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## The privatization of citizenship : race and democracy in the Dominican Republic and Brazil.

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THE PRIVATIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP:  
RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN  
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND BRAZIL

A Dissertation Presented

by

ANTHONY PETER SPANAKOS

Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment  
Of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

MAY 2000

Department of Political Science

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A Dissertation Presented


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
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
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To Antonia and Alexandros Zundos,  
Stella and Michaelis Spanakos,  
Stratoniki and Petros Spanakos, and  
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ABSTRACT

THE PRIVATIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP:  
RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN  
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND BRAZIL

MAY 2000

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The spread of democracy is one of the most important and impressive occurrences in Latin American politics in the last two decades. However, scholars may, and do, question the degree to which democratization has truly occurred and been institutionalized. This dissertation examines the quality of citizenship for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, groups that have been traditionally considered marginalized, with the belief that an analysis of the quality of citizenship for these peoples will make visible the depth of democratization in these two countries.

The dissertation examines the citizenship of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians by using two distinct models of citizenship: the first is a Liberal model which focuses on individual rights and negative freedoms that are protected by a state; the second is a Republican model which emphasizes positive rights, political activity and community. Combining empirical research and observations, secondary sources and statistics (when available), the dissertation finds that neither Liberal nor Republican

versions of citizenship are adequately institutionalized for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

In an attempt to examine what sort of citizenship does exist for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, the dissertation finds that citizenship is 'privatized' and that this privatization is deepened by political culture and the adoption of neo-liberal economic programs. This privatization takes place on three fronts: first, power is largely extra-institutional and, despite democratization, political agendas and decisions are often orchestrated in private space; second, citizenship is considered an exclusive status, related to one's socio-economic identity, rather than an inclusive and universal political identity; third, services traditionally associated with the state have become cut as the state "down-sizes," and NGOs and organs of civil society are now taking the place of the state on a micro-political level, in some areas.

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## PART I

### THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Democratic government has shifted from the “exception” to the “rule” in Latin America. In the last two decades every country in Latin America, with the single exception of Cuba, has shifted to, and maintained, a system in which all government officials are chosen through elections. Suffrage is universal, the media are much more independent than they have ever been, and, in many countries, although not all, the military has returned to the barracks and has not been an active participant in the political arena. The dominance of electoral government and competition for political positions between elites and political party organizations represents a very important move towards democracy. It also allows scholarly attention to move its focus the transition from authoritarian government to the institutionalization of democratic citizenship.

Democracies are most clearly defined by their citizenship, not just demographically and culturally, but in terms of how democratic is citizenship, what rights and responsibilities are considered fundamental to citizenship, and how are these ensured. An examination into citizenship allows one to see the everyday politics which are juxtaposed to the “democratization” of political parties seen through electoral politics and competition between political parties.

The first chapter of this book, “Citizenship, Race and Democratization in the Dominican Republic and Brazil,” focuses on outlining theoretical terms and issues within the context of the Dominican Republic and Brazil. The chapter begins by outlining the salient issues of what I consider a crisis of citizenship in Latin America, and then

examines two dominant concepts of citizenship, which I label "Liberal" and "Republican."<sup>1</sup> The former is fundamentally based in negative freedoms, individual rights, and a limited and neutral state. The latter is a form of citizenship based in positive freedoms, active participation in political and communal activity, and a political community which receives loyalty and other 'emotive' responses from its citizens. I will then briefly place citizenship in the context of Latin America, and assert that neither Liberal nor Republican citizenship pervade in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, and that democratization has been concomitant with a "privatization" of citizenship, which undermines both Liberal and Republican notions.

In order to examine the true depth and breadth of democracy in the two countries, I will look at two groups that are often considered marginal, Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. I will first distinguish Latin American patterns of race relations from US and European concepts of race, and then I will examine the role and meaning of race and racial identities in the Dominican Republic and Brazil.

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that these terms do not correspond to a particular political party, but to traditions within political theory.

# CHAPTER 1

## CITIZENSHIP, RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND BRAZIL

This chapter sets out the theoretical framework and models which will be used in this book. It begins with a brief examination of the importance of citizenship in Latin America in this most recent period of democratization. This will be followed by two sections which will outline the most relevant aspects of both Liberal and Republican visions of citizenship, respectively. The notion of citizenship will then be examined within the context of contemporary Latin American democracies. The hierarchical nature of citizenship in the two countries compels an analysis of citizenship among a traditionally marginalized group, such as Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, to examine the depth of democratization. The last two sections will examine the meaning of "race"<sup>1</sup> in Latin America. The first of these will distinguish a "Latin American" pattern of race relations, from the more "rigid" system of Anglo and Dutch-American countries. The second section will focus specifically on how race is conceived in the two countries under study by combining empirical observations, statistical data, and discursive analysis.

### The Crisis of Citizenship in Latin America

Any recent observer of contemporary Latin American politics will notice constant appeals to "citizenship" (*ciudadanía, cidadania*) and the rights of citizens (*derechos de los*

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<sup>1</sup> "Race" is an "essentially contested concept." The meaning attached to race is hardly fixed, and as recent work in race theory has suggested, race is socially constructed. Thus, since race does not refer to a clear set of categories or characteristics which hold true over different historical periods and in different cultural contexts, it is important to ground studies of race in the society which has constructed the significance of the

*ciudadanos, direitos dos cidadãos*). These terms are used in reference not only to the traditional domain of explicit legal rights, but also to health care, penal codes, and even environmental policy proposals. The often excessive use of citizenship as a political referent and/or rallying point seems to suggest a recognition of the correlation between the deepening (*profundización/profundização*) of the process of democratization and a similar growth (*amplificación/amplificação*) of citizenship.

The fact that citizenship has become one of the key terms in political discourse shows not only the awareness of the importance of citizenship, but the recognition that Latin American democracies are enduring, in varying degrees, a crisis of citizenship (Bacal, 1997: 283). Citizenship seems to be in crisis primarily because the development of citizenship is lagging far behind, and often contradicts, successful democratic reforms in other areas, namely electoral politics. Informal politics are incapable of matching up with formal democratic guarantees and this constitutes a serious problem for nascent democracies. Citizenship is also in crisis because popular disappointment with democracy, if properly channeled, opens the possibility of transforming dominant patterns of relations and deepening democratization. However, as will be shown in chapters 4, 5 and 6, the possibility for using this moment to generate any long-lasting transformative effects to benefit the majority of the population seems unlikely. Additionally, although politicians invoke citizenship often, there is only limited evidence that they find citizenship critical enough to push it to the top of the political agenda. Thus, the lack of institutionalization of democratic citizenship constitutes a crisis whose severity has not received enough attention due to other priorities during democratization, such as

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concept .

achieving economic growth, slowing (hyper)inflation, and insuring military subservience to civilian rule.

While there are many crises afoot whose causes can be analyzed from many angles<sup>2</sup>, this essay considers three related phenomena as being fundamental in the creation of a crisis of citizenship.

- The possibility of a practical form of citizenship which is universally applicable to all members of a given population seems limited by the extra-institutional power structures and networks—in the form of clientelism, *caudillismo/coronelismo*—which govern much of the decision making and the appropriation of resources in Latin America.
- There is a necessarily problematic relationship between democratic politics and citizenship, which, when applied to the Latin American context, is not defined in universal terms of membership but rather in exclusive domains of privilege and status. The perception of all members of a political community as having equal political status and rights is limited by the multiple levels of marginalization that separates those who have power from those who do not. This separation is rarely random, and is often based on individual and group identification—social, cultural, economic, religious or otherwise.
- Citizenship is based on interaction of political agents (citizens) with a central political apparatus, which in modernity has meant the State. Between the Great Depression/World War II and the Debt Crisis of the early 1980s, Latin American economies were heavily statist, promoting Import Substitution Industrialization programs which increased the role of the State in incorporating popular sectors. During the last two decades, neo-liberal economics have been hegemonic, and this

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<sup>2</sup> Of the many arguments to explain this crisis of citizenship in Latin America, I will mention only a few: 1) Citizenship tended to be only imposed and effectively maintained during dictatorial and populist regimes, and as a result, citizenship was conceived within an authoritarian and limited context (Reis, 1997). Bryan Turner writes that when citizenship is constructed "from below" and through "public spaces," citizenship tends to be active. However, when citizenship is "handed down" and public spaces are limited, citizenship is passive (Turner, 1993; 9). 2) While the history of citizenship in the West is associated with popular and elite pressures for expansion of political space, 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century pressures to open political space were often limited to specific elite groups, while power remained in private spaces (Brea, 1983). 3) Although the history of citizenship in the West is seen as a continuous and linear evolution of rights corresponding with increasingly pluralistic and democratic governments (Marshall: 1963), the history of Latin America republics demonstrates recurrent problems with establishing a "democratic tradition" or culture, as democratic regimes were often short-lived, and coups, military rule and dictatorships impeded the opportunity of a slow and deep cultivation of a politics of citizenship (Wiarda: 1997). 4) The history of slavery and social exclusion was so intense in many areas of Latin America, that discussions of citizenship served often as window-dressing for European visitors, intended to cover up profound historical differences which the simple promulgation of laws could not address. 5) Many argue that there is a fundamental conflict between democratic politics and capitalist economics, and that the cleavage between the horizontal claims of the former, and the vertical ones of the latter make democratization a problematic enterprise (Robinson: 1996).

has led to a very different state structure, particularly in the area of social distribution, and to new forms of state-society relations.

These problems of institutionalizing a democratic form of citizenship are practical and explicitly political. However, it should be noted that there is at least one other crisis in which citizenship is involved: an identity crisis. While a sympathetic portrait of citizenship may be universal among political elites and mobilizers, it is by no means clear that all political actors, or theorists, are referring to the same thing when they invoke the term "citizenship." Although Shotter notes that "by its very nature as an essentially contested concept, citizenship entails a discussion of, and a struggle over what its meaning is..." (Shotter, 1993: 130<sup>3</sup>), there tend to be two principle visions of citizenship. One identifies citizenship with the legal guarantees of individual rights, while the other refers to political activity and participation within a bounded political community (Stewart, 1995: 63).

While Benjamin Constant differentiated between the liberty of the moderns and the ancients (Constant, 1988), political theory has categorized these two visions of citizenship as being heirs to the Liberal and Republican traditions respectively (Beiner, 1995; Mulhall and Swift, 1998; Taylor, 1989; Horton, 1994; Walzer, 1999; Avineri and de-Sahlit, 1996). Liberal Citizenship emphasizes the importance of individual rights and negative liberty, while Republicans understand citizenship in terms of community membership, active participation in politics, and positive notions of freedom. Although the literature on democratization has spent little time linking its theoretical models to political theory, debates between proceduralists and substantivists invoke many of themes

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<sup>3</sup> Similarly, Van Gunsteren "citizenship is not an eternal essence but a cultural artifact. It is what people make of it" (Van Gunsteren, 1998: 11).

which emerge from the Liberal-Republican debate. Distinctions between proceduralists, who favor a minimal and parsimonious notion of democracy, and substantivists, who prefer a maximalist understanding of democracy, are based in the Liberal and Republican traditions, which will be outlined in the next section.

This chapter will be neither a literature review of the two traditions, nor an attempt to delimit the factions within each tradition, nor even an analysis of the debate produced by scholarly encounters between advocates and critics of one or both of the above traditions. Instead, I will outline the most important elements of proceduralist and substantivist claims which can be traced to Liberal and Republican conceptions of citizenship. I will produce “ideal types” that will obviously obscure dissent within schools and runs the risk of oversimplifying the positions presented. However, the presentation of the traditions here is not intended as a means of critical analysis of the theoretical value of Liberalism or Republicanism; rather, ideal types serve to evaluate the quality of democracy and the relevance of democratic citizenship in the Dominican Republic and Brazil.

### **Liberalism, Polyarchy and Rights**

...the role of the people [in a democracy] is to produce a government<sup>4</sup>.

The Liberal tradition is based on individual rights and tolerance. This has typically been understood as the recognition of the autonomy of the individual and his or her freedom to make choices and express preferences. The “self” is seen to be prior to the community, and therefore is autonomous in its decision-making. The rights of the

individual, particularly his or her freedom to choose, is a fundamental concern of government. Liberal government should ensure the protection of individual rights, but it must not trample on the rights of a minority in order to protect those of a majority.

The most obvious distinction of the Liberal state, beyond its recognition of the sanctity of the sovereignty of the individual, is that it is limited. The Liberal state is self-constraining (Schedler, Diamond and Plattner, 1999). Self-constraint on the part of government, a critical issue in Liberal democracies, depends on a fairly minimal state which makes no major ethical claims nor purports to a singular notion of public good. A neutral State suggests a minimalist vision of what politics is. As Robert Nozick writes “the minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified. Any state more extensive violates people’s rights” (1996: 136). A similarly minimalist view is expounded by Ronald Dworkin who considers political acts to be “legislation, adjudication, enforcement and the other executive functions of government... nothing more should be added” (Dworkin, 1996: 217). Politics is conceived of, like the State, as a necessary evil that exists only to guarantee maximal individual freedom (Jaffe, 1997: 64), and government, like any form of politics, is conceived to be a form of coercion. Paraphrasing John Rawls, Mulhall and Swift write “[p]olitical power... is coercive; so its exercise must, if it is to be legitimate, respect the freedom and equality of citizens” (1998: 108).

Liberalism is perhaps the dominant paradigm in comparative politics, and even in political science more generally, and, not surprisingly, comparative politics has heavily emphasized the importance of “Liberal” criteria in its definition of democracy. Joseph

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<sup>4</sup> (Schumpeter, 1950: 269).

Schumpeter's notion of an elite centered and essentially formal democracy is perhaps the most common point of reference (1950). He considers democracy to be simply the "free competition [among leaders] for a free vote," and the role of citizens within such a system is essentially limited to voting for "leaders" (Schumpeter, 1950: 271). He recognizes that this form of democracy is far less participatory and utopian than others, but he believes that his is the most realistic and possible form of democracy given the "plausibility of assumptions" and the "tenability of propositions" (Schumpeter, 1950: 269).

Schumpeter's minimalist form of democracy was revisited by Robert Dahl in his 1971 *Polyarchy*. In it, Dahl expands Schumpeter's notion of democracy to include the free expression of citizen preferences. Polyarchy, Dahl argues, represents the minimal requirements for a democratic government. It is a political and procedural model which, like Schumpeter's model, emphasizes parsimony. Dahl's minimal requirements for polyarchy are: 1) the freedom to form and join organizations; 2) the freedom of expression; 3) the right to vote; 4) eligibility for public office; 5) the right of political leaders to compete for support; 6) the availability of alternative sources of information; 7) free and fair elections; and 8) institutions which compel the government to depend on votes and other expression of preference (Dahl, 1971: 3).

Polyarchy has been and remains the dominant model employed in democratization studies since the "Third Wave" of democratization began in 1974 in Southern Europe, as institutional and minimal visions of democracy have been hegemonic. Scott Mainwaring writes "Dahl's *polyarchy* (1971) exemplifies a clear formulation, with reasonably parsimonious yet not simplistic explanations. This is what we should strive for" (Mainwaring, 1992: 329). Similarly, in his presidential address to the American Political

Science Association. Lucian Pye said “in searching for the most promising variables for explaining dynamic change we probably could do no better than to start with Robert Dahl’s theory of polyarchy” (Pye, 1990:15). The appeal of polyarchy is that it offers scholars a parsimonious model which lends itself to mass comparative analyses, allowing for discussions of democratization across region and time which might not have been possible otherwise (see Coppedge and Reinicke, 1991; Przeworski et al, 1996).

Those who tend to use polyarchy as their standard definition of democracy accept that polyarchy is a minimal model, but one that is nevertheless possible and operationalizable, unlike more substantive definitions. Additionally, these scholars emphasize the importance of procedures (proceduralists) and institutions (institutionalists) in democratization. Polyarchy represents a “procedural minimum” in that it “presumes fully contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association” (Collier and Levitsky, 1997: 434). Polyarchy also emphasizes the role that institutions play in terms of ordering citizen preferences and providing government accountability. John Peeler, for example, has argued that institutions, particularly political parties, are “essential” to the successful consolidation of democracy (Peeler, 1998: 165). In his analysis of democracy in India, Ashutosh Varshney notes that despite its lack of an industrial revolution, the wide income disparities, and the low general levels of literacy, democracy has endured in India. He attributes this to the leaders of India during its independence, because they reinforced democratic institutions, and to two specific institutions, the catch-all Congress Party, and the structure of the federal system India (Varshney, 1998).

The most important democratic procedure for Liberal scholars, the one in which political parties are most relevant, is that of elections. This has remained the paramount focus of scholars who employ a minimalist notion of democracy, a testament to polyarchy's Schumpeterian heritage. Elections are the easiest means of monitoring citizens' preferences, and fair and free elections can easily be distinguished from the elections that occurred during dictatorships and other authoritarian regimes.

These scholars recognize that polyarchy is minimal, but they believe it provides broad enough guarantee of rights and freedoms so as to provide an environment in which democracy can grow. Trying to do more than this could jeopardize the stability of the transition to democratic government, as Huntington makes clear in his discussion of how to handle past human rights violations ("do not prosecute, do not punish, do not forgive, and, above all, do not forget"—1991: 223). Nevertheless, when polyarchy seems to be securely in place, scholars feel comfortable making the judgement that democracy has been consolidated in a given country. Although some scholars, such as Diamond, Hartlyn and Linz (1999) argue that democracy is consolidated when all relevant political actors have accepted democracy as "the only game in town," most proceduralists would agree with the more parsimonious definition of consolidation proposed recently by Andreas Schedler which argues that "[t]he term 'democratic consolidation' should refer to expectations of regime continuity—and to nothing else" (Schedler. 1998: 103).

Citizenship within a fairly minimalist democracy that is essentially procedural and institutional is conceived in terms of individual rights, particularly political rights. Although all political and civil rights are important within the Liberal tradition, it is their violation, not their exercise, which concerns scholars. For example, a citizen need not

vote to be a democratic citizen, but should he or she be denied the right to vote, the citizen does not live in a democracy. The voluntarism of Liberalism and the focus on the expression of preferences privileges voting above many other rights, particularly in terms of defining citizenship. In 1989, Robert Dahl's writes "the rights of citizenship include the opportunity to oppose and vote out of office the highest officials in the government" (Dahl, 1989: 220), which seems to echo Schumpeter's minimalist definition nearly four decades earlier in which he wrote "[d]emocracy means only that the people have the opportunity of refusing the men who are to rule them" (Schumpeter, 1950: 284-5).

### **Republicanism, Substantivists, and Participation**

The nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some common ethnic and cultural properties, but rather from the *praxis* of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights<sup>5</sup>.

The Republican tradition is one that is characterized by the importance of self-government and civic virtue (Sandel, 1999: 11). The republic is constituted of agents who, through their active participation, construct government and society. The freedom of citizens in Republican theory is an especially positive notion of freedom, and it rests on the individual's independence. This independence differs from Liberal autonomy quite significantly. As opposed to the Liberal agent whose decision-making process is autonomous and isolated from other people, groups and commitments, based on his or her existence and value prior to society, the Republican agent cannot be understood outside of society. He or she is born into a world where relations, expectations and cultural norms already lay claim to him or her long before any conscious expressions of preferences can be made (MacIntyre, 1981; Avineri and de-Shalit, 1996:3; Horton and

Mendus, 1994: 7-10; Sandel, 1996: 12). Nicholas Onuf writes “[t]he association comes first. In the absence of association (republic, society), there is no agency and there can be no agents” (Onuf, 1998: 5). Republican agents also recognize a certain civic responsibility and virtue that denies the citizen the possibility of the voluntary withdrawal from civic life possible within the Liberal paradigm<sup>6</sup>.

The republican agent is independent in that a citizen can only be truly free when they are not “dependent.” This idea stems out of Aristotle’s denial of citizenship for slaves, women and laborers, because they lived in the world of necessity, they could be swayed by dependent relations (particularly economic ones), and therefore were not truly free (Aristotle, 1972; Arendt, 1994: 12). Republican thought has long posed the importance of land ownership because it ensures the long-term interests of the citizen in a community, and because it gives the citizen a certain amount of economic independence believed to be necessary for participation in public life. J.G.A. Pocock writes that “political and economic autonomy” is “a prerequisite against corruption” in Machiavelli’s notion of *virtu* (Pocock, 1971: 212). Recently, Phillip Petit has conceptualized freedom within the Republican tradition to be “freedom from domination” (Petit, 1997: 4). He writes:

[to be un-free involves] having to live at the mercy of another, having to live in a manner that leaves you vulnerable to some ill that the other is in a position arbitrarily to impose; and this, in particular, when each of you is in a position to see that you are dominated by the other... It is the grievance expressed by the wife who finds herself in a position where her husband can beat her at will, and without any possibility of redress; by the employee who dare not raise a complaint against an employer, and who is

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<sup>5</sup> (Habermas, 1995: 258)

<sup>6</sup> These arguments are suggested by many thinkers such as Machiavelli, Tocqueville, Rousseau and Arendt.

vulnerable to any of a range of abuses, some petty, some serious, that the employer may choose to perpetuate...(Petit, 1997: 5)<sup>7</sup>.

Obviously, this is a much more robust understanding of freedom than that posed by Liberals in that it tries to remove social and economic power differences that limit liberty.

Republican government is far less concerned about the protection of individual and minority rights than it is about citizens asserting their civic duty and participating in the construction of the republic itself. Citizens are responsible for not only the creation and maintenance of their own government, but for its daily and most banal duties. Citizens are charged with the responsibility of publicly engaging one and other to create a common notion of a public good. While Liberals fear a unitary vision of “the good” would lead to the repression of those who subscribed to alternate views<sup>8</sup>, Republicans argue that a State which recognizes no public good cannot command the loyalty of its citizens, nor can it sustain their participation in its affairs (Sandel, 1996: 6). Social institutions can and must elicit “emotive” responses by citizens because that is the only way to maintain civic action and consistent participation in public affairs (Pinsky, 1996; Taylor, 1996: 49; Miller, 1996; Ignatieff, 1995: 5).

The Republican citizen must construct the public sphere, and in doing so, he or she defines the public good (Taylor, 1989: 169; Arendt, 1994). This follows Aristotle’s definition of a democratic citizen as “a man who shares in the administration of justice and in the holding of office” (Aristotle, 1972: 93), which has been translated into modern political language as “to rule and be ruled” (Ignatieff, 1995: 56). Aristotle considered

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<sup>7</sup> He lists other examples, which for the sake of space, I have omitted.

<sup>8</sup> Barber writes that Liberalism has challenged religious and traditional authority with the consequence of weakening the bonds that “sustain and integrate” (Barber, 1989: 55).

good political action to be the highest form of moral action. While certain acts were proof of the highest moral caliber, Aristotle believed that, regardless of goals or results, participation in politics in itself was something “good.” This notion of politics is in stark contrast to the modern Liberal distrust of politics, and hence, the limitation of the boundaries of the political. Politics is not a ‘necessary evil’ but a ‘moral obligation,’ as well as an ontological imperative—since the human being is a “political animal” (*zoon politikon*). Participation is fundamental, as evidenced by Benjamin Barber’s concept of “Strong Democracy” which “requires unmediated self-government by an engaged citizenry. It requires institutions that will involve citizens at both the neighborhood and the national level in common talk, common decision-making and political judgment, and common action” (Barber, 1984: 261).

Although the Republican tradition has been far less influential in comparative politics than has been the Liberal one, there are those who subscribe to Republican notions of democracy and citizenship. Such scholars oppose minimal versions of democracy, arguing that democracy must entail more than simple procedural and institutional frameworks. They argue that such procedures and institutions may be undermined, if not completely invalidated, by the presence of clientelism, sharp gaps in socio-economic disparities, cultural norms which devalue particular groups, etc. They argue that democracy must make more broad and more deep claims. In a 1993 essay, Guillermo O’Donnell argues that a democratic regime—a system of procedures—must be distinguished from a democratic state—a bureaucratic, legal and ideological institution<sup>9</sup>. A regime may be democratic in that an elected government is in power, but

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<sup>9</sup> O’Donnell writes “[i]t is a mistake to conflate the state with the state apparatus, the public sector, or the

the formal political democracy of that regime will be undermined if the State is not also democratic.

Many scholars who study democratization find polyarchy to be highly disappointing because many Third Wave democracies meet the minimal requirements set out by polyarchy, yet scholars are tentative about labeling them as democratic. Richard Joseph has characterized several regimes in Africa as "Virtual Democracies" because they maintain a democratic façade to legitimize governments which are often quite authoritarian and violent (Joseph, 1998). Terry Lynn Karl has repeatedly warned scholars about the "fallacy of electoralism" which is "the faith that the mere holding of elections will channel political action into peaceful contests among elites, the winners of which are accorded public legitimacy" (Karl, 1995: 73). As opposed to proceduralists and institutionalists, these scholars (substantivists) insist that democracy must make substantive claims which go beyond simply holding elections. Robert Fatton summarizes this position in a recent article on democratization in Haiti. He writes:

A substantive conception of democracy entails a participatory structure of governance where rulers are fully accountable to citizens and where the economic sphere comes under popular control. It must include more than the electoral mechanisms guaranteeing the possibility of regime alteration and the institutional check safe-guarding individual rights from the overpowering reach of the state. It must emphasize civil society and the market to the same norms of democratic accountability (Fatton, 1999: 213).

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aggregation of public bureaucracies. These are unquestionably part of the state, but are not all of it. The state is also, and no less primarily, a set of social relations that establishes a certain order, and ultimately backs it with a centralized coercive guarantee, over a given territory. Many of those relations are formalized in a legal system issued and backed by the state. The legal system is a constitutive dimension of the state and of the order that it establishes and guarantees over a given territory. That order is not an equal, socially impartial order; both under capitalism and bureaucratic socialism it backs, and helps to reproduce, systematically asymmetric power relationships" (O'Donnell, 1999: 135).

A similarly deep concept of democracy is echoed by David Becker who writes "[d]emocracy ...has comparatively little to do with the rule of law or other institutional arrangements. It is fundamentally an idea about societal distribution of power and denotes a society where power is in the hands of the people at large." (Becker, 1999:140). Substantivists point beyond elections and institutions to the contexts in which

elections take place and procedures are institutionalized, to inequalities in society, political practices such as clientelism, and cultural norms which attach status to members of certain groups over others, as leading to hierarchical societies which undermine democracy. Scholars as diverse as Howard Wiarda (1997) and Sonia Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino and Arturo Escobar (1998) have argued that cultural politics in Latin America play a very critical role in limiting and/or impeding democratization. Robert Fatton (1999) and William Robinson (1996) have argued that the current wave of democratization has been very limited because of its juxtaposition to neo-liberal economic programs that have worsened income disparities between citizens and will ultimately erode democracy.

Substantivists recognize that liberalization and, perhaps even, limited democratization has occurred in many countries of the world in the last two decades. But democratization should be understood as an interminable process which no government has completed, and to which all should strive. This understanding of the chronological aspect of democratization differs quite markedly from Schedler's idea of consolidation as regime continuity. Substantivists argue instead for "deepening" democracy by expanding institutional accountability, increasing participation, emphasizing the role of civil society, leveling inequalities in economic distribution, shifting cultural norms which denigrate members of certain groups (von Mettenheim and Malloy, 1998; Chaimers et al. 1997).

Republican citizenship reflects the maximal claims that substantivists make of democracy. As O'Donnell writes "citizenship does not stay within the (narrowly defined, as in most contemporary literature) confines of the political" (O'Donnell, 1999: 136). Instead citizenship extends into political activity, community building and equality of relations within and across societies. Republican citizenship can often be seen in the political and civic activity of individuals and communities in civil society, where individuals and groups attempt to articulate political programs, to build community, and to increase government efficacy. Such citizenship is especially important for the more "marginal" populations who are barred political access and full exercise of citizenship due to low economic status and cultural prejudice.

### **The Nether-Lands: Citizenship in Latin America**

...one of the greatest challenges for Latin American democracies lies in the area of political culture. This encompasses not only beliefs and preferences gathered in public opinion surveys, but also symbolic representations and collective imaginations—in other words, those bits of 'evidence' people do not make explicit because they consider them 'normal' and 'natural'.<sup>10</sup>

Just as Aristotle's citizen of one *polis* may not be a citizen of another, the Republican argument recognizes that what is construed within one political community as the set of rights and responsibilities understood as citizenship may not apply in another. Similarly, in "Justice as Fairness," John Rawls notes his political Liberalism is "securely founded in public political and social attitudes...[that sustain] the good of all persons and associations within a just democratic regime" (Rawls, 1996: 194)<sup>11</sup>. Can democracies

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<sup>10</sup> (Lechner, 1997: 170)

<sup>11</sup> Similarly, Joseph Carens writes "Liberalism, it might be said, emerged with the modern state and

and democratic citizens be crafted outside the communities in which they have been constructed?<sup>12</sup> Many who study Latin America would not answer very positively.<sup>13</sup> This does not mean that democracy is impossible in Latin America<sup>14</sup>, only that attempts to impose a democratic political institutional structure over cultures with strong authoritarian tendencies is likely to produce hybrids and mutations<sup>15</sup> (O'Donnell, 1996; Wiarda, 1997). In other words, what may have the institutional form of democracy may in practice be quite different from the expectations set out by the polyarchic model.

The notion of citizenship is one which is considered to be essentially modern, Anglo-American and European (Turner, 1993: vii). This citizenship, based on the experiences of England, France and the United States of America, is considered to be developed as part of a modern project and as a point of interstice between the nation and the State. Nation, state and citizenship are all concepts whose official histories are associated with "Western" discourse. Bryan Turner, and others, have critiqued the legalism of traditional concepts of citizenship, associated with T.H. Marshall (1963) as ethnocentric, and they argue that while it may be applicable to the history of English citizenship, it may not remain as relevant in other countries. Barry Hindes asserts that Marshall's notion of citizenship is not even accurate within the context of Great Britain (Hindes, 1993). Whether it is essentially, or exclusively, a European and Anglo-

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presupposes it" (1995: 244).

<sup>12</sup> See Giuseppe di Palma (1991).

<sup>13</sup> For example, Roberto Schwarz has argued that democracy, like many other ideas that have come from abroad, arrived in Brazil without the proper historical and institutional background necessary for longevity (1991). Roberto da Matta has similarly argued that when Liberalism arrived in Brazil in the nineteenth century, it entered into a society that was profoundly exclusive (1991).

<sup>14</sup> This is not to say that "democracy"—in a pure and essential sense—exists anywhere.

<sup>15</sup> Dissatisfaction with democracy in Latin America, has led to a wealth of adjectives used to describe the gap between formal elections and informal practices. O'Donnell has written of "delegative democracy" (1994). Caldeira and Holston (1998) have written of "Disjunctive Democracy". Other terms include

American concept, however, is an important distinction. Citizenship is considered an heir of the Magna Carta, the Age of Revolutions, regicide, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the US Declaration of Independence, Constitution and Bill of Rights. Each are moments within a narrative in which authority faced increasing limitations on its arbitrariness, and in which the political class continuously expanded until it reached, in theory, all adults born and naturalized in a specific state. While the citizen (*citoyen*) was a bearer of privilege based on status in pre-Revolutionary France, the modern Western citizen is conceived to be a form of political and legal equality based on contract (Turner, 1993: 5; Parsons: 1971)<sup>16</sup>.

The construction of citizenship in Latin America, in general, and in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, in particular, hardly followed the patterns of England or the United States, although there were numerous attempts to construct citizenship based on the US model in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. It should be noted that the majority of the attempts to open political space were led by elites who hardly expanded universal legal rights, and that government-led efforts to expand the citizen base were often populist measures used to increase the control exercised by the federal government over those very popular sectors. Additionally, the recurrent presence of coups and dictatorships, military or otherwise, often wore away many earlier attempts at constructing citizenship<sup>17</sup>. Citizenship, even when it expanded, however, remained fairly restrictive.

However, in the past two centuries "who" is included within the citizenry has been quite significantly transformed, and so have the rights that have been extended. In the

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"Democraduras", "Dictablandas" (see Collier and Levitsky, 1997).

<sup>16</sup> Other valuable readings in terms of the 'contractualization' of political society can be found in Locke and Rousseau.

Dominican Republic and Brazil, this has meant the abolition of slavery, the inclusion of women into public spaces, lowering the age of majority status, and eliminating literacy requirements for voting. Recent constitutions outline the rights of citizenship in universal language and many barriers that previously excluded different individuals and groups from public spaces have been formally removed. However, a gap exists between the theoretical and discursive articulation of these rights and their actual protection for members of traditionally excluded groups, such as Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, who are disproportionately represented among the victims of police violence.

Paulo Sergio Pinheiro writes that “Brazil, like other Latin American countries, is a society based on exclusion—a democracy without citizenship” (Pinheiro, 1996: 18). After historical and empirical research on (the possibility of) democratic citizenship for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, I am convinced that neither the Liberal nor the Republican citizenship is effectively institutionalized<sup>18</sup>. There is neither the profound sense of community that compels citizens to participate in the life of the *polis* nor is there an effective commitment on the part of government to protect the rights of all of its citizens. In fact, as will be argued in chapter 6, it seems that Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians suffer from profound political anomie. While this may resemble libertarian views of citizenship there are two critical differences. First, libertarian disengagement from politics is voluntary. Libertarians choose not to involve themselves in politics, as opposed to the situation for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians who are alienated from politics. This alienation is due to: discourses which negate their political agency and self-

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<sup>17</sup> See chapters 2 and 3 for a more deep analysis.

<sup>18</sup> See chapters 4 and 5 for examinations of Liberal and Republican notions of citizenship in the two countries.

worth; static socio-economic conditions which promote a sort of fatalism and inertia; and alienation from the sources of political power, which are not to be found in institutions but in clienteles. Second, libertarian citizenship in the United States, for example, is protected by guarantees of individual rights. Libertarians can thus disengage from political activity without fear that their personal rights or property will be encroached upon. Such a luxury does not exist for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians where either the State cannot, or will not, make any guarantees to ensure their most basic individual rights.

The result leads to a sort of “nether” citizen, neither a community member nor an individual, neither one born into a virtuous community nor someone who associates based on free choice, self-reflection and free affectivities. I refer to this situation as the “Privatization of Citizenship.”<sup>19</sup> a phenomenon which would probably be accepted by neither Liberals nor Republicans. There is even the question as to whether this should even be considered a form of citizenship. It is worth briefly explaining what is meant by this term, and, for that matter, why I use the word “privatization.” The “privatization of citizenship” refers to three particular privatizations<sup>20</sup>.

Citizenship becomes ‘private’ because the public and political—regardless of whether one uses the Liberal or Republicans definition of these terms—are perceived to

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<sup>19</sup> See chapter 6 for more on this theme.

<sup>20</sup> It should not be considered coincidental that this phenomenon has coincided with the most sweeping effort towards privatization in both the contemporary world, and in the history of Latin America. Norbert Lechner writes “...economic privatization generates a privatization of behavior. New ways of life based on individualist strategies emerge. They are rational and creative in adapting to competitive relationships. But they do not assume collective commitments. On the contrary, they weaken the public sphere and hence the shared experienced, the affective bonds and the practical knowledge upon which any institutional order rests” (1997: 176). As will be shown consistently throughout this dissertation, Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians have historically tended towards, and continue to pursue, individualist solutions, rather than collective action. This has been exacerbated during the current era of neo-liberal hegemony.

be the distant realms of a foreign and isolated group. Power is private and so the negotiations and exercises of it are private, and exclude the immense majority from observation and vigilance, to speak nothing of participation. Citizenship is also 'private' in the sense that Latin American economies and governments have all been, to some extent, privatized in the last decade or two. Services that have traditionally been provided to the lower classes by the federal government have been decentralized to either local governments and/or Non-Governmental Organizations. While this has allowed for some simple and limited efforts at advocacy for rights and community building, these organizations lack reliable and consistent resources, as well as the ability to coordinate their activities with larger entities (Walzer, 1999: 63-4).

Finally, citizenship is 'privatized' in that the distinction of being a citizen, of membership in a community of rights bearing individuals is one based on private resources, not on birth or naturalization. Roberto da Matta has written that in Latin America there are no citizens, only sub-citizens and super-citizens (1991). There is little notion of rights bearing being applicable to a universal category, since the idea of rights, and citizenship in general, is linked to the idea of status. Unlike the contractarian notion of 'bearers of equal status' suggested by Parsons, the status implied by Latin American citizenship has tended to be a means of exclusion, rather than inclusion. Thus, those who bear marks of social status might be considered super-citizens, while the majority of poor, semi-literate people could very well be classified sub-citizens. Rights are reasonably guaranteed, if not overstated, for the wealthy and are often ignored or violated for the poor. As a result, the poor, marginalized, Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian populations seek "status," to the extent that it may be available, through individual

negotiations of their identity, such as through conspicuous consumption and through "whitening."

### Visions of Race<sup>21</sup>: Latin America and Miscegenation

We must keep in mind the essential *regionality* of significations (and categories) and refrain from giving in to temptations of universalization or naïve unification<sup>22</sup>.

This examination of "race" in Latin America begins with the caveat that it is entirely misleading to assume that "race" has one particular meaning cutting across all societies and historical epochs. Recognizing this, the analysis of race contained in this essay will focus on how it is conceived in Latin America, and particularly in the Dominican Republic and Brazil. The amount of literature on race based on how race has been conceptualized within the social imaginary of Anglo-American or northern European contexts is rich and abundant. But race is imagined in these contexts within a framework where racial identities are clearly defined, and prejudice against demographic minorities is based on exclusion on the basis of color. The racial situations in the Dominican Republic and Brazil are undoubtedly different, even if Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians suffer similar conditions of relative impoverishment, and limited educational and occupational opportunities. However, it seems impossible to discuss race in Latin America without the constant implicit, if not explicit, reference to the system of race relations which pervades in Anglo-American and northern European countries, and most obviously the US.

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<sup>21</sup> The concepts of race considered will be of Whites, Mulattos, and Blacks. The racial conditions of natives in Brazil, nor the presence of Asians and Arabs in the two countries will be examined in this book.

<sup>22</sup> (Castoriadis, 1988:341).

Anthony Marx, in a comparison of race in the United States of America, South Africa and Brazil, makes an interesting note of differences between German and French notions of citizenship and the racial classification systems of the US and South Africa, and Brazil, respectively (Marx, 1998: 16). Following the traditional distinction between German citizenship as being biological, racial, and exclusive (*gesellschaft*) with the French ethnic, cultural and inclusive citizenship (*gemeinschaft*) (Brubaker, 1992), Marx argues that while in Anglo and Dutch colonies, integration of blacks within the nation was not possible due to "white nationalism" (1998: 2), Latin American race relations are closer to the French model. These distinctions are heuristic and should not be extended to the extreme, which is that Anglo and Dutch colonies were rigidly racist, and that Latin American colonies were utopian and accepting. The distinction, however, should neither be ignored.

The differences between cultural and racial notions of identity recall those between Iberian and Western European patterns of race relations identified by Harry Hoetink in his 1967 work *Race Relations in the Caribbean: Two Variants*. In it, Hoetink argues that Iberian colonies developed milder forms of race relations than their European counterparts (Hoetink, 1970: 115-6). Race relations are rendered more mild because Iberian colonies demonstrated high levels of miscegenation, defined "white" as somewhat "brownier" than the Anglo and Dutch colonies, and because light-skinned mulattos could identify as white, with little resistance from society. Hoetink writes:

the 'somatic distance' between white and colored is smaller in [Iberian colonies than in Western ones]... since a part of those who 'biologically' are colored fall within the margin of the prevailing white somatic norm image. Thus, a continuous absorption *by marriage* of coloreds into the

'white' group occurs, provided the former are somatically, and also economically, acceptable to the latter (1970: 116).

This does not mean that mulattos were accepted by white elites without reservations, or that Africans in Iberian colonies were treated better than the Africans living in English and Dutch settlements in the Americas. However, their situation was different.

Discourses of race in the Dominican Republic and Brazil are hardly Manichean,<sup>23</sup> since racial difference is not an issue of demographic minority status. *Indios*,<sup>24</sup> *morenos* and *pardos*, when taken together, in the Dominican Republic constitute an overwhelming majority of the population, and *morenos* and *pretos*, when considered together, in Brazil constitute a near majority. This allows for significant flexibility in terms of individual negotiation of racial identity, although, race is not completely flexible, since "blackness" is regarded as something less privileged than "whiteness," even though it is a relative category. Thus, although mobility is possible, in critical areas, such as the economy and juridical rights, it is very limited for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

Recognizing the uniqueness of racial significations in the two countries, this essay will try to examine what is recognized as racial identity within each country, and how members of a marginalized 'racial' community act, interact and react to conditions that are often adverse to their exercise of citizenship. While there are significant differences within the discourses of "blackness" and Afro identity in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, there are considerable similarities in terms of ascription as well as ontology. "Blackness," in both countries, is part of a discourse which privileges: whiteness, ethnic

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<sup>23</sup> As Anglo-American perceptions of race tend to be.

<sup>24</sup> The term "Indio" is a Dominican term which refers to light-skinned Dominicans. It is not used, here, to refer to people of native ancestry.

blanching, European language and religions<sup>25</sup>, modernization, education, urbanization, and wealth. The same discourse gives a subordinate value to, or simply ignores the presence of: blackness, ethnic identities outside of the national one, non-official languages and religions which are associated with underdevelopment<sup>26</sup>, rural life, illiteracy, and poverty. The major difference between the ascriptive accounts of *negritud/e* in the two countries is that in the Dominican Republic *negritud* takes a particularly negative meaning because of its association with Haiti. The actual association of *negritud* with a culturally and physically different group, even if these differences are not always apparent, allows racist meanings for *negritud* to become more uniform and concrete.

As early as the 1930s, anthropological studies of race in Latin America, often in Brazil, indicated that there was a clear difference between race relations in Latin America and Anglo-America (Freyre, 1934; Tanenbaum: 1946). Prior to this there was little systematic study of race, outside of slavery, in Latin America. There were some late 19<sup>th</sup> century musings on race in literature and philosophy, which were certainly influential, however there were few attempts to address the political, social and economic issues surrounding race. Prior to this, the idea of race was often subsumed into studies of slavery, despite the fact that many blacks and mulattos and slaves were born free and/or

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<sup>25</sup> Christianity, particularly Catholicism, is considered a European religion, probably due to its colonial legacy.

<sup>26</sup> For example, while English, French, and German (more so in Brazil) are not official languages they are considered to be languages that raise the individual's status: in the case of an Afro-Dominican or Afro-Brazilian, fluency in English would be a sign of education, culture, and wealth which would significantly improve the individual's status within the "relational universe of citizenship" (See da Matta, 1991). For similar reasons, Protestantism, while not particularly popular amongst faithful Catholics, is considered a legitimate religion, as opposed to Afro-inspired spiritist religions.

received their freedom at some point during their lifetime. However, little official and scholarly attention was given to these free Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

Livio Sansone characterizes the structure of 'Latin American' racial relations quite accurately, writing:

[r]ace relations in Latin America can be characterized by a high degree of miscegenation, a syncretic tradition in the countryside of religion and popular culture, a continuum of color and a hegemonic somatic norm that has historically located *negro* and indian phenotypes on a scale more inferior under the notion of 'good appearance'... this type of relations has offered space to manipulate ethnic identity as much as it tends to not foment ethnic mobilization. (Sansone in Hasenbalg, 1996b: 235)

What is clear from this is that miscegenation has allowed individuals to be able to negotiate their racial identity, while group identification has been quite inflexible. Thus, while the individual Afro-Dominican or Afro-Brazilian could become educated, hold a prestigious job, speak French or English, and therefore shed the tag "*negro*" in most contexts, the definition of the discourse of what it means to be "*negro*" has remained mired in social prejudices.

The incidence of miscegenation has been noted by many scholars as being critical to the construction of a much more fluid form of racial identity than that which took root in the British and Dutch possessions in the New World (Freyre, 1934; Hoetink, 1970). Marvin Harris, for example writes "the most important aspect of interracial relations...in Latin America from the abolition of slavery is the absence of neatly defined racial groups" (Harris, 1967: 86). Gilberto Freyre, as well as many other authors and commentators on Latin America, noted the mixture of races which seemed to indicate an absence of racial consciousness and prejudice (1934; also see Tannenbaum, 1946). While

racial mixture certainly did not mean an equality of position amongst the hierarchical web of power relations in colonial Latin America, something Freyre clearly states, miscegenation did lead to a particular form of racial identification, quite different from that which occurred in the British and Dutch colonies: a system that is far less deterministic, though not necessarily any more idyllic (Hoetink, 1967; Skidmore, 1994).

### **Race in the Dominican Republic and Brazil**

...Africans who had not succumbed to the revolutionary propaganda... and who felt too proud of the social superiority over their counterparts in the French Zone ...to follow the examples of the Haitians; finally, 73,000 mulattoes who began by calling themselves white and, in the absence of any injurious objections, ended by considering themselves such.<sup>27</sup>

Perhaps nowhere else is the meeting, intercommunication, and harmonious fusion of diverse or, even, antagonistic traditions occurring in so liberal a way as it is in Brazil. Meanwhile the vacuum between the two extremes is still enormous ... but in any event, the Brazilian regime cannot be accused of rigidity... it is one of the most democratic, flexible, and plastic regimes to be found anywhere<sup>28</sup>.

Nationality is generally considered to be something that is largely 'imagined' and is propagated through mythical histories rather than an immutable essence (Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1992). Some scholars argue that not only was nationality imagined, but there was a deliberate program through which the idea of a nation, and belonging to it, were constructed and imposed onto a people (Hobsbawm, 1982; Marx, 1998; Spanakos, 1999b). The idea that racism does not exist in Latin America, and particularly the Dominican Republic and Brazil, is often considered to be a result of hegemonic elite strategies which attempted to define the nation as essentially mestizo/mulatto (Hanchard,

<sup>27</sup> Comments following the Haitian Revolution of G. d'Alaux, the French Council in Haiti in 1845 (Hoetink, 1970: 115).

<sup>28</sup> (Freyre, 1946: 77-8)

1994; Safá, 1998). Such ideas of nationality, like that suggested by the work of Freyre, identify the relative marginal position of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians to be a result of the heritage of slavery, lack of development, poverty, lower levels of literacy and more limited opportunities, rather than clear and racial discrimination.

The idea that race is subsumed to class in Latin America (Marx, 1998: 15) is clear in the common declarations of Dominicans and Brazilians that there is an absence of racial tensions and identities in the two countries<sup>29</sup>. In the Dominican Republic, the definition of *Dominicanidad* (Dominicanness) has been constructed in terms of ethnic and religious elements, and has been contrasted to *Haitianidad* (Haitianness) on racial and ethnic grounds. In Brazil, a more complicated doctrine was articulated which stated that racial tensions did not exist in Brazil, and as a result Brazil represented something of a "racial democracy." In both cases, defenders of the position that racism does not exist in the two countries argue that extensive miscegenation makes it impossible for anyone to be a racist since every Dominican and Brazilian has a Afro relative, in-law, spouse, or friend.

Criticism of the marginalization of Haitians in the Dominican has recently allowed the subject of a Dominican form of racism to surface. Yet studies of race tend to focus only on Haitians and Haitian Dominicans, due to the lack of previous studies of race and the belief that racism refers to Haitians, and not Dominicans. Criticism of the idea of "racial democracy" in Brazil has a much longer history. Among the more valuable contributions, Carlos Hasenbalg argues that "the social perception of race

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<sup>29</sup> Although many people, especially educated and *blanco/branco*, and particularly in Brazil, acknowledge that there is racism in their society. However, racial tensions are not perceived, nor are racial identities clear and immutable. This will be examined in greater depth in chapter 4 and 5.

according to a continuum of shades of color, has led to a fragmentation of racial identities" (Hasenbalg: 1996a: 165). The fragmentation of identities has limited opportunities for political activity and solidarity among Afro-Brazilians, thereby weakening their political agency and ability to mobilize (Hanchard, 1994). While research on race in the Dominican Republic remains nascent, and is primarily impressionistic and discursive, there exists in Brazil ample research, including very complete behavioral research, which attempts to prove that racial democracy is a myth (Hasenbalg, 1979; Hasenbalg and Silva, 1992; Fernandes, 1969). It should be noted that the idea that racial tensions do not exist in either of the two countries is something that has been accepted by a great majority of the population of the Dominican Republic and Brazil, especially Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, and the effect of academic challenges to such discourse has been very limited in terms of "conscientizing" the masses (Spanakos, 1999a).

Who are the Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Dominicans in such a mestizo population? In attempting to address this question it is important to remember that identification reflects both individual and societal perception. One may identify oneself as being "X," and yet one may be identified by society as "Y." Thus, a person may identify as *mulata*, but may be seen by society as being *negra*, or vice-versa. However, the complexity of racial relations in the two countries cannot be collapsed into so simple a scheme, because in a room of *negros/pretos* one may consider oneself *morena* (brown), while the *negros/pretos* may consider the same person *india* or *branca*, and the same person in a room of *blancos/brancos* may be considered *morena* or *negra/preta*. Because the discourse of negritude is so linked to a specific discourse of political, social and

economic inferiority within a society which distinguishes based on educational achievement, class status, appearance, etc, the identification of the racial identity of an individual changes as one achieves values which are more typically associated with Euro-Dominicans and Euro-Brazilians.

A dark-skinned educated man may very well be recognized by Dominican and Brazilian society as *blanco/branco*, *indio*<sup>30</sup>, *quasi blanco/quase branco* when he is capable of showing the signs—education, wealth, job, etc—that prove his status. The same individual when dressed simply and walking in a poor neighborhood may very well be harassed, and even beaten, by police officers. When it is clear that the police are dealing with an educated person, they will apologize and admit that they “mistook” the Afro-Dominican or Afro-Brazilian for someone else. Very often, the educated Afro-Dominican or Afro-Brazilian feels both anger and a sort of humiliation for the “confusion.” It is important to point out that in this case, the police confused the educated man with a “common” *negro*. This suggests that prejudicial policing is often considered “acceptable,” or at least justifiable, as long as the police read the signs of social “inferiority” properly (Spanakos, forthcoming a).

Since negritude is understood in terms of a color continuum, and not as a polar opposite of European identity, people identify themselves and are identified by society in a fluid way. Due to the negative connotations associated with negritude in the two countries, few Dominicans or Brazilians, until fairly recently, have identified themselves as *negro*. Additionally, the idea of a continuum of color rather than fixed racial categories triggered various strategies of negotiation of identity, such as dying and

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<sup>30</sup> “Indio” in the Dominican sense, since in Brazil it refers to people of Indigenous heritage.

straightening hair, use of facial powder, marrying someone lighter skinned, and more recently, plastic surgery, all of which allows one to move farther away from the extreme position of "blackness."

