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The ineffectiveness of education reform.

Norman W. Nickens

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THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM

A Dissertation Presented

By

Norman W. Nickens

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

Major subject: Education

September 1972
THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM

A Dissertation Presented

By

Norman W. Nickens

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September 1972
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TO: Mortimer H. Appley via Director of Graduate Studies

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Mortimer H. Appley
Dean, Graduate School

APPROVED
Director of Graduate Studies
School of Education
DEDICATION

Dedicated to my wife, Clarice, and my children
Norma and Herbert, who inspired me to undertake this study.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Need for the Study

At this point in the history of American education, much energy and many millions of dollars have been used in reporting on the tragic conditions that currently exist in public schools throughout the nation and in developing extensive recommendations for improving those schools. Some of these studies, such as the one recently completed by Charles Silberman, focus upon conditions in a variety of school systems throughout the nation, while others, e.g., the Clark Plan in Washington, D. C., focus upon the problems of a specific school system. In spite of these extensive studies and their often lengthy recommendations for reform, classroom conditions continue to deteriorate, especially in the major city school systems.

During the past twenty-five years, over ten million dollars have been expended on a variety of studies that have focused upon the Public Schools of the


District of Columbia. Each of these studies has resulted in final reports submitted to the Board of Education of the District of Columbia and to the school administration. All of these studies have included specific recommendations for reform within the public schools, and a number of attempts have been made to implement the various recommended reforms. The Strayer Report\(^3\) in 1948 had a budget of $100,000; the 1964 Model School Division Report\(^4\) and subsequent implementation attempts represented an expenditure of over $4 million during the five-year period of its existence; the Passow Study\(^5\) utilized in excess of $264,000; the Anacostia Project\(^6\) represented an expenditure of over $2 million; and, finally, the Clark Plan\(^7\) (which is still in the process of being implemented) represents at this point an investment of at least $250,000.

Although these studies differed in many ways, they seem to have two major factors in common: (1) They were initiated and developed by experts and panels outside the public school system; and (2) They represented programs never successfully implemented. In those instances where there were success-


\(^7\)Clark Plan.
ful modifications, the successes have not been disseminated throughout the entire system, and in many instances, even those that were temporarily successful modifications have not remained within the school or area where success originally occurred. There appears to be a wide variety of internal and external reasons for the ineffectiveness of educational reform in Washington, D. C., and these failure factors have never been analyzed or documented in a comprehensive way.

Many major school systems have faced similar difficulties in the actual implementation of the recommendations for change made by various blue ribbon study committees, and yet very few researchers have actually attempted to analyze the reason for these implementation failures. This is in part due to the fact that most researchers do not have access to the necessary information, since they do not possess sufficient knowledge of the internal operations of major city school systems. At the same time, those educational leaders within our major school systems who do have access to the necessary information do not generally have the time, the interest, or the necessary research skills to conduct an effective inquiry into the problems associated with the failure of their efforts to reform.

The typical school administrator today is involved in the day-to-day operations of his school system and seldom emerges from crises long enough

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to take a hard look at what is going on in the schools. Long-range planning and evaluation of on-going programs (regular and experimental) must be left to someone else, if they are to be done at all. Despite this administrative preoccupation with day-to-day operations, schools have not operated smoothly or efficiently.

Urban school administrators are struggling with a perplexing and increasingly urgent problem - that of instituting change in school systems in which matters have become increasingly critical and insoluble. There have been two major occurrences in our recent history which led to the realization that change in education was critical to our future national development. The first was the advent of Sputnik, which brought national attention to the inadequacies of our science and mathematics programs. One result of this attention was that for the first time, people were involved in developing curriculum who had never been involved before, and the development of this new curricula was given major support by the federal government. Supported largely by the National Science Foundation, a group of research physicists and science teachers designed a modern physics course and embodied in it a new textbook, a new set of experiments, new examinations, new teachers' guides, a set of instructional films, and other new instructional materials. The materials were tested in the schools, presented in detail to teachers, and subsequently released for general use. This is only one example of the kind of activity generated by Sputnik and the subsequent emphasis on the general need for change in education in all parts of the country.
The second major catalyst for change in education (especially in urban education) was the civil rights movement, which brought national attention to the miseries of life in the ghetto and the failure of the schools to provide the educational experience which could help overcome the effects of discrimination and deprivation. The public schools in our large cities have abundant evidence that they are failing, and have failed, in educating those children for whom education is so crucial - the poor and the black. One needs only to look at the reading achievement test scores for any large city each year to be impressed by this discouraging downward trend. And because reading has been the basic tool for learning in nearly all subject areas, students who fail in reading eventually become across-the-board failures, drifting with apathy, and often with hostility, through the schools until they are old enough to drop out. In short, traditional approaches to instruction have typically met with dismal failure in our urban schools. It has taken a number of years and a considerable amount of community outrage to begin to convince educators that their approaches might be inappropriate, if not wrong, and there are still many who are reluctant to admit this.

If traditional methods of instruction are acknowledged as ineffectual in the inner city, then, logically, educators should experiment with new approaches and institute those which are successful in the urban schools without delay. Such

\[9\text{Ibid.}\]
experimentation has been fostered for a number of years under both governmental and foundation grants. Late in 1961, a Panel on Educational Research and Development under the auspices of the President's Science Advisory Committee was formed to explore the contribution that research and development could make to education - including instructional materials, classroom practices, teacher education, and school management. In its report of March 1964 to the U. S. Commissioner of Education, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Panel stated:

Educational reform can be sought in many ways. The technique emphasized by the Panel has two aspects. The first is the development of models, of something tangible to show what can be done - textbooks, films, teachers' guides. . . also the development of new kinds of schools and new programs of teacher education. The second aspect is the voluntary selective adoption of these models through local decisions by the components, numbering in the thousands, of the American school system. . . The very center of the Panel's concern, educational research and development, is not merely an effort to get more education for the dollar. It is a reflection of the belief that our society is evolving. Educational research and development is a mechanism to help the educational system adapt rapidly to new conditions. Reform must be continuous not only because successful research opens up further possibilities but also because a changing society means changing demands on the educational system. 10

10"Innovation and Experiment in Education: A Progress Report on Educational Research and Development to the U. S. Commissioner of Education, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology," March 1964, pp. 4-5.
Now, almost ten years after the formation of the Panel on Educational Research and Development, we must observe that reform is not continuous in education. In fact, when it appears, it usually occurs only in scattered areas within isolated programs and schools.

The strategies involved in achieving major reform in urban education have been approached in a number of ways. For example, a seminar in which this writer participated in February 1966, 11 sponsored jointly by the Center for Coordinated Education at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and the U. S. Office of Education, was devoted entirely to the growth of the teacher, to the nature of the organization or consortium which would create a method for this growth, and to the character of the agent or catalyst who, by direct confrontation with the teacher, would stimulate it. The approach developed by the seminar was that of using a consortium and a special person acting as a catalyst to motivate the teacher to examine his methods critically and to engage in small-scale inquiries of his own choosing.

This focus on the teacher as the key to educational change has remained as the fundamental aspect of most efforts to reform urban schools. Staff development programs of every kind have been designed to upgrade teaching skills. Those educators who were working for reform realize that the creation

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11 The Professional Growth of the Educator, Center for Coordinated Education, University of California, Santa Barbara, February 1966, the U. S. Office of Education.
of models was of very limited value unless the models could be implemented to affect large numbers of children. All of the new textbooks, films, and teachers' guides in the world would have only limited impact on what actually occurred in the classroom unless the teacher were given new skills to accompany them. Thus, the ability to change human behavior became, and has remained, the pivotal point for many of the reform efforts in urban education.

Staff development programs for teachers have been designed for many aspects of their development including teacher attitudes, teaching skills, and mastery of the subject areas. Many of these staff development programs have been carried out and numerous teachers have participated within our large cities. Nevertheless, these programs have reached a very small proportion of the teachers, because they are generally voluntary and they have reached primarily those teachers who are conscientious and eager to improve. As a result, there remains a large portion of teachers untouched by staff development programs - and even if these programs were made compulsory, there is considerable doubt as to whether it is possible to modify the behavior of adults who strongly resist change.

One important ingredient which has been missing in most staff development efforts for teachers has been the involvement of principals, as well as parents and students, as partners in the training process. The involvement and support of the school principal is crucial for effecting change, and the students of today have much to teach us, for it is they who have had the closest look at
our educational shortcomings.

In the Model School Division of the D. C. Public Schools, the work of the Innovation Team in staff development has had demonstrable impact on expectancies, program, and innovative style in classrooms. The Innovation Team is a group of teachers released from classroom duties in the Model School Division to help other teachers find ways to improve the education of inner-city preschool, elementary, and junior high school children. One of the major strategies of the Team (formed in 1967) was its active involvement in stimulating other teachers to consider alternative methods in teaching and instruction and in providing teachers with methodological tools (both skills and materials) and with enabling attitudes for improving general instruction and the learning climate.

In the process of developing teachers who are highly qualified, it is important that they be given a new image - that of being skilled in their fields and, even more importantly, that of being able to have decision-making roles both in what is being taught and in how it is being taught. However, development of teachers alone will not bring about the kind of reform we are seeking in education. In performing such a difficult job, teachers need strong administrative support, and, for the most part, they are not presently receiving such support. From my viewpoint, staff development at the administrative level is almost as crucial as that of the teacher.
Public school systems have grown very rapidly in recent years, particularly in large urban areas. This growth has been accompanied by little or no systematic or long-range planning, and the result has been the evolution of inefficient and ineffective school management structures. These structures are now faltering under the increasing strain of public demands on education. The sheer size of urban school systems today serves to emphasize those inefficiencies which might previously have gone unnoticed or which might at least have produced less noticeable ill effects.

A number of factors have contributed to the creation of the management dilemma now faced by educators. One of the most important is that management has been drawn almost exclusively from classroom teachers, who, while they might have had a great deal of experience and proficiency in that capacity, typically have had no management experience or training. Thus, a management hierarchy has been created with a serious lack of exposure to the technical and methodological aspects of job performance. Once created, this hierarchy has become self-perpetuating. Another factor which has complicated this problem is the existence of tenure laws in most places, making it very difficult to remove ineffective administrators from their jobs. The problem is further compounded by varying kinds of local government regulations and restrictions limiting the possibilities for providing financial incentives for improved job performance.

The result has been that the wheels of school management grind slowly,
if at all, especially in those areas where special skills are required, such as budget development, material procurement and distribution, building design and maintenance, and curriculum development. Efficient and effective performance in these areas is crucial to providing the essential administrative support to the classroom teacher in the development of successful educational programs.

The focus of school management has moved farther and farther from the primary instructional relationship — that of the pupil and teacher. As the hierarchy has grown, it has become cumbersome and rigid, and, most important, it has become isolated from the classroom. In effect, school management does not serve the very purpose for which it exists — that of providing services which will facilitate the educational process. Rather, it often seems to exist in order to complicate the educational process.

The ill effects of this kind of administration have become so visible today that there is an enraged community in nearly every large city pointing a well justified finger of guilt at the entire school administration, but especially at the most visible administrator, the principal. Often community personnel are fighting for decentralization and community control, which seem to them to hold the only promise for immediate solution of today's educational problems. Yet it is evident that decentralization and community control are not panaceas. Simply dividing up existing structures will not create the changes which are needed; nor will community involvement be meaningful without an effective
mechanism for orchestrating that involvement.

In the writer's view, even though it may seem impossible to those who are trying to make it happen, change is inevitable in our urban school systems. The evidence of the inevitability of change lies in the unmitigating forces within the community whose demands for change are unrelenting. It is these forces, often filled with hostility and militancy, which have placed an important choice before urban school administrators everywhere; that choice is one of systematic change through involvement of all of the forces in the community, or change brought about by conflict and disruption and over which there will be little control. The proper choice seems all too obvious, and yet, unless we develop in our school administrators and our teachers the skills to utilize these emerging forces for constructive change in an open school system, they will become more defensive and resistant, and conflict will inevitably ensue. Therein lies the challenge.

The Study

As a major school administrator, the author has had access to and personal knowledge of these factors (common to all large urban school systems in varying degrees) and their impact upon the Washington, D. C., school system. It is my intent to provide in this study an extensive analysis of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of attempted educational reforms within the Public Schools of the District of Columbia over the past twenty-five years. The study will
begin with the Strayer Report,² completed in 1948, and continue through the Clark Plan,³ still being implemented in 1972. It will be a study making use of objective data collected from school reports, the records, and newspaper analyses; however, the cohesion will be brought about by the author's own personal knowledge and participation in the school system during the period of these key events. And it is envisaged that this point of view will give the direction to the study.

Objectives of the Study

The general objectives of this study are to analyze selectively the major reform efforts that have occurred in the Washington, D. C., school system over the past twenty-five years. In the process of such an analysis, this study will provide information helpful to the Public Schools of the District of Columbia and to other urban school systems which face similar problems and have entered upon or are considering reform in educational operations.

The specific objectives of the study are:

1. To analyze and document the recommendations for reform made by the Strayer Commission, 1948⁴

2. To analyze and document the recommendations for

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²Strayer Report.
³Clark Plan.
⁴Strayer Report.
reform made by the Model School Division (Cardozo Area), 1964

3. To analyze and document the recommendations for reform made in the Passow Study, 1967

4. To analyze and document the recommendations for reform designed by the Anacostia Project, 1968

and to develop in detail this effort as a case study typical of reform attempts in the Public Schools of the District of Columbia

5. To analyze and document the recommendations for reform designed by the Clark Plan, 1970

6. To examine from a historical perspective the origin of each of these reports and the local and national forces which influenced each of the five reform movements

7. To determine the status of, and relation to the system as a whole of, each of the reform movements as of 1971-1972.

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15 "Model School Division Review."

16 Passow Study.

17 Fantini and Nickens.

18 Clark Plan.
In view of the above objectives, the study will focus upon: (1) the actual recommendations for reform; (2) the extent to which those recommendations were actually carried out; (3) how those recommendations were compromised in the process of their implementation; and (4) the significant factors in compromising the effectiveness of each of the suggested reforms.

**Procedures**

The information and data for this study will be secured from the author's personal knowledge of and familiarity with the origin, development, and operation of four of the five efforts. Except for the Strayer Report, the author has been directly involved in planning, writing, and administering each of the reform attempts to be analyzed. These experiences range from working with a local school community to meeting with representatives of local and national government and university and professional people from a cross-section of our country. This is a unique feature of this study and, paradoxically, a strength and weakness simultaneously.

Another major source of information will be a careful examination of the wide range of documents covering each of the five topics. These documents include minutes of the meetings of and reports to the Board of Education; files of newspaper clippings from all four of the papers covering the schools; progress reports made to various organizations from citizen to budget testimony before various federal offices; and interviews with a variety of people involved with the programs, ranging from past superintendents and Board of Education...
members to citizens who served as planners, community board members, and employees in the programs. Finally, where evaluations of any kind were made, these documents will be examined and the findings carefully reviewed and reported.

Limitations of the Study

This study is confined to the personal knowledge of the author and his peers who consented to be interviewed or to complete a written report on specific aspects of one of the reform movements; the files of the Board of Education; the newspaper files of the Public Schools of the District of Columbia; the various reports prepared in response to requests from many sources, as well as those called for in the design of the project; interviews with the citizens who worked in a variety of ways with each effort; and informal personal observations.

This study is not intended to provide a statistical analysis of specific quantifiable data and, in addition, will have all of the limitations inherent in historical research studies which look backward through the glasses of time. Conversely, this is also a unique strength, since the author has had personal access to and experience with the programs and people who attempted to carry out the various recommendations for classroom and system reform. The fact that the author was personally involved in the design and implementation of four of the five reform efforts may make the analyses somewhat biased; yet the story of reform and change (or the lack of it) in school systems is ultimately the human and personal story which would not be complete without a certain amount of personal bias.
The findings of this study are somewhat limited by the inescapable fact that pieces and fragments and often reasonably intact components of each of the reform efforts are still operating in many sections of the Public Schools of the District of Columbia.

Finally, this study on the Ineffectiveness of Educational Reform is somewhat limited by the lack of a clear definition of what the school system expected of reform efforts and the general lack of any provision for the introduction into the entire school system of the successful aspects of specific reform efforts that were carried out in a part of that school system.

**Design of the Study**

This study presents an extensive analysis of a variety of studies that have focused upon efforts at reform in education during the past twenty-five years in the Public Schools of the District of Columbia, and the recommendations made by each of these studies. The study makes an effort to analyze these recommendations and to identify those factors which compromised these efforts and thereby made them ineffective. Further, this study analyzes the situation or climate (social, educational, or political) which produced the need and the will to develop these reform efforts.

The study will consist of five chapters. In Chapter I the need for the study was determined, based upon a discussion of the need for some analysis of the ineffectiveness of educational reform in view of the large sums of local and federal money now being provided to support education in our cities. Despite
these efforts, education is still failing in our cities and citizens and officials are crying for improvements. Additionally, the purpose, objectives, procedures, and limitations have been set forth in the first chapter. In Chapter II, a number of relevant issues and background information on the Public Schools of the District of Columbia, which led to the undertaking of these reform efforts, will be discussed. Included in Chapter II will be a discussion of the nature of the reform studies, also examined will be the constraints within and without the system; the nature of the bureaucracy in which the reform efforts had to operate; and the difficulties encountered in interpreting and convincing the power structure (including the Board of Education, the city government, and the Congressional Appropriations Committees for the District of Columbia) of the need for educational reform.

In Chapter III the writer will discuss in detail The Strayer Survey, The Model School Division and the Passow Study. The Clark Plan and the Anacostia Project will be analyzed in Chapter IV. Under consideration are: (1) the actual recommendations for reform; (2) how the recommendations were compromised in the process of their implementation; (3) the significant factors in compromising the effectiveness of each of the suggested reforms. In Chapter V the writer will summarize his findings and present his conclusions and recommendations.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Chapter I discussed the fact that during the past twenty-five years over ten million dollars had been expended on a variety of studies that have focused upon the Public Schools of the District of Columbia with few major reforms actually implemented. In order to analyze the failure to implement these reform recommendations, some picture of the D. C. schools is necessary.

It will be the thesis of the author throughout this chapter that, while there are differences in size, governance, and ethnic makeup among various urban school systems, the commonality among their ailments and symptoms of distress is astonishing. Mario Fantini describes the national education crisis in these words: "It is not possible to discuss education as a problem peculiar to some Americans. Urban education is American Education."

Unique Character of the District School System

It will be the purpose of the author to focus upon what may appear to be a paradox: first, that Washington, D. C., as an urban school system is in many respects quite unique; and second, that in other respects it has served as a kind of temperature gauge and percursor of urban crises which are felt through-

1 Fantini, p. 6.
out the country. Washington, D. C., is unique in that it is the only city governed by the U. S. Congress through a Presidentially appointed Mayor-Commissioner and nine-member City Council. This characteristic of government for the District of Columbia applies to the public school system, which is under the control of an eleven-member elected Board of Education. Strayer described the Board of Education this way:

The Board of Education is the highest educational authority for the school system in the District. In the formulation of policies, in the development and improvement of the schools, the Board of Education has supreme control, subject only to the acts of the Congress. In this respect, the school system of the District of Columbia is unique. In every State and, therefore, in every city of the Nation, a local board of education operates under the general framework of a State educational plan. Such a board of education is also subject to the State education authority. In the District of Columbia, however, the legislative mandate for the "control of the schools" by the Board of Education comes direct from the Congress.²

The District Code relating to the government of the District, and more specifically through those sections known as Title 31, Educational and Cultural Institutions, defines the authority as follows:

The control of the Public Schools of the District of Columbia is hereby vested in a Board of Education to consist of nine members all of whom shall have been for five years immediately preceding their appointment bona fide residents of the District of Columbia and three whom shall be women. The members of the Board of Education shall be appointed by the District court judges of the District of Columbia

²Strayer, p. 2.
for terms of three years each, and members shall be eligible for reappointment. The members shall serve without compensation. Vacancies for unexpired terms, caused by death, resignation, or otherwise, shall be filled by the judges of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. The Board shall appoint a secretary, who shall not be a member of the Board, and they shall hold stated meetings at least once a month during the school year and such additional meetings as they shall from time to time provide for. All meetings whatsoever of the Board shall be open to the public, except committee meetings dealing with the appointment of teachers.

