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DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL POWER:

A CASE STUDY

A Thesis Presented

by

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DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL POWER:
A CASE STUDY

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The issue of busing to achieve desegregation of the Boston public school system has its roots in the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decisions in 1954 and 1955. Those decisions in Brown vs. Board of Education, (347 U.S. 483 of 1954)\textsuperscript{1} and the findings a year later in Brown vs. Board of Education, (349, U.S. 254)\textsuperscript{2} were the official beginnings of a struggle between federal courts and communities charged with desegregation of their schools. As Howard Ozmon reflects,

The two Supreme Court decisions form the legal backdrop from which busing has become an issue of crisis proportional to a moral crisis.\textsuperscript{3}

The Brown decision represented a mandate to American society. They were the foundation of a series of court rulings that led to Federal District Court Judge Wendell Arthur Garrity, Jr.'s findings of June 1974. Ozmon concurs that

The direction of that legal mandate was to root out and invalidate as unconstitutional any form of de jure segregation of public schools, that is segregation required and upheld by law.\textsuperscript{4}

In the Brown decisions the Supreme Court had limited itself to de jure segregation in assaulting racial inequality and
upholding the equal rights protection of the Constitution's fourteenth amendment. For the time being, de facto segregation remained unchallenged. However limited, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision of 1954 a year later by asserting that "once the state had undertaken the obligation to provide public education, it must be available to all on equal terms".\(^5\)

Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court not only limited its jurisdiction to de jure segregation, but delegated the task of desegregation to lower courts. Little guidance was offered except to require compliance with constitutional obligations to equal rights. In Briggs vs. Elliot, 1955,\(^6\) the U.S. Supreme Court was more concerned with articulating what it had not decided than with formulating a standard of desegregation for lower courts to implement and school officials to follow. The Court opinion claimed that it has not decided that the federal courts are to take over or regulate the public schools...has not decided that states must mix persons of different races in the school or deprive them of the right to choose the schools they attend. What it has decided...is that a state may not deny to any person on account of race the right to attend any school that it maintains.\(^7\)

The Court had concluded in this case that the U.S. Constitution forbade discrimination without demanding integration. Busing orders and a more affirmative role for the Court and local authority still lay in the distant future.
The U.S. Supreme Court took its first steps toward formulating a standard or offering guidance to lower courts in the case of U.S. vs. Jefferson County Board of Education.\(^8\) A duty for local school authority to assume an affirmative role in eliminating segregation was inaugurated by this court opinion. The court declared that "the only desegregation plan that meets Constitutional standards is one that works".\(^9\) This new direction of the court received welcomed support from the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 clearly reaffirmed the responsibility of local school authority to end segregation. Section 407 of the legislation "authorized the Attorney General to maintain desegregation actions upon the receipt of written complaints".\(^10\) Reflecting Congressional perception of popular disapproval of forced busing, the same section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically stated that the Act did not empower anyone to issue a busing order. Although this anti-busing sentiment was incorporated into the legislation, the Congress did not and could not deny or restrict the Court's power to insure compliance with Constitutional standards. When the Court did discern busing as necessary to achieve desegregation, it would reason that the Civil Rights Act "in no way withdrew from the courts their equitable remedial powers".\(^11\)

Although the U.S. Supreme Court had affirmed the need for an effective desegregation strategy by local school
authority, it had been ambiguous as to what was and was not affirmative action. Since the "Jefferson County" decision, conflicting views over the exact nature of the affirmative duty imposed upon school officials developed. In 1968, the Supreme Court moved to eliminate some of the controversy. Numerous "freedom of choice" plans for desegregation were ruled ineffective in ending segregation. That ruling came in the case of Green vs. County School Board.12

The freedom of choice plan to comply with the Constitutional obligation to desegregate was deemed ineffective because it did not guarantee desegregation. Black children attending white schools faced unchecked intimidation, and white children were simply transferred to predominantly white schools whenever necessary to evade an influx of black students. The unruly nature of the "freedom of choice" alternative had, in this particular county, resulted in overlapping bus routes, drawn by school officials, that sustained segregated schools. The Court concluded that local school authorities were

charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated, root and branch.13

Busing orders were not specifically authorized because Kent County, Virginia, was a rural area without segregated housing patterns. It was not clear that forced busing was necessary
to remedy the particular case under consideration. The Court's implied authorization, however, was unquestioned.

Three years later, the Supreme Court explicitly defended the use of busing to achieve desegregation. The case of Swan vs. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education was the first case in which a busing order came up for Supreme Court review. In this case, the school board's plan for desegregation included mathematic ratios for racial mixing of school assignments. The plan was ineffective, however, because it allowed for pupil assignment to the school nearest a child's home. Given the existence of a segregated housing pattern within the Charlotte-Mecklenburg area, this provision of their plan had made it necessary to use busing to achieve desegregation. The Supreme Court Swan decision concurred with a lower court ruling that busing was indeed necessary and constitutionally justified.

This U.S. Supreme Court decision represented the first explicit authorization for a busing order. The constitutional duty to provide equal rights and desegregate public school systems now meant that "busing as a remedy might be constitutionally necessary in some circumstances". The Court further ruled that:

school authorities have an obligation to prepare students for a pluralistic world by having a ratio of black and white in each school reflecting the portion of the district as a whole.

Further reflecting just how far the Court had altered its
role since the Brown decisions, the Court added that

If school authorities failed in this obligation, a district court had the power to provide a remedy insuring a unitary system.17

Busing to achieve desegregation could only be limited by consideration of the health of the children, distance traveled, and time involved.

Since the Brown decisions, the Supreme Court had focused only on the elimination of de jure segregation. The inclusion of de facto segregation as properly subject to redress under the fourteenth amendment right to equal rights came in 1973. The case was Keyes vs. School District #1.18 This was the first case in which segregation of a non-statutory nature was reviewed by the Court.

The School authority was held responsible for the creation and elimination of a segregated school system even though no clear motive to do so existed. In this case, the Court chose to employ a looser standard of intent than in the strict legal sense where motive is the central question. The formulation of why the school district was responsible stood as a guide for lower courts in assessing responsibility for de facto segregation. The Court argued that

School officials' actions and inactions which have the reasonably foreseeable effect of maintaining or increasing school segregation and which actually do cause segregation, create an inference of an intent to segregate. This inference of de jure segregation may be rebutted only by a convincing showing
that legitimate policy reasons compelled the challenged decisions.\textsuperscript{19}

In summary, the Brown decisions had ruled that segregated school systems were unconstitutional. A year later in Briggs vs. Elliot, the Court drew back from an active role in desegregation by stating the U.S. Constitution did not demand integration but merely forbade segregation. The continuing reality of segregated school systems compelled the Supreme Court into radically altering its early passive role in desegregation. The aforementioned Jefferson County Board of Education case established the validity and necessity for a more affirmative role for local school authority. Green vs. County School Board helped to articulate that role by ruling against "freedom of choice" desegregation plans. In 1971, the case of Swan vs. Charlotte formally justified busing orders as constitutionally acceptable tools for desegregation. The Supreme Court extended the constitutional obligation to desegregate to de facto segregated school systems in the Keyes vs. School District #1 ruling.