Who then are Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians? The categories chosen here refer to peoples who either identify themselves, or within certain, or perhaps all, contexts will be recognized by society as being, either *indio* (DR), *moreno*, *mulato*, *pardo*, *prieto/preto*, or *negro*. This does not mean that conditions are uniform for all of the sub-groups, however, Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians are all affected, to varying degrees, by similar discourses which denigrate "blackness," give preference to miscegenation, and praise "whiteness." Afro identity is conceived here as both racial and ethnic<sup>31</sup>. Using a purely ethnic and cultural definition could theoretically qualify many, if not all, light skinned Dominicans and Brazilians as Afro. However, unless they identify as Afro, or society could identify them as Afro, they will not be considered as such<sup>32</sup>. Similarly, the category Euro could include many dark-skinned people due to its ethnic component. Once again, this will depend on both individual and societal identification.

It is important to note that in identifying themselves, many Dominicans and Brazilians of varying racial and ethnic backgrounds will define themselves exclusively as Dominican and Brazilian, respectively. Clearly this speaks of a certain preeminence of national identity and solidarity, over a racial one, or any other identity for that matter.

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<sup>31</sup> "In Brazil blackness is not a racial category fixed in biological difference, but both a racial and ethnic identity that is based either on the management of black physical appearance, in association with status, or on the use of cultural traits associated with Afro-Brazilian traditions (particularly in religion, music, and cuisine), or a combination of these two aspects" (Sansone, 1997: 458)

<sup>32</sup> Dark-skinned northeasterners in Brazil who neither identify themselves, nor are identified by society as Afro-Brazilian will not be considered, even if their marginal socio-economic position is similar to Afro-Brazilians.

However, this does not mean that the same person who says she is Dominican or Brazilian, and not Afro, *negra*, etc, does not have the nickname "*morena*" ("brown"), does not have a sister "*clarita/ clarinha*" ("little light one"), does not refer to the doorman as the "*negrón/ negão*" ("big black"), etc. Therefore consciousness of color, particularly the color of others, is high even while racial identification, both individual and societal, is somewhat ambiguous, and racial consciousness, again individual and societal, is low.

While the population of both countries are the result of centuries of miscegenation, long histories of slave labor, policies which encouraged European immigration, and racial identification is weak and conceived in terms of a color continuum, rather than as an either/or situation, there is one clear difference. The absolute definition of "blackness" tends to represent all sorts of societal ills and underdevelopment in both countries, but only in the Dominican Republic does such an abstraction of negritude gain a specific name, that of Haiti. Haiti is a very important symbol which has been exploited by many a Dominican politician who has focused on the difference between "mulatto" Dominicans and the neighboring "*negros*" in Haiti<sup>33</sup>. The result of the presence of Haiti in the conceptualization of race, and nationality, cannot be overestimated.

There is an expression that "in the Dominican Republic, only the Haitian is Black." Such a statement is hard to accept for students of racial politics, particularly from the US<sup>34</sup>, yet the statement makes sense when one considers exactly what it means to be

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<sup>33</sup> More on the role of Haiti in the formation of national identity will be discussed in chapters 2 and 3.

<sup>34</sup> During several lectures on "Race in the Dominican Republic," the author found US students, particularly black students from the US confused and angered by Dominican conceptions of race. Assuming that their vision of racial identification was correct they criticized Dominicans for not recognizing who they really are.

*negro* and Haitian in the Dominican Republic. One of the principal ideologues of national identity during the Trujillo dictatorship, Manuel Arturo Peña Batlle, writes in one historical essay "we [Dominicans] should not forget that this is a Hispanic, Christian, and Catholic nation, that we are Dominicans, emerged pure and homogenous" (1943, 12). The purity of the birth of the Dominican nation was essential to establish because Peña Batlle wanted to make clear that while the histories of the two countries that occupy the island of Hispaniola are related, the Dominican people are genetically and culturally different. It was also essential because *Hispanidad* (Hispanicness) identified Dominicans as Europeans living within the New World, whereas the Haitians were "Africans" living in the New World.

The prejudicial distinctions can be seen more clearly in Joaquín Balaguer's *The Dominican Reality* (*La realidad dominicana*). In it Balaguer explains that Dominicans have to be wary of the "Haitian threat," the threat that Haitians will leave their side of the island and degenerate the purity of the *Hispanidad* of Dominican culture and blood (Balaguer, 1947). In the revised version of this text, published as *The Island Upside Down* (*La isla al revés*), Balaguer writes that Haitians have "barbaric customs," including that they have a prominent place for "promiscuity" and "incest" in their culture, that they reproduce like vegetables and that they, "the Ethiopian race," are "naturally indolent" (Balaguer, 1987: 40, 37, 52). These characterizations are not the mere jingoistic rantings of one of the country's most ardent nationalists. Balaguer occupied many posts during the three decade Trujillo dictatorship, including secretary of education, and he spent more than twenty years as president of the republic after the fall of Trujillo.

In theory, there is a clear racial distinction made between Dominicans and Haitians, the former of mixed heritage, but of European culture, and the latter *negro* of African culture. However, in practice these differences are harder to maintain, particularly since much of the discourse used to describe, and denigrate, the Haitian in the Dominican Republic is related to indices of poverty, levels of development, non-Christian religion, rural culture, and, of course, darker skin and less mixed physical features. The "problem" of the Afro-Dominican is that s/he often demonstrates the type of racial and ethnic qualities ascribed to the Haitian. Thus, although "in the Dominican Republic, only the Haitian is *negro*," so are those who are perceived to be Haitian, or who bear the signs that are associated with Haitian identity and not Dominican identity, such as dark-skin, illiteracy, or the religious practices of Santería, Gagá and Vodú.

At the same time, interracial relations and marriage are not uncommon in the Dominican Republic. It is even difficult to call such relationships interracial, since such differences are often seen to be differences in shading, rather than racial category. There is also, as in Brazil, an absolute worship of Afro aesthetics and a very high amount of consumption of Afro cultural production. Whether it be merengue, rap, hip-hop, reggae—additionally in Brazil, *samba*, *axe*, *pagode*—the Afro woman, particularly the *mulata*, and Afro culture are almost universally appreciated, even if high brow culture stereotypes and demeans them.

There is a simultaneous pride of Afro beauty and culture, particularly the objectification of women, while maintaining an understanding of very unequal relations of power among different racial, or even gender, groups. For example, in both countries an adage explains that you marry a white woman, choose a *mulata* for a lover, and have a

black woman as a domestic servant<sup>35</sup>. In a similar vein, television commercials for the world famous "Plataforma" show in Rio de Janeiro advertise proudly that they have the most beautiful *mulatas*. Not one of their barely clothed dancers is *branca*. Also, the show consists of *samba*, *pagode*, barely clothed women, men and women wearing costumes for carnival, and of several men performing *capoeira*<sup>36</sup>. The fact that this show designed for tourists does not have any performers who are Euro-Brazilian suggests that there is quite a significant amount of pride in Afro-Brazilian contributions to Brazilian identity and popular culture. And this certainly is the case, particularly since such contributions are more readily recognized nowadays than in the past<sup>37</sup>.

However, the pride that Brazilians may demonstrate for Afro-Brazilian contributions is also tied to a certain amount of shame. While *mulatas* are considered national symbols of beauty, it would be hasty to say that negritude is something that is valued in Brazil. A recent survey of primary school students in Brazil makes this painfully clear. When shown "white" and "black" figures, students overwhelmingly identified the "black" figure as "stupid" (83%), "ugly" (85) and only 6% recognized the "black" figure as "wealthy," compared with 17%, 14% and 94% respectively for the "white figure" (Hanchard, 1994: 61). In another survey, when asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "A good *Negro* is a *negro* one with a *branca* (white)

<sup>35</sup> Obviously, focusing on the position of women sets off all sorts of feminist bells about the objectification of women by cultures in which national identity was constructed by adopting *machista* narratives. It is important to note that there is no breakdown of the "use-value" of white, brown and black men in the two countries exists, or at least, there is no adage that refers to this.

<sup>36</sup> Capoeira is a form of dance/martial art which has its roots in Angola. During colonial times, it is said, that slaves were able to practice this form of martial art by disguising it as a dance. In the last decade, capoeira has moved from being something practiced mostly by the poor Afro-Brazilians in the Northeast of Brazil, to being a martial art consumed by Brazilians of all economic and racial backgrounds. The stigma that it once held has slowly disappeared, although not completely.

<sup>37</sup> See (Guillermo-Prieto, 1990).

soul," 35% agreed completely, while 12% agreed partially. Interestingly enough, when broken down by racial category, the numbers were almost identical (35% and 11% for *brancos*, 36% and 11% for *mulatos*, and 36% and 12% for *pretos*, Datafolha, 1995: 129).

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians are disproportionately present among the poor, illiterate, ghetto and prison populations, and underrepresented among the educated, wealthy and middle classes. The next part of this book, which addresses the historic evolution of citizenship, the nation-state and racial identity in the two countries, will give some clues as to why Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians occupy so marginal a position. The third and fourth parts of this will book will examine contemporary issues of citizenship for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

## PART II

### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

The racial system, formed by classificatory terminology of color and by "rules" of the system of race relations, is historically determined and, at the same time, reformulated in everyday race relations<sup>1</sup>.

The fundamental ideas considered in this book—citizenship, race and democracy—are all concepts which can be considered "essentially contested." These concepts are considered to be socially constructed, that is, shaped and patterned by social, political and economic conditions, rather than immutable and objective realities. Following Anthony Marx (1998), this book argues that the construction of socio-political identities and behavior is molded over time with the State assuming a particularly significant role in the interpretation of citizenship, race and democracy.

This next section (chapters 2 and 3) will examine dynamics and continuities in the construction of the State and its relation to citizenship, as well as the definition of racial identity and exclusion/inclusion. While at no point in the history of either country did Afro-Dominicans or Afro-Brazilians occupy the highest position in a hierarchical society, Dominican and Brazilian social hierarchies were rarely rigidly defined along racial lines. Lighter skin color, education and more European physical features tended to correspond to social ascendance for people of mixed blood, although ascendance did not unequivocally necessitate acceptance and equality. During certain periods and in certain regions, social mobility, political agency and the ambiguity of racial identity were more considerable, while at others they were quite minimal.

A brief note on method is necessary. In order to make more clear each country's unique system in which race and citizenship has been conceived, few comparisons will be

the beginning of the twentieth centuries in both countries. Increased opening to the European and Anglo-American world also meant increased awareness of how Dominican and Brazilian identity would be perceived by foreigners, particularly "white" ones. This led to the creation of foreign services and other public and private institutions which were "white" and intensely exclusive, especially in Brazil.

Chapter 3 follows the construction of national identity as the era of mass politics increased the possibility for the enfranchisement of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. The possibility was real considering that the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, who ruled for 31 years (1930-61), was a mulatto of very humble origins, and Getulio Vargas (1930-45, and 1950-54), the most significant politician of the era in Brazil, was especially sympathetic to Afro-Brazilian causes. Within both countries a notion of integration and assimilation was presented as being necessary for national self-realization and, later, for national security. The nations were presented as ethnically and culturally homogenous, although with an ethnically diverse past. No Dominican nor Brazilian could be the victim of racism because there were no "races" in the two countries due to centuries of miscegenation. This unity was reinforced in the Dominican Republic by highlighting the 'exteriority' and difference of the Haitian.

Other authoritarian governments clung to the notion of a national identity based on unity which systematically denied the claims of Afro-Dominicans and, especially, Afro-Brazilians who challenged national rhetoric. In the late 1970s and throughout the democratization during the 1980s, Afro-Brazilian activity was important in not only challenging ideas about national (such as the idea of racial democracy), but also in terms of expanding the notion of citizenship. Afro-Dominican activity also was able to contest

## CHAPTER 2

### RACE AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1492-1930) AND BRAZIL (1500-1930)

This chapter will provide a brief historical survey of political and racial identity in the Dominican Republic and Brazil between the arrival of European ships upon the shores of the Caribbean and South America and the modern, authoritarian, state-building efforts that began in 1930. Alternating between countries, each section will review relevant events and relationships during different eras in the two countries, with the intention of highlighting the uniqueness of the construction of race and citizenship in both countries.

Although the cases differ significantly, three common elements appear fairly consistently throughout this chapter. The first is that in both countries authority was located within private and paternalistic relationships and power was considered to be personal rather than institutional. This personal authority was legitimized by a hierarchical socio-political system that treated certain people as superior and others as inferior. The second is the role of political culture in setting a system of values and norms which conditions what individuals believe, accept and are willing to challenge. The political culture of these two countries, has not always been unequivocally authoritarian, and at various points, political institutions, the Crown, the government, and the legal system, have been able to force restraint on the powerful at various points. Yet, the historical tendency in the Dominican Republic and Brazil has been for institutions to limit the excesses of the powerful, rather than to serve as the proper channels through

which polities are articulated, deliberated and legislated. Finally, it will be emphasized that racial identification and the meaning attached to race are equivocal. While slavery produced highly unequal relations and was certainly cruel, masters often assumed a very paternal and, at times, protective role over slaves. Additionally, although the history of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians is affected by the history of slavery, it is not solely determined by slavery. In both countries, again varying over time, large numbers of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians were born free and/or were manumitted, and many of the countries' most important historical figures were of African descent. The large-scale miscegenation that took place in both countries also led to definitions of "white" and "black" which differed quite a bit from those in the Anglo-American colonies.

### **Iberia and Africa**

By the end of the fifteenth century, when Spanish and Portuguese explorers charted the coasts of the Western hemisphere, the Iberian governments had already had considerable contact with various African tribes and peoples. Not all of this contact resulted in the enslavement of the latter peoples; in fact, during the seven centuries of Moorish domination of Iberia, people from northern Africa governed the peninsula. Independence from the Moors led to the creation of the nation-states of Portugal in 1147 and Spain in 1492. Removing Moorish dominance was critical to the rudimentary formation of national identity, which, since it was a response to the Muslim Moors, made religious identity fundamental. Racial criteria, since the Moors were darker and from Northern Africa, was also involved.

The union of religious and national identification not only made problematic the lives of various Muslims living in Iberia, but also of Jewish people, who similarly had been in Iberia for centuries. Both Iberian countries defined their populations on the basis of the "purity of blood" which referred to Christian lineage,<sup>1</sup> although distinctions, including racial ones, between peoples were already assimilated into Iberian culture. Scholars differ as to the racial content of "pure" blood, since it connoted both religious and racial identity. Dominican historian Hugo Tolentino Dipp argues that "it should be made very clear that the question of the purity of blood in Spain was not based on ideas of racial difference and inferiority." He notes that those who were of unpure blood were "Jews, Moors, Africans, [and] mestizos," and therefore "purity" was not a "racial" distinction (Dipp, 1992: 105, 101-2). From a slightly different perspective, Stuart Schwartz notes that idea of pure blood was used in sixteenth century Portugal to "distinguish those persons who were untainted by racial or religious deviance." Purity, he writes, was used for "the ideal white, Old Christian Portuguese, untainted by the infected races, as the expression went, of 'moor, mulatto, negro or Jew'" (Schwartz, 1989: 248).

The fifteenth century was something of a golden age for Portugal. It became clear that to expand would mean either conquering Spain, which was highly unlikely, or braving the Atlantic ocean. The value of maritime activity was increased by the vast wealth that was believed to exist in Asia and Africa. Between 1415 and 1498, Portuguese explorers<sup>2</sup> conquered lands and set up trade posts along the eastern African coast, in the

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<sup>1</sup> The term "purity of blood" would later be used in the colonies for distinguishing between people of different races and cultures.

<sup>2</sup> The "Portuguese" and "Spanish" explorers were not necessarily Portuguese nor Spanish. At times, Spanish men sailed for the Portuguese, and vice versa. Other explorers were Italian. As for Columbus, many different groups have claimed him as one of their own.

southwestern coast of Africa, and in Asia. Spain also entered into the fray, challenging Portugal for the possession of Ceuta, a small but important port in northern Africa, and although Portuguese explorers were able to “uncover” much more territory in the fifteenth century, the Spanish explorers were the first to reach the Americas.

Before examining the “encounter” between the Europeans and the natives, it is worth examining the Old World. Columbus set sail the same year that Ferdinand and Isabel unified the Spanish crown, which was also the year that the Moors were expelled from Spain. The Moors had been removed from Lisbon some three centuries earlier. The independence of the Iberian countries coincided with the unification of the distinct provinces within the Iberian territory. This is especially true of Spain where the marriage of Isabel of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon united two of the most powerful Spanish principalities. The construction of national identity and unity during this period, following the anti-Moorish sentiment of the Reconquest, revolved around the Christianization of Spain and Portugal, and inquisitions into the lives of those who did not accept the Faith. The institution of the Inquisition was much more fierce in Spain than in Portugal, where territorial boundaries were newer, and where religion was more “inextricably” linked to nationality (Burns, 1980: 36; Freyre, 1933, preface).

Black Africans were no novelty in Iberia in this period. They had been there since the Moorish occupation, and they did not all serve as slaves. Additionally, slavery was not a condition that was exclusive to the black Africans. As late as 1514, the Portuguese *Ordenações Manuelinas* refer to the treatment of white, Moorish and black slaves (Schwartz, 1989: 251). Similarly, the slaves in Spain were “blacks, Moors, Jews, and even Spaniards” (Dipp, 1992: 163). However, as the Atlantic slave trade—which the

Portuguese initiated in the 1440s<sup>3</sup>—grew, slavery became more and more associated with color of skin and place of birth (Eakin, 1998: 18).

Slaves were predominantly domestic laborers in Iberia, and were generally allowed a certain amount of freedom to maintain their customs and religious practices.<sup>4</sup> Dipp observes that the relatively mild form of domestic slavery for Africans continued into the early colonial years in the Dominican Republic (Dipp, 1992: 166). In the new found colonies, such as the previously uninhabited Madeira Island, however, the Portuguese began to use slaves as a primary source of labor in the production of sugar. Sugar production became increasingly important and profitable after 1453 with the fall of the Byzantine Empire whose sugar production in Cyprus and Crete had been dominant in Europe (Cambeira, 1997: 95). By 1493, the eighty sugar *engenhos* (plantations) in Madeira were owned predominantly by Genovese and Jewish merchants who relied on the labor of slaves who were African, mulatto and natives of the Canary Islands (Schwartz, 1989: 8-9). This was only the beginning of the plantation system that would profoundly affect the lives of many of the 9.5 million African captives brought to the Western Hemisphere as slaves, with the largest number going to Brazil.

The slave trade would grow to previously unknown levels during the next three centuries. That is not deny to the ancient roots of the practice, since neither the virtuous republic of Rome nor the democracy of which Pericles boasted were ignorant of slave

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<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that African slaves had been introduced to Europe through the Muslim caravans, and much of the initial slave trade of the Portuguese involved selling African slaves to other Africans, in exchange for gold (Klein, 1986: 14).

<sup>4</sup> This is similar to the early forms of slavery in the Dominican Republic and Brazil. Carlos Esteban Deive writes that the domestic slaves at the beginning of the sixteenth century in the Dominican Republic were "treated like members of the families" and they were "even allowed to conserve their customs" (Deive, 1989: 20). Later this changed as African slaves were increasingly used in the mining industry and in the plantations (*ingenios/engenhos*).

labor or laws that systematically denied free status to large parts of the population<sup>5</sup>. Similarly, slavery was an institution which was quite well established in various parts of Africa before the birth of the Atlantic slave trade. Katia Queroz Mattoso estimates that anywhere between 30 and 50 percent of the population of the region of Sahel, a region in Africa, was enslaved (Mattoso, 1994: 15). Slavery was not limited to this region, as it was practiced also in Benin and Sudan, if not in other areas. According to Mattoso, slaves in Africa were 'integrated' into a family and could not be sold which seems to suggest a paternal, rather than exclusively commercial, type of slavery.

The presence of the Portuguese, and later the Dutch, increased the slave trade in Africa, and among Africans. Previously, slaves were often victims of war from other tribes. However, the commercialization of the slave trade allowed tribal chiefs to remove village upstarts as well. Additionally, during periods of crop failure or drought, children might be sold into slavery, since many families could ill afford extra mouths to fill, and, at times, even whole families sold themselves into slavery. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with such a high demand in Brazil, among other areas, "military campaigns undertaken [in Africa aimed] to conquer not land but men" (Mattoso, 1994: 20). Previous interest in the trade and precious metals in Africa had been replaced by the newest and most dreadful commodity.

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<sup>5</sup> For example, Herbert Klein notes that "... it has been estimated that at the height of the Roman empire the population of Italy contained some two to three million slaves, who represented between 35 and 40 percent of the population" (Klein, 1986: 4).

## Dominican Republic (1492-1791)

Christopher Columbus arrived on the island which he called Hispaniola (Little Spain) in December of 1492. Columbus remarked that the inhabitants were especially beautiful in comparison to the Indigenous peoples encountered on other islands, since the former were more white, and looked more like Spaniards (Dipp, 1992: 155). Columbus was not alone in seeing beauty in the inhabitants of Hispaniola. The 39 men he left behind at the Fort *La Navidad* (the Nativity) took many of the native women as wives or concubines. When Columbus returned one year later, he learned that the natives had killed the Spaniards because of the latter's abuse of the native women (Moya Pons, 1995: 29-30).

Approximately 400,000 natives lived in Hispaniola in 1492<sup>6</sup>. By 1519, due to forced labor, vicious massacres and various epidemics, there were close to 3,000 Indigenes left (Moya Pons, 1995: 27, 37). The Indigenous populations were hit hardest after the Spanish presence on the island became permanent. After two inept governors, including Columbus himself, the Spanish crown sent a more competent administrator, Nicolás de Ovando, in 1501 along with 2,500 immigrants, mostly nobles and gentlemen, a few free Africans, and, most importantly, very few women (Dipp, 1992: 128; Moya Pons, 1995: 32; Deive, 1989: 19). Despite incentives for married couples and the governor's persecution of those who married natives, miscegenation became common place and a *mestizo* (mixed of Indian and European blood) population was born (Dipp,

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<sup>6</sup> This estimate is from Frank Moya Pons, one of the most prominent Dominican historians (Moya Pons, 1995: 27). Other estimates range from between 60,000 and the 3,000,000 figure produce by Bartolomé de las Casas. For the sake of consistency, the numbers presented by Moya Pons will be used. I am especially grateful to Jane Rausch for this comment.

1992 130-5). The new governor enforced the *encomienda*<sup>7</sup> and *repartimiento*<sup>8</sup> practices of the Spanish crown, subjecting the natives to harsh slavery, primarily to working in the gold mines. Access to indigenous labor, however, was fairly limited to a small elite among the Spanish population<sup>9</sup>.

The enslavement of the Indigenous population was always considered problematic since one of the goals of the Spanish colonizers, in theory, was to Christianize the Indigenous. As early as 1501 "the Crown had declared that the Indians were free and should be treated as such..." (Moya Pons, 1995: 33). But this declaration bore little weight, and the Crown softened its position when the governor explained that the mines could not function without the coerced Indigenous labor. The Crown and the governor came to a compromise which allowed for the continuation of forced Indigenous labor on the condition that the natives become educated in the Christian faith. Ironically, as the defense of the Indigenes in Spain grew more vocal due to the advocacy of priests such as Antonio Montesinos and Bartolomé de las Casas, the natives were quickly disappearing<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> The *encomienda* was the legal means through which the Crown authorized a certain number of Indian laborers to favored Spanish colonizers.

<sup>8</sup> The *repartimiento* was the system by which conquistadors seized Indians to serve as labor upon the land of the Spanish colonizers.

<sup>9</sup> Frank Moya Pons writes "During this new *repartimiento*, a small colonial elite of 82 persons, representing only 11 percent of the *encomenderos*, managed to appropriate 44 percent of the Indians distributed... Apart from the elite, only 646 colonists received Indians. The rest of the population, which consisted of several thousand persons, was left without Indians and with very limited possibilities to earn a living except by working with their own hands, an idea repugnant to those accustomed to Indian serfs performing most physical labor" (Moya Pons, 1995: 36).

<sup>10</sup> In a sermon in 1511, Father Montesinos claimed "I am a voice crying in the wilderness; you are in mortal sin for the cruelty and tyranny you use in dealing with these innocent people. Tell me, by what right or justice do you keep these Indians in cruel and horrible servitude? Are these not men? Have they not rational souls. And you not bound to love them as you love yourselves?" (in Cambeira, 1997: 58). That Father Motesinos was quickly recalled to Spain shows that his proclamations were not entirely popular. In his book, *The Devastation of the Indies: A Brief Account*, Fray Bartolome de las Casas writes of Hispaniola, "Yet into this sheepfold, into this land of meek outcasts there came some Spaniards who immediately behaved like ravening wild beasts, wolves, tigers, or lions that had been starved for many days... killing, terrorizing, afflicting, torturing, and destroying the native peoples, doing all of this with the strangest and most varied new methods of cruelty, never seen or heard of before, and to such a degree that this Island of

Between 1520 and 1530 it was clear that not only was the source of forced labor gone, but so was the source of wealth, gold. This prompted large numbers of Spaniards, with their slaves, to leave the island, heading to Cuba, Mexico, or other parts of Spain's New World empire. Moya Pons writes, "Emigration was so intense that by 1528, seven Spanish towns had completely disappeared and those remaining held a combined population of only 1,000 Spaniards. A royal decree in 1526 prohibited the colonists from leaving the island under penalty of death, but emigration continue despite this law" (1995: 38). Once again, it is worth noting the inability of the central governing institution, the Crown, to enforce a policy upon its citizens.

Before leaving the Indigenes in history it is worth noting a few things about them. There were two main groups of Indigenes in Hispaniola, the Tainos and the Caribs. The former were far more passive, more society oriented, and punished incest severely<sup>11</sup>, while the latter were a warring tribe that practiced cannibalism (Moya Pons, 1995: 27). Questions about incest and polygamy were constantly circulated, and were intended to prove the natives' lack of civilization and humanity. One Spanish jurist, Pedro de Sepulveda, "argued that the Indians were not truly human, but rather 'little men' who were neither worthy nor capable of being baptized" (Wucker, 1999: 65). Throughout the brief period of co-existence on Hispaniola, the Spaniards, with few exceptions, consistently looked at the Indigenes as being physically and culturally inferior beings,

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Hispaniola, once so populous (having a population that I estimated to be more than three millions), has now a population of barely two hundred persons" (las Casas, 1992: 29). The importance of these two men should not be exaggerated. Most likely, clergy supported the repressive forced labor of the Indians, as they later would support the forced labor of the Africans. In fact, a considerable land-owner, until the Haitian Revolution, the Church was often also owned a considerable number of slaves.

<sup>11</sup> Moya Pons insists that the Tainos were very clear about incest, although Alan Cambeira suggests that it is possible that there was incest among the Tainos (1997: 37).

whose humanity was not always entirely clear. “[T]he native peoples were regarded as heathen, idolators, even cannibals, whose alien way of life was looked upon as offensive and barbarian, whose mentality—it was thought—rendered them incapable of conceptualizing *civilization*” (Cambeira, 1997: 53). Considerable debate also was given to the issue of whether or not the natives had souls.

The Spaniards noted the differences between the groups of Indigenes, and clearly preferred the Tainos, who prior to the Spanish arrival were subsistence farmers. However, they had a very hard time getting natives, of either tribe, to farm for anything more than subsistence, especially since farming was considered “women’s work” (Chapman, 1997: 3). The indigenes’ reluctance to farm in excess of subsistence seemed to validate for the Spaniards their claims about the lack of civilization and the primitive nature of Indigenous society. More troubling for the Spaniards was that the natives could not survive the labor in the mines, and many would run away into the mountains to avoid repressive labor.

War against a Spanish-raised Indigene named Enriquillo, between 1519 and 1533, weakened the colony. Though the population of Indigenes was small, Enriquillo was aided by runaway African slaves, whose presence on the island was growing, and by Indigenes captured from the other islands of the Caribbean who were forced to work in the mines of Santo Domingo. A treaty with Enriquillo in 1533 ended the hostilities bringing a degree of peace to the island. That the war lasted so long is not only a testament to the guerrilla techniques of Enriquillo’s soldiers and the geographic conditions of the Dominican Republic, but also the weakness of Santo Domingo’s militia

and government, especially considering that Enriquillo's army consisted of only 500 men (Wucker, 1999: 66).

Indigenous labor and gold mines were soon replaced by large plantations, initially producing sugar, and later ginger. These plantations were dependent upon slave labor which by the 1530s was increasingly African. Free Africans and African domestic slaves had been in Hispaniola since at least 1496, and Dipp notes that in 1515 one "black" named Antón Mejía had three Indigenous slaves. Dipp writes that it is possible that he was not the actual owner of the *encomienda* Indigenes, but a representative of the owner. Even still, the fact that he appears on the list of the *repartimiento* suggests that "social discrimination and racial prejudice did not yet have a hierarchy that it would acquire later" (Dipp, 1992: 160). By the 1520s, some 500 African slaves entered annually the colony of Santo Domingo (Cambeira, 1997: 100).

Governor Ovando warned the Crown that *ladinos* (Africans who were living in Iberia) were bad influences and were more likely to run away and rebel than *bozales* (Africans taken directly from Africa). The Spanish crown decided that the best way to maintain control would be to send more female African slaves (Deive, 1989: 20, 24), and, in 1526, the Spanish crown declared that one-third of all slaves imported must be women (Moya Pons, 1995: 20). It is highly unlikely that the increase in number of women produced any reduction in the numbers of runaway slaves, although it had the unintended consequence of greatly increasing the numbers of mulattos born in Santo Domingo.

Estimates for the population of Africans in Santo Domingo are very imprecise as figures exist only for slaves and even those are not entirely clear. In 1545, Moya Pons estimates the population of the colony of Santo Domingo at 5,000, with an additional

12,000 slaves. By 1568 the number of slaves had risen to 20,000, but dropped to under 10,000 slaves by 1606 (Moya Pons, 1986: 46). Much of the latter decline was due to a series of epidemics in 1585 (Moya Pons, 1995: 40-5). By the 1550s, Cambeira claims that as many as 2,000 African slaves were arriving annually, but sugar production had fallen by the 1570s, and slaves were being diverted to ginger plantations.

Some of the Africans, like some of the Indigenes before them, ran away from the plantations where they worked. Estimates of the number of runaway African slaves in Santo Domingo during this period vary. For example, while Cambeira writes there might have been as many as 7,000 runaway African slaves in 1545, Dipp argues that the number was probably less than 1,000 (Cambeira, 1997: 76; Dipp, 1992: 221). Among them, there were small groups, as well as larger groups which formed a sort of community, called *cimarrones*, often with internal political and social structures. Some writers have argued that *cimarrones* created communities reminiscent of African societies (Cambeira, 1997: 74). However, it seems that *ladinos* often assumed leadership roles in many *cimarrones* and that *cimarrones* were very rarely composed of only one ethnic group (Deive, 1989: 272), which problematizes simple representations of the communities as replications of pre-enslavement African communal life.

Justifications for African slavery followed much of the prejudices against the "primitive" natives. However, a new ideological argument was formulated especially for the Africans. Like the natives, they were considered primitive, close to the earth, innocent and savage. But the Africans were much believed to be better workers and "naturally" more suited for slave labor than the Indigenes, since they did not die off so

easily.<sup>12</sup> Dominican intellectual Juan Isidro Jimenez Grullón asserts "the inferior culture of the African is what best explains the fact that the Africans supported the working conditions better than the Indians" (in Dipp, 1992: 167<sup>13</sup>).

The seventeenth century has been called the Century of Misery by Dominican historians. While in 1606 the population of the Santo Domingo was 5,960 free people and 9,648 slaves, the total population was 7,500 in 1681 (Moya Pons, 1986: 46<sup>14</sup>). Following the bust of the sugar industry, the principal industries in Santo Domingo were ginger plantations and the selling of mahogany in the south and cattle herding in the north. This led to two different societies, particularly with regards to race relations, although paternalism predominated in both (Hoetink, 1994: 92). The cattle herders, or *Hateros*, of the northern region of the Cibao often worked alongside their slaves doing the same work, and slaves often earned enough money to buy their own freedom<sup>15</sup>. While lines between master and slave, and black and white, were becoming more and more blurred in the north of the country, the south continued to maintain traditional seigneurial distinctions and privileges which separated the pure blooded Spaniards from those of mixed heritage.

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<sup>12</sup> The belief that African labor was superior to native labor seems to be a "truth" accepted across the entire Western hemisphere (see Mattoso, 1994; Schwartz, 1989: 70).

<sup>13</sup> The original explains "Si soportó con mayor facilidad que el indígena las espantosas condiciones a que obligaba la esclavitud, es fundamentalmente su cultura inferior lo que más explica el hecho" (in Dipp, 1992: 167).

<sup>14</sup> Moya Pons does not have information on the number of slaves until 1769 when the population of the colony was 70,625 people including 8,900 slaves (Moya Pons, 1986: 46).

<sup>15</sup> Emilio Betances writes "On average ten to fifteen people lived on the *hato*, slaves included and social relationships were patriarchal. A relationship of trust between master and slave pointed to solidarity. Sánchez Valverde reports that masters used to have breakfast with slaves before going to the fields to work with them at the same tasks; a social division of labor was all but nonexistent. In this type of setting slaves did not run away, as happened on plantations dependent on slave labor, but they rather saved money in order to buy their freedom" (Betances, 1995: 10).

There were times when poverty was so extreme and widespread that even these differences became less stark. Cambeira notes that at certain points masters were forced to walk barefoot, like their slaves, and eat the same food (Cambeira, 1997: 107). This period was critical in equalizing many social relations, although never completely, which had developed during the early period of slavery. The financial situation of slaves, freed peoples, free peoples and masters became increasingly similar—in terms of poverty and misery, and miscegenation continued at a significant rate. Distinctions, such as *negro*, *blanco*, *tercerón*, *cuarterón*, and *grifo*, all indicating the amount of African and/or European blood possessed by individuals, began to be replaced by the more colloquial term *blanco de la tierra* (white of the earth) (Torres-Saillant, 1998; Wucker, 1999: 33). This was a tribute to the laxing of previous schemes which counted the number of African and Spanish grandparents a person had, and gave a much more inclusive term which “whitened” the non-Spanish population. Additionally, during this period, the colony was so poor that it was incapable of importing new slaves, only receiving a boost in population when a group of immigrants from the Canary Islands arrived in 1684. Moya Pons writes that 100 families arrived in 1684 and were soon followed by another 201 families by 1687 (Moya Pons, 1995: 66). As immigration and miscegenation continued, “the number of Caucasians easily surpassed and remained consistently greater than the numbers of Africans” (Cambeira, 1997: 115). The number of free blacks and mulattos was also very high, particularly in the Cibao.

During the eighteenth century the Dominican Republic recovered from the depopulation of the previous century. In 1718, the population was recorded as 18,410, and by 1783 it was 119,600 (Moya Pons, 1986: 46). Cattle herding and the sale of

mahogany remained the most important sectors of the export economy. But unlike wood which was produced for European consumption, the cattle raised in Santo Domingo was increasingly being produced for the French and English bandits who were invading the northwestern part of Hispaniola in the early seventeenth century, a territory which would be ceded to France in 1655, with a new border defined in 1697. The growth of this territory, called Saint-Domingue, was astounding. Within a short period the French colony was the world's largest producer of sugar, relying on a very high number of African slaves, and vast amounts of Dominican beef and leather.

While the 1681 census of Saint-Domingue registered 4,000 French planters, 1,565 indentured laborers, and 1,063 slaves, in 1716 there were 30,000 free people and 100,000 slaves (Moya Pons, 1995: 68, 76). By the late eighteenth century, sugar relied upon a slave labor force of 500,000 in Saint-Domingue, while the same industry in Santo Domingo had only 600 slaves at its disposal (Wueker, 1999: 99). The population of Santo Domingo by the late eighteenth century, in contrast to Saint-Domingue, was close to 100,000, with 85,000 free whites, mulattos and blacks, and 15,000 slaves (Klein, 1986: 222; Wueker, 1999: 36; Maingot, 1992, 230). Saint-Domingue was the world's richest colony and largest producer of sugar, while Santo Domingo was one of Spain's most insignificant colonies with only a fledgling sugar industry.

## Brazil (1500-1808)

In 1500, the Portuguese noble Pedro Alvares Cabral arrived in a land which eventually would be called Brazil<sup>16</sup>. But Portugal showed little interest in this new land, which possessed valuable wood but did not seem to have gold, as did the Spanish colonies, nor did it offer the riches of the spice trade which the Portuguese had just acquired following Vasco de Gama's circumnavigation of Africa. It was not until 1530 that the Portuguese crown decided to colonize the territory, essentially to prevent the Spanish from capturing the territory for themselves. Even when colonization began, the Portuguese remained very close to the Atlantic shores, with few settlements in the interior. In fact, it was not until the rubber boom in 1890s that the Amazon was colonized on any significant level.

Like Columbus, Cabral left several men behind in this new land before returning to Iberia to relate his discovery. These men, referred to in history books as "*degradados*,"<sup>17</sup> took quickly to the Indigenous women like their Spanish counterparts. Unlike the men left by Columbus in Santo Domingo, the *degradados* became quickly integrated into Tupí society. Some of them possessed several Indigenous women as wives, and by the time the Portuguese returned, there was a new race of *mesticos* (mixed of Indigene and European). Despite the dislike of the Portuguese for the *degradados* and their *mestico* children, they were forced to rely upon them in order to enslave the Indigene

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<sup>16</sup> The new territory was first called "Ilha de Vera Cruz" (The Island of the True Cross), "Provincia de Santa Cruz" (Province of the Holy Cross) and then "Terra do Brasil" (The Land of Brazil). While some believe that Brazil is so named after the Brazil wood that was found in abundance, a new book by Eduardo Bueno suggests that the name may come from the Celtic word "bress," which in turn comes from the English verb "to bless" (Bueno, 1998: 13).

<sup>17</sup> The *degradados* were criminals who were exiled from Portugal as part of their sentence.

populations which would be used in the sugar plantations (*engenhos*), as well as in the cutting of wood.

The Portuguese, like the Spaniards, viewed the natives as ignorant, culturally backward children whose labor could be exploited for commercial gain. Manuel da Nóbrega, writing from the newly established capital of Salvador in 1549, explained that “the Indians were ‘as blank paper upon which we can write at will’” (in Burns, 1980: 46). The coercion of the natives was justified by paternalist arguments which suggested that the natives were actually gaining from their servitude through the acceptance of the Christian faith and/or European civilization. Domingos Jorge Velho in 1694 explained, “[t]his is so different from enslaving them that it is rather doing them a priceless service, since we teach them to till, to sow, to reap, and to work for their keep—something which they did not know how to do before whites taught them” (in Burns, 1980: 46).

The Portuguese, like the Spanish, found cannibalism, incest and polygamy among the Indigenes (also among the *degradados*), and used these elements of Indigenous life to denounce the Indigenes as barbarous and uncivilized. And like the Indians of Hispaniola, many of the natives in Brazil would farm nothing more than that needed for their subsistence. Governor Diogo de Meneses in 1610 wrote “[t]hese Indians, Sir, are a very barbarous people having no government and being unable to govern themselves, and they are so lacking in this regard that even in their sustenance they will not save for tomorrow that which is in excess today” (in Schwartz, 1989: 31).

The Portuguese crown assumed a very paternalist stance towards the natives because of its perception that they were uncivilized and needed to be helped to develop, and to be protected from Portuguese who might abuse the Indian’s ‘lasting nature.’ King

Manuel I declared that whoever harmed his Indigenous subjects would receive the same treatment. In 1759, a law guaranteed freedom to all Indigenes who had Portuguese surnames and spoke Portuguese (Burns, 1980: 47-8). By the 1750s, the royal decree was somewhat superfluous since the natives were no longer being used as slaves, due to the availability and the sheer number of African slaves. Additionally, Portuguese colonists could still enslave Indigenes if the causes were just, such as the latter's practice of cannibalism, or war against the former (Schwartz, 1989: 30)<sup>18</sup>. As for Dom Manuel's guarantee of the protection of his Indigenous subjects, it is very likely that few people living in Brazil were even aware of it, let alone were restrained by it.

Unlike in Santo Domingo, the Indigenous population of Brazil was never wholly eliminated<sup>19</sup>, and despite the large number of African slaves being imported, Indigenes were the predominant source of labor in the northeastern province of Bahia until the middle of the seventeenth century (Schwartz, 1989: 28). But the Indigenous presence was not a very powerful one. Like the natives in the Dominican Republic, the natives of Brazil were subsistence farmers, and the men considered agricultural tasks to be "woman's work" (Schwartz, 1989, 35). Additionally, many of the Indigenes were nomads and had difficulties adapting to the lifestyle imposed by the Portuguese (Mattoso, 1994: 9). Like the Spanish settlers in Santo Domingo, the Portuguese noted the differences between the various groups of natives, making clear their preferences. The Aimoré, who were hunters and gatherers, were much more resistant to Portuguese

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<sup>18</sup> This was not possible in the Spanish colonies after 1530 when the natives were considered free vassals of Spain.

<sup>19</sup> Of course, like every other country in the region, there was a very significant decline in the population of Indigenous people. Burns estimates that in 1500 there were between 1 and 2 million Indians (Burns, 1980: 17). There are currently approximately 250,000 Indians living in Brazil (Eakin, 1993: 120).

domination than the Tupinambá. "Various Portuguese observers claimed that the Aimoré had no dwellings but lived in the forests like beasts... Other Amerindians lived in houses like men... the Tupinambá ate their enemies out of vengeance; the Aimoré, because they enjoyed human flesh; and so on" (Schwartz, 1989: 33).

The Portuguese Crown, like the Spanish Crown, made various efforts to limit the slave trade, dominated by Portuguese traders. It prohibited Portuguese slave traders from the taking of any Africans without first baptizing them. In Brazil, baptisms were often repeated since it was common, in spite of the prohibition, for traders to bring unbaptized Africans to the Americas (Mattoso, 1994: 32). Many were mass baptisms, where the sermon was in a language alien to the new "convert," and a new name was given to the captive who probably did not understand the bizarre ritual. Portuguese law also required that slaves be guaranteed 3 meals and 2.662 liters a day of water during the voyage across the Atlantic. The number of slaves that could be carried was also limited based upon the weight of the cargo (Mattoso, 1994: 33). These provisions were consistently disregarded as emaciation, disease and death were commonplace on the overcrowded slave ships. Yet the Crown seems to have been efficient in protecting the rights of certain mulatto youths in Salvador. In 1689, some mulatto youths appealed to the King to allow them to attend a Jesuit school in Bahia after the Friars had refused them entrance, and the King decreed that the mulattos were to be admitted to the school (Conrad, 1983: 220-1).

Unlike those in the Dominican Republic, Indigenes in Brazil had access to a larger territory to which they could escape without real fear of being recaptured. This also applied for African slaves. While the effect of the *cimarrones* was basically minimized by 1546 in Santo Domingo (Moya Pons, 1995: 41), runaway African slaves were a

constant threat to the Portuguese colonial government. In fact, quite a number of documents attest to the existence of various *quilombos*, societies of runaway slaves, throughout colonial Brazilian history. The largest of these, the Kingdom of Palmares, was probably in existence for close to one hundred years and may have had between 20,000 and 30,000 inhabitants (Burns, 1980: 54; Mattoso, 1994: 139). While Palmares was an extreme case, there are many others, although the number of people involved is much smaller<sup>20</sup>. The Portuguese governors were incapable of policing these runaway slave communities, and they relied upon slave hunters who were predominantly natives and/or free or freed Africans/Afro-Brazilians to destroy the *quilombos* and to bring back the runaway slaves (Schwartz, 1989: 471).

While runaways constitute an important part of the story of slaves in Brazil, the majority of slaves performed no such acts of open rebellion. The slave plantations in the northeast were particularly well disciplined. What is interesting about plantation society in northeastern Brazil is the amount of control exercised by the master over the slaves generally without resorting to excessive force (Mattoso, 1994: 101). This is not to say that slaves were not beaten and killed, but the master's paternal authority was often able to induce slave compliance without the actual use of castigation.

This paternal authority is seen consistently in manumission letters and wills in which masters free slaves because of loyal service and love. Most manumissions were bought, often by the slave, and were conditional. However, masters felt compelled to include personal and paternal comments into what would otherwise be legal, commercial documents. These comments would be considered gratuitous were it not for the

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<sup>20</sup> A 1741 provision defined a quilombo as "any clandestine group of more than five fugitive slaves"

importance of paternal authority in all relations in Brazil, particularly those between master and slave. Mattoso found that in manumission letters it was common to encounter phrases such as "for having served me well" and an even more intimate "for the love that I bore him (or her) because I raised him (her)" (Mattoso, 1944: 166). Children of the master and one of the slaves, who were recognized by the master, were generally freed at a young age (Mattoso, 1994: 175). In addition, two other patterns seem interesting. Despite the ratio of nearly two men to every woman among the slave population, manumissions of female slaves outnumbered those of males by a ratio of about two to one. Additionally "[i]n the period of 1684-1745, mulattos received over 45 percent of the Bahian manumissions but constituted less than 10 percent of the slave population" (Schwartz, 1989: 331).

Paternal authority was best exemplified by the plantation owner (*patrão*). Bradford Burns' description of the *patrão* is quoted here at length because of the importance of the *patrão* and the sort of authority that he wielded in Brazilian society, and especially vis-à-vis the free, freed and enslaved Afro-Brazilians. Burns writes:

The estate owner, a true lord of the manor, was a patriarchal chief who ruled family, servants, slaves, and even neighbors—unless they were large estate owners like himself—with absolute authority. The great size of the estate, its isolation from royal officials, and the relative weakness of local bureaucrats all strengthened his power. Furthermore, the estate chaplain and local parish priest orbited around him like satellites, lending the prestige of the Catholic Church to augment his authority. From the shaded veranda of his house... the patriarch oversaw the land, listened to petitions, dispensed justice, and in general held court... The rural economy consisted of much more than the patriarch, latifundia, slavery and export crops. Yet, those features dominated, characterized Brazilian agriculture, and shaped much of the colony's social and economic life. (Burns, 1980: 74).

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(Mattoso, 1994: 138).

Schwartz adds that the paternalist notion of authority was reinforced by "an ideological context in which the metaphors of family, obligation, fealty, and clientage predominated" (Schwartz, 1989: 257). Mattoso observes a similar paternal form of authority exerted by the master, which served to discipline his slaves without needing to resort to excessive force (Mattoso, 1994: 101).

There was a certain literal element in the master's paternal attitude towards his slaves, since his sexual relations with his female slaves often produced children. As in Santo Domingo, European women were quite rare, and masters were able to use their position to engage in sexual relations with slave and non-slave African and Afro-Brazilian women which were often coerced. Miscegenation was prevalent, and mulattos soon constituted a large group. Schwartz writes that in Bahia "[f]ield hands were almost always slaves, usually black, and predominantly Africans; senhores de engenhos were invariably free and white; but in the intermediate positions of management, technical skill, and artisan craft were found freemen, freedmen, and slaves; whites, browns, and blacks" (Schwartz, 1989: 312).

By 1675, sugar production in Brazil crashed due in part to the increased competition from the tiny colony of Saint-Domingue. The economy, however, quickly recovered with the discovery of gold in the southeastern state of Minas Gerais. The gold cycle marked the beginning of the development of the Brazilian south and southeast. It also was the beginning of the development of some of Brazil's interior since many of the gold and other precious stones were found in areas that were inland and in the mountains, such as Vila Rica (Ouro Preto). Slaves were used in large numbers in mining, but a

different dynamic existed among slaves and masters in the mining industry than in the northeastern plantations. Since the master leased land and his only concern in the land was its rapid exploitation, the slave was encouraged to find a certain amount of precious stones and metals every day. Beyond a certain figure, slaves could keep what they found, and of course, some slaves took gold for themselves regardless of whether they collected their daily quota (Mattoso, 1994: 94-5). As a result, it was fairly common for slaves in the mining regions to buy their own freedom after only a few years of servitude. There is even the story of one African, Chico Rei, who not only bought his own freedom, but his own mine and eventually the freedom of his entire tribe. He was also very much involved in the construction of a church for African parishioners<sup>21</sup>.

During this period, Portuguese interest in Brazil peaked. Colonial administration became much more efficient as the Crown demanded 20 percent of all gold and precious stones found in the mines. In order to guarantee that the Portuguese miners were reporting their findings honestly, the Crown declared that any slave who reported a phony claim by his or her master would be freed immediately.

In 1763, the capital of Brazil was moved from Salvador to the southeastern city of Rio de Janeiro. This change was a testament to the amount of growth the southeast had witnessed in the last century, and a hint at what might happen in the next two centuries. At the same time, rebellions were becoming more frequent in Brazil. In 1789, prominent men from Minas led a rebellion against the Crown, in which they declared they wanted independence for the southeastern states. In 1801, anti-Portuguese sentiment led to a revolt in Pernambuco. But the 1798 rebellion in Bahia is perhaps the most interesting

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<sup>21</sup> It is not insignificant that the most important sculptor in the town of Vila Rica, Aleijadinho, was a

since all forty-nine men arrested were mulattos. One of the arrested men told his judges, "We want a republic in order to breathe freely because we live subjugated and because we're colored and we can't advance and if there was a republic there would be equality for everyone" (in Burns, 1980: 140).

By the end of the eighteenth century there was no slowing down the slave trade, but there was an incredible growth among the freed and mulatto population of Brazil. Documents began to surface arguing that these people were citizens and should be treated as such. Cipriano José Barata de Almeida writes in 1822 "Mulattos, *cabras*, and *crioulos*; Indians, *mamelucos*, and mestizos are all our people, they are Portuguese; they are honorable and valuable citizens... They are Portuguese citizens, the sons of Portuguese or Brazilians, even if they are illegitimate. Whatever their color, whatever their status, they were born in Brazil" (in Burns, 1980: 137, italics in original). Interestingly enough, between 1798 and 1818 the population of whites increased from 1,000,000 to 1,040,000, that of slaves from 1,500,000 to 1,930,000, that of natives remained steady at 250,000, yet that of freedmen increased from 225,000 to 585,000 (Burns, 1980: 147). There is something curious about these freedmen, and that is that "most freed slaves were slave owners" (Mattoso, 1994: 207). As Mattoso writes:

masters were found in every class in society. There were white masters, masters of mixed race, and black masters. Their behavior did not depend on their color or social position but on their quality as individuals. But for the slave, the master—whether rich or poor, white or black—was always a 'white' master, because to be 'white' in Brazilian society meant to adopt certain superior attitudes, to wield a certain power (Mattoso, 1994: 115).

This reinforces the association of the discourses of whiteness with freedom and status, and blackness with servitude, illegitimacy and poverty, while also providing for space for individual negotiation of racial identity.