The Board shall determine all questions of general policy relating to the schools, shall appoint the executive officers hereinafter provided for, define their duties and direct expenditures. All expenditures of public funds for such school purposes shall be made and accounted for as provided in Section 47-101, under the direction and control of the commissioners of the District of Columbia.

This describes the responsibility of the Board of Education for the operation of the schools in 1948, which, for the school year 1947-48, had an enrollment of 91,489. This figure included both "colored" and "white" school enrollments. These terms were used by Strayer to describe the dual school system in operation until the Supreme Court Decision of 1954. In 1948, according to Strayer's figures, the "white" school population was 49,877, or 54.5 per cent, while the "colored" population, 41,612, comprised 45.5 per cent of the total enrollment.

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If one looks closely at the operation of the D C. Public Schools and the Board of Education, one could justifiably conclude that little substantive change has occurred since 1948. Paradoxically, there have been major changes in the selection and organization of the Board of Education, but in a later chapter we shall discuss in further detail how the day-to-day operations in 1972 differ only slightly from those in 1948.

Yet changes have occurred, as shown in the description of functions of the Board of Education in the pamphlet "Facts and Figures":

The general control of the Public Schools of the District of Columbia is vested in an elected Board of Education. The Board of Education appoints the Superintendent of Schools for a term of three years and an Executive Secretary who shall not be a member of the Board. It sets policy for the operation of the public schools, determines the entire curricula, plans the program of school construction, and is responsible for textbook acquisition. It approves and sets priorities for the expenditure of funds.

Under the directive of Public Law 90-292, the elected eleven member Board of Education holds its organizational meetings on the fourth Monday of each January. Members of the Board may receive up to $1200 annum in compensation. Eight members represent specific city wards; three represent the total city on an at-large basis.

The Board of Education holds stated public monthly meetings during the school year and such additional meetings as it deems appropriate. The stated meeting of the Board of Education is traditionally held

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4"Facts and Figures, D. C. Public Schools, 1970-71."

5Reorganization Act, 1967.
on the third Wednesday of each month at 7:30 p.m.
The Board may hold community meetings in various
sections of the city for the purpose of hearing persons
who desire to address the Board. Special meetings
may be called by the President when he deems necessary.
The President presides at the meetings of the
Board of Education. He appoints all special committees
and is himself an ex-officio member of those committees.

The major changes in the organization and functions of the Board of
Education as provided for in the Reorganization Act of the District of Columbia,
1967, were these: (1) for the first time since the last half of the 19th century,
the citizens of the District of Columbia could vote for representatives to the
Board of Education; and (2) the new Act provided a Presidential appointed
Mayor-Commissioner (to replace the former three-commissioner form of local
government) and a nine-member City Council. As in the old form of government,
the Board of Education has no fund-raising authority, and it must present the
school budget to the Mayor-Commissioner and the City Council for review and
approval. In other words, the elected Board in 1972 still faces many problems
identical to those in 1948 - lack of autonomy to raise funds, fix teacher salaries,
or classify jobs; and the requirement to transmit its budget directly to the
Congress for action through the usual federal procedures.

In summary, the budgetary process (including salary requests) now
follows this format: The Superintendent prepares the budget and presents it
to the Board of Education for review and approval, defending and justifying the
requests to the Board members. After approval by the Board of Education, the
budget is submitted to the City Council, which, after holding hearings, can
reduce or raise any items appearing in the budget. Indeed, the City Council has on occasion even eliminated entire programs, and although this authority has been disputed by the Board of Education, to my knowledge, the Council's authority has been sustained in each case. After the Council completes its review, it forwards the school budget to the Mayor, who, after a further review, incorporates the school budget into the complete city budget and forwards the entire package to the Federal Bureau of the Budget. There, the total budget for the District of Columbia is reviewed, revised, and forwarded to Congress for final action. Again the Superintendent and his staff must present and defend the final budget before the House and Senate Subcommittees on Appropriations for the District of Columbia. The schedule for this process is roughly from October to June: The Board of Education is supposed to transmit its budget to the Mayor by October, and final Congressional action should occur by the end of the current fiscal year. In fact, however, the District of Columbia budget has often been approved four to six months into the new fiscal year. This reality has had a significant and often negative influence on the reform efforts upon which this paper is focused.

As stated earlier, the total school enrollment in 1947-48 was 91,489, of which 45.5 per cent was Black. In October 1970, the total enrollment was 146,224, of which 94.8 per cent was Black. In other words, in 23 years the non-white school population had more than doubled.\(^6\) The October 1971 enrollment of the D. C. Public Schools was 143,411, representing a slight decrease,

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\(^6\)"Facts and Figures," op. cit.
and the Black school population represented approximately 95 per cent of the total.

It has been said many times that the civil rights struggle of the Sixties did more to highlight the inequities and shortcomings of urban education than any other single force. This is apparent in the literature of the period, legal actions brought by individuals and groups against various educational practices, and the support provided for education through legislation passed by the federal government. In this arena of citizen unrest and dissatisfaction with education, Washington had more than its share. From Congressional investigations to lawsuits, the D. C. schools have been buffeted mercilessly for the past several years. Perhaps the harbinger of things to come began with the Hobson vs. Hansen case (1967), which outlawed the "track system" in Washington and demanded plans for increasing pupil and teacher integration; it resulted in Superintendent Hansen's retirement in July 1967.

The last decision rendered against the schools charged inequalities in spending, and on May 24, 1971, Judge Skelley Wright, U. S. Circuit Court, ordered the school system to equalize the per-pupil cost of teachers' salaries to within five per cent of the city-wide average. The decree applied only to elementary schools and only to the amount the city spends for teachers' salaries.

7 Fantini, op. cit., pp. 9-19.

8 At this writing, February 29, 1972, the Washington Post reported 'Hobson said he will ask Judge Wright to find the school administration in contempt of court and to turn over the operation of the school system to an outside 'master' who would run everything until it's in compliance.' Julius Hobson, former school board member, brought the suit resulting in the equal spending ruling by U. S. Circuit Court Judge J. Skelley Wright.'
Salaries paid from federal funds were exempt from the decree.

During this climate of crisis, the D. C. schools have had an acting superintendent twice, an appointed superintendent (later relieved of his duties), and the incumbent superintendent (appointed in October 1970) since July 1967. The incumbent superintendent stated, four months after he had assumed office, that:

The public schools of the District of Columbia have been the object of intense public concern and scrutiny over the last several years, local, national and Congressional. They have also been the subject of a number of professional and non-professional reports, some of which have been highly objective and most thorough, others of questionable merit. These reports have in common one central theme: the lack of quality education in the District of Columbia Public Schools. All such reports have adduced a score of reasons why most students in our schools are not being adequately educated, why they are not acquiring the basic skills in reading and math, and why they drop out of school.  

An analysis of the reports mentioned in this study (the Strayer Survey, the Model School Division Review, the Passow Study, the Anacostia Project, and the Clark Report) supports the superintendent's statement, as each of these reports have some of the themes mentioned above. However, as we previously stated, there are other factors which must be considered in any analysis, such as why the reform effort was initiated; by whom, if known and identifiable; and the political and social climate in the system and the city at the time.

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The Strayer Report

This report was ordered by the Congress of the United States under the following Survey of the Public School System of the District of Columbia (Public Law 724, Chapter 555):

An act making appropriations for the Government of the District of Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part against the revenues of such District for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1949, and for other purposes.

Survey of Public Schools

For a complete survey of the public school system of the District of Columbia with respect to the adequacy of the present plant and personnel, as well as educational methods and practices, to serve the District, said survey to be conducted under the supervision of a person qualified by training and experience in the field of public school education to be appointed by the chairman of the sub-committees on District of Columbia Appropriations of the respective appropriations committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives at a salary of $1000 per month and $300 per month for expenses, $100,000: Provided that the person so appointed to supervise the said survey is authorized to employ necessary assistants at rates of pay to be approved by the chairman of the said committees, and the said director may request and be entitled to obtain such clerical assistance as he may deem necessary from agencies of the District of Columbia: Provided that the said Director shall make a full report to the aforementioned Chairman prior to March 1, 1949, setting forth the results of the survey and his recommendations, 10

Clearly, the Strayer Report occupies a unique place in urban education.

The author knows of no other study of a school system initiated and ordered

by Congressional legislation and, in fact, administered by the Congress through its subcommittees for the District of Columbia. In a later Chapter, III, we will discuss this significant report in greater detail.

**The Model School Division**

A very brief look at the Strayer Survey has indicated how the social and political characteristics of the District of Columbia impinge upon its education system and ultimately upon the operations of that system. The history of the Model School Division further emphasizes this unique characteristic of the District of Columbia.

The planning and organization of the Model School Division involved representatives from the developing local poverty program, the President's Science Advisory Committee, representatives of the Ford Foundation, and representatives of the superintendent's office. An outside consulting team was also hired to recommend the kind of structure and organization necessary to accomplish the goals of the Model School Division.* The five consultants were:

**J. Bernard Everett** - Assistant Superintendent of Schools  
Newton, Massachusetts

**Roderick F. McPhee** - Assistant Professor of Education  
Harvard University  
Graduate School of Education

*This area was commonly referred to as the Cardozo District.*
Donald P. Mitchell - Executive Secretary
New England School Development Council
Project Coordinator

David V. Friedman - Professor of Education
Harvard University
Graduate School of Education

Dean K. Whitla - Director of the Office of Tests
Harvard University

The kind of reform envisioned by this team is best expressed by this excerpt from a preliminary report submitted on September 15, 1964, to the superintendent and the local poverty agency, The United Planning Organization:

This preliminary report proposes an organizational structure for the model community system in the Cardozo school district. At that early stage of development, the structure is all-important, for a subsystem devoted to innovation and change, as Cardozo is, requires extra attention to be certain that the conditions for success are present.

Among the conditions this organization is created to provide are the following: involvement of all community agencies (U.P.O.) rather than the schools alone; sufficient autonomy to provide the freedom to experiment boldly and without fear of failure; provisions for adequate financing; a committment to testing and demonstrations on a major scale rather than "tinkering"; a realistic relationship of the Cardozo system to the District of Columbia school system; and an approach to
evaluation which can make the knowledge gained here of value to others.  

When the Board of Education finally approved the concept of a "model subsystem" for the District of Columbia schools, all of the above conditions were incorporated in the final plan in one way or another, with the exception of a well developed evaluation plan.

It has been stated that ideas which fostered the Model School concept came from many sources, but one which is subtle and difficult to identify, since it was a gradual process, must be pinpointed. This was the growing volume of interest in and implementation of experimental programs and research projects concerning the sociology, the psychology, and the economics of poverty which dominated the social and political climate of the mid-sixties.

The reforms stated were to occur in a subsystem comparable in size to many school systems across the country. The central city boundaries of this subsystem presently contain five pre-schools, sixteen elementary schools, four junior high schools, one senior high school (Cardozo), and a city-wide vocational high school. In October 1971, the official total enrollment was 15,127 for the division.

Perhaps the Model School Division has had more influence on the District of Columbia Public Schools than any of the other reform movements we are analyzing. We will look at the impact of its programs on the system and at the

evaluative reports in Chapter III and determine the degree of impact.

The Passow Study

In 1964-66, the Four Track Curriculum instituted by Superintendent Carl F. Hansen was coming under increasingly hostile scrutiny. It is hard to say, even in 1972, whether the system as charged was discriminatory and invidious and handicapped poor Black children; however, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia found that the "track system" did discriminate against poor Black children and ordered its abolition. Prior to the decision of the court, however, the Board of Education and most organized segments of the community had been debating, often bitterly, the merits and motives of the track system, begun in 1956. It was in this social and political climate that the Board of Education decided to order a comprehensive study of the "Four Track Curriculum."

The following excerpt indicates the authorization for the study of the track system, but also the greatly expanded scope of the study which was finally authorized. The following report was submitted by the superintendent:

At the September 22, 1965 meeting of the Board of Education, the Superintendent was authorized to make arrangements for an outside study of the track system. The ensuing discussions and developments indicate that the study should be much broader than an analysis of our method of ability grouping.

The Superintendent has conducted extensive discussions with possible research groups and with the Citizens' Advisory Council. The proposal at this stage is that arrangements be completed with Teachers College, Columbia University, for a complete study of the Washington Public School System with concentration
upon the instructional, including, as early as possible, an analysis of the operation of the track system and contributing services, such as administration, treatment of data, organization for instruction, curriculum services, supervisory and pupil personnel services.

The objective will be to discover what needs to be done in the Washington Public School System to develop the most productive educational opportunity for all members of the urban community.

The Superintendent is particularly pleased that Teachers College, one of the great national institutions, has agreed to accept the responsibility of studying the Washington Program and to offer its services for follow-up action for the implementation of recommendations.

The cost of the study is estimated at $200,000 to $300,000, a part of which would be defrayed by monies available for the already Board-approved data processing study to be funded in part under the National Defense Education Act and for the administrative organization study to be funded under Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The remaining amount of funding would be under Impact Aid, if legal, or from a research grant.  

The Board of Education approved the report of the superintendent, and Dr. Harry Passow, Teachers College, Columbia University, was named to head the study. This study, unlike the previous studies discussed, was initiated by the Board and the superintendent in cooperation with the community. Despite these favorable conditions, a discussion of the Passow Report in Chapter III will show that the results were quite similar to those of the other studies.

12"Minutes of the Board of Education," March 16, 1966."
The Anacostia Project

The Anacostia Project was begun in response to a mandate from the President of the United States. Although the mandate did not specify the Anacostia neighborhood, an advisory panel of citizens and local and federal agency representatives, after an exhaustive study, decided to recommend Anacostia to the Board of Education as the project site. Again we have a reform effort in education initiated by an office outside of the school system - in this case, by the highest official in our country, the President.

In his March 1968 message to Congress, President Johnson said:

Washington's 150,000 school children and their parents... must also be able to exercise one of their most fundamental rights. They must have a voice which can be heard in the operation of their school system.13

President Johnson went further and spelled out the kind of school experiment he envisioned:

I propose a major model school experiment in the District, embracing a significant area of the city. This program will:
- Revive the interest of citizens in their schools
- Help teachers improve the skills of their profession through retraining opportunities
- Bring to students the best in teaching methods and materials
- Revise the curriculum to make it serve the young people of our city
- Equip high school graduates with marketable skills
- Seek alliances between employers and the schools
- Give children the chance to learn at their own pace, reducing both dropouts and failures

13 President L. B. Johnson, Budget Message to Congress, March 1968, in Fantini and Nickens, op. cit., p. 3.
Serve a section of the city where the needs of students and schools are greatest.
To support this program, I have included $10 million in my 1969 budget for the Office of Education to supplement the funds providing regular support for the D.C. schools.\textsuperscript{14}

Launched in this political climate, and with the prestige of the Office of the President behind this experiment, success would seem relatively inevitable. Such was not the case, however. At this time, the Anacostia Project is scheduled to be terminated in August 1972. In Chapter IV, we will examine the Anacostia Project as a classic example of the ineffectiveness of educational reform efforts in urban areas.

The Clark Plan

The last effort of educational reform to be discussed is popularly known as the "Clark Plan" after its eminent author, Dr. Kenneth Clark. The official title, however, is \textit{A Possible Reality: A Design for the Attainment of High Academic Achievement for the Students of the Public Elementary and Junior High Schools of Washington, D.C.} This reform effort was initiated by the Board of Education, and this fact caused a storm of controversy about the project which raged for over a year. The nature and objectives of the reform effort were not new, but the teachers and the community were sharply divided over how these goals were to be achieved and the "arbitrary manner" in which the report was approved. Simply stated, the goal of the Clark Plan was to

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}
raise reading and mathematics scores to national norms in one year.

Several of the recommendations within the Clark Plan were challenged by the Teachers' Union on the grounds that they were considered violations of the Board of Education–Teacher Union Agreement. The Teachers' Union objected to the plan for the following reasons: (1) teachers were not involved in the planning of the Clark Plan; (2) standardized tests were to be administered to pupils three times a year; (3) differentiated staffing was designed to conform with the university system, which, in effect, produced a mster teacher comparable to a full professor at a university; and (4) implied as teachers interpreted it, accountability and pay differential would be based upon pupil performance.

The Board of Education approved the Clark Plan on July 13, 1970. Dr. Clark stated at this meeting that "the basic assumption in the report was that the students in the public schools of Washington, D. C., were normal human beings and that normal human beings, if taught efficiently, would learn." The Board of Education, too, was sharply divided on the merits of the Clark Plan, and in the fall of 1970, the new superintendent officially assumed the task of implementing this plan. Faced with a divided Board of Education, a firm timetable for implementation, and a threatened teachers' work stoppage, this latest effort to reform education in Washington, D. C., was launched. These

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problems will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV.

In this Chapter, we have looked at the social, economic, and political climates of the District of Columbia and how they impinge upon and influence the operations of the public schools. We have further looked at the government of the District of Columbia and its unique relationship to the Congress, and how this structure affects the District of Columbia public schools. Finally, we have briefly sketched the nature of the educational reform efforts in the District of Columbia since 1948. In Chapters III and IV, we shall examine each reform effort in detail to determine (1) the actual recommendations for reform; (2) the extent to which those recommendations were actually carried out; (3) how those recommendations were compromised in the process of their implementation; and (4) the significant factors in compromising the effectiveness of each of the suggested reforms.
CHAPTER III

THE STRAYER SURVEY, MODEL SCHOOL DIVISION AND THE PASSOW STUDY

The preceding chapters reviewed the social, economic and political climate of the District of Columbia and the influence of each upon the functions of the public schools. Attention was given to the unique characteristics of the District of Columbia and how its territorial status, under the governance of the Congress of the United States, had a direct effect upon the public school system. An effort was made to relate these conditions and characteristics to attempts at educational reform.

In this chapter The Strayer Survey, The Model School Division and The Passow Study will be reviewed in detail. The Clark Plan and the Anacostia Project will be analyzed in Chapter IV. Under consideration are, (1) the actual recommendations for reform; (2) how the recommendations were compromised in the process of their implementation; and (3) the significant factors in compromising the effectiveness of each of the suggested reforms.

The Strayer Survey

In the opinion of this writer, The Strayer Survey was one of the most exhaustive and complete surveys ever completed on a major school system. It would be impossible to discuss all of the recommendations made in the report which covers every aspect of public school operation in the District of Columbia,
including elementary, secondary, and vocational education. Included in Dr. Strayer's fifteen chapter report is a review of and recommendations on all phases of school administration, operation and maintenance of buildings and grounds, food services, school buildings and school housing needs, and the financing of public school education in the District of Columbia. The report's nine hundred and eighty pages also include specific recommendations for each educational topic covered. Since the breadth and detail of the report preclude a comprehensive analysis of all its components, the author has limited his discussed to those areas which (1) remain issues today, (2) are still undergoing reform or study, or (3) impinge upon attempts at educational reform in the last ten years.

