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A REFORM STRATEGY IN URBAN EDUCATION:
COMMUNITY ACTION AND EDUCATION IN
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, 1962-1972

A Dissertation Presented
by
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B.A. University of Connecticut
M.S. Southern Connecticut State College

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

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A REFORM STRATEGY IN URBAN EDUCATION:
COMMUNITY ACTION AND EDUCATION IN NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, 1962-1972

A Dissertation
by
Mark Steven Peel

Approved as to style and content by:

Dr. Cleo Abraham, Committee Chairman

Dr. Dwight W. Allen, Head of Department

Dr. Patrick Sullivan, Member

Dr. Bob H. Suzuki, Member

Dr. Thomas Vitelli, Member
For Florence, my mother; Sharon, my wife; and Cleo, my brother
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Few people can fully understand my debt to Dr. Cleo Abraham, Associate Director of the Center for Urban Education. Let it suffice here to say that his endless encouragement, assistance, and advice are most responsible for this achievement. I am most grateful to Dr. Byrd L. Jones, Director of the Center for Urban Education; Dr. Bob H. Suzuki, Assistant Dean; and Dr. Patrick Sullivan, Director of the Media Center for their critical attention to this dissertation and my work during the last two years. To Dr. Thomas Vitelli, Dean of Students, Southern Connecticut State College, I owe a special debt of gratitude for his personal interest and guidance over many years. I would also like to thank Dr. Atron A. Gentry, Assistant Dean, a man who shows his concern in many ways.

Others contributed specifically to the conduct of this study. In New Haven, I received invaluable help from Ralph Goglia, Special Assistant to the Superintendent and Dr. George Harris, Assistant Superintendent of Schools. At Community Progress, Incorporated, Joseph Downey, Director of Operations and Sandy Ressler, Deputy Director opened many doors. Elsewhere Vincent Pitts and Brian David Peel provided the necessary inspiration in addition to other assistance. I thank them all.

A great measure of gratitude must go to my fellow graduate students and the staff at the Center for Urban Education, both past and present, for their constant support and friend-
ship. Regretfully they are too numerous to mention individually.

Lastly, and surely not least of all, I am forever indebted to my wife Sharon who was there throughout.
"... we do not possess adequate descriptions of the change process so as to allow us to begin to understand the high frequency of failure or the occasional successes."

Seymour B. Sarason
The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change
(1971)
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INTRODUCTION

Public opinion today has come to accept as axiomatic the assertion that urban education in America has failed. Recent professional literature and extensive supporting studies have advanced enough persuasive documentation and credible opinion to convince the educator and befuddle the apprehensive layman. With the exception of several under-publicized, isolated successes,¹ the conclusion, albeit relative, is generally accurate.

Changing the established performance record of urban schools is technically the exclusive responsibility of the formal education establishment for which urban taxpayers contribute the largest share of each municipal budget.² In reality, responsibility also lies with a more accountable social order, namely, the local government of elected and appointed officials which maintains the educational system, and ultimately, with the community which uses and supports it. Traditionally, urban school systems have resisted both change and accountability and, in fact, have abrogated that respons-


sibility in favor of the status quo. Recent research further indicates that "improvement in student outcomes, both cognitive and noncognitive, may require sweeping changes in the organization, structure, and conduct of educational experience," but also that "innovation, responsiveness, and adaptation in school systems decrease with size (of school systems) and depend upon exogenous shocks to the system." (Emphasis added.) The clear implication is that institutional reform, including more substantial segmental changes than periodic curriculum revisions or occasional demonstration projects, is required.

Janowitz suggests that some consequences of segmental change have worked, in fact, to the disadvantage of urban schools, and concludes that "inner-city school systems do not have the capacity to plan or launch comprehensive change to deal with any particular problem or student population."

Reform is not new to the American city. Almost without exception, cities have had to endure the trauma of corruption, scandal, and eventually change throughout the process of urbanization. Though corruption in the strict criminal sense


need not be characteristic of the need for all reform, stagnation and misuse of institutions may well represent the most dominant, causative pressures for contemporary reform since the bossism and unscrupulous municipal patronage of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The pernicious effects of kickbacks, bribery, and graft in the past are now achieved by the entrenched, unresponsive bureaucracies, routine, impersonal procedures, and distorted priorities of many public institutions. The indictment of urban educational institutions is staggering in this regard.6

In the early 1960's when most American cities were well steeped in physical rebuilding programs made possible by Federal legislation, several cities recognized the deepening tragedy of human conditions for the poor and minorities. Social planners of the most diverse backgrounds undertook the task of reforming urban institutions to meet the public's

needs. Assuming that local institutions, if redirected and coordinated, could do much more (and better) than previously demonstrated, planners identified the role of educational institutions as integral and paramount in this task. At the same time, it was evident that these very institutions were equally culpable in perpetuating the root causes and results of poverty, discrimination, and disadvantage. If educational institutions were to perform a new leading function in human renewal, they too would have to undergo reform.

This study describes and analyzes the efforts of one city -- New Haven, Connecticut -- to reform and revitalize its school system through community action. It is a story of change and the strategy which facilitated it.
CHAPTER I
EDUCATION AND POVERTY IN NEW HAVEN IN 1962

The State of Poverty

New Haven is a New England harbor city nestled between two small mountains (East and West Rock) on the Connecticut shoreline and the coastal waters of Long Island Sound. Settled by members of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in April, 1638, the town was initially a church-state which prospered through amiable relations with the local Indians and successful agricultural, trade, and shipping ventures. Historically, the city is most noted as the co-capital of Connecticut for 172 years (1701-1873) and as the seat of Yale University (1701).

For almost two centuries New Haven's population was mainly of English descent with a miniscule number of other nationalities.¹ In the course of the nineteenth century, as waves of Europeans emigrated, the city swelled with newcomers, first of Irish and German stock, and later Italians and East Europeans. The process of assimilation had taken hold by the time of the 1960 census when only forty-two percent of the city's population, for one reason or other, identified themselves

¹See Rollin Osterweis' Three Centuries of New Haven, 1638-1938 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953) for an extended historical treatment of New Haven's ethnic populations.
by foreign-national origins (See Table 1:1).^2

The period of New Haven's history germane to this study begins in the early 1960s. At that time New Haven was in the midst of change. The population was changing in composition, a factor holding critical political and economic implications. The skyline was changing; urban renewal and redevelopment were finally making an obvious, physical impact on the city. Latent social consciousness had reached a threshold level of new commitment and activity; numerous social factors, symbolized by the city's many new buildings within sight of its ghettos, were warning those in power to take heed and action. The human condition of New Haven's populace offered the real statement of historical significance. Like most urban areas in 1962, New Haven was suffering from an accumulation of newly recognized negative socio-economic forces. Most illustrative of these factors was the changing demographic patterns which showed a decline of 164,000 to 152,000 in total population for New Haven in the period 1950 to 1960. (See Table 1:2) Even more significant is the shifting composition of the city's population. Although there had been large percentages of foreign stock residents in the city of New Haven throughout its history, the 1950's saw a drastic influx of Southern rural blacks and the start of an emigration

**TABLE 1:1**

**NEW HAVEN POPULATION**
**BY NATIONAL ORIGIN**

1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Origin</th>
<th>1960 Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>25,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>8,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>6,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>5,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>3,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>2,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>1,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakian</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>6,430</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

64,111 Total foreign stock *

---

**By Racial Origin**

1960

129,383 White

22,113 Negro

552 Other races

152,048

---


*Foreign stock is defined as foreign-born, or native-born of foreign or mixed parentage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Black Population</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>164,443</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>152,648</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>137,707</td>
<td>26.3</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>New Haven SMSA*</th>
<th>New Haven City</th>
<th>New Haven SMSA excluding New Haven City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>320,836</td>
<td>152,648</td>
<td>168,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>355,538</td>
<td>137,707</td>
<td>217,831</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent Black</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*New Haven SMSA includes the city of New Haven plus Branford, East Haven, Guilford, Hamden, North Haven, Orange, West Haven, Woodbridge.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census
by white ethnics. In 1950 blacks comprised approximately 5.8 percent of the total New Haven population; by 1960 the figure had climbed to 14.5 percent. The emerging pattern was one of a declining total population and a rapidly increasing black population.\(^3\) City planners in the mid-1960's predicted a continual influx of unskilled blacks into the city for the next ten years resulting in projected population of thirty to forty percent by 1980.\(^4\) The 1970 census showed more than twenty-six percent of New Haven as being black.

The traditional indices which are used to illustrate the existence of poverty are perhaps never adequate in meeting the task. To the extent possible, one must attempt to gain an understanding or feeling of the "poverty of spirit" which accompanies or results from the poverty of the body. In 1962 New Haven's inner-city neighborhoods were steeped in both.

The inner-city of New Haven is composed of six identifiable neighborhoods — the Hill, Newhallville, Dwight, Fair Haven, Wooster Square, and Dixwell. In 1960, these areas included 83,000 people or fifty-five percent of the city's population living on only thirty percent of the city's total area. Residents of these neighborhoods are represented quite heavily in the poverty data available for this time period.


(See Table 1:3). While 14.5 percent of New Haven's population in 1960 was nonwhite, in these neighborhoods it was twenty-three percent. One out of every three inner-city families had incomes of less than $4,000 per year. Almost 10,000 families or 22.9 percent of the families in the city earned less than $4,000 annually. The rate of juvenile court referrals per 1,000 youths, ages seven to fifteen, was 35.3 from these neighborhoods as compared with 16.5 in the rest of the city. The infant mortality rate was as high as 70.8 per 1,000 births in one neighborhood, but well above the city (28.0) and national averages (26.0) in all of the inner-city neighborhoods combined.

Data on employment and education further defined the tangible and intangible parameters of poverty in the city. While the unemployment rate for the city as a whole was 5.6 percent at this time, unemployment in the inner-city averaged 7.2 percent but climbed as high as ten percent in two neighborhoods. Nearly three-fourths of the families receiving public welfare assistance lived in the inner-city neighborhoods. Almost half of the adult population of the same areas had an eighth grade education or less compared to 43.5 percent of the adult population of the entire city. In round figures, almost 40,000 adults in New Haven had no more than an eighth grade education in 1962. Each statistic adds to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Families under $4,000 No.</th>
<th>% unemployed</th>
<th>Adults 8th grade or less education No.</th>
<th>Infant Mortality %</th>
<th>Delinquency Rate **</th>
<th>Substandard Housing %</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Dixwell</td>
<td>1247</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>2680</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newhallville</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>2533</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill</td>
<td>1796</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>7940</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wooster Square</td>
<td>1207</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>3868</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Haven</td>
<td>1354</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>5129</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Average</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rate per 1,000 births.
** Percent of offenders (ages 8-21) of each area population, ages 8-21

the human portrait of deprivation.

By the early 1960's, New Haven had achieved a national reputation as a model city through its efforts in urban renewal and redevelopment. This achievement had dubious results, however, for the inner-city poor. In the first half-dozen years of redevelopment, the major beneficiaries of New Haven's model city status were business and industry. While the city's publicity alluded to efforts currently under planning, construction, or completion, its face-lifting had either dislocated the inner-city poor or completely circumvented them. Urban renewal was something to be read about in the newspapers or, worse yet, in notification papers to move elsewhere so that an office building or shopping center could be built in place of a home. The 500 units of low income public housing on the drawing boards in 1961 were hardly proportional to the actual needs of the city's residents.

New Haven's reputation as a model city, however, was not

6 A city publication, New Haven Development Guide 1961, asserts that by that year $60 million had been spent on new construction provided nearly 1,500 jobs for the construction trade. Almost 2,500 families were removed from renewal areas for the construction of a television studio, a shopping plaza, a telephone company office building, and a high rise, luxury apartment building. Citing the construction of over 700 units of moderate rental housing (387 additional units planned), the report neglects to mention that some 40% of the dwellings in the inner-city were substandard and untouched by redevelopment.
wholly unearned. More than one writer has graciously granted this. Inevitably, the city's initial preoccupation with its economic base served to emphasize its "benign neglect" of its resident poor. It took Mayor Richard C. Lee to admit publicly what had become privately apparent to most city officials. In a speech for the Norfolk, Virginia Chamber of Commerce in December 1962, the Mayor went on record:

It does not take a city planner's education or a blackboard of statistics to show that our cities are in trouble. It can become quite apparent to any concerned citizen who would but take an afternoon's walk through his own city.
At first glance he will certainly see the facades of our contemporary office buildings, the concrete ribbons of our interstate highways, and the glitter and excitement of Main Street. But let him look closer in the shadows down the streets.
And if he will look carefully, he will see another and even more serious dimension to the urban crisis—he will see it in most city neighborhoods, on the garbage-strewn streets and alleys, and on the faces of the men, the women, and the children who during their entire lives have known nothing but misery and despair.
He will see, in effect, that the haphazard growth of our cities and the years of neglect and lack of comprehensive planning have resulted not only in physical ugliness, chaos, and decay; they have also produced the terrible byproduct of human waste and suffering.

In admitting the need for national recognition and commitment to human renewal, Lee was duplicating his previous coup which had resulted in New Haven's redevelopment program.

---

7Varied plaudits can be found in:
Lee was convinced that New Haven's preparations in the preceding months had brought the city to a major confrontation with the human needs of its residents. The effort to deal with these needs had to commence with an extensive reevaluation of New Haven's public school system. The educative process was to serve as a crux for social concern and action in the coming decade.

The State of Education

New Haven has undertaken on several occasions during the last twenty-five years serious and extensive attempts to evaluate its school system in part or whole.⁸ The need for periodic examinations of the school system stems from a variety of organizational and socio-economic factors. Certainly the importance of education in American society and the immediate role it plays in municipalities like New Haven as the largest single budget expense are compelling factors. Another is the recognition that public education must constantly stay abreast of changing societal needs and adapt itself to meet them. For purposes of analysis a short digression to examine the first of two comprehensive system evalu-

tion's in New Haven's recent history may be worthwhile.

Shortly after the end of World War II, suggestions for a study of the school system were made to the school board from various segments of the community. In the immediate post-war period, the city had time to be concerned about education, something that had not been possible during the depression or in war-time. Accumulated community pressure brought upon the Board of Finance and the Board of Education resulted in a $45,000 appropriation in April, 1946 for such a study. Professor Julian E. Butterworth of Cornell University was engaged by the Board of Education to direct the study.

The completed study, submitted on June 15, 1947, made six recommendations to the Board of Education:

1. The Department of Education should be given status independent of city government in order that there be no suspicion that political influences are determining educational policies.

2. A more effective professional leadership should be developed. This need may be met by an increase in the personnel of the central staff, by a more effective organization of the various divisions of the staff, by a more definite allocation of responsibility, and by the use of more democratic procedures.

3. The residency requirement for professional employees of the school system should be eliminated.

4. Additional funds should be made available in almost every phase of the program.

5. An improved salary schedule for employees of the school system should be adopted at once.

6. As soon as building prices appear to be somewhat stabilized, an extensive program of rebuild-
ing and remodeling should be begun. 9

Using the Butterworth survey to gain a perspective of segmental progress in the school system, some measure of change dictated by social circumstances and events can be ascertained. For example, the typical teacher in the New Haven school system in 1946 was female and about forty-five years old. She was born in New Haven and attended local schools. After graduation from high school, she took her professional training at New Haven State Teacher's College, graduating in 1922 from the two year course. Immediately upon graduation she entered the local system without teaching experience elsewhere. She continued to take courses and typically secured a baccalaureate degree in 1941 after almost twenty years teaching. 10 Table 1:4 provides a broader statistical indication of change in the professional staff from this period through that concerned by this study, a span of twenty-five years.

In 1961 as part of a multi-faceted, preliminary approach to systematic human renewal, the Board of Education sponsored three individual studies which focused on the major areas of facilities, administration, and curriculum. Unlike the comprehensive Butterworth survey, these studies were implemented separately by a Harvard professor, a professional consulting firm, and a team of local professional educators.

9Butterworth, p. 4.