From merely ruling against the existence of segregated schools in the 1954 landmark case, the Court had, in the Keyes case, justified the possibility of a federal court directly assuming responsibility for desegregating a school system. For the Boston public schools, as well as others throughout the county, the path to desegregation took as
long as the Court's transformation of the 1954 Brown decision.

It is ironic that the Boston public school system became a center of national attention over the busing issue. Historically, Massachusetts and Boston have been leaders in educational reform and innovations regarding busing and desegregation. In 1838 the Massachusetts legislature passed the school union law. The unique legislation called for a consolidation of smaller schools. Consolidation was discerned as a more efficient use of funds to improve the educational environment. In 1869, Massachusetts enacted pioneering legislation which enabled school authorities to use tax money to provide transportation for school children. In 1855, the city of Boston became the first to outlaw school segregation.\(^{20}\) In 1965, the Massachusetts legislature was the first in making racially imbalanced schools illegal. Before the enactment of the Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 and afterward as well, the Boston public school system was segregated.

Boston is a city whose neighborhoods are clearly drawn by racial and ethnic factors. The Civil Rights Commission concluded that by at least the early 1960's, if not before, "discrimination against various groups has been a part of Boston life".\(^{21}\) The Commission also determined that the public school system was undeniably segregated. In 1960,
almost 80% of elementary-level black pupils attended schools with a black majority student population. Over 35% of the black students attended schools of 90 to 100% black enrollment. A 1961 plan of open enrollment failed miserably to achieve desegregation.

An advisory committee to the State Board of Education examined the problem and formally acknowledged the existence of at least 45 racially imbalanced Boston schools. Specifically, the task force found that the reality of de facto segregation was harmful to both black and white children, and recommended a short-term strategy of busing 5,000 pupils. In 1963, half of the city's 5,000 black high school and junior high students boycotted school to protest segregation policies. A year later, a similar protest drew 14,000 students. The target of the protest and of increasing State Board of Education pressure was the Boston School Committee.

By the mid-1960's, the five Boston school committee members were being regularly returned to office. As Alan Lupo, aide to Mayor Kevin White, contends,

> the committee had come to symbolize something...to those white people who...feared the growing power and population of Boston's black community. The committee symbolized resistance.

The School Committee had little reservation about busing black students past white schools with empty seats to other black schools. By its method of pupil assignments, style of
drawing district lines, and controlled feeder patterns to city-wide schools, the committee had created and maintained a segregated school system.24

Despite Supreme Court rulings against school segregation and the findings of the State Board of Education task force, the Boston School Committee remained opposed to desegregation. Determined to preserve the neighborhood school and to resist forced busing, the committee "maintained its general position through 1965".25 The school committee even thwarted a popular, privately supported plan to desegregate called "Operation Exodus", which transported black students to predominantly white schools with money and manpower supplied by parents and concerned citizens. The program was eventually undermined by the school committee, determined to thwart any desegregation effort. Students participating in "Operation Exodus" faced "locked doors, physical segregation in separate classrooms...and desks unbolted from the floor and removed from the classroom".26

In 1965, the Massachusetts legislature attempted to end segregation in state public school systems. The Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 was the first of its kind in the nation. Spurred by the Supreme Court ruling in the "Jefferson County" decision calling for an affirmative role in dismantling segregated schools, Republican Governor John Volpe and liberal Democrats in the legislature attacked de facto segregation in the school systems of the state. The
progressive legislation called for swift correction of racially imbalanced schools, defined as schools with a student population of more than 50% minority composition.

Strong penalties were provided for recalcitrant school committees which failed to take appropriate action. The act specifically proclaimed that "the commissioner of education could refuse to certify all state aid for uncorrected schools".27 This severe penalty for a continuation of racially imbalanced schools was, however, accompanied by vague guidelines to follow. The act did not require integration of all-white schools and explicitly prohibited the involuntary, inter-district transportation of students.28 The Boston school committee continued its fight against integration and ignored the intent of the legislature. Seven years after the passage of the act, the reality was that "the number of racially imbalanced schools (in Boston) had increased from 45 to 67".29

The Boston school committee frustrated the spirit as well as the letter of the Racial Imbalance Act in several ways. It was able to do so because the committee controlled local school policy. As Chairman John McDonough commented, the responsibility of the committee

is to oversee and formulate and direct the policy which will be used in the school system or imposed in the school systems here in the city of Boston.30

The general strategy for obstruction developed as one of
"formulistic compliance followed by procrastination and evasion on technical grounds". Black and civil rights leaders who petitioned the committee were ignored. Debate about desegregation was cut off by a majority vote of the committee members. So blatant was the committee's effort to block desegregation that 671 Chinese students were classified as white.

The State Department of Education also had little success with altering the Boston school committee's anti-desegregation policy. Charged with carrying out the policies of the State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education found himself opposing the Committee over elimination of racially imbalanced schools. Frustrated in his attempts to eliminate Boston school committee resistance, he terminated state aid to the city's school systems on two separate occasions. Because the school committee refused to formulate plans to do away with racially imbalanced schools, the State Board formulated four plans of its own between 1967 and 1970. The committee response to another plan in 1972 was a two-page report suggesting that a "freedom of choice" approach to desegregation be adopted. Three months later, the committee submitted relevant data for developing the plan. Similar alternatives had been declared ineffective by the Supreme Court in 1968 in the case of Green vs. County School Board.

Two years after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld busing
orders as constitutional, the State Board of Education presented another short-term plan for reducing the racially imbalanced schools. The plan intended to reduce that number from 61 to 42 by reorganizing the grade structure and busing 19,000 students to different schools. In March of 1974, the committee began to notify parents of pupil assignments pursuant to the state's plan. The reason for committee obedience was a state Supreme Court order to implement the plan. After years of struggle

State education officials and state courts had finally come around to taking the hardest of hard lines with the Boston School Committee. Submission to the state plan appeared to be temporary, however, because new legislation modified the Racial Imbalance Act in June of 1974. The modifications specifically withdrew the State Board's power to redistrict and order busing.

