NEGOTIATION AND PEACEMAKING IN CONFLICT NARRATIVES: THE INFLUENCE OF NARRATIVE REMINDERS OF PEACE PROCESSES ON ATTITUDES TOWARD PROTRACTED CONFLICTS VIA ZERO-SUM BELIEFS

Quinnehtukqut McLamore
University of Massachusetts Amherst

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A Dissertation Presented

by

QUINNEHTUKQUT MCLAMORE

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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NEGOTIATION AND PEACEMAKING IN CONFLICT NARRATIVES: THE
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QUINNEHTUKQUT MCLAMORE

Approved as to style and content by:

_________________________________
Bernhard Leidner, Chair

_________________________________
Linda Tropp, Member

_________________________________
Allecia Reid, Member

_________________________________
Tara Mandalaywala, Member

_________________________________
Jamie Rowen, Member

_________________________________
Farshid Hajir, Acting Department Chair
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences
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They know what they did.
ABSTRACT

NEGOTIATION AND PEACEMAKING IN CONFLICT NARRATIVES: THE INFLUENCE OF NARRATIVE REMINDERS OF PEACE PROCESSES ON ATTITUDES TOWARD PROTRACTED CONFLICTS VIA ZERO-SUM BELIEFS

SEPTEMBER 2022

QUINNEHTUKQUT JAMES MCLAMORE, B.A., BARD COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Bernhard Leidner

“Hegemonic” conflict narratives help reinforce intergroup conflict through focus on ingroup victimhood, denying outgroup narratives, and advancing beliefs that the conflict is “zero-sum” in nature. Many researchers have used narrative-based interventions to shift exclusive focus on ingroup victimhood and denial of outgroup narratives, but relatively little attention has been paid to the role of zero-sum beliefs. Here, I argue that narrative primes recalling past peace processes can potentially be used to shift zero-sum beliefs, thereby shifting conflict-relevant outcome variables indirectly. In two survey studies of American participants (Studies 1 & 2), I found evidence that participants who read about the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea compared to a control article or a baseline condition demonstrated reduced zero-sum beliefs, and that this reduction indirectly increased conflict-attenuating attitudes while decreasing conflict-promoting attitudes. In Studies 3 and 4, I examined whether how past reminders of peace processes are framed affects zero-sum beliefs in a context where denying peace processes had ever occurred was impossible (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) using representative samples of
Jewish Israelis. Taken together, these studies suggested that a positive (or at least non-negative) framing of past peace processes could reduce zero-sum beliefs among Jewish Israelis, leading indirectly to conflict-attenuating responses to downstream variables. As a whole, these four studies suggest that zero-sum beliefs are malleable in response to narratives, and that this malleability can have positive (or negative) implications for conflict resolution depending on how the narrative reminder is framed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Scholars of protracted intergroup conflicts (e.g., the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the Turkish-Kurdish conflict) have long argued that these conflicts are sustained by complex social and psychological factors as well as their material stakes (see Bar-Tal, 2007; Kelman, 2007; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Paez & Liu, 2011; Vallacher et al., 2012; Oren et al., 2015; Klar and Baram, 2016). Within this complex sociopsychological infrastructure, what the group as a whole collectively remembers (or does not remember) about the conflict—and how those memories are structured into conflict narratives—have been identified as particularly important (Bar-Tal, 2007; Bilali & Ross, 2012; Hammack & Pilecki, 2012; Ben Hagai et al., 2013; Bekerman & Zembylas, 2011). The types of conflict narratives that typically become most widely accepted within societies involved in protracted conflicts tend to promote further conflict through (a) bias in favor of one’s group and (b) characterizing the conflict as a zero-sum gain in which mutually beneficial agreements are impossible (Bar-Tal, 2007; Ben Hagai et al., 2013; Maoz & McCauley, 2005, 2009; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007; Kelman, 2007).

Alternative narratives often exist within groups that are party to protracted conflicts which do not do these things (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012; Klar & Baram, 2016; Oren et al., 2015), and interventions promoting these narratives have shown some degree of promise at reducing conflict-supporting attitudes (e.g., Ron & Maoz, 2013; Shnabel et al., 2013; Adelman et al., 2016; Garagozov & Gadirova, 2019; McLamore et al., 2019; Uluğ et al., 2020; Assouline & Trager, 2021). Such interventions generally focus on
victimhood and culpability for violence and suffering within the conflict, and function by attempting to shift participants away from mutually contradictory narratives that are dominant within their societies (Ron & Maoz, 2013; Noor et al., 2012; Shnabel et al., 2013; Adelman et al., 2016; McLamore et al., 2019; Noor et al., 2017; Vollhardt, 2009, 2015; Shnabel et al., 2018, for a review, see Vollhardt et al., 2021).

However, there are key limitations to these suffering-based approaches. First, conflict-supporting narratives are often explicitly promoted within conflict societies through state pressure, mass media coverage (particularly news media) and educational systems (Bar-Tal et al., 2010; Adwan et al., 2016; Kelman, 2007; Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008; Sharvit & Bar-Tal, 2007; Hoxha & Hanitzsch, 2017), creating a direct practical obstacle for the broad adoption of narrative-based interventions. Second, even were this obstacle not present, there is evidence that some people (particularly high-glorifying or hawkish people) actively resist such counter-narratives (Nasie et al., 2014; Klar & Baram, 2016). Third, while promoting “inclusive victimhood” by acknowledging suffering and victimhood on both sides may lead members of the more powerful party in a conflict to oppose conflict escalation and support conflict resolution to a degree under certain circumstances (e.g., Adelman et al., 2016; McLamore et al., 2019; Shnabel et al., 2013; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2015), such strategies can be harmful for members of the less advantaged party in a conflict by engendering complacency if misapplied (Cohrs et al., 2015; Dixon et al., 2012; Saguy et al., 2009; for a review, see Vollhardt et al., 2021).

While these limitations of suffering-based narrative interventions are neither universal nor insurmountable, an additional problem that has yet to be resolved is that the entire literature surrounding them has only focused on one component of conflict
narratives—the component which biases collective memory in favor of the ingroup and hinders reconciliation through competitive victimhood. I argue that these narrative interventions, while compelling, are incomplete because they neglect the components of conflict narratives that frame bilateral, mutually beneficial peace processes as impossible because they frame the conflict itself as zero-sum. While some research has examined the role of zero-sum beliefs as an obstacle to peace-making (Bar-Tal, 2007; Ben Hagai, et al., 2013; Ben Hagai et al., 2018; Maoz & McCauley, 2005, 2009; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007), relatively little research has examined whether the way in which people collectively remember the details of peace processes that have occurred in the past (e.g., the Good Friday Agreement, the Oslo Accords, the innumerable individual agreements and steps in most “post-conflict” societies; see Brewer & Hayes, 2011) affects present-day attitudes and intentions.

Much in the same way that research on conflict narratives has examined how memories of past violence and victimhood affect future attitudes toward violence and victimhood, the research I have conducted here examines how memories of past peace processes affect contemporary and future-facing attitudes toward conflict and hypothetical future steps in peace processes. Specifically, I examine how reminders of past peace processes affect the degree to which people believe that conflicts are zero-sum in nature as traditional conflict narratives typically hold them to be (Bar-Tal, 2007; Kelman, 2007; Ben Hagai et al., 2013). In two studies of American participants (Studies 1 and 2), I take advantage of the relative ignorance among Americans of the specific details of the conflict between the U.S. and North Korea in order to investigate whether narratives that include details of a past peace process (vs. narratives that do not and a
baseline condition) can reduce zero-sum beliefs, thereby transmitting indirect effects on attitudes toward current and future relations with North Korea. In two studies of Jewish Israeli participants (Studies 3 and 4), I shifted to a context (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) in which denial of past peace processes was impossible, but framings of that past process diverged between those that held it as inherently impossible and those that did not, in order to test whether mere exposure to reminders of peace processes are effective, or whether framing matters.

The Influence of Historical “Conflict” Narratives and Zero-sum Beliefs

Ultimately, “conflict narratives” are a specific subcategory of “historical narratives” (Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Oren et al., 2015), which are coherent, narrative organizations of commonly held, accessible memories that people within a group generally remember even if they did not experience them personally (see Hammack & Pilecki, 2012; McLean & Syed, 2015). Historical narratives are thought to originate from such collective memories of highly salient, group-relevant past events (Kansteiner, 2002; Hirst & Phelps, 2016; Paez & Liu, 2011) so as to contextualize present and future events in continuity with those memories (Paez & Liu, 2011, Bilali & Ross, 2012). Conflict narratives in particular also are rooted in social representations of both the ingroup (“us”) and the opponent group (“them”), as conflict narratives by necessity represent the groups embroiled within the conflict in particular ways (Bar-Tal, 2007; Liu & Hilton, 2005; for a review, see Staerklé, 2009). Because conflict narratives ultimately emerge from collective memory and social representations, they represent the “shared” history of a group, and consequently, how group members relate to that history shapes, and is shaped by, their identification with their group (Paez & Liu, 2011; Oren et
In other words, for members of groups in conflict, conflict narratives provide both context and content for what their identity as group members entails (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012; Bilali & Ross, 2012; Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Oren et al., 2015; Klar & Baram, 2016; McLamore et al., 2019).

Some (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2007; Klar & Baram, 2016; Oren et al., 2015) that the importance of conflict narratives for group identity is part of why the conflict narratives that are most commonly accepted are narratives that are both morally simplistic and biased in favor of the ingroup. This bias usually takes the form of emphasizing (exclusive) ingroup victimhood at the hands of the adversarial group, downplaying or outright denying ingroup-perpetrated violence, and dehumanizing members of the opposing group (Bar-Tal, 2007; Ben Hagai et al., 2013; Bar-Tal et al., 2014). Such narratives typically represent obstacles for peacemaking because they not only demonize the adversarial group and lionize “retaliatory” violence against them, but are mutually contradictory with the adversarial group’s narrative, meaning that the conflict parties cannot agree upon historical facts (Bar-Tal, 2007; Hammack, 2009; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Oren et al., 2015; Ben Hagai et al., 2013).

Bar-Tal (2007; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008; Sharvit & Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Tal et al., 2014) argues that because protracted conflicts are typically directed by those in authority, conflict-supporting conflict narratives are typically reinforced and reproduced within society by state-run agencies, particularly the mass media and education systems (Adwan, Bar-Tal, & Wexler, 2016). Whether or not this is strictly accurate, others have found that news media in particular within conflict societies typically reproduces existing narratives (Hoxha & Hanitzsch, 2017), and Klar and Baram
(2016) demonstrated that Jewish Israelis display a motivation to believe and adhere to conflict-supporting narratives that they learned within their culture (which they call motivation to achieve “Firmly Entrenched Narrative Closure,” or “FENCE” motivation). As such, these conflict-supporting narratives are sometimes called “hegemonic” (Oren et al., 2015; Klar & Baram, 2016).

Competitive victimhood (Noor et al., 2012) and exclusive victimhood consciousness (Vollhardt, 2015; Vollhardt et al., 2021) appear to be key mechanisms through which these narratives exert their effects upon present and future attitudes towards conflict and the adversarial group. Ron and Maoz (2013) found that through repeated exposure to Palestinian narratives, Jewish Israeli participants internalized memories and ideas that challenged hegemonic narratives (see also Bekerman & Zembylas, 2011). These findings extended those of prior workshop intervention studies (see Bar-On & Kassem, 2004; Kupermintz & Salomon, 2005). In survey research, Adelman and colleagues (2016) found that so long as Jewish Israelis, Americans, and Turkish Kurds were concerned about loss of third-party support, narratives that did not promote competitive victimhood, but fostered inclusive victimhood consciousness instead, could reduce support for militaristic policies toward the adversarial group. McLamore and colleagues (2019) found that across samples of Americans and samples of Jewish Israelis, narratives that promoted inclusive victimhood (rather than competitive victimhood) elicited changes in how participants identified with their group altogether.

Specifically, participants who read inclusive victimhood narratives rather than conflict-promoting “hegemonic” narratives showed reduced ingroup glorification (McLamore et al., 2019). Ingroup glorification (i.e., belief in the group’s superiority to
other groups and deference toward ingroup cultural symbols and authorities) is distinct as a mode of group identification from ingroup attachment (i.e., commitment to the group and importance placed upon group identity; see Roccas et al., 2006; Roccas et al., 2008; see other multidimensional conceptions of group identity: Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Leach et al., 2008; Staub, 1997). Glorification is particularly important within the study of conflict because it is associated with greater militarism, dehumanization of outgroups, rejection of responsibility for ingroup-perpetrated violence, as well as lesser support for diplomacy and reconciliation (see Leidner et al., 2010; Leidner et al., 2015). Glorification is also associated with motivation to defend established ingroup narratives (Klar & Baram, 2016). By reducing glorification, narratives that foster inclusive victimhood can reduce these variables indirectly (McLamore et al., 2019).

These results, taken together, suggest that exposure to narratives that do not engage in a core component of hegemonic narratives (i.e., competitive/exclusive victimhood)—through mediums as intense as intervention workshops (e.g., Ron & Maoz, 2013) or as brief as short fictitious news media op-eds in online surveys (e.g., Adelman et al., 2017; McLamore et al., 2019)—can shift something as fundamental as group identification, thereby having downstream effects upon conflict-relevant outcome variables. I therefore argue that it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that narrative-based interventions targeting another core component of hegemonic narratives—specifically, the theme that conflicts are zero-sum in nature and that therefore all peace processes are due to failure (Bar-Tal, 2007; Maoz & McCauley, 2005; 2009; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007)—can have similar downstream effects.
Narrative-based interventions on competitive victimhood “work” in part because competitive victimhood has deleterious associations with such downstream variables (Noor et al., 2012; McLamore et al., 2019). That hegemonic conflict narratives also foster zero-sum beliefs about the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007) may thus prove a fruitful target for intervention because zero-sum beliefs themselves are associated with greater opposition to peace-making processes (Bar-Tal, 2007; Maoz & McCauley, 2005; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007; Ben Hagai et al., 2013) and with greater dehumanization of members of the opposing group (Ben Hagai et al., 2013; Louis, Esses, & Lalonde, 2013). These relationships are found both in situations of open, violent conflict such as protracted conflicts (e.g., the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; Bar-Tal et al., 2014; Ben Hagai et al., 2013) and within intergroup tensions (i.e., opposition to immigration by White Canadians and Australians; Louis et al., 2013; White American’s opposition to affirmative action; Wellman et al., 2016; men’s attitudes toward gender equality in the workplace; Kuchynka et al., 2018). More broadly, individual-level and group-level belief that the world operates as a zero-sum game (i.e., gain for one party is inherently loss for another party) is a common axiomatic worldview cross-culturally and is associated with inter-individual and intergroup competition (Różycka-Tran et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2019).

Thus, much like competitive victimhood and exclusive victimhood consciousness (Noor et al., 2012; Vollhardt, 2015), the promotion of zero-sum beliefs by hegemonic conflict narratives can function so as to promote conflict. Among Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, adherence to traditional conflict narratives predicted opposition to a two-state solution among both groups, yet endorsement of the opposing side’s narrative predicted support for a two-state solution (Ben Hagai &
Zurbriggen, 2019). Further, even within post-conflict societies (e.g., Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia) persistent adherence to conflict-supporting narratives presents a key obstacle to overcome in ongoing peace processes (Mac Ginty, Muldoon, & Ferguson, 2007; BarTal, 2007; Psaltis, Franc, Smeekes et al., 2017). If this is the case, and part of the effect of hegemonic conflict narratives is owed to fostering zero-sum beliefs, then reminders of prior peace processes—particularly those that are framed in an alternative narrative as mutually beneficial—could help reduce negative attitudes toward the outgroup and increase support for future peace processes. As similar narrative-based interventions focusing on episodes of violence have been effective (Adelman et al., 2016; Maoz & McCauley, 2005; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007; McLamore, Adelman, & Leidner, 2019), small, narrative-based approaches based on reminders of negotiation may be similarly efficacious. Because zero-sum beliefs in particular are associated with dehumanization of outgroup members, militarism, and opposition to peace processes (Bar-Tal, 2007; Ben Hagai et al., 2013; Klar & Baram, 2016; Psaltis et al., 2017), reducing zero-sum beliefs via narrative exposure could result in conflict-attenuating downstream effects on these variables.

**Detailed Research Overview**

The current research had two closely interrelated goals across its four studies. First, I aimed to investigate whether exposing participants to conflict narratives that specifically mention past peace processes results in lowered zero-sum beliefs compared to baseline, or to a conflict narrative that explicitly denies past peace processes have occurred. Because zero-sum beliefs are associated with opposition to current and future peace processes, dehumanization of outgroup members, and support for militaristic action
against outgroups (Ben Hagai et al., 2013; Ben Hagai et al., 2019), this goal extended to investigating whether any such reductions in zero-sum beliefs led to indirect effects of the conflict narrative containing reminders of peace processes upon such outcome variables—particularly as such outcome variables have also been measured in studies investigating narrative manipulations targeting competitive victimhood (e.g., McLamore et al., 2019). Further, as hopelessness about the prospect of peace is conceptually related to zero-sum beliefs (Bar-Tal, 2007) and a critical variable in protracted conflicts (Cohen-Chen et al., 2020), I also investigated whether narratives that contained reminders of prior peace processes could influence such hopelessness.

