
Rhody Arnold McCoy
University of Massachusetts Amherst

A Dissertation Presented by RHODY A. McCoy

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Major Area: Urban Education

A Dissertation by RHODY A. McCoy

Approved as to style and content by:

May 1971
This work is dedicated to the valiant men, women, and children of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school district who attempted to alter the insidious route of self-destruction in order to exemplify the need of mankind to energize toward a reconstruction of a society for all.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In order to fully understand this document, one would have to appreciate the severe emotional and psychological trauma this candidate experienced. Not only was there an ongoing, unrelenting and escalating pressure in the day-to-day evolution of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville crisis, but to this very day the pressures have not ceased. The effect of the New York City experience has carved out a rivulet in my life, a memento designed so that it will never be forgotten nor sublimated. God has intervened for I am not hostile or bitter, nor have my values and faith in man diminished. It is precisely for those reasons that I gratefully acknowledge those persons whose lives so inexplicably touched mine so as to make this feat a reality.

To my family there can be no greater monument to their unrelinquishing support and affirmation of my convictions, as they undoubtedly affected their lives.

This document would never have been attempted had it not been for the persistence of the following people who felt that such an endeavor was worthy of documentation: Dr. Kenneth B. Clark; Dr. Mario Fantini; Mr. Lloyd Hunter; Mr. Joseph Andreacchi; Dr. Robert Green; and Dr. James E. Bowman (deceased).

There exists another group of individuals who supported me once I had made the decision to submit my emotional and psychological psyche to such a readjustment of embarking on so interesting and traumatic a project. To them I owe a debt of gratitude: Dr. Dwight Allen; Dr. Allan Calvin; Dr. Hyland Lewis; Mrs. Dixie Moon; Rev. C. Herbert Oliver;
Miss Allison Tupper; Mr. John Alschuler; Dr. Atron Gentry; and Mr. Albee Wells.

My appreciation and gratitude must be extended to the panelists who gave voluntarily of their time and support to participate in the production of this document: Rev. C. Herbert Oliver; Dr. Kenneth B. Clark; Dr. Mario Fantini; Dr. Marilyn Gittell; Rev. Milton Galamison; Dr. Bernard Donovan; Mrs. Esther Swanker; Mr. Fred Ferretti; and Dr. Allan Calvin.
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION


(May 1971)

Rhody A. McCoy

B.S. Howard University
M.A. New York University
Ed.D. University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Dr. Robert Woodbury

The impact on education resulting from the attempt of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Demonstration School District to teach its children was of such substance as to have created a crisis in the New York City public schools and across the nation that will never be fully told or explained. The study was designed to give a more complete accounting than presently exists of the events of the New York City crisis and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school district in particular. Hopefully, this effort will provide parents, teachers, politicians, in addition to those educators involved in educational reform with a compilation of data and a series of options that can assist them in bringing quality education to all children.

The attack on the practice of urban education has been led by black and Third World people who are not directly affected by racial
discrimination and class warfare. In Ocean Hill-Brownsville a broad spectrum of educators, politicians, social scientists, and political scientists lent, for varying lengths of time, their hatred of the schools and their analytic skills to the revolutionary efforts of the people in Ocean Hill. For the purpose of data collection, the dissertation assembled for panel discussions as many as was humanly possible of the key figures or representatives from organizations that were intimately involved in the critical incidents of the New York school crisis. Those who accepted and participated were:

1. Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, representing the Board of Regents of the State of New York;
2. Dr. Bernard E. Donovan, former Superintendent of Schools of New York City;
3. Dr. Mario Fantini, former Program Officer of the Ford Foundation;
4. Reverend Milton Galamison, former New York City School Board member and President of the People's Board of Education of New York City;
5. Dr. Marilyn Gittell, Director of the Institute for Community Studies at Queens College, New York City;
7. Mrs. Esther Swanker, former representative of the New York State Department of Schools in New York City;
8. Mr. Fred Ferretti, representing the mass media;

9. Dr. Allan Calvin, President of the Behavioral Research Laboratories, Ladera Professional Center, Palo Alto, California;


To no avail, many attempts were made to involve the President of the United Federation of Teachers or his chosen representative. The assumption could be made that had he or his representative been present, this dissertation could have taken a different form.

The group of participants convened one full day per month for five consecutive months in an effort to first establish their points of view as to what the critical issues were and then, either individually or jointly, to formulate hypotheses which could be considered as alternatives or, at least, as explanatory statements to the violence of Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

The theoretical assumptions of this design can be discerned as reformist in nature. However, midway in the panel sessions it became evident that these nationally known figures committed to educational improvement would reach one conclusion: that the New York confrontation was inevitable; that there exists a pre-determined script, established by racist, capitalist America, which makes the education of black, poor white, and Third World children in this country impossible; that not only are there no options, but that there is no imaginable reform to the school system operating under the constraints of the socialization necessary for capitalism that would educate all children.
As a result of blatantly clear patterns in the data and the analyses, the candidate concludes that a violent revolution is necessary in order to have America's public institutions serve all of its people. Finally, the contents of this dissertation are presented in two volumes. The first volume contains:

1. the Design of the Study;
2. the Statement of the Problem;
3. the Review of the Literature;
4. five chapters, each an analysis of the retrieved data from each of the panels which were audio and video taped;
5. a summarizing chapter;
6. a thematic index to the transcripts; and
7. the Bibliography.

Volume Two contains the transcripts of each of the five panels. It is the intention of the candidate to have these transcripts sealed and placed in the Library of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, until such time as the various panelists grant permission to make this volume a public document.
DEFINITION OF TERMS

Bundy Report - (or Panel)

"A Reconnection with Learning" - the report of a special committee commissioned by Mayor Lindsay to redesign the New York City public schools for the retrieval of additional funds. McGeorge Bundy, President of the Ford Foundation, was its chairman.

C.S.A. -

Council of Supervisory Associations likewise is the legal bargaining agent for the consortium of supervisory associations, i.e. the Assistant Principals Association, the Principals Association, and the Assistant Superintendents Association.

Governing Board -

Each of the three demonstration districts was able to create a governing body to set policies and make decisions within the framework of the experiment. The process of creation of these boards differed in time in all three districts. The Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Board included parents (elected), teachers (selected), and community people (selected).

I.S. 201

It technically was a school in Harlem, New York City (Manhattan), and was a focal point of a major confrontation on desegregation.
It later became the "seat" of a demonstration district.

The Local Education Agency comprises boards of education.

The Metropolitan Applied Research Center is an agency funded to conduct research in a broad spectrum of education.

The More Effective Schools Program.

A report on the conditions of the public schools of Washington, D.C., done by Harry Passow of New York City, with recommendations. It is significant in the fact that though there were extensive recommendations made, none were implemented, and the cost was ostensibly high. Subsequent reports for the same purpose have been commissioned.

Public Education Association

The United Federation of Teachers is the legal bargaining agency of the teachers of New York City. It was conceptualized in 1960.

A title which is bestowed on the titular educational leader of/and for the three demonstration districts. It is in fact comparable to a district superintendent since the qualifications are practically the same.
VOLUME I
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: DESIGN OF THE STUDY

Background and Context

Public school systems in urban areas have been faced with a series of confrontations focusing around the issues of student rights, bussing, union militancy, integration, black studies, relevancy, parental participation, and community power in decision-making. As the demographic context continues to become predominantly black and Spanish, i.e. Washington, D.C., New York City, Detroit, St. Louis, these educational issues become inextricably bound in the continuing revolution of the powerless in America. At this writing, there exists no resolution of the conflict acceptable to either the entrenched, bourgeois interests, or to the urban poor; an absence which forces educators to respond with either impotent confusion, or repressive measures of varying degrees of subtlety or brutality. However, this nexus does not abrogate the responsibility of educators to discharge their responsibilities to themselves, and to the children they supposedly serve.

Those attempting to meet this challenge, regardless of their race or political posture, agreed that there should not, in fact that there must not be a repetition of the crisis engendered by New York City's experimentation with bureaucratic reorganization. Members of the black community are attempting to develop a more effective strategy to achieve control over the education of their own children.
On the other hand, it is typical for those "observers" who desire to give the impression that they are involved, or at least interested in institutional change, to assert that future "experiments" must be less violent and more gradual. This latter group attempts to neutralize the debatable merits of Ocean Hill-Brownsville's challenge to the school system by suggesting that it was tantamount to a political revolution.

In retrospect, this writer is convinced that the events of 1967-70, which had the public school system as their superficial focus, were, in fact, political in nature; the issues being not simply teachers rights or decentralization, but rather the broader alignment of power in New York City. The various studies over the past years have claimed that actual power in the schools was exercised by the professional staff of the central agency, the support administrators in the field, and the teachers via their union, and not, as was theoretically the case, by the Board of Education and its Superintendent. Rejecting both of these hypotheses, I wish to investigate the possibility that power in the field of education rests and rested directly in the hands of the political chieftains of New York City: the giant unions, the major corporations, and the governmental agencies they employ. Attention has been focused on the Teacher's Union and on the educational bureaucracy because of the nature of their duties and their exposed position. But proximity is not power. Thus, the broadest context of this study is of an investigative procedure designed to uncover the original authors of what I shall attempt to demonstrate was a predetermined script.
Objectives of the Study

The structure of the New York City school crisis exhibits a paradigm, with identical, or roughly similar, constituent elements in urban school systems across the country. This study will attempt to isolate, identify, and then examine the most critical incidents and/or issues in the New York City school crisis in order to suggest alternative actions, or, in the absence of alternatives, to identify the given consequences from the elements that are present.

Sound and tested alternative educational strategies are not available to the educator. In response to this situation and without prior bias, this study will simultaneously pursue two contradictory reactions to this situation: (1) to develop a number of options for educators which they may utilize when and where there are similar educational decisions; (2) that given the social and political constraints under which educators must operate, there is not an effective resolution of the conflict. Thus a summary of the objectives of this study could be rendered as follows:

1. To examine the most critical incidents of the New York City school crisis and determine if other options or alternatives were available; and in the absence of such options, what results could be anticipated.

2. To identify for educational decision makers, as a result of this examination, possible courses of action based on the options and alternatives for urban school systems in reform.
3. To provide direction and evidence for such direction to all participants involved in change in urban areas.

By examining the literature on urban education, and by assembling a panel of participants in the New York crisis, the candidate hopes to effectively examine the following questions in pursuit of the above objectives:

1. When Boards of Education (or institutions) decide to involve indigenous community people, what does it mean and what types of processes should be applied to facilitate implementation thereof? What policies or practices impede reform (or experimentation) which, by their nature, have implications beyond the perimeter of the experiment?

2. What process can be developed to neutralize or minimize the potential conflict, and preserve the vested interests? Can vested interest be protected if gradual or radical change is the objective? Can it be presumed that there can be mutual agreement on an issue or issues for change?

3. How can decisions be made that are educationally sound and which do not create pressure groups when change is inevitable or needed? What kinds of relationships must be developed with all of the participants to effect change and to what extent do they participate?
4. Can "sign posts" be identified as predictors of consequences in a volatile solution? Or can a change process be designed to provide for adjustments?

5. What processes can urban educators establish that will incorporate all of the factions concerned?

6. How can all of the factions involved be identified?

7. Are compromise and negotiation possible in urban educational crises?

Procedure

The organization of the dissertation centers around a series of five panel sessions held in Amherst, Massachusetts and New York City from November, 1970 to March, 1971. The study begins with an introductory chapter which delineates the nature of the dissertation. This introduction is followed by a chapter which defines the nature of the questions under investigation. The third chapter on the literature related to urban education is designed to establish a context in which to present the subsequent panels, i.e. an examination of this literature to ascertain if the problems were correctly identified and if solutions or options were offered. The core of the study is comprised of the subsequent five chapters, each one devoted to an analysis of a particular panel session described below. The body of the dissertation will terminate with a conclusion drawn from both the general considerations raised in the opening chapters and the original data collected during the exercise of the study, together with a thematic index to the transcripts. The complete, unedited version of
all five panel sessions comprise Volume Two of the dissertation. Familiarity with the transcripts is a prerequisite to an adequate understanding of the analytical chapters.

The organization of the study was designed to assemble either the principal persons or their representatives involved in the New York City school crisis. This spectrum of legitimately involved persons is typical of the levels on which decisions are either influenced or made in urban educational systems; thus their contributions to the realization of the objectives of the dissertation represent an unusual level of expertise. Also, the manner of the design of the study, i.e. an assembled panel engaged in discussion of the most critical issues in an objective fashion should provide a significant body of data.

The panel sessions convened once per month: November 16, 1970, at the School of Education, Amherst, both audio and video taped; December 7, 1970, at the School of Education, Amherst, both audio and video taped; January 18, 1971, at Automation House, New York City, both audio and video taped; February 17, 1971, at M.A.R.C., New York City, audio taped only; and March 1, 1971, Automation House, New York City, both audio and video taped. Those invited were:

1. Esther Swanker, from the New York State Department of Education, assigned by Commissioner Allen to the special demonstration districts;

2. Dr. Kenneth Clark, from Metropolitan Applied Research Corporation and the New York State Board of Regents (and an arbitrator);
3. Dr. Bernard Donovan, ex-Superintendent of Schools in New York City, presently head of Center for Urban Redevelopment in Education;

4. Albert Shanker, President of the United Federation of Teachers;

5. Reverend Milton Galamison, former New York City Board of Education member and civil rights leader;

6. Mr. Fred Ferretti, a reporter with the New York Times;

7. Dr. Mario Fantini, ex-Chief Education Program Officer for the Ford Foundation, now Dean of the School of Education of State University College at New Paltz;

8. Dr. Marilyn Gittell, political scientist, consultant on urban education, and Director of the Institute for Community Studies at Queens College;

9. Reverend C. Herbert Oliver, ex-Chairman of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Board.

The broader structure of the dissertation which encompasses this study includes a chapter defining the problem per se, including some of the history of the unrest in urban education; a chapter on the literature related to urban education in order to establish a context in which to present the data, i.e., an examination of such literature to ascertain if the problems were correctly identified and if solutions or options were offered; five chapters devoted to the analysis of the panel sessions; and finally, a chapter devoted to the summary and conclusions drawn from both the review of the literature and the original
data collected during the exercise of the study.

The design of the panels is crucial to the objectives of the dissertation in that all of the panelists not only played radically different roles in the New York City school situation, but were also pre-crisis participants in a variety of capacities. Thus the design brings together a "seasoned" spectrum of people with the awareness, sensitivity, and skill to develop a method of creating and then implementing an effective educational process. This group of panelists represented one of the most unique data banks on urban education. To have brought them together and to have elicited from them reactions, concerns, prognoses, represented a major increment to the collective information available on the field.

The resulting data is compiled and then assessed from two perspectives. First, the usefulness of the data to an understanding of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiences is explored; and from this foundation, an attempt is made to determine the overt and covert background to the establishment of the demonstration districts.

While it is assumed that the reader will scan the transcripts prior to the analytical chapters, the analytical chapters deal with a very limited number of the direct statements of the panelists. The analysis can be characterized as lengthy discussions of short quotes. This particular form evolved from two considerations. First, the panelists spoke in a form of code. While their signals were understandable to those who already knew the reality which the words
represented, the symbolic level alone transmitted little of import. Thus, the analysis seeks to translate this code into the political and social realities which the symbolic system obscures. Secondly, either out of ignorance or omission, the panelists failed to delineate the implications of their assertions. Often the deductions that can be drawn from the statements of the panelists are of far more value than the initial statements themselves. Simply, the data solicited was viewed as a framework in which to structure an analysis of the New York school crisis rather than as a scripture to be presented to the public.

Limits to the Delineation of the Study

It is crucial that it be initially understood what this study is not, and what difficulty does exist in realizing its stated objectives. This examination does not attempt to blame all the problems of today's urban poor upon the schools, but rather it assesses some of the effects of these external variables upon the educational system. This position does not affect the writer's assertion that the failure to provide decent education is one of the major sources of urban unrest. Secondly, the writer does not attempt to either defend or attack the pedagogical effectiveness of Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Unfortunately, the district's ability to educate never became a serious focal point of discussion. Thus, the study rather attempts to explain why pedagogical skill was an irrelevant issue, than to define or defend the methods or programs begun in the brief existence of the demonstration district.
The candidate's experience and interests constituted a substantial input into the proceedings of the panel. The purposes were to assess the role of an administrator faced with overt and covert manipulation of his district as he attempted to implement relevant and qualitative educational reform in an urban community. An attempt is made to assess the actions and decisions made by the local board as translated and implemented by the titular educational leader to determine if, in fact, he had other options.

Unfortunately, the panel sessions lacked representation from the United Federation of Teachers. Numerous inquiries were made directly to Mr. Shanker and his assistant, Sandy Feldman, in regard to participation in the study through either attendance at the sessions or through response to a series of assertions and questions drawn from the transcripts. For understandable reasons, neither individual responded positively to these overtures. None of the active participants held a position at the time of the study which directly involved he or she as active participants in the New York school system. This altered relationship permitted the panelists to state in a more frank fashion their observation of the demonstration district. Mr. Shanker, however, remains directly involved in much the same role as he played in the period of 1967-70. Such ongoing relationship obviously would have made it difficult for the Union head to provide a perspective different from that of his political posture. While his absence undoubtedly leaves a void, his inability to participate may have permitted the panelists to more candidly develop their own argumentations.
From a different angle, the definition of critical issues for the candidate by the panelists may engender certain differences of opinion. It is anticipated that this presents some problems due to the nature of the panelists and their personal involvement, not only in New York, but in their expanding roles as consultants to urban districts throughout the country. Thus, the skill of the candidate and the moderator to maintain an objective pursuit of the objectives was of paramount importance. As a result of the same factors, the results of this study may be "suspect" by the simple composition of the panel. However, it is the candidate's belief that there exists no more competent group of professionals from whom information may be collectively gathered.

A final obstacle is presented by the sheer length of the transcripts of the panel sessions and the scope of the issues upon which the participants touched. No single dissertation could hope to adequately treat the raw data which this study has collected. Therefore, only those issues most centrally related to the objectives of this particular dissertation have been observed, leaving the remainder for use by others.
CHAPTER II

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Efforts to reform public education have a hazardous future, a future created by the failure of educators to generate reform from criticism. The glaring evidence of the ineffectiveness of a large number of school systems mandates educational reform. The entire educational community - pupils, parents, educators, politicians, and government officials - has attempted to demonstrate its dissatisfaction with the schools. Within the context of this general malaise, the most publicized failures of education are in the inner cities. The attacks on public education graphically described in the headlines of the 1950's are repeated in the 1970's, and educators have neither effected reforms nor unified in an effort to prevent the protracted decline in the quality of public education. This barrage of unanswered criticism gradually destroyed the credibility of urban systems, showing them as instruments of socialization rather than educational institutions. Finally, the unrest caused by school systems led to demands for institutional reform.

The increasingly militant struggle for civil rights widened the base of this movement, compounding the difficulties facing the white and black bourgeois educators. In the 1960's previously docile people were decrying the inhumane plight of both the inner
city citizen and the pupil, spawning a natural coalition between parents and pupils to "attack" the public schools. Gradually, public education and the social policy which the bureaucracy enforces, became subjected to examination as efforts were made by individuals and organizations to provide a more positive and productive learning atmosphere. Educators had expounded the myth that education was the conduit to affluence. Now those who had been denied affluence began to attack the system which had discriminated against them, thus transforming the spectrum of social problems (housing, employment, urban renewal, and health) into the problems of the schools. As a result of the examination, the myths which provide the ideological foundations of American education have been challenged; they may now be destroyed.

But criticism, no matter how strident, can not bring about a revolution, and American education looks much the same today as it did twenty years ago. Incidents of confrontation, designed to force educational reform, have created new issues, usually non-educational, that have polarized interest groups retarding attempts at change.

What is the problem, what is the direction, and what is an educational system designed for the future? A situation which has been historically troubled now appears impossible because of the complexities of bureaucratic standard operational procedures, public uncertainty, national neglect, political pressures and racism. One must be careful not to believe that one movement or one strategy is sufficient to diffuse the educational crisis. It is a major American dilemma which must be met with resolve and dispatch for it becomes more explosive daily.
This is the context which a white liberal, such as Lyndon B. Johnson, establishes most effectively. Writing in the foreword of the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, he attempts to give clarity and direction:

The only genuine, long-range solution for what has happened lies in an attack, mounted at every level, upon the conditions that breed despair and violence. All of us know what those conditions are: ignorance, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enough jobs. We should attack these conditions not because we are frightened by conflict but because we are fired by conscience; we should attack them because there is simply no other way to achieve a decent and orderly society in America.¹


¹Because adults take schools too much for granted, they fail to appreciate what grim, joyless places most American schools are, how oppressive and petty are the rules by which they are governed, how intellectually sterile and aesthetically barren the atmosphere; what an appalling lack of civility obtains on the part of teachers and
principals; what contempt they unconsciously display for children as children.²

Student unrest, teacher militancy, parent demands are familiar terms which indicate the severity of the problem. These conditions of the 1970's breed despair and violence as they did in the 1950's. Echoing Johnson, Silberman links this protracted stagnation to the structure of society:

This mindlessness, this failure and refusal to act and think seriously about the educational purpose, the reluctance to question established practice is not the monopoly of the public school. It is diffused remarkably throughout the entire educational system, and indeed the entire society.³

The concern is so deep, the phrasing is so well-turned, that one has no choice but to applaud.

But the black people in America have seen two decades of Silberman, Holt, Kozol, Friedenberg, Kohl, Goodman, Allen, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, and education for black people remains fundamentally unaltered. It remains impossible to question the rhetoric, but equally impossible to expect that education will stop destroying the minds of black children. In attempting to explain this failure, this study will center on three major institutions charged with maintaining racism and class oppression: the educational bureaucracy, the teachers union, the mass media.


³Ibid.
Objective conditions in the public schools are such that concern about the current educational dilemma should transcend racial and economic categories. But the manner in which these conditions have been publicized by the scathing institutional reports, such as the report of the National Commission of Civil Disorders, the Carnegie Commission, etc., have reduced educational issues to the concerns of the oppressed. After expressing the need for common cause, the Kerner report states "for the community at large, the schools have discharged their responsibility well,"\(^4\) thus undercutting its prior contention. While the victimized must certainly question the effectiveness of public education, particularly public educators and policy makers, the failure of the schools to even minimally serve the minority community should make it impossible to claim that schools have served well the community. Is there no longer a common interest? As a corollary to the above assertion, one must realize that the implications of Kerner's claim provide the spark for racial strife centering around the schools. The suggestion that public education has served the white community well insures that educational issues will degenerate into racial conflicts.

Once the pervasive nature of the crisis in education has been accepted, Kerner's statement and its assumptions must be viewed as an establishment strategy designed to minimize the need to make education for all children the nation's number one domestic priority. His faulty analysis of the conditions and his piddling recommendations for solutions beget the same inaction. Similar studies were done on the 1919 Chicago Riots, the 1935-36 Harlem Riots, the Watts Riots, the Newark rebellions. Others will follow, but no plethora of studies

\(^4\)Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, p. 25.
answers the problem.

But to state that American education is universally poor does not imply that it is not particularly bad for blacks and other people of color. Kenneth B. Clark alludes to the severity of the problem in his report to the Board of Education of the District of Columbia:

One of the most disturbing and persistent realities in contemporary American education is the fact that the academic achievement of minority groups and lower-status children in urban public education is consistently below norm. This retardation begins in the early elementary grades and continues at an accelerated rate through the upper grades. Cumulative academic retardation has become the most significant characteristic of large urban school systems. It is probably the dominant educational problem in the United States today.\(^5\)

This attack on the minds of black children can not be seen as simply the result of the incompetence of educators. Some schools are founded to create "the future leaders of our country," others to provide the requisite number of garbage men, bus boys, and junkies. Schools are used overtly to deny minorities the opportunity to participate as equals in society. Translated, this means that the failure of the pupil is the success of the school; that the low aspirational levels, the negative experience, frustrations, drop-outs, push-outs, despair, and violence is training for life.

Thus the conditions of society supply the ingredients which create an atmosphere of violence, the undercurrent of social unrest which results in the disruption of public education. Within the context of this disorder, certain fundamental issues are visible, predominantly the racial attitudes and behavior of white Americans

toward black Americans. Racial strife has shaped our history; apparently, it will now shape our future. Overt white racism must bear the blame for the social violence which has persisted since World War II.

Discrimination in employment, housing and education has excluded black people from the benefits of economic growth. The white exodus from urban areas has created concentration camps which deteriorate at rapid rates. The living conditions in these concentration camps, or ghettos, insure failure, re-enforcing the self-fulfilling prophecy that minority groups form ignorant masses from whom unacceptable behavior can be expected. Obviously, this breeds contempt and resentment directed particularly at the institutions of white America: the schools, the courts, the large corporations, and the police. The frustrated hopes represent the mutation of unfulfilled expectations resulting from gains won in the civil rights movement. The persistent failure of black people to gain control of their lives through legal means has led the community towards a more militant posture. Overt action, boycotts, riots, etc., usually incited by the young, have replaced the apathy born of a blind faith in the democratic process.

Once again, a people has emerged to challenge an American institution, not simply a black or minority institution. The objective is not to continue a policy of putting one race above another. The challenge mounted by the black and other minorities can, if met with meaningful reform, provide educational opportunities for all Americans. Repression or suppression will not create lasting answers; only a
realization of the needs for common opportunities for every individual in a single social order can lead to stability.

But, as stated above, white institutions pervert these educational concerns into racial issues in an attempt to forestall widespread reform. This attempt to restore dignity to a people and unity to a nation has been scarred, distorted, and oftentimes destroyed by one of America's more powerful institutions, the media. Today, one can read in periodicals, newspapers, or view on television, accounts of educational disorders couched in terminology so biased that the seriousness and persistency of the issues fail to incite people to action.

The racists lodged in the institutionalized media and the educational bureaucracy define issues and disseminate information that prevents a clear identification of the problem. The oppressor reports that acts of violence prevented the election of new P.T.A. officers at George Washington High School, thus placing blame upon the "militants." No mention is made that the school has been beset with serious problems for almost a year! The real issue of the rights of parents and students to control their schools is avoided by this type of emotionalized reporting. The press reports that a small militant group keeps New York City's I.S. 142 shut. The minority community can only view this as a strategy to protect the vested interests of a racist establishment; hardly the accurate reporting of the miseducation and abuse of students.

Such a strategy allows the bureaucracy of the school system to present meaningless options as solutions. Quests for information by
citizens can be parried with such typical generalizations as, "My God, what do they want?," and "What else do the blacks want?"

Ten or twenty years ago, headlines stating that public schools kill dreams and mutilate minds would have been intolerable, perhaps even leading to a congressional hearing. But the manner in which the press portrays the crisis is designed to elicit only minimal concern and no action. Can this not be seen as a deliberate policy designed by white America's institutions to keep minorities off the path to affluence by blocking the road to quality education?

Educational bureaucrats utilize techniques identical to those of the media. A Report to the Parents of Detroit on School Decentralization speaks of the protection of children and states that the black children are among the most abused in America. Yet, the report can be seen as a political vehicle at best. Its weakness is its failure to adequately identify the problem in such a manner that it will incite both black and white America to action. In other words, it makes the issue of education clearly a "minority problem," a definition which begets more polarization. Further, the manner of presentation does not differentiate between community control and decentralization, but pretends that they are one and the same. The report defines community control to be local governance democracy. If taken at face value, the statements are very noble; yet, within the next few hundred words, the report suggests that the interests of the tax payers, the school system, the teachers union, and the voters must

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6 Detroit Geographical Expedition and Institute, A Report to the Parents of Detroit on School Decentralization (December 1969).
be considered, as well as the interests of the pupils. The report assumes that all participants share in the policy and decision making, then structures the political situations in such a fashion as to insure the continued impotence of the community. This ploy can serve two purposes: one, to confuse the issues; the other, to give the impression that the blacks are making unreasonable demands. The ability to define terms with the intent to confuse issues and pacify critics characterizes much of the educational professionals. Consultants consistently stack the deck in favor of the bureaucracy that hired them against the people to whom they should be held accountable.

The third party to this deliberate attempt to accompany the rhetoric of liberalism with acts of repression is the United Federation of Teachers. Only a colonial ideology makes it the prerogative of the Teachers Union president to define some demands as reasonable and others unreasonable. His interpretation of a reasonable demand by the client is, for instance, repair of school buildings and demands for security, but unreasonable demands are student decisions on the selection of a principal, student demands for employment as security guards, the ouster of the local superintendent, etc. A related strategy is evident in the U.F.T. request that the George Washington High School issues be investigated by law enforcement officials to determine if a conspiracy exists to incite students to riot, that known disruptive students (known by whom to be disruptive?) be removed from school, that an injunction be issued to bar certain individuals from the school, and that supervision laws be enforced. The U.F.T. makes no mention of education in this law-and-order diatribe. The
suggestion that the courts be used against the community creates more ill will and displays an insensitivity to the experience of blacks in our judicial network. Also, in 1967, the U.F.T. persisted in making the disruptive child issue a negotiable item in its contract. This polarized the city along racial lines, rallying many whites to the cause of the Union.

Obviously, the demands of parents to become partners on local levels in the educational process are steeped in their commitment to prevent existing school boards from dealing with the problems through repressive acts, or by simply ignoring the problem, or by brinkmanship which leads to meaningless compromises. While this obfuscation might fool the white community, the people must ultimately see through this ruse. The black community, in the absence of any real attempt at solutions, perceives these overt manipulations as acts of repression from the hands of the slave master. When blacks see headlines such as "Millions in Anti-Poverty Funds to Consultants," there exist no options for them within the given educational system. How can they accept the fact that monies for the poor are in the coffers of the already affluent, or how can they accept the ease with which the oppressor retrieves monies earmarked for the indigent? Such headlines, as well as the accompanying stories, indicate not only powerlessness but complete rejection of the demand for community participation. Who are these consultants? How were they selected and by whom? These are some of the overt questions from the community people. The real question is: how can this manipulation of funds by the local education agency be stopped? This serious concern for
the control or influence over the commitment of funds is a foundation of the drive for the right of self-determination.

As the urban population continues to become predominantly black and Spanish, i.e. in Washington, D.C., New York City, Detroit, and as these minorities continue to escalate their demand to share in the affluence of America using as a vehicle for change the educational institution, every institution of our society is jeopardized. The numerous investigations and reports that reflect concern of the school community, the social scientists and public officials have failed to bring about any measurable and/or sustained improvement in the achievement of lower status children in the basic academic skills of reading and arithmetic. Educators are therefore faced with a dilemma: they must either attempt to preserve the existing public schools with repression, or redesign the educational system to meet the needs and demands of the people it is supposed to serve. Rhetoric, criticism, and inaction must become phenomena of the past.

Critics of the current educational system fall into two broadly inclusive categories. Assuming that miseducation of black and poor white people results from the failure of the schools to meet their own objectives, institutionalized liberals seek to reform education by infusing additional sums of money into the bureaucracies, redesigning curriculum, developing new teacher training models, in addition to implementing the current "innovations." On the other hand, there exists a more radical perspective which states that the failure of the schools to educate reflects the success of the school system in introducing social, racial, and economic distinctions.
Not too many years ago, the critical issues broached by both groups would have been considered revolutionary. Today, they are viable options and among the many being implemented, some have shown evidence of success. The issues now in conflict seem to be the most radical, radical in the sense of going directly to the root of the problem. They pose basic questions and the resulting alternatives reflect genuine possibilities.

One demand is for radical restructuring designed to eliminate compulsory education. The ensuing debate has attracted a "host of experts" who have created the illusion that the outmoded and academically disreputable system can survive. The educational elite markets compensatory programs, voucher systems, guaranteed performance contracts and decentralization plans, each meant to give the appearance of reform. Yet, embodied in each of these concepts are the seeds of the conflicts which presently plague the educational system and the society. The so-called experts, incapable of knowing the depth of the problem, continue to create illusory alternatives which must lead to more conflict and violence.

Sound and tested educational alternatives that will allow effective educational reform are not available to the educator. There exists a serious need for a variety of options and alternatives available to educators which they may utilize when and where there are similar urban educational problems. In too many instances interest groups and their ideologies cannot or have not been identified; and in the absence of a positive course of action which effectively
involves all of the vested interest groups, there exists no possibility for effective educational leadership.

Action by the legislators, city officials and politicians that cannot be implemented, as well as actions by those opposed to ending racial segregation continue as unrest spreads and discontent leads to confrontation. The necessary educational reforms center on the effective resolution of such questions as:

1. How can sound educational decisions be reached in today's world?
2. How and by whom are these decisions translated into action?
3. Who is to be accountable and for what?
4. New educational partners - a need or a fantasy?
5. What courses of action are available to educators to provide effective education for their clients?

The problems of the educational community are: (1) to define today's educational needs in such a way that every child in America is considered as an individual; (2) to redefine the role of the educator and to prescribe his function so as to maximize his effort in effecting the individual child's development; (3) to examine in depth the various vested interest groups and protect their needed gains, and to plan effectively for their future growth; (4) to recognize the need for a nationally declared and supported course of action replete with options and alternatives for educational excellence; (5) to recognize the complexities of the problem and solution not as an impediment for educational
reform, but rather as a vehicle to have every man, woman, and child in America participate in the solutions. This will demand new concerted actions and new coalitions to eliminate slogans, catchy phrases and individual ideologies, to eliminate attempts by one group or one agency to remedy this national disgrace and to make education the nation's number one priority.
CHAPTER III

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The open struggle which erupted in New York City around the attempt of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville demonstration district to assert control over the education of black, Puerto Rican, and white children occurred within a context established by the preceding debate over the nature and future of urban education. As this verbal and political battle progressed through the 1960's, certain prominent issues were defined by the various antagonists while they created certain roles which would predetermine their future conduct. It is the contention of this writer, a contention to be supported in this chapter, that the definition of these roles and issues presents a distorted, biased, incomplete and deliberately obtuse picture of the national educational arena in which Ocean Hill was, by necessity, forced to operate; and, that these categories are of overwhelming importance in molding the course of events. In other words, actual decisions stemmed from distortions in language and thought which characterized the literature on urban education.

These theoretical inadequacies developed from a series of causes. On a superficial level, the lure of authors toward sensationalism, an outgrowth of their natural desire to increase the circulation of their writing, led to an obfuscation of the factual material. But to focus on sensationalism would be to mistake a symptom for a
serious disease. Such sensational or distorted writing could only stem from writers who reflected the racist assumptions and class biases of their nation. Thus, one of the serious questions is the perspective of those providing the public with information. Using New York as an example, of all the books, articles subsequently written on the crisis, none were written by those people most involved or most affected: the people who lived and worked in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. This omission does not deter anyone from claiming an accurate understanding of what must be seen as a complex series of events. It is even odder, perhaps even hysterical, that so many people who claim to have a vested interest in the institution of education have not yet been able to determine who, or in fact, why education is not controlled by a visible entity. To remark upon this obvious failure does not prevent anyone from trying.

This writer feels that one may divide the literature on urban education into two basic categories, each with different subsets designed for their respective audiences. The first category, usually marked confidential, can be termed coded directional litany. This body of material is designed for those top-line policy implementors enabling them to make decisions facilitated by a pre-determined context. The second such category is what I describe as pastoral reporting, a genre which includes Schools Against Children,¹ Death at an Early Age,² The Teachers Strike,³ and Crisis in the Classroom.⁴ Most of this literature

²Jonathan Kozol, Death at an Early Age (New York: Bantam, 1967).
simply reiterates in different language what has been obvious for years, and then becomes required reading in the profession of education. I wish to make it absolutely clear that these categorizations are in no way a criticism, rather a conclusion based on the information which I will present for documentation. In order that the explication will not be facile, or degenerate into polemic, I will examine one or two examples of writing within each category, pastoral and liturgical, rather than attempt to cover a large number in a cursory fashion. The purpose of the examination will be to illustrate the effect of the language used, i.e. the categories established on the decision-making process.

The State of Illinois Commission on Urban Education held a decentralization hearing on September 14, 1970. The Commission, which was staffed by five state senators, five state representatives, one dean of a school of education, and three members of the general public carried a mandate to formulate a decentralization plan for Chicago's public schools. The premises from which the inquiry of the Commission departed stated that (1) decentralization held some promise for alleviating many problems in urban education; (2) effective decentralization must involve delegation of power; and (3) some form of meaningful participation is necessary to reduce the alienation between urban communities and their schools. The questions which the commissioners had hoped to face most directly were "how community is to be defined, how revenues


are to be generated and dispersed, and how local incentive and re-
sponsibilities can be required."\(^6\) The rhetoric is pretty, but it
disguises a code. The true intent being to secure power in the
hands of those who have traditionally held it by setting up road-
blocks, obscuring the issues, creating facades, and neutralizing
organized efforts. This writer contends that the committee hearings
were a sham, a tactic designed to legitimize an already established
strategy, a strategy easy to discern as it is the same one which
emerged from the New York crisis.\(^7\)

To support this hypothesis I wish to examine the procedures
used, the testimony given, and the potential usage of the unpublished
document. The procedures established unilaterally by the committee
dictated that:

1. no one was able to examine any plan for reform other than
decentralization;
2. the membership of the commission excluded representatives
   from the affected areas;
3. the persons summoned before the commission included only
token and ineffective representation from the community;
4. testimony was taken individually in the presence of no


\(^7\)This writer's appearance before the committee was highly pub-
licized and highly useful for the commission. Despite the fact that
most inputs were against community control, the committee could now
legitimize the pre-determined results of their "inquiry" by claiming
to have openly consulted all points of view. Chicago's black com-
munity and needless to say myself, "had been had."
one except the members of the commission; and the commission reserved the right to edit testimony prior to publication.

Given such a structure, the results must be a foregone conclusion, with each step fitting smoothly together to create the appropriate illusions. By limiting discussion to planning for "decentralization," the commission literally dictated the spectrum of issues to be raised. Instead of focusing on the desire of parents or the rights of children, the inquiry became a hymn to the woes of educational bureaucrats, of the unionized and administrative varieties. The mandate of the commission precluded any examination of the roots of power, or even the origins of dissent; simply, the stooges talked about what organization plan, given the status quo, would minimize the difficulties of professionals. This iron-clad limitation on perspective was preserved by excluding members of the community as either members of the commission or as witnesses. No one present could lend a different slant, and no one could attempt to disturb the categories established by the witnesses.

The manner in which these witnesses delivered their testimony further undermines the credibility of the commission. Given the context established above, no one could challenge the misinformation or distortions of another witness. Thus the commissioners, and the commissioners alone could judge the relative weight of competing distortions, a judgmental process they could completely disguise by an intelligent editing of the transcripts prior to publication.
But the procedure was simply a means to an end; in this instance facilitating the establishment of erroneous and misleading categories by the witnesses. We shall examine the testimony of four persons called before the commission, in each case attempting to analyze the impact of the categories and language present on potential decision making.

This particular session opened with testimony by Miss Vivian Gallagher, Vice-President of the Chicago Teacher's Union. The calculated distortion of fact inherent in her initial remarks layed a solid groundwork for the strategy to follow. For example, she asserted that a curriculum responsive to the community would increase the opportunities for vocational education, given the high number of students who do not graduate with an academic diploma. The explicit suggestion was that those who do not want to go to college "would profit from following a good career like carpentry or plumbing . . ." 8

In this attempt to demonstrate the sincerity and good will of the union toward the community, what was she really saying? Miss Gallagher was not a naive observer of the urban scene. She realized that (1) the vast majority of students who graduate without academic diplomas in the city of Chicago are black, and that (2) the unions in Chicago have prevented all black people from pursuing a "good career like carpentry or plumbing . . ." Given this context, the "good will" she displayed must be seen as a deliberate strategy to deny black people a meaningful

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academic education by substituting useless vocational skills.

In concluding her general remarks, Miss Gallagher stated:

The Chicago Teachers Union is all for anything that is going to improve the instructional program for the children and make it easier for the working conditions of our teachers.9

Let me openly state that I believe in the unions' right to fight for the working conditions of their members. America's history is a vivid portrayal of capitalists' continual attempts to exploit working men. But given Miss Gallagher's remarks about vocational curriculum, the linkage established between instructional programming and working conditions was clearly an attempt to manipulate the black children to allow white teachers to shirk their professional duties. The line of the logic began with a postulate of the difficulty of teaching disadvantaged children academic skills, proceeded with the assumption that they should then go to vocational schools, and concluded with the deliberate training of black children for irrelevancy, a fiat conducted under the banner of improved curriculum and better working conditions. The strategy was brilliant, effective, and painfully obvious: obscure the grounds of debate, confuse the issues, mandate decisions with the best of rationalization and the worst of motives.

One could run down the same logical steps through a number of other "issues" brought out in the initial remarks: Miss Gallagher's claims about the size of the system, the money which was "needed"10

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10Ibid., p. 7.
for decentralization, the necessity of tripling all administrative positions, her desires to utilize parents in the planning of curriculum, etc. But to do so would unjustly portray the Union as the devil manipulating just and concerned legislators. Rather, by looking at the dialogue between Miss Gallagher and the august members of the commission, each a political hack, one can observe the collusion amongst supposedly distinct entities to operate within fallacious categories in an attempt to obscure the vicious inhumanity and racism which will characterize their eventual actions.

Chairman Peterson: Suppose there were 15 elected Boards of Education in the city of Chicago. Would the Teachers Union be able to negotiate with all 15 boards or do you feel this would be an untenable position for you to be in? I am assuming complete decentralization and community control of the city of Chicago public schools.

Miss Gallagher: Where did you pick 15?

Chr. Peterson: I picked it out of the air. 40,000 is always considered the best possible school size.

Miss Gallagher: We have to. New York is facing the same problem. They will be negotiating separate contracts for the different school districts unless they have separate unions in each district. Certainly, it could not be any harder than it is now.

Chr. Peterson: You don't think this would be an impossible situation?

Miss Gallagher: I don't think it would be impossible. I don't know about 15. There are three areas right now.

Dean Hazard: Do I understand that at the moment, C.T.U.'s position would be supportive in general of the principle of decentralization, with a good many unanswered questions?

Miss Gallagher: Yes.
Chr. Peterson: What is the attitude of the Teachers Union toward this new idea of accountability or performance contracting; I see that the Teachers Union is having some problems with the concept now. Is there any attitude on the part of the Teachers Union toward accountability or merit pay?

Miss Gallagher: We are definitely against merit pay but would not be if there was some objective way you could mark a teacher. If it were like a plant where you turn out so many nuts and bolts, and thus could measure it...11

The fashion in which these two "antagonists" work together to create a pre-determined impression belies the supposedly "independent" position of their respective organizations. When "public" bodies become perverted into the tools of special interest groups, one must seriously question if anyone respects the needs of the people. Peterson opened assuming that the Union would be directly negotiating with separate community boards. While this has never been the case in other instances of decentralization, the prospects of separate negotiations hardly comforts an advocate of local power. Community boards, be they black or white, cannot possess the sophistication to deal with the strategic intelligence of the Union. The truly frightening aspect of this interchange is the tacit cooperation in creating the facade.

Miss Gallagher's passive acceptance of the numerical estimates offered by Chairman Peterson, his whimsical choice of 15 for the number of districts and 40,000 for the optimum pupil distribution, indicates the fraud which they have decided to perpetrate. Magical as they might be to him, such numbers cannot be justified on educational grounds, but

then it is obvious that educational issues are not as worthy of discussion as the politics of Union power. Shifting to another focal point, certainly no other conclusion can be drawn from the standard recital over accountability. The attitude of students toward their schools, and their ensuing performance, stands as living contradiction to the Union litany. Those who fail to perceive this contradiction simply fail to consider the student when discussing educational success.

One of the themes which recurs throughout the testimony is that of sympathy for the beleaguered teacher, administrator or bureaucrat, depending upon who is speaking. This creates a context so grossly distorted that it hardly necessitates attack. While hundreds of thousands of children literally have their brains eroded by the public schools, one supposedly must sympathize with the difficulties experienced by those perpetrating genocide. Nowhere in this hearing was this distortion clearer than in the testimony of Mr. Thomas Burke, President of the Chicago Principals Club:

In Chicago, at least, the principal has been the scapegoat of the rivalry and pressures which have developed [in response to minimal decentralization.] Unprotected by a contract as are teachers, and often unsupported by the board and the central administration, the principals have been attacked and removed from the schools for the sake of expediency... it produced more red tape and now people with whom the principal has to talk.12

The emotional connotations of the shibboleths of the statement, "scapegoat", "unsupported", "attacked", "expediency", "people with whom

the principal has to talk," deliberately attempt to evoke compassion for the poor principals. Legitimate education grievances presented by the community are denigrated as expedient attacks. His visibility makes the principal the scapegoat and the victim of the worst affront of all: now he must talk to "those people." What were the issues which the commission was investigating? Initially, by their own words, their purpose was to improve the education of children; yet the categories established bent the investigation into an effort to make white professionals with an income of over twenty thousand dollars a year feel better. Instead of viewing the community as the victim of racist educational practices, their efforts at reform become expeditious effrontery inflicted upon good men just trying to do a job.

Once Burke established this context, he manipulated it beautifully, with the cooperation of the commission, to create terminology surrounding "decentralization or community control" that once invoked, mandated an increase in power by administrators at the expense of the black, Puerto Rican, and white community. Mr. Burke cited in an almost biblical litany that decentralization should not be disorganization, or lack of authority, failure of decision making, ... or just plain buck passing; ... decentralization should be divisive of the loyalty of the staff where you have principals and the teachers, who are serving two masters, accountable to the central office ... on one hand, and accountable, as they should be, to the community on the other; decentralization shouldn't be an instrument for further deterioration, as we say, where if just constantly erodes the position of the teacher and the administrators.13

13State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, p. 11.
In prior testimony, it became quite clear what the principals felt about attempts by the community to influence the education of their children. Given this underlying resentment against dignified black people, Mr. Burke's catalogue of the "don'ts" of reform appeared not as an objective list of possible pitfalls, but as a conscious obfuscation of the legitimate issues in order to defeat meaningful community control. When he claimed that decentralization should not be divisive of the loyalty of the staff, no one can challenge him: who can advocate creating a disheartened group of teachers and administrators? But to focus on the morale of the professionals, without examining the sources of that morale, was a distortion of the issue. In this instance, morale was contingent upon the docility of the clients being served, just as Burke's desire not to see the authority of teachers diminish was contingent upon the continued powerlessness of urban citizens. In other words, Mr. Burke established categories of discussion which obscured his real motivations, and influenced the course of discussion in such a fashion as to insure that the real issue would be ignored as a result of this gentlemen's agreement among thieves.

The blatant self-interest of this superficially altruistic testimony surfaced with the presentation of the principal's positive program:

All principals should be given enough aid, so that their time is free to work with parent and community groups. Principals should make certain that they have meetings, programs, and communications, so that parents are continually aware of what is going on in the schools and in the classrooms. Principals should provide for learning experiences which will give all pupils opportunities to practice democratic
decision making at each level of maturity.

Principals advocate employment of more paraprofessionals from the community to provide needed assistance in the classroom.  

In this evocation of the good, the true, and the beautiful, Burke attempted to solidify the discretionary power of principals over what should stem from the people rather than be condescendingly granted. One need not belabor the implications of this slave-holding or colonial ideology, as it represented the "pure" voice amongst the cacophony of American history.

Those who possessed the greatest authority within this colonial structure utilized the inherent rationale of the existing system to protect their political goals. The central administrative staff was represented before the commission by Mr. Manford Byrd, Jr., and by Mr. James Moffet, both deputy superintendents operating under Dr. James Redmond. As they represented a single interest group, I shall treat their separate testimony as a single coherent presentation aimed at establishing a common strategy.

Mr. Byrd opened by giving the historical background of the Chicago decentralization plan. Omitting the violence and protest which surrounded the departure of the previous superintendent, Ben Willis, and the general condition of the schools themselves, the deputy superintendent focused on an efficiency study conducted by the business consultant firm Boozé, Allen, and Hamilton. This report, which found an unfortunate discrepancy between ability, function, and responsibility

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. . . gave birth to what we call our decentralization plan. It talked about the Board of Education and its concern with policy setting and the conduct of schools.

Of course, there are some things which have to remain centralized because of the present means of support that we have, the task that we have. Personnel functions have not been decentralized to this point and the matter of appointment and assignment of personnel—I think that there are some good reasons for this . . . .15

Mr. Moffet elaborated:

I think we are not to the point of having the local administration and the communities select the teaching personnel, but I think that we have moved with force and authority into the area of more local involvement not only in the principalship . . . but in the selection of the auxiliary non-professional . . .16

The overt line of reasoning attempted to describe a central administration deeply concerned about the efficiency of a school system. Based on the findings of a business consultants firm, they have decided which decisions are best exercised by central authority, and which decisions are best controlled by lower echelons in the bureaucracy. And if one allows the debate to remain on the plane of efficiency, as defined by Booze, Allen, and Hamilton, the administrative staff undoubtedly was correct. However, with an understanding of the risk of redundancy, let me assert that efficiency was not the issue. Every day teachers enter the Chicago classrooms and continue to attack the minds and spirit of the city's children. Each year the child is in school, his I.Q. declines. Parents have the right to foster the development of their children and, needless to say, to also prevent

15 State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, p. 33.

16 Ibid., p. 42
their retardation. But administrators didn't present the issue in this fashion. To do so would be to implicate themselves. Instead of speaking about recognizing the authority of parents to educate their children, deputy superintendents presented the issues in terms of the internal efficiency of the system.

Thus involvement was possible (it is beneficial to implicate one's opponent) but control remains in its traditional place. In fact, decentralization Chicago style actually increases that authority, an increase apparent in this dialogue:

Chr. Peterson: First of all, a question that came up earlier as a number of new positions that have been added because of decentralization. I am thinking more of the administrative or support positions--do you have any idea of the number of new positions that have come about because of decentralization?

Mr. Byrd: It is true that as we decentralize, as we develop these areas, we have to have persons that can help deliver these services. But I think that there have been some benefits in the creation of these positions. I think the persons are getting the services to the areas and to the schools in an innovative fashion and in an effective fashion.17

Decentralization was first proposed, in the words of Chairman Peterson, to eliminate the alienation existing between the schools of Chicago and the students they desire to serve. The effect of the plan, however, has been to increase the number of bureaucrats oppressing the community in the name of efficiency and dispersion of responsibility. Tweedle-dee has deferred to a score of tweedle-dums; and the community remained impotent.

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Examine the following statement by Mr. Moffet, looking closely at the ignorance and paternalism which pervade, and the self-serving confusion which he established:

I would say that the community can be involved in coming to a decision . . . I do not think that the program as developed by Booze, Allen & Hamilton . . . gives the ultimate decision-making power to the community. I don't believe that it does. In my personal experience, I cannot recall any decision that I have needed to make in which the community with which I was interacting was not supportive. I think it can be done without very strict guidelines or saying what the powers as opposed to my having the power.

Chr. Peterson: Would you comment, certainly in your position as Coordinator of Decentralization, you must have studied other programs—which in your mind are some of the problems connected with community control as opposed to administrative decentralization which is the program that you ultimately embarked on?

Mr. Moffet: You see, I don't know that there is any fine line of demarcation . . . I think they are so closely related that I can't bring myself to this ironclad distinction that this is participation and this is control.18

Simply put, the above statement is a classic exposition of a racist, colonial ideology. Moffet has no qualms about admitting that the community has no real decision-making power under the present decentralization plan. The deputy superintendent even suggested that such a delegation of authority is unnecessary: fully aware of the boycotts and riots which have manifested the black hatred of the Chicago public schools, he has the sadism to claim that he has made no decision that the community has not supported. As Ralph Ellison and Richard Wright have metaphorically asserted, white Americans seem not to believe that black people exist.

18 State of Illinois, Commission on Urban Education, p. 43.
Racist that he is, it would be a great mistake to underestimate the strategic intelligence of Mr. Moffet; this quaint scene being portrayed is not without its usages for him. The framework established by his response implied that here exists no essential conflict of interests between the schools and their black clients. Anyone claiming that this was not the case becomes branded as a militant or a troublemaker. Thus, Booze, Allen and Hamilton can think of a reason to create strict guidelines. Tried as he might have, Moffet could not bring himself even to make a distinction between community control and decentralization. Now in the utopian environment postulated above, there must be no need to shift the power to make decisions, as all parties were working toward identical ends. Ergo, under no system of reform whatsoever, neither decentralization nor community control, could the administrative staff envision any meaningful delegation of power.

This insanity neatly concludes the staged drama presented to the commission at this particular hearing. At this juncture, hopefully the reader understands the assertions which opened this chapter. I believe that the picture of the issues in urban education presented by the four witnesses in question represented a deliberate distortion of the issues. In the testimony given, no mention was made of the reading skills, academic motivation, the Coleman data, or the general rights of parents and pupils to mold a promising future. In fact, there was no mention of the educational process at all. Rather, the focus rested upon the difficulties of teachers and administrators in coping with the heathen population of the urban colony. It must be
recognized that this focus is not one randomly chosen, nor the product of excessive emotion. Actually, this alteration in perspective represents the brilliant, and to this date an all too successful strategy to maintain the status quo in the face of increasing militancy and violent dissent. By using the debate to pervert legitimate concerns, the established powers insure that no opposition will mount a winning assault. The appeal of their position within the categories established is too strong and draws too strongly on the racist myths deeply imbedded in the American mind.

What I have written above is not meant to denigrate the quality of the performances given by the respective actors; each knew his lines perfectly and the director has exercised his authority to maintain thematic continuity throughout. Undoubtedly the theater-goers received this bit of action with the appropriate thanks to all involved and with slightly intrepid hopes that, at long last, some progress had been made toward the ultimate pacification of the savage beast: in this instance, their children. The questions raised about the motives and methods in the preparation of the coded directional litany must also implicate the audience who respectfully applaud all performances open to the public. Why, after twenty years of serious attacks on public education in America, are educators and mere citizens still unable to see through this sham, this fraud, and this overt power play? The response to this inquiry must be diffuse, drawing from the spectrum of social and economic characteristics of our society, but so large a constituent element must be style of analysis fostered by the
"critical" literature itself, i.e. that writing on education has itself set the stage for its ineffectiveness. This general category of literature can be termed pastoral in the sense that its focus, its form of logic and presentation, are alien to the realities of urban education.

The most remarkable synthesis of the pastoral perspective was presented in the introduction to Charles E. Silberman's study, Crisis in the Classroom, a book which supposedly mobilized the reform wing within the American educational establishment. I have not dismissed Silberman's work. Its usefulness in planting seeds of doubt amongst the faithful cannot be ignored. Yet the tone which he creates plays upon the naivete, the conformity, and ultimately the passivity of our people. Crisis in the Classroom wants to sustain the myths of education through rites of purification instead of to destroy one framework in order to build from the ruins a more just and stable one.

To whom Silberman's plea is directed becomes clear after an examination of the assumption from which he proceeds. In the process of describing the general crisis which confronts, in his words, "twentieth-century man,"19 he attempts to differentiate our historical situation from that of our distant predecessors:

Men inherited their occupations, their status, their religion, and their life styles . . . and their struggles to survive gave them little time to question anything. Today, by contrast, they are presented with a bewildering range of options; they are forced to choose their occupations, jobs, places to live, marital partners, number of children, religion

19 Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom, p. 22.
political allegiance and affiliation, friendships, allocation of income and life style.²⁰

For an author who writes in ensuing chapters about the destruction of opportunity by the public schools, this is an astounding statement. Such myopia only stems from an ignorance of the common facts of city life: unwanted pregnancies, forced marriage, manipulative religion, political corruption, etc., etc.

Putting this aside for the moment, i.e. assuming that Silberman's concerns are white, middle-class, the fashion in which he does address his constituency plays upon the most conventional liberal ideology, the ideology of pastoral politics. As the appropriate myth would have it, America was founded by "good" men who wished to introduce "moral" concerns into government. Silberman's corollary to this premise holds that if, in fact, the government performs "immoral" acts, the "good men" need merely be apprised of that fact and they then will mobilize to rectify the situation. Needless to say, the racism and violence of this nation's history make a mockery of this belief, though clearly not for Charles Silberman. The central concern of the book is moral ideas and the remedy is to literally send Paul Revere through every Middlesex village and farm:

To say that this book is about educational purpose, therefore, is not to say that it is an exercise in academic philosophy, still less to suggest that it is concerned with abstractions and exhortations. My intent, at least . . . is to discuss 'moral ideas' . . . ²¹

²⁰ Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom, p. 22.

²¹ Ibid., p. 9.
It [the crisis in American education] cannot be solved unless all who have a stake in the remaking of American education—teachers and students, school board members and taxpayers, public officials and civic leaders, newspaper and magazine editors and readers, television directors and viewers, parents and children—are alerted to what is wrong and what needs to be done.  

In other words, Silberman's educational judgements are not unsound, but his model for institutional change insipid. Once he has described the ill of public schools, his societal analysis precludes any effective means of dealing with that failure. School superintendents, newspaper editors, politicians are not moral men. Their failure to reform the present school system stems not from their ignorance but from the vested interest they have in maintaining the public schools as they are. The only effective method of teaching a man to accept a job as a bell-boy, or as a street cleaner, or even as a middle-level executive, is to convince him of his social impotence, i.e. process him through grim, joyless, and oppressive schools.

From the perspective of the very people Silberman calls on to change the schools, the schools have succeeded for generations. As they see matters, what is now called for is efficient reform to facilitate the job of social stratification, thereby eliminating the present "unpleasantries" surrounding the public system. On another level, Silberman's model ignores less august interest groups such as the teacher's union, construction unions, textbook publishers, all of whom have a vested interest in the status quo, not in moral purity.

22 Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom, p. vii.
By coupling his educational sophistication with such naivete, Silberman sets the stage for the continued failure of efforts to revolutionize education.

One should not receive the impression that Silberman is an exception, or that he is in any way a self-conscious bourgeois propagandist. He shares his weakness with the vast majority of professionals who write about education, many of whom have less of a firm grasp on educational issues. Two of the most intelligent and sensitive of his precursors are Jonathan Kozol and Annie Stein. Kozol, in his often demonstrated concern for black children, and Mrs. Stein, particularly with her dedication to organizing the Brooklyn Parent Workshop, stand apart from any of the trite profiteering which characterizes the recent flow of books on urban education. Yet each, Kozol in his Death at an Early Age, and Annie Stein in her essay "Containment and Control: A Look at the Record,"\(^2\) inadvertantly help perpetuate the same debilitating myths that detract from Crisis in the Classroom. This built-in distortion of the issues must be dealt with regardless of the character of the authors.

Kozol, in particular, is difficult to characterize. Deep emotional pain, both that of the author and of the black children he observes in the process of being destroyed, permeates the book, molding the reader's response to every segment. But it is particularly this preeminent tone of personal anguish that erodes the political effectiveness of Kozol's prose. Eight year-old Stephen is a pathetic

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case: a sensitive child, but crushed by circumstance and frozen by his own severe mental illness. Through Kozol’s eyes, the reader sees him wistfully staring at billboards, proudly displaying his drawings, plaintively hoping to be readmitted to school, and being savagely treated by "educators." As the reader is a human being, he sympathizes. As the vernacular would express it, the reader wants to "do something." Within the cliche framework he creates, Kozol has succeeded. He has stirred the conscience of his audience.

But once this auspicious event has occurred, what is the newly sensitized reader to do? At this point Kozol sinks back into the trap of bourgeois ideology that held Silberman. Simple indignation is a useless weapon; pure sympathy for the plight of black people is an extension of the racist consciousness. Blind rage over the situation of others leads only, at best, to cathartic rituals of protests and concern, or leads to utter frustration. Neither option does much either to change American education or to help black people. By creating a purely emotional basis for action, Kozol assists in another of the white man’s strategy to maintain oppressive schools: train people not to look at the political realities of power; train them not to analyze the covert process by which decisions are made; and primarily train them not to recognize the calculated benefits of what appears as an error. It is futile to add that sustained movements for social change have never stemmed from one race’s or class’ desire to aid a different race or class. Instead of risking personal status to achieve revolutionary gains, such crusades generally degenerate into cathartic
gestures and condescending offers of assistance. As Robert Cromie wrote in the Chicago Tribune about Kozol's book: "This book will anger you to the boiling point and may make you want to weep."24

Annie Stein's essay in Schools Against Children provides a perfect description of the syndrome that can develop from the emotionalism of Death at an Early Age. In great detail she describes the struggle of black New York parents to integrate the public schools from the middle 1950's to the origins of the I.S. 201 struggle. Every conceivable method of attack was used in this struggle: they boycotted, they marched, they advocated busing, they advocated educational parks, they petitioned, and they pleaded with anyone who would listen. While perhaps a certain segment of the city became aware of educational issues as a result of these trials and tribulations, the gestures themselves were futile. One cannot help but sense that the point of it all is simply the actions themselves, rather than any improvement in the education of black people.

In the instance of Annie Stein, the result can hardly be seen as the consequence of deliberate planning, but again she writes in such a way as to obscure the issues and minimize support. She comes tantalizingly close, but still, no mention is made of the hidden power brokers of New York; no mention of the complicity of the entire economic and political leadership of the city in the failure of her movement; no mention of the horribly repressive nature of the schools into which

24Quoted on back cover of Kozol, Death at an Early Age.
she wanted to have black children bussed. White parents, reading that blacks want to come to their schools, unfortunately assume then that their schools are doing an adequate job, when in fact they are simply locking children into the economic ladder at a different though slightly higher level. But Annie Stein fails to deal with the problem in such a fashion as to (1) incite white parents to join the struggle for the sake of black and white children, or to (2) provide black people with a new sophistication with which to develop new and more effective forms of political action around the issue of better education for their children.

The pastoral genre though need not be so fraught with pain nor be so involved in active resistance. Two contributions from the academic community, *Teachers Talk* and *Dynamics of School Community Relationships*, also fail to dissipate the fog. Anthropologist Estelle Fuchs addresses herself to the question of how neophyte teachers picture their role in inner city schools. Such reportage, assuredly from a historical and academic perspective, adds new legitimacy to diversionary tactics. In this case, Mrs. Fuchs expands from the undeniable fact that new teachers have many problems to making generalizations that cloud the issue with excessive emotionalism. The areas of her concern, i.e. lesson plans, interaction with pupils and teacher, reactions to regulations and the social problems presented by the "disadvantaged," create certain types of questions for which there are pre-determined

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answers. An example of such a staged interaction follows:

Given the existence of the phenomenon of culture shock, how can teachers be helped through this crucial period toward a constructive functioning on their part? . . . One, too many new responsibilities ought not to be imposed upon the new teacher too early.26

The basic assumption related to this experience of teachers who are obviously white include imputations as to the superiority of one party and the savagery of the other; the inadequate preparation by society of these teachers; and the necessity of the children suffering as a result of this failure. The author sets the stage once again, and I do believe unintentionally, to confuse the issue:

Certainly greatly expanded services to deal with physical and emotional problems are required . . . . it behooves administrators to take care that the beginning teacher's classroom does not become the dumping ground for those children . . . .27

One can almost hear Representative Marchi calling for the power to remove "those children", the disruptive children, from the classroom, an increasingly fashionable cry which ignores statistics and records indicating the racist motives behind the improvement in the working conditions for teachers. The issues are obscured, the answers meaningless.

We know of the existence of these problems; they are persistent and pervasive. The insensitivity of a writer who will pander to the sensationalism of the media rather than utilize her insights for change

26Fuchs, Teachers Talk, pp.22-23.
27Ibid., p. 72.
cannot be forgiven. The writer is white, she moves in white settings, and again she talks about the black community without bringing attention to real issues and possible alternatives. Her audience, obviously educational bureaucrats and teachers, can empathize with the presentation and is provided with the conduit to avoid serious consideration of its actions.

Another academic production within this pastoral mode which totally fails to deal with urban settings is Campbell and Ramseyer's collaboration to produce The Dynamics of School-Community Relationships. They wrote:

Sometimes the improvement of citizen participation in educational planning and development comes as a natural consequence of orderly developments in the community. In other instances, this participation is revolutionary in character. Unreasonable demands are made upon the school system.28

What they mean by an "improvement," or "orderly development", or "unreasonable demands" is anybody's guess, yet the stage is already set for any administrator to dismiss whatever community movement he happens to dislike. But, for the purpose of argumentation, let us assume that the terms are not quite so vacuous. To the select, there is a process of parent participation that merely needs to be understood. This is a racist assumption directed only to white middle-class America which has always controlled its schools and, in a majority of cases, actually participated. Such casual references as

28 Campbell and Ramseyer, The Dynamics of School-Community Relationships, p. 2.
"... any school superintendent who has helped his community pass a bond issue or a school-tax levy knows that there are various degrees of support for the schools..." assume that this is a typical situation. But historically, minorities have not been involved in bond issue voting, as they are more often considered as dependents or welfare recipients. The model is obviously one of an affluent community where such participation is standard practice. To presume to deal with black urban communities in such categories is to deny their distinctive character, if not their very existence.

Please refer to Appendices A and B for a discussion of the literature in a historical perspective and comments on confidential literature and public naivete.

29Campbell and Ramseyer, The Dynamics of School-Community Relationships, p. 19.
There exist numerous logically defensible approaches to the analysis of the data assembled in the transcripts of Panels One through Five. The most obvious involves the collation of the significant portions of each panel into a single body which would then be subject to scrutiny as to the prominent themes, chronology established, options discussed, etc. The end product of such a procedure would be a synthetic compilation of the highest level of thought exhibited during the panel sessions. Yet, this methodological approach, no matter how neat, would obfuscate, by the necessity of its procedural rules, (1) the different conflicts between different factions at the different junctures over the course of five months; and (2) the manner in which the expressed thoughts of certain key panelists developed from session to session. In other words, the ensuing five transcripts must be treated not as moribund proclamations or even the products of "reasoned" thought, but rather as the organic development of the collective intellect of ten people operating under the pressures engendered by the peculiar group dynamics.

To facilitate the entry of the reader into the mass of data embodied in the transcripts, an analysis of the November panel session will (1) establish the background of each of the panelists; (2) delineate the list of issues which these panelists considered on first
reflection to be of paramount importance to the New York City crisis; (3) discuss crucial incidents in the chronology created to portray in actuality the theoretical statements previously discussed; and (4) to discern if, in fact, the chronology established lends substance to the prior generalizations. Excluding the representatives of the School of Education, Dean Dwight Allen, Associate Dean Robert Woodbury, and Dr. Atron Gentry (Dr. Gentry making the only substantive contribution), the panelists present were Dr. Marilyn Gittell, Mrs. Esther Swankker, Mr. Fred Ferretti, Reverend Milton Galamison, and Reverend C. Herbert Oliver. Crudely stated for the purposes of this brief introduction, the range of issues discussed centered upon those deemed crucial by the participants themselves in the opening remarks. These issues were defined as:

1. The conflicts between the powerful and the powerless in American society.
2. The bureaucratization of institutional procedures.
3. The rights of parents to educate their children.
4. The moral integrity of Americans.
5. The racial question.
6. The usage of the schools in the process of economic discrimination in capitalist societies.
7. The usage of state laws to regulate, or in fact, promulgate inequality.

The critical incidents in the chronological development of these issues, their portrayal in actuality which shall be dealt with for the purposes
of this thesis, include (1) the 1954 Supreme Court decision; (2) the New York City school boycotts; (3) the attacks on the Board of Examiners; and (4) the transitions in the attitude of the Teacher's Union from the drafting of the original proposal to the strike which prevented the opening of the 1967 school year. An analysis of these crucial junctures is the first step toward any discussion of the options that were available to each faction, and, by implication, the options that remain available at this point to their corresponding entities across the country.

The prime question that must be dealt with is the perceptions which each participant had of the crisis, and what effect these perceptions had on the participatory role, and ultimately, on the outcome which these roles dictated. The inverse of this proposition is equally important. What did each participant fail to see, and how did this failure relate to the background of not only the intellectual characteristics of the individual, but of the political experience of the social group or class which shaped these perceptions? In other words, the positions delineated by the panelists represent not only the thoughts of one person, but a synthesis of the social sophistication of the movements which they represented in the Ocean Hill confrontation.

Thus, one can hardly be surprised that Dr. Marilyn Gittell, a white political scientist from Queens College and Director of the Institute for Community Studies, presents the most cogent initial statement about the crisis. A consultant to both the drafters of the Bundy and the Passow Reports, her multifarious dealings with members of the black community, representatives of professional organizations, in addition
to men of great political influence, lends a sophistication unavailable to isolated members of the indigenous population: those persons whose children were the crux of the violence in 1968.

I don't think there has ever been any doubt in my mind that the issue was fundamentally an issue of critical and social conflict of vested interests vs. the powerless; people who had power in the school system and controlled the decision making in it, and those who challenged the output of education in New York City . . . and that confrontation between these two forces, I think, is the backdrop of the issue in New York City, and I dare say in the cities throughout the country.1

From the outset, Dr. Gittell conceptualized the events not in educational, but in strictly political terms, a perception that subordinates the educational nature of the conflict, i.e. what is best for children to an examination of the division of power in American society.

Given this context, what other actors have attempted to portray as central concerns becomes dependent variables or sub-sets within Dr. Gittell's broadly analytical perspectives. For example, the bureaucracies empowered by institutionalized education become not, as Esther Swanker, among others, would have it, independent power blocks, but rather a set of protective devices utilized by more deeply entrenched interstices. Continuing along this vein, Dr. Gittell perceived racism not as the motive force of the various antagonists, but as the cloak under which the white power structure chose to operate. This position does not deny the importance of white racism in the oppression of black people; rather, it attempts to establish a desire to protect the social

1Gittell, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 2.
and economic benefits of racism as the motive force, instead of its implicit or vituperative desire to deny black and Third World people their rights.

The strategic flexibility which this perspective permits foreshadows the impotence of the analysis and the movement which Reverend Oliver exemplifies. While the white trained academician attempts to explain apparent events in terms of hidden motivations, Reverend Oliver, by virtue of his training, and in a broad sense of the term his congregation, must assume that his restatement of a political slogan can suffice for an understanding of the dimensions of the problems. This is not to imply that the Chairman of the Governing Board was not a courageous man, a man with tremendous dedication and organizational skills. The fervent honesty with which Reverend Oliver presented his case, and his passionate concern for the children of his community stand as a consummate refutation of the persistent racist assumptions about the inability of black people to care for and educate their children. It is easy to feel the links between Reverend Oliver and the Ocean Hill community as he plays for the first time the theme which literally sums up his participation in the panels:

I would say the most basic issue is the right of parents to educate their children . . . I would ask: do professionals have a right to educate children? . . . does a union have the right to educate children? I think these were issues that were being challenged . . . .

The superficial validity of these assertions cannot be questioned. Undoubtedly on the moral level, the foundation lies in precisely that

\(^2\)Oliver, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 3.
determination about who does, in fact, have the right to educate. But the pervasive failure of Oliver's position stems not from a failure of sentiment, rather from a failure to generate political sophistication from that sentiment. From the Reverend's correct moral position stems nothing which is of political or educational use to his people.

It would be tempting not to dwell on this point; to simply praise the man for the unquestionable genius which he possesses, if it were not for what this position reflects in the black community, and in turn, the effect which such a position has upon this community. Given the sophistication of his audience, it would have been an impossibility for Reverend Oliver to utilize any argumentative basis other than a moral one. Regardless of the political intrigue and overt repression which characterized the white response to Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Oliver's fervent and consistent plea for the children provided the only possible organizational continuity. Yet it was precisely the nature of this ideological-organizational structure which betrays the unsophisticated level of comprehension which characterized the community itself. Denied access to any meaningful information and institutional participation by the genocidal actions of white America, the majority of black people is neutralized in its efforts to formulate an effective strategy to combat the obvious oppression which dominates their lives. Thus, it was only from the perspective of morality, from the perspective of the black community tradition of an overdependence on ministerial leadership in political affairs that Oliver could reach and maintain a following in the community. But once this community was mobilized around the moral issue,
the simply emotional base of the activism precluded an understanding of the enemy's tactics, which could have generated an effective strategy. As the panel itself stated at numerous junctures, the issue in Ocean Hill was not a moral one but a conflict over political and social power. It is impossible to fight such concentrations of power with moral arguments, no matter how fervent the sentiment behind those arguments might be. Further, the excessive, almost apocalyptic morality creates defeat in the community itself. Within such a movement, the goals are not tangible, and there exist no intermediate points which signify the types of gains that build and sustain a movement: any achievement short of the banishment of evil from the earth must be termed a failure. As the struggle continues over years and decades and evil seemingly fails to diminish, nothing is captured by the movement to prove its efficacy to its people. This continued failure, insured by an inability to define tactical and specific objectives, guarantees the eventual destruction of the spirit of the community and, needless to say, its continued impotence in the face of sophisticated political opponents.

Cast in this realistic, if not overly jaundiced light, Reverend Oliver's contribution at the opening session of the panel and to Ocean Hill becomes extraordinarily difficult to assess. The dedication of this man, for whom I have only the highest respect, to his community is a tribute to his morality and character. But unfortunately, the power of black people will not be enhanced in America, nor will our children receive a better education solely from the emotional strength of our people. Rather, the community and its indigenous leadership must begin to perceive the
vicious and sophisticated reality of urban politics before our attempt to destroy that system of politics is successful.

Seemingly, no one should have had a firmer grasp of that fact than Reverend Milton Galamison. After almost fifteen years in the "vanguard" of the education movement in New York City and an actual one-year term on the Board of Education, one might assume that he would have been able to deliver a cogent disposition on the background of the Ocean Hill confrontation. Unfortunately, one of Brooklyn's most prominent black political leaders slipped back to vague, yet remarkably eloquent assertions about the failure of man to meet his times, a classic exposition of political doctrine of original sin. Reverend Galamison neatly divided his remarks into four areas: values, ethnocentrism, anacrornisms, and economics. The problem, so this theory purports, relates back to the general failure of the philosophy of American education, namely, its excessive preoccupation with grades and test-passing at the expense of the "humanizing" usages of liberal education. He stated:

So I argue: what we are dealing with basically, in one instance, is a problem of values, because if our values were what they ought to be we would never have these struggles in these areas.3

It is, presumably, this lack of values which accounts for what Reverend Galamison so obliquely termed "the problem of ethnocentrism." This inbred cultural imperialism is compounded by the archaic structure of the white culture itself. Echoing a recent string of bourgeois critics from Allen Toffer and Lewis Mumford to Charles Reich, Galamison claimed that the pace of history has overwhelmed middle-class culture, that computers,

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3Galamison, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1971, p. 4.
television, and airplanes have confused Americans in the maze of their own ingenuity. Couched amidst the Reverend's pastoral eloquence, his positions assume a certain aura of dignity, the variety generally accepted in white, liberal, middle-class circles.

While this is indeed not an inherently derogatory remark, Galamison's remarks do little to help anyone understand and act upon the New York crisis while they do maintain Galamison's stature as a responsible spokesman for the national situation; i.e. for black people in the eyes of white organizations and politicians. More to the point, the initial three concerns of Reverend Galamison seem to preclude an adequate understanding of his fourth and most legitimate focus of concern, that of economics. Galamison alone among the panelists alluded in this initial session to the correlation between the schooling which the white bureaucracy is willing to provide, and the perpetual struggle for employment in our society. In other words, he perceived the lineage between the poor schooling afforded black people, and the relative ease with which they are denied even minimally adequate employment - a lineage obviously perceived by Shanker and the vast majority of the white population of the city. In this light, it is ironic that Galamison could persist with his cant about values, and particularly about the failure of America to gain control over its technological environment when he so clearly understands that the issue directly centers upon conscious attempts to maintain the economic oppression of black people. The implications of this understanding dictated an accusation against the white power structure delineating its genocidal assaults upon the minds and bodies of
the black community. Galamison's failure to even approach such a posture underscores the difficult relationship which exists between the faceless members of New York's black population and their "leadership" as defined by the white media.

Moving the analysis to a different stage, the fascinating initial statement of Esther Swanker must be read with great care as it provides an excellent introduction to the perspective not only of the State Department of Education for which she worked, but sensitive and liberal observers in general. The perspective which she brought to the panels was a unique one. As Commissioner Allen's liaison to the New York Board of Education, she had the opportunity to establish a close working relationship with Superintendent of Schools Donovan while observing the machinations of such organizations as the state legislature, the C.S.A., and the Union. Needless to say, such a perspective and such sources of information were not available to anyone within the black community.

Speaking after Dr. Gittell and Reverend Galamison had usurped the more obvious focal points for discussion, Mrs. Swanker alluded to the utilization of the New York State Legal Code by, in her words, "these vested interests." Given her position in Albany, her remarks validate what others could simply assert:

I think we were shown dramatically just where the political power lay when the decentralization bill finally came to the floor of the legislature, and we saw the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Board and all the people who supported it, and there were many very powerful people, as you recall, who fought for a broad general decentralization plan and it went down to a tremendous defeat, because of the power of the union, and the power of the CSA which sat on the tailcoat of the union.

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4 Swanker, Transcript of Panel One, November, 16, 1970, p.5.
5 Ibid., p. 6.
This verification of the power of the United Federation of Teachers is itself a valuable addition to the recitation of areas of concern, but the real fascination of her remarks stems from the context in which she placed this obvious fact of political life. As a civil servant, the failure of her bureaucracy to unilaterally dominate the situation is baffling, and she remained unable to integrate her knowledge of the power of the Union with her broader assertions about the legislature and New York politics in general.

For the past twenty years, the difficulties forced upon educational bureaucracy came from "those people," a vocal but politically impotent force of black and white liberal reformers. Regardless of the validity of the position advocated, the political powerlessness of the black community implied that their opposition per se could be met from a position of strength. Suddenly with the challenge stemming from a union, the bureaucracy lost its power to dictate "compromise" on its own terms and was forced to accede to the power of its lily-white opposition. Clearly, this loss of control made Mrs. Swanker, and undoubtedly her co-workers on Livingston Street and in Albany, understandably anxious.

Secondly, she failed to integrate her broad knowledge of the power of the Union with her understanding of institutional processes in America. Fully cognizant of the power of the U.F.T. to manipulate votes, she could still assert that "the legislature did not know how to really face the issues that were raised in the 1967-70 controversy."6

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Yet the obvious deduction from her prior assertion is that the legislature was fully aware of the necessity of its acting in the interests of the Union and was not simply confused or naive. As a corollary to this she hoped that the lesson of Ocean Hill to the people of New York will center around the inadequacy and inequality of the law. She stated this when her own data indicated that this issue is not the law, but the vested interests which the law protects; that the issue is not the legislature but the men and the money which control the legislature.

The reactions of a portion of the absent panelists, particularly Mario Fantini and Bernard Donovan, to this statement by Mrs. Swanker would have been particularly interesting. But their opening statements were solicited in later sessions and are commented upon at the appropriate juncture. This analysis has not dealt with the comments made by Mr. Fred Ferretti. While his intellectual interjections were extraordinarily valuable, his independent assertions generally centered solely around the role of the media in the school crisis. Because of the unique manner of Ferretti's contribution, his remarks are dealt with as a unit rather than under the appropriate panel.

The remarks capsulized above will hopefully provide a framework not only for the ensuing chronology, but for the ongoing discussion which rambles on over the full five panels. In this instance, their vague and general nature is valuable to the structure of the study, and this aspect also makes it extraordinarily difficult for anyone not directly involved in New York City, particularly administrators in other cities, to ground the remarks in particular situations indigenous of their respective communities. It is far easier to perceive the similarity or
dissimilarity between specific reiterations than to attempt a comparison of one particular circumstance to a vague generalization. Hence, the second major endeavor for the candidate and the panel was the abstraction of a chronology of the events in New York from the theoretical statements above, i.e. the translation of these abstractions into a concrete reality. It would be impossible to discuss each of the events touched on by the panel. Thus, four critical events have been selected for the purposes of this analysis: (1) the 1954 Supreme Court decision, (2) the school boycotts, (3) the attempts to abolish the Board of Examiners, and (4) the reactions of the Union to the proposal for the demonstration districts and the relation of this reaction to the 1967 strike. It is hoped that the nature of the events in question, in addition to what each panelist stated about that event, will be, when adequately analyzed, a useful tool in defining the import and the implications of the crisis in New York City schools and the role of the demonstration districts in that ongoing crisis.

The decision of the Supreme Court on the Brown vs. Topeka School Board case in 1954 is not simply important for the alteration it made in the legal attitude of white America about the question of segregated schooling. Not only did the negation of the separate but equal theory initiate a movement which began the challenge to the urban school systems which continues today, but it more crucially established a particular mode of attack, a particular political posture which has had deep and lasting effects on the Negro reform movement.
The decision is often credited with sparking the civil rights movements which began to materialize under Martin Luther King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The background of the decision centers upon the efforts of a black intellectual, Dr. Kenneth Clark, to manipulate governmental institutions for the benefit of minority Americans through an integrated organization, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Dr. Clark provided the research data which anchored the case in academically and legally respectable terminology while the NAACP provided the financial backing and legal expertise. In reaction to this combination a white institution, the Supreme Court, granted the coalition the most significant victory that the black movement had received in post-war days. The combination was eminently successful; such success invites repetition and repetition, in this instance, was a deadly error.

To understand this assertion one must examine the characteristics of the elements which combined to produce the victory and their relation to the larger black community. None of these constituent elements can be perceived in an inherently negative light. Dr. Clark is one of the true pioneers in his field and the NAACP did much to publicize and attack the plight of the American black population. But the positions into which these elements were projected by the circumstances debilitated the black community for a period that can only be seen as symbolically ending with the Watts riots. Dr. Clark is a black man who manipulated the style and the rhetoric of white America. In his ability to do so, he was literally unique in 1954, and he remains a scarce commodity even
at this time. But in capitalizing on this ability, he established that the battle would be fought using the white man's system of judgment, and on the white man's turf. In doing so he aided in the continued political castration of the black masses. By implication, their talents and their power were deemed either useless or irrelevant.

Secondly, the NAACP relied heavily on a "white" definition of racial problems and, significantly, on white financial backing to pursue those problems. Thus, the organization was strictly limited to what its liberal backing or its guilt money could condone; an obvious conflict with the needs and desires of the black community. And as in the implications drawn from Dr. Clark's key role, the conception arose that progress was possible without the participation of the mass of black people, that the combination of the black elite with white money would pursue the cause of racial justice. Further, the focus of all efforts was on justice from the same white institutions that had been perpetuating injustice since the founding of the Republic.

In summary, the 1954 victory established a pattern in New York and nationally. It defined the bases of black support in the narrowest possible fashion, tied the movement to the constraints imposed by its white financial backing, and established the precedent of fighting the battle with a foreign system of values in frameworks constructed and controlled by the opposition itself. It is almost a mute point to add that such a policy helps to perpetuate the lack of political sophistication of the black masses, literally helping to confirm the original assumptions of the victorious coalition. Thus, while the victory was a
great one, the patterns which it established had effects which influenced the course of events, ultimately helping to establish the context in which Ocean Hill-Brownsville functioned.

Milton Galamison stated the following about the nature of the consistent struggle over the public schools in New York City:

It was a group of people that had no body politic in a sense, that is, there wasn't a lot of mass organization and what not underlying these groups. So they made their bid and then sort of fell apart.\(^7\)

The reasons for this disintegration and the successes that were achieved before this dissolution are best exemplified in the school boycotts of 1964, led in part by Reverend Galamison. After a series of efforts to integrate the New York City schools and the sit-out for open enrollment in 1960, Galamison, backed by the Parent's Workshop, the NAACP, CORE, and the Urban League led a boycott in February of 1964 in which over 400,000 children participated. The focus of the boycott "was to get a timetable and a plan for desegregation of the public schools."\(^8\)

After the failure of the initial effort a second boycott was called for March. This one ultimately involved 300,000 children. Finally, a timetable was established, though not seriously pursued by the Board of Education. The obvious fact is that for all the organizational effort expended, the boycotts failed to noticeably affect the education of children in New York City. The intriguing question is why?

Among the responses which come to mind the pressing one is, as foreshadowed above, the financial base of the organizations. Because

\(^7\)Galamison, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1971, p. 8.

\(^8\)Ibid., p. 14.
the black people lack the expendable resources to engage in philanthropy, the sources, when they could be found, had to be white. And, at that time, most whites preferred to send their money south, as a consequence of, in Milton Galamison's unique phrase, the liberal "social presbyopia."9 Thus the dependable and adequate financial base needed for a mass organizational effort was lacking. As a corollary to this stance, Galamison pointed to the attrition which the movement experienced as it persisted in its struggle:

... I think it ought to be remembered that the farther we pressed along, the more our number dwindled, that is, every fight involved fewer people than the fight before ... between those two boycotts in 1964, we lost the NAACP, we lost the Urban League, and we lost the Congress of Racial Equality, at least we lost the national office, nine of thirteen branches participated anyway ... 10

Though the continued dedication of numerous parents groups can be consoling, the defection of institutions providing financial backing severely debilitated the boycott movement.

But the origin of the defeat must be sought not only in the backing of the movement, but in the goal and constituency of the movement itself. The entire effort was aimed at the establishment of a timetable, a statement of future commitment to integration rather than to immediate change. This attack at the manner in which the Board of Education conceived of its schools certainly struck at a fundamental principle, but timetables in their abstraction become too vague and


10Ibid., p. 16.
distant to provide the focus of a sustained movement. Even in victory literally nothing tangible is won. Given the most sophisticated of constituencies, this inability to deliver tangible rewards for victory insures the eventual dissolution of the coalition. This is particularly so when the community in question is subjected to the harassment and oppression of cooperating white racist institutions. A crude example is the standard threat to withhold welfare checks from activist parents. Under the best of circumstances, it is difficult to build a sustained drive with people forced to undergo the daily grind of poverty in New York City, particularly when the goals are so abstract and non-visible.

