were not fatal and would not necessarily prevent the two parties from governing together, after all, a similar gap existed between the Gaullists and Giscardians.

Early Socialists and the nation. The early founders of socialism made references to a united Europe.[3] Followers of Saint Simon and Fourier introduced a European idea into their socialist concepts. Auguste Comte

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[1] See the section on the Referendum on Europe in Chapter V.

[2] The idea of a larger nation: France could no longer achieve greatness alone. Greatness had to be transposed to the level of Europe. Duroselle, pp. 346-347.

[3] Examples cited here are from "La notion d'Europe dans l'idéologie socialiste", Rapports au Congrès Extraordinaire sur les problèmes Européens, Bagnolet, December 15-16, 1973, p. 4.

spoke of "La République Occidentale" which would join Europe together. Proudhon, in elaborating a l'Europe Fédérée insisted that the very notion of nationality was an abstraction filled with obscurities and absurdities" because it did not derive from nature. In fact, discussion of a European dimension in the framework of socialist methods and action persisted within the entire Socialist International up until the major schism in 1918.

Despite all the internationalist language, nationalism continued to constitute a potent factor in the integration of peoples in pre-1914 Europe. We have already seen the broad national élan manifested by socialists rallying to war in 1914. It seemed clear that the state had not been replaced as a form of social organization.[4] Even in the Manifesto, Marx had said that the proletariat had "to constitute itself as the nation". Later, the Bolsheviks would claim to have raised class struggle to an international level. But they too never renounced nationalism when it was instrumental. And so too with French Communists. Always sensitive to the charge of betraying their loyalty to another power, they have been quick to assert their national patriotism.[5]

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[4]Ironically, perhaps, certain productive and technical aspects of capitalism had managed to transcend the limits of the nation state. But why should the Left rally to that type of internationalism?

[5]Employing Tiersky's scheme of the four poles of French Communism, one could say that the nationalist pull was strongest when the Communists were enacting their "Government" role, as during Liberation and the period of the Tripartite Government.

The postwar years. Given this national perspective, Communist behavior becomes easier to understand. The PCF described integration from the outset as a device to extend U.S. hegemony over Europe. The close link between the construction of Europe and the U.S. aid made both suspect.[6] And when the early spokesmen for a United Europe invoked the danger of a Soviet takeover, it only confirmed to the Communists that anti-Sovietism was the driving motor of the European construction: formation of an anti-Communist bloc.[7] Kriegel argues that French Communists opposed unity of Europe not so much for national reasons of patriotism, but out of their time-honored loyalty to Soviet interests:

> The existence of a powerful Europe alongside the bloc of East and Central European socialist states would represent a distinct disadvantage to the socialist camp.[8]

The Schuman Plan and all functional integration schemes were

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[6]Thus the Marshall Plan was not disinterested aid. It urged recipient nations to integrate their economies. Only the PCF grasped the true nature of this aid: an opening for U.S. interests to penetrate the Continent. Socialists, however, were taken in by the myth of disinterested aid. Blum in fact, signed the accords in 1946 with Secretary of State James Byrnes. Roger Martelli, "Les problèmes Européens et l'analyse de classe", Cahiers d'histoire de l'Institut Maurice Thorez, No. 4, July-September, 1973, p. 9.

[7]"To construct Europe requires the rallying of forces in each nation around Governments that can reduce the Communists to impotence". Rassemblement, March 20, 1948, organ of the Gaullist RPF.

[8]Annie Kriegel, The Communist Parties of Italy and France, p. 57. Whether or not her attribution of motive is correct, the insight is accurate. In fact Communist gains have been most spectacular when Europe was disunited: namely during the two world wars. See Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 217.

seen as betrayals,[9] "economic Munichs" that would de-industrialize France and strengthen an aggressive Germany.[10] The Pleven Plan for a European Army (EDC) was also opposed during the Thorez era. After all, the Defense Community only extended from the logic of the Coal and Steel Community. The SFIO, on the other hand, largely supported EDC.[11] At the time, many considered it an international "third force", a counterweight to l'entente atlantique.[12] Partisans, such as Guy Mollet, felt

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[9]An entente of German and French capitalists would not in any way rule out the possibility of a Franco-German war. History demonstrated that such an entente could be extended during the period of the war itself, said L'Humanité, May 17, 1950, p. 3.

[10]Many on the Left had an "economic inferiority complex" regarding Germany. Duroselle, p. 347. France's weakest firms would be sacrificed to those of the Ruhr in the name of the "European idea", Jacques Duclos told a National Assembly debate, December 2, 1951. ECSC would create jobless French workers, compelled to expatriate themselves to Germany for work, as in the Hitler era. Details are in La Gauche en France et la Construction Européenne: Positions 1950-1975, Rubens Pinto Lyra, PhD dissertation, Université de Nancy. Also see Jacques Kuhn, L'Humanité, July 8, 1963, p. 8.

[11]To reject the military community would endanger the entire European edifice, the SFIO argued. France would be isolated in Europe. Nevertheless, Socialists split on EDC in the crucial 1954 Parliamentary vote: 54 voting for, 50 against. Opposition to German rearmament assembled many of the same political forces that had rallied to the Resistance: Communists, neutralists, Gaullists and nationalists. Alexander Werth, France: 1940-1955 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 177.

[12]This formulation did not persuade the PCF. If Truman, Acheson and even Eisenhower (the latter head of NATO) supported the European Army, it was unlikely they were urging a "counterweight to U.S. influence". The ease with which France later approved the Western European Union (W.E.U.) suggests a greater fear of supranationalism than of a rearmed Germany, according to Sir Bernard Burrows and Christopher Irwin, The Security of Western Europe (London: Charles Knight and Co. Ltd., 1972), Chapter 11. Burrows was former British Permanent Representative to NATO.

that the Soviet threat now clearly outweighed the danger of a revived Germany. In fact, Franco-German cooperation would help bind Germany into the Western camp.

Ultimately, the Communists would relax some of their fierce opposition to "Europe". Tactically, the PCF was seeking new alliances and furthermore, it could not deny realities on the Continent. But the basic hostility would always remain: a capitalist entente could never serve France and its working class.

The first break in European Communist opposition to EEC came with the Italian Communists in 1962.[13] The PCF was more cautious. Only in 1968 could Rochet note that:

> . European integration, though dominated by monopoly capitalism, was a reality. The struggle was to democratize it.

But Rochet denied that any construction of Europe would ever

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[13]Originally, the PCI opposed "Europe" as a perpetuation of the blocs on the Continent. But by 1962, economic integration seemed inevitable, irreversible. Italian Communists had to control that development harnessing it to further socialism. A year later the CGIL opened an office at EEC headquarters, Brussels, over the opposition of the French CGT and the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions. Today, the PCI accepts the fact of internationally integrated economies, so that socialism cannot be built in one country, but must be built transnationally. R.E.M. Irving, "The European Policy of the French and Italian Communist Parties", International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 3, July 1977, pp. 413-414. We saw earlier that this issue also divided the PS from CERES, with the latter opting for a "socialism in one country" approach.

develop an independent Continent outside the superpowers.[14] Furthermore, the structure created at Brussels was undemocratic (from a PCF point-of-view) since neither the Communist Parties nor labor unions of France or Italy had received representation at that time, despite their demands for a voice.[15]

The Communists rejected any transfers of sovereignty to what they considered a super entity of monopoly capitalism.[16] Supranationality would not be an effective road for achieving socialism among the advanced nations of Europe. Supranationalism would not allow for the simultaneous passage of six or seven states into socialism.[17] And finally, there was the economic argument: free circulation of goods in Europe was only freedom of action for monopolies.[18]

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[14]"The SFIO seems to forget what regime we are in and to whom the means of production belong in the six countries of little Europe". See the essay by Jean Claude Poulan, "Le Parti SFIO et l'intégration Européen", Cahiers du Communisme, No. 4, April 1961, p. 737. Cited in Sue Ellen M. Charlton, The French Left and European Integration, Monograph Series No. 4 in World Affairs, University of Denver, 1972, p. 57.

[15]L'Humanité, January 8, 1968, p. 3.

[16]Annie Kriegel suggests that the French Communists would later reject Euro-Communism because they interpreted that, too, as an issue of supranationalism. Private interview, February 12, 1979.

[17]Why should France or Italy wait for West Germany or Britain to go socialist? It was more important, the Communists argued, to preserve the national independence of each working class movement in those states where strongest. Pierre Joquin in Le Monde, March 9, 1968, p. 7. Or, as Duclos said, "The nation is not an entity that will pass out of existence in our era". Le Monde, February 11, 1970, p. 8.

[18]Jean Claude Poulan, "Le Parti SFIO et l'intégration européene"

The Socialists and Europe

From the start of the post-war era, integration was considered urgent, the only means of reviving Europe.[19] And, economic union marked a step towards political union, that ultimate supranational construction. The SFIO was not obsessed with the national sovereignty issue as were the Communists. Nationalist isolation, in fact, was a condition to be avoided. The only condition Socialists insisted upon in accepting a European construction was that it be "democratic", meaning that representatives of workers groups sit on the High Authority.

During the 1960s, almost the entire non-Communist Left continued to favor remaining in EEC, although some had lingering doubts about the direction toward which the Community was moving.[20] Some currents on the

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[19] So said the SFIO at its Fifty First Congress, 1950. See Lyra, p. 29. And Germany should be brought in, since it would be a greater rival outside the entity, without any constraints. Also, the SFIO began efforts to gain British entry (as a counterweight to Germany). But the Labour Party was cool to the European construction. A technocratic Europe might remove authority from her own Parliamentary institutions (a view not unlike one the PCF would later echo). See Robert Verdier, Cahiers d'Histoire: "La SFIO devant quelques problèmes internationaux", p. 97. Verdier was a Secretary of the SFIO in 1946.

[20] There were two general currents on the democratic left: the old-line SFIO people definitely supported a supranational Europe in order to realize socialism. PSU and CERES were more distrustful, particularly because (in those years) it had strong Christian Democratic overtones. Mitterrand backed a united Europe, but disliked the variety he observed at Strasbourg. One thing was certain, no European construction could be used to prevent a Socialist Government from carrying out its goals of democratic planning. See Ellen M. Charlton, p. 30.

democratic left had always opposed bureaucratic capitalism. And bureaucratic capitalism (or a technocratic variety) seemed to be the dominant model for European integration. This undermined some of the enthusiasm for EEC inside the Left.

The rationale for Europe. The Socialists favored the construction of Europe for many reasons. Historically the Party had an internationalist vision, with aspirations that derived from the brotherhood of man. And democratic socialism had strong historical links to Western Europe. Then, too, there was a conviction, described in the preceding chapter, that closer cooperation between the nation states of Europe would make war less likely. There was also a pragmatic conviction that there would be tangible benefits to France in industry and agriculture. The slashing of economic barriers could help develop Western Europe's prosperity.[22] Then, too, as we will see, there were Socialists who resented the dominance of the superpowers. To them, EEC was a realistic means for France to remain aloof and independent from the Soviets and America. Finally some held that socialism could only be built within a European framework.[23] France could not do it alone, since it was a problem of conti-

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[21] Ibid., p. 30.

[22] Some viewed integration as a means toward an end, namely the United States of Europe, much as the Prussian Zollverein fostered the uniting of Germany. Others had less lofty notions, considering economic integration alone a legitimate end. Duroselle, p. 349.

[23] Thus there was a close link between the "struggle for socialism and the struggle for Europe", said Report No. 2 of Les Socialistes et l'Europe, issued by the PS Congrès Extraordinaire on Europe, Bagnolet, December 15-16, 1973, p. 69.

mental dimension.[24] An exponent of this view is Rocard.[25]

Given these attitudes, Socialists strongly criticized de Gaulle for having blocked and retarded the fusion of the European Community. Socialists reject de Gaulle's famous formulation of a "Europe of nations". The unity of Europe was impossible among sovereign states operating in a framework limited to intergovernmental links.[26]

Rhetoric of this period sounds hyperbolic today. Gaston Defferre spoke of a "socialist continent" operating throughout an industrially developed European nation, a model distinct from American capitalism or Russian collectivism:

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[24]Early in 1970 a debate opened up on whether socialism was possible in a national framework - or did it require a European context. Robert Furon's Mouvement objectif 1972 took the latter view: the existence of Social Democrats in Britain and France was a plus factor in advancing socialism. Others rejected the Social Democrats of other countries, since many were not working to overcome capitalism, but to integrate into it. Several PS federations sought to adhere to this movement, but ultimately, it remained autonomous. Le Monde, March 6, 1970.

[25]"We seek to join the interests of all European workers, in steel, autos and farms, who demand a common solution. This must be imposed on the capitalist states. A socialist regime in France will have the task of proposing solutions that will allow for joint planning and the establishment of Euro-wide public sectors, imposed by the joint pressure of all states". Le Monde, May 28, 1969, p. 5.

[26]Thus de Gaulle was particularly guilty, since he placed the executives of ECSC, Euratom and the Common Market in positions of dependence to the heads of states and ministers of the various governments. Socialists also challenged his arrogant refusal to deal with anything having the remotest supranational nature. See Rapport Général au Congrès Extraordinaire sur les problèmes Européens (Bagnolet) December 15-16, 1973, p. 13.

> ...for the first time since the birth of the socialist idea in the world (this policy) can bring about a new model of civilization...[27]

Europe and socialism: were they compatible? The debates were lively on the Left. A basic issue was the kind of Europe one had in mind. A capitalist Giscardian model would be aligned with the U.S. Only a socialist Europe could distinguish itself from the American identity. Maurice Duverger, for example, saw little purpose in struggling for an autonomous Europe if the creation had the same design for society as the United States. It would only lead to an Atlantic entity directed by Washington. Why not have the European states one-by-one join the U.S. like Hawaii and Alaska?, he asked ironically. That way, they could at least enter in U.S. Presidential elections and receive directives from a Secretary of State, rather than from an Ambassador in Brussels. Integration would be a better form of decolonization than le protectorat camouflé. Better to be Texas than the Philippines.

Duverger meant that only a socialist Europe could develop independently of the U.S. But he doubted that the EC of 1975 could build socialism in France, considering that the Community (particularly the SPD and the British Labour Party) opposed the PS-PCF alliance of that period.[28]

Thus the Marché commun and the Programme commun were incompat-

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[27] Grosser, French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle, p. 137.

[28] Duverger, see his discussion, p. 139.

ible: member states could not reject Community rules considered contrary to their basic interests.[29] Only a Socialist Europe could be genuinely independent; there was no superpower to which its society would then correspond. But in calling for a socialist Europe, Duverger rejected the social democratic model of the FRG and the Labour Party.[30] In the short run, any strengthening of the European Community would render socialism in France nearly impossible, because an authentic European Community would compel France to restrain progress towards socialism, awaiting the day when its other European partners could catch up.[31]

One helpful way to understand the variety of socialist concepts regarding Europe is to identify the many positions that surfaced at Party forums. Earlier, I suggested that many socialists sensed a malaise inside the EEC.[32] 1973 was a key year; the PS staged its Congrès Extraordinaire at Bagnolet devoted to France. This came only 18 months after the signing of the Programmme commun, and Mitterrand, now First Secretary, remained committed to the European idea. But there was dissent within, particularly in CERES.

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[29]The logic is close to the PCF view: that the EEC would never allow socialism.

[30]He rejected a troika of Mollet, Schmidt and Harold Wilson. A socialist Europe required leaders of the first rank, such as Mitterrand, Brandt and Bevan. Ibid., p. 142.

[31]The sluggish socialism of the Nordic states would act as a brake on socialism that was in full ardour in France. Ibid., p. 143.

[32]See the discussions in Chapter V noting the generation gap in socialist and democratic-left thinking regarding Europe.

The Mitterrand position. On November 17, 1973, Mitterrand proposed sending representatives around to other European Socialist Parties to coordinate concepts.[33] But his proposal received a lukewarm majority from the Executive Bureau. Mitterrand attached great significance to the plan, and a week later he asked the Comité directeur to arbitrate the issue. If he lost, he would resign.[34] Europe represented a major issue of principle. He had gone to great lengths within the Socialist International to press his views, nurturing special ties to both Olof Palme and Bruno Kreisky. The Party, he felt, could not merely rely on the European initiatives of Pompidou or Foreign Minister Jobert. Rather, it had to launch its own initiatives. Nor did Mitterrand want to allow control over these Party policies to be taken over by rival tendencies within the PS.[35] Mitterrand feared too much factionalism within the Party on foreign policy issues, such as Europe, nuclear weapons and the Middle East. The Party risked being defused into a morass of currents,

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[33] His proposed representatives were chiefly pro-Europeans: Gérard Jacquet, Pierre Mauroy, Giles Martinet and Robert Pontillon, the latter of CERES. Le Monde, November 17, 1973. p. 10. Mitterrand and Alain Savary met with Callaghan that year to settle differences with the Labour Party, which was resistant to a supranational Europe.

[34] Mitterrand's stature in the post-Épinay PS was high. He did want his mandate on foreign policy, and probably had no true intention of resigning.

[35] He had taken a firm stand the prior month on the October, 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Many in the PS felt the impotence of Europe in world affairs. During that War, the two superpowers effectively settled the issues. Europe was mute, manifesting this impotence. Mitterrand was seeking to change this.

preventing it from acting as a potential governing power. Hence, he put his own leadership on the line.[36]

The Socialists reach consensus. During this period, the Socialists were moving significantly towards a more European position than at the time of the signing of the Programme commun in July, 1972.[37] At the Grenoble Congress in June 1973, and at Bagnolet, the momentum continued. The construction of Europe was now described as a precondition for Socialists in Europe.[38] Indeed, the Community required what the left often term a renewed social content, but Mitterrand was prepared to carry this out through his good ties with other European Socialist heads of state (an approach sure to arouse the suspicion of Communist alliance partners).

After much internal dissent, several factors brought the PS to a consensus on the European question. Certainly the oil crisis of Autumn, 1973 and the lack of unanimity among the "Nine" were factors compelling the Party toward a firm stand on a supranational Europe. And

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[36] The PS works under difficult conditions, and the leadership is often overburdened. Coordination is poor. The activities of CERES often generated hostility. Two years after Épinay, the Party was ascending, yet still riven with tendencies.

[37] The Program called for participation in EEC, but a democratizing of its institutions, it will be recalled. A Left Government would retain all options and treaty rights to establish its own social transformations.

[38] "Decisive action toward socialism cannot be made within a national framework", said Mitterrand. Le Monde, December 15, 1973, p. 14.

one should not underestimate the effect of Mitterrand's earlier threat to resign. The Party emerged from Bagnolet with a more conventional, "social democratic" view on Europe: a return to the original conceptions of the old SFIO. Even old veterans, such as Mollet, rallied support for Mitterrand for the first time since Épinay.[39]

However, we must underscore one key difference. The original postwar Socialist impulse toward a United Europe stemmed largely from fear of Soviet and Communist power. But in the 1970s the impulse toward Europe emerging at Bagnolet was more anti-American in tone: Europe had to be constructed to resist U.S. influence. In Mitterrand's specific analysis, the necessity for Europe stems largely from his critique of America, which is chiefly economic in nature. Mitterrand describes a U.S. system of free trade as one which operates with its own internal coherence, and has an external tendency toward expansion.[40] This expansion often contradicts European interests. However, a nation (such as France) cannot simply withdraw from this American system of free trade. It must enter another system. In other words, socialism cannot be established in France under autarchic conditions. Furthermore, a socialist France designed on a purely national basis, would expose France to the risks of a Chilean style coup. The foregoing analysis argues for Europe. Mitterrand goes on to reject the CERES-Duverger-Communist

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[39] Le Monde, December 18, 1973, pp. 8, 9 and 10.

[40] Ibid., pp. 8, 9, 10.

analysis that EC still remains a capitalist project.[41]

The attitude of the U.S. toward Europe has also changed. Americans favored unity during the early reconstruction and cold-war years. But today, the construction of Europe is feared as a rival in the world economy.[42]

Socialist conceptions for a European Community. In outlining plans for a reinvigorated European Community, Socialists repeatedly call for a "democratization". The term is vague. What is their alternative to a neo-capitalist Europe of nation states? Measures have been put forth, some of which are sketched out below. By no means complete, this lists some of the specific ideas and proposals French Socialists have devised for the EC.

