An examination of the concept of comprehensiveness with special reference to its use in urban planning.

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AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPT OF COMPREHENSIVENESS
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS USE IN URBAN PLANNING

A Dissertation Presented

By

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Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

September 1975

Political Science
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The writer gratefully acknowledges the encouragement and assistance of teachers, colleagues, friends, and family. The merits of the dissertation owe much to their efforts. For its defects I am responsible.

A special debt is owed to Professor William Connolly for his invaluable guidance throughout the writing of the dissertation and particularly for the way in which he can provide intellectual stimulation and critical support for the widely different views which his students hold.

Professor Patrick Eagan was highly supportive of my attempt to meld planning theory and political theory. He read early drafts of the first chapters and made many helpful comments. Professor Cadwell Ray provided valuable suggestions on literature. Professors Murray Kiteley and John Hoaglund read the initial draft on my distinction between a degree of truth and a degree of reality logic and helped me to understand the philosophic significance of what I was saying--and some of its dangers.

Thanks is also due to Mrs. Darrell Crotts who created order out of a mess of footnotes and to Edna Carney who typed the final copy with great care and under extreme deadline pressures.

My deepest thanks must go to my families for their endurance of a lengthy and attention consuming effort. In particular I thank my wife Elaine who did extensive bibliographic research, typed much of the first draft, helped in editing and made suggestions on style and content. Without her support the dissertation could not have been written.
An Examination of the Concept of Comprehensiveness

With Special Reference to its Use in Urban Planning

(September, 1975)

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Comprehensiveness—consideration of the whole—poses no theoretical difficulties from the viewpoint of the plain-man. All that is needed is to think with sufficient abstractness. Perhaps abstract thought is itself problematic, however. The West has not held so traditionally. We say that thought is power and we value power. But the human situation resulting from such thought is one of increasing polarization among men.

Human thought divides one into self and abstract concept of self—into subject and object. While some say that a person can reflect and yet not be self-alienated, the human situation suggests otherwise. I assume that alienation is inevitable, but I also assume that no individual could tolerate its full impact within himself. He must take sides and project alienation onto society, thus increasing its dangers. But to remain whole he then must try to recognize that his opponent's position is equally true and necessary. The whole is a
Neither operationalism nor ordinary language analysis seems an appropriate approach to this concept of wholeness. I examine it as a conflict—a conflict within the thought of two writers. Charles Lindblom tends to side with the objective in human nature and Karl Mannheim with the subjective.

To emphasize the objective is to see oneself and others merely as physical bodies with different behavioral tendencies. An immediate problem for Lindblom is to explain how there can be social agreement among a multiplicity of different values. A more basic problem is to explain the very existence of such values (which are abstractions) if all one encounters is particular behavior. According to Lindblom it is just through the clash of opposing values, in a process of bargaining, that social agreement arises and values appear.

To emphasize the subjective is to see different people as aspects of one mind, or at least as operating within one conceptual framework. Mannheim leans this way. His problem is one of explaining how to achieve autonomy within a conceptual framework or, more immediately, how to escape the rigidities of bureaucratic-technological society. Mannheim suggests that it is precisely in recognizing one’s necessary conceptual and social boundaries that one escapes from them.

If the whole is a dilemma, then the clearer and simpler one’s position—the more it can be summarized—the more immediately one-sided it must be. To embrace wholeness, such a one-sided position must be tacitly identified with its opposition. In the spirit of Hegel, I interpret the thought of Lindblom
and Mannheim as beginning in a narrow, clear position which, because it is fully though tacitly identified with its opposite, has little meaning. I see the development of their thought as attempts to loosen this identity, hence increasing meaning, while yet retaining it, and hence preserving the whole. The attempt moves the debate partly out of society and into the person's own thought--it becomes broader, more complex, and safer.

I argue by analogy that planned society can itself be interpreted as a dialectical struggle among conceptual frameworks in which the smaller provide purpose to the larger and the larger provide means to the smaller. I thus reject the view that there is only one correct scale of social understanding. Social reality is neither a large technocratic bureaucracy nor a small community. It is both, in necessary conflict with each other.

Every human has both right and duty to take personal responsibility for the whole at his own best level of understanding. One result will be an increase in personal stress, especially among those most facile with abstractions, but hopefully another result will be social survival.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This is an essay about comprehensiveness or wholeness in decision-making, about what we mean when we talk about "seeing the big picture" or "taking an overview." If you ask the one who has to do it--the governor, the mayor, the chief planner--he is apt to answer that it means personal agony. It means struggling with mutually exclusive, yet equally and highly worthy, demands. In short, it means to confront dilemma. In this essay I want to speculate about that answer.

Maybe this confrontation with dilemma is not a temporary aberration. Maybe for someone to be a whole human being or something to be a whole human society is necessarily to be a center of opposing forces--to be self-alienated. In that case, to the extent that we cannot tolerate this struggle within our individual selves, we must choose a side. And in joining with others of like choice, we will externalize and magnify the struggle--and increase its dangers. On this view, the hot wars between nations, the cold wars between cities and their neighborhoods, and all those other societal wars will be the price we must pay for our own inner peace.

Of course this is mere speculation. But the times almost demand that we speculate in daring ways. As the result of growing limits both on physical
and social resources we face the real possibility, internationally, of having
to adopt a "lifeboat ethics" in which the death of whole peoples may be the cost
of survival for others. And it is little consolation to know that at the national
and urban scales the required cost may be only increasing poverty, crime,
and mental disease among those sacrificed.

My essay is an elaboration and defense of this supposition that the whole
is a dilemma and that the price of social peace is our willingness to internalize
that dilemma. The essay means to be an instance of the action it recommends.
It is not a promise of solution to the human condition. It is an offer, on behalf
of urban planners, to share that condition.

Planners in a Quandary

My research began as a response to a concrete difficulty which profes-
sional urban planners of the United States have recently encountered. They are
no longer sure what they are supposed to do.

Until the 1960's, urban planning in the United States largely meant
physical planning. Physical planning was a response to the congestion, pollu-
tion, deterioration, and, in general, the physical chaos, of the early industrial
city. It was not a deeply thought out response because it apparently didn't need
to be. The obvious solution, so it seemed, was to make a "comprehensive
plan" for a city's growth. This comprehensive plan would focus in a map,
which would separate polluting factories from residences, would establish
limits on the height and coverage of buildings so as to reduce traffic and light
problems, and would otherwise organize the city in the same way that an architect would organize a well designed house for a docile client.

But the city was not a house and the client was not docile. In the United States, until the 1930's, the city was little more than an arena for the play of market forces. And even afterwards market forces continued to play the main initiating role in physical development. At their best the planning maps did not say what would happen but only what was allowed, and even then exceptions were easily gotten by those with sufficient economic power.

Following World War II, a wide range of federal grant programs were established or expanded to fund certain aspects of urban growth. The most substantial funding was for suburban single family housing, an intercity express highway system, and some very limited redevelopment of the urban cores. Some funds were also provided, mostly to the smaller cities and towns, for the plan-making upon which other grants were often conditioned. Given these many opportunities, urban planning became a high growth profession throughout the 1950's and for most of the 1960's.

People seldom question their basic assumptions when things are going well. Not until the later 1960's were there any general doubts within the profession that planners really could take a comprehensive view, as they understood it, and could apply it. By that time, however, two opposing tendencies had become evident.

Firstly, planners discovered that their comprehensive approach was more difficult than expected and that they really had not been using it. On the
one hand, the market system was still making the most important decisions—the location of industry and business and the general suburban movement. On the other, when planners did intervene they were most effective when they intervened on the side of the middle class or the rich. A redevelopment project to assemble land for business, or an exclusionary zoning ordinance to protect a suburb from low tax generators, would succeed. But a plan for public housing, or to improve the parks and schools of a ghetto area, was very likely to fail. Thus the planners were not helping everyone to the same extent.

Some planners saw nothing upsetting in this first discovery. For them it was a sign of the planner's maturity when he at last recognized that planning, like all else in government, was essentially a process of bargaining among interest groups. Granting that the rich had more power, these planners assumed that even the poorest would gain enough, since the economy was constantly growing and there was a basic consensus about matters in liberal societies. Other planners were equally sanguine about the discovery but for virtually opposite reasons. They attacked the depersonalizing inequitable features of large scale industrial society and saw the ideal of comprehensiveness as one more example of such features. They were glad enough, therefore, to see its limited success. They were confident that an agglomeration of small, relatively self-sufficient, communities would provide enough social order.  

1For a more extended discussion of liberal and radical planning, see text, chap. V, pp. 310-17, 318-22.
The second thing many planners discovered was the desperate need for some kind of comprehensive approach. Previously bemused by the easy money of federal grants, they had often taken their own profession less seriously than it deserved. They had been content to argue its need on grounds of aesthetics or efficiency. But these grounds were not greatly persuasive in a growing economy, one which apparently could afford waste and disorder more than it could afford restrictions on private enterprise. It is not when there is plenty for everyone (or everyone who is noticed) that we most need planning. It is when we face scarcity. Outsiders, and especially those in the environmental movement, made the strongest call for a more truly comprehensive approach and they based it on a stronger argument, survival.

According to the environmentalists, we must try to halt suburban sprawl in favor of revitalizing central cities and older small towns. They favor decentralization if it is achieved by concentrated settlements. They also favor mass transportation over the expressway system. The more thoughtful of them argue, as well, for a greater sharing of wealth and more attention to the basic needs of disadvantaged groups. All these aims require a more inclusive viewpoint, and probably a broader control, than has previously been available to public planning. And they are far more controversial.

Buffeted by these opposing viewpoints, the present day planner is often understandably perplexed. The proponents of interest group planning, I shall call them "liberal planners," assure him that things are going pretty well just as they are. The critics of industrial society, I shall call them "radical
planners," are equally sure that things need drastic improvement, but they agree with the liberals that the traditional comprehensive plan is no way to get it. Some of the environmentalists overlap the two previous groups, but others call for a tougher more inclusive planning, especially on physical matters. They want states to take back from the cities and counties much of their planning powers and they prefer more action at the national level also. While the liberals and radicals envision an explicitly political planning, environmentalists tend to favor the traditional view that planning is above politics. They suggest that the environmental planner, in particular, is sensitive to a long range public interest which should override the immediate concerns of elected officials.  

The concept of comprehensiveness is at the center of this dispute. Does society need to plan itself as a whole? If it does, can this occur indirectly, as the liberal and radical planners suppose, or must it mean an explicit large scale control? Or, again, is the need for explicit large scale control met, itself, through something like liberal and radical modes of planning? Is comprehensiveness perhaps a composite of all three approaches?

Because of the breadth of the preceding discussion about the planner's situation, and because the points are generally well accepted within the profession, the writer has not attempted to provide documentation. If there is a quarrel with what has been written, it would be that the categories of planners overlap more than has been suggested and that the writer has said little about the systems-analytic approach which many planners consider to be dominant. On the latter point, systems analysis is the present day variant of the same rationality model which underlay the earlier mapped plan approach. This rationality model is discussed in text, chap. V, pp. 311-13, see also text footnotes 25, 26, chap. V.
My essay is a response, at the level of theory, to this very immediate problem of American urban planners. Because the response is theoretical I must now leave the most concrete aspects of that problem. But they will reappear later on.

At the theoretical level, the planner's quandary is to know just what we do mean by comprehensiveness. The need is for a concept examination. And this, specifically, is what my essay provides. The effort divides into three parts. In the first part (Chapter II) I propose a method of concept examination because I have misgivings about the appropriateness, to the concept of comprehensiveness, of the methods now extant. In the second part (Chapters III and IV) I apply this method to the writings of two important planning theorists. In the third part (Chapter V) I consider, in a rather wide ranging discussion, the practical implications of my method and its applications.

As was said earlier, my total effort can best be called speculative. It is speculative not in having no connection with the current literature, but in making unconventional interpretations of that literature. These interpretations can be summarized as a series of suppositions and such a series is presented below as the most appropriate precis of the essay. Note, incidentally, that I treat the terms comprehensiveness, wholeness, and completeness as synonyms throughout all that follows.

Suppositions about Wholeness

1. Western Civilization traditionally has believed that the capacity for
abstract thought was perhaps the distinguishing feature of the whole human being. But suppose that this capacity, which allows us to imagine something different and better both in ourselves and in society, is also that which alienates us from ourselves and each other. Such a result would occur because in self consciousness we became divided into subject and object and, then, because we projected that division onto the social world. Suppose that our humanness will not allow us completely to reject the objective side of our nature and thus to become spontaneous and unthinking in our responses. And suppose that neither will it allow us completely to reject the subjective side and thus to become mere centers of mechanical behavior or model points of external social relations. Then we are saying that to be a whole human is necessarily to be self alienated.

In that case, the work of the thinker cannot be to show a way out of the problem--as there is no way that would not destroy a person's humanity. The thinker's work, instead, is to display the structure of the problem so that we have an understanding of what must be endured and can devise a plan to share the burden equally.

2. If the subject and object sides of a human are both present within that human, then knowledge about him, the kind of knowledge provided by the social sciences, is not obtained from some outside world of neutral facts. If we want to know about a person's overt behavior, his objective side, we must know about the meanings he himself puts into that behavior; we must know, that is, his subjective side. Thus if we want to know the meanings of human concepts,
we will find them to be internal meanings; there is nothing "out there" to point to. But, furthermore, these internal human concepts are each a unity of opposites. For each is a unity of the objective and subjective sides of the human.

3. What does it mean, though, to say that concepts are internal? Does it mean that they are internal to each human or internal to the whole society of humans? If a human could absorb the full burden of his self alienation within himself, then the concepts would have to be internal to himself, as he would have taken into himself the alienation previously projected onto society. But what could it mean to say that the concepts were internal to himself? It could mean something like the following (the example is not fully developed). If I define, say, a "traffic problem" as a problem when that "so and so ahead of me at the stop light doesn't start up fast enough," that is not a concept internal to me. But if I leave this nearest cause of my aggravation and trace through all the intermediate connections until I return to myself as tacit supporter and beneficiary of, say, a competitive inequitable system which results in different frustration tolerances, then my concept of a traffic problem more properly may be called internal. A more complete example of such an internal meaning is given in Chapter II on pages 94-96.

4. Suppose that no human could fully absorb his subject-object tension within himself but had to choose sides and thus project his tension onto the larger society in the form of public issues. Then human concepts would be, in part, internal to the society as a whole. This means that these concepts,
which by conjecture are always a unity of opposing forces, would now be defined not wholly by a conflict within the person but also, in part, by a conflict within the society. No concept could be understood except in contrast to its opposite.

The preceding suppositions are very abstract but it was necessary that they be set forth to provide the foundation for what follows. Insofar as they can be defended, the defense appears in Chapter II, and particularly in the discussion of a degree of reality logic. The more specific suppositions which appear below are the bases for the last section of Chapter II and for the later chapters.

5. The last section of Chapter II is based on, and gives some defense of, the following suppositions. Consider the life thought of a person who has written extensively on some social topics. Suppose that this person's thought, or a major part of it, takes one side of a certain public issue. If asked to guess the point of his thought process, we normally would say that it was an attempt to reach consistency and at the same time to reach a subtlety adequate to the objective facts of human experience.

Suppose, now, that neither consistency nor a correspondence to external facts is possible but that the thinker is on one side of a hard social dilemma, generated by human alienation. Suppose that his earliest thought begins with a primitive intuitive concept which includes both sides of the dilemma. Suppose that the development of his thought is not truly a reaching for consistency but is instead an attempt to hold onto his primitive faith in the identity of both sides
of the dilemma, while at the same time he increasingly distinguishes the two so that he can accept one side and ever more fully reject the other. And suppose finally that his "success" in doing this requires him explicitly to assume the side of his opponents while he must explicitly contrast that position with his own.

These are the suppositions, or main features, of what I call a dialectical method of concept examination. I suppose, so far as the concept of wholeness is concerned, that the appropriate method of concept examination is neither to operationalize wholeness nor to explore how we all ordinarily use that term. Instead I see the method as a tracing of some person's response to a dilemma he faces.

6. Charles Lindblom has argued that the process of pluralist bargaining is not an obstruction to coordination but is a way to coordinate. In Chapter III I examine his arguments through the perspective of my dialectical method. I suppose that he begins his thought with a kind of primitive faith in the compatibility, even identity, of bargaining and coordination. I suppose that the development of his thought is an attempt to maintain this identity, while more sharply distinguishing out the concept of bargaining so his claim that bargaining can coordinate will not be merely tautologous.

I suppose, finally, that he explicitly accepts the basic assumption of those liberals who believe in central planning. He assumes, in other words, that there is a consensus on important public matters. Because there is, it is possible for bargaining to coordinate probably about as well as central
coordination. But this is not the whole of his position, I suggest, since if it were the result would be trivial. The significant position is that people with widely different desires can coordinate by bargaining. In order to say the latter, he needs to contrast explicitly his own model of decision-making with those of central-planning liberals so as to suggest that his model does allow more conflict despite his consensus assumptions which imply the opposite.

7. Karl Mannheim has argued that the knowledge people have, as well as their beliefs, is affected by their social conditions. They see social reality from a "perspective," a conceptual framework. But Mannheim adds that it is possible for some people, at least to loose themselves from their perspectives. His arguments are considered in Chapter IV. I am supposing there that he, too, begins his thought with a faith in the compatibility of apparent opposites. In this case the belief is that "systematization," by which he means a sort of evolving conceptual structure, has intrinsic to it the notion of truth independent of that structure. I suppose that the development of his thought is an attempt to maintain this suggested identity of conceptual structure with conceptual freedom while at the same time distinguishing out the idea of freedom so that it is not simply a label for whatever the conceptual structure permits.

I suppose, finally, that Mannheim assumes, in the thought I am describing, a position often associated with totalitarian political regimes. This is the position that there is one best conceptual structure at a certain time, although that one is always in process of evolution. The view suggests an embracing historical destiny. Because there is this embracing history, it is possible to
achieve conceptual freedom; such achievement is automatic. That it is automatic, however, is just another expression of that trivial result one gets by identifying destiny and freedom. The significant position would be that a person can become free of his conceptual structure and not within it. To be able to say the latter, Mannheim needs to contrast his model of social reality with that of the totalitarians to show that his allows a true freedom, despite the assumption he shares with them which suggests the opposite.

The key to my examination of the thought of Lindblom and Mannheim is the supposition that they both face problems which are logically impossible, by the criterion of formal logic. Hence they must be understood to be elaborating their respective dilemmas instead of resolving them.

The results of the concept examinations in Chapters III and IV are not, except negatively, conclusions to be applied in Chapter V. Rather, they are insights into the structure of our response to dilemmas. Hence the results can be brought to the last chapter only as analogies. They suggest a structure which may also be found in the practice of urban planning.

8. Having assumed that every human being must to some extent externalize and thus put off upon society his own inner dilemmas, I suppose, in Chapter V, that the burden of these social dilemmas is not spread uniformly. I suggest that it is most easily avoided by those who are most able to generate it--the meritocracy or administrative class. Within this class are the planners. I suppose further that the principal expression of this inequity is belief that there is only one correct scale of human understanding--one true whole. And
I suggest that the presently accepted scale may have passed beyond the competence of many members of society. I suppose finally that there may be a sense in which simpler, narrower, conceptual frameworks may be as wholistic as broader ones. I argue that this supposition implies a different relationship between the high level professional or administrator and other people than that to which we are accustomed—a relationship more stressful to the former precisely because it is more meaningful to the latter.

These then are my principal suppositions. They are not undefended, but I call them suppositions because they are unconventional interpretations of our social experience and because they are in some cases too wide-ranging to permit in-depth defense.

It is time now to take a deeper look at the concept of comprehensiveness, as preparation for the concept examinations in Chapters III and IV.

Two Problems of Comprehensiveness

I have alluded to two problems encountered respectively by Lindblom and Mannheim, problems which I call dilemmas. I consider them to be problems both of comprehensiveness as a concept and of comprehensiveness as that to which the concept refers. (Comprehensiveness is a human concept and, for reasons already presented in supposition 2. above, we cannot draw a sharp distinction, in such cases, between concept and referent.)

Before the 1960's, most professional planners in the United States would have recognized only one of these problems of comprehensiveness. The
problem for them was how to achieve it. How could the society achieve an overview of urban physical problems and a control of those problems, within the bounds of a free enterprise, pluralist politics? Apparently it happened in some countries of Western Europe, toward which the American planner looked enviously. But it was seldom thought to happen here.

Recently, some American planners have identified an opposite problem. They examine the society more broadly and conclude that we are all captives of large scale bureaucracy, whatever may be the failures of urban planning per se. This condition of bureaucratic suffocation is true of industrialized societies generally, and the resulting problem is not how to achieve comprehensiveness but how to avoid it. How is it possible to achieve relatively small and self-sufficient communities within the larger social order? Planners identifying this other problem look to the Republic of China or to other third world countries for their models.

The first problem of comprehensiveness is what I call the social control problem. It is the problem which concerns Charles Lindblom and also concerns those designated as liberal planners.

The second problem is what I call the social change problem. In a more abstract form it is the problem addressed by Karl Mannheim in those of his writings which especially concern me. In its immediate form it is the problem of radical planners.

I want to consider, briefly, the philosophical roots of these two problems.

The Social Control Problem. To see comprehensiveness as raising a
control problem is to adopt a viewpoint with roots in the positivist aspect of Thomas Hobbes' thought. For Hobbes, human beings are merely matter in motion and, like the elements of which they are composed, they themselves have only mechanical relations to each other. In the later language of David Hume, each human could be described as loose and separate from all others.

Humans are not separate in having distinctly different understandings. Indeed they do not have understandings at all if by this is meant something involving an intimate mixture of facts, values, and reasoning. Humans do experience sensations but these sensations will be the same for all who experience them. Also, humans can give arbitrary general "names" to similar sensations. From these names it is possible to deduce consequences. But, because the names are arbitrary many alternatives are possible and the system of knowledge deducible from one set will differ from that deducible from another. Thus, human understandings differ from each other not in themselves but because different humans make different choices in the naming of similar sensations.

All humans are governed by passions (i.e., forms of the motions which they make), and these are in all cases directed to the same general goals—self preservation and self aggrandisement. Apparently the ultimate reason that humans are attracted to different specific goals, and may acquire different

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3Hobbes is not a wholly consistent thinker. This brief and somewhat oversimplified presentation of his thought emphasizes the mechanistic side of it. The discussion is based primarily on W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, Vol. II (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1952), chap. 22.
knowledge, is because they are different physical bodies.

Perhaps the dominant of the general human passions is self preservation—expressed as an intense quest for security. Unfortunately the effect of that passion is to produce a "war of all against all" such that even the strongest lose what little security they might gain through their strength. But if we assume that men are what Hobbes says they are—simply matter in motion—then this war of all against all should raise no problem of social control. Humans will have no way to reflect on their situation and imagine the desirability of social order.

The Hobbesian view of human nature is not preposterous. It is a variant of the view held by anyone who maintains that all significant knowledge of human beings must be reducible to sense experience. And it has the great virtue of explaining human differences and separateness. Both are due to the existence of different physical bodies.

Given this view of human nature, however, a social control problem only appears when the view becomes inconsistent. According to Hobbes the response to the war of all against all is an agreement among men, ceding power to an absolute sovereign who maintains order. But this response assumes that men can, in fact, reflect.

In any case, the social control problem itself can now be concisely stated. If there is a plurality of individuals with competing preferences, how can these preferences be ordered into a collective preference to which all
will agree? For if all do not agree and hence do not accept the collective preference then it does not function as a truly collective preference.

So stated, the social control problem is almost the same as what is otherwise called the collective choice problem. Because I assume no existing or enduring consensus on procedures or policies, but assume instead a sharp conflict, I emphasize the necessity for any collective preference to be unanimous.

The difference between my approach to the collective choice problem and that of most others consists in my assumptions, first, that the problem is logically impossible to solve and, second, that this logical impossibility does not mean an end to intellectual effort on the topic. It simply means a redirection of that effort. The first assumption I perhaps share with Kenneth Arrow and some writings of Robert Paul Wolff. The second, which may seem absurd to the reader, is defended in Chapter II at pages 74-81.

The Social Change Problem. Some thinkers take a position virtually the opposite of Hobbes'. Hegel, in his philosophy of history, is thought to

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4. This statement of the problem, with the exception of the reference to unanimity, is similar to that of Kenneth Arrow. See text, chap. II, p. 76.

5. This version therefore differs from that of writers such as J. M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock who, in the Calculus of Consent, also emphasize at least near unanimity, but who assume that such near unanimity is possible. For a discussion and critique of their view, see Brian Barry, Political Argument (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), chaps. XIV and XV.
His views provide one of the philosophically most extreme foundations of the social change problem. Where for Hobbes there was only matter, for Hegel there is only mind. And if there is only mind then there can ultimately be but one mind. No mind would be able to know another except as an aspect of itself, there being no neutral standard by which both could compare themselves.

Mind, or Absolute Spirit as Hegel otherwise calls it, is a largely non-temporal process of infinite self-realization. But there is a phase of this process—the phase of "Objective Spirit"—which occurs in time. That phase is discussed in some of the most "applied" of Hegel's writings. Yet even in the unfolding of Objective Spirit it is only the whole, the process of world history, which is wholly real. Individual persons are contingent differentiations of the whole. "Mind," says Hegel, "has actuality, and individuals are accidents of this actuality." 7

In the phase of Objective Spirit even single states are only passing

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7 Hegel, "The Philosophy of Right," ["Addition 100" of "Hegel's Additions to the Philosophy of Right"], p. 133. Also see ["Addition 94"], p. 132; and ["Addition 152"], p. 141.
phases, although they do seem to have a higher reality than individuals.

A state is higher not because it is, as for Hobbes, a contract among people whose individuality is rooted in their physically distinct bodies. It is higher because it is an organic moral community and creates individuals. It creates individuals not of course as bodies but as conscious thinking and willing beings. They exist as such only because they are members of this community.

Hegel is not primarily concerned to argue this view but to assert it as part of his description of dialectical development. He does give, however, what constitute a number of arguments. All are aspects of the claim that the community is a meaning framework. He argues that human wants as opposed to merely physical ones are socially conditioned; that a person is nobody definite except by limitation to some social group; and that the individual is only truly free when his choices are not merely arbitrary but are influenced by their content—a content already present as the customs and laws of a society. 8

Each stage in the historical development of this higher reality, the state, is called by Hegel the spirit of a people. This spirit is something like a world view and a national character existing as a single entity. It is less

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8 This summary of his arguments on the general point is largely paraphrased from a summary in Sabine, "Hegel's Political Philosophy," p. 318. On the particular point that a person becomes definite by limitation to a social group, see Hegel, "The Philosophy of Right," ["Addition 130" of "Hegel's Additions to the Philosophy of Right"], p. 139.
exclusively a way of seeing than a way of being and it comprises all aspects of social life.

The succession of dominant states is achieved through the agency of particular "world historical individuals." Spirit is not a discrete being who can act apart from individuals; Hegel does not argue that the self-consciousness of Spirit could occur in the absence of any individual self-consciousness. But world historical individuals further the goals of Spirit by intensely pursuing their own self-interest. They are not aware of these goals. Sometimes Hegel speaks as if the self-interest of world historical individuals was inevitably unethical. But he acknowledges at other times that the interests of such individuals, like those of other wise individuals within the state, may naturally serve ethical purposes, though in this case a higher ethics.  

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9". . . the history of the world occupies a higher ground than that on which morality has properly its position; which is personal character, the conscience of individuals, their particular will and mode of action. . . . They who on moral grounds, and consequently with noble intention, have resisted that which the advance of the spiritual idea makes necessary, stand higher in moral worth than those whose crimes have been turned into the means--under the direction of a superior principle--of realizing the purposes of that principle."

Then Hegel adds: "But in such revolutions both parties generally stand within the limits of the same circle of transient and corruptible existence. Consequently it is only a formal rectitude, . . . which those who stand upon ancient right and order maintain. The deeds of great men, who are the individuals of the world's history, thus appear not only justified in view of that intrinsic result of which they were not conscious, but also from the point of view occupied by the secular moralist."

But then Hegel concludes again that history has really nothing to do with morality. Hegel, "The Philosophy of History," p. 184.
From Hegel's viewpoint, at least as it is expressed in his history, there is no social change problem. The world historical individuals are as much subject to historical destiny as are any others.

A social change problem can be identified in Hegel's thought only when that thought is treated in a way which others (probably not Hegel) would call inconsistent. It appears only if we suppose that some people could become independent not only of their present social milieu but of any evolving social milieu.

The social change problem may then be stated as follows. If society, together with its concepts, is the source of human individuality and understanding, how can anyone independently alter his nature or his understanding?

This problem is what others may call the problem of cultural or social relativism. The term relativism implies that the problem is logically impossible to solve since individuality and understanding are relative to the society. I accept that implication. Again, as with the social control problem, I want to argue, however, that something's being a logical impossibility does not necessarily mean that it is no longer worth thinking about.

These problems of comprehensiveness are problems to which Lindblom and Mannheim respectively address themselves. Starting at Chapter III, I shall examine their efforts. First, though, I must explain my methodology and give its rationale. This is the purpose of Chapter II.
CHAPTER II

A DIALECTICAL METHOD OF CONCEPT EXAMINATION

"There are two kinds of truth,
small truth and great truth.
You can recognize a small truth
because its opposite is a falsehood.
The opposite of a great truth is
another truth." 1

Niels Bohr

This is a dissertation in political science. Knowing that fact, the reader who holds a conventional view of science is likely to be perplexed by the two problems I have identified: the social control problem and the social change problem. He may agree that they exist, if not perhaps in the form given, but will wonder if they are really problems of scientific knowledge rather than of applied knowledge. How a group of different free-thinking people can agree on forms of social order—is not that, for example, a matter more of technique than of science?

My response to the reader's perplexities is a conditional one. Whether the problems are problems of science depends on what kinds of scientific problems there might be. It depends on whether, indeed, there might be problems which were truly problems of theoretical knowledge and yet which were better described some other way than as science.

In this chapter I describe three sorts of problems of theoretical knowledge. The first two are widely acknowledged and discussed. One is the problem of empirical associations--what phenomena are truly associated with each other? The other is the problem of concepts--what are the meanings of scientific terms? The third problem is a speculative one on my part but it has foundations in a movement of thought which has previously been influential. This third problem is also a conceptual one, but of a different kind. I call it a dialectical problem.

Following the review of these problems, I shall present my reasons of theory and expediency for thinking it necessary to consider the problems of comprehensiveness as dialectical ones. The chapter concludes with discussion of a suggested method for dealing with such problems.

Conceptual Problems Distinguished From Empirical Problems

Empirical Problems--The Positivist Viewpoint. According to one view, which I shall call the positivist, research problems are empirical. They are primarily problems of data reliability--the statistical problems of assuring that if we repeated an observation or experiment, all conditions being the same,
we would be likely to get the same results. This view of research problems is part of the more general positivist position according to which the empirical world in some sense directly confronts us, and hence allows us to formulate general hypotheses about this world with assurance that there is a way to test them. 2 (Many scientists would now agree, though, that we do not test a hypothesis to prove it true. We do so to show that the hypothesis resists attempts to disprove it.) 3

It is not possible to identify something, unambiguously, as a positivist approach to research, since any piece of scientific work could be said to involve both positivist and non-positivist elements. But the following example at least emphasizes the former view. It builds on Skinner's approach to human behavior. 4 In this example our first step is to advance a hypothesis—say that the rewarding of "cooperative" human behavior is likely to increase

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2 In the philosophy of science, there may be few present-day writers who could be described unequivocally as positivists. But some writers approach that position more closely than others, among them being Ernest Nagel and perhaps Carl Hempel. In the application of scientific method, the emphasis on data reliability is still very influential. See, for example, Fred Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965). Here, the scientific method is described without hesitation as a study of relationships. Most of the book concerns data collection and measurement, and statistical tests of relationships.

3 This is the falsifiability criterion advanced by Karl Popper. For a discussion of it, see Bryan Magee, Karl Popper, Modern Masters (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), pp. 15-18.

the amount of that behavior. Then we devise a test of this hypothesis. Let us suppose we select a group of children and provide them with craft materials which they can use either for making objects to keep (self-activity) or to construct a large but simple doll house which is to be sent to a children's hospital (cooperative activity). After the craft session is over, those who spent any time on cooperative activity are called back, unbeknown to the others, and are given special praise. At a later date the session is repeated, under the same conditions, to see if the "cooperators" have increased the percentage of time spent in that way.

From a positivist viewpoint, the most important problem in this research is to assure that the associations we discover about the particular sample of children would be true of the entire universe of children. The problem is to assure that the findings are not due simply to chance.

There is another problem for positivists but it is one not taken so seriously. It is often called the validity problem or the problem of operationalizing concepts. (It is also a problem of going from a sample to the whole but a different one). In the example given, we need to decide what is meant by concepts like "cooperative behavior," "increases in cooperative behavior," and "rewards." Following Hume, positivists tend to hold that concepts have meanings because the more basic ones, at least, are reflections of sense experience. And because they have this kind of meaning we can test, by sense experience, the propositions in which they occur.  

Logical positivists express this in a verification theory of meaning, while practicing scientists more commonly speak of operationalism.
Having this faith that experience comes labelled, so to speak, positivists would assume that we could fairly easily agree on the meanings of "cooperative behavior" etc. Cooperative behavior means, among other things, making a doll house rather than making things to keep. Rewards means words of praise, among other things. And an increase in the amount of a certain behavior can mean an increase in the time spent on it relative to time spent otherwise.

The importance of giving very specific instances of these concepts cannot be overestimated. The positivist is anxious to assure that he has eliminated the effects of any variables, other than those whose association he is studying. Thus, he must be able to take some very narrow and highly controllable situation and generalize to something much broader. He sees no great difficulty in doing so, however.

I conclude that if research problems are empirical problems, they are mainly problems of predictability. They are also problems of meaning but the latter problems, though important, are not severe, since we know what our concepts mean in experience. They mean their overt instances—nothing more.  

**Conceptual Problems--The Contextualist Viewpoint.** There is another, less common, way of seeing research problems which places emphasis precisely on the question of meanings. According to this view, the primary

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6 This is admittedly the most extreme version of operationalism, but modified versions tend to weaken the positivist faith that experience comes ready labelled and, hence, to depart from positivism.
research problem is to get clear about the concepts we are using--it is a conceptual problem. From this perspective, the cooperative behavior research described above raises a question more serious than that of statistical reliability. The question is whether we are really studying cooperation at all.

The children in our supposed research were not asked to report on their motives, and we can assume that this was for reasons of objectivity. The positivist would argue that there is no way to be sure of someone's real motives, even for the person himself. He would note that motives are not objects of sense experience. But in the absence of reports about motives, how do we know that the behavior was indeed cooperative? A child might choose to work on the doll house because he liked the excitement or bigness of the project and not to help in a common effort.

There is a positivist argument which explains away this difficulty. It is that we have been misled by the peculiarities of the social sciences into thinking that we can do something there that we could not do in science generally. Unlike other objects of science, people can appear to exemplify a concept of interest by a self report as well as by other verbal, and by non-verbal, behavior. But, as stated above, we can never be sure that someone is manifesting cooperation, or fear, or intelligence, or anything else just because he says so. According to the positivist view, we conceptually identify human utterances as we do any other phenomenon--a concept is simply all of its overt instances.

This view of concepts, however, raises a second apparently intractable difficulty. How can the concept be general? How can a study of the
cooperation which means making a doll house for others rather than toys for oneself tell us anything about the cooperation which means being willing to accept peacefully the ascension of a political leader with whom one disagrees, if he has been elected by a majority of the citizens? If it cannot do this, then science, as the development of general laws, is impossible. Science, after all, can never study the whole of anything but must always look at instances.

This positivist difficulty, which I shall examine more closely at a later point, has prompted some people to adopt a different, "contextualist" view of research. Their claim is that general concepts are not defined by pointing to instances. Such concepts are defined by the context of other concepts within which they are used.\(^7\) If we want to study a cooperation which is more than a narrow overt behavior, then we will have to look at a cooperation in which general meanings are already an integral part. We could look again at our study of the children since there are surely meanings in their actions, but these meanings would be relatively simple and inarticulate. That may be an advantage from the positivist viewpoint but it is not an advantage otherwise.

Suppose, instead, that we study the adult reaction, in two countries, to the election of a chief executive. In country A (an industrialized, free enterprise system) the election appears to be peacefully accepted. In country B (an underdeveloped but also free enterprise system) it is soon followed by a coup d'etat during which the elected chief executive is replaced with a leftist

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\(^7\)Some philosophers of science who are particularly associated with this view are Stephen Toulmin, Thomas Kuhn, and Norwood Hanson.
military junta.

From a positivist viewpoint, it is obvious which country manifests a more cooperative attitude among its citizens and the major research problem is simply that of determining what factors might be associated with this attitude.

From the contextualist viewpoint, however, what counts as cooperation depends on one's conceptual or theoretical framework. And one's conceptual framework is a matter of the distinctions which are considered most important. The problem for the contextualist is to determine what distinctions are most basic.

We might view the two countries through quasi-Marxist spectacles and if we did we would be making certain characteristic distinctions. We would distinguish between exploited and exploiting peoples and also between a pre-capitalist, a purported free-enterprise capitalist, and a socialist stage of economic development.

From this view, the competitive system of country A would necessarily favor the strong and ruthless. And because it was a capital intensive system the effect of the system would be to further widen the gap between the power of these strong and ruthless, who controlled the capital, and those people who did not.

Though the system generated surplus capital, through industrialization, this capital could not be applied to the needs of the locally exploited except just so much as to keep them pacified. Otherwise there would be interference with
the market system. Given this unacceptable capital outlet and given the resulting inadequate income of the locally exploited, country A would need to find outside market opportunities and outside opportunities for capital use. Some of these opportunities would be in such underdeveloped countries as B. As the stronger country, A could dictate the terms of its economic relationships with B and the result could be to inhibit the development and maintain the poverty of B.

Given this view of countries A and B, we would conclude that the election behavior of country A reflected apathy rather than cooperation—since the same power group would hold office after any election and would always provide enough welfare to keep the public pacified. On the other hand, the behavior of the coup supporters in country B reflects the only true cooperation discernable in either country. It is deliberate and is directed at a goal beyond self-interest—the goal of eliminating the country's status as a pawn. Of course, once country B had embraced a socialist system then, on our view, cooperation would not need to appear as anti-system.

We see that if the concept of "cooperation in a capitalist country" occurs in a quasi-Marxist context, then it must be the cooperation of a revolutionary cell, as this is implied in the concepts of exploitation and historical determinism.

From within an opposing, capitalist, context one would deny that the controllers of capital were an elite and privileged group or that the relations of developed to underdeveloped countries were more exploitive than they were economically stimulating. Instead the claim would be that economic power is
widely distributed and that such power differences as exist represent, to a significant degree, the hard work of those whom they favor. From the perspective of the free enterprise capitalist, a more appropriate way to carve up reality would be by a distinction between politically free and politically unfree regimes. Given economic freedom, then, so long as a people were free to vote, to join political parties, and to participate similarly, one could assume that the peaceful ascension of an elected leader did indeed reflect cooperation and conversely that a coup-ridden polity reflected its absence. Furthermore, one could also assume that these meanings of cooperation were enduring ones, since one would not acknowledge any inexorable tendencies in history and certainly not any tendencies that would greatly alter the democratic rules of the game. 8

Ostension--A Problem for Positivism. Faced with the difficulties in both positivist and contextualist approaches to theoretical knowledge, it is not easy for one to choose between them. A positivist may have difficulty in persuading us that his findings mean what he says they mean but these findings at least seem to have some basis other than his own expectations--he has an obvious concern for "stubborn fact." While the contextualist is deficient in this respect, while he seems dangerously close to defining the facts to suit himself,
yet for this very reason he, too, has his own virtues. At least his findings must mean what he says they mean, and this is not a trivial result since the findings we are mostly concerned with are those about human actions. In such research, the researcher always has himself as object.

It is because human beings seem to be the immediate source of meanings, in any event, that one may prefer the contextualist approach. If it is difficult to explain the movement from meaning to fact, at least one does not deny the presence of meaning if one is a contextualist. By contrast, the positivist seems to do so. Consequently he faces a severe problem, the problem of ostension.

The problem of ostension (I shall treat ostension as synonymous with denotation), is the problem of teaching a meaning by pointing to a sensed instance of that meaning. The possibility of ostension seems to be the fundamental tenet of faith for positivists. It is expressed in the claim of the British empiricists that the mind is a mirror reflecting reality. While he denied that we gained the concepts of objects in this way, the grandfather of positivism, David Hume, seemed quite ready to admit that smaller elements, bits of sense experience, were so learned.9

The tendency of positivist thinking, since Hume, has been toward an exasperating increase in subtlety on this point. Faith in ostension still seems to be present but it is more illusive and inconsistent. Bertrand Russell has argued that a denoting phrase never has a meaning in itself but that the proposition in which it occurs has a meaning. 10 This view would look like a contextualist position, were it not known that Russell also had faith in the existence of "hard data" as the only ultimate source of knowledge, hard data consisting principally in personal sense data and logical laws. 11

A. J. Ayer, the best known spokesman for that variant of positivism described as logical positivism, has persuasively and explicitly argued against ostension. 12 Then, at other points in the same work, he tacitly has accepted it. He has developed a verification theory of meaning according to which any significant non-tautological proposition is meaningful only if it is, or somehow entails, an observation statement. 13


12 See text p. 36.

13 Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (2d ed.; New York: Dover Publications, Inc., n.d.). In this dissertation, the writer shall not discuss the intricacies of the verification theory or the subtle modifications which Ayer made in his first formulation of it. Suffice it to say that he asserts the meaning of a statement can be tested by a range of sense-contents occurrences and not by a single one. And, if this is possible, it apparently is so either, because we have some a priori theoretical framework which tells one which
The reason why recent positivist philosophers continue to maintain, and yet are ambivalent about, their faith in ostension is because ostension seems an impossible way to learn and has seemed so at least since Plato. It seems impossible, that is, to learn about anything by referring to an instance of it or a sign of it. 14

Plato, indeed, made the still broader claim that no reference to something outside oneself could teach one.

You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire. 15

Augustine believed that ostension was possible but that it was due to a

sense-contents are relevant and which are not or, because the sense-contents themselves will tell that. Ayer does not want to say the former and thus seems committed to the latter, which is the faith in ostension. See pp. 5-16 and 35-41. To the writer, the statement which most reveals Ayer’s faith in ostension is the following:

"... what is required to verify a statement about a material thing is never the occurrence of precisely this or precisely that sense-content, but only the occurrence of one or other of the sense-contents that fall within a fairly indefinite range" [p. 12].

14The writer’s use of the term ostension is deliberately broad. It encompasses all methods of defining which refer to an instance of the thing defined, which is why the term is made synonymous with denotation. It also encompasses, additionally, all methods which define by reference to a sign in its physical existence.

divine illumination. It was not possible in the way that empiricists suppose. "For if I am asked what walking is when I am still, or doing something else, and if I, by walking immediately, try to teach without a sign what has been asked... then how shall I avoid having the asker think that walking consists in walking only so far as I walked?... And what I have said about this one word will be true of all the others which we thought could be shown without a sign..." 16

As the thing itself could not teach one, neither, said Augustine, could the sign of the thing. "For when a sign is given me, if it finds me not knowing of what thing it is a sign, it can teach me nothing, but if it finds me knowing the thing of which it is the sign, what do I learn from the sign?" 17

The positivists acknowledge the difficulty. Ayer remarks that ". . . One cannot in language point to an object without describing it. If a sentence is to express a proposition, it cannot merely name a situation; it must say something about it. And in describing a situation, one is not merely "registering" a sense-content; one is classifying it in some way or other, and this means going beyond what is immediately given." 18

The ambivalence toward ostension, at the level of general philosophy, has its parallel in the philosophy of science, as we shall see. In the 1920's


17Ibid., p. 41.

there was a simple faith as expressed in Percy Bridgman's classic notion of operationalism. Bridgman held that every scientifically meaningful concept must be defined by a set of performable physical operations and meant nothing more than those operations. Yet he apparently supposed that such concepts were, at the same time, the highly general concepts with which science was concerned. He was claiming to be a nominalist, but the physicists' concepts of the 1920's were not, in fact, simply descriptions of the operations performed.

The problem of ostension soon became evident, therefore. If every set of operations represented a different concept, as Bridgman claimed (or going beyond Bridgman, if every even temporally or spatially different set of operations represented a different concept, as it logically should have) then generalization from, and even repeatability of, operations would be impossible. We have already encountered this difficulty in trying to generalize from supposed research on cooperative behavior among children.

Recognizing this difficulty in classic operationalism, positivist philosophers of science proceeded to modify the notion. Some changes were minor—the suggestion, for instance, that operations might be only hypothetical. But gradually there was a major change—the shift toward the view that scientific

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concepts do not stand alone but are part of a theoretical framework. There remain, today, differences of opinion as to the relative weight of theory and observation in the grounding of concepts, even among the positivistically inclined, with Hempel giving an increasing emphasis to theory by comparison with others. In general, though, the criticisms of ostension have been decisive—at least at the philosophical level, and at least to the extent that the positivist approach is now usually combined with the contextualist one.

Two Kinds of Conceptual Problems?

If we are to conclude that scientific problems are, in the first instance, conceptual problems, can we also conclude that there is but one principal type of conceptual problem? I believe that this conclusion is often drawn but I disagree that it is correct. In this section I shall try to say why.

The positions of positivism and contextualism are expressions, in the realm of science, of a more general philosophic distinction between empiricism and idealism. And the problems of those two approaches to science have their analogues in philosophy generally. The empiricist, as I describe him, believes

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Ibid. Also on this point, Ernest Nagel argues that the evidence for a purported scientific law is more satisfactory if, instead of supporting the law by itself, it supports it as part of a system. See Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), pp. 64-67, 68-70. For a particularly influential and concise statement of the view that knowledge confronts experience as a whole, and from a man who sometimes calls himself a nominalist, see W. V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," The Philosophical Review, LX (January, 1951), 20-43.
that there is a world wholly independent of consciousness and, hence, that the entities of this world are completely loose and separate from each other insofar as any influences of consciousness upon them are concerned. Indeed there are no entities--only transitory sense impressions. Accordingly, the problem for the empiricist is that there are only associations but no categorized objects to be associated. The associations have swallowed the categories.

The idealist believes that, since consciousness is essential for knowing, the world which is known must be a product of consciousness. Every entity in the world is thus integrally related to every other. The problem for the idealist is that there can be only one ultimate conceptual category--the knowing self. All associations are part of the definition of that concept. Thus this category has swallowed the associations.

When philosophers of science argue that inquiry occurs within the bounds of a conceptual framework but is nonetheless open to observational tests, they are adopting a middle way between idealism and empiricism. But the concept of a middle way tends to carry with it the suggestion that there is only one such position, whereas what is at least as likely is that the middle way simply incorporates, in microcosm, that larger debate of which it is the middle way.

For example, the "middle way" in American politics is a code phrase used to characterize one's own position, leaving the implication that one's opponent is an extremist.

I shall argue that there is a kind of contextualism, a kind of emphasis on conceptual problems, in the philosophy of science which seems dominant at the
time of writing and has tended to acquire the title of middle way. I shall then argue that there are important difficulties with this particular middle way and shall then sketch out features of a possible alternative.

In distinguishing two kinds of conceptual problems, I shall use the term "logic." Hence, I use the term not in the present sense, where it refers to the principles of propositional connections (syntax alone), but in an earlier and broader sense which also includes questions of meaning.22

Within logic there are three traditional laws of thought which are supposed to be necessary and sufficient for correct thinking. Present day logic has been developed as a formal syntactical system in which these laws are no longer fundamental. But they seem to remain fundamental in that pre-formal meta-logic without which the formal system could not have been designed.23

The three laws of thought are: the Law of Identity, the Law of Non-Contradiction, and the Law of Excluded Middle. There are different ways to formulate these laws. Since I am concerned with logic as implicated in the attribution of meaning, as having a semantical dimension, I believe the traditional formulations are probably best. These are as follows.

The Law of Identity asserts that A is A.

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22A presumed value in removing questions of meaning from formal logic was the hope that one might, thereby, avoid the paradoxes which had been discovered within all attempts to render logic systematically complete.

The Law of Non-Contradiction asserts that the propositions A is B and A is not B cannot both be true.

The Law of Excluded Middle asserts that either A is B or A is not B.

For both empiricists and idealists, logic and its laws are taken as absolutes. For empiricists like Hume or the logical positivists, the laws of thought are absolute because they are tautologous. For idealists like Spinoza, the laws are absolute because they are constitutive of reality itself. But in any middle way between empiricism and idealism, logic cannot be wholly absolute in either sense. The empiricists must be wrong to suppose a sharp distinction between contingent consequential facts and certain but tautologous and inconsequential logic. And the idealists must be wrong in their sharp distinction between an ephemeral deceptive world of fact and a certain and unchanging world of logically related ideas.

Consequently, if there is more than one middle way between empiricism and idealism, the differences between them may well have to do with which of the laws of logic is most qualified, which most becomes a matter of degree.

A Degree of Truth Logic. The apparently dominant form of contextualism, at present, seems associated with doubt about the Law of Excluded Middle. The claim is made that our most important concepts are incapable of precise definition. We cannot definitely say of them either, that they force us to see reality, permanently, in a certain restricted way or, that they provide us with accurate but highly fragmented glimpses of that reality. This claim is obviously advantageous since it avoids the criticisms of both con-
textualism and positivism. But the disadvantage, if such, is, as William Alston says, that "...the fact of vagueness forces us to make some sort of qualification in the supposedly self-evident 'Law of Excluded Middle. ...". We are no longer certain that A must either be B or not be B.

Now if our concepts were wholly vague so that there could be no progress toward deciding whether or not A was B, then we would be retreating to empiricist scepticism. To hold to a middle way, we must claim that our important concepts are capable of an increasing precision as we willfully alter them, as outside reality forces us to alter them, or as both events happen more or less together. Bertrand Russell has aptly described this general process, in discussing John Dewey's approach to inquiry. He speaks of object and subject rather than of outside reality and concept but the thrust of the position is similar.

Inquiry, it is evident, is some kind of interaction between two things, one of which is called the object and the other the subject. There seems to be an assumption that this process is more or less in the nature of an oscillation of which the amplitude gradually grows less, leaving it possible to guess at an ultimate position of equilibrium, in which, when reached, the subject would be said to 'know' the object, or to have arrived at 'truth' concerning it. 25

It is because this version of contextualism, this approach to conceptual problems, must assume that concept and "reality" gradually approach each


other, while never completely merging, that I describe it as a degree of truth logic. For we customarily use the term truth to characterize a correspondence between inner concepts and outer experiences.

I distinguish five interrelated features of any degree of truth logic. At least some, and often all, of these are evident in those works which set forth such a conceptual logic.

1. There is an "external reality" consistently independent of one's concepts (although the difference between reality and concepts is not absolute). Thus, although a degree of truth logic is a contextualist position it is one which tends toward empiricism more than toward idealism. This is the most important feature, though sometimes the least explicit.

2. There is a certain openness of concepts and conceptual frameworks. This is the second most basic feature and is necessarily associated with a qualification of the Law of Excluded Middle. It is this openness which allows for conceptual change to occur sometimes from the side of the concepts per se, sometimes from the side of that which is conceptualized.

3. Concepts undergo evolution toward improved forms. Consequently, it does not follow, because concepts influence what we see as facts, that all concepts are merely relativistic.

4. The evolutionary process occurs through the actions of a community of investigators or the broader community of language users. A conceptual framework is a shared phenomenon, and changes in it represent a collective effort.
5. The collective actions of these investigators are not arbitrary, but occur in response to evident problems. Although concepts are not absolutes but are ever open to change, the problems which generate this change do have a certain absoluteness about them, at least at any given point in time.

There are a number of directions in thought which may be called degree of truth logics. These are represented by: some advocates of multivalued logics; ordinary language philosophy, at least as represented by Wittgenstein; some recent philosophy of science; and some of pragmatism. In what next follows I shall briefly review certain of the writings involved.

William Alston has argued that many concepts are necessarily vague because we do not know what conditions are necessary and sufficient for applying them. 26 These are concepts for which we cannot readily distinguish between those (analytic) features which help define the term and those (synthetic) ones which are factually true of that to which the term refers.

Consider the concept of want 27—-it has many expansions. If I want something then, among other things:

(a) Belief that a certain act might help me achieve it increases the likelihood that I will try to perform that act.

(b) I may act aggressively if frustrated in my attempts to achieve it.

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26 Alston, Philosophy of Language, chap. 5. Also see his essay on "Motives and Motivation," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1st ed., V, see especially pp. 404-06.

27 Alston, "Motives and Motivation," pp. 404-06. The illustrations given on p. 45 of text are the writer's.
(c) I may be reminded of it when I think of other things associated with it.

It is not obvious that one or another of these expansions is purely analytic while the rest are purely synthetic.

Alston agrees that empirical evidence is, in a way, a conceptual construction but he would deny that it is a neat, tightly integrated, construction. A concept does influence the perceived facts. Presently we tend to identify as wants those to which expansions (a) and (c) are applicable. But we don't always do so, and thus the expansions are not purely analytic. Concerning (c) it is questionable, for example, whether the thought of cancer will remind the smoker of a cigarette, even if he associates one with the other. As regards (a) it is not certain that a businessman is more likely to withhold evidence about product safety if he believes this to be an effective act to achieve higher sales. Expansion (b), on the other hand, is not purely synthetic. If concepts influence facts, it is also true that empirical considerations influence concepts. If expansion (b) became securely established knowledge, then it might well acquire a degree of the analyticity of the other expansion.

Alston intimates that there is a way in which we all customarily do use the concept want—we accept most of a set of concept expansions but do not unequivocally commit ourselves to any one. We want to leave open the possibility, mentioned just above, that concept expansions previously thought synthetic will acquire a degree of analyticity.

Hilary Putnam makes similar points about the analytic-synthetic
distinction. He argues that there are many concepts which cannot be purely stipulative and thus purely analytic. There is no one common attribute involved in the concept of man, for example. There are a cluster of attributes and if most are present we label that entity a man. In science we deal with analogous concepts which may be called "law-cluster concepts." These are concepts like "energy" which figure in many laws but play diverse roles within them. Any one law, even one thought definitional, can be changed and we feel that the identity of the cluster concept has stayed the same.

When we see Einstein's change in the concept of kinetic energy or see a change in the concept of a straight line, resulting in part from experimental optics, these are not mere changes in stipulation of isolated concepts, says Putnam. The concepts exist within conceptual frameworks which reflect, in varying degrees, both convention and the import of experience.

For Putnam, as for Alston, many concepts are permanently open. It is not surprising then to find him, also, suggesting qualifications to the Law of Excluded Middle, although the earlier essay in which he suggests this does not itself argue for conceptual openness.

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What is most noteworthy in the cited writings of Putnam and Alston, as of others to follow, is that they maintain the distinction between concepts and outer reality. Both writers acknowledge the existence of purely analytic and purely synthetic statements. Consequently, their particular conceptual problem has an empiricist tinge. It is the problem of the gap between concept and reality. In other words it is once again the problem of ostension. To talk of the difficulty in connecting the concepts of want and energy with particular experiences, or with other signs, is to make essentially the same point as did Augustine for the concept of walking. Among a myriad of possible variations, how do we know where to draw the line?

But there is a difference between these writers and the positivists. The latter, insisting on the durability of the two epistemic poles, put their faith in

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30 Alston, "Motives and Motivation."

"There are some statements involving 'want' or 'desire' which, if they are true, do not enjoy that status through embodying some features of the meanings of the words involved. . . . At the other end there are purely analytic statements. . . ." [p. 405].

Putnam, "The Analytic and the Synthetic." Putnam intimates that change in meaning does not mean a change in basic reality and, hence, that there is a realm one usually refers to as the synthetic.

"In the case of the terms 'energy' and 'kinetic energy,' we want to say, or at any rate I want to say, that the meaning has not changed enough to affect 'what we are talking about'. . . ." [p. 380].

He also states that there can be purely analytic statements, in the sense of statements without exception, in cases where the subject term is presumed not to figure in any exceptionless natural laws.
bridging the gap, through operationalism. Contextualists of the sort I am now describing propose instead a gradual closing of the gap. According to them, concepts face experience collectively as a conceptual framework, and the experience we see therefore depends on that framework. We could not bridge the epistemic gap because we are only immediately in contact with the one side which is our concepts. But we can know we are closing it if the perplexities which appear in our concept usage should gradually lessen.

In the essays mentioned, neither Alston nor Putnam elaborates the notion that our concepts function within conceptual frameworks. I have already argued the case for that notion in my earlier discussion of contextualism. Let us look now at two philosophers of science who are particularly associated with it.