This tacit acknowledgment of the self-defeating aspects of the boycott movement does not lead to the implication that, perhaps, a more intelligently directed coalition, or a coalition encompassing a broader, more diverse spectrum of interests, would have been more successful. Each futile movement to reform the New York City schools has been traditionally criticized as creating its own impotence out of a failure to build workable and political coalitions. However, there exists no evidence to the conclusion that such a coalition could, in fact, be created around a substantive issue; and secondly, even if such a coalition did miraculously appear, that it would be successful in achieving its stated objectives. A classic example of the failure of such coalition politics was the attempt in 1966 to abolish the Board of Examiners.
This legally autonomous institution for the certification and selection of supervisory personnel had long been criticized as not only being racist, but entirely unable to conduct an adequate process of selection. With a minimum of effort, the board has long employed such racist techniques as pronunciation tests to unilaterally exclude minority groups for civil service eligibility for supervisory positions. Mrs. Swanker asserted that, just prior to the establishment of the decentralization districts, this unilaterally denounced board could have been abolished. She argues that not only was the black community calling for such a move, but the president of the Board of Education himself, Alfred Giardino, backed legislation to alter the selection process. In addition, the dean of the School of Education of the New York University, Daniel Griffin, had issued a report, endorsed by the Public Education Association, which recommended the abolition of the Board of Examiners to the Superintendent. Clearly, a wide spectrum of very powerful interest groups were demanding action on a single, clearly defined issue. This was not an attempt at a black or a militant coup, but a movement which included the most established white educators in the city of New York.

The Board of Examiners continues to exist, with its legal mandate to continue racial discrimination in the hiring practices of the public schools unchanged. The oft sought-after coalition failed to deliver on even so moderate an issue as the selection processes for principals, no less on the rights of blacks to self-determination. Just as Mrs. Swanker had so naively presented her hopes for such a coalition of white knights, she graphically explained why such a coalition was an exercise in futility.
from start to finish. In her words, "at that time the only two groups that were fighting for the continuation of the Board of Examiners were the Union and the Council of Supervisory Associations . . ."\(^{11}\) Such a crude recitation of the political facts forces a reassessment of any illusions about the process of political change in New York state. As a result of such a reassessment two facts become startlingly clear: (1) the number of people involved in any movement or coalition is irrelevant. Only the political allegiances which those groups represent can be calculated. And (2) that the efforts of black community groups to "work" in coalitions with "white liberal support" had produced absolutely nothing of substance to justify the continuation of such coalitions. Such conclusions drawn from the data which Mrs. Swanker presented in this first panel negate any naive speculation about the usefulness of blue-ribbon coalitions in the "reasonable" and moderate path to better schooling for all of the children of New York City.

Another series of incidents which may be lifted from the chronology, those relating to the origin of the proposal for the demonstration districts, provides support to this general assertion, in addition to more fully developing the political posture into which the Union, and the Governing Board were placed. To outline in full this evolution would necessitate an entire thesis of its own, due to the duplicity and complexity which it engendered. Space does not allow, nor does public information permit an adequate exercise of the actions and motives

\(^{11}\)Swanker, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 32.
of the Mayor's office, the Ford Foundation, the Union, the Board of Education, the State Commissioner's office, the State Legislature, and the professional staff and representatives of the community. Given the events which ensued from the proposal it is, however, crucial to understand the initial position of the U.F.T.; ultimately, Shanker's actions structured the framework within which the remaining white institutions were forced to operate. Thus, what is known about the Union's motives will be related to the general chronology of events, specifically the 1967 strike which shut down all the city schools just as the demonstration districts were beginning to operate.

In response to a mandate from the legislature and the Mayor to decentralize the administrative branches of the school system, Superintendent Donovan stated that they submitted to the Board a statement outlining twelve different types of educational innovations for New York City, three of which dealt with the idea of demonstration districts. More precisely, the intent was, in Mrs. Swanker's words, to involve "the people of the community in some fashion not specified."¹² At that point discussion was initiated with Ford, specifically with Mario Fantini, about the possibility of funding such demonstrations. At these discussions the 201 complex and Twin Bridges were identified as possible project locations. At a later stage in the negotiations, Sandy Feldman, the U.F.T. representative to Ocean Hill-Brownsville, suggested that groups of schools be submitted to Mario Fantini for possible inclusion. She did so because of what she perceived to be the

¹²Swanker, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 49.
constructive relationships established between members of the Union and elements of the local community. This action graphically poses a question about not only the Union's, but Superintendent Donovan's perceptions about exactly what a demonstration district was, as opposed to the definition later provided by the parents of Ocean Hill-Brownsville. The panel data does not, at this point, provide substantive data for a response, but Fred Ferretti suggests a portion of the factors motivating the Teacher's Union: "The teacher at this point conceived of the district as being nothing more than an enlarged More Effective Schools program." In other words, Ferretti was suggesting that the union conceived of the demonstration districts in their first stages as another opportunity to continue their expansion from an organization legitimately determined to deal with the working condition of its membership to the major education policy maker for the schools of New York City.

The strike which prevented the opening of school in the fall of 1967 provides the perfect example of this usurpation of power by the Union. The strike centered around two issues: (1) the pay raises requested, and eventually granted; and (2) the issue of the disruptive child. The simple fact of a strike was significant to the Governing Board, but the issue around which the strike was based mandated that it be even more central to the Board's concern. The desire of the Union to allow a single teacher to unilaterally suspend a child from class had long been opposed by even the more moderate organizations such as the NAACP, as a vehicle for

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13 Ferretti, Transcript of Panel One, November 16, 1970, p. 56.
the implementation of racist attitudes which permeated the New York system. In addition, the entire strike was staunchly opposed by the newly formed Afro-American Teacher's Association. The Governing Board perceived two central concerns about the strike: (1) they did not want to begin their experiment in improving the education of their children by denying those children entrance to the schools, and (2) they wanted to join with all the black people of New York in repudiating the Union's desire to build yet another instrument of institutionalized racism into the schools. Thus, against the recommendation of the unit administrator, the Governing Board voted to open all the schools in defiance of the U.F.T. strike.

Though the Union must have begun the process of altering its original conception of the district long before the opening of school in 1967, this failure to support what they considered to be a crucial strike must have indicated to the Union that the existence of an institution which was controlled by black people could only be detrimental to their self-declared goals. At this point the question must be raised, and it applies with equal force to the preceding discussion of the 1954 Court decision, the boycott, and the coalition to abolish the Board of Examiners, as to whether or not this action was a strategy, and if so, was it the best strategy which could have been created given the circumstances? In other words, throughout the 1960's, was the black community randomly picking at targets to siphon off its frustrations, simply attacking the educational bureaucracy without any conception of tactics or strategy?
Ferretti, speaking as a white man and as a representative of the media who observed the black insurgency throughout the 1960's, stated unequivocally that while blacks were becoming increasingly aware of their increased power, the community at large was incapable of translating that power into a sophisticated strategy. Thus he sees the failure of the specific instances cited above to deal with the appropriate issues in a positive fashion as being in part due to the failure of the black community to intelligently organize the resources available.

But what Ferretti was unable to do was to distinguish between the absence of an effective strategy and the absence of strategy all together. As Reverend Galamison stated it: "There was a strategy. The strategy was just no equal to the opposition and to the circumstances."14 Galamison's statement at this point is crucial to an understanding of the first panel. He was saying that while the black community was aware of the need to work toward a revolution in education, that no matter how intelligent a strategy evolved, the community lacked the resources to translate that strategy into victory. The inverse of the proposition is also valid: that given the power which the Union and the school board were able to bring to bear on the situation, any strategy they chose would have been an effective one. In other words, the crucial variables are not those related to tactics or goals, but rather to the political and economic resources which the opposing groups possessed.

The increments provided by the second panel resulted from (1) the presence of Superintendent Donovan, and (2) a series of confrontations structured by the candidate in prior consultation with the moderator, Dr. Allan Calvin. The intent of this strategy was to affirm or negate the premise that options existed for either the community, the school board, or the United Federation of Teachers prior to the solidification of political positions which the publicity and the violence of the conflict brought about. On another level it was and still is the hope of the candidate that such a delineation of possible alternatives of the pattern of events, which focused around Ocean Hill-Brownsville from 1967 to 1970, would be of assistance not only to black people everywhere in their struggle, but to administrators and teachers in any sincere attempt they might make to understand and assist that community in improving the educational institutions. Naive and idealistic as this may appear to the reader, the candidate hoped that the body of data resulting from the panels would in the most elevating sense of the phrase, "teach other administrators and communities a lesson," so that all of America's children, white and black, need not experience another trauma such as the one which shook New York City over the past four years.

In pursuit of this objective, Dr. Calvin approached the panel with an assertion that alternatives to any overt confrontation had existed in 1967. He stated that the community in Ocean Hill arbitrarily cast the
Union and the C.S.A. into the role of being "outside devils," thus everything they stood for was, in the eyes of the community, bad and detrimental to the community control movement. Continuing this argument in the interest of the legitimacy of his profession, i.e. social psychology, Calvin maintains that this initial action on the part of the community forced the Union, in the interests of its own preservation and the protection of the rights of its members, to become an enemy rather than an ally, if not simply a neutral observer. As an option to this intransigence Calvin proposed that the wisdom of hindsight indicated that the Governing Board should have negotiated a series of temporary alliances with the Union. The content of these hypothetical "treaties" would be an exchange of support, each respective entity agreeing to lend its power to the other around the issues in question. This "classic way of getting things done," would involve a series of "trade-offs." For example, the union would agree to support the appointment of a specific number of black principals in exchange for support of the 1967 strike for wage benefits. Such a policy of "horse trading" would have provided an option which, if pursued in good faith by both parties, would have abrogated the need for the Union to destroy the demonstration district.

While such a position has a great deal of appeal, it has little or no validity. Simply, Calvin's assertion is based on a substitution

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1 Calvin, Transcript of Panel Two, December 7, 1970, p. 82.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 83.
of the illusions created by political rhetoric for the necessities dictated by political realities. These are my personal feelings which I shall substantiate in detail later in this and subsequent chapters. At this point the discrepancies between the rhetorical position presented by ex-Superintendent Donovan and the reality which he intentionally masks provide adequate and impartial support. In other words, support for the options which Calvin asserts must have existed can be drawn from what Donovan says, but the illusionary nature of this substantiation becomes clear when the ex-Superintendent's words are translated into the context which they are intended to describe. Further, the existence of this discrepancy in the remarks of Dr. Donovan presents a more serious challenge to peaceful relations between the school and the community contained in the panels. The underlying motivation of the parents on the Governing Board was to make the educational system work for their children. Rather than holding to abstract revolutionary slogans, they simply wanted, in the best American tradition, to participate in and thereby reform the institutions that affected their lives. The duplicity on the part of those institutions in the face of this painfully honest sentiment can only be viewed as one of the most perverse manifestations of the sickness which the racism of this country has created and sustained.

The initial difficulty presented by Dr. Donovan's opening statement is in defining precisely for whom he is presuming to speak. In referring to perceptions of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville situation, he continually uses the pronoun "we"; perhaps he means the Board of Education,
perhaps the Union and the Board, perhaps the professional staff at headquarters, or perhaps simply himself and Esther Swanker. Placing this initial confusion aside for utilization as background material, Dr. Donovan, or more precisely, "we", perceived three issues as providing the foundation of the crisis: (1) the responsibility, authority, and decision-making powers of the demonstration districts; (2) professional rights and responsibilities; and (3) the question of the law and its relevance to education. Let us examine the categorization of the issues in the light of Dr. Calvin's attempt to construct options which would have avoided the overt conflicts that emerged in the 1968-1969 school year.

Donovan's initial phrase, "the responsibility, authority, and decision-making power of the people," 5 establishes the confusion which structured the eventual confrontation: while the words connote the existence of alternatives, the diverse meaning of those words to different constituencies denies the validity of those alternatives. The initial proposal for the three demonstration districts clearly stated that there would be no additional funds for the operation of the schools in those districts. The stated rationale for this curious policy was that the essence of the "experimental design" was to determine if increased parent involvement would make the difference in improving the quality of the educational processes. Proceeding from such an hypothesis, the obvious task for those involved in that "experiment" was to define the responsibilities that the parents would possess.

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5Donovan, Transcript of Panel Two, December 7, 1970, p. 73.
Given a variety of constraints, some established by School Board policy, some by state law, some by contractual obligations, and some stemming simply from the ingrained habits of a thoroughly racist system, this opportunity for the parents to exercise meaningful authority was not only a confused one, but also a deliberate or intentional fraud and deception. Whatever motivated those who created the demonstration districts, they knew that state law and city law required that only certified or licensed personnel may work with pupils within the school system. On the other hand, the Governing Board was a group of community residents elected by the community, and accountable to that community for the education of 9,000 students. When this Board was faced with vacancies in its instructional and administrative staff, it obviously wanted to employ professionals who would be committed to the children and accountable to the Board for their ability to implement positive educational programming. Such a "militant position" was the logical culmination of the unrest which motivated the initial establishment of the demonstration districts. It was blatantly clear to members of the community that the teachers provided Ocean Hill by the civil service list had failed: the children of the district provided living documentation. An objective consideration of the design of the demonstration districts indicates that an exercise of "the responsibility, authority, and decision-making power of the people," would necessitate a confrontation.

On a more subtle plane, it is difficult to assess in what fashion this "authority" was to be exercised, the realm in which the participation so crucial to the design of the experiment was to be meaningful. Most
school system budgets demand that seventy to eighty per cent of the available funds goes into such fixed costs as salaries. The nominal balance that could be used by the Board in a discretionary manner carries such restrictions as exemplified by the approved textbook list, so zealously guarded by the Central Board. Given the above realities, how was it possible for an untrained group of black community representatives to examine the financial allocations and thereby reorder the educational priorities for their district? The Governing Board was not even allowed to conduct its own monetary transactions: all transfers of funds passed through the city comptrollers by means of an internal voucher policy.

If the Governing Board took itself and its mandate from the black community seriously, it seems clear that the only available course of action was to challenge these processes by overt actions and then establish a negotiating position within the context of the experiment. Such a structured confrontation would be volatile enough if each faction represented white middle-class interests, accustomed to the exercise of power and fundamentally unified by racial and economic grouping. In the Ocean Hill instance, however, the Governing Board was an indigenous group of people, faceless, powerless, and unsophisticated, assuming authority without any orientation or preparation in the operation of the public schools. Undoubtedly, the white power structure gambled on the naivete and ignorance of the Governing Board. The rapid and brutal refutation of this classically racist assumption unveiled the violent confrontation which must result from people who have for so long been denied their basic human and constitutional rights.
When the elected Governing Board began to function as if it actually had authority and power in assuming the responsibility of appointing to existing vacancies men of calibre with whom they felt secure as principals of the district's schools, the Board obviously acted as a partner in the confrontation. Immediately, the issue was transformed from an educational one into a series of conflicts: the blacks vs. civil service; Ocean Hill vs. job security; the militants vs. the Union; and the separatists vs. American society. Once this context had been established, the Governing Board could only lose, and its prior efforts to avoid the confrontation were either ignored or distorted by the white press. Unfortunately, the issue was starkly reduced to "the responsibility, authority, and decision-making power of the people." This reduction revealed a crucial though hidden corollary: that such authority could be exercised only if the black people assumed the roles of their white oppressors, i.e. only if they used that authority to continue the destruction of the minds of their own children. When the Governing Board rejected this unstated assumption lying behind the central hypothesis of the experiment, it was clear that the Governing Board was never meant to exercise any authority at all. Thus the only options open to the local Board were either (1) to continue the genocidal policy of the Central Board, or (2) to provoke a confrontation by attempting to improve the educational operation of the district regardless of those policies. Clearly, no option existed at all.

The second issue broached by Superintendent Donovan concerned the rights and responsibilities of educational professionals. Any such
discussion must be poisoned by the historically determined context in which it occurs: New York educators overtly discuss tenure, civil service, accountability, and related contractual items as they relate only to the welfare of the professionals themselves. Each of the above issues can be seen as a legitimate right of an employee's organization to protect itself. But the underlying motivation of such protection must be the establishment of the best possible professional staff in order to serve the children. In New York the above issues have been transformed into devices utilized to perpetuate the protection of teachers who fail to teach. In short, such advances in the educational profession, usually stipulating an increase in salary for the professional, have been to the advantage of the professional over the client, rather than advances of the professional in the interest of the client whom he serves.

This perversion of the definition of professional rights precludes any legitimate discussion of its meaning without engendering a political holocaust. The Governing Board could not exercise its authority in such areas as hiring, firing, the evaluation of performance, and tenure, nor any of the myriad of union negotiated contractual items. Given such a position of utter powerlessness in the face of a mandate which dictated something quite different, the parents were forced to continually examine their conscience to determine if in fact they had relinquished all of their rights not only as parents, but as clients of an institution theoretically established to serve the public.

The Governing Board consistently searched for a legitimate fashion in which to effect the issue of professional rights and responsibilities.
Such rights are established by laws and by the contractual policies which the local board, or even the entire black community of New York, were unable to influence. For example, principals of schools cannot observe teachers without notice, which is only a small portion of an extensive and complex policy, nor can information be placed in teachers' files without their consent. This is a result of Union negotiations. Recognizing that there have been abuses of teachers, teachers cannot be transferred within a given district by the superintendent without their consent regardless of the educational soundness of such a move.

The operative principle in New York's personnel practices is "don't rock the boat," a precept which motivated the creation of an entire sub-strata of unwritten rules. Established transfer policies have been evaded through the consistent efforts of principals with the tacit cooperation of the Union. One principle suggests that rather than give a teacher an unsatisfactory rating, the teacher should transfer; coincidentally, the principal knows of an existing vacancy created by the reciprocal cooperation of those agreeing to maintain the illusion of legality. In the same vein, principals for years have refused to bring teachers up on charges of incompetency because of the difficulty of documentation and the reversal of roles from the prosecution to the defense.

The existence of this duplicity, this distinction between the overt and the covert operation, between the legal and the actual, places the Union and the Central Board in an almost invulnerable position on the issue of professional rights. They established legal and public guidelines that were educationally impractical and then systematically, though privately, violated them. This covert system of actual operating procedures
allows the untenable legal procedure to exist unchallenged by those with access to covert channels. Thus, when a group such as the Governing Board at Ocean Hill chooses to invoke such traditional courses of action, the Board and the Union publically decry the illegality of the action for political reasons of their own. At this point they may take refuge in the sanctity of the laws which they publically uphold while systematically violating them. Denied the normal routes open to any administrator or board member within the system, what options were there open to the Governing Board in Ocean Hill?

Dr. Donovan alluded to the professional rights, but these were not the types of concerns which the people had about the professionals in their employ. Their concerns focused directly upon the efficacy of the staff in producing educational progress in their children. Their obvious concern was based on an observable fact: the massive and unremitting failure of the teachers in the district. The parents wanted skilled, competent people who had the concern, willingness and a commitment to the children rather than to the institution which paid them. They were concerned that their teachers be leaders and innovators who would begin to offer alternatives which would produce an atmosphere in which learning would take place. Such a concern was an expression of the fundamental hypothesis which Dr. Donovan created for the district: to see if parental participation would lead to better education. Precisely how did he envision these parents relating to the teachers who attempted to thwart this effort?
The third issue raised by Dr. Donovan was the law and its relevance to the problems under discussion. More than the previous two categories established, this one is a pure fraud and an illusion. Throughout the confrontation, the Board and the Union did not "obey" the law, but continually utilized it as a vehicle to maintain the political impotence of the black community. The first instance of this was the voluntary transfer of U.F.T. teachers out of the district, illegally arranged prior to the assumption of operative power by the Governing Board. Such manipulations of the law did little but lend substance to claims that American justice is simply one more tool which the white man uses against the black, simply one more weapon which the school system uses against children. In a sense Dr. Donovan is perfectly correct: the law is an issue. But there is little substance to Dr. Donovan's attempt to justify his actions by citing the necessity of adhering to legally established structures; such a claim is simply a guise for political manipulation.

The prime instance of this chicanery is the legal fiat that led to the eventual abolition of Ocean Hill-Brownsville as an independent educational unit as defined by the city of New York. Claiming that the law necessitated such a move, the New York City decentralization plan released on November 17, 1969 proposed the absorption of the demonstration districts into larger educational units.\(^6\) But, as stated in a memorandum by the New York Civil Liberties Union:

The truth of the matter is that the law provides enough flexibility for the board to continue the demonstration districts, if it wishes to do so. The decision to abolish the districts was not a legal decision, but a political one.\(^7\) (Emphasis in original).

When considering its decentralization legislation, the state legislature considered wording which would have specifically continued, and wording which would have specifically abolished the demonstration districts. Discarding both of these alternatives, the legislature passed the law leaving the survival of the districts at the discretion of the Board of Education of New York City. For political reasons, the Board chose to deceive the people about the options at its disposal. In other words, it utilized the illusion of legal requirements to disguise its political affiliations. Thus, Dr. Donovan's assertion that the law was an issue in Ocean Hill simply masks his understandable desire to perpetuate the strategies which allowed him to cooperate with the Union in defeating the communities in 1968. The law was simply not an issue, but a device utilized by the varying bureaucracies to frustrate in an illegal fashion their opponents amongst the people. Operating under such constraints, black people must always be the violators of the law because it is our oppressors who arbitrarily define the law in response to our efforts.

One could write endlessly about the continuous deceptions and callous strategies employed by the professional staff of 110 Livingston Street. The tale would be extensive, fascinating, and of little advantage to anyone. Instead of this grisly alternative, a reexamination

of Donovan's initial assertions in the light of the above digressions and in view of Calvin's hypothesis of options leads to a clear understanding of the theoretical and political foundation of the New York school crisis. Hopefully, such a format will provide a better understanding of the realities of the situation, an understanding that administrators and communities can translate into action.

Did, as Calvin claims, either the Union, the school board, or the community have options to their ultimate positions vis-à-vis the rights of professionals, the power of the community, and the exigencies of the law? While the existence of such options seemed to be implied on the rhetorical level (who can be against either motherhood or the rights of professionals?), the realities which these phrases purport to represent require the opposite conclusion. What the Union meant by the rights of professionals was the power of the Union to create educational policy. What the community meant by the rights of professionals were those items which would aid teachers in the fulfillment of their basic responsibility to the children. Thus, the Union sought the power to remove disruptive children from the classroom; and the community opposed this usurpation because it was not an issue of professional rights, but one of institutional racism. Given the necessity of representing their varying constituencies, the Union and the community had no choice but to confront each other over the issue of professional rights.

Dr. Donovan was one of the most astute educational politicians operating in New York City. A man of his stature and experience most certainly understood the inevitability of conflict. Knowing this his
job centered on structuring the outcome. Even if the community
possessed the sophistication to perceive, as Donovan did, the nature
of the eventual conflict, no black group possesses the resources
which would enable them to successfully program the ensuing course
of events. Thus, no matter how astute the Governing Board and the
unit administrator might have been politically, they were ultimately
at the mercy of the Union and of the school board. Thus, no option
existed for the community as their role was defined by external powers.
Those who did have the power to alter the course of events, i.e. the
Union, and the Board of Education, those who possessed the power to
create options, saw no necessity of exercising that power as the path
already chosen produced the desired results: the Board got its admini-
strative decentralization and Shanker got power. What is clear from
this discussion is that only the community needed to "seek" options,
and that only the community was powerless to create such options.

This is not to imply that Donovan and Shanker did not create
an environment in which the illusion of options existed: both the
plethora of decentralization schemes and the actual nature of the
demonstration districts purported to established options, while actually
centralizing discretionary power in the hands of the Union and the school
board. In regard to the decentralization proposals, Donovan himself
said:

... neither the Bundy suggestions nor the Board's decentra-
lization plan seemed to be effective enough or deep enough in
its consequence to satisfy groups that felt this was not
meeting the need as they saw it.8

This failure was not a random happenstance. In response to the legislative mandate, there was a Bundy report, a Board of Education report on school reorganization, the Mayor's plan, a U.F.T. plan, the Commissioner's plan, perhaps a Regents' plan, and eventually a series of legislative plans. Donovan's reference to the fact that not one of these plans was far-reaching enough merits a study in itself, but it does suggest that each was deliberately designed to offer the least it could to the volatile black community while protecting the vested interests of each group, thus affording the most leverage to the constituents of the architects of the respective plans.

Further, one must place this plethora of reports in the context of the history of discord and resistance which the areas named as demonstration districts had prior to their designation as demonstration districts. In fact, Ocean Hill-Brownsville came into existence following one of the most hectic and disruptive of school years. From this chronology, numerous social scientists have suggested that the demonstration districts were created to help create a cool summer for the city of New York. This implication is supported by the curious fact that the Ford Foundation gave a substantial grant to three demonstration districts for a planning period of the summer, though each of the districts was at radically different phases of development.

Yet, the planners of the demonstration project in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, according to Dr. Donovan, continued to act in accordance with the Governing Board's collective beliefs.9 Unaware of their cooperation with an opposition strategy, or unable to act in any different

fashion, the Governing Board continued to operate as if it had unquestioned authority as the discussions in Albany progressed. Obviously, each faction was not only busily lobbying for its bill, but also watching the events in New York with great concern. Clearly, the action of the community could only jeopardize the possibilities of favorable treatment in the legislature. The representative from the State Department of Education sums it up rather concisely:

The legislative committee that put it together just took words and phrases out of each of the various plans and finally came up with something that would be satisfactory, mainly to Al Shanker and Walter Degnan, but also to the majority members of the legislature.10

It is simple to demonstrate the effects of the events in Ocean Hill-Brownsville on the evolution of the various proposals. For example, prior to the confrontation, a local district could receive funds from sources other than the Board of Education, State, and Federal agencies. In the final act all monies for local committees had to pass through the Central Board of Education; in fact, the Central Board had to request such funds. In the same vein, during the Tax Reform Hearings it was made clear that no foundation funds could be used for political purposes. This act curtailed the historical role of the Ford Foundation in supporting educational experimentation. It has been alleged that the testimony of the U.F.T. president on the use of Ford funds in Ocean Hill was of major importance in this decision.

After the fact, the strategies employed against Ocean Hill become painfully clear to anyone who examines the recitation of events.

Different factions of the white hierarchy first published a series of reports on decentralization; each report failing to adequately deal with the problems at hand, yet each uncutting the validity of one another. The large number of reports gives the illusion that the community could exercise some choice. But none of the reports originated from the community, and the community had no substantial inputs into the evolution of a final law. Secondly, the demonstration districts gave the illusion that community control has been tried. But the experiment was structured to fail by the bureaucracy, and this predetermined failure was used to defeat the most minimal attempts of the black community to exercise power, i.e. the power which stemmed from the Ford grant. Thus, the processes which were established under the guise of dealing with the failures to educate New York City's children were, in actuality, mechanisms created to protect those responsible for the continued failure.

Historically, when the mandarins of public education address their efforts to major policy changes, they consult with the Mayor, the U.F.T., the C.S.A., the Public Educational Association, and sometimes, out of kindness, with the Urban League, but never under any circumstance with the black community. The people only enter the theater after the script has been written and the actors cast. Dr. Donovan's suggestion that the overt public interest of the U.F.T. with professional safeguards built in would almost defeat the purposes of the demonstration districts, is an honest recognition by the ex-Superintendent of the power of the Union which, for all intents and purposes, has usurped the legitimate powers of the school board. Thus, when Oliver stated that the rights of
the people in a community to have a voice in the operation of institutions in their own communities is an essential demand, he oversimplified by denying the havoc and turmoil that such a demand must elicit. Any meaningful voice would strike at the heart of the seat of power, demanding for a new alignment of power within New York City.

It is ironic to note that such a fundamentally revolutionary approach was definitely not the perspective initially operative in Ocean Hill. On its most fundamental level, the demonstration district attempted to work within the system, to join in helping the schools meet the needs of the pupils. The three demonstration districts were demanding change and a reform of the system in a manner which initially suggested that they would receive the support of all factions of the city interested in educational improvement. In other words, for naive and even moralistic reasons of its own, the Governing Board directed its unit administrator to attempt to create options within the system. While the intelligence of such a strategy was debatable, it is important to note the basically reformist mentality on the part of the Governing Board.

A classic example of this attempt to work within the system, and one which demonstrates the paucity of options, was the endeavor of the unit administrator and the Governing Board to legitimatize the selection of principals not on the appropriate city civil service list, though certified by the State of New York. Upon a written request by Dr. Donovan to Commissioner Allen and after numerous dealings with both of them, the Commissioner informed the Board that a new category of civil service could
be established, viz. that of Demonstration School Principal. Operating under this edict, the Governing Board then moved to appoint those men with whom it felt most comfortable.

This attempt by the local board to negotiate the system led to the predictable results. The appointment of principals was immediately challenged in court. The C.S.A. claimed that it was impossible to differentiate between a Demonstration School Principal and a regular principal: each operated within the same structure, the same teachers, the same local superintendents, etc. The Teacher's Union went to court and won. This decision was appealed in the amicus curi role with the Board of Education. Ultimately, the appointments were upheld, a decision in no small part resulting from the threat of massive violence by the black community.

This apparently simple desire to reform the educational bureaucracy encountered the opposition of not only the directly involved unions, but all those dependent upon civil service to maintain their power. Donovan stated the case well:

When you're talking about the teacher's union, you're talking about a myth. And you talk about telling the teacher's union that its sacred protection of civil service rights and all that is something they ought to sit down and talk to community people about, don't forget the firemen are in on that, the police are in on that . . . every union man in New York is in on that, because he thinks if it's a threat to one union, it's a threat to all unions . . .

Thus, the attempt of the Governing Board to reform the system from within was met with all the crushing power which the system can generate against its opponents.

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Given the unambiguous conclusions resulting from the analysis of the previous data, no reason exists to belabor Calvin's initial postulate. Let us simply reexamine its assumptions in light of the above. Central to Calvin's mythology of options is the belief in the existence of goals mutually desired by the community and the Teacher's Union:

I think we can make it in the interest of the C.S.A. and the union to make certain changes which will also be in accordance with the goals of the community. And I think that if it isn't done that way, we don't find options that will do that, you can play 'till doomsday.  

At this point in the panel series, it was not possible for anyone to suggest precisely what such mutually identifiable goals might be. In other words, the fundamental interests of the Union and the community necessitate an ultimate confrontation of their respective forces. While the Union and the C.S.A. might be able to engage in horse trading to minimize their differences in pursuit of power, and while Ocean Hill might agree to temporarily compromise with the Ford Foundation or the Urban League to solidify the front in the face of opposition, such coalitions are created only in response to a partial solidarity of interests. Obviously no such solidarity existed, or ever will exist, between the Teacher's Union and the community. Unfortunately, the Union has inextricably placed itself in opposition to any meaningful progress by the black population of New York City. Until either the black community decides to cooperate in its own destruction, or until the Union decides to discontinue its racist policies, continued confrontation will prevent any restoration of harmony in the school system.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA: PANEL THREE

The purposes which the candidate established for the third panel session were the most ambitious of the project and the most central to the stated goals of the dissertation. Having dismissed the possibility of any belief in the existence of options to the course of events which precipitated the destruction of the district, the candidate instructed the panel moderator to focus the course of the discussion around the elaboration of hypotheses which would rationally or logically explain the absence of options. The moderator attempted to utilize the theoretical and academic faculties of the assembled panelists to outline a series of assertions about the school crisis which could then be subjected to the scrutiny of the membership of the panel, and tested against empirical data. Dr. Calvin, acting on behalf of the candidate, tried to establish an environment in which the emotion-laden issues created by the strike could be reduced by the process of intellectualization to a series of working hypotheses.

The rationale of the candidate and the moderator in attempting to subject the panel to this externally imposed discipline was designed to abstract from the New York situation a model or theoretical basis applicable to various cities across the country. In other words, a compilation of the hypothetical relationships delineated by the
panel would link together to form a model of an urban school system under the stress of decentralization and experimentation with community control. Once this model existed, administrators in other cities could then relate their specific circumstances back to a theoretical framework, hopefully deriving from this prototype information applicable to their immediate concerns.

The moderator, the candidate, and the assembled panelists were completely unsuccessful in this endeavor. Their ultimate conclusion was that the nature of the data on hand precluded the construction of a rational model. For the purposes of this analysis, this failure is as instructive, if not more instructive, than any accomplishment of the stated objectives would have been. The degeneration of the panel into a trivial and repetitious recitation of the obvious invites an examination into the inadequate theoretical orientation of the panelists, an inadequacy which prevented them from discovering principles which could be constructed into a prototype, or at least be empirically verified. Clearly, theoretical statements can be abstracted from the events which centered around Ocean Hill-Brownsville; and it is just as obvious that this model or prototype can be of use to anyone attempting to understand the process of change in urban school environments. Thus, the task of analyzing this panel is two-fold: (1) to describe the panelists' attempt to create a model, and (2) to delineate the reasons of why the participants were unable to do so. In response to this vacuum, the hypothetical assertions of the candidate will run through the analyses of the fourth and fifth panels.
Another recitation of the issues was the first step in the process which Dr. Calvin and the candidate utilized in structuring the panel discussion. While this new litany retraced many of the same points made earlier in Panels One and Two, three new categories of inquiry were established by Mr. Ferretti, Dr. Fantini, and Dr. Gittell, respectively: (1) the accountability and responsibility of the media; (2) the nature of the problem of the identification of the various interest groups; and (3) the relationship of social structure to social conflict. Because these areas warrant explication, they shall be utilized as tools in the process of understanding the inadequacies of the theoretical orientation of the panelists, inadequacies that led to the failure to create the necessary hypotheses.

Up to this point no extended mention of the contribution of Mr. Fred Ferretti, an education reporter for the New York Times and a free-lance writer, has been made. This deliberate omission results from the wide-ranging effect of the issues which he raised, an effect so pervasive as to almost deny the validity of any discussion of the relevant issues confronting educators, forcing the course of debate to almost deal exclusively with the total corruption of America's urban society.

The thrust of Ferretti's argument brutally demolishes any neat theorizing about "public affairs." In essence he claimed that the actual reality of the confrontation in Ocean Hill was an irrelevancy; that Ocean Hill can only be understood by a discussion related to what the media transformed the demonstration districts into: "It's that point
I wanted to make, is that all of these issues that we've been talking about never saw the light of day."¹ Or, in Calvin's rephrasing, "... there is no Ocean Hill-Brownsville, there is only what the New York Times' Ocean Hill-Brownsville is, and it was amazing that the media would just create a whole world all of their own. ..."² The issues previously discussed in this essay, those concerning the legitimate rights of community boards, those dealing with the sincere attempts of the Board of Education to pacify the system, became, when presented to the public by the media, almost mythological struggles supported by the pre-existent prejudices of the white population.

This phenomenon can be traced to four sources: (1) the bias of those writing the news; (2) the sophistication of those seeking to manipulate the media; (3) the media's lack of skill in conceptualizing educational issues; and (4) the bias of those controlling the news. As the Negro press is not germane to this discussion, one can safely state that the "news" is created by bourgeois white interests which are, perhaps, no more or less enlightened than those of the average white-collar professional. However, this does imply that the majority of the reportage will reflect the comprehensive racism of their society, a sickness which, in this instance, can be reflected in such formative areas as those sources which reporters choose to rely on. The labor reporter instinctively trusts his contact in the union whom he has known for fifteen years, rather than the black militant of whom he has just recently heard.

²Calvin, op. cit.
Initially, the prism through which the news must filter distorts rather than reflects events.

Additional factors compound this initial tendency. Those traditional "sources" have far greater skill, a skill born of long experience in manipulating the news. Ferretti mentioned Shanker's habit of calling a news conference at five o'clock in the evening. No television news station could afford not to cover any such conference on the subsequent six o'clock news telecast, though the stations obviously lacked sufficient time to verify the assertions of the president of the U.F.T. Two or three days later, when the erroneous or distorted nature of Shanker's statements became public knowledge, the initial impressions made by his television appearance could not be combatted. The black community lacks the sophistication to control public information channels in this manner. Almost completely new to the arena of debate, the skills needed simply were either not forthcoming or, when present, the pressure generated by the volatility of the community prevented their utilization. Thus the accuracy of news reporting was determined in part by the skill of the various opponents in manipulating the media.

Lying at the base of all of this deception was the failure of the media to conceptualize educational issues in a legitimate fashion. These fundamental misconceptions permeated the language used to report even the most trivial of events. Generally, the media viewed Ocean Hill as precipitating a crisis in the New York public schools; Martin Mayer, for example, considered the results to be the worst disaster New York
ever suffered. On the other hand, the black community considered the
accepted and ongoing failure of the schools to educate their children
to be the actual crisis. From this perspective the demonstration
districts and the ensuing strikes were simply manifestations of this
more pressing crisis. But the media persisted in seeing the disruption
of these genocidal educational policies as the "crisis" itself, accept-
ing the destruction of black children as the "normal" state of affairs.
Given this fundamental distortion, any statement filtering through the
media must inherently reflect the racist failure of the media to accurate-
ly define the nature of the educational "crisis."

The temptation exists to add a segment dealing with the politi-
cal interests of those who own the media, but in any such discussion
it would be awkward to publically document certain assertions. Let
this innuendo simply serve as a bridge between the specific comments
made by Mr. Ferretti and the more general statement made by Dr. Fantini
concerning the problem of identifying the various interest groups and
their allegiances in any political conflict. This was an intriguing
position for Dr. Fantini to take, one which perhaps stemmed from his
former position at the Ford Foundation. With no socio-economic alle-
giances in either the community, the school board, or the Union prior
to the establishment of the demonstration districts, his position was
almost one of a sole spectator in a room full of participants: the only
"observer" in the inner circle of vested interests. From this half
political, half aesthetic vantage point he observed:

3 Martin Mayer, The Teachers Strike, p. 15.
I think to me the key issues, one of the key issues, has to do with identifying the parties, the publics, the groups that tacitly had to reach [sic] in order to support any type of reform, and the degree of education which has to precede any reform in order to support that . . . 4

As his later statements reveal, Fantini's process of identification occurred on two levels: one education, the other political in the broadest sense of the term.

On the more overt plane, Fantini stressed the advisability of an outright identification of those parties whose support is necessary for conducting orderly reform. Theoretically, any innovative effort should begin by developing support within the various factions of the Board of Education, the staff at 110 Livingston Street, all the community organizations, the groups within the Teacher's Union, the organizations which comprise the C.S.A., and, significantly, the students themselves. Once this process has been completed, group interests should be respected in such a fashion as to avoid conflict. The candidate's opinion of the technique has been stated in preceding chapters.

On a more sophisticated level, Fantini explained the unfortunate process by which these educational interest groups unite with groups that share similar interests and which operate on a more political level:

Well, if I may . . . dynamics of an ever expanding cycle of forces, that was triggered, which started out as a really an educational issue . . . and it very, very swiftly became political, economic, racial, religious and many others; that the parties that converged and the manifestation of force and power on the institutions, it just became confusing even to the most - so-called most - sophisticated participants in the arena. 5

4 Fantini, Transcript of Panel Three, January 18, 1971, p. 143.

5 Ibid., pp. 152-153
This general statement conceptualizes the process by which the Governing Board developed alliances with the various progressive black and white organizations: the Teacher's Union received the massive support of organized labor not only in New York City, but nationally; the Jewish teachers developed linkages with the Jewish community organizations, etc. As these alliances developed, the amount at stake in Ocean Hill multiplied many times, while the forces mobilized to effect the outcome developed into armies of tremendous size and consequence. The end result of this "ever expanding cycle of forces" was that the primacy of the original educational concerns became subjugated to a more potent series of confrontations: black-white, black-Jew, Jew-Protestant, Union-anti-Union. At this level, the community was literally outgunned.

But that remark is not germane to Fantini's point. Rather, he wants to say that for educational reform to be possible, an identification of interests in the political, religious, racial, and economic sphere must occur. In support of this assertion he cited the failure of the initiators of the demonstration districts to comprehend the ramifications of their actions as a major precipitator of the crisis. But such an assertion is racist in the sense that it ignores the fact that no matter what the "elite" does, the demands of the black community must ultimately confront the matrix of power; but again, that is not Fantini's concern at this point. Instead of developing a hypothesis as he wished to, Dr. Fantini concluded with what is almost a rhetorical
question: "Is real reform possible given the configuration of relationships, power ... in the United States? ... Is it possible?"\(^6\)

Additional inputs crucial to this line of inquiry came from Dr. Clark. Dr. Clark, whose position on the New York Board of Regents afforded him an excellent seat at the spectacle, found himself fascinated by the speed with which the educational issues became subordinated to the "realistic power issues"\(^7\) as the struggle was transferred into one over the control of power rather than over any particular educational decision or technique. From this observation, Clark deduced that, in fact, the most important forces acting in the confrontation were not those directly involved with education:

But a very important and probably the most important resistance to meaningful decentralization was, interestingly enough, not coming primarily from the teachers or the ... but from other unions who were significantly threatened by a change in structure which would threaten their control over the allocation of funds, and of course, the obvious power problem was that of race and status in the institutional control.\(^8\)

Clark is referring to, among others, New York's all-white construction unions. As *Schools Against Children* brilliantly documents, the construction unions violently and effectively opposed community control because of the effect of such educational reforms on the allocation of funds. They realized that the black community, if given a choice, would funnel construction funds to those skilled black men who were locked out of the racist unions. To protect their own economic interests, the construction unions, even more than the more obviously implicated

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\(^7\)Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

\(^8\)Ibid., p. 148.
Teacher's Union, contributed political influence and money to destroy this attempt of the black community to begin to share in the series of economic trade-offs existent among whites. One should be able to derive from Clark's comments some idea of the depth of commitment on the part of both parties to the confrontation.

Echoing some of Fantini's more dubious sentiments, Clark then dwells upon the correlation between the lack of sophistication in Ocean Hill and the extent of the crisis. He claims that the community, having been left out of power matrix, was unaware of how to deal with this arrangement. Had the community possessed this sophistication, Clark thought they could have "insinuated"\(^9\) to become a part of, and to make contractual agreements with, the white consortium. Instead of threatening from outside, the Governing Board should have subtly joined this covert power structure. Given the evidence which Kenneth Clark presents about the absolute exclusion of the black community, and about the force which met the community's attempt to join, his hope is an absurd one. The ever expanding cycle of forces insures that the black people will not be peacefully allowed to share in the economic and political power stemming from Board of Education funds. The very essence of economic oppression and racial oppression dictates that the castle of white, monied interests can only be attacked by force.

The best justification of Fantini's original concern for the identification of these interest groups comes from a crucial point raised in an almost off-hand fashion by Dr. Gittell late in the panel

\(^9\)Clark, Transcript of Panel Three, January 18, 1971, p. 149.
session. As she describes her initial reaction to the Bundy Panel, she asserts that it represented "the whole powerhouse . . . the Governor, and the Mayor and Bundy . . . and every, you know, power basis . . . ." Undoubtedly, this assumption was shared by the majority of her colleagues in this endeavor and constituted one of the Bundy Panel's operative hypotheses. From this assumption, Dr. Gittell concluded that any alteration in the fundamental power relationships of the school system designed by the Bundy Panel could be implemented with a minimum of social conflict: those in power would simply have made a rational decision to distribute some of that power. As those who would see their influence diminished by the new structure were those who had designed the structure itself, little or no effective resistance to implementation could be foreseen. Thus, according to this mythology, a "revolution" would have occurred in a logical and peaceful fashion.

As the events which ensued after the issuing of the findings of the Bundy Panel demonstrate, Dr. Gittell's assumption that the membership of the Panel represented all the powerful constituencies in New York City was tragically flawed. Her deduction that the commission represented the powerful in the act of distributing their power was fallacious, as she herself later recognized. Classically elitist in nature, the assumption stated above omitted the substantial, but as yet dormant power of the city's middle-level professional class. In the case of the school bureaucracy, this group was predominantly Jewish. While the Bundy Panel did represent the white Protestant power of Ford and Rockefeller

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money coupled with the pseudo-aristocratic noblesse oblige of the Lindsay administration, its composition omitted, or entirely discounted, the interests, hence the power of the newly unionized middle-income brackets. Such preconceptions flow easily from the minds of WASP Americans, as documented in E. Digby Baltzell's *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America.*

In reality, the restructuring recommended by the Bundy Panel represented an attack on the power of the middle-level professional class, rather than a distribution of the power of the constituencies represented in the preparation of the report. By altering only the lower levels of organization of the school system, the recommendations left the interests of the Protestant elite literally untouched, if not enhanced, while posing a threat to the security of the civil service employees. This is not to imply that this threat was not a justifiable response to the proven incompetence and entrenched racism of this stratum; their failure to exercise their function as educators alone would mandate their removal from positions of influence. But the hatred which the black community felt for this group of paid assassins hardly constituted a new threat, and the failure of the black community to formulate these feelings into a serious challenge demonstrated their irrelevance to the alignment of power within the political intricacies of New York City.

On the other hand, the Bundy Report did represent interests significant enough to make their attack on the bureaucracy a substantive one. Further, they thought that instead of a confrontation, this attack

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would almost be a simple coup de grace. In the phrasing supplied by Dr. Gittell:

What I think was misread by people like Bundy, and Lindsay, and Rockefeller — if I may say so — was the power of the union and that middle group of professionals. They thought that they could give away their power. 12

In the ethnic terms necessitated by the composition of New York City, the WASP elite assumed that they could dispense with the influence assumed by the Jewish professional class of educators. Albert Shanker has convincingly disproven the validity of this assumption.

Marilyn Gittell's anecdote about the attitudes of the panel she served explains far more than the ethnic attitudes of Protestant Americans: her statement literally casts the origins of the confrontation into an entirely different light. In the preceding pages the impotence of the black community in the face of the political power of white interests has been demonstrated time after time; thus the community alone could obviously not seriously challenge a solidly unified white community. This was a fact of political life accepted by all parties prior to the New York school crisis. Thus, what established Ocean Hill-Brownsville as a serious threat was not the attitudes of the black community, or the sophistication of its leadership, but the decision of elements within the white elite to make another segment of the white community vulnerable. In other words, the original precipitation of the crisis came from the decision of New York's political elite to permit an attack on its middle-level bureaucracy. Clearly,

the basis of this decision lay in the violent revolt of the black community against its oppressors, but the decision itself was not made by the black community. Simply, Ocean Hill was the manifestation of one element within the white community's attempt to placate the black movement at the expense of another segment of the white community. From this assertion one can deduce the hypothesis that the black community was being used as a pawn in a political struggle which had its origin within the white community.

I fervently believe that the perspective on the events of 1967-1970 elaborated above is the only one which adequately explains the complexity of the derivative issues, preeminently the charge of black anti-Semitism by Albert Shanker and the Union. The importance of this spectre can not be underestimated. Many people claim that the degeneration of the conflict in the eyes of the public into a black vs. Jew struggle determined the course of events; hence, a thorough understanding of this charge is essential. At this point, it would be counter-productive to retrace all the argumentative steps: the fact that black anti-Semitism is at a lower rate nationally than is white anti-Semitism; the traditional role of the Jewish community in black neighborhoods; distribution of anti-Semitic literature by the U.F.T. itself; the vicious utilization of the charge of anti-Semitism by Shanker and the media to create public hysteria; and the consistent stand of the unit administrator and the Governing Board against manifestations of anti-Semitism within the demonstration district. At this writing, such arguments are a matter of public record. But the
relationship between the sociological analysis provided by Dr. Gittell and the position taken by Albert Shanker and his faction of the United Federation of Teachers casts an important light on these known arguments.

The Bundy Panel represented the thoughts of the Protestant political and corporate elite of New York City. The allegiances of this group lay primarily with the national perspective of the major financial concerns located in Manhattan. As a comprehensive Newsweek survey graphically illustrated, the personnel practices of these major corporations have traditionally been anti-Semitic, allowing few Jews entrance into the operation, and always at positions salaried no higher than twelve to fifteen thousand dollars a year. This exclusion, Newsweek asserts, forced upwardly mobile Jews into middle-level professional or bureaucratic positions. Surely the massive entrance of Jews into the teaching corps of New York City was not the result of a collective choice, but a necessary response to discrimination by the corporate sector.

Given this perspective, the attack by the Bundy Panel on the power of the middle-level school professional can be seen as another extension of their traditionally anti-Semitic policies: placate the blacks at the expense of the Jews who have been traditionally a marginal concern. Within this context Shanker's charge of black anti-Semitism is a tragic confusion of the proximity of the actors with the fundamental power of the playwright. Discarding this metaphorical allusion,

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the attack on Jewish interests stems not from the black community, but from the mutual oppressor of the black and Jewish minorities: the Protestant corporate and financial establishment. Shanker's anger should more properly have been directed at those who had the power to jeopardize his position rather than against those who had no power at all.

The explication of the preceding point of discussion amongst the panelists has been made primarily because of the importance of the issues in question. Fantini's, Ferretti's, and Gittell's statements are of great use to anyone attempting to discern intelligible patterns within the debris of Ocean Hill-Brownville. However, this explication has a secondary purpose. Given what has been said above, how does one attempt to develop such rational hypotheses, and what definition of "reason" is necessitated by such an attempt? As our society continues to promulgate the myth of rational social behavior, the question is central to any study of the school crisis. Particularly in liberal academic circles, a particular series of subjective assumptions are held as dogmatic laws or theories which explain social events in all their complexity. Academicians, politicians, and more than a few of the assembled panelists attempted to fall back upon these "truths" when pressed by Dr. Calvin to develop hypotheses.

In one of the more intelligent comments made in any of the five sessions, Dr. Clark tries to put an end to such self-serving speculations. To adequately appreciate his ensuing series of remarks, one must be aware of the position which he occupied during the confrontation.
As a black man with an established local and national reputation, he held a unique perspective on the events, and the political position to translate that perspective into constructive actions. Specifically, as a member of the New York State Board of Regents, Dr. Clark's access to Commissioner Allen helped to sensitize the Commissioner to the position of the black community in the city. Being in Albany and being familiar with white liberal circles in New York, Dr. Clark can comment on that group with authority. The "moderate, liberal, intellectual's" approach to the injustice and inequity in American society crystalized around the violence; while there had been room for ambiguity as long as Alabama remained the battlefield, no such lassitude existed in Brownsville. With a certain amount of sarcasm, Clark paraphrases this position:

"... if you manage it; well, you know, if you are thoughtful, if you are reasonable and rational and sit around the table with the parties that interest you, you will be able to come out with a rational approach in the program for institutional reforms and that this will make everyone happy."15

Those operating within this framework perceived the politics of the community in Ocean Hill-Brownsville as an unnecessary violation of natural laws, not as an affront to a particular political posture, but as a negation of the rules of culture itself. Now, speaking in a mocking tone of voice, Clark apes the opinion of bourgeois intellectuals:


15 Ibid.
And if only Rev. Oliver were a more reasonable person, if only Rhody McCoy were a little less intransigent, if only Al Shanker were not given to striking over-statements, then Bernie Donovan, Jim Allen, Ken Clark would have the world the way we would like it - you know, we like a manageable, soft-spoken world in which decisions are made intelligently and rationally and with some regard to equity. That's one answer...16

These "militant" or simply intransigent leaders, by the force of their personalities, disrupted the logical solution of the crisis, and, in Clark's best phrase, "they postponed the nirvana of rationalism."17

Hopefully, the analysis of the necessity of the violent interaction of social classes or movements precludes the reader's acceptance of this line of argumentation. History is not created by the personalities of men, rather by the pre-determined struggle between those who have and those who have not, between those who are in power and those who are oppressed. Clark himself clearly stated that there is really no evidence to support the rational, liberal case; that anyone who asserts such a line of argumentation does so on the basis of faith rather than on the basis of an examination of the facts in this incident, or of the historical processes in general. With the issue phrased in such an unambiguous fashion, only Calvin seeks to debate the point. The remainder of the panelists silently accept the verdict. In other words, they fail to challenge a position which undermines the validity of endeavors to which they are committed far beyond their participation in the panel sessions.


17 Ibid., p. 155.
Caught in such a vicious contradiction the panelists had two alternatives. First, they could begin to construct a new, or different, series of causal assertions which would better explain the events or, at least, a case that could be even slightly substantiated by the data. Secondly, the panelists could continue to operate along false premises, repressing the knowledge of the insipid theoretical foundation upon which they were operating. Significantly, they continued in pursuit of Calvin's elusive hypothesis and thus became engulfed in a mass of trivial details, none of which they could either categorize or place in a proper analytical perspective.

It is ironic to note that Dr. Clark is among the first to continue as if the model which political scientists created in the 1950's actually held validity. After ridiculing the white liberal view of the intransigence of the leadership in Ocean Hill, he assumes the same posture when speaking on a theoretical plane:

I'd like to . . . to formulate a vague hypothesis, that in the initial stages of problems . . . maybe the decision-makers are not responding with high focus and high clarity to the variety of interest groups that are in some way related to the eventual decision . . . .

This is a pretty statement. It implies that by sensitizing the leadership to the complexity of the situation they command, the overt actions which polarize social movements will be prevented. A mere ten minutes later, Clark has adopted the academic guise and proclaims the uses of reason. In reality, groups are polarized by their economic status,

\[18\] Clark, Transcript of Panel Three, January 18, 1971, p. 165.
and by the conflicting goals which germinate from that economic status. The actions of their leadership hardly create antagonism; they merely translate the predetermined conflict into political strategies. But none of the panelists can see this. Even though they have stated that no evidence can be found to support the "rational, liberal" case, they continue to analyze the confrontation as if that model was an accepted fact. This continued denial of the obvious forces the panel to descend into trivia. Because they lack the proper theoretical orientation to establish hypothetical relationships, they must degenerate into pointless discussions of political behavior.

I do not wish to become mired in this rhetoric, but one example might help to clarify the situation. Dr. Gittell, Dr. Clark, and Reverend Galamison become involved in a simply marvelous discussion about what determined the outcome of the vote in Albany on the decentralization bill. Someone suggests that Ocean Hill was voted out of existence because the largest number of voters in New York state was against the continuation of the experiment. As a counter to this pure model of representative democracy, it is suggested that the side that tried hardest to influence the legislature won; that the intensity of the lobbying determined the outcome. Dr. Clark counters with the claim that the amount of money at the disposal of the United Federation of Teachers proved the crucial difference; that financial leverage applied by organized labor allowed the passage of the Marchi bill. Milton Galamison supplies an apt conclusion by verbalizing his hope that in the future victorious coalitions will be founded upon a common adoption of correct moral principles.
While the above summary may be rather glib, it accurately conveys the level of discussion which characterized the remainder of Panel Three. While certain side comments were of inherent value, the systematic attempt to formulate hypotheses was a failure, if not an outright mockery. Their logical systems, or academic models, applied only to books, being of little value in attempting to explain the realities of a black-white confrontation in an urban area. Because of this failure to develop rational principles, no adequate hypothetical statements could be made about the issues and implications of the New York school crisis. From this fact the candidate does not draw the implication that no theoretical assertions can be made with reference to Ocean Hill-Brownsville; rather, the prevailing myths passively accepted by the panelists limited the scope of their imagination, rendering them incapable of rationally organizing the data which they themselves presented. It is the intent of the candidate to develop in the ensuing chapters a model which will not only place Ocean Hill-Brownsville in its appropriate social context, but will act as a predictive device, or analytical tool for the understanding of the conflicts which characterize urban school systems in general.
CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA: PANEL FOUR

In Panels Two and Three it was the intent of the candidate to pursue a course designed to elicit from the panelists (1) possible options which would have either mitigated or avoided the confrontation at Ocean Hill-Brownsville, or (2) hypothetical assertions necessary for the construction of a theoretical model abstracted from the New York situation and applicable to urban school districts nationally. At the direction of the candidate, Dr. Calvin repeatedly attempted to channel the course of the discussion to achieve the above goals. As a perusal of the actual transcripts and an examination of the corresponding analyses of the data demonstrates, the panelists at that time were unable to address themselves realistically to the creation of either alternatives or hypothetical relationships. It is within this context that the fourth panel began its unrelenting dissection of public education in America, declaring that the schools were, in fact, predetermined failures and that no options existed to this genocidal assault upon the black community. After it became apparent that the amorphous and academic discussions of hypothetical models had terminated, the panelists began to discuss education and the implications of the politics of education with an almost unbelievable change in attitude and direction. The panelists began to allude to the realities and to tell the stark truth about the present state of public education and the implications that can be legitimately drawn from this condition.
The structure of this discussion was provided by the ongoing events stemming from the Newark, New Jersey, teachers' strike. It was fortunate that the educational eruption in Newark occurred simultaneously with the retrieval of data by the candidate, for it provided an illuminating effect on the issues of New York City and offered many peripheral issues and possibilities of options for discussion and comparison. In the original design of the study, no mention was made of using another city as a comparative model. The candidate did, nevertheless, view the original design of the study, the proposal itself, as the guideline for a flexible endeavor, one which would actively engage the participants in a fashion best suited to the expression of their views. This flexibility allowed the candidate to utilize the Newark strike as a device pursuant to the objectives of the study. The example of Newark proved valuable for a series of interlocking reasons: (1) Newark is now generally assumed to be a black controlled city. The election of Kenneth Gibson as Newark's Mayor signified to the nation a racial transfer of power to a far greater extent than did the elections of Hatcher or Stokes in Gary, Indiana and Cleveland, Ohio, respectively. As the Mayor, the president of the school board, and the head of the teacher's union are all black people, Newark set the stage for an examination of the meaning of "black" leadership both locally and nationally; and (3) more than any other subsequent event, the Newark strike parallels the strike which threatened Ocean Hill, allowing the candidate and the panelists to use two situations to develop theoretical statements about urban education. The practical application of this methodological approach means that while the objective of the discussion centered on an understanding
of the New York situation, the issues in question were structured along the lines suggested by the example of Newark.

As the Newark strike has failed to draw the national attention which focused in Ocean Hill, an omission due in part to the absence of whites as visible actors, background information must be provided if the educational issues are to be understood. Newark has a black mayor who inherited a bankrupt city. Many observers suggest that a causal linkage exists between those two facts: that only because the city was bankrupt could a black man have inherited it. The president of the Newark Teachers' Association is a black woman despite the fact that the larger percentage of the membership is white. It has been suggested that her election to the presidency was only a tactic used to give the illusion of the sensitivity, merit, and liberalism of the Teachers' Association. It was viewed that having a black woman rather than an Albert Shanker would thwart charges of racial prejudice levelled against the Union, regardless of the actions of the Union. On the other hand, the Union hoped that installing a black person as its president would placate the militancy of the black community. The Teachers' Association introduced the black brainchild of the New York United Federation of Teachers, Bayard Rustin, to preach the virtues of unions, and to "explain" what unions have done for minorities, especially for black people. His role was to create the illusion that the black militants are hell-bent on taking over the schools for political reasons and, out of a malicious desire, to break the Union. He is not to discuss the power play and the financial demands of the Union.
This unpleasant picture of blacks attacking other blacks gives white America its opportunity to reinforce its belief that blacks are irresponsible children, continually acting in an unreasonable fashion. There are two more actors involved. The school board is predominantly black and its leading spokesman is a black man. Unsophisticated, but out of necessity learning quickly, he echoes the popular rhetoric of wanting to make public education accountable to the people. Any such melodrama, created and sustained by the white interests in cooperation with the white media, needs its "bad nigger": Ocean Hill had its Les Campbell, Newark, as always, has LeRoi Jones, "the separatist who has made Gibson his flunky."¹ The legitimacy of Jones' spoken word is obscured by the media's attempt to keep the issues obscured and the races polarized.

The only white actor on this stage represented the Central Labor Council. This "leader of men" valiantly states that no matter what the children of Newark have to suffer (these children, incidentally, are black) the "black militants" will not crush or destroy the Union. The vested interests of the Labor Council must be supported; this support allowing the Teachers' Association to transform the danger of a strike into an opportunity to gain power. Somehow the educational issues supposedly central to an educational institution are no longer visible. Instead of children, the wheels revolve around money, power, and the combination of those two which we call politics.

¹ Commonly used phrase used for LeRoi Jones' relationship to Kenneth Gibson.
Given this complex background, facts must be separated from fiction, and mere opinion from deliberate falsification. Ideally, in other words, if it were not for politics, this would be the function of journalism. Such a public service is contingent upon an awareness of the motives of those who provide information, their methods, and the audience they reach. The timing with which the news, or what actually is public relations, reaches the public is equally important. Thus, the writer cannot but feel that the series of columns entitled "Where we Stand" in the Sunday New York Times represents a deliberate strategy and one which is a disservice to education. Aside from the dubious validity of an organization which has a regular newsletter published periodically on the education page, a "freedom" bought with incredible sums of money, the propaganda disseminated is indicative of tremendous organizational skill and power. In this sense, Shanker's column on Newark is a classic.

Ironically opening with an attack on the media, the article stated that the public has been told little or nothing about the realities of Newark. Shanker claimed that the black mayor was attempting to make the teachers the scapegoat for the economic plight of the city. Curiously enough, there was no mention of the children. Either Shanker was deliberately lying, or his memory was short. Gibson inherited a corrupt and bankrupt system; in listing his priorities, education was at the top, as was his commitment to a unified city. He asked for federal and state aid to achieve these ends. After this innuendo at the Mayor, the article explicitly evoked the pro forma spectre of "black militancy." Knowing how

to capture liberal sentiments, he attacked the black community for its failure to limit itself to pastoral language and academic discussion, specifying the militants' virulence and stridency. Certainly, this was an odd posture for Mr. Shanker. In completing this beautifully structured introduction, he linked Gibson to the militants by falsely charging the Mayor with failure to decry violence against teachers. Once such a presentation has dissipated the slightest interest to investigate the facts of the situation, Shanker dispensed his version of the truth.

In dealing with the actual transcription of the panel session, a discussion of the contributions of individual participants will be followed by a structural review of the key issues embodied in these remarks. Initially, Dr. Mario Fantini acknowledged a basic similarity in pattern between the two cities, though he prefaced his remarks by stating that New York City was farther along its path of deterioration than Newark. If, then, this is the future of all systems of public education in America, the concentration of forces that shape our society must create the resources to deal with the disaster much in the same manner as the President designates certain state disaster areas after floods or earthquakes. But Fantini's assertion itself demonstrates the paucity of options, not only for Ocean Hill, but also for Newark. Because these actions must be taken by those in power, the positions of the participants in Newark are of no consequence; their actions a macabre dance of the powerless. Further, these powers are embodied in institutions with a
structural interest in self preservation. Any attempt to create a counter force capable of destroying these institutions, or even neutralizing them (a reformist option) is politically an impossibility. The origins of the crisis exist in every major American city; the fact that the forces of the oppositions are impregnable make it inevitable that there will be other Ocean Hill-Brownsvilles, perhaps in different forms, but with the same characteristics. The only tangible result of anyone attempting to break out of this pattern will be violent political repression, an indication that change cannot be expected in the near future.

The country was aware of Newark's financial bankruptcy; many were cognizant of the fiscal impossibility of the city meeting the teachers' contract demands; thus, the events of those weeks must be part of a predetermined script with a particular cast of characters. It is the position of the candidate that all school systems in the process of reform can predict the behavior of its indigenous set of actors by reference to this script.

Dr. Fanitini simply suggested the defeat was inevitable in Newark and in Ocean Hill-Brownsville once the black community altered its role from that of the docile victims to an active force in the shaping of its own destiny. Speaking as one who precipitated the original proposal for the demonstration districts, Dr. Fantini clearly asserted that Ocean Hill-Brownsville was never meant to take itself seriously, never meant to assume that the slave owners of New York City had partially given freedom to their colony. Once the educational establishment became aware that the blacks had gotten presumptuous enough to act as if they
were equals, it moved expeditiously to reestablish the status quo, attempting to protect all of the vested interest groups by denigrating the legitimate actions of black people as the insane acts of savages gone crazy in the jungle.

Dr. Clark viewed the situation in Newark as stemming more directly from economic causes and labor interests than the Ocean Hill confrontation. The power of these interests, from this perspective, over-rode strictly racial considerations. Thus, Dr. Clark felt that Bayard Rustin's role was to convince the black teachers to support the Union despite his apparent failure to convince himself of that fact. Supposedly, poor whites and poor blacks should join together in the labor movement for the mutual benefit of everyone involved. Rustin's hope was to force middle-class aspirations onto black people in an effort to dilute their militancy. This attempt at co-option parallels the attempt in 1967 by the U.F.T. to obtain the support of the community for its exclusionary policies. The purpose of striving for such support, essentially useless to the Union, was only to remove a slight irritant that could inconveniently dissipate some energies.

But Clark's objective at this point is broader than a delineation of the Union's manipulation of one man in an attempt to control the black community. The core of his remarks impute that the educational process has been contaminated by a power group that has no interest in the process of education, only in the power which stems from the fiscal allocations to education. Historically, American liberals
have mobilized to isolate, in their terminology, educational institutions from political or ideological hacks attempting to rape the educational process. In actuality, this attempt has been a guise to enforce in a totalitarian fashion the instruction of liberal, racist dogma. But Newark signals the emergence of a new kind of pariah, a new kind of power seeking to contaminate the educational process. This new danger was not so apparent because at its source allegedly were people within the educational schematism. This illusion will take a long time to dissolve because these unionists cannot be categorized as hack politicians or reactionaries, an exemption that enables them to mobilize the liberal sector of our intelligencia to their defense. Education then becomes a form of the labor movement: the subjugation of the school system by the teacher unions with the support of organized labor as a whole. The role of the educator will become that of an agent by which the union contract will be negotiated, the stipulations of that contract dictating educational policy for the contract period. Thus the right to structure the educational environment will have passed from the hack administrators to the hacks of the labor movement; the community, particularly the black community, is considered, as usual, to be irrelevant to this neat sharing of power.

Even though the pronouncements which characterized the fourth panel were remarkably realistic, two options or methods to break this stranglehold were proposed: Fantini looked to the corporate sector for relief generated by economic self-interest; and Ferretti imagined that
a political power base could be constructed. Both options are traps which fail to recognize either the essential motivation of the corporate structure, or the sickness of the political structure which these corporate interests control.

The cost of education has dramatically risen in the last ten years. The vast majority of these increases has been in response to (1) higher teacher salaries; (2) larger teacher benefit packages; and (3) the need to hire an increased number of teachers to maintain class sizes due to the reduction in the classroom load dictated by the Union contract. As the cost of education rises, society continues to pay for the peripheral costs stemming from the inadequacy of public education, i.e. welfare, etc. As Fantini recognized that community groups have, in the past, lacked the organizational resources to mount an effective assault, he looked for the corporate structure, out of pure self-interest, to seek to redesign public education. Not only do the corporations feel the societal effects of a rotten educational system, but they are forced to expend millions of dollars to retrain employees and prospective employees in basic skills that should be learned in the schools. This combination of expenses, Fantini hoped, would convince the corporate sector that it would be much more economical to educate children properly. In other words, operating from the perspective dictated by the profit motive, corporations themselves would lead the reform movement.

This position has two inherent flaws. One, as the analysis stemming from Marilyn Gittell's statement in the last panel indicates,
the corporate sectors lack this autonomous control. Any educational movement led by the financial elite that would threaten middle income jobs would be viciously fought and ultimately defeated by those tragically caught in the squeeze between the power of the oppressors and the demands for liberation by the oppressed. Secondly, the purpose of American business is financial exploitation, particularly of minority groups. The skill of a businessman, i.e. his ability to realize a profit, demands this ability to exploit. Thus any educational opportunities offered could only be in one of two roles: training to be a participant in the exploitation of our brothers, or training to be a flunky, i.e. to be exploited as a worker. Oddly enough, these two fundamental propositions adequately explain the existing school system, one that serves the function of dividing the exploiters from the exploited. Such schools are the perfect tool of capitalist oppression and must ultimately be destroyed by the white and black people of our cities. Thus, what Dr. Fantini in his naivete proposed as an option actually serves as an explanatory tool in the understanding of the lack of options within the existing political and economic system of oppression in America.

Mr. Ferretti from the New York Times seemed to feel that the reform of education can come from the political apparatus of the nation. The claim is suspect on grounds inherent in its operational procedure, i.e. those grounds which are built upon the subservience of that apparatus to the economic concerns of capital and co-opted labor. Leaving this theoretical mode of attack, the best refutation of Ferretti's hopes comes from later statements made by Ferretti himself. He explains
how South Jamaica, a black area represented by one state assembly-
man and one city councilman, was neutralized as a base for black in-
fluence in the educational areas by the guidelines allegedly drawn
by the U.F.T. charter heads for the decentralization boundaries:
South Jamaica was split in thirds, each segment being subsumed with-
in a larger white voting block. Given the housing patterns and the
corresponding gerrymandering, faith in the electoral system at best
represents a compromise with one's oppressors. When Ferretti utilizes
electoral terminology and speaks of the necessity of making a coal-
tion to obtain political clout, he can only mean that the black com-
munity should endorse gradualism and paternalism. For to be an equal
partner in such a coalition, one must have something of value to trade.
The only power of the poor in America is the power to destroy; the
power of violent and suicidal assault upon the white man. Since Watts
the threat of murder has held a certain political advantage. But given
the failure of black people to, as yet, mount a truly revolutionary
army, such violence only leads to the ruthless repression of the people;
hopefully, such repression will ultimately turn the tables, moving in
such forces as to create a true army which will liberate black, white,
and Third World people. Waiting for this auspicious event, educators
cannot rely on the slow process of legislative action; it is not our
function to stand idly by and watch the destruction of children.

One might assume from the virulence which has characterized the
preceding discussion that the unions, the teacher's union in particu-
lar, has been cast as the "bad guys" because of their economic power.
These powers, when translated into the political arena, have allowed
the unions to take control over educational institutions. But I wish to reiterate a position often stated above: that this characterization is far too simplistic an analysis of America's economic structure. Inherently, unions attempt to counterbalance the exploitative force of capital with the collective strength of workingman organizations. Capital forces them to become strong in order that labor might minimally protect itself. Thus, one may have no doubt about the necessity for the political strength of the union movement. However, when this strength originally garnered to protect the working man from the exploitation of his labor becomes a tool in the exploitation of others, the union movement becomes a tragic perversion of its original inception, transforming an enemy of inequality to a perpetrator of racial and economic discrimination. But, it must be remembered that this reactionary trend is a response to the initial exploitation of the labor force. Thus, the real villain must be the monied interests which originally forced labor to organize in order to protect its right to exist on a human level. It is only the perversion and sickness of the labor movement that has deflected their attack against those in power to those who are utterly powerless. In practical terms, the Union should attack those who originally plundered Newark, those who originally raped Ocean Hill-Brownsville, instead of fighting with black people for the meagre remains of the financial carcass.

What I have attempted to describe above is the ability of monied interests to turn the various subservient groups against each other, debilitating any revolutionary movement and obscuring the true enemy.
Simply, the rich may observe the battle while their underlings attack each other, then enter to collect the spoils. This policy stems from conscious strategic decisions which those in power have the money to implement. Needless to say, it is an unbelievable tragedy to observe this phenomenon existing within the black community: black men serving the oppressors' function against black people.

The decision of black men to become pimps against their own people represents the most ominous portent for the future of black and Third World leadership. For the purposes of this analysis, the discussion will draw data from three sources: Kenneth Clark's experience in Washington, D.C., the absorption of paraprofessionals into the United Federation of Teachers in New York City, and the career of Assemblyman Sam Wright, including the future of District 17 under his leadership.

In many respects Washington appears to be similar to Newark: the majority of the voters are black, the majority of the school children are black, the head of the school board is black, and the head of the teachers' union is black. Washington does differ in two important respects: one, the Superintendent of Schools is also black, and the white power structure has enough invested in the prestige of Washington and in the pretty white marble edifices in Washington not to abandon the city after the plunder as they did in Newark. Admitting the naivete of his prior conceptions, Dr. Clark assumed that this apparent racial solidarity would open the door to a realistic attempt to improve the academic achievement of black children. In the absence
of the white man, black people would be able to come together and literally begin to teach black children how to read and write. Instead of this coalition, Clark met intransigent opposition and his alternatives suffered a complete defeat. This defeat, as opposed to that dealt Ocean Hill, was done in a more polite fashion; meaning that the white power did not have to surface as they had the blacks tearing each other apart. In place of Bernard Donovan and Al Shanker, the Washington stage featured a black superintendent and a black union leader who explained that one really cannot just come into a school system and teach black children how to read.

The script literally is a rewrite of the one used for Ocean Hill and Newark. The only alteration made involved a simple substitution of black actors into the roles created by white men. These "pimps" simply assume the role vacated and take on the job of continuing the genocidal treatment of their own people. The system is so lucrative that it can, just as it perverted the labor movement, pervert black man into the protectors of the elite. Clark's concluding phrase in this discussion, "... so you're asking me for alternatives? See me tomorrow."\(^3\) is a glib one. He masks a tragic reality: simply putting black faces in white roles does not change the script. Co-opted by the affluence offered like water to a thirsty man, black people will aid in the oppression of their brothers.

It would be an error to assume that this co-option of black people occurs only on the higher levels of the bureaucracy. Black

\(^{3}\)Clark, Transcript of Panel Four, February 17, 1971, p. 254.
people have been enslaved in such a marginal economic position that an offer of very little has the potential of purchasing a great deal. The relationship between the paraprofessionals and the U.F.T. in New York City provides a classic example of this pathetic inability to maintain the dignity of one's allegiances. The majority of these paraprofessionals had developed a long standing hatred of Shanker and all his union represented to the black community: racism, the disruptive child issue, the Ocean Hill strikes, and the simple failure of the membership to educate the children of the paraprofessionals. These people gained entrance to the system under the Career Opportunities concept, a method of involving indigenous community people strongly identified with the cultural tradition of the neighborhood in the classroom.

Unfortunately, once in the system, certain paraprofessionals sought to rise to middle-class professional status at the expense of their allegiances to their roots and, in fact, to the purposes of their involvement. This drive for money led them to seek out and ultimately accept the "protection" of the Union, or simply to receive the benefits of unionization without publically supporting the Union. Inevitably, they will enter the programmed cycles, assuming the roles created by the whites whose dirty work they perform. From another perspective one is forced to ask what they have received for their sellout. Shanker was able to absorb them, then literally attack rather than defend their interests. They have no representation on the Governing Council and above all, the Union hardly noticed the fact that fifty per cent of them
lost their jobs last year. As Dr. Clark suggests, they are not members of the Union, but colonial subjects open to exploitation by the Union. All they received in return is the opportunity gladly given by Shanker to, in turn, exploit their own people.

Many people directly involved in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville struggle have perceived from the newspapers that Sam Wright is the master of such exploitative techniques. They claim that Wright, in building his political empire, has managed to mortgage the future of the black people in his district to buy personal political power, an achievement that can only benefit white people. In the face of this assertion, Dr. Clark said that Mr. Wright may, in reality, represent a brilliant and covert strategy being executed for the benefit of all his constituency. Though it is difficult to tell how serious an intellectual attempt this discussion represents, Clark postulated that Wright is aware of the fact that control will never be achieved in the fashion outlined by McCoy, Oliver and company. Profiting from their "mistakes," the good assemblyman has decided to pretend to be the enemy of the "militants," thereby giving the illusion that he is supportive of the establishment while building a political climate acceptable to white, middle-class America. The covert strategy which rationalizes these actions is supposedly the ultimate goal of assuming power under the guise of moderation, then turning this newly won right to control over to the community.

Such a position contradicts the facts of the style in which Wright runs his district, the political sophistication of the white
community, and the effect which Wright's dictatorship has had on the school community relationships in Ocean Hill. Wright, perhaps in co-operation with the Brooklyn democratic machine, runs the district for the sole purpose of the aggrandizements of his power. The use of physical force and financial exploitation has been charged to him and his organization. As a result of this mode of procedure, the black community learns to be treated as colonial subjects of a black man. The residents are not worthy of consultation, or dignity; their only value lies in what they have that can be taken away. No matter what Clark asserted about a "hidden agenda,"\textsuperscript{4} such a style can only lead to the continued destruction of the political sophistication of the black masses: the white man's game played by a black machine.

Secondly, as Reverend Oliver astutely points out, no white man is about to give Sam Wright power that he might even possibly use to benefit black people: the power to destroy, perhaps, but never the power to create. Oliver says it very clearly:

I don't think the establishment for a moment would allow him to gain that kind of power if he is going to use it for the benefit of the black people; and I think that the only reason that he can do what he is doing is so that he can hold the lid on and keep the natives happy.\textsuperscript{5}

In other words, Wright's job is to placate the masses. In return, the white powers allow this hack to nibble a small corner of their pies. Again, it is pitiful to watch black people turned into the enemy of the people by those who are in reality the common enemy.

\textsuperscript{4}Clark, Transcript of Panel Four, February 17, 1971, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{5}Oliver, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 232.
The final refutation of Clark's position comes directly from the chaos in the district which has resulted from Sam Wright's rule. Instead of building the faith of the white establishment in the self-governing powers of black people, Wright has staged a protracted demonstration of his inability to pacify people who seriously want their children to be educated. The sequence of protests, boycotts, confrontations, transfer of teachers, charges of fiscal mismanagement, culminating in the removal of the district superintendent, illustrates that the local community never accepted either the new Governing Board or the new administrative staff. The new local board is viewed not as a force for liberation, but as a tool in the hands of the Central Board; and the district superintendent is perceived just as a stand-in for the old city superintendent, Bernard Donovan. Even the New York Times continues to delight in the spectacle of black people ripping each other apart.

These case studies illustrate the failure of black "leadership" in Washington, New York City, and Newark. The mere introduction of black faces into the various levels of the educational bureaucracy, even at the top of the bureaucracy, does not affect the quality of education offered to black children. No matter how painful this failure is for the black community to confront, anyone seeking the revolution within the school system must consider that in addition to race prejudice, the factors of economic class dividing the black community itself threatens to continue the style of the white man's rule in black hands. Just as the white community destroys its own in the interest of status
and money, certain black leaders seem willing to place personal powers above the welfare of the people.

The conclusions which one is forced to derive from the example of Newark, the experience of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and the co-option of black leadership are not pleasant ones; their essence attacks the foundation of American capitalistic society. Yet once comprehended, the ramifications of the conclusions allow for the construction of a model capable of explaining the varied crises in urban education. In other words, once the theoretical basis is sound, the rational statements which stem from these premises have predictive value. At this point, we shall deal with three conclusions drawn directly from the transcription of the panel.

Mario Fantini is a man with a great deal of faith in American mythologies. Thus, his complete rejection of the myths of American education indicates a profound effort to confront illusion with reality. Towards the end of Panel Four, Fantini simply states that education is important to Americans only as means to achieve socio-economic power. Not only do various community groups and union organizations see the educational structures as providing a vehicle for their organization aggrandizement, races and social classes in America utilize education as a means of either perpetuating or combatting oppression. The perspective of the Teacher's Union towards educational policy stems not from their concern, even their minimal acknowledgment of children, but from their desire to protect their economic position. In a broader context, all of white, middle-class America must view the education of
black children in the same fashion: they must be kept servile by destroying their minds and bodies with bad food, bad housing, and bad schools. For this sector the schools are not failures, but triumphant successes in training the black masses for a life of oppression. Schools in this sense do not educate but socialize.

The black community, particularly in Ocean Hill, perceived this correlation. Our people are aware that the failure to be educated leads to the impossibility of competing on the social and economic fronts. Thus the black communities' fight for education can be reduced to a basic revolutionary struggle of black people in America. In the broadest sense of the term, the battle over education is a battle for power in American society. Those who profit from the degradation of black people cannot afford an educated black public. Watching the destruction of our children, the black community can no longer tolerate schools which are instrumental in genocidal policy.

This background gives some meaning to a series of assertions by Dr. Clark:

... what I have really learned during these last three years with disturbingly stark clarity was that the resistance educating our kids under any conditions is greater than the resistance to desegregation, now that is an appallingly disturbing lesson.6

Clark speaks of the efforts to integrate ghetto schools and then, in his words, "confesses" that:

... I didn't realize that that was almost child's play compared to the resistance against any way of increasing the quality of education for our children. That any serious proposal to have our kids academically competitive ... is going to meet a furious resistance initially disguised under all kinds of

6Clark, Transcript of Panel Four, February 17, 1971, p. 258.
procedural matter, due process, sometimes even humanistic concerns... but if you keep pushing, you aren't going to get but hard, sparse, bludgeoningly, God damn it no...

Once the desegregation issue slips into the background, the racial motivation for the miseducation of blacks becomes less valid as an explanatory hypothesis. White Americans not only refuse to have their children educated with black children, but they refuse to have black children educated at all. The real reason is not an inbred repugnance to associations with educated Negroes, but a very complex understanding that educated Negroes make poor bus boys. Because, as Fantini comprehended, education can be translated into socio-economic power, no white community is about to educate its black population. To thwart any community controlled attempt the oppressors will use any gimmick at their disposal: due processes, unions, procedural questions, laws, etc. The particular strategy is actually irrelevant; the device is a vehicle which the white community has the power to arbitrarily enforce. The white community understands the necessity of controlling black children, and possesses the power to implement that conscious decision. How they do it really matters very little once it is done.

The understanding which one draws from these conclusions is brutally simple: until a violent revolution occurs, school systems will continue to perpetrate genocidal practices against black children; that for political, social and economic reasons, the white community cannot tolerate the existence of a trained black mass; that the battle over educational issues is simply a front from the vicious struggle for

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7Clark, Transcript of Panel Four, February 17, 1971, p. 258.
social power in America; and that in the short run, Newark, Ocean Hill, Chicago, Detroit, and Washington are hopeless battles, fought more for the preservation of dignity than with the expectation of victory. There exists no softer language to accurately describe the context of the educational struggle.
CHAPTER VIII

ANALYSIS OF THE PANEL: PANEL FIVE

In the preceding four analytical chapters attempts were made to deal with the specific incidents which comprised the confrontation over Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and the issues raised by the participants in connection with these events. This procedure has resulted in a series of lengthy arguments, factual presentations, polemical assertions, and moral statements. The purpose of the discourse was to provide the reader with an adequate understanding of the events which took place in Ocean Hill-Brownsville from 1967 to 1970, while debunking several supposedly valid explanations of urban education in general. The fifth panel added little to this effort. As in the previous session, the panelists realistically and perceptively commented upon the activity in question, and although certain points were clarified or underscored, no significant new information emerged. Thus, while the rhetoric necessitates perusal of the final session, its clarity negates the necessity of an expanded analysis. Instead, this chapter will use the data of the fifth panel to synthesize and summarize the analyses of the previous four sessions in an attempt to develop (1) a model of the political structure which affects urban education, and (2) a series of conclusions and observations about the effect which that political structure has on urban education. As has been the practice of this dissertation, the terminology of the model and the conclusions will have that of New York
City idiom, though the assertions themselves have descriptive and predictive value nationally.

Any understanding of the political substructure affecting the institution of public education must originate from a comprehension of the linkage between education and the struggle for economic status in American society. As was documented in previous chapters, the underlying motives of the black community and our black and white antagonists originate in economic concerns. Public education is perceived by both groups not simply as an "instructional process", but as a determinant of future socio-economic status. Thus, any fight over education is, at its foundation, a fight for money. This antagonism stems from two sources: one direct, the other indirect. The former stems from the money allocated to education. Not only are teacher's unions viciously destroying any efforts toward the reform of education in order to preserve control over their increasingly large share of the budget, but other peripherally involved interests make their influence felt. For example, the analysis of Panel Three mentions the overriding importance of the intervention of the construction unions in the New York crisis. The sums of money currently available to labor unions and textbook publishers are so vast as to compel those interest groups to preserve the status quo. Obviously, any significant alteration in the power structure of education would seriously threaten their economic well-being. Thus, for reasons that have nothing to do with the development of children, educational policy is controlled by interest groups dependent upon the allocations to public education for their survival.
But, as stated in previous chapters, these interest groups are not totally independent entities; they are pawns who enact the decisions made, consciously or unconsciously, by larger political and economic entities. They simply represent the vehicle through which American education practices its policy of socialization. Those who control this process of socialization have a major effect on the future of the nation: by controlling the quality of education which the various socio-economic groups receive, they in part dictate the future options open to each group. For example, nice, upper middle-class kids are trained by their elite schools to respect themselves as they are prepared for future leadership within the general confines of our society. Black children are beaten, ignored, degraded so that they, too, will learn to accept their future role in society as bell-boys, garbage men, postal carriers, and dishwashers. It truly is a marvelous school system that can teach a dignified human being how to live in a state of subservience.

From this perspective, the schools are an unqualified success. Those who have an interest in maintaining the economic oppression of black people have an obvious interest in continuing their sub-education: one is a necessary precursor of the other, a necessary training for life as a slave. While education is not solely responsible for the predetermined fate of black people, the system of public education serves as a primary vehicle for the perpetuation of racial and class struggle in America.
The political structure, America's term for elected officials and the bureaucracies that they nurture, provides the power to enforce this policy of educational genocide. While the rationale for this phenomenon is rather simple, the manner in which this control is exercised is rather complex. Dealing with the former, these representatives of the people are dependent upon the financial power of the groups from whom they draw support. As was brought out in the fourth panel, politicians in New York need neither a large number of followers nor moral arguments to foster their bid or reelection: only the money supplied by organizations and wealthy donors can do that. Thus it is hardly surprising that politicians would pursue the interests of those racist groups upon which they depend for support. Needless to say, as the majority of these hacks comes from the socio-economic class which they serve, oftentimes they need little or no prompting as the attitude and economic perspective of their class form the core of their operative value system. For a more detailed development of this phenomenon, refer to C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite*.¹ Crudely stated, the political structure is charged with enforcing the genocidal educational practices necessitated by the economic structure of the nation.