Such an investigation necessitated a research context in which participants could potentially believe both that past peace processes existed or that past peace processes had never existed. For such a context to be realistic, it was necessary that it be a conflict context that most participants were simultaneously aware existed, but were also relatively ignorant on specific details. For this purpose, I chose the conflict between the U.S. and North Korea. While Americans are generally hostile toward and aware of conflict with North Korea (Moncus & Silver, 2021), most do not remember even basic details of the Korean War (History.com Editors, 2009) and cannot locate the country on a map (McCarthy, 2017). Thus, the U.S. conflict with North Korea represents a setting in which hostility is clearly present and has been consistently so for decades, but the population of interest is ignorant of specific details, making it an ideal setting for the first goal of this research.

In Studies 1 and 2, I therefore either exposed American participants to a historical narrative (through the medium of a fictitious but presented as real news article)
that either reminded participants of the 1994 Agreed Framework, a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and North Korea (Peace Reminder condition), or exposed them to a different narrative that explicitly denied any peace agreements had ever occurred between the U.S. and North Korea (No Reminder condition), or simply had participants complete a questionnaire containing relevant conflict attitude variables (Baseline condition). I hypothesized that:

H1: Participants in the Peace Reminder condition should have lower zero-sum beliefs about the conflict with North Korea than participants in the Baseline or No Reminder conditions.

H2: Because zero-sum beliefs are robustly associated with conflict-relevant outcome variables (e.g., dehumanization, opposition to peace agreements, Ben Hagai et al. 2013; 2019), reductions in zero-sum beliefs by condition should transmit indirect effects on conflict-relevant outcome variables.

Because Klar and Baram (2016) describe motivation to achieve firmly entrenched narrative closure (FENCE) as “intimately” related to zero-sum beliefs, and because it shares many of the same correlations with conflict outcomes as zero-sum beliefs, I also investigated whether these narratives had similar effects on FENCE and whether FENCE served as a parallel mediator of indirect effects. Further, given the importance of ingroup glorification for conflict studies (Leidner et al., 2015; McLamore et al., 2019), and prior findings that some interventions work exclusively at high or low levels of glorification (e.g., Li et al., 2016; Li et al., 2021), I measured attachment and glorification (Roccas et al., 2006) to enable probing for moderation. For a similar reason, I measured political ideology (conservatism/liberalism).
While useful for demonstrating whether basic exposure to reminders of peace processes can shift zero-sum beliefs, the conflict between the U.S. and North Korea is not typical of protracted conflicts, and in more prototypical contexts (e.g., the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), the level of ignorance displayed by Americans in the U.S.-North Korea context is extremely unrealistic given both how recent and highly publicized peace process steps have been (see Kelman, 2007; Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008, Sharvit & Bar-Tal, 2007). However, such contexts are ideal for the second goal of the current research: to investigate whether the mere mention vs. omission of peace process reminders from conflict narratives is sufficient to reduce zero-sum beliefs, or whether the way in which the reminder of the peace process is construed matters.

Therefore, in Study 3, I recruited Jewish Israelis and exposed them to either a short news article prime framing the fact that the Oslo peace process occurred as a negative event doomed to failure (Negative Framing) or as an event with the potential for positive ultimate outcomes (Positive Framing), or simply had participants proceed with a questionnaire (Baseline condition) using the same variables as in Studies 1 and 2, but translated into Hebrew and adapted to an Israeli Audience. Moving beyond Study 3, in Study 4, I recruited a much larger and representative sample of Jewish Israelis. With the assistance of Hebrew-speaking Israeli collaborators, I developed ecologically valid stimuli for the Negative and Positive framing conditions using actual quotations from Israeli News articles that were obtained and determined using qualitative coding methodologies. Using these stimuli, Study 4 aimed to replicate Study 3, while also examining possible effects of the narratives on elements of inclusive and exclusive victimhood.
CHAPTER 2

STUDY 1

The first goal in this research was to establish whether or not reminders of past episodes of negotiation as part of a prospective peace process could (1) reduce zero-sum beliefs and (2) if so, whether this reduction in zero-sum beliefs transmits indirect effects on attitudes toward the conflict in question. Study 1 investigated these hypotheses within the context of conflict between the U.S. and North Korea.

In this study, American participants (recruited from MTurk) were recruited and assigned to complete a questionnaire after either reading either a narrative that discussed a past agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, a narrative that explicitly stated that no such agreement had ever occurred, or to simply answer questionnaire items without any prime (i.e., a baseline condition). In order to assess whether these processes occurred across all participants, or were localized to specific types of participants, I also measured modes of group identification (e.g., attachment, glorification; see Roccas et al., 2006) and political ideology (e.g., left/liberal to right/conservative) as candidate moderators. This study was pre-registered (AsPredicted # 46765).

Method

Participants

I aimed to recruit 700 U.S.-born, English-speaking American MTurk workers via CloudResearch toolkits between 11/16/2020-11/20/2020. Including partial records from incompletes who did not subsequently withdraw data, I had data from 852 participants. Of these participants, records were retained from 735 participants (13.73% exclusion rate). However, as many of these records represented incompletes, analyses were based
on records from 525-564 participants (i.e., 75.00%-80.57% of the original 700 that I aimed to recruit).

Among retained participants: Gender: 213 (40.57%) Men; 309 (58.63%) Women; 1 (0.19%) Non-Binary or Other Genders; 3 (0.57%) refused to answer; Ethnicity: 423 (80.57%) White; 45 (8.47%) Black or African American, 12 (2.29%) Asian or Asian American; 20 (3.81%) Hispanic or Latino; 11 (2.10%) Native American or Pacific Islander; 14 (2.67%) Other Ethnicities; Age: $M = 41.67$, $SD = 13.42$, range: 18-76.

Participants were marginally (but not significantly) left of the scale midpoint (5), $M = 4.82$, $t (524) = -1.72$, $p = .086$, $d = -.075$.

**Procedure**

After recruitment, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (see Appendix C). In the “Peace Reminder” condition ($n_{final} = 149$), participants first read a fictitious, but presented as real, news article describing relations between the U.S. and North Korea during the 1990s and early 2000s that made mention of the 1994 Agreed Framework, an agreement between the U.S. and North Korea by which the U.S. agreed to provide material for hydroelectric power on the condition that North Korea took steps to denuclearize. Temporary declines in hostility between the U.S. and North Korea were also described in this condition. In the “No Reminder” condition ($n = 146$), participants read an article that described relations between the U.S. and North Korea that made no mention of either declines in hostility or the Agreed Framework. Participants in the “baseline” condition ($n = 230$) read no prime at all. After reading their prime and completing attention checks (if applicable), participants completed a questionnaire about attitudes toward the U.S. conflict with North Korea, North Koreans, and demographics.
Measures

All measures were scored on continuous visual analogue scales anchored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 9 (strongly agree).

**Zero-sum beliefs.** Eight initial items were used to measure zero-sum beliefs adapted from Klar & Baram (2016) and Różycka-Tran et al. (2015), e.g., “When something good happens for North Korea, the U.S. loses”; “In the conflict between the U.S. and North Korea, no compromise can be reached.” Exploratory factor analyses and Cronbach’s alpha correlations, however, revealed that two items did not cluster together with the other six and that reliability was improved by their removal ($\alpha_{\text{initial}}=.80$; $\alpha_{\text{final}}=.87$). Thus, six items were used to measure zero-sum beliefs, $M=4.50$, $SD = 1.58$, $\alpha=.87$.

**National identification.** National identification was measured using a multidimensional conceptualization that distinguishes between attachment (commitment to the nation and importance placed on national identity) and glorification (belief in the superiority of the ingroup and deference toward cultural symbols and authorities of the ingroup; see Roccas et al., 2006; Roccas et al., 2008). These constructs were measured for two reasons. First, to evaluate whether any effect of narrative on zero-sum beliefs was localized to people with certain levels of national identification, and second, because there is evidence that atypical conflict narratives can shift ingroup glorification (McLamore et al., 2019).

**Attachment.** Eight items from Roccas and colleagues (2006) measured Attachment (e.g., “Being an American is an important part of my identity,” “I am strongly committed to my nation.”), $M = 6.69$, $SD = 1.84$, $\alpha=.95$. 

**Glorification.** Eight items from Roccas and colleagues (2006) measured Glorification (e.g., “It is disloyal for Americans to criticize the U.S.,” “The U.S. is better than other nations in all respects.”), \( M = 5.42, SD = 1.81, \alpha = .92. \)

**Political ideology.** Participants’ political ideology was measured using four items, each anchored at 1 = “Liberal/Left” and 9 = “Conservative/Right.” One item each measured general identification (“In general, I am…”), economic policy (“Regarding economic issues (e.g., taxation, public spending) I am…”), social policy (“Regarding social issues (e.g., gay rights, multiculturalism, I am…”), and foreign policy (“Regarding foreign policy, I am…”). Exploratory factor analyses supported combining these four items into a single composite political ideology scale, \( M = 4.99, SD = 2.45, \alpha = .96. \)

**FENCE.** Twelve items adapted from Klar & Baram (2016) measured defensiveness of traditional conflict narratives in the form of motivation to achieve firmly entrenched narrative closure (FENCE); (e.g., “Americans need to know that the U.S., not North Korea, is on the right side of the conflict”; “People having different opinions about the U.S.-North Korea conflict weaken our position against North Korea.”). However, exploratory factor analyses and Cronbach’s alpha correlations found that three items did not cluster together with the other nine, and reliability was improved by their removal from the composite scale \( (\alpha_{\text{initial}}=.82; \alpha_{\text{final}}=.90). \) Thus, nine items measured FENCE, \( M = 5.44, SD = 1.44, \alpha = .90. \) These items were measured as a possible alternative mediator for zero-sum beliefs, particularly as zero-sum beliefs are related to, but distinct from, FENCE motivation (Klar & Baram, 2016).

**Hopelessness.** Five items, including two reverse-scored items, measured lack of hope that the U.S. and North Korea could resolve the conflict between the two nations
(e.g., “I don't believe that the U.S. can ever resolve the conflict with North Korea peacefully,” “I have hope that the U.S. can achieve peace with North Korea,” [reverse-scored]), $M = 3.90$, $SD = 1.62$, $\alpha = .83$.

**Conflict resolution.** Seven items adapted from McLamore et al. (2019) and Leidner et al. (2010) measured support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies (e.g., “The U.S. should maintain negotiations with North Korean leadership in an effort to resolve the conflict between the two parties”), 3 items, $M = 7.02$, $SD = 1.35$, $\alpha = .87$, and militaristic conflict resolution strategies (e.g., “Military intervention by the U.S. is necessary to resolve the conflict”), 4 items, $M = 4.07$, $SD = 1.88$, $\alpha = .89$.

**Support for State-Level reconciliation.** Five items adapted from Kelman (1999) and McLamore et al. (2021) measured support for State-Level reconciliation between the U.S. and North Korea (“The U.S. should try to do its part to promote reconciliation with North Korea”). Exploratory factor analyses revealed that two items did not cluster together with the other three, and that their removal from the composite improved reliability ($\alpha_{\text{initial}} = .69$; $\alpha_{\text{final}} = .85$). Thus, the final composite score was based on three items, $M = 6.66$, $SD = 1.36$, $\alpha = .85$.

**Dehumanization.** Seven items adapted from Leidner et al. (2010) measured dehumanization. Exploratory factor analyses revealed a two-factor solution that mapped onto dimensions of moral dehumanization (e.g., “Compared to other peoples in the world, moral values are less likely to be developed among North Koreans”), 3 items, $M = 5.42$, $SD = 1.54$, $\alpha = .68$, and cultural dehumanization (e.g., “Compared to North Korean culture, other cultures in the world are not as developed”; all reverse-scored), 4 items, $M = 5.44$, $SD = 1.52$, $\alpha = .85$. 
**Trust.** Four items initially measured trust in the outgroup party (North Koreans). These items all completed the stem, “If the U.S. were to enter into negotiations with North Korea…” (e.g., “…North Korea would come to the negotiations in good faith,” “…the U.S. could trust that North Korea would keep their word”). However, exploratory factor analyses revealed that one item did not factor together with the other three, and Cronbach’s alpha correlations revealed that its removal improved reliability ($\alpha_{\text{initial}}=.82$; $\alpha_{\text{final}}=.92$). Thus, the final composite was based on three items, $M = 4.41$, $SD = 1.68$, $\alpha=.92$.

**Future Outcomes.** A single item measured how likely participants believed peace between the U.S. and North Korea was in the near-future (“How likely or unlikely do you think a new peace agreement between the U.S. and North Korea in the near-future would be?”), $M = 4.90$, $SD = 1.95$. Another single item measured the extent to which participants would support a future agreement between the U.S. and North Korea (“Would you support a new peace agreement between the U.S. and North Korea?”), $M = 7.09$, $SD = 1.49$.

**Manipulation Materials Credibility Checks.** At the end of the survey, participants who read an article prime (i.e., those in the Peace Reminder and No Reminder conditions) were asked, “How believable did you find the article you read at the beginning of the study?” and “How convincing did you find the article you read at the beginning of this study?” both anchored at 1 = Not at all and 9 = Very Much.
Results

All analyses were conducted in SAS 9.4 (SAS Institute INC, 2013).

Data Attrition

Among these participants, 34 were excluded as multivariate outliers, 65 were excluded for writing incorrect or off-topic summaries of the article primes, 31 were excluded for indicating that they had ties to Korea as a region in some way, and 37 were excluded for failing an attention check asking about the country that the U.S. interacted with in the primes. In sum, 117 participants were excluded from analysis using these criteria.

These exclusions were not evenly distributed across conditions. As the baseline condition lacked primes altogether, it naturally had the least number of exclusions \((n=27)\), compared to the No Reminder condition \((n=41)\) and the Reminder condition \((n=49)\), \(\chi^2(2) = 7.93, p = .019\). However, participants were not more likely to be excluded from the No Reminder condition than the Reminder condition, \(\chi^2(1) = 0.463, p = .496\).

Preliminary

Predictors of zero-sum beliefs. Because both national identification and political ideology can be conceptualized as potential antecedents of zero-sum beliefs, a multiple regression was conducted in which glorification, attachment, and political ideology (all centered) were entered as predictors of zero-sum beliefs. Controlling for all other factors, glorification was the strongest predictor of zero-sum beliefs, \(b = 1.01, SE = .102, t (521) = 9.94, p < .001\), while attachment (controlling for all other factors) had a smaller, but negative relationship with zero-sum beliefs, \(b = -0.396, SE = .090, t (521) = -4.38, p < \ldots\)
Political ideology (controlling for all other factors) had no significant effect on zero-sum beliefs, $b = 0.105$, $SE = .077$, $t (521) = 1.36$, $p = .174$.

**Condition effects on political ideology.** A one-way ANOVA found no significant omnibus effect of condition was found on political ideology, $F (522) = 1.38$, $p = .253$, $\eta^2_p = .005$, 90% CI [.000, .018].

**Condition effects on Attachment and Glorification.** One-way ANOVAs were used to probe for condition differences in both attachment and glorification. Attachment did not significantly differ across conditions, $F(2, 524) = 0.40$, $p = .669$, $\eta^2_p = .002$, 90% CI [.000, .009]. However, there was a significant omnibus effect of glorification, $F(2, 522) = 3.28$, $p = .038$, $\eta^2_p = .012$, 90% CI [.0003, .030]. Participants in the Peace Reminder condition glorified the United States significantly less, $M = 5.17$, $SD = 1.86$, than participants in the baseline condition, $M = 5.64$, $SD = 1.79$, $t (522) = 2.45$, $p = .015$. However, participants in the No Reminder condition, $M = 5.32$, $SD = 1.78$, did not significantly differ from participants in the baseline condition, $t (522) = 1.64$, $p = .101$, or from participants in the Peace Reminder condition, $t (522) = 0.72$, $p = .471$. Given this unexpected effect, all other analyses were conducted controlling for attachment and glorification (centered) and the interaction term between condition and glorification (see Yzerbit & Muller, 2004; Muller & Yzerbit, 2005). Owing to this unexpected effect, it was impossible to probe for or interpret interactions between condition and glorification as planned.

**Condition effects on Zero-Sum beliefs.** To test for condition effects on zero-sum beliefs, a general linear model (GLM) was constructed probing for effects of condition

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1 Confidence intervals for $\eta^2_p$ represent 90% confidence intervals as per Steiger (2004).
while controlling for attachment, glorification, and political affiliation (centered), as well as the interaction term for condition and glorification. A significant omnibus effect of condition on zero-sum beliefs was found, $F(2, 517) = 13.98, p < .001, \eta^2_{p} = .051, 90\% \text{ CI} [.023, .083]$. Zero-sum beliefs were significantly lower in the Peace Reminder Condition, $M = 3.98, SD = 1.58$, than in either the Baseline condition, $M = 4.96, SD = 1.55, t(517) = 5.21, p < .001$, or the No Reminder condition, $M = 4.37, SD = 1.42, t(517) = 2.11, p = .035$. However, contrary to expectations, zero-sum beliefs were also lower in the No Reminder condition compared to the Baseline condition, $t(517) = 2.87, p = .004$ (see Figure 1.

**Probing for interactive effects of condition and political ideology on zero-sum beliefs.** A general linear model (GLM) entering condition and political ideology as full factors while controlling for attachment, glorification, and the interaction term between glorification and condition found no significant interaction between political ideology and condition, $F(2, 515) = 0.05, p = .954, \eta^2_{p} < .001, 90\% \text{ CI} [.000, .000]$. The main effect of condition on zero-sum beliefs remained significant in this model, $F(2, 515) = 13.91, p < .001, \eta^2_{p} = .038, 90\% \text{ CI} [.014, .066]$. Additionally, no significant main effect of political affiliation was found (controlling for all other model terms), consistent with the initial multiple regression, $b = .099, SE = .08, t(515) = 1.31, p = .191$.

