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The development of the Center for Urban Education, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1968-1970.

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A Dissertation Presented by JOHN CARR WOODBURY

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

June 1970

Major subject: Urban Education
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTER FOR
URBAN EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF
MASSACHUSETTS AT AMHERST,
1968-1970

A Dissertation

By

JOHN CARR WOODBURY

Approved as to style and content by:

[Signatures]

June 1970
THOSE WHO PROTEST TO FAVOR FREEDOM
YET DESPISE THE ANIMALS, ARE MEN
WHO WANT CROPS WITHOUT FLOWING
UP THE GROUND; THEY WANT RAIN
WITHOUT THUNDER AND LIGHTNING.
THEY WANT THE OCEAN WITHOUT THE
AWFUL ROAR OF ITS RAVENOUS WATERS.

--Frederick Douglas
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J.C.W.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1963, Dwight Allen, 37, a national figure associated with reform in education, became Dean of the School of Education at the University of Massachusetts. Allen, formerly an Associate Professor of Education at Stanford University, was a well-known spokesman for the flexible scheduling of public schools, new approaches to school staffing, and a teacher training technique called micro-teaching.

After turning down several offers from other institutions, Allen was given an opportunity at the University of Massachusetts to create a "new" School of Education. The size of the faculty was doubled which enabled Allen to recruit thirty new faculty members. The doctoral program was expanded dramatically and eighty doctoral students from across the country enrolled at the School of Education. The faculty and doctoral candidates were granted a charter to develop a "new" School as the Dean designated 1963-1969, "the Planning Year," and discontinued the existing courses and requirements—effective September 1, 1969.

The group of 150 were not all educators but represented diverse backgrounds and fields. The faculty included an historian, a ghetto community organizer, a musician with degrees in psychology and social anthropology,
a student founder of an experimental college of the 1930's, and a former Peace Corps training director. The doctoral students included an opera singer, Peace Corps and Vista veterans, principals and superintendents, a salesman, a folk singer, draft resisters, a former union organizer, teachers, and other individuals with a variety of backgrounds. Fifteen per cent of the doctoral students were black.

"The Planning Year" was launched in dramatic fashion when the 150 planners were flown on a chartered plane to a mountain summer camp in Colorado for a week-long retreat in September.

Both faculty and doctoral students were provided with considerable freedom from the usual course obligations during "the Planning Year." Thirty-five different committees which offered a variety of courses and experiences emerged during the planning process. In the fluid and sometimes chaotic atmosphere of freedom, a number of special activities and programs were undertaken. The School sponsored two "educational marathons" which included more than 200 events and which was attended by educators from across the country. During the New York City school crisis, an eighteen-man team from the School of Education was on site to document the events with the use of video-tape equipment. During the year, a new kindergarten through twelfth grade teacher education program was developed. Also, a number of projects and
relationships with school systems, colleges, and other organizations throughout the nation were initiated.

The School of Education was able to attract substantial financial support for its pioneering venture. Grants were received from the Institute for Community Studies, the New World Foundation, the Keloog Foundation, the Kettering Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the United States Office of Education, and the Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education. Roughly two-thirds of the program was supported by outside funding.

"The Planning Year" was carried out in an organizational environment which was unique for its democratic and non-bureaucratic features. Although formal authority rested with the Dean, major decisions were made by the Education Assembly where faculty and all resident doctoral students each had one vote. They elected an Executive Committee to coordinate activities and recommend policies to the Assembly. Students also sat on all committees of the faculty.

By the Spring of 1969, eleven emergent centers could be identified. The centers had developed in the fluid environment when individuals with common educational interests made decisions to establish a more formal organization. The Center for Counselor Education, the Center for the Study of Aesthetics in Education, the Center for International Education, and the Center for the Study of Educational
Innovations were several of the organizations which emerged to represent the diverse educational interests in the community.  

The study which follows is an analysis of the establishment of one of these eleven centers, the Center for Urban Education (CUE), from its inception in the fall of 1968 through the middle of the 1969-1970 school year.

The study consists of five chapters. Chapter I ("The New School of Education: A Setting for the Establishment of a Center for Urban Education") identifies a number of educational biases and beliefs shared at the outset by the 150 faculty and doctoral students which encouraged those among them who anticipated creating an urban education center. These ideas played a role in a complex situation which involved a host of other factors—organizational, financial, personnel—which affected the development of an urban center.

The attempt to generalize about the philosophical assumptions of the School of Education staff is a difficult and highly subjective task. The educational philosophy of the Dean was influential, and considerable space is devoted to his ideas. Allen was the intellectual as well as the administrative leader at the School of Education.

In addition to presenting the philosophical setting at the beginning of "the Planning Year" and the implications
for urban education, the recruitment of black faculty and students is discussed. From the viewpoint of urban education, the participation of black people was a necessary though not sufficient precondition for success. Also, part of the setting for "the Planning Year" at Amherst was the Colorado experience, and particularly relevant to this analysis were the race relations events which occurred at the retreat.

After setting the stage for the establishment of an urban education center at Amherst, the scene shifts to Hartford, Connecticut. Chapter II ("The Hartford Project: A Case Study") analyzes the major off-campus project associated with the Center during "the Planning Year," and which was run by five doctoral students who were members of CUI. The Hartford Project was significant as an experience which influenced the development of a CUI philosophy and direction with respect to off-campus projects. It is one example of how the Center's program emerged organically from a series of experiences. The successes and failures in Hartford provided an important object lesson on which to base an approach to various activities in the field in 1969-1970. Those off-campus activities and projects are discussed in Chapter IV. Lastly, the Hartford Project served as a training vehicle for several individuals in the Center and, therefore, suggests one urban education training model.
The central issue which is addressed in Chapter III ("The Organizational Environment at the School of Education: A Setting for the Center for Urban Education") deals with the relationship between CUE as an institution and the larger organizational setting of the School of Education. The study shifts from Hartford back to the School of Education and the experience of the planning process of 1968-1969.

The long term impact of CUE's activities in the field, Hartford for example, as well as the success of the efforts at the School of Education, was dependent on the viability of the home base, the growth and strength of the Center as an organization.

This chapter focuses on the organizational characteristics of the "new" School of Education and how they affected the establishment of the Center. Particular attention surrounds what is called the environment of the "New Corporate Design" at the School of Education. What kinds of positive and negative effects did it have on the growth of the Center? Considerable attention is devoted to analyzing the nature of this experimental organizational environment, and in particular the tension between individual and organizational needs. The effect of this environment on CUE as an organization struggling toward maturity comprises much of the chapter. Questions of personnel management, organizational leadership, image-making, and financial resources are major topics.
The major off-campus project associated with CUE in 1968-1969 (The Hartford Project) was analyzed in Chapter II, and the organizational problems of the young organization in Amherst during "the Planning Year" were discussed in Chapter III. The burden of Chapter IV ("Goals and Programs: From a Sign on the Door Toward a Network of Off-Campus Projects") is devoted to the goals and projects of the more established and stable Center for Urban Education in 1969-1970. CUE turned from primary concern with internal problems to more task-oriented goals for 1969-1970, particularly the search for viable off-campus projects.

Four CUE projects which illustrate the philosophy and point of direction of the organization by January, 1970 were selected for discussion in Chapter IV. They include an analysis of the negotiations with the SAHD community school organization in Hartford; an appraisal of the Parkway Program in Philadelphia as a teacher training site; an analysis of the inter-campus alliance proposal with the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district in New York City; and a study of the planning process for the COP program to train paraprofessionals for the Worcester and Springfield school systems.

A central theme in this chapter involves the frustrations caused by the gap between CUE's ambitious long-run goals and the existing situation in January of 1970. The
Center attempted to maintain a position where they could represent the interests of the urban poor, but they were increasingly at odds with less radical middle class urban education efforts.

The subject of Chapter V ("Conclusion: Race relations--some Observations") will be race relations. Racial issues are implicit in the preceding four chapters in the same way that race relations questions permeated Center activities and philosophy, internal relations, and relationships with other Centers and the field through the year and one-half period.

The major intellectual goal is to analyze the nature and effect of the white liberal environment at the School of Education on the activities of the Center for Urban Education. Much has been written about the dynamics of race relations in a conservative institutional environment. Such is not the case with liberal environments and, for this reason, this chapter may provide new insights in the race relations field.

The chapter is divided into three parts which correspond roughly with three phases over the two year period. The "Integration" phase deals with the racial implications of the admission of blacks, the question of academic standards, and the spirit of Colorado, which covered, approximately, the period September--December of 1968.
The burden of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of the "Identity" phase which covered, roughly, the period of January 1969-January 1970. When blacks and whites gather to try to work together under one roof in contemporary America, a frustrating and sometimes explosive situation is created. This section discusses the interaction between various groups with a variety of objectives which reflected the struggle of individuals to find their identities in the atypical situation.

The "Identity" discussion illustrates how the Center for Urban Education was affected by the divisions and suspicions which were part of the race relations environment at the School of Education. Specific events and episodes which elucidate the situation are presented.

The third phase, a "future" or "poor people's urban education" phase, involves developments which began to emerge around January of 1970, and whose direction remained vague at the time of this writing. Tensions appeared to surround a conflict between two different approaches to urban education, a liberal and middle class effort challenged by a more radical thrust from CUE.

The style of this final chapter differs from the other four chapters. It is more informal and subjective in content which reflects the personal experience and involvement of the author in race relations issues over the 1958-1970 period.
The biases of the author are placed on the table where the reader can deal with them and the perspective they reflect. Hopefully, this approach enhances both the emotional and intellectual understanding of the race relations situation at the School of Education.

The final chapter links the preceding four chapters because race relations was a "hidden agenda" which affected CUE activities throughout the 1963-1970 period. The participation of black people at the School of education was a theme raised in the initial chapter. A major subject raised in the Hartford analysis was the potential University change-agent role in a situation where a white controlled school system did not adequately serve the needs of its predominantly black and Puerto Rican student population. The organizational problems described in Chapter III which plagued CUE were complicated by issues of race and class. The prevailing theme of Chapter IV was whether a project or activity could ultimately affect the education of poor blacks, or if it would become another miscarriage induced by white society.

Several larger issues are raised by implication in this study which transcend the material presented in the individual chapters. One question raised is whether it is possible for a predominantly white educational institution to have an impact on the problems of urban and largely black America. What is required of such an institution and an urban center within it to launch a relevant effort?
More specifically, can a teacher training institution make a difference in urban public education? What is the potential of programs such as the Hartford Project? What kinds of institutional support and flexibility are necessary to gain enough leverage to effect change?

Another question raised is the feasibility of a School of Education establishing a network of satellite centers and projects in urban areas across the country. How can they be developed? How do you link them together? What kinds of people with what kinds of expertise and financial support are needed?

Definitive answers to these questions are not provided in the text. But the analysis of the specific School of Education situation, hopefully, offers a few clues and some handles for these questions.

Two additional issues require mention. The "revolution" at the University of Massachusetts, in many ways, was as much an experiment in organizational forms as it was an experiment in educational programs. Chapter III in particular deals with the positive and negative effects of freedom in an institutional environment. The fluid and sometimes chaotic atmosphere placed different kinds of organizational demands on the Center for Urban Education.

Finally, the study raises the question of whether it is possible for blacks and whites to work together in
a relatively open environment to create a viable organization. Or are the racial tensions in American society, transmitted through a School of Education and a Center for Urban Education, and through the individual participants, too great to avert internal disintegration and failure? At a time of growing racial separation on the national scene, can an attempt to solve urban problems through a combined effort of blacks and whites be successful?
CHAPTER I

THE "NEW" SCHOOL OF EDUCATION: A SETTING FOR
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTER FOR
URBAN EDUCATION

Introduction

The faculty and students at the School of Education shared several educational biases which were relevant to the attempt to establish a viable urban education center. Considerable attention is focused on the statements of Dwight Allen because he was the primary intellectual spokesman for the School of Education at the outset of "the Planning Year."

Most faculty and doctoral students agreed that the existing educational system had failed and were committed verbally to substantial changes. Also, they supported Allen's beliefs in performance criteria, the efficacy of the juxtaposition of personnel and theories, and the importance of the "affective domain" of education. Most also hoped the social relevance of programs would be a major concern and that the School of Education would have a national impact on education. Many also echoed Allen's call for more useful, relevant, and activist research and evaluation techniques.

Personnel were also a relevant part of the setting.
for the establishment of a center for urban education—in this case black personnel. The hypothesis presented is that one prerequisite for creating a viable urban education program was partially satisfied: a moderately successful effort was made to recruit black doctoral students, and, to a much lesser degree, black faculty members. A necessary but not sufficient step was taken.

Finally, at the Colorado retreat, both the promise and difficulties of creating an urban center were previewed when race relations issues reached the main agenda during the unique planning week.

Some Educational Biases

The School of Education and the attitude toward change

The educational revolution which the new Dean at the School of Education at the University of Massachusetts intended to lead embodied radical assumptions and ambitious, if not visionary, objectives. The first publication by the "new" School of Education in November of 1963, an interim year catalogue, began with the outspoken indictment:

Our new School of Education is building on a belief that most formal schooling today is irrelevant, archaic, and more harmful than helpful to the achievement of full, rich, satisfying, and productive life for every student. We see most students emerging from education shells with their innate curiosity, imagination, and creativity deadened under a process that demands assimilation of masses of useless and irrelevant information, most of which they have forgotten.
The critical view of the current state of American public education espoused, and the apparent willingness to take risks in the interest of fundamental change, created an emotionally charged environment resembling an educational crusade. Often, Allen and the School of Education attracted the same polarity of devotion and hostility which characterized Kennedy and Wallace politics of the 1960's.

At the School of Education itself, within the University of Massachusetts community, and in national educational circles, the "revolution" at the School of Education had great potential. Widespread criticism of schools indicated a possibility for change if focused in certain areas. Various publics viewed the developments in Amherst as a sign of real hope while other groups anxiously awaited the collapse of the "revolution."

The faculty and doctoral students who came to the University of Massachusetts in the fall of 1963 were for-the-most-part united in the radical view that the current state of American public education was a disaster. Sentiments expressed in the interim planning catalogue reflected their view that schools in general are "unhealthy for children and other living things." They believed the existing system was outdated, sick, often silly, and probably doomed. Allen stated: "Education is one of those rare institutions in which practice has consistently lagged at
least three-quarters of a century behind theory and research." Allen called the present educational system an antiquated agrarian model inherited from the Nineteenth Century. The curriculum, the organizational structures at all levels, and staff development techniques were "all frozen in traditional constraints that have neither rationale nor relevance." By totally condemning the existing system, the "new" School of Education sought to shift the burden of proof to the defenders of the status quo and, consequently, put the rationale for change in a more favorable light. "The keynote of our entire effort," Allen stated, "has been to place the traditional and innovative on the same intellectual footing—to require as strong a rationale for the continuation of the old as for the insertion of something new." That stance made new ideas, however wild their sound, an essential element in any debate during "the Planning Year."

The condemnation of the existing system, and the subsequent shifting of the burden of proof, set the stage for the rationale for bold risk-taking. Again, Allen summed up the spirit of the approach in a paper concerning differentiated staffing: "Risks should be encouraged, unsuccessful models discarded without apology or regret. Edison tried 500 experiments before he invented the storage battery." Significant progress, Allen believed, depended
upon institutions having freedom to experiment. More dramatically, Allen demanded a right to fail. And he demanded the right to take big risks, not just small or piecemeal changes, and to be bold and imaginative in approaching problems.

With new personnel, substantial financial support, and a mandate to create a "new" School of Education, Allen hoped to give substance to his philosophy of change. An article about the School of Education in *Saturday Review* summarized the situation. "The slate has been wiped clean at *UHS*, but that does not mean that none of the traditional assumptions won't be reaffirmed. It is just that nothing is being taken on faith," wrote Associate Education Editor, Wally Roberts. As for new alternatives, Roberts suggested: "Allen and the staff are gambling that they can come up with some relevant responses . . . and are wagering on several different horses. None of them may end up in the money, but they wouldn't have been able to find that out unless they took the initial risks of action."

The relevance of the philosophy of change for urban education

The basic assumption at Amherst that the existing educational systems was sick matched the evidence that had emerged in recent years from many analyses of inner city education. There were differences in both the degree to
which the disease had permeated the body and the types of cancer identified between education outside the city and urban schools. But a cure in both cases required a "clean slate" mentality.

The perspective of Allen and a majority of faculty and students at the School of Education was a view formed primarily from observing white middle class and predominantly suburban schools. It was not a "black" or "urban" perspective; but it was a radical indictment. While school of education people might employ the terms "often silly" and "ultimately doomed," the terms "totally ineffective," "destructive," "inhuman," and even "oppressive" would be more accurate descriptions of the urban perspective. While middle class children could read but were often bored in school; city children, and particularly poor black children, were bored with school and could not read.

The importance of the Allen critique of contemporary education for urban education lay not in the identification of the particular problems or specific solutions, but in the radical nature of the indictment and the call for total change. An intellectual environment which tolerated, if not encouraged, radical proposals for change would serve urban education interests. This in no way guaranteed, however, that the philosophical views would result in the implementation of a radical program. A cap
between rhetoric and reality characterized most institutions.

**Other biases and their implications for urban education**

A persistent theme running through Allen's speeches before public school audiences and the central idea behind the Model Elementary Teacher Education Program (METEP), the basic curriculum established for undergraduate education at the School of Education, was the notion that performance must be the essential criterion for advancement in the field of education. In the case of educational personnel, longevity, status, and credentialism would have to give way to substance, performance, and achievement if the educational system was to be improved. As for students, the METEP proposal stated:

>We must learn to face the professional embarrassment of admitting that the criterion of time by which we currently measure the educational progress of a student is at best only incidentally relevant to the student's ability to perform intellectually. It is simply not enough to know how long a student has warmed a seat in a Spanish class. What educators require are criteria of performance.

The expedient notion that there was some predictable relationship between a certain number of course credits collected and the ability of a person to perform in the classroom was the target of the METEP program for training teachers. Throughout public education, not merely in terms of teacher training, Allen had attacked the process whereby talent, creativity, and ability were subordinated
to years on the job, credits accumulated at local teacher education institutions, and a host of credential and legal barriers, as criteria for advancement in the profession. Salary scales in virtually all public school systems were based on the latter criteria.

In terms of the system all students must proceed through, Allen identified a falacious reward and punishment situation and pointed to underlying Puritan attitudes toward work and achievement as barriers to performance criteria. He often ribbed audiences of public school teachers and administrators with the remark: "The student who should impress us most is the one whose performance is exceptional but whose effort is minimal."

The idea of performance criteria, if operationalized at the School of Education—-in graduate school courses, in planning committees, in the relations among doctoral students and faculty—-would assist the efforts of individuals in the Center for Urban Education. For example, CUE had but one faculty member in 1963-1969 and he held the rank of Lecturer while simultaneously pursuing his own doctoral work. Doctoral students, both black and white, created CUE. If the traditional status considerations of academe were more important than competence and creativity, CUE would have difficulty lobbying for its interests. Lastly, many of those associated with CUE
lacked the usual educational credentials upon which expectations of expertise are based. There would have to be a free market of ideas; and the weight given to a person's opinion could not be merely the function of his advanced degrees or number of articles in reputable educational journals.

During the recruiting process a pet idea which Allen put into practice was the notion that individuals from fields other than education were needed to provide different perspectives on educational problems. Some of the individuals involved are introduced below:

There is a full professor with no Ph.D. who is a nationally known consultant on urban education. One 33-year-old instructor was a mail man until he earned a B.A. a couple of years ago; he is also a founder and executive director of one of the few successful ghetto community centers in the country. Another instructor without any advanced degrees is a founder of Black Mountain College, an experimental "community of scholars" that flourished briefly several years ago. One associate professor who has a Ph.D. in history from Yale is a former campaign manager for a successful state assembly candidate. Another example of this new eclecticism is a full professor who is 36 years old, Phi Beta Kappa, a Rhodes Scholar with a B.A. and M.A. in music and a Ph.D. in Jungian Psychology and Social Anthropology from the University of Chicago (he wrote, choreographed, and produced a ballet for his dissertation). 12

Part of the rationale was a belief that the educational system had become so encrusted and domineer that reform by educators alone was futile. Allen looked to other fields as well:
Such juxtaposition of diverse human beings has been planned to generate excitement and counterpoint, to encourage perspective and freshness in creating, implementing, testing, and modifying new models for all aspects and at all levels of the educational process in America. 13

The backgrounds represented in the Center for Urban Education eventually included an historian, several community organizers, two undergraduate business majors, a special education expert, a physical education instructor, and a federal government program evaluator. The effectiveness of these individuals would be influenced by the degree to which the idea of juxtaposition was accepted and institutionalized at the School of Education.

Also, in terms of different viewpoints as well as of people with varying backgrounds, the notion of juxtaposition was relevant to urban education. The members of CUE were to become "juxtaposed" to the majority on fundamental educational issues as they brought an urban education perspective to bear on problems. The reality of the idea of juxtaposition would be demonstrated only if CUE placed its alternative perspective before the School. 14

Many faculty and doctoral students who came to Amherst believed the non-cognitive side of education required greater emphasis. They sought to create a different balance in a teacher education curriculum at the School of Education and hoped eventually to have an impact in the schools.
The emotional development of individuals, human relations skills, and such theories of personality growth as "self-actualization" were part of the concern for the "affective domain."

The Model Elementary Teacher Education Program based its performance criteria on competence in three broad areas—content knowledge, behavioral skills, and human relations skills. Initially defined by Allen as "personological skills," the third area was designated the most crucial and represented one attempt by the School of Education to give the "affective domain" a central role in the new teacher education program. The NETEP report summed up the human relations objectives:

The NETEP is interested in producing the fully human teacher, a person who meets the human criteria of warmth or human understanding, is capable of rigorous thinking, is in control of his own behavior, and is in a constant pattern of growth. These are high objectives for teacher training, but it is believed that education, psychology, philosophy, and behavioral technology are at a stage whereby the effectively trained teacher can now be a human relations expert in addition to having content knowledge and presentation skills.

Again, much of the impetus for the affective curriculum came from Allen himself. Long a critic of the traditional curriculum in schools, he had proposed: "One possibility which seems to me to be worth pursuing is the notion of a Communications-Human Relations-Aesthetics-Technology curriculum—or what I would call a Liberal Science Curriculum." The communications and aesthetics fields, and particularly the human relations area, involved the
"affective domain." "A curriculum which focused on the processes whereby people communicate, interact, and relate to one another . . . . would seem to have enormous relevance to a world which is daily confused and submerged by inter-human strife," stated Allen.18

The emergence to a prominent place of an aesthetics group at the Colorado retreat and the early and sustained interest of those who formed a Center for Humanistic Education were clear examples of the attention given to the "affective domain."

Affective education had several vague connections with CUE. The Center believed that the key to effective teaching and administration in urban schools, particularly for predominantly white middle class training institutions, lay in the teacher and administrator understanding himself and his relations to other people. Knowledge in a subject area and technical ability in presenting information were competencies much less important than, for example, the student teacher's ability to understand and relate to a ghetto child. The Strength-Training Clinic which Professor Gerald Neinstein brought to Amherst from New York City was essentially a laboratory to train middle class whites to be "sensitized" to their behavioral strengths and weaknesses and help them develop an ability to be "real" and effective in the inner-city classroom. Neinstein was associated with CUE initially and then shifted most of his energies to the
Center for Humanistic Education.

In addition, the degree to which the School of Education as a community acted on a belief that the "affective domain" was a crucial concern would many efforts of the Center be successful. Questions of race relations and racism always affected CUJ affairs. Human relations skills and sensitivity to the emotional dynamics of race relations, as well as an intellectual and academic understanding, would be required of the entire community. The eventual agreement at the Colorado retreat to devote time to racial awareness activities was an initial indication that race relations might become a real part of the concern for human relations and the "affective domain" in the community.

Faculties of schools of education have justified their existence by counting their scholarly contributions. As part of academe and involved in its reward and punishment system, advancement resulted from research projects embedded in the pages of "reputable" journals. Typically, graduate students spent their time preparing for the moment when they could undertake professional research efforts. The training of teachers and educational personnel usually assumed a secondary priority.

Allen and staff were, for-the-most-part, skeptical of traditional educational research efforts. They wanted to develop more useful research and evaluation techniques.
Also, they sought an activist as well as a research posture for the School of Education program as a whole. Performance should be socially relevant. New research techniques, activism, and social relevance matched the biases of CUE as it sought to develop a program.

The Dean expressed his research bias most succinctly in various speeches when he declared that current research and evaluation techniques were useful when analyzing "rows of corn" but inadequate for researching and evaluating "rows of students." Also, Allen hoped to bring researchers and evaluators out of their campus isolation and into classrooms. CUE shared this hope that a more activist research orientation would result in people experiencing the real environment of urban schools.

Allen also linked the educational objectives of the School of Education with the larger goals of society:

It is this notion of 'social relevance' which stands at the heart of what we are trying to do, and which must serve as a meaningful bridge between the School of Education and the public schools of Massachusetts. One of the major problems in the traditional school of education as in the traditional public school is the tardiness of its response to the rapid and profound changes of society. In a complex world such as ours, education at all levels must be constantly changing merely to keep up with developments in society.

This philosophical stance was consistent with CUE's notion of "urban ecology"—that urban educational reform was related to and a vital component in a solution of larger urban
problems. Allen held a more catholic view that education could create a new vision of human existence.\textsuperscript{21}

"We envision specialized centers of inquiry at Amherst, but only as part of a worldwide network of schools and centers and services."\textsuperscript{22} This early statement in the interim planning year catalogue of the goal to become a socially relevant institution by creating a "worldwide network" matched a major objective of the individuals involved in CUE—namely, a belief that a group of off-campus projects and centers in urban areas should be established. In a report prepared in the fall of 1963 for the University Trustees where the various schools on the campus presented their plans for the next decade, the School of Education wrote: "While our resident program would be extensive, more than half of our activities will be non-resident including satellite schools of education throughout the U.S. and abroad."\textsuperscript{23} The ambitious plan called for 300 full-time and 750 part-time non-resident faculty, and 1,500 full-time non-resident students and 15,000 part-time non-resident students. The plan envisioned 20-40 satellite schools and 20-40 laboratory schools with an annual operating cost of $17,000,000.\textsuperscript{24}

Most relevant to CUE was the fact that the "Ten Year Projection," which envisioned twenty-four centers or areas of concern, listed "Urban Education" as the first priority.
It read:

Possibly the most ambitious center would focus on the area of urban education—problems of the disadvantaged (white and black), minority problems and the general problems of making education relevant and significant in the inner city.25

The designs of the School of Education to be socially relevant contained another more pragmatic objective—the goal of having a national impact on American education. Most of the staff viewed the experiment at Amherst as a potential vehicle for affecting the national scene. Presumably, that hope motivated the Trustees of the University of Massachusetts when they granted a flexible charter to Allen to create his "revolution." The creation of a nationally important School of Education could boost the prestige of a former agriculture school.

