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An examination of the relationship of phenomenological existential and perceptual theory to humanistic education.

Kenneth Lenchitz

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AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL, EXISTENTIAL, AND PERCEPTUAL THEORY TO HUMANISTIC EDUCATION

A Dissertation

by

Kenneth Lenchitz

Dedicated to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

May 1971
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DEDICATION

To my wife, Vivian
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Problem

At the joint frontier of psychology and education a new movement is emerging that attempts to promote psychological growth directly through educational courses, (Alschuler, 1969, p. 1).

These attempts are known by a variety of labels: affective education, psychological education, confluent education, and humanistic education. The emphasis in most of these attempts is a methodological one with great attention being given to the development of pedagogical procedures that deal more directly with the inner life of the learner. What is missing at this stage of development are sets of criteria, constructs and assumptions which could serve as a decision-making base for determining what the goals as well as the procedures of these programs should be.

This study will be an attempt to extrapolate from the psychological-philosophical sources of existentialism, phenomenology, perceptual theory and humanistic psychology, those assumptions and constructs which are serving and which might serve as a criterion for the development of humanistic, affective, psychological, and confluent education.
Need

Humanistic education needs a psychological-philosophical base for several reasons. A major reason is that a guideline for the direction of curriculum development is necessary. With such a guideline, a sequence of learning experiences, a curriculum, can be coherent and flexible. A psychological-philosophical foundation is also important in making value choices, setting guidelines, organizing priorities and establishing goals.

Method and Hypothesis

I have chosen to examine existentialism, phenomenology, perceptual theory and humanistic psychology; I have chosen those men, themes, and assumptions, who, for me, have made contributions to psychological education. For example, the themes of consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity freedom, and decision-making are all themes which concern psychological educators, and are dealt with extensively in the literature of existentialism, phenomenology, perceptual theory and humanistic psychology. By examining this literature from my personal viewpoint I will be able to establish what I believe is a psychological-philosophical base for psychological education. It is hypothesized that existentialism and phenomenology form an important base for humanistic education. This study will trace the relationship between the literature of existentialism and phenomenology, perceptual theory and humanistic psychology, and the psychological-philosophic rationale for humanistic education.
Unlike traditional ontology, phenomenology does not view man from an external position, but from inside the person himself. Psychologists who have adopted this philosophical stance include Rogers (1959), Combs and Snygg (1959), Maslow (1954), Allport (1940), Cantril (1959), and Perls (1969). The existentialists address themselves to the wholeness of man's being.

The discoveries of perception offer scientific support for the basic assumptions of phenomenology and existentialism. The problems of perception will be discussed since they help us to understand what phenomenology is. It is one of the major contentions of phenomenology that the way a person perceives the world influences his behavior. Studies in perception point out that "objective" experiments really depend on the scientist and his expectations as a key variable in the outcome of the experiment, (Rosenthal 1969; Krutch, 1953; Fesbach and Singer 1957).

Chapter II consists of a review of the literature and a tentative definition of humanistic education. It will show how humanistic psychology developed out of two divergent schools of psychological thought, the behavioristic and the psychoanalytic.

Chapter III will attempt to fill out the previously missing need for a philosophical psychological rationale for humanistic psychology. Understanding the philosophical and psychological basis for humanistic psychology will provide a useful vantage point to view this new field in education. This chapter will be primarily concerned with the major themes and assumptions of
phenomenology and existentialism that give information about humanistic education.

Chapter IV will be an examination of perceptual theory and how studies in perceptual theory offer support for the phenomenological-existential position. It will be more of a personal statement.

Chapter V will lay the foundations upon which humanistic education is built. This foundation will in turn be based upon the explications of the previous chapters. A conceptual schema will be developed in this chapter and will emphasize the importance of the intentional teacher (Ivey, 1970), and the intentional student (Weinstein and Fantini, 1970). Various approaches to humanistic education will be analyzed to see how each mode grows from the joint soil of phenomenological-existential philosophy, perceptual theory and humanistic psychology.

The final part of this dissertation will be my personal commitment to humanistic education, and what I am going to do with this data.

Limitations

Existentialism is an unorganized and unsystemitized school of philosophical thought. For this reason I am making a subjective choice of what to examine and limiting the examination to specific areas. I will examine those men, themes, and assumptions that I believe give information about humanistic education.
I will not examine the writings of the humanist of the middle ages to establish a psychological-philosophical base.
CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

Introduction

In this chapter I will trace the development of humanistic psychology. Humanistic psychology grew out of two other schools of psychology. I will compare and contrast the two schools of psychology, behaviorism and psychoanalysis, in the attempt to explain the development of humanistic psychology. Gestalt therapy, a humanistic therapeutic approach, will also be discussed because of my belief that Gestalt therapy, although not the only humanistic psychological approach, is the most effective one and puts into practice the assumptions and concepts of humanistic psychology. Assumptions and concepts are meaningless for me unless they can have a practical application. Gestalt therapy is a practical application of the themes and assumptions of humanistic psychology. The final part of this chapter will be a summary of the work of this chapter.

The Behaviorist Tradition

In psychology the most exacting scientific work has been done by the behaviorists. Here, objective empirical evidence relating to overt stimulus and response has been of primary importance. What is significant for purposes
of this investigation, however, is that "behaviorism is only minimally concerned with the subjective and intuitive side of human behavior," (Hall and Lindsey, 1957). However, psychology was not always minimally concerned with the subjective and intuitive side of behavior. Modern behaviorist psychology is a revolt against the introspective and subjective psychology of William Wundt. Wundt, who would not reconcile the mind/body split, substituted "consciousness" for soul (Watson, 1967). Consciousness becomes then something and everybody knows what it is. According to Wundt, we are being conscious when we have a sensation, a perception, or thought or when we desire to do something, (Watson, 1967).

Pavlov, and later Watson, led to the decline of Wundtian introspectionist psychology, (Spence, 1960). Watson declares clearly his independence from the introspectionist and consciousness dominated psychology of the period.

Psychology, as the behaviorist views it, is a purely objective, experimental branch of natural science which needs introspection as little as do the sciences of chemistry and physics... It can dispense with consciousness in a psychological sense. The separate observation of "states of consciousness" is, on this assumption, no more a part of the task of the psychologist than of the physicist. We might call this the return to a non-reflective and naive use of consciousness. In this sense consciousness may be said to be the instrument or tool with which all scientists work, (Watson, 1913, p. 176).
Watson believes that the data of psychology are exactly the same data as the data of the physical sciences. He does not, as many people believe, dismiss consciousness but believes that consciousness is a tool used by all scientists, psychologists and physicists alike. For Watson then the subject matter of psychology should not be mental or conscious events as Wundt and his followers believed, but should instead be matter, physical events or behavior, (Spence, 1960).

Skinner supports this view when he states that "it doesn't make any difference to me whether things are conscious or unconscious; the causality in behavior does not depend upon awareness," (Evans, 1968).

The growth of behaviorism should not be seen solely as a response to introspectionism or the subjectivism of psychologists such as Wundt. It aligned itself with the "scientific movement identified with Newton's celestial mechanics," (Matson, 1967). Psychologists sought rigor and reliability within the physicist's parameters of impersonal objective observation, (ibid). The behaviorist is concerned with the visible parts of the machine and admits that he can only study parts of behavior, (Kanfer and Phillips, 1970).

The Contribution of Behavioristic Psychology to Humanistic Psychology

The behavioristic psychologist's focus on visible behavior is of crucial importance for humanistic psychology. The humanistic psychologist in his concern for the individuals actualization, becoming, values, identity, self-actualization, and the exploration of self hopes that by changing present
behavior the aforementioned goals might be reached. The humanistic psychologists will therefore at times concentrate his efforts on changing behavior in the belief that the individuals actualization, becoming, values, identity, self-actualization, and the exploration of self might be facilitated. Evidence shows that by concentrating on specific parts of a person's behavior, the internal attitudes will undergo a concomitant change. It appears that trying on new behaviors exerts strong influences on personal attitude (Breer and Locke, 1965). The length of time the attitudinal change will endure after experimenting with new behaviors is most directly related to the experiential consequences of that change (Bandura, 1969).

Changed behavior and its subsequent influence on the growth, actualization and values shows the important that behaviorism has for humanistic psychology. This importance should not be underrated, even though the behaviorist never deals directly with growth, actualization and values. The indirect method of the behaviorist of changing specific behaviors is of crucial importance for humanistic psychology.

Behaviorism - A Brief Criticism

Behaviorism offers less help than it could because it does not deal with consciousness. If consciousness is the method by which we come in contact with the world, the examination of consciousness could be of crucial importance for any scientist. Another criticism of behaviorist psychology is that it has
not achieved what its model physics has achieved. Physics has been very successful in accounting for the behavior of certain objects. However, the search for laws "which will account for the many special features in a complicated phenomenon can meet with success only when the different properties of bodies have been distinguished by processes of measurement," (Cohen and Nagel, 1960). Behaviorism has not yet mastered this requirement.

Finally, behavioristic theory does not say much about the structure or development of personality. It never deals directly with what humanistic psychologists call actualization, becoming, values, identity, self-actualization or the exploration of self.

**Psychoanalysis - Freudianism**

Psychoanalysis is another important influence on humanistic psychology. Freudian analysis has led to the development of many psychological theories. The early Freudians developed the literature which described man as a dynamic function. Freud also postulated a super-structure which he hoped would account for man as a dynamic function. Man is an instinctual and social animal and the interplay between these two forces gives rise to personality. Freud's super-structure or topology is of course the now classic id (instinctual primitive force), super ego (societal, learned force), and ego (the personality or the most visible aspect of man's dynamic nature), (Freud, 1924). In fact, we can see that Freud did lay the foundations for the development of ego psychology. Freud's development of a theory of personality was again the
first systematic attempt to develop a general theory of human behavior.

Psychoanalysis is based on a 19th century physiology model. This model includes attraction and repulsion, conservation of energy, combination of forces acting from within, and a general closed system of energy which is enclosed in the organism, (Jones, 1953).

As Sutich and Vich point out, "psychoanalysis seems to have become bogged down to the degree that it continues to hold to most of its original premises," (1969). The psychoanalytic or Freudian concepts dominated most psychological and psychiatric investigation. This domination was superceded by the behaviorists' studying of abnormality, deviation and illness, (Sutich and Vich, 1969; Moustakas, 1956). Freudianism in its attempt to explain man's internal, unconscious and hidden dynamics have left unexplored healthy behavior, (Moustakas, 1956).

Skinner's criticism of Freud helps clarify the Freudian position:

The Freudian mental apparatus doesn't make much sense to me. Freud made some very important contributions. As a determinist, he convinced many people that things formerly believed to be accidental were really lawful, and I think he was right on that point. But in filling in the gap between the events which he saw to be causally related, he chose to construct or piece together an elaborate system of mental events going on inside the organism. This was particularly true when he tried to relate the behavior of the adult to what had happened to him as a child. Perhaps fifty years elapse during which no evidence of a causal effect is evident then suddenly something happens which looks as if it were related to an event that happened to the individual as a child. Now, I
believe that there are connections of that kind, but the Freudian formulation doesn't very well represent what happened, nor does it permit one to trace it to current behavior, (Evans, 1968, pp. 5-6).

**Behaviorism and Psychoanalysis – Summary**

The behaviorists and psychoanalysts based their practice upon rather divergent views of man. The behaviorists were Newtonian in that both man and his universe were viewed mechanistically. Man is a machine and by studying the parts of the machine it is possible to understand man. The psychoanalysts interpreted all behavior through a theoretical framework. This framework was comprised of conscious states as well as the unconscious states.

Both schools share one thing in common and this is crucial for the understanding of humanistic psychology. Man is "essentially the victim-spectator of blind force working through him," (Matson, 1967). It makes no difference whether the forces work from without as in behaviorism or from within as in psychoanalysis. This is not the point as Matson points out in

**Being, Becoming and Behavior:**

Man is thus in the end a passive and reactive structure, a neutral agent, rather than one self activating and self actualizing. It is his past condition and conditioning that pushes him, not a vision of possibility that pulls him, (1967, p. 15).
Humanistic psychology is an outgrowth of behaviorism and psychoanalysis but the most direct origin is in the neo Freudian work of Horney, Fromm, Goldstein, Adler and Jung. Understanding the neo Freudians will help us to understand "that affirmative countermovement of humanistic psychology which regards itself as a 'third force' standing between the poles of behaviorism and Freudianism," (Matson, 1967). The beginning of this counter movement cannot be called humanistic psychology but is really neo Freudianism.