**Condition effects on FENCE.** To test for condition effects on FENCE, a general linear model (GLM) was constructed probing for effects of condition while controlling for attachment, glorification, and political affiliation (centered), as well as the interaction term for condition and glorification. No significant omnibus effect of condition on FENCE was found, $F(2, 517) = 0.30, p = .741, \eta^2_{p} = .001, 90\% \text{ CI} [.000, .007]$. 
**Outcome Variables**

To test condition effects on each outcome variable, general linear models (GLMs) were constructed probing for effects of condition while controlling for attachment, glorification, and political affiliation (centered), as well as the interaction term for condition and glorification.

**Hopelessness.** A significant main effect of condition was found on hopelessness, $F(2, 517) = 4.83, p = .008, \eta^2_p=.018, 90\% \text{ CI} [.003, .039]$. Hopelessness was significantly higher at baseline, $M = 3.99, SD = 1.52$, than in either the Peace Reminder condition, $M = 3.35, SD = 1.53, t(517) = 2.92, p = .004$, or the No Reminder condition, $M = 3.53, SD = 1.43, t(517) = 2.10, p = .036$. However, no significant difference was found between the No Reminder and Peace Reminder conditions, $t(517) = 0.74, p = .457$.

**Conflict Resolution.** No significant omnibus effect of condition was found on support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies, $F(2, 517) = 1.16, p = .314, \eta^2_p=.005, 90\% \text{ CI} [.000, .016]$.

However, a significant omnibus effect was found on support for militaristic strategies, $F(2, 517) = 3.14, p = .044, \eta^2_p=.012, 90\% \text{ CI} [.0002, .030]$. Contrary to expectations, however, support for militaristic strategies was lower in the No Reminder condition, $M = 3.79, SD = 1.78$, than in the Baseline condition, $M = 4.41, SD = 1.96, t(517) = 2.33, p = .020$, but only marginally lower in the Peace Reminder condition, $M = 3.81, SD = 1.81$, compared to the Baseline condition, $t(517) = 1.76, p = .080$. Further, no significant difference was found between the Peace Reminder and No Reminder conditions, $t(517) = -0.52, p = .606$. 


Support for State-Level Reconciliation. No significant omnibus effect was found on support for state-level reconciliation between the United States and North Korea, $F(2, 517) = 1.52, p = .219, \eta^2_p = .006, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .019]$.

Dehumanization. No significant omnibus effect was found on moral dehumanization, $F(2, 517) = 1.67, p = .190, \eta^2_p = .006, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .020]$. However, a marginally significant omnibus effect was found on cultural dehumanization, $F(2, 517) = 2.87, p = .058, \eta^2_p = .011, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .028]$. Yet, the only significant contrast was that cultural dehumanization was higher in the No Reminder condition, $M = 5.68, SD = 1.46$, compared to baseline, $M = 5.22, SD = 1.61$, $t(517) = -2.30, p = .022$.

Outgroup Trust. A marginally significant omnibus effect was found on outgroup (i.e., North Koreans) trust, $F(2, 517) = 2.85, p = .059, \eta^2_p = .011, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .028]$. The only significant contrast was that trust was lower in the No Reminder condition, $M = 4.14, SD = 1.68$, than in the Baseline condition, $M = 4.66, SD = 1.78$, $t(517) = 2.23, p = .026$.

Future Outcomes. No significant omnibus effect was found on support for a new agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, $F(2, 517) = 0.53, p = .589, \eta^2_p = .002, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .010]$. However, a marginally significant omnibus effect was found of condition on belief that peace is likely in the near-future, $F(2, 517) = 2.56, p = .078, \eta^2_p = .010, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .026]$. In the No Reminder condition, belief in peace likelihood was lower, $M = 4.50, SD = 2.02$, compared to either the Peace Reminder condition, $M = 5.05, SD = 1.88$, $t(517) = -2.12, p = .035$, and marginally lower than in the baseline condition, $M = 5.04$, $t(517) = -1.78, p = .076$. However, a marginally significant omnibus effect was found of condition on belief that peace is likely in the near-future, $F(2, 517) = 2.56, p = .078, \eta^2_p = .010, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .026]$. 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\( SD = 1.94, t (517) = -1.84, p = .066. \) No significant contrast was found, however, between the Peace Reminder and Baseline conditions, \( t (517) = -0.50, p = .616. \)

**Indirect Effects Models**

For all indirect effect models, Hayes’s PROCESS Macro (v4; Hayes, 2018), Model 4, using 10,000 bootstrap samples with 95% confidence intervals was used. As FENCE was not significantly affected by condition (contrary to initial expectations), it was not entered as a parallel mediator. However, as glorification was unexpectedly different between the baseline condition and the peace reminder condition, the interaction term between condition and glorification was entered into the model as a covariate, alongside attachment, glorification, and political ideology. Because the independent variable (condition) was multicategorical rather than dichotomous, indicator (dummy) coding (syntax coded as mcx=1) was used all PROCESS models tested to model the distinct effects of being in either the Peace Reminder or No Reminder conditions compared to baseline (see Hayes et al., 2014). Across all models, the Baseline condition functioned as the reference category.

Across all models, being in the peace reminder condition (compared to the baseline condition) was associated with lower zero-sum beliefs, \( b = -.750, SE = .14, t = -5.33, p < .001, 95\% \ CI [-1.03, -.474]. \) Being in the no reminder condition (compared to the baseline condition) was also associated with (relatively smaller) reductions in zero-sum beliefs, \( b = -.404, SE = .14, t = -2.85, p = .005, 95\% \ CI [-.683, -.126]. \)

Being in the peace reminder condition (compared to baseline) transmitted relative indirect effects through zero-sum beliefs that reduced support for militaristic strategies, \( b = -.410, SE = .087, 95\% \ CI [-.582, -.244], \) moral dehumanization, \( b = -.179, SE = .048, \)
95% CI [-.281, -.094], and hopelessness about the prospects of peace between the U.S. and North Korea, $b = -.403, SE = .082, 95% CI [-.563, -.246]$. Analogous effects were found whereby being in the peace reminder condition (compared to baseline) transmitted relative indirect effects via zero-sum beliefs that increased support for diplomatic strategies, $b = .174, SE = .048, 95% CI [.089, .272]$, support for state-level reconciliation, $b = .187, SE = .054, 95% CI [.093, .301]$, and support for new agreements between the U.S. and North Korea, $b = .206, SE = .054, 95% CI [.110, .319]$. While these effects were expected, there was an unexpected effect in the opposite direction whereby cultural dehumanization was increased through zero-sum beliefs, $b = .193, SE = .056, 95% CI [.093, .313]$. 

For all these indirect effects, a corresponding indirect effect was also found of being in the No Reminder condition compared to the aggregate of the baseline and Peace Reminder conditions. However, the magnitude of that effect was between 53.88%-53.94% of the magnitude of the indirect effects through zero-sum beliefs of the Peace Reminder condition (see Table 1). No significant indirect effects of zero-sum beliefs were found on belief that peace between the U.S. and North Korea was likely in the near-future, or upon outgroup trust.

All parallel models tested are summarized in Figures 2-8.

**Manipulation Materials Credibility Checks**

First, one-sample t-tests were used to evaluate whether participants in each manipulation condition (i.e., Peace Reminder or No Reminder) found the article more or less believable or convincing than the scale midpoint (5). Participants in the No Reminder condition found the article both significantly more believable than the scale midpoint, $M$
= 6.91, $SD = 1.49$, $t (145) = 15.49$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.28$, and found the article more convincing than the scale midpoint, $M = 6.77$, $SD = 1.68$, $t (145) = 12.80$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.06$. Participants in the Peace Reminder condition also found the article more believable than the scale midpoint, $M = 5.66$, $SD = 2.23$, $t (148) = 3.60$, $p < .001$, $d = .295$, and more convincing than the scale midpoint, $M = 5.72$, $SD = 2.17$, $t (148) = 4.05$, $p < .001$, $d = .332$.

General Linear Models (GLMs) considering condition (excluding the baseline condition) as a factor while controlling for attachment, glorification, political ideology, and the interaction term between condition and glorification found that (controlling for these covariates), participants in the No Reminder condition believed their article prime more than participants in the Peace Reminder condition believed theirs, $F (1, 289) = 29.85$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_{p} = .094$, 90% CI [.046, .148]. Further, participants in the No Reminder condition found their article prime more convincing than participants in the Peace Reminder condition did theirs, $F (1, 289) = 22.46$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_{p} = .072$, 90% CI [.031, .122].

**Discussion**

Study 1 provided initial support for the suggestion that reading narratives (presented as news articles) that contained reminders of past peace processes (compared to either a baseline or to narratives that did not) reduced zero-sum beliefs, even controlling for attachment, glorification, political ideology, and the interaction term between glorification and condition. Study 1 further found evidence that these reductions in zero-sum beliefs could transmit indirect effects on conflict-relevant outcome variables. Through reduced zero-sum beliefs, being in the peace reminder condition indirectly
reduced support for conflict-promoting variables (e.g., militaristic strategies, hopelessness, moral dehumanization) and indirectly increased support for conflict-attenuating variables (e.g., diplomatic strategies, support for state-level reconciliation, support for new agreements with North Korea in the future). While there was no consistent pattern of direct condition effects on outcome variables, and what condition effects were found were only in contrast to baseline, such patterns (whereby direct effects are not observed, but indirect effects are) are not unheard of with narrative manipulations (see McLamore et al., 2019).

Further, the effect of condition on zero-sum beliefs was not moderated by political ideology, and despite its close relationship with zero-sum beliefs (Klar & Baram, 2016), FENCE motivation was unaffected by condition, suggesting a specificity to these effects. However, these findings did not extent to increasing trust of North Koreans, and cultural dehumanization of North Koreans was actually increased in the peace reminder condition, suggesting that while broadly conflict-attenuating, the condition may have the potential for backfiring in other domains.

While ingroup glorification being significantly lower in the peace reminder condition than at baseline prevented probing for interactions between condition and glorification in Study 1, it did not necessarily confound the results. The results reported all account for both effects of glorification and this condition difference, and the indirect effects of condition through zero-sum beliefs that are reported all control for any indirect effects of condition on outcome variables through glorification.

However, it is less clear why this condition effect on glorification is observed. A failure of random assignment is possible—as is the possibility that glorification was
simply higher in the baseline condition due to inattentive participants reporting high glorification not being filtered out, as manipulation checks were impossible in the baseline condition. The latter possibility is supported by the trend ($p = .101$) of lower glorification in the No Reminder condition and the fact that the No Reminder condition could also transmit indirect effects through glorification. However, it is also plausible that being in the peace reminder condition could reduce glorification, as brief exposure to non-hegemonic narratives presented as news articles has been observed to reduce glorification in suffering-based approaches (see McLamore et al., 2019). Nevertheless, given that glorification was a stronger predictor of zero-sum beliefs than either attachment or political ideology, the inability to probe for moderations is a limitation of Study 1.

A further complication with the results of Study 1 is that while indirect effects of being in the peace reminder condition (compared to both other conditions) were in line with my predictions, the No Reminder condition also reduced zero-sum beliefs compared to baseline. As a consequence of this difference, there were significant (albeit weaker) indirect effects of being in the No Reminder condition (compared to both other conditions). While these patterns do not diminish the effects observed as a result of exposure to narratives that contain peace process reminders, they were unexpected. There are multiple reasons why this unexpected pattern may have occurred. One possibility is random error. Another possibility is that even if the No Reminder condition claimed that no formal peace agreements had been made between the U.S. and North Korea, it inadvertently suggested that such agreements were possible (even if they haven’t happened yet) beyond what American participants would consider at baseline
given their general ignorance of the conflict context. This general ignorance was reflected in participant ratings of article believability and credibility—while participants did, on average, find both the No Reminder condition and the Peace Reminder condition believable and convincing, they found the Peace Reminder condition less convincing than the No Reminder condition—even though the Peace Reminder condition was what actually happened in history, and the No Reminder condition wasn’t.
CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2

Study 2 was almost completely identical to Study 1. The exact same manipulation materials, questionnaire items, and recruitment procedures were used. There was, however, one key alteration: in order to ensure that probing for interactions between glorification and condition were possible, attachment and glorification were measured before the manipulation, rather than after it. While this does create the possibility of identity priming affecting the results, it nevertheless guaranteed that only random assignment failure could render probing for interactions impossible. Given that Study 1 indicated glorification was particularly relevant for zero-sum beliefs in Americans, testing whether the narrative manipulation functioned at all levels of glorification was critical enough to undertake that risk.

Method

Participants

As in Study 1, I aimed to recruit 700 U.S.-born, English-speaking American MTurk workers via CloudResearch toolkits between 2/16/2021-3/3/2021. Including partial records from incompletes who did not subsequently withdraw data, I had data from 823 participants. Of these participants, records were retained from 726 participants (11.79% exclusion rate) using identical exclusion criteria for Study 1. However, as some of these records represented incompletes, analyses for variables other than attachment and glorification ($n = 705$ and $n = 705$, respectively) were based on records from 572-599 participants (i.e., 81.71%-85.57% of the original 700 that I aimed to recruit).

Among retained participants: Gender: 223 (39.12%) Men; 342 (60.00%) Women; 2 (0.35%) Non-Binary or Other Genders; 3 (0.53%) refused to answer; Ethnicity: 457
(80.18%) White; 43 (7.54%) Black or African American, 24 (4.21%) Asian or Asian American; 27 (4.74%) Hispanic or Latino; 4 (0.70%) Native American or Pacific Islander; 15 (2.63%) Other Ethnicities; Age: $M = 41.59$, $SD = 13.70$, range: 19-76.

Politically, participants were slightly left of the scale midpoint (5), $M = 4.44$, $t(569) = -5.72$, $p < .001$, $d = -.240$.

**Measures**

Identical measures and composite scores were computed for Study 2 as in Study 1 (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics).

**Results**

**Data Attrition**

Among these participants, 46 were excluded as multivariate outliers, 33 were excluded for writing incorrect or off-topic summaries of the article primes, 15 were excluded for indicating that they had ties to Korea as a region in some way, and 21 were excluded for failing an attention check asking about the country that the U.S. interacted with in the primes. In sum, 97 participants were excluded from analysis using these criteria.

These exclusions were evenly distributed across conditions (Baseline: $n=27$; No Reminder: $n = 36$; Peace Reminder: $n = 34$), $\chi^2(2) = 1.59$, $p = .451$.

**Preliminary**

**Predictors of zero-sum beliefs.** As in Study 1, a multiple regression was conducted in which attachment, glorification, and political ideology (all centered) were entered as predictors of zero-sum beliefs. Replicating Study 1, glorification (controlling for all other terms) was the strongest predictor of zero-sum beliefs, $b = 1.07$, $SE = .09$, $t$
(566) = 11.42, *p < .001*, while attachment had a smaller (and reversed) but still significant effect, $b = -.371, SE = .09, t (566) = -4.24, p < .001$. As in Study 1, no significant effect of political ideology was found on zero-sum beliefs, $b = .090, SE = .07, t (566) = 1.24, p = .214$.

**Condition effects on political ideology.** A one-way ANOVA found a significant omnibus effect was found of condition on political ideology, suggesting a failure of random assignment, $F (2, 567) = 3.75, p = .024, \eta_p^2=.013$, 90% CI [.001, .031]. Contrasts revealed that participants were more liberal/left wing in the No Reminder condition, $M = 4.09, SD = 2.21$, than in the Baseline condition, $M = 4.73, SD = 2.38, t (567) = -2.74, p = .006$. However, participants in the Peace Reminder condition, $M = 4.44, SD = 2.36$, were not significantly different from either participants in the Baseline condition, $t (567) = -1.22, p = .223$, or participants in the No Reminder condition, $t (567) = 1.40, p = .163$.

**Condition effects on Attachment and Glorification.** One-way ANOVAs found that neither attachment, $F (2, 705) = 1.11, p = .329, \eta_p^2=.003$, 90% CI [.000, .012], nor glorification, $F (2, 702) = 1.04, p = .353, \eta_p^2=.003$, 90% CI [.000, .011], significantly differed by condition in Study 2, indicating no failure of random assignment for attachment or glorification.

**Condition effects on Zero-sum beliefs.** To account for the failure of random assignment for political ideology, and for the potential influences of attachment and glorification on zero-sum beliefs, a general linear model (GLM) was constructed to test condition effects on zero-sum beliefs in which condition was a full factor whereas attachment, glorification, political ideology, and the interaction term between political ideology and condition were entered as covariates.
As in Study 1, a significant omnibus effect was found on zero-sum beliefs, $F(2, 562) = 6.60, p = .002, \eta^2_p = .023, 90\% \text{ CI [.006, .045]}. Replicating Study 1, participants in the Peace Reminder condition had significantly lower zero-sum beliefs, $M = 3.91, SD = 1.48$, than either participants in the Baseline condition, $M = 4.44, SD = 1.62, t(562) = 3.11, p = .002$, or participants in the No Reminder condition, $M = 4.34, SD = 1.56, t(562) = 3.26, p = .001$. Unlike Study 1, however, no significant difference was found between the Baseline condition and the No Reminder condition, $t(562) = -0.33, p = .741$ (see Figure 9).