In the 1960's and 1970's there was every evidence that the prospects of having a national impact would be limited if the urban scene was left out of the grand design for change. The "Ten Year Projection" spoke to the issue:

Just as we see ourselves in the next few years dealing with the major problems of race relations and urban problems, in ten years we expect to be equally committed to dealing with the most pressing social problems of that time.25

Many at the School of Education understood that exhortations for national reform in education could not be taken seriously if the urban component was neglected.
Conclusion

Good intentions toward urban education had, however, not yet produced a viable institution for change. New Deal welfare measures and Johnson's stepped up War on Poverty had failed to make an important dent in urban decay. The Supreme Court decisions against segregated schools and the whole civil rights movement had not ended racial isolation in schools or racism in American life. Rhetoric from the "Ten Year Projection," again, was no more than a paper promise.

It would be immensely difficult to establish a viable and relevant urban education program at a predominantly white, liberal, middle class education institution. American liberals, historically, have relied upon protestations of good intentions to maintain social stability until time brought a change. That tactic had worked for the Populist revolt in the 1890's and for the masses of unemployed in the 1930's. But white racism had changed its forms from plantations to ghettos without an important break in the pattern. Cities had simply accumulated greater problems. So had city schools. In short, there was no guarantee that viable urban education programs could be developed at the School of Education because the intellectual climate at the outset appeared favorable.
The Right People: The Presence of Black Doctoral Students and Black Faculty

Relevant Personnel

The ability of the Center for Urban Education to affect change in urban areas depended on the inclusion of the relevant people. The failure of inner city education directly affected poor people, and that failure was most pronounced for poor black people. Any attempt to impose white middle class solutions from the university and to ignore substantial input from those people most concerned, would be self-defeating.

Such factors as a necessary commitment to change, a sensitivity to the ghetto situation, the acceptance of university expertise by blacks in the cities, and the desire and competence to work in ghetto schools were usually lacking in efforts by white middle class Americans. These criteria suggested the need for the involvement of blacks at the university level. The presence of black doctoral students and black faculty at the School of Education was a necessary although not sufficient precondition of the urban education effort with respect to personnel. For example, the mere presence of blacks was no guarantee the individuals involved would be effective in a center for urban education.

The School of Education at the University of
Massachusetts included thirteen black doctoral students and three individuals who held both doctoral student and faculty status. The black doctoral students constituted 15 per cent of the full-time planning doctoral candidates and 5 per cent of the faculty in a state with only a 2 per cent black population. Reliable statistics are not available, but it is unlikely that any predominantly white university in the country admitted as high a percentage (and perhaps an absolute number) of black doctoral candidates in education.

Reasons for recruitment and admission

The reasons for the recruitment and admission of black students and the recruitment of black faculty members were many and constituted a complex picture. The recruitment of the former preceded the recruitment of the latter and appeared to be quite deliberate; while the faculty hiring effort seemed more as an afterthought and possibly the belated response to blacks joining the graduate student population.

The presence of activist, young, white educators as both doctoral students and faculty at the School of Education guaranteed a liberal and friendly attitude toward the admission of blacks. The intellectual virtues of integration held an honored place in the conventional wisdom of liberal educators. Most of the white faculty and
doctoral students had developed their political awareness in the 1960's. Former Peace Corp administrators, civil rights activists of the King era, and anti-Vietman protestors came to Amherst among the 150 planners.

The makeup of that group insured a climate of tolerance for the admission of blacks: it did not guarantee the active recruitment of blacks which was necessary if an institution genuinely desired an integrated community. The presence of blacks at the "new" School of Education was a result, primarily, of the active recruitment on the part of four people—an historian from California who joined the faculty, Robert Woodbury; the administrative assistant to the Dean, Milma Brady; a new faculty member from the University of Indiana, Daniel Jordan; and the Dean. The two faculty members and the administrative assistant were influential figures in the school, and the Dean took their recommendations seriously, which contributed considerably to the success of the recruitment process.

The three were strongly committed to the notion that urban education should be a high priority of the School of Education. They understood that black participation was one precondition for such an effort. Also, a very pragmatic reason involved was the fact that the federal government, and the U.S. Office of Education in particular, as well as many private foundations, were committed to funding
programs for the "disadvantaged." Allen and other faculty had strong ties with the Office and fully understood the intent of federal aid to the schools. The abilities and visibility of blacks at Amherst helped to satisfy both ideals and self-interest.23

The philosophy and process of admissions instituted by the Dean facilitated the participation of blacks in the "revolution" at the School of Education. First, the Dean exercised considerable freedom from traditional admissions restraints. Under the university administrative structure, the deans of the various divisions had many powers. All committees of the faculty were advisory to the Dean, including the admissions committee. Roberts, in the Saturday Review article, summed up Allen's outlook in this area succinctly: "Credentials at UMass don't count as much as Allen's perception of people with ideas, talents, or perspectives that could prove useful in shaping a new education school."29

The standard admissions procedures, including the usual paraphernalia of GRE and Miller Analogies scores, undergraduate grade point averages, and personal recommendations, were used as admissions criteria. But acceptance as a doctoral candidate was not limited to these criteria or a specific balance or formula among these criteria. Allen had a relatively free hand to use traditional measures as a guide rather than as rigid requirements. This does not
imply that no blacks would have been accepted according to standard criteria, because many qualified under traditional measures. But Allen's free hand allowed him to weigh such factors as the cultural biases of standard tests and other less tangible yet valid criteria. Some blacks and whites qualified for admissions in this context.

Very few blacks received doctoral degrees in any given year. Oppression, racism, overt and latent discrimination, and the well-known and sordid history of the lack of equal educational opportunity for blacks had resulted in this situation. The degree of freedom to develop and have a measure of control over one's own doctoral program promised by the School of Education at the University of Massachusetts was unprecedented. The School of Education at least promised to be different. It might actually award doctoral degrees to black people. That "hope factor" aided in the recruitment of black doctoral students.

Late in the spring of 1968, Allen had recruited close to thirty faculty members. None were black. Finally, the Director of the Westside Study Center in Pasadena, California, Atron A. Gentry, joined the faculty as a Lecturer and doctoral candidate. In July, a man admitted as a doctoral student, Elliott O. Williams, was made a part-time Lecturer. Finally, in August of 1968, a third man, Arthur France, joined the faculty as an Instructor and doctoral
student.

All three men were recruited largely through the efforts of Woodbury and the Dean. The combination of faculty and doctoral status in all three cases was a source of controversy and the appointments probably would not have been possible without, again, the special powers of the Dean. Most significant was the fact that Rentsy would become the Director of the Center for Urban Education.

Not only was the number of black faculty small, but the fact that none of the three had doctorates and were at the bottom of the faculty hierarchy meant that they had limited formal powers. An extraordinary kind of effort would be required by black faculty to establish an effective center for urban education.

The Colorado Retreat

On September 15, the 150 faculty and doctoral students boarded a chartered airplane for a flight to Colorado and a week's retreat at a summer camp in the mountains. A participant described the experience: "It was an intensive experiment in group living, interaction, confrontation, and participation. It was an opportunity to cut across ethnic, racial, age, and sex lines to find out what one's colleague thinks." The group held meetings, often on an ad hoc basis, throughout the day and sometimes far into the night. The
group participated in a variety of outdoor recreational activities which provided relief from planning sessions. but the isolation of the mountain camp allowed little diversion from the intensive group experience.31

The first real attempt of the School of Education to deal with issues of race relations and urban education took place at Colorado. In fact, it marked the only instance during "the Planning Year" when that issue dominated the agenda of the collective group for any length of time.

In a pre-Colorado planning meeting on urban education, a random group of planners arrived at the conclusion: "Solve the problems of urban education and you will solve the problems of education as a whole."32 That viewpoint represented a central idea of individuals interested in urban education which they presented to the community at Colorado. The underlying theme involved a belief that the order of magnitude of problems in the city loomed so large that to alleviate them would provide answers in every educational setting.

Many suggested the problem went deeper and was more complex. The School of Education intended to re-think the underlying values, assumptions, and objectives of contemporary education. The urban education group proposed the thesis that their urban education and "blacker" perspective on the current system would provide the most useful alternative
frame of reference. The race relations activity and sensitivity sessions at Colorado could create a different context and perspective from which to view the educational system and society. The experience of a predominantly white group confronted by a substantial number of blacks would add a necessary emotional element to the intellectually oriented planning process. A black doctoral student later presented the rationale clearly:

... teachers, administrators, professors, consultants and the like are all from a middle class background providing inputs and ideals extracted from their experiences which can only benefit those who will have similar experiences ... In other words, education must be radically redefined and restructured to include persons, concepts, values, standards, etc. relevant to inner city cultures if it intends to deal with the people there.

Consequently, an urban education group tried to enable whites to look at their system and, in addition, attempted to put the agenda of race relations and urban education before the community. The School devoted considerable time to those issues at Colorado.

The major event at Colorado involved an evening devoted to race relations. Several members of the group had lobbied for two days to persuade the entire community that such a session required first priority. An observer wrote: "On Monday night the question of racism was raised and in keeping with the philosophy of the retreat, it was decided to attack the problem directly." Former associates
of Gentry in California, experts in the area of black-white encounters, arrived to help conduct the session. They brought a film, "Black Anger," which served as a springboard for discussion.

After the large group meeting, the leaders divided the community into small groups, each with a two-man facilitating team. "It was midnight before the confrontation took place, lasting until 3, 4, or 5 in the morning. The deep desire of everyone to understand the issues and feelings, and set this problem out in the open paid off," stated a participant.25

Far from the artificial inequality of American society, the retreat provided the perfect setting where an integrated group could interact for the first time. Communication took place on a first name basis and most were ignorant of the professional status or position of many others in the group. Unique events occurred. White professors and black doctoral students, both on horseback for the first time, raced for the "calvary-charm cup" for "novices." Some claimed the only shirt the Dean brought to Colorado was a bright-colored African dashiki. Two assistant deans, troubled by race questions and personal misunderstandings left unsettled at an earlier evening meeting, went from bunkhouse to bunkhouse to sustain various blacks and whites. That session lasted until near dawn.
Also, the community of 150 elected a twenty-one year-old black woman Chairman of the Executive Committee at Colorado, the highest position in the new and evolving governing system.

A group returned from Colorado with many individuals having been deeply affected by their first real contact with black people and the perspective which they brought to bear on American education and society. Urban education people wondered whether the community would resume "business as usual" during "the Planning Year" at Amherst and avoid questions of race relations and urban education. An isolated mountain camp differed from a major institution in white society.

The Colorado experience also indicated that race relations would not be easy for the community to confront. It had taken two days to persuade the majority that the issue deserved public attention. Many felt the questions were too explosive to deal with out in the open. The majority of the community also seemed slow to recognize the link between urban education reform and the school's call for an educational "revolution." That raised doubts about the strength of the commitment to change.
CHAPTER II
THE HARTFORD PROJECT: A CASE STUDY

Introduction

As the major off-campus project in which CUE members labored during "the Planning Year," Hartford contributed to the position of CUE as a viable Center. Run by five doctoral students, it also served as a training vehicle for several CUE staff members. Most important, the Hartford Project became a pilot site where CUE developed a philosophy and direction with respect to off-campus activities; specifically, relationships with public school systems and various organizations. The successes and failures in Hartford provided important object lessons on which to base an approach to off-campus projects in 1969-1970.

A UMass-Hartford Partnership

A formal statement of partnership

In August, 1968, Medill Sair, Superintendent of Schools in Hartford, and Dwight Allen, Dean of the School of Education, met and agreed to explore the ways in which their two institutions might cooperate. Early in September,
Allen designated a planning doctoral candidate, Jack Woodbury, as the School of Education Coordinator for Hartford; Bair asked Robert Miles, Assistant Superintendent, to represent the Hartford administration.

Bair and Allen had known each other in California. A coincidence of style and attitude also helped cooperation at the top. Allen had pioneered in the area of flexible scheduling and Bair had co-authored an important study of team teaching. Both were free and open in personal manner and both reflected something of the maverick. Their public statements had put both men on record as advocates of fundamental reform in American education.

But each man also represented the interests of his own rather large institution, which proved to be more important than philosophical agreement and friendship.

Late in September, a "Statement of Partnership" was drawn up. "The Hartford Public Schools," Bair and Allen agreed, "will establish a partnership with the School of Education of the University of Massachusetts intended to expand the horizons of education in general, and to improve the quality of education given the Hartford Public School students in particular." For its part Hartford would "make selected schools and appropriate resources available to the School of Education for the implementation of projects and/or programs for which a concurrence of interest has been estab-
lished." The phrase, "a congruence of interest," postponed the central issue, which involved a history in which universities had rarely developed effective working relationships with urban school systems.¹

Mutual suspicion had characterized such relationships. Teacher training institutions and school systems usually acted like two mothers-in-law. Necessity and protocol occasionally brought them together but they rarely enjoyed each other's company. School systems resented the research pretensions of the universities and accused them of living in an ivory tower, far from the practical problems in the districts. Schools of education, on the other hand, were apt to conclude that school district personnel were more concerned about administrative formalities than the education of children.² The university and the public schools represented two independent and different constituencies, which made their cooperation difficult.

The cover letter which Bair sent to the Hartford Board of Education with the "Statement of Partnership" was somewhat defensive in tone and illustrated the political context in which the statement of high purpose would have to live. Bair stated: "Also, the reverse would be true: we will call on them only when we feel they can be effective."³ The coincidence of style of Allen and Bair, a California friendship, and the agreement about the need for
reform in American education would not determine the nature of the relationship: the partnership, rather, would rest on the self-interest of the two parties. Whether mutual benefits could prevail over mutual suspicions was the acid test of the partnership.

The reasons behind the partnership: Hartford

The most important reason for Hartford's participation was speculative yet quite obvious given the evidence which became available during the year. The universities in Hartford had not played an active role in the Hartford Public Schools prior to September of 1933. Bair had expressed disappointment in schools of education on this score in a speech in Springfield in April of 1933. He felt it might be necessary to "take some pretty drastic steps to improve the preparation of teachers for urban schools." One solution might be for "public education . . . . to move in the direction of taking over control of institutions of teacher education." The Hartford administration saw some initiative by an out-of-state university as a useful vehicle to involve local universities. The competition and jealousy inherent in the outside penetration of Connecticut university "turf" would be an important catalyst.

Evidence to support this hypothesis emerged as the project developed. The Hartford administration publicized
and paraded University of Massachusetts involvement in the schools before the many publics in the city, particularly university personnel. The University of Massachusetts was designated the higher education participant for the prospective Teacher Corps program until the University of Hartford became intrigued with the project. There were repeated reports of hostility from Connecticut university personnel directed at the mere presence of Massachusetts people in the Hartford schools, which appeared to confirm the effectiveness of the administration strategy.5

Secondly, the guidelines for federal government programs provided additional incentives for school systems which cooperated with the universities, and the University of Massachusetts appeared more eager for this role than Connecticut universities.6 School of Education staff participated with Hartford in the development of a federal second language proposal and a federal proposal in the area of school drop-out prevention, as well as in the early stages of the Teacher Corps proposal.

Other factors of less significance contributed to the rationale for the partnership. Hartford saw in the involvement of doctoral interns and undergraduate practice teachers a potential employment pool for a hard-pressed urban school system.7 The School of Education had many people committed to change, an activist orientation, new
ideas, and a flexible structure which might bring the
University's talents to bear on the problems the school
system faced. Also, unlike the Connecticut universities,
the School of Education had a significant number of black
doctoral students who might make a contribution in Hartford.

The reasons behind the Partnership: the University of Massachusetts

Fundamentally, the School of Education and members
of GUE wanted to develop off-campus projects in urban centers. Hartford could serve as a site on which to train personnel and as a laboratory situation for the group of activists at Amherst to experiment with the process of bringing chance to public education.

Hartford had certain advantages which overcame the
proximity advantage held by Springfield, Massachusetts. Allen's early and friendly contact with Bair made Hartford an easy place to initiate cooperative programs. The Hartford administration seemed closer in style and philosophy than systems in Massachusetts. The School of Education hoped, also, that the Hartford involvement might encourage the Springfield Public Schools to be more anxious to work with the University of Massachusetts.

Other factors were involved. The prospects of a relatively free atmosphere to test ideas was important. A
more subtle and yet no less crucial reason was that the School of Education, by working out of state, enjoyed more freedom of action than various political strings within the state might have allowed. Also, the Hartford partnership, along with other out-of-state projects, illustrated the School of Education's intention to seek a national impact.

A Partnership Program: the Hartford System

Hartford's plan for university involvement had been a "turf" plan: the system was divided into three parts corresponding to three high school districts and their feeder elementary schools. The district which included Weaver High School was University of Hartford "turf," the University of Connecticut ran programs in the Hartford High School district, and the Bulkeley High School district was opened to the University of Massachusetts, presumably until another Connecticut institution demonstrated sufficient interest. Also designated as "UMass Schools" were three of Bulkeley's feeder elementary schools--Burns, Kennolly, and New Park--and Arsenal Elementary School in the Weaver district.8

Bulkeley High School had a largely white enrollment, and its minority group students were new to the School. A major objective of the Hartford administration was to transform Bulkeley from a predominantly white school
to an integrated school in the midst of a heterogeneous educational park. A top priority for the administration would be to prepare the Bulkeley student body, staff, and community for an altered situation. It was already receiving increasing numbers of black and Puerto Rican students from the elementary schools.

Bulkeley offered a flatly depressing learning environment. Chairs were bolted to the floor, a six-inch platform remained at the front of some classrooms where a teacher talked down at a class. The teaching appeared singularly unexciting and any glance in a classroom revealed many students in a state of boredom. A new principal at Bulkeley understood the problems of his school and hoped to change the "law and order" environment, as he called it.

A new principal at predominantly white Kennelly Elementary School found her problems similar to those at Bulkeley and, in an early conversation, spoke of the unimaginative and traditional approach to teaching of her staff. The principal of Arsenal Elementary School in the poverty-stricken North End had a host of problems, including the fact that most of his black and Puerto Rican student body were reading below grade level. Many of his teachers also had trouble keeping enough control in class to be able to teach. At New Park Avenue elementary School, the major problems involved the inability of staff to teach and manage
black students at the seventh and eighth grade levels.

At the request of one UMass intern, Burns Elementary School was replaced by predominantly black Weaver High School, which was a major incursion on the sacredness of the "turf" system. Weaver was plagued by low student achievement, conflict in the faculty, and a potentially inflammatory situation between some white staff and some black students.

The catalogue of problems in these schools replicated most of the classic urban school problems. This was the setting for the involvement of the University of Massachusetts.

At its inception, the partnership lacked a program and a commitment of resources, both financial and personnel. The partnership was no more than a statement of intention.

As a first step the School of Education proposed placing a doctoral intern from UMass in each of the five designated schools as "general assistants to the principals." They would "also perform the UMass-Hartford coordinating function by determining the needs of their school, and begin to feed in UMass talent and develop various relationships." These ideas reflected the thinking of Woodbury, the UMass Hartford Coordinator. He hoped, also, that there would be frequent communication between the five interns in order to gain a "city wide perspective of the school system and
community."9

The interns would perform a maintenance function by assisting the principals, but the idealistic expectation of bringing School of Education expertise to Hartford was also indicated. And there was a call for coordination among the five individuals.

Hopefully, interns would seek acceptance by the staff in the expectation of eventually effecting some changes in the school.10 This approach, which saw the possibility of bringing change by working within the school in a non-threatening way and without the assistance of outside authority, was the predominant change-agent philosophy of the doctoral interns at the outset.11 The change-agent conception implied an ambitious hope that the University could do more than train administrators, perform maintenance functions in the schools, and provide university resources. This ambitious hope served as both an inspiration and a source of frustration as the year progressed.

The notion of a UMass-Hartford partnership might have been stillborn if no financial resources had become available to help implement the idea. Late in the fall, the next phase in the partnership began when the New World Foundation gave $10,000 to UCI to develop the project. The central idea in the proposal was the simple notion that a university-public school relationship could be mutually
beneficial:

In addition, the research expertise and other talents of the faculty and graduate students at schools of education have not been utilized in a broad and comprehensive manner. Public school systems have not benefited from this vast body of potential resources. University training programs have suffered as well because much of their work is irrelevant and divorced from the real needs of the public schools. 12

The two parties were not the natural antagonists which the recent history of such urban partnerships had implied.

The sum of $5,000 was allocated to support the salaries of the doctoral intern team, now designated the Hartford Coordinating Team. Hartford contributed a matching amount. The function of the Team was as originally planned — with one intern in each of the five schools. 13

The five members of the Team were Woodbury, Elliott Williams, Carol Carter, Robert Mackin, and Joseph Schulze. Williams and Carter were black. Woodbury, 29, a private school teacher in the suburbs for six years had one year of administrative experience and had been involved in urban school programs in the summers. Williams, 26, had been a public school teacher and administrator, had grown up in a city, and was knowledgeable about urban schools. Carter came to the School of Education from Gary, Indiana where she had been in the Teacher Corps. Twenty-nine years old, she was an experienced teacher. Mackin, 23, had taught for one year at a predominantly black school in California. Schulze was an experienced private school teacher, 27 years
old, and had been involved in urban school programs to a limited degree.

As a group, the Team was young, capable in dealing with people, effective as teachers, quite limited in administrative experience, and somewhat green in the world of urban school politics.

In addition to supporting the Team, the New World budget illuminated other assumptions of the program design. The amount of $2,500 was allocated to facilitate the travel of faculty, doctoral students, and undergraduates over the fifty mile trip to Hartford, once the doctoral intern had specified a need for university resources. The Team expected that many at Amherst would wish to become involved in Hartford.

A new aspect of CUE's design for a project in Hartford was discussed in the proposal:

Ultimately, we envision a UMass student-teacher training program which will be located in the midst of the urban environment and will include live-in facilities.14

The budget was also revised to help support the rental of live-in facilities for undergraduate and Master's level student teachers who wanted to fulfill teacher certification requirements.

Practice teachers either benefited a school as cheap manpower or they created additional problems for the regular staff. The School of Education designated its under-
graduates "resource students" rather than "practice teachers" because the intention was to benefit the five target schools by supplementing the efforts made by the doctoral interns.

A memorandum to the Hartford administration from the Coordinating Team stated the objective:

They may aid class personnel who are working in special projects in the schools or provide release time for teachers to plan and work on their own projects. In short, they may function in a variety of roles--staffing a reading clinic, helping with guidance, devising new curriculums, and actually teaching in the classroom... The basic concept of the coordinating team and the supporting resource students is to benefit the total program of an individual school and provide additional manpower.

The memorandum also made clear that the doctoral interns, not the regular staff teachers, would be responsible for the activities, training, and evaluation of the student teachers. The Coordinating Team wanted to have control of the resource student program as well as relieve the regular staff of those often frustrating responsibilities.

In summary, the rationale for attaching student teachers to the partnership was to multiply the long-term manpower in Hartford from five people to twenty-five people, spread over five schools. Run by individuals in the Center for Urban Education, the proposal concluded with a hope for a significant start on a larger agenda:

The Urban Education Center at the School of Education plans to concentrate their efforts in a number of areas: teacher training, race relations, strengths training, reading, early childhood education, the development of administrators and curriculum change agents, and community relations development. Our intention is to begin this year to establish projects
in these areas to build "pieces" into a developing relationship with public school systems.

A system-wide effort: the Hartford Schools Human Relations Committee

Race relations was a major problem in Hartford. The black and Puerto Rican school population in the city had increased rapidly as whites moved to the suburbs. The racial composition of the school staffs did not change rapidly and remained predominantly white. Racial tensions increased within the faculties, the student bodies, and between students and staffs.

Through the encouragement of the Hartford administration and the request of teachers who founded the Human Relations Committee, the doctoral interns participated in the planning for a race relations program. The interns eventually conducted four training sessions where teachers from throughout the system explored the area of race relations and human relations.

Both black and white graduate students associated with the Center had been involved in the race relations trainer class at the School of Education during the first semester and many were currently working as discussion leaders in the race relations course for undergraduates during the second semester. Each of the doctoral interns had experience in this area, felt it was a major problem in
Hartford, and was committed to doing something about it.

At an initial organizational meeting the interns emphasized their belief that personal encounter techniques were more useful than a sociological or historical approach to race relations. They felt it was a problem which should be talked out. Participants should deal with their feelings and attitudes which affected their behavior without consciousness of bigotry. A purely academic or intellectual argument could not affect behavior as readily.

Williams ran the first meeting which attracted volunteers from individual schools. He urged as a plan of attack that the members first deal with human relations problems within the group and find a point of direction, before they undertook a program in their individual schools.

Invited by the Committee, the interns ran the next two meetings for approximately fifty white and black participants, with the basic approach a series of group games and activities with race relations implications, and where the teachers dealt with each other on a personal level. Professor Weinstein, who ran the trainer's course at the School of Education, conducted the final session with the assistance of the interns.

The Human Relations Committee sessions, which involved the entire system, may have been the most useful activity the interns performed. Working with familiar
techniques, the interns attached a major problem area of Hartford's schools.

In-service efforts

There were many reasons why effecting change in Hartford was a difficult process: few levers or vehicles could be utilized. Within the existing structure of the schools with the restraints of daily schedules, one of the few legitimate, if rarely effective, vehicles of change was the in-service meeting for teachers and administrators. The Hartford Coordinating Team, when possible, brought School of Education personnel to Hartford to participate in those sessions.

Faculty and graduate students at the School of Education led meetings where they offered their particular expertise. Professor Steinmetz held a seminar on alternative approaches to curriculum; Dr. Harrington was effective in a luncheon meeting and an afternoon in-service session which dealt with the reading field. Lloyd Kline was an articulate spokesman for the utility of flexible scheduling. Richard Lacey, a national expert in the use of the film in the classroom, led a seminar at one of the non-targeted schools, Hartford High School. On another occasion a task force of six professors spent a morning at a school discussing alternative administrative functions. Six faculty and grad-
uate students offered two presentations at a principals in-service workshop.