The powers of parliament. In calling for a strengthened Community, with broader powers transferred to the supranational level, Socialists would want to enlarge legislative powers of the European Parliament in Community decisionmaking. Such a Parliament should be empowered to vote on the EC budget. The Council of Ministers should be

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[41] In fact the multinationals require a vast zone of free exchange so they are often hostile to EEC institutions and its preferences.

[42] At Bagnolet, Robert Pontillon hailed the fact that the US had now come to fear the EEC as an open competitor to be reckoned with. J.G. Quin, "The French Socialist Party and the EEC: Attitudes and Policies 1971-1974", Journal of European Studies No VI, 1976, p. 212. Quin notes also that the PS rejected attempts by the U.S. to organize European consumers during the 1973 oil crisis forming multi-national negotiating blocs. Europe should negotiate on its own, without U.S. interference.

required to consult it more than is currently the practice. To enhance the stature of the Parliament, they favored elections by direct, universal suffrage, and the granting to the Parliament of powers comparable to a sovereign parliament.[43]

Energy policy. Decisions on energy cannot be separated from political choice. They are not technocratic issues, but policy issues to be defined within the framework of democratic planning. If the people of Europe have all the facts, referendums could even be employed on specific questions.[44] Within the EC there should be more coordination to deal with questions of supply and research on new sources and forms of energy. Speaking broadly, the PS seeks a greater energy independence for Europe, and the establishment of new relations with producing nations, favoring those whose political orientation is closer to that of the French Left.[45]

Monetary policy. Policies would no longer support the preeminence of the U.S. dollar. Formerly, the U.S. was able to maintain its deficit balances through this preemminence.[46] Socialists would urge a common European unit of account and common exchange reserves pooled with a central monetary fund. This latter plan is not that different from

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[43] Bagnolet Report, p. 26. Socialists favor all proposals to change the current institutional balance between the European Parliament and the Commission. See Robert Pontillon in the above report, p. 21.

[44] L'Unité, February 23, 1979, p. 9.

[45] Bagnolet Report, p. 10.

[46] Bagnolet, p. 25.

the Giscardian conceptions.

Multinational corporations. These firms are, of course, the time-worn whipping boy of Communist analysis. But Socialists, too, have had to contend with the advent of multinationals to Europe. In some ways, they are an important aspect of the anti-Americanism just referred to. The problem, in their analysis, is that capitalist exploitation now transcends the national framework.[47] The resulting new form of enterprise, with its centralized management, essentially lacks any accountability. Many are, of course, American, and they add a new dimension to the problem of concentration. The Socialists (who have spelled out their nationalization policy in the domestic portion of the Common Program) speak about developing a European public sector and expanded planning under the control of the workers.[48]

Agriculture policy. Socialists call for greater participation by farmers and consumers groups within the European Fund for Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee (FEOGA) to provide for representation by farmers' organizations.[49] They would also seek to change and redirect certain Community policies, including a reform of CAP, involving regional problems. Agriculture is viewed as a Community problem. The U.S. view that the CAP is too protectionist, is rejected.[50] To date, the major

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[47] Le Poing et la Rose, August, 1978, p. 8.

[48] Le Poing et la Rose, December 23, 1973.

[49] Ibid., August, 1978, p. 11.

[50] Quin, p. 217.

burdens on financing agriculture have fallen on consumers through higher prices. CAP has not benefitted the smaller farmer, only the larger producers.

Democratized social-economic measures. Socialist measures here are designed to provide greater voice and control to workers organizations. The goal is to promote Europe-wide labor legislation, covering such questions as equal pay for men and women, questions of vacation time, as well as basic protections to migratory workers abroad. Socialists also seek the development of less favored regions of Europe. A goal is full employment. Socialists also call for a strengthened solidarity of the labor syndicates of Europe.

Beyond the agenda sketched here, French Socialists seek to advance prospects for socialism throughout the EEC countries, establishing some form of unity of purpose throughout the European Left, in both political parties and unions.[51] The hope is to build a transnational collaboration of socialist forces: the pre-1914 cry of uniting the workers everywhere in Europe. Inside the European Parliament, Socialist deputies were a prime force for elections transcending national boundaries. They were urging parliamentary groups to form and function without the

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[51] Bagnolet Report, p. 21. Such a project is not as easy as it sounds. The British Labour Party, for instance, is split on the question of Europe, and it is far more suspicious of supranationalism than French Socialists. Links between the PS and the SPD worsened when the SPD established relations with the Gaullists, even going as far as sending representatives to Gaullist conferences. See Le Monde, February 6-7, 1972.

control of national parties. But these were goals, not accomplishments.

The disenchantment on the democratic left with the European enterprise came from those - like CERES and PSU - who increasingly saw Europe developing strictly on capitalist and technocratic lines. Integration only seemed to encourage the penetration of Western Europe by U.S. capital. The EEC was not encouraging national planning. (The PCF, of course, accepted these interpretations.) The PSU, in opposing this form of integration, did not reject the principle of integration.[52]

The Communists Reverse on "Europe"

The PCF opposed Socialist European policies throughout the postwar years and up until the 1970s as class collaboration. But in the 1970s the Party began to take note of new realities. Certainly electoral strategy had much to do with the shifting of gears. We saw earlier how the PCF wooed the SFIO towards a leftist alliance. At this point it is necessary to examine in more detail reasons for the Communist reversal.

It would be too simple (and cynical) to attribute shifting Communist attitudes towards European integration entirely to tactical electoral motives. There were some definite evolutions in their analysis, stemming from changed circumstances in the international political

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[52] Communists went further, rejecting the entire integration process. Charlton, pp. 71-72.

configuration. By the mid-sixties, even, the PCF had been rethinking earlier positions and noting certain international developments that were positive from its point-of-view.[53] From 1968 to 1972, one could note:[54]

- A stabilizing of the cold war; start of détente.
- A completion of French withdrawal from NATO.
- Start of the monetary crisis, which heightened European suspicion of the U.S. role.
- Progressive settlement of the German question.
- The enlargement of the EEC.
- The signing of the Programme commun.
- Soviet recognition of the existence of the EEC in 1972.[55]

The leftist unions in Europe were also seeing the need for growing cooperation on the Continent, despite their ideological

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[53] In 1963 Rochet declared that withdrawal of France from the Atlantic Alliance and Common Market were not conditions precedent for an entente between Communists and Socialists. Humanité-Dimanche, October 13, 1963.

[54] During this period, 1969, Jacques Denis and Jean Kanapa collaborated on their book Pour ou contre l'Europe, setting forth PCF positions. The official line continued to call for an end to blocs in Europe and the holding of a European security conference.

[55] Brezhnev said it was a reality, that the USSR had no intention of undermining it. Le Monde, March 21, 1971, p. 1. And two years later, Soviet Academician Inozemtsev noted that an independent Europe undertaking friendly relations with the USSR and the U.S. would be the most likey model for the 1970s. He saw no threat from European integration. Soviets describe European integration "as an attempt by monopoly capitalism to reconcile private economic and productive forces which had overcome national frontiers". 1962 thesis of the Institute of World Economics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. See Cahiers d'Histoire, p. 110.

differences.[56] Unity of action made sense to offset the power of the multinationals and the increased integration of European economies. The various Communist Parties were also recognizing this need (despite earlier resistance to participating in EEC forums).[57] For a brief period there was a coordinated Europe-wide strategy. At Strasbourg, the PCF and PCI formed a parliamentary group, but it was more symbolic than significant, not always able to define joint Communist positions. By the 1970s the PCF also saw a need to broaden contacts with other European political forces: socialist and Christian as well as Communist. It did not want to be isolated within the EEC.

Despite all of this, the fundamental hostility to integration remained. However, it was only in 1978, when the Union of the Left began to disintegrate, that French Communists could again openly express their deep-seated fears of the integration of Europe.[58] They made these

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[56] Le Monde, July 26, 1974, p. 6. The PCF, in its rivalry with CFDT, worried about preserving its dominant influence over the trade union movement. Thus it induced its CGT to follow the example of Italy's CGIL, which was already participating in EEC organs. As early as 1969 the CGT sat on a consultive committee dealing with the free migration of Labor. See Charlton and the European Community Quarterly, No. 40, November-December, 1970, p. 24.

[57] Gustave Ansart was the PCF representative in the Parliament. Le Monde, July 6, 1973.

[58] The key point made earlier should not be overlooked: the PCF suspected that a strong, enlarged Europe was a political device to weaken the large Communist Parties of Europe. The supranationalists "seek to annul through the play of Community mechanism whatever successes can be obtained through a national framework for the French or Italian people." Jean Burles and Georges Cogniot, "Pour la véritable Union Européene", Cahiers d'Histoire, p. 118.

arguments:

1) French farms, being in decline, could not compete with the cheaper products of other European states. The entry of Spain, Portugal and Greece, with their cheaper products, would endanger French farmers.[59]

2) Enlargement of the EEC would lead to situations where supranational decision-making would encroach on national independence. Currently, EEC had been operating under a unanimity voting rule. A majority could not enforce its will against a recalcitrant member of the community. But this situation could change. The fear was that enlargement of EEC from nine to twelve would lead to a majority-rule form of decision-making.[60]

Some Doctrinal Issues Confronting the Communists on European Integration

French Communists, recognizing a popular attachment to the European idea, have always been defensive about what appeared to be their retrogressive nationalism, especially considering their original Marxian calling for internationalism. Communists had long been charged with defending an outdated idea of independence. Development of a modern economy required overcoming not only social division, but the archaic national divisions as well. Why should French Communists be

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[59] Nadine Bourdin, PCF official, in a private interview, February 14, 1979. Also see L'Humanité, July 30, 1977, p. 3.

[60] Thus the old argument: decisions affecting France will be made in Brussels, Madrid and Bonn. There was also a fear that with an enlarged EEC, French capitalists, seeking the most rational places to invest, would seek out the cheaper labor countries, developing facilities in Spain, Greece and Portugal. Since Spain was Fascist for 40 years, it lacked the advanced labor conditions of France. Industry's search for cheap labor would heighten the jobless crisis in France. These were domestic politic reasons used to justify a PCF international position.

blind to the original aspirations of their founders?

The problem was to reconcile traditional Marxian internationalism with the more current insistence on a national France. Critics of PCF policy could, for instance, cite Engels himself:[61]

> It is your great compatriot, Saint Simon, who foresaw that an alliance of the three great western nations - France, England and Germany - would be the first condition for the political and social emancipation of all of Europe. This alliance, tied to a European alliance, will forever end the cabinet wars and ethnic conflicts: I hope to see it carried out by the proletariat of the three countries.

One of the founders of "scientific socialism" is actually calling for the unity of Europe. As in many doctrinal disputes, all sides are adept at invoking the founders. Communists concede that for both Marx and Engels an alliance of European states was indeed an idea. But, such an historical undertaking could only be enacted through the efforts of the proletariat. In many ways, it is a "cart-horse debate", as we saw with Duverger.

- Do you unite Europe first and then struggle for social change within the new framework?
- Or is it first necessary to do away with bourgeois rule?

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[61] Engels is quoted here by Charles Fiterman in his essay "Pour une Europe indépendente, démocratique et pacifique", Cahiers du Communisme, April, 1968, pp. 14-18. Much of the analysis in this section derives from his essay. Fiterman does not provide the source of the Engels quote. Clearly it is addressed to a Frenchman.

French Communists clearly invoke the latter interpretaion of Marx. Charles Fiterman, for example, argues that Communists have never challenged the need for close links between people, and would indeed seek to build a stable human community transcending national frontiers, which would allow full development of productive forces.

Communists do, then, claim a long-term commitment of gathering together human society. But they doubt it can be done under a capitalist framework. As Fiterman expressed it:

> (The nation remains) a historically and socially durable phenomenon deeply rooted in reality. (And it) remains within a national framework that the popular masses continue to sense their needs (and interests).

Communists legitimate this national idea by citing Marx himself, who, after all, had urged independence for Ireland and Poland in the Nineteenth Century. But the argument is not a simple Gaullism; it is posed on different terms. For them, the "economic and social content" of a particular arrangement remains controlling. As they see it, the current Europe is designed strictly to maintain the existing capitalist arrangement. A supranational Europe, enmeshed in a social democratic or Catholic Europe, would frustrate their ideas for social transformation.

Guy Mollet had once urged that a European Community be invested

with the same powers as an independent state. This was vital if it was to channel citizen group efforts toward the general interest. Jacques Denis and Jean Kanapa challenged this view.[62] Mollet was proposing a state independent of social classes, one that ruled as the arbiter of conflict and as the guarantor of the general interest. But in the analysis of the Communists, the Governments of the "Six" (or the "Nine") were hardly guided by the general interest,[63] since in Communist eyes, they too served capitalist interests. Such governments inside a community framework could only form an entente of capitalist interests. Community institutions could never be more independent of class influence than the national institutions comprising them, making it illusory to believe that a political community with joint planning could in any way challenge capitalist rule. Socialists confused planning with socialism.[64]

The nation was hardly an outdated historical concept, said

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[62] They had written Pour ou contre l'Europe?, some important excerpts from which are in Cahiers du Communisme, No. 12, December, 1969, pp. 126-135.

[63] In the Marxian scheme the state is never independent of social classes, being an emanation of these classes.

[64] Planning was not the issue. The Communists of postwar Europe now accept the fact that capitalist economies and institutions can accommodate themselves to a modicum of planning. It even provides predictability. But when the constituent governments of EEC design a political-economic community with a common plan, it will not have a socialist orientation, but would offer policies emanating from the classes that dominate the individual states.

Kanapa and Denis, but remained a modern reality. The idea, evolving over centuries, had developed specific marks of culture, language and politics. Even if the nation-building process had accidental, arbitrary aspects, it still expressed a unity. Nations first formed chiefly to unify markets and customs unions in certain regions. Today, the trend was toward internationalization of these markets. But this phenomenon had not led to the decline of national reality.[65]

Thus the nation state framework had not been overcome, but remained quite modern as a potential for progress: the national idea, born at the time of the French Revolution, continued to represent a goal for Third World nations.

The European Parliament and the Left

This issue, and the question of direct elections, also raised both political and doctrinal problems among the various groups we are examining.

In the mid 1970s structural changes were proposed in the European Parliament. The EC had authorized direct elections to the 410-member Parliament for 1978, to be ratified by member states. With

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[65] Even in the East-bloc, national realities persisted. Even if integration was the goal, strict precepts of national sovereignty persisted. Supranational institutions are not imposed, but integration is carried out through international structures.

the plan, voting would occur under national parliaments. Communists at first attacked the plan as a Giscardian scheme of supranationalism, leading to domination by NATO.[66] Two years later, the Party again launched one of its abrupt and dramatic policy reversals: such elections would not be categorically opposed; the method of voting was not the problem.[67]

> The Problem is the rights and powers of the Assembly. We do not want it to overstep the jurisdiction of (national) parliament(s).[68]

The alliance politics of wooing the democratic left surely played a role in the policy switch. But not all segments of the democratic left agreed with the mainstream-Mitterrand acceptance of direct

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[66] Le Monde, December 5, 1975, p. 3. Kanapa cautioned that France would become a "province of the European Empire of monopolies". L'Humanité, January 1, 1977. Also see Roger Trugman, "Quelques aspects du contexte international", Cahiers du Communisme, January, 1976, p. 79. The Gaullists also opposed the voting plan. See Michel Debré's essay in Le Monde, January 11, 1979, p. 8, where he warned that a universally elected Assembly would have "virtually unlimited powers".

[67] It is interesting that CERES followed the PCF lead. Generally, CERES opposed traditional social democratic formations in Europe. The SPD and Schmidt were often singled out as class collaborators. The zeal with which CERES harmonized its views with the PCF is discussed critically in Lazitch, pp. 82-87. Recall that Mitterrand had broken his alliance with CERES (developed at Epinay) at the Congress of Pau, in 1975.

[68] L'Humanité, April 18, 1977, p. 4. There is evidence the reversal came after discussions with the PCI. Stiefbold, p. 85. Marchais' true concern was the December, 1974 Declaration at the Summit of the "Nine". "Competency of the Assembly will be enlarged, particularly by the granting of certain powers in the communities legislative process". This, he held, contradicted the Treaty of Rome, a view also expressed by the French Constitutional Council, a judicial body with review powers remotely akin to the U.S. Supreme Court.

elections. Some interesting opposition arguments were advanced by Duverger, who feared that EEC would become a technocracy, deprived of any popular base, one which could submit Europe to a majority formed by les conservateurs des Neuf et les sociaux-démocrates nordiques. The broad problem was that institutions were being created in Europe before a genuine community of men existed. Such a method of voting in an institution that lacked significance today, conferred on it "a democratic legitimacy that it would only possess in a community". By the nature of things, it would impel the Community in a supranational direction, always providing the "appearance of democracy", since it would be confused with rule by a majority. Legally, national organs of state power would be diminished without being replaced by any effective federal force. EC, after all, embodied no genuine European collectivity. From a policy point of view, public power in Europe would be dispersed. And lacking vigor, would be overwhelmed by the growing private sector.[69] Perhaps, he conceded, a union of Europe was required for the long-term development of socialism on the Continent. But in the coming decades, a strong Community would foreclose socialist possibilities in Europe. The only collective consciousness existing in Europe persists within the frame-

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[69] Such a perversion, he was arguing, would weaken the state apparatus to the benefit of the federal apparatus, the latter lacking any genuine popular support. This was the defect which would enable private interests to crush public power. See Duverger's interesting discussion in Lettre Ouverte aux socialistes, pp. 143-146. For him, a truly democratic socialism had to be established in a single country, or it would never be established. Ironically, the issue of "socialism in one country" opposes the PCF and PS much as it historically once divided the Bolsheviks after Lenin's death.

work of nation states. Thus to undermine national consciousness would destroy the only force that could resist American domination.

CHAPTER IX

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE LEFT IN FRANCE

I shall examine only specific facets of Soviet relationships to the French Left. Much of the broader subject has been explored elsewhere.[1] Throughout the post-1968 period, the PCF is moving away from orthodoxy, gradually assigning a primacy to domestic affairs over international commitment to the bloc, yet never renouncing its internationalist identity.

The Soviet Communists and the PCF

Earlier, we affirmed two basic formulations regarding the predicament of French communists.

A) That having fallen heir to a non-revolutionary situation in France, they transferred hopes to the USSR: the USSR became the "embodiment of a revolution France had missed".[2]

B) We also accepted Shulman's formulation that the postwar

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[1] Stiefbold. It has also been examined in this thesis. See Chapter II.

[2] Lichtheim, pp. 70-71. This led to the "misplaced identity" that Tiersky speaks of.

Communists in Europe (given the above) had to substitute "power-bloc politics for revolutionary politics". The revolution was put aside, in order to influence governments along lines that best furthered Soviet (or block) foreign policy.[3]

To work within these limits, and carry out item B, the Party had to preserve its:

1) Vanguard pretense: still appearing as the embodiment or carrier of revolutionary purpose.

2) Patriotic visage: still appearing as a political formation advancing French national purpose and independence.

These two major strategies imposed three subsidiary strategies and doctrines:

3) Proletarian Internationalism. Upholding and justifying the Soviet model, despite repeated tarnishments, such as Khrushchev's speech, the Prague invasion, or the "Gulag" revelations.

4) Union of the Left. With the entrenchment (and legitimacy) of the Fifth Republic, they had to work toward a domestic alliance with the democratic left against Gaullism, despite a clear Soviet preference for the latter.

5) Peaceful coexistence. Supporting a Soviet accommodation with the United States, yet without foreclosing any possibility of changing the European status quo. Détente should in no way imply a new Yalta or superpower duopoly.

Clearly, these five strategies created dilemmas and outright

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[3]Some might argue the PCF substituted an anti-fascist perspective for insurrectionary politics during the Popular Front.

contradictions for Party doctrine and policy. Many, we have encountered earlier. How does a political party:

- Back the Soviet model and still give credible support to the democratic liberties required for any alliance with the democratic left?
- Appear as a national party, while supporting virtually all foreign policy goals of the Socialist Camp?
- Justify pluralism within the world movement, yet deny it within one's own national Party?
- Ally with reformist social democracy and still retain revolutionary, avant garde objectives?
- Maintain identity to a bloc (and world movement) which was effectively, although not openly, rejecting a revolution in the West?
- Resolve the dilemma implied by item four above?