**Probing for interaction effects on Zero-sum beliefs.** To investigate whether glorification moderated the effect of condition on zero-sum beliefs, a GLM was constructed in which condition and glorification (centered) were entered as full factors while attachment, political ideology, and the interaction term between condition and political ideology were entered as covariates. While the main effect of condition on zero-sum beliefs remained significant, $F(2, 560) = 6.63, p = .001, \eta^2_p = .023, 90\% \text{ CI [.006, .045]},$ and glorification had a large main effect on zero-sum beliefs, $b = 1.06, SE = .10, F(1, 560) = 122.98, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .180, 90\% \text{ CI [.133, .224]},$ no significant interaction qualified these main effects, $F(2, 560) = 0.63, p = .531, \eta^2_p = .002, 90\% \text{ CI [.000, .010]}.$

**Condition effects on FENCE.** Using the same covariates to test for condition effects on zero-sum beliefs, no significant omnibus effect of condition was found on FENCE, $F(2, 562) = 0.08, p = .921, \eta^2_p = .0003, 90\% \text{ CI [.000, .002]}.$

**Outcome Variables**

Because glorification was not affected by condition, but there was a failure of random assignment for political ideology, models were constructed so as to test for main
effects of condition while also probing for interactions between condition and glorification, but also while accounting for the random assignment failure of political ideology. Thus, general linear models (GLMs) were constructed in which condition and glorification (centered) were entered as full factors, while attachment, political ideology, and the interaction term between political ideology and condition were entered as covariates for each outcome variable.

**Hopelessness.** Unlike in Study 1, no significant omnibus main effect of condition was found on hopelessness, $F(2, 559) = 1.61, p = .201, \eta^2 = .006, 90\% \text{ CI} [.000, .018]$. While there was a significant main effect of glorification (controlling for all other terms) whereby glorification was associated with greater hopelessness about the prospect of peace with North Korea, $b = .634, SE = .10, F(1, 559) = 43.68, p < .001, \eta^2 = .073, 90\% \text{ CI} [.041, .108]$, no significant interaction qualified these results, $F(2, 559) = 0.19, p = .828, \eta^2 = .001, 90\% \text{ CI} [.000, .005]$.

**Conflict Resolution.**

**Diplomatic.** Unlike in Study 1, a marginally significant omnibus main effect of condition upon support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies was found, $F(2, 560) = 2.61, p = .075, \eta^2 = .009, 90\% \text{ CI} [.000, .024]$. Support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies was higher in the Peace Reminder condition, $M = 7.26, SD = 1.25$, compared to the baseline condition, $M = 6.95, SD = 1.43, t(560) = 2.16, p = .032$, but not compared to the No Reminder condition, $M = 7.18, SD = 1.21, t(560) = 0.53, p = .599$. Support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies did not differ between the No Reminder condition and the Baseline condition, $t(560) = -1.62, p = .106$. 

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A significant main effect of glorification (controlling for all other terms) was found whereby glorification was negatively associated with support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies, $b = -.198$, $SE = .09$, $F (1, 560) = 4.47$, $p = .035$, $\eta_p^2 = .008$, 90% CI [.0003, .024]. However, no significant interaction qualified this main effect or the marginally significant main effect of condition, $F (2, 560) = 0.11$, $p = .899$, $\eta_p^2 = .0004$, 90% CI [.000, .003].

**Militaristic.** Like Study 1, however, there was a significant omnibus main effect of condition on support for militaristic strategies, $F (2, 560) = 5.09$, $p = .007$, $\eta_p^2 = .018$, 90% CI [.003, .038]. Unlike Study 1, the expected pattern of results was found completely by contrasts. Support for militaristic policies was lower in the Peace Reminder condition, $M = 3.36$, $SD = 1.70$, compared to either the Baseline condition, $M = 3.96$, $SD = 1.85$, $t (560) = -3.13$, $p = .002$, or the No Reminder condition, $M = 3.65$, $SD = 1.70$, $t (560) = -2.20$, $p = .028$. No significant contrast was found between the No Reminder condition and the Baseline condition, $t (560) = 0.81$, $p = .418$.

A significant main effect of glorification was also found whereby glorification (controlling for all other terms) was associated with greater support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies, $b = 1.12$, $SE = .10$, $F (1, 560) = 123.04$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .180$, 90% CI [.133, .224]. However, no significant interaction qualified these main effects, $F (2, 560) = 0.82$, $p = .441$, $\eta_p^2 = .003$, 90% CI [.000, .012].

**Support for State-Level Reconciliation.** As in Study 1, no significant omnibus effect was found on support for state-level reconciliation, $F (2, 560) = 1.32$, $p = .268$, $\eta_p^2 = .005$, 90% CI [.000, .016]. Further, no significant main effect was found of glorification, $b = -.132$, $SE = .10$, $F (1, 560) = 1.79$, $p = .181$, $\eta_p^2 = .003$, 90% CI [.000,
.015], and no interaction qualified these results, $F (2, 560) = 0.47, p = .624, \eta_p^2 = .002, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .009].$

**Dehumanization.**

**Moral dehumanization.** As in Study 1, no significant omnibus main effect of condition was found on moral dehumanization of North Koreans, $F (2, 560) = 1.21, p = .299, \eta_p^2 = .004, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .015]$. While a significant main effect of glorification (controlling for all other terms) was found whereby glorification was associated with more moral dehumanization, $b = .657, SE = .10, F (1, 560) = 43.88, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .073, 90\% \text{ CI } [.041, .108]$, no significant interaction qualified these results, $F (2, 560) = 2.26, p = .105, \eta_p^2 = .007, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .020].$

**Cultural dehumanization.** No significant omnibus main effect of condition was found on cultural dehumanization, $F (2, 560) = 0.99, p = .372, \eta_p^2 = .004, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .014]$. While a significant main effect of glorification (controlling for all other terms) was found whereby glorification predicted less cultural dehumanization, $b = -.440, SE = .10, F (1, 560) = 19.27, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .033, 90\% \text{ CI } [.013, .060]$, no significant interaction qualified these results, $F (2, 560) = 0.33, p = .717, \eta_p^2 = .001, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .007].$

**Outgroup Trust.** The marginally significant omnibus main effect of condition observed in Study 1 did not replicate in Study 2, $F (2, 560) = 0.44, p = .646, \eta_p^2 = .002, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .008]$. While there was a significant main effect of glorification (controlling for all other terms) such that higher glorification was associated with higher outgroup trust, $b = .503, SE = .12, F (1, 560) = 17.70, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .031, 90\% \text{ CI } [.011, .057]$, no significant interaction qualified these results, $F (2, 560) = 1.00, p = .370, \eta_p^2 = .004, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .014].$
**Future Outcomes.** As in Study 1, no significant omnibus effect was found on support for a new Agreement with North Korea, $F(2, 560) = 0.80, p = .452, \eta^2_p = .003$, 90% CI [.000, .012]. While a significant main effect of glorification, $b = -.352, SE = .10$, $F(1, 560) = 11.56, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .020$, 90% CI [.005, .042], no significant interaction qualified these results, $F(2, 560) = 0.62, p = .539, \eta^2_p = .002$, 90% CI [.000, .010].

However, similar to Study 1, a marginally significant omnibus effect was found on how likely participants believed that a peace agreement with North Korea was in the near future, $F(2, 560) = 3.00, p = .051, \eta^2_p = .011$, 90% CI [.000, .026]. Like Study 1, belief in the likelihood of peace was lower in the No Reminder condition, $M = 4.45, SD = 1.87$, than in the Peace Reminder condition, $M = 4.94, SD = 1.95$, $t(560) = -2.22, p = .027$. However, unlike Study 1, there was no significant contrast between the No Reminder condition and the Baseline condition, $M = 4.57, SD = 2.03, t(560) = 0.27, p = .787$, and there was a significant contrast between the Reminder and Baseline conditions, $t(560) = -2.07, p = .039$.

There was also a significant main effect of glorification (controlling for all other terms) whereby glorification predicted higher belief that peace is likely with North Korea in the near future, $b = .506, SE = .14$, $F(1, 560) = 13.63, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .024$, 90% CI [.007, .048]. No significant interaction qualified these main effects, $F(2, 560) = 1.95, p = .143, \eta^2_p = .007$, 90% CI [.000, .020].

**Indirect Effects**

**Conceptually replicating Study 1.** The first goal of indirect effect testing was to examine whether the indirect effects of condition through zero-sum beliefs replicated from Study 1 to Study 2 using Hayes’s PROCESS Model 4 (10,000 bootstrap samples).
Because glorification did not differ between conditions in Study 2, but political ideology did, the interaction term between political ideology and condition was entered into the models as a covariate alongside political ideology, attachment, and glorification. Otherwise, models were constructed and the multicategorical structure of the independent variable (condition) was accounted for as in Study 1.

Across all studies, being in the Peace Reminder condition (compared to baseline) reduced zero-sum beliefs, $b = -.420, SE = .14, t = -3.10, p = .002, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.687, -.154]$, but being in the No Reminder condition (compared to baseline) did not have any significant relationship with zero-sum beliefs, $b = .038, SE = .13, t = 0.286, p = .775, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.225, .301]$.

All indirect effects observed in Study 1 of being in the Peace Reminder condition (compared to baseline) were replicated in Study 2 (see Table 3; Figures 10-16). However, the smaller indirect effects observed of being in the No Reminder condition did not replicate from Study 1 to Study 2. As in Study 1, there was no significant indirect effect of even the contrast between the Peace Reminder condition through zero-sum beliefs on either belief that peace was likely in the near future with North Korea, $b = -.002, SE = .03, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.066, .061]$, or on outgroup trust, $b = -.022, SE = .03, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.085, .032]$.

**Probing for moderated mediation.** To probe for moderated mediation effects (whereby glorification moderates indirect effects of condition through zero-sum beliefs), Hayes’s PROCESS Model 8 was run for all outcome variables using the same parallel mediators as above, glorification as a potential moderator, and attachment as a covariate. No evidence was found for moderated mediation for any outcome variable.
Manipulation Materials Credibility Checks

As in Study 1, one-sample t-tests were used to evaluate whether participants in each manipulation condition (i.e., Peace Reminder or No Reminder) found the article more or less believable or convincing than the scale midpoint (5). Participants in the No Reminder condition rated the article prime as both more believable, $M = 6.46, SD = 1.56, t (181) = 12.61, p < .001, d = .936$, and more convincing, $M = 6.41, SD = 1.65, t (181) = 11.50, p < .001, d = .855$, than the scale midpoint. Participants in the Peace reminder condition also rated their article prime as both more believable, $M = 5.71, SD = 1.86, t (167) = 4.91, p < .001, d = .382$, and more convincing, $M = 5.97, SD = 1.84, t (167) = 6.80, p < .001, d = .572$, than the scale midpoint.

As in Study 1, a general linear model (GLM) using condition as a full factor while controlling for attachment, glorification, political ideology, and the interaction term between political ideology and condition found that participants in the No Reminder condition found their article prime significantly more believable, $F (1, 344) = 17.18, p < .001, \eta^2_p=.048, 90\% \text{ CI} [.017, .088]$, and more convincing, $F (1, 344) = 5.90, p = .016, \eta^2_p=.017, 90\% \text{ CI} [.002, .045]$, than participants in the Peace Reminder condition found theirs.

Discussion

Study 2 replicated the most important findings of Study 1, while allowing for interactions between condition and glorification to be probed. As in Study 1, zero-sum beliefs were reduced in the Peace Reminder condition compared to either the Baseline or No Reminder conditions. While there was a random assignment failure whereby participants in the No Reminder condition were slightly more liberal than participants in
the Baseline condition, all analyses were conducted while controlling for this difference. Further, the indirect effects of being in the peace reminder condition (compared to the aggregate of the other two conditions) on outcome variables through lowered zero-sum beliefs were all replicated from Study 1 to Study 2. While the smaller indirect effects of being in the No Reminder condition (compared to the aggregate of the other two conditions) did not replicate from Study 1 to Study 2, this can be attributed to zero-sum beliefs not being reduced in the No Reminder condition compared to baseline in Study 2. As these effects were unexpected in Study 1, these patterns actually hew closer to expectations than those of Study 1.

Further, as in Study 1, FENCE was unaffected by condition despite its relationship with zero-sum beliefs (Klar & Baram, 2016). That what few direct effects were observed in Study 1 were not completely replicated in Study 2, whereas the indirect effects via zero-sum beliefs did, supports the implications of Study 1 that peace reminders mainly exert indirect effects on outcome variables through zero-sum beliefs rather than directly. Also replicating Study 1, participants in the Peace Reminder condition found it less believable and less convincing than participants in the No Reminder condition, even if they still found both narratives believable and convincing overall.

Probing for interactions by glorification found no evidence that glorification moderated the condition effects upon zero-sum beliefs. The lack of moderation suggests that narratives that remind participants of prior steps in peace processes function to reduce zero-sum beliefs regardless of the extent to which participants glorify their national ingroup, implying that glorification may not impose a boundary on the
usefulness of peace process reminders in narratives despite its influence on other intergroup reconciliation efforts (e.g., Li et al., 2021). Further, no evidence of moderated mediation by glorification was found on any of the indirect effects of being in the peace reminder condition through zero-sum beliefs, suggesting that not only do the condition effects on zero-sum beliefs occur regardless of glorification, but so do all of the indirect effects. Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence that reminders of peace processes can reduce zero-sum beliefs, thereby transmitting patterns of indirect effects that are conflict-attenuating—at least within contexts of which the participants are relatively uninformed to begin with.
CHAPTER 4

STUDY 3

What is less clear from Studies 1 and 2, however, is whether any of these effects would be found in contexts in which participants are not relatively ignorant about the conflict in question. Indeed, while U.S. participants consistently found the No Reminder condition more believable than the Peace Reminder condition (which contained information about a peace process step that really happened), such a condition would be completely unbelievable to most participants in more prototypical protracted or “intractable” conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Further, because Studies 1 and 2 operate on populations that are, on average, relatively ignorant of the conflict context, they overlook that in conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, individual steps of peace processes are framed in particular ways within the collective memories of participants. Indeed, shortly after the failure of the Camp David Accords in 2000, Israeli News outlets explicitly framed the Oslo peace process as a failure that revealed the futility of negotiation with Palestinians (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008, Sharvit & Bar-Tal, 2007). In fact, the Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR), a right-wing Israeli think tanks, one of which explicitly published a book titled, “Israel and a Palestinian State: A Zero Sum Game?” (Stav, 2001). Conversely, other Israeli groups contend that the Oslo peace process could have been refined were it not abandoned, and even today argue in favor of refining rather than abandoning its precepts (Peace Now, 2017).

Therefore, in Study 3, I moved beyond Study 1 and 2 by examining whether framing reminders of a peace process that cannot be omitted from a historical narrative can also shift zero-sum beliefs. Specifically, I exposed Jewish Israelis to narratives that
either framed the Oslo Process as a complete negative (Negative Framing) or as having the potential to improve the situation (Positive Framing), and compared both to a baseline as in Studies 1 and 2.

Method

Participants

A representative sample of Israeli Jews was recruited via Midgam, a panel sampling company with access to representative samples of Israeli Jews. Based on a priori power analyses, I aimed to recruit 400 participants. I had complete or partial records from 418 participants who did not withdraw their data, recruited between 11/22/2021 and 11/23/2021. After data attrition, records were retained from 383 participants (8.37% exclusion rate). However, as participants could refuse to answer items, analyses were based on records from 327-376 participants, depending on the variable (i.e., 81.75%-94.00% of the original 400 that I aimed to recruit).

Among retained participants; Gender: 149 Men (45.85%), 176 Women (54.15%), no non-binary participants, 58 participants refused to answer; Born in Israel: 272 born in Israel (83.69%), 53 (16.31%) born abroad, 58 participants refused to answer; Age: 42.24, SD = 15.24, range: 18-74. Politically, participants were slightly to right (i.e., more conservative) of the scale midpoint (5), M = 5.34, SD = 1.65, t (357) = 3.95, p < .001, d = .209.

Procedure

The procedure for Study 3 was almost identical to that of Study 2, with two key differences. Firstly, all materials were presented in Hebrew, and adapted to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict context. Second, because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is all-
encompassing within Israeli society, it was deemed unrealistic that Israelis would be similarly ignorant of the Oslo Accords as Americans generally are of U.S.-North Korean relations. Claiming that no such accords had occurred would be completely infeasible; thus, the article primes here investigated what would happen if reminders of past peace agreements were framed positively (i.e., as evidence that negotiation is possible) or negatively (i.e., as evidence that negotiation is doomed to failure; see Appendix C). As in Studies 1 and 2, both of these conditions were contrasted with a baseline condition.

**Measures**

All measures used in Studies 1 and 2 were used here, albeit in Hebrew and adapted to the Israeli-Palestinian context (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics and reliability). However, exploratory factor analysis revealed that among Israelis, unlike Americans, dehumanization items loaded onto a single factor and did not cluster into moral and cultural dimensions.

**Results**

**Data Attrition**

As in Studies 1 and 2, participants were excluded for being multivariate outliers, 9 for writing incorrect summaries of article primes, and 10 for failing attention checks asking about which conflict context the primes were about. Exclusion of participants was not evenly distributed between the Baseline condition \((n=5)\), the Negative framing condition \((n = 10)\), and the Positive framing condition \((n = 20)\), \(\chi^2(2) = 10.467, p = .005\). Further, participants were marginally more likely to be excluded in the Positive framing condition than in the Negative framing condition, \(\chi^2(1) = 3.65, p = .056\).
Preliminary

Predictors of zero-sum beliefs. As in Studies 1 and 2, a multiple regression was conducted in which attachment, glorification, and political ideology (all centered) were entered as predictors of zero-sum beliefs. Unlike in the U.S. MTurk samples in Studies 1 and 2, the strongest predictor in the Israeli Midgam sample used in Study 3 was political affiliation, whereby greater conservatism (controlling for attachment and glorification) predicted greater zero-sum beliefs, \( b = .637, SE = .08, t (321) = 7.80, p < .001 \). There was a weaker, but significant, relationship whereby greater glorification was associated with greater zero-sum beliefs, \( b = .225, SE = .10, t (321) = 2.23, p = .027 \), but no significant relationship was found between attachment and zero-sum, \( b = -.105, SE = .10, t (321) = -1.08, p = .282 \).