According to Thomas Kuhn, much scientific work consists in elaborating a set of already accepted theories. He argues that until the scientists have such a set together with methods of application, until there is a shared

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31 Some might say that positivists collapse mind to matter as idealists do the reverse. But the relationship is not symmetrical here. Since one's thoughts are closest to oneself, the rejection of these thoughts is a less convincing epistemological extreme than is the idealist rejection of matter, granted that neither view is very convincing. As a demonstration of how foolish someone can sound who tries to reject thought, see Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, p. 21.

paradigm, they do not even know what to look for.

The concept of oxygen, for example, does not stand alone but is an integral part of the oxygen theory of combustion. According to the earlier phlogiston theory, combustion occurred in the presence of air combined with phlogiston. In the process of combustion phlogiston escaped. Hence, when "oxygen" was isolated by the phlogiston chemist Priestly, his concept was that of "dephlogisticated air" and this is not what we today understand as oxygen.\textsuperscript{33} The example illustrates how our conceptual frameworks structure the very reality we see. And it suggests that change in those frameworks will be difficult to accomplish, even though it obviously occurs.

Stephen Toulmin takes an approach to science which is similar to Kuhn's.\textsuperscript{34} These two men would agree with Alston and Putnam both that there is an external reality apart from our concepts and that, because many of our concepts are open, there is promise of shortening the gap. But they describe at greater length than the others how this process occurs, the community of investigators through which it occurs, and the problems to which the latter respond.

\textsuperscript{33}Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 53-56, 69-72.

Both men agree that those within a scientific discipline can move progressively from one conceptual framework to an improved one, although Toulmin emphasizes less the system and cohesion of the framework. Both describe this movement as basically evolutionary, although for Kuhn its internal dynamics involve periods of framework stability alternating with periods of framework change whereas for Toulmin the process is continuous. But more significant than these points of agreement on process is the discussion each man gives of the role played by the community of investigators.

Kuhn's views have undergone change on this point. Consider first what he says about periods of framework stability, those which he calls "normal science." According to his earlier views, the scientific community serves a proselytizing function. Students are expected to accept the prevailing paradigm of a discipline on the basis of authority rather than that of independent investigation. 35 They have little competence to do otherwise and the texts do not present fundamental alternatives.

More recently, Kuhn has suggested that much learning of scientific generalization occurs by a process of ostension in which the student is confronted with a series of problem-solutions and told what generalizations they illustrate. 36 If Kuhn is here proposing a pure correspondence theory of knowing, he would seem to have abandoned his basic theme that paradigms structure

35 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 80-81.

our knowing. This would be a surprising shift. But he seems to be making the claim, already noted in the writings of Alston and Putnam, that external reality and concepts somehow work together in knowing. Kuhn sees no difficulty with such a view—he observes that we all learn to identify many things by ostension: father, mother, sister, dogs, cats. And he gives some detail about how reality and concepts work together. Reality appears as stimuli which are the same for all. The clustering of stimuli into similarity sets, which allow us to identify, say, a dog or cat, occur in our neural processing apparatus and this, also, is the same for all. That we see one thing rather than another is due to the educational programming of the apparatus, and this must be the same as well since the persons in a discipline share the same history, an everyday language, an everyday world, and most of a scientific one. 37

Regarding periods of framework change, Kuhn acknowledges that individual dissent plays an important initiating role, but he holds that consolidation of the change occurs because it is accepted by the discipline as a whole. 38

37Ibid., p. 276. Kuhn's position here seems similar to Wittgenstein's claim that ostensive definition is possible within a context but not completely outside one. And, the context can change for both thinkers.

"One of the things upon which the practice of normal science depends is a learned ability to group objects and situations into similarity classes which are primitive in the sense that the grouping is done without an answer to the question, 'similar with respect to what?' One aspect of every revolution is, then, that some of the similarity relations change" [p. 275].

38Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 143.
Such wide agreement is possible, according to his later writing, for the same reasons that one can learn an existing conceptual framework. It comes about via stimuli, neural patterns, and programming which are shared by both the advocates of the new paradigm and the followers of the old. One evidence that framework shifts do indeed occur, he says, is that historians regularly learn to make them. 39

Kuhn warns against calling these changes in conceptual framework the result of decision or choice however. They are not ultimately matters of applying a priori standards but are more experimental. "Exploring an alternative theory by techniques like those outlined above, one is likely to find that one is already using it ... At no point was one aware of having reached a decision, made a choice." 40

Toulmin, like Kuhn, believes that the process in which the scientific community accomplishes framework change is not ultimately one of applying a priori standards. But for Toulmin it is not immediately of that sort either. 41 Whereas Kuhn seems to ground the possibility of framework shifts on what we all share in language and external stimuli, Toulmin emphasizes our shared


40 Ibid.

41 Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 486. Toulmin argues that the ideas of a milieu do not form static propositional systems but, rather, constitute historically-developing conceptual populations. The test of a man's rationality is not his application of the tests derivable from a static system, but is his ability to make conceptual adaptations to new situations.
problems.

... to the extent that men living in different milieus have faced similar collective problems, and developed comparable collective activities--or 'rational enterprises'--for tackling them in an organized manner, we can recognize those parallel enterprises as defining corresponding forums of judgment. 42

For Toulmin, conceptual change is literally evolutionary--a matter of conceptual innovation and selection so as to adapt to new situations. The selections involved are primarily the collective judgments of the relevant scientific community, based on experience in all cultures and historical periods. And, as in biological evolution, the rationality of the judgments is ultimately determined not by men but by history. 43

Having examined the Kuhn and Toulmin positions on the functioning of the scientific community, we must conclude that in a fundamental sense they are the same. Whether the community is better described as sharing in sensations and meanings or as sharing in problems, what it finally accomplishes, it accomplishes by force of outside circumstance. For Kuhn, the community does

42 Ibid., p. 492.

43 Ibid., p. 501.

"... we shall find ourselves coming close to a view of 'historical destiny' shared with... Vico and Kant, Epicurus and Hegel... To some--but only some--extent men could bring their rational grasp of the current situation to bear on their future expectations and patterns of life, in such a way that they anticipated, and so were 'rationally pre-adapted' to, the novel problem-situations that would face them in the future... the verdict of experience rewarded even-handedly those men whose rational procedures and innovations proved, in the event, to meet the actual demands of history most adequately..."
not deliberately choose a new framework. And while Toulmin wants to emphasize the reasoning involved in conceptual change, the success of a change depends on historical destiny. So in neither case can we properly criticize what the community does, for it ultimately has no choice.

The last of the five features I identify in a degree of truth logic is the belief in evident problems. Toulmin is quite explicit on this point, as we have seen, but the view has also been continuously present in Kuhn's work. The scientist never finds a perfect fit between the prevailing paradigm and external reality, says Kuhn. The scientist knows this is so not because he can go completely outside the paradigm and look but because there are anomalies. One of the anomalies in the phlogiston theory, for example, was that an object was supposed to lose phlogiston when heated in air and yet the material remaining after metal was so heated weighed more than before. Kuhn sometimes asserts, and most emphatically in later work, that the anomalous experience is an evident problem.

Most of the puzzles of normal science are directly presented by nature, and all involve nature indirectly. Though different solutions have been received as valid at different times, nature cannot be forced into an arbitrary set of conceptual boxes.

All of the writers mentioned above have probably been influenced by the "ordinary language" philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is thus appropriate

44Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, chap. IV.

45Kuhn, "Reflections on My Critics," p. 263. This position is admittedly at odds with some passages in the earlier work.
to close the literature review with a brief look at this position. Wittgenstein explicitly denies that ostension by itself can convey meaning. (He attributes the view that it can to Augustine but Augustine's ostension is an unusual kind, as we have seen.) Wittgenstein holds that ostension can work within a context--what Kuhn above calls an educational programming.

Contexts are for Wittgenstein like rules of a game, and words have uses according to the rules. To understand a piece in chess, for example, we must understand the whole game. Language is not one game, however. It is a series of games which overlap each other. And these are public games such that a person can engage in them all. For Wittgenstein this does not mean they are part of some super game--in fact there is no one thing which all language games have in common. What language games do have is family resemblances to each other. Consequently it is family resemblances, also, which tie together the various uses of a particular word.

What for us is most notable about this ordinary language position is Wittgenstein's belief that we can understand all the various language games. It is like the belief of Kuhn and Toulmin that we can pass from one conceptual framework to another. Wittgenstein's argument here seems to be that we could

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not even understand our own situation if we could not understand that of others. For a word to have a meaning there must be a rule governing its use. But to have a rule is to be able to check whether it is being followed, says Wittgenstein, and a single person cannot do so. It would be the same as trying to verify information in a newspaper by another copy of the same paper. 47

There is no sense in a person's talk about experiences as being purely inward. We can refer to our selves as objects but not as subjects. 48

It might be granted that Wittgenstein's argument is persuasive as to why any group of people must share some language games (though I do not grant this without qualifications) but why must they share all of them? I don't believe he gives a reason for the latter position. The stated purpose of his later philosophizing was to dissolve philosophical puzzles by examining our ordinary

47Introduction to Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds, pp. xvi-xviii.

48Ibid., p. xix.

"In his second argument, Wittgenstein attempts to show that the 'I' in the skeptical argument does not refer to an owner of experiences; and he presents two reasons... First, no criteria of personal identity are applied in my avowing my thoughts and feelings... Thus Wittgenstein says that I am not talking about any particular entity I but just about the experience of feeling pain itself. He does not maintain that all uses of 'I' or 'my' are nonreferential, but only what he calls the use of 'I' as subject. In 'I'’s other use as object, it clearly refers... In all of these cases, there is the possibility that I am wrong... And here we come to his second reason for holding that 'I' does not refer to an owner of experiences: he says that where there is no chance of referring to the wrong person, it does not make sense to speak of referring to a person at all." [Underlining of the long passages is this writer's.]
language use, and an assumption behind this purpose was that we simply did, in fact, have such an ordinary language. 49

In concluding this exposition of a degree of truth logic, I want to point out what it is about Wittgenstein's notion of a rule that makes me say of it, and of any similar contextualist position, that it is empiricist tinged. Empiricist philosophy tends to absorb categories within relationships. A purely empiricist social science will treat persons as publicly observable behavior patterns, and if it is wholly consistent it will reduce those behavior patterns to chemical interactions. The self, even the body, disappears into an associational flux. When we say that there are truly such things as mental concepts, not just sounds in response to sense impressions, then we depart from empiricism toward a middle, contextualist, view. But if we then argue that the existence of conscious meanings or purposes is only possible insofar as they are publicly shared, our position is analogous to that of the empiricist. There is now a mental life but it is still not an individual life, it is an associationism. The bleakness, the emptiness, of the empiricist notion of people

"... the general agreement among human beings that in fact makes it possible for them to play the same language games--to speak the same language on the whole--is a remarkable fact, by no means to be 'taken as a matter of course.' That men constantly misunderstand, and not always willfully, is obvious enough; what is easily overlooked--in moments of pessimism, at least--is the extent of de facto agreement that makes the very existence of a shared language possible. Human beings do, on the whole 'agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.'"

On the purpose of philosophy as the dissolving of philosophical puzzles, see Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, pp. 86-88.
remains. For Wittgenstein there apparently was no center of individual conscious subjectivity. By this I mean more than that an individual was in large part a product of his social setting. I mean that personal autonomy was completely impossible. There was meaningful reference but no true self reference.  

Critique of a Degree of Truth Logic. We could speak of a conceptual framework which was complete in the sense that it was shared by all (or more accurately was the determinant of all thought), although the framework was incomplete in the sense that it could evolve. Or we could speak of a conceptual framework like the above but which was also incomplete in that external reality could pierce through the framework at points. These are both what I would call degrees of truth logics. Wittgenstein and possible Toulmin may better illustrate the first view, and the others mentioned may better illustrate the second.

Whichever of these two views one takes, it faces a serious criticism. How can one judge, without being arbitrary, what is an improved concept or an improved conceptual framework? According to a degree of truth logic, this judgment is made by a community of investigators or language users and in response to evident problems. But this answer is not convincing in itself. Kuhn, for example, has been accused of advocating mob rule for his earlier view of normal science in which a paradigm is presented to students as dogma.  

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50 See footnote 48.

51 Kuhn, "Reflections on My Critics," p. 234.
Consider first this notion of evident problems. All the writers cited would probably agree that human values and purposes are not clearly distinct from facts of nature. Values are an integral part of that conceptual framework without which we could see no facts. Why then are problems any less framework-dependent, since problems appear to be values expressed in reverse form? Can it be that values are more lacking in the full concreteness of the here and now than are problems? I don’t see why.

If I can articulate a problem, I can rephrase it as a value having the same degree of specificity or generality. If in some city a certain amount of the housing stock is substandard, the corresponding value is simply to eliminate that substandard housing. If I see this particular housing problem as part of a broader problem arising from the operation of the economic system then just to the extent that I can describe how this connection works I can describe what I want to be different in the economic system, as regards housing.

Articulated problems seem no more capable than are articulated values of providing an outside position from which to judge the worth of different conceptual frameworks. Broader felt problems might be able to do so, but who is to judge when these felt problems exist? Apparently it must be the community of investigators or of language users. We seem to be thrown back on this notion of a meaning, purposive community as the one ultimate response

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52 The writer is not advancing a fully instrumentalist view of knowledge, on behalf of these authors. He is making the weaker claim that purposes are not independent of facts but help structure them.
to the criticism of a degree of truth logic.

Now why assume that the community is correct? Why assume that we share as much in sense data and interpretation as Kuhn, for one, says we do? Wittgenstein's answer, and he gives the most definite answer, is that we have no choice. To be conscious of something, to be able to conceptualize it, requires that we already be following a rule—that we already share a conceptual framework. For Wittgenstein, though, we cannot present meanings to our subjective selves since the rule, being public, tells us nothing of subjective selves. But we can communicate with each other, of course, and in such a way as to correct mistakes in meaning. I am going to call the kind of argument Wittgenstein has made the "communication argument," and because his version of it is analogous to a pure empiricism, in that it concedes no sense to reports of thoughts or sensations attributed to a subject, I shall call it the "empiricist version."

The reader will now ask whether this empiricist version of the communication argument is correct. And to that question I have no unambiguous answer. I personally believe that the argument is just as correct as what I shall call an idealist version—-but no more so. It explains why we can have meanings, concepts, and that is something which empiricism does not do well. It also explains why we can be mistaken about meanings, and that is something idealism does not do well. But the problem with this version of the communication argu-

53Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, pp. 75-76.
ment is its rejection of subjectivity.

By itself, the position in ordinary language philosophy that we just do share our concepts could lead to a dogmatic sort of concept analysis. I shall close this discussion of a degree of truth logic by very briefly considering one example of the ordinary language approach.

From an examination of "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis" Isaac Balbus concludes "... that the Marxian treatment of the concept 'interest' is far more consistent with the variety of meanings that our ordinary language acknowledges are entailed by the concept, and that, as a consequence, Marxian analysis has both explanatory and normative advantages over Pluralist analysis." 54

Our ordinary language recognizes, says Balbus, two very different yet equally important meanings of interest. 55 One, the subjective meaning, defines interest as what a person likes. The other, or objective meaning, defines it as what a person has a stake in or is affected by. According to Balbus, Pluralism recognizes the first meaning only believing that no one can be mistaken about his interests. 56 But Marxian analysis recognizes both and, above all, is concerned with their interrelationship. This is why Marxian analysis is superior.


55 Ibid., p. 152.

56 Ibid., p. 155.
Without probing the details of the Balbus essay I want to ask two questions. First, is it likely that any theory as widely accepted as the Pluralist theory of politics would ignore an obvious use of language? Secondly, is it possible for two very different meanings of a term to be "equally important" in the sense of "equally dominant?"

To the first question my own answer would be "no." Recent Pluralists such as Robert Dahl affirm the existence of a consensus on the most important procedures or methods. And they assert that the consensus is not something which most people reason about. It is something they have been socialized into.\[^{57}\] People thus have an "objective" interest in this consensus in the Balbus sense. Now of course the effect of society upon them is considered a benign effect rather than the malign one which Marxism sees. But that is not the point. The point is that Pluralists, too, accept the "... variety of meanings that our ordinary language acknowledges...\[^{58}\]


"... politicians subject to elections must operate within the limits set by their own values, as indoctrinated members of the society, and by their expectations about what policies they can adopt and still be reelected. In a sense, what we ordinarily describe as democratic 'politics' is merely the chaff. It is the surface manifestation, representing superficial conflicts. Prior to politics, beneath it, is the underlying consensus on policy that usually exists in the society among a predominant proportion of the politically active members."

\[^{58}\text{Balbus, "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis," p. 151. That pluralists may not label this consensus an objective interest, in the Marxian sense, is of minor significance. The fact is that they do allow for it and that it does have a specified relationship to subjective interests.}\]
To the second question, also, my answer is "no." If we assume that the effect of a social system on its members is largely benign, (perhaps because affluence washes away system bias) then the dominant concept of interest is the subjective. The objective, we take for granted. But if the effect of the system is malign then the objective concept of interest should become dominant. Whichever view we take, the two meanings of interest cannot both be dominant on that view. If I take the Marxist view I cannot say that the real interest of the American people is in a higher material standard of living, since that is what they say they want, and also that the real interest is in a change in the socio-economic system to provide more meaningful lives. I will probably say, as Marx does, that objective interests are the source of subjective interests.

The Balbus essay illustrates a troubling feature of ordinary language philosophy. If we really do consider the full variety of ways in which we use an important concept we may well find that the uses are virtual contraries. Hence our analysis does not much help us unless we assume that certain uses are dominant. In that case, a person who disputes the uses so assumed is apt to find himself confronted with appeals to look more carefully and with the argument that "we are communicating, after all, so we must really agree on our basic concepts."\(^59\) Wittgenstein suggested that his purpose in language

\(^{59}\) This writer does not say that Balbus, himself, takes such an overbearing posture, but that such a posture is given a rationale in the ordinary language approach. Furthermore, there are those who do seem to
examination was not to argue but to give reminders.

It is this very practical difficulty in a degree of truth logic--its downgrading of explicit debate over concepts--which prompts me to look for another approach to conceptual problems.

**A Degree of Reality Logic.** I want to speculate that there may be a second form of contextualism, a second middle way between idealism and realism. I believe that this speculation can lead to a method of concept examination which does give more weight to debate.

This second form is associated with doubt about the Law of Non-Contradiction. Whereas a degree of truth logic asserts that our most important concepts cannot be precisely defined, the conceptual logic I now describe asserts that these concepts are precisely defined but by their contradictories and contraries. Because this logic is as much a form of contextualism as is a degree of truth logic it too avoids the criticism of positivism that we have only a flux of sensations and don't really see a whole picture of reality. And because it envisions contradictory concepts it too avoids the usual criticism

take it. Consider the following statements by Copi.

"Since we do communicate with each other and understand the terms we use, the intensional or connotative meanings involved are neither subjective [constituting the features of objects believed to be denoted by a term] nor objective [all the features which are in fact common to all the objects denoted by a term]. . . ."

Now, it is agreed to use certain terms to denote certain objects, says Copi.

"The conventional connotation of a term is its most important aspect for purposes of definition and communication, since it is both public and can be known by people who are not omniscient" [Copi, Introduction to Logic, p. 109].
of contextualism that we are forced to see reality from restricted viewpoints. In this case it does so because if we simultaneously see a thing in contradictory ways, then our vision must be inclusive, whatever one may think of that kind of inclusiveness.

In striking contrast both to empiricism and to a degree of truth logic, this second conceptual logic denies, in the most sweeping way, that there is any gap between concepts and reality. By this I mean, firstly, that it denies there is any possibility of defining a concept by pointing. It denies the suggestion of Alston, Putnam, or Kuhn that external reality intrudes sometimes and can help produce a conceptual change. But I also mean, secondly, that this logic denies the essential objectivity of concepts. It denies a position like Wittgenstein's according to which all meaningful concepts must be capable of being checked by something outside the person using them.

I have now indicated the two main features of a second contextualism. The two are closely interrelated. If there is nothing outside concepts then concepts must be defined by themselves. But a self-definition is not at all informative unless it involves the negation of the concept. I do begin to learn something about white if I know that it is not not-white. That I do so necessarily implies, though, that a concept contains its contradictory within itself.

Now given a situation in which thought and reality are identical but in which thought becomes more informative as it becomes more aware of all its contradictions, we cannot say that thought can be mistaken. For thought always corresponds exactly to reality, since it is identical to it. Therefore we
cannot speak now of a degree of truth logic. But this thought which is also
reality can be incomplete. That is why I call this second conceptual logic a
degree of reality logic.

At this point the reader may well ask if my speculation is not idle spec-
ulation. One might grant that a degree of reality logic would be interesting,
if it were not implausible, but might then insist that it is implausible. Why do
I say that reality and thought are identical? We can think of many things which
don't exist--world peace for example. And why do I say that concepts are
internally contradictory? If I claim that a certain person is politically con-
servative does that mean the same as saying that he is not politically conserva-
tive? The claim seems absurd. Of course I may argue that people have
questioned the Law of Excluded Middle and ask why, therefore, it is not
equally plausible to question the Law of Non-Contradiction. But the reader
may respond that, in fact, it just is not equally plausible.

In the following discussion I respond to these questions. I first consider
at some length the two main features of a degree of reality logic, and I try to
show that each is more plausible than it may seem, initially. Then I make a
brief point by point comparison of this logic with the main features of a degree
of truth logic. The discussion is followed, as earlier, by a literature review,
but in the present case I shall consider the work of a single writer, Hegel. It
is Hegel whose work most represents what I call a degree of reality logic.
The discussion concludes by referring the reader to material in the last chap-
ter where I attempt to illustrate the practical difference between the two
conceptual logics.

The Verstehen Method -- As long as we focus on the natural sciences, the distinction between thought and reality may seem obvious. But in the social sciences there is a method of inquiry which tends to deny the distinction and yet has appeal to common sense. This is the Verstehen method. According to this method we learn about other human actions because the actions are the concepts and because we are somehow involved in the conceptual framework of these other people.\(^{60}\)

What underlies Verstehen is an observation I indirectly mentioned earlier in distinguishing between positivism and contextualism. While our concepts may structure the way we see physical nature we do not normally suppose that they constitute nature. We suppose that there is something external upon which they operate. But a human action is different. While such an action may possibly have a meaning imposed upon it, it also has a meaning within it, and in the absence of the latter meaning we are apt to say that there is no action. This action may involve a bodily movement but it may take place only as a

process in the mind. Stuart Hampshire points out that a conclusion reached in thought is as much an action as any other. 61 Hampshire also suggests that by an action we mean something conscious and I follow this interpretation. 62

Given the above features of a human action, I shall illustrate the point that meanings are internal by an example. A man waving could be greeting a friend, sending a message across a distance, directing traffic or doing any one of innumerable other acts. The societal context within which he is acting may narrow the possibilities. If he is standing in the center of an intersection then there is a fair probability that he is directing traffic. But if we want to know for sure what he is doing then we ask. And we normally take his answer as conclusive.

Furthermore, our hand waver's answer is conclusive not because he is the best predictor of his own actions (as if he noticed that he often greeted friends and so predicted that this was what he was doing now) but because his intention determined the nature of the action in the first place. Without that intention there would be only an arm movement, and if anyone interpreted that movement as an action it is his interpretation, not the other person's, that would be mistaken.

We see that there is a domain of human experience, some would say the

61 Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 90-91.

62 What Hampshire says, most explicitly, is that an intentional action must be conscious, but he also seems to say the same of action itself. See Hampshire, Thought and Action, chap. 2, especially pp. 93-95, 119-21.
most important one, where the common sense view is that thought and reality are identical.

There is, however, a serious problem with this Verstehen approach to human action in the extreme form which I have given it. If a man is conscious then he is thinking. But if his thoughts are his actions then it seems to me that he is incapable of moral deliberation, because he can never be mistaken. Now it is a common criticism of the Verstehen approach that it supposes a man cannot be mistaken about his actions. But it is less common to say that he cannot be moral. I shall explain my reasoning.

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63 The problem that is described here and in the following footnote is not, perhaps, the only major problem of Verstehen, but it is the one that shall be discussed.

64 Despite their varying treatments of it, this problem of identifying mistakes is a central point for Nagel, Davidson, and Brodbeck. Nagel views the Verstehen approach as one of introspective analysis of psychic states and argues that:

"... the controlled study of overt behavior is nevertheless the only sound procedure for achieving reliable knowledge concerning individual and social actions" [Nagel, "The Subjective Nature of Social Subject Matter," p. 40]. [This writer's emphasis.]

Davidson disputes the claim that reasons and actions are logically inseparable. He argues, among other points, that one can be mistaken about one's reasons, and that one can know one is mistaken because he can know the connection between reason and action. Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," pp. 54-57.

On this same general problem of identifying mistakes, Brodbeck criticizes the Wittgensteinian version of Verstehen on the ground that

"... our understanding and knowledge of man is therefore a priori and necessary rather than, as with the natural sciences, a posteriori and contingent." [Brodbeck, "Meaning and Action," p. 60].
If we conceive of human action as always involving bodily movement then the fact that a man could never be mistaken about his actions would not imply that he could not be morally responsible. Although some of his thought would be identical to his actions, other parts of his thought would consist in spreading before himself a series of alternatives and making choices among them, choices which would issue in action. But if all of his thoughts are actions about which he cannot be mistaken then his conclusions of thought are inevitable, by definition. We are not apt to call someone morally responsible if his moral conclusions are inevitable.

One possible way around this problem would be to adopt the position of Wittgenstein on language and social relationships. At least two recent Verstehen thinkers, Peter Winch and Stuart Hampshire, find it appropriate to do so.65 The rules which according to Wittgenstein provide meaning to our concepts are also simultaneously our social institutions and customs, and these in a sense are our actions.66 Winch gives this example, among others:

65Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy; and Hampshire, Thought and Action. Winch grounds his work, explicitly, on Wittgenstein’s approach. Hampshire does not do so, but his discussion of how one can communicate with another appears to draw from Wittgenstein. See pp. 55-61, Thought and Action. It is evident that the only Verstehen thinkers whose work is discussed in this section are those who draw from Wittgenstein. This is done because the writer’s purpose is to criticize this sort of Verstehen approach.

The idea of war... was not simply invented by people who wanted to explain what happens when societies come into armed conflict. It is an idea which provides the criteria of what is appropriate in the behavior of members of the conflicting societies. Because my country is at war there are certain things which I must and certain things which I must not do.  

Wittgenstein's position appears to be a solution to the problem of Verstehen because, while it holds that concepts and human action are simply different ways of describing how we follow the same rule (and is thus a Verstehen position), the fact that there is a rule means that one can check for mistakes. Hence one can distinguish, in a sense, between moral and immoral acts.

But when the Verstehen method is associated with a position like Wittgenstein's, the method ceases to be part of what I call a degree of reality logic because it ceases to emphasize the subjectivity of a human action.  

I shall elaborate again.

If I share the same rule with everyone else, if I am involved in the same form of life, then just so far as the rule affects my actions I am not a subject.

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67 Ibid., p. 127.

68 In any case, it seems to be a kind of Verstehen position, as it apparently does to those Verstehen thinkers who build upon it. Of course, Wittgenstein is not talking about introspection as a method of inquiry—and it is this latter method which is often, and this writer thinks more properly, associated with the approach.

69 The philosophic distance between apparent behaviorists like Nagel and Brodbeck and Verstehen analysts like Winch or Hampshire does not seem so great as the former suppose. Both sides tend to reject introspection—at least as something possible apart from society. Both emphasize a public domain, though for the former this tends to be a domain of sense experience while for the latter it is a domain of shared concepts. The empiricist tinge in Wittgenstein's approach is discussed in this writer's text at pp. 57-58.
I don't decide what to choose. The rule establishes my choices. If, for example, an instance of killing is involved, then the shared rule will determine whether this killing is murder and should not be done, or whether, as in war, it is national defense and should. Now, of course, I must decide, in the end, whether to do the act or not, but if the rule completely defines the morality of it then my action as a subject is intellectually empty and, hence, is not really action according to Verstehen analysis. The action may be "mine" in the sense that a Sartre existentialism would give to that term, but otherwise it is better described as the action of the society in which, as an object, I am immersed.

Perhaps no Verstehen thinker would claim, though, that the rule completely specified action. Certainly Peter Winch would not do so. He distinguishes between the beliefs which exist within a "mode of discourse" and modes of discourse as wholes. 70 This suggests what he elsewhere says explicitly—that a rule is not a rigid formula but must be interpreted anew by the agent in changing circumstances. 71 Now when I talk about the Verstehen method, I am talking not about the narrowing of human choices which the rule involves but about those choices to which Winch alludes—choices which still remain for the person as a subject to make. And about these choices I do not see how the actor can be mistaken; these he cannot check against a rule. So

70Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy, p. 110.

71Ibid., pp. 62-65, 91-94.
the problem of Verstehen—that we cannot morally deliberate—seems to persist.

There is another response to the problem, however—one which is no more satisfactory but is perhaps as much so. Suppose we take seriously the Niels Bohr quotation at the beginning of this chapter that the opposite of a great truth is another truth, and suppose we further assume that there is no sharp distinction between the true and the moral. Then it is possible for a person to act in a way which is autonomous, yet substantive, while at the same time the person can check the meaning and hence the morality of his actions. This is why.

The person acts, we are supposing, independently of social influences and furthermore he cannot be mistaken in his acts. He can be incomplete, however. If he does not recognize the inherently tragic nature of human action and thus sees only one side of a moral issue it is precisely then that he is immoral. He can identify his incompleteness without wholly sharing the views of his moral opponents, though. The conflict itself will accomplish that.

Now is it so odd to say that human action cannot be mistaken in meaning nor be morally wrong but that it can be one-sided? Consider the issue of fair trial vs. free press. Certainly there are strong arguments for a free press, particularly in the coverage of courtroom proceedings and particularly in the case of political offenders. But there can be equally strong arguments for the claim that press coverage makes a fair trial impossible and especially in just those cases mentioned.
There are many moral dilemmas such as the above. Are they pervasive? Do they define the human situation? In this discussion of Verstehen, I have assumed that they do. I have suggested that for the most important part of reality, human action, thought and reality are wholly identical, but that this is a tragic identity. It is necessarily filled with contradictions.

Contradiction -- The affirmation of contradiction is the second major feature of a degree of reality logic. I want to suggest both that there can be contradictory concepts and that there can be contradictions, or dilemmas, in social phenomena. While the first point is the more fundamental it must wait upon my exposition of Hegel for its defense. In what follows I speak mainly to the second.

This affirmation of contradiction may be more plausible than it seems. To understand why we must first look back to the argument that can be made for any contextualist position--for any position according to which the facts we see depend in part on our conceptual framework. Charles Taylor gives a cogent version of that argument as he develops the thesis that political science cannot be value neutral. I have drawn on his argument in my earlier discussion of contextualism. 72 I now look at it directly.

Taylor observes that for any range of phenomena there are an indefinite number of features that could figure in correlations. Thus we cannot develop explanatory theories of any breadth except as we identify the crucial dimensions

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72 See pp. 29-32 of text and footnote 8. The work referred to is Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science."
within which our phenomena can vary. Otherwise, we do not know what facts to gather. But in identifying the dimensions of variation (henceforth I shall simply call them distinctions) we are taking value positions. For example, to see the difference in political systems as primarily a difference in whether or not the systems allow political freedom is to have made, already, a value judgment in favor of those which do allow such freedom.

Now a person might say that in some cases political freedom had to be "overridden" in a political system—for example in wartime. But if he went further and argued that political freedom was not the primary basis for distinguishing between polities, then he would have "undermined" the theory involved. And it is Taylor's point that he would not be unscientific if he did this since any way of looking at phenomena involves some value position. 73

With the Taylor argument in mind, can we imagine any major distinction which would be an "outcast distinction"—a distinction never to be used as a principal basis for differentiating phenomena? Certainly one must be very careful before answering this question with a "yes." It is the nature of conceptual frameworks that those operating within them are not readily tolerant of other perspectives. An American liberal would probably find unconvincing the illustrations I use in discussing contextualism. He would label

73 In a later work, however, Taylor is very explicit to the point that some conceptual frameworks are superior to others, and that only those who operate within the more adequate positions can know this. Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics, XXV (Fall, 1971), 3-51. See especially pp. 46-47.
"exploitation," "imperialism" and similar concepts as leftist jargon unconnected with political realities. But the Marxist would find such concepts fundamental.

There is one distinction, however, which is very widely treated as an outcast in Western thought. It is the distinction between contradiction or its practical expression in dilemma, on the one hand, and the absence of contradiction, on the other. To use this distinction as a primary basis for dividing phenomena is to imply that dilemma is often the human condition. Otherwise there would be no point in so much emphasizing the distinction.

Thus the distinction makes a great difference. If there are many social problems which represent logical impossibilities then our intellectual response is to learn how to live with the consequent dilemmas. But if we suppose that the problems only appear to be dilemmas then we are saying that the distinction between contradiction and non-contradiction is trivial. We are saying that the appearance of something as a dilemma is obvious and is a point not deserving much elaboration. Our effort should be directed instead at attempts to resolve these supposed dilemmas.

Let us consider, now, the collective choice problem and some associated problems in democratic theory generally. According to a precise formulation, the collective choice problem is one of aggregating a multiplicity of individual preference orderings around alternate social actions. 74 The collective

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choice—democratic theory literature is particularly worth examining in connection with our tendency to treat the distinction between contradiction and non-contradiction as an outcast distinction. The reason it is so is because there are some writings which come perilously close to admitting the distinction and the treatment of those writings is illuminating.

I shall look very briefly at three works with the intent not to examine any details (except in one instance) but simply to point out what the writers claim to have done and how they and others react to it.

Kenneth Arrow, in a rigorous formal proof, claims to have shown that democracy, in a widely accepted sense of that term, is impossible.\(^75\) He argues, specifically, that there is no rule by which individual preference orderings can be aggregated into a social choice which is itself an ordering and is not dictated by a minority (provided there are at least three alternatives).

The reaction to Arrow's work appears to be largely an attempt to find a way out of the dilemma.\(^76\) And I believe that Arrow himself shares this desire. He

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76 In a chapter added to the second edition of Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, he responds to some of his critics. The thrust of their criticism seems to be a claim that there is no true dilemma or, alternatively, that there is a way out of it.
has described his conclusion as "quite embarrassing." 77

Richard Wollheim has argued that there seems to be a paradox in the theory of democracy. "... if a man expresses a choice for A and the machine [i.e. democratic system] expresses a choice for B, then the man, if he is to be a sound democrat, seems to be committed to the belief that A ought to be the case and to the belief that B ought to be the case." 78 Whereas Arrow argues that there is no reasonable democratic system which does not lead to a minority choice, Wollheim is wondering how a person can adopt as his own the choice of a democratic system if it does not agree with his personal choice.

Wollheim sees no real paradox, however. "I doubt that any of us are prepared to regard Democracy as inconsistent." 79 He proposes a distinction which, for him, shows that the two claims of his hypothetical democrat are compatible. Other authors, while displaying the same faith in the consistency of Democracy, propose other distinctions. 80

Robert Paul Wolff has claimed that there is no way to make the autonomy


79Ibid., p. 84.

of the individual compatible with the legitimate authority of the state. 81 If an individual is morally autonomous he cannot be under a moral obligation to obey the laws of any state. But if a state is legitimate it has a moral right to rule and, hence, its citizens have a moral obligation to obey its laws. Here Wolff has stated explicitly that the concept of a legitimate state is inconsistent. On his view, it cannot be possible, as Wollheim thinks, for a person's own choice to be compatible with the collective choice if the two differ.

Because Wolff, more than Arrow or Wollheim, seems to accept the distinction between contradiction and non-contradiction, it is worthwhile to consider the work of one of his critics to see whether that critic grants the distinction and operates within it, or whether he denies it and thus, in Taylor's terms, undermines the theory. I want to examine just one point made by Jeffrey Reiman. 82 Reiman argues that "Moral authority is not a meaningful

81This claim is a change in emphasis from an earlier one which involved essentially the same point, but made it subordinate to another. According to the earlier point, the individual's highest obligation is to be autonomous and anarchism is the only political theory consistent with autonomy. Because this earlier point is the one for which a defense is explicitly made, while, in fact, an attempt is being made to defend both points, Wolff's argument is confusing and highly vulnerable to criticism. This writer believes it is possible, nevertheless, to isolate the later claim and focus on that.


moral concept because it contradicts the notion of moral obligation itself. "83

Something is moral because of what it is and not because of where it comes from. 84 Consequently there is not a meaningful conflict between moral authority and moral autonomy since the former does not exist. If it existed there would be contradiction.

Notice that what Reiman has done is to undermine Wolff's position by denying that there might be contradiction. If we, instead, accept the possibility of contradiction then Reiman's statement converts to the claim that "because moral authority is a meaningful moral concept it contradicts the notion of moral obligation." While I grant that in its revised form this is not exactly Wolff's position, does it not come close? Wolff claims, at one point, that to be autonomous is to be oneself the judge of moral constraints 85 and this seems related to Reiman's claim that moral obligation issues from the inner character of something--what it is--and not from an outside source. Each person must judge the moral "what" if he does not depend on another for his moral standards. Thus, Reiman in his notion of moral obligation comes close to

83Ibid., p. 2. From the view of this writer, what Reiman must mean to say is that "moral authority is not a meaningful moral concept because" if it were, it would "contradict the notion of moral obligation itself."

84Ibid., pp. 2-4.

Wolff's notion of autonomy. 86

From this very brief look at some literature that skirts the edge of the distinction between contradiction and non-contradiction it is apparent that the distinction is treated as an outcast. And yet the fact that this literature exists at all might well suggest that there is something plausible in that distinction, especially in the light of Taylor's argument.

Features of a Degree of Reality Logic -- Having examined, in a little detail, the plausibility of the two main features which characterize a degree of reality logic, it is time to consider these and other features as they compare with what I call a degree of truth logic. Before doing so, however, I want to emphasize the tentative nature of my claims. I do not insist that thought and reality are wholly identical, even in the domain of human action, nor do I insist that contradiction is the nature of our concepts or of the human condition.

What I shall argue is that the possibility of these claims being true is too

86 Reiman acknowledges that, in rejecting the concept of moral authority, he appears to be agreeing with Wolff's defense of anarchism. But, according to Reiman, there is for him at least a "theoretical possibility" of establishing the existence of "legitimate" political authority, though not of moral authority. Reiman's final position seems to invoke what this writer calls a degree of truth logic. Reiman argues that Wolff's concepts of moral autonomy and moral authority are too purely definitional. In the terms of Alston or Putnam, one might say that Wolff's concepts assume too sharp a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. Real moral autonomy involves an existent social order, says Reiman, and cannot be completely opposed to legitimate political authority. See Reiman, In Defense of Political Philosophy, pp. 4-5, 75-79.
serious to be ignored. 87

The features of a degree of reality logic may be listed as follows:

1. There is no "external reality" consistently independent of one's concepts. Hence if this logic is a contextualist position it must be one which tends toward idealism more than toward empiricism. Now one might argue that this second conceptual logic simply is idealism and not another middle way, since to identify thought and reality suggests a complete and closed reality. I disagree. The reality I speak of seems internally contradictory, to me. Its "completeness" is the completeness of contradiction, not the logical order of an idealist philosophy such as that of Spinoza.

2. There is, as with the degree of truth logic, an openness of concepts.

But here they are not open because they are indefinite but because their

87Furthermore, the claims are so broad that their proof tends to be internal. There seems no way to test the validity of the Law of Non-Contradiction without assuming, in advance, either that the law exists or that it does not. Consequently, proofs against the existence of contradiction will usually be found to be assuming that law. Logicians imbed all the laws of thought within the metalanguage by which they talk about logic, and they can become quite testy if anyone questions the metalanguage. Mure makes the following important criticism of the logician's insistence on his laws of thought and, specifically, his insistence on the law of non-contradiction.

"It has been objected to Hegel's Logic that he bases it on a flat denial of the law of contradiction. The objection suggests that this law is for logic an unexaminable universal axiom to be accepted as an a priori datum. But if it is, there is exempted from the logician's critical scrutiny what is implied by this very objection to be an extremely important character of thought." [G. R. G. Mure, An Introduction to Hegel (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 139.]
definiteness is a product of conflict and tension. (In other words there is
determination by negation.) Hence definition is not a stable state, either of
rest or movement.

3. Again, as with the degree of truth logic, concepts undergo evolution.
But evolution does not here refer to a merging of reality and concept but to
awareness of the connection of the concept with every other concept. No con-
cept is completely understood until the conceptual whole is completely under-
stood.

4. The evolutionary process does not occur through the actions of any
pervasive community of investigators or language users but as a conflict be-
tween such communities. The conceptual structure within which individual
concepts have their meaning is that conflict.

5. The problems to which these communities respond are contrasting
problems and yet they are interdependent ones.

All these features of a degree of reality logic--identity of thought
(concept) and reality, definition by negation, completeness of definition de-
pendent on completeness of understanding of the whole, development of
definitional completeness as social conflict, and social conflict as conflict of
different but interdependent problems (and thus perspectives)--all these are
found in the philosophy of Hegel. I shall attempt to reveal these features as
I give an exposition of his thought.
Hegel's Thought. Hegel's views contrast sharply, in many respects, with those of common sense. If one places the burden of proof on he who opposes common sense then it falls heavily on Hegel, yet he accepts this burden only in the context of his own method and this method diverges as sharply from common sense as do his substantive positions. He does not ultimately defend his views either by appeal to sense experience or by the use of formal logic—that logic based on the Law of Non-Contradiction. Both methods are for him relatively early, partial, and by themselves mistaken, phases of thinking. Reality is "Absolute Spirit" becoming conscious of itself. The only adequate proof for any position is that it is part of the description of this development process, a process Hegel calls "dialectical."


A Defense of Hegel by Formal Logic -- For those who find his typical form of argument unconvincing, there are passages in Hegel's works and in those of his sympathetic interpreters which revert to other forms of argument, particularly to formal logic. I shall employ some of these formal logical arguments.

While it may seem inconsistent to try to defend Hegel by methods he himself rejected as inadequate, this is not quite the situation. Firstly, Hegel does acknowledge formal logic as what may be called a lower phase method. For him, the worth of this method is not to find, by a process of elimination, some position free of contradiction. There is no such position. The worth of such logic is to reveal its own defect, the defect of assuming absolute distinctions. 89 I am not proposing, however, to emphasize this particular use of such logic. For it could not support Hegel's position any more satisfactorily than it could support other views. Without, for example, absolute distinctions between what he will call "philosophical science" and what he will call the thinking of the "understanding" it is not possible to say as emphatically as he does that one position derives from the former and some other merely from the latter.

But Hegel's sometime use of formal logic can be construed in another way, and that is my second point. It can be construed as a neutral method capable of discriminating between the better and worse of other methods. Understood thus,

formal logic is something wholly other than Hegel’s dialectical logic. Yet it is perhaps only by means of something wholly other that his own logic can be defended. Indeed, this conclusion seems, in the end, to be a reaffirmation of the dialectic itself.

Having acknowledged the legitimacy of a defense of Hegel by formal logic, I would summarize the claim he wishes to defend by saying that: all knowledge is self knowledge. And I would summarize the basic argument for that claim as follows: To know anything presupposes a relationship between the known object and the knowing subject. If the object was completely foreign to the knower then he could have no knowledge of it. Specifically, if the mental image is apart from the real, one would need an image of the relation between object and image to know that the two corresponded. But this image is in turn only an image of a relation one term of which is foreign. To know that this second order image really corresponds to that relation, one would therefore need a third order image, and so on to infinity. To know anything at all therefore requires either that we reach the end of infinity (which we cannot do) or that we incorporate the object of knowledge within the knowing subject himself. One must conclude that all knowledge is a form of self knowledge or, put another way, is a form of self consciousness.

A corollary of the above point is that human self-consciousness is the prototype of all knowledge. Here is a sort of knowledge in which subject and

90For one expression of the problem, see Mure, An Introduction to Hegel, p. 150.
object are clearly distinct and yet a unity. The self as object is other than the self as subject and yet it is the same self.

Though they seem to follow by formal logic, the above conclusion and its corollary, when stated so abstractly, probably do not carry conviction. I shall begin again. As I do so I must give one prefatory remark. In what follows, I equate consciousness and self-consciousness. Hegel separates them both logically and, in a sense, historically. But in both cases consciousness is always self consciousness in potential. The two are not really separated.

Now, whether or not knowledge is a form of self consciousness it certainly requires self-consciousness in that it requires a self. It makes little sense to speak of knowledge without a knower. Yet there seems to be no knower on the reasoning of empiricists such as Hobbes or Hume. If Hobbes is correct in claiming that knowledge is merely a resultant of motions experienced somehow as qualities, where is the subject to have these experiences? The image of billiard balls rebounding on each other suggests, at most, a flux of sensation, not a point at which they are integrated.

The same difficulty arises for Hume. All non-mathematical knowledge, he claims, has its basis in given "impressions" (which include such entities as sensations, emotions and the will). Ideas are merely less lively impressions, being copies of the more lively ones. And they happen to be associated in regular ways. Knowledge, states Hume, is just an awareness of these associ-

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91 See text chap. I, p. 16.
lations. Even that much knowledge seems impossible, however, since the subject of awareness is itself nothing but a non-necessary association of ideas.

... from what impression cou'd this idea [of a self] be deriv'd?... It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference. ...

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. 92

Hume did have an explanation for the apparent existence of the self. It was a mere fiction of the mind. But how there could be a continuing mind to engage in such fictions was not indicated. Indeed, Hume suggested by his explanation that no such mind existed.

Neither Hobbes nor Hume, then, can convincingly account for subjectivity. Yet the existence of subjectivity is as certain to plain-man thinking as are real objects and the correspondence theory of truth. Common sense is not all on the side of the empiricists. Furthermore, the existence of the subject implies that the subject is conscious of itself. That is at least part of what subjectivity normally means.

I conclude that if the subjectivity essential to knowing cannot be reached, starting from an external given, (whether of objects or sensations) then one must apparently start from the subject itself. This conclusion gains further support from two other directions. First, consider again the infinite regress

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to which a correspondence theory of truth seems to lead. To acknowledge the priority of the subject in knowing completes this infinite regress, in a sense (while of course denying the correspondence theory in its usual empiricist form). It completes the regress by assimilating infinity within the subject itself as its essential attribute—the capacity for self reflection and thus self transcendence. Common sense recognizes the self as something that can reflect on itself, can reflect on its reflection and so on.

Consider, secondly, the method of ostension, that method upon which most empiricists ultimately ground their views. The classic difficulty of this method, as we have seen, is that of producing unambiguous information. Pointing, it seems, suggests an infinite number of applicable concepts. Subjectival knowing avoids this difficulty. If knowing truly begins with the subject, the problem which arises is not how information could be correct but how it could be incorrect.

These, then, are some of the principal arguments of formal logic for the claim that all knowledge is self-knowledge. In the following pages I shall further elaborate that claim, first by briefly considering Kantian thought, second by examining the Hegelian dialectic, third by discussing the Hegelian notion of Spirit, and last by some comments on Hegel's philosophy of history.

Contrast Between Hegel and Kant -- Immanuel Kant holds, in a way, both that the subject is epistemologically prior and that knowledge is ultimately initiated by an objective reality. To use a simple metaphor, concepts are like cookie cutters which cut "phenomena" out of the differentiated but otherwise
unknowable thing-in-itself. The difficulty with this view is that if the subject is a cookie cutter which cuts out phenomena then, to continue metaphorically, it is not, presumably, a mirror which pictures the phenomena thus produced. But how then can the phenomena be known? Kant's response is an appeal to something like unmediated sense experience. The subject provides only the forms of knowledge—certain very abstract categories such as substance or cause and effect. If one has an experience it will be prestructured by these forms. But whether one has the experience is determined somehow by things in themselves. It is those which provide the matter of knowledge, telling what particular substances there are or what particular instances of cause and effect. Thus for Kant, even as for empiricism, the subject does not seem to be truly prior in knowing.

It was particularly in response to Kant that Hegel developed his views of truly subjectival knowing. For Hegel, such knowledge implies a different status for concepts. They are not like cookie cutters which operate on something basically different. They are like seeds which contain the potential of developed reality within themselves. Such knowing thus implies also a fundamentally different source of differentiation for reality. For empiricists the division of reality into different determinate entities is assumed a given.

93 More precisely, there are acts of judgment which must occur prior to experience because they are presupposed by experience. They make experience cohere in certain general ways.

94 See the discussion in Mure, An Introduction to Hegel, pp. 89-91.
But if reality unfolds from the concept, differentiation appears in this very process, a process which Hegel calls the dialectic. Let us now consider that process.

The Hegelian Dialectic -- Michael Kosok has developed a very helpful formalization of Hegel's dialectic. My discussion of its principles is largely drawn from early pages of that essay but does not follow them exactly.

If all knowledge is self knowledge then it is reflection. Hegel's dialectical logic is the formal process of reflection. It is a process which is the structural opposite of empiricism oriented thought. In empiricist oriented thought we suppose there is a vast array of concrete sense phenomena and that from these ascends a pyramid of increasingly high abstractions. But dialectical knowledge is an inverted pyramid. A small set of elements on an early highly abstract level are capable, by reflection, of being analyzed from a meta-level which brings out properties about that level which could not have been formulated within it. As reflection continues on ever higher levels there is increasing complexity and concreteness. Of course this process is not simply one of moving from the abstract to the concrete instead of the reverse. The Hegelian "abstractions" already contain the concrete in potential much as the details of a mathematical system are already contained within its principles.

The dialectical process occurs in what are analogous to temporal stages but do not in fact exist in time; they are better described as logical moments.

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Let us examine this dialectical process rather closely. There is an element, something immediately present in the field of consciousness, which element is both concept and reality. This element is reflected upon. The first logical moment of the reflection affirms that this element is present. But the very act of affirmation implies that something other than the affirmed element must exist from which it is distinguished—namely the negation of the element.

This second moment, the moment of negation "... is regarded as the essence of reflection and mediation... since to mediate or reflect is to remove (negate) oneself from a situation of immediacy."96 It is thereby also the essential moment of determination or, to put it another way, definition. "Reflection is a questioning process producing determination by setting an element in opposition with itself..."97

As the assertion of the element implies its negation, however, so the negation again refers to the assertion. I cannot understand not-something except as I can imagine the something. This third logical moment is labelled by Hegel "double negation." Only with this third moment can I be said to have a complete reflection since I cannot think of an element without thinking of its negation and I cannot think of its negation without thinking of its affirmation.

While the triad of affirmation, negation, and double negation is essential for any reflection at all, and thus any determination of the element (or defini-

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96Ibid., p. 240.

97Ibid., p. 241.
ition of the concept), a single triadic process does not yield a complete reflection. The element has only been defined as one of mutually implied possibilities--the possibility that it is implies the possibility that it is not and vice versa.

Because the element with which reflection begins is made only potentially determinate, through that reflection, it is now necessary to reflect upon the reflection. This second level reflection will involve nine terms instead of the original three, since each moment in the initial act of reflection is itself the object of a triadic process. Similarly, the third level will involve twenty seven terms. Now this process goes on to infinity but by infinity is not meant here the endlessness of things which are themselves finite. Recall that Hegel is describing the process of self-knowledge. What is meant is the infinitude of the individual who because he can reflect upon himself, (or in other words has his own determining negation within himself) is internally infinite.  

Clearly, then, the dialectical process never comes to an end except in the sense that it always is at an end as the continuing self-struggle of the self-conscious individual. Kosok expresses this point by saying that "Reflection is an infinite movement of self-realization that can never resolve itself in the form of a completed product: the whole as a process is incomplete; only the process as a whole or an infinite totality and not a product is complete."  

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In summary, the dialectical process is the development of self-consciousness. There is, in the first step, subject present as a state of non-conscious harmony slightly disrupted by a vague awareness of unease. In the second step this awareness of unease is objectified—is made into an object confronting the subject. But in the third step the subject becomes more fully realized in becoming aware that this object is really an aspect of itself. This total process has at least three descriptions, with their associated terminology. It may be called the "development of self consciousness," as above, or it may be called the "dialectic," or it may be called the "realization of the concept."

It is difficult to illustrate briefly the principles of the dialectical process, since such brief illustration calls for concrete examples, and in Hegelian thought what is highly concrete only occurs at a late and complex logical moment. I shall attempt two illustrations while recognizing that the simple examples I give employ concepts richer than they ought to be. The first illustration embraces several levels of the dialectical process.

Consider a person emerging into physical consciousness with a headache. There is first that vague sense of unease. Next the person senses the headache as a definite something apart from himself, say a vise within which his head is being squeezed. Finally he becomes aware that this supposed foreign pressure is really part of himself.

If we use another expression for the process, if we think in terms of the "realization of the concept," we can describe that process a little differently.
The first step is the concept of a headache in its immediacy, the second is the concept actualized, and the third is the concept in its actualization. Only with the three steps together is there really the thought of a headache, the concept.

Of course the process can also be described by using the most well known terminology of the dialectic. The first step is then said to be relatively pure thought and to be relatively indeterminate. It is called the thesis. The second step, or antithesis, is the thought negated--confronted with its other--and by this step it begins to become something definite. In the third step, or synthesis, the thought is realized as one with its other. The headache as objective and the headache as subjective is the same one.

It is not odd to consider a headache as an aspect of a self, but Hegel argues that everything, even the supposedly external world of nature, is ultimately such an aspect. I shall carry the above metaphor a little further to suggest how this might be.

On a second level of consciousness the person is at first explicitly aware of his headache but only dimly aware of the immediate social context within which it arose. Subsequently he comes to objectify this context in the form of stress situations which confront him. Let us suppose, though, that through psychological counseling he comes to recognize these situations as attitudes, and thus aspects, of himself. This third step completes a second triad and already assimilates to the self that which prior to Freud might have been considered external.
At still a third level the person begins with explicit awareness of his neurosis but little awareness of its broader social context. With further counseling he objectifies the context as, say, overdemanding parents whose cumulative actions still confront him. But with the insights of a social philosopher he may finally recognize that the competitive society which helped produce insecure overdemanding parents is the same society in terms of which he finds his own self identity. Thus like the stress situations, the parental influence becomes, in a sense, an aspect of himself.

In this metaphor I have not reached the natural world but it is clear that at least much of social reality is conceivable as an aspect of the subject. Nevertheless, a word of caution is needed. This metaphor, like any other, can be misleading. We normally think that it is a person who becomes aware of a headache and that it is the same person who subsequently recognizes the contexts of the headache. But if the metaphor is to be exact, one must think of the headache as itself a subject, though not a fully developed one. Thus it is the headache which becomes aware of itself, then emerges from this narrow awareness to become aware that it is more than a headache, and then in turn emerges from the new awareness, and so on.

My second illustration is of a single level of the dialectic and shows how plausible it is to say that our social concepts, at least, are defined by their opposites.

Let us consider the ideological dichotomy of political conservatives and
political liberals. Do we know what a conservative is by sense experience? Clearly not. Until we already have a conception of conservatism we don't know what features of sense experience are important. But then do we all share the same conception? It seems so, because a conservative will probably use some of the same words in describing himself that his opponent would use. But there may be a difference. For the conservative these words may be concepts, while for his opponent they are empty categories. Both may agree that the conservative believes society to be an organic whole but the difference is that the conservative apparently sees it this way and his belief is not the cause but the outcome of that way of seeing. And the liberal does not see it that way.

Now if one accepts Wittgenstein's position about language—the position that we do seem to share our basic concepts—one may not find the preceding argument very convincing. But it is the best I will attempt. There probably is no conclusive argument either way. And assuming that we do not share the same conceptions, a conservative and a liberal must be defined by each other.

A conservative, as such, would have little determinate character on Hegelian reasoning. He does not acknowledge himself as a conservative nor does he acknowledge other ideologies. And this is because he tacitly assumes society to be a kind of living organism which can change only imperceptibly and not by the independent agency of any of its members. Still, there is a certain unease about conservatism, a vague sense of discord. But the conservative only begins to be determinate, his sense of discord only begins to be
objectified--and then only as defensiveness--when he is confronted with his antithesis. And it is his antithesis, the liberal, who especially manifests determinate character.

The liberal does not achieve determination directly, however. That is to say, he does not achieve it by arguing, at first, for a certain state of society. He achieves determination in becoming conscious of the conservative position, let us here call it the organicist status quo, as something distinct from himself. In this process he will necessarily see this status quo as in some ways opposed to his individual concerns and that of any other single experient. Thus when the liberal then proceeds to defend greater social equality and individual freedom the specific content of that concept will derive from its contrast to the status quo. He will begin by arguing against tyranny and privilege.

Hence the organicism of the conservative only becomes conscious when it is negated by the atomistic views of the liberal, but the latter views only become clear in contrast to what they negate.