10Butterworth, p. 33.
TABLE 1:4
NEW HAVEN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
PROFESSIONAL STAFF
BY SEX AND EDUCATION
1947, 1962, 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1947 (a)</th>
<th>1962 (b)</th>
<th>1972 (c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Male</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Female</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Under Four Years</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% BA</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% MA or Better</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Professional Staff</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>1488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Enrollment</td>
<td>21,112</td>
<td>20,917</td>
<td>21,000 est.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
(b) (c) New Haven Public Schools, Personnel Report of Professional Staff 1971-72, November, 1971.
The first study conducted was that on facilities. Dr. Cyril Sargent of the Harvard Graduate School of Education was hired by the Board to investigate thoroughly the adequacy of New Haven's educational facilities and to recommend measures to meet present and immediate future needs of the school system. Sargent and his staff set about the survey using the following evaluative criteria: 1) educational suitability of facilities, 2) age of school, 3) degree of deterioration, 4) location of schools in relation to population, 5) size of building, and 6) fire safety.

The Sargent study noted several other factors which had to be considered as well. It found, as the Butterworth report had forecast, that the absolute total population of New Haven was declining, falling from 164,443 in 1950 to 152,048 in 1960. The total school enrollment, however, remained fairly stable (20,234 in 1950; 21,028 in 1960). This indicated an increase in the ratio of school children to the total population, a trend it predicted to continue.

Sargent's assessment of the existing facilities, though anticipated, was nevertheless astounding. Twelve elementary schools had been built before the turn of the century and were judged incapable of providing the minimum educational facilities required of a modern school. An additional sixteen elementary schools had been built between 1900 and 1920. This meant that twenty-eight of thirty-five New Haven ele-


12 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
elementary schools, a full eighty percent, were more than forty years old. Two new high schools had been opened in 1958 alleviating some of the burden on the city's four junior high schools which ranged from twenty to almost forty years of age.¹³

In his recommendations Sargent developed a list of guiding factors. New Haven, he felt, could best be served by——

1. equalizing educational opportunity for all children;
2. relating school buildings to geography and community,
3. providing economical and efficient school buildings for sound educational programs,
4. avoiding one year schools for any pupils,
5. providing school buildings of a type and in locations which will be conducive to community use and neighborhood strength,
6. providing a sound framework of flexibility for future growth and change.¹⁴

The Sargent report recommended a $20 million construction program which called for the adoption of the grade structure and fifteen new schools (forty percent of the entire school plant). The new schools would be a third high school, ten new elementary schools, and four new intermediate schools. Fourteen existing schools would be abandoned. Significantly, the new building plan was based on the concept of elementary and intermediate schools serving neighborhood areas. Sargent wrote, "New Haven traditionally has endeavored to organize its school system on that (neighborhood) basis. In fact, at one time in New Haven's history well before the turn of the century, there were 65 schools in the New Haven school system


¹⁴Ibid., p. 21.
as compared with 40 schools at present. This concept will be preserved."

The second study, the Arthur D. Little study of the administrative organization in the school system, was completed late in the summer of 1961. It did for the existing bureaucracy what the Sargent report had done just months earlier for the existing plant facilities; namely, the Little report recommended a substantial revision of the system's administration. The chain of authority was particularly vague and overly personalized. This resulted, the report claimed, in more informal leadership among the top professionals in the system. Discretionary authority was seldom delegated, leaving the system's top administrators responsible for many mundane, daily tasks. Of several deficiencies found by the study group, the most notable was the lack of a formal city-wide in-service training program for teachers and principals.

Barely six years later, another study was commissioned by the Board of Education to reexamine the organization and administrative functioning of the system. Its findings, to the dismay of many in the system, were in some cases remarkably similar to those in the Little study and even to those in the Butterworth study of twenty years past! One example is the matter of morale. Through a description of a symptom, the Little report implied the existence of low morale among the staff:

15 Ibid., p. 28.
There is a lack of consistent mutual understanding among the administrators as to the definition of their responsibilities in relation to those of others. In some areas this has resulted in separated centers of authority and influence which are not effectively integrated or coordinated.\textsuperscript{16}

The 1967 study was more empirical but not more explicit in its finding:

On the basis of 76 two hour interviews, there appeared from the analysis of the interview responses evidence that morale, measured in terms of lack of confidence in one's fellows, is not all that it should be.\textsuperscript{17}

Another finding of the 1961 Little report was that there was no centralized, coordinated curriculum planning to deal with rapidly changing educational research and newly developing socio-economic conditions. By the time the Little report had been submitted, the Board of Education had already empowered a task force to do a third and complementary report focusing on curriculum needs of the system.

The task force worked throughout a ten week period of the summer of 1961. In September the group submitted recommendations designed to improve the effectiveness of education in the public schools. Noting that "the keynote for wise educators is flexibility," the recommendations stressed the importance for the system to respond to the changing needs of its clients due to many socio-economic factors and trends which influence the relevance and applicability of education.

\textsuperscript{16} Little, \textit{Administrative Organization}, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{17} Price, \textit{Organization and Administrative Functioning}, p. 138.
In addition to several efficiency measures (e.g. micro-filming inactive records) and general urgings (e.g. encourage wider use of community resources in school programs), the task force recommended "the gradual development of the community school program under school supervision and administration." This recommendation, number sixteen of some forty in total, was to have a most profound, programmatic impact on the school system over the next decade.

So the record shows that, having heralded the renaissance of many American cities by demonstrating what could be done through physical redevelopment, New Haven in 1962 was still in great need of human renewal. Living conditions, particularly among the increasing black population, were aggravated by persistent, negative socio-economic factors: high unemployment, immigration of poor. Concerned city officials had become openly conscious of the deplorable conditions in New Haven's inner-city neighborhoods as early as the late 1950's. New Haven's initial public response, guided by the most progressive members of the Board of Education with the general support of the mayor's office, was to make a comprehensive evaluation of public education in the city. The results of the three separate studies provided a substantive base of data, recommendations and professional opinions, as well as a starting point from which redevelopment officials and other social service agency people could devise a city-wide reform program of community action.

Education Task Force, Blueprint for Better Education, p. 112.
CHAPTER II
THE COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM AGENCY
AND THE NEW HAVEN SCHOOL SYSTEM

In late 1959 executives of New Haven's Redevelopment Agency sought a way and the necessary means to respond to the increasing reality of multi-problem families "uncovered" by urban renewal. A brief document, "A Program for Community improvement in New Haven", was quickly developed and an initial approach to the Ford Foundation attempted. The request was denied and the effort was temporarily abandoned.

Moynihan uses the remarks made in 1963 by one of Ford Foundation's principal executives, Dr. Paul Ylvisaker, to illustrate the foundation's philosophy at this time. Speaking on "Community Action: A Response to Some Unfinished Business," Ylvisaker indicated that Ford was looking for planning based on four precepts: 1) that the city is a system; 2) that "awakening self-respect" is the most powerful agent for human renewal; 3) that certain parts of the urban social system can be perfected by rational means and specific devices; 4) that new, effective social inventions could arise from agencies which already exist in the community. The Redevelopment Agency's proposal lacked both this systematic approach and the necessary depth to earn the foundation's support.

The following year a more concerted effort began.

Howard Hallman, the young director of the Redevelopment Agency's Division of Neighborhood Improvement, revived the initial proposal and organized a small but diverse group of New Haven professionals to plan a comprehensive human renewal program for the city. The city's chief executive, Mayor Richard C. Lee, and the Superintendent of Schools, Justin O'Brien, did not actively participate in the planning group; however, the effort had the general support of the mayor and the group knowingly anticipated the imminent replacement of the superintendent and therefore, did not include him. The mayor's confidence, influence, and national bravura were instrumental in moving the planning to the point of June, 1961, when Hallman's group, with Redevelopment Agency director Ed Loque, and the mayor, reestablished contact with the Ford Foundation.

Negotiations and planning sessions continued through the fall and on into the winter. By early spring, agreements were reached on the way and the means by which New Haven would assault its chronic social problems. The way as described in the founding document "Opening Opportunities" was a private, non-profit organization named Community Progress, Incorporated (CPI) working in conjunction with the New Haven Public School System and employment agencies to bring to bear

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The planning group consisted of six members of private social service agencies, three educators from the local system, and five staff members of the Redevelopment Agency.
the necessary attention and resources to confront neighborhood problems. Ylvisaker of Ford later remarked:

We have placed the Ford Foundation's first bet not on the central business district of the city but on its school system, and more on school outlook and methods than on buildings; on the city and metropolitan area's employment system, on their administration of justice, and a growing list of similarly critical "production processes" which are currently bottlenecks in the process of citizen-building. 3

The bet in New Haven's case was a three year, 2.5 million dollar "gray areas" grant establishing the nation's first community action agency. 4

3Moynihan, p. 41.

4A minor controversy continues among several claimants to this distinction. Private social service agencies have existed for decades. The comprehensive, private non-profit agency of the Community Action Program (CAP) agency prototype is a more recent social invention. A forerunner of the single, coordinating agency emphasizing community organization was Mobilization for Youth, Inc. of New York City. It was originally conceived in 1957, incorporated shortly later, proposed for funding by prospectus in 1961, and finally funded and implemented in May, 1962. In the meantime, four cities were being funded in quick succession through the Ford Foundation "gray areas" Public Affairs Program. Of these New Haven received the second grant in April, 1962, but was the first to incorporate its city-wide program under one agency. Oakland, California, the first recipient ($2 million) in December, 1961, chose to allocate its money and coordinate programs among existing social service agencies. Boston's agency, Action for Boston Community Development, Inc. (ABCD), though formed as a private, non-profit agency in early 1961, was not funded until mid-summer 1962. Philadelphia, the last of the four initial grantees, followed New Haven's experience in redevelopment and packaged a comprehensive program under a private, non-profit corporation which Ford funded in December, 1962.

New Haven received the first grant from the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in November, 1964.
Coalition reform is not a new strategy. Literally for centuries, governments, political parties, and social movements have been predicated upon the concept which unifies factions for the purpose of achieving common objectives. The aspect of coalition reform in education in New Haven which makes it truly unique is the unprecedented marriage of informal decision-making, resource sharing, and commitment to social processes which resulted in institutional change in New Haven's public school system. From 1962 until 1972, New Haven's community action program and school system identified common objectives, developed and coordinated programs, affected and influenced legislation, shared mutual achievements and suffered ignominious crises. The ten years under study here can be more easily understood through an examination of the four principle phases in the coalition's existence: the formative, peak, transitional, and terminal phases.

The Formative Phase 1961-1962

New Haven's commitment to human renewal had formed at least in conscience by late 1959 and early 1960. Specific action commenced and gained momentum through the education studies by Cyril Sargent (March, 1961), Arthur D. Little (August, 1961), and the Education Task Force (September, 1961). Working prior to and concurrently during these assessments, the group formed by Hallman prepared a new draft of a comprehensive, community organization program and was pursuing negotiations with the Ford Foundation for funding.
The coalition plan was established early in the informal deliberations of the planners. A consensus existed on the critical role of the educational system in the effort but some disagreement arose about the nature of the cooperating "outside" agency. Hallman suggested the creation of a private non-profit organization. Frank Harris of the Greater New Haven Community Council proposed using the New Haven Citizen's Action Commission (CAC) as the responsible agency. The commission, a blue ribbon panel of community leaders, had served Mayor Lee's redevelopment program very well over the years as a legitimating base of community support. Hallman won over Harris' suggestion with the argument that any existing organization including the CAC was likely to have too many inhibitors -- entrenched relationships, Civil Service regulations, and political debts -- to adequately undertake the human renewal task. Another fear was that a city agency could not manage the objectives of social reform and institutional change through new relationships and with outside money simply because of the political nature and stigma associated with it. A private, non-profit agency could. Hallman won over Harris' suggestion with the argument that any existing organization including the CAC was likely to have too many inhibitors -- entrenched relationships, Civil Service regulations, and political debts -- to adequately undertake the human renewal task. Another fear was that a city agency could not manage the objectives of social reform and institutional change through new relationships and with outside money simply because of the political nature and stigma associated with it. A private, non-profit agency could.


6 An interesting and possibly predictable parallel to this scenario was repeated in 1964 when high level members of the Johnson administration were planning the National War on Poverty. They, too, concurred with the need for an independent, new agency and thereby gave birth to the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969 (New York: Popular Library, 1971), pp. 75-76.
CPI (the agency eventually created) and other members of the New Haven coalition...realized that poverty and related social problems stem from a complexity of interrelated causes. Persons are trapped in these conditions because something is not working properly in the social system. To get at these causes, to open opportunities for people to help themselves, it is necessary to make corrections in the social system, that is, to bring about institutional change.

With this as a starting point, it is then possible to look upon the city as a network of interrelated systems. There is an educational system, an employment system, a system of health and welfare services, and so on. Each system is organized differently, but it usually includes both public and private agencies and it involves not only local governmental agencies, but also state and national agencies. When a system is functioning effectively, it will respond to new problems as they emerge and make necessary adaptations. But the existence of mass poverty in an affluent society suggests a serious lack in one or more functional systems...CPI acts as a catalyst to assist each functional system in embarking upon changes that will mean more effective services to the poverty group. It serves as a coordinator so that the functional systems will work together as an integrated network.7

New Haven's blueprint gradually emerged as two major coalition efforts and numerous minor alliances which served as service linkages. Education and employment agencies were forged into distinct coalitions within a larger referral network of complementary organizations. The concern here is with the former.

With a tacit agreement in effect between the city and the Ford Foundation by late winter 1961-62, attention turned most logically to the critical success factor of leadership. The question was not only who would head the new agency but who

would lead the agency's institutional counterpart, the school system. At this time, the school system was in the process of changing superintendents. The liberal persuasion on the Board of Education, primarily Lee appointees, had been led until late 1961 by a state labor leader, Mitchell Sviridoff, who served his last two terms as president of that body. The Board was seeking a superintendent whose philosophy and ideas were consistent with the reformist mood in the city and whose vision and ambition were commensurate with the task. Education and the educational system were being touted as primary instruments for human renewal. The system -- with its outmoded facilities and archaic curricula -- was also mired in a bureaucracy incapable of responding to the dramatic requirements of institutional reform. The three studies, treated in Chapter I, gave Board members some measure of the new task and the capabilities required of a new leader in accomplishing it. They chose Dr. Lawrence Paquin, a professional educator from Glastonbury, Connecticut. As Glastonbury's superintendent, Paquin achieved a notable reputation as a top administrator who insisted upon a periodic teaching assignment for himself. He authored two social science textbooks and coordinated the development of a foreign language program which received national recognition through a $1 million federal grant, a sum uncommon to a 3,800 student school system.

Paquin, as superintendent-elect, and Sviridoff, the knowledgeable labor leader and Board of Education member,
participated in the planning and final negotiations with the Ford Foundation. On April 12, 1962, Mayor Lee announced the grant award by the Ford Foundation and the incorporation of Community Progress, Incorporated (CPI) to handle the funds. Four days later, the CPI Board of Directors at Lee's direction named Mitchell Sviridoff the executive director of the new agency charged with spearheading the city's war on poverty. Sviridoff's long affiliation with the mayor and his record of championing liberal causes might have been enough to qualify him for the job. But his seven year tenure on the Board of Education and his intimate knowledge and experience in labor and employment problems and practices amply qualified him.

Little time was wasted in forming the organization of CPI. No doubt as a reward for his interest and efforts, Howard Hallman became Sviridoff's deputy, the number two man at CPI. Additional staff members were recruited immediately and preparations were begun to implement their reform strategy.

The man who was to play a most crucial operational role for the school system was hired by the superintendent after CPI's initial staff had been chosen. That man, Ralph Goglia, had been seeking a position with CPI in the spring of 1962.

Mayor Lee's influence was perhaps more ostentatious by his selection of Sviridoff as executive director and his appointees to the agency's Board of Directors. The direct telephone line between Sviridoff's office and Lee's suggests a continuing political intimacy with the agency's decision-making leadership.
As the executive director of a health and welfare agency in Hartford, Connecticut, Goglia was qualified for many administrative positions with CPI. Instead, Goglia received a call from the acting superintendent, Paquin, and was offered the directorship of the Community School Program, the initial operational arm of the reform coalition's strategy.

The Community School Program, as projected in the "Opening Opportunities" document and as officially endorsed by the Board of Education in August, 1962, extends the role of the school far beyond traditional limits. A true community school was defined in the following way:

1. as an educational center -- as the place where children and adults have opportunities for studying and learning;
2. as a neighborhood center -- as the place where citizens of all ages may take part in such things as sports, physical fitness programs, informal recreation, arts and crafts classes, civic meetings, and other similar leisure time activities;
3. as a center for community services -- as the place where individuals and families may obtain health services, counseling services, legal aid, employment services, and the like;
4. as an important center of neighborhood or community life -- the idea being that the school will serve as the institutional agency that will assist citizens in the study and solution of significant neighborhood problems.9

The CPI-Board of Education coalition was to use the Community School concept -- made possible through the Ford Foundation grant -- to implement a delivery system of criti-

ocal neighborhood services, leisure time activities, and a long-term educational program aimed at the prevention of poverty.