Condition effects on political ideology. A one-way ANOVA found no significant condition effect on political ideology, \( F (2, 322) = 0.08, p = .922, \eta_p^2 = .001, 90\% \text{ CI} [.000, .003] \).

Condition effects on Attachment and Glorification. A one-way ANOVA found that neither attachment, \( F (2, 373) = 0.02, p = .983, \eta_p^2 < .001, 90\% \text{ CI} [.000, .000] \), nor glorification, \( F (2, 369) = 0.24, p = .788, \eta_p^2 = .001, 90\% \text{ CI} [.000, .009] \), were significantly affected by condition.

Condition effects on Zero-sum beliefs. While neither attachment, nor glorification, nor political ideology significantly differed across conditions, the multiple regression nevertheless suggested that these factors can influence zero-sum beliefs. As such, to test condition effects on zero-sum beliefs, I ran an ANCOVA considering
condition as the main factor and entering attachment, glorification, and political ideology (all centered) as covariates.

A significant omnibus effect of condition on zero-sum beliefs was found, $F(2, 319) = 3.06, p = .048$, $\eta_p^2 = .019$, 90% CI [.0001, .046]. Zero-sum beliefs were significantly lower in the Positive condition, $M = 4.59$, $SD = 1.64$, than in the Baseline condition, $M = 5.07$, $SD = 1.58$, $t(319) = 2.31, p = .022$. Further, zero-sum beliefs were marginally lower in the Negative condition, $M = 4.72$, $SD = 1.38$, than in the baseline condition, $t(321) = 1.86, p = .064$. No significant contrast, however, was found between the Positive and Negative conditions, $t(321) = 0.49, p = .622$ (see Figure 17).

Probing for interactive effects on Zero-sum beliefs.

Glorification. In order to probe for interactive effects of glorification and condition, a general linear model (GLM) was constructed in which condition and glorification were treated as full factors, while attachment and political ideology were entered as covariates. While the omnibus main effect of condition remained significant, $F(2, 317) = 3.04, p = .049$, $\eta_p^2 = .019$, 90% CI [.000, .046], and a significant main effect of glorification was found whereby glorification predicted greater zero-sum beliefs, $b = .210$, $SE = .10$, $F(1, 317) = 4.30, p = .039$, $\eta_p^2 = .013$, 90% CI [.0003, .041], no significant interaction qualified these main effects, $F(2, 317) = 0.04, p = .963$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$, 90% CI [.000, .000].

Political ideology. Because political ideology appeared to be a more important influence upon zero-sum beliefs in Israel than in the U.S. samples, I also conducted an analysis probing for interactions of condition and political ideology upon zero-sum beliefs. I constructed a GLM in which condition and political ideology were entered as
full factors while attachment and glorification were entered as covariates. The main effect of condition remained marginally significant in this model, $F(2, 317) = 3.02, p = .050, \eta_p^2 = .019, 90\% CI [.000, .046]$, and there was a significant effect of political ideology such that greater conservatism predicted greater zero-sum beliefs, $b = .642, SE = .08, F(1, 317) = 61.16, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .162, 90\% CI [.103, .219]$. No significant interaction qualified these main effects, $F(2, 317) = 0.37, p = .693, \eta_p^2 = .002, 90\% CI [.000, .013]$.

**Condition effects on FENCE.** The same ANCOVA structure used to test for condition effects on zero-sum beliefs found no significant omnibus effect of condition was found on FENCE, $F(2, 319) = 0.75, p = .473, \eta_p^2 = .005, 90\% CI [.000, .020]$.

**Outcome Variables**

**Condition effects on outcome variables.** To test for effects of condition on outcome variables, I submitted each variable to an ANCOVA in which condition was a full factor while controlling for attachment, glorification, and political ideology (all centered).

Only one significant effect of condition was found. Specifically, a significant main effect of condition on support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies was found, $F(2, 319) = 3.71, p = .025, \eta_p^2 = .023, 90\% CI [.002, .052]$. Contrary to expectations, however, contrasts revealed that support for militaristic strategies was lower in the Negative framing condition, $M = 4.85, SD = 2.07$, than at baseline, $M = 5.39, SD = 2.11, t(319) = 2.28, p = .023$, or in the Positive framing condition, $M = 5.37, SD = 2.10, p = -2.42, p = .016$. Meanwhile, no significant contrast was found between the Baseline and Positive framing conditions, $t(319) = -0.27, p = .790$. No other omnibus condition effects were significant (see Table 5).
Interaction probing.

**Glorification.** I probed for interactions between condition and glorification by submitting each outcome variable to a general linear model (GLM) considering condition and glorification as full factors and attachment and political ideology as covariates. No interactions were significant.

**Political ideology.** I probed for interactions between condition and political ideology by submitting each outcome variable to a GLM considering condition and political ideology as full factors and attachment and glorification as covariates.

One significant interaction was detected. While condition had no significant main effect on how likely participants thought peace between Israelis and Palestinians in the near-future is, $F (2, 317) = 0.92, p = .400, \eta^2 = .006, 90\% \text{ CI} [.000, .023]$, and a significant effect was found whereby greater conservatism was associated with lower perceived peace likelihood, $b = -.494, SE = .11, F (1, 317) = 21.17, p < .001, \eta^2 = .063, 90\% \text{ CI} [.026, .108]$, a significant interaction was found, $F (2, 317) = 3.51, p = .031, \eta^2 = .022, 90\% \text{ CI} [.001, .050]$.

Decomposing this interaction revealed that among relatively left-leaning Israelis ($SD = -1$), peace was perceived as less likely among participants in the Negative Framing condition, $M = 2.79, SE = .24$, than among either participants in the Baseline condition, $M = 3.56, SE = .24, t (317) = -2.32, p = .021$, or participants in the Positive Framing condition, $M = 3.66, SE = .26, t (317) = 2.50, p = .013$. However, participants in the Positive framing condition did not differ from participants in the Negative framing condition, $t (317) = 0.29, p = .769$. In contrast, condition had no effects whatsoever among relatively right-leaning Israelis ($SD = +1$), who were comparable across the
Baseline \((M = 2.32, SE = .24)\), Negative framing \((M = 2.52, SE = .24)\), and Positive framing \((M = 2.21, SE = .27)\) conditions.

No other significant interactions between condition and political ideology were found.

**Indirect Effects**

Indirect effects of condition on outcome variables were measured using Hayes’s PROCESS (v4) Model 4, with 10,000 bootstrap samples and multiple comparisons, while controlling for attachment, glorification, and political ideology (all centered). Across all models, being in the Positive Framing condition (compared to the aggregate of the other two conditions) was associated with a significant decrease in zero-sum beliefs, \(b = -.432, SE = .19, t = -2.31, p = .022, 95\% CI [-.800, -.063]\), whereas being in the Negative Framing condition (compared to the aggregate of the other two conditions) was associated with a smaller, marginally significant decrease in zero-sum beliefs, \(b = -.337, SE = .18, t = -1.86, p = .064, 95\% CI [-.693, .019]\).

Significant indirect effects of condition (Positive Framing vs. the aggregate of other conditions) through zero-sum beliefs were found that decreased support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies, \(b = -.184, SE = .093, 95\% CI [-.387, -.021]\), dehumanization, \(b = -.076, SE = .04, 95\% CI [-.169, -.006]\), and hopelessness, \(b = -.205, SE = .096, 95\% CI [-.402, -.025]\). Analogous indirect effects were found whereby (via zero-sum beliefs) the Positive framing condition (compared to the aggregate of the other two conditions) increased support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies, \(b = .171, SE = .088, 95\% CI [.017, .358]\), support for state-level reconciliation, \(b = .147, SE = .075, 95\% CI [.016, .308]\), outgroup trust, \(b = .108, SE = .059, 95\% CI [.009, .235]\), support for
new agreements with Palestinians, $b = .228, SE = .11, 95\% \text{ CI } [.028, .453]$, and belief that peace with Palestinians is likely in the near future, $b = .098, SE = .06, 95\% \text{ CI } [.006, .231]$.

The specific bootstrap analyses used to generate these analyses did not yield any significant indirect effects of the Negative framing vs. the aggregate of other conditions on outcome variables through zero-sum beliefs; however, the confidence intervals for many approached significance, and it is not inconceivable that other random bootstrap samplings could show significant (if smaller) indirect effects (see Table 6). These analyses are visualized in Figures 18-22.

**Probing for moderated mediation (by glorification).** Using Hayes’s PROCESS (Model 8) with 10,000 bootstrap samples, considering condition as the independent variable, zero-sum beliefs as the mediator, glorification as the moderator, and attachment and political ideology as covariates, no evidence was found of moderated mediation of any indirect effects by glorification.

**Probing for moderated mediation (by political ideology).** Using Hayes’s PROCESS (Model 8) with 10,000 bootstrap samples, considering condition as the independent variable, zero-sum beliefs as the mediator, political ideology as the moderator, and attachment and glorification as covariates, no evidence was found of moderated mediation for any indirect effects by political ideology.

**Manipulation Materials Credibility Checks**

As in Studies 1 and 2, one-sample t-tests were used to evaluate whether participants in each manipulation condition (i.e., Positive Framing or Negative Framing conditions) found the article more or less believable or convincing than the scale
midpoint (5). Participants in the Negative framing condition found the article both more believable than the scale midpoint, $M = 5.69, SD = 1.94, t(107) = 3.69, p < .001, d = .356$, and more convincing than the scale midpoint, $M = 5.66, SD = 2.01, t(107) = 3.42, d = .328$. In contrast, participants in the Positive framing condition found the article both less believable, $M = 4.04, SD = 2.14, t(95) = -4.42, p < .001, d = -.449$, and less convincing, $M = 3.88, SD = 2.07, t(95) = -5.32, p < .001, d = -.541$, than the scale midpoint.

Consistent with these results, an ANCOVA considering condition as a full factor while entering attachment, glorification, and political ideology as covariates found that participants in the Negative framing condition found their prime both more believable, $F(1, 199) = 33.30, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .143, 90\% \text{ CI} [0.075, .215]$, and more convincing, $F(1, 199) = 39.18, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .165, 90\% \text{ CI} [0.091, .238]$, than participants in the Positive framing condition found theirs.

**Discussion**

Study 3 provided some evidence suggesting that in order for a peace process reminder to be effective in a context like the Israeli Palestinian conflict, the narrative needs to frame the peace reminder as a positive rather than as a negative. Across Study 3, being in the Positive Framing condition was associated with a significant reduction in zero-sum beliefs, and in the analyses that I conducted, significant indirect effects through zero-sum beliefs were only found among participants in the Positive Framing condition (compared to the aggregate of the other two conditions). However, Study 3 also found that being in the Negative Framing condition marginally reduced zero-sum beliefs compared to baseline, and found no significant difference between the Negative and
Positive Framing conditions. Further, while significant indirect effects on outcome variables were only found for the Positive Framing condition, the (non-significant) indirect effects for the Negative Framing condition (compared to the aggregate of other conditions) were 78% of the magnitude of those for the Positive Framing condition, and their 95% confidence intervals approach marginal significance, suggesting that different randomized bootstrap sampling or relaxed confidence intervals (e.g., 90%) could result in their significance. As such, it is not immediately clear from Study 3 whether the framing of the peace reminders that matters, or whether the presence of any reminder of past negotiations, whether framed as positive or negative peace, and whether framed as successful or failed, can reduce zero-sum beliefs and transmit indirect effects through this reduction. All these results consistently demonstrate is that if zero-sum beliefs are reduced, indirect effects on outcome variables are observed, even when controlling for attachment, glorification, and political ideology. That FENCE was once again unaffected, however, also suggests specificity to these effects.

Another key limitation is that (perhaps because both experimental conditions contained reminders of peace processes), the effect size I obtained for changes in zero-sum beliefs ($\eta^2_{p}=.019$) was slightly smaller than the minimum detectible effect suggested for this study by a sensitivity power analysis ($\eta^2_{p}=.028$). A second, more serious limitation is that the narratives we used were constructed by a non-Israeli team, albeit with Israeli supervision, and thus may lack ecological validity as stimuli. This is particularly concerning for the Positive Framing condition, as participants in Study 3 did not, on average, find this prime particularly believable or convincing. While participants in Studies 1 and 2 found the peace reminder condition less believable than the no
reminder condition, they did not outright distrust the prime, meaning that this condition is particularly troublesome as a comparison to the peace reminder condition in Studies 1 and 2. As such, in Study 4, I undertook exhaustive steps to rectify both of these limitations.
CHAPTER 5

STUDY 4

Study 3 suggested that even in a conflict context where participants are not ignorant of the conflict’s history and the conflict is of critical importance to their lives and that of their group, making past instances of negotiation and deal-making (i.e., “peace reminders”) salient through priming can reduce zero-sum beliefs, thereby transmitting indirect effects to conflict-relevant outcome variables. However, in Study 3, it is unclear whether how the reminder is framed (Positively or Negatively) matters—as even the Negative framing of a peace reminder had marginally significant reductions in zero-sum beliefs compared to baseline. Further, participants in Study 3 were skeptical of the Positive framing of the reminder—as such, the efficacy of the prime may be questionable. Further, there are some power concerns given participant attrition rates, so these marginally significant effects of the Negative framing may indeed represent smaller effects that are not detectible with Study 3’s sample size.

Study 4 moves beyond these limitations in two key ways. First, Study 4 recruited a much larger sample of Israeli Jews using Midgam Panels so as to have sufficient power to detect even small indirect effects. Second, rather than artificial primes constructed by researchers, Study 4 generated primes by selecting quotations from actual newspaper articles that were published contemporaneously with the episode of peacemaking participants were reminded of—the Oslo Accords. Using actual statements from Jewish Israeli authors, the primes for Study 4 consisted of lists of quotations about the Oslo Accords derived from actual news media, so as to use ecologically valid primes that Jewish Israeli participants would find more credible.
Method

Prime Creation Procedures

On March 6th, 2022, accompanied by Israeli collaborators and Israeli research assistant coders blind to the purpose of the study, visited the Beit Ariela Periodicals Library in Tel Aviv, Israel. This library contains a repository of Hebrew press articles dating from the 19th century to the present day in both physical and digital form, meaning that almost any article from a commonly circulated news outlet can be found there. Both physical press archives and digital repositories were searched for articles dated from 1992 (the year before the first of the Oslo Accords) to 2007 (two years after the ending of the Second Intifada). The specific publications searched for included Yedioth/Ynet, Ma’ariv, and Haaretz, as these reflected the most commonly circulated publications at the time and are still commonly read today. The following keywords were searched for:

- “Oslo”
- “Oslo Accords”
- “Oslo Process”
- “Peace Process”
- “Bilateral Agreements”
- “Stalemate”

From these searches and scans, research assistants were instructed to select articles that met the following criteria:
1. Are about the peace process (e.g., the main topic of the article is something to do with the peace process; it’s not enough for the article to simply mention the peace process in passing)

2. Touch upon the impacts of the peace process (broadly construed; this includes security impacts, impacts on relations between Israeli Jews and Arabs, economic impacts, the list goes on)

3. Are factually sound and meet basic journalistic standards. Opinion pieces/editorials are acceptable, but basic quality levels must be met.

4. Take the RAs themselves no more than 5 minutes to read if they’re just reading them casually.

A total of twenty-nine articles were selected using these keywords and meeting these criteria (see Appendix C for log sheets). Of these, 20 were sourced from Yedioth/Ynet (68.97%), 8 were sourced from Maariv (27.59%), and 1 was sourced from Haaretz (3.45%).

These articles were then coded by RAs according to a simple coding frame. Research assistants provided a simple yes/no dichotomous answer to the following 10 criteria:

1. Article explicitly name-drops the Oslo Accords

2. Article does NOT explicitly name-drop the Oslo Accords

3. Article expresses hope for future peace processes developing from the agreements between Israeli Jews and Palestinians.

4. Article expresses doubt or cynicism about the prospect of peace processes more
broadly

5. Article describes the conflict as zero-sum in nature.

6. Article criticizes the parameters of the Oslo Accords without insinuating the conflict is zero-sum in nature

7. Article describes a lack of forward motion; a stalemate

8. Article describes increases in security following the Oslo Accords

9. Article describes (at least temporary) improvements in relations between Israelis and Palestinians (Alternatively; acknowledgement of détente)

10. Article describes continued hostilities between Israelis and Palestinians

Interrater reliability was computed using Cohen’s Kappa for each of these criteria (see Table 7). Criteria 1, 2, and 4 demonstrated strong (κ > .80) interrater reliability; Criteria 5, 9, and 10 demonstrated moderate (κ between .60 and .79) interrater reliability; whereas Criteria 3, 7, and 8 demonstrated weak to no reliability whatsoever (see McHugh, 2012). Thus, on the basis of criteria 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, and 10, research assistants selected articles to pull quotations from for use in primes. Articles that were rated as “yes” on criteria 2, 4, 5, and 10 were deemed useful sources of potential quotations for the Negative Framing condition, whereas articles that were rated as “yes” on criteria 1 and 9 were deemed useful sources of potential quotations for the Positive Framing condition. Research assistants pulled 10 quotations each from these articles which were then looked over by Israeli experts with whom I collaborated, who then subjectively judged which 4 quotations for both the Negative Framing and Positive Framing to be
most useful as primes, resulting in the manipulation materials used in Study 4 (see Appendix C for materials).