**Neo-Freudians**

Adler who does not consider himself a part of the Freudian position because he himself had not been psychoanalyzed, helps link Freudian psychology to humanistic psychology. Adler believes that early learning occurs in the family group and the mother is the most influential member of this group.

Adler's motivational theory shows how humanistic psychology is related to Freudian psychology. All behavior, for Adler, is directed at long and short term goals. People pick counter productive routes to these goals and Adler wants to help man find alternate routes to these goals. It is this choosing or providing of alternatives that helps bridge the gap between Freudian psychology and humanistic psychology. However, Adler's model of man is still pathological and it is Jung who first emphasizes the positive side of man.

It was Jung's work as well as that of Horney, Fromm, Goldstein and other Freudian heretics or neo-Freudians who place their emphasis on the
"constructive possibilities of mind and personality," (Matson, 1967), that helped create a favorable climate for a more clearly defined and explicit humanistic orientation in psychology, (Sutich and Vich, 1969). Jung was the first man to offer a major shift in the psychological theory and practice from the negative pathologically-oriented general theory expounded by Freud. He moved to a positive philosophical conception of man and man's potentialities for realizing his potentialities. It was Jung's work and his belief that psychoanalysis must have as its ultimate purpose "the restoration of the total personality. . . the bringing into reality of the whole human being - that is, individuation," (Jung, 1967, p. 16).

As Goldstein points out there is only one drive and this drive is not directed at a release of tension but at self-actualization. "This tendency to actualize its nature, to actualize "itself," is the basic drive by which the life of the organism is determined," (Goldstein, 1956).

Horney also views man's positive side and is concerned with the development of man's potential, self-expression, feelings, and relationship with himself and others. "Only the individual himself can develop his given potentials," (Horney, 1956).

Fromm shows his close connection with the humanistic psychology in particular in The Art of Loving. It is here that he elaborates on love as a positive, active and growing process. Fromm believes man is free to choose life, love, peace and understanding by actively working for love, life and
peace or war, death and the extinction of the race, (1956).

It is out of these beginnings that humanistic psychology sometimes includes the aforementioned people as members; there is really no strict dividing line. However, the leading figure in the area of humanistic psychology is Abraham Maslow. Maslow's basic research has been the investigation of the "characteristics and behavior of self-actualizing persons," (Winthrop, 1968).

**Humanistic Psychology**

Maslow's particular achievement has been to emphasize the positive side of man, (Maslow, 1962). The potential for growth inherent in each individual is given more credence. The ecstasy of personal growth through loving, enjoying, achieving, and becoming develop as constructs of this new approach. Maslow understood this chasm: "it is as if Freud supplied to us the sick half of psychology and we must now fill it out with the healthy half," (1967).

It is Maslow who points out that the symptoms of guilt, bad conscience, anxiety, depression, and inferiority feelings indicate sickness and when taken away indicate health. He clearly rejects this facile distinction of health as symptom free and sickness as possessing the above symptoms.

*In essence I am deliberately rejecting our present easy distinction between sickness and health, at least as far as surface symptoms are concerned. Does sickness mean having symptoms? I maintain now that sickness might consist of not having symptoms when you should. Does health mean being symptom-free? I deny it.*
Which of the Nazis at Auschwitz or Dachau were healthy? Those with stricken conscience or those with a nice, clear happy conscience? Was it possible for a profoundly human person not to feel conflict, suffering, depression, rage, etc," (1967, p. 171).

Maslow contends that preventing a person or child from growing through their pain (i.e., becoming) is a false protection implying lack of respect for the integrity and growth potential for mankind. Allport and Moustakas share this view also. This is not to say that psychoanalysis and behavior psychology reject this view; it does seem, however, that humanistic psychology emphasizes this view.

Like Maslow, Allport's theories of personality are open and positive. According to Allport, man is free to act and is not pushed and shoved by either internal or external forces which are beyond his control. In this essentially optimistic view of man, man is always in control of his fate. When he is not in control of his fate, it is because he doesn't want to be in control, (Allport, 1967).

For Allport, man is always in process. His personality is never a finished product. Even though each person has things in common with the species, he is also unique and must be understood only in relation to his particular context. In the introduction to Becoming, Allport writes:
I have written this essay because I feel that modern psychology is in a dilemma. Broadly speaking, it has trimmed down the image of man that gave birth to the democratic dream. . .

Up to now the "behavioral sciences," including psychology, have not provided us with a picture of man capable of creating or living in a democracy. . . They have delivered into our hands a psychology of an "empty organism," pushed by drives and moded by environmental circumstance. . . But the theory of democracy requires also that man possess a measure of rationality, a portion of freedom, a generic conscience, appropriate ideals, and unique value. We cannot defend the ballot box or liberal education, nor advocate free discussion and democratic institutions, unless man has the potential capacity to profit therefrom, (1967, p. 160).

Moustakas, another spokesman for humanistic psychology, also writes of actualization and growth. The actualization of one's potentials or one's self only takes place when "the person is felt and experienced as a sheer personal being," (1956). It is only when each individual's unique experience is examined in the context of the unique individual that meaning and value are present. Moustakas has several principles which help summarize his basic approach to the recognition of the self; the central tenents are based on the individual knowing himself better than anyone else, and the individual as the only one who can develop his potentialities. Every individual wants to grow toward self fulfillment (ibid).
Sidney Jourard focuses on another aspect of openness. Jourard (1964) asks, "Shall we permit our fellow man to know us as we, or shall we seek instead to remain an enigma, an uncertain quantity?" This choice has always been available to man and Jourard believes, as I do, that we have always chosen to hide behind various masks and roles. What puzzles Jourard is that we have not questioned this decision to hide behind various masks and roles, but instead have assumed that self-concealment is the most natural state for grown men. Those who do reveal themselves Jourard points out, are seen sometimes as childish, crazy, or naive, (ibid). Under certain conditions, however, man will open up and give up his roles without having to use strategies of getting drunk, reporting dreams, or interpreting inkblots.

Jourard discusses the above problems and concludes that a person who plays his roles suitably may be considered normal. He believes "normal personalities, however, are not necessarily, healthy personalities," (ibid). The healthy person is one who not only plays his roles satisfactorily but at the same time derives personal satisfaction from the enactment of the role, keeps growing, and maintains a higher level of wellness, (ibid).

**Gestalt Therapy - A Humanistic Therapeutic Approach**

Gestalt therapy is the approach that appears to be the most direct way of achieving actualization. The Gestaltist believes in what Arnold (1970) calls the "paradoxical theory of change," (1970). This is change that occurs
when a person becomes what he is, "not when he tries to become what he is not," (ibid). Therefore one can only change when one takes the time and makes the effort to be what he is and to be fully invested in what he is. It is only by rejecting the role of being a change agent that a psychologist can make meaningful change possible, (ibid). A Gestaltist makes change possible by not trying to change but by allowing the person to be what he is.

An example:

Patient: I want to be happy.
Therapist: So be happy.
Patient: I don't know how to be happy.
Therapist: So don't know.
Patient: What do I do now?
Therapist: What do you want to do?
Patient: I want ________.
Therapist: So do - so don't do.

Only by staying with the patient or the person, going with him, allowing him to be, and him to choose to be, can the patient be, (Beisser, 1970).

Fritz Perls, the founder of Gestalt therapy believes Gestalt therapy is one of the humanistic, existential forces in psychology which stands on its own feet, and works on the awareness principle, on phenomenology, (Perls, 1959).

In contrast to both behaviorism and psychoanalysis the humanistic psychology also takes a holistic or organismic view of man. This view treats
man as a unified whole in much the same way as Goldstein and Maslow view man. The organismic approach to man is supported by almost all humanistic psychologists, and Gestalt therapy offers a slightly different viewpoint from other humanistic psychologists.

For Perls, if the whole is broken up into its components the essence of the whole that was there disappears. This simply means that the parts are less than the whole, and if not less, Perls concedes that the parts may be viewed as another Gestalt although a weaker one, (ibid).

It is with this view of man in mind, (i.e., the parts of man as something less than that whole man) that the Gestalt therapist considers all that is going on in a person. This includes thinking, feeling, remembering, doing, (both verbal and non-verbal) remembering and sensing as the behavioral data (Kepner and Brien, 1970). Gestalt therapy then can be translated into a behavioristic-phenomenological framework. This requires an understanding of what laws the behaviorist and phenomenologist use. Both the behaviorist and phenomenologist consider learning to be a lawful phenomenon whose laws can be discovered.

The only legitimate subject matter for psychology to study, according to the behaviorist, is observable behavior, (Kepner and Brien, 1970). Observable behavior is "the only criterion against which the outcome of any experimental procedure, including psychotherapy, can be evaluated. The phenomenologist studies learning as well as other behavior through the report
of individuals, sensory, perceptual or cognitive data, (ibid). He considers what goes on inside a person; this includes the person's sensations, perception, and cognition. What a person is experiencing is valid psychological data even though these events cannot be verified but must be labeled hypothetical constructs by another person, (ibid). The phenomenologist further believes that changes in such constructs as self-concept, self-awareness or ego control are acknowledged by the phenomenologist as valid psychological data and a valid criteria against which the outcome of therapy can be appraised, (ibid).

The behavioristic phenomenologist or Gestalt therapist lives in the best of all possible worlds. Like the behaviorist, he is "concerned with and attempts to account for external events, that is, for stimuli and responses;" and like the phenomenologist is concerned with the rich, varied and elusive internal world that goes on within each individual, (ibid). Kepner and Brien conclude that:

The behaviorist is primarily concerned with and attempts to account for external events, that is, for stimuli and responses. The phenomenologist, on the other hand, assumes certain "givens" about the nature of man and is concerned with what goes on inside the person, that is, with the rich, varied, and "elusive internal world" that goes on within each individual. The behavioristic phenomenologist deals with this world of personal experiencing in such a way as to make it external, overt, specifiable, and communicable, (ibid, p. 45).
A model of behavior has been proposed in the attempt to overcome the limitation of the S–R behavioral model. A two stage model has been developed to replace the single state S–R which fails to handle processes such as ideation, cognition and meaning, (Kepner and Brien, 1970). The two stage behavioral model $S_s R$ attempts to mediate between the observable $S$ and observable $R$. "The s–r refers to a covert process and might represent, for example, a listener's meaningful reaction to something just said (r) and the self-stimulation or thinking that the reaction triggers (s), both of which might lead to some overt responding," (ibid, p. 41).

In this model phenomenological events can be regarded as internal mediating responses or intervening variables. It appears that at present an increasingly fruitful and useful interchange is developing between phenomenology and behaviorism. It seems that man is finally being recognized at once as both a collection of habits and behaviors, and a whole being (ibid).

It is easy to understand humanistic psychology as an outgrowth of the neo-Freudian position stressing the importance of consciousness, as well as the behaviorist's stress on the importance of behavior. The paradigm of humanistic psychology is that it still retains the S–R of the behaviorist but adds to this S–R, $S_1 R_1$ so that this model now looks like $S_s 1-r_1 R$.

Another view of humanistic psychology is that it is based on Einstein's model of the universe which is now the accepted model. This model is an organismic model in which the parts do not make the whole, or where the
whole is greater than the parts. What is important about relativity theory is that within it there is a place for Newtonian physics. It is not that Newtonian physics is wrong so much as that it only describes a part of what is going on. Einsteinian physics describes more and incorporates Newtonian physics in it.

The same is true of humanistic psychology. It is not so much that behaviorism and Freudian are wrong as behaviorism and Freudian only describes a part. It is for this reason that humanistic psychology using the existential phenomenological approach that includes both the internal feelings and attitudes as well as the external observable behavior to describe more of what man is, is more akin to the Einsteinian scientific model.

It is easy to see that humanistic psychology is a new and daring field and is challenging some very basic psychological concepts.

Summary

In this chapter I have attempted to show how humanistic psychology developed out of two other psychological schools of thought, behaviorism and psychoanalysis. The contributions of both behaviorism and psychoanalysis to humanistic psychology were crucial and necessary for humanistic psychology to develop.