The Hegelian "Spirit" -- The preceding illustrations of the Hegelian dialectic indicate just how far from plain-man thought subject oriented knowing goes, if it is developed with formal logical consistency. Of course, the reality which Hegel saw as a development of thought is, preeminently, social reality. The natural world was treated somewhat differently. But in any case, whether or not the notion of dialectical reality seems odd that of the subject surely does.

The Hegelian subject, as potential, is many sorts of things "lower" than
an individual person. That it is has been already noted in connection with the headache metaphor. Concepts like quantity and thing, supposedly actual things like rocks or plants, and the human himself in his primitive or child state are all the subject in potential and at various stages of its development.

The Hegelian subject, in its full development, is not an individual person, however, but is something "higher." It is "Absolute Spirit," "Universal Mind," "God." Individual persons, as well as all the non-logical entities which are lower than them, are merely contingent differentiations of this being. There is a formal logical rationale for such a view. If knowing begins with numerous different subjects, by which I mean different as subjects, then knowledge will differ for each. But even if knowing begins with numerous identical subjects, no single subject has awareness of a "common" reality. In other words, there is no common knowledge. He is aware of his reality which happens to repeat exactly that of every other. On the assumption that there is a common knowledge, it clearly seems to follow that the subject must be singular. 100 Hegel so claims, although his subject is singular as a unity of numerous personal subjects.

Spirit is, of course, the subject of that dialectical process which has

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100This argument is drawn from Mure, An Introduction to Hegel, p. 91. It is interesting that, for both Wittgenstein and Hegel, there is a common world of concepts. But, for Wittgenstein this commonality means that there are no subjects--the usual conclusion for one with empiricist leanings. And for Hegel the commonality means that there is only one subject--which is again the usual conclusion for one with tendencies toward idealism.
already been illustrated. It is through the dialectic that Spirit grows in self consciousness. The process is primarily logical, not historical, and when that is understood it does not seem so odd to find that abstract ideas as well as persons are considered subjects. Nevertheless, the general theory still seems odd since rocks and plants are also subjects, and since persons are not the ultimate ones. In addition, reality as the self realization of a single subject is only describable by language which on positivist assumptions sounds like outrageous hypostatization and anthropomorphism. From those assumptions, which are close to plain-man thought, it is easy to criticize and even caricature Hegel. It is easy but not responsible. If his views are plausible then so must be the language they require.

Social Implications of Hegel's Philosophy--Two Views -- Hegel's philosophy as I have presented it clearly reveals the first three features of a degree of reality logic. Thought and reality are indeed identical. Together they make up the unity of the knowing subject since all knowledge is self-knowledge. And concepts are indeed open in the sense of being in conflict with each other rather than being indefinite. For it is in the process of self-negation that a concept becomes definite. Furthermore, the concept is definite only as the continuation of the process in higher levels of reflection.

That Hegel's thought also reveals the last two features of a degree of reality logic--conflict among meaning communities and dispute over the relevant problems--is evident from the discussion of his history which I offered in
Chapter I. History is a process of struggle among different forms of social life, different states. And that it is implies that the different states see different social problems.

Nevertheless, Hegel's social thought, unlike his logic, departs from the kind of contextualism I am trying to promote. The reasons are, firstly, that the historical process seems to come to an end (the struggle does not persist) and, secondly, that whether it does or not later stages in the process seem to supplant earlier ones. By contrast, I want to talk about a contextualism in which the conceptual struggle is eternal and, as will be clearer in Chapter V, where earlier stages continue to be as real in their own way as are later ones.\textsuperscript{102}

Is it possible that Hegel might reasonably have constructed a different philosophy of ethics and of history upon the same dialectical logic? I suggest that it is. Hegel's logic is a timeless process in which all the moments of the dialectic must be thought of as simultaneously present. Being a process of self realization, it can be thought of as a linear progression. But since every step in the process occurs by negating, and thus referring back to, that which preceded, the process also seems completely circular. Hegel's history, however, (though not his ethics) is a process which occurs in time and is usually interpreted only as a linear progression.

In his ethics and his history Hegel claims that the individual will only

\textsuperscript{101}See, text chap. I, pp. 18-22.

become free as he recognizes himself to be part of society and ultimately a part of the State--part of a form of ethical life. Thus Hegel usually seems to be saying that an individual is free just insofar as he obeys the laws and conforms to social customs. But if the state is simply a late phase in a single dialectical process, as it is, then one might also say that society generally, and the state in particular, are real only by contrast with individual persons and that the subjective wills of individuals are as real and moral as are the laws and customs of society.

A similar argument can be made about Hegel's claim, in his history, that forms of ethical life--let us say world views since they are at least roughly that--both succeed and improve upon each other. The argument is that if the later world views become real only by contrast with what precedes them, their reality is dependent on the reality of those earlier world views. Thus the later views are no more an improvement on the earlier than the earlier are on the later. I tried to illustrate this possibility before by showing that if political liberalism is in one sense an advance on political conservatism in another sense it depends on conservatism for its own meaning. (We have a common sense awareness of this converse relationship--revealed in the perplexities of social contract theories of society. Unless the supposedly atomistic individuals of liberalism already share certain deep-rooted customs and beliefs, including a theory of legitimate social rankings, they could scarcely agree on what sort of social contract to adopt.)
I want to suggest, in closing this section, that Hegel's logic, and the social implications he could have drawn from it but apparently did not, constitute another way to explain human concepts without retreating to empiricism.

The empiricist says we can know, learn, and teach by pointing. But there are grave arguments against his view. If we reject it, however, we must assume that if we can still know, learn and teach, then it must be because we see the world through conceptual frameworks which structure our knowledge, and that we can communicate our concepts to each other.

According to Wittgenstein and similar thinkers it seems that we understand each other's concepts because we share them—we somehow share the same conceptual framework. But according to Hegel we understand any concept by contrast with its opposite. This Hegelian insight, carried further into the social realm, would suggest that a community of investigators or of language users could have meaningful concepts only in contrast to those of opposing communities. Hence the reason communication would be possible across conceptual frameworks was because each side had to assume the opposing view in order to articulate its own and thus each side was, in effect, on both sides of the relevant issue.

The above theory of concepts would explain why convincing ad hominem arguments are so widely available in political debate. An American liberal (i.e. a reform liberal) finds that his ability to criticize system bias with relative immunity rests on his own favored position in the system. One recent
and striking example consists of those who favor busing for racial integration but themselves avoid its impact by the safe geographic location which their status makes possible. An American conservative (i.e. a classic liberal) finds that his own interest in the current system rests on his ability to undermine it. For example, he may argue the classic virtues of capitalism because he is simultaneously destroying them by monopolistic practices.

Because the Hegel-based argument I have just set forth is another way to explain human concepts without pointing, and because it must therefore assume the communicability of those concepts, I call it a second version of the "communication argument." Because this version explains communication as the product of self-consciousness, in which the object and subject are necessarily in contact since they are two aspects of the same self, I call this version of the argument an "idealist version."

The idealist version of the communication argument represents, to me, a legitimate second way between idealism and empiricism. If the reader would like to see a more detailed yet concise application of this approach than has yet been given, he should turn to pages 386-89 in Chapter VI. In the chapters which next follow I shall be applying the approach at some length.

Comprehensiveness as a Dialectical Problem

We have now reviewed three possible approaches to the examination of the concept of comprehensiveness. We could see the concept from an empiri-
cist viewpoint. In that case, the primary research problem would not be a conceptual problem at all but would be the statistical-survey problem of correlating comprehensiveness in decision-making with the conditions under which it was most likely to be achieved. But there would be a subsidiary problem which was conceptual. We would need to operationalize the concept.

Secondly, we could see the concept from the viewpoint of a degree of truth logic. Our problem then would be to examine carefully our ordinary usage and to do so with recognition of the perplexities which empirical experience would sometimes reveal to us about that usage.

Or, thirdly, we might want to see the concept from the viewpoint of a degree of reality logic. How we would proceed in this last case is not yet very clear but apparently the process would involve the idea of an inner conflict—a conflict between two aspects of the same subject.

We are now in a position to answer more fully the question posed at the beginning of this chapter—the question whether the problems of comprehensiveness identified in Chapter I are truly scientific problems or at least theoretical problems. I said then that whether or not they were theoretical problems depended on what kinds of theoretical problems there might be. But I want to point out now that the substantive research problem we identify already implies a certain research approach and hence a certain theoretical problem.

If the problem of comprehensiveness is basically the problem how a multiplicity of physically discrete individuals, with different values rooted in
their physical differences, can be organized into a social whole, then such a problem raises an empiricist research problem. For it presupposes, with naive empiricism, that there is an external reality of physical objects and that connections among these objects are mental abstractions discovered of experience (in the case of theory) or imposed upon it (in the case of practice). While on this view the problem of comprehensiveness is a problem of practice it poses a theoretical problem. That problem is, of course, to discover the conditions which correlate with effective achievement of social order.

If the problem of comprehensiveness is basically the problem how an individual is able to become free of the conceptual and social whole which already exists, and which provides his identity as an individual, then it both raises and simultaneously is a conceptual research problem. In order to loose oneself from the conceptual framework within which one is, it is necessary to become aware of that framework—it is necessary to push it away, so to speak, and examine it from outside. This is the kind of conceptual problem implied in a degree of truth logic. For it supposes that an individual could, in fact, become at least partly free of his concepts and reach a "beyond," whereas for the degree of reality logic there is no beyond.

The two problems thus lead to different virtually opposite approaches. Yet common sense tells us that both problems do exist. We could ignore common sense, and this is something I am always willing to do when common sense tells me to reject something. (Unless we always accept common sense,
in which case there is no room for theoretical knowledge, we cannot justifiably use it to reject certain things and not others. For more careful thought might tell us that what we first rejected really had merit.) But I always respect common sense when it tells me to accept something even if the result is that I must accept opposites; for there may very well be truth in both of those opposites.

Since common sense suggests to me that both problems of comprehensiveness are real I cannot accept the diverse methodological implications they provide if the dissertation is to employ a single method, and I desire that it should. My choice of method comes, instead, from an initial direct examination of the concept of wholeness itself. That examination proceeds as follows.

Is wholeness something to which we can point? No. The very act of pointing implies that it is a pointing at something. If there is any concept which it is singularly inappropriate to define by ostension then this concept of wholeness is the one.

Is wholeness then a combination of concept and social reality which is in a state of evolution toward a more definite form? According to a degree of truth logic this is the condition of important concepts. But wholeness, i.e. completeness, is not incomplete.

I conclude that it is best to examine the concept of comprehensiveness from the standpoint of a degree of reality logic since any other method of concept examination seems to deny the very existence of this particular concept
It must be admitted, however, that my own choice of method already presupposes the kind of concept which comprehensiveness must be. It presupposes that wholeness is a unity of opposites. But this supposition, while perhaps curious, does have an important source of support in mathematical logic.

A satisfactory wholeness apparently must embrace infinity and contradiction. This is what Hegel's concept of spirit does. But it is also an alternate interpretation of Kurt Godel's incompleteness theorem. Godel attempted to develop a complete formal systematization of the arithmatic of whole numbers—an arithmatic which contains an infinite numer of elements. His attempt consisted in mapping the assumptions of the system into the system itself. The resulting product was found to be self-referential, however, and to result in contradiction. 103 The more usual way of describing Godel's conclusion is that any logically consistent system with an infinite number of elements is essentially incomplete. The alternate conclusion, however, is that a system with an infinite number of elements is complete as an inconsistent system. 104

There is a further argument to be made for treating wholeness as a dialectical problem. The two problems of comprehensiveness previously


104 Something like this conclusion is suggested by Kosok, "The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic," pp. 263-64.
identified are not themselves wholly consistent but incorporate opposing views. I oversimplified them, in this section, so as to show the tendency of their methodological implications, but in each case there is only a tendency. If it is possible for the atomism and behaviorism of a Hobbes to yield social order (even if only in one act) then people cannot be merely sources of impulse. There must be some mind, some concept usage, present. And if it is possible for certain individuals to somehow rise out of the social meanings of their time, as Hegel asserts, then most of us would conclude that there must be neutral ground--sense experience--which provides the foundation on which to do this.

The approach of the degree of reality logic is particularly sympathetic to the inconsistent mixtures which both problems of comprehensiveness seem to represent.

A final argument for the method draws from considerations of expediency rather than of theory. The human condition, at the time of writing, increasingly appears as one of dilemma. We seem to be caught in impossible choices such as that between a livable environment and the satisfaction of basic material needs or, more fundamentally, between the maintenance of what is good in industrial civilization and the reversal of the trend toward increasing poverty in many non-industrial societies. Perhaps a method which sees dilemma as inevitable, and proposes to analyze it, is a method worth investigating. Indeed, if conditions are as bad as some commentators maintain, the method is one we cannot afford to ignore.
A Dialectical Method of Concept Examination

In this last section of Chapter II is presented the method of concept examination which I shall use in the following two chapters. I believe this method is something of a departure from that commonly employed in ordinary language analysis but I don't insist on the point. If it happens that some or many ordinary language analysts are using a method like that which is proposed, then it is their sort of ordinary language analysis which I, also, want to use.

A few comments might be made about nomenclature. The method is an "examination," not an analysis. It does not seek to draw out abstract elements and reduce them to a few even more abstract ones. Its purpose, on the contrary, is to display the gradual efflorescence of the concept through increasingly richer specification. The examination is "dialectical" in several senses. It is so first in the loose sense of making argument the focus of its concern. Within this focus is included argument over first principles, over the axioms which for conventional logic are unarguable, and consequently the method is dialectical in a second sense—that which Plato uses in the Republic. Finally the method is dialectical in the third sense that argument is understood to be a series of completed arguments each of which is successively more refined than the last and each of which grows from, and yet in a way rejects, earlier ones. This third sense is roughly the Hegelian sense.

105 The Republic of Plato, trans. by Francis MacDonald Cornford (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), chap. XXIV. [Bk. VI, 509-11.]
My proposed method is, in brief, an analogue to the Hegelian position according to which reality is a single subject or a single concept becoming ever more fully realized. Could we not see the life work of many an important theorist as the attempt to develop the full meaning of one concept? Plato's work could be plausibly understood as a continuing attempt to define the Good. Many medieval thinkers were perhaps attempting to define God, and many thinkers during the Renaissance were certainly attempting to define Man. The writings of a country's judiciary are an attempt to define Justice. Some novelists may be trying to define Fate, others Love, and so on.

If we do see a thinker's work in this way, could we not imagine the possibility both that his concept has no universal reference in experience and that it is not shared by all other minds—and would we not then conclude that his concept must be defined by its own negative? If we do imagine this then the definition of any concept requires the existence of its opposite within itself. If we further suppose that these concepts in question are still social concepts, not concepts which belong to the thinker alone, then the conflict of opposites in any concept implies a social conflict.

Now given the previous assumptions, we may say that the thinker's participation in a social conflict, though it appears to be a debate over propositions, is really a definition of a concept. And thus if we examine the debate we are effectually examining the definition. Such an examination, based on such assumptions, is the dialectical approach to concepts which I am proposing.
The Dialectical Method in Relation to the Ordinary Language Approach.

The ordinary language approach shares with other contextualist approaches the observation that there is no sharp distinction between facts and values, between description and normative evaluations. Human society, the source of all immediate values, is also the source of the conceptual scheme through which we identify facts.

Many contextualists, whether more or less inclined to ordinary language methods, appear to supplement this first observation with a second one, however, to the effect that when we know the description we know the norm. Julius Kovesi expresses the point, with respect to concepts, by observing that we cannot say that two objects are similar in every respect except that one is good while the other is not. Once we know, for example, that something is a murder we know that it is bad. 106 Others such as Kurt Baier 107 have taken like positions, positions which would seem very close to naturalism were they based on more positivist assumptions.

The question I have for this second observation is whether it could not as well be reversed. If we already know the moral worth of something when we


107 Baier argues that, in value judgments, the identification of that which is being judged about can only be made if one knows something about its purpose. To know a car is to know the purpose of cars and to know the latter is already to know something about the criteria for a good car. See Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics (abridged ed.; New York: Random House, 1965).
know what it is, why could we not equally well say that we already learn what something is as we argue out its moral worth?

The apparent response to such a question by much of ordinary language analysis, and by similar approaches, is that our most important concepts are concepts that we all share. Consequently we could indeed reverse the sequence but not to the point of producing a really intense debate. Gallie, for one, argues that there exist "essentially contested concepts" but he adds that these concepts have reference to "exemplars" which are acknowledged by all (although they are open and provide no one best set of defining features).  

Kovesi asserts that a fundamental duality is not possible, at least for moral notions. Conceptualization is a public process. "... only those features of our lives can be incorporated into these notions that are shared by any of us, and in turn the formation of the notion must itself be done from the point of view of anyone."  

By contrast with the view above, the method I propose is one in which we do learn what something is primarily as we argue its moral worth. And this debate is expected to be so fundamental that in a sense we do not even share the same terms of reference. The reason we can nevertheless have a debate is because our opponent's views are the necessary background condition for

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109 Kovesi, Moral Notions, p. 55.
our own, and vice versa.

I suggest now that this dialectical development of concepts is as amenable to common sense as is the position of ordinary language philosophy. From the latter position everyone is seen to be engaged in ordinary language analysis just in the process of social interaction and language use. Those for whom it is a profession differ only in that they do it more carefully and hopefully with a little more insight. Their method is not ultimately an adversary proceeding but is one of clarifying what things are.

The ordinary language approach makes sense since we do gain conceptual clarity through relatively nonconflictual processes of day to day social life and discourse. But it also makes sense to view concept development as a process of intense moral debate. This second approach, which is also pervasive, is in the first instance an argument over the worth of something whose nature is only very vaguely grasped. It is only through an adversary process that that nature becomes specified.

Consider the jury deliberations in a murder trial. Given my contextualist assumptions we know that these deliberations are not just a matter of seeing here a certain human act and finding there the best label for it. To know something as a human act is already to know, in large part, the kind of act it is. But the question remains whether the jury is better understood as engaged primarily in clarifying the nature of murder in the light of their experience with this particular event or in arguing about the intrinsic goodness or badness of that event. I grant that judicial decisions are often interpreted in the former way
by legal theory. But I would still maintain that what goes on in the jury room, and for that matter in the privacy of the judges’ chambers, is more aptly understood as an argument over moral worth. As the argument reaches a tentative conclusion the jury has "found" at once both the act and the concept.

Arguments on such basic matters are never more than tentative, of course. We might better say not that the argument reaches a conclusion but that the argument is the conclusion, that the argument is the--internally conflictual--concept. The plausibility of this, as regards the present example, is evident. Consider the hung jury or the split decision in appeals court. Split decisions are commonplace and hung juries would be more so if the juries were not so often pressured into decisions.

There are numerous other examples of social life which could be construed as examples of dialectical concept examination. Those which develop military or diplomatic concepts such as "aggression" and "war criminal" unfortunately tend to involve violence, so intense is the moral argument. But there are many examples which do not and these include not only the usual activities of legislatures, political parties, voters, etc. but also the writing of books.

Written arguments certainly can be seen as instances of dialectical concept examination. I do not refer to the obvious point that the sides of, say, a legislative debate can include written arguments as well as oral ones or that a writer may make the case for his opponents as well as for himself. I mean
that the written argument on one side of the debate can be seen as a debate in itself. In what now follows I try to show why.

From the view of a degree of truth logic, a book length argument rests on a great number of distinctions and hence of subsidiary concepts which can be safely taken for granted because they are part of a common culture. The argument then focuses on a few remaining concepts, and these of course can vary only within the relatively narrow limits set by the mass of concepts that are already assumed.

It does not follow, however, that because the subsidiary concepts are assumed by the author that they are therefore really free of inconsistency. According to a degree of reality logic, an author's meanings may vary not merely around a central tendency but to the point of being contraries and possibly even contradictories. And they are the more able to do so precisely because they are not the matter of prime concern. Thus within his argument the author may be found to be arguing with himself, if these contradictions are present.

There is nothing greatly odd about this thesis. That someone's arguments can be plausibly interpreted in quite different ways is commonly acknowledged and gives rise to one of the major needs for scholarship. But scholarly interpretation is usually motivated by a goal of the one best interpretation. And we may ask if this is a reasonable goal, granting that it is a necessary one for the purpose of writing textbooks. Perhaps the author really
is saying quite different things.

From the standpoint of a degree of reality logic the differing concepts and propositions in some extended argument are not a target for scholarly reduction. One's purpose is to interpret these as an internal debate constituting part of the larger debate over a certain concept or concepts. And this phenomenon of debates within debates itself constitutes a specification of the concept or concepts, the best specification possible. 110

Main Features of the Method. The purpose of a dialectical method of concept examination is to reveal, with increasing specification, a concept by and as the pattern of defense of the worth of the concept. By worth I mean

110 Even if one rejects the broader implications of the method, it still has certain practical advantages. Firstly, it takes very seriously the obvious question to be asked of anyone arguing a position—"Why should I believe that?" Despite its obviousness, this question is not emphasized by present-day empiricists since for them argument is not primarily instructive. Ordinary language philosophers, although they criticize the empiricist position, do not seem to emphasize the question either. They employ argument to clarify ordinary language as it contributes to the evolution of language and of the norms embedded therein. For them, argument seems to be a recognition device.

Thus, the proposed method seems to this writer to fill a practical need. And it does this without taking a skeptical position. It is concerned less with evaluating the defense of a position than with simply displaying that defense in its full complexity. In doing the latter, it has a second practical advantage. It treats an author's writings as worthy of an extended examination. In an era which emphasizes speed reading and rapid summary, this may be a useful counter force.

The practical advantages of the method are accompanied by some clear practical dangers. An emphasis on the great complexity, and even inconsistency, in an author's work can easily degenerate into nit-picking. Even worse, it may lead one to overlook general principles which are there. Points which appear to be inconsistent, at first, may actually be tied together by these principles. This writer recognizes these dangers.
centrally the "normative" value of the concept but without supposing that this value is wholly distinct from the "description" of the concept. By normative value is meant ultimate goodness or badness, not instrumental goodness or badness (as, for example, in "fruitfulness for research").\footnote{Note that, in this description of purpose, the writer speaks of the worth of the concept and not the worth of that referred to by the concept. It is obvious, from previous argument, that any permanently sharp distinction between thing and concept is not acknowledged.}

There are a number of features named or implied in the above statement of method and I shall elaborate on several of them.

Focus on the Writings of Others -- Although I propose to examine a concept by examining the defense of its worth, I will not, in an important sense, be focusing on a defense which I myself produce. If I did so I could not establish enough psychic distance to even approximate an adequate examination. This is because a dialectical examination must be self referential. Because it departs from the assumption of a generally shared and only vaguely conscious conceptual framework, it must seek defense of a concept's worth in terms of that very defense, or of an opposition defense, or of a combination of both. Hence it must look for argument within the argument. I shall therefore focus on other peoples' writings and on those which do more or less explicitly defend a position about the worth of a concept.

Hold Back from Summarization -- The argument within a writer's argument is the object of a dialectical concept examination. To see this argument one must hold back from summarization. In saying this, I don't suggest that...
one can avoid that which summarization implies, namely the presence of a
conceptual framework. I have of course been insisting on the ubiquity of con-
ceptual spectacles. Neither do I suggest that one could make any examination
of an author's work, other than verbatim repetition, without one's own analysis
and in that sense summary. What I mean is just what I said. One should hold
back from summarization as much as possible. 112

To hold back from summarization is the obverse of the affirmative in-
junction to seek out and identify the different distinctions and thus subsidiary
concepts, the different expansions of these concepts, and the different argu-
ments and other points of defense which employ the concepts. This is the
initial step.

Seek Patterns of Defense -- Following the initial step, is the second and
major step. It is the attempt to learn how an author uses all the elements to
defend his position for or against the worth of the concept in question. One

112 One might object that there often is not much complexity in an author's
work which could be overlooked. This writer is not so sure. Consider this
analogy. Traditional studies of legislative activity focused on recorded votes,
public debates, committee hearings open to the public, and similar overt acts.
It is recognized, now, that even a single legislator's activity on a single bill
comprises a very large number of different and even inconsistent actions, and
that those which have been traditionally the most obvious ones may be the
least interesting. As one moves from traditional models of politics, first to
pluralist models and subsequently to what, for lack of a more general term,
might be called new-left models, ever more of these other actions come into
clear view. Why should one not suppose, therefore, that a shift in viewpoint
might do the same for authors whose works would otherwise be considered
thin?
common approach would be to cleanse the elements of any definite contradictions and ambiguities and then to reconstruct what remained in a loosely structured chain of logical syllogisms. But it was precisely my point in giving a rationale for a dialectical method of concept examination that this approach would not do. In destroying the contradiction, it destroys the inner debate and it is just that which one seeks.

By a pattern of defense I mean, then, something broader and looser than the common approach requires. A point of defense need not be a conventional logical argument and this is why I prefer to use the word "defense" rather than the word "argument." It may instead take a form that would be considered fallacious by conventional logic and which is yet accepted as convincing by many people. The simplest way, for example, to prove that A can do B is to identify them. Thus democracy can obviously coordinate if it is coordination.

As for the pattern, I mean any relationship among all the various elements if that relationship makes some sense as a whole. It is often suggested that there can be no structure among concepts which are ambiguous by conventional standards or among arguments which, by the same standards, are fallacious. This is too strong a saying. We cannot be that sure of the claim, in the absence of any attempt to find such a pattern.

An Anticipated Pattern of Defense--The Dialectical Pattern -- No pattern can be found where none is anticipated. The assumptions of a degree of reality logic suggest a pattern as well as a procedure. Historians of science such as Kuhn argue that science is less an inductive aggregating process than it is a
succession of increasingly broader conceptual wholes incorporating in altered forms those which went before. We might plausibly say the same of a single person's thought. It makes sense to see personal knowledge as an efflorescence of distinctions which successively destroy and reconstruct conceptual frameworks. For most people this process goes unrecorded. But for some sorts of writers it may well be captured in the chronology of their works.

For Kuhn those wholes within wholes can be deductively organized after the fact, so to speak, although that organization does not accurately describe their historical development. In the realm of social phenomenon, however, I am suggesting that the confrontation with conceptual structures of higher levels is a perpetual one and does not appear only in their initial development. The liberal-conservative conflict in politics seems to be this sort of conflict. So does the relationship between various geographic levels of political community from the local community to the nation state. It is precisely the view of a degree of reality logic that such conflicts must be perpetual, as they define the concepts through a succession of conceptual wholes. The pattern to anticipate is, then, one of wholes within and against wholes.

I shall proceed on this assumption by examining, in chronological order, certain principal works of a single author. And I shall assume that these

113Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In his later writings, however, Kuhn has deemphasized the impression, conveyed in this early work, that scientific paradigms are complete conceptual frameworks which can change only by revolutions.
works do form some sort of ultimate whole, however incompatible they may initially appear.

The Dialectical Pattern. The dialectical pattern, or in other words the pattern of the inner debate within a thinker's works, is revealed by identifying the different levels of completed argument, of conceptual whole, and then by displaying the relationships between each completed argument and the next above it. I shall first discuss certain basic features of the arguments and shall then outline the major steps taken to reveal the whole dialectical pattern or any one level of it.

Features of the Arguments --

1. The argument is a conceptual structure.

Each argument is an argument for or against the worth of the concept under examination, in this case the concept of comprehensiveness. Now these arguments are themselves understood to be conceptual structures and are the closest things to what on another view would be called conceptual frameworks. If concepts become specified in competition with each other and not by reference to a common evolving culture then one cannot draw much of a distinction between a concept and the conceptual framework within which it makes sense. Both are equally independent. Conceptual structures are struggles, both internally and externally. They are not settings. This is Hegel's viewpoint.

2. A completed argument is circular.

By a completed argument is meant a circular argument. That the arguments should be circular is not so odd. If concepts are internally related then
3. A higher level completed argument is richer in distinctions than is a lower level one.

By a higher level argument, or a more expansive conceptual structure (two terms for the same thing) I mean an argument that is richer in sharp distinctions. This is a common meaning. The purpose of the distinctions, as I perceive it, is less common, however.

4. The purpose of richer distinctions is to better defend one's case.

Why does someone who has written a short essay on a certain subject then proceed to write longer essays or books on the same subject? It is often said that he does so in order to make richer points of connection with the concrete reality to which his discussion refers. He makes more distinctions to achieve a closer fit with that reality. Another purpose often cited is that he does so to elaborate the cultural-linguistic setting which we all share. It is important to recognize that however much these two purposes may differ they have in common the typically western assumption that differentiation of some sort, whether these differences are material or cultural, has ontological priority. They assume that the philosophic problem is to explain how there can be unity as expressed in such things as universals.

There is an alternate assumption, however, which is common to eastern and some western thought and which holds that reality is one. The problem, on this view, is to explain how there can be any differences, not why there is
unity. This is the problem for Hegel and his explanation is that differentiation is the self realization of a single subject.

On this latter assumption, a major reason for making more distinctions is to defend one's case against the attacks directed at one's earlier less differentiated positions. This other purpose was supposedly common to scholastic thought and it is often attacked as an improper one. People argue that someone who will use distinctions in this way has no respect for facts. He simply wants to defend his theories at all cost and hence a setback to his theory, from sense experience, will always be countered by more distinctions. But this argument supposes that there are neutral facts of some sort. If this is not so, then the development of distinctions, particularly of social distinctions such as ends/means, politics/society or individual/group constitutes in itself the development of reality. And if concepts must be defined by their negatives, so that the definition of a concept is not only social but a social conflict, then it is the very nature of this conflict, this debate, that one pursues it by making more distinctions.

Displaying the Pattern -- I now come to the most critical stage in my discussion of methodology. It is a detailed description of the dialectical pattern--the pattern of an author's inner debate. The dialectical pattern is displayed by showing that the following specific propositions hold with respect to a reasonably large selection of the person's written works. The works will most commonly be essays or books but they may include book reviews, symposia participation, personal correspondence and the like.
Those propositions designated by letters are background propositions.

Those propositions designated by numbers are treated as definite steps in the argument process and these numbered steps will appear in the analyses of Chapters III and IV.

A. With respect to each pair of chronologically proximate works, parts of works, or groups of works, both of the pair are complete arguments and the later of the two is a higher level argument than the earlier. In other words, the later is a larger circle with more internal arguments on it--because it incorporates more distinctions--than is the earlier argument.

B. The totality of an author's works, considered relevant for this concept examination, can be seen as maintaining one side of a debate. The debate seems to pose a dilemma. A common sense view of the debate suggests that each side has as much merit as the other although each excludes the other. Perhaps this is because each side is understood in opposition to the other. This debate is the "outer" or "primary" debate.

Within each side of the outer debate there are two factions. They arise as alternate attempts to deal with the dilemma posed by that debate. The first faction leans toward the other side of the debate, while still giving verbal allegiance to its own side. The second faction defines itself in opposition to the first faction. It wants to show that one can truly retain the advantages of one's own side but without its disadvantages. This debate within the outer debate is the "proximate outer" debate or "secondary" debate.

It is the second faction which seems the most aggressive faction in the
proximate outer debate. Because its position is logically so tenuous, however, the strongest position that it can take, and consequently the one usually taken, is that the other faction's position leads to logical absurdity. In other words, the argument begins as a reductio ad absurdum. But reductio arguments are not necessarily convincing unless it can be shown that there is an alternate position which is not logically absurd. Hence those on this side of the proximate outer debate must provide a "direct proof" as well as the reductio or "indirect proof."

The direct proof is a proof that it is in fact possible to gain the advantages of one's own side in the outer debate without its disadvantages. The statement of that possibility is called the "central theme" and because the central theme seems to pose a contradiction, the attempt to defend it is what generates the "inner" or "tertiary" debate.

The statement of the central theme appears in the earliest of the author's works and is more or less continuously maintained in subsequent ones. The initial argument and all the later ones are, in one sense, varying attempts to defend this theme. In another sense they are expressions of the theme.

C. There is also revealed in the earliest work a concept which is the subject of the theme and which is also present in all subsequent works. It may be called the "central concept." The dilemma of the outer debate comes to a focus in this concept. It is not the concept at issue in that outer debate, however, but is the negation of that concept. The central theme appears to be making an assertion about the central concept—an assertion which is simul-
taneously definitional and non-definitional. Stated from the point of view of the concept, the theme asserts that the concept both contains and does not contain a certain feature.

The reason for the curious nature of the central concept is because it is the negative phase in the dialectical definition of the concept at issue. If the concept at issue is comprehensiveness, then the central concept is the negation of comprehensiveness. But if the negative concept can only be understood by reference to the positive, then this opposite of comprehensiveness is somehow the same as comprehensiveness.

D. The earliest argument in defense of the central theme is in effect two arguments. There is the argument represented by the theme itself as an identity statement. And there is a more explicit argument which simultaneously rejects and yet incorporates this identity statement. Hence the tension present in the concept and theme reappear, not surprisingly, in the first explicit argument for that theme, and they subsequently reappear between that argument and any later argument.

The above propositions set forth the general structure of a dialectical concept examination. Below are listed the propositions connected with particular steps of that examination.

1. Central Concept

The central concept is stated. It is the analogue of the Hegelian antithesis. The central concept is central because negation is the active force of the dialectic. The central concept defines, by negation, the concept in debate.
2. Other First Order Major Concepts

Here are stated both the concept in debate, or thesis, and the concept which defines the central concept, or synthesis. Because we are talking about a concept which is internally defined--not by reference to anything outside itself--the synthesis concept must appear inconsistent. It defines the central concept by negation, and thus appears as the opposite of that concept, but it defines itself as being identical to the concept in debate. And the central concept is the opposite of that concept. In this second step we emphasize the tendency to identify the thesis and the synthesis concepts with each other. If these concepts are the same, then both are in negative relation with the central concept since we know from step 1. that the thesis concept is so.


This step merely states the inconsistency among the concepts which results from steps 1. and 2.

4. Central Theme as an Argument in Potential.

The central theme asserts that the central concept is identical to the concept in debate, although it understands the concept in debate as the synthesis concept, not the thesis concept. (The practical value in this apparent assertion of contraries is as a way to gain the advantages in both sides of a dilemma without the corollary disadvantages. ) The central theme is hence a compact expression of the identity of opposites described in step 3. It is, in Hegelian terms, a complete reflection--a concept both negated and with its negation.
Now the problem in defining a concept by its opposite is that neither concept has been defined except as a possibility. This is why the central theme is an argument in potential. It wants to connect two concepts in a convincing manner and the best way to do this is by an identity statement. In that case the central theme as assertion and the central theme as the object of argument are the same theme. But it also wants to be saying something meaningful and in this case there must be a difference. I could define peace, dialectically, as war but this would convince no one that the way to one is through the other.

5. A New Distinction.

Here it is shown that, in the progress of argument, the author introduces a new distinction which suggests a potential meaning for the central concept.


It is shown that the effect of this new distinction, is to cancel the central theme and risk denying the position that the author is trying to make. He would go over to the opposing faction within the proximate outer debate.


Here one claims that the author tries to use the distinction in such a way as to create a new argument which retains the advantages of the old.

8. Self-Contradiction of the New Argument in its Initial State.

But this attempt instead of strengthening the concept is shown to weaken it and leave the author in a worse position than he was before.


To avoid this problem it seems necessary to reintroduce the earlier
argument within the new one.


At this point the new argument is complete and does strengthen the potential for meaning in the central concept, but it does so because the argument is circular.

The preceding propositions are completely abstract at this point in the narrative, but they have not been derived from purely abstract thought. They are based on the application of certain tentative principles to the Lindblom and Mannheim work. In what follows, I show this application.

Any attempt to support the foregoing propositions cannot be a highly rigorous one, however, any more than can the ordinary language approach. It is not rigorous primarily because the hierarchy of conceptual levels which I identify is probably capable of expansion or contraction so that all the levels of argument might be found in the initial work or, conversely, very few might be identified even over the range of a large body of work. I shall try to show, nevertheless, that the work of at least two writers--and specifically their otherwise perplexing inconsistencies--can be plausibly interpreted in terms of the above propositions.

Because the method of concept examination is involved and lengthy I shall apply it primarily to a single one of each writer's works. In each case, I choose that work which to me seems the beginning of the author's line of thought, and thus seems to contain in potential all that will follow.
CHAPTER III

A NEGATIVE VIEW OF COMPREHENSIVENESS
THE PATTERN OF ITS DEFENSE
IN THE WRITINGS OF CHARLES LINDBLOM

A Problem for Lindblom

In this chapter, I interpret, in terms of a dialectical concept examination, those writings in which Charles Lindblom argues that the process of pluralist bargaining is a way to coordinate. I consider Lindblom's argument a response to the social control problem--the problem how the competing preferences of a plurality of individuals can be ordered into a collective preference to which all agree. I call it a control problem because if people can agree on policies and procedures then they can establish a social order--they can control their society.

The social control problem, or at least a less extreme version of it, appears to be another way to express the classic difficulty of political pluralism--the likelihood of disorder. How can a political system which gives great freedom to competing groups and individuals nevertheless achieve adequate social coordination?

I speculate that both problems present logical impossibilities. For the
latter problem, evidence suggests that neither pluralism nor authoritarianism can gain even its own distinctive advantage without an effort to gain also the advantage—and disadvantage—of the other. Pluralist political systems claim, in effect, to serve freedom at the expense of authority, but there is much evidence that these systems are themselves biased against some groups and restrictive of their freedom. To overcome this bias, authoritative social coordination seems necessary. A more perfect freedom has not been shown adequate to do the job. Similarly, authoritarian political systems, in their attempts to impose a total order even over freedom of thought, find they must

1The writer is, here, using the terms "freedom" and "authority" very loosely, with the hope that the manner of use is generally clear.


3There is an expressed hope among many critics of pluralism that the development of a less biased system can be achieved through greater individual autonomy. This increase in autonomy is supposed to result from a more adequate childhood education, through consciousness raising among adults and in related ways. But the political systems most often cited as at least partly exemplifying an improved society have not emphasized human autonomy. For example, Cuba and the Peoples Republic of China are highly egalitarian societies in many ways, but they also enforce substantial limitations on individual freedoms. I am not saying that a system having less of the pluralist bias will necessarily have more of the bias apparently inherent in central government control. I say only that the evidence seems to point that way. Strong evidence for the contrary view is not apparent.
concede a degree of freedom at least to those who impose the order and, by extension, to all whose cooperation is necessary for its success. 4 A control so complete as to embrace even the controller has been proclaimed in theory, but it has not been achieved in practice. 5

Despite such evidence as the above, Lindblom and other pluralists believe that it is possible to resolve the classic problem of pluralism and hence also to resolve a version of the social control problem. I assume,

4 Lindblom makes this point in an early essay.
"No dictator is mighty enough to stay in power standing alone. . . . He can only expect his orders to be obeyed by the leaders around him because they find it in their interests to obey. Hence he cannot rule without offering advantages to them; and, knowing it, they indicate at what price their loyalty can be won. These subsidiary leaders are in turn in the same relation to their subordinates as is the dictator to them" [Charles E. Lindblom, "Bargaining: The Hidden Hand in Government," Research Memorandum RM-M34-RC. (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1955), pp. 18-19]. [Hereinafter referred to as "Bargaining."]

For a defense of the general point as regards Soviet politics see Carl A. Linden, Khruschev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964 (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

5 A control even over the controllers is clearly supposed in Hegel's notion of world historical individuals, and is supposed also in Marx's dialectical materialism, as that is most commonly interpreted. In both cases historical necessity provides the control.

Although Lenin did not deny this historical necessity, his attempt, in effect, to distinguish between the mistaken spontaneity of the working class movement and the correct historical understanding of the socialists made the notion dubious. See Lenin "What is to be Done?" Milovan Djilas argues in "The New Class" that the political bureaucracy has become the new exploiting class in the Soviet Union. At a more philosophical level, Alasdair MacIntyre points out that while social control may extend even over basic conceptual frameworks, the controllers themselves cannot logically be confined within these frameworks. Their own consciousness must be wider or they could not be aware of what they do. See Alasdair MacIntyre, "A Mistake about Causality
by contrast, that this belief is not warranted\(^6\) and that what Lindblom actually does is elaborate the dilemma intrinsic to the problem rather than resolve the problem. But, to me, this is a more valuable function anyway.

The Lindblom Response as an Internalized Debate

If we suppose that the achievement of something poses a dilemma then we may suppose that the horns of the dilemma are represented by the opposing sides in debate over the merits of that particular thing. And if we suppose, further, that in human actions the concept of a thing is virtually the same as the thing,\(^7\) then the concept will be made clear by that debate. Given these assumptions, a dialectical concept examination is not a direct search for the meaning of a concept but is an argument over its worth. So to learn what social control means we argue about it. But control, in the loose sense I use the term, is synonymous with comprehensiveness. What is debated, then, is the value of comprehensiveness.


\(^6\)Perhaps the word "assume" should be emphasized here. This writer is assuming, not arguing, that the social control problem presents a logical impossibility. The point would be very difficult to argue, on either side, for reasons given in text, chap. II, pp. 74-81.

\(^7\)This is the Verstehen position, which is briefly discussed in text, chap. II, pp. 67-74.
If Lindblom is thought to be debating the value of comprehensiveness, how can I say, as I do in the chapter title, that he takes the negative position? Although we shall find that he criticizes certain kinds of comprehensiveness still his intent is to show that there is a kind which is attainable through the pluralist process. Should that not make his position affirmative? The reason I say "No" is because of the sort of debate involved. I am not talking about a school debate where the first rule is that we agree on our basic concepts. I mean the sort that often happens in politics—debate over concepts so fundamental that the concepts by means of which we debate are the same as those in dispute. In such debate the position one is most truly defending is that already provided by one's conceptual framework. Lindblom sees the structure of society as highly pluralistic, I shall argue, and this precludes him from ever truly reaching the position that comprehensiveness is either possible or of value.

Despite his conceptual commitment to social fragmentation, however, Lindblom certainly does want to argue that this fragmentation can produce—even perhaps be identical to—social order. It is just through this attempt that he internalizes within himself debate over comprehensiveness. He is trying to argue against the very conception of society which provides his terms of reference.

The purpose of my examining Lindblom’s argument with himself, and also of Mannheim's with himself, is to show how a debate, and thus on my view
how a dilemma, becomes internalized. My further purpose is to display the pattern of that process. But in these Chapters III and IV I am talking only about the intellectual internalization of dilemma. I talk about the necessary tension pattern within the person's thought as distinct from that within his life. In Chapter V, however, I consider the internalization of dilemma within the whole man.

A Peculiarity of the Lindblom Position

Before ending these introductory comments, I must make one major qualification to what has been said. I must partly take back the statement that Lindblom sees the social structure as fragmented. That statement is true when he is compared with Mannheim but not when he is compared with positivists. Lindblom seems to be a contextualist. He sees democratic society as a sort of embracing conceptual order which is cohesive and consensual. It is not just a collection of atomistic individuals. On the other hand, it is not a symbiosis as contextualist views of society are often thought to be. It is an order which emphasizes the competition rather than the cooperation among groups and individuals. Though he seems to believe that we all see through the same cultural spectacles, Lindblom nevertheless manifests, in my view, the tendency toward an atomistic view of society.  

8This point needs elaboration. Where Lindblom explicitly acknowledges the idea of a contextualist epistemology (the idea that our knowledge is at least partly the product of a conceptual framework), he asserts that there usually is
I have argued in Chapter II that philosophical tendencies are as important as philosophical extremes. Given this assumption, I believe that since Lindblom leans toward an atomist view of society his inner debate is ultimately an attempt to show how such a fragmented society can achieve social order. This is how he himself describes his work. But because Lindblom is a contextualist, believing that most democrats are part of one conceptual order, his argument appears to be the opposite. He appears to be trying to show that it is possible to have real conflict in a society that seems too all consuming to permit this.

no generally shared conceptual framework and that where there is the framework is inadequate. Indeed it is the usual absence of any such shared viewpoint, which he gives as one of the reasons why pluralist decision making is best. Such decision making assures that all important views will receive a hearing.

"It is well known... that the mind flees from comprehensiveness, that an 'object of perception, or judgement, is referred, not to the whole world, but to a specific background or framework.'... our minds determine what is relevant and irrelevant, by imposing a structure upon the problem situation. This structure tends to vary from mind to mind; and though it is true that on occasion people can be brought to adopt similar structures, it usually occurs at the expense of comprehensiveness and may mean that the most useful insights are abandoned together with the structures of assumption and interpretation that furnished them" [David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (New York: The Free Press, 1970.), pp. 43-44]. [Hereinafter referred to as Strategy of Decision.]

Similar points are made in other Lindblom writings. See Lindblom, "Bargaining," p. 28. Also see Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, XIX (Spring, 1959), 88. [Hereinafter referred to as "Muddling Through."]

Where Lindblom is not talking explicitly about conceptual frameworks but rather about the consensual cultural social base which makes it possible for a pluralist process to reach agreement, then he talks as if there were a generally shared conceptual framework which was adequate. See the first part of footnote 20. By 1967 and 1972 he seems to be saying explicitly that there is such an overall conceptual framework although by 1972 he is proposing that it, too,
This reverse argument is the one I examine in this chapter because its assumptions are the only ones on which the dialectical method can easily work. In the dialectical method we assume that society is an organization of concepts but not primarily one of publicly shared concepts. On the latter point we assume, instead, that a concept becomes definite in opposition to the shared concepts of its social-conceptual base. Since Lindblom does assume a dominant social-conceptual base in pluralist democracies, it is easy to see his thought as the problem of giving reality to a concept in apparent opposition to that base. The concept of bargaining, which assumes that people have different understandings and interests (else they would not need to bargain) is such a concept.

It is time now to examine Lindblom's attempt. A first assumption of my method is that the physical totality of a thinker's work, or a major part of that work, can be seen as a meaningful intellectual whole, however conflicting some of the writings may appear. Despite this assumption, I cannot be that inclusive in my discussion of Lindblom, but I shall consider a fairly large number of his essays and books.

Lindblom's most explicit writing in defense of his position on compre-

should be questioned. See text p. 149.

Because Lindblom at first tacitly acknowledges a shared democratic culture and then does so more explicitly in 1972, this writer calls him a contextualist. But because in most of his train of thought Lindblom sees a plurality of competing conceptual frameworks the writer would also say that he leans toward positivism and atomism.

9At various points in his writings Lindblom states that he is not arguing a position about decision making but is only describing the process which
hensiveness begins with an essay entitled "Bargaining: The Hidden Hand in Government" (1955). The thrust of this essay has since appeared in at least nine other short works and in three books. I shall consider all of these efforts. Most well known of them is his essay on "The Science of Muddling Through" (1959).

The essay was followed by two major books—A Strategy of Decision prevails.

"...this paper is one of a growing family of ventures into clarification of non-quantitative and largely non-theoretical methods. One noteworthy characteristic of these studies is that they are not argumentative: they do not urge this or that method upon social scientists; they merely make explicit and formalize the methods already in use" [Charles E. Lindblom, "Policy Analysis," American Economic Review, XLVIII (June, 1958), p. 298].

If this were generally true of Lindblom's writings they would not be easily suited to the writer's method. But this writer would agree with Lewis Froman that Lindblom is, in a sense, both describing and arguing. In a footnote to chapter II of The Active Society, Amitai Etzioni reviews this question.

"Lindblom does not manifestly advocate a strategy which he calls somewhat disaffectionately 'disjointed incrementalism.' Three reviews of the Strategy of Decision point to this ambiguity. Morton A. Kaplan notes: 'It is not clear throughout the book if the authors are more concerned with whether disjointed incrementalism is a description of how people do choose or a prescription as to how reasonably to choose,' The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 352 (1964), p. 189. 'Whether the strategy is a description of a 'social process' or an alternative ideal of rationality is not clear,' Victor A. Thompson, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 70 (1964), p. 132. Lewis A. Froman, Jr. concludes: 'As Lindblom, the empirical theorist and Braybrooke, the philosopher, try to suggest, it (the strategy) is really both, 'American Political Science Review, Vol. 58 (1964), p. 116" [Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: The Free Press, 1968) chapter II, footnote 65]

10 First reference is in footnote 8.

11 Ibid.
Preparatory to the concept examination, I shall present an "illustrative" summary of Lindblom's position. My purpose in doing so is to suggest that an adequate summary of his views is impossible since he seems to be taking opposite positions on numerous points. This impossibility of summarizing, moreover, is just what we should expect if the cause of Lindblom's inconsistencies is his attempt to deal with a social dilemma which he has intellectually internalized.

Following the illustrative summary I proceed to the concept examination itself. I first try to describe the overall dialectical process by which Lindblom gives increasing reality to the concept of bargaining in a consensual society. Then I examine in depth the first step of this process. That in-depth examination focuses on his 1955 essay.

An Illustrative Summary of Lindblom's Position

In Chapter II I argue the dangers in attempted summaries of an author's work, pointing out that interpretations of any work can be and always are multiple. For my own approach, the summarizing process is a very cautious

\[12\text{Ibid.}\]

and halting one. In order to emphasize the partiality involved in my attempt, and to introduce some of the perplexities which later will be examined, I append numerous provisos and contraindications to everything which I say.

The first and main proviso is the instability of Lindblom's theme. There is a traditional theme in pluralist thought which I have previously identified as the theme of pluralist disorder. But pluralists who acknowledge the likelihood of disorder usually do not focus on this problem. Instead they focus on the problem of safeguarding the opportunity for social conflict. They acknowledge the other problem as being present in the background but they don't deal with it, assuming that there is at least enough social order.

According to a converse theme, one would focus on the problem of achieving social order while acknowledging, in the background, the problem this raises for safeguarding social conflict. And in this case too one would deemphasize the background problem, tacitly assuming that there was enough social conflict. For the traditional theme, the immediate problem of social conflict would be the danger of losing it. For the converse theme, the immediate problem would be its very presence.

Lindblom's theme seems an attempt to have the advantages of the converse theme without losing the advantages of the traditional one. He shifts from one to the other. Usually his writing accords more with the former, but some works, and passages in many others, treat of the latter.14 For now I

14The following essays and books represent instances of a tendency
merely recognize the presence of alternate themes and proceed to a summary of the converse and, in a sense, central theme. In what follows, the provisos to my summary have been indented in order to set them off clearly.

Lindblom's Central Theme

I. Lindblom's central theme concerns pluralist democratic societies and involves the claim that such societies, and particularly the United States, can approach the traditional theme in Lindblom's writing (although everything he has written displays that tendency to some extent).

Lindblom, "Policy Analysis," pp. 298-312. See especially p. 307. In this essay Lindblom argues that an incremental method of policy analysis is appropriate for the political fragmentation of a democratic pluralist society. Since that kind of society is assumed to be best, so is incrementalism. Lindblom does not argue that this method will optimize or coordinate, however, though he intimates that it may. Unfortunately it is not clear whether he is intimating that the incremental decision method can itself coordinate or whether the pluralist political process can do so.

Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision. See especially pp. 73, 129-31. In the first part of this book Lindblom much elaborates the incremental method. His primary argument for that method seems to be, as in the preceding essay, the claim that it fits democratic politics. Comments about the coordinating power of incrementalism do occur, and it is even claimed that they represent the main theme of the book, but what is particularly emphasized is the ability of disjointed incrementalism to consider a wide variety of values.

Charles E. Lindblom, "Decision-Making in Taxation and Expenditures," in Public Finance: Needs, Sources and Utilization, A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 295-336. See especially pp. 314 (footnote) and 316-17. [Hereinafter referred to as "Decision-Making."] In this essay Lindblom explicitly claims more concern with the coordinating or calculating advantages of pluralism than with its safeguards against excess governmental power. But his discussion in some places tends to belie the claim. He recognizes, for instance, a need for a system of weighting values if there is to be coordination, but his weighting system turns out to be whatever minority groups demand as the price of their consent. Such a system safeguards against governmental power more obviously than it coordinates.
coordinate as well as can authoritarian societies.  

Presumably this is intended to be a significant theme or Lindblom would not have written so much on it. But it is significant to the extent that there is indeed a wide plurality of different intensely felt interests in democratic societies. Without those differences coordination does not represent a severe problem and displaying a solution to that problem is not much of an accomplishment.

What is coordination? Lindblom sometimes understands it as a characteristic of any relation whatever among decision-makers while at other times he suggests that it is a fuller concept. But the nature of this fuller concept is not clear.  

15See footnote 9.

16The following passages suggest that any decision-maker interaction is coordination and sometimes they show Lindblom's uneasiness with this conclusion:

"Since it has been shown that coordination is achieved when X defers to Y, when X ignores Y, and when X dominates Y, it would seem to follow that any pattern of yielding or dominance is as consistent with coordination as any other. This being the case, it would seem to follow that any kind of relation among decision-makers must be pronounced coordinated. Obviously, for further analysis, we need a fuller concept of coordination than has yet been introduced" [Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, p. 162].

"How often these methods for partisan mutual adjustment [methods of mutual neglect, deference, or manipulation] achieve a rational coordination of decisions is not realized. That they interlock decisions made at various points in the body politic is clear enough. . . . But what if the interlocking of decisions is without any perceivable desirable pattern? It has to be shown that coordination so achieved is rational in some sense going beyond what we have already said" [Lindblom, "Decision-Making," p. 316].

The tendency to identify coordination and decision-making apparently has roots in an earlier essay, if we can understand coordination as the achieve-
What is an authoritarian society? It is not too clearly distinguished from a democratic one. If the difference is the measure of coercion then the problem is that for Lindblom there is sometimes no sharp distinction between consent and coercion. 17

17In "Bargaining," Lindblom distinguishes between the two decision processes of bargaining and hierarchy. He clearly associates bargaining with pluralist democracy and intimates that hierarchy, in its purest form, is associated with dictatorship.

"... pluralism develops the complex distribution of control necessary to democracy rather than the monolith of control useful to the dictator" [Lindblom, "Bargaining," pp. 19-20].

But Lindblom also notes, pp. 18-19, that pure hierarchy is impossible. One must, therefore, conclude that the difference between democracy and authoritarianism is not for him an absolute one.

That the status of the distinction between consent and coercion is also fuzzy is apparent from the following passages:

"Because every demand one makes, every preference one feels, and every value one holds already reflects a compromise between individuals and circumstances ... we cannot draw a nice line between 'This I agree to' and 'This I am under the circumstances going to accept'" [Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy, p. 224].

"Even if the distinction between that to which one consents and that which one is forced to do is obscure and at best only a matter of degree, there
Features of Pluralist Democracy

II. A. Within pluralist society there must be consensus on fundamental procedures and values or minorities would not be accepting the decision outcomes of the society. 18

But what is this consensus—an inarticulated cultural milieu, a deliberate...
majority decision, or something else? Apparently it is neither des-
scriptive or normative theory in the positivist sense. No other single
alternative is consistently adhered to, however. What "Accepting an out-
come" means depends on which of the above alternatives applies.

II. B. In return for the consensus, minorities must be granted a veto
d power on any issue they wish. Experience suggests that in the United States,

Evidence that the consensus is an inarticulate cultural milieu appears
in numerous passages. The essence of Lindblom's position in many of these
is that the attempt to verbalize our values often produces apparent conflicts
which obscure a deeper but inarticulate agreement. An example of this view
follows:

"... agreement reached through these methods [of fragmented policy
analysis] is quite consistent with much explicit and elaborately articulated
ideological disagreement, which is, however, largely irrelevant to the
actual choices being made. ... words about values make the most of dis-
agreement while the actual handling of values in analysis quietly achieves
some important degree of agreement. ... much agreement emerges
simply because the practitioners share a common culture. ..." [Lindblom,
"Handling of Norms," p. 176].

Also see Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision, p. 133.
This inarticulate consensus embraces the current economic system.
Hence, that system appears as a given, not a deliberately chosen ideology.

On the definition of the consensus as a majority decision note that this
writer is here speaking of majority decision as the way to reach agreement.
He is not speaking of the doctrine of majority rule as the outcome of agreement.
On the latter topic, Lindblom sometimes takes an affirmative position (see
footnote 18, second quotation) and sometimes a negative one (see footnote 22,
second quotation). But on the topic now at issue--whether the agreement is
achieved by majority decision--Lindblom is also ambivalent. Sometimes he
implies that agreement cannot be reached this way.

Majority rule
"... is of limited use. Policy-makers do not know what the majority
wishes on any but a very few issues on which the citizens have expressed
themselves. ... Moreover, citizens are greatly dependent upon policy-
makers for advice as to what they should prefer. ..." [Lindblom, "Tin-
bergen on Policy-Making," Journal of Political Economy, LXVI (December,
at least, the price will not be too high. 20

Though if the consensus is an inarticulate shared culture, how can one set conditions for it?

The Impossibility of Synoptic Decision-Making

III. A. There is a conventional theory of rational decision-making which Lindblom calls synoptic decision-making. According to this theory, values should be clarified in advance, all the alternative implementing policies and

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Lindblom elsewhere implies, of course, that some agreement among the majority must be possible—at least on certain basic values and procedures—or democracy could not survive. See this writer's footnote 20, second quotation.

Sometimes Lindblom seems to "throw everything into the pot" and leaves the reader to interpret this consensus for himself. He does this, for example in speaking about the procedural "conventions" of democracy.