An in-service meeting for twenty-five principals and teachers from Hartford was held at the campus in Amherst. The intern Team used this occasion to facilitate better communication between administrators and teachers, and to introduce the participants to curriculum innovations being carried on at the University. Finally, Hartford personnel attended both of the twelve-hour "educational marathons" conducted by the School of Education. These in-service efforts represented a major part of the resources which the University contributed to the Hartford project.

Maintenance Activities

Primarily the doctoral interns provided daily administrative help for principals and staff at the five schools. Thus, they served maintenance rather than change-agent functions. In this role the interns performed a variety of tasks, including assistance in scheduling, advising the student council, handling discipline problems, and designing reading programs.

Similarly, the student teachers assisted overburdened inner city staffs. They supervised study halls, taught classes, served as teacher aids in the classrooms. participated in various kinds of individual conference
situations, visited parents in their homes, and played many other useful roles. One undergraduate assumed virtually the entire instructional responsibility for an overworked guidance department at New Park Elementary School. Another intern who spoke fluent Spanish made a major contribution to the second language program at Fox Elementary School. When a regular art teacher at Weaver High School was absent for three weeks, due to illness, a talented UMass student teacher assumed responsibility for all his classes. Two other interns added critically needed manpower in the seventh and eighth grade classrooms at New Park School for students with academic and emotional problems.

Finally, at Arsenal Elementary School, in the heart of the North End ghetto, UMass student interns often served as substitute teachers when it became difficult to hire capable replacements.

Change-Agentry in Two Schools: Kennelly and New Park

Introduction

The doctoral intern team, in addition to performing tasks which would be classified as "maintenance" activities, had more ambitious plans and hopes. They sought to effect changes in the five designated schools; to be catalysts for
improvement in the schools.

In two elementary schools, those change-agent efforts isolated certain problems, overcame roadblocks, developed strategies, and revealed how various University and Hartford School System components and forces interacted. The two cases indicated that change is often made up of a series of small victories. The two situations also demonstrated how frustrating the process of change could be.

Kennally Elementary School

The specific role of the doctoral interns from the University of Massachusetts aroused controversy in Hartford, both on the part of staff members in the five designated schools, and the Hartford Federation of Teachers which viewed them as vice-Principals who would become principals in the place of Hartford personnel. The role was intentionally ambiguous so the intern would not be pigeon-holed as an agent of the principal, a spy from the central administration, or an ally of the teachers in league against the school administration. Rather, by working with all these groups, the intern could lobby for certain kinds of change depending on the specific situation in each school.

Due to his responsibilities as Coordinator in Hartford, Woodbury, the intern assigned to Kennally, could spend often as little as one day per week there. Conse-
quently, he focused his involvement upon the seventh and eighth grades. He encouraged teachers to experiment with a more flexible approach to the daily schedule, student grouping procedures, and curriculum alternatives. By opening up these areas, he hoped teacher attitudes and behavior would be modified or gradually altered, paving the way for more significant and long-term changes.

The major vehicles utilized by the intern were the in-service meeting and the use of university "experts." Twice a month during the spring term, the intern met to plan specific scheduling experiments in the current term as well as to plan for a more open schedule for 1969-1970. The basic goal was to affect staff attitudes and to foster a team approach to the academic program. The intern brought experts in the areas of flexible scheduling and reading, and the Director of seventh and eighth grade education in Hartford, to various in-service meetings.

As one example of an experiment, a film demonstration was planned at an early in-service meeting. Richard Lacey, a graduate student at the School of Education, brought a film program to Kennelly one Friday afternoon. Several objectives were accomplished. First, a new precedent, the eighth grade honors group (8-A) and the eighth grade lowest group (8-I) were combined for the presentation in the auditorium. Also, because it was held in the auditorium,
the instrumentalist music teacher shifted his quarters, which demonstrated his mobility for the first time. Thirdly, a science, English, and social studies teacher abandoned their regular classes to allow the auditorium program to run for two consecutive periods. For Kennelly, this was a major experiment.

Other results were encouraging. Though not as active as the 3-K group, the 3-K group participated actively in the discussion which followed the movie. One of the teachers, initially skeptical of the plan, saw important possibilities for varying standardized groupings. Three weeks later, with the assistance of the guidance instructor, two UMass resource students showed *The Wild One*, a story of rebellious youth starring Marlon Brando, over two periods in the morning and for two sections. In the afternoon an additional period for discussion for each section was held. UMass had acted as a catalyst for abandoning traditional patterns to devote three periods in one day, for two sections, to a movie not usually defined by schools as "educational."

The Lacey demonstration had helped set the stage.

The in-service meeting proved to be a useful change vehicle at Kennelly. But no in-service program or other university activities at the School could have been successful without at least some staff support—a crucial element in the change process. Although two influential teachers
of the eight on the staff resisted Umass involvement, and several others were lukewarm at the outset, one innovation-minded teacher was outspoken at the in-service meetings and provided an impetus for change. He sometimes relieved the doctoral intern of the role of change-agent and was instrumental in winning several teachers in the middle ground over to the side of innovation.

Another factor in the change process was the role of the central administration. Several of the seventh and eighth grade staff expressed hostility toward the central administration. Early in the winter the Director of the seventh and eighth grade program in Hartford came to an in-service meeting and stressed the need to develop a more flexible schedule, which reinforced those seeking change. The Umass intern asked for staff planning time to undertake some innovations. The Director, on the spot, promised a once-a-week early dismissal for the seventh and eighth grades to provide planning time for the teachers. The intern had been able to link the central administration to a verbal and active attitude toward change. The intern had been useful as a middle man to bring the central administration to the school to lend support.

A key factor in the process of change at Kennelly was the involvement of five undergraduates from the University of Massachusetts. Eventually, six of the eight staff
members made use of the resource students in one capacity or another. A useful and subtle means of affecting regular staff behavior proved to be the presence of the student teacher in the classroom. Unass student teachers introduced many of the humanistic education curriculum, units which had been developed at the School of Education. Also, the student teachers utilized debates in social studies classes, introduced role playing and dramatic techniques to the English classes, and presented some inter-disciplinary units. Some teachers at Kennelly, less threatened by student teachers than by "university experts," modified their own teaching styles and experimented with some of these innovative approaches.

The most important element in the Kennelly situation turned out to be the support provided by the principal. In her first year at the School, she too sought a more flexible schedule and a more innovative program. She made it clear at the in-service meetings that she supported the current experimental efforts. She also allowed the doctoral intern freedom in his activities, welcomed and supported the resource students, and occasionally ran interference for the intern with recalcitrant staff.

By the end of the year, the staff could list nine areas where they had conducted pilot projects which involved innovative curriculum and the use of a variable
schedule. And in the last month of the school year, they developed a plan for the 1969-1970 school year in which one day a week the regular schedule would be abandoned and a special program implemented. Overall, the progress at Kennelly was modest, not without its failures and traumas, but nevertheless encouraging.

The reason for change lay in the cooperation and coordination of the several parties: the doctoral intern, an influential teacher, the central administration, and the resource students. Most important, however, was the active support of the chief administrative person in the School, the principal. Also, the objective was circumscribed, modest, and realistic in terms of the limited resources.

New Park

The greatest amount of effort and personnel resources were devoted to New Park Avenue Elementary School, and primarily at the seventh and eighth grade level which had a majority of poor, black children from Charter Oak Terrace, a public housing development. Joseph Schulze, the doctoral intern at New Park, described some of the social ills which plagued these students and affected their performance in school—the harvest of poverty and racism.
Drugs, alcohol, fights are all part of the daily fare. An 8th grade girl is sent home pregnant, shots from a pint of gin are sold to students at school, a small prostitution ring is discovered among the 7th and 8th grade girls, and numerous shake-downs in the hallways are part of what students, teachers, and parents must cope with. I shall never forget the frustration and fear of one boy whom I found trying to hang himself in the cloak room, sobbing as he stood on a chair with the rope tightly around his neck.22

Working with the intern at New Park was the largest group of student teachers—six, with a concentration of four at the seventh and eighth level. They conducted classes and provided release time for regular staff (usually for additional coffee breaks rather than for in-service meetings). They also supervised study halls, served as teacher aids in the classroom, participated in various kinds of individual conference situations, occasionally visited parents in their homes, and engaged in other activities.

The undergraduate worked full time for the overburdened guidance department. Another intern added critically needed manpower in the seventh and eighth grade classroom for students with "academic" and "emotional" problems.

Along with these maintenance activities the doctoral intern functioned similar to a vice-principal: his major job was to help "keep the lid on." The Coordinating Team hoped, somewhat naively, that this assistance would result in greater acceptance of the University, and would help prepare a climate for university-induced change.
The doctoral intern attempted to make changes in two areas: in curriculum, and in school-community relations. Also, late in the spring, an ambitious plan to alter the school program considerably was proposed.

Again, useful and subtle means of affecting the behavior of staff proved to be the presence of the student teachers in the classroom. The UMass student teachers at New Park introduced many of the humanistic curriculum units which were developed at the University. This proved a stimulating alternative to the traditional academic offerings in some classrooms. A few teachers at New Park modified their own teaching style to incorporate some innovative techniques. Film also became a vehicle at New Park for altering the curriculum.

Lacey's film project at New Park demonstrated the possibilities of a university-based change-agent effort. Movies did not appear threatening to a school staff, at least initially. Lacey showed films and ran discussions in the "coaching room." The regular teacher was desirous for help. After some successful demonstrations in the "coaching room," Lacey had requests from teachers in English and social studies classes. Eventually, he trained all the interns and four of the regular staff in the uses of the film in the classroom. Another spin-off benefit of the film project came from the transfer effect of Lacey's
more imaginative teaching style on the New Park teachers.

The doctoral intern concentrated efforts in a second area—the attempt to open a dialogue between the largely white school staff and black parents in the Charter Oak Terrace community. In an unprecedented move, two parent meetings were held in the Charter Oak community at a church, and several parents undertook a special telephone campaign to get other parents to attend. The intern supplemented these efforts by encouraging increased communication between individual faculty and parents. The MASS undergraduates also participated in this program.

But regular staff wanted "help to relieve them of burdens" not "help to change." That difference, not clearly understood by the Coordinating Team, hurt the effort by MASS at New Park. Most teachers felt threatened by attempts to upset the status quo. They had carved out a particular niche in the school and had established set patterns of instruction and behavior. Nor were they thankful for University assistance: the reward of the undergraduate who took over the entire class schedule in guidance was consistent abuse and harassment by several teachers.

UNASS personnel devoted considerable effort to New Park and achieved some first steps toward change. But the problems at New Park were much greater than at Lennally.
The teachers at Kennelly were not naturally more receptive to the University or more willing to change. First, the problems were magnified at New Park. But the key variable which separated change-agent efforts at New Park from Kennelly involved the different behavior of the principal.

The situation at New Park was poisoned by the hostilities between the principal of New Park and the central administration. "Downtown" clearly did not have confidence in the principal and the principal frequently expressed his dissatisfaction with the central administration. By a policy of non-cooperation with the University, whose program the central administration backed, the principal torpedoed UMass efforts and would not provide leadership for his staff in these activities. The principal permitted members of the regular staff to undermine the work of UMass personnel. Left divided and leaderless, the faculty foundered.

The principal demonstrated how he could thwart change when his impending departure for a year's leave of absence opened the way for an alternative administrative structure for New Park. Negotiations between the central administration, the New Park teachers, and the School of Education for a partnership experimental school took place late in the spring. Several planning meetings were held and a proposal for an Urban Developmental School, in which
New Park teachers and UMass personnel would share certain administrative responsibilities, was written. However, demands of time, intra-faculty politics and jealousies, and a lack of consistent pressure by the central administration prevented implementation in September. But the absence of leadership, and even obstructionist activity, on the part of the "lame duck" principal, was the key factor which upset the plans. 23

In conclusion, to contrast the change-agent efforts at Kennelly and New Park, in the latter case the problems were greater and UMass ambitions more bold. But several parties worked in concert at Kennelly while at New Park the principal divided his faculty and neutralized the central administration, which resulted in difficulties for both the doctoral intern and the resource students.

A Proposal for an Urban Developmental School

Introduction

When the question of the future of New Park Elementary School gained prominence in the spring with the imminent change in its principal, the central administration encouraged the Center for Urban Education to work with New Park staff to develop a proposal for a new administrative structure. In this context, members of the Center, based
on the New Park experience, wrote a proposal for a partnership school called the Urban Developmental School. It was the first attempt of the Center to conceptualize a laboratory school program. It reflected the thinking in CUE in the late spring and provided a blueprint for future discussions with public schools.  

An Urban Developmental School

The proposal dealt with three major topics: an innovative program; community participation; and the question of control and responsibility in university-public school relationships.

The "Introduction" to the proposal indicated CUE's objective to carry its program far beyond the training of personnel at Amherst:

The Center for Urban Education at the University of Massachusetts School of Education intends to establish itself as a long-range planning, research, and training center, focusing on the development of new models for education in urban areas . . . . The university can offer manpower—graduate and student interns—and expertise, in the form of consultants, special programs, and credit course offerings. The urban school provides a research and training site, the realities of urban education.  

The Center stated its intention to reverse a trend in which teacher training institutions had fled to the warm embrace of the suburban schools and turned their backs on the educational crisis in the cities.
The Center's menu for innovations in urban schools, at that point (May 1969), largely reflected the ideas developed by Dwight Allen in the suburban context, only adapted for the urban scene in the proposal. The plan resulted from a pragmatic decision to offer some alternatives to current practices rather than to present an in-depth analysis of the nature of the urban school crisis. It also represented a notion held by many in the Center that flexible scheduling and differentiated staffing, if not the most appropriate medicine for urban schools, could serve as a way to upset the status quo and create a discontinuity in the existing system.

A radical alteration of the learning environment in the seventh and eighth grades at New Park was intended. The Allen model had been applied to poor, black children at only one other location in the nation at that point. If successful, the New Park experience would provide a potential model for the Center to offer to other urban situations.

The proposal stated the basic rationale for flexible scheduling in classic terms:

Where individual attention is absolutely necessary, the flexible schedule facilitates the use of additional personnel. It maximizes the possibilities for small group work, individual tutoring, and conferences. The fundamental goal of flexible scheduling is to promote self-directed learning. Too many urban and suburban children lack motivation to learn even the basic skills. Flexible scheduling confronts this problem directly.
The plan anticipated building renovations although a traditional structure like New Park could have been physically adapted at minimal cost. The resource areas for small group work and independent study followed the traditional suburban model, with the sole addition of a reading clinic for New Park. Students might spend up to fifty per cent of their time in various resource areas such as the multimedia center, the library, and projection room. 

The curriculum section emphasized two points: a more effective approach to basic skills—reading, writing, and computation skills; and a new humanistic curriculum. The proposal represented a combination of the need to improve the traditional curriculum, to help ghetto students achieve better in the existing system; and at the same time to offer something more relevant than the tedious traditional fare. The proposal suggested:

Just as critical as the reading and computation skills are the areas of individual growth, whicherry
Weinstein calls "identity, power and connectedness" in his book, Making Urban Schools Work. Concerns such as Who am I? What values do I hold?, How do I relate to others?, How do I judge others?, To what degree am I manipulated by my environment?, How can I control my environment? would be examined under this concept of power, identity, and connectedness. 

CUS and the School of Education anticipated a major role in developing the humanistic curriculum and training teachers at New Park to use it.

The Urban Developmental School planned to train and
utilize the talents of undergraduate interns, and to provide a substantial in-service program for the regular staff, including on-site courses conducted by UMass faculty. The flexible schedule and added manpower of the interns would make available release time for the second function. And the Center would have a laboratory for training teachers.

The staffing pattern proposed also included such personnel as community liaisons and aids, students as teachers, and consultants from the university and community.

The structure and curriculum largely followed the thinking of Allen and Steinberg. New Park was to receive the heralded if untested School of Education package for educational reform, including community participation.

Ocean Hill-Brownsville, the small demonstration school district in New York City (9,000 students) had a major impact at the University of Massachusetts and in Hartford. The shocks from New York reverberated in Hartford in 1968-1969. Consequently, a plan for community involvement was outlined for New Park. The central administration had already pushed modified forms of community participation in the Hartford School System.

The doctoral intern had made attempts to improve the tenuous and often hostile relationship between New Park staff and the Charter Oak community. The proposal outlined a plan for community involvement, though not community control. First, the new administrative structure pro-
posed that the chief administrative officer at New Park, the Director, be responsible primarily for community-school relations. An Associate Director would be in charge of curriculum and teacher training. The rationale suggested:

The child's learning strongly depends on two factors: his school and his home. One of the primary goals of the urban developmental school will be to bring these two factors together in closer cooperation. Mutual suspicion between parents and teachers will be constructively attacked in order to create ultimate support for the child. The frequent interaction of parents and teachers will be encouraged, not just when problems of discipline arise.

In addition to the inclusion of community people in the staffing pattern, and the special emphasis on community relations in the design of the administrative structure, the plan called for a Community Cabinet. Three factors converged to bring this about. First, New Park needed a closer relationship with the Charter Oak community. Second, it matched the stated if cautious commitment of the central administration to community involvement. Third, it represented a developing policy in the Center that it would insist on community participation as a criterion for working with a school system. The degree of involvement, particularly on the sensitive issue of "control," was stated in vague terms, although the wording implied the Cabinet would be an advisory body. Throughout the year, the Center sought a position which would offer guidelines regarding an acceptable or unacceptable degree of community
participation for community agencies, students, and student teachers.33

The proposal also recommended in-house community participation; namely, the involvement of staff and students in the decision-making process, perhaps even a situation where the administrative personnel would be responsible to the rest of the school community. The idea was institutionalized by the Academic Cabinet. The rationale stated:

Traditionally, schools have been authoritarian in structure, with the curriculum and program descending in a direct line from the top. Yet, the success of any school system depends on its teachers. Teachers are professionals and should take an active part in the design of programs and development of curriculum. In the urban developmental school, full staff participation in every aspect of school planning is essential in order to create the dynamic learning environment desired.34

The Academic Cabinet would have student, community, and student teacher representatives.35

One crucial statement included in the proposal represented the search by the Center for Urban Education for a viable laboratory school, a site where the School of Education would have a degree of control sufficient to carry out an innovative program. "The Dean of the School of Education, University of Massachusetts, will negotiate with the city board of education to screen and select the administrative staff of the school."36 This statement also reflected a response to the current experience in Hartford where the University was implicated in the responsibility for
many partnership activities, yet they often had few levers to exercise control over events. The Center sought power to go with its responsibility in a partnership school. Also, the spring semester had demonstrated that CUED could not protect its student teachers sufficiently well if a principal allowed his staff members to make life difficult for them.

Negotiations for a Partnership School

Origins of the Partnership School Plan

In mid-March, the doctoral intern team and the Director of the Center for Urban Education, Atron Gentry, re-assessed the Hartford Project. Meeting with Robert Miles, Assistant Superintendent in Hartford, the Center decided to focus on one school in Hartford.

The Project, by spreading attention among five schools, had provided primarily "maintenance" functions rather than change-agent activities. The Project had lacked sufficient collaboration by the interns on individual school problems. Also, with resources too limited to be spread over several schools, only a concentration of activity and resources in one school could have produced meaningful results.

In the process of this re-assessment, a new strategy emerged for Hartford with the 1969-1970 school year in mind.
and New Park School as the focal point. The greatest involvement had been at New Park and some individual staff members had supported the University efforts. The other four schools held less potential because input had been more limited.

In retrospect, the choice of New Park was probably based on the wrong assumptions. More activity had developed at New Park, but the possibilities for long-range change and the creation of a developmental school at New Park proved to be limited. The principal's departure opened the door for a new administrative structure, but the overall nature of the existing staff, the composition of the student body, and the lack of a principal to take the lead during the planning made it less than an ideal site.

The plan for an Urban Developmental School described in the previous section constituted CUE's response to the new situation. The New Park staff debated several alternative proposals. But the planning process collapsed in the late spring due to intra-faculty strife, the lack of leadership by the principal, the absence of consistent pressure from the central administration, and the demands of time. The goal of implementing a new administrative structure and partnership program in September was abandoned as unrealistic. Instead, the central administration declared the fall semester a "planning" period.
Several planning steps were contemplated. Two teachers elected by the New Park staff would be released full time to plan with two full-time UMass doctoral students. The central administration also promised to seek CU's advice before selecting a new principal for the 1969-1970 school year. The new principal, presumably, would become acquainted with the plans to create a new administrative structure and program, assume a leadership role in its creation, and even be prepared to serve in a temporary capacity. The implementation of those points in the verbal agreement depended on the mutual interests of the two parties in the summer and fall.

The collapse of the partnership school

In a memorandum from CU to Dean Allen in May, the Center elaborated more specifically on the criteria which it felt should be negotiated with Hartford with regard to a partnership school. The Center spelled out the degree of control it must exercise in a laboratory school situation. The key points involved the right of the University to have a voice in the selection of teachers; a liberal transfer policy for teachers who opposed the program and a guarantee of 75 per cent initial staff support; negotiations by the Hartford Board with the Hartford Federation of Teachers and State Department of Education for flexibility in personnel
certification requirements; and a commitment to a new administrative structure, innovative curriculum, and a flexible schedule. 37

But the verbal understandings of the spring for a "planning" period in the first semester of 1969 were not carried out. Events during the summer and fall ended the plan for a partnership school.

Hartford kept its promise of providing two full-time internships for UMass graduate students to work at New Park. And the Board provided full release time for two elected "resource teachers" from the New Park staff. These four individuals constituted the projected fall planning committee.38

But the substance of the "working paper" was not discussed further. Secondly, the Hartford administration had agreed to consult with CÜ before appointing a new principal. But the central administration did not consult CÜ prior to the appointment of a new principal, nor did the new principal demonstrate any interest in the "planning" process during the fall. The four-man committee remained dormant. The administrator responsible for New Park in the central administration later admitted he had not discussed the partnership school proposal with the new principal.

Finally, the original UMass intern at New Park became, in fact if not in title, the vice-principal of New Park for grades seven and eight, and also responsible to
the principal. He maintained no independence vis-à-vis the New Park administration. The UMass intern, who was paid directly by Hartford, could not serve as an effective CUE bargaining agent. 39

The erosion of the partnership school resulted from neglect and lack of interest on both sides. Hartford retreated from its original position and members of the Center failed to push Hartford to deliver on earlier commitments. In the end, CUE and the Hartford administration could not arrive at a satisfactory position of shared power.

Conclusion

CUE emerged from Hartford having defined a policy with respect to involvement in public school systems and with a more sophisticated understanding of the change process with respect to university-public school activities. Firstly, the Center would commit its resources to a project in proportion to the degree of control which it could exercise. It would avoid a situation of accountability without power. Secondly, the Center committed itself to developing and utilizing vehicles for change in urban education, and it understood those vehicles would prove successful only if CUE had power in a given situation. The ultimate bankruptcy of the New Park "partnership" was demonstrated when the contract of a talented teacher recruited for New Park in
the summer of 1969 by CUE was not renewed for 1970-1971. Thirdly, the Center would establish different levels of involvement according to its training needs and the circumstances of a project.

New Park School, for example, became primarily a teacher training site for CUE in 1969-1970, not the best location, but a convenient one in light of alternatives. Individual CUE staff utilized New Park fundamentally as a training vehicle while they sought other projects with greater potential for effecting change and developing new urban school models.
CHAPTER III
THE ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AT THE
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION: A SETTING FOR
THE CENTER FOR URBAN EDUCATION

Introduction

The Hartford "Case Study" illustrated how aspects of the Center's program and philosophy developed, organically, from a specific experience. But off-campus activities depended upon the strength and growth of the Center at the School of Education in Amherst.

The Center for Urban Education had to establish working relationships with the larger organizational setting of the School of Education in order to survive and mature. The organizational environment during "the Planning Year" was unique and had unusual effects on the Center. OUJ confronted many frustrating problems as the School propped for an optimum balance between individual and organizational needs.

By the summer of 1969, the Center had overcome major difficulties of internal organization. An organizational base for launching projects and off-campus activities had been established.

The ideas of several organizational theorists provided a necessary perspective for comprehending these specific historical developments.
A "New Corporate Design"

The "New Corporate Design" environment in historical perspective

A graduate student clearly stated the experimental nature of the organizational environment at the School of Education and introduced the theorists whose ideas provided a conceptual framework for the "new" institution as it cropped for existence:1

Our studies in organizational structures have made it very clear that the kind of organization we are seeking does not exist in institutions of any size in this country. We have found parts of a blueprint in the works of organizational theorists such as Jay W. Forrester, Chris Argyris, and Douglas McGregor, but as far as the practical realization of their theories is concerned, we are in uncharted territory.2

In a broad historical perspective, the School of Education represented an attempt, on a microcosmic scale, to find an alternative to the traditional bureaucratic organization. A hierarchy of knowledge and power had proven an unsuitable social system for coping with the Twentieth Century's educational problems.3

Having emerged with the Industrial Revolution, the main characteristics of the traditional bureaucracy included: a high degree of specialization, a hierarchical authority structure with limited areas of command and responsibility, an impersonality of relationships between organizational members, and the recruitment of officials on the basis of
ability and technical knowledge.  

The School of Education sought to replace the quasi-military aspects of the bureaucratic organization which had pervaded practically all existing institutions in society. In a time of social change and educational upheaval the group at Amherst sought a more adaptable, flexible, democratic, and personalized organizational structure. The most publicized theoretical rationale for a new model at the University of Massachusetts came from an article by Jay Forrester called "A New Corporate Design."  

An Assistant Dean at the School of Education, Richard Coffing, sent a memorandum with a copy of Forrester's article attached to Allen in August of 1968. Allen circulated the document to the entire community. The specific impact of the article on the planners was difficult to gauge, but it probably came closest to articulating the value beliefs and preconceptions of the community. The School of Education seized upon two key generalizations in the article:  

1. New thinking in the social sciences indicates that moving away from authorization control in an organization can greatly increase motivation, innovation, and individual human growth and satisfaction.  

2. Critical examination of trends in the structure and government of corporations suggests that the present superior-subordinate basis of control in the corporation should give way to a more constitutional and democratic form.  

The article enumerated eleven characteristics as the basis for a new kind of organization. Many related more specifically to business organizations. The list included:
collegial rather than superior-subordinate relationships; individual profit-centers; objective determination of compensation; policy-making separated from decision-making; restructuring through electronic data processing; freedom of access to information; elimination of internal monopolies; balancing reward and risk; increased mobility of the individual; enhanced rights of the individual; education within the corporation. Again, individualism and democracy were the underlying tenets. The historian might claim the School of Education, by choosing the "New Corporate Design," attempted to find an organizational structure which could accommodate the philosophy and spirit of the civil rights and student "participatory democracy" movements of the 1960's.