Although the legislature negated the State Board's short-term plan, Judge Wendell Garrity, Jr. promulgated his findings and decision in the case of Tallulah Morgan, et. al. vs. James Hennigan, et. al., during the same month. Filed two years earlier by a local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the case charged continual desegregation by the school committee. The State Board of Education was also named as a co-defendant with the committee, but Garrity ruled that "the state had exercised all the authority it had within its limited juris-
Full responsibility, according to Garritty, lay with the school committee because:

the evidence was clear...that school officials had knowingly carried out a systematic program of segregation and had intentionally maintained a dual system...and deliberately dragged their feet in formulating plans to lessen...racial imbalance.36

Rejecting the defense of uncontrollable policy decisions due to segregated housing patterns, Garritty concluded that the committee's argument had no "relevance to the defendant's practices with respect to faculty and staff assignments, open enrollment and controlled transfers or feeder patterns".37

Citing the Supreme Court ruling in the case of "School District #1" permitting a court to issue orders to accomplish what local authorities failed or refused to do, Garritty ordered that the most recent State Board of Education short-term plan be put into effect by September of 1974. This action would be followed by the development and implementation of a full-term program for desegregation. The school committee attempted to modify the plan, but was unsuccessful. With little time to plan, the desegregation order went into effect in September. Generally, implementation of the plan went smoothly, with the highly publicized exceptions at the Dorchester and South Boston high schools.

Impetus for the success of Phase II of the desegregation plan was the Attorney General's refusal to intervene on
behalf of the committee by appealing Garritty's ruling to the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{38} The Supreme Court also refused to hear four appeals to the Garritty decision. Still bitterly opposed to desegregation, the majority of committee members had little choice but to accept the federal court ruling. As John Kerrigan conceded, "It would appear that we have exhausted some of our legal remedies."\textsuperscript{39} Although the committee found the implementation of the desegregation plan distasteful, the plan did proceed. Chairman McDonough admitted

\begin{quote}
...the school committee will do what Judge Garritty directs them to do. They will not, however, take this plan in their arms as their own... will not go any further than doing what Judge Garritty directly orders.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

Nineteen years after the first Supreme Court decision in Brown vs. Board of Education and nine years after the passage of the Racial Imbalance Law, the Boston public school system took its first step toward desegregation. A Federal district court judge had provided that leadership. The U.S. Constitution defended his power to do so. Anti-desegregation forces had confronted

\begin{quote}
a federal court order, and no mayor, no school committee, no governor, no president is going to stop it (desegregation) now.\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

Our courts may not have the power of the purse, but "the power of final decision is given to the judicial branch".\textsuperscript{42}
CHAPTER II

Until Judge Garritty's ruling in 1974, the Boston school committee frustrated efforts to desegregate the city's school system. Repeated attempts by the state government and several pro-desegregation decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court had not overcome the committee's resistance to desegregation. In 1974, the direct involvement of the federal court ended the committee's power over the desegregation question.

The intuitively correct understanding of who wielded power with respect to the Boston busing issue is that the school committee, until 1974, exercised power over the state government and the U.S. Supreme Court. After June 1974, the federal court exercised power over the committee and desegregation finally began. For now, the correctness of this intuitive understanding of power shall be assumed for the purposes of this thesis.

The following chapters of this thesis will examine three definitions of power. Each definition will be studied to determine if the power of the school committee and court is reflected. Definitions of power which do reflect the intuitive understanding of power will be considered successful definitions. Why some definitions do and do not
succeed will also be explored.

Felix Oppenheim defines the exercise of power as:¹

\[ P \text{ (a powerholder) exercises power over } R \text{ (a respondent) with respect to } X \text{ (an action of } R) \text{ means that } P \text{ influences or coerces } R \text{ to do } X. \]

Oppenheim clarifies the definition by explaining

'P influences R to do X' means that
P performs some action Y involving
a communication which causes R to choose X

and that

P coerces R to do X if P does some-
thing which causes R's attempt at
not doing X to fail and hence con-
strains him to do X.

(or)

'P restrains R from doing X' means
that P performs some action Y which
causes R's attempt at doing X to fail.

Applied to this case study, the Oppenheim definition has some success. The intuitively correct understanding of the committee's power is reflected by Oppenheim's definition. Employing the definition results in the true statement: The Boston school committee (P) restrained the State government and U.S. Supreme Court (R) from implementing a desegregation policy until 1974. The school committee (P) did procrastinate, ignore and evade (action Y) the direct orders of the state government to desegregate which caused the state government's (R) attempt to desegregate Boston schools to fail. The committee's tactics of evading and procrastinating are
properly subsumed by Oppenheim's notion of action. Both 'doing X' and refraining from doing X are actions, according to Oppenheim. The inaction by the committee is therefore mirrored by the definition as well as its power to block desegregation.

The definition also mirrors the power of the federal court ruling by Judge Garritty in 1974. Judge Garritty's (P) ruling in favor of implementing the state desegregation plan (action Y) caused the school committee (R) to finally begin desegregating the school system. More specifically, the ruling by Garritty coerced rather than influenced the committee to implement desegregation plans. Public statements critical of the decision by committee members persisted, but did not deter Garritty from actually implementing his order to desegregate. Judge Garritty's (P) decision to desegregate (action Y) left the committee (R) little choice but to abandon segregation policies (R's attempt at not doing X) and begin desegregation (X). The powerlessness of the school committee after the Garritty ruling is faithfully reflected by the definition.

The applied Oppenheim definition also correctly states the powerlessness of the state government to implement a desegregation policy in Boston prior to 1974. Use of the Oppenheim definition correctly states that: the state legislature (P) passed the Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 (action Y) but did not cause the school committee (R) to desegregate
the public school system (X). Likewise, the state Board of Education (P) twice withheld state aid to the committee (action Y), but failed to constrain the committee (R) to desegregate (X). The powerlessness of the Supreme Court is also captured by the definition. The statement "the Supreme Court (P) promulgated several pro-desegregation decisions since 1954 (action Y) but did not influence or coerce the School Committee (R) to desegregate the school system (X)" can be derived from the Oppenheim definition.

Another merit of the Oppenheim definition is that it correctly differentiates between which form of power is and is not relevant to the Boston busing issue. The power of the committee was its ability to successfully restrain the implementation of desegregation by the state government and U.S. Supreme Court. The committee neither influenced nor coerced the state or Supreme Court to cease their calls for desegregation. Oppenheim's definition accurately reflects this in the statement: The Boston school committee (P) refused to desegregate the school system (action Y), but did not cause the state government or Supreme Court (R) to abandon its desegregation designs (X). The State Board of Education, for example, drew up four desegregation plans which were successively ignored by the committee. During that period the State Board of Education did not acquiesce to the school committee's anti-desegregation sentiment.

A potential problem with the Oppenheim definition is
that, when applied to the case study, some actions which intuitively are not instances of power may be interpreted as such. For example, the state's withholding of funds from the committee to coerce its compliance with the desegregation mandate is properly understood as an unsuccessful attempt by the state to exercise power. The state's threat to do so, and not the committee's defiance or indifference, is an attempt to exercise power. However, the Oppenheimer definition appears to support the idea that the committee's disregard of the possible state action is also an instance of power.