Essentially, the preceding four panel analyses have been an extended documentary focusing on the manner in which this enforcement occurred from 1967 to 1970 in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Ocean Hill represents the best vehicle available to understand these fascist policies because when the black community in Brooklyn attempted to break out of this cycle, the oppressors were forced to publically demonstrate the

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manner in which they ruled to an extent unprecedented in American education. The primary instruments in this conscious policy of oppression were (1) the law; (2) the media; and (3) the various bureaucracies, i.e. 110 Livingston Street, the State Department of Education, the Ford Foundation, the Mayor's office, etc. As this formulation implies, each of these entities did not represent independent variables; rather, they acted to enforce a policy formulated by the considerations named above.

Representing one of the major victories of political indoctrination, the legal system in America is viewed as the impartial administration of justice and not as a biased tool manipulated to perpetuate the political and economic status quo. Unfortunately, to equate law with justice in America negates any distinction between fascism and democracy. Take for example the conventional legal definition of violence. If a man strikes another person with the intent to take his money, the law defines that as "armed robbery," a felony punishable with extended imprisonment. However, if a slumlord allows his property to deteriorate, killing children with lead poisoning and freezing temperatures, in his pursuit of an income, that is the legitimate operation of the capitalist system. There is no justice incorporated in such laws; they are simply functional guidelines established to facilitate the political-economic system.

Just as these laws condone the murder of children in the pursuit of profit, the law protects those who slowly destroy children in their classrooms while debilitating any attempt to reform the structure of public education. Numerous examples of this wanton perversion — the
most fundamental principles upon which America, not to say American education was formed - permeate the preceding chapters. The law allows the school system to harbor racists and incompetents; the legislature to manipulate voting districts to negate the power of the black vote; and the State Department of Education to rule Ocean Hill-Brownsville as a colony. As a sub-set of its duty to preserve the powerful, the law provides an active tool for the suppression of those who try to assert their rights and preserve their dignity. In America it is legal to surround I.S. 271 with thousands of armed policemen, to bar parents from the schools which their children attend, to expel students who seek to maintain pride in themselves and in their race. Bluntly, the American law has degenerated from its ideal position as the impartial administration of justice into an instrument utilized to perpetuate repression and class strife.

The various media, i.e. the newspapers, the television networks, etc., emerged as the second major societal institution charged with preserving the poor quality of American education. Unable to accurately conceptualize the issues, representatives of the media, either out of their own ignorance or in response to specific instructions from their superiors, continually distorted the grounds of the debate. These un-ending series of subtle distortions, gross misunderstandings and outright lies prevented the public from ever obtaining either an understanding of the basis of the struggle or the manner in which the struggle was conducted. Ideally, journalism, like the law, exists as an independent entity functioning in the public interest. The actions of the media
during the confrontation at Ocean Hill indicate that the television networks and the newspapers are, like the law, weapons in the arsenal of those who have vested interests in the perpetuation of the present educational bureaucracy. From the perspective of the media, the sub-education of black children was the normal state of affairs, and any attempt to educate them became a "crisis." In the summer of 1967 the media portrayed the forthcoming Union strike as one stemming from economic grievances rather than as an attempt by the Union to gain control over educational policy and implement racist disciplinary procedures; and white spokesmen were "responsible leaders" of the community, while the black leadership was portrayed as raving militants and revolutionaries bent on destroying the schools, the children, the church, and the nation. Few reporters found it relevant to discuss the educational innovations implemented at Ocean Hill, the unprecedented involvement of parents both in policy-making and instructional capacities, and the seriousness of our purpose. The media failed to provide information; rather, the media disseminated propaganda useful to the purposes of the white middle-class politicians who were compelled to destroy the demonstration districts.

The giant bureaucracy, which harbored these white middle-class folk, comprised the heart of this strategy of oppression. Certain institutions, such as the Ford Foundation and 110 Livingston Street, initially appeared to be publically supportive. However, their inability or unwillingness to sever past allegiances led to the transformation of this support into opposition and/or withdrawal as the political ramifications of their actions became clearer. The rules, the regulations, the raw
power amassed by the gnomes at 110 Livingston Street, the city agencies, and the State Department of Education proved capable of smothering some attempts at educational change; and, when those covert efforts failed, publically destroying others, such as the one which the community established in Ocean Hill. By perpetuating the rationale which supported the old system, they effectively established the stage for the destruction of anything new. In order to "test" the concept of community involvement, 110 Livingston could create demonstration districts, then structure the guidelines of the experiment in such a fashion as to ensure their eventual failure, thus blocking another vehicle for reform. In addition to such examples of agencies acting unilaterally to preserve the status quo, two or three bureaucracies neatly worked together to protect those interests which they had in common. When the Board of Education was caught off-guard or in an embarrassing position, either the Mayor or the State Board of Education calmly stepped in to effectively prevent any black group from benefitting from this situation. This cross-fertilization of bureaucratic omnipotence gave the unions and their racist, political supporters a guise in which to cloak their fascist policies in the name of "operational procedures." Rather than openly advocating the sub-education of black children, the institution merely has to "defend its legitimate right to conform to established procedures for the hiring of instructional personnel." In other words, the public bureaucracy of this country, along with its legal system and informational channels, have been perverted from institutions which serve the
people into bastardized servants of the power elite.

Standing in the face of these grim realities, black people concerned with the education of their children, and particularly black educators, have few acceptable alternatives. Black people are also aware of the correlation between education and the dignity which stems from economic security. The fight for a decent education is a micro-cosm of the fight for a just place in American society. Yet, though we fight in the same arena as our white oppressors, the black masses lack the tools and the power with which the white man perpetuates his power. One could intelligently speak of a white strategy to defeat the black man in terms of the institutions which the white power was capable of manipulating. For the black man no such alternative exists. The political powerlessness of our people in this society reduces the arsenal of the combatant to that which he was born with: his mind and his body. Unfortunately, much of the preceding chapter has been a description of the lack of political sophistication of black leadership and of the black masses. This inability to devise tactics reflect more than a simple lack of a power base to work with; it indicates that black people, regardless of their sophistication, lack the political and economic resources to effectively challenge American education. It is my fervent conviction that the community in Ocean Hill desired to reform the existing institution of public education, not destroy it. But, the intransigence of the white bureaucracy and the fascism of the white community forced the community to engage in what the media characterized as disruptive activities. Lacking an economic
and political power base to bargain from, the community is forced not to bargain at all; forced out of the system, the community must choose to either allow that system to perpetuate genocide against its children, or to exercise the only power it has: that of violence and disruption, or abandonment which invites further repression supported by the laws and the courts. Black people are not permitted to operate the system, but they can, for short periods of time, prevent the system from operating. Essentially, the community must use that futile and self-defeating weaponry against the arsenals of legalism, bureaucratic hogwash and political power that the white community has at its disposal.

To recapitulate, the struggle for economic position, which American capitalism creates, inevitably leads to the present conflict which characterizes urban education. The political structure which fights this battle for the interests which it represents, has at its disposal such tools of oppression as the law, the media, and the bureaucracy. Existing in a state of colonial subservience, the black community is forced to choose between accepting the continued destruction of future generations, or attacking the system with those means at its disposal.

The preceding analysis of the economic and political foundation of the struggle over the schools leads to the following descriptive and predictive hypotheses about public education:

1. Education is a process designed to perpetuate the attitudes of the ruling class; consequently, education for the poor and the minorities is practically impossible.
2. Education is never the issue; rather economic, political, and institutional reform.

3. The actions of the various parties were of no consequence after the actions of the community were interpreted as confrontation.

4. All overt attempts at resolution are designed for compromise which means the assurance of the powerlessness and oppression of the poor people.

5. Looking at similar school crises in urban settings across the nation, the behavior of the same entities is predictable, the results of the crises are also predictable.

6. The behavior of the various parties or entities was the only option available to them, i.e. there were no other options than those they employed.

7. Given the present political and economic system, there exists no viable alternative to the present conduct of public education.

8. The perpetuation of this system will breed more rebellions which will in turn bring about more repression.

The above eight statements represent a harsh verdict, including a rather protracted death sentence. After reviewing the preceding five transcripts and the supplemental analyses, it is impossible to refrain from these assertions. If, in fact, options do exist, they can develop only from a realistic appraisal of the facts at hand. The panelists, as recorded, reached the same conclusions, but presented them in much softer tones in
an attempt to elicit and perpetuate a continued hope and struggle
on the part of the oppressed to remedy the faults of the institution
which knowingly and unrelentlessly practices genocide against one
segment of the society it allegedly serves.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS AND OVERVIEW

This study has attempted to determine the relationships between the practices of public education and the political and economic structure of urban society. Believing that from the perspective of the dominant classes the school system successfully functions as an instrument of socialization, the analysis has focused on the educational myths which disguise this destructive process, and on the benefits which the bourgeoisie reaps from their assault. In this study the goals of this calculated policy have often been termed genocidal. The usage of a term which links white America with Nazi Germany is neither a hyperbole nor a vacuous political slogan. Though the characteristics of our schools result partially from the economic structure of our society, the particular aggression of these institutions toward black children transcends simple class antagonism to reflect the desire of white America to contain or destroy the black and brown population. In order to force black and Third World people into a slavery without visible chains, a slavery imposed by economic laws, the school system willingly destroys their intellectual and cultural heritage. The effect of school policies and practices implemented by teachers and bureaucrats is to force black people into jobs that do not pay, houses that have no heat, and cities that can support no life. This can only be seen as the result of a comprehensive strategy initiated by the elite of America and designed to
control black and brown people. The nature of this strategic action can only be termed genocidal: institutions of repression destroy Americans who seek liberation in the same fashion as they destroy those men and women in Viet Nam who desire their freedom from colonial domination.

The manner in which the strategic assault occurs and its relation to the movement of community control of the schools is made clear by a document taken directly from the Congressional Record entitled *Urban America, Goals and Problems*, prepared for the Subcommittee of Urban Affairs of the Joint Committee of the Congress of the United States. The study, reproduced in its entirety as Appendix C, was submitted by the noted anthropologist Edward T. Hall to a body the membership of which included some of the most distinguished liberals in the Senate: Charles Percy, Abraham Ribicoff, Jacob Javits, and William Proxmire. This association does not implicate these legislators in the production of the idea contained in the body of the report. However, it does confirm one's paranoia to read a document bearing the names of such men which presents a blueprint for the fascist government that presently rules America's cities.

Stripped of the shibboleths and illusions which normally cloud liberal rhetoric, the document delineates the methods used by the United States Government to manipulate the minds and to control the bodies of "lower class Negroes." Approaching the substantive issues raised by the ghetto rebellions solely with an interest in social control, the author asserts that lower class Negroes present "very special problems" resulting from the character alterations necessitated by the adjustment
to ghetto living. Both the passive and armed resistance of black and Third World peoples to their imprisonment presents a serious problem to an economic structure requiring domestic peace and a docile labour force. Those most directly charged with maintaining totalitarian control, i.e. the police, have not found their resources adequate in scope or comprehensive enough in nature. Thus, the document seeks assistance from other sources:

Our studies show the relationship of men to the city is the need for enforced laws to replace tribal custom. Laws and Law Enforcement Agencies are presently in cities all over the world, but at times they find it difficult to cope with problems facing them and need help [sic]. As aid to law and order that has not been used to the fullest extent possible, is the power to custom public opinion in the ethnic "Enclaves." Co-operating preachers, politicians, teachers, etc.

White Americans cannot control the unfettered mind of lower-class Negroes who live in the "jungle," thus the liberals must provide educational and social services adequate to train these beasts in the fundamentals of subservient behavior. The document proposes to aid the police with the subtle, more manipulative skills of ministers and teachers. In other words, the dangerous potential of millions of black people jammed in a single "sink" must be neutralized by means of police violence cooperating with the pacification program launched by liberal welfare institutions such as the schools. It is crucial to note that the behavioral objectives of the police and the liberals are identical.

The study claims that the fulfillment of these objectives is threatened by massive overpopulation. This danger manifests itself in two ways: (1) the possible territorial growth of the ghetto which could not only destroy the established culture of the sink, but threaten
surrounding white residents and businesses; or (2) the overcrowding of the ghetto itself which could lead to intolerable conditions and possible revolutionary violence. As expanding the size of the sink is really not a socially permissible option, the report focuses on how to maintain social control given conditions of severe overcrowding.

Because "letting the 'sinks' run their course" would ruin the white sections of the city, those who hold power have developed an "alternative" solution: "Prepack or introduce design features that will counteract the undesired affects of the sink. But most important not destroy the enclave in the process [sic]." According to the document, implementation of this notion requires the secret cooperation of a "coterie of experts: City Planners, Architects, . . . Economists, . . . Educators, Lawyers, Social Workers, . . . Ethologists and Preachers." It is further recommended that one consult with, though not empower, "... Negro enclave specialists . . . . Remember it is important to learn about them in order to forward the desired effects." The product of this impressive combination of academic talent should be an Urban Renewal Program in the broadest sense that utilizes experiments on mice to understand how to effectually rule human beings.

Dr. Hall notes that these experiments show that caged animals, when improperly housed, become stupid and confused. Because such character traits contribute to movements towards social revolution, they should be avoided. Thus, an excess of sensory deprivation resulting from public housing projects creates a threatening situation. Therefore, a crucial need is to design spaces that will allow for a healthy rate of interaction
as defined by the "proper amount of involvement, museums, jobs, games, swimming pools, movies, etc. And a continuing sense of ethnic identification." Once this "proper" amount has been defined, the totalitarian control over the black population will be forced to depend less on the overt violence of police methods than on the covert violence perpetrated by just the right amount of swimming pools, jobs, and other inessential items. The sophistication of the document is such that its authors even understand the use of a sense of ethnicity to control black people. The operative principle is to allow them enough pride to avoid the dangers of what bourgeois psychotherapy terms pathological insanity, i.e. revolutionary violence, etc., without transforming the docile folk into militants. The secret cooperation of all the social scientists should produce a design that creates enough self-respect to avoid mass suicidal actions like ghetto rebellions, though not enough self-respect to develop a people's army capable of confronting the police. The phrasing provided by the document offers a perfect summary of this social policy:

Through a process of taming, most higher organisms, including Negro men can be squeezed into a given area, provided that they constantly have a minimum amount of food provided for them, that they are made to feel safe, and their aggressions are under control.

Brilliantly perceptive, the author of the report understands that while a minimum of food might be provided by welfare, the feeling of security necessary to control aggressions is lacking in the black community. Men made fearful of each other possess an explosive awareness of their need of more land and better living conditions. As the fundamental premise of
the document is that America will allow its poor neither additional land nor additional income, an alternative must be developed to diffuse this potentially revolutionary development.

The author of the report states that "our policy must be to entertain compromise, maximum community control and financing in their sinks, but not awareness or awakening to the true values." (Emphasis mine.) He then outlines a social policy that would utilize the black movement for self-determination as a vehicle to maintain the genocidal oppression of the United States Government. Black and brown people must be given the illusion that they may exercise some meaningful direction in their lives in order to forestall any real attempt to seize power. The institutional reform which will create this illusion is community control, the self-enslavement of a people in behalf of the totalitarian state and its police force.

The involvement of the "Negro leadership" is central to this strategy, and the document is very explicit on this point. While it remains difficult to determine "who is a Negro leader," the study asserts that careful scrutiny can identify the persons necessary for a successful implementation of the strategy. The document cautions white people about assuming airs of superiority or authority when approaching Negro leaders. Oppressors are supposed to show exceptional concern, respect, and act in an unsuspecting fashion. The possibility that community leaders may represent interests inimical to that of the government hardly disturbs the logic of the policy. More maleable leadership may simply be "created" with the cooperation of those dispensers of project money, the media,
and the delegation of some institutional authority. After "these potent movers of the community" have been identified, our wisest and most urgent move now should be to put them in 'New Towns in Town' and let them have 'community control' so they will have a feeling of security. Thus creating self-containment [sic].

Beautifully simple, the government will handpick the leadership for the black community, delegate to them a token amount of authority in order to prevent more radical demands, then benignly neglect the blacks as they perpetrate the totalitarian policies of the government upon their own people.

This report to the Subcommittee on Urban Affairs of the Congress places the actions of the government into a proper perspective and is of tremendous value in understanding the events which centered around the demonstration district in Ocean Hill-Brownsville from 1967 to 1970. Above all, the document confirms the perception by black people that the government of the United States will stop at no measure to enforce its fascist control over black people. While the government would prefer to have the work of the police and the army done by the schools and other welfare institutions of the bureaucratic state, genocidal violence would serve the same policy equally well.

Standing between the peoples and this overt violence are the new myths used by both liberal whites and hopeful blacks to mask the reality of powerlessness: self-determination and black capitalism. Just as the pacification program in Southeast Asia is a front for imperialism, the
social welfare institutions of liberal society, whether they are controlled by blacks or whites, are a front for the totalitarian powers of the government. In this vein, the rise of black capitalism only indicates that the black bourgeoisie has been given a license to exploit their own people. The document demonstrates that no thought is given to self-determination for black people as a people, and no thought to upgrading the standard of living of black people as a people. Rather, those policies which appear to attack these ills are simply more subtle methods of maintaining social control.

The preceding statements leave little dignity in the liberal position. While the data presented in the body of the dissertation supports such condemnation, one should not surmise that the generals of the welfare state are lacking in "good will" or are even consciously aware of the effect of their actions. Most men and women who work in our schools, universities, and government are devoted to what they perceive as their task. They have no visions of perpetrating genocide or exercising totalitarian control. As products of white America's ideological brainwashing, such liberals honestly desire to help "those poor people in our cities." While they may reveal their true nature in the pro forma rejection of "militancy," "communist ideas," "anarchism," and "preachers of racial hatred," educators generally claim the sanctity of Christian idealism. But the rationalizations provided for their actions do little to alter the realities of the effect of their actions as outlined in the document quoted above. The report graphically illustrates the usage of social welfare institutions designed by the liberals for the
totalitarian goals of the state. Such institutions will never offer the services to those who staff and envision them: the schools will not provide education, the welfare department will not provide adequate food, the housing department will never construct decent housing, etc. These bureaucracies will just continue to provide the "proper" amount of the item in question; properly defined as the amount required to keep the blacks docile in their concentration camps.

While none of these motives can be attributed to the educators we have discussed in this dissertation, their complicity in this policy is unquestionable. New York City's experiment with community control was an experiment with self-containment. The three demonstration districts established were designed to provide the people with the sense of security necessary to forestall any more militant action against the schools. When the people of Ocean Hill-Brownsville overstepped the boundaries of the experiment, when they developed more pride than was permissible, when they began to mount a challenge to the foundations of the government itself, the experiment had to be crushed. Having ceased to be useful, the government was forced to pay the cost of removing it.

Though Clark, Fantini, and Gittell make brilliant reference in elitist language to this concept in this document, their message is clear: yes, there is an alternative and an option. For those who believe that peaceful change is possible and who have the commitment to muster energies and resources to deliver reform, the denouncement of such a document would obviously be to eradicate this plight from the annals of our history. This can only be possible when programs designed to eliminate the conditions become operative, functional, and successful.
Finally, the document speaks directly to those people within the state, those people who choose to function within the domain of the educational institutions. Since the perversion of the community control movement has become so obvious, one must construct a rationale that combines a commitment to the revolution of black and poor white people with the reality of one's role in the social structure. Mao Tse-Tung once quoted an old Chinese proverb. He wrote about how once one has learned to walk a straight line under all conditions, one can walk a crooked one. In other words, if one understands how to contribute to the ongoing movement of oppressed peoples, one can translate this knowledge into action under any circumstances.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

THE LITERATURE IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
For a black man, or any man, cognizant of the history of black people in America it is indeed difficult to view the current literature on education in an unbiased fashion. The persistent recurrence of white strategies to prevent the education of Negroes lends an almost dreamlike quality to any comparison, a quality which cannot, however, mute the frustrations and anger that such an inquiry creates.

For one hundred years the students and teachers in Negro colleges have been anomalies in the system of American higher education, excluded from the security, financial protection, and sense of intellectual community which characterized many of their white counterparts. In fact the estrangement of blacks from white universities has been so great as to make it impossible to speak of Negro colleges as members of the American academic world. Rather, they have been as parishes to the community, or relegated to the status of the unacknowledged bastard child of a righteous household. And today, just as in 1880, southern Negro colleges stand in the same derivative condition as northern urban ghettos stand within our thriving metropolitan areas; in Sekora's words: "... white institutions created them, white institutions controlled them, white institutions maintained them, and white institutions degraded them."¹

Educators and political scientists, and almost anybody else who wants to profit by publication, speaks about the condition of public education in inner cities with such terms as "decentralization,

parent participation, local control, militancy, etc." The history of black colleges provides one more reason for viewing this debate as subterfuge and deliberate obscurantism. We have run through this gauntlet before. James M. McPherson writes that "...home rule for our colored students had become a powerful slogan by 1895."2 At that time a large movement of blacks demanded the authority to appoint teachers and an involvement in local management. And even eighty years ago, black demands were countered by white financial control. Playing upon countless myths of black incompetence, the white community countered these demands by refusing to "risk" money on the "experiment;" then, just as they will not now, relinquish their grasp on an institution they founded.

Decentralization in 1895 was supported by white America only when blacks could make financial inputs into the institution without corresponding decision-making authority, regardless of the amount of participation in the institution. Thus, fiscal control was the leverage used to play blacks against blacks to neutralize the efforts of so-called "militants" to achieve self-governance. This overt rejection of black people as capable, intelligent, and mature individuals capable of controlling their own lives was based on two corresponding racist assumptions: the superiority of whites and that fiscal control or management was too sophisticated for blacks.

Pitifully then as now, Negroes, stripped of meaningful control over their lives, fought each other in a degrading spectable of seeking

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self-aggrandizement through subservience to the man. In 1912 each 
faction of the black community backed one of the three deans of 
Howard University in a bid for the then vacant presidency. Yet only 
two of the eight black trustees supported any of the black candidates,
while a majority of the white trustees desired the election of a 
Negro president. Given the circumstances, if any of two of the three 
deans had withdrawn from the context in favor of the third, Howard 
would not have waited another fourteen years for a black president. 
But each of them preferred a white man to a black comrade in a superior 
position, and a white president was elected.
APPENDIX B

CONFIDENTIAL LITERATURE AND PUBLIC NAIVETE
Let me make a very personal statement. It is unbelievably frustrating to be aware of large-scale corruption and fraud within the practice of education, yet be unable to prove or publically validate what is common knowledge. There exists a whole corpus of documents, strictly secret, hence available only to high level policy makers. One can be only vaguely aware of their existence, and completely unable to act on this awareness in a fashion which would benefit the general public. Lacking this crucial information, critics remain either childishly naive, or impotent to crack the edifice. The real conduct of business in education is performed so that the people never even see a glimpse of a shadow to reflect the actuality.

For example, those involved in the movement in New York have long been aware of a state document dealing with the city's handling of federal funds. The review of the various programs included in the report disclosed weaknesses in administration and internal controls which permitted fraud on the largest scale. Large sums of money were advanced to the Local Education Agencies on a percentage of approved budget, yet unrelated to actual cash need. Thus, the state asserts large amounts of cash were on hand for unnecessarily lengthy periods of time, permitting the city to invest for income between ten and twenty million dollars. This was feasible because of the exclusion of New York State's three largest cities from the requirement which provides for annual financial reports submitted by the Local Education Agencies to the State Department of Audit and Control. Funds earmarked for Title I, Title II and the Appalachia Regional Development Act are
thus being used to provide unrecorded income on a mammoth scale for the city of New York, rather than providing educational opportunities for the city's children.

But this is an instance of a scandal that will never surface, because one cannot base a case, or even make an unqualified public assertion, on the basis of "common knowledge." And mention was made at this point not to stir puriant interest, but to indicate the necessary shallowness of the literature of urban education, a shallowness which precludes inciting large numbers of citizens to attack the present educational bureaucracy in an effective manner. First of all, the vagueness of the "information," or actually the rumor, prevents its utilization in any strategy. But that is only the most superficial damage. Far worse, the inability of critics to present such documents creates a naive community. Literally no one outside of the profession, and few within it, can understand the nature of the educational crisis given the available information. This ignorance of the true sources of power precludes the creation of a movement that would crush the powerful.
APPENDIX C

URBAN AMERICA: GOALS AND PROBLEMS
GOALS AND PROBLEMS

Compiled and Prepared for the
Subcommittee on Urban Affairs

of the
Joint Committee
Congress of The United States

SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
Washington, D.C. 20402

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Created Pursuant to Sec. 5(A) of Public Law 304
79th Congress

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National Priority

THE HIDDEN DIMENSION
By EDWARD T. HALL
Professor of Anthropology
Illinois Institute of Technology, 31st and State Streets,
If what is known about animals when they are crowded or moved to an unfamiliar biotope is at all relevant to mankind, we are now facing some terrible consequences in our urban "sinks" ("Jungles"), ("Ghettos").

The adjustment of these people (Negroes) is not just economic, but involves an entire way of life.

The lower class of Negro in the United States poses very special problems in their adjustments to "Sink" living, which if those problems are not solved may well destroy us by making our cities uninhabitable.

An often overlooked fact is that lower class Negroes and middle class whites are culturally distinct from each other.

Some Negro spokesmen have gone so far to say that no white man could possibly understand the Negro.

They are right if they are referring to the lower class Negro. Only those we have trained do we understand.

**The Need For Controls**

Our studies show the relationship of men to the city is the need for enforced laws to replace tribal custom. Laws and Law Enforcement Agencies are presently in cities all over the world, but at times they find it difficult to cope with problems facing them and need help. An aid to law and order that has not been used to the fullest extent possible, is the power of custom public opinion in the ethnic "Enclaves." Cooperating preachers, politicians, teachers, etc.

These "Enclaves" perform many useful purposes, one of the most important is that the "enclaves" act as lifetime reception areas in which the second generation can learn to make the transition to the "sink" (jungle) (ghetto) life.

The main problem for us with the "enclaves" as it is now placed in the "Sinks" is that its size is limited. When the Negro population increases at a rate the enclaves is unable to convert them — only two choices remain: 1. Territorial growth, (more land), or 2. overcrowding.

If the enclave cannot expand and fails to maintain a healthy "density," (overcrowding) a sink develops.

The normal capacities of law and order enforcement agencies are not able to deal with "sinks."

Apart from letting "sinks" run its course "more land" and destroy the city, there is an alternative solution:

Prepack or introduce design features that will counteract our undesired affects of the sink. But most important not destroy the enclave in the process.

A study by Pathologist Charles Southwick discovered the permunyces mice could tolerate high cage densities.

In animal populations, the solution is simple enough and frighteningly like what we see in our Urban Renewal Programs or sinks.
To increase density in a rat population and maintain healthy specimens. (a) Put them in boxes so they can’t see each, (b) Clean their cages. (C) and give them enough to eat.

Then you can pile them in boxes up as many stories as you wish.

Note: Caged Animals become stupid, from states of flux boredom; confusion, which is a risky price to pay for our super filing system of these people.

The question we must ask ourselves is, how far can we afford to travel down the road of sensory deprivation in order to file these people away in these public housing projects?

Our most critical needs at this time therefore is for ideas, principles for designing spaces that will maintain a healthy density. A healthy interaction rate, a proper amount of involvement, museums, jobs, games, swimming pools, movies, etc. And a continuing sense of ethnic identification.

The creation of such ideas; principles will require the combined efforts of many diverse specialists all working

secretly, closely together on a massive scale. “Coterie of Experts: City Planners, Architects, Engineers of all types, Economists, Law Enforcement Specialists, Traffic, Transportation Experts, Educators, Lawyers, Social Workers, Political Scientists, Psychologists, Anthropologists, Ethologists and Preachers. As we know, “some of the most capable help is Negro enclave specialists, hire as many as you can and keep contact. In their presence don’t talk, listen and let them talk. Remember it is important to learn about them in order to forward the desired effects.

It is absolutely essential to us that we learn more about how to compute the maximum, the minimum, and the density of the Negro enclaves that make up our cities.

Through a process of taming, most higher organisms, including Negro men can be squeezed into a given area, provided that they constantly have a minimum amount of food provided for them, that they are made to feel safe, and their aggressions are under control.

However if men are made fearful of each other, fear resurrects the fright reaction, fear, plus overcrowding produces panic, thus creating an explosive awareness of their need for more land.

We can not allow this to happen. Land will not be allowed them, that as we all know is the most precious of all values.

Our policy must be to entertain, compromise, maximum community control and financing in their sinks, but no aware or awakening to the true values.

Conclusion 2

You can’t shed culture in the briefest possible sense, the message of this book is that no matter how hard man tries, it is impossible for him to divest himself or his own culture, for it has penetrated to the roots of his nervous system and determines how he perceives the world.

Most culture lies hidden and is outside voluntary control, making up the warp and weft of human existence even when small fragments of culture are elevated to awareness they are difficult to change, not only because they are so personally experienced but because people cannot act or think through the
medium of culture.

Negro Leaders

Political interests of Negro community power are best indicated in the talk and actions of Negro leaders.

Of course it is not always easy to know who is a Negro leader and who is not, for rarely do leaders lead everything, or as rarely as community itself is utterly in a singular direction.

Further, yesterday's leader may not be today's leader. However with close observation and sympathetic objectivity you can identify present Negro leaders with community power or influence or respect of the people.

The only major precaution which must be taken is to avoid the easy mistake of superiority or authority approach when seeking their leaders. In other words act and show exceptional concern, respect, and friendliness to them ask questions, unsuspectedly and listen.

Our enclave or those in the Negro community with whom we would prefer to deal, and whose influence is already established with our power structure, may not be leaders at all.

And if they are leaders, then they may be leaders of interests other than that of the community interests. This is why they must be watched very close and deep thru our enclaves as well as the many laws which we have at our need.

A Negro leader is one who moves his community, rather than establish legal authority in the country.

The popular leadership of the Negro community is almost unknown to those in authority outside the community.

Without the involvement of legitimate office the true Negro leaders are unnoticed by the media and by public opinion.

When in danger from us they are carefully guarded by the Negro community itself. The undisputable fact remains that there are thousands of such leaders, each one moving the local community with a powerful potent force.

Our wisest and most urgent move now should be to put them in "New Towns in Town" and let them have "Community Control" so they will have a feeling of security. Thus creating self containment.
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THEMATIC INDEX TO TRANSCRIPTS


The attached listing of comments by panelists about the role played by each of several of the groups and forces involved in the New York City School crisis of 1967 - 1970 is taken from the transcripts of the five panel meetings, November 16, 1970 - March 1, 1971. It should be considered as an index to the transcripts rather than as an independent document.

Below is a listing of what the panelists said about each of the following entities:

I. The United Federation of Teachers, Albert Shanker and other Union spokesmen and teachers; other unions.

II. The Board of Education, Dr. Bernard Donovan and Board members.

III. The City education bureaucracy at 110 Livingston Street.

IV. The State Education Department, James Allen, his staff and that bureaucracy.

V. Mayor Lindsay and the Mayor's office.

VI. The media.

VII. The Ford Foundation, Dr. Mario Fantini, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy.

VIII. Black militants.
IX. The establishment and liberal groups: the power structure in general, including the liberal establishment - black and white, excluding groups that are included in a separate listing.

Within each of these groupings the listing is complete, at least complete enough to be representative of each panelist's contributions, in spite of the redundancy that entails. Where a remark refers to two or more of these groups, it is listed under each. Within each grouping the material is presented as it appears in the transcripts: from the beginning of the first panel to the end of the last. This method was chosen in the hope that it would be helpful in showing the panelists' views and the change in attitude or interpretation that took place as the meetings progressed. Individual panelist's remarks can be followed through any of these listings, with reference to the transcripts themselves for context. This method also highlights the amount of attention given by the panel to each of these groups in comparison to the others.

The themes that developed through the course of the meetings were the historical, political, and social setting of the school crisis, including racism, the civil rights movement, and the "democratic" structure; the resistance to the redistribution of power, especially racial redistribution, and the resistance to the education of black children; the inevitability of events, the evidence that participants are acting out preordained scripts; the results, good and bad, of the demonstration districts; what might have been, or what might have happened if one group had acted otherwise than it did; and what might be tried in the future.
I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, ALBERT SHANKER, AND OTHER OTHER UNION SPOKESMEN AND TEACHERS; OTHER UNIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel</th>
<th>Panelist</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Theme</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Swanker</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>When the decentralization bill came to the floor of the legislature, the CSA and UFT defeated all the groups which wanted a broad, general decentralization plan.</td>
<td>Power redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Swanker</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>The Giardino Board's decentralization plan was defeated by the unions.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Board of Education and school system are captive to the CSA, UFT, and other unions as well as to professional staff and other groups represented on the board.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>UFT and other unions are a formidable voting block. Joined forces to defeat the 1966 decentralization legislation. Far stronger than other groups or coalitions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Ferretti</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>New York is such a union city that the whole labor force can be galvanized behind an issue, whether it is a labor issue or not, as happened in Ocean Hill-Brownsville.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Swanker</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>New York is a union city.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Shanker says the UFT helped with the first 1964 boycott. The whole city was behind that boycott, so UFT may have given token support, although Galamison does not remember it. Shanker would not permit the Board of Education to penalize the teachers for taking the day off.</td>
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</table>

UFT did not support any boycotts after the first one.
Union agreed on Ocean Hill-Brownsville as a demonstration district because they had been working with a parent group there: Shanker suggested Ocean Hill-Brownsville because Sandy Feldman had been working with a local board there.

In June 1967 the UFT was supposed to inform the teachers in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district, but gave conflicting information. In one place, teachers were elected to serve on the steering committee over the summer, and in another place they were appointed. There was confusion about the union's role in planning or implementation. There was talk about a strike from the beginning.

The union pulled out of the planning when the teachers were on vacation.

The talk about the teachers strike in June had nothing to do with the demonstration districts.

Didn't the teachers, specifically Sandy Feldman, think of the demonstration districts as enlarged More Effective Schools (MES) program?

There was a lot of discussion about the district being an enlarged MES program, but there were a lot of mystiques surrounding it. There wasn't any real indication, at least not overt, that MES was the union's hope.

The union's demands on the disruptive child issue was an attempt to get part of school supervision and to implement an anti-black policy. It was not a dispute over wages as the media presented it.

MES is a union pet.
I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS . . . (continued)

I. Galamison 60  MES was a very serious issue because it gave some schools very special privileges.

I. Gittell 60  MES was an important issue because it meant a major educational policy issue sewn in the contract.

I. Swanker 60  1967 was the first year the MES program was going to be put in the contract.

I. McCoy 63  During the summer of 1967, there was controversy over whether teachers were going to be on the Governing Board, which had already been decided, and what their voting rights were. The Governing Board (?)-We...) exposed their fraud - they voted on everything except principals and only wanted to vote to see that the five community representatives were not militant. Sandy Feldman was programming them.

Because of the way the union played its role that summer, the original proposal was modified so that the 5 community representatives had to have 200 signatures and were then elected by the 7 parent representatives.

I. Oliver 66  Union wanted to have a voice in choosing the 5 community representatives to the Governing Board, though they already had teachers to counterbalance the votes of the parents, and 2 supervisory personnel, which gave them the edge.

I. Swanker 66  One of the goals of the union for its next contract may be that teachers will elect principals - a popularity contest. Not surprising that teachers wanted a stronger voice in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. They had a stronger voice in Two Bridges, almost the controlling group.
I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS ... (continued)

I  Oliver  68  Teachers were present and voting when the Governing Board elected Rhody McCoy instead of Jack Bloomfield as unit administrator. Voting went by almost a racial breakdown.

I  Oliver  69  Teachers who were serving with the steering committee and then the Governing Board proposed that the Board support the strike. The Board refused, and shortly after the teachers dropped out.

I  McCoy  69  Some teachers had been elected in June and others had been selected, but suddenly on the Friday before school opened they had all been just serving, though there are records showing that three of them had been elected.

I  Oliver  69  UFT struck on the day school opened. Teachers wouldn't listen to Rev. Oliver and Father Powis and accused them of trying to mastermind a black takeover.

I  Oliver  70  Not a single school chose a teacher to serve on the Governing Board for three months. When McCoy issued a directive urging teachers to elect representatives, a minority in four schools finally sent representatives to the Governing Board.

II  Donovan  76  Initially, both UFT and CSA publicly professed support for decentralization, surrounded with safeguards for professional personnel which would almost defeat the purposes of decentralization. Union members participated in first organizational meetings in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and Two Bridges, not at IS 201.
I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS . . . (continued)

II Swanker 79 Union support for demonstration districts was for MES, giving the union more control, not for community control. Perhaps administrative decentralization or an elected advisory board, but not community control.

II Ferretti 79 UFT publications from the start were against community control, but in favor of the demonstration districts.

II Donovan 80 Union in favor of the demonstration districts at the start.

II Oliver 77 The Governing Board's refusal to support the strike was the end of union support for demonstration districts. When they could not control it, they tried to destroy it.

II McCoy 84-85 Union refused to take the disruptive child demand out of the contract negotiations in spite of attempts by NAACP and other groups to urge them to take it out.

II Donovan 95 The teachers have the right to organize to protect their economic interests, and the parents have the right to organize to protect their interests. The line between union control of education and union protection of working conditions is hard to draw.

II Donovan 100 UFT and CSA were opposed to the appointment of principals from outside the examination list, and took the Board of Education to court over it, summer of 1967.

II Donovan 123 Unions pressured Donovan to cut off McCoy's salary and were critical of him for not doing it.

II Ferretti 111 Shanker and Degnan regarded each decentralization plan as an erosion of their power and were against it.
I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS . . . (continued)

III Gittell 146 The union's role in the controversy over the demonstration districts was a national political issue with implications for white-collar unions and for Shanker's national union leadership.

III Fantini 166 The union did participate with IS 201 groups and the Ocean Hill group and might have continued if their interests had been taken into account. UFT expected in return for their early alliance a MES program. The Governing Board lost their support when this was taken out. Union leadership had a hard time showing what was in it for the teachers without the MES program. The UFT asked Donovan and Fantini whether they would support the MES program. When they said they could not, the uneasy alliance deteriorated.

III Clark 173-174 Legislators' decision on the decentralization bill was not made on the basis of numbers of votes but on much more mundane grounds. No other explanation for the 24-hour shifts of opinion and refusal to consider prior discussions. After that union victory, Shanker was asked how much was spent on this in Albany. Answer - between $200,000 and $500,000. Nobody asked for a more specific accounting. Clark suggested to some dissident UFT members that this might be an issue on which to challenge Shanker, but they didn't make the challenge.

III Gittell 182 People misuse concepts for own ends. The union challenged the validity of the election of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Board because only 25 per cent of the eligible voters voted; but no one is challenging the recent school board elections in which fewer voted.
I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS . . . (continued)

III Swanker 195 The demonstration districts threatened UFT and CSA power, but they gained power through this controversy. They were unpopular at the beginning because of the previous year's unpopular strike; gained power and public opinion through this.

III Gittell 194 The blue-ribbon panel approach won't work in New York because labor unions run this city and they do not support the redistribution of power.

III Galamison 198-199 Teachers felt as though their jobs were threatened when the Governing Board transferred teachers out of the district, and would have felt so regardless of race. No teachers actually lost their jobs in the transfer, but newspapers kept saying that they were and people began to believe it.

IV Oliver 211 New York City children are now the captives of the UFT, and there is no way to make the teachers produce what they are paid for. If the Newark Union, with its support from other unions, is successful, it will be another defeat for community involvement in education.

IV Clark 213 Newark and Ocean Hill-Brownsville are examples of a contemporary threat to education by a power group that is not interested in education but in using education as an instrument of power. Previously, the threat was from politicians, and liberals mobilized to protect education from political influences. Then threats from right-wing ideologists, and again liberal mobilization in defense. Now, a new kind of power seeks to contaminate the educational process, but this
I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS ... (Continued)

IV Clark (continued) 214 danger is less apparent because these are allegedly educators. If they succeed, not only will local community people not have control over education in Ocean Hill, but no one will have control including mayors and middle-class boards of education. If teacher's unions continue to grow in power and to be supported by labor movements in general, then education will become a form of labor movement.

IV Clark 219 In the Ocean Hill and decentralization conflict, political power was very much involved, but the control of the political apparatus was in the hands of the UFT and Central Labor Council.

IV Fantini 224 Paraprofessionals are now members of the UFT, being protected, and have entered the middle-class cycle.

IV Clark 225 Paraprofessionals are not in the UFT; they are the colonial subjects to the UFT. They have no voice, no representation on the UFT governing council. 50 per cent of them have lost their jobs since they joined the UFT - and without a strike.

IV Ferretti 225 At a junior high school in Queens, in a black neighborhood, 60 per cent of the teachers are white, parents seeking control of some aspects of the educational process, rebelled against the local elected board, and 22 teachers were transferred involuntarily and a principal fired. 17 of the teachers and the principal are black. They appealed to the UFT and were told that the UFT would support them if they won in court.
I. THE UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS . . . (continued)

IV Clark Ferretti 242 The union won't win in Newark because there is no money.

IV Clark 242 The more the UFT and other unions become identified with the Newark case, the better it may be because it is a "no win" case. If they do find the money, the unions will be that much stronger.

IV McCoy 243 The unions must know there is no money in Newark - they're not crazy.

IV Oliver 244 The union may know exactly what it is doing, the union president may be being used without knowing it.

IV Clark 245 The resolution in Newark will be a union defeat packaged to look like a victory. Looking behind the package one could see a severe blow to the union movement.

IV Oliver 247 Education has always been the key part of the black struggle, and there is always some obstacle - now the Boards of Education are yielding that role to the unions.

IV Clark 247 The union has emerged as the contemporary chief opposition to the legitimate educational aspirations of American minority people, particularly colored minority.

IV Ferretti 249 The UFT chapter chairmen drew the boundary lines of the local school districts, which the Board of Education promulgated as theirs.

V Ferretti 273 The UFT could predict the Governing Board's reactions and in that sense could almost program the Board's actions.
V Oliver 273 Union didn't know enough about the Governing Board and community to predict their reactions. They expected the Board to accept binding arbitration, which would end the experiment.

V Ferretti 274 UFT did expect the Governing Board to refuse binding arbitration.

V Oliver 283 Union and media used anti-Semitism gimmick to pressure Ford Foundation out of the experiment and to defeat the Governing Board. It was a powerful gimmick.

V Ferretti 284 Yes, it was an important gimmick.

V Clark 285 Shanker's charges of anti-Semitism changed public opinion of the reformers to that of a group of barbaric anti-Semites.

V Fantini 288 The original coalition between the UFT and the community was for MES and when the community wouldn't buy that, the union pulled out.
### II. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, DR. BERNARD DONOVAN AND BOARD MEMBERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel</th>
<th>Panelist</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Theme</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>In 1967 the Board of Education approved an open enrollment plan for integration including redistribution of teachers. Did not carry out the plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Gittell</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Board of Education made a series of unkept promises leading to the 1964 boycotts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Gittell</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Theobald, Board of Education, promised a timetable for integration, but never produced it.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Gittell</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>In consultations in 1966 between the Board of Education, Donovan, and the IS 201 community about integration, the Board of Education was talking about integration of black and Puerto Rican; the community was talking about integration of white, black and Puerto Rican.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Swanker</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>The Giardino Board, the last Wagner Board, wanted to abolish the Board of Examiners, but their decentralization plan was defeated by the unions.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Ferretti</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>The Board of Education has always been a dumping ground for political appointees.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>The Board of Education and school system are captive to the CSA, UFT, other unions, and the groups that are represented on the board. Minority people are not represented. The Board is captive to the professionals because even working full-time its members cannot keep up.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
II. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION . . . (continued)

I Swanker 29 The Board is captive to the professional staff, but its information comes from several members of the 110 Livingston Street staff, not just the Superintendent. The interests of the Board pretty much come from 110 Livingston, there is really no question about that, unless a member makes a determined effort to go to the field.

I Gittell 35 The People's Board of Education sued the City Board of Education on the basis that they were not doing their job.

I Galamison 35-36 The People's Board has won only one case against the City Board of Education, with Commissioner Allen's help: a lawsuit arguing that the Board of Ed was spending money in a manner that perpetuated segregation and that it should spend this particular money in Brownsville and East New York for a school structure that would lend itself to integration. The money is still being held up, about $40 million dollars. Staff won't begin a plan to un-court that money.

I Gittell 45 Donovan and Fantini consulted with Shanker about the demonstration districts and he suggested Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

I Swanker 48 Donovan and Swanker had been speaking to Fantini about funding the demonstration districts - during the time when the districts were being decided upon.

I Swanker 47-48 In February or March 1967, Donovan and Swanker drafted a proposal to the Board of Ed for 12 different educational innovations including 3 demonstration districts, location not
II. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION . . . (continued)

I Swanker (continued) specified, and involving the people of the community in some fashion, not specified. In April, the proposal was submitted to the Board and they adopted it in theory.

I Swanker 48 Donovan, not the Board, was involved in the discussions and decision about demonstration districts and selection of Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

I Gittell 49 Board of Ed approved the proposal including the demonstration districts without knowing what they were doing.

I Swanker 49 Board adopted the recommendation without giving it much thought, with the exception of Giardino. Didn't connect it with the then current controversy at IS 201 (in answer to Gittell's question).

I Swanker 51 Board of Ed had decided that there would be three demonstration districts and when Joan of Arc was ruled out, Fantini suggested Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

I McCoy 55 The first meeting that steering committee had with Donovan made it clear that there would be no additional funds, that it would be blood, sweat, and drudge and in spite of all the rules and regulations that were applied.

I McCoy 56 Steering committee met with Donovan in July 1967 to find out what the personnel status was in the district. Vacancies weren't declared until September.

I McCoy 57 When principalships were declared vacant and Governing Board asserted itself to appoint them, Donovan agreed.
II. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION . . . (continued)

I  Swanker 63 Re whether the Board of Ed accept-
ted the notion, in June, that a
Unit Administrator or someone with
administrative pay would be appointed
(Gittell question p. 57), the Board
sort of closed their eyes in the
hope that the whole thing would go
away.

I  McCoy 63 Donovan had to avoid giving a civil
service title to the unit admini-
strator because of civil service re-
gulations.

I  Oliver 65 When Oliver wrote to the Board of Ed
in the spring of 1967, as chairman of
a local board in the district, asking
about plans for the demonstration dis-
trict, he got a letter from Robinson
saying that nothing would be happen-
ing in September.

II  Donovan 75 Choice of the demonstration districts,
spring 1967: Donovan and Board were
looking for districts. In addition
to the districts that were organized,
quite militant and ready to go, the
Board wanted some that were not so
organized.

II  Donovan 75 Swanker and Donovan had recommended
the idea of demonstration districts
to the Board because they thought
there should be some trial (of de-
centralization). Board was not re-
ceptive but finally agreed that there
should be a trial.

II  Donovan 76 Board of Ed's 1967 decentralization
proposal was for administrative, not
policy decentralization. Their legis-
lative proposal, not passed, was far
short of what the Ocean Hill and 201
community groups wanted. Board was
concerned about guidelines.
II. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION . . . (continued)

II Donovan 81 Re local steering committee's plan that was supposed to have been agreed to by union, Board, local district, and Ford: Board of Ed did not formally adopt it, they said 'fill it out and we'll consider it at the end of the summer.'

II Donovan 81 Board of Ed had rejected the Bundy panel proposal, and its own legislation had not been passed, so the decentralization as it worked out was not really connected with the Bundy or Board plans.

II Donovan 98 Board of Ed did not cooperate or acquiesce in the June elections held by the steering committee or planning for school opening.

II Donovan 98 One impediment to steering committee's and then Governing Board's proceeding with the experiment was that the plan had been agreed to by union, Ford, steering committee, but not the Board of Ed. Board had wanted to see fuller plan at end of summer. Later, they called in Jack Neimeier and consultants who advised the Board to accept election results. Board reluctantly and not formally decided to work with the Governing Board. Board resented steering committee's proceeding without the Board's formal approval.

II Swanker 99 April 1967 Board recognized, without formally adopting, Swanker-Donovan proposal, without really understanding what they were recognizing. No enthusiasm, but no great reluctance: took the Superintendent's word for it. Giardino may have been the only Board member who was knowledgeable about it. Later, September, October 1967, felt that they had been dragged into it - that the Superintendent had put one over on them.
II. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION . . . (continued)

II Donovan 100 Board of Ed, summer 1967, did not want to give official public recognition to the Governing Board until there was a total plan for the operation of the district.

II Donovan 100 The Board did cooperate with the Governing Board: got permission from Commissioner of Education to appoint principals from outside the examination list. And made those appointments, including appointing McCoy.

II Donovan 100 Board of Ed cooperated with State Education Department to establish a plan, with Ford funding, to train Negro and Puerto Rican educators, and three of them are now district superintendents and many are principals.

II Donovan 108 Donovan and others thought of the decentralization districts as projects to find out how to decentralize, what the problems were, before adopting city-wide decentralization.

II Swanker 113 July 1968 was the first time the Board had a majority of Lindsay appointees and they did some things that were important as far as decentralization is concerned.

II Donovan 117 Governing Board did not accept guidelines offered by the Board of Ed, and Board of Ed did not accept the guidelines, list of responsibilities, that three local boards and an attorney had drawn up (Oliver, p.117), so there were no guidelines, no definition of authority, and the two Boards disagreed about what rights the Governing Board had, and that's what created the hang-ups.
II. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION ... (continued)

II Donovan 118 Board of Ed might have worked with the demonstration district in the summer 1967 on the plan, but felt that community boards should be allowed to do it themselves, so did not participate.

II Swanker 119 Since the 110 Livingston staff was against the demonstration, and Robinson and Branbecker who had been appointed by Donovan as liaison had not helped but had done everything from foot-dragging to sabotage, even if the Superintendent had authorized help to the local boards, they would probably not have gotten much help.

II Donovan 123 Donovan could have but did not cut off McCoy's salary in spite of UFT and CSA pressure - because it wouldn't have achieved anything.

II McCoy 129 Donovan provided substantial support. The only real support the Governing Board had, though at times his hands were tied.

II Donovan 139 Board of Ed and Governing Board had agreed before the demonstration project began that teachers could transfer out of the district if they didn't want to stay. Some did then and some did later. But there was no discussion or agreement that the district could transfer teachers out. Perhaps there should have been, but there wasn't. The transfer started the controversy.

III Donovan 158 Speaking in retrospect, the Board of Ed and Superintendent looked on it as an educational manifestation of a political problem, but no one had time to sit down and try to predict the consequences (in answer to Gittell's question, p.150).
II. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION . . . (continued)

III Swanker 162 Swanker didn't think the Board of Ed would pass the demonstration proposal of Swanker and Donovan. Probably only Giardino knew what recommendation they were accepting. Didn't think they would because of the political backgrounds of the Board members. Race and power issues may have been in the backs of their minds.

III Donovan 163 Didn't expect the Board of Ed to accept the Swanker-Donovan proposal because the Board was concerned with the formalities and the law. Law didn't permit them to hand away their responsibilities - they said. The plan included principals from outside the list and a lot of flexibility for the local board. Some provisions needed extra-legl approval from the Commissioner, e.g. the principalships. Board had asked Donovan to draw up recommendations and he put the demonstration districts in, which was not what the Board had asked for. Board was concerned with legal responsibilities for funds, etc.

III Donovan 164 Donovan put the demonstration districts in the proposal to the Board of Ed to have a model for decentralization. Did not foresee the kind of furor that developed in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Expected the community to want more.

III Clark 164 Asks whether Board of Ed's resistance to the proposal for demonstration districts came from sensitivity to CSA and UFT.

III Donovan 164 Board was not concerned with CSA because at that time CSA was new and had little or no authority. UFT may have had some effect but the Board was thinking about legalities.
III. Gittell 167 Some Board of Ed members were very sensitive to Superintendents at 110 Livingston.

III. Donovan 168 At that time Superintendents at 110 had nothing to do with CSA, they had power in Albany but not as much in New York City as UFT.

III. Donovan 165 As soon as the Board passed the recommendation for demonstration districts, Ocean Hill-Brownsville went to Ford for funding and Donovan suggested districts. This actuality frightened the Board about the proposal.

III. McCoy 169 The Lindsay Board of Ed was supposed to represent a different constituency, but they found it was practically impossible to do anything even at that point.

IV. Clark 170 Donovan had said that the establishment (specifically the Board of Ed) did not intend for the black community to exert real power.

IV. Clark Fantini 230 Rose Shapiro was protecting Rev. Oliver from his own ignorance.

IV. Clark 248 In the first decentralization proposal in Albany, the positions of the Board of Ed, CSA, UFT were identical. No one represented the people.

IV. Ferretti 249 The districts promulgated by the Board of Ed for the new decentralization law were drawn by UFT chapter chairmen.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Board of Ed is captive to the professional staff because even working full-time its members cannot keep up.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Swanker</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>The Superintendent presents the agenda for the Board of Ed, and to that extent the Board is captive to the professional staff, but each Board member has a contact on the staff, so there is not just a single professional staff man controlling information to the board. The interests of the Board pretty much come from 110 Livingston Street, there is really no question about that, unless a Board member makes a determined effort to go to the field.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Gittell</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Groups who wanted decentralization, parents schools, open enrollment, bussing - on every issue they were defeated either by the union or by headquarters staff at 110 Livingston Street.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ferretti</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>There was a strategy at 110 Livingston to defeat everything with administrative detail.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Re the one court case the People's Board won against the Board of Education, a ruling that a particular sum of money should be spent in Brownsville and East New York for a school structure that would lend itself to integration: the money is still being held up, about $40 million. When Galamison was on the Board of Ed he could not get the staff to begin a plan to un-court that money.</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>THE CITY EDUCATIONAL BUREAUCRACY . . . (continued)</td>
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<td>II</td>
<td>Ferretti</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>Did not support the experiment and did not take action to further it, which hindered it. Left things in in-baskets.</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>Donovan</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>April 1967, Superintendents at 110 Livingston had nothing to do with the CSA.</td>
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<td>III</td>
<td>Gittell</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>Some Board members were very sensitive to superintendents at 110 Livingston.</td>
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IV. THE STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, JAMES ALLEN, HIS STAFF AND THAT BUREAUCRACY

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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Donovan</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>James Allen, Commissioner of Education, summer 1967, ruled that the Governing Board could appoint principals from outside the list, presumably at the recommendation of the unit administrator.</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Donovan</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Initiated plan, with cooperation of Board of Education and funding from Ford, for training program for black and Puerto Rican educators.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Donovan</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>Thought of demonstration districts as trials of the plan, before adopting decentralization city-wide.</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>McCoy</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>Gave ambiguous answer to question of whether demonstration districts could be defined as state training schools which would have been a legal way to appoint principals without examination.</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Swanker</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>State Education Department, Bob Stone in chief counsel's office, saw to it that the demonstration districts were given every legal break possible - with regard to appointing principals as for state training schools.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Swanker</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>Policy heads - Commissioner Allen and staff were sympathetic to the demonstration districts, had faith in the theory, and this is part of what kept the districts going in spite of opposition.</td>
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</table>

State Education Department used Urban Education Act, saying Ocean Hill-Brownsville was to have a community education center and presenting it to the Board of Education as a fait accompli.
Swanker

The bureaucracy, analogous to Livingston, did not support the demonstration districts and took no action in its support. Only the policy heads were dedicated to its success.

McCoy

Allen told McCoy, in the presence of Stone from the chief counsel's office, that there was nothing in the law to prevent Ocean Hill from becoming a state training setting and suggested that he would be willing to go to court about it. But he did not act to obtain this ruling.
V. MAYOR LINDSAY AND THE MAYOR'S OFFICE

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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Gittell</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Lindsay's people pushed through legislation requiring the Mayor to propose a decentralization plan including community control, thinking that educational reform would be a good political issue for Lindsay.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Oliver</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Where 110 Livingston is weak, the Mayor supports them, and where those two are weak, the CSA and UFT support them.</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Gittell</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Then the IS 201 community groups rejected Kenneth Clark's proposal, Lindsay recommended a task force as an alternative, discussions with Mayor's office, Sverdoff; Ford, Fantini, Bundy; community groups. These discussions led to proposal of demonstration districts and Ford funding</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Swanker</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>There was a time when Lindsay would have shut down the demonstration districts if he had had the authority - when the law and order issue was high and 3,000 policemen were in Ocean Hill-Brownsville.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>Neither community people nor others - Mayor's office, Ford, etc., were prepared to deal with the political consequences. Committed themselves verbally to decentralization and community control but were not prepared to deal with the repercussions and did not maintain their support.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Ferretti</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>When the crunch came, Lindsay was absent. The entire episode created a great many political cowards. People who might have been expected to foresee the political repercussions evidently did not.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
V. MAYOR LINDSAY AND THE MAYOR'S OFFICE (continued)

III Galamison 169 The Mayor and his appointees did not produce the kind of plan Galamison thought they had said they would. Mayor did not fully support the demonstration districts.

III Clark 179 Dean Flaco, in Lindsay's office, was sent to organize the community to get consensus before moving on housing programs. Flaco used community organization approach to create confusion whereby non-movement can be justified on the grounds that the people are divided.

V Fantini 283 The Mayor's appearance and economic boycotts showed the effectiveness of the anti-Semitism gimmick.
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>During the 1965 demonstrations at the 600 schools, media talked about letting insane children into the street, though in fact those children functioned very well on the picket line.</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>During the IS 201 controversy, the media gave more attention to Stokely Carmichael than to the moderate and integration forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Ferretti</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Summer 1967, media presented union strike threats as a union dispute over wages, which it was not. The disruptive child issue was an attempt to get part of school supervision and an anti-black thing.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Ferretti</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>From mid-1967 on, the reporting on education was poor and misinformed, e.g., the disruptive child-control of the school issue never saw the light of day.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Ferretti</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Media gave the impression that the Bundy plan was important, although in fact it was not seriously considered.</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Ferretti</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Sophisticated groups, e.g. the UFT, have greater access to the media than others. A result is misinformation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Donovan</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Media treated the Ocean Hill-Brownsville controversy as a controversy only, asking for answers to other people's statements, not about substantive issues.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Ferretti</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>That is because equal time laws require giving the opposition the opportunity to answer.</td>
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</table>
Media did not adhere to the equal time rule: did not provide opportunity for Oliver to correct slanders against Governing Board by the UFT and some media.

At the early stages, there was an effort on the part of some media people to mediate the strike. Turning point was a press conference at 144, when media people stayed to see the reading program being initiated there.

Opinion makers who influence the decision makers are as important as the decision makers.

Media includes those who report and those who attempt to influence opinion - honest and dishonest reporting. An example of a dishonest piece of reporting.

Even honest reporters reflect their own biases. Newspapers help by airing the issues, but coverage reflected reporters' views and was detrimental.

Examples of roles assigned to various people by the media.

Questions asked by reporters in Newark are political: education issues not discussed.

In covering the involuntary transfer of teachers from Shanger Junior High School in Queens, Times does not cover the UFT aspects of it, which is really all of it (union said they would support the teachers, who have the support of the local black community, if they won in court).
VI. THE MEDIA (continued)

IV Oliver 227 At a recent public meeting of the new local board in Ocean Hill, there was a violent attack against the chairman. The Times covered the meeting with no mention of it.

IV Clark 235 Media coverage made the conflict over the demonstration districts look like a pervasive community issue whereas people other than those directly involved were apathetic or did not understand.

IV McCoy 236 An example of a meeting that was packed, but with no one in the first row. Pictures in the papers showed the first rows only, giving the impression that there was less community interest than there was.

IV McCoy 241 Media is overplaying the role of the militants even more in Newark than in Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

V Oliver 283 Media and UFT used anti-Semitism as a gimmick to destroy the experiment. A powerful gimmick. Used it to pressure Ford out of the experiment and to defeat the Governing Board.
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Swanker</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>The Ford Foundation first became interested during the IS 201 controversy in 1966.</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Swanker</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Ford Foundation established a training program for black and Puerto Rican administrators in 1965. A three-year program - trained 60 administrators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Gittell</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Discussions winter 1966-67, when Lindsay proposed a task force to deal with problems such as those at IS 201. Included Mayor's office, Sverdoff; community; Ford, Fantini. Bundy did not head task force because community was opposed to it. Proposal of demonstration districts grew out of negotiations for task force, which also led to Ford's funding the project.</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Gittell</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Re selection of the districts. Fantini and Donovan consulted with Shanker who suggested Ocean Hill-Brownsville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Swanker</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Swanker and Donovan had been talking to Fantini about funding the demonstration districts. Communities approached Fantini about the project.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Gittell</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Only Fantini at Ford really understood the idea of the demonstration districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Swanker</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Fantini suggested Ocean Hill-Brownsville as the third demonstration district.</td>
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### VII. THE FORD FOUNDATION . . . (continued)

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<tr>
<td>I Gittell</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Letter from Sandy Feldman to Fantini recommending Ocean Hill-Brownsville because the union was working with them. Fantini had requested the letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Swanker</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Two Bridges had a poverty group and a reading program and were pressing for more control of the schools. Had an active, working group and asked Ford for funding, which is how they were selected as a demonstration district.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Gittell</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Gittell heard that the Two Bridges group, with an active program, had asked Ford for money for baseball fields and got hooked into the demonstration project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Donovan</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Ford provided funding for the training program for black and Puerto Rican administrators initiated by the state education department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Fantini</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>UFT asked Donovan and Fantini to support the MES program for the demonstration districts. When they said they could not, the uneasy alliance deteriorated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Gittell</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>When Gittell first started to work with the Bundy panel she thought that even though it represented powerful people it wouldn't work. This kind of institutional change has never happened without revolution. Bundy agreed. The panel was giving up not the power of the groups they represented but the power of middle-class professionals. They misread the union and that professional group. That power wasn't the Bundy panel's to give away.</td>
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Oliver 283 Media and UFT could use the anti-Semitism gimmick to pressure Ford out of the experiment by accusing them of anti-Semitism.


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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Gittell</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>The IS 201 confrontation was the last time integration was an issue and the first time community control was an issue.</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>The IS 201 confrontation was the last time any formidably sized group demanded integration. This betrayal was a pivotal point. The picket lines included moderate and integration people but it was Stokely Carmichael who got the attention.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Gittell</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>If Carmichael and the Black Power movement had not appeared in 1964, the 201 people wouldn't have switched from integration to community control.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>McCoy</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>The media are overplaying the role of the militants in Newark even more than in New York</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Ferretti</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>LeRoi Jones is a powerful man - based on interviewing Ferretti did for the Hughes riot commission - Jones does have a lot to say about what goes on in Newark today, as he did three years ago.</td>
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<td>IV</td>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>Newark community people are not active participants except the militants.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Ferretti</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Northern white liberals who fought for integration in the south opposed it in the north.</td>
<td>Context; Power redistribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>School boycott 1964 had as its objective a timetable for integration, not instant integration. Largest civil rights demonstration yet. Had the support of everyone - 400,000 children, NAACP, CORE, Urban League, UFT, rainstorm.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Each fight involved fewer people than the one before. After the first 1964 boycott, NAACP, Urban League and CORE National Office pulled out. Nine of 13 CORE branches stayed.</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>McCoy</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>What kind of strategies were being created in 1965 and 1966 by white America to neutralize the ghetto? The war on poverty may be such a strategy.</td>
<td>Power redistribution Black education</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>McCoy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Strategy in the white establishment: the examination system is a fraud. Special preparation for it after the 600 school demonstrations were because the examination system was under attack.</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Galamison</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>NAACP, Urban League, CORE, pulled out before the 600 school strike. Not gracefully, but with a front page attack.</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Oliver</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Where 110 Livingston is weak, the Mayor supports them, and where those two are weak, the UFT and CSA support them.</td>
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NAACP, Manhattan Branch and others had advised Shanker not to include the disruptive child demands in the contract because it would polarize the city.

The Board of Examiners, the process of examination, is a discriminating practice. Workshops and training programs are a way of perpetuating the Board of Examiners — as astute politicians recognize.

Opposition to the several decentralization plans because of differences over how many districts there should be. Opposition because of administrative reasons ostensibly, but the hidden reasons were power. A major obstacle was amount of power to be retained centrally or to go to the districts.

The Governing Board concentrated on education, not political processes. Didn't know then whether a volunteer board could even function, and it couldn't be expected to match the political power and sophistication of established forces.

As support for the Governing Board grew, and threat to the establishment increased, the establishment moved to counteract the threat.

Mythical supporters of education didn't support local appointment of principals without examination when that was in court, and didn't support Donovan in other cases when he was out on a limb in support of the experiment.
Entrenched interests did not permit the demonstration districts to be an experiment but continually put obstacles in its way. ensuing problems resulted from this frustration.

A current example of a demonstration project funded to provide innovative program in narcotics. HEW, State, and City Departments of Social Service rules and guidelines don't permit the kind of program that was funded.

Neither the community nor others - Mayor, Ford, etc. - were prepared to deal with the political consequences of the demonstration project. Committed themselves verbally to decentralization and community control but were not prepared to deal with the repercussions and did not maintain their support.

When the crunch came, Lindsay was absent. The entire episode created a great many political coward. Re people who might be expected to have foreseen the political repercussions but did not, in reading the Bundy report, Ferretti saw the political aspects.

There wasn't total political awareness on anyone's part, not even those theoretically sophisticated enough to think about those things ahead of time because there was not the ability to talk about it. It was not that clear-cut.

Decision makers may not be responding to the various interest groups with high clarity in initial stages. Importance of decision makers may be
<table>
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<th>IX. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND LIBERAL GROUPS (continued)</th>
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<td><strong>III</strong> Clark (continued)</td>
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<td>determined in initial stages on the basis of their sensitivity to the various interest groups, especially those with which they identify.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>III</strong> Clark 200</td>
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<td>Strategy of power structure to neutralize or evade attempts at redistribution of power. Initial confrontations are with fairly good people, initial resistance quite reasonable: we agree with your objectives but we don't like your methods. If you don't learn the convenient methods but pursue your goal, next step is to impugn the reformer's intelligence and personal stability - and this applies to white reformers as well as black. Where the reformers are black and the establishment is pushed to the wall as Shanker was, pressure and resistance may cross the threshold of social irresponsibility so that all issues are subordinated to emotional issues of racism, black anti-Semitism.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IV</strong> McCoy 205</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newark has the same relationships of people around an educational issue as Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Education is not discussed; the issues are of political power. Representatives of the several constituencies had to protect their constituencies and couldn't talk about education.</td>
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<td><strong>IV</strong> Oliver 211</td>
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<td>Bayard Rustin took a position against the Governing Board and in favor of the union without ever going to Ocean Hill-Brownsville or asking anyone there about the issues, and is probably not in contact with the people in Newark either.</td>
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Ocean Hill-Brownsville triggered an awareness coast to coast. But a negative, not a positive thing as it was communicated. Made people with vested interests aware that they must pay more attention to the educational consumer, so they devise mechanisms that appear to satisfy this but are controlled by those in power. One result is the issue of accountability.

Newark and Ocean Hill-Brownsville are examples of a contemporary threat to education by a power group not interested in education but in using the educational process as an instrument of power. Previously, threat was from politicians, and liberals mobilized to protect education from political influence. Some reforms that have since become abuses were attempts to protect schools against this threat. Then threats from right-wing ideologists, and again liberal mobilization to protect against that threat. Now, a new kind of power structure seeking to contaminate the educational process, but this danger is less apparent because these are allegedly educators. If they succeed, not only will local community people not have control over education as in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, but no one will have control including mayors and middle-class people everywhere and boards of education. If teachers unions continue to grow in power and to be supported by labor movements in general, then education becomes a form of labor movement.
When the people in power are affected by the deterioration of education and of the cities, the process will change.

The Ocean Hill experiment was never meant to happen.

Donovan said that the establishment didn't intend for the black community to exert real power.

Some so-called liberals who were involved in Ocean Hill wanted the experiment to show the black community that they couldn't do it without white liberal support. When it began to work, support, money, was withdrawn. Was it a fraud throughout?

In Chicago, the power structure read the signs and commissioned a legislative body to begin hearings on alternatives to the schools. Structured the hearings in the language of community control and decentralization. Had witnesses from teachers union, superintendent, supervisors, so they had legitimated their position without making full report of the testimony they had heard.

If power structure can read the signs and expect confrontation, and if they have education as their aim, they could have minimized the Newark confrontation, could have taken steps to avoid it. Since they did not, there must be a reason - to destroy it so that it won't happen again.

Reason for establishment groups' not taking steps to avoid Newark confrontation may be the racist reason that McCoy suggested (p. 239)
They are overplaying the role of militants in Newark even more than they did in New York.

Establishment let the Newark situation get to this point so that when they move it will be destruction of the concept of black people becoming cohesive.

A lesson from Ocean Hill-Brownsville is that there has to be a more comprehensive effort than that, without faith in the system. When black people make some headway, the white population destroys it, even at their own expense, and this has to be kept in mind. No alternative within the system.

There was a predetermined script, and regardless of who plays the roles, they play according to the script. They have no choice. If education is going to change, you have to change the script.

The people who have written and updated the script for years are not going to be allowed to write a new one.

Can identify inevitability in terms of how each force had to behave in reaction to challenge to existing power from groups not in power. The Ocean Hill-Brownsville community was serious: it was a real challenge. They made it clear that they could not be co-opted. If they had just gone through the forms, establishment reaction might have been different. If the experiment had worked, that would have been a devastating criticism of the system, so they had to defeat the effort and had to subordinate differences among themselves.
IX. THE ESTABLISHMENT AND LIBERAL GROUPS (continued)

V Clark (continued) 272 in order to defeat it. Their lack of options is clearer than the Governing Board's.

V Clark 272 The Governing Board was serious about educational reform and genuinely believed that decentralization would improve chances for education. They could not be taken lightly by the power structure.

V Oliver 273 Governing Board refused binding arbitration because they saw that that would end the experiment. They refused to put power back in the hands of those who had not demonstrated interest in the education of black children.

V Fantini 276-277 Individuals were serious about educational reform, and their organization was rudimentary. Non-committed allies - Ford, Mayor's office, state, and at first the union. A new kind of coalition, and for a while it looked as though it would work. When it began to work, the allies realized the seriousness of its challenge and proved remarkably resilient in meeting the threat, expending more energy than for education. Individuals within the organizations maintained their support for educational reform, but the organizations pulled out when the going got rough.
VOLUME II

A Dissertation Presented
by
RHODY A. McCoy

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Education
May 1971
Major Area: Urban Education
Volume Two is comprised of the transcripts of five panel sessions held once each month from November 1970 through March 1971. The purpose of the panel sessions was to collect information about the New York City School Crisis of 1967 to 1970 from those who either participated in, or observed the events in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. The participants were:

Dr. Dwight Allen, Dean of School of Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Dr. Robert Woodbury, Associate Dean of School of Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Dr. Atron Gentry, Director of Center for Urban Education, School of Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Dr. Allan Calvin, President of Behavioral Research Laboratories, Ladera Professional Center, Palo Alto, California (serving as panel moderator).

Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, Director of the Metropolitan Applied Research Center (MARC), New York City, representing the Board of Regents of the State of New York.

Dr. Bernard E. Donovan, former Superintendent of Schools of New York City.

Dr. Mario Fantini, former Program Officer of the Ford Foundation, New York City, now Dean of the School of Education, State University College, New Paltz, New York.
Mr. Fred Ferretti, a reporter with the New York Times.

Reverend Milton Galamison, former member of the New York City Board of Education, and a civil rights leader.

Dr. Marilyn Gittell, political scientist, consultant on urban education, and Director of the Institute for Community Studies at Queens College, New York City.

Reverend C. Herbert Oliver, ex-Chairman of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Governing Board.

Mrs. Esther Swanker, former representative of the New York State Department of Schools, New York City.

Rhody A. McCoy, former Unit Administrator of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville School District.

The candidate is grateful that such a distinguished group of educators found it possible to rearrange their schedules in order to accommodate the design of the study. However, it is discouraging that the technical sophistication of the video and audio recording was not sufficiently refined as to capture certain crucial portions of the dialogue. The relative isolation of the Amherst campus of the University of Massachusetts necessitated that three of the five panel sessions were held in New York City, either at Automation House or in the offices of MARC where the process of recording was impaired. All possible steps were taken to insure a complete and accurate transcription of the proceedings.
Finally, because of the present positions held by certain of the panelists, it is not possible to release the transcripts for public consumption at this time. The members of the Dissertation Committee and the candidate are fully conscious of the time restriction of three years before the transcripts can be released. Thus, although both volumes have been copyrighted in the candidate’s name, only Volume One has been submitted to the Graduate Division of the University of Massachusetts. It is the intention of the candidate to make the transcripts available to students as soon as possible in the hope that they might excite further inquiry.
TRANSCRIPT OF PANEL ONE

November 16, 1970

School of Education
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts

Panelists

Mr. Fred Ferretti
Rev. Milton Galamison
Dr. Marilyn Gittell
Mr. Rhody A. McCoy
Rev. C. Herbert Oliver
Mrs. Esther Swanker

Dean Dwight Allen
Dr. Atron Gentry
Assistant Dean Robert Woodbury
McCoy: I am Rhody McCoy, doctoral student at the University of Massachusetts, and the panel is convening to discuss the critical issues and incidents in the New York City School Crisis, 1967 through '70. It is my privilege to introduce Dr. Dwight Allen, Dean of the School of Education, who will introduce the panel.

Dean Allen: Thank you, Rhody. It is a real pleasure for the School of Education to participate in this program which is unique in the history of our School in attempting to relate dissertation research to a real problem and to bring the people who have been involved in the issues as the real world of education is progressed into the University setting, and to try and bring to bear the scholarly power of the University on an issue that is too young to have a full historical perspective. This dissertation program is developed under the direction of our Assistant Dean for Special Programs, Dean Robert Woodbury, and he will tell you more about the program and the reason that we, at the University, feel that it is important to develop its use and to offer it as a contribution to the community at the same time as it fulfills the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education. Bob . . .

Dean Woodbury: As a point of suggestion, what we are hoping to do in this kind of a dissertation is to see if we can get at some critical issues and a kind of study that won't be something that will go on the back shelf as soon as it is done. But we will not only look at some of the perimeters and problems of the school crisis of '67, '68, and so forth, but also suggest some new directions in urban education: what kinds of possibilities there are, some kind of a sense of what kind of alternatives and options there can be. So our hope here is to lay in these sessions a data bank or a data resource base to get a better handle on what went on in the New York City School Crisis, but also get a better sense of what our options are as educators and people concerned with education, both in New York and elsewhere in the nation. And so I would like
to introduce to you the panel that will be today discussing the issues and implications for the New York School Crisis, 1967 to 1970.

McCoy:

I personally thank all of you for participating. As you know there will be five panel discussions, and I think we can start these panel sessions laying some ground work, some ground rules, so that we can make a productive session out of it. One of the things that we were concerned about is attempting to list, or to set some sort of frame of reference as to what the issues were in the New York City crisis and the problems around those issues, and then try to put them is some sort of chronology. I think that will be the forerunner. I guess the ultimate aim of this has been a very personal hope that the kinds of experiences that all of us have had, because we were all participants in some degree, will have some implications for other urban administrators who are faced with similar problems. So I guess if we can take off and discuss the issues and problems as we see them, and maybe the first way we'll do it is to go around the table, because ultimately I am going to ask very specific questions of each of you. Marilyn, do you want to start with what you see as some of the critical issues and problems around them?

Dr. Gittell:

Well, I think starting from the broader perspective, I don't think there has ever been any doubt in my mind that the issue was fundamentally an issue of critical and social conflict of vested interests vs. the powerless people who had power in the school system and controlled the decision-making in it, and those who challenged the output of education in New York City and want to be feeling what was going on, and that confrontation between these two forces, I think, is the backdrop of the issue in New York City, and I dare say in the cities throughout the country. The whole question of urban education seems to me revolves around not to a very great degree. A part of that as well, I think, is the whole question of bureaucratization and professionalization of education over the last fifty or seventy years, and what that has meant in terms of the output of urban education and why, at this present time in our history, that is also being challenged. It seems to me
that was fundamental, too; we built up a whole set of protection devices which protect the professional and bureaucratic structure which are now significantly being challenged. I think these are part of the broader issues of what obviously is underlying this also is racism in American society which is fundamental to the whole question of what happened in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and what is happening in other cities, and the strike itself, I think, released the racist issue to the public and the involvement of larger numbers of people in it, no on an overt level, where it had been covert before. So I would say, at least in broader perspective, and I think it would be a mistake not to consider this problem in a broader perspective, I would say those three issues are key.

Rev. Oliver: I would say the most basic issue is the right of parents to educate their children. I think behind this is the problem of who has the right to educate. I think the struggle of '67 to '70 brought this to the forefront, for when parents made an attempt to have a deciding voice in the education of their children, they ran into a bureaucratic structure which said "No, you don't have this right." I do feel that the right to educate is a basic issue. I would ask: 'Do professionals have a right to educate children' or 'privilege to educate children'? 'Do educators have a right or a privilege to educate children? Does a union have the right to educate children?' I think these were issues that were being challenged, and I think that basically the parents must have and must exercise the right to educate their children as well as have a deciding vote in the control of institutions which they are deeply involved. To me these were the basic issues - all else, I think, would be side issues . . . .

McCoy: Fred.

Mr. Ferretti: Yes, in my particular - I'll call it a narrow viewpoint for the sake of argument here, I think the responsibility of the media in this whole question is something we ought to discuss: a failure of the media both in newspapers and television to report the issues properly, the failure of all the media to hold the accusers accountable
to statements, public statements that were made; and in many, many cases to permit themselves to be used as outlets for partisanship. We can get on to that later.

McCoy:

Milton.

Rev. Galamison: Just briefly, I think one of the serious problems has been a problem of values, that is generally. That is I have argued for a long time that when we talk about education, we are not really talking about education at all, because we sort of relate education to making a living which may be vocation, but it certainly isn't education which is an enlargement of life, an enlargement of the mind for its own sake without any relationship necessarily to these other values that we attach to education. Just by way of illustration, let me say this is why we get such a struggle to pass the tests by hook or crook and such a struggle in the competitive area because very few people, when they talk about education, are really talking about education. So I argue - what we are dealing with basically, in one instance is a problem of values, because if our values were what they ought to be, we would never have these struggles in these areas, and nobody would content himself with the kind of education and racist division which has permeated our education throughout. Secondly, I have argued that our problem largely has been one of ethnocentrism, that the ethnocentric gap between those who teach and control the education system and those who learn is so immense that it has not been bridged and very little teaching and learning take place, as they ought to take place. Thirdly, I have argued that our educational structure has been archaic, that we live in a period during which people have undergone more changes than at any other comparable time in history. Not the changes that are forever with us; change of course is the most constantly dependable thing on which we live or with which we live. But very few generations have undergone the quantitative and qualitative change that our generation has seen in the area of the atomic explosion, for example, or atomic energy, atomic competence, has compounded itself beyond the
wildest dreams of those who first conceived it. The computer, probably the greatest agent of change, the greatest mechanism for change, has expanded in its use and there are countless other things - heart surgery, transplants, the whole bit has been a part of an era in which colossal changes have taken place. The schools have not begun to move to meet this era of change which has been a part of our own generation's lifetime, as it were.

An then just fourthly and finally, I'd argue that we are caught in a serious economic struggle for jobs which in the minds of many people transcends education, educational importance and the school structure; that we have been caught in a kind of economic situation where the success of one person means the failure of somebody else, or for one person to get a job means to displace another. An this has had serious ramifications in the effort to right what might have been the most obvious wrong in many instances.

McCoy: Esther

Mrs. Swanker: It is difficult in his position he has the others . .

are very, very well and I thought that Marilyn and Dr. Oliver especially in the broader issues covered it quite well and so I would limit myself to two rather narrower contexts of area of what they have already indicated, and one was the political power involved in invested interests. In other words we were faced almost immediately with the political power of the union, the political power of the CSA, and the lack of political power which the Ocean Hill Board had and could muster. The second thing which probably is much broader and of more interest, at least in my role in that particular series of events, and that was - we were faced immediately with a challenge to protective laws that had been enacted by a middle-class, suburban legislature and these laws became protective of these vested interests, and the legislature, of course, had a history, and still has in New York state, of being white middle-class oriented and the laws that were passed prior to the Ocean
Hill-Brownsville controversy, of course, protected the schools like Mistiona and many up-state white suburban schools. The legislature did not know, had not really faced the issues that were raised in the 1967-70 controversy, and it immediately made the lines very clear and made the law clear as to just exactly what they were set up to do and what they couldn't do. And to me this was one of the major outcomes of this controversy; that is to make the people, at least the people of New York City, and out of the state, aware of the inadequacy and inequality of those laws, and that they were set up for a very special group and that they did not apply equally to all of the children and to all of the people of the state, and I think, we were shown dramatically just where the political power lay when the decentralization bill finally came to the floor of the legislature, and we saw the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Board and all the people who supported it and there were many very powerful people, as you recall, who fought for a broad, general decentralization plan and it went down to a tremendous defeat because of the power of the union and the power of the CSA which rode on the coat-tail of the union. So those are the only two that I really could add to.

McCoy: I think it covers pretty much as you've alluded to as a broad general topic, but I think that there are some other underlying things. For instance, if I was allowed the privilege of translating it, it sounds like to me we are talking about the decline of society through the whole educational system or the society is going down the drain using the conduit of public schools, because you talked about all of our institutions in a short space, except the church, but . . .

Galamison: That's because you have two clergymen. (laughter)

McCoy: I guess what I am trying to look at very basically is that these were problems that the system, meaning the educational system, has been facing for a long time, either subtly or covertly or in some form. There obviously had to be something - a catalyst, if you wish, that caused this thing to begin to spin, bringing it to the
point where it, say, at this moment is. I think what I am saying to you is Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, practically every major school system has had a similar setting, and I use the word similar because I'd like to identify some of the conditions that they have that have pretty much followed in the path of New York. It may be that you are saying that racism is patent, that's the only way that they know how to function and respond to this racism, which means that the political enterprise comes in, and the unions come in, and so forth and so on, to protect them. There must be some other kinds of concerns, at least I know there are, talking to a number of educators recently. The conditions can be outlined, the conditions can be seen who are the people who play these various roles you can then predict the kind of defeat that Ocean Hill had, although I think it had its positive implications. So what I guess I am trying to talk about is a chronology as we did before, I take the liberty of just asking one or two people and trigger.

Galamison: Are we allowed to just butt in here, Rhody?

McCoy: Absolutely, this is a democratic kind of panel - as long as you know that it is mine!

Galamison: Just let me take a shot at the chronology, however rough it may be. I think the current movement probably started with Martin Luther King's bus effort in Montgomery, Alabama, but then with the Supreme Court decision in 1954, people began to direct their attention to the schools, particularly some people in the north took the position - Dr. Kenneth Clark and some of his group - that we have probably as much segregation in schools in the north as you have in the south, and that we must direct ourselves to de facto segregation. But I want to say in spite of the other institutions that have been criticized, liked the courts, the legislature and what not, I think the schools were most affected because the schools were in the forefront, and the schools were in the forefront because not only was the pioneering done in the area of public schools from 1954-1955 through to the present, but it was the only consistent fight that we went through in New York City, i.e. other battles came and went, and in other areas of the country other types of battles came and went.
McCoy: You are talking about the boycotts?

Galamison: Yes, and - well, the whole business long even before the boycotts - Dr. Clark's group and some other groups - were challenging the educational structure, challenging the defacto segregation with their limited resources, and I'd say limited resources. It was a group of people that had no body politic in a sense, that is, there weren't a lot of mass organizations and what not underlying these groups. So they made their bid and then sort of fell apart. But I just want to emphasize the fact that the major and consistent struggle in NYC which was unabated for about 15, 16, 17 years, was the struggle in the area of public schools and this is why the horrors that are being catalogued by Ethel and some others - I mean Esther

Swanker: You have been doing that for five years, I am used to it. (laughter)

Galamison: were made first apparent, I think, to the school struggle.

McCoy: How about you, Marilyn?

Gittell: I am just sitting here thinking: Do you think it was the schools, Milton, because the schools were the most vulnerable, the easiest to push? I mean, obviously, and I think we ought to recognize something else that you are, I mean I think your making the point is a good one - 1954 and the whole movement - but then what you are really saying is that the underlying core issue is really racism - in American society. And out of that grew the questioning of the whole institutional structure not only of education but of the whole system, because I certainly meant to indicate that in my opening remarks that it seems apparent to me that what we are talking about may manifest itself in the school issue but that this is really a questioning of the whole society.

Ferretti: But was there another added dimension in that the focus was on the schools, however, there was a change when you could speak of integration in the
abstract, everybody was for it, but when it became a concrete thing to be dealt with in the north as well as in the south, then all sorts of walls went up.

Swanker:

I think that the schools were highly visible, highly vulnerable and therefore became the battleground, rather than - it's pretty hard to talk about housing, because you have to scatter your shot, I mean you are talking about individual landlords and smaller organizations, whereas, in the schools, really in the State of New York - it is pretty easy in one target, the State of New York, because it is responsible for all education in the State of New York and it delegates to each local board the authority to operate the schools within that city. So, as a result, I certainly have a feeling that Milton's take-off point is right and that part of the reason for the choice of the schools is, as I said, they were so vulnerable and they were so open to attack.

