Family and adolescent role development in Greece and the United States: a cross-cultural perspective.

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FAMILY AND ADOLESCENT ROLE DEVELOPMENT IN GREECE AND THE UNITED STATES: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

A Thesis Presented

By

KALLIOPI VLONDONI

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Psychology
FAMILY AND ADOLESCENT ROLE DEVELOPMENT IN GREECE AND THE UNITED STATES: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the present inquiry is to examine the family and adolescent role development, with emphasis upon the aspect of sexuality, within the context of the Greek and American society. Greece and the United States differ with regard to their respective cultural background and contemporary stage of socio-economic development. Consequently, the family ideology and its implications for the issue of sexuality are different in the two countries.

By drawing upon the historical and the corpus of research and fieldwork on the family, sexuality and adolescence, the following issues will be addressed:

--Cultural antecedents of the contemporary mores in Greece and the United States.
--The present status of the family as well as sexual attitudes and behavior among youth.
--Future trends and implications for research in Greece.

In order to systematically examine these issues, I will proceed in the following format:

1. Issues of adolescence.
2. Family and adolescent role development in the
context of the Greek cultural experience.

3. Family and adolescent role development in the context of the American cultural experience.

4. Comparisons and contrasts.

5. Summary and implications.
The experience of adolescence is a fairly recent phenomenon. Prior to the twentieth century, infancy was followed by a period of childhood that lasted until puberty. After puberty most young men and women started working, thus, initiating their entry into adulthood.

In the nineteenth century, the problem of those past puberty, but not yet adults, starts to attract attention. Stanley Hall (1904) in his classic work on adolescence describes, in length, the turbulence, ambivalence, dangers and possibilities of the new age.

In historical context, thus, adolescence emerges as a stage of life, conditioned by the demographic changes and the industrial development of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Joseph Kett (1977) gives an account of the social forces which contributed in creating the adolescent. In the United States and Europe there occurred a sharp decline in birthrate by 1900. Families were having fewer children and births were spaced more closely together. Thus, a type of family was created in which the children entered adolescence together. At the same time, the aging of the population gave special
prominence to families in which a predominance of teenage children existed. These demographic changes and the development of advanced industrialization displaced young people from the job market and contributed to the growing social interest in adolescence. In contrast to industrialized societies, in rural societies physical maturation is the criterion for entering adulthood. In this context, the adolescent is viewed as an economic asset (Goldberg, 1964; Kenniston, 1945).

Industrialization and its concomitants, urbanization and technology, change the criterion for entering adulthood and, in doing so, demand the prolongation of adolescence for the following reasons: in order to keep the labor market small; to provide the education required for certain skills which call for longer periods of training and study. Mental growth becomes the precondition for entering adulthood. In a sense, the adolescent becomes an economic liability (Goldberg, 1964; Kenniston, 1975).

Obviously, the biological and physical adjustments, as well as the resulting psychological upset are not sufficient reasons to ascribe the status of a distinct stage of life to adolescence. Historical development is a decisive factor. In both Greece and the United States the rate of economic development and social change make adolescence a prolonged stage of the life-cycle.
Adolescence is usually considered a difficult age, because of the biological and psychological changes occurring during this period. However, it is debatable whether adolescence is unavoidably a stormy age.

Anna Freud (1958) argues, from a psychoanalytic approach, that "adolescence constitutes, by definition, an interruption of peaceful growth, which resembles in appearance a variety of other emotional upsets and structural upheavals." She further contends that the upholding of a steady equilibrium during adolescence is in itself abnormal. For the psychoanalytic school, adolescent upheavals are the unavoidable concomitants of internal adjustments. Social and family structures can facilitate or aggravate the adolescent turmoil, but in no case can they prevent the experience from occurring. Developmental processes are conceptualized in terms of a prefixed sequence of stages attributed to ontogenetic factors.

In contrast to the psychoanalytic school, Bandura (1964), an exponent of the social learning theory school, argues that "stresses and conflicts are not inevitable concomitants of pubescence, but rather products of cultural and social conditioning."

From a more global point of view, M. Mead (1974) and R. Benedict (1949) emphasize the cultural factors which can make the process of growing up more or less traumatic.
Through cross-cultural studies Mead has indicated that the social and cultural expectations of puberty account for many of the adolescent's problems; that adolescence is not necessarily a period of stress and strain, and that these problems can flow from cultural anxieties. She argues further that culture can artificially distort the age at which these problems must be confronted. Thus, at whatever point society decides to stress a particular adjustment, it is at this point that the process of adjustment becomes acute to the individual.

Continuities or discontinuities in responsible-non-responsible status, dominance-submission, and contrasted sexual roles account for the extent of the conflict in adolescence. Modern Western society provides conflicting standards. The polarity between child and adult, existing both in the American and the Greek culture, implies that the individuals in the role of adult must revise their behavior from non-responsible to responsible, from submissive to dominant, and unlearn the dangerousness of sex which was inculcated upon them during their most formative years. The adult role demands traits that are interdicted to children. The adolescent has to adopt a new behavior. The discontinuity in this process accounts for much of the adolescent conflict.

Among the multiple transformations taking place during
adolescence (i.e., biological and physical adjustment, sexual, intellectual and cognitive growth) of major importance are the subordination of all the other sources of sexual excitation under the primacy of the genital zones and the process of finding an object (Freud, 1905).

Much of the adolescent sexual life is self-seeking. However, "a normal sex life is only assured by the exact convergence of the affectionate current and the sensual current, both being directed towards the sexual object and sexual aim" (Freud, 1905). Thus, sexual intimacy is the precondition for true and mutual psychosocial intimacy.

Integrating sexuality meaningfully with other aspects of the developing sense of self and of relations with others is a major task for both boys and girls. To what extent this task becomes a source of joy or despair depends on the parent-child relationship and the contemporary social standards and values extant in society. I want to focus mainly on the sexual dimension of adolescence, because the sexual and the social are closely interwoven, and it is in the process of building their sexual identity that the youth come to perceive themselves as social beings.

Erikson (1968) defines adolescence as a "psychosocial moratorium, during which the individuals through free role experimentation may find a niche in some section of his society which is firmly defined and yet seems to be uniquely
made for him." The implication is that the culture will provide the ideological structure (i.e., what is socially acceptable) within which the adolescents will organize their experience. From this perspective, the present investigation will deal with sexuality during adolescence in relation to the norms and values provided by both the American and the Greek societies.

Sexuality is not a problem in itself. However, it can become a problem given the physical maturity and lack of independence of the adolescents on the one hand, and the different opportunities which more or less traditional societies provide, and within which the individuals must develop their potentials.

Sex role development starts within the family. The biological predisposition interacts with social experience, so that the sex role finally refers to the expected attitudes and behaviors assigned by the culture.

In most cultures there is a double standard of adult sexual morality. Women are expected to play the expressive role, by being modest and to a certain degree chaste. Within the family their task is to maintain interpersonal harmony by being emotionally sensitive and giving pleasure. On the other hand, men are allowed or even expected, to have a more active sexual life and take the initiative in the encounter between the two sexes. Within the family
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they are assigned the instrumental role, which requires providing protection and the material resources necessary for the members of the family (Parsons and Bales, 1955). The present inquiry will consider the factors within the American and Greek culture which allow for deviations from normative sex role behavior.

In different stages of historical and economic development there are differentiations in the form and degree of allowed sexual freedom and the family can be more or less decisive in directing the adjustment of the individual to the social norm (Kenniston, 1977).

Thus, at times when the individual household was a self-sufficient unit, the family, fused with the economy, was the decisive agent in transmitting the values and demands of society. To gain independence, the adolescent had to contradict parental authority; deviations from the accepted pattern were punished within the family.

In the early stages of industrialization, the family loses its economic function, but it still is the basic agent of authority. Sexuality remains a taboo and the adolescent has still to fight against parental authority.

In the modern Western society, however, the family is no longer the primary agent of authority as the mass-media and the institutions transmit the values and considerably replace the family in its role. Young people still fight
with their parents, but this is no longer the major source of conflict as parents increasingly accept the shrinking in their role and allow independence from the family. In this sense, sexuality is, relatively, a less thorny issue in parent-youth relationships. However, the conflicts are transplanted, now, more in the broader social context, putting under pressure both the family as an institution and its individual members. Thus, at the same time that youth sexuality is no longer under the control of the family, it comes under the control of the social context within which it is embedded. This becomes manifest both in the emergence of compulsive norms of sexual behavior and in the tensions concerning interpersonal communication.

Obviously, depending upon the level of socio-economic development, the family can be a more or less decisive agent of authority with different implications for adolescent sexuality. The Greek and the American society, being of a different cultural background and in different stages of contemporary socio-economic development will provide the settings for comparing the function of the modern family and its impact upon the sexual activities of youth.

"Subjective culture," namely "a cultural group's characteristic way of perceiving its social environment" is a most important element in understanding the variations of human behavior and experience in different settings.
(Osgood, 1967; Triandis, Vassiliou, and Nassiakou, 1968). That is why the present account will start by identifying the particular ecological and historical factors in each country which shaped the respective subjective culture.

In an attempt to show the idiosyncratic elements of each tradition, I will discuss the pre-industrial stage of each country in terms of the family pattern and sexual values and attitudes. Then, I will refer to the process of industrialization and urbanization with the respective implications for the status of the family, women and youth. Finally, I will discuss the contemporary family pattern in each country, and sexuality as it is treated by the family and society at large.

I hope that the present account gives an image of the family and adolescent role development which is close to reality. Although I am also aware that each country presents a level of complexity which makes any discussion about the family and the adolescent run the danger of oversimplification. Especially in the case of the United States, where one cannot talk about the American family, since there are a multiplicity of families reflecting different cultural background, I limited myself to the discussion of the white middle class family. However, practical considerations of space obliged me to do so and not any kind of prejudice.
CHAPTER II
FAMILY AND ADOLESCENT ROLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GREEK CULTURAL EXPERIENCE

Greek Subjective Culture

A brief account of the Greek ecological and historical conditions will help to understand the Greek "subjective culture" within the context of which the traditional family has evolved still shaping the current family patterns and current attitudes concerning sexuality.

Greece is a predominantly mountainous country (80%) consisting of a large peninsula and hundreds of islands. The two basic geographical characteristics, the mountains and the sea, have originally brought about a considerable isolation of the population. As a result, in limited transportation conditions, the average Greeks had to identify with their island, valley or town and develop intense interpersonal relations.

Making a living in Greece has not been easy. The mountainous nature of the country makes cultivation difficult with the exception of two or three valleys. Extensive use of the sea and emigration have preserved a reasonable standard of living till the very recent past.
Through history the position of the country as the key to the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa have made it the victim of tensions between the East and the West. Major influences on the modern Greek culture come from Byzantium and the 350-year long Ottoman occupation (1453-1921). After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Balkans came under the domination of the Ottomans. During the Ottoman occupation, the fights between the Greeks and the Turks did not cease; the threat of execution kept the best of the Greeks on the mountains. These strenuous conditions were accentuated by the Ottoman practice of kidnapping the male children for the creation of special military bands, the Janissaries. Furthermore, the history of modern Greece (1821 to the present) has been very turbulent: revolutions, Balkan Wars, Asia Minor events, World War II, civil war, etc.

The psychological importance of these events can be considered as follows: the fact that the Greeks were obliged to meet crises created by war and revolution often made survival the major concern and contributed measurably to the formation of the Greek "identity" and the "ingroup-outgroup" contrast. The factors which influenced the modern Greek culture could be then summarized as follows:

a) scarce resources and keen competition for them;
b) reaction to the domination by autocratic rulers;
c) little potential for control over the environment.
From this perspective, it is not strange that the Greek "subjective culture" is centered around the distinct categorization of people between ingroup and outgroup. The critical attribute in "other perception" is the amount of concern shown in a given interpersonal encounter. The Greeks define their ingroup operationally as "people concerned with me," implying my family, relatives, friends (Vassiliou, 1963). The Greek ingroup is a dynamic social entity constantly in process. Membership can be terminated the moment one is perceived as not showing concern, since ingroup relations call for absolute interdependence and unlimited give and take.

The functional significance of such ties among the members of the ingroup is obvious: under hard conditions, it is easier to survive as a member of a group of people who cooperate and help one another.

In contrast to the "ingroup," the "outgroup" consists of anyone who is not perceived as a person who is concerned with one's welfare. Consequently, relations with members of the outgroup are competitive and agonistic (Triandis, 1972; Vassiliou and Vassiliou, 1972).

Consistent with the Greek subjective culture is the closely-knit character of the traditional rural family and its multifunctionism: namely, a) the family is a medium of cultural transmission; b) it programs and conveys the
inherent tendencies toward upward mobility (through education, emigration); and c) through the family's emigrant members the interaction among cities and villages is secured (Tsoukalas, 1977).

In the Greek rural setting, the insecurity as well as the demographic explosion urged a number of the family's members to leave the rural estate. Thus, an ex-agricultural network was established (especially in the eighteenth century) aiming at the relief of the demographic explosion and the financial support of the family unit. However, despite the departure of some of its members, the family does not run the danger to disintegrate as far as the departure is consistent with the family ideology, i.e., the goal is to promote the interests of the family (Friedl, 1963). Thus, on the one hand, the family has been the bearer of traditional values; on the other, its same power caused the procedure of the interaction between the city and the village (or even between abroad and the country).

This is, undoubtedly, a major reason that contributed to the mild assimilation of the cultural differences between the village and the city (Bardis, 1955; Allen, 1926). This point will be considered again later in the discussion of the urban-rural antithesis as far as attitudes and values toward sexuality are concerned.
The rural family has been the traditional family pattern in the Greek society and its features, more or less modified, are still to be found in the less urbanized sections of the population. For this reason, the analysis of the rural family, in the following section, will help in the understanding of modern norms and patterns.

Rural Family

The traditional rural family fits perfectly within the framework of the Greek "subjective culture." The strong loyalty in its members and the distrust to the outside world are recurrent themes in the description of the Greek family (Bardis, 1959; Campbell, 1964; Campbell and Sherrard, 1968; Zotos, 1969). Thus, interpersonal relations tend to be intimate and intense, positive towards the members of one's family and a small group of people one considers "his or her own;" whereas, relationships outside the family are competitive (Friedl, 1963; Peristiany, 1965).

To delineate the dynamics of the conjugal and parental relationship, the status of the adolescent and the culturally accepted norms of sexuality, I will focus on the basic characteristics of the traditional rural family, i.e., a) hierarchical structure; b) decency and morality; c) arranged marriage and dowry; and d) high birth rates
In the discussion of the hierarchical structure, one should keep in mind that the distinction between private and public domain is essential for the understanding of the Greek social life given that there are more prestigious public roles open to men than to women in the Greek rural society (Friedl, 1967). This is reflected in various aspects of the public domain (i.e., church, coffeehouse) where clear separation of the sexes occurs.

The hierarchical structure of the roles within the traditional rural patriarchal family is defined according to the factor of sex first and age second (Campbell, 1964; Frangoudaki, 1978). Thus, the member endowed with the most authority is the grandfather, followed by the father, grandmother and, last, the mother. Among the children, the boys, even if younger, are more prestigious than girls, so that a male infant has often enjoyed a higher status than his older sisters or even his mother (Valmas, 1936).

The conjugal relationship is not very intimate according to modern Western standards and the relationship between husband and wife is oriented more toward their roles as parents than toward their roles as spouses (Campbell, 1964; Triandis, Vassiliou, and Nassiakou, 1968). The children are often in the center of attention in rural Greece both inside and outside their family.
Both parents are very permissive until the child starts to represent the family vis-a-vis the outside world. As adolescence approaches, the father—and to some degree the mother—is less likely to express his love and affection directly to the child. The relationship tends to become more distant and formal, especially in the case of father and son.

The son is expected to show respect towards his father and to accept his authority. In traditional Greece, it was—and in many places still is—thought to be improper for a young man to drink or smoke in the presence of his father. As Campbell (1964) mentions, the relationship between father and son among the Sarakatsani\(^1\) tends to become somewhat tense, when the son becomes older and challenges the authority of the father, though seldom in public. The relationship between father and daughter changes at a somewhat later age, when sex differences make familiarity seem improper. The tone of their conversation tends to become more formal and neutral by that time.

Concerning the mother's relationship with her children, it changes less over time. The mother's relationship with her daughter is one of companionship. Also, sex does not form a barrier between mother and son to the same extent as in the case of father and daughter. The mother is, in a sense, asexual, a symbol of unconditional love, a sacred
woman (Campbell, 1964). That is why the mother-son bond is generally described as very strong and important (Zotos, 1969; Triandis, Vassiliou, and Nassiakou, 1968). There is a certain ambiguity in the position of the son; namely, as a son he is subordinate to his mother, but as a male he becomes superior to her with increasing age.

However, the above description of the traditional rural family needs some qualification in relation to the already mentioned distinction between private and public domain. One should not mistake this form for the essence of family life. In the rural setting, the segregated roles are at the same time complementary and, consequently, harmonious. Since the house is fused with the economy, the woman is a key figure even though she has no publicly acknowledged position. Essentially her role is not inferior, although it could be considered so, if viewed according to modern Western standards.

Within the intimacy of the home, the power of the wife seems to be very real, not only in female tasks, such as child-rearing and the discipline of the children, but also in the "male" tasks of selecting a mate for the son or daughter or sending the son to the university. The woman's influence in the last decisions is secured through indirect influence techniques (Friedl, 1967; Sanders, 1969).