One could go on citing further dilemmas. Tiersky has designed a framework which makes no attempt to resolve these dilemmas, but does demonstrate the unusual adaptability of French communism, by identifying what he terms its four faces or aspects: Government, Tribune, Vanguard and Counter-community.

To give an example at random, the PCF might oppose EEC in its

a) "Tribune" visage: supporting the interests of French wine growers and small peasants.

b) "Government" visage: protecting la patrie and national independence.

c) "Vanguard" visage: promoting bloc aims (or Soviet diplomatic interests) which are defined ultimately as radical and revolutionary.

One can advance various motives to explain foreign policy. One might opt for "c" above, rejecting "a" and "b" as demagogic. But motive is inherently subjective.[4]

The dilemma of revolutionary goals: The PCF's dilemma over its revolutionary nature in many ways derives from the Soviet dilemma. While the CPSU must appear revolutionary to justify and preserve a leading role in its movement, this stance, it has often been pointed out, conflicts with the USSR's acknowledged interest in détente and its wish to acquire trade and technology from the West. Nevertheless, during the 1970s the Soviets did not ignore opportunities and unrest in Western Europe: ferment in Spain and Portugal, stalemate in Italy, a renewed Left in France. When the Soviet 20th Party Congress outlined a parliamentary road to socialism, Western Communists interpreted this as legitimating a kind of "socialist pluralism"[5]-- a development the Soviets clearly reject, as shown by their crushing of the "Prague Spring". There are certainly motives (and evidence) to suggest the Soviets do not want a revolution in the West. It would risk:

- Reactivating the Atlantic Alliance and destroying détente.
- Spreading the pluralism infection to East Europe.

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[4] We reject here the ready-made notion that PCF International behavior simply follows Soviet requirements. Such an explanation would require no further analysis.

[5] Joan Barth Urban, "Prospects for Revolution in the West", Orbis, Winter, 1976, pp. 1359-1402.

It would seem, then, the Soviets seek orthodoxy, preferring Parties they can control in Western Europe. All the evidence since the war shows that those imposed in power are more reliable than the home-grown varieties taking power on their own.

In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the Soviets lost control, as the European Parties grew independent and critical of Soviet reality, and sought power through elections and pluralism.[6] The risks of killing détente (perhaps tilting the U.S. toward an alliance with China) or spreading independent, pluralist-minded Parties within its own bloc were too great to tolerate merely because independent European Parties were seeking power. This explains, perhaps, the often open Soviet preference for de Gaulle and Giscard d'Estaing. The dilemma was great: on the one hand they could not tolerate seriously revolutionary parties in the West (risking détente),[7] and they could not tolerate reformist Parties (undermining their East-bloc Empire).

PCF-Soviet relations after 1968. After "Prague", the PCF and CPSU moved

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[6]Tiersky maintains that the embracement of pluralism by the European Communists in the 1970s was genuine, but always "muted by an insistence on the vanguard role, that is a directing role as an embodiment of the working class". Communists claim they alone are endowed with scientific Marxism. In this sense, Tiersky holds that the Party has not de-communized, "but continues to claim a unique legitimacy: a pretension to alone decide the nature of the regime". See his essay in Problems of Communism.

[7]Admittedly, this line of argument would not explain why Soviet Communists supported Cunhal in Portugal, who took an openly anti-pluralist line.

to repair links strained by the invasion.[8] The PCF was one of the few (along with the Portuguese Communists) European Parties to accept all the theses of the June, 1969 Moscow Conference of Communist Parties (one where the Soviets were notably described as the principle force in world struggle).[9]

When the PCF and CPSU signed their Common Declaration of July 7, 1971 (their first joint document since 1968), there was no mention this time of the "leading role of Communist Parties",[10] a concession by the CPSU, since the French Communists were now embarked upon an alliance with democratic socialists. Nor were the Soviets insisting that Communist

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[8]Rochet and Duclos met with Kosygin and Brezhnev, and basically restated convergencies on well-known foreign policy issues: Vietnam, Germany, the Middle East, Western imperialism. The Soviets backed PCF moves to develop a Union of the Left. "Unity could be a decisive factor" said Radio Moscow, June 27, 1968. All this was occurring in a period when state relations between France and the USSR were good. Trade was rising considerably. Brezhnev noted at his Party's 25th Congress, that since discussions with de Gaulle, Soviet-French summit talks had become a tradition. Vital Speeches of the Day, February 24, 1976, p. 363.

[9]Le Monde, February 5, 1970, p. 8. Despite strong policy disagreements among fraternal parties, "the need for unity in combatting a common enemy is (vital)", Rochet told the PCF Central Committee. See Le Monde, October 16, 1969, p. 7.

[10]The PS asked for a clarification of the Joint Declaration. Communists replied they would insist on their ties to the Soviet Communists; that this should not interrupt progress towards a Common Program. Le Monde, July 16, 1971, p. 6. Claude Estier of the PS rejected the PCF attempt to liken its international ties to those of the PS with other social democratic governments. The latter, said Estier, never prevented "us from expressing our own independent position...." Le Monde, July 17, 1971, p. 5.

Parties conform to a particular model (as formerly). Rather, they accepted diversities in how the various parties "struggled and fulfilled their tasks". The PCF and CPSU would seek common actions, and would not be divided, it said.

However, in Fall, 1972, at the PCF's 20th Party Conference, relations with the Soviets cooled. The Russians now appeared to disapprove of directions being taken by the PCF after the Programme commun.[11] Tensions were only resolved later in the year, when Marchais and Kanapa flew to Moscow to see Brezhnev and his Central Committee advisors, Boris Ponomarev and Vadim Zagladin. In the joint communique, the Soviets agreed to support the PCF strategy of working out joint policital actions with other parties, especially Socialists.[12]

But a year later, relations again skidded. This time, Soviet Ambassador Tchervonenko had paid a visit to Giscard d'Estaing (Finance Minister in Pompidou's Cabinet) between run-off rounds in the May 7,

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[11] The Soviet press gave less space than usual to the PCF Congress and deleted all attacks by PCF leaders on French Government leaders. Le Monde, December 20, 1972. The Soviets were upset at this new road to socialism, and wanted to preserve their ties to the Pompidou Government.

[12] The Soviets handled the Joint Communique discreetly, it being the eve of Pompidou's visit to Moscow. But it did confer stronger Soviet support for PCF alliance strategy, unlike earlier ambiguities. Le Monde, December 20, 1972.

1974 Presidential Election.[13] The Political Bureau termed it "inopportune." The Soviets denied the visit was in any way linked to the French elections, being merely an exploration of economic questions.[14] Nevertheless, it evoked memories of the well-known earlier incident of December, 1965, where the Soviet press had indicated support for de Gaulle when Mitterrand was campaigning with PCF support.

Disputes again surfaced in Spring, 1975. On the eve of a trip to Moscow, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac promised to raise directly with Brezhnev certain issues concerning the PCF. The Communists, enraged, warned against any attempts by the French Government to have Brezhnev pressure the PCF.[15] Détente was fine, but could not be used for restricting the actions of French Communists. Peaceful coexistence in no way implied an economic-social status quo in Europe. It should be noted that this marked a period when the Soviets were growing increasingly critical concerning French Communist behavior, particularly their alliance policy. A Soviet handbook on Communist strategy, edited by

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[13]The number two man at the Soviet Embassy, Yuri Pankov, was a highranking, unobtrusive specialist on Latin Europe and a member of the International Section of the Secretariat of the Soviet Central Committee. Le Point, November 1, 1976, p. 63.

[14]Le Monde, May 10, 1975.

[15]Le Monde, March 23-24, 1975. Chirac threatened to discuss certain contradictions in PCF policy: on the one hand supporting an independent defense for France, yet taking actions weakening that defense. Chirac later denied such intent and never did say whether he did in fact take these issues up with the Soviet Party leader.

Konstantine Zagladin, had urged vigilance by the Communist Parties entering leftist alliances. Clearly it applied to the PCF. But the Soviets were probably overreacting in this case. The Soviets issued a strong critique a month later, noting that a genuine revolution was impossible

> outside the hegemony of the working class. (That) modern-day conciliators were prepared to dissolve Communist Parties into ideologically amorphous entities under all sorts of unity arrangements, regardless of the price. Tactical unity with social democrats requires a simultaneous struggle against united front partners.[16]

Chevènement notes that while this critique was couched in ideological terms, it concealed the genuine fears of the Soviet Union, which were strategic: namely that bids for power by the Left could endanger coexistence.[17]

French Communists and Soviet domestic repression. Stalinism was another perennial issue.[18] And the PCF increasingly criticized

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[16]See the discussion in Stiefbold, p. 45. Marchais moved to reassure the PS that it remained loyal to the alliance: policy was made in Paris, not Moscow.

[17]J.P. Chevènement, p. 188. That successes by the Left in Paris, Rome or Madrid could upset détente.

[18]Marchais had argued that Communists could not be faulted for supporting the Soviets fully during the Stalin era. Soviet vulnerability had led to practices far removed from socialism; that Communists were unaware of what was later revealed. L'Humanité, June 9, 1976, p. 5.

[19]The Party criticized the trials of Soviet writers as far back as 1966. The one-time unconditional attachment to the USSR would now be a conditional attachment. On the other hand, the Party insisted it would never sink to "anti-Sovietism". See Stiefbold, chapter 6.

aspects of Soviet reality during the 1970s.[19] Kanapa, speaking at the Party's l'école centrale, asserted the right to challenge violations of human rights and liberties. "These are not merely (Soviet) wrongs, but wrongs done to socialism itself". Hence, French Communists had a duty to criticize. The Soviets, he added, were often blind to the significant democratic liberties, describing them as bourgeois and formal. "Actually, these are acquisitions we call upon the working class to defend".[20]

Open PCF rejection of Stalinist practices in the East bloc countries, often served PCF purposes within France. The Party could show that even L'Humanité protested outrages in the East. But in establishing this distance from such Soviet practices, a confusion was created. In the minds of people, Stalinism became identified with something that was merely a governmental practice, something remote. It was never described as an outright deviation in the class struggle. Thus French Communists were refusing to describe Stalinism as a possible current within their own ranks. Most Frenchmen did not make this distinction. For most people, the phenomenon remains the Stalinist Party holding state power. They do not distinguish between repressive practices of a government and

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[19] The Party criticized the trials of Soviet writers as far back as 1966. The one-time unconditional attachment to the USSR would now be a conditional attachment. On the other hand, the Party insisted it would never sink to "anti-Sovietism". See Stiefbold, chapter 6.

[20] Le Monde, December 14, 1977, p. 15.

behavior inside the Party. But guarantees by the PCF of democracy are not sufficient.[21]

Debates over Stalinism and the extent that the PCF could criticize Soviet practices were never fully resolved. Soviet experience was venerated because it had socialized the economy, built up what they saw as a new society. Even if it was deformed, that was not essential. What was given priority in the Communist mentality was the emergence of this new society. But as Party historian Elleinstein pointed out, many on the Left challenged the socialist credentials of the USSR. If it was a socialist state, it had to be defended. Once conceded it was not, it was wide open to any critique. Elleinstein incurred strong Soviet wrath because he:

- denied the socialist nature of the USSR.
- held the Soviet model of tansition inapplicable to France.
- urged the PCF to "disassociate itself in principle" from Soviet experience.[22]

The persistence of PCF-CPSU links. The force and persistence of the ties

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[21] Other critics insist on guarantees inside the Party as well. The PCF often makes spectacular demonstrations of abandoning Stalinism (like rejecting the dictatorship of the proletariat) which suggests that police terror and secret trials are a thing of the past. But to many, the term Stalinism today refers to arbitrariness, a lack of discussion of issues, use of expulsions. These are the real vestiges of Stalinism, stemming perhaps from Leninist principles of centralism.

[22] Le Monde, April 13, 1978. The Soviets responded that Elleinstein wanted the PCF to renounce its essence and to "disavow the decisions of the historic Tours Congress of 1920..." New Times, No. 22, May, 1978, pp. 14-15.

between the French Communists and the Soviet Communists has preoccupied many observers. Why the PCF perpetuated this linkage, instead of breaking decisively with the USSR has, of course, been a central aspect of this investigation.[23] We have seen that Soviet behavior in the past had repeatedly embarassed and injured the PCF. And during the years reviewed here, French Communists adopted a critical stance toward the more outrageous and repressive Soviet practices. This distance from the Soviet Party earned the French Party a certain respectability. Often, it served as a good-conduct pass, allowing it to develop new alliances with other leftist forces. Nevertheless, the ties to the Soviets remained. Clearly, the Soviet and French Parties (as well as all of the European Parties) continue to have reciprocal and overriding needs for each other. Annie Kriegel makes the central point: that without its links to the USSR, the PCF loses all of its political force. Hence, "the world movement enjoys an absolute priority..."[24] Marchais once explained the tenacity of the attachment. At the 23rd Congress, he noted that the very existence of the USSR and its bloc established a relationship of forces and conditions which guaranteed the life of the French Party.

> Can one imagine that it would be possible for us today to discuss a peaceful, democratic road to socialism in our country if the world

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[23] This will be explored further in the section on the International Movement.

[24] Kriegel, in Blackmer and Kriegel, p. 37.

relation of forces was in favor of imperialism?[25]

Marchais' explanation implies a debt to world socialism. The French road, different and less costly than that taken by existing socialist states, is only possible because of the existence of those states.[27] Namely, that the French and Soviet Parties remain together much like an old married couple, "for the children. A break would create internal problems, leading to factions", he holds. There still being a significant pro-Soviet current within.

These, then are some of the reasons for the links, even though the PCF is condemned to repeated embarassment by Soviet repression. Kriegel makes the interesting point that PCF relations with the Russian Communists vary inversely with their links to other political forces within France.[28] As the PCF recedes into its ghetto, as in 1978 (or 1948), and places itself at odds with four-fifths of the French electorate, as when it revived its fierce rhetoric with the PS in the late 1970s, it cannot continue its conflict with the Soviet Union. It cannot afford to

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[25] L'Humanité, May 10, 1979, p. 6.

[26] The mere existence of the USSR will not protect Parties abroad from destruction. The undoing of Parties in Spain, Germany or Indonesia remains a live, historical memory. Marchais' reasoning somehow makes the Soviet bloc the guarantor of opposition party rights in a Western European country.

[27] André Harris and Alain Sédouy, Voyage à l'intérieur du Parti communiste (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1974), p. 272.

[28] "L'Euro-Communisme 1978", Table ronde entre E. Bettiza, François Fejtö et A. Kriegel, Commentaire, no. 2, Summer, 1978, p. 147.

close itself off on both sides. In terms of international behavior, Kriegel is arguing, there will be a kind of normalization alongside of the international Communist Movement: that the PCF cannot continue to conduct a two-front war, being at odds with the USSR and simultaneously with its broader potential allies and constituents at home. Lazitch point out in the same vein that 1976 marked a kind of truce in the PCF-Soviet relationship.[29] The quarrel between Marchais and the Soviets had grown so sharp, that it was hard to lead a war on two fronts against the "grand frère soviétique" and against the "camarade socialiste".[30]

The Soviets, too, gain from the bargain of having close ties to the European Parties. They can present themselves to the world with an ideological façade and justify their power position inside their bloc and even strengthen their negotiating position with the West. They do not merely present themselves to the world as a classical power which dominates a certain number of states. Rather, they are a force and an

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[29] L'Échec permanent, p. 101.

[30] Even the Italian Communists, who openly proclaim their preference for building socialism in Western Europe rather than in the East, basically align with the USSR world view. Raymond Aron attributes this to their inherent Marxism-Leninism (rejection of private property, rejection of U.S. imperialism). "This global concept automatically ranges them on the side of the Soviet Union and those countries which profess Marxism-Leninism". See his "My Defense of a Decadent Europe," Encounter, Vol. XLIX No. 3, September, 1977, p. 48. "A Communist party's link to Moscow does not disappear on the day when it claims and proclaims its autonomy". Thus it would not change its views on Angola or Israel or label Soviet domination of Eastern Europe as imperialist.

idea that has support outside their frontiers, outside their region. To extend Tiersky's framework, the Soviet Union represents not just a governmental force or a counter-community. But it advances the pretense of acting as the vanguard and tribune for vital world forces. Thus links to an important European Party, such as the French, are a useful asset to Soviet power.

Socialist Relations with the Soviet Party

The PCF is not the only domestic political force with ties to the Soviets.[31] It will help to examine as well some of the links established by the Socialists. After the War, the SFIO, understandably, had been hostile towards the USSR. Like most groups in the West, they saw Soviet expansionism as messianic and military, employing ideology to cover imperialist-like actions. No one on the democratic left could forget that the Soviets had been the destroyers of social democracy as a political force in Eastern Europe. As a result of this history, relations between the two languished during the first two decades after the War. Only when the Socialists loomed as possible candidates for power inside France, did the Soviets take notice. For example, a Soviet delegation attended a Socialist Party Congress for the first time at Pau in 1975.

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[31]The PCF is sensitive to Soviet links with non-leftist forces in France, viewing them as disloyal. When a Gaullist youth affiliate traveled to the USSR, the Communist's youth affiliate objected. It was wrong to form ties with reactionary organizations in other countries. Le Monde, March 26, 1976, p. 30.

The PS was a renewed political formation, a force to be reckoned with.[32]

Earlier efforts by Mitterrand to form some ties with Soviet authorities met with little success.[33] Soviet aloofness invited speculation that the CPSU was signalling disapproval, opposing a victory of the Left. We saw earlier that the Soviets never rejoiced over the Programme commun, but they did pay lip-service to it.

The Moscow meeting. The significant breakthrough in relations came in April, 1975, when the Central Committee of the CPSU agreed to welcome a delegation headed by Mitterrand.[34] This marked the first important contact between the two Parties in 12 years, since Guy Mollet's visit to Moscow in 1963.[35] The high-level meeting dealt with international

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[32] Le Monde, February 2-3, 1975, p. 1. Both superpowers prudently keep lines open to opposition parties having a potential government role.

[33] A 1972 trip was cancelled by the Abrassimov incident. Another in 1974 was cancelled by Pompidou's death. The Russians did not want to endanger conciliatory steps made by Giscard regarding hopes for a Pan-European Conference on European Security.

[34] On the eve of the trip Pravda hailed the Union of the Left as France's best hope. L'Humanité, April 23, 1975, p. 3. The 1969 World Conference of Communist Parties called for cooperation with Social Democrats where possible, so that the CPSU was now acting within these guidelines. The PCF welcomed any broadening of ties between Communist and Socialist forces. "They'll see there is such a thing as socialism in the world", said Marchais. Ibid.

[35] The Russians gave the airport arrival full TV coverage. Along with Mitterrand were Claude Estier, Lionel Jospin, Pierre Mauroy and Robert Pontillon, all of the Secrétariat national. Others included Chevènement, Didier Motchane and Michel Rocard of the Bureau exécutif, and Alain Savary, ex-First Secretary. Along with Brezhnev, they met M. Suslov, B. Ponamarev, responsible for Party relations in capitalist states, P.N. Fedossiev, Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism,

questions, rather than domestic issues or matters connected to French alliance politics. Mitterrand reassured his hosts that a Government of the Left would continue the French-Soviet cooperation of prior Governments. Some of the issues discussed included the Conference on Security and Peace, EEC, Vietnam, the Middle East, Cyprus, Greece, Chile and French-Soviet relations, as well as relations between the two political parties.[36]

The meetings were reportedly lively and frank, with much good humor on all sides. Socialists felt, in fact, they often received better treatment and airing of their views than they had been getting recently from the PCF. It was agreed that future talks would be held.[37]

The Soviet side gave the impression of being almost "obsessively concerned" about the Conference on European Cooperation and Security. Suslov asked how the PS envisaged building a Europe conforming to their aspirations in a hostile and reactionary environment? (A question often posed by the PCF.) Mitterrand explained that since 1965 he had always sought a simultaneous liquidation of the two blocs in Europe. With or

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Inosemtsev, Director of the Institute of World Economy, and Vadim Zagladin.

[36] Jewish emigration issues and Czechoslovakia were not discussed.