Gestalt therapy, a humanistic therapeutic approach, shows how both the non-observable internal world as well as observable behavioral world can be incorporated into a humanistic approach.
The assumption, goals and central concept of humanistic psychology showed clearly the focus of this new movement. The goals of actualization, becoming, etc. and the assumption that man's fate is not determined by either external or internal forces showed the focus of humanistic psychology.

Knowing the assumptions, goals and concepts of humanistic psychology helps one understand the assumptions, goals, concepts, and parameters of humanistic education. Humanistic education tries to implement the goals of humanistic psychology and is based on the same assumptions and concepts as is humanistic psychology. Humanistic education tries to implement procedures so that the achievement of humanistic psychological goals can be implemented in an educational setting.

The need remains for a more precise direction, a set of guide lines and an organization of priorities to clearly implement these goals. The next chapters will continue to establish a psychological and philosophical base on which this unmet need can be met.
CHAPTER III

A PSYCHOLOGICAL- PHILOSOPHICAL BASE FOR HUMANISTIC EDUCATION—PHENOMENOLOGY—EXISTENTIALISM

Introduction

This chapter will attempt to establish a psychological-philosophical base for humanistic education by examining those men, themes, and assumptions, who for me, have assumptions to contribute to humanistic education. In the first section I will show the difficulty and confusion that exists when trying to write about existentialism and phenomenology. The next section will be devoted entirely to phenomenology. In this section I will trace the development of subjective and objective knowledge and phenomenological knowledge, and show how this leads to the development of the phenomenological method—intentionality.

The phenomenological method is a way of looking at subjective, objective and phenomenological knowledge. I will trace the development of the phenomenological method and the concept of intentionality historically, and my major emphasis will first be placed on Husserl's development of his theory of intentionality. After tracing this development I will then show how the concept of intentionality has been redefined by Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Sartre and Kelly to become more of an existential concept. In the third part I will examine the concept of anxiety in the hope of explicating the existential position. In this section other existential themes (choice making, freedom, nothingness) will be
discussed as they are explicated through the discussion of the concept of anxiety.

**Phenomenological-Existential Confusion**

To write or talk about an existential system is impossible because as some existentialists believe, once we systematize existentialism, we are no longer being existential, (Wild, 1966, Kaufman, 1957). It is precisely this refusal to belong to any school of thought, its repudiation as inadequate any body of beliefs and systems, its dissatisfaction with the superficial, remote and academic traditional philosophy that is the heart of existentialism, (Kaufman, 1957). The protagonists of existentialism have traced it back to the Bible, (Kaufman, 1957). In our time writers who have claimed to be existentialists don't agree on any one cardinal point, (MacIntyre, 1964). There are existential atheists, such as Sartre, and existential theists, such as Kierkergaard, and any one formula that would embrace all the major tendencies of existentialism would have to be so broad and general that it would be meaningless, (MacIntyre, 1964).

We find the same difficulty and confusion when we come to phenomenology, for as Friedman points out,

The leading phenomenologists were not themselves existentialists, and many existentialists are not, or are only very secondarily, phenomenologists. This makes it impossible to understand existentialism without phenomenology, but equally impossible to understand it by means of phenomenology alone, as some have tried to do, (1964, p. 69).
Natanson elaborates on this difficulty. Phenomenology has been usually misunderstood and it has been taken as "a kind of mysticism, a Bergsonian intuitionism, an anti-scientific doctrine and philosophy that denies the reality of the world," (1966). To add further to the confusion is the complex relationship that historically exists between the work of Heidegger, Husserl and Sartre. This difficulty is further compounded by the fact that much of Husserl's work is not completely known and is just now being edited and published, and during Husserl's own lifetime much of his work underwent important developments, (Natanson, 1966).

One can see that there is much difficulty in clearly separating existentialism from phenomenology. However, I have decided for the purposes of this investigation and to make clarity possible to separate phenomenology from existentialism.

Rollo May reinforces this separation when he summarizes the differences between phenomenological and existential analysis:

1. **Existential analysis does not restrict itself to the investigation of states of consciousness, but takes into account the entire structure of existence of the individual.**

2. **Whereas phenomenology had emphasized the unity of the individual's inner world of experience, existential analysis emphasizes that one individual may live in two or more sometimes conflicting "worlds."**

3. **Phenomenology takes into account only immediate subjective worlds of experience. Existential**
analysis strives to reconstruct the development and transformations of the individual's "world" or conflicting "worlds," (May, 1958).

Existentialism differs from phenomenology because it operates in a larger frame of reference, (ibid).

Phenomenology - Subjective Knowledge

Carl Rogers in an article Toward A Science of the Person, discusses the problem of subjective and objective knowledge. Rogers describes subjective knowledge in the following way: "Within myself - from within my own internal frame of reference - I may "know" that I love or hate, sense, perceive, comprehend. I may believe or disbelieve, enjoy or dislike, be interested in or bored by," (Rogers, 1969).

The above are all subjective hypotheses which I may check by asking myself questions such as, "How do I know I really hate her." After asking myself this question I may realize that it is not hate which I feel but something else, perhaps envy or jealousy. The same process could be gone through when I ask myself, "How do I know I love her" and then realize what I feel is admiration. This is what Rogers calls subjective knowledge. It is knowledge that one checks on with one's self.

Rogers gives other examples of subjective knowing. What do I experience when I taste a foreign food? I may ask, "Do I like that food?" Rogers believes that it is only by referring to the flow of my experiencing that I can sense the implicit meanings and conclude, "I like its flavor but not its consistency."
These hypotheses are always being more sharply defined and differentiated and in this subjective knowing become more precise and accurate. Psychotherapy is a good example of this sharpening. When the patient discovers the word that more accurately describes his feelings, or perceptions, there is a real sense of relief. This new sharply differentiated knowing in contrast to the vague knowing previously present permits the client "to be more congruent within himself," (Rogers, 1969). This method of knowing is certainly not infallible and for this reason little attention is given to it today. This kind of knowing does not lead to publicly validated knowledge and yet seems to be "our most basic way of knowing," (ibid).

American science, especially American psychology, has greatly ignored what Rogers calls "the creative inner hypotheses which is checked and re-checked against the relevant aspects of one's experiencing, and which may then eventuate as the formal hypotheses to be operationally tested," (ibid).

However, the subjective way of knowing is an important and extremely valuable way of knowing and perhaps should be given more attention as the source or way the hypotheses is formed. The following example of hypotheses formation offers a clear example of subjective knowledge. A relevant hypothesis is formed and his hypothesis can come from any source - 'intuition, trial and error, past experience, accident, imagination, even a dream,' (Madden, 1960, p. 7). It appears the subjective knowledge is as crucial to science as it is to personal affairs.
How We Know - Objective Knowing

In turning our attention to objective knowing we find that the hypotheses are no longer checked against an internal frame of reference as in introspective Wundtian framework but are checked both by externally observable operations in the Galelian model and by "making empathic inferences regarding the reactions of a trusted reference group, usually one's colleagues," (Rogers, 1969).

When a physicist says that he knows that the formula $v = 32t$ ($v =$ velocity in feet per second and $t =$ time in seconds) he is really saying that individuals that he trusts have gone through precisely defined operations, observed similar results, and "arrived at a similar subjective conviction" expressed by that formula and "is understood in a similar manner by all," (ibid).

Physicists and chemists of all nations are in agreement about the facts. The language barrier is not of importance because these sciences have created their own language of signs and symbols in which the subjective element appears to be completely divorced. The natural sciences deal only with what is observed in the world of matter.

The objective way of knowing transforms all that is studied into objects. Objective knowing consists of data and phenomena that are observable and reproducible. Rogers believes "objectivity can only be concerned with objects, whether these are animate or inanimate. Associated with this kind of knowing are terms such as objective, behaviorist, impersonal and operational (ibid).
Interpersonal Knowing or Phenomenological Knowledge

For lack of a better term, Rogers describes a third way of knowing and says that, "Logically somewhere in between the two types of knowing I have discussed is a third mode," (Rogers, 1969). He calls this third mode, for lack of a better term, Interpersonal Knowing or Phenomenological Knowledge. This mode applies primarily to human beings.

In this kind of "knowing" I "know" that you were hurt by my remark, or you hate yourself, or you are really concerned about the world being destroyed by thermo-nuclear war. This "knowing" like the knowing described earlier are all hypotheses, but I use my skill and whatever "empathic understanding is at my command to get at the relevant aspect of your phenomenological field, to get inside your private world of meanings and see whether my understanding is correct." To do this I may simply ask you, which is usually inadequate, or I may observe your tone, gestures, words or create a climate that makes it safe for you "to reveal your internal frame of reference," (ibid).

The hypotheses in this way of knowing are tested "by relating them to the most accurate picture we can obtain of the internal frame of reference of this individual," (ibid). The knowledge that is gained is of a particular individual "but from this knowledge generalizations can be formed which can be tested in the same manner," According to Rogers, "It provides us with scientific leverage in getting at the non-observable events which go on within the individual."

The criteria for this kind of knowledge are either the individual confirms my hypotheses about his internal frame of reference or the inferences about his
internal frame of reference are confirmed by consensual validation, (ibid).

Subjective-Objective - Phenomenological Knowing - A Summary of How We Know

This argument is an old one, and embraces two epistemological positions - i.e., subjective knowing vs. objective knowing. The argument between subjective knowing and objective knowing is one that continues today, and its psychological origins can be traced to Wilhelm Wundt, the founder of modern psychology. Wundt believed that the psychologist uses a method of investigation entirely different from the physicists. He examines by introspectively analyzing the contents of his own conscious experience. Physicists examine the external world while psychologists examine the internal world.

It was the failure of introspection as a reliable method of investigation that eventually led to a new framework or model of logical structure of science which is more akin to the Galilean model. Even within the modern Galilean model of psychology, the same objective vs. subjective split is readily observable. The behaviorist school believes that theoretical concepts must be closely tied to "observable concepts in order to insure a maximum of empirical meaning," (Madden, 1960).

It would appear that there is little difference between phenomenological knowing and subjective knowing; there is, however, one crucial difference. The crucial difference is that in phenomenological knowing you get in contact with someone else's unique interaction with the world. This contact takes place even though no one can know how anyone else really experiences the world.
This kind of knowing is highly personal and really interpersonal. Rogers conception of phenomenological knowing is primarily concerned with the interaction of human beings, one human being with another.

The very important question that I feel this argument between subjective objective and phenomenological knowing still leaves unanswered is, "How do we know?" Do we know subjectively, objectively, phenomenologically or a combination of the three? It is Husserl, the father of phenomenology, who directs himself to answering this question.

Phenomenology - How We Know
The Phenomenological Method - Intentionality

The phenomenological method is a mode for interacting with the intra-personal, interpersonal and the external world. This means you can approach these three things phenomenologically. Using Husserl's phenomenological method one can look at intrapersonal knowing or man's relationship to himself, interpersonal knowing or man's relationship to other men, and man's relationship to the world. The one basic characteristic in the phenomenological method is becoming conscious of your consciousness and your unique interacting with any of these three referents.

In order to understand and explicate the phenomenological method, one must understand the concept of intentionality which is inextricably bound up in the phenomenological method.
Before I begin with Husserl's explication of intentionality and the phenomenological method, however, it is important to understand some distinctions made by Kant. It was Kant who gave phenomenology a new and broader definition as a result of his broader redefinition of phenomena. This broadening resulted in a redefinition of phenomenology. What Kant did was to distinguish objects and events as they appear in our experience from objects and events per se which appear independently of the forms imposed on them by our mind. He called the former "phenomena"; and the latter, "noumena" or things in themselves. Kant thought that all we can ever know are phenomena, (Kant, 1950).

Hegel tried to show that Kant was wrong and traced the development of the mind through various stages, stages in which it apprehends itself as phenomenon, "to the point of its full development, where it is aware of itself as it is in itself - as noumena," (Schmitt, 1967).