The Strayer Survey suggested that the Board of Education reorganize its procedures to allow that more adequate consideration be given matters of major policy. The Strayer Survey particularly criticized the detailed operations of the Board of Education and its cumbersome "committee system" which apparently involved the Board in administrative details more appropriately handled by the Superintendent. As Dr. Strayer put it:

The Board of Education is responsible for the general management and control of the District School System. However, the carrying out of this function does not imply that the administrative detail should be handled directly by the Board of Education or by committees representing the Board.

In his evaluation of the rules of the Board, Strayer found confusion be-
between policy and procedure. He recommended that far greater discretion be
given to the Superintendent of Schools in the administration of matters of procedure
and in carrying on the routine activities of the schools.¹

There have been several subsequent ineffective attempts to revise the
rules of the Board of Education. For example, a comprehensive study was
undertaken in 1968-69 by an outside consulting firm, which completed over half
of the job - the collection and compilation of all administrative directives and
policy statements. However, the study has never been completed nor have any
plans been made to provide the funds to complete it. While some changes in the
rules of the Board of Education have been made by the Board and the Superintendent
working as a committee, the type of comprehensive rule changes called for by
Dr. Strayer have not yet even been contemplated.

- Of more significance, perhaps, was Strayer's recommendation to abolish
the "committee system" of the Board. For years, until 1968-69, the Board
operated with eight standing committees which held public meetings to discuss
business on the Thursday preceding the regular Wednesday meeting of the Board
of Education. The personnel committee meeting was the only meeting closed
to the public. Shortly after the elected Board took office, the committee system
was eliminated except for personnel matters which were to be handled by the
entire Board sitting as a closed committee of the whole.

¹Strayer, Ibid., pp. 37-38.
In the last two years, however, without actually reversing its previous action eliminating the committee system, the Board drifted back to the committee system by creating committees as the need arose to handle such matters as federal programs, budget matters, employer-employee relations, and so forth. In other words, the detailed procedural functions which consumed so much of the Board's time and cut into the Superintendent's responsibilities have been reinstated with little change from those criticized by Strayer in 1947.  

The Board of Education should be a policy making body. Its function is legislative in character and not administrative. However, in the District of Columbia, the resurrected committee "system" lends itself to administrative action. The committees invade the administrative realm and increasingly usurp responsibility and authority belonging to the Superintendent, the executive officers of the administrative staff and even the Board of Education as a whole. As a result, prompt action on the part of administrative personnel is often impeded as delegated functions are interfered with by Board of Education committees.

It appears that the Board's practice of dealing with all administrative matters in detail could not be modified or easily relinquished by its members. This has been particularly true in matters which affect school operations and personnel in any of the eight wards. Although it has often been stated that the Superintendent should be given maximum administrative freedom and held

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Ibid., p. 38.
accountable for his actions especially in personnel matters, this has not been the case.

Strayer recommended that the administrative supervisory staff be reorganized at the top level on a functional basis with several associate superintendents in charge. In 1968, following a similar recommendation in the Passow Study, a major reorganization of the school system took place which created several associate superintendent positions in administrative services, personnel, instructional services, research, planning and innovation, and later executive management and budget.

Although first called for over 20 years ago and sought many times thereafter, the addition of several associate superintendents was not well received by some of the community and staff. Because of the concentration of administrative personnel in one building, the charge was often made, that supervisory staff were isolated in a downtown office away from the day-to-day problems of the school. This, however, was not the case since supervisors spent four days a week in the field. On the fifth day, they met together in the central office building to go over the problems that had occurred in the schools, to plan and evaluate supervisory techniques, and to deal with problems of supervision.

At this writing, many of the administrative offices have been dispersed with administrators assigned to various schools in the city. This change was in large part an economy measure. Under the proposed decentralization plan,
administrative officers will be assigned to decentralized units throughout the city. The economics notwithstanding, this should be an effective way of providing supervisory assistance and was recommended in the writer's Reorganization of Instructional Services in 1968.

Dr. Strayer saw a real need for reform in the administration of business affairs.

The setting for the administration of the business affairs of the Washington Schools is unique. The administrators in no other large city school system are as subject to laws, policies, rules, regulations, opinions and intricate legal structure.

The Survey continued,

A school system to serve children must be flexible; its needs are constant and inconspicuously changing. It is extremely difficult to meet these shifting demands, not to mention emergencies, without a fair amount of fiscal freedom and administrative freedom in business affairs comparable with that permitted in educational affairs. 3

Yet, school business executives are dependent upon the District of Columbia Government for plant design, construction, maintenance, and for accounting, auditing, budget control and procurement services. They are guided by a complex structure of laws affecting federal offices, a District Code, decisions of the Comptroller General, the Bureau of the Budget, legal opinions, and the suggestions and requests of District officials and committees of the U. S. Congress. Fiscally, the schools are affected by the District's financial and

3 Ibid., p. 121.
business policies, and their support is generally dependent upon the overall financial condition of the District. The District's financial health and well-being is in turn affected by the way in which Congress appropriates all money used by the District, including even D. C. tax returns. This unique double dependency presents Washington school administrators with all of the problems of the school business executive in a city where the board of education is dependent upon the city council or equivalent body for financial support and many more.

The business-related problems outlined by Dr. Strayer in 1947 still plague the District of Columbia schools today but are compounded by growth and an influx of Federal monies. A recent editorial in the Washington Post is illustrative:

A good four months ago Washington's taxpayers learned to their astonishment that the city's public school system was so disorganized bureaucratically and financially that no one could tell for sure whether it was bankrupt or not. There were reports that the system might be anywhere from three million to 5.9 million dollars in the red, but the books were in a shambles and nobody would admit to being in anything resembling command.4

Although substantive changes in the business affairs of the scope called for by Dr. Strayer have not been completed, two of his minor recommendations have been instituted and are proving economical and effective. These were (1) the establishment of a mail room equipped for metered mail which might

result in economies, and (2) a central store of office supplies which might produce savings in time and money. Both of these measures have been carried out largely as Strayer recommended, and the result has been greater efficiency and promptness in mail delivery.

Dr. Strayer also saw deficiencies in special education, such as: (1) the lack of a strong central clinic to which all children would be referred for any type of special service; (2) the lack of supervisory and advisory service for the physically and mentally handicapped; (3) an inadequate budget; and (4) untrained teachers in special education. Dr. Strayer's central recommendation in Special Education was that "a child adjustment clinic be established to cover the needs of all children". This clinic would serve not only as a referral center for analysis, diagnosis, and recommendations for children, but as a treatment center as well. All children who were to be referred for any special classes or special services by the Health Department would be referred automatically to the central clinic for educational evaluation.

After similar recommendations were put forth in the Passow Study, a department for Special Education has been set up under an associate superintendent during the past school year (1970-71). A reorganization of this department has been completed, and a substantial increase for the Department of Special Education was received in the 1971 Appropriations Act for the District of Columbia. Although the central clinic that Dr. Strayer proposed has not been set up as such, it is fair to say that diagnostic and referral practices have
improved and that the reorganization will insure that a greater amount of attention is given to those pupils who are physically and mentally handicapped.

One of the paradoxes of the Strayer Survey, written over 25 years ago, is that most of the problems it identifies still exist in varying forms in 1972.

In the report's summary, Dr. Strayer might have been talking about the current scene when he stated:

The following steps must be taken to develop an adequate program for financing the school system in the District of Columbia: (1) the taxing system must be modified to produce 15 million dollars to 20 million dollars additional revenue to balance the District budget. The inequitable features of the present tax system should be corrected; a reasonable proportion of the additional revenues appropriated to the school system would provide the funds necessary to operate the schools on a defensible basis; (2) the Federal payment should be increased to a more equitable relationship with the value of Federal property in the District and the burdens imposed on the local Government by the Federal establishment; (3) Financing of the recommended building program cannot be carried on the pay-as-you-go plan without an equitable and undesirable increase in current taxes. The cost can be equalized over a period of time and the funds be made available when needed with the judicious use of credit. The funds should be advanced by the Federal Government on a definite repayment schedule, or the District Government should be authorized to issue serial bonds to be paid from debt service appropriations from District revenues; (4) the system of fiscal control should be simplified. The authorities responsible for the operation of the District Government should be given fiscal powers commensurate with their responsibilities. While the Congress must retain the legislative authority and also review the actions of the District Government for the protection of Federal interests, there is little justification for the detailed controls now exercised by Federal authorities. A functional relationship between the needs and the desires of the citizens of the
District for education services and the methods for
financing these services can be attained when fiscal
authority coexists with administrative responsibility. 5

The debate over increased taxes and an increased Federal payment still
rages today with these critical issues far from resolution. The fiscal needs of
the school system as outlined by school officials and the School Board are still
not acknowledged or supported by other important segments of the community.

In large measure, the Strayer Survey was compromised by two realities
which still haunt those seeking educational reform in the city. They are (1) the
estimated cost of the reforms and (2) the lack of authority on the part of both
the Board of Education and Washington, D. C. citizens to implement a report
which was initiated, supervised and funded by the Congress of the United States.

Model School Division

In the early stages of the war on poverty one inner city region - The
Cardozo High School - was chosen initially to receive a saturation of innovative
educational and social programs to measure the impact of increased resources
on deprived areas. However, responding to a report issued by the President's
Science Advisory Committee, the District of Columbia Public School System
soon embraced the idea of creating a model subsystem out of the chosen inner
city target area. This concept and the Superintendent's proposed program for
action were approved by the Board of Education of the District of Columbia on

5 Strayer, op. cit., p. 980.
June 17, 1964. The Superintendent's rationale for recommending adoption of the subsystem concept and his hopes for the program were in part set forth in his memo to the Committee on Finance, Personnel, Student Activities, and Health and Special Education Services of the Board of Education. The Superintendent justified his recommendation with the following report to the Board of Education:

The target area program contains many programs which are inherent in the model school concept. These goals are now integral parts of the total community action program being developed in other cities in the country and represented in the District of Columbia by United Planning Organization efforts.

The Model Schools Division planning was given further impetus by the publication on March 1964 of Innovation and Experiment in Education, a progress report of the panel on Educational Research and Development of the United States Commission of Education, the Director of the National Science Foundation, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The report proposed a novel concept for dealing with educational problems which it was felt had great possibilities for adaptation to the educational needs of the District of Columbia. This concept embraced the idea of an experimental school subsystem, a model subsystem, to be instituted in an inner city area in a medium size or large city.

The new wave in educational research and development had been devoted largely to the design and writing of better instructional materials. At the same time there had been some experimenting with the institutional aspects of the schools - team teaching, non-graded structures, after school tutoring programs and the like. Until the advent of the Model School Division however, such programs had been along lines fixed in advance. What you could do along one line was limited by what you could not do along another. The proper unit for institutional
innovation and experiment was a cluster of schools in the school system.

Administratively, this cluster could be described as a model system within the regular system which included a high school, contemplates preschool centers, elementary schools and junior high schools that fed into it. This cluster would also include a vocational high school, either in or out of the selected area and provision for post-high school training. It was considered essential that vocational and/or occupational and technical training be available to pupils desiring that kind of educational program. This procedure would define an area and the area chosen should have certain characteristics - a high rate of unemployment, sub-standard housing, a high incidence of juvenile delinquency, and other social and economic problems which plague large center city areas. This approach makes essential the development of a sequential program. New results with a child in the first grade make necessary new things in the second grade and so on through high school. As innovations in the model subsystem are developed and proved of value they ought to be introduced as rapidly as feasible into our schools on a city-wide basis.

As Washington, D. C. develops this program we will work in close cooperation with other cities carrying out similar projects, and in addition have access to outstanding educators and other government and private resources for advice.

The Superintendent thus believes that the concept of a model school subsystem has greater potential for total impact in conjunction with a community action program than did the original concept. The inner city area planning will be a part of the model system approach which does not assume that we know all the answers and have simply to pour in more resources. It is however an across-the-board experiment - curriculum development, utilization of teachers, the management of the system itself - with provision for rapid feedback of results and rapid exploitation of new opportunities. The hope is to develop effective patterns of schooling that can be adopted at considerably
less expense by other parts of the school system and other school systems across the nation. Much work still needs to be done in developing and implementing this idea, and the Superintendent finds merit in the opportunity afforded to work jointly on these problems with national leaders in education.\textsuperscript{6}

A committee was formed to develop and adopt a plan of action to implement the model school subsystem concept. Judge David Bazelon was selected chairman. The Assistant Superintendent in charge of the Model School Division met regularly with this committee to develop plans for the model subsystem. The controversy which ensued will be discussed below.

During its initial year of operation, 1964-1965, the model subsystem structure consisted of an assistant superintendent, a director of programs, and assistant director, and a small clerical staff. The assistant superintendent did not have line authority over the subsystem schools themselves; he was given responsibility only for those special programs not considered part of the regularly offered school program. Teachers, principals, and supervisors continued to be responsible to the departments of elementary and secondary education. All elementary principals, therefore reported to the Assistant Superintendent for Elementary Education just as all secondary principals reported to the Assistant Superintendent for Secondary Education. Principals were responsible to the Assistant Superintendent of the Model School Division only for new and experimental programs.

\textsuperscript{6} Report to the Board of Education, June 11, 1964.
The Model School Division administration prepared budget requests for special programs which were submitted to the United Planning Organization. The division had no formal control over regular budget allocations for its 19 schools. The introduction of the "model" programs and new ideas were traumatic enough in themselves. But with a second authority figure to deal with, many principals became extremely ill-at-ease and had difficulty adjusting to the newly imposed duality of control and functions.

In the Model School Division's second year of operation, a decision was made to transfer operating control of the 19 schools from secondary and elementary school departments to the Assistant Superintendent, Model School Division. At the same time it was made clear that other school departments of the system were to continue to service the Model School Division. With the transfer of control, some of the problems of the Model School Division were eliminated. For example, one rather small but significant action was the requirement that all principals meet together regardless of level; while at the outset there was great resistance to the idea of bringing elementary and secondary principals together, principals gradually came to view the education of their children as a continuous process, and each began to see that by planning they could develop more effective team approach to educational problems.

Still, the fuzziness about the mission and role of the Model School Division persisted. In an effort to clarify and redefine the Model School Division role within the system, the Board of Education on June 30, 1967,
reaffirmed its commitment to the Division and to the following policies and procedures governing its operation: (1) that the Model School Division has the authority to deploy all specialized teaching personnel and all supervisory personnel to insure effective coordination of departmental activities with experimental programs in the Model School Division; (2) that the Model School Division has the authority to disseminate experimental programs and curricula of demonstrated validity and applicability throughout the Model School Division, even though these programs and curricula may not be represented in the standard departmental courses of study; and (3) that the Model School Division has the authority for direct purchase of experimental materials through the Assistant Superintendent of the Model School Division.

Although the panel of consultants hired to assist in the development of the model subsystem concept had recommended funding at about the $10 million level, or two to three times the per pupil expenditure of the regular schools, the schools in question were never funded at such high levels. Indeed, The Model School Division received little, if any funding more than its schools would have received had the Division not been formally organized.

From its inception, the Model School Division was supported primarily through regular school appropriations, Impact Aid Funds for the eligible schools, Economic Opportunity Act Funds, and ESEA Funds. However, only EOA Funds and ESEA Funds have been used for the Model School Division's special projects. The highest amount received additionally per pupil from ESEA
and Impact Aid Funds was less than a hundred dollars per student, an amount not in excess of the fair share which would have been received normally based on the proportion of Title I and Impact Aid formula children attending Model Schools compared to the total number of these children in all city schools. Nonetheless, the amount of funding was a constant source of irritation and controversy. Many felt that the Model Schools Division was receiving a great deal of extra money; and they believed that the money should be shared equally across the system.

In reality, it merely looked as if the Division had additional monies. What made the difference was not the funds available but the authority to spend them in a different way. Thus, the classrooms in the Model School Division were vibrant with new science curricula, new science materials, new math materials. The rooms took on an open and lively look. This was in contrast to other classrooms in other parts of the city which did not have the option to buy the same materials. In addition, the Division's teachers were trained to utilize these materials, and, as a result, the classrooms, pupils and parents reflected this different type of operation.

In spite of these changes in some of the Model School Division classrooms, the severe delays in funding during the first two years of operation did not improve with the stabilization of ESEA and Impact Aid appropriations. Repeated delays and cut-backs made it difficult to plan and carry out objective program evaluations. Programs often could not be implemented until the size
of the governmental appropriation was known - sometimes not until late in the school year.

Programs developed during the Model School Division's first year of operation placed strong emphasis on staff development and reading instruction. There was also a great deal of emphasis on school-community relations, largely carried out through school community councils, and some evaluation took place.

The objective of the Model School Division's Staff Development Program was to achieve and maintain the highest possible level of staff competence. Each staff member from administrator and teacher to custodian and cafeteria worker was considered an integral part of the educational process, learning and growing along with the students with whom they interacted and supported.

- Perhaps the most effective staff development technique used in the Model School Division was the Innovation Team, a group of teachers who assist classroom teachers in improving instructional techniques. Many methods were used to improve classroom teaching: school-day in-service programs and workshops; innovative materials, equipment and instruction; supportive services in the classroom based upon the individual needs of the classroom teacher and those of her students; the development and use of curriculum materials which were responsive to the times and children's needs; assistance from outside consultants; and summer institutes which helped the teacher develop new instructional techniques and which provided organizational assistance and sensitivity awareness.
The Innovation Team tried to enhance and amplify the resources and strengths of individual teachers so that they may more successfully develop the capabilities of individual children through meaningful educational experiences. The Team offered peer assistance without any evaluation. It was available to teachers at their request to assist with problems.

The chief characteristic of reading instruction in the Model School Division was that of the eclectic or combination approach to reading instruction. Whenever possible, two or more programs were combined together with supplementary materials and audio visual aids to provide teachers with the possibility of providing their pupils a multi-media, multi-sensory, balanced program in reading instruction in which reading, writing, speaking, and listening served to reinforce each other. The combination approach was in harmony with a marked trend throughout the country for greater emphasis on individualized instruction to meet the needs, attitudes and feelings of each child. Some 12 to 14 reading programs are currently used throughout the Model School Division schools including Bank Street Readers, Initial Teaching Alphabet, Language Experiences in Reading, Learning to Think Series and Project Read.

In program evaluation, the Division faced some handicaps. Research and evaluation within the system had typically been spotty and dependent upon either the availability of the assistant superintendent in charge of research and his very small staff or money from outside sources to hire review and research
assistants from private concerns. Nonetheless, some evaluation has taken place. For example, in a report prepared by the Department of Research and Evaluation, Division of Planning, Innovation and Research, September 1969, a three-year study of the reading achievement of 4th and 6th grade students in the Model School Division was provided. It was based upon STEP (Sequential Test of Educational Progress) scores for the school years 1966 through 1969 of students who remained in the same school for the three-year period thereby receiving essentially the same programs and treatment.

Any effort to evaluate The Model School Division should take into account Dr. Harry Passow's observations as articulated in his study of the D. C. schools.