Thus, keeping in mind the distinction between private
and public domain, I will discuss the sex-linked values of honor and shame connected with the second feature of the rural family (decency and morality). These values sustain the differentiation and separation of sex roles in the public domain. They constitute a system related to the following features of the social structure: i.e., a) complementary opposition of the sexes; b) solidarity among the family members; and c) some form of hostility between families which are not connected by kinship ties (Campbell, 1964).

Honor implies manliness; namely, not only the condition of being courageous, but also the ability of a man to do something effective about the problems and dangers that surround him. Shame, the complementary value of honour, is thought to be an inborn moral characteristic, part of a woman's personality, which descends in the female line from mother to daughter. It is related to an ambivalent attitude toward sexual relations, consistent with the importance of legitimacy as the essential qualification for membership in the family group. It implies an intrinsic revulsion from sexual activity, an attempt in dress, movement and attitude to disguise the fact that the woman possesses the physical attributes of her sex (Campbell, 1964). Loss of shame implicates the honour of the men of the family (husband, brother, and especially sons) reflecting on their manliness (Campbell, 1964). The Greek concept of "philotimo" (i.e.,
love of honor) clarifies the connection between honor and shame and determines whether any action will be taken in order to restore the insulted honour. According to Safilios-Rothschild (1969), "philotimo acts as the sensitizing catalyst which makes the individual feel shame when one of his own or his family's dishonourable actions are exposed; this drives him to the culturally appropriate action."

Within the rural context, conformity to the code of sexual shame is required. Honor and shame are complementary in the sense that the manliness of men in any family protects the sexual honor of its women from any external insult; at the same time, the woman must have shame if the manliness of the men is not to be dishonored. E. Friedl (1967), commenting on the control exercised by women over men, mentions that, "it is the women's willingness to behave chastely, modestly and becomingly that is a prime necessity for the maintenance of a man's self-esteem."

Solidarity among the family members implies that insult toward one member of the family will reflect on the entire family. The worst insult that can be made to a man is to use the name of his sister or mother in an unpleasant sexual context. The dishonor of the family is never entirely forgotten.

The values of honor and shame delineate the double standard of morality for men and women in rural Greece. A
kind of sexual dualism characterizes the man-woman relationship. Thus, a man is by his very nature noble, whereas the woman is a constant threat to his honor.

Consequently, the whole burden of the shame of sexual relations is shifted on to the female sex. As Campbell (1964) notices, "in the Sarakatsani view, the power of a woman's sexuality, the weakness of her will and the physical strength of a man are the important factors involved in sexual activity." This sexual and moral dualism is finally transcended through the fact that from women are born sons. And it is as the mother of adult sons whose reputation for manliness is untouched and as a woman past the period of her active sexuality, that she has almost overcome the moral dangers emanating from her sex.

The sexual, reproductive and working capacities of women belong exclusively to their families. That is why, companionship and cooperation between people of opposite sex is possible only within the family and the kindred. Outside these limits, the sexes (except in the case of the very old and the very young) are rigidly segregated. This happens because in this context women are always a potential threat to the honor of men.

From this perspective, it is not strange that in the Sarakatsani view or as it is portrayed in folksongs (Campbell, 1964; Safilios, 1965), sex, sin and death are inter-
related themes as well as virginity, continence and life. Sexuality is sanctioned only within marriage and it is believed that, even during the engagement period, the young couple will refrain from sexual relations if they have respect for both sets of parents (Friedl, 1963). Thus, "in rural Greece one can count upon parents and brothers actively to try to safeguard a young woman's honor" (Sanders, 1969; Safilios, 1965). The brother is often expected either to avenge any violator of his sister's honor or, if she is to blame, to punish her. Nowadays, matters do not often come to such an extreme point, but the tradition of protection is still very strong, as it is reflected in folksongs and the less frequently occurring crimes of honor (Safilios, 1965; 1968; 1969).

Within this context of strict morality rules which operate for women, courtship becomes an open strife and as such it is portrayed in the Greek folklore (Safilios, 1965). Of course, the fact that in traditional rural Greece chastity and virginity have been the basic values does not imply that violations and variations throughout Greece have not existed. However, since the Greek moral norms do not permit premarital sexual relations to "good girls," whenever a girl experiences such relations, she cannot openly admit a conscious consent and a voluntary participation. That is why
linguistic expressions referring to the sexual experience of an unmarried girl and her loss of virginity bear always the connotation that the man took the initiative and that he forced his will upon her. Hence, expressions such as "he took her," "he made her his own," "he deceived her," and "he destroyed her" are very common in Greek folklore and everyday language (Safilios, 1965).

At the same time, whereas girls are very restricted, boys are not only permitted, but even expected to engage in sexual activities. It seems that the larger the number of conquered women, the better for the reputation of the young man as far as his virility and masculinity are concerned.

In such a society as rural Greece, a reasonable question is how the boys and girls get acquainted. The most common methods have been the "bride's walk" (as people refer to the Sunday afternoon promenade), meeting at the fountain, some festival dance, the wheat harvest, the gathering of grapes, the harvesting of olives (Sanders, 1969). However, still in those settings any conversation had to be surreptitious. In other words, within the context of traditional rural Greece, socializing with the opposite sex usually occurred in group situations (i.e., work, festival dances). Hence, the lack of Greek terms describing any type of dating behavior and the modern use of terms borrowed from other European languages, such as "flirt" and "rendezvous" (Safilios, 1965).
Within this context, love is thought to be an irrational force under the influence of which people may commit unreasonable actions; consequently it is not considered a sound basis for marriage. Of course, this does not mean that there are no cases in which personal feelings have been the key variables in a marriage. Practically, there are no social restrictions as to who may fall in love with whom; however, the problem of choosing a bride or a bridegroom involves the consideration of the other family's prestige, the personal qualities of the candidate bride or bridegroom and the question of dowry.

The dowry is one more indication of the interdependence among the family members and the double-standard of traditional rural Greece. It is mainly met in relatively poor countries with a large percentage of rural population, where the woman usually does not work independently from the family as a professional, and where the family is powerful enough to arrange the marriages of its youngest members (Lambiri-Dimaki, 1966).

The dowry functions both as an economic and a social institution. It functions as a mechanism by which property is transferred from one generation to the other and it serves as a contribution on the part of the woman to the expenses of marital life. Consistent with the fact that the woman's family provides for her dowry, is the assumption that the
woman is not by herself capable of contributing to the expenses of marital life. And, furthermore, that she is not able to look after her own property. The legal framework is provided by the Civil Code, Sections 1414, 1416, according to which the husband has the right to the management and control of the movable and personal dower property. Thus, the cultural norm that the family is obliged to provide dowries for the daughters creates a strong incentive for saving money and for the emigration of sons and fathers (especially among poor Greeks). As a social institution, the dowry has been a source of social prestige, which prescribes that each family must, at all costs, provide a dowry for the daughter. At the same time, it becomes a means of social mobility through marriage, since it encourages hypergamy, mainly among men (Friedl, 1963; Lambiri, 1972). The social factors which sustained the institution of dowry have their roots in the Greek tradition, i.e., a) strong sense of responsibility toward the girl; and b) sense of honor (philotimo) which clearly associates dowry provision with family prestige (Lambiri-Dimaki, 1972).

Despite the discontent expressed by the villagers as far as the provision of dowry is concerned (i.e., daughters are a net economic loss to the family), they regard it as a fixed feature of their lives (Friedl, 1963). The same attitude is portrayed in the novels of writers dealing with
traditional Greece (e.g., Papadiamantis’s "Fonissa" = the Murderess).

The fourth feature of the rural family, namely high birth rates, has been conditioned by certain historical and socio-economic factors, which can be summarized as follows:

a) The trend toward large families was sustained by the function of the children in rural society as economic assets. This explains the favorable attitude to having boys since they are potential workers in the fields, whereas daughters are a net economic loss to the family because of the dowry (Sanders, 1967; Campbell, 1964; Friedl, 1963).

b) High-death-rates of children urged the families to try to secure a minimum number of living children through high birth rates.

c) The rural nature of the country and limited education preserved very traditional values (Safilios, 1969), according to which having numerous children was regarded as God's blessing, a proof of virility on the part of the father and a token of security for old parents (Bardis, 1956; Smothers, 1948). However, although childlessness has been considered a personal tragedy, it is also contemptuous for a family to have more children than it can adequately
care for. It is the family's duty to maintain a ratio between property and children (Friedl, 1963). Furthermore, chaotic conditions in the beginning of the twentieth century created a high degree of familism and celibacy has been very uncommon. Early marriages for women have been the rule: most village girls married between seventeen and twenty-two, while a single woman of twenty-five was considered an old maid (Bardis, 1956).

For these reasons, the generation of older women (i.e., nowadays, sixty and over), born in the beginning of the twentieth century and starting to bear children between 1915 and 1925, had significantly larger families than the next generations.

Thus, the traditional family in Greece has been consistent with the "rural family type" as it has been defined by Burgess (1953); namely, a) marriage arranged by parents or by young people in accordance with parental standards of mate selection; b) separation of children and youth of the different sexes before marriage or only formal relationships under strict chaperonage; c) emphasis upon the economic aspects of marriage; d) marriage relatively indissoluble; and e) evaluation of the children as potential workers and economic assets.

In the beginning of the twentieth century, this type of family and the corresponding norms of sexuality were very much conditioned by the rural nature of the country, the
conservative and authoritarian church, illiteracy and poor transportation and communication facilities (Bardis, 1955; 1956).

Within this context of a fairly uniform society, in which the economy is fused with the family, one cannot talk about class differences in the sense they emerge in an urbanized and industrialized society. In rural Greece, the rural factor unifies attitudes toward sexuality, and limits differences to only quantitative ones. As, for example, to the amount of dowry given to the daughter according to her father's economic condition and to the effect this would have upon the age of marriage. The last proposition holds mainly for the daughter. Traditionally, Greek men married much younger women (Safilios, 1972), since they had to provide dowries for their sisters and since it was considered improper for the son to get married first.

Thus, among the landless and landpoor families, young people marry earlier and with small or token dowries (Friedl, 1963; Lambiri, 1972). The underlying reason is that early marriages are essential to protect the honor and chastity of the daughter. The villagers seem to recognize that when there is no hope for financial aid from the family, there is no reason for the girls to postpone sexual indulgence.

Among rich families, the girl can get her dowry at a very young age and the young man, knowing that he will get a
substantial dowry, need not wait several years before getting married. Among the families who have some land, but not quite enough to dower their daughters, it becomes necessary to delay the marriage of their girls because "the men would lose honor and self-respect if dowries were too small" (Friedl, 1963).

Although one should not expect to find exactly this family pattern in modern Greece, the moderate rate of socioeconomic development has not obliterated it yet. Thus, it still reflects on modern attitudes and values, and constitutes a frame of reference for the way the modern Greek family is differentiating from tradition, as urbanization and industrialization proceed.

Socioeconomic Changes which Brought about the Transition from the Past to the Present

Major changes in the course of the twentieth century influenced the traditional form of family life and the corresponding cultural norms of sexuality (i.e., strict double standard and morality code, arranged marriage and dowry). Social change was conditioned by increasing urbanization, industrialization, mobility, declining illiteracy, improvement of the standard of living. The result of these processes has been the change in the function of the family and the position of
the woman, and the questioning of the traditional roles.

The increase of the urban and the decrease of the rural population have been constant features of the Greek society since 1879 (Tsaoussis, 1971). The urbanization process due to internal migration was abruptly intensified in the 1920s by the upcoming of the Greek refugees from Asia Minor; thus, in 1928, the refugees consisted of 31.7% of the urban population (Eddy, 1931). In addition to the impact that the refugees had on increasing urbanization, their influence on prevailing attitudes toward women and morality was significant. Due to different socio-economic conditions, Greek women in Asia Minor were more emancipated than their counterparts in Greece. They had more initiative and participation in family decisions, they fostered looser child-rearing patterns and they vividly claimed their political and social rights (i.e, equal pay for equal work, etc.) (Kalkani, 1978; Sanders, 1962). Thus, they brought family patterns new to those whose forefathers had lived in Greece itself.

The urban trend was intensified in the postwar period (1940-1971). The percentage of urban population has increased from 33% in 1940 to 53% in 1971 (Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1975). Nowadays, urbanization is still in process. The urban population is unevenly distributed. More than half is gathered in Athens (Tsaoussis, 1971) while the two biggest cities after Athens, Thessaloniki and Patras, are proportion-
ately small compared to the capitol. The rural population is scattered in villages. The intermediate level among cities and villages consists of smaller cities and towns, most of which are of rural rather than urban nature.

The impact of urbanization upon the family and sexual mores and values has been twofold: a) in the urban setting, control over the behavior of the women and the young members of the family is more difficult than in the narrow social circle of the village; thus, the loosening of sexual norms is favored; b) the migrants maintain close ties with the village they come from, which results in a two-way cultural process. Namely, the city-dwellers retain some aspects of their original peasant values, thus implanting some of the features of the rural family in the urban areas. It is in this sense that J. T. Allen (1926) notes: "whereas in the U.S. the city extends itself into the country, in Greece the country flows into the city." At the same time, within the urban context, the villagers' norms get looser and reorganized.

However, since the family remains a strong functional unit even when its members occupy very different social positions in the villages, towns, or cites, often the urbanites effect the connection of the villagers with the city customs (Friedl, 1963). Consequently, the city-village interaction passes through the family, which results in the mild assimilation of the cultural differences between village and city.
In Greece, urbanization preceded industrialization, which began very slowly after the 1880s (Skliros, 1976). Industrialization continued in a moderate pace until the early 1950s and has settled down to an average yearly rate of about 5% since 1955 (Alexander, 1964). Nowadays, 20% of the country's manpower is industrial, while the rural population rises to 47% (Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1975). The fact that urbanization preceded industrialization, favored the creation of the middle-urban class in the cities despite the slow pace in the development of productive forces. This phenomenon was accompanied neither by the formation of a considerable proletarian class nor by the excessive augmentation of the marginal strata (Tsoukalas, 1977). In the urban setting, recent immigrants (i.e., less urbanized persons) tend to have relatively lower income and occupational status, thus comprising the major part of the lower classes; whereas more urbanized persons tend to have higher occupational status and income, thus, comprising the upper-middle and upper classes (Vermeulen, 1970; Safilos, 1967).

Consequently, in the urban setting, class differences regarding sexuality reflect more or less traditional attitudes, with the lower classes (being of recent rural origin and upbringing) adhering to tradition, and upper-middle and upper classes adopting more Western norms. For these reasons, class differences are still circumscribed by the rural-
urban antithesis, and changes are better understood in terms of adaptation to the urban setting (Vermeulen, 1970). Both urbanization and industrialization have not been completed yet. When Greece will be a fully urbanized and industrialized country, the rural-urban antithesis will fade and socio-economic class differences will prevail on the domain of sexual attitudes as well.

Since the advent of industrialization in Greece was rather delayed, the socio-economic conditions for increasing participation of women in the labor force with resulting changes in social conventions, have been missing for a long time. Nevertheless, pertinent statistics indicate that industrialization has been an important factor in promoting and consolidating women in the economic life of the country: Whereas, in 1951, 15.8% of the female population over ten years old were economically active, in 1961, the percentage has risen to 33.5%. Nowadays, women constitute the 28.5% of the total labor force (Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1977). However, the number of professional women is inversely correlated with the number of professions requiring specialization, education or responsibility.

A further conditioning factor in the improvement of women's position has been the decline of illiteracy. Female illiteracy has dropped from 80% in 1907 to 27% in 1961; however, male illiteracy figures are 40% in 1907 and only 8% in
1961 (National Statistical Service, 1968). Nowadays, female illiteracy is 22.5% and male illiteracy 5.8% (Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1977). And, in addition to that, more women are participating in lower rather than higher levels of education compared to men (National Statistical Service, 1971).

The Greek woman has improved her position considerably, compared to the past. However, she has a long way to go in order to gain equal status with the men, at least in areas in which an objective index can exist (i.e., occupation, education).

The revision of the Family Law, which provided the legal framework of patriarchal tradition, will be a further conditioning factor in this process. More specifically, the Law in its present form prescribes that "the man is the head of the family" (Civil Code, Article Number 1387), "the father is responsible for the care of the children and the management of their property" (Civil Code, Article Number 1501), whereas "the mother is responsible only in case that the father is impotent" (Civil Code, Article Number 1500). The parent-child or, rather, the father-children relationship is defined in terms of "paternal authority." The dowry is institutionalized (Civil Code, Article Number 1406) and the husband is considered responsible for the management and usufruct of the dower property (Civil Code, Articles 1406-1437).
The revised version of the Law, which will be effective by 1981, is based on the new Constitution of June 9, 1975, which, in contrast to the old one of 1952, introduces the principle of equality among men and women (Article 4, paragraph 2). The Family Law in its modernized version will be modified in all its parts which imply inequality between the spouses or between parents and children based on the criterion of sex. Thus, the man is no longer considered as the head of the family and the husband can no longer impose his will in case of disagreement. The term "paternal authority" is replaced by "parental care", the dowry is legally abolished, and civil marriage starts being considered as an option, while for the time being, only the religious ceremony is valid.

Certainly, the legal sanction of the above changes will not automatically mark their abolition as social institutions. However, it is an important step in the direction of modernizing the legal framework which has sustained the patriarchal mentality.

Modern Urban Family

The socio-economic changes described in the previous section indicate that Greece has been a rapidly developing country during the last few decades. However, changes in the social domain generally evolve in a slower pace than the
transformations in the economic structure dictate. Thus, discrepancies appear to exist between development in the public sectors of the Greek society and the preservation of more traditional forms in private life sectors. Lately, there has been a growing awareness of a "cultural lag" in less apparent areas of socio-cultural development, such as family patterns, roles, socialization within the family, values and norms concerning sexuality.