"The conventions are explicit or implicit prescriptions that specify to some degree, though only very roughly, what goal values and side values can and cannot be sacrificed to the achievement of other values. Some conventions are written into law, others come to be traditionally accepted without force of law. Others not written into the law are themselves the product of the kind of interchange [partisan mutual adjustment] we are describing in this book. . . . Where these are not law people may accept them out of the conviction that the stability of the system demands their acceptance. Or they simply may strategically calculate the advantages of their accepting them. . . . Presumably the acceptance of some conventions is traceable simply to social indoctrination" [Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 91-92].

Incidentally, this appeal to social indoctrination is particularly ironic in a work supportive of minority group freedom. Yet it also appears at the very beginning of that thought sequence which culminates in Lindblom's Intelligence of Democracy. See Lindblom's "Bargaining," p. 39.

20. "Societies can be thought of as purchasing this agreement, or consent to continuation of democratic government, by conceding to each interest group whatever it requires as a price for its consent" [Lindblom, "Decision-Making," p. 317].

". . . in the United States and other successful democracies some of the
all the consequences of each policy should be considered, and that policy should be chosen which best serves the chosen values. This conventional theory has severe problems, though, which can be avoided by frankly accepting the kind of society mentioned in I and II.

The Problem of Value Conflict --

III. B. 1. One problem of synopsis is that people disagree on values.

common values (including democracy itself) on which citizens unite are more important to them than the values on which they disagree. Were this otherwise, a large minority would rather abandon democracy than be outvoted. . ." [Lindblom, "Bargaining," p. 32].


Some illustrative quotations are the following:
". . .decision-makers, to say nothing of the electorate, do not in fact wholly agree on objectives or values. To be sure, on many they agree roughly; but the scope of government decision-making is not limited to their areas of agreement" [Lindblom, "Decision-Making," p. 302].

It seems, indeed, that even on some basic procedural matters there is no agreement.
"Despite conflicting preferences among citizens, might a decision-maker . . .not simply follow the principle of equality in the weighting of individual preferences?"

"This is a defective criterion. . .differences in social function call for inequalities in the weighting of preferences. . .The case for equality in weights has never been pushed seriously except for the special case of equality in a kind of 'last say' decision, as in elections. . .But even in 'last say' expressions of opinion we are not agreed on equal weights; many persons wish to depart from them to take account of intensity" [Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 140-41].

". . .universal or general criteria such as majority preference are inadequate for the solution of complex problems" [Ibid., p. 185].

Also see Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision, p. 35.
But usually Lindblom emphasizes that large scale choices, at least, are agreed in democracies. 23

III. B. 2. This is not to say, however, that all value conflict is significant. Disputes over grand ideological alternatives such as Communism vs. Capitalism are not very much so. 24 All real world political systems are mixed.

Though in his most recent work, Lindblom does intimate that grand alternatives need discussion and may be disputed. 25

23 See point II. A.

24 See footnote 19, first quotation.

In the book he wrote with Dahl, Lindblom was particularly explicit in rejecting the significance of ideological disputes, and this view does not change in most of those later writings we consider.

"In economic organization and reform, the 'great issues' are no longer the great issues, if ever they were. It has become increasingly difficult . . . to find meaningful alternatives posed in the traditional choices between socialism and capitalism, planning and the free market, regulation and laissez-faire. . . . [Actual choices are not so grand]. . . because, at least in the Western world, most people neither can nor wish to experiment with the whole pattern of socioeconomic organization to attain goals more easily won" [Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1953), p. 3].

25 The economist . . . is correct to take the main structures of society as given. Otherwise his analysis would be irrelevant to the circumstances in which policies are actually made.

The consequence, however, is that as a policy analyst he has to practice a conservative and superficial kind of social science. . . it does not ask radical questions about fundamental features of the social structure" [Charles E. Lindblom, "Integration of Economics and the Other Social Sciences through Policy Analysis," Integration of the Social Sciences through Policy Analysis, ed. by James Charlesworth (Philadelphia: The American
III. B. 3. Significant conflict is conflict at the margin. By this Lindblom often means a conflict over trade-offs—a conflict in an essentially zero-sum situation where an increment in one element implies a decrement in some other. There certainly is substantial conflict here. 26

But maybe there isn't. Elsewhere, Lindblom in effect questions whether decision situations are zero-sum. 27 He also suggests, elsewhere, that

26 Lindblom's common example is the trade-off between inflation and unemployment.

27 "In the market, trade offers benefits to both parties, hence public good. But in bargaining in government it often appears that one's victory is another's defeat. I shall show, however, that bargaining almost always (perhaps without exception) takes place because of the possibility of mutual gain to all the..."
marginal values are equivalent to policies and that people often agree on
policies. 28 Furthermore, sometimes all he means by a marginal conflict
is the small difference between two social states, and thus conflict at the
bargainers, although sometimes the only mutual gain is in abating a pre-
existing conflict by reaching a settlement" [Lindblom, "Bargaining," p. 3].
This half-hearted confidence in the mutuality of values becomes less so further
on in the essay. See p. 31.

In the Intelligence of Democracy there are numerous intimations that the
social situation is not zero sum. For example:

"A central coordinator... may easily fall into the habit of believing
that what one party gains another must lose, a fallacy that plagued economic
thinking until Adam Smith made it abundantly clear that for many transactions
all parties can gain" [Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, p. 210].

This confident statement, also, becomes half-hearted as Lindblom adds, on the
same page, that the mutual advantage may be only a Pareto optimum. In a
Pareto optimum some do not gain and not to gain, in a changing world, is to
lose.

28Since Lindblom has frequently held that general values in a democracy
are agreed, it follows that if marginal values are also agreed there is no place
left for conflict.

That we can often agree on policies is asserted in numerous places.
"... it is commonplace that individuals can often agree on policies when
Also see Lindblom, "Decision-Making," p. 309.

That policies are identical to marginal values is less commonly asserted
but consider the following passage:

"Instead of choosing among values in the light of which alternative policies
can be rated, we often choose among alternative policies directly. That is to
say, instead of choosing among a group of abstract values, we compare and
choose among combinations of them in which their proportions differ... .

Now because, in our society, change proceeds almost always through
incremental steps, it turns out that we often evaluate only a restricted set
of alternatives which are only incrementally different from each other... .

Hence, our values are not total or average values but are instead values
at the margin" [Lindblom, "Handling of Norms," pp. 170-71]. [First
emphasis is this writer's.]
margin is mild by definition. Finally he says we can often agree on the specific things we are against though not those we are for.

III. B. 4. Value statements are not really meaningful until stated in terms of choices at the margin. The evaluator cannot really know what he wants except in terms of the options and costs apparent at the moment he is confronted with the need for a choice.

29 Lindblom makes the claim that marginal differences are incremental differences and that the incremental is small.

"... a 'small' change is a change in a relatively unimportant variable or relatively unimportant change in an important variable. ... a small change in an important variable will also be denoted as an 'increment of change'" [Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision, p. 64].

"... the notion of 'small' is not so subjective and personal. ... in any society there develops a strong tendency toward convergence in estimates of what changes are important or unimportant. ..." [Ibid., p. 62].

30 "Another hypothesis is that in the practice of these [pragmatic] methods we often find ourselves agreeing on what we are against, even if we cannot agree on what we are for" [Lindblom, "Handling of Norms," p. 177].

"Policy aims at suppressing vice even though virtue cannot be defined. ..." [Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision, pp. 102].

See also Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 147, 149.

The agreement on what one is against has no apparent temporal endurance, however.

"(It is in their conception of social ills as well defined 'problems' with 'solutions' that ... aspirants to the synoptic ideal go wrong.) In a nonstatic society, objectives and other values continue to shift and so do actual possibilities for change" [Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision, p. 124].

See also Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 146-47.

31 "For national economic policy ... only in the vaguest and least helpful way do we as citizens or policy-makers know our values except by inference from our actual choices.

Aims cannot be rationally chosen without regard to costs, but costs are not always known in advance" [Lindblom, "Tinbergen on Policy-Making," pp. 534-35].

Elsewhere Lindblom intimates that the costs (i.e., the trade-off values)
III. B. 5. Consequently, the synoptic goal of postulating values in advance of choices is impossible. And this means that the synoptic goal of deducing choices from values is also impossible, supposing as it does a greater conceptual division between the two than exists.

But then there are no conflicts of values, there is only interaction among choices, and Lindblom does not want to say merely that interaction can achieve coordination. He wants to say that conflict can do so. After all, one of his major points is the existence of value conflicts, probably among large scale values, the kind one would deduce from, but certainly among values at the margin. He often writes as if one could deduce choices from values were it not that the values conflict. 32

can never be known in advance. If they could, then it would be possible, presumably, to determine how many people preferred one side of the trade-off rather than another. And, it is not possible to do that.

"No one can know the facts about that subtle kind of value or preference"

[Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, p. 254].

In his very next paragraph, though, Lindblom partly retreats from the aforementioned assertion.

32The following passage illustrates the view that were it not for value conflict, one could deduce choices from values.

"...whether a set of decisions are fully coordinated or not, other things being equal, depends, finally, on the values by which one judges the set. A set of policies nicely adjusted to achieve a maximum of price stability is not necessarily nicely adjusted to achieve a high level of employment" [Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, p. 165].

But Lindblom also adopts, on this matter, a similar approach to that taken elsewhere. That is to say, he sometimes embraces both sides of a question though in such a way that their mutual exclusivity is obscured (see this writer's footnote 19). In the present instance, Lindblom suggests that value conflict, on the one hand, and the knowledge of values only at the decision moment, on the other, are alternative reasons against a welfare function.
The Problem of Deficient Knowledge --

III. C. 1. In addition to the problem of value conflict, other major problems of synopsis are the problems of complexity and of uncertainty. Even if there were values apart from implementing means it would, in any case, be impossible to consider all the available means or to foresee all the possible consequences. Not only is the information limited but so is man’s capacity to process it. I shall refer to these two problems together as the problem of deficient knowledge.

Are the problems of complexity and uncertainty really additional to that of value conflict or alternative to it? Meaningful conflict among large scale values (such as ideologies) would suggest that something substantial was at

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"In synoptic analysis the common requirement that values be clarified and systematized in advance of analysis is impossible to meet in many circumstances in which, on the one hand, the relevant values are unknown until the analysis is far advanced or in which, on the other hand, disagreement on values guarantees that no stated principles or welfare function can command the agreement of those whose values are presumed to be governing" [Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 139-40].

In the aforementioned quote, neither the presentation of the two possibilities as live alternatives nor the phrase "many circumstances" must be allowed to obscure the fact that these two possibilities can never occur together. If values conflict, then they must have been statable in advance of decision. And if they are not so statable they cannot conflict. Yet Lindblom apparently wants to say both things. He wants to say that there is a sort of automatic coordination of values since they only become specified when the battle of interests is resolved and a choice made. But he also wants to say that this coordination is a product of conflict.

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33 These criticisms of synopsis, like those based on the presence of value conflict, occur throughout Lindblom’s work. For a particularly clear presentation, see Lindblom, "Decision-Making," pp. 300-02.
stake, and this in turn would imply that such values could be applied. The
effect of applying values so wide would be to decree a conceptual closure in
support of the values—and with closure, knowledge would not be deficient.
For there would be a designed limitation of means and a designed interpre-
tation of all consequences.

Neither would knowledge be deficient if there was conflict over incre-
mental values. Meaningful conflict among incremental values, as distinct
from incremental choices, would imply that such values could be articulated
in advance of choice. But to articulate and then debate incremental values
presupposes, according to synopsis, the capacity to consider all variables.

Thus it seems that if there is a problem of value conflict for Lindblom,
then there is no problem of deficient knowledge.

III. C. 2. If one had adequate theory, meaning by theory the sort that
positivists call descriptive theory, then knowledge would not be deficient. Un
fortunately there is no such adequate theory. What there is is sufficient to
serve an "orienting function" but not to guide choices at the margin.  

34 Although Lindblom expresses belief that theory of a certain sort
structures our facts (e.g., see Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision,
pp. 98-99), such theory, he says, is not what the synoptic decision-maker
wants. For such a decision-maker there must be
"... highly structured bodies of generalizations that systematically
employ concepts offering some approximation of axiomatic treatment. . ."
[Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision, p. 117].
On the inadequacy of such theory, see the previous reference, pp. 117-19,
also Lindblom, "Muddling Through," p. 87.
What does orient mean? How can a theory aid direction and yet not aid choice?

If knowledge is deficient from lack of adequate descriptive theory, then this means that large scale values cannot be successfully fitted to social reality since we cannot achieve a large-scale description of such reality on which to fit them. And if knowledge is deficient from lack of decreed conceptual closure then such values have not been applied. Thus, conflict between large scale values cannot be very significant in either case.

Furthermore, the lack of adequate descriptive theory prevents an overview of all variables and makes impossible the articulation of incremental values. If they cannot be articulated then they cannot be known to conflict.

Thus one reaches the converse conclusion to that reached in the proviso to III. C. 1. If there is a problem of deficient knowledge then there is apparently no problem of value conflict.

The Possibility of Democratic Decision-Making

IV. A. Given the impossibility of synopsis for social coordination, in complex cases, it is not necessary to show that democracy can do better. It is necessary only to show that democracy is a possible coordinating device.35

35Lindblom would deny, sometimes, that synopsis and democracy are even in the same class and would thus deny that they are alternatives. The alternative to synopsis is incrementalism, according to him, and the alternative to democracy (understood as "partisan mutual adjustment") is centrality. These other alternatives rest on the distinction between decision method and sociopolitical process, however. Synopsis and incrementalism are alternative decision methods while centrality and democracy are alternative sociopolitical
IV. B. The processes of democracy which enable it to achieve coordination include two major components: the decision method and the socio-political process which employs that method. 36

Though it often seems that these two components collapse into one. 37

processes. And this distinction between method and process is, itself, an unstable one. (See footnote 37.) Assuming, therefore, that one can justifiably conflate the distinction between synopsis and centrality, the following passage is arguing, in effect, that democracy can coordinate faux de mieux (although on the surface the passage makes a less conclusive claim).

"... to look upon an overview of mutual repercussions among decisions as a merit of central coordination is to conceive of central coordination as an exercise in synoptic problem solving. But synopsis... is an impossible method of problem solving for complex problems. We do not prove by this argument that central coordination is impossible or that, by default of it, partisan mutual adjustment is a desirable alternative. We make the point only that one traditional claim [many would say the distinguishing claim though] for the superiority of central coordination over other forms of adjustment is invalidated for sufficiently complex problems.

This limited move in the argument somewhat changes the perspective with which one regards partisan mutual adjustment. ... [It] imposes on no one the heroic demands for information, intellectual competence, time, energy, and money that are required for an overview..." [Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 170-71].

36 Throughout his writings, Lindblom makes an explicit distinction between these two components. For example, the distinction is a cornerstone of the essay on "Policy Analysis" in which he first explicitly argues that incremental policy analysis is the method most appropriate for incremental politics. And in the Strategy of Decision he and Braybrooke again make the point as they speak of "Matching Practices to Political Contexts." In The Intelligence of Democracy, Lindblom tends to identify only the incremental element of decision-making with decision "strategy." Though he speaks of the strategy as both incremental and disjointed, it is primarily the former features which he discusses. The disjointed element of decision-making appears more fully when he speaks of "The Need for a Multiplicity of Decision Makers." See Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 148-52.

37 One indication that the distinction between decision method and socio-political process is often conflated is the description of incremental politics
IV. C. These two components are associated with the two major problems of synopsis. The decision method is particularly responsive to the problem of deficient knowledge. The socio-political process is responsive to the problem of value conflict. Neither component, however, is sufficient by itself to solve either problem. Each depends upon the other.

in almost the same terms used to define the incremental method.

"We shall call this typical pattern incremental politics for two reasons. In the first place, we have referred to its preoccupation with small or incremental changes as one of its defining characteristics" [Braybrooke and Lindblom, *Strategy of Decision*, p. 73].

"It becomes clearer now why political policy, in its focus on increments of change, also shows the other characteristics--it is remedial, serial, and exploratory, for example--that we identified as part of incremental politics" [Ibid., p. 74].

Another indication of a conflated distinction is the fact that incremental method and incremental politics seem to be necessary conditions for each other. If we understand incremental politics as a competition and adjustment among many interests then such a politics is necessary if the incremental method is to achieve any degree of comprehensiveness. In an incremental, serial process it is only the presence of such competing groups which assures that most interests will be represented. Hence, a necessary condition for the incremental method is incremental politics. See Lindblom, "Muddling Through," p. 85. But conversely, a necessary condition for this incremental politics, this interest group politics, must be the incremental method. It is the only method available for solving complex problems, and, therefore, must be the analytical basis of any politics whatever.

We need not look so far as we have, however, to see suggestions of the identity of decision method and political process. That suggestion is apparent in the very titles and subtitles of Lindblom's major works. He speaks about The Intelligence of Democracy--that is, he speaks of the analytical method inherent in democracy itself. The subtitle of A Strategy of Decision suggests the same point. It is called Policy Evaluation As a Social Process implying that the decision strategy is this process. In "Handling of Norms," Lindblom makes this point explicit.

"It is customary to think of an analytical process as going on in one mind or within the minds of a small group. But the analysis of policy problems can also be seen as a social process..." [p. 174].
IV. D. As it commences to make decisions, a democracy finds itself in agreement on certain problems—the ills in society—even though different individuals and groups cannot agree on the solutions to those problems. 38

But since the nature of a problem closely determines the range of possible solutions, why are the problems agreed when the solutions are not? Lindblom elsewhere suggests that the problems are not agreed either. 39

The Method of Incrementalism --

IV. E. 1. Taking those known ills as its departure point is the peculiarly democratic decision method, "Incrementalism." In dealing with those ills, the method considers only policies that differ slightly from the current ones, and only a limited number of those. 40 Furthermore, in the process of policy analysis it may conclude that the problem should itself be incrementally altered and hence so should the objectives. 41 (New technologies, for example, might suggest new goals.) Though small, the policy changes are frequent and thus successively compensate for errors of oversight. 42

Lindblom sometimes describes the decision method not only as incre-

38 See footnote 30, first part.
39 See footnote 30, last part.
40 The most extended description of the method is given in Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision. On the present point, see pp. 83-93 in that work.
41 Ibid., pp. 93-99.
42 Ibid., pp. 99-102.
mental but also as disjointed.\footnote{It is so described primarily in the \textit{Strategy of Decision}. See in their book the chap. 5 title and pp. 104-06.} This practice assimilates decision method and political process to each other, as previously noted.

IV. E. 2. It is by the reliance upon small increments both in problem formulation and policy choice that incrementalism resolves problems of complexity and foresight. This method is thus a way of assuring that social inter-relationships will be under control despite deficient knowledge. It is not, however, adequate by itself to assure this.

IV. E. 3. The reason it is not adequate is that incremental policy choices are not small primarily because there is a value in safety and no great need for large changes. They are small because they are marginal, because they are zero-sum choices between alternatives both of which are greatly desired. That they are marginal means that the values on which they are based are determined at the moment of choice itself. \underline{We don't know what choice is small or marginal except in the choice process.}\footnote{Textual evidence for this statement is basically the same as given in footnote 31. We don't know what we want until we know the trade-offs. And trade-off choices are often what Lindblom means by marginal choices. But we cannot know the trade-offs or margins except at the instant of choice since they are constantly changing as a result of new technologies and prior choices.}

But in many passages Lindblom treats marginality itself as mere smallness and not as a zero-sum relationship.\footnote{See footnote 29.}
The Process of Partisan Mutual Adjustment --

IV. F. 1. In a democracy, the customary choice process is "partisan mutual adjustment." In a democracy incrementalism can identify its increments only through this process.

But maybe not. There are apparently social ills known by all democrats.

And there is a convergence of estimates on what are small changes.

IV. F. 2. This decision process is one in which the many diverse groups of a pluralist society struggle with each other over their different problems and policies.

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46 This is the term used in The Intelligence of Democracy. Elsewhere Lindblom refers to the apparently same process simply as mutual adjustment or as incremental politics.

47 See footnotes 30 and 29.

The issue raised in footnote 30--whether there are known social problems which have some temporal endurance--never is resolved. Following are some further passages which suggest that social problems are indeed more enduring, have more the nature of givens, than do social goals.

Incremental decision-making is:
"... better described as moving away from known social ills rather than as moving toward a known and relatively stable goal" [Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision, p. 71].

The incremental-decision-maker:
"... deals with specific features of observable situations, which we suggest can be evaluated regardless of whether there is any way to deal conclusively with the more abstract conceptions of value" [Ibid., p. 132].

Adjustment of means and ends is:
"... caused by observation of empirical discrepancies between given means and suggested ends... there are well established techniques, accepted throughout the scientific community and beyond, for making observations of this kind" [Ibid., p. 135].

48 They struggle in at least the minimal sense that they each make decisions calculated to serve their own particular goals, not goals presumably shared by
But perhaps they don't often struggle. Often they cede authority on different matters to each other. And many other times they simply adjust to whomever moves first.

IV. F. 3. It is only through this struggle that policy costs to each group become clear (see point III. B. 4.) and thus it is the struggle that is both the choice process and the policy evaluation process. Unlike synopsis (or, rather, unlike the ability claimed for it) evaluation here cannot be made by one person or one cooperative group. It is a social process.

__49__Lindblom's view of partisan mutual adjustment is so broad and the different forms he identifies are so varied that only a small fraction of them seem to imply, necessarily, a partisan struggle. Of twelve separately listed forms, only four clearly do so—negotiation, bargaining, partisan discussion, and reciprocity. __Ibid__, pp. 33-34.

__50__They do so in the "deferential" form of adjustment and in the "calculated" which is a variant of it. They also do so in accepting the "authoritative prescription" of others. Similarly a kind of authority is presupposed when one person "unconditionally manipulates" another or is able to make a "prior decision" which constrains the alternatives of another. And "compensation" too appears a kind of authority since it is of little effect unless the power of the purse is unequally distributed. __Ibid__.

These concessions of authority are multilateral. There is no single highest prescriptive authority in government which prescribes to all others and concedes authority to none. __Ibid__, pp. 77, 99.

__51__They apparently do this in "parametric" adjustment where one decision maker simply adapts to another's decisions without considering the consequences for that other person. __Ibid__, p. 33.

__52__"It is customary to think of an analytical process as going on in one mind or within the minds of a small group. But the analysis of policy prob-
But Lindblom must assume that evaluation is not always such a process or else his own writings will not be very significant. Lindblom's writings are addressed to persons or to groups acting as persons and hence cooperative. One cannot, after all, address his writing to a struggle. And Lindblom appears to be giving more than mere description of the policy process to those readers. His description is also a recommendation. This implies that evaluation can be made in other ways since Lindblom himself apparently intends to do so.

IV. F. 4. The outcome of the struggle is always a simultaneous agreement on policies and values. +

That it is always one is a definitional truth if values are determined in the process of policy choice and if policy choice is a social process which adjusts conflicting interests to each other. But Lindblom elsewhere says that policy agreement often rather than always results and that it does so problems can also be seen as a social process. . . ."

"The weighting [of different values] does not take place until actual policy decisions are made. At that time, the conflicting views of individuals and groups . . . are brought to bear on policy formulation. Policies are set as a result of such conflict. . . . The weighting or aggregation is a political process, not an intellectual process" [Lindblom, "Handling of Norms," p. 174].

53 See footnote 9.

54 " . . . because choice of value and choice of policy are made simultaneously, evaluation is achieved automatically in decision-making. . . ." [Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision, p. 132]. See also footnote 52.
even when people disagree about values. The implication of this latter claim is that values and policy are distinct and that evaluation is not always a social process.

The question whether point IV. F. 4. is a definitional or non-definitional truth is itself unclear depending on what is meant by "agreement." Since all individual preferences already represent compromises between individual and environment there is no sharp distinction between free agreement and coerced agreement, says Lindblom.

The Coordinating Ability of Partisan Mutual Adjustment --

IV. G. 1. If values could be distinguished from policies, then whether a set of policies was coordinated would depend on whether it was nicely adjusted to achieve a certain value or values, even at the expense of others, and thus it would further depend on whether there was agreement on those values.

But this implies what elsewhere is called a naive view of consistency. There it is suggested that numerous different sets of policies can be considered consistent in service of any single value if one distinguishes between different relevant considerations—say between short and long range ones.

55See footnote 28, first part.

56See footnote 17, last part.

57See footnote 32, first part.

58"One naive view of inconsistency--hence, by inference, of consistency--is to be immediately rejected as troublesome. One hears, for example, that a government is inconsistent (and hence foolish) if, on one hand, it encourages
IV. G. 2. Now there is value agreement but it is not on values distinguishable from policy choices, and the values chosen are not the deliberate choice of individuals. They are a resultant of many conflicting interests.

But see the proviso to point IV. F. 4.

IV. G. 3. The mutual adjustment process thus does not deliberately achieve coordination but it automatically does so. For it adjusts policies to each other in a context of value agreement, and this is as much coordination as is possible anyway given the deficiencies of knowledge.

IV. G. 4. And this amount of coordination is enough since there is resource slack in the society and a shared
crop restriction and, on the other hand, undertakes expensive projects for reclaiming productive soil from wasteland. . . . These are inconsistent policies only in the trivial sense that in each of these cases one can think of a value toward which one of any two paired policies advances while the other of the pair is indifferent or opposed. By such a test, however, any two policies can always be shown to be inconsistent, for such a value can always be found."

"In the light of a number of relevant values, rather than only one, and even in the light of most single values, such pairs of policies turn out to be quite consistent. It is easy to find a combination of short- and long-range objectives, and of objectives with respect to growth as well as to distribution of income, that make crop restriction and acreage increases consistent. . . " [Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, p. 193].

59See footnote 27.

This writer does not know that Lindblom ever explicitly mentions resource slack in connection with his own work. But he and Hirschman do so favorably in discussing Hirschman's thesis that the unbalanced economic growth inherent in a market system may be preferable to deliberately balanced growth.

"Admittedly, the process is likely to be more costly in terms of resource utilization, but the imbalances at the same time call forth more resources and investment than would otherwise become available. The crucial, but
culture which provides an initial basic agreement on values, policies, and procedures.

The non zero-sum notion of resource slack conflicts with the frequently zero-sum notion of marginal choice.

The assertion of a shared culture conflicts with the often substantial emphasis placed on value conflict, even conflict over values at the margin.

Furthermore, given system slack and wide cultural agreement, the claim that pluralist systems can coordinate is not very significant. It would be surprising, indeed, if the systems could not. See the proviso to point 1.

The Lindblom Position as a Dialectical Concept Examination

The conclusion of my attempted summary thus reconfirms the problems which have faced that attempt from its beginning. There is substantial ambiguity in the Lindblom concepts and diversity, even to the point of inconsistency, in his arguments. The result is a very great number of different concepts and


In any case, there are numerous tacit references to resource slack besides those in footnote 27. For examples, decision makers can defer to others and still have enough options left to achieve their own goals. Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 47-50. And even in the case of finite resources, as in a budget, additional funds come in from time to time (and apparently one can always afford to wait for these). Ibid., p. 199.

See footnote 19, first part.
positions. I interpret this diversity as a response to an inherently conflictual social reality. And I interpret the response as an "inner debate" which Lindblom is having with himself—a debate he undertakes in the course of his participation in an "outer debate" with others over the worth of comprehensiveness.

I understand Lindblom to be on one side of the outer debate. His participation takes the form of concepts developed and arguments advanced in support of a position on that side. In the inner debate he argues both for and against those concepts and arguments. The presence of this inner debate is why, in my view, it is practically impossible to summarize Lindblom's position. The remainder of Chapter III is an attempt to partly trace the progress of this inner debate.

The discussion to follow, and a similar discussion of writing by Karl Mannheim, represent, in a sense, the core of the dissertation. It is through these discussions that I utilize what I call a dialectical method of concept examination. In one sense, of course, the core is represented fully as much by the problem statements given in Chapter I and the methodology considered in Chapter II, for both the problem statements and the method delimit the conceptual possibilities. Nevertheless, the early chapters are intended to introduce the later ones rather than to stand by themselves.

The Ceaseless Quest for Proof. In many present day approaches to concept examination the emphasis is placed on meaning. Typical questions concern why we understand universals or essences, how to make our ideas clear, how we in fact use certain words, and so on. By contrast, the emphasis in the
approach presented here is always on cogency. I assume that conviction does not arise out of understanding but that understanding arises out of conviction. I further assume that the quest for cogency is a perpetual one and that it is fruitful as such.

I expressly reject the assumption, typified by some passages of John Hospers, that it is not fruitful to ask for ultimate proof. As a specimen of the view I oppose, these passages are worth quoting at some length. (Hospers speaks of the foundations of logic.)

...we are so accustomed to being barraged by the request "Prove it" that we tend to think that this is required also of the very bases of proof themselves... But the principles of proof themselves make proof possible. We cannot prove them in turn. . . 61

Still, the uneasiness may persist. We want every statement to rest on another one. We are in the position of the lady and the rock: The earth rests on an elephant; what does the elephant rest on? A rock. What does the rock rest on? Another rock. What does that rock rest on? Another rock... and so on ad infinitum. A lady in the audience keeps asking this question over and over again; finally in exasperation the speaker says to her, "Lady, it's rock all the way down!" All the way down--to what? The speaker can stop her endlessly repeated question only by teaching her a little astronomy and curing her of naive notions of up and down--though perhaps she will never quite overcome a feeling of dissatisfaction with the explanation. You too may remain dissatisfied with our conclusions about logic unless you get over the idea that the ultimate principles of proof must themselves be proved... 62

We have to start somewhere, and this is where we start. 63


62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., p. 212.
This warning away from the quest for ultimate proof assumes that we all share Hospers' faith in certain bases of proof and/or that a ceaseless pursuit is not worth undertaking. Now in the sciences, even the "hard" sciences, it is certainly not clear that we share the same concepts or basic laws. And, more fundamentally, it is not clear that we agree on the absoluteness of the laws of logic. Contextualists do not agree, for example, that absolute identity statements can be made. Breakthroughs in philosophy as well as the sciences are supposed to be possible and may well depend on calling in question what previously went unquestioned.

If shared faith is not obviously adequate to stop our demands for proof, neither is the ceaseless nature of those demands. Indeed, traditional philosophy itself seems to represent such a ceaseless process and it is not obvious that such philosophy is therefore useless.

Synopsis of the Discussion. In the following discussion I trace the pattern of that apparently ceaseless struggle with himself through which Lindblom seems to argue the case against comprehensiveness. I think this struggle, like every other conceptual struggle, occurs within a hierarchy. A group of nations, let us say, struggles ideologically with another group. Most of the time the struggle is non-violent, taking the form of a debate. For those who share the ideology there is an additional inner struggle or debate over ways to gain the peculiar advantages of that ideology while escaping its disadvantages. If the first struggle is said to be between friends and enemies then this second
one may be said to be among friends. In actuality, the distinction between friends and enemies is only one of degree, however. Now there may be an indefinably large hierarchy of debates within debates but at whatever level one looks there will be spokesmen who attempt to summarize and defend a position at that level. The perpetuity of the debate, and of its hierarchical order, must ultimately go on within these spokesmen themselves. Thus it is in this form that there appears that limitless quest for proof of which Hospers (mistakenly I think) denies the legitimate existence.

Context of the Lindblom Debates -- The outermost debate (I shall call it the primary debate) in which Lindblom is involved concerns the traditional pluralist position. According to that position the politics of central control is undesirable because it produces overconcentration of power and thus becomes a threat to individual liberties. One acknowledges that the cost of pervasive competition among groups and individuals may be a deficiency of governmental coordination but one then holds that this deficiency is not serious since there exists a general consensus over procedures and policy in pluralist political systems. The outermost debate is between liberals and "authoritarians." Lindblom is certainly a participant in this debate, though only indirectly as regards most of those writings examined here. 

\[64\]

\[64\] Lindblom leaves no question about his support for liberal democracy over dictatorship. He does not believe that coordination is incompatible with liberalism. That is the main point of his writings. But wherever it may appear to be incompatible, coordination must be abandoned. For example, coordination seems to call for at least some equilibrium among different
Within the outermost debate is another, secondary, debate among the liberals themselves—a debate over the extent to which central coordination may replace political competition, given the consensus which is assumed. This debate is particularly evident between the central planners of Western Europe and Americans like Lindblom. Here he is a direct participant, for the debate concerns precisely what I have called the converse pluralist theme. It is hence apparent that the converse theme is subordinate to the traditional one.

As a participant in this secondary debate Lindblom takes the side which denies that central coordination is appropriate for liberalism. I suggest that he does so, at least in part, to avoid reducing the primary debate to triviality.

...group interests. This condition is not obviously achieved if a minority can exercise an absolute veto, can effectually blackmail the other groups. But in that case it is the requirement for consent that must prevail, even at risk of a veto, rather than the requirement of equilibrium. See Lindblom, "Decision-Making," p. 317.

Putting this point another way, one might say that coordination is often associated with the need for relatively greater social equality. But the need for minority consent may result in inequality. Where it does so we must abandon the equality criterion.

"Most of us in the Western tradition would, if faced with a practical choice, probably sanction any degree of inequality necessary to maintain a government based on consent rather than a high degree of repression" [Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, p. 260].

65"It will be apparent to many that in exploring these [decision-making] processes I am following the tradition of the pluralists in political theory. But my . . . interest [is turned] toward the calculation aspects of these processes rather than the control aspects. More concretely, where a political scientist asks whether these processes safeguard us against an overconcentration of power, I ask whether they can aid us in rational choices" [Lindblom, "Decision-Making," p. 314, footnote 14].
Central coordination cannot be compatible with liberalism unless there is widespread consensus. Otherwise, coordination will involve a rebuff to substantial minorities. But if there is widespread consensus then no great harm is done by choosing central coordination over individual liberties, as a governing approach, and no great benefit is gained either. It simply doesn't matter much which approach one chooses. What do I care that I am told to do what I would want to do anyway?66

Now it would be easy to argue that Lindblom does assume the existence of a widespread consensus in pluralism and that, consequently, all his arguments for it do tend to become trivial—for he makes numerous references to

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66 To what this writer has just said, the likely criticism will probably be that he fails to distinguish between levels of freedom. Because we may agree on the most important matters does not mean, it will be argued, that our right to disagree on lesser matters is not worth protecting. The writer concurs but asks for examples. It is doubtful that examples can be found which will allow us to distinguish clearly between authoritarian and democratic regimes. Consider the freedom to speak on matters other than the political-economic system itself. This is not proscribed, for example, in the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is encouraged through vigorous letters to the editor columns and the injunction to report problems to party members. Granted that the line between sensitive and nonsensitive topics is unclear. But it is that, also, in the United States.

Furthermore, if one emphasizes effective freedom of speech then the distinction between two countries becomes particularly obscure. In the United States it is true that one can speak to acquaintances and to political representatives in more daring ways than would be permissible in some other countries. But access to wider audiences is under the control of the political-economic system, in the guise of advertisers and interlocking directorates between business and the mass media.
American political consensus. Lindblom appears much more consistent if we accept this view. I believe it likely, however, that he means to make his views significant even at some expense in consistency. And there is evidence for this belief. He is neither consistent nor wholly clear in his discussion of consensus. Suppose, therefore, that Lindblom does want to make significant claims for pluralism and consequently that he is assuming the existence of substantial value conflict. Is he not then forced to conclude that pluralism will fail to coordinate and that it will instead produce, probably violent, disorder? His colleague, Robert Dahl, has drawn just this conclusion in those circumstances. Clearly Lindblom would not like the conclusions. Thus he faces a challenge. He must show that significant pluralism—a pluralism of widely different values—can coordinate these values even if it does not "centrally" coordinate them.

It is in the light of this need for a claim that is both significant and favorable to pluralism that we should see the debate between Lindblom and the central planners of Western Europe. Both sides are liberals and both agree on the need for some coordination. But the Europeans seem to assume the

67"... in the United States and the other successful democracies some of the common values (including democracy itself) on which citizens unite are more important to them than the values on which they disagree" [Lindblom, "Bargaining," p. 32].

See also footnote 18.

68See footnote 19

existence of social consensus in assuming the possibility of a social welfare function. Hence they face the danger that their liberalism will be trivial. What Lindblom needs to show is that his style of liberal coordination is truly coordination and yet allows for more conflict than does theirs. It is in his attempt to do this that we can trace the relation between this most proximate outer debate, where Lindblom stands on one side, and the ultimately inner debate, which he has with himself.

Relation of the Proximate Outer Debate to the Inner Debate and Theme --

The proximate outer debate in which Lindblom is engaged is, to repeat, a debate with fellow liberals over the virtues of central coordination. The position he wants to defend in that debate seems a logically tenuous one. Given this tenuous position, the safest way to make one's own case is by an indirect proof—a proof for the logical impossibility of one's opponents' views. Lindblom gives just such a proof.

The concepts of comprehensiveness and central coordination involve the idea that general goals can be formulated in advance of decision, that the relevant means to these goals and consequences of these means can be exhaustively canvassed from a central position, and that from the central position

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70 Consider the following statement by Jan Tinbergen in his review of A Strategy of Decision. "It is not quite true... that no social welfare functions have been constructed; Van Eijk, Frisch, Sandee and Theil may be quoted to the contrary" [Jan Tinbergen, review of A Strategy of Decision, by David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, in American Economic Review, LIV (December, 1964), 1094].
one can choose the most appropriate means. I suggest that Lindblom constantly
argues against this idea to the effect that the formulation of advance goals is
logically impossible. A person cannot know what he wants until he knows what
the options and costs are and he cannot know the applicable ones except at the
moment of decision. 71

The above argument is so cutting, however, just because it is two-edged.
In denying the possibility of advance goals it seems to deny the very possibility
of deliberate individual decision. For one cannot then differentiate between the
spontaneous interaction of an animal with his environment and the thoughtful
action of a human on that environment. By itself, this indirect proof would
simply once again reduce the general concept of pluralist politics to triviality.
Of course there can be both value conflict and coordination if the conflict is no
more, say, than the interaction in a bee hive.

Consequently, Lindblom also needs a direct proof—a proof that his own
form of coordination through conflict is possible. I think he tries to meet the
need by showing that evaluation and decision are both social processes and
processes of conflict. Such decisions are not the direct reflection of individual
deliberation since, on the one hand, they are not individual decisions and, on
the other, they are not a result of cooperation and advance agreement. Thus
they do not, in these senses, involve advance goals. But such decisions are
still deliberate since they are the result of an initial conflict over values.

71 See footnote 31.
Consequently they do seem to involve advance goals indirectly. In effect, Lindblom seems to be saying either that social conflict is deliberate unified decision or, at least, that social conflict leads to such decision. These views are expressed in his own earliest language, as the statement that bargaining can coordinate. 72 The statement presents the central theme which I believe he pursues in attempting to complete the indirect proof for his position (the argument against comprehensiveness) with a direct one.

At this point in my argument it may be asked if Lindblom’s theme is as curious as I suggest. I apparently assume that no distinction can be made between different sorts of advance goals. But maybe bargaining can have advance goals, after all, even if they are different from those of central coordination. In that case perhaps Lindblom does not find himself in quite the dilemma which I describe and accordingly need not respond with what appears to be a contradictory thesis.

I don’t believe that Lindblom acknowledges such a distinction in advance goals as can relieve him of his dilemma, however. Certainly there is a distinction. It pervades his writings. It is the difference between an aggregate of separate more or less atomistic goals, on the one hand, and a goal integration embedded in our very culture, on the other. The latter may be otherwise described as a conceptual framework.

But the existence of this sort of advance goal in bargaining is precisely

72 "I am arguing that bargaining is a method of coordination, not a tolerable obstruction to coordination" [Lindblom, "Bargaining," p. 4].
the cause of dilemma, not a solution to it. In most of his writings that we examine Lindblom wants to show that a conflict of interests can result in (if it is not in fact identical to) social coordination. The interaction involved in a social-conceptual framework is not evidently a matter of conflict, however, at least not for those within it. To be in conflict would logically require one to stand at least a little distance outside the conceptual framework. Now Lindblom does seem to draw this last conclusion at certain points but I think it a mistake to suppose that it summarizes his writings. It seems to represent, instead, a basic transformation of that thought sequence which culminates in the *Intelligence of Democracy*.

Within the thought sequence, Lindblom focuses on the concept of bargaining, of partisan adjustment, of group conflict. And he has the problem of showing how there can be this conflict within a pervasive culture which itself defines social values. But even in the "Bargaining" essay Lindblom anticipates another concern. He sees a need to investigate the formation of the culture, as manifested by social consensus.  

73 In his subsequent comments in *Nomos VII* (1967) he explicitly describes the problem of values as one of cultural formation rather than the aggregation of individual values. And in his remarks on integration of the social sciences (1972) he urges the need to ask radical questions about the social structure. 74 These comments of 1967 and 1972

73 Ibid., pp. 39-40.

74 "...because values are in fact culturally aggregated, the problem of 'aggregation' is in fact a 'formation' problem to which contemporary analysis
follow the Intelligence . . . and imply the question of how to escape from a dominant conceptual framework.

I say then that Lindblom works over one problem and ends by transforming it into another. He first struggles with the problem how there can be value conflict within a pervasive culture which defines our values. Just after he has developed his fullest answer to this problem he apparently transforms it to the different problem how we can escape from our culture sufficiently to alter it. It is primarily his first problem that we examine. That problem does seem to present the dilemma which I describe and hence to justify my explanation of what he is doing.

Now odd as it might seem, this explanation of the theme and its purpose seems plausible. For such an explanation can make sense of a central inconsistency in Lindblom's thought (mentioned in the provisos to III. B. 5. and IV. F. 4. of the illustrative summary). That inconsistency is the presence of the contrary claims, first, that values are derived from choices at the social decision moment and, second, that people disagree about values, the latter claim implying that the values must endure over time.

If we assume that the central theme of Lindblom's thought does appear to affirm contraries, then the support of that theme obviously will constitute an intellectual struggle. The struggle could be conceived as a primarily linear

process leading to an increasingly more exact and less inconsistent concept of human decision—a discovery that the struggle was only an apparent one. But it could also be conceived as a primarily circular process which represented progressively expansive restatements of the struggle itself. I propose to conceive the theme and the struggle in this second sense.

Before considering how this inner struggle seems to generate development of Lindblom's central theme, I need to make some points of summary and comment about what has just been said.

1. Liberals must show that as they emphasize individual and group freedom in the conduct of a polity they can yet achieve enough social order in that polity.

2. Some liberals propose to do this by showing that central coordination is compatible with liberalism—that liberal democracies can plan as well as can authoritarian regimes.

3. But to be able to show this, it seems that one must first assume a wide consensus among a country's populace. And given this consensus it doesn't greatly matter which political system one chooses. A recommendation for liberalism is really a recommendation that the country be lucky enough to be consensual. (And since consensus comes easier to the rich, one may also be recommending, in effect, that the country be rich.)

4. To avoid making his position trivial a liberal might want to show both that a society can be consensual enough for coordination and that it can be conflictual enough so that a pluralist competition is the better politics. Such a
liberal, and Lindblom is one, would then be engaged in debate with those fellow liberals who espouse central planning. Unfortunately, his position would seem as logically shaky as theirs was trivial.

5. Because Lindblom's position in this "outer" debate does indeed appear shaky, his safest approach apparently would consist in logically discrediting the liberal planners. If he could do so, his own position, tenuous though it was, would be all that remained.

6. The importance of this approach cannot be too much emphasized. In conventional formal logic, to show a contradiction in some position is equivalent to proving its contradictory. This procedure is called a "reductio ad absurdem" argument or an "indirect proof." The debate between pluralist liberals and planning liberals is not so sharply drawn as to logically demand the application of this principle, but it is enough so as to suggest it.

7. I cannot accept this principle, however. According to a most critical assumption of my dissertation, reality may not be such that the principle holds.

8. Lindblom shows, by an apparently conclusive argument, that central planning is illogical. He does so by showing that advance goals seem impossible. But he must then indicate that some human decision-making is still possible or he has reduced pluralist politics to non-conscious animal interaction. An indirect proof alone would not let us take notice of this problem but we do.

9. It is just in moving from indirect proof to a direct proof that the outer debate over liberal planning is evidently converted to an inner struggle. For Lindblom it seems to be a struggle to maintain the view both that human values
are consensual, in deriving from the social decision moment, and that they are conflictual, and hence must endure in time.

The Impetus for Theme Development -- If Lindblom's thought is an effort to affirm contraries, this is not necessarily a surprising circumstance. The need to do so may well be the human condition. And if it is, then we might find a certain characteristic beginning to the development of any person's thought. We might find that in his intellectual youth he had a faith in the identity of contraries--a faith which in later years he tried to maintain while yet differentiating ever more finely between them. I suggest that Lindblom's thought does develop in this way.

Lindblom's central theme--the position he holds in the outer debate and the position which in its seeming contradictariness capsulizes his inner debate--is that bargaining can coordinate. I want to make the bold claim that this theme does begin as an identity statement. I think Lindblom takes the tacit position that conflict is coordination! In his early essay on "Bargaining" (1955) he associates coordination with value agreement and with the public interest. So far as one can tell from a very few and vague comments this is what coordination is. But then Lindblom explicitly states that the public interest is often nothing other than bargained agreement among partisans--i.e, a managed conflict. 75 Now Lindblom might mean that conflict results in agreement rather than that it is agreement--and this seems, indeed, to be the simplest most

obvious interpretation of his views. I don't believe, however, that he can mean this in the light of later works which he apparently treats as compatible with this early one. And there seem no other meanings which would avoid this identity of opposites. More will be said later in defense of this identity statement. 76

Assuming for now that there is this attempted identity of opposites then there is a constant compulsion to move on in one's thought. To rest in the identity of value conflict and value agreement would be to reduce the one to the other. In a pluralist model of politics--one which makes conflict its foreground concept and relegates agreement to the status of a background assumption--conflict would appear to be reduced to agreement. If the concept of conflict is to be made meaningful and not left as a mere label for what looks like its opposite then increasing efforts must be made to differentiate it. 77 But these efforts can never be decisive since they will be constrained by a constant need to reassert the original identity of the two concepts. Otherwise pluralism freed from consensus assumptions becomes a hopeless attempt to negotiate the


77Consistent with his method of dialectical concept examination, the writer is treating the development of Lindblom's thought as if it comprised the elaboration of a concept. He does so even though Lindblom's writings may appear, on the surface, to be defending a proposition rather than defining a term. In fact, Lindblom, himself, sometimes speaks as if his thought were a process of definition.

"Because this is an exploratory and imprecise paper, I cannot define bargaining very sharply. If we understand it as poorly as I argue to be the case in this paper, it can only be defined with satisfactory precision as we come to know it better" [Lindblom, "Bargaining," p. 2].
non-negotiable.

The Stages of Theme Development (The Progress of the Inner Debate) -- I identify three main stages in the development of this ambivalent theme. The first is represented by an early and little mentioned essay which Lindblom wrote under the auspices of the Rand Corporation in 1955. Entitled "Bargaining, the Hidden Hand in Government" it represents some departure from the book written with Robert Dahl two years before where bargaining and coordination were treated as alternate processes. In the 1955 essay the central theme that conflict is coordination seems starkly evident. Perhaps Lindblom would now reject some of these early statements but I don't believe he can do so without rejecting major works which follow. For the ambivalences reappear in those works.

In the essay the concept of coordination is vaguely but effectually identified with value agreement. Now since conflict appears to be identified with coordination, then if coordination is equivalent to agreement conflict must be a wholly undetermined concept. There is conflict in name only. This result makes the whole theme meaningless, however, and the urge to have a meaningful statement consequently forces an immediate rejection of the theme as an identity statement. Lindblom instead acknowledges the possibility of deadlock

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78 First reference is in footnote 4.

and the consequent need to distinguish levels of power. There is now conflict in potential and not merely in name. 80

After the essay on bargaining, Lindblom wrote nothing closely relevant to his central theme until 1958. 81 There then appeared in rapid succession four important essays, highlighted by the famous "The Science of Muddling Through" 82 in the spring of 1959. "Policy Analysis" 83 appeared in June of 1958 followed in December of 1958 by "Tinbergen on Policy-Making" 84 and in 1959 by "The Handling of Norms in Policy Analysis." 85 These four essays

80 Elaboration and defense of the points made in this paragraph begin on text p. 188.

81 He contributed to a brief published discussion of the monopoly problem, see American Economics Review for May 1957, and in January of 1957 his essay "In Praise of Political Science" was published in World Politics. The comments on the monopoly problem are confusing but Lindblom seems to be arguing for a broader view of the corporation than that to which economists are accustomed. Seen in the context of his other writings he is probably removing the concept of the corporation from a strict market model only to place it in the not-so-different pluralist model. In the essay published in World Politics Lindblom argues that political scientists possess a degree of systematic theory beyond what they recognize, namely the pluralist theory. He does not emphasize the advantages of pluralism as a normative theory, however; he emphasized, instead, its value as a description of society.

82 First reference is in footnote 8.

83 First reference is in footnote 14.

84 First reference is in footnote 19.

85 First reference is in footnote 18.
constitute, to me, a second stage in the development of the Lindblom theme.

The concept of conflict no longer exists only in potential. It is actual but only as conflict over minor individual values. This conflict occurs within a larger setting of other individual but widely shared values. It is marginal conflict in the sense of being mild.

86 What noticeably separates the essay on "Bargaining" from the four works just mentioned is an emphasis in the latter works on the means/ends distinction. In "Bargaining," Lindblom's main emphasis is on the point that coordination of values occurs automatically in the process of political-social conflict and that, consequently, there is no need to distinguish between means and ends because one needs no deliberate ends. There is little evidence that Lindblom does make the distinction in this earliest essay.

Lindblom needs to introduce the means/ends distinction, however, if he is to make the concept of value conflict meaningful. Otherwise, a value and its implementing action will be identical, and in that case value interaction apparently can take only two forms neither of which will constitute real value conflict. If the interaction involves no shared conceptual framework it will necessarily reduce to an unresolvable debate over opposing actions--a debate like those which emotivists envision. (One actor will insist that he, himself, should perform Act A. Another will insist that he should perform B instead.) But if there is a shared conceptual framework its existence will imply that similar values-actions are undertaken by all.

Where the means/ends distinction is introduced (i.e., where actions are considered somehow different from the values they implement), then there is, for positivists, logical space to argue about values. The debate is not necessarily reduced to a shouting match. And for contextualists the presence of some shared values does not, then, necessarily predetermine, as it otherwise would, agreement on those lesser values called means.

Having acknowledged the concept of a means/ends distinction, one must simultaneously admit that it cannot be an absolute; it is a concept about the relationships between entities and not about any particular entities themselves. Hence, means are simply lesser values. These lesser values are the marginal values which represent differing trade-off relationships possible in implementing the more general ones. There can truly be conflict over such marginal values. See Lindblom "Muddling Through," pp. 84-85; and Lindblom, "Handling of Norms," p. 167. This conflict seems to take place within a larger setting of shared individual values, however. See Lindblom, "Policy Analysis," pp. 309, 300-01; Lindblom, "Tinbergen on Policy-Making," p. 534; and Lindblom, "Handling of Norms," p. 171.
Beyond the second stage I think it possible to identify a third one, though the differences between second and third are not as dramatic as those between the first and second. The third stage involves more lengthy, more subtle works, the major ones being *A Strategy of Decision* (with David Braybrooke) and *The Intelligence of Democracy*. It is in the last of these that Lindblom particularly recognizes conflict over "collective" values as distinct from conflict over individual ones.

Collective values are those which cannot benefit one person without benefiting many others and similarly cannot be withheld from that person without being withheld from others. Presumably the costs, too, must be shared though Lindblom does not explicitly mention this. He admits that collective values often evaporate from pluralist theories of politics as they seem to do in his own earlier works. But even in *The Intelligence of Democracy* there are, for him, only discrete collective values. There is no "overriding aggregate of collective value," nothing that might be called "the" public interest.

There also appears, with this explicit recognition of conflict over collective values a greater emphasis on conflict as a zero-sum situation. That

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87 First reference is in footnote 8.

88 First reference is in footnote 13.


90 Ibid., p. 283.

91 In "Bargaining," Lindblom consistently maintains that most political situations are non zero-sum. (See first quote in footnote 27.) In later writings
is to be expected. Where values are individual what is a need to one may be a benefit to another so that nobody has to pay costs. A classic example is the nursing mother who is supposed to receive as much gratification in feeding the child as the child obtains in being fed. Capitalist theory supposes that many relationships are like this.

If values are collective, though, there may sometimes be costs equivalent to the benefits. And if collective values are generalized into the public interest then there almost must be such costs. For if people have a great variety of needs and wants which must be satisfied as an aggregate, and for all persons, then unless none of this great variety conflict—a highly implausible

he continues to say this at points while at other points he suggests the opposite. Those four works which this writer identifies as a second-stage argument reveal only rather brief acknowledgment of zero-sum relations. To be sure, they speak much of value conflict but they do not emphasize the possibly mutual exclusivity of these values. There are allusions to the danger of minority rule, but only in the essay on "Handling of Norms," p. 167, is there explicit discussion of whether social relations are zero-sum. Here, Lindblom does suggest that except in the price system they usually are.

The balance of emphasis throughout the four works still leans strongly to a notion of mutual gain, however. For an example of the prevailing tone consider this passage:

"Both in bargaining and in other kinds of strategic interplay, there are strong motives for adversaries to find what has been called an 'integrated' solution. . . some settlement which, by reconstructing the conflict, gives all parties much or all of what they want and does not simply 'split the difference'" [Lindblom, "Tinbergen on Policy-Making," p. 536].

In the Strategy of Decision, p. 29, Lindblom states a position which he has implied clearly many times before but then has blurred. Value conflicts are zero-sum situations.

"Whenever values are in conflict—that is, whenever one has to give up some of one value in order to achieve some of another value. . . " [Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision, p. 29].

The best evidence, in Intelligence of Democracy, for a greater concern
assumption--conflict over the public interest must be zero-sum.

Although there is no explicit connection drawn by Lindblom between the above admissions of collective values and of zero-sum conflict, on the one hand, and the greater length of the works in which they occur, on the other, I suggest that there may be such a connection. It is perhaps just because Lindblom attempts to maintain the identity of conflict and value agreement while at the same time he is claiming that conflict can be rather severe that his works at this third stage are so lengthy and so subtle.

These then are the three main stages which I identify in Lindblom's development of the converse pluralist theme. Within the limits of this dissertation it will not be possible to consider all of them at length. I shall examine only the first but that one is to me the most critical stage in any case.

**First Level of Argument.** In elaborating on the first level of argument with potentially zero-sum relationships comes not from specific passages but from the greatly extended discussion of how value conflicts can be reconciled through partisan mutual adjustment. It comes, that is, from the obvious implication that the demonstration of this reconciliation is not easy. Almost all the material in the last one hundred pages of the book is devoted in one way or another to this problem. And as significant as length is the progress of the discussion. It seems basically circular. For example, Lindblom suggests that we interpret value consistency as a Pareto optimum but acknowledges that pursuit of such an optimum does not resolve all value conflicts. Then he suggests that partisan mutual adjustment will achieve much value agreement anyway at least in the basic sense that some decision is finally reached. But he acknowledges that this decision may appear coercive and he can only soften that fact by de-emphasizing the distinction between coercion and consent in the first place. See Lindblom, *Intelligence of Democracy*, chaps. XIII and XIV. Similar advances and retreats occur in later chapters.
as it is presented in the essay on "Bargaining. . ." I shall first attempt a somewhat extended summary of that work. Of course there must be, on my view, many provisos to any such summary but I shall not give them here in the explicit form which they took in the earlier illustrative summary. They will now appear as interwoven into the very fabric of my interpretation and analysis.

The Essay -- The thrust of the essay is apparent from the title. Lindblom suggests that in the same way as the selfishness of men in the market can lead to public good so can partisan bargaining in government. (Reference in this essay is only to bargaining among public officials.) In his own words,

I am arguing that bargaining is a method of coordination, not a tolerable obstruction to coordination. 92

. . .bargaining or negotiation in government is a closer kin to Smith's "higgling of the market" than third-cousin-by-analogy. 93

The alternative to bargaining is hierarchy. The author advances the hypothesis that bargaining is preferable for various reasons, in particular because the bargaining process tends to insure that all vital interests obtain a hearing, and because the results of bargaining tend to be in the public interest. 94

Lindblom is confident that market trade offers benefits to all since, according to him, there are curbs on the power of any one individual. He acknowledges that bargaining, in contrast, often appears to favor some persons

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93 Ibid., p. 5.

94 Ibid., p. ii.
at the expense of others. But he promises to show that bargaining, too, almost always occurs because of the possibility of mutual gain to all, though he concedes that the gain sometimes consists merely in abatement of conflict.  