Participants

Based on an *a priori* power analysis for obtaining 80% power, and the attrition rate observed in Study 3, and a minimum effect size of $\eta_p^2 = .012$, I aimed to recruit a representative sample of 1,000 Jewish Israelis via Midgam panel sampling (as in Study 3). I had complete or partial records from 1058 participants who did not withdraw their data, recruited on 4/10/2022. After data attrition, records were retained from 943 participants (10.87% exclusion rate). However, as participants could refuse to answer items, analyses of mediator and outcome variables were based on records from 778-813 participants, depending on the variable (i.e., 77.80-81.13% of the 1,000 that I aimed to recruit).

Among retained participants; Gender: 386 Men (49.49%), 394 Women (50.51%), no non-binary participants, 163 participants refused to answer; Born in Israel: 663 born in Israel (85.11%), 116 (14.89%) born abroad, 164 participants refused to answer; Age: 43.81, $SD = 15.61$, range: 18-74. Politically, participants were slightly to right (i.e., more conservative) of the scale midpoint (5), $M = 5.36$, $SD = 1.68$, $t (778) = 89.29$, $p < .001$, $d = .215$.

Materials

Many of the same scales used in Study 3 were copied verbatim to Study 4 (see Table 8 for descriptive statistics and reliabilities). However, as motivation to achieve firmly entrenched narrative closure (FENCE) had repeatedly demonstrated across Studies 1-3 that it did not function as a candidate mediator, I decide to investigate other potential
mediators in Study 4 that are particularly relevant to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that can be shifted, in part, through narratives (see Adelman et al., 2017; McLamore et al., 2019).

**Victimhood consciousness.** Four items each adapted from Vollhardt et al. (2015) measured inclusive victimhood consciousness (e.g., “Other groups in the world suffered in similar ways to Jews”), $M = 4.49$, $SD = 1.88$, $\alpha = .84$, and exclusive victimhood consciousness (e.g., “The suffering of the Jews is different from that of other groups”), $M = 6.67$, $SD = 1.84$, $\alpha = .87$. These items were all scored on 1 to 9 continuous visual analogue sliders, similar to all items used in previous studies.

**Perpetual ingroup victimhood orientation (PIVO).** This related construct to inclusive victimhood consciousness has been used in studies of Israelis as a result of collective trauma (see Schori-Eyal et al., 2017). Six items scored on visual Likert scales anchored at 1 (“totally disagree”) and 7 (“totally agree”) measured Perpetual ingroup victimhood orientation (PIVO), e.g., “Our existence as a group and as individuals is under constant threat,” “We must not rely on other countries and peoples”), $M = 5.56$, $SD = 1.22$, $\alpha = .886$.

**Temporal distance.** Because Study 4 used manipulation materials derived from older news articles, a single item measured subjective temporal distance from the Oslo Accords at the end of the questionnaire, “How close or far in time do you feel from the Oslo Accords?”, $M = 3.56$, $SD = 2.08$. 
Results

Data Attrition

As in previous studies, participants were excluded for being multivariate outliers \((n = 50)\), for writing incorrect summaries of article primes \((n = 21)\), and for failing attention checks asking about which conflict context the primes were about \((n = 56)\). A total of 115 participants were excluded from analysis using any combination of these criteria. Exclusion of participants was not evenly distributed between the Baseline condition \((n = 18)\), the Positive framing condition \((n = 58)\), and the Negative framing condition \((n = 39)\), \(\chi^2(2) = 24.590, p < .001\). Further, as in Study 3, participants were marginally more likely to be excluded in the Positive framing condition than in the Negative framing condition, \(\chi^2(1) = 2.87, p = .090\).

Preliminary

Predictors of zero-sum beliefs. As in prior studies, a multiple regression was conducted in which attachment, glorification, and political ideology (all centered) were entered as predictors of zero-sum beliefs. As in Study 3, the strongest predictor of zero-sum beliefs was political ideology (i.e., greater conservatism predicted greater zero-sum beliefs), \(b = .800, SE = .05, t (778) = 15.01, p < .001\), while glorification (controlling for all other terms) was a significant, but weaker, positive predictor of zero-sum beliefs, \(b = .280, SE = .07, t (778) = 4.29, p < .001\). Unlike Study 3, however, but like Studies 1 and 2, a significant effect was found of attachment whereby greater attachment predicted lower zero-sum beliefs, \(b = -.264, SE = .065, t (778) = -4.06, p < .001\).
**Condition effects on political ideology.** A one-way ANOVA found no significant condition effect on political ideology, $F(2, 776) = 0.19, p = .824, \eta_p^2=.001, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .004]$.

**Condition effects on Attachment and Glorification.** A one-way ANOVA found no significant omnibus effect on attachment, $F(2, 912) = 1.69, p = .185, \eta_p^2 = .004, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .012]$. However, there was a marginally significant omnibus effect on glorification, $F(2, 911) = 2.61, p = .074, \eta_p^2=.006, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .015]$. Contrasts suggested, however, that this was a consequence of glorification being higher in the baseline condition, $M = 5.86, SD = 1.37$, compared to either the Negative Framing condition, $M = 5.65, SD = 1.42, t(911) = 1.89, p = .059$, or the Positive Framing condition, $M = 5.64, SD = 1.53, t(911) = 2.00, p = .046$; the Positive and Negative Framing conditions did not differ from each other, $t(911) = -0.09, p = .931$. Given the large sample size, trivial effect size, and lack of difference in the focal conditions, this marginally significant omnibus effect was not taken to preclude probing for interactions by glorification.

**Condition effects on Zero-sum beliefs.** As in Study 3, I ran an ANCOVA considering condition as the main factor and entering attachment, glorification, and political ideology (all centered) as covariates to test for condition effects on zero-sum beliefs. A significant omnibus effect of condition on zero-sum beliefs was found, $F(2, 772) = 8.43, p < .001, \eta_p^2=.021, 90\% \text{ CI } [.007, .040]$. Zero-sum beliefs were significantly lower in the Positive Framing condition, $M = 4.61, SD = 1.56$, than in the Baseline condition, $M = 4.89, SD = 1.63, t(772) = -2.10, p = .036$, or the Negative Framing condition, $M = 5.09, SD = 1.62, t(772) = -4.11, p < .001$. Further, unlike in Study 3, zero-
sum beliefs were significantly higher in the Negative Framing condition than at Baseline, $t(772) = 2.36, p = .019$ (see Figure 23).

**Probing for interactive effects on Zero-sum beliefs.**

**Glorification.** In order to probe for interactive effects of glorification and condition, a general linear model (GLM) was constructed in which condition and glorification were treated as full factors, while attachment and political ideology were entered as covariates. While the omnibus main effect of condition on zero-sum beliefs remained significant, $F(2, 770) = 7.96, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .020, 90\% \text{ CI } [.006, .038]$, no significant interaction between condition and glorification was found, $F(2, 770) = 0.73, p = .482, \eta^2_p = .002, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .008]$.

**Political ideology.** In order to probe for interactive effects of glorification and condition, a general linear model (GLM) was constructed in which condition and political ideology were treated as full factors, while attachment and glorification were entered as covariates. While the omnibus main effect of condition remained significant, $F(2, 770) = 8.47, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .022, 90\% \text{ CI } [.007, .040]$, no significant interaction was found, $F(2, 770) = 0.58, p = .558, \eta^2_p = .002, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .007]$.

**Condition effects on victimhood variables.** ANCOVAs were constructed in which condition was entered as a factor while attachment, glorification, and political ideology (all centered) were entered as covariates for each victimhood-related variable.

**Exclusive victimhood consciousness.** No significant omnibus effect of condition was found on exclusive victimhood consciousness, $F(2, 772) = 1.33, p = .265, \eta^2_p = .003, 90\% \text{ CI } [.000, .012]$. 
**Inclusive victimhood consciousness.** No significant omnibus effect of condition was found on inclusive victimhood consciousness, $F(2, 722) = 1.53, p = .218, \eta^2_p =.004$, 90% CI [.000, .013].

**PIVO.** No significant omnibus effect of condition was found on PIVO, $F(2, 772) = 0.51, p = .598, \eta^2_p = .001$, 90% CI [.000, .007].

**Condition effects on temporal distance.** An ANCOVA controlling for attachment, glorification, and political ideology (all centered) found a marginally significant effect of condition on how temporally distant or proximal the Oslo Accords felt in time, $F(2, 771) = 2.94, p = .054, \eta^2_p = .008$, 90% CI [.000, .019]. The only significant contrast, however, was that participants in the Negative framing condition reported that the Oslo Accords felt closer in time, $M = 3.29, SD = 1.93$, than at baseline, $M = 3.69, SD = 2.12$, $t(771) = 2.42, p = .016$. Participants in the Positive framing condition, $M = 3.53, SD = 1.88$, did not differ from either participants at baseline, $t(771) = 1.01, p = .314$, or in the Negative framing condition, $t(771) = 1.36, p = .174$.

**Outcome Variables**

**Condition effects on outcome variables.** As in Study 3, I submitted each variable to an ANCOVA in which condition was a full factor while controlling for attachment, glorification, and political ideology (all centered). No significant omnibus effects of condition were found (see Table 9).

**Probing for interactions by glorification.** As in Study 3, I constructed general linear models (GLMs) in which condition and glorification were full factors while attachment and political ideology were controlled for to probe for interactions between condition and glorification. Two significant interactions were found.
**Dehumanization.** A significant interaction between condition and glorification was found on dehumanization of Palestinians, $F(2, 770) = 3.17, p = .043, \eta^2_p = .009, 90\%$ CI [.0001, .020], despite neither condition, $F(2, 770) = 1.82, p = .162, \eta^2_p = .005, 90\%$ CI [.000, .014], nor glorification, $b = .091, SE = .06, F(1, 770) = 2.42, p = .120, \eta^2_p = .003, 90\%$ CI [.000, .013] having significant main effects.

Decomposing the interaction revealed that among low glorifiers ($SD = -1$) dehumanization of Palestinians was lower in the Positive Framing condition, $M = 6.57, SE = .12$, than in the Baseline condition, $M = 7.04, SE = .11, t(770) = -3.03, p = .003$. Further, dehumanization also was marginally lower in the Negative Framing condition, $M = 6.74, SE = .12$, than at baseline, $t(770) = -1.88, p = .061$. However, dehumanization did not significantly differ between the Positive Framing and Negative Framing conditions, $t(770) = 1.08, p = .279$. In contrast, among high glorifiers ($SD = +1$), no significant differences were found between participants in the Baseline condition ($M = 6.93, SE = .10$), participants in the Positive Framing condition ($M = 7.01, SE = .12$), and participants in the Negative Framing condition ($M = 6.96, SE = .13$).

**Peace Likelihood.** A significant interaction between condition and glorification was found on how likely peace with Palestinians in the near future is, $F(2, 770) = 3.51, p = .031, \eta^2_p = .009, 90\%$ CI [.0004, .022]. Decomposing the interaction revealed that among low glorifiers ($SD = -1$), participants in the Positive Framing condition believed peace was more likely, $M = 2.86, SE = .16$, than in the Baseline condition, $M = 2.36, SE = .16, t(770) = -2.29, p = .023$, and marginally more than in the Negative Framing condition, $M = 2.44, SE = .17, t(770) = -1.87, p = .062$. No difference was found between participants in the Baseline and Negative Framing conditions, $t(770) = -0.340, p = .734$. In contrast,
among high glorifiers (SD = +1), no significant differences were found between participants in the Positive Framing condition (M = 2.76, SE = .17), the Baseline condition (M = 3.05, SE = .15), or the Negative Framing condition (M = 2.95, SE = .19).

**Probing for interactions by political ideology.** As in Study 3, I constructed general linear models (GLMs) in which condition and political ideology were full factors while attachment and glorification were controlled for to probe for interactions between condition and political ideology. Two interactions emerged.

**Support for militaristic strategies.** Despite the lack of a significant condition effect, $F(2, 770) = 1.95, p = .143, \eta^2_p = .005, 90\% \text{ CI}[.000, .015]$, a significant interaction between condition and political ideology was found, $F(2, 770) = 6.51, p = .002, \eta^2_p = .017, 90\% \text{ CI}[.004, .033]$. Decomposing the interaction revealed that among left-leaning Israelis (SD = -1), support for militaristic strategies was higher at baseline, $M = 5.10, SE = .13$, than among either participants in the Positive Framing condition, $M = 4.48, SE = .15, t(770) = -3.12, p = .002$, or participants in the Negative Framing condition, $M = 4.43, SE = .16, t(770) = -3.27, p = .001$. However, participants did not differ between the Framing conditions, $t(770) = -0.205, p = .837$. In contrast, support for militaristic strategies did not differ between the Baseline condition ($M = 7.23, SE = .13$), the Positive Framing condition ($M = 7.32, SE = .15$), and the Negative Framing condition ($M = 7.56, SE = .16$) among right-leaning Israelis (SD = +1).

**Hopelessness for peace with Palestinians.** A significant interaction between condition and political ideology was found, $F(2, 770) = 4.56, p = .012, \eta^2_p = .012, 90\% \text{ CI}[.002, .026]$. Among relatively left-leaning Israelis (SD = -1), hopelessness was lower in the Positive Framing condition, $M = 3.02, SE = .15$, than among participants in the
Baseline condition, $M = 3.50$, $SE = .13$, $t (770) = -2.50$, $p = .013$. No other significant contrasts were found. In contrast, among relatively right-leaning Israelis ($SD = +1$), hopelessness was higher in the Negative Framing condition, $M = 6.08$, $SE = .16$, than at baseline, $M = 5.54$, $SE = .13$, $t (770) = 2.65$, $p = .008$, and marginally higher than in the Positive Framing condition, $M = 5.66$, $SE = .15$, $t (770) = 1.92$, $p = .055$.

**Indirect Effects**

Indirect effects of condition on outcome variables through zero-sum beliefs were measured using Hayes’s PROCESS (v4) Model 4, with 10,000 bootstrap samples and multiple comparisons, while controlling for attachment, glorification, and political ideology (all centered). Single mediator models were analyzed, as no significant condition effects were observed on inclusive victimhood consciousness, exclusive victimhood consciousness, or PIVO. Across all analyses, being in the Positive Framing condition (compared to the aggregate of the other two conditions) was associated with significantly lower zero-sum beliefs, $b = -.243$, $SE = .12$, $t = -2.10$, $p = .036$, 95% CI [-.470, -.016], whereas being in the Negative Framing condition (compared to the aggregate of the other two conditions) was associated with significantly higher zero-sum beliefs, $b = .283$, $SE = .12$, $t = 2.36$, $p = .019$, 95% CI [.048, .519].

Being in the Positive Framing condition (compared to the aggregate of the other two conditions) had significant indirect effects via zero-sum beliefs that reduced support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies, $b = -.119$, $SE = .06$, 95% CI [-.236, -.012], hopelessness about peace with Palestinians, $b = -.147$, $SE = .07$, 95% CI [-.283, -.015], and dehumanization of Palestinians, $b = -.055$, $SE = .03$, 95% CI [-.111, -.006]. Analogous indirect effects were found through zero-sum beliefs that increased support
for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies, $b = .133$, $SE = .07$, 95% CI [.006, .267], support for state-level reconciliation, $b = .123$, $SE = .06$, 95% CI [.013, .239], trust of Palestinians, $b = .079$, $SE = .04$, 95% CI [.008, .155], support for new agreements with Palestinians, $b = .144$, $SE = .07$, 95% CI [.011, .287], and belief that peace with Palestinians is likely in the near future, $b = .042$, $SE = .02$, 95% CI [.004, .095].

Conversely, being in the Negative Framing condition (compared to the aggregate of the other two conditions) had significant indirect effects that inverted those of the Positive Framing condition. Being in the Negative Framing condition indirectly increased support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies, $b = .139$, $SE = .06$, 95% CI [.020, .253], hopelessness, $b = .171$, $SE = .08$, 95% CI [.024, .318], and dehumanization, $b = .064$, $SE = .03$, 95% CI [.009, .122]. Analogous indirect effects were found through zero-sum beliefs that decreased support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies, $b = -.163$, $SE = .07$, 95% CI [-.305, -.028], support for state-level reconciliation, $b = -.144$, $SE = .06$, 95% CI [-.269, -.021], trust of Palestinians, $b = -.092$, $SE = .04$, 95% CI [-.170, -.013], support for new agreements with Palestinians, $b = -.171$, $SE = .08$, 95% CI [-.322, -.025], and belief that peace with Palestinians is likely in the near future, $b = -.049$, $SE = .03$, 95% CI [-.106, -.006].

These results are visualized in Figures 24-28.

**Probing for moderated mediation (by glorification).** Using Hayes’s PROCESS (Model 8) with 10,000 bootstrap samples, considering condition as the independent variable, zero-sum beliefs as the mediator, glorification as the moderator, and attachment and political ideology as covariates, no evidence was found of moderated mediation of any indirect effects by glorification, as in Study 3.
**Probing for moderated mediation (by political ideology).** Using Hayes’s PROCESS (Model 8) with 10,000 bootstrap samples, considering condition as the independent variable, zero-sum beliefs as the mediator, political ideology as the moderator, and attachment and glorification as covariates, no evidence was found of moderated mediation for any indirect effects by political ideology, as in Study 3.