Since its inception, the Model School Division has been a source of controversy primarily in terms of its mission and its funding. Its dependence on partial funding from outside sources, its involvement with lay organizations, and its special position within the school's bureaucratic structure has caused many problems. The Superintendent of Schools saw the Model School Division primarily as a demonstration unit - not necessarily as a creator of innovations; a model subsystem designed to insure the infusion of new ideas and lessen institutional reluctance of departing from existing procedures. The United Planning Organization on the other hand tended to view the Model School Division only in terms of 'shaking up the system itself' by developing different patterns of schooling. The Model School Division described its special mission in its June 1967 report as "an across-the-board experiment - curriculum development, utilization of teachers; the management of the system itself - with provisions for... rapid exploitation of new opportunities for inner city children."
The Division does have many gains to its credit. It appears they have accomplished much in bringing elementary and secondary school principals together in a meaningful dialogue. It has developed an esprit-de-corps within its staff. The materials it has distributed have apparently enriched the programs. It has launched several challenging upgraded and team teaching projects. Significantly, it has found ways to draw upon research relating to innovation. The Model School Division might well become increasingly productive given appropriate support - administratively and financially.

The Model School Division represents the closest thing available in Washington to a system for initiating and testing ideas new to the District School System. Problems have flowed, of course, from the joint funding by the District Schools and the United Planning Organization, as well as from confusion over the interrelationships among two agencies and the Model School Advisory Committee. The relationship between United Planning Organization's education section of the Model School Division has stuck on the point of program initiation - where it is to come from and who is to determine its dimensions. There are diametrically opposing views as to the seat of authority for program development as contrasted with program approval. There are also disputes over the relationship of the Model School Division to the rest of the school system.

The basic question is whether the Model School Division is really to be autonomous, solvent, and free. Finally, there is the basic question of demonstration versus innovation. Demonstration would simply involve locating good ideas and putting them into practice for the inservice edification of other school staffs. However, if Model School Division is to innovate, then its role involves some demonstration and dissemination of course, but even more program planning and experimental development.

The request of the Model School Division for $100,000 for planning purposes firms up a position which has been wavering. Evaluation of the quality and impact of Model School Division programs has been erratic. The lack of ongoing research and evaluation for the Model School
Division has been cited previously as one of its major defects.  

The Washington Post's December 1970 analysis of the Model Schools is also instructive:

For six years the Washington School System has been trying in a limited way to do the two things the Superintendent of Schools, Hugh J. Scott has put at the top of his list of educational reforms needed here; they are decentralization - dividing the 145,000 pupil - system into smaller more manageable units - and intensive teacher training.

The place where they are being tried is the Model School Division - Cardozo High School and the four junior highs and 16 elementary schools that feed into it. All serving inner city youngsters in Northwest Washington... With its twin emphasis on smallness and "staff development," the Model School Division thus seems very much in the Scott mold.

The Model Schools do seem different from others in Washington; they have a distinct freshness about them; more than elsewhere in the city it is possible to find teachers and students doing old things in new ways - the result of the intense teacher training which is the work of a group called the Innovation Team. Some of the Division's six-year olds learn to read from soup cans and milk cartons and soap wrappers. Their first words may be "Dial" as in soap; "Bean-with-bacon" as in soup and "hi" as in Hi C orange drink. Some teachers have replaced traditional classroom furniture with bookcases and independent study centers made of heavy-duty cardboard. The Division's 16,000 children are the authors and illustrators of a poignant book with a national circulation in education circles - "The Children of Cardozo Tell It Like It is.

But the heart of its effort has been the Innovation Team - 18 teachers-of-teachers who move through the Division's

\[\textit{ibid.}, \text{pp. 375-381.}\]
schools spreading new ideas, methods and materials. Depending on who you talk to this emphasis on teacher training has accomplished a great deal with very little or very little with a great deal, or something in between. Again, here evidence is sketchy and contradictory. ... Information on how much money goes into the Division is as scanty and inconclusive as the information on pupil achievement. Nickens, the Division's first superintendent, who now is Deputy of Superintendent of Instruction for the entire system, contends that the Division has never gotten much, if any more money than any one else, only the freedom to spend it differently. Mary Lela Sherburne, another founder of the Model School Division and still closely associated with it as Director of a regional federally financed pilot community program, estimates a spending difference as at most $100 per pupil in any given year. A reporter's analysis of school-by-school operating costs for the 1969-1970 school year, compiled by the school system for the U. S. Court of Appeals and Judge J. Skelly Wright supports this view. Spending per pupil from regular and regular funds for the Division's elementary pupils was $684.00 - $700.00 more than the city-wide spending, but $29.00 less than the average in the 13 elementaries west of the Rock Creek Park.

• Despite the mixed reactions, there is no doubt but that many of the programs started in the Model School Division have been introduced into the system as a whole. Team teaching, ungradedness, many new reading programs, Innovation Teams, School Managers, direct purchases and procurement of materials for classrooms all have in some form either been called for in the system at large or established in some school communities. In addition:

(1) The Model School Division created the best staff development model that has been put forth in some years - the Innovation Team - a group of highly skilled teachers who worked with other teachers on a peer basis with no

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authority or power to evaluate or rate teachers. The impact of this team was felt far beyond the Model School Division because it was called upon to give workshops and provide assistance in other troubled areas of the system. In fact, this very demand upon the team's energy and time affected its ability to serve the Model School area; it was impossible for 18 teachers to service an entire school system. The need for additional Innovation Teams could not be met because of a lack of resources and time. Replication of the Innovation Team could not be achieved simply by producing new people and calling them Innovation Team members. Training had to be provided and skills developed over a period of time.

(2) The Model School Division demonstrated that classrooms can be alive and fresh and that teachers, parents and school officers working together can plan programs and carry them out for the good of children. (3) The Model School Division proved beyond doubt that given an opportunity to communicate, the teachers and principal can develop an esprit-de-corps which will allow them to overcome initial feelings of distrust.

(4) The Model School Division developed a Center for the Innovation Team which attracted not only adults and citizens of the community, but teachers from other areas outside the metropolitan school district who came in to attend workshops and look over the large number of materials, textbooks and other items collected for viewing, handling, and learning how to do.

The Model School Division was handicapped by: (1) a lack of continuous funding which would enable it to build and plan programs; (2) a bureaucratic
structure which did not lend itself to the need and desire to respond quickly to problems; (3) an absence of funding that was unencumbered by the legal restrictions imposed by the District of Columbia and Federal Governments; (4) the absence of a mechanism for incorporating what was learned in the Model School Division by the rest of the system; (5) a general misunderstanding and distrust of the Model School Division, its goals and financing; (6) the School System's inability to accept a sectional, autonomous resources and development unit; and (7) the system's lack of commitment to the idea of the Model School Division, to experimentation and innovation.

In the absence of total commitment by this or any other school system, no innovative educational experiment can succeed. With a total commitment, however, administrators can program resources over a five-year period and plan a continuing program which will have some chance of success. The necessity to fight for every dollar and every new idea dissipates the energy of those who have been charged with the responsibility for making new ideas work.

**Toward Creating a Model Urban School System**

Unlike the Strayer Survey, the Passow Study was initiated by the Board of Education and the Superintendent in cooperation with the community. It was approved by the Board of Education largely as a result of the controversy raging over the Four Track Curriculum then in effect. The scope of the study was enlarged, however, to include the entire school system.
Developed with the assistance of Teachers College, Columbia University, the study was conducted by 33 task forces, each headed by a specialist. Task force chairmen, aided by consultants and graduate students, visited classes and schools; interviewed students, staff, members of the community and school and community leaders of many kinds, administered questionnaires and inventories to pupils and staff members, examined pertinent pupil records and other school data; analyzed existing resources and materials as well as curriculum bulletins and guides; examined reports from other agencies and offices and drew on appropriate data sources wherever they could be found.

Since the District Schools are surely among the most surveyed and investigated in the Nation, early reports on the schools were studied as well, dating back to the report of the Advisory Committee on Education in 1938.\(^9\)

The Passow Report was presented to the Board of Education in September 1967 at which time the Board created a review mechanism for input from community groups, staff, students and professional groups. The review structure included an executive study group, a community council and 25 working parties formed to study specific sections of the report. The common goal was to propose those changes that would effect maximum improvement in the D. C. public schools in order to insure quality education for all. The process,

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\(^9\)The personnel of the task forces and a detailing of the inventories and instruments used are found in Appendix A of the report.

as far as can be determined, represented the most extensive involvement and cooperation in the analysis and proposed rebuilding of a school system ever undertaken by the school community of any large city. This was in marked contrast to the Strayer Survey which saw little or no concentrated effort at implementation.

On July 17, 1968, the Executive Study Group, under the chairmanship of Mrs. Anita Allen, Vice President of the Board, made its report to the Board of Education. Two sections of this report are significant:

The Board quite clearly recognized that those who glibly proposed implementing the Columbia University recommendations as published, had not read them. The Columbia University Report describes in great detail what is wrong with the schools, but gives suggestions for change in only the broadest terms. Dr. Passow himself suggested to this Board that no improvement in the schools could be achieved without the full participation the Board so wisely saw fit to include in the Executive Study Group review structure.

As far as we are concerned the specific recommendations growing out of the joint Board, administration, teacher and community involvement now supplant the more general directions provided in the Columbia University Report and should be published by the Board and made widely available throughout the school system and community as a blueprint for change. 11

The second important aspect of this Report is reflected in these words,

Briefly the Executive Study Group envisioned a school system which centers around the child and which has adequate tools to meet the needs of every child in the system... The focus of such a system must be instruction and the tools of instruction staff, materials, curriculum - must undergo continuous

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progressive development in order to serve each child adequately. Instruction should be individualized so that each child's particular strength can be used as a foundation upon which to build. The system which best serves the child must involve the total community in both the continued education of the community and the continuous participation of the community in planning for the educational process.

Flexibility, planning, change and evaluation must be built into the school system so that it can continue to meet the needs of children. We do not see the school system we propose as a rigid structure, but rather as the beginning of a process of evaluation. 12

The recommendations of the Executive Study Group approved in concept at the July 30, 1968 meeting of the Board of Education, were to be used as a guide for instituting comprehensive reform in the school system. With the assistance of an office created especially to implement the Executive Study Group recommendations, the administration would have the capacity to develop full-scale plans for the proposed reform efforts. The Superintendent and his staff reviewed all Study Group reports to determine the implications for all divisions of the school system. Each division was charged with developing action blue prints "for phasing in its operational change." These action blue prints were to describe the phasing in in terms of target date, funding and human resources necessary to meet intended goals.

The Passow Study, like other major reports on the D. C. schools, is voluminous and comprehensive; only some of its recommendations will be

12 Ibid.
discussed here. Singled out for analysis are those recommendations which bear upon school operations today or which impact upon future operations of the school.

Dr. Passow strongly recommended decentralization and the Executive Study Group supported him and recommended that the school system decentralize, but that changes be made in such a manner as to insure the greatest possible success for the reorganization. According to the study, decentralization could help the school system realize two objectives: (1) an effective school organization which will facilitate teaching and learning; and (2) shortened communication lines with parents and citizens integrally involved in the educational process. Built into the system's central organization is a lack of responsiveness to the needs of students, parents, and teachers. A decentralized system might alleviate these problems by bringing administration closer to the buildings, their personnel and students, providing the flexibility and freedom necessary to develop and carry out responsive and innovative programs, and by providing a mechanism which would allow the intensive focusing of resources and insuring accountability for performance. In addition, by increasing community participation and control, the school program could be reinforced by the community after being shaped with its needs and wishes foremost in mind.

The author, in a report submitted to the Board, "The Five Year Plan for Improving Instructional Services in the Division of Instruction" hypothesized
that greater efficiency in the delivery of services to improve instruction
could be accomplished through either of two means - the formal decentralization
into districts or the decentralization of services so that they are closer to the
user, i.e., the school and the students. The summary of this plan is attached
as an appendix.

In response to the recommendation for decentralization, the Status
Report on Implementation of Specific Executive Study Group recommendations,
based on the Passow Report, stated:

The school system now has four differing extremes
in decentralization: The Model School Division,
The Morgan and Adams Community Schools, The
Anacostia Project, and The Fort Lincoln New Town
Project. 

The Model School Division was created almost five years ago as a semi-
autonomous subsystem. As the other decentralization experiments took hold,
a mechanism was needed to link the decentralized units with the central
administration. The most favorable solution was the creation of a special
division as a part of the Superintendent's Office. And so the Division of
Special Projects came into being to serve a two-fold need - giving the de-
centralized units direct access to the office of the Superintendent and freeing
them from much time-consuming procedural red tape. Accordingly, these
decentralized units are being given as much autonomy and as much admini-
strative support as is presently feasible.

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13Executive Study Group, Ibid., p. 9.
However, it is fair to say that the decentralization envisioned by Dr. Passow replete with community superintendents and elected local school boards is nowhere in existence. The Board has twice turned down proposed system-wide decentralization plans. The first reorganization along these lines, proposed by former Superintendent Dr. Manning, was based on existing high school boundaries. Objections to his proposal included: (1) the proliferation of administrative staff; (2) the diversity of size in the proposed districts with the population ranging from roughly 30,000 pupils in one district to approximately 15,000 in another district; (3) the fact that the new districts would not be contiguous to the eight Board of Education Wards. The second decentralization plan that was rejected by the School Board was presented informally by Dr. Scott. He is currently revising that plan and is scheduled to present a revision of it to the Board in late Summer, 1972.

Another Passow recommendation called for administrative reorganization to bring greater efficiency to the operation of the Superintendent's Office. The plan proposed was: (1) that the Vice Superintendent be in charge of the day-to-day operations of the school system; (2) that the central administration include four divisions - one headed by a Deputy Superintendent and the other three headed by Associate Superintendents each performing a clearly delineated function; (3) that the Division of Instruction, headed by a Deputy Superintendent, should be the dominant division of the system; (4) that the Division of Planning, Innovation and Research be concerned with long-range planning and provide
information and guidance for the progressive evaluation of the Division of Instruction; (5) that the Division of Administrative Services be the facilitating agency for the Division of Instruction and that service not shape the instructional program; and (6) that the Division of Personnel also serve as a facilitating agency for the Division of Instruction. This recommended reorganization of central administration offices was authorized by the Board of Education at its meeting of August 15, 1968. It is significant to note that the administrative reorganization now being prepared by the Superintendent will modify and significantly change this organization which was effected in 1968.

Another major recommendation in The Passow Study concerns finance and the budgetary process. The Executive Study Group recommended that the school budget be written in terms of educational objectives. The budget, it was reasoned, should therefore be prepared by the Department of Planning, Research and Innovation, the office responsible for identifying specific and long-range educational objectives. Such goals should be set by the Board of Education through a continuing dialogue between the Board, the school administration, and the community.

It was further recommended that a Program-Planning-Budgeting System should be utilized which would make resource allocation dependent upon desired educational results. Budget items should be presented as programs in order of priority with each item including projected results if appropriations were

\[14\] Status Report, p. 7.
smaller than those requested and specific gains were they larger. The line item form of budget should be abandoned.

The Passow Study also recommended that the Congress or other funding authority should commit itself to approving Capital Outlay Programs six years in advance to permit advance site acquisition. The District should be permitted to issue bonds for facility construction to be retired out of property tax revenue. The responsibility for school site acquisition, facility design and maintenance should be transferred to the school administration. In addition, Passow recommended that a revolving fund should be established so that purchases for any fiscal year can be made prior to the start of that year, and a management analyst in the Division of Administrative Services should be assigned as a trouble shooter for procurement distribution and materials accounting problems.

The Passow Study also recommended that the Board of Education should impress upon Congress the tremendous need for additional funds for education in the District. The Board should petition Congress from the City Government to permit the D. C. Government to handle its entire budget, to levy taxes on incomes of all those who work in the District, and to increase its Federal payment, either to the amount which would accrue if a property tax were to apply to Federal property or specifically for education to the amount which the average city of its size would receive under state aid to education. However, without these provisions, the schools should not be cut loose from Federal responsibility.
This major recommendation is still far from being implemented. First, the budget writing function has not been placed in the Department of Planning, Innovation and Research. Rather, the Budget Office incorporated a program planning and budgeting system for FY 1971. Broad educational goals established by the Board of Education were used as a basis for formulating the FY 1971 budget.

The second major attempt at implementation took the form of a Budget Committee request that individual schools prepare budgets using the program method. Forms were constructed by the schools that provided quantitative information to enable the Budget Department to prepare justifications in terms of educational output. However, the time sequence was tight, and although many of the schools prepared sophisticated budget requests, they received very little in the way of return or feedback for their efforts. This lack of positive response to the work performed within the schools took two forms: first, the individual school requests were often completely submerged within the larger report and, therefore, did not surface in recognizable form; and second, many individual requests were flatly rejected. Schools simply were not given the option of vastly increasing some services to the exclusion of others. As a result, a great deal of ill will was generated because many school personnel and their parent-teacher associations felt that they had been invited to engage in an exercise in futility.

Other weaknesses of the local budgeting exercise were that no ball-park
figure was given to the schools and, in addition, there was no time to inform and assist the school officials and parents who were to participate in the new budgeting process. Therefore, the sophistication of the school personnel, the neighborhood and its parent-teacher association often had a significant impact upon the kind of budget document that emerged. Nonetheless, this plan, in principle, is an excellent one, and with modifications could be very effective.

Like Dr. Strayer before him, Dr. Passow was critical of the District's Special Education Programs. He recommended that an Office of Special Education be created under the Division of Instruction to coordinate existing programs and to develop new programs based on the individual needs of the children assigned to it. All children referred to the Division by diagnostic teachers would be placed in a special class in their home school whenever possible on the theory that a child should not be categorized according to the nature of his problem (deafness, retardation, etc.) but rather on the basis of the prescribed methods of achieving results with him. At its August 15, 1968 meeting, the Board of Education approved the establishment of The Department of Special Education referred to earlier.

A related recommendation made by Dr. Passow calls for tuition grants for children who cannot be provided for in the regular school program. The response to this provision has been overwhelming, and the system has been unable to meet the needs of all interested children. However, when the reorganization plan proposed by the Associate Superintendent for Special
Education is implemented, the system will sharply reduce the waiting list on a phase basis until all children needing special help are accommodated. The Board underscored the necessity of providing an education for all District children when, as a result of a court suit brought by a group of parents, it voted to provide free education to all children. Board action will guarantee that children with special handicaps, who are currently forced to remain at home, will have access to the schools.

The Passow Report called for the creation of a Bilingual School to include the standard curriculum in Spanish, intensive course work in English as a second language, and orientation of children to North American cultural patterns and history. It was recommended that Spanish-speaking children in scattered city locations be bussed to this school and that some English speaking children be admitted to increase their appreciation of diverse languages and cultures. It was also suggested that evaluations be made of students to determine when they are sufficiently competent in English to be placed in an English language instructional program.

One bilingual program has been developed by the Model School Division in cooperation with the parents, teachers, students in the Oyster area where the Spanish speaking population of the District is concentrated. A proposal describing this program was approved by the Board of Education at its meeting of January 15, 1969, for submission to the U. S. Office of Education for funding under Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.
Last year, under the Bilingual Act, a group of teachers were trained in cooperation with the District of Columbia Teachers College, and a Bilingual Elementary School was opened. The school is supposed to have a fifty per cent Spanish speaking and fifty per cent English speaking student body.