Officials at CPI and the Board of Education used the remaining months of 1962 to gear up their respective institutions for full operation by January 1, 1963. The formative phase drew to a close in a flurry of activity which found CPI completing its hiring of initial staff, establishing its headquarters in a central business district building shared by a furniture store (and barely half a block from the Board of Education and City Hall), and facing the future optimistically with all the security and enthusiasm that more than two and a half million dollars can provide. At the same time, the Board of Education and the school system administered by Superintendent Paquin prepared to implement the Community School Program as well as a host of recommendations, garnered from the Sargent, Education Task Force, and Little studies. Human renewal was on the threshold of reality in New Haven.

The Peak Phase 1963-1965

Coalition reform was perhaps never more effective or healthy than in the 1963-1965 period. This can be attributed in part to the enthusiasm generated by the participating social planners, some educators, neighborhood residents, and volunteers. CPI staff in administration and programs expanded with each grant renewal. Starting with fewer than a dozen full-time employees, by 1965 CPI employed 169 New Haven
residents full-time and over 2,200 others in various part-
time and volunteer program capacities. (Table 2:1).

**TABLE 2:1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total Staff</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Staff</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals and</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Aides</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>1202</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2503</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Much must be attributed, however, to the availability of funds and to the newness of CPI and the processes fashioned by it. Participation in CPI-Board of Education programs was, in fact, an attractive employment opportunity for professionals and a convenient employment or volunteer opportunity for indigenous residents.

Funds were never a problem during this three year period. A precondition of the Ford agreement required matching portions of money. Federal sources responded graciously after
the initial grant by the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency was used to acquire the first Ford grant. Seemingly on a monthly basis, CPI tapped new Federal sources for program funds from such government branches as the Department of Labor, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and eventually, the Office of Economic Opportunity. In the case of the last, CPI received the first community action program grant in November, 1964. The influx of funds, some $9.4 million by the end of 1965, also included increasing contributions by local private sources and the city of New Haven (See Table 2:2).

In addition to grantmanship, a principal function of CPI was to act as a conduit for funds to the Board of Education and other agencies conducting cooperative programs. Some twenty-five public and private agencies spent 58.1 percent of the funds received by CPI. Allocations by these agencies and CPI clearly reaffirmed the establishment of education and employment as city-wide priorities. Breaking down the total among the ten program areas over the three year period provides a good indication of the variety of activities which came under the aegis of community action (Table 2:3).

During these years, a wide range of education programs, to be discussed in detail in Chapter III, were devised and implemented, revised and expanded or deleted. In themselves the programs represented a departure from the normal or usual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRANTOR</th>
<th>DATE OF GRANT OR COMMITMENT</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
<td>April, 1962</td>
<td>$2,500,000</td>
<td>Three years</td>
<td>Multi-purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford Foundation</td>
<td>May, 1964</td>
<td>$75,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Public Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency</td>
<td>March, 1962</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Youth Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September, 1963</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Youth Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal of Above Grant</td>
<td>November, 1964</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Youth Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Labor Dept.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMAT (1)</td>
<td>January, 1963</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Manpower Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMAT (2)</td>
<td>June, 1963</td>
<td>116,060</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Youth Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMAT (2a)</td>
<td>January, 1964</td>
<td>191,618</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Youth on-the-job training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training through state agency</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>(est) 300,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training through state agency</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>(est) 600,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMAT (3)</td>
<td>June, 1963</td>
<td>360,415</td>
<td>Two years</td>
<td>Adult Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMAT (4)</td>
<td>August, 1964</td>
<td>533,027</td>
<td>Two years</td>
<td>Skill Training and Placement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Home Finance Agency</td>
<td>June, 1962</td>
<td>178,000</td>
<td>Three years</td>
<td>Housing Demonstration</td>
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TABLE 2:2 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Haven Foundation</th>
<th>February, 1962</th>
<th>100,000</th>
<th>Three years</th>
<th>Private Agency Participation</th>
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<tr>
<td>City of New Haven</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Education</td>
<td>9/62 to 8/63</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(new funds)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Education</td>
<td>9/63 to 8/64</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(new funds)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Parks and</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Rec. and work crews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(new funds)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.H. Redevelopment</td>
<td>9/62 to 8/63</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Neighborhood Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency (1/3 city,</td>
<td>9/63 to 8/64</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Neighborhood Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/3 federal)</td>
<td>9/64 to 8/65</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>One year</td>
<td>Neighborhood Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Dept. of Health,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education &amp; Welfare</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Service</td>
<td>September, 1964</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>Three years</td>
<td>Concerted Services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>Three years</td>
<td>Family Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natl. Legal Aid &amp;</td>
<td>September, 1964</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>Three years</td>
<td>Legal Services Prog.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defender Assn.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Research of Legal Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meyer Research Grant</td>
<td>September, 1964</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>Three years</td>
<td>Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2:3
ALLOCATIONS OF FUNDS BY PROGRAM AREA
1962-1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manpower and Employment</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Services</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Welfare</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Program Evaluation</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and Correctional</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Relations</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure Time</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Training and Development</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


school tradition and responsibility and as such, they were bound to encounter resistance. Farrell notes in his book A Climate of Change:

...there is the kind of resistance that springs from the established, comfortable ennui of one sort of bureaucracy or another. There is the kind of resistance which has its roots in race prejudice, or in the vague fear that the CPI program is somehow a plot to turn over the city to the Negro, that it is somehow anti-white. And there is the natural kind of resistance to change aroused in the conservative citizen who wonders just how much of all this new activity can really be good for New Haven, and worries that perhaps it is all moving just a bit too fast. 

Change is seldom accomplished in a mood of gemütlichkeit. Early opposition to CPI and its allied efforts took the form of cautious speculation by the city's evening newspaper, the New Haven Register. It editorialized that every citizen

should be concerned about the fiscal implications of CPI's existence after the Ford money was spent. From other quarters, opposition was a bit more acute. "Some New Haven teachers and social workers resented the invasion of a new force of non-professionals into what had previously been the professional's exclusive battleground. Some of them objected, publicly and privately, to the new demands made upon their time and consciences." In July, 1963, a group called the League of Independent Voters created an education study group of resident school teachers, administrators, PTA, and union members. Ostensibly, their primary concern was to investigate the Board of Education's duties and responsibilities and ascertain the full degree of involvement with CPI. In other words, their resistance to the reform movement was being manifested by their public speculation that the Board of Education was losing control of the school system to outsiders.

The single most threatening public reaction which directly and indirectly confronted the two coalition parties stemmed from a controversy on an issue which continues to beleaguer school systems -- busing to achieve racial balance. On September 23, 1963, the Board of Education resolved to implement a plan to overcome racial segregation in the New Haven schools. De facto segregation was an undeniable fact

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13 Farrell, p. 57.

14 New Haven Register, July 8, 1963.
of city life in New Haven at the time. Black students comprised 39.5 percent of the total elementary school population.

Of thirty-one elementary schools, blacks represented more than 50 percent of the student population in ten schools, more than 90 percent of the population in three of those ten (See Table 2:4). The system's four junior high schools were 36.7 percent black; however, one of those schools was 90.2 percent black and another 52.5 percent (Table 2:5). As early as July, 1963, the NAACP had brought the segregation matter to the attention of the Board of Education. Its president, John Braslin, assured NAACP representatives that the Board would devise a plan to address the imbalance problem and hence the September commitment in the form of a resolution. A one year deadline — September, 1964 — was established for implementation.

The superintendent and two special assistants devised a plan which would send more white students and fewer black students to the two predominantly black junior high schools. In addition, a grade reorganization of several elementary schools promised to alleviate overcrowding and create available seats for black children to attend predominantly white elementary schools by choice.

The integration plan was inexplicably leaked to the public before the Board of Education officially released or even considered it! On June 3, 1964, the Board and the plan came under serious attack by citizens in those areas in which the plan called for the busing of white students to predominantly black schools. Superintendent Paquin bore the brunt of
TABLE 2:4

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUPILS
IN NEW HAVEN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS
NOVEMBER 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of Whites</th>
<th>% of Blacks</th>
<th>% of Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnard</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beecher</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brennan</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheever</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton Ave.</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conte</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horace Day</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgewood</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwards St.</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hale</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hooker</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivy St.</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jepson</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimberly Ave.</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloyd St.</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lovell</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince St.</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scranton</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherman</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welch</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Hills</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodward</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolsey</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Averaged Totals  56.9  35.9  3.6

Source: New Haven Public Schools
### TABLE 2:5

RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUPILS IN NEW HAVEN JUNIOR AND SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS NOVEMBER 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Junior High Schools</th>
<th>% of Whites</th>
<th>% of Blacks</th>
<th>% of Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bassett</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Haven</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheridan</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troup</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Averaged Totals 61.7 36.7 1.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senior High Schools</th>
<th>% of Whites</th>
<th>% of Blacks</th>
<th>% of Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilbur Cross</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Hillhouse</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Averaged Totals 78.9 20.5 .6

Source: New Haven Public Schools
the assault. Many who had resented the educational system's relationship with CPI held Paquin directly responsible for the radical changes, of which busing was just one, occurring in the system. Several meetings produced the worst public demonstrations of white fear and covert racial hatred that New Haven had ever witnessed. The Board of Education and Paquin were subsequently forced to reconsider their plan. Rejecting the suggestion of one way busing, that of blacks to predominantly white schools, an eleventh hour proposal by one Board member proposed the pairing of white and black schools in certain grades. "This idea did not pick just one school in any area but took all of them en mass and therefore answered the complaints of 'why just my child?' It also included the elimination of 7th and 8th grades from all but two elementary schools, thereby opening more elementary school space to alleviate overcrowding and to allow open enrollment; i.e. parents had the option to send their children to any one of several elementary schools within a district."\(^{15}\)

Paquin and the Board survived the crisis when reaction to the plan appeared cautiously favorable. On July 8th the Board adopted the plan for the September, 1964, school year,

thus meeting its original commitment.\textsuperscript{16} Though a disgruntled small group of residents attempted to get an injunction preventing its implementation, the plan was affirmed when the Connecticut Superior Court denied the injunction. One month later Paquin announced he would resign in one year to become the Superintendent of the Baltimore Public School System.

If the years of this phase were controversial for the school system, they were relentlessly challenging to CPI. CPI began the 1962-65 era seeking internal stability and external acceptance. The allocation of funds during this period indicates that educational reform, though instrumental in its overall strategy, was not the only priority or the major beneficiary of CPI funding (Table 2:2, p. 35). The manpower and employment area received equal priority in the agency from its inception.

When CPI organized in the Spring of 1962, a Manpower Division was established, and a grant was given to the Central Labor Council, enabling it to assign a full-time representative to work on the Manpower Program. Soon after full-time representatives were also assigned by the State Department of Education (Vocational Education) and the New Haven Board of Education (Adult Education) and a representative of the State Employment Service shortly thereafter. This staff functioned as a permanent working committee to design and carry out various manpower programs often consult-

\textsuperscript{16} Historically, the record actually shows that the New Haven Board of Education did not act with all due dispatch. Rollin Osterweis notes that "on July 7, 1869, Negro residents petitioned for the ending of discrimination and segregation in the public schools; and the Board of Education moved to incorporate 'the colored children' into the regular school system." Three Centuries of New Haven 1638-1938 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 343.
ing with labor and management representatives.  

The manpower effort suggests a basic duplication of the coalition strategy. Sviridoff and his manpower director, George Bennett, applied concurrently the same strategy of co-operative planning, joint sponsorship of programs, and shared resources to induce participation. The major difference between the education and manpower strategies was manifest in results. Manpower, even educational manpower programs, produced impressive statistics indicative of immediate surface success in its training and placement programs. Education could boast of significant numbers of participants in its various programs but could not easily, or wisely, translate mere participation in its programs into educational achievement in such a brief span of time. Implicitly the intent in education was aimed at the long term results which would have an accumulated preemptive effect on poverty.

Riding an illusory wave of success and acceptance, CPI encountered the same difficulty as its partner and, in fact, from a group born during the integration crisis. The Better Education Committee and its leader, Joseph Einhorn, after failing to get an injunction against the integration plan,


18The manpower coalition existed publicly as a creation of CPI's administration and information service; however, in fact, it existed as a tenuous working arrangement. See Russell D. Murphy, Political Entrepreneurs and Urban Poverty (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971), p. 112.
continued to select issues and positions critical of the educational system, Mayor Lee, and CPI. CPI, the group maintained, was run by opportunistic social schemers who had wrested control of basic municipal functions through the use of outside money and influence. Einhorn used this type of attack repeatedly to implicate the Mayor, his policies, and appointees. It culminated for Einhorn in the 1965 Republican nomination for mayor and virtually terminated with his defeat by a Lee landslide in November. The coalition had weathered its greatest threat.

Other events bolstered local enthusiasm and reaffirmed the coalition's existence. The passage of the Equal Opportunities Act (written with the aid of Sviridoff and Hallman) in 1964 established the Federal War on Poverty and a federal agency, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to distribute funds for local anti-poverty initiatives. On November 25, 1964, CPI was awarded the first grant by OEO for $450,000. Four months later the Ford Foundation demonstrated another measure of approval when it awarded CPI a second $2.5 million three-year grant. That news had barely arrived when the Congress passed the historic Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 offering new and critical financial support for local education.

The Transitional Phase 1966-1969

The endpoint of the peak phase and, therefore, the starting point of the transitional phase defies precise de-
lineation. In fact, it is more the accumulation of events and circumstances over a period of time rather than a specific date or one event. Whereas the peak phase represented the apogee of intense cooperation and activity in the symbiotic CPI-Board of Education relationship, the transitional phase was occasioned by a disintegration of that original bond; new circumstances, a new set of required responses on the part of the Board of Education, dictated a change. Certainly the departure of Superintendent Paquin in August, 1965, marks the beginning of the peak phase decline. Many link this event directly to the crisis in confidence over the busing-integration issue whose indirect impact had yet to reach CPI.

Other causal factors are not so easily observable or defined. By 1966 CPI had a four year demonstration period during which its actions and its investments, strategical and financial, bore the appearance of success, as interpreted by CPI, Ford, OEO, and the Department of Labor. These investments paid off handsomely in establishing a national reputation and in attracting the necessary funds to continue and expand. CPI was a model community action program not only because it had been first, but because by being first, it exploited its capability to be a showcase program.19

That reputation also had not so peculiar local effects. A by-product of the formative and peak years of the agency and its distinctive operating style was a growing member of articulate "grass roots" spokesmen which included many issue-oriented militants, parents, and youths who had either participated in a CPI program or had otherwise been affected by one. After some four years, these numbers were becoming significant; persistent issues highlighted by CPI's efforts were becoming a major factor in the espousal of community confrontation. Intensifying national influences, e.g. the Civil Rights struggle and the emerging Black Power movement, the Watts riots, also contributed to a heightened sense of community power. Debate over its exercise polarized: on one extreme stood the black militants; and on the other those who sought answers and responses through the formal channels of government and community participation.

The modus operandi for self-determination was not a clear one for New Haven's blacks. For many blacks, the integration crisis and particularly the white-dominated emotional meetings which ensued served as the final indictment against white-controlled and dominated public decision-making in New Haven and against the complacency most blacks had hitherto demonstrated toward the decision-making processes affecting their lives. One description of this decisive period epitomizes this turning point:

Despite anger and provocation, the Negroes showed amazing self-control and moderation. While white families held private protest meetings guarded carefully by self-appointed vigilantes to keep "outsiders"
away, the Negroes restricted their discussions to shops and living rooms, where there were angry discussions and, now and then, calls for militant counter-action. Publicly, however, the Negroes remained silent as the white community fought among themselves.

At this point few could foresee the military occasioned by riots in Detroit, Newark, and the long hot New Haven summer of 1967, almost exactly three years after the busing crisis.

