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MOTIVATIONAL MESSAGES: DIRECT CONTACT AND TURNOUT

A Dissertation Presented

by

MICHAEL T. HANNAHAN

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

May 1999


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
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A Dissertation Presented
by
MICHAEL T. HANNAHAN


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A long project will accumulate an equally long list of people deserving thanks if only for supporting the author for such an extended period. A special note of thanks goes to my late father, Bill Hannahan, who told me ten years ago to finish what I started. There have been times over the past decade when this advice was the only thing that kept me going. I am proud to dedicate this work to his memory.

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ABSTRACT

MOTIVATIONAL MESSAGES: DIRECT CONTACT AND TURNOUT

MAY 1999

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The following project attempts to connect one type of campaigning, direct contact, to voter turnout. Direct contact is defined as any type of campaign communication that is directed from the campaign at an individual voter. Most direct contacts are either telephone calls or direct mail pieces. The working assumption is that campaign activities matter in determining voter turnout apart from the demographic, political, and psychological characteristics of individual voters. Four congressional districts, two from 1994 and two from 1996, are chosen for analysis. Data is collected on the direct contact efforts of the eight campaigns taking place within the four congressional districts. The direct contact information is then coded onto voter files containing the actual turnout information, age, and party registration of each voter. Using logistic regression, the effects of direct contact are analyzed while controlling for past voter history, age, and party affiliation.

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CHAPTER 1

WHY STUDY VOTER CONTACT?

Why should we care about political campaigns? Clearly, people do. American elections are frequent, expensive, noisy, and controversial. Various actors with different roles spend the better part of their adult lives studying elections, participating in campaigns, or commenting on the electoral process. Most books on campaigns and elections will begin with a sentence or two on the importance of elections to Democracy. The following example is typical:

Elections are important because they allow us freedom to actively participate in selecting our leaders. They are the core of democracy. Nowhere in the world are more people more freely engaged in active, responsible participation in the choice of leadership than in the United States. ...[T]he political election campaign is an essential element of a democratic system.¹

Most Americans will agree with the assertions above. Indeed, they are so commonplace as to be uninteresting. Still, there is some ambiguity in the third sentence "Nowhere in the world are more people more freely engaged in active, responsible participation in the choice of leadership than in the United States". The authors cannot mean voter turnout which is lower in the United States than in most other industrial democracies. If not voters, then the authors must be referring to the large number of citizens involved in the electoral process itself ranging from donors to candidates. This presents a picture of a relatively large number of involved citizens and a mass of comparatively indifferent voters.

¹ Trent, Judith and Robert V. Friedenberg. *Political Campaign Communication* (New York, Praeger, 2nd Ed 1990) Page 3.

The following study addresses the question of campaign effects on participation by looking at the one campaign effort most closely related to voter turnout, direct campaign contacts, and measuring that activity's effects on the probability of voter turnout. Direct contact is any campaign effort aimed at individual voters for a specific purpose. This definition differentiates direct contact campaigning from the electronic media in that TV and Radio, even when targeted, cannot be aimed at a specific voter but only masses of people, a preponderance of whom may show the desired demographic characteristics. Although the advent of cable and satellite television has greatly increased the range of targeting available to candidates using the airwaves, electronic media is still only aimed at groups, not individuals. The source of voter names for a direct contact effort is an enhanced file of registered voters. The delivery system used is usually direct mail, phone calls, or door-to-door contact. As a method for reaching specific voters with a targeted message, direct voter contact is only one of many campaign techniques designed to influence voter perceptions and turnout through the provision of campaign controlled information. Thus, direct contact is best viewed as a specific type of campaign communication. Until quite recently academic research has ignored campaign effects and focused research energy on demographic, social, psychological and institutional voting determinants. These studies produced powerful paradigms for the analysis of voter turnout and participation. However, to change the question which introduced this chapter from, "Why care about political campaigns?" to the more specific "Why care about the effects of direct contact on voter turnout?" requires the addition of campaign actions to the voter turnout model. This addition, and

the implications it entails, is of great interest to reformers, scholars, and practitioners alike.

Campaign reformers pursue the dual goal of making the system more fair and more participatory. "Fairness" is generally defined in terms of money and message content while "participation" is defined in terms of voter turnout. The usually unstated model is that the money goes into a set of messages and practices which are unsavory enough to depress voter turnout. An analysis of campaign efforts to increase turnout may require a shift in the reformist model by showing that in some circumstances the spending of campaign money may increase political participation. Likewise, it may point out that it is not so much the amount of money being spent by campaigns as it is the allocation among competing campaign technologies which deserve the analysis and attention of those involved in implementing and reforming electoral policy.

Researchers will be interested in the effects of direct contact on voter turnout for many of the same reasons as reformers but for a few reasons of their own as well. Most research on voter turnout -- and it is one of the most consistent bodies of research produced by the social sciences -- is derived from panel studies and surveys. When they focus on campaigns they tend to concentrate on Television. Direct contact allows the study of the actual voter record, avoids many of the pitfalls of survey research, and makes available millions of potential cases for comparison and isolation. As an activity, direct contact makes use of county voter files. It is always possible to acquire those files and enhance them with campaign contact material to ascertain a direct connection, or as direct as one might get in this type of research, between a campaign stimulus and a voting act.

Most candidates and consultants assume that direct contact affects turnout but would welcome confirmation, ponder denial, and make use of any suggestions that add the heft of data to their intuitions. No one wants to spend money on ineffective campaign techniques. The question of the effects of direct contact on voter turnout is no less than the attempt to link campaign stimulus to the positive policy outcome of increased turnout

American campaigns have always made use of direct voter contact. In the introduction to his study on electoral culture in the northeast Michael McGerr gives the following description of a rally and GET-OUT-THE-VOTE (GOTV) effort during the 1876 presidential campaign.

Early one evening in October 1876 groups of young men wearing military-style caps and capes and carrying kerosene torches in the shape of rifles gathered in the sixth ward of the city of New Haven, Connecticut. The men were members of the "York Escort", the "Shelton Escort," the "Bradley Guard," and the "H.G. Lewis Guard," marching companies formed for the presidential campaign that year and named in honor of four of the city's leading Democrats. ... By seven o'clock, the companies had formed into line and lit their torches. On orders from the commanding officers, the men set off, a brass band at their head, through the darkening streets of the city. Returning to the sixth ward at eight o'clock, the companies found three or four thousand people filling the street around a temporary platform at a main intersection in a working-class neighborhood. Gas lights and Chinese lanterns brilliantly illuminated the surrounding buildings. As the companies marched and counter-marched, the band played and fireworks lit the sky.²

Rallies, marches, and the accompanying door-to-door canvassing illustrated the intense partisanship and public nature of political activity. The political goal was to excite partisans through both public display and individual contact. Partisan excitement and individual attention were the primary tools available to political elites to increase

² McGerr, Michael. *The Decline of Popular Politics: The American North 1865-1928*. (New York, Oxford University Press. 1986) pp. 3-4

turnout. Republican campaign schools claim Lincoln once said "First we need to find our voters, then we need to talk to them, then we need to visit them all on election day to make sure they turn out to vote". Whether Lincoln said anything like this is less important than the Republican's desire to claim him for their direct contact efforts. Direct voter contact, either as mail or GOTV, is everywhere. Even Hunter Thompson, running a Freak Party campaign for Mayor in Aspen Colorado, attributed the closeness of his strange campaign to their GOTV script "Get off your ass, you bastard! We need you. Get out and vote!"³

Differing in degree but not necessarily in kind from the Freak Power effort was Congressman Steney Hoyer's 1992 reelection effort. Maryland's 5th Congressional District covers three rural counties in Southern Maryland as well as large parts of suburban Prince George's and Anne Arundel Counties. Its suburban-rural divisions are reflected in a break between the more conservative rural voters and the liberal democratic voters centered around College Park, home of the University of Maryland, and reinforced by the largest concentration of federal workers in any US congressional district. Perceived divisions within the district have always kept it on the swing seat list of the national committees but in reality the Democrats are strong here. Generally, this district produces a Republican challenger strong enough to raise money and attract attention but not strong enough to beat Congressman Hoyer. Congressman Hoyer had originally earned his job by winning a tough Democratic primary in 1981. but redistricting in 1990 made the district more conservative and he began to face a succession of tough Republican challengers. In 1992 he defeated Lawrence Hogan, Jr.

³ Thompson, Hunter S. "Freak Power in the Rockies" reprinted in *The Great Shark Hunt*, (Ballantine Books, New York. 1979) Page 157

53% to 44%. Hogan was thought by experts to be one of the toughest challengers in the nation that year.⁴

Hoyer's professional campaign team was headed by a general consultant from New Mexico named Chris Brown. Among his many duties Brown devised a voter identification and GOTV program for the 5th Congressional District. In a series of meetings with campaign staff and other professionals Brown laid out his plan. Approximately 50,000 people were targeted based on their party, voter history, and demographic characteristics. The goal was to identify as many favorable and undecided voters in swing precincts as possible. Issue questions were also developed. Issue responses were cross tabulated against the names of undecided voters. These voters then received personalized mailings.

Brown designed the target universe, calling scripts, and follow-up mail. The calling was done by an Oregon firm named Telemark. Voter names and numbers came from an electronic file compiled from original county tapes. Voter Contact Services (VCS), a firm with offices in Hawaii, California, and Massachusetts, had a Honolulu employee order the Maryland tapes. The tapes were shipped to California and processed by computer technicians in both Santa Clara and Honolulu. The processing included appending phone numbers, gender codes and ethnic identification. Although the technical work was handled on the West Coast, political issues such as targeting and script development were handled by the New Mexico consultant and a VCS employee in Massachusetts. By the time the computer file was ready it contained 280,000 registered voters and included voter history going back to the 1988 primary

⁴ District description and history taken from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa. *The Almanac of American Politics: 1994* (New York, Macmillan publishing, National Journal Books. 1995) 583-585.

and general elections as well as birth date, registration date, gender, party affiliation, precinct, jurisdictional information, phone number and ethnicity.

VCS created the target universe file of 50,000 voters and mailed it to Telemark where employees using predictive dialing equipment made the calls in three days. Predictive dialing technology allows phone numbers to be loaded into a central computer and continuously dialed with each answer directed to an employee at an open computer terminal. Disconnected numbers are eliminated from the file while answering machines and busy signals are placed at the end of the queue for future calling. Such technology greatly increases the number of calls a single employee can make per hour and allows greater supervisory control over the now more efficient workers. When the calling was completed the results were sent to VCS and added back to the Hoyer voter file. Counts for each response were generated so the print shops would know how many of each issue piece to print. Mailing tapes and labels were generated within 24 hours and sent to various mail shops around the country. A few days before the election lists of favorable voters were sent back to Telemark for GOTV calling. The Maryland race involved consultants and personnel in seven states across five time zones. The Hoyer campaign spent \$1,584,271 in 1992 while challenger Hogan spent \$265,065. In 1994 the Hoyer campaign repeated, on a smaller scale, the voter contact program described above. The 1992 data were moved forward and matched to a new voter file so the process might be repeated more efficiently in the 1994 and 1996 elections,

Mid-19th century rallies, Freak Power tickets, and modern congressional races all rely on reaching voters with a specific message. The technology varies but the underlying desire is the same: to move selected voters to the polling place. Still,

despite commonality of purpose, it would be a mistake to ignore the technological distinctions between a local motivational rally, organized along strict party lines by volunteers, and a phone bank organized and managed by paid professionals. The professionalization and complexity of modern campaigns represent qualitative changes in electoral techniques.

Campaign research has taken as its starting point the decline of political parties and the rise of the candidate centered campaign. Some studies, using measures of "consultant team presence and quality" suggest the mere presence of consultants increases a candidates final vote share.⁵ Certainly politicians think so. Consultant billings in congressional campaigns jumped more than \$60 million between 1990 and 1992 -- an increase of 32%.⁶

If a contrast between the New Haven rally and the Hoyer race illustrates the move from a party-centered effort to a consultant managed campaign system it also illustrates that the electorate has become less predictable. In New Haven, partisans were to be motivated. In Maryland, they needed to be identified first. Modern campaigns take place in an era where there is no faithful to be taken for granted.

We have moved from locally based party organizations, designed to gain and hold the mechanism of government and organized along stable electoral cleavages, to a professional political elite, nationally dispersed, still intent on winning public office but not so much to take over the mechanisms of government, as to earn money in a newly

⁵ Guerrieri, Mark. "Can a Dream Team make a Difference?" Unpublished paper delivered at Northeast Political Science Conference, November 10-12, 1996 Providence RI.

⁶ Morris, Dwight and Muriel Gamache. *Handbook on Campaign Spending: 1992*. (Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington DC 1994.)

minted profession -- a profession, like others, heavily dependent on the expertise inherent in the use of new technology.⁷

What impact do current technologies have on voter turnout? For consultants and candidates the success or failure of communication techniques is either victory or, at the very least, a showing that exceeds expectations. For our political culture at large the evaluation of any given campaign technique is more complex. Certainly voter participation and turnout is an important measure of systemic success, and it is here that the current electoral structure is often viewed as a failure. Low voter turnout is often seen as a function of bad candidates and empty, negative campaigns. The argument claims that such electioneering creates a jaded public more likely to stay home than go to the polls. Voter turnout in 1876, the year of the rally described by McGerr, was 78%. Voter turnout in 1992, the year of the Hoyer race was 56%.

Direct voter contact is the campaign technology most closely associated with turnout. Unlike electronic media, direct voter contact, or much of it, is used to encourage specific individuals to vote. Despite the effort and money spent by campaigns to move voters to the polls, the academic literature on voter turnout had, until quite recently, focused almost exclusively on social and psychological explanations for the voter decision. While this research has greatly increased knowledge of voting behavior and turnout a number of paradoxes have emerged. Why, for example, has voter turnout decreased while one of the main determinants of voter turnout, level of

⁷ See Larry Sabato. *The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections*. (New York: Basic Books 1981) and David Rosenbloom. *The Election Men* (New York: Quadrangle Books 1973). For a discussion of the changes in campaign tactics from a communications perspective see Daniel Shea. *Campaign Craft: The Strategies, Tactics, and Art of Political Campaign Management* (Praeger Press, Westport Connecticut. 1996)

education, increased dramatically? Why has voter turnout decreased despite numerous simplifications in voter registration?⁸

Although there is now a substantial body of research studies political mobilization effects, most of that research focuses on the aggregate effects of the political climate such as the race at the top of the ticket, issues, or the economy. There is still little research on the mobilization effects of campaign activities themselves. Aside from journalistic articles linking attack ads to reduced turnout the relationship has been explored very little. Although research on the effects of negative advertising on turnout is inconclusive at best, a public that is often sick of the political process tends to take the relationship as gospel. There is also a voluminous literature built around models detailing the social, psychological, and institutional factors affecting voter turnout. These studies, by far the bulk of the work on voting behavior, leave little room for campaign effects on voter turnout. It is as if all of the good reasons for voting, or not voting, are taken and those striving to affect turnout directly are viewed with some condescension, like drones working on shadows in a cave while true social effects inexorably push the turnout stone up and down the hill. It is ironic that social and demographic factors, which are mostly beyond the reach of public policy, has received so much attention while campaign activities, which are well within the

⁸ For an early discussion of the voting paradox see Richard A. Brody, "The Puzzle of Participation in America" in the *New American Political System*. Edited by Anthony King. (Washington D.C.; American Enterprise Institute 1978). There are also many excellent summaries of the literature on political participation. See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. *The American Voter*. (New York: Wiley 1960); Raymond Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone. *Who Votes?* (New Haven Yale University Press, 1980.); Ruy Teixeira. *Why Americans Don't Vote*. (Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press. 1987)

framework of public policy, have been slighted. What attention campaign activity and spending has received has been divorced from their avowed purpose of winning elections and focused on general assertions of over spending or vote buying. Almost never is the question asked, is the money providing information to voters? Does it help drive voter turnout? Instead, the claim is that "too much" money is spent although the term "too much" is never established in a comparative sense.

Direct contact efforts are especially underrepresented in the literature. The most comprehensive book on political consultants and the electoral process now available is Larry Sabato's Political Consultants. Sabato's chapter on direct mail consists of descriptions of fundraising direct mail, an industry that has little in common with direct mail done for persuasion or turnout.⁹ There are signs that the gap surrounding campaign effects is being filled. A recent survey of the political participation field highlights a growing body of literature on political mobilization.¹⁰ This literature will be reviewed in more depth later in this paper but a quote from authors John Mark Hansen and Steven J. Rosenstone will suffice as a summary. These authors argue that voter turnout can only be partially explained by social and psychological factors and have made a strong case that political behavior, broadly defined, is influenced by the conscious activities of political elites.

⁹ Sabato, Larry. *The Rise of Political Consultants*.

¹⁰ Leighley, Jan. Attitudes, Opportunities, and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation. *Political Research Quarterly*, Volume 48, Number 1, March 1995.

They claim:

The reigning theories of participation in American politics, amazing as it may seem, do not have much to say about politics. Instead, they trace activism to the characteristics of individual American citizens, to their education, their incomes, and their efficacy. They assume that attitudes determine behavior. When asked to account for changes in citizen involvement over the last half century these explanations largely fail.¹¹

The following work examines whether specific efforts by political elites affect voter turnout. Campaign polling and demographic research is first directed at dividing the electorate into likely and unlikely voters, and then, categorizing the likely voters into persuadable and unpersuadable voters. Research strategy, and technology come together to form ever finer divisions for the delivery of diverse messages in the hopes of building a winning coalition. The political question becomes less, "How might I get my party behind me?" and more, "How might I exploit cleavages in my district?"

Although electronic media can be targeted, it is direct contact, with its specific message delivery system, which is the modern embodiment of political targeting and, at the same time, the primary tool of the political elite for influencing turnout. Does it succeed? If direct contact is found to help increase voter turnout, or alternatively, if we find that direct contact provides information primarily to those already participating and ignores the information needs of more alienated voters, then discussions of campaign finance policy needs to concern itself with elite effects on participation as well as strictly "money and politics" issues.

¹¹ Rosenstone, Steven J. and John Mark Hansen. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. (New York, Macmillan 1993) Page 28

Among the specific questions addressed will be

- 1) Do direct contacts increase turnout?
- 2) Who receives direct contacts from campaigns?
- 3) If direct contacts do work, how many does it take for an appreciable increase in voting?
- 4) Again, if direct contacts work, which types work the best?
- 5) Do some types of voters respond better than others to direct contact?

All of these questions are quite specific, but they directly address more general empirical questions. Can political elites consciously affect voter turnout? Are some voter groups excluded from their efforts? Such empirical questions have strong normative policy implications. My argument can be summarized in the following points. First, to evaluate voter turnout we must be able to concentrate on efforts within the sphere of influence of public policy. Second, campaign behavior is susceptible to such influence. Campaign finance regulations are particularly powerful in forming incentives for campaign behavior. Finally, if particular campaign behaviors are found to have an effect on voter turnout such behaviors need to be encouraged, or, at a minimum, not discouraged, by the campaign regulatory system.

1.1 Data and Methodology

I use multiple sources of data for the following study. First, data from the 1994 and 1996 congressional elections are used to select four districts for study. Second, interviews with campaign operatives and an examination of campaign finance records are used to reconstruct the strategic and tactical direct contact choices made in each campaign. Third, a previously ignored but potentially useful data source, actual county

voting records, is coded with the campaign contact information. This weaves the campaign information with a file rich in individual level demographic data including age and past voting history. The result is a data set that combines all of the campaign's direct contact information with the political information contained on files of registered voters. Logistic regression equations, incorporating campaign contacts as a variable, as well as control variables, are run to ascertain the effectiveness of campaign direct contact efforts in increasing voter turnout.

1.2 Dissertation Plan

In Chapter 2, I will review the academic literature on voting behavior. This examination will concentrate on the development of voter turnout and participation theory from a field dominated by the standard socioeconomic model to one that has recently begun to explore the effects of political elites on turnout and participation. This study will look to expand the literature on mobilization by using individual level campaign contact data instead of the more aggregate measures of political influence generally used in the mobilization work.

In Chapter 3, I will examine the uses to which direct contact is put by various campaigns. Using information from campaign periodicals, as well as campaign expenditure data, direct contact will be defined in fine enough detail to allow the formulation of testable hypotheses. The analysis of direct contact will provide a framework for the choice of case studies and a method for categorizing and analyzing direct voter contact.

In Chapter 4, I will describe the background, strategy, and direct contact efforts of the eight campaigns under study. The eight campaigns, representing four races, will

be taken from both 1994 and 1996. Special attention will be paid to the targeting of subgroups within the voter population at large. One of the chief differences between the party centered campaign and the candidate centered campaign is in the degree of targeting. While turn-of-the-century campaigns might be described as targeted in that they focused on their own partisans, modern campaigns are heavily targeted enterprises that design messages for numerous subgroups of voters. Targeting by party is still important but to win an election, much deeper demographic divisions must be found and exploited. Each individual contact will be examined and a detailed retrospective direct contact plan built for each campaign. In chapter 5, I will summarize the distribution of campaign contacts. At issue will be the number, type, and distribution of the various forms of direct contacts within the four voting populations under study.

In Chapter 6, I begin to test the effects of direct contact on voter turnout. The standard socioeconomic model (SES) conceptualizes voter turnout as a form of behavior that proceeds from particular social resources and attitudes such as income, education level, social class, and feelings of political efficacy.¹² This data is often unavailable to political consultants who instead rely on age and voter history maintained on county tapes to predict voting behavior.¹³ Actual voting records for the race in question allows for the development of probabilities for voting at various levels

¹² The literature on voter turnout is voluminous. For early statements see Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie. *Participation in America* (New York: Harper and Row 1972) and Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. *The American Voter*. (New York: Wiley Press 1960). For a more recent survey see Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks. 1996 *The New American Voter*. (Cambridge, Harvard Press 1996).

¹³ Age is sometimes available. Level of education is usually available only at the census level and therefore describes the propensity of a neighborhood as defined by the census bureau rather than an individual characteristic.

of age, past voting history, party membership, and contact information. By isolating the effects of total direct contacts on each voter I will examine the effects of direct contact on voter turnout in each of the districts under study.

In chapter 7, I will take the next logical step and examine the efficacy of different types of voter contact on turnout. The kind of comparisons that will be made include those between mail and phone contacts; Republican and Democratic contacts; and negative vs. positive contacts. This chapter will also examine the effects direct contact has on different voter groups.

In chapter 8, the conclusion, I will examine the empirical findings in light of previous hypotheses and place the findings in a larger campaign context. I will also examine the implications the findings have for current campaign trends and reform.

CHAPTER 2

TURNOUT: CAMPAIGN EFFECTS OR VOTER CHARACTERISTICS?

There has been little research into the question as to whether campaign activities do what their practitioners expect them to do. This is not to say that social science is silent on the turnout and persuasion effects of voter characteristics, electoral systems, or more overtly political variables such as campaign spending, candidate quality, and the prevailing political and issue mix, it is only to say that research linking specific campaign activities to individual level responses have been few. Indeed, the literature on voter turnout is one of the richest legacies of the social sciences. The following chapter traces two strands of research which indirectly illuminate the relationship of voter turnout and direct contact, research on voting behavior, and research relating to political campaigns. The literature on voting behavior, while rich in explanatory power, leaves unanswered a number of questions surrounding voter turnout. The literature on campaigns, both that which studies political mobilization and that which examines campaign activities themselves, while addressing some of the paradoxes raised in the voting behavior literature, still slight the study of actual campaign activities. First, I will review the literature on voting behavior and campaigns to examine why there has been little, if any, study of direct contact and voter turnout. For a world that has provided such a large literature on voting behavior, there has been little information produced on the campaign activities most closely associated with voter turnout. Secondly, I will review studies which have either examined general campaign effects on voter behavior or have specifically analyzed direct contact. Because there has been

little work done in the field of direct contact and its effects on voter turnout in the academic literature I will also review the "how-to" technical literature on all phases of campaigning.¹⁴ The dissemination of campaign technique information is entering a period of remarkable growth. Internationally, US consultants give seminars in both the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics as well as the more established western European states. At home, the last ten years have seen the development of a new type of degree; the Master's in Campaign Management. Both National Committees, most state parties, private companies, PACs, and other political organizations, all hold campaign training seminars and produce technical manuals on everything from candidacy announcements to late November campaign office closings. Many of the hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of direct contact can only now be derived by a look at current working assumptions in the field of campaign management.

2.1 Voting Behavior

Research looking at direct voter contact needs to draw upon different analytical traditions as well as professional literature on the tactics and strategy of voter contact as actually practiced by campaigns and consultants. Because of the importance of turnout as a measure of civic health and the ready availability of survey data, political scientists have produced an enormous literature on voting behavior and turnout making a voter's motivation, knowledge, and decision making process one of our most widely studied political phenomenon. There are at least two main strands of research. The older of the two strands consists of a studies which assume that attitudes and resources precede

¹⁴ There has probably always been a large store of stock "how-to" literature from campaigns. This authors first campaign handbook was a 1955 document on GET-OUT-THE-VOTE produced by the Massachusetts Republican State Committee.

behavior. These studies have identified a number of consistent social, psychological, and political indicators of voter turnout. Wealthy Americans are more likely to vote than their poorer counterparts. The elderly vote at higher rates than the young, and the educated at higher rates than the uneducated. Citizens with a strong sense of political efficacy participate at higher rates than those with a reduced sense of political effectiveness. Studies have also found that those with strong community links participate at higher rates than the socially mobile.¹⁵ Finally, many studies have argued persuasively that, in addition to social and psychological predictors of turnout, there are also institutional constraints on voting. The American system of voter registration, at least before recent reforms, has been found to depress turnout by as much as 13%.¹⁶

The early studies on voting behavior often obscured campaign effects. Eventually, with the advent of more comprehensive data sets, researchers started looking at candidate effort and campaign effects. The campaign literature itself started with anecdotal presentations by consultants and journalists and slowly grew to include detailed study of the impact of campaign spending. That empirical research began with questions of campaign spending points to the importance of available data.

¹⁵ There are many excellent summaries of the literature on voting behavior. For early statements of the issue see Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in American: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1961); Campbell, Miller and Stokes *The American Voter*, 1960. For more recent treatments of the topic see, William Flanigan and Nancy Zingale, *Political Behavior of the American Electorate*, 8th ED (Washington, D.C. Congressional Quarterly Press 1994); Ruy Teixeira, *Why Americans Don't Vote*; Raymond Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* For a current summary of the literature see Jan Leighley "Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly*, Volume 48, Number 1, March 1995.

¹⁶ Powell, Bingham G. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective in "Controversies in Voting Behavior, 3rd ED" Ed. Richard Niemi and Herbert Weisberg (CQ Press, Washington D.C. 1993)

Writing in The New American Voter Warren Miller summarizes the importance of data sources in guiding research by saying of the NES

Insofar as this book is a reflection of the work of other scholars, it is so because since 1962 all of the NES data have been in the public domain and accessible ... (The utilization of those resources) by others has created a sub-field of the discipline of political science. Furthermore, it has enriched the work of colleagues in other disciplines far beyond the limits suggested by the works cited in the notes .¹⁷

Miller's quote illustrates two important points. First, the NES data have provided a touchstone for an enormous amount of study on the decisions made by voters. Secondly, the object and perspective of study is at least partially dependent on the data available. The National Election Survey data is a field of dreams for researchers; collect it and they will come. What they came in search of was voters. The overriding concern of voting behavior research is with low turnout in American elections. The US consistently ranks below all other advanced democracies in voter turnout. Without attempting to summarize the broad and deep literature on voting behavior it is enough that substantial agreement exists on certain facts. Participation in American presidential and mid-term elections have ebbed and flowed since the turn of the century reaching a peak after the civil war, declining in the 1920s, rising again throughout the 1930's, 1940's and 1950's and finally beginning the long, current decline after the 1960 election. Naturally, most scholars have focused almost exclusively on the most recent period of turnout decline. Presidential year turnout fell 13% between 1960-1988. In 1996, turnout reached an all time low as only 48.6% of the eligible electorate voted-- and the 1996 election came after the Motor Voter

¹⁷ Miller and Shanks. *The New American Voter*. Page 6

Act, the most comprehensive simplification in our complex system voter registration since the elimination of Jim Crow laws.¹⁸

Voting studies take the normative stance that turnout is an important measure of civic health. They subscribe to Schattschneider's description of participation and conflict:

The outcome of every contest is determined by the extent to which the audience becomes involved in it. That is, the outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of the contagion. The number of people involved in any conflict determines what happens; every change in the number of participants, every increase or reduction in the number of participants affects the result. Every change in the scope of conflict has a bias.¹⁹

The scope of our own contests, as measured by voter turnout, is increasingly restrained. Campaigns and other political variables were ignored in early research designs because the influence of voter characteristics seemed so overwhelming. In 1984, while writing about campaigns, Edie Goldenberg and Michael Traugott could say, "A substantial difference exists between the minimal significance that academic studies have attributed to campaigns and the influence attributed to them by candidates, political consultants, and members of the press."²⁰ Goldenberg and Traugott consider the minimal campaign effects found by so many early studies an accident of history. The SRC studies for example, took place in an era when most people had made up their minds at least three months before the election "Only 8% of those interviewed in 1940 actually switched their votes from one party to the

¹⁸ Rosenstone and Hansen. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. Page 25

¹⁹ Schattschneider, E.E. *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realists View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston 1960) pp 2 and 4-5

²⁰ Goldenberg, Edie and Michael Traugott. *Campaigning for Congress* (CQ Press, Washington DC. 1984) p. 3

other during the campaign."²¹ This strong relationship between party and vote choice may have had more to do with communication than partisanship. A close reading of the SRC studies showed the potential for campaign and media effects when it noted that voters exposed to newspapers espousing political views different from their own, were three times more likely to switch their vote as readers exposed to only like-minded newspapers.²² Although there are substantial areas of agreement on predictors of turnout, the consistency of the findings has made the question of turnout decline more, not less, difficult to address. Demographic and political change over the last twenty years would suggest increasing, not decreasing voter participation. In the last thirty years our population has become wealthier, older, and better educated. Barriers to registration have slowly been removed. Still, voter turnout has declined.²³

A second strand of research includes the mobilization effects of a host of economic and political variables. A recent survey of the field claims that "mobilization factors simply cannot be ignored", and that research needs to study, "... elite and informal mobilization activities and how they determine the nature, timing, and consequences of individual participation".²⁴ Although the literature on mobilization, at first glance, may seem to focus on campaign activities it was actually concerned with aggregate economic and political conditions.

²¹ Goldenberg and Traugott. *Campaigning for Congress* Page 5

²² Goldenberg and Traugott. *Campaigning for Congress*. Page 7

²³ For the classic discussion of this problem see Brody, Richard A. "The Puzzle of Political Participation in America." In Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System*. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute 1978) pp. 287-324.

²⁴ Leighley. "Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation."

A clue to the voting paradox is be found not in turnout studies but in the examination of what makes voters pick one candidate over another. Much of the early research on voting behavior, including studies conducted by the Survey Research Center (SRC), identified party as the most important factor influencing a voter's choice. Party stood out even stronger against a background of voter ignorance. Early research also laid the groundwork for the commonplace that Americans knew little about presidential candidates and even less about congressional and senatorial candidates.²⁵ Weak knowledge of the issues suggested that voters made decisions based on social, psychological, and political cues. Party has retained its predictive strength even in the face of the decline of party identification in the electorate. In a new addition of their classic study, Miller reprises the importance of party "As a long-term stable predisposition, party identification is not only a point of departure for electoral analysis; it is the most important of several predisposition's that provide continuity across electoral epochs."²⁶

Once party was enthroned as the variable of choice, subsequent studies slighted the effects of campaigns on voter choice and electoral success or failure. University of Michigan studies conducted throughout the sixties showed a slight decline in partisan identification and an increase in split-ticket voting. Yet, despite an evident decline in party importance, researchers did not focus on campaign effects, choosing instead to investigate economic and political variables not subject to campaign activities. The most important of the variables affecting voter choice was incumbency while partisanship,

²⁵ Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes. *The American Voter*

²⁶ Miller and Shanks *The New American Voter*. Page 11

presidential popularity, economic conditions, political conditions, and the differences between incumbents and challengers were examined for their effects on turnout. The data sources for these studies were generally aggregate national data or survey information. Generally, aggregate studies which link either national economic conditions or presidential popularity show a stronger effect on turnout than revealed by individual level panel or survey data.²⁷ The original focus on incumbency as a voting cue eventually led researchers to the more specific question of campaign effects on voter mobilization. There has been a long and still unresolved debate as to whether a decline in partisan voting portends a weakening of political parties or a change in their electoral role as voter attention shifts to a cue based on incumbency.²⁸ There is no denying that until 1994 incumbents were remarkably safe. Well over 90% could expect to be elected in a typical cycle and, at least through the sixties and seventies, they seemed to get reelected by more votes each election.²⁹ Incumbency enhances safety and that safety grows with service. The longer one serves, the safer one becomes.³⁰

²⁷ See Abramowitz, Alan I., and Jeffrey A. Segal. *Senate Elections*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); Alan I. Abramowitz. "Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives." In Joel H. Silbey ed., *Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System*. (New York: Scribner's, 1994); Barbara Hinkley and Edward Muir. "Elections to the U.S. Senate." In Joel H. Silbey, Ed, *Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System*. (New York: Scribner's, 1994); Gary C. Jacobson. *The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946-1988*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); For an excellent summary of both aggregate and individual level responses see Gary Jacobson. *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper-Collins 1992).

²⁸ Burnham, Walter Dean. *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*. (New York: Norton Press, 1970).

²⁹ See Fiorina, Morris. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It." *American Political Science Review* 71 1971, pp 177-181; Mayhew, David. *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1974); Cover, Albert D. "One Good Term Deserves Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections." *American Journal of Political*

Explanations for incumbent safety fall into three categories. First, some studies link the rise in incumbent safety to changes in incumbent resources and behavior. Redistricting, congressional mail, free travel, case work, local appearances, and bureaucratic growth have all been cited as internally generated sources of incumbent strength.³¹ An alternative explanation of incumbent success looks at change within the electorate. This argument claims that voters now use incumbency rather than party as a prime voter cue. Albert Cover suggests that incumbency has gained at the expense of partisanship because incumbents attract an increasing number of defectors from the opposition party.³² In a study supporting Cover's thesis, Warren Kostroski shows that party has declined as a voting cue in Senate Elections and has been replaced by incumbency.³³ It is still an open question as to whether a big victory margin for an incumbent is at all related to either future victory margins or even the certainty of victory itself. Winners of safe open seats are often able to keep their seats safe but winners of marginal open seats are not able to make the seat safer in future elections.

Science 21 1974: 523-542

³⁰ Alford, John and John Hibbing. "Increased Incumbency Advantage in the House." *Journal of Politics* 43 1981, pp 1042-61.

³¹ See for example Tufte, Edward. "The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems." *American Political Science Review* 67 1973: pp 540-54; Mayhew. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. and Fiorina. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It."

³² Cover. "One Good Term Deserves Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections.

³³ Kostroski, Warren. "Party and Incumbency in Post War Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns, and Models." *American Political Science Review* (December, 1973): 1213-1234

At issue in all of this discussion of the relation of incumbency to victory is the logic that asserts larger victory margins indicate safer seats.³⁴

If incumbents are winning by larger margins, but are still not any safer, it indicates an increased volatility in the electorate or changes introduced from election to election by the quality of the challenger or incumbent and the type of campaign run by the participants. Such evidence points to a dynamic within the campaign itself. Two such dynamics include campaign spending and challenger quality. Explanations of incumbent safety might also focus on an uneven contest between a well known incumbent and an unknown challenger. Incumbents fare well because they run against unknown opponents and people vote for names they recognize.³⁵ Much of the research studying incumbency in light of challenger qualities emerged from new data generated from American National Election Survey (ANES). This series of surveys was the first to include congressional district level questions and a district sample size distribution suitable for analysis. More than just a change in explanation, these studies change the analysis from items like incumbency and party, which are not under the direct control of the campaign, to items like the name recognition of the challenger, which are more effected by campaign activities. When asked to rate House candidates, most voters

³⁴ See the original statement of the problem in David Mayhew "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals." *Polity* (Spring 1974b): 295-317. For other discussions see John Ferejohn. "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections" *American Political Science Review* March 1977: pp 166-176.