**Manipulation Materials Credibility Checks**

As in previous studies, one-sample t-tests were used to evaluate whether participants in each manipulation condition (i.e., Positive Framing or Negative Framing conditions) found the article more or less believable or convincing than the scale midpoint (5). As in Study 3, participants in the Negative framing condition found the article both more believable than the scale midpoint, \( M = 5.80, SD = 1.88, t (212) = 6.26, p < .001, d = .429 \), and more convincing than the scale midpoint, \( M = 5.64, SD = 1.95, t (213) = 4.76, d = .325 \). Unlike in Study 3, participants in the Positive framing did not particularly disbelieve their article prime, with their mean being marginally higher than the scale midpoint, \( M = 5.24, SD = 2.06, t (236) = 1.78, p = .076, d = .116 \), and did not necessarily find the prime unconvincing, as their mean did not significantly differ from the scale midpoint, \( M = 5.05, SD = 2.15, t (235) = 0.38, p = .701, d = .025 \).

As in Study 3, an ANCOVA considering condition as a full factor while entering attachment, glorification, and political ideology as covariates found that participants in the Negative framing condition found their prime both more believable, \( F (1, 444) = 10.68, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .024, 90\% \text{ CI} [.006, .051] \), and more convincing, \( F (1, 444) = 10.51, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .023, 90\% \text{ CI} [.005, .051] \), than participants in the Positive framing condition found theirs.
Discussion

The results suggest that Study 4 improved upon Study 3’s lack of ecological validity in that while participants in Study 3 were overtly skeptical of the Positive Framing condition, participants in Study 4 were not. Moreover, while participants in Study 4 found the Negative Framing condition more believable and convincing than the Positive Framing condition, the effect size of that difference was drastically smaller than in Study 3, and comparable to those of Studies 1 and 2. With these stimuli—ultimately created using quotations from news articles searched, selected, and qualitatively analyzed by Israeli research assistants—and a much larger sample size, the results of Study 4 differ from those of Study 3, but should be considered much more robust.

That said, the main finding of Study 3—that zero-sum beliefs were reduced in the Positive Framing condition compared to baseline—was replicated in Study 4. Further, all indirect effects observed through the reduction in zero-sum beliefs in the Positive Framing condition were also replicated from Study 3 to Study 4, and replicated with comparable magnitudes. What differed between Study 3 and Study 4 was that participants in Study 4’s Negative Framing condition had increased zero-sum beliefs compared to baseline, and that these increased zero-sum beliefs transmitted indirect effects of the Negative Framing condition that increased conflict-supporting variables (e.g., militaristic strategies, hopelessness) while decreasing conflict-attenuating ones (e.g., diplomatic strategies, support for new agreements). Crucially, exclusive victimhood consciousness, inclusive victimhood consciousness, and PIVO were all not significantly affected by condition—suggesting a specificity of such manipulations to zero-sum beliefs.
That these findings were observed irrespective of either glorification or political ideology, and that neither moderated these indirect effects, suggests two things. First, these results reinforce that zero-sum beliefs are malleable in response to narrative framings of past peace processes, and that this malleability extends to downstream variables. Second, it is crucial that the stimuli used in studying this phenomenon demonstrate ecological validity and are comparable to narratives that participants might encounter in their daily lives. Researchers have highlighted that news media can play a role in promoting conflict-supporting hegemonic narratives (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008, Bar-Tal and Sharvit, 2007b; Hoxha & Hanitzsch, 2017); that Study 4’s manipulations (i.e., quotations from actual news media) promoted zero-sum beliefs whereas the lab-based constructed article used in Study 3 did not suggests not only that news media promotes zero-sum beliefs through hegemonic narratives, but that without using such ecologically valid stimuli, researchers might not be able to observe these effects. One key limitation of Study 4, however, is that while the process used to determine the content of news stimuli was grounded in principles of qualitative analysis (see Schreier, 2012), it was restricted to the articles that the repository had available and was based exclusively on selective content from these articles removed from its original context; as such, it is not clear from Study 4 what these primes would do to newspaper readers in context.
CHAPTER 6

GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Across all four studies, I found evidence that, as hypothesized, zero-sum beliefs are malleable in response to narratives that discuss past peace processes. The findings of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that when such a comparison is possible, narratives that inform their readers of past peace processes existing can reduce zero-sum beliefs compared to narratives that make no such mention of peace processes, or to baseline. Studies 3 and 4 further suggest that, in contexts where outright omission of peace processes is impossible, narratives that frame the peace process positively can reduce zero-sum beliefs compared to baseline, whereas narratives that frame the peace process negatively may not. Study 4 in particular suggests, using far more ecologically valid primes than Study 3, that narratives that frame past peace processes negatively may actually foster greater zero-sum beliefs. These patterns are summarized together in Table 10.

Crucially, Studies 1-3 found that narrative primes affected zero-sum beliefs specifically rather than motivation to adhere to traditional narratives (FENCE; Klar & Baram, 2016), and Study 4 found evidence that narratives focused on the recollection of past peace processes shifted zero-sum beliefs, but not inclusive or exclusive victimhood consciousness or perpetual victimhood orientation—suggesting that the indirect effects that were observed are attributable to shifts in zero-sum beliefs rather than other possible explanations. That zero-sum beliefs were, across all our studies, positively associated with conflict-promoting variables (e.g., militaristic conflict resolution strategies, dehumanization, hopelessness) and negatively associated with conflict-attenuating variables (e.g., diplomatic conflict resolution strategies, support for state-level
reconciliation, support for new agreements, outgroup trust) is grounded in precedent from existing literature (e.g., Ben Hagai et al., 2013; Ben Hagai et al., 2018; Ben Hagai & Zurbriggen, 2019; Klar & Baram, 2016; Różycka-Tran et al., 2019). That media could promote zero-sum beliefs has been theoretically argued by conflict scholars in the past (e.g., Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008; 2007b, Kelman, 2007). These studies substantiate these past arguments in empirical designs, and by shifting zero-sum beliefs, shift outcomes that prior literature has demonstrated are connected to zero-sum beliefs about a conflict. By doing so, these studies are firmly rooted in existing literature that nevertheless advances the current understanding in a new direction with consistent evidence.

That the subtotal of all four studies suggests no evidence whatsoever for moderation of either condition effects on zero-sum beliefs or indirect effects of condition on outcome variables through zero-sum beliefs by either glorification or political ideology hints that the processes observed apply across participants regardless of their political ideology or modality of national identification. From an applied perspective, this is encouraging, as other mechanisms for intervention in conflict contexts are often less useful among people who are relatively high in glorification (e.g., Li et al., 2016; Adelman et al., 2016; Rovenpor et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018; Li et al., 2021; Leidner, 2015) or who are particularly hawkish (Nasie et al., 2014). Because this does not appear to be the case for the mechanism observed in these studies, narrative-based interventions targeting zero-sum beliefs rather than victimhood or suffering may be efficacious among high glorifiers where other efforts have been less so.
Peace Process Reminders in Context as Narrative-Based Interventions

Ultimately, many existing and well-studied psychological interventions for members of groups in conflict draw from the concept of conflict narratives. Bar-Tal (2007), Kelman (2007), and Oren et al. (2015) explicitly identify conflict-supporting hegemonic narratives as a key component of a sociopsychological infrastructure that keeps conflicts intractable. Adwan and colleagues (2016), Bar-Tal & Sharvit (2007a; 2007b) identify mechanisms in education and mass media (particularly news media) by which such narratives are distributed. As such arguments largely originated from studies of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they also often point out that the narratives of Jewish Israelis and Palestinians are mutually contradictory on even basic facts and are structured so as to negate one another (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Based on this observation, many past narrative-based peace-building interventions have focused on attempting to reconcile such contradictory narratives or by exposure to outgroup narratives (e.g., Kupermintz & Salomon, 2005; Oren et al., 2015; Bar-On & Kassem, 2004; Bar-On, 2010; Ron & Maoz, 2013; Ben Hagai et al., 2013a; see also Garagozov & Gadirova, 2019) both within and outside the Israeli-Palestinian context. Bilali (2022) in particular utilized a full-scale radio drama to create a narrative intervention in the Sahel region of Burkina Faso based on prior interventions showing similar effects in post-genocide Rwanda (Bilai & Vollhardt, 2013).

Other narrative-based interventions focus specifically on victimhood and victimhood consciousness (Noor et al., 2012; Shnabel et al., 2013; Noor et al., 2017; Vollhardt et al., 2009; Vollhardt, 2015; Vollhardt et al., 2021). These interventions highlight that exclusive victimhood consciousness and competitive victimhood can
obstruct efforts for peace-making, even ones rooted in narrative sharing, as exclusive victimhood, particularly among more advantaged groups in an asymmetric conflict, can lead to unwillingness to reconcile with the adversarial group or pursue any forms of justice that may come at the expense of ingroup members (see Noor et al., 2012; Bilali & Ross, 2012; Vollhardt et al., 2021). While inclusive victimhood consciousness is not a cure-all, particularly as there are potential for backfire effects, overcoming the psychological barriers that competitive, exclusive victimhood represents appears to be conflict-attenuating (Shnabel et al., 2013; McLamore et al., 2019; Vollhardt et al., 2021).

Both of these intervention types function by targeting what are conceptually downstream consequences of hegemonic conflict narratives—denial of the outgroup’s narrative and competitive/exclusive victimhood. In this context, the current research represents an expansion of this basic principle that targets another consequence of hegemonic conflict narratives—zero-sum beliefs. The current research supplements (rather than supersedes) these approaches by examining how efforts at peace processes are folded into memories of the past that contextualize the present as well as (not instead of) memories of violence and conflict—particularly as researchers studying conflict education have identified zero-sum thinking as an obstacle for the effectiveness of interventions (Maoz & McCauley, 2005, 2009; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007). Such efforts may be important even beyond the contexts of active protracted conflict. Conflict scholars focused on Northern Ireland note that zero-sum beliefs can obstruct continued negotiation even after conflict has ended (e.g. Mac Ginty, Muldoon, & Ferguson, 2007). Further, Li and colleagues (2016) have found that reminders of past episodes of violence can increase aggressive tendencies and conflict intentions toward completely unrelated
groups—might narrative framings of past peace processes also have effects even beyond their conflict context?

**Limitations and Future Directions**

One limitation of these findings—even those of Study 4—is the ecological validity of the manipulations. While real news quotations were used for manipulation materials in Study 4, and while news media reproduces and articulates hegemonic conflict narratives (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008; 2007b; Hoxha & Hanitzsch, 2017), the materials used were only out-of-context quotations from whole articles. Further, the article primes used in Studies 1 and 2 only discussed the presence or absence of peace processes without additional editorializing. Actual news coverage, however, does not do this, and is not constrained to one specific dimension of conflict narratives that a research team is studying. Actual media coverage can communicate many aspects of conflict narratives simultaneously—competitive victimhood, zero-sum beliefs, denial of outgroup narratives—and their inverse. Textbooks reproducing hegemonic conflict narratives can do so throughout their entire text (Adwan et al., 2016). These realities suggest an important question for future research: what happens when (as actual media and textbooks often do) multiple dimensions of a conflict narrative are primed? Do competitive victimhood and zero-sum beliefs exert joint indirect effects? What happens if one is primed, but not the other? Future research should not only aim to replicate and extend these findings on zero-sum beliefs, but investigate how they interface with the broad literature on narrative manipulations of victimhood and recollections of suffering. One direction in which research could do this is an exhaustive analysis of how peace processes are discussed in textbooks, as these are a key means through which hegemonic
narratives are reproduced (Adwan et al., 2016; Obradovic, 2016; Hakokongas & Sakki, 2016; Maoz, Freedman, & McCauley, 2010).

The most important limitation of these findings, however, is one shared by many studies of conflict: they are exclusively drawn from members of the advantaged party in an intergroup conflict. As Vollhardt and colleagues (2021) point out, a wealth of recent literature suggests that approaches that are ostensibly beneficial for advantaged groups in that they reduce support for conflict escalation may have a delegitimizing or even pacifying effect on members of disadvantaged groups (see Dixon et al., 2012; Adelman et al., 2016; Saguy et al., 2009). While inclusive victimhood can (under the right circumstances) be beneficial for members of disadvantaged groups (e.g., Black Americans, Palestinians), these circumstances must also be mindful of existing structural realities and psychological needs that these groups have that advantaged groups may not have (Cohrs et al., 2015; Twali et al. 2020; Vollhardt et al., 2021). Prior to applying these findings in any type of workshop or direct intervention, I argue that they must be tested for potential negative impacts upon members of less advantaged parties in intergroup conflicts.

**Conclusion**

Drawing from a broad literature within peace psychology that approaches intractable conflicts from the perspective of conflict narratives (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2007; Maoz & McCauley, 2005; Maoz & Eidelson, 2007) and multiple studies that utilize alternative narrative frameworks to shift attitudes toward conflict (Shnabel et al., 2013; Adelman et al., 2016; McLamore et al., 2019), these findings suggest that narrative reminders of peace processes, if framed in positive (or at least, not overly negative) ways, can reduce
zero-sum beliefs. These findings, taken together, further suggest that if zero-sum beliefs are reduced through narratives, they can transmit indirect effects of narratives that are conflict-attenuating. Study 4 also finds evidence that this process can work in the reverse direction—that negative framings of past peace processes in narratives can increase zero-sum beliefs, thereby transmitting effects that are conflict-exacerbating.

In context with existing literature on narrative-based conflict interventions, these studies suggest that examining how attempts at peacemaking are remembered may prove just as fruitful a direction as examining how victimhood, violence, and suffering are remembered. Study 4 in particular suggests that the effects observed operate separately from these types of interventions. I argue that, should future research find that interventions targeting zero-sum beliefs through narrative reminders of peace processes be free of unintentional, harmful effects upon members of disadvantaged conflict parties, future interventions should focus on reducing zero-sum beliefs about conflict outcomes as well as on reducing competitive victimhood and constructing consensus narratives. By doing so, future interventions can more comprehensively overcome the effects of hegemonic conflict narratives that pose obstacles to just and lasting peace.
APPENDIX A: FIGURES

Figure 1. Effects of condition upon zero-sum beliefs in Study 1. ***; $p < .001$, **; $p < .01$; *; $p < .05$. 
Figure 2. Indirect effects of condition (dummy coded for multiple comparisons) through zero-sum beliefs on support for militaristic policies. Solid black lines with bolded coefficients represent significant paths, dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. *