The CPI-Board of Education coalition in transition reflected a social metamorphosis, a maturation of institutional, community, and individual roles. The major transitional elements were:

a. an exodus of the original principals, the architects of the coalition;

b. increased internal and external criticism aimed at CPI;

c. major racial disturbances in the New Haven schools, and

d. a shifting reliance on the part of CPI and the Board of Education to new sources for program funds.

It seems inevitable that good teams, in social reform as well as in sports, never last too long. In the months following Paquin’s resignation, Sviridoff spent much of his time heading a task force studying New York City’s comprehensive

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human resource needs. That venture ultimately led to his resignation in October, 1966, to head New York City's new superagency, the Human Resources Administration (HRA) under John Lindsay.

Other principal administrators, including Deputy Director Howard Hallman and Manpower Director George Bennett, also left for other jobs, usually with higher pay and more prestige, on the national level or in cities much larger than New Haven. Their experience in New Haven uniquely qualified them in the fields of urban strategy and poverty entrepreneurship. Attractive employment opportunities were particularly abundant in these areas: public and private agencies on the national level were in need of experienced personnel to develop and manage their master strategies in the war on poverty, and the more urban areas were extremely eager to employ those with successfully demonstrated expertise. On a weekly basis each New Haven loss was another city's gain.

Internal criticism also contributed to the changing nature of the coalition. Dissatisfied neighborhood employees were becoming more bitter and more public in their criticism of CPI's administration. Federal dicta on citizen or resident participation in anti-poverty efforts, though mandated

21 The study, sponsored by the Institute of Public Administration and paid for by the Ford Foundation, was the basis for consolidating New York City's social services in health, education, and welfare under the Human Resources Administration. Developing New York City's Human Resources (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1966).
as a requirement for funding (in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964), resulted in accusations of tokenism and rubber stamp participation (see Chapter IV). In many cities across the nation time had run out by 1967; the brutal reality of ghetto conditions was dramatized by summer riots.

New Haven, the Model City, could not escape this same trauma in spite of its relative progress. Despite fourteen manpower programs funded with $2,150,828 in federal money and sixteen educational and community service programs worth an additional $2,251,042 in federal funds (not including Ford outlays), the city endured six frantic days of disorder in its worst ghetto area, the Hill. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders concluded that the same factors which precipitated rioting in Detroit's 12th Street area were the immediate causes for New Haven's disturbance: 1) crowded ghetto living conditions, worsened by summer heat; 2) youth on the streets; 3) hostility to police; 4) delay in appropriate police response; and 5) persistent rumor and inadequate information. Principals at CPI, the Board of Education, and City Hall pondered the root causes for some sense of redirection and perhaps a reason to assuage their individual guilt.

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22 Figures are as reported in CPI to the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), pp. 188, 195.

At CPI introspection manifested itself in a philosophical and program review led by Mitchell Sviridoff's successor, Lawrence Spitz. This ultimately concluded that —

not because of the outbursts, but because of long festering conditions which the outbursts merely pointed up, CPI had to do more to galvanize and strengthen the Inner City. And it had to do this with or without increased help from a Federal Government whose attitudes toward the War on Poverty had chronically vacillated.24

Guilt is not easy to assume; however, reasoning softened the blow to CPI:

CPI has never laid claim to a perfect or near-perfect formula for rooting out the privation and frustration and anguish whose continuance can mean recurrent violence and threats of violence in this and every other city. From the outset, CPI's programs have had to be experimental and fraught with great risk. No one had ever drawn a blueprint for a massive attack on deprivation, yet action had to be bold and sweeping. Social decay and human suffering had gone too far to permit timid and small-scale attempts at solutions...large-scale experiments, and great risks inevitably invite big mistakes.25

Redirect was essential. The winter months of 1967-68 provided time in which CPI began to rethink its philosophy and its programmatic strategies. Spitz and his staff privately explored the possibilities of decentralization. Decentralization, they felt, was undeniably a concept whose time had come. It meant a rejection of CPI's basic "do for" and its strangely unique "do with" philosophies in favor of a "do it themselves" strategy for the neighborhoods, with


25Ibid., i-ii.
only technical assistance from CPI. Neighborhood corporations would exercise self-determination through program development, management, and fiscal responsibility.

Barely had the decision for decentralization been made public, when Spitz announced his resignation to return to a lucrative position in organized labor. The new executive director, Milton Brown, who had been CPI's Director of Community Services and one of the original CPI administrators in 1962, immediately made a firm and irrevocable commitment to the decentralization concept.

The busing crisis, the summer riots, and city hall politics all resulted in sharp criticism of the mayor, CPI, and the Board of Education.²⁶ For CPI, external criticism became acute in early 1968 when Third District Congressman Robert Giaimo castigated CPI's staff from the floor of the House of Representatives. He accused certain highly paid staff members of social opportunism and flagrant mismanagement of public funds by paying high salaries, exorbitant fringe benefits, and inordinately high administrative costs. Progress and results, he concluded, were pitifully meager, and for the most part a creation of CPI's public relations division. His most serious indictment was that CPI's attitude towards existing agencies was contemptible:

Its (CPI's) attitude that these agencies had done nothing to solve local problems is incorrect. Its

²⁶ In July, 1969, Mayor Lee announced that he would not seek reelection giving rise to speculation that the riots and discontent in the city had broken his spirit after sixteen years in office. See Powledge, Model City, pp. 12-14.
attitude that if it could not control the local agency it would have little or nothing to do with it is wrong...I am convinced that...many fine local agencies in New Haven...could do a much better job than CPI and with much smaller overhead costs...if the 18 million dollars CPI has received had been given to these local agencies without the CPI hierarchy and superstructure draining off most of the money, we would have had more effective accomplishments in the antipoverty war. They hardly could have done worse.27

CPI publicly refuted Giaimo's charges but the cause of its critics had been served simply by the fact that allegations had been made. This attack also contributed to the decision by CPI to divest itself of its extensive power to determine what was best for New Haven's poor.

What CPI and the Board of Education had endured separately in the common struggle was amplified during this phase by the occurrence of racial disturbances in the New Haven schools. Racial violence and vandalism broke out at Hillhouse High School on December 15, 1967, when, according to reports, a white boy punched a black girl who refused to stand before the American flag. A bi-racial meeting of approximately 700 Hillhouse parents met on December 19 to investigate ways of dealing with the heightening racial tension.28 A few months later more incidents occurred at Hillhouse and at Lee High School, the new school named after the mayor. This was followed by outbreaks at Sheridan Middle School. A


fundamental belligerency by both black and white students in an atmosphere of antagonism added to the intellectual militancy of a few to produce altercations and tension. The local Commission on Equal Opportunities investigated the causes and found "long smoldering discontent" between school administrators, teachers, and students. The Commission recommended more community participation in the schools.29

The events did in fact spur increased community participation through a decentralized educational decision-making process (see Chapter IV, p.102). They also indicated that programs and money did not constitute panaceas, that the discontent which spilled over into the streets had also inundated the schools. New leadership and new responses were required of the school system and this meant a further change in the CPI-Board of Education coalition.

A final transitional influence on the coalition was the changing sources of program funds. CPI's original reliance on Ford and OEO money with additional manpower funds from the Federal Department of Labor changed significantly over the years. In 1967 the Connecticut General Assembly established the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) making the state a full partner in local human renewal initiatives. Eventually DCA would become the primary source of community action funds, providing the necessary seed money for CPI to decentralize into neighborhood corporations.

In the meantime, the Board of Education had gained a high degree of internal sophistication in fund raising and in 1967 established the Office of Special Projects and Program Planning specifically for that purpose. Consequently, the school system began to rely more on its own resources and its ability to generate financial support and less on CPI's established role in that area. Still other events during the transitional phase helped to further mitigate this reliance.

Even earlier than their action in 1967, the Connecticut General Assembly passed Public Act 523 during a special session in March, 1965. This bill, called the State Aid to Disadvantaged Children Act (SADC), provided $10 million to Connecticut's cities and towns for use in educating disadvantaged children.30 By July, 1965, the Board of Education received SADC funds, the first of some $1.2 million during the 1965-67 biennium, to support programs previously supported by CPI controlled money.31 Shortly thereafter, in December, other money from the Federal Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965 became available to the school system, again for some of the same programs which CPI and the Board of Education had originated

30CPI initiated this bill and was instrumental in mustering bipartisan political and community support for its passage. See Chapter IV.

31The Board of Education did not rely completely on CPI funds for new programs. Ford, state, and federal sources required local matching for their grant awards. While CPI parlayed the use of private Ford funds as local matching to acquire public state and federal money, the Board was contributing money from its budget. See Table 2:2.
with financial support from CPI funds.\textsuperscript{32}

Financial independence inevitably dictated a change in CPI-Board relations though not entirely in the sense that CPI now became expendable due to the new sources of money. The basic change which occurred was what the coalition had been all about, namely, institutional change to meet the needs of a changing constituency. The major consequence of almost six years of planning, cooperating, sharing, and struggling was the establishment of a new self-reliance in the school system, a demonstration of new resourcefulness. Then, too, by the late 1960's the school system was more accustomed to innovation, accommodation, and change than it had been in 1962. A significant turnover in teaching personnel in the system resulted in the hiring of young, less experienced teachers not indebted to the traditional system (Table 2:6). To the extent that traditionalism i.e. inability to adapt to change, can be inferred through personnel turnover, leaves of absence, resignations, and retirements peaked during the transitional years 1967-1970 (Tables 2:7, 2:8).

A final factor encouraging the independence of the school system and therefore, the breakdown of the coalition was the impending change of superintendents. During the tenure of the coalition, superintendents had been hired from outside the system. On July 1, 1969, Gerald Barbaresi, a former

\textsuperscript{32}By CPI's accounting, this shifting period pushed education substantially past manpower in CPI expenditure categories: education consumed 36.6 percent of the total available funds to manpower's 32.6 percent in fiscal 1966. CPI, \textit{The Human Story}, 1967, p. 99.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative, Supervisory, Principals, Itinerants</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High Schools</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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<td>Middle Schools</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Schools</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total System</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Personnel*</td>
<td>1021</td>
<td>1017</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>1183</td>
<td>1324</td>
<td>1455</td>
<td>1473</td>
<td>1488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include vacant positions.

### TABLE 2:7

**LEAVES OF ABSENCE, RESIGNATIONS AND RETIREMENTS OF PROFESSIONAL STAFF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaves of Absence</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resignations*</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirements</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly Totals</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* From active service only.

### TABLE 2:8

**RESIGNATIONS FROM *ACTIVE SERVICE IN NEW HAVEN BY LENGTH OF RESIGNEE SERVICE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of New Haven Service</th>
<th>Less Than 1 Year</th>
<th>1 Yr.</th>
<th>2 Yrs.</th>
<th>3 Yrs.</th>
<th>4 Yrs.</th>
<th>5 Yrs.</th>
<th>6 Yrs.</th>
<th>7 Yrs.</th>
<th>&amp; Over &amp; Over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1968</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include resignations from leaves of absence or before active teaching.*
classroom teacher, community school principal, and associate superintendent, took the office of superintendent. In 1962 when the coalition began, Barbaresi was a classroom teacher in the system that desperately needed reform. Seven years later, after serving various key roles in reform programs, he achieved the highest leadership position in the system.

The transitional phase is significant, then, in terms of the events which changed the reform coalition, as well as the ascendency of new executives, and the adoption of a new operating style -- institutionalized innovation -- and philosophy -- decentralization -- compatible with the changing times and the demands of CPI's and the Board of Education's shared constituency.

The Terminal Phase 1970-1972

As the end of the decade approached, the New Haven reform coalition entered its final phase. The impact of the major events discussed in the previous phase was fully realized shortly after the beginning of the new decade. The major characters originally responsible for the coalition had moved on, leaving the commitment for others to manage. Resources which were so critical for the support of the coalition continued to decrease. The Ford Foundation was no longer the

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33 Sviridoff settled at the Ford Foundation barely a year after taking the top position of New York City's Human Resources Administration; Mayor Lee retired; Paquin died of cancer while superintendent of the Baltimore schools and Hallman became a private, community action consultant in Washington, D.C.
angel it had been. Austerity programs on the state level resulted in severe cutbacks in supportive program categories and funds.\textsuperscript{34} Even the state's SADC aid to local school systems was cut.

Though the original coalition had dissipated greatly by 1970, residual effects and by-products perpetuate the coalition's intent. The school system under the direction of Superintendent Barbaresi assumed the role of innovator. The system's efforts are discussed in Chapter III. CPI's role has changed drastically through the decentralization process. New neighborhood corporations have education committees whose members participate on community school teams and school-community councils, school advisory organizations composed of students, school personnel, and parents (see Chapter IV). One neighborhood, the Hill, is the designated Model Cities neighborhood and therefore receives the benefit of additional federal money and local attention from the City Demonstration Agency, a \textit{pro forma} extension of the mayor's office. As this is written, the city is planning to expand these benefits to include the entire city.

In sum, however, CPI's initial role as an innovative agent was completed by the end of the transitional phase. On April 12, 1972, at the tenth anniversary banquet commemorating the founding of CPI, barely a word was mentioned about CPI's

\textsuperscript{34}Starting with an appropriation of $44.5 million in 1967, the state's Department of Community Affairs budget was $32 million in 1970-71 and $24.5 million in 1971-72. The proposed 1972-73 budget is $7.6 million. \textit{New Haven Register}, April 16, 1972.
role in educational reform. The state of the nation's economy and the myriad of circumstantial changes have required CPI to adhere strictly to a technical assistance function in the inner-city neighborhoods, except for some remaining manpower training programs. But as this is being written, the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity has been dismantled leaving CPI and its fifty delegate agencies without community action funds for the first time in ten years.

Superintendent Barbaresi has recently left New Haven. The Board of Education, consisting of a new majority appointed by the present second term mayor, voted not to renew Barbaresi's contract when it was due to expire in July, 1973. Barbaresi subsequently was offered and accepted an administrative position with the State Department of Education.

In regarding Barbaresi as expendable, the Board ignored a groundswell of parent, teacher, and administrator support demonstrated at a public hearing for Barbaresi. Political motives seem apparent as the present mayor and Barbaresi have not been on "good terms" (Barbaresi was appointed by Lee). The reform coalition era thus ended in as much political confusion and with the same inconclusive results that had characterized its existence.


CHAPTER III
THE EDUCATIONAL ENTERPRISES OF A
COALITION REFORM STRATEGY

Educational reform as a thrust of human renewal in New Haven took a substantive form which today may not appear to be innovative, "progressive," or at all reformist. Understanding the context of change lends to the validity of local institutional reform. A few years ago a small Texas city of 25,000 people put it more simply in its Model Cities application. It said: "These (programs) may not be innovative elsewhere in the country but they certainly are for us." ¹

In 1962 "business as usual" in New Haven's public schools meant the use of outmoded facilities and a curriculum a generation old. Realistically, any departure from the educational process institutionalized at that time represented reform through simple change. ² With the advent of the Community Progress Inc.-Board of Education coalition, the intensity and parameters of reform increased geometrically by virtue of the additional public and private funds available and through the mutual cooperation between these two organizations. The pur-


²The city's only evening and Sunday newspaper characterized the Ford grant proposal with the following headline: "Blueprint for Ford Grant Here Borders on Revolutionary," New Haven Register, May 27, 1962.
pose of this chapter is to survey the programs which resulted from this coalition, noting the particular changes in program emphasis throughout the ten-year period of the coalition's existence.

It would have been easier, certainly more convenient, to conduct this survey if the programmatic schema corresponded neatly with the phases described in Chapter II. In fact, as explained in that chapter, the phases themselves are not clearly delineated by dates or, for that matter, programs. Nevertheless, the consistency and perspective offered by the phase treatment can still serve well here as a practical guide to this survey.

The Formative Phase 1961-1962

There were no coalition-sponsored programs until late in the formative phase. Logically, this was a time for organizational planning, for formal and informal discussion, for the identification of specific problem areas and remedial solutions, and for the acquisition of sufficient resources. While the school system assessed its capabilities and inventoried its needs, the group planning CPI busied itself with devising an educational agenda for community action. Superintendent-elect Paquin supervised the educational program planning and participated in the final negotiations for the initial $2.5 million Ford grant, of which approximately $1 million would be spent on education.³

The original focus of the educational reform movement was the Community School concept. Adopted by the Board of Education on the recommendations of its Education Task Force and new superintendent in August, 1962, the Community School concept identified the four essential roles of a school as (1) an educational institution, (2) a neighborhood community center, (3) a community service center, and (4) a center of neighborhood life. The first two functions were traditionally the responsibility of the Board of Education. They included all educational programs for children and adults and various cultural and recreational offerings. CPI was given administrative responsibility for the latter two functions, the establishment of the Community School as a center for community services and as a base for neighborhood community action. Figure 3:1 illustrates the CPI-Community School program relationship.