³⁵ See Gary Jacobson. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections." and *Money in Congressional Elections*; Hinckley, Barbara. 1980. "House Re-Elections and Senate Defeats: The Role of The Challenger". *British Journal of Political Science* 10 441-460; Mann and Wolfinger. "Who Votes?" Alan Abramowitz. "A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative in the 1978 Election.

emphasize personal traits, with incumbents especially effective at engendering positive personal evaluations ³⁶. In cases with little or no information, personal evaluations favor incumbents at the expense of challengers and such personal qualifications influence voters independent of party and incumbency. ³⁷ This information makes it plausible that a well financed challenger, by increasing name recognition, can influence the election apart from the social and political demographics of the electorate. The quality of challengers then, is a factor in voter choice and the closeness of a given congressional race. Challenger quality itself has been measured in a variety of ways including past political experience, the type of offices held, and money spent and raised. ³⁸

We have come full circle. Explanations of voter turnout based solely on social, psychological, and political information are incomplete and do not explain why voter turnout has declined over the past thirty years. Research on voting choice has also slighted the role of campaigns but, in studying the effects of incumbency, it becomes evident that campaigns do play a role in moving the electorate. Still, when

³⁶ See Richard Fenno. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).

³⁷ Ragsdale, Lynn. "Incumbent Popularity, Challenger Invisibility, and Congressional Voters." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 6: 1980 201-18

³⁸ For studies looking at past political experience see Alan Abramowitz. "A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative." Jeff Fishel, *Party and Organization: Congressional Challengers in American Politics*. (New York: McKay 1973.); Robert J Huckshorn and Robert C. Spencer. *The Politics of Defeat*. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1971); Jacobson "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections." Mann and Wolfinger. 1980. "Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections." For more sophisticated measures of challenger quality see Shawn Rosenberg, Lisa Bohan, Patrick McCafferty, and Kevin Harris. . "The Image and the Vote: The Effect of Candidate Persentation on Voter Preference." *American Journal of Political Science* 30:1986. pp. 108-27; Robert Biersak, Paul S. Herrinson, and Clyde Wilcox. . "Seeds for Success: Early Money in Congressional Elections." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 18 1993: 535-51; Jon R. Bond, Cary Covington, Richard Fleisher. . "Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections." *Journal of Politics* 47 1985: 510-29.

concentrating on the mere status of the competitor or on the aggregate spending involved, the actual effects of campaigns are only implied.

2.2 Campaign Effects and Elections

Paradoxically, some forms of participation have enjoyed a sharp increase. For example, Kenneth Goldstein analyzed the growth of grassroots lobbying in the office of former Senator Hart, of Michigan. Senator Hart received approximately 1795 constituent contacts per month in 1959. By his retirement in 1975 that figure had grown to 9870. His successor, Senator Carl Levin, received 20,000 letters, 5000 telegrams, 10,000 calls, and 1000 faxes per month in 1992.³⁹ Americans are also great givers of political contributions. Frank Sorauf estimates that in 1988 between 13,000,000 and 15,000,000 Americans donated to political campaigns.⁴⁰ Kenneth Goodwin takes note of the increasing participation shown by Americans in many facets of political life and credits the growth to elite direct marketing.⁴¹ In fact, in many categories, including political donations, Americans far outstrip their European counterparts. With fundraising, it is observed that American scholars ask, "Who gives how much and why?" while a European observer might ask "Why give at all?". In all three of the studies mentioned above; that of Goldstein on lobbying, Goodwin on elite interest groups, and Sorauf on money, the common element is elite recruitment. Sorauf

³⁹ Goldstein, Kenneth. "Seeding the Grassroots: Mobilization and Contacting Congress." A paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association meeting, Palmer House, Chicago, April 6-9 1995.

⁴⁰ Sorauf, Frank. *Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities* (New Haven, Yale University Press 1992) Page 36

⁴¹ Goodwin, Kenneth R. *One Billion Dollars of Influence: The Direct Marketing of Politics*. (Chatham, N.J., Chatham House 1988) Page 1

summarizes the attitude by saying, "Although contributors respond to inner motivations and political convictions, they respond more immediately to a specific stimulus."⁴² A political fund-raiser might summarize this line of thinking by claiming that no one gives unless asked.

Other studies have looked at the links between campaign action or spending patterns and the vote. Broadcast advertising, for example, as measured by a proportion of total expenditures is a positive predictor of the candidate's final vote.⁴³ In fact, the news media, by focusing on campaign ads and the horse race, convert ad messages into horse race stories and the medium truly becomes the message.⁴⁴ Older studies on media effects presented researchers with mixed results, with some claiming the commercials lead to a more informed electorate and others showing that ads had no effect on the voter's views of candidate quality.⁴⁵ More recent studies, using techniques derived from cognitive psychology have taken a broader and deeper view of influence and have argued for a powerful mass media effect.⁴⁶

⁴² Sorauf, *Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities* Page 36

⁴³ Jacobson, Gary. "Strategic Politicians and The Dynamics of U.S. House Elections 1946-1986." *American Political Science Review* 83 1989: 773-93; Goldenberg, Edie and Michael Traugott. *Campaigning for Congress*. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press 1984).

⁴⁴ West, Darrell. *Air Wars* (CQ Press, Washington D.C 1993.)

⁴⁵ For the "Ad-Effects" view see Gina Garramore "Effects of Negative Political Advertising", *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* 29 1985 as well as West, *Air Wars*. For an early statement of the "no effects" view see McClure, Robert and Thomas Patterson. *The Unseeing Eye* (New York, Putnams, 1976.)

⁴⁶ Iyengar, Shanto. *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991); Graber, Doris. *Mass Media and American Politics*. (Washington D.C. CQ Press, 1993) 4th ed.

Campaign spending bears a complex relation to electoral outcome even after controlling for party and incumbency.⁴⁷ Challenger spending is strongly related to electoral success whereas incumbent spending had a slightly inverse relationship to the election result. Jacobson suggests that incumbent spending is largely reactive to challenger spending as incumbents in trouble spend more money.⁴⁸

It is possible that studies showing small campaign effects are compatible with campaign industry assumptions regarding the power of campaigns. At issue is the term "small". Even in a world of givens, any effort that might move 2% to 8% of the voters might easily be enough for victory. This notion of political elites operating within a realm of givens is captured in a quote from The New American Voter.

To qualify as a long-term influence a given characteristic must both be stable ... and have a continuing impact on other partisan attitudes or the vote. In contrast, short-term forces in a given campaign can be based on either the temporary activation of stable predisposition's or some unique forces (and therefore transient) aspect of the current campaign. Short-term forces need not have an impact on other forces that help shape the vote.⁴⁹

Most political professionals, despite some self-serving posturing every four years, understand that they can only change votes that lie at the margin of a complex series of givens, including party, incumbency, economics, issues, and other ongoing political contacts. This same notion, of the campaign as an entity moving in a field of givens, is

⁴⁷ Jacobson, *Money in Congressional Elections*.

⁴⁸ There is also an argument over whether incumbents raise money because of the existence of a strong challenger or to prevent the emergence of a strong challenger in the first place. See Janet M. Box-Steffensmeir, "A Dynamic Analysis of the Role of War Chests in Campaign Strategy," *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (1996): 352-371 and Jonathan S. Krasno and Donald Philip Green, "Preempting quality Challengers in House Elections" *Journal of Politics* 50 (1988): 920-937

⁴⁹ Miller and Shanks. *The New American Voter*. pp. 8-9

emphasized by Gary Jacobson, when he claims, "The electoral impact of even major national issues depends in good part on how effectively individual candidates exploit them in local campaigns."⁵⁰ Jacobson goes on to say, "what matters to campaigns is not whether a majority of constituents care about issues at any particular time, but whether an attentive public can be made to care".⁵¹ In particular, the question is whether an attentive public will notice issues and become active, or inactive, based upon the candidate's issue positions.

Studies that look in detail at the workings of congressional campaigns also emphasize campaign effects within a realm of political and social givens. Campaigns take shape in response to political realities.⁵² Some studies have examined the relationship between recognition and evaluation and found that, for incumbents, name recognition is a necessary but not sufficient explanation of incumbent strength and that the reputation of the incumbent matters as well.⁵³ In the Abramowitz model, voter evaluation of personal qualities, issue positions, constituent service and a diffuse image variable combine to form an overall incumbent evaluation leading to voter choice.

⁵⁰ Jacobson Gary. *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. (New York: Harper Collins, 1992) p 7

⁵¹ Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections* p.73

⁵² It might be better said that "good" campaigns do. Good campaigns target their resources. Goldenberg and Traugott (*Campaigning for Congress*, p 47) found that 28% of the campaigns under study targeted only supporters, 32% independents (swing), and fully 40% said they were targeting all voters whether for conversion or for GET-OUT-THE-VOTE.

⁵³ Goldenberg and Traugott. *Campaigning for Congress*. Salmore and Salmore. *Candidates, Parties and Campaigns*.

Certainly the presentation of personal qualities, issue positions, and the "diffuse image variable" are critical parts of any campaign.⁵⁴

Lynn Ragsdale adds the challenger to the model and asks, "how is incumbent popularity and challenger invisibility related?" Ragsdale not only tries to account for different evaluations between the challenger and the incumbent, she also looks at the different effects of media advertising vs. personal campaign contact and finds some evidence that personal contact campaigning might be more effective.

The most ambitious attempts at measuring campaign effects on voter choice and turnout has been made by Goldenberg and Traugott. Using a representative sample of congressional races, they examined the effects of stated campaign strategies and actual campaign activity on a statistically derived measure of a normal vote. They use data from campaign manager interviews, the ANES survey, FEC reports, campaign literature, and media content analysis to develop a model of campaign effect on electoral success. The model evaluates relative electoral success as a function of relative candidate recognition and relative candidate evaluation. They suggest that evaluation is in turn a function of candidate status combined with the quantity and quality of media coverage. Their research also suggests that elections are affected by the working of the local press and campaign spending strategies. The authors use a two stage multivariate test, the first to determine the effect of media on recognition and evaluation and the second to measure the effect of recognition and evaluation on electoral success.

⁵⁴ Abramowitz, "A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative in 1978"

They conclude:

Media content is demonstrably important to electoral outcome. Advantages in the quantity of attention by the news media as well as endorsements and greater resources to purchase campaign controlled advertising are of obvious benefit to the favored contestant. Media coverage directly translates into recognition and evaluation that in turn lead to favorable margins at the polls.⁵⁵

Goldenberg and Traugott see campaigns as more than simply competition between two candidates. Instead, they take the broader view that campaigns can be part of an ongoing process undertaken by political professionals with long term career goals. As such, campaigns are about more than winning and losing. They also are strategic contests where a large victory margin may discourage future competition or a surprise showing may improve future electoral prospects. Elections are less discrete events and more a part of a career process.

Research focusing on voter characteristics has provided a powerful model for predicting an individual's likelihood of turning out to vote. However, that same research left unanswered a number of question regarding the variability of turnout from election to election and the overall decline in voter turnout. Studies which focused on the effects of campaign variables such as incumbency, campaign finance, and challenger quality have suggested that campaigns have effects as well. In addition, a third strand of literature, that focused on the mobilization effects of political situations and actions returns to the question of whether voters are mobilized to vote because of aggregate political conditions or because, like the person contributing to a campaign, they have been asked. These mobilization effects have received increasing attention.⁵⁶ Part of the

⁵⁵ Goldenberg and Traugott, *Campaigning for Congress*, p 159

⁵⁶ Leighley, Jan Attitudes, Opportunities, and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation

interest in mobilization effects stems from concern that the SES model assumes that attitudes precede behavior and do not consider whether the activities themselves may generate future behavior. It ignores the possibility that voting might be more productively viewed as a habit and policy concerns directed toward the early development of such habits. Participation enhances numerous political attitudes including efficacy and sophistication.⁵⁷ This is not to suggest that the SES model is not powerful, it clearly is. It is only to suggest that political variables need to be included in any model of turnout. The notion of a political variable might be an aggregate national variable such as the state of the economy or the presence of a presidential election; a local, or state level variable such as the competitiveness of a race or the strength of the top of the ticket; or a specific campaign event such as direct voter contact efforts.⁵⁸ Although there is ample work on the aggregate level effects, less attention has been paid to the role campaign activities themselves have on voter turnout.

The few studies that do focus on the extent of campaign effects show that campaigns can operate at the margin of political and social givens. While campaign information is not the sole source of voter evaluation, it is a necessary and important component. Conventional wisdom supports the notion of marginal effects as well and suggests that voter mobilization can increase voting rates by a modest 2%-5%; but

⁵⁷ Bennet, Stephen. "Know-Nothings' Revisited: The Meaning of Political Ignorance Today." *Social Science Quarterly* 69 1988: 476-490

⁵⁸ For a brief summary of the literature on political variables and voting at the congressional level and below see Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg. "What Determines Congressional and State-Level Voting?" In, *Controversies in Voting Behavior, 3rd Edition* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press 1993) pp. 207-221

again, percentages and effects that may seem small in the abstract may make the difference between victory and defeat on election day.

If there have been few empirical studies on campaigns in general, there have been even fewer that isolate the effects of different campaign techniques on turnout and electoral results. What work has been done on individual campaign activities has concentrated on television. Television is generally considered to be the most important form of modern campaigning, and certainly dominates presidential and senatorial politics, but when looking at American politics as a whole, mail usurps TV's throne.

According to the May 1997 issue of Campaigns and Elections:

Mail emerges as the top expenditure category. Over \$3 Billion dollars was spent by political candidates and committees on direct mail over the last four years. This covered everything from list rental to database management, labeling to postage, printing and processing to layout and design, computerized targeting to creative copywriting.⁵⁹

Despite its widespread use there has been very little examination of direct contact in the literature on campaigns and elections. In 1992, Paul Herrnson found that campaign techniques had an impact on a House challenger's vote share, and that direct mail, in some circumstances, had the greatest impact.⁶⁰ Aggregate measures of campaign spending often obscure the distribution of such resources. When campaign spending is divided into categories that include direct communication with voters, campaign spending not encompassing direct communication, and non-campaign

⁵⁹ Ron Fauchaeux, *Campaigns and Elections Magazine* "Answer d) Direct Mail" May, 1997 p 23

⁶⁰ Herrnson, *Congressional Elections*.

spending, it is the money spent on communication which is most closely related to the final vote.⁶¹

Campaign activity is an important source of turnout variation. Turnout varies first by interest in the campaign, but secondly by voter recruitment through the party or the campaign. Of those recruitment mechanisms campaign literature is most effective among those predisposed to vote already.⁶²

Bingham Powell puzzles over the political attitudes of most Americans, which would predict high voter turnout, and the relatively low turnout in US elections vis-a-vis other countries. He blames low turnout at least partially on institutional restraints:

The present analysis suggests that in comparative perspective, turnout in the US is advantaged about 5% by political attitudes, but disadvantaged 13% by the party system and institutional factors, and up to 14% by the registration laws.⁶³

Powell also includes under his "institutional restraints" the object of study in this paper: party voter turnout and recruitment efforts. He finds the lack of such programs, especially among citizens with low levels of education and income, to be one of the main reasons for turnout variance. Other authors have also concluded that our system "of political mobilization does not do a good job of covering those at the bottom of the social order."⁶⁴

⁶¹ Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Alan Gerber. "The Mismeasure of Campaign Spending: Evidence from the 1990 U.S. House Elections." *Journal of Politics* 56 1994: 1106-18

⁶² Claussen, Aage. "Do Parties Make a Difference?" *Journal of Politics*. V. 48 1986 page 47

⁶³ Powell, Bingham. "Turnout in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review*. V. 80 1986. pp 17-44

⁶⁴ Walker, Jack L. Jr. Three Modes of Political Mobilization. Paper presented at American Political Science Association, 1984 p 33

John Blydenburg conducted a controlled experiment on door-to-door canvassing and telephone solicitation at the precinct level. For analytical purposes, Blydenburg found it convenient to distinguish between two possible types of voting behavior effects, referred to in his study as preference and turnout effects.

By a preference effect, we shall mean any alteration in the individual's candidate preference or more precisely, in the conditional probability that if he votes, he will vote for a given candidate. By turnout effect, we shall mean any alteration in the probability that he votes at all, for any candidate.⁶⁵

Blydenburg found significant persuasion effects but not turnout effects, the exact opposite of previous studies. He suggests that this reversal may be because the other studies were about races heavily covered in the media where people had made up their minds and additional personal contact simply encouraged turnout.

Another controlled experiment on personal campaigning and the vote was conducted in Britain by Bochtel and Denver.⁶⁶ They explicitly asked the question underlying this study: "Do election campaigns then merely serve to provide personal psychic satisfaction or to increase 'expressive solidarity' amongst party activists?". The authors chose two flats in one ward of Dundee. One flat provided a control while the other flat became the location for the experiment. The experimental flat went through three campaign phases. First they received a personal canvass. The canvass was followed by a literature distribution and finally, favorable voters were called, reminded

⁶⁵ Blydenburg, John "A Controlled Experiment to Measure the effects of Personal Contact Campaigning. *Midwest Journal of Political Science*. May 1971 365-381 Quote from Gerald H. Kramer, "An Analysis of the Effectiveness of Certain Precinct Level Campaigning Activities"

⁶⁶ Bochtel, John and Warren Denver. "The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local Government Elections, *British Journal of Political Science* 2 239-260 1971.

to vote, and offered a ride to the polls. The authors found that those voters receiving calls and a canvass were 10% more likely to vote than those living in the control flat.

Boctel and Denver conclude

Scholars concerned with the problem of non voting, for example, have tended to discuss the phenomenon in terms of social and demographic variables, offering sociological types of explanation. We would not quarrel with this, but would suggest that the effectiveness or otherwise of local party activity is an additional factor which should be considered.⁶⁷

Daniel Katz and Samuel Eldersveld found that strong party leadership at the precinct level increased a presidential candidate's vote by 5%.⁶⁸ They also found that the differences were stronger for the minority party. Their work was supported by Raymond Wolfinger who stated as early as 1963,

The bald proposition that precinct work can have an impact has been established. A comparison of the data in this paper with those presented by Katz and Eldersveld suggests that this impact will vary in inverse ratio to the salience of the communication to the voters. The present research task in this area to explore the effectiveness of vigorous party activity in conditions of varying public knowledge and interest in different types of elections, with different types of voters.⁶⁹

Gerald Kramer likewise found that personal contact was effective in increasing turnout but not effective in influencing voter preferences for presidential, congressional, or local office candidates. Surprisingly, Kramer found repeated contacts to be relatively ineffective.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Boctel and Denver, p 269

⁶⁸ Katz, Daniel and Samel J. Eldersveld, "The Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the Electorate. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 25 1961 pp 1-25

⁶⁹ Wolfinger, Raymond. "The Influence of Precinct Work on Voting Behavior." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Fall 1963. p 398.

⁷⁰ Kramer, Gerald H. "The Effects of Precinct Level Canvassing on Voter Behavior", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34, 1971. pp 560-572

In a more recent study, Robert Hughes, using voter files for the analysis, concluded that the phone canvass under study had little effect on the turnout rate of the independents targeted by the campaign. Simply getting someone on the telephone appeared to be positively correlated with turnout. This is not so unusual as it might sound. The chance of reaching someone on the telephone is closely related to stability. Variables that predict stability such as age, income and community involvement are also related to voter turnout.⁷¹ W. Adams and DJ Smith came to the same conclusion, that merely having a phone and answering the canvass call might predict increased turnout.⁷²

The most recent and most comprehensive explication of mobilization literature, and one that focuses on campaign effects, is the work of Stephen Rosenstone and Mark Hansen.⁷³ Taking another look at why voter participation is declining, and why it fluctuates from campaign to campaign, they suggest that social, demographic, and attitudinal data can only account for 60% percent of the overall decline in voter turnout, while fluctuations in elite mobilization efforts account for the rest. This marriage of social and demographic predisposition's with targeted and purposeful elite mobilization efforts helps to explain the decline in participation as parties, PACs, and campaigns expend increasing energy on governmental lobbying efforts and decreasing efforts on more traditional voter turnout efforts. Rosenstone and Hansen describe the constellation

⁷¹ Hughes, Robert. "Assessing the Effectiveness of a Phone Bank Voter ID and GET-OUT-THE-VOTE Program for Unaffiliated Voters for the 1988 General Election: An Exploratory Study. *Voter Contact Journal* 1991.

⁷² Adams W and DJ Smith. "Effects of Telephone Canvassing on Turnout and Preference: A Field Experiment. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Fall 1980 pp 389-395

⁷³ Rosenstone and Hansen, *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. Page 25

of factors affecting the who and when of participation with the phrase "the centrality of political elites" which is a very different description of the political process than the social and psychological determinism of earlier studies.⁷⁴

Direct mobilization by political elites for the purpose of increasing turnout is declining according to Hansen and Rosenstone. They argue that "Political economic, and social changes have dramatically altered the mix of incentives for political mobilization and ... face to face canvassing in neighborhoods has given way to polls and focus groups... Grass roots organization has given way to professional staff."⁷⁵ Changes like these are part and parcel of the move from party to candidate centered campaigns and much of the new technology is hired by professional lobbying firms, interest groups, and individual campaigns. Parties, on the other hand, have remained active in direct contact efforts. Soft money and coordinated campaigns, despite becoming appellations for scandal, were originally legal avenues for increasing party Get-Out-The-Vote and volunteer efforts. Although it has been persuasively argued that parties have declined in importance for candidate recruitment and nomination, local and state parties are still active in mobilizing the electorate.⁷⁶ Party communication efforts

⁷⁴ The recent rewrite of the American Voter, called "The New American Voter" looks to formative generational political experiences as determinants of voter behavior which adds an element of history, and thus, through the back door, governmental statesmanship and politics, as long term factors effecting turnout levels.

⁷⁵ Rosenstone and Hansen, *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America* pp 233-234

⁷⁶ For arguments looking at parties and mobilization see Paul Herrnson, "Do Parties Make a Difference?", *Journal of Politics* 589-613 v. 48 1986; and James Gibson, Cornelius Cotter, John Bibby and Robert Huckshorn, "Whither the Local Parties?: A Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Analysis of the Strengths of Party Organization", *American Journal of Political Science*, 29, 1985 pp 139-160. Perhaps this distinction underlies the change in parties from organizations which control jobs and, as a result, the career patterns of dependent politicians to organizations which control, develop, and distribute political

not only increase the stock of voter information but also act as a direct motivator of turnout.⁷⁷ Although parties may have declined as shapers of policy, they do appear to be active in voter mobilization.⁷⁸

Studies of political organizations outside of the party structure also document the efficacy of elite mobilization. Goldstein, for example argues that, with all other factors in his model held constant, elite mobilization increased the probability of participation in a variety of political programs by 33%.⁷⁹

The literature suggests that voters participate and choose based largely on social, psychological, and political factors outside of the realm of campaign control. As campaign finance data made possible a closer analysis of specific campaigns, more studies began to raise questions about the individual campaign effort within the arena of social and political givens and, as seen, these studies indicate that campaigns do have an effect. Still, these studies are limited in using data like campaign spending to stand for what in reality is more specific campaign actions like the production and presentation of TV and radio, direct mail, rallies, literature drops, etc. Barbara Hinckley comments

technology. The move from politics to technology can certainly be seen as parallel to the change from recruitment and nomination to mobilization.

⁷⁷ Claussen Aage and Mary Ann Kasofsky, "Dynamic Modelling of Campaign Effects on Voting Participation Level". A paper presented at the 1989 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta.

⁷⁸ The classic statement on responsible parties is "Toward a More Responsible Two Party System" produced by the Committee on Political Parties and published in *American Political Science Review* September 1950.

⁷⁹ Goldstein, *Seeding the Grassroots*.

that "(r)esearch designs have not yet linked the campaign stimulus with the voter response".⁸⁰

Goldenberg and Traugott summarize the problem:

It has been difficult, however to collect contextual data systematically. It is one thing for the press to speculate or campaigns to assert that this or that issue or strategy or contribution made a difference. Maybe they are right and maybe they are wrong it is quite another problem-- and a much more difficult one -- to measure campaign emphasis or media coverage or a pattern of endorsements.⁸¹

The studies of direct contact covered in this chapter have left a number of questions unanswered, or have given conflicting answers to the same questions. Although the studies have consistently found some small effect from contact efforts, be they for elections or lobbying efforts, there is no agreement as to the strength or scope of the effect. There is no agreement or analysis on what types of communication are effective and on what types of voters. No one has studied many contacts are needed nor has anyone systematically looked at what types of contacts go to different voting cohorts. Mobilization literature in general has placed campaign activities back into the forefront of analysis but the accumulation of campaign specific data is difficult.

One reason for the lack of data on these questions is the difficulty of collecting such detailed information using surveys, the most common method of studying campaigns. The following study explores campaign effects by studying the direct contact efforts of four campaigns but instead of using survey information the data set will be created using files of registered voters as a base and adding campaign contact

⁸⁰ Hinckley, Barbara, *"Congressional Elections"* (Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington, DC 1981) p 138

⁸¹ Goldenberg and Traugott, *Campaigning for Congress* p 4.

information, gathered from interviews, contact reviews, and campaign finance reporting, to that base. Voter files allow the detailed tracking of individual voters and an accurate measurement of their actual participation. The most difficult aspect of studying campaigns is developing a research design which efficiently links a voter's behavior and demographic background to campaign contacts. By allowing an exact one-to-one matching between a voter record and a campaign contact voter files allow the use of the information already on the file such as age, gender, party, and past voter history. More importantly, using a voter file allows coding each phone call and mail piece to the correct voter group and avoids survey and panel methods which rely on the voter's memory of campaign communications. This in-depth campaign view allows for the comparison of voter groups within a single campaign between those receiving a campaign contact and those in similar political and demographic groups who, for a variety of reasons, did not receive a campaign contact. Using voter files allows the testing of a number of theories on turnout as well as an opportunity to cover a campaign's direct contact effort in great detail.

CHAPTER 3

CONTACTING VOTERS

Any man who attains a high place among you ... may date his downfall from the moment; for any printed lie that any notorious villain pens ... appeals at once to your distrust, and is believed.

Charles Dickens, *American Notes*, 1842

To judge from casual conversation or news coverage Americans have taken Dickens to heart. Negative campaigning is at the top of many campaign finance reforms and citizens often decry the "state of our dirty campaigns". Are campaigns as negative as we seem to think they are? What types of campaign communications are there? The election literature summarized in the previous chapter offers a variety of perspectives on campaigns. One branch of the literature focuses on voting behavior with its emphasis on the psychological, social, and demographic characteristics of voters. A second perspective takes elite action as the unit of analysis and studies candidate recruitment, media placement, campaign finance, campaign behavior, and mobilization efforts. Literature on voting behavior, by concentrating on voter characteristics, often slights the effects of campaigns, while studies looking at the electoral context often verify that campaigns may be as important as the anecdotal evidence suggests. Still, campaign studies labor under the difficulty of assembling data from fleeting enterprises and assigning causal relations to the data that can be salvaged.

This chapter concentrates on the idea of direct contact as currently used by political professionals. What is direct voter contact? Why is it worthy of study? What campaigns use voter contact and when? How are direct contact efforts implemented in

the political environment? The answers to these questions are interesting in and of themselves, but they also open up a rich world of data sources -- files of registered voters -- which can be used to track voter participation at the individual level and electoral results at the precinct level.

The analysis of direct contact will proceed in five parts. First, there will be an extended discussion of the activity of direct contact as it is understood and defined by political professionals. This discussion will be used to develop a way of categorizing direct contact efforts for study and analysis. This extended effort at definition will comprise the second part of this chapter. Third, using a database of campaign expenditures, combined with census information, we will take a brief look at who uses direct contact and under what circumstances such use takes place. The fourth part of this chapter looks at the construction and content of files of registered voters as used by campaigns. The final section will pull together the previous four sections in a discussion of case study selection.

3.1 Direct Contact

As understood by campaign professionals, "direct voter contact" refers to that portion of the campaign using techniques that reach out to individual voters. It may seem at first that all campaign activities reach out to individual voters but they do not. Television and radio are experienced by an individual voter at home, or maybe in the car on the way to work, but the commercial is targeted at a demographic group, not an individual. Because it is targeted at a group and then broadcast over the airways it is certain that people not in the target audience will receive the message. Direct contact is often contrasted with "broadcasting" and is even sometimes referred to as

"narrowcasting" by consultants. Direct contact is exactly that. It is the delivery of a contact directly to an individual, not a group. That individual is part of a target group, but the message goes to particular individuals with specific demographic or political characteristics. It is the individual nature of the message delivery that is the distinguishing feature of direct contact and it is from that distinguishing feature that the distinctive strengths and weaknesses of direct contact flow.

It might also be useful here to revisit the division alluded to in the previous chapter between efforts designed to persuade voters and efforts made to turnout voters. This is the same distinction as the "preference effect" for candidate preference and the "turnout effect" regarding the alteration of the probability that an individual will vote at all, for any candidate.⁸² Although direct contact encompasses both persuasion and turnout, the two are not only different in practice, they require a different method of analysis. In the following study the two are analyzed separately because of the different nature of the dependent variable. In turnout it is only necessary to look at a tape of voters after the election in question to ascertain participation in the previous election but the voter's actual candidate choice is not so easily discerned. Most campaign studies use surveys to measure voter behavior and surveys have a clear advantage in the amount and flexibility of the data collected, but voter files record actual participation and avoid the over-reporting of participation by survey respondents.

Turnout and persuasion have even spawned different industries. Persuasion efforts rely heavily on the mail and are managed by direct mail consultants or the occasional general consultant. Turnout efforts, also referred to as Get-Out-The-Vote

⁸² Blydenburg, "A Controlled Experiment to Measure the Effects of Personal Contact Campaigning"

(GOTV), are usually phone or door-to-door efforts. The world of turnout is more diverse than the persuasion universe as campaign volunteers, party workers, professional phone banks, and field consultants all perform the necessary technical tasks.

Turnout efforts tend to include more volunteers than persuasion direct contact but it is always possible for a campaign to use volunteers for the production and delivery of mail just as it is common for professional phone centers to make GOTV calls. There are persuasion telephone calls just as there are mailings designed to effect turnout but the distinction between the two, both in practice and for purposes of analysis is important enough for emphasis.

It is also important to distinguish direct voter contact from fundraising. There is little, if any, discussion of direct contact efforts in academic literature, and, where there is, it concentrates on direct mail fundraising. Direct mail fundraising is a distinct campaign activity and one that has everything to do with money and very little to do with the immediate turnout or persuasion of voters. Still, the confusion of direct mail fundraising and persuasion mail persists even in works as comprehensive and well respected as Larry Sabato's Political Consultants. Sabato has an entire chapter devoted to direct mail but only talks about the list segmentation and production involved in fundraising, not persuasion. The political industry reflects the distinction as firms specialize in either fundraising or political direct mail, but seldom both.⁸³ A company like the San Francisco/D.C. based Campaign Performance Group will do only voter

⁸³ Of late a few firms have combined. The fundraising firm Malchow and Associates merged with the November Group, a persuasion mail firm and the fundraising firm Norman Communication merged with David Welch and Associates, a Republican persuasion company. In both cases the former firm is devoted to fundraising and the latter to persuasion direct mail and political communication. They are treated as very different worlds because they are.

persuasion mail while a firm like the Boston based, SCM Associates produces fundraising mail.

Fundraisers contact those deemed likely to donate money. There is an almost unspoken assumption that the people receiving fundraising mail will, at a minimum, vote for the candidate sending out the mail. Even when prospecting, enormous efforts are expended to acquire lists of "likely" supporters. In fundraising, the lists are smaller, the targeting more intense, and the costs per piece greater. Persuasion mail is generally targeted at undecided voters. The message emphasizes issues of import to the undecided and is designed for immediate, emotional appeal. Persuasion mail uses voter file targeting to reach larger universes at a lower per piece cost than fundraising mail.⁸⁴

All campaign communication involves targeting, message construction, and message dissemination. A campaign's polling for example, may suggest that women aged 45-55 are a swing voting universe. A campaign using television will produce an ad appealing to the target universe and then purchase commercial time in television slots which, according to a number of possible measures, attract large numbers of viewers who are women, aged 45-55.

The direct mail equivalent is the creation of a mail piece with a message and a design appropriate for the targeted voters. The piece is mailed directly to the target audience of women making use of a list of registered voters for the selection of the list and final dissemination. It is in the dissemination phase that direct voter contact differs most significantly from television and radio. No matter how sophisticated the targeting when using electronic media, the message will go out to a broad spectrum of voters.

⁸⁴ See Sabato, *The Rise of Political Consultants*.

Even commercials run on specialized cable channels, while aimed at particular groups, still reach voters beyond the target audience. They may reach demographic groups not in the original target or they may reach voters not in the district. Such broad spectrum ads must convey its message without offense or inconsistency.

Unlike electronic media, a piece of direct mail goes to an individual household. If a message is to be directed at women, age 45-55, then the labels produced will only be for that audience, and barring error, no other. Direct mail allows for a finer segmentation of the audience and a more finely tuned message but lacks the immediate persuasive impact of television. It is also easier to ignore. Television commercials are hard to escape because they intrude into a passive, quotidian experience. Direct contact mail requires consumer effort and acquiescence. Mail has to be opened and then read. Phone calls must be answered and then tolerated. Much to my neighbor's dismay, I keep a trash can next to the mailbox in my front yard for rapid "sorting" and I immediately hang up on callers who mispronounce my last name. Such message handling by consumers is far different from the passive viewing of a television commercial.

When decreased persuasive power and more uncertain delivery is combined with the ability to more finely target an audience, a push for more and more dramatic message presentation is inevitable. The voter must be captured immediately by the message and the most important information conveyed in the most dramatic fashion. Furthermore, because the message is not as widely seen as a television ad a campaign might use a more divisive theme because of reduced public scrutiny.

Campaign communications are part of an overall electoral system. In this system voter habits and expectations combine with current media and computer technology to determine the mix of campaign communication methods and messages. One part of this system, targeting, has always been a part of political campaigns, but has become increasingly sophisticated. Targeting programs work to divide the electorate into coalitions that, in a standard two-party contest, will equal 50% plus one of those voting on any given election day. It is the heavily targeted nature of modern campaigns which bridges the gap between the importance attached to campaign technology by practitioners and the academic focus on social, political, and psychological givens. A practitioner knows that a technique swaying 2% to 4% of the electorate is an invaluable one but an aggregate study of campaign effects will miss small changes that are concentrated within specific voter groups.

The importance of dividing the electorate into micro-groups is one of the distinguishing features of modern campaigns. It is both a cause and effect of a volatile electorate, candidate centered campaigns, and a voter base accustomed to sophisticated communication technology. As noted above, some form of targeting has always been important. In the early 20th century party organizations targeted their own partisans. Partisan targeting involved building lists of supporters through the compilation of preexisting canvass lists or the creation of new, candidate and campaign specific lists. Campaigns then moved the identified supporters to the polls with an endlessly full bag of method including simple door knocking and extending to tavern clearing and the paying of "social dregs", as one turn of the century progressive pamphlet described a New York Democratic GOTV effort.

Campaign targeting of either individual voters or of specific demographic groups provides all campaign communications with a similar framework. Like other forms of campaign communication direct contact efforts arise from the research phase of a campaign. Research discovers how specific voters feel about issues and personalities as well as what messages move specific blocks of voters. Research looks to answer the question: What voters are undecided and how might we sway them? Related questions include: "What types of messages might move voters?" and "How should these messages be presented?" Campaign messages are often organized around a central theme but increasingly, as the public becomes accustomed to more sophisticated forms of advertisement, the single strand of a theme might be difficult to pick out from a host of diverse messages. Regardless of how it is presented, campaign communications begin with a target group and a message. The content of the campaign message and the make up of the target group form the strategy of the campaign. Although there are many other elements that go into a strategy; what is said, how it is said, and to whom it is said make up the bulk of critical campaign decisions. Targeting and message development used in campaigns has become so sophisticated that one consultant reported the use of studies to ascertain the impact of various colors on the voter perception of direct mail. No good campaign delivers a voter communication without having first defined a message. The exact content of the message can be as varied as the number of candidates but it is common to divide such efforts into negative attacks, positive communications, and issue pieces.⁸⁵ There are no generally agreed upon definitions for these terms and one campaign's positive advertisement is another

⁸⁵ See Herrnson, Campaigning for Congress or Shea, D. *Campaign Craft: The Strategies, Tactics, and Art of Political Campaign Management*. (Westport CT, Praeger Press, 1996)

campaign's scurrilous attack. Negative attacks look to shine an unflattering light on one's opponent or offer an enlightening comparison between the two candidates to the disadvantage of one's rival.⁸⁶ Negative campaigns attack an opponent on the basis of a personal or professional issue not in synch with the district.⁸⁷

Despite its reputation, not all negative communication is "dirty". In The Little Book of Campaign Etiquette, Professor William Mayer of Northeastern University is quoted as saying

We need to find out about the candidate's strengths, it is true, but we also need to learn about their weaknesses: the abilities and virtues they don't have; the mistakes they have made; the problems they haven't dealt with; the issues they would prefer not to talk about; the bad or unrealistic policies they have proposed.⁸⁸

The opposite of the negative communication is the positive one. Like negative communications, positive communications have a personal emphasis that is not always directly related to public policy. A positive image message emphasizes personal experience, history, and accomplishments.⁸⁹ A typical positive piece might be for name identification and it will invariably describe the candidate in positive, memorable terms, which will have a strong resonance with the voters in a particular district.