The major concepts in the essay are bargaining, hierarchy and coordination but only the first one is explicitly defined. Hierarchy is associated with the idea that if one wants to achieve a social goal then one must make it some official's responsibility to pursue it. It is also associated with the concept of unilateral power and, obliquely, with that of dictatorship. But Lindblom also acknowledges that democracy can take a hierarchical form and, apparently, not just in the sense that the bureaucratic part of any government is usually a formal hierarchy. He seems instead to be acknowledging a planning or "socialist" democracy of the European sort. Hierarchy in any case seems to mean the deliberate pursuit of the public good. This public good is not

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95 Ibid., p. 3.
96 Ibid., p. 6.
97 Ibid.
98 "In any democracy the subordination of hierarchy is always more marked than dictatorship even if it is less marked than in American government" [Ibid., p. 19].
99 "Aside from the price system, we are still wedded to the idea that... the way to reach social goals is to set them up as organizational objectives... the way to serve the public is to motivate individuals to serve the public--in short, the way to get results is to organize power hierarchically" [Ibid., p. 7].
necessarily a generally agreed public good, but it would be so in a socialist democracy.

Coordination, or social coordination as it is sometimes called, is even less explicitly defined than is hierarchy. One often thinks of this concept as referring to a process by which many different elements are brought into a whole—brought so through the purposive application of some common principles or values. This makes the concept look much like hierarchy, and we shall see later that it does seem to look that way to Lindblom—but for a different reason.

The elements which are brought together may be different values, however. In other words, coordination in a more basic sense may be needed to provide the common values which coordination in a more applied sense can then use to integrate elements other than values. Lindblom apparently understands coordination in this more basic sense. It is associated with "achieving a social goal," serving the "public interest," "finding common goals,"

100"... we are still wedded to the idea that the way to reach social goals is to set them up as organizational objectives, which means then that the way to coordinate is to make it someone's job to coordinate...."

101Despite his use of the term "coordination" at the beginning of his essay, what Lindblom mainly tries to do from then on is show that bargaining serves the public interest, the latter being defined as widely shared goals.

"An official's bargaining power depends in large part upon the coincidence of the goals he pursues in bargaining and the public interest, here defined as the achievement of widely shared goals" [Ibid., p. 21].
"improving everyone's position." In this imprecise and intuitive form coordination thus seems to mean either the achievement of value agreement or value agreement itself.

Bargaining, which is the one explicitly defined concept, is defined by negation. It is said to comprise those methods of control over officials which are multilateral instead of unilateral. It is a residual category of controls not accounted for in the hierarchical models of government.

Of the many other distinctions which appear in later works several are here conflated to the distinction between bargaining and hierarchy. There is little distinction between the general political process of democracy, the specific political process of bargaining, and the decision method of incrementalism. And there is similarly little distinction between dictatorship, hierarchy, and the decision method of synopsis. Neither is there much emphasis on the means-ends distinction and its deficiencies.

After distinguishing between bargaining and hierarchy, the essay elaborates the point that bargaining is common in American government. It then proceeds to the main topic which is a discussion of the virtues of bargaining for coordination.

102"... bargaining almost always (perhaps without exception) takes place because of the possibility of mutual gain to all the bargainers..." [Ibid., p. 3].

103Ibid., p. 2.

104Ibid.
Lindblom begins, as so often in his later works, with a kind of reductio argument. He observes that bargaining is ubiquitous and concludes that if hierarchy can be shown to be impossible or clearly inferior in important circumstances then facts like ubiquity will have to be persuasive. 105 He then completes the argument with sub-arguments showing that hierarchy actually is impossible in democracy, because of social and institutional pluralism, and that it is also impossible, in certain circumstances, in any government. 106 (Lindblom is speaking mainly of democracies, though.)

Now Lindblom could end the argument here but he evidently senses that a reductio argument is not enough. He doesn’t want to say merely that bargaining is the best there is. In what immediately follows comes the most interesting and curious part of his total argument.

Earlier in the essay Lindblom claimed to see the presence of curbs on power inequality in the market system and to see the possibility of similar if less effective curbs in pluralism. 107 This was to be expected since pluralist theory usually holds that there either is or can be rough equality of bargaining power. But now as he proceeds to the most critical steps of his argument,

105 Ibid., pp. 15-17.

106 Ibid., pp. 17-20.

107 Lindblom did not put the matter exactly this way. He spoke of curbs on "private vices" rather than on "power inequality." But the import would seem to be much the same. In a bargaining polity one need not curb the vices of the weak. And to curb the vices of the strong, one must curb their power. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
Lindblom denies this latter position. Equality is a ridiculous idea, he says. Bi-partisan equality would lead to deadlock. And equality defined as a situation in which no party to the bargain feels anyone else did better is also undesirable. Coincidence with the public interest, not satisfaction of the partisans, ought to be the test of a settlement. 108

The public official with more power is probably one with a higher position in the formal government hierarchy. And he should have gained this through various alliances. "... the only way to win is to find common cause with a majority of the bargainers." 109 The official thus will have more bargaining power if he pursues more widely shared values. Such values constitute the public interest, the only sort of public interest there can ever really be. 110 And the public interest as such, or at least its achievement, is apparently what is meant by coordination.

At this point in the argument Lindblom fears he will be thought to have begged the question by assuming that the bargaining objective is something more than private gain. 111 But he assures the reader that he has not. There are many different interpretations of the public interest; failure to recognize that fact is a basic defect of hierarchy. And often these interpretations cannot

108 ibid., p. 21.
109 ibid., p. 22.
111 ibid., pp. 24-25.
be reduced to a smaller number by appeal to the voice of the majority. The majority is silent. Often the only way to know that values are widely shared is to know that they are the outcome of bargaining. "Hence within a certain range the public interest is represented by an agreement among partisan interests, which is the way bargainers see it, not a goal or state of affairs having some validity other than as a practical bargained compromise."\(^{112}\)

Thus does Lindblom argue that bargaining is not merely the best one can get in the direction of coordination. It is a definite coordinating device. It is so because those sympathetic to the public interest will have the greater bargaining power. This public interest is not something above the bargaining process, however, but is often the outcome of that very process.

The crux of Lindblom's argument seems to be captured in the above points, but it is elaborated in subsequent points and some of those need to be mentioned. For one thing, there are other related advantages to bargaining besides its ability to see the public interest for what it is. The bargaining process better assures that the values of every significant group will be considered in any final reconciliation of interests involved in a policy decision. The hierarchical decision maker sees such reconciliation as a matter of his own judgment in weighing values, and he is likely to miss the values that don't fit his biases. The bargainer believes that reconciliation will come just in letting every group speak for itself. On his view, it cannot occur in one person's

\(^{112}\)Ibid., p. 26.
Bargaining also produces better feedback since big decisions are not necessarily made at the top of a hierarchy. And it is less intellectually demanding. But its greatest value is that it motivates men to seek common goals rather than to be satisfied with a compromise of conflicting interests. This is a value because there are countless common goals, at least in the United States. The reason that there are is partly the good fortune of our history but it is also partly because bargaining makes it the business of our government leaders to uncover every possible area of agreement. (Is Lindblom perhaps alluding to his earlier point that the areas of agreement are often whatever emerge from bargaining?)

After discussing the virtues of bargaining, Lindblom very briefly considers its deficiencies, suggesting that these deficiencies stem from an excess of institutional pluralism or from attempts to gain power other than through alliances. In any case, he does not think the objections are very serious.

The paper concludes with some suggestions for further study, the most significant to us being the first. That suggestion is to study the social framework of agreement, on fundamental ends and on political means, within which

113 Ibid., pp. 27-29.

114 Ibid., pp. 29-30.

115 Ibid., pp. 30-31.

116 Ibid., p. 32.
bargaining occurs. Lindblom claims that this framework of agreement is achieved through social indoctrination, "strategic calculations," and, for certain groups, through special role restraints. \textsuperscript{117} It is not clear, though, that the ends and means in question are less fundamental than those which earlier were considered to be our historical inheritance or the product of bargaining itself. (Perhaps bargaining implies the making of strategic calculations and perhaps our historical inheritance is the result of indoctrination.)

The Dialectical Pattern -- I want to suggest now that the inconsistencies or, at least, ambivalences which must have been apparent in the essay on Bargaining have a point, assume a pattern, when interpreted as a dialectical concept examination.

1. Central Concept

The central concept in this essay, and in the Lindblom thought sequence as a whole, is the concept of bargaining. It appears to be a broad concept. It already comprises, in embryo, the concept of patterns of adjustment among dominants and subordinates as well as that of bargaining among equals. \textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{117}Ibid., pp. 39-40.

\textsuperscript{118}As has been previously said, Lindblom does not explicitly argue for a bargaining among equals in this essay. Indeed, his explicit statements go in the opposite direction. But he takes for granted the presence of a rough equality in his very use of the concept of pluralism and in his claim that groups retain some degree of autonomy.

"... if groups working through a common government retain some degree of autonomy with respect to one another--and this is what social pluralism means--they can arrive at governmental decisions only through bargaining" [Ibid., p. 20].
2. Other First Order Major Concepts

The other major concepts are hierarchy and coordination. These are never clearly defined but what definition there is is critically significant. For it makes the two concepts seem very close to each other. This isn't necessarily surprising. If we forget Lindblom's discussion and consider a plain man view of the two concepts, it would clearly seem that to coordinate implies the exercise of hierarchy and that what hierarchy does is to coordinate. We might easily say, then, that the two concepts are really just different aspects of a single one. Now this does seem to be the conclusion to which Lindblom is headed but he is arriving there from a different direction.

I suggest that in his view it is value agreement of which the two concepts display different aspects. Both allude to value agreement and for both there are limits to purposive action as regards that agreement.

From the previous exposition it appears that coordination means either social agreement or the purposive achievement of social agreement. If it means the latter then it shares with hierarchy an assumption claimed for that concept by Lindblom—the assumption that goals can be achieved by deliberately pursuing them. But more likely it means the former. Lindblom clearly doesn't intend to emphasize the idea that value agreements have temporal endurance and could serve, once achieved, as promises for a hierarchical process. To do so would weaken considerably his central theme. It thus

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seems more accurate to say that coordination and value agreement occur simultaneously rather than to say that coordination achieves agreement.

Hierarchy might be supposed a very different concept given the strong association Lindblom seems to make between that concept and purposive action. But let us give some extended thought to the implications of the concept as he uses it and see if the supposition holds. We note firstly, and despite Lindblom’s sometimes claims to the contrary, that hierarchy must be possible. Since bargaining is all those governmental processes which are not hierarchy, then if hierarchy did not exist the term bargaining would refer to any governmental process whatever. In that case some of bargaining would surely coordinate. Lindblom clearly means to say more than this in his essay.

Furthermore, the hierarchy from which Lindblom wants to distinguish bargaining is primarily that of Western social democracies, not that represented by command economies such as in the Soviet Union. Now the

120 Lindblom’s contrary claims are explicit.
"... hierarchy is impossible in American government except as one of several bargaining controls" [Lindblom, "Bargaining," p. 17]. In other words, hierarchy is a subordinate element in the bargaining process. On the most critical matters, hierarchy is impossible in any government.
"To take an extreme, dictators can exercise power only through employing large elements of bargaining in their hierarchies" [Ibid., p. 18].

121 In emphasizing the coordinating ability of a bargaining polity, rather than its ability to protect against power concentration, Lindblom is obviously speaking to the West. If he was speaking primarily to the Communist East, it is the latter ability that he would most need to emphasize. For it is just that ability that they would most violently dispute.
hierarchical forms of democracy must presuppose value agreement since values cannot simply be imposed under a democratic system. Some of that agreement might be the result of historical inheritance, but according to Lindblom that is not the whole explanation for the presence of agreement in the United States and there is consequently no reason for us to think that it would be a sufficient one elsewhere. Presumably then the agreement on basics, even for socialist democracies, is associated with something like bargaining. Thus coordination and hierarchy seem to be the same at least in the sense that both are associated with agreement over basic values and that this agreement arises in bargaining.

If there is still a distinction between coordination and hierarchy it must be that coordination shares with bargaining the bargaining approach over lesser values whereas hierarchy resolves disputes among those lesser values by deduction from greater ones. But in the context of this distinction, Lindblom's major arguments no longer support bargaining over hierarchy as a coordinating device. Hence, if Lindblom is to be persuasive then he must abandon even this minor distinction between hierarchy and coordination. In the following lengthy analysis I shall try to defend these last two sentences.

122"That we have common values to unite us is in part the good fortune of our history. But it is also explained by the fact that bargaining makes it the business of our governmental leaders... to uncover every possible area of agreement" [Lindblom, "Bargaining," p. 32].

123This writer believes that Lindblom has only two principal arguments for the superiority of bargaining over hierarchy. There are other lesser
The first major Lindblom argument is that the more powerful officials better reflect agreed values (the public interest).\textsuperscript{124} By itself, however, this is an argument for hierarchy, not bargaining. If our officials will always do what is best for us then why not opt for hierarchical government? In those circumstances it should be both the most efficient kind and the most just.

It is really the second argument that supports bargaining. According to this one, value agreement \textit{arises from} bargaining.\textsuperscript{125} Now since coordination in its broader sense seems equivalent to value agreement it follows from the second argument that bargaining can coordinate as well as can hierarchy. We must closely examine this second argument.

If the agreement which arises from bargaining is agreement over what I have called the "greater" values then this accomplishment of bargaining does not serve to distinguish coordination from democratic forms of hierarchy. Both coordination and democratic hierarchy derive their greater values from bargaining, as I have just finished saying.

But suppose that there is the further claim that bargaining results in agreement on "lesser" values as well. There are two interpretations of this ones, but they do not seem very cogent in themselves. He argues, for example, that a bargaining model can accommodate more diverse views, but this advantage is not relevant unless the many views can be brought together. He also argues that the model requires less intellectual capacity from decision makers, but that advantage is scarcely relevant, either, if the cost is chaos.


\textsuperscript{125}Ibid., pp. 27-29.
further claim. According to one interpretation, agreement on these lesser values will follow from bargaining rather than occurring simultaneously with it. But if this is what happens then the values selected have temporal endurance. They do not necessarily alter with every move in the bargaining process. Now if the lesser values endure then greater values can be expected to do the same. For example, if a nation sets specific policies both for increases in social benefits and for across-the-board decreases in taxes, and if the nation continues to do this despite any contraindications economically, then these enduring policies may be generalized into an equally enduring greater value—that of unlimited economic growth. And given this greater value it is now possible to deduce other policies from it. Hierarchy is thus justified. From this example I conclude that if agreement only follows from bargaining then bargaining does not seem superior as a method for determining lesser values. It is true that bargaining may produce policy agreement. But the agreement, once achieved, may be generalized into principles which may then be applied by hierarchy.

I think Lindblom's more common claim is that bargaining and agreement occur simultaneously. Certainly in later works he argues that we cannot even know our values except in the process of bargaining over trade-offs. In other words, the process of coming to know values occurs simultaneously with the reaching of agreement over them. If this is so, however, then there can be

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126See footnote 31.
no distinct decision process called hierarchy since there are no enduring values available to be applied. Values change with every step in bargaining. Thus bargaining must be the superior process as it is the only process. But by the same token there is no distinction left between coordination and democratic hierarchy. For it is senseless to try to distinguish between lesser and greater values if none of them endure long enough to be objectively examined. And without that distinction the distinction between coordination and democratic hierarchy must collapse.

3. Attempted Identity of Opposites—Genesis of the Inner Debate

If Lindblom begins his argument as I suggest then he faces a dilemma.

a. He explicitly defines bargaining as the negation of hierarchy. "... bargaining refers to a residual category of controls in government that are not accounted for in the sometimes explicit but commonly implicit hierarchical models. ..." (my emphasis.)¹²⁷

Bargaining is the negation of hierarchy.

b. He then seems to identify bargaining with coordination in identifying it with the public interest as value agreement. "Hence within a certain range the public interest is represented by an agreement among partisan interests, which is the way bargainers see it, not a goal or state of affairs having some validity other than as a practical bargained compromise."¹²⁸


Bargaining is identical to coordination.

c. But he also seems to equate coordination and hierarchy as I have tried to show in the immediately preceding discussion. If he did not do so he apparently could not sustain his claim that bargaining is superior to hierarchy.

Hierarchy and coordination are identical to each other.

Let us stop abruptly at this point and look back over the first three steps of this "dialectical concept examination" of Lindblom's essay. These three steps are highly significant. They represent my first application of that method described in the last part of Chapter II. And in any application they would be the most critical steps.

The basic assumption behind these three steps, and behind the method as a whole, is one simple idea. THERE ARE NO CONCEPTS WHICH JUST ARE. There are no concepts which we can gain by pointing, despite the ubiquitous common sense belief that there are. There are no concepts which we all just find ourselves sharing, despite the belief among many Anglo-American philosophers that there are.

From this simple idea there come two critical inferences. Because there are no concepts which come from pointing, every concept must be understood in terms of other concepts. But because there are no concepts which we all just share, every concept is questionable.

From these two inferences come, in my view, two possible visions of our human situation.
We may think ourselves like the person who seeks the meaning of some term, say "democracy," in a dictionary and finds the defining terms to be as questionable as that whose meaning he sought. This is the skeptics' vision.

But alternatively we may think ourselves like the person who finds himself in actual struggle against a concept, say totalitarianism, which he scarcely grasps but nevertheless in contrast to which he comes to understand such a concept as democracy. I believe that this vision is a meaningful alternative and I would call it the vision of dialectical struggle. It is in terms of this latter vision that I have been examining Lindblom's thought.

If there are no concepts that just are, then even the simplest subject-predicate proposition becomes conceptually involved. There must be the concept about which we principally speak. Then there must also be the negative of this concept since without that we could not understand it. Thirdly, there must be the concept (or concepts) which we predicate of the first. And this concept, also, must be defined by negation if we are to grasp it. But, curiously, on the great social themes we may often find (I shall later suggest always) that the concept of predication is said to constitute the negative of the conceived relationship between the first two concepts. In other words, the negating of the first concept is in turn negated suggesting a somehow positive relationship between what seemed at first to be contradictories. Hence it is often argued that we can have the best features of both our own position and the apparently opposing one.
I see Lindblom involved in just such conceptual complexities as I have just described. He finds himself in an intellectual struggle with European democratic planners and in that struggle he assumes that he and his opponents know what is meant by one concept—that of hierarchy. The concept is not known in any positive sense, however. It is, instead, a penumbra which surrounds the beginnings of speculation. This does not mean it is nothing. We might call it the seed from which a fuller concept could develop. But for the present it is only a seed.

Lindblom places himself in opposition to this vague concept of hierarchy and expresses this opposition as the concept of bargaining. Bargaining is what hierarchy is not. If hierarchy were understood as something inherently inequitarian, having a chain-of-command structure, and pursuing an external purpose then bargaining would be different in these features. But Lindblom never clearly says that it is different in all these ways, and sometimes he says the opposite. That is to be expected. After all, the concept of hierarchy is largely undetermined.

At this point then Lindblom has two major concepts—hierarchy and bargaining—but since the second is defined by the first and the first is only very vaguely defined we may say that the definiteness of the concept of bargaining is only potential. So Lindblom is in a predicament. It is like the predicament we would encounter by defining black as not-white, when we don't know very clearly what white is. And the solution is the same. One needs a further
concept which simultaneously separates and integrates the first two concepts.

This further concept must integrate the others in the sense of showing what they have in common. For we don't know what it means to say that one concept is the negation of another unless we know their common ground. (If they have none, the statement is meaningless.) At the same time the two concepts must retain their negative relations or they lose any distinct meaning because they are absorbed within that "common ground" which is no longer common to anything.

In the case of white and black we have such a concept as I suggest. It is color. This concept maintains the separation of concepts because it is itself associated with one of the two sides. Color implies white. Black is the absence of color. But the concept also integrates. Color embraces both black and white.

I suggest that for Lindblom the synthesizing concept is coordination. Coordination is associated with hierarchy as we normally suppose, and as even Lindblom seems to believe. And it is hence the opposite of bargaining. Yet coordination embraces both hierarchy and bargaining as different ways of interrelating individual actions. (Lindblom is not wrong when he suggests that all decision making coordinates. That is a definitional truth. But there is as well the opposing definitional truth that only hierarchy is coordination.)

129The thought that the same concept can both immediately negate another concept and also transcendentally affirm that concept is denied by many people. With regard to the present example they would claim that the coordination which
Given the dialectic of concepts which I describe as necessary if any concept is to have meaning, it is to be expected that Lindblom's argument, and any argument for that matter, will take the form described. While an argument may appear to be an argument over propositions, it will actually be a debate over concepts. For Lindblom it is an attempt to define bargaining by contrasting it with hierarchy and then to define the contrast in terms of what both terms share in the third concept of coordination. But coordination can only be understood by contrast with bargaining. Hence if the concept of bargaining is to have meaning it is necessary to affirm what appear to be contradictories. This affirmation of contradictories takes here the form of the three assertions that bargaining is coordination, that bargaining is not hierarchy, and yet that hierarchy and coordination seem to be the same.

In popular expression we could say that Lindblom is trying to eat his cake and have it too. This is not to suggest, however, that his attempt is merely a

* is opposed to bargaining is of a "lower level" than that which embraces both bargaining and hierarchy and consequently that there is no contradiction. This writer agrees that there is a difference of levels but does not see how this ends the contradiction. If bargaining and hierarchy are understood in terms of the higher level concept of coordination, how is this concept understood? Recall that we always assume no outside source of concepts. Concepts determine each other. Eventually, then, even the most sophisticated concept returns to the starting point. It is, therefore, useful and correct to think of every conceptual level as circling back immediately on the next beneath it. In the present example, this means that while coordination involves what is common to both bargaining and hierarchy the only way we can know what coordination means is by contrasting it with bargaining (which, in turn, is in the process of being contrasted with hierarchy). In Hegelian terminology, coordination is a negation of the negation which bargaining is.
practical expedient. Given the problem of achieving adequate social coordination while retaining a bargaining society the attempt might seem to be so. It might seem a way to affirm both features, however practicably incompatible they seemed. I am suggesting, however, that Lindblom's position may constitute something more—that it may constitute a conceptual necessity. When he argues that a bargaining society can coordinate he is, on my view, providing a definition of bargaining.

If contradictory assertions are inherent in the use of concepts then Lindblom's apparent attempt to eat his cake and have it too is no criticism. But does concept usage necessarily involve contradiction? I have just given some reasons why I think it does, and these recapitulate earlier arguments. Those arguments are initially abstract however. How convincing is my case when it proceeds from the other direction—-from the concrete? In other words, how convincing is the claim as it appears in those three propositions which I derive from Lindblom's thought?

The first proposition—that bargaining is the negation of hierarchy—can hardly be disputed. Lindblom is quite explicit on the point. He says that bargaining comprises all those government controls not accounted for by hierarchy. And he gives no other more purely positive definition.

The third proposition—that hierarchy and coordination are identical—may be disputable but I cannot see how, other than by exploiting a certain vagueness in Lindblom's discussion of these concepts. And if the concepts are left vague,
Lindblom's use of them will be equally vague and hence questionably significant.

The second proposition—that bargaining and coordination are identical—may seem more dubious than the others. Before responding to that point, however, I must recall Lindblom's understanding of coordination. For him it seems to mean the bringing together of diverse values rather than the bringing together of other things once these values have been agreed upon. (The thesis of the essay is that bargaining can coordinate—yet the main thrust of the discussion is that bargaining leads to agreement, and very little subsequent use is made of the word "coordinate." ) Hence coordination means either the achievement of value agreement or the value agreement in its achieved state.

Of these two meanings the former would emphasize the idea that we reach goals by pursuing them and this is just what Lindblom does not want to do. I have suggested, accordingly, that coordination, for Lindblom, means value agreement itself. And there is one further consideration. Lindblom explicitly identifies the public interest with agreed values. Hence coordination seems to mean the public interest.

We are now ready to consider objections to my second proposition. One objection is this. Perhaps Lindblom is saying that coordination (hence value agreement, hence the public interest) follows from bargaining rather than that it is bargaining. Now it happens that I have already responded once to this objection in discussing the concept of hierarchy. I here shall do so again with

130See text pp. 201-03 and footnote 115.
specific reference to coordination.

The quotation which for me most explicitly identifies bargaining with the public interest is the one given when I first presented proposition b. In that proposition it is true that Lindblom refers to the public interest both as a "goal" and as a "state of affairs." And the former term suggests that the public interest is something to be achieved by bargaining while only the latter term suggests that it is perhaps imminent in the bargaining process. But the latter term makes more sense when the quotation is placed in context. The question is how to determine what values are widely shared and the quoted answer is, in effect, "whatever arises in bargaining." But this answer clearly implies that with every iteration of the bargaining process there will be a new public interest. If this early Lindblom position were not repeated and even strengthened in later works, or if one could find some reason in this early essay to largely isolate it from later ones, then one might perhaps reject the interpretation I am giving. But I find nothing in the "Bargaining. . ." essay which so far separates it from what follows. And what follows does support the interpretation. In "Handling of Norms" Lindblom argues that the weighting of values, and hence the occurrence of some kind of agreement, is not an intellectual process accomplished in the minds of individuals.

The weighting does not take place until actual policy decisions are made. At that time, the conflicting views of individuals and groups. . . are brought to bear on policy formulation. Policies are set as a resultant of such conflict, not because some one policy-making individual or group achieves an
integration but because the pulling and hauling of various views accomplishes finally some kind of a decision. . . 131

One must not be misled by such terms as "accomplish" and "finally" in this quotation. It would be more accurate to speak of the agreement as imminent in the process. For, elsewhere, Lindblom emphasizes that the process never ceases but is a constant succession of small steps. "It is a characteristic of political processes in most governments that any single office, organization, or agency pursues a never-ending series of attacks on more or less permanent, though perhaps slowly changing, problems. . . 132

One should not be misled, either, by the new item of permanency--the problem--which is mentioned in the last quotation. Specific problems are not truly permanent either. "Decision makers do not fix on a nicely defined problem. Ends are adjusted to means as well as the other way around. . . Hence 'the problem' is continually redefined. "133

In "The Science of Muddling Through" Lindblom again intimates that agreement is imminent in bargaining. Sometimes administrators can agree neither on abstract values nor on trade-off values. Yet agreement occurs and the objectives are established by the agreement. " . . . it ought to be remembered that objectives themselves have no ultimate validity other than are agreed upon.

133 Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 146-47.
Hence agreement is the test of 'best' policy. . . "134 [whether the decision method requires advance objectives or does not].

In all of the foregoing quotations Lindblom is not describing a sequential relationship between a bargaining process and value agreement. Instead, the situation he describes is one in which agreement arises as this process goes on. Hence it seems to me that the first objection is not sustained.

There is, however, a second objection that might be made to my proposition b. According to this objection one would grant that bargaining and agreement were identical but would then insist that Lindblom avoids dilemma because he assumes consensus. On this view it is true enough that Lindblom's concept of bargaining involves a sort of imminent, simultaneous agreement. But there is no comparable disagreement.

I have responded before to this second objection by noting that Lindblom is neither wholly clear nor wholly consistent in his discussion of consensus.135 But a simpler and to me as persuasive a response is simply to note the magnitude of Lindblom's work. What point is there in writing at such length about the coordinating abilities of pluralism if those are just the result of happy circumstance? Why write so much only to reassure us that our muddled decision methods are just fine? If this is all Lindblom means to do then we are almost forced to draw negative conclusions about both his scholarly ambitions

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134Lindblom, "Muddling Through," p. 84.

135See footnote 19.
and his common sense.

Faced with the above prospect I believe it is better, as a general rule, to reject negative conclusions about scholarly work, especially when the work has a reasonable reputation. Having done so I must believe that Lindblom's concept of bargaining is substantive. He wants to say that struggle among partisans can constitute agreement. He is not saying merely that their interaction does so.

4. Central Theme as an Argument in Potential

I have argued at some length, both on an abstract level and in view of his essay, that Lindblom faces a conceptual problem. One aspect of this problem (which seems to me a universal problem) is that none of Lindblom's principal concepts have independent meaning, or the promise of it. They ultimately depend on each other for their meaning. But the other converse aspect of the problem is that nothing meaningful can be said about concepts unless they are distinct from each other. Placing the two aspects together we see that concepts must define each other by their differences, and yet unless the concepts are somehow the same we cannot even recognize these differences.

I believe that Lindblom's central theme reflects, in its strongest form, the first aspect of the above problem. The strongest expression of that theme asserts that bargaining is coordination; hence it dramatically asserts the interdependence of the two concepts. Such a theme appears definitional, however, and hence the argument for the theme appears to be that very theme itself. If we say that all unmarried men are bachelors, and if we assume that the con-
cepts involved here could not change enough to alter this truth merely by social evolution, then the sentence is its own proof. I am saying that Lindblom's strongest statement of his theme is like that.

But if bargaining just is coordination then the concept of bargaining is emptied of any distinct content. In order to keep the theme it seems one must lose the concept. This cannot be allowed to happen, however, or the theme becomes meaningless. Hence one wants to deny the view above that the theme as argument and the theme as assertion are the same theme. In doing so one emphasizes the second aspect of Lindblom's basic conceptual problem.

We see that there is a tension developed between the theme as assertion and the theme as argument. Lindblom needs to both affirm and deny that these two themes are the same. This is why I describe the central theme not as an argument but as an argument in potential.

5. A New Distinction

In the initially strongest statement of his central theme (the quotation in my proposition b) Lindblom does not understand bargaining as a reflection of power inequality. Bargaining seems instead to imply a conflict among equals. For at the point where that statement occurs Lindblom is saying that the public interest automatically arises with bargaining and that this justifies defenders of the public interest in gaining more power. The bargaining-public interest identity is hence the source of power inequality rather than its reflection. My interpretation here seems, at least, the most reasonable interpretation of the
rather muddy passages in Lindblom. By his initial contrast of bargaining with hierarchy we have to assume that he mainly envisions a relationship among equals.

However, given the emptiness of the concept of bargaining or conflict in his initial theme statement, Lindblom needs to make changes. Now I suggest that the development of an argument in potential will always occur by introduction of a new distinction. And I suggest that at this point in Lindblom's argument the distinction advanced is one between levels of power.

The distinction between levels of power seems necessary to strengthen the concept of conflict. It suggests that there might actually be an enduring, nor merely an instantaneous, conflict of values and hence that there might be need for a way to avoid deadlock by making some people more powerful than others. Whereas for the theme itself there is conflict only in name, the introduction of this new distinction now means that there is something more. There is conflict in potential.

6. Cancellation of the Earlier Argument

But the distinction also has another consequence. It means cancellation

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The passages are muddy because one does not know whether the more powerful bargainers—the public officials—created the public interest in the process of bargaining or whether they only reflect a public interest previously arising from bargaining among equals. If they did the former, then their relationship to the public interest is circular (a conclusion to which this writer eventually arrives). But if they only reflect a previously-achieved agreement among equals, then it must be possible to agree on goals before implementing them. Lindblom wants to deny that possibility, however.
of the previous argument—that is to say, cancellation of the central theme itself. It denies that the bargaining from which value agreement comes is a bargaining among at least rough equals.

7. Initial Development of the New Argument

Now Lindblom does not want to say that this inequality is arbitrary or coercive. He is expressly opposing such forms of government, wanting to contrast his position with those of the Soviets, etc. He argues, instead, that the inequality results because certain public officials represent an alliance of a majority of the bargainers.

8. Self-Contradiction of the New Argument in its Initial State

But note the disastrous situation in which this new argument places him if it is now taken as complete. Far from having strengthened the concept of conflict, Lindblom has weakened it—for he has weakened the contrast it needs to make with the consensus assumptions of European economic planners. If value agreement is built on majority alliances then what matter if the values are applied through bargaining or hierarchy? In any case the minority has been shut out. In its present form the argument contradicts its own intent: the intent to allow for that political conflict of which the conflict between minority and majority is the prime example.

9. Preservation of the Earlier Argument

One way to remove this danger would be to reintroduce the initial central
theme which holds that bargaining is agreement. 137 Lindblom seems to do this. He now says that the source of power inequality is not an alliance with a majority, at least not a vocal majority. Instead the alliance is with a general agreement which is itself a reflection of bargaining.

10. Circularity of the Completed Argument

The argument is now complete in that it does not weaken the contrast between the concept of conflict and the majoritarianism, party discipline, and similar emphases of Europe. And it does allow for a conflict which may be real enough to require levels of power.

But the argument achieves this completeness through circularity. Those have more bargaining power whose own views reflect bargained agreement and bargained agreement obviously results from the influence of those with more bargaining power.

I have now completed the first level of argument which I identify in Lindblom's thought. There are two sorts of criticisms which are likely to be raised against what has been presented. One will be a criticism of the dialectical

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137 The passage that most vividly expresses this position is the one quoted so many times before, and especially in connection with proposition "b" (see text p. 203). That this should be so may confuse the reader. For while this writer quotes the passage as evidence of what he calls Lindblom's central theme and makes it the genesis of a dialectic, the passage does not, in fact, appear until after the discussion of power inequality. That is to say, it does not appear until a late stage in the dialectical concept examination. The writer does not believe that this situation presents a problem, however. The identification of bargaining and value agreement is not presented as the conclusion of a syllogism. It is presented as something one just knows; hence, the point at which the observation is first most explicitly made is not critical.
examination I have just given. The other may at least partly accept the validity of that examination but will then conclude from it a severe criticism of what Lindblom himself has done, at least in the essay examined.

The first critics will probably say that I have read too much into the essay examined. If concepts are not clear the clarity should not be forced as I seem to have done, for example, in the process of suggesting that hierarchy and coordination are indistinguishable. If clarity had not been forced then what I identify as inconsistencies might not obviously be so, and, likewise, the pattern of argument might then be different.

I have no conclusive answer to this first criticism. An attempt has been made to document the assertions made, insofar as possible, but I am afraid that it could never be sufficient to remove all doubts. Suppose I hypothesize that a concept or proposition which is clearly present in an author's work generates a certain intellectual inconsistency. A criticism of that hypothesis should be reasonably straightforward. But suppose it is an absence in the work which is said to generate the inconsistency. Suppose, as I do, that it is precisely the lack of clarity in certain concepts that explains Lindblom's thinking. Clearly no pointing to the text will either conclusively verify or conclusively refute the claim.

Nevertheless, I think my assumption is a useful one. I have tried to say why I think so in Chapter II. Chapters III and IV are attempts to illustrate the claim. And in Chapter V I shall state it anew and from another perspective.
But there is no final proof.

To the second criticism, also, there is no final proof. According to that criticism my work constitutes a devastating attack on Lindblom, because it captures him in serious inconsistencies. If inconsistency is our inevitable lot as concept users, however, then it is not appropriate to attack Lindblom on that basis. Whether this situation is thought to prevail depends, finally, on whether one accepts the assumptions I have been using.
CHAPTER IV
AN AFFIRMATIVE VIEW OF COMPREHENSIVENESS
THE PATTERN OF ITS DEFENSE
IN THE WRITINGS OF KARL MANNHEIM

To examine someone's thought as, and by, a dialectical concept examination is to take a different approach to the expository function than is customary. In this case we don't judge the thought by standards of consistency and clarity since we do not expect to find only one set of main points within it. We expect to find opposing sets. Hence exposition is not an attempted reduction of thought to single main points. It is a tracing of the pattern of inner debate among opposing ones.

I have attempted to make a dialectical concept examination of Lindblom's early essay on bargaining. I hope the attempt may persuade the reader that this is a plausible approach to thought, even if an unconventional one. In this chapter I shall make a second attempt, by interpreting the thought of Karl Mannheim in the same way.

A Problem for Mannheim

In perhaps most of what he wrote prior to his emigration from Germany
to England in mid-career, Karl Mannheim argued, in one way or another, that participation within a socio-conceptual structure was the way to become at least somewhat free from the interpretations imposed by one's society. Mannheim's position is a response to what I call the social change problem—the problem how anyone can independently alter his human nature or his understanding if society with its concepts is the source of individuality and understanding.

The social change problem could be presented in terms of that illustration of the contextualist approach to inquiry which I gave in Chapter II. If a certain society is operated according to a liberal model and hence structures its social phenomena by distinctions like political freedom, how is it possible for members of that society to so free themselves from its perspective as to determine whether or not it is a distortion?

The Mannheim Response as an Internalized Debate

I speculate that the social change problem, like the social control problem, may present a dilemma. And if it does, then for Mannheim, as for Lindblom, we can expect a distinctive response. We can expect, firstly, a public choosing of sides and, secondly, an internalization of dilemma within the debaters as they discover that they each need both sides.

Although Mannheim wants to argue the possibility of some freedom from one's conceptual framework, he starts with the assumption that knowledge and society are indeed part of such a framework. And on my suppositions where
he starts is where he must end. Hence I consider him to be taking an affir-
mativ e position on the question of the priority of concepts. Now the priority of
concepts implies the priority of comprehensiveness since there is nothing more
comprehensive than a conceptual framework. Consequently I describe Mann-
heim as on the affirmative side of the debate over that concept.

But despite his own conceptual commitment to a view that society is the
wholeness of a conceptual framework, Mannheim wants to argue that it is
nevertheless possible for a person to achieve some intellectual and social
autonomy. This is how he internalizes the debate over comprehensiveness
within himself. Like Lindblom he wants to argue against the very conception
of society which provides his terms of reference. Lindblom's conception of
society is of something fragmented into competing interest groups and yet he
expects this society to allow for the development of social harmony. Mannheim's
conception of society is of a conceptual integration which he yet expects to
allow for something at least partly unintegrated.

My examination of Mannheim's thought will be relatively brief. Instead
of first presenting an extended exposition, as was done in the "Illustrative
Summary" of Lindblom's position, I shall move almost immediately to the
dialectical concept examination as such. However, I do need to make, first,
a few comments on the totality of Mannheim's work.

Karl Mannheim was a highly prolific but rather unsystematic writer.
Whereas it is initially plausible to speak of summarizing Lindblom's work,
because so much of it seems repetitive, it would not even be initially plausible
to say so of Mannheim's. Mannheim's thought is generally considered to have passed through a series of phases, the most dramatic of which occurred with his move to England.  

If I were to attempt for him something comparable to my summary of Lindblom's work it would have to be titled the "apparent diversity" of Mannheim's position. Nevertheless, my purpose in attempting to summarize Lindblom could equally well be achieved in an attempt to show the differences in Mannheim. If a thinker is on both sides of an issue, and makes opposing points to himself, then works which appear the "same" will not be as repetitious as they seem provided that this inner debate shows some development. Conversely, works which appear different will in fact be less so than they appear since they will contain points contrary to what are considered the main ones. Such differences as still persist may here, too, reflect the development of the inner debate.

Of Mannheim's works I shall focus mainly on his doctoral dissertation written in 1922 and entitled "Structural Analysis of Epistemology." This work is commonly interpreted to be claiming that scientific knowledge has an

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1. Two useful and brief interpretations of these phases are the following: George W. Remmling, "Philosophical Parameters of Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge," The Sociological Quarterly, XII (Autumn, 1971), 531-47; and Helmut R. Wagner, "The Scope of Mannheim's Thinking," review of Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, by Karl Mannheim, in Social Research, XX (April, 1953), 100-09.

absolute base, that it is not merely relative to a historical period. Other writings which were studied, and will be briefly referred to, represent later and supposedly different phases in his thought. Ideology and Utopia (1929) is the fullest expression of his concept of the sociology of knowledge. Here he argues, in apparent contrast to his dissertation, that knowledge is a function of the social situation of the knower. But he also maintains that some situationally determined views are less distortions than are others and, following Marx in this respect, he sees a need to identify false consciousness and eliminate it. With the move to England his emphasis shifted more definitely from questions of epistemology and methods of inquiry toward practical aspects of social change. The first major effort was Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (1935). Disturbed by the rise of totalitarian regimes and believing that it was a response to imbalance between the increasing rationality of private industry and the lack of rationality in politics, he provided one of the first and strongest arguments for public planning in liberal political systems.

In 1950 came the posthumous publication of Freedom, Power and Demo-


The cratic Planning\textsuperscript{5} in which Mannheim developed themes similar to those of the 1935 work and in which he also suggested the importance of religion as a means to achieving the new liberal but planned society. An earlier work, Diagnosis of Our Time (1943), \textsuperscript{6} further developed the importance of religion to the planned society and suggested that there should be planning for religion itself.

These are the principal Mannheim works which I have examined in process of writing this chapter, and the chapter focuses, as was said, on the first. The reader may well be perplexed that I make so little use of the works explicitly on planning, and especially since Mannheim is recognized as an important writer on that topic. The reason for this neglect is threefold.

Firstly, Mannheim's planning writings are, to a large extent, arguing the need for planning in liberal regimes, but that is not my concern. I assume the need. I want to know how to meet it. \textsuperscript{7}

Secondly, when Mannheim does talk about how to plan in a liberal polity he suggests that the success of the process depends heavily on the existence of a "democratic personality"--one which is cooperative and open to change. \textsuperscript{8}


\textsuperscript{7}Dahl takes note of Mannheim's preference not to elaborate answers to these "how to" questions. Robert Dahl, review of Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, by Karl Mannheim, in American Sociological Review, XV (December, 1950), 807-10.

\textsuperscript{8}See Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. pp. 199-236;
But it is another of my assumptions that tensions, inevitable to thinking man, produce limits to cooperation and to openness. Cooperation is limited because the inner tensions are partly projected onto the social world as conflict. Openness is limited because one side of man's nature seeks security and long range commitments. Certainly Mannheim's image of the democratic personality is a reasonable one. It is the image connected with what I call a degree of truth logic. But my own image of an inevitably self-alienated personality is at least plausible. And thus it too seems worth pursuing when the gravity of the current human prospect suggests that we consider all plausible explanations of that prospect.

My third reason for the limited treatment of Mannheim's later works is simply one of time and methodology. My method requires that I start with the earliest statement of a certain train of thought, and because of the length even of this first step the introduction of later ones was not possible. Time considerations also prevented the development of the kind of involved summary which was prepared for Lindblom and that is the only kind of summary considered appropriate for a method which emphasizes the presence of inconsistencies. Having once demonstrated my reasons for believing in the impossibility of concise summary I felt it unnecessary to repeat the process here.

The dialectical concept examination now follows. Its organization is the same as encountered previously. I first try to describe the overall process by

and Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, pp. 199-245.
which Mannheim gives increasing reality to the concept of conceptual freedom.

Then I examine, in depth, the first step.

The Mannheim Position as a Dialectical Concept Examination

Synopsis of the Process. Again we want to trace the steps by which an outer debate between social groups is internalized within the work of an individual thinker and then again we want to see how the debate proceeds within that person's own thought.

Context of the Mannheim Debates -- The outermost or primary debate in which Mannheim is involved might be thought less a debate between political positions than one between epistemological positions. Whether it is so understood, however, depends on one's vision of society and politics, as we shall shortly see. At least until his move to England, Mannheim was involved in a primary debate with the positivists over the methods of knowing. We have already encountered the issue of the debate in Chapter II. The contextualist is able to explain how we can identify objects and construct theories. It is because we have a prior conceptual framework. But he finds it difficult to show us how we can verify the "truth" of what the framework lets us see. The positivist has difficulty explaining how we get our concepts but he does have an answer for the verification problem.

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Mannheim takes the side of the contextualist and so he has a verification problem. But he has another one too. Our conceptual framework is the product of, and also provides the perspective of, our social situation, according to Mannheim. \(^{10}\) Hence a person can only perform those acts and see those problems which the conceptual framework permits. Thus Mannheim faces the problem of conceptual freedom not only epistemologically but socially.

Now the contextualist position and the contextualist problem have affinities to certain kinds of political systems, notably to totalitarian ones where a single ideology is pervasive. Conversely, the positivist position and the positivist problem have affinities to liberalism with its assumption of the existence of discrete relatively autonomous groups. The contextualist, and especially one who applies his views in the social realm, will therefore find himself, in one important respect, on the side of the totalitarians and in opposition to the liberals. This happens to Mannheim. Consequently, I shall focus henceforth on this political debate rather than on the epistemological one, although the latter will continue to be mentioned occasionally.

Within the primary debate between liberals and totalitarians (given that Mannheim is in one sense an unwitting totalitarian) there is a secondary debate among the totalitarians themselves. This is a debate over the extent to which it is possible to have freedom from the conceptual framework or ideology while

\(^{10}\)For a discussion of the way in which a conceptual framework affects practice, see the discussion of the theory-practice distinction, in Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 117-46.
that framework or ideology nevertheless persists. On one side of this debate are the idealogues who insist that a conceptual framework or ideology must be absolute and complete or else it is not effective. In epistemological terminology these people would be called idealists. Mannheim is on the other side. His position is particularly evident in *Ideology and Utopia*. There he attributes to the intellectuals an ability to see beyond the situation in which they first find themselves. The combination of their diverse class and status backgrounds, overlayed by their common educational background, brings them in contact with the opposing perspectives. Some of these individuals will use their heightened awareness to attempt a synthesis of the perspectives. And since Mannheim, like Marx and Hegel, supposes a direction to historical change, he supposes that these syntheses will have resemblances to each other. They will constitute an evolving conceptual framework.  

Mannheim's position seems logically tenuous, however. He insists that the intellectuals do not themselves form a class, that the perspective which the forward looking among them are capable of elaborating is not just one among others but is a synthesis, and that the intellectual syntheses of current perspectives are not as diverse as those perspectives themselves. But why should one accept any of these claims? They seem incompatible with Mann-

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heim's insistence that there is such a thing as a "total" conception of ideology and that this conception is only adequate or "general" when a thinker has the courage to critically examine his own ideology as well as that of others. 14

Mannheim cites Marxism as the example of an ideology which has not become general because it is not self critical. But if Marxism is wrong in supposing that its own viewpoint is free of that partiality which it attributes to all other viewpoints, then why should Mannheim be any less wrong in supposing such ability among the intellectuals? Many Marxists are themselves intellectuals and precisely the sort who attempt a synthesis of previous views. It seems to me that the ability which Mannheim ascribes to such people does not really explain how they can escape from their perspectives but is merely another way of saying that they somehow can.

Relation of the Proximate Outer Debate to the Inner Debate -- When one is on logically shaky grounds the safest proof to give is an indirect proof. One attempts not to prove his own position but to prove the logical impossibility of his opponent's. In this case Mannheim needs to prove that ideological absoluteness is impossible. I think he gives such a proof and that it takes at least two different forms. One is a proof that there is an absolute truth beyond any given conceptual framework. The other is a proof that no specific conceptual framework need be called "relative" since there is no absolute standard by which to measure relativity. At first glance these proofs may seem to lead to

14ibid., p. 77.
opposite conclusions but their impact on the status of conceptual frameworks seems basically the same. In neither case can any one ideology or conceptual framework be called absolute. The first proof is discussed later, at pages 249-51. It is the proof I there describe as being based on self-reference. Suffice it to say here that this first proof apparently shares the same fatal defect as the second.

The second proof appears in *Ideology and Utopia* and has already been sketched. In more detail it goes like this. If we assume that knowledge is situationally determined, this assumption might be called a relativist position. But to call it so reveals that our belief in perspectival knowledge is not thorough going, but is inconsistent, since it combines that approach with the older belief in absolute static knowledge. It assumes that there is an absolute standpoint from which we can discern what is relative and what is not. In a consistent epistemology of Mannheim's sort we must instead speak, he says, of "relational" rather than relative knowledge.\(^\text{15}\)

I grant the cogency of Mannheim's proof that conceptual frameworks cannot be accused of relativism. But the proof is so cogent probably just because it is also so dangerous to Mannheim's own views. By rejecting relativism in one sense he embraces it more completely in another. Given his proof, we now have no standard for identifying distortion of reality other than the historical process itself. Only the dynamic of this process can provide

\(^{15}\text{Ibid., pp. } 78-79.\)
such identification. It is *dynamic* relationism which ". . . offers the only possible way out of a world-situation in which we are presented with a multiplicity of conflicting viewpoints. . .".  

Those can transcend the current perspectives who acknowledge the "flux of life," who recognize that there is the possibility of an "open system" at least for some epochs and some social positions, who maintain a "conceptual elasticity."

Given the self-subverting nature of his indirect proof, Mannheim needs to attempt a direct proof—a proof that there is a conceptual freedom which is more than just another name for the historical process itself. I cannot say, however, as I thought it possible to say for Lindblom, that there is any single systematic direct proof in Mannheim's thought. His concept of dynamic relationism perhaps comes as close to such a proof as does anything else but it is not developed. There are other individual items of direct proof in Mannheim's different works. I will look at a few of them in examining his dissertation.

The Impetus for Theme Development -- If we say that dynamic relationism does somehow constitute a direct proof for the claim that participation in a socio-conceptual structure is a way to conceptual freedom then we have a curious proof. On the one hand it sometimes looks like a proof by definition.

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16 Ibid., p. 98.

17 Ibid., p. 87.

18 Ibid., p. 99.
To think relationally means to be able to have "...assimilated all the crucial motivations and viewpoints, whose internal contradictions account for our present social-political tension. ... If the investigator, instead of at once taking a definite position, will incorporate into his vision each contradictory and conflicting current, his thought will be flexible and dialectical, rather than rigid and dogmatic."\(^{19}\)

On the other hand even such proofs are likely to be offered with hesitation and to suggest that the problem is not solved.

This unavoidable implicit ideology which is at the basis of our actions... marks the horizon within which lies our world of reality and... cannot be disposed of by simply labelling it ideology. At this point we see a glimmer of a 'solution' to our problem even though nowhere else in this book do we attempt to offer one. The exposure of ideological and utopian elements in thought is effective in destroying only those ideas with which we ourselves are not too intimately identified. Thus it may be asked whether under certain circumstances, while we are destroying the validity of certain ideas by means of the ideological analysis, we are not, at the same time, erecting a new construction--whether in the very way we call old beliefs into question is not unconsciously implied the new decision...\(^{20}\)

From passages such as these we are left to conclude that the argument for Mannheim's claim--so far as he tries to give one--is at least sometimes an attempt to affirm identity of contraries. He cannot remain satisfied with that claim, however. Since between the poles of situationally determined knowledge and conceptual freedom he seems to lean toward the former, at least in his German period, the result of identifying the two would be to make

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\(^{19}\)Ibid.

\(^{20}\)Ibid., p. 88.
conceptual freedom a meaningless concept. This is what happens in totalitarian thought where conformity to the prevailing ideology is simply labelled freedom. To avoid this result Mannheim must try to increasingly differentiate the two concepts of freedom and situational determination from each other. Still, the efforts can never be decisive as they will be constrained by the constant need to reassert the identity of the two concepts. For if Mannheim gives real meaning to conceptual freedom and yet does not identify it with the prevailing conceptual framework then he is saying, with the positivists, that there is a neutral ground of something, such as sense experience, which gives us knowledge. He is saying that we can know at least some things without the aid of a conceptual framework.

The Stages of Theme Development -- It is possible to identify several stages in the theme that a socio-conceptual structure is is a way to conceptual freedom. I shall identify just three such stages. They represent attempts to give increasing meaning to the concept of conceptual freedom.

The first stage, or level of argument, is represented by Mannheim's doctoral dissertation--"Structural Analysis of Epistemology." In this work the theme does seem to begin as an identity statement. Mannheim argues that the notion of a truth independent of any given conceptual framework is intrinsic to "systematization." And one meaning of systematization seems to be that it is a system--a closed conceptual framework. Hence a closed conceptual framework is said to be identical to a truth independent of that framework. Now the existence of an independent truth means there is a neutral ground to which
knowers can refer and hence it means that they can be free of their conceptual framework. So in suggesting that a conceptual framework is identical to an independent truth Mannheim is suggesting that it is identical to conceptual freedom. This initial position would make the notion of independent truth a wholly undetermined concept, however. The concept would become, as for the totalitarians, merely a label.

Mannheim thus goes on to say that there can be a "typology" of systematization—there can be certain timeless elements which are true of any one. If Mannheim is correct, these timeless elements would provide an epistemological base of reference—a sort of neutral ground. Individual knowledge would not be captive of a changeable conceptual framework. But he concludes that the probable nature of these timeless elements is their openness to conceptual change. In other words the determinateness of the elements present in any conceptual framework whatever is their indeterminacy! Consequently in his first level of argument Mannheim is able to show only that there is conceptual freedom in potential. 21

I consider Mannheim's position in Ideology and Utopia to be a second level of argument. Here he asserts, as we know, that there exist intellectuals who are in a position to see beyond their own conceptual spectacles though in doing so these people do not reach any absolute position; they participate in

21This writer's elaboration of this first level of argument will be developed shortly.
the "flux of life." 

The emphasis in *Ideology and Utopia* is more on knowledge than action, however, especially when compared with works which follow. The central problem for the forward looking of the intellectuals is to identify those conceptual frameworks which are distortions of present social reality and which serve the dominant classes and the status quo. These are what Mannheim calls "ideologies" in a more restricted sense of that term. In identifying these distortions the intellectuals, in concert with subordinate classes, will help reveal the conceptual framework or "utopia" which is most adequate to the present stage of thinking, and hence to the present social needs. This too is a distortion, though not in this case because it is undesirable but because it is not yet realized.

In *Ideology and Utopia* there is now freedom in reality, and not merely in potential, but it is freedom to know more than to act. This more real freedom is not a freedom in opposition to conceptual structure, however; it is still integral to it. This continued melding of conceptual structure and freedom thus suggests a more expanded contradiction than before.

A third level of argument may possibly be identified in *Man and Society*.

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23 This is because the utopia to be born is apparently fated to be so. "... every age allows to arise (in differently located social groups) those ideas and values in which are contained in condensed form the unrealized and the unfulfilled tendencies which represent the needs of each age" [Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, p. 109].
in an Age of Reconstruction. But here the emphasis is on methods of broad scale social control rather than on the visions which guide it. And because of this emphasis I am not certain that Mannheim is involved any longer with a problem of conceptual freedom (rather than with the kind of atomistic freedom recognized by positivists). One suggestion that he is is his description of the planning approach as a stage of thought.24 The description indicates that he still thinks in terms of conceptually determined thought and action. Evidence to the contrary, however, is present in his notion of middle principles ("principia media"). These are particular groups of general factors operating in a certain historical setting.25 For example, there is the general law that hopes of social advancement may obscure for individuals their real social position.26 In the late capitalist period the classes typical of earlier economic forms, such as the class of small shopkeepers do, in fact, remain anti-proletarian until their hopes of advancement are completely destroyed. Hence this historical period does concretely express a general law in a certain setting.27 To postulate general factors which persist through historical periods is for Mannheim to retreat significantly from his sociology of knowledge, however.

24Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, pp. 147-55. His point here seems a pragmatic one. Thought is an instrument for dealing with the human situation, and at a point in time one sort of thought may be more adequate than another. Thought is not apart from, but is intimately bound to, action, p. 149.

25Ibid., p. 178.

26Ibid., p. 182.

27Ibid., pp. 181-82.
I suspect, on balance, that Mannheim is still inclined to try to identify the contrary concepts of conceptual structure and conceptual freedom. Though principia media are reducible to general principles they are to be dealt with in their concrete setting and within that setting they do prepare us to perceive certain things and not others.\textsuperscript{28} They are conceptual frameworks to that extent.

Furthermore, the discovery of principia media, by reduction of concrete phenomena to their abstract components, is difficult, despite the fact that these abstract components are present. To understand new principia media, we must observe them in process of being born. This involves an experimental approach which synthesizes a willingness to intervene in the interplay of fundamental social forces with the realization that one can only act as a strategist to reinforce possibilities but not to create them.\textsuperscript{29} It seems to be through such a process of experimentation and openness that Mannheim thinks it possible to reconcile social determinism with large scale planned change of society. In \textit{Men and Society} there is an apparent attempt to make conceptual freedom real not only as the freedom in knowing but as freedom in acting.

By the time Mannheim writes \textit{Diagnosis of Our Time} he seems to have clearly ended, though, the train of thought which began with his doctoral

\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 179.

\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 190.
dissertation. Now he emphasizes not the situational determination of thought but the almost reverse problem of planning for religious experience, such experience being understood as a device for social integration.  

It is not, however, the ending of this great train of thought with which my discussion essay is primarily concerned. I am concerned with its all-crucial beginning. The discussion of that beginning now follows.

First Level of Argument. I have identified Mannheim's doctoral dissertation as a first level of argument in what seems to be a dialectical development of his thought. A review of the dissertation is, once more, the first step in developing my position.

The Dissertation -- The "Structural Analysis of Epistemology" is a complex and subtle work. Although its purpose is explicitly stated, some of the key concepts in terms of which this is done appear to be ambivalent ones. I shall attempt a summary, but the summary will itself reveal these ambivalences. It will not, in a sense, be a single summary.

Mannheim begins with the idea of a conceptual "systematization." He claims to reject, at least for the cultural sciences, the abstracting analytical posture which holds that general principles and concepts (in his term, "complex structures") can be understood by breaking them down into simpler com-


31 "Structural Analysis of Epistemology," reprinted as chap. 1 in Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology.
ponents. Explanation is, for him, the contrary process of understanding simpler forms in terms of the more complex. And "systematization" refers to this more complex structure.  