To those most concerned with the structure of the "new" School of Education, the writers of the human relations oriented school of organization theorists, especially Douglas McGregor, were just as influential. To a lesser degree some of the group at Amherst had assimilated the thoughts of Chris Argyris and Walter Bennis. These writers were concerned, primarily, with a non-bureaucratic definition of the optimum balance between individual and organizational needs. The heart of McGregor's philosophy was contained in The Human Side of Enterprise and focused on a comparison of two styles of organization called "Theory X" and "Theory Y." A concise summary statement of the organizational outlook expressed in
McGregor's "Theory Y" follows:

The essence of this attitude is to trust people, to grant them the power to motivate and control themselves, to believe in their capacity to integrate their own personal values with the goals of the organization. Doug believed that individual needs can and should be integrated with organizational goals. In the extreme, Theory Y has meant democratic processes in management, giving people a greater voice in the making of decisions and trusting them to contribute rationally and loyally without surrounding them with elaborate control structures.12

"Theory Y" was an optimistic theory which saw organizations benefiting as they fostered and allowed individuals within them to grow as people.13 Rules and policy should be built on the assumption that men were good and self-motivated. McGregor believed, which was very different from the typical bureaucratic policies which implicitly claimed men must be forced to work and constantly policed. Many at the School of Education claimed a "Theory Y" organizational environment could be created where the individual could reach "self-actualization."14

A "New Corporate Design" at the School of Education

The School of Education emphasized the notions of individualism and democracy proposed in Forrester's article when it set up organizational procedures for "the Planning Year."

At the Colorado retreat, the group of 150 participants elected, on a one-man one-vote basis an Executive
Committee which was responsible to the community as a whole. The motion which launched the experiment in organizational governance began:

MOVED:

THAT THE PRESENT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF THE CURRENT SEVEN MEMBERS PLUS ONE MEMBER OF THE UNDERGRADUATE STUDENT BODY BE CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ACTIVELY ATTEMPTING TO SENSE THE CLIMATE OF OPINION OF THE FACULTY AND STUDENT BODY AND WHEN IT FEELS THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL CONSENSUS IT ACTS. FURTHER, THAT WHEN THERE IS A SENSE THAT SUBSTANTIAL CONSENSUS DOES NOT EXIST, IT REFRAINS FROM MAKING THE DECISION IN QUESTION AND REFERS IT TO THE FACULTY AS A WHOLE.

The resolution went beyond the representative assembly notion to a more radical democratic, even Quaker, notion of government by consensus. Also, special care was taken to protect the individual. The motion concluded:

WHENEVER ANY FACULTY MEMBER OR STUDENT OBJECTS TO A DECISION . . . THAT PERSON CAN BRING THE ISSUE TO THE FACULTY AS A WHOLE FOR REVIEW. FINALLY, WHENEVER ANY FACULTY MEMBER OR STUDENT WISHES TO MAY ASK THE FACULTY . . . TO TERMINATE THE COMMITTEE.

The School of Education operated under the "Committee of the Whole" concept until the community passed an Interim Constitution in the spring of 1969. At that point, an Education Assembly was instituted which became the basic policy-making body of the School. It was composed of voting members "all faculty (lecturers, instructors, and all professors), all doctoral students in full-time residence, and representatives of all other student groups and professional staff at the School of Education." The Assembly elected a nine-member Executive Council to serve as a clearing
house for proposals and to recommend policies.

During the year the School of Education operated in this democratic context. It should be noted, however, that the Assembly delegated considerable authority and freedom of action to the Dean, including that of hiring faculty for 1969-1970.18

Also consistent with the spirit of the "New Corporate Design" was the freedom granted to doctoral students to design their own programs and participate fully in the planning process. "Thus, a major portion of each graduate student's credited work toward his degree will be spent in actively planning programs for future students who might share his own professional talents and educational interests," the Dean wrote in an article.19 The School granted maximum freedom to the doctoral students by allowing them to choose three advisors and negotiate an individualized program. That was a major revolution in graduate education in itself.

"During the year, staff members have been encouraged to pursue individual interests, to negotiate relationships with other staff members, to teach courses as they think best, and to offer courses they have created."20 This statement accurately described the freedom granted to faculty during the planning year. With a reduced class load, they devoted a considerable amount of time to individual and center interests.
What emerged from the freewheeling planning process were thirty-five planning committees developing courses and experiences in a variety of areas, and a host of other activities. At the end of the year, the community proposed that the School of Education be organized around eleven centers ranging from Aesthetics in Education to Educational Media and Technology. 21

An initial tension: centers versus "own bag"

From the outset, members of the group advocated two sometimes contradictory planning strategies. The two approaches embodied different philosophical nuances, styles, and objectives rather than specifically contrasting sets of plans. The tension between the implications of the two strategies existed throughout the two years at Amherst. In simplified terms, it was a difference between an emphasis on the more structured planning strategy of "centers" and the individualistic style called, in crude but descriptive vocabulary, "do your own thing" or "own bag." The two approaches were often incompatible and a shift in the balance to one strategy would be to the detriment of the other approach.

In a memorandum to the faculty and doctoral students in July of 1963, Allen offered some alternative planning strategies and invited the staff to comment and offer their
own proposals. Allen set the stage for the dialogue between "centers" and "own bag" approaches. His structure Alpha suggested "the School be organized into a series of centers for the study of individual educational problems." Structure Omega proposed "a structure for the School of Education not identified so much in terms of the contents, problems to be studied, or center of interest but more in terms of the style of inquiry of the faculty."23

The "own bag" advocates opposed an early closure on structure and proposed an ad-hoc manner approach to planning where the School would be organized around the interests of the individual staff members. A faculty member called for this approach as early as August of 1963:

I suggest that each faculty member (and each special Doctoral Student?) be sent a fairly lengthy memo . . . . The memo should ask that each person describe in as much detail as possible the daily activities which he or she would like to engage in . . . . It should ask them to describe the lectures they want to give, the small groups they want to lead, the individual tutoring they want to do, the research they wish to perform, the committee and/or faculty meetings they would like to attend, the advising services they wish to perform, the dissertation or doctoral exam or exam committees . . . . It should ask for a task analysis of their desired future role in the School of Education . . . . The organization of the School of Education would, in effect, be no more than the faculty and doctoral students who were in residence.25

The more structured planning strategy supported the formation of a number of centers. Not highly structured, however, the "centers" approach advocated flexibility
cross-fertilization, and interaction among individuals, and did not suggest a rigid departmental structure. Two faculty members replied to the original Allen "Planning" memorandum with the basic learning center proposal:

Each center is inter-disciplinary and problem oriented. Each center has its own faculty and consultant staff (resident and non-resident), resources appropriate to its function, and engages in both training and research. The centers are not rigidly organized departments, but loosely assembled collections of resources and staff; most faculty in the School of Education are attached to several centers.26

A fundamental difference between the two planning strategies related to the allocation of resources. Under one plan, resources would be allocated to centers, and "under the 'own bag' approach every faculty member and doctoral student(?) would be free to pursue his own interests, and resources would be allocated in such a way as to encourage this freedom."27

The individualism of the "New Corporate Design" and its effect on the centers

Certain individualistic tendencies in the School of Education organizational environment placed special burdens on the attempt to create viable centers. The individualism and other characteristics of the "Design" had many healthy effects on the centers as well. Also, some of the debilitating effects of the "Design" environment were confronted and overcome as time passed.
McGregor once stated: "complete individual freedom in organizational life is impossible."

In seeking that optimum balance between individual and organizational needs, the School of Education made the path to the establishment of centers difficult. Organizations in order to survive required a minimal level of resources, both human and financial. The freedom granted to faculty and doctoral students, and the allocation of financial resources, limited center effectiveness. Several centers were forced to survive on a system of "voluntarism" as late as 1970.

In 1963-1969, forty-five graduate students received stipends from general funds for the purpose of supervising student teachers and participating on planning committees—but not for specific committees. Nor were the planning credits received by doctoral students tied to specific committees. Similarly, the faculty had a wide latitude of freedom for committee planning.

Most important, as the committees grew into centers, both doctoral students and faculty could choose to participate or not participate in center activity.

In summary, the system of rewards and punishments, financial and other, was structured in such a way that the centers had difficulty surviving. The individualistic characteristics of the environment had a positive effect in the early stages when committees emerged from a natural
selection of interests, but they had an increasingly negative impact when the committees struggled to become viable institutions.

Again Forrester and McIvor helped to understand the planning process. In their concern for individual needs they did not at the same time neglect organizational requirements. Forrester wrote: "The guiding policy structure and accounting procedures of the system must be so adjusted that the self-interest of the individual and the objectives of the total organization can be made to coincide." 29

Forrester stated that the elimination of the superior-subordinate relationship could be replaced by "individual self-discipline arising from the self-interest created by a competitive market mechanism." 30 But the infant centers could not compete for services when the individual faculty member or doctoral student could choose not to participate in any center. Further, "He would accept specific obligations as agreements of limited duration." 31 No one at the School of Education had Center obligations if they did not wish them.

In Forrester's model, innovations depended upon the elimination of internal monopolies. "No person is limited to a single source for his needs," he said. "No person is dependent on a single user of his output." 32 The School of
Education reversed the balance. The centers had no guarantee of anybody's "output" or any guaranteed "source" for their "heads."

In terms of balancing rewards and risks, "A New Corporate Design" suggested: "Rewards should attract and encourage the competent and be high enough so that a normal quota of success will more than carry the burden of occasional failure."33 Given all the effort required to establish a center and the absence of extrinsic rewards, many faculty members and doctoral students did not take risks for the centers and exercised their option to "do their own thing."

The centers at the School of Education had no significant rewards to discourage a person's exit and, also, virtually no restraint on entry. "Most corporations have reward structures designed to discourage men from leaving," said Forrester.34 He felt, "the individual should have much greater freedom of internal movement, and greater ease of voluntary exit, but more restraint on entry."35

McGregor also made it clear that all organizations must maintain the principle of individual accountability. "Such a strategy is not permissive management, or soft or indulgent management. It includes clear demands for high performance, clear limits consistently enforced," McGregor pointed out. Nor was McGregor unrealistic with his basically
optimistic view of human nature: "It is to be anticipated that some percentage of any employee group . . . will not respond at all or will take advantage of such a strategy."

In such situations McGregor clearly supported "the firm enforcement of limits, followed if necessary by dismissal."36

but the centers did not have enough control to maintain the degree of accountability recommended by McGregor.

The conclusion that faculty members and doctoral students who were not active in centers were free from responsibilities, however, is inaccurate. Doctoral students had other activities and were accountable to their three-man advisory committee and for their student teacher supervisory task. Faculty members taught classes, engaged in research efforts, advised students, and worked on non-planning or "maintenance" committees. Finally, perhaps the struggle to survive was a healthy process which helped the centers test their strengths and ambitions.37

In summary, the individualistic aspects of the "New Corporate Design" discovered fertile soil in the School of Education environment. This created a conflict between individual prerogatives and organizational needs. The centers had difficulty surviving under those circumstances.
The Center for Urban Education in the Context of the "New Corporate Design"

The Center for Urban Education, like any other organization, had to cope effectively with two secondary tasks while it pursued its goals. It had to maintain an internal system and, secondly, it had to adapt to an external environment. The "New Corporate Design" environment created specific problems and opportunities for CUE during the year and one-half period.

Two factors made CUE's problems particularly difficult. First, the Center held extraordinarily ambitious goals: it hoped to develop a network of off-campus projects in addition to the usual course activities on campus. Second, the Center's adjustment internally, and to the external environment of the School of Education, was complicated by the omnipresence of race relations issues.

The positive effects of a democratic and competitive environment

The environment of the "New Corporate Design" was a necessary but not sufficient factor in the establishment of CUE. An opportunity to try did not guarantee success. Could a black man with a Bachelor's degree at the Lecturer level, and assisted only by doctoral students, build a significant center?
To a degree perhaps unprecedented in institutions of higher education in recent years, the democratic atmosphere of the School of Education allowed talent and creativity to compete with traditional measures of status in academe. The School made performance criteria as well as degrees, experience, and longevity relevant to the establishment of centers.

Individuals interested in urban education had the right to compete for the interests and resources at the School of Education. For example, a group had raised questions of urban education and race relations to a major topic on the public agenda in Colorado by their persistence in speaking out. The environment continued to provide relative freedom for urban education partisans to make their case. Also, most blacks and whites interested in urban education had learned how to relate their rhetoric and beliefs to the cause of urban education—which they then made into a test of the liberal intentions of the group.

Another important characteristic of the "New Corporate Design," a concern for individual growth and needs, assisted CUE efforts in important respects. Especially helpful for the Center was the fact that doctoral students were largely free to develop their own degree programs. The doctoral students became the backbone of the CUE staff during the two year period where they combined academic and activist
training experiences. The Center competed for their services in the democratic and individualistic environment. Also, to a lesser degree, the Center competed for faculty.

**Personnel management**

Alton Gentry, the Director of the Center for Urban Education, was in a position not unlike "an unpopular chairman of a voluntary hospital fund-raising committee." Most of the organizational variables which determined whether a situation was favorable or unfavorable for a leader worked against Gentry. The fact that the Center was established and continued to exist into 1970 largely resulted from his creative leadership.

One theorist introduced the central problem of all organizations—how to motivate and utilize human resources effectively—in concise terms: "When someone joins an organization, a transaction takes place by which he receives inducements (money or any other kind of reward) in return for the contribution he makes to the organization." Various scholars referred to this subject as inducement-contribution equilibrium, exchange theories, and extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. The third definition was most popular.

The most widely used and traditional type of extrinsic reward was money. The School of Education also used course credits for the planning process, as another example of
extrinsic rewards. Extrinsic rewards could be controlled externally. Intrinsic rewards were "inherent in the activity itself."^44 Personal satisfaction in a job, altruism, and self-respect were examples of intrinsic rewards.

"He [the leader] could control only indirectly and remotely by means of intrinsic rewards and punishments, whereas he can directly give or withhold extrinsic ones," stated McGregor concerning the two types of rewards.45 He assumed that all organizations must have some control over extrinsic rewards. McGregor, like others identified with the human relations oriented school of theorists, argued for enlarging the role of intrinsic rewards in modern organizations.

CUE, like the other centers at the School of Education, particularly in 1963-1969, had literally no extrinsic means of control. That need held a high priority for Center efforts. Well into the spring of 1970, the Center still relied upon volunteers and depended upon intrinsic rewards for its members. The individualism of the "New Corporate Design" as applied to the School of Education environment thus hindered development of centers as self-controlled units within the School of Education.

First, CUE had little access to the control and accountability provided by extrinsic rewards—no money, no full faculty to guarantee degrees, and minimal sanctioning power of any kind. CUE relied on such intrinsic rewards as
the factor of "identification." When an individual genuinely identifies himself with a group, a leader, or a cause, he is in effect saying that the goals and values associated with that cause have become his own," said McGregor. Two crucial elements in the creation and maintenance of CUE were: loyalty to Gentry, and a commitment to the goals of the Center.

Power in the "New Corporate Design" environment was based more on personal traits and relationships than on bureaucratic or institutional authority. Amitai Etzioni described "two kinds of power—position and personal." The School of Education clearly reflected the "personal" type.

A premium was placed on charismatic leadership such as that demonstrated by Dwight Allen. Lacking position power in the unstructured and competitive School of Education environment, and as director of a center with limited power, the personal power of Gentry had to be considerable. Fortunately for CUE, Gentry had those charismatic qualities.

Another aspect of the leadership question was the special problems of CUE caused by racial tensions at the School of Education. Internal adjustment within the organization required particular attention to human relations. Most observers of the centers failed "to make the fundamental distinction between interpersonal frictions and social
conflict which has its basis in the structure of the organization and the society in which groups and individuals are imbedded.\textsuperscript{49} The human relations problems within CUE, and between CUE and the School of Education, were not simple frustrations of interpersonal relations or communication.

Lastly, the Center required effective task-oriented leadership as well as human relations skills because CUE held ambitious goals. In summary, versatile and extraordinary leadership qualities were required of Gentry and others in the Center.

No center functioned for long or effectively with a high dependence on volunteers. Yet CUE faced this situation as it sought to grow from a committee to a center in 1988-1989. CUE had a shifting group of participants throughout the year. It lacked a control factor and accountability with respect to participation. The principle of multiple entry and exit points which pervaded the School of Education became an unpredictable and threatening factor for CUE.

At some points CUE was immobilized and undermined by its non-participating members. In the individualistic environment of the School of Education, a verbal statement of membership was sufficient for a person to claim to represent the Center. The immediate acceptance by the
majority of the community that any black person who expressed an interest in urban education was, in fact, a participating member of GUS reached comic proportions. When representatives from the Ford Foundation came to Amherst and GUS sought a hearing, a one-day coup d'état by a group of non-participating members exposed GUS's organizational impotence.

A final ironic event in 1968-1969 which proved the structural weakness of the Center occurred when the leadership of GUS felt it necessary to pack a meeting with sympathetic non-participating members in order to win a showdown vote over other non-participating members. Then the Director found it advisable to put two people on the seven-man "interim" Executive Committee who had never participated in GUS activities.

The Center's personnel planning strategy for 1969-1970 attempted to overcome these organizational weaknesses. GUS adopted a twofold approach. First, the Center actively recruited new personnel who supported the objectives of the organization.

Second, the Center sought mechanisms which would insure that some degree of control and accountability to organizational needs was achieved within the flexible School of Education environment. The Dean assisted this process by recognizing that the funding of doctoral students
through individual centers could bring some stability to the centers. Eventually, seven graduate assistantships were granted to CUI. A second device was the creation of a fifteen-credit course titled "Research, Planning and Development in Urban Education (Education 557)." This applied research course supported CUI staff activities. The environment at the School continued to maximize the possibilities for individual activity, but the above two mechanisms provided a measure of support for the Center by giving it at least a modicum of control over some real extrinsic rewards.

The principle of "voluntarism," however, remained the dominant operating procedure for the Center through the spring of 1970; thus perpetuating earlier weaknesses. "So long as management does not violate the norms of legitimacy the great majority of members of the organization . . . will comply with the exercise of power," wrote McGregor. The principle of organizational accountability still battled the principle of individualism in order to represent the "norms of legitimacy" in the "new corporate design" environment.

With only the authority of intrinsic rewards available, the Center relied "not so much on punishment but on education as the means for reducing deviant behavior." Such a democratic organizational style was the only alternative. Also, the prevailing style in the School of Education
at large would have created pressures against a tighter, more authoritarian managerial approach. But, given the special divisive circumstances and vulnerability which CUE faced on the race relations front, greater organizational authority would have made the Center more effective. Instead, CUE took the only path available, and labored hard on the human relations front to build mutual trust and a healthy working climate for the blacks and whites in the Center.

A "professional" image

The Center for Urban Education in its idealistic moments sought to represent the educational interests of poor black people. Yet it had to compete for existence in an organizational environment dominated by white middle class values. The ambivalence of the major character in Hermann Hesse's Steppenwolf, captured the sense of CUE's dilemma:

Then again, I like the contrast between my lonely, loveless, hunted, and thoroughly disorderly existence and this middle-class family life. I like to breathe in on the stairs this odor of quiet and order, of cleanliness and respectable domesticity. There is something in it that touches me in spite of my hatred for all it stands for.  

"Over a period of time, an organization, much like an individual, becomes characterized by certain modes of behavior which are perceived as its personality or style... or corporate image," wrote Paul Hersey and Kenneth
Blanchard. The Center for Urban Education was preoccupied with problems of internal organization during the 1963-1969 school year. Factional strife largely related to race relations issues plagued the Center. It acquired a reputation and an image made up of a constellation of unfavorable traits. It was alternately termed cliquish, hostile, disorganized, and paranoid by its critics in the rest of the School of Education. Most segments in the School viewed the persistent conflict with groups and between individuals with skepticism.

In the absence of the protection provided by extrinsic rewards, the attacks by its critics hurt the Center. Secondly, although other centers had internal problems, they concealed their disarray under traditional academic maneuvers between faculty and students.

Convinced that the dominant white middle class education community would never understand the life of CUE in 1963-1969, and having strengthened its position internally, the Center consciously sought a new image in 1969-1970. It decided to adopt a more middle class style in order to increase its power and develop its programs. In organizational terms, it became more of a task-oriented institution and expended less energy on internal human relations problems.

A first step was to place the Center in the most favorable geographic proximity to other centers. In August
of 1969, the School relocated most offices and centers. Initially, CUI was "arbitrarily" assigned to share a large room with the Center for Humanistic Education and a group of radical doctoral students. The CUI staff referred to this policy as "putting all the crazy folks together."

After a week of negotiation, the Center ended up in a room with three "establishment" groups: the staff for Allen's USOE advisory panel; CARE, a trio of respectable educational innovators; and CUI, a center comprised of young conservative administrators and researchers. The three groups were white, responsible, and businesslike.

As another strategy, CUI increased the volume of paper circulated within the Center and then the School of Education at large, particularly to the administration. Printed material gave the appearance of important activity, especially in academic institutions where the length of bibliographies and the complexity of course descriptions often was assumed to be representative of the quality of instruction. A few centers had maintained the illusion of meaningful activity with timely memoranda.

CUI also held more formal meetings and published the time and place. Academic institutions, including the School of Education, continued to respect time as much as performance criteria in evaluating achievement, as the system of credit hours for students and the measurement of faculty responsibilities in class hours demonstrated.
The Center sought to appear more efficient and organized. A bulletin board contained meeting notices, the committee and organizational structure of the Center, and other information. Staff members who had dressed casually the year before changed to coats and ties, and staff members even carried attaché cases.

As the Center looked forward to the development of a series of projects it courted a new reputation of middle class organizational competence and an image of "professionalism." This was necessary in a middle class environment where forms were often as important as the substance of programs.

**Financial Resources**

Allen indicated in his initial planning memorandum that every center had a "hunting license" to seek financial support: "Each center would be free to and indeed encouraged to seek outside funding support to pursue research areas of interest."54 But prior to the allocation of graduate assistantships to individual centers for the fall of 1969, most centers had no guaranteed source of human or capital resources. The survival and the direction of more than one center was determined by its ability to secure a federal grant for a specific project. For example, the Teacher Corps program of the Center for International Education and
the federal training program of the Early Childhood group enabled these two organizations to prosper.

The competitive and open environment of the "New Corporate Design" helped CUE by allowing it to seek funds where it chose, and for purposes it had selected. Because the centers initially grew from the interests of the individuals at the School of Education, priority areas were not imposed upon the education community. On the other hand, given the national climate and the atmosphere at the School of Education, urban education might have been designated a top priority and some funds provided. Also, rather than each center seeking its own support, a specific fundraising effort for urban education might have been launched by the School.

In any case, the problem of limited funds added to CUE's organizational problems. A bankrupt institution could not develop off-campus projects, and without a travel budget it became difficult even to explore the program possibilities in the field.

With the exception of one center which received a special $10,000 appropriation from the University, the centers had to build from the ground up. The Dean hired no faculty specifically as staff for centers in 1963. Similarly, doctoral students were supported at-large in 1963-1969 and the personnel in all centers were "volunteers." Secretarial
help, equipment, and administrative assistants were not provided. A secretarial pool served the School of Education as a whole. Also, a liberal communications policy allowed centers to obtain telephone support. That was the extent of the overhead assistance.

Consequently, CUE spent energy and time seeking money. Usually, the best kind of money an organization acquired was support with the fewest strings attached. Grants from either public or private sources where the funding agency prescribed an increasing number of specific guidelines was less attractive. When the granting agency specified the program, it tied the beneficiary to the purposes of the benefactor.

CUE, initially, sought support through the general School of Education fund raising effort. The Center assumed that urban education was an attractive area, and to join in a general fund raising effort would result in support. CUE sought assistance under the larger umbrella.

The fund raising efforts in 1968-1969 illustrated the early promise but ultimate failure of CUE's "umbrella strategy." CUE terminated one effort because a coincidence of interest between the foundation and CUE did not exist. The Center would have had to alter its objectives radically to get the support. In the Ford Foundation case, CUE put all its eggs in one basket—and lost. The fact that
another Center received support from Ford as a result of the combined effort made that failure particularly difficult to accept.

In October, the Director and members of GUS, representatives of the administration group, and others, in two trips to Flint, Michigan, sought support for "community school education" from the Hott Foundation, one of the wealthiest but least publicized of the foundations.

A grant to the University of Massachusetts would have involved the training of community school directors, in a graduate program. Presumably, on-site training would have taken place in cities such as Springfield and Worcester. It became clear, however, that the Hott Foundation's ideas about community schools bore little resemblance to community school issues in such places as the decentralized districts in New York City. Flint's notions of "community participation" bore a striking resemblance to ESEA efforts but were light years separated from the concerns of a community like Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

The Center would have had to convince the Hott Foundation to alter their community schools philosophy radically to meet contemporary urban problems, or GUS would have had to change its objectives in urban education. GUS terminated its participation in the fund raising effort because the nature of the strings attached would not have made it
worthwhile.

CUE sought approximately $100,000 for each of three years from the Ford Foundation. A grant would have provided CUE with an important base of support. The proposal asked for a general support grant to develop an urban education program. The strings from the Ford Foundation would have been limited. The Introduction outlined the broad objectives of CUE:

The long-range goal of the Center is the improvement of urban existence through a specific focus on urban education. The year 1969-1970 will be a planning year for the Center in which its program, curriculum, and structure will take shape in light of the long-range goals. Incoming faculty, staff, and graduate students as well as present personnel will have the opportunity to develop their particular expertise through field experiences and through working with the diversity of CUE personnel.55

Staff support was at the heart of the proposal ($33,000). It would have provided an opportunity for a group of people to become trained and created a permanent staff in the Center. This "cooling up" would have taken place in the context of the development of off-campus projects. The proposal stated:

The vehicle for developing this curriculum and providing these experiences are pilot projects carried out in various urban settings. A key to the establishment and operation of these pilot programs is political, educational, and social involvement of the urban community . . . . Several of these projects already in operation or soon to be implemented are described in the appendix.55
The Ford proposal, thus, was geared to the developmental plans already devised by the Center. With the grant G12 could have arrived.

The lack of funds contributed to the divisive tendencies which already plagued the Center in the environment of the "New Corporate Design." Foundation or project money which the Center controlled would have provided staff support and a means of encouraging accountability to the organization. The lack of financial resources also inhibited collaboration with other centers. Without money G12 had little power.