### **Dominican Republic (1791-1882)**

By the late eighteenth century, Santo Domingo was highly dependent upon Saint-Domingue particularly as a market for beef and leather. Yet as important as the economy of Saint-Domingue was for Santo Domingo, it was its politics that most critically influenced its eastern neighbor. Saint-Domingue's rapid growth, and the very low percent of whites (6 percent) relative to a very large enslaved black population (Cambeira, 1997: 125) created an environment which was especially propitious for rebellion. Only two years after the storming of the Bastille in France, revolution began in Saint-Domingue, which soon changed its name to Haiti. By 1794, a significant number of Spanish elites, fearing that the rebellion would spread or encourage a slave rebellion in Santo Domingo, left Hispaniola with their slaves (Moya Pons, 1995: 166).

The most immediate effects of the Haitian revolution on Santo Domingo was the invasion of the Spanish colony, which was then in the possession of the French government<sup>22</sup>. The Haitians abolished slavery, which won support among the newly liberated slaves, but was unwelcome to the large numbers of whites and free mulattos and blacks who believed themselves to be civilized Spaniards, and their invaders to be savage Africans (Cambeira, 1997: 137). In 1809, Spain was able to reassert control over its former colony, and slavery was re-institutionalized, and though Spain easily defeated a

small uprising of free Afro-Dominicans in 1812, its control was weak. This was especially the case since the colony was of little value, and there was a growing resistance and rebellion in Spain's larger and more important colonies. In 1821, José Nuñez de Cáceres declared Dominican independence from Spain.

The declaration of independence was premature. Sensing the weakness of the political situation in the former Spanish colony, the Haitian government invaded and quickly conquered the nascent state. The Haitian occupying forces immediately abolished slavery a second, and final, time, and redistributed many of the lands that belonged to the Church to former slaves. Hoetink comments that due to the absence of large sugar plantations, such as those in neighboring Cuba and Puerto Rico, "the abolition of slavery in Santo Domingo only affected a society where, for a long time, and in large part, slavery had existed *de jure*, instead of *de facto*" (Hoetink, 1994: 91-2). The number of slaves was quite low, and the poverty of the colony had also rendered small the difference between slaves and other poor Dominicans. The Haitians truly enraged many Dominicans when they encouraged the immigration of black Protestants from the United States in an attempt to "darken" the population (Martínez-Fernández: 1995: 71). Between 6,000 and 13,000 blacks from Philadelphia accepted the offer of "free trip, free lodging and board for four months and 36 acres of farmland for every twelve workers," however, eventually only 500-600 settled in Santo Domingo (Chapman, 1997: 9). The Haitian occupation is remembered by Dominican elites, particularly Euro-Dominicans, as a time of chaos, violence and cruelty, during which plantations were burned and many elites left the island. This occupation is one of the more important moments in racial

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<sup>22</sup> In 1897, the Spanish territory on Hispaniola had been ceded to the French.

consciousness forming among Dominicans, particularly the elites and mulattos, who rejected the Haitians.

In 1844, a group called *la Trinitaria* (the Trinity) consisting of Pablo Duarte, Ramón Mella and Francisco Sanchez Duarte, a mulatto, declared the independence of the Dominican Republic. In order to repel the Haitian army, which vastly outnumbered any militia the *Trinitarios* could muster, the *Trinitarios*, who were predominantly liberals, were forced to enter into bargains with conservative caudillos, particularly Pedro Santana. Santana controlled the militia regardless of the political posts that he did or did not occupy, and the members of the militia, much to the dismay of the *Trinitarios*, were loyal to him not to any invisible state or theoretical ideal (Moya Pons, 1995: 159; Betances, 1995: 20). He used his position to exile the *Trinitaria* leaders as traitors and was able to consolidate his authoritarian rule because of the constant threat of Haitian invasion, which persisted until at least 1855. He then replaced the Liberal constitution of Moca, which the *Trinitarios* had written in 1858, with a constitution that more thoroughly concentrated power in the executive.

Sovereignty, which always had a powerful external dynamic, was no different after independence. When Cáceres declared the Dominican Republic independent he wanted it to be part of Gran Colombia because he believed it was too small and poor, and too vulnerable to another Haitian invasion that it required protection from a larger power. This second independence produced no more security among its elites. Santana disagreed with his former associate Buenaventura Báez over which country the Dominican Republic should surrender its sovereignty: Santana's preference for the United States was clear, especially during the 1850s, while Báez leaned towards Spain. The United States

sent repeated groups to evaluate the situation in the Dominican Republic, since the United States had long been interested in the Samaná Bay.<sup>23</sup> The Haitian government invaded the Dominican Republic several times during this period because it saw the entrance of a slave-holding power as a serious threat to the freedom of Haiti<sup>24</sup>. Ironically, Haitian interference in the Dominican Republic only reinforced the fears of the elites who insisted that the Dominican Republic needed protection from its neighbor.

The possibility of a US protectorate disappeared once the Civil War in the United States began, and Santana turned towards seeking Spanish protection, as Baez had favored earlier. In 1860, after a report from a finance minister that the frontiers were being 'Haitianized,' he felt more pressure to enter into an alliance with a European protecting power. Santana abandoned the progressive religious tolerance position of the past, which he had used to chastise the Catholic Church and to court the British, U.S. and the few Black American Protestants. He became much more protective of the Catholic Church which he believed to be the key ingredient in convincing Spain to again accept the Dominican Republic as a colony (Martínez-Fernández, 1995: 75). In 1861, the Dominican Republic re-entered the Spanish Empire. The reinsertion into the Spanish

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<sup>23</sup> Martínez-Fernández reports the various figures and demographics that US observers noted during this period. "Not surprisingly, the U.S. Department of State exhibited a continuous preoccupation with the racial composition of the Dominican Republic. Virtually all agents dispatched there were instructed to assess the proportion with the racial composition of the Dominican Republic. The first U.S. agent to the newly independent Dominican Republic, John Hogan reported to [President] Buchanan that the republic's population consisted 'of about two hundred and thirty thousand of whom forty thousand are Blacks and over one hundred thousand are whites.' Hogan was applying a very liberal use of the term *white*, obviously including lighter-skinned mulattoes. Interestingly, Hogan's report established a racial polarity: there were blacks and whites, but no groups in between, corresponding to racial perceptions in the United States. A year later, another U.S. citizen entrusted with assessing the republic's racial composition, Commander David D. Porter, produced a more detailed picture. Porter stated that there were 5,200 pure whites and 20,000 pure Africans in the Dominican Republic. Porter also estimates populations of 75,000 quadroons, 60,000 light-skinned mulattoes, and 14,000 dark mulattoes" (Martínez-Fernández, 1994: 41-2).

<sup>24</sup> It should be noted that the United States did not recognize the Haitian government until Abraham Lincoln did so in 1862.

empire led to an immediate, but ineffective, rebellion led by General José Contreras and a group of mostly mulatto soldiers who feared Spain would reestablish slavery (Moya Pons, 1995: 204).

The return of the Spanish was critical for the building of a sense of national identity. It was essential to use the Church to prove to the Spaniards that Dominicans, even after twenty years of Haitian rule and two and a half centuries of miscegenation, remained Spaniards. But the Dominicans failed to convince their new governors that they were indeed Spaniards, particularly since the Spaniards saw the Dominicans as mulattos and Africans. This rejection was critical in the formation of a proto-national consciousness. The Dominicans were able to identify themselves as Spaniards as opposed to Haitians prior to the return of Spanish government. However, the return of Spanish government destroyed any illusions about Dominicans being Spaniards.

The Spanish who came to govern the Dominican Republic were primarily from Cuba and Puerto Rico, slave holding colonies, and they refused to recognize the Dominicans as white and European. Moya Pons writes:

[the race and color of Dominicans] was a constant topic of conversation among everyone because the Spaniards continually offended the Dominicans who were reminded that in Cuba or Puerto Rico they would be slaves. This attitude of superiority had its effect on the Dominicans themselves. The lighter-skinned people began to avoid contact with their darker skinned friends for fear of being associated with them or of being considered inferior by the new, Spanish rulers (Moya Pons, 1995: 206-7).

Additionally, the Dominicans immediately felt the burden of the Spanish bureaucratic apparatus. Betances reports that the payroll of Spain's administrators was more than seven times the government's income (Betances, 1995: 18).

Dominicans quickly remembered the exploitation and the denigration imposed by the Spanish Crown. In 1863, Dominicans took up arms to remove the Spaniards from their country, and by 1865 they were successful. Among the greatest heroes of the War of Restoration were the dark-skinned soldiers, Gregorio Luperón and Ulisses Heureaux, who were among many Afro-Dominicans involved in the battle for independence. Like the war of independence waged against Haiti, this war had a racial element, and like that war it appealed to Dominicans of all races (Maingot, 1992: 232). During both conflicts, racial criteria were crucial whether it was the Dominican rejection of the 'black' Haitians, or their rejection of the Spaniards who refused to accept the Dominicans as Spaniards. The war against Haiti had called for the Dominicans to repel the invading African/blacks, a climate which Dominican historian Franklyn Franco believes to have been "highly propitious for racism" (Franco, 1997: 74). Dominicans rejected Haitians as being a different people. This was critical since as U.S. agent Benjamin Greene wrote in 1849, "Dominican blacks and mulattoes acted and felt like whites" (Martínez-Fernández, 1994: 42). The war against Spain forced a slightly different definition of national identity. Hoetink writes that by the late nineteenth century, Dominican nationalism relied upon "the Spanish language, the Catholic religion and the idea of a population whose origin is predominantly mixed and Spanish" (Hoetink, 1994: 123). Admitting to African heritage would have been too much to accept, but it is noteworthy that the failed re-colonization effort by Spain made it painfully clear to both Dominicans and Spaniards, that Dominicans were no longer simply ethnically Spaniards.

By the 1870s and 1880s, due to the immigration of Spaniards, Puerto Ricans, Italians, Americans and Cubans, there was a growth in the sugar industry for the first time

in over two hundred years. Bringing with them the technology that was being used in the plantations of Puerto Rico and Cuba, such as the use of steam engines and railroads, they began to build a modern sugar industry which would soon emerge as the most dominant economic activity in the country (Moya Pons, 1995: 259-260). As the nineteenth century came to a close, the growth of sugar made the south the most important region in the Dominican Republic, replacing the Cibao. The Dominican intellectual Pedro Francisco Bonó warned that "sugar was the business of large landowners with great amounts of capital and was therefore injurious to the small independent farmers on whose progress the traditional wealth of the country depended" (in Moya Pons, 1995: 261).

The presence of light-skinned foreigners not only built the modern sugar industry but contributed to the informal segregation of Dominicans by color. "With the white newcomers, the issue of race became more important. As in most of Latin America, Dominican elites began to gather in social clubs, meeting places where members could do business" (Betances, 1997: 42). These social clubs became increasingly exclusively Euro-Dominican. The importance of race increased even more so as the labor force for the sugar plantations became almost exclusively made up of black foreigners, mostly from the West Indies<sup>25</sup>. This marked a considerable change since before the assassination of president Heureaux (1899) the majority of the leaders of the Dominican Republic were mulattos, yet between 1899 and 1929 only one president was not a Euro-Dominican

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<sup>25</sup> See the section on the Dominican Republic (1882-1930) in this chapter.

(Wiarda, 1975: 363). However, wealthy Afro-Dominicans were still considered "white," although less so than in the past<sup>26</sup>.

Following the War of Restoration two political parties were formed, the *Rojos* (Conservatives) and the *Azules* (Liberals). The latter were led by Luperón who used his position as president to become one of the country's richest men. The abuse of state funds for personal enrichment and to institutionalize clienteles did not begin, nor end with Luperón<sup>27</sup>. But despite Luperón's wealth, no clientele was able to dominate for any period of time, and the period that followed the War of Restoration was just as unstable as the period that preceded the Spanish annexation. Jonathan Hartlyn writes that between 1865 and 1879 there were 21 governments and 50 military uprisings (Hartlyn, 1998: 29).

### **Brazil (1808-1889)**

In 1808, the Portuguese monarchy became the first European colonial power to move its capital to one of its colonies. The Portuguese royal court fled Lisbon on British ships when Napoleon's occupation was imminent, and Rio de Janeiro became not only the capital of Brazil, but also the capital of the Portuguese empire. The arrival of the Portuguese monarch in Brazil led to increased consideration for the colony, as well as increased vigilance and efficiency on the part of the government. Colonial government, which had given significant liberties to slave owners and caudillos in the early colonial

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<sup>26</sup> Ramonina Brea quotes a relevant Dominican adage, which has analogues in Brazil, "[t]he rich negro is a mulatto and the poor mulatto is a negro" (Brea, 1983: 9). Neither is *blanco*, although at times the rich *negro* would be accepted, although not without reservations.

<sup>27</sup> Ramonina Brea cites Tilman Evers' work on the privatization of the public sphere during the nineteenth century to explain the depth of political clienteles and collusion (Brea, 1983: 69, 89). The idea of authority and power being privately held seems to be fairly consistent with the history of the Dominican Republic, and the increasingly centralized governments of the nineteenth century seem to only exacerbate this tradition, rather than undermine it.

period, and had become increasingly present and restrictive since the discovery of gold and the enforcement of a 20 percent royal tax on all gold found, saw its capacity increase significantly during this period. More control meant a growing political apparatus and bureaucracy. It also meant a slow growth of anti-Portuguese sentiment that would eventually translate into proto-nationalism.

Dom João, the Portuguese monarch, was quite comfortable in Brazil and he only returned the Portuguese crown back to Lisbon in 1821 when the pressure exerted by the Portuguese and British parliaments was insurmountable. Before leaving, Dom João advised his son Pedro, whom he left as regent of Brazil, that should the Brazilians push for independence, he should go along with the movement, because even though Brazil would be independent, at least it would be ruled by a Portuguese monarch.

In 1822, Dom Pedro declared Brazil independent and was later crowned Emperor of Brazil. Although independence was virtually bloodless, Dom Pedro agreed to pay 2.9 million dollars to Portugal and to assume Portugal's debt to Britain of 6.7 million dollars, which meant that Brazilian sovereignty would be limited by its external debt, particularly to Britain (Bushnell and Macaulay, 1988: 160). Dom Pedro assembled a group of Brazilians to put together a constitution for the new empire, but he soon butted heads with the Brazilian Andrade brothers, dissolved the congress, and selected ten Brazilians to write a constitution that was more to his liking. The Constitution of 1824 gave citizenship unequivocally to free born people with an annual income of one hundred dollars or more (Bushnell and Macaulay, 1988: 158). The Constitution did not refer to slaves nor to race. "The right to nationality and citizenship was not therefore the privilege of whites in the empire; it was a right that belonged to the free born" (da Silva,

1993: 119). The rights of Afro-Brazilian citizens were explicitly defended in a decision of Dom Pedro II's Council of State in 1849<sup>28</sup>, in which it was declared that "[a]ny provisions which make hateful distinctions concerning mulatto citizens of Brazil or freedmen, such as excluding them from belonging to a religious brotherhood, etc., are unconstitutional" (in Conrad, 1983: 221).

But the Emperor's anti-slavery bias was unable to prevent the formal guarantees of equality of the Constitution from being subverted by the informal inequality of Brazilian society. Because birth was so important for citizens, Afro-Brazilians' citizenship could be questioned since they were more likely to have an "illegitimate" birth, and they were more likely to be the descendents of slaves than were lighter Brazilians. For example, in one extreme case, Schwartz notes that in Vila Rica in 1804, 52 percent of children born of free parents were illegitimate, compared to 98 percent of children born of slaves (Schwartz, 1989: 389). Also, although freed slaves were considered citizens, they rarely had enough income to vote, and although they could serve in the military, they could do so only as private soldiers (Mattoso, 1994: 179).

Brazilian political elites were not always sympathetic to the emperor or his goals to centralize power, but many realized that centralization was necessary to prevent various rebellions from spreading or snowballing. Power in rural areas still resided within *coroneis* and powerful *caudilhos* (local strongmen), however, these men realized the need to support some of the activities of the government in order to maintain their own position of power (Graham, 1990: 69). Social relations continued to reflect vast differences in power, institutionalized through the household and the family (Lauderdale

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<sup>28</sup> Dom Pedro II, the son of Dom Pedro I, assumed the Brazilian throne in 1831.

Graham, 1988: 3). The power and authority of private individuals were sustained by a very entrenched system of patronage. Political culture supported the notion that society was a hierarchical arrangement between subordinate and super-ordinate members.

Richard Graham detects two important elements of politics in nineteenth century Brazil: "First, practice... constantly ingrained the notion that all social relations consisted in an exchange of protection for loyalty, benefits for obedience; recalcitrance merited punishments. Second, virtually every institution served to stress the social hierarchy, insisting that for every individual there was a very particular place...." (Graham, 1990: 23-4).

In 1835, there was a slave revolt in Bahia which was particularly clear about its racial goals. This revolt seems to be more of an exception than the rule, as it was carried out mostly by Muslims. Although it was put down within hours, some 500 hundred revolutionaries were imprisoned (Reiss, 19293, xii). That large number and the racial overtones left a strong imprint on Bahians of all colors. In general, as in the Dominican Republic, free Afro-Brazilians (*pardos* and *pretos*), who took part in various struggles for political change, very rarely involved themselves with slave populations. The Sabinda Revolt of 1837-8 is a good example. Schwartz writes that during the rebellion "attempts made to integrate slaves into rebel military units met with opposition not only from slave-owners but also from free people of color who objected to being placed on the same level with the enslaved... Even in the midst of revolution, the divisions of slave society could not be overcome" (Schwartz, 1989: 477). All members of Brazilian society, just as in the Dominican Republic, understood the hierarchy of social relations, and the ways through which people of lesser status could better themselves. For Afro-Brazilians, and Afro-

Dominicans, this meant association with European values, literature and religion, and the rejection of the same aspects of Africa.

The number of manumissions had been growing during the nineteenth century, and pressure from the English, including invading Brazilian ships, forced the Brazilians to end the slave trade in 1820, although it actually ended in 1850. It became obvious that, without a source of new slaves, and given the deplorable conditions of slaves and their high mortality rates<sup>29</sup>, slavery would soon end. Beginning in the 1830s, the Brazilian government began encouraging immigrants from southern Europe to emigrate to Brazil with the hopes of both "whitening" the population, and providing a source of cheap labor. Tavares Bastos explained "[w]ithout the immigrants of Germany and Great Britain, Brazil will never progress" (in Burns, 1980: 223<sup>30</sup>). He further suggested that the "pure blood of the Northern races" would "renovate our degenerate race." This immigration exploded during the last two decades of the nineteenth century and lasted until the third decade of the twentieth century.

By 1861, the majority of Afro-Brazilians were free and the trend towards gradual emancipation was hastened after the war with Paraguay (1864-1870). This war was especially significant because some 6,000 Afro-Brazilians received their freedom when they joined the militia (Burns, 1980: 259). Afro-Brazilian slaves could also take the place of their master or master's son, and receive their freedom as a result. Despite the promise of freedom, many of the soldiers who entered the militia were hardly volunteers (Graham,

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<sup>29</sup> Senator Cristiano Benedito Ottoni of Minas Gerais in 1871 explained "I know our rural districts, and I do not hesitate to affirm that at the present time, despite the better treatment of the slaves that began after workers grew scarce, not more than 25 to 30 percent of the children reach the age of eight. The scarcity of adolescent slaves is proof of great child mortality" (in Conrad, 1983: 100).

1990: 29; Silva, 1993: 19). The militia officers rounded up poor Brazilians and Afro-Brazilians and often coerced them into military service. Others, including free Afro-Brazilians, voluntarily entered the army as a means of consolidating their integration into society and to feel that they were truly citizens<sup>31</sup>.

Coffee became the most important crop in Brazil during the nineteenth century, and it was through its production, primarily in the southeast, and the growth of telegraph, trains, and technology that Brazilian elites became more exposed to international markets and ideas. Liberalism entered Brazil in the nineteenth century. But unlike the Liberalism of certain countries in Europe, but similar to Liberalism in the Dominican Republic, this was a Liberalism that coexisted quite comfortably with social hierarchies, and even slavery. Elites used Liberal ideas to push for independence and freedom of trade. Viotti da Costa contrasts the Liberalism of Europe with that of Brazil writing:

In Europe, liberalism had originally been a bourgeois ideology, an instrument in the struggle against the absolutist power of kings, the privileges of nobility, and the feudal institutions that inhibited economic development. But in Brazil, liberalism became the ideology of rural oligarchies, which found in the new ideas arguments they could use against the mother country. These men were primarily concerned with eliminating colonial institutions that restricted the landowners and merchants... (Viotti, 1985: 7)

Many of these Liberals supported the gradual abolition of slavery. In 1831, any person who married a free person was considered to be free. By 1869, the government prohibited any sale of slaves which would separate a husband from wife, or parent from child. In 1871, the Free Womb Law declared free children born of slave parents.

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<sup>30</sup> The Brazilian elite wanted the elites of German and Great Britain to migrate, but found that the largest populations to arrive were the Southern Europeans, which was certainly not the elites' first choice.

although their masters would be responsible for raising the children, and could request work of them. In 1885, the sexagenarian law was passed freeing slaves of sixty, conditionally, and those over sixty-four unconditionally. In 1872, the first national census showed that there were 4.2 million free Afro-Brazilians, compared with only 1.5 million slaves, and the free Afro-Brazilian population accounted for some 43 percent of the total population (Klein, 1986: 223<sup>32</sup>). When Princess Isabel, in the absence of her ailing father, Dom Pedro II, passed the Golden Law in 1888, somewhere between 600,000 and 723,000 slaves were freed, approximately 5 percent of the population of Brazil at the time (Carvalho, 1995: 36; Burns, 1980: 278).

In the 1880s, the abolition movement in Brazil began to articulate itself clearly<sup>33</sup>. Among the stronger arguments in favor of abolishing slavery was the fact that all other "civilized" countries had done so. The use of the word "civilized" was interesting since it had so consistently been used, in the past, to denigrate Indigenes and Afro-Brazilians. The most preeminent abolitionist, Joaquim Nabuco, wrote, "Brazil does not want to be a nation morally isolated, a leper, expelled from the world community. The esteem and respect of foreign nations are as valuable to us as they are to other people" (in Skidmore,

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<sup>31</sup> Eduardo da Silva's *Prince of the People* (1993) points to the figure of Cândido da Fonseca Galvão, a free Afro-Brazilian (*preto*) who entered into the war for just this purpose. Some of the letters written by Galvão, included in the appendices are particularly telling.

<sup>32</sup> Klein explains that by the 1780s there were only 30,000 free colored peoples in Saint-Domingue, Martinique and Guadeloupe, only 13,000 in the British West Indies, despite a population of 53,000 whites and 467,000 slaves, and 32,000 free colored in the United States, compared with 658,000 slaves and 1.3 million whites (Klein, 1986: 224).

<sup>33</sup> An interesting note is that while abolition was a position generally preferred by the Liberals, every major law which lessened the presence of slavery in Brazil was passed by Conservative congress. But as many scholars note there was little ideological difference between Liberals and Conservatives. In fact, the Viscount de Albuquerque commented that "there was nothing so like a Conservative as a Liberal in power" (Burns, 1980: 219), and the reverse could very easily have been said as well.

1993: 18)<sup>34</sup>. It should also be noted that abolition did not remove the power from social and racial relations in Brazilian society. Richard Graham writes, “[s]ince freedom was a gift from a superior to an inferior, not resulting from an agreement between equals, it exemplified the uneven exchange or bargain that characterized most relationships whether social or... political” (Graham, 1990: 27). Additionally, since Afro-Brazilians received their freedom most often from personal manumissions, and not from government legislation, the freedom of Afro-Brazilians was very clearly a personal gift.

Another idea that entered Brazil at this time was scientific racism. Henry Thomas Buckle, a British resident in Brazil during that period, theorized that miscegenation in Brazil degenerated all members of Brazilian society. Brazil, he wrote, has a “population totally mulatto, vitiated in its blood and spirit, and fearfully ugly” (in Skidmore, 1993: 30). While different forms of racial prejudice had existed in Brazil at various points, the presence of European foreigners in Brazil made Brazilians even more conscious of their race and their racial mixture. The French thinker Gobineau, perhaps the most famous author of scientific tracts on race at the end of the nineteenth century, wrote long polemics arguing that not only was the white race superior to the black one, but also that mixture of the two represented a perversion of both. In a similar vein, Georges Vacher de Lapouge wrote that Brazil was “an enormous *Negro* state on its way back to barbarism” (in Burns, 1980: 363).

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<sup>34</sup> Later in his autobiography, Nabuco seemed to confirm that his concern was not racial equality nor defending the racial heritage of the Brazilian people. He wrote “We Brazilians—and the same can be said for other American peoples—belong to America merely on a new and fluctuating layer of our mind, while we belong to Europe on all stratified levels. As soon as we acquire the least culture, the latter predominate over the former. Our imagination cannot fail to be European, that is, human” (Skidmore, 1993: 92).

The Europeans were not alone in noticing the degree of miscegenation in Brazil, Brazilian documents often reflected "some confusion: the same person might be marked down as white or mulatto in different official documents" (Mattoso, 1994: 192). At the same time, Brazilians responded to the charges of the scientific racists. Silvio Romero produced contradictory accounts which at once supported and rejected the arguments of Gobineau. Nina Rodrigues distinguished between civilized and inferior races, arguing that the latter could not be civilized (Skidmore, 1993: 36, 59). While many Brazilians were willing to accept the inferiority of Africans and Indians they believed that mulattos might represent an improvement on those races and "whitening" was considered a viable developmental strategy by elites (Skidmore, 1993: 64).

### **Dominican Republic (1882-1930)**

In 1882, Ulisses Heureaux, a mulatto of humble origins, came to power in the Dominican Republic, a position that he would occupy for the next seventeen years, through an authoritarian political system maintained by an extensive clientelist system of payoffs and excessive borrowing. Despite the existence of racial prejudice, Heureaux, like Luperón before him, was able to attain the position of president. Heureaux was far more of a dictator than a president, yet he felt the need to legitimize his rule by holding regular elections. While the elections were not necessarily fair, and his opponents often had to deal with overt interference and repression, Heureaux's maintenance of an institutional façade suggests that political institutions were recognized as important. However, Heureaux had little problem manipulating or ignoring institutions when it was

convenient, and his political support was based upon his cultivation of clienteles, not popular legitimacy<sup>35</sup>.

Although there were numerous rebellion attempts and failed invasions led by various Dominican elites outside of Heureaux's clienteles, the Heureaux period represented a period of significant political stability for the Dominican Republic, earning Heureaux the nickname *el pacificador* (the peace-maker). Heureaux invested heavily in developing and modernizing the country, giving large pay-offs to associates in the process. Railroad construction and the telegraph were both introduced during his regime (Bell, 1981: 58). His administration is also credited with works projects, such as the construction of irrigation canals and other modernizing reforms within the country's communications system (Wiarda and Kryzanek, 1982: 30).

The stability and modernization of the Heureaux regime created an environment that was more attractive for foreign investment, particularly in the area of sugar. But the sugar plantations required labor, and since both the wages and the hard labor involved in cutting cane were considered distasteful by many Dominicans, the government was forced to import labor. During the Heureaux period and for the years to follow, sugar cane production became increasingly dependent on labor from the British West Indies and from Haiti (Hochstetler, 1994: 97-108). These laborers were very poor, willing to work in dreadful conditions that most Dominicans could avoid, and were overwhelmingly dark-skinned. Thus, parallel to the ascendance of a white and foreign planter and elite class<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> In 1888, for example, after another dirty election, only 11,000 people, out of an electorate of 100,000 voted (Moya Pons, 1995: 268).

<sup>36</sup> As seen in the section on the Dominican Republic (1791-1882) in this chapter.

was the development of a dark, foreign, and, eventually, Haitian, labor force. This labor force was received by both xenophobia and racism (Hoetink, 1994: 108).

After Heureaux's assassination in 1899, politics became fairly unstable again<sup>37</sup>, and the Dominican Republic was saddled by debt that had accumulated during Heureaux's government. Additionally, the fiscal crisis prevented politicians from rewarding both supporters and opposition, which led to more instability and more insurrections. With the Dominican Republic's debt to foreign governments mounting, the United States guaranteed the debt of the Dominican Republic citing the Monroe Doctrine. To guarantee Dominican debt, the US took over the Dominican customs house, used 55 percent of the revenue to pay Dominican debt and for its collection staff, and gave 45 percent to the Dominican government. The Dominican Republic had little choice but to accept this arrangement, although it was a severe one since tariffs were almost the exclusive source of income for the Dominican government.

Between 1910 and 1916, the United States increased its presence in the Dominican Republic through its control over the exchange rate and almost all decisions involving the national economy. While the US brought stability to Dominican finances, the Dominican political system crumbled, especially without the monetary incentives traditionally used to maintain clienteles. A rebellion in 1914 was met with a stern reaction from the United States government which insisted that the rebels either lay down their arms or accept a government chosen by the US. The rebels assented, but peace was short-lived. Finally, in 1916, US marines invaded the Dominican Republic, as they had Haiti only one year earlier.

The US Marines governed the Dominican Republic for eight years. They immediately began an effort to disarm the population and censor the press. Disarming the population was accomplished fairly rapidly with the exception of the *gavilleros*, groups of isolated resistance fighters mostly in the east. Despite the censorship of the press, Dominican elites from all sides of the ideological spectrum began to take nationalist and anti-US positions, making the occupation less and less tenable.

In the meanwhile, US Marines were able to further the modernization projects of Heurax and to stabilize the political and economic systems. During the eight years, the first tax system in the country's history was implemented, a National Guard was created, and schools, sanitation, highways and mail service were improved. All this made it easier to govern the various regions of the Dominican Republic. But the accomplishments of the occupying government were not gifts, nor were they without cost. Repression remained high during the occupation. The US was able to consolidate controlling interest in many of the nation's industries, most notably sugar. Wiarda and Kryzanek note critically that the modernization projects of the Marines were

not so much the policies of an 'enlightened civilizer' as a 'pragmatic occupier.' Its 'modernization' of the Dominican Republic's land titles system allowed American sugar firms to expand their holdings, the new roads were designed to facilitate the mobility of the occupation military forces, and the public works projects were paid for with *Dominican pesos* (Wiarda and Kryzanek, 1982: 33, italics in original).

A negotiated settlement between Jacinto Peynado and Charles Evans Hughes called for elections to be held, under US observation, and the recognition of the debt incurred to the US during the US occupation. The winner of the elections was the aging

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<sup>37</sup> With the exception of the Cáceres period (1906-1911).

Horacio Vásquez who was able to win enough support to extend his term to six years, but was able to generate little support thereafter. Despite that, Moya Pons writes "[f]or the first time in Dominican history there appeared to be a government capable both of keeping order and of maintaining civil liberties" (Moya Pons, 1995: 350).

Since Dominican history in the eighteenth century was plagued by constant rebellions between political ins and outs, a priority for the US Marines was disarming the population and training a National Guard in order to instill a more professional police force and a more stable environment. Ironically, by disarming the population, the Marines left the population with little protection from the National Guard. Understanding the importance of military support, Vásquez made sure that his most loyal supporter, Rafael Trujillo, be the head of the National Army. And Trujillo was probably the most loyal Horacista, that is, until he removed Vásquez from office.

### **Brazil (1889-1930)**

The Empire of Brazil was overthrown by a peaceful military coup in 1889<sup>38</sup>, one year following general abolition, which launched a period of Republican government. Historian José Murilo de Carvalho has argued that the First Republic, was much less inclusive than the monarchy it replaced. For example, the Constitution of 1891 extended limited suffrage to all literate Brazilian men, yet some 86 percent of the population was illiterate in 1890, and 76 percent was still illiterate in 1920 (Andre..., 1991: 73, 276 n. 54). The literacy requirement not only removed large parts of the population from participation, but it concentrated the citizenry since literacy was highest, by far, in the southeastern and southern states. It is estimated that 50 percent of the electorate lived in

São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul. Not surprisingly São Paulo and Minas Gerais politicians began to dominate Brazilian politics. Additionally, the literacy requirement disenfranchised Afro-Brazilians, including the recently liberated ones, since the illiteracy rate among Afro-Brazilians was estimated to be nearly twice that of Euro-Brazilians (Andrew, 1991: 73).

The Brazilian military showed a remarkable respect for institutions and legitimacy and produced a constitution within less than two years of the coup which removed Dom Pedro II (Burns, 1980: 291). But at the same time, it is doubtful that too much consideration can be given to the institutions of the First Republic. Carvalho finds that while the voting levels during the monarchy were better than those in Europe and were close to those of the United States, voting under the First Republic decreased precipitously (Carvalho, 1995: 24-5). He estimates that between 10 and 11 percent of the total population voted prior to the creation of the First Republic, while only between 1 and 3 percent voted afterwards (Carvalho, 1987: 160). He explains this saying "[t]he people knew that the formal [the institutions of the republican government] was not serious. Not having a means of participation, the Republic was not for real" (Carvalho, 1987: 160). Rather, abstention was due to a lack of faith in political institutions, an awareness of the farcical nature of institutional power, the efficacy of clienteles, and a political system in which participation in official politics was an entirely alien affair.

Following the War with Paraguay, many uprooted poor and Afro-Brazilian soldiers who had fought returned not to their old plantations, but to the growing urban areas along the coast, most prominently Rio de Janeiro, and later São Paulo. Without

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<sup>38</sup> There was, however, considerable resistance in Bahia. (see Freyre, 1986).

money, these people squatted on land outside of the city in slums called *favelas*. During the First Republic, more Brazilians moved from the countryside and went to the cities, especially in the southeast. The informal and peripheral status of these migrants made their citizenship particularly problematic and left them with little protection. Again, as with the integration of former slaves, the government made no effort to facilitate the economic, political and social integration of the people living in these shanty-towns.

Authority remained linked to wealth and status. While the powerful in the southeastern states were immigrants, capitalists, industrialists and entrepreneurs, outside of these states power remained fairly concentrated among the older families. Two observations by English traveler James Bryce speak of the extent to which politics had not changed since the nineteenth century. In 1910, Bryce explained that the Brazilian planter lived “‘in a sort of semi-feudal patriarchal way’ in his ‘little principality,’” and that “‘there were no organized national political parties in Brazil and ...state issues crossed and warped federal issues, which in turn confused state policies” (in Burns, 1980: 279, 307). This attests to both the continued personal and unchecked authority of the planter, vis-à-vis his subjects, and to the stunted development of organized, national politics on an institutional level.

Although it began in the 1830s, European immigration to Brazil was most significant between 1889 and 1930. Between 1830 and 1930 some 3.5 million immigrants, mostly from southern Europe, settled in Brazil, the same number as Africans arriving in Brazil between 1550 and 1850. Immigration was mostly directed towards the southeast and the south, where the coffee economy was still booming, and where industry was beginning to grow. Demonstrative of this is the very high percentage of Euro-

Brazilians and the low percentage of Afro-Brazilians in the south and in São Paulo. In 1890, Anthony Marx notes that the mulatto population in the southeast was 24 percent, one half of that in the rest of Brazil (Marx, 1998: 66). Additionally, Marx points to the politics of census taking, which aimed at 'whitening' Brazil. In 1890, Euro-Brazilians were only 44 percent of the Brazilian population. However by 1950, the next time that race was included on the census<sup>39</sup>, they accounted for 62 percent of the population of Brazil (Marx, 1998: 163).

While Brazil was being whitened by the southern European immigrants, Afro-Brazilian citizens found that freedom from slavery was not necessarily real freedom. Their integration into the country's economy and society was slow and marred by strong prejudice, particularly in the southeast where employers preferred immigrant labor. Andrews writes, "Blacks were permitted to hold... gatherings as long as they kept to a specified area of the park or plaza. In a 1924 case in which several blacks attempted to enter a part of the public square traditionally reserved for whites, the mayor admitted that Afro-Brazilians had the legal right to use any part of the square, but in practice 'custom makes law'" (Andrews, 1991: 138). In so short a response the mayor was able to explain the frustration that Afro-Brazilians, particularly free ones, had been experiencing for many years. Legal status was subordinated by social status, and Afro-Brazilians were not socially equal to Euro-Brazilians, and so they could enjoy only an abridged form of citizenship.

Another brief incident explains how certain members of elite could surpass the expectations of their color. Additionally, the idea that their success contributed to the

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<sup>39</sup> Race was not included on the censuses of 1900 and 1920, probably because the government did not want

perception that they were "white" or "whitened," sustained the low status of given to Afro-Brazilians in general. After the death of Machado de Assis, one of Brazil's best authors, José Veríssimo wrote an article in homage to the literary giant in which he mentioned that Machado, like Veríssimo, was a mulatto. The great abolitionist Joaquim Nabuco was highly critical of this. "Nabuco... recommended the suppression of the word [mulatto], insisting that Machado would not have been pleased by it. 'Your article,' he wrote to Veríssimo,

is very beautiful but there is one sentence that caused me chills; 'Mulatto, he was indeed a Greek...' I would not have called Machado mulatto and I think that nothing would have hurt him more... I beg you to omit this remark when you convert your article into permanent form... For me Machado was white and I believe he thought so himself" (in Viotti da Costa, 1985: 241).

Thus the category of white could include, at times, mulattos, in order to shield those excellent individuals from the 'rabble' of Afro-Brazilians. This sort of individual negotiation of racial identity, rather than group contestation had been very present throughout Brazilian society, and it became even more prevalent as Brazil continued to modernize and urbanize, even though economic mobility of Afro-Brazilians, as a collectivity, remain very limited.

Political power shifted within the coffee aristocracy between Minas Gerais and São Paulo during most of the First Republic. But the alliance that kept the presidency within one of the two states fell apart as São Paulo grew hegemonic. With the support of the Minero aristocrats and a military supported coup, the southern politician Getulio Vargas came to power in 1930.

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to know the result, and there was no census conducted in 1910 and 1930 (Marx, 1998: 168).

## Conclusion

During the approximately four and a half centuries of history covered in this chapter, political institutions slowly evolved and were often subordinated to personal and private interests of *caudillos/caudilhos* and economic elites. The personalization of power undermined the legitimacy given to political institutions, and even political systems, while emphasizing the power of wealthy individuals. Neither abolition, nor independence, nor the institutionalization of elections and republican government in either country had very significant effects on the distribution of power within the political systems.

At the same time, over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, early forms of nationalism developed in which national identity was conceived in terms of the relation of citizens to one or more countries to which they aspired to be like or from which they insisted that they differed. In both countries, race played a very important role in both including and excluding nationals, although that role differed at different times in both countries. African heritage united the two American countries, especially in relation to the Iberian colonizers, however, independence and nation-state construction were the projects of creole elites who did not use African heritage as a unifying point. In fact, the elites did just the opposite, denying African influences and attempting to create European nations. Additionally, race relations, like all relations, were characterized by a combination of unequal power and status with paternal concern and control. In both countries, having African descent lessened one's legitimacy, literally, as a citizen, and yet that did not prevent individual mulattos and dark-skinned

Dominicans and Brazilians from occupying the most prominent positions in politics and literature.

What was considered "white" in both countries was quite fluid, although at times it was more static, such as when modernization began in the late nineteenth centuries in both countries. Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians who were successful could often be accepted as 'white,' with few people offering protest. What this suggests is that while miscegenation allowed many to enter the socially privileged space of light-skinned peoples, the social significance given to dark-skinned peoples was generally not positive. Thus miscegenation did not institute equality, especially since the sexual relations that were involved were often between people of very different levels of status. Additionally, abolition occurred without a fair integration of the newly freed people.

Finally, in both countries, it seems that there were periods when racial barriers were more stringent, diminishing mobility for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, as groups. The Spanish rule (1861-5), the rise of the sugar industry (1870-1914) and the US occupation (1916-24) opened up Dominican conceptions of race to European and American versions, which resulted in more clear forms of racial prejudice. Similarly, the increased presence of the southeastern coffee production made the Brazilians more familiar with European literature on Liberalism, as well as European 'scientific' conventions on race, very much affected the means by which Brazilians began to view race. This is not to say that racial prejudice in either country was essentially foreign, only that the type of prejudice that emerged was increasingly influenced by the scheme of European and Americans, particularly at the highest levels of society. Racial identity remained weak, however, and differences along color continued to be dominant.

### CHAPTER 3

#### RACE AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1930-1999) AND BRAZIL (1930-1999)

This chapter will continue to examine citizenship, race and the political systems of the Dominican Republic and Brazil, focusing on the last seven decades of the twentieth century. In this period certain social and political developments are especially important. First, the nation-state emerged in both countries as a legitimate and powerful institution, even if dominated by an individual, the military, or an elite class. The nation-state effected the entry of the masses into politics without compromising the order and hierarchy considered so critical by elites. Curiously enough, the most significant extensions of mass politics occurred during authoritarian and corporatist regimes.

Second, the nation became an integrative tool imposing an ideology which assumed integration, particularly of people of different colors. The assumption of a unified and homogeneous nation denied the possibility of racism or, for that matter, racial identification. Racial identification tended to be minimal, although discrimination along color lines did not disappear. Color was perceived in terms of shades, which therefore effected individuals, rather than racial categories, which involved collectivities. Within such a system mobility and ambiguity of identity was a salient factor. However, the degree to which individual mobility existed may be questioned, and certainly the collective perception of *negritud/e* remained reasonably static. Finally, as development, urbanization, and modernization occurred at unprecedented levels, the traditional differences between the extremes of the socio-political spectrum—Euro and Afro, rich

and poor, even men and women—were not mediated, and new democratic institutions have only had limited success in doing so. Persistent social, economic and political inequalities have been significant constraints during the most recent periods of democratization and liberalization in both countries.

### **Dominican Republic (1930-1961)**

Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, a mulatto of Spanish, Creole and Haitian descent, rose quickly through the National Guard formed by the US Marines to head the National Army. In 1930, through a *coup d'etat*, he became president of the Dominican Republic. While the United States was hesitant about supporting a man who had come to power through a coup, Trujillo immediately legitimized his rule by having an election in which he won some 99 percent of the votes cast<sup>1</sup> (Hartlyn, 1998: 91). Satisfied, but still ambivalent, the United States left Trujillo in power, a position he would enjoy for over three decades. Even critics of his regime within the Roosevelt administration were prevented from overtly opposing Trujillo because of the Good Neighbor Policy which ended US intervention in Latin America (Roorda, 1998).

During Trujillo's thirty-one year reign, the country went through tremendous transformations as the processes of urbanization, centralization, modernization and industrialization accelerated. Due in large part to the development which occurred during the US military occupation—the development of roads, the mail service, a tax system, the disarming of the population—Trujillo was able to build an efficient and powerful

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<sup>1</sup> There was a 45 percent abstention rate, however (Hartlyn, 1998: 40).

authoritarian state. Between 1938 and 1960 "the number of manufacturing establishments almost doubled; capital investment multiplied by 9 times; the number of workers and employees grew by 2.5 times...the national raw product used by the manufacturing sector also multiplied 14 times... industrial sales also multiplied more than 12 times from \$13.3 million to \$164.4 million" (Moya Pons, 1995: 363). Trujillo could point not only to the increase in investment and the many public works projects (which also enriched his family) but also to the Trujillo-Hull pact which returned control over customs receivership to the Dominican government. Trujillo won back the economic sovereignty of the Dominican Republic, and in 1947 he was able to pay off the country's debt to the United States.

But while Trujillo was concerned with constructing a powerful Dominican state, his primary interest was his own enrichment and monopolization of the wealth and power of the small country. For example, Trujillo raised tariffs on many foreign capitalists, particularly in the sugar industry, in order to pressure them into selling their plantations to him. Moya Pons reports that, within a short period, Trujillo monopolized the production of salt, meat, rice, and milk (Moya Pons, 1995: 359). And Trujillo's reach went beyond even this, entering into cashing checks and prostitution, and including a 10 percent deduction from wages of all workers who were members of the only political party, his Dominican Party (*Partido Dominicano*) (Moya Pons, 1995: 360; Betances, 1995: 99; Wiarda, 1975). By 1934, Trujillo was the richest man in the Dominican Republic and by the time of his assassination in 1961 he was among the richest men in the world (Moya Pons, 1995: 360, 365).

This was quite an accomplishment for the mulatto, born out of wedlock, rejected by Dominican aristocracy, and not admitted to their social clubs (Wucker, 1999: 45). A former plantation guard, telegraph operator, stable boy and pimp, he had been humiliated by the upper class on many occasions (Diederich, 1990). It is likely that this rejection led to Trujillo's attempt to crush the white social clubs, and also to his use of white powder to cover his face before appearing in public. It is not unimportant that Trujillo believed that white powder could make him more legitimate among the social circles which considered him an outsider, or that it made him seem more legitimate to the Dominican people, and the US. It is also likely that the rejection by the Euro-Dominican elites prompted his extreme narcissism and egomania which was evidenced by his love of titles<sup>2</sup>, the obscene number of monuments honoring him<sup>3</sup>, and changing the name of Santo Domingo to *Ciudad Trujillo* (Trujillo City) in 1936. Trujillo even proclaimed his son Ramfis a colonel at the age of four and brigadier general at nine, and his daughter Angela queen.

Trujillo built a regime that went beyond personal enrichment and authoritarian practices. The Trujillo regime was the regime that most closely approximated a totalitarian regime in Latin American history (Wiarda and Kryzanek, 1982: 37). More so than any dictator before him, and since, Trujillo extended his control into the most intimate aspects of his subjects' lives through a vicious intelligence service (SIM), high levels of surveillance, and through control over education and intellectual production

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<sup>2</sup> When he was president in the 1950s he was addressed thusly: His Excellency, the Generalissimo, Doctor Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, Honorable President of the Republic, Benefactor of the Nation, Restorer of the Financial Independence of the Country and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Hartlyn, 1998: 94).

<sup>3</sup> There were 1,870 monuments which honored Trujillo in Santo Domingo alone (Cambeira, 1997: 12).

(Hartlyn, 1998: 86). There were really no independent institutions or individuals who lived outside the dictator's tentacles, or who were safe from his wrath. In 1956, a former government employee, Jesús Galíndez, working on a dissertation on "The Era of Trujillo" at Columbia University was kidnapped, brought back to Santo Domingo, and "[i]nch by inch... was lowered into a vat of boiling water" later to be fed to a pool of sharks (Diederich, 1990: 9). Eduardo Galeano writes of Trujillo's reign of terror "[w]hen a piece of land interests him [Trujillo], he doesn't buy it; he occupies it. When a woman appeals to him, he doesn't seduce her; he just points" (Galeano, 1992: 106<sup>4</sup>). By 1959, Trujillo's regime became even more repressive. He killed three of the Mirabal sisters<sup>5</sup>, who were involved in anti-Trujillo activity, and, in 1960, he attempted to have Venezuelan president Rómulo Betancourt assassinated. The attempt failed, and after the Mirabal murders and the fall of Batista in Cuba in 1959, international pressure began to weaken Trujillo's stronghold.

Modernization allowed the Dominican state to reach into even the most remote areas of the country, most important of which was probably the border with Haiti. By the 1930s, "Haiti had become the main source of cane cutters for the Dominican Republic's cane growers" (Martinez, 1996: 2). The large numbers of foreigners involved in the labor force of the sugar mills as well as the use of Haitian *gourdes*<sup>6</sup> in the Cibão and the western parts of the Dominican Republic troubled Trujillo, and in 1933 he began a period of Dominicanization of the Dominican Republic. That year he passed a law which

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<sup>4</sup> Trujillo would point to women that he saw on the street and they would later be brought before him. Additionally, Trujillo felt no shame asking and expecting men seeking favors to offer their daughter's virginity to the Dictator. For more on this, see (Deiderich, 1990).

<sup>5</sup> Quite a number of works have surfaced recently dealing with the Mirabal sisters (Aquino García, 1996; Alvarez, 1995).

declared that 70 percent of laborers in cane fields had to be Dominican (Martinez, 1996: 44). When he received strong pressure from US multinational corporations, Trujillo allowed those mills to continue to use Haitian labor. In 1934, Trujillo had 8,000 Haitians deported (Wucker, 1999: 104), but it is estimated that some 52,000 Haitians were living in the Dominican Republic at that time (Maingot, 1992: 233).

In 1936, the Dominican foreign minister suggested that Trujillo be nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize, because of his work with Haiti, a suggestion that seems especially misguided considering the events of the following year. In 1937, after a visit to the border towns, Trujillo was reportedly shocked by the presence and influence of Haitians. He later ordered his soldiers to brutally eliminate the Haitians along the border, although anti-Haitian violence took place to a lesser extent in the sugar plantations in the east and south. Between 5,000 and 35,000 Haitians were killed during this massacre, most were killed by beatings, since gun shot wounds would have made it too obvious that it was the work of the army (Wucker, 1999: 48<sup>7</sup>). The official government account of the incident was that illegal Haitian squatters were killed by local Dominican peasants. In justifying the event, minister André Pastoriza explained ““illegal Haitian penetration seriously obstructed the Dominican government’s aim to improve the low Dominican standard of living; to defend the clean traditional customs of our citizens; to protect Dominican property on the frontier from Haitian bandits; and to preserve our racial superiority over them”” (in Roorda, 1998: 136).

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<sup>6</sup> Haitian currency. The Dominican currency at the time was US dollars.

<sup>7</sup> After international pressure forced Trujillo to recognize the incident, Trujillo agreed to pay the Haitian government \$750,000, but after some reported bribes, Trujillo paid only \$525,000 (Moya Pons, 1995: 369).

Under considerable international pressure, Trujillo decided not to run again for president in 1938, although he still controlled the government. He attempted to regain some international support by welcoming Jewish people who were fleeing Europe. By accepting the Jews, Trujillo took pressure off US President Roosevelt whose hands were tied due to the official neutral status of the United States vis-à-vis the war in Europe. Trujillo offered 100,000 visas to Jewish refugees fleeing Germany, and offered to settle them on his land on in the northern region of Sosúa. Trujillo's magnanimity might be questioned by his limits on married Jews, since he clearly was luring the Jews in order to whiten the population (Wucker, 1999: 57). In the end, only about 235 Jewish refugees settled in Sosúa (Roorda, 1998: 146). Additionally, during this period Trujillo encouraged European immigration, much as Brazil had done earlier. He explained "[t]he urgent need that the Dominican Republic has to attract people of the white race, particularly farmers of the Spanish race" in order to counterbalance "the excess of peoples of Haiti... [who created] complex and various problems with their clandestine invasion" (in Franco, 1992: 81). In 1937, Trujillo explained a new immigration policy which would facilitate such a process of "whitening." He writes "[a] great quantity of immigrants of the White race is needed. The immigrants shall be Spanish, Italian, and also of French origin. Immigrants of Caucasian stock shall pay a fee of six pesos for the residency permit and those not of such origin shall pay 500 pesos" (in Cambeira, 1997: 185).