FIGURE 3:1
THE COMMUNITY PROGRESS, INC.-COMMUNITY SCHOOL RELATIONSHIP

\[ \text{Community Progress, Inc.} \quad \text{New Haven Public Schools} \]

- Ford Foundation Funds
- OEO Anti-Poverty Funds

\[ \text{Special Programs and Community Action Programs} \]

\[ \text{City Funds} \quad \text{State and Federal Funds} \]

\[ \text{Seven Community Schools} \]
Organizationally, an assistant principal was appointed in each of the seven schools to coordinate Community School programs. Each assistant principal worked with a CPI neighborhood services coordinator, a park department recreation supervisor, and a volunteer agency group work supervisor in what was called the Community School team. The assistant principals worked closely with their school principals and their academic counterparts but were ultimately responsible to a single Director of Community Schools, Ralph Goglia, who was in turn responsible to the superintendents (See Figure 3:2).

FIGURE 3:2
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY SCHOOL PROGRAM

Actually CPI neighborhood service coordinators maintained offices in each of the community schools.
CPI delegated the first portion — $384,450 — of Ford money to the Board of Education for the community schools in September, 1962. Within a year of its endorsement by the Board, the Community School concept was established in seven New Haven schools serving seven different neighborhoods.

A typical community school program consisted of a variety of educational and recreational activities and resources which addressed the needs of that particular neighborhood. Some common programs included a pre-kindergarten program, a tutorial, informal education activities such as clubs, organized recreational activities, and a groupwork program. The groupwork component was an attempt to service behavioral problems which tended to affect academic achievement and social adjustments. During the summer months, these activities were expanded or underwent revision. By 1969 variations of these programs in five "satellite" community (elementary) schools supplemented the offerings of the original seven schools.4

The Peak Phase 1963-1965

In addition to the four functions of the Community School Program, funds from the Ford grant launched seven new programs by early 1963: a pre-kindergarten program, a helping teacher program, a higher horizons program, an improved reading program, expanded guidance services, in-service training for

teachers, and a new concept for summer school. These programs in some instances were part of the Community School Program but not always.

The pre-kindergarten program, a forerunner of OEO's national Headstart Program, was intended to increase the likelihood of success in school for pre-school children whose cultural "deprivation" created handicaps to normal school achievement. A ten week pilot program started in April, 1963 and by September a full program involving six centers became operative. Each center conducted four two-hour sessions weekly for two groups of fifteen children. The program consisted mainly of group singing, dancing, listening to stories, and working with paint, clay, and sand. A fifth session was devoted to the mothers and dealt with child-care, nutrition, homemaking, and problem discussions. Each center was staffed by a head teacher, a teacher's aid, and a baby sitting attendant. Part-time services of a parent-counselor, a visiting nurse, a psychologist, and a pediatrician were also available at no cost to the parents.

In time the educational objectives of Headstart became clearer and more sophisticated, encompassing language and social skill-building. Program components were aimed at encouraging interest in learning, developing good self concepts

5The treatment of these seven programs, unless otherwise noted, is based on information contained in: Community Progress, Inc., New Haven Youth Development Program Part Two: Programs (New Haven: CPI, 1963).
in pre-schoolers, and building self-confidence.

The initial pilot program grew to 210 enrollees in seven centers by 1964 and then to 600 enrollees in 20 centers by 1968. Financial support of the program shifted from Ford to OEO when the National Headstart Program began. In 1969 the state's Department of Community Affairs augmented the OEO, ESBA, and SADC support of the city-wide network of centers.6

The reading program was designed to reduce reading failure in the very early stages and to provide special assistance where reading retardation was apparent and remedial work required. One supervisor and twelve reading consultants and teachers serviced all thirty-one elementary schools and a special junior high school developmental reading program for grades seven through nine.

Since studies in the New Haven school system indicated that underachievement in reading was a major cause of many problems at all levels, from the primary grades through high school, an intensified reading program had to involve most classroom teachers in order to have an impact on all the school system's poor readers. The reading specialists developed and conducted workshops for all teachers on the primary, junior, and high school levels, in addition to providing the training of teachers in the developmental reading program.

The Helping Teacher Program, later named the Curriculum Assistants Program, started in February, 1963. The program

was designed in response to problems caused by the increasing turnover of teachers in the inner-city schools, a full thirty-five percent in 1961. Emphasis was placed on structuring experiences for new teachers and strengthening teacher support. Some nine curriculum assistants in seven inner-city elementary schools were charged with assisting principals in the orientation of new teachers; they also presented and demonstrated new instructional materials to regular classroom teachers, assisted teacher planning, and conferred with teachers and parents about individual pupil achievement and advancement. Most curriculum assistants were highly skilled, successful classroom teachers who were reassigned to the program.

A fourth new program, the Higher Horizons Program, was developed to introduce students and their parents to new cultural and social resources in New Haven, to new interests, new inter-personal relationships and as a result, to stimulate them to higher aspirations. Like several other programs, Higher Horizons began on an experimental basis in February, 1963. Its program consisted of trips, demonstrations in art and music, multi-cultural activities, and dramatic performances for children in kindergarten through sixth grade levels. The program attempted to reinforce and expand upon the work of the pre-kindergarten program, though initially it took a few years for pre-kindergarten graduates to transfer into Higher Horizons.

The trial program proved to be so successful that it was expanded to include two of the four junior high schools and five elementary schools. Teacher involvement increased from
twenty-two to seventy-five in two years and eventually some 2,000 students participated in the program.

Responding to a recommendation of the Education Task Force, the Board of Education established a new Department of Pupil Services to coordinate a systematic, comprehensive program utilizing the services of guidance counsellors, school social workers, psychologists, and the entire school staff. The department conducted studies to determine the nature of student problems, grade failures, and reasons for dropping out. A new system of reliable guidance data, including vocational information, was developed. Another phase of the program provided in-service staff training in the form of seminars, lectures, and group discussions which centered on the urban community, its social and economic changes and related youth problems. Still another phase involved student-counselor field trips to acquaint both groups with new and changing opportunities in the local labor market.

In sum, the establishment of the Pupil Services Program provided for a host of aids and critical guidance services to students and training opportunities for staff in an effort to bridge the staff competence and student communications gaps which existed in 1962.

Though most programs were designed to offer in-service training in specialized areas, a system-wide in-service education program was established to develop, conduct, and coordinate general in-service training. This program had two basic objectives:
1. to develop a better understanding among staff members of the full scope of the education program so as to encourage implementation of its parts;

2. to provide staff with more details of the economic and social structure of the community and the special problems of the inner-city.⁷

Half day training programs for all school staff dealt with topics such as pupil growth, art and music programs, CPI and its relationship to the schools, the goals and programs of the Human Relations Council and the Urban League, the education of the American teacher, and other community topics. Participants assisted in starting a curriculum materials center and a professional library. Staff members also attended selected regional, state, and national education conferences; others visited various urban school systems and community programs, and some participated in local community welfare projects.

The last of the original programs was a new summer school program. Its purpose was to offer students from grades four through twelve learning situations where students and teachers were free from the tensions which too often come from marks, report cards, examinations, and credit. Consequently, the summer school curriculum allowed students to explore fields of knowledge not generally taught in the regular school program in a more informal and relaxed atmosphere. These circumstances also enabled teachers to experiment with new tech-

niques and to refine others for incorporation into the regular school program.

Almost 2,000 students participated in the first summer school program in 1963. That number increased to 4,622 in 1966 and to a peak of over 5,000 in 1967. With budget cuts and reduced course offerings, summer school enrollment has since decreased.

Not all programs which began during the peak phase were the product of, or intimately dependent on, the CPI-Board of Education relationship. Others had begun prior to the establishment of CPI but found essential financial support to continue in the CPI commitment to education. And still others were developed from the original programs but evolved new objectives and structures. Because the criteria for categorizing these programs is tenuous, if not entirely obscure, it is necessary simply to treat each program independently, providing sufficient information for each to be placed in the overall framework.

One of CPI's first attempts at educational programming was the CPI Work Crew Program (in 1965 renamed the Neighborhood Youth Corps Out of School). In 1963 Mitchell Sviridoff supervised the development of this program to provide unemployed high school dropouts work experience, work-related education, counselling, basic education, and a modest income. The program consisted of three work-study stages during which a participant received educational and vocational training
eventually leading to a full-time job.\textsuperscript{8}

In 1965 CPI and the Board of Education sponsored the High School Work Training Program or the Neighborhood Youth Corps In School. This program was aimed at high school students from low income families who were potential dropouts. Participants worked twelve hours a week after school and received a reasonable hourly wage. The goal of the program was to keep these students in school and ease their transition into the labor market by increasing their skills and confidence through work experience.

A CPI-supported program of a similar nature was the U.S. Grant Foundation. The Foundation was actually a Yale student program organized in 1953 to assist local black students in preparing for college. An Upward Bound-type of program, it admitted students in the sixth grade and continued with them until they started college. CPI supported the summer program phase until 1968 when Title III funds were obtained through ESEA.

The New Haven School System also contributed to the program picture. The Adult Basic Education Program was a Board of Education program funded from 1963 to 1965 by CPI-Ford funds. It provided New Haven adults basic academic instruction and an introduction to cultural appreciation. A large portion of its students were non-English-speaking inner-city residents.

At least three single experimental programs were planned

\textsuperscript{8}Ad Hoc Committee, \textit{Supplemental Education}, p. 19.
during this phase though only one was eventually implemented.

The psycho-education experiment was a program established in two schools under the direction of Dr. Seymour Sarason of Yale University. The program provided a psychologist for classroom use in the two schools. Problems of individual students could be observed, assessed, and remedied by the psychologist in cooperation with the classroom teacher. The services can aid multi-problem school situations in the correction of poor school adjustment.

The fifth and sixth grade program was an experiment designed to prevent school dropout and raise pupil achievement levels in selected inner-city elementary schools. Central to the program was the organization of elementary schools in clusters of three and the shared use of facilities in each cluster. This was also to enable the school system to achieve a better racial balance throughout its elementary schools. The program never reached the implementation stage due to the superceding city-wide integration plan.

The seventh and eighth grade program with parental participation was another experimental program planned but not implemented. It was to involve seventh and eighth grade students (in two of the inner-city K-8 schools) and their parents. The hypothesis was that there is a direct relationship between the aspirations of parents and those of their children. Parents placed as observers in classrooms of their children could later have common discussions with teachers and their children, together or separately.

In 1962 a study found that one-fourth of New Haven's
students enrolled in the seventh grade were dropping out of school before finishing; sixty-five percent of all inner-city students were leaving school before the eleventh grade; twenty-three percent by the ninth grade (See Table 3:1).

**TABLE 3:1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Dropouts</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Subsequently single curriculum (also called individualized educational planning) was designed to curb the dropout rate in the seventh, eighth, and ninth grades. Through these three grades the program offered each pupil an individualized program which reflected the pupil's interests and ability. A form of flexible scheduling enabled pupils to maintain a more personalized school schedule.

The school system recognized the need for new and updated vocational education. A joint education and training program was developed to meet the needs of students who lack ability, interest, or motivation for regular school programs. During the 1963-64 school year, forty students, ten from each junior high school, were assigned to four self-contained classrooms with four carefully selected teachers. The program stressed social learning -- informal education, interpersonal relations, self-learning -- rather than strict aca-
ademic study. Teachers and students utilized the supportive services of guidance, reading, social work, health and psychological services.

Because of the increasing numbers of students desiring vocational and technical programs, high school pre-vocational and pre-technical programs were critically needed. The State Department of Vocational Education conducted four training programs during the 1964 summer in auto mechanics, drafting, printing, and general machinery. In the fall, pre-vocational and pre-technical students chose school curricula based upon their summer experiences.

Work study programs supplied practical vocational experience while students continued their academic programs. A pilot project at one junior high school hired potential dropouts as aides to work a maximum of ten hours a week at seventy-five cents an hour. Ninth grade boys participated in furniture repair, landscaping, painting, glazing, and clerking. Ninth grade girls worked as aides to teachers, dieticians, librarians, and school office personnel.

Study clinics represented a final offering in this program phase. The clinics, available for study and tutoring, were open two nights a week in each senior high school from seven to nine at night. In addition the seven community schools had tutoring programs during the afternoons and evenings. Attendance was voluntary though some students attended by guidance counselor referral.

This broad scheme of programs represents the initial planning effort by the members of the Department of Education
in New Haven and CPI. Few, if any, of these programs could have been possible without the infusion of outside money, particularly from the Ford Foundation. As described in the previous chapter, towards the end of the peak phase of the coalition, new funding sources dictated a change in the relationship between the Board of Education and CPI; however, many programs originally implemented became institutionalized while others became inoperative. The coalition's denouement during the transitional phase had little effect on changing the fundamental commitment to the programs developed and implemented earlier.

The Transitional Phase 1966-1969

By late 1965 and early 1966, the time period which corresponds roughly to the change from the peak phase to the transitional phase, the programmatic scheme was altered somewhat. In 1966 all CPI programs relating to Community Schools were transferred to the Board of Education. The coalition members planned new programs, expanded existing programs, and eliminated others. Basically, it attempted to maintain its most successful programs and extend them through new funding sources.

The new programs were the Long Wharf Program, Residential Youth Centers, the High School Enrichment Program, and the School Library Services Program. Programs which were by-products or variations of existing programs were the Summer Headstart Program, the Summer Institute for Teachers, and the Educational Research Project. Discontinued programs included
the joint education and training program, and the individualized instruction and guidance program for grades seven through nine which ended after the 1965-66 school year; the fifth and sixth grade program and seventh and eighth grade program for pupils and parents were never implemented.9

Under the new program category, the Long Wharf Program attempted to demonstrate the viability of theater as an instrument to raise the motivation of inner-city youth with respect to learning in general and language skills in particular. The repertoire company in residence at the Long Wharf Theatre was instrumental in providing material for inner-city high school and elementary school students and in conducting workshops with school drama groups.

In September, 1966, the doors opened on the first Residential Youth Center (RYC), funded as a demonstration project by the Department of Labor. The RYC was a neighborhood-based, self-help residential center for inner-city boys age 16-21. The program was an out-growth of the Neighborhood Youth Corps started in 1963 for high school dropouts. RYC, like NYC, used indigenous non-professionals as staff but added the residential dimension for boys needing a non-institutional

9 Information contained in this paragraph and those on new programs is derived from: New Haven Public Schools, "Background Paper for Meeting Between Members of the New Haven Board of Education and Members of the CPI Board and their Residents' Advisory Committee," November 14, 1966.
yet clinical setting. The program drew on many social services in New Haven including a formal relationship with the Yale Psycho-Educational Clinic.

The high school enrichment program consisted of a series of Saturday morning lectures for area high school students. Topics covered political philosophies, civil rights, U.S. foreign policy, painting, jazz and folk music as art forms, and the cinema.

The most ambitious of the new programs was the library service project. It established a division of school library services which facilitated the development of five new libraries in elementary schools and supplemented the collections of nine additional existing school libraries. The division also established neighborhood library instruction centers, a central resource collection and bookmobile, and a training program in the use of library resources for teachers, students, library aides, and study center leaders.

The summer institute for teachers, first held in 1966, was in fact an extension of the in-service training effort in the original scheme of programs. This institute for 100 teachers focused on the education of disadvantaged students.

Finally, a new educational research project attempted


to establish reorganized system or research instruments in the fourteen poverty impacted schools which were receiving more than three million dollars in special aid during 1965-1967. This project was designed to maintain a standardized, computer-based system of data collection, storage, retrieval and analysis on the programs affecting these schools. The data could be used to provide a basis for evaluation in long range decision-making and planning.

In the time which elapsed from the start of the reform coalition until well into the transitional phase, the tendency of those involved in the programs described above was most certainly to support the more successful of the programs implemented. Those programs which were eliminated or phased out were ostensibly absorbed by other programs or simply deemed unworkable or no longer necessary. Other programs which were never implemented appeared to be the likely victims of an arbitrary priority system suffering from over programming.