Husserl and Brentano, who were both dissatisfied with traditional philosophy, focused their attention on the "intentional structure of human awareness that is always related to, or stretch out toward, its object," and concluded that consciousness began with mental acts. These acts however are essentially related to their objects. Husserl soon saw "that the traditional conception of an external world beyond our immediate awareness was incompatible with the intentional structure of our lived experience," (Wild, 1966).
Husserl's descriptive phenomenology studied the "parallel structures of intentionality," i.e., the intended objects and the intending acts without a pronounced preference for either the intended acts or the intended objects. The conclusion that Husserl came to was that "the subject pole of this relation was the decisive one." He believed that in order to have an adequate understanding and justification of our knowledge it was necessary to have "a deeper exploration of the subject, in which he (Husserl) came to see the source or origin of all object knowledge," (Natanson, 1966). The phenomenological method is dependent upon us being conscious as we intend. Without a consciousness we couldn't be aware of the subjective nature of our experience. It is this subjective experience which Husserl sees as the source of all object knowledge. So even when we try to get in contact with our subjective knowing experience, objective knowing experience, or phenomenological knowing experience, Husserl suggests using the phenomenological method which entails the understanding of the transcendental ego and the transcendental reduction.

The Transcendental Ego – And the Transcendental Reduction

It is necessary in order to understand the world and the basic intentions which constitute the world to "gain a position outside it" from which it can be viewed as a whole together with the basic intentions which make it possible for it to be viewed as a whole, (Wild, 1963). The transcendental ego is Husserl's name for the phenomenological observer or person in such an extra-worldly
position. The gaining of this position from which our whole subjective-objective existence in the world could be objectively viewed, "is the transcendental reduction," (ibid).

Herbert Spiegelberg describes this method:

It began as an operation of "bracketing" or suspending our belief in the existence of the phenomena under investigation. But almost unnoticeably it became an elaborate procedure by which Husserl tried to trace all phenomena back to subjectivity, to an irreducible core of absolute consciousness, a transcendent subject. Here Husserl believed he could uncover the intentional acts by which the whole objective world was constituted, (1966, p. 139).

It is not that the phenomenologist denies the existence of the outer world; he does not. He makes up his mind, for this analytical purpose, to temporarily suspend belief in its existence (Schultz, 1966). He refrains intentionally from all judgements related directly or indirectly to the existence of the outer world. Husserl called this procedure putting the world in brackets or performing the phenomenological reduction, (ibid).

As Husserl saw it, the whole phenomenological method required an abandonment of the outwardly directed attitude which usually dominates our daily lives. He believed we must become conscious of our original attitudes and meanings. In order to become conscious of these original attitudes we must be aware that all conscious acts have a fundamental directional character, (Natanson, 1966). Therefore when one thinks the thinking is thinking of or
about something, all remembering is remembering of something and all consciousness, then, is consciousness of something. Chapman, (1966) in his essay "Realism - Phenomenology" elaborates on this point when he says, "consciousness in all its modes is awareness of something." When thinking and thinking of something, when perceiving, and perceiving something. He further elaborates on this point:

Thus, as in thinking I have a thought of something, so in sensing I have a sensation of something, in perceiving I have a perception of something, in experiencing an experience of something, in conceiving a conception of something, in judging a judgement (proposition) about something, and so on, (Chapman, 1966, p. 104).

Using the phenomenological method - intentionality, one becomes aware of the intended directional character and understands that the subject, in the relationship between subject and object, is the origin of all object knowledge. Understanding that the subject is the origin of all object knowledge (subjective, objective, phenomenological) resolves the subject-object split. There is no distinction between subject and object according to the phenomenological method.

Existentialism
The Phenomenological Method - Intentionality

Husserl's foremost existential student, Martin Heidegger, rejects the notions of the transcendental ego and the transcendental reduction. Sartre, considered to be an existentialist, and Merleau-Ponty, a phenomenologist (this demonstrates the confusion of trying to clearly separate existentialism
from phenomenology) both agree with Heidegger that there is no transcendental ego and transcendental reduction. They believe that Husserl was mistaken in believing that all consciousness is intentional and outwardly directed because there is another kind of consciousness, one that knows itself, not objectively but in the very act, (Wild, 1963). They take the view that it is possible to become aware of myself as well as my situation in the world by developing and cultivating a consciousness that inhibits my intentional acts as they reach out toward their objects, (Wild, 1966).

John Wild gives an example of this kind of consciousness:

Thus I do not have to watch myself walking from an external point of view. There is a mode of awareness that dwells in my walking, and which gives me the feel of walking as I walk. It also stretches around me and beyond me to reveal the direction in which I am moving and how fast. It is true that, for the most part, this immediate consciousness is submerged and repressed by my awareness of objects. But it can be developed and made explicit by the right sort of phenomenological attention, (1963, p. 33).

Merleau-Ponty gives another example:

For example, I may have been under the impression that I lapsed into silence through weariness, or some minister may have thought he had uttered merely an appropriate platitude, yet my silence or his words immediately take on a significance, because my fatigue or his falling back upon a ready-made formula are not accidental, for they express a certain lack of interest, and hence some degree of adoption of a definite position in relation to the situation, (1969, p. 227).
Both Heidegger and Sartre stress a more developed consciousness of the \textit{I} in the action. Heidegger says the \textit{I} is always in the action, and can be summoned through recollection, or the right sort of phenomenological attention. The implication is that this is always part of our existence because we intend naturally. There is no special effort needed. Sartre emphasizes the consciousness of the \textit{I} in the action and focus on the \textit{I} in the action. Sartre puts more emphasis on action or choice making. The taking of action is a should for Sartre. Action is making choices, and making choices is a way to get in touch with the \textit{I} in the action. Sartre wants us to make choices. Heidegger believes there is no special effort needed.

Humanistic Education is more akin to the Sartreian position. One must make choices in order to get in touch or become conscious of the \textit{I} in the action. Thus both consciousness and choice making are crucial to humanistic education.

\underline{Consciousness or Intentionally and Freedom}

Kelly clarifies the relationship of intentionality or consciousness and freedom. If freedom is understood as transcending the phenomenological field by being conscious of that field then it is clear that freedom depends on consciousness. On the other hand, if one is not conscious of the phenomenological field, then one is not free.

If one believes, as Kelly apparently does, that the actions of a person are determined by the phenomenal field, then the person has no choice and can be neither free nor responsible. Kelly maintains in the \textit{Psychology of Personal}
Constructs (1955), that a person's behavior is determined by those constructs he uses to define the choice making situation. When a person adopts a particular construct his behavior is determined by the construct, but the person is free to redefine and change those constructs and move to a higher or superordinate construct system, (Kelly, 1955). Depending on how Kelly is understood his position could be considered either a deterministic or free one, and Kelly maintains, "that freedom and determinism are two sides of the same coin," (ibid).

Kelly and Heidegger believe man can only be free when he is conscious of this subjective side of his viewing the world and it is his becoming conscious of this very subjectivity that enables him to transcend the constructs of that phenomenological view and gain another view which he can also become conscious of. If a person is not conscious, then he cannot be free.

Adelbert Ames seems to clarify this existential question for me: He believes that free will is inconceivable unless the possibility of choice exists, and the choices are known to the chooser. The choices must be in the choosers consciousness, (Ames, 1960). However, the paradox of consciousness, as Sartre points out in Nausea (1964), is that total consciousness or awareness or intentionality, leads to paralysis. Other existentialists have seen consciousness in a different light. In Beyond Good and Evil (1955) and Thus Spake Zarathustra (1966) we see Nietzsche expound the view that the gayest thing that can happen to man is to reach self consciousness. On the other hand, Dostoevsky in Notes
from Underground (1957) shows his underground man to be constantly suffering as a result of achieving self consciousness.

This does not mean that you become frozen at either end of this continuum but that consciousness is on a continuum. It is up to the individual to chose how conscious he wants to be.

Existentialism – The Role of Anxiety

It is necessary to understand anxiety in order to understand personal existence, and yet, Kierkegaard was the first modern thinker who recognized the role of anxiety in normal life. Until that time it was regarded as a "morbid symptom of some kind" that was of some importance for abnormal psychology. Recently another view of anxiety has prevailed and this view stresses the importance of anxiety and the role it plays in human existence, (Wild, 1966).

Heidegger's theory of anxiety is right now the most carefully thought out and widely accepted, (Wild, 1966). In Being and Time, (1969), Heidegger explains anxiety.

Anxiety is not only anxiety in the face of something, but, as a state-of-mind, it is also anxiety about something. That which anxiety is profoundly anxious (sich abangstet) about is not a definite kind of Being for Dasein or a definite possibility for it. Indeed, the threat itself is indefinite, and therefore cannot penetrate threateningly to this or that factually concrete potentiality-for-being. That which anxiety is anxious about is Being-in-the-world itself. In anxiety what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within-the-world. The "world" can offer nothing more, and neither can
the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the "world" and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about - its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world,"

(Heidegger, 1969, p. 137).

Heidegger in his use of the term existence is not using it in the Thomistic sense. In the Thomistic conception, existence would be translated as "existing" or being "actual," its opposite would be "not existing," "not being." For Heidegger existence, is the character or essence of the Person (Dasein), (ibid 1969). Saying the essence of a person is his existence is not saying that a person essentially is, but it is rather saying that a person is defined in terms of possible ways for him to be. Existence of the person is not some quality which one could say a person possesses it is rather that a person is defined in terms of his potentials to be this rather than that. It is the person who chooses to realize these possibilities that are definitive of the person. The realizability or not realizability of these possibilities are the person's choice, (Molina, 1969). It could be said instead of Sartre's dictum of existence preceding essence; Heidegger's interpretation would say that a person's having possibilities of being this or that way precedes his being finally that way, (ibid). Jaspers is in accord with Heidegger on this point and explains in Reason and Existenz that there is no final content to Existenz; it is always becoming, moving, on the way, (Jasper, 1955).
In anxiety no definite thing or object can be identified. If asked what he is anxious about he will reply, "I don't know, nothing really." Anxiety is not like fear in that in anxiety "my very being is at stake," (Wild, 1963). There is no way that an answer to anxiety may be given by a calculating machine or another person. Anxiety is my own responsibility and no one else's. I must deal with it. However, anxiety may be evaded.

It is possible to run away from my anxiety when it starts to encircle me. "I may regard it as a morbid delusion, deciding to be sensible" and go about my business, (Wild, 1963, p. 24). I face risks in doing the above but these risks "are no longer a misty nothingness but definite dangers against which definite precautions may be taken," (ibid). Wild comments:

This depersonalization of existence is, in fact, the easier way. Hence we may be able to glimpse what Heidegger means by his statement that the impersonal one of everyday life (das Man) is constantly evading his anxiety and attempting to replace it by derived forms of fear," (p. 24).

Nothingness and Anxiety

The no-thing-ness in this theory of anxiety is strangely reminiscent of the impasse in Gestalt therapy. Frederick Perls describes this nothingness:

At first the patient will do anything to keep his attention from his actual experiences. He will take flight into memory and expectation (past and future); into the flight of ideas (free associations); intellectualizations or "making a case" or right and wrong. Finally, he encounters the holes in his personality with an awareness of

However, it is only through anxiety that man encounters nothingness. It is in the encounter with nothingness that he becomes aware of the necessity to die and his own finitude. Only through this encounter and the resolution and reappraisal of himself can man make real choices and achieve what Heidegger calls "authentic existence," (Wild, 1963).

A crucial part after the encounter with nothingness is the choice making process; freedom and choice are central themes of existentialism. Even Sartre's dictum that existence precedes essence, and Heidegger's elaboration of that theme in his anxiety theory as a person "having possibilities of being this way or that way precedes his being finally that way," (Molina, 1969), really means no more than that men's natures are not fixed or limiting or that man's nature determines his choice. It is rather that their choices bring whatever their nature is into being (MacIntyre, 1964). The crucial nature of freedom and choice is central to the doctrine of existentialism and anxiety helps clarify this.

Anxiety and Fear

In fear, one is afraid of something definite. If a person who was fearful were asked what they were afraid of they would be able to tell you. I am afraid of that man, or I am afraid of this examination. The things that I know I fear can be both dangerous and strong. However, one may take precautions toward
such dangers. Usually fears are shared by others, but even if not shared, one can get assistance or advice.

Summary

This chapter has focused on phenomenology and existentialism and attempted to draw certain assumptions from existentialism and phenomenology for humanistic education. The major assumptions that were drawn after explicating the phenomenological methods are these:

1. The subject, in the relationships between subject and object, is the origin of all object knowledge. Object knowledge includes myself as subject (subjective knowledge), the world as subject (object knowledge), and others as subject (phenomenological knowledge).

2. There is no subject-object split.

3. Consciousness or intentionality are crucial. Man can only be free when he is conscious of the choices he makes, and can only be responsible for those choices when he chooses them freely. (In other words, when they are in his consciousness.)