$p < .05$, **

$p < .01$, ***

$p < .001$. 
Figure 3. Indirect effects of condition (dummy coded for multiple comparisons) through zero-sum beliefs on moral dehumanization of North Koreans. Solid black lines with bolded coefficients represent significant paths, dashed lines indicate non-significant paths, solid gray paths indicate marginally significant paths. †; p < .10, *; p < .05, **; p < .01, ***; p < .001.
**Figure 4.** Indirect effects of condition (dummy coded for multiple comparisons) through zero-sum beliefs on hopelessness for peace with North Korea. Solid black lines with bolded coefficients represent significant paths, dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. *; $p < .05$, **; $p < .01$, ***; $p < .001$. 
**Figure 5.** Indirect effects of condition (dummy coded for multiple comparisons) through zero-sum beliefs on support for diplomatic strategies in conflict resolution with North Korea. Solid black lines with bolded coefficients represent significant paths, dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. *; $p < .05$, **; $p < .01$, ***; $p < .001$. 
Figure 6. Indirect effects of condition (dummy coded for multiple comparisons) through zero-sum beliefs on support for state-level reconciliation with North Korea. Solid black lines with bolded coefficients represent significant paths, dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. *, *p < .05, **, p < .01, ***, p < .001.
Figure 7. Indirect effects of condition (dummy coded for multiple comparisons) through zero-sum beliefs on support for new agreements with North Korea. Solid black lines with bolded coefficients represent significant paths, dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. *, $p < .05$; **, $p < .01$; ***, $p < .001$. 
Figure 8. Unexpected indirect effects of condition (dummy coded for multiple comparisons) through zero-sum beliefs on cultural dehumanization of North Koreans. Solid black lines with bolded coefficients represent significant paths, dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. *; $p < .05$, **; $p < .01$, ***; $p < .001$. 
Figure 9. Effects of condition upon zero-sum beliefs in Study 2. **; $p < .01$. 
**Figure 10.** Indirect effect of condition on support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies through zero-sum beliefs. Solid lines indicate significant paths; solid dark gray lines indicate marginally significant paths; dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. †; \( p < .10 \), *; \( p < .05 \), **; \( p < .01 \), ***; \( p < .001 \).
**Figure 11.** Indirect effect of condition on moral dehumanization through zero-sum beliefs. Solid lines indicate significant paths; solid dark gray lines indicate marginally significant paths; dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. †; $p < .10$, *; $p < .05$, **; $p < .01$, ***; $p < .001$. 
Figure 12. Indirect effect of condition on hopelessness for peace with North Korea through zero-sum beliefs. Solid lines indicate significant paths; solid dark gray lines indicate marginally significant paths; dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. †; p < .10, *; p < .05, **; p < .01, ***; p < .001.
Figure 13. Indirect effect of condition on support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies through zero-sum beliefs. Solid lines indicate significant paths; solid dark gray lines indicate marginally significant paths; dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. †; $p < .10$, *; $p < .05$, **; $p < .01$, ***; $p < .001$. 
Figure 14. Indirect effect of condition on support for state-level reconciliation through zero-sum beliefs. Solid lines indicate significant paths; solid dark gray lines indicate marginally significant paths; dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. †; $p < .10$, *; $p < .05$, **; $p < .01$, ***; $p < .001$. 
Figure 15. Indirect effect of condition on support new agreements with North Korea through zero-sum beliefs. Solid lines indicate significant paths; solid dark gray lines indicate marginally significant paths; dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. †; $p < .10$, *, $p < .05$, **, $p < .01$, ***, $p < .001$. 
**Figure 16.** Indirect effect of condition cultural dehumanization through zero-sum beliefs. Solid lines indicate significant paths; solid dark gray lines indicate marginally significant paths; dashed lines indicate non-significant paths. †; \( p < .10 \), *; \( p < .05 \), **; \( p < .01 \), ***; \( p < .001 \).
Figure 17. Effects of condition upon zero-sum beliefs in Study 3. †; $p < .10$. *; $p < .05$. 
Figure 18. Indirect effects of the Positive Framing condition on (A) support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies and (B) hopelessness about peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through zero-sum beliefs in Study 3. †; p < .10, *; p < .05, **; p < .10, ***; p < .001. Solid lines represent significant paths, dashed lines represent non-significant paths. Model terms that are not part of a significant indirect effect (but are controlled for throughout) are grayed out.
Figure 19. Indirect effects of the Positive Framing condition on dehumanization of Palestinians through zero-sum beliefs in Study 3. †; *; $p < .10$, **; $p < .05$, ***; $p < .10$, ***; $p < .001$. Solid lines represent significant paths, dashed lines represent non-significant paths. Model terms that are not part of a significant indirect effect (but are controlled for throughout) are grayed out.
Figure 20. Indirect effects of the Positive Framing condition on (A) support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies and (B) support for state-level reconciliation through zero-sum beliefs in Study 3. †; p < .10, *, p < .05, **, p < .10, ***. p < .001. Solid lines represent significant paths, dashed lines represent non-significant paths. Model terms that are not part of a significant indirect effect (but are controlled for throughout) are grayed out.
Figure 21. Indirect effects of the Positive Framing condition on (A) support for new agreements and (B) perceived peace likelihood in the near-future through zero-sum beliefs in Study 3. †; $p < .10$, *; $p < .05$, **; $p < .10$, ***; $p < .001$. Solid lines represent significant paths, dashed lines represent non-significant paths. Model terms that are not part of a significant indirect effect (but are controlled for throughout) are grayed out.
Figure 22. Indirect effects of the Positive Framing condition on trust of Palestinians through zero-sum beliefs in Study 3. †; * p < .10,  * p < .05,  ** p < .10,  *** p < .001. Solid lines represent significant paths, dashed lines represent non-significant paths. Model terms that are not part of a significant indirect effect (but are controlled for throughout) are grayed out.
Figure 23. Condition effects on zero-sum beliefs in Study 4. *; $p < .05$, ***; $p < .001$. 
Figure 24. Indirect effects of the Positive Framing condition on (A) support for militaristic conflict resolution strategies and (B) hopelessness about peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through zero-sum beliefs in Study 4. *, $p < .05$, **, $p < .10$, ***, $p < .001$. Solid lines represent significant paths, dashed lines represent non-significant paths.
Figure 25. Indirect effects of the Positive Framing condition on dehumanization of Palestinians through zero-sum beliefs in Study 3. †; p < .10, *; p < .05, **; p < .10, ***; p < .001. Solid lines represent significant paths, dashed lines represent non-significant paths; dark gray solid paths represent marginally significant paths.
Figure 26. Indirect effects of the Positive Framing condition on (A) support for diplomatic conflict resolution strategies and (B) support for state-level reconciliation through zero-sum beliefs in Study 4. *, $p < .05$; **, $p < .10$; ***, $p < .001$. Solid lines represent significant paths, dashed lines represent non-significant paths.
Figure 27. Indirect effects of the Positive Framing condition on (A) support for new agreements with Palestinians and (B) perceived likelihood of peace with Palestinians in the near-future through zero-sum beliefs in Study 4. *, p < .05, **, p < .10, ***, p < .001. Solid lines represent significant paths, dashed lines represent non-significant paths.
Figure 28. Indirect effects of the Positive Framing condition on trust of Palestinians (outgroup trust) through zero-sum beliefs in Study 4. *; $p < .05$, **; $p < .10$, ***; $p < .001$. Solid lines represent significant paths, dashed lines represent non-significant paths.
APPENDIX B: TABLES

Table 1
*Indirect Effects of Condition (No Reminder vs. Other Conditions) Through Zero-Sum Beliefs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$SE$</th>
<th>LLCI</th>
<th>ULCI</th>
<th>Size comparison by percentage to Indirect Effect of Condition (Peace Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for Militaristic Strategies</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.377</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>53.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Dehumanization</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.174</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>53.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopelessness</td>
<td>-0.217</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.368</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>53.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Diplomatic Strategies</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>53.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for State-Level Reconciliation</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>53.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for New Agreements</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>53.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Dehumanization</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>53.91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2
*Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities: Study 2*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attachment</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glorification</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero-Sum Beliefs</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FENCE</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopelessness</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Diplomatic Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution Strategies</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Militaristic Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution Strategies</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for State-Level Reconciliation</td>
<td>6.74</td>
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<td>Moral Dehumanization</td>
<td>5.16</td>
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<td>0.70</td>
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<td>Cultural Dehumanization</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup Trust</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Likelihood</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>N/A  (single-item)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Support</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>N/A  (single-item)</td>
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### Table 3

*Indirect Effects of Condition through Zero-Sum Beliefs, Study 2*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>LLCI</th>
<th>ULCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for Diplomatic Conflict Resolution</strong></td>
<td>X1 (Peace Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td><strong>0.109</strong></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td><strong>0.037</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.189</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X2 (No Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for State-Level Reconciliation</strong></td>
<td>X1 (Peace Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td><strong>0.105</strong></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td><strong>0.035</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.191</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X2 (No Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agreement Support</strong></td>
<td>X1 (Peace Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td><strong>0.120</strong></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td><strong>0.041</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.212</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X2 (No Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Dehumanization</strong></td>
<td>X1 (Peace Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td><strong>0.057</strong></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td><strong>0.008</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.122</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X2 (No Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for Militaristic Conflict Resolution Strategies</strong></td>
<td>X1 (Peace Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td>-0.239</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.393</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X2 (No Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moral Dehumanization</strong></td>
<td>X1 (Peace Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.220</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X2 (No Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hopelessness</strong></td>
<td>X1 (Peace Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.351</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X2 (No Reminder vs. Other Conditions)</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
<td>0.161</td>
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Significant indirect effects are **bolded.**
Table 4  
*Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities, Study 3*

<table>
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<th>$\alpha$</th>
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<td>Attachment</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>0.94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Glorification</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero-Sum Beliefs</td>
<td>4.83</td>
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<td>0.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>FENCE</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hopelessness</td>
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<td>0.86</td>
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<td>6.05</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
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<td>Support for Militaristic Conflict Resolution Strategies</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for State-Level Reconciliation</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanization</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outgroup Trust</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
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<td>Peace Likelihood</td>
<td>2.89</td>
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<td>2.60</td>
<td>N/A (single-item)</td>
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Table 5
ANCOVA Results for Outcome Variables, Study 3

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>$p$</th>
<th>$\eta^2$</th>
<th>LLCI</th>
<th>ULCI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for Diplomatic Conflict Resolution Strategies</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>(2, 319)</td>
<td>0.706</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopelessness</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>(2, 319)</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for State-Level Reconciliation</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>(2, 319)</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanization</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>(2, 319)</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup Trust</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>(2, 319)</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Likelihood</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>(2, 319)</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Support</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>(2, 319)</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.021</td>
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</table>
Table 6
*Indirect Effects of Condition (Negative Framing vs. Other Conditions) through Zero-sum beliefs, Study 3*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>LLCI</th>
<th>ULCI</th>
<th>Percentage of Positive Framing vs. Other Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for militaristic</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.316</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>78.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>strategies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopelessness</td>
<td>-0.160</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.341</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>78.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanization</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.138</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>78.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for diplomatic</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>78.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strategies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for state-level</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>78.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for New Agreements</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>78.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>78.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup Trust</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>78.14</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 7

*Interrater Reliability for Article Coding in Study 4*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Percent Agreement</th>
<th>Cohen's κ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Article explicitly name-drops the Oslo Accords</td>
<td>93.10</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Article does NOT explicitly name-drop the Oslo Accords</td>
<td>93.10</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Article expresses hope for future peace processes developing from the agreements between Israeli Jews and Palestinians.</td>
<td>79.31</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Article expresses doubt or cynicism about the prospect of peace processes more broadly</td>
<td>96.55</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Article describes the conflict as zero-sum in nature.</td>
<td>93.10</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Article criticizes the parameters of the Oslo Accords without insinuating the conflict is zero-sum in nature</td>
<td>82.76</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Article describes a lack of forward motion; a stalemate</td>
<td>65.52</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Article describes increases in security following the Oslo Accords</td>
<td>86.21</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Article describes (at least temporary) improvements in relations between. Israelis and Palestinians (Alternatively; acknowledgement of détente)</td>
<td>86.21</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Article describes continued hostilities between Israelis and Palestinians</td>
<td>86.21</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interrater reliability for article coding in Study 4. Criterion that demonstrate at least moderate interrater reliability are **bolded.**
Table 8
Descriptive Statistics and Reliabilities, Study 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attachment</td>
<td>7.37</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glorification</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero-Sum Beliefs</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopelessness</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Diplomatic Conflict Resolution Strategies</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>0.94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support for Militaristic Conflict Resolution Strategies</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for State-Level Reconciliation</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanization</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup Trust</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Likelihood</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>N/A (single-item)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Support</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>N/A (single-item)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9
*ANCOVA Results for Outcome Variables, Study 4*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$F$</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$\eta_p^2$</th>
<th>LLCI</th>
<th>ULCI</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for Diplomatic Conflict Resolution Strategies</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>(2, 771)</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Militaristic Conflict Resolution Strategies</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>(2, 772)</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopelessness</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>(2, 772)</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for State-Level Reconciliation</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>(2, 772)</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanization</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>(2, 772)</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup Trust</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>(2, 772)</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Likelihood</td>
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<td>(2, 772)</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Support</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>(2, 770)</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 10
*Cross-Study Comparison of Main Effects on Zero-Sum Beliefs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Study 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline vs. Peace Reminder</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.96 (1.55)</strong> vs. <strong>3.98 (1.58)</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.44 (1.62)</strong> vs. <strong>3.91 (1.48)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( t (517) = 5.21, p &lt; .001 )</td>
<td>( t (562) = 3.11, p = .002 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline vs. No Reminder</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.96 (1.55)</strong> vs. <strong>4.37 (1.42)</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.44 (1.62)</strong> vs. <strong>4.34 (1.56)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( t (517) = 2.87, p = .004 )</td>
<td>( t (562) = -0.33, p = .741 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Reminder vs. Peace Reminder</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.37 (1.42)</strong> vs. <strong>3.98 (1.58)</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.34 (1.62)</strong> vs. <strong>3.91 (1.48)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( t (517) = 2.11, p = .035 )</td>
<td>( t (562) = 3.26, p = .001 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                                | Study 3                          | Study 4                          |
| **Baseline vs. Positive Framing** | **5.07 (1.58)** vs. **4.59 (1.64)** | **4.89 (1.63)** vs. **4.61 (1.56)** |
|                                | \( t (319) = 2.31, p = .022 \)   | \( t (772) = -2.10, p = .036 \)   |
| **Baseline vs. Negative Framing** | **5.07 (1.58)** vs. **4.72 (1.38)** | **4.89 (1.63)** vs. **5.09 (1.62)** |
|                                | \( t (319) = 1.86, p = .064 \)   | \( t (772) = 2.36, p = .019 \)   |
| **Negative Framing vs. Positive Framing** | **4.72 (1.38)** vs. **4.59 (1.64)** | **5.09 (1.62)** vs. **4.61 (1.56)** |
|                                | \( t (319) = 0.49, p = .622 \)   | \( t (772) = -4.11, p < .001 \)   |

Table 10 summarizes main effects of condition on zero-sum beliefs across all four studies. Significant contrasts are **bolded**. Across Studies 1 and 2, being in the peace reminder condition was associated with reductions in zero-sum beliefs compared to baseline, as was being in the Positive Framing condition in Studies 3 and 4. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated a greater degree of internal consistency than Studies 3 and 4, although Study 4 more closely demonstrated hypothesized effects.
APPENDIX C: MANIPULATION MATERIALS

Studies 1 and 2

Peace Reminder Condition

Retrospective: U.S. Relations with North Korea, 1990-2000

The Impacts of the Agreed Framework at the end of the 20th Century

During the last decade of the 20th Century, relations between the U.S. and North Korea noticeably improved as a result of negotiated agreements between the two countries concerning North Korea’s nuclear program.

On October 21st, 1994, the U.S. and North Korea signed an initial peace agreement between the United States and North Korea called "The Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea."

Under the terms of this agreement, North Korea agreed to freeze and replace its nuclear power plant program. In return, the U.S. agreed to supply North Korea with the money and resources it required to make non-nuclear, water-based power plants.

While the Agreed Framework held, hostile incidents between the U.S. and North Korea decreased, leading to reduced tension between the two nations.
No Reminder Condition

Retrospective: U.S. Relations with North Korea, 1990-2000

_The Impacts of U.S. North Korea Relations at the end of the 20th Century_

In the last decade of the 20th Century, relations between the U.S. and North Korea remained generally hostile. In particular, North Korea’s nuclear program served to maintain tensions between the two countries.

Despite these tensions, no substantial, lasting agreements arose from negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea. No talks between the two countries ever yielded a formalized peace agreement.

Without a formally articulated, binding peace agreement, hostile incidents between the U.S. and North Korea did not noticeably change across the final decade of the 20th Century.
Study 3

Positive Framing

Rough English Translation: Does the peace process with the Palestinians improve or harm relations between Israelis and Arabs?

The peace process between Israel and the Palestinians that began with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 was a historic step that marked the end of the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. Did he achieve his goal? A comprehensive study conducted by the Edelman Institute for Conflict Research, which examined many parameters: economic, security, social, and political, found that the peace process with the Palestinians was ultimately successful in spite of everything. The various indices clearly show the improvement of relations between Israel and the Arabs, and the reduction of friction and acts of hostility between the parties.
Rough English Translation: **Does the peace process with the Palestinians improve or harm relations between Israelis and Arabs?**

The peace process between Israel and the Palestinians that began with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 was a historic step that marked the end of the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. Did he achieve his goal? A comprehensive study conducted by the Edelman Institute for Conflict Research, which examined many parameters: economic, security, social, and political, found that the peace process with the Palestinians was ultimately a failure with all things considered. The various indices show no improvement in relations between Israel and the Arabs, no reduction of friction and acts of hostility between the parties.
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<td>אגרת אל החגיגת מעבר מעמד אשי, מצהaylor</td>
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Positive Framing Condition Materials

1. ריבב בישראלי, מתכון בירוק של תכשיטים. אגם רייאם ייצור - כ- חכמה.

2. הכנות המ положительн האפשרי של תכשיטים של תכשיטי אギャל ייצור. אגם רייאם ייצור - כ- חכמה.

3. איגוי הלךadesh היה חדש ומעניין אוסטבל רביע, אך הספר שינה מבט את מבטךsheets.

4. תוכן גורא על בחינה זו危險ה וכנראה תכשיטי אוסטבל נוירא. אגם רייאם ייצור - כ- חכמה.
Rough English Translation

In the years following the Oslo Accords, Jewish Israelis discussed the significance of the agreements on the State of Israel and its history throughout the political spectrum and in the media. These are some of the quotes from that period that are still repeated in some way in discussions about the Oslo Accords to this day.

1. Many in Israel, who criticize the signed agreement, do not fear its essence - from the intention to release the burden of government imposed on the Arab population and give a real chance for a political settlement.

2. The essential difference that enables peace now is the willingness of Arab states to resolve the conflict with Israel by political means, after they have insisted on the IDF's power to defend the state's vital interests and after they have begun to properly assess Israel's deterrence.

3. If the Likud had thought that the Oslo Accords were bad, it would undoubtedly have repealed them during the last nine years it has been in power - but not so, since the Likud knows that the Oslo Accords are the only way to bring security and peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

4. A bad agreement for the Palestinians is not necessarily a good agreement for Israel. On the contrary, only an agreement that both parties can live with would be a good agreement.
Rough English Translation

In the years following the Oslo Accords, Jewish Israelis discussed the significance of the agreements on the State of Israel and its history throughout the political spectrum and in the media. These are some of the quotes from that period that are still repeated in some way in discussions about the Oslo Accords to this day.

1. One of the tragic consequences of the Oslo Accords, which gave the Arabs official sovereignty over a large part Western Israel is a possibility of compressing a large new population within the country, a compression that will make Jewish immigration and settlement impossible.

2. The simple truth is that in such a small country the national desires of two peoples will not be able to materialize.

3. The Oslo conception failed due to the Palestinian refusal to recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist as an independent Jewish state (or in the language of international resolutions: "a national home for the Jewish people in the Land of Israel"). Of the State of Israel.

4. Is not the end of any stingy negotiations, in which the gain of the one is the loss of the other, only a local security arrangement that is likely to explode? Indeed, the Palestinian camp has serious internal problems, and their plight can be understood. To Israelis, it will stand in stark contrast to our internal constraints.
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investment: a hierarchical (multicomponent) model of in-group identification.

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https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.144


Peace Now. (2017, October 13th). *The two state solution is still alive 20 years after Oslo.*


Rovenpor, D.R., Leidner, B., Kardos, P., & O'Brien, T.C. (2016). Meaning threat can promote peaceful, not only military-based approaches to intergroup conflict: The