Gittell:

Ya, what is interesting is that in the professional cadres, particularly in social sciences, when I first entered this thing which was in '62, starting a study on the NYC school system, I was shocked to find that almost no political scientist or sociologist had studied the school system or dealt with it. In the 1930's there had been one study by two political scientists out at the University of Chicago who said, basically education is a part of the whole governmental structure, it's really no different than anything else and should be part of that structure. They were quickly chastised, their book gathered dust on the shelf and that was the only thing I found that dealt with education as a political set-up or institution, which means that from - and I doubt with a little less than the thirties - that basically American educators were quite successful in isolating and insulating education from anybody's view. The reason I would like the '54 court position is because what that did was for the first time, say this whole thing is really a political issue, so we've got to deal with it as a political issue - it hinged on integration, but basically it opened the schools up for consideration, whereas prior to that, educators
controlled the setting and had convinced everybody that this was so-called apolitical. I think they did that with a lot of other things as well, and I think it just broke on the school issue because of the '54 court decision.

McCoy: There is something ironical here, and I don't know if I can phrase it well, but the Martin Luther King movement in the south, and then the Supreme Court decision in a way - if we want to look at it from the educational point - were educational. They served as an educational process for people and yet, as you said earlier, it's never been an educational issue. I mean, it's sort of surprising. In other words, what happened to Martin Luther King educated a lot of people to social conditions in the north and east and some other sections. I guess I am trying to ask another kind of question. I don't think that the schools ever were an issue in the south. I think the people had sort of accepted the dual school system and here in the east and the north and some other sections of the far west grew operating under that mystique and facade that there was a kind of integrated educational system. I guess what I am asking here in another way is that it seems to me that the catalyst here was the plight of the people. In other words, you are finding minority people who find themselves unemployed, poorly housed, powerless, not being able to function in this advanced technology, and so forth, and then seeing their kids - that, I mean that was the base and then these two acts, the Martin Luther King movement and then the Supreme Court decision, sort of triggered it. I mean if that is some sort of chronology.

Swanker: There was one thing about that movement in the south that did have an effect in the north, and that was, I think, that the freedome rides and the sit-ins, and so forth, awakened the north - the common people in the north - to the plight of you know, because up to that point, up to that time, I think that particularly the whites in the north had always thought that everything was quiet and calm and there really were no problems, and this is what the press, the media, had led us to believe. An then, all of a sudden, it became
apparent that this wasn't the case, and that was being dramatized by Martin Luther King and by the freedom rides, and this kind of thing, and it made them, especially the liberals of the north and the white liberals of the north, aware of the problem, so that in fact many, as you know, many of them went south to join ... and so became fighters for cause in the south, and then eventually came back north and moved it back up here. So it really did have, I think, have an effect in the north, and in that respect, in that it enlisted a small army, but an army of fighters.

Oliver: In response to that though it was good for the south, let's say the long white south? To see the influx of people from the north to come and help bring about a condition that was supposed to be mandated by the laws of our country, that we have not had in the north, an influx of people from the south to help and force the same thing in the north and the assumption that it is not here is a very tragic assumption. But when I look back at the 1954 decision, at that time, it gave me hope that at last equality was beginning to take hold in this country. As I look back now, it seems to me now that it gave hope for equality for children, but not for adults, and what I see that children might have hope for equality but they are moving into an adult world where they are not going to have that equality. It just seems to me that that whole decision sidetracked us from the real issues and those real issues are still here now plaguing us more than they did in 1954.

Ferretti: I don't want to integrate the efforts of those who went south to help in the integration fight, but it seems to me that this goes back to what I said before - this business of in the abstract as opposed to in the concrete. I think most of us would agree that many of those who went south did it - I don't know if out of altruistic motives or not, but those many, most I might even say, most of those who went south opposed the same things when it came north and I want to know why. I think that's something we ought to explore.

Galamison: Well, let me try to answer that. I have a real
thing about this, because during all the struggles of the fifties and sixties, many organizations were sending their money south, many people were sending their gifts south, many people were going south and as you have indicated, most of these people never gave a nickel for a struggle in the north or near home, and most of these people bitterly opposed any effort to create a better society in their own front yard and in their own back yard - I have a word for it. My optomologist tells me that presbyopia is an eye disease that enables you to see what's far away but you can't see what's right up under your nose. So I have always called it a kind of social presbyopia... a kind of social presbyopia not of itself when Martin Luther King began to move north, when he began to move into the area of the Cicero problem or what not a lot of the support in the north, financial support was cut off, he had to go to Sweden to raise the money and there is no question about what you're saying but that the liberals in the north bitterly opposed any kind of action on their own home ground and almost used the south as a substitute, as a place at which they could look down their noses and say: 'you are worse than we are'; until the battle was brought to the north and then there was no place for black people to go but to Canada, you know, to get help, because there was no north for us to go to get help as the south had gotten help from the north. I think we are all saying the same thing.

McCoy: Let me go back. You know you have a long history of fighting, leading some of the fights in the New York City system, aside from that Supreme Court decision and its beginning rumblings in New York. Can we, or will you trigger off what were some of the sequences leading up to the major confrontation in New York as you saw them and perhaps even then some of the people who were involved in some of these scenes and how long they sustained it?

Gittell: Are we allowed to talk about ourselves?

McCoy: No. (laughter and mumblings)

Galamison: Well, I'll try to be brief about it. As I
remember it chronologically in New York City, the first real effort was waged by Kenneth Clark, Dr. Kenneth Clark and Judge Hubert Delaney and their committee - I don't remember the name of their committee - but it was composed of a number of echelon organizations. They, back as early as 1954, and maybe a little prior to that in 1953, were arguing that education in the north was unequal and that the de facto situation was not a reasonable excuse for not integrating the schools and that something ought to be done about it. They ran their course, but then when they had sort of run out of steam, and as I said before, they had no forces, no grassroots forces to mobilize to battle for them, they sort of died for a while. And then there came along a number of unsung parents' groups, in Harlem, some in Brooklyn, which made little efforts here and little efforts there which came to not too much. Then about 1956, I think it was, or '57, we started parent workshops in Brooklyn with Mrs. Annie Stein and parent workshops got a great deal done in the way of mobilizing opinion and what not, and we had so much trouble with the NAACP - and I could go into real detail about this - the NAACP gave us a very difficult time, the Brooklyn branch of the NAACP. So in order to facilitate things, I ran for president in the NAACP branch and won. So for three years, the workshop worked within the framework of the Brooklyn NAACP, but this became increasingly difficult, because there was too much opposition, there were too many distractions. And I remember in '60, I pulled out. The workshop people disagreed with me - Annie Stein and Claire Cumberbatch - but somehow Annie Stein was not re-elected - I'll never believe it was an accurate count. And we mobilized the parents' workshop again, and in 1960, we threatened the first sit-out of parents. It was called a sit-out in Brooklyn, and the effort was in order to get an open enrollment policy, or at least we got the open enrollment policy as a result of it. In fact we had a thousand parents pledged to sit out, now that seems like very little, very few people today, but it was a big number of people in 1960, and, of course, it rained - it was a hurricane the first day school opened, and we claimed credit for everybody who was out there (laughter).
Anyway, as a result of this effort, and by this time the NAACP and the Urban League and some other groups had sort of joined forces with us, at least in consultation with the Board of Education, we did an open enrollment policy in NYC for September of 1960, and the open enrollment policy simply indicated that if there were all-white schools in all-white communities which had available space, that black children in overcrowded schools in the ghetto community could be transported to occupy that space. And the funny thing was that Dr. Jansen had almost offered the same thing two or three years ago, it was very strange yeah, and we didn't, you know, we somehow wouldn't buy it and we didn't buy this, really, but it was the best that we could get at that particular point of development. And what happened, too, I think, it ought to be remembered, the Board of Education never put out any information on open enrollment, really, so that parents could tell one school from another; that is, if you had ten schools, you didn't know which school to send your kid to. The Board of Education, in fact, discouraged it by giving children notes to take home to get signed during the Christmas holidays when nobody was thinking about a thing like this, and the Urban League disseminated some information, but I think the parents' workshop disseminated more information than anybody else. Now the next thing I remember, we got into another effort to integrate the schools, in other words, we continued it, and because the Board of Education had made a series of promises which it never kept, there was a boycott in 1964 in which over 400,000 children participated, almost half a million children, and it was really the biggest civil rights demonstration in terms of numbers in the country. Was that in '64 or '63?

Panelists: '64.

Galamison: That was in February of '64, but then in March of 1964, there was another one, and there were little over 300,000 youngsters participating in this one. Now the effort of both those boycotts was to get a plan and time-table for the desegregation of the public schools. Now the fact that those who participated, and many
organizations participated in the first boycott, asked for a plan and time-table indicates that nobody said you have to do it tomorrow, but people were saying 'for heaven's sake, give us a time-table and let us know when you intend to do it.' We never got the time-table even though we were promised it by Theobold, we were promised it by the guy who succeeded Theobold, whose name I can't recall. Anyway . . .

Gittell: But, Milton, in '57, I think, the Board did approve an integration plan for the city's school system which included bussing, which included open enrollment, which included redistributing teachers around the city according to experience. I forgot there is a name for it, but I want to get this on the record because I think this is important as well as the alignment of forces on the integration, as you do establish, that the politics of this is terribly important in terms of the alignment that takes place later on in the strike, and issues that were raised then, because all these things had been approved in the Board of Education plan of '57, which is why Jim Allen, I think, was able to come in the early sixties and say "you haven't got a darn thing. What's more, you're more segregated than you ever were before and you haven't followed through on your own plan." And the reason I am interested in this, since you were so directly involved in that integration struggle, where was the CSA on each of these things? Had you any contact or were you aware of what they were manipulating and the same thing with the UFT. Now the union is not recognized officially until 1960, but there were several other groups and you have gone past 1960 . . .

Swanker: . . . organizations prior to the UFT . . .

Gittell: Right, they are the teachers' union and the Guild. Were you, I mean, was there the feeling at that time that the school professionals were with you or against you or what? Because, you know, the point is, that the question of integration has been raised in the community control issue and politics of it, I think in particular are significant.
McCoy: Look, before you answer this - hold that as a point. Don't let it go. But we've gone from '53 to '64, and I think maybe what we could do is to bring it up to '70 and then go back and take a look at the various things, because this thing opens up a whole Pandora's box of questions. After 1964, then what?

Galamison: Well, Marilyn Gittel's point is well taken and many promises were made like teacher assignment and nothing ever came to fruition. This is why our efforts were redoubled and redoubled, but the thing is that I think ought to be remembered, is that the farther we pressed along, the more our numbers dwindled; that is, every fight involves fewer people than the fight before. But I think this also ought to be said that in attempting to recapitulate in any way, any of these incidents, one is bound to forget and everybody ought to remember that there were dozens of little parents' organizations, and a mother here and a mother there - people were making great sacrifices and struggling and pushing the struggle along all the time; people who had no organization, no - you know - claim to anything, but who were just out there fighting for their children. Well, I think we ought to say that between those two boycotts in 1964, we lost the NAACP, we lost the Urban League, and we lost the Congress of Racial Equality, at least we lost the national office, nine of the thirteen branches participated, anyway.

Oliver: What does this have to say about the supporters of those organizations? (Laughter)

Somebody: Don't mean that's and or but . .

McCoy: Everybody focus on the game . . , but let's take it from '64 to '70. There has to be some sequence in there which you probably . . .

Galamison: Well, the next effort came about a year later, now in '65, and it was an effort with 600 schools and high schools, and again the effort was for a plan and timetable for the desegregation of the public schools, but we just focused on the 600 schools because, well, for two reasons:
number one, because they were most vulnerable, they were the most neglected, you know - middle prisons, you know, in which children - our children - were housed. And secondly, because Rhody was working in the 600 schools at that time - he was. And I think Rhody came to me with the idea, because I didn't know where to go next, and I would say on Tuesday, we are going to boycott and empty such and such a school of . . . everybody would wonder how I did it, I'd get on the phone and call Rhody. Rhody would call the teachers in that school and they would turn their school (laughter and mumblings) . . . well, anyway they really made a scandal of this, in spite of the fact that the 600 school kids functioned much better on the picket line and what not, than the junior high or high school youngsters did, you know they said letting insane children into the street.

McCoy: That was the media!

Galamison: Yeah, the media, and this and that and the other thing and that we were terrorizing people. Anyway, that was our last major struggle in '65 as a mass organization effort that we had in terms of trying to involve people on a city-wide level pretty much. The next thing I remember after that, Rhody, was the creation of the people's board at the Board of Education in December of 1965, ah, 1966, I'm sorry, thank you, when spontaneously a group of parents sat in and stayed for about a day-and-a-half to two days, two-and-a-half days, I don't remember, we were all ultimately arrested. And out of that came the people's board, and the people's board never really got anything done within itself, except give inspiration to community. And then, I think, just beyond this and simultaneously, there was the creation or simultaneously was the creation of the demonstration projects, IS 201, Ocean Hill, and a third one, Two Bridges, and of course, this carried us into the beginning of another period.

Gittell: But I think . . . (rest drowned in voices; everybody speaking at the same time.)

McCoy: . . . the 201 complications.
Gittell: Yeah, which is was on . . .

Swanker: . . . feeling the most, actually that was really the most direct line to the confrontation, I mean that you can follow the chronology directly from that; I mean, these others are all important, they all provide a history everything that Milton said up to this point, but I think starting with that '66 confrontation at 201, it moved, it just snowballed right from that point, because this was when the Ford Foundation became interested in . . .

Gittell: Well, it dates back on the consultations with the Board and with the Bernie Donovan on 201 being an integrated school, and when all the dust settled, what the Board seemed to be talking about was integrated Puerto Rican and black, but what the community leadership was talking about was integrated white and black and Puerto Rican, and I think the original group that fought that issue at the 201 and met regularly with Donovan. It interested me, because that's the first time I saw the word 'community control' used in the NYC school setting, that in the . . . reports that Preston Wilcox had on those daily meetings and where the community group, Dave Spencer, Babbit, Edward Preston, Hanna Barkington . . .

Galamison: Your parents' workshop, was that it? . . . not the parent's workshop, Marilyn, was it the Harlem parent's committee?

Gittell: Right, well . . . (mumblings, everybody talking at the same time) and some of the people were connected with the Haryou were negotiated for control of that school and what they were asking for was to choose the principal. This was in the negotiations. And also to develop a parent involvement, direct involvement, even decisions as to how money would be spent on curriculum, which - I think is important - because it's a prerequisite silhouette to what happened later on and I think the whole sequence of events around 201, I would agree with Esther, are a setting for the three demonstration districts, at least. I want to add another dimension here, Rhody, as representative of the white establish-
ment. During this period, I think, another thing you'll have to help Milton with the whole recognition of the overcentralization of the NYC school system, that starting in '52 with the Strayer Yarbner report and up to several other reports, there was a recognition on the part of various study groups that the system was overcentralized, it was not responsive to needs, it had to be broken down; the Board of Examiners was recommended they'd be abolished at least five studies that I could think of starting with Strayer Yarbner and the Shinnerer report and what have you, so that I think you have two things developing; certainly the integration struggle was the major thing.

Galamison: But, may I say this, that from my own point of view, the 2O1 situation which I had gone over was the pivotal point; it was where the corner really turned, because it really turned the corner, because it was the last time any formidably sized group of people ever demanded integration again. I think it ought to be pointed out that the 201 people actually wanted that school placed near the Triborough Bridge where white children could be brought from the neighboring communities in Queens to integrate it, and every conceivable deception was heaped on them in terms of frustrating and preventing this, and then the picket lines formed with some moderate people and integrationist people, like the Harlem parents committee, but we didn't read about them in the press, because Stokely Carmichael was on the line and, you know, a number of other people who were taking a much different position than had been taken previously. So I think this was the 201 frustration; the 201 betrayal was the real turning point from a movement in the direction of integration to an emphasis on community control.

Gittell: But what you say, and I was going to raise this before, that the Carmichael position in '64 was the basis on which that turning of the corner was made, that if Carmichael and the whole Black Power Movement thing hadn't arrived at the point that it did, that the 201 people wouldn't have used this issue of community control, wouldn't have made the switch.
Galamison: Well, true, a number of things - I am sorry.

Gentry: Now, excuse me, I am sort of out of it in the historical event. I hear everybody talking about the Board in the abstract. Who is the Board?

Swanker: Board of Education.

Gentry: Yeah, you are talking about politics. I have some idea what the Board is, in terms of reading and what have you. I wonder who appoints the Board? Is it elected?

Gittell: We had three different boards during this time.

Gentry: Way back up here in 1957, when we start talking about ... (talking by everyone) ... there was some process the board had promised. Now these people turn over and ... Are there six people one the board now? And how are these people ... 

Gittell: No, five people.

Gentry: What I am talking about, I guess has to wait. To talk about how ... responsibilities.

Gittell: What was it, was it nine originally?

Everybody: Yeah, nine.

Swanker: ... a 13-member board ...

Galamison: Well, the point you are making, I think, though is a partial answer to your question, and that is, that over this period of time, there were three different boards of education; there were three different superintendents of schools; and there were three different presidents of the Board of Education.

McCoy: ... and three different processes.

Gittell: Starting with the original process was really the Mayor appointments; then a selection panel was interposed with the notion that various civic groups in the city would recommend to the mayor a procedure for appointment, and that process was in effect at the time of the 201 thing.
Swanker: And prior - now there is something else that has to be considered, too. Prior to the 201, in fact, when the first 201 competition took place, there was a Wagner-appointed Board. Lindsay didn't come to office until when? '66, so he did not appoint a Board until the Doar Board, that was the first Board that he appointed, and I think this is important.

Gentry: Did he appoint any members of the previous Board?

Swanker: He did because there were retirements and . . .

Gittell: Lloyd Garrison was chairman of this Board.

Ferretti: I don't think you can call it the Lindsay Board.

Everybody: No, it was not the Lindsay Board.

McCoy: I think what the point is that Atron is making is a very significant one. Let me just back up and see if I can put some . . . put another dimension to it. Starting with 1953 and 1954, you begin to see some movement around schools in this chronology, by "key figures" who had some concerns about it, and the question I am raising right through here is about a dual set of strategies which may answer your question. What I am saying, is, many people have asked the question: 'Was the 'black minority communities' sophisticated enough to begin to develop strategies?' So, what I am saying is, I see a strategy developing. The question is how the people, a coalition of people, were formed and how they spun off into these other groups as groups, as you alluded to, dissi-pated themselves, or for various other kinds of reasons I think you said as you pushed on, groups began to drop off. what those groups were, why were they dropping off? I guess another question that I am asking is, that it seems to me - and I'll give you a classic example, Milton - you know we were both involved in that, when we were fighting on the 600 school precedent issue, one of the major issues was black principals. We didn't ask about how to appoint them, but we asked that there be an ethnic representation at that level. When the 201 people finally got their heads together, they were asking for not
only black principals but for control and selection by those people. Now, what I am saying is there seems to be "strategy" emanating out of the minority community, powerless as it is, as against the strategy being developed by the white community, which we haven't alluded to, even though the mass media played a tremendous role here. So the question I am raising: let's assume that these conditions were prevalent somewhere else. That obviously, there should have been some coalitions formed that would have maintained not only substantive kinds of direction, but sustained kinds of direction, because as I have watched the civil rights movement even in education in New York, it goes from one point to one point, dies, then you have to resurrect it and start again. Could it be . . . the reason I wanted to deal with the Board and the politics . . . could it be that organizations who weren't . . . in the '65 thing; people had people organizing the people on the street . . . could that be a fact that there . . .

Swanker: It played a very important role in that it, it gave these three, I think, these three demonstration groups a nucleus of organization on which to call. Now, they didn't, I don't think, stay with them very long, and I just remember that Haryou was very active originally at 201 and then they just left.

Gentry: Thank you.

McCoy: But, the dimension that you are asking and I want to follow that because I think it's key, the dimension that Atron is alluding to is not what happened as a result of it, but what kind of strategies were being created by white America to neutralize on the ghetto and the war of poverty may be just such a strategy.

Galamison: Could we not gloss over this point that you just made because I think it's significant, that during the 600 school effort there was a demand not only for the improvement of 600 schools, but for black principals, and I think black teachers, too, and Puerto Ricans, and what happened there as a result of that, at least one thing that happened was that the next time the principal's
exam was given, we had, oh, I think - I don't remember the exact number - but a number of people passed, which was unprecedented, a number of black people passed the exam, and some efforts were made to facilitate the exam and to prepare people for it. So something came out of that in terms of what subsequently became known more so as community control and what have you, but . . .

Swanker: I want to follow on that - just a minute - because I think there was something important in that, of what you say about the exam, because I think it was mentioned. I'm not sure it is exact that a group from the state wrote a proposal to the Ford Foundation to set up the same program for the black and Puerto Rican principals or administrators, training program, and - I may be wrong - but it seems to me that that was the first, that that was earlier when the Ford Foundation . .

Gittell: It was . . . for creation . . .

Swanker: Right, that this was one of the things that helped the interest of the Ford Foundation in this trial one, because they funded that three-year program and eventually it trained sixty-some black and Puerto Rican administrators.

Gittell: . . . and who are still acting principals. (laughter, and everybody talking)

Ferretti: The important thing what you ask though is the word "strategy," and I don't think a strategy emerged, because I . . .

McCoy: Where? What side?

Ferretti: In the black community I am talking about.

Swanker: Not on either side, really.

Ferretti: Well, I would question the school establishment side. I would say that so far as the black community went, the leadership was too diffuse. I think the recognized organizations that people looked to for leadership did not provide it, and I think what you had was an increasing awareness of the power of blacks, but not a strategy.
And I think that...

McCoy: Let me do an intolerable injustice at this point. I happen to disagree with you violently. I'll let Milton talk about that because I saw him being triggered. You see, if I just take a minute and go back to this examination system, and this is why I say strategy, because that whole examination process was a sham and a fraud.

Ferretti: No, we are talking about strategy as a word, it means like... because...

McCoy: Because having had some inputs into it, it could be, I mean, it couldn't be done other than having been a strategy, and at some point, maybe in one of these panel discussions, around the problems in that area, we'll allude to it. But I am saying it that the fact that the examination was announced, that they set up courses for it and they did all the funny things that they had been doing, was because the system itself was under attack after the Griffith report of the examination system.

Ferretti: Now I see what you mean. You misunderstand me. What I am saying is that you had a certain set of circumstances and there arose a response to it, here, and then you have the same thing here, so I don't think there were some overall strategies.

Galamison: Let me say, there was a strategy. The strategy was just not equal to the opposition and to the circumstances. Now, there are many people who would agree with even how the strategy evolved and dissipated and evolved again. I mean, a fellow like Stokely Carmichael would say: 'This is the way you fight anyway; you fight a little while, you wait for people to catch up, you fight again, you wait for people to catch up.' We did this not because we agreed with it as a philosophy - we had no alternative. Because after a struggle, our forces were so dissipated by the press, and the people, I mean, for example, just in this, well prior to the thing Rhody and I are talking about; the 600 school strike - we lost - we had a little organization - we never had more than $500 in the bank at one time
during our whole existence. But the NAACP, the Urban League, CORE with their hundreds of thousands of dollars, you see, pulled out. Now, it was, well, it wasn't an accidental pulling out, it was a connived pulling out, because they didn't pull out, no, they didn't pull out gracefully, or pull out saying 'we won't hurt the movement.' Every one of them pulled out with a front page attack, you know, on what we were doing. The kind of thing that the black community wouldn't even tolerate today. They did . . .

Ferretti: I don't consider that strategy.

Galamison: But, yeah, of course it is, but it was a strategy to defeat . . . (Everybody is talking at the same time again.)

Ferretti: We were talking about the other side. That's what I was thinking.

Galamison: But there were times when we, when just - we had all the people arrested, that we could get to go to jail. We'd spent all the money that we had for food to give kids lunch, and you just plain ran out of resources, you ran out of bail money. So the only thing to do was just to hold the hump, so I . . . (everybody is talking)

Ferretti: . . . I don't mean to have a quarrel, but . . .

Gentry: I thought he was saying that, too. I thought he was saying something; that because of the different groups and their dissension, that this was a major problem; there was no togetherness which is no togetherness of nobody.

Oliver: I think what you are saying is that there was a strategy that was defeating you and us all the time, and we just, our forces were depleted because there was a counter strategy that was there working, and it's still working.

McCoy: Yeah, but Milton plays a different kind of role in this particular session. At the time when . . .

Ferretti: I think you have to use the word "activism" rather than "strategy" here.
McCoy: You see at that time, Milton was able to bring together a number of coalitions of people, despite the fact that at periodic times they would do whatever they had to do politically to pull out the question used to be as to why they were pulling out, and so forth and so on. But you had a continuous, shall I say, influx of new people, so when we got to the 600 school boycott right through these things, we still had, what I think, was a strategy. We went after the practice who provided it for the same reason we're talking about. The other side had a better strategy because they had all the resources.

Ferretti: No, the point I made was that there was a series of strategic actions.

McCoy: But not all planned ...

Ferretti: No argument with that, obviously, but no overall strategy, like existed on the other side, and I think I'm right.

Swanker: I think we ought to define the other side because we've all ... (rest drowned by everyone's comments at this time) but I have particular reasons for mentioning it, (laughter) because I recall that the Giardino Board, which was the one that was put out of office, remember, by Lindsay's being able to appoint, and he could tack the Board. But the Giardino Board, which was the last real Wagner Board, wrote a decentralization plan - proposal - and in his legislation, and in it, they called for the abolishment of the Board of Examiners. So, yeah, everybody had twenty-twenty hindsight. We can all look back and say if we had only done that and thus and thus. If we had pulled resources at that time with what, with some of the strength of that organization, because that board was sincerely - with the exception of one or two members - wanted to abolish the Board of Examiners, but it was the power of the union again, in the CSA that beat back. However, if at that time, when your organization was strong, and you still had the remnants of the Wagner Board and you had Lindsay certainly in favor of the abolishment of the Board of Examiners and you could have pulled all of those factions together and just concen-
trated on one target - the abolishment of the Board of Examiners - we might have accomplished it at that time, but nobody knew enough to play.

Gittell: But that is the key issue, because I think certainly, Milton, you remember even at the time of the creation of the people's board, there was a great deal of conflict and disagreement in those groups; some of the people Rhody mentioned about that . . .

(There was a change here in the original recording. However, the audio that we are missing will be on the video-tape. There will be just probably less than twenty seconds worth of talking and then it will continue.)

Gittell: . . . of education, I mean the union. The Council Supervisory Association, but particularly the headquarters staff at 110 Livingston Street.

Gentry: That's what . . . accountability . . . responsible to the Board or something?

Somebody: On paper.

Gentry: I don't want to establish . . . I do understand. But I thought that was an important point, because you know how you deal with the Board of Education, and you can't deal with the finances. Nobody can audit that, you know, the Board of Education, to find out where the money is going.

Gittell: Well, that isn't entirely true. I mean, the Mayor could have if he wanted to, and Lindsay did . . .

Gentry: On a political level, you can't do that unless you have political force, but the Mayor may have had his head cut off. I don't know. I don't understand part.

McCoy: I guess the question goes back, let's see, to your Board. Who appointed that Board? What was it appointed for?

Gentry: How long did it take that board to get to such a complex mechanism that nobody can ever audit it - the books?
Swanker: By that you mean bureaucracy?

Gentry: Yeah.

Ferretti: The Board has nothing really to do with the bureaucracy at 110 Livingston Street. The Board has always been a dumping ground for political appointees.

Gentry: You are talking about accountability and who is responsible to who and who really runs the school system.

Galamison: Could I make an effort to . . . (everybody talking again) . . . and I was going to say that some of you have had an opportunity to observe it much more closely over a protracted period of time than I did, but I would say two things about the educational structure from having been on the Board. One is that the educational structure is captive, and that is, the Board is captive, the school system is captive to these organizations that Marilyn Gittell mentioned: the CSA, the United Federation of Teachers, and the PA - the construction union - all these people have their constituencies on the Board. Now, the minority people or almost any other; any other people would hardly have any real representation on the Board. Now the second thing is, you see, the Board is always - I felt - accused wrongly, because the Board is usually captive to the professionals and it's captive to the professionals for the simple reason that the Board can't keep up. You can't possibly keep up as a volunteer, even if you are a full-time volunteer, with . . . this was true when I was on the Board. I had five people working in my office and we couldn't keep up. You see, so that for every one thing you are moving on, the professional staff got ten things going somewhere else.

McCoy: That's really a good case of community control, though.

Swanker: I want to confirm one point though, Milton, because I sat through four Boards, four boards, consecutive boards, and I went to almost every meeting, and it's true what you say, that the Board is presented by the superintendent and the
deputy... what should be on the agenda. However, it doesn't work quite that way, because there is nothing whatever to protect individuals on the staff from their own, you know, they each of their own key board member or a board member each had his key on the professional staff and leaks were tremendous in both directions, and this is as it probably should be; the Board shouldn't have to rely solely on one man for information. So, when you say that you were in the hands of the professional staff, that's right but it was not a single professional staff man; in other words, it wasn't just the superintendent, because you know yourself you had inputs on that Board from several people on the staff, you had people walk through 110 and out; in the field that you got information from, just as every other member of... Rose Shapiro had her cows... you know, that she heard from other than the superintendent and the deputy, so while it's true that you heard what the professional staff wanted you to know, but it wasn't always just one professional staff man. The inputs of the Board pretty much came from 110 Livingston Street. There is no question about that. Unless you made a determined effort to go to the field, your information came pretty much from the 110 Livingston Street staff. Right?

Galamison: True, but even so, even if you were provided all the information in one week, it just could...

Swanker: Oh, I agree, I agree with that. You were given a lot of garbage that you shouldn't have had. I mean, you know it was the Board's fault; not this Board, but somewhere way back the board started getting into administration, and they've always been in administration, and so as a result, rather than be accused, I think then the superintendents developed a kind of a defenseless position on the thing. They thought rather than be accused of not giving enough information, they overfed them. They were saturated every week; they would come in with piles of papers that they weren't interested in.

McCoy: Let me back up, because something Rev. Oliver said in his introductory remark having to do with the rights of people to educate, who edu-
cates, and so forth. Let me ask it in a different kind of way. You mentioned the fact that if - give 'X' coalition had been formed - that the strategy to attack ... whether the abolition of the Board of Examiners. Now obviously, for my benefit anyway, you have some information that I don't have, or some direction. What I am trying to say here is that I don't believe that you could ever make that kind of coalition.

Swanker: I don't know whether you could, but I am saying that the climate was ripe at one time to do that, because when Mr. Giardino was President of the Board - and I have forgotten the year, I would guess at about '66 - because it was when decentralization had first become a key issue. Legislation was prepared and sent to Albany which called for decentralization of the school. True, it was the Board's plan. It was not a community control. It was the Board's plan to decentralize and included in that legislation was . . .

Gittell: Was it in the legislation? Because he backed out . . .

Swanker: That may be, but it was in the legislation, because I saw the legislation and included in the legislation was the abolishment of the Board of Examiners, and I know, because this is immediately following the Griffin report.

McCoy: Let's go back, and I don't want you to lose track of it. If that was the case, Giardino was in that position, or supporting that, and the Board had any inclination to do it. How is it that he couldn't muster support?

Swanker: Well, this is why I say everybody, you know, had twenty-twenty hindsight, because at that time, the demonstration groups were just becoming, coming to the fore. 201 and the various groups were looking for community.

Gittell: But I think Rhody is raising an important question which is: 'Why do you assume that any of these groups had any power, because the whole sequence of events following that created a coalition of those groups, and they couldn't exercise . . .'
Swanker: Well, no, my point is this: that if those groups had...

Gittell: Which groups?

Swanker: I mean, well, let's say the demonstration groups, which were just beginning in 19...

Gittell: Well, they didn't exist really.

Swanker: Well, there were organizations behind them, and they were beginning...

Gittell: No, no, that plan was prior to the creation of the operational... of the demonstration districts.

Swanker: No, what I am saying is that there were groups in each of those three areas. They were...

Gittell: ... the people's Board of Education.

Swanker: Well, no, they were before that. Down at the Two Bridges area there was a group of...

Gittell: The area of Shapiro, the NFY...

Swanker: There was a poverty group down there that was working for community control. There was the Ocean Hill group. There was the IS 201 group, and Mend and Haryou and all that crew up in Harlem that were trying to do the same thing, and they were all working eventually towards the same thing.

Gittell: But then, let's be realistic about it. I insist on some kind of scientific analysis. All of these groups worked for integration, with the help even of additional groups. No one ever answered my question about the union on integration. I would like to know that for real. They were unsuccessful on every issue on integration, on parents' schools, on open enrollment, on bussing, on every issue they were defeated. And they were defeated either by the union - to my way of looking at it - or by the CSA or headquarter staff at 110.

Swanker: Well, at that time the only two groups, I think, that were fighting for the continuation of the
of the Board of Examiners - three groups - the union, CSA, and the Board of Examiners, because the State-city Board, the minority group representatives, all the poverty groups, people's Board, all these various groups were opposed to the Board of Examiners, who were working for its abolition. For example, the Griffin report had just come out, and even the PEA and various other white groups were in favor of the Griffin report. So at that time, as I said again, we are talking about an "if" that might have been . . .

Gittel: Why, I would say all the evidence because of the fact that you haven't got a shred of evidence to say that they had any power, because what we were really saying is that they had no power, and you see, the reason I think this is important is because later on, when we get to talking about the districts themselves and what coalitions could have maintained the districts or what have you, or gotten the Bundy plan through, you are going to face up to the same fact: what you are dealing with is a whole bunch of powerless people.

Swanker: But, by that time, you had lost some of those key elements now.

Gittel: No, we gained more, as a matter of fact . . .

Swanker: No, but we had lost the Board of Education, which we had at that time.

Gittel: We had Giardino who later backed out and the reason he backed down, from my understanding of it, was because his board wasn't with him. He saw the value of abolishing the Examiners.

Swanker: I think there were two members on the Board, Yushevits, and I can't remember who the other was - probably Shapiro.

McCoy: Yushevits was a myth. (laughter)

Oliver: We have a debate situation where we have a chancellor who in my understanding feels the same way about the Board of Examiners, but if the minority groups only came to his support, he is still a dead duck just by the fact that we coveted his support.
Swanker: Well, that may be now, but you still have...

Oliver: Giardino wouldn't have had near the chance, the chance the chancellor now has. Sometimes, black people supporting a thing will kill it, and they are the only ones who come out and support it.

Swanker: Well, we are really wasting time.

McCoy: I think there is something else here because earlier you made some remarks...

Ferretti: You said that there was a lack of strategy.

McCoy: Yes, and, but... more here that means there was a definitive strategy on the other side. I guess what I am saying is Giardino and the rest of his Board may have had a position "to abolish" the Board of Examiners. It in itself was not complete enough, it didn't or was not responsive to what these various entities were all concerned about as a total kind of package, and I think it was a very "definitive" strategy to see to it that those groups couldn't come together. Even if they did come together, they couldn't deliver it, so it would make it much easier as a strategy to keep them apart. I mean nobody knew what they...

Ferretti: I said that there was a strategy on the other side, and the strategy at the other side was at 110 Livingston Street which did right from - we were talking from what... 1955 to tomorrow... defeat everything simply with administrative detail. It's amazing what you can do.

Oliver: It's more than just 110 Livingston Street. I think that where 110 Livingston Street might be weak, then the Mayor will come in and support them, and where the 110 Livingston and the Mayor might be weak, then the CSA and the UFT will come in to support them.

Ferretti: When I say 110, I include the CSA and UFT in that.

Galamison: Shouldn't we realize that we are dealing with one of the most formidable voting powers in the state when we deal with the construction unions and the UFT, and if for example, as Esther was saying,
the legislation to abolish the Board of Examiners could not get through, it would be because the CSA joined league with the UFT during the strike and supported them, and therefore, the UFT and all the other unions related to the UFT had to join hands, and Mr. Rockefeller gets elected for the fourth time in a row, because he knows how to give deference to these tremendous voting blocks, so that even if a substantial number of white people that you could organize in the city, I argue, would come out now to support the present chancellor. Even the churches and these groups could not begin to amass the kind of voting strength for strength to effect the legislature that Van Arsdale and Al Shanker and Degnin and all these guys with the other unions who are in league and in partnership with them - they protect each other - I - medical men protect each other . . .

Swanker: I agree with you there. I am saying that in 1966, that if we had been able to pull all these groups together, because then that was prior to the marriage of the CSA and the UFT, you see, and we might have had a little hope from the UFT at that point, because at that point, after all . . (everybody talking) . . they were being held down by the CSA at that time.

Ferretti: I think that is a speculative point. I think it has merit. I really do.

Swanker: If we could have come together on that one issue and got rid of the Board of Examiners, we should have, we could have.

Ferretti: Now, not a chance.

Swanker: Not a chance.

McCoy: But you see, you continually . . . and I agree with what you said - the hindsight - and I am looking at it obviously in this panel and subsequent panels about some sort of direction, and I just don't believe from what I am hearing, what my past experience has been is that those groups can come together. You said earlier that, and so did Milton at some point as you begin to move to these things, fewer and fewer people
are in the forefront and nothing ever happens. Now, I guess what I am saying here - let me jump like just say five panels away - if I was listening very carefully, I would say that any urban administrator, anyone, at any level - school level, superintendent level, headquarters level - would obviously recognize the potency of the local political machine, meaning the teacher's union, labor union, and their vested interest. He'd have to recognize that right. So then it must be - you got to ask yourself, or I would ask myself two questions. One is, what's the rationale for acceptance of a job like this? I mean if you know the potency of the political machine, then why would you accept that job? Number one. And what's the criteria, or what can the people expect as a criteria, a performance criteria, when you allude to accountability of the guy who is going to take that and how is he going to take education? I mean the direction he is going to take education. The only option that I see for him, and you know my bias is small or autonomous units, if you want to call it again community control, but, obviously, from what I am hearing is the behind-the-scenes politicking and the vested interests that don't have to politic have preserved themselves.

You know, I guess I wouldn't want to give up so easily. I always deal with the hope factor. Anyway, there is no place, so I have to find some kinds of things so that I can keep pushing that we don't have a bout. At this point, can you turn that around? Our teachers' union and all the teachers would be happy with unions and things these days. Are you going to deal with your tax, you know - your limits? New York City is going to be at that point pretty soon where you are going to have to absorb people who are being paid for not working . . . plan to just working, and that they have a whole . . . in New York City, you know. There is going some in the future, there is going to be some kind of rebellion on taxes, and teachers and people are going to have to be accountable for something, and that's when unions and things are going to have to start to do some things, too.
Swanker: I think that they are going to get bailed out. I think that the state is going to take over more and more the cost of education, and the cities are never going to really have to come to grips with that issue, because New York is a union city, and there is just ain't no way around it. You might have a chance though, what you are suggesting, in another city and especially away from the eastern seaboard, but not in New York.

Ferretti: New York City is such a union city that you could take an issue like the Ocean Hill-Brownsville thing, which is essentially not a union thing, and with one statement galvanize the entire labor force in a city in back of you . . . just by simply calling iself, it became, you know, over-night.

Gentry: If that's true . . this is I tell you . . then you would say that I don't want to put a conclusion to things right now . . . there's no hope for New York?

Oliver: Education is union education, so who has the right to educate?

Gentry: So, the only thing people can do is try to do . . I think we ran into something here . . somebody is going to sue to see if school boards, and administrators, and teachers, and things, are supposed to be responsible for education and responsible for children. Well, then, I think the people ought to start to . . people and that they can use words as law, and with . . . that says about a right to have equal education.

Gittell: That was the basis on which the people's Board of Education sued the city Board of Education, that they weren't doing their job and that . . was thrown out of court.

Galamison: We have only, to my knowledge, won one court case. Now, Esther will certainly have a better recollection of this than I do, but we won that one with Commissioner Allen, and it was simply a lawsuit arguing that the Board of Education of New York City is going to spend money, and that
the manner in which it spent money only perpetuated segregation and that it should be made to produce a plan for the expenditure of this particular money in the Brownsville and East New York area for a school structure which would lend itself to integration. So we won that adjudication. The money is still being held up - must be about $40 million by now - but even when I was on the Board of Education, it multiplied, because nothing can be spent in that area. Even when I was on the Board of Education, I could not move that the staff begin a plan to un-court that money. Now, that's a fact.

Swanker: I believe it. I know it.

Gittell: Some people around here would take court action on that.

Galamison: If nobody has anything on his heart he wants to say right now, I want to speak to the question Rhody raised. Rhody was talking about the difficulty of moving things politically. First Rhody said, well, why does a man take a job if he knows he's caught in a structure like this. Well, I think if you want to just put the best motive on a man's intentions, sometimes a man takes a job because he thinks he can do something with it, because he has the kind of confidence in himself and the kind of optimism which leads him to believe that even though he is in a box, he may be able to do something with his job. I think this is why Commissioner Allen took the job in Washington, because he believed he could do something decent with it, don't you see? So sometimes a man is disillusioned and life is like this, I think; sometimes, the higher the responsibilities you accept, the more difficult you find to do something with them so that, at least this has been my experience, so that while people sit back and say 'oh, look at Galamison, he's on the Board of Education,' you know one of the most wasted nine months in many ways, that I've ever spent in my life, in terms of apparent progress, anyway - I don't say something doesn't happen. So I just want to point that out. But the second thing is this; what these, all these efforts, dramatized is the serious disadvantage at which we are as minority people in a democratic struc-
tire where the name of the game is counting numbers. Now Esther alluded to this when we first started out. She talked about political mores and what not which make it impossible for us to move things. Well, the philosopher would have called it class legislation. You know this nation has a notorious history of class legislation. John Stuart Mills called this class legislation which is legislation passed to benefit the majority of people who happen to be voting, not the minority of the people. So that if you go up to the state legislature in New York, you find one black representative in the assembly and senate who is not elected from New York City. So what does this mean? In a state, like in states that big cities like Albany and Schenectady, and - I think the one guy is from Buffalo and he voted wrong last year, by the way - but what I am trying to point out is, while the word democracy becomes a very glorified word and most public speakers, when they get up, because they say: 'we live in a democracy,' that they are providing people with the answer to something. The very nature of the democracy creates horrible problems for minority people because democracy started out with an assumption that the majority of people would look after the welfare of the minority and they do not, the whole concept grew out of a man's desire to be able to throw off the tyrants. People got tired of tyrants, the people said: 'well, if we elect our peers and our friends and neighbors to public office, when we get a tyrant in office, we can throw him out.' And this is great, and it's possible in many areas of life but it doesn't happen to be possible in a democracy for, you know, for minority people, because, you know, you just - you don't elect these people, and you can't vote them out, for you constantly get class legislation which does not serve your interests at all and even though you many speak idealistically of moving to a kind of school structure, Oliver - you and Rhody, whereby the school is governed by a smaller contingent, a more neighborhood type of contingent, you still encounter the serious problem of finding the kind of state legislature which will legally empower you as a minority person. You see what you notice, let me . . .(laughter) . . what you'll notice is that whenever black people or minority people amassed power in a local area, then the arena of
political exercise is expended. Now, I mean, like for example, you have now five boroughs in New York City, each one of which can elect a member to the school board, and the only borough that could manage possibly to elect a black person or Puerto Rican person would be Manhattan, you know, you are defeated otherwise. So even more so, education power is enlarged sometimes on a state-wide basis, because even though you may have power in the city, like in Philadelphia, where maybe 70% of the people are black, then the power is exercised on a state-wide basis, so the political geographic arena is continually being enlarged to deprive minority people of whatever power they have managed to muster in their small groups. I didn't mean to go on so long with it, but this is basic, this is basic to the whole comprehension of what is happening in this country.

McCoy: Let's - this brings us around before I ask Rev. Oliver for this that there are three more parts to this real quick and then we can take a break. But, what Milton is saying is - what you are hearing here about the futility of it all, the kind of built-in protective devices that they have, what hope is there for community control?

Galamison: Excuse me, except I didn't say it was futile. I just computed the odds.

McCoy: Okay, what hope is there for community, or what's the process for the community to achieve its hope with these conditions as they exist presently?

Oliver: With these conditions, it can't be achieved, I don't think.

McCoy: What's the alternative?

Oliver: Well, I am sitting here thinking about it. We say that the powerless-that-be, though they voice integration, they rock it at every turn with the power that they have, yet they still talk about it; i.e. to give you one example: I think in Ocean Hill-Brownsville we had the nearest approach to integration that you had anywhere in the country, yet we didn't talk about it, but we had the
nearest approach to that, and yet that went by the Board. I see now - if this isn't premature - the structure subsidizing black people to do to black people what white people had been doing all along, to force the black confrontation in the black community and thus destroy it. We've just got to find the wisdom and the strategies to avoid that and yet preserve ourselves and achieve what we feel what we have to have in this country.

Swanker: To answer the question, Rhody, on a long-range basis, I think... obviously none of us has a short-range answer. Now, on a long-range basis, it means simply that the minority groups must establish a political power basis, This is the whole answer to what we have been saying that you are powerless, because you don't have any political spots, and as you say - now you say that the black community is being divided against itself and confronting itself, so the long-range answer is, of course, to establish a power base and just get power in the legislature, power in the city council, power in the Board of Education.

McCoy: But, it's so long-ranged that it's not within my ability to see it.

Swanker: I know it's a long range... I don't think it is that long-ranged.

McCoy: Without some sort of unusual kinds of strategies.

Gittell: Yes, but I think the - Milton has already said it - the procedure for the legal constraints are such that even building a basic support, the change in the political arena dissipates that power, so that in cities, for instance, election of city-wide councilmen diminishes the possibility of black power in the city council in most large cities and similarly down the line. In other words, the political structure has constantly changed to prevent that power base from being developed. I think you misquoted Rev. Oliver; he said it was the white community which was pitting various leaders in the black community against each other.

Swanker: No... happening.

Gittell: ... helter-skelter, because I really do think that it does make a difference.
And I want to disagree with you, Milton, on something. I don't really think it's the majority factor of so-called democratic society which is creating problems that you were talking about. On the contrary, while the UFT has a sizeable voting block, I don't believe for a minute that it's voting block is what was significant in that particular confrontation. I think (it was) it's how the union is organized, who its supportive forces are, how many people in the legislature are owned by unions in this state, or New York State - I don't want to talk about Massachusetts here - owned not because of controlling voting blocks, because they pay for their campaigns, and political campaigns, if you recall during the key session on the Bundy plan up in Albany, Shanker went up there and threatened that he would run opposition against Jerry Kretsmer. I remember that in particular, and did .

Mc Coy: He did, ha . .

Gittell: Right, and in Coney Island were a few guys who voted the wrong way, or he thought would vote the wrong way, and I don't think it's numbers, I think it's extent of organization and the ability to align oneself with other peripheral groups that have crowd and leadership. I really do believe that Al - the exercise of leadership on Al's part in that legislature was an enormous strategy on his part - very cleverly thought out.

Ferretti: What you are asking for - can I say something before you defend yourself? - is that what you are talking about, of course, is a new political coalition. You must talk about new politics, you must talk about blacks and Spanish-speaking people and the poor building a constituency, and not courting politicians, you know, who happen to be around now. You create a constituency and you create politicians.

McCoy: Let me cut off, before you do it, too, and say to you that, of course from another perspective that has substantial educational merit, or if I listen to what has been said before, you are still dealing with a powerless group, trying to perform some sort of coalition and develop a
strategy to take away the power of powerful men.

Swanker: Can be done. Wilson Riles just did it in California.

Somebody: Okay, if that's what you believe.

Swanker: He did. He beat the . . . , he beat the main party. He dealt a new coalition.

Galamison: Well, I don't think Marilyn is saying anything different from what I have been saying. She just put an emphasis on some things different. She is saying that it's a coalition that wins the success, not the numbers, in essence - this is what you're saying. I would agree with that, but I would argue, you know, until doomsday that numerically, we have been defeated not only because we don't have a coalition, but because we happen to be a minority people in a majority country where the majority of people are so tragically insensitive to anything else, except legislation which favors their own interests, that we have just not been able to get our head above the water.

McCoy: Let me do one more thing. We started with the chronology from 1953 and ran through '70 . . .

Ferretti: Through '66.

McCoy: No, we went through . . .

Ferretti: But you missed '67, which is very important.

McCoy: No, we stopped with the demonstration district. We went through '66, stopped at the demonstration district - I am going to ask Marilyn to present a chronology from the political science point of view of '66 and a half through '72 at the next session - the chronology there, what actually happened in the demonstration districts, who saw beyond that. Let me ask you, given the chronology, I'd like to just put this on the record so that at the subsequent panel can look at it, are there names of people who played roles in this whole period of '53 through 1970 that we have not touched on? We talked about Ken Clark and Delaney starting it off, and the Harlem
parent's group. And we've talked about the Helen T. . . , talked about Annie Stein, Rose Shapiro, the whole . . . (everybody talking) key people who . . .

Ferretti: George Bundy . . .

McCoy: What I am saying is that I think we ought to put these people's names into the record at this particular time.

Galambos: I would say Robinson, who was head of the Harlem parents' committee who is now on the Board of Education; Thelma Johnson, who was very active in the Harlem parents' committee; Thelma Hamilton, who now is in education in Brownsville, you know, in the area of poverty work and what not, anti-poverty work, who was very active in the parent's workshop, and so many parents - Preston Wilcox, who came along late, I have to say came along a little late.

Gittell: Down on the lower east side, I think you have to say the MFY . . . (everybody talking) . . truly was one. I think we left that out. MFY, Milton, truly was one . . . P.D.C.

McCoy: The reason I asked for names is because at some point I think we ought to take a look at what kind of organizations they represented at that time, and roles of those organization, and at what point later on did their politics change in terms of coalition and who was sustained, and so forth. This will give us a broader picture.

Galambos: June Shagiloff, Bayard Rustin . . .

Gittell: You never did answer my question. Can you answer my question about the union?

McCoy: That's the way to close the session!

Galambos: Mr. Shanker says that the union helped with the first, that is the March or February boycott of 1964. Now, I do not remember that they helped, but let me say this, that my impression of that boycott as I look back on it is that boycott had the blessings of the entire city, i.e. once everybody thought they couldn't
stop it, everybody got involved, and it was only when we started the second boycott and they saw that we were really serious that people began to pull away. So it may be that the UFT did give some token support. I do remember that Mr. Shanker would not permit the Board of Education to penalize the teachers salary-wise by having taken a day off, but I do not remember their support and certainly subsequently we got no support from them.

Gittell: Did Bayard support all of the boycotts?

McCoy: No.

Galamison: After the first one ... anymore.

McCoy: Look, can we stick to terminate this before we go to dinner? We need a little time to get over to the other place so, can we take a few minutes to see if we can't put together time, a time slot for the next meeting, because I know at the end of the second half after dinner, everybody is going to be rushing.

(End of first half of session. Dinner break.)

PART TWO OF FIRST PANEL SESSION - November 16, 1970

AFTER DINNER

McCoy: We can now convene the second part of Panel One, and we left off with agreeing that we start with the chronology beginning in '67 because we laid the groundwork for the demonstration districts, the actual teachers' strike, and so forth. Marilyn, let me ask you to kick it off again in terms of chronology in '67.

Gittell: I think the two events most important starting in '67 were the - in the legislative session of the spring and probably that was before Easter, which would be March '67, was the legislative act which requested the Mayor to prepare a decentralization plan for the City school system which
would include community participation as the major element of the plan.

McCoy: That was in the legislation?

Gittell: Yes. And actually, during the course of that winter, starting with the summer before, the summer of '66 which was the 201 circumstance where a whole series of events occurred, where the Mayor, and, I think, Mike Sverdoff as head of HRA, were trying to negotiate some kind of deal for setting up a task force on the problems in 201 and anywhere else in the city where they might arise, to kind of deal with that difficulty. I would assume, and I am pretty certain, Bernie Donovan was involved in it. Sverdoff was. I don't think he admits to that anymore, but he was, and the plan was to set up a task force which George Bundy would head, and Mario Fantini was brought in at that point that winter, too.

Swanker: Can we interject to add more names to that, because I think they are important - Benita Washington was on it, Giardino . . .

Gittell: No, no, no; wait a minute.

Swanker: I am sorry.

Gittell: No, this was the task force that the Mayor was looking to create to resolve the 201 controversy. You remember Ken Clark had made a proposal, a plan, which was rejected by the 201 community groups and as an alternative, the Mayor orders was recommending a special task force headed by Bundy to resolve the issue which was at that point that Mario Fantini was brought in and met with the community groups and realized that they informed him that they had no part in the creation of that task force and would not accept it as a task force if it were created, and they wouldn't work with it. And I think Fantini brought the message back to Bundy and recommended that that Bundy not allow himself to be put in that position of being on a task force which the community rejected already. It was out of those negotiations that the idea for these demonstration districts emerged. Certainly the 201 district is clear. On the Ocean-Hill Brownsville
(somebody coughed) . . . not actually clear, but my understanding is that either Mario, or Mario and Bernie Donovan thought it might be a good idea to have other districts and consulted with Al, and he mentioned that Sandy Feldman had been working with a group in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and there had been a rum board in Brownsville for District 17 which Father Powis at that time was instrumental in creating. And the union agreed that that might make a good demonstration district, because the union and the parent group were working on it at that time. And the union . . .

McCoy: Just a clarification. Is this immediately following the legislation?

Gittell: No, well, I think this was all discussed prior to the passage of the legislation. I don't think anyone thought - anyone I've spoken to - realistically thought that there would be any kind of legislation like that. I mean, obviously the Mayor's people up in Albany did push it through, but I don't know how seriously they thought they . . .

Swanker: I think that was a late legislative session that year. I think that went through late in May, as I recall, because I remember . . . usually they were negotiating that thing up in May.

Gittell: It did come through after the districts had been agreed on. The districts were announced in April.

McCoy: The reason why I am asking because I thought there were three events and I am just trying to put them in order. One was the legislature's directive to Lindsay to decentralize the system, or to reshape it for financial reasons. That was one, and that's why I asked you the question.

Gittell: No, no, no. I . . .

McCoy: And then, two, there was the Board of Education's mandate about experimental ideas in education, and then finally there was the demonstration district, so we are talking now about 1967 in
terms of months; March, April, May.

Gittell: I wouldn't interpret the legislative action as - for financial reasons at all. Well, the fact was that the Mayor had - since I originated that idea, I'll fight on this one - the Mayor had already arranged that borough designation for the legislature which was pretty clear cut; i.e. that New York City would no longer get aid as one school district, and that need had been coming already. Now there was the notion that the City had to make some move to actually decentralize in order to continue that aid, but I don't think that anybody really believed that. I am certain, maybe Esther has a different view, that that aid would have been continued, that it was Lindsay's move to try to get ahold of the handle through forming the school system as a political action and that legislature was . . .

Swanker: But didn't he reshape the legislature to get . . .

Gittell: Oh, yeah, the year before, but it wasn't an actual decentralization. It was saying 'yes, there are five borough districts in New York, therefore, we should get aid based on these five boroughs.'

Swanker: Yeah, but I think he got the bill passed that said: 'we're continuing on this basis if the Mayor comes up with a decentralization plan.' I think this was . . .

Gittell: Yeah, but what I am saying is that New York City would have continued to get aid on the basis of the five borough districts whether he got enabling legislation to go ahead with reform or not.

Swanker: But I think he tried it to prove that . . .

Gittell: Right, because I think for political reasons, which I am sure he may think a different way about it now, I think he had made the decision and his staff had made the decision that educational reform was a good issue for him, and that if he got a directive from the legislature - he could control that issue, because you remember that the first reaction to the legislation was
the New York Times and the PEA saying 'how dare
the legislature give the Mayor the power' instead
of the Board of Education. So there is no ques-
tion that it was the Mayor's men up in Albany who
manipulated that bill through. My only point
with Rhody is that there was no real fiscal rea-
son to do it. The aid would have been continued
on the basis of the five counties if they hadn't.
The real play there was a power play on Lindsay's
part to be in charge of educational reform in the
City, which he thought he could get political
leverage from. You know, he was the educational
reform mayor. He was gambling with that notion
and, therefore, I don't think there is any ques-
tion that the demonstration did force move on the
demonstration districts as well as the Mayor's
was made without any knowledge that the legis-
ations would seriously going to be considered,
or certainly not passed, because in very many
conversations that I have been involved in, and
at Ford many people say that if that legislation
had gone through, the likelihood would have been
that the districts probably would not have been
funded, at least by Ford. They might have been
created, but that there would have been second
thoughts on that. Actually, the districts got
the go-ahead... annual legislation was passed
and here they were, you know, sitting with both
these now, and now, I mean, then the Mayor cre-
ted the Bundy panel. It was Bundy he wanted on
that task force in the first place. Bundy had,
or Ford had already negotiated for the creation
of the districts as a result of their involvement
and refusal to serve on the task force, and here
I would say was more Mario Fantini than Bundy.
I don't think Bundy really understood fully the
demonstration districts as an idea. In fact,
I don't think anyone at Ford did, besides Mario.

McCoy:

That's a fair answer.

Swanker:

Well, to pick up on this. In February or in
March, I worked with Bernie Donovan to draft
the proposal to the Board of Education for the
creation of twelve different types of educational
innovations in the city of New York; three of
which were to be demonstration districts - not
specified, in other words, the location or the
geography was not specified, but there were to be demonstration districts involving the people of the community in some fashion, not specified. This was submitted to the Board of Education in April and adopted in theory by the Board and at this time, I had been talking with Mario about the possibility of Ford funding them, so he was working with both groups - both with me and Bernie Donovan and with various communities, and as the communities approached him, we looked at their potential as a demonstration and their leverage with the Board, with the legislature, and the City, this kind of thing. So the decision finally was made in April, I think, or in early May to fund the three districts, and to be very honest, Ocean Hill-Brownsville was a very late starter, because 201 had been decided on right from the beginning, that was obvious, and Two Bridges had been decided on, but there was a third one that had been proposed up in upper west side Manhattan, as you recall, the Joan of Arc complex, and there was some problem in the community there in accepting it, and so, when this did not go through, Mario said he had been working with a group in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and how would this set with Bernie Donovan, really, because he knew that the Board was not involved in this discussion at this point, that, Bernie was making the decision. So the decision was made to go with those three, and that was . . .

Gittell: But then there was the . . . (mumbling)

McCoy: Let me go back to see if I got this correct, Marilyn. You had the legislative move engineered between the legislation and the Mayor.

Gittell: But after the demonstration districts had already been decided on.

McCoy: So then, the demonstration districts or district?

Gittell: It's districts!

McCoy: Had been decided before the legislation.

Gittell: Right.
Swanker: I think that legislation came in May, not March.

Gittell: Yeah, I think you are right.

McCoy: The Mayor's task force was instrumental in helping to put this . . .?

Gittell: There was no task force. What he thought would be the task force, the negotiating parties, helped put together the plan for the demonstration districts.

McCoy: And then, at what point did the Board of Ed's proposal come in? After that?

Swanker: Well, that was in April.

Gittell: Well, obviously. Bernie Donovan submitted it to the Board of Ed, and they gave it approval. I guess you have to ask Bernie, but you worked with him (addressing Mrs. Swanker) . . . they realized, they didn't know what they were doing, I am sure of that.

Swanker: It was a two to three page memorandum and there were twelve ideas presented and, well, you've sat through Board meeting and know how much attention is given to memorandums, and it was asked for an opinion to vote, and it sounds like a good idea, but to be very honest and with the exception maybe of Giardino, I don't really think any of the other Board members were . . . Yushevits might have known it.

Gittell: The only question I have about that is since the 201 thing was really quite controversial at that time, what happened to the 201 thing? Did any of the Board members associate this with . . .

Swanker: I don't think so. I don't recall that there was really much discussion about it at all, because you remember 201 had kind of died then. There was some legislative action going on, and the Board had submitted some kind of legislative plan including the abolition of the Board of Examiners, and so they, I think were feeling pretty confident and secure at that point, that the things had kind of died down and that . . .
McCoy: You are talking about Donovan's new proposal?

Swanker: The April - yes, right.

Gittel: I just want to add one other element here. I should tell about something else I was involved in, and I was at the meeting with the people from the people's board at that point, who - various members of whom were involved in the negotiations, and I remember specifically going to Preston's house one night. You were not there.

McCoy: No.

Gittel: Various people came up and told me about the negotiations and what was being offered, and - that was when I didn't know Mario. You know I didn't know anybody involved, but I have heard about Mario, and did I think about it, and I said: 'unless you get all of Harlem, forget it.' And I just want to establish that I was opposed at that point to the creation of the districts, at least I mean I had no official capacity. I was an unpaid consultant to various people around, community groups, around the city.

McCoy: Can I ask you a question and go back to just clarify? I can understand how they were dealing with 201. I am hard pressed to understand in this chronology here how - what you said - Two Bridges and the Manhattan area and then Ocean Hill came into it. I mean who did they touch bases with?

Swanker: I am not sure who the person was at Ocean Hill, but apparently there was. Rev. Oliver would know more about this than I, but in the proposal that Bernie made to the Board, there was mention of the Joan of Arc complex, because there had been some discussion in that area. That's P.S. 96th, I think. I know it's the upper west side of Manhattan. Joan of Arc Junior High School and its feeder schools to becoming a demonstration district, and Edythe Gaines was then principal of Joan of Arc, and this was considered to be a leading contender and was to be one of the three. There were two things against it. One was that that would have put all three
demonstration districts in Manhattan. Secondly, there was community opposition apparently. I don't know what all the ramifications were there, but there was some problem about agreeing on a Board there; it had two elections, and neither one of them took. So, at this point, it had been decided by the Board of Education that there were going to be three districts, and one district was obviously not going to make the grade, and so Mario came forth with the Ocean Hill-Brownsville thing, now who . . . (rest was drowned out) You would know better than I, I don't know.

Oliver: I wasn't involved in that at that time, so . . .

Swanker: Well, all I know is that he was the one who proposed Ocean Hill-Brownsville. He said: 'I've been working with the group in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, what do you think about it?' And he mentioned the union.

Gittell: I saw a letter from Sandy Feldman to Mario recommending the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district because the union was working with them. Now, it is obviously - it was a letter which was solicited. Mario had a technique of requesting things in writing.

McCoy: Let me go back just once more. Then I'd like to move this forward. 201 was involved because of their conflicts. How did Two Bridges get involved?

Swanker and Gittell: They had . . . Marguerite somebody . . Higgin . . no . . . I know it - Margaret Dodd, that's it.

Swanker: They had a community poverty group, reading program funded, and they were pressing for more funds and more control in the schools, and so they were already an active group and a working group and had a pretty good electorate down there, and they had come to Ford for help. So they were already functioning, and that's how they became involved. Now, as I said, I am vague on the beginnings of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, because this came to me out of the blue from Mario.
Gittell: They supported Elliot Shapiro's appointment down District three - they were part of originally . . . MFY and had been activated to support Elliot Shapiro's appointment in District three at that time and had this parent training program and it was Chinese, Puerto Rican and black with combinations. I must say that I heard that they came to Ford from many of the baseball fields or some kind and got talked into . . .

Swanker: I think they wanted to continue to . . .

Gittell: I think this is something you should really ask Mario.

McCoy: As far as I can remember the chronology, the Board of Ed. passed its little resolution. At that particular point, negotiations began in earnest with the Ford Foundation about funding in this model and there were some conditions, and I think we ought to ask Mario to fill those conditions in when we get there. So the next move was the activation of the pilot grant. I think it was June, June 1, 1967.

Swanker: And do you remember the creation of that group, you and John Bremer - somebody from 201, I can't remember who it was, Berlin Kelly, I think, and Bob Bunker and I to work out the criteria for selection of . . . the five of us worked through the summer - that was the summer of '67, too.

McCoy: But what I am saying is on June 1, the announcement was made, a press conference was held, that this was the grant, and, let me just try to put some details in there. Originally, in Ocean Hill at least, they had a proposal that had been worked out with somebody at the Yeshiva University, sixteen people on the local committee that had been negotiating that. Their orientation at that time again was like 201, was around IS 55, where they had been told that they could have an input into the selection of the principal - were told in such a way as not to give the impression that they could bypass civil service, that they could if they, in fact did this. And then the proposal itself was worked out. It had about
seven to eight pages to it, the original proposal, talked about everything but control. Then we moved on into trying to put that thing together immediately after the press conference so that we could begin to make some sense out of what the plan was. Now, my understanding is - and maybe at some point we need to bring in a person like Father Dowis to come in and fill that void - but they spent an inordinate amount of time of planning with that committee as to what in fact they would or would not be able to do. The union was supposed to talk to the teachers in the district.

Swanker: They pulled out in the first part of the summer because the teachers all went on vacation.

McCoy: Well, no, before the school year was over, in June, they were supposed to have informed the teachers in the district and the task force was basically supposed to inform the community, and the Board of Ed. would have done its homework by assigning a special guy. I think they assigned Robinson, if memory serves me correctly, as special assistant before Brombacker. What I found out on close examination was that whoever was responsible for informing the teachers had given them about six different dimensions to the problem. For instance, one - and we operated under that dual geographic location above the hill and below the hill - but above the hill it had already been determined that they would make some change, and the change meant a local body coming in. The lower hill, and I guess for a variety of reasons, they were told that there would be a planning session over the summer, and then above the hill - shall we play that game again? - the teachers elected representatives to serve on the steering committee over the summer, and the below hill - they were appointed and so you had all of this confusion around what the union's role was, what it wouldn't be and whether they were appointed to the Board or not, whether it was a planning session or whether and implementation, and so forth and so on. The next step was after the press conference - the actual awarding of the check which is a sign of go - from the Ford Foundation, and quoting Mario,
referring to the gome who said: 'I met a guy who meant action, so he handed the check and the elevator stopped running, and a few other things, and the light went on.' We began the planning sessions and the very first thing that we were confronted with during the planning session - I'm trying to stay within the chronology - was the threatened teachers' strike. At that time, it was just talk about strike, but not - I mean they had not implemented any move towards strike, they were waiting for some negotiations with the. . .

**Swanker:**

Let's clarify that. That was the strike over the contract.

**McCoy and Swanker:**

It had nothing with the demonstration districts.

**Swanker:**

That was the semi-annual contract.

**McCoy:**

Right. My understanding is that there had been a number of meetings around this disruptive child issue with local people and from all intelligent advice Shanker has been programmed not to involve the disruptive child as an issue in the strike because it would polarize the City, the Manhattan branch, the NAACP, and those kinds of people had been putting inputs into it, and then over the summer, as the negotiations approached the critical stage and no decisions had been made, then you had the City beginning to be polarized, and at that point the Afro-American Teachers Association entered the picture and made its stand clear that they were opposed to it, and that they were going to support whatever fight there is in the act on the part of the union. They wanted the schools kept open and I think they approached Ocean Hill. Again I go back to our political strategies. Ocean Hill was asked to support the move because shortly after that, we'd have to have held the election near August 4, or whatever it is. They were asked to basically support the black teachers in their positions and they wanted to use - it was suggested that they use - Ocean Hill as the rallying point. If memory serves me correctly, I recommended to our Board that we only open half the schools, and the Board voted to open all of them, and this was before
the final declaration on the part of the union to do its thing. So, when it became apparently clear that the union was going to strike the Friday before school opened, if memory serves me correctly, they came to the Governing Board, representatives of the union. So, couched in this planning and distortion of what planning was and meant, they had this tremendous responsibility to be the first decision made out in front, and it was very obvious that they had to take on the might of the teachers' union - which was a consideration, as well as having to make a decision on whether to support the black teachers association, and so forth.

**Ferretti:**

Wasn't there another consideration in that initial planning for the district, that the teachers, when I say the teachers I am talking of Sandy Feldman at this point, conceived of the district as being nothing more than an enlarged, More Effective Schools program?

**McCoy:**

Yeah, there was a great deal of discussion around it. I don't know how to answer it, you see, there are so many - what I call mystiques here - I can't cope with that because the first meeting I think we had with Dr. Donovan was a clear indication that there be no additional funds, that you do this out of commitment, blood, sweat, and guts, despite all the other kinds of bought-in rules and regulations that were applied, like the transfers which violated the union contract - all those kinds of things, I mean special dispensations. So it may have been one of the reasons that the union used - to talk about More Effective Schools, but as far as I can tell and looking at all the documentations, there never was any real indication of More Effective Schools was the union's hope, at least it never became overt.

**Swanker:**

Was the selection of principals an issue in that at all because it seems to me that you had selected two or three principals in the original summer . . .

**McCoy:**

No. In the initial planning stage, the only problem, the only issue was IS 55, and it was even
suggested that if they opened school in September they'd allow them to select a principal outside the civil service, but then the building program bogged down because of building strikes, and so forth.

Swanker: But I thought you put . . .

Ferretti: Didn't you have the Ferguson thing, too, at the same time?

McCoy: Yeah, but way down on the chronology.

Swanker: But didn't you have Fuentes . . .

McCoy: Let me back that up so we get this chronology correct.

Swanker: Because I remember you wanted to grandfather them in when we wrote that . . .

McCoy: Well, there are two things before that.

Gittell: Well, let's hear about that, Rhody.

McCoy: In June I had done some work in looking at the law. In July, as we began to organize, we have had a number of meetings just before Donovan went away and we attempted to find out what the present personnel status of the district was. There had been some discussion by members of this task force that there were in fact, or would be in fact, four vacancies. Up until September, if memory serves me correct, those vacancies had never been declared, I mean as legitimately, remember one of those meetings when Dr. Donovan finally announced that there were four vacancies? And so what we were operating on was 55 which was not even completed yet. The possibility of 144, the possibility of 137, and I don't remember, whatever Fuentes schools was, yes, 155, and as late as the beginning of September we were still operating on three vacancies. 178 was a junior high school at that time, and at the last moment it became a vacancy, and that's when we appointed Mr. Harris. So what we were doing was operating on the premise that these were vacancies, because you had the absentee principal and another guy and so forth, and some other kind of information that we had received,
that some of these guys would pull out in fact.

Gittell: Were you assured that you would be able to appoint these other principals outside of credentialing procedure?

McCoy: No, at the beginning - Rev. Oliver, I think you may fill in - there was no real discussion around it because in fact there were no vacancies. We couldn't find where the vacancies were and if you recall, we began to talk about ways of doing this. One way we talked about was - as you said, the grandfather clause - and what happened was, we began to look at state certification.

Swanker: Right . . . . was the proposal for community principals.

McCoy: But there is a step before that, unless my chronology is wrong. We also talked about it becoming a state training school which led us . . . I guess as a result of doing the homework, but what I am saying is it led us to the fact that we then look outside of the list and once we talked about that and then the late date when the principalships were finally declared vacant and the Board asserted itself as wanting the right to appoint them, and that's when Donovan finally agreed.

Gittell: What I am curious about is, was there some kind of feeling from the beginning that you had to make your own appointment to those schools?

Swanker: No, because Bernie asked us, and I am sure that this was before the close of the school in 1967, because that's when he said: 'you, Bremer, and I'm pretty sure Berlin Kelly, Don . . . and I,' we met - we must have met twelve times working out qualifications for community school principals, because I had already gone to our legal department, state legal department, the community or the state training school was ruled out early in the game as far as the state was concerned, that was a dead issue, that law should have been off the books years ago, so you had to find some other way, and the only other way is to declare it a unique situation; set up
unique qualifications, and I remember the five of worked on what those qualifications were to be and what kind of criteria would be established for the selection of those principals.

McCoy: Let me back up. If memory serves me correct and I can't spell this out, because I didn't start in that district until July 1, and if you recall 201 didn't have a unit administrator and Berlin Kelly was put on as a consultant - all of this, the meeting that you were talking about - took place after Donovan came back from vacation, which was August - after August 4 - because we hadn't appointed the principals at that time. As we approached the school and the alliance between Ocean Hill and the black teachers association became evident, then it was clear that Bernie was going to support a resolution allowing us to appoint "demonstration school principals" using state certification.

Swanker: Bert Swanson, I remember now. It was before you were appointed, Bert Swanson, Norm Brombacker, somebody from 201 - I thought it was Berlin Kelley, but it may not have been - maybe he may have been a member of the Governing Board or a consultant, and John Bremer, before you were appointed, and then when you were appointed you joined the group, because we started - I remember starting in the summer on that and we never did - we finished it and it was presented to the Board, and, as I recall, it never was accepted. Is that your recollection, too?

McCoy: Yes. Fred, can we talk a little bit about what happened with the media over that summer?

Ferretti: Over that summer?

McCoy: Not really over the summer, but as the school began to open and the strike became . . .

Ferretti: Well, as usual with Shanker, things began in June, where there would be one statement saying that unless we had a contract, you know, over the summer, there would be a strike, which he always does and you know is continuing to do. And then along around mid-August, we used to see
the union newspaper and he'd be on television many times, saying the same things that were getting nowhere. This time I felt that what was presented as a union dispute was not such. I thought the disruptive child thing was really something that was ignored by the media, something that they did not consider, because it became a strike of how much the teachers are making, how much do they want, and there was no concept of the union attempting to get part of the school supervision, which is what this was. Nor was there any interpretation of it as an anti-black thing, which I think it was.

Galamison: This interpretation was put on it in the black community because of the background that the school system had with 600 schools where we had a disproportionate number of black and Puerto Rican children dumped in the 600 schools on the basis of real arbitrarism. Obviously, prejudice on the part of some teachers that no teacher should be allowed to determine who is a disruptive child and who isn't. We took the position that no teacher was qualified. The one thing that has been passed over here - somebody suggested that the MES school was an issue and indeed it was an issue, too. It was a very serious issue, oh yes, because many schools. . .

Ferretti: That's a union pet . . .

Galamison: Right . . . had very special privileges on the basis of the whole MES contract and concept.

Swanker: But that was the first year it was going to be put into the contract, I think.

Gittell: Which was an issue, because it meant that they would then have in the contract sewn in a major educational policy decision.

Galamison: But these were the two major issues that reached the public . . the MES and the disruptive child thing. I want to suggest that I stand to be corrected, that you were right in saying that they settled for money, that this was the basic issue, one which the union ultimately settled.

Swanker: They had a fantastic package.
Panelists: They sure did, they did.

Gittell: . . . first point was that the media covered it that way.

Panelists: Right . . . and not covering it appropriately.

Ferretti: Another thing that happened was that everybody discovered Albert Van - who is this guy? All of a sudden he came up as a guy who'd call a press conference on his front steps. I recall a piece of film, because I used it that night. Who the hell was he?

Swanker: I know who he was.

Ferretti: That's right, exactly. That was the point.

McCoy: Well, that leads us further to two incidents; the Afro-American Association, Al Van etc., Ferguson, and a number of black teachers came into Ocean Hill and collectively we worked out the strategy for the opening of schools; workshops, distribution of materials, and workshops on how to handle the kids, and everything for the first term.

Gittell: Could you go back just a few minutes and - I'd like to know how you and Rev. Oliver got involved in Ocean Hill camp.

Swanker: I would like to know, too, because that part is too vague.

McCoy: That's a rather strange story. I'll tell a version and then you tell the better version.

Swanker: Could we back up just a minute, because your background is in the south.

Oliver: Yes, not altogether, though.

McCoy: Don't let them put you too far south. I was called in and I understood recommended by Edythe Gaines to Father Powis who was searching to find a "principal" for IS 55. And when I met, they were having a number of interviews, and to make it very sophisticated, they gave me this proposal that they were operating under to sit and
read while I was being - while I was waiting to be interviewed for the principal of 55, and I had been an acting principal for about six or seven years in the 600 schools, and when I read the proposal, I read between the lines almost immediately that they meant civil service, you know, and when I met with the steering committee - you know it's a very warm comfortable feeling knowing that you got all the marbles in your hand. I said to them, 'they done snowed you, they really sat you up for a job that you can't possibly operate this way,' and therefore, I began to tell them what I saw in it, that they had to go civil service, they could select one of the first three, I mean, that would be the game that they would play; and the proposal was too broad and ambiguous and didn't address itself to the specifics, what they needed to do is just to define control and talk about personnel, etc. etc. etc. And we had an interview - I thought it was a good interview - we called each other a few nice things, I mean really honest things, and there was a great deal of apprehension about a guy who was coming out of this system and finally somebody suggested that I had been involved with Milton Galamison - that was the magic word at that time - and I had experience in the 600 schools' strike, and so they thought that maybe I could convince them to stand up, but I mean, at least at that interview, and then I suggested that I wasn't interested in 55, because I was already an acting principal and had a school that had gained some national interest or reputation, and the subsequent was that they called me back and asked me to serve as pro-tem "unit administrator". There was no title at that time, because Bernie had not made up his mind what he was going to call this funny little people, but anyway, I was to be it over the summer.

Swanker: ... something that wasn't in the civil service job application.

McCoy: And, at first, as I said ... (everybody talking)

Gittell: Had the Board accepted the notion that a unit administrator would be appointed, or someone with administrative pay?
Swanker: Well, I think the Board sort of just closed their eyes in the hope the whole thing would go away for a long, long time on this thing.

Ferretti: When did their candidate come in?

McCoy: Who? Whose candidate?

Ferretti: The UFT candidate.

McCoy: I was trying to program this, as I say. There were no titles and Bernie had to avoid it for another reason, because if he gave it a civil service title in a sense, not only would it have certain qualifications, but it would have the implications of a lawsuit, ultimate lock it in, which is ironic, but what I began, essentially talking to the teachers, they already had a program that it was a fait a compli that Bloomfield, who was the junior high school principal, who had established a reputation, would be the guy, but it took me three or four meetings with key people in the community to show that that guy really wasn't doing his job, he was just used. So, as I say, I operated on a - just on a summer program of being the organizer for the planning part of it, which really meant that we ran the Board, and so forth and so on. Let me just talk about two members on the Board and then I'll turn it over to Rev. Oliver, and we'll come back.

There had been a lot of feeling in that community about Sam Wright, and I spent an awful lot of time convincing them that they needed the political support of this guy and everybody said he'd had such a bad record, bad experience until they didn't want any part of, but we had two major controversies over some - what the teachers were going to do, whether they in fact were going to be on the Board or not be on the Board, which I think had already been determined, and what their voting rights were, and once we had sort of exposed them and exposed them for the fraud, i.e. number one; they voted on everything except the principals, and what they wanted to do was to vote to see that the "militants" did not get on the Board for the five community people, so they voted half the time when there were soft issues, and refrained from voting on hard issues, and
Sandy Feldman used to sit right at their elbow and program them, but she wasn't fast enough, you know, our program was better. So, I mean, we had this operation. Then the next move was Rev. Oliver. It had been known that Rev. Oliver was to serve on the local school board in the adjacent district - is that District 17? - which was one of their adversaries, and so somebody suggested that we ought to talk to Rev. Oliver, and I called him on the telephone and we talked, and he got interested and started coming to the meetings, and so forth, and so finally the decision was made asking would he be a candidate. And that's interesting, because the seven community people the seven school people were elected in a public election and the modification of the original proposal based on how the union had played its role over the summer was, that they would be nominated and each one would have to get a minimum of two hundred signatures on a petition.

Swanker: This is the school representatives?

McCoy: These were the five community people at large; not the teachers. The teachers - they were still playing their games.

Swanker: But you had parents, or representatives of each of the schools that had been elected by the parents of those schools. Right? And then you had five community representatives.

McCoy: Right.

Gittell: And they had to put names on petitions (everybody talking) . . .

McCoy: No, they were basically supposed to collect two hundred, a minimum of two hundred petitions, and then they would be brought back in and those who had two hundred, the seven members would vote on the five community members.

Oliver: We didn't go out and solicit. Others went out and solicited for us.

McCoy: Right. People who sponsored them.
Oliver: Well, I had been - a few months earlier in the Spring of 1967 - appointed to the Board, local board of our District 17, and one thing that we were concerned with there was what will happen to the schools in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville area, because they were originally part of District 17, and I wrote to the Board as chairman of one of those committees to inquire about that and got a letter back indicating that the effect of it was that there wouldn't be anything starting in the demonstration districts in September anyway. So I got this kind of reluctant.

Gittell: Who was that one?

Oliver: Robinson, and yet I could see that in this community there was distrust to get something started in September. I was approached, Mr. McCoy spoke to me and others requesting me to come and serve in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and make my name available. I did so, my church is in the area, and being one the qualifications to serve on the Board was that you either had to live in the district or work in the district, and since my work was in the district, I qualified, and I was accepted and became involved. Soon after I came on the Board, there was an election for chairman of the Board, and I got elected. At the time, I didn't know who had been serving as chairman, I had no knowledge of how it was functioning, but I understood later that Mr. Wright had been serving as chairman of those who were meeting previously. Just let me mention here, I am not a newcomer to New York. I was born in Birmingham, Alabama, and I grew up there, got my high school training, elementary and high school training there, I went to college in Illinois and to seminary in Philadelphia, and for nearly six years I served a church in northern Maine. Then went back to Birmingham and was there about six years and involved mainly in cases of rights violations and circulating them throughout the country. Then I cam back to New York, but I had been in New York before, and I have three children - one 22, one 18, who is here now, and one 16 - and all of them were born in Manhattan. So I was not a newcomer to New York City. I'd like to throw in here also that there
was and is a concern about - in the black community - about who is serving in the schools of New York City. We saw almost no principals in a system of nine hundred schools, and I think as late as 1967, there was not as many as six black principals. I couldn't accept it that I came from an area of the country where all the principals were black and got their education in the north, and I come to the north and find out that there is nobody apparently qualified right here in the north to serve as principals of schools, and I just couldn't accept that this was just the way it was. I suspected that something was wrong, and we definitely wanted, and the people in the community wanted, to see black men serving in some of these positions in their own communities, and one of the difficulties with the union was that the union wanted to have a voice in choosing those five community representatives. Now they had already had the right of having a teacher to counterbalance the vote of the parent and two supervisory personnel. That gave them the edge, but they still wanted a complete control which really would not be community control at all, and somehow that did not work out.

Swanker:

Al Shanker . . . . trouble, for example, one of the goals of the union perhaps the next contract will be . . . the teachers will elect the principals, in other words, a popularity contest. This is one of the . . . . It's not surprising that they adopted this position and they were moderately successful in achieving it in Two Bridges, which was the reason that they were pressing so hard . . . . they knew were out in Harlem, because they had been just completely out in that first confrontation and they never had a chance there, but in Two Bridges they had become literally, practically almost a controlling group, I think, on that governing board. They were still . . .

McCoy:

Let back this up and bring the chronology around so you can move again. When we first met - the steering committee met and we looked at the Ford proposal, and the only - and I hate to say it this way . . .

Gittel . . . who had written that . . .
McCoy: This was about the third version of ... the UFT and the guy down at the ... , but the only thing that made any kind of sense to me was the budget on the last page, and it called for - it had a line-item budget and the first half of it was election, so immediately after the press conference, we all assembled in a little room and then we figured it out in the dark recesses of 271, and we planned this election. And, there was a very interesting remark that Dr. Gentry made earlier about the expense for the programs and how they came into being, but I said we are going to have an election in a month. Now the budget called for a planning of an election over a period of two months, and this created all kinds of anxieties, because it had a dollar sign attached to it, and it was a poorly written budget, because you take a school like 271 that had over two thousand kids and the appropriated amount of money was the same as 87 across the street with four hundred kids in it. But we ran the election in twenty-four days, and it was on August 4th, I think, we had the election and the next day ... no, we had ... 

Gittell: Rhody McCoy on ... 

McCoy: We had college students, we had New York City. We had a beautiful election. The New York Police Academy cadets, and we did a better job than any politician ever could have done in that area.

Gittell: We should say here that Bert Swanson and the Niemeyer commission said that it was a very odd election. Was Wright right? Was the election within a month? This was June now?

Swanker: No, that was in August.

McCoy: July and August, and I think immediately after that - I don't remember the exact date, but the Board in total assembled and they elected you the chairman, and then from there you proceeded to appoint the unit administrator, so Reverand, if you take it at that meeting and then talk about those appointments that are now ... 

Oliver: Well, that meeting I remember - after I was elec-
ted chairman, I believe, was at that - the same day we moved to the election of the unit administrator. There were two candidates, Rhody McCoy and Jack Bloomfield, and there was a good deal of apprehension there, because the teachers were present and voting at that time. This was in August, and it was a toss-up - a very serious toss-up - as to which way it would go. When the ballots were counted, McCoy won; he was chosen unit administrator, but it looked like they were going a straight breakdown, almost a racial breakdown, but it was very close, very close, but McCoy won. Then, either at that meeting or soon thereafter, when we discussed the matter of the strike or was that the same meeting - I should have checked my records, was that the same meeting where we dealt with Ferguson?

Galamison: No. Could I just suggest that if you are talking about a strike chronologically, let us know which strike we are talking about.

McCoy: the '67 strike.

Oliver: The teachers who had been serving with the steering committee in the summer put a proposal to the Governing Board, and it looks as though I am leaving them off the Governing Board, but they were only serving in voting at that time.

Gittell: How many teachers were there in August on the Governing Board?

Oliver: Seven.

Gittell: And in administration?

McCoy: No, administrators were all on vacation.

Gittell: And there were eight parents in five communities?

Everybody: Seven parents ... five communities.

Oliver: But there were two supervisory personnel. Yes, the gentleman there who was always bringing up high-sounding words and theories.

McCoy: Oh, I know the guy you are talking about.
Oliver: But I forget his name, but he was there and serving and there was someone else - a supervisory personnel - Matisse, but this proposal was put to support the strike, and we'll support you and your efforts, and it didn't take the members of the Board long to say: 'No, we are not bargaining with our children. This is not a bargaining matter. Our children need an education, and we cannot go along with closing the schools now at the beginning of a new thing for us. This is a new day for our children and we simply said No, we could not do that.' And it wasn't long after that that the teachers who had been involved simply dropped out.

McCoy: That was the Friday before school opened, and school opened on that Monday, and the strike took place on that Monday.