In modern Greece, the family still is a powerful institution. It remains the most important vehicle through which the new members of the society learn its norms and values. Thus, certain conflicts arise as the adolescents become socialized with the culturally imposed attitudes which survive in their families, whereas they have to meet a changing society which calls for different norms and values. To delineate this point, I will discuss the status and structure of the family within the urban setting; the dynamic of the conjugal relationship and the way the double-standard is reflected in various dimensions of it; the issue of sexuality and the urban redefinition of honor; parental relationships and the reproduction of traditional models through the differential treatment of boys and girls. Within this framework, the conflict of the adolescents with the family, especially on the issue of sexuality will be dealt with.

The family remains a powerful status symbol considered
as one of the main factors contributing to happiness in life for both sexes and correlated with the stereotypes of the proper Man and Woman (Vassiliou, 1966). Research indicates that singlehood is unacceptable by Athenian men and women of all social classes (Safilios, 1972) and marriage is perceived more as a relationship based on mutual understanding, concessions and obedience by the woman. Love is still thought by many to come as the aftermath of marriage and not as its presupposition (Vassiliou, 1966).

In urban Greece, divorce has become a possible alternative for both men and women, even among the most traditional sections of the population. In 1907, the percentage of divorced persons was .08% of the population, while in 1961 it constituted .55% of the population (Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1968). Also, in 1961, the percentage of divorces amounted to 39.5 per 1,000 marriages, while in 1968, the respective percentage rises to 51.5% (Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1966; 1969). And furthermore, the number of divorces increased from 3,768 in 1976 to 4,517 in 1977 (Statistics of Justice, 1976; 1977). However, the increasing number of divorces is not a proof that the institution of the family is questioned because it is correlated with the increasing frequency of marriages and remarriages (National Statistical Service, census, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1975).

The type of family most often encountered is the nuclear
family, while the extended one is on the decline (Vassiliou, 1966). In 1969, the average number of children per family was estimated to be 2.2 (Valaoras, 1969). In fact, low fertility has started causing concern, and research indicated that abortion has become a nation-wide phenomenon in the last years, despite the fact that it was illegal until January 1979. By January 1979, it became legalized, but, even then, only in cases where pregnancy would threaten the mother's health. Abortions are estimated at 100,000 per year; their occurrence is most frequent in urban areas and mainly in Athens (Valaoras, 1969; Louras, 1967).

At first glance, the high number of abortions could be correlated with more progressive attitudes toward marriage. However, research has indicated that the Greek woman accepts the option of abortion in case of undesirable pregnancy. But, at the same time, she rejects any idea which would have unfavorable consequences for marriage and the institution of the family. In other words, the broader acceptance and practice of abortion is the consequence of the missing sexual education.

Birth control is practiced primarily through repressive rather than preventive methods (Tsaoussis, 1971), depending on the spouses' level of education, mainly the woman's, and the nature of the relationship between them (Safilios, 1966-67).

In the transitional Greek society, there is a discrepancy between the outward manifestation of adaptation to urban
living (i.e., low birth rates) and the underlying attitudes. Thus, reproductive behavior follows the model of developed countries, whereas the attitude toward contraception is the characteristic one of a developing country.

As far as the position of the woman in the family is concerned, considering her traditionally inferior role, it is expected that social change will affect more her position than the man's. Thus, women are more important agents of change regarding the conjugal relationship and, generally, relationships between the sexes. This is confirmed by the fact that most husbands (at least in the urban setting) talk almost exclusively about women when asked about changes in the relationships between husband and wife (Vermeulen, 1970). It is worth noticing, however, that the positive and negative aspects of the changing position of the woman discussed by men illustrate a dilemma in their attitude toward women. Namely, on the one hand, approval of the financial contribution of the working woman; on the other hand, fear that work outside home brings her in contact with other men, thus creating the possibility of greater sexual freedom and threatening the moral integrity of the family.

Also, the traditional stereotypes, namely, positive stereotype of the man, negative image of the woman resolved through motherhood still persist, even among young people and a considerable percentage of women and high socio-economic status
Thus, the roles within the family are segregated and complementary with little overlapping: i.e., it is considered that the husband will demand from his wife to take care of the house, to be moral and decent, to love and obey him; the wife is expected to demand from her husband to provide materially for her, secure recreation, comfortable living and treat her properly (Vassiliou, 1966). It is remarkable that love is ranked low on the list of demands. In case of disagreement, it is considered that the wife should yield place to the opinion of her husband (Vassiliou, 1966). It is also interesting to note that, while the wife's employment lowers the degree of authority exercised by her husband (Safilios, 1967), her power remains restricted to the more "feminine" decisions of child-rearing, purchasing household items and in the area of sexual relations the double standard is definite. Research findings (Safilios, 1972) illustrate a rather "passive" image of the Greek woman: she is not expected either to initiate sexual relations nor to refuse her husband's sexual advances; also, the man is considered more responsible for birth control. According to a 1966-67 survey, in 58.8% of the cases the husband is practicing birth control and only in 4.5% the wife is (Safilios, 1969). These attitudes are shared by the traditional part of the Athenian population, both men and women,
while a considerable percentage of upper-middle and middle-class people have more liberated attitudes concerning these issues.

However, in case of marital infidelity, both men's and women's reactions seem to indicate that the sexual double standard is still strictly prevailing. One-third of the upper-middle and middle class men and women thought that a man may be unfaithful in several cases, such as when the wife is cold and unresponsive, ill or absent for a long time. However, less than 10% of them gave the same right to the wife even when the husband is impotent, tyrannical, etc. (Safilios, 1972). It is evident that liberation of the Greek woman in certain areas, e.g., choice of occupation, does not necessarily imply liberation in the area of sexuality, at least to the same extent as men. The traditional sexual double standard prevails and liberation is more an upper and upper-middle class phenomenon.

Consistent with social change is the urban redefinition of the concept of "honor," which is now based upon one's personal situation rather than the behavior of other members of the family (Safilios, 1969). Thus, while the rural man may feel dishonored by the improper behavior of any of his close female relatives (since he feels responsible for the entire family), the urban man tends to restrict the number of women whose behavior reflects upon his masculinity and honor. Rural and
urban lower class people (of recent rural origin) still adhere to the traditional concept of honor; according to this code, even killing in defense of the family's "good name" is not considered a crime; on the contrary, it is socially accepted. Thus, violence and "crimes of honor" are more frequent among people of rural origin and older men (Safilios, 1969). On the other hand, urban upper and middle classes prefer "Western" moral norms to the traditional Greek ones, the more so the higher their education and occupational standing. However, in general, one could say that, despite its urban redefinition, the concept of "honor" persists in Greece even among those who would not consider an honor crime appropriate, when faced with "dishonor."

As far as the dynamic of the parental relationship is concerned, despite the trend indicating a gradual decline of the patriarchal tradition, research indicates that in the urban setting the father is still the dominant figure (Vermeulen, 1970). The parent-child relationship is more meaningful than the husband-wife one (Spinnelis and Vassiliou, Communication Number 65).

As it has already been mentioned, in the traditional rural family, the child was the focus of family life. However, in the rural setting, this attitude was consistent with the function that children had as economic assets. And, furthermore, it was consistent with the tradition of interdependence
and the rural context which sustained it. In the urban setting, although the function of children has changed and modern conditions do not favor interdependence, the attitude remains more or less the same. Also, the couple's relationship is still based more on an economic rather than an emotional basis. Thus, there is a strong, unconscious motivation of the parents to use the child as an extension of themselves and to try to fulfill through him or her their own needs, frustrated wishes and ambitions. As a consequence, the parents foster dependency and try to maintain control through the child's development. Emphasis is given upon the future achievement of the child (Katakis, Ioannides, Tarantzis, 1974; Potamianou, 1978). Education is considered as the main vehicle for advancement in society and a son is still preferred over a daughter (Spinnelis and Vassiliou, Communication Number 65).

Nowadays, although the parent-children relationships are much more relaxed than they used to be, parents' attitudes and expectations are still permeated by authoritarian tradition (Vassiliou, 1966; Safilios and Georgiopoulos, 1970). Respect, esteem, obedience and care during old age are the main duties expected by parents from their children, while love is ranked last (Vassiliou, 1966; Zarnari, 1978).

It is consistent with the above image that sexuality is a taboo and sexual education is largely missing or inadequate. In a survey of Athenian adults (Vassiliou and Vassiliou, 1970),
parents have been reported to be very ambivalent and insecure. Most of them "had never dared" ask their parents about sexual matters and they had received such information only during adolescence from friends and classmates. In addition, most of them thought that parents are "unprepared" to deal with such matters, although they considered the parent of their own sex as the most appropriate agent for sexual education. The above attitudes were shared mostly by persons of lower education and socio-economic status while persons of higher socio-economic status had more progressive attitudes concerning this issue. More recent data (Zarnari, 1978) indicate that while the general climate of the family has changed sufficiently for most children to feel free to pose such questions, most parents and mainly working-class parents do not feel comfortable in giving the child necessary information.

Thus, despite relative change, tradition persists and constitutes the basis of the socialization process reflecting on the differential treatment for girls and boys. Differential treatment is consistent with the cultural expectation that girls will be more tied while boys more independent from the family. Tradition in Greece prescribed strict differentiation regarding the goals set forth for boys and girls. Namely, the boy was raised with the goal of a profession and a responsible position in society, whereas the girl was indoctrinated with the vision of a "good marriage," through
which she would gain full status in society. Consistent with this norm was the fact that education, which in Greece constitutes a means of upward mobility, would not be offered equally to girls and boys.

In contemporary urban Greece, men and women, with the exception of the lower classes, think that both boys and girls must be equally well educated in order to be equipped to face life (Safilios, 1972). When, however, the question was addressed, as to which child they would choose to educate if they had enough money only for one of them, only two-fifths of the men and one-fourth of the women would choose the most intelligent child regardless of sex. On the contrary, three-fifths of the men and about half of the women would choose the boy for a variety of reasons and justifications. Since, however, only economic necessity forces parents to choose between children, these attitudes do not affect the upper-middle and middle class families, but mainly the lower-class families with limited means. This attitude explains the fact that, while many young women study or undertake a responsible job, very often they consider their occupation as something temporary, the final goal being to find the "appropriate husband," i.e., one with satisfactory social position and income.
Adolescent Role Development

Thus, the problems confronted by boys and girls are consistent with these expectations. With the upcoming of adolescence, male-female discrimination becomes definite, and it is the father who is mostly affected by that. He assumes a more authoritarian role which, however, is expressed differentially, according to the cultural expectations for boys and girls.

The basic demand now made upon the boy is to do well in secondary school in order to enter college and, thus, prepare for a satisfactory career. Contact with the opposite sex and sexuality are not such thorny issues in the case of the boy. Since he is a man and he must test his manliness, such activities are accepted and even expected as long as they do not interfere with his studies and the major goal of his career.

In contrast to that, pressure on the girl concerns not the matter of education so much as the matter of relative freedom from the family and socializing with the opposite sex. Tradition prescribes that girls will not have as much freedom as boys simply because they are girls. Usually, at the age of fifteen the girl begins to break loose from childhood and tries to acquire a certain degree of independence. It is at that time that she encounters real opposition at home, mainly from the father who tries to impose authoritarian power.
and shows definite and unshakeable ideas. His chief concern from the beginning of a girl's last year of secondary school is the "good marriage." This dream is shared by the mother too; however, since the average middle-class urban family is more or less patriarchal with the father carrying for the most part the burden of responsibilities, it is deviation from his ideas rather than the mother's which will cause friction in the family. Having provided her with a good basic education, an adequate dowry and having protected her good name, he wishes to marry her off as soon as possible to a man who will provide for her material needs, will give her male protection and will assure for the role of the wife and mother. However, even in this case, real consternation is caused to the parents by the possibility that the husband's work may take the couple to another location.

Thus, dating is strictly tabooed by the father, who insists that it is impossible to trust any of today's boys to respect a decent girl. The first conflicts arise when the girl asks to go to the movies or to parties with classmates and friends and they become intensified as the girl starts questioning parental authority. It is worth noticing at this point that while the conflict of generations has been a recognized phenomenon of advanced societies, in Greece it is relatively new for girls to dare to oppose and criticize their parents. The girl's complaints are usually that parents are
old-fashioned and narrow-minded, they don't understand and make young people miserable.

The mother's attitude in this conflict is usually a compromising one; namely, the mother is torn between the old ideas and the modern ones, and between the desire to be a good wife and a progressive mother. She agrees with the father on basic issues. But even though she finds it difficult to frankly discuss matters of sex with her daughter, she has more faith than the father does in the girl's capability to judge between right and wrong. Having herself overcome certain pre-conceived ideas about the woman's position, she is sympathetic to her daughter's desire for further emancipation. Yet, since her children have been the axis of her life, she is reluctant to relinquish her strong hold on them for fear of the loneliness that their independence will bring to her. Then again, having been relatively restricted within the home and the family, she desires for her daughter a more meaningful life, which she knows that education, travel and social contacts can help her to have.

Thus, the middle-class woman struggles to find workable solutions and to bridge the gap of misunderstanding between the father and the daughter. Whenever possible, she will avert heated arguments in the father-daughter conflicts by using milder persuasion. At times, however, when she feels that her husband has gone to extremes, she will end up a dispute by
cents confront. All the young people interviewed agreed on a basic point: there is no help from home as far as sexuality is concerned. Usually such issues are not discussed and, when discussed, the parents' attitude is either aversive or prohibiting. Sexual education is missing and advice, when given, stresses more the possible dangers than the way in which practical problems will be solved. Most of the parents interviewed believe that they are aware of the personal affairs of their sons and daughters, although mothers more so. Both parents are concerned more with their girls between sixteen and twenty years of age than with boys. The usual advice to boys is to be careful not to be involved in affairs with the other sex that will prohibit a successful career. Advice to girls emphasizes that they should not allow sexual permissiveness and that they should avoid affairs which would not lead to marriage. Thus, 45% of the parents interviewed were supportive of premarital relations, but only for boys; 23% were against for both boys and girls and 26% were generally supportive for both sexes, which indicates that there is some trend toward more liberal parental attitudes. The mother, however, tended to be more liberal, which could be expected given their ambivalence between the old ideas and the new. Thus, 37% supported premarital relationships regardless of the sex of the child, while only 12% of the fathers fell in the same category.
These data, despite the reserve with which they should be accepted because of the previously mentioned limitations, are indicative of the family dynamic; namely, the father is the protector of the family's honor, which is reflected much more on the daughter's than on the son's behavior.

The fact that the family fosters dependency and mystifies sexuality does not mean, of course, that the adolescent girls and boys do not have the chance to socialize with the opposite sex or to have sexual relationships. The Greek youth defend this right against accusations of the elders. The most common places for acquaintances are: the school, when it is coed, the "frontistirion"⁴, the club, the party. The procedure is the classical one: the boy is expected to have the initiative while the girl indirectly shows that she likes him. When, exceptionally, the girl makes the first movement, this is accepted with puzzlement and it is believed to subtract from her femininity.

The highly praised, in the rural setting, virtue of virginity seems to decline considerably in the urban context. Research conducted in Athens among men younger than thirty years old (Papadopoulou, 1975) indicates that the majority do not care, while the rest would prefer but not demand it. Nobody mentioned it as an indispensable presupposition. Respective opinions were expressed by young women too. The place of origin seemed to be a decisive factor, since the majority of
young persons coming from rural areas were more conservative on this issue.

Also, the majority of the youth interviewed by the Nielsen Hellas Institute (1977) approved premarital relationships in a percentage of 77%; 7% were against and 13% stated that it depended on the circumstances. However, boys were more supportive of premarital relationships than girls, the respective percentages being 89% and 65%. Religion did not seem to have any effect on the young persons' attitudes toward premarital relationships since 72% of those who reported belief in God were pro-premarital relationships. Both boys and girls agreed that the indispensable presupposition must be reciprocity of sentiments and love. University students, both males and females, did not seem to have any hesitation concerning premarital relationships. It seems that the non-equalitarian double-standard which considers all unmarried women's coitus wrong is on the decline, at least among university students and urban youth.

Thus, despite preventive family attitudes, most young people by the age of 17-18 have some kind of relationship, which however, especially for girls, does not always reach coitus in this age. From the sample interviewed by the Nielsen Hellas Institute (1977), the majority of males (92%) reported complete sexual relations by the age of twenty, usually starting around the age of 16 (21%), while only 3% reported no relationships
at all until the twenty-fifth year. Women reported complete sexual relations by the age of twenty in a percentage of 68%. The fact that 38% of the women interviewed were married may account in part for this relatively high percentage. Only 1% reported coitus around the age of 16 and 26% reported no relationships at all until the age of twenty five.

Only slight differences exist among the different socio-economic groups, with the working and low-educated youngsters—in a percentage of 15% for both categories—exceeding slightly in reporting sexual relationships before the age of sixteen. In all other cases it seems that the training of the parents and the dependency fostered by the family weight a lot, which accounts for women's later initiation in sexual life, compared to men.

Regarding the type of relationship approved, there are no specific data which would indicate a particular norm. From the sample interviewed (Nielsen Hellas Institute, 1977), 24% were already married, 36% had a steady relationship and 38% reported no steady relationship. Considering the attitudes toward pre-marital relationships and the presuppositions under which pre-marital relationships would be ideal, i.e., reciprocity of sentiments and love, one could hypothesize that a steady relationship is the ideal even for people who do not report going steady.