Curriculum materials were developed in both languages, and, to date, preliminary evaluations indicate that the school has been very successful. Indeed, plans are currently being made to expand the school so that the opportunities it offers can be available to more students. At present there are also bilingual education classes in one other elementary school within the Model School Division.

There are some factors which threatened to compromise the affectiveness of this Bilingual program at Oyster School. First of all, it was viewed with hostility by many members of the community. While most agreed that it would be a positive force, many community residents did not want it in their neighborhood. Secondly, operational red tape took its toll in that six months expired before the contract became operational. Consequently, the money for teacher training, supplies and materials were held up, and little school time remained to carry out the goals of the program and make delivery on the high expectancies of a community which had difficulty understanding the working of the bureaucratic structure in the first place. Nevertheless the Oyster School in Northwest Washington is a case in point of overcoming such difficulty and providing a good program. Oyster, which services large numbers of English and
Spanish-speaking children, has successfully instituted a strong bilingual program which seems worthy of imitation in other city schools. All subjects in the school are offered in both languages and language is taught through subject matter. The nine Spanish-speaking teachers are aided by 70 Spanish volunteers who serve as tutors and playground aides. Both cultures receive equal attention, time and respect with Spanish and English-speaking children benefiting.

Yet this concept, worthy of replication in schools with population mixes of any kind, has not been adopted by the system. Similarly, teacher approaches which have brought promising results - such as the fostering of self-confidence and self-awareness through open and often child-structured programming - continue as isolated experiments. 15

Dr. Passow called for the establishment of a strong office of staff development in the Division of Instruction to be responsible for the development of programs at all levels in the school system. The report recommended that 15-20 per cent of a teacher's time be devoted to staff development activities during the regular school day. The rationale was clear,

If quality education is to materialize in the District schools, the major focus of efforts must be on the personnel who conduct the educational programs and arrange the conditions for learning; this includes all instructional staff: teachers, administrators, supervisors, supporting service personnel, aides and volunteers, custodians and clerks. It has been recommended that a massive inservice continuing

program be shaped and tailored to all personnel, professional and paraprofessional. No substantive improvement will be realized by simply publishing a new curriculum guide nor adopting another textbook. Not only classroom teachers, but principals, supervisors, and other leadership personnel require ongoing and continuing education. This comprehensive schema for professional growth will require staff, time allocation, and funding of an unprecedented order. True, city systems have had inservice courses; they have provided for attendance at courses in nearby colleges and universities; they have made other arrangements. The prescription for Washington differs by integrating continuing education into the total professional armament of all the District's educators. When combined with a redevelopment program and a long range operation, the District schools could realize considerable upgrading. 16

The report also called for the establishment of an advisory council of representatives from school systems, colleges, universities, community agencies and institutions to work on policy matters and programs at the office of staff development.

The recommendation on Staff Development was partially implemented with the opening of the Office of Staff Development on February 1, 1969. Since that time, a number of staff development programs have been initiated. While the Office of Staff Development quickly became a very effective operation, its existence was shortlived. Indeed, budget cuts by the City Council actually resulted in the demise of the office two years after its inception. The director's position was reduced in classification through the same budget action, and the

16 Passow, Ibid., pp. 381-382.
remaining funds were placed in the office of the Deputy Superintendent. The small amount of money that was left necessitated a sharp curtailment in staff development activities.

Finally, Passow made a series of specific recommendations on staff personnel procedures.

1. It is recommended that the school system prepare or have prepared an attractive recruitment brochure designed to show the multitude of advantages of teaching in the District of Columbia. The brochure should be positive in approach showing educational, cultural and living advantages and represent a continuous effort with appropriate financial support to attract good teachers.

   This recommendation has been implemented and with the result that very attractive brochures have been issued for the last two years.

2. That new sources be explored in recruiting new personnel, especially teachers.

   This recommendation has been partially carried out. A Division of Recruitment was formally established under the Associate Superintendent in Charge of Personnel, and the division has vigorously recruited teachers. However, there has been little liaison between the Recruitment Office and the Budget Office, and in some instances more teachers have been recruited than were allowed for in the budget. The resulting confusion has created unnecessary problems such as the honoring of contractual agreements which were not in the best interests of the school system.

3. That the functions of certification and appointment be clearly delineated and separated and
that separate sub-office units be established to handle these functions.

Although this recommendation has in effect, been implemented, some confusion still exists as to the separation of the two roles of appointment and certification.

4. That the new personnel procedures authorized in the Personnel Department to handle all applications of all prospective teachers should be implemented promptly, the Department should promptly acknowledge each application and otherwise reply to each applicant.

This recommendation has not been fully carried out primarily because of a lack of staff in the Personnel Department. A further obstacle to reform is the absence of close liaison between the recruitment functions, hiring functions, and the mechanics of processing applications.

5. That the Board of Education cease to assess the personnel files of each of the officer candidates

The Board rejected this recommendation and continues to examine the files of all officer candidates. It is important to note the similarity between Passow's observation and one made by Dr. Strayer, namely, that the Board involved itself too greatly in administrative detail and other matters which would better be left to the Superintendent of Schools.

6. That an Office of Staff Negotiations be established for continued attention to the relationships between the Board of Education, administrators, teachers and other school employees affected by collective bargaining. This office should not be part of the Personnel Department, but should be on equal level with it.
A Department of Employer-Employee Relations was established with a director and a small staff and has been in operation since the summer of 1968. This office has been invaluable in handling the grievances brought by the Teachers' Union and in negotiating sessions for new contracts with the Washington Teachers' Union.

In Chapter III we discussed the Strayer Survey, the Model School Division and the Passow Study and the recommendations of each proposal and the extent to which each was carried out. In addition we attempted to analyze those factors which compromised the implementation of each reform effort and the impact of each on the school system.

In Chapter IV we shall discuss the Clark Plan and the Anacostia Project, their origin, similarities in emphasis, but how each differed in the political and social climate in which each was introduced and the impact each had upon the system.
CHAPTER IV

A POSSIBLE REALITY - THE DESIGN FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF HIGH ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTS FOR THE STUDENTS OF THE PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS OF WASHINGTON, D. C. - THE CLARK PLAN

On July 13, 1970, the School Board approved the Metropolitan Applied Research Center (MARC) Report, calling for the attainment of high academic achievement for Washington's public school youngsters for educational excellence. Hoping to avoid grimace posturing, MARC addressed itself to the substantive ingredients of educational excellence as well.

In the area of curriculum, the report advocated specific educational content and precise grade requirements that everyone understood; it recommended that all the people involved - teachers, parents, and students, be directly involved in establishing the standards and seeing that they are attained. Regarding teachers, Dr. Clark wrote that the profession, probably the most important one in present-day society, should have dignity, status, and the objective support for dignity and status. The teachers should be strongly motivated to perform at a high professional level.

At the meeting in which the Plan was adopted, Dr. Clark was asked about his expectations for the reading mobilization plan. Dr. Clark stated it was their belief that the present retardation was unnecessary and there was
no rational or non-remedial reasons why that retardation should continue.

If the barriers to academic achievement are removed it is believed that the average reading level of the children in the elementary and the junior high schools of the Washington, D. C. Public Schools could be raised to national norms within the first year of the program.

Dr. Clark went beyond that to say:

In subsequent years, sustaining the momentum, the professional drive and performance, the norms for reading in the Washington, D. C. System could go beyond the national norms, in fact, the Washington, D. C. Schools could create a condition of chaos in terms of norms because it would be possible for their children to function beyond what is considered now adequate and which they did not believe to be adequate. ¹

At the meeting Dr. Clark stated that:

There were three uncompromisable objectives of the mobilization reading year which must be carried out in each school. First, to remedy all present cases of reading retardation among normal children in the school so that each achieves at grade level or above; second, to see that every normal child entering the school system will function and continue to function at or above grade level in reading and related skills; third, to determine empirically through the attainment of the first two objectives the highest level of reading skills actually attainable by classes of normal children without regard to their present age, I.Q. label, grade level, or current national norms. In other words, new and higher norms would be established. ²

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¹ Minutes of the Fourteenth (Special Meeting) of the Board of Education, July 13, 1970, pp. 3-5.
² Ibid., pp. 29-30.
In devising the curriculum which would be necessary to accomplish the goals set forth in the Clark Plan, there were certain requirements set forth by Dr. Clark. They were: (1) Designation of clear, specific and high standards of what the system expects normal children to learn at each grade level and the communication of these expectations to every child, every teacher and every parent; (2) the establishment of system-wide minimum floors of achievement in content learning and skill mastery appropriate to the age and grade of normal children and that these expectations be adhered to and obtained from each child; (3) encouragement of flexibility, creativity, and imagination in the teacher's choice of curriculum beyond the minimum curriculum content and the minimum expectations of achievement; (4) provision of immediate success with reward and reinforcement to facilitate the learning and skill mastery for each child.

Other areas of the Clark Plan which generated controversy had to do with teacher requirements. Dr. Clark specified:

The teacher must have adequate professional training in behavioral development diagnosis, remediation and familiarity with a variety of methods and materials in order to assure his own competence and confidence. Continued training and professional support on the job must be provided to teachers in ways which are consistent with personal and professional dignity.

The expectations for teacher achievement like the expectations for student achievement must be clear, specific, challenging, and attainable.
Materials used in the initial and early stages must be stimulating and specifically oriented toward the sequential development of reading skills, for example, the repeated association of the visual stimulus of the letters of the alphabet and combination of letters with specific sounds.

The natural curiosity and interest of children can be constructively exploited to involve the children as active participants in the excitement and exhilaration which are possible in the process of learning to read.3

Dr. Clark rproposed differentiated staffing, a four rank stage progressing from resident teacher to staff or experienced or certified teacher to senior teacher and finally to master teacher. Each of the requirements, skills and functions of the four ranks was spelled out. The master teacher was equated with a full professor at the university level. Salary formulas commensurate with teacher rank were proposed although no exact figures could be set forth since this would require legislation and approval by the Congress after a salary schedule could be agreed upon and submitted by the Board of Education to the Mayor and City Council. However, the formula system would make it possible for teachers to continue their professional development and encourage them to make contributions within the teaching profession itself.

The administration quickly moved to implement the Clark Plan. The first structure proposed by the Acting Superintendent consisted of two senior staff members from the administration and a Howard University professor

3The Plan also called for a mathematics mobilization team with the same kinds of requirements: upgrading teacher skills, and establishing minimum Floors.
working with staff members from MARC who were to develop the minimum
Floors, the reading mobilization teams and those elements of the plan which
should be operational by September.

However, before plans could materialize at all, the Washington Teachers'
Union made known its opposition by issuing the following statement:

The Washington Teachers' Union condemns the action taken by the Board of Education on Monday, July 13, 1970 as another example of the callous contempt displayed toward the students, staff, and the community of the D. C. Public School System. In its hasty adoption of the report "A Possible Reality" the Board has committed a criminal act in compromising the public that it has found the magic formula that could cure the ills which plague the school system.  

The Union denounced the action by declaring it a violation of the Board's own procedures and a flagrant violation of the agreement with the Board of Education which was ratified in January, 1969 and was effective until June, 1971. The Union took issue with the Clark Plan for many reasons, the chief one being that the Union realized at the outset that the plan gave hopes to children and parents that were impossible to fulfill within the time span suggested. For too long parents had had their hopes and aspirations raised only to find them dashed when the results were tallied.

The proposal was geared to standardized tests as a means of measuring pupil achievement and teacher effectiveness. Since standardized tests are

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4Paper prepared by Mr. William Simons, Executive Director of the Washington Teachers' Union, for specific use in this Dissertation.
normalized on a white middle class population, it was felt that this means of measuring the achievement of a predominantly black student population would have been invalid from the beginning. Furthermore, if teacher performance was to be based on test results, it would follow that the children would be taught in order to insure continued employment for the teacher.

Another aspect which had dubious validity to teachers was the emphasis on competition. Pupils' scores were to be posted in every classroom and in the principal's office. Study after study has shown the debilitating effects on pupils and teachers when results of unreliable group test scores have been revealed. Arthur Combs of the University of Florida exposed the fallacy of competition in his article "The Myth of Competition." And Dr. Clark himself had only a year before soundly denounced competition in colleges and universities.  

The Proposal had other shortcomings; it assumed that all changes necessary could have been accomplished by the opening of school when the persons affected were not even on duty prior to the opening of school. It advocated ignoring the language patterns which many students used to communicate, with Dr. Clark stating that the so-called Black English should be stopped at the school door. In effect, Dr. Clark was suggesting to teachers that they reject students who do not use standard English. This recommendation was in direct conflict with studies from many linguistics groups that have demon-

5Ibid., p. 72.
strated that non-standard English can be used effectively in developing standard English patterns. 6

The Union did agree with Dr. Clark that there exists widespread retardation in reading and arithmetic in the inner schools of our large urban centers. It also agreed that the prevalent theories seeking to explain this under-achievement were basically fallacious, that Black children can learn if educators deal with the fact of their oppression, and that Black children are normal, but have had abnormal experiences in a racist society.

Finally, the Union agreed that there were many effective methods for teaching reading skills. The Union indicated that what happens in a school before and after the reading lesson has as much if not more to do with how well a child learns to read than the reading lesson itself. The total climate of the school, the relationship between and among the administrators, teachers, students, parents and community, and most importantly the extent to which the child perceives he is respected and has some control over what happens to him - all these affect the reading program. The changes required go far beyond mere organizational shifts.

However, even though the Union and Dr. Clark started from the same basic premises, the conclusions reached were far different. The Union suggested that instead of a reading mobilization there should be a mobilization on the teaching of children; children fail to learn to read not because of too

6 Ibid., p. 73.
little teaching but because of too much teaching, too much organization, too much regimentation, too much conformity, too much stress on law and order, too much bureaucracy, and too much authoritarianism.

The teachers of the School District goaded by the Union, pursued a course of action which all but killed the program. Their first action was to disrupt the testing schedule. Almost half of the teachers refused to administer the initial reading test in September 1970. Their refusal led to an all night bargaining session with the Board of Education which culminated in an agreement allowing the testing to proceed. However, the teachers won an important psychological victory. They put themselves on record trying to save the community from the victimization of an ill-conceived program as the teachers viewed the plan.

The Teachers' Union agreed that effective programs must be developed by all parties concerned. Simons pointed out that the School Board adopted the Clark Plan four days after it had been made public. No public hearing had taken place; and Simons had spoken to one of Clark's staff for only 45 minutes before the Plan was issued. Simons argued that teacher involvement was imperative, and that if teachers weren't involved, they would sabotage the plan. Clark's representative asked whether the Union would sabotage a plan that was good for the children. Simons responded, "Yes, if we are not involved. What is good for children is not going to be purchased at the price of dignity for adults. If we are going to be professional, we are going to be involved in what
affects us."

By the time the new Superintendent took office sides had been chosen. As expected, many parent groups had endorsed the Clark Plan. The city-wide Congress of Parents and Teachers praised it for emphasizing reading and although the group too no position on Clark's proposal for salary differentials, it favored some form of recognition for outstanding service by teachers.

It may seem incredible, but during this raging debate-controversy, the incumbent Superintendent's 40-man task force of union representatives, citizens and administrative staff reviewed the work of the task forces set up by the Acting Superintendent after which the Superintendent put into operation the machinery to implement the Clark Plan. Committees were quietly going about the business of developing minimum floors; workshops for principals were being set up to explain how schools would be organized to carry out the Clark Plan; reports were being reviewed by various teacher committees, and in effect schools and the school administration were attempting to carry out the mandate of the Board of Education.

The underlying and deep-seated conflicts and resentments remained. They were exacerbated by an anticipated Court ruling. The Washington Post editorial of September 13, 1970, described the confusion;

The D. C. Public Schools are now being buffeted by two plans, each of which may be put into effect within the current school year. First is the Clark Plan; this

program modestly titled, *A Possible Reality*, has two
major thrusts: (1) emphasis on developing reading
skills in the primary grades, and (2) the introduction
of Differentiated Staffing wherein teachers will receive
different ranks in salaries (much like college faculties)
as well as duties. A key element in the staffing plan is
that promotion - and hence salary and responsibility -
be based in large part on student performance. Each
teacher's eligibility for higher rank would be strongly
influenced by his students' test scores.

The second hurricane heading up the coast toward the
District is the promised new J. Skelly Wright Decision.
In 1967, Judge Wright held that the D. C. schools must
be run on the basis of real equality. Julius Hobson in a
recent suit has charged that Wright's earlier ruling has
not been enforced and that variations in expenditures per
pupil in different schools is prima facie evidence of
continued unequal educational treatment. . . If the Clark
Plan were implemented along with the Wright order, the
schools with the best achievement records would lose
non-salary funds while the schools which perform most
poorly would gain funds to bring their expenditure levels
up to the average.

Needless to say, these two plans are incompatible. If
Judge Wright rules that District Schools must equalize
expenditures, the implementation of the Clark Plan would
be an unmitigated disaster. Teachers would be striving to
raise their salaries through pupil achievement while
principals will be striving to hold achievement levels
down. If too many teachers in one school building succeed,
salaries will rise and principals will have to either transfer
some of their best teachers or do without books, heat, or
window repairs. The two plans are incompatible because
they are derived from entirely different notions about what
is wrong with the schools.  

A little time soothed some of the emotional outcry generated by the

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8Two Major School Plans May be Incompatible, September 13, 1970,
Washington Post, Robert W. Hartman.
stration were working on the plan, the threatened teacher walk-out was called off. The Washington Afro-American in an article on October 17, 1970, described the changing climate:

The stalemate divided the Washington community into two camps for and against the plan. There were loud supporters on both sides, but the silent ones found that the latent threat in such a conflict endangered the children's education. Community leaders got both of the parties to the negotiation table. That led to a truce between the Board and the Union. Both agreed to set up a joint Union-Board Committee to explore amicable means to implement the Plan eliminating its controversial and questionable aspects.⁹

About this time, the Superintendent expressed his intention to set up a twelve-man community advisory committee to advise him on implementing the Design for Academic Excellence called for in the Clark Plan. Scott stressed that the new advisory council would in no way supersede his responsibility as chief administrative officer of the school system. He added that if the reviewing process of any report were delayed within the advisory council, he would make disposition of the matter himself without benefit or recommendation from the council. In addition to its eight citizen members, the council was comprised of four members of the administrative staff. The chairman was the Associate Superintendent of Instruction.

Over the first few months of the school year different contentions were being made. The Superintendent consistently declared that the Clark Plan was

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⁹ Afro-American, October 17, 1970.
being carried out, but that modification and time were needed. According to Dr. Scott, the schools needed reorganizing; they had to gear up for such a massive assault on reading and mathematics retardation. Dr. Clark on the other hand, continued to stress that his Plan was being watered down, compromised, and, in many ways, being done away with. And, on the school scene were those teachers and administrators, both at the building and central office levels who were working to develop and carry out the Clark Plan.