Oliver: But on that Monday, Father Powis and I went to about six of the schools in the area to address the teachers, the entire professional staff, to try to let them know what was going on in the community and to urge them to vote for someone to serve permanently on the Governing Board and that was a very hectic day, because we got a great deal of flack from each school that we went to - 73 in particular, we were almost unable to speak to them. We were charged with, accused of trying to mastermind a black take-over, teachers said that. Well, this didn't work in Washington, it can't work here, what are you trying to do? You are under the control of black militants,' and we couldn't convince them otherwise, and not a single school chose a teacher to serve on the Governing Board. They all refused to have an election.

McCoy: Excuse me. Although some of those members had already been elected before school ended, and many of them had been elected before that time and the others had been "selected." But after the initial presentation on Friday, it suddenly became that they all were just serving, but there were records indicating that the three of them had been elected.

Oliver: Well, they claimed not to know what was going on in the district and they just were not prepared to
vote because they didn't know what was happening in the schools and on the Governing Board. From there, well, things just went from bad to worse, basically the people . . . (interrupted by several panelists) . . . as far as cooperation with the teachers, it was a good three months before we were able to get any teachers on the Board, and they were on the Board as a result of, was it a directive that you sent to them eventually? requesting those who were interested to, or urging the principals to have a meeting and urge those who were interested in serving on the Board or having anything to do with it to come together and choose somebody to serve on the Board. . . Then four schools and a minority in those four schools chose someone to serve on the Governing Board, and in that way we got four teachers to serve on the Board. They all turned out to be black. We tried to assure the teachers, however, we tried to let them know that this was not an effort to get rid of teachers, but to see that our children get a decent education regardless of who teaches. Who teaches will have to be responsible whether they are black, white, blue, or what. They would have to be responsible. Letters were sent to them to urge them to stay, but this didn't seem to work out too well, and if we are not going too fast to back in November, when you had about seventeen . .

Swanker: Before you go to that point, Rev. Oliver, can you put a date, do you think, on the approximate time when your negotiations with the union as a group kind of broke down, and when you really could say that they no longer were officially part of your organization? In other words . . .

Oliver: Well, I do remember a meeting at the George Washington Hotel where an effort was made to try to rectify the situation. You were there, Shanker was there, members of the Governing Board, but nothing came of this.

McCoy: Well, Shanker said at that meeting that he would let racists and labor watch management for a while, if you remember, because they hadn't completely resolved the strike issues. We were . . .

Ferretti: Where do we put the Ferguson thing here?
Oliver: That was when teachers were still present. They would not vote on Ferguson.

Ferretti: On Ferguson . . . he was arrested and was out on bail.

McCoy: Yes, let's back up and look at that just quickly before we are running out of time. When Donovan finally declared four vacancies, we began to move because we have been interviewing people. We appointed Fuentes and Gerber and Bill Harris, and . . . (Swanker interrupting) no, Hanes didn't come on the scene until later, and we appointed another guy, I forget his name now, but who didn't take the job, if you remember. But we were programming Herman Ferguson because we took him right out of the Board's curriculum projects; he was working on fifth grade curriculum projects despite all of this fanfare, he was still at that time a legitimate Board of Ed. member.

Galamison: Well, oughtn't you also add that Herman Ferguson had passed legitimately a principal's examination to be a principal? (interrupted by panelists) No, no - he had passed, you can correct me if you found out otherwise, he had passed the principal's examination to be the principal of a special school, you know, for crippled children or something. Anyhow, it was some special exam, and he was always requesting that he be given a slot because there were no vacancies in that area in a regular school . . . they would never transfer his license.

McCoy: It wasn't a principalship, it was a supervisor, but it was comparable in salary which was the same thing, but incidentally, while you are mentioning that, if you recall, there was a (somebody interrupts) . . . yes, it was definitely true, I want to get back to that . . . (Galamison interrupting) We're being put off. We pick it up at this point with H. Ferguson, but what happened in his case is couched now and that group in that district with parents, teachers, and everybody supported him being a principal in that district over and above, you know, without the civil service, and so forth. So that was before we got him, and just
as we picked him up at that point, while he was working on the Board, and he had community support to be a principal, but . . .

.McCoy:

Well, I'll make a note of this. We are going to transcribe these tapes and get them to you real quick. You are running against tremendous odds of getting them to you before the seventh of December, so what we'll do is to . . .

END OF TAPES FROM PANEL ONE

NOVEMBER 16, 1970
TRANSCRIPT OF PANEL TWO

December 7, 1970

School of Education
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts

Panelists

Dr. Allan Calvin (Moderator)
Dr. Bernard E. Donovan
Mr. Fred Ferretti
Mr. Rhody A. McCoy
Rev. C. Herbert Oliver
Mrs. Esther Swanker
Calvin: Not only to New York City now, but to urban school systems in general. Last time there was a prolonged discussion, really, on some of the issues and also some of the specific people that were involved in the history that led up to the Ocean Hill situation, but the Ocean Hill situation itself was really not discussed directly. I would like to begin today's discussion by having Dr. Donovan, who at that time was Superintendent of Schools, make some remarks either about what he saw in the situation at that time, and perhaps to comment directly on the transcript of the last session that we had.

Donovan: Rather than comment on last session's transcript, I think maybe we ought to get to the fundamentals of what we saw at the time from our various points of view. Very briefly, as the Superintendent of Schools, I saw several issues facing us. One was the very fundamental issue, not yet resolved of the responsibility and authority and decision-making power of the people of a community for the educational process in their community. Another issue I saw at that time was the question of professional rights and responsibilities - both sides involved in a stab and its relationships with the community it served. The third, and I only mention three of them at the moment, although there may have been many others, but a third one that seemed very important was the question of the law and its relevance to these problems, that is, the laws governing education, many of which were passed quite some time ago, seem to be under surveillance to find out whether those laws were pertinent to today's problems. Those are three of the things that I saw from the vantage point of superintendent.

McCoy: Allan, let me go back just briefly and bring in for your purposes in part to sort of reconstruct just very quickly the chronology which will open up a new dimension which I think is important for you to kick off today. We started back in '53 I think, if memory serves me correctly, put together people like Ken Clark and Judge Delaney who
began to overtly talk about the system, whoever was functioning in that, and then Harlem Parents, that came on the scene, individuals and groups talking about particular schools and school areas, and then the Parent Workshop where the parents began to get feedback and information as to why the schools were or were not functioning and what course is open to them, and then you began the Brooklyn sit-out, ultimately two or three boycotts in which Milton was involved, and then the 600 school boycott, which had certain kinds of specific demands, such as black supervisors, as well as better buildings and locations of those buildings, and then we moved on to the Board of Education's plan for changing the school system, then we moved into - for a short period of time - the introduction of the union, union being formed and so forth, and ultimately . . . the condemnation of the school system by Commissioner Allen, its not performing, and then finally the people's board in '66 and their sit-in, and then finally the beginnings of the Bundy panel, the Board's proposed educational change, etc. All those things we felt . . . in bringing up to '67 and the beginning of the demonstration districts. So I guess what I'd like to ask you to start off with, which would probably open the door, is just what was happening and why the demonstration districts were formed from your point of view.

Donovan:

Well, I think from my point of view, two or three things were happening. First and probably most fundamental was that the public schools in those areas were not meeting the educational needs of the children. That was basic. The second was that despite all of the efforts that you talked about just now in bringing this to the attention of the public and in trying to focus attention on it, neither the Bundy suggestion nor the Board's decentralization plan seemed to be effective enough or deep enough in its consequences to satisfy groups that felt this was not meeting the need as they saw it, and I think that at that point, certain groups having talked together, having planned together, decided that they would like to show what could be done in their areas if they were given the opportunity, had been trying in 201 and other places unsuccessfully, i.e. they hadn't gotten approval for trying. I
think at this point they were ready to try, but they needed help in doing it, because you can't operate just in a vacuum by yourself.

McCoy: Well, I can understand that, and I think that's probably one of the reasons that we had such problems in Ocean Hill, and 201, and Two Bridges, as you referred to in the early part of the laws, that the existing school laws and its not being relevant to the needs and demands of the people who had some problems, but was there any particular reason why the demonstration districts were chosen at that particular time? My understanding was that . . .

Donovan: Why they were chosen?

McCoy: Not only chosen, but that approach, because usually the three demonstrations . . .

Donovan: Well, yes, there was a particular reason for it at that time. At that time between Mrs. Swanker and myself operating for the State as a liaison in New York and as Superintendent, we felt that there ought to be some trial, some demonstrations, and prepared for the Board jointly a suggestion that there be demonstration districts. As I recall, at the time the Board did not take very kindly to this. The Board did not think this demonstration idea was very good, but they finally came around to being convinced that we should try some, and in looking around to try some, we found some areas that seemed to be ready to be tried. One of them was Ocean Hill, one of them was 201, one of them was Two Bridges, one of them at that time seemed to be ready - that was the upper west side, but did not get ready, and then the Board insisted that in addition to these obviously ready districts in areas that were really quite militant and ready to go, that we also try some districts that were not organized to go, but could be used as a kind of other examples, or other experiments, and so we looked to South Jamaica, we looked to the Bronx to find something. So really, at that time, the recommendation came from the Superintendent and from Mrs. Swanker, representing the State Education Department, to the Board of Education to establish these demonstration districts.
McCoy: You mentioned that the Board was not so receptive at that time. Were there any specific reasons why they were reluctant to move?

Donovan: Well, the Board of Education, you know, at that time was pursuing a policy of administrative decentralization and their legislation, that they had sent to Albany, while it was a big step forward, frankly was still far short of the kind of decentralization that groups like Ocean Hill-Brownsville and 201 were asking for, so the Board was a little concerned about going way out in that demonstration and was particularly concerned in trying to set up some guidelines, etc. It also was concerned that the demonstration not be limited to areas like Ocean Hill and 201 where they had already, you know, had a little argumentation back and forth, but that it be tried in other places that were not so organized already.

Calvin: Maybe we can get some comments on Bernie's initial remarks, also maybe Bernie can say it. There isn't somebody from the union here now, maybe we'll wait until the next session when hopefully there will be, maybe you can just say one thing, and then I'd like to go around the table. What was the union's initial reaction, and also the CSA's initial reaction, to the idea of demonstration districts?

Donovan: Well, it's a little hard for me to tell what their initial reaction was four years ago.

Calvin: When it first came up in the Board, did anybody testify against it? Did you get a reaction from CSA?

Donovan: Well, the CSA and the union both professed publicly an interest in decentralization, i.e. they said this is a great idea . . . (interrupted by Calvin) . . . surrounded, surrounded with safeguards for professional personnel and all that which would almost defeat the purposes of decentralization. They . . .

Calvin: Did they support the initial districts?

Donovan: Initially, there were union members on the organization board, at least at Ocean Hill-Brownsville,
there were union members participating at our first meetings. Yes. I do not know about the other demonstration. Yes, I think there were some in Two Bridges, but I don't think they participated at 201.

Calvin:

Rev. Oliver, perhaps you would like to comment on what you saw; the situation at the time that it was initiated at Ocean Hill, and in regard to Bernie's comments, perhaps you'd like to comment on those and also, how did you see the union's initial reaction, and the CSA's initial reaction, and maybe, as we go along, other people will comment on that.

Oliver:

Well, I agree wholeheartedly with Dr. Donovan that the schools in my judgement, and in the judgement of many people of the community, the schools were not meeting the needs of the children, and it was necessary that something be done and some kind of experimentation to see if the matter could be improved. The rights of the people in the community to have a voice in the operation of institutions in their own communities, I felt and still feel, is very basic and as yet they have not been worked out. The attitude of the union - when I first became involved in August of 1967 - I was not really aware of the role of the union, but I came to feel that the union wanted to control the experiment, and when they were not able to control the experiment, then there were things that were done to really make it unsuccessful, or to destroy it. There were UFT teachers, professionals who were serving with the steering committee during the summer of '67, and I think a turning point came when McCoy was elected as a unit administrator rather than a member of the UFT -(McCoy: CSA) Jack Bloomfield, who was principal of 271. I think that was the turning point. Then there was another turning point when members of the Governing Board were asked to support the 1967 strike, and the Board refused to along with that. They wanted our support in turn for their support of the experiment, and we did not go along with it.

Calvin: Why not?

Oliver: Our reasoning was that here was something new now for our children. We are beginning something new.
There is a chance now for our children to get a good education and to start that off with the schools closed to us was pure folly.

Calvin: I think I'd like to come back to what Rev. Oliver has said after we hear from the other panel members, because I think it is one of the crucial issues in the Ocean Hill situation which offers some other strategies that might be appropriate for other school systems, because early in the game obviously there was not, at least, overt UFT opposition to the idea, and yet as it went along it began to - divergent opinions came out and then finally, or fairly early, you refused to back the UFT, let's say in their strike, and we might talk about what would have happened if Ocean Hill had agreed initially if Rhody and yourself and whoever was involved, the Board had taken a different view. I'd like to hear maybe some comments and come back to you then, if we could.

Oliver: Well, I would say to start something as new as this with closing the schools to me - it would have taken the heart out of me.

Calvin: Okay, well, let me come back to that because classically that's the way - well, I don't want to take any time because I want to hear from the other panelists, but I'd like to come back to it because that is an alternate strategy. Esther, do you have any comments on what Bernie said or . . . particularly, it's unfortunate, I think, and perhaps we can remedy this next time, that the union isn't here, because at the end they played such an important role, but maybe you can speak?

Swanker: Well, they played an important role at the start also in that the union saw an opportunity in at least Ocean Hill-Brownsville and I think in Two Bridges, to create their MES school. They saw this as an opportunity to create seven, ten, twelve additional MES schools which, of course as you know, is the union idea and would mean more jobs to union people and less work for the people who are presently employed. So, their initial interest, I think, was based on the concept that these would be MES schools and they were willing,
therefore, to support the idea of the Governing Board. Now, I don't think they ever totally accepted the idea of community control. I think that they were willing to go along with an idea of a, perhaps an administrative decentralization, or an elected board which would be advisory, perhaps, but I don't think that the union ever went so far - and now, again with Sandy here or if someone from the union had joined us this could be clarified, but it's my impression that they never went so far as to support the actual concept of community control.

Calvin: That's interesting. Fred, as an outside observer from the media, what do you see, how do you see this evolving from the initial start where perhaps the professional groups were neutral, let's use that phrase to a point where they were the key, one of the key demands, obviously was the abolition of the demonstration districts. How about commenting, and also on Bernie's opening remarks.

Ferretti: Well, I would comment, I would tend to disagree with you that they were neutral and . . .

Calvin: Well, I am using that only because they aren't here. I don't want to - let's say that initially, at least, they weren't overtly . . .

Ferretti: Well, I would even . . .

Calvin: Okay, well then, maybe you want to comment on that.

Ferretti: I think there were several publications put out by the UFT which said very frankly that they were opposed to it. I think - yes, indeed - in fact, I'm talking about the UFT publication, which followed one put out by the League for Industrial Democracy which was written by Sandy Feldman, which tended to agree that the concept of decentralization as it, almost as it exists now, but not with community control, which are two different animals. So I think they were outspokenly against it from the very start.

Calvin: You think they were?
Ferretti: Oh, sure, I would think so.

Donovan: Fred, I have to disagree with you. Only at the beginning, I have to disagree, because the union sat at the table with us when we went to Ford to get the money to start it, and the union sat at the table and said: "Yes, we want to work with it." But I must admit that I think in their minds was a joint running of that district, rather than a community control district.

Ferretti: Yes, that was their vision of it, I think.

Donovan: But at the time they were damning . . . one of the things financed, one of the goals, you know it didn't take long - it took a month - for everything to go like that.

Ferretti: There was one added dimension to what Rev. Oliver said. One of the reasons for not supporting the '67 strike, one of the union demands in that thing was that teachers be given control over so-called disruptive children, and I think that was something which really grated upon the communities.

Calvin: Let me ask you, and Mac, maybe you want to comment because after I'll direct this question to you, and maybe . . .

McCoy: Hold that question until I get off some solid ground. You talked about decentralization as a concept and let me couch that in three terms. First, I'd like to know when the term decentralization entered the picture, and how did you reach that decision to decentralize, and then as the demonstration districts were being formulated, what kind of relationship that had with the Bundy panel, and finally the architects of the decentralization plan and, you know, its relationship to how it began to be implemented, for example - and the last question - when I came on board for an interview in the summer, as a matter of fact, June 28 or 29, they already, the local board, i.e. the steering committee, not the local board, already had a plan which supposedly was tacitly agreed by the union, school board, the local district and had the budget that Ford had agreed to put the planning money up for, which - well, let me start with those three, because then it leads to another kind of question.
Donovan: Well, I can answer one thing for you. By the time you came aboard at the end of June, the steering committee in Ocean Hill-Brownsville had a skeleton plan which the Board of Education then said: 'Fill out over the summer! Fill it out, put the bones on this skeleton over the summer. Come back to us at the end of the summer, and we'll consider it.' They didn't, in other words, they didn't formally adopt it by the Board. The Board said: 'Okay, it looks hopeful, work on it this summer, fill it out, come back with the whole thing and then by that time, we'll be able to say that we'll adopt it, we'll have guidelines,' and all that. That was the June situation, and Ford had put money up by that time so that the Ocean Hill-Brownsville could get, but between June and September, a number of things took place that destroyed that sequence of events.

McCoy: To go back to the first question - how did we get the term "decentralization" into the picture?

Donovan: Well, I think you'd have to go with a hawk-sure microscope to find out where that happened, it's been talked about for years, everybody talked about the unwieldy size of the system and something ought to be done to break it down and gradually you got down the word "decentralization," and - I don't know just when it happened, but it had been talked about for several years in one way or another. I couldn't tell you.

McCoy: Then the last part of it was, as the demonstration districts, the proposals, etc., were being discussed, what was their specific relationship with that Bundy panel or ... project?

Donovan: I don't think they had any relationship with the Bundy panel at all. By that time, the Board of Education had rejected the Bundy panel, had proposed its own legislation which had not gone through, so everything was just kind of hanging in the air. I don't think there is any link, do you, Esther?

Swanker: I don't think so. The Bundy panel really never got off the ground.
McCoy: Well, the reason I asked is because I recall - I wish Mario were here - but I recall that on a number of occasions as we began to implement the plan over the summer - which is the next question I am going to ask Bernie - there were some allusions to it being a forerunner or prototype of what Bundy was planning, and it was also an attempt to ask people to take certain postures and positions so that it wouldn't really destroy what the Bundy plan was, or was to be, since it had basically in its skeleton outline breaking up the schools into some sixty-odd districts, if memory serves me correctly.

Calvin: I want to interject here for a minute, because I think there is a key thing in what we are trying to do here in order to talk about options that are open. Mac, I'd like you to react to this and also I'd like everybody else around the table. One of the key things that you could see in Ocean Hill was, regardless of where the union and CSA stood initially, within a relatively short period of time they were opposed, and what I saw - as an outside observer - was very soon, the union and the CSA were cast in a role of being outside devils, and everything that they - they were basically looked down on as bad, and basically looked down as people that were trying to interfere with community control or decentralization. Now, initially, as I understand it, Rev. Oliver, the community group in Ocean Hill decided not to support the strike. In effect, which from a labor point of view, is about as - you know, if you don't back a strike and you are scabs and so forth, that's about as rough as you can go, I wonder if any serious attempts were made to say to you see the classic way of getting things done, as a social psychologist would look at it, is that you trade off, so it's in the teacher's best interest to go along, and in the Board's best interest, and in the CSA's best interest, if you say we'll support you in the strike if you guarantee so many black principals and teachers, and we'll support you in the strike provided you do such and such. Now you may not support them next time, but a temporary alliance ... and it seems to me that very early in the game that the community groups, and maybe the union, too, maybe you were responding to a union initiative, but very early in the
game there was a traditional kind of horse trading - no, saying that: 'look, if you'll give us such and such, we'll be willing to do . . .', in other words, 'we'll go for MES schools provided you will say that the control of the MES schools will be jointly in the hands of such and such kind of parcels, in other words, we'll allow those because we want to experiment to see if they are good, otherwise we'll put them out, but we'll be willing to try them.' In other words, what I see happening here is an option that's open to school districts going into reform, and it's happened almost every time that I've been around big cities, that the community groups and the professional groups assume like this. It's true of Model Cities Programs, it's true in all programs, and I wondered, maybe you have some suggestions, Rhody, and later on Bernie and everybody around the table. How come this split, and was there any choice, and was there any possibility of forming a coalition before everybody got frozen into public positions for their own constituencies with the union saying basically: 'hey, these guys are no good and they're everything from being anti-Semitic, to being anti-white, to just being bad folk who are just trying to do terrible things,' and the communities saying: 'here they are trying to destroy our children.' By the time you got that far, you obviously couldn't put a "meaningful" coalition together because the constituencies wouldn't allow it, but was there a chance earlier? What would have happened if you had taken any options supporting the strike? A horse trading, let's use that. Now I'd like to hear . . .

Oliver: Well, one of the reasons that we did not, and I could not even as I am looking back, I could not have supported that strike, and one was the disruptive child. That was involved in the strike.

Calvin: Did you ask them to take that out? Would you have said: 'we'll support your strike if you'll take that and that out?'

Oliver: We didn't do that, no.

Calvin: What do you think would have happened if you would have? Do you think there is any chance that they - I mean, I don't know, because I don't
know the union leadership and it's easy in hindsight.

Oliver: I don't know what would have happened had we suggested that, but I would like to say that the frustrations of the people in that community were beyond that kind of trading. (Somebody interrupts) ... and fix the service ... and Ocean Hill-Brownsville was burning daily!

Calvin: And you think that any kind of accommodation to the union was hopeless, as far as your own constituency was concerned? In other words, you don't think your constituency ... supposing your constituency would have said to them: 'we'll support your strike provided the disruptive thing goes out and provided a certain percentage of black administrators are increased over ..., provided you make the following demands in addition to.' I mean, that's the classical, you know, alliance kind of politics, and then maybe McCoy wants to ...(mumbling) ... because that's an option.

Oliver: With a brand new Board, with newly elected community people, it's expecting too much for them to go with an experienced body to bargain with them. I think that's expecting too much.

Calvin: Okay. Well, Mac, maybe you want to comment.

McCoy: I have to go back and look at it in a different way. Obviously, the disruptive child issue from the union's point of view was a city-wide thing. It has nothing to do necessarily with Ocean Hill.

Calvin: But if you had said: 'if you drop that as a city-wide demand, we'll support ....'

McCoy: Let me follow this. Let's say this had tremendous, had created tremendous polarization throughout the City, and I know for a fact that there were many attempts by people in much greater leverage positions to negotiate with the union to take that out of the contract, and therefore, when it was sort of a fait a compli, then you couldn't expect this particular community to support it, even though it may have had some inclinations which I can't attest to. But that
kind of situation out of this disruptive child thing polarized the city in the black-white issue. And secondly, you also have to understand that the black teachers' association was involved in that aspect of the union's negotiations around the disruptive child, and therefore, you are talking about getting support - the main thing to support obviously at this particular point, this local board wanted to support the Afro-American Teachers Association, and a few other things. The second one is that, I think Rev. Oliver just touched it briefly, is that there was such a lack of confidence in the public schools system, period, and most of it was addressed to poor teachers' performance and the inability of the central Board to get teachers to begin to perform like they should. A third one had to do with what I call the earlier relationships, that is to say, this had all its ramifications city-wide. The union offered no options. I know for a fact the NAACP negotiated with the union on a sustained basis to try to remove this disruptive child issue, and therefore, the union wouldn't provide any options. The union wasn't about to discuss it at this particular point. I think what you are saying is right. I think they used their leverage to get more effective schools into the thing, but that's one of the things which we can do. But specifically about Ocean Hill, there were two things that I think would have mitigated any possibility of dealing with the union at that time. One is the proposal itself. I mean the proposal had been written supposedly reflecting the attitudes of the local steering committee which the union played a major share in drafting this proposal. It also was alleged that the union had agreed to it and had suggested to the members of the union in Ocean Hill that they cooperate over the summer and plan, as you say, and that planning was never clearly spelled out to anybody. Then they functioned behind the budget of the Ford Foundation which had monies for elections, and so forth and so on, which gave one indication that there was something to be implemented, not questioned. And then finally, which I think is more important, were the teacher attitudes that prevailed through the months of July and August, who were there. For instance, just to give you an illus-
tration, at the first assemblage of the alleged teachers who were involved in the planning stage, some were elected, some were selected, and some were appointed, all of which is saying that it was their understanding that they would do what they were specifically elected to. In other words, those who were elected were elected to cooperate and work with the Board, those who were appointed were appointed just to spend time over the summer to see what was happening, and the ones who were selected were designed, as far as the communities were concerned, were put in there to destroy the whole project. So you had those three kinds of concerns.

Calvin: Not only in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, but the issue that's now involved in Model Cities and wherever you see a decentralization, or wherever you see an attempt to involve people in control. I think the key to issues are beginning to come out now, and maybe some people have some ideas about some alternate strategies, because I feel that the strategy that was employed at Ocean Hill-Brownsville and is now being employed by numerous - I use the words "by people's groups" around the country has been defeated every time and will continue to be defeated, because the power really belongs in our constituted lives, lies in the hands - lies elsewhere, and I think maybe we could look to some other options which might prove more effective within the present structure, or maybe the present structure just has to be altered, I don't know. Bernie, maybe you want to comment?

Donovan: I'd rather have some others comment before . . .

Swanker: In our first session, we mentioned that there was a possibility, as you hinted, there was a possibility earlier, early in 1967, that there were a number of groups that, had anybody known that had taken the reins, might have possibly formed a coalition, if they had been able to form their one point only, and that the abolition of the Board of Examiners. Marilyn disagrees with me heartily on that point. She feels there is no evidence to support that contention. I say the evidence is in the legislation which the Board of Education drew up, is in the public statements
of the community groups, poverty agencies, and various public group sections, such as public education associations, parent associations and various groups of that sort. That, to me, of course, is a tremendous classical case of everybody having twenty-twenty hindsight, and that, you know, it's water over the dam.

Calvin: Well, let me ask you a specific question. Do you think that at any time, including right now, right today, that it would be possible to bring together in a big urban area, let's say New York City, but not focusing, are there areas of agreement, where the - I won't use the word "the people," but let's say the community, could be brought together with the professional groups so that the professional groups would gain by this bringing together, so that the people would gain - where the community would gain some of its objectives. Is there a possibility even now to reassemble so that we don't keep going in this direction? Or maybe there never was such a possibility.

Swanker: Yes, I think there is a possibility. I don't think there is a possibility in New York. I think the positions are too polarized at this point, the hostilities too great, and I think it will take a number of years before those positions soften. However, I think in other major cities, and we've seen evidence of it this summer, where we have seen representatives of the union and the professional teachers' association, the administrators, the Board of Education, and the community groups sit down at the table and talk out plans for possibly experimenting and performance contracting - in Rochester there was something of that sort. It is possible. It has to be done delicately, obviously, so that each side feels that their own needs and wishes are being met. It can be done. I think so, yes.

Calvin: Fred?

Ferretti: I would agree with that. I would like to just go back and discuss my narrow frame of reference here from the media. I think that . . .

Calvin: Not narrow at all, because you guys - you know, it was always interesting to me, there is no
Ocean Hill-Brownsville, there is only what the New York Times' Ocean Hill-Brownsville is, and it was amazing that the media would just create a whole world all of their own because . . . (interrupted by Ferretti) . . . now you have a very important role to play.

Ferretti: It's that point I wanted to make, is that all of these issues that we've been talking about, never saw the light of day.

Calvin: I understand that.

Ferretti: I thought that the reporting on education generally throughout this period, let's say, let's pick a point - mid-1967 until today - has been so poor and so misinformed, and what happens is that the groups which have sophistication, like the union, like Shanker . . .

Calvin: . . . reach the public.

Ferretti: . . . like Shanker, knows precisely what to do to reach the public with his message. For example, during . . .

Calvin: But that's your fault, then, isn't it?

Ferretti: To an extent it is, yes, of course. But on the other hand, there is a tendency when the president of a union, which is one of the protagonists in a dispute, calls a news conference at five o'clock in the afternoon. You do not out of hand reject it.

Calvin: No, you'd have to attend it.

Ferretti: You go. And unfortunately, you put it on, and if three days later what he has said is not factual, well, that's tough. This happened over and over again during the course of that dispute.

Donovan: You know, there is a - I have to put in a little something here about the media, not the Times now, but the media in general.

Ferretti: I wouldn't . . . the Times, go ahead.

Donovan: I am not afraid of the Times either, but I don't
want to level with it at this time. It had to do with all the media. One of the difficulties throughout that whole period, which you described as mid-'67 even up to now, was the idea of the media that the only thing in the educational matter was a fight, and that therefore any time Rhody said anything, before they printed it, they would call me and say: "what do you answer to it?"

Well, if I said something, they'd call in "what is your answer to it?" So you are answering each other in the media rather than attending to the substance of the problem, and that I found very trying.

Ferretti: One of the causes for that, unfortunately, is an FCC regulation on equal time, but this is . . .

Calvin: Equal? . . . yes, in a newspaper? Come on!

Ferretti: I am talking about media. I am talking about television and radio.

Calvin: I hope so.

Ferretti: At this point; and to an extent even newspapers and magazines, if he calls him something, then you call him to say 'he called you that, what do you say?' I think there is a tendency to do this in every media, I really do. There is another point I'd like to make to follow this up, that in any dispute which involves a city or any, you know, large group of people, most of the people depend upon the information they get in newspapers to make decisions, and I would suggest that, even before I became involved in this, that I really thought that the Bundy plan was a great, big, seriously considered thing. It was not at all, but if you read the papers and if you saw the magazines, and if you watched television, the Bundy Report was everything.

Calvin: Reverend Oliver, maybe you have a comment to make to that?

Oliver: Well, I was about to say that the did not adhere to that rule of equal time, because there were times when I tried to get something to the news to correct slanders that were laid against us by the UFT and by some news media,
but they never gave me a chance.

Calvin: I would say that it's honored more in the . . . well, let's just put it this way; I think that perhaps television is pretty careful during election campaigns and other things, but it is more likely that - and if I sound like Spiro Agnew, I can't help that - certain kinds of people tend to sell newspapers and tell them to make interesting television viewing and I think they tend to perhaps be able to get their message on the media a little bit more easily than people who are trying to do solid and substantive things that involve education.

Ferretti: Well, that's true, but there again, you have the what kind of medium we are talking about. For example, if I go out and speak to McCoy and get an interview and print it, and I spend three or four hours with him and come up with something, I can still call Donovan on the phone and in the papers there will be a back and forth kind of thing. On the other hand, if I go out with a television camera and do an interview and he is on the screen, and he faces saying something for a minute-fifteen, and I have a script answer said, you know, in response to that, 'Mr. Donovan said . . .', well, then you just don't remember Mr. Donovan.

Calvin: It's a good point.

Donovan: Or if you interview for three minutes and then put twenty seconds in that interview, your picture . . .

McCoy: I want to backtrack this quickly. If memory serves me correct, when you asked about a coalition . . .

Calvin: Yes, that's what I want to come back to.

McCoy: Actually, as far as I recall the history, there was some sort of a coalition between the steering committee or people in Ocean Hill and the union. That's how one of the proposals got together, got written. The question that I raise is that the issue that they were around - and I don't identify each single issue - the issue that they were around was either not a major priority one
or not severe. In other words, you - they could coalesce around improving the schools in that sense, but when you asked them to coalesce around "racism" or the disruptive child, to be specific, then obviously you couldn't get them with that. A second aspect of it is - what you're saying before - about the unsophistication and the people to deal with these various things, because the union obviously had some hidden agendas which, you know...

Calvin:

Let me tell you an assumption that's made which seems to determine the options, and then I could get people's reaction to that. The assumption is that the union somehow is monolithic, the community is monolithic, people have fixed positions, they don't bend, and it's difficult to make a coalition on the major issues, such as racism. I am of the opinion that even today that, if Rev. Oliver and Rev. Galamison, Rhody, and four or five or six other leaders of the community - Puerto Rican leaders and white leaders, too - would ask for a meeting with four or five leaders of the union, and were to sit down just like any other kind of bargaining session or discussion, and that at the end of four or five days, particularly if it were so that they couldn't be interrupted, they could discuss, that the ability to reach agreement, particularly because there are things that the union needs from the community, and it will be difficult for the community to move without cooperation from - so there is a symbiotic relationship between ..., in other words, I don't think we can afford to wait ten or fifteen years for this polarization to diminish on its own, and I am not willing to say at the present time that, as a matter of fact I think the union would welcome an initiative from the leaders of the community, and now I may be endowing them with certain Christian characteristics that they don't have, but I think we tend to somehow get to fix positions that these are bad guys, and maybe they are bad guys, but I guess what I am saying is, couldn't we look at the option of even at this late date, say an initiative where you'd say 'look, there are problems in the schools, we care about kids, we got different ways of doing it, we want to have something to say, you want to have something to
say, let's get it together.' What do you think of that?

Ferretti: I applaud your optimism!

Swanker: What bargaining powers do these people have?

Calvin: They have one hundred per cent bargaining power, because without their support, let me tell you what's happening, because we move, you know, Esther, by this time, that we are able to make certain changes in structures and one of the things that we try to see at the beginning is that the other side isn't one hundred per cent, even GM and the UAW get together, you know. I guess what I am saying is you have more power than you think, well, because - Rev. Oliver, do you want to add?

Oliver: Let me respond to this. Let me say that the Governing Board sat down at different times with teachers and we discussed . . .

Calvin: But that's different, Reverent Oliver, than sitting down with union leaders, because you don't have much . . .

Oliver: We did that, too. I mean, we were working together with UFT personnel.

Calvin: But did you ever initiate a meeting, you, yourself initiate a meeting with Shanker?

Oliver: Hold it - let me finish! The vice-chairman of the Governing Board was a UFT representative, Natalie Melkins. She never served, but she was, the people of that community thought enough of her to elect her, that is the Governing Board, elected her as a vice chairman. That to me is an indication that we were anxious and willing to work, and we - Father Povis and I - on the opening day of school in '67 went around to six of the schools to urge the teachers to cooperate and work with us. Not a single school sent anyone to serve on the Governing Board.

Calvin: But that's different. Let me show you why I think that's different and let me get your reaction to this. That's like - the union always says: 'but
look, we have this black representative here and we've got this black vice-president here, and in the observers we sent black.' That's not the same. I am saying you, Rhody, Galamison, whoever, Ken Clark, whoever you think is appropriate by the way, I am leaving out another group, and I'd like Bernie's comment about, you know, there is a board group, there are all kinds of groups that have to get together - I am saying that the five or six of you as spokesmen for a particular point of view sat down with Shanker, Selvin, whoever else to the name you want to name, and said as equals, 'how can we get together and accomplish our goals,' instead of saying 'these are the adversary.' An adversary position very seldom makes for - I am just trying to lay out a possible alternative strategy.

Oliver: Do you know Sandy Feldman's involvement in Ocean Hill-Brownsville?

Calvin: A little bit.

Oliver: Well, this was done through Sandy Feldman.

Calvin: But not, but you see Sandy - that's like saying - they will always counter: 'we talked to this person in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and we talked - we got this black representative,' but that isn't really talking to you.

Donovan: Yeah, but I think you have to realize, Allen, that when the Reverend talked with Sandy, he felt, he felt he was talking with Shanker. Shanker wouldn't come. He sent Sandy. She was his special representative in Ocean Hill; so when they talked to her, they felt . . .

Calvin: Maybe somebody else has some comments?

Donovan: They may have felt wrong, but that's what they thought they were doing with good reason.

Calvin: Well, let me ask you a question. Did Shanker send a letter to say that 'Gee, I am sorry I can't come, but I'll have Sandy go as my personal representative.' Was there any such thing?
McCoy: I think that was handled in a different way, not through a letter, but I think everybody understood that to be . . .

Calvin: But I think one of the problems . . . (everybody talking)

Ferretti: . . . understood today!

Calvin: Oh, yes. Well, I would say . . .

Ferretti: Sandy Feldman represents the Teachers' Union.

Calvin: We found a very helpful thing, and that is that if people would get a little more formal. You see, one of the things that there always seems to be communication problems . . . from whose point of view, but what I am trying to do is explore, and maybe we want to go on to something else because this is just an alternative, but it's a basic alternative, and maybe we want to move to another point, which is this. What would happen . . .

Oliver: Before you go on to another point . . .

Calvin: Okay, because we can move on to something else.

Oliver: I feel there is something basic right here.

Calvin: Okay, so do I because I think it's a key.

Oliver: And that is, the right of the union to educate children. I think this is something that is not clear, and I do not feel that a union has an inherent right to educate children. Parents have that inherent right to educate children, and we . . .

Calvin: In order to change, not yet, to . . . here's the key, I think. You have a structure with a set of rules, and laws, and power bases, and legalisms, that are set up with bargaining and contracts, and things going on. If you want to work within that structure, which is not the only alternative, then the only way you can do it is by changing the laws, or getting the courts, or something, because as long as they are held to be bargaining agents, they'll send the police in and enforce the rights which you may not believe in.
Oliver: We know that already.

Calvin: They got, they got . . . that's one approach. The other approach is to say: 'look, the whole system is no good, we are going to pull it down.' But as long as you are going to work within it, you may say: 'I don't believe in a union,' - by the way, as the chairman of the board of a company, I may not believe in a union, either, but they have the NLRB and they have all kinds of - we deal with the Teamsters Union; now we may not believe they have a right to do certain things, but nonetheless that's written into our structure. So we have two choices: we can either work hard to change the structure . . .

Oliver: I believe in unions, but I don't believe in unions having an inherent right to educate children, and that's . . .

Calvin: Well, but in order, that, how would you, how would you go about, but it's a fact that a contract was negotiated between Superintendent Donovan of the Board and the Union, and so you can either say . . . Bernie, maybe you want to comment on that, or somebody else?

Donovan: I think we have to be careful how we speak these things. I don't think a union should have, or has an inherent right to educate children. I would agree that the education of children should not be either the responsibility or the right of a union. Teachers have a right to be organized to protect their economic and personal interests, as anybody does; just as the people of Ocean Hill-Brownsville had a right to get together and elect the Board to protect their rights as parents in the matter. And so this, this very shadowline between a union protecting the salary, the fringe benefits, and all that kind of business, and the union dominating the school system to the extent where it tries to dominate the instruction is a critical one and very hard to separate where working conditions end and education begins. It's very hard, it's probably harder in education than anything I know of, unless you talk maybe to the police or firemen. There, too, it's a very critical shadowline as where a union is. But I wonder whether we are not trying today to
seek the answers which may not come until we are all through with the panel, after several more sessions, because we are really trying to get the answers to everything that happened in Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

Swanker: Right, we are only at the beginning of . . .

Calvin: Yeah, the only point that I was going to make - I didn't mean to stay so long at - is that you have to view this in context and two things were apparent, and you, all of you around this table are so close to it, maybe, that there is a slight advantage in being slightly detached, and that is this. At the beginning, it is at least possible with the professional organizations granted here objection, that were at least neutral, let's at least say that this was possible. As it went along, the professional organization very rapidly made it into a fight. Now I think we have to view everything within that context, because the overwhelming forces, or one of the biggest forces operating were the union and the CSA, because, I think - I am sure - we'd have an Ocean Hill-Brownsville going today, and I'm sure, if it weren't for the professional organization, let's say interest, if not active attempt to oppose. And so I think if we view the happenings in the light of that change, because a strategy was adopted in 1967 during the first months of the existence of Ocean Hill-Brownsville which said: 'we won't back the union in its strike,' and from thereon in certain other consequences, I believe, were absolutely determined by their initial actions. In other words, that the initial strategy on the part of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, I think, allows us to usurp other things within that context. That's all. Maybe now we can move to some other . . .

Ferretti: Well, you are taking that as an initial strategy. I wouldn't agree with that at all.

Swanker: I wouldn't agree with that, either. I think the choice of Rhody McCoy over Jack Bloomfield was much more important.

Calvin: Okay, that's first.
Swanker: ... as far as the union is concerned, the ... (everybody talking)

Donovan: a second thing ... the second thing, it came at the same time - our agreement to appoint principals who were not on the list.

Calvin: Nonetheless, that's another ...

Donovan: That complicated it, you know. It wasn't just the disruptive child.

Calvin: Yes, but that's CSA rather than a union.

Donovan: They are both ...

Calvin: Okay, what point would you like to move on to now?

McCoy: Let's get specific and go into the Ocean Hill-Brownsville situation. Let me set some stages and then hopefully get some response to it. There was a proposal written - the original proposal had about four or five pages that called for a lot of things, and so forth, and again I am saying on the back page of the last page was the budget by the Ford Foundation, which called for an election of the Governing Board by a mere line-item budget. One is so much money for election years, so much money for publicity for election, etc. etc. The Governing Board - the steering committee in the community proceeded at this point to hold such an election and then moved - which brought us to this point where we had to deal with the union - towards the opening of school, which obviously had some inputs from the teachers' strike, teachers' negotiations for their contract. Now the question I am raising is, they had this proposal, they proceeded to have the election, and they prepared for the opening of school. The question I am raising here is specific: why, and if so why were the various impediments from that period, from the time the proposal was initiated to the time of the opening of the school? I mean, I think that's a ...

Donovan: I can tell you one of them. One of them was that this was an agreement between the Ocean
Hill-Brownsville steering committee, which included the union, and the Ford Foundation, but not with the Board of Education. And the Board of Education as such did not approve this agreement, merely said, as I described before, 'all right, this looks like a good outline, work over the summer and come back and see if you can give us a full-blown proposal.' But in the meantime, the election took place without the Board's participation or acquiescence. And then after the election took place, Ocean Hill-Brownsville wished to be represented by that elected board and the Board of Education kind of had sixes and sevens because you had a board which you hadn't approved, but you had a board, called in Jack Niemeyer and a group of men at our request to look at that election and see if it was a reasonably conducted one, so that maybe they could give a kind of de facto approval. They looked at that election, and they found that despite many things that they would have done in a different way if they had conducted it, that in essence it ought to be accepted. And so the Board kind of reluctantly, I don't think ever by any formal vote or resolution or anything like that, said: 'well, okay, we might as well deal with that board.' I mean, that's what happened over the summer, so one of the impediments that came up out of the whole thing was the board got its back up - I mean the Board of Education - got its back up over the quick election without the Board ever having said: 'go ahead and have an election.'

Swanker:

Could I just back up one second, Bernie, because you were not here last time when we discussed this, and I think it's kind of important for you to either agree with us or change the record. And that is, when the original proposal, which you and I made to the Board of Education, was adopted or recognized, let's say, by the Board of Education - I don't recall that they ever adopted it formally, but was recognized by the Board, it was my contention at the last session that of the Board members present, perhaps one, at the most two, really understood what they were recognizing, that the rest of them kind of said: 'well, if the Superintendent recommends it, I guess it won't hurt.' In other words, that most of them really didn't know what they were getting into.
Donovan: There wasn't any great enthusiasm.

Swanker: No, there was no enthusiasm, but I really didn't get the sense that there was any great reluctance. I just felt that they really weren't aware what the ramifications of such a thing could be, and so as a result, with the exception of Mr. Giardino, who I think, really was knowledgeable and was aware of what was going on, the rest of the Board, I think, felt - along about September and October in '67, that they kind of have been dragged into this without knowing what it - what was going on.

Donovan: Right, I agree with you.

Swanker: To be very blunt about it, I think that many members of the Board felt that you had put one over on them, that you'd really run one, and I guess, really, in a sense we had.

Donovan: Well, I remember one Board member who particularly said: 'I'm not going to approve this, if these demonstrations are just going to be in 201 and Ocean Hill - no, 201 and Ocean Hill would give us trouble,' so . . .

Swanker: Are you sort of using that with the community education centers? Because that was an issue.

Donovan: No, that was back when we started the other. The same thing happened again, same thing, same number.

McCoy: Bernie, you said that after the election and the Board brought the - got Niemeyer and his staff in to take a good look at it - I don't know what the date was, but the next move behind that was - and I am trying to follow your sequence because it may be important to highlight some other things - the Board said: 'well, it wasn't such a bad thing, we'll begin to deal with this newly elected board.' The next time we had a meeting, an issue at that time was the appointment of principals. So if, in fact, the Board had said: 'okay, it's not such a bad idea,' and then we began to deal with them around them around the issue of principals. And the next issue was the opening of school. Then why did the Board get its back up again?
Donovan: The Board didn't get its back up again. The Board went to the Commissioner of Education and got permission to appoint principals in this demonstration without taking them from the examination list. They did that over the opposition of both the UFT and the CSA, and they got Jim Allen to rule that for a period of time, they could appoint people at the recommendation of the unit administrator, presumably with the approval of his board, and we did appoint such people to those positions, including yourself. And then the CSA took us to court. So they didn't balk on that, what they balked on was giving official public resolution recognition to the Board until the Board - your board - came up with a total plan for the operation of the district.

Calvin: Let me stop here, because we have to go to lunch. Before we leave, could I get comments from people around the table? We are now talking about the initiation of the plan and we are talking about going outside the list, which is happening in every city. Now, from your vantage point, Bernie, in particular, and Esther also, and then everybody, what - that strategy didn't work, and by didn't work I mean the fight is still going on, as I understand it - I am not that familiar with the internal workings, but from the newspapers, Scribner is saying 'hey,' and everybody is still saying 'hey,' and that's maybe five years later. Now what other options or strategies were open in order to increase the number of black and Puerto Rican principals? Is there another option that could have been taken at that time?

Donovan: There were a couple of options, and they were both taken at that time, and I think last time you met in the session, if I read the notes right, Esther reminded the group here that under her initiation from the State Department and my cooperation from the Board, through Ford Foundation, we did establish a plan, first for the training of Negro and Puerto Rican educators, which has gone through three years and three of them now happen to be district superintendents - three of those people. And many of them are now principals, but it took a long time. The second thing was that we did appoint the number of men not on the list under this Allen approval of the
demonstration, and just before I left the Superintendent- tendency, I nominated ten people - Negroes and Puerto Ricans - to be specially examined by themselves to be principals of junior and senior high schools, which the Superintendent has a right to do under the law, but, when you say "cities all over the country are going outside lists," cities all over the country don't have lists!

Calvin: Newark had the problem.

Donovan: Newark had never had a Board of Examiners by state law.

Calvin: No, I mean what the problem seems to be - Newark is objecting to the fact that, for example, principals were appointed more rapidly, went to court over it, similar problems I can't name the city.

Donovan: But the problem in this city, by that I mean New York, has always been unique, because of a state law which many times has been attacked, but never has been able to be beaten, and therefore, the problem is still the state law which governs the appointment of principals in this city, and all the little ways around it, like training blacks and Puerto Ricans to become principals and doing demonstration work, doesn't answer the whole problem. And therefore the present position of the Chancellor is: 'I appointed a man to a high school, I am going to keep him there even though he is not on the list.' Now he is going to fight that in the courts to see if he is right? He can appoint a man and send him down for examination, and if the man passes the exam, he can put him on; he doesn't have to wait for a list, but he must pass the exam. The law is still there binding the City.

Calvin: Well, what is the strategy? Maybe we will ask Rev. Oliver. What would you suggest for New York or for some other city, and then Mac and everybody, what options are available? Let's deal with New York then, saying that its situation is unique as a state, but also I think there are ramifications in Newark, because the issue - and for other cities - is at least related.

Donovan: The issues are related, but not as in New York.
Calvin: But not as legal. What strategy can you see, Rev. Oliver, and Mac and others, on how you attack this problem?

Oliver: Well, right now the utmost thing in my mind is the aspirations of people to that of their education. Why is it that the UFT has got to raise a fuss with Scribner when he appoints somebody that the community wants? Why can't the UFT find some way of relating . . . (Voices lost.)

Calvin: So the district superintendent says: 'hey, I want to appoint a bunch of principals, Commissioner Scribner, isn't there a turn' - 'they haven't passed the exam,' or whatever he'd say. What should be done now?

Oliver: I think, I'll have to relate to the actual situation there. I think Scribner did a wise thing, although it's going to be a big fight, it might cost him his job, but I think he did the wise thing. In the long run he may have to go, maybe someone else who comes in and does the same thing, has to go. But the time is going to come when the union has got to recognize that people have rights and they must recognize those rights.

Calvin: Do you still view this basically as a union, let's say CSA-Union confrontation with the community, and you don't see any, until that's resolved . . . you see I can't such feel that that's the frame that you get into. Rhody, you have probably more experience than anybody around the table with this particular issue directly. What would you say should be done?

McCoy: Well, I think Bernie hit on it "that New York is unique."

Calvin: You know, if people in Buffalo say "Buffalo is unique."

Donovan: Buffalo operates under the same law as New York City.

Calvin: No, but I mean by the people in Toronto or by the people somewhere else. I think it is unique.
but I think the problem . . .

Donovan: . . . by unique, - legally, that's always so . . .

Calvin: Right.

Donovan: Legally, we're unique, but we look like all other people, generally speaking, although that may be fair to the other people, but legally, we're unique.

McCoy: Well, my concern is, again you are talking about the superficial aspect of an issue, and basically, I think that there are two or three major concerns. Number one is that there have been a number of people who fought the Board of Examiners for "its discriminatory practices," or the mere fact that by using this process the minority people had not, in fact, been through that. Mario alluded to the fact that they prepared, set up some workshops and a training program for blacks and other minorities, it had a stigma whether we want to recognize it or not, and it was sort of like the hope factor that Dr. Gentry talks about all the time that blacks and Puerto Ricans hope that this will be a conduit through which they can get into the system. But I guess the more astute politicians, the educational politicians, recognize that rowing this way perpetuated the Board of Examiners, so therefore, that was one issue. The second issue was that what the hope was that by appointing the wrong principals that you would then begin to structure a different kind of accountability of people who had "relationship to the community" and that they could hold these people accountable for their performances in the community. It brings to mind a little funny thing that you hear all over the country now when people ask you the question "we had the right to hire and fire." If a person accepts an appointment on those conditions, then obviously he had a right to hire and fire. A person who doesn't want to accept those conditions, then you don't. But the third fact that I am saying is, it's just public opinion that blacks and minority, Mexicans, Chinese, etc. in the City would then begin to take jobs that were formerly held by one particular group. Those are the three issues, never mind the mere fact that you got blacks into the system.
Calvin: I agree, and I think you state it very well. My question is - today, let's suppose that you were the head of a board, or that you were a superintendent, or that you were just a consultant, what strategy would you recommend to a school system on the basis of your Ocean Hill experience to increase the number of minority administrators, assuming that most school systems in the - California has a different kind of problem, legally, but basically the problems are the same; there is kind of waiting list of, regardless of how it is structured, and generally speaking there haven't been many blacks and browns and other minority groups who've gone ahead. So here are these people who've been waiting for eighty years - they've been waiting for eighty years to be principal, and I am white, and now you are saying to me 'hey, we need more blacks, so you are going to jump somebody ahead of me.' Now, what I am saying to you is, Mac, what strategy, concrete strategy?

McCoy: Well, two things. First of all, I would insist on local community people being involved in the selection of the administrative leadership. That's part of it, and I think accompanying that has to be an educational process of letting people understand that it's important both academically as well as psychologically that the ethnic representations effect the clientele that you serve. So I guess basically, I am not talking about an option as much as the process of allowing local people and the clientele to be involved in the selection of those people who both teach and administer their schools.

Calvin: Fred, you are the one who creates the educational client.

Ferretti: Well, you are talking about options here.

Calvin: That's right. What could be . . .

Ferretti: I really think that you are talking about a dream world, to an extent. I think there are options in certain communities, but there is no option in New York. There is no option at all, because as Bernie pointed out, there is a law in the books.
Calvin: We've changed laws in three legislatures.

Ferretti: What I am saying is that you have a situation where legalisms are being used to combat a social movement, and, you know, you just can't talk about what options are there, you have to talk about pressure, continued pressure to get laws changed.

Calvin: What strategy . . .

Ferretti: There are no options, really.

Calvin: Oh, gee whiz, that's an awfully interesting comment. What kind of pressures? How could you create these pressures? In other words, what would you ask - it's not fair to ask people to wait ten or twenty years, that would seem to me, how would you create these pressures?

Ferretti: Well, I think Rev. Oliver could answer that question.

Swanker: Well, the only answer, obviously, is to mount enough of a lobby to beat the union.

Calvin: Now supposing that the union had, now, you see, now we get back again to what I think is the one thing that's missing that I see in every other discussion, and Esther always come closest to it, as a matter of fact, after when I have read the transcript - maybe we'll talk about it after lunch. I think we can make it in the interest of the CSA and the union to make certain changes which will also be in accordance to goals of the community. And I think if it isn't done that way, we don't find options that will do that, you can play 'til doomsday. Now maybe you can destroy the union, maybe it can be done. A lot of big corporations, including plumbing, manufacturing, and clothing in Wisconsin tried for a number of years. It's a very difficult thing to do. I don't think there have been many notable successes in this country with the labor laws as they are now written.

Oliver: Do you feel that we tried that?

Calvin: I don't know. I'd like to hear from you more.
Oliver: We did not.

Calvin: Well, but then what alternative do you have? You see if you say: 'well, we don't want to destroy them' there they are. They do exist.

Ferretti: You try to make them see that there is a law in the books that ought to be changed.

Calvin: Well, psychologists in general feel that people only do what's in their best interest to do.

Ferretti: Of course!

Calvin: And so what I am saying to you is, has anybody tried to work out . . . Is there an option that would involve working out programs that would benefit the CSA to make a change?

Oliver: I would like educators to see some of these things, some of these social problems, otherwise, they have no right to be teaching our children.

Calvin: You see, there is the crux of it.

Donovan: I think that's true.

Calvin: I think that that's, I think it has been enunciated very well. If you expect it, you see, I think, educators are no different than life insurance salesmen, really, honest to Gosh, or ministers, or psychologists.

Oliver: They are human, of course.

Calvin: That's right, and I think they have their . . . well, come on you guys . . . (laughter) . . . you get the same spectrum.

Donovan: Now, I think, what you have to see is something else here. I don't think it is quite that simple. When you are talking about the right of the union you are talking about a myth. And you talk about telling the teacher's union that its sacred protection of civil service rights and all that is something they ought to sit down and talk to the community about. Don't forget the firement are in on that, the police are in on that . . .
Calvin: I understand that.

Donovan: Every union man in New York is in on that because he thinks if it's a threat to one union, it's a threat to all unions, so that two things have to be done. One of them, despite the improbability of success there is still a possibility, is the attempt to sit down high level to hash these things out. I don't think anybody disagrees that an attempt ought to be made. What we may disagree about is a possibility of a success. But it ought to be tried. I wouldn't leave any stone unturned, seriously. And the other is the mounting of this pressure on the legislature to remove one of the big barriers and the people in areas are hard to organize. The union is organized. They've got a legion to send out pamphlets and get other unions in, and they go there in court and the legislators know it. But the people come in dribs and drabs. Some of the people that come don't put their cases forcefully as the union does. So that's a great, big job to try to organize a community to stand up for its rights.

Calvin: Well, Mac, if you'd like to adjourn for luncheon, we'll . . .

Swanker: Let me just put a footnote on that because it isn't just the community as we've been using it - that term - what I am saying is that you need more than the community. You need all of the pressure you can bring to bear to force the State which is opposed to the Board of Examiners for years. The various groups in the City, particularly who have in the past stated their opposition to the Board of Examiners, I am referring here to Parents Association, the Public Education Association, the various educational groups - whatever they may be . . . You know the names of them far better than I - that they are not powerful. None of them, in themselves, have the power of the union. And all I am saying is that in order to effect this change, it can't be just the community, although that's the biggest group, and obviously should, and it should be made to organize them and to mount this pressure, but ally with them, along with them all of these various other groups, because alone, I don't think the community controls enough votes to do it.
Calvin: This afternoon, although we may refer back to the general context, I thought we'd spend our time on some specific things that happened at Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Without initiating a specific topic, maybe, Mac, you'd like to begin by talking about some key things, key programs, key issues.

McCoy: I am going to take a certain kind of privilege and I talked earlier at lunchtime with Dr. Donovan, and I think that some of the inputs that he would make at this point are crucial before we get into the very specifics. Bernie, would you try to put together for us something, some of the progression around the Bundy report, the Mayor's report on decentralization, the Board of Education's report on decentralization, the Markey bill, and ultimately the legislation, and probably towards the tail end of it, sum it up how it affected Ocean Hill or how Ocean Hill played a part in it.

Donovan: Well, it's a little hard to tie all these things together, but let's start with the Bundy plan which was a big plan worked out to create an entirely decentralized system in the city of New York. It was kind of the father of all plans. After it was promulgated, there was a long period of argument back and forth, and just very briefly, the Bundy plan kind of faded out of existence, practically, as a Board plan came into being which was a modification of the Bundy plan, because the Board president was a minority member of the Bundy Commission, and he voted against the Bundy plan. And then, with Mr. Giardino, he drew the Board's plan, which is a modification of the Bundy. The Mayor drew his own plan. None of these plans achieved any legislative success. But while this was all going on, the Ocean Hill demonstration project was moving ahead. We thought - when I say "we," I am talking about myself, and I think I can say Mrs. Swanker thought, many of us thought - that the Ocean Hill, 201, and Two Bridges projects were demonstration areas to find out how you could decentralize, what the problems were,
and whether any changes were needed before adopting decentralization as a whole city-wide process. We looked upon it as a real demonstration area. I am not sure whether anybody else did except maybe the people in Ocean Hill and 201 and Two Bridges may have, too, from their point of view, and the State did, I know. I am not sure whether anybody else did, but in the midst of it, Ocean Hill kept moving ahead, but I think it kept moving ahead on its own axis, kind of apart from the Bundy report, apart from the Board's report, apart from the Mayor's report. It was proceeding the way its people in its community felt it ought to move, and the Board was reacting to it - and I was reacting to it as Superintendent. In a way we felt we had to react regardless of Bundy, or Lindsay, or anybody else's plan. Here was a fact rather than a lot of theories going on. I don't know how else to tell you, but it's kind of general. Esther?

Swanker: Well, I'd like to amend that because there were a couple of major things that (he said) were left out. It's hard to remember. Well, it was four years ago, it's hard to remember the exact sequence, but as I recall the Mayor took the Bundy plan and adopted it, modified it considerably and adopted it as his proposal, his legislative proposal. But there was another major input, I feel, in that decentralization legislation, and that was the Regents' plans which were quite different from any of the forementioned plans. And as you may recall in the legislative history, the Regents plan won, I think, the greatest support from the community districts, from practically all of the groups except the union, which didn't support any of the plans. And when the final bill came out, as someone said - as Murray Burtrom said - it was put together with a paste crack on the night before adjournment, and it's very obvious that that's what it was. And I think that the legislative committee that put it together just took words and phrases out of each of the various plans and finally came up with something that would be satisfactory, mainly to Al Shanker and Walter Degnan, but to the majority members of the legislature.

McCoy: I have two questions to ask both of them similar
to that. As each one of these plans came about for whatever their reasons, basically can we - all the panelists could be able to react to it, why was there so much opposition to each one of the plans? Or was there something that was continuous through each one, or was the opposition sort of . . .?

Swanker: Well, as I recall, and again I should go back in review, but everybody had their own particular hang-up on how many districts there should be, for instance. This was a big issue. I recall that the final bill which was enacted was kind of a compromise - some of the plans called for seven districts, some called for thirteen districts, some called for sixty-six districts, and everybody had their own hang-up about how many districts there should be.

McCoy: Why?

Swanker: Why? Well, the given reasons were the administrative. The hidden reasons, I think, were the power breakdown. But, in addition to the number of districts, of course, another big stumbling block was the amount of power to be given, or if it was to be decentralized what should be retained centrally and what should be given to the districts, to the local community districts. And that varied all the way from complete control of the programs - kindergarten through grade twelve - with absolute control in the districts to limited, well, almost, the bill that we have now, very limited decentralization, very limited power given to the districts.

McCoy: I don't want to sort of hold this, but I mean we keep touching some points which, I think, leaves us open. Each one of these proposals on decentralization, at some point . . are they, I think you said the public had the impression that the Bundy report was the thing, and yet you allude to the fact that it wasn't. And I am saying each one of these decentralization plans had some "visibility and support" and yet, in substance, they were not going to be accepted. Besides just the power breakdown, there must be some other . . .

Ferretti: I think the opposition from Shanker and Degnan came
because, I think as I said this morning, that they regarded each program or each decentralization plan as an erosion of their power to some extent, and I think they would be against it as a general principle, and then let's talk about it against, but let's talk. And they proceeded from that point of view, I think.

Donovan:

Well, there is another element to this besides Shanker and Degnan. They were a very critical force. But there was also the force of the people in the City of New York who didn't all agree on whose district they wanted it to be in. This little group didn't want to be in that district and that little group didn't want to be in this district, and so the matter of six districts or sixty-six districts was a critical matter with people who said: 'I don't want to be with them and I, we've always been here and this is our traditional center,' you know all that kind of stuff that came into it. Some of it, I think, was racially motivated. Some white people didn't want to get mixed in with some black districts, and so forth, you know. So it wasn't just Shanker and Degnan, although they had the big public force, but the people themselves. Everytime you go to a PTA meeting, or a local board meeting, there would be a big fight about where the district was to be and who is to be there and how many there would be in it.

McCoy:

Was integration a part of that?

Donovan:

Yes, I think it was a - well, I wouldn't say integration. I would say a part of it was the desire by a number of people not to be integrated.

Ferretti:

Bernie, I think you are right, because - as we've seen with the new bill - the so-called - I would really put quotes around these - the so-called "neighborhood school districts" that have been created, you know, are argued. For example, Flushing is as much a part of Amherst, Massachusetts, as some of those are. Incredible, incredible things that they call neighborhoods. For example, they took - out where I live - in Queens County, South Jamaica which is a black community and which over the years has been thought of as a community in so far as
council manic districts, state senate, state assembly. It is now broken into three districts. South Jamaica is now part of three different school districts, so that there is no power whatever.

Calvin: You know, I think one of the things being overlooked, and I think it's an important thing, I'd like your reaction to it. Feelings were running so high at that time, for example, we talked to a lot of people - cab drivers, and people like that - and of course they wouldn't drive us out to Ocean Hill-Brownsville, but there was a lot of feeling against the Ocean Hill-Brownsville as the focal point, but also 201, and one thing that you got from a lot of people - like I used cab drivers as an illustration - was those "people" are doing all kinds of bad things. "What we should do is to get them all together and shoot them." I mean there was a really strong element. And I am not talking about the sophisticated opposition of Shanker, I am not talking about the sophisticated opposition of some other legislators, or even the power brokers; I am saying the man in the street had been by the media, so stirred up that I genuinely believe an election would have - I don't know what would have happened to New York City - but I think you would have gotten a very repressive kind of movement at that time. Now, you were all . . .

Ferretti: But you almost did. The last mayoral election proved that.

Calvin: Okay, but I am leaving that aside. I am just saying that the school issue at that time had been so polarized by the media that it wasn't simply a matter of sophisticated people carving up districts. There was a general feeling that in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, hate, revolution, terrible things were being taught by terrible people, and,'by golly, we can't let our schools fall into the hands of the . . .' and then you can fill in whatever word you think is most appropriate.

Donovan: I tell you one thing. That particular time had a lot to do with changing John Lindsay into the law-and-order man at that point.
Swanker: Well, there was another significant event of that spring, too. You recall that following, or part of that legislation that finally became a decentralization bill, created what was called the Lindsay Board. The first Lindsay Board. Because prior to that time, the board had been a carryover from Wagner days, although Lindsay had appointed a few members. He did not have a majority until July of 1968, and so that Board did what you, Allan, would call some funny things, too. Some of them probably were very good and others certainly were very bad as far as their public image and as far as furthering decentralization is concerned. That, I think, was a key element of that year, too.

McCoy: I still am hung up on a couple of concerns. Let me try it in a different way. The Board had a report, the Regents had a report, the Mayor had a report, Marchy had a report, and finally there was a legislative act. Now, I am going to preface the question we remarked. It would appear to me that the Board of Ed.'s plan would have the greatest educational report - should have the greatest educational report, theoretically, as well as the Regents' plan, and yet basically..., but theoretically, for some reasons - and I hasten to add this - for some reasons, none of these reports were, ah, received sufficient support that they could stand. I mean even the Mayor's report. And then the other part of that question has to do with the odd situation with how the community people never really understood and were able to rally around any one of those reports.

Donovan: Well, Rhody, I think there are a couple of things in them. One is that each one of the reports approached it from a different angle, provided different things for decentralization. No one of those reports by itself satisfied everybody, no one of them. And in the meantime, while those reports were being conserved, all the turmoil in Ocean Hill and 201 was going on saying to a lot of people in the City: 'well, if this is decentralization, we don't want this.' People didn't really look at the issues at all, but just saw a lot of turmoil. And so nobody rallied around decentralization at a time when the only decentralization demonstrations were in turmoil.
So maybe it blocked some people from getting at it. All I know is that there was no consensus.

McCoy: I want to come back to that point, Bernie, on turmoil.

Swanker: Yes, I was just going to say, Rhody, you may also recall that it was in May of that year that Ocean Hill contributed their bit to the decentralization bill by transferring nineteen teachers and supervisors. You remember, that was what eventually precipitated the strike.

Panelist: She said transfer.

Donovan: She said transfer. (laughter by panelists.)

Calvin: Rev. Oliver, you haven't had a chance to comment on this so far. Maybe from your point of view, what did the Board, what did you and Rhody do to try and communicate? Any word I choose here is hard - I'll just say the communities. What did you try to do to get your ideas across to the people who made the decision; i.e. did you ever meet with them, maybe you can't comment on this, maybe this is still too recent history. Did you ever try to meet with Rockefeller, was there ever an attempt - that's assuming that he was a channel - or did you use any other channels? What did you do and why didn't any work, and what maybe could be done differently? I think Rhody has opened up a very good point. What did you try to do?

Oliver: An effort was made eventually to meet with Governor Rockefeller, but nothing came of that. During this period, we were able . . .

McCoy: A slight correction. We met him down in the St. George Hotel. He promised an audience, you remember that?

Oliver: But, we did meet with the Central Board of Education many times - the Governing Board. And looking back over that, I can say that we, that now was a pleasanthing, because now, we never did meet with the new five-man Board. We've never, we've requested it, but we've never had a chance to meet with them. But we did meet
with the old Board, with Dr. Donovan, several times. We had our hot times, but at least there was an open door and we did meet. The community, I think, very quickly analized each of the various proposals, very quickly. I think - I give credit to the people, many of the people who had not even been to college, but they were involved with their own children and they could read these documents and see what was in them. Their reaction to the Bundy panel, or the Bundy report rather, was that basically it shifted power at the top, giving the Mayor a little more power and letting the communities have a small voice in the selection of district superintendents, but everything else remained pretty much the same. And they rejected that as not allowing the people to have a sufficient voice in the operation of the schools.

There were good elements to that bill, but there was one thing, I think, that frightened many people, and that was if there had been as many as sixty local boards, there would have been over a hundred people that the Mayor himself would appoint to those boards, so that would give tremendous power to the Mayor. The Board of Education plan, we felt, was much weaker than the Bundy plan, and the community didn't go for that at all. The Regents' plan was analized as soon as we got copies of that and there were many good features about it. We liked their stand with reference to the Board of Examiners, but in the fine print it appeared that after a few years you go right on back to the same old thing. And I don't have the wording here, but I think if you were reading it, that after a few years, things would go back, and it seemed as though somebody with a good sociological mind was saying: 'well, here is something happening, we'll roll with the punch, we'll give in now, but we'll make sure that we write into it that we go back.'

Calvin:

But what did you do then? I guess what I am saying is in the way of options, let's look at some options that some other people have employed. For example, Charles Edwards or Medger Evers, used economic boy... and Martin Luther King used economic boycotts, and supposing you would have said: 'look, if we don't get the kind of decentralization bill that we want, we will ask the black and brown people - the Puerto Ricans
and black people in this area - not to buy from any downtown New York City stores, we will withdraw our patronage," and the New York City. . . I mean, I am not saying a type could have used; what techniques did you utilize of the options that were available, by that, I think the economic leverage is by far the most powerful. That's the one thing that has worked every single time I know of, from the bus boycott on, to be effective. Was ever anything like this utilized? Have you thought about . . .

Oliver: Here again, you had a new Board, a community board, going into an issue that was very difficult and new to many of them, and people were putting their minds to education.

Calvin: And not to the political processes.

Oliver: Not to the political process. We couldn't, these were volunteers, all volunteers, and it would remain yet to be seen whether a volunteer board could even function. We didn't have a chance to discover that. I think that a volunteer board, really, just can't do it. You can't take volunteer people to do a job to keep up with people who are making $35,000.

McCoy: The question I am directing to Rev. Oliver is his reaction to whether or not the people saw each one of the proposed bills of having some direct relationship to Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

Oliver: Very definitely, yes, because it appeared as though each one of them reduced, or cut out, from under Ocean Hill-Brownsville the things that we were struggling for, and that is a good education for the children, period. If it can be done through the union - beautiful; through the Board of Education - beautiful; but a good education.

McCoy: Well, that leads me to my next concern, and Bernie, I said I would come back to it. You translated the things that were going on in Ocean Hill, and some of that I can understand, in terms of turmoil. And early in the session, we've talked about the Board sort of accepting tacitly the fact that Ocean Hill was an elected
body and they would deal with them. And then further we discussed that Ocean Hill was, in fact, and historically it has been proven, we were continuing to go through the educational process. We were actually running, and given the reaction to these various pieces of the proposed legislation, how is it that Ocean Hill was sustained, I mean allowed to continue, you know, its programs, etc., even though you translate it as turmoil, the people saw it as moves which were necessary in order to continue educating the kids.

Donovan:

Well, I am not arguing whether the moves were necessary or not, it still created turmoil, whether they were necessary or not, that he'll call three thousand police in a place of turmoil, and I don't know what you'd call it. There was a turmoil, whether it was good or bad, is not - I am not putting blames on anybody in the turmoil. Turmoil was when the union pulled out, too. That was part of the turmoil. But nobody can deny that as far as anybody in the City of New York was concerned or any place in the nation, there was turmoil in Ocean Hill for a long time. But, you may not recall, Rhody, but some time back in around October, or maybe November of '67, after you became the unit administrator, and after the Board had tacitly agreed to deal with the Ocean Hill Board, the Ocean Hill Board was asked to accept a set of guidelines for how it should operate, so was 201, so was Two Bridges. Nobody accepted them. Ocean Hill didn't, 201 didn't, Two Bridges didn't. But guidelines were offered. They didn't go as far as Ocean Hill wanted to go, and so Ocean Hill said 'no,' and from that time on, no guidelines were drawn. You know, there was no real definition of authority. But Ocean Hill went ahead on what it assumed was its right to do for its children. And the Board never recognized some of those rights and that's what created the hang-ups.

Oliver:

Well, there was a strategy at that point. Ocean Hill-Brownsville, 201, and Two Bridges got together and had several meetings together with an attorney, and they drew up in legal terminology the types of things that we felt we should have.

Donovan:

That was never accepted. It wasn't accepted.
So the Board's guidelines were not accepted by Ocean Hill, and Ocean Hill's guidelines were not accepted by the Board.

McCoy: Bernie, would time have been a fact? In other words, at the beginning you said that the Board's assumption was that over the summer they would put together, or put the meat on a framework.

Donovan: That the Ocean Hill-Brownsville steering committee would do that.

McCoy: Well, you had the other two districts . . . well, you had . . . (mumbling by other panelists.)

Swanker: No, because the others weren't that far along, but they didn't have their elections that early.

McCoy: Well, the Board assumed - what the Board assumed that over the summer all three of those using the Ford planning grant would put them . . .

Donovan and Swanker: Yes, right . . .

McCoy: Now, what I am saying is, if - in fact, or could they have been processed, or would it have been effective if they had a process where during that summer period the Board of Education through some of its representatives, primarily you, I suspect, or an appointee, could have devised a program at that point that would have not created this conflict of accepting the Board's plan, or the Board accepting Ocean Hill's plan.

Donovan: It is possible, but I think the Reverend put it very clearly before. The Ocean Hill-Brownsville community had so little regard for the Board and the public establishment of the Board that it frankly did not want the interference of the Board in preparing its plan for its own community. It wanted to make its plan itself. Not that they might not have - yes, maybe they might have accepted some help - but the Board felt that the community was going to set up a community board it ought to be allowed to set it up itself, which it did, but the Board never participated in the main operation.
Swanker: There is another point here, too, Rhody. I am not sure that your suggestion that if it had been followed would have been very meaningful, because you recall in the relationships you've had with the liaison people that the Superintendent appointed, there was Dr. Robinson and Mr. Brambecker, you got the very definite feeling that there was-if not outright sabotage, certainly foot-dragging - that there was no real help offered to you, and so even if the Board or the Superintendent had authorized personnel from 110 to help you develop an education plan, I don't know that you would have gotten anything more than you got anyway. So, I mean, because this was the attitude at 110 with the exception, I would say, of the Superintendent of Schools. The whole hierarchy there was very definitely - and this is no secret to any of you - very definitely opposed to the demonstration districts and they were not about to go out of their way to help you move them forward.

McCoy: But, you see, I am coming around about, before we get back at it. Part of the question that you raised before, Allan, was that the community, as Rev. Oliver very specifically stated, was really addressing itself to education, had put all of its efforts into education and as a result of that kind of effort they were literally dissipated in terms of dealing with other kinds of "strategies" or political leverage. We did have at some point some suggestions that helped to do some boycotting and so forth and so on, but we were not - I am saying we were so dissipated. The reason I use that is because I recall using Howard Kalodner - we tried every approach in the books to deal through the law, and that brings me back to this key point, and Esther, I'd like to direct it specifically to you at this point. At the time that Dr. Donovan wrote to the State Department, Commissioner Allen specifically, about the principalships - I may be a little bit off in terms of dates, but I think I am pretty accurate - that we also were petitioning the Commissioner to create "training schools" situations, and even though - if memory serves me correct - the law did not specifically define training schools at that time, and I think he was ambiguous in his answer, but it left the door open as a possible choice between
either using demonstration school principals as against creating training school setting which were sort of giving us a sort of isolation from the existing laws. Now is there any particular rationale behind why the other option couldn't have been tried?

Swanker:

Very definitely. That law was established back in the normal school days when teacher training was a kind of a haphazard thing, and it was established so that various schools could become campus schools if you will, or demonstration project schools for teacher training institutions. Well, it was on the books, and I want to assure you that with Bob Stone in the chief council's office, Ocean Hill and the demonstration districts were given every single legal break that there was possible to give, because this was not true in Charlie Brin's day. Charlie Brin was a strict instructionist and he was never going to give anybody a break as far as this kind of thing was concerned, but if there had been a loophole; Bob Stone was the kind of guy who would have found it and would have worked to your advantage. However, if you could have demonstrated a tie-in with a teacher training institution where you would literally have used all of your schools as demonstration schools in that your primary, your primary purpose was to train teachers, then I think they would have allowed that loophole. But, you see, it was obvious that it was not your primary purpose.

Your primary purpose was to educate the children of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and you were using this - hoping to use this loophole to get around another law, and so even the most sympathetic people in our department, and incidentally I think you also realized that most of our department - I am not talking about individuals now, and I am not talking about the people who came down as policemen during the occupation, but I am talking about the real policy-making heads of the department - were very sympathetic to the Ocean Hill, well, to the demonstration districts, and really this will answer part of an earlier question of Dr. Donovan, is what kept you going. Part of it was the faith of Commissioner Allen and members of his staff had in the theory of the demonstration districts. I
can remember Dr. Donovan and Dr. Allen talking many times about this should be tried, we realize that there are headaches, there are problems. Commissioner Allen, meeting with the New York City Board, saying: 'have faith, it'll work out, it's trying, but . . .' A lot of things were done, kind of behind the scenes, to keep you going even to "finagling" - if I may use the term - of funds from the State - and I don't mean that in any way dishonest or illegal - but when the Urban Education Act was passed, we went to the Board of Education in New York City with a fait a compli and said: 'Ocean Hill-Brownsville is going to have a community education center.' And don't think there wasn't some objection on the part of the Board at that time, because that was still the Giardino Board at that time. There were a lot of people - and I am talking here about Commissioner Allen, Bob Stone, Dr. Donovan - people who were in decision-making positions, who had the feeling and who had the faith that this was a thing that needed to be done. They sometimes regretted some of the methods, but that - I think this can answer your question as to what kept you going - and I think it was the faith of people like that that kept you going, because I have a feeling that there was a point when Mayor Lindsay would have shut you down if he had had the authority to do so, because as Bernie said, he became very law and order at one point, when three thousand policemen were out there. So I tried to answer two questions here at once, and the first was on your question about the training schools and the second on what kept you going.

Calvin:

I want to bring this back into one focus. Maybe Fred can comment on it and then have the others, because I think we've got some very useful data here. As far as drawing conclusions from this that could be very useful to other school systems in New York and other places, would you say that the thing that kept it going - let's see if we can get a little consensus - was the support and belief of a large number of officials in the State, and maybe the Superintendent of Schools of New York, and the State Superintendent and others, that they should be given a chance that'll allow it to run for a while, but
the failure, the ultimate failure was because the laws and the legislature and other people are used to people dealing in fairly political ways, and that the Board and the community of Ocean Hill-Brownsville and its allies - using that term in a loose way - lacked the political sophistication, know-how, muscle and money to organize, and that therefore, is it a fair statement to say that if it were to be done over again, maybe more attention should be paid to the political process as well as the education process? Are we foredoomed to all these unless we realize that education is fundamentally a political issue? Maybe the Board should initially appoint a director of public relations, or - I guess what I am saying to you is maybe for other school systems who are about to go through this and for particularly the community people in it, maybe they should be aware of the fact that it's basically political.

Ferretti: Well, I think in these days everything is political. I don't think there is anything you can do in any urban situation which is not political.

Calvin: Then, Fred, what kind of advice would you give from what you saw in Ocean Hill and then I'd like other people to comment on it. What could have Ocean Hill done with all these bills coming out and all these other things? Rhody and Rev. Oliver have pointed out the political problems that they had encountered.

Ferretti: I think you answered it in part in what you said before. It's not what they could have done with all these bills coming out. I think it's what they could have done is back before there were any bills is to get political.

Calvin: In other words . . .

Ferretti: I remember Rhody saying to me about one morning in his office - like two months after this had begun - when he had gotten to the point where he was calling and he was speaking off the record and speaking to people with whom he had not spoken before. Rhody spoke of sophistication, and it came late.

Donovan: Let me care to look at it in another way. When
you say what could Ocean Hill have done - Ocean Hill was really the first community in the whole nation that tried to crack the big city, and, you know, they had to throw the tea in the harbor in Boston once, too - and that was illegal - but if they hadn't thrown the tea into the harbor, maybe things wouldn't have come out the way they did. So Ocean Hill had to do some things, I assume, that were more illegal - I'll put it that way - in terms of the civil war, the education war, and more distasteful to some people because of what they did, than you would have to do perhaps in the future, because they did it first. And all the other cities have a lot to go by and a lot to learn, and have learned a lot, and may be able to put it to use in sitting down and talking long ahead and building up political pressure. I don't think they had the time to do it because as they read their reading scores - if they were going to sit around for a decade and build up political - a whole generation of kids would have gotten by, well, - they did that, so I am not condoning some of the things they did. I think some of the things they didn't do properly, but I see their reason for it, so what we can do out of this is not so much go back and look at what could Ocean Hill have done, because Ocean Hill is unique in a sense that it was Number One. We might look back at what other people can do as a result of the experience of this which is an entirely different matter. A lot of forces kept this thing alive. There was constant pressure to cut Rhody's salary off, you know - 'he defies you, he is insubordinate, come on, throw him out of the office, cut off his salary!' I could have done it, like that. What would it have achieved? A momentary victory! Hurrah, the Superintendent shows his force. There wasn't much point to it, so the union and the CSA were critical of that. Anybody was critical of it - we were all in something for the first time. None of us had ever been in this before. Commissioner Allen had never been in it. Three of his minions from the State that came down had never been in it to try to do what the Superintendent couldn't do, and the three of them failed. So that, you know, it was new to everybody. I think we ought to continue to get the facts of what we did and when we are through,
let's see what we can say to other people.

Swanker: I want to take issue with one thing you said, Allen, and - because I don't like to have the record show the the Ocean Hill demonstration was a failure, and you mentioned that word - that it was a failure.

Calvin: That should be wiped out. Let's say lost in the legislature's mill. It was dismantled, eliminated, or . . .

Swanker: All right, as a political entity, it no longer exists. But I certainly don't think that we can term the entire effort a failure, because as Dr. Donovan indicated, it opened the door, it showed other cities and others in New York City that it can be done, that there is a way; may not, maybe not all, everybody would agree with the way Ocean Hill did it, but at least, that the bureaucracy of the school system and the education laws are not sacred, that they can be challenged, and that it takes a lot of gut.

Calvin: Do you agree with that, Rev. Oliver? I'd like to hear because I am not - I think that's a very important point. Do you think that the outcome for Ocean Hill showed that the laws could be changed, that the educational establishment would bend, and you look on Ocean Hill as a success or a failure. How do you look on it from your point of view, and Rhody, too? What way, do you think, was accomplished? Do you agree with what Esther said?

Oliver: Well, I agree that it showed that laws can be challenged and that the central Board can be challenged, but I don't think we were trying to prove that. What has ultimately happened to Ocean Hill-Brownsville, I think, brings out something in that, and that is that the law in this country is such that when black people try to take the law as it is and get ahead with it, they get slapped down illegally, or legally, or in some way, and if they try to get it around the law, then they become illegal bad guys, so you are locked in. And this is not going to stay this way. There might have to be some tosses and tea in the harbor again, or something equivalent
to that which would challenge the whole law.

Calvin: Would you characterize Ocean Hill, and now I want to ask Rhody the same question, would you characterize it as a victory for community participation, community control, decentralization? How do you see it in the general concept?

Oliver: A victory for community participation as long as it lasted. It was a victory because people were involved, even people could come to the Governing Board and demand the kind of principal that they wanted and get it, even over Mr. McCoy and over the Governing Board; they wanted a certain principal and the Governing Board would say this is who you want, all right, you may have him. I think this was a victory for the people.

McCoy: It wasn't easy.

Calvin: Rhody, do you want to speak on that point, because I think it's an important . . .

McCoy: No, I don't know how to speak to that point, Allan, because - I guess what I am saying is, that it appeared to me even though the people were sort of reflecting almost a national concern about the quality of education and the determination on the part of people, parents, to rectify that condition, it became a morality versus a political fight. In other words, the education of kids, the future of kids was the moral issue and its opposition was political. What I saw developing was as each day the district stayed on, and, Fred, I am going to touch just the key point here, we began to get more support, but more support from a moral point of view, from the powerless people, and I saw that as suddenly a threat to the establishment who moved expeditiously and this sort of led to the kind of conflict. For instance, and I am jumping way ahead, if you recall at one point there was a great deal of, I think, bias on the part of the mass media in the early stages around the effort to resolve the strike, if you recall, a number of the mass media guys got together and wanted to set up a proposal to come in and mediate the strike, because their whole attitude changed. I think the turning point was in 144; that press
conference when they came to see Johnson vs. McCoy at that particular fight. You remember that, Allen?

Calvin: Yes, I do.

McCoy: And they stayed for over an hour and a half looking at the reading program that we were initiating in the school even though we were "under trusteeship," and so forth. So I am saying, if you can couch it in that kind of terms, I think it was undoubtedly a victory and still is.

Ferretti: May I - I'd like to even take it further. Never mind the education. I think you had an issue here in which a community which heretofore had not even been regarded as anything - either as a political entity, or as a group of people with any power at all, who suddenly found themselves able to work together for something, and I think on that basis it was certainly a success.

Donovan: I think, to me the big element in it is not whether it introduced the reading program, because the same reading program was introduced in two other districts in the City that were not in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and not whether the union was made to learn a small lesson, it didn't learn much but a little bit, but this demonstration district got people in the City thinking more about education for children who have never had good education, and it got them to thinking more about communities having some control. We now have a bill which while it doesn't give communities control, at least it's some movement forward to let people elect local boards. I don't know how, I don't say this is a very great piece of legislation, but it is a movement. You know it was about four hundred years ago that Martin Luther nailed a thesis on the door and some of what he nailed at the door is just starting to come around now. It doesn't happen that quickly, and I think that thrust that it gave, the opening up of people's thinking about this whole thing is a victory in itself.

Swanker: Well, ...
Calvin: You know, Rev. Oliver is ... Let me just ask one question, because ... you didn't participate in the election and I think that a lot of people have asked why Ocean Hill - why your Board refused to run and why you refused to participate and why you refused ... ah, if what Dr. Donovan says is true, and I think most people believe what he says is true, because it certainly makes sense, why wouldn't you participate in the process and run and try to get your own programs continued?

Oliver: Well, as soon as the bill came out and we made a study of it, we felt that it, there was a design here to get rid of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and later on we could see when the central Board at that time, the new interim board drew the lines of the new district that would involve Ocean Hill-Brownsville, they almost made it coterminous with the boundaries of the assembly-man of the district - a lone foe of Ocean Hill-Brownsville where his political strength was. So the decentralization bill set up the structure for it, the interim Board of Education drew up the boundaries to give Ocean Hill-Brownsville to Sam Wright, and that's exactly what happened, and that's why we did not participate, because we would become a party to giving it over to someone who would have destroyed it, and it has actually been destroyed by that politician.

Calvin: Esther, maybe you want to comment on that?