4. To approach the world phenomenologically means becoming conscious of your consciousness
as you view the world, others and yourself.

The above assumptions were drawn from discussing the phenomenological method and tracing its development. The development of phenomenological method and the development of the concept of intentionality led to the exploration of themes crucial to both phenomenology-existentialism and humanistic education. Choice making, freedom, nothingness, responsibility and consciousness have been shown to be central concerns of phenomenology and existentialism. They are also concerns of humanistic education.
CHAPTER IV

THE UNIQUELY EXPERIENCING INDIVIDUAL

Introduction

The focus of this chapter will be on the uniquely experiencing individual and try to offer support for the subjectivity and uniqueness of one's experience. The phenomenological method showed that the subjective pole of experience was most important, and the one from which we viewed the world. This chapter will try to offer scientific support for this assumption by examining experiments in perception. After examining experiments by Rosenthal (1969), Cantril (1959), Ames (1960) and others, I will then discuss the importance of the following six things:

1. our brains.
2. our past experience.
3. our heredity.
4. our senses.
5. our eyes.
6. our language.

The final parts of this chapter will discuss, because of the uniqueness of experiences, how we each create our own meanings and subjective and objective reality.
Experiments in Perception

In The Phenomenological Problem, Carl Rogers tries to explicate the relationship of phenomenology and perception. Rogers in an article, "The Organization of Personality," comments on a point made by Snygg and Combs, two of the leading phenomenologists. Snygg and Combs in Individual Behavior point out that it is the perceptual field which determines behavior and the object for study "would be the person and his world as viewed by the person himself." Rogers believed then that it might mean that by turning our attention to the laws that govern perception we might better learn the laws that govern behavior (Rogers, 1959). Rogers in the same article hypothesizes "that behavior is not directly influenced or determined by organic or cultural factors, but primarily, (and perhaps only) by the perception of these elements," (ibid). A good general hypothesis then is that a close relationship exists between behavior and how reality is viewed by the person (ibid). This clearly supports the phenomenological view of looking at the world from a personal and unique perspective.

The Senses and Past Experience

Hadley Cantril in an article, "Perception and Interpersonal Relations," (Kuenzli, ed., 1959), tells of an interesting series of experiments on perception and interpersonal relations. This story is about a friend of Cantril's a distinguished lawyer, who went to see Ames' demonstrations. Cantril takes
them to see the "distorted room" designed by Ames, which produces the same image on the retina as a regular square room if it is viewed monocularly from a certain point (Cantril, 1959). People within the room or objects within the room become distorted because the room is seen as square. This distortion is also true of people looking through the windows. Cantril had shown this room to hundreds of people and it had been demonstrated that when two people looked through the back windows, the head of one individual appeared very large, the head of the other to be very small. However, the size of the people's heads appeared to the observer to change when they reversed the windows they were looking through, (Cantril, 1959).

On this Sunday morning something unusual happened. The friend's wife was observing Cantril and her husband and said, "Well, Louis, your head is the same size as ever, but, Hadley, you've become awfully large." Cantril recalls that a shiver went up his spine and he asked her how she saw the room.

It turned out that for her - unlike any other observer until then - the room had become somewhat distorted. In other words, she was using her husband - to whom she was particularly devoted, as her standard. She would not let him go. His nickname for her was "Honi," and this has been dubbed the "Honi phenomenon," (Cantril, 1959).

Dr. Warren Wittreich in a series of experiments with married couples systematically observed the "Honi phenomenon." He found that in people
married for a long time there was greater and quicker distortion than in
couples married for less than a year. In the newly married couples there was
a very definite tendency not to let the new marital partner distort as quickly
or as much. Preliminary investigations on children, he reported, "seem to
show that parents of young children will not allow their children to distort as
readily as will parents of older children," (ibid).

Cantril believes that we could continue for some time reporting experiments
which seem to show that what we perceive is in large part our own creation
and depends on the assumptions we bring to the particular occasion. We seem,
according to Cantril, to give meaning and order to sensory impingements in
terms of our own needs and purposes, (ibid).

It is evident that an understanding of phenomenology is impossible without
an understanding of perception. A little known man, Adelbert Ames, Jr.,
seemed to have done some remarkable work in this field. Ames, whose
Morning Notes, (1960) a collection of his theories, experiments on perception,
seems to have the most impressive credentials of any educationist of recent
times. Alfred North Whitehead called him an "authentic genius." Others who
recognized Ames' significance are Albert Einstein, John Dewey, Hadley
Cantril and Earl Kelley (Postman and Werngartner, 1969).

Ames' experiments with oddly shaped rooms, windows, tables, chairs
and other objects, which seemed to distort reality when perceived by ordinary
people, showed further that our perceptions come from us, not from the things
around us. This does not mean that there is no objective reality, nothing outside our skins, but that whatever is out there can not be known except as it is filtered through a human nervous system, (ibid).

The second thing that Ames proved was, what we perceive is largely a function of our previous experiences, our assumptions, and our purposes (ibid). This means that one perceives what one needs and wants to perceive. In the New York Times, August 8, 1967, was the following story which clearly illustrates the above point, (Postman and Werngartner, 1969).

Robert Rosenthal, a social psychology professor at Harvard reported that after tests "rats performed far better when the experimenters were told, falsely, that the rats had been bred for intelligence," (ibid). When the experimenters were told the rats were dull, the same kind of rats turned in consistently poor performances. Rosenthal then tested school children and got what he termed similar results, (ibid).

A random sample of first and second grade children at a South San Francisco elementary school, who it was predicted would make dramatic gains in school work, actually made those gains, while the rest of the student body did not. Only the teachers and not the pupils or parents had been told of the predictions. Although, for ethical reasons, it was not predicted that any child would turn out dull, Professor Rosenthal believes that his tests provide important evidence supporting the common thesis that many children, particularly minority-group children, turn out dull because their teachers expect them to be dull.
Ames' third point is that "we are unlikely to alter our perceptions until and unless we are first rated in our attempts to do something based on them." This does not mean that if we are first rated when acting on our perception that we will automatically change our perceptions. It does mean that alternatives are available and the ability to relinquish inappropriate perceptions and develop new ones is learning, (Postman and Wangartner, 1969).

The fourth point is that each individual perceives what is out there in a unique way. This is true because our perceptions come from us and our past experience, (ibid). "We have no common world and communication is possible only to the extent that two perceivers have similar purposes, assumptions, and experience," (ibid).

This is similar to Snygg's, two principles of a phenomenological system. "Behavior is completely determined by and pertinent to the phenomenological field of the behaving organism, and there is some relationship between the phenomenological fields of different individuals," (Snygg, 1959). If this is an accurate description of characteristics of a phenomenological system, then we truly do live in different worlds, simply because our perceptions of things are so different.

I was involved in entering my son's world the other day and to understand this principle after the following thing happened. Today I brought home from the library, three books for my three year old son. My son cannot read, but this book was a book without words. It was a book of visual discrimination
exercises. A surprising thing happened when he began to name the shapes he saw. He understood the concepts of triangle, square, rectangle, and circle, all of which he had recently learned on Sesame Street. It made him very happy to identify the following shapes which were on page one:

![Shapes on Page One](image1)

On page two, several shapes which I thought he had never seen before were pictured. The following is page two:

![Shapes on Page Two](image2)
A surprising thing happened. He was supposed to find the picture that corresponded to Figure One. When he looked at Figure One, he immediately yelled 'T' or "eye" and put his face over the paper with his eye covering the "eye" in Figure One. He did the same thing when he discovered that Figure Six also contained to his world or his eye or his perceptual field an "eye."

After a short discussion with my wife who looked into my eyes and discovered the shape to correspond exactly to the shapes in Figures One and Six, we then entered my son's world - the eye is my eye, according to her.

The Eye

Studies of the eye, by J. B. Eccles, a Nobel prize winner, offers evidence to support the uniqueness of one's perceptions. According to Eccles, man doesn't really sense the world, he perceives it. It often happens that different sensations lead to the same interpretations. A man reading a book with eyes and a blind man reading the same book with his fingers perceive the same words. Perception is derived from sensations, and in this way man tries to understand his world. It is a misconception that the blind develop supernormal touch. There are high concentrations of nerve endings in the fingertips, lips, and nose tip sufficient to feel every dot of Braille in all human beings. Studies at McGill University have shown that the blind have urgent motive to develop their other senses. It is subject to his perception of reality that the motive or the way he perceives that develops. Another astonishing discovery of two
women in Russia and one in the United States who are capable of distinguishing colors with their fingertips shows how great the possibilities our sense organs might possess.

Vision is commonly explained as

an image on my retina, which is transmitted by nerve fibers in each of my optic nerves, and that the information so travelling to the visual cortex of my brain gives rise to some specific pattern of activity, woven in space and time by the activity of the nerve cell. In some mysterious way, this pattern gives rise to experiences that are projected out into space, and, lo, there is the room visualized by me, (Eccles, 1968, p. 108).

According to Sir John C. Eccles, who received the Nobel Prize in medicine as the result of a lifetime of brain research, this explanation is only partly true. What we can say, according to Eccles, is that "when there is a specific patterned activation of the nerve cells in my brain, I have a conscious experience, that somehow is derived from these specific events, (ibid).

Eccles believes that visual perception is not an inborn property of the nervous system but that "the visual world is an interpretation of retinal data, that has been learned through association with information from sense organs, particularly those of muscles, joints, skin and the inner ear, and is the end-product of a long effort of progressive learning by trial and error (ibid).

In experiments conducted by Von Sendin, well documented accounts of adult given patterned vision for the first time after removing from their eyes congenital cataracts. The people reported:
... that their initial visual experiences were meaningless and quite unrelated to the spatial world that had been built up from touch and movement. It took many weeks and even months, of continual effort to derive from visual experiences a perceptual world that was congruous with their 'kinaesthetic world,' and in which, as a consequence, they could move with assurance, (Eccles, 1968, p. 111).

These experiments show that when we think that we perceive the visual world objectively as it really exists in three dimension and the properties color form and texture, we really see things arising from our own conscious experiences.

Such perceptual experiences arise because of the coded information that is fed into the brain by our sense organs, there to produce spatio-temporal patterns of activation of our brain-cells, and which we learned throughout life to interpret in order to give a valid picture of the world in which we live, (ibid).

Eccles further states:

The example of color-blindness illustrates in a most pointed manner the amazing dominance of the majority agreement and the commonsense way of repressing the minority of disagreement. This method works out well for the crude levels of perception, using simple criteria of perceptual recognition with nothing more subtle than color matching; but there are immense divergences in the perceptual experiences of individuals, when it comes to highly-sophisticated performances such as occur with philosophical arguments, with aesthetic judgments in music, the plastic arts, and literature, and even with such learned skills as tea and wine tasting, and the evaluation of design and decor, (ibid, p. 112).
This position eliminates the existence of an objective reality or external world and makes the perceptual world the only one which exists:

For example, colors, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and cold, as such, belong only to the perceptual world, and have no existence in the external or 'objective' world. Furthermore, it is part of my interpretation of my perceptual experience that my 'self' is associated with a body that is in the objective world; and I find innumerable other bodies that appear to be of like nature, (Eccles, p. 113).

The Brain

William Penfield a neurosurgeon, offers biological evidence to support the psychological evidence that our perception "comes from us and our past experience," (Postman and Weingartner) and adds the functioning of the brain to support the two other assumptions of phenomenological-perceptual theory. The list now reads that we perceive what we perceive:

1. Depending on our senses
2. Our past experience
3. Our brains
4. Our eyes

Penfield, found that by stimulating the cortex of the brain with a weak electric current transmitted through a probe "could force recollections clearly derived from the patient's memory," (Harris, 1969). The experience stopped when the electrode was withdrawn but the experience repeated itself when the electrode was reapplied.
One of Penfield's conclusions was that the electrode didn't evoke "as mixture of memories or a generalization" but a single recollection (Harris, 1969). Penfield further concluded that the response to the electrode was involuntary.

Not only were the past events recorded in detail in the cortex of the brain, but "the feelings associated with those events" are recorded in the brain also. The event along with the feeling produced by the event are "inextricably locked together in the brain so that one cannot be evoked without the other." This means that a person feels the same emotion "which the situation originally produced in him" and is aware, whether true or false of the same interpretations which he "gave to the experience in the first place," (Harris, 1969). According to Harris, "recollections are evoked by the stimuli of day-to-day experience in much the same way that they were evoked artificially by Penfield's probe." If day-to-day experiences are evoked in much the same way as Penfield's probe, then what persons perceive is clearly unique.