The combined attempt to whiten the population, and to eliminate the Haitian presence in the island, became a fundamental cornerstone to Dominican national

identity<sup>8</sup>. And it was during the period of Trujillo's dictatorship that a conscious national identity was formed, propagandized and disseminated. "During the epoch of Trujillo, Dominican historiographers felt necessary, for the first time, to invent an official past" (Nuñez, 1990: 187<sup>9</sup>). To do this, Trujillo relied on a stable of intellectuals, most notably Manuel Arturo Peña Batlle and Joaquín Balaguer. His bevy of intellectual sycophants created the image of Trujillo as a warrior/hero who had finally vanquished the Haitian foe, who had defended *Dominicanidad* (Dominicanness) from the degeneration that Haiti represented, and who was leading the country into a new epoch.

The Trujillo period was one of the most important for the development of a national identity with a racial/racist component. Since the late 1880s, black foreign workers had been used in increasing levels by the sugar plantations. However, it was only by the 1920s and 1930s that the most predominant group among these laborers was Haitian. The growth of the sugar industry had led to the creation of a very small Euro-Dominican or American elite and a caste of foreign laborers of African descent. Cane cutting began to be thought of as Haitian labor, and the Haitian laborers occupied the lowest and most peripheral rung in Dominican society. The increased presence and denigration of the people of this caste transformed the dark-skinned Dominicans into

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<sup>8</sup> While some form of anti-Haitianism had been present in Dominican society, it did not become a significant part of Trujillo's nationalist ideology until 1937 (Dernby and Turits, 1992: 67).

<sup>9</sup> Ramonina Brea cleverly synthesizes the dominant form of historiography employed by the intellectuals of the Trujillo regime. She writes: "[t]he constant battles in the mountains, the political fragmentation that disseminates the caudilloist power all over the territory, the multiple foreign occupations and interventions, the difficulty of constructing an institutional power, are symptomatic aspects of the obstacles that made difficult the unification of the society, and, in turn, the emergence of the Dominican nation, and the constitution of a modern State" (Brea, 1988: 36). Given such a history, a heroic male figure was needed to unify the people and bring peace to the nation. Conveniently, Trujillo fit that description. For another analysis of this historiography see (Mateo, 1993; San Miguel, 1997; Moya Pons, 1995: 360).

“*morenos*” and “*mulatos*,” and the light-skinned Afro-Dominicans into “*indios*” (Indians), since only the Haitians were considered “*negro*.”

The ideologues of the Trujillo regime emphasized the chaos and violence before Trujillo, the massive works initiated by Trujillo, and most importantly, his heroic defense of the border, preventing the historic enemy from invading again. They emphasized the Spanish culture and the need to segregate that from the “African” culture on the other side of the island. Peña Battle writes “we should not forget that this is a Hispanic, Christian, and Catholic nation, that we are Dominicans, emerged pure and homogenous” (Peña Battle, 1943: 12). Other work by Peña Battle emphasizes the Hispanic purity of the Dominican nation (*Hispanidad*) and the sanctity of the border. He writes “[u]ntil Trujillo, no other Dominican governor had understood the phenomenon of the Dominican-Haitian frontier [and its importance vis-à-vis]... the juridical, political and economic life of Dominican nationality” (Peña Battle, 1943: 10); and “[t]he pauperization, misery and productive incapacity of four million angry beings on the extreme of the island.. constitute, necessarily, a permanent and tragic threat of massive penetration” (in Gratereaux, 1996: 14). These prejudices are echoed in Lizarazo’s *La isla iluminada* which explains that “[i]n as much as in the Dominican Republic the white predominates, the population of Haiti is integrally black... With the exception of some select groups... the intense majority of black Haitians represent a corner of Africa, in their most primitive form, over America” (Lizarazo, 1946: 97).

The intellectuals helped Trujillo produce a national myth which emphasized the Hispanic and Catholic aspects of the Dominican people, contrasted with pagan and

African Haiti<sup>10</sup>. Andrés L. Mateo writes that the ideology of Trujillo is best explained through "Messianism, Hispanism, Catholicism, Anti-Communism, ....! Anti-Haitianism" (Mateo, 1993: 136). The Hispanic, Mateo argues, was a metaphysical creation which was used to define the Haitian as the Other, and to serve as a unifying symbol for the Dominican people (Mateo, 1993: 31). But it is important to note that the Anti-Haitianism inherent in Dominican national identity, as posed by the Trujillo regime, was not only a nativist ideology, but also a racist one. Dominican historian Roberto Cassá writes "[p]robably the most important theoretical proposition which justified nationalism was racism" (Cassá, 1982: 764). The Dominican nation was a predominantly mulatto nation, which through its rejection of Haitians, was able to establish itself as culturally European, if not phenotypically so (Perez Cabral, 1965). The use of an ideology with racist overtones allowed for all Dominicans to be considered Hispanic in relation to Haitians, while also allowing Dominicans to distinguish amongst themselves based on their proximity to the abstractions of "Hispanidad" and "Haitianidad." Therefore, it could be argued that there was no racism within the Dominican, while at the same time racism was used to organize Dominican society through a hierarchical notion of place. This understanding continues to be dominant today.

Trujillo's policy of Dominicanization was not limited to the slaughter of black foreigners and the immigration of white ones. He invested heavily in integrating the frontier lands through construction and development projects, and by sending Church missions to the border towns (Balaguer, 1947). Dominicanization was also something

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<sup>10</sup> The Trujilloist image of Hispanismo was consistent with the conservative form of Hispanismo which became dominant following the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Fred Pike notes that prior to this date

that occurred in the rest of the country as Trujillo constructed and institutionalized a nation-state<sup>11</sup>. As Betances writes "[t]he Trujillo dictatorship consolidated the modern Dominican state and initiated national control over the economy" (Betances, 1995: 6). Through a national identity, Trujillo was able to include the entire population in the affairs of a nation and to weaken traditional regional isolation. Through a repressive political apparatus, however, Trujillo made sure that the inclusion of the populace did not mean an extension of civil and political rights. Citizenship was available only for his most trusted political and business allies. Civil and political rights for all others, particularly the poor, dark-skinned, and Haitians, did not exist.

Despite the Haitian massacre and the overt anti-Haitianism, the Dominican sugar plantations (CEA) depended upon Haitian labor. Recognizing the possibility for mutual gain Trujillo and Papa Doc entered into an agreement in 1952 which provided guaranteed labor for the CEA. The Dominican government was financially dependent upon sugar production, which required the low wages and lack of labor organization that Haitian migrants made possible. Simultaneously, the construction of a "Hispanic" national identity in the Dominican Republic depended on the Haitians serving as an Other, a ethnic/caste which represented the inverse of what the Dominican was.

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Hispanismo, had both liberal (secular) and conservative (Catholic) variants, which both posed the importance of Spanish culture and the authoritarian and hierarchical ordering of society (Pike, 1971).

<sup>11</sup> Trujillo, obviously, did not conjure a nation-state out of nothing. He relied upon much of the development of the Heureuax and Cáceres administrations, and the US Marine government.

## Brazil (1930-1964)

As remarked in the last chapter, the First Republic in Brazil (1880-1930) was even more exclusive than the monarchy. The new era of mass politics began with the rise of Getúlio Vargas through a popularly supported coup (Burns, 1980; Carvalho, 1995: 65). Mass politics, however, should not be confused with mass participation, and individual integration into a democratic political system. Although Vargas did not use a pluralist system to integrate individuals, he did extend the reach of the State through the construction of a corporatist state apparatus. The recognition of the need to enfranchise large portions of the population was similar to that of the Trujillo regime; however, the size of Brazil, its diversity and its relative institutional development made totalitarian rule impossible.

In contrast to the federal system of the First Republic which produced a weak central government, Vargas empowered the national government, particularly the executive. He saw a strong and efficient central state as the only way to achieve national unity and development (Reis, 1983: 13). During the various governments he led (1930-1945, 1950-4), he increased the role of the state in the national economy, created a large bureaucracy, and invested heavily in national industry. Economic policy was protectionist and populist, limiting foreign imports, aiding national producers, investing in construction and infrastructure projects, and raising wages (Page, 1995: 133). A Ministry of Labor was created and a series of pro-labor laws were enacted. Through a corporatist framework, Vargas used the State to channel worker demands while at the same time de-politicizing the growing (especially urban) worker population. He was able

to use a corporatist state and his personal charisma in order to engender a paternalist state, which was especially popular among the poor. Page writes "it was easy for Vargas to substitute the government as the authority figure that would take care of the needs of employees, just as the landlord or employer had done in the countryside" (Page, 1995: 203).

Vargas also expanded the voter base significantly by extending suffrage to eighteen year olds and working women who were literate, and provided for a secret ballot. However, he was not a democrat, and in 1937 he dissolved all political associations establishing, with the help of the military, the proto-fascist *Estado Novo* (New State). In radio addresses justifying the coup, Vargas emphasized his corporatist understanding of democracy saying that political parties were licentious, and democracy must be based on collective rather than individual rights. He explained "in periods of crisis, such as the one through which we are now passing, the democracy of parties... subverts the hierarchy, menaces the fatherland, and puts in danger the existence of the nation by exaggerating competition and igniting the fires of civil discourse" (in Burns, 1980: 407). He later asserted that the "decadence of liberal and individualistic democracy represents an incontrovertible fact... Individuals do not have rights; they have duties. Rights belong to the collective!" (in Burns, 1980: 410). Vargas's discourse met with little resistance.

Despite his authoritarianism, Vargas' government was the first government to institutionalize the nation as a collective and the state as an institution. The construction of the nation-state meant mass enfranchisement, even if this was not achieved through especially democratic procedures. The Brazilian historian José Murilo de Carvalho

writes “there was, at least, some process of formation of a Brazilian identity, to the extent that some movements of authentic political participation sprouted” (Carvalho, 1995: 66). Similarly, Elissa Pereira Reis writes “[a]s a constructed reality the nation provides for the ideological reconciliation between bureaucratic domination and social solidarity... It was... only within the authoritarian modernization experiment under Vargas (1930-45) that a national ideology gained relevance in politics” (Reis, 1983: 3). On a more concrete level, Vargas created political parties, which were used as vehicles for his populist propaganda, but which nevertheless continued to produce presidents after his death.

Vargas also dabbled with a nationalist rhetoric, including the 1931 Law of Nationalization of Labor<sup>12</sup>, which ended the century of European immigration. Among the principal beneficiaries of this law were Afro-Brazilians who had had a difficult time competing against the foreigners, especially in the southeast. But Vargas’s support from the Afro-Brazilian community went far deeper than this. He encouraged Afro-Brazilian culture, “such as samba, *candomblé*, and the spiritist *umbanda*, in which he reportedly participated. In 1934, he supported the first national Afro-Brazilian Congress. He signed the 1951 Arinas anti-discrimination law, and partially opened the civil service” (Marx, 1998: 170-1, italics in original). He also advocated the idea of “racial democracy” which would become Brazil’s single most important national ideology.

The concept of “racial democracy” is associated with Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre (1934) who challenged the scientific racism of the previous three to four decades. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he argued that the socio-economic position

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<sup>12</sup> The Law of Nationalization of Labor was part of Vargas’s nativist/nationalist policies. The law required that at least two-thirds of employees of any businesses, particularly industry, be native born Brazilians (Andrews, 1991: 147). This is similar to the legislation passed by Trujillo in 1934.

of Afro-Brazilians was not due to inherent biological problems, but due to the disturbing effects of slavery and the patriarchal system that it had engendered<sup>13</sup>. He argued that the true Brazilian was a mixture of the Portuguese, African and Indigenous races (although the influence of the first two were far greater than the last). In his *Casa Grande e Senzala* (The Masters and The Slaves), Freyre argues that due to the cultural disposition of the Portuguese, the climatic conditions of Brazil, widespread miscegenation and the cultural influence of the Africans, violence between whites and blacks was rare (Freyre, 1946: xiii). Freyre equated Brazilianization with racial and cultural hybridization (Freyre, 1946: lxiv), and suggested that the depth of hybridization made identities within Brazil plastic and fluid, contributing to a situation in which racial tensions were very rare. The notion that all races were peacefully integrated into a racial paradise, a naïve simplification of the work of Freyre, was propagated as the fundamental myth of Brazilian nationality. Afro-Brazilians identified themselves not as *negro*, Afro-Brazilian or mulatto, but as Brazilian.<sup>14</sup> Samba was considered to be Brazilian, not Afro-Brazilian.

Vargas also seemed to be very sympathetic to Afro-Brazilian politics. The São Paulo based *Frente Negra Brasileira* (Black Brazilian Front), the largest of several Afro-Brazilian organizations, mostly located in the southeast, supported Vargas, until, like all other political organizations, it was closed down in 1937. The relationship between the *Frente Negra* and Vargas deserves some mention. In one case, despite laws preventing discrimination in the civil service, the Civil Guard of São Paulo had an informal policy of preventing Afro-Brazilians from entering. When the law opened up the legal possibility

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<sup>13</sup> This view point was not readily accepted by all elements of the educated elite. One critic insisted that Freyre's discussion of the Portuguese colonist be separated from the "Negro," since the latter more properly belong among "beasts of burden" (Freyre, 1946: lxiii).

of the entrance of Afro-Brazilians, the commander of the Guard exclaimed "Now that blacks can enter, we can open the door to lepers and cripples" (in Andrews, 1991: 151). When it became clear that the Guard would not hire Afro-Brazilians, the *Frente Negra* "appealed directly to President Vargas, who, after receiving a delegation of the Front leadership, ordered the Guard to enlist immediately two hundred black recruits" (Andrews, 1991: 151).

Vargas's *Estado Novo* was cut short in 1945 by a military coup, which ushered in a twenty-year period of restricted democracy, wherein the military was an important political actor. In 1950, Vargas returned to power through direct elections. However, he found an active Congress which resisted much of his legislation. With very serious allegations of corruption against top aids and mounting pressure, Vargas composed a final literary work to define his legacy<sup>15</sup>, and then committed suicide. Juscelino Kubitschek was elected president in 1955 and promised 'fifty years of development in five.' During his regime Brazil continued its impressive economic growth, built schools, airports, hospitals, won the World Cup, invented and exported *Bossa Nova*, and began

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<sup>14</sup> The various novels of Jorge Amado present Brazilian culture as especially mulatto.

<sup>15</sup> Vargas wrote "Once more the forces and interests against the people are newly coordinated and raised against me... I follow the destiny that is imposed on me. After years of domination and looting by the international economic and financial groups, I made myself chief of an unconquerable revolution. I began the work of liberation and I instituted social liberty. I had to resign. I returned to govern on the arms of the people. A subterranean campaign of international groups joined with national groups revolting against the regime of worker's guarantees... I have fought month to month, day to day, hour to hour, resisting a constant aggression, unceasingly bearing it all in silence, forgetting all and renouncing myself to defend the people that now fall abandoned. I cannot give you more than my blood... I offer my life in the holocaust. I choose this means to be with you always. When they humiliate you, you will feel my soul suffering at your side. When hunger beats at your door, you will feel in your chests the energy for the fight for yourselves and your children. When they humiliate you, you will feel in my grief the force for reaction. My sacrifice will maintain you united, and my name will be your battle flag... I fought against the looting of Brazil. I fought against the looting of the people. I have fought bare-breasted. The hatred, infamy, and calumny did not beat down my spirit. I gave you my life. Now I offer my death. Nothing remains. Serenely I take the first step on the road to eternity and I leave to enter history" (Burns, 1980: 448)

construction on a new capital, Brasilia, all of which figured into a 'Golden Age' for Brazil, and particularly for Brazilian national identity.

Kubitschek's government was followed by Jânio Quadros, whose belligerent political style was countered by an obstructionist congress. Claiming the country ungovernable, he resigned, hoping that the country would beg him to rescind his resignation. Instead, his vice president, the popular, and populist, João Goulart, became president. Goulart's presidency encountered many obstacles, primarily from the military who considered Goulart a communist,<sup>16</sup> especially considering some of Goulart's radical policies as Vargas' Minister of Labor. Goulart's government witnessed a rise in inflation from 25 to 100 percent, as foreign loans dried up and the economy slowed (Eakin, 1998: 54). Increasing pressure applied by the military and the Right was met by Goulart's move farther towards the Left. He attempted to mobilize the masses in order to counter-balance the power of the military. When Goulart supported the unionization of lower ranks within the military, the military removed Goulart from office (Siquiera Wiarda, 1990: 182). One point that should be noted is that in 1963 when there was a plebiscite which would remove military limitations on the president, in effect since 1961, the Brazilian electorate voted five to one in favor of presidential autonomy (Eakin, 1998: 54). This was an unambiguous sign of support for democratic institutions, however, one year later, the military coup was met with little resistance.

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<sup>16</sup> He was in China at the time of Quadros' resignation.

## Dominican Republic (1961-1986)

After the 1961 assassination of Trujillo, the Dominican Republic suffered from a very significant power void. For a brief period, Ramfis Trujillo and other members of the Trujillo family attempted to maintain control of the country, while also investigating and murdering almost all of the members of the group that assassinated Trujillo. A changing environment in the United States and the Dominican Republic made a continuation of Trujillo family government unlikely, and puppet president Balaguer was able to encourage the Trujillo family's exit. Balaguer dissolved the *Partido Dominicano*, used its funds to reward friends and members of the armed services, and nationalized the vast lands and industries belonging to the Trujillo family (Moya Pons, 1995: 384). After Balaguer was exiled, a provisional government was set up to observe elections which were won by author and former exile Juan Bosch, and his Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). But some of his proposals seemed too radical for a military that remained very conservative, and for elites whose fears of a second Cuba were shared by the United States. After only seven months in power, the ineffective Bosch government fell to a military coup. Again, provisional governments were set up, but in 1965 a group of pro-Bosch supporters launched a counter-coup. That year, the United States invaded the Dominican Republic for the second time this century, and in 1966 instituted elections in which the US favored candidate, Joaquin Balaguer, former Trujillo ideologue and puppet president, won (Sanchez, 1992: 303).

Balaguer was elected president three consecutive times, although twice his opposition abstained from participation. During his twelve years, the Dominican

Republic had political parties, congressional assemblies, and a judiciary, as well as news agencies. The effectiveness and the freedom of these organs, however, is a point for debate. Balaguer promised order and “a path without danger” and spouted ideology consistent with that of the Trujillo regime. He relied on a mixture of economic nationalism, large works projects, centralized decision making, personalism, and an obsession with peace and order. He writes “Peace is the major good that a People can enjoy” (in Mateo, 1993: 117). Under Balaguer there was a relatively free press, and a more independent economic elite, and Balaguer was also less intimately connected to the Armed Forces than Trujillo (Hartlyn, 1998: 109). All this represented considerable progress following the thirty-one year dictatorship of Trujillo and the five years of instability since his assassination.

Nevertheless, Balaguer’s “path without danger” translated into a continuation of authoritarian policies and a very significant repression of all politically active members of the Left, particularly around elections. During the 1966 presidential campaign alone more than 350 political activists were killed, while candidate and former president Juan Bosch’s campaign was limited to radio messages broadcast from his house, since the military kept him under virtual house arrest. During the twelve years, Balaguer used classic carrot-stick incentives to the political opposition. Between 1966 and 1974, 3,000 political activists were murdered. At points, despite the regular elections and the constitutional appearance, Emilio Betances notes, it was not safe for Leftists to walk the streets (Betances, 1995: 119). At the same time, Moya Pons notes that an inordinate amount of Leftists, who were wholly unqualified, occupied academic and administrative positions at the growing Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (Moya Pons, 1995:

390-5). This was the softer side of Balaguer's authoritarian politics, the side dependent on large and inefficient state budgets.

Balaguer continued in the tradition of Trujillo, Heureaux, Santana, Báez, and other strong-men who ruled the Dominican Republic through a powerful executive and through public works projects which employed supporters and provided lucrative patronage for associates. "Public officials and high ranking military officers generously doled out contracts for public works among themselves, enjoyed exemptions for the tax-free import of all the consumer goods they desired, and became rich enough to play the roles of investor and entrepreneur in unfair competition with traditional commercial and industrial groups" (Moya Pons, 1995: 401-2). The projects of the Balaguer government were initially financed by massive amounts of US aid, however, aid gradually decreased as the Dominican economy grew at high rates.

In 1978, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) candidate Antonio Guzmán was elected president. Or at least, the voting favored the PRD candidate until members of the National Police closed voting polls and stopped the vote count (Sanchez, 1992: 309). A coup seemed inevitable. Pressure from US President Jimmy Carter prevented the coup and led to a settlement in which Guzmán was allowed to be president, while Balaguer's party (the Reformist Party—PR) gained four seats that it did not win, in order to maintain a majority in Congress (Espinal, 1998: 95).

That Balaguer was a candidate in the 1978 presidential elections, and that he tried to prevent fair and free elections, constituted nothing new in the Dominican Republic, considering the considerable precedent (1966, 1970, and 1974). However, there was something new and exciting about the fact that Balaguer was leaving office, even if his

party still maintained a majority in Congress. As Ramonina Brea et al write, "[t]he elections of 1978 not only marked a transition from semicompetitive to competitive elections but also an ascension to power of the PRD which allowed for an impulse of expansion of citizenship (e.g. respect for public liberties, more respect for civil rights, disarticulation of military groups ...) and democratization" (Brea et al, 1995: 86). But, as much as civil rights were more respected, and a more safe and democratic political environment was instituted, it did not take long for Guzmán to disappoint the electorate, as well as segments of his party.

Guzmán attempted to duplicate the patrimonial politics of Trujillo by not only relying on clientelism, a traditional and legitimate practice in the Dominican Republic, but also by involving his entire family in the government. In his first year in office Guzmán hired 8,000 people, and the public payroll swelled from 129,161 in 1978 to 201,301 in 1982. The public sector had grown so large that it accounted for 85 percent of the national budget, and Guzmán was forced to resorting to printing money (Moya Pons, 1995: 406).

Despite the disappointment with the Guzmán government, and Guzmán's suicide, the PRD candidate, Salvador Jorge Blanco, was elected president in 1982. Blanco promised to deepen Dominican democracy by instituting an "economic democracy." However, the debts and fiscal indiscipline of the previous administration and the debt crisis, which would soon hit all Latin America, forced belt-tightening. While publicly denying any negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and continuing to spout a rhetoric of economic democracy, the Blanco government was secretly involved in negotiating an austerity package with the IMF. The severe package accepted by the

Blanco government resulted in mass strikes, to which the government responded with harsh repression. One three-day uprising in 1984 challenged the government's economic turnaround, and led to 70 murders (Moya Pons, 1995: 415). During these strikes it remained unclear whether Santo Domingo Mayor and PRD Secretary-General José Francisco Peña Gómez was supporting his own government, criticizing his government's actions, or fomenting popular unrest.

In the midst of increasing political instability and economic crisis, Balaguer was elected in 1986, this time over PRD candidate Jacobo Majluta, by a margin of 40,000 votes. Balaguer represented, as he had said, a safe and predictable path. While it was true that he was no democrat, he offered stability, and people remembered how the economy grew during his administrations, averaging 7.6 percent growth between 1968 and 1974 (Hartlyn, 1998: 109). There was a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that the re-election of Balaguer was not a good sign in the democratization of the Dominican Republic, since his election meant a return to a centralized, personalized executive, and impotent institutions. Dominican sociologist Rosario Espinal explains "as with Trujillo, the Law under Balaguer did not really acquire any important position, and as always was subordinated to personal dictates, and it would have a limited effect on the conformation of the new political identities in Dominican society" (Espinal, 1987: 107). As corrupt as the PRD presidents were, government institutions, particularly Congress, seemed to be reasonably empowered. Guzmán and Blanco were also able to weaken the presence of Trujilloist officers within the armed forces, and the election of the two PRD politicians legitimated a transition to an electoral system.

The overwhelming presence of Balaguer, one of Trujillo's anti-Haitian and racist ideologues, for more than a decade during the twenty five years discussed in this section had considerable effects on the concretization of negative attitudes towards Haitians and Afro-Dominicans, although the agreement between the Haitian government and the CEA continued, even through PRD governments. History books and educational material continued to be dominated by terrifying portraits of the Haitian occupation and the various Haitian invasions in the nineteenth century.

During the Balaguer regime, new historical perspectives began to emerge, particularly those of Franklin Franco and Roberto Cassá, who emphasized the racist and anti-Haitian roots of Dominican national ideology. During the 1970s, a small group of "conscientized" Dominicans created a folkloric organization which celebrated native and African roots of Dominican culture. These intellectuals were able to capitalize on a shift in merengue, which had begun following the death of Trujillo, in which *merengueros* accentuated more "African" roots. Merengue, the national dance and so vital a part of national ideology, became increasingly "Africanized" as it left the parlor and, entered more clearly, the popular realm. Trujillo was actually responsible for much of this, ironically, since he destroyed many of the all Euro-Dominican social clubs. He also promoted merengue since he was a notoriously suave dancer, although he preferred a refined type of merengue, as opposed to the more rhythm-driven merengue which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.

Fradique Lizardo argued that "'merengue's origin is in Africa'" (Austerlitz, 1997: 3). This sentiment was not universally well received, and one composer called it "unpatriotic." "Afro-Dominican music found advocates also among members of the

*nueva canción* (new song) movement, which originated in Chile in the 1960s and spread throughout Latin America, using local music in the struggle against rightist authoritarian regimes, economic inequity, and U.S. imperialism.” (Austerlitz, 1997: 109). Also as the number of Dominicans living in New York increased, Dominican merengue adopted a more Afro-Caribbean sound (Austerlitz, 1997: 130).

There was a small “Black Soul” movement during the 1970s, following international cultural trends and production in other areas of the African diaspora. However, the political effects and the visibility of these people were limited. Simultaneously, there was the rise in the number prominent Afro-Dominican politicians. Most prominent among these is José Francisco Peña Gómez, who was the Secretary General of the PRD, the most powerful political party. However, it should be noted that Peña Gómez continually employed a class-based analysis, avoided discussions of race, and did not identify positively as an Afro-Dominican.

### **Brazil (1964-1985)**

The military coup that removed President Goulart in 1964 led to military government that would last for twenty-one years, the longest period of direct authoritarian rule in the Brazil’s modern history. While the regime was in no way as totalitarian as that of Trujillo, it was slightly more authoritarian than the Balaguer governments in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly between 1968 and 1974. Like Balaguer’s governments in the 1960s and 1970s, the military government in Brazil left a strong imprint on Brazilian

political culture, however, the military government was far more institutionalized than was the government of Balaguer.

Despite the military's criticism of Vargas, it adopted similar corporatist politics which were seen as means of incorporating different sections of Brazilian society, while at the same time limiting mobilization<sup>17</sup>. In this regard, it is interesting to note the military's attempt, through institutional means, to justify its rule. Brazilian political scientist Bolívar Lamounier explains:

[t]aking the period 1964-1984 as a whole and ignoring for a while certain moments of authoritarian exacerbation, three important democratic formalisms seem to have been at work... (1) an element of self-restraint on the part of the military institutions; (2) electoral rules and practices kept at an acceptable level of credibility, despite some manipulations; and (3) a clear (and after 1974 virtually unanimous) preference on the part of the opposition to play the electoral game and to avoid violent confrontation" (Lamounier, 1990: 112).

Elections were regular, although congress was fairly impotent, and opposition victories were increasingly recognized. The military also, oddly enough, passed a series of Institutional Acts, as a means of legitimizing what would otherwise be arbitrary authoritarian politics.

The first two Institutional Acts, passed in 1964 and 1965 respectively, gave the president the right to declare a state of siege, to intervene into states, to dissolve political parties, and to remove the political rights of persons considered to be threats to national security for a period of ten years (Burns, 1980: 508-515). What is striking about this is that the military used an institutional act to deprive citizens of their rights, but constrained

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<sup>17</sup> The military government was very much influenced, and was indeed advised, by Harvard professor of government, Samuel P. Huntington, whose 1968 *Political Order in Changing Societies* warned of the danger of too much mobilization without institutional means to peacefully channel it (Huntington, 1968).

its own authority by limiting these extraordinary powers to only ten years. Clearly the military government felt that its government had to be legitimized, although its legitimacy depended most heavily on the success of the economy which placated elites and discouraged mobilization against the regime.

The period of 1968 to 1974 was the most repressive period of modern Brazilian history<sup>18</sup>. Beginning with the Institutional Act 5, essentially institutionalizing mass censorship, this most violent period of military rule attempted to eliminate the very small subversive revolutionary groups, labeled "communists." During this period of repression, the military government benefited from remarkable growth rates. Between 1967 and 1973, the Brazilian economy grew at rates close to 11 percent per year<sup>19</sup>, inflation fell from 100 to 17 percent per year, and import-substitution-industrialization seemed to be paying off as domestic demand was growing (Eakin, 1998: 227). This growth, called the "Miracle," was halted by the increases in the price of oil in 1973 and 1977, since Brazil's industrialization was highly dependent on foreign petroleum. Nevertheless, the military was able to contain a passive population as long as the economy continued to grow.

The military also extended the reach of the nation-state through a variety of projects such as the construction of the Trans-Amazon highway, the Niteroi Bridge, and a nuclear power plant. The military government offered low-interest loans for citizens to buy television sets, a policy which extended the reach of national ideology (in a country

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At one point, the military considered trying to make its party (ARENA) serve as a hegemonic party, like the PRI in Mexico.

<sup>18</sup> It is significant that at least as late as 1968, the Brazilian military allowed Marxist literature to be easily available in academic book stores (Schwarz, 1992: 126-9). The most significant crackdown was between 1968 and 1974, but as Mattelart and Mattelart write "even when censorship was at its most repressive, particularly under the Medici government, it cannot be said that this totalizing/totalitarian project of a 'Ministry of Truth' was really concretized" (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1990: 57).

<sup>19</sup> The highest rate of growth in any country in the world with the exception of Japan.

where illiteracy rates were still very high) (Page, 1995: 169). The promotion of national identity in an authoritarian context meant that national identity became synonymous with national security. In 1968, Professors Florestan Fernandes, Octávio Ianni and Fernando Henrique Cardoso were removed from their positions at the University of São Paulo ostensibly because their sociological research asserted that Brazil was not a racial democracy. "In 1969 Brazil's National Security Council identified studies and reports on racial discrimination in that country as subversion" (Fontaine, 1985: 2). The 1970 census did not contain the category of race, and by the end of the decade the US based InterAmerican foundation was pressured into eliminating all research on race in Brazil, and eventually was "expelled" (Skidmore, 1992: 10).

National identity revolved around the belief that racial identity was not salient in Brazil, and if Afro-Brazilians were more likely to be illiterate, poor, etc, it was a consequence of their economic class, and not the result of racial prejudice. Florestan Fernandes and a team of scholars funded by UNESCO in the late 1950s and early 1960s challenged this idea, although the number of people aware of this criticism was relatively small. Afro-Brazilians continued to identify, in general, as Brazilian, and did not speak out or complain about racial discrimination. A growing group of new scholars in the 1970s began to view this as a matter of ideological hegemony. Afro-Brazilians, they argued, fooled themselves into accepting the idea of racial democracy, when it was clear that this was only a "myth." Carlos Hasenbalg argued that the combination of an ideology of whitening and the idea that racism is absent in Brazil, was "a legitimizing mechanism destined to absorb tensions... a means of anticipating and controlling certain areas of social conflict" (Hasenbalg, 1998: 115).

Hasenbalg writes that the “social perception of race according to a continuum, of shades of color, had led to a fragmentation of racial identities” (Hasenbalg, 1996: 165). Nelson do Valle Silva in 1979 explained that the belief that *pardos* are treated better than *pretos* was not supported by statistical evidence which showed that *pardos* fared only slightly better than *pretos*, and far worse than *brancos* (Valle Silva, 1979). Nevertheless, despite academic falsifications of the “myth of racial democracy,”<sup>20</sup> the majority of Brazil’s population accepted the idea of race/color conceived of as a continuum, and that there was little racial prejudice in Brazil. Comparisons with the United States were common, although the lessons learned diverged. Afro-Brazilian activists claimed that the goals of US civil rights leaders in the 1960s was similar to those that they were trying to consolidate. The populace, in general, saw a very frightening situation and a country in a virtual civil war over racial distinctions, which appeared to be wholly different from the experience of daily life in Brazil.

By the late 1970s, as the Military regime began to liberalize, there was a swell of local organizations which focused on identity politics and mobilization. Middle class Afro-Brazilians were finding that they were marginalized in the state universities and in the companies that employed them<sup>21</sup>. In the year of the ninetieth anniversary of the abolition of slavery, São Paulo black activists attempted to create a “black” movement. After the murder of an Afro-Brazilian worker by police officers, and the removal of four Afro-Brazilian volleyball players from a social club, the newly formed *Movimento Negro Unificado* (MNU, Unified Black Movement) was able to garner some support. The MNU also promoted Afro-Brazilian culture, following the “Black Soul” movement and

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<sup>20</sup> (Spanakos, 1999a).

employed a “Black is Beautiful” rhetoric. Prior to the formation of the MNU there had been several small Afro-Brazilian organizations, academic programs, and even exchange programs with Africa, which sprouted up in different cities across the country.

During the Geisel (1974-8) and Figueiredo (1979-85) administrations the Brazilian government allowed for a gradual *abertura* (opening process) in which the government reduced repression and opened limited space for opposition. But the government was not willing to give up power without a fight. In 1984, the government party drafted a bill delaying direct elections in Brazil. The response to this was immediate and unanimous as large rallies filled the streets of Brazil demanding “direct elections now” (*diretas já*). The government proposal failed, and Tancredo Neves, the opposition’s candidate, was elected by the electoral college in 1985. One interesting sign of change and democratization was that, in 1982, the state of Alagoas, where the Kingdom of Palmares once stood, began Project Zumbi, a program which offered education about Afro-Brazilian history and themes in schools. Other such projects began to appear in other cities, most prominently São Paulo, whose Project Zumbi featured films, conferences, exhibits and other educational programs (Andrews, 1991: 218).

### **Dominican Republic (1986-1999)**

Balaguer returned in 1986 and immediately suspended debt payments, ignored the recommendations of the IMF, and pursued an aggressive campaign accusing former president Jorge Blanco of corruption. By attacking Blanco so intensely, Balaguer

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<sup>21</sup> Interview with Amaury Mendes, 14<sup>th</sup> of October, 1998.

diverted attention away from the pressing economic problems, while at the same time setting up a fall guy whose personal greed was responsible for the crisis. Balaguer then returned to high public spending and mass employment projects which sparked a boom in the economy (Moya Pons, 1995: 427). But this boom was ephemeral and Balaguer resorted to printing money, which led to high inflation rates, the overvaluation of the peso and a decrease in foreign investment.

Reelecting Balaguer meant a return to a well-known politics, which would “deepen the lack of institutionality and the personalization of the state” (Brea et al, 1995: 100). This was obvious by his investment in pharaonic projects, such as the multi-million dollar Columbus Lighthouse<sup>22</sup>, and by his designation of Haitians as “Others.” Although Balaguer had always been consistent in his disdain for Haitians, in 1986 the formal agreement between the Dominican Republic and Haiti over Haitian labor ended (Wucker, 1999: 95). The numbers of Haitians willing to live in deplorable conditions did not decrease, although they now had even less protection and legal status than they did during the 34 years of official agreement between the two governments.

In 1985, Balaguer published *La isla al revés* (“The Island Upside Down”), an updated version of his *La realidad dominicana* (“The Dominican Reality”), in order to assert Dominican nationalism, reinforce Dominican fear and hatred towards Haitians, and thus reinforce his own popularity. The timing was particularly relevant since Balaguer used his stereotypical and offensive portrayal of Haitians to discredit José Francisco Peña Gómez, the dark-skinned PRD leader and former mayor of Santo Domingo, who was believed to be of Haitian descent. Peña Gómez, a very emotional speaker, was blamed by

many for inciting the riots in 1984, a view that Balaguer seemed to suggest through racial stereotypes which linked Haitians to violence and degenerate behavior.

Balaguer argued that "Santo Domingo is, by instinct of conservation, the most Spanish and traditional Pueblo in America" (Balaguer, 1985: 63). Despite its ability to conserve its *Hispanidad*, "contact with the black [i.e. 'Haitian'] has contributed, without a single doubt, to the relaxing of our public customs," which results in "the progressive ethnic decadence of the Dominican population..." (Balaguer, 1985: 45). Balaguer also explained that the difference between Dominicans and Haitians is not exclusively cultural, but also biological, writing "[t]he excess of population in Haiti constitutes... an increasing threat to the Dominican Republic. That is for a biological reason: the black abandoned to his instincts and without the reserve that a level of relatively elevated life imposes in all countries to reproduction, he multiplies almost in a similar way to a certain species of vegetables" (Balaguer, 1985: 37). Balaguer's "scientific" treatise declared that "the Ethiopian race [either Haitians or blacks<sup>23</sup>] is by nature indolent and does not apply its force to a single useful objective, except when it needs to do so for its own subsistence" (Balaguer, 1985: 52).

Balaguer's argument is unclear since it seems difficult to believe that Dominicans are the most Hispanic people in the Americas and that Dominicans have devolved because of the cultural exchanges with Haitians. While Balaguer recognizes that Dominicans are of mixed blood, he seems to use the terms "Haitian," "*negro*" and the "Ethiopian race" fairly synonymously suggesting that Dominicans are light-skinned

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<sup>22</sup> The Columbus Lighthouse was constructed in celebration of the 500<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Columbus's arrival on Hispaniola. For more on the project see (Ferguson 1992).

mulattos who are culturally Spanish, while Haitians are blacks who are culturally African. Regardless, it is clear that Balaguer's prejudice goes beyond simply nativism and includes his stereotypical and demeaning portrayal of "blacks." What is also clear is that Balaguer's prejudices are not simply literary, and that he used his position as president to continue the victimization of Haitian laborers. During one three week stretch in 1991 Balaguer issued the deportations of some 50,000 Haitians (Ferguson, 1992: 89).

When Balaguer returned to power in 1986, he surprised few people with his lack of respect for institutions and elections. "As opposed to the PRD which played the role of the articulator of social demands and proponents of the extension of citizenship, the PR [Balaguer's party] formed part of a 'disarticulating project, atomizing and depoliticizing the masses' in that 'reform only was capable of being an instrument of a pauperizing and corrupt clientelism'" (Espinal in Brea et al, 1995: 85). Balaguer narrowly won the elections in 1986, 1990 and 1994, a tribute to his brilliant ability to manipulate political situations, such as the 1991 coup in Haiti, the US embargo and the 1994 US intervention, to maintain power, even when he had clearly lost and violated the law. In 1990, the official margin of victory showed him beating Juan Bosch by fewer than 25,000 votes. Four years later, he won, over Peña Gómez, by only 0.7 percent of the votes (Espinal, 1998: 106). In both cases, accusations of electoral fraud were rampant and very credible. In 1994, many scholars, NGOs, and international monitors, including former US congressman Stephen Solarz, spoke out against the fraudulent elections.

The pressure that followed the 1994 elections led to the passage of a law which prevented immediate reelection for the president, and to a negotiated settlement in which

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<sup>23</sup> Balaguer could be referring to either Haitians, blacks, or both. It is not entirely clear. It is clear,

Balaguer agreed to a two-year term of office and to hold elections in 1996. The 1996 elections were the first elections in over three decades in which Balaguer was not a candidate and had no chance of winning, although it was not clear whether he was actually going to leave power. In the end, Balaguer refused to support his party's candidate, Jacinto Peynado, and in the second round of the election he supported Juan Bosch's protégé Leonel Fernandez. Fernandez and Balaguer formed a "Patriotic Alliance" (*Frente Patriótico*) which was clearly yet another attempt to undermine the "nationality" of Peña Gómez, and Fernandez emerged victorious from what was probably the most fair presidential election in Dominican history. Fernandez won with 51.2 percent of the electorate, compared to Peña Gómez's 48.8 percent (Espinal, 1998: 110).

### **Brazil (1985-1999)**

The promise of Brazil's democratization quickly turned to dismay with the sudden death of president-elect Tancredo Neves in April of 1985, and the ascent to the presidency of José Sarney. Sarney had been a member of the government party (now called the PDS) who left in 1984 to join the *Frente Liberal*. Unlike Neves, who had the backing of the MDB, the largest political party, and who was elected by popular vote, Sarney had no real base for his political power. Since Sarney was the candidate of few people, he had virtually no mandate when he entered office and faced an intimidating military institution, which had just surrendered power after twenty years of rule, and a newly empowered Congress which saw him as a weak president.

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however, that this comment was not aimed, specifically, at the subjects of the Ethiopian state.

Brazil was faced with several daunting economic problems—massive debt, high inflation, and an abundance of inefficient and costly state bureaucracies. Civilian politicians, who had finally achieved power since the military retreat to the barracks, would not allow the economic crisis to interfere with their promises and their personal ambitions, which required the doling out of patronage. State agencies were among the most abused institutions. Brazil had one of the most statist economies outside the communist world due to decades of economic nationalism, and to the traditional practice of using public agencies as sites for patronage. Not only were bureaucracies a means of staving unemployment of the politically connected, they were considerably corrupt. Brazil was rated by the German non-governmental organization Transparency International as one of the most corrupt countries included in their survey (Eakin, 1998: 204). Brazilianist Joseph Page explains that much of this corruption is in the relations between state agencies and industries and politicians. Businessmen overcharge the government and, in turn, use part of the profit to reward the politicians who awarded them the contracts initially (Page, 1995: 122<sup>24</sup>).

The first directly elected presidency in Brazil ended as inauspiciously as the first indirectly elected one had. The young and charismatic Fernando Collor de Mello became president at the age of 40, defeating long time Leftist, and brother-in-law of João Goulart, Leonel Brizola, and the leader of the relatively new Worker's Party, Luís (Lula) Ignácio da Silva. Collor's campaign capitalized on his heroic battles against corruption in his home state of Alagoas. During Collor's two years he was able to briefly gain success fighting inflation, although his economic team's radical measures failed and the economic

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<sup>24</sup> This seems to be a practice that has continued.

crisis soon worsened. Ironically, Collor was the first president impeached and removed from office in the history of the Western Hemisphere because of very serious allegations of corruption, made by his brother.

Itamar Franco's presidency<sup>25</sup> was marred by a similar inability to control inflation and the economic crisis, until his selection of sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso as Minister of the Economy in 1994. Cardoso's economic plan brought down inflation while introducing a new currency, something previously attempted during the Sarney and Collor governments. Cardoso's plan, the Real Plan, was so successful that Cardoso became president in 1994, beating da Silva handily in the first round of elections. Cardoso's four years were characterized by adjustments to neo-liberal plans, negotiations which allowed for limited privatization of some companies, an increase in foreign investment, a decrease in tariffs and obstacles for foreign investors, and a controversial amendment which allowed for presidential re-election. Despite the Mexican crisis of 1994, and the Asian and Russian crises of 1997 and 1998, Cardoso's economic team was able to maintain inflation at a very low rate and limit devaluation by maintaining high interest rates and spending government reserves of dollars. With the crisis in Asia deepening and threatening Brazil, Cardoso defeated da Silva for a second time in the presidential elections of 1998, also in the first round.

Afro-Brazilian mobilization probably peaked between the celebration/contestation of the centenary of the abolition of slavery in 1988, and the three hundred year anniversary of the death of Zumbi, the legendary last king of Palmares who died in 1695. In 1988, "President Sarney used the opportunity [of the centenary of the abolition of

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<sup>25</sup> Franco was Collor's vice president. He assumed the presidency in 1992.

slavery] to embrace the African component of Brazilian culture... in the state of Rio de Janeiro, the PDT established a Secretariat for the Promotion and Defense of Afro-Brazilian headed by [Abdias] do Nascimento" (Marx, 1998: 261). The Movimento Negro seized the opportunity to organize protests and marches throughout the country in which they called abolition "an act of political romanticism" (Fernandes, 1989: 78). Others argued that the abolition was a farce, slavery still existed, and the holiday that should be celebrated was the death of Zumbi (20, November). However, the politicized members of the MNU have been unable to maintain the success of that period due to a lack of identification among Afro-Brazilians with the radicalism of the MNU (Burdick, 1998) and the persistent belief that racism does not exist in Brazil.

Despite the belief that racism does not exist in Brazil, statistics suggest that the life chances for Afro-Brazilians are far lower than Euro-Brazilians (Wood and Lovell, 1998), the number of Afro-Brazilian students enrolled in universities is disproportionately low (Silva, 1998: 164), and the number of Afro-Brazilians who are killed by police officers is disproportionately high (Fagundes and Aquino, 1997: 19). Despite the Caó law, which sets constitutional punishments for racial discrimination, and other formal attempts to penalize racism, two major problems exist: there is no consensus on when an incident is racist since the race of the people involved is not always clear; and preventing racism faces a severe obstacle from informal, social and political perceptions. As Teresa Caldeira notes, the 'criminal' in Brazil is associated with "the poor, with black people, with migrants from the Northeast of Brazil, with single mothers, with consumers of drugs, with promiscuity, and with *corticós* and *favelas*" (Caldeira, 1996: 201). Given the assumption that Afro-Brazilian have lower class culture, poverty, crime and violence, it is

easy to see why many Afro-Brazilians do not identify as Afro-Brazilian, as well as why police officers are more likely to harass, arrest, torture, and even kill Afro-Brazilians. It is also easy to see how Afro-Brazilians who “whiten” themselves, i.e. are educated and/or wealthy, may be considered to be Brazilian and not Afro-Brazilian by Euro-Brazilians, or by other Afro-Brazilians. But this does not mean that they are accepted as full members of society, and are not the victims of prejudice.

## **Conclusion**

The growth of a nation-state has been central to the many unsuccessful attempts to build democratic government in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, and particularly in terms of developing citizenship in terms of rights and positive freedoms for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. The nation-state in both countries was truly built and institutionalized by authoritarian governments. Thus, the increased capacity of the government to implement policies occurred during non-democratic governments. Worse still, increased capacity was often linked to a lack of self-constraint on the part of government. The most critical difference between the two countries in this regard is that the authoritarian state in the Dominican Republic under Trujillo and Balaguer was especially personalist, or “sultanistic” (see Hartlyn, 1998a, 1998b). Only Getulio Vargas could claim the sort of deference that Trujillo and Balaguer received, although personalism was very much a factor in local Brazilian politics. Brazilian authoritarianism was less personalist and far more institutional than Dominican authoritarianism. Vargas did not have the powers that completely eclipsed institutions in the way that Trujillo did,

and even at its most brutal, the military government in Brazil limited its own authority and even made very careful notes records about torture<sup>26</sup>.

The common denominator between the two countries is that corporatism was used as a means to build a homogenous nation and an ordered state. Democracy was often supported by elites, especially in Brazil, as long as it was a restrictive democracy. Mass mobilization meant the politicization of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, and the specter (realistic or not) of Revolution encouraged elite support of authoritarianism, dictatorship and/or military rule. Contesting politics and opening political space for the most marginal members of society was seen as a threat to stability, far more dangerous than simply an opposition victory. Bosch's election in 1962, the counter-coup in 1965 and the election of Guzmán in 1978 raised significant fears among elites, much as did Vargas' popularity among the poor, particularly labor. Goulart's radicalization of the political sphere, and eventually, to a lesser extent, Brizola and da Silva's campaigns in 1989. That the class and color element of the "marginal" populations commingle is not surprising, given the perception of race in the two countries.

During the past seven decades race in the two countries has been conceived of in terms of a color continuum. People consistently identified themselves along a color scheme, and not through the use of racial categories, and they did not recognize the existence of racial discrimination. However, discrimination along color lines has been clear, whether it was Trujillo's destruction of the Euro-Dominican social clubs, or his support of the "whitening" ideal by powdering his face before public speeches. Both countries encouraged immigration to further "whiten" the population, although Brazil was

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<sup>26</sup> See (Weschler, 1990).

far more successful in this regard. At the same time, during the 1930s and 1940s a national ideology which denied the existence (in the Dominican Republic) and the salience (in Brazil) of racial identity was propagated. The Hispanic ideology of Dominican nationality argued that the Dominicans were culturally Spanish and European, even if there was some racial mixture. Racial discrimination was not possible since there was only one race in the Dominican Republic. Similarly, Brazilians began to believe that their country was one in which miscegenation made racial divisions more mild than in other parts of the world, and that Brazilian national identity was very much based on the legacy of its African, European and Indigenous ancestors.

Even if these nationalist "fictions" were believed in both countries, which they were, it was also clear that those along the lighter end of the color spectrum were more likely to be better educated, better paid, etc. Poor Haitians made up a *negro* caste in the Dominican Republic, and although Dominicans often considered dark-skinned Dominicans to be "*morenos*" and not "*negros*," dark-skinned Dominicans predominated among the poor, and often occupied the most marginal positions in the economy alongside Haitian migrants and residents. Brazil's *favelas* (shanty-towns) are perceptibly darker than its middle class neighborhoods. While it is true that miscegenation was and is high in Brazil, it is also true that the extremes—the poorest and richest sections of the population—tend to be very ethnically homogenous. The same holds true of the Dominican Republic.

There is individual mobility, often considerable, for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. Mobility tends to be greatest for those who are mulatto, rather than very dark, and for those among the lower and the lower middle classes. Mobility correlates with the

idea of "whitening," which is conceived of as a means of advancing in a modern, capitalist society. Various strategies, lightening the color or straightening one's hair, increased education, high paying jobs, marrying someone wealthy or lighter than oneself, are typical examples of what has pejoratively been called "whitening." When economic or educational success is defined in terms of color, it is clear that the mobility of the individual Afro-Dominican or Afro-Brazilian is contingent on their being an exception or different from the stereotype of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. Therefore, the exception reinforces the marginalization of the rule.

One final note about race in the two countries is that the idea of authority within the political cultures in both countries is based on an understanding of politics which is especially hierarchical and corporatist. Each person, group, or sector of the population serves a specific purpose, but it is also given a certain value within society. Dominicans and Brazilians have a specific "place" in the order of their social and political systems, and various members of society or institutions of government, such as the police, the military and the courts, will remind other members of their status should the former forget. This idea of place most clearly limits the citizenship of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians who are generally assumed to occupy the positions of lowest status among citizens.

**PART III**  
**LIBERAL AND REPUBLICAN CITIZENSHIP**  
**IN CONTEMPORARY DOMINICAN**  
**AND BRAZILIAN POLITICS**

The previous section (chapters 2 and 3) discussed the historical conditions under which race and citizenship have been conceived in the Dominican Republic and Brazil. These chapters are included in order to give insight into the hierarchical socio-economic, cultural, and political systems which have been democratizing, on and off, for the last two decades. It is critical to begin by understanding that one's identification by color (generally not race) is determined by context and not by one's positive and inevitable commitment to a specific "race." However, although Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians do not always identify and are not always identified as Afro-Dominican or Afro-Brazilian, discrimination and persecution are not uncommon. This has considerable consequences for democratization as it limits the extent to which Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians can exercise democratic citizenship, whether defined as Liberal or Republican.