Campaigns also communicate with voters about issues. Issue communications present a candidate's stand on substantive public policy questions. Negative, positive,

⁸⁶ Many consultants make it a point of honor to distinguish between an attack ad and a comparison piece. They then categorize their work as "comparative".

⁸⁷ Herrnson, *Campaigning for Congress*

⁸⁸ Hess, Stephen, *The Little Book of Campaign Etiquette*, Brookings Institute Press (Washington DC 1998) page 5

⁸⁹ Herrnson, *Campaigning for Congress*

and issue pieces have a great deal of overlap and the conceptual distinction, while useful, ought not be carried too far. The Little Book of Campaign Etiquette uses the following example of an ambiguous ad. It is taken from the 1972 Nixon Campaign

The Scene opens with the camera on a formation of toy soldiers. "The McGovern defense plan," says the narrator. "He would cut the Marines by one-third. The Air Force by one-third. He'd cut Navy personnel by one-fourth, He would cut interceptor planes by one-half, The Navy fleet by one-half .." A hand comes across the screen and sweeps away the toys. "President Nixon doesn't believe we should play games with our national security."⁹⁰

In this television advertisement what might be defined as an attack on McGovern is also a useful summary of his military plans. The contrast between McGovern and Nixon was acute on issues of national defense.⁹¹

The mix of campaign messages is determined by political variables as well as research and the two most important political variables are the candidate's party and status. Status implies whether or not a candidate is an incumbent, a challenger, or a contestant for an open seat. These two items, party and incumbency, are the most important strategic dimensions of campaign planning and the two most important voter information shortcuts.⁹² It is reasonable to assume then that the source of a campaign communication raises interesting questions about that communication's content and effectiveness. Current assumptions are that candidates focus on their records and that voters evaluate candidates based on that record. Candidates are more successful if they emphasize issues which are viewed favorably by voters and for which they have an

⁹⁰ Hess, *The Little Book of Campaign Etiquette*, pp 4-5

⁹¹ For the study's working definition of negative, positive, and issue see Appendix 1.

⁹² For a summary on voter information short cuts see Samuel Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter*. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996).

established record.⁹³ This would indicate that incumbents, often the only one in the race with a record of any sort, would emphasize their background. Likewise, candidates may often exaggerate their accomplishments and voters, knowing this, may discount such claims in the absence of experience or use other voting cues altogether.⁹⁴

Candidates may also emphasize issues which are already identified with their party.⁹⁵ In 1994 the "Contract with America" provided a ready identification for Republican candidates. Republicans are associated with issues like crime and taxes while Democrats are often seen as more capable of handling education and social security. The content and quantity of issues is also affected by the competitiveness of the race. As the race becomes closer the messages become more negative.⁹⁶

Noncompetitive races are characterized by a comparable lack of campaign information.⁹⁷

⁹³ Sellers, Patrick, "Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns. *American Political Science Review* Vol. 92, No. 1, March 1998..

⁹⁴ For a discussion of how candidates and voters act in a principle-agent relationship see John Ferejohn, Ed. *Information and the Electoral Process in Information and Democratic Processes*, (Urbana IL, University of Illinois Press, 1994); For voter discounting see Melvin J Hinich and Michael C. Munger, "A Spatial Theory of Ideology." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Number 4, December 1992. pp 4-31; Shanto Iyengar, Nicholas A. Valentino, Stephen Ansolabehere, and Adam F. Simon. "Running as a Woman: Gender Stereotyping in the Political Campaigns." In *Women, Media, and Politics*, Ed. Pippa Norris. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1992)

⁹⁵ Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Shanto Iyengar. "Riding the Wave and Claiming Ownership over Issues: The Joint Effects of Advertising and News Coverage in Campaigns." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 58(2), 1994. 335-57; John Petrocik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study." *American Journal of Political Science* 40, August, 1996: 825-50

⁹⁶ See Herrnson, *Campaigning for Congress*.

⁹⁷ The notion of messages varying by competitiveness can be found in Stergios Skaperdas and Bernard Grofman, "Modeling Negative Campaigning." *American Political Science Review* 89, March 1995: 49-61

Incumbents are more likely to send positive messages highlighting their background while challengers are more likely to attack the incumbent.⁹⁸

Thus, differences in Republican and Democratic campaigns, along with even greater distinctions between incumbent and challenger races, make both differences important to the study of any campaign communication. Does the party or status of the candidate affect the type or effect of direct contact effort? Does the notion of incumbent advantage extend to the direct contact arena?

The campaign message, and the source of that message, form part of the strategic framework for campaign direct contact. In addition to strategic considerations there are also tactical choices involved in all campaign communication efforts. Some tactical choices involve allocation among different mediums such as the choice of doing television or direct contact. Other tactical choices include choosing between different methods of communication within the same medium. There is little or no research into the allocation choices among varieties of direct contact. Mail, phone, and door-to-door efforts are the only methods for delivering a direct contact effort. Why one is used instead of another often depends on candidate and consultant preference along with the purpose of the direct contact.

Direct contact has three possible goals. First, it might be used to persuade voters. Secondly, it might be used to urge voters to the polls. Finally, it is often used to identify how voters feel about a candidate or an issue. This division, with the addition of voter identification, reflects the division used by Blydenburg between preference and

⁹⁸ Herrnson, *Campaigning for Congress* and Sellers, "Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns."

turnout effects of direct contact.⁹⁹ Campaigns target some mix of base voters, generally defined as voters who are members of the candidate's party, and persuadable voters.

Campaign strategy is still more an art than a science. Still, research that has focused on the different choices made by incumbents, challengers, open seat candidates; Republicans and Democrats; and those in competitive or noncompetitive seats have suggested that the status of the race dictates the mix of direct contact efforts.¹⁰⁰ The preceding discussion has divided direct contact into a number of mutually exclusive categories. These categories, and the question they address, are summarized in table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Categories of Direct Contact

Coding	Question				
Source	Where did the contact come from?	Incumbent	Challenger	Rep.	Dem.
Type	How was the contact disseminated?	Mail	Phone	Door	
Purpose	What was the purpose of the contact?	Persuasion	GOTV		
Message	What type of message was disseminated?	Positive	Negative	Issue	

3.2 Who uses voter contact and why?

The only way to examine the effects of direct contact using the categories created in section 3.1 is to examine a race closely, or set of races, and follow the effects of each individual contact. However, before going into detail about the coding process it is possible to examine the questions of how much voter contact is used vis a vis other

⁹⁹ Blydenburg, "A Controlled Experiment to Measure the Effects of Personal Contact Campaigning."

¹⁰⁰ See Goldenberg and Traugott, *Campaigning for Congress*; Herrnson, *Congressional Elections*; Shea, *Campaign Craft: The Strategies, Tactics, and Art of Political Campaign Management*.

communication techniques; who uses direct contact; and, at least in a preliminary manner, why direct contact is used. The answers to such questions will assist in picking case studies where the entire range of categories can be examined.

Congressional candidates consider television the most important advertising medium and district population density is the key variable in resource allocation. Urban candidates tend to rate direct mail and canvass activities more highly than rural candidates, which may reflect the density and concentration of voters and the high cost of television in urban areas.¹⁰¹ Despite the dominance of television, direct contact still makes up a significant budgetary item .

In an article written for Campaigns and Elections Magazine, Katherine Cook, a direct mail consultant working for Lukens Associates, emphasizes that the strength of direct mail is its ability to reach individual voters with a specific message.¹⁰² Targeting and its associated benefits are at the heart of direct contact's appeal. In addition to the finer targeting, consultants also consider the cost of direct mail vs. other forms of communication. When you think of politics you think of the presidential election or possibly an exciting congressional or senatorial race. Seldom do city council, county commissioner, state representative, or state senator contests occur to even the most politically involved citizen. Even congressional races fall out of the populace's attention range. Even though television dominates well-known races a recent Campaign and Elections issue even suggested that direct mail might be the largest recipient of political

¹⁰¹ See Herrnson, *Congressional Elections*, pp. 181-199

¹⁰² Cook, Katy, "Mr. Smith Stays in Washington" *Campaigns and Elections Magazine*, May, 1997

money in the nation if one takes into account federal, state, county, and local races.¹⁰³

Mail and other direct contact efforts are still integral parts of the overall effort but most resources are focused on television.

Direct contact is not as public as television nor is it as easy to track from outside of the campaign. Television money flows to consultants and TV stations while direct contact expenditures can be spread out among phone companies, consultants, printers, mail shops, list vendors, and the post office. One author who has collected some figures for direct contact is Dwight Morris. Morris and his various partners have analyzed all of the campaign expenditures for every congressional race from 1990, 1992, and 1994.¹⁰⁴ The Morris data offers a number of advantages. First, it separates persuasion mail from GOTV efforts. This allows for comparison between the two conceptually distinct categories. Second, Morris keeps persuasion mail separate from fundraising expenses. Finally, Morris collects the data for each candidate; not simply each race, and provides a comparative basis for statements about the expenditures of Republicans, Democrats, incumbents and challengers.¹⁰⁵ When the Morris data for one year, in this case 1994, is combined with census data for median family income,

¹⁰³ Fauchaux, Ron, "Direct Mail" *Campaigns and Elections Magazine*, May 1997, p 15

¹⁰⁴ The book for 1994 has not been published. However, Morris did provide this author with relevant 1994 data by congressional district.

¹⁰⁵ Unfortunately, the data reporting period for the Morris data includes a large amount of organizational maintenance expenditures leading to an a distinction between incumbents -- whose spending is spread out over two years, and challengers who confine their spending to the election cycle. For the purposes of this analysis the comparison of direct mail and direct GOTV still remains valid even if the percentage figures for spending on mail and GOTV may be low for incumbent campaigns.

percentage rural, percentage over 65, and percentage with college degree, a picture begins to emerge on the use of direct contacts in campaigns.

One difficulty that Morris faced was with the reporting of expenditures for GOTV. Campaign finance reports often fail to provide enough detail to allocate expenditures and in the GOTV category -- often using volunteers and in-house lists -- it is especially difficult. He eventually placed such expenditures in an "other" category. In an interview conducted with Morris he said the assumption is that the majority of money in the "other" category was spent on some type of GOTV effort.¹⁰⁶ A further difficulty in measuring GOTV is that it is the one area where parties and independent groups, especially labor, spend an enormous amount of time and money. Often, the campaign will rely solely on the party's GOTV effort. The Committee on Political Education (COPE), the political arm of the AFL-CIO, spends a good part of its political budget on turning out registered union members. On the Republican side both the NRA and the Christian Coalition often work diligently to turnout members. Smaller GOTV efforts are run by issue groups, local unions, and professional associations. In 1996, for example, one voter file firm, Voter Contact Services (VCS) worked on GOTV efforts with the Hawaii Service Employees local, the Sierra Club, People for the American Way, and the American Medical Association. Because of the data problem and the amount of resources dedicated to GOTV and other phone efforts by entities other than the campaign, campaign spending alone probably understates the amount of money going into turnout efforts. Direct contact expenditures can still be placed in context even with the limitations of the data. In 1994 campaigns spent a grand total of

¹⁰⁶ The interview was conducted by the author in July of 1997 at Morris' Virginia office.

\$302,250,996 dollars. Of that, \$51,728,222 (17%) was spent on GOTV and \$32,326,643 (12%) went to direct mail for a combined direct contact percentage of 28%. As might be expected the variation of spending for direct contact was quite wide. Direct mail saw a range of \$573,300 and GOTV of \$662,700. The variations are also reflected in percentage expenditures with the mean percentage spent on direct contact mail being 12% but the range being from 0 to 97%. The following table summarizes spending variations for direct mail and GOTV by type of race for 1994. Because the 1994 Morris data is preliminary it was not coded by type of race. I used the final general election percentage, and a candidate code supplied by Morris, to create categories for unopposed campaigns, hot races, and contested races. Unopposed races were defined as races where only one candidate reported expenditures. A "hot race" included any campaign where the winner received 60% or less of the final vote. Finally, a race was considered merely "contested" if two candidates were present but the winner received 61% or more of the final vote. Because there was no data on the file for open seat races they are not included in this analysis.

Table 3.2 Direct Contact Expenditures by Type of Race for 1994

Level	Total Expenditure	Average Mail Expenditure	Mail Percentage	Average GOTV Expenditure	GOTV Per.
Unopposed	\$11,975,857.00	\$9,595.00	3.00%	\$27,046.00	14.00%
Hot	\$74,001,074.00	\$65,973.00	12.00%	\$100,589.00	32.00%
Contested	\$116,274,065.00	\$30,194.00	12.00%	\$51,001.00	35.00%
Total	\$302,250,996.00	\$43,862.00	12.00%	\$70,188.00	33.00%

Note: Data taken from file provided to author by Dwight Morris.

Hot races in 1994 expended \$74,001,074 in total dollars. The average hot race spent \$65,973.00 on mail, or 12% of the average amount spent. Hot races also spent \$100,589.00 on GOTV efforts which represented 32% of the money spent in the average hot race.

The absolute amount of money spent on GOTV activities is higher than that spent on persuasion direct mail. This may be due to the catch-all nature of the "other campaign activity" category. Still, even if we can be sure about the absolute numbers when comparing mail and turnout, it is striking how consistent the percentage spent on each activity is despite the level of campaigning. It does not appear at first glance that the competitiveness of the race is one of the variables affecting resource allocation between turnout and mail.

Table 3.3 summarizes the same expenditure data for 1994 from a party perspective. How does the party of the candidate affect resource allocation divisions?

3.3 Direct Contact Expenditures by Party of 1994

Party	Total	Avg. Mail	Avg. Mail Per.	Avg. GOTV	Avg. GOTV per.
Republican	\$137,616,166.00	\$43,064.00	13.00%	\$69,878.00	35.00%
Democratic	\$164,634,830.00	\$44,689.00	11.00%	\$70,508.00	31.00%
Total	\$302,250,996.00	\$43,862.00	12.00%	\$70,188.00	33.00%

Note: Data taken from file provided to author by Dwight Morris.

Allocation between persuasion mail and GOTV is almost equal between the two parties. Republicans spend 13% on mail and 35% on GOTV in the average race while Democrats spend 11% and 31% respectively. If party and competitiveness do not influence the allocation of direct contact resources what does?¹⁰⁷ Candidates in urban

¹⁰⁷ It would be useful to examine the data by incumbents and challengers but the 1994 Morris information does not allow the distinction to be made. There was a code for "incumbent" but there was no designation for open seat.

areas rank direct contact higher than television relative to their more rural counterparts.¹⁰⁸ In many districts the electronic media markets broadcast to hundreds of thousands of voters who live outside of the district. Time purchased on Los Angeles television for example, costs approximately \$814.00 per rating point while in the third congressional district of Ohio a campaign might pay only \$75.00 per point. TV is important for both but affordable for only one. Expensive channels are inefficient as well. Urban areas like New York City and Los Angeles are perhaps the best example of TV inefficiencies but adjoining states fall victim to expensive markets as well. New Jersey relies almost entirely on New York and Philadelphia television. Whenever a candidate puts on a television ad in South Jersey, all of Philadelphia sees it. More people who live outside of the district will get the chance to enjoy the candidate's ad than will voters within the scope of the campaign's concern. There are parts of southwestern Connecticut that are wholly within the expensive New York media market. Direct mail, in this circumstance, is more efficient than electronic media because the message can be targeted to voters in the correct district without paying to send the message to voters in other districts. If this hypotheses is true spending on direct contact should increase be positively related to a measure of TV costs while controlling for total expenditures. The more expensive the TV, the more likely that direct contact will be used. This is, in fact, the case. While controlling for total expenditures the Pearson correlation between television Cost Per Point and direct contact expenditure is .394 and is significant at the .01 level with an N of 699 races.

¹⁰⁸ Herrnson, *Congressional Elections*, p 199

Can this simple bivariate equation be improved by adding any other district demographic information? Claussen suggested that direct mail was more efficacious when targeted to highly educated voters. If this is correct it still does not indicate that campaigns make an effort to target as such but it does present a possible explanation of a campaign's strategic choice and it also echoes the distinction we reviewed earlier between the casual voter and the policy wonk. Many consultants also target higher income voters. Although this may be a stand in for education level, it is worth examining in its own light. Finally, the rural/urban breakdown of a district may be related to resource allocation because Urban areas are traditional bastions of GOTV activities. However, including percent urban, education level, and median family income adds little explanatory value to a simple bivariate model containing only television cost per point. The degree of urbanization, the education level, and the median family income are all closely related to the TV cost per point.

Data can not capture the complex mix of campaign decision making. It is, after all, at the intersection of art and science. How things are done is often pursued in the best empirical tradition. What things are done is often based on consultant salesmanship and influence. If the campaign professional or the candidate's staff believes that direct mail is more effective than television or that the message is more efficiently communicated by using a variety of channels, each disseminating the same message through different means, there will be an increase in direct mail. Like most industries many decisions are based on past results, personal relationships, reputation, and trust. Still, even with personal relations and past predilections taken into account, it is clear the television cost provides some empirical basis for resource allocation.

3.3 Voter Files

Once a campaign decides on a course of direct contact the voter file becomes its most important technical resource. The voter file also provides a rich, and largely under used, source of research data. The examination of relationships between political variables such as message, method, source, and purpose requires two comprehensive data sets: a file of registered voters and a specific accounting of campaign direct contact efforts. The following section will review the use and construction of voter files. Voter files offer a number of advantages over survey information as a research tool. While survey data probes deeper than simple voting records, actual data is more reliable. Survey estimates based on respondent voting reports of their own behavior suggest voting turnout rates that range 15% to 20% higher than rates derived from official statistics.¹⁰⁹ In 1988 50.1% of Americans voted in the presidential election but 64% claimed they participated when asked in a post election surveys.¹¹⁰ Not only do voter files give a better picture of actual participation than do surveys they also contain past voting history which allows a comparison of electoral behavior from year to year. Finally, voter files contain demographic and political information including party, gender, ethnicity, age, registration date, precinct, and jurisdictions such as assembly district, state senate district, and congressional district. It is the presence of this political and demographic information on computer that allows for the sophisticated targeting that has become a defining feature of modern, candidate centered campaigns.

¹⁰⁹ Miller and Shanks, *The New American Voter*, p 16

¹¹⁰ Sorauf, *Money in Congressional Elections*, p 29

Because this study is based on an analysis of these computerized lists it is worthwhile to examine the construction and content of voter files in some detail.

How detailed targeting can be is limited by four factors. the imagination of the consultant, money, actual turnout, and data. My experience has been that the imagination of the consultant is not much of a limiting factor because their imaginations run toward the expansive. Money, or lack thereof, limits every aspect of campaigning. Complex targeting often requires that external files be matched to the voter file and this is always an expensive undertaking. The relationship of turnout to targeting is more complex but simply put there is a tradeoff between the total number of actual voters reached and the percentage of people reached who are actual voters. If a consultant targets people who have voted in five of the last five elections, the chances are very good that a person receiving that mailing will vote on election day, but the chances are also good that a large number of people who go to the polls for the election in question will not get a piece of mail because it has been so narrowly targeted. William Daly, president of Voter Contact Services (VCS) and Professor Robert Hughes of the University of Colorado at Boulder have written a series of articles that cover the tradeoff between what they call "Hit" or the likelihood that a piece of mail will get to a voter who will vote and "Cover" or the percentage of people who participate that receive a piece of mail. Consultants and campaigns always have to keep in mind the tradeoff between fine targeting and a narrow electoral reach when developing their direct contact universe.

Finally, targeting is constrained by the amount and type of data available in the voter file. Data quality, content, and cost varies a good bit from state to state and from

county to county within a state. In some states, there is a single statewide magnetic tape available. The increased reporting and data processing required to comply with Motor Voter legislation has led to an increase in the number of statewide files.

However, in many of those states certain counties maintain better data than the state file contains so the final file is a combination of county purchases and the statewide tape.

Other states maintain voter files at the county level. That almost always means that some of the smaller counties will not have automated files available. This requires that a campaign or voter file firm keypunch the data. There are even a few parts of the country where the files are maintained by the town and not the county which produces a profusion of responsible entities and makes file building a difficult proposition.

Once collected from the proper authorities the files need to be converted to a standard format before they can be processed. The special computer program and procedures needed for each tape take a programmer a day or two to complete and might cost as much as \$1000 per format. Sometimes it is possible that a number of counties will come in the same format because a single service center does all of their processing. With automated counties updating for new registrants, deletions and changes of address are handled by getting a completely new tape and discarding the old file. Voter files are usually inexpensive enough to make this more practical than any kind of merge-purge system. For those few counties still without electronic data it is necessary to start the expensive and time consuming keypunch process. Key punching costs upwards of \$70 per thousand entries. Key punching also takes time. A company might finish an entire statewide file in the time it takes to keypunch one medium sized county.

The data used by consultants either comes on the voter file or is added by the vendor. The data that comes on the original file, often called the "base" file, is entered and maintained by the governmental unit responsible for the general administration of elections. The quality and content of voter files vary from state to state and from county to county within a state. For the purposes of this study, only districts which contain a minimum amount of demographic information will be used. That minimum includes age, voter history, registration date, phone number, gender, ethnicity, and party affiliation. It may be useful to look at what each of these variables represents and how they are collected and maintained.

Many counties collect **birthdate** at the time of registration. The presence of birthdate allows candidates to send a specific message to particular age groups. In what has become a regular dance for example, Democrats send mailings to the elderly that accuse to Republicans of trying to gut Social Security. Republicans respond by either defending their record on Social Security or accusing the Democrats of trying to frighten older people.

Voter history refers to a voter's actual election participation and is the single most important targeting variable available on a voter file. Candidates use voter history targeting to save money by removing non-voters from potential mailings or by identifying voters who may turn out for only certain types of elections. In a presidential election year, for example, it is useful to see who voted in 1992 but not 1990 even though they were eligible to vote in both elections. This group of "presidential surge voters" may respond to increased GOTV or may be the target of additional campaign messages. Voter history is so important to direct contact targeting that many

campaigns go to great lengths to add it to the file by hand if it is not available on the base file.

Registration Date is often recorded by the county as well as age. If age is not present, and registration date is, it can be used as an approximation for the age of the voter. Like age, voter history, and registration date, party affiliation is also included on most voter files and it is available on all of the files used for this study. While the presence of age, voter history, and registration date varies from place to place, they are often available, and when not available, universally missed.

In addition to data available from the county files the voter file vendor often adds information including, but not limited to **phone number, gender, and ethnicity**. These items are all appended to the voter using computer matching. Phones are matched by name and address from a national phone file. Gender and ethnicity are matched based on proprietary dictionaries developed by consultants, campaigns, and voter file vendors. For gender, a first name dictionary is used. To code ethnicity, most voter file vendors have developed large surname coding tables. Both of these items have a variety of political uses and are very popular selections although neither is fool-proof. Names like Lee, a very common Chinese as well as Caucasian surname which illustrates the inaccuracies generated by the "melting pot" process in the United States. There are also non-gender specific first names such as "Terry" or "Pat" as well as voters who register by initials only. Ethnic dictionaries usually contain names for Hispanic, Japanese, Chinese, Irish, Italian, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Greek, Armenian, American Indian, German, and French surnames. It is important to note that African-American is not an ethnic group that can be targeted by last name coding. In

many Southern states race is coded onto the voter file to fulfill the voting right's act which requires statistical information by race on voter registration. In other areas, precinct election returns are used to identify predominately African-American precincts. Despite the problems involved the accuracy rate of gender dictionaries is over 94% and that of ethnic dictionaries over 80% in most areas.

Because phoning and GOTV efforts are so important for direct contact voter file, vendors must append **telephone numbers** to the base file. Like matching with ethnic and gender dictionaries, phone matching is an imperfect process. There are unlisted numbers, disconnects, moved, and failed matches caused by spelling differences. If you are, for example, "Hannahen" in the phone book and "Hannahan" on the voter role the match will miss. Still, campaigns can almost always obtain enough numbers from the file to meet their campaign objectives. There are several companies that maintain magnetic tapes of phone numbers and they are usually generated from keypunching phone books or buying tapes directly from the phone companies.

These then are the variables found on or added to voter files. Although the process is mundane, the results allow the complex targeting to which modern political campaigns are so addicted. In addition to fueling the machine of targeting, the rich data available on voter files makes an in-depth study of campaign efforts possible.

3.4 Case Selection

The two data files needed to assess any relationship between direct contact and turnout, voter files and contact information, are both difficult to collect and manipulate. The difficulty of acquiring and utilizing campaign information is one reason for the relative lack of election research. Voter files are enormous data sets. The average

congressional district has about 325,000 voters and each voter record includes name, address, party, voting history, age, registration date, and a variety of other bits of information. Manipulating and coding files of this size is difficult and time consuming. Likewise, collecting campaign direct contact information requires finding people who are years removed from the election and whose memory and filing system are faulty. Marrying the two files, by coding each individual contact to all of the voters on the file who received the contact, involves substantial computer resources. Clearly, data considerations call for case studies. It is impossible to collect and manipulate the information for anything approaching all of the congressional races -- or even all of the competitive congressional elections -- during any given cycle.

The following study examines four districts, making up eight campaigns, and their use of voter file information. The four cases were chosen with an eye toward putting together what Eckstein calls a crucial case study. Crucial cases are those that might present either the most likely proof of a theory or be a least likely case for analysis. Four important criteria emerge from the previous discussion which frame the choice of campaigns which, through comparison and contrast, will offer evidence on the effects of direct contact and voter turnout.

- 1) Campaigns must reach a threshold of competitiveness but still present a variety of competitive situations. In other words, the two candidates must have spent enough money to make the analysis worthwhile but still represent a range of competitive situations.

- 2) The campaigns must have generated a variety of direct contact messages and used a number of mediums for the transmission of those messages to allow for an analysis of the effects of different types of direct

contacts on turnout. The campaign must also have generated enough direct contacts to make study worthwhile.

3) Some of the campaigns must come from a presidential year and some must come from an off year. This allows for some control over this critical turnout variable.

4) The campaigns must come from districts with a range of television costs. Previous analysis indicates that direct contact is a substitute for television. By capturing districts with a range of TV costs it is possible to infer that voter contact effects turnout at various levels of television expense.

5) The campaigns must come from districts where the voter files have all of the data needed for analysis. This includes a voter file with age, party, gender, phone number, ethnicity, and, most importantly, voter history. There must also be personnel available that remember the race and can produce an account of the direct contact efforts backed up with documentation.

6) Someone must give permission for the campaign to be studied.

Initially, twenty districts from 1994 and 1996 were chosen. Ten of the districts were from 1994 and ten were from 1996. The districts were then divided between competitive and non-competitive races, a distinction based not on a prior evaluation of the race nor the amount of money spent but on the final outcome. Races where the difference between the winner and the loser was 15% points or less were considered competitive and races where the difference fell above 15% were considered non-competitive.

Out of the initial twenty races, fourteen were eliminated because of a lack of some critical voter file data component. Two other districts had one or more campaigns that either could not or would not participate in the study. Since the permission of both campaigns was critical, the refusal of one side of the contest rendered the district unfit for inclusion in the study.

The field was narrowed to Maryland Congressional District 5 and Ohio Congressional District 1, Pennsylvania Congressional District 21, and California Congressional District 1. Unfortunately, all of the open seats under consideration failed to meet either the data requirements of the study or had at least one candidate who refused to cooperate.

A summary of the important characteristics for these four districts is included in table 3.4 below.

Table 3.4: Case Study Congressional Races

District	Competitive level	Year	Data?	TV Cost Per point	Contacts
MD05	Not Competitive	94	Yes	Moderate/High	Moderate
PA21	Competitive	96	Yes	Low	Light
OH01	Moderately Competitive	94	Yes	Moderate	Moderate
CD01	Competitive	96	Yes	High	Heavy

Maryland 5 and Ohio 1 are from 1994 while California 1 and Pennsylvania 21 are from 1996. All four of the districts have voter files which meet the data requirement. Ohio has age coding on 60% of its voter file but has 100% coverage for all of the other variables. The other districts all have 100% coverage of voter history, age, gender, and party. The column "TV Cost Per Point" shows that there is a wide

range of television costs included in the study with a high in the California district and a low in the Pennsylvania race. The "contact effort", which will be summarized in great detail in later chapters, is the combined total of both campaign's contact efforts within a district.

The definition of direct contact and in this chapter, and a brief discussion on the utilization of direct contact, as well as a description of the files used to implement direct contact plans provided criteria for the choice of cases. Although the base voter files contain all of the political and demographic information needed for study the direct contact strategy and campaign effort of each campaign has not be explored.. In the next chapter I turn toward the reconstruction of eight campaign efforts; one Democratic and one Republican for each of the four districts.

CHAPTER 4

THE ARENA OF DIRECT CONTACT

Was the phone and the mail useful? You bet. It wasn't our biggest ticket item but those phones and mail programs; they let us sneak in under the radar screen.¹¹¹

This chapter will reconstruct the direct contact efforts of the eight campaigns that took place in the four districts under study. Each reconstruction will have three components. First, there will be a description of the general campaign situation. This initial description will accompany a discussion of the campaign's direct contact strategy. Secondly, there will be a detailed description of each campaign's direct contact effort. Finally, at the end of each description, there will be a table which summarizes the coding for each individual direct contact undertaken by the campaign. At the end of the chapter each campaign's strategy will have been examined with an eye toward determining the distribution of contacts among base and persuadable voters and each individual direct contact will have been described, categorized and coded onto the base voter file for analysis.

The campaign world exists in a time frame so compressed as to make "advance planning" an oxymoron. Campaign organizations reflect time compression by coming into and passing out of existence in six month intervals. Records from two election cycles ago are difficult to find and, once found, difficult to interpret. Campaign staffers have moved and even those remaining have only dim memories of past efforts. Because of the uncertainty of this kind of information it is imperative to confirm the

¹¹¹ Interview with Bob Holste, Administrative Assistant and campaign manager to Congressman Phil English.

data using multiple sources. Using interviews, original vendor invoices, campaign finance reports, and a detailed review of old voter file orders, the chances of a reconstruction are good.¹¹²

4.1 Maryland Congressional District Five: 1994

Congressman Steny Hoyer is a powerful nine term Democratic incumbent who represents Maryland Congressional District 05. The key to understanding Hoyer's campaign strategy over the years lies in the diversity of the district that is represented in the map on the following page. The map also contains a partisan breakdown by county.

Hoyer's district includes more federal employees than any other congressional district in the country. In addition, nineteen percent (19%) of the voters in the district are African-American. The neighboring 4th Congressional District has a majority black population. Added to the federal workers and African-Americans is a substantial academic community centered around College Park, home of the University of Maryland. With such a strong core constituency it is no wonder that Hoyer said on the house floor in 1994. "I am a tax, tax, spend, spend Democrat. Let me make that clear, and let my opponents make of it what they will."

His opponents have tried to make much of such statements. Because of a strong suburban Republican section in Anne Arundel county, combined with conservative rural areas in outlying counties, Hoyer always attracts quality opposition. Like many congressional districts nationwide, the 5th CD in Maryland, although heavily

¹¹² A "voter file order" is the document or computer file generated when the campaign or consultant places an order for labels, lists, or a magnetic media file with the voter file vendor. The advantage of these documents is that they indicate what was actually produced as opposed to what the candidate thought (or wished) was produced. Copies of the interview forms and documents are in Appendix 1.

Democratic, has experienced strains between liberal and conservative Democrats. Maryland 5 include suburban Anne Arundel county, partially suburban and partially urban Prince George's County, as well as rural St. Mary's, Charles, and Calvert counties. Although the district registration is heavily Democratic it is the diversity among the Democrats that has given Republicans hope over the years. The three rural counties have traditionally been conservative on many issues even though the increase of long distance DC commuters has diluted the socially conservative vote. According to the Almanac of American Politics "Historically, this is a Democratic area but southern Maryland has been conservative on many issues and voted for George Bush over Bill Clinton, and many Prince George's and Anne Arundel whites are Republicans as well."¹¹³ Hoyer faced well funded opposition in 1992 and 1994. In 1992 his opponent, Lawrence Hogan, Jr. spent \$265,065 while Hoyer raised and spent a remarkable \$1.6 Million to keep his seat. Hogan, the son of a former congressman and a local Reagan campaign chairman as well, won 60%-38% outside of Prince George's county but lost enough inside Prince George's to be defeated by Hoyer 53% to 44%.¹¹⁴

The discontinuities and contradictions of the 5th CD attracted another well placed challenger in 1994. Political consultant and college professor Donald Devine presented Hoyer with an experienced opponent with an impressive resume and reasonable fund raising capacity. Devine had been the director of the Office of Personnel Management during President Ronald Reagan's first term. After winning a hotly contested Republican

¹¹³ Barone Michael and Grant Ujifusa. *The Almanac of American Politics*. (Washington, D.C. National Journal 1995.) p. 617

¹¹⁴ A table in Appendix 2 gives the electoral and spending history of the district general elections from 1992 to 1998.

primary, Devine waged an aggressive battle against Hoyer. Devine spent \$581,000 to Hoyer's \$1.3 Million. This time, Hoyer won both in and outside of Prince George's county and was one of the only Democrats in 1994 to increase his winning percentage over the 1992 cycle. Thus, the 1992 and 1994 cycles saw a powerful Democrat residing in a district marginal enough on paper to attract well financed challengers. Using the Morris data collected for the 1994 election we can review the spending distribution of the two campaigns.

Table 4.1: Distribution of Hoyer and Devine Spending

Campaign	Hoyer	Devine
Total	\$1,295,285.00	\$346,569.00
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE	\$93,544.00	\$89,857.00
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE%	7.22%	25.93%
Mail	\$39,684.00	\$58,265.00
Mail%	3.06%	16.81%
Total Direct Contact	\$133,228.00	\$148,122.00
Contact%	10.29%	42.74%

Note: Data taken from campaign finance reports and file provided to author by Dwight Morris.

The differences in amount obscure an even greater difference in approach and campaign strategy. In the last chapter we discussed campaign strategy in the context of imperatives and incentives arising from the status of the candidate and the competitiveness of the race. Devine, engaged in a difficult primary, spent a lot of time and effort mailing to his Republican base. Mail is especially effective in a primary because the message can be targeted to people of one's own party. Television ads in a primary reach thousands of people who cannot participate in the primary at all. In the case of a Republican primary in Maryland, this translates into sending a television commercial to 303,444 voters; 103,362 of them eligible to vote for you on primary

election day. The campaign strategy of each candidate was dictated by their status as incumbent or challenger as well as the political and demographic construction of the district. As a challenger from the minority party in the district Devine needed to put together a coalition that included a very high percentage of his base, independents, and conservative Democrats. This led him to a highly targeted strategy designed to communicate with the most malleable voters in the most efficient manner.

Hoyer followed a classic incumbent strategy that included using television throughout the district to trumpet his experience and accomplishments. Direct contact was reserved for very specific voter identification and turnout efforts as well as an attempt to raid Devine's base. Although I will discuss the contacts in more detail later in the chapter the overall strategic implications of the Hoyer and Devine spending patterns emerge from their status as an entrenched incumbent and a well financed, but clear underdog, challenger. Hoyer was working a plan conceived three cycles ago. The incumbent's campaign centered on communicating with an already identified base and built on programs begun as far back as 1990. Devine, as the challenger, focused on reaching out first to Republicans for the primary and then to building a winning coalitions of voters.

4.1.1 The Hoyer Effort

Corey Alexander, Hoyer's current administrative assistant, was in charge of the direct contact effort. Alexander served as Hoyer's deputy campaign manager during the 1994 general election and had held that position for seven months preceding the election. Although John Bohannon was the official campaign manager, Alexander was in charge of day to day details, including the direct contact effort. A local campaign

staffer, Patty Fiorello, handled the fundraising. Mark Mellman served as the Hoyer campaign pollster and Matt McWilliams performed electronic media production and buying duties. The campaign used Voter Contact Service for voter file work, although much of the actual mail was designed in-house. Hoyer led 58% to 42% in the early summer with favorability figures in the sixties and name identification in the nineties. These strong numbers reinforced the campaign's inclination to run a positive campaign based on experience and district service.

The campaign direct contact effort started with utilizing voter identification records dating back to 1992. Some of this 1992 program was described in detail during the introduction. Previously identified voters, from the 1990 and 1992 elections, were computer matched against a current voter file. These records listed a number of Democrats and independents as being for, against, or undecided in a Hoyer campaign. The results were stored on a voter file in the VCS office. Just before the 1994 election season the data collected during the 1990 and 1992 cycles was moved forward to the 1994 voter file. This process eliminated people who had moved or died since the previous cycle.