The decline of patriarchal tradition becomes manifest in
various aspects of mate selection among the younger generation: the presuppositions of marriage and attitudes toward dowry, the age of spouses, the meaning of children for the conjugal relationship.

As far as the presuppositions of marriage are concerned, emotions play a more and more important role in mate selection. Modern young Greek men and women consider as the basic presupposition for marriage love (41%) while economic and social security is mentioned less (3% and 8% respectively) (Nielsen Hellas Institute, 1977). It is worth noting, however, that although the dowry loses its financial function in the urban setting and, consequently, the main reason for its existence, it does not disappear as a social institution. In modern Greece, the dowry is still to be found either in its traditional form (i.e., financially) or in a modernized version. In the last instance, the bride's worth is estimated on the basis of her educational achievement and her capability of earning money. It is very often said that "a woman's dowry is her education." Among rural and low-educated working class people, the first tendency persists, while among more urbanized and educated families the second tendency is manifest (i.e., "a woman's dowry is her education") (Lambiri, 1972). It is also worth noting that the formation of a dowry constitutes a strong incentive for work for the women of lower classes, when the family has no adequate financial resources
(Lambiri, 1965; Nikolaidou, 1975). In this case, it is ironically the persistence of a traditional institution (dowry) that encourages female emancipation. In other words, it is in order to meet a traditional demand that Greek women have to follow a non-traditional way of living (i.e., working outside home). At the same time, the very fact that such "emancipation" serves in reinforcing traditional norms leads to a more rapid acceptance of social change. The parallel existence of two almost contrasting patterns, as free mate selection and dowry, is a characteristic phenomenon of a transitional society, in which tradition coexists with modernization.

Another aspect indicative of the decline of authoritarian tradition is the decrease in the average age difference among spouses, since research (Vermeulen, 1970) has shown that the smaller the age difference between spouses, there tends to be more mutual respect and the husband tends to be more supportive. Nowadays, an average age difference of six years is regarded reasonable in contrast to the traditional tendency according to which the woman was ten or even fifteen years younger than her husband. Among young people (18-25 yrs old), the ideal age of marriage for the man and the woman has been reported as 29 and 23½ respectively (Nielsen Hellas Institute, 1977). However, the women are still urged to get married earlier than the man and it is also considered unacceptable for her to marry a man younger than herself. Research
(Safilios, 1972) indicates that the majority of Athenian men and women, with the exception of upper-middle and middle-class persons, still think that a woman should in no case marry a man more than five years younger.

In Greece, although marriage is legally allowed from the age of 14 and 18, for women and men respectively (Civil Code, Article Number 1350), early marriages are only an exception for both sexes. The greatest frequency of marriages occurs between the ages of 25 and 29 for the man and between 20 and 26 for the woman (National Statistical Service, "Demographic and Future Tendencies of the Greek Population: 1960-1985"). For the Greek youth, both psychological and financial factors contribute to the delay of marriage: namely, longer period of dependency from the family and more strenuous financial conditions at an early age. The Greek young men and women, by being dependent on the family for a longer time, do not feel the need to establish a family of their own at an early age, as it happens with their American counterparts. In addition to that, strenuous financial conditions at an early age make thoughts about establishing a marital life quite unreasonable, since the state does not encourage early marriages (i.e., by providing cheap housing, family allowances, etc. as in other countries).

Although the rural population tends to marry somewhat earlier than the urban, the Greek population as a total fol-
lows urban patterns as a result of accelerating urbanization (Tasoussis, 1970). Men and women in the higher social classes tend to marry later, probably due to prolonged education. In the lower social classes, men and women tend to marry earlier probably due to greater adherence to the traditional norms and values (Vermeulen, 1970).

Among the younger generation, the attitude toward children changes. A research project carried out by Catakis on a student population indicates that the child is no longer the center of young people's preoccupations (Potamianou, 1978). The same attitude was shared by the youth interviewed by the Nielsen Hellas Institute (1977).

This trend indicates that the transitional pattern of the Greek family starts fading as changes in behavior are followed by changes in attitudes, among the youth. In other words, among the older generation, despite declining birth rates, the child has remained the focus of marital life. This attitude reflected tradition and has been further conditioned by the economic rather than emotional basis of marriage. Among the younger generation, the change in behavior (i.e., low birth rates) is accompanied by the respective change in attitude (i.e., the child is not longer the main preoccupation), at the same time that the basis of marriage is emotional rather than economical.

The future augmentation of this trend implies that the
Greek family will gradually abandon its possessive character and will foster independence of the children and young.

**Variations in Sexual Mores**

Up to this point, it has become obvious that values and attitudes concerning sexuality in modern Greece, do not present the relative uniformity which characterized the rural setting. Modern Greece is a transitional society in which the entire range of values coexist, from the most traditional to the most modern.

Although these variations have been mentioned in various parts of this account so far, in the following pages I will try to be more specific in the way they become manifest as regional and class differences. The rural-urban antithesis concerning the sexual issue is still the major one, which only in the urban setting is cut across by the socio-economic factor. However, even in the last case, socio-economic variations depend on the urbanization factor, since traditional lower-class attitudes change to a more liberal end with increasing urbanization.

Regarding regional variations, one should keep in mind that the degree of urbanization and education are important factors in the understanding of changes in family ideology and attitudes toward sexuality (Safilios, 1967; Vermeulen, 1970).
Consistent with that, in the more rural communities, given the greater percentage of illiteracy, traditionally the strict double standard prevails, decreasing as one approaches urban centers. In addition to that, the larger the number of young people leaving (for work, studies, etc.) without coming back, the slower the loosening up of the normative structure. In the villages, the family is a powerful institution with the father as the dominant figure and authoritarian ideas concerning sexuality and the woman. Even nowadays, preference of boys over girls prevails. One can still hear a father saying that he has one child (implying a boy) and one girl, or referring to his daughter as "a note to pay off" (meaning the dowry he has to provide for her). In these settings, double standard and honor (Safilios, 1965; 1969), arranged marriage and dowry (Lambiri-Dimaki, 1972) are culturally accepted and expected. The church is still influential, whereas abortion or divorce hardly exist as alternatives (Valaoras, 1969; Safilios, 1969).

In provincial towns, the same conditions, more or less modified, depending on the size and the degree of isolation from urban centers exist. The complaints of provincial boys and girls center around the control exercised by the family on their personal life (i.e., social relations, sex, cultural activities), the fear of questioning paternal authority, the prohibiting role of the father and brother concerning the sexual activities of the daughter; the "public opinion"
which requires dowry and "good name" (i.e., morality) for a "good marriage" with the "ideal" type of husband who will either be a civil servant or will have a college degree or both.7 Despite the restrictive environment, parties, school meetings, and cultural activities offer opportunities for acquaintance with the opposite sex. Limited dating takes place and often elopements or early engagements and marriages (Tsaoussis, 1971) provide a solution to sexual needs and desires.

The more restrictive the environment, the stronger the desire is expressed for leaving; however, fear of the reaction from parents forms a strong barrier to this tendency. Going away for college studies or work is considered by both boys and girls as the best excuse for leaving home. As it has been mentioned before, it is impossible for unwed youngsters to live separately from the family in the same town, without causing considerable emotional friction. It is often mentioned by girls that "by the age of 25 either you leave or you get married."

In the urban setting, it is not so unusual for unmarried couples to live together, especially among university students, who represent one of the most progressive parts of the Greek population on various political issues and the issue of sexuality, as well. In Greece, the phenomenon of youth culture has not reached the extent it has in the United States. It
is a more conspicuous phenomenon in modern Greece compared to the past, since, with the improvement of education, more high school students pursue college studies. In 1961, 1.1% of the age group 20-26 and 2.8% of the 25-29 age group had a four-year college degree. In 1971, 2.2% of the 20-24 year olds and 5.5% of the 25-29 year olds had graduated from college (Population Census, 1961; 1971). These statistics do not include the youth who graduated from vocational schools and any other form of education after high school.

Despite the relative increase, however, neither the extent of education (there are no graduate studies) nor the structure of educational institutions (there are no campuses) favor the development of an autonomous youth culture.

The fact that the universities in Greece are established in more or less large urban centers (i.e., Athens, Thessaloniki, Patras, Ioannina, Xanthi, Crete) allows students independence. Thus, urbanization combined with education, which functions as a liberalizing force, favor more progressive and equalitarian sexual relationships.

Depending on the size of the urban center, there is more or less reaction from the inhabitants to the students' way of life. For example, in Athens and Thessaloniki, which constitute the largest urban centers with the oldest universities and long tradition of student life, the population has been used to and influenced by the students' liberal attitudes.
In smaller urban centers (i.e., Xanthi, Ioannina, Patras, Crete), despite reaction from the inhabitants, the students' liberal way of living is finally taken for granted.

There is a reciprocal process between the urban center, which by its very nature, favors liberal sexual attitudes, and the students' mentality which influences and is influenced by the objective condition of independence. For the provincial student, going to the university usually means leaving home. Thus, although they may be more conservative, due to recent rural origin, independence from the family contributes to the loosening of their norms. For the students whose family lives in the same place where the university is, it is still very difficult to live separately. However, the fact that they are students encourages them to question paternal authority and impose their own pace of life.

Campuses, namely, university towns remote from the cities, are only now starting to be constructed in Greece (in Athens, Crete). So far, the universities have been in the cities, and students live either in apartments scattered all over the city or in dormitories, which however, are not preferred because of their strict regulations. Namely, students are not allowed in after a certain time at night, usually twelve o'clock and they are not allowed to invite their boy- or girl-friends, etc.

A fact characteristic of the way students face authoritarian mentality is the movement which burst out in the last
two years for the revision of these regulations; and the demand that boys and girls be allowed to invite their boy- or girl-friends in their rooms.

Socio-economic class differences concerning the family dynamic and attitudes toward sexuality appear mostly in major urban centers and less in provincial towns and villages. Thus, the lower classes show a higher degree of conjugal role differentiation than the higher social classes (Vermeulen, 1970) and they adhere more to honor, dowry and traditional values (Safilios, 1969; Lambiri, 1972). In upper and upper-middle class families, the relative parental power of the mother increases (Vermeulen, 1970) and more liberal attitudes prevail concerning differential treatment for boys and girls (Vermeulen, 1970; Safilios, 1972), sexual education (Vassiliou, 1966; Vermeulen, 1970) and more generally sexuality (Safilios, 1972). Thus, depending on the socio-economic status of his/her family the adolescent will be given more or less liberal training and independence, although the decisive factor remains the sex of the child (i.e., more freedom for boys, less for girls).

Since the degree of independence from home is correlated with sexual freedom, we could say that the working-class and upper, upper-middle class young people will have more liberal sexual life than their middle-class counterparts, although for different reasons in each group. The working-class youth break loose from the family at an earlier age to earn their living,
creating the presuppositions for independence. Thus, even if conservative attitudes have been instilled during childhood, they are circumscribed by the objective condition of independence. On the other hand, upper and upper-middle class young people come from families usually sharing more liberal attitudes and allowing independence to their youngsters.

The student population, for the reasons mentioned previously, has more potential for liberal attitudes and behavior, regardless of socio-economic background. The difference between the two groups might be traced in the meaning of sexual behavior among the youth who do engage in sexual activities depending on the training from home and the level of education. Usually, among the better educated youth, liberal sexual behavior is correlated with more progressive attitudes toward women, marriage and children, whereas this is not always the case with their low-educated counterparts.

Church.

The Greek population is homogeneous as far as religion is concerned, the majority being Christian Orthodox. The orders of the Greek Orthodox church regarding marriage, procreation and sexual relations are: a) increase of the human race; b) promotion of mutual helpfulness among the family members; c) restraint of passions; d) Christian training of the young (Bardis, 1956; Stavropoulos, 1977). Thus, the church
has maintained a most unfavorable attitude not only for pre
marital relationships, but even for sexuality within marriage, i.e., sexuality only with the purpose of procreation; women's emancipation is discouraged, low fertility and abortion are condemned (despite the partial legalization of abortion by the State), divorce is partly accepted, civil marriage is rejected. The fact that in Greece Church and State are united encourages the Church to try to impose its way even when the State initiates progressive changes (i.e., legalization of abortion, automatic divorce in case of long-time desertion of the family, civil marriage).

In modern Greece, its influence depends upon the factors of urbanization, education and degree of dependence from the family. Namely, it is minimal in urban centers, relatively increasing in rural areas. The Church does not seem to be very influential upon the youth. This is due to the conservative attitude it maintains despite social change and to its neutral or even negative attitude toward crucial political events (i.e., support of the dictatorship between 1967 and 1974). Thus, there is a dissention between the attitude toward religion in general and the Church specifically. From the sample interviewed by the Nielsen Hellas Institute, although 76% of the young people either believed in God or were skeptical about the existence of God, also 61% expressed discontent with Church. The main reason given was that the
Church does not take a satisfactory position toward social problems and it does not respond to the problems faced by the youth. That implies that at least in urban Greece the unfavorable attitude of the Church concerning sexuality does not have a considerable impact on young people's sexual behavior. However, in less urbanized and less educated strata of the population religion is still influential. Research conducted among young female factory workers, in a small provincial town, Megara, indicated that, among those who rejected premarital relations, the majority (69%) were religious (Nikolaidou, 1975).
CHAPTER III

FAMILY AND ADOLESCENT ROLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AMERICAN CULTURAL EXPERIENCE

American Subjective Culture

A striking characteristic of the American family life is a relative lack of parental authority and the acceptance of independence of children from parents. This pattern should be considered not only as a result of contemporary conditions, but also as a continuation of a transformation in parental authority starting early in the American history. As we shall see, specific cultural factors favored the loosening of old commitments and, consequently, the erosion of parental authority.

In the pre-industrial era, the factor of space has been decisive in affecting the balance of authority relationships among the kin and family members. The existence of land, limitless in extent, offered young people the potential to move and live by themselves, instead of accepting a portion of their parents' property. Thus, families were continuously divided. Evidently, factors inherent in the American environment did not demand the development of feelings of interdependence and mutual obligation among the kin and the family.
members (Demos, 1977).

Another crucial factor in the shaping of family relationships has been immigration, namely the constant transplantation of European settlers, for the most part, in the New World. A concomitant of these transplantations, both during the original settlements and the great immigrations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, has been the irrelevance of most parental knowledge for the successful adaptation of the child in the new environment. The younger people were often more flexible than their parents in meeting the challenges of the new land. As a consequence, an experiential chasm was created between parents and children, with a direct impact on the pattern of family relationships, manifest as the gradual erosion of parental authority. Even if the newcomers brought with them a family system different from that prevailing in America, their children tended to reject parental values in order to enter the mainstream of the American culture (Slater, 1977).

Thus, both ecological and historical conditions favored the loosening of interdependence among the family members, on the one hand, and among the family and the community on the other. The erosion of parental authority was a concomitant of this break of interdependence, furthermore accentuated by the increasing experiential chasm between immigrant parents and their children.
In the industrial era, this tradition (i.e., lack of interdependence, erosion of parental authority) has been furthered by the profound technological development in terms of family relationships, the impact of technological change is that it outdates the parents' knowledge and experience. The parents cannot define the parameter of the future for their children, while they increasingly function as the coordinators of the experts and the institutions that undertake the training of their young (Kenniston, 1977; Mead, 1970).

In the following pages, I will discuss family, adolescence and sexuality both in the pre- and post-industrial order considering the implications that the above mentioned cultural conditions have had for interfamilial relationships and sexual mores.

Pre-industrial America--Rural Family

In pre-industrial America, the family functioned as the primary unit of economic production, as the chief agency of education and as a welfare institution (e.g., place of recourse for the sick persons, the elderly, the orphans, etc.) (Demos, 1977; Kett, 1974). In other words, the family was a multi-functional unit, as dictated by the rural nature of the economy. The structure of the family was hierarchical and patriarchal
based upon distinct discrimination made upon gender and age (Demos, 1977). Women were considered the inferior sex whose chief duty was obedience to the husband. Femininity was linked with a special potentiality for evil and sexuality was acceptable only within marriage. In case of extramarital relationships, the significance of the violation of the Puritan moral code was evaluated differentially, depending upon the sex of the transgressor. Thus, as Demos (1977) notes, whereas a wife's adultery was both a violation of her marriage and an offense against the community, a husband's adultery was only a violation of his marriage.

As far as children were concerned, they actively participated in the tasks of the house or farm from a very early age. Schooling was not a given of youth experience in pre-industrial America. The youth who attended school, usually did so for only part of the year, working in the intervals. At the same time, the youth were not segregated from the adult world and age heterogeneity characterized the family, school, work and socializing group (Kett, 1974). Within the family, it was not uncommon for fifteen year old boys or girls to have much younger or older siblings. Thus, the range of ages of the family members approximated the range of ages in society at large. Also, in any type of schooling (i.e., academies, "family schools," etc.), the students were likely to be anywhere from seven or eight to twenty-five years old. Concern-
ing the proper deportment of children, now, the Puritans emphasized humility, tractableness, and the inculcation of religious principles.

However, despite this stern Puritan family image, in practice, the firm moral code was modified by factors inherent in the American environment, as it has been mentioned before, i.e., space and mobility. Historical studies indicate that the pre-industrial period was a time of tremendous mobility in America and that the majority of movers were young people (Katz, 1976; Thernstrom, 1973). Young people, usually, stopped attending school at twelve or fourteen, or never attended school at all, to leave home for shorter or longer periods seeking work on a seasonal basis. Thus, although family authority could be severe as long as young people stayed home, in practice it was undermined by the fact that young people moved a lot. Furthermore, the fact that the young people turned out to be more effective in the new land contributed to the erosion of parental authority. For the same reasons, as mentioned above (i.e., space, mobility), a newlywed couple was expected to establish a separate household. Thus, the pre-industrial American family unit was nuclear, consisting of husband, wife and their natural children, in contrast to the traditional extended rural family of other countries.