According to the definition, the committee (P) caused the state (R) to withhold state aid (X) by ignoring (action Y) their threat to do so. Oppenheimer does avoid this problem by (1) distinguishing between power and causation, and (2) limiting actions which are instances of power to influencing or coercive action. Oppenheimer clearly states,

I am defining 'P exercised power over R's doing X' not by P's action Y causes R to do X, but P's influence or coercive action Y causes R to do X.

This clarification by Oppenheim is his basis for drawing a definite distinction between the concepts 'causing' and 'exercising power'. Actions which are not influential or coercive may cause response X or Y but do not properly stand as instances of power. The indifference of the school committee to the state threat to cut off funds did cause the
actual withholding of aid. However, because their action was not influential or coercive, it does not stand as an instance of power. The Oppenheim distinction thus eliminates the problem of his definition applying to actions which are intuitively not instances of power in this case study.

William Connolly suggests a different definition of power. Connolly defines power as meaning

\[ A \text{ exercises power over } B \text{ when he is responsible for some } X \text{ that increases the costs, risks, or difficulties to } B \text{ in promoting } B's \text{ desires.} \]

Advocating that a generally negative moral point of view fashions the concept of power, Connolly argues that a wielder of power is generally blamable for not respecting the right of those over whom power is exercised. To exercise power, according to the Connolly perspective, one need only increase the costs or risks to another doing something. The respondent does not have to be prevented from doing X or be compelled to do something. Applied to the problem of desegregation in Boston, the Connolly definition does not function well.

The definition works best when the school committee stands for A, the power wielder. The following statement results:

The school committee (A) exercised power over the state government (B) because it increased the costs, risks
or difficulties to the state in promoting the Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 and numerous desegregation plans.

No doubt surrounds the point that, until 1974, the school committee increased the difficulties, costs or risks to the state in securing a desegregated Boston school system. However, the Connolly definition does not entirely reflect the full power of the school committee.

The school committee did more than increase the difficulties, costs or risks to the state's desegregation desires. The school committee thoroughly frustrated and prevented the state from realizing its desegregation designs. Although successfully mirroring the intuitive assumption of the school committee's power, the Connolly definition remains deficient in capturing the full scope of the committee's action to be explained as an instance of power.

Likewise, the definition only appears to reflect the assumed power of Judge Garritty after 1974. The applied definition creates the statement

Judge Garritty (A) ruled that the state's desegregation plan be implemented (X) which increased the costs, risks, and difficulties for the school committee (B) to perpetuate a segregated school system.

Again, the Connolly proposal does not capture the full scope of action to be explained as an instance of power that it should. By the admission of school committee members themselves, the decision left no options available for the com-
mittee to persist in its resistance to the desegregation mandate. The decision did not merely increase the difficulties, costs, or risks to the school committee. Judge Garrity effectively eliminated the committee's power on the issue. Desegregation finally began because the committee's power ended.

Another difficulty with the Connolly definition is the result that both the state government and U.S. Supreme Court can be understood as exercising power prior to 1974. This is contrary to the assumed power of the school committee and powerlessness of the state and Court prior to 1974. The definition produces the statements:

The State Board of Education (A) withdrew state aid to the School Committee (X) which increased the costs, risks, and difficulties for the school committee (B) to perpetuate a segregated school system.

and

The U.S. Supreme Court (A) promulgated several anti-desegregation decisions since 1954 (X) which increased the difficulties, risks, and costs to the school committee (B) continuing to resist desegregation.

Both statements are true because the state and Court did increase the costs, risks, and difficulties for the committee. By the Connolly definition, then, all three exercised power over each other prior to 1974. The problem is that only the school committee prevailed with regard to the
issue of desegregation. The intuitive assumption of the committee's power, prior to 1974, and powerlessness of the state and Court means that the Connolly definition is unsuccessful.

Similarly, the intuitively correct assumption that the school committee's power was terminated by Judge Garrity's ruling in 1974 is not supported by the Connolly definition. Long after the order to implement the state's Phase I plan for desegregation,

the Boston school committee members (A) continued to publicly criticize (X) the Judge and the order which increased the costs, risks, and difficulties for Garrity (B) to implement the desegregation plan.

According to the definition, the committee exercised power over Judge Garrity as Judge Garrity exercised power over the committee with respect to the same issue. In conclusion, the distinction between the power wielder and the powerless is a distinction which the Connolly definition is not equipped to make.

The Connolly definition could avoid the problems that surface when applied to the Boston busing issue. The definition could distinguish between the power of the school committee prior to 1974 and the powerlessness of the state government. Connolly's definition could also completely capture the entire scope of action it should to explain the power of the school committee and Judge Garrity. To overcome these difficulties, a different understanding of the
definition might be advanced. Instead of merely increasing the costs, risks, or difficulties for another, to exercise power might mean increasing the costs, risks, or difficulties so that another actually did or did not do something. Connolly, however, specifically rules out this interpretation or suggestion. Connolly states⁴

...(the respondent's) conduct could vary from my expectations, but as long as the element introduced did in fact increase the costs or risks in meeting his interests, wishes or obligations, I would have exercised power over him.

The Connolly definition, therefore, cannot and does not succeed when applied to the case study under consideration in this thesis.

Anthony de Crespigny suggests that intentional action alone should stand as an instance of exercising power. De Crespigny defines power as⁵

the capacity of an actor to affect the actions of others in accordance with his own intention.

The basis of de Crespigny's definition referring only to intentional action is ordinary language. To de Crespigny, the idea of unintentionally exercising power⁶ is confusing because it is unnatural to talk of an exercise of power when effects on conduct are produced which are not in conformity with an actor's intention.

De Crespigny does agree with Partridge⁷, however, that the idea of unintentionally exercising influence is defensible.
Only when the question of exercising power is raised must a reference to intention be made, according to de Crespigny.

Applied to the Boston busing issue, the de Crespigny definition is successful. Both the power and powerlessness of the school committee, state government and U.S. Supreme Court is accurately reflected by the definition. Prior to 1974, the school committee was able to prevent the implementation of the desegregation plans by the state government and the desegregation policy of the U.S. Supreme Court. Clearly, the school committee's action was in accordance with its intention to maintain a segregated, neighborhood school system. The intent of the Supreme Court and state government action to desegregate the schools did not affect the school committee's decision to delay and avoid desegregation.

In 1974, the Garrity ruling to begin desegregation did affect the action of the school committee. Desegregation finally began. The intent of Judge Garrity to fulfill the desegregation mandate of the U.S. Supreme Court signaled an end to the school committee's power with respect to desegregation.