[37] The hope was to institutionalize contacts. A year later, Rocard and Pontillon did meet with CPSU representatives. In 1977, CPSU observed the Nantes Congress of the PS. The PS is the only Socialist Party in the Internationale Socialiste to institutionalize its links with the CPSU on an international level. Lazitch, p. 231.

without a Common Market, the Left would take power in a capitalist environment, one hardly favorable to socialism, he explained. The Soviets were further told that any leadership taking power in a nation of 50 million people could not casually withdraw from one defense system, without establishing a new arrangement in its place.

Disagreements at the meeting centered on problems of Portugal, where the Soviet side felt the French Socialists were lending support to a "slander campaign" against the Portuguese Communists. Ponomarev referred to a particularly dangerous role of the Socialist International in that country. Mitterrand replied that it was puzzling for the Soviets to reproach one Socialist Party for defending another.[38] The Soviet side also raised questions regarding the "rôle néfaste" of the Socialist International in the Middle East, keeping in mind the close ties between the Israeli Labor Party and the PS.[39] Disagreements also arose over EEC. The Socialists were astonished at the extent of Soviet hostility toward the Community.[40]

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[38] Mitterrand was reassuring: (We) always urged Portuguese Socialists to remain allies of the Communists. Lazitch, p. 231. Questions relating to the Socialist International and events in Portugal will be discussed later.

[39] The final communique ignored differences, calling only for Israeli withdrawal under the UN Resolution of 1967.

[40] PS representatives received the impression the Soviets actually preferred a Europe anchored to the United States, rather than an independent Europe. Le Monde, April 27-28, 1975, p. 3.

CHAPTER X

GERMANY AND THE TWO PARTIES OF THE FRENCH LEFT

Central to French foreign policy has been Germany. And the German problem has never been distant from the international behavior of political parties in France. Following Liberation, it was understandable for Gaullists, Socialists and Communists to align with the broad designs of Bidault, creating, as we saw, an essentially Poincairist solution: keeping Germany down, internationalizing the Ruhr and putting the Rhineland under Allied control.[1] Despite a later rapprochement with the ennemi héréditaire, inspired by the "Europeans" Monnet and Schumann, the essential Franco-Soviet relationship described in earlier chapters persisted. It persisted largely because of shared perceptions concerning Germany.[2] Even with de Gaulle's strong ties to the Bonn Republic, he never ceased to view Germany as an inherent rival.

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[1]This was a nationalist line, one with which Soviet or German Communists did not necessarily agree. Contrast this with World War I, where the PCF opposed Versailles and the Rhineland occupation.

[2]Soviet commentators hold that French-Russian interests merge on controlling Germany. Both seek to prevent the FRG from acquiring muclear weapons or seeking territorial changes. See International Affairs, No. 12, December, 1966, p. 13. Debré concurs, see Le Monde, October 24, 1975, pp. 1 and 5. De Gaulle had accepted the Oder-Neisse line as far back as 1944 in discussions with Stalin. This was confirmed at a press conference 15 years later. See Grosser, p. 77.

The French-Soviet link was, in effect, a policy for encircling Germany.[3]

Germany Dominant: The French Communist View

Until the 1970s, there were many on the Left who feared that Germany would be an inherently destabilizing force until she accepted the realities of the territorial changes wrought by World War II.[4] At the start of the period reviewed here, one can observe a steady Communist preoccupation with the Bundesrepublik, as manifested by the Party press and journals as well as Central Committee statements and other actions of the leadership. In 1969, much of the obsession focused on Franz-Josef Strauss. Thus the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U.) was described as intent upon revising the Eastern frontiers,[5] or nurturing dreams of a "European" atomic force to be shared by the Bundeswehr.[6] The Party press repeatedly cited, and often exaggerated neo-Nazi tendencies said to be rampant across the Rhine.[7] Marchais himself provided a

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[3] Vernon Aspaturian, Soviet Foreign Police Since Khruschchev (New York: Viking, 1972), p. 169.

[4] This was the specter of a revanchiste Germany, kept alive by many Communist Parties.

[5] L'Humanité, September 25, 1969, p. 3.

[6] "...possession of atomic weapons is a moral duty of the nation", said Strauss. Ibid. After "Prague", the PCF feared that Germany would use the events to strengthen itself and acquire nuclear weapons. L'Humanité, September 20, 1968, p. 3.

[7] Much was made of an NPD victory in Baden-Wurtemburg during 1968. The issue was international, in that the rebirth of Nazism affected peace in Europe. Fred Fischback, "Neo Nazi Tendencies and Revanchardes in West Germany", Cahiers du Communisme, January, 1969, pp. 64-74.

a summary of Communist grievances: the Potsdam Accords had been ignored, the German Communist Party (D.K.P.) had been banned since 1965,[8] and the Bundeswehr was headed by ex-Nazi generals, such as Speidel and Heusinger.[9]

In assessing this list of grievances and Communist purposes in drawing it up, it should be kept in mind that French Communists cannot be understood as merely another political party on the domestic spectrum. It has been shown throughout here that they are capable of behaving as a broad, and sometimes dynamic, actor in the international system, bringing weight to bear on behalf of policy positions crucial to themselves and the world movement with which they identify. Perhaps nowhere was this more evident than on these grievances regarding Germany. Below are some tangible actions they took to influence policy.

> . When the Bonn Government moved to hold Presidential elections inside West Berlin, the Political Bureau of the PCF issued a strong statement calling upon the French Government, one of the four powers with special responsibility for Germany, to have the FRG renounce the election.[10]

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[8] By not legalizing the German Communists, Chancellor Kiesinger was stifling a genuine Left. The argument was made that a reconstructed German Communist Party was somehow related to France's own security. Perhaps the PCF was repeating its role during the 1920s when it did seek to aid the forces of the Left across the Rhine, doing whatever it could (in those years) to keep France's occupation out of the Rhineland.

[9] L'Humanité, May 10, 1968, p. 6.

[10] L'Humanité, March 3, 1969, p. 1.

- In 1970, the Party launched a widespread drive to have Pompidou's Government recognize the GDR. France finally took such a step on February 9, 1973.

- With the signing of the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship, August, 1970, Marchais wrote Willy Brandt directly, urging legalization of the German communist Party.[11]

- That same month, the PCF welcomed a large Socialist Unity Party (East German Communist) delegation to Paris.

- Social Democrats in Germany were attacked for not opposing the U.S. role in Vietnam.

The major softening in the attitude of French Communists toward Germany occurred when Brandt entered the Government of the Grand Coalition. This marked the first Government role for the SPD in the history of the Bonn Republic. The CDU had led nowhere, from the PCF's point of view. The hope now was that there would be some tournant à Bonn. Perhaps the new Government would now sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Or perhaps it would annul the Hallstein Doctrine, requiring Bonn to sever ties with those states recognizing the GDR. Most of all, there was a feeling of momentum, of a new orientation, now that Social

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[11] Stressing the positive character of Germany's new policies, Marchais asked why neo-fascists should be allowed to openly engage in the political process, while the "Party of Thäelman" remains illegal. He adroitly called Brandt's attention to the fact that the only Communist Parties illegal in Europe were in those states with fascist regimes: Greece, Spain and Portugal. He further explained that the PCF in its new program was committed to a pluralism of democratic parties, attaching significance to the cooperation of Communists and Socialists in France. (Mitterrand also opposed any restrictions on Communists in the FRG, an issue he took up with German leaders at Socialist International forums. Le Monde, December 13, 1975, p. 12.)

Democrats were in the Government. L'Humanité even reported that Brandt now favored negotiations with the GDR. And on November 16, 1969, the PCF issued a joint statement with the DKP, setting forth common prospects. Events dragged for the balance of the year; talks even broke down between the two Germanies. On August 12, agreement was reached with the Russians, exactly 25 years after World War II. The FRG recognized the Oder-Neisse frontier, launching a new situation in Europe. It was a fulfillment of a long-time objective of the French Communists, and unquestionably a victory for Soviet policy.

While in no way diminishing the extent of this victory for the Communist camp, French Communist hopes were over-exuberant, and even naive. Surely there were broad possibilities for détente. But it was unrealistic to describe an end to confrontation on the Continent, or an imminent withdrawal of all troops from foreign territory in Europe.[12] Nevertheless, the drama of developments when the SPD negotiated a détente with the East did lessen the credibility of a revanchiste Germany that Communist propaganda had constructed over the years. Party media, of course, had to welcome the realism and sagacity of Willy Brandt. But on the other hand, the specter of a dominant, aggressive Germany would never disappear from Party propaganda tracts and media. Even under the new Social Democratic leadership, Germany would soon be described as "the royal administrator of the interests of capital ... the vanguard of

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[12] Jacques Denis had suggested this in Cahiers du Communisme, February, 1971, pp. 68-79.

U.S. imperialism".[13]

The more nationalist appeals designed to revive the ancient confrontation between France and Germany were firmly rejected by most political groupings in France, and definitely by Giscard d'Estaing.[14] One reason for the continuing hostility by French Communists towards Germany, despite Ostpolitik and the new realism, stemmed from some new developments in defense policy. It will be recalled that under Giscard d'Estaing collaboration between the defense forces of France and Germany had been strengthened, which undid some of the more aloof arrangements that had prevailed under de Gaulle.[15]

There were even deeper and more basic reasons. Some were doctrinal in nature. And as the 1970s progressed, French Communist disenchantment with the SPD heightened. Early hopes yielded to more basic historic antagonisms. It should not be forgotten that French Communists had a deep suspicion of German social democracy. They considered it to be the driving force behind l'Internationale socialiste, the force that was seeking to reorient the Socialists Parties of Europe to the right -

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[13] So said L'Humanité editor René Andrieu in an interview with Der Spiegel, February 23, 1976, pp. 89-92.

[14] Le Figaro, February 16, 1979, p. 1.

[15] See Walter Schutze's discussion in Le Monde Diplomatique, October, 1976, pp. 12-13. German and French Governments had agreed on the emplacement of Pluton missiles inside Germany. Both the PCF and DKP coordinated a drive to prevent this action (without success). L'Humanité, June 24, 1975, p. 3.

and certainly away from collaborations with Communists.[16] Helmut Schmidt, for example, confirmed the worst nightmares of the Communists in a TV address in April, 1976, where he noted, among other things, that Communists had to be prevented from assuming power in large European countries; that there were no significant Communist Parties where social democracy remained significant.[17] The SPD was suspicious and critical of Mitterrand's cooperations with Communists. Specifically, he was yielding too much terrain to them and betraying his commitment to Europe.[18]

The above were some of the political and doctrinal considerations that engendered hostility between the PCF and ruling Government in Bonn. Along with these arguments, the Communists also invoked economic objec-

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[16]The SPD spoke the language of socialism, but only to conceal its capitalist reality. The oldest and largest Marxist Party of Europe had somewhere renounced its validity. The SPD had made its historical turn at Bad Godesberg in 1959, abandoning class collaboration. Brandt was not building socialism, but putting through pseudo-reforms of co-gestion. For the full indictment, see Gérard Cornillet and Claude Montagny, "République Fédérale d'Allemagne Le 'modèle'", la social démocratie au présent, Paris, Éditions sociales, 1979, pp. 77-97. Also see p. 28 of the same volume: Jean-Claude Poulain's essay "Points de repère sur l'actualité".

[17]L'Humanité, May 7, 1976. The PCF strongly protested the remarks. Chevènement went so far as to describe Schmidt as the "new Metternich", threatening a "holy alliance of capital if the PCF joined the Italian Government". op. cit., p. 183. Italian Christian Democratic leaders were told that Germany would withhold any future new loans, if Communists were to occupy Cabinet posts in any new Government. Schmidt, whose Government had just authorized a $2 billion loan to Italy, made this commitment to Henry Kissinger at the Economic Summit Conference in Puerto Rico, June, 1976. New York Times, July 18, 1976.

[18]Le Monde, June 30, 1972, p. 7.

tions to Germany and its designs towards hegemony in Europe.

- Thus the malaise in the Lorraine steel industry was attributed to Germany. Germany's steel industry had outdistanced that of France two-fold in the past quarter century.

- Germany, because "it does not have to channel a significant part of its resources into weapons or expenses for war or colonization" is at an advantage because it can devote a greater share of its resources to productive investment.[20]

- The same forces that brought the Nazis to power remain in the Federal Republic. Thus the Coal and Steel Community reconstituted Hoechst, Krupp, Stinnes and Thyssen in the years 1954-1958.[21]

- Chemical firms such as Bayerwerke, Farbwerke and Hoechst were suppliers of poison gas for the U.S. Army.[22]

- Germany ranks as the banker of Europe, with monetary reserves four times that of France. Thus the franc has steadily been devalued in relation to the D Mark since 1959.[23]

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[19] L'Humanité, February 20, 1979, p. 4.

[20] This demagogic argument was made by France Nouvelle, No. 1735, February 12, 1979, p. 38. Thus the PCF on the one hand rejects a Germany that is militarily strong and aggressive. Yet it complains that the lack of resources devoted to such efforts constitutes an advantage for Germany in its competition with France.

[21] Fred Fischback, op. cit.

[22] L'Humanité, February 6, 1968. A journalist in the Communist press was apparently citing a West German publication from Berlin, Extradienst. There is no way to verify the accuracy of the report. It is only cited here to demonstrate the international perceptions and perspectives of French Communists regarding the role of West Germany.

[23] L'Humanité, February 20, 1979, p. 4. Communists argued that any European money plans pursued by Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing would only serve to legalize and heighten this domination by the Mark.

In conclusion, it can be said that prior to SPD participation in the Federal Republic, the PCF echoed the Soviet line of a revanchiste, neo-nazi Germany that refused to renounce nuclear weapons and which refused to allow a genuine Left opposition to develop. It was the only state in Europe which did not accept its existing frontiers. Following the normalization in the East, the hard-cutting edge of the German threat was blunted.[24] The danger was now the SPD, playing a Metternich-like role through its control of the Menshevik Axis embodied in the Internationale socialiste. It would seek economic control of Europe and deny any social change (ie Communist advances) on the Continent, as demonstrated by its role in southern Europe during the 1970s. In fact, the Communists distrusted their alliance partners' links to German social democracy much as French Socialists distrusted PCF links to Moscow. There was a basic symmetry: each rejected the international movement of the other.

Socialist Party Perspectives on Germany

Before examining specific Socialist attitudes, it will help to outline certain historical perspectives regarding the Left in France and social democracy in Germany. One can properly note certain similarities between the working class movements of the two European states. Certain-

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[24] It cannot be proven, but it is an arguable hypothesis that once the revanchiste military threat receded, the Communists were able to yield some of the concessions to the PS in foreign and defense policy cited in earlier chapters: on EEC, nuclear weapons and on the European Parliament, to cite only a few.

ly both had been storm-tossed by events at the time the Second International had spawned the Third. And it is obvious that the Socialists of France would develop quite different relations with German social democracy from the PCF (although the former, too, could be quite critical of its brother Party across the Rhine). And it should be no surprise that SPD spokesmen might react critically to the 1960s dialogue in France between Communists and Socialists.[25] Of course, the talks in France were occurring at a time when Willy Brandt was himself talking to Willy Stoph in Erfurt. This is not to suggest a parallel in the substance of the respective dialogues, but only to note the symmetry, perhaps symbolism, of the two events.

What then were the similarities of the working class movements in these two key European states?

- Both had been led into a Union sacrée in 1914, ignoring the anti-war declarations issued at Basel, Stuttgart and Amsterdam.[26]
- Both had remained essentially divided in the face of Fascism during the war.
- Both had emerged as antagonists in the cold-war era.

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[25] At a Vienna gathering of Social Democrats, Brandt, along with Olof Palme and Bruno Kreisky, strongly rejected the idea of collaboration by Social Democrats with Communists. This was clearly in opposition to the view of Mitterrand and certain Southern-European Socialists, such as Mario Soares (of the Portuguese PS). Le Monde, May 27-28, 1975, p. 3.

[26] See Chapter II.

But the differences, as J.P. Chevènement notes, were probably greater. Thus the decisive and violent defeats of the German Revolution in 1919-1920 under the Social Democrat, Gustav Noske, resulted in a fratricidal struggle between Communists and Social Democrats that ultimately led to Nazism,[27] war, and a redivision of Germany--a redivision which ironically made that nation the effective frontier between Communism and Social Democracy in Europe.

On the other hand, the split in the working class movement in France during 1920 was essentially peaceful. And it was followed by those celebrated moments of reconciliation, that we have reviewed here in prior pages: Popular Front, Resistance, Liberation, and Union of the Left.

Chevènement argues (and it is a view widely shared by the CERES faction in the French Socialist Party) that somewhere in the soul of the French Left, the hope still flickers that the working class movement can be reunited: that Tours can be transcended.[28] There is at least a memory of a common struggle (which the SPD and KPD would be hard put to

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[27] He had called out Reichswehr and Freikorps units to put down the Berliner Spartakistenaufstand, which foreclosed future possibilities for joint action.

[28] But Mitterrand to the contrary: "Obviously many Socialists are dreaming of reversing the break of 1920. I understand these people. But we are far from that. Communists and Socialists, separated for nearly 60 years now, have crystallized their characteristics in contradictory fashion". Paris-Match, October 30, 1976, pp. 56-57.

evoke).

If Chevēnement is correct, the stakes for France and Germany are ultimately the same: overcoming the dilemmas inherited from the Second and Third Internationals.[29] Spokesmen for CERES hold out the hope that the advent of a Western European socialism, oriented towards pluralism and workers management, could exercise influence over the German problem. Somewhere in the future there could be a spectacular rapprochement between French socialism and German social democracy. Such a development, according to Chevēnement, would create conditions favoring a subsequent rapprochement between the FRG and the GDR.[30] Germany, despite its energy and hopes, remains a prisoner of the international situation. And the social democracy within, remains divided in its perspectives, with various factions and generations pulling in different directions. What Chevēnement has to say is often provocative and speculative. But it does represent the interntional perspective of one important segment of French Socialism.

So much for CERES. There remains the attitude towards Germany held by the more mainstream segments of the P.S. Following the War.

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[29] Chevēnement, pp. 282-288.

[30] His argument is that the natural drive for Germans to find their unity--if it is not to erupt in a world war--can only be normalized by the two Parties themselves. It cannot be done through a Rapallo arrangement or a variation of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

ties between the SFIO and SPD were not good. Policy disagreements arose on some key European issues. The SPD opposed EDC, whereas the SFIO, under Mollet ultimately declared in favor. On the other hand, a large group in the Party (and in Parliament) rejected the Mollet line, continuing to see Germany as revisionist. A rearmed Germany would easily dominate a France that was so preoccupied and dispersed defending the French Union. Others made the argument that to support EDC was to support a non-democratic Germany. Far better to identify with the positive Germany embodied in the SPD, the trade unions, and the Protestant Church, rather than that represented by Catholics and the old Ruhr magnates. But this stance did not prevail. The SFIO supported the European Army (certainly with the understanding that the U.S. would continue its presence in Europe).

Relations with the German social democrats declined even further when the French Party reconstituted itself as the Parti socialiste in 1969. As noted, its political and alliance strategy was considerably to the left of the SPD. Also, there was a strong suspicion of close ties between the FRG and the USA, especially in defense.[31] Schmidt's statement opposing Communist entry in West European governments irritated PS opinion being a direct challenge to their left union strategy.

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[31] There was a domination by the FRG in the Euro-Group of NATO. Dieter S. Lutz, "Eurocommunism and the Federal Republic of Germany", Co-existence, April, 1978, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 61.

CHAPTER XI

THE SOCIALIST PARTY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT

This chapter will examine some international dimensions of the French Socialists, focusing on their links to the broader base of social democrats in Europe. It will also examine the critique by the Communists of social democracy at the international level, particularly in the continuing North-South dialogue. The thesis will be further developed that because of certain irreconcilable perspectives, ultimate cooperation between the PCF and social democracy is likely to fail.