**Heredity**

The importance of this view of perception is clear. It seems to show clearly that there is along with the psychological basis for perception, as shown by the distortions in Cantril's husband and wife perceptions, also a biological component coupled with this. This biological component is attested to Dr. Holgar Hyden, (ibid).

The capacity to recall the past to consciousness can certainly be expected
to reside in a primary mechanism of general biological validity. A firm link
to the genetic mechanism is important, and in this respect especially, the RNA
molecule, with its many possibilities, would fulfill many requirements (ibid).

This adds heredity to the three things already mentioned as determining
our perception. If both a biological and psychological component are part of
our perceiving, then the brain and its functioning play a crucial part in what we
see. The brain seems to have many functions, and what Penfield believes is
that the brain functions like a tape recorder, where past experiences are
recorded and the feelings associated to those experiences "inextricably locked
to those experiences." This data, which is locked in the recording mechanism
of the brain, is recalled and relived and determines "the nature of today's
transactions." Harris further believes that "much of what we relive, we
cannot remember, and he illustrates this point.

She felt herself in the grip of a sadness she could not
understand, the intensity of which was almost unbearable.
Nothing in her conscious thought could explain this.
After she described the feeling to me, I asked her if there
was anything in her early life that this song reminded her
of. She said she could not make any connection between
the song and her sadness. Later in the week she phoned
to tell me that, as she continued to hum the song over and
over, she suddenly had a flash of recollection in which she
saw her mother sitting at the piano and heard her playing
this song. The mother had died when the patient was five
years old. At that time the mother's death had produced
a severe depression, which had persisted over an extended
period of time, despite all the efforts of the family to help
her transfer her affection to an aunt who had assumed the
mother role. She had never recalled hearing this song or
remembering her mother's playing it until the day she
walked by the music store, (Harris, 1967, p. 7).
This story illustrates another of Penfield's very important conclusions that even after the subject no longer has the ability to recall the memory, the memory record continues intact. It is clear that much of what we perceive is clearly dependent not only on our heredity, but on our senses and our past experiences and our brain. The importance of the brains functioning cannot be underrated in the examination of perception.

Language

Language also affects the perceptions and particularly our language abstraction. It is Korzybski's view that our language abstractions are derived from a particular point of view. It is because of this point of view that distortions in meaning take place. It is only by becoming aware of our habitual use of language that we can understand that our language is not always an accurate tool to describe the real world. As Korzybski points out:

The degree to which we are conscious of abstracting... becomes a key problem in the way we evaluate and therefore to a large extent, may affect the way in which we perceive, (1951, p. 190).

It is because of this that Korzybski uses what he calls extensional devices to increase our awareness of our abstracting.

Kelly and Cody give an example of what happens when a child is frightened by a large dog. The large dog might make a child generalize about all dogs and the word "dog." Dog, being a linguistic sign, certainly influences the child's perceptions of dogs in the future. When the child sees a dog, large or small,

We now have a list of six things that determine what we perceive:

1. our brains.
2. our past experience.
3. our heredity.
4. our senses.
5. our eyes.
6. our language.

We can see that our perceptions come from us and are determined by our brains, our eyes, our past experience, our language, and our heredity. It is a determined field unless we are able to transcend our perceptual field by being conscious of that field.

Objective and Subjective reality

It could be argued that there certainly is an objective "reality," reality that all people see or feel. If one hundred people dipped their hands into a pitcher of boiling water, all would feel the warmth and have their hands burn. (Possible exceptions: People under hypnosis or drugged.)

In this sense there is an objective reality. In another sense there are only many subjective realities, since each person feels the water separately. It is evident that "reality" as perceived by senses is very personal, and each individual's perception can be very different from any other individual's, dependent upon the perceiver.
If we can approach the objective world by means of definitions and approximately define a "cornfield" as a piece of ground on which cereal is cultivated; if the "cornfield" is the so-called objective reality, then in what sense is it objective? When a farmer looks at a cornfield, the sees it in terms of his specific interest. The farmer wants to make a living and sees the cornfield as the field he cultivated and a place where corn grows. A merchant looking at the field would probably estimate the gain he would derive from handling the crop. Lovers would choose the field as a place to withdraw from the world, and have no interest in its monetary value. A painter would become enthusiastic about the colors and harmonies of light and shade; but to a pilot who needs to make a forced landing, the cornfield and the corn serves only as a wind indicator. The agronomist has neither the lover's, the painter's, nor the pilot's view of the cornfield. He only considers the chemical composition of the soil. The six people have six different spheres of interest. They are interested in such objects of the outer world as are apt to gratify their different needs, and only by coincidence is the cornfield the object common to their different spheres of interest, (Perls, 1966).

It seems evident that the scale of observation creates the phenomenon. Every time we change the scale of observation, we encounter new phenomena.

To the naked eye a razor blade appears as a straight line. When the razor blade is observed under the microscope, it is a broken but solid line. If we use the chemical scale to observe the razor, we have atoms or iron and
carbon; and on the subatomic scale; we see electrons in perpetual motion traveling at the rate of several thousand miles per second, (DeNouy, 1947).

Bertram Russel stated a similar view:

We all start from "naive realism," i.e., the doctrine that things are what they seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow are not the greenness, hardness, and coldness that we know in our own experience but something very different. The observer, when he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really - if physics is to be believed - observing the effects of the stone upon himself. Thus, science seems to be at war with itself - when it most means to be objective, it finds itself plunged into subjectivity against its will, (Russell, 1946, pp. 14-15).

Russell further states in The Act of Creation:

that all the animals that have been carefully observed have behaved so as to confirm the philosophy in which the observer believed before this observations began. Nay, more, they have all displayed the national characteristics of the observer. Animals studied by Americans rush about frantically, with an incredible display of hustle and pep, and at last achieve the desired result by change. Animals observed by German's sit still and think and at last evolve the situation out of their inner consciousness, (Koestler, 1964, pp. 32-33).

The sphere of interest of Perls is another term for Eccles' perceptual field, or Snygg and Combs principles of a phenomenological field, or Russell's and Lecomte de Nouy's scale of observation.

It is only possible to transcend our fields if we are conscious of our subjective reality and our subjective perceptions. When you realize that you are realizing something at that moment transcendence is possible. A woman listening to some nonsense words claimed this nonsense word was saying I
hate God. I hate God. Over and over again. It was later revealed that this woman came from a very religious family and was forced to pray and love god from early childhood. It was during this session that she realized the reason for hearing this and transcended her field and made a new contact. This transcendance helped her escape her limited phenomenological field.

Meaning Makers

We all create our own meanings and always are making or giving meanings. Our perceptions of the world, the people around us, and ourselves, determine what that meaning will be. It is our perceptions which determine our meaning and our perceptions which make up our phenomenological field. The way we perceive the world determines both our meanings and our phenomenological-perceptual field.

We are always making meanings, and experiments in altered states of consciousness have shown that we can transcend our meanings or our perceptions and give new meaning based on new perceptions. The transcending of our perceptual field is achieved by awareness. When we see things differently or have many views of the same thing, we are changing our phenomenological field into a new field and thereby become a different existential self.

Once again, then, our freedom depends on our awareness. The awareness of our perceptions and our phenomenological field helps us to transcend the limits of our perceptions and phenomenological field and to become existential beings who can choose more freely. The assumption of the uniquely
experiencing individual appears to have been validated by the data in this chapter.

Summary

This chapter attempted to offer support for, and continue developing a philosophical and psychological base for humanistic education. It attempted to offer scientific support for the assumption that each individual is unique and experiences himself (subjective), the world (objective), and others (interpersonal or phenomenological) from his own subjective viewpoint.

The subjectivity of this viewpoint was reinforced by examining six things: our brains, our past experience, our heredity, our senses, our eyes and our language.

It was concluded because of the unique way in which one views the world that meanings are created by perceiving the world in such a way. Each man creates his own meanings on the basis of his perceptions. However, one is free to become conscious of one's perceptions and thereby transcend those perceptions and create new and different meanings.

The major assumptions extrapolated from this chapter are:

1. Each person is unique and perceives the world in a unique way.

2. Each person creates his own meaning because of the way he perceives the world.
3. One can transcend his perceptual field (perceptions)
    by becoming conscious of his perceptual field.

    The assumptions extrapolated from this chapter and the previous
    chapter serve as the foundation for humanistic education.
CHAPTER V

HUMANISTIC EDUCATION

Introduction

In this chapter I will show the focus, importance and objectives of humanistic educators by comparing it with traditional education. I will also show how the following assumptions extrapolated from phenomenological-existential and perceptual theory serve as the philosophical and psychological foundation for psychological (humanistic) curriculum, and how humanistic educators attempt to implement these concepts with psychological curriculum. Thus far we might summarize the assumptions, extrapolated from phenomenological-existential and perceptual theory, that may serve the foundation of psychological curriculum as follows:

1. Each person is unique and sees the world in a unique way. (Chapter IV)

2. The subjective pole is the most important and the one which we view everything from. (Chapter III)

1. Therefore psychological curriculum would have to focus on the uniqueness of the individual and his singular way of processing the world.

2. Therefore there must be a greater emphasis on one's subjective experience. Metaphor, allegory symbol and fantasy must be used to get in touch with the subjective pole because the subjective is sometimes undiscussable, (Morris).
3. To approach the world phenomenologically means becoming conscious of your consciousness as you view yourself, others and the world. (Chapter III)

4. Each person creates his own meaning. (Chapter IV)

5. Individuals live in many conflicting worlds at the same time. (Chapter III)

6. Free will is conceivable only if there exists the possibility of choice of alternative action and the alternatives are known to the chooser. (Chapter III)

7. Consciousness is crucial. (Chapter III, IV)

Education and Humanistic Education

If one of the tasks of education is to meet the emotional needs of children then it is necessary that a conscious, controlled and planned for curriculum be developed to help with the psychological problems that exist today.

Psychotherapists have realized that the traditional methods and settings which they have been using are inadequate because of the magnitude of psychological problems that exist today in our society. The amount of violence seems to
prove that the long-term one-to-one therapeutic relationships often taking place in ideal environments are inefficient, (Alschuler, 1969).

Humanistic Education attempts to meet the psychological needs that cannot be met by traditional methods and settings. Humanistic Education as previously defined is curriculum that directly promotes psychological growth in contrast to programs in which psychological growth is concomitant learning.

For example, a lesson taught on children of other lands first focuses on the children of these lands. It is hoped that as a concomitant part of this lesson children will understand differences in children they know, or children in their class, but the primary learning is about children of other lands, The primary learning in psychological curriculum aims at making self understanding and relational capacities with others the primary objective and not a concomitant component and therefore would probably not use as context children of other lands, but something more direct such as having pupils examine their own communication patterns with each other.

One of the major aims of education is behavioral change, and humanistic education helps facilitate alternative ways of responding other than verbal responses. When a person is either more conscious or aware of his responses, he has an increased capacity for alternative ways of responding. By developing this increased capacity, humanistic education makes possible experimentation with a range of responses. Only when a person becomes aware of his response patterns is it possible to have alternative ways of responding and his
response-ability. Humanistic education stems from the premise that self-awareness and the "trying on" of alternative responses give one leverage for controlling behavior and makes possible alternative ways of responding. Humanistic Education attempts to make a person aware of his "RESPONSE-ABILITY," gives him the opportunity to try on new responses, and in so doing increases the behavioral repertoire of that person.

What is called humanistic education offers promising alternatives to the debilitating effects of current practice. Experimentation with new responses is now viewed as a means to change both response and attitude. Of the issues previously outlined, the major aim is to increase the response-ability to himself and others.

Humanistic Education will not resolve all educational problems, but there is an excellent probability that psychological education might make an important contribution to developing more fully the potentials of both individuals and communities. Education tries to help man become a better and more productive human being. This is also the aim of the psychological educator. The difference between a psychological educator and a non-psychological educator is that the psychological educator attempts to facilitate the humanization process by increasing one's intrapersonal and interpersonal awareness and behavioral skills, mostly through experiential techniques. A psychological educator tries to have a person experience intrapersonal awareness by teaching a person, e.g., relaxation, non-verbal behavior, body position, a host of skills that facilitate this awareness, (Ivey and Rollin, 1970).
The content of psychological education curriculum is also different in that the individual and his personal experiences become the content. It is clear that this new curriculum is needed for two reasons:

1. to meet the unmet psychological needs of students.
2. current knowledge is in such flux that the current curriculum is practically useless.