This next section examines the extent to which Liberal and Republican notions of citizenship apply to Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. While the presentation of the cases in the previous section was used to follow the significance of race and citizenship in each country's specific history, so as to avoid making uninformed generalities about history and culture, the two chapters in this section are more explicitly comparative. The goal is not only to present evidence that addresses the (lack of) institutionalization of citizenship for Afro-Dominicans and/or Afro-Brazilians, but also to compare the two

cases. Such a comparison gives insight into countries with significantly large (demographically speaking) racial groups who consistently suffer discrimination yet do not organize politically along "racial" lines. It also gives the opportunity for the successes and failures in either country to contribute to a more general knowledge and to aid in the construction of new strategies.

Democratization literature often cites citizenship as an important variable, although rarely do comparative and empiricist scholars invoke the theoretical categories of Liberal or Republican citizenship. However, the division underlies some of the more fundamental work and debates in the area. The most obvious example is the debate over whether democracy should be understood and analyzed on the basis of procedural or substantive claims. Advocates of the former pose that democracy's strength lie in the institutional and legal procedures that ensure universal political and civil rights. Advocates of this point subscribe to the Dahlian vision of polyarchy as the minimal set of institutional arrangements necessary for democracy. Proceduralists are not alone in their advocacy of a minimum set of recognizable and enforceable rights, as New Institutionalists support similar claims, and, although the scholars in the above groups do not always cite them, so do classical Liberal, libertarian and neo-liberal theorists.

Republicans who argue that democracy must make more substantive claims would insist that democratic procedures, institutions and rights are not enough to maintain democracy if they are not enforceable. These scholars choose more maximal visions of democracy which propose not merely elections, and free press, but also attention to socio-economic disparities and alienation. Substantivists are joined by those who study political culture as well as a host of post-Marxists who argue that socio-

cultural norms and economic inequalities can negate even the most progressive and democratic laws. Although these scholars almost never make reference to Republican theory, their understanding of citizenship, as a praxis through which individual members of political community can constitute their own rights while also constructing their own political reality, seems to be quite similar.

A study of Liberal citizenship, conceived in terms of civil and political rights, as outlined in chapter 1, is conducted in chapter 4. Liberal ideas within the sub-field of democratization studies are considered and then some preliminary comparisons between the two countries will be made. Empirical evidence from the two countries is then presented, detailing the respect and violation of civil and political rights of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. Finally, the evidence from the two countries is compared and some evaluations about the quality of, and the possible improvement of, Liberal citizenship for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians are considered.

Chapter 5 examines the extent to which Republican citizenship, in terms of political agency and activity, exists for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. Like chapter 4, chapter 5 begins with Republican ideas advanced by literature on democratization before moving to a brief contextualization of Republican citizenship in the two countries. This is followed by empirical evidence from the two countries, particularly addressing the role of NGOs in increasing self-conscious identification as *negro*, and mobilizing Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians along political lines. The chapter concludes by comparing the successes and failures of groups in both countries to attract Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, as well as to improve the conditions of Republican citizenship for both groups.

## CHAPTER 4

### LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND BRAZIL: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND PERSONAL PRIVILEGE

Liberal notions of citizenship are dependent on a bottom-line recognition of the civil and political rights of all citizens. The institutions of Liberal democracy are designed to protect these rights and to ensure that abstract universal equality of all individuals can be translated into the practical and legal world. In the Dominican Republic and Brazil, Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians have faced serious challenges in exercising Liberal citizenship, often at the hands of the very institutions—the police, the courts, and the government in general—who are supposed to defend those rights. While the exercise of political rights has received increasing support in both countries, the guarantee of civil rights remains illusory in both the Dominican Republic and Brazil, particularly for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

#### **Procedures, Institutions and Democratization**

In the concluding essay of their multi-volume *Transitions to Democracy* series Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter focus on the unpredictability in the transition period of the liberalization of a country's political system (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). This essay, considered one of the more influential pieces of scholarship on democratization during the most recent wave of democratization, has been challenged by more recent research, which argues that democratic institutions can impose structural limitations making transitions more predictable (Karl, 1990; Mainwaring and Scully,

1995). Some scholars even suggest that democratic institutions provide an incentive system which gives actors 'pay-offs' for behaving 'democratically' (i.e. with the rules of the system) (Rustow, 1970; Geddes, 1994).

These scholars focus on the importance of political institutions and the procedural norms of modern liberal democracy. The belief is that if the formal requirements for democracy are met, this constitutes a marked improvement over the previous government, and that institutionalization of formal political structures is dependent upon the empowerment of institutions while less formal structures wane in importance. Understanding democratization through the use of institutional structures and constitutional procedures is consistent with Liberal notions of citizenship, in that citizenship is understood as a set of rights and negative liberties, rather than as a civic, political or social commitment of engagement which should be exercised. In this vision, government institutions are charged with the responsibility of protecting political and civil rights.

Scott Mainwaring writes "[d]emocracy's fundamental claim to legitimacy is not a substantive one (greater efficiency, equity, or growth), but rather a procedural one: guarantees of human rights, protection of minorities, government accountability, and the opportunity to get rid of rulers who lose their popular support" (Mainwaring, 1992: 306). This is similar to Huntington's claim that "democracy has a useful meaning only when it is defined in institutional terms" (in Robinson, 1995: 50). Citizenship, thus, is understood within a polyarchic system, a government that provides a minimum of political access and the maintenance of civil liberties through institutional protection (Dahl, 1971). The role of the citizen in "liberal democratic" politics, according to this

line of reasoning, is not one of political engagement. In fact, in a more recent book, John Peeler argues that "*the establishment of liberal democracy is fundamentally a matter of elite action*" and that "*the role of nonelites in liberal democracy is relatively marginal*" (Peeler, 1998: 190, 192, italics in the original).

Citizenship, according to Liberal thought, is a collection of political rights as well as protection of various civil liberties. The neo-liberal strain of Liberalism, which has been dominant in Latin America in the last two decades emphasizes the need to guarantee property rights, while also promoting individual rights understood in terms of preferences and choices, and reducing political rights *de facto* to the right to vote. An even more minimal, and much more provocative, form of democratic citizenship was proposed by Adam Przeworski who defined democracy as the right not to be arbitrarily killed (in Wanderley Reis, 1996: 121).

The spectrum of literature which examines procedures and institutions in democratization therefore ranges from Przeworski's bottom line to more demanding studies which look to institutions to redistribute wealth and resources (Weyland, 1996). The points of commonality are the focus on procedures and institutions are considered paramount, and the understanding of citizenship in terms of political and civil rights. In their essay in the first issue of the *Journal of Democracy*, Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner explain that democracy has "three essential features": real and considerable competition for political positions; an inclusive system that allows political participation; and "*a high level of civil and political liberties*" (Diamond and Plattner, 1990: 5, italics in original). These liberties include "freedom of speech, religion, opinion, and information; freedom of peaceable assembly; freedom to form and join organizations; and equal

protection and due process under the impartial law." These rights, primarily civil, should be ensured by an independent and fair judiciary, as well as by a democratic police force. Additionally, members of the legislature should pass laws to improve the performance of the criminal justice system and to protect individuals or members of who are systematically denied their rights.

Democratization in Latin America from the standpoint of political rights has been relatively outstanding in the last decade. Elections are a regular feature of the political landscape of all Latin American countries, with the exception of Cuba, and suffrage is universal to all people of majority status. Elections are generally mandatory which is intended to increase citizen participation as well as decrease feelings of anomie among citizens<sup>1</sup>. Additionally, both the Dominican Republic and Brazil no longer employ literacy requirements.

The electoral system has been fairly successfully institutionalized in Latin America. This may best be illustrated by the fact that although 44 percent of the Venezuelan population supported the coup to remove President Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1992, 93 percent believed that democracy was the best form of government (Brooke, 6 Dec, 1996). Former coup leader Hugo Chavez became president in Venezuela in 1998 only via an election. Perhaps a more striking show of support for institutional structure is the expression of popular and elite disapproval through increasingly institutional channels with impeachment a real political option and a decrease in serious coup attempts in Latin America. For example since 1989, there were serious coup attempts in Venezuela in 1992, Paraguay 1993, and Guatemala 1993, three presidents were impeached and/or

removed from office by the legislatures of their countries (Collor in Brazil 1992, Pérez in Venezuela 1993, and Bucaram in Ecuador in 1996), and the Peruvian Congress proposed impeaching Fujimori in December of 1991.

The institutionalization of elections has led scholars to examine more deeply how fair and free those elections are, most obviously, by analyzing the party systems (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Some scholars argue that there is a direct relationship between the institutionalization of a party system and the institutionalization of democracy (Peeler, 1998). Mainwaring and Scully write "[t]he nature of parties and party systems shapes the prospects that stable democracy will emerge, whether it will be accorded legitimacy, and whether effective policy-making will result" (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995: 2). Jonathan Hartlyn's examination of the Dominican electoral system distinguishes between free, fair, frequent and open elections (Hartlyn, 1998: 221-2). While Mexican elections are frequent and relatively free, the degree of fairness and openness is questionable. This was most obvious during the 1988 presidential elections when computers crashed after electoral ballots from Mexico city gave opposition (PRD) candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas a lead over Carlos Salinas. Mexican elections are also unfair in that the ruling party (PRI) uses the State's budget to finance its campaigns, and if enough popular pressure challenges the legitimacy of its local governors, it will remove and replace them, regardless of whether they indeed were the winners of the contest, or the replacement was even a candidate (Oppenheimer, 1998).

One of the most significant problems in institutionalizing party systems, is that political parties, like other formal institutions, provide a democratic veneer which hides

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<sup>1</sup> This is not to say that it is necessarily effective, since many voters produce "blank" and "invalid" ballots.

informal and non-institutionalized political practices, such as clientelism. This is particularly problematic for political parties that either engage in clientelism and the distribution of patronage in order to garner support, or are viewed as ineffective. Even, sometimes especially, the parties with the strongest ideological positions seem to engage in widespread use of clientelism, such as APRA in Peru, AD in Venezuela, and the Peronists in Argentina.

Aside from political rights, proceduralists and institutionalists look at the protection of civil liberties as a fundamental cornerstone of Liberal democratic citizenship. Given the list of "civil and political liberties" cited by Diamond and Plattner, it seems clear that civil liberties are given priority, perhaps because they can be more clearly articulated and protected by law. Protection of civil liberties requires laws that civil liberties be recognized by a legal system which has the capacity to ensure those liberties. Latin American constitutions are without fail Liberal and, very often, progressive documents. Citizens are protected from arbitrary arrest, from torture and death, from acts of discrimination, and are given the freedom to express themselves. These are all rights that are defined by national governments, and are considered the privileges of those who are citizens of the respective country. In addition to these rights, Latin American governments have signed numerous documents in which they show their solidarity or commit themselves to various international standards of human rights.

On paper, all Latin American governments have legally independent judicial systems as well as police forces trained to maintain order and to not violate individual rights. In recent years, almost all countries in Latin America have moved in this

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While living, the monkey Tião, a fan favorite in the public zoo of Rio de Janeiro, received many votes.

direction, although some seem to have moved much closer to this institutional ideal than others. However, the majority of the judicial systems in Latin America are still weak relative to the presidency, to elites, and even, at times, to political parties. The judicial system does not tend to serve as an independent branch of government which checks the power of the executive and legislative branches, but more as an institution which tries criminals of violent crimes. The bulk of the indicted are poor and considered marginal, and courts are seen as having a clear bias against this group. One of the reasons that the majority of those indicted are poor and marginal is that police tend to arrest only poor and marginal citizens. In many countries in the region, police torture is commonplace, and disappearances remain an option, although it is nowhere near as commonly used as during the 1970s. Such conditions obstruct the rule of law and decrease popular legitimacy, but, more importantly, they contribute to the maintenance of a hierarchical system in which certain people are considered to have more recourse to rights than others. In more extreme cases, some groups are considered to have no rights at all. This seems to be occurring even in Costa Rica, where Nicaraguan refugees constitute a virtual caste.

Elizabeth Leeds writes that since it is generally assumed that "the duty of the state [is] to protect its citizens against certain basic dangers—such as threats to personal safety, property, and civil and human rights—then we must also assume that all segments of society have the right to be equally protected..." (Leeds, 1996:51). That right seems to underlie all other claims to civil liberties and, indeed, even political rights. However, since political rights are generally understood in terms of ability to vote and the potential to associate, political rights in electoral systems seem relatively secure, even if they do not resemble any "democratic ideal." What this means is that other political rights, such

as participation, open choices in elections, fair campaign opportunities, open and democratic political parties, are neglected, or are considered too much for a minimal definition of democracy. The violation of civil rights are more obvious threats within electoral systems, especially ones with societies which are hierarchically structured, and in which violence towards marginal groups is considered acceptable.

In an analysis of state-sponsored violence in Brazil, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro explains that it is difficult to ensure political and civil rights "in countries where 'structural violations' of economic, social, and cultural rights seem to be a permanent feature of society" (Pinheiro, 1992: 262). Although this chapter posits that the structural hierarchies in the Dominican Republic and Brazil are largely responsible for the failure to consolidate rights-based notions of citizenship in those countries, these hierarchies are dynamic and show some capacity to change. As a result, they are better described as enduring, rather than permanent<sup>2</sup>.

### **Liberal Citizenship in the Dominican Republic and Brazil**

The New York based Non-Governmental Organization Freedom House annually rates countries on the degree of freedom in their political system in terms of political rights and civil liberties<sup>3</sup>. The ratings range from 1, the most free, to 7, the most repressive political system. In 1988-9, both the Dominican Republic and Brazil scored fairly well with the Dominican Republic being assigned a 1 and 3 and Brazil receiving a 2

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<sup>2</sup> See Diamond (1996) Wiarda (1995).

<sup>3</sup> The following figures are taken from [www.freedomhouse.org/rankings.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.org/rankings.pdf). These numbers are not part of a scientific study of objective phenomena, but are merely comparisons of the degree which analysts

and a 3, for political rights and civil liberties respectively. Both recorded scores quite a bit better than the Latin American average of 3.35 for both political rights and civil liberties.

In the most recent study, the other Latin American countries seem to have caught up to the Dominican Republic and Brazil, while the ratings for the Dominican Republic and Brazil have worsened. The 1999 surveys rated the degree of political rights and civil liberties, respectively, in the Dominican Republic as 2 and 3, and in Brazil as 3 and 4, while the Latin American Averages were 2.8 and 3.4. Dominican political rights were listed as high as 4 in 1994 following the fraudulent election of Joaquín Balaguer, and so the number 2 should be considered an advance over the previous several years. However, the institutionalization of democracy in the last ten years has not greatly increased political access for the majority of citizens nor have civil rights improved across the board in either of these two countries. Democratization has opened up some countries to more self-criticism and to foreign critics of human rights violations, but it has also endured an illiberal backlash.

In some ways, democratization has improved Liberal citizenship. The autonomy of the press in the Dominican Republic and Brazil is considerable. There are many NGOs and other pressure groups, especially in Brazil, which try to improve political access and civil liberties particularly for marginal sections of the population. Voter registration as well as electoral fairness, always problematic in the Dominican Republic, improved considerably in 1996. The election of Leonel Fernández in the Dominican Republic led to a change in the style of political leadership, to a less centralized and

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consider political rights and civil liberties guaranteed.

authoritarian political system, as well as to a government more in need of coalitional support, and more willing to negotiate. Elections are regular in Brazil and challenges of fraud are rare. During both his first and second terms in office, Fernando Henrique Cardoso appeared to differ from his predecessors in that he has been very successful in maintaining the support of a coalition of political parties<sup>4</sup>, which are normally quite “undisciplined.” This style seems much more democratic than the centralized and exclusive governing cadre of Collor, or that of the military government. But as much as democratization has occurred, in some areas, at the level of national politics, local politics continue to be dominated by socio-economic and political structures which lend themselves to hierarchy and to the empowerment of informal political processes.

Liberalization has also made it easier for NGOs as well as international organizations, such as Human Rights Watch (formerly Americas Watch) and Amnesty International, to make evaluations about the condition of civil rights<sup>5</sup>. While these groups are often criticized for challenging the nation's sovereignty, they are nevertheless less restricted and less subject to violence than in the past. However, the beating and deaths of human rights activists is still not uncommon in both countries. In the Dominican Republic, international organizations have been invited, although they face much domestic opposition, to help observe presidential elections. Jimmy Carter was present in 1990 and 1994, at the request of Dominican candidates, and the presence of international monitoring organizations is believed to have been a factor in restricting police violence prior to the second round of the 1996 elections (Hartlyn, 1998: 266).

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<sup>4</sup> As of 1999, Cardoso's control over his alliance shifted, and Brazilian political parties reverted to more traditional obstructionist and rent seeking practices.

<sup>5</sup> It is possible that greater access of said organizations have led to more critical assessments of civil rights

Brazil has also come quite a way since the 1970s when it repressed statistics and research that suggested that racial discrimination existed in Brazil<sup>6</sup> (see chapter 3). The march held in 1988 condemning the Brazilian racial system was restricted by police from passing by the statue of the Duque de Caixias and from flying flags of political parties. However, flags depicting Afro-Brazilian culture and "Black" themes were permitted (Hanchard, 1995: 150). The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) includes color in the census and produces data which is published by mainstream media and which demonstrates income disparities between *brancos*, *pardos* and *pretos*. No such data has been published in the Dominican Republic, and as of this writing it is still unclear whether such data exists. Chapter 5 discusses the nascent debate over racism, as a sidebar to discussions of anti-Haitianism. However, racism remains a topic that is not acknowledged or discussed on a large scale in the Dominican Republic. Additionally, since the census does not include an option for color or race, since "race" (*raza*) is often synonymous with "nation" (*nación*), and Dominican society does not acknowledge color prejudice, no data is "available" which can statistically prove impressionistic claims that darker skinned Dominicans are disproportionately poor, harassed by the police, and poorly served by the judiciary system.

There have been quite a number of obstacles to implementing a universal rule of law and respect for civil and political rights, and for empowering democratic institutions. Recent literature in democratization studies, which focuses on democratic consolidation as well as how to "deepen," "construct," or "build" democracy, recognizes that democratic consolidation requires that the government be perceived to be legitimate

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in the two countries.

(Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle, 1995). Linz and Stepan write "we mean by a consolidated democracy a political situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become 'the only game in town'" (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 5). Liberal democratic procedures and institutions are seen as the "rules of the game" and the "proper channels," respectively. If this understanding of democratic consolidation is employed rigorously, it would be hard to apply it to either the Dominican Republic or Brazil, or probably any other country in the region. In both cases, democratic procedures and institutions certainly provide a set of rules and channels. However, they are not the "only game in town," and often are not even the dominant "game in town." In a major survey conducted in 1994, Isis Duarte et al found that Dominicans still prefer extra-institutional means to problem solving, and are quite skeptical of institutions. When asked about the "utility of political parties," 56.2 percent responded that parties "serve only in order to participate in elections" (Duarte et al, 1994: 70). A survey conducted in a *favela* by the Brazilian Order of Lawyers (OAB) "found that 56 percent of the sample surveyed preferred 'informal channels' of resolving conflict, as compared to 20 percent who preferred formal processes of adjudication and 24 percent who expressed no preference" (Leeds, 1996:62).

Preference for informal networks and patronage is based on the perception that institutions are slow, ineffective, biased and uncooperative, as well as the ignorance of citizens of formal options. Citizens are also aware that clientelism is an efficient mechanism in which the relatively powerless can gain access. The presence of clienteles and their importance in Dominican and Brazilian politics is quite old (see chapters 2 and 3), and it has become a very salient ordering principle of the political and social system.

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<sup>6</sup> Of course, the military was in power at the time.

In 1975, Howard Wiarda wrote that patronage and clientelism were so ingrained in Dominican political culture that it seriously affected the possibility of democracy following the end of the Trujillo dictatorship (Wiarda, 1975). In 1968, David Maybury Lewis in "The Persistent Patronage System" writes "[p]olitics everywhere entails patronage but in the Brazilian interior it involves little else... This tradition dates to the beginning of Brazilian history" (in Summ, 1995: 154).

Three decades later, a small elite maintains its privilege through clientelistic practices, although it is not limited to rural areas. As one analyst writes of northern Brazil, "[t]rue power, derived from wealth and influence, is vested in a relatively small segment of the population and is accessed through complex chains of patronage. Government is frequently little more than a venue for patrons and clients to negotiate favors" (Butler, 1998: 159). Clientelism is pervasive, and it is especially powerful in the regions where the agency of clients is weakest relative to their patrons, and that includes rural areas of both countries, the border with Haiti in the Dominican Republic, the north and northeast in Brazil, and the ghettos and shanties in urban complexes in both countries. Clientelism is also strengthened by high unemployment figures, shrinking state involvement in the national economy, and considerable payoffs for political support (Hartlyn, 1998: 225<sup>7</sup>). In short, clientelism most constrains the economically, socially and politically marginal, for whom clienteles and patronage, rather than through institutions, are often the most available, immediate or efficient recourse.

Roberto da Matta's work on Brazil (1987, 1991) attempts to address how clientelistic systems can become so embedded in social practice that they can engender a

particular rather than a universal vision of citizenship. He writes "there is a form of universal citizenship, built on modern roles which are tied into operation of a bureaucratic society and a market; and also other forms of affiliation to Brazilian society—other forms of citizenship—that stem from the intimate, relational world of the *casa* [home] ..." (da Matta, 1991: 321). This is because, he asserts, Brazilian society is ignorant of the "individual" and of "neutral" modern bureaucracies. In Brazil, there are no individuals, only persons, and persons are not equal. This inequality is determined by one's "place" within society, or as da Matta clearly writes "[w]ho you know versus who I know, is the fundamental fact in the Brazilian social calculus" (da Matta, 1991: 322).

Ramonina Brea et al observe a similar recognition of the "person" rather than the "individual" in Dominican political culture (Brea et al, 1995: 125). The use of the person rather than the individual as the basic agent of political life aids in the construction of a system which institutionalizes hierarchy according to personal identity and socioeconomic status. "The acceptance of hierarchy, authority, power, privilege, rank, social condition is linked to a vision of a differentiated society cut across by inequality. *Responsibilities and privileges* are learned as attributes derived from social conditions, from power" (Brea et al, 1995: 125, italics in original).

Equating one's agency within a democracy with one's personal attributes or socioeconomic position is clearly antithetical to Liberal claims for universal membership and equality before the law. However, recognizing that a "relational universe," as da Matta puts it, coexists with, if not dominates, a legal and bureaucratic one, is necessary to understanding the institutionalization of citizen rights in the Dominican Republic and

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<sup>7</sup> See also chapter 6.

Brazil. Da Matta explains the coexistence of a Liberal and a particular notion of citizenship writing "if I am assuredly a citizen on Independence Day and in the political rally, in no way do I want to be *only* a citizen when I am struggling with the police...or when I need a bank loan..." (da Matta, 1991: 320). Coexistence should not be confused with equality, and it is clear from this phrasing that in situations where power is necessary those in better positions will not only seek the anonymous rights of citizens, but will use clientelistic relations and hierarchical status to ensure results.

This system of hierarchical relations is most deleterious to the protection of the rights of the marginal. Marginals are distinguished in the Dominican Republic and Brazil by the very tenuous socio-economic and political positions that they occupy. For example, Hartlyn estimates unemployment in the Dominican Republic in the last two decades to be consistently between 19 and 25 percent, with the informal sector and micro-enterprises providing the chief source of income for one in five families in 1992-1993 (Hartlyn, 1998: 143). The infant mortality rate for the Brazilian northeast is 116/1,000, "one of the highest in the hemisphere and comparable to the poorest parts of Africa" (Scheper-Hughes, 1992: 279). Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic, even those with official papers, are subject to constant abuse by police officers who routinely disregard or tear up their documentation, demand bribes, or torture them. Those who work on plantations are often not allowed to leave the compound. Between 1988 and 1991, an estimated 5,644 streetchildren were killed in Brazil, and 16 percent of the population supported the use of brutality to eliminate streetchildren (Dudley, 1998: 35).

In worlds where rights are recognized by status, it is difficult to prevent violence against those of limited or no status. The same political culture that recognizes people as

"marginal" also perceives them as "filth," "trash," "demons," "thieves," and "animals," to cite just a few epithets<sup>8</sup>. In a survey conducted in the Dominican Republic in 1994, 66.43 percent of the sample agreed that "Haitians bring problems to the country" (Brea et al. 1995: 227). Most societies are unaffected when people considered to be marginal within their borders are arbitrarily arrested and harassed, yet Dominicans and Brazilians seem to strongly support violent methods used to deal with "marginals," particularly in Brazil where citizens have protested the imprisonment of leaders of death squads which killed streetchildren (Dimenstein. 1991: 48).

It is necessary to elaborate the perceptions and discourses that surround citizenship in the Dominican Republic and in Brazil in order to situate how Liberal notions of citizenship apply or fail to apply to Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. It is clear that the majority of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians are adversely affected by negative stereotypes which associate *negritud/e* with illiteracy, poverty, lack of culture, stupidity, violence, and, in the Dominican Republic, with Haiti. Despite legal guarantees of equality and, in Brazil, constitutional provisions against racial discrimination, Liberal rights have been very difficult to achieve for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

One reason for this is that there is a clearly understood hierarchy in which Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Dominicans occupy a very marginal position. As one expression—among academics—in Brazil says, "there is no problem with race in Brazil, because *negros* know their place." Along similar lines, Livio Sansone found that there tend to be three different domains in which Afro-Brazilians operate: "tough" domains such as the workplace, encounters with police, and searching for a spouse; "soft" domains such as

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<sup>8</sup> One could trace this idea of dehumanization of the Other back to debates during the early slave trade,

leisure activity and sports; and "Black Space" such as carnival, Afro-Brazilian religions, capoeira, etc (Sansone, 1997: 470). In the "tougher" areas, racial discrimination is often more clear and racial identities are less flexible, i.e. all Afro-Brazilians may be considered Afro-Brazilian. In the "softer" areas Afro-Brazilians face less racial discrimination and their racial identities are more flexible and far less relevant. For example, the color of soccer players in Brazil and baseball players in the Dominican Republic is rarely relevant, if noticed at all. Finally, the areas which are traditionally considered Afro-Brazilian spaces are ones in which Afro-Brazilian identity is valued and is considered quite positive. Since this is an investigation of rights and liberties, the essay will concern itself mostly with what might be considered "tough" spaces. The result of this is that the areas in which Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians suffer the most prejudice will receive the most attention, whereas areas where race/color is less important will receive little attention. The intention here is not to overstate racial prejudice, only to emphasize the conditionality of the political rights and civil liberties of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

### **Dominican Republic**

The Dominican Republic is one of only a handful of countries in Latin America where the protection of political rights worsened during the last decade, especially in election years, although it has improved since 1996. Electoral fraud prior to the 1996 presidential elections was as certain as was the candidacy of Joaquín Balaguer for the presidency, and this was no spurious relationship. The most blatant area of violation of

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about whether the natives and Africans had souls.

political rights in the Dominican Republic has been electoral fraud, whether removing peoples' names from electoral lists, paying citizens in exchange for their voting cards, or allowing the military—constitutionally banned from voting—to vote. Every electoral contest since Balaguer's 1966 victory has been denounced as fraudulent by the losing opposition, although not all have been. As detailed in chapter 3, repression was so significant that serious opposition withdrew and abstained from the 1970 and 1974 presidential elections. The 1978 elections involved the awarding of a majority of seats in Congress to the PRSC, as part of a deal that allowed Antonio Guzmán to take power. Charges of fraud were also made in 1982 and 1986, although the fraud was not nearly as substantial. Not surprisingly, despite compulsory voting, abstention rates increased between 1978 and 1990, and only 1994 showed a decline in abstention (Hartlyn, 1998: 231).

There were numerous claims of fraud following the 1990 and especially the 1994 elections which were voiced by national and international groups. In 1990, due to divisions within the PRD and Balaguer's lack of popularity, the PLD's Juan Bosch made a strong run at the presidency. Since the PLD had a very shallow electoral base, the PRSC began to buy electoral ID cards from people who were believed to be sympathetic to Bosch for the price of 100 and 500 pesos, roughly \$10-50 (Moya Pons, 1995: 439). The voting fraud that Moya Pons reports was mostly confined to the poorer classes of the Dominican Republic, and it is common knowledge that *Reformista* technocrats bought votes in the areas where they knew they were not likely to win. Poor Afro-Dominicans who were urban residents made up a majority of those offered money for their voting cards. Moya Pons also reports that approximately 8,000 members of the armed forces

and national police were provided with electoral cards so that they could vote, despite Constitutional provisions against this. Finally, the Catholic hierarchy and the armed forces, both very pro-Balaguer institutions, spoke openly against Juan Bosch, and rumors proliferated of a coup if Bosch were to be elected (Moya Pons, 1995: 440).

Jimmy Carter's electoral monitoring group as well as the Dominican Central Electoral Board (J.C.E) were unable to detect clear evidence of fraud, and Joaquín Balaguer was declared the winner, winning by 1.1 percent of the valid votes. In contrast, even the most casual observers recognized massive fraud in the 1994 elections which pitted Balaguer principally against Peña Gómez, who now led a more unified PRD. Even the J.C.E., which has generally been considered weak, conservative and corrupt, established through an investigatory committee that

more than 28,000 voters had been deliberately disenfranchised by having their names removed from the electoral lists at the 1,500 polling stations... Since the 1,500 polling stations represent about 16% of the country's total, simple arithmetic supports the PRD figure of 200,000 frustrated voters nationwide. In the end, the JCE merely ignored the committee's findings (Ferguson, 1994: 11; also Espinal, 1994: 11).

Balaguer's victory by 0.7 percent of the valid votes in 1994 was even more contested than his victory four years earlier. However, due to the crisis in Haiti and Balaguer's political savvy, Balaguer was able to negotiate a two year presidency, while the opposition finally was able to pass a no-reelection amendment which prevented Balaguer from running in 1996. The voters whose names were absent from the voting lists in 1994 were, not surprisingly, PRD members or people that Reformista surveys believed would sympathize with Peña Gómez. Again, the fraud was limited primarily to poor and urban areas where Balaguer's support was weak and where Peña Gómez's

support was stronger, which meant that Afro-Dominicans were most adversely affected. Unlike the vote buying scheme which recognized that the poor Afro-Dominicans had political rights which they could trade for momentary economic relief, this scheme of fraud simply negated the political rights of Afro-Dominicans altogether. The political rights were not the only rights of Afro-Dominican citizens that were abridged during the elections. Because Balaguer's message of order and security and national sovereignty was dependent upon his nationalist discourse which denigrated Haitians, *negros*, Africans and the "Ethiopian race" (terms he used interchangeably), the civil rights and liberties of Afro-Dominicans were also abridged during these electoral campaigns.

Perhaps the most clear and documented case of this is Balaguer's nationalist rhetoric that attempted to challenge the nationality of Peña Gómez. The mass public relations campaign aimed at undermining of Peña Gómez's *dominicanidad* was evident as early as 1985<sup>9</sup> when Balaguer published *La isla al revés*. Throughout his campaigns against Peña Gómez he echoed the racist and xenophobic rhetoric of that book. While many Dominicans, including some scholars, say that Balaguer's attack on Peña Gómez was not racist but anti-Haitian (Interviews, 1997), it is hard to make such subtle differentiations when an ideologue purposely conflates the terms Haitiano, *negro*, and the "Ethiopian" race. For example, even though his book is concerned with the presence of Haitian culture affecting the Dominican one, he writes "[c]ontact with the *negro* has contributed, without a doubt, to the relaxing of our public customs" (Balaguer, 1985: 45, emphasis added). Thus, "our" customs refers to both Dominican and non-*negro* customs.

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<sup>9</sup> Peña Gómez's *dominicanidad* was often challenged even prior to this, but not with the same vigor, the immense resources of the office of the presidency, and without the same consequences.

which clearly demarcates the Haitian as other, while also placing the Afro-Dominican in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis Dominican nationality.

Balaguer's campaign was no less subtle. James Ferguson reports that the Balaguer campaign attempted to call into question the nationality of Peña Gómez by using "TV commercials [that showed]... a gesticulating Peña Gómez accompanied by a frenzied drumming or a map of Hispaniola in which a dark brown Haiti gradually spread over and covered a bright green Dominican Republic" (Ferguson, 1994: 12). This was exacerbated by the perception that the dark-skinned Peña Gómez had a 'volcanic' temper, and Dominicans were reminded of his presence in the riots of 1984<sup>10</sup>.

The message of Balaguer's campaign was simple: the Haitian *negro* who opposes me is going to unify both countries and then we are going to be 'African' and barbaric like them. The only protection from Peña Gómez, and in order to protect the "Dominican destiny" from its neighbor (the threat involved in the subtitle of Balaguer's book), is to elect a "real" Dominican: the *blanco*, educated president who has maintained Dominican security, stability and sovereignty for over two decades. One billboard declared "Dominican: Your destiny is in your hands... Defend your nationality, conserve the peace, liberty, order, and the progress of the country...." Peña Gómez was presented as a man who could "not be trusted," who was "not good," who would "burn the country," who believed in "satanic cults"<sup>11</sup>, and who would "open the border to Haitians."

Another Balaguer poster read "Think: We cannot risk the future of our country on a man

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<sup>10</sup> The implication being that Peña Gómez fomented the riots. See (chapter 3).

<sup>11</sup> This was a reference to a videotape in which Peña Gómez was in attendance during a ritual performed by a Brazilian spiritist. This sort of ritual, like Santería, Gagá, Vodú and other Afro-spiritist and syncretic religions are considered demonic by the Catholic hierarchy. They are also perceived as being the "cults" of the Haitians.

like THIS" (Espinal, 1994: 6-7). All of these comments about Peña Gómez used code-words for stereotypical portraits of Haitians.

Although some may find such blatant prejudicial politics out of place in a democracy, William Connolly argues that "[e]lectorate politics contains powerful pressures to become a closed circuit for the dogmatization of identity through the translation of difference into threat and threat into energy for the dogmatization of identity" (Connolly, 1991: 210). This certainly explains the "Haitianization/ Otherization" of Peña Gómez during the 1994 presidential elections. Yet it is critical to remember that identity can only be 'dogmatized' during specific periods, such as elections, if elements of alienation and marginalization already exist in daily life. Therefore, it would not be possible to assert Peña Gómez's lack of *Dominicanidad* if the *Dominicanidad* of millions of Dominicans, particularly Afro-Dominicans, were not perpetually threatened, challenged and negotiated in everyday life.

In the Dominican Republic, many children of Haitian workers as well as many poor Afro-Dominicans, particularly in rural environments, are born and never properly registered. This is due to the shallowness of state institutions, the ignorance of the parents, and/or the lack of money required for the birth registry. As a result many Afro-Dominicans do not have documentation to prove they are Dominican. Sam Martinez observed that there "[t]he Dominican Constitution is unequivocal on that matter... states that any person born in the Dominican Republic has the right to Dominican citizenship. Yet the authorities do not necessarily respect the valid documents of Haitian-Dominicans..." (Martinez, 1996: 10).

Balaguer often used the equivocal status of Haitians in order to boost his role as a national protector and father figure. When the Dominican government decides to crack down on Haitians, those who are without papers are deported regardless of their place of birth. Police are reported to consistently tear up the official documents of legal Haitian residents, who are sometimes deported. In June of 1991, Balaguer decreed that Haitian immigrants under the age of 16 and over 60 be expelled from the country<sup>12</sup>. James Ferguson writes:

within three months, an estimated 50,000 Haitians had been deported or had left voluntarily to avoid being rounded up by Dominican troops. Further human rights reports alleged that Haitians were robbed by military personnel, beaten up and separated from their families. Some people of Haitian descent but born in the Dominican Republic were reportedly returned by force to a country they had never seen before (Ferguson, 1992: 89).

There were no government investigations into the military's activity, nor any preventative measures installed to avoid future repetitions of such incidents. As usual, the government ignored the political rights of dark-skinned Dominicans, Dominicans of Haitian ancestry and Haitian workers, with or without documentation. Additionally, being "strong" with the Haitians has traditionally been considered a means of increasing prestige among politicians. Balaguer used the "threat of Haitian infiltration" as a means of justifying the brutal security policies of his police, his arbitrary decisions to deport Haitians, regardless of legal status, and in the formation of his "Hispanic" vision of Dominican nationality. But Balaguer is not alone in this. When Leonel Fernandez entered into an alliance with Balaguer after the first round of the 1996 elections, the alliance was called "The Patriotic Alliance" (*El Frente Patriótico*), a clear attack on Peña

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<sup>12</sup> Those between 16 and 60 were allowed to stay since they were considered workers.

Gómez's Dominicanidad. Dominican observers generally consider this to have been a political tactic, which at worst was anti-Haitian; few Dominicans interviewed for this study considered there to be any racial element involved, especially since Fernandez is of mixed racial heritage (Interviews, 1997).

Other than Balaguer, the most conspicuous of the anti-Haitian ideologues involved in the 1996 elections were the PLD's Mauricio Vinicio Castillo (Hartlyn, 1998: 239, 243). The retired yet still active Bosch, who oddly enough wrote some of the earliest revisionist historical accounts which presented Haitians in a positive light, did not seem the least bit bothered by his association with Balaguer, or the rampant use of anti-Haitianism by his party, since it was being used to defeat his enemy and former protégé, Peña Gómez.

A month before the election, Leonel's party alleged that massive numbers of Haitians, perhaps as many as a quarter of the Dominican Republic's 3.75 million voters, would try to vote using fake identification... Police swooped into the cane fields and into Haitian urban ghettos, demanding identity documents from anyone whose skin was dark. The police deported as many as three thousand illegal Haitian immigrants. Dominicans interpreted the move as an attempt to intimidate dark-skinned voters who might have wanted to vote for Peña (Wucker, 1999: 187<sup>13</sup>)

The use of police repression and the obstruction of basic civil rights prior to an election was nothing new in the Dominican Republic. In fact, Balaguer gave the ruthless General Pérez y Pérez<sup>14</sup> the position of head of the police prior to the first round of the elections, for the express purpose of browbeating would-be PRD voters. It was only with international pressure, particularly from Jimmy Carter, and public statements from Fernandez himself that the repression ended (Hartlyn, 1998: 265-6). What was new,

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<sup>13</sup> See also (Hartlyn, 1998: 263)

<sup>14</sup> General Pérez y Pérez was well-acquainted with this role since he was responsible for the repression of

however, was that violence, anti-Haitianism and blatant violations of the rights of Dominican citizens were being exploited by someone other than Balaguer.

Fernandez supporters, including some scholars, justified pragmatic politics, such as the alliance with Balaguer, and nationalist rhetoric (they were never more explicit than that) as being politics necessary in an election (Interviews, 1997). Yet they were positive that Fernandez would rule democratically and that his election would represented a true transition to democracy, since the transitions of 1961, 1963, 1966, and 1978 were all somewhat disappointing (see Hartlyn, 1998). And the Fernandez government has been an improvement over the previous Balaguer regimes, although it is strongly aided by a massive economic boom. Fernandez has avoided the authoritarian ruling behavior of his predecessor and seems to represent what political scientist Jacqueline Jiménez-Polanco considers a transition from a "charismatic leadership to contingent leadership" (Jiménez-Polanco, 1999).

However, the contingent and less charismatic leadership of Fernandez may be due to his weakness relative to a very obstructionist congress where his party was unable to maintain even tenuous alliances. In this sense, his governing style, rather than being something new, may actually be more like that of earlier presidents Antonio Guzmán and Jorge Blanco whose lack of *caudillista* prestige and party majority and/or unity made them weak presidents, not necessarily democratic ones. One reason to believe this is Fernandez's resorting to the abuse of Haitians to protect himself from opposition within his party (PLD), his fragile alliance with the PRSC, and from the PRD. In March of 1997, Fernandez sent the police in pursuit of undocumented Haitians, especially in

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political opposition in 1966.

Santiago where there was rumored to be a "Haitian beggar network." Wucker writes "[t]he Dominican agricultural authorities even announced that they would keep out Haitian pigs, which the officials said carried hog cholera..." (Wucker, 1999: 247).

Leonel tried to put the best light on the situation by pointing out that at least these deportations had been done with the cooperation of the Haitian authorities and that efforts were made to deport the Haitians as humanely as possible. "Nobody can deny the Dominican government's right to return undocumented workers to their country. Every day Dominicans come back, expelled from Puerto Rico, and we don't say anything. Every day, when the U.S. repatriates Mexicans from the border, nobody protests, because they know the U.S. has the right." (Wucker, 1999: 247)

Interestingly enough, six years earlier President Joaquín Balaguer defended his deportation of Haitians saying that he had "the right to treat the Haitians the same way as the United States or Puerto Rico treat Dominicans" (in Ferguson, 1992: 89).

The abuse goes beyond periodic deportations during moments of waning presidential popularity. There is also an everyday aspect of abuse, principally perpetrated by the police. It is well documented that during the harvest, Haitian workers are restricted to the plantation on which they work (Wilhems, 1994). In the neighborhood of San Carlos, also called Little Haiti, Haitian and Afro-Dominican residents are regularly stopped, harassed, and forced to pay bribes to police officers (Wucker, 1999: 89). This harassment is not limited to undocumented Haitians, but also to those with papers, and dark-skinned citizens of the Dominican Republic. If Afro-Dominicans do not carry their papers, they are often fined (for a bribe) and can be sent to a detention center or a plantation that needs labor. This repression has been exacerbated by the growth of the drug trade, especially in San Carlos, and the creation of the DNCD (the National Directorate of Drug Control). It is the DNCD which has been actively involved in

invasions of San Carlos and other areas populated by the darkest members of Dominican society and which has been cited repeatedly for human rights violations, including beating and killing people who refuse to pay bribes (Human Rights Watch, 1997, 1998).

There has been little effort by the police or any other governmental institution to prevent police from beating those who do not observe the unofficial curfew, from accepting bribes, and from torturing and killing civilians. The Fernández government does not seem to be much of an improvement in terms of limiting police impunity (Human Rights Watch, 1998), although he has rhetorically supported judicial reform and ending police impunity. Whether it is because he is a weak president or because police violence is not a primary concern for him, Fernández has done little to institutionalize a police force more respectful of civilian rights<sup>15</sup>.

The documentation of civil rights abuses tends to be limited to describing the routine abuse of Haitians. For example, Human Rights Watch wrote "the human rights situation in the Dominican Republic in 1992 continued to be dominated by official mistreatment of Haitians who crossed the border into the Dominican Republic" (Human Rights Watch, 1993: 100). In 1997, some 21,000 Haitians, Dominicans of Haitian descent and Afro-Dominicans were expelled from the Dominican Republic (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Again, there are no numbers which can detail how many Afro-Dominicans have been deported, just as there is no evidence of how many Haitians with documents were deported. Additionally, Dominicans on the darker end of the color continuum predominate in prisons, where prisoners are dealt with severely (i.e. torture

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<sup>15</sup> One American researcher was able to protect various Afro-Dominicans and Haitians from forced bribes, potential beatings and possible detention by pretending to be an American reporter when he noticed police stopping people in San Carlos. The police allowed the Afro-Dominicans and Haitians to leave after the

and/or death) for 'rioting' and where as many as 90 percent of prisoners in some jails await trial (Human Rights Watch, 1997: 96).

The National Office of Statistics (ONE) which conducts the census and produces some of most important demographic information in the country has no information broken down by color or race. In fact, the census does not even ask individuals to identify by color/race. The 1994 Demos study represented a change since it included questions about color, but the overwhelming majority of the questions involved in the survey were differentiated by sex, urban/rural, and class factors, and not color/race. As of the writing, some of this data is being broken down by color/race<sup>16</sup>.

One statistic that was included in the ONE's evaluation of the Dominican census of 1993 and was a chart which broke down the number of suicides by race and sex. The information was provided by the National Police. The National Police have not responded to several letters requesting access to their data, and it is unlikely that other similar data will be published. In the absence of other data, it is worth speculating on the statistics for suicide, the only available statistics differentiated by "race."

In the Dominican Republic, the number of suicides in 1993 by race are 20 for *blancos*, 101 for *mestizos*, and 171 for *negros*. The numbers are odd when one compares them to national demographics (16% *blancos*, 73% of *mestizos*, and 11% of *negros*). When the number of suicides per 100,000 people of each racial category are tabulated, the rate of suicides is incredibly high among *negros* (1.6/100,000 *blancos*, 1.8/100,000 *mestizos*, and 21.2/100,000 *negros*). Thus, the suicide rate for *negros* is more than 14

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"reporter" said he was unaware that a curfew existed (Turits, interview).

<sup>16</sup> A special acknowledgment is owed to Isis Duarte and Ramonina Brea who are facilitating the reconversion of these statistics.

times that of blancos. Additionally, the differential according to gender is also skewed by race. The ratio of *blancos* to *blancas* committing suicide is 3.2 to 2, while for mestizos to mestizas it is 7.42 to 1, and for *negros* to *negras* it is 10.61 to 1.

Any explanation of this isolated statistic calls for speculation. However, given the above discussion there are probably two possibilities. The first, being that Afro-Dominican, particularly *negro*, suicide rates are so much higher than that of Euro-Dominicans because their life conditions are much more depressing, confining and repressive. The second, is that it is possible that some of the suicides reported by police were not indeed suicides.

In 1997, 30 civilians were killed by police in "self-defense," and 35 extra-judicial killings were reported in 1996 (Human Rights Watch, 1998, 1997). "Dominican police routinely ignored due process, such as providing access to lawyers and observing the forty-eight hour limit on holding detainees in police lockups. They also arbitrarily detained criminal suspects' family members as hostages, to entice the suspects to turn themselves in" (Human Rights Watch, 1998: 13). Reports like these and the disproportionate number of *negros* (men) who committed suicide bring into question whether the deaths were actually self-inflicted. If other police records indicate a similar bias, it would seem to be an indication that Afro-Dominicans are more likely to be harassed, abused and killed by police, and, therefore, that their civil rights are, indeed, abridged vis-à-vis Euro-Dominicans. In the defense of the National Police, the same statistic for suicides when broken down by nationality shows that almost all suicides were by Dominicans, only 3 were by Haitians and 1 was Asian. The low number of Haitians

suggests that using suicides to cover up murder may not account for the very high number of *negros*.

The National Police is not the only Dominican institution that is reluctant to make information available. In a report to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Dominican government's position was "since no racial discrimination exists, no legislation has been enacted in this connection" (IHERCD, 14 Oct, 1988). In the 1990 Report to the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Mrs. Bonetti Herrera gave a very brief report on the lack of racial discrimination. Members of the advisory committee expressed concern about racial minorities and asked for an update on this in the next report filed, which would be due in 1992. In their analysis of the condition of human rights in the Dominican Republic in 1998, Human Rights Watch noticed

[a]t this writing, the Dominican government still has not submitted its report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which was due in March, and the committee considered the report 'excessively overdue.' The Dominican government, which is obliged to submit reports to the committee every two years last satisfied this requirement in 1990 (Human Rights Watch, 1998: 115).

As of this writing in the summer of 1999, no such report has been filed.

## **Brazil**

There is a very long tradition in Brazil of legal protection of rights and negative liberties. However, legal protection of rights has remained something that is elaborated in law, but not actualized in practice. As Caldeira and Holston write:

[i]n Brazil, every democratic constitution since the first Republican charter of 1891 has contained adequate provisions for due process and the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property—provisions directly inspired, in fact, by the U.S. Constitution. In reality, however, Brazilian

courts have only consistently protected property and only certain kinds at that" (Caldeira and Holston, 1998: 275).

What is interesting is that while rights to vote are guaranteed to all Brazilians, and Brazilians face few official obstacles to political access, socio-economic structures and political hierarchies essentially marginalize most Brazilians. This is especially so for Afro-Brazilians who do not have a 'racial consciousness' which is connected to their political and civil rights, the means and time in which to approach political institutions, and/or the perception that political institutions may actually help. The next chapter will examine obstacles to mobilization of and expanding political rights of Afro-Brazilians. This section, however, will concern itself with violation of the civil rights of Afro-Brazilians, as well as recent low-profile denunciations of racism. Understanding the condition of civil rights for Afro-Brazilians requires understanding the hierarchy of personal value in Brazil, and the society's relative indifference to homicides among its "marginal" populations.

Former Sub-Secretary of the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro Jorge da Silva explains that police, in any country, have two responsibilities:

law enforcement...and the maintenance of order... [The former may be somewhat clear, however, the latter] is more ambiguous... What if the order is not equal? [what if there is a savage order which undermines the law?].... Will the police maintain an unequal order or execute the law?... A unequal society does not want an egalitarian police force (Interview, 30<sup>th</sup> of October, 1998).

The police in Brazil seem to consistently maintain a hierarchical order in which lighter skinned, more educated and wealthier Brazilians occupy a higher place than darker skinned, less educated and poor Brazilians. Brazilian military police, and to a lesser extent civil police, routinely arbitrarily arrest or pull over potential suspects, who they

later find guilty of some crime. The two principle groups that suffer from police harassment, groups which overlap, are the poor, particularly residents of *favelas*, and Afro-Brazilians.

The *favelas* are considered to be "liminal types of social spaces: they are residences, but not 'proper' residences" (Caldeira, 1992: 83). *Favelados* tend to be dark or brown skinned (although not necessarily *negro/preto*) and/or from the northeast, although *favelas* are inhabited by Brazilians from all over Brazil and of all colors. There is some animosity between Afro-Brazilians and northeastern migrants, and many brown-skinned northeasterners do not consider themselves to be *negro*, but rather *caboclo*, *indio* or *blanco*. However, their location within the *favela* "darkens" (the opposite of "whitening") them, and they are seen to be like, although not the same as, the *negros*.

The ratings cited from Freedom House show that Brazil is not the only Latin American country where civil liberties for ethnic and racial Others have worsened during democratization. However, Brazil is particularly exemplary in this area. The end of the military regime coincided with economic crisis as well as massive penetration of the *favelas* in urban areas<sup>17</sup> by drug dealers, as well as by the considerable growth of *favelas*. During the 1980s and 1990s, a virtual war has raged in many *favelas* at night between police and off-duty police and citizens, police and drug dealers, drug dealers and rivals, and drug dealers and local residents. Among the various groups, the violence of the

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<sup>17</sup> This section will focus on police responses to urban violence, especially using Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Police violence is not limited to these cities, or to urban areas for that matter. However, police targeting of "marginal" peoples seems to be something that pervades throughout the country. For example, in the center-west squatters, often associated with the Landless Movement (*Movimento Sem Terra*), are often removed from property with considerable violence. Also, this will not address claims of slavery/forced labor in rural fazendas in Brazil, or claims of forced and underage prostitution in Brazil (see Human Rights Watch, 1993).

police seems to be the most efficient, although the drug dealers who rule *favelas* are by no means enlightened despots.