The de Crespigny definition of power appears to encounter a problem in explaining the power of Judge Garrity. After the federal court ruling, the school committee, by the members' own testimony, had no choice but to begin desegregation. De Crespigny maintains that

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when one actor exercises power in relation to another, the behavior of the latter is voluntary--"voluntary" in the sense that, in principle, it is subject to choice. According to this criterion, Judge Garritty did not exercise power over the School Committee because the committee's action was not voluntary. Such a finding would mean the definition did not successfully reflect the intuitively correct assumption of Judge Garritty's power in 1974. This difficulty is overcome, however, because in principle, the committee did actually have a choice of ignoring the court and facing imprisonment.

Having applied three definitions of power to the issue of busing to achieve desegregation in Boston, I will examine the question: Should only intentional action and intended effects be considered as instances of exercising power? Examining the success and failure of the definitions, I will determine what attention, if any, they pay to intention. More importantly, I will try to determine whether a definition's success or failure results from including only intentional action and effects or not. Answers to these questions will, hopefully, be a starting point for fashioning yet another viewpoint about political power.
In this chapter of the thesis, the focus of attention will turn directly to the question of intention in definition of political power. The role which intention plays, if any, in the success or failure of the definitions applied to the Boston busing issue will be scrutinized. Whether or not a failure to pay attention to intended action and effects commits a definition to counter-intuitive interpretation shall also be examined. Such counter-intuitive interpretation would offer support to the idea of limiting political power to intentional acts because, as Champlin points out, 1

A definition of power, however coherent and faithful to the terms it uses, is only the beginning; in order to prove its usefulness, it must aid political analysis.

Pursuant to this effort, an understanding of intention shall first be suggested.

Intentional action is behavior which an agent self-consciously performs in pursuit of some interest, usually formed as a result of some deliberation. 2 In contrast, unintentional action is behavior whose effects or possible effects an agent is unaware of, or did not self-consciously plan; which may or may not be in the agent's interests; and
which is usually done without deliberation.\textsuperscript{3} Intended effects are consequences of an action which an agent self-consciously hopes will occur and tries to bring about because they are consistent with his or her interests. Unintended effects are consequences of an action which an agent does not expect will happen but do, or which an agent knows will happen but does not intend.\textsuperscript{4}

According to the findings of Chapter II of this thesis, Felix Oppenheim's definition of power enjoyed the most success when applied to the Boston busing issue. The power of the school committee was mirrored by the definition, as was its eventual powerlessness in 1974. The power of Judge Garritty, and the powerlessness of the Supreme Court and state government were also reflected by the definition. Oppenheim specifically rejects the idea of limiting his definition of power to intentional action. According to Oppenheim, several examples of unintended action that should be comprehended as instances of power would not be if the definition of power applied only to intentional activity. This position is defended by Oppenheim despite his own view concerning a paradigmatic case of exercising power. As Oppenheim points out,\textsuperscript{5}

\ldots The paradigmatic case of exercising power, especially in the political sphere, is: R wants to do X, this is contrary to some purpose of P; P therefore wants R not to do X; P therefore deliberately performs some action Y which influences of coerces R not to do X.
What I shall argue is that the Oppenheim definition implicitly does and must limit itself to intentional activity, despite Oppenheim's insistence to the contrary.

As was noted earlier, the Oppenheim definition encountered the potential problem of equating "power" with social causation. In this case study, action which is not understood as an instance of power might be construed as such by the Oppenheim definition. The example I employed was the school committee's refusal to begin desegregation after the State Board of Education threatened withdrawal of state aid to the city school system. According to the Oppenheim definition, the action of the school committee might be construed as an instance of power because it did cause the state to carry through with its threat. The school committee's (P) refusal to begin desegregation (X) caused the state (R) to choose to withdraw state aid (Y). The Oppenheim remedy to this potential problem is also the basis of my argument that unintentional action should be excluded from his definition.

To avoid equating all causal relationships with his definition of power, Oppenheim distinguishes between any action X or Y and influence or coercive action X or Y. Even though some action X or Y might and does cause another action, according to Oppenheim, only the influence or coercive action may properly stand as an instance of power. This distinction between causing and exercising power rescues his definition from equating any and all causal relationships as
instances of power being exercised. Because of this distinction, the school committee's refusal to begin desegregation cannot, by Oppenheim's definition, be correctly understood as an instance of power with respect to the withholding of funds by the state. The school committee's refusal, although causing the state to carry through with its threat, was not a coercive or influential action. This application of the Oppenheim position to the Boston busing issue is quite similar to the example Oppenheim uses to illustrate the distinction between causing and power.

In the example advanced by Oppenheim, two persons want to enter a post office. One person (R) sees the other (P) try to open the door but finds it locked. Seeing that P cannot enter the post office, R walks on by the post office. Oppenheim correctly states that P caused R to bypass the post office and that

\[ \text{since P's action involved no communication, P exercised no influence over R, and as there was no coercion, P exercised no power either.} \]

What do the two examples reveal about the basis of making the distinction between causing and exercising power? If a reference to intention is not the basis of distinction, then the continued inclusion of unintended acts in the definition entangles the Oppenheim definition with the very problem the distinction is designed to avoid. Continued inclusion of unintended action would mean that P, who unin-
tentionally caused R to bypass the post office, and the school committee, which unintentionally caused the state to withhold funds, can both be understood as exercising power. Without reference to intention alone, the Oppenheim distinction between causing and exercising power cannot be drawn. If the distinction cannot be drawn, then the Oppenheim definition of power becomes equated with social causation.

The single path open for Oppenheim to make the distinction without reference to intention is the appropriateness of the notions 'unintended influence' and 'unintended coercion'. Only if both notions are defensible, can the distinction between cause and power be drawn without exclusive reference to intention. I do not think these notions can be successfully defended.

In the Oppenheim example of the man bypassing the locked post office door, every ingredient of influence, as defined by Oppenheim, is present except one. The missing criterion is that P's action did not involve a communication. The reason no communication was involved, despite the fact that R "got the message", is that P did not convey a signal to R that the door was locked. P's actions signaled R that the door was locked, but P did not communicate with R because P's actions were not intended as a message to R. Oppenheim concedes that intention is a central part of the concept 'communication' by pointing out...
usually done with some intention (but) the message being communicated may have an effect quite different from that intended by the sender.

Unable to think of an act of communication, in contrast to noise or someone overhearing a conversation, which does not involve intention, I conclude that Oppenheim's definition of influence must refer to only intended action.

If unintended effects of an act of communication are to be understood as instances of exercising power, Oppenheim's definition encounters the same serious problem. Writing about which effects of behavior are appropriately comprehended as exercises of power, D.M. White contends that

...there is no genuine issue about whether some state of mind (or analogue thereto) is required, for if there were, then a distinction between personal power and causation could hardly be sustained.