In terms of contemporary sexuality, the gradual erosion of parental authority was consistent with a growing permis-
siveness in the area of sex. Despite the firm moral code of the Puritans, there was a growing tolerance for premarital sexual relationships, as the rising rates of premarital pregnancy indicate. As Demos (1977) reports, "by 1750 as many as one-third to one-half of the brides in some communities were going to the altar pregnant."

Thus, it seems that, despite the patriarchal and hierarchical orientation of the pre-industrial American family, the cultural factors which favored the loosening of commitments among the kinship members, also favored the erosion of parental authority and a growing permissiveness in the area of sex.

Before discussing how social change affected the family pattern by altering its function, the status of its members and the balance of intimate relationships, I should qualify the traditional agrarian pattern.

What characterized the agrarian family life was the unity between work and home and the patriarchal order, according to which authority over the family is exercised by the older male. However, the unity between work and home qualified the patriarchal order as being gynocentric at the same time, since the woman's work was of major importance in the maintenance of the agricultural household (Ehrenreich and English, 1978). The same unity between work and home preserved the continuity between ages, since all age groups were defined by the same
work relationships. There was no reason for adolescence to be recognized as a distinct stage of life in the pre-industrial period, since the youth were actively participating in the adult world of work.

With the advent of industrialization and the gradual shift in the family function from production to consumption, the status of both women and youth are affected. As far as women are concerned, they are deprived of their productive skills, which will be regained only later with increasing participation in the labor force. Regarding youth, as a longer period of their life is occupied by education, they cease being economic assets; they become economic liabilities (Kenniston, 1975).

In the following section, I will discuss in some detail the process of industrialization and urbanization, and the present status of women and youth as indicated through their participation in the labor force and education respectively.

**Socio-economic Change**

In the course of the last two centuries, the development of industrialization and urbanization made the American society much more complex than it used to be.

Industrialization in the U.S. started in the early nineteenth century and accelerated to the extent that in 1972 only 4.3% of the population were employed in agriculture (Ray,
The parallel development of urbanization completed the transformation of the morphology of the American society. The biggest change was in the proportion of Americans who live on farms, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1
Percentage of Population Living on Farms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>40-50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1880 Census, Volume 1, Population; 1970 Census, Detailed Characteristics, Table 189)

At the same time, the larger cities were growing: between 1880-1910, the population who lived in cities of more than 100,000 people nearly doubled; in 1940, 28.9% of the population lived in cities of over 100,000 people. Nowadays, the majority of Americans (66%) live in metropolitan areas, most of them in towns, near a central city rather than in the city itself (1970 Census, Number of Inhabitants, Table 5; 1970 Census, Detailed Characteristics, Table 189).
The combined influence of industrialization and urbanization had a major impact upon the status of the woman and youth, and, consequently, upon the structure and function of the family as well.

With the advent of industrialization, the loss of the economic function of the woman within the home could be regained only through her incorporation in the labor force. In the course of the twentieth century, pertinent statistics reveal a gradual increase in women's participation in the labor force, as indicated in Table 2.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1950, women constituted 28% of the labor force, and in 1977, 42% (Bureau of Labor Statistics). The rapidly increasing participation of women in the labor force, especially after the spurt created during World War II is combined with the rise in educational attainment. These figures are shown in Table 3.
Table 3

Levels of Education for Females and Males between the Ages of 25 and 34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Age 25-34 with Four Years of High School</th>
<th>Female High School Graduates with at least Some College</th>
<th>Male High School Graduate who have Completed Some College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1974a)

However, despite these changes, there is still considerable difference between women and men both in work and educational opportunities. As far as work is concerned; women are still considered qualified more for "women's jobs" (i.e., teaching, nursing and secretarial work). In 1960, 54% of the female professional employment consisted of elementary school teachers and registered nurses. In 1970, the percentage was 46% (Fuchs, 1975). Also, women's unemployment rate was still higher than that of men (Department of Labor, 1975), and there is no decrease in the income differential between men and women, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4
Median Earnings of Full Time Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>about $5,800</td>
<td>about $3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>about $12,000</td>
<td>about $6,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Bureau of the Census)

In 1972, "nearly 66% of full-time female workers earned less than $7,000," while "over 75% of full-time male workers earned over $7,000" (U.S. Department of Labor, 1975 Manpower Report of the President). As far as education is concerned, there are still important differences between men and women:

In 1974, 47% of all white women 25-34 had completed high school but had no college training and an additional 33% had completed some college. The comparable figures for white males are 38% with only a high school degree and 44% with at least some college. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1974a)

A significant aspect of the increasing participation of women in the labor force over the past several decades has been the changing composition of the female labor force in terms of single versus married women. In 1920, the typical
working woman was single, under 30 years old and from the "working class." Today, most working women are married; over two thirds of them have child-rearing responsibilities in addition to their jobs; they represent the entire socio-economic spectrum; and more than half of them are 40 or over (Dusen and Sheldon, 1977). Pertinent statistics indicate the increasing participation of married women in the labor force: In 1950, 12% of married women with children under six were in the labor force, whereas, in 1974, the respective percentage is 40% (Hayghe, 1975; 1976). The changing composition of the female labor force can be accounted for by both economic and demographic reasons: a) the expansion of industries and occupations (particularly after 1940) needed female work; and b) women have been postponing marriage and childbearing within marriage, they have fewer children and they are divorcing more often. Thus, they experience a relatively long period of time after completing high school or college during which they may advance in their careers (Oppenheimer, 1970).

Thus, industrialization stripped the family from its economic function and allowed women to work outside the family, participating in the labor force. In terms of youth, however, industrialization marked the passing from the "work phase" to the "schooling phase." The increasing need for specialization, a concomitant of industrialization, made the informal methods of licensing and certification in professions inadequate for
finding a job. The response to the need for specialization was the systematization of schooling, the increase in the number of young people in schools and the respective decrease in the labor force. These figures are shown in Table 5.

Table 5
Percentage of Young People Attending School

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Age 14-17 in Secondary School</th>
<th>Age 18-21 in Higher Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Burton Clark, 1974; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report 135, Table 1)

The consequences of extended schooling as far as the status and function of youth within the family and society are concerned, could be summarized as follows:

a) young people spend far more time in educational institutions and less time in employment;

b) young people are economic liabilities within the family; and

c) in schools, young people are segregated from the adult world with exact age peers (Kett, 1974; Coleman, 1974; Clark, 1974).
In addition to extended schooling, certain demographic factors further contribute to the segregation of youth from adults and the prominence of youth culture:

a) the proportion of youth to the population is much larger now than it was in 1950 or 1960, due to the baby-boom in 1946; and

b) most children in the 1970s are born into families with two or three children with small differences in age, so that children are in touch with fewer adults (1970 Census, Women by Number of Children Ever Born, Table 8).

Thus, with the shrinking economic function of the family, women start working outside the home, while extended schooling becomes the primary activity of youth. Certainly, these dangers reverberate on the whole dynamic of the conjugal and parental relationship.

In the following pages, I will point to the changing function and structure of the family, the increasing sentimentalization of the conjugal dyad and the lessening of the tendency to see the child as the main focus of marital life. Thus, the contemporary adolescent is expected to be relatively independent from the family. At the same time, however, as extended schooling favors the prominence of the youth culture, he or she becomes more dependent upon the peer group embedded within it. It is within the context of
youth culture, then, that adolescent sexuality will be considered.

Modern American Family

The main change accompanying industrialization, as far as the family is concerned, has been the separation between the world of work and the home with major implications for the family function and family relationships. At the same time that the family's economic functions diminish, the family becomes private, while its members are no longer held together by their dependence upon each other's labor. Emotional and sexual satisfaction are now the major factors that can keep the family together, and, at the same time, can counteract the competitiveness and depersonalization of the outer world.

This transformation appears to a certain extent in all societies with advanced technology and a high degree of urbanization. However, it is found in its most acute form under advanced industrialization and urbanization, as is the case in the United States. Consequently, in the United States the diminishing economic function of the family has been accompanied by rising expectations of intimacy within the family (Bane, 1976; Kenniston, 1977; Skolnick, 1978). And, although one might conclude from the rising divorce rates
that marriage is declining in importance as an institution for people's life, remarriage rates suggest the opposite. Ninety to ninety-five percent of Americans marry at least once and about four out of every five of those who obtain a divorce will eventually remarry (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972). In addition to that, people's evaluations of their general well-being include marriage as a basic factor of happiness, while discontent is expressed with singlehood (NORC General Social Survey, 1972; 1973; Glenn, 1975; Campbell, Converse and Rodgers, 1976).

However, the same conditions that create exceptional needs for intimate relationships, increase the complexity of family life and make it difficult for the family to fulfill those needs. When the family members had more tasks to perform together (i.e., when they were united around work as a family), lack of emotional or sexual satisfaction with the marriage partner still left family members with much to do in common. In contrast to that pattern, nowadays, the spouses are usually economically independent. Thus, people are more accepting of divorce as a solution to an unsatisfactory marriage, because one loses less by divorce today than in earlier times. From this perspective, the rising divorce rate is not an indication of increasing discontent with marriage as an institution that much. It is rather, a concomitant of the diminishing economic function of the family and the rising
expectations for emotional and sexual satisfaction, furthermore conditioned by the economic independence of women. Thus, while "companionship has emerged as the most valuable expectation of marriage today" (Blood and Wolfe, 1960), the high divorce rates reveal how difficult it is for such expectations to be fulfilled.

In terms of the conjugal dynamic, the increasing participation of women in the labor force has changed the roles within the family to the direction of greater equality, even though the ideological support for sex role differentiation has not been totally relinquished (Skolnick, 1977).

As far as sexuality is concerned, the increasing privacy of the family and the greater equality in sex roles have been accompanied by more liberalized attitudes toward erotic behavior and expression. Research findings indicate that since Kinsey's time (1930s and 1940s) there has been a great increase in marital eroticism in recent years, while women appear to be equal rather than reluctant participants (Hunt, 1974). However, despite the loosening of sexual constraints, both sexes are not exempt from tensions generated by the rapid change in behavior and the broader social context of competition and consumption within which it is embedded. Thus, often women report perceiving their orgasm more as a requirement of their husband's pleasure than their own (Rubin, 1976). And, furthermore, the potential for sexual enjoyment is often moderated by being sub-
ject to the criterion of adequacy (Skolnick, 1978).

Turning to the parental relationship, its dynamic is complementary with the increasing sentimentalization and fragility of the conjugal relationship. From this perspective, the child is no longer seen as the central focus of marital life, as both spouses are concerned with their personal enjoyment and satisfaction, as well. And, mainly, this tendency is related to a basic change in the function of children and parents. On the one hand, children, now, subtract considerably from the family budget. On the other hand, as the family has drastically changed in its power to raise children unaided, parental tasks include the coordination of experts and institutions. While, ironically, parents have little power over those with whom they share the task of raising their children (Kenniston, 1977). It is in this sense, then, that parents are put under strain.

The interplay of these conditions is reflected both on family size expectations and low fertility rates. The birth rate in 1973 was the lowest in the country's history, fifteen children per 1000 population. Thus, many more women have two or three children nowadays, in contrast to five or more, as it used to be (CPR, P-20, Number 288, "Fertility History, 1975").

Furthermore, the consequence of the accelerating technological change and its concomitants (i.e., extended schooling) is the relative decline of parental authority. Parents can no more
serve as the most valid models for successful adaptation, because they do not represent what is going to come any more (Mead, 1970). From this perspective, parental specialization decreases, as the father no longer represents the punitive figure, and child-rearing is based upon internalization rather than obedience (Bronfenbrenner, 1961; Elder, 1962; Kohn, 1979). Thus, independence from the family is acceptable and, generally, considered as the socially adaptive norm in American society, despite persisting variations depending upon social class and the sex of the child. As research indicates, the traditional pattern of socialization, organized around stressing obedience, tends to be found in the working class (Kohn, 1979). Also, dependency is still a more stable trait in girls than in boys (Kagan and Moss, 1962; Mischel, 1970).

**Youth Culture**

Up to this point, the discussion of the American family points to the lessening of the tendency to see the child as the main focus of the marital life, and to the relative emphasis on independence and self-reliance of the children. However, a more complete understanding of adolescence involves its consideration from two aspects: the relationship between adolescents and parents as well as the relationship between adolescents and peers within the context of youth culture.
Consideration of the last point is important because it underlies a basic difference between the worlds in which parents and their sons and daughters develop. Thus, youth culture becomes a key concept in the discussion about the dimensions of the generation gap.

As it was mentioned before, the ascent of youth culture has been conditioned by two basic factors: increased schooling and the resulting segregation of adolescents from the adult world, as well as the increasing proportion of youth to the population. As greater numbers of young people are denied full adult status for longer periods of time (whether as college and graduate students or unemployed and underemployed), youth culture has become a distinctive part of social life. In other words, youth culture came as a result of the special position in which young people find themselves today, as imposed on them by the structural forms that their social environment has come to take. Thus, ironically, the values of independence and self-reliance fostered by the parents are complementary with the prolonged, dependent status of adolescence within society at large. From this perspective, the acceptance of independence from the family is also complementary with the increasing importance of the peer group and the expected conformity to its values.

The youth culture is reflected in distinctive patterns of activity (i.e., in dress, music, drugs) and in attitudes,
such as inward lookingness, psychic attachment, drive toward autonomy, which are initiated and shared mostly by youth (Coleman, 1974). Thus, from its very nature, it constitutes a subculture within the broader social setting. A subculture can function as a counterculture advocating norms and values opposed to the ones sanctioned by adult society (Manheim, 1974). However, a subculture is not necessarily a counterculture; it can simply be the result of alienation of young people from adult society without really questioning adult norms and values (Coleman, 1974).

This subtle difference between counterculture and subculture has often been ignored in the discussion of the generation gap in the United States, leading to conflicting views as to whether youth culture is a counterculture, a subculture or both.

Youth literature emanating from the upheaval of the 1960s viewed a widening gap in values and morals dividing young people, especially college youth, from their parents (Yankelovich, 1974). From this perspective, youth culture was considered as a real counterculture. A completely opposite view advocated "no strong evidence of major discrepancy in attitudes between adolescents and parents" (Weinstock and Lerner, 1972; Curtis, 1975; Harris, 1971). However, both views have been the result of overgeneralizations.

In order to accurately evaluate the extent of dissent between youth and parents as well as between youth and
society in general, various factors should be considered together. The segregation of youth from adult world is one dimension of the generation gap, creating a high degree of generational consciousness and alienation. Young people strongly identify themselves with members of their own generation rather than with older people (Sorensen, 1973).

However, youth culture is not as homogeneous as it is often portrayed. Attitudes toward society and parents vary as a result of socio-economic and educational level, age, sex, and affect relationship between youth and parents. Thus, college and non-college students did not share the same attitudes even in the 1960s, at the peak of the counter-culture. And in the 1970s, while non-college youth have more or less adopted the norms of their college counterparts, they are still less alienated from American society than their better educated peers (Yankelovich, 1974). Also, the younger the adolescents are, the more likely they are to conform to parental values, while males tend to show more disagreement with parents than females do (Smart, 1973; Floyd and South, 1972; Jacobsen, 1975). Furthermore, depending upon the higher or lower level of affect relationship between parents and adolescents, peers will have more or less in common with parents, thus serving to reinforce or to minimize parental values (Dreyfus, 1976). In addition to these factors, social and cultural change is another basic
variable in the degree of accord or discord between generations. In the 1960s, even when students shared the same liberal values with their parents, they still differed considerably in the intensity with which they would express their disillusionment (Flacks, 1970; Lerner, 1975; Offer, 1970). In the early 1970s, with less stimulating social conditions, the younger and the older generations move closer together in values and morals (Yankelovich, 1974).

Thus, it seems that under particular social conditions youth culture has the potential of becoming a counterculture. However, overall it reflects adult norms and values, and youth attitudes vary depending upon the previously mentioned factors. Research findings indicate that "young people do not really want independence from society; they only want independence from their parents" (Sorensen, 1973). Furthermore, according to research, American adolescents do not seem troubled in their relationship with their parents, the majority expressing a great deal of respect for their parents' ideas and opinions (Sorensen, 1973). However, although American adolescents reflect many adult values and norms, certain parts of their lives are distinctive from American adult culture.

Parents Attitudes and Adolescent Sexuality

An important aspect of the American youth subculture
has been the development of new values related to premarital sexual intimacy. Thus, the generational conflict over premarital sex centers around the parent value that one should be in love and married before entering coitus and the modified value system of youth that an emotional and interpersonal commitment is important for sexual relationships, but that this may occur before marriage (Bell, 1966; Reiss, 1970). Research findings very vividly illustrate this point. Three-fourths of the adolescents participating in the Sorensen study (1973) stated that their parents believe sex is immoral unless it is between two people who are married to each other. In contrast, approximately the same percentage of adolescents (80% boys and 72% girls) think that it is all right for young people to have sex before getting married if they are in love with each other (Sorensen, 1973).