Swanker: Well, I'd like to. There was a point prior to that when Dr. Donovan mentioned that it made the people of the City aware of the educational issue as far as minority children are concerned. I think it was an even broader thing than that. I think it's made the people of the country aware and wherever you go in the country now, you know, you are used to get around a fair amount and still do, you never used to hear about community control involving parents or local boards. These things were just never mentioned, never discussed prior to 1967; you never heard about it anywhere. Oh, we had a little thing going up in the corner of Detroit, maybe New York or there was something down in Philadelphia, but nothing major; there was never any major thrust at involving the parents of children, particularly minority
group children, in the educational process, and particularly in a policy-making, decision-making role. And now, you go around the country and there are very, very few large cities that do not have a plan, a legislative action, a something in the works that will at least make a start toward what you were trying to do in Ocean Hill. So I certainly think it would be a great mistake to call your effort a failure, because while you didn't accomplish in your own little eight schools what you wanted to do for those particular children on a broader scale, you did open the door.

Calvin: I think that's well put.

Oliver: Again, let me react to that and perhaps, no doubt, you must have more experience than I in that, but if community control now should be used as a gimmick to still control black people by the use of community control, that is a failure.

Swanker: I didn't think I used the term community control over . . . I didn't intend to. I meant to use . . .

Oliver: It isn't, but I am afraid that this is what it's going to be. The establishment and say, the white establishment in this country can very well take community control and control black people with it.

Donovan: But you take your present district, that's hardly true.

Oliver: It is - it's happening now.

Donovan: In your own district?

Oliver: Exactly! That's exactly what's happening. You've got now black people doing in the community - killing our kids. There has not been a full day of school at 271 this year, and nobody is saying anything about turmoil. There are not five hundred out of seventeen hundred; nobody is saying anything about turmoil, but the kids are not being educated.

Donovan: I wasn't referring to that. I was referring to the fact that I agree with you thoroughly; that
if community control is a gimmick to do the black people out of their rights to ... the education of their children, then it's a farce. It's worse than not having ... (mumbled) But, when community control is turned over to a district which is all white, and your district is black, particularly, or very close to it, then you begin to fight with yourselves.

Oliver: That's part of the disability to ...

Calvin: You think that's a plan you got to ... the plan.

Donovan: Well, if that's a plan, I don't like any part of it, that's all. (Several panelists talking at once.)

Oliver: ... already chose a man who already was opposed to everything that we were trying to do, for political purposes.

Donovan: They elected him, didn't they?

Oliver: No. The establishment put him in.

McCoy: Well, let me go back. Let me touch it from another point of view. And this is in its general context. If in fact what happened in Ocean Hill began to coalesce people all over the country to look at education - that's one dimension - the second dimension is - and I say this, and I say it over and over again - and I believe the only real support that we had, I mean, can I say substantial support, was through Bernie, even though I know that there were times when his hand was tied, and I'd say this because . . .

Swanker: You had the Board with you, too, for a short time. You had the Doar Board - I neglected to mention that when you asked who kept you going, but . . .

McCoy: I don't put those in the same vein with what I am talking about primarily.

Swanker: Well, at least they gave lip service to . . .

McCoy: Well, let me get back to what I was specifically saying, given the kind of support that we were supposed to have had and the kinds of concerns
about people for education, I am going to ask this kind of question. I know that the first thing that we did which ended up in the court, was the appointment of the principals. If, in fact, people were saying that we were looking at options or we were looking at improvement of education, then those people, whoever they are, mythical as they are, should have begun to support that concept. I know for a fact, in one instance Bernie was out on limb, period. The second thing had to do with the transfer of teachers...

(End of second side of tape.)

Ferretti: It was in the in basket and it stays in the in basket until that guy who's been there for twenty-five years decides to take it out, and it goes down three more levels, and it never reaches the schools.

McCoy: Fred, the difference is, the point I am making here, and maybe I didn't allude to it, the difference was that Ocean Hill out of commitment to the people, persisted in staying alive, I mean despite all of the overwhelming odds, and I am saying . . .

Ferretti: But what you're saying is that if there had been indeed this broad basis of support, why did it not succeed further? And I think that, I just . . .

McCoy: But I am also saying it in another way, because maybe Bernie wants to allude to it. I know for a fact that if he ever set a taboo on the districts, the life of that district, or part of it, is shorter, and I know he fought that over some tremendous odds. The point that I am saying is that as Ocean Hill mustered support, it preserved itself, we went out and actively enlisted support. We tried the law, court cases, tried all the organizations, we got the support of the powerless people. I am questioning whether in fact when Bernie made those stands which were way out on the limb, so to speak, why those people who basically had said that they supported some sort of change in education, didn't rally to Bernie's support.

Calvin: Why should they?
McCoy: I'm not talking about the union now.

Calvin: But, but, Mac . . .

Ferretti: But, I think, the analogy I gave, I think, holds true. I think it holds true for Allen, holds true for Bundy, I think it holds true for the Mayor, you know.

McCoy: You are saying Allen backed off?

Ferretti: John Lindsay can say something on television, and then he gives four pages to Lou Fieldstein, and in three weeks, you know, where are you?

Swanker: No, what he was saying on that, you said about Allen, because, well, I know that Commissioner Allen was committed to the concept and dedicated to it and he worked hard at it, and so was Bob Stone, his legal counsel, so was Niquest, and so was I, and I was a minor functionary, so that didn't mean anything. But, you get below the level of Commissioner Allen, and the deputy commissioner, and then you get people, and I am not going to mention names, but you get old school men who are just the exact counterpart to the people at 110 Livingston Street.

Donovan: . . . and who never saw New York City.

Swanker: And who never came into New York City except to stay at the Waldorf and go to a parking place. What I am saying is that Commissioner Allen could do so much and Bob Stone did all he could, and the people like myself and Commissioner Niquest were directly involved and had something to do with it, did try to help, but . . .

Ferretti: Can I make a point? The best analogy I can think of if, we were talking about New York City, let's stay there. John Lindsay creates the Environmental Protection Agency to encompass about five different city departments, and he appoints an administrator, and there are four or five commissioners, but all the civil servants stay there, the guy who'd been there for twenty years, and so what happens? He talks about plans for a pollution-free city, and he talks about overall plans for green belts and all these things, but what
happens is that the garbage doesn't get picked up, because it goes from here to here to here to here, and it's in somebody's in basket for two, or two-to-three months.

McCoy:

No, I guess my perspective is a little different. What I am saying is the people in Ocean Hill specifically, despite - we read implications in the various proposals for decentralization, we read hidden agendas in the "overt" positions of people, and so forth, and I am saying that there were certain people who had demonstrated orally, mostly, a kind of support. For instance I am saying, let me use this very specific, in the original discussion we had with Commissioner Allen about training schools versus the other way of appointing principals, he had suggested that there was nothing, in the presence of Stone - I am challenging indirectly the kind of support that you say they are giving - but he had said that there was nothing in the legislature that denied Ocean Hill becoming a training school setting. He would have to look at it and "it would then be subject to interpretation," and he even suggested that if he went that way, he may be prepared to go to court about it. Now the question I am saying is after a certain period of conflict, and we appealed to the Commissioner on more than one occasion, knowing Bernie's role in this, that these two power brokers, so to speak, could then change direction as an option or an alternative to say: 'okay, rather than have all the conflict,' because I suspect that a large percentage of what happened in the City was out of "fear" that this community would erupt into violence. What I am saying is that Commissioner Allen could have then in his office, or I think it should have responsibility to run a move to the training school level. I am not picking that as a specific, but an option to . . .

Swanker:

Do you think the outcome would have been any different? The CSA would have challenged that just as they challenged the others.

McCoy:

He was prepared for that, but it was an option.

Calvin:

You know, I think, we are getting into specifics, here, and I think there is a central phenomenon
which I have noted again and again in the American education and particularly among black educators, and I want to comment on. I'd like to get some reactions, because I think it'll have real implications. There seems to be a belief that education is different than washing windows or delivering eggs or picking up garbage, or anything else, that the people in that are different and that they don't operate with the same needs and goals and incentives that people do in every other area of American life. And those areas - the reason people do what they do is because there is something in it for them. Otherwise they wouldn't survive - it's environmentally built in and to say people should do this or should do that or shouldn't, I don't mean this in a narrow sense of a payoff, I mean in the sense of the survival of certain institutions. Now you can't get - it seems to me what I heard Rhody saying was: 'why shouldn't they because it was right, it was fair, it was just, it was reasonable,' and what I am saying is that nobody says: 'what could we, could we have gone to Nyquist, or whoever you were going to talk about, Jim Allen, or whoever you were going to talk about; do we ever give any support, do we ever give any help, do we ever take a public position, did we ever find out what it was that the State Department wanted that we could have felt with?' I guess what I am saying is what would I hear out of this - still what I read in the first transcript - was the feeling that somehow or other people should do things because it's right? And I don't think that we should expect educators to do things that are right any more than we expect any another group. I think it's unfair and unreasonable, and as long as we have that conflict, then the remark that you make - it's like listening to two different people talk. You are saying one thing, Fred, and you are trying to address yourself to one problem, and Rhody is addressing himself to another.

Ferretti: I don't think so.

Calvin: Well, I do. I don't think I . . . (Ferretti interrupting) . . two people not hearing each other. They would be in the same room and saying things.

Ferretti: I would disagree with one of the things you said
right at the beginning that people should not look upon educators any differently from window washers. I would say to that that I think people ought to look at educators differently because you give your kids to them for six hours a day.

Calvin: Well, if you do, if you think they are any different from window washers, or doctors, or lawyers, or psychologists, or dentists, that you also give your kids to, you are in trouble. And if you do, you will constantly find yourself running against basic facts of human behavior, and that's what we are doing. Teachers are the same as the people who run the television cameras, and of those - ah, they are basically people.

Ferretti: I couldn't disagree with that.

Calvin: Okay, that's a basic disagreement and that's why education is in the state it's in, I think.

Oliver: I disagree with you very violently, violently. Because if a garbage collector refuses to pick up a garbage can and then dump the garbage out, the garbage won't cry, it won't long for its mother. But it's different when a teacher walks out on a child. You are not dealing with things, but with people.

Calvin: As long as you want to take this position, you will try and figure out how to make changes in education and the changes won't come about, because you have to appeal to the same interest of the teacher has as you do to the interest of the garbage collector. As long as you say: 'but the teacher should be dedicated,' the teacher should. People don't behave . . .

Oliver: If children were garbage, I would agree with you.

Calvin: On the contrary, the reason why so many children are in the garbage is because we don't understand that teachers are human, that educators are human, and because they are people, just like firemen, and policemen, as long as we say they are different, and teachers should behave differently, have different goals and needs, then - if you are like garbage collectors, then we will turn children into garbage which is what we are
systemically doing.

McCoy: Allan, I think I'd just like to redirect that. What I am saying is what we tried in Ocean Hill was everything. Every option that we possibly could to remedy the inequities of education. Now, as I said, we resorted to the court, we used consultants, we went to appeal to pressure groups, and so forth. The mere fact that you have a Commissioner of Education, he has an obligation to see that certain kinds of things are done - the Superintendent of Schools, the local School Board, and such and such. What I am saying is these people have certain kinds of obligations by virtue of the positions which they hold. Now, what I am saying is, if we found that important, remember, Esther, we called and asked, and I think it was, I don't remember how we got to Kalodner, but we ended up getting Kalodner to try to put this thing together; if we felt that that was a responsibility, then obviously by the mere position that the other people held that they had a responsibility likewise to look at their options. And I don't think that has anything to do with their vested interests other than to look at the options.

Donovan: Well, I think there are a few things that I'd like to comment on. One is on Rhody's and one is on yours. There is no question on what the people in responsible positions should look at all the options, but they don't have to accept them. Just because you say: 'look at the option; you should have given us this training school,' maybe the people looked at it and said that it is not the thing to do and turned it down. That doesn't say that you didn't look at it, just because you don't agree about everything; otherwise this would be a fine world. The man in authority wouldn't have any authority at all, because you'd just go the way he was told. And sometimes those chores are difficult. You made a statement, Allan, a minute ago - I know you didn't mean it quite the way you said it, and that is that people lead people into things because it's right to do them. And I know you were saying that we - well, we are not all angels, we are human beings and teachers are as well as everybody else. But, I am very sorry
that, even though it sounds like a Sunday sermon, I hope we don't get away from the fact that people ought to do things because they are right, and the more we get away from it and begin to say: 'well, everybody is a human being, they are all good, bad, and indifferent,' which they are. If we don't keep hammering away at what's doing right, then we are just going to get further and further into the vicious cycle of the policeman who got his $800 raise, the fireman got to get $800, the next one got only a $25 weekly in twenty-five years; in other words, you have to keep crawling up the line; everybody is mechanical. I know that's the way we live, but I hope that we try to get - not only from teachers, doctors, dentists, and others who deal with human beings, not with panes of glass and garbage cans, with people who deal with human beings. I hope we continue to hammer the fact that something is right, whether you like it or not.

Calvin:

Listen, now, for a second. There are ten thousand studies, there are hundreds of pieces of information that show why people behave as they do. It's because impulses go to the cephal region of the medial part of the cortex. Now, if you want to start talking about rights and wrongs, if we wanted to say: 'he's bad, the union is bad, black people are bad, there is bad, there is good there is right, there is wrong, there is . . .' As long as you get it on a moralistic plane, we'll never be able to help the kids because we won't set up an incentive system so that teachers and educators will do what's best for children. Nobody is accountable. There are no incentives because we keep saying 'it's right.' Now when you say, Rhody, that a superintendent of schools, or that a commissioner ought, or should, or must, or has the responsibility to, you could change superintendents in the State of New York for one hundred years, it wouldn't make any difference. And you could change superintendents of schools in New York City for as long, because the delivery system is the teacher and as long as that teacher has no incentive to do what you want her or him to do, you'll have a situation like the Post Office. You must have accountability, and you must have incentives because that's why people behave in the way they do. And I think that's a
Donovan: I don't think that has to do with Ocean Hill, and I hate to bring it in, but will you tell me, please, what incentive the teacher is going to have besides a $17,000 maximum salary, nine months of work, every medical, dental and health plan, and all the protection of the law that you practically . . .

Calvin: Boy, am I glad you came to that because that's the key to Ocean Hill. I'll tell you that's the key to Ocean Hill because they get that whether they teach or not! So that's not an incentive, and that's their attitude and that's why you see: 'you ought or you should' is what's wrong. And that's why as soon as you look at that you say: 'hey, that's right; they get all those things whether those kids learn or not,' then you get what you and I went to the Field Foundation for, what they are beginning to do in the US Office of Education and that, and that is as you say, that you'll get more when the kids learn more; you'll get less if they learn less, and you will get fired, if they don't learn at all, and that's the real message of Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

Ferretti: That's all very well and good, but it's impossible in New York City. You can't tell a teacher in New York City he'll be fired if he doesn't . . .

Calvin: You know, they told us the same thing about the State of Louisiana and the State of Indiana, but it didn't turn out to be impossible and . . . (everybody talking again) . . I hope we don't have to come to it either.

Swanker: Read what your contract says.

Calvin: But what I am saying to you is that . . .
Ferretti: You are talking about unreal things, you really are.

Calvin: Reality lies in the eyes of the perceiver! You can't say . . . (laughter) That's right! You can't say that it's unreal until you want to try it. And what I am saying to you is if you tinker with these other little things, tinker, tinker, tinker, you'll never get it until the teacher is reinforced and rewarded and gets an incentive when they do a decent job, and when they don't . . .

Donovan: ... a lot of tinkers.

McCoy: Let me just touch basis and back to specifics within this panel discussion for today. I asked that specific question about the principals and the teachers, the transfer of teachers, because I guess what I am saying is that if there had been some other kinds of inputs into that situation, perhaps then it would have become an obligatory responsibility of those people who were making the decisions. What I am saying is that whoever drew, the architect who drafted the concept of teachers because it was a demonstration district, had a right to transfer out; recognizing what the problem in the inner city is in terms of teachers. Anyway, in other words, the large turnover of teachers, the inexperience of teachers and so forth, if they had in fact conferred with community people on that issue before it took place, then perhaps you wouldn't reach the point of (1) being a conflict situation, and (2) putting a person out on a limb to have to defend a particular position which would fall in the realm of the "responsibility of the persons who make those decisions" in terms of providing options. In other words, I guess what I am saying is, how did the central Board, or you, Bernie, reach the kind of act, starting with the principals, the transfer of teachers, and other similar kinds of acts that were passed on to the community Board which elected principals?

Donovan: Well, I'll try to answer briefly since this is the last question, but it is a series of questions. One is that you know we had an agreement with you and your Board when the demonstrations first star-
ted, that teachers who did not wish to participate in them, could get out. That was an agreement we had. That any teacher who didn't want to work under those circumstances had a right to transfer. Some did, some waited a length of time, which was wrong, then they decided they wanted to leave. You know, they didn't make up their minds. The issue was never raised, nor agreed to, that the district could transfer out people it didn't want to stay. Now maybe it should have been raised, but it wasn't. That issue wasn't raised. It came up, you know, on May the nineteenth. On the principals, the Board of Education and I went with you, and allowed you to select principals. I even had to go to court and testify against the CSA and UPT about it to uphold that. So that there are three different acts there. One, the Board went along with you and said: 'all right, we'll let you pick your principals,' and we did, you nominated them, we appointed them, maybe it took a month, you know, these big institutions are slow. But as far as the teachers getting out, it was agreed that in all three districts that any teacher who didn't want to serve there could leave. But it was never agreed that any teacher who wanted to stay there, could be put out by the district. Now maybe that was bad. Because after all, when the time came and you saw some people you didn't think were functioning, maybe you should have had the right to move them. But you didn't at the time, so you took the step - you and the Board, whoever did - you thought you had to take. You want these people out. But that was never agreed on. That started the whole she-bang.

McCoy:

Well, Calvin, I think that our time has run out for today. I know you are going to thank the panel, and I'd like to thank the panel personally and would suggest that we are going to send correspondence to you within the next two or three days about the next panel, and if there are any feedback or inputs you want to put in, I would appreciate it.

Calvin:

I think one thing that we might try to do before the next meeting or even on the basis of this meeting is, maybe as we go along, we kind of keep in our own heads ways that we can see that
the Ocean Hill experience can be useful to other school systems. I think that's really the key because, as Esther and Bernie pointed out, there are acts and bills and plans, that would work in all kinds of districts. I don't know how it is going to work and I don't know how many are going to make real changes, and maybe if we can give some ideas to people we can be of real service. And I think that that's one of the key things to come out of here is to see if we can formulate some kind of plan, not a definitive plan, but rather some sort of options that we can use from the basis of what you gentlemen have experienced before.

McCoy:

It may be premature, Cal, but I look forward to this panel being superimposed on major school systems. I think we'd have all the answers.

END OF TAPES FROM PANEL TWO

December 7, 1970
TRANSCRIPT OF PANEL THREE

January 18, 1971

Automation House
New York City

Panelists

Dr. Allan Calvin (Moderator)
Dr. Kenneth B. Clark
Dr. Bernard E. Donovan
Dr. Mario Fantini
Mr. Fred Ferretti
Rev. Milton Galamison
Dr. Marilyn Gittell
Mr. Rhody A. McCoy
Rev. C. Herbert Oliver
Mrs. Esther Swanker
Calvin:

This is the third panel on critical issues and incidents in the New York City school crisis. I might set the stage a little bit for today’s format by saying that it’s going to be a bit different than what we’ve done to date. So far we’ve established a chronology of events. Now, we are going to really try and look at those events and see what the critical issues were and get suggestions from each of you as to what alternatives could have been advanced at that time that might have led to different outcomes. We will want you to state these in hypothesis form, and then we’re going to try and see if we can deduce data that will tend to support or contradict this hypothesis. Now this is going to be a really unusual thing in American education. I think everybody is aware of how many words have been written and how many things have been said about what happened at Ocean Hill-Brownsville, but we have in this room some of the outstanding educators in the country, and more than that, we have people who directly participated in the activities that went on in Ocean Hill. All around the country in the large urban school districts people are faced with the problems that were in microcosm in Ocean Hill, and what we want to look at today, and hope we can get from the assembled people around these two tables, is ideas, ways, means of making relevant change. What did we learn from Ocean Hill-Brownsville? Did we learn anything at all? Are there different things that could have been done in different junctures which we can now apply to the similar situations in Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Detroit, Gary - all kinds of school systems around the country. In other words, today, we are going to kind of ask you, each of you, to select one critical issue that you think was really important in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville situation, and then we would like you to put forth a hypothesis about an alternative, i.e. here is what did happen, if we would have done something else, namely this, something different would have happened, and then from around the table we’d like some evidence brought in, from Dr. Clark, from Dr. Donovan, from Rev. Oliver, and from everybody else about what they think of the hypothesis as put forward, because the whole purpose of this get-together is to see if we can find an example, a model, a prototype which will
be useful to all of the other school systems around the country who are struggling with related problems. Do you have any questions about - this is by the way, my one speech for today. Today I am just going to listen and see if I can elicit the kind of hypotheses and the kind of data that will be useful. This format make sense? Okay, let me just begin then by asking you, Dr. Donovan, what you think was the critical issue in the whole Ocean Hill situation, and then - after you pit the issue itself, and I've got some notes here that have been made about the conflict, participation, covert or overt issues, but really basically, what we're saying is what could have been done differently, and then later on we'll ask other people about what they think about what would have happened if it had been done differently.

Donovan: Well, I think one of the most important - in fact I think the most important issue at stake was, to put it in today's terms, accountability. By that I mean who is it that sets the policy for a school district and then determines whether that policy has been carried out. That's what I mean by accountability. And I think in the Ocean Hill matter, there was a fundamental issue of how close to the community should responsibility lie; what measure, what terms, what degree. That to me was the prime consideration. There are several others, but that stood out with me.

Calvin: I think what we'll do, and I think that's a very good way to begin, is take the issues first and then go around and ask for people's hypotheses about how it was actually set up, what could we have done differently in the accountability thing. And so, I think - does that make sense to you, Rhody, to first state the issues? That's a very good beginning. Dr. Donovan has suggested that the major issue, or one of the major issues, is accountability. Who should be accountable for educational control? I am going to slip Rhody at this point, because I think we really want to get everybody else's opinions about the issues rather than his and then he'll comment on them later on. Dr. Fantini, perhaps you would like to select and issue that you think is extremely im-
important in this kind of situation.

Fantini: As I understand it, we are not going to respond to this.

Calvin: No, we'll come back to him with hypotheses about specific things. Perhaps accountability was set up in such and such a way. You might have a suggestion later on about Dr. Donovan's issue, saying: 'now, if accountability would have been set up, then we would have gotten different results,' and then people will respond to that. I think first of all we'll just get one key issue from each person. And if you'll agree that his is the key issue, and really don't want to add anything else, we can just say: 'I feel as Dr. Donovan does that that's the key issue.'

Fantini: I think to me the key issue, one of the key issues has to do with identifying the parties, the publics, the groups, that tacitly had to reach in order to support any type of reform and the degree of education which has to precede any reform in order to support that. And one of the major problems here was that there was a loose alliance of, in terms of the parties of interest, it was limited and through real participation to be realized much more had to take place in terms of a process for informing, for involving greater numbers in the major parties, and the major parties there had to be the teachers, the parents, the students themselves and other community residents. Not enough may have been done.

Calvin: The issue, then, and that's another interesting one and obviously very different from the first is, who were the people and who were their constituencies and what were their particular interests and they weren't really identified clearly enough and so certain things were obscured because nobody knew what people were looking for in the particular situation. Okay, I think I have that pretty clear. I can't see down to the end, but I think Mr. Ferretti is next.

Ferretti: Well, I would like to expand a bit on Dr. Donovan's... in my narrow frame of reference of communications. I think that an issue, perhaps the most important issue, because so much had to
be communicated to the public in looking at this thing over a long period of time, was the responsibility for words and actions. For example, who spoke for whom? Was he responsible? Did he indeed, - now let me be more specific. Let me say, did Albert Shanker, for example, speak for all the teachers in the City? Was he held accountable for what he said? And who were the spokesmen for the community? Were they indeed spokesmen for the community? Were they accessible? I think that's an issue.

Calvin: I think what - to restate that, that's another interesting point - is from the media's point of view, various people spoke for various groups. Did they really speak for them? How can the media decide to delineate who speaks for whom: and perhaps the issues were clouded by spokesmen appearing to really represent groups of people and in fact they didn't. We might talk about ways of clarifying that later on. I think the next gentleman is Rev. Galamison. Perhaps you would now like to give us what you think was one of the key issues.

Galamison: Well, I would suggest that one of the key issues was that Ocean Hill was a demonstration project that was never permitted to be a demonstration project. That is, in its effort to pioneer and demonstrate, Ocean Hill ran head-long into structures, and obstacles, and guidelines, and entrenched interests which would not permit the kinds of adventure that Ocean Hill was designed to make, and that many of the ensuing problems were a result of this kind of frustration.

Calvin: In other words what we are saying, and certainly we can see this all over the country, is that people who are going in to do innovative things very often find that the very nature of the structure of the organizations in which they are trying to innovate make these innovative attempts impossible to actually bring about.

Galamison: May I cite a case in point, which is worth telling. We've been funded, for example, to do a demonstration project by the Health, Education, and Welfare Department in narcotics working with
teenage girls. But already we have run headlong into the Department of Social Services, the State Department's Social Services, and the City Department of Social Services whose guidelines are so rigid and so restrictive that if we adhere to their guidelines it will be impossible to carry out the kind of innovative project that we were initially funded for.

Calvin: It will be very interesting to see Dr. Donovan's reaction to this point and some other people's later on, because this is a very difficult point and obviously one which should bring about some very interesting discussion about what can be done by the people in control of the structure to make such things possible, or perhaps they really were done. I think the next gentleman is Rev. Oliver. What issue do you see as a primary one?

Oliver: One issue that I feel is very important is how can people exercise a meaningful role in the life of institutions around them, institutions that influence their lives, their future, their destiny. I do believe that what's happened in Ocean Hill-Brownsville was basically an attempt of people to get into the system, so to speak, and at least have a meaningful say in the schools; if not, at least the power to exercise a meaningful role, how can people at least be made to feel that they have a meaningful role and they really don't have it. But that's a positive thing.

Calvin: I think that that's a point that is easily recognizable not only in Ocean Hill but in all the other programs, such as Model Cities, that have been set up and I think that should bring around some very interesting commentary also. Dr. Gittel, what do you think from your vantage point is the key issue?

Gittel: Well, it kind of disturbs me to talk about key issues, frankly, because I don't know whether we are talking about individual strategies, or talking about the fundamental questions. So I am going to go to them. I think one of the real problems in this whole controversy was the lack of recognition or acceptance of the fact that you were not only dealing with an educational
reform or a change, but that what you were dealing with was a fundamental political question, and, of course, there is the distribution of power within the system. And I think that's - I have to go to where Mario was in terms of the lack of recognition on the part of both parties and their actions or strategies coming out of a non-political awareness or a lack of acceptance of the fact that they were dealing with a fundamentally political question; so that on the part of some of the people in Brownsville or the so-called movement for community control, I think there was a lack of perception about the realities of the political structure in New York City and in New York State and a failure to use that structure to their own advantage, presuming they could. I have serious questions as to whether or not in the long run that could be done, but it certainly was not used, or they did not try to use it. It was more a question of kind of rejecting the political system entirely. I think there were individual participants who may have touched, certain levers or played with certain handles, but never really fully effectively. I can recall, even in terms of the legislative action that there was almost no participation on the part of people in New York City who purportedly supported community control or decentralization up in Albany. I mean there was complete disavowal of the whole Albany political arena which I happen to think was instrumental in all of this, and that certain coalitions might have been made. I think up until the time - well, maybe three months after the implementation of the experiment, there were many people on the Board, or at Livingston Street who themselves did not perceive this as fundamentally political. That the union was playing on a political issue nationwide with certain implications for white-collar unions, for Al Shanker's leadership in the national union picture; all of these were parts of the game. As social scientists like to think that the way to make decisions is to lay down all of the evidence and the consequences of your actions and then move on them. That's, you know, a little optimistic, however, I don't think that was done almost at all on either side. So everybody was operating out of a kind of ad-hoc situa-
tion and without full recognition of the total picture. I am not sure, however, even in recognition of all this evidence and the attempts to use strategies which fit into the evidence, that the results would have been majorly different, frankly. And I think we were dealing with such fundamental social forces, and I think the evidence is clear that in cities like Detroit, Los Angeles, and even Portland the same kinds of conflicts, basic conflicts of social forces, are occurring. The kind Rev. Oliver is talking about in terms of if people challenge the system, which is really what you're saying so that they can get a piece of the action, isn't the roof going to cave in no matter what happens? I think we have to deal with that fundamentally.

Calvin: I think if nothing else comes out, if we can - in all of these, and then I'll get to Dr. Clark's comments, if we can begin to formulate something so that at the beginning, citizen's groups or educational groups, or political groups can be aware of these problems - and this is certainly a vital one which was absolutely overlooked, having been involved I would certainly agree with that - and then we'll call their attention to the need to focus on this initially, and I am not quite as pessimistic as Dr. Gitellis. I think that perhaps if that's done, maybe it would make a difference. Dr. Clark, what do you see from your vantage point as one of the key issues?

Clark: I think one of the key issues is the extent to which the Ocean Hill-Brownsville situation demonstrated that one cannot understand such an important social problem in terms of isolated issues. The key issue to me is the interrelatedness of a variety of issues which did not become clear until the problems and conflicts emerged. One started out with the problem, the situation as if one were dealing with an educational problem. And it soon became clear that one cannot deal with an educational problem in our complex society as if one could deal with an educational problem in isolation, that the attempts to deal with educational reforms soon elicited a variety of conflict power of problems which were not primarily issues concerned with education. In fact, what soon emer-
ged was that despite the fact that we thought we were talking about schools - Bernie mentioned the schools - it became clear that we were involved immediately in an awareness which came to varying individuals, the different individuals in various ranges of time which may have been said earlier, but the awareness that reform of any institution in our society brings with it conflict. I mean the essence of a conflict is that you cannot have reforms without, again, I'm rather serious, genuine reform, without redistribution of power. And you are not going to get redistribution of power without conflict because the conflict reflects the attempt and the understandable attempt on the parts of those with the power without regard to how they use the power. Whether they were using the power to educate children or not, that became clearly secondary; that people with power do not respond positively to their power being challenged, and they tend to resist challenges to their power and to use whatever methods are available to resist power challenges. And the thing that fascinated me about Ocean Hill-Brownsville was the quickness with which the educational issues became subordinated to such realistic power issues as the desire on the part of individuals in the educational system to maintain their control over a deeper following; the area of their expenditure of energy, how much energy they were going to expend for a return of this, their protection of a representing process which had been built into educational systems under a variety of hearings or assumptions, the extent to which other groups involved in this institution and in other institutions in our society maintain control over money, funds. This is a very important issue by the way, but it never really emerged except in Albany - behind the scenes. But a very important and probably the most important resistance to meaningful decentralization was, interestingly enough, not coming primarily from the teachers or the ..., but from other unions who were significantly threatened by any change in structure which would threaten their control over the allocation of funds, and of course the obvious power problem was that of race and status in the institutional control. As I've looked back on this issue, I
thought it was the issue that was used most effectively, and disguised even more powerful issues in the area of the interrelatedness of power problems when any threats for its existing power relationships of arrangements were made. And, by the way, I think this would be true no matter where the threats come from - whether they came from the community or whether it comes from the State Education Department because they are more sophisticated in the unstated awareness that you don't really shake off a power arrangement without inducing or eliciting inevitable conflict and tension. So they are more sophisticated dimensions of our society, such as legislators or officials and what not, seek to insinuate themselves into the power arrangement rather than to confront it. And to me, the issue with Ocean Hill-Brownsville was the extent to which a community group, not being previously a part of a power structure, sought redistribution in the power arrangement in ways that could only lead to conflict because they were not sophisticated enough to seek to insinuate and to become a part of and to make contractual agreements in this way which I . . . operate.

I think that the key issue here which I'll try and sum up although they are interrelated is that in a school situation like Ocean Hill-Brownsville, this is a dynamic process, and that very often the parents or the people who speak for the parents or purport to, are not aware of all of the subtle of financial and other things of the problems that interact. Perhaps if they were made aware of them, they would take this into account instead of focusing just on educational problems, and there might be then other strategies and options that would make possible educational change. And I think we can see this thread running through all of the comments that were made. Esther, you came in a little bit late. What we are trying to do is elicit from everybody a prime issue that people around the two tables think was really important in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and then we're just going to take an issue and see if somebody has a particular strategy that they think would help other communities going through this problem and offer that as a hypothesis. And then
various other people will, we hope, comment and bring data to bear on whether this indeed would have been a meaningful option and had it been taken, would things have changed? In other words, we are trying to learn from the Ocean Hill-Brownsville and make things . . . and so, if you have a particular issue - maybe it was covered already, or maybe you just want to advance one as everybody else did.

Gittell: I'd like to follow through on something. I am not, really, I'm too unstructured, but I think we need a little bit of flexibility and in following through on, I think, a number of us have indicated that we think there wasn't a political awareness. I think what Ken said relates to that as well; that it immediately became a political issue yet, I am certainly interested and I think it's relevant to this, as to whether the people who created this district in the first place from above, maybe Bernie, maybe Mario, and Rhody, and Rev. Oliver can talk to this point, whether they - when they worked out the details of this arrangement, or from their immediate role in it, sense that this was going to be a very political issue as well as educational issue, that it would be as volatile as it became. Perhaps you couldn't predict that, but to what degree was there an awareness that this really dealt with a question of redistribution of power?

Calvin: What I'd like to do is, if you could state that in the form of an alternative, or testable hypothesis.

Donovan: What difference does it make how it's stated?

Calvin: Well, it makes a difference, it does make a difference in the following words. Yeah, let me see if I can tell you why. One of the things that we hope will evolve from this is not simply an historical review of what occurred, but rather hypotheses that can actually be extrapolated to other situations. If we don't get it into that format, then people who don't have the background and experience and insight that people on this table have, will not find it useful. And I think that, at least, if Rhody wants to change the ground rules, that's fine, but he asked me at the beginning if
we could keep it in this kind of structure, and I guess I have to look to him for guidance rather than make any kind of judgement myself. Do you want to just go . . .

Gittell:

I don't think there is a . . . I mean, I think if we can deal with this question now and then at the end of the discussion of it; it seems to me I don't form hypotheses until I know a little more information. Then we can say, based on the discussion that one can hypothesize that had people been more aware of the political circumstances, X, Y, and Z might happen. But I do mean until we talk about this a little bit, it's kind of crazy. I am not willing, I mean it's not going to make any difference to me if you want to say: 'the hypothesis is that presuming there was greater awareness and sensitivity to the political issues, other strategies might have been used or might not have been used and the end result would have been different,' except I think there's a lot more that goes into that. The union was to me as a hypothesis at this point.

Clark:

I question this, because I just didn't feel there is anything to be gained by framing this into a particular thing, even if the richness or whatever we have to say, because . . .

McCoy:

All I suggest is, let's don't lose sight of what we are trying to accomplish, and I think we do need a background for any kind of response, but couched in that understanding of different kinds of alternatives. Let me follow your question, Marilyn, just a simple statement to that. I think that there were some political awareness from our end. Let's put it that way . .

Gittell:

How early?

McCoy:

I am trying to say it this way. The problem I see is it could only be to the extent that we had been involved, or - I don't mean just involved in education, but the extent in which we have been involved in education, period. In other words, at the very beginning, I think we were cognizant of the fact that there were rules and regulations related to - let's say the assignment of principals - civil service, the City examination, and so forth. And
we were conscious of that, we were conscious of the political overtones of it, but only to the extent that we had had exposure and experience to it.

Galamison: May I throw something in here because Ken's remarks stimulated a comment here that I think ought to be made and I would put it this way for future generations. That one of the serious problems in this whole adventure was that the people who ostensibly supported it and under Rhody were not prepared to deal with the political consequences apparently. That if Ocean Hill were not prepared to deal with what ensued politically, certainly other people were not, too. It's like the "mission impossible" thing, you know where they send the guy off to do something and then they say if you get into trouble, we'll disown you. And I think that beginning with the Mayor, who supported decentralization and the whole - the Bundy Committee, the Ford Foundation, and all manner of other people who committed themselves verbally to decentralization or community control were not prepared for the kind of repercussions which ensued, and did not give the proper support nor did they deal with it in various ways and areas where it ought to have been done forthrightly. Let me cite one other and current illustration which is not quite the same, but which indicates how blindly we loose sometimes. I just cite the off-track betting adventure, which can't get off the ground because apparently the people who designed the off-track betting adventure didn't reckon with the union people at Yonkers race track or other race tracks, who will now not let it move. And it just seems to me that somebody in political life particularly, or people who want to form somebody ought to be sagacious enough and astute enough to foresee some of these things, because it happens in every instance where we try to move something.

Ferretti: If I can make one comment. I thought that the Bundy report, I thought, as I read it, took note of all these political things. However, when the crunch came, Mayor Lindsay was absent. I think the entire episode created a great many political cowards.

Fantini: Well, if I may ... dynamics of an ever expanding
cycle of forces, that was triggered, which started out as a really an educational issue . . . (mumbled) . . . and it very, very swiftly became political, economic, racial, religious and many other; that the parties that converged and the manifestation of force and power on the institutions, it just became confusing even to the most - so-called most - sophisticated participants in the arena. They said, well, you know, this is all we expected out it was really an educational effort, recognized that there were problems in urban education and this was going to be one of the alternatives. But as soon as it broke open, then I think that the people just backed away. And this gets back and I think there is a fundamental irony in what both Dr. Gittel and Dr. Clark were saying, if I understood them, because this is all related, that is, if intensive series were formed, are almost always, if not always accompanied by a major conflict because of redistribution of power and the responsibility of authority . . . then the notion here was that what is it if power and the redistribution is essential to reform, and if those in control will negotiate only to the extent that they'd only like to state control, then we have a situation in which real reform is never possible without conflict of major proportions, and if Ocean Hill were a microcosm which it I think made us all aware of, convergently speaking, what difference now would it make if communities have wed time, that is, take another district, that is, did Ocean Hill occur at a time of crisis in the development of New York City? In other words, you have to view it in terms of fact that they were. The front page of the New York Times carried 201 and all of the symptoms of a stage of decline which hadn't, which I think had to receive a response from local people, and especially politicians were aware they had to do something in order to maintain, even if they maintained their own power, they had to at least communicate, or given the indication of certain types of reforms were taking place. That's not what happened and we saw very quickly on the floor before us what will happen now. Is real reform possible given the configuration of relationships, power in . . . at this time in the United States, especially as far as education is concerned. Is it possible? Because if you look at the history of reformists,
it's systematically one by one they have been defeated and dissipated in such a way that they have been rendered ineffective. And the only one that I can count on as saying this is reform is still convenient is one who is not challenging the power but rather - adding on to power, such as compensatory education. So that the real question I am raising is thus, that the Ocean Hill fellows that you really can't achieve reform in a kind of transitional smooth way at a time when in education is already for many of the children at least the stage where it is life and death.

Clark:

I think, Mario, that you certainly have focused our questions and I don't think there is a simple answer to that. I think that one of the things that we ought to look at in terms of trying to understand more clearly what happened in Ocean Hill-Brownsville as to the important issues, is that the answers to the questions you were focusing on vary according to who is trying to give those answers. For example, if one looks at the kinds of answers that the moderate, liberal, intellectual sought to give during the Ocean Hill-Brownsville ..., you see that their answers were similar in this particular instance that they give for the whole approach to the problems of injustice and inequity in American society, mainly that if you manage it; well, you know, if you are thoughtful, if you are reasonable and rational and sit around the table with the parties that interest you, you will be able to come out with a rational approach in the program for institutional reforms and that this will make everyone happy and convenient, that there is such a thing as, I mean that there is (such a thing as) the educated, liberal, moderate, continues to believe that there is such a thing as reform and modestation from inequity to equity that can be powerful and convenient to all of the parties involved. And those individuals looked upon Ocean Hill-Brownsville as a disturbing, unnecessary violation of this which could happen. And if only Rev. Oliver were a more reasonable person, if only Rhody McCoy were a little less intransigent, if only Al Shanker were not given to striking overstatements, then Bernie Donovan, Jim Allen, Ken Clark would have the world the way we would like it - you know, we like a manageable, soft-spoken world in which decisions are made intelligently and rationally and with some regard to equity.
That's one answer, and those of us who took that answer didn't want to have anything to do with Rhody McCoy, or Oliver, or Shanker, as long as they were shocking. You know, they said they made our job difficult, if not impossible; they post-phoned the nirvana of rationalism of social problems. Another answer can be given by revolutionaries who unfortunately have become more popular since the heyday of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and they say: 'the hell with the system if you can't get any reform in the system' and certainly the least likely way to get it is by irrational negotiations, problem-solving approach. They say 'break it up,' but they tempt us, but they scare us. The thing that scares me most about them is that they might be right. Then there are some of us who try to combine these two by being psychologists or systems analysts, or something. You say: 'all right, what is the optimum balance between disruption, confrontation, non-rational ways of seeking equity on one hand and the rational?'

How can we really academically portray . . . or . . .

My problem is that I don't know. I don't know and if we went to get the evidence - I don't know that there really is any evidence to support the rational, liberal case in the use of reason approach. And people who believe this have to believe it. I don't know, and technically, there is no evidence for the romantic revolutionary approach because nobody has yet succeeded in destroying the establishment. Nor do I know of anyone who has really succeeded in destroying an institution, including colleges which everybody said that it's going to be destroyed; they haven't been destroyed, they are probably stronger now. And I don't know that we have any evidence to support or even point to the optimum balance between these two seemingly conflicting positions. What we do know is that whenever anyone gets really serious about bringing an institution or any important operation in our society closer to justice, they've never got there with everybody being comfortable, and even if he makes people uncomfortable, that doesn't necessarily mean that he is going to do it. And I don't know whether this is a hypothesis or . . .

Calvin:

I tell you what it is. What happened is when you take, let me say something from an outsider's standpoint, because I am an outsider. I don't
come from the same environment, the same union, the same kinds of problems involved, same approach. But I'll be blessed if I can see this group of people today before Ocean Hill-Brownsville community sitting around the table and having this conversation and not having one iota of effect on the events that took place. And I tell you why: Because they are not couched and that's why I want to see what happened, and that's why I wouldn't accept these things in terms of hypotheses that our attempts do make a difference. That's why we insist on this and other kinds of situations I don't see that these are couched in ... terms. I don't see that they have antecedents in consequences, I don't see that they have probabilistic features involved in them, and therefore, I think that there is an exchange of information and that really doesn't read. Around this table we've got some of the best minds in the country. People who have had more experience in urban education and got more than almost anybody else. Now, if we can get out of that six, eight, ten things, concrete things that can be done, then I think that we'll really have accomplished something, because you people know more than anybody. But, what I am afraid of, is that instead we are going to have basically general statements and that really doesn't add much to the community leaders in Portland, or the Superintendent in L.A., or the union leader in Washington, D.C., and I guess that might.

Gittell: I think we don't want to accept what we hear, frankly ... I mean, I think - you want us to say how it can be done, in what Ken has said and what the rest of us are saying that without conflict, without maybe revolution, it's not going to happen. Now that is a, I think, a very substantial hypothesis.

Calvin: Stating a hypothesis that without revolution, you cannot have change in a structure, and then you can have the evidence both for and against that, we can put it in some terms, get some data that would support ... 

Clark: I must confess, I really don't understand you.

Calvin: The reason, I think, that you don't understand me and we might talk about that, and then I'll just
get back and maybe people can give it a thought, is that I am trying to couch this in terms that are meaningful for action in both the corporate sense, political sense, and in the physical-scientific sense. And now that may not make sense to the program we're having, and I am certainly willing to back to the format that we had, and if it's useful, let's by all means continue in the general . . .

Clark: Let me inflict a fair interpretation for reasoning what I hear you saying. All you're saying is that there are things which the people around these tables can say here that will make the job of the superintendent in L.A. easier on the basis of what we've said here.

Calvin: No, rather that some ideas will be advanced that he can test, which he can find out whether these ideas have merit or don't have merit for community leaders.

Clark: And having merit or not having merit in terms of what?

Calvin: In terms of the empirical consequence.

Clark: And what happens to the kids?

Calvin: And what happens to the kids, or the teachers, or the parents, or whatever that you are interested in talking about, or all three. That's really what I am saying.

Galamison: If we are trying to arrive at some clue here in recommendation about revolution and we're going to have to qualify revolution. For example, I don't know whether Dr. Calvin would feel that a revolution necessarily involves violence or not, or whether there are other ways, non-violent ways, to wage a revolution. But I think, Dr. Calvin, that in theory, if some of the criticism and observations or suggestions and some of these hypotheses can be drawn, I would be happy to attempt to do it later on today, or anyone at the table would, but I think what the argument here is for a freer discussion. Well, that just has to be couched in some kind of . . .
Calvin: Let me turn then, Rev. Galamison, to a free discussion. I just know that when there is a free discussion that three or four people are discussing, three or four people listen.

Donovan: No, I just want to have a chance to have something to say, but I first wanted to listen to the philosophy behind it. I'd like to go back to Dr. Gittell's first question, and a lot of what's been said here I don't think there is any fundamental disagreement with that. These things are always distasteful to the power structure, that they are going to lose their power, that I don't know anything has been done as a teacher's history two for years it hasn't been done, but some form of violence, it may not have been physical violence, but there was some violence to it one way or the other. What I am concerned about is your question about what happened at the beginning of Ocean Hill. Was anybody politically aware of the ramifications? My answer to that will have to be limited, very limited, because I think from our side of the Board of Education, and myself, and so forth - there were some ways. I don't think we looked upon it as a totally educational problem, although there was the educational manifestation of a problem, and yet we're almost Monday morning quarter-backing because unfortunately in all these things there's never the time for anybody to sit down and say: 'now, let's think through what's going to happen out there,' we have panel sessions and then decide what to things break too fast; that's unfortunate, that's not an excuse, it's just a statement of fact and they are going to break, they break fast in Detroit, Los Angeles, every place else. And I don't think we can sit here, and even after the next panel discussions, set out a panacea for the new superintendent in Los Angeles, either. I just don't think we can. We can, though, point out a few things. For example, in that political structure, nobody was listening, everybody was talking. Nobody listened - on either side - to the ones who were talking to them. They were all thinking either we are going to get the power in the community or the Board, and if we are not going to get it we are going to hold it, or the law doesn't permit, or I can't let this man do that because that subordinates everything. Everybody was thinking, but not truly listening to the other
side. That, I think, stems from a long period of the inability of any institution to get people to know it, to understand it, to be a part of it. I don't know any institution in this country of which the people are a real part. I only know them as institutions of leaders' run, and the leaders vary from time to time. That even applies itself to the Church where you would think people would be more a part than any place else, a very personal thing. And yet, they are not all a part of it as they should be. So that when it came to political realities - I am not going to talk too long or write a paper on it, but I don't think there was a total political awareness on anybody's part, not even on the part of the people theoretically sophisticated enough to think about those things ahead of time. I say theoretically - there wasn't, there wasn't the time, there wasn't the ability to talk about it, and it wasn't just that clear cut, it wasn't an issue you could put under a microscope and pick out the three germs that caused it, because there are more than that in it.

Galamison:

I would like to throw out an hypothesis, ill-conceived perhaps, on the basis of the discussion so far, and it would be this, Dr. Calvin: that it is impossible to computerize the events which will take place as the result of a reform effort. Now this does not mean that the possibility should not be considered. You know, don't misunderstand me. I think people should sit around the table when it is possible and try to speculate in every area about what the consequences might be. But I would argue that the forces of life was such and the forces of society was such that it is impossible to guideline and computerize all the consequences of an effort at social reform. I am a believer in the serendipities of life. I think if we all sat around this table and drew up the best possible plan for the achievement of almost anything, that almost nothing in that plan would come out as we had conceived it sitting around the table. This is what makes social science such a difficult discipline, because things do not work out when we are working with people as we've preconceived them on paper. So if I were to advise a school superintendent in Los Angeles or anybody who was begetting to try to do anything, I would say your best bet is to assume that anything can happen,
and nothing is going to happen the way you planned it.

Gittell: Can I defend the social sciences?

Calvin: Please do. Now, I think that's - once we can state that that way, I am interested in what Dr. Gittel, Dr. Clark, Dr. Fantini, Dr. Donovan and other people have to say.

Gittell: I am going to respond to Milton, but I want to pursue what Dr. Donovan has said because I think there are some unanswered questions, at least to me, on that. I am only going to argue with Milton in terms of the fact that I think you can go a long way to understanding who might be the participants, for one. I mean that's clear that there are certain people who are more interested in educational policy and you are going to attract certain kinds of participants, as distinguished with, let's say, from health policy, or other areas of public policy. And I think you can outline of where communities, what the lay of lands might be. You can even go further than that. I think on the basis of experience that in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and in other cities now, you can pretty much outline what the coalitions might be. You might not be able to predict some individual participants, let's say Ford Foundation, for one, which was the major participant in New York City, but will probably not be in Los Angeles because - just for the fact that they were in New York City, so they are laying low. I can remember that when people from Detroit called me and Mario and I went out there, we did just this. We sat before the Board of Education and tried to describe or predict exactly what we thought would happen in Detroit, and I can remember also that a lot of them put down some of the things we said about the union's role, about the professionals' role, and so on, which actually we predicted quite accurately on our part in Detroit. I just came back myself from Los Angeles and went through the same business with various people asking me what could this legislative committee do to get their legislation through this year, and they were dealing with the new superintendent and the Board which was going to come up with a plan, which followed a very similar pattern, Milton, to what
was happening in Detroit, as a matter of fact; not so much to New York. And I think you can set up what the battlefield might be, and I happen to agree with Ken that it is a battlefield. I don't think that the compromise model which I really think social scientists imposed upon everybody, in that way of thinking, that you could sit down and figure out a solution was a part of all our thinking, and it is a part of all our thinking even if we don't admit to it, and I think that came from the compromise model which prevails in the social sciences. I mean we are really beginning to just accept somewhat more the conflict model which brings me back to the appropriate point for my question to Dr. Donovan, and that is: We know historically that the 201 controversy was at the heel for the creation for those three experimental districts. It has always appeared to me that that was part of the compromise model that in your thinking and anyone else who was involved in that, the feeling was that if you gave these people something, some kind of compromise, that is their own local school board or whatever, that you could put your hand on that kind of controversy which was emerging at that time; that this would be a kind of solution to the problem which was developing. I am just curious to know if this was at all thought about. What was the reasoning behind the creation of the experimental districts on the part of the Board of Education and the superintendent at that time?

Donovan: I'd like to answer part, and I'd like Mrs. Swanker to answer part, because we happened to work together on that at the time. 201 was a special problem which kind of blew up at one point because the Board and I didn't agree on whether they ought to get some of the powers they thought they should have. But actually what took place was that the Board of Education itself had proposed some administrative decentralization, not the kind of decentralization Ocean Hill was talking about, but administrative decentralization. And at the time, Mrs. Swanker and I and with Mario and some of the people who were in Ocean Hill had some meetings and out of that came some suggestions which as Superintendent, I took to the Board. I'd like her to describe if she would, how we did that, then I think of what happened when we got to the
Board, because this is what you are asking about. How did they come about? What was behind them? It was not, may I say, 'here is something that if you'll accept this as a partial plan that'll quiet everything all around.' That was not in my thinking, nor do I think it was in Mrs. Swanker's. Maybe you'd like to...

Swanker: Definitely not. Well, my role, as you know somewhat, was different in it because I was outside the event. In other words, I was not actually an interested party, and therefore could make suggestions kind of as an observer, and just as kind of see what was happening in certain things were put into position. So I think that there is a little bit of this in my thinking, and the document that Bernie and I drafted and it was, following some discussions with Mario at the Ford Foundation, but I am trying to recall in my own mind the exact chronology of that. It seems to me that the serious discussions with Mario took place following our draft of that document, and actually, Bernie and I kind of sat down with him and brainstormed the kinds of decentralization or the kinds of demonstration projects that we felt should be proposed. We, I personally didn't think they had a snowball's chance with that Board of Education. I really was being kind of an imp in suggesting some because I honestly didn't think the Board would adopt them, but that, let's just see what'll happen if we propose these and we can do one of two things. You can either bring them to this Board, hoping that they'll see the light and adopt them, or we can run one which was actually what we did. We took it to the Board and said: 'here they are,' and outside of Mr. Ciardino, who I think actually did do some studying - he knew a little bit about what was going on - the rest of the Board passed it on his recommendation and they really didn't know until July what they were into.

Gittell: Why do you think the Board would not accept it? Or, why do you think the Board would not accept any?

Swanker: Given the composition of that Board and their political backgrounds...
Gittell: I would like to ask you, I'd like to have your interpretation of that clearly. Because they would lose power by it, or because they were racist?

Swanker: I don't think they were at that point. I don't think that the race issue as such, entered their minds, I mean, I don't think they thought of it consciously that way. I think perhaps in the back of some of their thinking was: 'we got to keep this a predominately white power structure.' That may have been in back of this. I don't know because I didn't work this closely with that Board as I did with the subsequent Board. But given the composition of that Board and their political backgrounds, it was fairly clear to me that they would never adopt willingly and knowingly the kinds of proposals that we were putting before them. It seemed to me that our strategy had to be one of two things: either as I said, education and hope that they would adopt part of it, or just try to run it. I think our strategy kind of evolved by accident in a way which we ran it, instead of educating... merely because the events pushed us into that.

Gittell: Why didn't they accept it?

Donovan: I'll tell you why they wouldn't accept it. I think in my - I agree with what Esther said - but the Board was concerned very much with the formalities of education, which was obeying the law. There was nothing in the law of this state that gave them the right to hand away their responsibilities - they said. And we were proposing with the demonstration district, which would have in it principals not taken off the list, a lot of flexibility and they weren't sure they wanted to go that far. They were worried about it, because some of it had to get approval from the Commissioner in extra legal kind of fashion which we got for the principalships, for example. So that we proposed this, it just happened they asked the Superintendent to draw up some recommendations, so we drew them, and in there, we threw these demonstration districts, which kind of upset them, and I recall a few meetings where there was quite a lot of furor about 'what did you put this in there for; we didn't ask you to put any demonstra-
tion districts in.' Well, the answer was, 'look, you want to try decentralization or don't you want to try it? Do you want to have some models for how it could operate around the city?' I don't think at that time - I know I didn't; I don't know what Esther did - I didn't really foresee an Ocean Hill furor, like we had. I saw an Ocean Hill not satisfied, wanting more.

Clark: Bernie, perceiving as accurately as given, Esther says the resistance on the part of the Board. Did you take into account that some of that resistance might also be their sensitivity to the fact that there was a Council of Supervisory Association, there was the UFT, and that they will probably be more responsive to these - as it turned out very important power confrontations that they had to be sensitive to.

Donovan: That original Board was not that concerned because the CSA had just about started to form and had no authority at that time at all. The UFT was there, was in a strong bargaining position - that might have had, the UFT might have had some effect, but . . .

Swanker: . . . just one or two members, but I don't think it had . . .

Donovan: Garrison, for example, would be responsible . . . the rest of them weren't so bad. I really think they were thinking about the legalities; we can't give away, we were appointed to watch the public funds and we're - you know, that kind of thing I am assuming was what was making them buck it.

Clark: But in a sense, they were - if you look at that Board and maybe just as this Board - they were representative, consciously or not, of particular kinds of interest in the community, and would certainly be more responsive to those interests, mainly to the newly emerging . . .

Swanker: Except that I don't think the issues were as clearly drawn at that stage. In other words, there had been no legal per conflict at the time that these proposals were presented to them, and I don't think - with the possibility of Mr. Yushevits - I doubt that any of them really thought - maybe Mrs. Shapiro - in terms of a
Clark: I'd like to run the rest of the panel to formulating a vague hypothesis, that in the initial stages of problems of this sort, maybe the decision makers are not responding with high focus and high clarity to the variety of interest groups that are in some way related to the eventual decisions; that the importance of who are the decision makers may very well be determined in these initial stages in terms of their subliminal sensitivity to the various interest groups and particularly their sensitivity to those interest groups with which they are relatively identifying. It is only when we get to a really overt level of conflict, you get what has now come to be called polarization, or you know, high focus of the groups with which the decision makers will identify and the groups with which they will not identify. But in the early stages of this, it is normal; it's democratic, you know, it may even be presented in terms of the highest example of public responsibility.

Gittell: I would say that that certainly doesn't happen after an Ocean Hill-Brownsville, but there isn't a city in the country in which a Board wouldn't react that way, because they are already sensitized by their experience.

Donovan: The antagonism of the Board at the time continued, even after their reluctant adoption of the demonstrations, because it was right after they had adopted it - and that was something like April, or something, in the year - was right after that Ocean Hill and a few other places came to the Ford people and said: 'we hear they got a demonstration, we've been working to get groups together, we'd like to be the ones to try it.' That's when we began to talk with Mario and picked two or three places, went back to the Board and said: 'here are two or three places,' and that's when they began to get a little bit - what shall I say - a little frightened about the proposal.
Fantini: May I just add to this because the Ford Foundation is involved. I said that in the early days, the whole history of Ocean Hill and the other demonstrations might have been different if the union had taken a different stand in these demonstrations, and in the early days, the union did negotiate, did participate with the IS 201 group which had emerged, and the Ocean Hill groups, and that at a certain time, had the interests of the UFT been taken into account, then the whole history would have been different. I would say that at least from my point of view, if there had been an alliance of sorts, there had been negotiations worked out between the UFT as the major political and educational course and the negotiating groups to the community; now had that preceded, I think the whole history would have been different, but in this case where it broke down, the issue was that the expectation of UFT that in return for this alliance they would receive a More Effective School program which they identified with for a variety of reasons. So there was a dollar sign to this. And that the negotiating group of the Governing Board that emerged would have teacher participation in decision-making; now, so that when the ... occurred, the UFT, the leaderships of the UFT, supported these experiments; they would have supported it in a different fashion if part of this proposal was the underwriting of a program which the UFT thought highly of, and that's the More Effective School, and when that part of it was taken out, then you see the leadership had, they had to go back to the rank and file to explain, had very little in the way of what is in it for the teachers. And I remember the clearing a couple of meetings where the UFT representatives asked Dr. Donovan and me if whether there would be any —whether we'd support the more effective school program, and we both had to say that we couldn't do it, and then the interest terms just began to decline and what was an uneasy alliance to begin with, deteriorated. But the whole history of Ocean Hill and what I think is one of the major lessons is that you really can't bargain any type of participation, any participation, without involvement of the teachers, especially teachers, but other professional groups because you would have built-in conflict situations. But, the other hypothesis, if there is a hypothesis, gets back to Marilyn, and since we are rushed for
Gittell: Why, I think any - I mean these two are not mutually exclusive. You can have a conflict model out of which comes a compromise model.

Fantini: There was a compromise model, but that became...

Gittell: I must argue with you on that, Mario. I think 201 - it's clear that the union had taken a position on the appointment of that principal, and may have made a break on that point when they went against the appointment of the community appointing principal. I don't think the union breaks on any of that; on MES is the change point of this, because they had already come into conflict with the community group at 201 on the appointment of the principal. I think that's very important and then maybe goes back in saying to take into account the evidence when the union had switched its position from, let's say, abolishing the Board of Examiners and taking no stand on what they called "management" appointments which would be principals, too, now being that the big defender then you can see turn in issues starting with the 201 incident of recognizing that their lot was with the professionals in that they had to defend the CSA and, Bernie, I want to go back to what you were saying that the Board did not, the CSA was the string and had already put through the ratio formula in the State legislature over the head of, I mean, on the objection of Robert Wagner, and of the Board of Education, so they were strong enough to act in the legislature and I can recall when I did participate... interviewing Board members who were very sensitive, overly sensitive, to the associate and assistant Superintendents at 110 who they felt ruled the system and that they had no leverage on this thing. They were scared to death of these people.

Donovan: We are talking about two different things, I am sorry. The assistant superintendency and associa-
Clark:

It's true, but in support of Marilyn's point and trying to refresh your memory, do you remember that time when Harris, who was chairman of the Board and the few of us, including John Fisher, and, I think, Rabbi Kahn, and I came down and thought that we were going to be talking to the Board about our ideas of how one could deal rationally with the decentralization problem. That was before Mr. Brown, who was . . . . , it was IS 201, really, and you remember at that time the Board, without our knowledge, invited representatives of the CSA and the UFT, and they took over the role of - what I call - imposition. Remember, I started to walk out. I thought I was coming to talk with the Board and didn't think I was coming to be subjected to the degree by CSA and UFT people. Do you remember?

Donovan:

I think maybe all we are talking about here is the terminology. The Board was calling in its administrators, and the UFT was its teachers at that time. I don't think at that time they referred to them, frankly, as CSA - but they were the same people.

Clark:

It doesn't make any difference, it's the men . . right from what happened in that meeting because the meeting was taken over by UFT people who had the power and they told us what was going to happen, and that happen. The Board was sitting behind.

McCoy:

Ken, let me ask you a question, and I think we can, if we get the answer, we can wrap that one up for lunch. But you made some statement about the decision makers determining their constituency - who they represented. Is that correct? The question I am raising . . .

Clark:

. . or with whom they identified.
McCoy: Right. The question I am raising is couched in the next level when Mayor Lindsay appointed some additional members to the Board, that was supposed to represent a different constituency, they found that it was practically impossible to do anything even at that point. I mean, they had a different constituency which they had to work with. So the question I guess I am raising is, does it really make any difference who their constituency was?

Clark: Yes, I think it does, but again, at the risk of philosophizing, that really, the constituents, or the groups with which the individual decision makers identified, cannot be understood in terms of isolation from the status and hierarchical structure of the large of society. Milton Galamison was clearly identified with the community, but it just so happened that his job was much more difficult than Rose Shapiro's because the community with which Milton was identified is a powerless community. So all Milton can do is shout and demand confront. Well, in other groups with more power can exercise their decision making without the tactics and strategies which the powerless representative might give. See my point, Rhody, that I guess - the good thing that a political official can do is to put representatives of powerless groups in alleged decision-making roles knowing full well that the basic decisions are not going to be made by them anyway. . . . constituents were led to make poor decisions.

Galamison: You know, inherent in Rhody's question, though, is an assumption that the Mayor himself who made these appointments was one hundred per cent behind what I would call a valuable or even an honest plan. He was not. What I am saying, is, that the more I moved along on the Board, the more I found myself fighting the Mayor, because the Mayor and the people that he controlled on the Board did not really produce the kind of plan which I felt had genuineness to it. But I know it's almost time to break for lunch. I think Bernie has added another dimension to this which all ought to be stated in some kind of hypothesis and I would put it this way: that when one plans a reform movement or an innovative movement in the area of education or in any other area, one should do some research on the legalities which might be
in the way which were initially designed to protect the people who are already entrenched in the system that you want to reform. Bernie is saying, that's my hypothesis, Dr. Calvin, that some people on the Board were honestly distressed about the legalities which bound them to certain responsibilities in Albany so that they found it difficult to let go in terms of power and responsibility that might have been delegated to the demonstration districts. And I think that this is a very real consideration.

Calvin:

I think we can adjourn for lunch, but I think we have some beginnings of some very interesting hypotheses. I'd like to see some people commenting on whether the legalities really do make a difference. I think we saw that teachers, policemen, and firemen, other people and the legalities involved don't seem to be so constrained. I think that's a question that could be answered and discussed. I think some of the other hypotheses also can be looked at. I think a very crucial decision is supposing the school system - and obviously the journalists - supposing the school system is ready to embark on a binge of this kind now, would that school system benefit by having a group such as this sit down and try to make up a comprehensive plan pointing out where the problems are, what should be called in, having an advisory council of this kind brought together to be useful? I don't know whether that's an interesting, or useful or valid approach. Perhaps from what Rev. Galamison said, such kinds of planning are just a waste of time, in which case we'd be off in the false hope that it would be a fraudulent kind of proposal.

Galamison:

Dr. Calvin, I'd modify that. I would not say planning is a waste of time. What I would say is that in the drawing of professed conceivable plans, one should be prepared for all kinds of unexpected events that take place.

Clark:

Milton, I didn't know that I'd be in a situation in which I would be more extreme than you. I think a valid hypothesis is one in which one examines the liberal traits which I think is more than a trait - maybe it's necessary belief in the myth of rational approach to problems of fundamen-
I think that's a key issue and maybe we can close on that and talk about it after lunch, because that's really to me a key issue, if that is really - if what Dr. Clark is saying is really the consensus ... or as a hypothesis.

What I am asking ...

What he's asking, I think, it would be really a very fundamental question.

My hypothesis is that we answer that after lunch.

LUNCH BREAK

It took a little bit of time. But one of the things that we - I don't think anyone realized and it was spelled out here before - we didn't know, no one saw what was ahead. No one saw what would eventually come out of this, no one knew what forces would rise up to put an end to efforts that were being made in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. I, for one, didn't, well, I knew that the legislature was there. I didn't know how much they were involved, but as far as the local - the community school board - it was an appointed board, we knew that, and what Esther said a while ago about ... perhaps some members of the Board may have thought that while we have this power we'd better make sure that we don't let it get away. I would say that people in the community didn't try to arrive at that as something to be believed, that this was deeply imbedded and that consciousness of everybody. This is what is is; that we did not count on the legislature coming up with the kind of bill that they did. Of course I don't know whether it would have made much difference, but there was a good deal of political sophistication in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and I think one thing that enabled the Board to maintain itself as long as it did was the fact that there was an election, an election of this local board, and those who were elected were political enough to realize that they should represent those who elected them. And, of course, as you know, this was one thing that we harped on over and over again, and I think if we had been an appointed board, we would have been
easily swept aside. But the fact that we were elected, though we claimed that we were - I see that Dr. Donovan is frowning over there - but we, it was an elected board and to me this was the real, this made the difference in our determination to stay and the communities somehow hanging in with us, until finally there was another election. I don't feel now that we, that there should be now elected local boards. I think that that is really not good, but I think in our community we had to have something like this to break out of the cell. But now we are back in the cell; we've got to find a way to get back out again.

Galamison: May I speak on this, because you are touching here on one of the deep-seated problems in a democratic structure, that black people happen to face. Not only did you work in Albany, might you spend a whole term, legislative term in Albany working up there two or three days a week . . .

Donovan: Seeking to influence legislation?

Galamison: Exactly so, exactly so. Now had to return to a certain organization because I did that. I didn't know I couldn't do that. But you did not and maybe I ought to say we did not have the political class to achieve what we wanted to achieve in the State legislature. I don't care how hard we might have worked, I don't care how sophisticated we might have been, we did not have the political class, this . . .

Clark: The Board of Regents did not have the political class.

Galamison: Exactly so. We had more people on our side, I say, than we have ever had on a side that was moving toward progress. But it was not sufficient. And when you look at the Albany State legislators where you have only one black person, for example, and this is only one example, who was not elected from New York City, I think he was from Buffalo, he voted wrong . . . you just didn't have the kind of political clout over against constituted labor unions which commanded a tremendous amount of votes, and unfortunately if you are caught in a kind of system whereby the chief virtue is to get elected, and this is what every politician con-
cerns himself with, and this is Mrs. Morality and this is Mrs. Right, the process of getting elected and you are also a minority people as black people are in the United States, it's very difficult to get anything done, you know, on behalf of progress or reform, or on behalf of education even if it happens to be right in your particular interest. So what you ran into, politically and legally, and legislatively, was a democratic process which everybody extols, but which is gravely to the disadvantage of minority people and black people, because when you begin to count numbers and numbers become the substitute for morality and what is decent, then you are in trouble, then the whole society is in trouble.

Clark:

Milton, I agree with you so much that now it's going to hurt me to show you from what you have just said what's being made to be a disturbingly clear example of power and naivete, because what you said makes a great deal of sense up to the point where you specified the area of powerlessness, namely numbers. I thought this, too, and would have continued to have thought it were it not for the disadvantage of being actually in Albany watching the process by which the legislature arrived at its decisions on the form of the decentralization bill. And I am not even sure that it's wise for me to say what I am about to say to you now, because I've never said this publicly, the decision of the New York State Legislature on the nature of the decentralization bill was not made in terms of the legislative leaders' assessment of the relative votes of the Central Labor Council and . . . in contrast to the votes of the minorities. And this is a popular belief. I am convinced without having the definitive data that that decision was made on much more mundane grounds of the kinds of lubrication which lubricates the political apparatus on local and state levels. There is no other explanation for a number of specific things which I observed in terms of twenty-four hour shifts kind of thing and the refusal to continue the process of discussion that was going on prior to a very specific determinant of decision making. Now, after saying that, I will shift categorically to another set of facts which if anybody draws any relationship between what I've just said and what I am about to say, that's
their problem, not mine. After the victory of the union, some dissident members of the UFT asked: 'how much money did the Union spend in this victory in Albany?' The head of the union said: 'oh, somewhere between two hundred and five hundred thousand dollars,' but nobody asked: 'how can anybody make public statements that span that width of expenditure from two hundred to five hundred thousand dollars. You know, there's a great difference between two hundred and five hundred thousand dollars.' Some dissident members of the union who wanted to, you know, had run a black candidate, whom they romantically felt would challenge Shanker's little presidency, came to talk to a few of us about how could they do this, and I was naive enough to say to them: 'well, one way in which you could challenge the present leadership is raise this question of the accounting of the expenditures of the UFT in this particular struggle.' Now these were revolutionary, these were dissident, these were people who were going to challenge their verdict. They looked at me as so if I were crazy. They said: 'now, we can't get anywhere asking for an accountant of union expenditures,' and they never did. They never raised that issue. As I said, anybody who'll make any relationship between the settings, you know, is paranoid; they're been meritorious, they are people who should not be considered responsible to service this social program. Milton?

Galamison: Well, let me - I would like to believe that this might be accepted as a hypothesis. Let me sound a note of hope here. What I hear you saying - you add another dimension to this, you probably be numbers, they give you money. I'll agree if you have a minority and a lot of money, you might be able to do what a majority can do. But my argument when you said . . .

Clark: No, I was merely saying, Milt, that there is the kind of built-in romantic naivete on the part of do-gooders who believe that, you know, reason, or number of votes, or justice of cause.

Galamison: When a five dollar bill might do it.

Clark: I didn't say that! You just said that the resources would be parried differently; we thought redeployment of available resources at a critical time
might determine how many votes on republic or the democrats in legislatures or councils do get.

Galamison: Well, these then are the formidable obstacles that minority people see in a democratic structure, but then we have to live by a philosophy, and it doesn't have to be a philosophy of defeat. We have to live by a philosophy that David can really live a lie in the long run, for example.

Clark: But David had a sling-shot.

Galamison: So David had a sling-shot. But maybe that's all we have is a sling-shot, but we have to accept this as a practicable philosophy with which and at which we can work. Or we have to believe it's a Cinderalla story, you know, the whole concept that the rejected can ultimately triumph, because all the ostensible circumstances are . . .

Calvin: Well, I'd like you to - maybe you and Dr. Clark and some of the others to reflect on the facts since now this is a hypothesis that there is some interesting data. For example, we did some work with Wilson Riles, and Wilson Riles is a minority member and ran into a state which has roughly eight per cent blacks and he beat the hell out of Rafferty, and Rafferty had lots of money and you might want to comment on that. That Rafferty was well organized and supported by all kinds of groups with all kinds of money. He is now the state superintendent of education in California. And Wilson is black.

Ferretti: Dr. Calvin, there was one other element there, that people didn't like Max Rafferty.

Calvin: Well, when you say that we might . .

Clark: We are talking about people, we are not talking about the legislature.

Calvin: Well, just a second. What we are talking about is an elective process and I am interested in the comments that were made earlier about - you see, I agree with you on economics. I think very often there is some data from other areas that indicate certain things, and what I am saying is that when you say the people didn't like Max, the way you
find that out, I guess, is by the election. Well, that's certainly true. If the polls show twenty, Max ahead by twenty-five percentage points before he began to debate Wilson, and when he began to debate Wilson, Wilson was smarter, and made a lot of good educational points; and I think that there are a number of people who still judge people on the basis of what they can do rather than . . .

Swanker: Yes, he made a basic mistake, too. He attacked the color of the skin.

Calvin: That's right. He ran a racial campaign. Rafferty, no question about that.

Clark: So did Yorty, and Yorty won.

Calvin: Well, that's why there are all kinds of things that are involved, and that's why it's interesting — that's another piece of data.

Gittell: We are not comparing apples to pears, I mean, that Riles came from a basis power. He had status not only in California, but nationally, from the Riles Commission — a report has been published in the Congressional Record. He was an established acceptable figure in the educational establishment in the California politics; he had money behind him; he had opposition to Rafferty which were willing to pour resources into the Riles campaign, and California is crazy, anyway.

Calvin: That was the key point. I was waiting for . . . I don't want to get involved in that.

Galamison: Dr. Calvin, these are certainly extreme illustrations that may or may not bear testimony to what I am trying to share. And that is, if a Negro in a population that is overwhelmingly white wins, I don't applaud until I know what kind of Negro he is. He may be far worse then most of the white people may have elected.

Calvin: I don't know if that's fair to Riles, because he isn't here to defend himself, but I would say one thing. I think that most people would agree that Riles is considerably different than Rafferty on other variables besides the color of the skin.
Clark: May I state that - may I suggest that Riles was not elected by the legislature, Riles was elected by the electorate, the state-wide electorate. I was addressing my two totally independent observations to the way in which the legislature operates.

Donovan: I wonder if we can return for a minute to something that Dr. Calvin asked for which I do not think we can produce. And that is some definite guidelines for superintendents and Boards of Education in other cities. I don't know if we can produce definite answers. I think we can produce some ideas to be looked into. So I'd like for a moment to revert to Mario's questions. He felt that a very critical issue this morning was, who speaks for whom in this outfit. Milton, for example, recently has been saying: 'we said, we said, we said.' Who is we? In other words, what I am saying is, when you said "we said," who is the "we" that said any place who is is the "we" said says, either side or inside, or in between, and this is what a superintendent on the Board also has to take into consideration. I wonder if we could spend just a little time on that.

Calvin: Yes, who'd like to comment on this?

Galamison: I would. I'd like to begin by saying that this, you see, again reflects this whole tragedy of being caught in the process of number kinds, which is one of the pitfalls of a democracy. That is, if somebody speaks, if he speaks anything, my first consideration should not be 'how many people he is speaking for, or how many people he has behind him' if the issues is 'is he right, or is he wrong,' and if he's right, then i should try to pursue what other recommendations or policy he has outlined; or if he is wrong, I should refuse to support him. In other words, what I am saying, Bernie, is that numbers can be entirely irrelevant to moral issues, now they are not irrelevant to political issues, and when you get in a kind of structure where you're working with the labor union, are working with the school system, or you are working with the state legislature, you have to consider numbers. But my criticism is that we determine too frequently what is right and what is wrong by numbers, and it is because of this kind of structure that black people,
minority people, found themselves at a supreme disadvantage in a democratic structure.

Ferretti: I'd like to say something to that. I realize that you are a Reverend, Reverend Galamison, and you must, of course, drill on the relevant. I think that in case of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, for example, there are a great many moral issues to my way of thinking, almost all of them on the side of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville community; and yet they lost everything. So I think in that particular case since we are talking about, the numbers beat morality, and I think one of the things that . . .

Galamison: Not in the long run. In the short run, yes, but not in the long run.

Ferretti: What's the long run?

Clark: Tomorrow.

Galamison: Oh, the long run may be a week, it may be a year, it may be the next generation, but not in the long run. You have to believe that in the long run what is right and decent will triumph even though it may not win in your particular structure.

Ferretti: You are talking about hypotheses. Would it be a good thing, for example, to build up a constituency of such force that you could make your representatives act morally?

Galamison: This would be ideal.

Ferretti: And then we get into numbers again, do we not?

Galamison: We would get into numbers again, but we would be in a different kind of a ball game in the sense that we would be educating people to the best of our knowledge, to what is moral and what is good and what is right, not for a segment of the people - for that we have class legislators, but for everybody, so that we have democratic legislation in the sense that people who initially conceived of democracy thought legislation ought to be or ought to become.

McCoy: Can I ask a question that is generally on this
topic? When is it important to know who speaks for whom? At what point is it important to know who speaks for whom?

Clark:

Rhody, I think that's an extremely important question, because actually if you look at our social political system, you see that there are some very important decisions that are made in a democracy, that no one raises the question who is speaking for how many. For example, the draft - the draft operated in America for decades without the question of representation, or referendum, or participatory democracy, and for to me there are pretty obvious reasons, that if those kinds of questions were raised, that if the machinery were settling them in the usual nosecounting approach were developed, you probably wouldn't have a draft. I think there are questions of tactics. My hypothesis is that when the decision makers of our society want to make decisions that involve the reinforcement or the expansion of the existing power, it does not generally permit itself to get in the bind of seeking democratic representation or evidence of this. This might be biased in selective perception, but as I look at this society, issues and the kinds of questions that Bernie raised and obvious effect, are generally raised when there is some kind of serious confrontation of people without power seeking to get power. For example, like I think I am - and I hope that I can continue the illusion of being the next bird on the ghetto in America, when I look at the ghetto and the social change processes in the ghetto, some start ghetto by the way, and we've done something on the kinds of things that we have precipitated in the Haryou document of community action programs, etc., I don't think I found out within two or three years after perpetrating on poor powerless people what I thought was a device by which they could democratically get more power, was that that very device was used to getting something, they need community participation, etc. that I watched the Lindsay administration, for example, on its housing; Dean Flaco enter ghetto communities to organize the community so that if he could get community consensus before he moves on urban housing programs. Now Dean Flaco was very effective in using the community organization approach to get the kind of conflict and confusion, etc., so that he now has a valuable
device whereby non-movement can be justified on the
grounds that the people are divided, you know, 
the Puerto Ricans, and the blacks in Southeast 
Harlem aren't together, therefore you can't 
really move toward a housing project there. Now 
this is what's made, nobody asked those kinds of 
questions in the decisions on Lincoln Center. 
Lincoln Center moved in spite of more unity on the 
part of the lower-class whites who were being dis-
placed in that area. to be displaced and nobody 
said 'you can't put up Lincoln Center because the 
people object to it.' When you have powerless 
people, it doesn't really matter whether they 
object or agree, you use to win.

Galamison: 

May I say something on this? Let me expand on this 
a little bit, because it's so relevant. In this 
democratic structure, one of the supreme techniques 
by which black people are deceiving is the expan-
sion of the area of agreement, the expansion of the 
area of plebiscite, let me put it that way. Let me 
try to cite it in another way. When we have been 
through a period even in New York City where black 
people in the ghetto couldn't even elect an assem-
blyman, because they didn't have that much politi-
cal strength, so then we got to the point where 
they could elect an assemblyman, maybe they could 
elect a senator, maybe even elect a congressman - 
in Brooklyn, where we have this tremendous con-
centration of black people, they can at last elect a 
congressman; but as black people move alone, could 
they achieve whatever achievements they might make 
by virtue of having been ghettoized, those who 
are in power expand the area of political thrust 
so that what was concentrated and effective is 
reduced to ineffectualness. Now this would be 
true with the current process of electing Board of 
Education members in New York City. It will 
be almost impossible in Harlem, now, and he is 
going to have to be a good Negro to be elected 
in Harlem, to elect a black person or a Puerto 
Rican person to the Board of Education, because 
if you expand as we have expanded the area of 
political thrust to a borough-wide basis which we 
had done on Staten Island, in Brooklyn, in Queens, 
in the Bronx, it will be almost impossible to 
elect a minority person. The same thing has gone 
on in Boston, Massachusetts, in this area where 
the control of the school system has been extended
beyond any kind of lower framework to a whole city-wide kind of thing whereby somebody in the suburbs will determine the destiny of the people who live in the black ghetto; as in New York City, somebody out in Staten Island who now determines the destiny of black people on a school board, or who'd lived in Brooklyn, or in Harlem. As we move along and we get even into a position where we numerically can take advantage of the democratic process, somebody, or some upshot is maneuvering continually to make the base so tenuous that our urbanization and our ghettoization are ineffectual ones in this process. Now if you don't understand it, you don't understand what's going on.

Donovan: I think there is another point, Milton - excuse me, go ahead.

Gittell: Well, I think, Milton, you've defeated your own argument and we had this discussion two sessions ago, and I disagreed with you then, and obviously I disagree with you again, and that is, that it is in misinterpretation and the abuse of numbers, and the democratic process that is doing what you are suggesting the democratic process is doing, and you hit on a very salient point in terms of what political scientists call city-wide elections versus ward district elections. Now I recall, a couple of months ago, I got a communication from the people out at L.A., from the NAACP asking me 'could I get them together data to support the notion of ward election,' and I wrote back and said: 'political scientists have rejected ward elections over the last twenty years as being outmoded.' Now, you know, there is a very real argument that in cities like Detroit and Los Angeles for ward elections to get black representation, and the social scientists themselves have not produced any data to substantiate that case. It was the misinterpretation, in effect, on their part - the goo-goos, the reformers of city governments, who said over the last twenty or thirty years that you had to have city-wide elections because that seemed to be more representative. They were wrong. The fact is that ward elections may produce the more representative kind of government. Now for you to argue against the more representative form saying 'that's what defeats black people,' I think is a misinterpretation.
Donovan: I didn't understand that that was what Milton was saying.

Galamison: Marily in your eagerness to disagree . . .

Gittell: Well, because you've used this argument several times.

Galamison: I am using it because it's so fundamental.

Gittell: You see, I think Ken makes the more relevant point in saying 'those processes will be set up on high as an argument against getting more black representation,' just as I recall very clearly that when the union first came out blasting the elections in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, the argument was not enough people voted. We made a great effort at that time, you remember Rhody, to estimate precisely the percentage of eligible voters who are voting, and it came out to something like twenty-five per cent. Now we get the city-wide decentralization elections figures, all which are, in almost every district, below twenty-five per cent. No one is arguing the validity of those elections. The very same people who argued against the validity of the Brownsville Board because it was elected by twenty-five per cent of the people, and I think that's more to your point, Ken, that people are going to misuse concepts for whatever, in whatever way they want to, and it's a constant battle to throw it back at them.

Clark: To keep people without power from getting power.

Gittell: Right. I just want to go back to what Bernie asked, and I think it's relevant to that. As a political scientist functioning over a fifteen-year period, I am embarrassed to say, I never once heard raised the question of who speaks for the community, or is this political leader who is elected representative of the community, or even the political leader who emerges out of the community, whatever community you are talking about, is he representative, who is he talking for - I never heard those questions raised until the sixties, until black people started to arise as community leaders. And I think that there is firm evidence to this, Bernie, that social scientists, political leaders themselves, never challenged
someone who seems to be a leader just on that basis, who spoke up. He didn't even have to be representative, he didn't have to have this base of power that one could count the numbers of because he was elected, or because he could go back to his local clubhouse, that is, to get support on an issue. If someone emerged as a leader who was accepted as - he was a leader. The only time those questions seemed to be raised, and I observe this everywhere now, this is a constant question that arises, 'who is he speaking for, whom does he represent, who elected him, how many people?' These are questions that political scientists never even conceived, and I do think that it's related to racism in our society.

Donovan:

I think it is, too, but I think you have to realize something else, and I am delighted that you are young enough to have only been in the business fifteen years. Fifteen years ago and before that there wasn't any argument from anybody anywhere. The man who spoke for the community - whoever he was - there wasn't anybody up there challenging him because he spoke for the dominant community and in generally speaking - they are all alike, you know. But now, you sit there and the man steps up before the Board of Education and says, 'I talk for the community and I say do this,' and the next fellow up there says he doesn't talk for the community at all, 'I talk to the community and I say do the opposite,' it's an entirely different ball game. I wouldn't doubt for what the issue of minority group coming to a position where they want power from the majority has a lot to do with it, but you can't evade the question by philosophy. You have to answer to a superintendent anywhere. Two men stand up in front of you as they did in Ocean Hill, by the way, and one man says, 'I speak for this community and we want this,' and another man - and right or wrong I am not arguing on that at all - another man says, 'just a minute, I speak for the community and we want something different.' Somebody has to decide where the weight is. Now Milton says you decide on the side of right. Now right is not an egalitarian procedure, that there are a few of us who are endowed with the knowledge of what is right and everybody else is wrong. Right is very difficult - it's just like Christianity, it's never been tried. But a superinten-
dent doesn't sit there to write a book. He sits there and the Board of Education sits there listening to opposing points of view, both of whom present to some extent reasonably strong cases. You sense a little more right on one side than the other - you sense it in a matter of morality, but let's not brush off the fact that there are many people today speaking for what they say is this, that, or the other group, and somebody has got to think about it.

Galamison: Bernie, the point that is somebody is trying to make here is that this is an innovation of determining response to a community. And the truth is - and I want to add this - that this whole concept of a great many people is a mythological procedure, is a mythological concept with which the American people have lived because the majority of people never really decided anything. They may decide within a certain framework that has already been established for them, and if you are going to vote, you got to vote for the only two or three candidates who are on. But something has already been predetermined. I would argue that everything that's ever been decided of any importance is decided by a minority people, a few people who sit in a room somewhere and say women are going to wear short skirts next fall, women are going to wear long skirts next fall, or, you know, some other... 

Calvin: ... very bad example... 

Galamison: Some argue that minority makes the important decisions, never the majority. The majority deals with, you know, what few shortages are given to them.

Clark: Before we get off from Bernie's point, I'd like to throw in my share of problems. Bernie, in the operation of the Board of Education, there are decisions, you know, that are made in terms of contractors, capital expenditures, decisions in terms of publishers, textbooks. It isn't, you know, the questions of representation and all, and who is speaking for whom, are not salient questions in those capital expenditures. But when it comes to the community being - now, let me be more specific here - when it comes to a
previously denied community raising issues of its share of the educational resources, then these kinds of question are more likely to be raised. Am I right?