The distinction could not be sustained because a definition's ability to discriminate between exercising and failing to exercise power would be eliminated if any effect stood as an instance of power.

The response of another must be relevant to the intended message or act and consistent with that intent. If such a requirement is not maintained in a definition of power, then any response, including ignoring, disagreeing, and even no response would stand as an instance of exercising power. Power then does become equated with all causal relationships.
The ability to discern when someone failed to exercise power is lost. This loss is demonstrated by Terrence Ball's criticism of Robert Dahl for suggesting that a teacher exercises power over a student whether or not the student complies with the order to read a book. As Ball claims, 9

To avoid absurdities of this sort, one must refer to (someone's) intention with respect to (another's) behavior.

If absurdities of this kind are not avoided, then the success of the Oppenheim definition, when applied to the Boston busing issue, is compromised. The state, rather than failing to exercise power when it threatened to cut off funds, would be perceived as exercising power with respect to causing the committee to choose to refuse. Contrary to the findings of Chapter I, the state legislature and Supreme Court could also be viewed as exercising power because their actions had the unintended effect of stiffening the school committee's resistance to desegregation.

The inclusion of unintended effects of communication as instances of influence, therefore, also risks equating Oppenheim's definition of power with social causation. If the definition of exercising political power cannot include reference to any and all effects, then it should not include both intended and unintended effects. Failure to pay exclusive attention to intentional acts and effects also seriously undermines the success Oppenheim's definition enjoyed when
applied to the Boston busing issue.

The awkwardness of including unintentional action and effects as instances of coercion, as defined by Oppenheim, is even more apparent. The Garritty ruling is a clear example of coercion as defined by Oppenheim. Judge Garritty ruled in favor of implementing state desegregation plans which caused the school committee's attempt at not desegregating to end, and hence constrained the school committee to desegregate.

The distinction between causing and coercing cannot be established without reference to intention. All actions which obstruct another's attempt at not doing X and constrain another to do X are not instances of coercion.

For the concept of coercion to be applied, rather than the concept 'cause', someone must first be aware that another is not attempting to do X. Having decided that the other's doing X is desirable, someone then deliberately performs some action that both stops another from not doing X, and constrains, not causes, the other to do X. As Terrence Ball claims,¹⁰ (his emphasis)

...there can be no unintentional or unconscious exercise of power, as no one unintentionally exercises his judgement.

The central ingredients of intention, awareness and deliberation, characterize the concept of coercion. How else can the distinction between causing and coercion be designed?
The very idea of someone coercing another to do something contrary to or in the absence of the power-wielder's intent or interest suggests counter-intuitive possibilities. Without reference to intention, the following example can be understood (incorrectly) as an instance of coercion. The school committee coerced the state to withhold the funds because,

the school committee (P) refused to begin desegregation which caused the state's threat to withhold funds (X)* to fail, thus constraining the state to withhold funds.

The intuitively correct understanding is that the school committee caused, not coerced, the state to carry through with its threat. The school committee did not coerce the state to do so because the school committee could not have viewed the actual withholding as desirable. The relationship between intention and coercion is further supported by Oppenheim's use of the term "constraint" instead of cause. Constraining someone to do X, in contrast to causing another to do X, connotes a description of the action as deliberate and consciously performed.

Unintended effects of an act of coercion are clearly possible and frequently encountered. What is not so clear is whether the presence of unintended responses allows the

*The state was only threatening to withhold funds. The state was attempting to coerce the school committee to begin desegregation and continue financial support.
concept of coercion to still apply. The very structure of
the Oppenheim definition of coercion seems to exclude unin-
tended effect as instances of coercion. The definition
refers to someone constraining another to do X, not A, B,...
W or Y and Z. Thus, if someone refuses to do X and chooses
action A or W, the other has failed to exercise coercive
power. This facet of the definition prevents the definition
from becoming equated with social causation. The limitation
builds into the definition a firm groundwork for drawing and
implementing the necessary distinction between causing and
exercising power. The limitation also implies a commitment
to intention.

Judge Garrity's ruling, for example, was an instance
of successful coercion with regard to the school committee
ultimately implementing desegregation plans. The continued
public criticism of the ruling by school committee members;
the limited but violent opposition to the ruling; and the
media's preoccupation with publicizing the violent minority
reaction were all unintended effects of the Garrity deci-
sion. To defend inclusion of unintended effects as instances
of coercion would infer that Judge Garrity coerced the media
to downplay the generally smooth implementation of the dese-
gregation plan; coerced community members to violently pro-
test the Garrity ruling; and coerced school committee mem-
ers to persist in their public criticisms of Judge Garrity
and desegregation. That such statements overtax the concept
of coercion reveals the fundamental relationship between coercion and intention.

In conclusion, Oppenheim has drawn a distinction between causing and exercising power. It is a distinction which must be drawn in order to prevent his definition of political power from becoming equated with social causation. The distinction cannot be made without reference to intention. As Champlin reasons, (my emphasis)\textsuperscript{11} When we say 'A has power over B', we mean not simply that B can be caused to do something by A, but more importantly that A is in a position to get what he wants, to satisfy his purposes or desires: if this is not so, we find it strange to discuss the situation in terms of power at all.

William Connolly's definition of power encountered serious difficulties when applied to the Boston busing issue. The definition could neither distinguish between the powerful and powerless, nor entirely explain why an action did represent an instance of power. Connolly is a theorist who advocates the necessity for definitions of political concepts remaining closely associated with ordinary discourse. The failure of the definition in this case study raises the possibility that Connolly's definition of political power is founded upon a misperception of ordinary language.

In a value-laden ordinary discourse, a moral point of view bears a constitutive relationship with a concept, according to Connolly. A concept has the criteria it does because of the moral point of view. As Connolly maintains,\textsuperscript{12}
The distinctions among such notions as persuasion, coercion, manipulation and conditioning are built around, and reflect shared moral considerations. Without the moral point of view embodied in each, there would be little reason to distinguish among them.

To fashion a definition without regard to or in contradiction of the moral point of view generally associated with a concept is to transform the concept. To transform the concept is to alter the action which the concept informs, and the investigator must explain. Why then has the Connolly definition failed when applied to the Boston busing issue?

The definition's failure can be explained by Connolly's view that an agent need only raise the costs, risks and difficulties to exercise power over another. An amendment is necessary to enable the Connolly definition to distinguish between the power wielder and powerless, and to entirely describe an action which is intuitively viewed as an instance of power. That amendment would alter the definition and more precisely mirror ordinary discourse. That amendment would read:

Someone (A) exercises power over another if he or she is responsible for some action which raises the costs, risks, or difficulties to another (B) doing X, so that B does not do X.