Generally speaking, parents are more conservative than their adolescent sons and daughters, the major reason being the difference in responsibility levels (Reiss, 1970). Thus, although dating is not tabooed by parents, there is very little communication on the topic of sexuality. Adolescents perceive their parents as having more conservative values and only 36% (28% of boys and 44% of girls) believe that "when it comes to sex my attitudes and my parents' attitudes are pretty much the same" (Sorensen, 1973). In only a little over one-third of cases do adolescents and their parents indicate that they
find it easy to discuss sex with each other, and many adolescents believe that their parents have a number of misconceptions concerning their children's sexual activities. For example, among virgins 16% say that "My parents assume I've had sex," while 31% among nonvirgins say that their parents do not assume that they have engaged in intercourse (Sorensen, 1973). Generally, most parents do not discuss sexuality with their children, and when they do discuss it, this is done more from a clinical, physiological perspective (Bell, 1966).

Research indicates that adolescents gain the greatest amount of information about sex from peers (37%) while only 15.5% from parents, primarily the mother (Thornburg, 1975). However, usually, parents do not concern themselves about their sons' and daughters' sexual intimacy as long as they are not aware of it. Only a small minority of the adolescents interviewed in the Sorensen study feel that they are hassled by their parents about their sexual activities. But, adventurists (namely, young men and women seeking many sexual mates) are most in conflict with their parents compared to other sexual behavior groups. Only 61% of the adventurers share a great deal of respect for their parents' ideas and opinions compared with 78% of the monogomists (Sorensen, 1973). This supports the assertion that parents can be tolerant of premarital sexual intimacy as long as this is not explicitly manifest.
The sex of the child affects the intensity with which permissiveness is felt, particularly by fathers, pointing to the relative differentiation between boys and girls on the issue of sexuality. Research indicates that fathers tend to become less intense about their permissive feelings as the number of their male children increases and more intense as the number of their female children increases (Reiss, 1967). It seems that the girl's sexuality is a more delicate issue than the boy's. Consequently, the daughter's sexual activity is more likely to hurt parental morals compared to the son's. This assumption is supported by research findings indicating that family problems made up only 10% of the most pressing difficulties reported by boys, but 22% of those of girls (Adams, 1964). Furthermore, although there is little tendency for young people to behave sexually in order to challenge parents, girls may acknowledge their greater ability to do damage to parents in this regard. Only 42% of the older girls disagreed as to whether they would behave sexually to challenge parents compared with 62% of the older boys (Sorensen, 1973). Also, the fact that females are more likely to see themselves as similar to their parents in sexual standards points to the relatively greater dependency of girls upon the family and the persisting differentiation between boys and girls as far as parental treatment is concerned. However, there appears also to be some reduction in severity of nega-
tive sanctions by parents if the daughter deviates and is caught. And although today's parents do not offer positive sanctions for premarital pregnancy, they are more able to adapt to it (Bell, 1966).

In general, there is a tension between parents on the low permissive side and peers on the high permissive side (Reiss, 1967). However, the view of parents and peers is one of mild permissive difference due to certain factors. Namely, the independence fostered by the family, the tolerant parental attitude toward sexual intimacy as long as it is not explicitly manifest and the relative privacy of youth subculture. It is the interplay of these factors which contributes to minimizing the tension between parents and their adolescent sons or daughters on the issue of sexuality.

**Sexuality among Youth**

When talking about changing mores of sexuality among the youth, we refer both to attitudes and behavior. It is often argued that the term "sexual revolution" refers mostly to changes in attitudes, since the great shift in sexual behavior occurred in the first decades of the twentieth century and remained relatively stable afterwards (Reiss, 1970). Thus, according to this point of view, adolescents' sexual activities do not vary significantly from the activities their parents
engaged in. As it will be pointed out in the following section, the drastic change occurred in terms of attitudes. However, behavior did not remain as stable, and changes occurred in various kinds of premarital sexual activities as well.

The large shift in sexual behavior came between the birth decade 1900-1909, 1910-1919, 1920-1929 and those born before 1900. Between the "before 1890" and the "1900-1909" birth groups, a significant decrease (from 36% to 51%) in the number of female virgins occurred (Kinsey, 1953). More than 66% of this decrease was due to the increase in the number of women who had experienced intercourse with their fiancées only. At the same time, in the same period, the number of men who had intercourse only with their fiancées increased almost fourfold (Kinsey, 1953). These findings indicate that the changes in behavior of that era initiated a change in attitudes toward premarital behavior, as well. Women allowed themselves to engage in intercourse with their future husband, while men did not consider intercourse as an activity which would infect the "good name" of their future wife.

Furthermore, what has happened since the 1920s is a significant change in attitude to match the change in behavior of that period. The strict double standard allowing men's coitus for any reason, while women's coitus only within marriage seems to be on the decline. Increasing acceptance of the "transitional double standard," which accepts men's
coitus for any reason, while women's only if in love or engaged, constitutes the invervening stage between the "double standard" and "permissiveness with affection."

Nowadays, the trend is toward this last norm, according to which coitus is right for both men and women, when a stable, affectionate relationship exists. Thus, although coital behavior is not that different among the youth, it is accepted more naturally, especially with the presupposition of affection.

A number of studies illustrate the rise in the percentage of youth approving of the "permissiveness with affection" norm. In Packard's (1968) study of 2,100 older adolescents, 80% of the boys and 72% of the girls agreed with the statement, "it's allright for young people to have sex before getting married if they are in love with one another." Among adolescents 13-19 years old participating in the Sorensen study (1973), the majority reject the traditional double standard about what is morally right for males and wrong for females. Rejection of the double standard seems to increase with age and sexual experience. Furthermore, comparisons of data selected in 1959 (Reiss) and 1973 (Perlman) in a New York State College showed that the student body had become even more liberal. Both males and females had become more accepting of sexual liberation with the 1973 sample showing little difference between men and women. More specifically, in 1959, 72-73% of men and women would accept
coitus if the couple were engaged or in love; in 1973, the percentage had increased to 93-97%.

These findings could be accepted with reserve because, generally, the State of New York is considered a fairly liberal setting. However, research in the student population of more conservative areas, as Virginia and North Dakota, considered as more typical of many schools than New York is, yielded comparable results. Mirande's sample (1974) of freshman and sophomore single females in Virginia and North Dakota showed a drastic increase in the percentage of women who would accept coitus if engaged, in love or if they felt strong affection. In this sample also, in every category of sexual activity except coitus without affection, females are far more liberal in 1971 and 1972 than the females participating in Reiss's total student sample in 1959.

Besides increasing acceptance of "permissiveness with affection," there is also relative acceptance of sexual relationships even if the couple do not feel particularly affectionate. In the Sorensen study, nearly three-fifths of the boys and one-fifth of the girls with intercourse experience believe that: "it's allright for someone to have sex with another person one has known only a few hours." Also, comparing Reiss's (1959) and Perlman's (1973) data in the same New York State College, there was an increase in the percentage of those accepting coitus without affection. Namely, in
1953, 32% of males and 19% of females would accept this norm, while in 1973, the respective percentages were 69 and 67. One should keep in mind, however, that this is a liberal setting and the results cannot be easily generalized.

Increasing acceptance of premarital intercourse for women is congruent with changing attitudes toward virginity. Christensen's study (1970) suggests that acceptance of nonvirginity from both sexes increased over the ten-year period studied (1958 to 1968). However, there were greater percentages of women who accepted nonvirginity in men than there were men who accepted nonvirginity in women. In the Sorensen study (1973), 65% of all boys disagree with the statement, "I wouldn't want to marry a girl who isn't a virgin at marriage." However, although 65% of all boys disagree with the view that a girl should stay a virgin until she finds the boy she wants to marry, only 47% of the girls disagree with the same view.

Furthermore, the number of students who would welcome greater social acceptance of sexual freedom has increased steadily over the past five years. In 1969, 43% of the students looked forward to this change, as compared to 56% in 1971 and 61% in 1973. In addition to that, despite the fact that the general moral code of the noncollege youth is still somewhat stricter than the norms of college youth, the belief in a freer attitude toward sex is increasingly pre-
vailing (Yankelovich, 1974).

With changing attitudes toward premarital intercourse and virginity, guilt appears significantly less and contemporary youth are more open in their sexual behavior. As it was mentioned before, it has been argued that the drastic shift in sexuality concerns the increasing acceptance of premarital coital behavior rather than the increasing performance of this behavior. This assertion was supported by various research findings. Kinsey's research (1953) suggested that there was no significant change in the proportion of those who had experienced premarital coitus in the birth decades 1900-1909, 1910-1919, and 1920-1929. Other studies of premarital behavior during the 1950s and 1960s showed little difference from Kinsey's findings (Ehrmann, 1959; Freedman and Mervin, 1965; Reiss, 1960).

However, milder forms of premarital sexual behavior (i.e., petting) have increased and there may also have been some moderate increase in coitus rates, as well (Reiss, 1967). The Vener and Stewart study of adolescents of a wide range of socio-economic status, in 1973, yielded relevant findings: boys reported higher participation in each level of sexual activity at all ages (compared to the past); the older boys and girls were, the more similar became their participation in each level of sexual activity. However, males showed greater promiscuity than females. Other studies also gave
comparable results (Zelnick and Katner, 1972; Sorensen, 1973).

Incidence of sexual intercourse among contemporary youth, when compared to that of their parents, shows a considerable increase, particularly at the younger age level. In Kinsey's research (1953), 3% of the females had engaged in premarital intercourse by age sixteen and less than 20% by age nineteen. Also, 39% of males had engaged in premarital intercourse by age sixteen and 72% by age nineteen. In 1973, however, the Sorensen study yielded higher respective percentages. Among adolescents 13-19 years old, 44% of the boys and 30% of the girls have had sexual intercourse prior to age sixteen. By age nineteen, these figures increased to 72% for boys and 57% for girls. This contrast shows that change has been more remarkable for females, although still the percentages of males are higher than the females'.

Among virgins (48% of the adolescents participating in the Sorensen study), adolescents range from those with virtually no sexual experience to those with a variety of experiences, short of intercourse itself. Among nonvirgins, in the same study, two major subgroups emerge, each characterized by distinctive personal values and attitudes: serial monogomists and sexual adventurers. Generally, monogomists do not have intercourse with others during a specific relationship, and they consider love as an important element of a sexual rela-
tionship. Often such a relationship is succeeded by another. Serial monogamy without marriage was found to be the most frequent type of active sexual behavior: 21% of all adolescents and 40% of nonvirgins in the Sorensen study can be classified as serial monogamists. Also, among girls, serial monogamy was more frequent overall: 21% of girls in contrast to 15% of boys. On the other hand, sexual adventurers move freely from one sex partner to the next and feel no obligation to be faithful to any sex partner. They do not consider love as a necessary part of sexual relationships. Fifteen percent of all American adolescents, in the same study, qualify as sexual adventurers, and more boys are adventurers than girls (24% and 6%, respectively).

Thus, overall trends of sexual attitudes and behavior among youth point to a drastic change in attitudes accompanied by change in behavior, as well. However, as it has already become obvious in various parts of this discussion, attitudes and behavior are not homogenous among the youth population. They vary depending on socio-economic and educational level, geographical area, religion and sex. Economically privileged, more highly educated adolescents and youth are less conservative in their attitudes and values than their less privileged peers of the same age. Currently, the size of the difference appears to be declining (Yankelovich, 1974). Depending upon the geographical region and city size, the youth, even the
college population, appear to be considerably diverse. The most urbanized regions seem to be the most permissive. At the same time, city size operates as a direct determinant of permissiveness, due to its encouragement of courtship autonomy. Thus, the South, being the most rural section in the United States, is lowest on permissiveness, and has the highest proportion of double-standard adherents. On the other hand, New York and California, being more urbanized, came out relatively high on the permissiveness attitudes of white males and females (Reiss, 1967).

Religion also plays an important role to sexual attitudes and values. For example, among adolescents, 13-19 years old, 60% of virgins state that they go to religious services fairly often, while only 36% of nonvirgins do the same thing. Also, serial monogamists are almost twice as likely as sexual adventurers to say that they go to religious services fairly often (Sorensen, 1973).

Despite the decline of the orthodox double standard, and despite the fact that change in attitudes and behavior is more significant for women, generally, women are still more conservative than men concerning the issue of sexuality. This was evident in all studies reviewed above (i.e., Packard, 1968; Sorensen, 1973; Perlman, 1973; Christensen, 1970). Females approved of premarital relationships in a lower percentage than males. And, as it was apparent in the Sorensen study,
girls' emphasis on "love" as a necessary component of a sexual relationship was higher than boys'. Thus, 64% of serial monogamists were females, whereas the majority of sexual adventurers (i.e., 80%) were males. Reiss's findings (1967) are congruent with the above observations. His research indicated that exclusiveness of dates, going steady and falling in love were the crucial factors associated with liberal sexual behavior for females, while not as much for males.

Differential cultural conditioning persists, although to a less extent, compared to the past. According to this cultural conditioning, the female courtship conception is more marriage oriented and more susceptible to family influences. Thus, women are more sensitive to affection as a factor which would generate more liberal sexual behavior. On the other hand, males are expected not to be extremely affectionate. Thus, they are equally or even more liberal in their sexual behavior, when not exclusively involved with affection-related relationships.

**Dating "Going Steady," and Cohabitation**

Dating is the first stage in the courtship to marriage sequence. Since parents do not arrange marriages, dating facilitates mate selection as it enables adolescents to acquire a wide range of social skills in getting acquainted
with the opposite sex. Parents encourage their children to start dating early, and may feel disappointed if their sons and daughters fail to do so. Dating, thus, serves various functions. For the youth, it offers the opportunity of socialization, recreation and status grading. Furthermore, it serves as a means of mate selection, sexual experimentation and gives the opportunity for companionship without the responsibility of marriage. Recent research findings indicate increasing interest in developing close, intimate relationships through the dating experience (Orlofsky, 1976; Vreeland, 1972). As family ties dwindle, while at the same time youth culture evolves, young people find themselves in a situation in which they have to turn much more to other young people than they once did. Thus, dating satisfies the increasing need to establish close attachments to friends as a replacement for attachment to parents.

The median age at which youth begin dating has decreased by almost three years since World War I. In 1924, the median age for girls beginning to date was sixteen, whereas in 1968, it was 13.2 (Smith, 1924; Bell and Chaskes, 1970). Early dating is more a middle class than a lower class phenomenon in the United States. Middle class adolescents tend to engage in earlier dating and they delay settling on a steady partner. On the other hand, adolescents of lower socio-economic status
with less education, begin dating later and they start going steady relatively quickly (Lowrie, 1961). The number of dating partners, usually, increases up to about the twelfth grade and declines afterwards (Broderick and Weaver, 1968). Overall, the modern trend has been toward earlier dating, with fewer partners than in years past.

Thus, "going steady" is a further development of the dating pattern. Its function for teenagers seems to be comparable to the one of the husband-wife relationship in the modern nuclear family. In other words, "going steady" reduces the uncertainty inherent in the competitive nature of the dating system and provides a refuge in a society in which other relationships have become increasingly distant. This point is supported by research findings indicating a trend toward increasing monogamy and going steady. For example, the 1968 coeds went out more often with the same individual than did coeds in 1958 (Bell and Chaskes, 1970). Also, serial monogamists constituted the 21% of the adolescent sample participating in the Sorensen study, in contrast to 15% of the sexual adventurers.

Very often, "going steady" is consistent with the increasing widespread practice of cohabitation. As attitudes toward premarital relations change, coed living arrangements are accepted more naturally, compared to the past. The phenomenon of unmarried cohabitation is not limited to any particular
region of the country. However, it is more conspicuous on campus, where many young people come to meet each other, and it is fast becoming an established fact or college life. Colleges and universities, under students' pressure, cease playing the role of absentee parent. Thus, although stricter schools still have various degrees of requirements (parietal rules), generally restrictions of this nature are becoming increasingly rare. In a study of cohabitation at Cornell University (Macklin, 1974), nobody from the interviewees gave as a reason for not cohabiting that "it would be morally unacceptable to peers or to the local community." Of those who had cohabited, more than 90% had experienced no disapproval from other students, or from the University administration or staff.

Among youth, attitudes toward cohabitation are positive, with the majority emphasizing love as a presupposition. One 1974 study showed that the percentages who were not cohabiting but would like to, ranged from 43-57% of females to a high of 63-71% of the males (Henze, 1974). Another study at Florida State University indicated that 56% of all students thought they would live with a person of the opposite sex sometime without being married, given the right conditions. Thus, the most widespread pattern of living together is the one implying intimate involvement with emotional commitment. The majority of cohabiting college couples place themselves
in this category (Macklin, 1974).

Usually, cohabiting couples intend to continue the relationship indefinitely, although they do not consider themselves as married. However, most involvements are of fairly short duration. Reasons, usually, offered for the preference for cohabitation, include: the loneliness of a large university, the superficiality of the dating game, the search for a more meaningful relationship.

Estimates of the number of college students who have cohabited vary, from less than 10% to more than 33%, depending on different factors, i.e., the school's geographical location; housing and parietal regulations and their enforcement; the male-female student ratio, etc. (Macklin, 1974). Although research indicates that cohabitation may depend more on opportunity than liberality, cohabitants, generally, have more sexual experience and more liberal sexual attitudes. For example, all the cohabitants at Cornell were nonvirgins, compared with 68% of the non-cohabitants (Macklin, 1974).

Despite the increasing acceptance of living together in an unmarried status, practical problems persist as a considerable number of adults disapprove of the trend. The negative attitude of parents is of major concern for cohabitants, especially for females. As a way out of this problem, the majority of cohabiting women maintain their own separate room to keep parents from finding out about their personal life.
Often, lack of space and privacy is a matter of concern, as over half of all couples share their living quarters with other people.

Emotional problems related to cohabitation, usually include the tendency to become overinvolved and feel over-dependent on the relationship. Sexual problems (i.e., fear of pregnancy, occasional fear of orgasm, etc.) are common, but not serious. Generally, however, cohabiting couples report their relationship as satisfying and are happy with it (Shuttleworth, 1975).