The Terminal Phase 1970-1972

The terminal phase is by definition the end of the coalition reform movement. In the absence of a planning and resource catalyst like CPI, innovations and new educational enterprises must generally be generated from within the system, i.e., institutionalized. Though during the transitional and terminal phases, surrogate agents, which will be discussed in Chapter IV, contributed to fill a growing void left by CPI's changing role.
One of the more remarkable programs established in the 1969-70 school year was the Neighborhood Guidance Center. This project was designed to offer an informal but parallel school program to the segment of students conveniently labeled as disruptive. Because of their inability to function within the more rigid, traditional school programs, these students were being expediently subjected to suspension from school. The Neighborhood Guidance Center, located in a former synagogue not far from one of the high schools, offered these students an interim school setting where they could adapt to a program of self-discipline and academic study. The program lasted only one year due to funding difficulties and internal political factors.

Another example was the high school in the community (HSC), an innovative alternative to the standard high school. Established at the beginning of the 1970-71 school year, HSC consisted of 10 full time teachers and 150 students. Students, chosen at random from applicants, were offered the following opportunity:

A chance to take educational advantage of the great human and physical resources of New Haven. HSC classes are held at locations throughout the city, as often as possible at places relevant to the courses involved.

A chance to take a wide variety of courses in small class settings. There are five to ten students in a typical high school in the community class.

A chance to develop their own individual courses of study. The program hopes to find out what a
student needs and wants and to work with him on achieving his goals.\textsuperscript{12}

Still another program, Focus, which had its philosophical roots planted in the early coalition years continues to be a primary ongoing project of the Board of Education. Focus' purpose is to provide a concentrated program of reading, math, and language arts for students in inner-city primary grades. The program involves instruction for students on an individual and small group basis and similarly for teachers in developing relevant curriculum materials.\textsuperscript{13} Focus receives ESEA funds through Title I.

This chapter cannot be concluded without some mention of a CPI relationship to non-public schools. As a private, non-profit corporation, CPI's status provided a useful link to the non-public school. While most of the resources of the public school programs were available to parochial school students, CPI nevertheless facilitated an OEO grant for a pre-Kindergarten program at St. Martin de Porres, a parochial school, the first instance of this in the country. In addition OEO monies through CPI were used by parochial schools to provide individualized reading assistance to their pupils and


\textsuperscript{13}A recent evaluation by the University of Connecticut found the "majority of children in the program during the last academic year were achieving at a level comparable with national norms and equally important, target populations have also shown substantial academic growth." New Haven Register, December 3, 1972, p. 17c.
an in-service education program for their regular school teachers. This is further evidence that the spirit of commitment of CPI's reform philosophy penetrated beyond sacred cows in an attempt to deal with the problems of poverty.

All the programs described above, however radical or mundane they may seem, could not have been at all possible if there had not been 1) a motivating catalyst to initiate them, 2) sufficient additional resources to implement and support them, and 3) the basic willingness and accommodation on the part of those individuals and the system for whom change was most difficult. It is not a purpose of this study to evaluate or even report on the effectiveness of the programs which resulted from this reform coalition. It should suffice at this point to say that the mood created in 1962, the innovative atmosphere, was responding to new and changing social and economic demands; that mood persisted and continues to persist in a system not wholly adverse to the lethargy of bureaucratization. The singular achievement of these educational enterprises or programs i.e. their establishment, meant a departure from all that was previously held sacred under a monolithic philosophy of education. The clear departure from that philosophy constituted a commitment to new ways of learning for all.
CHAPTER IV
COMMUNITY ACTION VEHICLES FOR RESIDENT PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATIONAL DECISION-MAKING

Decision-making is a function of power or authority. Classically, power within an institutional hierarchy corresponds proportionally to an inverted pyramid, whereas the number of people affected by that accumulative power corresponds to a regular pyramid. The point is simple: most people whose lives are affected by institutions -- and that is most people -- have little, if anything, to say in the institutional decisions which directly or indirectly govern their lives. In 1962 this was as true for the nation in general as it was for New Haven.

With the added benefit of hindsight, identification of the inherent social problem is rather easy: dysfunctional public institutions quite naturally breed public discontent and usually require reform. The impetus for such reform can be provided by public pressure, a catalytic form of power, or the basis can be generated or formed by public assumption of the institution's power and responsibilities, i.e., local or community control. Restated, these alternatives can constitute the necessary means of political pressure or political control.

In 1962 Community Progress, Incorporated explicitly set out to reform local institutions, with educational reform as a major objective. It did not seek to institute a new system of participation in local government. National as well as local events and circumstances (as described in Chapter II)
controlled the direction of CPI and its reform coalition after its auspicious beginning. During his tenure as executive director, the politically astute Mitchell Sviridoff was remarkably successful in anticipating social trends and maintaining CPI's strategy as a national model. While it is obvious that CPI's planners were aware of the political dimensions of New Haven's social institutions, it is equally obvious that they underestimated the social role of education in that regard. They could have benefitted from what Christopher Jencks wrote just a few years later:

... the social role of education is at bottom a political rather than a technical question. Schools ... can play a major role in solving America's social problems only if control over them passes to new individuals and interests who expect to benefit from solving these problems.

The experience of the CPI-Board of Education reform coalition was, as has been indicated, marked by various forms of achievement. The programmatic substance of that relationship may seem to lack the gleam of innovation; yet the more subtle, innovative achievement which developed through a curious mixture of political strategy and circumstance stands distinctly in support of any evaluation of CPI, the Board of Education, or their relationship. The political strategy consisted of a conscious attempt to invoke neighborhood or resident participation in the planning, implementation, and operation of neighborhood programs through the use of community action

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vehicles. National and local events acted as an uncontrollable variable, reshaping the political strategy, speeding it up at times, redirecting it, and even reconstituting it. The following chapter is a treatment of community action vehicles and their use in an educational reform coalition.

Participatory vehicles played an historical role as well as a functional one throughout the time line of the coalition. However, the vehicles discussed in this chapter are more significant in their functional aspect, rather than in their temporal one. In other words, the relevance of community action vehicles in New Haven's context lies mainly in their level and type of activity as a measurement of participation. Consequently, though historical incidence will not be ignored, emphasis will be placed upon function.

It is necessary at this point to attempt a definition of a community action vehicle. Clark and Hopkins' *A Relevant War Against Poverty* offers a useful definition for this purpose. In defining community action, the authors conclude it must:

> involve the development and use of techniques whereby the victims of poverty, social injustice, or some form of exploitation and discrimination are organized to identify their problems, determine the sources and causes, mobilize their energies, resources, and collective power in seeking and obtaining remedies and the desired changes.2

(Emphasis added.)

This chapter is concerned with those "techniques." Further-

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more, "victims" in the above definition takes on the additional dimension of education clientele. Specifically, this refers to the poor who are a target population of the anti-poverty agency and also users of the education system.

Community Action Vehicles and Community Progress, Inc.

CPI's experience with participatory vehicles began with its articles of incorporation. Formation of a board of directors was an essential first step in establishing the agency. The agency's planners decided that a nine member board could adequately serve the needs and coalition variants of the reform strategy. The makeup of the board was clearly indicative of the groundwork laid for the agency's success. The nine member board consisted of representatives from the New Haven Board of Education, Mayor Lee's Citizen's Action Commission, the Community Council, the New Haven Redevelopment Agency, the United Fund, Yale University, and three public members appointed by the Mayor. Serving for three years (the term of the Ford grant), the original board members represented organizations and institutions with a prior vested interest, direct or indirect, in the agency's planning effort. Hence the board's participatory function was originally conceived as being highly restrictive and neatly perfunctory. At least one writer has labeled the board (to no one's astonishment) "a legitimating device," noting that there was no provision for the voice of the poor or other clientele.  

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When in the fall of 1964 the Economic Opportunity Act took effect, "participation" gained new meaning and concomitant momentum. The words "maximum feasible participation" constituted a loosening wedge in the narrowly defined process devised by CPI. Thus, more flexible vehicles were necessary.

CPI, much to its constant fiscal advantage, was especially adept at anticipating governmental action and therefore could respond posthaste not only with written proposals requesting funds but also with rationales and local initiatives to justify itself. Consequently steps were taken early in 1965 to plan for increased neighborhood involvement in agency decision-making. The first step was a benevolent attempt by CPI to rationalize informal inputs of the poor in the agency's decision-making processes. The second step was to begin groundwork on a new advisory body eventually called the Resident's Advisory Committee.

The Resident's Advisory Committee was designed to be an

4 Much credit for this is due to CPI's national leadership role as a model community action program and the frequent participation of its administrators in determining federal anti-poverty policy.


A previous attempt is located in CPI's first proposal to OEO. The proposal emphasizes CPI's decentralized program structure throughout the inner city in community schools, employment centers, neighborhood offices, and store fronts. It also stressed the number of indigenous program staff members and the involvement of "generalized neighborhood organizations" and "specific program related groups." In a truly prophetic statement, the proposal asserts: "It (continuous feedback through resident involvement) is a process that continues and grows as neighborhood competence develops." CPI, "Application for Community Action Program Grant," November 17, 1964, CAP 3, p. 28.
explicit advisory mechanism for resident participation with implicit functions. The twenty-one member council — three members elected from each of seven neighborhoods — was "to play a major role in counseling CPI on programs of activity ..." According to Sviridoff, "that might include advising the Board (CPI) on the feelings and reactions of the neighborhood residents regarding CPI programs and suggestions for new programs or modifications." A former CPI employee, and critic of the agency's resident participation efforts, commented later:

The Residents Advisory Council was launched with no specific functions, no direction, and no future. Minutes of their meetings for the first year showed they were still undecided on their functions. For example, November 8 minutes showed they voted unanimously to postpone a proposed joint meeting with the CPI Board of Directors to consider the question of the former's function. On November 25, a discussion of the committee's functions followed. A member offered a motion that the CPI Board be asked to submit an outline of the committee's functions. He withdrew it after several committee members voiced opinion that the committee should meet with the CPI Board to discuss the matter.

The same critic points out that the RAC's original membership included everyone but the poor (Table 4:1). He claims

6 Statement by Reuben Holden, President, CPI Board of Directors, New Haven Register, November 9, 1965.

7 Statement by Mitchell Sviridoff, Executive Director, CPI, New Haven Register, November 9, 1965.

TABLE 4:1
FIRST RESIDENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE (1965)
BY NEIGHBORHOOD AND OCCUPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dixwell</td>
<td>1. real estate, property manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. college student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. president of PTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight</td>
<td>1. labor relations specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. machinist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. assistant librarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Haven</td>
<td>1. factory inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. mechanical engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. salesman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newhallville</td>
<td>1. commercial fuel operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. housewife (member of CORE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. material control operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Rock</td>
<td>1. president of PTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. shipping clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. homemaking adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wooster Square</td>
<td>1. insurance agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Redevelopment Agency employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. housewife (member of PTA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The seventh neighborhood, the Hill, did not hold elections until after the original council convened. That occupational data was unobtainable by this author.
the election procedure was devised to allow for minimum accessibility by all people, e.g. prearranged candidates, voting by invited residents at meetings. Fewer than 500 people in toto and as few as fourteen voted in one neighborhood in the CPI supervised elections.9

Such criticisms, well taken as they may be in relation to the inner-city poor, still obscure an unavoidable fact: regardless of the ground rules, systematic steps, developed and implemented in gradual piecemeal fashion, were involving people who had up to that time been excluded from any formal input into the agency's decision-making. Interest in the RAC waned throughout its first year until almost exactly on the anniversary of its first meeting, a group of members boosted by neighborhood support issued a manifesto reasserting its neighborhood legitimacy and demanding approval powers for CPI programs and policies. This action heralded the beginning of a new definition of participation, one defined through neighborhood initiative.

CPI took another step to involve neighborhood residents in its policy-making structure at the same time it was fostering the development of the RAC. Feedback to OEO had aroused federal skepticism with CPI's definition of "maximum feasible participation." Perhaps because of CPI's reputation, OEO expected CPI to be more exemplary in its progress. In any case the direct result was a move on November 12, 1965, by the CPI Board of Directors to expand its total membership from nine

9 Ibid., p. 50.
to sixteen, one additional member to be elected per neighborhood by the residents. This move pre-dated the Green Amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act by three years. That amendment mandated one-third board representation by residents.

The two simultaneous efforts suggest that CPI was seeking to further explore two forms of procedural resident involvement -- cooperative and self-sustaining. Cooperative participation refers to the institutional, i.e. CPI, accommodation of residents to an expanded board of directors, although initially in numbers insufficient to provide a voting majority. Self-sustaining participation is represented by the Residents Advisory Committee which remained a flexible vehicle for self-determination according to neighborhood initiatives. A truism of practical politics holds that in the transfer of power, power cannot be given but must be taken. That the RAC floundered its own demand for power can be construed as evidence to that truism.

Participation in decision-making also has an operational meaning. Within CPI's Community Services Division, the operational arm most involved in the Community School Program, participation was a primary objective. An early document outlined the intent of the division's neighborhood services offices as participatory vehicles:

1. To develop responsible leadership with concern for the neighborhood and with awareness of its problems.

2. To develop and strengthen participation in neighborhood organizations.
3. To encourage citizen initiative in program planning.

4. To promote full use of the community school as a community center.

5. To educate residents to constructive use of their rights and neighborhood resources.

6. To encourage the raising of individual and neighborhood aspirations.¹⁰

Multi-service community service offices first operated in the schools serving as community schools. For various reasons, the offices later shifted to store front facilities. CPI workers and programs in each of New Haven's inner-city neighborhoods sought to implement the above roles by encouraging residents to participate in programming and to organize for community development.

The accelerated redefinition of resident participation and the participatory movement itself entered the most critical stage in the summer of 1967 (see Chapter II, p. 50). Well-worn institutional rationales and delays were ultimately consumed in the chaos and retribution of riots in New Haven that summer. There can be no denial that the trauma resulting from the "civil disturbances" in the nation's leading model city exacted an irreversible commitment by CPI and the Board of Education to the community's definition of participation. The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders concluded:

Ghetto resident increasingly believe that they are excluded from the decision-making

process which affects their lives and community. This feeling of exclusion, intensified by the bitter legacy of racial discrimination, has engendered a deep-seated hostility toward the institutions of government. It has severely compromised the effectiveness of programs intended to provide improved services to ghetto residents. In part, this is the lesson of Detroit and New Haven where well-intentioned programs designed to respond to the needs of ghetto residents were not worked out and implemented sufficiently in cooperation with the intended beneficiaries.\(^{11}\)

In the months after the riots, CPI brainstormed a strategy consistent with the immediate social dictates made evident the previous summer. A vague notion of decentralization emerged in agency pronouncements throughout the winter and spring. In May, 1968, the CPI Board of Directors with its complement of neighborhood representatives adopted a resolution stating that the agency's new policy was to foster the creation of neighborhood corporations. The decision-making process would be broadened through decentralization and neighborhood residents would be invested with the authority and responsibility for planning and implementing programs that affect their lives.\(^{12}\)

Decentralization was the fundamental process identified by CPI as necessary to transform its centralized, decision-making bureaucracy into a diffused system of stable, self-


determining organizations. The neighborhood corporation would be the model umbrella organization (Table 4:1) at the community level, with the responsibility for performing the same functions which CPI had previously performed, e.g. identification of neighborhood needs, development and implementation of programs.\textsuperscript{13} By decentralizing into neighborhood corporations, the number of centers of decision-making and the number of initiators of policy are increased; people are directly engaged in the function, thereby increasing the awareness of individuals of the whole function in which they are involved and establishing as much face-to-face association with decision makers as possible.\textsuperscript{14}

At the outset, corporations took one of two basic forms. The first was a multi-purpose organization responsible for planning and screening program proposals and for being a neighborhood "voice" in matters of community concern. The second was a collection of single-purpose groups which, under the aegis of the umbrella corporation, would act to meet needs in specific program areas. Both forms are embodied operationally in the Figure 4:1 schematic; however, combinations of the forms varied from neighborhood to neighborhood.