Perspectives of the PS since the War. With the collapse of *Tripartisme* in 1947 (and the fear of Communism), the SFIO understandably identified its more reliable friends in the wider world to be the welfare capitalist states of the West, allying itself with such forces as the British Labour Party, the Truman Administration and many of the emerging social democracies in Europe.[1] Despite this post war link to the West, the renewed *Parti socialiste*, born at Épinay 25 years later, shifted perspective significantly: declaring its opposition to the "reformist"

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[1]This identity is described by ex-Minister Jules Moch. *Le Monde*, February 21, 1968, p. 7.

nature of social democracy.[2]

It must be stressed, however, that in rejecting classic social democracy, the PS was not revising its essential identity with the West, not changing its foreign policy. Nevertheless, these new perspectives did create tensions between the Party and other social democratic forces in Europe. There were sharply differing evaluations concerning the wisdom of the new alliance strategies that the Socialists in France were developing with the PCF. The more mainstream European social democrats opposed these alliance experiments by their French colleagues. One might even note a certain symmetry here. Socialists outside of France were playing a role not unlike that of the World Communist Movement. Much as orthodox Communists abroad, particularly in Moscow, distrusted the PCF's alliance with social democracy, so too, the international socialist movement distrusted the French Socialists' new flirtation with the PCF. If Communists and Socialists were to join together as domestic political allies, they were likely to generate disturbances in the respective international constellations of which they formed important components.

There is no doubt that the more successful Socialist Parties of

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[2]The Party affirmed its Marxism at this historic congress, claiming to reject much of its reformist behavior. A motion calling for withdrawal from the Socialist International was only narrowly defeated. Frank Wilson, The French Democratic Left, p. 24. This constrasts with the SPD, which rejected its Marxism in the 1950s.

northern Europe welcomed the emergence of renewed Socialist Parties in southern and Latin Europe.[3] What they feared were new strategies of alliance with Communists. In this sense they oddly mirrored the stubbornness of the CPSU, which we saw repeatedly cautioned the fraternal Parties against contamination from Menshevik forces. The Mitterrand strategy seemed likely to conflict with mainstream social democrats of the Internationale socialiste (I.S.).

Thus at Épinay, the Socialists of France established a certain distance from the I.S., despite the fact that Mitterrand remained one of the 14 vice presidents of the international body.[4]

The disputes with the I.S. regarding Mitterrand's alliance arose from a deep distrust by officials of that organization of Communists and their "new look" in the West. At a Vienna Congress of social democrats in 1975, Bruno Kreisky, Olof Palme and Willy Brandt (all of whom led successfull ruling Parties) voiced opposition to collaboration

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[3] Many feared that French politics would fragment into two blocs, Gaullists and Communists, without any intermediate force of social democracy. Andrei Fontaine, Le Monde, June 28, 1968, p. 1. Helmut Schmidt noted that Communist Parties exercised influence only where "old relationships have been stuck fast for decades". The New York Times, May 19, 1976, p. 16.

[4] A language of Marxism was now replacing that of reformism. As Mitterrand noted at Épinay, democratic reforms and improvements in the lot of the workers were not enough. It was necessary to "penetrate the heart of the current system, power in the economic enterprise". Lazitch, p. 234-235.

by social democrats with Communists.[5]

In describing a symmetry between the behavior of the two international movements of the left, I am not suggesting an exact parallel. The I.S. clearly lacks the discipline and central coordination that the Communist movement once had some pretense of maintaining. In fact, one might say that the Communists manifested more disarray internationally than did the Socialists. At this point it will help to examine briefly some historical aspects of international social democracy.

The Internationale socialiste. Heir to the original Second International, this body has survived through difficult historic periods.[6] The original organization, as shown in Chapter II, almost disintegrated during the First World War, when the various national components rallied to the trenches. Lenin's formation of a rival International constituted the next blow. The I.S. managed to survive World War II years largely through efforts of the British Labour Party. After the War, the I.S.

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[5] Le Monde, May 27-28, 1975, p. 3. At other moments spokesmen for the International propounded a more tolerant view of PS behavior. Kreisky maintained that the Socialists of Europe held no uniform view on the issue of cooperation with Communists; alliance decisions would be left to the judgment of individual parties. Vienna Kurier, March 12, 1976, p. 3. Members of the International appeared to have a particular distrust of the PCF. Thus Brandt openly indicated a preference for the style of party run by Berlinguer over that of Marchais. Der Stern, August 9, 1977. When the PCF renounced its doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Kreisky dismissed the reversal as a trivial act. Der Spiegel, March 7, 1977.

[6] The organization included such early socialist figures as Eduard Bernstein, Jules Guesde, August Bebel and Keir Hardie. Individual members were grouped in national sections.

was reconstituted at the Frankfurt Congress, 1951. East-bloc parties that had merged with the Communists were expelled. Kurt Schumacher and Guy Mollet emerged as president and vice president respectively, on a program pledging a democratic socialist order.[7]

The I.S. and French political life. Identity with an established socialist movement, representing many ruling European Governments, is enhancing for French Socialists, particularly in their competition with other parties. Just as Communists acquire stature through links to powerful forces on the Continent, so too do the Socialists. On the other hand, I.S. activities can also intrude into domestic politics. For example, when the I.S. convened in Paris in the midst of January, 1973 legislative elections, it generated considerable stir. I.S. organizers insisted, correctly, that it was a routine meeting, scheduled well before the French elections had been called. But heightening the controversy was the presence that week of many heads of state, including Golda Meir,[8]

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[7]Eight post war Congresses have been held in Europe. A general Council meets between Congresses. The 20-member Executive Bureau is headquartered in London. There is both an Asian organization and a Latin-American affiliate. Le Monde, January 12, 1973, pp. 1 and 9. In 1978, the I.S. met in Dakar, the first time in the Third World. L'Humanité, May 15, 1978, p. 5.

[8]There had been disagreement on Mid-East policy, and the Israeli Labor Party had been told that Meir's presence during an election would be construed as support for Mitterrand, perhaps influencing the 250,000 Jewish voters in France. Le Monde, December 28, 1972, p. 5. Generally, Jews in France do not vote as a bloc.

Bruno Kreisky, Olof Palme, James Callaghan and Pietro Nenni.[9]

Since other member parties of the I.S. rejected cooperation with Communists, Mitterrand, presiding at the meeting, felt the need to justify his policies, much as he had done earlier that year in Vienna before the same body.[10]

The PCF was also sensitive to this I.S. Conference in Paris, a meeting of parties judged reformist by their standards. When finally staged, the meeting itself was more an exchange of views than a formal conference reaching conclusions.[11] If today the Socialist International is hardly the disciplined army many had raptured in during the last century, neither is it an impotent debating forum. Socialist Robert Pontillon terms it a "collective laboratory for reflection", one that could from time-to-time "bring world pressure against dictatorships of Western Europe or against repressions in the East bloc." The I.S. had a role to play in the construction of Europe. Encouraging to many in the International was the assumption of power in Germany by Brandt, an event seen

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[9]Willi Brandt, due in Paris for an official visit two weeks hence, declined to attend. He did not wish to compromise his links with the Government by accepting an inviation from an opposition Party during an election. Le Monde, December 28, 1972, pp. 1 and 5.

[10]See the chapter on the Programme commun.

[11]The Vietnam issue dominated discussions, with the I.S. calling for a halt to bombings and urging elections in the South. Mitterrand and the Scandinavians took a stronger anti-American stand; Kreisky, Callaghan and Meir demurred. There was little discussion of the Middle East. Various Socialists urged the Labour Party to enter the European Parliament.

at the time as enhancing détente and fostering an intra-European normalization.[12]

The PS and the Socialists of Southern Europe

Southern Europe has unique problems, for example, underdevelopment relative to the countries of the north. While the southern nations affirm links to northern Europe, they have not foreclosed certain special ties to the Third World, particularly Africa. The divisions and affinities experienced on a nation state level in Europe are also felt within the I.S. Recognizing this, Mitterrand, Mauroy and Jospin in May, 1975 organized a conference, inviting socialist leaders of Southern Europe: Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Belgium.[13] There were several purposes behind the conference.

Defining future policy. The countries of southern Europe constitute an area of historical and political interest to France. Thus it was natural that Socialists, anticipating a future role in government,

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[12] Le Monde, January 12, 1973, p. 1 and 8. Perhaps this chapter has overemphasized some of the distance between the I.S. and the Socialists in France. A few years later, Mitterrand said in an interview "We are members of the Socialist International along with Kreisky, Brandt and Palme....While there are obvious differences between German or Swedish social democracy and French socialism, we still belong to the same family, the same international movement. There is a socialist group in the European Parliament comprising Germans, British and Frenchmen. Perhaps we represent different wings of the movement". Paris Match, October 30, 1976, pp. 56-61.

[13] There was some fear in Belgium and the Low Countries of a Europe divided into Latin and non-Latin regions - then falling under possible German influence. See the analysis of Thierry Pfister in Le Monde, May 24, 1975, p. 11.

would be seeking to define policy toward that region.

Overcoming isolation. In 1975 Mitterrand sensed that the PS was isolated politically. (This was shortly after his visit to the CPSU, also an attempt to overcome isolation.) The other social democrats of Europe had not rallied around the perspectives of the PS. Socialists in Scandinavia, Austria, Germany and Britain all had a certain confidence, all carried a certain global weight as ruling parties. Because of this, Mitterrand sought new ties southward, toward states which in the 1970s were shedding rightist or military regimes. In Spain, Portugal and Greece Socialist Parties were beginning to assert themselves. Thus it was natural for Mitterrand to seek support in the south.

Airing common problems. Many Socialists in France felt an affinity for the Socialist Parties of Southern Europe because they faced similar circumstances.[14] Unlike the social democrats of the North, these parties confront large, active Communist Parties. Often the social structures of these nations are more archaic. The Southern nations are mostly Catholic and more agrarian. The persistence of traditional elements has prevented the working classes from being integrated fully into society, an integration process which did occur in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The PS had strong ties with the Spanish Socialists during the 40 years of the party's exile. Similar years of exile also

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[14]The analysis here derives from Pfister's essay, ibid.

strengthened ties with the party of Mario Soares in Portugal.[15] Mitterrand was thus invoking the Southern European Socialist Parties as a counterweight to the social democrats of the north. By 1975, Mitterrand was concerned about the possibility of an integrated Europe, and he wanted to increase the options of his own party in such a political structure. Details of the discussions at the meeting need not concern us. They dealt with a range of problems: collaboration with Communists, attitudes of socialist parties towards their countries joining NATO, and other relevant topics. The important fact is that the meeting was held, defining a Southern European point-of-view within social democratic ranks.

Social Democratic International Perspectives: a Critique from the Left

Thus far we have established that socialists and social democrats in general manifest a particular world view. Many of the perspectives as they apply to French Socialists have already been examined herein. The important question now becomes: how compatible, or incompatible, were such perspectives with those of their Communist alliance partners? The answer here would largely determine how one views the ultimate

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[15] For similar reasons the PCF forged close ties with Cunhal and the Portuguese Communists. The risk was that the two French Parties would tend to identify with their respective ideological allies, threatening the already delicate balance in their relationships. In fact, such a spillover did occur when the communists and Socialists of Portugal entered a sharp dispute. The dispute soon erupted inside the two French Parties.

viability of the left alliance. This chapter began by noting the general affinity and identity of French Socialists and European social democracy with the Western camp. Or in Brezhnev's terms, "social democracy became a hostage to bourgeois imperialism".[16] But it is not only Communists who hold this view. It will be helpful to explore briefly some of the arguments and apprehensions of those who challenge the social democratic world order. At the same time it will help clear up the Communist point-of-view, and help explain the virulence of their attacks on social democracy.

The historical argument has been made that it was the post-war Western international system itself which required or encouraged the formation of social democratic coalitions in the European states. These coalitions were formed as a force to preserve the vulnerable post-1945 capitalist order, according to the argument. Thus it is said that the CIA subsidized social democratic parties as far back as 1947. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency placed Willy Brandt on its payroll.[17] Wolfe makes the argument that

> ...the centrality of social democracy to the

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[16] So he told the World Conference of Communist Parties in 1969. Le Monde, June 10, 1969, p. 6.

[17] Morton H. Halperin, et al., The Lawless State (New York, 1974), p. 37. Cited in Alan Wolfe, "Has Social Democracy a Future", Comparative Politics, October, 1978, p. 104. "What is surprising about social democracy", says Wolfe, "is not that it exists in a capitalist world system, but that in some ways it actually organizes that system and defines its priorities". p. 103.

> political organization of advanced capitalism was a lesson U.S. policymakers learned, inadvertently to be sure, when they tried to organize the world capitalist system under American hegemony after World War II.

Whether or not such a broad thesis is valid is not the point here. The point is that it attempts to implicate social democracy in a political design. While those creating a political order in the West might have preferred Italian Christian Democrats, Adenauer, or Ludwig Erhard, rule by these political segments alone was untenable in the long run, since the very growth and success of European recovery under capitalism encouraged expectations in the post-war working classes that only social democratic parties could fulfill. Furthermore, if the whole edifice was to survive, it required some planning apparatus and state interventionist manipulations.[18]

While French Communists would probably accept much of the above analysis, they would carry the argument one step further. Not only was (and is) social democracy the preserver of the capitalist order, but it is also the destabilizer of any radical (that is Communist) attempts

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[18]Once in power, social democrats, having raised expectations, sought to fulfill their promises. But they could only deliver on these promises by mortgaging the future in the form of inflation. The quagmire led to the difficulties experienced later by such parties in Britain and Scandinavia. The state-managed order of social democracy was thus viable during the pro-growth era of the 1950s and 1960s, but vulnerable thereafter.

to change that order. This interpretation explains the sinister nature that Communists attribute to social democracy's international role. And it is this fundamental interpretation by them of social democracy which I believe makes any alliance between the two forces ultimately untenable. Chapter X discussed the PCF's suspicions of the SPD that emerged from Bad Godesberg. There was a deep fear that German social democracy would act to stabilize a leftist government that might someday come to power in France. [19]

French Communists in 1978 considered the PS to have realigned itself with European social democracy. 1976 marked the end of Mitterrand's brief and ephemeral tactic of attempting to distinguish the Socialist Parties of Northern and Southern Europe.[20] And Communists, who long took pride in their own internationalist orientation, looked with deep suspicion upon the harmonization of policies among the socialists in Europe. In fact, the situation contrasted with the lack of harmony

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[19] See for example Ralph Milliband, Marxism and Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 183-185. These fears were intensified by the role of the SPD in opposing the quasi-insurrectional activities of the Communists in Portugal. For a French Communist discussion of the role of the SPD in the I.S., see Louis Althusser, "on the Twenty Second Congress of the French Communist Party", New Left Review, No 104, July-August, 1977, p. 6.

[20] Thus the PS joined in the Elsinor Conference, convened to elaborate a European-wide Socialist program. This confirmed to them that the PS was conforming to the SPD's vision of Europe.

between European Communists in recent years.[21]

One important instrumentality of international social democracy, according to Communist sources, is the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Directed from Bonn, its operations are said to promote the international purposes of social democracy, not merely in Europe, but in the Third World as well.[22] Party journalists and researchers have been critical of the Fund for several reasons:

1) Important members of German industry sit on its board.[23]

2) It serves as a source of financial support for other Social Democratic Parties, as in Spain and Portugal. Furthermore it is active in France, Italy and Greece, namely those countries where change is taking place and where Communists are active. In France, both non-

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[21] European Social Democrats in 1974 formed an office of coordination for Socialist Parties in the EEC Parliament and Commission.

[22] The Fund serves as a research and archive center, offering seminars and conferences to 100,000 participants a year. Data is from Claude Montagny, "La fondation Friedrich Ebert: efficace démarcheur de la social-démocratie allemande", La social-démocratie au présent (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1979), pp. 101-122.

[23] These are said to include directors of Volkswagen, Hoechst. and German banks. Two board members are also members of the Trilateral Commission, making them suspect. La social-démocratie au présent, p. 30. The Swiss journalist, Jean Ziegler, reports that funds from the SPD control the entire Socialist International, with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation serving as the primary source of financing. Le Monde Diplomatique, January 16, 1978.

Communist trade unions, the F.O. and the C.F.D.T. receive support.[24]

3. It operates with Governments and universities in the Third World, including Morocco, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal and Indonesia.[25] In 1973 a Brussels office opened to inform Third World nations about EEC. German trade unionists sponsor seminars. The purpose, according to these sources, is to move the Third World states away from Marxian solutions, towards social democracy.

This is the critical Communist evaluation of social democracy's actions at the international level, a mixture of truth, demagogy and conspiracy theory. In the Communist belief system, the class struggle has moved to a world level, manifesting itself today in the struggle between rich and poor nations. Leaders, such as Brandt, are alarmed by the destabilizing possibilities inherent in this struggle at the world level.[26] Social democratic policy, therefore, is one of reducing tensions between North and South in the world. It is in this sense that the I.S.

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[24] Thus 13 million marks were transferred from the Foundation to the bank in Lisbon of the Socialist Party and its journal, Republica. The foundation also organizes seminars for journalists in Spain. The purpose, of course, is to preserve capitalism and prevent change in these countries. Or the goal is to channel the labor movement towards social democracy, to ultimately create an enlarged Europe with a political center in Bonn. Ibid., p. 118.

[25] Montagny, Ibid., pp. 109-110.

[26] Ibid., p. 133.

has continued to intervene in North-South relations.[27]

The goal, then, is to avoid class struggle at the planetary level and attenuate the national liberation struggles. On the other hand, if the social democrats of Europe do nothing, famine, disease and overpopulation will endanger the entire edifice. Given this situation, the Brandt solution calls for an enlightened generosity in the developed states: certain sacrifices to be made now. But it is the working people of the Western countries, the supposed constituency of the PCF, who will be paying for this generosity. This is the international order that social democrats have in mind. Communists, however, are confident that the working people of the developed countries will not pay the costs of salvaging this particular crisis of capitalism.

A final note. Social democratic perspectives cited in this chapter on North-South issues do not always reflect the views of the French Socialists. Neither the I.S. nor the Ebert Foundation speak for the PS, a Party which formulates policies independently on such questions. The next chapter will examine policies toward the Third World by both the PS and PCF.

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[27]Thus the Commission formed by Robert McNamarra of the World Bank, to resolve deadlocked issues between North and South, designated Brandt as its head. If the Third World was making demands, it was Brandt's role to determine methods of attenuating these demands by fostering class collaboration and defusing the world from dangerous social upheaval in the less-developed areas.

CHAPTER XII

THE THIRD WORLD: PERSPECTIVES OF THE COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALISTS

The Common Program

The French left brings its own perspectives to Third World relations. But Communists and Socialists, given their different conceptions, do not always align on questions relating to underdeveloped nations. Each interprets events through its own prism. The two parties, in the time frame examined here, were in the process of redefining proposals for a Government program. And while 1977 negotiations to update the Program failed, Third World policies did not appear to be at issue. Nevertheless, events in the Third World could in the future divide the two coalition partners.

A sensible point of departure for analysis, then, is the Programme commun. It can shed light on certain broad shared perspectives. Further on I will examine PCF and PS positions on specific Third World issues. Then I will examine some specific Socialist proposals on "the new economic order".

The Common Program commits a Government of Left Union to seek a

major restructuring of relationships with the underdeveloped world, calling for cooperation based on genuine independence and non-interference in internal affairs.[1] While the document urges an end to colonial domination, it recognizes that France holds special links to its former realm, especially in Africa. The two parties call for an aid program favoring public development over the private sector, directing benefits towards the needs of the recipient states, rather than the narrower requirements of French investors. The Program also calls for a revision of the Association status arrangements negotiated between EEC states and the developing countries, the so-called Yaoundé Agreement.

Nothing is said about national liberation movements, other than brief reference of support for independence struggles. Nor is there any reference to France's dependency on the Third World for raw materials (the document was drafted before the oil price rises). In sum, the Common Program tends toward generalities with respect to the Third World; one must probe elsewhere for concrete perspectives. But first it will help to sketch some historical background.

Historical Overview

Third World problems are not peripheral to French politics.

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[1] Le Programme commun du Gouvernement de la Gauche (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), pp. 120-123.

It was de-colonization and the ensuing new relationships to Indo-China and the African states which so upset French political life in the Fourth Republic. The parties of the left also grasp the political, economic and cultural ties binding France to Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Middle East.

For the past 25 years, the PCF has essentially accepted the general world communist line towards the Third World: supporting the major national liberation confrontations of the period. Although not a governing Party, the PCF has mobilized its resources, taking the political action steps available to it. This includes issuing pronouncements, acting in parliament, or participating in world conferences.