Thus, it seems that the same factors (i.e., depersonalized, distant relationships), which contribute to making adult marriage being conceptualized as a refuge within the social context, are decisive for the way youth perceive their interpersonal relationships, as well. From this perspective, the liberal trend in sexual attitudes and behavior does not point to the questioning of monogamy and marriage. As it becomes obvious from the widespread practice of "going steady" and cohabitation, the liberal trend in terms of sexuality is channelled within monogamous marriage like relationships. At the same time, despite the subjective intentions of the participants, most involvements are of fairly short duration. This indicates how the same conditions which push toward a monogamous orientation undermine it as well. It is from the same perspective that certain phenomena
related with youth are worthy of consideration in terms of their erotic life and interpersonal relationships.

Up to this point, the erotic life of American adolescents has been discussed in terms of their relationships with parents on the one hand, and in terms of youth culture on the other. As it has been shown, the American family generally fosters independence and adolescents are not hassled that much by their parents as far as their sexual life is concerned. At the same time, the "permissiveness with affection" norm is generally sanctioned among youth, liberal sexual attitudes prevail, while cohabitation is increasingly practiced. Generally, then, the American youth seem to enjoy the revolution occurring in attitudes and morals.

The rise in student suicide and drug addiction, however, somehow blur the above picture. The suicide mortality rate per 100,000 among white males ages 15-24 is 17.3 and among white females ages 15-24 it is 4.8 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976). And the suicide rate among college students is about 50% higher than among adolescents in the general population (Miller, 1975), which points to the loneliness which underlies the surface merriment of the campus life. Concerning drugs now, there has been a dramatic increase in the extent of drug abuse as pertinent statistics indicate.
In 1960, the heroin dependent persons in the country were estimated as fewer than 100,000, but by 1975 these estimates ranged up to 700,000 (Schroeder, 1975). The majority of these addicts were under thirty years of age.

These facts can partly be explained by increasing feelings of alienation resulting from the segregation of youth from the adult world and its activities. In addition to that, these statistics suggest that feelings of depersonalization, loneliness and competitiveness imbue the youth culture as well, making communication among young people quite difficult. And, ironically, this happens within a context, which on the surface provides opportunities for easy and rich communication. Thus, apparently, increasing need for intimate close relationships as manifest through the widespread acceptance of the "permissiveness with affection" norm are not so easily satisfied, and dating as well as sex can be as competitive as the achievement oriented competitiveness of adult culture.

From this perspective, healthy attitudes toward sexuality are moderated by the fact that often sexuality is viewed as a performance test situation for both men and women. A recent study of American college students, conducted by Komarovsky (1976), showed that men often tend to compare with considerable anxiety their sexual performance with the imaginary sexual performance of their girlfriend's ex-lovers.
a preoccupation with "liberation" can truly lead to sexual satisfaction, as well. It results from the same frustration which often pushes women to their same sex counterparts for companionship and sexual satisfaction, when relationships with men have been traumatic and disappointing. (Bartell, 1971; Blumstein and Schwartz, 1976).

Thus, although the American youth are not troubled that much by their families as far as their sexual life is concerned, they often undergo the strains imposed by a competitive and consuming interpretation of sexual liberation.

Marriage among Youth

Turning to marriage among youth, now, besides the traditional model, certain alternatives as the companionate marriage (i.e., a voluntary alternative without legal framework) and various forms of communal living have been developed. Nowadays, there are about 3,000 urban communes in operation (National Institute of Health), with approximately 750,000 participants (Jerome, 1974). However, acceptance of non-traditional patterns of coed living is not the norm among youth. When asked about interest in living in communes and collectives, 51% of a student national sample expressed no interest, while 13% were unsure. From the 36% who would be interested, 31% would consider the commune as a short-term
option, in contrast to 5% who would see it as a permanent choice (Yankelovich, 1974).

On the other hand, marriage as an institution is still very popular, although it carries different assumptions for today's youth than for their parents. In 1969, 76% of college youth disagreed with the statement "marriage is obsolete," while 24% agreed with the same statement. In 1971, percentages among college youth were 66% and 34% respectively. Also, 71% gave a positive answer to the question, "Does the traditional family structure work?", while 12% said no and 17% were not sure. Concerning attitudes toward being married, 61% looked forward to it, 14% did not, and 18% had no opinion. Among noncollege youth, 67% agreed with the statement that "putting family before anything else is a very important quality in a man" (Yankelovich, 1974). Thus, although between 1969 and 1971, skepticism toward marriage marked a relative increase for such a short period of time, still the majority of youth (about two-thirds) continue to hold fairly traditional views about marriage. At the same time, a considerable minority remain skeptical and seem to be seeking new forms and meanings about marriage. However, as marriage has been shorn of its economic functions, for the traditional majority marriage is seen as a commitment to another person, completing one's own sense of personal identity. In other words, the assumption now is that marriage is
no more a means to an end, but an end in itself.

The recent increase in the age of marriage for both males and females as well as the sharp increase in divorce rates could cause some concern for the popularity of marriage among youth. The median age of first marriage for both men and women stopped declining in 1956, remained relatively steady until about 1960 and has been increasing slowly since then. In 1976, the median age of first marriage was 23.8 for men and 21.3 for women (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract, 1976). Also, divorce rates increased from 10.3 divorces per 1,000 married women fifteen years or older in 1950 to 13.4 divorces in 1969. In 1971, among young women, 0.2% of 18-19 year olds, 2.4% of 20-24 year olds and 4.3% of 25-29 year olds were divorced, while for men the divorced percentages were 0.1, 1.0 and 2.5 respectively (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970).

However, figures referring to age reflect a postponement of marriage rather than an abandonment of the institution, and divorce rates correspond to increasing expectations from marital life rather than the questioning of marriage itself. Pertinent statistics indicate that there has been only a slight decline (about 3%) in the total number marrying in the last fifteen years (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1974), while the percentage of married youth remains high. In 1971, 22.2% of the women aged 18-19, 60.5% of those aged 20-24
and 83% of those aged 25-29 were married. In the same years, among men, 7.5% of those aged 18-19, 42.9% of the 20-24 year olds, and 75.3% of the 25-29 year olds were married (U.S. Bureau of the Census). Thus, it seems that marriage as an institution is still very popular among youth, although young people today get married at older ages and are more likely to be divorced than their parents.

Consistent with the changing meaning of marriage among youth is the attitude toward having children. Although youth still look forward to having children (76%), it is increasingly seen "as a matter of individual choice--neither a duty to society nor an indispensable life value." Only one-third of students currently regard having children as "a very important personal value" (Yankelovich, 1974). Also, the percentage of students who would consider having children outside marriage as morally wrong has declined from 1969 to the present (40% of the students in 1971 would accept children without marriage) (Yankelovich, 1974).

As far as sex roles are concerned, differentiation has declined as the housewife category has shrunk, while female participation in both enrollment and labor force has increased. However, marriage and parenthood still carry different implications for males and females regarding both activity patterns (i.e., education and work). Thus, there is a much closer relationship between age of school termination and age of
marriage initiation for females than for males. In other words, for females marriage intervenes to terminate enrollment, while for males the decision to terminate enrollment does not seem to be related significantly to the event of marriage. Also, the presence of children increases the probability that the male will be in the labor force, but sharply reduces the probability that the female will be in the labor force (Ryder, 1974). It seems that male activity is still dominated by the move from school into the labor force, whereas female activity is dominated by entry into motherhood.

Thus, although the ideological support for sharp sex role differentiation in marriage has weakened, it has not been totally relinquished. The sequential pattern of withdrawal and return to work is the favored answer to the women's "career and marriage issue," while male domestic participation is defined as assistance to the wife who is to carry the major responsibility (Komarovsky, 1973). Men's attitudes are ambivalent and contradictory. On the one hand, they express admiration for the career woman and ascribe low status to housewifery. On the other hand, they seem to be convinced that there is no substitute for the mother's care of young children, which further reinforces the deeply internalized norm of male occupational superiority. These attitudes tend to exacerbate role conflicts
in women, as well. Nowadays, the major shift in female attitudes has been in the decline of women who would aspire to full-time housework, with the sequential pattern of withdrawal from employment for child-rearing as the preferred option. Furthermore, women in the 1970s are much less likely to play down their intellectual activities than women in the 1950s out of fear of the consequences their success will have for their relationship to the opposite sex (Komarovsky, 1973). In other words, although the contradiction perceived in the choice of feminine or modern roles has not disappeared, women are more and more attempting to develop a combined role.

In general, it seems that youth marriage carries the same connotations that adult marriage has had, and, one could say, even more accentuated. Thus, it seems that marriage carries the implication of a refuge much more for youth than for their parents, with higher expectations in terms of personal fulfillment and satisfaction. It is from this perspective then, that marriage among youth is considered as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end. Consequently, it is not strange that again the contradiction between the higher expectations and the potential for their realization results in the greater fragility of youth marriage.
CHAPTER IV
COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS

This discussion of the family patterns and sexual mores in Greece and the United States began with a brief analysis of the respective "subjective culture" in each country. This was done in an attempt to show how values and attitudes constitute an adaptive response to experience. And, consequently, they are subject to the idiosyncratic conditions of the setting within which they evolve. From this perspective, the past, to a certain extent, is reflected on the present and modernization is not uniform in different countries. Following this line of thought, contemporary family patterns and attitudes toward sexuality in Greece and the United States should be viewed as a result of two basic factors:

a) different historical and ecological backgrounds; and
b) different stage in socio-economic development.

At the same time, as Greece develops economically and technologically in the direction of the United States, differences emanating from these factors get relatively homogenized. Following this reasoning, I will contrast the respective family patterns and sexual mores of the two countries in both the pre-industrial and industrial era.
Pre-industrial Order

Despite cultural differences, there are common elements in the family patterns of both countries before the advent of industrialization. The hierarchical and patriarchal family was the primary unit of production. Sexuality was tabooed, children functioned as economic assets and age heterogeneity characterized all aspects of social life.

Besides this common structure, however, several elements both in the ecology and the history of Greece and the United States differentiated the pre-industrial order. In Greece, limited natural resources and turbulent historical conditions required that the kinship and family members cling together in order to survive. Thus, the traditional rural family was extended and closely-knit, fostering strong feelings of loyalty, obligation and interdependence among its members (Bardis, 1956; Friedl, 1963; Peristiany, 1965). It is this need for close, supportive, interdependent relationships which is reflected on all levels of its structure. Namely, the ingroup-outgroup contrast (Triandis, 1972; Vassiliou and Vassiliou, 1972); the sexual moral code of honor and shame, in which the sexual behavior of any member of the kin unit, especially the females, would reflect on the "good name" of the whole family (Campbell, 1964; Friedl, 1967); the attitudes toward children and youth fostering dependency;
the dowry (Lambiri-Dimaki, 1966). In contrast to his American counterpart, the Greek young man would leave not in order to establish an independent household, but in order to support the family that was left back home (Friedl, 1963). The village structure provides an additional indication of this need for interdependence; the Greek village is built around a central square, the one house next to the other. In other words, in the traditional rural Greece, living by oneself was not easy. Clinging together was a necessity. In this sense, then, the particular Greek cultural factors sustained old commitments and standards and, consequently, parental authority.

In the United States, on the other hand, the factors of space and constant mobility were decisive in affecting authority relationships among the kinship and family members (Demos, 1977; Slater, 1977). As we saw, although parental authority emphasized humility and tractableness among children, in practice authority was undermined by the fact that young people could leave (Demos, 1977). Extended land provided the opportunity for establishing a separate household instead of accepting a portion of the family estate. Consequently, a new couple was expected to establish an independent home. Thus, the family was relatively private and nuclear (Slater, 1977). As it is obvious, the cultural factors inherent in the American setting favored a loosening of old commit-
merits and standards and, consequently, the erosion of parental authority. The family members were not obliged to depend upon one another.

Thus, what differentiated the pre-industrial tradition in the two countries is summarized as follows. The Greek environment demanded the maintenance of close ties among kinship and family members, which affected the balance of authority relationships between the older and the younger generation. In contrast to that, the American environment favored autonomy by providing the possibility for the young to leave and by extending the experiential chasm between the old and the young, who proved to be more effective in the new land. In a sense, then, the Greek and the American setting could be seen, respectively, as representative of what Mead (1970) refers to as postfigurative and cofigurative cultures. Namely, in a postfigurative society the rate of change is slow enough to allow the children's future to be shaped by the experience of their forbearers. Alternately, in a cofigurative culture, the elders are still dominant, but as a result of the rate of change, it is expected that the new generation will embody a different style of behavior modeled on that of their contemporaries.
Industrial Order

Industrialization and urbanization disrupted the old order in both countries. The family is no longer the keystone of the social order as its function gradually shifts from production to consumption. With the diminishing of its economic function, the status of both women and youth is affected. Women are deprived of their productive skills, which are gradually regained through increasing participation in the labor force (Ehrenreich and English, 1978). The youth are no longer economic assets, as extended schooling occupies a considerable part of their life (Kett, 1974; Kenniston, 1977). The family becomes private, while increasing depersonalization and competitiveness imbuing the work relationships, make marriage to be understood as a locale for emotional and sexual fulfillment (Skolnick, 1978). At the same time, the family becomes more fragile, as its members are no longer held together by their dependence upon each other's labor. Criteria for marriage, for sexual practice, for child-rearing, become subject to constant change and uncertainty. As a consequence, a large number of specialized agencies for family advice and assistance develop. With extended schooling, the family starts losing control over its own children (Kenniston, 1977).

However, industrialization is not an inexorable process
with identical results everywhere. Neither its advent nor
the rate of its development were the same between Greece and
the United States. As we have mentioned, in Greece urbaniza-
tion preceded industrialization (Tsoukalas, 1977). Indus-
trialization essentially started only after 1950 and settled
down to an average yearly rate of about 5% since 1955 (Alexan-
der, 1964). Now, 20% of the country's manpower is involved
in industrial activities, while the rural population rises to
47% (Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1975). In the United
States, industrialization started in the nineteenth century
and accelerated to the extent that in 1972 only 4.3% of the
population were employed in agriculture (Ray, 1975). Urban-
ization proceeded at an equivalent pace, so that in 1970
only 5% of the population live on farms (U. S. Census Bureau,
Detailed Characteristics, Table 189). Thus, Greece is now a
transitional society in the process of industrialization and
urbanization, while the United States is in the post-
industrial stage. As a consequence of this difference, the
percentage of women's participation in the labor force is
higher in the United States than in Greece. In the United
States women constitute the 42% of the labor force (Bureau of
Labor Statistic, 1977), whereas in Greece, women represent
the 28.5% (Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1977). And,
furthermore, education is much more extended in the United
States than in Greece, both in terms of student population
and in terms of study duration.

Table 6

Percentages of Students with Degrees of Higher Education in the United States and Greece

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age 20-24</td>
<td>Age 25-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>who had completed four years of college</td>
<td>who had a degree of higher education (four year college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The above statistics are not exactly comparable, because in the United States one can go to school in various ages; it is not uncommon to drop out for a certain period of time and return to school later, or even pursue college studies as an adult. Whereas, in Greece, this is very unusual and most people have a degree by the age of 30 at most. However, the respective percentages point to a considerable difference in the two countries, furthermore accentuated by the fact that very few students pursue graduate studies in Greece, since there are no graduate programs.

Overall, then, the respective stage of economical
development with its concomitants in terms of women and youth, sustain, to a certain extent, the particular tradition of each country. Thus, the function and structure of the family is not the same in Greece and the United States.

In Greece, the moderate rate of industrialization and urbanization allow the existence of a transitional family pattern, which maintains many traditional, although considerably modified, aspects. Thus, the conjugal roles are still segregated, while emotional and sexual compatibility are not considered as the primary factors of happiness within marriage (Vassiliou, 1966). Practical considerations of marriage persist, as many wives are not professionally working women and dowry is still to be found.

The parental relationship maintains a considerable degree of specialization with the father as the head of the family and the main punitive figure (Safilios, 1967; Vermeulen, 1970). Consistent with this pattern, in order to alleviate tensions between father and children, the mother often assumes the frontstage, backstage role in case of arguments. Socialization is still based considerably on obedience and the child is in the center of family life, often providing a substitute for the fulfillment of the parents' wishes and needs (Katakis, Ioannides, Tavantzis, 1974; Potamianou, 1978). The family fosters dependency of children and differentiation according to sex persists (Spinnelis, Vassiliou,
and Vassiliou, Communication Number 65). At the same time, advancing industrialization and urbanization affect the content of the family life, the stability of marriage and the extent to which parents rely on extrafamilial agents for the rearing of their children.

Thus, we have a mixture of traditional and modern characteristics, the typical pattern of a transitional society. Dowry coexists with emotional considerations of marriage, the wife is often working, but still the conjugal and parental relationship maintain a considerable degree of specialization. The urban context undermines the interdependence among kinship members and provides conditions for liberal sexual relationships, but still the values of honor and shame reflect on the comportment of modern Greeks. The family fosters dependency, while contemporary conditions and relatively extended schooling undermine parental authority and demand independence.

In other words, the Greek family is in a turning point, still trying to function in a modernizing setting with its traditional equipment. It is precisely this discrepancy which puts the Greek family under strain. The problems confronted by the Greek family evolve on a different level than the ones in the United States. And it is among a segment of the Greek population, usually the more educated, urbanized and upper strata of society that the family presents the dynamic and the problems representative of the
American family.