In the late spring of 1969, as indicated previously, the financial situation and, consequently, the internal political situation, was alleviated somewhat when G12 received seven assistantships for the 1969-1970 year. This provided a limited base from which the Center sought to expand its programs and projects.
CHAPTER IV

GOALS AND PROGRAMS: FROM A SIGN ON THE DOOR TOWARD A NETWORK OF OFF-CAMPUS PROJECTS

Introduction

By January of 1970 the Center for Urban Education was by no means secure as a viable organization at the School of Education, nor had it even approximated its ambitious long term goals. But it had progressed considerably, since a sign had been tacked on a door in March of 1969 which indicated a planning committee had visions of becoming a center. No longer was it continually threatened with internal disintegration. And relative to other centers in the School, CUE was more than holding its own. Moreover, its course appeared to be heading in an upward direction though its movement was gradual and marred by periodic setbacks.

CUE existed as a committee rather than a center for most of the 1968-1969 school year. It preoccupied itself with the recruitment of students and faculty, negotiations with the administration and other committees, the design and teaching of new courses, and attention to the embryonic off-campus program.
The tasks described for 1968-1969 demanded staff energies in 1969-1970. In the second year, the Center also sought to expand its projects and activities, particularly the off-campus program. CUI spent much of its time in negotiations with various organizations and school systems. This negotiating process served as the primary educational vehicle for the CUI staff. The Center discovered that change in urban schools was fundamentally a political rather than an educational problem.

A Sign on the Door: 1968-1969

Campus Activities

The first semester of the 1968-1969 school year was essentially a committee planning phase in urban education, characterized by great flexibility with individuals alternately participating and not participating, and a shifting clientele of urban enthusiasts. The list of priorities and programs shifted as rapidly. A fall planning meeting in 1968 identified six areas of concentration: Black and African Studies; Reading and Communicative Skills; Curriculum Change-Agents; Strength-Training; Black-White Encounters; and Administration, Community and Political Change-Agents.¹

By June of 1969, the Strength Training Laboratory was independent of the Center, and the chairman of the
Curriculum Chance-Agent area had moved this concern to the Center for Humanistic Education. Also, the Black and African Studies area, and the Reading area had been de-emphasized. The organizational climate at the School of Education encouraged this fluidity, and it initially had a healthy effect as individuals tested their interests and the environment. The urban education group did not launch a specific urban course program during the first semester, although faculty associated with the committee taught classes.

The outlines of an organizational tissue for the Center appeared during the second semester. Three visible aspects of a framework emerged from two courses, "Urban Community Relations," which Atron Gentry and Robert Woodbury taught; and a race relations course for 650 graduate and undergraduate students, largely planned and conducted by future Center personnel. A third structural element was the Hartford project, run by individuals who became immersed in GUx activities and increasingly identified with the Center's program. Out of these three activities emerged four areas of concentration which remained prominent in the future of GUx: community involvement in education, race relations, administrative and political change in off-campus projects, and teacher training.

The race relations course, "Educational Perspectives
in Problems of Race Relations," which included the involvement of Professors Gerald Weinstein and Daniel Jordan, was a major undertaking by Gentry and other CUE personnel during the second semester. The credibility of the fledgling Center increased considerably with this effort, even though the course had many critics. CUE recruited and trained thirty discussion leaders. The small group sessions which comprised the heart of the course enjoyed a 10:1 student-instructor ratio. The course included lectures by Jordan, films such as *One Potato, Two Potato* and *Mathcampus* and a unique ten-hour all day field experience. The instructors encouraged participants to deal with race questions on an emotional level, with their feelings, as well as on a rational and academic level.

A tentative and early effort to develop an off-campus project in Springfield was tied to the Gentry-Goodyear "Urban Community Relations" course during the spring semester. "Probably the only way . . . to learn about community relations is to dig into a particular city, to talk to the people who run it and with those who live in it," wrote an individual involved in the course design. The School of Education hoped to become related to the planning for a new community school in the North End of Springfield, a predominantly Puerto Rican area. The course became a vehicle to assess the prospects of the Brightwood School. "a pro-
liminary step toward understanding what [Mass] might best be able to offer . . . for the improvement of schools there," as well as a learning experience for students. We were interested in establishing connections with Springfield so that our Urban Education program would be for real--based on actual experience," stated Mass faculty and doctoral students in a meeting with Springfield Superintendent of Schools, John Beady. 4

The students in the course formed groups of eight to ten and spent the semester in the field surveying the circumstances surrounding the Brightwood project, particularly the attitudes of the various segments of the community toward the plan. The involvement of the Center did not proceed much beyond the "survey" stage, but the effort pre-viewed C.U.J. activities in terms of training procedures, concern about community involvement, and the search for off-campus projects.

Two activities peripheral to the Center were based in California. A joint Westside Study Center (Pasadena, Calif.) School of Education proposal "to develop more effective teachers and teaching methods in urban schools," resulted in a $10,000 planning grant from the U.S. Office of Education. Gentry, the former Director of the Study Center, and Woodbury had written the proposal prior to their arrival in Amherst. The Pasadena organization carried out the burden
of the planning, with the assistance of CUZ. The two
groups envisioned the establishment of a community school.
The School of education would conduct the teacher training
activities.

Gentry also worked on a public school career
opportunities training program in Temple City, California,
funded under EPDA. He interviewed and screened applicants,
and participated in the training program.

In March, the Urban Education Committee called
a special organizational meeting, tacked the letters G-U-E
1 to an office door, and formally established the Center for
Urban Education. Individual members of first the Committee
and then the Center spent part of the 1963-1969 school year
involved in course and project activities. The staff spent
most of their energies and time coping with the educational,
political, and human relations problems related to the
creation of a working group and a viable organization.

Goals for 1969-1970

Program outlook in September

Two factors had helped the Center for Urban Educa-
tion establish a stronger base for more ambitious programs
in the 1969-1970 school year. First, through CUZ's personnel
recruitment efforts, the acquisition of Center assistantships,
and the creation of the "Research, Planning and Development
in Urban Education' course, the potential for a working staff existed. Second, having solved some basic internal human relations problems, the Center fostered a more "professional," task-oriented, outward-looking style which would make it more competitive in a middle class organizational environment.

Two factors which improved CUE's position in the School of Education were the appointment of Woodbury as Assistant Dean for Program Development, and the recruitment of a white faculty member at the Associate Professor level, Byrd Jones. Woodbury had close ties with the Center, and his new position placed him in charge of all the off-campus projects for the School of Education. Probably that Assistant Dean's Office and CUE would support and complement each other's efforts.

Jones quickly began to share the load which Gentry had borne over the past year by assuming a front line responsibility for counseling, advising, and producing courses. Jones also helped with long range planning as the Center developed higher ambitions.

Another significant factor in CUE's emergence was the improved relationship with the Dean, still the predominant figure at the School of Education. The Dean had viewed the intramural struggles within CUE and in the black community in 1968-1969 with skeptical eyes. But the new stability
in CUE in the fall began to alter this perception and he began to work more closely with CUE in some instances.

The position of the other centers also cast the Center for Urban Education in a relatively favorable light. Several had faltered by September of 1969. The Center for the Study of Innovations was alive but had internal difficulties, as did the Center for the Study of Aesthetics in Education, which also had no financial support.

The Center for Humanistic Education had not received a grant it expected, and it feared its radical wing. The Administration group, although it anticipated a Ford Foundation planning grant, was divided; one faction showed promise, however. The Center for Counselor Education was repairing divisions. The Center for International Education was preoccupied with its Teacher Corps program, and the Teacher Education group had the tremendous burden of running a training and practice teaching program for 1000 undergraduates with minimal resources.

The context of the new situation in 1969 placed CUE in a favorable position to collaborate with the Dean, and to make a mark in its own right. Perhaps the turning point in CUE fortunes was symbolized when the Dean delegated to the Center the planning task for the large EPDA Career Opportunities Program with the Worcester and Springfield school systems. The year before, the Center for International
Education had developed the major urban program at the School of Education.

GVU objectives in the fall

There was a difference between the concept of a center and the traditional notion of a department. Within the context of the School of Education with its activist bias and its intent of becoming extensively involved in projects in the field, a department might have been defined as a group of faculty whose functions were essentially "maintenance" or in-house in nature. A department offered courses and research experiences on the campus. The concept of a center suggested a larger investment of staff and financial resources, and an organization which engaged in special projects on the campus and in the field in addition to maintaining a program of courses. The centers at the School of Education represented both types. The goals of GVU implied the more ambitious undertaking.

The activities of the Center for Urban Education included both "maintenance" and project objectives. Personnel in the Center and staff closely associated with GVU taught courses in 1968-1969 with a total student enrollment of approximately 950 students. In 1969-1970, in addition to courses taught by faculty members Sentry and Jones, ten staff members developed and offered nine seminar courses
on a variety of subjects in the spring semester. The School of Education definition of staff included both faculty and planning doctoral students. Though under faculty supervision, those seminars involved more responsibility than the typical sections led by graduate assistants. The doctoral students designed the courses and assumed the full instructional task. Several of the staff also taught seminar sections in non-CUE programs in the 1969 fall semester.

**A commitment to change**

In September of 1969, the Center prepared a general statement of objectives which provided guidelines for future activities. Those goals defined the philosophical framework upon which CUE based its activities in 1969-1970. "The Center for Urban Education . . . is a planning, research and training center focussing on education in urban areas," the statement began. A number of overall tasks were enumerated:

... to develop new models for urban schools that will bring real changes in curriculum, teacher attitudes, and school structure; to develop tools for community involvement to help bring about these changes; to discover ways to sensitize teachers, students, parents, and administrators to the needs and feelings of each other.

The policy statement, product of the various academic and practicum experiences in Hartford, Springfield, and at the
School of Education in 1968-1969, provided a rationale for the increasingly "professional" tone of CUE. 9

Fundamentally, CUE sought vehicles for change. The Hartford experience had demonstrated the limitations of "maintenance," educational welfare, and "band-aid" programs. Could CUE find training sites for its personnel, develop projects which would provide replicable models, and create relationships with school systems and organizations, where the prospects for change were maximized? What might be the nature of these sites, models, and relationships?

Much of the frustration which the Center faced at the School of Education and in the field resulted from its commitment to change. CUE preferred not to participate in urban programs which held little prospect for changing the lives of poor children, particularly poor black children. They viewed most federal government programs for the "disadvantaged" with skepticism if not cynicism. The basic failure of government programs was their approach that improvements could be made without basically changing things—especially established power blocs. That had been the story of the War on Poverty. Headstart and compensatory education programs represented inadequate remedial efforts misconceived as fundamental change.

The Center was intrigued with new and exciting humanistic curriculum but condemned its failure to provide
basic skills for urban school children. In addition, career opportunity programs for paraprofessionals had not yet resulted in bachelor's degrees for the poor.

Increasingly, personnel in the Center found themselves in conflict with what they perceived as ineffective middle class urban education efforts. Unfortunately, most of the financial possibilities were tied to these middle class, largely federally linked, reform efforts. The "establishment" structures did not maximize the potential for change. Lower class black radicalism was not the most pragmatic educational stance: it lacked the necessary potential to attract political and financial support. "Powerlessness" characterized and defined the basic condition of CUU's prospective constituency.

The training and chance objectives of CUU required on-site laboratories as well as a base at the University. Consequently, CUU adopted a multi-urban involvement strategy and explored relationships in a dozen cities across the country. The policy statement suggested: "Existing research paradigms lack organizing categories which fit urban schools, or schools in general. Too little has been done in institutions . . . to make the vital connection between research and the patent needs in urban schools." To dramatize this point, CUU staff personally visited and contacted projects in cities such as Pasadena, Temple City, and Los
Angeles, California; Hartford, Waterbury, and New Haven, Connecticut; Worcester, Springfield, Pittsfield, Boston, and Holyoke, Massachusetts; Media, Philadelphia, and Chester, Pennsylvania; Wilmington, Delaware; Chicago, Illinois; and New York City. Staff visited several sites in many of these cities. Strongly positive criteria eliminated most permanent relationships.

The Center held few illusions and little optimism that a strictly educational approach could bring fundamental change: "Our recognizes that improving urban schools involves an understanding of the total urban environment. No single key explains the working of a city; a city is an ecological system." The absurdity of the hope for head-start was the request that the schools assume the task of remediating the social, economic, and political deprivations created by American society in urban areas—in one school year. The statement continued:

Politicians, businessmen, social workers, ghetto residents; smog, noise, transportation systems, housing and landscaping; job opportunities, church groups, racial and ethnic loyalties and antagonisms—all affect [sic] the urban school.[1]

Another principle stressed in the policy statement was the necessity of community participation in school programs. Any relevant and enduring changes must have the backing of those concerned—parents and students in addition to teachers and administrators. Again, the experience in
Hartford, Pasadena, and Springfield in 1968-1969, as well as the impact of the New York City school crisis, had an influence on CUI's perspective:

The tragedy in urban schools is that so many want change and yet feel powerless. Community leaders want it, but often are disenchanted with the educational establishment and hostile to new "projects and programs." Parents want their children to learn, but too often they are alienated from the schools. Many students and teachers know the shortcomings of their schools, but feel helpless.

In terms of specific models for change in school programs and structure, CUI objectives focused on the need to loosen the rigid patterns of traditional schools. Flexible scheduling and differentiated staffing, with an emphasis on non-professional and community resources, continued to be stressed. Certain humanistic curriculum, individualized instruction, and cross-age tutoring were also advocated. CUI placed special emphasis on sensitizing staff and changing their attitudes toward each other and students.

One cliché gained currency in the Center and constituted a challenge to both the School of Education teacher education program and the Center itself. Simply stated, CUI believed "you can train a teacher for urban education who will be effective in suburban schools; but you can't train a teacher in a suburban environment who will be effective in urban schools." CUI staff were concerned that its undergraduates be trained at urban sites which would offer a kind
of experience that would be relevant for all environments. Also, what training models maximized the chance for the interns to develop the necessary resiliency and commitment to change? A traditional school site would illustrate the problems but provide little hope or alternative models. The innovative school site might provide an unrealistic teacher training experience.

Those general objectives and principles had become the common strands in the Center's philosophy by September of 1969. The next difficult step involved an attempt to apply them to real situations during the 1969-1970 year.


Introduction

CUL wanted to effect change in urban areas and that required extensive and continuous negotiations with many organizations and school systems. The Center's demanding criteria for involvement meant that few relationships would actually be established. The Center recognized a wide gap between just any project and one which had the potential for basic change.

In a real sense, no one knew how to solve urban school problems, and yet everybody could have provided answers. The key to the paradox lay in the definition of
the urban school situation as either a political crisis or an educational phenomenon. Sound educational ideas were plentiful. Many thinkers had proposed new educational experiments. An infinitely more complex and difficult task was to get those ideas accepted and implemented by a school or organization.

The Hartford Project had demonstrated the widespread fear of innovation and the protective reactions of bureaucracy in urban school systems. Even such apparently small things as teacher attitudes toward interns or a university's sense of its own "turf" could have significant adverse effects on a program. That kind of fear and suspicion made negotiations very difficult if anything more than trivial results was anticipated.

CUE had established its urban educational goals by the fall of 1969. The SADD, Parkway, COP, and Ocean Hill-Brownsville cases illustrated the forward progress and the difficulties encountered as the Center for Urban Education sought to implement its objectives.

CUE activities were not confined to four projects in 1969-1970. The planning for the community school in Temple City continued; negotiations took place with a variety of organizations and school systems; the New Park School in Hartford continued to be utilized as a "maintenance" project; a major proposal in the area of emotional and environmental retardation was prepared. Those and
other activities, as well as the expanding course program, consumed staff energies.\textsuperscript{13}

SAHD

In negotiations with the South Arsenal Neighborhood Development Corporation (SAHD) in September, CUS worked out policy guidelines and relationships with community organizations in more specific terms. In the previous year, CUS had traveled the broad spectrum with respect to the "community participation" issue. Some individuals associated with CUS had taken the hard line position that the Center should only work with organizations and schools where substantial community participation already existed. Other persons in CUS held that relationships should be negotiated with school systems with traditional structures and the Center should help them develop meaningful community participation. The efforts of JMass personnel to establish links between the Charter Oak Terrace community and the New Park Avenue School in Hartford had been an example of the latter approach. During the SAHD negotiations, CUS set forth specific guidelines.

The South Arsenal Neighborhood was in the heart of Hartford's North End ghetto. SAHD sought to establish a new community school, The Everywhere School, as a focal point for dealing with the problems of the South Arsenal
community. The neighborhood was described in a SAND proposal:

The South Arsenal Neighborhood has served as a Hartford port of entry for black and Puerto Rican people for almost a decade. Many of the long-time residents are veterans of redevelopment projects (Windsor Street) that moved them to South Arsenal from the former port of entry, the Windsor Street area... Approximately 1,000 families (5,000 people) live in this area. 40% of the residents are Puerto Rican and 60% are black. South Arsenal is at the bottom of the economic ladder; 50% of the families earn less than $4,000 a year, and 60% of these residents are on welfare. The predominant occupations are in the semi-skilled and service classifications.14

SAND stated its broadest goal as the "improvement in the quality of the lives of South Arsenal people." The organization linked its plans for the Everywhere School with community development by suggesting that "the primary vehicles for corrective action, hence improvement, are community participation and learning."15

The educational plan of the Everywhere School envisioned a legitimate community-operated school which would be affiliated with the Hartford Public School System but would maintain considerable independence. SAND planned to establish a pre-primary and primary school program which operated on the IIA (multi-instructional area) or open laboratory concept. Coupled with the creation of the new program, SAND intended to carry out housing renovations in the area. The IIA's would be located in the bottom floor of the housing units.
SAND came into existence originally largely through the herculean efforts of a successful Hartford architect named Jack Dollard. Incredibly talented in the area of organizational entrepreneurship, and indefatigable, Dollard had raised several hundred thousand dollars for the Corporation. Gradually, and intentionally, he had moved to the position of consultant as "community people" became more involved.

A series of meetings took place between CUI and representatives of SAND in September and October of 1959. SAND sought assistance in the preparation of their curriculum package which would be presented to the Hartford Board of Education late in November. At an initial meeting at the School of Education, Dollard and the staff director of SAND met with CUI representatives. At that time Dollard outlined the need for curriculum help. He indicated that he did not have money to pay for CUI's input at that point, but having raised over $250,000 for SAND, he felt he could promise to pay later for services. At that point CUI was intrigued with the idea of the Everywhere School. Several members of CUI grew up in Hartford, knew the South Arsenal area, and were particularly interested in the community school experiment.

At a second meeting, the staff director of SAND, and a consultant from an experimental private school
associated with the Everywhere School planning program, met with CUI in Amherst. A heated debate ensued over one basic question: did SAND represent the neighborhood? CUI members insisted they wanted any curriculum they prepared to reflect the real concerns of individuals in the South Arsenal Community. CUI proposed that part of their efforts would involve a survey of the people in South Arsenal about their hopes for the Everywhere School. Some members of CUI doubted that SAND represented "the community." One member of the CUI staff recalled having tomatoes thrown at him in the neighborhood when he accompanied the SAND staff director on a walking tour of the area. Also, the warehouse where SAND maintained headquarters was broken into during the fall "riot" in the North End and SAND equipment was stolen and burned. CUI staff members questioned SAND intensively about the reasons why they were "hit." CUI members knowledgeable about Hartford were convinced that SAND was distrusted by the people in the large public housing projects, the area adjacent to the private apartment buildings where the Everywhere School would be built.

SAND claimed it had expanded representation to include individuals from the public housing projects during the summer, but CUI members viewed that as a token effort. The meeting ended in an angry atmosphere, with SAND claiming it would bring representatives of "the community" to the
next meeting to demonstrate its broad base of support. Also, at the meeting, SAND appeared to retreat from a promise to make every effort possible to reimburse Center staff for their anticipated efforts.

Before the third meeting, CPU submitted a proposal and a budget for $6,500 to the SAND organization. The third meeting marked the climax of negotiations between SAND and CPU. Present were approximately fifteen members of CPU, one person from the University of Hartford and two individuals associated with the University of Connecticut, the SAND staff, and "community representatives" from the SAND board.

The debate again focused on SAND's claim to represent the neighborhood. The subject of the proposed $6,500 contract also came up. CPU asked if SAND intended to pay for services performed, and on what basis a contract would be negotiated. SAND chose to interpret that request as evidence that CPU was not interested in assisting the educational efforts of the South Arsenal "community." They charged CPU with being concerned primarily with money, not service to poor people.

At a caucus during the final SAND session and on the following day, CPU developed its policy on the SAND relationship. Several members of CPU stated they believed "legitimate community people" were involved in the SAND
effort. A majority felt that SAMD did not represent the South Arsenal "community"; they felt CUI should not work with SAMD until SAMD negotiated a contract. Among other reasons, they pointed out that they had observed no parents involved in any of SAMD's everywhere School planning efforts.

The Center decided not to participate in a formal relationship with SAMD because it concluded that SAMD did not represent the South Arsenal neighborhood. Because CUI believed the Everywhere School might one day develop into a legitimate community education experiment, however, CUI invited individual members to work on the curriculum package on a voluntary basis. Eventually, four members of CUI participated in the design of the curriculum project for the Everywhere School.

The specifics of a policy emerged from the SAMD experience. Three points were emphasized: (1) CUI would seek out and preferred to work with groups where legitimate "community participation" existed; (2) CUI might not request financial remuneration for services if a group truly represented the interests of "the community"; (3) CUI would work with groups with "community participation" potential on a contract basis.

In one sense, the negotiations with SAMD failed. On the other hand, they represented progress. SAMD was
located in Hartford, yet they were never able to gain the involvement of more than one or two individuals at either the University of Hartford or the University of Connecticut. It would have been a radical step for those institutions to negotiate with black-led organizations. As many as twenty-five or thirty faculty and doctoral students from the School of Education had been involved with SWE in various meetings over a six-month period. CUE had personnel with enough experience and expertise to "read where SWE was coming from," and could decide whether it would be fruitful to develop a relationship. CUE was probably one of the few university-based urban education groups in the country which had sufficient interest and capability to assist "legitimate community organizations."

Also, the SWE negotiations were highly important as a learning experience for members of CUE. In general, liberal groups often found themselves drawn into situations without checking for the possibilities of real action. The negotiations demonstrated that extraordinary sensitivity to individuals and groups was required to maneuver through the area of urban education.

The Fartley Program

A University of Massachusetts graduate and beginning teacher at an all black chesso school in Los
Anneals, frustrated by his difficulties, offered a challenge to the School of Education and the Center for Urban Education. He wrote in a report:

What good if any was the teacher training at the University in dealing with these unforeseen problems? What are the personal limitations which a white, middle-class, teacher from Boston must overcome to attempt to teach in a new and, often, hostile environment? These are the important questions which must be overcome if we are to have a clearer picture of exactly what must be changed or what must be altered to properly train teachers to teach in the Urban Shatto.

In the fall of 1969, twelve interns, both undergraduate and graduate students, enrolled in the Parkway Project. Most of the students had participated in the "Urban Community Relations" course either during the spring term of 1969 or in the summer session. They researched urban problems on-site in neighboring cities. Their involvement in that course apparently had important effects. Gentry suggested that these students learned not to be afraid of the city, or of black people, while involved in the practicum experiences of the course. The experience indicated that white, suburban UMass undergraduates could become intrigued with teaching in urban areas. And the vehicles to bring the shift about apparently involved no major campaign, but merely an anxiety-reducing exposure to the urban environment. The fact that a majority of the seniors in the Hartford Project the year before had acquired
inner city teaching positions in September of 1969 reinforced the point. That did not guarantee they would be effective urban teachers. But it proved that a good teacher intern program could be a valuable part of CUE's activities.

By the spring semester of 1970, the Center had undergraduate teacher intern programs at three sites: New Park Elementary School in Hartford, Stephens Elementary School in Philadelphia, and the Parkway Program in Philadelphia.

The experimental Parkway Program in Philadelphia was one of the few really exciting alternative educational models in the country run by a city school system.17 The Philadelphia School District sent a letter to all the high school students in the City which described the innovative school:

The Parkway Program will not be a school with classrooms or bells. The organizations around the Benjamin Franklin Parkway will provide laboratories, libraries, and meeting space. Although participation will only be required for the length of the normal school year, study and work programs will be available year-round. Students and faculty will form small groups for discussion, study, counseling, and self-evaluation. Learning situations will vary from films, jobs, lectures to special projects.18

Parkway maintained an open environment, both physically and educationally, and utilized the various resources of the city as a major base of its curriculum. The Director of the School, John Bremer, wrote: "There is no school house, there is no separate building; school is
not a place but an activity, a process."

The UMass interns were self-selected; they worked out their relationship to the Parkway Program on their own when school began, and they had limited supervision from UMass personnel during the early weeks in Philadelphia. Also, they located housing in Philadelphia on their own. Finding their way in the city proved to be a valuable kind of orientation to the urban education process.

At the School, the interns functioned more like regular staff than practice teachers. They learned "methods" in the most effective way--on the firing line. They became fully responsible for at least three classes, and they could also offer an additional elective course, be it in the areas of civil liberties or Zen philosophy. The enthusiastic description by one School of Education faculty member who visited the program summarized the value of the internship experience:

The kinds of issues and problems that were discussed in our session with the interns make me think that these young people are more in touch with the fundamental needs of our society and its educational system than are most of the doctoral students and professors here at UMass. It was truly amazing to see x-fraternity and sorority people from this place functioning effectively in the "hard core" of Phila.

The development of the Parkway Intern Project meant GUE could offer the new teacher an initial experience in an innovative educational environment--one which might help point the way out of the traditional inner city quagmire.
The Parkway program itself was not a panacea: basic skills were not stressed enough with poor readers and mathematicians; some of the teaching and a lot of the curriculum was not innovative; the laissez-faire atmosphere sometimes reached chaos; and many reported the Parkway brand of "town meeting" democracy to be more rhetoric than reality.

On the whole, however, it was far better as a training site than New Park. Those students who were not ready for the more independent, challenging, and demanding Parkway experience could begin their urban involvement at New Park, where there was also more direct Unmass supervision. The Stephen's School interns, who lived at Father Divine's hostel in the Philadelphia ghetto, had a different type of experience in a traditional core city school. The three sites provided the Center with alternative kinds of internships requiring different levels of experience and maturity.

Several items on the CUL teacher training agenda still demanded attention. Three major needs remained: the need to create a complete curriculum or series of experiences for the development of those skills which would best prepare students for the urban environment; the need to find additional training sites for Unmass interns where the environment was appropriate; and the need to develop a follow-up network of progressive urban schools and a
clearing house at UMass, so that Center graduates seeking teaching positions would not immediately be crushed and swallowed by the traditional urban system.