The campaign extended its previously identified universe by calling all of the Democrats and independents district wide who had not been contacted before. After this late fall effort was completed, Hoyer sent a mailing to both the favorables and the undecideds who had been identified through phone banks from 1990, 1992, and 1994.¹¹⁵

The campaign also did targeted mailings to increase support in rural Charles and Calvert counties. In its only effort to reach out beyond its base, the Hoyer campaign

¹¹⁵ The 1994 effort was a micro-coordinated campaign. Hoyer asked questions about a host of local candidates as well and shared that information with those closely associated with Hoyer.

mailed a piece called "Choice" to Republican and Independent women with phones who had participated in the 1990 and 1992 general elections. Finally, the Hoyer campaign sent out a sample ballot to all Democrats and Independents in the district. In a pattern which will be repeated in other races under study the Hoyer contact effort concentrated on those already likely to vote. Little campaign effort went to mobilizing new voters.

The campaign did few, if any GOTV calls, but the Maryland Democratic coordinated campaign called Democrats in targeted precincts on behalf of gubernatorial candidate Parris Glendinning. The party work has also been coded back onto the file. In a final phoning effort the Hoyer campaign called all of their favorable voters on or around election day.

Table 4.2 below summarizes the Hoyer direct contact efforts. The first column is simply a code that designates that particular contact. Democratic contacts begin with a "D" and Republican contacts begin with an "R". The second column describes the contact.

Table 4.2: Summary of Hoyer Direct Contact Effort: 1994

Target Group Description	Count
All Dem. Hhslds with a phone not previously contacted (sj875)	48,465
RI Women w/ phones vtd 90 and 92 General (sj876)	3,249
All DI Hhslds in Charles County Portion of the District (mh597)	19,510
All DI Hhslds in Calvert County portion of the District (mh599)	7,692
All Hoyer Favorables for Mailing (mh668)	27,944
All Hoyer Favorables with a phone for calling (mh669)	20,336
All Hoyer undecided for a mailing (mh664)	27,809
All DI, sample ballot (mh222)	154,000
Democratic Party Phoning in targeted precincts	17,000

Note: Contact descriptions taken from interview with Corey Alexander; counts derived from invoices, job files, and analysis of computer coded data.

The campaign also sent mailings to in-house lists of fire fighters, business leaders, and environmentalists but these lists have since been lost and cannot be recorded onto the voter file.

4.1.2 The Devine Effort

George Nesterchuck managed Donald Devine's campaign. The campaign did not use a pollster. They used a staff member, not a consultant, for fundraising. Direct mail, both fundraising and persuasion, was done by Nesterchuck and Devine with advice from some of Devine's consulting friends and colleagues. The party also supplied help. Finance reports indicate that the campaign used national and state party resources for TV production, radio production, and voter file development. Persuasion mail efforts made use of a voter file provided by the Maryland Republican Party. The party had acquired the file directly from the Secretary of State. Devine's organization did no phoning or voter identification on its own but relied on the state and national parties to make calls to Republicans in the district. Although well funded, this campaign was clearly run with local resources and talent.

Nesterchuck and Devine believed that to win they needed to add conservative Democrats, Christian Coalition members, and the National Rifle Association to their base of Republican voters. They also calculated that they would need approximately two-thirds of the independent vote in the district. Based on this, and the national Republican trend of 1994, Nesterchuck gave the Devine campaign an even chance for victory. First, Devine needed to win a primary and to secure his small, but critical, Republican base against a well known incumbent. To this end, the campaign sent six mailings to the district's small Republican population. The rest of the campaign efforts

used an anti-tax message to build a coalition of conservative Democrats and independents. The campaign dropped a positive newsletter to the northern Prince George towns of Bowie, Laurel, Beltsville, and College Park. The drop featured information on Devine's public service and anti-tax message.¹¹⁶ Although the campaign did not have polling information on this area their analysis of local races and their experience in the district led them to believe that these neighborhoods contained potential swing voters. Next, the campaign targeted Democrats in precincts won by Ronald Reagan in 1988 and George Bush in 1992.¹¹⁷ Following close on the heel's of the Democratic mailing Devine's wife sent out a letter to all independents in the district discussing his commitment to family values. Finally, a popular retired State Senator, Jack Cade, sent a letter on behalf of Devine to voters in his former Anne Arundel county district. The Maryland Republican party claims to have made GOTV calls to all of the district's Republican households.

¹¹⁶ A "drop" is a volunteer effort where campaign workers place a piece of literature at the door of all voters (or sometimes, on all households) in a given area.

¹¹⁷ There are two types of direct contact targeting. One type uses demographic measures to contact individuals. This might include age, gender, or voting history. A second type is geographic. Geographic targeting is often based on precinct election returns which include how a given precinct voted in a specific election. The two types of targeting are sometimes used in tandem. Precinct election returns are collected from individual counties, usually on paper, and keypunched into a spreadsheet for analysis. Demographic information comes off of the voter file.

The following table gives a snapshot of the Devine direct contact effort.

Table 4.3: Summary of the Devine Campaign Contact Efforts

Description	Count
Republican Mailings (six times)	103,000
Lit. drop in Bowie, Laurel, Beltsville, Colege Park	71,712
Reagan Democrats	124,844
Wife letter on taxes to all independents in district	41,597
Letter from Former Senator Cade to Anne Arundel	45,645
Republican GET-OUT-THE-VOTE effort	63,098

Note: Contact descriptions taken from interview with George Nesterchuck. Counts derived from invoices, job files, and analysis of computer coded data.

The campaign recognized the coalition they needed to build but, for whatever reason, they concentrated on their Republican base. Some of this concentration was due to the late September primary but the campaign also sent out three mailings to Republicans after the primary. Nesterchuck admitted this may have been a mistake. Having a clear strategy is not the same thing as implementing it.

4.2 Ohio Congressional District One: 1994

Republican congressman Steve Chabot wrested the right to represent Ohio's first congressional district when he defeated incumbent David Mann in 1994. He was one of many Republicans swept into office behind the Contract for America. It was not only the Republican sweep that brought Mann down. He had to contend with trouble within his own party as well. While trying to establish himself as an independent Democrat and to distance himself from a then unpopular President William Clinton, Mann cast one too many conservative votes for the activists within his own traditional constituency. Labor was especially incensed by his vote for NAFTA which was, ironically, a Pro-Clinton vote. His apostasy earned him a primary challenge from

African-American State Senator Bill Bowen, Mann's original opponent from his 1992 race. The result was a hard fought primary ending in a 667 vote victory for Mann.

The first congressional district of Ohio is nestled entirely within Hamilton County, Ohio and includes much of Cincinnati as well as a number of surrounding suburbs. The rest of Hamilton county is represented in Congress by Republican Robert Portman. A map and chart on the following page show the district's location and the partisan composition of each community within the district. Cincinnati is a conservative city and Republican by urban standards. Its immigrants were primarily German, but over the years, an African American and Appalachian population has emerged. Cincinnati may be the only city in the country to prohibit discrimination against people of "Appalachian Origin". A major Ohio River port and a regional center of commerce, the city is headquarters for the giant Procter and Gamble, or, as they say in Cincinnati, Proctor and God. Milacron, a world leader in the production of machine tools, and Federated Department Stores, Inc., which owns Macy's also make their headquarters in Cincinnati and bespeak of the city's diverse economy. Cincinnati is equally diverse politically. Cincinnati has given the world Marge Schott, Klan rallies, and the anti-pornography movement. Historically, Cincinnati was an anti-slavery Republican bastion in an otherwise Copperheaded southern Democratic Ohio but, over time, the city has developed a unique political culture with a strong third party offering additional competition to Republicans and Democrats alike. Republicans, Democrats, and Charterites, as the third party is called, vie for local office while Republicans and Democrats, both seeking Charter party support, compete in the two congressional races.

One or both of the local congressional districts has been seriously contested in almost every election since 1964.¹¹⁸

Mann's challenger was former City Council member, and current Hamilton County Commissioner, Steve Chabot. In the general election dance between Mann and Chabot, Mann would step away from president Clinton while Chabot would advance the image of the then unpopular President one step closer. Chabot spent \$871,771 to unseat Mann while Mann spent \$1,001,393 trying to keep his office. Despite Mann's slight spending advantage he lost to Chabot 56% to 44%. The political history of the district's general elections is contained in Appendix 3.

In a race pitting a well financed incumbent against an experienced challenger both sides were aware that the election might come down to the effective targeting of swing voters. The number of swing, also known as "persuadable", voters may be small but their importance outweighs their number. Both the Chabot and the Mann campaigns aimed the bulk of their direct contact efforts at small groups of potential partisans. Cincinnati is in a relatively low cost television market and much of a campaign resources were accordingly directed to television. Each campaign used television to paint a favorable picture of their candidate while direct contact was used to reach specific swing voter in particular precincts judged amenable to persuasion.

¹¹⁸ Although the author is from the Cincinnati area, and was politically engaged enough to have worked with then City Councillor Jerry Springer, much of the description of the cities economic base was taken from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa's *The Almanac of American Politics* Op. Cit. 1994

Table 4.4: Distribution of Mann and Chabot Campaign Spending

Campaign	Mann	Chabot
Total	\$1,015,009.00	\$871,721.00
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE	\$206,759.00	\$104,376.00
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE%	.203	.12
Mail	\$104,376.00	\$41,505.00
Mail%	.13	.05
Total Direct Contact	\$311,135.00	\$145,881.00
Contact%	0.31	0.17

The competitive nature of the district, Mann's problems with his base, and Chabot's strong base of support make this contest more like an open seat race than a challenger/incumbent contest. Although Mann outspent Chabot the difference is not great and much of it is due to Mann's expenditures on organizational maintenance before Chabot had filed (see table 4.4 above). Unlike Hoyer, Mann could not run a safe incumbent campaign. Mann was forced to engage his base from the beginning and compete for persuadable voters with the well known Chabot. It is not always possible to attribute differences in direct contact expenditures to neat strategic calculations because consultants and campaigns respond differently to similar situations, but it is clear that in this circumstance Mann's need to communicate with his base required that he spend money on direct contact. It is the only way to reach only African-American voters effectively with a specific message and to speak to the other Democrats in his base without alienating swing voters. Chabot, on the other hand, could target his direct contact efforts and spend the bulk of his money in the relatively inexpensive television market.

4.2.1 The Chabot Effort

The Chabot campaign was a unique combination of the professional and the amateur. Many campaigns attempt to do all sorts of technical work themselves, but most never rise above a level of technical mediocrity. A campaign bogged down in xeroxing, disk crashes, and production decisions instead of fundraising and voter communication has serious problems. Consultants often worry about candidates who spend more time on campaign details than on raising money or meeting voters but the Chabot campaign, while a home grown effort, avoided this problem and was efficiently and professionally run.

The person who put the campaign together was Shannon Jones. She started as campaign manager in January of 1994 and now works for the congressman as his administrative assistant. Characteristic of the Chabot organization, Jones, still the key political decision maker after the candidate himself, lives and works in the district, not in Washington D.C..

The Chabot staff produced its own media, fundraising, direct mail, and voter file work, consulting occasionally with the Pennsylvania-based media firm of Brabender Cox for advice. The firm was characterized in the interview as "helpful, but not that involved in the race."

Although nominally a Democratic district, Jones pointed out that the turnout in the more Republican leaning suburbs more than compensated for the registration disadvantage. Ohio Republicans turn out at higher rates than do Democrats or independents.¹¹⁹ The turnout disparity suggested a three pronged strategy for Chabot.

¹¹⁹ There is no party registration in Ohio. Democrats and Republicans are defined by their primary

First, work the strong conservative infrastructure in Cincinnati by using internally generated lists built from sources that might naturally gravitate toward Chabot including, but not limited to, Catholic Churches, Realtors, Christian groups, and Pro-Life activists.¹²⁰ These groups either received a Chabot mailing reminding them of his affinity for their issues or were contacted by the group organization itself on behalf of Chabot. These contacts are an important source.

Second, the campaign identified swing precincts by taking the Bush percentage from 1992 and subtracting the Chabot percentage for 1992 when Chabot ran for Hamilton County Commissioner. They then ranked precincts by that difference and assumed they housed people who inclined toward well known Republicans. The top 200 precincts were designated as "Chabot persuasion precincts" and were the focus of nearly all campaign direct contact efforts. Chabot's targeting program is an interesting combination of party targeting and candidate targeting. Although he was the challenger his long record of service had allowed him to build campaign experience and organization.

Within the targeted Chabot precincts the campaign only targeted households without a Democrat.¹²¹ The Chabot campaign also targeted Republicans districtwide with a GOTV program. The GOTV effort consisted of one call on the Friday and

participation. The definitional formula for the 1994 file was "Anyone who voted in the 1994 primary as a Republican is coded as a Republican. Anyone not voting in the 1994 primary as a Republican, but voting in the 1992 primary as a Republican is also a Republican". A similar definition codes the Democrats with the remainder being carried as "independent". VCS has conducted studies in Illinois and Ohio and found that remarkably low number of people "pick" primaries. In Illinois, out of 6,900,000 voters, 7200 people voted in different party primaries over two election cycles.

¹²⁰ The prolife movement as we know it today was founded in Cincinnati.

¹²¹ In voter file language this universe would be "all pure Republican households, all pure independent households, and all pure Republican and independent households"

Saturday before the election and a follow-up call on the Monday before the election and on election day itself. Within these disparate universes, the Chabot campaign ran an aggressive ground game using as a unifying theme; *Another Family for Steve Chabot*.

Chabot's persuasion pieces were modeled on standard Republican themes developed for the 1994 election. His standard brochure emphasized local roots, and featured a young Chabot with his parents standing in front of their mobile home. Inside, the brochure detailed Chabot's local-poor-boy-made-good rise to community prominence. Over the course of the campaign, volunteers dropped this brochure to all targeted households.

The family emphasis of Chabot's campaign, typical of Republican efforts in 1994, was coupled with other standard Republican appeals including mailings to the same target universe on taxes and crime. At the time of the interviews no one associated with the campaign still had a copy of the crime or taxes mailing but both were described as positive pieces which listed Chabot's issue positions. Republicans had not cornered the market on standard mailings, and Chabot had to defend his record on seniors -- a mailing necessitated by the standard Democratic attack on Republican senior policy. The senior mailing showed candidate Chabot standing with his mother while promising never to cut Medicare.

In keeping with its amateur ethos the campaign placed a volunteer in charge of a comprehensive precinct leader program. This volunteer attempted to find one family in each of the 200 key precincts who would be willing to have their picture taken with Chabot and printed on a post card. The text on the reverse side of the card was precinct specific and said something like "We live on Elm Street and we are another

Family for Steve Chabot." The letter was mailed by the campaign to voters living in the vicinity of the volunteer family. Eighty volunteers covering eighty precincts were eventually recruited. Through a kind of geographic extension these eighty volunteers saw their coverage increased to include 120 precincts representing over 30,000 pieces of mail. These cards were sent to all Republican and Independent voters living within precincts which had a volunteer family.¹²² The campaign also did, or benefited from, substantial telephoning. 1994 was a terrible year for Democrats both nationally and in Ohio. The Republican ticket, headed by the popular Governor, George Voinovich, put together a formidable coordinated campaign called Victory 94. It was Victory 94 that contacted all Republicans with a GOTV call in the Hamilton county area. The campaign itself augmented the Victory 94 effort by calling 10,000 Republicans in targeted precincts. Victory 94's script was a simple 5 second talk which urged Republicans to turn out and support the ticket. The Chabot call was more specific, urging voters to go to the polls because Chabot was in a close race for congress. The following table summarizes the Chabot direct contact effort:

Table 4.5: Chabot Contacts during the 1994 Campaign

Target Group Description	Count
300 Top precincts/Drop on local roots/all RI households	108,003
Top 300 Precincts/Mailing on Taxes/All RI households	108,003
Top 300 Precincts/Mailing on Crime/All RI households	108,003
Top 200 Precincts/Mailing to Seniors/All RI over 65	11,911
Top 120 Precincts/Postcard from local families	45,572
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE call to all Republican HHslds with a phone	51,906
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE call to 10,000 Republicans in Top 200	23,300

¹²² The volunteer was also an amateur photographer and took all the pictures as well as performing the recruitment duties.

4.2.2 The Mann Effort

The Mann campaign faced two major problems; neither of which was amenable to improvement without exacerbating the other. The first was the unpopularity of President Clinton, summarized by the Chabot slogan; "A vote for this Mann is another vote for this man." While addressing the Clinton problem by casting "independent democratic" votes, he alienated his labor and African-American voters and drew a difficult primary which cost money and political capital, leaving him weakened for the general election.

The situation did not look so bleak for Mann in the summer of 1994. An early poll showed him ahead of Chabot 48% to 32%. Mann also had a fair 56% to 32% favorable/unfavorable ratio. The campaign team charged with reelecting Mann was, like many of the campaign teams under study, a combination of local activists and national consultants. In almost every case the campaign manager was a local political operative. In this case the team was headed by native Ohioan Jeff Berding. Berding was the campaign manager for Mann from January 1994 until November of 1995. Berding helped Mann put together a team which included the New York consulting firm of Penn and Schoen for polling; Washington D.C. consultant Roy Fletcher for the production and placement of electronic media; and Cleveland based Burges and Burges as general and direct mail consultants. The campaign used a local staffer, Andy Goldner, for in-state fundraising, and a DC based firm, FMG enterprises, for PAC and DC fundraising. The division of fundraising duties between in-district efforts and

Washington D.C. efforts is quite common and points out the national and local character of many congressional efforts.¹²³

Mann's primary challenger was African-American state senator Bill Bowen, the candidate Mann had originally defeated for the job. Bowen, with the support of the African-American community and labor, lost to Mann by fewer than 1000 votes in the divisive May primary. The campaign pursued the triple strategic goal of increasing the perception of Mann as an independent Democrat, solidifying the Democratic base after the bruising primary, and increasing Chabot's negative image through early attack ads.

To accomplish these goals, the campaign ran an aggressive, heavily targeted, direct contact effort. Like the Chabot campaign, the Mann contact effort focused on a group of voters living in swing voter precincts. The actual swing vote was identified by a combination of precinct and demographic targeting. First, precincts were identified as "swing" through the application of formulas developed by the National Committee for an Effective Congress (NCEC), a Washington DC group that performs these analyses for Democratic candidates all over the country. NCEC defined swing precincts as those voting for then candidate Clinton and Republican Senate candidate Michael Dewine in 1992 as well as Voinovich and Democratic gubernatorial candidate Gene Fisher in 1990. The campaign also gave consideration to precincts that gave a plurality to both presidential candidate George Bush and Senator Howard Metzenbaum in 1988. These combinations allowed the campaign to target areas which lean Republican but may also vote for a better known and more popular Democratic alternative on the same ballot.

¹²³ See Herrnson *Congressional Elections*.

After completing their computations the campaign was left with 100 targeted precincts. Mann himself, along with volunteers and workers, went door-to-door in the twenty top persuasion precincts. The volunteers left literature at every door and Mann talked to voters where possible. A mailing called "Independence" was then mailed to all households within the one hundred top precincts. The mailing was designed to build a positive picture of Mann by emphasizing his independence from the Democratic party line. Both the literature drop and the mailing featured the same material. Both were positive, both contained pictures of Mann in the district, and both highlighted Mann's voting record where it diverged from Clinton or other key democratic constituencies.¹²⁴ The next mailing, targeted to the same key precincts, compared Mann and Chabot's policies. A flattering picture of Mann on one side headed a list of issue positions on education, race relations, and social security. On the opposite side was an unflattering picture of Chabot which listed his opposition to a number of programs touted by Mann. These same voters received a final mailing constructed from a collage of newspaper articles praising Mann and his record.

Because of Mann's tough primary with Bowen, his campaign needed to improve his image in the African-American community. They sent out two mailings which were designed both to improve Mann's image and to increase turnout. Because race is not a variable on the voter file, the mailings were targeted to selected precincts.¹²⁵ The first

¹²⁴ As is often the case, no campaign staffer had saved any copy of the Mann mailings. These descriptions are taken from an interview with Jeff Berding, Mann campaign manager.

¹²⁵ People often confuse "race" and "ethnicity". This is not limited to the political world but is endemic to everyday conversation as well as within the social sciences. Definitions of the terms are controversial. However, in the political world "ethnicity" is a category which can be approximated by using surnames while race cannot. Approximately 55% of African-American voters code as "Irish" on ethnic dictionaries. Such targeting require care. There are two ways to target African-American voters.

African-American mailing was signed by Senator Bowen and endorsed Mann for the general election. The letter praised Mann's efforts on behalf of civil rights legislation. The letter contained nothing controversial and was designed to let voters know that Bowen was supporting Mann. The second piece attacked Chabot's record on race issues. Both pieces went to the same group of 38,567 households.

The campaign made two phoning efforts. Their pollster, Penn and Schoen, designed a turnout program aimed at the Mann base. The Penn and Schoen script was a straight "David Mann needs your vote. Please turn out on Tuesday." Your polling place is (say polling place). Blue Chip Marketing, a Cincinnati-based telemarketing firm, called selected precincts with a more detailed persuasion message. The phoner asked to speak with a particular voter, praised Mann's record in congress, and urged the voter to participate in the election on Tuesday.¹²⁶

First, someone who knows the area will simply list precincts they know to contain a certain percentage of African-Americans voters. If such local knowledge isn't available, or not applicable, campaigns will target any precincts that cast over 75% of their ballots for the Democratic presidential candidate.

¹²⁶ Recollections of the Penn and Schoen call came from an interview with Jeff Rusnak of Burges and Burges in July of 1997. The Blue Chip script review came in a phone conversation with Terry Ward, President of Blue Chip Marketing of Cincinnati, also in July of 1997.

The following table provides a quick, visual summary of each individual direct contact effort undertaken by the Mann Campaign.

Table 4.6 Mann Campaign Direct Contact Summary

Target Group Description	Count
Door to Door drop to all hhslds in top 20 swing precincts	9,296
Independence mailing to top 100 persuasion precincts	56,418
Comparison mailing to top 100 persuasion precincts	56,418
Newspaper Collage to top 100 persuasion precincts	56,418
Bowen Letter to African-American precincts	38,567
Race/issue comparison to African-American precincts	38,567
Phoning effort to all targeted precincts	33,296
Phoning effort to selected targeted precincts	15,233

4.3 Pennsylvania Congressional District Twenty-One: 1996

All descriptions or accountings of Erie, Pennsylvania, begin with a sentence like "Erie is the forgotten city". Third in size behind Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, it often feels ignored by the rest of Pennsylvania, falling into the great bulk of the state one political wag characterized as "Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Mississippi in-between." It is even relegated the state's highest congressional district number; 21, as if the district were an afterthought. The city has the best natural harbor on Lake Erie but few, if anyone, thinks of Pennsylvania as a Great Lakes state. Northwest Pennsylvania is tied by water and industry more to Cleveland and Buffalo than to Pittsburgh or Philadelphia. Of course being "forgotten" is never much of an issue with the actual residents of any given place because their day-to-day life is real enough to them. Part of that life in Erie is a highly competitive political environment, reflected in the congressional district that encompasses Erie and the surrounding counties of Butler, Crawford and Mercer. In

1996 the district produced one of the closest House races in the nation. A map of the district and a partisan breakdown, by county, is provided on the following page.

In 1996 the incumbent congressman for Pennsylvania congressional district 21 was Republican Phil English. He brought to Washington what one book calls a "varied background" which, in 20th century American politics, means a varied political career as a legislative aid, campaign strategist, state committee member, candidate for treasurer, and local elected official. English is a professional politician but one with a variety of political experiences. He was originally elected in the Republican landslide of 1994 at the age of 34; the culmination of a political career that started in his early 20's.

Local politics tends to be Democratic and union, with contests taking place along ethnic lines. Poles and Italians have long competed for local office. In the past decade, some of the Italian community has moved away from their traditional roots in the Democratic party and toward the Republicans. The Polish community has remained more tied to Erie proper and is very close to labor. Outside of the city of Erie, in Erie County, the battles are hard fought. Reagan won Erie county in 1980 and 1984 but Dukakis and Clinton won in 1988 and 1992.¹²⁷

The outlying counties of Crawford, Butler, and Mercer make up 49% of the district. Crawford and Butler county tend to be Republican but Mercer county, hard hit by industrial problems, is a Democratic stronghold. Before English won in 1994 the district was represented by the very popular Tom Ridge, now Governor. Ridge, also a Republican, helped establish the GOP as a force in local politics.

¹²⁷ District descriptions and facts taken from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa. . *The Almanac of American Politics* (Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington DC 1996). pp 1178-1180

English beat Eric Leavans in a 1994 race that highlighted class differences. Leavans contrasted his background as the local son of a Polish-American mill worker with English's history as a mainline Erie family who had never worked in the private sector. English stuck with the winning national formula for Republicans and called for a middle class tax cut and attacked Leavans by linking the Democrat with President Clinton. Evidently taxes and current political animosities outweighed perceived class differences and English won by 4713 votes, 89,439 (49%) to 84,796 (47%). A table summarizing the general election history of the district from 1990 until 1998 is provided in Appendix 3.

The 1996 contest was very different, even if the outcome proved the same. Always considered a classic marginal seat, except when held by Tom Ridge, English found himself on top of every target list. As early as April of 1995 he was one of two Republicans targeted by the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) in local ads that sought to marry English and Gingrich. The ads had serious effects and contributed to making the 1996 English/Dinicola race one of the 20 closest House races in the country. English finally prevailed by fewer than 1000 votes and a percentage margin of 51% to 49% despite outspending DiNicola \$1,262,645 to \$478,871.

English's spending advantage obscures the large role played by labor in the DiNicola campaign and also hides some very diverse spending patterns in each individual race. The two men faced very different strategic situations. Although television was king in the 21st congressional district, markets outside the lower cost TV areas around Erie and intensive, targeted GOTV efforts by both campaigns led the

to the use of the 21st CD voter file. The table below summarizes the spending effort of the two campaigns.

Table 4.7: Distribution of English and DiNicola Campaign Spending

Campaign	English	Dinicola
Total	\$1,262,645.00	\$478,871.00
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE	\$118,930.00	\$66,100.00
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE%	9%	13.7%
Mail	\$151,287.00	\$103,288.00
Mail%	11.9%	21.5%
Total Direct Contact	\$270,217.00	\$169,388.00
Contact%	21.4%	35.3%

Source: Figures taken from FEC reports.

Much of English's spending advantage consists of money spent on organizational maintenance in the months and years leading up to the election. Over 85% of the GOTV and Mail expenditures for English took place in the eight months preceding the elections. The spending reflects their strategy. English needed to spend money defending himself and his image against early attacks by DiNicola and labor. This type of defense is best conducted on television. On the other hand, DiNicola had to spend a greater percentage of his money on direct contact because he needed to spend time and money solidifying his base, a more phone and mail intensive activity. The direct contact strategies for both campaigns are discussed in more detail below.

4.3.1 The English Effort

Congressman Phil English's campaign was managed by Bob Holste, now English's Administrative Assistant in Washington, D.C. Mr. Holste worked as campaign manager for Congressman English during the final three weeks of the campaign.

Public Opinion Strategy (POS) was their pollster. Ottosen/Sanders did PAC fundraising and the campaign did local fundraising internally. Steve Meyers of SCM Associates did direct mail and voter file work while Murpy/Pintak/Gautier provided television production and buying. Again, the English campaign shows an organizational make-up similar to fellow incumbents Hoyer and Mann. They all had local campaign managers but national campaign consultants. They also had fundraisers working in the district and in Washington, D.C.

In the early summer a POS poll showed English with a 50%-37% lead over DiNicola and a 47%-29% Favorable/Unfavorable ratio. This ratio reflects the percentage of voters who view the candidate favorably and any figure under 50% is considered worrisome. The below average favorable figure may have reflected the early spring labor attacks on English's record and required that the campaign spend money early to both defend English and attack DiNicola. Direct contact was only a small part of the English effort, and it was concentrated in areas within the expensive and inefficient Pittsburgh media market. This is an excellent example of campaign tactics based on the cost of television. The campaign sent out four mailings and ran an extensive calling effort.

The first piece of mail was sent to all voters in the district who were 55 or over and contained a signed letter from the very popular former congressman and current governor, Tom Ridge.

In the letter Ridge defended English's efforts on behalf of Social Security. Ridge wrote

Phil English realizes that Pennsylvania has the second highest senior population in America.... When it comes to Medicare and Social Security, Phil's position is crystal clear; You earned it, you deserve it, you were promised it, you are counting on it, and he wil make sure you get it.¹²⁸

A second mailing went to Senior's throughout the district. This piece was a simple oversized post card with a picture of a senior citizen and the headline quote "No one has worked harder for us than Phil English." Butler and Crawford county voters, all of whom are within the Pittsburgh media market received a mailing contrasting English's local roots with DiNicola, who had resided in California prior to moving back to Erie. In fact, the "Hollywood" Ron image built by the English campaign lasted until the DiNicola people countered with their own message ten weeks out from the election. This mailing, with small local variations, had pictures of English in the district opposite of DiNicola surrounded by symbols of California like the Hollywood sign, sunglasses, and a road sign saying "California U.S. 66". All of it was meant to express the theme, "English is from here; DiNicola is from there".

English also made heavy use of advocacy calls because, as Holste put it, "Phones let your message get in below the radar screen." And phone they did. The Pennsylvania Republican Party called all of the Republican voters in the district prior to election day with a GOTV script which read "Tom Ridge and the rest of the Pennsylvania Republican ticket need your vote, please go to the polls on Tuesday." The campaign calls focused on Crawford and Butler Counties and used a script which reinforced the mail. "Phil English is one of us and the Democrats have brought in a candidate from

¹²⁸ Steve Meyers, English's direct mail consultant, kindly provided copies of the mailings.

California"¹²⁹ The mail also called DiNicola a California Liberal and warned the voters against his "...dangerous liberal ideas!". The phone effort undertaken by English encompassed the whole range of phone goals; persuasion, ID, and GOTV. The following table provides a visual summary of the English direct contact efforts.

Table 4.8: English Direct Contact Summary

Target Group Description	Count
Ridge Letter to Seniors	56,994
Brochure to Seniors	56,994
Butler County Comparison Piece	52,091
Butler/Mercer county comparison piece	85,256
Republican Party Calls	130,274
Campaign Calls to Butler and Crawford	67,943

4.3.2 The DiNicola Effort

It is often difficult to speak of "the campaign manager", as they tend to come and go like modern professional sports franchises. Bill Peduto was the campaign manager of record for Ron DiNicola but he only held that position for the ten weeks prior to the election. It is a wonder anyone would have wanted the job. The campaign found itself twenty-two points down with ten weeks to go. Mr. Peduto's first task was to focus the campaign. After a series of meetings they decided on three goals:

- 1 Secure a strong commitment from local labor leaders.¹³⁰
- 2 Solidify the Democratic base
- 3 Schedule candidate's time and fundraising efforts.

¹²⁹ No copies of the scripts exist. This reconstruction was done over the phone with Jack Zadow, president of Grassroots Direct, the phoning company making the calls. The interview took place in January of 1999.

¹³⁰ Labor leaders supported DiNicola. The support described was a local effort to keep national labor, primarily COPE, from dropping the race from its target group. The task of the campaign was to convince local and national leaders that they could reverse the downward drop and climb back into the race against English.

To accomplish these three goals Peduto put together a campaign team that included pollster David Bennett of Bennett, Petts & Associates the fundraising firm RMM Consulting; direct mail expert Ed Peevy of Direct Response; and television consultant Michael Donilon of Shrum/Donilon/Devine. Peduto was a local political operative but the other members of the campaign team were from out-of-state.

All three goals were directed at arresting drift and refocusing effort on a base which, in and of itself, would be sufficient to win the election. It was a strategy born of district demographics and time constraints. Tactically, the DiNicola campaign needed to solidify their base through personal contact and then use their abundant ground resources to turn out their vote. They also needed to respond to the English attacks in key jurisdictions.¹³¹ First, the campaign identified a core group of voters who had not voted since 1992. These voters, mostly Democratic women in Eire, came to 15,000 households with a phone. Each targeted household received one identification call and then two turnout calls.

Like the English campaign, the direct mail focused on Butler and Mercer counties. These counties were home to a number of key swing voters as well as being inside the more expensive and less efficient Pittsburgh media market. The campaign sent two mailings into Butler county, both to all Democratic and Independent households. The first mailing, called "Bricklayer" sought to redefine DiNicola from the slick Hollywood lawyer portrayed by the English campaign to the ex-marine, local boy made good, "Tough enough to box in the Marines, smart enough to go to Harvard", and

¹³¹ The campaign manager developed a mail plan calling for four mailings to Butler and Mercer county. These were considered, at least in part, "swing" areas. They only had the money for two and at the last minute funding groups in the state switched their money over to different Pennsylvania races.

born to an immigrant bricklayer at that. That the piece was mailed to Democratic voters in Butler and Mercer counties showed the importance placed on recovering a dwindling base. The second mailing discussed senior issues and was sent to all Democratic and Independent voters who were 65 or over and who lived in Butler county.¹³² The campaign called this the "Older Voter/FDR" piece and it emphasized DiNicola's ties to traditional Democratic issues as well as the threat Republicans presented to the elderly by contrasting Democratic support for Social Security with "Republican Attacks on our most important social program".

Because of the large number of labor volunteers and the importance of turning out the Democratic base, the DiNicola campaign concentrated on phoning and literature drops, both of which can be performed by volunteers. They did two large literature drops. The first drop was done in the City of Erie and the Shenango Valley.¹³³ The second drop, done by labor union volunteers, was in Western Erie county.¹³⁴ Both drops were designed to improve DiNicola's image with his Democratic base. The campaign used its volunteers for one final foray on the Sunday before the election. The Christian Coalition prints its political endorsements on that day and puts the resulting ballot package on the windshields of cars parked at churches. The campaign got an

¹³² The definition of "senior" is somewhat arbitrary. One voter file company insisted on using "55 and over" as its senior definition until the owner of the firm turned 54. The definition was altered to read "65 and over".

¹³³ The valley is defined as the towns of Farrell, Sharpsville, Sharon, Hermitage, and Wheatland.

¹³⁴ Western Erie county is largely a campaign defined area and encompassed all of Erie City, Albion Boro, Edinboro, Fairview Boro, Girard Boro, North East Boro, Waterford Boro, Wattsburg Boro, Wesleyville Boro, Fairview Township, Girard Township, Harborcreek Township, Millcreek Township, Summit Township, Union Township, and Waterford Township

advance copy of the piece and prepared a response. Their volunteers then placed the response next to the Christian Coalition piece on each car. This activity took place at all church lots in Erie, Butler City, Greenville, Sharpsburg, Farrel, Meadville, and the previously defined West County area. The drop in response to the Christian Coalition featured DiNicola with his family history and linked English to "outside extremists" who didn't have the districts best interests at heart. Unfortunately, no copies of the second drop are left and none of those interviewed remember much about the piece except that it was taken up with DiNicola's personal background.

The campaign called all Democrats in the district who had voted in two or more of the last four general elections. In the city of Eire they called all Democrats. All of the calling was short, direct, and partisan. The script read, in part, "Please go to the polls on Tuesday to elect a Democrat to congress and stop the right wing."¹³⁵

Labor also made significant efforts. In addition to calling and turning out their own union membership organized labor helped the campaign to knock on the doors of all Democrats who lived in precincts with an National Committee for an Effective Congress (NCEC) defined Democratic performance of 70% or greater.¹³⁶ The door-to-door effort was aimed at persuading Democrats and encouraging their participation. Labor volunteers then made a GOTV calls to all Democrats living in the same precincts. Both the door-to-door effort and the labor calls emphasized that it was a union calling

¹³⁵ Provided in an interview with Bill Peduto, campaign manager, in June of 1996.

¹³⁶ NCEC provides Democratic campaigns and parties around the country with precinct targeting information. The organization is based in Washington DC and was very helpful in providing information for this dissertation.

and that DiNicola represented the union and working class vote. The following table summarizes the DiNicola campaign effort.