Criminals and marginal people are pathologized and "animalized," and as a result, there is broad support in Brazil for violent methods of repressing "criminals."<sup>18</sup> When asked, "Bandits who do not respect the rights of other, therefore they should not have their rights respected," 63.4% of a sample in Rio de Janeiro "agreed completely," and 40.4% of informants felt it was justifiable in some cases to use violence in order to get a confession (Carvalho et al. 1997: 18, 20). The use of violence is justifiable because criminals, often dark-skinned or perceived to be, are considered to be less civilized and, therefore, less human. In one moment of political bravado, former governor of Rio de Janeiro Marcelo Alencar exclaimed "[t]hese violent criminals have become animals... They are animals. They can't be understood any other way. That's why encounters with them can't be civilized. These people don't have to be treated in a civilized way. They have to be treated like animals" (in Cavallaro, 1997: 1).

The statistics of number of citizens killed by police officers is staggering. "In 1991, the Military Police alone killed 1,104 people in São Paulo during 'confrontations with criminals'" (Caldeira, 1992: 159). In Rio, "...between January of 1995 and February of 1996 the military police killed, on average, 3.65 people per 100,000 inhabitants. The number in São Paulo was 2.68 deaths for every 100,000 inhabitants." (Fagundes and Aquino, 1997: 18). In 1992, São Paulo military police killed 1,470

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<sup>18</sup> See (Spanakos, forthcoming a).

civilians. In 1992, 424 street children were killed in Rio, 118 more than the year before (Human Rights Watch, 1993).

In a recent article in a journal focusing on "Organized Crime and the Politics of Public Security in Rio de Janeiro," Ignacio Cano shows that in 1991 the police force of the city of Rio de Janeiro killed more suspects in armed confrontations than the combined police forces of the United States of America (Cano, 1998: 208). In addition, several massacres stand out, including the killing of 110 inmates at the Carandiru Prison in São Paulo in 1992, the 1993 murder of 8 sleeping homeless teenagers on the steps of the famous Candelaria Church, the murder of 21 residents of the *favela* of Vigário Geral one month later, and the raid on the *favela* Nova Brasília in 1994 which killed 13 drug dealers, all in Rio de Janeiro (Human Rights Watch, 1993, 1994). These deaths are often implicitly supported, if not explicitly funded, by local businessmen, residents of apartment complexes and others, who encourage private security forces to protect their businesses and residences.

Not only does the level of police violence show a blatant disregard for human life, but it is also clear that there are certain places where life has little value. This is the more troubling part of da Matta's relational citizenship, since those who are "absolutely poor" or are at the "absolute" bottom of a relative scale have little recourse to rights and protection. Brazilians of all colors responded that a *negro* would be treated more rigorously than a *branco* for the same crime (64.5% of *Branco*s, 67.2% of *Pardo*s, and 70.9% of *Preto*s, Carvalho et al, 1997: 49). Responses are not surprising since the courts are believed to have a bias in favor of the wealthy and powerful, and Afro-Brazilians are general among the most poor and powerless. That Brazilian courts do not treat Brazilians

of different colors the same is very much a result of discourses that are embedded into Brazilian culture. The "criminal," for example, is conceived as generally poor, Afro-Brazilian, a migrant from the northeast, the son of a single mother, a drug user, and a resident of a *favela* (Caldeira, 1992: 84; 1996: 201). Since anywhere between 40 and 60 percent of Brazil's population could be identified as Afro-Brazilian (Telles, 18<sup>th</sup> of December, 1998), and it is unlikely that any state would ever have such a high crime rate, it is clear that Brazilian police interrogate, and often torture, many Afro-Brazilians assuming *a priori* that they are criminals. As one police officer bragged to Roberto Kant de Lima, "the police use torture to extract confessions when they are already certain that the suspect is guilty" (Kant, 1994: 40). The Brazilian police gain their certainty not through Promethean visions, but through access to thick cultural and stereotypical discourses which are validated by some experiences that the police officer has had or has been told about. As Jorge da Silva writes, "the police produce fantastic explanations *a priori* to later look for evidence that conforms with an imagined reality" (Silva, 1996: 3).

The combination of a police that is aware of who is a criminal, often before a crime is committed, and the discursive depiction of criminals lead to routine police violation of the rights and liberties of Afro-Brazilians. A 1997 report on police violence in Rio de Janeiro found that of the victims, 34.7% were identified as "*branco*," while 37.1% were "*preto*" and 28.2% were "*pardo*" (Fagundes and Aquino, 1997: 19). The racial breakdown of Rio shows a very different set of numbers: 55.96% are "*brancos*," 34.55% are "*pardo*," 9.36% are "*negro*," and 0.12% are "*amarelo*" or "undeclared" (Silva, 1998: 164). This suggests that Afro-Brazilians, especially those considered "*preto*" are over-represented among the victims of police violence. These deaths often

occur during "confrontations," however, comparative numbers challenge the idea that these "confrontations" happened. For example, while only one out of every four people wounded by police in New York, Philadelphia and Chicago dies, three out of four people wounded by the police of Rio de Janeiro die. The police force of Brazil's largest city, São Paulo, is only slightly less deadly, as the rate is a striking two out of three (Cano, 1998: 211).

Of those who survive police interrogation, and who invariably go to prison, the percent of Afro-Brazilians is again disproportionately high. Caldeira notes that while 75% of the São Paulo population is *branco*, only 47.6 % of prison population is, and while 22.5% of the population is *pardo* or *preto*, 52% of prison population is (Caldeira, 1992, 123). Similarly, in the state of Rio 1988, "2/3... of the total 126,152 prisoners were black or mulatto" (Silva, 1998: 53). And in a study of "297 criminal jury trials in São Paulo, Sérgio Adorno found a conviction rate of three blacks [Afro-Brazilians] to one white [Euro-Brazilians]" (Caldeira and Holston, 1998: 275).

International organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have been able to put a significant amount of pressure on the Brazilian government, especially with Cardoso as president. Although the pressure to eliminate police violence is generally focused on the abuse of *favelados*, reports do contain information about the disproportionate presence of Afro-Brazilians among the victims of police violence. Some small NGOs, particularly those identified with the *Movimento*

*Negro*, have also served to pressure government from a more local level<sup>19</sup>. This is especially significant since police are controlled by state governments.

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso has been very receptive to human rights groups, and has been very active in proposing various measures to limit police prerogatives and impunity. In 1995, Cardoso created a commission of human rights and introduced legislation to compensate family members of those who disappeared during the dictatorship. In 1996, Cardoso invited various NGOs to participate in the construction of policy on human rights in Brazil<sup>20</sup>. A proposal to eliminate the use of military courts to try military police was eventually passed in 1996 as a bill which allowed civil courts to try military police for homicide, but not manslaughter. This dilution is significant since homicides are often written up as manslaughter, and because civil courts would not be allowed to try cases of harassment or torture. Cardoso later proposed the use of a witness protection program in order to protect those who testify against police violence<sup>21</sup>, the elimination of all military courts, as well as the possibility of eliminating the military police altogether (Human Rights Watch, 1995; 1998). Cardoso also created a National Prize for Human Rights which was given to human rights activist Cardinal Arnolds of São Paulo (Pinheiro, 1997).

However, as much as Cardoso has introduced important legislation and as important as it has been that he has opened significant public space about the violation of rights, his government has been unable to end police impunity. In 1998, Human Rights

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<sup>19</sup> See chapter 5 for a more detailed account of their success and failures.

<sup>20</sup> The NGOs here served as "authorities" and gave "testimony" which was vital to the construction of policy (see chapter 6).

<sup>21</sup> There is a fairly successful witness protection program in Recife which was being considered at the federal level (Cavallaro, 1997: 26).

Watch reported that in an appeal trial, all the police officers accused of the massacre at Candelaria were acquitted, despite the testimony of the one man who they were unable to kill (Human Rights Watch, 1998). On the 9<sup>th</sup> of December of 1998, police officers accused of the massacre in Vigário Geral were also acquitted. The coordinator of the Grupo Cultural Afro-Reggae, which offers services to the community of Vigário Geral, explained that he was not surprised by the verdict given the historic protection of police by the courts (Interview, 10, December, 1998<sup>22</sup>).

These acquittals were only a small part of what has been occurring in Rio de Janeiro the last few years. The city invited the military to participate in its war on drugs and criminality in the *favelas* as part of a program called Operation Rio. Military involvement coupled with a generous incentive system for “bravery” has led to a marked increase in the number of civilian deaths caused by police (Cano, 1998; Cavallaro, 1997). Many officers accused of murdering civilians receive bonuses or promotions within months of the homicides (Cavallaro, 1997: 40-1). Internal investigations are hardly neutral, and when it is clear that the victim was a “marginal,” the investigation is generally closed. This is a serious obstacle to allowing justice for Afro-Brazilian victims of police violence who are generally assumed to be “marginals.”

In contrast, the police in São Paulo have made incredible progress. A very progressive series of policies in São Paulo has led to a massive decline of civilians killed by military police, from 1190 in 1992, to 243 in 1993, 333 in 1994 and 331 in 1995 (Cavallaro, 1997: 51). Police who are found to have killed a high number of people are removed from active duty and are provided psychological counseling. Even though it is

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<sup>22</sup> Curiously enough the interview was given the day after the verdicts were announced, on December

difficult to fire police officers because they are part of civil service, São Paulo's Secretary of Public Security took 200 police officers off of active duty because of their role in homicides.

Afro-Brazilians are the immediate beneficiaries of the program in São Paulo and among those who suffer most because of the "bravery" incentives in Rio de Janeiro. The long term effect of the São Paulo program is likely to improve, slowly, the relations between civilians and police, and perhaps also the judiciary system. However, the violence of the police in Rio, as well as other urban areas, encourages anti-police and anti-state sentiments among the marginalized populations, and engenders an environment that is often quiescent if not completely supportive of local drug dealers (Ungar, 1998). That sort of situation reinforces Afro-Brazilian use of informal channels rather than formal institutions, thereby weakening the latter, while also alienating themselves from the official, legal political system.

Policing the police will obviously improve the condition for the primary victims of police violence. However, there have been efforts to not only limit police violence, a general demand among activists and scholars, but also to raise consciousness about racism<sup>23</sup>, and to encourage denunciations of racial discrimination. Título I Article 5 and 6 of the 1988 Constitution guarantees "life, liberty, equality, security, and property..." to all Brazilians regardless of race, and Article XLII declares that "the practice of racism constitutes a [terrible]... crime [for which there is no bail], subject to imprisonment, according to the terms of the law" (Fundação Cultural Plamares, 1995: 39). The Caó

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<sup>10</sup>th, the international day of human rights.

<sup>23</sup> See chapter 5.

Law, passed one year later, provides for punishment, fines and/or prison sentences for racial discrimination.

Few claims of racism make their way into the Brazilian public. Perhaps the most famous is that of Anna Flávia de Azaredo who "was insulted by an apartment manager and punched in the face by the manager's son " in Vitoria, the capital of Espírito Santo (Page, 1995: 60). The incident arose when Flávia was told to take the service elevator, since the manager assumed she was a maid. This enraged Flávia, who happened to be the daughter of the Governor. High-profile criticism of racism has also come from former senator and current vice-governor of Rio de Janeiro, Benedita da Silva, who has always positively identified publicly as *negra*, woman and *favelada*, and as a result, has been repeatedly called "monkey" and "*crioula*" (Mendonca and Benjamin, 1997).

During the field research for this study there were only three cases of racism reported by *O Globo*<sup>24</sup>. In one case, two children of a police chief in Belo Horizonte claimed that a couple in a social club called them "monkey, *negra*, *crioula*" (Globo, 14 Oct, 1998). The couple denied this saying it was the children who were harassing them. In another case, a woman was arrested for cursing at and biting a military police officer who claimed she called him "monkey, shameless *negro*" (Globo, Oct 20, 1998 ). The accused denied the use of any racist slang saying "My father is mulatto and my husband is Japanese. My children are all mixed. How could I be racist? I, like almost the whole world, have a foot in Africa" (Globo, Oct 2, 1998). In the third case, a nanny decided to press charges against the Metropolitan theatre because she was not allowed to enter a children's concert. The Metropolitan's policy is that children under 14 could only enter

with their parents. The nanny was asked whether the children she was accompanying were her own. Metropolitan reported that the guards asked her because they felt that she was too young to be the mother of the two children. She claimed that they asked her because of her race since she saw Euro-Brazilian nannies inside (Globo, 27 October, 1998<sup>25</sup>).

Pushing aside the truth claims, the cases are interesting because they point to certain places where the civil rights of Afro-Brazilians are abridged because of stereotypes and cultural discourses of negritude which are similar to the "informal" and "social" discrimination that Afro-Dominicans experience. For example, the children of the police chief were in a social club, an area that is considered socially exclusive. It is likely that the couple would not have found the children so rude were they simply walking down the street, a public space. However, since there are certain spaces that Afro-Brazilians have been historically denied access or been given limited access, it is often in these areas where racial discrimination is clearest. It is also likely that the children of the chief of police were more aware of racial discrimination because of their position in the club as a "minority" and because of their relatively high degree of education (Guimarães, 1997)<sup>26</sup>. Further, because the children were the children of a

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<sup>24</sup> Brazil's most popular daily which tends to be on the conservative side.

<sup>25</sup> These cases are culled from issues of *O Globo* between August of 1998 and January of 1999. It is probably only coincidental that all three incidents were reported in October, the month when presidential, congressional and gubernatorial elections were held.

<sup>26</sup> Claims of racism in Brazil are highest in cities with the lowest percentage of *pretos*, which also tend to be the cities with the highest literacy rates (Guimarães, 1997). For example, the number of cases of discrimination per 100,000 *preto* inhabitants demonstrated that the number of cases was highest in Brasília (11.51), Curitiba (9.87) and São Paulo (6.50) where the percentage of the population which is *preto* is 3.7, 2.5 and 4.6 percent respectively. The rates of illiteracy for those cities are 9.12, 7.97 and 9.15 percent (Guimarães, 1997: 64, 66). The number of cases for the cities of Recife (2.43), Salvador 4.23) and Rio de Janeiro (5.55) where the percent of *pretos* is much higher (5.6, 15.6 and 10.5) was much lower. Similarly, the rates of illiteracy in the three cities were 15.42, 11.60 and 9.08 percent.

police chief they certainly had the awareness that they could report racial discrimination, and that they had the ability to enforce it. The couple was jailed for the offense of racism, an anomaly in Brazilian law. Certainly, no response would have been that fast were the mother not a chief of police.

In the second case, a military police officer claimed that the woman defamed him after he told her she could not catch an illegal van in front of a shopping area. The shopping area, while public, is considered somewhat exclusive, in that going there demonstrates a capacity to consume, which is generally associated with status especially among the lower and lower middle classes (see chapter 6). The woman was prevented from doing what she wished by a person who, she believed, was clearly her social inferior. This led to her setting him straight by reminding him of his lower position on the social totem pole, similar to the "do you know who you are talking to?" phrase which da Matta correctly associates with putting someone in his or her place, while simultaneously establishing his or her own.

Her response is also very interesting because it mimics much of the national discourse on race in Brazil, or the Dominican Republic for that matter. She claims there is no way that she is racist since her father is a "mulatto" and her husband is Japanese. However, she does not identify as mulatto and she married "up" in terms of Brazilian hierarchy, consistent with "whitening" ideology. This is not to say her claim is false, only that most of the Brazilian nation (and practically the entire Dominican one) can claim an ancestor, loved one or friend who is dark-skinned or mixed. But this does not mean that

they do not discriminate against people on the basis of race, or that they identify with that race<sup>27</sup>.

The third case demonstrates the power of discourses. Euro-Brazilian nannies were allowed to enter with the children of their employees, but this particular Afro-Brazilian nanny was not. Security guards asked if she were the nanny of the two children because of her skin color, she claims. They insist that it was because she looked too young to be the mother of the children. Regardless, security guards, salespeople, policemen, and others make judgements and decisions everyday based on their perceptions. An Afro-Brazilian woman at a concert for children, where tickets are fairly expensive, is assumed *a priori* to be a nanny, whereas a Euro-Brazilian with the same occupation is assumed to be the mother of the children or, at least, given the benefit of the doubt. Here, Brazilian culture reinforces these beliefs since other areas that are considered "exclusive" also show a dearth of Afro-Brazilians. For example, the foreign service, businessmen and women, social clubs, high political officers, the president, and members of the cabinet and congress are highly disproportionately Euro-Brazilian. So it should be made clear that it is not merely the police who impinge on the citizenship of Afro-Brazilians, although they may do so in the clearest and most quantifiable ways.

### Comparative Analysis

Procedural and Institutional claims about Liberal democratic citizenship focus on the importance of institutional structures and officially prescribed channels for interest articulation. It has been argued that relational and particular conceptions of identity

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<sup>27</sup> This is particularly relevant in the Dominican Republic where the Dominican nation is considered to be

undermine universal ones, therefore limiting the universality of rights-based claims of citizenship. In both the Dominican Republic and Brazil, inequalities of power have radically affected the way political and civil rights are conceived, and the structural hierarchies of citizenship have persisted during democratization.

Political rights, understood within the neo-liberal tradition, involves voting and the expression of political preferences. Elections are regular in both countries and officially recognized victors of elections enter into the positions for which they ran. This is significant considering the vast number of years spent under explicitly authoritarian governments during this century for both governments (at least 51 in the Dominican Republic, and approximately 28 in Brazil). In Brazil, unlike the Dominican Republic, electoral results have been reliable, and losing candidates have had little opportunity to claim fraud. Perhaps certain candidates suffer from media bias, as da Silva did in 1989 against Collor. However, voters for the Worker's Party (PT), or any other party, are not systematically denied the right to vote.

Voting in the Dominican Republic has been highly problematic, especially in the 1990 and 1994 elections. Electoral irregularities weakened the legitimacy of the electoral system and undermined the political rights of Dominican voters, particularly Afro-Dominicans. The relatively clean electoral results in the 1996 presidential and the 1998 municipal elections may have restored some faith in the electoral system. It remains to be seen whether this was a result of Balaguer not being a candidate or whether this represents a new transition (Hartlyn, 1998). Regardless, some criticism is due since prior to the second round of the elections, Fernández's party benefited from, if not was

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one of mixed race, and that therefore there can be no racism.

complicit in, the police repression of Afro-Dominicans and Haitians. This was a scare tactic that targeted Afro-Dominicans and Haitians, and seems to be a clear infringement of their right to free exercise of political expression. Fernández also used the "Haitian problem" as a means of salvaging his popularity after less than a year in office.

Despite the generally positive picture of regular, if not institutionalized, elections, and the success in improving political rights in the Dominican Republic and Brazil in recent years, the quality of political rights for Afro-Dominicans and poor Dominicans worsened during this decade, although it shows some signs of improvement since 1996. Electoral fraud, a perennial thorn in Dominican democracy's side, has been limited, although political round-ups still continue. More troubling than the ineffectiveness in building deep universal political rights is the inability of the Dominican and Brazilian governments to protect the civil rights of their citizens. Worse still is the fact that organs of the Dominican and Brazilian governments, most obviously the President, the police and the courts in the Dominican Republic and the police and the courts in Brazil, seem to consistently violate the rights of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

What has been demonstrated here is that the two most recent presidents of the Dominican Republic have encouraged the violation of rights of Haitians and Afro-Dominicans, and even if they claim to have only dealt with undocumented aliens they never placed any limitations on the National Police to protect Dominican *negros*. It can also be shown that the nationalist discourse of Dominican identity (*Dominicanidad*), constructed in large during the *Trujillato* and by Balaguer, is not only anti-Haitian, but it espouses a racist ideology which denigrates Afro-Dominican influence, culture, and people, while presenting itself as Hispanic and "Indian." It can also be shown that the

National Police and the DNCD are employed to maintain an order in which darker skinned Dominicans, in general, are relegated to the bottom rungs, and that the areas which these organizations target for their operations are also populated principally by Afro-Dominicans and Haitians. The situation is highly propitious for racism, which limits the civil rights of Afro-Dominicans far beyond the "informal barriers to social and economic advancement" that the US Department of State identified (Department of State, 1999).

The violation of the civil rights of Afro-Brazilians is a little easier to demonstrate as statistics abound. Statistics cited earlier demonstrate the disproportionality of Afro-Brazilians relative to Euro-Brazilians in prisons. The São Paulo example is particularly telling since the population of Afro-Brazilians is so low in the state, and yet very high among the prison populations. This is not enough to prove that Afro-Brazilians have their civil rights abridged, only that they make up a larger part of the prison population. But when the criminal population is determined "*a priori*" based on discourses that assume a natural proclivity for crime among Afro-Brazilians, the poor, migrants, residents of *favelas*, the question of racial discrimination becomes more clear. When police methods—which include arbitrary arrest, harassment, and torture—are combined with police results—signed confessions or civilian deaths in 'confrontations'—one can speculate further on a systematic infringement on the civil rights of Afro-Brazilians.

Brazilian police brutal methods, interrogation of people they "know" are guilty and impunity from investigation, are similar to that of the Dominican police. Both target the poor and marginal sectors of the population who are least capable of asserting their rights and are the least likely to be defended by a lawyer, let alone receive a hearing. The

difference for the purpose of this comparison is that statistics show that the poor in Brazil and the majority of victims of police violence are disproportionately Afro-Brazilian. The government of the Dominican Republic has no data which breaks down economic class by color or race. The National Police of the Dominican Republic may have information that would correlate race to victims of police violence, but the release of such information is unlikely. From a more qualitative perspective, months of direct observation of "society" sections of Dominican newspapers shows an almost homogenous Euro-Dominican or very light-skinned population. These are the citizens whose citizenship is consistently recognized, and this reinforces the idea that Afro-Dominicans, whose photos typically appear only in the sections on "crime" and "entertainment, are not proper members of society.

During the summers of 1990 and 1997 when field research was conducted in the Dominican Republic, there were no cases of racism which were reported by mainstream media. There are also no cases as high profile as that of Ana Flávia, nor are there politicians, like Benedita da Silva, who have publicly reported racial prejudice encountered. During follow-up interviews with Bienvenida Mendoza, coordinator of an NGO which teaches against racism (see chapter 5), she indicated that she had considered running for office. If she were to do this, denunciations of racism would likely be part of her campaign. In the meanwhile, victims of racial discrimination in the Dominican Republic do not report such activities (see chapter 5).

An area where civil rights protection has improved in Brazil, albeit slowly, is in the area of denouncing racism. As Antonio Guimarães writes " the publication and denouncing of these attitudes as *racist* by the press constitutes a sign that the times are

changing, although slowly" (Guimarães, 1997: 68). Whether people will receive serious jail time as a result of racial discrimination, or whether a case of racial discrimination can survive a thorough trial, remains to be seen. In the meanwhile, it is generally considered that racism, in the abstract, is not a good thing and that one should be against racism. This constitutes an improvement in the condition of Afro-Brazilians who now have a little more legal recourse to protect themselves from arbitrary abuse. However, the amount of protection offered on a practical level is minimal because it is rarely used since many of the police officers violating rights are also Afro-Brazilian, and most Afro-Brazilians do not see violence or discrimination committed against them as racial, especially when the aggressor is also an Afro-Brazilian<sup>28</sup>. Although racial consciousness is higher in Brazil, in general, than in the Dominican Republic, Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Dominicans tend to see prejudice they receive as a result of their class, and not their race<sup>29</sup>. This does, however, change among the more educated and those in more highly "skilled"/"white-collar" positions.

## Conclusion

Political and civil rights in the Dominican Republic and Brazil fall far short of the ideal. Institutional structures and democratic procedures have been undermined to the point where the most marginal people have the least recourse to the very institutions and procedures which are designed to protect and fortify their rights. Worse, organs of the government—such as the police, judges, the military—are complicit, if not the actual aggressors, in the abridgement and violation of those political and civil rights. The last

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<sup>28</sup> See (Spanakos, 1999a)

ten years have seen the institutionalization of electoral systems and formal democracy but some of the conditions for citizenship, defined in terms of rights, have worsened, in both countries. The deterioration of citizenship has affected most profoundly the groups who occupy the lowest end of hierarchy of value and identity that the societies pose. Thus, while development of Liberal citizenship in the Dominican Republic and Brazil is shallow, it is most equivocal, if not at times fictional, for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

The development of Liberal citizenship would certainly improve democratization in the two countries. However, doing so would require at least three preconditions, which are all quite problematic. The first is a rule of law that would be guaranteed by police and enforced by the courts. As Pinhero writes "[t]he failure to enforce the law not only affects the equality of citizens before the law, but also makes it more difficult for governments to strengthen their legitimacy and perpetuate the illegal circle of violence" (Pinhero, 1992: 271). The São Paulo military police seems to have made headway in terms of decreasing the number of civilians killed, however police internal investigations are half-hearted and police impunity continues. Police violence in Rio de Janeiro and Santo Domingo has increased, due to incentives for "bravery" and the involvement of the military in Rio, and the growth of the "war on drugs" in Santo Domingo.

A second area which would need to be improved is the hierarchical structure of power in the two countries, particularly punctuated by the presence of a small elite, an effective system of clientelism and relatively hollow institutions. Democratization has not weakened clientelism and strengthened institutions across the board, contrary to the

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<sup>29</sup> See chapter 5.

claims and wishes of Institutionalists. As Kurt Weyland reports "[d]emocratic competition has done little to strengthen the bargaining power of clients... Clientelism has reinforced the narrow interest definition of marginals and impeded their autonomous horizontal organizations" (Weyland, 1996: 70).

This leads to a third condition, connected to clientelism, which is challenging the discourses that link identity, particularly Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian, to criminality, barbarism, violence, illegitimacy, and poverty. Vast power differences among members of Dominican and Brazilian society set up conditions which engender a concept of citizenship which is hierarchical and relational. Particularistic concepts of citizenship are troubling for Liberal citizenship which is based on universal rights and neutral institutions. But it is clear that some institutions are not neutral and that rights are not universally recognized and protected, therefore privileging the wealthy, those with powerful family and personal connections, and those with more European features over the poor, those without connections, and those with more African features. In countries where ghettos and shanties contain poverty that is considered "absolute," and where the inhabitants of these spaces are much "darker" than the inhabitants or more wealthy neighborhoods, the relational citizenship has an "absolute" bottom. The bottom of this hierarchy is for "marginals" whose political civil rights are routinely ignored and violated through government sponsored policies, primarily at the hands of the police, and through less formal discourses which continually locate them at the very bottom of a hierarchy of status as persons, citizens, and human beings.

## CHAPTER 5

### REPUBLICAN CITIZENSHIP IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND BRAZIL: POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Republican theorists find minimalist visions of citizenship and Liberal democracy troubling. They argue that democratic citizenship must be constructed through active participation and they focus on political agency and positive political rights. Republican citizenship also considers that a citizen must be “free from domination” (Petit, 1997), and thus even if formal political rights and civil liberties exist, these may be impeded by informal structures of domination. Scholars who study democratization with a substantivist perspective make similar comments about Liberal and institutional democracy. They argue that, by themselves, the institutions of Liberal democracy are not capable of providing a democratic political environment because they do not give enough attention to the hierarchization within societies where identity and class politics have made political agency weak, if not nonexistent, for large portions of the population. This is especially true in areas such as Latin America, or in other areas outside of the “developed world,” where there is a highly unequal distribution of wealth and power across elements in society. Republican concepts of citizenship which focus on the depth of citizenship rights and commitments are particularly important in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, where rights have been so difficult to institutionalize, especially for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. This chapter will examine efforts to politically mobilize and conscientize Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, the strategies employed by activists and Non-Governmental Organizations, and the success and failures

encountered in the effort to construct a political identity, community, and a Republican form of citizenship for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians

### **Civil Society, Political Activity and Democratization**

This section will examine some of the literature that analyzes democratization in Latin America, particularly in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, from a substantive perspective. Perhaps the most clear example of this perspective is the recent work of Guillermo O'Donnell. In 1996, he writes "the definition of polyarchy is silent about important but elusive themes such as if, how, and to what degree governments are responsive or accountable to citizens between elections, and the degree to which the rule of law extends over the country's geographic and social terrain." (O'Donnell, 1996: 36). Polyarchy provides minimal requirements for a democracy, but it assumes a reasonably blank political slate prior to the transition to polyarchy. It also assumes: that traditional hierarchies have not become so imbedded as to obstruct the rule of law; differences in socio-economic status will not be so stark as to problematize the universal legal rights of the poor and marginal; and the norms, expectations, beliefs and behavior of the people of the new democracy can sufficiently be constrained by democratic institutions or that they will be given enough of a "payoff" to behave democratically (see Rustow, 1970). Challenging these assumptions, O' Donnell writes "[i]nstitutions are resilient, especially when they have deep historic roots; particularism is no exception. Particularism is a permanent feature of human society; only recently, and only in some places and institutional sites, has it been tempered by universalistic norms and rules" (O'Donnell, 1996: 43).

Many of the scholars who study Latin America, particularly those who study social movements, Non-Governmental Organizations and micro-politics, challenge the procedural and minimalist vision of democracy on similar accounts. They argue that it was through alternative terrain—through civil society—where democratic politics began during authoritarian regimes. The expansion of political activity within spheres separated from the State was very much involved in forcing authoritarian governments to respect fundamental human rights, later some citizen rights, and eventually in pushing for democratization. As Joseph Foweraker writes “[w]here authoritarian regimes compressed the public sphere, social movements asserted their right to expand it” (Foweraker, 1995: 93).

Mass protests in Brazil in 1984 which demanded direct elections (*diretas já*), and therefore the hastening of democratization, were not only successful in their goal, but constituted the most large-scale and inclusive political act of citizen politics in Brazil’s history. There was quite a bit of political activity before and since then which pressured the military state, including pressure from new labor unions, the *Movimento Sem Terra* (Landless Movement) and even the *Movimento Negro Unificado* (Unified Black Movement). These groups were successful in pressuring first a declining military regime and later a fragile civilian regime, both of which faced legitimacy and economic crises.

Although the Dominican Republic experienced no protests similar to *Diretas Já* during its transition to democratic government<sup>1</sup>, popular resistance and small-scale organizing was growing during the 1970s, and activists as well as popular sectors increased their activity during the PRD governments, which they believed would be

sympathetic to their causes. The most significant acts of protest in the Dominican Republic during the 1980s also occurred in 1984, in response to the Jorge Blanco government's negotiation of an austerity package with the IMF. While this protest was not as clearly steeped in the language of expanding the rights of citizenship as was *Diretas Já*, what is important was the increased activity within civil society, especially activity which suggested the idea of a somewhat engaged citizenry.

Neither Brazil nor the Dominican Republic were exceptional in Latin America during this time period for having an increase in citizen contestation of political and economic decisions, an increase in associational activity, and a movement in discourse away from human rights to rights of citizenship (Jelin, 1997). It was in this context that many scholars, some of whom were involved in social movements, non-governmental organizations and other forms of political activism, wrote how this new form of politics was radically transforming the societies in which it was taking place. Writing of social movements in general, and the MNU in particular, Florestan Fernandes believed that social movements allowed for "self-emancipation" (Fernandes, 1989: 23). While some authors focused on the idea of civil society, as a democratic alternative and a separate sphere from an authoritarian state, others emphasized more clearly the role of social movements and other new actors within a democratic society. Emblematic of this research is Tilman Evers' work which argues that "these new political actors are not secondary to political parties, but at least parallel" (Evers, 1985, 48). He goes even farther writing "social movements are not questioning a specific *form* of political power, but the centrality of the power criterion itself" (Evers, 1985, 61).

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<sup>1</sup> There was, however, significant popular response to the perceived electoral fraud following the

More recent studies of democratization have been far more sobering. For example, although Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar write "[s]ocial movements not only have sometimes succeeded in translating their agendas into public policies and in expanding the boundaries of institutional politics but also, significantly, have struggled to resignify the very meanings of received notions of citizenship, political representation and participation, and, as a consequence, democracy itself" (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998: 2), Alvarez and Escobar explain "social movements are unlikely to radically transform large structures of domination or dramatically expand elite democracies, certainly not in the short run" (in Foweraker, 1995: 112). Ruth Cardoso explains that while social movements played a critical role in the transition to democracy in Brazil she is skeptical of their role since (Cardoso, 1994). In a similar vein, Joseph Foweraker writes "with the transition to democracy, the struggle for citizenship moves to the constitutional sphere, and social movements lose their pre-eminent role as defenders and promoters of legal and political rights" (Foweraker, 1995: 105). Citizenship not only moved from the civic to the constitutional sphere, but it became increasingly defined through institutional terms, which gave a comparative advantage, in many cases, to political parties and to more formal structures.

The obvious difference between the enthusiasm of the early to mid 1980s in Latin America, when it seemed as though "new actors" were of at least of comparable importance to more traditional ones, and more recent work is the predominance of democratic government in Latin America. Much of the agenda of the new actors was taken by more traditional actors as countries became more democratic and elections

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presidential elections of 1990 and 1994.

become more institutionalized. Some of the new actors were absorbed by political parties on the Left, while others entered into government or civil service. Others found their funding, mostly international, drying up as much of their *raison d'être*, challenging authoritarianism, seemed to be gone. Yet, some social movements have survived and Non-Governmental Organizations proliferate, even if their scope and resources are very limited, and these new actors still can affect politics.

What contemporary scholars and scholarship from the early 1980s have in common is its belief that through participation and conscientization in civil society or social movements, individuals are capable of constructing their own political subjectivity (Evers, 1985: 59). This ability of citizens to engage themselves within the politics of collective action allows citizens to become actively involved in both making political decisions, as well as shaping the system that makes those decisions (Dagnino, 1998: 51). This offers the potential for a radical type of subjectivity which could seriously transform the discursive norms and power networks of even very hierarchical political systems (Spanakos, 1999b)<sup>2</sup>. Potential, however, should not be confused with reality, since the potentially transformative capabilities of the "new citizenship," as Dagnino calls it, is contingent on many factors.

Another appealing aspect of this sort of participatory driven and associational concept of citizenship is that citizenship is constructed, at least in theory, from the grass roots level. Bryan Turner writes that when citizenship is developed from below and public spaces are open, citizenship is active, while when citizenship is "handed down" and public spaces are limited, citizenship is passive (Turner, 1993). In her analyses of

citizenship in Latin America, Elisa Reis argues that citizenship and inclusion projects in Latin America have been essentially elite led projects (Reis, 1997, 1998). Redefinition of citizen rights and agency at local levels, as the obverse of previous incremental and trickle-down theories, would therefore be able to contribute to the deepening of democracy.

At the very least, grass roots activism, associational life, social movements and NGO service providers are able to perform various functions for specific people, targeted by their geographic, sexual, racial, ethnic, religious, class, etc, identity. Foweraker notes that these small-scale organizations can serve both as "schools of democracy" where norms of deliberation and contestation are learned (Foweraker, 1995: 91<sup>3</sup>). They can also serve as watchdog organizations which keep vigil over the State, its policies, and its institutions. In this chapter, the "school of democracy" idea will be more closely examined. A caveat should be issued in advance. Even scholars who are sympathetic to the politics of these new actors, recognize that the politics in civil society are not always democratic (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998: 17; Lehmann and Bebbington, 1998). Another point that should be made is that dense associational life, as well as high degrees of political consciousness, are most likely to be found in abundance among the most wealthy, and lacking among the poor. As Laurence Whitehead writes "[i]n most neo-democracies the main attributes of civil society tend to be highly concentrated in specific sites; are often reserved to a minority of the population; and are not infrequently derived from privileges conferred by a pre-democratic structure of power" (Whitehead, 1997:

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<sup>2</sup> The idea of a citizenship which involve active participation and in which citizens attempt to expand public space through their involvement recalls the notion of Republican citizenship (as outlined in chapter 1).

<sup>3</sup> There has recently been a trend for NGOs to register with and to seek recognition from the government.

102). It is important to consider these points in order to view the role of NGOs critically, and not to simply endorse any action on the part of NGOs because it seems to be more “genuine,” “organic,” or “grass-roots based” than other actors and institutions.

Social movements and NGO service provision can serve to contribute to a Republican form of citizenship in their ability to channel individuals with similar political goals and interests for the purpose of improving the political, social and economic conditions for their constituents. There are limits to the effectiveness of such social movements and NGOs, which are due to their strategy, the conditions of their targeted population, and the willingness of the government to cooperate and assist, among other things (Foweraker, 1995: 102).

### **Republican Citizenship in the Dominican Republic and Brazil**

Republican forms of citizenship pose the importance of positive forms of liberty, and particularly the citizens’ ability to define and create his or her political community. The freedom to vote has by and large been available to Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians during the last decade of democratization. Compulsory voting actually forces their inclusion and exercise of their vote, which as a compulsory act becomes a duty rather than a freedom or a right. Voting fraud and problems with registration in the Dominican Republic until the 1996 elections were common and obstructed the ability to express preferences through voting. Thus, even though voting is compulsory, many Dominicans, particularly Afro-Dominicans, often found their names missing from voter

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which suggests a possible return neocorporatism (See Wiarda, 1995).

registration lists or their names were registered at poles on the other side of the city.<sup>4</sup> This clearly impeded them from exercising their most basic political right.

Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Dominicans are both able to enjoy an environment in which they may more or less openly express opinions and assemble. But this is where infringements upon Republican citizenship begin. First, there is the problem that while they may be free to express opinions, those opinions may not be well received or may not be taken seriously. Second, should an assembly of dark-skinned Dominicans or Brazilians acquire large enough numbers or make enough noise, it is likely to receive pressure from police that aims to silence or coopt it<sup>5</sup>. There has been a very traditional silence about racism in Brazil, and those activists who have attempted to "break the silence" have not always been well received by Brazilians of all ends of the color continuum (Marx, 1998: 250). Despite the reluctance, quite a bit of movement and conscientization has occurred in Brazil in the last two decades, due primarily to the *Movimento Negro Unificado*, as well as other groups. There is no similar "movement" in the Dominican Republic, however, a small group of activists, with the help of intellectuals, are attempting to revise national fictions about Haiti, Africa, and Dominican identity (*Dominicanidad*). There is little coordination among these individuals and the groups and institutions that they may represent.

One of the features which differentiates Latin American racial systems since abolition from that of the United States "is the absence of sharply defined racial groups... [T]here is no such thing as a *Negro* group or a white group...never the *Negroes* nor the

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<sup>4</sup> See chapter 4.

<sup>5</sup> See Wiarda's comments on the role of the corporatist State in the development projects in Latin America (Wiarda, 1981).

mixed or mulatto types or the whites may be said to constitute by themselves separately identifiable, significant social segments" (Harris, 1974: 54, my italics). As many scholars have pointed out, due to centuries of racial mixture, clear and singular racial identities, such as those that developed in the United States, did not develop on a significant level in Latin America. This does not mean there was not prejudice across groups, or even within them. This also does not mean that Latin American societies do not "notice" differences in skin color, physical features, etc. The Dominican Republic and Brazil are both very color conscious. It is quite common for someone's nickname, often the same name they use in business, to be a color (*rubio/loira*, *indio* (DR), *moreno/moreno*, *negro/negro*, *prieto/pretos*). Also, to these words diminutive or superlatives are commonly added (*morenito/pretinho*, *negrito/neguinho*). Typically, the terms *negro* and *prieto/preto* are traditionally reserved for other people, and have not been used commonly as a means of positive self-identification, except among the darkest segments of society. Color consciousness, however, does not translate into collective identity formation, particularly around the idea of race.

When asked to identify themselves, to identify their ancestry, or even their race, the vast majority of Dominicans and Brazilians, regardless of color, respond "Dominican" or "Brazilian." Dominicans and Brazilians of all colors not only primarily identify themselves by their national identity (Dominican or Brazilian), but their secondary and tertiary identities are rarely related to race or color. Dominicans and Brazilians will regularly choose regional, class, and religious identity as secondary forms of identification, long before they consider their color/race. Additionally, immigrants as well as second and third generation Dominicans and Brazilians (generally Jewish, Asian,

Middle Eastern, and southern and northern European peoples), and those who live in diasporas are the only people who are likely to identify ethnically. A recent survey in Brazil found that when asked "what is your origin [background]?" (Qual é sua origem?), 75.95 percent responded Brazilian. What is more interesting is that more *pardos* identified as Brazilian than *brancos*, and more *pretos* identified as Brazilian than *pardos* (Schwarzmann, 18<sup>th</sup> of December, 1998). This indicates what Gilberto Freyre and many of the more traditional theorists on race had argued, which is that the great mass of Afro-Brazilians believe themselves to be Brazilian, and not Afro-Brazilian or Black. This does not, however, mean that they live and work in environments free of prejudice.

Statistics in Brazil clearly show that Afro-Brazilians have lower life expectancies, fewer educational opportunities, and are more likely to have lower paying jobs, than Euro-Brazilians (Wood and Lovell, 1998). Yet Afro-Brazilians, who are generally poor, believe that their socio-economic conditions are caused primarily by their class. Statistics about poverty in the Dominican Republic inevitably leave out the category of "color" or "race." But unlike in Brazil, when nearly half the population is Euro-Brazilian and where Afro-Brazilians live in poverty and in *favelas* alongside Brazilians of various shades (although Afro-Brazilians tend to be disproportionately represented), the slums in the urban centers of the Dominican Republic have few to no Euro-Dominicans. In some rural areas, however, there are poor Euro-Dominicans. But here it is critical to note the difference between a country, like Brazil, where 48.9 percent of the population is considered "*branco*" and one, like the Dominican Republic, in which some 5 to 16 percent of the population is considered "*blanco*." The smaller percentage of "*blancos*" in the Dominican Republic, and yet the maintenance of a primarily light-skinned elite class

of politicians and television personalities could be capable of contributing to a racial consciousness. However, Dominicans tend to believe that since anywhere between 70 and 90 percent of them are of clearly mixed racial heritage that there is a sort of racial equality.

But perhaps the Brazilian example shows why there is not a 'racial consciousness' in the Dominican Republic. In Brazil, the regions which have the lowest percentages of Afro-Brazilians are also the ones where Afro-Brazilians are the most marginalized and conscientized. For example, Afro-Brazilians in São Paulo, Porto Alegre and Brasília, where the percentage of Afro-Brazilians is quite low, disproportionately report incidents of racism, relative to other regions (Guimarães, 1997), and are more prone to assume "racial consciousness." Afro-Brazilians have been elected governor in the south, which is the whitest area of Brazil, and São Paulo now has an Afro-Brazilian mayor. In the meanwhile, the elite class of Bahia, where *brancos* constitute 20.2 percent of the population, is almost entirely Euro-Brazilian. It is very possible that the condition of being a minority increases the likelihood of racial consciousness. However, the populations of São Paulo, Porto Alegre and Brasília also are much more educated than those in Bahia, and there seems to be a clear connection between education and awareness of racial prejudice (Guimarães, 1997). Nevertheless, the Dominican Republic and Brazil make interesting comparisons to examine the relation between demographic presence and racial "consciousness." The evidence seems to support the idea that consciousness of racial identity and discrimination is sharpest in areas where populations are better educated and where the "disadvantaged" group occupies a position of demographic minority.

One of the most significant problems facing the expansion of the citizenship of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians is that of identity. In examining black movements in Brazil, the US and South Africa, Anthony Marx notes the political results depend on the construction of group identity and the building of solidarity. "In Karl Marx's terms, a group must be conscious of existing 'in itself' before it can engage in collective action 'for itself.' The 'object' of a self-conscious group must be evident before it can act in response to its situation" (Marx, 1995: 159). Political movements and strategies require self-conscious groups which can articulate policy proposals based on their position. When groups are struggling to expand their own rights they can generally unify around their collective identity which is based on suffering specific to that group, and their belief that that suffering can be alleviated.

The problem of creating a collective identity is particularly acute among Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians since they invariably identify as Dominican and Brazilian, and since it is quite common for them to ignore or deny any African heritage, and to aspire to "Whiteness." Additionally, Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians have traditionally sought individual means, lightening hair color, straightening hair, marrying a lighter or more wealthy person, attaining high levels of schooling, working in certain markets, etc, as means of negotiating their racial identities. Such negotiation of individual racial identity seems a rational strategy for mulattos to pursue, given the color preferences and racial ambiguities (in certain circumstances) of their respective countries. The process, pejoratively referred to as "whitening," is one in which individuals better their position by accepting society's stereotypes. Their individual success tends to reinforce the stereotypes, since if educated *morenos* are no longer *morenos* but are

*moreno claros*, *indios*, etc., this means that those who are less educated are considered by society to be more "brown." By connecting success in a capitalist marketplace, as well as education, family background, ability to consume, etc., to the lightening of skin color, those of darker skin color are invariably seen as failures and marginals, which reinforces notions of social Darwinism. This is particularly so of the Haitians and the darkest skinned Dominicans, as well as the people who live in *favelas* in Brazil.

The idea that *negros* constitute a race onto themselves, separate from the Dominican or Brazilian race, or that *negros* and all people who are not *blanco/branco* constitute the same race is quite controversial, and it has been accepted only by activists and their selected following, some academics, and some educated Euro-Dominicans and Euro-Brazilians. Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian activists see it as imperative that Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians see themselves as constituting a culturally rich community, which is nonetheless discriminated against. The idea of constructing a conscious community is considered to be a primary goal, and any efforts at political lobbying and applying pressure on a democratic government requires the perception that an "Afro-Dominican" or "Afro-Brazilian" vote exists. Since voting is compulsory in both countries, a politically conscious and unified community has the potential to make significant demands upon the political system. However, such potential is blocked by the rigid schemes of activists whose use of essential "Black" identity and issues limits popular support for their programs.

In the Dominican Republic, challenging racism is still at a very nascent state, and the bulk of work has been by very small groups and individuals who have attempted to raise awareness about racism. The section on the Dominican Republic will, therefore,

focus on these efforts. In Brazil, however, there is a more unified national "movement" which has been raising consciousness for twenty-years, and which, at times, has been successful at pressuring the government on behalf of "black" issues. The section on Brazil will therefore analyze efforts to conscientize individuals, to form a self-conscious community and to deliver open politic space and expand the rights of Afro-Brazilian citizens.

### Dominican Republic

There is an adage that "in the Dominican Republic, only the Haitian is *negro*" (*solamente el haitiano es negro*)<sup>6</sup>. Frank Marino Hernandez suggests that there is another group of people who are "*negro*." "Here, the only *negro* is the one standing in front of another *negro*" (*aquí, lo único negro es él que está en frente de otro negro*)<sup>7</sup>. In other words, Afro-Dominicans only notice the color of other Afro-Dominicans, and do not recognize their own color. Dominican society clearly associates Haitian identity with "*negritud*," as well as a host of very negative discourses. But, since color is conceived along a continuum, dark-skinned Dominicans identify people who they consider to have more "*negro*" features than they do as "*negro*," which therefore makes them "not *negro*." This is based on the idea that there is a continuum of color, rather than strict racial categories, into which the population can be classified. Although the majority of the population can hardly claim to be *blanco*, they can very easily claim to be not *negro*. One investigator reported an experience that the author shared on separate occasions. When

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<sup>6</sup> In his genealogy of Peña Gómez, Campillo Pérez writes "in the Dominican Republic, '*negro*' is reserved regularly for the native of Haiti" (Campillo Pérez, 1996: 24).

<sup>7</sup> (Interview, Hernandez, 23, June 1997).

speaking with Dominicans in the Dominican Republic about racial categories in the United States, which was a source of curiosity and criticism among Dominicans. Dominicans asked what would be their color in the Dominican Republic. When told "you would be *negro*," they responded, "well if I would be *negro*, what would Carlos be?"<sup>8</sup>

The obvious problem for the very few Dominican activists who address racism is getting Dominicans to be willing to admit that Dominicans on the darker end of the color continuum experience racism, that they can organize politically, and can use the public sphere to improve their situation. Bienvenida Mendoza, the director of the *Casa de Identidad de Mujeres Afro* (The House of Identity for Afro Women), explained that her organization, concentrates its energies on speaking out about Dominican style racism while also attempting to promote self-esteem among Afro-Dominicans. When Miss Mendoza was interviewed for this study, her organization had recently changed the name of the organization from *Casa de Identidad de Mujeres Negras* (The House of Identity of Black Women). When asked about why the name of the organization had been changed she explained that "many people do not identify themselves as *negra*," and that "Afro" might be able to attract more people (Mendoza, 25<sup>th</sup> of June, 1997). For example, non-*negras* who have African ancestry might be more receptive to their message.

One activist criticized Miss Mendoza's decision since the term "*negro*," which is very political and assertive, was replaced by the softer "Afro" (Interview, 1997). However, given the reluctance of Dominicans to identify as *negro*, her decision seems to be not only pragmatic, but also inclusive, since it may appeal to *indias* and *morenas*. Her

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<sup>8</sup> I am grateful to Richard Turits for this anecdote which quite succinctly complements my own participant

use of the term Afro, which is more associated with culture and ancestry rather than black which is seen as more linked to skin color and economic condition is reminiscent of comments made by a Brazilian anthropologist who complained that Brazilians were identified by color and not ancestry (da Silva, 30, Oct, 1998).

The problem, for Miss Mendoza, was not simply that poor Afro-Dominicans did not identify as Afro-Dominican, but that the few Afro-Dominicans who were wealthy were quick to find 'light-skinned wives and to deny their background.' When asked about three-time presidential candidate, former mayor of Santo Domingo, and secretary general of the PRD, Miss Mendoza responded "Peña Gómez does not have an identity as a black or African... He is a coward for not accepting his identity—a leader without courage." She also noted that his wife, Peggy Cabral, is "almost white" (Mendoza, 25<sup>th</sup> of June, 1997). Her anger was not just directed against Peña Gómez because he did not positively identify himself as "*negro*," but because when he was the butt of all sorts of racist and anti-Haitian attacks from his opponents in the PRSC and PLD he remained silent. He had the opportunity to take a stand for dark-skinned Dominicans and for Dominicans of Haitian ancestry, yet he passively avoided the attacks. In fact, as one scholar reported, "Peña Gómez denies his Haitian ancestry" and "he paid for the genealogy"<sup>9</sup> commissioned before the 1996 elections which proves that he and his parents were born in the Dominican Republic (Interview, 1997).

While the *Casa de Identidad de Mujeres Afro* is one of the very few Non-Governmental Organizations that expressly deals with racism, other organizations are sympathetic to the idea of the creation of a positive Afro-Dominican identity. Prominent observation.