Because it was CPI's commitment to "encourage" the neighborhood corporation concept as its final community action


The Neighborhood Corporation

Board of Directors;  
CPI Staff;  
Executive Committee;  
Vista

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equitable Representation of all racial and ethnic in the neighborhood at least 60% representation of the poor.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS  
i.e., churches  
professional groups  
private agencies |
| CPI BOARD  
REPRESENTATIVES |
| TEENS  
MANPOWER COMMITTEE  
WELFARE COMMITTEE |
| ALL ORGANIZED GROUPS  
GEOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION |
| DAY CARE COMMITTEE  
HEALTH SERVICES COMMITTEE  
LEGAL SERVICES COMMITTEE |
| HOUSING COMMITTEE |
| SENIOR CITIZENS  
ALL INTERESTED |
| UNAFFILIATED GROUPS AND ISOLATED "POCKETS" |
| COMMUNITY SCHOOL TEAM  
PARK RECREATION  
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY |
| HOUSING AUTHORITY  
GROUP WORK PROGRAM  
CPI NEIGHBORHOOD STAFF  
OTHER NEIGHBORHOOD AGENCIES |

There are no arbitrary, rigid, or fixed limitations for inclusion on either participation or planning, the illustrations are only to suggest examples.

TABLE 4:1
vehicle, CPI staff recognized two alternative ways to proceed: CPI could manage the formation of corporations in each neighborhood by providing organizers and training, or it could encourage independent local initiative in each neighborhood.\(^\text{15}\)

The latter alternative prevailed for its inherent political implications: not only would CPI avoid charges of paternalism which had plagued it since 1962, but the transfer of power — control over funds and programs — could be accomplished to any independent resident organization or cluster of such groups which demonstrated neighborhood-wide representation.

The self-determination alternative was equally important: after several years of operating programs and piecemeal inputs of token participation, New Haven's inner-city residents were experienced enough with formal institutions to undertake the basic task of governing and serving themselves.

By 1972 neighborhood corporations were in operation in each of New Haven's geographic neighborhoods. CPI continues to maintain a technical assistance service, primarily to meet funding requirements.

Community Action Vehicles and the Board of Education

Community action vehicles within the education system in New Haven are perhaps indistinguishable from those in many other cities. It has only been in recent years that the accumulative effects of crisis confrontation, neighborhood initiative, and larger social trends have prodded the system.

\(^{15}\)CPI, "Neighborhood Corporations Proposal," p. 4.
into developing real, meaningful participatory vehicles. On the whole, there had been no regular involvement of parents and teachers in deciding educational policy before the late 1960's. Whatever involvement there had been resulted from some crisis within the system or within a particular school. For example the Hillhouse Ad Hoc Parent's Committee formed (December, 1967) as a response to the high school's racial disturbances. One experienced New Haven educator has concluded of the era:

New Haven was indeed a model city for the nation if it is defined in terms of new buildings, new stores, and the physical apparatus of a city. When the definition is extended to include such factors as goals of education, changing neighborhoods, and the central issue of power, a different picture emerges. Had the educational structure been more effective in relating to the changing population of its neighborhood schools, had the channels been left open for the black and minority populations to change those institutions that directly impinged upon their lives, then the bone of power would have been far less crucial.16

The first formal participatory body in the education system is the city's Board of Education. It consists of the mayor and seven members appointed by the mayor who serve four year terms without pay. The Board has general control over the entire school system and is required by state law to appoint a superintendent of schools who serves as the executive officer of the Board, and who is responsible for implementing the policies determined by the Board. The day-to-day operation of the system is the responsibility of the superintendent and his staff.

Appointments to the Board of Education are basically political. Realistically, true resident participation through the Board as a vehicle can be achieved only superficially through the Board's open meetings. Board members traditionally have reflected the views, and the will, of the mayor who appointed them. Because of the four year term, it is not so easy for an incumbent whose views differ radically from his predecessor's to alter quickly the Board's composition. Mayor Lee sought to effect a change in the relatively conservative Board he inherited as quickly as possible. One of his initial accomplishments was to appoint the first black member in the history of the Board. Not until the late 1950's and early 1960's was Lee able to stock the Board with a majority of progressives like Mitchell Swiridoff.

It is not unlikely for Board members appointed by a previous administration to clash with a new administration. One recent example occurred in the spring of 1971 when two members, one the president, resigned because of the curtailment of Board funds and other political complications. A third member also appointed by the previous mayor resigned shortly thereafter. Events as these tend to stigmatize City Hall in-

Dahl discusses the political nature of the Board and its "executive-centered" decision-making in the Lee and previous administrations. The mayor and his Board appointees decide or influence most decisions more than the superintendent except in the areas of curriculum and internal organization. Of course, this varies depending on the superintendent's leadership. **Who Governs?** (New Haven: Yale University, 1961), pp. 205-205.

Abraham, **Urban City**, p. 89.
volvement in education in purely negative terms. The Board's integrity suffers and its role as a participatory vehicle exists solely as a political device which permits direct resident petitioning.

With the establishment of CPI, its educational programs within the school system, and its neighborhood offices, residents began to participate in running programs and responding to community organization initiatives. Three hundred neighborhood residents, most from the inner city, journeyed to Hartford by bus to urge the 1965 General Assembly to pass a bill "to improve and accelerate education of children whose educational achievement has been or is being restricted by economic, social, or environmental disadvantages." The group met with the governor and was heard at the hearings. The State Aid to Disadvantaged Children Act passed two months later.

Other examples abound. "In the Scranton School area, a reactivated PTA organization with an ADC (Aid to Dependent Children) welfare mother as its new leader waged a successful campaign for classroom and playground improvements. Elsewhere a school principal in a low income neighborhood failed to convince parents that he was anything but apathetic and uncaring. The parents demanded that the Board of Education

remove him ... and the Board did.20 When the first director of New Haven's Headstart Program retired, parents of children in the program helped to select a successor.

Consistently, progress in resident participation increased in various ways. The concept of the community school planning team, drawing together the assistant principal, area group work and recreation supervisors, the CPI neighborhood coordinator, and other neighborhood service people, also proved effective. Activities at Prince Street school, a community school serving New Haven's Hill area, provided a notable example of effective team work with residents. In the spring of 1968 the Prince Community School team played a key role in establishing discussions between neighborhood residents, including militants, and established agencies such as the Chamber of Commerce. As a result, $107,000 in funds contributed by the Chamber and its various members supplemented summer program funds available through CPI.

The Community School teams developed and implemented programs with the aid of a Citizen's Advisory Committee, a belated vehicle designed some five years after the Community School Program commenced. Each committee, one per community school, consisted of twenty-one to thirty-five parents and neighborhood residents who met separately from the community school team to discuss programs, new ideas, and suggestions which could be made to the team. In addition, three members of each committee were representatives to the city-wide

Citizen's Advisory Committee which served a similar feedback function for the superintendent's office.

By 1968, however, the Board of Education was convinced that a more formalized vehicle for direct resident participation in educational decision-making was necessary. Perhaps, like CPI, such a vehicle represented an inevitable extension of the system's historical role. More likely causal factors existed in the almost daily occurrence of incidents with racial overtones in the schools. During the 1967-68 school year, these incidents disrupted many school days with injured and arrested students, police assigned to the schools, and racial tension high. Adding to the system's problems, the Board of Education released in May, 1968, the results of a reading survey of New Haven students which showed 43 percent of the students in the city reading one to two years below grade level and 4 percent three years below grade level. School vandalism at the same time was increasing monthly.

In an effort to arrive at a response that would serve a preemptive function as well as a crisis-oriented one, the Board formed a committee to study new ways of citizen participation in the school system. The committee worked from summer 1968 to summer 1969 and finally recommended the establishment of councils composed of representatives of all the constituencies in the educational process (students, parents, teachers, administrators, and staff). Among many suggestions, they proposed that each school have a council which would establish discipline codes, develop curricula, and screen new school personnel.
No sooner had the committee submitted its report than the City Plan Commission initiated a similar study under a state program named Community Development Action Plan (CDAP). The department subcontracted the education study to the Education Improvement Center, a non-profit organization "to develop, coordinate, and supervise programs undertaken by the six colleges in the New Haven area to assist the New Haven Public School system." CDAP was a product of the 1967 Connecticut General Assembly which established the Department of Community Affairs. The legislature specified that any city wishing to receive DCA funds must undertake and complete a community development action plan within a three year period. Resident participation was essential to every phase of the planning process.

The Educational Improvement Center conducted the education component of the comprehensive CDAP study with its $40,000 contract with the city. The Center subcontracted with an independent citizens action group, Citizens Commission to Develop Quality Education. The Commission's function was to facilitate citizen participation throughout the education study. Task forces established by the Center and the Commission investigated school economics, governance, management, pre-service and in-service education, pupil personnel services, reading and vocational education, school health, and library media centers. It was, however, the report by

the governance task force which further developed the concept of resident participation in the schools.\textsuperscript{22}

The ultimate challenge of developing and implementing a participatory vehicle fell to George Harris, a former principal and trouble-shooter at Prince Community School. After receiving several crisis assignments from the superintendent, Harris took a sabbatical in 1969 to study the formation of School-Community Councils as part of his doctoral study at Michigan State University. The following year, while completing his dissertation on the School-Community Council concept (see Appendix for details), he served as a consultant to the New Haven school system, laying the foundations to implement it. Upon receiving his degree in June, 1970, Dr. Harris returned to New Haven to assume the position of Assistant Superintendent for Supportive Services. By June, 1972, thirty-seven councils had been established to advise their schools on budgetary, curriculum, and personnel matters, while eight schools elected to maintain their present system of governance.

The CDAP study on education also made two other major recommendations for increased citizen participation. It

\textsuperscript{22}The entire study, consisting of ninety-two recommendations and hundreds of pages, ranks with the Butterworth (1947) and the three 1962 studies (see Chapter I) as another attempt by New Haven to determine its present education status and future goals. The main, and very significant, difference between this and the previous studies is that those who have the greatest stake in the school system, the users, professional and non-professional alike, had a hand in making judgments as well as recommendations for school improvement.
called for the creation of an Office of Community Involvement to support the School-Community Councils by facilitating citywide council communications, reviewing disciplinary actions by the councils, and dealing with citizen suggestions and grievances.\(^{23}\)

The other recommendation dealt with the Board of Education's membership. The report recommended that a city Charter Revision Commission change the manner of selecting Board of Education members "to accomplish broader and more responsive representation."\(^{24}\) One proposal suggested increasing the Board of Education from seven to thirteen members — three appointed by the Mayor at his discretion, three appointed by the Mayor from nominees submitted by the Board of Alderman, and seven appointed by the Mayor from nominees submitted by School-Community Councils.\(^{25}\) To date, no progress has been made on this recommendation.

Though participation, true resident participation in educational decision-making, remains as elusive a goal as ever, it also remains a viable community objective and a recognized institutional necessity. Lapses in community initiative as


\(^{24}\)New Haven City Plan Commission, Community Development Action Plan for the City of New Haven, Draft for Review by the Board of Alderman, February 9, 1971, p-11.

\(^{25}\)Ibid.
well as rekindled institutional conservatism mitigate against achieving the most efficient practical solution. Perhaps, what was, again, a major unforeseen, unanticipated achievement of the reform coalition was gained through the process of striving: new community-minded leadership was born in the neighborhoods and schools of New Haven.
Sarason has written that "an initial requirement of a theory of change is that it can be appropriate to, and mirror the complexities of, social settings." An attempt has been made in preceding chapters to indicate the complexity of a coalition reform strategy in New Haven. Particular emphasis on context and chronology assisted in the construction of settings from the coalition's outset to its termination. In this, the concluding chapter, an effort will be made to extrapolate from the New Haven experience general elements of this strategy which may be useful elsewhere in urban education.

Some Additional Reform Perspectives

On the surface, educational reform through community action attempted dual, concurrent objectives during the last decade: it sought to meet continuing educational needs while at the same time redefining and changing the institutions charged with that responsibility. Whatever the chosen strategy, reformers were quick to adhere to two fundamental assumptions or propositions in planning their efforts. First, they recognized that education is completely interdependent with other components of society's framework. Secondly, they accepted the fact that school systems are not competent in all the

\[^{1}\text{Seymour B. Sarason, The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), p. 58.}\]
specific areas which contribute to the educative process.\(^2\)

Basic, then, to recent educational reform is a strategy which seeks to highlight this interdependence by redefining or implementing new roles and relationships between urban educational resources and institutions.

Three such model strategies, of which New Haven is one, emerged in the 1960's. Figure 5:1 shows a simple schematic of these community action model strategies. While the concern of this study remains New Haven, a brief digression is worthwhile in order to add perspective to the New Haven analysis.

**FIGURE 5:1**

THREE COMMUNITY ACTION REFORM STRATEGIES

![Diagram showing competitive, coalitional, and complementary strategies.]

The competitive strategy consisted of an attempt to demonstrate exemplary educational programs and practices through non-traditional structures and means. Once credibly and successfully demonstrated, these programs and practices could be absorbed or simulated by a school system at the urging of the community. Consequently, accountability is community-directed by using neighborhood resident pressure.

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to force a lethargic, inert school system to accept and implement change. This strategy was aimed at very large school systems which by their sheer size are unmanageable by a central authority and unyielding to internal change factors. The New York City school system is a prime example.

In 1966 Mayor John Lindsay sought to remedy the squandering of the city's resources by investigating new bureaucratic arrangements for resource coordination. This was, in part, necessary groundwork for New York City's participation in the Federal Demonstration Cities Program (Model Cities). New York was at that time spending $90 million in anti-poverty funds and an additional $1.4 billion on human resource development in poverty-stricken areas. These efforts were too inadequate and uncoordinated to succeed. The mayor's office in conjunction with the Institute of Public Administration tapped Mitchell Sviridoff, New Haven's anti-poverty agency executive director, to conduct the study.

The study recommended the establishment of a Human Resources Administration (HRA) for the city. It would be

3 In his first term, Lindsay advocated the decentralization of city government and to some degree established "little city halls" throughout New York City.

4 A new federal, anti-poverty approach replete with mandated resident participation requirements with ultimate control resting with municipal government. Enabling legislation was the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966.

structured to maximize resource coordination and performance in community development, manpower and career development, social services and public assistance, and education. Because the Board of Education is a separate agency independent of the city's administration, the study recommended the establishment of the Office of Education Liaison (OEL) within the HRA to provide a critical daily linkage between the two agencies.

The need for institutional reform was clear to both Mayor Lindsay and the planners involved in the study. Couched in cautious, politically acceptable terminology, the intent of the HRA was, in fact, to reform New York's social service agencies and specifically their bureaucracies. This, of course, included education, perhaps the most inaccessible institution due to its long time independent status.

The thrust in education involved the installation of the Program-Planning-Budget System (PPBS). This budgetary process promised to "relate money to educational objectives rather than merely to administrative divisions." In fact it represented a new means of ascertaining performance and assuring accountability. Furthermore, the system would enable the HRA to implement Lindsay's key strategy of using anti-poverty programs to demonstrate to the massive education establishment successful new ways of educating children. Once this was accomplished, the school system would have to reform or bear the consequences of public acrimony mustered through community ac-

6 Institute of Public Administration, Developing New York City's Resources, p. 34.
tion efforts.  

Thus, the crux of the Lindsay paradigm was a two-fold, competitive model: one, anti-poverty programs would openly compete with the school system to demonstrate successful educational programs and practices, and two, community action efforts would focus on organizing local support for the adoption of these successes on a system-wide scale. The school system would gradually accede to institutional reform when faced with credible educational alternatives supported by the community.

Unfortunately, no sooner had this begun when the tempest of decentralization struck the city. In the fall of 1966, community leaders demanded control of I.S. 201, whose de facto segregated student body was composed entirely of Blacks and Puerto Ricans. The resulting turmoil shifted Lindsay's primary reform strategy to a concentration on decentralization as a process for community development and a mechanism for fundamental changes in structure and procedure in the school system.  

The second reform model approach, the complementary

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8 Indications were that the competitive model was not best suited for the nation's largest school system. The extensive, though fragmented anti-poverty programs, many of which were established prior to the HRA, failed to perform as expected, demonstrating few exemplary programs. The task of organizing local support also proved too lengthy and more difficult than anticipated. Whatever the cause, the strategy was irrevocably shifted by the decentralization issue.
strategy, relies on the reformist instinct from within a school system using additional resources and expertise when appropriate to plan and implement institutional change. Under this model, educators played a dominant revisionist role as change initiators, program planners, and implementers within the context of community action. A good example of this model is Corpus Christi, Texas.