Table 4.9: DiNicola Campaign Direct Contact Summary

Description	Count
D hhslds in butler and Mercer (Bricklayer)	56521
DI Hhslds 65 plus Butler, Mercer (Senior/FDR)	9996
All Hhslds, Erie City, Shenango Valley (Drop 1)	81077
All Hhslds, Western Eire County (Drop 2)	115793
All D in Eire City; All D phone vtd 2 or more Gen. in the rest of Eire County (ID one)	42653
All D 70% NCEC persuasion	22903
All D 70% NCEC with phone	17070

4.4 California Congressional District One: 1996

The California first congressional aspires to fulfill Walt Whitman's self-description; it too encompasses multitudes. Stretching from the Sonoma county wine country to the rough, remote, country along the California-Oregon border, it may present more contrasts and contradictions than any other congressional district in the country. Although the most common image that outsiders take with them of the first are the tall redwoods standing over the cliffs in the northern counties of Del Norte and Mendocino, it is the more populated and suburban southwestern corner of the district that provides the votes. In the 1980's the population of Vacaville and Fairfield grew by roughly 50% to more than 150,000. About 40% of the district's total vote comes from Napa and Solano counties. The diverse economy includes agriculture, logging, ranching, tourism, eco-tourism, and the military. The agricultural output counts marijuana as a cash crop of note. The district contains Fort Ross, the only place in the

lower 48 states originally settled by Russians. They built the fort in 1812 and sold it in 1841. Had they waited another eight years they would have found gold and the 49'ers would have had a distinctly Slavic flavor. As it is, the sale will go down as yet another bad Russian land deal in the new world. The Redwoods live and thrive near their distant cousin the grape vine. Where twenty years ago there were twenty wineries there are now over two-hundred. A district map and partisan breakdown by county is provided on the following page.¹³⁷

This unstable amalgamation of economic, botanical and historical diversity has given rise to a competitive and unstable politics defined less by traditional ethnic or class cleavages like those that divide the more traditional Pennsylvania 21, and more by cultural conflict between environmentalists, loggers, developers, and suburbanites. The large number of working class citizens in the district has tilted it toward the Democratic party on economic issues, but it has gravitated toward Republican social views in response to the influx of counterculture voters along the district's coast.

California congressional district 01 is represented by Congressman Frank Riggs who took his background in the military and law enforcement and parlayed it into victory in a tough 1990 election. Two years later Riggs, who helped uncover House checking account overdrafts, found himself uncovered as well. He drew a tough opponent in Dan Hamburg, one of People magazine's "50 Most Beautiful People" that year, a charismatic environmentalist who had graduated from Stanford and founded an alternative school in the district. Hamburg summarized the differences between Riggs

¹³⁷ District description and political history taken from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa. *The Almanac of American Politics* (Congressional Quaterly Press, Washington DC 1996) pp 95-97

and himself by saying "He used to be a narc and I favored growing your own".

Hamburg won.

They battled again in 1994. Hamburg drew heavily on environmental support and the battle turned into one of jobs vs. conservation. Riggs was quoted as saying, "I say jobs first and not Earth first like Dan Hamburg and the other environmental extremists do". Evidently the message worked better in 94 than in 92 and Riggs regained his seat -- the only congressman that year to do so.

Spending followed incumbent lines. Riggs outspent Hamburg in 1992 \$716,401 to \$647,532. Hamburg won 48% to 45%. The roles were reversed in 1994 and Hamburg, now the incumbent, outspent Riggs \$834,611 to \$605,185, while losing 53% to 47%. It is probably the only district in the country where the loser has outspent the winner two cycles in a row. A table summarizing the district's electoral history is in Appendix 3.

In 1996, newcomer Angela Alioto surprised political observers by winning the Democratic primary and the right to challenge Riggs in the general. Related to the famous San Francisco politician, Joseph Alioto, and wheelchair bound from a skiing accident, the telegenic Alioto proved to be a colorful candidate. Her surprising primary victory made her a target of opportunity for the Democratic party. In addition to providing the Democratic candidate, San Francisco also supplies the TV coverage. Its stations dominate the market and make advertising in the 1st CD an inefficient and expensive proposition.

Table 4.10: Distribution of Riggs and Alioto Campaign Spending

Campaign	Riggs	Alioto
Total	\$1,390,399.00	\$1,228,870.00
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE	\$83,423.00	\$61,443.00
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE%	6%	5%
Mail	\$431,023.00	\$270,351.00
Mail%	31%	22%
Total Direct Contact	\$514,446.00	\$331,794.00
Contact%	37%	27%

Source: Figures taken from FEC reports.

Riggs outspent Aliot (see table 4.10) but not by much. Both campaigns spent much more money on persuasion efforts than on GOTV and both spent larger percentages of their budget on mail than did other campaigns included in this study. No doubt the high cost San Francisco media market constrained both candidates.

4.4.1 The Riggs Effort

Phillips managed the Riggs campaign team. Phillips was from out-of-state, unlike the other campaign managers in the case studies, but, like them, he went on to become Riggs' Administrative Assistant. In addition to Phillips the Riggs team included POS for polling; Steve Powell for media production; National Media for media buying; and Bay Area consultant Harvey Hukari for the targeting and design of direct mail. Shellie Garret of Garret Enterprises assisted with the complex precinct targeting and VCS of California provided the voter file effort.

To pay for this collection of talent, Riggs, again like the other incumbents studied, relied on two fundraisers, one in Washington D.C. and the other in the district. The local fundraiser was Pam Simpson, a Riggs staffer. Tom Hammond performed the

PAC duties in the District of Columbia. In July, an Alioto poll had Riggs ahead 41% to 39%, a close margin for a race with an incumbent but not unusual in the turbulent California first congressional district. An early POS poll showed that between 40% and 45% of the district's voters held a favorable view of Riggs. Over 89% of the voters had heard of Riggs as compared to near zero for newcomer Alioto.

According to Phillips, the campaign stressed voter turnout of its base areas as well as targeting swing areas for persuasion efforts. The campaign message compared the experienced Riggs who, as a congressman, had brought a number of local projects into the district, and Alioto, the young, inexperienced newcomer. This message was delivered by a two-pronged direct contact effort with the campaign in charge of small, local mailings and the consultant team of Hukari and Garret providing the targeting and design for larger direct mail and phoning efforts. The campaign undertook an extensive calling and door-to-door effort based on precinct election return targeting. Precincts targeted included all those meeting the following four criteria:

- 1) Dan Hamburg lost to Don Bosco in the 94 Democratic Primary
- 2) Angela Alioto lost in the 1996 Democratic primary
- 3) Frank Riggs beat Dan Hamburg in the 1994 General
- 4) Pete Wilson beat Kathleen Brown in the Gubernatorial

These precincts were the focus of a three part walking program. First, all voters in the precincts were canvassed with an ID question. Second, the campaign distributed a piece which touted Riggs' district work. Finally, all of the voters were given a newsletter and a video that attacked a number of statements Alioto had made

during the campaign. Later, the campaign called back all of the favorable voters in these precincts for turnout.

The campaign also did a number of local mailings. Mendocino, Solano, and Napa county voters all received a mailing touting the work Congressman Riggs had done in their area. The campaign did not have any copies of the local mailings left for the election but Phillips described them as "positive pieces which listed the federal projects that Frank had either brought into the district or was currently working on. The Napa mailing was further subdivided into a mailing to American Canyon City and a mailing to all of Napa outside of American Canyon City. Riggs had worked hard on a federal grant for American Canyon City. Finally, a local mailing went out to targeted zip codes along the district's Pacific coast which highlighted the positive side of Riggs' environmental record.

The campaign's internal effort was supplemented by twelve professionally produced and targeted direct mail pieces and extensive paid phone work. The campaign defined groups of seniors, persuadable voters, and base voters for targeting. The actual targeting was very complex but, fortunately, the original production orders were recovered and used for file coding. Seniors were defined as those over sixty. These older voters received two mail pieces. The first attacked Alioto for "helping to raise taxes on Social Security benefits by 59%". After noting that "President Roosevelt would roll over in his grave" the campaign went on to compose another senior piece, this one positive, touting Riggs for his leadership on the Medicare Preservation Act. The persuadable universe was defined using a combination of precinct election return targeting and political information. First, Democrats living in precincts which had

voted Republican for president in 1994 and on the conservative side of a 1994 ballot measure were chosen. The campaign referred to this target as "Soft D's".¹³⁸ Added to this were Republican voters who had failed to turnout out in two of the last three elections. The targeted Republicans were called "Soft R's". These voters received three attacks on Alioto, all designed to remind the voters that "She can't be bothered to pay her taxes, vote, or live in the district". The first mailing was called "Her Heart" and implied that Alioto, a San Francisco native who had moved to the district to run for office, had left her heart in her native city. The second attack, called "Little People" detailed taxes that the wealthy Alioto had failed to pay on time and contrasted that with a quote of hers saying "People who can afford to pay their taxes should be happy to pay their taxes."¹³⁹ The final attack piece sent to the persuadable universe, entitled "Bothered" summarized the other attacks with three lines: She can't be bothered to pay taxes; she can't be bothered to vote; she can't be bothered to live here.¹⁴⁰

All of the mail pieces were printed on oversized pieces of glossy paper. They all had a single fold in the middle and a spare outside cover sporting a head turning lead like "Taxes are for the Little People ...". The Riggs mail is an excellent example of a graphic presentation mode which conveys a message to even the most inattentive reader. It may also signal the passing of the assumption, common among consultants, that a man attacking a woman in a campaign will come off as too harsh and

¹³⁸ No one in the campaign could recall which ballot initiative.

¹³⁹ The original quote appeared in the Napa Valley Register, March 16, 1996.

¹⁴⁰ Quotes taken from mail piece provided by consultant Harvey Hukari.

mean-spirited. The Rigg's campaign not only attacked a woman, but one who campaigned from a wheelchair.

Riggs targeted independents with three positive pieces. The first, "Clear Choice" contrasted newspaper endorsements of Riggs to negative press for Alioto. The second, "Fighting" simply listed the endorsements Riggs had received from local groups like the United Seniors Association and the National Federation of Small Business. The final piece mailed to independents highlighted headlines from newspapers endorsing Riggs. The campaign also mailed a piece on the Riggs environmental record that targeted Democrats. In all, the eleven Riggs mailings reached over 150,000 voters. To supplement the mail, the campaign paid a telemarketing firm, Direct Contact America, to conduct an intensive persuasion phoning program. Direct Contact called the same persuadable universe which had received so much mail from Riggs and delivered a message about Alioto being new to the district and inexperienced at politics. All of the Riggs contacts illustrate the strategy of an incumbent with a tough race. He emphasized his record in mailings to independents and he called his base but, in addition, because the district was volatile and the race close, he attacked his opponent by mailing to groups of swing Republicans and Democrats.

Table 4.11 that follows summarizes the Riggs contact effort. Because of the number of mail pieces an extra column giving the campaign's name for each piece is included.

Table 4.11: The Riggs Campaign Direct Contact Summary

R1	Her Heart	Soft R and Soft D	136,069
R2	Little People	Soft R and Soft D	136,069
R3	Bothered	Soft R and Soft D	136,069
R4	Roosevelt	Seniors One	97,321
R5	Seniors/Medicare	Seniors two	97,321
R6	Clear Choice	Independents	78,412
R7	Fighting	Independents	78,412
R8	Headliners	Independents	78,412
R9	Redwood Empire	Dems voted 11/94	84,969
R10	Local	Mendocino	
R11	Local	Solano	
R12	Local	Napa	(R10, 11, 12 = 160,626)
R13	Local	Coastal Zip Codes	43,296
R14	Phoning	All voters with a phone	169,000
R15	Walking One	target precincts	68,070
R16	Walking Two	target precincts	68,070
R17	Walking Three	sg525,target precincts	68,070

4.4.2 The Alioto Effort

Tom Pier managed the Alioto for Congress from its inception in early 1996 until the final vote was tallied in November. Paul Maslin of Hickman/Maslin and Brown provided polling and strategic advice. Bill Carrick did both media production and electronic media advertising placement. The firm of Gaddy/Neuwirth handled both local and PAC fundraising. Ambrosino and Muir did direct mailing planning and production. The campaign did no internal phoning but did work closely with the Democratic party and its field phoning efforts. This campaign team was more local than many examined in this study. Ambrosino and Muir, Gaddy/Neuwirth, and Bill Carrick were all from

California. It is hard to gather from this fact whether it is part of a larger trend toward challengers hiring more local talent or whether California candidates can more easily draw on the huge base of local consulting firms.

In July, the campaign felt it had an excellent chance to unseat Riggs. Riggs' high name ID was a mixed blessing because his favorable/unfavorable ratio was 38% to 37%. The Alioto's campaign's strategy aimed to link Riggs and Gingrich in the mind of the districts' many swing voters. Like many challengers she felt that attacks were necessary to weaken the incumbent's base. The campaign direct mail plan suggested that resources be spent on targeted voters with a message that emphasized the Assault Weapons ban, education funding, Medicare and Social Security. To quote from the plan:

"He (Riggs) is working closely with Newt Gingrich to slash funding for education, Medicare, and Social Security. Frank Riggs is strongly supported by the NRA and opposes the ban on assault weapons and requiring waiting periods before being allowed to purchase a gun. He is also out of touch with the needs of working families by voting against job-training programs.¹⁴¹

To get this message across the Alioto campaign developed a complex direct mail target of approximately 90,000 voters. The target group consisted of three sub-groups; independents, Republican women, and soft Democrats. Repetition of detailed targeting information is tedious but it is worth quoting the Alioto targets in depth simply for illustration. Unlike Riggs, they are simple enough to review, but unlike English or Devine, complex enough to be interesting. The three groups are defined below

¹⁴¹ This special target group for the medicare mailing is defined as "All Independents over 60 plus all R women over 60 who voted in 11/94 but not 6/94 or 3/96 or registered since 10/5/94 and did not vote in 3/96

Group a) Independents: All Independents and Greens over 30 who voted 11/92 plus all independents and greens over 25 who voted in 11/94 or have registered since 10/05/94.

Group b) Republican women: R women ages 25 to 49 who voted in 11/92 but not 6/94 plus Republican women 25 to 49 who voted 11/94 but not 6/94 or 3/96 plus all R women 18-49 who have registered since 2/26/96.

Group c) Soft Democrats: Democrats over age 25 who voted in 11/92 but not 11/94, 6/94, 3/96 plus democrats who voted 11/94 but not 6/94 or 3/96, plus democrats who have registered since 10/5/94 and did not vote 3/96 plus democrats who have registered since 2/26/96.¹⁴²

Although the campaign recognized that it needed to attack Riggs it also realized that it had to increase Alioto's name identification. Messages coming from a known source have more impact than those coming from an unknown source.¹⁴³ The first piece of mail was a reprint of a primary brochure called "An Independent Fighter for Us", and made the case for Alioto as a strong candidate. Rapidly following the brochure were five negative attack pieces of varying severity. Two of them covered education with one each on Medicare, Assault Weapons and the Riggs record. Like the Rigg's mailings, all of the Alioto pieces were large, single fold, graphic pieces with very little text. The mail was designed to convey a message to even the most cursory of readers. This style of mail is often called "California Mail" because it is thought to have come to perfection in the expensive Los Angeles media market.

The first education piece attacked Riggs on his student loan votes. The second piece featured a picture of Riggs and Gingrich with the headline "Frank Riggs voted for

¹⁴² From the Alioto direct mail plan. Quoted with permission of Paul Ambrosino, principal, Ambrosino/Muir/Hermann. All direct mail quotes from the Alioto campaign come from samples provided by Ambrosino and Muir.

¹⁴³ See Sellers, *Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns*.

Newt Gingrich's plan to cut education by \$10 Billion." The Medicare piece claimed that Riggs voted to cut Medicare by 270 billion dollars, while the assault weapon ban claimed that Riggs wanted to repeal the ban. This mailing illustrates the compelling and often aggressive nature of graphic mail. When looking at the front the reader is faced with an assault weapon, held in the sinister looking gloved hands of an otherwise anonymous criminal. On the back is Alioto, seated in her wheelchair, holding the same assault rifle, stating "Unlike Frank Riggs, I don't think military-style assault weapons should be sold to the public."¹⁴⁴ The final attack piece used cartoons to highlight inconsistencies in the Riggs voting record. All of these mailings went to the same target group except for the Medicare piece which went to senior citizens.

The campaign had little or no field effort of its own and relied on the state party coordinated campaign for phone calls. The State Party ran both volunteer and paid phoning programs which called all of the Democrats in the district. There was an additional local Democratic effort which tried to increase the turnout among Green Party members, selected independents, and Democrats, but the local party organization would not share its actual target information. Table 4.12 below summarizes the Alioto direct contact program.

¹⁴⁴ Many papers thought she was implying she had been injured with a weapon. She was actually hurt in a ski accident.

In keeping with the table convention for Riggs, the campaign names of each direct contact effort is included.

Table 4.12: Alioto Campaign Direct Contact Summary

Code	Name	Target	Count
D1	Fighter	Target Group	96,706
D2	Education	Target Group	96,706
D3	Truth	Target Group	96,706
D4	Medicare	Target Group Seniors	9,688
D5	College	Target Group	96,706
D6	Gun Ban	Target Group	96,706
D7	Party	Democrats	118,987

4.5 Summary

In this chapter I detailed the direct voter contact effort of eight campaigns in four congressional districts through interviews with consultants, campaign managers, and candidates, along with an examination of phone scripts, door-to-door scripts, and mail pieces. Each contact was coded onto the base file and identified by source, type, purpose, and message. One final result of this effort is a description of seventy-three (73) separate campaign contacts reaching over 1.2 million voters during the 1994 and 1996 campaign cycles. After the target universes for each contact had been defined, each contact was coded to voters on the base voter file. Coding proceeded according to the categories defined in chapter three. Each contact was assigned to individual voters within five mutually exclusive categories.

- 1) **Party Source:** Did the contact come from a Republican or Democrat?
- 2) **Status Source:** Did the contact come from an incumbent or a challenger?
- 3) **Type:** Was the contact delivered via phone, mail or door to door?

4) **Purpose:** Was the contact designed for persuasion, voter identification or GOTV?

5) **Message:** Was the contact negative, personal, or issue specific?

Table 4.13: Summary of All District Direct Contact Efforts

	MD05	OH01	PA21	CA01	Total
Republican	11	7	6	17	41
Democratic	10	8	7	8	33
Incumbent	10	8	6	17	33
Challenger	11	7	7	8	41
Mail	15	10	6	19	50
Phone	4	4	5	3	16
Door	1	1	2	3	7
Identification	1	1	2	1	5
GOTV	5	4	4	3	16
Persuasion	15	10	7	21	43
Positive	13	9	8	6	36
Negative	4	4	3	10	21
Issue	4	4	2	9	17
Total	21	15	13	25	74

Note: Cells represent the number of contacts in each category. Source: Interviews and supplemental sources.

It is not surprising to see a slight edge for Republican and incumbent campaigns over Democratic and challenger efforts (see Table 4.12). Republicans tend to raise more money than Democrats and incumbents far outstrip challengers in fundraising. Mail efforts out number phone and door-to-door efforts by a large margin. Sixty seven percent of the contacts traveled through the mail as compared to 22% over the phones and 9% via door-to-door efforts. Because mail is related to persuasion, while calling is related to GOTV, persuasion is the dominate purpose of the contact programs and occupied 58% of the total.

Given the media attention to negative campaigning it is a moderate surprise to see that, overall, positive contacts outnumber negative contacts 43 to 36. Still, we need to look closer at what kinds of contacts serve various purposes. The preponderance of positive efforts is probably a result of most phone efforts being coded as "positive".

This brief summary is useful for understanding the types of contacts involved in the sample of cases selected for study but it is the types of voters receiving the contacts as well as the effect direct contact has on those voters that is of interest. Toward that end the following chapters bring together the voter file information discussed in chapter three with the contact information summarized in this chapter.

CHAPTER 5

THE RICH GET RICHER: THE UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECT CONTACT

At the end of that frenzied ten-day hustle (since we kept no count, no lists or records) we had no way of knowing how many half-stirred dropouts had actually registered, or how many of those would vote. So it was a bit of a shock all around when, toward the end of that election day, our pollwatchers' tallies showed that Joe Edwards had already cashed more than 300 of the 486 new registrations that had just gone into the books. The race was going to be very close. The voting lists showed roughly 100 pro-Edwards voters who hadn't showed up at the polls, and we figured that 100 phone calls might raise at least 25 of these laggards. At that point it looked like 25 might make the nut, particularly in a sharply-divided three-way mayor's race in a town with only 1623 voters.

So we needed those phones. But where? Nobody knew ... until a girl who'd been working on the phone network suddenly came up with a key to a spacious two-room office in the old Elks Club building. ... We seized the (office) at once, ignoring the howls and curses of the mob in the Elks bar where the outgoing mayor's troops were already gathering to celebrate the victory of his hand-picked successor. ... By six o'clock we had the new headquarters working nicely. The phone calls were extremely brief and dire: "Get off your ass, you bastard! We need you. Get out and vote!"¹⁴⁵

Who receives political contacts? First, I detail the frequency of contacts with voters in the four districts included in the study and then I analyze types of contacts generated. I also examine the types of voters who receive direct contacts from campaigns. What sorts of voters are likely to receive multiple contacts and, conversely, what voters receive none? If campaigns are an important source of political information and, if those same campaigns provide some motivation for voters to turnout, then the distribution of campaign information among blocks of voters raises important normative questions. Included in this section will be a comparison of GOTV and persuasion contact efforts in the context of campaign strategy.

¹⁴⁵ Thompson, Hunter S. "Freak Power in the Rockies" reprinted in *The Great Shark Hunt*, Ballantine Books (New York, 1979) p. 157

In the final sections I will focus on differences between persuasion and GOTV contacts and the efforts candidates make to reach out to independents and members of the opposite party. Campaigns are contests with two players but how many voters receive contacts from both? How often do candidates target independents, often considered the most persuadable universe? How often do candidates attempt to contact members of the opposite party?

5.1 Frequency and Distribution of Campaign Contacts

There are 1.36 million registered voters on the four district base files and 95% of those voters received at least one contact from at least one candidate.¹⁴⁶ Sixty-six percent of the registered voters turned out. The eight campaigns made 4,838,297 direct contact attempts to the electorate -- an average of 604,787 contacts per campaign, or a little more than two contacts per campaign per voter.

¹⁴⁶ Some of the contacts recorded in this study were made by political parties. In one case, the contact was made by a labor union. Still, this study did not attempt to capture, and probably could not have captured, the number of mail pieces or phone calls generated by Independent Expenditure and Issue Advocacy groups.

At first glance this represents a significant effort on behalf of campaigns to communicate directly with the electorate via mail, phone, and door-to-door efforts. (see table 5.1)

Table 5.1: Total Number of Voters and Direct Contacts by District

District	Voters ¹⁴⁷	Turnout	At Least One	Mean # of Contacts
MDCD05 (1994)	265,192	167,625 (63%)	265,186 (99%)	4.45
OHCD01 (1994)	272,186	163,845 (60%)	192,804 (70%)	2.53
PACD21 (1996)	302,991	216,674 (71%)	290,281 (96%)	2.64
CACD01 (1996)	296,316	204,618 (69%)	292,461 (99%)	6.89
Total	1,136,685	752,762	1,040,732	

Note: Cells represent the number of voters in each category. Percentages are in parantheses and represent the percentage of total voters within a district.

In three of the four districts nearly every voter was contacted by at least one of the two campaigns. Even in the district with the fewest contacts, Ohio CD01, 70% of the voters received at least one direct contact from at least one campaign. There is more variation in the mean number of contacts received per voter. That figure ranges from a low in Ohio CD01 of 2.53 to an astounding 6.89 average direct contacts per voter in California CD01. With only four districts in the study it is not possible to generalize on the reasons for the variance in the number of contacts per district, but as discussed in Chapter 3, it appears that even in our small case study group there is, at least on the surface, a strong relationship between TV costs and direct contact. Table 5.2 below compares the mean number of contacts and the 4th quarter average television costs per point. Although this study concentrates on the distribution of contacts among voters and the small district sample size does not allow generalization from the district

¹⁴⁷ The "number of voters" on the voter file is not the same as the number of voters that were registered on election day. For example, after removing all of those who registered after 11/94 in Maryland CD 05 there were 265,192 thousand voters left on file. However, on election day 1994 there may have been more. About 8% of the voting population moves or dies each year.

level some hypotheses do suggest themselves. The average number of contacts per district does not seem related to election year or turnout. The low and high turnout districts are evenly split between Republican and Democratic incumbents as well as presidential and non-presidential year cycles. Furthermore, comparable amounts of money were spent in each race. However, TV costs varied widely among districts and the table below indicates the possibility of a relationship between the two variables.

Table 5.2: Comparison of Contact Mean and Television Cost

District	Contact Mean	TV Cost
CA 01	6.89	\$491.00
MD 05	4.45	\$371.00
OH 01	2.53	\$113.00
PA 21	2.64	\$19.00

Note: TV cost is the 4th quarter cost per point of the media market covering the largest part of the district. TV costs taken from Media Strategies Research 1998 Media Planning Guide.

The district with the highest TV cost also had the highest number of per capita direct contacts (see table 5.2). The two lower cost districts; Ohio 1 and Pennsylvania 21, have correspondingly low numbers of per capita contacts. Maryland 5, with television not quite as expensive as California but still substantially more than Ohio and Pennsylvania, ranks second. Clearly, direct contact can be seen as a tactical substitute for electronic media.

Most consultants agree that a message is registered by a voter only after multiple receptions. One rule of thumb suggests that a television buy needs a minimum of 300 Gross Rating Points (GRP) before any kind of voter movement is to be expected. Three hundred GRP's indicate that the commercial is seen by the target audience three times. Many consultants feel that the "rule of three" applies to messages received through

direct contact as well. All of the average contact figures summarized in Table 5.1 exceed or hover around the magic number three. The imperative to target particular voters, when combined with the need to send voters multiple messages, suggests that the distribution of campaign contacts will cluster among voters. Table 5.2 begins to address the distribution of contacts among voters by displaying the dispersion of contacts by frequency at every level of contact.

Table 5.3: Distribution of Contacts by District

Contacts	CA	MD	OH	PA	Total
0	3,885	6	79,382	127,021	95,944
1	15,249	10,922	39,687	74,066	139,924
2	18,703	44,766	20,791	73,390	315,300
3	10,069	60,314	46,181	63,930	541,482
4	26,323	40,389	26,412	38,001	524,500
5	35,546	17,318	21,068	18,177	460,545
6	29,108	27,233	19,839	15,715	551,370
7	32,621	33,897	12,427	4,504	584,150
8	26,135	23,732	4,980	2,506	458,824
9	24,316	5,656	1,251	0	281,007
10	31,005	738	168	0	310,911
11	16,038	221	0	0	178,849
12	9,715	0	0	0	116,580
13	10,854	0	0	0	51,090
14	3,903	0	0	0	19,680
15	1,312	0	0	0	1,312
16	1,242	0	0	0	1,242
17	319	0	0	0	319

Note: Cells represent the number of voters by district. "total" represents the number receiving a contact when all four files are combined.

Table 5.3 contains a hint of conventional wisdom as the plurality of voters received between two and four contacts. Significant numbers also received less than two and more than four contacts. There is enormous variation among districts. California CD01 is a major donor to the total number of contacts -- contributing all of those receiving twelve or more contacts and the vast majority of those receiving eight or more contacts. Some poor soul in California received a total of eighteen contacts. In contrast, a voter in Pennsylvania CD 21 might have received a maximum of six total contacts from the two campaigns combined.

Table 5.4 below uses the same information but summarizes it into categories of low, moderate, and high contact groups. The grouping is suggested by the distribution of contacts in Table 5.3 and the political goal of sending a minimum of three contacts to each voter. The low category includes those receiving less than three contacts. The moderate category includes voters receiving between three and five total contacts while those in the high contact category received more than five contacts during the course of the campaign. The districts are ordered in the table from the highest to the lowest average contact per voter.

Table 5.4: Percentage Distribution of Contacts by Frequency

State	Low	Moderate	High	Total
CA	37,807 (12.7)	71,938 (24.3)	187,571 (62.6)	296,316
MD	55,694 (21)	118,021 (44.5)	91,477 (35)	265,192
OH	139,860 (51.3)	93,661 (34.5)	38,665 (18.6)	272,186
PA	160,157 (53)	120,108 (39)	22,726 (8)	302,991
Total	393,518 (34.6)	403,728 (35.5)	232,698 (20.4)	1,136,685

Note: Cells represent total number of voters within each district with percentages in parentheses.

In Ohio and Pennsylvania approximately half of the voters received fewer than the accepted target number of three contacts. In the two higher television cost districts in Maryland and California majority 80% and 89% of the voters received more than three contacts respectively.

5.2 Types of Contacts

What types of contacts were generated by the eight campaigns under study?

Who sent them and what types of material were disseminated?

Table 5.5: Percent of Voters Receiving No Contacts by Contact Type and District

Variable/State	MD	OH	PA	CA	Total
<i>Incumbency</i>					
Challenger	10%	57%	37.7%	65%	43.2%
Incumbent	31.9%	57%	32.6%	2%	30%
<i>Party</i>					
Democrat	31.9%	57%	37.7%	65%	48%
Republican	10%	57%	32.6%	2%	25.4%
<i>Type</i>					
Door to Door	76%	97%	53%	80%	76%
Mail	0%	45%	49%	5.1%	25%
Phone	66.6%	65%	31.5%	22%	45%
<i>Message</i>					
Issue	30.2%	67.8%	81.2%	15%	48.8%
Negative	17.4%	44.7%	70.3%	19.4%	38.6%
Positive	30%	29.2%	9.8%	12%	19.6%
<i>Purpose</i>					
Persuasion	0%	44%	21.2%	1.3%	16.7%
GOTV	66.6%	64%	38.7%	100%	67.7%
Voter ID	79.6%	43%	67.3%	80%	67.4%

Note: Cells represent the percentage of voters not getting any contacts of the type listed

Because of the mass of data available each category is summarized by the percentage of voters who received zero contacts within a particular category. Once again there is significant variation between districts but also some emerging patterns (see table 5.5). Only 2% of the voters in CA01 failed to receive a direct contact from their incumbent but fully 57% of OH01 voters missed out on hearing from their congressman during the campaign. Overall, however, voters were more likely to hear from their incumbent than from the challenger in the district. Voters were also more likely to receive some form of direct contact from a Republican than from a Democrat. Neither of these findings is surprising, even in a small sample like this one. Incumbents are better funded than challengers and Republicans tend to spend more than their Democratic counterparts.

Looking at the categories by "TYPE" it is clear that mail is more prominent than GOTV or door-to-door efforts which might indicate that direct contact, once a medium for turnout, is now primarily a persuasive medium. Moving on to the category named "MESSAGE" it appears that voters are not being overwhelmed with issue information. Nearly half of the voters in these four districts received no issue contact at all. Only 38.6% failed to get a negative piece while only 19.6% received no positive name-ID contact.

The emphasis on mail, a primarily persuasive medium, is also reflected in the distribution by purpose. 67% of the voters received no GOTV or ID contact at all from the campaigns while only 16.7% missed out on a persuasive contact. It is clear that direct contact, one of the prime elite voter mobilization tools is, at least in these case studies, primarily a persuasive and not a turnout mechanism.

The predominance of incumbents and Republicans as a source of direct contact, as well as the dominance of persuasion mail is clearly seen by looking at the mode -- a measure that is very sensitive to strategic considerations. In Maryland for example, the mode is six for persuasion contacts. This captures the challengers decision to mail nine letters to all Republicans in the district. However, what is interesting when looking at the modes is not the four measures which manage to reach two or more but the overwhelming majority of zero or one which indicates that, in any given category, a plurality of voters received one or fewer of that type of contact. Even in cases where the mean is above two mode often remains zero or one.

Table 5.6: The Mean Number of Contacts and the Mode for Each Contact Category Presented by District and by a Combined Total of All Four Districts

Variable/State	MD Mean	Mode	OH Mean	Mode	PA Mean	Mode	CA Mean	Mode	Total Mean	Mode
<i>Incumbency</i>										
Challenger	3.14	1.00	1.41	0.00	1.16	0.00	1.70	0.00	1.82	0.00
Incumbent	1.31	0.00	1.12	0.00	1.48	0.00	5.19	5.00	2.32	0.00
<i>Party</i>										
Democrat	1.31	0.00	1.12	0.00	1.16	0.00	1.70	0.00	1.33	0.00
Republican	3.14	1.00	1.41	0.00	1.48	0.00	5.19	5.00	2.82	0.00
<i>Type</i>										
Door to Door	0.24	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.73	0.00	0.60	0.00	0.41	0.00
Mail	3.80	6.00	2.08	0.00	1.05	0.00	5.50	4.00	3.12	0.00
Phone	0.34	0.00	0.42	0.00	0.87	1.00	0.78	1.00	0.62	1.00
<i>Message</i>										
Issue	0.94	1.00	0.36	0.00	0.38	0.00	2.10	1.00	0.95	0.00
Negative	1.68	1.00	0.69	0.00	0.49	0.00	3.28	4.00	1.54	0.00
Positive	1.83	0.00	1.49	0.00	1.78	1.00	1.51	1.00	1.65	1.00
<i>Purpose</i>										
Persuasion	3.78	3.00	1.05	0.00	1.51	1.00	6.69	7.00	3.28	2.00
GOTV	0.47	0.00	0.42	0.00	0.81		0.00	0.00	0.43	0.00
Voter ID	0.20	0.00	1.06	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.44	0.00

If the modes alert us to the plurality of voters getting almost none of each different type of contact the mean emphasizes those contacts that were concentrated on groups of targeted voters. Although state variation is again high, the same patterns emerge as in table 5.5. Incumbents and Republicans put more contacts into the hands of voters. The most common contact type was persuasion mail with phone, door-to-door,

GOTV and ID efforts far behind. In addition, the majority of messages were either positive or negative with issue contacts far behind.

5.3 Who is Contacted?

What voters receive multiple contacts and what voters are ignored? The literature on voter turnout, as well as our discussion of direct contact targeting, strategy, and implementation, suggests a number of working hypotheses.

The distribution of campaign contacts is the mean number of contacts going to specific voter groups. This distribution is a function of targeting which in turn depends on campaign strategy and the availability of data. As discussed in chapter four, campaigns often pursue the dual goal of holding onto a base while attracting undecided voters. Interactions between base and undecided furnishes the material for varied strategic themes. A campaign may raid its opponent's base or take a stance that alienates supporters while adding additional votes elsewhere. While making judgments about when and how to contact base and undecided voters, targeting displays its strategic side but there is also a large budgetary element in such decision. While the strategic element in targeting focuses on getting the right message into the right hands the budgetary element looks to save scarce resources by directing contacts to likely voters. Any given contact needs to balance both elements. This suggests the hypothesis that people with a history of voting will receive more contacts than those without such a history. Past voting history on a voter file becomes a substitute for standard turnout predictors like education, race, and income. Age, another strong turnout predictor, is available on the voter file, so we would expect campaigns to contact older voters more frequently than younger ones. A review of the contacts

recorded in the last chapter show that 55% percent of the contacts incorporated some form of targeting by voter history, and 32% used some form of targeting by age. Using age as a selection variable group illustrates the dual nature of targeting. On the one hand, age figures into issue mailings. As a group, older citizens are more interested in Social Security and that single program has provided more than its share of partisan conflict over the years. Democrats routinely accuse Republicans of wanting to gut Social Security and Republicans routinely respond, like Phil Gramm, "Ah would nevah cut my momma's check." Older citizens are also more likely to vote so campaigns target them to make sure their contacts get into the hands of likely voters. Thus, age is both an issue target group and a measure of voting propensity.

Political party also serves both a strategic and budgetary purpose. Party members vote at higher rates than do nonparty members. In the four districts under study, in the election year under study, 67% of the voter universe turned out. This translates into a 75% turnout for Republicans; 72% for Democrats and 44% for the unaffiliated voters. Many people claim to be independent and, when defending that choice, like to say they "vote the man and not the party". A more accurate expression for independents might be, "Don't vote for either".

Party also plays a major role in strategic calculations that look to solidify or turn out a base vote. Even with the assumption that some campaigns will target independents as easily identifiable swing voters the combination of turnout efforts and targeting by voter history should put more contacts into people's hands who are registered with one party or another.

It is also possible that all of these effects will not exist at one time and, in fact, may cancel one another out. For example, if a campaign follows a strategy of appealing heavily to its base, as Donald Devine did in Maryland CD05 in 1994, then there will not be much of a relationship between past voting history and age. The blanket mailings to Republicans will cancel out the age and voter history effect. Strategic choices will influence the concentration of contacts but those strategic choices still take place in the context of modern campaign targeting. One or more of the relationships between age, voter history, and party will hold true. In summary, we can expect the distribution of voter contacts to take on many guises, but regardless of the mix, we might also expect to find patterns. Such patterns will include strategies that funnel more contacts to older voters; frequent voters, and party members. Which combination of group factors depends on strategic and tactical campaign decisions.