Gentry made a statement when he was Director of the Westside Study Center in Pasadena, California, which also accurately represented the philosophy of the Center for Urban Education at the University of Massachusetts:

These are primarily poor people. There's a new factor. We call it the hope factor. We realize that one of the things that makes democracy work is the hope factor. The factor is that people, from the bottom, can move through the strata to the top. And we want to make people feel they can move.

The Career Opportunities Program proposal which was planned, prepared and negotiated by CUI in the fall of 1959 was the clearest attempt of the organization to implement the philosophy of the "hope factor."

The multi-year project would be run in cooperation with the Springfield and Worcester, Massachusetts, public schools and be funded at $170,000 by the federal government for the first year. The basic rationale of the proposal was "to provide an educational career ladder and lattice for low income minority group personnel who aspire to positions in the field of professional education." Teacher aids in the two school systems would earn a Bachelor's degree in
the work-study program "while continuing to serve as para-
professionals in their local school systems." Umass antici-
pated that ninety para-professionals would participate
in the Springfield and Worcester based in-service programs
while twenty para-professionals would be based at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts in Amherst.23

Traditionally, in career opportunities programs,
oranizations presented the idea of a career ladder on
paper but very few para-professionals ever advanced far
enough in academic programs to receive their Bachelor's
degree. Usually, school systems benefited by receiving
federal support for employing teacher aids but rarely delivered
on the "hope factor" for poor people.24 The necessary
arrangements with the colleges to insure a degree program
were not concluded. CUE hoped to build in those elements
during the planning process which would avert that exploitive
situation and enable the career opportunity concept to work.
CUE pursued this main goal in the negotiations with the
Springfield and Worcester school systems.

The School of Education achieved a major strategic
objective when they gained control of the educational com-
ponent of the training program.25 Springfield and Worcester
had hoped to play a significant role there. Frequently,
aademic credit for on-site practicum work was not provided
because local higher education institutions did not estab-
lish the courses, or local school districts did not persist in their efforts to create such arrangements. The Center built in that kind of flexibility with a broader definition of what constituted relevant educational experiences. It also proposed to offer more strictly academic courses on-site in Springfield and Worcester. Another step which the Center took was to include graduate assistantships at Worcester, Springfield and Amherst so that doctoral students would be available to advise, guide, and generally provide a support system for the participants. OUI defeated an attempt by the school districts to radically reduce the number of those graduate assistantships.

The negotiation efforts of the School of Education with community colleges and the administration and faculty of the University of Massachusetts comprised an important part of the planning. The School acquired the cooperation of the nearby community colleges to arrange courses in the liberal arts fields for paraprofessionals. More liberal admissions and academic requirement policies with the University of Massachusetts also were sought. The planners anticipated a person could earn the 120 credits for a Bachelor's degree in five to six years.

The Center also asked Springfield and Worcester to provide enough release time during the day to enable the paraprofessionals to earn a substantial number of college
credits during a semester at either the in-service center or at a neighboring college. Ultimately, the proposal allowed paraprofessionals in Worcester and Springfield to take as many as twelve credit-hours per semester. Very few programs have completed the difficult task of making such a program possible.

The Center invoked the "hope factor" in a number of other ways. Most important, they collaborated with the U.S. Office of Education in Washington in pressuring the two cities, particularly Springfield, to boost their current paraprofessional wage. Springfield did not have a paraprofessional career lattice salary schedule, and their basic wage was inadequate. With university and federal encouragement, Springfield raised the base pay and developed a three-level lattice based on education credits and work experience.

CUH also pushed both cities to reduce the proposed $22,000 16-month salary for the directors. That inflated administrative cost could have had a demoralizing effect on the poor people who would be participants in the program. The figure was reduced to $15,000. The Center also feared, both cities intended to appoint white middle class administrators as directors.

With respect to the selection of participants, CUH expressed its concern about the apparent intent of the two cities, particularly Springfield, to enroll a high proportion
of white, middle class, female teacher aids. CUI's power
to avert this situation was more limited than in the educa-
tional component, however.

Not only did the CUI planning process enable CUI
to train personnel and demonstrate its professional compe-
tence: it also offered the opportunity for the Center to
engage in a project which was consistent with its commit-
ment to change and its philosophy of the "base factor" for
poor people. But extensive negotiations on many points
had been required to insure that the idealistic objectives
could be fulfilled.

Ocean Hill-Brownsville

At a press conference in New York City on November
9, 1969, an unlikely marriage was proposed. The Dean of a
School of Education at a state university in a rural setting,
in a state with only a two per cent black population,
announced his intention to form an "inter-campus alliance"
with the most controversial and embattled urban school
district in the nation, the predominantly black anetwo area
of Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

The board of Education of New York City established
Ocean Hill-Brownsville as one of three experimental school
districts in the summer of 1967. The limited decentraliza-
tion plan allowed the three districts greater autonomy from
the central school board. The proponents of the plan hoped to involve the immediate community of the poverty stricken Ocean Hill-Brownsville area in the schools in order to provide a more effective educational program. When the community board of education in Ocean Hill-Brownsville attempted to transfer a number of teachers, issues of teacher rights and "community control" of education burst to the surface across the city. The situation was also inflamed by racial politics. Ultimately, a teacher's strike which began with the opening of school in September was not settled until the middle of November. The shocks from the Ocean Hill-Brownsville struggle reverberated through many cities in the United States, where the interests of predominantly white administrative bureaucracies and teacher organizations clashed with the demands of black and Puerto Rican communities.

The proposed alliance did not result from the exclusive activity of the Center for Urban Education. Dean Allen and Assistant Dean Woodbury initiated the School of Education activity. But CUA personnel were involved from the outset and, gradually, and somewhat to their dismay in view of the risky nature of the enterprise, the Center was drawn into the plans. CUA feared it might be left "holding the bag." Ultimately, Allen asked CUA to coordinate the anticipated alliance project. The negotiations with Shady
McCoy, the Ocean Hill-Brownsville administrator, were affected throughout by the threatened dismantling of the small experimental district and its absorption in a larger district.

The School of Education had established links with the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district in the fall of 1968 when a fifteen-man team from the School received a $5,000 grant to document, using video-tape equipment, the New York City school strike. The team made contact with McCoy, the district administrator, at that time and, subsequently, Weinstein and his associates conducted a workshop in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and another at Asherst for McCoy's teachers and parents in 1968-1969.

In October of 1969, Woodbury led a six-man task force, which included Bentry, to investigate the possibilities of an Ocean Hill-School of Education relationship. Woodbury later recorded his impressions of that experience:

"To walk into the schools of Ocean Hill-Brownsville is to walk into a community where people are alive. The buildings themselves are dingy, almost like prisons. But inside there is a commitment and excitement about education." Woodbury noted that the curriculum did not appear to be particularly innovative. But the morale of children, parents, and para-professionals working together in the schools impressed him. That atmosphere convinced the task force that "som-
thing important educationally may be taking place."33

The announcement of the alliance followed the visit of the task force. The New York Times presented the be-throthed to the nation on November 10, 1969. The front page story began: "Ahody A. McCoy, the administrator of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Demonstration School District, urged the Board of Education yesterday to approve its affiliation with the University of Massachusetts to avert the dismantling of the experimental district."34 The nature of the alliance required an evaluation of the demonstration district. "Dr. Allen said that an evaluation of the experiment would take at least two years and that it would be unfortunate to have the structure changed before an evaluation could be made," stated the New York Times.35

In concise terms, the affiliation with the School of Education represented McCoy's final trump card in his attempt to prevent the 9,000-student district from being absorbed by the new 20,000-student district decentralization plan. Why had the University of Massachusetts come to Ocean Hill's aid when other established institutions had remained at a distance?36 As the fact of the press conference illustrated, the relationship provided a useful public forum for the School of Education to gain national exposure for its "revolution." Secondly, the School had championed a movement in New York City which history would probably
treat in a favorable light; namely, a step toward freedom for black Americans. 37

Dean Woodbury also offered more idealistic reasons for the School of Education involvement, reasons which attracted CUJ's interest and involvement in the plan:

People who are on the line in American education are on the line in places like Ocean Hill-Brownsville . . . . As of today the Board of Education in New York City and the New York State Legislature have scheduled the demise of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiment without any major attempt to evaluate, assess or document what the educational impact of the experiment may have been or may be. Thus, political battles and political controversies threaten to obscure forever what may have been the educational possibilities and potential of one experiment in community control in urban America. 38

The Board of Education eventually announced during the winter that the decentralization experiment would end with the 1969-1970 school year. Furthermore, the anticipated alliance evaluation program lacked funding. But the relationship between the School of Education and Ocean Hill-Brownsville continued on a limited basis. Two members of CUJ joined a three-man differentiated staffing team which visited and conducted an exploratory evaluation of the district in December. 39 Also, McCoy and members of his staff participated in a reciprocal exchange of information with the School of Education staff in the spring of 1959. Finally, Woodbury set up an experimental circuit seminar during the second semester, involving travel between the Pennsylvania Advancement School in Philadelphia, Ocean Hill-Brownsville,
a group in Washington, D.C., and the School of Education. CUA personnel were involved in this effort.

CUA's affiliation with the Ocean Hill-Brownsville affair illustrated, again, its search for projects which might serve as vehicles for changing the educational life of poor people. Also, by opening up the possibility of a major alliance with Ocean Hill-Brownsville, the Center had to face a number of difficult questions which otherwise were far removed from Amherst. The process proved to be another valuable experience which increased the knowledge of members of the Center.

First, McCoy and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district, though nationally important as a symbol of change in urban education, lived a precarious existence. The School of Education, by the commitment to McCoy, placed itself in the position of inheriting his powerful enemies in education, particularly the powerful American Federation of Teachers. If Ocean Hill was doomed to begin with, the alliance could have represented a high price to pay for negligible benefits. CUA's association with the project raised the same issues. The Center and the School of Education both possessed national ambitions. Balancing the rewards and risks, and the other alternatives, should they have bet on McCoy?

The Ocean Hill-Brownsville situation also forced
CUE to ask itself what it could offer the district. What expertise did the Center possess which could benefit McCoy's schools? Did other centers in the School of Education have something to offer and would they participate in the alliance? Could the School leave CUE out on a limb without support? Should CUE insist that the alliance be considered a total school effort because urban school problems belonged to everybody—and then reject the leadership role?

The Center for Urban Education learned once more in the Ocean Hill negotiations the vast difference between a verbal expression of support from the comfort of academe and the attempt to do something about the problems of an embattled school district in New York City.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: RACE RELATIONS--
SOME OBSERVATIONS

Introduction

Racial issues affected Center activities, philosophy, internal relations, and its external relations with the School of Education and the field during the years 1968-1970. That struggle fell into three phases over a year and one-half period, labeled "Integration," "Identity," and "Future" phases.

The "Integration" phase involved the racial implications associated with the admission of blacks and the spirit of Colorado, which spanned approximately the period September--December of 1968. The "Identity" phase covered, roughly, January 1969--January 1970. The year was marked by the interaction between various groups and organizations at the School of Education. The human relations problems of CU1 played a major role in those events.

By January of 1970, the problems of the "Identity" phase became less prominent and tensions appeared to crystallize around a liberal reform versus a more committed approach to urban education. Where the "Future" phase would lead could not be determined early in 1970, but members of CU1
felt a new and more purposeful identification with the Center and its goals.

The Integration Phase

**Academic standards**

The "Integration" phase corresponded to the acceptance of a black presence at the School of Education. This phase consisted of the admissions policy of the Dean; the outlines of a new doctoral program; and the recruitment of black students and, later, of black faculty.

The racism confronted at this stage presented an obvious and quite visible target in September of 1963 and, for-the-most-part, lay outside the School of Education. The targets were the racially biased definitions of intelligence, competence, "academic standards," and research which had traditionally kept blacks out of the white middle class academic world.

The initial barrier in the conservative academic environment which the School of Education overcame was in the admissions area. The School revised the traditional practice of judging candidates merely in terms of Graduate Record Examination and Miller Analogies scores, and undergraduate grade point averages--suitably adjusted for the amount of ivy on one's alma mater. Many key figures in the School of Education believed the tests reflected cultural
bias and the scores represented a narrow definition of intelligence. Most faculty members accepted the principle that the admission of a large number of blacks depended upon a more flexible and less rigorous interpretation of admissions "standards." Only a few on the staff knew that active recruiting would be required to attract a fifteen per cent black student population.

The formal structure of a racially biased admissions policy remained in the School of Education through the 1963-1970 period. The School continued to use the CBI scores and other measures as criteria. But the operational admissions policy reflected a more realistic and flexible policy. The School of Education admitted other people as well as a usual group of Ivy-educated, middle class, and articulate masters of the traditional academic world.

Few members of the School of Education understood the racist implications of "academic standards" incorporated in the traditional doctoral program itself. The same narrow and often irrelevant definition of competence and intelligence which guided traditional admissions policies provided a setting for program requirements. Graduate schools measured competence according to the ability to consume books, produce sophisticated treatises of sufficient semantic ability and, periodically, prove oneself fluent in a brief but all-important oral examination. Tedious, usually
irrelevant, and often statistical approaches to research dominated traditional doctoral programs in education. What use these standards had in preparing effective teachers, school administrators, or even researchers evaded rational defense if one raised the plight of urban schools as a major criterion.

The faculty promotion system represented the illogical extension of the traditional doctoral training program in education. Creative teaching and service in the field became inconsequential factors when considered alongside a professor's publication record. Furthermore, when publication and high performance depended upon defining tasks which could be accomplished, most professors ignored the difficult to impossible issues of urban schools and racism.

The School of Education doctoral program sought new definitions of competence and expertise, and proposed alternative routes to the completion of a degree. In that way, the School blunted, though did not reverse, the racist impact of traditional "academic standards."

The "Integration" phase was characterized by a non-racist view of "academic standards." The danger remained, however, that such a liberal view would erode as the conservatism of time had its effect. In particular, the threat would be maximized as the School of Education "honeymoon" period ended and its program came under the scrutiny of an interested faculty in the rest of the university.
Apparentley, a different outlook existed in the School of education when the community turned from black student recruitment to the issue of the hiring of black faculty. Three faculty had been recruited as late as the summer of 1968—almost an afterthought. The trend persisted. During the fall semester, the School's Executive Committee agreed to spend forty per cent of its recruiting funds during 1968-1969 for the recruitment of black faculty for the following year. By the end of the fall semester, however, the intent remained unfulfilled. Numerous whites and no blacks had been hired for 1969-1970. Most whites ignored the fact that black faculty recruitment required special efforts and commitment to deliver on the resolution. Perhaps the most unfair rationalization devised by white faculty at the time involved the charge that Gentry, who had been delegated the thankless recruitment task, had not vigorously recruited black faculty. Some even suggested Gentry was threatened personally by the prospect of the hiring of strong black faculty with the doctoral degree—a brutal allegation.

The black Ph.D. market barely existed and colleges competed fiercely for the few individuals with doctoral degrees. Finally, the community recognized that an Executive Committee recommendation would not solve the problem.
nor could the "buck," which was the responsibility of the entire community, be passed to Gentry. Despite vigorous efforts by many faculty during the spring, the school hired no new black faculty for 1969-1970. Success was prevented by the extended battle over the problems of faculty integration during the fall.

The Colorado experience became an important early symbol of the "Integration" phase. The recruitment of black students and later of black faculty, and the revision of traditional "academic standards," constituted an exercise on paper. The School of Education, at the retreat, affirmed the right of a black community to exist in a physical sense. Most whites spent the early months of the 1968-1969 school year acclimating themselves visually to that black presence.

The Identification Phase

Introduction

The divisions and suspicions which emerged as part of the race relations environment at the School continued to rock and reverberate through the Center for Urban Education. The life of CU2 and the life of the School of Education were interdependent: developments outside the Center interacted with elements of the situation within CU2.

That human relations task which faced CU2 prevented the organization from developing successfully for many months.
The admission of black students and to a lesser degree the recruitment of black faculty could be accomplished in a white liberal institutional environment. In fact, the intellectual climate encouraged the process, but blacks and whites found it much more difficult to live and work together as peers in the same institution.

That second stage of integration resulted in many uncomfortable situations for both blacks and whites. The barriers appeared high from each group's perspective. The situation was frustrating and sometimes explosive. A struggle between various groups with a variety of objectives took place as individuals and organizations attempted to find their identity in the atypical racial environment.

White Groups

Four basic groups of whites could be identified at the School of Education: Conservatives, Moderates, Peace Liberals, and Kennedy Liberals. Many Conservatives, largely represented in the faculty, held positions at the School before Allen arrived in 1963. They represented a traditional view of "academic standards," and it is likely that they would have recruited few black doctoral students and no black faculty if they had controlled the School.

The remaining three white liberal groups constituted a majority at the School of Education. The first group,
labeled Moderates and largely faculty in the 30-40 age bracket, reflected a suburban educational orientation. Concerned more with strictly educational questions than political or social issues, the Moderates supported but probably had not participated in civil rights activities.

A second liberal group, most though not all in the graduate student population, consisted of Peace Corps returnees, some Jews, a few Quakers, and in the radical wing, Vietnam resisters. Those individuals, designated Peace Liberals, concerned themselves with international issues more than civil rights and urban problems. Idealistic and often utopian, they envisioned a future world of peace, community, and love. Many joined the Center for Humanistic Education, and to a lesser degree the Center for International Education. They also represented the School of Education's branch of the cultural revolution of the 1960's. Because many sought a less competitive and more harmonious relationship between people, they often found the interpersonal strife and conflict surrounding urban education distasteful. If one applied a political litmus test, most would have ended up in the camp of Senator Eugene McCarthy.

The third group of liberals was the Kennedy Liberals. They included both faculty and doctoral students. Political and social issues concerned them as much as educational problems. A number had been actively involved in the King
phase of the civil rights movement of the 1960's; they had participated in Democratic politics; and they held a pragmatic rather than an idealistic view of change. They believed the election of Robert Kennedy would have produced a new liberal coalition which might have solved the domestic urban crisis. They resented the passing of the integrated civil rights movement and, at the School of Education, saw the possibility of a small but important resurrection through a viable urban education program.

In all three liberal groups, not to mention the Conservatives, barely a handful of individuals had worked and/or lived with blacks and, consequently, knew little about black people. Also, raised in the middle class, they did not understand the experience of poverty. CUE's immediate problems as well as its ultimate hope lay in the passage of the white liberals through the "identity" phase.

**Black Groups**

Several groups of blacks joined the School of Education. Virtually all the blacks at the School were middle class in educational if not always in family background. The traumas of the "Identity" phase involved them as well as whites.

Many of the blacks at the School of Education found themselves in the identity crisis caused by their
middle class background, aspirations, and success in a white middle class world at a time of the acceleration of the revolution by the poor black majority. While they looked upward toward increased opportunity in a white-dominated world eager for "qualified" blacks, on the other hand they felt guilty due to the increasing demands of blacks left behind. At the same time the white liberals at the School of Education put on their dashikis and "shades," the middle class blacks experimented with their "Nero" hair styles.

One group of blacks at the School of Education belonged to the Bahai faith. Oriented toward international education, none joined CUB, although the Center's relationships with the Bahais were friendly. Generally, they did not become involved in the sometimes explosive politics of urban education and race relations.

A second small group of blacks were the campus militants. Outspoken, perceptive, often well-read and verbal, they sought the public mantle of black militance. Middle class in background and not involved in the problems of urban America, the campus militants skillfully manipulated and irritated the majority group of white liberals. Their power lay in their ability to affect the behavior of a less sophisticated group of whites. The interaction between the campus militants and the white liberals created most of
CÜS's internal and external human relations problems.

The third and largest group of blacks were involved in a number of programs and activities. Several in this group helped form the backbone of CÜS. Caught in the historical dilemma of the black middle class in the 1960's, they experienced an eventful and often painful "identity" phase.

Intramural "causes."

The lack of racial awareness of most white liberals; the activities of the campus militants; and, to a lesser degree, the ambivalent reactions of middle class blacks continuously plagued CÜS and created enough instability to almost immobilize the young organization. Outsiders rarely perceived the nature of the difficulties CÜS faced. The Center's problems differed from those of the other centers. Several events elucidated the difficult situation.

Just prior to the visit of the Ford Foundation, at a hastily assembled "black caucus" called by the campus militants, a group voted to make CÜS responsible to the "black caucus," even though most blacks in the caucus had not participated actively in the Center. The principle of non-participating membership which survived in the individualistic environment provided the quasi-legal loophole to attempt a "black caucus" coup d'état.
The caucus wanted the present director, Santry, to remain as titular head of CUE but subject to caucus direction. Many middle class blacks, unfamiliar with the politics of black militancy, found themselves intimidated by the campus militants. "Were they truly black?"

At the meeting with representatives of the Ford Foundation, the "black caucus" claimed to represent urban education interests. The Dean, who arranged the meeting for CUE, was confronted with a fait accompli. Two campus militants told two white faculty members who had helped arrange the meeting that they could not speak for the first hour while various blacks presented program proposals. The campus militants threatened to disrupt the meeting if they disobeyed that order. The majority of the blacks, unaware of the order, were double-crossed by the campus militants. The proposal plans of the campus militants dominated the agenda of the meeting. The Ford visit marked the only occasion during the year when the militant-dominated caucus took an active interest in CUE affairs.

Except for the effect on CUE, the Ford affair was almost comical. Friends at the School of Education briefed the leader of the Ford team before and after about the nature of the coup d'etat. No one believed the Ford Foundation would give several hundred thousand dollars to an organization at the University of Massachusetts independent of the Dean of the School. The meeting exposed the
weaknesses of CUIA, however, and probably influenced the decision by Ford not to fund the Center.

The Ford incident illustrated the identity problems. The middle class blocks, including several members of CUIA, were intimidated and then double-crossed by the campus militants. The white liberal students and faculty associated with CUIA, and other whites involved with the Ford visit, did not defend the position of the Center. The subtleties and dynamics of the caucus situation intimidated and baffled them. The campus militants exploited the situation with relative ease. The Administration Center which met with Ford that day, and which eventually received a grant, did not have the same problems as CUIA.

An experience similar to the Ford affair confronted CUIA during the Ocean Mill-Avonaville negotiations. The Center feared from the beginning that they might inherit any failure of the proposed Ocean Mill-Avonaville alliance. Individual CUIA members joined the initial administration initiative on the project. Most CUIA staff agreed the prospects for a substantive alliance were minimal in light of the imminent absorption of the district. And no agency provided funds to carry out the evaluation effort. The administration later asked CUIA to coordinate a non-existent, non-funded alliance at a meeting with McRoy and his staff at Limerick.

With the proposed alliance in that kind of unstable
situation, the administration of the school called a community meeting to explain the Ocean Hill affair the week after the press conference. The dean had returned from New York City hoping, even expecting, that the community would fully support his gesture supporting Ocean Hill-Brownsville. He discovered once more that urban involvement produced rare victories. At the public meeting, the dean came under attack from various black and white quarters as individuals presented their particular agendas. The administration shifted some of the responsibility for the commitment to Ocean Hill over to CÜs while under attack. The Center took considerable criticism at that point in a situation exploited largely by the black campus militants and a group of whites. They challenged and ridiculed the Center. The white liberal community remained silent while the dean carried the abuse heaped upon him for a variety of sins by a small minority. The liberals demonstrated no more ability to "deal" or deal with the militants' "aims" than they displayed during the Ford affair.

The Ocean Hill meeting had a divisive effect on the internal relations of CÜs. Whites questioned their urban education legitimacy, a familiar white liberal identity problem. CÜs staff accused each other of not defending the Center. The built-in racial tension surfaced in various characteristic forms of paranoia, hostility, and mistrust.
The experience demonstrated again that blacks and whites had immense difficulty living and working together as peers. The Ford and Ocean Hill events illustrated the kind of human relations problems which the Center confronted often. Many people at the School of Education criticized the Center for the amount of "hassling" and conflict which took place in CU1. Many whites and a few blacks found that distasteful and not quite civilized. Many did not become involved in CU1 activities for that reason. The Moderates and Peace Liberals often expressed such a viewpoint. CU1's shift toward a middle class style in 1969-1970 represented one attempt to neutralize the implicit racial and class prejudice directed at its organizational life.

A few whites reportedly left the Center because the black caucus drove them out. Other CU1 members found it difficult to understand how that thesis survived when the Center and the caucus were two separate and sometimes conflicting groups.

Many white liberals expressed an interest in urban education but did not join the Center because they claimed CU1 was a "black thing." A racial head count of CU1 members at any point in the 1963-1970 period would have revealed a narrow white majority. An influential white faculty member once termed CU1 a "black ghetto" and also a "white mafia" in the course of the same week.
The Center for Urban Education confronted those and other difficulties while trying to build an integrated working team. GUL weathered the storms primarily due to the remarkable leadership of an $3,500 Lecturer and doctoral student, Atron Gentry. Many tenured professors saw the wisdom and safety of concentrating on their courses and other individual responsibilities.

The white liberal environment: all black people look alike

"Love prejudice" emerged as a basic race relations problem in the white liberal environment of the School of Education. That attitude constituted a liberal adaptation of a prejudice common to conservative environments and summarized with the term "all black people look alike." Rather than generalizing and assigning certain uncomplicated traits to all blacks, the white liberal environment dehumanized black people by assigning favorable traits to all blacks. The white liberal's behavior at the School of Education reflected the "all black people look alike" attitude, which was partially concealed by a general "love prejudice."

Some corollaries of the theory "all black people look alike" included: "black people think and act alike"; "Any black person can speak for all black people"; "Every
or any black person is primarily responsible for the actions of every or any other black person"; "All blacks are interested in urban education"; "Urban education is a black thing"; "All blacks are members of the Urban Education Center."

The behavior of white liberals at the School of Education reflected, if in more subtle ways, those assumptions. Some of the problems CUE faced on the race relations front could be explained in such terms. On an obvious level, secretarial and supporting staff and sometimes faculty and doctoral students, often automatically sent black visitors to the CUE office. This happened even when the visitor expressed an interest in aesthetics. Also, the mail of some black doctoral students, the majority of whom belonged to other centers, would frequently be forwarded to the Center.

The assumption that the black caucus and CUE were synonymous offered an example of the "all black people look alike" phenomenon. That perception lay at the root of CUE's problem of persuading the community that not every black person who merely claimed an interest in urban education actually belonged to the Center.

Other examples involved cases where individual blacks came into conflict with the administration. Although the particular problem did not involve the Center, others
passed the "buck" to CUB to resolve the situation. Also, whites sometimes justified criticism of the Director of CUB by identifying a black person in the Center who agreed with the charge. "If a black person says Dentry has halitosis, than he surely must have it."