Finally, on November 21, 1970, Dr. Clark charged that Superintendent Scott had abandoned his reading plan. The story was reported in the Washington Post as follows:

Psychologists Kenneth B. Clark said yesterday that Washington School Superintendent Hugh J. Scott has totally abandoned Clark's Reading Mobilization Plan which was adopted at a city school Board meeting in July. Clark stated the Superintendent is returning the schools to the usual pattern of inefficiency and retardation. He added, now it is up to the people of Washington and the School Board; they must either say they accept this abandonment or they will make other arrangements for getting someone else to implement this plan since the Superintendent says he cannot. ¹⁰

The Washington Daily News reported a follow-up story:

D. C. Superintendent Hugh J. Scott will meet in closed session with the District School Board tomorrow to answer a lot of questioning about his progress in carrying out the Kenneth Clark Reading Plan and demanding that he report directly to Dr. Clark and to the

Metropolitan Applied Research Center of which Dr. Clark is President. The letter which the School Board sent to Dr. Scott last week after Dr. Clark complained that his Plan must be accepted as written or he will peddle it elsewhere, directs Dr. Scott to outline your assessment of normality and charged him with apparent equivocation in regard to testing.¹¹

Finally, the Washington Daily News on November 26, 1970 reported:

Superintendent of Schools Hugh J. Scott emerged a clear winner today in his dispute with the District School Board over the speed with which he is carrying out the Clark Reading Plan in the District elementary and junior high schools. The Board supports the administrative position School Board President Anita F. Allen said after a long meeting with Dr. Scott yesterday. There will be major expeditious changes in the classroom. The Board looks forward to his, Dr. Scott's, implementation of the Reading program. The statement ends, at least temporarily, an argument which began when Kenneth Clark, author of the Reading Plan, publicly criticized Dr. Scott for failure to act to achieve its goals.¹²

Weeks later on December 10, 1970, the Washington Post reported that:

Psychologist Kenneth B. Clark, author of Washington School System's Reading Mobilization Plan, has resigned as a paid consultant to the city School Board. But in a letter released yesterday Clark promised that he and his staff would continue to work indefatigably to help those who want the Reading Plan carried out. In reply School Board President Anita F. Allen wrote that she is counting on Clark's promise to continue to help us. Mrs. Allen said in an interview that the Board still intends to have the Plan carried out.¹³


Soon thereafter a full-time Clark Plan coordinator was named by the Superintendent to carry out the Clark Plan and see that necessary steps are taken on the school level.

By spring, mobilization teams were operational in all schools; heterogeneous grouping had been established, minimum floors in reading and mathematics had been issued to all teachers; workshops had been set up, and the Superintendent had issued an eighty page report detailing the start that had been made on the Clark Plan. But still the controversy raged as to whether the Superintendent was truly implementing the Clark Plan as designed or not.

One of the issues that had not been satisfactorily resolved was heterogeneous grouping. Teachers pleaded with the Administration to narrow the gap in learning abilities in their classes. The Superintendent responded by promising that no more than a 2.2 achievement differential would prevail in any class. This action brought cries from several sources that the city schools were returning to the "track" system. It appeared that the controversy surrounding the Clark Plan would never die down.

The Washington Post on April 20, 1972, in an article entitled, "The Clark Plan Two Years Later: Between Possibilty and Reality" reviewed the Plan from the standpoint of its progress two years later. It included interviews with teachers, principals, Dr. Scott and Dr. Clark and analyzed what had been called for in the Plan. Dr. Scott summed up his reactions by claiming that too much had been expected. In addition, he stated that:
The plan came from the Board and that was something almost improper... You don't change a major school system as large as the D. C. Public Schools by adopting a plan in isolation from those who have got to implement it; that was a mistake.

Somehow every other week I had to keep issuing a statement that I had supported the Academic Achievement Project. I support it in terms of implementing it in ways that I thought were sound. That was my responsibility, not the Board's.

What you must keep in mind, the Plan did not spell out any specific things in detail. It offered a whole lot of nice things you should do. Well there are problems and we're working on them. I get rather disturbed by people who can come up with a plan saying a lot of nice things that are going to happen and not really spell out some specifics about how things relate. That's been my job and I have been criticized for that and that's rather foolish.

Read some of the directives that I have sent out to the field then tell me that I don't care. I laugh at these people who criticize, maybe some people are saying I am not doing everything I could in terms of what they think I could be doing, but it is utter foolishness to state that I am not doing something to try to promote academic achievement. 14

Dr. Clark on the other hand, summed up his position two years later as follows:

There are some ingredients of the Plan being implemented piecemeal as there must have been in some of the schools before there was a Plan. We said it was a total package; we put great emphasis on the totality of the effort. What's there now is like going out and looking at five bones and saying it's a dinosaur.

14 Washington Post, "The Clark Plan Two Years Later: Between Possibility and Reality, April 20, 1972."
Scott is right when he says there never has been a Clark Plan in the schools. There is nothing wrong with the elements of the Plan, but they are incomplete without the kind of committed leadership that is needed for this to take roots and spread.

The selection of Scott as Superintendent removed the possibility of there being a grasp of the need to have a plan on a city-wide basis and to have the kind of psychological support that can only come from the top leadership. He emphasized what was difficult and what couldn't be done. On the basis of his preoccupation with all that was impossible, the Plan didn't have a chance.

I haven't washed my hands of the Plan. That would mean I had washed my hands of the kids. We will try to find some way to put pressure on the Board and the Bureaucracy. There is a need for parent and community pressure, some sort of group ombudsman in the schools and we will play a role as a catalyst in trying to get such a group off the ground.

Right now there are these pieces of the Plan operating in the larger atmosphere of negativism and confusion and I just don't think they can work in it. The possible exception is if a particular school operates in spite of this and builds its own climate. We know that's possible, but that's not what the Plan was about. We were trying to spread things that had been going on here in selected schools to the whole school system.

There is absolutely no such thing as the Clark Plan in the schools. I am glad the Superintendent laughs at critics; I am glad he can laugh at anything; I can't laugh at the fact these kids are no better off now than two years ago. 15

Whether the Plan is working or not largely depends on the school and the personnel of the individual school in which it is being operated. Its effect

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15 Ibid.
in the Model School Division was discussed by William Raspberry:

If you haven't heard angry shrieks from the Cardozo Model School Division over implementation of the Clark Reading Mobilization Plan it is because the Model School Division has already implemented much of what Clark proposed.

The results may be instructive; consider the 1969-1970 reading test results - 4th graders at ten of the Division's administrative units showed gains over the previous year. The other two declined but one of them by only one point. Two of the model schools scored at or above the national norm; two others were a single point below that norm; all but one of the twelve equalled or surpassed the city norm for reading.

What happened in the Model School Division that was different? First, it may be useful to point out what was not different.

Model School Division Schools had no extra money or facilities beyond what was available to other schools in the city nor were the children from privileged homes. A recent survey taken in connection with Hobson's court challenge to allocation of school funds shows that Cardozo comprises the poorest population group in the city.

What was different was that the Model School Division had decided five years ago to do something about teaching children to read.

The result of that decision was something very much like what Dr. Kenneth Clark has proposed for the whole school system; a pooling of resources, involvement of parents, optimum use of reading specialists and perhaps most important, training of teachers in the teaching of reading.
What all this suggests is that the Clark Plan can work if individual teachers will try to make it work. 16

What Factors Compromised Implementation of the Clark Plan

In implementing the Design for Academic Achievement proposed and adopted by the school system in the District of Columbia, a considerable amount of data has been collected from principals, administrative personnel, and representative teachers at workshop sessions. Basically many school staff members at the building level realize that the solutions to basic problems in the school must involve a rather comprehensive rethinking of organization, power and authority relationships. In summary form, the problems described at building levels in the District of Columbia Public Schools cluster in five major areas, four in the area of organization and management.

1. The Principal's Role. In general, as the principal views his role, he lacks authority to implement programs, to reprimand and correct teacher behavior; to have a voice in teacher selection or decision-making about educational programs and major educational policies. He has no control over the actual reward system in the schools, is devoid of authority over his actual budget, is not supported by sufficient staff and help for administrative duties, and lacks authority over personnel who come from other school departments or central sources.

2. Procurement, Budget and Management of the Local Buildings. Ordering procedures are described as cumbersome. A long delay exists between the time of ordering supplies and actual delivery. The system

for maintenance and general support service is inadequate.

3. Communication. Formal avenues of information exchange don't work. Policies are made and communicated to personnel by the press. Interpersonal communication is poor; training for staff to improve communication is not supported adequately. The concept that teachers, administrators, and staff must continue to learn throughout their time of service in education is not accepted.

4. Decision making. Programs for individual buildings are not developed by people involved in implementing the program, but are devised from rather sketchy guidelines which are standardized throughout the city. Mechanisms have yet to be devised whereby buildings can participate in defining their own needs and solutions. In the area of decision making, principals are unsure of their own power, and consequently transfer their insecurity to teachers. Policy-making efforts of the Board and Superintendent do not regularly make use of input from buildings, principals, teachers or students.

5. Classroom Instruction. The standards, guidelines and procedures for the grouping of children and for assessing their needs and strengths are developed at upper levels without the involvement of classroom personnel.

The above solutions proposed by teachers, principals and administrative personnel accept the existing organizational structure and system. However, if one takes into account what has been learned about educational change in the last ten years he will conclude that limited intervention at the levels of administrator and teaching will produce only very limited and unsatisfactory results.
In large measure, The Clark Plan is failing because there was no dynamic interaction between experts and theorists in the field and practitioners and implementers of the program at the teaching and learning level. In the earliest stages of any educational program, the analysis and understanding of the problem and the eventual solution proposed must involve all people who will share information, responsibility and action in the project. Had these procedures been followed, it is possible that much of the insecurity of the teachers concerning differentiated staffing, differences in salary and accountability would have dissipated.

It is still questionable whether the school system had in hand the resources to carry out the Plan. The high costs of testing, new materials, and staff development worked against the successful implementation of the Clark Plan. Obviously, too, the transition of leadership also created a problem since the Plan was approved under the administration of an acting superintendent and the job of implementing the program was taken on by a new superintendent two months after the Plan had been approved.

The Anacostia Project

One of the chief reasons for the failure of the Clark Plan was the lack of involvement of teachers, administrators, citizens and all who have a stake in the public schools. Yet the Anacostia Project with its total involvement of a community, citizens, teachers, administrators, federal and local officials
is scheduled to be terminated as of August 1972. The Office of Education, in a letter to the Director of the Project dated October 13, 1971 stated that the decision had been made to terminate the Anacostia Project because the venture "has been unable to successfully document that it has made significant progress towards the fulfillment of its original objection."\(^{17}\) It was added that there is "no evidence of capacity that needed changes could be made."\(^{18}\)

The Board of Education approved the Anacostia Project on September 18, 1968. In presenting his report and recommendation for approval to the Board, the Superintendent pointed out that:

The proposal was in response to President Johnson's request to Congress for ten million dollars to develop a demonstration of excellence in urban education in Washington, D. C. The proposal has involved the joint efforts of professional educators, citizens and students of the Anacostia area.\(^{19}\)

The Superintendent explained how the professional educators, citizens, and students worked together to assess the educational needs of their community. He expressed his appreciation for the time and efforts that participants devoted to this proposal and stated that the finished project has his whole-hearted support. The Superintendent further stated that it was his hope and belief that Congress would provide the requested funds for this project so that the

\(^{17}\) The Anacostia Project, Some Impediments to Its Successful Operation and Fulfillment of Its Goal, by William Rice, Project Director, prepared for the writer.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.
"Anacostia Community might realize the benefits of the program they have proposed and thereby serve as a model of excellence in urban education for the entire nation."20

The approval of the project by the Board of Education climaxed six weeks of intensive work during the summer of 1968. In those two summer months an amazing partnership evolved. For the first time, there was a real cooperative effort in the planning process; citizens, professionals and youth sat and worked together to develop a program for the benefit of the child and other members of the community.

The traditional planning model whereby highly qualified and competent professionals are brought together to plan for a community was bypassed. Such models, it was agreed, however well designed, foster exclusion and denials; the community, by not being involved in the planning of its own programs, is denied the right to participate. By being denied participation, citizens are denied the opportunity to increase their awareness of the options available and to grow through their exposure to alternatives.

The model chosen by the Anacostia Project, a model of community involvement in the planning process, provided a viable and workable alternative. As a result, the community emerged as a legitimate partner in school involvement and involvement is not only seen as a prerequisite for the success

20 Ibid.
of the educational system, but as a "fundamental right." As President Johnson said in his March message to Congress, "Washington's 150,000 school children and their parents must also be able to exercise one of their most fundamental rights; they must have a voice which can be heard in the operation of their school system. 21

The Anacostia document is symbolic of that voice: Readers may be accustomed to proposals which elaborate more in detail the step by step procedures for developing programs, but it is safe to say that there are few documents which represent the community involvement represented here. The document is not a technical address, but rather the voice of the spirit of the Anacostia community. Residents played the central role; the school administration, a background role. The administrators attempted to use this knowledge and experience to facilitate the efforts of the participants. Traditional leadership roles had to be changed to meet the new demands being made.

The Anacostia Community School Project was designed for ten schools in an area of the city suffering severe school overcrowding. The area contained about fifty per cent of the city's public housing. Pupil performance ranked at the bottom third of the nation. The people of Anacostia had long felt neglected, both because vital programs were rarely brought to their section of the city and because they were in fact cut off geographically from the rest of the city by the Anacostia River.

21 Ibid.
The immediate task facing the staff was how to involve large numbers of Anacostia residents and educational personnel in planning and thinking about Anacostia's needs and the kinds of proposals to recommend for funding. A one-day meeting was planned open to all Anacostia citizens interested in having the scope of the project explained. The meeting provided a forum for the discussion of the educational needs of the area. The meeting was held in a neighborhood church rather than a school; this at the suggestion of some community residents who explained the community's alienation from the school.

The meeting was a general one which featured speakers from the Office of Education, the Ford Foundation, the D. C. Public Schools and operational school community projects. The conference thus provided a broad framework for those attending. It further provided the occasion for the selection of some members of the Anacostia Community Planning Council. The council, subsequently a 46-member body broadly representing the Anacostia Community, was chosen to assure continued community participation in the preparation of a proposal. The conference also provided two other important elements of the planning process: (1) identification of the educational needs of the Anacostia community, improved relevant curriculum, expanded community involvement, greater teacher involvement with the community, expanded counseling and psychological services, job opportunities and placement, more class space; and (2) active involvement of substantial numbers of Anacostia
residents and school personnel. Subsequent to the conference, a massive effort was launched to bring many residents to the planning workshop which would start on July 1.

The numbers and diversity of people attending the July 1 workshop at Ballou High School were impressive: 280 people, approximately 46.7 per cent parents and residents of Anacostia, 37.8 per cent teachers in the Anacostia schools, and 15.5 young adults and school age youth of the Anacostia area. The Washington Teachers' Union had worked very closely in the planning stage of the Anacostia Project and gave its full support and endorsement to the teachers who participated in the planning and the workshop.

The 280 workshop participants rapidly divided themselves into four main task forces each dealing with one area: early childhood education, elementary, secondary, and adult education. All task forces were composed of both teachers and community people, and all divided into sub-groups to consider specific areas of concern such as program development, student skills and service, staff development, community participation, administration and organization. Thus, there existed a task force base structure for formulating program goals for the experimental community school system. Another group, the ad hoc community planning council became a task force devoted to insuring lasting community participation in the life of the project. Moreover, the youth who participated as members of the various task forces assumed the responsibility for designing programs for youth.
The process of accumulating knowledge and sharing experiences were fluid and varied. Special resource people and consultants were on hand to advise groups and to help arrange meetings with other specialists. During the course of the planning, outside consultants were brought in on a regular basis to meet with the various task forces and the information they provided often stimulated the participants to visit sites and programs in other parts of the country. Such visits were encouraged, funds were provided, and participants went to cities as Boston, Philadelphia, New York and Flint, Michigan. The Flint, Michigan Community School Program sent a team to Anacostia to meet with the participants.

A typical day would see the entire institute assemble for a few minutes to outline the day's program. Participants would then divide into task forces and work in sub-groups. All would reassemble at midday for a formal feedback session at which each task force leader would report. Although the institute was scheduled to close at one o'clock, the subgroup and task force leaders often remained with the staff to plan and evaluate until late in the afternoon. In addition, the Anacostia Community Council met late into the night reviewing the day's occurrences and helping to keep the task force effort in focus.

Youths wanted and achieved some independence. They chose not to make on-site visits with adult members of the group but went on their own to see

22 Ibid.
projects like New York's Street Academies. The youth group also decided to formulate its own plans and ideas and then report back to the group as a whole rather than participate in the task forces as members of the various sub-interest groups.

In the final week of the institute the sub-groups hammered out their proposals and had them costed. The early childhood task force submitted a total package for a comprehensive early childhood program including prenatal care, early intervention using young adults as trainees, a child centered curriculum for 3-5 year old children, full supportive services, and community decision-making and participation in all aspects of the program. The elementary task force proposed nine individual programs ranging from inservice training for both teachers and the community to a program to keep the schools open all day to provide programs for children and adults. The secondary education task force proposed a twelve-point program geared to the betterment of school-community relationships, the development of innovative curriculum reflecting the character and needs of urban life, methods of improving school attendance, and the formation of a structure which would provide greater program flexibility for teachers, thereby leading to increased creativity in classroom instruction.

The youth group developed seven programs ranging from sex education to data processing and vocational guidance. Youth were also concerned with improving teacher salaries, working conditions, and inservice programs and
in instituting Black history courses in the school.

The adult education task force, recognizing the manpower needs in Anacostia proposed a training and employment program which would provide adequate vocational preparation and training skilled and community persons to work in the schools as paraprofessionals and trainers.

Most of the group urged the inclusion of Black history and culture in the curriculum and special programs to improve reading. The Community Council developed a design for community participation in the Anacostia Community School Project.

Provided with costs and copies of the program, ideas developed by other groups, each sub-group and task force, and finally the entire institute, was able to determine program priorities. The institute then combined all programs into an overall proposal, costed at about 15 million dollars, for submission to the U. S. Office of Education.

The decision to exceed the President's call for a 10 million dollar program was deliberate. The citizens decided that they wanted to demonstrate a comprehensive package, including a two million dollar health program for their community. They therefore opted to present the full package rather than scale their needs to a predetermined arbitrary figure.

In August, the proposed program ran into financial trouble. Word was received that the Project would probably receive only one million dollars. While the citizens made known their displeasure and disappointment, they also
decided that one million dollars was more than they had had in the past, and they intended to do the best they could with whatever they got, always of course, fighting for additional funds.

There was no doubt about the President's concern for the Project as many project documents make clear, its origins were high in the Federal Government and far from local initiative. Numerous papers housed in the Johnson Library attest to the fact that in 1967 and 1968, White House aides and Federal education officials spent a lot of time and effort trying to do something about the city schools. One result was a community-controlled school district in Anacostia. Despite substantial lobbying by White House aides, Congress voted only one million dollars to start the Anacostia Project, instead of the ten million dollars Johnson requested. Since 1969, another five million dollars has been spent on the venture.

Using the one million dollars received from Congress, the Anacostia Project placed its emphasis upon reading. Community people were trained to become reading assistants in the classrooms (CRAs). The CRAs were given courses at Federal City College where they were to receive an associate in arts degree. The experiment also included a data processing course at Ballou High School, a preschool program at the old Congress Heights Elementary School, Adult Education, and attempts to organize the community, with each school being assigned a community organizer for this purpose. Each school had its own community board; and a full board governed the entire project.
In October, the U. S. Office of Education, claiming that little had been achieved, cancelled the Anacostia Project. No prior notice of dissatisfaction with performance had been given by government officials. Indeed, evaluations during the project's two-year operation noted that after overcoming problems inherent in the process of community involvement, the project had begun to deliver.