While proud of its anti-imperialist record, the PCF has at times equivocated on issues of colonialism. The classical doctrine was not always helpful in sorting out the issues, for Marx rarely dealt with issues of national liberation. Only late in life did he interest himself with the independence problems of India, Poland and Ireland. Lenin had wanted to bring the revolution to the colonies, but was unsure if colonial liberation was a one-stage or two-stage operation. Would colonies move to socialism directly, or did they first require development of a national bourgeoisie? Even Stalin was suspicious of independence

leaders. Men such as Ghandi were vassals of capitalism, leading independent nations, but dependent on their ex-colonial rulers. It was probably Khrushchev's insight to accept the non-aligned states as basically compatible with the socialist world.

It should be no surprise, then, that a form of revolutionary paternalism describes early French Communist attitudes toward backward lands. Socialism would come to the colonial lands, but derivatively: through the French people themselves achieving socialism. The Empire would be socialized rather than de-colonized.[2]

Furthermore, the USSR approved these conceptions. At the de Gaulle-Molotov meeting of May, 1942, the Soviet Union pledged to support a post war framework where all the peoples of the French colonies would yield to de Gaulle's leadership.[3] Early PCF policy conformed to this scheme: urging retention of colonies in the French Union, but paying lip service to some autonomy. Algeria was not seen as a national entity. In 1945 Thorez spoke of a "union of freedom" between French and colonial peoples, holding out some vague idea of self determination. During the early stages of the Indo-China War in 1946-47, Thorez, then a vice president in the Tripartite Council of Ministers, supported credits for

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[2]On the other hand, the PCF was instrumental in the formation of revolutionary parties in the colonial countries.

[3]Claudin, The Communist Movement from Comintern to Cominform, Vol. II, pp. 336-7.

the war on the insurgents.[4]

Socialists and the Third World. The SFIO too underwent painful adjustments to France's declining influence. Guy Mollet led France in the 1956 Suez War. He went on to become a major supporter of the war in Algeria, despite an earlier repudiation of the Algérie Française slogan.[5] These actions of the SFIO during the Fourth Republic did tarnish their image as friends of the Third World.[6]

Today, however, the Socialists have fundamentally revised their conceptions of the Third World. They recognize the urgency of a new economic order, attuned to the demands that the underdeveloped states have made on the industrial nations.[7]

Mitterrand's program in 1972 was highly critical of France's

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[4]Claudin, p. 338. Some hold the PCF accepted more mainstream views on colonial questions in order to gather allies in the struggle against EDC, which they gave a greater urgency to.

[5]Socialists operate in a pluralist framework, where factions could oppose or support various colonial policies. Many who had a falling out on the Algerian question later joined with Mendes-France in forming the PSU.

[6]The PCF continues to cite the role of SFIO in various past wars to demonstrate its historical opposition to liberation movements. See L'Impérialisme français aujourd'hui (Paris: Editions sociales, 1976), p. 75.

[7]Socialists evoke an historical parallel, analogizing Third World demands for a new economic order with the 19th Century struggle of workers to form unions for their rights. See Lionel Jospin (ed.) Les Socialistes et le Tiers Monde (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1977), p. 120.

past dealings with the Third World.[8] Existing policy favored French business interests over the requirements of the poorer nations. Policy was often subordinated to U.S. interests (a theme often stressed by PCF pronouncements). Below are some other themes of the Mitterrand program:

- The Third World must reach its own development goals, without particular western models imposed.
- Abandonment of priviliged zones of French influence.
- Promotion of a legitimate French-speaking cultural policy, in no way tied to development aid.
- No sale of arms to repressive, racist regimes.
- Developed nations must contribute one per cent of GNP to development aid.

French Communist Perspectives

In the last chapter certain broad ideas were sketched. While the Communists accept the legitimacy of national liberation struggles, they reject the conception that there will be violent explosions arising from the Third World confronting the rich nations. Contrast this to the Brandt Report, which is predicated on the possibility of such confrontations. As Marchais told a press conference in Mexico City, the interests of the people in developed countries cannot be contradictory, but must complement those of the poorer countries to form a more just order.

> Imperialism spreads the idea that there is a contradiction between the aspirations of the French people and working class regarding their

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[8] François Mitterrand, Changer la vie: Programme de Gouvernement du Parti Socialiste (Paris: Flammarion, 1972), pp. 193-197.

> well-being and that of the demands for sovereignty and social progress by the nations of Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and Asia.[9]

Communists also reject what they term demographic theories of catastrophe. Thus some of the poorest African states, such as Gabon and the Congo, have a zero rate of population growth. Industrialization of the Third World will not lead to extreme population explosions. There will be increases, as mortality rates decline, but population will ultimately stabilize, as in other industrial states. Thus problems of population growth and food shortages are judged false problems. The PCF is confident there are rational ways to organize social and production relations to avoid these crises.[10]

The PCF critique of French policies. French capitalism emerged from the Second World War in a state of dependency, stagnation, indebtedness, and general political impotence, according to the Communists. To regain

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[9] Visits such as this are one of many forums used by the PCF to promote its views on the Third World. Marchais had been invited by the Mexican Communists, who had been legalized after nearly 40 years in 1978. Marchais was also granted a 45-minute visit with President José Lopez Portillo. L'Humanité, see the issues of May 15, 16 and 17, which gave wide coverage to the visit.

[10] Thus the proper models for development, not surprisingly, are those of the Central Asian USSR, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and others which have developed far more than Pakistan, Turkey and Afghanistan, having moved from feudalism to the modern era in a matter of decades. André Moine, "Points de repères pour les problèmes du Tiers-Monde", Cahiers du Communisme, May-June, 1968, pp. 110-126.

position required a larger base.[11] Gaullism became the political force to accomplish this, drawing upon the Treaty of Rome and the new relationships deriving from it. From the viewpoint of the communists, the new Fifth Republic went on to establish stable positions, strengthening the currency, reducing debt, developing a nuclear force, disengaging from NATO and encouraging advanced sectors of technology.

At the same time, Gaullism required a Third World policy to meet new realities. Its solution was to enter into agreements of cooperation and aid. Actually, de Gaulle was establishing neo-colonial relations with the newly independent states. The goal was to:

1) Keep them within a capitalist mode of development.[12]
2) Extend French economic penetrations.
3) Overcome France's backwardness in relation to its rivals.

To achieve this, France had a number of foreign policy assets at its disposal: its Security Council seat, its nuclear arsenal, and its network of bases capable of deploying forces in Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean. Thus France pursued its penetrations through its policy of "cooperation". The Third World states were seen as "privileged zones" for commercial activity. French capital flowed into the Ivory

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[11] L'impérialisme français. Much of the analysis here is based on the opening essay by Martin Verlet, pp. 11-33. It presents a good outline of some Communist positions.

[12] Verlet, p. 14.

Coast, Gabon, the Zaire of Mobutu, or South Africa, Iran, Egypt, even as far away as Indonesia and Brazil. Raw materials were also a prime target.[13] Despite its penetrations, imperialism ultimately confronts (or even engenders) the inexorable liberation movements.[14] These then are some of the perspectives that emerge when one examines the seemingly endless pages of Party journals and tracts. Through this Leninist prism, imperialism appears as a force consciously seeking to destroy the unity of the younger nations. The developed countries go so far as to manipulate the more reactionary regimes of the Third World against progressive ones (that is those with a socialist orientation). Thus Zaire or South Africa is summoned to defend a faction in Angola, or Hassan's Morocco is employed to preserve the status quo in Zaire.

Some French Communist assessments in the 1970s. The communists were cautiously optimistic in 1975. The MPLA in Angola had achieved a liberation victory. The Party noted that the U.S., frustrated over Watergate and Vietnam, was powerless to intervene. Imperialism's means of direct intervention had been diminished.[15] Furthermore, the political weight of the Socialist-bloc countries (namely the ability of the Soviets

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[13] Verlet, p. 13

[14] The PCF does not support every indiscretion of the liberation movements. The Central Committee condemned the killings at the 1972 Olympics as adventurist, "ill-serving the just cause of the Palestinian Arabs". Cahiers du Communisme, October, 1972, pp. 127-128.

[15] Cahiers du Communisme, July-August, 1977, p. 82.

and Cubans to aid liberation movements) had to be taken into greater account.

Imperialist rivalry. While the Communists applaud any withdrawal by French forces from areas of former interest (as happened with certain Indian Ocean outposts), there is one caveat: rival imperialist powers might step into the vacuum. It does not promote socialism if France withdraws, only to have the U.S., the Federal Republic or Japan supplant the former role of France. Thus Madagascar, independent since 1960, has tripled its trade with the dollar zone. Evidence of West German penetrations into former French Africa is a particular irritant. Communist analysts make the case that the U.S. has stepped into many former French (and British) realms in the Indian Ocean. Soviet penetrations are ignored.[16]

The Communists, in their role as a vocal opposition Party, opposed Government military initiatives in the Third World, such as Giscard's threat, in May, 1975, to dispatch forces to Lebanon. In fact, the PCF rejected any attempts by the Giscard Government to assert France's role in crises. At the same time, it ridicules any signs of impotence by the regime. This inconsistency gives them the flexibility to be critical where they see fit. When Giscard did assert a role in Africa, as shown

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[16] South Africa's de Beers now prospects on the island. Japan has secured fishing rights off-shore, and the FRG has extensive investments there. the PCF particularly objects to the SPD's links to the social democrats on that island.

by the airlifting of Moroccan troops to Zaire in april, 1976, it was dismissed as an American-inspired adventure.

These, then, were some perspectives of the PCF concerning the Third World. Next, it will help to examine some problem areas.

The Indian Ocean region. Despite withdrawals from this region of one-time Anglo-French influence, France retains a residual force. (And the PCF retains its own influence through its own extensive contacts with Communist Parties in the region.) French outposts lie along the sea lanes from the Suez Canal and the Cape route. Major oil supplies come from the Persian Gulf, and they require protection. France also conducts atomic tests in the Indian Ocean, requiring monitoring stations. Until 1975, France retained its large air and naval facility at Diego Suarez and the island base at Tananarive. When Madagascar insisted on full neutrality in 1975, the Navy shifted to a new base at St. Denis on Réunion, still a Department of France. Bases on the Comoro Islands were yielded, but the one at Mayotte, on the northern entrance to the Mozambique Channel (opposite Madagascar) has been retained. The area has strategic value in any conflict, since it dominates the sea lanes along the eastern coast of Africa. The significance of this was not overlooked by the Communist press, which noted that a million tons of oil flowed through the channel daily, destined for Europe and the U.S.[17]

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[17] L'Humanité, April 5, 1976, p. 2.

Djibouti, at the mouth of the Red Sea, is a further strategic site noted by the Communists. In June, 1977, this area of the Horn received independence after 71 years of French rule. The event was welcomed by L'Humanité, but the press report noted many "remaining booby traps".[18] Thus Giscard was seeking to manipulate the government structure, and was intent on retaining the French base there. At the time this was viewed as a threat to socialist-leaning Somalia.[19]

The Communists believe that both the U.S. and France would oppose any leftist-oriented regime installed in that area of the Horn. They also suggest that strongly anti-socialist Saudi Arabia would willingly play the role of protector for the new state of Djibouti. In terms of overall Indian Ocean policy, the PCF appears convinced that France is determined to maintain what influence it can, a viewpoint confirmed by Vali. By maintaining a permanent military presence capable of intervening in crises, France is opposing the right of new nations to settle their own affairs.[20] The Communists claim they would offer a "more democratic policy in the Indian Ocean, a region where France could make a positive contribution towards peace and security".

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[18] Ibid.

[19] The base is operational, say the Communists. This is confirmed by Ferenc Vali, who cites its excellent military harbor, and notes that its garrison is reinforceable by a force d'intervention. Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region (New York: Macmillan, 1976).

[20] See Michel Charlot in L'Impérialisme français, p. 65.

The Middle East, Africa and Energy Issues

The PCF had been critical of Giscardian policy toward the Middle East, a region furnishing 85 percent of France's petroleum. For instance, the Government favored certain oil producers, such as Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf, over the more socialist-oriented Algeria, Iraq and Libya.[21] While the Communists may dislike certain Arab regimes, they are in no position to close off supply sources. But they would prefer to increase imports from the latter nations listed above. (The Mitterrand Government has shown signs of agreeing with this policy.)

The Communists also hope that the Left Government will expand trade with the Soviet and East-bloc states. However, I have nowhere located the suggestion that the Soviet Union could itself supply petroleum to France, being already over-extended in Eastern Europe.[22]

Relations with Algeria. Communists always viewed the Evian Accords as a device allowing France to control Algerian national wealth. But the Boumédienne Government was said to be leading a legitimate independence struggle for control of this wealth. The PCF welcomed Algeria's decisive nationalization of the oil and gas facilities of ELF-ERAP and Compagnie

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[21] Jacques Goulard, L'Impéralisme français, p. 69.

[22] But see Bernard J. Crescenzo, "Quelle Politique Énergie pour la France?", L'Impérialisme français, p. 108. He suggests that cooperation with the East-bloc could provide France with natural gas and oil.

française des pétroles in 1970-71.[23] Algeria was carrying out policies in 1971 that Mossadegh had been powerless to do in Iran in 1951. This, in fact, confirmed the notion that the world relation of forces was shifting, further demonstrating the myth of the invulnerable monopolies. There was also the hope that such nationalizations would inspire Syria and Iraq to take similar steps.

Ties to the FLN. One of the more interesting aspects of the PCF's involvement with the Third World is the network of proto-state relations enjoyed by the Party and its leading functionaries with various heads-of-state, political parties and liberation movements around the globe. The Communists, if not a government, are a potential government, standing ready in the wings. Thus the Party has carefully guarded its special links to the FLN. Ties, strained after 1965, have since improved. In 1972, Raymond Guyot of the Political Bureau led a delegation to the FLN. Among other things, he spelled out what a new energy policy would be under the Party's démocratie avancée: namely that ERAP and CFP would be nationalized. Future agreements would be negotiated fairly, without any suggestion of neo-colonialism.

Two years later, Boumédienne invited George Marchais and Jacques Denis to Algiers. The wide-ranging talks had almost the flavor of a

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[23] Robert Lambotte, "L'Algérie dix ans après l'indépendence", Cahiers du Communisme, October, 1972, pp. 88-98.

government-to-government parley.[24] Marchais noted that France had retaliated because of certain Algerian nationalizations: limitations were placed on immigrants coming into France, and restrictions were set on the import of Algerian wines. Such neo-colonial pressures would not be applied by a Government of the Left, he said. In April, 1977, C.G.T. Secretary George Séguy visited Algiers to discuss racism toward Algerian workers in France.[25]

When PCF delegations meet with their Algerian counterparts, it is not merely to support issues of interest to their hosts, nor to issue resounding pronouncements on the urgency of Third World liberation. Often, there is some important quid pro quo, with the Algerian side affirming positions more crucial to the Communists. The PCF, after all, is a non-ruling European party, excluded from various world forums. By lining up governmental support from a friendly Third World state, it increases its prestige and leverage as a political force. For example, in 1971 the PCF held consultations with Algeria's Parti Avant Garde Socialiste (PAGS). Typically, the joint declaration included certain ritualistic Third World positions: condemning Israeli expansionism and the South African regime; supporting the PRG in Vietnam, the MPLA in Angola and opposing Portugal's activities in Mozambique. But the

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[24] L'Humanité, September 12 through 16, 1974. Links to the Third World were active that year. Earlier, Marchais journeyed to Hanoi to summon a world front against imperialism.

[25] L'Humanité, April 7, 1977, p. 7.

declaration went on to support certain other mainstream Communist political objectives, such as a European Security conference, recognition of the GDR, and a de-nuclearized Mediterranean.

Sub-Saharan Africa. In the 1970s this region became an important arena of anti-colonial activity. The Communists are on record as having opposed:

- French Government collusion with Portuguese forces in furnishing aid to South Africa.
- French military intervention in Chad and the sending of paratroops to Gabon.
- Expanded French investments in Africa under the cover of aid and cooperation agreements.
- Accords between France and African states, if they were imposed in negotiations that were unequal.

In cultural relations with former French areas, the PCF remained suspicious of the official policy of Francophonie, in that it masqueraded neo-colonialist objectives.

Policies toward African liberation movements. The PCF resented the fact that the PS (like most European social democratic parties) supported the FNLA and l'Unitas against the M.P.L.A. in Angola. Communists opposed Giscard's efforts to salvage the Mobutu regime in Zaire, seeing both French collusion with Belgium and attempts to solicit U.S. intervention. When Giscard provided French transports to King Hassan II to airlift 800 Moroccan troops from Kinshasa to Shaba Province, the PCF

reacted strongly.[26] Giscard was deceiving the French people, violating international law, and acting without authority of Parliament. Socialists, too, opposed the venture, but softened the tone and substance of their objections.

The Soviet role in Africa could also generate differences between the two coalition Parties. The PCF justifies Soviet and Cuban penetrations, while the Socialists oppose these ventures.

The Left and Latin America

While Latin America is not a major area for French penetrations, Communist sources note that of all the colonizers in that region, it is France that retains virtually the only toe-hold. The important outposts are the Overseas Departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe. Both the PS and PCF urge immediate self-determination. Communists have also challenged aid programs: a ruse to offset the large payments deficits of these islands. The funds are used merely to finance French imports, ultimately returning to France as private capital, perpetuating the dependency.[27]

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[26] Giscard argued that he acted on behalf of "Europe". See discussions in L'Humanité of April 4, 9, and 11, 1977.

[27] Cahiers du Communisme, January, 1977, p. 121. Also see L' Impérialisme français, pp. 153-154. The PCF maintains ties with local Communists on the islands. Thus in November, 1976, PCF leaders and corresponding leaders in the Departments met in Paris.

Allende's Chile and the Left in France

Domestic events in Chile during the 1970s had strong international ramifications because the Left in France drew many lessons from them. These lessons strongly influenced strategies and political relationships inside France. Chile, even though a Third World country, had important symbolic value: Communists and Socialists had, after all, achieved power through an alliance. This appeared to confirm the strategy of the Left Union in France. Furthermore, the Popular Unity forces had accomplished their victory through the electoral process, and by preserving democratic liberties, policies that both signers of the Programme commun were committed to.[28]

After the coup, much of the euphoria surrounding Allende's experiment of course sounded naive, and each segment of the Left drew its own revised conclusions. All agreed that it revealed the vulnerabilities in the Left alliance. Some in the PS were confident that the French Party was in a stronger position than Allende's Party. Mitterrand concluded that it was vital to broaden the base of one's allies; that a truly majoritarian movement was necessary. And the Communist Parties of

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[28]Mitterrand admired the Communists of Chile as more realistic and moderate than the French variety. They would not try to dominate the coalition, let alone attempt a coup de Prague. And the PCF admired Chilean Socialists: they were more Marxist than the European variety (and were not linked to the I.S.). And they had been favorably disposed toward liberation struggles in Vietnam, Cuba and Algeria. See Le Monde, November 17, 1971, p. 12 and L'Humanité, November 25, 1971, p. 1.

Europe drew similar conclusions on the need for broader alliances.[29] Communists also revived an old theme, the need to prepare for various kinds of struggle; counter-revolutionary violence was always possible.[30]

Events in Chile increased Socialist suspicions of the World Bank. The Party had long been critical of IBRD as manipulative in its loan and development policies to Third World states. Socialists claimed that Robert MacNamarra and pressure from the United States played a contributory role in financially stangling the Popular Unity Government.[31]

Both the PCF and PS agreed that France would halt all aid to the Pinochet Government, particularly the sale of arms.[32] Giscard had been criticized for providing such aid.

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[29] Berlinguer said that drawing 51 percent of the votes in an election would not sustain a government. This was the logic which induced the PCI to design its Historic Compromise. Rinascita, October 12, 1973. The PCF agreed: a left government was not viable if 49 percent of the electorate was hostile. Le Monde, July 4, 1974, p. 6.

[30] Lazitch, L'Echec permanent, pp. 48-51. Socialist Deputy Jean Poppern also supported this view, but did not have the backing of his Party. The PS did not want to identify rule by the Left with civil war, always a latent possibility in France.

[31] Les Socialistes et le tiers monde, p. 173.

[32] The PCF would cease all commerce in arms to states that are fascist, racist or aggressive. (The PCF would, of course, be defining these categories.) The Party has opposed sales to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Morocco. The Socialists have been outspoken against sales to South Africa and Rhodesia. Ibid., p. 173.