Swanker:

I mean the fact is that - I think it has very often been said, a community in Staten Island, for instance - because they pretty much agree because they all look alike - they don't have major issues that separate them. You get a reasonably tolerable community like, but Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant . . . Take Harlem, for instance, the issue of 201. Helen Testimas said that she spoke for the community, equally adamant was Spencer, who said he spoke for the community, both right. They both had a problem, they both had convictions and the point that I am making here is what you are saying is absolutely right, but the reason for it is that there is a division in those communities, that they have not yet pulled themselves together and realized the strength in working together, as a block. I mean this is it for real, because when Wilson Riles was almost defeated in California for that same thing, because Julian Nova ran in the primaries and they almost knocked themselves out completely, because they split the minority board out there. But fortunately, Riles managed support enough to get a . . . against Rafferty. But this is the same situation that the reason that you don't have the kinds of conflicts and the kinds of questions in the "colored communities" or the white communities or the homogeneous communities, is that you don't have the arguments about who leads and what the issues are. Now they may be issues perhaps, been resolved before they got to the Board of Education whereas when you get Dave Spencer, Helen Testimas, both right, both . . . , both with good causes, then it's the problem for the superintendent and the Board of Education to make a decision as to which one really is the representative.

Oliver:

May I throw in here that . . . . superintendent that goes with that position, but I think I know it's not, I don't think that anyone can ever determine precisely where a community is, really, because so often the community doesn't know where it is. Buy maybe there may be someone who can articulate it. The community is some-
where, we know, but where there is someone who can articulate where they are, well - it's hard to say where they are.

Swanker: I think this goes back to the very issue that we have discussed on in the first session and that is the question of a power block and of the powerlessness of the black community, and I think this really is answering one of the questions you raised at that time, why, that is why the black community or the minority community is powerless, and I think perhaps one of the answers - now I am not saying it is the only answer - but one of the answers is that they are divided among themselves.

Clark: But in the other community, in terms like Marilyn said, that Nixon was elected by a minority in the last electorate. She reminded me so was Lindsay, and so was Buckley. Being divided is not peculiar to a black community, or the Puerto Rican community. However, the fact of division can be more effectively used against powerless communities.

Donovan: Ken, I think there is another part to it. I think the white community, as you say, is divided amongst itself, maybe in a different way, but it is divided - it is in one community, but because they are all part of the dominant community when they differ and they fall out, so they fall out and one fellow wins and the other fellow loses . . .

Clark: And the decisions are made independently.

Donovan: Then that's a way. Now, unfortunately, in recent time, when there is a power struggle when the black community was coming up, and if one faction won and wanted to get something then somebody agreed with, then the other faction would take steps to block it to cut in to. 'not have it done that way, you didn't listen to us.' This is, I think, part of growing up, of coming into the business of trying to be like the majority and trying to get some political power not having had it, and it creates, really, a lot of problems for the people who have to make decisions. And you might say, 'well', a man who has to make the decision' - as Rev. Oliver says- 'should be a Salomon.' Well, I wish we had one around someplace, I don't find in any other city, state or federal level.
Not even amongst community action agency do I find any. We don't have them, we don't even have one half of a Solomon around. So we live from day to day with this unfortunate ... the decision making on what is pressure, and most of us hope that he had got some morality behind us, you know, you don't do things if you're in power if you can help it. But you got an awful lot of pressures in there.

Calvin: Let me break in for a minute because Dr. Clark has told me that he is going to have to leave at four, and he certainly has a lot of input that's important, and I am sure that's true for the other people around the table who have - let me speak directly to another point. One of the reasons why I am trying to get his cast into a particular structure is that this vehicle that we are working on serves two forms and one has to relate to the constraints that Rhody is under. Rhody really is working very hard to make an effective contribution to education. One of the things that you need in order to do that is a particular kind of piece of paper, and in order to get that piece of paper and to work with it, certain things have to be put in a certain form. That's perhaps the reason for some of the particularly peculiar language, but I certainly would not want to have Dr. Clark leave without commenting on certain things in a particular fashion, maybe just to meet the constraints of the educational bureaucracy that exists up in Amherst. But I want to interject, because I see what Rhody went through in certain other things and I just feel that he won't speak up because of his respect of the people around the room, and so I am going to kind of speak up without that ...

Clark: ... that last remark?

Calvin: Yes, so I am just going to say that I'd like Rhody, I'd like to get this now into a format, because one of the reasons that this is important is because of you people. I mean if it were just a gathering of ordinary people, this wouldn't have the weight it has, and when Dr. Clark leaves and certain other people leave, then it's not going to have the impact that it has while you people are in the room. So, I don't want to take any more time, but I would like to get this into the kind of educational
leads which is necessary with the - as a graduate dean and I am sure he'll understand what the message is.

Donovan: I think we ought to defer to you, because you are the only man I ever saw that ever made Rhody drop his pipe. That's a sign that he's nervous.

Calvin: Do you want to comment on that?

McCoy: Now, I'd like to follow it in a little different way at the moment, because I've listened, which is unusual for me to just listen, but I've heard some things here which I think you've called substantive things that have created a number of questions in my mine, and I have them in two categories; the first one has to do with the political arena and the second one has to do with the identification of the parties, as Mario suggested. Now, under the political - and if I can get some reactions from the panel on this, on these for quick questions and then under the second one, I just have two. I hear you saying that political reform cannot be made when the issues are basically those of morality. And the second one I hear you saying is that conflict is inherent in reform. And the third one I hear you saying is that of established coalitions for compromise, that is, if you are going to try to make any kind of refom, you are going to have established coalitions that basically will come off with some sort of compromised positions. And finally, I guess this is from my one bias, I hear that reform must consider the covert issues. Now if those are the general kinds of things that I am hearing, then, okay, but it's not going to have some sort of . . .

Ferretti: I'd like to speak to the third point you mentioned, the coalitions for compromise. I would say, now, let's put this in the form of a semi-hypothesis, in so far as the lesson of Ocean Hill-Brownsville is concerned and from what we can see in the wake of the local community board elections here in New York City right now. I think coalition for compromise is perhaps not correct. I think what should be considered by groups is a coalition for power, because I think that the educational establishment in particular in this city as evidenced in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and as evidenced today,
they do not move unless they are pressured by power.

McCoy:

Just before that, Rev. Oliver, I heard somebody say something that said that one of the decisions confronting, or one of the problems confronting a 'superintendent' is, that here we have two people standing up in front of him saying that he recognizes both representing the community because they both say so, and also I think I heard, Dr. Clark referred to the fact that you are dealing with powerless people, and so the question I've got to ask in that sense, if what you are saying is so, is that if you have a total coalition of powerless people, you are still not going to be able to deliver any kind of reform. I think Milton said that he had people in Albany consistently, right? But they didn't represent that kind of clout.

Ferretti:

No, what I am saying is that you have groups of powerless people who, with numbers can force legislation, can force morality, if you will.

Oliver:

Along that same line, I think there is something that does need consideration of having gone into and that is the role of the opinion-makers as over against the decision-makers. When you think of decision makers you think maybe of the Mayor, and . . . But really he's not the decision maker. He responds to opinions that are created and the opinion makers are the ones who determine those decisions, and well, I think of Ocean Hill-Brownsville and the news media. It was the opinion that they put out of Ocean Hill-Brownsville that determined the decisions that were made by Ocean Hill-Brownsville. I think this . . .

Clark:

Are you thinking in particular of the Martin Mayer piece in the Sunday Magazine section of the Times?

Oliver:

Right.

Ferretti:

Well, as a member of the medium, let me talk about that. I don't think, well, the media is divided into two categories: there are those who fought, and there are those who attempt to formulate opinion, or to influence opinion. I think, Dr. Clark mentioned the Martin Mayer piece. I think
that goes to the hear of something I want to say, that it was basically a dishonest piece of journalism. I think that in so far as reporters, ... their reports is concerned, all they can do is to report honestly.

Galamison: That they can't honestly?
Ferretti: Oh, yes, they can.
Galamison: They would like to report honestly, but when man is raised with biases, and ignorances . . .
Ferretti: But he still is reporting honestly.
Galamison: It's very difficult to write a news piece that isn't to some degree slanted, in fact it's almost impossible to write things that isn't to some degree slanted. And what happened in this whole process in the sixties is that the news people, while they helped all these efforts greatly by misgiving some public airing, did formulate opinions and did interject their biases and their prejudices in reporting, and it added up, I think in the long run it was a great detriment of some of the things that we were trying to accomplish.

Oliver: A good example of that was that some newsmen, or some of the new media at times would play me off against McCoy, and play me up, play McCoy down, and other times they played him up with me down. And other times they pitted me against Sonny Carson and made me like the nice sweet guy that should have been listened to and he the bad guy who could not be listened to and at another time they played around.

Donovan: Unless you think you are alone, Reverend.
Fantini: I have my own gripes about it.
Donovan: A new one, and look from my position. I could claim the same thing. I could claim that undue publicity was given to Rhody, everything he said I had to respond to. You know, as you look at these things, you can say that if you wish to - I don't choose to say it at the moment, but I want to say that I don't think anybody is ever satisfied with his own image - whoever portrays is portraying it improperly.
Calvin: Okay, we've now got roughly ten or fifteen minutes left. I'd like to put out some concrete alternatives and get some reactions, if I can. One thing, one strategy that we tried when we were in Chicago with Dr. King, and one strategy that we suggested to McCoy, and one strategy that you might consider, and I'd like your reaction to it, is to get a kind of blue ribbon advisory board that represents all kinds of opinions. For example, Neal Sullivan and a large number of other educators who are willing to go to the legislature, black and white, not only educators but all kinds of people, to support Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and it was possible to maybe put together an advisory board with people from King's group and white conservative groups, all kinds of groups together in an advisory board that would in a sense give an umbrella. Now I have never see this tried in education. Mac vetoed this at that time because he thought it wasn't an appropriate strategy. I wonder what your reaction is to it, why it has never been tried, for example, in Washington, or - Dr. Clark gave me his kind of grimace, like now, let's talk about that - but why not, what's wrong with the idea of getting all kinds of people in at the beginning, not just those who are engaged, and using them as an umbrella technique. We use it all the time in everything else.

Swanker: But they are powerless, too.

Calvin: Well, don't kid yourself.

Gittell: Well, I think we did have an example of that. We had the Bundy panel, I mean, it was a blue ribbon panel.

Galamison: Marilyn, a very powerful school group in New York, even PTA or . . .

Calvin: Yes, but did they represent industry?

Galamison: Oh, no, they didn't represent industry, but there were people who did represent the industry, for example local 1199 - during this whole thing, no, let me say this. We met with people once a week in a hotel for breakfast who represented about nine or ten labor unions, every - you know every - but they didn't have the weight that Harry Van Arsdale
had had, they didn't have . . . no, let me say it, you see, I want to, and this is my last attempt to philosophize here. What we are doing here is saying in a sense that you can have a society without leadership - really let me finish this please - that you have a society without charisma, that you could have a society without the kind of prophetic, of you know, leadership that people have given in every age to every society which would imply that it would have everybody on the same level, thinking the same thing, and that somehow numbers determine what is right and what is wrong. And what I am saying is while all of this would be very wonderful if it were possible or practicable, that there are times in life when the people who have prophetic concepts and ideas, with people who do have leadership, with people who do deal with tomorrow and not with today, have to just get out and say, 'doggone it, this is it, and this is where I am going, and if I can't stand by or for by myself, I won't stand for it at all, and if everybody leaves me alone, this is what I am going to do.' Now this is the way I saw Ocean Hill. This is the way I see every significant reform movement in America. If you could get a whole lot of people to support you, it wouldn't be a reform movement. Then you have the way a whole lot of people think. When would it make you a leader? You would be saying which way does the crowd go, I am going to lead them, you know, get out there and get out in front. So what we are arguing for even if we are trying to deprive society of one of the most significant elements that has ever existed, you know, in any society as long as you had society, and that is people who get the visions, people who get the concepts, people who fall in love with an ideal or an idea and say, 'here I go, and if somebody follows me, fine, if somebody doesn't, then I am standing with this idea.'

Donovan: Do you remember the time when Charles Duval came down the stairs and not well and his wife said, 'my God, he's . . . (rest not clear on tape)

Oliver: One of the most difficult things for anyone who is in a leadership position is to really know what the sympathies are, and that is where a community is. I think that was always, and still is,
the problem - where is the community? And there were times when we thought they would be right there and other times we didn't expect them and then they were there by the hundreds, so it's very difficult.

McCoy: Let me try a dimension on the second question that had to do with the people, which gets back to you, Milton, but don't philosophize this time. The question I am raising in terms of what I have been hearing is that if the people identified leadership or spokesmen, the institution will only deal with it to the degree of a confrontation. Is that, that's legitimate of what I am hearing? I am talking about . . .

Gittell: Well, I think that . . .

McCoy: . . . people emerging from . . .

Gittell: That they'll deal with him until he challenges their power.

McCoy: In terms if we had a confrontation, is that . . .?

Gittell: I would do it. I just want to answer a question and present the final hypotheses. I think what you are talking about is the strategy which is secondary or even way down the hill. I mean, I wouldn't put it out of hand, but I remember when I came in to work with the Bundy panel, I kind of thought to myself, 'this is not possible,' I mean, you've got the whole powerhouse here, you got Bundy, you got the Governor, and the Mayor, and every - you know, the power basis, if any political scientists looking at this would think would put the thing over. I can even - and I tell this all the time - but I can remember saying to Bundy on the first day I met him in this discussion that this kind of institutional change that we are talking about has never happened in history without revolution. And he agreed. But we proceeded to work with the Bundy panel, assuming that that - and this is the way that I interpreted it at that time and I still interpret it that way - that the people up there had nothing to loose by this; that they were giving up just the power of the middle-class professional if they were giving up anything. What I think was misread by people
like Bundy, and Lindsay, and Rockefeller - if I may say so - was the power of the union and that middle group of professionals. They thought that they could give away that power. The didn't have it to give away. And that's where the confrontation came. But what I want to say is that that was the strategy of the Bundy panel, that you get a representative blue ribbon group together who you thought can manipulate it through, and I think you are misreading New York City politics, if I may say so, which is quite different from Chicago politics, or - each of these cities have a political culture of their own. And the business community in New York has never played a role in education. That's one thing, now ...

Calvin: Was the President of IBM and the President of US Steel on the Bundy panel?

Gittell: No.

Calvin: Well, then, you are saying that industry is represented you - you are talking about a different game? Right?

Gittell: No, no, no.

Galamison: Well, the President of RCA was involved.

Gittell: No, no, later on . . .

Galamison: Yes, he played a very significant role.

Gittell: Yes, Milton's right - the operational thing of it, but I think you misread New York City politics. I mean if you could convince David Rockefeller, let's say, to move in on the critical issues, which he wouldn't because of his brother, you might have - then you have his support in advance, but there are other kinds of business leadership that you might find functioning, let's say, in a city like Pittsburgh or Cincinnati, which really doesn't function here, labor unions run this city, and you are not going to get Harry Van Arsdale to be on the side of that redistribution of power.

Calvin: I think that's an important point.

Gittell: Can I just - and I don't think there was a chance
in hell to get the support of Harry Van Arsdale. I really do believe this. And I think there were real efforts made to do this, but - I mean he knows where he is at and where he is going, and this is not, and this had no advantage for his union membership, in fact, he saw it as a threat. I would like to hypothesize this: that the structure of power in America makes it impossible to achieve a redistribution of power without confrontations and conflicts; that changing institutions in America, and that means mainly educational institutions, requires that redistribution of power; therefore, what we are faced with is what kinds of strategies can you develop that people without power can use to get a wedge in the door to create some kind of power base which they can use for the redistribution of power. And I think for that I'd go back myself to theories of social change, and either you can go to Barrington Moore and say, 'this requires a cumulative long-time confrontation kind of thing, which we deny calling violence, but may very well include it in Ocean Hill-Brownsville,' may in effect be one of the stages of that cumulative action, because I certainly notice around the country that whereas two years ago people talked about Ocean Hill-Brownsville like a catastrophe, now they are looking at it in the perspective of history. And I think that may be one possibility. And the other is Parson's notion of the accident of history. The social change can come from some guy who doesn't read clearly that what you are doing is moving him over, that is, he's trying to get, pull you in to sublimate you and prevent you from gaining power, but in doing so he gives you a wedge in the door and you can capitalize on that. That's another possibility. I mean these are threads which don't help other cities, frankly, I mean, because it's terribly discouraging, but I think the picture is discouraging, and I don't think we should move away from that.

Swanker:

I want to pick up a point that Marilyn gave, and I think a thought that will emphasize the point you made, as well, and that is she mentioned the fact that the union and CSA were threatened, their power was threatened by the demonstration districts. I would like to propose that the union and the CSA gained power through this, that in this realignment of power, the union and the CSA came out much stronger than they had been before. The union at that time was very unpopular, they had just comple-
ted a very unpopular strike the previous year and they were very unpopular in the City with the parents and the - with most groups in the City. But as a result of the publicity given to them as a result of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, is a result of the sympathy that they drew from labor and from working families, and so forth, whose labor sympathies supported the union and from the CSA. I would say that they gained, no only did they gain in power, they gained in membership, people who had previously not joined, joined because they saw themselves threatened by this, the CSA certainly gained in power and in strength as a result of this. Now this is a negative move as far as this particular group is concerned. In other words, it's a change, and it's a power of the alignment and as far as we are concerned, it's in the wrong direction but going back to Dr. Calvin's point, what could be proposed and what could we theorize for other cities who might be facing the same situation. This is something that they might gain, in looking at these events that led to this and what happened as a result, in other words, this realignment of power in strengthening the very groups who opposed to change, and see if there was some possible ways and moves that might have been made, that might have made a difference in that particular case.

Galamison: Could I suggest one that might have been made? I think it might have been possible to duplicate some of these positions that were threatened if we could have found the amount of money and the understanding - to put into the total picture - in other words, if some principal were threatened by the innovation of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, then some structure might have been set up whereby we could have two principals in the school, one an administrative principal and one another kind of principal. Or the same thing with an area superintendent, that some structure may have been set up whereby we could have created a dual superintendency. I just want to throw this at you, Ken. You can knock it down if you want to.

Donovan: I'd like to knock it down, okay? Because I don't think education is run by compromise. I just don't think you get anyplace. We gave eighty-nine additional positions to Ocean Hill-Brownsville to get the union off the backs of the Board for
one year, for the rest of that year eighty-nine positions were given to retain the teachers that Ocean Hill had hired in good faith by itself, and also retained union members who still stayed. I remember the figure eighty-nine. At the end of the year that eighty-nine ran out, they had to decide which teachers, you know . . . it was done. The principals weren't done, but Milton, that, too, is a temporary compromise that settles nothing. It just delays to make a decision.

Clark:

That's a good one within the conflict of the rational approach to the resolution of problems, and in that way we propose that because in proposing that you demonstrate that your ministerial Christian saying is very much a part of you, because you ignore a very important part of the problems in New York City which differentiate this from Washington, Chicago, Detroit, etc. The fact of the matter is that Ocean Hill-Brownsville and the whole decentralization issue came in New York City within the context of racist, ethnic, locks, and exclusion, and it was not just the issue of counting positions, etc. A realistic look at the structure of power in New York City in education, labor, you know, shows that New York City is a free, free, free city. Now, there was once the Board of Education was organized on the basis of three Catholics, three white Protestants, three Jews. You look at labor unions in New York City . . . yes, when the Negroes moved in, they moved in at the expense of one of the white Protestant positions, you see. All right. So you weren't just dealing with shear economic, or displacement of members, you were dealing with status, racial complexities, you were asking an institution in the City that was an integral part of the ethnic organization of New York City to reorganize its ethnic perspectives. I have an hypothesis which we'll never get data on. That if Rhody McCoy had been a white administrator, and preferably a Jewish administrator in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville thing; first, his style would have been different in terms of how he did what he did, but what he did that allegedly precipitated the thing, would not have been a state of calamity or crisis, that actually - you know, Bernie, that these arrangements drew debate and whereby administrators, shift people or get them around - but for the first time you had a black
area administrator, or superintendent, saying that some white teachers were incompetent, and particularly in a school in which black students were the people whom they were being frightened. Now New York, with the reputation of being the most cosmopolitan city in this country, with sometimes the exception of San Francisco, is the last city in which that kind of thing could be tolerated, and there isn't any way a formula could have done anything. It is more likely to be tolerated, well, not tolerated, but is not likely to have the same intensity of crisis now, because Oliver and McCoy were the commandos in breaking that kind of ethnic unquestioned etiquette.

Galamison: Could I say this, though, Ken, there is no question that there are racial overtones and other overtones in this, but it's very difficult to get to them, and I believe Shanker used them for all that it was worth, but it's very difficult to get to them.

Donovan: By the way, I think Shanker used them genuinely, I don't think . . .

Galamison: But when you are dealing with a situation where somebody has to be displaced because somebody else takes his job. In other words, it would be perfectly normal in a sense for a teacher, no matter what color she wears, if she belonged to a union, to feel that she was being displaced because somebody else took her job. Now, true, Rhody hired more white teachers than he hired black teachers.

Donovan: Yes, but he was firing whites and who was doing the displacements?

Galamison: Well, I am not debating that. I am just saying it's awfully hard to get to that when you turn the school system in this country or any system in this country into a back alley, where people have to fight so that somebody else is getting a job always means somebody's displacement. And what I would have done, you know, if I'm not being Monday morning quarterback, if I really had wanted to carry this thing out peacefully, was to make sure that anybody who felt threatened had some kind of, you know, satisfaction, you
know, some kind of guarantee so that I could make room for the innovations without creating the kind of public and social tensions.

Calvin: Milt, was anybody fired? Was anybody actually fired; wasn't it a transfer?

Galamison: No, nobody was actually fired, no - but when the newspapers for six weeks keep saying people were fired, then people begin to believe that they were fired.

Clark: Milton, before I leave, there is one other thing I wanted to say to reinforce my judgement to you as a Christian . . . is that fact that you got graciously the nature of the 201 crisis that came after. You remember when, what's his name, Chuck Wilson made some administrative decisions as to when his teachers should or should not be in the school. It wasn't firing. It was a black administrator being presumptuous enough to believe that he should make decisions about white teachers. It wasn't a due process problem there. There wasn't a losing job, it was just authority - the teacher. Shanker made no bones about the fact that he questioned the right of a black administrator to take literally authority and power to make now, if the white can be satisfied with money, ritual tokens, possessions, he doesn't - you don't have to worry about anything, you know, to deal with him like with other people, you call him by his first name, and he'll call you by - if you're white - your first name, but when we really get problems and difficulties, is when a black borough president decides that they are going to use the office of borough presidency the way white borough presidents had previously used it, then you not only get problems, but you get reorganization of municipal codes, and you get the borough presidency reduced . . . Black and white Christians, unlike social scientists, can face these kinds of realities which lie in the face of myth of removing and making racial progress. And I am fascinated and I will tell my students that Milton Galamison, a good, sound, American democrat . .

Galamison: No, I have no argument with what you are saying and it is undeniably true, but what I am saying is it's awfully difficult to get to that in terms
of other circumstances, and in terms of the illustrations that you have just pointed out, having been on the Board of Education and having studied the bureaucracy as I had an opportunity to study, I think there would have been some resentment and some hostility against anybody who made a decision which might countermand for it, or disagree, or even indicate that somebody had the power to make the decision, that the structure at 110 Livingston Street hadn't made itself. Now this is not going to take away from what you were saying, I hope not, because I think what you were saying is undeniably true, but there are other factors here, too, that I think, Ken, have to be dealt with, and that is the sharing of power with anybody, and maybe we can say especially with sharing it with black folks.

Clark: Particularly when the predicament of black men in America has been a predicament of differential power and any confrontation of black make will be a confrontation that is essentially giving more power.

McCoy: Ken, can I ask you a question just a little different before you run, and omit a word, but I just heard you say that the stronger a man in control 'you can write participation, and add money, and are those things the more precise is the effort is on the part of the institution to neutralize those efforts.

Clark: To neutralize and evade, or ignore. Initially it would seem to me that the techniques would be because generally these kinds of confrontations are made with good people, or fairly good people, and they are not going to start out be reacting to them in terms of flagrant forms of resistance. The initial forms of resistance will be quite reasonable. The law, what the cliche one is 'we agree with your objectives but we really don't like your methods,' and this kind of thing, so you didn't have to suffer through a process of education in terms of convenient methods. If you don't learn, it your cultural deprivation is such that you become preoccupied, you know, and compulsive and obsessive about your goal, your objectives, then reforms over resistance have to be stepped out.
McCoy: Then you get chucked?

Clark: Not always, you'll get, you know the first sign is a tendency to ridicule, or to describe you in ways that question your intelligence, that method because actually it's agreed that you are culturally deprived anyway, well, your personal stability - and these are not peculiar to white black thing you do this with dissident whites, whites can threaten other whites that have to be dealt with with varying degrees of social control. In the black situation you can do, when you are really pushed to the wall the way Shanker was, you really can get so intense and so emotional as to build up the van and the other thing to a point of real threshold if not beyond social irresponsibility. By that time all of the issues of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, not only educational, but, you know, authority, the relationship between the Central Board or local, became totally subordinated to the emotional issue of black anti-Semitism, and then you were lost. I just didn't see any way that you could have won once that issue became transformed. But you notice it didn't start that way. It started with due process and the usual.

Gittel: So, what you are really saying, Ken is so long as Brownsville didn't back down, you would predict that being an accelerated kind of . . .

Clark: Absolutely. The only alternative to that was confession to the right of the community to make this its decision and to go back to Bernie's initial issue, to be the instrument of accountability.

Calvin: Is there a strategy?

Clark: The instrument of accountability, Bernie, without authority and power, etc.

Donovan: I am not arguing with that.

Calvin: Dr. Clark, is there a strategy that can be adopted to avoid this problem? Is there a way, is there any kind of strategy that can be - or option, or alternative, or one which . . .

Clark: Now your question gets me back to why I was so
unclear about the original . . . Frankly, I am now telling you the conclusion of this book that I am writing on the subject - that there is no alternative to this except going through it.

Galamison: Going through what, Ken?
Gittell: Through . . .
Calvin: Are you any further ahead than we were before?
Clark: Not necessarily. Nobody can guarantee that you are going to be successful.
Calvin: And there is no strategy that you can see . . .
Clark: To guarantee success?
Calvin: No, to avoid the problem itself, or to at least . . .
Clark: Yes, there is a strategy to avoid the problem - not making the original confrontation.
Gittell: You are not seeking reform, but . . .
Galamison: But here again, could I just, let me just make . . .
Clark: I don't think you can do that.
Galamison: I don't think that anybody can say at this point whether Ocean Hill was a success or not, you see. For those, you know, who look for the immediate achievement of immediate goals, as heaven knows I do, you know, maybe we should say Shanker walked away with all the marbles. I wouldn't want to . . ., but this would not mean to me that Ocean Hill has not succeeded in terms of the seeds that have been planted, in terms of the social consciousness, social awareness which have been created. Every college student is interested in education all around the country is interested in Ocean Hill, 201, and what happened to Two Bridges in the New York situation during those years, and it's thoroughly possible that a seed has been planted in our society which will openly bring about the phase that Rhody McCoy and Oliver and their group tried to do. Now, you know the fact is, you don't win right away, the objective gone doesn't mean that you didn't win at all and whether
you succeed or fail or not, is not - can't be determined by what happened externally either, you know, it's what happens within people.

Donovan: Milton, I am inclined to agree with you. If I would have to say the whole thing, I would say that Ocean Hill-Brownsville was a success, but we haven't seen it yet. In other words, it was an immediate failure perhaps in terms of the people there getting exactly what they wanted, but I think the repercussions of it, this shaking up that it did, even though it resulted in a stronger union and all this kind of stuff that came out of it, in the long run it has changed a lot of people's thinking, or at least made them think-if it hasn't changed their thinking about what's going on. Eventually I would hope that it would pay off. I don't really consider it a defeat, I think it's a kind of a delayed victory, maybe that's the way I ought to put it.

Gittell: Well, there is a success on certain levels we can put it on, immediately that I think you would agree with, Bernie, and that is like they appointed the principals, that some of the things that are going on now in New York, which I don't think could happen five years ago. And you have made it more palatable to say that the community confused the principal Benjamin Franklin, which would have been unheard of five years ago in that respect.

Donovan: But it still has to be settled.

Gittell: All right, yes, but I think Ken left that open in terms of it's possible, but there is no guarantee.

Donovan: The people of Ocean Hill may not at the moment see any great reward out of it, you know, but I do think there is a residue there that will get stronger as time goes on.

Gittell: Well, at least it's possible.

Calvin: Mac, do you want to break here until the next session. Is this a communion place? How does everybody feel? It would be extremely helpful from a point of view of let's say certain educational constraints at a higher level if each of
you . . . Seriously, each of you could write a little bit about - well, maybe we'll wait until after the fourth or fifth thing, but we are going to need some help from you on this in some other ways, and ways that may not seem to be - you see, what's coming out of this that I can see is there really is beginning to emerge not a panacea or solution for other people's problems, but really some ideas that I think are going to be useful as the dickens looking towards for a beginning because you can't get this group around the table without a bunch of ideas coming out that will be useful to people, at least to consider. So we may ask for your help after the fourth or fifth session in putting your ideas in a form you'd like to see and maybe as appendages to a document that Rhody is getting ready to submit. So-but I thought this is a very useful and constructive kind of session, and I know I speak for Rhody in thanking you all for coming.

END OF THIRD PANEL

January 18, 1971
TRANSCRIPT OF PANEL FOUR

February 17, 1971

Metropolitan Applied Research Center
M.A.R.C.
New York City

Panelists

Dr. Kenneth B. Clark
Dr. Mario Fantini
Mr. Fred Ferretti
Mr. Rhody A. McCoy
Rev. C. Herbert Oliver
I guess I have been one of the few people who've had an opportunity to look through all three transcripts and see what the direction is we've been going, very exciting, and I guess basically, in the three transcripts we sort of have identified very clearly a chronology to search the background as we did in the first session, and outlined a series of issues which was in the last panel, and in looking at all three of the recordings, we find some cohesion and some articulation which begins to make a lot of sense, gives a lot of direction. And obviously, I am concerned about where the next two panel sessions will lead us. The design of this project was laid out clearly in the beginning as trying to look at the New York crisis, look at the critical incidents and issues and see if from it we could put together some options, some conditions that would lead to certain kind of responsive behavior and so forth, and having the luxury of being in school now, being in college, some other things have been happening. One in particular which I think is very significant, and I'd like to use that as a point of departure for today's panel. I would hope everybody is aware of what's happening in Newark right now. My feelings are that it's almost an identical relationship of people around an educational issue, as it happened in New York City and in Ocean Hill-Brownsville in particular. One of the latest experiences I had was watching the television, and television gave an accounting of the Newark situation, and in a very long news broadcast, it started out, I think, with Ken Gibson, and the questions that were asked almost dictated the kinds of answers that he had to give and it was centered around LeRoi Jones's participation in the government, and the school strike in particular, and then the news broadcast suggested that the next person to speak was the black school board president, and made it a point of reference that the school board was black, and then the president of the Newark teachers, a young lady, spoke, and her concerns were - let me back up and say that the board member said that
his concern was particularly in education, and then
the president of the teachers' association spoke
and her concerns were why were the black militants
bombing her car, fire bombing and inciting and doing
all these things, when actually what they were trying
to do was to get better teaching conditions for the
teachers so that obviously they could get better
educational programs for the kids. And then the
next person who came on was LeRoi Jones, and they
asked him a question which I think was just lost
in the translation, asked him a question about why
were they attempting to bust the union, and he said
they weren't attempting to bust the union, what
they were trying to do is to get an ethnic represen-
tation of the people who work in the community
and allow some decisions be made by people in the
community as related to their own children. And
then Bayard Ruskin came on and he said that this
was just an intolerable situation and if you really
looked at it, it was the black militants who are
responsible for all these problems, and so forth.
And then finally the union representative came on,
not the teachers' union, but the labor union's
representative came on, and he deliberately threat-
tened the situation by saying that if it was an
attempt to bust the union, they would not in any
way tolerate it, if they had to tie up the entire
eastern seaboard or bring the entire labor move-
ment and its pressures, but this was a test situa-
tion which they weren't going to allow the union
to be busted because they had fought too long for
gains that it had. That was the chronology of
the people who spoke on television and very obvious-
ly, you, I, think, all around the table can under-
stand how it was frightening as being a replica of
Ocean Hill. The two most prevalent concerns that
I had - one was that, and I attribute this to
you - at the last meeting, to talk about how peo-
ple sit around the table and discuss an issue in
isolation, when in fact the discussions centered
around an educational issue and nowhere in the
discussions was education discussed, it was purely
political, the power and pressures generated by
the power entity; and secondly, I looked at it
very carefully in terms of the kinds of responses
that came from each of the people who represented
a constituency, and even in their ability, or
attempts I should say, to address themselves as
to why are the teachers striking in Newark and
why the conditions are so deplorable in order to protect their respective constituency it was obvious that they couldn't talk about education. So with that kind of background for today, I thought maybe we could look at it two or three ways with a clear understanding of its relationship on what are the possible duplications in Ocean Hill as to two parts in relation to it; one is the opinions about the Newark situation and two, are there any inputs to this that we can make around this table, obviously the position of this panel that may resolve the impasse. Those are the two levels I want to start off with and then move to another level, which will sort of wind this panel up today. Incidentally, if we can look at it this way, and I recognize that it may be rather difficult, I think it'll really put some substance in the New York Crisis and Ocean Hill, that's translation, but I would appreciate it if anybody would have any opinions about the Newark situation, and two, do you have any idea what inputs we could make around this table as to what may be some of the possible solutions.

Fantini: Well, I am not as close to the Newark situation as to New York, but I can - I could formulate an hypothesis that New York City . . you can look at New York City as being farther along in the stage of deterioration, if you will, in other words the concentration of forces that is shaping the whole society, particularly at work in New York City, and has become as a matter of fact in the concerns of people who use institutions which are not working for their behalf and that in education which took the form and shape in New York City, a stage of concern on the part of particularly the educational consumers, have been concerned, that they had to literally intervene in what was happening and they called it . . . ., which was to establish a different type of relationship, try to make institutions work for them, they are not, these were public institutions, and my hypothesis is that New York is at one stage of development, and other cities are at different stages and that continues. And if the conditions remain unaltered, that is, if the basic concern for education - it is so important that if you don't have it, you don't have access to this kind of society we have; if doesn't - your options are limited, and not only
are your options limited, but we have a - without education perpetuated things that happened again, and right now education is vital to survival, and, so therefore, to deny human beings education today is to deny them the means of survival, and it is not surprising that this is the case. That those who are affected will have to reach a stage of the reigns, then in which they try to do something about it. Now New York, in Ocean Hill was an attempt to look at Ocean Hill this way and now that you say, 'well, look at Newark, this is a parallel,' that's not surprising to me that it is a parallel, because the same conditions are at work, the same frustrations, the same needs and people are going to watch your change, they are going to express themselves. The irony of it, and the one we talked about last time, was that institutions have their own, they have their own character, and try to - any entity, they try to preserve themselves so that we have those on the inside who are trying to preserve it, trying to justify it in one way, and those on the outside seeking some form of redress; but those who do not have access to power are trying to challenge it. And I think that the unfortunate part of this theory is that it seems to be inevitable that there is no way of altering this; it seems to be that the forces are so concentrated, so power-laden right now that to try to create a counterforce to remedy a deteriorating situation, first is politically non-tenable and that - economical- the situation in the community can't, even if you could do it politically, you can't sustain it, because exactly the people who are the most affected are the people who are trying to monopolize that power, and that - if it's true what Dr. Clark or Dr. Gittel said the last time - that you really to affect, to try to intervene in a situation of this kind, is not only controversial and sort of hazardous, but in many ways it can't work, so that the fundamental irony here is that we can see these symptoms, we can see these things that are parallel in Ocean Hill, but I don't see much that we can do about it. So, my theory is that New York was at a certain stage of development, others have forces that are shaping New York that are shaping other cities so that the conditions developed have not been a change that cause this, and therefore you have a Newark and we are going to have other cities that will have the same
Ferretti: kinds of conditions. So there will be other Ocean Hills that will be taking different forms, but essentially the same characteristics.

There is another dimension in Newark; this is a funny city. It's a city without any tax base at all right now. All of the white middle-class people have moved out and the blacks that were there are poor in this city. The only businesses of note are downtown, Prudential Insurance, as I recall, some of the breweries. So there is really no money in Newark. Newark is a businessman's town. People come in from East Orange, or from Bergen country, so that at the end of the day, they go home at five o'clock and it's a ghost town at night, and there is really no money unless the people . . . to do anything in Newark these days. And when I hear the teachers or the teachers' association, as I recall the first two or three days in the strike talking about nothing else but 'the package has to be bigger or we don't talk.' There was no talk about education at all; the package has to be bigger - there is no way of making the package bigger. But you know, of course, you go along with the political ramifications. What's significant to me was the appearance on the scene of Bayard Rustin. You know when Bayard Rustin shows up, you know that he goes there with the teachers' union approval and he says things that will be approved by the teachers. So I don't count on him anything more than a piece of litmus paper, as we say.

Fantini: When you say it's bankrupt, I want to follow through on that - when you say that there is no money there, but there is a need, then it seems to me that this is - it only reinforces the kinds of concerns that I have, that if they wanted to find money and if there was a national priority declared, that was a, you know, if there is a flood, you have an emergency, - we even have special executive powers to make money available, well this is the stage that education is in, and therefore you have it deteriorate like this; you have people who are trying to get some kind of regress from injustice; and then finally you have that what leads - the only thing that comes out of this is repression. This is another indication that things are not going to change. It's going to be inevitable,
and that they even - concerns, you know, the fact that there are all kinds of ways camouflaging it - you could get people who have a vested interest in seeing to it that things remain as they are saying, 'look, who is involved in this, look at all these people who are wild,' and camouflage it . . . the problems, but that's the irony of the whole thing. The general public, as you were saying earlier, is not aware that the emperor wears no clothes! You know that there is a fraud here going on, something the general public is not aware of, so they throw out these political things and they see a person like Bayard Rustin, who seems to be a reasonable man, very . . . you know, since they are away from the problems, they . . . , and the kids remain a sacrifice. To me, I don't know how you relate them.

McCoy:

Can I ask it in a different way? If what I am hearing you say is so, let me pose it in the form of a question, if in the Newark situation it is obviously apparent to me that every one of the people to whom I have talked see what the fiasco is, obviously know much more. I mean, I think the nation knows he's bankrupt because he's been appealing to the federal government for help, so if they know that and obviously there must be some role that they are playing and a script they are following to make those kinds of demands. Now let me put it into New York. If what I think hearing you is so, even in New York, before Ocean Hill, with the more sophisticated people, obviously knew that these - of this stage of development that you are talking about, were there. So I guess that the last thing I am saying is if you are identifying the fact that education in this country is not a national priority, which we all believe, then you are saying that people all over the country as they reach this stage of development will become involved in this struggle, and those who are vested interest groups can expect those kinds of behavior. But then if that's how it is right now, then does it get to a stage like it is in New York, or like it - I mean like it was in New York, or like it is in Newark? I mean, the vested interest groups knowing this phase of the struggle and seeing the signs . . . can expect certain kinds of behavior.
Fantini: Rhody, that presupposes that vested interests have the public interest at heart.

Oliver: I remember back in '68 when an issue came before the Governing Board, that is also involved in the Newark situation, and that is the binding arbitration, and at one time we were confronted with a choice of accepting binding arbitration and we did not go along with that because it seemed as though we could see that the kind of binding arbitration that we would have gone along with would have been detrimental to us. So we didn't accept it, and I see that this same issue is in Newark. As far as Rustin is concerned, he never - even though he came out against, publicly against the Governing Board's, spoke against it - he never once to my knowledge set foot in Ocean Hill-Brownsville to ask anyone there what their issues were. He never tried to find out, and without trying to find out or to see it from another side, he publicly took sides against the Governing Board and with the UFT, and I have the feeling that he is practicing the same there. He was and remained out of contact with Ocean Hill-Brownsville and I rather suspect he is still out of contact with the people in Newark. But it does appear right now that the young people, the children, the students in the New York City public school system are the captors of the UFT. They are, they are colonies now of the UFT, and unfortunately there is not enough policing of the UFT to make them produce what they are being paid for, so they have pretty much a dictatorial system of control over the students, and if the union with the backing of the UFT and with backing of labor is successful at Newark, I am afraid that those who want communities to be more involved are going to suffer another defeat. I don't think that education made advances in the defeat of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and what's going on there now, I think is evidence of that. I can only hope that Newark won't go that road.

Fantini: You are supporting my statement; it's inevitable, you came close, you caught a glimpse of something other than what it is, and that's part of the reason that you really shouldn't have travelled that road at all, you were never meant to travel that road, you were never meant to have the
community have that much. When they found out what was happening here, they quickly moved to establish an equilibrium which served, you know, the status quo, because there were vested interests associated with it, and I think that what has happened is that before . . . (not distinguishable on the tape) . . Ocean Hill triggered an awareness coast to coast, it also triggered and the way it was played, it was a negative rather than a positive thing, at least that's the way it was communicated, but it signaled the people who have vested interest whether it is community organizations or what, that they have to become more aware of the educational consumer than they have in the past. So they devise mechanisms that appear to satisfy the public code, you know, the past, or you know, by developing notions of participation which are still controlled by those who are the power, so that they have advisors' groups, and they do have parent participation, but it's of a sort that is tolerable to those who are present and when they do talk, and another thing, they came out of the whole decentralization community control with the whole issue of accountability. And now, you see, they are - we got to be accountable, but they capture that, they know this, and they say, 'look, we are, we'll create a -Dr. Clark, you know, he's wearing no clothes,' and so the people say, 'now here . . .' (indistinguishable on the tape) . . . and we, the people who are charged to conceal this reform, are put in a position of trying to justify what can be very unreasonable, and then you have people like LeRoi Jones and what . . . that kind of up to the American public, and they say, 'look, if you have people like that, what good becomes of something like this,' you see, and this cycle continues, this is my whole point. I don't know how to deal with it, it's inevitable, and Ocean Hill came closest in the history of American education for a short period of time to demonstrate what a . . . at least in terms of government might be relationship between the schools and the community for the purpose of improving education of children we've never gotten to that because we have been thick in the clouds of politics. And, you know, one of the questions I remember that was raised with you, Rhody, is that, refers to the clouds of politics were so thick, what words, what . . . quality of education
during that process, you know, when you did have a chance in those moments, did you, were you able to . . .

Clark:

Before you raise that question with Rhody, I'd like to go back to the initial question that Rhody raised about the similarities between Ocean Hill-Brownsville and Newark, because I think in order to see the similarity, maybe we ought to see the differences, too. As I see the Newark thing, the major triggering with the teachers' strike in Newark was economic, was the political or the community control or who has the control over the public schools in Newark and the prerogatives of criticizing, and what not, was not the board's concern, it's basic concern in Newark was the type of variety, union's concern was protecting the economic, the labor interests of the union's members, and this apparently cuts through obviously the first thing that goes is educational concerns, economic, largely economic picture of an inequality in subordination, just as the unions in New York, or firemen or policemen, etc. It's not their concern who pays as long as it isn't that the union in Newark, and certainly race is irrelevant on the leisure level; the fact that the leader of that union in Newark is black, sex is apparently irrelevant because she is also female, and you don't have the structure of, you know, more convenient personification that evil which we had was a white, male Shanker in New York, and the only part of it on television that I saw, Rhody, was what I thought was a pathetic appeal of Bayard to, I think, predominantly black teachers, when he was trying to convince them for basic support for strike; and the segment I saw, he didn't seem particularly too decisive, nor did he seem particularly convinced himself. He seemed as if he were going through a routine that has become his role, particularly in regard to teachers' strikes, because apparently Bayard has focussed his production of his role as the liaison between disadvantaged black minority and the "disadvantaged labor movement," and he becomes the agent of clearance or alliance here. And sometimes he obviously has difficulty in this role, so as I see this Newark thing, it - in many basic ways, is different. Now in some ways it is similar. But to me the similarities are deep beneath the surface, in a way
maybe more insidious, because the growth of organized labor movements, unions, in the educational field is a kind of a danger and a fact which was highly focussed in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville thing, because what made there was to take themselves against the people of a community, 'look, we sued you, we have the power to block you,' as it turned out they did. But let me take the... and look at Newark, in Washington, in other sections where you have strong, or varyingly strong teachers' union movements, you have what I would consider the contemporary form of a significant interference and contamination of the educational process by a power group that is not particularly interested in education, that's interested in using the educational process as an instrument of its power. But I declare this kind of danger and desire for educational virginity or purity was put in the dark form of preventing the politician from raping the educational process, in other words, all good liberals mobilize themselves to effect education from political interference and by political interference you mean the hack politician, ... teachers, area supervisors, and what not, in fact some of our reforms that have since become abuses were attempts to deal with that, such as the civil service exam, or the Board of Examiners. These were attempts to maintain the purity and virginity of the educational process and educational decisions from being abused and raped by non-educators. When I... the danger of raping and contaminating the education process by some other kind of power changed somewhat; here it took the form of the American Legion or rightist people, or people who had a particular kind of ideology that they wanted to see that the schools would not go against, so all good liberals mobilized themselves to protect the virtue or the virginity of education from this kind of raping by the writers, the ideologists who are generally the conservatives, in fact, reactionary who wanted to control the schools. And somehow or other we fought that through with some sort of success, but I will go to Newark, there is a new kind of rapist, a new kind of power structure that is seeking to contaminate the educational process and subordinate it to their issue, but now the danger is not as apparent because these are allegedly people within the educational issue - they are allegedly educators,
so the fact that they are really alien to educational concerns takes a long time for anybody to see, and you can't look at them as if they were hack politicians, or as if they were reactionary, because you have a Bayard Rustin, you get the liberal labor movement mobilizing to come to their defense, and if they succeed, not only will the local community people not have control over education a la Ocean Hill-Brownsville, but the Mayor Butler won't have control over education, nobody will have control over education, including nice, conservative, middle-class people everywhere, they will readily be relegated to the irrelevant, and the last people who will have control of education will be the central boards of education and bureaucracy if this particular power, as I see it without regard to the justice or injustice of their economic, if you want, I am not in a position to say whether the teachers in Newark are underpaid or overpaid, nor am I in a position to say whether the city or the state can find the money or not find it. These are not questions which I have any pipeline to doubt. The other . . I feel I can say is that if teachers' unions continue to grow in power, as they appear to be, and are supported by the labor movements in general, then education becomes a form of labor movement, and what the American Legion and the Birch Society and the others did not succeed in doing, that the hack politicians did not succeed in doing, the liberal labor movement would have succeeded in doing.

Ferretti: What better . . . to leverage . . .

McCoy: It puts a different context on it to analyze this as you just did. Mario mentioned or Reverend Oliver quoted what Mario mentioned indirectly, that there is some concern on the part of the people, one to hold somebody accountable for the performance of these educators, and you alluded to the fact that they mentioned this in the rhetoric so that the public would think that they are addressing themselves to it. . . . the teachers in the next few lines which says . . .

Clark: Well, they watch the smile on Shanker's face on the front page of the Times.
McCoy: Which really says in effect, 'we are going to have to work out a situation where we can look at this thing objectively,' which is almost tantamount to impossible. On the other hand, you touch bases with the last body who doesn't have an effect on education, that's the Board of Education, so what I am saying is that you almost paint a hopeless picture of 'the people who are supposed to be in education' being involved in education, or you are bringing . . .

Clark: Well, they will be involved, Rhody, in the sense that they will be the agents by which the union contract will be negotiated, that is clearly as the unions become stronger, their contracts will demand . . . if you look at the contracts which the Board of Education will be required to negotiate, they'll be negotiating any way.

Fantini: How many contracts are negotiated now as part of protection of the people? How many police are there at school? That's part of the contract, is it not? (Tape is damaged here.) . . . correct, in other words, you can perpetuate this system and if, the irony is, I don't think that there is any way that you can deal with it. This is exactly the levels of analysis that Ken said. . . the only thing here is that what you have is an unquestioned, critical mass of kids who are not being educated, a critical mass. Now . . .

Clark: Why would that be a concern of the union? The concern of the union is to protect its members.

Fantini: No, let me say this, this is in my own way of how this is a concern of the economy, it is a concern of the pocketbook in the sense that it is a way, because there is a major process which is the driving force of the American people, one reality, one motivation of force is the pocketbook what effects it has. Now if somehow there is a benefit which shows a relationship between their education about which there is no question about, and the fact that people have or are entrenched in this economy as a result of that that they have to pay for welfare, part of the welfare costs, and so forth, that it may be possible to convince the public, you know, not for any reason but that if you had a better system which kids were educated, you could save
some money, and that may be the only other major strategy which, an economic one, which you have just . . . as far as I am concerned. There is now how to make this argument, who makes it, but it is a national trend now that people even in so-called suburbs are vetoing the rising costs, it's just that they don't feel that they are getting, they just can't afford to . . . more money, and they don't think they are getting that much out of it. There are all these symptoms that are characterizing education. Now if it's possible to get businesses and industry, this is the only other major force. We tried the political one, and before that we tried to be reasonable, we tried to appeal to justice and the like, and then we moved into the political realm, and into the economic realm, say education, the drain that it has where the school, where why people . . . in terms of the kids wanting to go to school, the fact that they are not being satisfied they turn to other forms of trying to satisfy . . . the deterioration of the cities, business and the industry have to relocate, all kinds of expenses, too. The business and industry have to re-educate, they have to recycle their . . . They have to create their own educational system in order to salvage people so that the manpower needs are met, and it seems to me that for, as far as I can see, the kind of energies to it that's necessary to deal with this dimension is its problem, packed in our times the economic. I mean, I just don't think that the - it's such a monumental kind of thing, that unless you get it to the educational consumer . . . where you begin to get power . . . the giants of industry, the pressure of politics, . . . then action might be taken, but as far as, you know, trying to say that the communities, who for the right reasons want to get a better education and they want to intervene with a basically bankrupt system, when it's not worth it, and that they can organize themselves and sustain any kind of reform movement. I just think that that's what we learned, we can't do it, the sources of energy are very, very minimal for the kind of bureaucratized institutions that we have with the power that's inside trying to keep it going. The only counterforce I can see; well, you first tried the political force, you see that . . .
McCoy:

Let me back up and put it two ways. First of all, you started off mentioning the number of security guards at school. The question I am raising in that vein borders on racism, because you don't pull this in a white community. Now, hold that, I'll talk - the second part goes back to some of the things that you alluded to and Fred opened it up by saying that the Newark teachers demanded a package, if the taxpayer is cognizant of the fact that "higher" or more money to be poured into education regardless as to what the quality is, and this attitude is a growing one, then how do you account for the Newark situation as a package, as a union package? Number one. And, two, I don't see how you can possibly discount that it isn't the politicians in the political arena. I think they are the most devastating. Senator Markey is proposing a bill, at least they say he is proposing a bill. How can you discount the politician in that thing? You know what I am saying here is that these characters work together.

Fantini:

Yes, but who is pushing the politicians? That's my point. You have, you know, common folks trying to push them, you have business and industry saying, 'look, we got to do this because it's going to affect our profit, it's going to affect'. ...well, then they act. Busloads from Ocean Hill warned the legislators very little, but, you know, in terms of your concept of overall power of who makes decisions.

McCoy:

I guess I have problems with that, and I am looking at New York and Newark, and Washington and Chicago, it's very simple. I mean if you look at the national budget on welfare expense, it's almost an unbelievable figure.

Fantini:

That's economic.

McCoy:

Yes, so obviously if you are saying that if you begin to appeal to the taxpayer in terms of where it hurts his pocket, then you get this tremendous escalation in the welfare system.

Fantini:

I say that you can use that to get better education.

McCoy:

That ... that strategy.
I wouldn't completely discount politics myself. I think there has to come a time on the part of the poor and black people, or the minority people of this country, where some kind of a viable coalition must be formed to get political club. I think there have been people toying with this, notably Herman Bedia in this town, who has tried over the last two or three years to create this kind of thing. Whether he is going to be the man big enough to do it or not, I don't know. But I think if something like that could be created, then I think things can be moved. I am a firm believer in politics, I really am, for good or evil, but it has to be a kind of politics not appealing to reason, as it suggested, but appealing to power, or you will do it because I think this is the way any vested interests react.

The institution, the way it's structured now, is so potent in terms of the lives of the people in it, that is goes beyond racism that Ken found, you know, he pointed out in Washington and in Newark the people in the union, black or white, that once they're in and assume certain roles that are appropriate to being that kind of member in a school situation, you assume those attitudes, it's not compounded in New York City, but certainly there. The teachers were motivated not so much by education, but by their own elevation of status in terms of power.

Let me remind you, gentlemen, in terms of politics that in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville situation and in the decentralization laws, struggle, politics was very much involved, but the control of the political apparatus of this particular issue was in the hands of the union, the UFT and the central labor council and that actually the people in the local communities had no direct political access or power or what have you.

I think the thing to do is to build up, build up that political club.

Yes, but in the meantime, I don't know how many generations you are going to have to . . .

Can I go back to follow something that Ken said to some sort of conclusion. If, in the beginning
you said there was a stage that New York suggests, a quick example in Newark, obviously the people, or certain kinds of people . . . of development, I mean the fact that Gibson took over a bankrupt city and you begin to make certain of appeals, obviously the people appeal. I am saying, obviously . . .

Fantini: What? I am not sure. New York City thought it was bankrupt.

McCoy: I mean dollars and cents there. The question I am saying is, if people can see these signs, based on some sort of historical recognition of it hasn't taken place somewhere else, how do you account for the length of time from the beginning of the school to certain time of in the absolute concretized polarization of various people on the part of each one of these accidents. I mean, in other words, I am saying how far . . . and I would say, . . . got to the people the other times said, 'look, let's take this money situation, and show you that if you spend the money, you get a better education. That'll cost you less money in the end.' So what I am saying is simple . . . the problem, because you'd be addressing yourself to . . . (Panelist interrupting) . . . no, frankly, I can't. That's what I'm dealing with, but I am saying to you, if what you are saying is the money, you know, where it hurts in the pocketbook, you say to the people, 'listen, if we expend this money and we get a better education, it'll cost you a lot less money in the long run.' But it would seem to me a simple solution that teachers would give money, right? Who, the other people . . .

Clark: That is not - you are saying that society should run according to rational . . .

Fantini: No I didn't, not at all, absolutely not. I am saying here, we are trying to look over a situation, I am saying one way to look at it is look at the forces . . . urban consumer, urbanization, one, density of population, where are these forces, institutional, you know, the . . .

Clark: Factories in the urban cities . . .

Fantini: All right, and I am saying that white New York happens to be because of its size and all of the
factors, at one stage, and others are at different stages. Now just take the school situation and when you have masses of kids not being educated, when you know that education is important, when the parents in the community realize this, they want to try to do something about it. It took a form in New York, . . . In Newark it takes another form. I am not sure because I don't know enough about this local situation whether it's the same thing is clear that people inside will try to protect what's theirs, because that means the normal way of behaving, if you are inside that system. It has nothing to do with the guilt-learning, children and so forth. You know, I have certain rights, and I need more money, that's how everybody is doing it, and I am organized politically in the power terms so that I, you know, I protect, and I say that's from coast to coast. Then when they are jolted somewhat, as they were in New York, they pick up strategies to deal with it; accountability is to deal with it one way, participation they'll deal with, but not with community control, that's not right, but with participation - sure, we'll participate for our term, we'll tell you how to participate, and they can literally control all of the issues that are brought up and the continuing goes on, and the injustice goes on. I am saying there is no critical man for dealing with this, and politicians right now they want to respond just to beat the injustice of it, can't - because people are controlling the politicians, and I am saying right now organized in New York, organized groups who had a lot to lose on this mobilized because they could, they had the money to do it, and they defeated it. So people who were most affected or people who are powerless can't move into it. Now, the only cycle, I mean that's a very bleak picture, and if you want to intervene and really are serious about it, what was put out at the last session was that if you intervene it's controversial, and you are going to be clobbered as a result of it, because you are going against, you are swimming upstream. All right, my point is, that you could try these things, but ultimately the only way for this society to deal with these problems is by business and industry being affected, by the fact that the manpower aids as served by the schools, are not, you know, they are just not producing,
they have to duplicate a lot of the efforts, they have to . . . very inconvenient for them to move, and therefore they will affect . . .

Ferretti: Look, Mario, it's good business to have baseball, but how far . . .

Fantini: That's why I am saying, that's why I say that you're saying why don't you go around saying or tell the public that, you know, we tell the public every day that people are starving all over, they don't pretend, it makes any difference.

Panelist: What's going to be the difference here?

Fantini: The people who control want power, they have to be affected by this. They have not yet been affected, and until they do, you know, it's not going to change. Now your point is that there is a - there are energy sources that have yet to be organized and tapped. And I am saying, 'fine,' and I encourage that, but in the meantime the medium . . . . (Tape is indistinguishable) . . . and perpetuating . . .

Ferretti: I couldn't agree with that.

Fantini: . . . a certain status and . . .

Ferretti: How does one make . . .

Oliver: Where are the people going to be during all this time that industry is becoming aware?

Fantini: I say that they are going to be more and more frustrated and the way they deal with it is that your frustration will appear to be, you know, you get angry, and look at the people, they are angry, they look like people who are not in control of themselves, you know, and they'll put labels on them, they are extremists, they are militant, and so forth and so on, and everybody says, 'yeah, that's correct.' It is just shameful and I don't know how to . . .

Ferretti: Your example, I think, is proper. I have a friend, a very good friend, who is an executive at the New York Telephone Company, and every single thing you said is applicable to the New York Phone
Company, the training, to everything else. But yet, they do it, they are doing on a massive scale, massive scale, all over, yet there is no political discussion and there seems to be no inclination on the part of that company that I know of to influence anything. They just simply take and do, you know, just do it because it's there, and charge you more, but there is no philosophical...

McCoy:

Let me turn this around just to ask another question because I have an idea in my head that I don't want to put out just yet, but - are you really saying, Mario, that given what the situation is in Newark, that may happen again somewhere else and so forth and so on, there is nothing you can do - number one, because of the reasons that you have given, controversial, power, assigned gimmicks, and strategies, and so forth; or is there such a thing in terms of another kind of a strategy, another level of strategy, and I don't know fits into your... or not, but is there such strategy that can be pulled in a situation like Newark where it comes off literally at this point as a compromise because basically what I see happening here is people... but usually that they can be pulled off by whom and how that can neutralize the present situation and both parties seek some degrees of compromise, but a compromised situation, and then how can the people sustain it. Let me say what my prophecy is, if they destroy Newark, it will be an added-on kind of thing that reinforces of what you said about the professionals raping the educational system and having absolute control. But I see it going much further than that of having national education, the minorities say, 'every time you... you don't bust it open, then you destroy it and so forth,' and that will dissipate other kinds of movements all over the country in smaller communities or communities who are equally powerless, and so forth. Now, is there a provision that can be captured out of the Newark situation that will allow some sort of compromised position for the powerless so that they sustain in terms of delivering something else? Because if they destroy it, I mean, historically...

Clark:

The black militants of New York are trying to answer your question affirmatively by being
openly, overtly and some people even say violently, opposed to the unions. My own hunch is that this might bring forth sympathy for the union among middle-class blacks and whites what one ordinarily would expect. Just in terms of data it is also becoming the union admiring something, which I doubt that is what they are going, and I should quickly balance this by the way with the fact that I see no such indications in Washington, where you have a pretty confused situation, blacks, whites, unions, an upper middle-class, black militant board members who you know, and their confused splinter black militant group that seems to be in some kind of unstable equilibrium. In Ocean Hill-Brownsville you had more than Newark is having, or Washington is having. I suspect and this is a sheer destiny that the minorities who are really hurting though obviously hurting from the inefficiency of urban public education in spite of Bayard Rustin, and if you reproduced Bayard a hundred fold, are not going to be particularly sympathetic to unions who have to operate in terms of their own interests and who clearly exhibit only lip service, if that, to a concern for the predicament of ... in the schools, and my guess would be that the only effective counterforce to the increasing growth and power and control of unions, teachers' unions, that I can see on the horizon, would be the melting pot or the concern, but - and the danger here, as I see it, again as a social analyst, is that this fight precipitates middle-class white allegiances to the unions, and the only way you ever get back is voting down bond issues, but not particularly to curb the power of unions particularly if they can continue to protect their children in parochial schools and independent schools or private schools. I offer that merely as a draft, a hypothesis of what the picture will bring.

In New York, and correct me if I am wrong, we had a growing paraprofessional public, if you want to call it that, I forget the numbers, but they - teacher aides and the like, and mostly these were supposedly to provide facilities for new careers for the poor, so-called. Now as I understand it, they are now members of the UFT. They are mostly black middle-class but they are now being protected and they will enter the inevitable cycle.
Clark: They are another color section.

Fantini: Well, but they are in action, nevertheless, and once they are in the UFT and subjected to the whirl of the . .

Clark: Mario, the fact of the matter is that they are not in the UFT. They are colonial subjects to the UFT.

Fantini: If they are not, they are only roles to what they have to pay the . .

Clark: They do not, they will not have a school voice, you remember that I said as a manner without knowing that they do not have a single representative on the governing council of the UFT

Fantini: But when they do in my hypothesis, very few of them will have, you know, will survive the process and then become . .

Clark: Do you think the parents know that after the UFT's flamboyant demonstration of protection of para-professionals, that fifty per cent of them lost their jobs? And not a single strike?

Fantini: Well, that is just one of . .

McCoy: That hurts.

Clark: That is a fact.

McCoy: That's just one of the institutional characteristics.

Ferretti: That reminds me of another thing. You know we were talking about a situation parallel to Ocean Hill-Brownsville. There is even one more pertinent than Newark today. It's a school out in Queens called Shimmer Junior High School. Little background. It has about thirteen hundred students, it's in an all-black neighborhood, the student body is about ninety-nine per cent black, the other one per cent is Spanish-speaking. The teachers are about sixty-fourty whites and you have this situation where parents looking to control some aspects of the educational process rebelled against a local elected board, and you
have twenty-two teachers transferred involuntarily. You have a principal fired - all white. Now the principal is black, and I believe seventeen of the teachers of the twenty-two are black and all of them appealed to the UFT, of which most were UFT members, and they were told that the union would support them if they went in court. It's very interesting.

Clark: But those teachers who were transferred in Ocean Hill-Brownsville didn't have to go to the court and you know this precisely.

Ferretti: Because you now have a board, an elected board that can cut this local election which really just tore that apart. We have a section of Queens where this school is called Jamaica, South Jamaica, which is a black ghetto, and for the purposes of the election became three school districts. For years and years and years it was represented by one state assemblyman, one city councilman, and so on. All of a sudden it is now three school districts with no power whatever. You have a whole community disenfranchised. This is what happened.

Fantini: They were involuntarily transferred?

Ferretti: Yes, and I can give you a whole ...

Fantini: Without due process?

Ferretti: Without due process!

Clark: What does the New York Times say?

Ferretti: The New York Times is carrying a piece now which I have been in consultation with the guy who is writing it, because there are too many details and he won't be able to go into the UFT department.

Clark: Oh, that's interesting.

Ferretti: Which is really all of it, it's all the UFT. Very interesting, a very interesting thing.

Clark: Well, would a letter - and you don't usually put these things on tape - but would a letter to the editor pointing out the important details that
have not gone into . . .

Ferretti: It might be appropriate.

Several Panelists: You ought to investigate it . . . talk to . . even if they put it in, my guess is that they'll put it on page 37.

Ferretti: Well, they are timing it to go with a piece of a news story that's going to come out on Friday, talking about an arbitration on both sides, accepting arbitration. If you are interested, Mario, I will send you the piece I wrote on it.

Fantini: It would really be good.

Ferretti: Okay.

Oliver: There was the public meeting in Ocean Hill-Brownsville of the new local board, and at that meeting, there was someone from the *New York Times*. I was not present but was informed of it but was told that they had an outburst of violence there and the man was trying to get on the stage how it would be . . . chairman of the board, and the *New York Times* was there and they did nothing about it, and two days later a member of the board was shot in the stomach. We don't know whether this was an outgrowth of that violence, but . . .

Clark: Well, I don't . . . the fact that maybe the apparent reasoning is that now that it is free of the mad people in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and does not have to deal with minor matters such as shooting in Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

McCoy: Obviously, you have been reading Shanker's piece that went along with the Newark situation in which he says that you suggested, the press carries off some dual sets of standards that when black teachers and black people, you know, go back against the union, but if the white guy says . . . against the union, it has to do with black cats to the white cats.

Clark: Shanker said that? Who else reads Shanker's advertisement?
Ferretti: I do only before breakfast.

Fantini: That theory ... why is that . . . MARC is taking a stab on the fact that the UFT or anybody for that matter, would take an ad out like this? And they can do conditionally, look back at the New York Times.

Ferretti: The columnist . . . out with Shanker.

Fantini: That's right, and if this is . . . he is using a blackboard which is just not equally available. I think that this is . . . obviously an advocator has certain . . .

Clark: When we talked last with the Ford Foundation we obviously don't have the resources to counter that.

Fantini: Well, this is all part of what you see . . . and that's why I say it was never meant to happen in Ocean Hill.

Clark: What wasn't meant to happen?

Fantini: The experiment itself, that was not, you know, it wasn't supposed to be that way.

Clark: Well, Mario, isn't that one of the cleverest things that the establishment, I think Bernie even agrees, ..... denying that, the establishment really didn't intend for natives to take seriously.

Ferretti: You did use the word natives.

Clark: Well, the natives get restless, you sell them a little of conciliatory gestures, but when you . . . troubles, when they are naive and uncivilized about who believes, that . . . and, you know, take seriously control and power and the rest of it, then you have to make them more sophisticated. You have to make them understand that, you know, that's not the way it really is.

McCoy: Mario and Ken, let me ask . . .

Fantini: Along certain quarters, it's attitudedly the so-called liberals who also are people who were
involved with the Ocean Hill, some of them said exactly what Ken said, 'well, we're going to have to show them that they can't do it.' In other words, they wanted to have the experiment as proof that the communities couldn't do it without those . . . and they are not even coming to that, and that, you know, I actually have heard it over and over again. The other things in this and I can - when you are serious, especially when you are new to playing games, when you are there, then okay, the community has a right, then momentarily you have provided the means to do it. Those, you know, foundations and every other - you know, the things, the means for continuing that are quickly, are quickly closed, in other words, . . . means foundations are . . . (Tape is indistinguishable) . . . embarrassment that goes along with this . . . and one of the questions, you know, id dealing . . . prove it, that is what it really worth it, was it an . . . was it a kind of thing, was it a fraud all the way around, was it - you see, the people, I don't have the . . .

Clark: Why are you asking this question in the light of what happened, man. If you want the answer to your questions, look at the decentralization bill. Look at what happened with it.

Fantini: Simply in terms of Ocean Hill.

Clark: Well, that is even more obvious. Look at what happened to Ocean Hill.

Fantini: Well, it may be that some of us were, you know, who were - took it seriously, also were pawned to deal with this, because I was involved as a staff person as irrelevant of that thing, and I took it seriously.

Oliver: Where are you now?

Fantini: Well, I think this is one of the reasons that, all the time, if foundations exist to serve the public . . . you got to be out of that problem.

Clark: Well, in less official terms that they can't do it embroiled in controversial obvious power conflicts, where powerless people who are trying to
get power and everybody knows that they aren't really able to use it. Everybody knew that the Egyptians really couldn't operate the Suez Canal when the British left. Gee, I don't know how they do it, so they are obviously inferior people, you know, the Europeans could operate the Suez Canal.

This is correct, it's attitudinal, it's the attitude, but the point is that the so-called sophisticated people have been proffered into all these roles, communications.

Mario, don't you know that Rose Shapiro knew more about public education than Reverend Oliver?

She sure does.

And that - you know Rose was to protect Reverend Oliver from his own ignorance, and - didn't you know that?

Of course I knew that, I had lunch with her.

... very clear, I think in Ocean Hill-Brownsville now we have a bowl cheer of political experiment now that has been set up by the legislature with its cooperation of the central Board of Education, and they have pretty much turned everything over to one man. But now, how is that working out? A month ago I heard that a meeting that had been held, it was a public meeting, one, it was held at 137, and it was surrounded by Young Lords, and they told this board, that you are just not going to do what you think you're going to do, you are going to have to work with the people. The governing board never had this kind of threat from any local group. Just yesterday, I learned that a program ... (interrupted briefly by a panelist) ... with the programs now, is they are requiring a community action agency to sign the proposal. They are insisting now that the local board get another agency, but when we had it I signed it and they looked at the governing board as a community action agency. But how has it worked out - this came out to me yesterday - was that someone from the Board of Ed. called the district superintendent, the district superintendent called Mr. Wright, and Mr. Wright himself chose the community action agencies, which wasn't held - community
council, it is his political role. Of course this was in a meeting that I heard about it, I opposed it there, but how can one man choose a community organization. I don't know whether they will back away from this, I hope they will. But this is the kind of thing that is going on and when the community and the community is finding out more and more about these things, they are just not going to survive, there'll be terrible in the end.

**Fantini:**

Yes, but if I were seriously - you are dealing with something that . . . deal with at a level of justice, injustice, and so forth. If I were, you know, for me it's very easy to say, we found this place such a mess, that governing board that just left that we have to really start below zero, and you know, we are trying, and so forth, but the blame will be cast and since the unions already exist in the mind of the public that people, you know, were militant in that period of time, you know, I can understand is and so that is the end of that.

**Clark:**

I want to give another explanation of Mario's. . . . Reverend Oliver, will be that Wright is being more realistic and sophisticated in the transmission of power and he is building for control of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, the school district, a power base that will be much more difficult for a union or the guy who defeated you guys, in a sense of the review of the old boards had to be sacrificed in terms of - very quickly without regard to evict the walls of rightness or wrong, this is the fact that you guys were defeated meant that you didn't have the power not to be defeated. I don't know whether Wright is virtuous or not, I don't know what he is, I don't know what his concerns are about education, but if it is possible for him to build in Ocean Hill-Brownsville the kind of political climate that this society traditionally respects and thereby protects, whatever he is doing in those schools, he clearly would have been more effective than you guys were. Is that making any sense? Is that a clear, amoral . . .

**Ferretti:**

You are not suggesting that he might be doing that?

**Clark:**

Well, if he can get, for example, the Times to
respect his political position enough not to report a shooting, or a fight and not to present him as, you know, generally by the media, as a kind of an irrational, making, crazy you know, and they could get away with this. And when somebody tells you what you say, 'my God, this guy is soft-spoken!' Well, now, Wright has eventually some kind of hold, or magic, over the image-builders, or the image projectors, that obviously must reflect their estimate of power or something that they have to ascribe, and we may not use that immediately to raise the reading level of a single kid in any of those schools one half a grade in the next two or three academic years, but what is happening, I hope, is that something about power is happening there, you know, something about somebody black or native to go direct, is beginning to take things in his and it might turn out like in Brooklyn, it might have to personal as hell, you know, initially, and with all the trappings of democracy you have an authoritative hold there until they get hold of those damn schools and then somebody overturns them to take those schools and make responsive to those kids.

Oliver: I don't think the establishment for a moment would allow him to gain that kind of power if he is going to use it for the benefit of the black people, and I think that the only reason that he can do what he is doing is so that he can hold the lid on and keep the natives happy.

Clark: Well, suppose he - like my friend Malcolm X who understood the importance of a dual role, the public role as opposed to a private agenda role, I would call it and I don't know if it's this what he's doing or protecting him or with authoritative intent to whatever, he may be very direct, naive, but suppose he says okay, the white establishment will not willingly give up power that considers itself being challenged of the power of the black people. It will play that it's only if this is expense that which will be for their convenience. As a politician, this is not foreign to me to operate in terms of what other people make it appear to be my . . . , so I won't operate this way. But my private agenda is to really get the kind of controlling power of these schools that Oliver and McCoy were trying to administer. They couldn't
do that, because they made the confrontation in ways that had to be resisted. I am going to pro-
fit from their mistakes, I am going to seem to be their enemy, I am going to seem to - you know - . . . with you guys, take a lot of . . . This will take years of white middle-class or black middle-
class to do this because this is the only way that I am going to be able to really get control over these schools, and when I do this, and when I get the control of these schools, then I will confront the white establishment with the fact that these kids are being taught. End of dream, my dream.

Oliver: If you had this outlook, it would have been my . . . to have come up with . . . somewhere in the last three years, but it has never . . .

Fantini: Let's put it differently. I think that's a - no, I think that's a very astute analysis of . . . power consideration, but . . . back, one of the political strategies were, that our society would not . . . unlikely, initially, the road we wanted to take was not unlike what Ken just said and that for a variety of reasons, the road that was taken was not necessarily that way, a more direct and more, you say, 'why not go directly to it,' and the kinds of coalitions that are necessary, all of the stages . . . as a deterrent, people in the establishment as well as on the outside, that those were not necessarily forged, it seems to me that perhaps the situation called for. They were, they are, I think, that people look back and say, 'sure, you can go back and look at it as a lesson, that's a pun.'

McCoy: I remember, you know, when we used to . . .

Fantini: You mean to tell me that we don't have the intelli-
gence to say, you know, of getting some things done of sorts, that it called for a type of compromise (interference on the tape) . . . the types of new schools who are gold, which may appear to be at the time, you know, in certain quarters and is selling out. That there, you know, there is a whole system of checking bases with all kinds of political figures that would give some indi-
cation, but not enough was done on this, not enough for whatever the reasons. Not enough was . . . of tying into whether it is the political figures
who were there, but rather we are going to do this, you know, we are going to go it alone.

Clark:

You guys gave me in twenty-twenty hindsight the impression that you really believe that righteousness would prevail.

Fantini:

You really say that, that's funny. There is no way to argue with that.

Clark:

And I'd like to get a working newspaperman's view of this hindsight view.

Ferretti:

Well, you know, it's nice to say that one believes that righteousness will prevail, but it so seldom does. I think, you know, it was sad to see, you know, I think the impartial observer out at Ocean Hill-Brownsville every day could not fail to see the rightness and the wrongness of the situation, but that very seldom enters into it.

McCoy:

I am sort of hung out in those kinds of promulgated confessions. Let me say it in a different way, and I respect the fact that there is a political machine that you've got to deal with, but there is a coalition of forces as you move into certain kinds of urban areas that you have to deal with. I would say that the educators have never been free of politics, never have been . . .

Clark:

You guys were trying to make it free of the traditional kind of bureaucratic and political controls.

Ferretti:

. . . talking about what's right and what's wrong.

Clark:

I am talking about the right of the community to control the schools and the destiny of its kids. This was their basic appeal.

McCoy:

Yes, you see, as I hear this, and I am talking about looking to some sort of future, that's why I want to go back to Newark in a minute, is that, and I am using . . ., you can't deal with this in isolation, you can't deal in the political arena along.

Clark:

Rhody, let me assume . . .
McCoy: If it wasn't for the moralistic aspects of this, meaning the plight of poor black children - you never got this thing off the ground to start with so that there has to be some . . .

Clark: Rhody, you have to look at who took that moralistic appeal seriously.

McCoy: I think nobody did.

Clark: Yes, you did. Reverend Oliver, Rhody McCoy, the Governing Board, you know, when those people (tape interference) . . . right throughout Ocean Hill-Brownsville, you just couldn't escape being a part of the sincerity, the genuine concern of the people, you know, there is no question about that. But after you react, the present arose people who were immediately and directly involved. For example, when I came over to visit you, Rhody, and (tape interference again) . . . and your concern. . . . I went outside and the kids, and I listened to them . . . what's going on there, you know, . . . that's a part of reality that has nothing to do with race or, I suppose, in fact, it doesn't even have anything to do with social economic status, because I guess this is the general pattern in the suburbs, you know, that many people who are not directly involved in the critical issues are pretty apathetic or bored about it, or don't understand it. My . . . of isolation or the . . . but looking back on it now, you guys were more isolated than you realized, and the illusion of not being isolated was perpetuated by the media that focussed upon individuals and the conflict and the controversial aspects for their own purposes, and they, a lot of us, were feeling that we were really dealing with a pervasive community issue, you know, an issue that pervaded the entire area, when actually, . . . like that, which was, that was the people.

McCoy: . . . done by the State Department, made the contract.

Ferretti: What was the feeling, Rhody?

Clark: Well, they kept telling me that, too. Nordos particularly would tell me this, in other words . . .
McCoy: ... such a committee that I am aware of ...

Clark: When you guys knew this community backing in support, it seems to me you remember ...

Oliver: But we knew that it was there, we knew that it was there even though it may not have become physically.

Ferretti: Well, it almost seems that in that case it should have been visible.

McCoy: I can't deal with that because I was called humorously at the moment when we marched across the bridge, it took something like five hundred kids from the one end and the next issue carried something like three thousand people. I mean I translate it - even at the meeting at 271 when all the auditorium was packed, and if you looked at the photographer who took the pictures he got the first row where nobody sat in the first row except... The auditorium was packed, kids were sitting in the aisles, with parents. But I mean that's part of that kind of strategy which leads me to ask you this other question. The bureaucracy and this what occurs to me about Sam Wright, too, and where Reverend Oliver the bureaucracy does have the people, it does have - even an almost intituitive sense, to know when it is being challenged. I say intituitive, I talk about being things the 'kinds of CIA' tactics that they use and all the funny kinds of things that they do, but I am saying is, if they are that sensitive, perceptive, have the resources, then they can literally read those signs of stages of development, and predict certain kinds of behavior. Is that reasonable when it comes a little jaded and jaundiced in something?

Fantini: What is instinctive ... can be challenged.

Clark: Particularly after response to your ...

Fantini: Right, we are talking about a rational, you know, exceptions that the, you know, I at least have thought that way. Stages of development are only appropriate for analysis here, it has nothing to do with ... you know when you are in it yourself, we are just standing the part.
I am saying one way to look at is . . .

McCoy: Let me back it off.

Fantini: Two people looking at the stages of development, that's a very sophisticated term.

McCoy: Chicago, let's look at Chicago.

Fantini: Detroit, that's decentralized.

McCoy: Yes, I won't go far away. But the plight, I mean the scions were being reared by "the people in the power," and they commissioned a legislative body to begin hearings on alternatives to the schools, that's the way it was called.

Fantini: That's economic.

McCoy: Yes, the whole discussion around that thing was all about community control. In other words, it had been predetermined by the structure of what it was going to talk about, meaning community control, and they read all the signs, they had all the indications of the community unrest, they . . . the lack of tax base in such a mobile population. They had everything. But what I am saying is as they structured the hearings which basically were an alternative, the language that they used had to do with decentralization, and all the witnesses that they paraded in in those ten sessions were asked very specific questions. They say, 'what's your reaction to community, I mean decentralization.' In other words, well, you got a variety of witnesses responding - depending on who was representing there - for instance, when they called the president of the teachers' union, and she said, 'I am for it,' as long as teachers have more oney they are not interested in any of them, you know that kind of argument.

Ferretti: Well, she didn't say that but you could read it.

McCoy: They called in the superintendent, the supervisors, the president of the supervisors' association, and he said, 'I have hard problems of drawing the line between decentralization and community control;' I mean it is cute, the language that each of the constituencies is using. Now what I am saying to
to you, the bureaucracy in that instance was so far ahead; the opening statement when they introduced me was, I am just going to tell you briefly about how I had been had, because I was said . . . a lot about . . . and said, 'come out and talk to the people on community control,' and I get there and they close the hearing. This is so, so whatever I said, and I called them all kinds of MF's and FB's and told that they were . . . and so forth, and what I am saying is that given the situation, you know, the press carried a statement, you know, that they had conferred with Mr. Urban Education, you know, just to legitimatize the positions. Well, what I am saying is they read all the signs and . . .

Fantini: Well, that's not the point.

McCoy: Wait a minute, I just want to ask you, they'll accept . . .

Fantini: Then they'll . . .

McCoy: Okay, but I am saying that they . . . be able to predict certain kinds of behavior or responses out of meeting all of those concerned.

Fantini: Who is they?

McCoy: The bureaucracy . . . okay, then how do you account for Ocean Hill in one sense and Newark in another sense?

Clark: I don't see the rationales of your question, Rhody, I don't see the sequitur. The bureaucracies read these signs, and they read some sign more clearly than others, or area than others, this is better. But what does that have to do with Newark, and I don't understand your tying Newark to Ocean Hill.

McCoy: Number one, I would say that in the Newark incident, I believe that if they had a legitimacy of another purpose, meaning education, that they could have minimized this confrontation.

Panelist: Who?

McCoy: The school board, not the school board, but all the parties who are presently in the position
Clark: Then you don't buy my differentiation that the Newark thing is more a garden variety - unions, economic class issue that is a community control, you know, an educational issue.

McCoy: No, what I am saying, Ken, in that response is that I believe that if the bureaucracy knowing what the signs were would take certain kinds of steps to . . .

Clark: Specifically what kinds of steps did you . . .

McCoy: I can't answer that, I mean, for instance, that they knew . . . okay, but Gibson has been appealing to the federal government and to the state for massive help.

Clark: Yes, but Gibson . . .

McCoy: I wasn't saying that he was going to get help, what I am saying is that if he was reading the sign, which I think the bureaucracy can, maybe in his . . . has not been . . . but if you are reading the sign that goes on to the state legislature and say, 'look, we are going to have this massive strike, you have blacks fighting blacks, and whites and blacks fighting and . . .

Clark: But, Rhody, what' the . . . you read Newark off the map . . . I really . . . they did this years ago.

McCoy: I understand, but what I am saying is that they could neutralize this situation. Now, if the conception here is that they couldn't and didn't, then my answer is that there must be another reason.

Clark: Should they neutralize this, Rhody?

McCoy: It's like Shanker says, 'you got to destroy this so that the people won't rise up again and start some fooling.'

Clark: Rhody, I can honestly say that I do not quite understand the putting together of Newark and Ocean Hill.
Ferretti: Except in a racial context, I - that's the only way that . . .

Fantini: I can accept the bankrupt system on the part of education of the kids.

Clark: And the Newark teachers' union is not addressing itself directly or indirectly to that, no matter what the negotiation is, if the government helps you out, the . . . we want money, and it's related to New York, only in the sense that New York has got the money, you know the teachers' union in New York got the money . . . bankrupt the educational business make . . .

Oliver: I get the impression that you feel that there is something happening that could be good for Newark among black folks. Over here in New York, the UFT senses they have some connection with forcing the situation in Newark in order to nip something in the bud that just might get off the ground. This is pretty much . . .

Clark: I really am lost on this, you got to develop that for me, man.

McCoy: What I am saying is that if - let's just stay in Newark, let's take Gibson - he knows that he doesn't have money. The teachers are demanding money; if he is reading the signs like you say that these signs are obvious in the stage of development, that he would have told somebody, let's call it the federal government, the state government, and say, 'look, we have a race riot in Newark, let's come on and have some money,' so that somebody, let's call it the state legislature, will send a representative down and say to these teachers, 'look, we know you want these dollars and so forth and so on, these dollars are not forthcoming, but these dollars are forthcoming, just don't create this pandemonium, and when we get this . . . and so forth back on the map, we can negotiate.' In other words, what I am saying is that they could have neutralized, and if they . . .

Ferretti: And if they could, because they didn't there is a reason, they were incredibly . . . that's the reason, I think the reason, I think it's a racist reason, I think it's the same reason that's at
the bottom of it. But I think that . . . and I think it's all that, maybe it's racist, too.

Clark: But that goes so far beyond Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

McCoy: That's what I am saying. Ocean Hill was like Lesson one, Newark is like Lesson two, if I can use it in that sense; Lesson two in Chapter Two, because . . .

Clark: Well, Newark is Chapter Two.

Fantini: Okay, now wait a minute, again I am not.

McCoy: Because they are really overplaying the militant role in that situation.

Clark: Who?

McCoy: Parents, teachers' union . . .

Fantini: Well, that's the same as in Ocean Hill. They played the militant role.

McCoy: I said they are overplaying it.

Fantini: They are overplaying. Ken was just saying this . . .

McCoy: Well, that maybe, let's say they are overplaying it even at the grassroots level, how is that? And I said that earlier. You have feelings in Newark has some impact on how Gibson has run this business.

Ferretti: It's my feeling from conversations I had - this goes way back, three years ago - I did most of the interviewing that went into the Governor Hughes' riot commission report and city government were all, you know, . . . on down, and it was my feeling then that LeRoi Jones is a powerful man, not as a . . . but as a functionary in that city, he had an awful lot to say today. Yes, I do, I really think so.

McCoy: It's just reinforced, and I don't buy that, I told you that, it just reinforces what I am saying is that if that is an acceptable fact that the establishment has recognized, then they are going to play this Newark thing out to the point so
that when they move, it's total destruction.

Clark: Of who and what?

McCoy: Any concept of black people becoming cohesive without any issues. . . the same thing Shanker did.

Clark: I'd like to speculate that if the realities of the Newark situation, and to me the principle reality is there that they don't have the money and they can't possibly mortgage the future of education the way Milton says in the Shanker UFT strike, they just don't have enough money, and my guess which twenty-four hours from now is likely to be shown to be absolutely wrong, is that the union won't be able to win that strike in Newark. No, that the union . . .

Oliver: But with other labor unions backing up on that.

Ferretti: There will be no money, simply no money to spare. There is no money in that treasury.