The reaction of the community was expectably strong and angry. As the Washington Post reported,

Supporters of the community have protested vigorously, arguing that since its inception the Project has been shortchanged on money and denied support from the Office of Education. They say that while it has not done all that it was supposed to, it has accomplished something; they contend that in a community with a history of apathy, the Project needed more time to really dig in. 23

William Raspberry, writing for the Post, stated his concern:

Among those even remotely interested in the Anacostia Community School Project, I may be the only one who is not utterly certain where the truth lies. The Federal Office of Education which originally funded then killed and then recently gave a temporary extension to the experiment, is utterly certain that it wasn't working. Community based leaders of the Project are just as certain that it was working very well.

The community people cite gains in reading achievement one to two grades above the city average with every single one of the eleven schools posting scores above the national big city average.

The Office of Education officials say there has been no measurable improvement in reading ability; that data purporting to show such gains simply aren't valid.²⁴

At least one man who has been involved in the Project since the beginning, William Anderson, Executive Director of the Frederick Douglas Center thinks something more sinister than differing academic assessments is involved.

I think the problem is how the administration looks at how to attack social problems.

First they start a pilot project to placate the community, then they see to it that the pilot project fails. For example, of the ten million dollars needed, we get one million dollars.

If certain kinds of projects show signs of motivating Black people to think for themselves, far too often comes the arbitrary decision to cut them off, and since no project is perfect, they can always find an excuse to cut it off.⁵

Anderson, hardly an objective critic, sees a kind of pattern in programs that have been started for poor people (in the last five years especially). The examples he cites includes the Ocean-Hill Brownsville School Project in New York. When that experiment began to show results, he said, they legislated redistricting which essentially killed the project. The same pattern he charges, applied to fair employment programs, the neighborhood legal services, and OEO community action programs. The Government simply does not intend for


²⁵Ibid.
the efforts of Black people to be successful.

Why did the Anacostia Project fail? Project Director, William Rice discussed the reasons as he saw them.

1. **Lack of Multi-Year Funding.** At the end of the first Fiscal Year, June 30, 1969, the officials of the Project, those of the Office of Education and public schools had no prior knowledge of whether the Project would be continued during the next year, and if so at what level of funding. Requests had gone forward for a major increase from one million to five million dollars for the next year. Plans had to be held in abeyance for several months with the Project's two partly funded programs operating on a continuing resolution. When it was learned that funding would remain the same for the second year, this meant that little if any progress could be made toward established goals. In fact, because of the increases in pay which had occurred, and which had to be absorbed from the grant, staff actually had to be reduced.

2. **Improper Placement of the Program with the Office of Education.** From the very beginning, the Project faced a serious problem of accountability at the Office of Education. Its funds were received from the Bureau of Research under Title IV, while it was being monitored and given technical assistance by officers from ESEA, Title I. This unhappy and unpleasant arrangement was continued for two years. When a change in administration and personnel was effected, the Project was transferred to the Bureau of Research, Title IV and management was assigned to the Director of Experimental Schools. The Project, however, did not fit the guidelines for this program and it, therefore, was merely a detachment. As a result, there was no project officer available to the Project at the Office of Education (except on a temporary assignment basis for a period of eight months). This slowed down approval of proposals, funding, and the day-to-day answering of questions as they arose.
3. **Changes in Top Level Administration both at the Office of Education and the D. C. Public Schools.**

By the close of the second year, no one at the Office of Education who had originally supported the Project was still associated with it in any way. Even clerical and administrative personnel had been changed. Also, new top level administration in D. C. Schools had not been urged to give preferred attention to the Project (as had former staff members) in order to help insure its success were in office. Therefore, although the funding of the Project was short-termed, it was necessary for it to wait its turn for services that had to be provided by the System.

4. **Change in Educational Emphasis from Community Control to Accountability.** From the beginning of its ascendancy as an idea for improving urban education, school systems either feared or doubted that the community could do an effective job of running as complex an organization as the public schools. If schools were to be accountable, officials resolved, then they and not the community must have control. The idea of community control ceased to be popular in spite of any successes it might cite.

5. **Bureaucratic Delay.** When short term projects (with year-to-year funding) have to wait four and five months to have positions that have already been approved and funded filled, programs naturally suffer. It is especially difficult to find or keep competent staff under these conditions. The long wait for instructional materials and supplies, the lease of space for special programs cause project officials to be accused of failure to hire needed personnel and make available adequate supplies and materials. Also, the poor accounting and reporting system in the D. C. Schools failed to inform the Project of its financial status with any regularity or accuracy. This resulted in audit exceptions which were unavoidable.

6. **Lack of Sophistication on the Part of the Community in Understanding the Complexities of School and Government Operations.** It was expected that many community participants would not understand the complexities in school and Government operations, such as procurement,
personnel, budget, et cetera. It was also realized that role definition would be an important issue that would be difficult to deal with, but this it was thought would be worked out to a great extent in proposed board training workshops held in each of the neighborhood schools and for the area board. Board members, however, soon tired of so many workshops and many of the expected problems had to be worked through as they occurred. For example, it was the realization that board members could not make themselves available to interview every teacher all during the year that prompted the decision that the director would be given this authority. Some other similar powers the board would not relinquish; this caused additional periods of delay in operation.

7. Lack of Agreement Among Major Participants on Priorities for Goals. In the final analysis, a lack of agreement as to what should be the proper goals and what should be the priorities in attempting to reach them was the direct reason for the project's termination.  

Certainly, the Anacostia Project did not fail because of a lack of involvement at any level of community or government. The Project was called for by the President of the United States; it had the support and backing of the Commissioner of Education; it had the complete backing and support of the Superintendent of Schools and the Board of Education, and the program without doubt, was planned completely with the active participation of the citizens, teachers, and youth of the community concerned. The community exhibited a tremendous amount of energy, enthusiasm, and effort in putting the Anacostia Project together. They considered the program an opportunity to gain control of the operation of their schools and to have a say in what was taught, when it

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26Statement prepared by the Director of the Anacostia Community School Project for the writer of this paper.
was taught and how it was taught so that their children might benefit. And
the Board of Education cooperated with the community. For example, in
response to the overcrowded conditions in Anacostia schools, the Board gave
first priority to new school housing in the Anacostia area beginning in 1969-70.

The Project director pinpointed a major part of the trouble when he
talked about administrative problems. The staff members who were in office
at the project's inception are no longer around, and the new people coming in
did not share their commitment to the Project. Perhaps a lack of resources
was also a factor in the project's demise. Or perhaps it was the bureaucratic
structure which delayed supplies, materials, and hiring so that the momentum
and impact of the project were completely lost. Probably all of these factors
contributed to the failure of the Anacostia Project. But basically, once again,
the Project was an attempt at a piecemeal, bandaid operation when an entire
system is in need of reorganization and revitalization.

The whole educational system needs revamping.

The confusion existing is hardly credible, authority
and responsibility are horribly tied up with red tape;
the bureau-centered methods in use are entirely in-
adequate to the task. An attempt is made to manage
a large city school system by small town methods and
the result is disastrous. Educational conditions in
Washington from an administrative point of view are
among the worst to be found in any city in the Union
and the school system is behind that of cities of
elsewhere of equal size in the Union. The superin-
tendency of the schools of Washington is generally
agreed as one of the most difficult and undesirable
positions of the United States. 27

While this comment was made by a superintendent of schools fifty years ago, it has been restated in almost the exact words in the last decade by such people as Dr. A. Harry Passow in his study Toward Creating A Model Urban School, by Dr. Kenneth Clark in his recent 1970 proposal Toward A Possible Reality, and by Dr. Hugh Scott, Superintendent of Schools, to the Board of Education in February 1970.

Various strategies have been undertaken over the years to respond to such indictments, most of them piecemeal and isolated attempts to effect change. Curriculum and teaching have been tackled through the various surveys and now the Clark Plan. Organization has been tackled through the sub-system concepts suggested originally by President John Kennedy's Science Advisory Committee in the form of the Model School Division. Community control has been instituted within the Adams-Morgan and Anacostia Community School Projects. The Innovation Team has been effective in staff training. Most recently, Dr. Kenneth Clark charted a massive concentration on reading and attempted by policy, politics, and charisma to force a system-wide confrontation with the failures of the system and the possibilities of changing it by inducing personal accountability.

Yet the stark facts remain - in spite of these diverse well-intentioned efforts, the school system is failing its students today just as it failed them fifty years ago.

And in the face of the city's political and social realities, it is, at the best, foolish to propose that universities, planners, or any outside resources can, in one fell swoop, reform and administer to all of the ills of a public educative system in the federal city. 28

With this rather bleak conclusion to the Anacostia story, the author will attempt in Chapter V to summarize and isolate those factors which seem to have the greatest impact upon the success or failures of attempts at educational reform. Hopefully, the conclusions that come from this final analysis will in some way help us to chart a better course towards reform of our schools in urban settings.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

In Chapter III, The Strayer Survey, the Model School Division, and the Passow Study were reviewed in detail. The Clark Plan and the Anacostia Project were analyzed in Chapter IV. Under consideration were these factors: (1) the actual recommendations for reform; (2) the extent to which the recommendations for reform were actually carried out; (3) how the recommendations were compromised in the process of their implementation, and (4) what the significant factors were in compromising the effectiveness of each of the suggested reforms.

The Strayer Survey

As was pointed out earlier, Dr. Strayer's report is a review of, and recommendations on, all phases of D. C. public school life - administration, operation, maintenance of buildings and grounds, food services, school buildings and school housing needs, and the financing of public school education. In the report, Dr. Strayer made the following major recommendations:

1. That the Board of Education should reorganize its procedures to guarantee that more adequate consideration will be given to matters of major policy. In other words, the Strayer Report was advocative that the Board of Education be responsible for the management and control of the District school system. Strayer wanted to free the hands of the
Superintendent of schools to take care of the administrative details - he wanted the Superintendent and his staff to run the school system.

2. That the Board of Education abolish its system of operating through a committee structure. Dr. Strayer felt strongly that the committee system interfered with the operation of the Superintendent's office and, indeed hindered the operation of the Board of Education itself. He emphasized strongly that the Board of Education should be a policy-making body.

3. That the District's administrative and supervisory staffs should be reorganized so that function was the paramount consideration, not position in the hierarchy.

4. That the system undertake serious reform in the administration of business affairs. Dr. Strayer recommended that there be a great deal of built-in flexibility in spending, planning, and the ability to shift monies by the Board of Education to meet emergencies. He suggested that the Board should share those freedoms enjoyed by other cities in the operation of their business affairs.

5. That deficiencies in the area of special education be overcome. In one of his strongest critiques, Dr. Strayer highlighted four glaring inadequacies: (a) the lack of a strong central clinic to which all children needing special services could be referred; (b) the lack of supervisory and advisory services for the physically and mentally handicapped; (c) an inadequate budget for special education; (d) too many untrained teachers serving in special education programs.

6. That a strong program be devised which would develop an adequate system for financing the public school system of the District of Columbia. Dr. Strayer indicated the pressing need for reform of the District's system of taxation to produce about
15 to 20 million dollars in additional revenue to balance the District budget. Strayer wanted to see an increase in the federal payment, changes in the financing of the school building program and the institution of a new system of fiscal control.

In large measure, the Strayer Survey was compromised by two realities which are even more acute today: The cost of the reforms and the lack of authority of the Board of Education and D. C. citizens to raise their own revenue or to implement a report which was initiated, supervised, and funded by the Congress of the United States. Actually, however as was pointed out earlier in this report, many of the recommendations handed down by Dr. Strayer were carried out administratively; indeed, many recommendations that he made are still in effect today even though they have undergone some modification.

Model School Division

The Cardozo High School area was conceived of as a project which would saturate one inner city area with a variety of social and educational programs. However, this effort was modified by the School Board. Acting upon the recommendations of the Superintendent, the Board of Education decided to embrace the idea of an experimental model sub-system which would be instituted in the same inner city area that had been set aside for the saturation effort by the planners of the poverty program.

From the beginning, the Model School Division was plagued with financial problems, administrative organization, misunderstanding of program goals and conflict between the advisory committee and the Board of Education con-
cerning the role each was to assume. Yet despite the problems and the wide-ranging controversy sparked by the Program, it did make some important inroads. Its successes: (1) the development of an effective staff development technique - the Innovation Team, a group of highly skilled teachers who worked with other teachers on a peer basis with no authority or power to rate or evaluate performance. This technique was so successful within the Model School Division that it is currently being used elsewhere in the District and in other cities as well;¹ (2) the eclectic or combination approach to reading instruction. Whenever possible, two or more programs have been combined together and use has been made of supplementary materials; (3) Dr. Passow, in his review of the school system, commended the Model School Division for having developed an outstanding esprit-de-corps within its schools and for having distributed new materials and used new methods of teaching students.

Dr. Passow indicated, "the Model School Division represented the closest thing available in Washington to a system for initiating and testing ideas new to the District School System."²

Indeed, the Model School Division did demonstrate that inner city classrooms can be alive and fresh and that teachers and parents and school officers working together can plan programs and carry them out for the good of children.

¹The Baltimore Model Cities Areas has developed an Innovation Team now in its second year of operation.

²Passow, p. 377.
(4) The Model School Division proved beyond doubt that given continuing opportunities to communicate with each other, teachers and principals can work together in planning school programs and that this process would enable each group to overcome feelings of suspicion and distrust. (5) The Model School Division proved that the development and implementation of a good program would encourage citizens of the community, teachers and citizens from other parts of the city and from the surrounding area to attend workshops and look at the materials, textbooks and other items being used in the program.

The success of the Model School Division was compromised by a number of factors: (1) a lack of continuous funding which would have enabled the Division to build on and plan new programs; (2) an existing bureaucratic structure which did not lend itself to the need and desire to respond quickly to problems; (3) an absence of funding fostered by the legal restrictions imposed by the District of Columbia and Federal Governments; (4) the absence of a mechanism for incorporating in the rest of the school system all that was learned in the Model School Division; (5) a general misunderstanding and distrust of the Model School Division, its goals and financing; (6) the school system's inability to accept a sectional, autonomous resources and development sub-unit; and (7) the system's lack of commitment to experimentation and innovation within the Model School Division.

There is a great deal to be learned from the history of the Model School Division. Through the study of its evolvement as a program a number of
educational observations become clear:

1. The unit of change for a school system is informal, molded generally by society and larger systemic forces than the classroom, the individual school or the sub-system. The collective forces of training and growth points within a subsystem could not be maintained when decisions made at higher and more comprehensive levels constantly undermined the small subsystem. A model of change focused exclusively on a subsystem, therefore, is not practical in view of the nature of the overall system and societal wishes to have decision-making affect all schools. The sphere of influence of the Innovation Team in its initial stages in 1966 was a subsystem in the Model School Division. It is apparent in retrospect that Federal and local decisions to equalize expenditures across the schools; to redistribute black and white teachers and students, and to focus educational efforts on specific skills were all decisions which forced mobility and spread out the expertise developed in individual teachers by the Model School Division experience.

2. The funding sources often determine who the clients of particular programs will be. Titles I and IV of ESEA, the general influence of federal policy and programs dictated in the first and the final decree who the client would be and in general the kinds of solutions which might be provided for the client's problems. These decisions were made, of course, in the initial stages on the basis of economic and social determinants. While economic and social determinants do define the problems, they do not necessarily provide the best definition of the units or approach for encouraging improvements in education which they purport to foster. In other words, school systems are not organized specifically to deliver services or to improve only Title I schools. They are organized as entire systems, and the efforts to influence only a few schools invariably fall into the same morass of problems related to the whole system.
3. Due to funding patterns, school organization and the definition of tasks described above, most training and development programs in schools are offered to professionals and other people working within the school system. The community's potential for supporting and contributing to the change process in schools is thereby radically limited because it lacks legitimate access to training and to the elements creating real growth. The lack of legitimate access in responsibility of the community with regard to extending change and information in education radically limits its potential and real influence. It is not, and has not been considered, the legitimate role of the school to influence and train any people other than professionals or those who are connected with the schools in some formal way.

4. The bias of funding and development programs in schools is toward introducing piecemeal solutions, packages, and new methodologies into old systems, rather than changing those systems. This is built on the assumption that a system functions as a mechanical model and new parts can be substituted for malfunctioning ones. This interpretation runs counter to an organic theory of systems which recognizes that whole systems grow and that the introduction of one new part influences others. The people are the basic unit of the system and should therefore be the target of change. It is their competence in utilizing and distributing resources which should be the fundamental concern and the objective of the primary interventions.

5. The operational inadequacy in planning and expenditure procedures of school systems insures that programs will be developed - in time and in function - behind the needs of people and society. It is now clear that the new learnings and informal power which the Innovation Team's new programs and dynamic approaches within the system were able to give could not be supported by the day-to-day procedures of the system. 3

As Toffler says in *Future Shock*:

What passes for education today in even our best schools and colleges is a hopeless anachronism. Parents look to education to fit their children for life and the future. Teachers warn that lack of an education will cripple a child's chances in the world of tomorrow. Government, ministry, churches, the mass media all exhort young people to stay in school, insisting that now as never before one's future is almost wholly dependent upon education. Yet, for all this rhetoric about the future our schools face backward toward a dying system rather than forward to the emerging new society. Their vast energies are applied to cranking out industrial men; people tooled for survival in a system that will be dead before they are. To help avert future shock we must create a super industrial educational system and to do this we must search for our objectives and methods in the future rather than in the past.\(^4\)

In my opinion, The Model School Division and the Innovation Team offered the best hope for the kind of dynamic, futuristic planning called for by Toffler.

**Toward Creating A Model Urban School System**

Unlike the Strayer Survey, the Passow Study was initiated by the Board of Education and the Superintendent in cooperation with the community. In the beginning, it was requested that an outside consultant group be brought in to evaluate the four-track curriculum which was in effect during this period. However, this modest effort was expanded into a study of the whole District of Columbia Public School System. This study was undertaken by Dr. Passow

from Teachers College, Columbia University. The study was conducted by thirty-three task forces and covered every facet of the school system and its operations and personnel. The common goal was to propose those changes which would affect maximum improvement in the D. C. Public Schools in order to insure quality education for all. In contrast to the Strayer Survey, the process carried out in the Passow Study, as far as can be determined, represented the most extensive involvement and cooperation in the analysis and the proposed rebuilding of a school system ever undertaken by any school community in any large city. This is in contrast to the Strayer Survey which saw little or no concentrated effort of implementation.

Some of Dr. Passow's recommendations discussed in this paper were:

(1) The school system should decentralize and the decentralization process should be done in such a manner as to insure the greatest possible success for the reorganization; (2) An administrative reorganization should take place in the Superintendent's Office. A Vice Superintendent should be in charge of the day-to-day operations and the administration should be separated into five major divisions; (3) A Program-Planning-Budgeting-System should be developed and utilized, and the process for developing the budget should be placed in the new department of Planning, Research and Innovation; (4) A complete reorganization of the District's Special Education programs should be undertaken. This recommendation was similar to Dr. Strayer's 25 years earlier; (5) A Bilingual School should be created to include the standard curriculum in English and
Spanish; (6) A strong office of Staff Development should come into being. Dr. Passow recommended that 15 to 20 per cent of teachers' time be devoted to staff development activities during the regular school day; (7) The school system should embark upon a massive recruitment program to attract new teachers and the latest recruitment techniques including attrative brochures should be used in this effort; (8) A major reorganization of the Personnel Department should be accomplished, including the establishment of an office of staff negotiations so that there would be constant and continued attention given to the relationship between the Board of Education, teachers, administrators and other school employees affected by collective bargaining.