Carl Rogers believes that the teaching in psychology will almost certainly be out of date in 20 years. The 'facts of history' really depend very largely upon the current mood and temper of the culture. Chemistry, biology, genetics, sociology, are in such flux that a firm statement made today will probably be modified by the time the student gets around to using the knowledge, (1956).

Traditionally education has either supposed what the interest of students are and assigned students classes on the basis of breaking knowledge into categories (i.e., English, history, math and science) or more progressive educators have allowed the students to select particular interests and work on them. Earl Kelley describes the latter method in his book, *The Workshop Way of Learning*, (1951).

As Weinstein points out, that educators were on the right track in sensing the link between interests, needs and learning. In their reluctance to deal with needs the interest curriculum become very limited because the curriculum is usually confined to present interests and shuts out material in
which learners could be interested, (Weinstein, and Fantini, 1970).

More important, the expressed interests of a student may not be what really concern them. Weinstein gives an example of what concerns are in the following story:

A teacher told the project staff that her class had an almost compulsive interest in science. She was asked, "What aspect of science?" "Evaporation," she replied. "The children seem utterly intrigued by evaporating water." After further questioning of the pupils, however, we found that it was not evaporation as such that intrigued the class but, rather, a concern with change, permanence, and absence; they were saying, in effect, "If water can disappear, can we?" Similarly, the interest expressed by many boys in racing cars or strong athletes may actually indicate concerns with power and control, (1970, p. 27).

It is necessary to understand what is clearly meant by concerns and interests. Concerns are deeper and more persistent and connote an inner uneasiness that seeks cognitive assistance. Interests are not anxiety producing and are more likely to be transitory, (ibid).

This inner uneasiness in a sense shows all concerns are negative. The uneasiness signifies an imbalance or incomplete satisfaction. A person's interests may give clues to his concerns. For example: "A person may have interest (in say, urban poverty) and yet not be concerned; on the other hand, his interest may give clues to concerns," (ibid).

Ralph W. Tyler's Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction offers two meanings of the term "need." The first use he says "represents a gap
between some conception of a desirable norm, that is, some standard of philosophic value and the actual status." In this sense need represents the "gap between what is and what should be," (Tyler, 1949).

The second meaning for the term need is used by psychologists and represents "tensions in the organism which must be brought into equilibrium for a normal healthy condition of the organism to be maintained." It is to the second meaning which needs or concerns in psychological education are directed.

There are three major patterns of concerns or needs which by definition are "deep and persisting," and the most direct and valuable cues to these three major patterns of concerns are what the learners "say and write about their lives." Non-verbal cues, which are more difficult for teachers to interpret are also a valuable cue for finding concerns. Other cues (i.e., profession literature, general description of pasivity, alienation, folklore of a particular sociological group) are less direct and are of limited value.

The three major patterns of concerns are:

1. Cues indicating self-rejection reflect a concern for more positive self-concept.

2. Cues indicating disconnectedness reflect a concern to establish connection with each other or with society at large, to know where one fits in the scheme of things.

3. Cues indicating powerlessness reflect a concern for greater control over what is happening to oneself, (Weinstein and Fantini, 1970).
The non-humanistic educator aims the transmission of knowledge of the external world such as driving a car or solving a math problem, in the hope that these new skills will also help to make man a better and more productive human being. The difference then between a psychological educator and a non-psychological educator is that the psychological educator focuses on deliberately increasing the intrapersonal awareness, interpersonal awareness and the personal negotiations within these areas, and the non-psychological educator aims at teaching performance skills, such as problem solving skills, reading improvement skills or language facilitation skills, behaviors to which Bloom's Taxonomy Handbook I addresses itself.

The problem is that we do not have a conscious, controlled structure for experiential curriculum that deals with the individual's concern for increasing intrapersonal and interpersonal intentionality.

The central concepts of humanistic education are the key to understanding the differences between psychological education and non-psychological education. The differences are clear, and the rest of this chapter will show how psychological education concepts can be implemented, the scope and what different humanistic educators do and finally what all humanistic educators have in common.

Bertrand Russell believes that education has three purposes; to provide opportunities for growth; to give culture and develop one's capacities; training useful citizens. Russell believes in a combination of the above three
purposes as the goal of education, (Russell, 1946).

Humanistic educators in general focus their programs on providing opportunities for growth and leaves the giving of culture and the development of useful citizens in the realm of non-humanistic educators. If a person becomes a useful citizen or gains culture this is concomitant to the humanistic educator. In non-psychological education the emphasis is placed on giving culture and useful citizenry and only incidentally is concerned with personal growth and the development of the self. The development of the self hopefully takes place as part of the other processes. Both the means and purposes of humanistic educators are different from traditional educators.

The implementation of the concepts of humanistic education is crucial for understanding this field and it must be remembered that the humanistic program is experiential and the following written description can only give the flavor and not the meat of the program.

**Focus on Uniqueness and Consciousness**

Weinstein focuses mainly on assumption number one, i.e., each person is unique and sees the world in a unique way. He therefore uses curriculum that focuses on the uniqueness of the individual and his singular way of processing the world. He uses a schema called the Trumpet (See Appendix A), which was developed by a Ford Foundation project field group, and was used, adapted and refined by the Philadelphia Cooperative School
Program, utilized to find a curriculum that was more relevant to the basic psychological concerns of children than others in use, (Borton copyright in Weinstein and Fantini, 1970).

The Trumpet begins with two steps called Confrontation and Uniqueness. It is these two steps that are a good example focusing on the uniqueness and the singular way an individual processes the world.

A confrontation is used to allow a person or a child even, to be in a confronting situation so they can generate data about themselves and the unique way they experience this confrontation. The confrontation or encounter is combined with the next part of the trumpet, Uniqueness.

An encounter can be different for many people. What may be an encounter or confrontation for one person need not be an encounter of confrontation for someone else.

What we hope happens in an encounter is that an inner experience results from the meeting with another individual. It is this inner experience that hopefully reveals itself to the person having it. This can happen to either of the people involved because as was pointed out above, an encounter is different for everyone, something new, different or unique. May points out that "an encounter can bring a sudden liberation from ignorance or illusion, enlarge the spiritual horizon, and give a new meaning to life," (May, 1958). He believes that in encounter, and here the uniqueness of the individual cannot be separated, "something totally new is revealed, new horizons open, one
weltanschaung is revised, and sometimes the whole personality is restructured, "(ibid).

Step 2 - Uniqueness: This next part of the trumpet looks at how I responded and since we all see the world differently and behave in unique ways based on our perceptions of the world, it asks what was unique about my response, what was not unique, or what was common about my response.

Humanistic education courses offer a chance for me to discover patterns or unique patterns of responses, because the structure or organization of the exercises are such that they lead to the discovery of the uniqueness of patterns of responses. The exercises are structured so that we can direct our attention to discovering these patterns. The basic rule which is held to that when using exercises is that "not upon knowledge alone rather upon knowledge directed by purpose," (Becker, 1960).

The exercises are always aimed at a purpose or goal and this direction is what gives valuable information about that person's uniqueness. Examples of confrontation are shown in Exercises 1 - 11.

Examples of Exercises that Facilitate Uniqueness and My Experiences. (The parentheses are my personal reactions to the exercises.)

Exercise 1.

Push your palms together. Eyes closed.

Push a train out of your way - eyes closed.

Mill around without speaking or touching.
(I felt silly milling, and stayed on the fringes but tried to get in the middle.)

Shake hands with your left hand and then examine with the right hand the other persons left hand.

(I started to feel different. Felt we had to do this too many times. Perhaps my discomfort was caused by shaking and examining too many men's hands. The women's hand I rather enjoyed.)

Exercise 2.

Seek out a partner that interests you.

(Really uninterested at this time.)

Sit back to back, let your heads touch. Tell how you feel about being here.

(We could barely hear each other but we introduced ourselves when we were allowed or told to face each other while still seated.)

Exercise 3.

Whisper two nicknames. Whisper back the names trying to evoke the feeling this name had when you were called it. Explain to your partner why you had this name and if it was pleasant or unpleasant. Why?

(Told my two nicknames and one of them really made me feel annoyed. Annoyed like when I was called that name as a kid. The name was "Spaces." I was called that because my teeth had never grown in. My other nickname, the one I got because I was leader of the guys, though it does embarrass me
out of their company, so I won't reveal it. I rather enjoyed recalling it.)

Exercise 4.

Gather in group and one partner tells the last time they felt free.

(This caused me difficulty. I really wonder how meaningful my life was when I was having trouble thinking of this. Then I remember the time I got on a plane and flew to Brazil to write the great American novel and chase this great Brazilian woman. The other time, and it seemed odd to me, was when I got married. Not during or before, but when the ceremony was over and Vivian and I were driving away. I really felt loose. I felt free when I was coming to Amherst.)

Exercise 5.

Tell anyone if you felt their rememberance of freedom was truthful. Then it's your turn to enter the circle.

(no record.)

Now we then did a feeling wheel.

(This is mine:)

\[ \text{Happy} \]
\[ \text{Relaxed} \]
\[ \text{Calm} \]
\[ \text{At peace} \]
(happy - I feel content and relaxed; loose - I would like to hear some music and do a little dancing; calm - after a lot of dancing I sit down and feel calm or at east; at peace - I feel no weights or pressure.)

Exercise 6.

Weinstein then introduced the concept of geography and asked us to go through the table of contents in relation to our bodies.

What are your imports and exports?

(Food - sperm used to produce kids and sperm given - secondary friendship. Exports - sweat, waste.)

Exercise 7.

What is your climate?

(Stormy - great fluctuation of hot and cold - depends on mood and time of day.)

Where are your slums?

(My hands for loving to violence - express both extremes.)

Exercise 8.

What is most productive area?

(My testicles, the kids we have whenever we want; the writing of my novel or book which has meaning only to myself; this is creative as opposed to reading or intellectualizing.)
Exercise 9.

Unfinished Business.

(What haven't I said or done that I wanted to say or do with someone else or myself. This exercise is one that is used continually throughout the course.)

Exercise 10.

The group draws a composite picture using each member's body parts.

(A. List of things of mine which were selected: Shape of head - liked the shape; eyes - everyones - one person liked each others eyes for shape; mouth - shape; arms and shoulders - strong and sturdy yet not too muscular.)

B. Things that surprised me.

(no record)

C. Things that they didn't like, or I was self conscious about and hoped group would ignore.

(Legs - too self conscious - calves are too thin.)

D. Disclose one thing that you were most self conscious about.

(my legs.)

Exercise 11.

Picture your body and double its size.

(Real big and much too large. Don't think I would like it.)
Cut yourself into half size.

(Three feet tall. Small - tiny - little - scared - too small - defenseless.)

Add anything you wanted to it.

(hair on head - or more of it.)

Subtract something from your body.

(shave my hair off my head.)

Bodies in a bunch of pieces - what would be on top of the pile?

(Penis, head, heart, stomach, arms, legs, shoulders, hands, feet.)

Examine these parts - Why?

If you could multiply more things on your body, what would you multiply?

How many could you have?

What materials would you build a new body out of? Not protoplasm.

(Rubber.)

Changing the color of your body. What color would you select?

(Deep blue)

Your body cannot be used as a body - needs another function? What function would that body be?

(Spare parts.)

The major part of the exercises focus on each person's unique way of experiencing themselves and the world.

The next part of the Trumpet focuses on #7 (The Crucial Nature of
Consciousness) and tries to structure information so that it becomes meaningful. The following are examples of the attempt to increase consciousness.

**Recognize Patterns** - What are my patterns of behavior or what is typical of me in this confrontation or encounter.

The feedback one gets about his patterns comes from a group of people who he works with for the entire course. As yet there is no way of knowing what group structure is best for one actualization. As Abraham Luchins points out:

> There is at present to test to indicate what kind of group structure is most effective for one's actualization process. Until research does develop them we need to take an experimental approach with each individual and see how the various structures in the group affect him, (1964).

It is clear though, that if a person can discover this response patterns he is certainly a more aware, and he is possibly better able to choose.