5.7: Mean Frequency of Direct Contact by Voter Age, Past Participation, and Party by District

Age	MD	OH	PA	CA	Total
18-25	4.3	2	1.9	5.7	3.7
26-35	4.5	2.3	2	6.2	3.9
36-45	4.3	2.4	2	6.6	4
46-55	4.4	2.5	2	6.5	4.3
56-65	4.5	2.7	2.7	8.3	4.9
65 Plus	4.5	3	5.1	8	5.9
Party					
R	7.1	2.9	2.8	7.6	4.9
D	3.1	0.86	2.7	6	4.3
I	2.7	3	1.2	6.3	3.7
Voting					
0	4	1.96	2.1	6.1	4.02
1	4.3	1.69	2.5	5.8	3.96
2	4.6	3.43	2.6	7.9	4.77
3	5	2.5	2.8	7.7	4.91
4	5	2.6	3	7	5.01
Male	4.5	2.5	2.6	6.5	4.3
Female	4.4	2.5	2.8	7.2	4.5
With Phone	5	2	3	7.1	5
Without Phone	3.7	2.7	2	5.7	3.35
Presidential	0	0	0	0	4.7
Off Year	0	0	0	0	3.9

Note: Cells represent means based on samples amounting to 5% of each base file.

Table 5.7 shows the mean number of contacts by the voter demographic groups of age, voter history, party, gender and the presence of a telephone. A breakdown by presidential and off-year election is provided for the file as a whole. Looking first to the means for the combined file of all eight campaigns some general patterns emerge.

Because the districts were all chosen to represent a mix of strategic situations the fact

that some general patterns still emerge is interesting. Older voters receive more contacts than younger voters. Although the move from one age group to another is not dramatic the difference between the youngest group and the oldest is more than two full contacts. Less dramatic, but still noticeable are the differences between party and voting history. With party, independents are less likely to be contacted than are either Republicans or Democrats.

The case of voting history is more complex. Looking at all eight campaigns combined in the "TOTAL" column, people who voted in four elections receive nearly one more contact, on average, than those voting in no elections. However, most of this change takes place between voters who voted in one election and those voting in two or more elections. In fact, the mean number of contacts tends to peak with voters who voted in two elections. This non-linear relationship highlights the tension involved when targeting using voter history. The tension is caused by attempts to balance the chance of sending a piece of mail to a voter who will participate with attempts to send a piece of mail to the universe who will participate in the election in question. If for example, if you sent a newsletter to those who had voted in five of the last five elections that newsletter would no doubt find its way into the hands of very likely voters. However, it would not find its way into the hands of the majority of people who will turn out to vote in that election. The most important tradeoff, when targeting to save money, is between reaching a voter who is sure to vote and reaching the universe of people who will vote in the election in question. The tradeoff involved in targeting is examined in a series of articles written in 1990 by William Daly, President of Voter Contact Services,

and Professor Robert Hughes of the University of Colorado.¹⁴⁸ The study calls the likelihood of sending a piece of mail to a person who will vote a "hit". It then refers to the percentage of people who vote who get a piece of mail the "cover". It is evident from the studies that there is a distinct tradeoff between hit and cover. In the 1988 Iowa Democratic Primary for example, a piece of mail that went to voters who had participated in the 1984 and 1986 primaries reached voters participating in the 1988 primary slightly over 60% of the time. However, that mailing only covered 38% of those turning out for the 1988 election. Conversely, a mailing sent to those who had voted in the 84 and 86 general elections covered 91% of those turning out to vote in the 1988 primary but only 30% of those receiving that particular piece of mail voted. The more finely tuned the targeting the higher the hit rate of any mail piece but the lower the total cover. Consultants are usually aware that targeting by past voter history is very useful in ensuring that a piece of mail gets into the hands of a likely participant but they are cautious lest their selections be so complex as to miss large numbers of other electoral participants. The tension between hit and cover may explain why the effect of voter history on turnout is not stronger and appears to level off after two elections.

Strategic distinctions also emerge from a review of Table 5.7. In Maryland, where the Republican campaign chose to work almost exclusively on its base, there is little, if any, relationship between the number of contacts and age or voter history. There is, however, a strong relationship between the number of contacts and party. In Pennsylvania, where labor was targeting a freshman Republican, social security was a major issue. The result is seen in the targeting priorities. The strongest relationship

¹⁴⁸ William Daly and Robert Hughes. "Hit v. Cover in the 1988 and 1990 Elections". Unpublished Study. 1992. Quoted with permission of the authors.

appears to be between age and the number of contacts. In Pennsylvania 21 voters over 65 show a mean number of contacts that is four times that of voters under 25. In California, with its highly targeted and intense direct mail campaign, both age and voter history show an increase in means. In Ohio 01, with most of the efforts focused on precincts, there is a flatter pattern among all of the variables because all of the different demographic groups within each precinct received a like number of contacts. With the slight exception of California, none of the districts shows a difference between the mean number of contacts received by a male and the mean number of contacts received by a female.

Not surprisingly, one of the strongest relations is that of the presence or absence of a telephone. There is a tautology involved here. GOTV is a phone driven effort so those without a phone cannot receive GOTV calls. Still, this near tautology does highlight the distinction between GOTV and persuasion. They have different purposes and practitioners. It is to the differences between these two activities to which we now turn.

5.4 Turnout and Persuasion Differences

We might expect GOTV and persuasion to show different distribution patterns. GOTV was usually a partisan effort in our case study while persuasion contacts were often targeted by precinct, age, or voter history.

Table 5.8: Mean Number of Contacts for Voter Demographic Groups by Persuasion and by GOTV

State	MD		OH		CA	PA		Total	
Type	GOTV	PERS	GOTV	PERS	PERS	GOTV	PERS	GOTV	PERS
Age									
18-25	0.3	3.12	0.44	1	5.5	0.59	1.07	0.3	3.12
26-35	0.33	3.9	0.29	0.97	6	0.58	1.14	0.32	3.31
36-45	0.42	4	0.36	0.97	6.3	0.54	1.08	0.32	3.4
46-55	0.53	3.7	0.43	0.98	6.3	0.6	1.11	0.37	3.6
56-65	0.62	3.7	0.43	1.2	8.1	1.27	1.13	0.62	4
65 Plus	0.73	3.7	0.16	1.2	7.8	1.4	3.38	0.66	5
Party									
R	0.61	6.5	1.18	0.98	7.5	1.25	1.43	0.7	4.1
D	0.41	2.3	0.27	0.29	6.1	0.51	1.71	0.3	3.6
I	0.2	2.5	0.1	1.32	5.8	0	1.18	0.01	3.1
Voting									
0	0.22	3.6	0.16	1	5.9	0.63	1.37	0.25	3.5
1	0.34	3.8	0.26	0.8	5.6	0.67	1.49	0.34	3.4
2	0.5	3.9	0.41	1.37	8	0.78	1.51	0.44	3.9
3	0.56	3.8	0.6	0.92	7.6	0.89	1.58	0.48	4.1
4	0.6	3.3	0.75	0.93	6.8	0.95	1.67	0.45	4.2
5	0.8	2.3	0.8	0.71	6.6	1.1	1.88	0.76	3
With Phone	0.77	3.8	0.6	1.01	7	1	1.6	0.5	2.9
Without Phone	0	3.6	0	1.04	5.6	0.6	1.3	0.1	4.07
Presidential									
Off Year									
Total									

Note: Cells contain means derived from samples of each file amounting to 5% of the total universe. There were no GOTV contacts in California.

As expected the strongest variation occurs between party members and nonparty members (see table 5.8). Overall, independents received a mean of .01 GOTV contacts while Republicans received 0.7 and Democrats 0.3. This pattern is repeated in all of the districts where there were GOTV efforts. What is most surprising about the

distribution of GOTV contacts is that, even when looking at eight campaigns, all using different strategies, the overall pattern points strongly to older voters, more frequent voters, and party members receiving GOTV contacts more frequently than younger, lower turnout, nonparty members. Even efforts designed to encourage turnout gravitate to those most likely to turnout. This pattern is nicely highlighted in an article on GOTV from Campaigns and Elections magazine.

- 1) You need GOTV if your party's national ticket has a different voter base than you do.
- 2) You need GOTV to make sure favorably inclined voters don't simply vote for the top of the ticket.
- 3) You need GOTV if you have significant voter support among people who are part of neither Democratic nor Republican base constituencies.
- 4) You need GOTV if your support constituency includes voting groups that are historically low in turnout.
- 5) You need GOTV if turnout manipulation is the only way to win your election.¹⁴⁹

Of these rationales for GOTV only numbers 4 and 5 indicate that efforts may be targeted to non-voters. Even GOTV efforts appear to be targeted to infrequent voters rather than non-voters. Non-participants do not even get the benefit of an extra nudge to the polls.

If turnout shows a strong party prejudice and weaker relationships to age and voting frequency, persuasion shows an even greater number of possible patterns. The overall effect, when looking at the eight campaigns together, is still the same. Older voters get two more persuasion contacts than younger voters. Frequent voters also get

¹⁴⁹ Ron Faucheux, "Do You Need GET-OUT-THE-VOTE" *Campaigns and Elections Magazine*, October/November 1996. pp 54-55.

more contacts than do infrequent voters but with the same nonlinear pattern, peaking around two or three elections. Oddly enough, voters with a phone receive nearly two times as many persuasion contacts than do voters without a phone. It could be that the presence of a phone is another stand in for the stability measures so often associated with higher voter turnout.

There are stark differences in the persuasion patterns between states. Ohio and Maryland show almost no difference between the number of persuasion contacts received by older voters while California and Pennsylvania both show strong growth in the number of contacts as we move up the age groups. This may well be a result of strategic calculations. Both Maryland and Ohio were off year races while California and Pennsylvania shared the spotlight with the presidential race. Social Security is the most likely persuasion piece to be mailed to senior citizens. It is possible that the issue is more salient in a presidential year, serving as one of the few national issues in the congressional arsenal. Likewise, neither Maryland or Ohio shows any more persuasion contacts for frequent than infrequent voters. In fact, they display an odd pattern: frequent voters are contacted more often, relatively speaking, for GOTV than they are for persuasion. California and Pennsylvania both show some indication that frequent voters receive more contacts than infrequent voters. Again, in a non-presidential year, the lower voter turnout forces candidates to target more likely voters. It is simply too hard to get infrequent voters to the polls in off-year elections.

Maryland, while not showing an age or a frequent voting pattern does show a strong party distribution for contacts with Republicans receiving 6.5 contacts on average to 2.3 and 2.5 for Democrats and independents respectively. Ohio is the

exception to the party rule. There is, however, no party registration in Ohio. The designation of Republican or Democrat is assigned by primary participation. Because of low primary turnouts, independents make up 60% of the Ohio Congressional District 01 electorate. Neither campaign could afford to target all independents so they both relied on precinct targeting with the result being a flattening out of other demographic patterns in deference to the geographic, as opposed to demographic, nature of the targeting.

5.5 Battle Ground Voters

Although campaigns concentrate on turning out their own supporters they also focus on persuadable voters and, occasionally, members of the opposite party. It is not uncommon for both campaigns to target the same "swing" voters, nor is unusual for a candidate to try to shore up his or her own base in response to raids from the other campaign. Two campaigns competing for the same voters creates a battle ground for persuasion and turnout. Republicans received twice as many contacts from their fellow Republicans and Democrats over three times as many contacts from Democrats as from Republicans (see table 5.9). This pattern holds true in all states except California where the Republican campaign went to great lengths to target swing Democrats. If information from an opposing source is often a factor in changing a partisan's vote it is clear that that information needs to come from a source other than campaign direct contact.

Table 5.9 Mean Republican and Democratic Contacts by Party

Party	MD R	MD D	OH R	OH D	PA R	PA D	CA R	CD D	Main R	Main D
D voters	1.09	2.04	0	0.87	1.01	1.8	5.5	2.1	2.2	1.84
R voters	6.9	0.15	2.85	0	2.14	0.49	5.5	0.6	4.3	0.36
I voters	1.43	1.34	1.29	1.66	0.6	0.6	3.6	2.7	1.77	1.77

Although neither party expends much effort in reaching out to members of the opposite party, both Republicans and Democrats do work at contacting independent voters. Overall, both Republican and Democrats produced a mean number of 1.77 contacts to independent voters. Although candidates pay more attention to partisans, they both pay some attention to independents. Who these independents are is an important normative question. They are less likely to vote than are Republicans or Democrats and therefore more malleable to elite voter turnout efforts and because journalist, politicians, and academics all view independents as the most readily identifiable swing vote.

Forty one percent of the independents on the base file receive from 0 to 2 contacts (see Table 5.10). In fact, 45% of the independents on file received no contact at all from any campaign.

Although in California non-aligned voters were included in the campaign, in all of the other districts under study they were largely ignored.

Table 5.10: Percent of Contacts by Range for Independents by State

Range	MD	OH	CA	PA	Main
0-2	44.6%	40%	25%	95.7%	41.3%
3-5	53%	44.2%	19%	3.3%	37.6%
6-8	2.3%	14.9%	22.9%	1%	13.1%
Over 8	0	0.9%	33.9%	0	8.1%

Note: Cells represent percent of independents receiving a given number of contacts. Percentages are calculated using the entire universe for each district.

Even though independents are frequently ignored, there is some variation among the districts. In Ohio congressional district 01 for example, 44.2% of the independent voters received from 3 to 5 contacts while only 3.3% of the Pennsylvania independents received a like amount. This result is at the intersection of strategic calculations and registration law. In Ohio, the lack of party registration produces a partisan list of Republican and Democrats based on their past primary participation. These primary participants are usually taken, and rightly so, as highly partisan. Campaigns are forced to concentrate on the unknown group of independents. In contrast, there are very few independents in Pennsylvania because state law encourages registration in one of the parties. As a result, candidates must focus more resources on a larger group of party registrants whose partisanship is not so tightly defined as in Ohio.

Table 5.11: Mean Number of Contacts Received by Independents by Age and Number of Elections Voted

Age	MD	OH	CA	PA	Main
Under 25	2.3	2.09	3.68	1.07	2.35
26-35	2.53	2.54	5.96	1.17	3.58
36-45	2.86	2.88	6.49	1.01	3.9
46-55	3.16	2.89	6.61	1.02	4.54
56-65	3.11	3.46	9.23	1.6	5.06
65 plus	3.24	3.85	10.3	4.45	6
Elections					
0	1.75	1.91	4.84	1.3	3.1
1	2.84	1.71	5.91	1.38	2.9
2	3.61	4.48	7.35	1.05	4.65
3	3.5	4.75	8.42	0.62	6.3
4	3.6	5.03	9.26	0.8	8.33
5	3.5	5.13	9.07		10.13

The results in table 5.11 mirror the distribution of contacts among all voters only with even more concentration in the hands of likely voters. Voters over 65 receive, on average, three times as many contacts as do voters 25 and under. Likewise, there is a noticeable jump in the mean number of contacts when comparing those who voted in two or more elections with those who voted in less than two elections. In fact, the relationship between age, voter history, and the mean number of contacts is evident in every district except Pennsylvania where only age appears as a factor in independent voter contact targeting. Once party is removed as a factor it is clear that campaign communications reach older, more frequent voters. Even among that group of voters least likely to vote, independents, campaign communications cluster around those independents most likely to turn out to vote.

5.6 Summary

Strategy guides direct contact, but strategy itself is bounded by budgetary and tactical concerns. The amount and mix of direct contact is different from district to district. Still, despite the demographic and strategic differences there is a distinct concentration of contacts in the hands of those already most likely to vote. This concentration might be related to another pattern that emerges from the tables and that is the use of direct contact as a persuasive medium although even GOTV efforts are directed toward likely voters.

The concentration of contacts with likely voters is manifested in the distribution of contacts among the important swing group of independent voters. An outside observer would expect GOTV efforts to concentrate on partisans but even persuasion efforts are most often directed at party members. Republicans and Democrats are equally likely to contact independent voters and equally unlikely to contact members of the opposite party. Independents receive less persuasion contacts than do their partisan counterparts and they receive almost no GOTV efforts. The distribution of contacts among independents is even more skewed toward older, more frequent voters than it is among all voters.

When it comes to voter contact the rich do indeed get richer. Those least likely to vote, young, infrequent voters who are independents are the least likely to receive campaign information or a nudge to the polls. However, lurking behind this analysis is the question as to whether direct contact has any effect on turnout at all. If not, then the distribution pattern is of little concern. If so, then the lack of information directed toward infrequent voters reinforces a host of other factors reducing turnout.

CHAPTER 6

TURNOUT AND VOTER CONTACT

The Titanic won't be the only sinking Americans will watch this year, as voter turnout in the 98 General election is heading toward the rocks.

Republican polling firm newsletter

The distribution of direct contacts studied in the previous chapter is important because it is the campaign technology most closely associated with voter turnout and the concentration of direct contacts among likely voters merely reinforces current turnout patterns. However, there is a second question that needs to be addressed before the issue becomes clear: Do contacts influence turnout? A skewed distribution of contacts to those already predisposed to vote will make little normative difference if we find that direct contact has little if any effect on turnout.

Most research paradigms predict that direct campaign communication will increase voter turnout. A cost/benefit model will assume that direct mail and phone calls are mechanisms that reduce the information cost to the voter by providing data on the candidates and the election. If voting choice is a retrospective act of judgment, then direct contact can serve as a reminder of an incumbent record. If we look at the act of voting as a the end result of complex demographic, psychological, and political interactions, then direct contact is a nearly exact mirror in its efforts to identify and contact voters based on the same variables often used in academic analysis. Looking at voting behavior through one of the academy's many demographic and psychological lenses the discussion of targeting paints a picture of direct contact which reinforces

preexisting trends by emphasizing partisanship with one group; issues with another, past performance with a third. Studies in voting behavior, whether they study turnout or voter choice; or whether they use rational choice theory, cognitive processing, retrospective voting, or prospective voting models all predict some possibility that a campaign will successfully impart communications based around already existing electoral cleavages. In addition to the electoral cleavages, campaigns also know that voters approach an election with a measurable predisposition to participate. Campaigns know this and target accordingly. Any effort to ascertain the effects of campaign contacts on turnout must also take this predisposition into account and control for it.

6.1 The Relationship of Direct Contact and Voter Turnout

In its most simple form the research question is whether turnout increases with the number of campaign direct contacts. Where V_{hdep} represents the probability of turnout for the election in question and must be some number between 0 and 1. The term "C" in the formula equals the number of contacts received by a given voter or group. The function (b) represents the amount of change in the probability of voting for each additional contact. This simple statement might be illustrated by visualizing turnout as a function of direct contacts or:

Formula 6.1: Relationship Between Contact and Turnout: $V_{hdep} = b(C)$

As discussed earlier both the number of contacts a voter receives and a given voter's probability of turnout are also effected by past voter participation, age, and party affiliation. Any analysis of the effect of contacts on turnout must include age, voter history, and party affiliation as control variables.

Formula 6.2: Full Model. $V_{hdep} = b(0) + b(1)(A) + b(2)(PT) + b(3)(PA)$

Where the relationship includes the intercept $b(0)$ as well as terms for age as represented by $b(1)(A)$ and by past turnout as represented by $b(2)(PT)$. The party term is represented as $b(3)(PA)$. Together, these functions create a model with which to examine the relationship of turnout and direct contact while controlling for age, past voter turnout and party affiliation. The model will be tested using logistic regression analysis. (Logit).¹⁵⁰ Before developing the model, however, I will look at each of the control variables in turn. One demographic characteristic that is important in academic research as a turnout predictor that also appears on the voter file at an individual level is age.¹⁵¹ Age figures into the targeting scheme both as another turnout predictor and as an ideal voter block for specific message delivery. Nearly every campaign studied sent at least one mail piece to seniors detailing campaign positions on Medicaid and Social Security. Likewise, age is a key variable in predicting turnout. Preliminary logit models run using only age as an independent variable suggest that for every one year increase in age there is a 3% increase in the probability of voting. Although this figure will decrease when other control figures are introduced to the model it is consistent from district to district.

¹⁵⁰ Logit is one of a family of general linear models (GLM's). GLM's include linear regression, multiple linear regression, Probit, and Loglinear modeling. Logit is called for because the dependent variable is bivariate. With a dichotomous variable the distribution of errors may not be normal and predicted values cannot be interpreted as probabilities thus ruling out a multiple regression model. Another possibility, linear discriminant analysis, requires the assumption of multivariate normality of the independent variables for the prediction rule to be optimal. Logistic regression analysis requires fewer assumptions. Because logit is designed for data with a dichotomous dependent variable, which in this case is whether they turned out to vote or not, it makes good statistical sense. However, a logit coefficient is the estimated effect of a unit change in the independent variable on the natural log of the odds ratio and is difficult to understand in probabilistic terms. I will therefore employ a procedure to produce more readily understood probabilities.

¹⁵¹ See Miller and Shanks. *The New American Voter*.

Research on voting behavior generally uses age, education, political efficacy, income, and other psychological and demographic factors as independent variables. Unfortunately such information is not available at the individual voter level and few, if any consultants, rely on census data. Instead they use the past voter history contained on the voter file to provide a convenient summary variable for the information used by scholars in research. Voter history is maintained at the individual level and it is current. Census data is often old data, or data estimated from old data, and often imperfectly matched to precinct lines. As one direct mail consultant said, "The best predictor of future behavior is past behavior". Reliance on past behavior for prediction is general knowledge in the social sciences as well.

By relying on voter history as a control variable the question becomes not so much, "Did the contact affect turnout?", as it is, "Did the contact affect turnout given the voter's current predisposition to vote?" How to include voter history in the model is not so straightforward. There are five elections coded onto each base file. Because the dependent variable represents the 1994 election in Ohio and Maryland and the 1996 election in California and Pennsylvania the other elections need to be defined by their distance in time from the actual election year. The following table summarizes the naming conventions for voter history for each election available on the file.

Table 6.1: Variable Names for Election History

Variable Name	Explanation
Vhdep	Variable for dependent election year (CA and PA=1996; OH and MD=1994)
Vhgen1	Previous General Election
Vhgen2	General Election two cycles removed
Vhpri1	Previous primary election
Vhpri2	Primary Election two cycles removed
Vhpridep	Primary election from same year as dependent General Election
Tote	Total Number of elections voted (figure ranges from 0-5)

There are four possible ways of combining the voter history as a control variable in the model. First, all of the elections may be added to the model individually. Second, some combination of elections which seem most explanatory may be added to the model. Third, a single summary variable "Tote" summarizing the total number of elections in which a voter had *participated* leading up until the general election may be used. Finally, voters may be coded into three categories, such as non-participants, moderate participants, and high participants. Test models using only voter history combinations and the dependent variable show that using "Total Elections" as a quantitative variable from 0-5 provides the best explanatory power as an independent variable. Preliminary models run to assess the different combinations of voter history show that, in a bivariate model, the impact of voter history on predicting turnout is very strong. However, age and voter history are highly correlated so age is included in the final model. Models will be evaluated in greater depth in later sections but, as an example of the power of past voter history as a predictor of turnout, in PA CD21, people who had voted in three previous elections were 42% more likely to turnout than were people who had not previously voted.

In the previous chapter we saw that voter contacts were more often directed at members of the same party. In general, party members received more contacts than independents. The importance of party as a factor in the distribution of campaign contacts requires that it be used as a control variable when looking at the effects contact has on turnout. Party will be entered into the model as a categorical variable using the category of independent as the base.

The following tables present the results from Logit models within each district. The 1994 elections in Ohio CD 01 and Maryland CD 05 are presented first, followed by the 1996 elections in California CD 01 and Pennsylvania CD 21. Finally, we will see what the implications for our model are for a combined sample of all four districts while including a dummy variable for presidential election year. The partial effects and the probabilities for voting at each variable level will be examined as well. After presenting the models for each district to answer the question, " Do contacts affect turnout? " that question will be refined by examining the effects of different types of contacts.

Table 6.5 below summarizes the coefficients, standard errors, and partial effects of the logit model using total contacts, past election history, age, and party membership as predictors of the dependent variable, participation in the 1994 general election.¹⁵²

Table 6.2: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: OH

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Partial Effects
Total Contacts	0.02*	0.01	2% (0-3)
Voter History	0.83*	0.03	37% (0-2)
Age	0.01*	0.001	9% (25-60)
Democratic	1.02*	0.07	22%
Republican	1.43*	0.07	29%
Constant	-2.08	0.07	

N=11333. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 77% . Chi Square 4265 with 5 degrees of freedom.
 *Significant to the .05 level. Full model presented in Appendix 4

The coefficient represents the amount of change in the log of the odds of the dependent variable for each one unit increase of the independent variable. This is hard to understand in probabilistic terms and is converted into a more readily understood "partial effect" in the final column. The coefficients indicate that all of the variables have a positive relationship to voter turnout. That is, as they increase, so does the probability of voter participation. The partial effects column for total contacts, total elections, and age details the change in that probability from one unit to another of the independent variable. Party is included as a categorical variable and the partial effects represent the increase in voting probability over the base category of independent. It is this column, and future derivations of similar numbers, to which we will focus much of the rest of our analysis. Partial effects represent the difference in the predicted probability of a person voting in the election in question between two values of an

¹⁵² The full model for Ohio, as well as the other districts, is presented in Appendix 4.

independent variable with all of the other variables in the model held constant, in this case held constant at the empirical mean.

In the table above the 9% partial effect for age represents the difference in the probability of voting between a 25 year old voter and a 60 year old voter. Thus, while holding the total number of contacts, past voting history and party membership variables at their mean, 60 year olds were 9% more likely to turn out than were 25 year olds. Party membership has a very strong relationship with the probability of voting. Democrats are 22% and Republicans 29% more likely to vote than independents. This strong party effect is an artifact of party registration law in Ohio. There is no party registration required. On a voter file, voters do not come with a party field defined. For political purposes, those who voted in the Republican primary are coded as Republican with the same process followed for Democrats. Thus, the mere definition of party encompasses past primary voter participation. This kind of registration system makes it more difficult and expensive for candidates to define and target a group of base or persuadable voters.

For the variable on voter history the measure compares voters who had not participated with voters who had participated in two previous elections.¹⁵³ Those having voted in two previous elections were 37% more likely to vote than those who had not voted in any previous election.

Age, party membership, and past election history, as expected, are strongly related to the probability of voting but what of direct contact? In Ohio, receiving three contacts increases the probability of voting by 2%. Direct contacts, the only variable in

¹⁵³ The effect of elections is non-linear and peaks at two. The increase in the probability of voting decreases after two elections although each additional election (up to five) represents an increase.

the model under the control of the campaign, does not have as strong an effect as demographic variables, but it is not politically insignificant. A two percent increase in turnout, especially among the right voters, can easily swing a close election.

Table 6.3 below summarizes the relevant model information for Maryland Congressional District 05.

Table 6.3: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party and Contacts: MD

Variable	Coefficient*	SE	Partial Effects**
Total Contacts	0.09*	0.01	6%
Voter History	0.82*	0.01	39%
Age	0.01*	0.01	7%
Democratic	-0.3*	0.06	-7%
Republican	-0.34*	0.11	-7%
Constant	-1.54*	0.09	

N=17264. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74% . Model Chi-square 3793.39 with 5 degrees of freedom.
 *Significant to the .05 level. Full model in appendix 4.

Once again, past election history has a very strong effect on a person's probability of voting. Those who had voted in two past elections had a 39% greater probability of voting in the 1994 election than did those who had voted in no elections at all prior to the 1994 race. However, there is a striking difference in the importance of party. In Ohio, party membership indicated an average 28% increase in the probability of voting while in Maryland party membership indicates a 7% decrease in the probability of voting. It is possible that in Maryland, independents are more active electoral participants -- possibly due to the high number of federal employees in the district. Federal employees have the financial, educational, and psychological characteristics of high turnout voters but may, as a group, be discouraged from partisan affiliation. This is highly speculative and more analysis would be needed to develop a

more definitive answer. Age has the expected impact. Those voters who are sixty years old show a 7% higher probability of voting than those voters who are 25. The probability of participation also increases with the number of direct contacts. Voters receiving three contacts were 6% more likely to go to the polls than those receiving no contacts -- an indication that in Maryland, political elites were able to affect turnout with multiple contacts. Table 6.4 below begins to examine the 1996 election districts, starting with Pennsylvania congressional district 21.

Table 6.4: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party and Contacts: PA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Partial Effects
Total Contacts	0.03**	0.02	3%
Voter History	0.63*	0.02	31%
Age	0.01*	0	6%
Democratic	0.05**	0.07	1.1%
Republican	0.31*	0.07	5.3%
Constant	-0.96	0.08	

N=14974. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 73% . Model Chi Sq 3040.91 with 5 degrees of freedom.
 ** Not Significant. *Significant to the .05 level. Full model is presented in Appendix 4

Once again, the effect of voter history stands out with a 31% difference in the probability of turnout between voters who went to the polls in two elections and those who have yet to go to the polls. Age is consistent with the previous models. Older voters were 6% more likely to participate in the election, in this case, the 1996 general, than were younger voters. Party membership still has a fluctuating effect and Pennsylvania falls well between the extremes of Maryland and Ohio with Democrats showing a small 1.1% increase in voting probability over independents and Republicans a more robust 5.3% relative increase. Contacts show some effect. There is a 3% increase in the probability of turnout among voters who had received 3 contacts over

those who had received 0 contacts. However, even this small effect, which is not insignificant from a political perspective, is statistically insignificant. It is worth remembering that the Pennsylvania race was decided by fewer than 1100 votes and the Democratic candidate had scheduled three contacts to moderate likelihood voters -- but ran out of money before the final contact could be made.

The most intense direct contact efforts took place in the high TV cost and low TV coverage efficiency district of California Congressional district 01. Table 6.8 below shows the coefficients, standard error, and partial effects for the California district.

Table 6.5: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party and Contacts: CA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Partial Effects
Total Contacts	0.15*	0.0065	9.7%
Voter History	0.7*	0.0174	34%
Age	0.003**	0.0034	2.5%
Democratic	-.1010***	0.0589	-1.4%
Republican	0.411*	0.0631	6.5%
Constant	-1.27		

N=14848. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 79%. Model Chi Square 3642.54 with five degrees of freedom. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 Level ***Not Significant. Full Model in appendix 4

Again, past voter history shows a strong effect on the probability of voting. Age and Democratic are not statistically significant. Being Republican increases the probability of voting 6.5% over the base category of independent registration. The change from 0 to 3 direct contacts increases the probability of voting by nearly 10%.

Before comparing the district results and examining the effects of specific types of contacts on voter groups it might be useful to examine the coefficients produced when a sample is pulled using all four districts. This combines the various strategic

approaches and allows for the inclusion of a variable designating presidential or non-presidential election.

Table 6.6: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party and Contacts: Combined file

Variable	Coefficient*	SE	Partial Effects
Total Contacts	0.065*	0.006	4%
Voter History	0.74*	0.015	35%
Age	0.007*	0.001	5%
Democratic	0.182*	0.049	3.6%
Republican	0.384*	0.037	7.3%
Presidential Year	0.483*	0.037	9%
Constant	-1.599*	0.063	

N=22830. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74.37%. Model Chi Square 4872.54 with six degrees of freedom. *Significant to the .05 level.

The combined file follows the general trend of the districts. All of the variables included in the model are significant and all are related to increased turnout. Voter history still has a strong influence as does the newly added variable for presidential year. With all other things held constant, voters in the two elections held during a presidential year were 9% more likely to turnout than those voting during the two non-presidential election years.

Before comparing the districts and discussing their differences it might be useful to pull together the partial effects from each table before embarking on a more detailed discussion.

Table 6.7: Comparison of Partial Effects Among Districts

Variable	OH	MD	PA	CA	Main
Total Contacts	NS	6%	3%	9.7%	4%
Voter History	37%	39%	31%	34%	35%
Age	11%	7%	6%	3%	5.5%
Democrat	26%	-.7%	NS	-1.4%	3.6%
Republican	30.8%	NS	5.3%	6.5%	7.3%
Presidential Year	NA	NA	NA	NA	9%

NS=Not Significant NA=Not Applicable. Partial effects represent changes in the probability of voting as follows. Total Contacts = change from 0 to 3 contacts; Voter History = change from voting in zero elections to voting in 2 elections; Age = a comparison between a 25 year old voter and a 60 year old voter; Democrat and Republican = the change in probability compared to an independent voter; Presidential year = change in probability for those voting in a presidential vs. an off-year election. Models are summarized in appendix 4

There is a striking difference between the consistency of age and voter history as compared to the inconsistency of party and total contacts. Despite the variety of campaign situations represented these two independent variables show a steady and, in the case of past voter history, dramatic influence on the probability of turnout. Age is also consistent across all four districts although it is a little higher in Ohio than the other three districts. This difference may not be due to any unique political or social factors but because of the structure of the data. Age is not available on many of the Ohio records and the missing data is skewed toward older voters.

The contrast between age and voter history on the one hand and total contacts and party on the other is not as mysterious as it looks. The effects of age or past participation might be seen as consistent across the country. A sixty year old in California has similar life experience to a voter in Pennsylvania. Likewise, a voter who has gone to the poll twice before will be more likely to vote than a non-voter no matter where they live. The effect of direct contact, however, is a part of a larger question regarding the campaign as a whole. If we assume that campaigns effect turnout, then it

is the campaign as a whole which might capture that effect. Thus, the effect of direct contact on turnout will increase with the overall percentage of campaign resources directed toward contact and, for the most part, that is the case. The most intensive direct contact effort, that taking place in California congressional district 01, is much greater than that of the smallest contact effort, the one carried out by David Mann and Steve Chabot in Ohio congressional district 01. To the extent that the effect of direct contact on turnout measures the campaign effect on turnout it reflects strategic and tactical choices. The greater the allocation to direct contact, the greater the effect that particular campaign activity has on turnout. It is difficult to gauge from the data the total campaign effect on voter turnout but it does appear that the greater the allocation to one particular aspect of campaigning, in this case direct contact, the higher the turnout which, at a minimum, suggests that campaign efforts themselves can motivate the electorate.

Party might be thought of as more comparable but, at least with voter file definitions of party, the term "Republican" and "Democrat" might mean very different things. In Ohio for example, the party designation is based on primary participation. In Maryland, it is simply a question of voter registration. In one, party is defined by voting in elections where turnout is already low while in the other it is a matter of personal choice -- unrelated to the act of voting.

Although in every district contacts raised the probability of turnout the strength of the effect varied from 2% in Ohio to 10% in California. Maryland and Pennsylvania fall in the middle of the spectrum. The change from zero to three contacts raised the probability of a Keystone Stater by 3% but increased the likelihood of a Marylander

voting by a more substantial 6%. Why the difference? The data does not allow for any comprehensive testing of hypotheses regarding the difference among districts but a look at the probability of voting at each level of the independent variable may reveal some patterns. Table 6.8 summarizes the probability of an individual voter participating in the election in question for each level of the quantitative independent variables voter history, age, and total contacts while holding all of the other variables at their mean.

Table 6.8: Probability of Voting by Total Contacts, Voter History and Age

Contacts	OH	MD	PA	CA
0	0.66	0.62	0.72	0.57
1	0.67	0.64	0.73	0.61
2	0.68	0.66	0.74	0.64
3	0.68	0.68	0.75	0.67
4	0.68	0.7	0.76	0.71
5	0.68	0.71	0.77	0.73
Voter History				
0	0.3	0.29	0.41	0.47
1	0.48	0.49	0.57	0.64
2	0.67	0.68	0.72	0.78
3	0.82	0.83	0.83	0.88
4	0.91	0.92	0.9	0.93
Age				
25	0.617	0.62	0.679	0.665
35	0.651	0.646	0.703	0.672
45	0.681	0.671	0.726	0.68
55	0.71	0.694	0.748	0.687
65	0.737	0.717	0.766	0.7

Note: Cells contain percentages which represent a probability of voting in the election in question for each level of the independent variable. Models are presented in Appendix 4

Table 6.8 is similar to the partial effects table 6.7 but provides more information on the effect of incremental increases. The first thing to note is the different starting points of the 1994 election and the 1996 election. This difference is illustrated in the voting history rows. In Maryland and Ohio, both 1994 races, a person who had not voted in a past election had a 30% probability of showing up for the 1994 general. However, in 1996, for the California and Pennsylvania races, non-voters show a 41% and 47% probability respectively of showing up at the polls. These results are consistent with the known turnout differentials between presidential and non-presidential years. Despite the different starting points the effects of past voting were consistent across districts. Participating in even one previous election raised the likelihood of voting by between 17% and 20%. By the time a voter had participated in four previous elections his or her participation in future elections had become a near certainty.

Keeping the presidential and off-year difference in mind let us consider age and total contacts. Age is presented in ten year increments. The probability of voting increases between 1% and 3% for each decade. The low is in California where a voter's probability of turnout only increases by 1% per decade and the high is in Ohio where each decade sees an increase of nearly 3% per decade in the probability of turnout. Although the numbers look small from a decade to decade movement they are quite significant when comparing older and younger voters. Even in California, where the age effect is the weakest the probability of a 65 year old participating is 4.5% higher than the probability of a 25 year old voting. In Ohio the difference is nearly 12%.