In the contemporary American social context, the rapid rate of technological development and its concomitants (i.e., increasing depersonalization, competitiveness) contribute to making the family being conceptualized more or less as a refuge. In such a fluid society, the couple cannot rely on a stable and supportive external social context (Bott, 1960). Consequently, they must develop a more intimate relationship with each other. It is as a response to this need, then, that companionship has emerged as the primary expectation from marriage (Blood and Wolfe, 1960). And, although specialization in terms of the conjugal and parental relationship is still to be found in the working class (Kohn, 1969), in general, there is a trend toward overlapping roles within the family (Bronfenbrenner, 1961). Furthermore, as both parents become less available to their children, while, at the same time, there is a loose-knit network of social relationships, the pattern of socialization changes. Emphasis is given upon the individualism and autonomy of the child, and child-rearing is based upon internalization rather than obedience (Elder, 1962; Kohn, 1969). Independence from the family is acceptable as the socially adaptive norm and there is not significant differentiation in the treatment of boys and girls (Kagan and Moss, 1962; Mischel, 1970).
However, the same conditions which contribute to making
the family private undermine its privacy as well. In fact
the family cannot be isolated from the context within which
it functions. Increased depersonalization and competitive-
ness of work relationships, put under tension the family
life and increase its complexity. High expectations of emo-
tional and sexual fulfillment arise, while at the same time,
high divorce rates reveal how difficult it is for those
expectations to be fulfilled. Nowadays, about one out of
every three marriages ends in divorce, and it is estimated
that four out of every ten children born in the 1970s will
spend a part of their childhood in a one-parent family
(Kenniston, 1977). The development of helping professions,
such as psychiatrists and professional experts to uphold
the family, furthermore violate its privacy and develop new
forms of control. Thus, the need for expert assistance in
child-rearing results in a new dependence on people and
institutions outside the family (Kenniston, 1977). It is
the interplay of these conditions which puts the contem-
porary American family under pressure.

In recapitulating, then, it seems that, while in both
countries the family is shrinking in its role, the particu-
lar tradition of each country prescribes a different way of
coping with it. The American family is shrinking in its
role, but, at the same time, tradition is congruent with the
demands that the contemporary conditions of accelerated
development create. Thus, independence of children and
youth from the family is accepted and expected. In Greece,
regardless of subjective wishes, under conditions of advanc-
ing industrialization and urbanization, the family's role
is shrinking too. However, tradition is not congruent with
what modern conditions prescribe, nor has the rate of develop-
ment obliterated traditional patterns yet. Thus, the family
still fosters dependence, while this is not longer the norma-
tive pattern.

It is this difference, now, in family mentality, further-
more conditioned by the different extent of youth culture in
each country, which differentiates the conflicts related with
adolescence in each country.

Traditionally, adolescence bears the connotation of an
inevitable conflict between parents, especially the father,
and the adolescent. In Greece, this is the form that the
adolescent conflict takes. Greek adolescents still fight
with their fathers to gain their independence from the family,
and it is within this context that adolescent sexuality
should be considered. Greek parents are strict as far as
sexuality is concerned (Vermeulen, 1970). Their morals are
more or less consistent with the values of honor and shame,
while among youth virginity is outdated and the double
standard on the decline (Nielsen Hellas Institute, 1977;
Papadopoulou, 1975). Thus, parents strongly react to their children's sexual life and the conflict is most acute between father and daughter. The dependency fostered by the family accentuates this problem, while the extent of youth culture does not secure the privacy which could counteract the family's strictness. Certainly, there is youth culture in Greece, too. However, neither the extent of education, nor the structure of educational institutions favor its more or less autonomous development. Thus, Greek adolescents may rely on their peers, but in order to establish their solidarity with the peer group, they have to fight with their parents. For the Greek adolescents, especially the girls, dating is tabooed by parents, and sexual activities always threaten to disrupt familial harmony. This conflict is accentuated by the fact that the Greek youth in only exceptional cases will leave the family house for independent settlement before marriage. In other words, in Greece, the issue of sexuality is a difficult issue between parents and youth.

In the United States, the issue of adolescent sexuality should be considered within two pivotal points. The degree of independence from the family and the degree of conformity to the youth culture. The rate of technological change outdates the old generation and contributes to
the erosion of parental authority (Mead, 1970; Kenniston, 1977). It is often assumed that children will put family attachments behind them without passing through an emotional crisis. Thus, to the extent that the family fosters independence, overt tensions are more or less eliminated. American parents are more conservative on the issue of sexuality than their sons and daughters (Bell, 1966; Reiss, 1970). At the same time, however, parents encourage dating and do not concern themselves about their sons' and daughters' sexual activities, as long as they are not aware of it (Sorensen, 1973). Girls may meet somewhat stricter reaction as far as sexuality is concerned, but there is not significant differentiation (Adams, 1964; Sorensen, 1973). And young people report that relationships with their parents are free of tension (Sorensen, 1973). However, the decline of the father-adolescent conflict coincides with the growing importance of the peer group. Both parents shift much of the responsibility for their adolescent to his or her peers, and permissiveness rests in part on peer group control. As we saw, there is not that much difference in the values sanctioned by parents and youth (Yankelovich, 1974; Sorensen, 1973), which implies that selection of peers is more or less consistent with parents' preferences. In this sense, the independence allowed from the family and the extent of youth culture
are complementary and self-perpetuating. This pattern creates a liberal setting for youth sexuality.

In comparing Greek and American adolescence, then, it seems that tension is centered around different issues. In Greece, adolescence is a stressful process, as far as sexuality is concerned. On the other hand, transition to adulthood is somehow smoother, due to the earlier participation of the Greek youth in the adult world of production. In the United States, the opposite is true. The issue of sexuality is not a main source of friction among parents and youth. At the same time, the later participation of the American youth in production and the resulting semi-autonomous youth culture contribute to their greater alienation from the adult world. This is what creates tension in intergenerational relationships.

When we contrast, then, the erotic life of the Greek and American youth, we should consider both the family ideology and the social context within which it is embedded. In Greece, the tradition of interdependence reflects on two levels (i.e., the family and the broader social setting), creating a somehow contradictory situation. On the one hand, the family is still restrictive. On the other hand, the social context is still more or less supportive, since interpersonal relationships are not so distant and competitive yet. Thus, the source of conflict, as far as adoles-
cent sexuality is concerned, is localized in the family. The sexual attitudes and behavior of the Greek youth differ significantly from those of their parents. Greek boys and girls start having sexual relationships much earlier than it was the case ten or twenty years ago and premarital relationships are generally accepted among youth (Nielsen Hellas Institute, 1977). However, the family's control, regardless of effectiveness, still weighs considerably, and constitutes a constant threat, at least for the girls' sexual comportment. The tradition of honor and shame, although increasingly obsolescent, has not been totally relinquished. Thus, liberal sexual behavior of the girls is accepted with much more concern than the boys', and girls are more hesitant in the courtship and sexual game compared to their male counterparts. Also, cohabitation is practiced, especially among university students, but it is limited because of the restrictive role of the family.

In the United States, on the other hand, we have a permissive family and a social context within which interpersonal relationships are getting increasingly distant and competitive. Thus, consistent with parents' attitudes and the semi-autonomous peer group norms, American adolescents seem to be more liberal in their sexual relationships than their Greek counterparts. The taboo of virginity does not seem to trouble American adolescents, although some hesitation may persist among the female
population. And, generally, there is a considerable increase in sexual freedom, particularly at the younger age level (Sorensen, 1973). Furthermore, despite persisting differences between males and females (Zelnick and Kantner, 1972), the change in sexual morals has been more significant for women (Sorensen, 1973). Thus, American adolescents present a more relaxed sexual life. On the one hand, they are not hassled by their parents and, on the other, the youth culture provides favorable conditions for liberal sexuality. However, the rise in adolescent suicide (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1976) and drug addiction (Schroeder, 1975) cast doubt on this agreeable picture. To a certain extent, these phenomena could be attributed to feelings of alienation among youth as a result of their segregation from the adult world and its activities. However, they also imply that despite the "sexual renaissance", interpersonal relationships are not so easy, even among young people. The youth culture is not immune to the older ideology of competitive individualism, which becomes manifest among youth on a different level, i.e., approval from peers, status gaining through the dating system, etc. That is why it is often reported by adolescents that going steady reflects the need to get rid of the competitive dating system, while increasing interest in developing close intimate relationships is not
so easily satisfied (Orlofsky, 1976; Vreeland, 1972; Shuttleworth, 1975). And this is also a reason accounting for the "performance requirement", which often undermines the potential of emotional and sexual enjoyment between the sexes (Komarovsky, 1976). I could say that these are problems confronted by the Greek youth, as well. One can feel these conflicts among the more urbanized and educated segments of the youth population. However, these problems do not touch the Greek youth as intensely, because still the center of pressure is localized more within the family and not that much outside of it.

It is apparent, so far, that in both countries the sexual attitudes and behavior prevailing among youth are much more liberal than those of their parents. However, this liberal trend is not accompanied by a radical reconsideration of traditional institutions, such as marriage. It is rather channeled within monogamous relationships, as the increasing tendency for "going steady" indicates. Among youth, in both countries, marriage is conceptualized as a private refuge. For the Greek youth, this is a new tendency, which together with other characteristics (i.e., emotional presupposition for marriage, reduced age difference between spouses, declining child-centeredness), differentiates youth marriage from the transitional pattern of their parents' families. For the American youth, this
private pattern of marriage is a continuation of their parents' family pattern rather than a differentiation from it. In Greece this tendency may cause friction among parents and youth; in the United States, this is accepted and expected.

Although marriage carries comparable assumptions for the Greek and the American youth (i.e., private and centered around the spouses rather than the children), the age of marriage differs. Both economic and psychological reasons account for this difference. For the Greek youth, economic difficulties at a younger age are much more acute. Thus, entry into economic adulthood is a presupposition for entry by the family ingroup, being restrictive as well as supportive at the same time, does not make Greek youth so anxious in establishing a family of their own. As we saw, in Greece, the greatest frequency of marriages occurs in the age range of 25-29 for the man and 20-24 for the woman (National Statistical Service, "Demographic and Future Trends of the Greek Population: 1960-1985"). For the American youth, less strenuous financial conditions make possible the earlier entry into familial adulthood and the postponement of economic adulthood. In addition to that, the independence fostered by the American family and the fluid social context make youth feel the need of establishing a family of their own. Thus, despite recent
postponement of marriage, the American youth marry earlier than their Greek counterparts, i.e., 23 and 21, men and women, respectively (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract, 1976).

Certainly, family patterns, attitudes and behavior are fairly differentiated by regional and class factors. In both countries, rural areas are more conservative than urban ones, and the lower, uneducated classes are more conservative than upper classes. However, although in the United States, class differences permeate both rural and urban areas, in Greece the situation is somehow different. Within the urban context, the lower classes reflect the traditional rural values, while rural areas present a certain uniformity (i.e., no class differences). In this sense, then, although in Greece the village extends within the city, in the United States the city extends within the village.
The present thesis investigated the family and the issue of sexuality in Greece and the United States as a function of their respective historical background and stage of contemporary socio-economic development. It is the interplay of these factors which differentiates the family pattern and sexual mores in the two countries.

In Greece, the generational conflict is due, to a great extent, to the increasing "cultural lag" in family structure and socialization patterns. With advancing urbanization and industrialization, alterations along economic and technological variables occurred abruptly while alterations along psychological and cultural variables continued in a slower pace (Vassiliou, 1966). As a consequence of this discrepancy, the modern Greek society functions in two different speeds, the traditional rural and the urban mass-oriented one. Thus, the persisting tradition of interdependence among the family members prescribes a family pattern which is dysfunctional in the urban setting. The family fosters dependency, while contemporary conditions (i.e., education, career, love life) urge the youth to strive for independence from their
parents (Katakis, Ioannides, Tarantzis, 1974). It is this discrepancy between the family mentality and the contemporary needs which makes the parent-youth conflict inevitable and, especially so, on the issue of sexuality.

In the United States, the tradition of the loosening of old commitments (Demos, 1977; Slater, 1977), furthermore accentuated by the rapid rate of technological development, favors the erosion of parental authority (Mead, 1970; Kenniston, 1977). The family fosters independence (Elder, 1962; Kohn, 1969) and this attitude contributes to reducing the parent-youth conflict on the issue of sexuality (Sorenson, 1973). The context of youth culture provides a liberal setting for sexual relationships and parents do not usually interfere with their sons' and daughters' sexual life, as long as they are not directly confronted with it. For the American youth, tensions emanate, not that much from the family, as from the social context, with all the implications that depersonalization, competitiveness and consumerism can have for sexuality and interpersonal communication, as well (Schroeder, 1975; Komarovsky, 1976).

Thus, in Greece, the family is restrictive, while the social context is still more or less supportive. In the United States, the permissive family is embedded within a context of increasingly distant and depersonalized relationships. It is in this sense that the source of tension
is localized more within the family in Greece, and relatively more outside the family in the United States.

On the basis of trends manifest in Greece and the United States, certain assumptions can be made for the future. Since in Greece, urbanization and industrialization have not been completed yet, one could anticipate that in the future aspects of social life, such as family patterns and sexuality will evolve in a way equivalent to the one in the United States. Although the particular Greek tradition may delay this process, it does not seem that it will eliminate it. For the time being, it is among the most urbanized and educated segments of the population that this change in the family mentality and attitudes toward sexuality can be traced. With increasing urbanization and industrialization these changes will encompass a larger part of the population. In other words, it can be anticipated that the family will be more equalitarian in its structure and will finally foster independence of its younger members. At the same time, the improvement of educational standards and the prolongation of schooling will make adolescence a much more prolonged stage in life than it has been so far, and will result in a more autonomous development of the youth culture. The liberal trend as far as sexuality is concerned among youth will increase, as the family's restrictiveness is lessening.
In addition to that, the augmentation of urban centers makes interpersonal relationships increasingly distant, so that loneliness and alienation are becoming the novel characteristics of the Greek social context. Thus, the loosening of interdependence and its concomitant constraints regarding sexuality will be accompanied by the limitations in interpersonal communication imposed by the new conditions. It seems that there is increasing awareness of these changes in the context of family life and interpersonal relationships among youth as more and more articles crop up in the Greek newspapers and journals concerning these issues. However, detailed scientific research is missing.

So far, sociological and psychological research has been limited due to poor funding and the elementary stage of social sciences. Furthermore, research on the family and issues of sexuality has not been encouraged because of the prevailing preoccupation that the family institution need not be questioned. The rural family has been the object of several anthropological and sociological studies (i.e., Campbell, "Honour, Family and Patronage"; Friedl, "Vassilika: A Village in Modern Greece"; Sanders, "Rainbow in the Rock", Mandras, "Six Villages d'Epire"). Research on the modern Greek family has dealt with the dynamic of the family, roles, stereotypes of the man and
the woman, the parent status of women, dowry, abortion.
Research is usually sponsored by the "National Center of
Social Research", the "Center of Mental Health", or the
private Institute "Anthropos", run by G. and V. Vassiliou.

As social change increasingly affects the Greek
society, there is a very broad field of research:

--The dynamic of parent-youth relationship and the
extent to which changes in the social milieu have
influenced the attitude of fostering dependence;

--The extent of youth culture and the degree of con-
sonance or dissonance between parental and youth
culture values;

--The extent of the generation gap as reflected on
the issue of sexuality and other general issues;

--The extent of change in sexual attitudes and behavior
among youth, as well as the quality of interpersonal
relationships and sources of strain, besides the
family.

As far as future trends are concerned in the United
States, one could speculate that the family will continue in
its equalitarian direction while, at the same time, its
fragility will increase. The youth culture, unless there
is a change in the educational system, will continue to be
a pervasive phenomenon. The liberal trend in sexuality will
increase as more people are being brought up from childhood
in accord with these more liberal norms. More and more the traditional sex-role stereotypes and the double-standard will be reduced, as change in attitudes will allow women to feel increasingly more comfortable in assuming an active sexual role. Despite the search toward alternatives, it does not seem likely that marriage will be radically questioned, as the social context of loneliness and depersonalization will push the youth toward the security of the conjugal dyad.

Research in the area of sexuality among youth has been very thorough, dealing with the extent of change in sex behavior among youth, attitudes toward sexuality, and the meaning of sexual behavior. An area which has been relatively neglected and which needs more specific investigation concerns sexual behavior and attitudes among the various ethnic groups, and how these relate to the sexual standards of mainstream America.
1. A nomadic group of shepherds living in the Northwest part of Greece (Hepirus).

2. There are no specific data available about "honour crimes" in earlier years, but folkloric and anthropological evidence point out their occurrence and social acceptability.

3. This survey was conducted for the newspaper, "Nea". Despite its limitations in terms of sample size and methodology, it can serve as an index of certain trends in attitudes and behavior. Being aware of these drawbacks, I will refer to it in the next pages, since scientific research on this domain has been minimal.

4. The "frontistirion" is a kind of private school. Its purpose is to prepare the school-boys and school-girls for the university entrance examination, since public education is not adequate. Every adolescent has to attend such a private school at the same time with the public one for at least the three last years of high school. Thus, conflict with parental authority in
combination with the preparation required for the competitive university entrance examination make adolescence a very strenuous process.

5. Student marriages are unusual in Greece due to the factors mentioned above.

6. Percentage of illiteracy in terms of urban-rural areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1971)


8. In the Nielsen Hellas Institute survey, working young people reporting early sexual relations exceeded slightly.

9. Encyclical 1529/May 29, 1968, "concerning the dangers of low fertility".

10. However, these changes have been finally effected.

11. Divorce Rates per 1000 People:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Divorce Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U.S. Center for Health Statistics, 1974)
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