As amended, the definition could avoid the problems encountered when applied to the Boston busing issue and function successfully.
Rather than understanding the state and Supreme Court as exercising power over the school committee prior to 1974, the amended definition would correctly mirror the former's powerlessness. The following accurate statements could then be derived from the amended definition:

The Supreme Court (A) ruled favorably on desegregation questions, but did not raise the costs, risks, or difficulties for the school committee's (B) segregation policy (X) so that the school committee abandoned those segregation policies.

and,

The state government (A) passed the Racial Imbalance Act of 1965 and withdrew state aid from the school committee, but did not raise the costs, risks, or difficulties for the school committee's (B) segregation policy (X) so that the school committee abandoned those segregation policies.

The amended Connolly definition could also entirely capture an action which did stand as an instance of power. The full extent of the school committee's resistance to desegregation prior to 1974 is revealed by the proposed amendment. This is an advantage over the original Connolly definition because the school committee thoroughly frustrated or restrained efforts to initiate desegregation plans. Thoroughly frustrating state attempts to implement desegregation plans is more than raising the costs, risks, and difficulties for the state to do so. The following statement accurately and fully reflects the full scope of the school
committee and its power:

The school committee (A) delayed, procrastinated, and evaded the state (B) demands to begin desegregation (X) which raised the costs, risks, and difficulties for the state (B) to implement desegregation plans, so that the state (B) did not implement their desegregation plans (X).

The amended Connolly definition more aptly reflects the view of political power drawn from ordinary discourse. An examination of ordinary discourse would suggest that the idea of someone failing to exercise political power is clearly possible and widely employed. Applied to the Boston busing issue, the original Connolly definition could not mirror this idea. By the original definition, failing to exercise power meant that someone failed to raise the costs, risks, or difficulties to another's doing or not doing something. The common understanding is that someone fails to exercise power if that someone does not or cannot, but has tried to compel another to do or not do something. This prevalent view is captured by the amended definition, but is related to the original Connolly proposal. The relationship is that failing to compel another to do or not to do something generally implies that the costs, risks, or difficulties have not been raised enough by the frustrated power wielder.

Connolly's interpretation of the ordinary discourse implications regarding unintended actions is also contest-
Connolly includes unintended action as instances of exercising political power because persons are generally held responsible for unintended actions. It is empirically accurate that people are blamed or praised for actions which they did not intend. The comprehension of unintended actions as instances of political power, however, is not so clear.

The Connolly reasoning blurs and ignores a relevant distinction inherent within ordinary discourse. That generally shared distinction is that persons are held less responsible for unintended actions than for intentional acts. For example, persons convicted of manslaughter usually receive less punishment than convicted murderers. The lesser punishment can be explained by an absence of intention. The criteria of the crime 'manslaughter' also involve an absence of intention. This differing degree of responsibility for unintended acts is the basis for usually excluding unintended acts from the idea of political power. To intentionally raise the costs, risks, or difficulties for someone doing or not doing something so that the other does or does not do something, entails a greater blame or praise than unintentionally doing so. Only the former example is appropriately understood as an instance of exercising political power. In the words of Terrence Ball (his emphasis), "The idea of exercising power has the element of intention built into it."¹³

Connolly's inclusion of unintended effects as instances
of exercising power also represents a departure from ordinary discourse. Unlike Oppenheim, Connolly restricts the application of the concept 'power' to only those effects which were known, or which someone could reasonably have been expected to know about. Connolly does correctly reason that someone may exercise power in such a situation that, "...A intends to help C, and in the process knowingly takes action that harms B severely...We would conclude that A had exercised power over B..."\textsuperscript{14} This distinction between intended and known consequences is a valid one. The distinction is, however, an irrelevant one with regard to establishing a foundation for the inclusion of unintended effects as instances of exercising power. The legal concept of transferred intent reveals that known consequences are generally treated as if they were intended.

According to the legal concept of transferred intent,\textsuperscript{15} if someone performs an action which results in consequences which the agent knows would happen, or could have reasonably been expected to know would occur, then such consequences are treated as if they were intended. A person is held responsible for known consequences of an action in the same manner as if they were intended. D.M. White echoes this general understanding when he writes about an office holder who habitually makes decisions with effects he can reasonably be expected to know about. As D.M. White contends,\textsuperscript{16} ...

...(the officeholder) must realize
that any habitual decision he makes will have effects. If he does not take the slight trouble of finding out what these effects are, the matter should be treated as if he did have a favorable attitude towards them.

In our society, the legal concept of transferred intent accurately reflects generally shared understandings. Its ability to do so lies in the empirically verifiable fact that laws in our society are fashioned by elected representatives who are held periodically accountable to the people they represent. The legal concept of transferred intent, as an indicator of shared views which shape and govern the formulation and use of concepts like political power, reveals that the distance between knowing and intending is not sufficient to warrant the inclusion of unintended effects as instances of power.

Complementing the claim by Ball that intention is built into exercising power is my argument that intention is clearly built into the concept 'political'. Connolly's own understanding of what is political explicitly refers to concepts which are identifiable with the idea of intention. Connolly repeatedly employs the concepts 'decision' and 'choice'. Examples of political action which Connolly suggests are,

(my emphasis)\(^1\)

\[\ldots\text{actions that involve a decision or choice among viable options... considerations or motives participants make in selecting one available option over others...extent}\]
to which decision outcome affects the interests, wishes, values...

According to the Connolly perspective, a political action is the outcome of a person's choice or decision, not the result of an irrational moment or impersonal factor or social structure. Robert Dahl's criteria of what is political express agreement with Connolly. Dahl maintains that,¹⁸

> Political action, like other human actions, consists in making decisions—in somehow choosing among alternatives and then trying to make one's choice effective.

The relationship between the criteria of intention discussed earlier and the criteria of political cannot be denied. This relationship is further support for referring exclusively to intentional action in formulating a definition of political power.

In conclusion, the Connolly definition does not pay enough attention to ordinary discourse. Recognizing a necessity to mirror the implications of ordinary discourse in a definition of political power, Connolly overlooks several significant features of ordinary discourse. Only an amended form of the Connolly definition is able to support a discrimination between exercising and failing to exercise political power. Altering the definition to more accurately reflect generally shared views which fashion the concept of power is needed to permit the Connolly definition to reflect this common understanding. The Connolly definition similarly
ignores the pervasive distinction between responsibility for unintended and intended action. The lesser responsibility for unintended acts explains why the concept of political power generally applies to intentional acts alone. After all, the question is how to define political power.

De Crespigny's definition of power obviously pays attention to intention. This definition of power faces none of the problems encountered by the Oppenheim or Connolly definitions. Specifically limiting the definition of power to intended acts effectively eliminates the possibility that the definition will be equated with any causal relationship. Any action \( (X) \) causing response \( (Y) \) can not be properly understood as an instance of power by the de Crespigny proposal unless the action and effects are intended.