The limited perspective demonstrated by the community concerning the recruitment of black faculty illustrated the problem. That a man be black monopolized the agenda. That he be competent and make an important contribution to some program concerned people less. To be black should have been necessary but hardly sufficient. The preoccupation with black "visibility" and the virtual exclusion of other criteria represented token and superficial efforts at integration. In addition, several centers made a special effort to recruit one black person to participate in their program.

Racism in the white liberal environment wore a benevolent exterior. It was more innocent than deliberate, more unconscious than conscious, less oppressive but more elusive and frustrating. The white liberal rarely became involved in projects with blacks so that he learned to identify various groups of blacks and, more important, get to know individual blacks. The inability and/or unwillingness of white liberals to learn to "read" situations involving blacks caused most of CUB's difficulties. Consequently,
liberals tended to accept the outrageous actions of a few blacks simply because they were black. That kind of "love prejudice," reverse racism, and paternalism hurt the legitimate efforts of both blacks and whites at the School of Education.

Finally, "Hit Me Again," a favorite "game" which liberals at the School of Education played, also prevented healthy race relations. Liberal groups, expressing "love prejudice," consumed racial haranguers from blacks continuously and often with delight. It helped liberals to deal with their guilt and personal conflicts, and it kept campus militants employed, but it often diverted both groups from programs and action to solve racial and urban problems.

Conclusion

By January of 1970, although race relations identity problems remained, the School of Education had made progress. Many white liberals and many middle class blacks had established a clearer view of their own identity in an interracial context. The traumatic experiences had an educational impact and some blacks and whites gradually discovered individual personalities under skin colors. Many individuals became more experienced and thoughtful participants in the race relations arena. The white liberal environment was an arousing
and frustrating setting in which to work out racial problems. In the last analysis, however, despite the difficulties and ambiguities, the liberal atmosphere was far preferable to the usual white conservative academic environment.

By January of 1970, visitors to the School of Education continued to express surprise at the integrated composition of the Center for Urban Education. Inside CUD, the staff rarely took notice of that fact as they carried on their activities. More resilient to racial shocks and pressures from outside, a unique integrated team had been created on the campus of the University of Massachusetts.

The Future Phase

Introduction

The conservative in America cared more about maintaining the status quo than the liberal cared about changing it. The behavior of white liberals reflected their ambivalent position in American society. Intellectually, they recognized the inequality of the present and the need to change. But they also had a stake in the status quo from which they derived benefits. Blacks, who had much less to lose, viewed the status quo as white and change as black and found the liberals unreliable allies. The typical white liberal too often attributed racism to peer group pressure, the personality configuration and attitudes of individuals,
or "institutional racism." They placed less emphasis on how their own actions or inaction could eliminate racism by changing the objective circumstances of reality.

The evolution of many black groups in the 1960's from an integration position to a "black power" stance, the latter representing the search for an economic and political base, could be explained in part as the failure of a reliance on a coalition with white liberals. The rapid and massive shift in concern of white liberals from the problems of urban America to the Vietnam issue in the 1960's justified the new black emphasis. Blacks did not have the luxury of choosing among alternatives. By definition the black attitude toward change was more radical than that of the white liberal. The tension between CIU and the school of education increasingly focused on that difference in perspective. The difference began to be expressed in terms of priorities, political strategies, and the nature of programs.

A Perception Gap

From the outset of "the Planning Year" a fundamental perception gap existed between white liberals outside and the CIU staff. Outsiders perceived CIU as a ghetto--divided, paranoid, and more ready to engage in backbiting than conducting business. Those critics called upon the Center to
seek out and collaborate with other faculty and doctoral students who had initiated urban programs or had expressed an interest in working with CUU.

Members of the Center, on the other hand, viewed many individuals at the School as more committed to pretending changes than making real changes. CUU perceived a huge gulf separating "pure" research efforts carried out in Amherst, and active involvement in urban areas. On a personal level, Parkway interns who had survived on their own in Philadelphia, for example, had demonstrated a commitment to change. Others in the School talked about self-discovery and change, not through involvement in real situations, but at weekend sensitivity sessions in remote locations.

The Center asked why it had become so easy for whites to "cop out" of urban education with the explanation that CUU was a "black thing," by protestations of rejection, or by claiming concern for children but a distance for politics and conflict. CUU perceived such reactions in terms of a lack of commitment.

Priorities

The Center stressed the need to label urban education the number one priority and provide the human energies and resources to deliver on such a commitment.
Urban education had been placed at the top of the agenda in the “Ten Year Projection” but the reality had not matched the rhetoric. The Ocean Hill-Brownsville affair encouraged CUE initially, and they urged it be viewed as a School of Education project not solely a CUE program. But the school never established such priorities.

The issue of Vietnam revealed a view of priorities on the part of the community which produced cynicism in CUE. At an Education Assembly meeting in November of 1969, the community debated whether the school should be officially closed on Vietnam Moratorium Day. Faculty and students made impassioned speeches about “principles,” “individual conscience,” and the need for the School to “take a stand.” The community voted to close the School of Education.

No one in CUE deplored the genocidal aspects of the Vietnam War, where on the front lines and in the flag-draped coffins blacks for the first time were more equal than whites. But the School apparently judged the statistics in Vietnam more important than those which indicated twenty million blacks in America lived an average of five years less than whites, or the genocidal implications of the fact that twice as high a percentage of black babies die as white babies before the age of one.

Once the School had established priorities, resource allocations would have had to fit those priorities. The
Center welcomed the effort to recruit black faculty and the awarding of seven assistantships to CU in 1969-1970. But the School might have hired as many urban education faculty as "pure" researchers. The School could have established graduate assistantships for supervision of student teachers in urban areas at a twenty-five per cent higher rate, and boosted the salaries of urban education faculty at each level. Special incentive measures were required to give substance to urban education as a first priority.

**Political strategy**

The aversion to political involvement expressed by many at the School frustrated CU. The Center resented those who had the luxury of choosing not to participate in urban or School of Education politics. And the lack of common sense of the education "radical" who would risk everything, including the degrees of other students, for one principle, aggravated CU. White liberal politics were often characterized by the freedom and irrelevancy to sit on the sidelines in a Humphrey - Nixon election, or throw away a vote on Eldridge Cleaver. The non-political stance of a part of the white liberal community came under increasing attack by the Center during the winter of 1970.

**Progran**

The likely focal point of future tensions with
racial implications from the perspective of January, 1970 appeared to lie in different program directions. CUE moved increasingly to try to identify with a more radical urban education position, if attempting to deliver on the commitment to teach black children to read could be called "radical." Others at the school were oriented toward a middle class urban education perspective. The outlook on federal programs illuminated the differences.

The emphasis of the federal "disadvantaged" effort often seemed to be geared to paper promises. Applicants who presented the most sophisticated documents and included the most good intentions received the money. The federal effort, however, utilized few and ineffective methods to insure that organizations fulfilled their paper promises. The CUE planning process illustrated CUE's concern about that situation.

In the future, it appeared the Center would become increasingly critical of middle class urban education efforts and would try to develop projects with a greater potential for change. In the area of black faculty recruitment, CUE would press for consideration of competence as well as pigmentation criteria.

In the area of teacher training, CUE would likely be more concerned that programs teach children reading and other basic skills. It also appeared they would try to
prevent the imposition of suburban curriculum and programs
disguised as urban remedies.

Finally, pressure from CU& would increasingly
challenge the class and racial biases underlying the trad-
tional admissions policies and "academic standards" still
in evidence at the School of Education. In view of the
increasing conservatism of the School as outside and inside
pressures increased, that appeared to be an area of growing
polarization.

CU& in 1970

Robert Woodbury, the Assistant Dean for Program
Development at the School, compared CU& favorably with several
nationally recognized urban education groups in the spring
of 1970. The School had established contacts with the
Pennsylvania Advancement School in Philadelphia; McCoy's
team in Ocean Hill-Brownsville; the DOF organization in
Trenton, New Jersey; and the Innovations Team in Washington,
D.C. Everyone had considerably more financial backing than
CU&, providing them with the illusion of greater success.
But the Assistant Dean stated that CU& matched the other
groups in potential. He believed the Center possessed at
least as much urban education expertise, and it had sur-
passed the other organizations in the task of creating an
integrated team. CU& lacked funds, had taken a difficult
path during its growth period, but it had established a stronger base for the future. 6

Conclusion

The three phases of the 1963-1970 period at the School of Education paralleled the past and projected course of the national civil rights movement in some striking ways. First, the "Integration" phase saw blacks admitted to the predominant white society along with the expectation they would conform to the prevailing middle class norms.

The "Identity" phase which followed resembled the national experience when "black consciousness" emerged as the prevailing mood. Both blacks and whites at the School of Education found living together a confusing, uncomfortable, and difficult situation. Racial tensions increased and racial differences were magnified. The Center for Urban Education acted not unlike black groups in the nation which became disillusioned about coalitions with white liberals, retrenched, and then concentrated efforts on internal problems.

Finally, organized and more unified internally, and having established a modest power base and a point of direction, CUI sought to achieve its program as one organization among peers at the School of Education. The third phase reflected the projected course of the black revolution.
on a national level where political and economic competition among peer groups follows a period of internal organization and unification.

Broad historical parallels have often misled necessarily parochial viewers, yet blacks and whites at the School of Education participated in a process on a microcosmic scale which may prove to resemble a process the entire nation will ultimately experience.
FOOTNOTES

Introduction

1. The information presented concerning "the Planning Year" was largely drawn from two publications: School of Education, "A Thrust Toward Relevance" (mimeograph, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1969); and Lyman D. Brainerd, Jr., "A Thrust Toward Relevance: the Year in Review," Tread, 5 (Spring, 1969).

Chapter I


6. A classic Allen statement on this subject follows: "It is, thus, a major fault of our profession that we do not risk enough to have the potential to even fail dramatically and hence we also lose the potential to succeed. Where necessary, we must find publicly acceptable excuses for setting out in radically new directions, thereby allowing the profession to adopt a dynamic rather than a defensive stance at the outset."--Dwight W. Allen, "Needed: a New Professionalism in Education," Published by The American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (May, 1969), p. 7.


Roberts, "Voices in the Classroom," p.63.

Brainerd, "A Thrust Toward Relevance," p.5.

Allen and Wagschal presented a definition of juxtaposition: "As a gross starting point, we might do well to begin by looking at creativity as the kind of spontaneity of perspective which Arthur Koestler (The Act of Creation) has described so vividly. We create, perhaps, when we bring more than one point of view to a situation at the same time. Or when we bring together familiar ideas which we have never brought together before; or when new experiences are crafted onto old, traditional ways of life. The exciting possibilities for encouraging creativity through juxtaposition are being energetically explored with results which strongly suggest a much more active role on the part of educators."—Allen and Wagschal, "Bridging," p.21.

In a paper prepared before the fall semester, Allen highlighted his concern for "personological skills" in the following way: "The final area in which performance criteria are required is undoubtedly the most demanding and quite possibly the most important. We all recognize that effective teaching is more than subject matter plus an active repertoire of behavioral presentation skills. The "something more" might be designated as "personological skills," though the suffix "skills" may be misleading."—Dwight W. Allen. "In-Service Teacher Training—A Modest Proposal" (mimeograph, School of Education, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1963), p.14.


Ibid., p.5.
The research and evaluation biases of Allen and others were compiled in an evaluation proposal to the Ford Foundation titled: "Evaluation Model for the Program Toward a Contemporary University." The new three-dimensional model combined the traditional approach with two new techniques called the "Existential" dimension and "Participant-centered" dimension. At other times, a fourth dimension called the "Artistic Model" was proposed.


Allen and Macchal linked "social relevance" with the solution of urban problems directly: "By now, the lack of social relevance in American education has become painfully clear. The dissatisfaction of University students, the total dismay of black people in the cities, and the growing discomfort of private and public school students below college age do not speak well for the relevance of our education institutions and their experiences to life in an amazingly complex society."--Allen and Macchal, "Bridging," p.3.


Ibid., p.9.

Ibid., p.3.

Ibid., p.1.


The professor from the University of Indiana, Jordan, received a $50,000 grant from the Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education to evaluate compensatory education projects in the state before he arrived in September, 1963. This grant provided assistantship funds for several black doctoral students whom Jordan recruited for the evaluation project.

30. Reliable statistics in that area were not available. But few predominantly black colleges awarded doctoral degrees, and predominantly white institutions, historically, enrolled few black doctoral students.


In the same article Van Camp presented additional details about the retreat: "For the following five days, (it seemed like ten) this mixed-bag of company shared bunk houses, quartering 24 persons in each, a dining lodge, and a meeting hall. For those of us who had not participated in group living during the last ten or twenty years it was strange, sometimes difficult, but also exhilarating (exhausting). Upper bunk sleeping is not for the older generation, (those over 26), and water shortages bothered some compulsive savers. If one craved more than 4 hours sleep a night, this was not the place to be. Each bunk house contained a central living room about 10' x 15' in area, and it was in these many of the intensely exciting educational innovations were born, usually and fittingly, between midnight and 3 A.M."

32. From minutes of a planning meeting for urban education before the Colorado retreat, September 3, 1963, School of Education, Documentation Files. See bibliography for Chapter III for a description of Documentation Files.


34. Van Camp, "Why Retreat?" p. 2.

35. Ibid.

Chapter II

The Hartford Board of Education, "Proposed Statement of Partnership of the Hartford Public Schools with the School of Education of the University of Massachusetts," (typescript, Sept. 25, 1963, School of Education
Center for Urban Education), Hartford File. See the bibliography for Chapter II for a description of the Hartford File.

2 Robert A. Mackin and John C. Woodbury. "Preparing Teachers for Inner City Schools", Jend, 5 (Spring, 1969), 42.


5 The strategy the Board followed with university and other publics was revealed by the objection of the Hartford Federation of Teachers to a budget item. The Hartford AFT President, Art Brault, wrote in a front page editorial of the Unionizer in the February, 1969 issue: "I certainly have strong feelings about the deletion of certain items. For example, the inclusion in the budget of thousands of dollars for nine administrative interns via the University of Massachusetts. Dr. Miles talks in glowing terms of the feedback from the college via the interns. . . . It would seem that administration could come up with a viable Hartford intern program which would give our own Hartford teachers an opportunity to pursue a career in administration."—Hartford File.

6 For example, the guidelines for the More Effective School Personnel Utilization Program under LEA included as one of ten points: "Have other agencies and institutions made commitments to or participated in planning for a more flexible school organization and the training project?"—U.S. Department of health, Education, and Welfare, "Education Professions Development Act, Final Progress Information, 1969," p. 10.

7 Four of the seniors in the Hartford Project teacher training program were hired by the Hartford system. One of the five doctoral interns became a vice-principal at New Park Elementary School in 1969-1970 and another became director of the Hartford Teacher Corps.

8 Bair's letter to the Board of September 30 also designated the feeder schools and mentioned an option of using other schools "in that general section of the City."
9 Memorandum, Jack Woodbury to Gerald Weinstein, October, 1963, Hartford File.

10 The Woodbury memorandum to Weinstein also included the statement: "A particular concern of the aids would be to develop friendships with teachers in their school and try to satisfy their needs. Perhaps a better title would be administration-teacher liaison. This aid or liaison (or curriculum aid) would also become involved in any number of areas when and where assistance is needed—filling in by teaching classes, running some study halls, helping the guidance people in their counselling, etc. They would have to get to know their school and its many constituencies and operations...."

11 The doctoral interns had been attracted by the ideas of a Professor at the School of Education, Gerald Weinstein, whose notions of change in schools had been spelled out in The Disadvantaged. See Mario Fantini and Gerald Weinstein, The Disadvantaged: the Challenge to Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).


13 The proposal described their function: "In addition to helping with the ongoing program at these schools, a major portion of their work would be to identify the needs of each school and draw upon the resources of the university. The five-man team would also exchange ideas and coordinate the broader partnership program. In this process, a more comprehensive view of the needs of the entire school system would emerge. Additional schools would be targeted and other programs would be established as time passed...."—Ibid., p.2.

14 Ibid., p.2.

15 Memorandum, UMass Doctoral Intern Team to the Hartford Administration, n.d. [Spring, 1968], School of Education, Hartford File.

16 "New World Proposal," p.2.

17 The goal of the Committee was presented in a letter to all the Hartford teachers: "The ideal pursued by the Teacher's Human Relations Committee is quality integrated education for the City of Hartford. To set
goals and ways of promoting action, we as teachers want to promote a healthy cooperative climate where the best of each of us can flourish—only then can seemingly impossible tasks become a reality."—Letter, The Human Relations Committee to Hartford Teachers, February 20, 1963, Hartford File.

18. In Hartford, under the terms of the contract with the AFL, a principal could hold only one involuntary in-service meeting and one faculty meeting after school per month. Other after-hours meetings had to be voluntary.

19. The Associate Superintendent, Robert Kelley, felt it necessary at one point to put out a memorandum to all principals to try to clarify the intern's role. The memorandum read: "The role of the University administrative interns (usually doctoral students) cannot be defined as being similar to the principal intern appointed by us to serve in a school-wide capacity under the direction of its principal.

1. The Umass administrative interns will be entirely responsible for the activities and training of the resource interns from the university.
2. The administrative interns will not be used to evaluate members of the regular staff, nor should classroom teachers be compelled to provide assistance for them in Umass projects, but based upon assignment, under the direction of the principals, they may be used to perform other administrative assignments.
3. They may be used by the principals in a variety of ways to help provide resource help to benefit the on-going program in their schools. They will not, however, have any school wide administrative authority, unless working under the specific authority of the principal."—Memorandum, Robert Kelley to all principals --subject: University Interns, April 1, 1969, Hartford File.


21. The pilot projects were listed in the May 16 memorandum:
1. Several presentations which combine the fields of art and music have taken place (Simon).
2. Debates which have combined the disciplines of Social Studies and English (Alden, Lucianno).
3. The effective use of Umass interns (staff).
4. Presentations by outside speakers to combined 7th and 8th grade groups (staff).
5. Multi-media presentations in science to combined groups (Campbell, Gibson).
6. Team learning as an instructional approach in mathematics through the use of resource students (Lynch).
7. Social topical presentations in history (Moanan).
8. Pilot experimentation with tutoring and reading in small groups (Walsa).
9. Pilot film presentations and group work with affective techniques—guidance (Finn).—Ibid.

22 Joseph Schulze, "One Student's View of Urban Education." Trend, 2 (Spring, 1969), 59.

23 Several observers believed the proposal for a new administrative structure which the principal wrote at one point, and which the faculty voted for until new factional strife broke out, was prepared as a joke. The three-page proposal concluded with the obsequious remark: "The New Park Avenue staff is in a position to promise the superintendent nothing but honesty and industriousness, should he deign to accept the aforementioned proposal."—Robert Johnson, "New Park Proposal," May, 1969, Hartford File.

24 The principal authors of the Urban Developmental School Proposal were Jack Woodbury, Carolyn Pealla, Joseph Schulze, and Robert Mackin—all members of the Center for Urban Education.


26 The flexible scheduling—differentiated staffing model was initiated at Weeks Elementary School and Martin Luther King Junior High School in Kansas City, Mo. in September of 1963.


28 For a further explanation of the resource areas, see Appendix I, the full text of "A Proposal for An Urban Developmental School," particularly page 9.
The Community Cabinet was to be composed of the following members: the Director (Chairman), the Associate Director, two teaching staff, four parents, four representatives of the community agencies, one student from the school, and one student intern. The proposal stated: "The school and university and parent representatives will be elected by their respective groups; the community representatives will be volunteers."—Ibid., p. 16.

The Academic Cabinet included: the Associate Director (Chairman), the Director, six teaching staff, two student interns, two school students, and two community representatives. Participants would be selected by their respective groups.—Ibid., p. 15.

It is likely, also, that the Umass internships and the "resource" teachers did not mark an increased financial commitment to New Park for a planning period. The $14,000 for the two interns was easily covered by the removal of a vice-principal position at New Park and the lower salary of a first year principal. Further, many schools in Hartford received an additional new administrator in the fall. New Park did not; the salary was absorbed by the "resource" teachers.

This point was dramatically illustrated when the principal, in five minutes, vetoed a CUL plan to conduct an after school in-service "educational marathon" on two consecutive days. The naive optimism of CUL's New Park planning committee was evident in the minutes of their meeting. "We decided that our first major contact with the school and surrounding community would be a 2-3 day marathon held at the School. We discussed the various factions which we could incorporate into the marathon and later on into our program:"
1. K-6: have had little help from UMass and might not be very cooperative.
2. 7-8: most are interested in changes being made . . .
3. Principal: will probably support us but not work with us . . . "--Minutes of Planning Committee Meeting for New Park School, October 17, 1969, Hartford File.

Chapter III

1. The size and nature of the group in the School of Education had changed to such a degree that the reference to a "new" institution is an accurate characterization. Also, the Dean was granted a charter to create an entirely new program.


7. In the memorandum to Allen, Coffins related Forrester's notions directly to the School of Education experiment: "Educational settings seem to me to be appropriate for testing some of these ideas; indeed, we see to be testing some of them or some ideas that are quite close to these, in a way, through differentiated staff, flexible scheduling, variable exit and entry points and alternative routes and strategies--not to mention your provision of considerable resources and opportunities for faculty and students to work with . . . ."--Ibid.


9. Ibid., pp.5-17.
10. A good historical review of the evolution and development of organizational theory appeared in Chapter IV of Warren Bennis' Changing Organizations. He placed in historical perspective the Scientific Management movement of Frederick Taylor, the Human Relations movement most closely identified with Elton Mayo, and the later emergence of the Revisionist School and others.


13. Caroline McGregor, the widow of Douglas McGregor and an editor of her husband's last book, lived across the street from the School of Education in Amherst, Massachusetts, and had discussed the organizational climate of the School with members of the administration.


15. Under the authority granted by the Board of Trustees of the University, all faculty decisions were "advisory to the Dean." The new governing bodies operated in a context where the Dean had delegated his authority to the Committee of the Whole.


18. A member of the faculty pointed out in an article that a reality of the School of Education operation was the charismatic leadership of the Dean which was always in competition with the "participatory democracy" nature of the Assembly—Ray Budde, "Let's Not Become Purists" as we seek to try out Forrester's "New Corporate Design," I., No.11(1963).


23. Ibid., p. 4.


25. In a memorandum co-authored by Peter Wagschal and Robert Woodbury, the "do your own thing" approach was concisely stated: "The entire School should see itself as no more and no less than the faculty and students in it. The catalogue, then, should contain biographies of all faculty and doctoral students, with statements of their interests and office hours so that students may come to see them whenever they wish."—Memorandum from Harry the Crawler and the Late Van Buren to the Community, "Substitute Package," March 20, 1960, Documentation Files.


30. Ibid., p. 6.

31. Ibid., p. 6.

32. Ibid., p. 12.

33. Ibid., p. 12.
34 Ibid., p.12.
36 McGregor, The Professional Manager, p.73.
37 In this sense the analysis appeared to reflect the views of Chris Argyris—his view of the inevitable if healthy conflict between individual and organizational goals. See Chris Argyris, Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness (Homewood, Ill.: R.D. Irwin and the Jersey Press, 1962).
38 Zennis, Changing Organizations, p.7.
40 See Hersey and Blanchard, Chapter IV.
41 Mouzelis, Organization and Bureaucracy, p.125.
42 Mouzelis used the term "inducement-contribution equilibrium," Dennis the term "exchange theories," and McGregor "extrinsic and intrinsic rewards."
43 The discussion of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards rests on McGregor's ideas in The Professional Manager.
47 Hersey and Blanchard, Organizational Behavior, p.27.
48 Professor Herbert Walberg of Harvard University visited the School of Education to analyze its organizational characteristics. Using Weber's formulations of charismatic, collegial, and bureaucratic types of organization, he found the School of Education to be a combination of charismatic and collegial types, having rejected the bureaucratic.—Manuscript from Richard Clark to the Community, "Notes on Professor Walberg's Presentation," December 23, 1968, Documentation Files.
Chapter IV


3 Letter from Robert Woodbury to Thomas J. Donahue, Assistant Superintendent of Springfield Schools, May 1, 1969, Documentation Files.

4 "Minutes of "Meeting with Springfield Superintendent of Schools," Friday, Jan. 31, 1969, John O'stich, recorder, Documentation Files.

5 The objectives of the School of Education were expressed in a letter of May 1, 1969 to Assistant Superintendent Thomas Donahue and a letter of May 16, 1969 to Springfield Mayor Frank Friedman--both from Robert Woodbury. The letters were written after school personnel in Springfield had raised questions about the Urban students' presence in the North End-Brightwood area--Documentation Files.


8. The total included the approximate figures:
1. Fall Semester--Race Relations training course--Gentry, Weinsten (50); Urban Community Relations--Woodbury, Gentry (30); Education and Public Policy--Woodbury, Lyon (30).
2. Spring Semester--Race Relations--Gentry, Weinsten, Jordan, Staff (30); Urban Community Relations--Gentry, Woodbury (40); Education and Public Policy--Woodbury, Lyon (30); Teacher Education--staff (25)
3. Summer--Urban Community Relations--Gentry (60).


10. Ibid., p.2.
11. Ibid., p.2.
12. Ibid., p.2.
13. The new urban education courses which were developed by the staff included: "Special Problems in Education" (Selency); "The Politics and Economics of Education" (Schley,Freesten); "Race Awareness in Elementary Curriculum" (Simmons, Dade); "Studies in the Communication of Racism" (Jones, Gentry, Dade); "Community Conflict and Urban Education" (Anderson,Jones); "Introduction to Urban Education" (Bennister, Fealle, Williams, Carter, Frudhomme, Abraham, Green); "Urban Education and the Teacher" (Phillips,Gentry).


15. Ibid., p.9.

17. In an unpublished article on the Philadelphia School System, Wally Roberts, Associate Editor of Saturday Review, suggested that Philadelphia was seeking new models; perhaps more than any other school district in the nation." He cited the Parkway Program as one of the three most promising projects.--Wally Roberts, "The Philadelphia Story (2nd draft)," April 1969, p.16, Center for Urban Education, General Files.


21. Ibid., p.2.


24. There is an urgent need to provide readily accessible educational career opportunities for low income minority group personnel. Most school systems which have developed teacher aide programs for indigenous personnel have experienced difficulty in arranging for full Bachelor of Arts Degree availability in conjunction with those para-professional programs . . . ."--Ibid., p.1.
25. "The School of Education, University of Massachusetts, assumes full responsibility for the educational component of the career opportunities program, which will be jointly administered by the public school departments of Springfield and Worcester, Mass., and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst with considerable assistance from the afore-mentioned colleges of Springfield and Worcester."--Ibid., p. 23.