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among these is *MUDHE* which not only deals with the controversial issue of racism, but also with the controversial issue of anti-Haitianism. Their target group is Dominicans of Haitian ancestry and they work primarily in two *bateys* (plantations). While the women of *Identidad* primarily give lectures and facilitate discussions on racism in schools, businesses and other environments, *MUDHE* complements their consciousness raising efforts with social services in two *bateys*, where they pay for occasional visits by nurses, doctors, and medical supplies. In one of the *bateys*, *MUDHE* maintains a pre-school, since the CEA (the state sugar agency) only pays (very little) for primary school, as well as a general store which offers reasonable prices.

Sonia Pierre, the director of *MUDHE*, explained that growing up on the *batey* she noticed that many laborers were not allowed to leave, plantation owners chose young women/girls for sexual partners, and they were forced to have abortions if they were to become pregnant (Pierre, 19<sup>th</sup> of June, 1997). Conditions have improved, but Haitian workers are often prevented from leaving *bateys* during the *zafra* (cane-cutting season), and they are arbitrarily transferred from one *batey* to another (Wucker, 1999: 95). Conditions were so bad that various international anti-slavery organizations criticized the conditions of workers in the *bateys*, and academic discussions raged over whether *batey* labor could or could not be considered slavery (see Martinez, 1996). Sam Martinez's astute observation that although the workers in the *bateys* are not slaves they certainly are not free is particularly useful, because although Haitian workers may not be slaves, they do not have recourse to rights.

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<sup>9</sup> See (Campillo Pérez, 1996)

MUHDE attempts to improve this condition, especially through their campaign "for the right to have a name and nationality" which emphasizes documentation for the many babies born on the *batey* who often have neither documentation nor proof that they were born in the Dominican Republic. This is true of Dominican as well as Haitian workers, since labor in the *bateys* is not exclusively foreign. Documentation is especially important given the constant threat of deportation, which is directed against people with dark skin who are believed likely to be Haitian (see chapter 4).

Even still, there seem to be advances for those who are seeking to improve the ability of Afro-Dominicans to participate in their government. Although 66.43 percent of the Dominicans believe that "Haitians bring problems to the country" and 58.30 percent said that "*negros* will cause problems [*la hace*] either in the entrance or the exit," 63.62 percent said that there was no problem with a "*negro* in an important position" and 52.27 percent of the population agreed that "the country is racist" (Brea et al, 1995: 227). To acknowledge that racism exists in the Dominican Republic is quite an important step in trying to improve the citizenship and socio-economic conditions of Afro-Dominicans<sup>10</sup>. However, recognizing that racism exists in the abstract does not mean being able to identify it in the specific, a complaint made by Brazilian anthropologist Jorge da Silva (da Silva, 30, October, 1998). Additionally, being against racism in the Dominican Republic may mean being against racial discrimination against Haitians, not Dominicans who are not considered *negro* anyway.

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<sup>10</sup> In fact, this study is the first study to explicitly examine the political condition of contemporary Afro-Dominicans. A "doll" test, conducted in 1996-1997 by Ashindi Maxton, demonstrated that young Dominicans of all colors think the prettiest and most intelligent dolls are the ones with the lightest skin color.

But speaking of racism has, slowly, become easier over the past decade or so. Miss Mendoza explains "Dominicans can express that there is racism" in seminars which deal with racism in the Dominican Republic (22. June 1998). They are however "afraid" to express the same sentiment outside of the seminars where they are silenced by a society and a culture which denies the existence of racism, while simultaneously supporting discourses and stereotypes which negatively depict Afro-Dominicans. When Miss Mendoza began her work of conscientization, most Afro-Dominicans neither identified as "Afro-Dominican" nor "*negro*." She believes that this was due to Trujillista-Balaguerista propaganda that insisted that Haitians, not Dominicans, are *negro* (*el negro es el Haitiano*), and that simultaneously demonized *Haitianidad* (Haitianness). A similar understanding of a national myth serving as an hegemonic identity to silence protest is assumed by *Movimento Negro* activists in Brazil.

However, in the safe space of seminars which concentrate on African identity, *Negritud* and racism, Afro-Dominicans feel more comfortable to speak to a counter-narrative, and to challenge the racial myths that underlie *Dominicanidad*. In these seminars, Afro-Dominicans not only are able to acknowledge their experiences with racism, they are able to compare their own experiences with those of others, and, in on a very limited scale, the potential for community and collective identity is built.

"Every day," Miss Mendoza explains, "there is more receptivity" to the work of *Identidad*, and "there are more people identifying themselves" as Afro-Dominican or *negro*. However, the majority prefer to express their identity in the safe space of *Identidad*'s seminars, and are not willing to transform their experiences and personal identity into a public and political "racial consciousness." After Miss Mendoza's

appearance on a nationally aired television program which discussed racism in the Dominican Republic, she "has been approached by many people of all socio-economic positions who share their experiences and solidarity" with her<sup>11</sup>. The program was aired three times, and as a result, the discussion of the theme of racism has grown within public spaces, as well as more informal spaces.

The television program was able to introduce the theme of racism in the Dominican Republic as part of public and popular discourse. Through television, the subject was able to reach a large national audience. Additionally, through the medium of television, Afro-Dominicans could watch the program and empathize with Miss Mendoza's organization, without having to publicly affirm their identity as Afro-Dominican or that they had similarly been victims of racial prejudice. This last point is particularly important since admitting to being a victim of racial prejudice tends to not elicit sympathy/empathy from listeners, as it might in the United States, but instead is a confession that the story teller is "*negro*."

Prior to Miss Mendoza's television appearance, challenges to Dominican racism were limited mostly to NGOs with limited resources, and still more limited success, and to Dominican scholars. For quite some time, Dominican scholars have denounced anti-Haitianism, particularly as part of the nationalist ideology that they identify with Trujillo and Balaguer's nationalist projects. In the last decade and a half, academic work on racism has been building, although it has mostly focused on the treatment of Haitians in the Dominican Republic. Harry Hoetink, one of the pioneers of studies of race in the Dominican Republic, notes "we see especially during the last fifteen years, a re-

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<sup>11</sup> (Interview, 22, June, 1998).

evaluation of the cultural contributions of the 'negro' part of the Dominican people has been undertaken, although it has been slow" (Hoetink, 1994: 126, italics added). The number of studies of slavery have increased, particularly those that study the "slave resistance" of the *cimarrones* (runaway slaves) (Deive, 1980, 1989; Dipp: 1992). *The Africans and Our Island* by Celsa Albert (1989), Carlos Andujar's study of Afro-Dominican religion (1999), and Carlos Hernandez Soto's study of Afro-Dominican funeral rites (1997) are visible examples of these. These works, nevertheless, are consumed by a small and very educated elite, most of whom were already conscious of racism.

The most influential works in mainstream Dominican scholarship that have attacked racism and anti-Haitianism have come from Roberto Cassá and Franklin Franco Pichardo. Cassá, for example, has used his position as a preeminent public intellectual to criticize the deportation of Haitians in newspapers, and his history books have been very critical of the Trujillista-Balaguerista concept of *Dominicanidad* which he considers racist and anti-Haitian (c.g. 1991: 398). Franco has written books entitled *Negros, Mulattos and the Dominican Nation* (1989) and *On Racism and anti-Haitianism (and other essays)* (1997). In these anthologies, Franco analyzes the role of *negros* and *mulattos* in Dominican history, as well as elitist and racist ideologies within the Dominican Republic. In both his *Myth and Culture in The Era of Trujillo* and his regular contributions to Dominican newspapers, Andrés L. Mateo regularly attacks the Hispanicist and racist vision of *Dominicanidad*, and often criticizes Balaguer's use of them (Mateo, 1993, 1996). A more partisan collection of essays, *Against a Racist*

*Ideology in Santo Domingo: Two Campaigns for Peña*, was written by Diógenes Céspedes (1998).

This literature is not without its opponents. Federico Henrique Grateruax has written numerous essays that assert clear demarcations between Dominicans and Haitians. He explains “[w]e are Hispano-mulato, Haiti is Afro-French” (Grateruax, 30<sup>th</sup>, June, 1997). He denies that Dominicans are “Spanish-Hispanics” and he recognizes the Dominicans have been mulattos since the middle of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. However, like Manuel Peña Batlle before him, Grateruax argues that Dominican identity does not come from race, but culture, which though mixed, is primarily Hispanic. Another writer who recognizes racial mixture yet privileges the Spanish part of Dominican cultural identity is Carlos Dobal who writes “we are a racially mixed people; we have the predominance of Africa and America in much of our physical presence; and of Spain in the basic structure of our temperament and our very being. If we insist serenely upon our most cherished values and those things most precious, we will more likely approach our Spanish heritage” (in Cambeira, 1997: 46).

In a more concentrated attack on Cassá and his brand of revisionism, Manuel Nuñez writes that Cassá’s anti-Trujillism forces Cassá to become a Haitianophile, and that his interpretation of history shows this ideological bend (Nuñez, 1990: 189). He later writes that Cassá makes the mistake of associating Hispanophilism with racism and anti-Haitianism (Nuñez, 1990: 306). In the end, he concludes, like Grateruax, that since Dominican culture is filtered through its linguistic expression, Dominicans are culturally Hispanic, even if they are not racially European. And this culture, he believes, is under attack by an increasing Haitian population. He writes the “Dominican population has

doubled between 1960 and 1989, while the amount of Haitian immigration has sextupled" (Nuñez, 1990: 37). In a 1997 presentation on "Cultural Subsistence," he made clear his belief that Haitian invasion was corrupting the Dominican nation, echoing Balaguer's thesis in *La isla al revés* (1985).

President Fernandez's government has supported cultural commissions and a ministry of tourism which has recognized Afro-Caribbean roots in Dominican culture, and which considers Dominican society to be essentially mulatto<sup>12</sup>. While this is often done from a position of romanticizing the Other and appealing to the eroticism of European and American tourists, it does mean more visibility for Afro-Dominicans and more areas from which pride can be drawn<sup>13</sup>. Increasing visibility for Afro-Dominicans, though, must not be limited to the realm of popular culture—such as *merengue* and *bachata*<sup>14</sup>, where they are reasonably well represented, but to positions which do not contribute to stereotypes. Such stereotypes inform what Graterneau calls the "civil war in the heart" where the mixed racial heritage of the Dominican leads to a personality conflict: "when we dance we want to be *negros*; and when we study or investigate we want to be *blancos*" (1995: 10).

The State, for its part, seems to be more open to including darker skinned Dominicans in their tourist brochures, and cultural commissions have given greater attention to the contributions of Afro-Dominicans to Dominican national symbols. But efforts towards promoting more positive identity for Afro-Dominicans relies on certain stereotypes, such as their contributions are purely in the area of popular culture, and all of

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<sup>12</sup> (Interview, 24, September, 1999).

<sup>13</sup> These ideas are echoed in Brazil, and oddly enough, even by *Movimento Negro* activists.

<sup>14</sup> Although both forms of music have become much less Afro-Dominican, rural and "popular" as they have

these efforts must be processed through a culture which has for so long denied and discriminated against Afro-Dominicans and Haitians. A clear example of how such progressive efforts become interpreted can be found in an interview with Selenes Mendez, Miss Dominican Republic 1998.

When asked "What question would you like to answer that you have never been asked? What is the answer?" Miss Mendez responded "'How do you feel spiritually and emotionally about being a woman?' I feel like a universal woman. I am made up of three races with their beautiful characteristics. They go beyond the boundaries of my own country—the kindness and dignity of the Indian, the strength and courage of the African, and the culture of the European." It should first be noticed that she believes she is saying something complementary. Only four years earlier, Balaguer employed racist stereotypes to present Peña Gómez's emotional character as one that would lead to the razing of the country. The idea that Miss Dominican Republic offers a somewhat more palatable and progressive view than the nonogenarian many-term president, and former chief ideologue of Trujillo, is comforting, yet not entirely praiseworthy.

Even while trying to be politically correct, she defines roles and traits for the three races that have inhabited the island<sup>15</sup>. If the European contributed culture to the Dominican Republic, what does that mean for the African? Was the African devoid of a culture, or did the African have a culture which was considered inferior? If the African's contributions are strength and courage, then it makes sense that the African worked in the plantations. Her statement seems to suggest that Africans are most capable of doing

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become adopted into mainstream music (see Austerlitz, 1997; Pacini-Hernandez, 1995).

<sup>15</sup> These comments equally apply for Brazil which makes similar assumptions about European, African and native influences. It should be noted that there are Asians and people from the Middle East in the

physical work, as opposed to the Indians and Europeans. This reflects well the roles that are distinguished in Dominican society. Afro-Dominicans are believed to be better workers, whereas culture is seen as Euro-Dominican. In a society where economic inequalities are sharp and where civil and political rights are not institutionalized for the majority of the population, the civilized Euro-Dominicans will be assumed *a priori* to be citizens, and the Afro-Dominicans are more likely to be recognized as workers, beggars or thieves.

### **Brazil**

The primary problem for members of Brazil's *Movimento Negro Unificado*, like that of those who aim to improve Afro-Dominican self-esteem, increase Afro-Dominican participation in politics, and expand Afro-Dominican citizenship, is that of identity. The bulk of Afro-Brazilians are unaware of the existence of the MNU, let alone active participants in its political struggles. Yet, unlike the Dominican Republic, the MNU has been able to garner enough support, primarily among small NGOs, often with foreign financing, and academics, in order to serve as, at times, an efficient pressure group. Therefore, in this section, not only will the questions of consciousness and community-building be addressed, but so will the various political efforts of the MNU.

Chapter 3 examined the genesis of the MNU as well as the much lauded 1988 protest to the centennial celebration of the Golden Law. Since the mobilization in 1988 the MNU has had little success with national efforts at mass conscientization. Instead, the various groups and individuals associated with the MNU have continued their local

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Dominican Republic and Brazil, but nationality only refers to three races (African, European and Indigene).

activism, their research, or their teaching. Despite a large number of sympathetic and potentially sympathetic people in Brazil, the MNU has not been able to consolidate mass support nor has it been able to broaden the base of its support. One reason which has been cited by numerous authors, mostly from the US, is the MNU's use of an essentialist identity which does not appeal to the Afro-Brazilian masses (Hanchard, 1994; Hasenbalg, 1998; Burdick, 1998), and may be inappropriate in Brazil altogether (Spanakos, forthcoming a).

There has been much ado about the "lack of racial consciousness" among Afro-Brazilians (see Hanchard, 1994; Winant, 1994). Afro-Brazilian activists are quick to consider the failure of many Afro-Brazilians to identify as such to be a classical case of false consciousness.<sup>16</sup> This "false consciousness," they argue, is seen as a result of the ideological hegemony of the idea of racial democracy. Florestan Fernandes, one of the first to challenge the idea of racial democracy as a "myth," argues that racial democracy was used to "hide reality and to simplify things," while also instilling a sense of "false consciousness" among Afro-Brazilians (Fernandes, 1989: 14).

The idea of racial democracy has been unanimously criticized by Afro-Brazilian activists, and Gilberto Freyre, the anthropologist most associated with the concept, has become the object of much scorn. Freyre's historical analysis of Brazil found that colonial and independent Brazil was a place in which no racial identities were clear, and racial tensions were almost completely absent (Freyre, 1934). But it is less Freyre's

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<sup>16</sup> "False consciousness" is associated with certain strains of Marxism. It explains that workers do not always act in their best interests because their consciousness as proletarians is not sufficiently developed. One example of this is that labor and communist parties in Europe supported their nation-states in World War I, instead of rallying behind their "real" common interest, improvement of working and living conditions.

portrait of Brazilian society than the simplified version of "racial democracy" which became part and parcel of nationalist propaganda employed by the authoritarian governments of Brazil during modernization that the MNU attacks. During the *Estado Novo* (1937-45) and the military dictatorship (1964-85), 'racial democracy' was turned into nationalist political propaganda, which emphasized that the "Brazilian," the product of prolonged cultural encounters, was something of a meta-race, one that surpassed its predecessors. This interpretation eliminated the presence of the Portuguese, Indigenous and African peoples in Brazil, and limited them only to being cultural influences in Brazil (Motta Maués; 1997: 284). Therefore, there were no longer cleavages between ethnic and racial groups because all Brazilians were successfully integrated into one cultural unit.

This notion of racial democracy, when employed by the nation-state, has been used within developmental discourses which deny the salience of race as an indicator, focusing instead on broad based social, economic, political and technological development. But scholars and activists challenged the notion that class was more important than race. Statistical data from the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (Hasenbalg and Silva, 1979, 1992), shows that Afro-Brazilians, both *pardos* and *pretos*, fare much worse than *brancos* in all salient categories. A national survey of average wages for *brancos* and *negros* published in the newspaper *O Globo* indicates that on average, Euro-Brazilians earn more than double what Afro-Brazilians earn (Oliveira, 1998: 21). In an examination of the 1980 census, Lovell and Wood find that the life expectancy for Euro-Brazilians is seven years higher than that of Afro-Brazilians (Lovell and Wood, 1998: 95). In other studies, while 10% of the *brancos* population completes university level education, only 2.5% of *pardos* and 1.9% of *negros* do (Telles, 18<sup>th</sup> of December, 1998).

In a survey of students in undergraduate, master's or doctoral programs in Rio de Janeiro between the ages of 20 and 24, 85% were *branco*, 13.6% were *pardo*, and 0.67% were *negro*, and 0.68% were *amarelo* (Silva, 1998:165). The racial breakdown of Rio shows a very different set of numbers: 55.96% are *branco*, 34.55% are *pardo*, 9.36% are *negro*, and 0.12% are *amarelo* or "undeclared" (Silva, 1998: 164).

Activists claim that the conditions of Afro-Brazilians are so clearly different from Euro-Brazilians, even when class is held constant, that Afro-Brazilians can only be denying the truth if they deny the existence of racism. The "myth of racial democracy," they argue, through its romantic and integrationist ideology gives Afro-Brazilians a means to block out the reality which discriminates against them. MNU activists argue that Brazil is "[t]he world's most racist country! [It has] the most effective type of racism"<sup>17</sup> (Ivanir dos Santos, 16<sup>th</sup> of October, 1998). They argue that unlike South Africa under Apartheid and, and the US South under Jim Crow Laws, such formal legal distinctions never existed in Brazil because they were unnecessary.

Scholars also criticized the idea that Brazilian society is characterized by a color continuum. Carlos Hasenbalg writes "the social perception of race according to a continuum of shades of color, had led to a fragmentation of racial identities" (Hasenbalg: 1996: 165). This, in turn, limited opportunities for political activity and solidarity among Afro-Brazilians, thereby weakening their political agency and ability to mobilize. It also makes it difficult for MNU activists to mobilize lighter Afro-Brazilians who may not feel as though they are in the same position as darker Afro-Brazilians. It is true that *brancos*

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<sup>17</sup> These sort of statements irritate more moderate people who are sympathetic to some of the goals of the MNU, but are unwilling to support such hyperbolic situations. Two people very involved with Afro-Brazilian activity both expressed their disagreement with the "most racist..." statement.

are statistically in a more advantageous position in society than both *pardos* and *pretos*, but *pardos* and *pretos* do not often believe that they are discriminated against, and *pardos* generally do not believe that they are victims of the same type of prejudice as *pretos*.

The MNU's effort to construct a solid and positive identity is clearly done as a means of attempting to construct solidarity, to open political space, and to increase the political capital of a potential lobbying group. This explains the constant preoccupation of members of the MNU with identification and the attempt to market a "Black" identity. In a recent seminar presented by the MNU and the *Centro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos* (Center for Afro-Asian Studies), Marcelo Paixão outlined four areas where the MNU had to improve in order to address "How to deal with social exclusion and democracy?" He notes that the primary problem is identity. After that, education—the inclusion of more pro-Africa information on curricula and better preparation about the issue of racism and about Afro-Brazilian culture of teachers, increased economic potential—better wages as well as more space for advancement, and visibility in the media of communication are critical to the success of the MNU program (Paixão, 2 of December, 1998).

The lack of control of self-representation was among the principal messages that various leaders among the MNU conveyed in interviews and at conferences<sup>18</sup>. In an effort to try to combat this, the MNU has created counter discourses, a form of "*negro*" identity which is supposed to replace the image presented by mainstream media. To counter dominant, marginalizing discourses which degrade the Afro-Brazilian, activists attempted to create a positive discourse of *negritude*. The creation of such a counter-

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<sup>18</sup> Interview with Ivanir dos Santos, Jorge da Silva, and Conference on "Neoliberalism and the Question of Race", coordinated by Beth Vieira, 2<sup>nd</sup> of December, 1998, sponsored by the *Movimento Negro Unificado* and the *Centro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos*, Rio de Janeiro.

discourse involved the creation of a set of heroes, of which Zumbi was given a prominent place, a revisionary approach to official history, the advocacy of candomblé as an official religion, and a continuation of activity from the late 1970s and 1980s which attempted to integrate symbols of the "African diaspora," such as rap, reggae, braiding of hair, and symbols of Black Power<sup>19</sup>.

These images have been promoted in the many newspapers and magazines that now cater to an Afro-Brazilian middle-class, which although small is increasingly racially "conscious." Similarly, Afro-Brazilian artists often celebrate the cultural artifacts consistent with the MNU's counter-narrative and propaganda. Popular musicians are increasingly adopting Afro-Brazilian identity, including groups like *Cidade Negra* (Black City), *Raca Brasil* (Brazil Race), and *Nação Zumbi* (Nation of Zumbi). Brazilian popular musicians, such as the Racionais MCs, Rappa, and Carlinhos Brown, are also placing more emphasis on "*Negro*" themes, including racism, than ever before.

The more unified and consistent the union of Afro-Brazilians, the more effectively they could resist racist politics, could challenge police violence, and attempt to promulgate laws that would benefit their community. Their discourse has been essentialist and radical. This facilitated the political coherency of the *Movimento Negro*, and also was able to valorize elements of Brazilian culture which were seen as having roots in Afro-Brazilian culture, or where the contributions of Afro-Brazilians were fundamental. Coherency also facilitated localized victories on the federal level. The *Movimento Negro* generated enough political pressure to force the inclusion of an article

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<sup>19</sup> Zumbi was a runaway slave who in the seventeenth century formed a *quilombo*, or runaway-slave community. MNU leaders celebrate the day of his death on the 20<sup>th</sup> of November as the day of "National Black Consciousness." Candomblé is a syncretic religion with combines Afro-spiritist traditions with

in the Brazilian Constitution (1988) which criminalized racism and the promulgation of the Caó Law (1989), which provided for punishments to be assessed for those found guilty of racism (Fundação Cultural Palmares, 1995: 39). It also opened up significant political space for discourse on racism, and for self-affirmed "*negro*" politicians, and it was linked to the creation of various NGOs that provided services for the Afro-Brazilian community. Ivanir dos Santos's Center for Marginalized Peoples (CEAP), which is associated with the MNU, offers legal protection, as well as other services, for victims of racism can be considered a success. Another success is the social program of Olodum, which began as a Afro-Bahian musical troupe in the northeast and was very influential in re-Africanizing carnival in the Northeast, and later all of Brazil (see Yúdice, 1999: Oliveira, 10<sup>th</sup> of December, 1999). Another area of success has been applying pressure on the Brazilian government to include race in the 1979 census.

More recently, President Cardoso admitted that Brazil was a racist country, suggested that Brazil may need some sort of measure resembling affirmative actions, and convened an academic conference on affirmative action. MNU activist Vera Lúcia believes that Cardoso's sympathy was due to MNU pressure which "forced" him to recognize that Brazil was racist (Lúcia, 2<sup>nd</sup> of December, 1998).

However, despite these successes for the MNU and the campaign to improve the conditions for Afro-Brazilians, the most significant success of the MNU, all of the local NGOs allied with it, as well as a reasonably committed artistic community, is the use of the term *negro* in common parlance. John Burdick reports "[u]ntil the 1980s, *negro* was generally avoided as a self-referential term.... Due to the influence of the *Movimento*

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Iberian Catholic Saint worship.

*Negro*, but also to the growing presence in Brazilian markets of U.S. black popular culture, especially hip-hop, '*negro*' increasingly became a term of self-affirmation and pride" (Burdick, 1998: 19, italics in original). Similarly, Livio Sansone notices that the use of the term *negro* for self-identification has increased in Salvador, although he also notices that these people are better educated and more likely to be unemployed than those "who define themselves with less ethnically assertive terms of color, like *pretos*, *moreno*, *pardo* and *escuro*" (Sansone, 1997: 471). The MNU must be given some responsibility for the increasing use of the term *negro*. In his study of several poor Afro-Brazilian neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro, John Burdick found that several people

had once called themselves by a middle-continuum terms such as *morena* or *mulata*, or had vacillated for years between this and a darker-continuum term, but had finally opted definitively to call themselves *negra* in the recent past, during the last decade, due to the influence of the media, the *Movimento Negro*, friends and family, or religion (Burdick, 1998: 18, italics in original).

But the MNU's success comes at a relatively high cost. As political scientist Anthony Marx writes "[t]he strengths of the MNU also suggest its limits. The movement was and has remained relatively intellectual, elitist, and middle-class, with fewer than two thousand active members. At its height in 1988, none of the MNU's candidates for public office were elected, suggesting a general view that it was too elitist and too advanced to gain broad popularity" (Marx, 1998: 258). Its coherence, its activists' dogmatism and its essentialist vision of Afro-Brazilian identity alienate many Afro and Euro-Brazilians who might otherwise be sympathetic to many of their causes. One principal problem is that the MNU still is a very small and elitist group that has very little grass-roots support. An example of this elitism and lack of connection with the masses,

was when one academic/activist insisted to the author that so few Afro-Brazilians identified to census takers as *negro* because the census takers had not given MNU activists "enough time to instruct them on how to answer". The 1998 march which celebrated the 303<sup>rd</sup> anniversary of the death of Zumbi was poorly attended, and the relative percentage of organizers of some MNU affiliated NGOs and other MNU activists to non-activists was very high. This indicates the low level of participation among the broad mass of Afro-Brazilians. What is perhaps worse is that the march was seen as an opportunity for different politically active people to prove how much they oppose neo-liberalism and President Cardoso. Considering the presence of many directors of NGOs which provide service to "Afro-Brazilian" communities, one would think that such organizations would set up tables promoting their services to the few people in attendance, instead of simply grandstanding against neo-liberalism.

Another problem with the MNU is its essentialist identity. This has produced a very stereotypical portrait of Afro-Brazilians. Michael Hanchard has been quite critical of the MNU's use of what he refers to as 'culturalisms.' Several informants told anthropologist John Burdick that the Afro-Brazilian drumming during the Inculturated Mass<sup>20</sup> bothered them, and they did not feel any less *negra* because they did not like the drumming there (Burdick, 1998). However, the dogmatism of MNU activists insists that Afro-Brazilians like drumming because it is African, that Afro-Brazilians are good dancers, etc. The use of these stereotypes by a group attempting to combat racism and increase the political agency of Afro-Brazilians is puzzling. Especially since, 30 percent

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<sup>20</sup> The Inculturated Mass is a Catholic mass, designed by Frei David Raimundo dos Santos, which incorporates "African" elements (such as dancing by semi-clothed *negras*, constant drumming, offerings to elemental spirits, and praying to the deities of Africa as well as Zumbi).

of Brazilians agreed totally, and another 13 percent agreed in part. with the statement, “the only things a *negro* does well are music and sports” (Datafolha 1995: 129). Even more troubling is that while 28 percent of *Branços* agreed completely, 31 and 32 percent of *pardos* and *pretos* agreed completely.

Another problem is that “Movimento Negro activists adopt stances that alienate many people in their targeted constituency who otherwise are sympathetic to their goals” (Burdick, 1998: 5). For example, the essentialist identity that is fundamental to the logic of the MNU is considered radical, alien and unacceptable to many Afro-Brazilians. Carlos Hasenbalg explains that one of the principal problems with the MNU is that it employs a system of categorization that mimics that of the United States. He writes:

in this dichotomous system there are blacks and there are whites; there is nothing in the middle... Racial prejudice in Brazil is not ... [clear, neat, nor bipolar]... and the *Movimento Negro*, in their rhetoric, insist on this polarity white-black, when the majority of people between white and black think of themselves neither as whites nor blacks (Hasenbalg, 1998: 28).

Ignoring the fact that “Brazil is multiracial, not biracial” (Skidmore, 1992: 1), MNU activists adopt the idea of hypodescent, which is alien to most Brazilians, especially Afro-Brazilians who experience life quite differently. Although statistics clearly show that both *pardos* and *pretos* fare worse than *brancos*, *pardos* fare consistently better than *pretos*. As John Burdick notes the greatest difference is often “not between white and nonwhite women, but between *pardas* and *pretas*” (Burdick, 1998: 45, italics added). However, for the sake of unity and coherency the MNU insists that all non-*brancos* are *negro*<sup>21</sup>, and

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<sup>21</sup> Similar to the US understanding of race.

this position alienates *mesticos* and *pardos* who experience prejudice but do not identify as *negro*, and this is not necessarily due to shame or false consciousness.

Many mulattos consciously reject the black-white scheme of the MNU, since it does not accurately represent their social position. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, there is a quite rational reason for mulattos to accept the idea of color being perceived on a continuum since it gives them relative advantages in many areas. For the same reason, they are often unlikely to believe that the discrimination and segregation that they face is identical to *pretos*. This is not to say that they are unaware of their color, or unaware of racism. In fact, *pardos* are statistically more likely to be aware of racism and are less likely to identify as Brazilian than are *pretos* (Datafolha, 1995; Schwarzmänn, 18<sup>th</sup> of December, 1998). However, they also recognize that in many situations they are in a more privileged position than are *negros*.

There is also the problem with Afro-Brazilians who are aware of their skin color, their ancestry and yet they identify as "Brazilian" (Carvalho, 26<sup>th</sup> of August, 1998).<sup>22</sup> MNU activists have a very hard time convincing these people that they should be "conscious" and politically committed to their *negro* identity, when they do not have similar consciousness to other facets of their identity, such as religion, class, sex, etc. José Pereira de Oliveira Junior, the director of the Cultural Group of Afro-Reggae (GCAR), has been reluctant to associate with the MNU. Additionally, he commits the sin of identifying as "*mestico*," since he says that is what he is. In several interviews he

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<sup>22</sup> It is also marginalizing to brown or dark skinned *nordestinos*, particularly those who are not from Bahia, whose identity is more linked to the Sertão. The 'racial' identity of these people is more clearly articulated as being *Indio*, *Caboclo*, or *Blanco* and not *negro*.

explained that he had ancestry that was *blanco*, *negro* and *indio*, and then asked why he should say he is *negro*.

GCAR began as a newspaper that focused especially on culture, particularly music, but also included political pieces. Soon it grew into an NGO that has been involved in community education projects and in AIDs prevention programs. Following the massacre in Vigario Geral in 1993, GCAR set up a cultural center and offered classes to the youth of the neighborhood. GCAR set up a performance troupe, consisting almost exclusively of residents of the *favela*, while also providing private musical instruction as well as language, history and theatre courses. The idea, Oliveira explained, is to build self-esteem, especially through the use of Afro-Brazilian culture.

The cultural focus of GCAR has avoided some of the excessive dogmatism of the MNU and it has been very effective in bringing youth, some of whom are formerly drug dealers, into community participation and activism. GCAR has been able to insert itself into the *favela* of Vigario Geral, contributing to a community, and improving the condition for many residents in the process. One anecdote emphasizes this point. In one interview, Oliveira recounted how earlier that day he was called down to Vigario Geral because there was a run-in between police officers and some members of GCAR<sup>23</sup>. The police invited Oliveira's participation and encouraged his mediation. This is a particularly positive sign given that only five years earlier off-duty police officers murdered 21 sleeping residents because of the *favela*'s reluctance to give information about a drug dealer who killed a police officer.

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<sup>23</sup> Interview with the author 10<sup>th</sup> of December, 1998.

The results for Afro-Brazilian activism and Republican citizenship remain mixed. Self-esteem among Afro-Brazilians remains a serious problem. When shown "white" and "black" figures, primary school students overwhelmingly identified the "black" figure as "stupid" (83%), "ugly" (85) and only 6% recognized the "black" figure as "wealthy", compared with 17%, 14% and 94% respectively for the "white figure" (Hanchard, 1994: 61). Similarly, in a study of racial prejudice in Brazil, 89% of Brazilians admitted that racial prejudice exists in Brazil, but only 32% of Afro-Brazilians claimed to have been the victim of prejudice (Datafolha, 1995). This awareness that racism exists is certainly a positive sign, considering the extent to which the idea of 'racial democracy' is accepted. However, the idea of racism is something that is rarely transformed into a personally experienced event. Jorge da Silva reports that informants noticed racism only as "isolated incidents, never practiced by them (in the case of *brancos*) and rarely personally suffered...(in the case of *negros*)" (da Silva, 1998: 31).

Another problem is that even while the idea of racism exists in Brazil is being affirmed, old stereotypes and discourses persist. The statistics cited earlier about sports and music is exemplary of this. More poignantly Brazilian, and particularly Afro-Brazilian, acceptance of "whitening" is also validated by the same study. When asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "A good *Negro* is a *negro* with a *branco* soul" [*Negro bom é negro de alma branca*], 35% agreed completely, while 12% agreed partially. Interestingly enough, when broken down by racial category, the numbers were almost identical (35% and 11% for *brancos*, 36% and 11% for *mulatos*, and 36% and 12% for *pretos*, Datafolha, 1995: 129).

Despite the increased number of self-affirmed "Black" politicians, the passage of key legislation, and the growth of NGOs that target some of the needs of Afro-Brazilians, "it would be rash to argue that Afro-Brazilian protest has had any significant impact either on the prevailing assimilationist ideology or social behavior" (Skidmore, 1992). Or as former director of the Center for Afro-Asian Studies Carlos Hasenbalg explains, "the *Movimento Negro* has far more influence on the government than on the masses" (Hasenbalg, 12<sup>th</sup> August, 1998). Much of this is due to their adoption of a discourse which is inaccessible to the mass of Afro-Brazilians who are aware of their skin color but do not identify as "*negro*."

### Comparative Analysis

In comparing the experiences of activists and academics who are challenging silence on the issue of race in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, there are several issues that stand out as groups and individuals attempt to broaden and deepen the rights of Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian citizens. The *Movimento Negro Unificado* is hardly a sustained "movement" and even less a "unified" one at that. However, there is a remarkable amount of consensus among members over certain fundamental ideas, such as hypodescent and the idea that Brazil is the most racist country in the world. The *Movimento Negro*'s presence, even if small and elitist, in all of Brazil's major cities and states allows for national campaigns. The *Movimento Negro* also serves as the central point of nexus for people concerned with racial issues, with activists and mobilizers, NGO service providers, academics and artists. There is a central institution to filter anti-

racist political activity, which can give legitimacy to the actions of local organizations, and which can pressure national governments, in addition to just local ones.

The Dominican Republic has no such organized anti-racism campaign. Combining the offices of *Identidad* and *MUDHE* there are not more than ten activists and perhaps another ten volunteers and academics that are somewhat regularly associated with the organizations. While the Dominican state without Balaguer at its helm seems more likely to be sympathetic to preventing racism, the likelihood of any anti-racism legislation, or any policies aimed towards improving the conditions of Afro-Dominicans is very low. As of yet, the government still has not recognized racial discrimination as existing, and so there is no debate to promote policies to prevent it.

The area of identification remains perhaps the most difficult one in the promotion of Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian citizenship. The situation in Brazil is only slightly clearer, since Brazil does not have a significant population of foreign dark-skinned nationals. Therefore, the victims of racism are always members of the same national community of citizens. In other words, while in the Dominican Republic, Dominicans seem willing to accept the poor treatment, and abuse, of Haitians and people who may be perceived to be Haitian, all of the Afro-Brazilians who are mistreated are clearly Brazilian citizens. This should contribute to a slightly more sympathetic audience for MNU claims, as opposed to in the Dominican Republic. However, the MNU has consistently employed very extreme and essentialist discourse. Afro-Brazilians (*pardos* and *pretos*) who do not "recognize" their race, those who do not employ the term "*negro*," those who date/marry lighter-skinned peoples, and those who straighten their hair are often considered traitors. Additionally, the MNU discourse insists that non-*brancos* are *negros* an assertion which

seems not only to contradict Brazilian reality, but which is especially alienating for the majority who believe otherwise. Finally, MNU disdain for the Catholic Church and hatred for Evangelicals cuts it off from many potentially sympathetic Afro-Brazilians (Burdick: 1998).

In the Dominican Republic, Miss Mendoza's choice of the word "Afro" rather than "*Negro*" is symbolic of an attempt to be inclusive. Since Afro-Dominicans constitute anywhere between 75-95 percent of the population, but *negros* are only 5 to 15 percent of the population, Afro could include many more people. Additionally, the choice of Afro highlights the role of culture and a heritage, which is shared by all Dominicans, and which therefore could be used to forge useful alliances with Euro-Dominican elites. But the issue of combating racism is complicated because many Dominicans may be against racism, and yet may exhibit very anti-Haitian views. This complicates strategies towards building self-esteem and racial consciousness among Afro-Dominicans. The strategies employed by *Identidad* and *MUDHE* seem to be fairly successful, however the most difficult logistical problem is the scale of their campaigns. As mentioned earlier, without national institutions through which they can link and without large and reliable sources of funding, their efforts are limited to local activism.

The strategies employed by the MNU can be more thoroughly evaluated since it has existed for more than two decades. The MNU's attempt to create Afro-Brazilian heroes has had only limited success, in that awareness of Zumbí is not as high as activists would like to think, given twenty years of organizing. Also, focusing on Zumbí has fetishized the runaway slave and has led to a romanticization of Zumbí and of Palmares. Surely, an organization of so many people, including scholars, could find and promote

other figures in Brazilian history, for example, Afro-Brazilian activists and political figures such as Abdias do Nascimento, Benedita da Silva and Ivanir dos Santos. Also, MNU strategy has involved positive stereotypes of Afro-Brazilian identity, but stereotypes nonetheless. Michael Hanchard (1994) has issued harsh criticisms over this issue, but perhaps more telling is the Afro-Brazilian Catholic mass of Frei David Raimundo dos Santos which brings "African" culture into the Catholic Church (see Burdick, 1998).

Afro-Dominican activists have not given much pursuit to the idea of constructing a mythology of their own heroes, or specifically Afro-Dominican historical accounts. The closest character to Zumbi in Dominican history is probably the runaway slave Lemba whose statue is alongside Bartolomé de las Casas and Enriquillo in front of the Museum of the Dominican Man. Despite the prominent placement of this statue, Lemba is less well-known than Zumbi. However, the idea of propagating heroes may be successful, given the vast amount of coverage given to the assassination of the three Mirabal sister's which is used as a means of encouraging the participation of women in politics (Cassá, 25 June, 1998). Dominican history is certainly full of prominent Afro-Dominican figures, even though not all of them, such as the mulatto dictator Trujillo, contributed morally to the Dominican nation and Afro-Dominican identity.

Where the MNU has been extraordinarily successful, especially considering its lack of a significant mass of support, is in pressuring both dictatorial and democratic governments at the elite levels of society. Although the Caó Law was mostly a revision of the 1951 Afonso Arinos Law and it has only rarely been used, the inclusion of a policy against racism in the Constitution and the passage of an anti-racism law the following

year is significant. Again, President Cardoso's declaration that Brazil is a racist country is a very significant step, as was his opening of an academic convention on the possibility of adopting a sort of affirmative action program. MNU pressure was no doubt involved in putting affirmative action, for however so briefly, on the political agenda, but activist claims that MNU protest forced Cardoso to recognize racism in Brazil seem completely exaggerated (Lúcia, 1998), given that the sociologist was a member of the São Paulo revisionist school which attacked the notion of racial democracy, and one of the reasons the military government removed him from his post at the University of São Paulo was because of his investigations in the area of race.

On a more local level, GCAR has been immensely successful in raising self-esteem as well as opportunities for members of one of Rio de Janeiro's *favelas*. It was able to insert itself into a community, draw its leadership primarily from the community and to raise educational levels while raising self-esteem in a very depressed area. As seen in the incident cited earlier, GCAR can serve also as a means of mediation between the State and the residents of Vigário Geral. However, GCAR has only been in Vigário Geral since 1993 it is difficult to evaluate the long term effects of its program on the community, or even on leadership within that community. CEAP's anti-racism program has been reasonably successful, although it has not created the sort of community and limited Republican citizenship that GCAR has. These programs are small and targeted which means that they tend to have a concentrated influence on a fairly small population. This contributes to deepening citizenship for very narrow communities and as of yet,

these efforts remain primarily localized and their success is directly linked to the qualities of the individual leaders and their ability to get funding<sup>24</sup>.

Another significant difference between Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian activity is historical. The historical roots of challenging racism in the Dominican Republic are reasonably shallow, while an actual organization, the MNU, has existed in the Brazil for more than two decades. Additionally, the MNU was able to build on a significant amount of Afro-Brazilian activity between the 1920s and 1940s, principally in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, a historical legacy of activity that really has no analogue in Dominican history. In addition to the number of years of existence, the MNU came into existence at a period when civil society activism was challenging military governments, and therefore earned a more receptive public audience.

In a review of the conditions for consciousness of racism, political identity, community formation and Republican citizenship for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, it seems as though all of these conditions are slightly more developed in Brazil than in the Dominican Republic. This does not mean that the condition of Afro-Dominicans will follow the path of that of Afro-Brazilians. However, Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian activists could certainly benefit from comparing notes on successful and unsuccessful strategies.

In terms of consciousness of racism, a considerable number (52 percent) in the Dominican Republic acknowledged that there was racism in their country, while almost all Brazilians (89 percent) recognized that there was racism in Brazil (Brea et al, 1995: 227; Datafolha, 1995: 96). Both numbers are certainly impressive, given the many years

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<sup>24</sup> See chapter 6 on both accounts.

of denial of racism. However, one continually hears both Dominicans and Brazilians deny that racism exists in their countries, especially to foreigners. and while a large number of informants in the above surveys admitted their countries were racist, that does not mean that racism is understood in terms of concrete acts. The reason for this is the persistence of color categories along a continuum and an absence of any large-scale collective and racial identification. In this area, both Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian activists have had limited success, since the problem of political identification remains the most fundamental problem to collective identification, community building and political participation of a self-conscious "group."

While Identidad's scheme of identification is far more inclusive and will lend itself to more of a mass-base, the MNU's strict dichotomies create very dogmatic, yet very few, sympathizers and activists. Neither group has been altogether successful in creating Afro-Dominican or Afro-Brazilian communities that are self-conscious. In this area, NGOs which provide services, such as MUDHE and GCAR, have been more successful in contributing to an actual community, which already existed, and attempting to raise self-esteem there.

Judgements of Republican citizenship could range from harsh to very generous. Considering the amount of political agency and participation of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, it would be very easy to argue that positive freedoms are very limited. No doubt discourses that demean Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, as well as other discourses that deny the existence of racism, limit the possibility for active, participatory and associative citizenship. Additionally, the fact that Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians also occupy low ends of very rigid socio-economic hierarchies impede the

construction of a Republican citizenship, since resources and access to services are very limited (see chapter 6). This seems to validate Aristotle's claim that citizens must be individuals who are not dependent, since the economic marginality of the mass of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians is a very serious constraint on the expansion of citizenship.

However, given the generally anomic position of almost all citizens in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, there is reason to be more optimistic about the relative anomie of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. Most Dominicans and most Brazilians do not enjoy Republican citizenship. Few Dominicans and Brazilians are involved in any associative activity in civil society, and still fewer aim to expand the public sphere. Party identification is very low among Afro-Dominicans, and it is especially low among the lower classes and among women (Duarte et al, 1994). Politics remains an arena which few women enter, while civil society is over-representative of women. This is true also for Brazil. Dominican and Brazilian societies are based on subtle yet recognizable hierarchies in "which people know their place." It is a common expression among Brazilian scholars of race that "Brazil does not have a racial problem, because the *negro* knows his place." The same could be said of other groups who occupy lower rungs of the social hierarchy, such as migrants, labors, the poor, homeless, and, in many instances, women. Republican citizenship for these people has, like that of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, also been abridged by hierarchical societies and degrading stereotypes.

But public space has expanded in both countries over the last two decades and this has increased the area in which Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians could organize. Also, activists have access to a much more open media and to more competitive and free

elections. Afro-Brazilians have formed groups within various Brazilian parties (e.g. PDT, PT, PFL), and both Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians have increased access to US and Western European resources, assistance and support.

## Conclusion

There are certain elements of racial identification in the Dominican Republic and Brazil that seem to be little affected by Afro mobilization in the last twenty years. For example, the idea that *Negro* is a term reserved for Haitians in the Dominican Republic, or that "[t]o be black in Brazil means to have no white ancestors" (Eakin, 1998: 115). In his study of the slave "Saint Anastasia," John Burdick found that most Afro-Brazilian women who were devoted to Anastasia "often thought about her in nonracial terms" (Burdick, 1998: 154). They identified with her more as a symbol of suffering, than by her race. Yet, as noted, both countries, particularly in the past two decades, have seen an increasing use of the term *negro*. While it is still used by a minority, it does suggest that racial dynamics may be shifting towards one which is more assertive and public, more "*à moda*," as Carlos Hasenbalg puts it critically, of the United States.

Despite the persistence of the mass belief that racism does not exist or is fairly mild in both countries, there are clubs in the Dominican Republic where Afro-Dominicans cannot enter. Also, in both countries, children are regularly recognized by their skin and hair color and are often treated better or worse as a result, even by members of their own family<sup>25</sup>. Employers in professions where workers will have to be seen still

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<sup>25</sup> This is true even of Euro-Dominicans and Euro-Brazilians with dark hair who report that they do not receive the same attention as blonde and blue-eyed members of their family (Interviews, 1997, 1998, 1999).

implicitly, if not explicitly, expect employees of “good appearance” (*buena apariencia* / *boa aparência*), which means the more European the better.

As Marshall Eakin writes “racial prejudice seems to intensify as one moves up the social scale”(Eakin, 1998: 117). This is largely due to the fact that certain spaces, whether these be public, commercial or private, remain fairly closed to many Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. Access for lighter skinned Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians with more European and Indigenous features is better, but still not entirely open. As a result, consciousness of racial identity and racism seems strongest among the most educated who are most capable of seeing that barriers presented against them are not related to wealth or education.

As Livio Sansone has pointed out, a “new openness to cultural diversity has developed [in Brazil] as a result of the increased acceptance of black cultural expressions by government institutions and official culture. In addition, the leisure industry is more interested in black culture than ever before” (Sansone, 1997: 467). This is also true of the Dominican Republic with the growth of merengue-house music and the increased consumption of rap music. Yet there are two things that should be noted regarding the awareness of Afro culture. First, this often contributes to the propagation, rather than the contestation, of stereotypes. Second, cultural awareness of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians contributes to socio-cultural identity, and does not immediately translate into a political identity. This is particularly salient because participation in politics, challenging racism discourses, and trying to expand Republican citizenship is still very much limited in both countries, although it seems slightly more developed in Brazil. However, as will be argued in the next chapter, participation and Republican citizenship, for all groups, in

both countries seems to be seriously obstructed by authoritarian and anomic strains in the political culture and by the stripping of public space resultant from the fall of a state-centered economic model and the growth of neo-liberal hegemony.

Finally, there is a new generation of Afro-Brazilian activists within and outside of the MNU who are actively pushing Afro-Brazilian political issues. Among the more prominent of these groups is a group of São Paulo based Afro-Brazilian lawyers who have held conferences about affirmative action which have attracted some of the world's most prominent scholars and lawyers who deal with distributive justice and minority rights (Telles, 17<sup>th</sup> September, 1999). They also have been active in prosecuting racism in advertising. The issue of affirmative action underscores the difference among members over who should benefit from affirmative action, and whether all non-*brancos* are really *negros*. It remains to be seen how they will adjust affirmative action programs, if at all, to conform to Brazil's pattern of color classification. In the meanwhile, they are actively advocating Afro-Brazilian rights and are addressing many issues that are relevant to Afro-Brazilian citizenship.

## PART IV

### CITIZENSHIP AND DEMOCRATIZATION: THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND BRAZIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Having argued in part 3 that neither the Liberal nor Republican notion of citizenship seem very well institutionalized for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, the study now turns to what sort of citizenship does exist for these groups, and what are the consequences of such a conceptualization of citizenship for democratization. Chapter 6, "The Privatization of Citizenship in the Dominican Republic and Brazil," follows the conceptual alternative to the Liberal and Republican models that was set out in part 1, relying upon the construction of norms and values in Dominican and Brazilian society which have historically developed surrounding citizenship, race and the political system, examined in part 2, and the portraits of contemporary issues in race, citizenship and democracy in the Dominican Republic and Brazil which appeared in part 3.

The following chapter argues that there are three fundamental components within the privatization of citizenship. The first is that power remain external to public institutions, that the procedures of policy-making be denatured by extra-institutional arrangements, and that the public agency of the citizen is undermined by particularistic identities, such as membership within a clientele. The second point is that citizenship is consistently understood in terms of a status which is distinctive and private rather than universal and public. Being a citizen is very intimately linked to class politics and ethnic and racial stereotypes which privilege the wealthy and the light-skinned at the expense of the poor and the dark-skinned. The third is that, following neo-liberal economic dogma,

the State has down-sized considerably and the cuts in government budgets have often been concentrated in social spending which has traditionally constituted some, even if minimal, source of assistance for the most marginalized populations. This represents a significant change in state-society relations particularly since the State in Latin American developed in the heavily statist context of Import Substitution and Industrialization policies. The two most salient issues underlying these privatizations are to be found in political culture, which orders societies hierarchically and undermines democratic notions of rights and agency, and structural adjustment programs which strip away the capacity of the State to integrate citizens politically, socially and economically.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE PRIVATIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND BRAZIL

The most fundamental work on citizenship remains T.H. Marshall's lectures on "Citizenship and Social Class" in which he states that "citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which status is endowed" (Marshall, 1950: 28-9). Marshall intended citizenship to be a means of expanding the privileges of the wealthy to the working class, thereby enfranchising the latter and institutionalizing a more substantial form of equality. Yet the construction of a citizenship which is a status available to all and which provides equal rights and duties is continually frustrated, especially in electoral regimes where clientelistic practices and hierarchical notions of status prevail. The lack of "full membership" for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians is particularly exemplary of how the construction of citizenship is thwarted by such particularistic behavior and such socio-economic disparities.