Direct contact also affects turnout. In Ohio and Pennsylvania each additional contact added about one percentage point to the probability of voting. In Ohio even that small effect flattened out after three contacts. This indicates that multiple contacts may increase turnout but also points to a saturation level after which each additional contact adds little to the probability of voter turnout. In Maryland and California the effects of direct contact are more noticeable. In Maryland each contact raised the probability of voting by about 2% while in California the effect was nearly 4% for the first few contacts leveling off to 2% as the voter reached the four or five contact level. Evidently, direct contacts are also subject to a law of diminishing returns.

Direct contact increases the probability of turnout less than demographic factors such as age, party affiliation, and past voter history. In general, a voter who receives three contacts is from 3% to 10% more likely to turnout than a voter who receives no contacts from either campaign. This district variation indicates that complex local factors also influence the turnout effectiveness of direct contact. Although the sample size of districts is too small to test any hypotheses some factors suggest themselves for future research. One possible factor is the cost of television. The two districts with the strongest contact effects California and Maryland, also have the highest TV cost per point. California, where contact effects are even stronger than in Maryland, also has much higher television costs. Likewise, the two districts with the least expensive TV costs, Ohio CD01 and Pennsylvania CD21 show the least direct contact effect on turnout. This relationship between TV cost and direct contact effect suggests the presence of an overall campaign effect on voter turnout while controlling for other variables. That effect might be spread out among all campaign activities including direct

contact, television, radio, and free media. The higher the percent of campaign activities devoted to direct contact, the higher the marginal effect of voter direct contact on turnout.

With a small relationship established between direct contact and voter turnout the next group of questions center on the importance of different types of direct contacts on different types of voters. At the beginning of the data collection phase direct contact was divided into four mutually exclusive categories: First, contacts were divided by source. There were two definitions of "source". Contacts were divided between Republican and Democratic as well as between incumbents and challengers. Secondly, contacts were divided by their method of delivery. There were three delivery methods; phone, mail, and door-to-door. The vast majority of contacts were delivered by either mail or phone. Third, contacts were divided by purpose. Again, there were three purpose categories; voter identification, GOTV, and persuasion. Finally, contacts were divided by their message type. Message could be positive, negative, or substantive issue contacts. In the following chapter we will examine the effects of these different types of contacts on different groups of voters.

CHAPTER 7

WHO DO WE ENCOURAGE TO VOTE?

Electoral politics has always been about division. The rallies described in the introduction were all about reminding the faithful that they were different -- they were Republicans or Democrats -- and that, unless vigilant, the enemy would take control of government. Modern politics is very much the art of dividing the electorate in ever finer ways. Declining partisanship in the electorate and the concomitant rise of candidate based organizations combined with computer and communication technology to create a system which melded necessity and capacity. While much of this division is aimed at persuading groups of voters deemed malleable, some of it is aimed at increasing turnout among specific voter groups. Choices regarding how to address base and swing voters provide the framework for direct contact strategy. The tactical implementation of direct contact strategies takes on a number of characteristics which have been captured by dividing up the contacts by their source, purpose, method, and message. This chapter examines each category to see if one type of contact influences turnout more than another. It addresses such questions as whether incumbent contacts increase the probability of turnout more than challenger contacts; Which is more effective in increasing turnout: phones or mail? Do negative messages depress turnout or increase it? Finally, the chapter also looks at the effects of contacts on different types of voters. All other things being equal do non-voters get more motivation from direct contacts than frequent voters? Do younger voters respond to direct contact differently than older voters?

7.1 The Goals and Methods of Direct Contact

Conceptually and professionally direct contact rests on a distinction between persuasion and turnout. This division is less perfectly mirrored in the two primary methods of delivery, that of phone and mail. Generally, persuasion contacts travel via the post office while GOTV efforts move over the phone or on foot. Both persuasion and GOTV can also be carried out using a door-to-door effort. Still, a "less perfectly" is called for in the previous distinction because there are such things as persuasion phone calls and GOTV mail. Because the two dichotomies are closely related it will be all the more interesting to review their effects on turnout side by side. After all, GOTV is designed to increase turnout while persuasion is used to influence a person's candidate choice and the method of contact would seem secondary.¹⁵⁴

Table 7.1 Change in Voting Probability for Voters Receiving 0 Contacts with Voters Receiving 3 Contacts for GOTV/Persuasion/ID and Mail/Phone/Door to Door Contacts

	GOTV	PERS	Voter ID	Mail	Phone	Door
OH01	13.1%*	-15%*	15%*	NS	12%*	NS
MD05	NS	6%*	16%*	13%*	-6%*	NS
PA21	-11%*	NS	27%*	NS	13%*	-10.1*
CA01	NA	13%*	NS	11%*	6%*	NS

Note: Cells represent the percentage change in the probability of voting for voters receiving 0 contacts and voters receiving 3 contacts all other things being equal. All findings are significant at the .001 level. NA=Not Applicable NS=Not Significant

The coefficients used to produce the probabilities in table 7.1 are derived from models similar to those used in Chapter six with one exception. Total contact is removed from the model and various mutually exclusive groups, which add up to the number of total contacts, are added in its stead. Table 7.1 contains two such divisions.

¹⁵⁴ All of the models used to create the partial effects tables in this chapter are presented in Appendix 5.

First, total contacts are divided into GOTV, persuasion, and voter identification contacts. Secondly, total contacts are divided into mail, phone, and door to door efforts. Changes in the probability of voting occurring when each type of contact is increased from 0 to 3 is presented. For each change, the model controlled for age, voter history, and party affiliation. Again, like the base model explained in chapter six, age and voter history were included in the model as quantitative variables. Party was included using an empirical mean for Republican and Democrat. Two facts stand out from the data in table 7.1. First, the effects on turnout are more consistent when looking at the method of contact rather than the avowed purpose of the contact. What this says is that phone calls are more effective at increasing turnout than are other methods of voter contact. Although the data does not provide any clues as to why this might be, two things come to mind. First, phoning is often done on or near election day and may well serve as a reminder to that percentage of the voting population for whom such reminders are useful. Secondly, the mere presence of a phone in the house -- and the fact that someone in the house was home to answer it, is, in and of itself, a measure of social stability.

Taking PA21 as an example, mail does not reach a statistically significant level but three phone contacts increase the probability of turnout by 13%. This contrasts with the comparison between GOTV and persuasion in the same district where the GOTV effort was associated with an 11% decrease in the probability of turnout while persuasion was not significant. The same pattern is repeated in every district as the method of direct contact tells us more about the effects on turnout than does the contact's purpose. This emphasizes an important tactical point. It may well be that the

avowed purpose of the contact is less important than the method of communicating -- at least when it comes to voter turnout. The telephone appears to have a strong impact on voting in three of the four districts. Phoning has a much greater effect than mail or door to door in Ohio and Pennsylvania and slightly less of an effect than mail in California. Even the seeming anomaly of Maryland may be due to the structure of the data. Unlike other districts there were no blanket GOTV efforts undertaken by the campaigns. Instead, the Hoyer race identified favorable voters via the phone and then mailed to them to encourage turnout. However, the voter identification contacts, all done by mail, had a very strong affect. In fact, the change in probability of voting when moving from 0 identification contacts to three is 16%. The low overall phone effect in Maryland but the strong effect of voter identification efforts is due to the large number of bad and disconnected telephones in the Prince George's county portion of Maryland CD 05. A telephone number might be disconnected or incorrect for a number of reasons but almost all of them are related to notions of stability. The longer a person resides in one place and does not unlist or change his number, he will tend to match with a good phone. The more often a person moves, has her phone disconnected, changes numbers or unlists numbers the greater the chance for a mistaken, or disconnected number. Stability is highly related to turnout so places with a mobile population tend also to have low turnout and a high number of bad telephones.¹⁵⁵ Because the areas with bad telephones overlap with low turnout areas, the positive effect of phoning is masked and actually shows up as a drag on turnout. However, as the revised Maryland figures indicate, in a specific case where the phones are known to

¹⁵⁵ The worst places for telephones tend to be urban college areas such as Cambridge MA and Berkely CA because they combine highly mobile student populations with pockets of urban poverty.

be good there is a strong positive effect on voter turnout. Thus, phoning appears to have a strong effect on voter turnout but, unfortunately, this mechanism may be least effective in poor, highly mobile areas most in need of turnout effort. The impact of voter identification on turnout in the other districts reinforces the notion that identifying voters early on in an effort to ascertain their vote preference is associated with a higher voter turnout. More expensive and more intensive than simple GOTV calls, voter identification efforts generally represent multiple, coordinated contacts.

Also evident from table 7.1 is the lack of any positive effects on turnout from door-to-door efforts. This is certainly contrary to expectations. Most experts would consider a personal appearance at the voter's door to be the most powerful form of campaign contact; although, it must be said, all campaign workers have met candidates who might not benefit from personally appearing at someone's door. Candidates are urged to walk door-to-door whenever time, fundraising, and district demographics allow but, according to the figures in table 7.1 these efforts can even reduce the probability of turnout. The effects of door-to-door efforts were not significant in Ohio, Maryland, or California. In Pennsylvania walking efforts were related to a 10% decrease in turnout. Why does door-to-door, presumably among the most effective campaign tactics available, appear to decrease turnout in Pennsylvania?

The answer may well be in the coding of the data. A look back to the contact efforts in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Ohio shows that most of them were in the nature of literature drops, not direct visits with families. With mail and phone efforts it is relatively easy to ascertain the exact targeting of the call or mail effort, but it is next to impossible to do so with a non-targeted literature drop. In Pennsylvania for example,

two of the "door-to-door" efforts were blanket drops in the lower middle class Eire City and the Shenango Valley. To code this on the file, all voters living in those areas were listed as having received the contact. In the Shenango valley drop campaign literature was placed under the windshield wipers of cars parked in church lots on Sunday. The drop was in response to a similar effort by the Christian Coalition. In a case like this, no good way exists for determining who really received the literature let alone who may have read it. Such blanket drops in low turnout areas may well account for the negative relationship between so called "door to door" efforts and turnout.

There are variations as well as similarities. In Ohio CD01, GOTV efforts had a strong effect on turnout, while in Pennsylvania CD05 the same type of effort had little or no measurable impact. Mail had increased turnout in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and California but not in Ohio. It is difficult, when looking at contacts at this level of detail, to determine why one type has an effect in one area but not in another. All of the myriad strategic and tactical choices come into play. Given how different every race is demographically and politically it may be remarkable that we can find any consistencies at all such as the generally positive effect direct contact has on turnout; the power of phoning, the efficacy of ID efforts and the seeming futility of door-to-door drops.

7.2 Negative and Positive Contacts

Few issues surrounding the conduct of campaigns attract as much attention as negative advertising. Observers journalistic, academic, and elected decry their increase, their content, and their effect on voter turnout. Negative advertising is seen as both the cause and result of the coarsening of our national dialogue. The effect of negative advertising on turnout is also a hotly debated empirical controversy. Ansolabehere and

Iyengar argue that negative advertising lowers turnout. Other scholars, such as Darryl West, argue that mistrust of government is much more strongly associated with lower turnout than negative advertising and that, in fact, negative advertising has no significant effect on turnout at all.¹⁵⁶ Because the contacts recorded for this study were divided into negative, positive, and issue contacts we can examine some of the relationships between negative direct contacts and voter turnout. Table 7.2 below summarizes the partial effects involved in the types of campaign direct contacts.

Table 7.2: Partial Effects of Change From 0 to 3 Contacts for Positive, Negative, and Issue Contacts

District	Positive	Negative	Issue
OH01	15%	NS	NS
MD05	7%	2%	6.3%
PA21	NS	14%	-11%
CA01	-8%	15%	8%

Note: Cells represent the difference in the probability of voting among voters receiving 0 contacts vs. those voters receiving 3 contacts. Control variables included age, party, total elections, and the number of positive, negative, and issue contacts. *Significant to the .05 level. NS=Not Significant

The partial effects presented in table 7.2 are not good news for advocates of the classical model of democracy. Under such a model, one might hold, with Aldous Huxley, that "The survival of democracy depends on the ability of large numbers of people to make realistic choices in the light of adequate information."¹⁵⁷ It appears as if the issue information, which, presumably, is all that Huxley would find adequate, has much less of an effect on turnout than do the negative attacks sent out by the candidates

¹⁵⁶ See Steven Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, *Going Negative* (New York, Free Press, 1995) and Darryl West, *Air Wars: Television Adverstising in Election Campaigns 1952-1996 2nd Ed* (Washington, DC, CQ Press 1997); Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Dirty Politics: Perception, Distraction and Democracy* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992)

¹⁵⁷ Huxley, Aldous. *Brave New World Revisited*. (1st Ed. New York, Harper and Brothers) p 58

or the positive pieces touting candidate background. In most cases, issue ads had less of an impact on turnout than did either positive or negative contacts. In Pennsylvania, issue ads had a negative effect on voter turnout. Only in Maryland did issue contacts come close to their positive or negative counterparts.

Some of the largest effects are reserved for negative contacts. In Pennsylvania and California turnout increased 14% and 15% respectively with the addition of three negative contacts to the voter's stock of campaign information. They also had a positive effect on turnout in Maryland albeit a slight one. In Ohio, again giving us at least one exception to the possible development of a generalization, negative contacts were not statistically significant. There is little room to believe that issue contacts have a strong impact on turnout while either positive or negative direct contacts, especially negative contacts, do appear to increase the probability of a voter participating in a given election. Why do contacts based on personal qualities seem to motivate voters more than issue pieces? The presentation of human characteristics lends itself to more humorous and dramatic presentation styles. What is at work here is the ability to draw the voter into thinking about the campaign in the face of a remarkable marketing cacophony. The level of non-election noise is substantial. Electoral messages have to compete for mental attention against much better funded and more frequently presented private advertisements. To draw peoples attention to their candidate they need to present memorable material quickly. People to remember personal information more readily than issue data. Also, information that is presented as a narrative is easier to recall than textual or pedantic material. Finally, insofar as campaigns are about the reinforcement of already held beliefs and opinions, it is the personal narrative, or the

personal attack, which is fitted to link privately held beliefs with the differences presented by two candidates.

7.3 Republicans, Democrats, Challengers, and Incumbents

Although the Republican campaigns studied made more individual contacts than the Democrat ones, perhaps reflecting their more robust funding, there is little a priori reason to believe that Republican contacts will have more of a cumulative effect than Democratic contacts. There is, however, some reason to believe that incumbent contacts will have more impact than challenger contacts. Incumbents are known entities and research suggests that communications are more believable when the source of the information is familiar. It is also possible that communication will benefit challengers proportionally more than incumbents because they enter races as blank slates. In other words, a communication about a challenger increases the stock of voter information whereas a communication from an incumbent may simply reinforce previously held beliefs.

Table 7.3: Change in Voting Probability for Voters Receiving 0 Contacts with Voters Receiving 3 Contacts for Republicans/Democrats and Incumbent/Challenger

	Rep	Dem	Inc	Chall
OH01	NS	NS	NS	NS
MD05	8%	3%	3%	8%
PA21	7%	NS	7%	NS
CA01	11%	7%	11%	7%

Note: Cells represent the percentage change in the probability of voting for voters receiving 0 contacts and voters receiving 3 contacts all other things being equal. Control variables include age, total elections, party, the number of contacts from republicans, democrats, incumbents and challengers. All variables included are significant to the .001 level. NS=Not Significant

The Republican/Democratic dichotomy is the mirror of the Incumbent/Challenger dichotomy in table 7.3, but looking at them side by side highlights

the differences. In the three districts where party reached statistical significance in the model, Republican contacts had a greater effect on turnout than did Democratic contacts. This somewhat unexpected result could arise from the different coalitions needed for a Republican, as opposed to a Democratic, victory. Republicans need to target suburban voters while Democrats often need to increase turnout among poor and working class voters. For example, DiNicola focused attention on infrequent voters while English focused on the outlying suburbs.

A less clear pattern emerges with respect to incumbent and challenger contacts. In two of the three districts where candidate status reached the level of statistical significance incumbent contacts had more influence than challenger contacts in the other. In Pennsylvania, challenger contacts were not statistically significant. In fact, the coefficient was negative. This may be due to the number of blanket literature drops performed by DiNicola's challenger campaign. In California the difference is also quite high. Receiving three incumbent contacts increased the probability of turnout by more than 12% while the challengers contacts only increased the likelihood of turnout by 5.3%. In Maryland, the challenger contacts were associated with a higher probability of turnout and may simply reflect the Republican/Democrat dichotomy. Hoyer, the Democrat and incumbent, targeted lower probability voters than did Devine, a challenger and Republican.

The preceding examination of the turnout effects of different types of direct contacts still leaves open their effect on different voter groups. It is one thing to note that different types of contacts have comparatively stronger or weaker effects but quite another to note whether such effects are strongest among likely or unlikely voters. How

do direct contacts affect different voter groups? This broad question is important to researchers looking at the dynamics of turnout as well as reformers searching for an election system that will remain inclusive while becoming less dependent on private interests for funding. An examination of voter file orders over the past four years at VCS, as well as a quick glance at the targeting undertaken by these eight campaigns, overwhelmingly consist of age, gender, party, and voter history selections. Do such common political practices have an effect on the distribution of turnout in elections? The following section evaluates the effects of direct contact on each of these commonly targeted political groups by selecting each subgroup independently and testing the effect of direct contact on each group. The same model used earlier reappears in each section with one difference, the variable chosen as a subgroup drops out of the model, while the other variables remain as controls. An examination of the contact effect on turnout by party will serve as an illustration. First, only those voters within the party in question are chosen. Then, the model is run controlling for total elections, age, and total contacts. Party drops out of the model. One possibility is that independents, because they are generally less likely to participate than party members, will benefit more from direct contacts than will Republicans or Democrats. Alternatively, Republicans and Democrats, by merit of their previous decision to register with a party, may be easier for a campaign to move to the polls with an extra effort or two. The second possibility is supported by the data. In Pennsylvania, California, and Maryland direct contact increases the probability of turnout equally for both Republicans and Democrats. Independents do not seem to respond as well. In all three states, the relationship is either not statistically significant or substantially smaller in magnitude than for either of

the parties. In Ohio, none of the relationships are significant.¹⁵⁸ Independents are both harder to move to the polls and less likely to be recipients of candidate efforts to move them.

Candidates also frequently target by gender. Some issues are deemed more relevant to men or to women. Anti-gun control mail for example, is often directed to men while pro-choice and education mailings are often sent to men. Research indicates that men and women turn out at similar rates. This has not always been the case. In 1952, 79% of the men and 69.3% of the women self-reported voting in the most recent election. In 1984, 73.6% of men and women reported voting in the most recent election.¹⁵⁹ Roughly the same results are found in the four district samples present in the study. In each district, the turnout percentage for men and women was within 2% points. In Ohio and Pennsylvania the turnout was identical for both groups. In Maryland, men turned out at a slightly higher rate than did women. In California, the only district with a female candidate, the female turnout was 2% above the male rate.¹⁶⁰ Nor did contacts have a differential effect on men and women. In every district studied, the effect of direct contact on turnout for each gender showed the same direction and strength.

¹⁵⁸ It is also possible that it is the mix of contacts which cause this effect. Both parties generally do GOTV calls to their own members, ignoring independents. Models run which included ID, GOTV, and Persuasion as variables in place of Total Contacts lent some support to this idea. The coefficients were much stronger for ID and GOTV for independents but seldom reached statistical significance.

¹⁵⁹ Conway, Margaret. *Political Participation in the United States*. (CQ Press Washington, DC, 1985) p 27

¹⁶⁰ However, the equivalence in turnout percentages masks a shift of electoral power to women. In each of the districts under study women comprised anywhere from 6% to 9% more of the total turnout on election day.

7.4 Older and Younger Voters

Age is the demographic measure most commonly associated with voter turnout. Within limits, the older the voter, the higher the turnout. There are a variety of competing theories on why this might be so but the theories fall into two different categories. Generational theories speculate that the current group of older voters went through events of political and historical socialization which tended to increase their drive to participate in electoral politics. Other theories speculate that simply growing older, by increasing stability and community connection, increases turnout. In one group of theories the historical period of political socialization is key; in the other it is the process of movement through demographic stages. In the four districts in question voters over 55 turned out at rates 35% higher than voters 25 and under. Because of the higher probability of turnout for older voters direct contacts should have less of an effect on them than on younger voters. Turnout becomes a near certainty as voters age and there seems to be little room for increasing turnout.

Table 7.4 below summarizes the results of two models. Each model was built using a subset of the samples for each district. The first subset consisted of all voters 55 and over. The second subset contained all voters 30 and under.

Table 7.4 Change in Voting Probability for Voters Receiving 0 Contacts with Voters Receiving 3 Contacts for Voters 55 and Over and Voters 30 and Under

State	Mean	No Contacts	Three Contacts
OH 30 and Under	39.8%	NS	NS
OH 55 and Over	78%	76.3%	79.3%
MD 30 and Under	47%	NS	NS
MD 55 and Over	87%	NS	NS
PA 30 and Under	44%	40.4%	47.5%
PA 55 and Over	86.9%	81%	87%
CA 30 and Under	50.4%	28.4%	38.9%
CA 55 and Over	90.5%	73.7%	81.5%

Note: Cells represent the probability of voting at each age and contact range. The mean represents the probability of turnout while holding all variables at their mean. NS=Not Significant. All other probabilities statistically significant at the .001 level. All models include a constant and control for age, voter history, and party. Party included in the model as a categorical variable, using Independent as a base, and reporting categories for Democrat and Republican.

Table 7.4 above presents three probabilities for each age cohort. To take Ohio as an example, with all variables held at their mean, the probability of turnout with all variables held at the mean for those 55 and over and under is 76.3% while it is 39.8% for voters 30 and over. This difference is repeated in every district.

Because of the higher turnout for the older cohort we might assume it is more difficult for contacts to increase their probability of turnout. The data does provide some support for this thesis. Neither Maryland nor Ohio produced statistically significant results in both age categories. In the two races which took place during a presidential year, direct contact does have a statistically significant effect on the probability of turnout for both cohorts.

In Pennsylvania, the change from 0 to 3 contacts produced similar results. For the older group, the change in the number of contacts increased the probability of voting by 6% while the younger group saw the slightly larger, but not irrelevant, increase of 7%. This effect was intensified in California. Three contacts increases the turnout of older voters by 7.8% but increases turnout among younger voters by more 10.5%. It is possible that direct contact has a disproportionately greater effect on younger voters. There are a number of possible reasons for this impact. First, older voters are already so likely to vote that any additional campaign information has little or no effect. This is another way of saying that older voters are already integrated into the electoral process. They know when elections are approaching; they understand how to participate; and they have had years of placing disparate bits of information into a political context. Younger voters are correspondingly less socialized into the electoral process. Anxiety about how and where to vote, combined with a lack of informational contexts makes campaign direct contacts more useful sources of information and, consequently, increases their utility as turnout motivators. The notion of socialization takes on even more normative importance when we recall that older voters are much more likely to receive direct contacts from candidates. Younger voters may need them more to increase turnout but campaigns, for a variety of reasons, are encouraged by our current system, to direct contacts to the older voters who least need a prod to the polls.

7.5 Frequent and Infrequent Voters

Age may be the most common variable used in academic studies on turnout but it is not the best measure of voter participation available to consultants. To predict turnout, they turn to past voter history. Past voter history captures the effects of age as

well as other factors which may increase a person's chance of participation. Age is a factor in identifying voters who have developed the habit of voting but voter history is proof that such a habit exists. Therefore, we should expect to see even stronger differences in the effects of direct contact on frequent and infrequent voters than with younger and older voters.

There are many possible ways of looking at "frequent" and "infrequent" voters. For simplicity I have opted to consider all non-voters and all voters who have participated in only one election to be infrequent voters. Any voter who has participated in two or more elections is coded as a frequent voter.¹⁶¹ The files for each district were divided along these lines and models were run across each of the subgroups. Table 7.5, like table 7.4, summarizes the effects of the model by presenting the probabilities of voting at that level in the model where each variable is held at the mean.

¹⁶¹ I first ran each model using a subgroup defined by the number of elections voted. Models were run on subsets of voters who voted in 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 elections. It was clear from looking at the changes in the model as they moved from one subset to another that the real difference was between those who had voted in 2 or more elections vs. those who had voted in 1 or fewer elections.

The next two columns present the probabilities of voting for each subgroup at the "infrequent voter" and "frequent voter" level.

Table 7.5 Change in Voting Probability for Voters Receiving 0 Contacts with Voters Receiving 3 Contacts for Frequent and Infrequent Voters

State	Mean	No Contacts	Three Contacts
OH Infrequent	37.7%	NS	NS
OH Frequent	82.7%	NS	NS
MD Infrequent	38.3%	28.8%	35.5%
MD Frequent	89.7%	NS	NS
PA Infrequent	48.3%	44.1%	49.7%
PA Frequent	87.7%	NS	NS
CA Infrequent	51.8%	24.1%	37.3%
CA Frequent	91.9%	NS	NS

Note: Cells represent the probability of voting at each age and contact range. The mean represents the probability of turnout while holding all variables at their mean. The model controls for age, voter history, party, and total contacts. Constants are included in each model. NS=not significant. All other cells are significant at the .05 level.

Direct contacts have a stronger effect among non-voters than among voters with, once again, the exception of Ohio, where the effects of contacts were neither significant nor appreciable. It is difficult to tell from the information why contacts had little impact in Ohio. Both campaigns targeted frequent voters more than infrequent ones and both campaigns spent most of their time and effort on persuasion and not GOTV. In fact, when the above models are run in Ohio by substituting the number of persuasion, GOTV, and Voter Identification contacts, the GOTV contacts are significant for both frequent and infrequent voters. The coefficients for both groups are nearly identical. Evidently the mix of contact efforts and other campaign information did not move infrequent voters to the polls any more than their more frequently participating fellow citizens.

In the other three districts the contacts had no statistically significant effect on the probability of turnout among frequent voters. Among infrequent voters, however, there is a distinct effect. In Maryland, three contacts increased an infrequent voters chance of turnout by nearly 7%. In Pennsylvania, the probability of turnout among infrequent voters increased by 5.6% with the addition of three contacts. California shows the greatest difference with the receipt of three contacts increasing the probability of turnout by nearly 12% among infrequent voters.

7.6 Conclusion

All contacts are not created equal. Even with district differences in the results emerging from each model enough generalizations emerge to sketch an outline of the relationship between direct contact and voter turnout. The surprise is not that the districts show variation in each individual model but that districts as different as the ones under study show any pattern at all.

Clearly, telephone efforts work better at increasing turnout than does mail. In fairness to mail, it is designed to persuade voter, not to turn them out. In this light, phones are only doing their job. However, one might think that the increase in political information alone would increase turnout. It does not appear to do so. Phone calls work better at increasing turnout no matter what the purpose of the contact. Door-to-door efforts, which might be expected to be powerful turnout tools, do not have a positive affect at all.

Contacts are also more potent at increasing turnout to the extent which they offer the chance for more dramatic presentation. Positive character pieces and negative attacks are stronger engines of turnout than issue communications. Likewise, the

communication has more of an effect on turnout when it comes from the incumbent. Voters prefer the devil they know on election day and they must be more motivated by the familiar devil's communications as well.

All voters are not created equal. For younger voters and infrequent voters the receipt of campaign contacts has a discernible mobilization effect. Older voters, and those with a history of past election participation, have already so developed the habit of voting that candidate communication has little if any impact on their probability of turnout.

CHAPTER 8

CAMPAIGNS AND THE HABIT OF VOTING

A Democratic president is mortally threatened by the same medium, television, that 38 years ago helped construct the myth of another Democratic president, Clinton's idol and model, John F. Kennedy." He added, "The reality of contemporary democracy is this: Everywhere, fewer and fewer voters and more and more viewers.

From Slate Magazine International News Summary 9/22/98

Research over the past forty years has provided a wealth of information on voter turnout but very little about what political elites themselves can do to influence that turnout. Certainly journalists and campaign workers believe that political campaigns directly affect voter participation. I am writing this one day before the 1998 election and one consistent stream of commentary claims the election hinges on the turnout rates of Democratic and Republican partisans. But even this line of commentary slights the direct efforts of campaigns. Often, the participation discussion focuses on the effects of national political stories on people's predisposition to vote. Typically, the analysts will debate whether the Clinton scandal will increase the turnout of Christian conservatives or loyal Democrats. An alternative scenario has voters on both sides staying home because they are sick both of scandal and "negative campaigning" in general. Taken to its logical extreme this line of thought directly links campaigns to depressed turnout and implies that if politicians ceased campaigning, turnout would increase. There is a notion contained within such beliefs that lend power to this chapter's opening quote. Modern democracy has become more and more a matter of viewership and not participation.

My goal in this project has been to examine the effect of one aspect of campaigning, direct contact, on voter turnout, and has been motivated by the belief that campaigns can make a conscious difference in electoral outcomes, including participation. In this final chapter I summarize my project's main findings and discuss how they fit into the broader literature on campaigns and voter turnout. I also examine the project's findings in light of the larger questions posed by the decline of voter turnout and current trends in campaign finance reform.

8.1 The Incentive Structure of Direct Contact

In chapter three I noted what has come to be called the paradox of voter participation. Simply put, even though most of the measures associated with turnout are moving in a direction which would predict an increase in voting, we have actually seen a decrease in voter turnout. The 1998 elections had the lowest turnout on record. Running parallel to this is what I call the paradox of voter contact. The evidence suggests that voter contact increases turnout, especially among low turnout voters. However, political campaign imperatives provide incentives for campaigns to concentrate direct contacts on voters already likely to vote. This is the direct contact version of the rich getting richer.

The logic of campaign targeting arises from a desire to get the right message to the right people and to do so at the least cost. Both desires lead campaigns to concentrate their contacts in the hands of likely voters. First, some target groups who are more likely to vote, like seniors, are also the target of issue specific direct contacts. Secondly, campaigns try to save money by sending their message to those who have participated in some combination of past campaigns. Finally, most GOTV efforts are

directed at partisans, leaving most independents outside of the GOTV universe. In the four districts under study at least one, and often more than one, of these targeting patterns were present. Seniors, frequent voters, and party members received more direct contacts from campaigns than did younger, infrequent voting, and independent voters.

The distribution of contacts would not be an issue if there was little ground to believe that contacts were irrelevant to turnout, but that is not the case. Direct voter contact does increase the probability of turnout. The change in probability for each single contact is small, ranging from 1% to 4% but most campaigns send out more than one contact and the cumulative effect of a change from zero to three contacts increases the probability of turnout anywhere from 2% to 7%. Although these numbers may seem small, the vast majority of congressional turnover takes place in elections decided by similar margins.

Some contacts work better than others at increasing turnout. Phones are much more effective than are mail or door-to-door efforts and multiple calls more effective than single calls. Voters appear to respond to prodding. Personal messages, however delivered, are more motivational than are issue pieces. In a number of the districts, negative mail or phone efforts were particularly effective in increasing turnout. The turnout effect of direct contact is about the same for Republicans and Democrats but a decided edge goes to incumbents over challengers.

All voters do not respond the same way to direct contact. The probability of turnout for voters thirty and under increases by an average of 6% for every three contacts received but, for voters 55 and over, that same number of contacts only

increases the probability of turnout by an average of 2.5%. A similar pattern is found when looking at frequent and infrequent voters. Infrequent voters, defined as those individuals who voted in one or fewer elections, show a 6% average increase in the probability of voting for every three contacts received. Frequent voters show an average increase of 1%. Campaigns can increase turnout and they can most increase turnout among those least likely to vote.

8.2 Implications for Research

Research on voting behavior has concentrated on voter resources and characteristics. The act of voting is seen as a function of a voter's wealth or age or information resources or sense of political efficacy. However, such explanations do little to explain why, when most measures associated with higher turnout have increased, voter turnout has decreased; or why, despite the relative consistency of such factors from cycle to cycle, turnout varies. This study provides some grounds for arguing that the actions of political elites need to be included in any model seeking to explain the fluctuations, be they temporal or spatial, of voter turnout. The use of voter files for this type of research is invaluable. Researchers looking to isolate and test the efficacy of campaign activities should contact campaigns ahead of time and secure their agreement to participate in the study. Early vendor interviews, especially with the telemarketing companies, will insure that data will be saved. Campaign cooperation will allow the researcher to collect contextual information like TV, Radio, and direct contact expenditures. Telemarketing cooperation will allow the researcher to measure the actual contact record for each individual voter and measure that contact record against voter turnout. Most telemarketing companies maintain each response next to

the voter record including records for bad number, disconnects, and refused. If combined with survey information and precinct voting returns a link could also be explored between candidate choice and campaign activities. Not only would more research involving the use of voter files establish links between campaign activities and turnout, it would also provide more information about which voters are left out of the information delivery process.

Researchers should add direct contact information to historical models of voter turnout. Research into past elections cycles might show that direct contact expenditure is related to voter turnout fluctuations. It is at least suggestive that turnout decline partially overlaps the rise of the candidate-centered media campaign and the decline of the party-voter-mobilization paradigm. Voter files represent an especially rich and diverse data set for the tracking of direct campaign effects and allow for the one to one linking of campaign action to voting behavior.

Finally, any detailed study of actual campaign activity exposes the paucity of spending data. It is common for researchers to plead for "more and better" data while oblivious to the costs of data collection at the source. As one who has filled out far too many FEC forms I could not, in good conscience, call for much added complexity. Still, it is surprising that more scholars have not waded into the expenditure jungle.

Currently, only the Morris data presents a detailed picture of campaign expenditure based on FEC data. Such research might be greatly facilitated by simply adding a category code next to each expenditure entry. Additionally, the FEC might attempt to computerize expenditure data. This is no doubt a massive task but certainly smaller in scale than the entry of all donors. There are a lot more donors than vendors. Perhaps

one explanation for reform's focus on fundraising is the ready data available on campaign donations. Better expenditure data will flesh out the issues surrounding campaigns by detailing outflow as well as inflow.

8.3 Implications for Reform

In 1980 there were 204 firms openly devoted to making money in some part of the political campaign process. The 1996 Carol Hess political resource directory names 3500.¹⁶² The growth of campaign professionalism and the professional marketing of candidates is not a new development so much as a rapidly accelerating one. As early as 1937 John Dewey was worried about issues being determined by "habit, party funds, the skill of managers of the machine, the portrait of a candidate with his firm jaw, his lovely wife and children, and a multitude of other irrelevancies, determine the issues." Distaste for organized, electoral politics is a part of a deep and longstanding distrust of politicians in general. One hundred years before Dewey's comment, a folk song, later adapted by Aaron Copeland as a quintessential American statement, presents a musically cynical chant to campaign and candidate trustworthiness:

Yes the candidate's a dodger,
Yes a well known dodger.
Yes the candidate's a dodger,
Yes and I'm a dodger too.
He'll meet you and treat you
And ask you for your vote,
But look out boys,
He's a-dodgin for a note.¹⁶³

Today, the timeless concern over the power and morality of politicians, melds with concern over the state of campaign politics, its techniques, and the consultants who

¹⁶² Interview with Carol Hess; March 3, 1996

¹⁶³ Dewey, John. *The Public and Its Problems*. (Athens, OH Swallow Press, 1927) p 122

bring expertise to bear on the process. The entire political process is viewed with distaste by a majority of Americans. Critiques of campaigning concentrate on the evils and influence of money and what are often seen to be vacuous campaign messages.

Many campaign reformers would have the electorate believe that politicians are bought and sold and that improvement requires some combination of less money and more governmental regulation. There is no doubt the many campaigns are unsavory. Nor is there any doubt that any system of campaign financing will lead to abuse. What is missing in many reform arguments is any appreciation of the utilitarian side of campaigns in a democratic system. The absence of a notion of the campaign's role in democracy is analogous to the absence of empirical research into campaigns. The rallying cry of "get money out of politics" ignores the very function of money within politics.

This research suggests that at least one function of money, as funneled through campaigns, is to increase voter turnout, a goal shared by reformers as well as defenders of the status quo. Clearly, elite mobilization efforts account for at least some of the variation in turnout from district to district or election cycle to election cycle. Although it may sound trite, campaigns are, at least partially, about communication. The logic of the argument is simple. Elections are arenas in which candidates, working within given limits, try to communicate their beliefs and capacities to voters. The exact effects of communication, and how they work, are debatable, but, at least in this paper, some forms of those communications, in some circumstances, increase voter turnout.

Communication costs money. To call all of the households within a Massachusetts state representative district one time would cost \$20,000. To send all

households in that same district a letter would cost approximately \$17,000. A recently approved Massachusetts initiative imposes a spending cap on Representative districts of \$30,000 (\$18,000 for the primary, where there are almost no races, and \$12,000 for the general). Even if a campaign put all \$30,000 into direct contact, assuming a campaign could be run without a paid manager, lawyer, or accountant, that campaign could not even send two pieces of mail or make two phone calls to district voters.¹⁶⁴ This is especially devastating in light of the data in this study suggesting that only multiple campaign contacts increase turnout.