26. "Within this in-service phase, program participants would be able to obtain college credit for activities such as the following: (1) participation in formal courses taught by staff members from the University of Massachusetts and personnel from the school districts; (2) participation as trainers of other paraprofessionals or teachers within the in-service program (e.g., as strength trainers), (3) involvement in specific paraprofessional activities as part of their regular teacher aide assignment (e.g., tutoring students or small group instruction of students); (4) involvement in specific activities with community organizations, agencies or other projects (e.g., liaison function between schools and other agencies, or functioning as a change agent working with community organizations)."--Ibid., p. 16.

27. "The University of Massachusetts agrees to offer, each fall and spring semester, courses representing six (6) credit hours, on-site in Springfield and Worcester, respectively, in facilities provided by the respective school districts."--Ibid., p. 24.

28. "Program participants within the In-service Centers will be closely supervised and counseled by the local program Director, and by graduate assistants at each in-service site who are enrolled in the Doctoral Program at the UMass School of Education."--Ibid., p. 17.

29. "The University agrees also to arrange for a variety of three credit-hour courses each semester from the Core Curriculum, to be made available to all program participants at a local, and mutually agreed to, site in each of the two cities. It is understood that these three-hour courses may be offered in Springfield and Worcester through a local community college, to be named, or, in the event this cannot be arranged, by University of Massachusetts personnel."--Ibid., p. 24.
30 "The primary contributions which this C.O.P. training component can make to the other UMass programs are innovations from traditional teacher preparation programs in two major areas: (1) waiver of traditional student academic requirements for admission; (2) waiver of some of the traditional academic requirements for trainers of teachers."--Ibid., p.12.

31 "It is estimated that the program participants will be able to earn baccalaureate degrees and meet teacher certification requirements within a period of five to six years, and, of course, within less time if they have had some previous college work."--Ibid., p.2.

32 "Program participants might take as few as three credit hours or as many as twelve credit hours per semester, depending on the appropriateness for the individual participant of the activities, courses, and other opportunities that are available within the In-service Center during any given semester."--Ibid., p.17.


36 The former vice president of the city board of education, the Rev. Hilton Galanison, had tried to arrange an alliance with the Harvard Graduate School of Education the year before. The New York Times wrote: "At that time the Rev. Hilton A. Galanison, then vice president of the City Board of Education suggested that Harvard University's School of Education oversee the experimental district. Although the idea did not take root, Dr. Galanison has since been appointed visiting professor of education and urban studies at Harvard's Graduate School of Education.

A suggestion by Dr. Buell G. Gallacher, former president of City College, that units of the City University affiliate with local schools also has not yet been implemented."--Ibid., p.42.
McCoy had called the School of Education "the most flexible and innovative" school of education he knew. This was reported in the New York Times article and in the Boston Herald Traveler. -- Uriel Cohen, "Mass Education School to Aid N.Y. Experiment," the Boston Herald Traveler, Tuesday, November 11, 1969.


A letter of December 22, 1969 to several Ocean Hill-Brownsville administrators from team leader Richard Clark presented a brief assessment based on the visit--Center for Urban Education, General files.

Chapter 7


3 Ibid., p.97.

4 Based on remarks by R. Woodbury, Center for Urban Education meeting, April 1, 1970, Hadley, Mass.

5 That process was described by Thomas F. Pettitray in "Racially Separate or Together?," Social Issues, 25, No.1 (1969).
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Chapter I

Several articles by Dwight Allen and a number of publications by the School of Education proved to be most useful in the preparation of the first chapter. The Allen pieces included: Dwight W. Allen and Lloyd M. Kline, "Differentiated Staffing" (mimeograph, School of Education, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1963); Dwight W. Allen and Peter H. Manship, "Fing the Great Divide." Massachusetts Teacher, 43 (April, 1969); Dwight W. Allen, "Needed: A New Professionalism in Education," published by the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, (May, 1963); and Dwight W. Allen, "In-Service Teacher Education--A Modest Proposal" (mimeograph, School of Education, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1963).

Two descriptions of the activities during "the Planning Year" are School of Education, "A Thrust Toward Relevance" (mimeograph, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1963) and Lyman B. Brainerd, Jr., "A Thrust Toward Relevance: The Year in Review," Trend, 5 (Spring, 1969). An article by Sally Roberts, "Voices in the Classroom: Clean Slate at UMass," Saturday Review, January 13, 1969 provides an outside national perspective.

The best week-by-week account of the developing situation at Amherst is offered in Tabula Rosa: the foil. Journal of the Mass. School of Education. This in-house publication includes a variety of materials and was published twice a week in 1968-1969, though less frequently in 1969-1970. The publication consists of editorials, reports of committee and center activities, reprints of articles in other journals and newspapers, letters from the School's friends and foes, and various miscellaneous information. Tabula Rosa captures the evolving spirit of the "revolution" better than any other record of the period.

Two other sources were crucial in the preparation of the chapter. First, the memoranda, letters, minutes of meetings, and reports in the Documentation Files were invaluable. Also, as a participant in the events at Amherst, I relied on my recollection of the sequence of events and impressions of the activities in reconstructing this account.

Chapter II

I compiled the Hartford file while serving as the
Unass Hartford Coordinator in 1963-1969. The File consists
of approximately 4,000 pieces. It provided a basis for
the analysis of the Hartford Project. Included are various
memoranda, letters, proposals, and reports. It contains
such key items as the memoranda and letters of Superin-
tendent Medill Fair, Assistant Superintendents Robert Miles
and Robert Kelley, Dean Dwight Allen, the Hartford Coordinating
Team, and the principals in the five target schools.

Several documents provide information about major
developments in Hartford during 1963-1969. They include:
The Hartford Board of Education, "Proposed Statement of
Partnership of the Hartford Public Schools with the School of Education of the University of Massachusetts" (typescript, Sept. 25, 1968, School of Education, Center for Urban Education), Hartford File; School of Education, "A Proposal to the New World Foundation" (mimeograph, School of Education, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, November, 1963), Hartford File; Center for Urban Education, "A Proposal for an Urban Developmental School: Working Paper" (mimeograph, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1969), Center for Urban Education, General Files.

Two articles by members of the Hartford Coordinating Team help present a perspective on the Hartford Project: Robert A. Mackin and John C. Woodbury, "Preparing Teachers for Inner City Schools," Trends, 5 (Spring, 1969); and Joseph Schulze, "One Student's View of Urban Education," Trends, 5 (Spring, 1969).

Gerald Weinstein, Professor of Education at Amherst, had a personal and an intellectual impact on the Hartford Team. His ideas concerning change in urban schools are presented in two books: Mario D. Fantini and Gerald Weinstein, The Disadvantaged: Challenge to Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); and Mario D. Fantini and Gerald Weinstein, Making Urban Schools Work (New York: Holt-Rinehart, 1968).

Again, much of the information and perspective for the analysis of the Hartford Project was based on my personal involvement in that experience.
Chapter III

The School of Education Documentation Files, compiled by the Documentation Committee established during "the Planning Year," include approximately 15,000 pieces. These Files provided me with important documents for the preparation of Chapter III as well as for other chapters. The Files, not yet systematically organized, include various memoranda, letters, proposals, reports, and newspaper and magazine articles relating to the "revolution" at the School of Education. The Files also include copies of Tabula Rasa.


The burden of Chapter III reflected the intellectual impact of several organizational theorists. The pivotal piece is Jay W. Forrester's, "A New Corporate Design," Industrial Management Review, 7 (Fall, 1965). Two books


Tulia Rosa and my own involvement at the School of Education provided further understanding of the organizational setting.

Chapter IV

The General Files at the Center for Urban Education consists of approximately 10,000 pieces. Included are memoaranda, reports, proposals, course descriptions, letters, and newspapers and magazine articles. A significant part
of Chapter IV was written after analyzing these documents.

Key items in the General Files include: Center for Urban Education, "A Policy Statement" (mimeograph, School of Education, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, September, 1969), Center for Urban Education, General Files; South Arsenal Neighborhood Corporation, "The Everywhere School: Working Paper" (mimeograph, Hartford, Conn., 1963), Center for Urban Education, General Files; and memoranda and materials on the Parkway Program.

Also crucial in the preparation of Chapter IV were School of Education, "Paraprofessional Teachers of Teachers: Career Opportunities" (mimeograph, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, November, 1969), Center for Urban Education, General files; and Robert Woodbury, "What About Ocean Hill-Brownsville?" (mimeograph, School of Education, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Nov. 12, 1969), Documentation Files.

The literature in the field of urban education insisted that immediate "action" was required to solve urban problems. This dissertation represents an analysis based on "action" experiences. I participated in most of the major activities described in Chapter IV. I took part in the SMCU negotiations, helped arrange and was present at the McCoy-Allen press conference, and directed the Parkway Intern Project.
Chapter V

Most individuals associated with the Center for Urban Education during the 1963-1970 period participated in a continuous and intensive race relations experience. It taxed the intellectual and emotional capacities of all who were involved. An inestimable number of meetings and sessions took place where race relations was the central issue. The information and analysis in Chapter V was based on those experiences.


A number of books have informed my general perspective in the area of race relations. Many are classics in


Books which deal with racial attitudes and psychological questions include: John H. Griffin, *Black Like Me* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1961); Ralph Ellison, *Invisible

APPENDIX I
A PROPOSAL FOR

AN URBAN DEVELOPMENTAL SCHOOL:

WORKING PAPER

The Center for Urban Education
University of Massachusetts
School of Education
Amherst, Massachusetts

May 1969
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III. Personnel                          18
Rarely have urban school systems been able to respond adequately to the needs of their clientele. The exodus of good but extremely frustrated teachers from city to suburb, unrealistic educational objectives, the social and economic deprivation prevalent in many homes—all have contributed to the gradual erosion of the quality of urban education.

The cities have not accepted their fate without a struggle—special programs directed to students and staff have been implemented; foundation and federal support has been sought; and pleas have been extended to universities to direct teacher training to the realities of the urban schools. The first two approaches have not proven particularly fruitful, and the latter request has been generally ignored. Consequently, cities are left in a default position: without adequate financial or even moral support, their school systems begin to deteriorate.

It is our belief at the Center for Urban Education that schools of education must assume a greater responsibility, not only in training teachers specifically for urban schools, but also in developing new strategies for improving the quality of urban education in general.

In fleeing to the warm embrace of the suburban schools, colleges of education have taken the safe route of maintaining and improving the status quo, rather than facing the harsh realities of the changing urban environment. The Center for Urban Education at the University of Massachusetts School of Education intends to establish itself as a
long-range planning, research and training center, focusing on the
development of new models for education in urban areas. To realize
this objective, the Center will be working closely with administrators,
teachers, and students in urban schools. The following working paper
for an urban developmental school hopes to facilitate that close working
partnership. The university can offer manpower--graduate and student
interns--and expertise, in the form of consultants, special programs,
and credit course offerings. The urban school provides a research
and training site, the realities of urban education.
I. THE PROGRAM

A. Flexible Scheduling

Increasingly, schools throughout the country are breaking down the four walls of the self-contained classroom. The object is to create an environment where "teachers are free to teach and students are free to learn." By utilizing facilities most efficiently, varying grouping patterns, and employing the individual talents of teachers more effectively, flexibly scheduled programs have revitalized traditional school patterns.

Most schools with flexible schedules are located in the suburbs. But successful models have been developed in urban ghetto areas. Where individual attention is absolutely necessary, the flexible schedule facilitates the use of additional personnel. It maximizes the possibilities for small group work, individual tutoring, and conferences. The fundamental goal of flexible scheduling is to promote self-directed learning. Too many urban and suburban children lack motivation to learn even the basic skills. Flexible scheduling confronts this problem directly.

The transition from a traditional schedule is often first implemented in grades 7 through 12 where students already move among several classrooms for instruction in various subjects. But the principal applies equally well to the primary grades. Teachers and students at all levels will benefit from the opportunity for individualized instruction, release time for curriculum development, and
team teaching. The huge, carpeted, multi-purpose learning areas
evident in some schools at the primary level support the feasibility
of the flexible design.

The flexible schedule permits an enriched program for the student.
A variety of learning environments and additional modes and materials
are made available. Most important, a program can be tailored closer
to the specific needs and learning style of each child.

The role and responsibilities of the teacher is altered under a
flexible schedule. The new approaches to teaching include:
team teaching
team planning
preparation of special programs
increased staff decision-making
continuous in-service training

The key to the above activities rests in the fact that the flexible
schedule reduces the time spent in regular classroom instructional
activities. As much as 30% of a teacher's time could be spent in
team planning, conferences, instructional preparation, and in-
service training.

Students might spend approximately 50% of their time in a
traditional classroom situation, the remainder in smaller instructional
situations and self-directed activities in resource areas.
The schedule is constructed with the help of a computer, which is responsive to faculty guidelines and the availability of plant facilities.

Flexible scheduling makes possible a variety of grouping situations:

1. Small Group Activity (5 - 10 students)
   a. Emphasis on basic skills; high priority on math and reading
   b. Special counseling situations
   c. Team projects for highly motivated students and for independent work (activities might include drama, school newspaper, student preparation of curriculum units, literary magazine, art and music groups).

2. Regular Classroom Setting (25 students)
   Instruction, discussion: Social Studies, Language Arts, Science Laboratory

3. Large Group Meetings (40 - 60 students)
   Films, lectures, field trips, multi-media presentations, involvement of metropolitan resources.

4. Individualized Learning—Unstructured Time

The amount of unstructured time in a student's schedule would vary according to the ability of an individual to direct his own learning. Some students would receive direct supervision throughout the day, while others might spend up to 25% of the day in independent work. Activities would include:

---guidance conferences
---special attention at the reading clinic
---use of resource areas and library
---cross-age tutoring
---independent study
B. More Relevant Curriculum

The irrelevance and sterility of curricula is one of the most often heard criticisms of urban schools. Columbus, *Silas Marner*, or the earth's crust are not captivating topics for a child who daily confronts the urban setting. While there is a real effort being made now to produce materials which deal with the social realities of the urban child, there are yet many inadequacies in the curriculum.

Reading, writing and computation skills are of primary concern, and additional efforts need to be made in developing and refining these skills in children. With the addition of more university manpower in the form of student-teachers (and community personnel) more students could receive the individual attention necessary to increase their ability to read and write.

Just as critical as the reading and computation skills are the areas of individual growth, which Gerald Weinstein calls "identity, power and connectedness" in his book, *Making Urban Schools Work*. Concerns such as Who am I?, What values do I hold?, How do I relate to others?, How do I judge others? To what degree am I manipulated by my environment?, How can I control my environment? would be examined under this concept of power, identity, and connectedness. It is in these areas of personal self-awareness and realization that urban curriculums are most weak. A major component of university involvement would be the teaching and development of this more humanistic and personal curriculum. Time would be made available for staff to work in conjunction with the U Mass Center for Humanistic Education in developing
this curriculum. In short, given the complexities of the urban environment, it is essential that schools attend to the real concerns of its children and develop in them a series of personal awareness skills which will enable them to cope more adequately with their environment.

While considerable emphasis would be placed on this humanistic development of the child, extra efforts would be made to teach the standard academic content--Social Studies, English, Science--in the most exciting way possible. With the addition of community personnel and student teachers, an all-out attack could be made on the skills in an effort to increase the students' level of achievement.

Efforts would be made to develop a greater sense of responsibility for their education on the part of students. Opportunities would be available for students to design their own instructional materials. Black studies, photography, and creative writing are examples of the type of student electives that might be developed.

Art, drama and music should be integrated into the academic classroom. Teachers of these special subject areas would be available to assist academic subject teachers in presentations.

A program of assemblies which bring various segments of the school together once a week would be instituted. Outside speakers plus special classroom presentations would be the main content of these assemblies. Through this vehicle of assemblies, segments of the school and community populations would be brought together and a greater sense of community and trust would be encouraged.
Teachers would have the opportunity to teach special interest courses which might run for short periods of time. Teachers with special expertise in a creative area would have the time to work with small groups of students on a special talent.
C. Resource Areas

Crucial to the success of the curriculum in a flexibly scheduled program is adequate plant facilities and materials. This is particularly important for teacher and student activities during unstructured time periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Projection Room</td>
<td>Films will be shown continuously throughout the day and will be different each day. Classes may be scheduled for films. Individual students could attend during their unstructured time periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dark Room and Film Making Equipment</td>
<td>Opportunities will be provided for students to make their own films and develop their photographs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conference Rooms and Faculty Alcoves</td>
<td>Space will be provided for frequent interaction between students and staff in individual and small group situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Multi-Media Center</td>
<td>Film strip projectors, tape recorders, compact T.V. monitors, record players, with earphones provide a variety of means to communicate material and make individualized learning worthwhile. Listening carrolls, comfortable chairs, conference tables, and written resource materials are included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Reading Clinic</td>
<td>Space will be provided for intensive tutoring and group work in reading.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Library</td>
<td>Independent study and reading; research and homework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Gymnasium</td>
<td>Essential in any effective program is an adequate athletic and recreation program.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D. The Role of the Student Intern

A major component of a university developmental school is the use of student interns. Their major function is to contribute in a meaningful way to the school program. Their contribution might take many forms:

a. To assist the teacher in working with specified groups of students.

b. To assist in the preparation of materials for classroom use.

c. To tutor special students.

d. To serve as resource person for library and resource centers.

e. To aid in establishing more personal contact between parent and teacher.

f. To assist in special projects such as field trips.

g. To free up time for teachers to meet in special planning units, or meet with parents.

This list is not exhaustive but does suggest some of the possibilities for student-teacher involvement. Especially important here is the use of student interns in a significant fashion which meets the special individual needs of the regular teacher.

It is anticipated that a university developmental school would have 50 to 60 student interns available for teachers. With this increased manpower, the staff could concentrate on the traditional skills as well as produce special programs which relate to the needs of students.
E. In-Service Training

An integral part of the flexible schedule and structure of the school and of the partnership with the University of Massachusetts is extensive in-service training for school staff during the regular school day. Members of the faculty at the school will be offered opportunities for professional advancement with credit. Courses will be offered both on site and at the University of Massachusetts.

For example, an in-service on-site course would be offered in urban curriculum and humanistic education. Courses offered at the University would include Educational Innovations and Leadership, Reading, Media and Technology, to name a few.

In addition to credit courses there will be frequent workshops in which School of Education faculty would come to the school to discuss such concepts as flexible scheduling, micro-teaching, film-making and film use, teaching of reading, science education, computer-assisted instruction, creative writing, the learning theater, tests and measurement, and many others. Through the flexible schedule, and the cooperation of student interns and community aides, teachers would have time to keep up with current research in their field through individual study, credit course work, special workshops, and team cooperation with other teachers.

The responsibility for directing the in-service training program would lie primarily with the Associate Director. The Academic Cabinet
(see II. Organizational Structure) would participate fully in coordinating the program and in choosing what courses and workshops would be most meaningful for the school staff. The goal of the in-service training program is to provide the teacher and staff member with an enriching and challenging educational environment.
II. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A. Administration

The administrative structure must be responsive to the need for increased communication between school and community, for extensive in-service training, and for coordination of University resources. Additionally, the directors must be freed as much as possible from the burden of daily administrative details.

The Dean of the School of Education, University of Massachusetts, will negotiate with the city board of education to screen and select the administrative staff of the school. The following administrative structure is proposed:

1. Director
   a. Oversees entire school operation, coordinates with Associate Director and School Manager
   b. Human relations within the school sits on the Academic Cabinet
   c. Community Relations
      chairs the Community Cabinet
      acts as communications liason between school and community.
      holds frequent meetings involving parents, students, and teachers
   d. In conjunction with the Associate Director, he is responsible for recruitment and hiring of new staff
   e. Public Relations
      seek more varied uses of the school by the community. Encourage cooperation with other universities, community agencies, businesses.
      general publicity responsibility
2. **Associate Director in Charge of Curriculum and Teacher Training**

a. Direct total school curriculum. This would include the overall on-going curriculum as well as special programs and projects.

b. Research and develop new curriculum and programs.

c. As chairman of Academic Cabinet, work with representatives of the whole school in academic and school concerns.

d. Train student teachers and community personnel.

e. Direct and coordinate the in-service program

f. Sits on Community Cabinet

g. Act as liaison with universities on student teachers and on sharing of special expertise of university faculty.

3. **School Manager**

a. Responsible to the directors and the staff for the administrative implementation of the total program.

b. Duties include: coordinating scheduling, transportation, facilities, materials, resources--i.e., all coordination and communication for the on-going functioning of the school.

**B. The Academic Cabinet**

Traditionally, schools have been authoritarian in structure, with the curriculum and program descending in a direct line from the top. Yet, the success of any school system depends on its teachers. Teachers are professionals and should take an active part in the design of programs and development of curriculum. In the urban developmental school, full staff participation in every aspect of school planning is essential in order to create the dynamic learning environment desired.
The Academic Cabinet

The Academic Cabinet will be composed of the following members:

The Associate Director, Chairman
The Director
6 Teaching Staff
2 Student Interns
2 School students
2 Community Representatives

The cabinet will be elected from the school and parent community by the respective groups. The Academic Cabinet will meet at least once a week to discuss and recommend changes in the curriculum and general school program. Although their primary concern will be the academic program of the students and the teaching needs of the staff, they may also be concerned with internal school spirit and discipline, the in-service training of staff, the relationship of the student interns to the school; in short, anything that effects the needs of teachers and students.

The child's learning strongly depends on two factors: his school and his home. One of the primary goals of the urban developmental school will be to bring these two factors together in closer cooperation. Mutual suspicion between parents and teachers will be constructively attacked in order to create ultimate support for the child. The frequent interaction of parents and teachers will be encouraged, not just when problems of discipline arise.

C. The Community Cabinet

The Community Cabinet will be composed of the following members:

The Director, Chairman
The Associate Director
2 Teaching Staff
4 Parents
4 Representatives of Community Agencies
1 Student from the school
1 Student intern

The school and university and parent representatives will be elected by their respective groups; the community representatives will be volunteers.

The Community Cabinet will meet frequently to discuss ways in which communication and understanding between the school and the community may be achieved: to inform and interest parents in the programs of the school; to encourage teachers and interns to visit with parents; to encourage students to communicate their school activities to their parents. The Community Cabinet will also be concerned with the school's larger role as part of an urban environment. They will be concerned with community action programs involving students and staff of the school in the urban community. Community organizations and agencies will be encouraged to take an active interest in the school. The goal of the cabinet will be to free the school from its insularity and to disseminate the goals and activities of the school to the larger urban community.
D. PROPOSED STRUCTURE

- DIRECTOR
- ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
- SCHOOL MANAGER
- ACADEMIC CABINET
- COMMUNITY CABINET

STAFF TEACHERS
PARENTS
COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES
COMMUNITY AIDES
STUDENT INTERNS
STUDENTS
III. PERSONNEL

A. Administration

1. Director (see II. Organizational Structure)
2. Associate Director (see II. Organizational Structure)
3. School Manager (see II. Organizational Structure)

B. Staff Teachers

full-time classroom teachers and staff. Includes 2 full-time
guidance counselors and 1 floating arts man, 1 full-time
physical education director.

C. Student Interns

graduate and undergraduate students from the School of Education,
University of Massachusetts, including practice teachers and
students in Urban Education practicum work. They will serve as
aides to the directors, as tutors, as practice teachers.

D. Community Liaisons and Aides

tutors, aides—either volunteers or supported by outside funding
or built in as paraprofessionals paid by the school system.

E. Students

students can play various roles above and beyond the traditional
student role—as tutors, discussion leaders, curriculum developers,
advisors to faculty and administration.

F. Consultants

resource people from universities and the community
available for special programs, seminars, credit course work,
workshops on all aspects of school program.
ABSTRACT

The Development of the Center for Urban Education, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1968-1970. (June, 1970)

John C. Woodbury, B.A., Wesleyan University; M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Directed by: Dr. Byrd L. Jones

This dissertation is an analysis of the development of the Center for Urban Education (CUE) at the School of Education, University of Massachusetts, during the period 1968-1970. This five-chapter study presents the Center in the context of the larger School of Education "revolution" initiated in 1968 by Dean Dwight W. Allen.

Chapter I presents the educational philosophy espoused by the group of 150 faculty and doctoral students at the School, and analyzes the impact of these biases on the plans of some members of the group to create a viable urban center. The recruitment of black faculty and doctoral students is also described.

The following chapter is a case study of an administrative intern and teacher training project in Hartford, Connecticut which was run by five members of CUE. The analysis demonstrates how the Center's program and philosophy developed organically from specific field experiences. Chapter II also provides an understanding of the change process in urban schools, and discusses the many aspects of university-public school relationships.

Chapter III presents an analysis of the unique organizational
environment at the School of Education and the problems that setting created for the Center for Urban Education. The literature of the human relations oriented organizational theorists is utilized to provide perspective on the experimental environment. Chapter IV deals with the philosophy, programs, and activities of CUE during the 1968-1970 period. Emphasis is placed on the expanding program in the 1969-1970 school year and the shift from internal organizational problems to a concentration on off-campus projects.

The subject of Chapter V is race relations which was an implicit concern in the previous four chapters. The development of the Center was vitally affected by issues of race in the predominantly white liberal environment. The chapter includes an analysis of three successive phases which the entire community experienced in the 1968-1970 period. Much has been written about the dynamics of race relations in a conservative institutional environment. Such is not the case with liberal environments and, for this reason, Chapter V provides new insights in the race relations field.

The burden of Chapter V deals with the "Identity" phase and illustrates how the Center for Urban Education was affected by the divisions and suspicions caused by whites and blacks searching for their identities in the atypical racial environment. The most important problem in this chapter involves how an integrated working team can be developed and prove effective given the contemporary racial climate in America.

The dissertation as a whole sheds light on a number of significant educational issues, although definitive answers are not
provided in this analysis of a specific historical situation. One important issue raised is how a predominantly white educational institution goes about trying to solve problems in urban and largely black America. How can a viable urban center be developed and what is required of such an institution to launch a relevant program?

The dissertation also focuses on a more circumscribed issue; namely, what is the potential of a teacher training institution to effect change in urban schools. The politics of negotiations with institutions and organizations are examined in many parts of the dissertation.

Another issue concerns the feasibility of establishing a network of satellite centers and projects across the country. The dissertation analyzes the Center's efforts to develop off-campus sites, link them together, gather financial support, and involve individuals with the necessary expertise.