A Possible Reality: The Design for the Attainment of High Academic Achievement for the Students of the Public Elementary and Junior High Schools In Washington, D. C. - The Clark Plan

The chief goals of the Clark Plan were to raise the achievement levels of elementary students in reading and mathematics with heavy emphasis on the teaching of reading and mathematics and the testing of achievement through standardized tests. In large measure the Clark Plan is failing because there was no dynamic interaction between experts and theorists in the field and practitioners and implementers of the program at the teaching and learning levels. This is in essence the opposite of the technique proposed by the Model School Division and several other programs which involved all who are to have a hand in implementing the program at the beginning. Had these procedures
been followed in the Clark Plan, some of the problems may have been avoided or dissipated.

It is still questionable whether the school system had in hand the resources to carry out the plan. The high cost of testing, new materials, and staff development worked against successful implementation of the Clark Plan. Obviously, too, the transition of leadership also created a problem since the plan was approved under the administration of an acting superintendent and the job of implementing the program was taken on by a new superintendent two months after the plan had been approved.

The Anacostia Project

The Anacostia Project was unique because it was called for by President Johnson in his Budget of March 1968 Message and was supported by high officials in local and federal government. Despite the massive involvement in writing the Anacostia Project by citizens, youth, teachers, members of the teachers' union, and representatives from all segments of the community, the Project was judged a failure and is to be terminated in August 1972. The reasons given for this failure are: (1) lack of multi-year funding; (2) improper placement of the program with the Office of Education; (3) changes in top level administration, both at the Office of Education and the D. C. Public Schools; (4) change in educational emphasis from community control to educational accountability; (5) bureaucratic delay which Dr. Strayer and Dr. Passow both recognized as handicaps to new programs and which is also cited as a compromising factor.
in the success of the Model School Division; (6) the lack of sophistication on the part of the community in understanding the complexities of school and government operations; and (7) lack of agreement among major participants on priorities of goals for the Anacostia Project.

Certainly, the Anacostia Project did not fail because of lack of involvement of any level of community or government. The Project was called for by the President of the United States and had the support and backing of the Commissioner of Education. It had the complete backing and support of the Superintendent of Schools and the Board of Education. The program, without a doubt, was planned completely with the active participation of the concerned citizens, teachers, and youth of the community.

Conclusions and Observations

1. Involvement

In many recent attempts at educational reform, the major emphasis has been upon the involvement of all the various groups of people concerned. In the study of the five major plans for the District of Columbia this technique ranged from complete involvement of virtually every group in the Anacostia Project to a small involvement of outside experts in the Clark Plan, yet as has been pointed out, the results are in each case rather similar. In fact, one could say that the Clark Plan has outlived the Anacostia Project, since the Anacostia Project is scheduled to be terminated in August 1972. Yet, despite the spasmodic involvement of all personnel, one has to analyze what school
officials were looking for in terms of change. Perhaps expectations of what change efforts can accomplish have to be reevaluated. There are elements of each of these projects still existent in the schools today and if this represents change perhaps it is change in a small way which ultimately can be cultivated into something that will have major impact upon the system.

2. Growth of the System

When Strayer made his Survey in 1948, the school population was roughly 90,000 pupils. In the beginning of school year 1973, it is projected that the school population will approximate 143,000 pupils. This growth has been accompanied by tremendous social upheaval in our cities, by massive influx of federal monies, and by new demands for quicker delivery of services and results to school clients - the children. Yet the administration has moved farther and farther away from the children due to the very growth factors which have increased the size and complexity of the organization of schools in big cities. Those people who attempt to act as catalysts or change agents within the school system often find that they lose focus on what they are trying to change and find that they themselves become absorbed in the bureaucratic structure of the school system. Many times they too begin to focus in an almost "tunnel vision" manner.

3. No Mechanism for the Introduction of Reform Efforts in the Schools

The Innovation Team has been cited as an excellent staff development
effort. Yet there has been no attempt to replicate the kind of training and effort that went into the development of the Innovation Team. This attempt at change introduced into the Washington, D. C. School System from 1965 to 1970 provided time and again ample demonstration that there were accelerating forces both within and without the school system which impeded action, paralyzed decision making, made it impossible for the system to capitalize on its own growth points and its new programs which had pointed ways to success. The Innovation Team in particular was one example. It was one growth point in the system with proven effectiveness. As stated earlier, it was impossible for 18 teachers to service the city and meet the needs of all of the teachers that were asking for help.

4. **Lack of Continuous Funding**

In the Anacostia Project, the Model School Division Project, and in the carrying out of the recommendations of the Strayer Survey and the Passow Study, a lack of continuous funding seriously compromised individual project success. Each project director with whom the writer talked complained about the arrival of funds in the middle of the school year, the uncertainty of the amount of funding and the inability to plan for the following year based upon a given amount of money. More money and a consistency in the flow of resources is not the answer to all of the schools' problems but it is one important factor.

In a booklet prepared by the D. C. Citizens for Better Public Education, Washington does not seem to compare favorably financially with other cities.
In cities of comparable size such as Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, and Cleveland, Washington, D. C. had the smallest share of the total city budget spent on education. Atlanta spent 47.0 per cent of its total budget on education; Baltimore 30.9 per cent; Boston 34.4 per cent, and Cleveland 33.2 per cent in contrast to Washington, D. C. which spent 23.9 per cent. In the neighboring communities, Alexandria, Virginia spent 41.4 per cent of its budget on education; Arlington, Virginia, 48.8 per cent; Falls Church, Virginia, 52.9 per cent; Fairfax, Virginia 47.0 per cent; Montgomery County, Maryland 67.9 per cent; Prince George's County, Maryland, 59.5 per cent (See Table 1).

Yet more than money is needed. It will be remembered that both Dr. Passow and Dr. Strayer pointed out that the problems that plagued the Model School Division, the Anacostia Project and the Clark Plan, even with expanded funding, would have to be corrected, i.e., the business practices, the procurement practices, the budget procedures and all of the life lines that service the classroom would have to be updated and services improved so that supplies, equipment, and materials reach the classroom when they were needed. The parent, too, would have to understand the budget process, because an increase in amounts for education would ultimately have to be borne by the citizen - the taxpayer.

5. Impact

Each of the attempts to educational reform had some major impact on the city. Despite the fact that they were piecemeal and bandaid operations, there
Table 1

Comparison of the Education Share of the Total Budget for Washington, D. C., Cities of Comparable Size and Neighboring Communities, FY 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities of comparable size to Washington, D. C.</th>
<th>Education Share of Total City Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D. C.</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighboring Communities</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria, Va.</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arlington, Va.</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falls Church, Va.</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairfax, Va.</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montgomery County, Md.</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince George's County, Md.</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statement by the President of the District of Columbia Board of Education before the District of Columbia City Council, on the FY 1972 Budget. February 13, 1971.
have been lingering effects; some positive, some negative in the school system. It is hoped that what will emerge from these Programs is a marriage of the best of the Clark Plan, the Model School Division, the Passow Study, the Strayer Survey and the Anacostia Project to be put into a different form of change effort. The system has only to create the models necessary to capitalize on the best of the reform efforts that have taken place in the District of Columbia since 1948.

There is little need for further studies by experts from outside the system. In fact, I propose that a moratorium on such large scale efforts is undoubtedly in order. In consideration of catalysts and change agents, it is necessary to have a structure outside of the school system, completely independent of the schools, but serving unique needs of the schools which only such an organization is equipped to do. But a matching structure or complimentary organization in the school system is necessary to utilize these services to create an interfacing or constant flow of ideas, people, in and out of the two organizations.

In 1968, the author submitted a Proposed Five-Year Plan for the Reorganization of the Division of Instruction. The Plan was designed as the best and most direct route for reaching the following ultimate goals: (1) raising the achievement level of students in basic skills; (2) producing citizens capable of satisfactory career fulfillment; (3) producing citizens adaptable to a changing society; and (4) maximizing the self-awareness and potential fulfillment of each
student. The Plan proposed that over a five-year period a series of instructional units be established to provide training and assistance to the classroom teachers and to guarantee that materials, supplies and new ideas move systematically and continuously into the classroom. The Plan was the outgrowth of four months of concentrated research, thought and discussion and the work of a conference and a task force and should be viewed as a plan of action and an outline of a strategy for involving the instructional units rather than a detailed analysis of the final product. The instructional units would serve discreet geographical areas to include one or more high schools and feeder schools. They would serve only as service units; administrative and operational control of the schools would remain the function of the assistant superintendents in charge of the operation.

Prototype Instructional Unit

It was proposed in the plan that a prototype instructional unit be established during this 1969-1970 school year. The unit would have been organized around the concept of the team approach to the improvement of instruction; therefore, the related subject fields were to be clustered and supported by a core of generalists.

The prime goal must be the development of the teacher; the curriculum to be created, adopted and implemented must be broad and relevant to today's world. Teachers, representatives of neighborhoods, and the community at large must collaborate in shaping curriculum in roles which provide real
influence on final decisions. The task of organizing to improve instruction must be understood by all as a risk-taking enterprise bound to create confusion, anxiety and some failures as a part of the process of working out more successful relationships.

This reorganization was designed to function inside the school system. Another organization has been designed which would compliment the instructional unit concept and would provide the outside dynamism for change in the District Schools. This is the Advisory and Learning Exchange developed by Mary Lela Sherburne, and established in September 1971, "to organize, connect and facilitate learning and growth of individuals in the community of Washington, D.C. relative to the process of education; the development of new institutions, and the renewal of old ones."5

Merging these two functions - utilizing grants from private foundations to support the Advisory and Learning Exchange with school system funds being contracted to the Advisory and Learning Exchange for those services that the schools needed - provide the kind of organization capable of using the best of the recommendations of the reform efforts discussed in this paper.

A number of decision making assumptions can be drawn from the analysis of these attempts at educational reform within the D.C. Schools.

1. No plan for reform should be undertaken unless funding is guaranteed for at least a four-to-five year period.

Any program which is to be implemented should from its inception have realistic plans for continuous programs assessment, and modification of program direction in relationship to new findings. Example: The Anacostia Project could not reshape itself and was evaluated against different criteria than the original intent of the plan. The Model School Division had to face the issue of larger school system needs before there was ample opportunity to prove it had increased the achievement scores of children and improved the school environment or the skills of school personnel within the Model School Division. Strayer and Passow were replaced or forgotten even before the reports were implemented since a lack of resources dictated very limited capabilities or short-term implementation plans. Thus, short-term plans produce short-term interventions with very little potential for long-term impact.

2. No plan should be adopted which was developed, introduced, or imposed exclusively from outside the system that is supposed to be changed. All plans should include an appropriate planning period in which the staff and personnel slated to operate the program go through a process of
accepting, rejecting, modifying and preparing themselves to implement the plans.

3. No plan should be adopted which enables one part of a system to be set aside from the larger system, unless appropriate funds are added to the experimental funds, for the specific purpose of dissemination and change within the larger system. In other words, experimentation should not only be allowed, it should be encouraged, but only with constant interaction between the subsystem and the larger system. Such constant interaction between the two systems will broaden the impact of the reform itself and will also prevent exclusivity and jealousy from developing among personnel. By its success, the Innovation Team created jealousy of extra services that were provided for one section of the city to the apparent exclusion of the rest of the school system.

4. Any new educational reform plan should undertake a testing and systems analysis process which would determine how the proposed plan interfered with, challenged or eradicated already existing operational guidelines, regulations or rules under which the system was currently operating. For example, the Clark Plan negated some of the
underlying concepts and principals upon which the Model School Division was based and also violated the Board-Washington Teachers' Union Contract.

5. No plan should be adopted unless it recognized that successful growth of personnel and of students, as well as increased learning opportunities would of necessity require some basic and meaningful change within the system itself. For example, Innovation Team members could not remain in the system because successful strategies of peer operation did not fit with the system's expectancy of "promotion" and supervisory bureaucratic hierarchy. The system could not provide the personal challenge and satisfactions to support the individual professional growth it had encouraged.
ADDITIONAL SOURCES CONSULTED
ADDITIONAL SOURCES CONSULTED


Evans, Judith T. Characteristics of Open Education: Results from a Classroom Observation Rating Scale and a Teacher Questionnaire. A Pilot Communities Program, Education Development Center, Newton, Mass., August 1971.


APPENDIX

The Five-Year Plan for Improving Instructional Services in The Division of Instruction

This plan proposes that over the next five years a series of Instructional Units be established to provide training and assistance to the classroom teacher and to guarantee that materials supplies and new ideas move systematically and continuously into the classroom. The plan is the outgrowth of four months of concentrated research, thought and discussion and the work of a conference and a Task Force. It should be viewed as a plan of action and an outline of the strategy for evolving the Instructional Units rather than a detailed analysis of the final product.

This plan was designed as the best and most direct route for reaching the following ultimate goals:

- Raising the achievement level of students in basic skills;
- Producing citizens capable of satisfactory career fulfillment;
- Producing citizens adaptable to a changing society;
- Maximizing self-awareness and the potential fulfillment of each student.

The Instructional Units will serve discrete geographical areas to include one or more high schools and feeder schools. They will serve only as service units. Administrative and operational control of the schools will remain the function of the Assistant Superintendents in charge of operations.
The Instructional Units will report directly to the Deputy Superintendent through the Associate Superintendent for Instructional Services. In addition to the line personnel reporting to the Deputy Superintendent, the following staff service groups will be available: State Level Directors, who will be the present heads of subject matter departments and will provide leadership in their particular areas of expertise; Office of the Director of Staff Development, which will provide leadership for Staff Development Teams in the Instructional Units; and Executive Staff, which will provide research and logistic support.

Prototype Instructional Unit

It is proposed that a prototype Instructional Unit be established during the 1969-70 school year. The Unit will be organized around the concept of the team approach to the improvement of instruction; therefore, the related subject fields will be clustered and supported by a core of generalists.

The prime goal must be the development of the teacher. The curriculum to be adopted, created and implemented must be broadly relevant to today's world. Teachers, representatives of neighborhoods and the community at large must collaborate in shaping curriculum in roles which provide real influence on final decision. The task of organizing to improve instruction must be understood by all as a risk-taking enterprise bound to create confusion, anxiety and some failures as a part of the process of working out more successful patterns of relationships.
The prototype Unit must be housed in a facility geographically related to the schools served and must provide adequate space for the activities to be carried out by the Unit. Sixty-five professional and ten non-professional positions will be redeployed to the Unit.

The central officer of the Unit will be a Director who will coordinate and bring into focus the support teams and the expressed needs of principals, community and teachers. An Advisory Committee, comprised of two teachers, two parents, two principals and the leaders of the four permanent teams within the Unit, will be a decision making group and will meet on a regular basis with the Director to review operations and recommendations. A Business Manager will be in charge of budgeting, finance, purchasing, management of the building, securing and scheduling substitutes for staff development. There will be four permanent teams within the Unit. Each team will have permanent members and will also draw from Specialists working in the center as needed. While their precise functioning must be determined by the first Unit, these teams will provide services to the classroom and support to the teacher, conduct workshops, provide assistance in improving teaching and classroom management and implement new instructional materials. Specialists will be primarily responsible for subject matter. Task forces will be temporary work groups assembled to do specific tasks - writing curriculum, studying new materials or finding answers to specific problems.

Evaluation services will be provided by the Division of Long Range
Planning, Innovation and Research, to be facilitated by addition to the executive staff of a Coordinator for Evaluation. The internal evaluation made by the school staff which formulates goals and objectives should also be used, and outside agencies should be engaged to provide summative and comparative evaluation.

Implementation

The implementation of the Instructional Unit has been divided into four growth phases for purposes of planning, budgeting and training staff. Growth must be regarded as evolutionary and developmental within each individual Unit, as well as within the city as a whole.

Phase I is the planning and development stage for each Unit and should be carried out as a small group operation. During this period, personnel will be deployed from subject departments; a teacher will be detailed from each building; a program budget will be established; new positions will be created and budget submitted for new costs; training and staff development will be designed and temporary leadership will be appointed to serve during the organization and training period.

Phase II is the organization of the Unit, the first stages of operation and implementation of a delimited program in given areas of curriculum and staff development. During this stage, the staff will establish its own physical facilities, work on its own personal development and organization, set up initial programs with the schools, operate workshops and support plans for the
school with a gradual ascending magnitude of services and effort.

**Phase III** will be expanding the operation of this Unit, but will include making curriculum development research operative at the Unit level. One area of interest will have been chosen and plans laid, as well as budget needs established for intensive curriculum work and development within the Unit, which will utilize the efforts of teachers and resources of outside consultants and specialists.

**Phase IV** is the final stage, regarded as being one of full operation with evaluation, classroom support, staff development and curriculum development being attached for each area on a local basis.

These four phases can be developed in all eleven areas of the city by the end of a five-year period. The timetable is shown in Chart 4, page 27 of the Plan.

**Considerations in Establishing Instructional Units 1969-70**

1. **Timing.** The recommendation of all concerned is that immediate planning and staff development get underway.

2. **Location of Physical Space.** An Instructional Planning and Service Center will be established as the base of operations for the training, developing and deploying of all these Units. It is recommended that this Center be established in the Malcolm Scates Building at 13th and Upshur Streets, N.W. because of its availability and desirability for these purposes.

3. **Establishment of the First Unit.** The Task Force recommended the Spingarn area for establishment of the first Unit as it has a large population of pupils and teachers and has not had input from special programs.
Other areas which fall into this category are the Dunbar area and the Roosevelt area. An arbitrary choice will have to be made for the first Unit, although inherent in the development of the first is the promise that all will ultimately be reached.

4. Logistics of Setting up the Unit. If this plan is adopted the following steps will be taken:

Step 1 Involve principals in the schools in the area in a briefing session opening the way for their participation.

Step 2 Provide a briefing session for teachers from each building and discuss their needs in the classroom.

Step 3 Obtain a similar assessment of needs through community representatives.

Step 4 Deploy personnel from departments to this Unit.

Step 5 Principals and representatives of the Washington Teachers Union will assign one teacher from each building to be the teacher member of the team.

Step 6 Establishment of program budget enabling the Unit to be dealt with as a whole.

Step 7 Deputy Superintendent, with the approval of the Superintendent, will appoint a temporary director and committee to assist in initial organization.

Training and Development of the Staff of the Instructional Unit

One of the first tasks of the Unit will be the provision of staff development for itself. Adequate provisions must be made to have the assistance, guidance, consultation and services of outside organizations and individuals in hammering out the new organization. The first sessions should provide the following:
task-oriented planning sessions and human relations training for all members; modification of job assignments and task analysis as operation gets underway; and focus on major area of curriculum. Reading and language arts along with Black historical and social experience are recommended.

Once the training and planning is complete and the first Unit moves into Phase II, it will be appropriate to proceed to establishing Phase I operations for two additional Units. This Phase I operation should consist of ten members from the two next Units to be set up. They will be representative of administration, teachers, principals, specialists and services. They will be released some part of their time to work in the building with the Operational Instructional Staff. Part of their training and planning will consist of observation of the first Unit as it establishes itself.

Estimated costs for establishment of the Instruction Unit prototype for one full year are shown in Chart 5, page 36 of the Plan. Chart 6, page 37, projects the costs for phasing in the Plan over the five-year period.

Note: A complete copy of the Plan is available through the D. C. Public Schools, 415 Twelfth Street, N. E., Washington, D. C., 20005.