In chapters 2 and 3, evidence was given to suggest that social and political structures that prioritize privilege over equality have negatively effected the institutionalization of democracy and democratic notions of citizenship, especially for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. In these chapters, the notions of racial identity and citizenship were traced through different historical periods, noting shifts and continuities. While the legal definition of the citizen expanded during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the percentage of the population that could claim to have its exercise of citizenship consistently recognized remained small. The elites in Dominican and

Brazilian “democracies” resisted opening public space to the masses, and often sided with authoritarian governments which limited mass entry into the political sphere. The resistance to include popular sectors expressly limited the political agency of the Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian citizen, who often found democracy to be little better at ensuring political and civil rights, as well as political agency and access, than other forms of government.

Chapters 4 and 5 examined the extent to which Liberal and Republican citizenship have been institutionalized, exist and/or are possible for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. The Dominican and Brazilian governments, despite their many successes, have been disappointing in terms of institutionalizing and protecting the rights of all of their citizens, and government remains inaccessible to many as efforts at participation and community building face serious challenges. This has practical and direct implications for the quality of citizenship of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. In contemporary Dominican politics, the State has implicitly, if not explicitly, supported the violation of the civil and political rights of Afro-Dominicans. In a similar vein, the Brazilian national government has had little success in ending police immunity and in preventing wide-scale violations of civil rights of Afro-Brazilians, particularly in urban areas. Two of the most significant challenges towards constructing a robust and deep form of democratic citizenship lie within the limitations imposed by traditional societal beliefs and political culture as well as by new dynamics of neo-liberal economic policies of structural adjustment.

## **The Privatization of Citizenship**

Despite approximately two decades of "democratization," the political arena and political cultures in the two countries still demonstrate significant strains of authoritarianism. This does not mean that Dominican and Brazilian political culture is exclusively authoritarian, nor that Dominicans and Brazilians have no means of understanding democracy, much less implementing it. It also should not be assumed that what is understood as political culture is homogenous and static (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1999). However, there is a persistence of highly unequal relations, based on the historic social and political exclusion of the poor, uneducated, women, and non-Europeans which was normalized within political culture. This political culture has mixed with the restructuring of state and society relations that result from neo-liberal plans and structural adjustment packages that often are emergency stabilization measures designed to cut (hyper) inflation. The privatization of state owned industries and the decrease in state spending in social areas has forced citizens to seek assistance and charity in the area of civil society (Yúdice, 1999: 49). This is especially significant considering that the State has been the most central political and economic institution in Latin America since at least World War II, if not the Great Depression (Cavarozzi, 1993; Vellinga, 1998).

One should not lose sight of the many democratic advances in the last two decades in both countries. The military seems to be under civilian control more so than at any other time in modern history<sup>1</sup>. Legislative bodies are becoming more active and willing to challenge presidential prerogatives. The media, with probably fewer

restrictions than ever, have been able to uncover many scandals, and elections are fairer, more institutionalized and respected<sup>2</sup>. Yet democracy has not trickled down into every day politics, nor have democratic politics normalized to the extent that they are expected and considered the only legitimate form of politics<sup>3</sup>. Due to a hierarchical understanding of the ordering of society and a decrease in State involvement in terms of social integration, there is an undemocratic form of politics that underlies all of the praiseworthy changes mentioned above. Examining how citizenship is conceived, maintained and institutionalized within contemporary Latin American democracies allows the investigator to see the gap between formal electoral politics and informal, everyday marginalization.

I argue that citizenship in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, like other contemporary Latin American democracies<sup>4</sup>, is neither based on Liberal guarantees of individual civil and political rights<sup>5</sup> nor a Republican notion of robust participatory politics and community,<sup>6</sup> but is rather a largely "private," rather than "public," matter. This chapter will examine the "privatization" of citizenship by analyzing: first, the privatization of power; second, the association of citizenship with socio-economic status; and third, the privatization of services. Since the role of the citizen is a public one, I consider the persistence of political patterns that make public space less accessible to ordinary citizens, such as clientelism, deleterious to the construction of democratic

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<sup>1</sup> Some notable exceptions include Peru, Colombia and Mexico.

<sup>2</sup> Given the history of electoral fraud in the Dominican Republic, this is no small feat.

<sup>3</sup> See Linz and Stepan (1996, 5) on this issue.

<sup>4</sup> See Spanakos (forthcoming b).

<sup>5</sup> Liberal citizenship advocates the inviolability of the individual citizen, particularly though his or her rights (see Kymlicka and Norman, 1995; Shklar, 1989; Nozick, 1996). See chapter 1 for a theoretical outline and chapter 4 for empirical analysis.

citizenship, understood in terms of horizontal accountability<sup>7</sup>. This is made more difficult because citizenship is associated with private resources and not public rights. As a result, the wealthy are disproportionately treated as citizens, and the poor and marginal often seek to compensate for their peripheral socio-economic position through conspicuous consumption. Finally, social services and advocacy become privatized as market reforms have cut down the size of the state, ushering in a more prominent role for NGOs that provide direct services. While these organizations can often offer specialized support services for marginal communities, they cannot offer a viable independent form of citizenship. They can only serve to complement and make more robust the citizenship offered by the State. Additionally, neo-liberalism shifts the entire perception of what constitutes a "public good," which makes attempts towards state-based distribution policies more difficult to implement.

### **Power as Private**

Citizenship requires power to be a public good that is contestable and negotiable. Citizenship is limited when power and decision-making are private and thus not placed within a domain that the public, particularly ordinary citizens, can access. This has long been the case in Latin America where public institutions and Liberalism have been historically undermined by private individuals, dictators, caudillos/caudilhos, networks, or clientele (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998: 9). This tendency is worsened by the diminishing public and political space resulting from the adoption of neo-liberal

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<sup>6</sup> This sort of deep citizenship is advocated by Republican theorists (See Barber, 1998; Habermas, 1995). See chapter 1 for a theoretical outline and chapter 5 for empirical analysis.

structural adjustment programs that have further institutionalized the privatization of power. The privatization of economies, particularly ones where the State has long played the role of distributor of welfare, services and unemployment, shifts the notion of public and private space which radically affects how state-society relations are conceived. Neo-liberalism constructs the individual as the basic economic unit<sup>8</sup> and in so doing it strips away bonds of solidarity across groups which weakens their bargaining power relative to the State. This is particularly relevant as the ontotheological acceptance of the Washington Consensus<sup>9</sup> vision of government efficiency cuts government programs which would typically serve as much needed aid, relief or patronage for the more marginal sections of society.

As has often been noticed, the growth of the developmental state and the bureaucracy in Latin America did not lead to the creation of neutral public institutions (Vellinga, 1998: 5; Smith, 1998). Instead, patrimonialism was employed to reinforce old clientelistic networks, as well as to construct new ones. This allowed power to continue to be a particular and private possession, as opposed to something universal and public. As Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar write, the privatization of public political spaces "normalizes favoritism, personalism, clientelism, and paternalism as regular political practices." (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998: 9). These behavioral tendencies, particularly clientelism, tend to reinforce existing socio-economic and political

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<sup>7</sup> See (O'Donnell, 1998).

<sup>8</sup> As opposed to the group as the economic unit which was critical to Latin American corporate and Import Substitution and Industrialization models (see Wiarda, 1981).

<sup>9</sup> Coined by John Williamson, the "Washington Consensus" represents a consensus among money lenders and financial experts in terms of improving economic performance and ending economic crisis (see his "Appendix" in Williamson, 1994).

inequalities, and to subvert legal notions of equality<sup>10</sup>. This is particularly dangerous in areas where inequalities of power and resources are so deep and trenchant (Vilas, 1997: 60).

Active and independent media in both countries have opened many political spaces and exposed many scandals since the 1980s<sup>11</sup>, most obviously the corruption surrounding the Collor presidency in Brazil. It is not unimportant that the scandal surrounding Collor led to his impeachment. Similarly, following the very problematic and fraudulent presidential elections of 1994, Balaguer ended up serving a two, rather than four, year term. This represents an improvement on eras in which politicians were entirely unaccountable. However, many critical political decisions remain enshrouded in non-institutional spaces, made in back rooms, far from the gaze of the citizenry. In fact, although public contestation has increased during this most recent period of democratization, many politically significant groups are aware that there are more efficient arenas than those of the official political institutions. This is because power has resisted institutionalization and democratization, and instead has crystallized in the private form of clientelism. Or as Lechner writes "‘really existing politics’ occurs on the margins of democratic institutions, which often are limited to ratifying extra-institutional accords" (Lechner, 1998: 32).

Clientelism is certainly not a political practice that is limited to Latin America. However, while the practice of clientelism enforces the idea that certain individuals are patrons and others clients, the difference in power between the two groups depends on

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<sup>10</sup> See chapter 4.

<sup>11</sup> This does not mean that the Latin American media is capable of holding the government and others accountable, but it does at least report scandals.

economic distributions, societal values and political culture. While politicians may trade favors in other countries, what has been institutionalized in Latin America is the considerable inequality of power relations which underlie clientelist practices, and which reinforce social inequality between those people who are perceived as having power and wealth, and the vast majority who do not.

In a region like Latin America, which has the world's most perverse distribution of income within its countries, the unequal relations between patron and client weaken the possibility of democratic citizenship. And yet it should be stated that democratic government has rarely been able to improve the socio-economic conditions of poor and marginalized individuals, while local patrons have historically provided for their clients through jobs and the distribution of food and resources. These sorts of relations hardly contribute to the normalization of democratic behavior or even economic mobility, however, they explain quite a bit about the politics of survival, political inactivity and the quiescence of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

In a survey conducted in 1994 in the Dominican Republic, 88.5% of those interviewed agreed with the statement "when someone arrives at an important post s/he should help those who supported him/her" (Duarte et al, 1996 :63). Support for this claim was even higher in cities other than Santo Domingo and in rural areas (89.9% and 93.6% respectively, Duarte et al, 1996: 187). The expectations for pay-offs are quite normalized since fundamental to Balaguer's power has been his ability to personally distribute patronage. Jonathan Hartlyn notes the very high budget for the office of the presidency, through which most of the government's construction projects are funded (Hartlyn, 1998: 194-5). Although current President Leonel Fernandez seems to be less

capable of monopolizing government budgets, he still maintains quite a significant amount of budgetary discretion (Hartlyn, 1998: 272-3).

Elections in rural Brazil are often characterized by, and satirized because of, the amount of free food available to populations who ordinarily are quite poorly fed. Money, food and alcohol have traditionally been given to voters at election time in order to garner the support of the most poor. Political supporters—in all of Brazil—believe that a direct link should exist between the amount of work that they "volunteer" for a candidate, and the position they receive after the election (Interviews, 1998). Although these traditions seem to have waned to some extent, the lack of discipline of Brazilian political parties and the lack of majority parties forces political coalitions, such as the one President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's PSDB has made with the PFL and other mostly conservative parties. Coalition-building in Brazil, as one might expect, is less influenced by ideology or party program than by the amount and the type of patronage offered to members of the coalition. Again, when parties are weak and incapable of providing members and constituents with necessary relief and protection, patronage emerges as a very rational survival strategy.

Access to the political sphere is very much effected by patron client relations, not legal status or *birth-place*, the traditional prerequisites for citizenship. This seems antithetical to both the Liberal and Republican notions of citizenship outlined in chapter 1. Liberalism requires that individuals be universally and unequivocally recognized as legally equal, but the recognition of an individual's legal equality is undermined by the primacy of private over legal status. Republican citizenship is also limited by the existence of an abridged public space that is not the only, nor even the most important,

arena in which political decisions are made. As a result, private concepts of power deny the citizen the Republican notions of participation, responsibility and membership. Citizenship becomes private because the public and political are perceived to be the distant realms of a foreign and isolated group, to which the citizen is an "alien." Power is private, as are the negotiations and exercises of it. This excludes the immense majority from observation and vigilance, to say nothing of participation.

This is especially true for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians who are alienated from the public sphere due to their weak political agency and the inability/unwillingness of the State to ensure and guarantee their civil and political rights. For a variety of reasons<sup>12</sup>, Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians rarely identify their lack of citizenship with their "race," and rarer still do they politically organize in an attempt to improve their status. Not only does this limit the possibility of any participatory oriented citizenship, but it also impedes the ability of groups to monitor and prevent violations of civil and political rights within Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian communities. Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians are agents in an order where they know that power is profoundly concentrated in distant places, where individuals are far lighter than them, and that they are subject to the arbitrariness of police officers who invade the neighborhoods in which they live.

The privatization of power means that not only is it embedded in private networks accessible only through patronage and exchange of favors, goods, and support, but also that decision-making is external to the public realm. Thus, not only are political institutions (often) alienated from power and politics, but so are citizens. In the survey

cited earlier, 49.2% believed that the majority of Dominicans never or almost never have a means of influencing those in power (Duarte et al, 1996: 64). Whether this is the case or not what is important is that Dominicans believe that the majority of their compatriots have limited or no means of affecting politics, indicating that there is a sense that the majority of citizens are incapable of asserting their legal rights and civic responsibilities<sup>13</sup>.

In the same survey, 56.2 percent of Dominicans said that political parties only served in order to participate in elections, and 42.5 percent said that politicians only defend their own interests (Duarte et al, 1996: 70). A survey in Brazil in 1990 found that 52% of Brazilians believed that "political parties only divide people," 61% agreed that "parties only defend interests of politicians," and 50% believed that "political parties only make political participation more difficult" (Dagnino, 1998: 56). This is a serious indictment not only of political parties, generally considered the most effective means of democratically integrating common people (Peeler, 1998: 165; Mainwaring and Scully, 1992), but of the political class as a whole. That the impeachment of Collor did not lead to a cleaner form of politics, but simply to more efficient forms of corruption, suggests

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<sup>12</sup> See chapter 5.

<sup>13</sup> Those familiar with the decline in "civic" activity in the United States of America (see Robert Putnam, 1995) and in other advanced economic countries might wonder what is so specific about anomie in the Latin American context. As argued in chapter 1, Libertarians in the United States may disengage from politics and yet be guaranteed that their civil and political rights, as well as their right to property, will be guaranteed. In most Latin American countries, and in the Dominican Republic and Brazil specifically, civil and political rights are not entirely institutionalized nor necessarily guaranteed. This is particularly true of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians and other marginalized peoples. Also, since much of the land which is occupied by poor Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians is based on informal property rights which are not guaranteed by the State, withdrawal from political participation and interest articulation could have immediate negative effects for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians (see Becker, 1999 on the issue of informal property rights).

that such skepticism is well-earned. It also brings back the idea of patronage serving the poor, where parties can, or do, not.

Economic reform programs and privatization schemes have been deemed necessary by many of Brazil's governments during democratization, as well as by Fernandez's government in the Dominican Republic<sup>14</sup>. Cuts in budgets and privatizing of state-owned companies have received continual protest, from both the Left and Right, since these policies cut the traditional cash-cow of the state. As the amount of money available for patronage decreases, the need and competition for patronage becomes steeper. This is not only true of patrons but especially also of clients who suffer increasing rates of unemployment, downsizing and devaluation.

Citizenship is won through public struggles and politics. This does not mean that matters which society may consider "private" or "social," as opposed to "public" and "political," such as racial discrimination, are not rights for which citizens can petition. The reverse is true. Citizens may choose to articulate issues that are considered private, but they will only be able to guarantee these issues, through political means, when they are publicly debated. Laws against racial discrimination are negotiated and written in the public sphere. But this is only when the public sphere is porous enough to allow advocates for such issues the opportunity to articulate their view points, to access state funds, to petition legislators, and to effect policy. When political spaces are less accessible and/or cut off to large sections of the population, the construction and institutionalization of democratic citizenship faces very difficult odds.

## Citizenship as status

Citizenship is also “privatized” when the distinction of being a citizen, of membership in a community of rights-bearing individuals, is based on private resources, not on birth or naturalization. Roberto da Matta has written that in Brazil there are no citizens, only sub-citizens and super-citizens (1991); this is certainly true of the Dominican Republic as well. There is little notion of rights being applicable to a universal category, since the idea of rights, and citizenship in general, is linked to the idea of status.<sup>15</sup> Unlike the contractarian notion of “bearers of equal status” upon which modern, Western democracies are based, the status implied by “citizenship” in the two countries has always been a means of exclusion, rather than inclusion. The citizen is recognized by his or her distinctive, rather than common, features. This understanding of the “status” of citizen is considered with the increased possibilities for consumption offered by liberalization of markets and import restrictions, increased differences between classes resultant from neo-liberal austerity programs, and the fatalist belief that citizenship cannot be achieved through political activity and education. The political becomes cut off, and “[t]he role of the consumer... replaces the notion of the citizen” (Lechner, 1998: 33).

The association of wealth with citizenship, and therefore with rights and privileges, is a dangerous one in a region where relative and absolute poverty affect so large a percent of the population. Again, it is not just a matter of GDP per capita, but how GDP is distributed across society. Additionally, it is worsened with the

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<sup>14</sup> Balaguer remained very consistently against neo-liberalism, and generally maintained a very economic nationalist position, which was used to grease the political machine he depended on.

<sup>15</sup> See chapter 4.

dehumanization of members of marginal groups, particularly the indigent. Those who bear marks of social status are considered super-citizens, while the majority of poor, semi-literate, racially and ethnically marginalized are classified as sub-citizens. The privileged are often capable of stretching, or simply ignoring, the Law, while the marginal are harshly subjected to its excesses.

This has significant policy implications, particularly in terms of citizen support for democracy. Considering events in several other countries in Latin America, such as the *autogolpe* (self-coup) in Peru in Fujimori and Chavez's failed coup in 1992 and his electoral success in 1998, it seems that support for institutional Liberal democracy is not always high among the *demos*, that is the popular sectors. While neither a coup nor an *autogolpe* seem likely in either the Dominican Republic or Brazil, low levels of popular support and interest in democracy can engender an environment in which government can become increasingly inaccessible, unaccountable and alien.

The negotiation of the identity of the citizen in Latin America shifts from a legal arena to a socio-economic one. As Carlos Vilas writes, "...when socioeconomic and cultural disparities reach extreme levels, effective inequality tends to dominate legal equality" (Vilas, 1997: 60). Brazil represents perhaps the clearest example of citizenship being undermined by social status. Some Brazilians have referred to their country as Belindia to demonstrate the vast cleavages between two Brazils, one rich and one poor, the former resembling Belgium, the latter, India. The Brazilian economy is among the

fifteen largest in the world, yet it has one of the most uneven distributions of wealth in the world (Page, 1995: 6<sup>16</sup>).

In 1993, Brazilians who were middle class and entrepreneurs responded overwhelmingly that they believed they were treated as citizens (63 and 75%, respectively). Of the members of social movements<sup>17</sup> and unions who were asked the same question, 90% answered that they were not (Dagnino, 1998: 55). When asked to demonstrate "evidence" of their citizenship, "middle-class interviewees and entrepreneurs stressed activities such as 'paying taxes,' 'having a profession,' 'voting,' or even 'having money'" (Dagnino, 1998: 55). This is not surprising given that 'citizenship' has generally been attached to the privileges of a class, rather than the rights of a nation.

Although similar statistics for the Dominican Republic are not available, interviews with Dominicans implied a certain hesitance about using the word "citizen" for non-elites, and it is clear from Dominican responses to the Demos survey, that citizenship has a very powerful class element. When Dominicans were asked whether there existed equality before law for poor and rich people, 75.3 percent of the population responded that such equality did not exist (Duarte et al, 1996: 54). Widespread lack of faith in the judiciary system and the police support the claim that citizen rights are perceived as particular, rather than universal rights.

Citizenship, then, becomes a sort of commodity which is possessed in relative amounts. The greater the capacity to buy or spend that an individual has, the greater the

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<sup>16</sup> For an idea of income disparities in other countries in the region, the poorest 40% "get 5.7% of their countries' income in Mexico, 5 % in Venezuela, 7% in Brazil, 4.9% in Chile, 2.7% in Guatemala and 4.9% in Colombia" (Vilas, 1997: 59).

<sup>17</sup> It is assumed that these members of social movements are members of poor neighborhoods and not the predominantly middle and upper class organizers.

status, and the higher the likelihood that his or her rights will be respected. The wealthy have asserted this citizenship through the creation of spaces that can be controlled and monitored privately. Large shopping malls, private security forces and guarded condominiums are becoming incorporated into Latin American culture. Brazil offers clear examples of the construction of private spaces for citizens whose recognition *qua* citizen is dependent upon their financial status (Caldeira, 1992, 337). The shopping mall is an open space where through the medium of consumption, rather than politics, citizens can be distinguished and recognized. Similarly, private security forces and closed off condominiums guarantee safe spaces in which the wealthy are, literally, walled off from the poor. The poor may enter only to provide services. As James Holston and Teresa Caldeira explain:

The walls not only separate residences but also create semi-public enclaves, such as shopping centers and office complexes, where entrances can be controlled and social homogeneity guaranteed. In this sense, fear of crime legitimates practices of segregation and considerably changes the character of public space. In a society where people from different social groups tend not to interact or even encounter each other in public, the chances for propagation of democratic practices are surely diminished (Caldeira and Holston, 1998: 279).

Although segregation through malls, closed off condominiums and gated residential communities has a much longer history in Brazil, the Dominican Republic is quickly catching up, especially during this period of rapid economic growth and growing economic disparities. Private schools, new condominiums with round the clock guards, and the very common figure of private security guards (with old rifles on their laps) are the most recent demarcations where the poor and Afro-Dominicans can pass as workers, and not residents or consumers. Of course, as with most aspects of racial and color

identification in the two countries, this point is not absolute. Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians can go to some exclusive malls to shop, and often consume at high levels. However, their presence as consumers is considered somewhat alien and marginal, and their relative purchasing power abridges the way in which they are treated by a relatively elitist mall staff<sup>18</sup>.

The linkage between citizenship and consumption recalls the union of the cultural significance of citizenship with contemporary economic restructuring. Neo-liberalism institutionalizes the individual as an economic actor and increases the capacity of the individual to consume through the liberalization of markets and the elimination of import restrictions. Neo-liberals stress economic rights, such as the protection of property, and freedom from tariffs, high taxes, etc, while cutting down the State and its capacity to ensure civil rights and to redistribute wealth<sup>19</sup>. This reinforces the idea that citizenship is an economic value, one that can be attained through material success and/or consumption. This marketization of citizenship has serious repercussions for democracy because as Barber writes “[m]arkets are simply not designed to do the things democratic politics or free civil societies do. Markets give us private, not public, modes of discourse: we pay as consumers in currencies of consumption to producers of material goods, but we cannot use this currency when we deal with one another as citizens or neighbors about the social consequences of our private market choices” (Barber, 1998: 72). Also, “[c]onsumers speak the divisive rhetoric of ‘me’, citizens invent the common language of ‘we’” (Barber, 1998: 73). The neo-liberalization of Latin America, particularly with its

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<sup>18</sup> Unlike the United States, yet similar to many places in Europe, Latin American boutiques and stores, especially in malls, believe that they are doing the customer a favor by providing a service, and customers can usually expect to be ignored or spoken down to at even more “pedestrian” malls.

reformulation of state-society relations, contributes to an increase in individualism and reinforces the idea of the primacy of private transactions, as already noted, but without the notion of rights central to traditional Liberalism.

The privatization of citizenship entails an increased sense of individualism mixed with the idea of citizenship as a form of status. When combined with globalization and the increase in access to television, and other media, the poor and marginal begin to view citizenship as a status that can be achieved only through economic means. Following the belief that justices, police and citizens treat the wealthy better than the poor (Duarte et al. 1996: 79; Carvalho, 1997: 49), and the opportunities afforded the liberalization of markets (i.e. decline in prices of imports), many marginal citizens feel vindicated in viewing citizenship in terms of consumption. The capacity to consume among these classes is relatively low vis-à-vis the wealthy and this encourages specific spending strategies. Livio Sansone has noticed that frustrations at not being treated as full citizens "increases the importance of conspicuous consumption and leisure in the pursuit of status, dignity, and civil rights" among Afro-Brazilians (Sansone, 1997: 473). From participant observation in Rio de Janeiro and Santo Domingo, I noticed that status, especially among poor Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Dominicans, was evidenced by the ability to consume, particularly in terms of short-term, conspicuous consumption and the importance of material status symbols. Interestingly enough, Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, and particularly youths in both countries but especially in Brazil, are consuming culture which is "Black,"<sup>20</sup> from, or very heavily influenced by the US and the English speaking

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<sup>19</sup> Although, to be fair, neither state was particularly efficient at either of these tasks.

<sup>20</sup> These cultural products are generally limited to music, dance and fashion, although movies are able to present other products as well.

Caribbean. Sansone sees this consumption of having the double end of both a wish to "belong" and to "protest." However, it is important to point out that Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians are not alone in consuming reggae and other "Black" cultural products. These cultural products are so ingrained into mainstream popular culture that Euro-Dominicans and Euro-Brazilians consume them along similar lines. Also the consumption of "Black" cultural products has yet to develop a similarly widespread notion of "*Negro*" political identity and activity.

The poor and marginal, as has been suggested already, are not recognized as full citizens, because they are often the antithesis of a citizen. This is precisely because citizenship is defined by its distinction from the poor and marginal, and from societal discourses of poverty and criminality. This understanding of citizenship strips the poor and marginal of their citizenship, as well as their very humanity. In an investigation of Dominican *bateys* (plantations), Sam Martinez found that *batey* laborers are not slaves, however, their economic condition undermines Liberal notions of freedom. He writes that civil and political rights in such conditions lose the relevance attached to them in wealthy democracies since "the third world poor tend to see starvation, disease, and economic uncertainty as a more immediate threat to human dignity than being deprived of the right to vote freely or organize politically with neighbors and coworkers" (Martinez, 1996: 17).

In both countries, the State cannot, or will not, guarantee individual rights to many sections of the population. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro writes "Brazil, like other Latin American countries, is a society based on exclusion—a democracy without citizenship" (Pinheiro, 1996: 18). The dehumanization of the Haitian and Haitian-Dominicans clearly

has its correlates in the *favela* (shanty) populations of the urban centers of Brazil, as has been detailed in chapter 4. Looking more broadly at Latin America, Norbert Lechner writes that necessity in conditions of scarcity "limits the range of available alternatives" (Lechner, 1997: 178), and that certainly helps to explain the lack of mobilization seen in chapter 5.

The quest for citizenship in the Dominican Republic and Brazil is elusive since the citizen is the exception rather than the rule, and an individual becomes a citizen based upon his or her value in a "relational universe" (da Matta, 1987). Such an understanding excludes large portions of the population, most obviously the poor, illiterate, and ethnic and racial "others." In such environments, where citizenship is the possession of the very few, those who live in poverty become dehumanized, pathologized, and, often, demonized (Vilas, 1997). Dominican discourse dehumanizes Haitians and those of darker skin who live in urban slums and rural backlands, just as Brazilian discourse does the same for street children, Afro-Brazilians, and *favelados*, who are often the victims of police and vigilantes.

Democracy has not been able to eliminate many of these prejudices. In fact, in many cases prejudice worsened during democratization and economic liberalization<sup>21</sup>. This may be most clear in relation between criminality and law enforcement. During field research in Santo Domingo and Rio de Janeiro many informants, across socioeconomic classes, revealed a sort of nostalgia for the order and social peace of prior dictatorships. In the Dominican Republic, it was common to hear people say that during the dictatorship of Trujillo "one could still walk the streets at night." One informant in

Brazil declared that he was "against democracy" because it did not work, and because it "meant giving rights to people who should not have them." One does not have to think very hard to realize who 'the people' are who make 'walking the streets impossible,' and who the people are who 'should not have rights.' Teresa Caldeira noted similar comments on the part of middle and lower middle class residents in São Paulo who watched their neighborhoods become increasingly dangerous. She notes that while there was a high degree of support for human rights during the dictatorship when victims were middle class dissenters, there was a very significant backlash against human rights during democratization because human rights were understood as "rights for criminals" (Caldeira, 1992).

Police violence is supported by the fact that the police target the groups that society considers to have a 'proclivity,' *a priori*, towards crime, and by support among the poor majority for order and security, even if it comes at the cost of limiting liberties. Police are able to consistently violate the rights of the poor, *favelado* and Afro-Brazilian populations because Brazilian society does not see members of these groups as citizens<sup>22</sup>. Similarly, Haitians and dark-skinned Dominicans have no recourse to protection from regular police shake-downs and from periodic deportations. They also are not seen as "full members," in the sense of Marshall's definition of citizenship, and they are often presented as not civilized, and somewhat less human. Powerful discourses of inferiority which link racial identity and poverty to ghettos and shanties, to migrants, to unemployment, to violence and crime, to drug use, to homeless children, etc. strip them

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<sup>21</sup> This is also due to the increase in drug trafficking.

<sup>22</sup> This could probably be compared to "racial profiling" in the United States.

of their citizenship<sup>23</sup>. These discourses of inferiority construct a marginal space which serves to dehumanize the people who occupy it. This marginal space is not only discursive but also geographic and physical as slums and *favelas* are real spaces which are isolated from the wealth of the city, although they are subject to the abuses of its police.

In a sense, repression of the poor and marginal protects what society sees as the citizen, while violating the rights of what it considers non-citizens. Even though both groups are legally citizens, citizenship is understood in opposition to poverty and marginality. The citizen is recognized through his or her position of privilege and the possession of rights, freedoms, and customs that are unavailable to the great majority of the population. Political activists, social movements and Non-Governmental Organizations often challenge this notion of citizenship by attempting to broaden the societal understanding of who citizen is to correspond better with the legal notion. But such contestation requires high levels of participation, a highly politically "conscious" group that can be mobilized at any time, as well as leaders and institutions with stable resources. The conditions of relative and absolute poverty make this very difficult, since contesting politics means missing work, losing time that could be spent looking for a job, upsetting an employer or local bosses, and spending some of the few free hours that a person might have away from his or her family, friends and church. In a sense, most Dominicans and Brazilians, especially Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, cannot afford to maintain high levels of civic activism, which is necessary to demand and consolidate the rights and access necessary for constructing citizenship.

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<sup>23</sup> Again, this is not unique to either country, nor even to Latin America, since it seems to also happen in the United States, in Europe, in Africa, in Asia, etc. The difference is probably the extent to which and the frequency with which the rights of people considered "marginal" can be violated.

## **The Privatization of Services**

Finally, citizenship is 'private' in the sense that the Dominican and Brazilian economies and governments have been, to some extent, privatized in the last decade or two<sup>24</sup>. Neo-liberal hegemony and efforts to cut deficits, combat inflation and to restructure the economy have lead to much "leaner" states in Latin America. Even the Dominican Republic and Brazil, which have privatized to a much lesser extent than some of the other countries in the region (e.g. Peru, Chile, Argentina), have accepted the "rationalization" of national economies encouraged by the Washington consensus, although political support for such measures is still weak, particularly because it will weaken politicians capacity to give out patronage.

Citizenship, traditionally conceived, revolves around the State, whether one considers Marshall's notion of expanding political, civil and social rights within a welfare state or the Latin American "state-centered matrix" that Cavarozzi (1993) discusses. The State is generally assumed to have certain responsibilities and for providing "public goods," which has included employment, utilities, welfare, health care, and the protection of citizens' rights, in varying degrees across the countries in the region. Large public-sector deficits and hyper-inflation have been countered by massive privatizations and downsizing which have changed the notion of public goods, as well as government responsibilities to its citizens. Public goods become narrowly defined, and the maintenance of stable markets, low inflation, as well as political and social order become

dominant. The change in public goods is especially salient for marginalized populations who become the victims of the narrowing concept of public goods because it places primacy on order, which translates into police violation of the rights of marginalized peoples<sup>25</sup>. They further suffer since, even though some were already disproportionately in the informal sector, many benefited from the State's underfunded social projects and from the existence of large State-owned companies.

Social services are among the first areas to be sacrificed in order to appease international creditors and investors (Vellinga, 1998: 11). Services that have traditionally been provided by the federal government have been decentralized to either local governments and/or specific Non-Governmental Organizations.<sup>26</sup> Decentralization and privatization of services have allowed NGOs to make in-roads in many "marginal" communities through the promotion of direct services, offering advocacy, education, job training, etc...<sup>27</sup> The growth of NGOs has allowed for some simple and limited efforts at advocacy for rights and community building. Said articulation of rights and participation

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<sup>24</sup> This is less the case in the Dominican Republic, as Balaguer almost invariably refused to give in to international pressures to cut the state or to privatize. Fernandez, on the other hand, has been able to implement small-scale liberalization of the economy.

<sup>25</sup> See chapter 4 for empirical examples.

<sup>26</sup> The NGOs that I am referring to here are non-governmental organizations that serve as "service providers." These NGOs are local organizations which tend to focus on one or more target populations, and provide direct and immediate services. I will not be looking at non-partisan research institutes and think tanks, which constitute a good number of the NGOs in Latin America, unless they supplement their academic endeavors and policy research with programs that provide some sort of service (e.g. free legal counsel, protection for battered spouses, etc). Additionally, I will not be referring to transgovernmental groups and organizations, such as the Socialist International, which have representatives in Latin America, unless, again, they provide direct services for communities. The focus on this section is how NGOs are competing for the spaces that open up when the State reduces its social spending. As a result, the most pressing concerns is how NGOs which offer services to marginal populations can meet the immediate needs of those people, and whether this may affect the way in which democratic citizenship is conceived, particularly whether NGOs can replace the State in some instances or serve as a sort of intermediary between state and society

<sup>27</sup> Obviously, NGOs differ in their size, scope, and the services they provide. I will speak generally here, and then mention a few more specific examples.

in politics can be seen as a type of citizenship, except for the fact that these forms of citizenship are not tied to the state, and a common collective community, but to particular, targeted groups (Dagnino, 1994, 1998; Spanakos, forthcoming b). These groups can serve as effective pressure groups on specific issues, although their role in more general political decision-making and policy-making is far more limited. Additionally, these groups lack reliable and consistent resources, as well as the ability to coordinate their activities with larger entities (Walzer, 1999: 63-4).

As many scholars have noted, neo-liberal economic structural adjustment programs tend to disproportionately affect the poor and the lower middle classes (Vellinga, 1998: 13; Vilas, 1996; Centeno, 1994). While these groups clearly benefit from measures that halt inflation (Boloña, 1993: 191), shock packages tend to increase unemployment, decrease the amount of services provided by the State and force many people into the informal sector. Menno Vellinga explains that "[t]he withdrawal by the state from areas that provide services to meet basic needs has resulted in a policy void that has been filled increasingly by grass-roots movements and the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)" (Vellinga, 1998: 17). NGOs, in general, have been seen as constituting a crucial element in cushioning the shocks of economic packages, and offering a legitimate space for public contestation of rights.

The non-governmental organization service providers examined here play two crucial roles: one is the provision of services to a community; the other is acting as "experts" in the development of policies on domestic and international levels. The first role is the one that most directly affects marginalized communities. As opposed to the sweeping nature of social movements, NGOs tend to be organizations which concentrate

on a specific issue or set of issues within a specific community. The efficiency of NGOs to target "problem areas" in "at risk" communities has won NGOs foreign financing, which previously was reserved as block grants to state administrators for aid.

In chapter 5, both MUDHE in the Dominican Republic and GCAR in Brazil were briefly discussed. The former is an NGO, consisting primarily of women of Haitian ancestry or Afro-Dominicans, which provides direct services, in the form of medical attention, medicine, pre-school, and a somewhat subsidized market, to plantation workers. The latter provides lessons, ranging from history to theatre to musical instruction to *capoeira*, to residents of one of the *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro, with the aim of using this education, melded with an appreciation for Afro-Brazilian culture, as a means of increasing self-esteem. Plantation workers in the Dominican Republic and favelados in Brazil may be considered among the most disadvantaged populations in their respective countries, and, unsurprisingly, these populations are far darker than the more privileged sections of society.

While social projects of earlier decades were dependent upon the direct assistance of the State, if they were not already part of a State initiative, NGOs are separated from the State. By not being directly linked to the state, NGOs have a certain amount of autonomy and are able to challenge institutional prejudices and arrangements. In fact, funding for NGOs is often contingent upon explicit non-partisan positions. For example, the women of *Identidad* in the Dominican Republic may spend quite a bit of time educating people about racism in the Dominican Republic, despite official discourses which deny the existence of racism, because they are not dependent on the State for funding. Similarly, CEAP can serve as an advocacy group and bring the State, police

officers, and other officials to trial for crimes of racism, because it is independent of the State. As a result, CEAP, like *Identidad*, does not have to follow any partisan or political line. In most countries in Latin America NGO workers tend to be non-partisan, although generally of the Left. Brazil is a notable exception since there are quite significant ties between the Worker's Party (PT) and the Workers Democratic Party (PDT) and various NGOs and social activists (Lehman and Bebbington, 1998: 262).

Autonomy has a price. Since NGOs do not receive set funding from the State, they are dependent upon fickle international financing. This means that the NGOs that will receive funding will be the ones that are best organized, most capable of writing grant applications, and of tapping international resources. This severely limits truly "popular" groups who do not have the assistance of university professors or technocrats (Alvarez, 1998: 306). Additionally, although this subject is rarely discussed, since NGOs are often wholly dependent upon international financing, they often reflect the policy preferences of their financiers<sup>28</sup>. NGOs also often change their funding sources, their foci, disappear or are swallowed up into a larger group.

Even still, NGOs can play a vital role in providing community to otherwise marginal individuals, and also as serving as "watch-dogs" of government abuses. Sam Martinez notes that "[t]he tasks of investigating abuses and putting pressure on governments to guarantee human rights has instead fallen largely to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), of which the best known perhaps are Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch" (Martinez, 1996: 18). The local investigative units of the above organizations have played a critical role in documenting the systematic abuse of Haitians

in the Dominican Republic. Human Rights Watch produces regular reports of the situation of human rights in Brazil, and makes consistent efforts to pressure the Brazilian government to make what it considers necessary reforms.

NGOs play a second role in Latin America that is also very important as neo-liberalism and traditional cultural practices meld in a transition period. The logic of neo-liberalism has been interpreted as the smaller and more decentralized the State, in terms of service provision, the better. But as social services, education, health, among other things, are decentralized and left up to local non-governmental service providers, the State becomes increasingly dependent upon the expertise of NGOs. NGO workers are regularly invited to attend and speak at conferences on local issues for domestic and international organizations. For example, Latin American women's groups were very much involved in the planning of national and regional presentations at the Women's conference in Beijing in 1995 (Lehman and Bebbington, 1998). Alvarez reports that the Brazilian government, eager to make its mark at the Beijing conference, went so far as to recruit feminists to prepare a statement on behalf of the government (Alvarez, 1998). NGOs which target women were very much involved in the drafting and lobbying for the law against "interfamily" violence in the Dominican Republic (Interviews, 1997). "Femocrats" have also served as technical advisors for government policies relating to women, such as the creation of women-only police stations in Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru (Alvarez, 1998, 302). NGOs also are legitimate representatives in the eyes of the international community. This provides alternative voices to that of the State, and issues

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<sup>28</sup> This is a polemic that I will not address here.

of women's rights, ethnic and racial politics, as well as environmental politics (Lehman and Bebbington, 1998: 255).

But as hinted already there are severe limitations upon NGOs. There is something certainly appealing about local people organizing their community and protecting themselves from state-sponsored violence, but fragmented and under-funded organizations cannot replace the State as the political center of citizenship. They can, at times, provide better and more efficient legal advocacy for individual members of specific communities, however, they are still dependent upon the legal apparatus of the State. This is a critical limitation since NGO success depends upon it being non-partisan, and for all intents and purposes, non-political. Citizenship is explicitly political and public, and this limits NGO service providers to the role of charity, direct service provision and offering a social supplement to citizenship. Additionally, because the specificity of their issue orientation, lack of funding, and lack of technological resources, NGOs are often incapable of forming long-standing coalitions that will be capable of producing solidarity and large-scale change<sup>29</sup>. The result of focusing on a target area means blurring the rest of the picture. When one organization provides information on sexually transmitted diseases for prostitutes, another offers services to battered women, and a third offers seminars on self-esteem for racial and ethnic "others," all in three different neighborhoods, it is difficult to build politically significant coalitions. While the leaders of these NGOs may be sympathetic to the others' causes, mobilization is another

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<sup>29</sup> Yúdice writes "[p]olitical struggle under neoliberalism increasingly works from the basis of a civil society paradigm, which prioritizes difference over the kind of imaginary totalizing that national identity presumed in the era of the popular" (Yúdice, 1999: 54).

issue. Additionally, NGOs often compete with each other for activists, funding and consumers, and such competition can be fierce and saturated with ideological venom.

There is an additional caveat that need be issued about NGOs. Even if the emotive bonds between the marginal individual and the NGO are stronger than those between the marginal individual and the State, this does not represent what is generally considered to be citizenship. There is something that resembles a fragmentary form of, perhaps post-modern, citizenship<sup>30</sup>. NGOs can provide community, distribute services, contribute to the self-esteem and the construction of identity of an individual or a group. They can provide a level of governance, when they are funded, on a very local level. But since NGO service providers target the most marginal communities there is the possibility that strengthening the bonds between marginals and NGOs, without increased government involvement, may serve to further alienate a group which is already so alienated from politics.

NGOs are generally funded through the charity of Western European and US organizations and/or social science grant experiments of (primarily) US institutes. These funds are distributed through local activists who are often very anti-State. Considering the NGO community privileges transnational and/or local levels of politics, and attempts to bypass or replace the State, it is possible that the communities that are being constructed, successfully or not, by NGOs may only worsen the alienation of the marginal. There is a need to insure the distribution of direct services to populations without means, however, there is a danger of creating communities that are even more isolated than they are now. If marginal communities become increasingly insular, they

simultaneously become increasingly excluded from state politics, which may consider NGO activity sufficient in these areas. This may lead to a further pull out by the State, and for even less support for human, civil and political rights of the residents in poor and marginal areas.

The privatization of services has serious consequences for citizenship. One of the most significant elements of a state-centered form of citizenship has been its provision of services, however minimal, particularly to the poor and destitute. This has been a means of enfranchising the "marginal." Marshall considered the development of social rights and entitlements to be the most fundamental challenge for citizenship in the twentieth century, since only by lessening the socio-economic differences and privileges between people could citizenship become an effective and democratic means of integrating people into a society. Ironically, democratization in this most recent wave, has allowed for the articulation of many political and civil rights, and yet has been concurrent with the most significant period of austerity and downsizing.

## Conclusion

These comments on the "privatization in citizenship" are very preliminary, although they do tend to emphasize contemporary trends and obstacles in the forms and formation of a democratic form of citizenship in the Dominican Republic and in Brazil, particularly for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. A "privatized" citizenship is not considered preferable to either the Liberal and Republican notions of citizenship outlined

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<sup>30</sup> In Spanakos (1999b) I make a theoretical defense of this form of citizenship. However, I am not as sure

in chapter 1. However, unlike the Liberal and Republican notions of citizenship, a "privatized" form of citizenship seems to be normalized into Dominican and Brazilian political culture, behavior and expectations. This is despite two decades of democratization and three decades of liberalization in the Dominican Republic and two decades of liberalization and one and a half decades of democratization in Brazil.

The Dominican Republic and Brazil are not alone in being democracies that have severe limitations on their ability to institutionalize democratic politics and norms. Other countries in the region share a similar difficulty in integrating a horizontal type of democratic government with hierarchical economies and societies (O'Donnell, 1998), particularly with the considerable constraints placed upon Latin American governments by debt, currency instability and economic crisis. Although every government in Latin America, with the possible exception of Cuba, approaches the millenium with some form of democratic government, an accomplishment which should not be ignored, democratic government does not mean democratic governance, nor even democratic politics. Impressive as the transitions to democracy have been, democratic politics have not been normalized into political culture, and this has been particularly worsened by the wreckage wrought by structural adjustment programs and austerity plans.

The persistence of non-democratic practices and values within political culture and society, particularly the hierarchization of value of its citizens, coupled with the "logic" of free market capitalism has contributed to the construction of a "privatized" form of citizenship across Latin America. The majority of the populations of Latin America remain fairly alienated from the politics, and the political arena is especially

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it is as empirically possible and satisfying as I claim in this article I wrote two years ago.

inaccessible for them. This may explain the high popular support for Hugo Chavez's coup attempt 1992, his election in 1998, and 90% of his supporters being elected to the Venezuelan constituent assembly in 1999. It also explains the high levels of support for Alberto Fujimori's *autogolpe* in Peru in 1992, and the decline of the traditional political party system in Peru.

Patrons who dominate clientelistic networks have taken advantage of the fact that power is not institutionalized, and that new democratic institutions still lack power and legitimacy and have very limited resources. One need only consider the traditional form in which *políticos* (politicians) from the Mexican ruling party (PRI) coerce members of unions to vote along party-lines to see that the inequality of power across society has allowed clientelism to subvert democratic institutions. Or, recognizing a different power source, drug dealers and insurgents in Peru, Colombia and El Salvador have been able to exact demands upon citizens which citizens have been reasonably powerless to resist.

Again, citizenship is denied to the majority of the populations as citizenship is conceived of as a matter of privilege that distinguishes members of the same society, rather than a shared status that unites the members of that society. High-ranking Guatemalan political officials are still predominantly of European and not native descent. The members of the foreign service in the Dominican Republic, Brazil, as well as in the Central American and Andean countries hardly provide a more representative sample of the ethnic and racial diversity of their countries. Rather, it reinforces the class associations with power and with European features, creating only marginal spaces for "others."

Finally, many of the services traditionally offered by government to its citizens are now being offered to members of targeted sub-groups by non-state actors. The presence of NGO service providers has been critical for the survival of many peoples, neighborhoods and communities, but it has come at a high cost, and that is the large-scale withdrawal of the state from social policies. Peru has recently shifted their labor law which allows businesses to pay wages below the minimum wage to people under the age of 24. These young workers are considered "apprentices" and are not covered by social security. Chile's social security system has been completely privatized. While governments are cutting spending and pulling out of safety net programs, US foreign aid has dropped precipitously, leaving the role of support services in many instances to poorly funded and very parochial Non-Governmental Organizations.

### **Implications for Democratization**

As democratization studies continue to move away from the study of transitions and towards issues of consolidation and "deepening" (Peceny, 1999; Diamond, Hartlyn, Linz, 1999) informal behavior and socio-economic and political hierarchies become more important. Electoral government predominates in Latin America and many other areas in the world where the historical roots of democracy are relatively shallow. While electoral government in itself is not democracy, it does allow for citizens to express preferences, to have some role in choosing the leaders and organizations that are supposed to represent their interests, and it provides a modicum of legitimacy and accountability (at least in theory). This represents a substantive difference from the dictatorial regimes that have

stained the history of Latin America, and other areas of the world, regimes under which political participation has been quelled, voices of opposition annihilated, and political parties and institutions have served as mere institutional ornaments.

The hegemony of electoral government in Latin America remains secure even given the presence of autocratic politicians such as Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Hugo Banzer in Bolivia, to name a few. Yet, electoral government must be considered to be no more than formal democracy, and sometimes it is quite a bit less than that. Formal institutions that intend to enfranchise citizens, to make the government accessible to its citizens, and to allow for public accountability, are in place in all countries in Latin America, including Cuba. But formal democracy is undermined by informal behavior, such as clientelism, by economic conditions, and by social and political hierarchies which challenge the most fundamental claims of democracy.

Democracy makes three very significant claims: that citizens are equal, particularly before the law; that citizens are free; and that government institutions and agents are held accountable to each other and to the public at large (see O'Donnell, 1998). These three claims are problematic in Latin America, and this study has presented evidence to that effect. People in Latin America are not equal before the Law (in the courts or in the eyes of the police) or in terms of access to resources and opportunities. Massive disparities in income distribution engender divisions between those who pursue luxury versus those who pursue subsistence. Middle classes, in such situations, often identify with the privilege of the upper class rather than with the survival techniques of the poor. People are also not free to act, participate in politics, nor to create institutions

that will be able to articulate and defend their interests. Again, the poor and marginal sections are often dependent on outside organizations and foreign funded NGOs—whose efficacy and legitimacy varies greatly, to represent their interests. Additionally, there is the presence of local bosses, politicians and patrons who are able to press their clients into supporting certain politicians, spending time at particular rallies, avoiding discussion with other parties or politicians, etc. Political options, access and participation takes place among the narrow constraints laid out by patrons, necessity and economic hardship. This is a significant impingement on the political freedom of the individual.

Finally, while there seems to be some improvement in some countries in the area of public accountability, this remains a serious problem for Latin American democracies (O'Donnell, 1998). Government institutions and branches are often not accountable to each other, despite constitutional and institutional structures which are supposed to foster this. Similarly, institutions and individuals remain fairly unaccountable to the public. The inability of the judiciary to check executive and legislative power, on a macro-level, and seems unwilling or incapable of defending citizens whose rights have been violated by the police or the military, on a micro-level, is a major problem for public accountability (Becker, 1999).

The hierarchical arrangement of society, the restrictions on freedom and the lack of a legitimate and efficient form of accountability create conditions for a “privatized” form of citizenship that, in turn, reinforces those three conditions. The increase in income disparities and in unemployment which have followed neo-liberal economic programs, and the existence of a culture which allows democratic politics to coexist with very hierarchical conceptions of citizenship further “consolidates” and “deepens” the

privatization of citizenship. During the authoritarian governments of the 1960s and 1970s, civil society and social movements used the private sphere to force *abertura* (opening) in the public sphere and, eventually, democratization. During democratization, the public sphere has opened in some senses, however, the public sphere has been reconquered by clienteles, patronage, and political parties who have significantly marginalized the “new actors” of the 1960s and 1970s. Economic and social issues are exemplary of this as the 1990s witnessed the insulation of economic policy-makers and actors (technocrats) from public space, and social issues became increasingly the concern of actors (NGOs, civil society) who operated within the private sphere. The civic engagement of the 1970s and 1980s has been largely defused despite the presence of polyarchic governments, and this applies to general struggles of citizenship, as well as for the more specific “group” claims of identity politics (e.g. racial, ethnic, gender, labor groups).

The institutionalization of a privatized form of citizenship explains why there has been neither a reverse wave/ return to overtly authoritarian government (Huntington, 1991), nor a substantial improvement in the quality of democracy in many countries (Diamond, 1996). There may be an altogether different pattern of relations that approximates neither formal models of democracy nor authoritarian government. In fact, adjectives such as “democratic” and “authoritarian” may not be helpful enough in naming the dynamics that underlie third wave democracies, such as the “privatization of citizenship.”

There is a virtual morass in between democracy and authoritarian government which democratization theory often does not address<sup>31</sup>. Examining the formal and informal contexts of citizenship, particularly as understood for "marginal" groups, allows a valuable light to be shed on the quality of democracy. Such an examination neither exaggerates the "democratic" aspects nor ignores "authoritarian" elements of new "democracies." It also unearths the forms of political exchange, the system of social and political values, and the dynamics of power which impose restrictions on democracy and democratization.

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<sup>31</sup> O'Donnell's "Delegative Democracy" is a notable exception (O'Donnell, 1994).

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