There are three basic types of systematization, among which is the philosophical. And one part of philosophical systematization is epistemology. It is of course the latter with which Mannheim is concerned.  

Now the reader needs no more background than what I have just given to acquire, already, a sense of unease. For against that background the very title of Mannheim's work suggests at least a near contradiction. He claims to analyze the structure of epistemological systematization. In other words, he identifies epistemology as a conceptual structure which is philosophically prior to its components but at the same time he proposes to isolate some components which are particularly fundamental to that structure.  

Disquieting as it may be, this near contradiction in the dissertation title and purpose should not come as a surprise. The danger of contradiction seems inherent in the project Mannheim sets himself. I have suggested that Mannheim's thought was always directed toward a social change problem--the problem how someone enclosed in an evolving socio-conceptual structure could yet exert some independence from that structure. It is just Mannheim's purpose in his earliest published work to assert confidently that this can be done. But he does so at a more abstract level and more indirectly than will be the case.

32 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
later. Here the claim is for existence of truth which is at once independent of systematization and yet intrinsic to it. The accessibility of such independent truth does imply, however, the possibility of that conceptual freedom which Mannheim later argues for directly.

Put another way, the argument for an independent truth connected with systematization is, in my view, one expression of that inner debate which Mannheim is having with himself. It is of course related to that outer position with which he is more immediately identified—the position which asserts the primacy of conceptual structure, vis-a-vis a more positivist approach, whatever the problems such a position may raise for social change.

1. Three Sets of Distinctions Relative to Systematization

In proceeding with his dissertation argument Mannheim devotes most of its first section to several sets of distinctions. For purposes of emphasizing the importance of conceptual structure, these distinctions may perhaps be usefully separated. But, at least in the context of his inner debate, I suggest that the distinctions tend to reduce to each other. And I also suggest that they represent just in themselves a succession of promised solutions to the social change problem—-even though, ostensibly, they are merely preliminaries to such solutions.

One major distinction is between adequate theoretical systematization

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33It will be clear that truth is somehow independent of the systematization. See text pp. 249-53. That this independent truth is also intrinsic to the systematization, it is this writer's particular purpose to show.
and minimal theoretical systematization. Mannheim introduces the latter concept very early in his essay at the time he is making his strongest argument for a contextualist epistemology. That argument asserts that even a reality consisting of nothing but isolated individuals, which are identifiable only by proper names, cannot be identified without a systematizing presupposition. One must assume, of such a reality, that the names themselves constitute a kind of conceptual framework. In the absence of these names there could be nothing stable to identify—and hence there could be nothing but an indefinite variety.

This minimal theoretical systematization, which produces cognition of discrete givens, seems virtually opposite, however, to Mannheim's initial concept of systematization according to which it constitutes the epistemological priority of the complex over the simple. For if one is to explain the simple from the complex, one must know the complex. But minimal theoretical systematization is not knowable as such. If systematization generates the consciousness of external givens, such systematization cannot be brought to consciousness by those external givens. To argue that it could would be to argue in a circle. Of course positivist theory could be brought to consciousness from those givens but that is not the sort of theory Mannheim wants to expound.

I have already noted, however, that Mannheim identifies another sort of

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theoretical systematization. This latter is a pattern of interrelated concepts, not merely a collection of proper names. 36 It is more truly a conceptual structure. But of this pattern, as of the first, one may ask how it is possible to know the pattern when that pattern is a prior condition for the existence of those very concepts by which it would be known.

Mannheim may be reaching for an answer to these problems of theoretical systematization in his implied position that the difference between minimal and adequate theoretical systematization is only one of degree. 37 Perhaps he is tacitly suggesting that because the minimum systematization could generate solid givens which lead to knowable positivist laws, and because the adequate systematization is truly a conceptual structure, and then because minimal systematization and adequate systematization only differ in degree, therefore one can to some extent articulate his or her conceptual structure. If this were so, then the social change problem would be at least partially solved.

A related set of distinctions, and a second promise of solution, are

36 Ibid., p. 20.

37 Ibid. Mannheim is not wholly consistent on this point. He states that the principle which underlies minimal theoretical systematization is in sharp contrast to that which underlies the adequate form. But he persists in using the degree term "minimum" as he says so. He also makes the following observation.

"That the concepts with which we actually have to do in the sphere of theoretical thought are not 'minimal concepts' in this sense, i.e. that they are more than such 'proper names,' hardly needs detailed proof."

Here, again, he speaks of interrelated concepts as being "more than" proper names when it might be more logically consistent to say that they are wholly other than proper names.
constituted, I think, by Mannheim's distinctions among aesthetic, scientific and philosophical systematization. Aesthetic systematization refers to the existence of numerous conceptual structures each of which exists on its own. Acceptance of one aesthetic period does not mean rejection of another. 38

Aesthetic systematization is neither an open process nor a closed step in some progressive movement. By contrast, in scientific systematization a new truth will force rejection either of itself or of the old truth which it replaces. Scientific systematization is an open process in which conceptual structures do change. 39 Philosophical systematization represents a midway process. As with science, the solutions to problems change, but, in contrast to science, the same problems endure. Thus, earlier solutions are not wholly rejected. 40

This second set of distinctions has close ties to the first in that the concept of adequate theoretical systematization is often treated as synonymous with scientific systematization or with philosophical systematization. 41 More

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38Ibid., pp. 20-21.

39Ibid.

40Ibid., p. 21.

41Ibid. For examples see pp. 20-21, 34.

"This fundamental dissimilarity in the guiding principles of these two 'systematizations' (of the theoretical as against the artistic sphere) is also responsible for the difference in the structure of their respective histories. The historical pattern of science can only be adequately represented as a unilinear series of approximations towards the one and only possible form of truth...whereas the history of art shows the most varied works of art existing side by side without contradiction" [pp. 20-21]. [This writer's
important, the impact of the concept of philosophical systematization has affinities with the combined impact of the concepts of adequate and minimum theoretical systematization. In both cases a major distinction is first advanced only to be then weakened and made a matter of degree. For philosophical systematization the result occurs in the following way.

In philosophical systematization solutions may change while problems remain. But Mannheim would probably agree (and certainly would do so in later works), both that statement of a problem strongly limits the range of possible solutions and conversely that problems themselves may at least change appearance. 42 Now the concept of philosophical systematization suggests, at

emphases.]

"Philosophy has in common with science, first of all, the character of being a theoretical pursuit. . ." [p. 34].

42Ibid., pp. 35, 36. There is a clear suggestion that problems may limit solutions where Mannheim says that:

"It is quite striking what stock we always take in the correct formulation of a problem. . ." [p. 35]. He is talking about the need to seek various possible solutions given a correct formulation of the epistemological problem.

And, despite his statements that philosophy and epistemology deal with enduring problems, it seems that there might well be alteration in such problems as they appear to us at different points in time. Though the problems per se may endure, the questions may perhaps change. Mannheim refuses to go far into this issue, however.

"one of the most fascinating logical inquiries would be the examination of the logical structure of problems, and of the difference between problems and questions" [p. 35].

"Because there is no denying that there can be but a single truth, that accordingly for any question in any field only one solution can be correct and that the history of thought is only the road, through error and confusion, to truth, from this indisputable postulate it does not follow that the shape of
first glance, the contradiction that we are constrained by the conceptual structures implicit in changing solutions, and yet that we have a benchmark of truth in persisting problems. But since the absoluteness of the problems and relativity of the solutions apparently only differ from each other in degree, therefore we can at least partly break out of prevailing conceptualizations and there is no contradiction.

A third and possibly the most fundamental set of distinctions in the first part of Mannheim's dissertation is that among systematization, system, and architectonic—in particular among the first two. Both of these first two refer to conceptual structure. Systematization is an "entire set of serially connected mutually defining elements." It is a "constitutive form" which is created by the (in Kantian terms) "transcendental logical subject." Mannheim describes system as a "reflected methodological form" created by the "empirical subject." Apparently there is a continuity between these two subjects, however, since the individual who orders his thought into a system "is really doing no more than push to its logical conclusion a tendency already

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the path must always be the same" [pp. 35-36].
"ultimately the structure of a problem can only be understood from the structure of the entire systematization—and it may well be that the present discussion will incidentally provide a few clues to this topic as well" [p. 35]. [This writer's emphasis.]
Also see p. 37.

43 Ibd., p. 24.
44 Ibd.
prescribed in the very systematization."\textsuperscript{45}

Besides a difference in the subject, these last two concepts differ in that systematization is always open—a still to be completed chain of interdependent concepts—while a system is always closed.

Here again, we see that a distinction is made only to be then bridged. An individual as a logical subject can identify facts of experience because he finds himself already operating within a systematization. The conceptual structure is prior to thought. But this individual can also push tendencies in this systematization to their logical conclusion, thus creating a system. And this suggests that the conceptual structure is an object of thought.

I suggest now that the distinction between, and connection between, systematization and system does not add more helpful information, relative to the social change problem, than what we have already acquired through the prior distinctions. Instead it parallels the information contained in the distinction between minimum and adequate theoretical systematization or the distinction among aesthetic, scientific, and philosophical systematization. My reasons for this assertion are fourfold.

Firstly, it seems that there cannot be aesthetic systematization despite Mannheim's use of that phrase. The aesthetic sphere is neither an open process nor a series of closed steps in such a process. The principle of continuity does not hold, he says for aesthetics. "In primary experience a work

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 25.
of art is taken to be an isolated monad. 46

Secondly, there cannot be a system so far as true science is concerned. Scientific activity may well produce systems but their persistence, as such, is antithetical to science. 47

Thirdly, it is in philosophical systematization that the other two forms of systematization are synthesized. And in that synthesis one finds a similar mix of conceptual closure (in problems) and conceptual openness (in solutions) to that found in the relationship between system and systematization.

Finally, it is just such a mix of closure and openness which is also found in the connection of minimal and adequate theoretical systematization. From now on I therefore shall treat the other two sets of distinctions as reducible to that between system and systematization. And since systematization always seems to mean theoretical systematization for Mannheim, despite his contrary claims, 48 I shall initially use that phrase in referring to systematization, and shall always intend it.

2. Independent Truth Inherent in Theoretical Systematization

At any given time there is not just one theoretical systematization but several, these being associated with the various sciences. 49 Some of these

46 Ibid., p. 20.

47 See text p. 245.

48 A contrary claim is that there exists aesthetic systematization. See text p. 245.

systematizations are "primary" in that they can comprise all elements.

Whatever the status of any systematization, however, the fact that it is one implies that it has a final form according to Mannheim. By saying this, he introduces the critical notion of an independent truth. Mannheim supports his claim of an independent truth with two different lines of defense.

One line of defense is based on self-reference and appears to go like this. Concepts have meaning because they are members of a chain sequence of interrelated concepts. Statements made within the context of such a chain sequence, such a systematization, are either true or false. The statement that there is no truth per se is such a statement. If assertion of this statement is not simply meaningless (because of the contradiction involved) then there must at least be meaningful falsity, and there cannot be the latter without the contrasting possibility of an independent truth. Now since the validity of one proposition implies that of others, then if there must be the possibility of independent truth for one statement we may say that there must be a possible truth, a possible final form, to the systematization as a whole. 50

50Ibid., p. 27.

"Any single statement—even the proposition that there is no truth, no validity in se—can by virtue of the structure of theoretical systematization only be either true or false. It follows that the content of this proposition contradicts those presuppositions that are inescapably implied by its form; after all, this, like any other statement, only has theoretical meaning if its content can be said to be either true or false. If the content expressed—that there is no truth valid in se—is true, then this at least must be thought valid or it would be meaningless to assert it; if it, too, is false, then it still must
An argument by self reference is dangerous for Mannheim, however. It could as well be used to attack as to argue for his views. The proposition that our concepts have meaning by their location in a systematization is itself presumably contained within a systematization and seems therefore to have no independent validity at all.

It is not surprising, then, that Mannheim concedes the insufficiency of his first line of defense. But he concedes only that it does not prove the validity of truth as such.\(^{51}\) And that was not really the point at issue anyway. On the question whether such final truth is implied in systematization he remains firm. He bluntly asserts that the notion of a truth valid in itself is an inevitable postulate involved in the existence of a theoretical sphere as such.\(^{52}\) This sort of statement is not new. Similar ones appeared in connection with the first defense. "It is thus implied in the very structure of the theoretical sphere that it must itself be assumed as atemporally valid. . ."\(^ {53}\)

\(^{51}\)Ibid., p. 28.

\(^{52}\)Ibid.

\(^{53}\)Ibid., p. 27. [This writer's emphasis.]
In his first line of defense Mannheim seems to be saying that statements must be true or false and that since statements only exist in a theoretical context, the context, also, must lead to final truths. All those of his remarks which assert the reality of error—e.g. "... it is a fact that actual thinking is open to error..."—seem, to me, to tacitly assume the absoluteness of the true-false distinction and thus to belong in this first line of defense. Perhaps common sense may tell us that the possibility of error does not necessarily imply the necessity of a final truth. Perhaps it is possible to knowingly recede from error without, at the same time, knowingly approaching truth. But I am unconvinced by common sense arguments for reasons given elsewhere.

And on logical grounds the two situations do seem tightly connected. I conclude, then, that the first line of defense takes the form of a standard syllogism. One simply assumes, as a first premise, a clear division of truth and falsity regarding statements. One then infers that the possibility of truth must be inherent in the theoretical content of these statements, in their systematization. In other words, if truth is possible in a part then it must be possible in that whole without which the part would not exist.

In his second line of defense Mannheim is asserting that it is just in that theoretical statements are mutually defining that they must be true or false. Since they exist in a context, unless that context has a-temporal validity the

54Ibid., p. 27.

statements can have no meaning. Thus this second line of defense appears to be less an argument than a definition. According to Mannheim it is the very nature of a conceptual structure both that it constitutes one's experience and that the structure has a final form which can be knowingly approached and consequently leaves one free to move from one conceptual structure to another.

If my interpretation of Mannheim's second line of defense seems far-fetched it is nevertheless similar to an interpretation which has elsewhere been made of Mannheim's later works. After reviewing a number of those works, Paul Kecskemeti observed that "... the survey of this process of the working out of the categories of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge leads us to a strange conclusion: the demonstration of the dependence of thought on social reality serves to open a road to freedom." 57

3. The Existence of Typologies

Mannheim was an advocate of rather fundamental social change. For such a person to maintain that the conceptual structure is intrinsically an opportunity for freedom is, I suggest, no more surprising than it is for a

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56 This is also the writer's second interpretation of that key passage which he quoted in footnote 50. Even that passage might as plausibly be understood to be part of the second line of defense as to be part of the first. The assertion that any single statement must be true or false "by virtue of the structure of theoretical systematization" seems readily interpretable as identifying independent truth and conceptual structure.

On text pp. 275-77, this writer suggests that Mannheim must adopt his second line of defense rather than his first, given the purpose of his general argument.

liberal to suggest that the process of bargaining, of negotiated social conflict, is itself social order. In any case, the virtual identification of conceptual structure and conceptual freedom does not remain in the forefront of Mannheim's dissertation. In his concern to analyze a systematization, that of epistemology, he retreats to the more positivist view that there are some specific timeless elements involved. We can be confident that this is so, he says, since all epistemologies are called by the same name.  

For the same reason we can be confident that it is a single problem which they all address.

These timeless elements must be interdependent if they are parts of an epistemological systematization. But we don't know in what specific way this interdependence occurs and so we must consider all the logically possible systematizations as equally possible ways of solving the one epistemological problem. Some ways, however, may be more historically advanced than

58 "However much the various epistemologies may differ in their historical development, they all belong to the same continuity of one idea (which is the reason why all are called 'epistemologies,' 'theories of knowledge'). There must accordingly be some concepts at any rate, some perennial problems, some constellations which always recur and thereby make this continuity possible" [Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology," p. 31].

59 "The sole remaining assumption, then, would be that the successive words forming the historical body of 'epistemology' are commensurable up to a point and may be taken to be attempts to solve one and the same theoretical problem. . . . As long as it is not mere chance that the individual theories of knowledge have a common name it ought to be possible. . . to consider their divergencies as the ramifications of a common path they all take at the start" [Ibid., pp. 32-33].

60 Ibid., p. 32.
are others.

Structural analysis is the exploration of these various solutions. It is the analysis of typologies of epistemology. It is not the exploration of the one problem however. The structure of the problem could only be understood from the structure of the entire systematization and that would apparently include the whole succession of solutions--something that is never completed in finite time.

The epistemological solutions are a priori possibilities and must be identified through a pure logic. But not every solution is possible at a given period. History, which is not random but a directed flow, will "materialize" different solutions at different times says Mannheim. This statement is perplexing, however. Does it mean that Mannheim is now making a retreat back to the sort of conceptual relativism which a history bound systematization would imply? Is he abandoning the concept of timeless elements in a systemat-

61 Ibid.  See also text p. 246 in regards to Mannheim’s approach to the epistemological problem as distinct from his approach to its solutions.

62 Ibid., p. 29. There is for Mannheim a pure logic which is not influenced by historical origins--a logic by which one can examine, apparently with neutrality, the enduring concepts of epistemology. But this logic cannot say which epistemology is more correct.

63"...it is perfectly possible to view cultural manifestations historically without plunging into historical relativism. . . . Historical factors determine only the materialization of the mental content in question. . . . The process can still be conceived as a quest, as a necessary, roundabout way to the only correct solution. . . .history is not just a flux, but a directed flow towards some ultimate goal" [Ibid., p. 39].
ization? I doubt it. He first leaves the question open. The task for philosophy 
"... is to work out the solution of the problem of historicity and timeless 
validity." And then he apparently concedes to the critics of historicism. 
He emphatically denies that the ultimate categories by which we grasp things 
could change (though in the same footnote he acknowledges that the cate-
gories we now use and by which we think we grasp things could change). This 
concession ends the first part of his dissertation.

4. The Question of Ultimate Presuppositions

In the second part of his dissertation Mannheim identifies three distinctive 
and timeless features of epistemology. There is a problem (the question of the 
ultimate presuppositions of knowledge), a unique value (truth), and a

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64 Ibid., p. 39.

65 "This latter conception would finally lead to the postulation of a 'dy-
namic' logic according to which not only the matter of history but also the 
categories by which it is grasped are subject to change and evolution. Yet, we believe that such a doctrine is bound to become entangled in diffi-
culties. Owing to the relativism to which it necessarily leads. The ind-
dubitable fact that everything in history is subject to change must not be carried over into the realm of meaning and validity; by doing so, we should unwittingly controvert our own assertions" [Ibid., p. 40, footnote 1].

66 "Epistemology achieves the status of a theory entirely sui generis 
only because it answers a primitive question in a peculiar way not met with 
in any other science. What is common to all theories of knowledge. . . is that they transform the question about the nature of knowledge into a 
question about the presuppositions of knowledge. . ." [Ibid., p. 44].

67 "The value of being-known, the fact of being-true, is specific to the 
epistemological approach, and has come into being together with it" 
[Ibid., p. 69].
specific correlation (the subject-object correlation). But though timeless the features are also indeterminate in themselves, for epistemology cannot provide its own content. The exact problem of presuppositions varies with the epistemological approach. And what the presuppositions are depends on the standard of truth and the exact nature of the subject-object correlation.

The content of the above features of epistemology comes from one of the three primary systematizations--those systematizations which can comprise all elements. They are psychology, logic, and ontology. It can be said that there is a "priority contest" among them. Where it is psychology which provides the content to the timeless features of epistemology, Mannheim seems to see an empiricist epistemology emphasizing the experiential given. The argument for the priority of psychology is that all knowledge arises from experience.

Where the content comes from logic, emphasis is placed on the presuppositions of knowing. By these, Mannheim apparently means reality constituting categories similar to those of the Kantian "transcendental apperception." The argument for this second approach consists in the claim that everything we

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68 "Uniquely specific to the theory of knowledge, as we have come to see, is alone the correlation of subject and object. . ." [Ibid., p. 66].

69 Ibid., pp. 47-48.

70 Ibid., p. 49.

71 Ibid., p. 50.
are aware of appears to us as known. 72

Ontological systematization produces two forms as it provides content for epistemology. It may take a naive form which fails to recognize that what is--being--nevertheless only appears as known being. 73 (This form sees being as consisting in raw givens.) Or it may take the form of an "ex-post ontological" epistemology which does not so fail.

This last form of epistemology is not made wholly clear. But it seems to be a synthesis of the experiential given of psychology with the universal reality--constitutive concepts of logic. Denying priority to either alone, it embraces them both with the argument that both experience and validity must be. 74

This ex-post ontological epistemology is highly suggestive of that "sociology of knowledge" which Mannheim will subsequently develop--that socio-conceptual structure which at once forms our concepts and is, in a sense, formed by them.

According to Mannheim, ex-post ontological epistemology is associated with a special way of stating the epistemological problem--one which does not

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72Mannheim's exact words seem to be a paraphrase of Kant:
"Priority for logic is pleaded on the following counterclaim: granted that everything the sciences can talk about is first encountered at the level of experience, it still is by no means proved that all we can know about this original experience is also given in experiential immediacy" [Ibid.].

73Ibid., pp. 50-51.

74"Priority for ontology, in turn, is urged on the ground that everything to be met with at all is an instance of 'being' in the most general sense. From this point of view, both experience and logical validity also appear as modes of being" [Ibid., p. 50].
go directly to ultimate presuppositions as that approach associated with logical
systematization appears to do. Instead it explores which of all possible postu-
lates (psychological, logical or ontological) will finally be revealed as an essen-
tial assumption. 75 And it reaches the conclusion that it is the ex-post onto-

75Ibid., pp. 49-52. The argument is cloudy but seems to go something like this:

1. There are three approaches to the question which seeks to know presuppositions of knowledge, p. 49.
2. Which approach to the question is chosen will determine in ad-
   vance the nature of the answer--that is, it will determine the underlying sys-
   tematization, p. 49.
3. But, it is apparently the systematization that constitutes the
   approach in the first place since the ultimate presuppositions determine what
   can be asked!

This third step in his reasoning is implicit in Mannheim's dis-

"Priority for psychology is assured according to the psychologistic theory of knowledge. . . " [p. 50].

Sometimes the third step seems explicit:

"This dispute [the priority contest] reveals most clearly the hopeless and
yet unremitting aspirations of all epistemology to do without presuppositions.
The problem of priority simply cannot arise within the various sciences
which may serve as fundamental disciplines. . . " [pp. 49-50].

4. Now, it is precisely one of these approaches--the ex-post ontological systematization or ex-post ontological epistemology--which incorporates the initial question as to which of several possible approaches is ultimately correct.

"So we see there is nothing accidental about the type of epistemology that
starts with logic and ends up with an ontological postulate" [p. 52].

"There can be no doubt but that this type of epistemology. . . would em-
ploy as its fundamental science just this analytic of structure qua logical
doctrine of systematizations, and that it would recognize, as its ultimate
presupposition, the primary systematization laid bare by such an analysis"
[p. 52, footnote 1].
logical epistemology itself which will be so revealed!76

The above proposition is not presented as an argument but it has that impact. And as an argument it is tightly circular and self-referential. An epistemology drawing from a sophisticated view of ontological systematization is led to conclude that just this systematization provides the indispensable postulates for epistemology. And those postulates call for an analysis of epistemology in terms of various primary systematizations, which is precisely what the current discussion, and indeed the entire second part of the dissertation, has been manifesting. According to this view only at the postulated end of history will one of these primary systematizations be revealed as best, but, given that view, one already knows what one it must be.

This apparent circularity in the discussion of epistemological content is interesting. It is suggested that ex-post ontological systematization will win the priority contest, and that this tells us that knowledge is of just that open ended constructive nature which would let us reach this conclusion.

Mannheim concludes this discussion with a somewhat related point. He

76"Ex-post ontological theory of knowledge is unmistakably the outcome of the...indirect approach...[the one that] begins by exploring which one of all the possible postulates will finally stand revealed as an indispensable assumption" [Ibid., pp. 51-52].

Mannheim, himself, seems to acknowledge the circularity apparent here. At the end of his footnote on page 52 (see text footnote 75) he remarks:

"Whether such an epistemology—which would have its own logic as basis—would in fact amount to a meta-critique of all epistemology in general presents an exceedingly knotty problem."
observes that the arguments for all three primary systematizations can be made at the same time, since he has just done so, and concludes that each can reveal the basic fact of the other two, though from its own "alien" perspective.\textsuperscript{77}

One must assume, however, in view of what we have just heard, that this mixing has a certain tendency toward one particular systematization.

5. The Subject-Object Correlation and Truth Value

Is the content of the subject-object correlation also circularly determined? It seems so, but to understand how one must distinguish the ways of mediating between subject and object, on the one hand, from the correlation as such on the other. The former is less fundamental to epistemology, according to Mannheim.\textsuperscript{78}

Mannheim claims that there are, at present, only three recognized ways to mediate between subject and object. These are the copy theory, the theory that the object world is spontaneously evolved from the subject (possibly the Kantian position is in mind), and the theory of pre-ordained harmony between knower and known (perhaps a Hegelian view).\textsuperscript{79}

The ways of crossing the subject-object gap are not, however, really independent of it. They are also ways of identifying that gap in the first place.

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., p. 52.

\textsuperscript{78}"...the various ways of mediating are a less specific and clear-cut criterion of epistemological thinking than the subject-object correlation is" [Ibid., p. 62].

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid.
And they apparently derive, in both their aspects, from the three primary systematizations of psychology, logic, and ontology. Hence the outcome of the priority contest will simultaneously decide both what is the nature of the subject-object gap and how to successfully bridge it. As Mannheim puts it, the essence of epistemological systematization is to resolve the correlations involved in formulating the problem—it is to resolve a self made gap. According to this reasoning I presume that if, for example, one accepts psychology as ultimate systematization—if one accepts the view that knowledge is a matter of experiential givens—then the subject and object will "by definition" be of that sort where only the copy theory could apply.

If the content of the subject-object correlation is understood as the matter of its formulation and of its mediation then we know this matter comes from one of the primary systematizations. And the priority among those systematizations appears to be established, for reasons already given, in a circular manner.

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80 Ibid. That the ways of mediating are also ways of identifying the gap is a point to be elaborated shortly.

This writer's claim that the ways of mediating derive from the primary systematizations might be called an oversimplification. Mannheim recognizes two other variables which influence these ways—the distance between subject and object and whether one starts from the subjective or objective side. But he immediately intimates that these other variables are reducible to the first. For example, a given way of mediating already suggests whether one starts from subject or object—that characteristic consequently becomes definitional.

81 Ibid., p. 61.

82 The reasoning here is analogous to that which Mannheim employs later in arguing that the standard of truth, also, is determined by the presuppositions. See p. 67 of his work.
Hence this content is itself circularly determined, though in an indirect way.

But what of the subject-object correlation itself, as distinct from the ways of bridging the subject-object gap? Mannheim claims that this correlation is unique to epistemology and he displays a triadic structure of knower, known, and to-be-known which apparently is supposed to constitute it. Prior to this claim however, he has argued the point that science cannot find the subject since the subject is always a vehicle of experience, never an object of it. 83 And the way this point is developed strongly suggests that the subject-object correlation is itself circularly determined. In what next follows, I shall try to show how.

For the subject-object correlation, even more clearly than for the ways of mediating it, content comes, says Mannheim, from one of the primary sciences. But this condition creates a problem if it is true that science never reaches the subject. In that case science can provide only an objectified subject appearing in the form, say, of consciousness, truth, or objectivity. 84

There is a solution to this problem in the fact that we can "construct" a subject which is a complement to the objectified subjects. But this solution only raises the further problem that since all these reconstructions are based on objectifications they would appear to be the same, regardless of the fundamental science, the primary systematization, involved.


84 Ibid.
According to Mannheim, the solution to this further problem comes from awareness that some primary sciences can objectify more than can others. The meanings of, say, psychology refer to something less objectifiable than those of logic, and the constructed subject can therefore vary accordingly. 85

Let us consider now the implications of what has been said about constructing the subject. It is held that the subject-object correlation is unique to epistemology but that the substance of its uniqueness comes from another, alien, systematization. It is also held that there is more than one alien systematization which is a primary systematization and from which the correlation in question might come. The latter claim seems an essential one. If there were only one primary systematization from which content could come, we could not meaningfully speak of the systematization as "alien" either to epistemology as a whole or to such a feature as the subject-object correlation.

Regarding this subject-object correlation, we cannot distinguish different alien systematizations, however, unless it is through their different degrees of objectifying--unless some are less successful in objectification than are others. But then it is only as we invoke the most successful of these systematizations that we can identify a subject-object correlation in the first place. 86

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85Ibid., p. 57.

86We are not told which systematization would be capable of the greatest degree of de-subjectification. This writer presumes that it would be the one which is involved in ex-post ontological epistemology. Only for that one does a person objectify not only the subject but the various systematizations through
In that case, the only determinate content which the primary systematization provides is that built into the identity test. This test tells us nothing further however; it only affirms that the subject-object correlation is whatever it is.\(^87\)

The other apparent possibility for establishing the content of the correlation is to find it in the entire range of primary systematizations. That this is a possibility for Mannheim is indicated by his claim that we can always identify by inspection the degree of objectivity present in any meaning.\(^88\) If we can do that then all the primary systematizations must be simultaneously evident to us. To find content under these circumstances, however, is to which the subject is conceived and, thus, objectified.

In any case, the writer anticipates an objection to his claim that only by the most de-subjectifying of systematizations could we identify the subject-object correlation. The objection may be that since every systematization loses the subject, we gain nothing by depending upon the one that does so "most." This objection, however, either supposes that we cannot identify a subject-object correlation at all (because there is no subject) or that we can do so but that the differential to do so is not significantly large as between systematizations. Now the first alternative apparently is not accepted by Mannheim since he, himself, recognizes a subject-object correlation. If the second applies, then we have what the writer calls the second apparent possibility for establishing the subject-object correlation. See the next paragraph in the text.

\(^87\)We can never learn anything about something merely by applying the criterion which identifies that something. Wittgenstein illustrates an analogous point as the situation of someone trying to verify a newspaper article by another copy of the same paper. See text, chap. II, p. 56.

\(^88\)"Meanings always clearly show a greater or lesser degree of objectivity... and it is always possible to ascertain this degree of objectivity by inspecting them" [Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology," p. 57].
determine the correlation precisely by its indeterminacy. If the subject-object correlation incorporates different degrees of objectification in its very identity then clearly it has been internally, circularly determined. Furthermore, the subject-object correlation then becomes, in itself, one more ostensibly solution to the social change problem. Though the primary systematization structures our concept of the subject-object relation, we apparently can escape from any particular conceptual structure. We can do this because the differences in extent of objectification are only matters of degree, and furthermore, can always be identified as such.

For all the preceding reasons I conclude that both the unique question of epistemology and its unique correlation do not seem to gain substantive content from alien systematizations. What they gain, surprisingly, is a reiteration of the very indeterminateness which those systematizations were supposed to end. To complete my exposition I shall now argue that the same situation also characterizes epistemology's unique value— that of truth.

As the subject-object correlation involves two distinct aspects—the correlation itself and the ways of mediating, so does the value of truth—there is both a value of truth as such and there are standards of truth. 89 Now standards of truth are immediately implied in the different ways of connecting subject and object. The standard of truth is different in a copy theory, for example, than in a Kantian one. And furthermore the same systematization which provides

89Ibid., p. 66.
both the standard of truth and the way of connecting subject and object will also answer the unique question of epistemology—the question about presuppositions. The result is the paradox that once we employ certain presuppositions we already know the standard of truth. 90

It is the value of truth, however, which is unique to epistemology and this must always involve, says Mannheim, an alien systematization. 91 Propositions do not really have the value of truth if they are wholly within a single systematization. Epistemology is thus a mixed systematization, and, despite

90"...the truth criteria occurring within an epistemology are closely related to the particular science that supplied the analytic means for the quest after ultimate presuppositions. The locus of the ultimate cognitive presuppositions is also taken to be that of the cognitive value standards. If knowledge is claimed to be experience at bottom, then experience will be the bearer of value and its guarantee; if it is asserted to be ultimately logical, then it is logic that will provide the criterion of truth..."

[Ibid., p. 67].

91Ibid., pp. 69, 71. The writer may appear to be misrepresenting Mannheim, but he is not. One must be clear as to how alien systematizations are involved. To acquire its standard of truth, epistemology borrows from an alien systematization. But the value of truth is unique to epistemology. Alien systematizations are involved in the latter because truth value and epistemology are alien to themselves—they are mixed systematizations. To speak of the value of truth is to absorb the borrowing process, described previously, into a concept. It is only as we recognize the borrowing, the alienation, that there is value.

"Nothing can appear as valuable or normative as long as we remain within the context of psychological, ontological, or logical systematizations. A state of things which merely 'obtains' may become...normative only if we look at it from another, alien systematization...there is a 'relatedness' involved in every valuation" [p. 71].
Mannheim's elsewhere suggestion that there might be other such mixtures, \(^{92}\) it appears to be the only one there is. "Epistemology... alone enables us to place ourselves outside of the various universal systematizations..." \(^{93}\)

Here again we have encountered something unique to epistemology--the value of truth--but here again the determinate content of that something turns out to be its very indeterminacy! To know the content of this value of truth is not to know merely how epistemology lets us be outside the pure systematizations. That epistemology can do so is what we mean by this value. An alien systematization gives us the value of truth and the value of truth consists in the confrontation with an alien systematization. \(^{94}\)

My argument that the three unique features of epistemology are all circularly determined may appear a bold one, but it has some justification in Mannheim's own words.

\(^{92}\)Ibid., pp. 22-23.

\(^{93}\)Ibid., p. 71.

\(^{94}\)In other words the borrowing process yields truth value and truth value consists in the borrowing process.

Mannheim associates what he sees as the intersystematic nature of epistemology with another concept also. He calls it "free choice of reference."

Both the concept of truth value and of free choice of reference appear to solve the social change problem by definition. That epistemology can get outside any one conceptual framework is precisely the point at issue. The free choice of reference also seems a concept which simply begs the question. According to Mannheim, ours is the sort of mind which can get away from the "natural" approach directed entirely at objects. We can think about thinking.

"...the presuppositions of knowledge are always capable of becoming objects of knowledge in their turn" [Ibid., p. 45].
Any theory of knowledge is hard put to it when it comes to the point of proving the ultimate presuppositions to be true values. That is the explanation for the well-known paradox in the Kantian system, whereby Kant grounds the necessity of synthetic a priori judgments in the concept of spontaneity, justifying the latter in turn by means of the a priori. The circularity is anything but accidental... it is the necessary consequence of the paradox involved in any epistemology.⁹⁵

With that parting thought I now turn from the more expository aspect of discussion to the more analytical one.

The Dialectical Pattern -- Mannheim’s dissertation is a far more lengthy and complex work than is Lindblom’s early essay on Bargaining. Yet I believe that the former, as much as the latter, can be fruitfully examined as the first step in a dialectical thought process. It is true that there seem to be numerous logical twists within the inmost structures of the Mannheim work. For example, the various sets of initial distinctions seem to be both affirmed and denied. Yet, on a larger canvas, the Mannheim essay, like that of Lindblom, seems to embody the same general pattern. It is my purpose now to display that pattern.

My identification of a certain inner debate within Lindblom’s thought may be disputable. But there is little dispute about the existence of a correlative debate within the thought of Mannheim. Critics widely agree that throughout his life he struggled with the question how a sociology of knowledge could escape the danger of relativism. And they further agree that this inner debate occurred within the context of an outward position expounding and defending

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⁹⁵Ibid., p. 69.
such a sociology of knowledge. 96

1. Central Concept

The central concept within Mannheim's inner debate is unquestionably that of conceptual freedom. It is the concept of being free not from the abstract laws of a deterministic science but from the constraints of a total conceptual framework. It is a freedom from the concepts which structure one's very reality. 97

In Mannheim's dissertation the concept of conceptual freedom appears indirectly. It appears as independent truth or final conceptual system. But if

96 What this writer calls Mannheim's outer position--his defense of a sociology of knowledge--is too well known to need documentation. That he engaged in a life-long, or at least almost life-long, struggle with relativism is acknowledged by numerous scholars.

"The objections to Mannheim's theory...the ancient argument against scepticism, that of self-contradiction...Mannheim was aware of these difficulties and much of his intellectual effort went into attempts to deal with them, either by denying that his own theory was relativistic...or by arguing that the 'perspectivistic' character of his own theory did not diminish its value" [T. B. Bottomore, "Some Reflections on the Sociology of Knowledge," British Journal of Sociology, VII (March, 1956), 55].

"One of Mannheim's fundamental questions--perhaps the fundamental question--might be formulated thus: how, in the face of the demonstration that the spirit is socially conditioned, can I still do right by its inexhaustibility and unforeseeability? Or perhaps: how can I, nevertheless, save it?" [Kurt H. Wolff, "Introduction: A Reading of Karl Mannheim," in From Karl Mannheim, ed. by Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. xiv.)

97 Mannheim makes clear that a systematization is, indeed, a conceptual framework which structures one's very reality.

"Systematization is constitutive to such an extent that anything 'given'...any 'fact of experience'...must already belong within one of the existing systematizations, in so far as it is theoretically grasped at all. The simplest, most primitive way of 'objectifying' an element is to range
there is independent truth then obviously there is a way to be free of any
particular conceptual framework. We become so by reaching out to that truth.
And if we can know of a final system which does not simply incorporate the
imminent system then we must be somehow free from them both. Otherwise
we could not notice the difference between them.

Both these two variants of the concept of a conceptual freedom are de-
dined, effectually, by negation. Independent truth is truth independent of, i.e.
truth which is not, any of the series, orders, etc. which currently appear to
underlie our theoretical propositions and concepts.\footnote{Ibid., p. 26.} The final form of any
systematization is that which we do not possess and never will.\footnote{Ibid.} That the
form exists we can affirm, but what the form is we can know only as the nega-
tion of any system which we now have.

2. Other First Order Major Concepts

The two other major concepts seem to be those of theoretical systematiza-
tion and of system. Although numerous other major concepts are presented

\footnote{Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology," pp. 24-25].

Mannheim also insists, of course, that there is an ultimate form of any
systematization which is distinct from the current one. By contrast with the
possibility of this ultimate form, the current one may perhaps be recognized
as partly erroneous.
they seem reducible to these two. Aesthetic systematization is an impossibility, as defined, and philosophical systematization is largely equated to theoretical systematization when the latter concept is used in its broadest sense. Minimum theoretical systematization is different only in degree from the adequate variety; it is not qualitatively different. Once again I therefore find, as I did with Lindblom, that there are two major concepts other than the central concept.

I also conclude, once again, that these two major concepts are very close to each other. (From now on I shall refer to systematization without the qualifying adjective, "theoretical"). Systematization is an open, evolving, reality-constituting chain of interdependent concepts. Although there is a final form to this evolutionary process it will never be reached. Any systematization always contains erroneous and tentative elements. System, by contrast, is a closed chain and is how the final form of systematization would appear if it was reached. There may also be intermediate systems when an individual, at a certain time, pushes to its logical conclusion the tendency already present in the systematization. It first appears, then, that system and systematization are distinctly different, even contrary, concepts. But they do not seem so once the status of historically intermediate systems is taken into account.

At the very beginning of his dissertation Mannheim makes a fundamental distinction between the discrete, on the one hand, and the all-embracing or

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100 See text pp. 242-49.
continuous, on the other.\textsuperscript{101} He asserts that the discrete concept or proposition can only be understood in terms of a continuum of concepts and propositions.\textsuperscript{102} Now we don't have to consciously understand, say, a concept in order to use it, and usually we are not aware of this continuum from which comes our understanding. But we do become aware, says Mannheim, when doubt about the concept arises. And he implies that such doubt must arise since the continuum of concepts changes and evolves.\textsuperscript{103} Therefore we must become aware of our intermediate partially erroneous conceptual frameworks. Just this necessity creates a problem, however, if system is distinguished from systematization. The problem is that that of which we can be conscious, an individual conceptual system, does not display error in itself while that which does display such error, the continuum of systems (or systematization), is not something of which we can be conscious. I shall explain.

A system is a conceptual continuum because it is circular but the continuity of systematization results from its infinitude.\textsuperscript{104} The latter is continuous as an open process, not as a closed stage in time. A concept cannot be brought


\textsuperscript{102}Ibid., pp. 16, 20.

\"... primacy among logical forms belongs to systematization. The simpler forms can be understood... only in terms of this 'highest'... form\" [p. 16].

Adequate theoretical systematization comprises:
\"... a continuum of closely interrelated elements\" [p. 20].

\textsuperscript{103}Ibid., pp. 18, 39.

\textsuperscript{104}See text p. 248.
to conscious understanding, however, if understanding depends on a grasp of the continuum and the continuum is never complete in time.

On the other hand, if there are intermediate conceptual systems which are complete in time then it would be possible to consciously understand our concepts. But we could not move from one system to another with any recognition that we had done so. For the move from system to system would take place within the infinite continuum, not a closed one. Thus to claim that there was more than one closed system and that one was superior to another would be a metaphysical claim in the Kantian sense. It would be a claim for which an equally convincing case could be made on either side.

It seems then that the distinction between a circular continuum and an infinite continuum removes any opportunity for a meaningfully critical stance toward concepts.

Given the situation I have described, it is not surprising that Mannheim often seems to conflate the aforementioned distinction. At one point he speaks of closed circles in connection with systematization although these are supposed to be distinctive of systems instead.

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106 In the theoretical sphere, one has to presuppose a closed chain of continuously connected propositions" [Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology," p. 20].

The context of this quote is an early discussion of systematization before this concept has been explicitly distinguished from that of system.
At another point he speaks of system as a matter of identifying a "tendency" prescribed in a systematization and developing that tendency. 107 But this seems to make system simply an integral part of systematization, not a discrete monad which happens to be located within it.

The very proposition that consciousness of conceptual structure arises with doubt is still further evidence that the distinction is conflated since with systematization there could be no consciousness and with system no constructive doubt.

Finally, one might consider Mannheim's assertion that history is a directed flow toward an unreachable end. 108 He is saying that history is a system because it is directed toward an end, and is thus a closed circle. But history is also systematization because the end is unreachable and the continuum is thus "closed" only by infinity.


If it be assumed that Mannheim begins with the conceptual situation I have described, then a case can be made that he attempts an identity of opposites:

a. He explicitly defines final system (in other words, independent truth)
as the negation of any conceptual system which men have yet developed.

Independent truth is the opposite of system.

b. He then virtually identifies this final system with systematization.

Independent truth is identical to systematization.

...we have to take it for granted that an ultimate, true and complete form of any systematization exists objectively, independently of our own contributions. This is...to be interpreted...as a stringent logical postulate implied...in every theoretical construct. 109

"It is thus implied in the very structure of the theoretical sphere that it must itself be assumed as a-temporally valid..." 110 "...that truth is valid in itself...[is] an inevitable postulate involved in the existence of a theoretical sphere as such." 111

c. But he has also virtually identified system and systematization, as I have tried to show in the preceding subsection. If he had not done so he apparently could not explain the existence of conceptual criticism.

System and systematization are identical to each other.

If this is a correct reading of Mannheim then he is indeed trying to say that conceptual freedom is conceptual structure. He is making a claim much like that which Kecskemeti finds so strange in later works, 112 though I suggest

109 Ibid., pp. 26-27. [This writer's emphasis.]

110 Ibid., p. 27. [This writer's emphasis.]

111 Ibid., p. 28. [This writer's emphasis.]

112 See footnote 57.
that this early expression of it is even more flatly contradictory than that of which Kecskemeti takes note.

4. Central Theme as Argument in Potential

Mannheim's central theme is at least the claim that the dominance of a conceptual framework over one's thought and action can lead to conceptual freedom. I have suggested that in its original form this theme makes the even stronger claim that conceptual structure is identical to conceptual freedom. If that is true then the theme would include an inner tension, and it does indeed seem to do so.

The final truth which is implied in the very structure, the very existence, of the theoretical sphere is never attained. Therefore it cannot be understood as the goal at the end of a chronological sequence, despite Mannheim's claim to the contrary. 113 For we cannot know that the sequence is progressive. And therefore, also, this final truth cannot be understood as neutral ground outside one's conceptual situation. It must instead be seen as something which, by definition, is imminent in systematization as a process. But to understand final truth (and hence conceptual freedom) in this latter sense is to empty it of distinct content.

Thus, in order to assert the theme that conceptual freedom is systematization one must lose the concept of such freedom. Here again a tension seems

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113 For the contrary claim see Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology," p. 39. See also this writer's footnote 41.

It is true that Mannheim does not argue, on page 39, that the final truth can be such a goal. He simply asserts it.
to develop between the theme as assertion and the theme as argument. One would like to say that the relationship between conceptual freedom and systematization is as close as identity and that the theme as assertion and the theme as argument are consequently the same theme. But one also wants to give some distinct meaning to the concept of conceptual freedom and to do so the two themes must be different. So again one must describe the central theme not as an argument but as an argument in potential.

5. A New Distinction

I suggest that it is in the attempt to add substance to the concept of conceptual freedom, that Mannheim introduces what otherwise seems such a curious purpose. I refer to his attempt to give a structural analysis of epistemological systematization—to give an analysis of something beyond analysis.

This curious purpose is capsulized in the distinction between historical and typological aspects of epistemological systematization. According to Mannheim one can find some single elements in any epistemology which are the same for all periods. There are, furthermore, logical patterns, typologies, composed of these elements, although which pattern is correct could be known

114"Every individual work in its actual historical form, e.g. any particular epistemology, contains elements which can be explained only with reference to the individual personality of the philosopher concerned, and others which can be interpreted only in terms of the structure of the mentality of the age in question. Now the more completely we succeed in identifying those features of the epistemological systems which stem from the nature of the problem, from the persistent, timeless task itself, the easier it will be to distinguish those features which, if present, have to be explained differently" [Ibid., pp. 36-37].
only at the end of history.

The notion of typologies of systematization appears to strengthen the concept of conceptual freedom. It suggests that the comprehensive final truth inherent in systematization, but itself unreachable, must be somehow connected with the separate elements which persist throughout the systematization, and thus are reachable. If this is so, conceptual freedom is no longer an empty concept. It has at least potential substance. One could become free of one's conceptual structure by reaching the absoluteness of final systematization, and the persisting truths in any systematization give promise that there is a way to get there.

6. Cancellation of the Earlier Argument

Without modification, however, this new distinction would cancel the central theme. Mannheim wants to say that the elements which persist are nevertheless part of a systematization which by definition is basically open and, in this sense, all-embracing. But if these persisting elements are fundamental to the systematization then it is not basically open and all-embracing. If one persisting element is the presupposition that empirical experience is the source of all knowledge then systematization is basically "psychological," in Mannheim's terms. And this must be true for all time. Similarly, if one persisting element is the standard of truth as correspondence with the empirical given then again systematization is psychological.

If, on the other hand, the persisting elements are not fundamental to systematization then they can give no promise of a final systematization, an
7. Initial Development of the New Argument

Mannheim's response to the above problem seems to consist in the tacit suggestion that while the openness of systematization may be unsettled by the concept of a typology this is not a serious consequence. It is not serious because enduring concepts do not exist apart from epistemological systematization. Instead they are integral to it. Hence they do not eliminate conceptual openness; they structure it.

A typology of epistemology does commit us to a course even though it does not exactly determine the path. It provides the a priori quasi axiomatic structure of conceptual correlations.

... how far is it possible to deduce from the structure of epistemological systematization both the uniformity of epistemological thinking and the principle of differentiation which makes for the sundry individual systems?

... On the evidence available so far we can already state: the uniformity is guaranteed by the correlations that are posited with quasi-axiomatic necessity. The logical structure of epistemological systematization--which commits us to a certain course but does not exactly determine the path to be followed--must be recognized as the pivot of any typology.

These points seem consistent with Mannheim's earlier claim that history is a directed flow. Apparently the logic of epistemological systematization is an instrument of that flow.

115Ibid., p. 39. The creations of the mind are grounded in timeless rules but these rules constitute a directed flow. A-temporal elements are thus an inherent part of evolutionary openness.

116Ibid., pp. 64-65.
8. Self-Contradiction of the New Argument

The foregoing argument has a devastating impact, however, on the concept of conceptual freedom. If the concept before had some substantive potential or, at most, was empty, it is now worse than empty. Not only is the claim made for an embracing conceptual framework but it is now said that this framework is determined, at least in its basic nature. Hence conceptual freedom is not merely an empty concept; it is one which is positively absent.

This particular stage which I have identified in Mannheim's thought seems to me an especially significant one. In its structure I think it explains the reactive nature of much of Mannheim's work. And looking back to my Chapter III I think this stage also explains the similarly reactive nature of the thought of Lindblom. Neither Lindblom nor Mannheim can be satisfied to rest at this stage of their respective arguments. Lindblom doesn't want his politics of bargaining to be identified with a politics of majority choice.¹¹¹ And Mannheim is not satisfied with the "freedom" in historical destiny. Yet, paradoxically, they both seem to need these positions in order to identify their own.

Lindblom is engaged in an outer debate with the totalitarians on their own home ground--the advantages of planning. And he tries to defend a classic minority rights liberalism on precisely that ground. But Lindblom also has a more inward debate with his fellow liberals in the more socialistic planning-oriented countries. His critical problem is how to distinguish himself from

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¹¹¹See text, chap. III, p. 217.
these people so that he need not abandon his outer position. His problem is how to retain the classic minority rights liberalism in this situation. Hence the European economic planners, especially Jan Tinbergen, become the goad to development of his thought, and he begins most of his work as a more or less direct reaction to theirs.

Lindblom says that he attacks the Tinbergen type model because it is so common a fallacy. I suggest that the more important reason he does so is to define his own method of incrementatalism by contrast. He needs this other model to show how his own is different in the face of his apparent assumptions of political consensus which would make it the same. In Lindblom’s model of decision-making there must be real conflict, and by juxtaposing his model with Tinbergen’s he hopes to make evident the reality of conflict without abandoning his theme that bargaining (as conflict) can coordinate. 118

I think it not too fanciful to say that Mannheim’s thought is also fundamentally reactive—first to ideology generally, later to its specific expression in Hitler’s totalitarianism.

118The most direct evidence of Lindblom’s need for the Tinbergen model is his way of defining bargaining. This most critical concept in his work is never given a clear positive definition. In the essay on bargaining, it is defined by contrast with hierarchy and thus obviously requires the Tinbergen model. In the much later book on the Intelligence of Democracy, Lindblom’s argument focuses on the broader concept of “partisan mutual adjustment,” but this concept is so broad as to include deference at one extreme and unconditional manipulation at the other. Since a concept this broad would seem to be amenable to European planners, Lindblom must refer to their thinking if he is to show that it is not. And, he implicitly does so in Pt. 5 of his book.

See text, chap. III, pp. 171-74, 192.
Mannheim is engaged in an outer debate with the liberals on their home ground—the virtues of personal freedom. He tries to defend conceptual structure on that ground but he is also engaged in a more inward debate with totalitarians. He is urgently concerned to distinguish himself from the latter so that he, too, need not abandon his outer position—that he need not accept the view that prior conceptual structure determines all thought.

I suggest that as Lindblom needs Tinbergen for a contrast model so Mannheim needs something like Hitler’s totalitarianism. It is not just that Mannheim is so disapproving of the Hitler phenomenon that he so often reacts to it. He needs something like it to show how different his own position is in the light of his claim that conceptual freedom is integral to systematization and, apparently, to the historical process. In his model there must be real freedom, and by contrasting his position with that of Hitler he apparently hopes to show this without abandoning his basic theme. 119

119 The best evidence that Mannheim actually needs something like Hitler’s totalitarianism, as a contrast model, is Mannheim’s way of defining conceptual freedom. He defines it by negation. In his dissertation, conceptual freedom is described as that truth which is independent of any present system, and so he must at least intimate the existence of defects in any present conceptual system. In Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia, he identifies certain “intellectuals” who can take a relatively uncommitted view. Hence, he must contrast these people with others who only claim to take such a view. He must show that some people can be the conceptual leaders without at the same time being, say, fascist ideologues and propagandists.

See text pp. 270-71.

There are two qualifications to these points: Firstly, Mannheim does not place himself in explicit written opposition to fascism until he moves to England. But prior to that he was attacking the conceptual constraints of then-current liberal ideology. Consequently he was, even then, concerned with the constraints
For both Lindblom and Mannheim it therefore seems necessary to continually reintroduce a threatening contrast model. But then because the model is so threatening it is always necessary to move away from it—showing in Lindblom’s case that bargaining is not just a name for democratic consensus and in Mannheim’s that freedom is not just a name for historical-conceptual destiny.

9. Preservation of the Earlier Argument

One way to help prevent weakening the concept of conceptual freedom is to say that while there is a typology of epistemology it is indeterminate. Mannheim says just this and he says it both directly and indirectly. The direct statement is that the enduring elements—the question, the value, the correlation—do not have content in themselves but derive it from one of the primary systematizations. The indirect statement consists in frequent use of the word "typology" with the indefinite article rather than the definite.\footnote{Mannheim acknowledges that any historical typology is likely to be incorrect. "This essay of mine is an attempt to do justice to the historical process on the basis of static logic; such an effort must...culminate in a typology. Even though a structural analysis should turn out differently if it were carried out...at another age, it is true for this, as for all theoretical works, that one solution alone can be the right one" [Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology," p. 40, footnote 1]. Also see, in the previously cited work, pp. 36, 58.}
To leave the typology indeterminate is not satisfactory, however, since it is to have timeless concepts which are empty. If this result were accepted, it would return the argument to steps 3 and 4 and to the initial contradiction which those steps seem to represent.

The typology is not left indeterminate. It is made determinate, in effect, by reintroducing the initial central theme that conceptual freedom is systematization. The typology—that which represents timeless concepts—becomes determinate through the open-ended evolutionary process which is systematization itself. 121

10. Circularity of the Completed Argument

This process of determination clearly involves circular argument, however. Consider one timeless, a-priori, element—the question unique to epistemology. This question is that of the ultimate presuppositions of knowledge. But the answer to the question, says Mannheim, will be found to be the ex-post ontological approach. And that approach repeats the question. 122

Again, consider that timeless element of "truth value" which provides a benchmark in systematization. This value must come from an alien systematization. It must come, that is, from a mixing of systematizations. But this

121 See the quotation in footnote 120. Apparently later typologies are more accurate than earlier ones and for that reason more determinate. At least we would expect them to be more determinate in those circumstances. Existing typologies are indeterminate precisely because the priority contest among basic systematizations has not yet been settled.

122 See text pp. 258-60.
mixing is simply the reaffirmation that one can put oneself outside a systematization. We want to know what that value is which comes from an alien systematization but the answer seems to be merely a reiteration that it does come from outside—that it involves mixture. 123

123See text pp. 266-68.
I have laboriously examined the arguments of Lindblom and Mannheim over comprehensiveness, and have done so on the ground that these arguments are in themselves elaborations of that concept. What is the use of this involved intellectual effort?

The use of a concept examination depends on one’s viewpoint. The empiricist wants to ostensively and unambiguously define objects and events so he can look for correlations. But one cannot unambiguously define concepts by pointing.

Many contextualists believe they can reveal the conceptual framework implied by our present day concepts and can show us how to see the world differently and better. But people may disagree both on what the world looks like now and on what would represent a better view.

Other contextualists, a minority at present, believe that the use of a concept examination is to reveal the deep contradictions inherent in any conceptual framework and to help us endure them. I have adopted this third purpose. In previous chapters I sought to identify the contradictions in the abstract
concept of comprehensiveness. In this chapter I look for the same contradic-
tions in planning practice.

Abstraction—Both the Essence and the Dilemma of Planning

The practical implications for public planning, which I draw from my concept examination, are radical ones. They are radical in the classic sense that they go to the roots of a problem. In this case they go to deep roots—the conventional rationalism of Western thinking.

The Centrality of Abstraction. In the West we place a high (one might say the supreme) value on abstractions and on the formal logical relationships among them. With few exceptions we reserve our highest honor, the esteem of history, for those through whose mental capacity and/or effort we gain new and vivid expressions of the most abstract thought. We assume, furthermore, that the reality around us has a structure analogous to such thought.

These values and assumptions of rationalism have their esoteric forms as in our normal view of science, the view of it as a relatively straightforward process of abstraction from certain obvious facts. And toward these esoteric forms there is much criticism. In its more mundane guise, however, we almost always take our rationalism for granted. Science may not be a simple matter of abstraction but we expect the one who says so to say it in an abstract way, his book being organized by general headings and subheadings. And we ask the reader of this book to abstract and summarize the "main points." Our conventional measure of a good student is his ability to do this and his ability
to then rethink, by logically recombining, a number of main points drawn from
different books and from personal experience.