The de Crespigny understanding of political power distinguishes between exercising power and failing to exercise power. Unlike the Connolly definition, applying the de Crespigny definition to the Boston busing issue reflects the powerlessness of the state government and Supreme Court prior to 1974. Prior to 1974, the intent of the state government and U.S. Supreme Court to desegregate public schools did not affect the actions of the school committee. Because the school committee maintained, even increased the segregation in the school system in spite of the state and Supreme Court intention to the contrary, the state and Supreme Court failed to exercise power over the school committee.
The single difficulty with the de Crespigny definition is the requirement that the respondent's action must be voluntary, in principle, for the concept 'power' to be appropriate. According to de Crespigny, all human action is voluntary. If one human exercises power over another, then the action of the latter must be voluntary. The de Crespigny requirement is contrary to the general understanding of exercising power as revealed by such philosophically diverse theorists as Oppenheim and Connolly.

According to Oppenheim, 19

By restraining R from doing X, P not only exercises power in that respect, but also makes R unfree to do X.

Connolly concurs with Oppenheim and fashions his understanding of power from the person over whom power is exercised. Connolly maintains 20

For those tacitly or explicitly committed to the principle that persons are worthy of respect, the distance between persuasion and manipulation is a moral distance; it reflects the judgement that there is a moral presumption against the latter that does not obtain for the former.

This problem with the de Crespigny definition is troublesome. The de Crespigny requirement means that the action must be voluntary in principle. As illustrated earlier, Judge Garrity did exercise power over the school committee according to the de Crespigny definition. The school committee's compliance with the ruling was voluntary, in principle,
because the committee members could have chosen to defy the order.

Thus de Crespigny's position raises interesting questions as to when an action is and is not voluntary. The school committee did not freely comply. If truly free, the committee would have continued its segregationist ways. This difficulty with the de Crespigny definition, however, does not disturb its success in the case study. The school committee could have, in principle, defied the order because that option was not eliminated by the order. The federal court order raised the costs of defiance enough so that the committee members complied.

The significant problem with the de Crespigny definition is a difficulty shared by the Connolly and Oppenheim definitions as well. That problem is a failure to define political power specifically. All three theorists disregard the implications that a criteria of the concept 'politics' could have on a definition of power. Only Connolly has developed an explicit understanding of what is political. This Connolly understanding does not, as I have argued, find expression in his definition of political power, as I argue it should. Ignoring what is political and the effects the concept 'political' entail for a definition of political power involves - that concept with relationships not usually understood as political.

It is odd to think of someone who intentionally signals
another that the post office door is locked as exercising political power over that person if he bypasses the post office. It is just as awkward to think that children, who raise the costs and difficulties to their parents' effort to have them do well in school have exercised political power over them. Has a person who asks another to answer the telephone, thereby affecting that person's actions in accordance with his intentions, exercised political power over that person who answers the telephone? I think not.

These examples support the claim that more is needed than just limiting the concept 'political power' to intentional action, as the Connolly and Dahl criteria have done. A more basic problem is, as Terrence Ball contends, comprehending "...power over as paradigmatic of all intelligible talk about political power". The solution is what Partridge would term a "field" or "zone of acceptance", not for the notion of power, but for the concept 'political', i.e., a clear understanding of under what circumstances the concept 'political power' is appropriate.

The issue of busing to achieve desegregation in Boston is a helpful pathfinder through this difficulty. This case study did not encounter the problem of whether or not the relationships under scrutiny were properly discerned as political. The reason this was not a question is the the relationships in the case study were unquestionably political. Elected government officials at different levels of govern-
ment confronted each other over a question of desegregation. The judicial branch of federal government promulgated pro-
desegregation rulings which formed a backdrop for the con-
frontation in Boston. A federal court judge eventually
resolved the confrontation between state and local officials.
The issue itself seemed political because it affected a
large segment of the community which was comprised of dif-
ferent groups who held opposing views on the question.

This character of the Boston busing issue, the parti-
cipants, and its effects reinforce Sheldon Wolin's under-
standing of political. Arguing that politics is synonymous
with the public, common, or general, Wolin reasons that

...political authority is distin-
guished from other forms of auth-
ority in that it speaks in the
name of a society...concerned
with those general interests
shared by all members of the com-
munity.

Having presented a "field" for the concept 'political',
I would amend the successful de Crespigny definition by
specifically incorporating the concept 'political' into the
definition of power. Therefore, the de Crespigny definition
would be amended to read,

...the capacity of an actor to
affect the actions of others in
accordance with his own inten-
tions, and with regard to a poli-
tical issue.

At the very least, this thesis has added yet another
"contestant" in the ongoing debate over defining the concept
'political power'. Avoiding the difficulties encountered by the other definitions examined in this study and remaining close, if not identical to, everyday language, this definition of political power acknowledges an admonishment offered by Champlin. As Champlin observes,^{24}

While ordinary discourse about power flows smoothly, scientific studies of power grounded on explications appear full of limitations, ambiguities and inconsistencies.
CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES


2. 1975 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: Desegregation of Boston Public Schools, p. XIX.


5. McKay, p. 52.


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid.

11. Ozmon, p. 11.

12. McKay, p. 64.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.

16. Ozmon, p. 11.


18. Ibid.


20. Ozmon, p. 22.

21. 1975 Commission on Civil Rights, p. XV.

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22. Ozmon, p. 23.


24. 1976 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: Desegregation of the Nation's Public Schools, p. 16.


27. 1975 Commission on Civil Rights, p. XV.


29. Lupo, p. 149.


31. 1976 Commission on Civil Rights, p. 16-17.

32. Lupo, p. 149.


34. Lupo, p. 154.


36. Lupo, p. 156.


38. 1976 Commission on Civil Rights, p. 22.


41. Lupo, p. 179.

42. McKay, p. 60.
CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES


2. Oppenheim, p. 598.


4. Connolly, p. 100.


6. de Crespigny, p. 42.


8. de Crespigny, p. 40.
CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES


3. Aune, p. 200. According to Aune, an intention may not be carried out effectively or efficiently and therefore may sometimes entail unplanned, even unwanted effects or contrary to the intended ones.

4. Connolly, p. 105-106. Here, Connolly speaks of A intending to help C, but "in the process knowingly takes action that harms B severely". Connolly maintains that A exercises power over B, even though A did not intend to do so.

5. Oppenheim, p. 598.


"In the unintended viction (or bad aim) situation--where A aims at B but misses, hitting C--it is the view of the criminal law that A is just as guilty as if his aim had been accurate."

20. Connolly, p. 94.
24. Champlin, p. 3.
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