Clark: There is no money, and there the state doesn't have an income tax, you see. . . in Newark so far has been to walk around and see where the dirty streets were and ask the people why they didn't clean it up, and if they had a little bit of money, they are not going to give it to Ken Gibson, you know, from the state.

Oliver: Ken Gibson is the loser, perhaps, and then the union, but Ken Gibson . . .

Clark: Well, I believe in stern . . .

Ferretti: Newark is the loser because it's a black city, and I tend to . . .

Clark: And it might be a graveyard of the burgeoning power of the UFT, you know, it might be, and if Mario weren't here and willing to accuse me as he always is of Machiavellianism, I would express what seems to me to be a perfectly mathematical formulation, namely that the more the UFT and its dignitaries and functionaries, such as Sheldon and Shanker become identified with the Newark union case, which I think is a 'no win' case, the more they put in there, the greater the stakes
that they build in that, the better in the long run it will be for our kids, because they can't win in Newark, Newark can be a kind of a battle of the Bulge for the UFT.

McCoy: Ken, you are really frightening me, that really frightens me. What I am hearing you saying is which is bothering to me and that is frightening is that this is a head-on confrontation with the union in an area which they have not anticipated. . . . might be, and if that's so, I am going to suggest to you - you talked about making . . . change like overnight - that they are going to find the money, or they are going to find a way, an option, for that union. They've got to.

Clark: I would like to see where it can be . . .

Ferretti: Well, it would be very interesting to do that because, you know, when they are saying there is no money, there is no money, I really mean it.

McCoy: But, man, the union has to recognize this, too, they are not crazy!

Clark: Yes they are, yes they are.

Ferretti: Rhody, in every other circumstance, you do it and you find the money, that's the answer. It works in every major issue. They'll find the money, they'll just not find it this time.

Clark: Except that they don't realize that they don't find the money in Newark.

McCoy: If they found the money, and what you are saying is . . .

Clark: If they found the money, the union is strong as hell throughout the nation.

McCoy: You better believe it. In addition to that, so would Gibson be strong.

Oliver: But they might find the money after Gibson had it.

Clark: I don't think the primary problem here is Ken Gibson.
McCoy: Newark is a black town.

Clark: No, I think the cities are bankrupt, there are cities with black mayors that are doubly bankrupt because that's the only way that they are going to get black mayors. . . . unions are stupid enough not to understand that basic system of American democracy that is . . .

Oliver: . . . doesn't know exactly what they are doing. I was beginning to wonder . . . they know exactly what they are doing, and maybe Grace doesn't know what she is doing, perhaps if they do that some of the black folks don't know what's going on, but I think that maybe somebody behind her really knows what is going on.

Clark: Let's make this, you know, head-on confrontations of the . . . my friend . . . has to say, 'oh, to hell with this,' you know. It is very unusual for a mediator to make the kinds of statements we made yesterday, unless he is apparently an ass, and I can't imagine that. He really has to have come to the end of his tether to say, 'look, I want to be relieved.'

McCoy: Let me say this in a different way, just for kicks, and somebody who is a member of Parliament I say this to him. Right now, with the Newark situation where it is, is it conceivable-I don't know how many adjectives I can put in this as far as this to tell you . . . (the rest in indistinguishable) . . . but, anyway, let's take Newark, right now fifteen, twenty people left, like Julian Bond and Brooks and you and me, and Whitney Young all went to Newark.

Clark: On whose side?

McCoy: Neutral.

Clark: No, I couldn't . . .

McCoy: I told you, damn it, in all those things, try to be reasonable.

Clark: But this hypocrisy is beyond my imagination. If I went to Newark I would have to go against the union.
McCoy: Well, okay, but I mean then you would come up with some answers, but anyway, if they went over and tried to take this neutral position to negotiate, to get a compromise out of that situation, if that body of people, qualified at politics, would know how to negotiate a compromise position that would at least allow a community some substantive gain that they could sustain and work on it to develop to a later point - I think you made an allusion to something that Mario said that it may take years, two, three, four generations and for people to be killed in the process, but what you are saying here now is that there is nowhere a resolution to Newark. It's just a matter of what the final blow is going to be and who delivers it.

Clark: I think there is a resolution in New York - a defeat of the union with appropriate face-saving.

McCoy: It won't be a defeat.

Clark: It will, because actually he is not getting the money that they want, that Eddie... support from the money that the New York teachers got, would have to be a defeat, because that's what they want. Now, if that defeat could be packaged in ways which may the union... and, by the way, I think we have an example of it in the garagemen union settlement where the garagemen didn't get any more what they expected... the garagemen rejected. That is a possible way for the union to come out with its skirt being extreme and down.

McCoy: That's because of...

Clark: Yes, but if anyone probed behind that, one would see that the teachers' union movement suffered a severe blow which hopefully will be transferred elsewhere.

Ferretti: But, what they are asking for, too, is a kind of public relations effort following this which would tell everybody how badly the teachers did, so it would be impressed upon the media.

McCoy: You are all hanging me out, because I see two levels here. What I am saying if if there is a position that you are saying that the union does in fact suffer out on education, at least
on the economic level, that it can be packaged in such a way that the images that they didn't leave to, which is what I am saying, the bureaucracy does all the time anyway, regardless of how it gives them a position, then the same kind of strategy ought to be applicable to the community people. I don't know what the compromised situation would be, but they ought to be able to gain something out of . . .

Clark: But, Rhody, you are . . . fanatical, which is unusual. The community people - they are not active participants, except the militants who I think are right, by the way, in the sense of Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

McCoy: My definition of community in this sense is our kids.

Clark: Yes, the kids have . . . that is wrong.

Ferretti: Kids can't play with a union boss, or they . . . union loss and document it.

Clark: In other words, a political black because he does it.

Fantini: My own sense of it was that you were saying, 'whichever way it goes, somebody wins,' in the sense that if the union wins the capability . . . have a control . . . education of kids because that's the way it works. On the other hand, if Ken Gibson wins, and his association with LeRoi Jones and others, nobody is going to allow anything like that because you can't deal with it in terms of, you know . . .

Clark: Except that Ken Gibson can only win on the basis that he is bankrupt.

Oliver: But can he lose on that?

Clark: He could lose in terms of the struggle with the union on that basis.

Fantini: Now with the union, but if he wins, the question . . .

Clark: . . . Mario, as I said, that he cannot concede to the union's salary demands.
Fantini: This is correct and that's a victory, and a question, a basic question is, 'will he ever get money ... the negotiation?'

Clark: The thing that disturbs me about this discussion is that we are making it for Rhody's dissertation and it is clear that Rhody's dissertation will not be written until all our speculations have been washed away by reality, and that's not the way you have a doctor's dissertation. You have a doctor's dissertation as unassailable, so we ought to be profound. ... in the next two or three weeks we will know how ... 

Panelist: We may be very profound, thinking of how profound he will be.

Clark: Well, there is nothing like, you know, cold ... embalming your prophecies - that will be found wrong.

Oliver: Every case that we've heard always been in the last hundred years is centered around activities on the part of ... they bury themselves. The civil rights struggle gets away from that, but it always inevitably gets back around to that. But, I wonder, if you are trying to get back through it there is some obstacle there. I wonder if it could be that the UFT now is in fear of opposition to black control, or black progress in education. If it weren't for that, it would probably be something else. Right now, they did those things in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and certainly blackened the situation. ... Shanker's article in the New York Times last Sunday that which he wrote in the news that if the black revolution - something in ... (the rest is indistinguishable on the tape.)

Clark: Well, I think that's basic to the ... I skim through this ... the kindlessness without regard to whether the union wins or loses in Newark, the fact is the union has emerged as the contemporary chief opposition without regard to Bayard Rustin, through the legitimate educational aspirations of American minority people, particularly colored minority.
Oliver: They are protected by being a union and the favors that unions have in this country, they'll oppose them as . . . bad guys . . . the union. It's not really a union, in that sense of term, it's not, it's a labor union term.

Ferretti: All their trucks in the last three or four years have been on non-union management . . . they have been on . . . management.

Clark: Yes, but they clear the money for it.

Ferretti: I am not talking about contract negotiations, I am talking about all of the power play, all the public like things they have done, all have been on social issues.

Oliver: And where a Board of Education might not be able to cope with the . . . among black, the union is better able to do it. Maybe the Boards of Education can serve their usefulness now and the educational opponent that they have to deal with.

Clark: You know, I should go into the Hoffa - a bit of information that supports your statement. I was shocked and reflecting my own naivete, to discover in the first decentralization proposal in Albany, that the positions of the Board, the Council of Supervisory Association, and the union were identical, that actually Shanker when he spoke before the legislators . . . for that legislation was speaking for Rose Shapiro, or he was speaking for Degnan and they accept this as fact, and I was also naive enough to be shocked to be, you see, I raised this question in the Board of Regents, namely who was protecting the public interests when the Board that was supposed to be representatives of the public was in the same bag with the power, vested interest groups, that is supposed to be on the other side, and the supervisees and the intermediary who are now a part of organized labor, that in the realm of education in that area there was no public interest spokesman because the polarization had occurred in terms of white and black and that the Board of Education saw itself as having more in common with the union and the supervisory such as you . . . in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. Well, my colleagues on the Board of Regents didn't understand my position, and the
other thing that fascinated me was that the same legislature that had these decentralization bills that merely were at the dictate of the union and the Board, except the last one which abolished the Board, in the same session had a ... so when they could divert the issue from these blacks, they are not pro-labor, then they only pull labor when the issue ... was put in terms of black teachers, which I think ... 

Ferretti: That observation that the Board, the CSA and the union were together was just one ... you know, because when the local school boards, the boundary lines were drawn, the UFT drew them. That's a fact, they drew them, and they were presented to the State Legislature by the Board of Education, the UFT drew them, the UFT chapter chairman.

McCoy: I, for what it is worth, I still believe that, maybe it's almost a paranoia, but I still believe that there has to be some underlying strategy which may well be what we are talking about, racism or what not. The union threatening the power on the other hand, but what I am saying is that if these conditions are allowed to come to a point of coalition was for a very deliberate reason, and if I now talk about the institution of education, somehow or another it should have the same kind of resources that the bureaucracy has that would at least get some sort of substantive things out of these various conditions that would affect education. Now I haven't discounted what you were saying about what appears to be the union's position as being the - for black and other minority positions I recognize that, but that has so many ramifications that it goes all the way back to the federal government, and so forth. But the lessons that were learned in Ocean Hill was the question is what unions did we see, because those games, and I am saying if we are sophisticated enough to see those games, so is the establishment to see those games. They ought to find a way to - we use the word repeatedly in all our discussions we saw a glimpse. Somehow or another they manage to close that glimpse off, so obviously their ability to perceive these things is as good as ours if not better, given the kind of resources that they have. Unless I hear you saying that - which I hope is not so - that we are going to lose
lots of children continuously until some sort of race riot or revolution takes place, then Newark, Ocean Hill, Chicago, Detroit, anywhere else, in Washington, it's all a hopeless thing, that education doesn't have a place in this society.

Clark: Yes it does, but not for underprivileged people. Education is very important in this society . . . society is . . . but not the union, because it's so important.

Fantini: The unions deny education is relevant to kids, over thirty-six days were, they were, you know, . . . people something . . . too important that they would do anything you know, in Ocean Hill or anywhere else, to . . . You can't tinker with education for white people . . . conflict and anger. . .

Clark: . . . can't get away with anything.

Fantini: You know, when he said that we are going to stop it for everybody, it was over.

Ferretti: Yes, you know, as long as it was a limited walk-out . . . the previous May and June in Ocean Hill-Brownsville was fine, it was fine.

Fantini: You can't . . . education . . . run, you know, . . report that . . . You can't deny educational to the Jewish is you wish to . . . too long before it . . . You can't do it, it would be a . . . played a very important role.

McCoy: I got to go back and set the stage to what Ken said before, he said he was making an analysis on a very simple mathematical basis. Right? I am saying is unless the statistics are wrong the vast majority of the population is in the inner cities.

Clark: But the majority of the school population in the inner cities are irritating and disturbing facts.

McCoy: Okay, but also the vast majority of professional people are still in the inner cities.

Clark: Well, then they have to send their kids to the same kinds of schools that you have to send to your school.
Oliver: But they get their employment there.

Clark: Why do you think we are building the highways? Why do you think we are going to talk on Al Shanker's commuting problems? ... anything?

Oliver: Well, I don't see going through another Ocean Hill-Brownsville again, just like I don't see going through a ... so I think there is a lesson from that, and I think one lesson is that there has to be a much more, a total effort made, a much more comprehensive and without the faith in the system that we have. ... that came out of that, but a wish on my part that this a reflection of what became of mind dying. When Kennedy charged that we couldn't read the mind of the public, and he thought he was in touch with the public, but he was completely out of touch with them eventually, we thought that he could run the country without ... and he could not and he eventually got his own head cut off.

Clark: So what have we got in his place?

Oliver: We got a coronary, but we had a ... who was trying to force democracy on a nation that didn't want democracy, and then decided to force ... on hand but at least if somebody has to see the particular shape we are in, but I am saying, that he has to move in the direction of taking the whole world, and this is a difficult job, but there is no playing around, we have played around for a long time, but I think we have gone through a lot of playing around and I don't think that ...

Fantini: Who is we?

Oliver: Well, right now I talking specifically of black people and their struggle in this country, because where we make some headway, and when it looks like we are going to get somewhere, the white population gets upset, and they rather tear it down even if it hurts themselves, destroy themselves rather than the black man, and I think we are aware of them now so plans have to made with that in mind, so ... progress.

Fantini: How are you going to play that kind of game?
I just don't see it unless that's the name of the game now and unless the people in power...

Clark: I really don't know what you guys are talking about by "that," that what? Schools?

Oliver: No, no...

McCoy: I am glad you answered that, Rev. Oliver.

Fantini: What is the...

Clark: What is that "that?"

Fantini: The "that" to me is that there is no apparent alternative.

Clark: ... within the system.

Fantini: Yes, there is no way that I can see now to do these kinds of changes, and, you know, that's the ball park to that theory, and what I am saying is that the alternative is...

Panelist: ... resources.

Fantini: Can not be, you know, one that is democratic, participatory, you know, that had all the elements, you know, that are at work, you know, this country stands for in terms of rhetoric, participation, the public schools, accountability, all these exist for that purpose. All that was done, you know, in the name of the game of power, and if you are going to play that game of power, you have to have power.

Ferretti: That's what I said before.

Fantini: This is correct, it's a political one, and education becomes important as a means of power and what you were trying to do was obviously the opposite, that is gain power to suspend education or use education as a way of gaining power, and I really have no way of dealing with this except that this is not a solution at all, it just seems to be a way that the dynamics unfold, namely that the... of the whites then they will then say, 'okay, it's in their times, it's their decisions,' and the kids will continue to
be thwarted. I am saying that this is why we, you know, that wasn't one alternative or move with an issue that you can throw into it, it's not very much and it's very squashed. I don't know how to deal with it.

Ferretti: You conjure up things like this, for example, the black population of New York City is considerable, they pay a considerable tax, the taxes help to support public school systems. What if the blacks did not pay taxes? Somebody is listening.

McCoy: You know, let me ask that in a different way and address it specifically to change.

Clark: You are talking about alternatives to Ocean Hill-Brownsville that presumably would lead to non-defeat.

Ferretti: We are talking about power, ways to exercise power, to make your voice heard, only massively, boycotts...

McCoy: I want to redirect this, I want to rephrase it and then ask Ken a specific question. What you are defining for me is the taxes, paid some massive educational programs, it takes the same kind of enforcement that white America uses to put people in the line, so again I am seeing this situation... (Panelist interjecting something)... that's not within a category, within my ability to measure. Now, to rephrase it and let me ask it another way: Is there such a thing as a..., I mean options, Ken, I mean given what the President...?

Clark: I am the last person you should ask that in the light of the bloodiness you should see on my ears and all over me with my Washington battles and I... in Washington... achievements on the assumption that, you know, the one thing that, that I could say to the young people, because if you stick to this kind of no-win operation long enough you get one reward, and that is that every day you learn something new, no matter how old you are, and one of the things that I've learned about Washington was that, you know, I was naive as hell to believe that because a predominantly black board invited me in and that you were going to get a black superintendent and that you have
a black head of the teachers' union and you have a black majority in the city, a city that the whites really don't want to give up totally because they have invested so much in the marble, I assume that they do - white marble as it is, but you know, these were all big catches, so all you have to do is to go out a simplistic regarding for academic achievement of black kids predominantly, and they welcome you with comfort and the next thing you know you have some black marble statues erected . . .

Panelist: In Pennsylvania or Constitution?

Clark: Ah, U Street . . . battles of the world, if you teach black kids you got all the power failure going your way, the only way to look at, another glorious defeat. Not as dramatic as Ocean Hill-Brownsville, because here the forces were much more polite.

McCoy: What does that mean?

Clark: Yes, the whites did not have to surface, they had blacks tearing each other apart, the only right whites had to do is to write polite editorials on the one hand and on the other hand, you know, everybody knows you can't really come in and teach black kids, and if you get a black superintendent saying this and a black union man doing his job of being with the union members, they can get out of everything, you know, well . . . the last group of people to be talked for are dead. I am trying to deal with my own romanticism that I deal with on some of these things, and I have to say that Washington also taught me that the parents were not as outraged as they should be and there was no mass grassroots, indigenous support behind the Clark I know for teaching kids how to read or write; the letters to the, well, of course, one of the . . might show that the letters to the editor were all from middle-class whites who were saying that to teach black kids to read would be to dehumanize them, and I never realized that the only reason that the parents didn't write was because they were never taught to write, you know. So you are asking me for alternatives? See me tomorrow.
Fantini: The only alternative that I see - it's not an alternative, it's a compromise alternative, which may not even be valid, because it's such a compromise, and that is that an infiltration of the structure of the educational system at different levels of it, forming therefore easy.

Clark: Infiltration by whom?

Fantini: By those who are - you know, have fought, you know what the problem is.

Clark: What makes you think that they will not become indistinguishable from other view of the fact successfully infiltrating?

Fantini: Well, you are now saying, you know, you are now giving the only reason why this may not be valid, but I am saying, when you are searching.

Clark: Let's go back to the question, I really don't know.

Fantini: I would say that you need to.

Clark: ... King.


Clark: A man by the name of King who was the deputy superintendent last before it was public. He could have been considered as infiltrator.

Fantini: Now, what do they mean, they mean that organizations like MARC and some others will have to.

Clark: We've got our share of bureaucrats.

Fantini: I am saying that you have a kind of transitional. ... the system will corrupt you, there is no question about it, and will and the way.

Clark: Either it will corrupt you or destroy you.

Fantini: All right, but there are ways, you know. There are people around this room that in some way managed to maintain some semblance. ... (Panelists interjecting something). ... no, but I am just saying - asking for an alternative - what is an
alternative to it? I mean, it's such a bleak picture, and I am saying that on the one hand you have to affect the economic structure and vouchers of places like this, or in a sense the business and industry might look at education as an economic market place and maybe get better education through that means, and again there is no control in terms of parents, and just simply let somebody else try to do it and it may be advantageous economically, but that being right, because they'll make money on it. That's one overall strategy. The other one, you know, is if you start this kind of an infiltration where you are in the school system, some of . . . or somewhere else, and form a coalition which provide alternatives. You kind of create a different process, very slow and it will continue to die in that sense. But those are the only operational ones that I can come up with. You know, established the teachers are opposed the vouchers, oppose the performance contracting, they have the . . . and all that kind of stuff and so those are not likely to get too far, but these are the only alternatives that I can think of.

McCoy: Let me just backtrack for a minute. You said something - maybe you passed over it lightly, Ken, didn't hear you, I didn't see his ears prick up, but you said something like MARC starting its own schools.

Fantini: Not in this sense . . .

McCoy: That's what he said, now I didn't ask you to . . .

Fantini: MARC is identified in that work across the country with people who are committed, and there is a certain sense that you can clinically accept I said whether somebody is . . . and whether you can train him or not if you are going to use those talents, a phase, you know, you go into an environment in which it is possible to make it . . . not be compromised and try to keep, try to convert what's there and coming back to get fuel into this strategy and what have you, you keep coming back and forth, and the whole notion of you assigned to Washington was in essence to be able to do this and to bring some resources and maybe rechannel that energy and that power in
a certain way. You couldn't do it, well, okay, that's difficult and then that's it. You may have brought in some people at different levels, you may have tied up with a college, and so forth. . . . the way to do it, but it is possible to capture and turn it around somewhat . . . the stage of deterioration is so bad that they might allow, right now, you know, some - you know people say it's so bad that . . .

Ferretti: In their area, they might allow . . .

Fantini: Sure, they'll say go ahead.

McCoy: Well, let me back up again if what I was saying when you said that, because if your original statement was when you talked about some options of business and progress and us not having any control over it, and by us, I mean the minority not having any control over it, that's sort of a different perspective at this point. Now, what I am saying is even if we were able to educate all the black people, I mean substantial numbers of them, business still controls the job market, business still controls the political scene, so in that sense you are building another level of frustration and I would see the bureaucracy moving just executively closed eyes. In other words, you got to educate them if this infiltration process you are talking about became a reality, because it's so bad, they say, 'go ahead and do it,' the bureaucracy would again move, and move I guess even more expeditiously because the real forces are being confronted and challenged, and they'd stop the job market, an even worse job than they are presently doing, and its controls . . . meaningful in a sense to use public education as a weapon.

Clark: I really say that I have to believe in Mario's optimism, because if you don't, don't do anything and you are very cleverly defeated and you know this is similar to . . . if you don't do it you are bound to lose, and if you do something, you have a fifty-fifty chance to do something. Well, I got to believe that because if I didn't believe that I would make really an honest living I am not sure enough at MARC going to hide in the academic sanctuary at 42nd Street graduate center. I do
want to remind you, though, if Rhody is going to take seriously your invitation that is someone who has been involved in the struggle for democratization of our public schools from the old-fashioned ancient days of the struggle for Brown and desegregation, what I have really learned during these last three years with the disturbingly stark clarity was that the resistance to educating our kids under any conditions is greater than the resistance to desegregation, now that is an appallingly disturbing lesson.

Fantini: Say that again.

Clark: That the resistance - I thought that in the early stages, you know, in the struggle with the royalists, that the desegregation finishing as we have to raise the quality of education for our kids that that was the maximum level of resistance which you are going to find in the arena of education and civil rights in America. I thought, you know, when I was threatened in South Carolina and other places, you know, hell, the man is really fighting his last ditch racial fight and if we were to win this, the rest is easy sailing. I may say many confessions of ignorance and naivete, I mean get self-conscious about it, and I didn't realize that that was almost child's play compared to the resistance against any way of increasing the quality of education for our children, that any serious proposal to have our kids academically competitive to allocate, is going to meet a furious resistance initially disguised under all kinds of procedural matters, due process, sometimes even humanistic concerns, namely not wanting to frustrate our kids, that wasn't meant to have the same kind of neurotic hangups that the kids who go to Harvard have, and sometimes they come under real heart rending concerns, but if you keep pushing you aren't going to get but hard, sparse, bludgeoningly, God damn it no - the things that we get initially in desegregation and interestingly enough I think even more vehement than in the desegregation struggle. Now I don't know if that means it's hopeless. Where those that those of us who study the history of race relations in America know that the first civil rights struggle was the fact that the question of whether the Africans should be taught to
read or not, and that's the same thing with the civil rights struggles, how do you keep people in slavery if you give them the academic and intellectual skills to . . .

Panelist: Obviously.

Clark: Yes, and this is what the issue is although it was not generally put that starkly.

Ferretti: When your education system - the result of John Dewey equips . . . children to fit into society so that they can to question society.

Fantini: That's the whole adjustment, that's correct, that's very critical.

McCoy: I go back again because there is really something I want to tell you, but I still haven't found the focus to make it stand up, but what I am saying is - let's ask this question - education in this country - public education - is still controlled by white America and they are using every gimmick in the books to - what shall I say -

Clark: keep control.

McCoy: not only keep control, but to put it in a profit-making - let me change the subject just quickly. The University of Massachusetts has a tuition fee of two hundred dollars per student and every dime of that tuition fee goes back to the State, I mean it goes back to the fund, you know, it goes right through the University, goes through right on back to the State and they have already earmarked that money for something else, and I am saying that white America is doing the same thing. All of the - as you put it - voucher systems, programmed instruction, all the gimmicks that they are using in education, they are perpetrating these on both white and black, but more appropriately on black people. It seems that they - literally what you are saying - that they are for what they are worth - gimmicks - and they are designed, still designed to see to it, give the illusion that they are doing something, but yet they definitely preventing the educational attainment on the part of minority students and so forth. If that's the case, what can - I don't
want to say it the way I fear it sounds - but what can be done about exposing these characters? I mean . . . society, but you have to talk about it and recognize, except that the mass of the people don't recognize it. It's like the union. The teachers in the union are not making small wages don't really know what the union leadership is really into.

Ferretti: You ask the editor of Fortune to lunch.

Clark: I am not at Rhody's invitation to exposure, I want to maintain my status as a moderate and understanding person who can communicate with white Americans in the same way as I can with . . .

McCoy: Is there a role for the cat who wants to expose you?

Ferretti: He makes the New York Times.

Clark: . . . can expose all he wants, at the moment he'll get in the exposure bag, then you are an extremist, and then your phone should be tapped - there should be some of us who are softspoken, academic, philosophical, understanding, and that's the role I have chose for . . . and you find some other exposers - and Mario who is another minority that is often disguised as a minority status by his preoccupation with others, ought not be asking to take any more exposure roles if he is to be the School of Education, the establishment.

McCoy: You are destroying the hope factor by those kinds of standards.

Clark: I am saying that we have to accept division of labor, and Mario and I have decided at eleven or eleven thirty today what role we are going to take, we are going to deal with . . .

McCoy: Oliver, you and I have to get together and establish our roles.

Clark: We are rational describers of the way in which the establishment can be more efficient and that's not exposure, you interpret. I have a candidate for exposure - two: Bernie Donovan and Esther Swanker.
McCoy: That's on the record man - oh, God, I am, I don't believe it - I am sorry about that. I know that you know.

Clark: Well, they are much more invulnerable to attacks in being extremists than Mario, the minority, and I guess I am a minority. You certainly have to interpret the ..

Ferretti: Of course.

McCoy: Let me throw this last thing in.

Clark: And you guys, expenditure, exposure bag.

McCoy: Well, look, let me just ask this last question. I planned it for the last panel, but I read the transcripts pretty accurately, and I have been reading a lot of what I call supportive literature, and I am convinced that there was a predetermined script, that script has been written and regardless of who this person is fitting into the roles the main characters in that script, they are going to play those roles. They have no choice. They do either because they have read the script, or they do it intuitively being in the roles, and I suspect what I am saying is if education is going to change the minority, you got to write another script .. that. This script is like preordained.

Clark: The script of frustration, you are welcome.

Ferretti: A new script - how do you write the new script?

McCoy: Well, that's a question, maybe ..

Ferretti: Well, what should the new script do? What should it say?

Clark: You start a book, you know, a la college? Open enrollment, open admissions, knowing full well ..

Panelist: Compensatory education.

Clark: Compensatory education ..

McCoy: Now you are talking about a compromise script.

Clark: No, we are talking about the opening theme of the new script, which we already have ..
McCoy: Yeah, that's not a new script, that's part of...

Clark: Ocean Hill is the last I see of the old play... we got it, we got a lot of people taking this role or this approach and sustaining it as long as they don't look at the statistical reality, you know, that just accounts for an embarrassingly small percentage of human beings who relate this - but it is doing good, you know. This is a real reformation.

McCoy: It's not going to be a new script then.

Clark: Write a new script.

Fantini: You are going to be another employed actor.

McCoy: I am already in that stage.

Fantini: All right, you want a script in which you are employed?

Clark: ... impossible... about this compensatory programs, so people are really going to get money out of it.

Fantini: Right down at the time when you laugh so it hurts, because you laughed at it, you know, but one strategy is to go in saying compensatory education... process of education, it's certainly sensible and the like, and you go in and try to capture that, convert it slowly, you know, to me that is difficult, I can't see how this can happen.

McCoy: I agree.

Fantini: It's a matter of only an appendage and they are sticking out there... even say we need more money.

McCoy: I agree with that wholeheartedly, but for a different reason. What I am saying is that the people and their allies who have written the script for years and updated the play and updated the script, and so forth, are not going to be able, are not going to be allowed to write the new script.

Clark: We must now take the role and analyze it, I think initially, dispassionately...
Panelist: That's correct.

Fantini: I am not the one of man . . .

Clark: . . and among the things you learn is that you are expendable.

Fantini: You know, I have learned, people will say you know . . .

McCoy: Do I have to say what I am learning?

Clark: Well, you got to write a dissertation . . . they are going to ask that your dissertation tells something about what you've learned.

McCoy: That's why I meant . . .

Ferretti: Why not say what you meant?

McCoy: You don't listen to me, fellows, do you?

Clark: You're expendable and in a good position a moderate, for good causes.

Fantini: That's right. I understand that's what Bayard Rustin said, 'whatever happened to Rhody McCoy?'

Ferretti: That's right, I think I've heard you say it.

Fantini: He's still around.

Ferretti: Writes, teacher, and everything . . .

Clark: Rhody has gotten an invitation for a testimonial dinner with Al Shanker . . black tie . .

Fantini: . . can say Al Shanker was right.

Clark: In that that he had the power . . at political times when I need it.

McCoy: Do you say that benediction or do I have to get a neutral minister?

Oliver: No, you are regularly licensed.

Clark: We love you, Rhody, and we are glad that you were out there. In fact, Mario and I did the fact
taking care of the logistics.

McCoy: I heard that last week. Well, I am afraid this has been the bleakest panel session that we've had.

Clark: I think it has been one of the most enjoyable.

McCoy: It's been awfully enjoyable, no question, but it has been undoubtedly the most bleak.

Clark: I didn't realize the perspectives of the comic quality of the union, particularly . . .

McCoy: . . . the person who is going to record it, I put in parenthesis after that: (sarcasm) 'Clark added.'

Clark: No. I really love it. I really think that the stark quality of comic tragedy, inherent in a struggle for power depends on human beings to control their own destiny in the face of other people having this power and unwilling to do without, it's exciting kids, people like you are concerned about that. It's a necessary part to report of hunger; it's like my good friend, Les Dunbar, ironically, received an ovation for information that is . . . in other words . . . society such as ours really doesn't give a damn whether kids starve or not. He got an ovation for summarizing that fact. I really was embarrassed. For again, if you look at that, it's a tragic commentary - we are bringing democracy to Vietnam, and we will democratize them if we have to destroy them, and this is not an invention of mine, this is a high military . . . that is this town has to be saved, and the only way that it could be saved is to destroy it.

McCoy: And then what you said before, the coalition, the reaching out to these people and, meaning the economic power and so forth, it's just another exercise.

Clark: No, we do it.

McCoy: I didn't ask you whether you do it or not, I am asking just to exercise it.

Clark: You do it, because if you don't do that, you do nothing.
McCoy: Yes, but in the absence of any new script, new play, new actor, then you know you are in.

Clark: ... possibility of a new plot.

McCoy: ... just being an old play.

Fantini: ... years and years of talking, you know, it's just power, and I want to get in on it, I want to take it.

McCoy: That's so elusive and so nebulous.

Fantini: No, it isn't, it isn't, it's very clear.

Clark: Rhody wants us to be a magician ... 

McCoy: Nope.

Clark: in the wave of a magic wand you say, 'here, we've gone from educational injustice to educational democracy.'

McCoy: No, I really don't think that, Ken, what I am saying is the old warriors who have gone out and got this manuscript out, I mean, I know that they are a little ... (interrupted) ... yes, I know that. But I am saying that as a result of those experiences, some of those inputs can be substantial in writing a new script, because as I see and read - it's just a rehashing of the old script, and as you were just making in the last statement, I feel that this is ...

Fantini: From what the alternatives thrown out at this table has any, you know ...

Ferretti: You are right, it is a contest, it is a fight against labor, but it's also yet you must outdo it to have change, you have to have power, that's the way this country works. It doesn't work just out of the goodness of its heart, it really doesn't.

McCoy: You couch that out as a concession that you can reach up for, but you know that ... paying the graft you can't get through.
Clark: What do you want us to do for you, Rhody? Do you want us to say, 'here it is, the answer, here is the new script.' I can't do it. We can do it, but it has nothing to do with reality.

Fantini: You take the same theme, but with a different orchestration, same notes and everything else, you can't do - those you are the same - it's reality, you know, if you don't touch that, you know, then you are not playing the game, and I am saying, you know, that we believe in schools.

Clark: I have a friend who says that the only way you can deal with this problem is to abolish all schools, you know, get rid of them.

Oliver: . . . abolish the children.

McCoy: When you tell me that one of the strategies is to infiltrate the system in the form of coalitions around people who have certain delivery capacities . .

Fantini: Right, they really don't have the source of power, I know you can't - no locomotion whatsoever.

McCoy: Maybe not.

Fantini: They'll plug into a certain power source.

McCoy: What I am suggesting to you is that the very establishment that has the present controls and manages to keep them and shift them from the fullback to the quarterback, or from fullback to the running halfback who is going to see you infiltrate and is going to create the same atmosphere of frustration for you . . .

Clark: No co-option.

McCoy: Of course, that's what you are saying, the co-option will destroy you.

Clark: But, look, you'll be taking up some time on this.

Fantini: Not only be taking up some time, but you will be able to - for a limited period of time - to divert some energies. It may take you less far - you really have to go light years - but I don't know, you know.
Clark: Why are we permitting Rhody to put us into the role of consoling him.

McCoy: You told me I was joining the ranks of the unemployed, you got the confrontation with exposure, what else can I take?

Clark: Well, have to run things if the establishment is . . . which is closed to us now, my expectance is confrontation and exposure, that's what they learned . . . make no mistake about it, the establishment, bureaucracies are very resilient. I'm sure I have been most helpful to you, Rhody.

McCoy: In more ways than one, Ken, I want to be honest about it, this is going to make me, when I come back at it the next time - make some more help.

Clark: Next time is the last time?

McCoy: Yes.

Fantini: . . . can only deal with reform is, if you want to call it that, to beat them at their own game.

McCoy: Yes, but what you are saying is . . .

Fantini: Yes, and you can't beat them. I mean my point is have all the values that they grew past, those sacred values, and develop a proposal that is based on that. Now, one . . .

Clark: . . . has anything to do with the experimental districts.

Fantini: This is correct, and they now might have learned some things about participation, what you should, what participation is legitimate and what is not.

Clark: I keep listening at great length about the experimental districts approach . . . and he is all gung ho about the experimental districts.

McCoy: Mario has somehow or other tried to convince me to get in this car again and I am to play in there with no hands and no cars, but I am . .

Clark: . . . told you.
McCoy: Well, even so you've got to get it from the guy who ran the . . . Okay, Dixie, thank you, and he don't sell to black people. I know I won't sleep tonight behind this one.

Fantini: But I do have a proposal for next time. I want to save this for the last.

Moon: Do you want to have that on the record, Rhody?

McCoy: What? Yes, he got it. I am going to hold him to it, too.

Clark: I'll list the first two: that there is revelation of Ocean Hill-Brownsville in terms of plusses and minusses, but if you look at, for example, of how Ocean Hill-Brownsville operated as if it had power, which was probably the only way it could have done, but when the clench came, it really didn't have the power. Is that part of your . . ."

Fantini: Yes, that's power of justice.

Clark: And power of concern.

Panelist: And power of rhetoric.

Fantini: Power of dignity.

Oliver: The fact that it has for three years, though, the fact that it has survived three years with all the waste that this government has . . .

Panelist: . . by foolishness it survived.

McCoy: I haven't been very religious . . . turn out to be a real . . .

Clark: The name you call that, does that account to somebody in Albany? You get rid of Firman?

Fantini: Yes, but in comparison, ratio-wise . . .

Clark: We had a lot of little victories, we had a lot of small victories.

Fantini: As far, you know, you could muster.

Clark: Victories to be penalizing . . get rid of . .
Fantini: You can - all the lives of the other will degenerate.

Clark: We even survived Martin Mayer!

END OF FOURTH PANEL SESSION

February 17, 1971
TRANSCRIPT OF PANEL FIVE

March 1, 1971

Automation House
New York City

Panelists

Dr. Kenneth B. Clark
Dr. Mario Fantini
Mr. Fred Ferretti
Mr. Rhody A. McCoy
Rev. C. Herbert Oliver
Good morning to the panelists and let me just bring this up to date. This is the last panel session and obviously I want to express my appreciation for the kinds of cooperation I have had up to this particular point and suggest further that the kinds of inputs that the panelists have made, has made this study of mine exciting and profitable for me. Unlike most of you, I have had an opportunity to read all of the transcripts and I suggest to you that each one of the panelists has been productive, that is in terms of providing information and direction. The last panel session we had at MARC I think was indeed very substantial, but it certainly was kind of discouraging in terms of what the future of the educational arena looks like; it appears to me in terms of what my proposal is, that is participation, I think it really put the lead on the skeleton. As a result of reading and looking at all the panels and obviously being concerned what's happening now in Newark, Detroit, Chicago and other big cities, and sort of comparing what happened in 1967, '68, and '69 in New York and what's happening now in New York, it led me to only one kind of frame of reference in trying not to look at options necessarily because I guess I am of the opinion at this particular point that if there are some, I don't have the wisdom and the ability to see them at the present time, but I do think there is some sort of predictable behavior that we can look at, and I think as compared to the note that you have there, someone suggested that we can - and if I use this kind of quote "infiltrate the system" and support people who want to try to bring about reform and maybe the time will come when other people will become conscious of the need of change in education and use these people, different people. In front of you I have put together six or seven items which obviously reflect two things, one, what inputs we received from the panel and how the panelists have perceived the kinds of conditions that we discussed, and two, some of my personal observations and not only my obser-
vations, but the roles and involvement I had in Ocean Hill and New York City. So if we can take today and each one of us address ourselves at some point to each of the seven items there, I think we will have done more than I can expect. I think I can round out this dissertation and make it a document of acceptance. So if we take the first item - anybody like to volunteer to start out? I am going to play a different kind of role today, as you respond - I am not just going to take notes, but I am trying to just be a little provocative using substitute of the panelists and so I'd like to be gracious.

Clark: So you are being gracious, Rhody?

McCoy: Well, I have to say that Ken because as I said at the last panel, you all really did my mind up pretty good.

Clark: Well, I don't know whether I can meet your requirement of being gracious, but I'll certainly try my hand at the first item of the behavior of the various parties or entities was the only option available to them, that is, there were no other options in those cities employed. I suppose I can identify it with the position pretty consistently in these discussions that which was a certain kind of inevitability in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville - an inevitability of how each of the workers who were in contact and in conflict with each other had to behave, and this perspective of inevitability is based upon general theories of power and what is involved when an existing power situation, bureaucracy, or social system is challenged or confronted by an individual, or individuals or groups that are making the challenge precisely because they are not part of the status quo, and who by making the challenge are clearly criticizing, threatening, challenging the people who control the existing system. I think the last time you were here at Automation House, if not at MARC, I tried to make a distinction between serious challenges and the kinds of challenges which will not lead to any serious confrontation. I think that the problem with Ocean Hill-Brownsville was that for some reason the community people, the Board, the administrator, and the people who supported the
administrator in Ocean Hill-Brownsville were serious, or certainly communicated a sense of seriousness, they communicated that they were really seriously concerned about the education of these children and believed that a genuine form of decentralization would increase the chances of effective education for the children; and something about their manner and their style and their presence that communicated that this could not be taken frivolously by the status quo, that for some reason - what I really don't know, Rhody, is why did these people in the community, you and Rev. Oliver and others, take this goal so seriously as to communicate to the bureaucracy and their agents that you could not be co-opted, that you couldn't be played with or brought within the system of good boys until this goal was attained. Whatever the reasons are that you gave this impression, the fact is you gave it, and Mr. Shanker and the people at 110 Livingston Street were not making up fantasy, I mean they weren't engaging in fantasies when they decided to stand and fight. They were correct from their point of view, that they had no options because if you really did some things that a decentralized system for operating the schools in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district did in fact lead to a more effective education for those children attending those schools, that would be really a most serious and devastating criticism of the existing system. So they really had no options except to fight you on all technical grounds or on due process grounds, to invent grounds - you had to be defeated, and - I know I said this before - that actually you had to be defeated so clearly that differences among the groups of people who were allied together in defeating you weren't actually subordinated. If there were any differences between the union and the Board, they had to be subordinated to the fact that they had to join forces to see that you and your allies did not make the devastating criticism of the existing system.

McCoy: Ken, isn't that a predictable behavior?

Clark: Yes, I think that the lack of options on the part of your adversaries is clearer to me than the lack of options on the part of your allies. What is still left unclear to me is why did your Board, and you and some of your principals and some of
your supporters in the community take so seriously this need to really test another approach for a more effective education. Why did you just be good boys and girls and go through the motions of decentralization and save yourselves a lot of Sturm and Drang, etc.? Why weren't you cooperative gracefully?

Ferretti:

Before Rhody answers, I'd just like to throw in - the way that's worded is interesting: the behavior of the various parties or entities were the only options. That word option substitutes either tactics or reaction, and I think you can say something. I think that the UFT and the local board as the two protagonists, the initial protagonists in this thing, the UFT's options or tactics I think were clearly defined. They knew exactly where they were going to go at every step. They knew what they were going to do. On the other hand they gambled on your reactions and I think they won in every case. They knew how you would react to each piece of pressure that they brought against you, so that the Number One becomes a truism, that they were the only options available. I think they were almost programmed options on the part of the UFT. This is what I think. Do you agree?

McCoy:

I was very facetious when I hear...

Oliver:

I don't agree at all with that. I don't think that the union was that knowledgeable about the board or the community as to play the game that way and anticipate what we would do. I don't think that we were that knowledgeable about what we were doing in the community or the board. At the time when it was proposed that we accept binding arbitration, I think it was perhaps thought that this would end the whole thing, but the community people and the board looked at that whole situation and could see that if we went along with binding arbitration, it was taking the power out of the hands of the black community and putting it literally back into the hands of people who have not demonstrated an interest in educating black children. And the board simply could not go along with that. Not that they opposed the principle of binding arbitration, but when that principle is used as a gimmick to stop black people, then we saw through and said "no" to that.
Ferretti: I think what I said - don't you think you were in effect supporting what I said - they gambled on your reactions and won in almost every case.

Oliver: I don't mean that they expected us to turn them down.

Ferretti: You don't?

Oliver: No.

Clark: What I would like to ask Rev. Oliver, there are other black communities in New York City, why was the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Board and officials so much more adamant about the need to control the education of their children? Other black communities have similar problems, you know, they have the history of inadequate education for their children, but they didn't make the stand, now IS 201 is an exception. Why were your options in terms of goals or relationships with the governing structure of education and the powers that control education in New York City, why were your options limited and why were your tactics and strategy limited compared with other black communities that accept what is, and even this year there seems to be very little struggle on the part of black communities for the kind of direct, immediate control which the board you headed wanted.

Oliver: Well, a number of the members on the Board were people who had themselves experienced through their own families, the experience of the frustrations of their children in schools not receiving education. I, for one, experienced that when I moved here from Birmingham, Alabama, when my son was doing above the national average in mathematics, and one year in Brooklyn he was failing mathematics and I couldn't get the teacher to even give him a book to study from. And when I went to the schools to try to do something about it, I had to get through so many intermediaries before I got to the principal that I finally had to say, 'I want to see the principal and I am not going to talk to the rest of you, I want to see the principal.'

Clark: This is not uncommon, this is not uncommon in New York City.
Oliver: This helped me to be more determined to change this thing if ever I was in a position to make a change; you know, there were a number of people on the Board who felt that way and we had a man like Mr. McCoy who didn't have to make the sacrifices that we did but who could see the problems and issues and who was willing to make this fight along with grassroots people from the community. I think that the Board simply was just not for fooling around, we were in business, and I think that's the only way that we'll ever go and get anywhere is to have people who really mean business. I wouldn't want to . . .

Clark: But that was the basis of your problem, the fact that you meant business.

Oliver: Then, are you saying that we should not mean business in America?

Clark: No, I am just addressing myself to Rhody's first question, that because you meant business your options were limited.

McCoy: Well, let me try to put that in another phrase, another context, and these are just four little concerns that I have. Number one is that in that environment you had all of the ingredients present, of people who had different kinds of concerns, housing, etc., etc., that if some cohesive elements were brought together, you could find that their commitments would be the same, whether it was housing or employment or what have you. The second ingredient was that there you had persons who themselves had been in the system for a number of years and who saw how the system was functioning, did a lot of homework to know where it is vulnerable and which forms of pressures to make some sort of change and then look at it in terms of concerns for the education of the children, which can many times be awfully . . . saying . . . other look at education. Take those three elements and put them together and the thing that made Ocean Hill different than any others was because almost immediately our first objective was to establish some visible change, or what I call, some visible suggestions; local people running their own election and coming out on top. I think if you go back and check the records we put together that election in twenty-
one days and ... was how people canvassed the community, not only about the education concerns of the community, but their housing concerns, sanitation department and employment concerns, and while we were overtly talking about education, we were trying to address ourselves to those to keep that "powerless community" in some sort of spearhead to attack the whole spectrum of education. And then beyond that, if I can couch it in one way, was the competence of the people who were involved. It may not have been necessarily a formal competence, but the competence in terms of their concerns and their ability to get something delivered, mixing with the formal competence made us quite an "instrument" and we saw the possibilities.

Fantini:

My own sense of it, Ken, was that the seriousness of purpose of ... was carried around by individuals. They didn't know what to do with it, faced with this amorphous educational system and what was conceived here was a rudimentary form for organization in which you can collect people who were serious and put them in a position initially of governmental responsibility. So what happened here under the, I think the acceptable bureaucratic pattern, that experimentation is, you know, an okay thing and the fact that they had gone through various stages of participation, advisory councils and the like, that these experiments whether they were completely understood by the people who were involved in it, and I am talking now about the people who were in a position to legitimize it or to least make an operational, whether they understood completely the seriousness of it or the implications I am not sure, but you have to understand that there were other people involved besides the community here. I myself and the Foundation was involved and if you want to say that this was one of the allies and was a power source to contend with the fact that we were involved in the initial meetings at which time they - the fact that the seriousness of purpose was reflected in the proposals, and so on, the fact that the Ford Foundation at a certain stage actually funded the planning for it, the fact that the Mayor's office was supportive, the fact that decentralization had been mandated or at least a plan had been mandated by the legislature, so that you did have some allies who
joined the serious community in an attempt to
develop an alternative to urban school reform on
the guise of experimentation, that is these are
three years to test some things out. Initially,
even the union had been involved; the union had
been involved in developing the proposal. Now,
so that you had in a sense the community, you had
some indication of support from the state, you
had the city government which was, I think, respon-
sive to it creating a certain climate, and you had
the Ford Foundation. Now this was a type of coal-
tion which I hadn't seen until now, and for a
brief moment, I think the community felt that they
had some means, you had some money, you had your
own headquarters, that this might indeed be a
different type of ball game. And when the serious-
ness took the next - when the act actually began
to put some specificity to the seriousness, namely
that, you know, we are going to look at accounta-
bility, this was part and parcel of seriousness,
that performance was important, well, I think,
you began to lose some of your allies one by one,
because they realized that something had to be
done about it, but they really didn't fully under-
stand what was involved in the pursuit; and I for
one tried to keep one of these forces connected
with you for as long as it was possible, but
this was a political process, this was the use of
power to bring about fundamental change and when
you deal with politics in this way, then I think
you are dealing with controversy and you are
dealing with the use of power, and the resiliency -
what surprised me was the resiliency of the so-
called bureaucracy when they were challenged, in
other words, the same energy which could be used
to educate children, you know, the same vitality
that we still exhibit to defend their own interests.
It was not necessarily seen in the advancement of
education for children. So that I am saying what
you had was a force field of some kind with the
beginnings of coalitions, political coalitions
formed, and when the politics flared, because it
would, because you are dealing with a coordination
of energy sources around a problem of developing
an alternative for urban school reform, when this
began to unfold then you began to have repercussions
so that City Hall was put on the spot, certainly
the Regents and others were bombarded with letters
of protest and certainly the Ford Foundation was
was deluged with concern that they had overstepped their boundaries, and if you look at these and if you look at the fact that these were from predominantly white organizations beginning to develop a relationship with a predominantly black community, and then down the road, you know what it means to be associated with serious, with a serious attempt at reform to bring about better education for black children, and the fact that the politics, one by one it seems to me that your allies left you and you were left alone. And since you started out powerless but with a sense of purpose and since the people who could feed you some energy and some power left you, at the end of the scenario - you were there alone, but communicated to the end that you were serious and that you would not compromise because obviously, the name of the game on the way was to compromise.

McCoy: Ken, let me strike out to you to get a different kind of reaction. At the beginning of this session, you stated that this whole atmosphere was permeated by individuals.

Clark: That is correct.

McCoy: Well, let me address myself to the allies. The question I am raising is: one, my perception at the moment is that the allies were people who were waiting in the wing who had two basic concerns, one - those who make these reforms who saw the tragedy and I put you in that category, and once the action started the liberals who took the side of the underdog, which is typically an American kind of thing, but at some point it changed, and I guess the question I am asking you is the reason that we lost the allies or in some instances the reformers changed for a reason other than what we are saying here, I mean challenges to the power structure, if that is in itself being the only kind of reason.

Fantini: No, I think my own sense of it is that you lost the organizations with which the individuals were associated. You didn't lose the individuals. I mean Kenneth and I were always looking for alternatives, to be serious in terms of wanting reform, 'I am,' and so forth. He represents an organization in the sense I do, and you represent still
another, the emergence of community, but when you deal with the game of reform and given the fact, you know, that all the forces that Kenneth outlined and the inevitability of certain consequences, either it was very naive on our part to have entered the game at all or we just kept trying that this time maybe in the dynamics something would happen that would not normally happen. But we were all sober about the consequences of this. So we are still together as individuals, but it was very difficult to develop an organizational capability to deal with these problems, as individuals I think have the same kind of commitment, the same kind of feeling, but your ability to deal with this capability in a community to in a sense say that the community is with you at all times, or for me to say that the Ford Foundation is always with us, or the Regents, is extremely difficult to develop, as you preceded, as your seriousness began to take hold and people began to realize what seriousness meant, and at that time, you see, we remained as individuals, but it was very difficult to . . .

Clark:

I'd like to pick up on your term what seriousness meant. Looking back now on Ocean Hill-Brownsville to me this seriousness meant that the Board, the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Board, the unit administrator, Rhody McCoy, place the education of these children and the right of these children to receive a better education than the central Board has so far provided them above everything else, and you certainly initially made this absolutely clear. The other component of seriousness which I saw in looking back on it was that there was a kind of absolute inflexibility in the attainment of this; that the Board and the administrator probably were all in . . . justification of support employed, so that this particular assignment and this particular way of obtaining effective education for their children had to be given in spite of the fact that it was coming in conflict with the whole cascade of positions, stagnations, the prerogatives of supervisors and associations and prerogatives of the UFT, and once that became clear that there was no room for any of this, once it became clear that Rhody McCoy really believed that he would be given the power to remove teachers in the system and on the basis of his own judgment, once he believed that he had authority and power which other people
Oliver: Well, I don't think that there was any effort on Mr. McCoy's part on the basis of his own judgement to try to put this thing through. These matters came before the Board.

Clark: Why not, why not if he were as interested? Why wouldn't he try to . . . that power?

Oliver: The Board insisted on McCoy being an employee of the Board, and they insisted on having a board and an exchange of personnel, or a . . . and he did have a voice in that, and a number of times McCoy was overruled, so it was not that he was . . .

Clark: - by the local board?

Oliver: By the local board, and at times everyone was overruled, matters that came before the Board. At times I was not the . . . the times was wrote spent . . . in ways that I personally did not approve of.

Panelist: . . . power within . .

Oliver: . . . not a struggle for power. As chairman of the Board, I tried to insist that any decisions coming out of that Board would be the Board's decisions, the majority of that Board. Not my decision, not my purposes, but it was the majority of the Board that voted on what came out as a result.
Fantini: But McCoy had a . . . there was room for executive judgement.

Oliver: Yes, there certainly was room for that. But on the matter of transfer of teachers, that matter came before the Board and . . . individualize assignment there.

Panelist: Should . . . the same Board?

Oliver: We felt so, we felt so and we insisted on that right at the time.

Clark: But the incident precipitated the fight - you were saying that that was a Board decision, but the recommendations for this came from the professionals.

Oliver: It came from the professional and also the personnel committee of the Governing Board. The Governing Board had a personnel committee that worked with the administrator and the two of them united on that action in May, 1968.

McCoy: Depending on which side . . . action . . . I recall that the Governing Board in its early stages said we are going through the organizational process. We had a number of teachers who came in at the same time . . . but it didn't work. But, I guess . . . the Board itself gave me free permission to hire my own staff which wanted to be involved in the selection of the advisory, the supervisory staff, principals, assistants and teachers and I think historically they interviewed something like three hundred prospective candidates in a week. The point I'm making was which I said before in putting together a cohesive, visible package that people could deal with the system in relation to education was that I refused to hire anybody including my own staff, and they interviewed them and so forth . . . Let me just jump quickly to that. Dr. Clark, you recall that all during that time after the - some of the incidents that took place which maybe . . . complication - there was some dialogue between myself and you on a number of occasions and I always had the impression that I had a different kind of person who could see things objectively based on the experiences and the advice that was offered in some instances offered in the tactics of the strategy. But what I am saying is
that you must have perceived not only the seriousness of it but the possibility of us making some sort of inputs in that stage of the educational arena. . . recall, I called you on the phone and talked to you about Franklin K. Lane and what they are doing to the . . . This is information that had come to us from the results of our own students who were in our community, that Franklin K. Lane was - he was not an issue problem. Ocean Hill was in the context of confrontation, but your resources moved almost immediately past the issue that did it, we began to alleviate that situation which helped at this stage of the game. So I am saying, I guess I am asking the kind of question is that individuals that you were referring to, do have some leverage in trying to alter the tactics in the assignment whether their agency goes along with the public . . .

Clark:

I guess from one perspective one can say that what happened at Ocean Hill-Brownsville in spite of the limited options implicit in your first point had some positive things. One of the positive things is that you made it rather clear that it got people discussing this issue of the responsibility of local people for the education of their children. It certainly became a basis for continuing discussions at the point of the crisis and during the crisis and it involved - as Mario pointed out - many forces of power within the community, in the large community and in the initial phases some of the power bases were aligned on the side of the people of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, you know, and its Governing Board. The Regents, the State Education Department, initially was sympathetic with . . . one of the Regents himself, and, you know, there were people who believed in this experiment and believed that it should be given a chance. And this was dealt with . . . without any substantial source of power even temporarily aligned with the desire on the part of the communities to control the education of their children. In terms of what actually happened . . . got a decentralization bill that was realistic in keeping the power where it was before, but because . . . at least they used the term of decentralization, at least they talked about local boards and made some obeYance to that even though the actual control of power was pretty much to where it was before.
Oliver:

I think there was a reason at Ocean Hill of why the Board and the community found itself alone, and I think this is understood that the whole conflict, the community understood, that was that the UFT and certain elements in the news media used the gimmick of anti-Semitism . . . . plastered the community with that and plastered the Governing Board with that, and plastered the country and the world with that. . . . myself . . . declare Henry Ford the First who rode . . . into Ocean Hill-Brownsville and his protocols were citing as something that influenced the Board in support of Ocean Hill-Brownsville and that here was a group of black people trying to get somewhere and they are anti-Semites and Ford, who had a supposed history of anti-Semitism came in and helped them, and this was . . . and Ford was made to look as an evil institution, an anti-Semitic institution. There were times when I ran into the most violent audiences that I have ever met, and one time I had to walk out on an audience of about five hundred people . . . (Tape is indistinguishable here) . . and when I attempted to speak they gave me such . . . . I attempted to walk out. They asked me to stay . . . I once spoke at lunchtime . . . Albert Einstein Hospital and invited there by union . . never let me out. I had to have police protection to get out of there. Actually, literally they had to put me in a police car and drive through crowds of people whooping "nigger" and all that. This is between them, I think it was the publicity that the union gave to this over a period of seven months that made people, I think, withdraw from Ocean Hill-Brownsville. That is to me a most powerful injustice upon a community.

Fantini:

This was made . . . also by the Mayor's appearance at one of the synagogues . . . and, you know, the effect of what you are talking about had a toll on him, as well, and certainly on the Ford Foundation, not only in anti-Semitism, but in the economics. Ford dealers were boycotted, and, you know that had nothing to do with the Ford Foundation but the people picketing certain show rooms, for example. We were deluged with letters, and so forth. No this is what - these are the things that I was talking about, as you move into a political arena in which seriousness and purposefulness, you try
to implement it without compromise, that the consequences on the participant, you know, down the road are very serious indeed, so that you ultimately - because you did not compromise - you were left out there by yourself while the problems continued. And what has happened is that the rhetoric of reform, decentralization, participation and so forth is now used but is encaptured by those who are to an extent still in control of an educational system which is not working.

Ferretti: Mario, you are absolutely right, and Reverend Oliver is right except that it is what Number Two is all about, which reads: the actions of the various parties are of no consequence who happen to be community people working was interpreted as confrontation. That's precisely what happened.

Clark: But it wasn't a confrontation.

Ferretti: Of course it was confrontation, but a subtle confrontation initially, and then it was so easy to make it a physical thing, with the use of rhetoric and thus all issues were obscured and the parties on both sides were in a position of saying, 'here is charge A' made by one side,' charge B would respond, charge B would in turn make its charge which would be responsive by the other side, and so on, so that that's all that was left.

Clark: Rev. Oliver . . . point . .

Ferretti: . . . television is devoted to, news is devoted to instead of the real issues involved.

Oliver: I would disagree with you on what you say about confrontation. If standing up for the rights of black children to get a decent education, then it is confrontation.

Clark: Well, that's exactly what it is. If you are standing up to a system that has consistently and traditionally not educated black children and you tell them now you want to do it and here are the conditions under which we are going to do it, if that's not confrontation, you will have to do . . . the only way they are going to get it, the only way that you are going to kick the bureaucracies as I see it is by confrontation, because they are
not going to change it. And when you confront them, you are going to get these charges such as .... That was one of the most .... that was probably the most effective weapon to shift general public opinion on pro-Jews or in-between to shift it toward the negative, and it was very effective in New York City because what you had running against you was that it was in fact a substantial proportion of the education in New York City is Jewish and the UFT and Al Shanker ... (tape is indistinguishable). ... stupid, Shanker takes that and ... close it off. You can view it these two ways, that was a very risky, dangerous, irresponsible thing for him to do, but it was also a very shrewd thing to do, it was shrewd because it shifted public opinion away from the neutral, away from the ... and then look upon Ocean Hill as a mass of black, barbaric ...

Ferretti: To the point where you have an organization such as the Anti-defamation League which has a stake in anti-Semitism, you know, it's really coming out with this absolutely atrocious vilification ...

Fantini: Reason was suspended ...

McCoy: Let me try to project this on two levels and I guess I am talking about the language, because in being involved in the formal structure of education, it raises a number of questions. Let me use an example first and then say why I used it. On one occasion I called the principal of 271 into my office and suggested that some of the things that he was all about in doing was creating dissension among his own faculty, students and the community. I talked to him at great length about it and I suspect - you used the word naive before - I suspected that he would accept that from one professional to another, particularly in the role that I had, which was a mistake, and subsequent to that time given his continued actions in this same vein, I have been on top of the faculty .... I had access to information that they were going, some of the community people were prepared to come in and move him out, physically. So I invited him over to my office and told him that I wanted him to stay over there with me for a few days until the matter got cooled down. I got a telephone call from Dr. Donovan, who said,
'that principal is not to leave that building unless I give him the word.' Subsequent to that time he apologized for what he was doing, he used - was doing the same thing with remote control, but I guess what I am saying is when you talk about confronta- tion, it's how one perceives the action. In other words I am saying, being an assistant for a long time I know I have transferred student's work, I know some of the kinds of off-handed and under-handed ways that they were doing it, we were within the confines of the law, really - so therefore it was translated for other kinds of reasons as confron- tation. So I am saying that that whole use of interpretation in language answers the question as to what I am saying that nothing that we did was of any consequence after we had taken our initial stand. I suspect also that - if I can put it in this language and Mario, you know this to be a fact - if we could have demonstrated through P.R. that we had in fact begun to change the flow of education in that community, they would have found an attack equally responsive. I think Ken alluded to here, if you are showing them that you can educate these kids, they would have devised another tactic anyway.

Ferretti: If you can show them that you are educating, that in itself is confrontation.

Clark: That's right. That's the ultimate kind of confronta- tion.

Fantini: That would be the one - you talk about strategy, tactic, that if you - in retrospect - look back saying what precipitated this chain of events which dwarfed then anything you could do, if you had made a decision not to cause that kind of eruption that early, if you said the name of the game for us will be in our own way avoid, minimize the politics and emphasize the education, that is, 'we are going to demonstrate beyond any shadow of a doubt that we can provide quality education for our kids and we are going to do it this way.' But in a sense you couldn't. You took the system on in its own terms, power terms, you didn't have enough power to do this and therefore, you know, the political analyst, you know, it was inevitable that you would lose, that is we, only the people who were associated with it, and therefore one of
the lessons is that if you can surround yourself with a force field component with certain allies behind, that the priority - the manifestations of the priority on the part of education would have been education, not politics; that you had enough - it seems to me you had enough energy to take this for a few years - could have protected that experiment and you could have had much more educational inputs, and then you could have gone back to the allies and say, 'now, look here is the evidence and in terms of our relationship, you know, we need to make this salient.' But what we had to make salient was the politics rather than the education, not clear therefore to anybody because of the bombardment, the political bombardment, and anything educationally worthwhile that took place in Ocean Hill except you know, in terms of people floating in and out and saying 'the climate is better and certain things are happening there,' but we never did come to the conclusion that better education is provided. It seems to me that that's the ultimate weapon and if we were to pass on our learning, if you will, to some others, it would be that; it would be that if you really have achieved a political coalition of this dimension that we are talking about and instead of using ..., but instead of playing out their chips so early, brings confrontation of the type that would generate retaliation, that - you know - you protect yourself and try to move in just in the limited time you've had in terms of educational pace. Now that may have been inevitable, but I am simply saying ...

Panelist: ... or impossible.

Fantini: ... may have been impossible, but I am simply saying that that to me was the priority, that should have been the agenda and that's what it was all about. But as soon as we went in, we were babes in the woods and literally, we were taken apart by forces that were completely, you know, superior to us. It was ridiculous to go in and try to take somebody along in that arena. I am just saying that if I had to go back and if we had to put our collective wisdom on the table at that time, which we couldn't do because everybody was in distant stations, but at that time I think that if we were to form allies we would have not supported that type of ..., because we didn't understand
completely all of the dimensions that would necessitate it, but it seems to me now . . . . that could . . . . would have been wiser to . . . . that. (Clark briefly interjecting something.) Remember I called you and said if it is at all possible to minimize this, not to take it on, that we were all going to blow our chips at this time, that's the end of the educational . . . . We have a certain amount of money and once that's used, that's it. And you were going to use it at that time. There was no reserve on which to call on, and therefore you had really no energy left to put into education. But that's . . .

Ferretti: On the other hand, isn't it a fact, however, that you were . . . in the educational basket, you still could not have done otherwise because as far as the union and the school establishment is concerned, the only educational, viable educational change so far as they were concerned out there (Tape is indistinguishable) . . . . and you were having no part of that at all. This was an initial confrontation and unavoidable.

Fantini: No, I think you made that, I think you had enough collateral in a sense to get by that, because that was - the original coalition on the part of the UFT and the community was on the basis of the community to buy more such and such; it did not buy, so that the union pulled out. The others did not - no, no, that's all right, but to then abuse the relationship by saying, 'okay, we didn't come together on more effective schools because, you know, that's not our prescription, that's yours, that we still have to engage in ours,' but once you have done that to come back and beat them by saying, 'we'll also want to take some of your people and get them out,' . . . section of . . . let me just finish, then I think you had no choice but to do this. Now, if you had gotten by in a sense that IS 201 had gotten by, I have no way of knowing whether the quality of education has been improved, but the reports, editorials in the New York Times have begun to demonstrate this. But you had a different type of - it seems to me that you had coalitions which could have really taken anybody on in terms of performance. You could have said 'more effective schools cost this much and so forth and so on,' or whatever it is, and
what really have they demonstrated because it is a compensatory program versus your approach, but there is no approach; what is it that you are putting down as an educational plan? They at least have more effective schools. I could question this, but you never had a chance to come up with yours what you educational program would be.

Clark:

The fact of the matter is though that you will have to agree that probably the most important factor in improving quality education in schools is the right to select and evaluate teachers, and actually this is ... to this initial confrontation. Rhody, for some reason or other, backed by his Board and in consultation with his Board, believed that the attack that they were confronted with in this experiment district of improving the quality of education for these children would be a charade if they didn't have the power to make judgements about quality of teachers and to take action on the basis of their judgement. How could they have gotten around that without being involved in a charade?

Fantini:

Well, one ... concern and I mean everybody is watching you the first time a game like this is being played; people are on edge and all of a sudden it appeared to everybody that this was a dismissal which was based not on the fact that the people there couldn't teach as effectively as others, but on the basis that the people there were allied with the union and were there in a sense politically in causing some problems for the Governing Board, that there were political reasons not educational reasons at that game.

Clark:

I got the impression that the administrator believed that it was his prerogative, in fact in all probability his obligation, to make judgements of the teachers, I don't think he even knew initially whether they were union teachers or not; but my recollection was that certain information that had come to the attention of the administrator up the line from the principals and others in the schools and this information added up to the fact that these were not competent teachers. Therefore, they did not expect them to provide high quality education for the children, and it was on the basis of this that they were transferred. This is his confrontation.
Ferretti: I was going to say that even more basic than that is the fact that Rhody McCoy was asking as the District Superintendent to have the same power as any other district superintendent in the City, and to some of the cynical fellows, I think that was his mistake.

Fantini: Well, I would raise questions about the fact that at that time within the press of all of those forces that a statement, you know, that way, released that way was in a sense politically the thing to do when at any given time you trigger an eruption that would stop you from doing anything else, and there probably were alternatives and this is the point that we were - there probably were alternatives to . . .

Clark: When would have been the time to do that?

McCoy: Mario, before you answer that, let me take a prerogative and also make an announcement. I just keep getting signals and people keep running the finger under your throat and I don't know whether this is designed for me or what have you, but let me just leave three thoughts for you so that when we reconvene we can take it from that. I believe Rev. Oliver is chafing at the . . . to get to that. You talked about the survival of 201, you talked about something in terms of a model for compromise if you had taken a compromised position and just stuck with education, which we'll get back to. And thirdly, the discussion is what attainments educationally were made in Ocean Hill. Just in the context of those three things which we can talk about when we come back, if you recall in looking at two, after the confrontation nothing was of consequence, then you can understand why no one really had an opportunity or wanted to and I emphasize wanted to, to look at education rather than to look at the confrontation situation because it was, as Ken says, touching sore sore points with a population that presently was in control. So, hold those three points, I'll open up when we come back from lunch to get to those because I think they encompass all the remaining four or five items on that sheet of paper. Okay? I don't know what lunch is or where it is, but let's adjourn.

(LUNCH BREAK)
McCoy: Just before we broke for lunch - and might I add that the audio is pretty rough upstairs - that's what they tell me - so would you all speak a little louder - but just before we broke for lunch we talked about three - left three things hanging out. One was the survival of 201 and some rationale for it in terms of the strategies that it may have used to survive; the other left hanging out was a model. You talked about a model which literally addressed itself to - if education was the priority and if we had stuck to a compromise and did some other things, you probably could have sustained yourself, and thirdly the educational achievements in Ocean Hill, or educational achievements being initiated. And Mario, I suggested to you just before we broke that I'd like you to start with 201 and maybe tie the other two together. I am really concerned about how you perceive 201 at the present time.

Fantini: Well, as I recall, IS 201 had their confrontation earlier. They (loud noises on the tape) . . . the decentralization process was started at IS 201 in the Fall of 1966, and so they were in their stages of confrontation a little earlier, but it seems to me what they decided to do was to maintain . . . (the rest of Dr. Fantini's comments were completely indistinguishable due to the tape.)

McCoy: Let me see if I can raise a question here. If I hear you correctly . . . (the tape again is indistinguishable).

Oliver: . . . of reading scores . . . and in the nation. Some of them were as low, some grades were as much as ninety per cent below the average reading level, and apparently the public has taken this very quietly and who cares? Nobody is worried about it and the parents out there who were trying to do something about it have nowhere the time, so it does appear that as long as blacks and Puerto Ricans are not being educated, it's perfectly all right. So how else can you avoid the kind of confrontation in order to change this program?

Fantini: (Dr. Fantini's remarks are again lost at the beginning and end of this section due to the tape.) . . . he reports that the standardized tests of achievement in academic . . . the children were doing as well as anywhere else and no . . . was involved.
Clark: We had an interview with ... (The rest is lost in the tape.) This system is not just accidental, seeking not to educate lower status kids, but that is systematically involved in this conspiracy to see that lower status kids are not educated in spite of all the compensatory programs and all that kind of nonsense.

McCoy: Let me ask you - in a different form - take off where Rev. Oliver left off. There is, these kinds of leaders emerged dealing with blacks and Puerto Ricans ... and see what ... would survive, who attempted to reform the system and my suspicion is that if they are going to continue, the outcome is going to be predictable, and I guess the question I am raising is will they continue to have some sort of support until a head-on confrontation takes place and if we gain anything from it? For instance, at the last panel, Ken, you said that it is pretty clear in your mind that it's more difficult to update education for a minority than it was to make gains in segregation. So, you know, the question I am saying is really unless we can look at it differently you can ... union attempts on the part of the "blacks" ... (The rest is lost in the tape.)

Fantini: That confrontation is necessary and if you are going to engage in confrontation ... no end ... this is no kind of strategy anyway. You can slice it, the fact that kids are first affected under any circumstances, then it seems to me that the alternatives or options that you are talking about in Number Seven, and at the last panel suggested that in dealing with this ball game, the only way I can see having any payoff for the kids is to make a ... a profit-making kind of ... that is to deal with the profit motive and to say that the welfare children ... involved and let the business and industry come in and make money on ... problems, and in exchange for it, for making money, ... and that's as simply as I can put it. That through contracts or through vouchers to whatever that what you are saying is that, you know, we continue to write off one generation after another with democratic ways of trying to form community involvement and so forth and so on, that it may be what we need is another American activity, namely enterprise, free enterprise, and then you'd
say, 'look, have our kids reading and you get paid for it,' and since we are finding no other alternative, so deadly, I don't know how you can beat this in terms of the inevitability of defeat . . .
establish power but you can't do it, so therefore the only power source that has to be tapped . . . (The rest is lost in the tape.) . . . you can say, 'look, it is - you can make money if our kids can read and write.' Now, that's one alternative, let's paint a picture of alternative and - appeal - the particular economic period that we are in this might have some appeal. So take it out of our hands, and you take the other major power source in this country, not political, but economic, and simply negotiate with them in terms of money, and say, 'our kids can't read and we'll pay you if they can read.' This is at least one alternative. Then you are talking about what's the alternative if you are going to continue the seriousness of purpose and hold the interest of children to be the priority, then it seems to me that given the context in which we find ourselves, given the power arrangements, that the next stage in negotiations with the most powerful, or potentially the most powerful force that we have - business and industry, cut them in and in an exchange for that profit the children can read and write.

Ferretti: Mario, really, what makes you think that business and industry would do that?

Fantini: For profit.

Ferretti: Well, but the schools today as structured are structured so that blacks and Puerto Ricans are there to be educated just enough to fill unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, and once they begin reading too much, then I think you are going to get confrontation again. I agree with Dr. Clark wholeheartedly on the . . .

Fantini: You were saying that this conspiracy . . .

Ferretti: Reword the conspiracy.

Fantini: No, I want to use it because I think it is appropriate to use; this conspiracy is so pervasive that it cuts against one of the most instinctive drives in free enterprise - the profit, that people will
put profit and cut their profit as long as the conspiracy continues. That's what you are saying. All right, that's a ...

Clark:

I think we have some evidence in support of this in terms of the conspiracy between labor unions and management which certainly is to the detriment of . . .

Ferretti:
The labor unions in this town are choosing to die rather than to allow blacks in; the construction trades - it's incredible.

Fantini:

That's an immediate job right now. But talking about elementary schools that aid children, you are talking about education as an economic marketplace, you are talking about businesses coming in with materials for which they will be paid, scores and so forth, thus for teaching children - it has nothing to do with what . . . once they know how to read and write what happens to them. It just simply is the fact that if right now kids can't read or write on the assumption that if they can read and write something happens to their mobility and their competitiveness, which is debatable, but say that does happen, then it seems to me that one way of dealing with just the fact that you want kids to read and write who are now being short-changed is to make it a money-making proposition for those who would otherwise not consider it.

Clark:

Mario, what is more vital to economic success and profits than control of the labor market, and when business and industry permit a racially exclusionary union to dominate the labor market and thereby control unofficially the available labor supply, is this not to their economic detriment?

McCoy:

Let me just jump here for a minute, Ken.

Clark:

Just a minute. Actually, it would seem to me that if business and industry would give priority of profits over racism, they should be impeccable enemies of racially exclusionary or . . . unions, because opening up the unions would certainly open up labor supply, it's just like natural resources and raw materials. Scarce raw materials increase prices. I would like to believe that what you were suggesting is an out, and it would be an out if it weren't for racism, but how do you get around
the racist part of it that's contaminated every-
thing including . . .

Oliver: I think that right in this same connection, exploi-
tation of ignorance is itself more profitable
and easier than exploitation of intelligence so
the profit motive is operative now - very much so,
but it's living on exploitation of people who
don't have . . .

Clark: Who are not equipped.

Oliver: Right.

McCoy: I was going to propose it in almost the same way
but just a little different. For instance, I find
it very difficult having been an administrator
to just sort of envision of what you are saying as
a contention for an option, because right now
white America is practicing its repressiveness in
education and all the other tax still controls educa-
tion. For example, what I am saying is they still
control the textbooks, the publishing, the pur-
chase of them, etc., etc., regardless of whether
the kids pass or fail, read or write; they still
control construction, they control the economics
of the "teaching profession" they are in control,
and what you seem to be saying is that creating
this viable process where business says, 'if you
do such and such, it's profitable.' It's just
another gimmick, because they have all those
controls now. If you had guarantee performance
now and if you look at the guaranteed performance
contracts, the people who make the assessment
that in fact something has happened are the ones
who still control education today. They use the
same gimmick. We talk about accountability, new
kinds of assessment instruments, new kinds of
evaluative process - all that you need, so I don't
see it as really being an option.

Clark: . . . couldn't be distorted as the detriment of
our kids. I say that what we are saying . . .

McCoy: You still talking about white America legitimati-
zizing education for all people.

Clark: Mario, it's a very difficult thing for a kind of
person to accept, you know, that there is probably nothing that this society could not destroy for the detriment of kids whom it seeks to reject and to destroy. If you look at the various education acts, certainly provision for the upgrading the quality of education for culturally deprived or economically disadvantaged kids and consistently you find that these are more often used for the advantaged. In New York City you find it difficult to find out where Title III money goes, and I could see firms coming in with performance contracts making big fanfare, getting profits and people winking their eye at the fact that the average scores of kids in predominantly black schools haven't moved one iota. Now this sounds paranoid but I don't know whether you read the recent front-page New York Times story of the accountability fiasco, where there was Shanker smiling, Degnan smiling, Scribner smiling, Berstrom smiling - there wasn't a black face in that picture - that's why they could all smile the way that . . . but, you know, when you read this alleged accountability, you found it was the biggest shell game. This guy Dyer and EPS already have used the term accountability to mean non-accountability, so you could get that same kind of relativism perpetrated at predominantly black and minority schools where the guys could cream off the profits and hand in some elaborate mathematical formula to prove that they had done something, but the kids still can't read, because there it is that the accountability formula would say. Well, that sounds, I know I guess it is - if that sounds paranoid, I guess it is a kind way which comes out of experience with the establishment and that prestigious black mentor of the establishment - the Board of Regents, you know - what greater prestige do you want? But these are what the elaborate mechanisms are designed to do, to obscure the fact that nobody is going to do a damn thing by way of any effective education for black or lower status kids.

McCoy:

Ken, can I just capture one of your statements about saying to be a kind man to say the things I am going to say is rather crude. You mentioned earlier that these are elementary school kids that you are talking about in terms of projection and very lightly you touched on the fact that
after they learn to read and write you can't account for what happens after that, and I suggest to you at all the schools of education, if that's a premise, just start preparing for psychiatry, because if these kids do in fact "begin to master the tools" to put them in a competitive position in society and the present "employment picture" continues and the present disease of racism continues to the degree that it is, you are just going to have thousands and thousands of frustrated kids who are going to end up as "mental cases."

Oliver: And there is already a well-prepared group to study them and to make the loom off of studying them to find why they act that way.

Clark: We've set up another department in MARC to get some of that money.

Fantini: Well, all I am trying to do is to come up with some options. I know that we are very skilled at knocking them down, and I am trying to probe the vested interest that I see operating and trying to turn it around in a kind of reverse psychology. If it's true - and I think that it is - that schools and education is an integral part of life in a city, that is whether the city is considered to be prosperous or not, whether it's a place of danger or not that the schools play a vital role that there is a stage of disfunction in terms of just urbanization which sets in, at which point even racism might take a back seat in terms of survival. I am talking now about survival and how to put the education of kids in that context, that business and industry, as I understand it, are beginning to move out of the city because of the deterioration of it to which education contributes and at what point, if at all, because evidently if you take Newark that has already gone by and nobody has, you know, it really hasn't made that much difference, but New York is a center of dominance - economically, politically, and so forth - at what point does indeed - you get a rearrangement even temporarily of the priority so that good education is just simply something you are going to have to do in order to survive, the white establishment to survive, so that I am just wondering at this state - and that's the other reason why I keep coming in with that business and industry - because
without it this country doesn't go too far and
the fact is that it has to be cast in such a way
that they are tempted to say, you know, 'it's to
our best interest - survival, profit, and every-
thing else to do this, otherwise, things are going
to get so bad that we have to get out of here and
we are going to lose a lot of money, and so forth.'
I'm not talking about altruism, but just simply
very, very selfish - survival, economic profits
and so forth that are being jeopardized here to
a degree that people are forced to rearrange even
temporarily. I am not vouching for what would
happen afterwards when people come and qualify
for jobs, that's another ball game, but at this
stage, it seems to me that I have very few options
with enough magnitude powerwise to intercede in
the dimension of the problems that we have out-
lined. We've talked about the politics of it
and that's certainly one power source that could
be brought to bear, but we saw the consequences
of that in New York. You know, not to wait for
an even greater political - you know, I don't
know how long you'll have to wait; in the meantime
kids are not educated. So I go to the next power
source which is business and industry and trying to
tap in on that on this problem. You know, we've
gone to the people, we've gone to the community,
and so forth - you know, maybe the next generation
which is the other source of energy which is
critical, you know, which has the scope of which
could deal with this problem. But I don't know
how else to do it. Now the other alternative
that I see is that this discontent with public
education is beginning to find its roots in the
suburbs and certainly with the youth and I wonder
at this time how to capitalize on this other type
of discontent - it's not divorced from the city,
the suburban discontent, middle-class content with
what's going on; the so-called movement for alter-
 natives, free schools, open schools, people already
know how to read and write, but they need to be
made more humanistically oriented, and so forth.
There is an opening now for structuring of alter-
 natives within the framework of public education.
There is a demand - the whole supply and demand
type of thing, and I am wondering to what extent
we can ride herd on demand for alternatives within
the structure of public education so that some of
the innovators and some of the people who want to
make a difference with the kids can be somehow grouped to do this. So those are the only two alternatives that I have, one is economic - business and industry, profit, the other is this new diversity in the society, the fact that a lot of people are discontent and if this makes a demand on the public schools and one of the ways of dealing with that is to open up alternatives within the structure and identify people, teachers who want to move within alternatives and parents who want that alternative and the like. But those are the only the only two I can find, beyond that. I can't think of any more. That's it. This is the last session. Those are the only two I have for the reform of American education. And both of them have tremendous holes in them so you can see where we are.

Ferretti: I am addressing myself to your first part - business' self-interest. I think that is in concept a good idea, but I keep seeing instances and I speak of New York because everything gets magnified in this town, I see self-interest thrown aside in the interest of racism, I see contractors who would sooner pay time-and-a-half, double time and triple time to unions which don't have enough membership than to force these unions to admit black and Spanish-speaking people, and I think when you start talking about self-interest, business self-interest you have to address yourself to the larger question and how you abolish racism, I don't know. A lot of people who . . . have talked about that for a long time. And until you can address yourself to that problem then self-interest has almost no meaning.

Fantini: But that itself is an education problem - racism. If you don't really - if the next generation goes through the same processes that I went through and others went through, you come out racist. Now, you know, - due process it's educational. Now if there is no change in the educational process then this is just a perpetuating cycle, no end to it.

McCoy: I think there is a reason. Let me go full circle. In the beginning when you opened the discussion, Ken, you talked about the seriousness of Ocean Hill . . . concerned about housing, we were concerned about the health problem, we were concerned about employment, if you recall . . . living in
Panelist:

He isn't fighting heroically.

McCoy:

Maybe not for the same reasons that we are talking about, but a concern is to put people in that so that he can . . . rhetoric giving them jobs, and so forth, which is part of their self-interest, so I guess what I am trying to say - likely have gone through the amount of money we spent on the Police Department . . . so that to continue to keep people in - it's like the Highway Department - to put money into it to keep certain kinds of control. So, really I don't see either of those two being options. The discontent of "the suburban," of youngsters and their families may be a viable alternative for some people, but when it gives on that racism, or borders on racism you know which prevails. Let me capsulize that long story. I am absolutely amazed that a guy like Martin for whatever his reasons is talking about the present time lowering the dropout age. What I hear him saying to me is that education is going to work out like it seems to be in Europe - for the very select few - and I obviously see that as . . . unfortunately, and it also taught me what the six or seven items say on this paper that there are no options at the . . . for black kids to get an education to be assimilated in this society.

Clark:

I think though, Rhody, in this context of what you are saying, is that while this might be true, we have no alternative except to act as if there are options and to fight as if there are options and maybe the only consequence of that will be inconvenience, inconveniencing those in control because actually they don't want to be inconvenienced, they don't have to devote as much time and energy, etc., to you guys if they had to and maybe this is the major strategy that there must be crazy people who don't understand that they can't win and fight as if they could and if you get enough of these people, you'll divert enough energy and time and what not so that in the long
run it might be - in the long run, I don't know how long that is - more economical to bring about some changes than to keep fighting one Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Oliver and McCoy and others, and that this be part of a lot of things that people try, may be that we are reduced to trials and error, that confronted with the problem we have to act like mice in mazes to keep running and running assuming that there are going to be some that are not blind alleys. My philosophy now is function in spite of obstacles or else you don't function at all and if that rat in the maze doesn't run, you never are going to get any food, it'll just die.

McCoy: That's a very good note on which to end the panel except that I'd like to ask . . .

Clark: Except that we hopefully will get some food.

McCoy: Yes, I'd like to add two dimensions for I think that Ocean Hill is and was a memorial, unfortunately - in memoriam, and I think it served an educational lesson to the public that the powerless are going to do just as you say - operate in that maze until some change is evident, and it is my strongest conviction that maybe I was about - when I listened to you towards the end - I was thinking about a good legitimate reason for the continuation of Black Studies, that is if there is still enough pride in those people you ought to let them know where the predictable is and let them know what the commitment has to be and perhaps, as you say, we may get that food. Are there any other comments that any panelists like to make before we turn off the microphone? If not, thank you.

Clark: Don't you think Rev. Oliver should have the last word?

McCoy: It's almost like a benediction.

Oliver: Well, I don't think that Ocean Hill-Brownsville was in any way a failure. I think in some respects it was a real success in that it pointed up the problems in the educational structure that I don't think could have been discovered in any other way. And I think it demonstrated that for once in modern times, black people have not come with hat in hands to the structure, we are part
of this structure, we are taxed to support part of it and I do think that black people perhaps maybe the burden of taxes in this country, and they go all around the world so there is no need for us to have hat in hand and I am proud of Brownsville because - Ocean Hill - Brownsville, because this was maintained there and I think it has to be maintained if people are going to have any kind of dignity. I think the educational changes that came to Ocean Hill-Brownsville were significant in there were new programs that were brought into the district, first of all into the whole educational structure of New York City through Mr. McCoy's leadership, the bringing in of paraprofessionals to help teachers to create a more stable atmosphere in the schools I think was a very, a beautiful thing, and it reached a high proportion in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and it's now all over the City. Programs like the Becker-Engerman program where children in kindergarten after spending a year could read on the first-grade level and this came as a result of parents having made a choice of a particular program and were given the privilege of having this kind of program. I think the fact that there has not yet been an evaluation of Ocean Hill-Brownsville is in itself - it belies the interest of education. We would welcome such but somehow this has been aborted and the district has been practically dismantled without ever finding out whether we failed, and I think that if we had absolutely failed, it would have been easy to demonstrate it, but somehow this was not done and I think this is a plus for Ocean Hill-Brownsville. I'll stop on that.

McCoy: Shall I say "thank you?"

Fantini: Can we keep these for . . . ?

McCoy: It would indeed be a privilege to have you keep it.

END OF THE FIFTH PANEL SESSION

March 1, 1971