In its mundane form our Western rationalism is not opposed to what
philosophy often calls empiricism or realism. It is not opposed, that is, to a
belief in real objects which are independent of our thinking. We assume, for
example, that the sequence of words in that book on science is relatively un-
ambivalent in meaning, at least on an elementary level, and can be summarized.
We make similar assumptions about our personal experiences. How we can get
from shapes on a page to a meaningful sense is perplexing, if we think about it,
but usually we don't think about it.

Wholeness (Planning) as a Product of Abstraction. As it does for other
things, mundane rationalism provides our most deeply believed, most common
sense interpretation of planning and of the concept of comprehensiveness which
is central to it. Comprehensiveness or wholeness is not a conceptual problem
on that interpretation. We know very well what wholeness is. There are two
sorts: the concrete, or individual, and the abstract. Material objects, in-
cluding human beings, are concrete wholes. They are individuals. All other
wholes represent abstractions, of varying levels, from these objects and from
the relationships among them.

For mundane rationalism there is no intellectual difficulty in taking a
wholistic view, no difficulty in "seeing the big picture." All higher levels of
government do so and they do so all the time. One simply raises one's level of
abstraction to an appropriate point. Of course higher level abstractions may
give a distorted view of social reality (i.e. of the relationships among human
beings), but that is the price of social order, so it is argued. And, furthermore, constitutional protections and an improving social science are looked to
with confidence for some mitigation of the distortion.

This common sense approach to reason is manifest in most of the theory
and practice of urban physical planning. Speaking for an orthodox and long held
view, T. J. Kent emphasizes that the urban plan is a general plan, and he sees
no serious theoretical difficulty in connecting the abstractions of this plan with
the concrete city. The urban plan is only one level of abstraction however
and there may be numerous others. Some plans would represent subordinate
levels--the plan of a geographic portion of the city such as a neighborhood, or
of a functional element such as the transportation system. These plans would
deal more closely with concrete wholes. Some plans would represent superior
levels--a metropolitan area, a river basin, or a state--and would be more
distant from the concrete.

The view that one can achieve wholeness through appropriate levels of
abstraction has its advocates not only among planners themselves but among
the sociologists and political scientists from which they often draw their
theoretical insights. Max Weber's classic model of bureaucracy with its

1T. J. Kent, Jr., The Urban General Plan (San Francisco, California: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964).
hierarchy of roles is an important source. In recent times, Amitai Etzioni's strategy of "mixed scanning" has been influential. It is not clear to what extent Etzioni acknowledges any concrete wholes, but he does articulate the belief that general overviews of a situation are possible and can be integrated with more detailed studies of particular aspects.

The common sense view of planning seems to be fundamentally correct. The wholeness of social entities is clearly an abstraction. Hence abstraction could be called the essence of planning.

**Self-Alienation Inherent in Abstraction.** The fact that planning is essentially a matter of abstractions does not necessarily mean, however, that this planning is free of conceptual problems. It might be precisely the presence of abstractions that would produce such problems. In what follows I argue that the process of abstraction alienates the thinking person from himself.

1. According to contextualist epistemology there is no sharp distinction between the concrete and the abstract, and I assume such epistemology. A person is not a Cartesian combination of thinking soul inexplicably aware of material body, but is something more complex.

Both the critics of rationalism and most of the sophisticated rationalists agree with this view. They agree that the belief in the immediacy of concrete

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objects is a mistaken one. Concepts are not formed by observing a number of objects and abstracting from their differences so as to retain only what the objects have in common. For there are no objects except as the products of abstraction. Ernst Cassirer suggests a description for this simultaneously abstracting and objectifying process. It is a spark which jumps somehow across an intensely focused experience such as that of a storm. In that subjective excitement the experience becomes objectified as a personal god. The appearance of what we call abstract concepts is merely a later and less important transformation of these personal gods.

2. According to that form of contextualism which I call a degree of truth logic, this something more complex than Cartesianism involves a concurrent evolution of "abstract thought" and "concrete reality" toward each other. Thus personal selfhood appears to be developmental and, in that case, no one would ever be fully self-conscious.

3. But according to a degree of reality logic, abstract thought and concrete reality are already identical. Hence every person is a unity of thought and reality and is fully conscious. I adopt this second view.


4. If a person is not thought to be divided between body and soul, he must be thought to be divided within the soul itself, so to speak. For to be self conscious is to employ abstract thought to divide oneself into subject and object. Having acknowledged this so fundamental point some philosophers, like Comte, take the heroic step of denying self consciousness. But others, like Hegel, affirm the subject-object relationship and accept, at least temporarily, the self-alienation to which it leads. I shall do so as well. I shall postulate that human alienation is inherent in abstraction and in the objectification which abstraction expresses.

For help in making my point clear I suggest that we distinguish between existential and pathological alienation. Existential alienation is unavoidable for thinking man, but it should not be confused with such often pathological alienation as personal maladjustment, the alienation of a worker from his product, or the alienation of citizens from government.

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8In identifying a form of existential alienation, this writer is particularly objecting to the Marxist position on that point. The position is concisely summarized by Bernstein:

"Alienation does not result from the fact that man objectifies himself, produces objects--this is man's distinctive character. Alienation results
Reflection on our personal and cultural experience tends to confirm that there is a form of self-alienation which is intrinsic to thought and is unavoidable. As an illustration from personal experience consider such a commonplace phenomenon as the freshness of travel to new places. The first encounter with a new environment is wholistic—a total impression of sights, sound, activities. It is also disorienting, however. One's normal instinct is to search out this environment in order to achieve orientation and thereby capture and hold the total experience. But this instinct is self-defeating. Orientation is achieved by abstraction and by abstraction the full experience is lost. In time it will be possible to travel through the environment with reference to only a few visual clues. The travel will now take place over an abstract route in the mind. In reaction to this result there will thence appear the instinct, once again to find, and this time successfully to capture, a newer fresher experience. But once again, and ever after, the instinct will defeat itself.

Our cultural experience, also, suggests that the phenomenon of self-alienation is a durable one. In support of this view there is, first of all, the fact that mystic and rational philosophies provide the major division of world culture and that for the former the self-alienating nature of thought is the

when he produces in such a way (conditioned by the political economy in which he finds himself) that his products are at once an expression of his labor-power and at the same time are not a true expression of his potentialities. . ." [Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 44. Also see pp. 45-49].

This writer wants to assert, in contrast, that alienation does result from objectification.
central point. But, additionally, the great themes of religion and art cross the cultural divide and seem to reaffirm this point. There is the theme of return to wholeness after a life of self struggle, whether this be the wholeness of an "empty" Nirvana, the plenum of a Mohammedan paradise or some mid position as in the Christian Heaven. And there is the corollary theme of self-alienation and return within life itself. This is not only a major substantive theme in the arts. It often seems to be, indeed, the very principle of artistic construction. The development of great themes in tension with each other and then the affirmation of such tension as itself a form of resolution--this may be an apt description of much artistic design and particularly the design of its non-verbal forms such as music and sculpture.

5. If abstraction is the essence of planning and if self-alienation is inherent in abstraction then there is a dilemma. We want to plan our individual and social lives but we can do so only at the cost of self-alienation. If there is such a dilemma then it must be the fundamental dilemma of planning as it must

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9Mystic philosophies, and those associated with them, seek to deny or reject objectivity as they affirm its self-alienating character. The writer accepts their analysis of objectivity while rejecting their practical conclusions. He wants to ask how one can live with objectivity, assuming that it is, indeed, self-alienating.

In any case, there is probably as large and respectable a literature asserting the alienating character of thought as there is a literature denying it. For samples of the former, see: the Bhagavad Gita, one of the three canonical books of Hinduism; writings of Zen Buddhism, in particular those by D. T. Suzuki; I and Thou by Martin Buber; Romantic poetry, such as that of William Wordsworth; Theodore Roszak's The Making of a Counter Culture; and the writings of such existentialists as Jean Paul Sartre.
be, also, the fundamental dilemma of Western culture.

Self-Alienation Intrinsic to Human Beings. Should we try to avoid human alienation and hence much of Western culture with it? The answer is not obvious. It depends on how we understand the condition. If alienation is the total severance of a person from that person's self then perhaps the answer is "yes." But perhaps a degree of self-alienation is the condition for achieving human personality, and perhaps a degree of social alienation is a condition for human community. I shall give some arguments, both from theory and from expediency, in support of this view.

Arguments from Theory -- Consider, first, the concept of human physical health. We call a person physically well not because he is free of disease but because the disease processes are in a state of subtle controlled tension; his own physiological defense mechanisms are in a continuous moderated struggle with the germs always present in his environment. If the struggle ceased, because the defense processes had decisively overwhelmed the external threat, this would be as deadly to the organism as it would be if the struggle greatly intensified.

Moving away from the physiological toward the personality structure itself, and beyond that to its social base, we may perhaps draw the same conclusion. The person is characterized both by an enduring sense of self and by a series of specific personality traits which may alter while self identity remains. These two characteristics seem to be in tension, however. To develop his personality, and hence his characteristic traits, a person must
assert his traits against what is outside him. Unless he does so he cannot
develop a conscious identity. In other words, without conflict, and in that
sense an atomistic voluntaristic relationship to other people, a person cannot
be conscious of himself as a unique being. The infant apparently begins to
achieve self-hood just when he sees himself in confrontation with his parents,
when he no longer sees them as extensions of his own being.

Is this conflictual element in the production of human personality perhaps
subordinate to a harmonious one? The latter is also important. If the person
cannot be conscious of his self except through social conflict, still it seems
that he cannot have an enduring self of which to be conscious except through a
measure of social harmony and shared meaning. Without that social grounding
every human confrontation would totally jeopardize self identity. 10 One can

10 This writer sees a connection between these two aspects of self and
the concepts, in social theory, of "alienation" and "anomie." But what Marx
calls alienation and what Durkheim calls anomie are for this writer two oppos-
ting tendencies in the self-tendencies which together produce alienation in this
writer's broader sense of that term.

According to Marx, every human being has many possibilities for crea-
tive self-development and what is most important about man in society is that
he have the opportunity to realize these possibilities. The requirement of
capitalist society that man should be confined within fixed and limited roles
removes that opportunity, hence producing alienation. This Marxian view is
similar to what this writer calls the atomistic model of personality formation,
but it is a more mixed position since it supposes that cooperation and the
growth of personal relationships, rather than conflict and impersonality, will
accompany self-realization.

According to Durkheim, a human being becomes fully himself by the
limitation, and hence definition, provided by stable social roles. For Durkheim,
the weakening of such roles destroys human identity in destroying human com-
munity. This position is similar to this writer's organicist model of personal-
ality formation, but here, again, the view is more mixed since within Durkheim's
illustrate the effects of these two personality forming processes by contrasting the schizophrenic, but often intellectually vital, character of disintegrating urban societies (for example, Berlin between the great wars) with the self-nourishing, but often intellectually unreflective, character of any primitive or peasant culture.

I don't agree, however, that the social, organicist base of personality formation is more fundamental than the atomistic, conflictual one and I see no way to settle the question without appeal to the very points at issue. If we assume that human conflict is only identifiable through social meaning, then this social meaning is obviously primary. Individual differences exist but they are minor and they arise from the social nexus itself (class relationships for example) rather than through individual initiative. But this position has no

ideal of social order there would be room for an equal opportunity based on merit.


According to Lukes:
"...one can plausibly argue that some degree of alienation and of anomie is inseparable from life in an industrial society...some alienation must exist wherever there are reified social relations, socially-given roles and norms; while some anomie must exist wherever hierarchies disintegrate and social control is weakened" [p. 152].

This writer is trying to make a similar point, but he wants to emphasize that both alienation and anomie must occur simultaneously. Industrial society is always in need of a fixed social structure as a control mechanism. It confronts this need because of social complexities and the necessity for long lead-time plans. But it is similarly always in need of a weakening of the present social structure to make it more adaptable to change.
explanation for the existence of major human differences. If someone persists in asking about such differences then a changed answer is obvious from the persistence of the question. It must be the case that individual conflict is primary and that social meaning is possible precisely in such conflict. (Thus, for example, we perhaps understand the concept of communication itself by contrast with opposing concepts of atomism and alienation.)

It seems, then, that neither the organicist nor the atomistic base of personality formation is obviously superior, as I describe them. This is why I suppose that both are necessary and that alienation is the essential human condition. The person must risk himself in new social environments, yet nourish himself in persisting social environment. Hence the condition for his very existence does seem to be a kind of alienation from himself and his society. It should be noted, however, that in adopting this view I cannot and do not remain neutral. I myself adopt the atomistic view and then make it self-referential. If there is a legitimate conflict between theories of personality formation then clearly the ultimate conflict is between the view that there is such a conflict and the view that there is not.

Aside from the preceding comments I shall not argue here for the correctness of my view of human alienation. That argument is intrinsic to the arguments made previously for a dialectical relationship among concepts and among persons. To call a concept dialectical is, after all, just another way of saying that it is self-alienated. Here I want only to argue the usefulness of my view as a "working hypothesis," given present social conditions.
Arguments from Expediency -- From the science of medicine we know that desperate conditions require desperate remedies. It is widely claimed that our conditions approach desperation at the time I am writing. The energy-population squeeze, the world-wide inflationary spiral, and the capacity of nations for mutually annihilating war are major pieces of evidence. Probably more important still, and only a little more illusive, is the sense that we are, indeed, in a state of growing alienation from ourselves and from each other. At such a time as this no diagnoses of our condition should be rejected out of hand.

My diagnosis is that we are ill precisely because we are trying to avoid alienation. Apparent physical illness is sometimes a sign of health. Fever may show successful struggle with a disease as may high adrenalin levels a successful struggle with environment. In the same way, moderate alienation may be an indication of human life and, if so, then the attempt to avoid it may only increase it to pathological levels for some people, while reducing it to levels equally pathological, but less apparently so, for others.

The Horns of the Planning Dilemma

Let us suppose, then, that alienation is intrinsic to human beings. How would we see public planning and the problems which planning seeks to solve? I propose that we take as our model the alienated personality. As described, personality represents a dialectic between changing personality traits (the
process of self-realization which Western culture has largely and strongly extolled) and an enduring self identity. But planning does not usually deal with personality directly; it deals with society. Hence, the analogous dialectic might be this: Planned society represents a process which must simultaneously allow for personal and social commitment while achieving a conscious ordering of social change. The element of commitment parallels that of enduring selfhood in the single individual. And the element of conscious change parallels that of individual self-consciousness.

The element of commitment cannot be overemphasized. Yet it is often taken for granted, and sometimes even tacitly rejected, in discussions of planning. The result is that planning appears an easier, more simply rational, and consequently a less important function than it is. But things do endure and in their own ways. The large-scale physical city is an enormous commitment both physically and socially. Planning would be easy if this commitment could be abandoned, as some writers (Buckminster Fuller for example)\(^\text{11}\) seem to suppose and as American society has pretended to do in its frontier and more recently in its suburban escape. But the commitment is still there, and in a time of tightening resources it will remain so.

A person's life work is also a commitment—a psychic and social one. Planning would be easy and, again, less necessary, if this commitment, too,

\(^{11}\)For a brief but apt description of this attitude, see the discussion on Fuller in Paul Goodman and Percival Goodman, Communitas: Means of Livelihood and Ways of Life, Vintage Books (2d ed., revised; New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 76-82. [Hereinafter referred to as Communitas.]
could simply be abandoned. At the time of writing, the problem of job loss is a severe one. And the main response of officialdom consists in exhortations to be very flexible, in other words to abandon the commitment. This response trivializes a severe problem for which the better response might well be a serious attempt at manpower planning.

The element of conscious change is perhaps less apt to be under-emphasized, but that too may easily happen. For the physical environment, the goals of growth management and environmental protection are sometimes interpreted in such a way as virtually to stop all change. For the employment problem, the seniority principle has often had a similar effect. Clearly, the process of planning is no more difficult or important in the absence of change than in the absence of commitment. To plan is to work with dilemma.

Community and Opportunity. In what follows I shall be talking about this particular dilemma of commitment and change but I shall use a different terminology and an expanded meaning. The terminology comes from Lawrence Haworth. In The Good City he expressed the problem of planning as follows (but did not himself see it as an enduring dilemma).

Specialization of activities and of the person is the source of the distinctive contribution that the urban environment makes to the good life. But it is also the source of that condition of cities which renders them least likely to sustain a good life. What specialization contributes to the good life is opportunity. Because urban life is specialized it is diverse; the person confronts an unlimited wealth of opportunities to act, to express himself, to develop his potentialites. What specialization removes from life is community. By promoting a plurality of individual worlds, specialization dissolves the continuity of persons, their sense of living a common life and their common concerns. The problem is that of restoring community to
the city in such a way that the distinctive contribution of city life, the
wealth of opportunity it offers, is not lost. 12

I shall use Haworth's terms in a similar though possibly broader way.
By "community" I mean, most basically, conceptual commitment. In assuming
a contextualist epistemology, I maintain that thought and action are intimately
interrelated. We may think that we are committed to a high material standard
of living, for example, but it is our concepts which determine what a high
standard is.

The definition of community is, I think, consistent with other more
common definitions which characterize it as having small scale, simplicity,
face to face relationships, or, in short, a rural-village character. Many
people would agree that the larger society is, in its conceptualizing, more
fluid and open than is the small. Some people would still see in this larger
society a conceptual commitment, although an evolving one. Others, however,
would see in it a lack of commitment—a lacunae within which opposing commit-
ments clashed. Because the latter view assumes there is more room for
fundamental conceptual and action choices in that society I accept it. And on
this latter view it is indeed true that conceptual commitment is associated with
the smaller scale society.

As our commitment is primarily conceptual, so it is our conceptual
framework which is the most important object of conscious change. By

12Lawrence Haworth, The Good City (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
"opportunity" I mean, therefore, an openness to conceptual change. And for reasons already given, this definition seems consistent with the more concrete definition of opportunity as involving a large scale, complex society, in which face to face relationships are less common. It is in such an urban society, as Haworth says, that there is the greatest wealth of opportunities to act and to realize one's potentialities.

What I have called the dilemma of planning, this dialectic of opportunity and community, is a recurring theme in the seminal literature of physical planning. The physical environment has always provided one of the greatest and most easily perceived canvases on which to sketch human ideas. The idea of self-alienation is vividly expressed by the pulsating movement of people into the city to find themselves then out to the country to renew themselves; for people never truly succeed and the movement never ceases. The "country" to which they return is only a suburb scarcely distinguishable, socially and economically, from what they left.

Probably the most influential of recent planning theorists is Ebenezer Howard whose work was the basis of the new town movement in Britain and elsewhere. Howard spoke of three magnets. The "town magnet" provided social and economic opportunity but at the cost of unhealthy working and living conditions, the closing out of nature, and the "isolation of crowds." The "country magnet" provided the beauty of nature but lacked the advantages of the town. And it, too, often provided an impoverished life. Howard saw this
dilemma as resolvable through a "town-country magnet," and in fact this
town-country phenomenon has come about, partly in the form of new towns but
more commonly as suburban growth. But if suburbanization may seem to have
resolved those parts of the dilemma connected with material living standards,
it has not obviously resolved that deeper problem hinted at by the phrase
"isolation of crowds."

Lewis Mumford speaks more directly to the latter problem by distin-
guishing between individuation and socialization. In the past, according to
him, these two were treated as alternative social philosophies. The one em-
phasized the privacy of individuals and the importance of personal freedom.
The other emphasized the importance of the community.

But Mumford too, denies that there is any dilemma. Society is primary.
Except within it human individuation would not arise. For some inexplicable
reason (probably a kind of evolution) society becomes complex, however. Thus
individuals are now highly differentiated and the theory of individuation is as
valid as that of socialization, but without negating it. Good planning is an
attempt to keep the whole environment in a state of dynamic equilibrium, in
which freedom does not mean empty chaos, and in which discipline does not

13Ebenezer Howard, Garden Cities of To-Morrow, ed. by F. J. Osborn

14Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt, Brace
mean an even more vacuous death." 15 Today it is possible, says Mumford, to provide a generic, equalized, standardized, communal base and to rest upon it an individualism which is specific, standardized, even aristocratic. This possibility comes from an abundance of energy and resources. 16

The Goodmans, also, identify what to me reflect the horns of the planning dilemma. They distinguish between "green belt plans," whose purpose is to quarantine technology from domestic and social life, and "industrial plans," which sacrifice the latter for the sake of the former. Like Mumford, though, and for similar reasons, they see no problem in combining these interests into integrated plans which serve the whole man. 17

"... for the first time in history we have, spectacularly in the United States, ... a technology of free choice. ... And with this technology of choice, we have an economy of abundance. ... that could underwrite sweeping reforms and pilot experiments." 18

"... if we want to combine town and country values in an agrindustrial way of life, we can do that." 19

The theme of dual values which appear to be opposed but really are not

15 Ibid., p. 458.
16 Ibid.
17 Goodman and Goodman, Communitas, Pt. I.
18 Ibid., p. 11.
is thus central to classical planning theory. According to that theory, it is abundance which saves us from dilemma. I disagree with the classic theory, however. I shall argue that abundance aggravates the dilemma instead of saving us from it.

In the examination of the thought of Lindblom and Mannheim, I therefore see myself tracing out the two sides of the planning dilemma and elucidating the social and personal alienation which that dilemma must express. Each side represents, on this view, a perennial effort to resolve the dilemma by simultaneously cancelling and preserving the opposing position. The effort appears as an inner debate within the writer's thought.

Lindblom, Liberal Planning, and Opportunity.

Lindblom's Position -- If one begins with an emphasis on conscious change, even at some cost in social commitment, then one takes the approach which I call "liberal planning." The writings of Charles Lindblom illustrate it. Lindblom seems to accept the reality both of an existing conceptual framework (the democratic culture)\(^{20}\) and of individual interaction, or bargaining, which is somehow independent of that defined by the framework. It is this apparently contradictory vision which puts him in debate with himself.

For anyone who agrees that conceptual spectacles help color our thought, the existence of those spectacles is the first assumption, and so it is for Lindblom. Yet for him these spectacles do not have a comprehensive impact. What

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exists is only a structure of sharing and agreement among more or less freely competing interest groups. It is Adam Smith's hidden hand. Lindblom does not seem to imagine, in most of his writing, that the conceptual framework in which we are implicated might affect not only the matter of social agreement but the very nature of, and structural relationships among, the groups themselves. Perhaps, however, the social division which is really most important is a class division and perhaps that division limits the autonomy of groups and the amount of free competition which is open to them.

Despite the fact that Lindblom's concept of democracy does not seem to be a complete conceptual structure, he treats it as if it were. Democracy is not merely a set of rules which are referred to by competing groups before they take action. It is the phenomenon of the competition itself, understood as something basically harmonious. Good policy is just that which results from the competition and policy evaluation is the competition process. 21

What specifically generates Lindblom's inner debate is his continually more elaborated attempt to identify a group competition which exists in actuality--and not as an empty category--but which nevertheless is the manifestation of a cohesive and pervasive culture. It may seem that he never reaches that state of truly free competition--that his so-called bargaining is merely the bee-like interaction process which he sees as democracy. 22 It may seem,
then, that the need for conscious social change is never met. In fact, however, it is the other need which is never met. This is because the apparent conceptual commitment from which Lindblom departs is that of non-commitment! The culture of democracy is a culture of sharing among atoms; it is not an organic whole.

Both Lindblom and Mannheim seem to be trying to acknowledge conceptual commitment while at the same time giving ever more reality to the phenomenon of conscious conceptual change. But Lindblom makes the effort in its reverse image as it were. If one's conceptual framework interprets human action as atomistic competition and thus, ironically, as something free of the conceptual framework, then to make such competition more truly free is to make it a competition over conceptual frameworks themselves, including the one which interprets action in that way. The problem is, in form, something like the so-called paradox of democracy. To be fully democratic is to be able to vote away democracy.

The attempt I see in Lindblom to make his concept of bargaining increasingly real reaches its terminus, I suggest, in the attempt to show that bargaining may take place over a "collective good," where this collective good is not merely an aggregate of lesser goods but is an overall vision of the public interest. Lindblom comes close to saying this in 1965 in the Intelligence of Democracy. In that work he acknowledges piecemeal collective goods, though not an overall one. But in 1972 he clearly suggests that there could be competition

23 See text, chap. III, p. 186.
over total world views and hence over the broadest interpretations of the collective good.\(^{24}\)

Lindblom does not specify, in much detail, what different kind of social structure could be implied in a new world view. But he suggests that such a social structure might not have the atomistic character of bargaining or market exchange. Instead it would presumably involve more organic and communal relationships. Hence the competition between world views would be ultimately one between a competition view of society and a non-competition view. If, in this process, the organic view prevailed then liberalism, in attempting to resolve the planning dilemma, would seem to have destroyed itself.

Liberal Planning -- Lindblom’s position is one expression of the theoretical foundation for what I call liberal planning. (In saying this I don’t acknowledge any significantly real distinction between theory and practice--but there is an analytical distinction and it is that to which I refer.)

The distinctive response of liberalism to the dilemma of conceptual change or conceptual commitment is its decision to embrace the former and, by its means, to try to achieve the latter. Of course it must not finally succeed or further change would be impossible. Put more concretely, the liberal approach in planning is the continuous attempt to achieve community through individual competition. The irony in this approach is that the community achieved is always a community of competitors, not of organic relationships.

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\(^{24}\)See text, chap. III, p. 149 and footnote 25.
and cooperation.

Many professional planners would deny that liberal planning, as I describe it, represents a form of planning. For them, planning means the conventional theory of rational policy-making. Writers like Lindblom or, on another side, John Friedmann are considered to be anti-planners. The advocates of the rationality model admit that it poorly accords with practice but they claim, nonetheless, that it is the proper normative theory. I disagree. The rationality model points to an important something which, for me, is missing in liberal planning—an awareness of the reality of individual decisions.

25 This statement can be misleading. Until the decade of the 1960s, American urban planners were relatively little aware of planning as a general process. Before that time, a course in planning theory was most likely to focus on goals and, specifically, on the ideal city literature. Such discussion of process as there was tended to be hortatory or to refer to techniques, although there were some classic works, like those of Patrick Geddes, which might be mentioned.

An important sign of change was the discussion of the conceptual scheme in Meyerson’s and Banfield’s case study of Chicago public housing policy. This study articulated that rationality model previously implicit in American urban planning and, at the same time, it cast doubt on the realism of the model. See Martin Meyerson and E. C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955).

Despite the practical difficulties of the rationality model, Meyerson and Banfield still considered it a worthwhile ideal. In 1962 it received a more extended discussion in the pages of the planning profession’s own journal. The article also emphasized the value of planning for widening the range of choice, and thus it brought together the earlier utopian interests and the new rational process interests of planning. See Paul Davidoff and Thomas A. Reiner, "A Choice Theory of Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXVIII (May, 1962), 103-15.

Impressed by the apparent rigor attainable in the transportation planning of the 1960s, much of urban planning has tried to adopt the same systems analytic approach to its own concerns. The rationality model now tends to appear in the guise of such an approach. The goal of the rational process may
and of zero-sum conditions. But the model cannot be very helpful for action.
The insights it provides will need to be incorporated into some other model.

What is basically wrong with the rationality model is its dependence on the theory-practice gap. In my view there is no such gap. Planning is a human action, and we cannot have a cognition of such action without simultaneously making a practical judgment on it. When we describe how policies are made we are not providing a neutral observation. We are simultaneously describing either how they should be made or perhaps how they should not.

Some writers on social policy-making would allow something to be called a social policy even if it was purely capricious from the standpoint of the society as a whole, being the outcome merely of the competing deliberations of individuals and groups. Other writers would insist that there is no policy-making, properly so-called, except where someone acting for the society as a whole has based the policy on deliberations over alternatives and their consequences. Lindblom is one of the first group. Advocates of the rationality model belong to the second. It is apparent that the principal dispute between these two groups concerns how to identify policy making. The goodness of such policy is not at issue here since it is implicit in the identification.

be one outside the system or it may be the equilibrium of the system itself. In any case, there has been much confidence in our ability to gain detailed quantifiable knowledge about the urban system, and hence to approach the kind of comprehensive calculation possible according to the rationality model. For an example of this confidence, see J. Brian McLaughlin, Urban and Regional Planning: A Systems Approach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969).
My point is that if a human action is possible in practice we must be able to fully conceptualize it in theory. The rationality model is defective not simply because it has not been fully accepted. It has not been accepted because we don't know what we are supposed to accept! Lindblom asks how we can identify general goals apart from all the relevant trade-offs and how we can know all these trade-offs (which keep changing) in advance of choice. This is a conceptual problem. When theorists mostly leave this problem for the practitioners they are not adopting a feasible division of labor. They are evading their own responsibilities since the problem cannot be solved in practice unless it is simultaneously solved in theory. Until it is solved, rational planning is not a very legitimate theory.

The theory of liberal planning is a more legitimate theory. It is so not because it better describes what actually happens. It better describes what happens because it is a more legitimate theory. In distinguishing between theory and practice, advocates of rationality are, of course, assuming an empiricist epistemology according to which there is a neutral social reality. But if there is none, if social concepts and social reality mesh, then there can be more than one planning theory that appears to be "merely descriptive," provided there are competing world views.

Although there is still a substantial allegiance to the rationality model, among American urban planners, allegience is shifting toward the theories

26See, for example, Donald N. Rothblatt, "Rational Planning Reexamined,"
of liberal and radical planning. Like Molière's gentleman who discovered he had been speaking prose all his life, many practitioners, and even more theorists, have realized that in "applying" their theory (i.e. in completing it) they have really adopted the liberal model. They have functioned as brokers among city agencies, business interests, etc. or have lobbied for a planning interest among many other interests.  

These newly realized liberals may still eschew Lindblom's work (despite his explicit claim to be propounding another kind of planning rather than opposing planning). But they are increasingly influenced by others who say similar things. Altshuler's case studies of planning practice are required reading for the American Institute of Planners membership examination. In these studies, Altshuler echoes the Lindblom point by claiming that general goals provide no basis for evaluating concrete alternatives. According to Altshuler people prefer to work at lower levels of generality even if this means fragmenting policy choices. And at these lower levels no one point of view is obviously superior to another. The planner is a specialist among other


The rationality model has probably had more application in Western and Eastern Europe, where legislatures are less fractionated, than in the United States. This writer's discussion principally concerns American planning.

27 One sign of this new realization comes from statements of candidates for office in the American Institute of Planners and in the American Society of Planning Officials. Another is the more or less frankly acknowledged national lobbying efforts in which the Institute is now engaged.
specialists. 28

In an influential 1967 review of planning approaches, Bolan acknowledges the difficulties of the rationality model but holds out hope that it need not be largely abandoned. 29 By 1969, however, he has developed a supposedly value-free description of the planning process from which he concludes the importance of incremental decision-making and negotiated conflict resolution. 30 He intimates that the planner must become a sort of broker (his own terms are motivator, coordinator, and consensus builder). The brokerage role is advocated explicitly by Rabinovitz who suggests that the planners will have to assume such a role, if long-run urban problems are to be resolved. The politicians, she says, have not successfully applied the role to that end. 31

Within the profession, the most influential and explicit of the liberal planners is probably Davidoff. Yet, though he claims to be a pluralist, his liberalism is perhaps more classic than that of others. He, too denies that there is a single interpretation of the public interest, and he concludes that


planners should be advocates for interest groups. But his image of this adversary planning process is the discovery of truth, as in the criminal proceedings of a court, rather than the striking of a bargain. The latter image would not have been as hopeful for the advancement of minorities and it is that specific purpose with which Davidoff is particularly concerned. Despite the explicitness of its pluralism, Davidoff's views are perhaps the closest, among liberal planners, to those of the radicals in planning.

Though from within the rationality model planners have clearly and constructively noted the defects in liberalism, they have not yet done so as they moved within the embrace of the liberal model itself. The problem looks easier from the outside than the inside. The new response seems often to be one of disillusion and cynicism, as in Catanese's book on Planners and Local Politics. Planners are just not convinced that an interest group competition really can constitute a form of community.

In the end, American urban planners seem little happier with the liberal model than with that of technical rationality. The frontier of planning thought

32Davidoff presents two different directions in his writing. His essay on a choice theory of planning (see footnote 25) incorporates the model of rational decision, but his essay on advocacy planning could lead away from that model. See Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXI (November, 1965), 331-38.

seems already to have moved on to radical planning. The deepest theoretical foundations of radical planning are traceable, in part at least, to Karl Mannheim.

**Mannheim, Radical Planning, and Community**

Mannheim's Position -- Mannheim expresses the dialectic of conceptual commitment and conceptual change more directly than does Lindblom. It appears that Lindblom's problem, in theory, is how there can be real conflict within a democratic culture so consensual that negotiations are usually considered to be satisfactory just in being made. But I suggest that the problem, in practice, is the reverse one of determining how a competition of atomic individuals and groups can make a community which is more than just that competition itself.

Unlike Lindblom, Mannheim begins his thought with a certain emphasis on full conceptual commitment. It is commitment which does not contain within it the idea of non-commitment as the conceptual model of the market system would do. Mannheim's position yields a radical approach to planning. The challenge is to achieve conscious conceptual change despite conceptual commitment. Again unlike Lindblom, Mannheim sees in our conceptual spectacles not merely a set of shared preferences but a definition of the very social structure which would color those preferences. This becomes clearer in works subsequent to his dissertation. But I suggest that it is present there, also, in some passages--for example in the claim that one may see cultural manifesta-

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34 See text, chap. IV, pp. 225, 237.
tions historically, without thereby falling into relativism. 35

What generates an inner debate within much of Mannheim's thought is his continually more elaborated attempt to realize conceptual freedom—to establish that there can be people who achieve some escape from their perspectives—while he yet maintains that the perspective has the character of a total world view. This effort might be said to reach its goal in 1943 when he suggests that individuals are so free that they can plan for religious experience. 36 He sees religious experience in the way that earlier he saw more purely intellectual "perspectives." It is that which ultimately integrates and gives meaning. If man can freely plan his conceptual commitment, by planning for religious experience, then he would have become truly free of that commitment. But in thus trying to resolve the planning dilemma, if one can interpret Mannheim's effort in this way, his distinctive approach—the emphasis on the priority of the conceptual commitment—seems to have been destroyed.

Radical Planning -- The intent in radical planning is the reverse of that in liberal planning, as regards the planning dilemma. Here one embraces conceptual commitment to become free of it. Specifically, one wants to provide for opportunity, for self realization, within the bounds of community. And by community is usually meant a small community. Radical Planning, like liberal planning, is a sophisticated concept. It is not blindly anti-system nor funda-

35 See text, chap. IV, footnote 63.

36 See text, chap. IV, p. 240.
mentally violent (although for some people it may mean that).

One can develop a supposedly "merely descriptive" theory of planning from the radical perspective as well as from the liberal one. Lindblom is mistaken in supposing that the description of existing policy processes will necessarily favor his own view. Consider the following contrast. Bolan develops a descriptive theory of the planning process on the foundation of the rationality model as modified for group decision-making. He builds the bargaining model into key steps of this process and concludes, not surprisingly, that if planners adopt this bargaining approach they are more apt to affect action. Grand efforts to change institutions or reallocate resources are less likely to be effective than efforts at incremental change, in his view. 37 Friedmann proposes a different descriptive theory of planning. It is organized around a basic distinction between allocative planning, which distributes existing resources within an existing institutional framework, and innovative planning, which builds new institutions and fundamentally reallocates resources. 38 The conceptual division which Friedmann makes would be almost useless for Bolan since the latter denies that there can be any significant amount of innovative planning anyway. But it leads Friedmann to look at instances of national planning in a country like Chile where the model seems to apply better than


does Bolan's. (It must be admitted, however, that Friedmann's "descriptive model" does not seem to reflect his fully developed theory of radical planning. The more developed theory is less applicable.)

Grabow and Heskin, building in particular on the insights of Roszak, have set forth some of the main features in a radical concept of planning:

We presently live under a world view consisting of the maintenance of a mass technocratic society governed by the myth of an objective consciousness, through the demands of the rational-comprehensive model, with emphasis on an accommodating economic growth. The paradigm rising to challenge this present concept of reality is based on systems change and the realization of a decentralized communal society which facilitates human development by fostering an appreciation of an ecological ethic based on the evolutionary process: spontaneity and experimentation.\(^{40}\)

The authors do not mean, by the above passage, that the evolutionary process continues only until a decentralized communal society is realized. The realization of this society is a perpetual effort, a sort of permanent revolution, which the radical planner helps facilitate but which he does not, in the traditional sense,"plan."\(^{41}\)

The process of evolutionary experimentation is, I think, the central feature of radical planning. It is a process that somehow synthesizes rational action and spontaneity so that the person engaged in social learning does not set

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\(^{41}\)Ibid.
himself apart from what is learned. 42 Friedmann develops this process into what he calls transactive planning. Transactive planning involves subject matter communication together with the more personal "life of dialogue." The transaction occurs between the abstract processed knowledge of the planner and the more personal less generalizable knowledge of a client. 43

While the process of radical planning is learning, rather than bargaining, the context of such planning is the small community, rather than a large society of competing interests. The Goodmans, whose classic work describes the goals of radical planning, though not the process, see these communities as relatively fixed. 44 Recent works see them more as task forces which group and regroup. 45 What matters in any case is that the relationships among those people within them are fully personal.

The promise of radical planning is the achievement of a society in which people are known as wholes, as they would be in a small community, but which does not have the provinciality or rigidity of the usual small community since it is not a fixed community. Put another way, the learning activity which contributes to human development does not alienate the person, as abstract thought

42Ibid.


44Goodman and Goodman, Communitas, chap. 6.

45Friedmann, Retracking America, p. 196.
would do, because the activity is not merely abstract. It is an evolving merger of the rational and the spontaneous, the abstract and the personal.

At the present time, the theory of radical planning is probably much more influential among academicians than among practitioners. In its supporters there is a sense of optimism which allows little room for second thoughts or self-criticism. The posture is in marked contrast to that of the liberal planners who, though they also are often optimistic, show a recognition of difficulty, even dilemma, in their views.

What makes the optimism of radical planning so particularly frustrating to critics is that the language of the theory tends to preclude its knowing application, and so it is an illusive target for criticism. If the learning process is an unspecifiable combination of the abstract and the personal, how can one know when one is engaged in it? The theory seems impossible to apply and hence complete, and it seems thus to produce as serious a gap between theory and practice as does the rationality model.

Promised Resolutions of the Planning Dilemma. At the level of planning practice neither liberal nor radical planning obviously resolves the planning dilemma—the problem how to have both conceptual commitment and conscious change of that commitment, or how to have both community and opportunity.

There is disillusion with the results of planning interpreted as liberalism. And there perhaps ought to be equal disillusion with radical planning if it was examined carefully. At the level of abstract theory, however, it is possible to
promise a solution without being held immediately to account. I suggest that such promised solutions are provided by both Lindblom and Mannheim.

Lindblom maintains that there is a consensual democratic culture which is nevertheless a culture of bargaining and exchange, and is hence, by implication, one consisting of beings atomistically related to each other. To show that the beings are so related he must show that they can question the very exchange culture which defines them as atoms. This he seems to do in 1972 by himself arguing the case for such questioning. But he does not then abandon his earlier support of bargaining. A reader is left with the impression that somehow the values of a competitive society and those of a more cooperative organic one are compatible.

Mannheim argues for the existence of a culture which goes beyond atomism in that it structures the very identity of individuals and groups, as well as their relationships to each other. Despite the pervasive influence of this culture, at least some individuals can loosen its influence, he maintains. To show that individuals can become truly free, however, Mannheim must show that they can form the culture which forms them. He appears to do this in 1943 in arguing the possibility that one can plan for religious experience. But neither then nor later does he explicitly abandon his claim for a culture-bound consciousness.

Perhaps the immediate reason why neither writer acknowledges a persistent dilemma is because each assumes the prior achievement of one side and
thus has only to focus on establishing the other. In that case, what each assumes is that for which the other argues. Lindblom does indeed appear to assume the reality of that atomistic individualism which, seen from Mannheim's viewpoint as conceptual freedom, it is the latter's purpose to establish. And Mannheim in large part assumes the reality of conceptual wholeness which, seen from Lindblom's viewpoint as social coordination, it is the latter's plan to reveal.

But this kind of logical interdependence should cause embarrassment to the two sides. If, say, Lindblom leaves it to someone like Mannheim to establish that social reality really is a matter of competing atomic individuals, and Mannheim succeeds in doing so, then the latter has said that social reality is not a matter of organic wholeness. Yet Lindblom wants to say that it is and now his assumption seems to preclude him from saying so.

Whichever may be the immediate reason why Mannheim and Lindblom are willing to hold apparently contradictory positions, the ultimate reason is, I suggest, because both accept some kind of theory-practice gap. At the end of The Intelligence of Democracy Lindblom observes that his attempt at a formal evaluation of partisan mutual adjustment must be inconclusive, both generally and in particular situations. In choosing among policy making methods, one must use the incremental method, a method which cannot set forth standards in advance. 46

Although Mannheim, in "The Sociology of Knowledge," sets up what appear to be fixed absolute principles--such as the principle of situational determinism--he suggested that it is not by absolutes but in what he elsewhere calls the flux of life that a person reaches some freedom from partial perspectives. And even were this not so,--even if some formulae for moving among perspectives were attainable--this fact, too, would be something only discoverable as one works with the empirical data. 47

Thus Lindblom and Mannheim both say of their respective problems that while in theory these seem likely to be resolvable, only in practice can we know for sure and know how.

**Dilemma Avoidance as Class Exploitation?**

If my views are correct, as regards the status of social concepts in general and of human alienation in particular, then planning theoreticians must be wrong in supposing that the planning dilemma is avoidable. On the one hand, the durability of alienation would imply the durability of a dilemma expressive of it. And, on the other hand, there would be no theory-practice distinction to allow for a promise of solution, at the theoretical level, which was not immediately called to account by practice.

Given the above conclusions, I trace out, in this section, the expected

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social consequences of continuing to assume away dilemma. The analysis has enough rough parallels to Marxist thought so that a preview in its terms might be useful.

1. It is hypothesized that there is a contradiction in human thought. By abstraction a person splits himself into subject and object and thus becomes self-alienated. Once in existence this subject-object split—this self contradiction—impels the person to increasingly higher abstraction and self-awareness—the object pole—but also to increasing efforts at reunification of subject and object. The development of civilization, and of cities, may be seen as the material expression of this mental struggle.

2. There is a fundamental class division. It is based upon relative facility at abstract thought, since abstraction is the principal control mechanism in the society. Planners and planning theoreticians belong to the upper class, or "meritocracy."

3. There is a process of exploitation. It results from the attempts of the meritocracy to avoid the contradiction in thought, by obscuring its existence, and hence to delay its development. Liberal and radical planning are instances of this attempt.

4. In these attempts at avoidance, however, the contradiction really continues to do its work. It generates a process of increasing material control and affluence which at first obscures the contradiction. But the growth process is self-limiting and as it slows the contradiction becomes increasingly painful to the lower classes without their being able to articulate the cause. This
growth process is manifest in the physical environment as the development of the low density urban region. The limits to that growth are also increasingly evident in the form of intolerable congestion and pollution.

5. The contradiction reaches a kind of fruition in the natural tendency of a meritocratic society to overproduce the number of persons needed for the most abstract functions. The tendency is expressed by widespread higher education. There is a three-fold result. Firstly, increasing numbers of people become self-conscious about their world views. Secondly, upper levels of the meritocracy, in order to justify their positions to this increasingly articulate audience, must give more attention to the applications of their abstractions. Thirdly, this growing merger of theory and practice reveals more clearly the basic dilemma in thought. For as these inherently contradictory abstractions become more relevant, those who apply them become more stressed; the stress can no longer be concentrated on others.

I have already discussed the first of the above five points—the alienating character of thought. In this section I briefly describe the hypothesized process of class exploitation, as it is outlined in points two through four. Point five is elaborated in the following section.

The Meritocracy. There does exist a class division corresponding to the theory-practice distinction and it seems to be the most fundamental division in society. Tocqueville observes how the administrative class persisted in France
through the Monarchy, the Republic and the Empire. It continues to do so. Djilas identifies a new administrative class in the self-proclaimed classless society of the Soviet Union. But in its meritocratic attributes this class looks like the old Czarist bureaucracy which Lenin confidently assumed to be eliminable but quickly found was not. Galbraith finds that the American industrial economy is no longer controlled by entrepreneurs but by highly trained experts and managers whom he calls, collectively, the techno-structure. The presence of a technical elite is not really new for America, however. The old entrepreneurs may have often combined product expertise with their other skills.

Prabably the fundamental attribute of this administrative class is the ability of its members to think in abstractions and to organize knowledge by

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48 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, trans. by Stuart Gilbert, Doubleday Anchor Books (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955). The persistence of the administrative class is not the chief point of Tocqueville's work but it is an important one.


means of these abstractions. The justification for the British administrative class is particularly explicit on this point. For the British it is not the particular subject knowledge that defines an administrative class member. In the past what defined such a member was a certain family background combined with a liberal education. But in recent times the membership criterion has been, increasingly, one of mental capacity. 53

With the rapid obsolescence of technical knowledge, other countries may, like Britain, begin to see in their administrative class less a subject matter expertise than a capacity for rapid learning through freely abstract thought. 54

I shall follow Michael Young, Richard Herrnstein, and others in calling such a class the "meritocracy." 55

Perhaps it is possible for a person to rise through the meritocratic class divisions. 55 But even if it is the division itself seems highly durable. Our

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54It is not suggested that the new administrative class includes no specialists but that the specialist/generalist distinction is no longer the decisive one for determining membership in the higher British administration.


55See Herrnstein, I. Q. in the Meritocracy, for the argument that intelligence is largely hereditary and that a class division based on intelligence consequently would allow little mobility.

Herrnstein has been vigorously criticized. The specific issue of the heritability of I. Q. is highly, even passionately, controversial. Hence, although
admissions criteria for professional level work and for higher education constantly reaffirm it.

The Unequal Burden of Alienation. The defining attribute of the meritocracy is the facility of its members at abstract thought. If alienation is a product of abstract thought, then as abstraction becomes more pervasive alienation will become more intense. In my view of alienation this means that an individual will find conceptual commitment (community) must be purchased at a higher cost in conceptual change (opportunity) and vice versa.

Conventional wisdom identifies typical examples of this conflict. There is the ambitious business executive who sacrifices family, community life, and geographic roots for self advancement. Conversely there is the individual --often visualized in the United States as a second generation immigrant--who

I. Q. scores have been widely used in education and although the assumption of native differences in intellectual capacity seems to pervade industrial society, when the assumption itself is commented upon it is often hotly denied. Yet it persists. Runciman, in arguing that all people should receive equal respect but not equal praise, speaks about the different activities which children are "good at," the fact that one person may be more "gifted" than another, differences in "talents" some of which are more admired than others and so on. W. G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth Century England (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 274-84, passim.

Lukes, after questioning the conclusiveness of the hereditarian findings on I. Q., admits that perhaps, after all, these findings may hold and concludes that our objective, in any case, should be to organize society so that the powers of its members, whether great or small, will be fully realized. Steven Lukes, "Socialism and Equality," in The Socialist Idea, ed. by Leszek Kolakowski and Stuart Hampshire (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974).
sacrifices goals of individual development in order to remain in the old home neighborhood or town and concentrate on family nurture.

I believe that because of the meritocratic class division the burden of increased alienation is not spread so uniformly as conventional wisdom proclaims. The emphasis may well shift in the direction of opportunity as regards the upper class but overall that class benefits both in terms of opportunity and community while, conversely, the lower class is deprived in both respects. This inequity is not primarily attributable to any self-interested exercise of overt power by the meritocracy. It is merely the consequence of applying abstract thought in society. Furthermore this inequity does not seem unique to any one political system. Its effects are apparent both in capitalist systems and in communist ones. Whether it is eliminable in the "third world" is uncertain.

Abstract thought appears both as analysis and synthesis. Through analysis such thought increases the apparent complexity of reality. Through synthesis a similarly abstract thought is utilized to control that complexity. Hence, those who deal in abstractions find more opportunities open to them because they can see more richness in their environment. And they find community more easily because in their power of high synthesis they necessarily represent smaller groups than do those for whom the synthesis is provided.

For example, that ambitious business executive is one of a class of professional and managerial people. The class, considered as a whole, is a
relatively comfortable one, regardless of whether it is an American or a Russian class. The work of its members is usually challenging and stimulating and their opportunities for social and political participation, on a high level, are also greater than are those of the lower class. Clearly they have opportunities for conceptual change and growth.

But the class seems not to fully pay for these opportunities by a loss in community. It does not encounter as much loss of personal ties or as much traumatic change to long held beliefs as one might expect. The world of the professional is often cosmopolitan and personal at the same time--the best of both worlds. The few doctors, lawyers, or planners in a region can easily know one another, often be able to be together and, through the operation of professional ethics, have seldom in the past had to come in severe conflict. And the professional will be treated more personally--more flexibility, for example, to cope with family problems and more collegial concern for them.

Of greater importance, however, is the professional's ability to maintain his belief system. Because the system is more abstract than that of others it can appear less subject to change. When the professional or executive advocates a change of principles it is not he who is likely to pay most dearly. The cost is imposed largely on those who must put the principles into practice and thus it rests more heavily on them than it would if uniformly distributed.

Consider the alienation of the industrial laborer from his work as a result of a major conceptual change--the extreme rationalizing of the work
process. The intensity of that alienation results, I suggest, because management supposes that the logical analysis of work details does not imply any substantial change in the more general management principles. It is because of that supposition that work is allowed to become highly fragmented and boring. If the burden of change is to be uniformly spread, then management's supposition is wrong, however.

One might resynthesize complex industrial work into large components rather than small ones. Workers would become specialists, say, in assembling an entire product. And having now become more valuable, and hence more independent-minded, their coordination by management, with respect to any future organizational change, might well become more difficult and stressful for that management. But at the same time it is probable that their own sense of alienation would decrease. It would become less a Hobson's choice between individual isolation or mass action and more a matter of group conflict. In other words, when the burden of a change in social organization is fairly spread, the change in basic principles, and hence the impact on their custodians, may be as risky and unpleasant as the change in details.

For an extended examination of the effects of industrial organization on personality, one valuable though older source is Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957).

In a review of efforts for industrial democracy, which she finds to be limited so far, Hirszowicz suggests that the relationship between effective leadership, on the one hand, and worker participation in management, on the other, is inevitably contradictory. The two principles can only coexist by means of constant clashes and readjustments. The movement toward socialism
The only way to eat one's cake and have it too is to take someone else's. That this is the relationship between the meritocracy and the lower classes is a hypothesis compatible with what we know of the latter as well as of the former.

That second generation immigrant, mentioned earlier, is a member of a lower class. Most of the class are, comparatively speaking, deficient in opportunities for self realization. But they seldom find themselves in a meaningful community either. Supposedly this individual gains in family closeness and community ties part of what was lost in career success. Actually it is in his class that the family is most seriously degenerating.\(^58\) Divorce, deficiencies of child care, even child abuse are indications. But though the family is in decline it is not being replaced by some broader community relationships. In his work life, for example, the lower class laborer does not find his personal needs to be treated flexibly—he works by the time clock. And he is more apt to have to see his fellows as adversaries, competing for his job or setting an intolerable work pace.\(^59\)

\(^58\) That the lower class has more incomplete families than do higher classes is well known. As one item of documentation, among many, see S. Kirson Weinberg, Social Problems in Modern Urban Society (2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 153-56.

\(^59\) This entire discussion of the unequal burden of alienation is not heavily
The lack of community is as evident in the matter of belief systems as in that of personal relationships. The simplest part of a belief system is its explanation of the immediately tangible—the physical environment. Unfortunately the physical environment has grown beyond the appreciation of those not comfortable with high abstractions.

We live today in great "urban regions" where the functions of industrial society are coarsely scattered. It is difficult to appreciate why and how such a region can exist. By contrast, the purpose of a small agricultural market town was apparent. It is difficult to move around in an urban region and the major highways are dully abstract. The old market roads displayed a varied scenery and what difficulties there were (such as mud) were easily understood if not always correctible. The market town had, indeed was, an identified center, but the urban region is so multinucleated that only according to each one's interests can he identify any very clear focus.

To the meritocracy the nature of the urban region is understandable and it may even be exciting. Melvin Webber, Raymond Vernon and others don't merely describe. They even seem to celebrate these new megalopoles.

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60 For one good overview of this phenomenon, see Jean Gottman, Megalopolis; The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

61 Melvin M. Webber, "The Urban Place and the Nonplace Urban Realm," in Explorations into Urban Structure, ed. by Melvin M. Webber (Philadelphia:
But not even the meritocracy particularly much wants to live there. Indeed nothing more concretely demonstrates the usefulness to the meritocracy of the theory-practice gap as the fact that many of the managers of megalopolin society themselves flee to the outer suburbs which they try to recreate as small villages. 62

In closing this section I want to emphasize a previous point. The kind of exploitation engaged in by the meritocracy does not necessarily involve overt action. If self-alienation is intrinsic to thinking man, then thinking man is in a severe zero-sum situation and so is the society of which he is a member. It is easy to identify the exploiting class in a severe zero-sum situation. It is the more comfortable class. Those members of the meritocracy who must take overt action to protect their status will not be the most comfortable members. Those will be who need not take such action but will get the important benefits anyway.


62A major theme among celebrants of the new urban regions is that these provide the life style which the middle class--and the poor also--really want. The point is misleading. The fact is that each suburban resident wants this lifestyle mainly for himself. He would usually prefer to keep the others away. His desire was to move to the country, not to a suburb. The physical signs of urbanity, such as sidewalks, are anathema to him.
The Growth Ethic--Compensation and Exacerbation. Associated with the Western ideal of abstract thought is the ideal of thought's development. Since the Renaissance this development has been understood in the sense of progress--particularly scientific progress and its consequence in material progress. Through abstract thought is achieved, supposedly, an increasingly rich analysis of experience and an increasingly broader synthesis and control of that experience.

It is usually assumed that there is a perpetual surplus of most of the major elements associated with this development process. Firstly, there is a surplus of mental capacity in the most gifted of society's members. This is supplemented by a surplus of the mechanical energy and other physical resources needed to provide adequate computers and to power and supply the technology of a computerized science. ⁶³ There is, thirdly, a surplus of opportunities for total personal growth, despite the role specialization required by the technical society. ⁶⁴ And there is, finally, a surplus of that nurturing aptitude which is sensitive to the concrete wholeness of personality and is critical to the growth of the child and the maintenance of community; there is this last surplus despite an environment which makes increasing demands for

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⁶³ For a particularly enthusiastic presentation of this "technological optimism," see the writings of R. Buckminster Fuller.

⁶⁴ The Horatio Alger novels are a classic expression of the belief in surplus opportunity. For a recent incarnation, see Richard Bach, Jonathan Livingston Seagull (New York: Macmillan, 1971).
an abstract, complex, and fragmented response to life situations. The belief in mental and material progress, together with the assumption of surplus, may be called the "growth ethic." This growth ethic seems to have varying effects on the problem of class exploitation--effects which result, I suggest, because certain of the assumptions about surplus are false.

The most immediate effect of the growth ethic is to compensate for an increasing loss of opportunity and community. In a highly organized technological society opportunities for total personal growth do not appear to be in surplus. They appear scarce. The best opportunities go to the meritocracy and this is true both with respect to mental and manual work. Regarding the latter, for example, those whose work is still craftsmanship rather than physical routine, are apt to be the college educated and to be working for a relatively small clientele in museums, art shops, etc. The chances for development of

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65Symbolic of this belief is the emphasis in the women's movement on day-care facilities for pre-school children. Here, the argument is not that the father and mother should share more equally in child rearing, but that perhaps neither has to do so. This writer is not speaking about the justification of such facilities for one-parent families where the parent has to work. Nor is he talking about mother or father substitutes where one person cares for only two or three children. What is meant is the use of day-care facilities where a few adults care for many children and as a means to provide greater freedom from child-care responsibilities for both the spouses of a complete family. Such child-care authorities as Benjamin Spock have argued against this practice, claiming that children of three years or younger need much more attention than such facilities can provide and that any family which is capable of giving it should do so. Spock is saying, in other words, that the nurturing aptitude is relatively scarce because so much is needed. Some parts of the women's movement are saying that it is in surplus because much less is needed.
community also tend to appear scarce, for reasons given previously.

The resulting increase in alienation appears as a loss of self-identity. For the middle class, material affluence becomes its surrogate. Wealth becomes the measure of self advancement. Gifts substitute for the community of close personal relationships. And costly physical appearance (colonial architecture, rural character, etc.) becomes a partial replacement for the wider community. But though the material side of the growth ethic compensates for middle class alienation, it does so unobtrusively. The Alger myth of surplus opportunity and the Jeffersonian myth of small scale agrarianism persist.