The argument that campaigns are forms of communication, and that communication costs money, seems unexceptionable, but is in fact, heretical. It seems to lead to the conclusion that money is good and the more money the better. Alternatively, it focuses attention not so much on the sheer amount of money, so much as the need for some minimum amount of funding which will allow challengers and incumbents alike to communicate their issues, and display their character, to voters. It proceeds from the assumption that campaigns have a valuable role in educating and turning out voters. The question that arises from the argument is not how to get money out of politics so much as to how money can best be regulated to produce electorally desirable results.

The notion of "electorally desirable results" is not one that gets a lot of detailed attention in campaign reform discussions. Although this is not the place to develop a theory of electoral democracy I would suggest that the notion of "clean and fair"

¹⁶⁴ This is assuming paid phones and direct mail. Presumably, volunteers could make literature drops and provide phoners for calling. This reliance on volunteers merely reinforces the already overwhelming strength of incumbents who can cultivate a core group of volunteers year round through constituent work.

elections is but one criterion. Others, which are equally important, include a process which facilitates turnout and electoral change. From this perspective the limitation of campaign money -- and, in a related manner, the funneling of campaign money to purely persuasive mediums instead of more turnout specific methods, may serve to decrease turnout. Secondly, the restriction of campaign money also violates the notion that elections need to facilitate electoral change. In a world of incumbent advantage, and this study extends that advantage to the efficacy of incumbent communications, suggests that real challengers need to outspend incumbents just to stay even.¹⁶⁵ Any reform which limits spending benefits incumbents. In a world of zero spending, the better known candidate with a constituent service based organization will win.

This study suggests that restricting campaign spending may harm campaign efforts to turn out voters. If increased turnout is the goal, then policies that encourage campaign spending on direct contact efforts are warranted. This notion of encouraging the right kind of campaign spending is captured in a New York Times article on soft money. Congressman Albert Winn of Maryland, is quoted as saying, "Soft money has helped drive my voter programs. If we didn't have that money I'm sure the turnout in my district would go down."¹⁶⁶ Winn's district is largely African-American and has proven in the past to be a low turnout area. The picture of soft money doing what it was originally designed to do, increase turnout through voter programs and build local party strength, is quite different from the prevailing view where soft money has become shorthand for political corruption. Frank Sorauf rightly calls soft money "a term of epic

¹⁶⁵ There are numerous studies which show the enormous fundraising advantages of incumbents. See Paul Herrnson, *Congressional Elections*; or Sorauf, *Money in Congressional Elections*.

¹⁶⁶ New York Times, June 8, 1998. National Edition Page A12.

imprecision" but in one of its incarnations it was intended to facilitate party GOTV efforts. Current reform discussions should focus less on eliminating soft money and more on redirecting it back to its original intent.

If, even for a moment, one can accept the assumption that certain kinds of campaign spending are beneficial to democracy, then systemic reforms will aim to make the beneficial activities cheaper relative to the alternatives. However, in almost no discussion of campaign reform is direct contact discussed. In fact, many proposals, by limiting spending, making fundraising more difficult, and providing access to free TV time will actually decrease the incentives to engage in direct contact at all.

In addition to the two general proposals suggested above; encouraging more campaign spending and redirecting soft money back to its original purpose, I propose the following specific topics for discussion in light of this study's findings.

1) Reduce postage costs. The largest single cost of any direct mailing is often postage. Campaign reformers often suggest that privately owned radio and television stations provide free air time. Why not the federal government? Reduced postage would decrease the cost of direct contact vis a vis television and radio and reduce the pressure to target mailings to smaller groups. It would broaden the use of direct contact while, at the same time, broaden direct contact targeting. Reduced cost postage will also give challengers the same benefit as incumbents who make good political use of franked mail. Franked mail is restricted to non-political uses but incumbents often target franked mail just like voter mail and use gender, age, and even voter history to make sure the right message gets into the right hands.

2) Increase the number of election day phone calls. In this study phoning proved the most effective direct contact turnout medium yet 67% of the voters in the study received no GOTV contact at all. How might the campaign system be structured to make more phone calls to voters before or on election day? There are a number of possibilities, of varying political plausibility, ranging from reducing the cost of phoning through selective tax reduction, subsidy, and legislative fiat to providing parties and organizations with funds for GOTV. Some organizations, like Project Vote, already make non-partisan GOTV calls to increase turnout. Surely this kind of activity would benefit from government subsidy. As the internet slowly becomes a viable political tool and e-mail takes its place as a voter contact method, will it to favor those already likely to vote or can incentives be constructed to insure a more widespread message delivery? Finally, why not have a governmental system in place which makes election day calls reminding people of their duty to vote? This type of program, while technically simple and cheap, is political dynamite. Still, the notion of government using effective techniques to increase turnout is worth debate and again, the increasing reach of e-mail provides another cheap and simple method of governmental communication. There is no suggestion that government sponsored TV ads do anything to increase voter turnout.

3) Make sure the data is readily available to all candidates. Voter files are at the intersection where the information requirements of democracy meet privacy concerns. Before every election I get a few phone calls from people who have traced a campaign phone call back to my firm's voter list. We try to remove the person's name from our file. Still, this begs the question as to whether, in a democracy, people have the same right to avoid a political communication as they do a marketing initiative. This

is also related to the notion of unlisted phone numbers. In some parts of the country 25% of all numbers are unlisted.¹⁶⁷ This withdrawal into the private realm, while understandable, removes large parts of the populace from a type of political communication proven effective in increasing voter turnout. This privacy issue is also played out over access to voter file. Some states restrict the access to the file or limit the data available. Any additional costs from restricted access are inevitably passed on to campaigns and reduced party and campaign GOTV efforts.

The modern campaign takes place in a deafening arena. My son's third word (whether the first was mama or dada is a matter of dispute) was french fry. How many McDonald's commercials did he see before the age of two? How do campaigns, with their comparatively minor resources, expended in a compressed time frame, get heard above the din? What is it they can do to help further at least one goal common to any democratic electoral system, that of widening participation? This study suggests that by calling and mailing voters, especially those who need to begin to develop the habit of voting, they can widen participation. Unfortunately, the current logic of our electoral system leads candidates away from broad based direct contact efforts and toward either the electronic media or highly targeted direct contact efforts. The money that does go to direct contact is often spent on persuasion mail. Those resources that do go to GOTV are not always directed at those voters who need the biggest nudge to the polls. Finally, the current political atmosphere is one where it is more likely that the amount of

¹⁶⁷ A report by Survey Sampling of Connecticut, (Choosing between Directory Listed and Random Digit Sampling in Light of New Demographic Findings, May 19, 1989, conference report) comparing listed and unlisted number households shows that unlisted numbers cluster among high and low incomes.

campaign spending will be restricted with a concomitant decrease in the ability of political elites to do what little they can to increase voter turnout.

This study indicates that campaign communication increases turnout. Of special note is the utility of phone calls at increasing turnout among younger, infrequent voters -- and some evidence the multiple calls are more effective than a single call. This type of campaign communication may well be the most effective tool politicians have at their disposal to spread the habit of voting throughout the electorate. It may well be that the critics are right and that the content of campaign communication is often empty and misleading, but it is information none the less. Isaiah Berlin once said that there was no guarantee that, once found, truth would be interesting. The same is true of campaign communication. The desire for democracy is nearly universal but no one said that, once realized, it would be intellectually edifying. Our politicians do have tools at their disposal which can widen citizen participation. We should spend less time on taking those tools out of the hands of political elites and more time structuring a system that encourages their correct use.

APPENDIX A

DEFINITION OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE, AND ISSUE CONTACTS

Differentiating positive, negative, and issue contacts was a two step process. First, each script or mailing was examined for issue content. If a specific issue, or group of issues, was the primary topic of discussion, the contact was defined as an issue contact.

If the primary topic of discussion was the background, history, or experience of one of the two candidates, the piece was not considered an issue contact. If the communication focused on the opponents background, history or experience, or if the communication was a comparison between personal characteristics to the advantage of the campaign producing the communication, it was defined as "negative."

If the primary topic of discussion was the background, history, or experience of the candidate issuing the communication, it was considered "positive". GOTV calls which did not criticize the opponent, or raise an issue question were considered positive as well.

Most of the mailings, phone calls, and door-to-door scripts fell clearly into one of the above categories. Some of the contacts mentioned both a candidate's accomplishments and an opponents opposition to those accomplishments. Such pieces, often called "comparative" are a gray area. For purposes of this study, if the primary graphic or the weight of the text, emphasized issues, it was coded as an issue piece. If the primary graphic or the weight of the text emphasized candidate characteristics, it was coded as positive or negative.

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW DOCUMENTS

Document 1: Before interviewing anyone associated with the campaign I requested that each candidate sign the letter listed below.

Mike Hannahan
P.O. Box 43
Amherst, MA 01004-0043

Dear Mr. Hannahan:

This letter gives your permission to study my campaign that took place during the 19 election cycle.

It is my understanding that you are researching the campaigns voter contact efforts and will focus your research on direct mail, voter id, and GOTV. I also understand that I will be allowed to review the written material before it is submitted for publication and request any changes that may affect future campaigns.

Sincerely,

Document Two: Once permission was granted the letter below was sent to all of the interview subjects. The letter was followed up with a phone call to confirm receipt and an interview, either in person or via the phone, was scheduled.

Thursday, November 05, 1998

<Contact:26>

<Company:25>

<Address 1:27>

<Address 2:28>

<Address 3:29>

<City:30>, <State:31> <Zip:32>

<Country:33>

Dear <Salutation:40>:

Thank you for agreeing to speak with me about your campaign. I wanted to write and summarize the content of the interview to help our actual conversation move more smoothly.

The purpose of my research is to examine the effects of direct voter contact. I define direct voter contact as any non-fundraising contact to an individual voter for the purposes of persuasion or GOTV. Direct voter contact includes door to door efforts, mail, and phone calls. For a variety of reasons I am concentrating on efforts that took place from July 1 until the election.

I intend to collect information on each individual contact. After collecting the information I will code the data back onto a current voter file and examine the effects direct contact had on turnout and persuasion.

To accomplish this I need to discuss each individual piece of mail or GOTV call. I understand that detailed information is hard to recall after a few years but anything that can be provided will be helpful. I will be reviewing campaign expenditure forms from the FEC because the line item details of such reports may often be helpful in filling in specifics.

The questions will cover the following general areas:

- What was your role in the campaign?
- Who were the other key campaign players?
- What were some key campaign target groups?
- How did you feel about the race at the beginning?
- Did any other groups do direct contact on your behalf?
- Did you do any door to door efforts?
- Did you make any Voter ID, Persuasion, or GOTV phone calls?
- Did you make use of persuasion mail?

- Did the state or national parties do any direct contact on your behalf?
- Do you feel as if the phone calls and the mail made a difference with your campaign?

Specifically, I will be looking to find out the following types of information about each direct contact effort.

- To whom was the mail piece (or phone call) directed? With this question I will probe for specifics regarding party, age, voter history, precinct, registration date, gender, ethnic group, or other targeting variables.
- How many pieces did this group receive?
- What was the purpose of a given piece of mail or phone call?
- When did the contact occur?

It might help if you had around your office any of the following information

- Direct mail plans
- GOTV plans
- Sample mail pieces, phone scripts, or Door to Door scripts
- Polling information
- Names of people responsible for the work
- Names of people involved with the party or independent expenditure groups

Overall, I think the initial interview will take about one hour. After that I hope to be able to complete the project with follow-up phone calls.

I look forward to speaking with you. Thank you again for your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Mike Hannahan, Vice President, Voter Contact Services

List of Interview Subjects:

Maryland Congressional District 05:

George Nesterchuck, Campaign Manager, Devine for Congress
Dr. Donald Devine, Candidate
Corey Alexander, Campaign Manager, Hoyer for Congress
Don Powell, Operations Director, Telemark Inc. (Hoyer Phones_

Ohio Congressional District 01:

Shannon Jones, Campaign Manager, Chabot for Congress
Jeff Berding, Campaign Manager, Mann for Congress
Jeff Rusnak, Vice President, Burges and Burges (Mann Mail)
Brewster Rhoads, Political Consultant (Mann Targeting)

Pennsylvania Congressional District 21:

Bob Holste, Campaign Manager, English for Congress
Bill Peduto, Campaign Manager, DiNicola for Congress
Steve Meyers, SCM Associates (English Mail)
Jack Zadow, Grassroots Direct (English Phones)
Jim Thompson, Political Director, COPE

California Congressional District 01:

Beau Phillips, Campaign Manager, Riggs for Congress
Paul Maslin, Hickman, Maslin, Maulin (Alioto Pollster)
Harvey Hukari, Hukari Associates (Riggs Mail)
Donna Patterson, Patterson and Associates (**get new name**)
Shellie Garrett, Garret and Associates (Riggs Targeting)
Paul Ambrosino, Ambrosino and Muire (Alioto Mail)
Tom Pier, Campaign Manager, Alioto for Congress

Section 1. Involvement:

Name:

Date of interview: _____

What was your role in the campaign?

How long did you have that role?

Who was your pollster?

Who was your fundraising consultant?

Who was your direct mail consultant?

Did any one else work as a consultant on the campaign? Who? What was their role?

Section 2: The campaign overall.

In July, what was your horserace figure?

What was your favorability?

Your Opponents?

What was your name id?

Your Opponents?

Can you summarize in a few words what you needed to do to win?

What groups did you target for persuasion?

What groups did you target for turnout?

Why did you target particular groups for persuasion?

Why did you target particular groups for turnout?

If you can remember, what did you think your chances of winning were in July?

1. Poor
2. Fair
3. Good
4. Excellent
5. No answer

Section 3: Direct Mail Section:

What Did you use any direct mail in the campaign?

Lets talk about the direct mail part of your campaign?

How many pieces did you send?

To how many different target audiences?

What were those target audiences?

How many pieces did each audience get?

What did you feel about the role of direct mail in your campaign?

What percentage of your budget was spent on direct mail?

What did you feel about the role of GOTV in your campaign?

What percentage of your budget do you think was spent on GOTV?

How many different pieces did you send out?

Now lets talk about each individual contact

Contact Information Form:

RACE:

Date of recording:

Recorded by:

Contact name or description:

Approximate date contact was made:

Contact purpose: Persuasion Id GOTV Other

Specifically, what did you hope this contact would accomplish?

Contact type: Mail Phone Door to Door Other _____

Target of contact: (describe in detail and PROBE for)

PROBE for:

Party

Age

Voter History

Geography (precinct, town, county, other)

Precinct targeting analysis (persuadables, turnout, etc)

Registration date

Gender

Ethnic Group

Group membership

Who designed the piece of mail (or script, or door-to-door program)

PROBE for:

Direct Mail consultant

Phone Bank Firm (or volunteers)

Direct mail house:

Voter file vendor:

Do you have a sample of the mailing (script for the phone call or door to door)

Was the same piece sent to the same universe again? Yes No

If so, how often? _____

Would you describe the contact as a Name ID Issue Negative

Other _____

Did the contact win any awards? Yes No

APPENDIX C

ELECTORAL AND SPENDING HISTORY

Table A.1: Ohio CD 01: 1994

Year	Rep. Candidate	Dem Candidate	Rep Percent	Dem Percent	Rep Spending	Dem Spending
1990	K. Blackwell	C. Luken (I)	49%	51%	\$651,544	\$670,640
1992	S. Grote*	D. Mann	43%	51%	\$83,038	\$278,294
1994	S. Chabot	D. Mann (I)	56%	44%	\$542,829	\$1,001,393

Grote was an Independent Candidate. There were no Republicans on the ballot.

Table A.2: Maryland CD 05: 1994

Year	Rep. Candidate	Dem Candidate	Rep Percent	Dem Percent	Rep Spending	Dem Spending
1990	L. Breuer	S. Hoyer (I)	19%	89%	\$8,709	\$716,469
1992	L. Hogan	S. Hoyer (I)	55%	44%	\$265,065	\$1,584,271
1994	D. Devine	S. Hoyer (I)	41%	59%	\$581,198	\$1,295,542

Table A.3: Pennsylvania CD 21: 1996

Year	Rep. Candidate	Dem Candidate	Rep Percent	Dem Percent	Rep Spending	Dem Spending
1990	Tom Ridge	None			\$361,712	
1992	Tom Ridge	John Harkin	68%	32%	\$705,861	\$15,800
1994	Phil English	Bill Leavens	49%	47%	\$450,795	\$465,190
1996	Phil English	Ron DiNicola	51%	49%	\$1,262,645	\$478,871

Table A.4: California CD 01: 1996

Year	Rep. Candidate	Dem Candidate	Rep Percent	Dem Percent	Rep Spending	Dem Spending
1990	F. Riggs (I)	D Bosco	43%	42%	\$251,662	\$413,213
1992	F. Riggs (I)	D Hamburg	45%	48%	\$716,401	\$647,532
1994	F. Riggs	D. Hamburg (I)	53%	47%	\$605,185	\$834,611
1996	F. Riggs (i0	M. Alioto	50%	43%	\$1,390,399	\$1,228,870

APPENDIX D

BASE MODELS

Table A.5: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: OH

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	0.02**		
Voter History	0.83*	0.01	1.01
Age	0.01*	0.03	2.29
Democratic	1.02*	0.001	1.02
Republican	1.43*	0.07	2.78
Constant	-2.08	0.07	4.17

N=11333. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 77% . Chi Square 4265 with 5 degrees of freedom. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant at .05 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 15540. -2 Log Likelihood with model 11275.

Table A.6: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: MD

Variable	Coefficient*	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	0.09*		
Voter History	0.82*	0.01	1.09
Age	0.01*	0.01	2.27
Democratic	-0.3*	0.01	1.01
Republican	-0.34**	0.06	0.74
Constant	-1.54*	0.11	0.71
		0.09	

N=17264. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74% . Model Chi-square 3793.39 with 5 degrees of freedom. *Significant to the .0001 level. **Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 17264. -2 Log Likelihood with model 13470.

Table A.7: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: PA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	0.03**		
Voter History	0.63*	0.02	1.02
Age	0.01*	0.02	1.87
Democratic	0.05**	0	1.01
Republican	0.31*	0.07	1.05
Constant	-0.96	0.07	1.36
		0.08	

N=14974. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 73% . Model Chi Sq 3040.91 with 5 degrees of freedom. ** Not Significant. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 17310. -2 Log Likelihood with model 14269.

Table A.8: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: CA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	0.15*		
Voter History	0.7*	0.0065	1.16
Age	0.003**	0.0174	2
Democratic	-.1010***	0.0034	1
Republican	0.411*	0.0589	0.9
Constant	-1.27	0.0631	1.5

N=14848. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 79% . Model Chi Square 3642.54 with five degrees of freedom. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 Level ***Not Significant. Beginning Log Likelihood 14848. -2 Log Likelihood with model 16318.

**Table A.9: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
Combined file**

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	0.065*		
Voter History	0.74*	0.006	1.06
Age	0.007*	0.015	2.09
Democratic	0.182*	0.001	1
Republican	0.384*	0.049	1.2
Presidential Year	0.483*	0.037	1.46
Constant	-1.599*	0.037	1.62
		0.063	

N=22830. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74.14%. Model Chi Square 4705 with 5 degrees of freedom.

*Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 23266. -2 Log Likelihood with model 18560.

APPENDIX E

MODELS BY CONTACT TYPE AND VOTER SUBGROUP

Tables for GOTV/Persuasion/Identification (Table 7.1)

Table A.10: Causes of Voter Turnout with GOTV/Persuasion/Voter Identification: OH

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
TypeGOTV	**0.161		
Type ID	*0.208	0.054	1.17
Type Pers	*-0.171	0.044	1.23
Voter History	*0.775	0.041	0.84
Age	*0.012	0.028	2.17
Democratic	*1.06	0.001	1.01
Republican	*1.4	0.076	2.9
Constant	*-2.08	0.089	4.06
		0.07	

N=11333. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 77%. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level
Beginning Log Likelihood 15540. -2 Log Likelihood with model 11246.

Table A 11: Causes of Voter Turnout with GOTV/Persuasion/Voter Identification: MD

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
TypeGOTV	*-0.004		
Type ID		0.033	0.995
Type Pers	*0.132	0.062	1.4
Voter History	*0.833	0.03	1.14
Age	*0.011	0.019	2.3
Democratic	*-0.399	0.001	1.01
Republican	*-0.488	0.069	0.67
Constant	*-1.66	0.138	0.613
		0.108	

N=13170. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 17264. -2 Log Likelihood with model 13438.

Table A.12: Causes of Voter Turnout with GOTV/Persuasion/Voter Identification: PA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
TypeGOTV	*-0.181		
Type ID	*0.472	0.037	0.834
Type Pers		0.061	1.6
Voter History	*0.612	0.022	1.03
Age	*0.013	0.016	1.84
Democratic		0.001	1.01
Republican	*0.538	0.08	0.882
Constant	*-1.03	0.083	1.71
		0.081	

N=14280. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74.14%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 17310. -2 Log Likelihood with model 14196.

Table A.13: Causes of Voter Turnout with GOTV/Persuasion/Voter Identification: CA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Type ID	*-0.435		
Type Pers	*0.172	0.059	0.647
Voter History	*0.691	0.007	1.19
Age		0.017	1.99
Democratic	***-0.131	0.002	1
Republican	*0.437	0.059	0.876
Constant	*-1.33	0.063	1.54
		0.07	

N=13999. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 79%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 16318. -2 Log Likelihood with model 12577.

Tables for Mail/Phone/Door-To-Door (Table 7.1)

Table A.14 Causes of Voter Turnout with Mail/Phone/Door to Door Included for Total Contacts: OH

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Mail	**0.012		
Phone		0.011	1.01
Door to Door	0.159	0.054	1.17
Voter History	*0.893	0.149	0.979
Age	*0.011	0.026	2.29
Democratic	*0.997	0.01	1.01
Republican	*1.29	0.074	2.71
Constant	*-2.08	0.086	3.65
		0.07	

N=11333. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 76.74%. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .001 level Beginning Log Likelihood 15540. -2 Log Likelihood with model 11268.

Table A.15: Causes of Voter Turnout with Mail/Phone/Door to Door Included for Total Contacts: MD

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Mail	*0.189		
Phone		0.029	1.2
Door to Door	-0.096	0.052	0.908
Voter History	*0.825	0.004	1
Age	*0.011	0.019	2.28
Democratic	*0.333	0.001	1.01
Republican	*-0.661	0.064	0.716
Constant	*-1.73	0.129	0.516
		0.105	

N=13170. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 17264. -2 Log Likelihood with model 13443.

Table A.16: Causes of Voter Turnout with Mail/Phone/Door to Door Included for Total Contacts: PA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Mail	***0.047		
Phone	*0.292	0.021	1.04
Door to Door	*-0.184	0.047	1.33
Voter History	*0.629	0.029	0.831
Age	*0.006	0.016	1.87
Democratic		0.001	1
Republican		0.075	1.02
Constant	*-0.671	0.089	1.01
		0.087	

N=14280. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74.14%. *Significant to the .001 level. ***Significant to the .05 level.
Beginning Log Likelihood 17310. -2 Log Likelihood with model 14191.

Table A.17: Causes of Voter Turnout with Mail/Phone/Door to Door Included for Total Contacts: CA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Mail	*0.176		
Phone	***0.137	0.007	1.19
Door to Door	-0.028	0.052	1.14
Voter History	*0.691	0.018	0.972
Age		0.017	1.99
Democratic	***-0.13	0.002	1
Republican		0.059	0.878
Constant	*-1.31	0.063	1.55
		0.082	

N=13999. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 79%. *Significant to the .001 level. ***Significant to the .05 level
Beginning Log Likelihood 16318. -2 Log Likelihood with model 12577.

Tables for Positive/Negative/Issue (Table 7.2)

Table A.18: Causes of Voter Turnout with Positive, Negative, and Issue Contacts: OH

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Voter History	*0.782	0.027	2.18
Positive	*0.197	0.037	1.21
Negative	**0.18	0.067	0.829
Issue	**0.134	0.056	0.874
Age	*0.012	0.001	1.01
Democratic	*1.05	0.074	2.86
Republican	*1.34	0.078	3.84
Constant	*-2.07	0.071	

N=11333. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 76.14%. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level
Beginning Log Likelihood 15540. -2 Log Likelihood with model 11247.

**Table A 19: Causes of voter turnout with Positive, Negative, and Issue Contacts:
MD**

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Voter History	*0.819		
Positive	*0.114	0.019	2.26
Negative		0.028	1.12
Issue	***0.11	0.04	1.01
Age	*0.01	0.051	1.11
Democratic	**0.242	0.001	1.01
Republican		0.081	0.784
Constant	*-1.56	0.186	0.835
		0.129	

N=13170. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74.14%. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level. ***Significant to the .05 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 17264. -2 Log Likelihood with model 13466.

**Table A.20: Causes of Voter Turnout with Positive, Negative, and Issue Contacts:
PA**

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Voter History	*0.655		
Positive	***0.042	0.016	1.92
Negative	*0.321	0.02	1.04
Issue	*-0.373	0.028	1.37
Age	*0.02	0.045	0.688
Democratic		0.001	1.02
Republican	*0.271	0.076	1.04
Constant	*-1.44	0.077	1.31
		0.093	

N=14280. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 75%. *Significant to the .001 level. ***Significant to the .05 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 17310. -2 Log Likelihood with model 14070.

**Table A 21: Causes of Voter Turnout with Positive, Negative, and Issue Contacts:
CA**

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Voter History		0.688	
Positive	*-0.161	0.017	1.99
Negative	*0.247	0.028	0.85
Issue	*0.168	0.011	1.28
Age	*0	0.015	1.18
Democratic		0.001	1
Republican	*0.332	0.06	0.917
Constant	*-1.06	0.065	1.39
		0.079	

N=13999. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 79%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 16318. -2 Log Likelihood with model 12546.

Tables for Republican and Democrat/Incumbent/Challenger (Table 7.3)

Table A.22: Causes of Voter Turnout Party and Status of Candidate: OH

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Republican Candidate		0.011	
Democrat Candidate	*0.084		0.988
Voter History	*0.786		1.08
Age	*0.011		2.19
Democratic	*1.06		1.01
Republican	*1.59		2.89
Constant	*-2.07		4.91
		0.07	

N=11333. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 77%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 15540. -2 Log Likelihood with model 11257.

Table A.23: Causes of Voter Turnout Party and Status of Candidate: MD

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Republican Candidate	*0.12		
Democrat Candidate		0.031	1.12
Voter History	*0.825	0.056	1.05
Age	*0.011		2.28
Democratic	*-0.271		1.01
Republican	**0.559		0.762
Constant	*-1.55		0.571
		0.095	

N=13131. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74.15%. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 17264. -2 Log Likelihood with model 13468.

Table A.24: Causes of Voter Turnout Party and Status of Candidate: PA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Republican Candidate	*0.122		
Democrat Candidate	***-0.044	0.022	1.13
Voter History	*0.647	0.019	0.956
Age		0.016	1.9
Democratic		0.001	1
Republican	**0.187	0.076	1.14
Constant	*-0.821	0.078	1.2
		0.083	

N=14280. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 73.24%. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level. ***Significant to the .05 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 17310. -2 Log Likelihood with model 14228.

Table A.25: Causes of Voter Turnout Party and Status of Candidate: CA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Republican Candidate	*0.167		
Democrat Candidate	*0.137	0.01	1.18
Voter History	*0.685	0.01	1.14
Age	***0.002	0.018	1.98
Democratic		0.001	1
Republican	*0.372	0.059	0.896
Constant	*-1.33	0.066	1.45
		0.075	

N=13999. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 79%. *Significant to the .001 level. ***Significant to the .05 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 16318. -2 Log Likelihood with model 12672.

Tables for Age Cohorts (Table 7.4)

Table A.26: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: 55 Plus OH

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	0.058**		
Voter History	0.86*	0.023	1.06
Age	-0.013*	0.056	2.36
Democratic	1.03*	0.005	0.987
Republican	1.7*	0.164	2.82
Constant	-0.673*	0.189	5.47
		0.397	

N=2649. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 82%. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level
Beginning Log Likelihood 3162. -2 Log Likelihood with model 2219.

Table A.27: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: 30 and Under OH

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	-0.013	0.022	0.986
Voter History	0.656	0.054	1.92
Age	0.005	0.014	1
Democratic	1.1	0.158	3.01
Republican	1.33	0.128	3.78
Constant	-1.81	0.342	

N=2705. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 73%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 3454.
-2 Log Likelihood with model 2930.

Table A.28: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: 55 Plus MD

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	**0.11	0.046	1.11
Voter History	*0.841	0.037	2.31
Age	*-0.037	0.005	0.96
Democratic	**0.59	0.18	0.55
Republican	*-0.64	0.265	0.52
Constant	*1.68	0.405	

N=3247. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 80%. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level.
Beginning Log Likelihood 3470. -2 Log Likelihood with model 2713.

Table A.29: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: 30 and Under MD

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	0.022	0.05	1.02
Voter History	*0.694	0.05	2
Age	***0.03	0.013	1.03
Democratic	0.047	0.134	1.04
Republican	0.236	0.26	1.26
Constant	*-2.31	0.36	

N=2530. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 72%. *Significant to the .001 level. ***Significant to the .05 level.
Beginning Log Likelihood 3276. -2 Log Likelihood with model 2945.

**Table A.30: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
55 Plus PA**

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	*0.13		
Voter History	*0.758		1.13
Age	*-0.04		2.13
Democratic		-0.2	0.95
Republican		-0.02	0.812
Constant	*2.78		0.974
			0.413

N=4428. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74.14%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 4125.
-2 Log Likelihood with model 3251.

**Table A.31: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
30 and Under PA**

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts		0.096	
Voter History		0.269	1.1
Age		0.002	1.3
Democratic		0.238	1
Republican		0.531	1.26
Constant	-1.03		1.7
			0.298

N=2807. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74.14%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 3861.
-2 Log Likelihood with model 3739.

**Table A.32: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
55 Plus CA**

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	*0.15		
Voter History	*0.783		1.16
Age	*-0.027		2.18
Democratic		0.228	0.97
Republican	*0.78		1.25
Constant		0.287	2.18
			0.353

N=4566. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 87%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 3980.
-2 Log Likelihood with model 2970.

**Table A.33: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
30 and Under CA**

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	*0.158		
Voter History	*0.402		1.17
Age	*-0.05		1.49
Democratic	*-0.46		0.95
Republican		0.1	0.63
Constant		0.15	1.11
			0.336

N=2195. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 63%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 3042.
-2 Log Likelihood with model 2803.

Tables for Frequent and Infrequent voting subgroups

Table A.34: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: Frequent Voters OH

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	-0.01	0.017	0.985
Voter History	*0.64	0.07	1.89
Age	*0.008	0.002	1
Democratic	1.35	0.11	3.85
Republican	1.76	0.1	5.83
Constant	-1.87	0.1	

N=5245. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74%. . *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 6360. -2 Log Likelihood with model 5773.

Table A.35: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: Infrequent Voters OH

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	-0.013	0.017	0.986
Voter History	0.74	0.05	2.09
Age	0.01	0.002	1.01
Democratic	0.64	0.1	1.9
Republican	1.1	0.09	3.01
Constant	-1.74	0.16	

N=6088. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 79%. . *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 6246. -2 Log Likelihood with model 5436.

Table A.36: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: Frequent Voters MD

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	***0.065	0.031	1.06
Voter History	*0.824	0.037	2.27
Age	*0.003	0.002	1
Democratic	*-0.8	0.146	0.44
Republican	*-0.81	0.188	0.44
Constant	**0.57	0.207	

N=7229. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 84%. . *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level. ***Significant to the .05 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 6388. -2 Log Likelihood with model 5722.

Table A.37: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: Infrequent Voters MD

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	*0.102	0.03	1.1
Voter History	*0.487	0.06	1.62
Age	*0.015	0.002	1.01
Democratic	**0.227	0.075	0.79
Republican	-0.27	0.157	0.75
Constant	*-1.64	0.121	

N=5927. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 63%. . *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 7894. -2 Log Likelihood with model 7680.

Table A.38: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: Frequent Voters PA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	***-0.055		
Voter History	*0.658	0.026	0.94
Age	*0.02	0.036	1.93
Democratic	***0.335	0.002	1.02
Republican	**0.46	0.15	1.39
Constant		0.15	1.58
	-1.44	0.18	

N=8340. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 86%. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level

***Significant to the .05 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 6664. -2 Log Likelihood with model 6078.

Table A.39: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: Infrequent Voters PA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	*0.074	0.021	1.07
Voter History	*0.245	0.05	1.27
Age	*0.007	0.001	1
Democratic	-0.03	0.08	0.96
Republican	*0.271	0.08	1.31
Constant		-0.721	

N=5940. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 56%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 8218. -2 Log Likelihood with model 8105.

Table A.40: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: Frequent Voters CA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	**0.036	0.05	1.03
Voter History	*0.935	0.012	2.54
Age	*0.01	0.002	1.01
Democratic	0.154	0.109	1.16
Republican	*0.389	0.116	1.47
Constant	*-1.7	0.194	

N=7985. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 89%. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level Beginning Log Likelihood 5482. -2 Log Likelihood with model 4901.

Table A.41: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: Infrequent Voters CA

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Exp (B)
Total Contacts	*0.197	0.008	1.21
Voter History	*0.41	0.057	1.5
Age	0.002	0.002	1
Democratic	*-0.24	0.07	0.78
Republican	*0.39	0.07	1.47
Constant	*-1.34	0.09	

N=6014. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 66%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 8330. -2 Log Likelihood with model 7556.

APPENDIX F

DISTRICT MAPS AND REGISTRATION FIGURES


The district is within Hamilton County
Ohio and contains the towns listed
below. Cincinnati has 47% of the voters.



OH CONGRESS (U) = 01
COUNTY / CITY

		TOTAL VOTERS	REP VOTERS	DEM VOTERS	IND VOTERS
31 02	CHEVIOT CITY	5968	1328	758	3882
31 03	CINCINNATI CIT	173715	19949	36448	117318
31 04	DEER PARK CITY	19	1	3	15
31 05	FOREST PARK CI	13568	1658	2676	9234
31 11	MT. HEALTHY CI	4694	887	758	3049
31 12	NORTH COLLEGE	6452	1328	1065	4059
31 15	ST. BERNARD CI	3426	611	490	2325
31 17	SILVERTON CITY	3787	458	1029	2300
31 23	COLERAIN TOWNS	30198	7344	3765	19089
31 24	COLUMBIA TOWNS	1446	299	288	859
31 26	DELHI TOWNSHIP	20169	6447	2640	11082
31 27	ELMWOOD TOWNSH	1741	214	160	1367
31 29	GLENDALE TOWNS	747	174	172	401
31 30	GOLF MANOR TOW	2385	248	630	1507
31 31	GREENHILLS TOW	2994	904	352	1738
31 32	GREEN TOWNSHIP	39104	14066	4110	20928
31 34	LOCKLAND TOWNS	3145	372	534	2239
31 36	MIAMI TOWNSHIP	3817	808	408	2601
31 37	MIAMI HEIGHTS	4624	1670	397	2557
31 39	SPRINGFIELD TO	22816	5907	3647	13262
31 44	WOODLAWN TOWNS	2203	162	645	1396
31 45	LINCOLN HEIGHT	2567	24	817	1726
31	HAMILTON	349585*	64859*	61792*	222934*
Report Total		349585	64859	61792	222934

Figure 1. Ohio Congressional District 01: 1994




COUNTY	TOTAL VOTERS	REP VOTERS	DEM VOTERS	IND VOTERS
02 ANNE ARUNDEL	48639	20559	20904	7176
05 CALVERT	36971	15330	16884	4757
09 CHARLES	56001	22735	26366	6900
17 PRINCE GEORGE'S	164771	40884	98435	25452
19 ST. MARY'S	37939	13848	19517	4574
Report Total	344321	113356	182106	48859

Figure 2. Maryland Congressional District 05: 1994



COUNTY	TOTAL VOTERS	REP VOTERS	DEM VOTERS	IND VOTERS
10 BUTLER	57127	26988	25355	4784
20 CRAWFORD	33165	18088	13045	2032
25 ERIE	164024	64401	87668	11955
43 MERCER	68239	28165	34395	5679
Report Total	322555	137642	160463	24450

Figure 3. Pennsylvania Congressional District 21: 1996



COUNTY	TOTAL VOTERS	REP VOTERS	DEM VOTERS	IND VOTERS
08 DEL NORTE	12784	4760	5391	2633
12 HUMBOLDT	78126	24191	35791	18144
17 LAKE	29654	10240	14502	4912
23 MENDOCINO	46229	13432	22770	10027
28 NAPA	63198	22694	30185	10319
48 SOLANO	68541	22485	33329	12727
49 SONOMA	31795	11039	15505	5251
Report Total	330327	108841	157473	64013

Figure 4. California Congressional District 01: 1996

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