Support for Liberation Movements

The two left Parties could probably agree in most cases on which regimes to withhold weapons sales from. But could they agree on which regimes or groups to supply arms to? Probably not, if they disagreed on the validity of a particular liberations struggle, or were backing different factions (as in Angola). And here, it would seem, is a likely or possible source of disagreements for the Left Coalition. I would assume that French Communists, like their Soviet and Cuban comrades, would be eager to supply certain liberation forces. The Socialists would not, if it interfered with overall relations with their allies or the West. This conclusion stems from the point established earlier in these pages: the French Socialists remain fundamentally bound to the Western camp.[33]

The "New Economic Order"

The concept of a new world order in trade and economic relations

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[33] The Socialist Government has agreed to sell 15 trucks, two Alouette III helicopters and two patrol boats to the Sandinista Regime in Nicaragua. Le Monde, January 9, 1982, pp. 1 and 3. The country is said to receive weapons from the USSR and Cuba. (In August, 1981, the Mitterrand Government also deviated from U.S. policy by recognizing the Liberation Front in El Salvador.) Charles Hernu noted that France did not have "to justify its plans", since France was not part of the military command integrated into NATO. "The United States should be pleased that this Government (Nicaragua) is addressing itself to France, rather than the Soviet Union or Cuba", the Defense Minister added. Socialist policy is to free the Third World from being dependent on one or the other superpower.

was originally put forth by the Third World states at various North/South conferences. Both Left Parties in France support these demands to re-structure relations. Both describe this new economic order as representing the legitimate aspirations of the Third World to industrialize and develop.

Yet differences in policy can be discerned. The Socialists support export stabilization programs between EEC countries and the Third World, for example. The Communists do not. These programs, a concession to developing countries, are intended to reduce the sharp fluctuations in the prices of raw materials exported to Europe. The Communists, however, counter that they are merely a device to assure a steady supply of raw materials to the EEC countries. That they preserve the developing nations in their role of supplier of raw materials at low prices. They have the subsidiary goal of preventing the formation of Third World cartels, such as OPEC.

The call for a new economic order is not a demand for immediate equality among all nations, rich or poor. Rather, say its advocates, it is an attempt to reverse the overwhelming dependency that has characterized the Third World's relationship to the industrial states. Since World War II and the advent of the Bretton-Woods framework, they argue, the industrial states of the West have managed both the rules and functioning of international economic arrangements. While the formal

aspects of Western political domination collapsed with colonialism, the substantive aspects of this domination have persisted into the era of de-colonization: the so-called neo-colonial relationship.

In France, the two mass Parties of the Left have apparently embraced this Third World conception--as well as the demands that flow logically from it. They begin with the assumption that the relationship between the developed and underdeveloped nations is inherently inequitable. One must recognize this assumption to understand their policies. Thus, as we have seen, the PCF argues that many of the past accords reached between France and various African states should be revised: they contain clauses that restrict the sovereignty of the developing states. Furthermore, runs the argument, they were imposed in negotiations that were unequal during a period when these states were arriving at independent status. And finally, the PCF and the PS insist on disinterested aid: political conditions tied to aid as a means of pressure must cease. Only in this spirit can there be valid cooperation between France and Third World states.

The Socialists and the Third World

The weight of analysis this far has emphasized PCF policies and perceptions of the Third World. It remains to show how the Socialists envisage France's relations to the underdeveloped nations.[34]

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[34] Most of the following analysis is based on Les Socialistes et le tiers monde.

They begin with the assumption that investment and financial decision-making in the world is generally determined by the developed nations. Because of this, the new nations are forced to conform to an international division of labor enforced to their detriment by an exploitation of their natural resources. As a result, the modernized sectors of their economies are largely shaped and controlled from abroad. Some pf the poorer developing states have become so totally dependent on the industrialized nations that they no longer control their development. For example, the need to import elaborate technology from abroad forces them to acquire foreign exchange. Hence the poorer nations must develop their own exports and accept the establishment of foreign firms on their soil. Furthermore, the pattern of world trade imposed by the dominant countries forces them to be suppliers of relatively simple commodities.

Then, too, the Third World nations are burdened with foreign debt, which, it is pointed out, has risen from $51 billion to $119 billion between 1967-1973.[35] Debt service alone had reached $11 billion annually (in 1973), compelling these states to assign an ever-growing share of their export revenues merely to the servicing of these debts. The accumulated debt could exceed the net transfers made to the Third World: "The Third World states will thus be aiding the developed states, an absurd situation", say the Socialists.

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[35] Ibid., p. 58.

First, the Socialists ask that steps be taken to lighten the burden of this debt.

France in 1975 contributed private and public aid of 17 billion francs (over 1.0 percent of its GNP) plus an added 4.2 billion, if the overseas departments and territories are included. France's public aid to the Third World is approximately 0.4 percent of GNP, well below her goal, which was 0.7 percent.[36]

This aid chiefly goes to states recently administered by France, 70 percent to Africa. Private aid, on the other hand, is more diversified: only 36 percent going to the French Zone and North Africa. In other words, the Socialists argue, French capitalism has a well-protected preserve in Africa, yet it does not reject other profit opportunities in areas such as Latin America (a point equally noted by the Communists).

The Socialists, like the Communists, have been critical of certain French public aid projects. Often they are designed to further French cultural interests by encouraging language and schooling under French methods, based on modes of instruction introduced in the colonial era--ill-adapted to the needs of modern Africa.

Below is a summary of certain critical evaluations the Socialists

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[36]Ibid., p. 63

have made of certain international agencies dealing with Third World development:[37]

- The United Nations. Not only is it weak, but it is far more political than it pretends. The U.S., as chief furnisher of funds, has an inordinate voice in decision making.

- The World Bank. IBRD imposes unreasonable conditions on Third World states and interferes in their internal affairs, as in Chile.

- EEC. Socialists are more tolerant here. They approve the Association status accorded to African states at Yaoundé - and later extended at the Lomé Convention in 1975. They favor the STABEX mechanism to protect against the fluctuations in exports. Certain duty exemptions on goods coming into EEC countries are also approved of.

The Communists would most likely agree with the first two evaluations, but challenge the third given their basic suspicions about EEC.

The Lomé Accord is viewed here as an innovation between underdeveloped and industrialized states, since it attempts to correct imbalances in relations: giving the Third World non-reciprocal advantages on the export of products into EEC nations. Nevertheless, Lomé does not respond fully to the requirements of the new states, which seek long-term development agreements.[38] They require a basic redistribution of world wealth, not based on capitalist rules of international exchange.

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[37] Ibid., see the discussion starting on page 86.

[38] Ibid, For a discussion of the Lomé Accords see page 98.

Capitalist and socialist development models: Socialist Party analysis distinguishes between capitalist model and socialist model states. The former:

- are states such as South Korea, Singapore and Brazil.
- tend to develop export goods economies.
- are wide open to multinationals.
- ignore the needs of the bulk of their populations by developing a comprador class, fostering wide inequality.

Socialist model states are such states as Algeria, Cuba and China. Their policies seek more than mere increases in GNP. They are also attempting to meet the broader aspirations of the great majority of their people. To attack the roots of misery, they will accept a less dramatic rate of growth.

Breakdown of the economic order. The Socialists argue that the capitalist world economic order is beginning to alter. Economic liberalism or the laissez-faire rules of world trade, as conceived at Bretton-Woods and further developed by GATT, along with the entire structure designed on post war U.S. hegemony--is weakening. It was a liberalism designed to prevent the narrow protectionism of the inter-war years; but it still signifies the old world order to the Socialists. Several factors are operating, in their analysis:

1) The rise of Japan and Europe as powers in their own right.

2) The loss of dominance by the U.S., particularly with the "77" making broad challenges at world forums.

3) The U.S. defeat in Vietnam.

4) The coup de grâce provided by the oil price increases of 1974.

Given these developments, the Third World is demanding new rules of the game. The old economic order, postulated on unlimited access at cheap prices to the world's natural resources, is now undermined: the industrial nations are now compelled to negotiate.

The OECD states confront an array of coalitions: the non-aligned countries of 1973; the bloc of "77" at the United Nations; and the OPEC states. By the 1980s these groups could compel the United States to attend a North/South dialogue. And they were strong enough to expand the agenda beyond a discussion of the energy crisis, raising questions of equality, despite the objections of the United States.

Such, then, is the Socialist Party's description and analysis of the Third World's confrontation. They are in essential agreement with these demands to restructure the rules of international exchange. To stabilize raw material prices, they propose a system of "stockage", the storing of surplus produce to regulate the tensions between supply and demand. they would further extend the policy of "generalized preferences"

-- establishing a system of non-reciprocal preferential tariffs to allow Third World nations to export their manufactured goods to industrial nations. (This would extend an already-existing EEC mechanism.) They propose some novel reforms of the world monetary system, modifying the voting system within I.M.F., giving these countries a larger voice.

In financing development aid, the Socialists would emphasize public funding. It would be multilateral in nature, not bilateral. This would preclude the donors using it as a means of influencing the beneficiaries.

The Socialists are also proposing an unusual (perhaps utopian) system of communal ownership of unexplored territories, such as ocean explorations. Profits would be used to finance Third World development.

And finally, they set as a goal for France: the achievement of a rate of public aid at 0.7 percent of GNP. It is now at the 0.39 level.

Some Conclusions on Third World Policies

When beginning this project, my judgments on future policies of a Government of the Left toward the Third World were subject to some

intervening unknowns: would Communists or Socialists dominate the ruling alliance? How much leverage or veto power would the Communists have? Today, the answers are clear: Communists are more of an appendage to the Mitterrand Government.

It would also have been helpful to know at an earlier stage the mandate of the Left. If strong the Government would be able to mobilize public opinion and undertake initiatives in foreign policy, more so than a weak regime vulnerable to an articulate opposition. Given that the mandate was strong, one still wants to know: can the two Parties carry out commitments and programs? Can they be translated into policy?

Electoral restraints. Programs enunciated before taking power by parties in opposition are not to be taken as literal commitments. Many of the PS and PCF proposals outlined in this Chapter favor Third World aspirations. But would these proposals be popular with the French electorate? A party does not necessarily please its constituency in Pas-de-Calais by furnishing more development aid to Chad, or by seeking to fulfill a utopian "new economic order".

Jahangir Amuzegar has posed some questions regarding the indifference of voters in Western democracies towards the demands of the developing countries.[39] If he is correct, many in France view the "77"

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[39] "A Requiem for the North/South Conference", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 1, October, 1977, pp. 136-159. Amuzegar was formerly Iran's representative to the I.M.F.

as demanding unacceptable sacrifices of jobs and living standards. If there are to be changes, it will require new public attitudes, according to Amuzegar. Electorates must be convinced that the present world pattern is still fundamentally colonial, with unequal partnerships between the have and have-nots: that the North's prosperity increasingly depends on the resources of the Third World.

The question, then, is can the Parties of the Left mobilize their working class and other constituencies behind the changes they are urging?

The Socialists, we have seen, at times invoke a moral fervor, likening the struggle of the Third World to that of the workers in the Nineteenth Century. At other times they invoke an enlightened self interest, suggesting more efficient uses of world resources. Communists, too, in what Tiersky calls their "tribune" role, have not hesitated to appeal to self interest. Thus a policy that allows multinationals to operate freely abroad can also result in pockets of unemployment in specific regions of France. This harms the constituency whose interests Communists claim to embody, suggesting that there are perhaps prudential reasons for limiting the monopolies. The point is that success in carrying out the plans of the Left will depend much on the Government's ability to persuade Frenchmen that a "new economic order" will be to their benefit.

Transformations in policy. When a nation adopts a socialist order, one can reasonably anticipate changes in its international behavior. (Castro's Cuba backs policies unthinkable for the pre-1959 regime.) This is not to say that a Mitterrand Government, with Communists in some ministries, will be dispatching troops into liberation wars. But other means of support cannot be ruled out: thus one can supply or withhold weapons, as France does with Nicaragua.

But it is doubtful that a Left Government in France will risk an adventurous policy in the Third World; there are too many constraints:

1) It would upset existing alliance ties.

2) The more radical Communists will be held in check because of their very junior status.

3) Both Parties will be preoccupied with domestic problems. Domestic social change holds a priority for the new regime.

Nevertheless, Third World problems would be decisive to the coalition.[40] The PCF continues to conceptualize in Leninist terms. Its affinities still lie with the broadly defined anti-imperialist camp. But it is wedded to a Socialist Party which, in the final analysis, identifies with the West. In Duverger's phrase, it is not a "mariage d'amour, mais un mariage de raison".[41]

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[40] Recall that the PCF and SFIO had a major falling out over whether to furnish the Spanish Republic weapons in the 1930s. (Spain is not in the Third World, but the lesson is relevant.)

[41] Le Monde, January 9, 1982, p. 1.

Continuities in policy. Perhaps the emphasis on transformation has been too great here. There are certain permanent fixtures in French policy toward the Third World. Access to energy and resources will be a permanent requirement of any Government, left or right. France's dependency on the Middle East has not disappeared with the arrival of the Union of the Left Government. The Government must devise tolerable relations with regimes it disapproves of. What is most likely is that the Government will continue to flaunt its radical bahavior and egalitarian credentials in Third World areas remote from France, such as Central America, where there can be no real risk to France. But it will manifest prudence in more vital regions, such as Saudi Arabia or the Gulf States.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUSION

The Communists

Power-bloc vs class politics. The contradictions in French Communism arise from the ambiguity of its identity. Draped in the Tricolore, the Party during one phase proclaims its national or patriotic aspect. At another, it displays an international face, defining the advance toward socialism in terms of the interests of a world movement. Its reference point is a broad anti-imperialist bloc and other fraternal Parties. The fact is, the PCF is implanted in two constellations: there is first this world movement, loosely headed by the USSR, and second, there is the domestic political system, of which it is a component. It can act on behalf of each and form alliances within each, as we have seen. But from the start, maintaining membership in this world movement was assigned a primacy. It was intimately linked to the major millennial goal, worldwide social transformation. The progress of socialism proceeds at a global level, deriving largely from the achievements of socialism already realized in the USSR. Proceeding within this framework, I have elaborated two further ideas, namely that the Communists:

1) thwarted in making their own revolution merged their identity with the Soviet state;

2) confronted with the Yalta settlement, accepted Stalin's post-

war injunction to substitute power-bloc politics for insurrectionary politics.

But the USSR had its own requirements. It assigned primacy to its own raison d'état over that of millennial goals. It required obedient parties in the West, and the PCF complied. Despite this compliance, the idea developed here has been that the French Communists never stifled a capacity for radical action, their vanguard pretension. Rather, their ability to substitute an internationalist purpose or ideal over domestic advantage was, in their own eyes, a manifestation of radical capacity.

A long period of exile from the mainstream of post-war life led to some new conceptions. By the 1960s it seemed that the efficacy and legitimacy of the PCF depended more from its ability to link up with broader social classes and strata inside France, rather than in following a world movement which was losing some of its coherency. This realization argued for a weakening of ties with the world movement, the establishment of a format that the Italian Communists prefer to term "unity in diversity". Once the USSR was no longer the embodiment of the new society, the unconditional unity of the entire edifice was under a challenge.

I have shown how the new domestic politics strategy of the PCF became imperiled in 1968. That was the year the Russians again invoked

power-bloc politics; all Western Parties were enjoined to support the invasion designed to preserve the bloc. However, obedience by the PCF would have shattered its "peaceful road" strategy, then ripening into a Union of the Left (much as the earlier obedience jettisoned insurrectionary strategies in 1946-47). The PCF refused this obedience. It rejected this second post-war attempt by the USSR to thwart a strategy for achieving power. Ignoring Soviet raison d'état, the PCF for the first time acted to further its own domestic legitimacy.

Vanguardism and pluralism at the national and international level. But it is this domestic legitimacy, endlessly pursued, which is so elusive to the Communists. Their vanguard pretensions, their internationalist identity and their insistence on democratic centralism have left many Frenchmen sceptical of the Party's loudly proclaimed commitment to pluralism, democracy and the electoral road.

Questions of pluralism and democracy can be analyzed on three planes:

1) the international movement

2) the domestic politics

3) the internal party.

Pluralist mechanisms are denied on level three, we said. Democracy is not practiced inside the Party. On the other hand, pluralism (that is the coexistence and tolerance of diverse views) is practiced,

indeed insisted upon, on level three, the international. Such widely divergent parties as the Italian and French both proclaim that there is no longer any center to the movement: each party, they insist, is independent and sovereign - and arrives at its own conclusions. But this raises a question. If there is no longer one central line binding all parties, why such a Leninist procedure internally? The contradiction is glaring: if there are many truths internationally, why but one internally? Pluralism at level one suggests the introduction of pluralism at level three. This is an area where further research would be helpful.

An equally interesting question concerns level two. Would the PCF in power respect the values of pluralism in domestic politics? Would it guarantee basic rights and tolerate alternation of power, diversity, ambiguity and opposition groups? Observers differ. It might during the transitional phase now postulated by the Party as "advanced democracy". But after that phase, it is not clear. This vanguard pretension remains a major obstacle between the PCF and its alliance partners: the insistence upon the idea - deriving from Lenin - that it alone is the historical emanation of the working class. This insistence of a uniqueness and a leading role is distrusted.

In most normal circumstances, the PCF will continue to support Soviet raison d'état. It will challenge Soviet authority only when in its judgment, orthodoxy would endanger its own viability (Czechoslvakia, for instance). Or, if the interests of France are clearly at variance

with those of Russia, it will offer a challenge. (Even such a loyalist as Thorez challenged Molotov's position on the internationalization of the Ruhr in 1946.) One can now expect policies to be calculated increasingly with domestic considerations in mind, as in 1965 and 1968. However, since its electoral setback in 1978, the PCF has been far more supportive of Soviet foreign policy initiatives. This shift will be discussed further on.

Regionalism: the Eurocommunist phenomenon. Pierre Hassner is probably correct in describing Eurocommunism more as an attitude toward the values of Western democracy, pluralism and internal dissent.[1] Employed in this sense, the term suggests the Parties of the OECD states: Parties which felt they would be isolated so long as they were identified with the despotism of the East bloc.

But these Communist Parties of Europe lack any coordinated strategy or any coherent doctrine of what their final societies will be. They may have some partial convergencies, but that is all. The only point where they probably all agree is on the desirability of reaching out to broader alliances beyond the old proletarian constituency. (This was one important lesson of Allende's defeat.) Thus all Parties insist on their own identities.

French Communists continue to reject conceptions that impose a

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[1]"L'Euro-communisme: stade finale du Communisme ou de l'Europe?", Commentaire, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer, 1978, p. 135.

regional unity. And this is consistent with their well-known defense of national independence, their strict assertion of national sovereignty. This can be termed their Gaullocommunist manifestation. Eurocommunism, like the European Community, is viewed as another supranational entity. They will neither accept regionalism (or regional decision-making) in a capitalist framework, nor in a Communist body. We have seen that the PCF has held widely diverging views from the PCI on many questions, ranging from the integration of Europe and the validity of NATO, to judgments about the tactics of the Portuguese Communists. As the capitalist world moves toward supranationality and the abandonment of sovereignty, the Communist world moves in reverse, towards less supranationality, toward what is termed polycentrism. This may defy their classic dogma, which promised an international vision, but they insist on this.

This does not mean that the PCF rejects all cooperation at the regional level. It will act jointly if there is no danger of a center forming. PCF activity on the regional level was well-reflected at the Brussels Conference of European Communist Parties, January, 1974. This foreshadowed the type of cooperation that existed until 1978, but which seems less likely during the 1980s, as certain European parties drift apart. The agenda at Brussels was broad, the monetary crisis; migrant labor, multinational corporations: in short, problems peculiar to Europe.[2] The PCF was not seeking any special relationship to the Parties of the

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[2] Le Monde, October 5, 1973, p. 10 and January 20, 1974, pp. 1 and 2.

EEC states. Some document might emerge with action proposals, but any statement issuing from Brussels would have strictly the status of recommendations. The PCF, along with the other parties, preferred consensus rather than majority-rule decision-making. It sought a voluntary coordination in which parties would exchange information and experience. However, the French and other Parties will evolve common strategies on questions peculiar to Europe. The internationalization of production requires some internationalization of struggle, given the progress of the integration process in Europe. For instance when two European Parties are dealing with the same multinational, coordination is feasible. A resolution was adopted at Brussels supporting 75,000 workers on strike against Michelin in Britain, Ireland, Spain and Italy. On more basic issues no regional positions emerged. Thus an attempt to set forth a common strategy for dealing with social democrats proved elusive. Discussions were frank, with no attempts at a cosmetic unity, which suggests some democratization of old Stalinist practices, at least at the international level.