The assumption of a surplus of energy and other resources may also be a myth, however, and if it is then the ultimate effect of the growth ethic may be to exacerbate the problem of class exploitation rather than to compensate for it. When self identity is tied to something quantifiable, then it becomes relative; one has a self to the extent that one is more affluent and more materially generous than another. Consequently, the desire for material prosperity becomes insatiable. But if there are limits to resources then the result of such material greed (understandable as it may be) is an increasingly inequitable distribution of resources between those with more overt political-economic power and those with less.

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66 This analysis of the psychological use of wealth is similar to that made by such social critics as Paul Goodman and Herbert Marcuse but they identify somewhat different reasons why such compensations are needed.
Now the assumption of resources slack may indeed be false. Resources are resources only because of an available technology to use them, and technology may be self-limiting. For one thing there is the increasing problem of information overload involved in measuring the reciprocal effects of phenomena upon each other. But, for another thing, there may be an increasing need to measure these effects. The technology employed to solve problems almost always creates others—such as the pollution problem caused by industrial technology, or the problem of job contraction caused by management technology.

Hence, on the above analysis we can expect to find a trickle-down process of exploitation. The higher meritocracy will try to avoid the burden of alienation by shifting it to the middle classes. The middle classes will try less successfully to shift it further downward but in addition they will try to compensate for alienation through material wealth. The final result will be that the lower classes are placed in increasingly tight zero-sum situations since the achievement either of opportunity or community does require some resources (education, land, etc.). These zero-sum situations have distinct and characteristic descriptions: "cross pressure," the "double bind" or, most simply, "stress."

67For persuasive statements on both points, though not connecting the points directly with each other, see Kenneth E. F. Watt, "Planning--So There Will Be a Future," in Ecocide--and Thoughts toward Survival, ed. by Clifton Fadiman and Jean White (Santa Barbara, California: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1971), pp. 109-39. On the first point, in particular, see p. 137.
Consider an example of this trickle-down process. An academic planner writes a book in which he argues for a massive shift of economic resources to public needs (translation = "a massive increase in taxes") on the ground that planning problems are otherwise unsolvable. The book receives critical acclaim giving its author a sense of self advancement, and he finds himself welcomed into a community of scholars who recognize the articulateness of his position though they may quarrel with its substance. But the book makes no great change in public policy. If it had seriously threatened to do so, the writer would probably have become an outcast and have gravely endangered his career as the price of his creative ideas. He is saved by the theory-practice gap. The price of his salvation however is that there is not that massive increase in public funds which might have occurred, had he been taken more seriously.

On a lower level of mental activity is a freshly graduated planning student who would like to get involved in minority group advocacy but discovers that the financing for this has dried up--partly because the arguments of that academic planner were not effective. Even if it hadn't, the budgets of local governments are so tight, partly for the same reason, that there is little likelihood of prying out a greater share for the poor. So the fledgling planner lays aside his new ideas and joins a suburban planning agency which he well knows is oriented to traditional exclusionary practices. To make matters worse, not only must he forego his ambitions for creative self development but he cannot
even be confident of a pleasant working environment—a community of peers. The agency budget is so short that each member must see the others as competitors. The effect of this is to damage not only his office community but his own family as well.

Faced with these prospects, the new planner opts for money. Let his life style display self advancement. Things like luncheons and gifts can help make up for what is missing in the community of office and home. And he will need a lot of money—to compensate for the criticism he receives for "selling out" from those who didn’t have to.

Near the bottom of the social system is a member of the working class poor. There is little public money available to help him—partly because that fledgling planner cannot afford to share his wealth—since it constitutes his very self identity. On this member of the working poor and those beneath him rests in crushing form, on my interpretation, that excess of alienation which results from its partial avoidance by higher social levels.

The alienation of a person from himself is a matter of stress and some stress, I argue, is essential. But it is stress in its most extreme forms which the poor are made to face. A boring poorly paid work life juxtaposed to an over-dense and often dangerous residential environment is the general manifestation. But there are many specific dilemmas which relate directly to the money focus of my particular illustration.

There is a necessity to work and rigid working hours but there are no
affordable facilities for child care.

There is unemployment but there are very few public recreation facilities or programs in the areas of greatest need.

There is more incentive to crime as an outlet for frustrations but there is also a harsher response by authority to such crime.

Other illustrations could be given of the claim that, on balance, the growth ethic merely exaggerates the inequality in the burden of alienation.

But enough has been said. Having looked generally at the exploitation inherent in dilemma avoidance we must look specifically at current planning practice in the United States. That practice seems to contribute to the exploiting process. After all, the planners themselves occupy relatively high positions in the meritocracy.

Failure of Liberal and Radical Planning. According to the theory of liberal planning it is possible to have a decision process in which through the incremental interaction of individual choices a unified social result is achieved. If this theory is correct then the problem of self-alienation, as expressed through a conflict of opportunity and community, should be resolved when we act in terms of the theory. It should be resolved because each individual in realizing his own opportunities will be contributing to community. But if the theory is a false promise then action in terms of it will simply convert the problem of alienation into new forms not previously recognized.

The major physical product of twentieth century liberal planning is
middle class suburbia. As a product of liberalism, suburbia should provide its residents with opportunities for conceptual growth—opportunities provided by interaction with the numerous viewpoints present in a metropolitan center. And the suburban phenomenon should itself be the product of individual interaction rather than an imposed order. Suburbia does indeed have these characteristics.

But liberal planners promise that the suburban phenomenon will also provide for community. It is supposed that the suburbanite will encounter the stability, small scale, and closeness to unintellectualized experience of the small town. Only superficially does this occur, however. A suburb is not, socially or economically, a small town. And even this superficial community which it is is purchased at great expense to society generally. It is costly in terms of provision of urban facilities to low density areas and of transportation to the center. Consequently, suburban residents resist efforts to also share the costs of the central city, though they use its services and ultimately depend upon its existence for their jobs.

The inadequacy of revenues, and the loss of middle class interest and leadership, in the metropolitan cores has a truly disastrous effect, though, on community and opportunity for the lower classes. Opportunity declines as the financial support of public education is siphoned off to the suburbs and as commerce and industry follow in the wake of the suburban residents. Community declines with the neglect of most inner city housing, and with the expulsion
of current residents and frequent disruption of community life which occurs in those few areas of redevelopment. 68

Liberal planning does not seem to fulfill its promise to achieve community just in allowing for opportunity. The lower classes find themselves deficient in both respects in order that the middle classes can have the physical appearance of community, though often without its substance.

If liberal planning holds forth a false promise that mainly serves to perpetuate the inequity of alienation, radical planning scarcely does better. According to the theory of radical planning it is possible to have a decision process which is rooted in an ongoing social system but which yet can operate somewhat free of that system. This theory, also, implies the possibility of avoiding self-alienation if it is correct. But, again, it may be only a false promise.

American radical planning, as part of its central belief in an evolving collective consciousness, usually incorporates emphases on ecological awareness, widespread citizen participation, and flexibility in decision. Because he participates, and does so free of strict rules, the individual is not, theoretically, merely a captive of the prevailing socio-conceptual system; and yet because his participation is part of a collective contribution, involving awareness of his place in all nature, neither is he separated from system.

Closeness to the natural environment has always been considered a fundamental part of a person's community and a major constraint on his possibilities of self development, since it poses constraints over environmental control. Those in the environmental movement promise that this constraining effect need not be too serious. But that promise only seems to obscure a shifting of constraints to lower classes. The movement justifies, for example, physical growth controls which inhibit lower class mobility to the suburbs. It justifies pollution controls which, at least in the short run, reduce their job opportunities.

The curious notion that change-oriented citizen participation can be built into an established political system is one that continues to be part of many United States federal grant programs. But a system does not willingly fund its opposition. In physical planning the most acceptable and successful forms of citizen participation have been those of middle and upper class neighborhoods which have much to protect and can do so via restrictive covenants or neighborhood associations. When lower classes, with less to protect and more needs, attempt to use participation devices for making major changes in public budgetary priorities they usually fail.


70 For an overview of some of the federal programs for citizen participation—and their problems—see Donald G. Hagman, Public Planning and Control of Urban and Land Development: Cases and Materials (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1973), chap. VI.
Perhaps the most important element of radical planning theory is the notion of openness or flexibility. As expressed by the open mindedness of the intellectuals this was a central feature in Mannheim's thought, and it continues to be central for Friedmann and others in the notion of experimental learning. But there is a strain of elitism in this notion if, in fact, some people are naturally quicker to learn than are others. What we find in urban planning practice is not inconsistent with this view that radical planning is elitist. There is increasing flexibility in American urban planning but it tends to be associated with increasing administrative discretion in which the average citizen has less voice rather than more. 71

From these instances it appears that radical approaches to planning have not uniformly produced a society with both community and opportunity. Instead, the possibility of opportunities for change and growth, without such costs to the community as ecological degradation, seems to be provided mainly to upper classes.

How to Live with Dilemma

At this point, some words of summary are appropriate. I have argued that abstract thought is the essence of planning and that on one view of such

71In fact, planning flexibility is generally defined as an increase in administrative discretion. For one revealing indication that citizens and other planners will reject flexibility if it implies discretion for someone else, see Anthony James Catanese, "Plan? or Process?" Planning: The ASPO Magazine, XXXX (June, 1974), 14-16.
thought it necessarily leads to self-alienation. I conditionally accept that view. I suggest that the avoidance of self-alienation poses a dilemma in that it seems to require individuals and societies to be characterized both by conceptual change and conceptual commitment.

In public planning the two sides of this dilemma are confronted respectively by the liberal and radical approaches. Each is a promise, at the level of theory, to show how it is possible to achieve the advantage of each side while avoiding its disadvantage. But neither approach obviously succeeds—and given my view of self-alienation neither could.

It is possible, however, for those who are most adept at abstract thought to most successfully avoid its alienating effects. The theories they contrive are helpful in this respect by obscuring the irresolvability of the dilemma. The consequence is to intensify the dilemma by concentrating its impact on lower social levels. In trying to escape this impact some of these classes increase further both its total severity and its concentration on social levels still lower.

Whatever else may be said for this view of the human situation, it must be admitted that in the mid 1970's dilemmas do seem increasingly common. Within the industrialized nations the relation of inflation to unemployment, of energy needs to environmental protection, of public expenditures to private consumption—all of these appear not only as zero-sum (they have always been that in the short run) but as harshly zero-sum. And the relations between the
living standards of the industrialized nations and those of the third world also appear to be in this condition.

That these situations are truly dilemmas, however, is in various ways denied. Optimistic labelling is the crudest device. Declining productivity and employment, in the midst of inflation, presumably poses a less severe dilemma when the former condition is labelled a "recession" rather than a "depression." Optimistic promises are a more frightening device. They involve the need to trust, say, that the widespread harnessing of the energy in wind, waves, or sun would have no catastrophic effects.

That there is a specific dilemma of physical planning also is evident. In defense of community one finds increasing need for effective governmental decentralization both to the city or town level and beneath it to that of the neighborhood. Some cities seem in danger of social collapse without such decentralization. Neighborhood school boards and neighborhood corporations are two of the most dramatic recent responses to this need.

The need for community and for decentralization is the basic truth behind the suburban movement. But the suburban movement has not really met that need for the middle class and has posed a financial impediment to its achievement in the central cities.

In defense of opportunity there is a pressure to accept and consolidate the new scale of the urban region. While the urban region provides multiple opportunities for work, education and social life, this new scale also creates
severe problems of pollution, congestion, and energy demands. To deal with these problems, strong regional and state planning seems essential.

We have already seen, though, that the theories of liberal and radical planning operate to deny the dilemma of planning as other dilemmas are denied.

Cynicism and Despair—A Destructive Response to Dilemma. Not far beneath the optimistic words and promises there seems a present mood of pessimism which tacitly admits that there are severe dilemmas and that we cannot avoid them. For some observers—the cynics—this mood is less marked than for others.

About our cities there may be serious problems, says Banfield, but no disaster impends and, anyway, we can do little about matters. Granted that there are concentrations of the poor in our central cities, with accompanying problems of crime and unemployment. These people are a minority however. The majority live in comfortable suburbs and cannot be expected to accept major changes in income distribution or similar changes, nor is there any reason they should since poverty is primarily a cultural phenomenon for which the poor are themselves to blame.\footnote{Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1974).} Banfield's cynicism may be nicely summarized in Daniel Moynihan's slogan of "benign neglect."

A more active and despairing brand of cynicism is often found among those taking a broader view. The environmentalists Ehrlich and Meadows are
concerned about the dilemma of world population growth and resource limits, but they have little confidence that governments, or perhaps even most people, will respond to it. And so their writing is directed to the self interest of individual families. The theme is what you individually can do to save yourself from the coming crises of energy and food. It is the cynicism of "every man for himself."

Finally, there are those who are optimistic neither about the general human prospect nor about the ability of individuals to save themselves from it. For them, cynicism gives way to despair. Robert Heilbroner is concerned about the dilemma of population growth and dwindling resources, but he sees the emphasis on individual self interest not as a constructive response, even for the individual, but as an aggravating one. Only social-structural solutions could respond to the dilemmas, in his view, but just because of self interest these are unlikely to be forthcoming either from capitalism or from communism. The prospect is for great wars of redistribution and for "lesser" crises such as critical crop failures or fatal urban temperature inversions. Instead of our controlling events, the events will control us, and not in a benign way.

Small Scale Wholes--A Constructure Response to Dilemma: Part I. If there are severe dilemmas which confront our cities and nations, and the

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73 See, for example, Paul R. Ehrlich, *The End of Affluence* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974).

current literature of cynicism and despair acknowledges that there are, then perhaps that literature also represents the appropriate response. But perhaps it does not. In my view it is self-alienation from which social dilemmas ultimately spring, and if upper classes in alienated society could be persuaded to bear more of its burden, these dilemmas would, while not vanishing, become much less severe. 75

In this last part of the dissertation, I shall draw upon the Hegelian model of conceptual relationships, and upon my applications of that model, to suggest a constructive response to dilemma generally and to the dilemma of planning in particular. While the response may represent a somewhat new direction in planning thought it is less alien to trends in its practice. The response is in three parts.

In part 1. I consider again the problem of achieving community in a

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75 Consider this point. If we agree that the root of the world's ecological dilemma is population growth, then a close connection can be drawn between attempts to reduce self-alienation in advanced societies and the severity of the ecological dilemma. This writer argues that the urban region is one important means for attempting to avoid alienation. But it is costly in money and in its demands for the technical knowledge of civil servants and consultants. These particular knowledge demands, added to the many other such demands in industrialized nations, have been inadequately met within those nations themselves. The result has been a brain drain from the poorer industrialized nations to the richer and from the underdeveloped nations to both. Within the underdeveloped nations an analogous brain drain occurs from country to city. Assuming that the only really effective way to change family planning practice is by face to face contacts throughout the rural areas, and by an increase in their living standards, then the population problem is indeed one costly side effect of the attempt in industrialized societies to avoid alienation.
meritocratic society. If there are levels of competence in abstract thought, if society is a social-conceptual whole, and if the totality of the society only exists at the highest level then how can those below that level be part of a community? I answer, with Hegel, that the social-conceptual whole is expressed by its "smallest part" and that this part is the whole as truly as is any other.\(^7\)

The re-creation of complete small scale community would reduce the need in the lower meritocracy for the compensations of material affluence and hence would reduce the dilemma-intensifying effects produced by the growth ethic.

An emphasis on the small community is central to thinking of the new left, to some environmentalism, and to some third world ideology. But there does not seem to be an equal emphasis on opportunities for self development. There is indeed emphasis--an emphasis on the simpler more understandable opportunities associated with small scale enterprise. For some people this kind of opportunity represents a widening of opportunity. But for Western culture generally it is apt to be a narrowing. The frontiers of the arts and sciences are always associated with relatively large scale societies. What is very often omitted in such literature as that of the new left is any adequate discussion of these larger scales. In part 2. of my discussion I shall briefly argue for their importance and persistence in the field of urban planning.

I want to argue that there can be societies which are not only small scale

\(^{7}\)For Hegel, only when the concept is fully developed--when Spirit is fully realized--can we speak of the whole. But it is also true that the initial concept of Being is already Spirit in potential.
socially and economically but also conceptually. Yet I insist that these societies must be part of larger wholes. How is this possible? How can there be truly competing views of society when one is more inclusive than the other, and how can the competition persist? It will be found that I have already given the main part of the answer to this question in part 1. In part 3. I consider that answer again as it is reflected in some very recent planning theory.

Having mapped the way ahead, I shall now start out by considering more fully the idea of small scale conceptual syntheses. I look firstly at the need for such syntheses, secondly at the problem in meeting that need, and finally at some resolutions of the problem.

For many people, some would say for all, the scale of society is too large and its composition is too homogeneous. I have already described this condition as regards the physical environment and have alluded to it as regards the working environment. On the latter point, the fact is that the average worker does not know, except in the most obvious way, how his work contributes to the total product of his organization. And he knows still less how that organization contributes to the total economy. The scale of the cultural environment has also become too large. The local participatory culture of church, school, and civic associations is increasingly eclipsed by a mass culture centered on television.

When the stated point of the aforementioned criticism is to reinstitute a more humane society--as it is for Mumford or the Goodmans--the criticism
is often considered merely visionary and perhaps even mistaken. But if the revival of the small community is defended less for its value in reducing human alienation than for the more immediate purpose of defusing the thread of a mass politics it is taken more seriously. In serving this latter purpose, community revival usually appears as community control—especially control over neighborhood schools or neighborhood police. Official acceptance of increases in such control may often be a clear response to the danger of riot.

Without a strengthening of community perceptions, however, it is unlikely that community control would stem mass movements. At least it is unlikely that this would happen if assumptions about resource limits are accepted. Those inner city residents fighting for better schools, in New York and elsewhere, have apparently accepted the society as a largely unintelligible but still a competitive affluent one. They ask only a better chance at their share of the pay-off which the middle class gets. I mean the pay-off, in large scale

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77 For an articulate defense of anonymous technological urban society, see Harvey Cox, The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

78 For the argument that a mass politics grows out of the elimination of social groupings, see Hanneh Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1951).

79 This is not wholly true. Some advocates of community control of schools want to ground education on a less materialistic vision of society. The main source of support probably comes, however, from those concerned with the educational failure of their children as indicated by the standard measures of reading levels, jobs attainable, class mobility and the like. See Maria Fantini and Marilyn Gittell, Decentralization: Achieving Reform (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 41-44.
society, for abandoning most claim to intellectual participation. If the pay-off is no longer available (i.e. if the living standard declines) then the major options remaining to these residents seem to be either to join a mass politics of negativism or to claim back an intelligible community— one which, though materially poorer, has an understandable economy and a participatory culture.

There is relatively little problem in the revival of small-scale conceptual syntheses if the large scale ones are to be abandoned— if the technology, economics, and politics of nation-states are to disappear. For then the "small" is not part of anything larger. But if it is part of something larger then any attempt to assert the completeness of small perspectives confronts what Whitehead called the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. 80

The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness is the so-called fallacy of mistaking the abstract for the concrete; it is similar to what is called hypostatization. Whether or not, and in what sense, it could be a fallacy, examples of the process are ubiquitous. In physical planning a classic example is the proposal of Vitruvius to orient streets so that unpleasant winds would always be diverted. He mistook the abstract concept of prevailing wind direction for a concrete phenomenon, supposing that the direction was wholly invariant. 81


For Whitehead it was the nature of science that earlier abstractions were less abstract than supposed. Scientific advance was a continuing process of escape from the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. Toulmin's discussion of motion nicely illustrates how a concept which is highly abstract can only gradually be appreciated for what it is. Aristotle supposed that motion was the result of a force overcoming a resistance and this idea of motion was close to the concrete experience of a horse pulling a cart. Newton, in abstracting from the abstractions of Aristotle and the later ones of Galileo, developed a completely idealized view of motion as something not the product of force but completely free of any force including even that of its own weight. 82

The scientific base of urban politics and planning largely builds on this Whiteheadian view. Consider an urban region within which there are numerous local governments. An understanding of how this region operates presumably will be relatively complete and relatively abstract. An understanding of a smaller locality within the region can be less abstract but if so this understanding will be more narrow and hence less complete.

A frequent suburban self-image is of a small relatively self-sufficient community which retains the virtues of neighborliness and civic participation. This image plays the critical role in the attempt of suburbanites to overcome

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the alienating effects of city life. From the regional viewpoint, however, the image is a prime example of misplaced concreteness. The image would have been valid in pre-industrial times. But today the suburb is merely one highly interdependent part of a larger whole. The suburban self-image hypostatizes the self sufficiency of an international, moneyed, large scale industrialized economy as the self sufficiency of a farming village.

The belief in the relative intellectual superiority of higher abstractions over lower ones is very persuasive. Some people would even argue that there is a moral superiority. Regarding the present example, I myself have previously said that the small town pretensions of suburbanites are at the expense of increased alienation downtown. Nevertheless I want to argue against the view that hypostatization is either an intellectual or a moral mistake.

I want to take specific exception to those who patronizingly acknowledge that the more abstract and the less abstract viewpoints both have their place but then make quite clear that the place of the lesser is always merely within the greater. A representative instance of this pervasive view is the following passage in which Harris argues that a city plan cannot grow out of a neighborhood plan but that the neighborhood plan should "carry out" the city plan.

"... it is equally mistaken to assume that in principle or in practice a large metropolitan or city plan can grow out of neighborhood planning, and to assume that a broad comprehensive plan can be effective without steps to carry it to the neighborhood level. ..." 83

83 Britton Harris, "Plan or Projection: An Examination of the Use of
In this dissertation I have assumed a contextualist epistemology—one which asserts an intimate interdependence between "concepts" and "reality." Hence, for me, the abstractions to which Whitehead refers cannot simply mirror the concrete. They must to some extent structure it. But I disagree that the process of structuring is one in which concepts and reality together evolve toward an increasingly closer fit. I suggest, following Hegel, that it is instead one in which the two already fit exactly.

This reality which is identical to its concepts is a paradoxical one. It is differentiated as the concepts act to negate and thus define each other. Thus, only as we understand all other concepts can we truly understand the one with which we begin, but the beginning concept contains in potential all the others and without it the later ones could not exist. Consequently this initial synthesis is not merely as important but also as complete as the later ones.

A synthesis is an abstraction, an effort of thought. One probably cannot sustain an abstraction in one's mind unless one continuously either broadens or deepens it. To broaden the synthesis is, I suggest, to destroy it and provide a

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84"In different senses absolute spirit is both prior and posterior to its self-alienation and return. So far as geometrical expression is applicable at all, the whole series and each triad within it, as Hegel himself suggests, is better symbolized by a circle than by a straight line. If it were worth while refining the symbol further, we might imagine the dialectic as a series of spirals bent back on itself in a circle. . ." [G. R. G. Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 37.] [This writer's emphasis.]
replacement at a more abstract level—a level capable of systematizing a wider range of what passes for experience. It is to overcome the supposed Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. But to deepen the synthesis is to do something quite different. It is to make ever more connections between the present abstractions and the apparent experience. It is to entrench the supposed fallacy.

As I mean it, the distinction between broadening a synthesis and deepening it is analogous, within some professional discipline, to that between academic activity and practical experience. And within each of these two enterprises it parallels the distinction between "young turks" and "old fogies." It is also related to the distinction between inner and outer debate which I employ in analysis of Lindblom and Mannheim.

The reason why I claim that a deepened synthesis is as complete as a broadened one is because it is the latter which enables us to summarize, and planning requires summarization. As the essence of planning is to abstract, so the purpose of abstraction is not merely to mentally capture reality but to do so in a summary form.

We normally think that summarization means simply to abstract to a sufficiently high level. Thus for example, we provide an "abstract" to a journal article. And we describe our army leaders as "generals" because they are required to abstract the general principles from more concrete experience and hence to understand in a brief form how the parts fit together. We usually take for granted this summarizing ability but we should not do so, for it is a
very odd phenomenon indeed. We suppose that we can brief a government leader about the most highly complex and varied matters and that on the basis of those briefings he can make informed deliberate decisions. Yet he might logically be expected to know very little of the concrete meanings of most abstractions with which he is presented.

Again, we suppose that we teach a student by first presenting him with the fundamental principles of a discipline and then letting him subsequently fill in increasing detail from his experience. Granted that some subjects are withheld until the student is older or has more background but that does not change my main point. The fact is that we expect both government leader and student to somehow understand the import of highly abstract concepts without first encountering all the aspects of the phenomena to which the abstractions apply. That this summarizing process is actually possible is not so obvious as it seems, as I have already indicated in attempting to apply the process to Lindblom.

In any case, our first explanation of this curious ability is that it comes from intelligence. But that explanation is useless, amounting merely to the circular claim that those who can understand concepts can understand concepts.

More significant explanations come, respectively, from empiricist and contextualist epistemology, but both of these explanations are incomplete. The empiricist tells us how to establish the non-arbitrary meaning of a concept, if only he could find a stable concept. Unfortunately, the operational tests give
us a new "concept" with every replication of the operation. In the end the empiricist seems to conclude that some concepts are just forced on us by experience.

The contextualist tells us that we already have a relatively stable conceptual framework. Now if only we could find a touchstone of non-arbitrary meaning. But, again unfortunately, the conceptual framework seems to preclude any outside test. In the end the contextualist tends to conclude that our concepts have non-arbitrary meaning simply because we all share the same ones.

Although Lindblom adopts contextualist views (in emphasizing that different groups have different perspectives and sometimes in his notion of a democratic consensus) he also has empiricist leanings. He argues that individual people don't deliberately summarize since they do not know what general concepts mean. Instead, through the process of bargaining among individuals over concrete policies the social system as a whole may be said to summarize. The unity among concrete events or objects is forced upon us by a hidden hand.

Mannheim, who is a more straightforward contextualist, concludes that people already find themselves within a kind of summary. The perspectives (or conceptual frameworks, or world views) which they share may be called such. Consequently they too do not summarize deliberately. Concepts are

85For a discussion of the virtues and difficulties in the empiricist and contextualist positions, see text, chap. II, pp. 24-33.
apparently more a matter of recollection.

Are we to be satisfied with such answers? Is summary to be either the product of sense tyranny or of the tyranny of the community of concept users? Of course neither Lindblom nor Mannheim is satisfied with his initial view but what I find in their ultimate responses seems more like a swapping of views than any third alternative.

How then is deliberate summarization possible? How is it ever possible to "come to the point?" I suggest that it is just through the hypostatizing of concepts. Pure abstractions could not bring us there. When the empiricist Hume argued that sense experience was wholly discrete he was not speaking of sense experience as the plain man knows it. He was really speaking of abstractions. Bits of color or texture are not the quintessential concrete but the quintessential abstract. Thus when Hume observed that he had no impressions of objects or self he was talking about the result of abstraction. The result is that we confront only flux, not specific wholes.

To know about a phenomenon we must abstract, must broaden, but then to summarize that knowledge it seems we must narrow the abstractions by turning them into things. Empiricists and some contextualists say we understand these things by sense experience or recollection, respectively, but their answers do not allow us to play much deliberate part in that summarizing

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process.

I suggest that we understand the hypostatized concept just because it is hypostatized. We understand it by contrast with that more freely abstract but evasive knowledge which it solidifies. For an intellectual discipline to have a point it must embrace its enemy, "oversimplification." Although similarly, the point of the discipline is only understood through that same broader view which condemns it. This logical-conceptual relationship between smaller and larger syntheses is analogous, I think, to the relationship between community and opportunity.

Perhaps the most vivid example, in urban planning, of the interdependence of broader and narrower syntheses is the debate over zoning. Zoning is the central planning power in the United States. In its traditional or "Euclidian" form, it can be easily described as a hypostatization of the abstraction of land use. It recognizes only a very few major uses and recognizes only a few standard relationships among these uses. There are the simple nuisance relationships, as between residence and industry. And there are the simple positive relationships as between major highways and commercial use. 87

The value of a hypostatized concept of land use is in taking some given scale of urban industrial pattern and making it sufficiently stable and simple,

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87 For a description of a largely Euclidian approach to zoning, see Philip P. Green, Jr., "Zoning," in Local Planning Administration, ed. by Mary McLean (3d. ed.; Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1959), chap. 11.
relative to one's common "experience," that an individual can control a part of it and be personally identified with that control.

It may seem curious to think of zoning, and of the private property system on which it is based, as evidence of a concrete element in society. According to a more common view, the concept of private property is abstract and atomistic. But all things are relative. The concept of social property is clearly more abstract than the version we owe to Locke.

The obvious disadvantage of Euclidian zoning is that in its pure form it cannot allow for the complexities of a large scale society. Many present day functions planned as large units, such as shopping centers, require subtle decisions about location and internal design. These decisions are not specificable in advance. They require a richer knowledge of economics, for example, than the traditional zoning relationships express. Like all hypostatizing, Euclidian zoning rigidifies and thus makes economic, social, and ultimately psychic opportunities more difficult.

One may increase opportunities in use of land by replacing fixed zoning with a broader syntheses--specifically with one which sees the subtle, volatile relationships in land usage and proposes to control these by a process of case by case development permission.\(^8\)\(^8\) Alternatively, one may try to incorporate greater opportunities within the Euclidian structure itself by making the latter

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\(^8\)The American Law Institute in its Model Land Development Code proposes this kind of approach. Also see John W. Reps, "Requiem for Zoning," Planning, 1964, pp. 56-67.
more flexible.

I argue that because both syntheses are necessary for each other that this second alternative, which deepens the existing land use synthesis, constitute as much completeness as the first, which broadens it. Euclidian zoning is the completeness of the more concrete, while the approach of development permission represents the completeness of the more abstract.

The broader view of land use associated with development permission is a view lifted out of the matrix of individual property relations. Land use is now an almost completely public and abstract concern. But pure abstractions do not make a whole, as Hume showed. This highly abstract vision of the city tends to lack unity and direction. In Britain, which employs a process of development control, such control has been referred to as the mockery of ad-hoc-ery.  \(^89\)  In the United States the more inclusive understandings of the city developed through mathematical simulations and systems analysis often do not even claim to be anything more than Humian associations.  \(^90\)

The process of zoning as development permission involves a constant inner struggle to attain, within the bounds of abstraction and flexibility, the

\(^89\)For the difficulties in both the Euclidian and flexible approaches to zoning, see Richard F. Babcock, "Key Issues in Land Use Controls," Planning, 1963, pp. 14-20.

\(^90\)In a review of the large-scale models of urban phenomena undertaken in the 1960s, Lee concludes, among other things, that the models were too comprehensive, too complicated, and too abstract to be very helpful in deciding what to do. Douglas B. Lee, Jr., "Requiem for Large-Scale Models," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXIX (May, 1973), 163-78.
guidance of something more concrete and fixed. A recent state court decision has affirmed the need for this something.\(^9\) \(^1\) The broader synthesis, in zoning as elsewhere, has no point unless it incorporates a narrower synthesis as its "form."

Of course, no conception of one's situation could be purely concrete. An approach, such as Euclidian zoning, which is relatively more concrete faces a reverse problem. Unless it becomes self critical, by placing itself within a broader framework, it ceases to be effective. Hence, it involves a constant inner struggle to achieve, within the bounds of a relatively concrete and stable mapped plan, a flexibility based on more abstract urban science. In other words this narrower whole only becomes one as it fits within a broader whole which is its "material."

From an examination of the apparent logic of summarization, and from an example of that logic, I conclude that small scale syntheses, the intellectual perspectives of "less educated," "less intelligent" people are as important and as fully complete as those of others. But they are no more so. Each needs

\[^9\]In Fasano vs. Board of County Commissioners of Washington County (Oregon), (507 P2d 23, 1973), the Oregon Supreme Court declared that certain zoning decisions will no longer be granted presumptive validity. In cases of zoning flexibility where decisions are made on a case by case basis the burden of proof shifts to the governing body. It must show that the zone change is harmonious with the comprehensive plan. The court does not say that the comprehensive plan must be a mapped plan but presumably it must be a fairly rigid document or the problem of arbitrary discretion will simply reappear in a new form.
the other. 92

**Wholes Against Wholes--A Constructive Response to Dilemma: Part II.**
The literature which argues for the small community usually does not claim, as have I, that there can be equally complete conceptual wholes which are nevertheless on different levels. Instead it tacitly suggests either that there need be no larger wholes or that, if there must be, that these larger ones need be no more than loose confederations.

The Goodmans propose an ideal community based on syndicalism, the integration of physical and mental work, the integration of personal and work life, and relative community autonomy. But on this last crucial point of autonomy they say nothing more. 93

According to Alperovitz, the basic issue for radicals, and one they have not clearly addressed, is whether society can ever be organized humanely

92 In an influential essay, Alexander argued that the city did not have a tree-like structure coming to a point but instead was of the nature of a "semi-lattice" with much overlap. In saying so, Alexander argued against small-scale syntheses--or any conventional syntheses--but he did so, ironically, in a beautifully-organized paper which itself had the classic structure of a tree. See Christopher Alexander, "A City Is Not a Tree," _Design_, February, 1966, pp. 46-55.

By contrast, Aitshuler, in a previously-cited work, has taken the view that there can be small syntheses.

"...every concrete object of planner attention is a miniature of the whole. The important analytical problems that arise in planning for an entire urban area arise also in planning any section of it" [Alan Altshuler, "The Goals of Comprehensive Planning," _Journal of the American Institute of Planners_, XXXI (August, 1965), 191].

without generating a highly centralized authoritarian system. He suggests that it can be—that the local communities can be the building blocks for larger political-economic units. But in the end he too is vague as to how this is done.  

If society is sufficiently affluent then the deficiencies of coordination which may arise from a confederate system need not be serious. The assumption of material affluence seems the ultimate reason why neither the Goodmans nor Alperovitz attempt a more specific discussion of larger scales.  

I disagree with the literature just sampled but will not argue the matter at length. In research what is obvious and what needs explanation depends on one’s point of view. For this dissertation it is considered obvious that extensive world, regional, and state planning is necessary. My concern is with the conceptual logic of contrived social wholeness, not with its necessity. A few arguments for this necessity will nevertheless be advanced.  

The development of very large scale social units was made possible by certain methods of organization such as capitalism. But the desirability of this scale may result more from the artistic, scientific, and technological opportunities of which it is both product and process. People come to great cities not only, and probably not even primarily, for a better physical existence. They come because those cities represent the cultural frontier. Many advocates

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95 See Goodman and Goodman, *Communitas*, pp. 11, 160; and Alperovitz, "Notes toward a Pluralist Commonwealth," p. 43.
of a smaller scale do not accept it for themselves. Paul Goodman lived most of his life in New York City, as Lewis Mumford still does.

Of course the provision of cultural opportunity may not require institutions of the current size. And there are obvious dysfunctions—responsiveness to demand for example—in the current scale of business and government. But decentralization primarily by local initiative seems unlikely. Would General Motors break itself up mainly as a defensive response to small competitors? Will New York City be broken up into neighborhoods mainly by the action of those neighborhoods, and can most functions then be handled by them? If society disintegrates into small armed camps, the answer to both questions may be "yes." But under less catastrophic circumstances that answer seems unlikely. It seems that large societies are needed not only for their own cultural advantages but as the necessary means for producing decentralization.

Proposals for decentralization are made within the context of an existing world population, much of which lacks basic necessities, and of an existing technology. Where this technology directly contributes to the necessities it probably will not be abandoned for less effective forms. Nor is it likely that those other parts of technology and social organization, which support this effort, will be abandoned. At present the relevant technology is associated with large scale social organization. States and nations are pervasive and exercise great power. There are many commentators who assume that this
condition must remain and that assumption seems to be the safest one. 96

While I agree that decentralization is not only desirable but necessary for social survival, I also agree with those commentators who believe in the necessity for centralization.

Can there be a clear division of responsibilities between centralized and decentralized social units? That there can is a common assumption. But it is questioned, of course, by both liberal and radical planners. Lindblom argues that this division of responsibilities ignores the extent of interdependencies among decision centers. It also ignores the problem of agency bias. Because an agency is likely to have a distinctive viewpoint on a given matter, it may neglect other considerations important to the same matter that a different agency would not. 97 Friedmann presents another important reason. The rapidity of change militates, he notes, against a clear division of responsibility. 98

96 In describing the decentralist--participatory theme among emerging nations, Worsley points out that these nations still see the need for a strong state. See Peter Worsley, The Third World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 173.

Besides the arguments for the continuation of the nation state, there are also numerous arguments for a new governmental entity larger than cities or counties but less than the state.


98 "Where the 'activities to be managed' are themselves subject to frequent redirection and reorganization (because of rapid changes in environmental conditions and the quick response times of the system), [i.e., guidance system] work and guidance can no longer be conceptually distinguished" [Friedmann, Retracking America, pp. 208-09].
Now there is substantial evidence (for example in federal-local relations) for the subtle interdependency among social units and for the speed with which they change. And Altshuler, for one, has demonstrated in his case studies the value of multi-agency perspectives on the same topic. It seems, therefore, that division of responsibility is not a way of avoiding the dilemma posed by the need for both centralization and decentralization. This conclusion is not the one which liberal or radical planners draw from the above arguments since they reject, anyway, the concept of deliberate centralization. But it is the conclusion which is most significant to me.

Wholes Within and Against Wholes: A Constructive Response to Dilemma: Part III. The literature of urban planning theory has given little previous recognition to the concept of a simultaneously conscious and conflictual social whole. The traditional theory of centralized planning and systems analysis—theory almost totally divorced from practice—always assumes that the conflict can be overcome. The more relevant theory of liberal and radical

99 One important source of evidence is comprised by the publications of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

100 Altshuler, The City Planning Process.

101 This writer is referring primarily to the United States when he says that the theory of centralized planning is largely divorced from political practice.

102 To overcome social conflict is to find an agreed public interest or a social welfare function. For evidence that planners believe they have found one, see Altshuler, The City Planning Process.
planning does not acknowledge conscious central planning. Wholeness is a pre-conscious part of the social fabric intrinsic to bargaining or to experiential learning.

There is some recent literature, however, which acknowledges a planning dilemma. While the literature is small, and focuses upon the struggle for control rather than a struggle over conceptual frameworks, it seems likely to grow and broaden. For it touches upon some very current and sensitive issues.

In 1967 Bolan hypothesized a tension in the general domain of planning. According to Bolan this tension existed not within planning itself, but between planning and decision-making. Furthermore this was not a tension of concepts or meanings but one of mechanical control. Bolan's comments are nonetheless suggestive.

In any decision environment, as the number of independent decision-makers increase, and as functional responsibilities become increasingly fragmented and specialized among independent decision-makers, the capacity of the system to utilize comprehensive forms of policy-making decreases, while the needs of the system to utilize comprehensive forms of policy-making increases. These counter requirements produce tension between the decision system and the planning system; a tension directly proportional to the degree of dispersal of decision-making. 103

Bolan did not seem to accept the tension, however. At that time, and in later literature, he proposed to reduce it by adopting incrementalism. 104 But if an incremental strategy will resolve this tension then the independent decision-


104 Ibid., and see this writer’s footnote 30.
makers of his hypothesis must not be deciding anything very important or long range, and hence the hypothesis is less interesting than it appears.

Some recent literature accepts dilemma, if only grudgingly, and proposes or describes response to it. Where this response is one of words, as distinct from action, I shall call it "heuristic dialectics." Where the response is both, I call it the "dialectics of action."

One proposal for heuristic dialectics is a 1974 essay by Hudson and others. They ask how one could see the impact of regional public service systems "from the concrete and unique viewpoint of neighborhoods." For them, the basic question is "whether it is possible to consider simultaneously the neighborhood's and the larger city's perceptions of costs and benefits. . ." They suggest that it is and propose a method of "dialectical scanning."

Dialectical scanning is a device for analyzing points of disagreement. It isolates the parts which are clearly differences in values so that those differences can be juxtaposed. The emphasis is on presenting a debate more than on resolving it.

Another approach to heuristic dialectics is Churchman's concept of "Hegelian Inquiring Systems." Here it is supposed that the confrontation of

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106 Ibid., p. 256.
one set of underlying assumptions with another set of counter assumptions will result in a synthesis incorporating the best elements of both. Hence for Churchman there is confidence in resolution of debate through dialectic. 107 And there is some evidence that this confidence is justified when applied to corporate enterprise. 108 Its success in public planning has not been demonstrated as yet.

Most approaches to heuristic dialectics do not claim to deal with dilemma but with conflict, and conflict may be resolvable. Nevertheless, these approaches would also be useful as responses to dilemma. And the fact that they have been proposed is tacit recognition that conflict is at least more durable and more large scale than is supposed in other approaches to policy study. As responses to dilemma, however, they only tell how to display the conflicts, not how to live with them. It is only a dialectics of action that could do the latter.

We want to know how to live with conditions where community and societal viewpoints both interlock and compete. As case studies we would look for organizations which either have a centralized internal organization or themselves act as the central control for a larger organization. Among the internally


centralized organizations we would look for those which also allow substantial internal decentralization. An example would consist of those major corporations which have developed successful programs of job expansion and some worker control. Among those organizations which act as central controls we look for that subgroup which designates some of its members as area representatives.

In planning literature the best example is perhaps an interview study by the Needlemans on the community planning experiment in several United States cities. Community planning is the assignment of individual staff members to specific areas within the city. Each community planner is supposed to work closely with the district residents in developing a plan for their area. This new approach to planning seems to have developed as a response to urban unrest partly in lieu of money responses, the latter being unavailable. Community planners represent only one part of any agency staff, the remainder consisting of those responsible for the city-wide plan or some of its functional elements.

What the Needlemans found in those agencies which had adopted community planning was evidence of intense dilemma and cross-pressure. It fell

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109 Martin L. Needleman and Carolyn Emerson Needleman, Guerrillas in the Bureaucracy: The Community Planning Experiment in the United States (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974). This work was originally Martin Needleman's doctoral dissertation prepared for the State University of New York at Buffalo, 1972. As a dissertation, it appeared under the more revealing main title of Planning against Itself.
principally upon the community planners but to some extent on the entire staff. This cross-pressure resulted, in my terms, because the agency was attempting to integrate different levels of wholes. The city-wide planners were committed to a relatively abstract whole, this being the concept of physical land use. The concept was broad, as abstractions can be broad, but was narrow in the sense that other urban functions were handled elsewhere in government. The Needle-mans describe this traditional planning as "encapsulated." It was organized as an "elite council" in which decision-making was limited to a small group of insiders.

The community planners dealt with richer more concrete wholes. The agencies had not intended this result but community residents, many of whose problems were more social than physical, tended to insist upon it. Hence community planning became expansionist and intruded into the domains of the city operating agencies. This form of planning was organized as an "arena council" in which decision making became an open forum.

A community planner was placed in a double-bind. On the one hand, he was urged by his agency to develop rapport with the community. In order to do this he had to demonstrate a primary allegiance to it. The most credible demonstration was to effectively pressure the city government on the community's behalf--it was to follow an expansionist, arena council view of planning.

On the other hand, his superiors expected the community planner to provide simply a divisible part of the traditional comprehensive plan. He was supposed to follow the encapsulated, elite council view.
As the community planners were cross-pressured, so the planning department itself became polarized between them and the comprehensive planners. Polarization expressed itself variously as disputes over basic planning theory and failures in coordination.

One might expect that a planning approach so organizationally disruptive could not last. But the Needlemans think otherwise. The organization of an American planning agency already reflects, they suggest, the schizophrenic nature of its functions. To maintain its pretensions to long range central planning, in a polity basically hostile to that approach, an American planning agency must always be prepared to put aside other matters when asked for research services to the city council and to operating agencies, and it must always be ready to take advantage of the latest federal or state programs. This makes for a crisis-oriented work process and a lack of clear organizational hierarchy. Because the agency can offer little salary, relative to the abilities it requires, it instead offers autonomy. This makes for a chronic lack of coordination.

Given the nature of plan agency organization, a director has few incentives at his disposal to keep independent employees in line other than dismissal and the termination of the community planning experiment.

It appears then, according to the Needlemans, that most professionals involved in the community planning process have experienced an increase in stress. This condition results from their attempt to live with dilemma--to live with an agency which embraces two contradictory forms of planning or, in my terms, two different levels of the whole.
The principal significance of the study is that the less a community planner was able to avoid being cross-pressured the more effective he was in his community. The initial intent of most community planners was to function as "urban guerillas"--to operate under cover. But really effective pressure on operating agencies or city council was eventually certain to blow the cover of a community planner and sharply increase the cross-pressures upon him. The community, having tasted success, now pressured for more action, while the government establishment, stung by unaccustomed demands and by surprisingly knowledgeable lobbying, pressured for less.

It seems clear that what the Needlemans document is a redistribution of stress. Groups previously apathetic and deeply alienated now see the possibility that someone in the socio-political system has their interests at heart. And this is no foundation-sponsored consultant type advocate planner, nor is it somebody dependent on highly capricious federal programs. It is someone whose role is built into the system and whose commitment to the community is supposed to be a permanent in-depth one. But to build opposition into a system is necessarily to build stress into the adversary role.

In reflecting upon their study, the Needlemans do not see this redistribution of stress as a long term condition. For them, the community planning experiment, given the presently inadequate financing of our cities, is likely to intensify the self-interest of different groups. In view of present financial problems, however, they consider this result to be a "necessary step backward"
from a more harmonious and rational planning process.

But how can the financial problem improve? Perhaps it can do so only as the burden of social dilemma is dispersed across society and as the compensations of material affluence therefore become less necessary. Perhaps only as the suburbs are organized to fight for meaning and esteem in the way that the inner city has been organized to fight for material goods will the zero-sum game of the metropolis become less severe. If this is so, then what the Needlemans describe is not perhaps so much a step backward from rational planning as it is the shape of things to come, at least for a long time.

The natural pressures of a meritocratic society would further articulate this struggle between community and society. Through a mass higher education, now aggressively reaching out to the public, the opportunity to conceptualize and control his social environment again begins to seem a possibility to the average person. And because a meritocracy is likely to overproduce the skills needed for the highest positions, there will be increasing numbers of people interested in intellectual synthesis who find that the only opportunities for use of those skills are provided at lower levels of abstraction and among lower level social institutions than would previously have been the case. The result will probably be an increase in the number of people who are willing, perhaps anxious, to play the role of community advocate. But it will not be a comfortable role for them. Nor will those in higher positions find their roles so stress free as they once were.
A struggle of wholes within but against wholes may be a necessary human burden but it is a burden nonetheless.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Mure has suggested that:

The reader who tackles a work of Hegel for the first time should, as a preliminary exercise, take any process of development, the growth of an organism, an historical movement, or the course of what strikes him as a well constructed novel or play, and try to reflect on it at a level beyond pictorial thinking. He should try...to think what really is that movement which he already calls development. Then, as he reads Hegel, he should treat the triadic notation as an indespensable but rough sign-posting of the route and watch to see whether there may not be triads (on any scale) which not only reveal sublation in the very heart of things but suggest that it cannot be something merely sporadic and accidental.¹

This is the method I have tried to follow in this essay but I have used it as much to understand the processes I study as to understand Hegel.

I begin by assuming, with Hegel, that thinking man is necessarily a division of objective and subjective self. I assume that human life is a ceaseless struggle to recombine these aspects into a whole, thus providing community and avoiding anomie, while at the same time it is a similarly ceaseless struggle to ever more sharply distinguish them, thus providing opportunity and avoiding alienation.

I apply the Hegelian approach primarily by tracing the development of

two people's thought about wholeness. I see this thought as the attempt to reconcile without eliminating—to sublate in Hegel's words—two expressions of the subject-object split. Charles Lindblom tries to allow for real human conflict (the object side of human society) within a democratic society so consensual (so clearly of the subject side) that the interaction among people is presumed to constitute a kind of automatic agreement and harmony. Karl Mannheim tries to allow for a freedom from the point of view involved in a socio-conceptual order (again the object side) but to allow for it precisely within this socio-conceptual order (which is itself the subject side).

I see the Lindblom and Mannheim efforts not as producing a resolution of their respective debates but as internalizing these debates. And I see the pattern of this internalizing process as a roughly triadic one. There is firstly an attempt to boldly identify the subject and object poles. But then there is secondly an attempt to differentiate out the object pole so that it really means something—so that "bargaining" is not, for Lindblom, just another name for consensus and so that "relationism" is not, for Mannheim, just another admission of relativism. Following the attempt to give meaning to the object pole there is thirdly the need to recombiné subject and object, although the result of the third step is to destroy those meanings provided in the second step, if the argument is allowed to stop at this point.

I see the pattern of debate as a series of circular arguments, contained within each other. Each broader argument begins, however, by introducing a new distinction which denies the totality of the preceding arguments. Con-
sequently these arguments are not only circles within circles; they are circles within and against circles.

Because Lindblom and Mannheim do not resolve their debates about wholeness we cannot apply their arguments directly to the planning situation. But we can examine the dialectical pattern of their continuing debates with themselves to see if a similar pattern may be found in ordered or planned society. I suggest that it may. I suggest that planned society is perhaps best understood as a dialectical pattern of conceptual frameworks in which the ones smaller and nearer to what we usually call the concrete provide the point and purpose to the ones larger and more abstract, while these larger ones provide the specialized concepts which serve as the material for the purposes of the smaller. I suggest that our acknowledged ability to summarize and come to a point, in an intellectual effort, is itself an acknowledgement that these smaller conceptual wholes are valid. If they were not, it seems that we could not teach principles without first teaching their extensive application.

I have argued that the subject-object conflict is expressed, in a bureaucratized society, through a necessary competition of larger and smaller conceptual frameworks but that the custodians of the broader views—the bureaucrats and professionals—have largely avoided this competition by denying the legitimacy of the smaller views.

But I have also advanced the claim that the natural tendency of a society based on thought (and thought creates all the problems I am speaking of) is to
educate everyone to the maximum ability and hence to overproduce the number of persons needed in the highest parts of the bureaucratic hierarchy. The result, I believe, is a self correction of the tendency for the administrative class to avoid the human struggle. Some members of that class must find their best opportunities for intellectual synthesis at lower steps. In a planning agency they may become advocates of neighborhood perceptions against those of the city or advocates of city perceptions against those of the state. In a school system they may be advocates and agents of a neighborhood school board. In industry they may be spokesmen for functional work groupings which result from a process of job expansion.

The result of these new demands on administrators is to increase the stress of life for them while probably reducing it for those in lower positions of the bureaucratic society. Previously, those lower classes endured sparse opportunities for self realization and a disintegrated communal life because the scale of a highly rationalized society had grown beyond them. But if the nature of men and society is not rational but dialectical—not a logical order of one great whole but a paradoxical order of large and small wholes—then the recognition of that fact will help distribute the necessary pain of being human across the entire spectrum of society. By insisting on the integrity of those smaller wholes over against the necessary integrity, also, of the larger, one will impose greater stress on those who by virtue of their control positions must straddle both sides.

From the standpoint of the meritocratic class itself my speculation may
present a gloomy prospect. Faced with this prospect one cannot help but look once again at the alternate promises of liberal and radical planning—promises that the dilemma of planning and of planned society is avoidable and that no one, either "great" or "small," need anticipate a permanent self-alienation.

Let us look at those promises in the context of the community planning situation, since that situation seems to typify the sort of challenges I envision. Why isn't community planning just another expression of partisan mutual adjustment? It seems so with its emphasis on a plurality of groups in competition with each other. Is there not a good possibility that this process could result in a mutually satisfactory accommodation?

My answer is simple. There is surely such a possibility if we make certain assumptions about our concepts. Of course we cannot assume that planning concepts are just "out there" in the physical world. We know very well that they are social products, and the concept of wholeness most obviously so. But if they are social products then on one view they must involve a pre-conscious consensus. If it was not pre-conscious we could disagree but if it was not consensual we could not be communicating.

Now when these concepts, which are social products, are also about society, they are not merely theoretical. They define action as they simultaneously describe it. And since mutual accommodation is obviously a value concept, then if the concept is consensual—if we can agree on what it means—we have agreed as to when it exists. Hence we have agreed on our values. If
a community planner and a comprehensive planner can agree on what constitutes a "mutual accommodation" between the locating of a highway and the protection of neighborhood housing then they have of course already agreed on what to do.

If we accept the above logic of concepts—which is what I have called a degree of truth logic—then the theory of liberal planning may well convince us that we do not face dilemma, though it is less the substance of the theory which is convincing and more the sheer fact that we can understand it.

But I do not accept a degree of truth logic, for purposes of this essay. I agree that concepts are social products and that we can communicate them to each other. But I don’t agree that communication implies a basic and pre-conscious consensus. For me it implies fundamental disagreement because for me it is wholly conscious. Consciousness is what divides us, within ourselves, into subject and object. The resulting division is projected onto the social world in the form of debates, such as that between conservatives and liberals. We can communicate with those of opposing views because we have the core of that opposition within ourselves.

The concepts envisioned by a degree of reality logic also are social products. When they, too, are about social reality, they, too, define action in process of describing it. But here they do so by conflict. Let me return now to my illustration.

If the community planner does not reach agreement with the comprehensive planner on the highway-neighborhood tradeoff, they both must somehow con-
ceptualize this failure. If both planners have accepted the theory of liberal planning they will of course describe the failure as a failure in bargaining. But they obviously cannot point to an agreed operational definition of bargaining. For if they could do so then by theory the bargaining should have issued in agreement. Hence each must define his concept in opposition to the others and will understand the others as some form of hierarchy. Each will say that the other really isn't willing to bargain but wants to impose his own views instead.

The community planner will probably call the comprehensive planner a tool of the local elite while the latter will reply that the former is one of those radical elitists. But each will know that he himself is necessarily caught in a contradiction. Each wants to say both that if his wishes were to prevail then that would be coordination and that if anyone's wishes prevail over the objections of another then that is not coordination. His liberal planning confronts him with dilemma.

From such analysis I conclude that liberal planning is not an alternative to the struggle of wholes against wholes which the Needlemans describe. It is not, that is, if we deny the assumption of a basic conceptual consensus. Instead the self-styled liberal planners are themselves engaged in this dialectical struggle though they interpret it in another way.

In one sense my view of planning is indeed pluralistic. I emphasize the struggle of groups with each other. But in another sense it is not. If the struggle is only an outward struggle then I say that it will become intolerable in its intensity, since on my supposition there is no pervasive consensus to mod-
erate this struggle. It is through the internalizing of the pluralist struggle within each individual person, so that each becomes aware of the great truth in his opponent's views as well as that in his own, that the outer struggle becomes moderate and endurable.

If liberal planning is not a way out of the somewhat unpleasant prospects I describe then why not radical planning? Couldn't community planning be considered the prime expression of a learning society? Isn't it possible to reconcile the needs of large and small social units if each person remains flexible and experimental in his attitudes?

Again let us consider my illustration. If we assume in advance that the community planner and the comprehensive planner will agree, then of course we have assumed that something like liberal or radical planning will work. I did not make such an assumption before and will not do so now. It would contradict the basic assumption I have made about the inherently conflictual nature of social reality.

What happens then if we assume, again, that our two planners do not agree but if we now suppose that they consider themselves radical planners rather than liberals. In that case, failure to agree will be described as a failure in learning. And, again, it will signal a failure to agree on the operational definition of the concept.

Each will define himself as learning, in contrast to the other who will be said to be caught in a rigid conceptual system. The community planner may say that the comprehensive planner is a captive of obsolete abstractions and
does not appreciate the personal small scale realities of the city. The comprehensive planner may accuse the other of an equally abstract pluralism which does not recognize that social problems can only be resolved by large scale system change.

But it is true, again, that each will be caught in a contradiction. Each wants to say that if his views were accepted then that would represent conceptual advance but yet if anyone's views are accepted by someone who nevertheless disagrees with them then that is not conceptual advance since it does not reflect understanding.

So I conclude that the radical approach is no more an answer to the problem revealed in community planning than is the liberal one. These planners too are engaged in a dialectical struggle which they describe otherwise.

But as in one sense my view of planning is pluralistic so it is also radical. I emphasize the need for a new consciousness among planners--one which better accords with their real situation. The enemy which I believe this new consciousness will reveal, however, is not someone external. It is the planners themselves in their efforts to avoid inevitable dilemmas.

In these last chapters I have developed a frankly speculative hypothesis about the nature of planned social wholeness. The hypothesis arises out of that pessimistic vision of the human prospect which is common at the time of writing. I feel instinctively that this vision is accurate. And if it is, then we ought to consider every plausible explanation for our situation, and every plausible
response. Desperate conditions may require desperate remedies.

I have hypothesized that our problems result from that attribute which we usually take as their salvation—human thought. It is in our attempts to avoid the inherently alienating effects of thought, so I argue, that we have made the problems so severe. If this is so, our true salvation is to accept this burden of alienation and to fully share it. It is to participate in that very stressful process of integrating conceptual wholes—world views—of widely different scope.

My purpose in presenting this hypothesis is not to start some new trends. There is already much happening in higher organization that parallels the kind of pressure system which has been described. My purpose is to argue for the possible virtue in those trends— and hence, perhaps, to make them more enduring. Perhaps. I personally believe that my hypothesis is correct. But I do not like it.
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