The fifth step in the trumpet focus on assumption #4, i.e., each person creates his own meaning. In this step the curriculum attempts to make one aware of the meanings he assigns to people, himself, and the world; by asking him to concern the consequences of his behavioral patterns.

**Step 5 - Consider Consequences** - This step asks the person what happens or what could happen to me in my life because of this pattern. Or from a perceptual viewpoint what could happen to me because I see myself or the world from this viewpoint.
This program's limitations appear to be that its focus is on uniqueness and consciousness and only briefly touches on the rest of the assumptions. This may not however be a limitation but a recognition of the difficulty in incorporating the seven assumptions into the program. Furthermore, this is my perception of the program, and I am sure not the only one possible.

This brief description is incomplete and the course lasted about twelve weeks. This program is not intended to replace existing educational programs, but is intended as a supplement in the attempt to right the balance between cognition and affect. It must be remembered that different psychological education programs must be developed for use with different populations and different age groups.

This however, is not the only kind of humanistic education that can be experienced as Alschuler, one of the leading humanistic educators points out, that psychological education as a discipline is unorganized psychological education courses have even been developed and designed to increase achievement motivation, (Alschuler, 1969).

**The Subjective Pole - Consciousness**

George Brown (University of California) focuses, for me, on assumption number two: the subjective pole is the most important and the one which we view everything from, and assumption number seven: consciousness is crucial. He uses curriculum to deal directly with these assumptions. He lists five goals of his workshop.
1. To communicate to others some of the things that we had discovered through the year.

2. To attempt to get others in education interested in affective learning.

3. To begin to establish training models for later use in training teachers in the use of affective teaching techniques.

4. To demonstrate some ways in which we have been coordinating and integrating affective and cognitive learning, by having workshop members participate in samples of these activities (1971).

5. To stimulate possible development of other programs in affective education, (1969).

He then goes on to summarize what the basic planning for the weekend will be. It includes elementary awareness training technique, encounter groups, awareness training through Gestalt therapy and again more awareness training. The entire weekend is dominated by training in awareness using different techniques to facilitate this awareness, (ibid). As Brown later states, "becoming aware of what causes us to choose certain groups can give us some insight into ourselves," (ibid).

In another exercise, Mr. Montz, a group leader asked that the group close their eyes and "on the inside of their eyelids draw an imaginary road map," (ibid). The group is then told that they are now on the left side of the map; not in terms of location, but where you are in your life, your feelings and your awareness of yourself.
Martin Buber, one of the leading existential writers of the 20th century tells a similar story. A rabbi who had been in jail is visited by the jail keeper. The jail keeper begins to question the rabbi's belief in his God because of the Book of Genesis. How can your God be so great and good, he asks, if in the Book of Genesis he has to ask Adam: Adam where are you?

If your God was so smart and created the earth why doesn't he know where Adam is? The rabbi thought for a minute and replied: God is not asking Adam where he is in terms of his location but is asking him where he is in terms of his life. God in affect is saying, Adam, you've been alive for forty years, where are you in life and in your awareness of yourself.

The Buber story and Mr. Montz's exercise of describing where you are at not so much in terms of location as in terms of your life, your feeling and your awareness, show the close, if not almost identical concerns, connection between humanistic education and existentialism.

Later on in the session Brown describes awareness training, the using of Gestalt therapy techniques. According to Brown and Janet Lederman, co-leader of the Gestalt awareness groups, are used "to help the individual take responsibility for himself and his action." It further facilitates the student to become aware of the resources outside and inside himself that are available to him, (ibid).
#3 - Focus on Responses and Choices

Allen Ivey focuses, I believe, on the third assumption: to approach the world phenomenologically means becoming conscious of your consciousness as you view yourself, others and the world. He uses curriculum that is directly concerned with the individual's behavioral responses and choices.

Ivey has developed a human relations course called The Human Relations Performance Curriculum: A Commitment to Intentionality. His curriculum was developed using behavioral objectives, (Ivey and Rollin, 1970). Behavioral hierarchies have been established to help teachers learn human relations skills, i.e., relaxation, listenting and non-verbal skills.

Juxtaposed to these behavioral objectives is Ivey's concept of the intentional teacher. Ivey calls this construct of the intentional teacher existential. According to Ivey the intentional teacher has many 'behavioral options open to him, can decide which option seems appropriate, and can interact with environment feedback to change the direction of his actions,' (ibid). The intentional (existential) teacher is one who is aware of the situation, the many possible choices in that situation, the many possible choices in that situation, and can act on those choices. The intentional (existential) teacher is one who can generate alternate responses in a given situation and 'come at' the problem from different vantage points as he receives environmental feedback, (ibid). The intentional (existential) teacher has more than one course of action open to him and can at any moment respond to ever changing life situations, (ibid).
In order to act (existentially) with intentionality, one must have alternative behaviors available. The performance curriculum in Human Relations instructs beginning teachers in these specific human relations behaviors (ibid).

It is also possible to use the Trumpet to teach these particular behavioral skills such as relaxation, attending, non-verbal or self-expressive skills. For example, when the confrontation of a person is achieved we can ask them, or they can observe themselves and see if they are relaxed. If they go on to the next steps of the Trumpet we can ask them to verbalize their feeling of uniqueness, the functions of their responses, and the patterns of response they notice. They can also notice how they feel, relaxed or otherwise, when people give them information or when they have to verbalize information about themselves.

Ivey's course certainly teaches awareness at the same level for me. After learning how to relax, cue my non-verbal behavior, and attend, I can make different choices.

For example, when I am confronted do I still relax? What happens to my body? Do I still attend? Perhaps the Trumpet could be also used to see how specific responses are affected by confrontation, and how awareness can be increased by simply focusing on nothing but these skills. Ivey's concept of the intentional teacher is existential, and intentionality is one of the major concepts of phenomenology.
Focus on the Subjective

Terry Borton uses exercises very similar to those described by Brown earlier in this paper. He focuses on the subjective pole of experiencing the world and uses metaphor, allegory symbol and fantasy to get in touch with the subjective pole because the subjective is sometimes undiscussable.

He begins the article with an exercise which asks you to try and go back to the sixth grade. He begins by asking you to close your eyes and relax. He tells you that you are in the sixth grade. Let your mind rest there for a while. It will probably be worthwhile for you, the reader, to try the following exercise. Remember, you are in the sixth grade - relax.

Do you remember much about your old class? Do you remember whether other people were close, or far away? Were you warm or cold? Do you remember where the class bully was sitting? The boy with the mossy teeth? The one with the snotty nose? The kid who sucked his thumb? Who supplied the dirty picture? How did you feel about him? Who were the special people? How were you going to get near them? Who was the teacher? Do you remember the lesson?... And at the end of this paragraph, close your eyes again. Let yourself drop down those years, until you find your sixth-grade you. What was school like, really? Stop, and give yourself time to remember it as you experienced it. Stop, and allow yourself to remember school as you experienced it," (Borton, 1969, p. 594).

In this article that follows, Borton emphasizes his purpose of focusing on the importance of feelings and attitudes in the classroom. He describes James Coleman's results in his mammoth survey, "Equality of Educational
Opportunity," Coleman concluded that of all the factors studied and these factors included "family background, teachers salary, school facilities, curriculum materials, attitudes such as interest in school, self concept, and sense of control, showed the strongest relation to achievement," (Boston, 1969).

He points out similarly to Brown that besides the here and now feelings - (here and now a key concept in Gestalt therapy) of the child, the child learns not about psychology in general, but about his own specific feeling and actions or behavior, (ibid).

Particular attention is paid to the child's fantasies, non-verbal expression role-playing, "as a way of simulating behavior so that it can be studied and changed," (ibid), also taught in explicit fashion are the basic principles of group dynamics so that a student can have more responsibility for the conduct of their own affairs. Process in the structure of the classroom is of paramount importance in brining about these changes, (ibid).

It is now clear that humanistic education is different from traditional education and within the field of humanistic education there is great diversity. However, the concepts described earlier in this chapter are generally part of all humanistic education.
Summary

In this chapter I have attempted to show that humanistic education is different from traditional education. It is different in many respects. First it is based on the assumptions of phenomenology, existentialism, and perceptual theory, and therefore, tries to deal directly with the concerns of children and increase their consciousness of themselves, others and the world.

I have also tried to show in this chapter that within the field of humanistic education there is great diversity. This was shown by giving samples, examples and my personal experience in some of these programs. The humanistic educators, Ivey, Brown, Borton, and Weinstein are all interested in the concepts described earlier in this chapter, but all use different methods and focus on different concepts to achieve their aims.

The humanistic educators do not deal with all the assumptions extrapolated from phenomenological-existential and perceptual theory. This assumes that the assumptions are all very different, They are not all very different, but overlap. It is this overlapping that makes it difficult to give order to humanistic education. It will be remembered that the same was true with existentialism and phenomenology. If humanistic education is like its philosophical predecessor's phenomenological-existentialism perhaps it cannot be ordered without diluting the educative process.
AN ADDENDUM

It is my personal feeling that the stagnancy of education has been tolerated for too long a period. If the purpose of education is to change the behaviors of its learners; then why can't the principle of change be applied to the changer? The change in education to which I am addressing myself is a greater emphasis on the actual concerns of the students. I know the change I am asking for is a momentous one. The roots of our present pedagogical practice are rooted very deeply in the soil of our society. In spite of the fact that I may not possess a lever, fulcrum and location with which to overcome the inertia of schooling as it exists; I do have hope though.

If knowledge can be viewed as a search for self; I wonder why this very same criterion cannot be applied to education. The vast majority of education has avoided the self. This avoidance continues despite reports of incredible success by teachers such as Sylvia Ashton-Warner (1963) and Paul Freire (1970). The success of this duo stemmed from the frontal attack they had their students amass on their very selves. Maoris of New Zealand and natives of Brazil learning to read because they themselves chose the words that were of the greatest personal concern. These two teachers dared to defy the age old pedagogical taboo of dealing with the unreality of each individual student. Their defiance was rewarded by success. The students who could see them-
selves as individuals with individual concerns learned to read at a prodigious rate, (Ashton Warner, 1963, Freire, 1970). The lessons of existentialism, phenomenology and perceptual theory have been ignored for too long. It is my desire and ambition to make people, students, faculty and administrators aware of these concerns and assumptions for their students as well as for themselves.

My personal commitment extends far beyond this dissertation. I am a product of the cognitive or so-called objective curriculum. I remember the only interests I had in school were gym, cafeteria, fighting and girls. I took three years of Spanish and can't speak a word of it. I took four years of math and can only do basic arithmetic; many years of English and began to like to read only after completing high school. The only thing I remember about biology is when girls can't become pregnant and for some strange reason the amoeba. After recently sitting in a high school history class I recontacted the boll weevil. The stinking weevil is still taught while the real concern of kids is ignored.

We still pay lip service to dealing with these concerns but never deal with them. Sex, love, death are taboo subjects, but the boll weevil is not.

This dissertation represents my investigation and explorations into a new field of education based on assumptions differing from those underlying that of our present educational system. The best way I can describe what I am going to do with that knowledge is to describe some of the components
of a school based on these principles.

Formal Structure:

This school would be similar to Summerhill in that there would be no required course sequence, attendance or grades. The children would describe what they would do or learn. Since the faculty would come under the existential umbrella of the school and pursue interests; it may well be that some of these interests would serve as entry points for concerns of the children.

Curriculum:

The primary purpose of the curriculum is to serve the interests of the children and to make individuals aware of their concerns. Parameters of study such as English, math, science and history might well be replaced by subjects such as sex, love and death which I feel to be areas of paramount concern to children, (Ashton-Warner, 1963).

The focus of the curriculum would be on intrapersonal (identity) interpersonal (connectedness) and power concerns. This would mean, at times, a structured set of experiences to generate data or a class where people generate their own data and raise their own concerns. For this to happen an atmosphere must be established where kids feel free enough to let out what's really in their hearts and on their minds.

What I would like to do most now is stop writing and get out into the
field and see what kind of different teacher I am now as opposed to what I was before I returned to school.
APPENDIX A

THE TRUMPET
Allow child to confront situation to generate data.

How did I respond?

What was unique?

What is common?

What function does this pattern serve for me?

What does happen, or could happen in my life because of this pattern?

Would I like to try on a new behavior, a new response?

What happened when I tried on a new behavior?

Now that I have a choice which behavior do I want to use?
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