The Soviet connection. It was suggested earlier that Eurocommunism implied a certain distance between the Western Parties and the USSR. Indeed in the 1970s all of the Parties in Europe insisted on a broadened licence to criticize repressive aspects of the East bloc. The PCF was more muted than some of the other Parties. But Marchais has moved far beyond Thorez, and has persuaded his membership "to abandon

the illusion that somewhere in the East there exists a perfect society".[3] On the other hand, it is necessary to distinguish between what is a fundamental, a priori anti-Communist choice, and what is instead, a reservation, a demur, a disagreement, a dissent on certain positions.[4] Kriegel has gone so far as to argue that Eurocommunism does not mark a break with the Soviets. In her view, it is still very much Communism. The Western Parties require the Soviet Union; they are powerless without it.[5] Whether such a view still applies to the Italian and Spanish Parties, which have broken with the CPSU on major issues, is open to question. But it still applies to the PCF. Tiersky, too, doubts that there would ever be a full break between the PCF and the Soviet Communists.[6]

The important point is that the PCF continues to conceptualize in bloc terms and it rejects the West in principle. This distinguishes it from some of the other mass Communist Parties in Europe. Paradoxically, even its repeated insistence on nationalindependence has an internationalist dimension: the goal being 1) reduce United States influence on the Continent, and 2) to prevent Western Europe from evolving into an economic, military and political community that might imperil the Soviet

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[3]Annie Kriegel, French CP Regroups", The New Republic, September 16, 1978, p. 10.

[4]Antonio Rubbi in Rinascita 6, February 6, 1976, pp. 17-18.

[5]Private discussion, November 14, 1978.

[6]"The French Communist Party and Détente", Journal of International Affairs (Vol. 28, No. 2, 1974), p. 205.

bloc.

In fact, I can locate no actions or strategies of the PCF described in these pages that would in any way contradict either of these two propositions. On the other hand, one should not distort this internationalist dimension into the misconception that the French Communists are seeking a reversal of alliances, a joining by France to the Warsaw Pact.

At its Twenty Third Congress at Vitry in 1979, the PCF realigned itself closer to the Soviet Union, declaring its overall judgment of the Socialist states to be positive, "le bilan globalement positif". By 1980, it would be difficult to speak of a genuine Eurocommunism at all. The PCF went on to consumate the break with other European Parties by supporting Soviet action in Afghanistan in 1980 and by its acceptance of the military takeover in Poland in December, 1981. Italian Communists, on the other hand, have undertaken a possibly historic break with the USSR, going so far as to suggest that the propulsive force issuing from the October Revolution is exhausted.

For the Soviet Union the dilemma is real: as it stuggles to preserve empire in the East, it loses the allegiance of its pro consuls in the West. The process of regaining Czechoslovakia and now Poland back into the bloc has induced the Eurocommunist parties of Spain and Italy to break with Moscow. The PCF continues to walk a tight rope,

juggling the ambiguities of independence and loyalty.

The core of the problem arises from the fact that the Communists long ago designated the nation state to be the vehicle of social transformation. When there later came into existence a plurality of Communist states, it was no longer feasible to preserve the single center of ideological authority in Moscow. This led to the divergencies in the system which today are progressively disintegrating the world movement.

There is a further problem. As the reformist parties of the West, those that have broken with the USSR, enter into a government role, they generate dangerous revisionist tendencies in the East European states. This could be destabilizing and even lead to the dismemberment of the entire edifice. This remains speculative at this time, but it does suggest areas for further exploration.

Détente and the status quo. Clearly, then, the USSR has valid reasons to be wary of the reformist Parties. But it also has reason to restrain the more progressively revolutionary Parties, such as the Portuguese. These parties could endanger the status quo in Europe. And during a period of détente, the USSR is eager to preserve the existing balance in Europe. Why risk the tangible benefits of détente for a possible victory in Portugal? Recognizing this, the PCF in the 1970s repeatedly

reminded its adherents (and the USSR) that détente in Europe in no way implied acceptance of the status quo in France. It reserved the right to make its transformations. This was important during the years reviewed here, essentially years of détente. The issue is more muted today with the passing of détente in the 1980s.

One must conclude that the PCF remains ambiguous about the desirability of détente. Officially it supports détente, and for valid reasons: many historic achievements have occurred during periods of relaxation, rather than when East and West were clashing. In fact, most Communist Parties, including the PCF, developed their national and international strategies on the assumption that détente would be lasting. A more benign USSR makes the PCF appear less menacing, more legitimate.

On the other hand, détente suggests to Frenchmen a superpower condominium, a freezing of the status quo, evoking the Yalta style of decision-making over the heads of Europeans. This is rejected by all political groupings. Even today, Mitterrand identifies the Yalta Agreement as a major source of tension.[7]

A further factor concerning Communists and the East-West balance is that the PCF (and the PCI) has grown so powerful in its own right, that it is a complicating factor in East-West relations. The Soviets

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[7]Die Welt, January 2-3, 1982, p. 1.

must deal with it not merely as a fraternal party, but as a political force in its own right, influencing government policy, and therefore interstate relations. In this sense as well, the entry of a Communist Party into government could be destabilizing to superpower relations.

The interplay of domestic allies and foreign support. Following the collapse of negotiations over the updating of the Programme commun in September, 1977 and the electoral defeat of the Left in Spring, 1978, the Communists re-enclosed themselves, if not in a ghetto, in relative isolation. The strategy of employing the PS as a stepping stone to power had failed (largely because the Mitterrand forces were entertaining the same strategy in return - successfully). The Party acted to renew ties to its traditional working class base, continuing to attack the Socialists, now increasingly described as social democrats. It awaited better days. And while it awaited better days, it conceded a vague allegiance to the Union of the Left. To employ Tiersky's terms, the Party was shifting from its "government" aspect to its "tribune" function, rallying Frenchmen around various popular domestic themes, unemployement, the drug danger, and the problem of immigration. Some demagogic and even racist themes emerged. What is significant for our analysis is that in a period of domestic isolation such as this, the PCF has a continuing need for allies. This suggests an interesting dynamic in their behavior.

1) Cut off from domestic allies, the Communists will move to

strengthen ties to the USSR.

2) Conversely, when isolated from the Soviet Union, the PCF seeks broader domestic alliances. Thus the search for new allies at home varies inversely with the closeness of the relationship to the USSR.

With its domestic alliance disintegrating rapidly in 1977-78, the PCF in isolation prudently edged closer to the USSR and the foreign policies it proclaimed. Thus the Communists:

- Issued their positive judgment on the Socialist countries at their Twenty-third Congress.
- Supported the Soviet interpretation of the Sino-Soviet War.[8]
- Organized in April, 1980 a Paris conference of East bloc and Western Parties to mobilize support behind Soviet positions on disarmament in Europe: opposing the NATO decision to emplace cruise missiles in Europe.
- Supported the Soviet Union, isolated by its invasion of Afghanistan.

In edging closer to Soviet foreign policy the French Party was growing increasingly out of alignment with other European Parties, particularly the Italian, which was itself developing some novel perspectives. The PCI declined to partici in the 1980 disarmament conference organized by the PCF. In fact, that week Berlinguer pointedly held discussions with Mitterrand and Willy Brandt, pursuing his new

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[8] Le Monde, May 10, 1979, p. 10.

strategy of the "Euro-left", opening up a broad dialogue with social democratic forces in Europe.[9]

The crisis in Poland, following upon the Afghanistan crisis, undermined still further the solidarity of Western Communists. The PCI, in condemning that East bloc repression, moved toward its historic break with the Soviet model. The PCF was one of the few major Western parties (and surely the only one linked to the exercise of power) which defended the dictature militaire in Warsaw.[10] The Party displayed its readiness to provoke a possible first split inside the Government since the joint victory of the two parties in May, 1981. The PCF, as so often in the past, was prepared to endure unpopularity to regain its internationalist identity, which, we have seen, it interprets as a capacity for radical action. Having 14 years earlier condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia, why did it now not assert a similar stand for independence regarding Poland? In the latter case, the Soviets were implicated less overtly, less brutally than in 1968. The PCF could uphold the fiction that it was a purely internal affair. More important, Rochet and the PCF leadership could never accept the Soviet argument that Dubcek was a threat to socialism. Communist leadership however does today judge Solidarity as an anti-socialist force.[11]

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[9] International Herald Tribune, April 2, 1980, p. 1.

[10] Le Monde, December 17, 1981, p. 1.

[11] See Marchais' letter to Jaruzelsky, Frankfurter Rundschau, December 25, 1981, p. 1.

Intra-socialist wars. These various conflicts and crises around which the Russians attempt to line up the loyalty and approval of various Communists, suggest a new factor in international relations, what Kriegel terms the Guerre intra-socialiste.[12] Prague, Budapest, Somalia, Afghanistan, Poland, and the Sino-Vietnam war: the PCF is invariably drawn in to take a position on these conflicts. Socialism has not solved the problem of war and peace, which had been the great hope of 1920 when Lenin founded the International. Generally, the PCF has supported the Soviet view. Thus China was blamed for the 1979 war with Vietnam.

The durability of the Left coalition. It is too soon to make an informed judgement, but some observations can be made. Chapter IV on the Programme commun noted that it was invariably foreign policy disputes that had shattered the great historical alliances between the Communists and Socialists, whether in 1939 or 1947. Thus it would be imprudent to ignore the latent possibility, particularly since each coalition partner conceptualizes and draws its values from a different international bloc. The PCF enters the new Government in a diminished position, having dropped to a 16 percent share of the electorate in 1981. Nevertheless, the two coalition parties, despite sharp foreign policy differences, manifest a shared interest in preserving the coalition intact. From 1978 to 1981, the PCF had maneuvered itself into

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[12] Le Figaro, February 26, 2979, p. 5.

isolation, resulting in its weakest electoral performance since the Third Republic. Rigid structure, and dogmatic behavior are growing archaic; a renewed tilt toward adventurist Soviet behavior is also damaging. The PCF risks being marginalized, as it persists in preserving its identity and its uniqueness.

The Socialists: Some Concuding Observations

Since World War II, the Socialists have recast international perspectives fundamentally. The more crucial areas I would list are the following.

Alliance policy. After some agonizing, Socialists accepted the post-war consensus of the Center, adhering France to Germany against the continental threat from Russia. This was a historic reversal.

Defense policy. After some confusion, the PS has devised a coherent policy overcoming the pacifism that had been so self-destructive in the Third Republic. This too I would label basic.

Third World policy. Earlier Socialists accepted the essential framework of Empire and French Union. They lacked any persuasive summons to the emerging colonial world. This has been reversed. The post-Mollet Party emerging from Épinay has gone on to elaborate some broad humanist policies to deal with basic inequities in a post-colonial era. Under the direction of Lionel Jospin, these have even evoked some of the fervor of the Nineteenth Century struggle for French

workers. On the other hand, policies are tempered by realism in regions vital to France's requirements.

Independence. Socialists continue the Gaullist legacy of national independence and autonomy from the United States. In their own manner, they appear committed to dislodging the hegemony of the superpowers.

Europe. They appear committed to the view that a Socialist France requires a socialist and integrated Europe (although there is disagreement here). Like the Communists, they have taken a critical distance from the larger international movement to which they adhere.

Tempering the Communists. Since 1968, Socialists have helped integrate the PCF into France's political system, negotiating them into the acceptance of realities of European integration, a more objective view of the USSR, and a more realistic view of certain defense questions. These too would have to be cited as tangible achievements. Admittedly, this is a broad listing of general achievements. All have been examined in the foregoing chapters.

The PS and the dilemma of bipolarity. In reviewing the above accomplishments, there is one area where I would note some confusions. This concerns the adjustment to a bipolar world. On the one hand, the PS, in its Gaullo-socialist aspect, aspires to escape the dominance of the United States over the West. Yet it recognizes some risks in accomplishing this. The ability of the United States to dominate or mediate

the rivalries among the states of the industrial West has provided a framework of world order. Left to themselves, capitalist states might war as in 1914 and 1939. Even Lenin did not anticipate the order-producing effect of a hegemonistic superpower. If I am interpreting Mitterrand's design correctly, this framework is to be dismantled. Instead, there would arise autonomous power centers among the capitalist democracies, with all the instabilities inherent in such rivalries. Here too there is room for further investigation to discern what exactly the PS has in mind - and how it differs from Gaullist conceptions.

View of the United States. By 1974, the Socialists had moved far from earlier Atlanticist positions. Despite the end of the war in Vietnam, there was a deeper suspicion of United States objectives on the Continent. It was described as seeking a hegemony through the penetration of its multinationals and through the Kissinger doctrine which described Europe as a mere "regional power" during the oil crisis.[13] Party pronouncements warned of becoming a satellite of the United States and termed American power a destabilizer of the Third World and a supporter of totalitarian regimes.[14] Mitterrand was sharply critical of America's unilateral renunciation of the Breton Woods framework.[15]

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[13] Le Monde, April 14, 1974, p. 4.

[14] Jean Paucot, Réflexions, p. 44-45.

[15] Le Monde, October 8, 1974, p. 12.

Socialist policies today. Despite rhetoric, one would have to conclude that the PS has never renounced its commitment to identify France with the West, which in the final analysis rests upon a shared value system. The mainstream of the Party does not challenge this. One can, though, distinguish policy areas where the new Government may assert independence.

At this point one may discern some broad patterns to Socialist Government policy since May, 1981. For instance, there has been a consistency in opposing all super power interventions, whether in Afghanistan or Central America. And it is highly significant that the presence of PCF ministers in no way hindered the Government from registering a firm opposition to the military takeover in Poland, a stand which marked the first foreign policy dispute among the two coalition Parties. They have agreed to disagree, which may provide a formula for handling such disagreements in the future, suggesting a certain stability to the coalition.

The regime seeks to avoid giving offense to either super power, a goal which is probably illusory, if genuine independence is to be pursued. Nevertheless, President Reagan at the Ottawa Summit declared himself "pleasantly surprised" with policies of the new Government. And the Soviets through Pravda cited the "positive but limited nature" of

PS performance.[16] The statement was nuanced, approving areas where Mitterrand was continuing established Gaullist positions (remaining out of NATO and furthering the development of ties with the USSR) and where he was launching new initiatives, as in Central America. They criticized his support for NATO rearmament. (France has approved the emplacement of intermediate range missiles in Europe, but they would, of course, not be placed in France.)

Mitterrand has been reassuring verbally toward the United States, always careful to avoid genuinely angering the Russians. Thus he has not supported sanctions against the Soviets regarding Poland. And he has signed a multi-billion dollar gas pipeline project with the USSR. By pursuing such initiatives, Mitterrand could collide with some of the more crusading aspects of anti-communism manifested across the Atlantic.

A new, Gaullo-socialist independence is discernible in Third World policy. Sale of weapons to totalitarian or racist regimes will be halted. On the other hand, a favored regime, such as India, will be sold Mirage aircraft valued at over three billion dollars.[17]

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[16] Analysis was by Pravda Editor-in-Chief Victor Afanassiev, October 16, 1977, as reported in Le Figaro, October 24-25, 1981.

[17] New York Times, November 13, 1981, p. 3.

Africa. The new Government provides support to some important black guerilla groups in South Africa and Namibia, which is at variance with United States positions. The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) was permitted to open an information bureau in Paris.[18] Steps such as this highlight a new tone in foreign policy, revealing a spirit of independence not displayed under the Giscard d'Estaing Government. The PS is living up to a heritage of support for certain leftist and revolutionary causes, in much the same spirit that it supported Allende in the 1970s. Mitterrand has said he will continue to support certain causes.

On a more pragmatic, less ideological level, the new Government is aiding Chad in removing Libya's troops. This is related to a broader effort to preserve French influence in Africa, and to continue support to governments and forces that historically had good ties to earlier French regimes, such as the Ivory Coast, Gabon and the Central African Republic.[19]

Latin America. The challenge to the United States has been direct. France has recognized the guerilla organization of El Salvador as a legitimate partner to negotiations. There has been very strong moral support by Socialists. An arms agreement has been concluded with

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[18] International Herald Tribune, September 12-13, 1981, p. 3.

[19] New York Times, November 4, 1981, p. 4.

Nicaragua (which the U.S. terms a subversive center throughout the region) to furnish weapons, helicopters and patrol boats to the Sandinista forces.[20] The rationale here - and in the large sale of Mirage jets to India - is that Third World states should not be compelled to be dependent on the superpowers. In both of these instances, the USSR would be the normal supplier. I believe that the Socialists see France as able to offer an intermediate option to those countries that do not wish to be wedded to particular superpowers.

Socialists, disarmament, and the "defense consensus". Under the guidance of Charles Hernu, the PS is carrying out an 18 percent increase in defense spending.[21] The Defense Minister goes on to note, correctly, that "France is less thwarted by neutralism (than the NATO countries)". There is little dissent to her nuclear weapons development because of the so-called "defense consensus". When, as we saw, the PCF reversed on the *force de frappe*, there was no longer a mass party opposed to the weapon. But how durable is the new consensus? The new Government is on record as favoring the U.S. proposal to station Cruise missiles in Europe as long as the Soviets do not remove their SS-20s. In the 1980s, France may lack a peace movement as such. But the "defense consensus" may be more illusory than appears. As has been documented in

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[20] *Le Monde*, January 9, 1982, pp. 1 and 3.

[21] *New York Times*, November 15, 1981, p. 5.

these pages, there is a historical sentiment (for example, the pacifism of the inter-war years) that is anti-war and anti-nuclear. This sentiment exists, submerged, inside the PS. The enthusiasm generated in other European peace movements has probably been diverted into the general euphoria of renewal following the Mitterrand victory. But such sentiment could change. Mitterrand has been critical of neutralist-pacifist positions in West Germany, Britain and the Netherlands. On the other hand, their Communist coalition partners have taken the lead in organizing anti-American (not anti-Soviet) disarmament manisfestations in Paris. The suggestion here is that the latent pacifist sentiment could be released by this campaign, upsetting the assumptions of the "defense consensus".

Final Considerations

The Communist-Socialist dynamic continues to unfold. Tours has not yet been overcome, as CERES would have it, but the two Parties are again in uneasy alliance. If anything, we have seen that communism has been largely nationalized as a world force. And, if a generalization is permitted, socialism has been internationalized. Despite the Jacobin cry that 1789 remains unfulfilled, revolutionary politics is not now on the agenda. This has been confirmed too often, as the East-West struggle has superimposed itself over the old struggle of the workers. Robert Pontillon, a veteran of the Resistance and now a PS national secretary, has said that the "two superpowers are in Europe. The

Russians are there by geography, the Americans were called in by history".[22] Geography is probably more immutable than history, but whether or not the superpowers will disengage on the old Continent is almost irrelevant. They are condemned to an uneasy interdependence, particularly since the East-bloc is no longer insulated from the boom-bust cycles of the capitalized West: one bloc condemned to the contradictions of the other. Perhaps it is this interdependence which will allow the PS to sustain its alliance with what many in it continue to view as a surrogate of another power bloc. If the Communists have been nationalized, the risk is not so great. Marchais, speaking about the vanguard role, once said that it did not come about by decree, nor was it a demand for hegemony on the Left: it was the recognition of a historic fact. But as Chevènement noted, this is dogma, not fact, hence irrefutable.[23] Duverger has been generous. He credits the PCF with an integration function.[24] Despite everything, they have since 1920 restored a consensus. "They have revalued all values". By appropriating old values and symbols - Tricolore, Marseillaise - they have reintegrated the working class into its own patrie. In this sense he is probably correct. They have compelled the once-excluded workers to participate in the nation-building process, picking up where Jaurès left off. They have played the parliamentary game, and in that sense

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[22] Réflexions, p. 3.

[23] Les socialistes, les communistes et les autres, p. 43

[24] Le Monde, March 17, 1968, p. 9.

contributed to making that game legitimate. But despite their integrating function, they have not renounced their revolutionary calling. And herein lies the ambiguity with which we began this exploration.

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