Known originally as the Community Committee on Youth, Education and Job Opportunities, Inc. (CCYEJO). Corpus Christi's Community action agency was initiated in part by professional educators in the school system who acted in the belief that the opportunity and means to retool extensively the educational offerings and responses to community needs could be provided a community action program. Working with local welfare and social service agencies, these educators were successful in establishing the city's community action agency as a separate private, non-profit organization whose funded program structure consisted mainly of educational programs proposed through the school system. The school system thus became by far the largest single delegate agency of the anti-poverty agency. The latter served primarily as a funding conduit and community participation vehicle. The superintendent of schools was also a major decision-maker on the

\[9\] Now known as the Nueces County Community Action Agency.
CCYEJO Board of Directors.10

As antithetical as it appears, the implied basis of the complementary strategy is that those best qualified to direct institutional reform are those who have the greatest positions of authority and responsibility in the institution. Institutions outside of education are peripheral reform participants which mostly as a contributing infrastructure of expertise and resources to complement the efforts of the educational superstructure. Inevitably some redefinition of traditional roles and relationships occurs.

The coalitional model sought to reform public-serving institutions through a partnership of cooperative planning, decision-making, and resource sharing. Problem-solving through social adaptation resulted from a pooling of professional and non-professional talents and additional resources to create alternatives to dysfunctional social system components. In education, this constituted a commitment to find alternatives to traditional educational programs and practices, with the active involvement of non-educators as outside agents of change.

This study has examined a leading example of a coalition reform model -- New Haven. Now by way of summary and analysis a review of this model and its most salient features as applied in New Haven follows.

Coalition Reform in New Haven

The coalition reform movement between New Haven's community action agency and the school system pursued a process-oriented change strategy. Starting with a comprehensive assessment of human conditions in the city, the coalition sought the social means, e.g. programs, organizations, and new relationships, to attain specific, albeit ideal, social ends, i.e. elimination of poverty, equality of educational opportunity. Most importantly, the coalition shunned a rigid monolithic approach for a flexible and developmental posture guided by the critical forces of social processes. This basic attitude was manifest largely in the coalition's willingness to adapt institutional structures and responses to rapidly changing public needs and demands, while at the same time maintaining a continuity of intent and concerted resources. Unfortunately because the net products of social processes are unlikely to be pre-planned objectives, they are seldom appreciated as success factors in evaluations.

There are three identifiable institutional change processes which characterized reform through New Haven's community action agency -- school system coalition: 1) a shifting of leadership roles, 2) the decentralization of organizational structures, and 3) the pluralization of decision-making procedures.\(^\text{11}\) Within the context of change, these processes

\(^\text{11}\) Evidence of these same processes clearly exists to varying degrees in the other reform strategy examples treated earlier (New York, Corpus Christi). This is a matter for further study or perhaps another dissertation.
themselves represent a notable achievement in the institutions affected by them.

Figure 5:2 graphically illustrates the institutional change processes over the ten year span of the coalition's existence. Simplified, the processes substantively involved the leadership, organizational and procedural variables of CPI and the New Haven school system.

FIGURE 5:2

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE PROCESS OF COMMUNITY PROGRESS, INC. AND THE NEW HAVEN SCHOOL SYSTEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Executive → Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational</td>
<td>Centralization → Decentralization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural</td>
<td>Non-participation → Participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hindsight allows the temporal use of before and after elements. In 1962 these represented a statement of static negative conditions; in 1972 the same variables are in a dynamic developmental state undergoing further redefinition and transition as public requirements change. Further clarification of the variables' change due to the process is mandatory in order to avoid any assumption that the Figure 5:2 variables represent absolutes: they do not.

In 1962 educational and social service leadership, in New Haven was extremely formalized institutionally, and exclusively executive-oriented. The operating style of the school system and public agencies centered around administrative figures much as city hall centered around the mayor. Significantly, when the CPI-Board of Education coalition was formed,
this pattern continued with considerable variation in calibre and sense of mission. Both CPI's executive director and the school superintendent were newly chosen for their jobs; both had progressive backgrounds in their respective fields—labor and education; the executive director had recently been president of the city's Board of Education. Their task was to mobilize resources and attitudes to make a two-pronged attack on poverty through education and employment. Consequently institutional leadership of the coalition was highly executive-oriented at least through the peak phase (1966) of its existence, by which time the original executives had moved on. New sources of leadership gained credibility and responsibility through the recruitment and promotion of minority educators in the school system, through genuinely sensitive and outspoken neighborhood advocates, and through numerous third party groups and individuals who worked tirelessly on critical issues and projects in the schools and CPI. For example, neighborhood-elected residents now direct neighborhood corporations which are charged with the responsibility for anti-poverty program on the neighborhood level. In recent years minority and other school personnel originally classroom teachers have gained administrative positions with leadership functions. Non-educators received appointments as community school coordinators with vice-principal status. Community school teams have neighborhood residents on them (originally they did not) and School-Community Councils have parents, teachers, and other school staff who directly exert leadership influences in the governing of the schools.
In 1962 the organizational structures of the school system and New Haven's public service agencies were extremely centralized. Seats of authority very much approximated the common organizational pyramid and most were located in New Haven's central business district, "downtown" as far as the public was concerned. The first steps to revise this operational structure was the adoption of the Community School Program and the installation of CPI neighborhood service centers at the community schools. Organizationally this meant an expanded administrative staff -- school vice-principals and CPI social service staff -- at the neighborhood level. Programs which were cooperatively developed and administered by CPI and school personnel took a quantum leap in numbers compared with previous programming. And the nature of the decentralized and CPI programming concommitantly required other agencies to adopt a neighborhood service structure in order to be able to participate in the new federally and privately funded programs, e.g. the city's Park Department assigned area supervisors to community school teams; likewise summer day camps were reorganized to serve specific neighborhoods.

As the decentralization process matured under the stress of various local crises and national influences, the significance of CPI's decentralization outstripped that of the school system. CPI's entire organizational structure except for certain manpower programs was reconstituted in the form of neighborhood corporations. Today a residual technical assistance staff remains at the CPI central office to facilitate funding procedures and serve the CPI Board of Directors; the net in-
institutional change was so complete that many CPI non-resident employees literally worked themselves out of their jobs.

The third reform process was the pluralization of decision-making procedures. This stands perhaps as a result of the two aforementioned processes but the fact remains that even with a shift of leadership and decentralized organizational structures, logically the procedures for making decisions, big or small, did not have to change. The powers that traditionally had made decisions, the ancien régime, still had the wherewithal to maintain those procedures de facto within the new operational context. Fortunately, they chose to recognize the obvious need for this to change. The consequences, the means and ends of the pluralization process, are discussed in Chapter IV.

The significance of this process in New Haven is that it completed the essential linkage for neighborhood government, a direct decision-making and accountability system of quasi-governance on the neighborhood level. Born in the rhetoric of community control and the demands of the city's civil disturbances, neighborhood government became first an end itself and then a means by which neighborhoods could exercise local decision-making authority. The previously discussed processes served well in preparing local professional and non-professional leadership and in creating organizational structures for the functional tasks of neighborhood rule, but as Kotler observes, "institutional authority goes with territorial control, and one power cannot hold the institution if another
power holds the territory.\textsuperscript{12} The legitimization of neighborhood decision-making sources provided the institutional authority needed by the neighborhoods who had already achieved territorial control.

To relate this more directly, the concept of neighborhood government began with the realization by neighborhood residents, primarily the poor, that New Haven's political, economic, and education systems were not doing enough for them. And the social service system was not able to fill the void in spite of CPI's valiant efforts. City hall, the school system, CPI, and others attempted to placate neighborhood discontent through gradual accommodation. The use of participatory vehicles represents a major example of this. Eventually, however, neighborhood advocates gained institutional commitments to their leadership, i.e., positions in CPI and the school system; they accumulated sufficient political experience to plan and direct their own organizations and due to increasing national and local pressures, e.g. community control movement, school racial incidents, they found a fundamental acceptance of their organizational initiatives. Institutional decision-making procedures were redesigned. The school system reacted most notably with School-Community Councils, a radical departure from traditional educational decision-making. CPI provided the commitment and technical advice for the establishment of neighborhood corporations, a new political and

social service institution. Bolstered by these institutional achievements, neighborhood government, though far from being absolute or even self-sufficient, must now share part of the institutional responsibility for social problem-solving and change.

**Political Rhymes and Reasons**

Any reform movement is political by definition. Improving or amending something for whatever reason means a redefinition of present roles and relationships, a change in an existing power structure. Coalitional reform simply involves partners in this effort. It then follows that as perpetrators of reform, coalition partners must themselves be political.

The logic can be pushed further, but it need not be to make the point: the New Haven coalition -- the community action agency and the school system -- was basically a political partnership in a political movement. CPI was conceived as a political device and even carried a stigma over most its history as an extension of city hall. The school system, like all school systems according to Agger and Goldstein, "in addition to having educational (and economic) purposes and effects is a political system in itself in a congeries of political systems."¹³ Political maneuvers and decisions were a daily task of both institutions.

It is not the intention here to resurrect and analyze

every political decision over the ten year period. This analysis is concerned with the major political decisions and their implications which implemented and sustained the coalition's efforts.

The first, and perhaps most important, political decision made by the coalition was to establish CPI, the coalition change agent, as a separate, private and non-profit agency. This move, prompted by obvious political reasons discussed earlier, enabled CPI to be an advocate, to tread where others feared to, to do practically anything necessary to dislodge the school and social service systems from their default positions. Unencumbered by established relationships, political debts, and the like, CPI was free to devise its own operating style and supportive strategies. Of these, two represent the principle guiding light for most others.

CPI's social executives recognized at the outset that success would have to be demonstrated clearly as well as early. Two sub-strategies emerged to support this realization. First, the procedural stages of organizational development and institutional change should reflect the modes and associations demonstrated as successful by the city during urban renewal. Secondly, the agency and its reform movement should be touted as the first demonstration of human renewal in the country.

The first sub-strategy amounted to a system of political parity (Table 5:1). CPI duplicated in its externals the formal political structure in New Haven. The school system through the community school structure created an internal parity within its formal organization.
TABLE 5:1
POLITICAL PARITY AND COALITION REFORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>External</th>
<th>Internal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redevelopment Agency</td>
<td>Community Action Agency</td>
<td>CPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Community School Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Board of Alderman</td>
<td>Board of Directors</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizens Action Committee</td>
<td>Residents Advisory Committee</td>
<td>Community School Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ward System</td>
<td>Neighborhood Corporations</td>
<td>School Community Councils</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taking over a weak-mayor-council form of government and turning it into a strong-mayor-council, Mayor Richard Lee accomplished his controversial objectives (redevelopment) by administrative fiat; similarly, CPI's executive director and the superintendent exercised considerable personal determination and administrative leverage without explicit mandates to achieve their institutional objectives. Establishing CPI and the community school program as separate entities was, in fact, a replication of the mayor's political move in setting the Redevelopment Agency aside from the city's government and its constitutional constraints. Furthermore in his city record of eight, two-year terms, the mayor enjoyed a significant

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aldermanic majority of party members who supported its programs; likewise, the CPI and school boards were carefully stocked with progressives who were comfortable playing passive, supportive roles for the activist reform executives. The mayor also recognized early in his redevelopment efforts the need to legitimate many executive decisions and involve community sub-leaders in major city projects. For redevelopment he created the Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) and for education, the Citizens Advisory Committee on Education. CPI and the school's leadership sought these same ends of administrative, policy, and program sanctions from the Residents Advisory Committee and the city-wide Community School Advisory Board, bodies similar in function and intent to the mayor's committees. Lastly, New Haven's political infrastructure is based on the ward system, an old and cherished device for party support and management. CPI and the school system have facilitated community support through neighborhood corporations and school-community councils respectively.

In sum the CPI-Board of Education coalition wisely created a parity of successful mechanisms which mirrored the local political strategy for change. And typically participatory vehicles were most useful for this purpose.

The second sub-strategy -- staking a national reputa-
tion -- was less complex. National publicity and federal recognition established an irrefutable veneer, however superficial, of success. CPI was a showcase anti-poverty agency just as Conte School, the first new school built as a New Haven community school, was a showcase educational innovation.

A direct benefit of this model sub-strategy was a request in 1965 by the Office of Economic Opportunity that CPI develop a training center which would prepare community action personnel for the New England region. CPI responded with the Community Action Institute, an educational delegate agency which conducted on-the-job training, held seminars, and produced training films for nearly five years. Before its function became obsolete, CAI had encountered several hundred professional and non-professional trainees and schooled them at CPI.¹⁶

Community Action Vehicles: Reexamined and Defined

Community action vehicles were discussed in detail in Chapter IV. Additional references concerning their political use have already been made elsewhere in this chapter. It remains for these vehicles to be scrutinized aside from political motives and raisons d'être.

The participatory instruments which operationalize the Clark and Hopkins definition of community action programs (see Chapter IV, p.86) fall into three basic categories: systemic, sub-systemic, and extra-systemic apparatuses. To

be sure, some of the vehicles described in Chapter IV fit more snugly than others in the following conceptualization; however, the categories do serve well in providing perspective and analytical foci.

A systemic participatory apparatus is an organizational vehicle for broad representative governing through policy formation. It is characteristically a constituted body with a membership appointed or elected by a pre-determined process. Members participate as representatives of ascribed constituencies primarily by exercising a voting privilege which results in the support of opposition of policy. In some cases members will actively participate in the development of those policies though usually this is done by non-member assistance, e.g. executive director, agent of the body, superintendent. CPI's Board of Directors, the Board of Education, the Resident Advisory Committee, and the School-Community Councils fall within this functional category.

The second category -- sub-systemic participatory vehicles -- is an organizational vehicle for specific operational inputs through daily representative decision-making. Such bodies are organized around elected, appointed, and volunteer participants who serve to facilitate the formation and implementation of specific programs. A sub-systemic apparatus is organizationally accountable to the systemic apparatus. Coalition examples relate mainly to the program delivery systems, such as the CPI neighborhood service office, the community school teams, and more recently the neighborhood corporations.
The final category, the extra-systemic participatory apparatus, describes non-system vehicles for formal and informal inputs through organized service, pressure and influence. These are typically organizations generated by a specific need or for a limited purpose and which continue to function in a participatory role. At times they serve as independent third party voices in decision-making, as legitimating support for systemic apparatus decisions, as cooperative participants in both systemic and sub-systemic apparatus ventures, and more often as a forum for mass discussion of, and confrontation over, educational issues. This study has dealt with two examples in this category the Educational Improvement Center (EIC) and the Citizens Commission to Develop Quality Education (CCDQE). Others include the Black Coalition, and the Black Educators, two organized groups generated during the peak coalition phase as issue-oriented activists for New Haven's minority blacks.

Goals, Scale and the Sum of Educational Enterprises

Chapter III discussed in detail the educational enterprises of the reform coalition. Though very much the day-to-day business of the coalition, the real intent of these programs was to change the traditional practices of a very traditional, urban school system. Emphasis on early education, environment and peer influence, cultural enrichment, and teacher development attempted to highlight long neglected, likely root causes of poor student outcomes and general failure for inner-city, poor and minority students. To the ex-
tent that new practices (teacher and student development efforts) and innovative flexibility have been institutionalized, these enterprises have been successful. Whether or not this would have eventually occurred without the intervention of a change agent (CPI), no one can know. Most coalition program evaluations, conducted in-house for funding purposes, merely fed the biases of proponents and critics and the controversy that forever accompanies evaluative claims.

Mounting evidence indicates that the initial role expected of educational innovations -- programs and practices -- did not materialize.

An extensive survey of research by the Rand Corporation could not find "a variant of the existing educational system that is consistently related to students' educational outcomes."

Rand concluded that there was "a suggestion (from existing research) that substantial improvement in educational outcomes can be obtained only through a vastly different form of education." Implying that educational innovations in recent years were too small in scale and perhaps too large in their expectations Rand recommended that large-scale


18 Ibid., p. 162.
experiments or demonstrations of different forms of calculation should be implemented, carefully observed, and evaluated. It did not, however, elaborate on what the "forms" might be.

In the decade 1960 to 1970, the Ford Foundation, completely separate from its funding of educational enterprises through its Great Cities-Gray Areas Program (community action), conducted the Comprehensive School Improvement Program, a $30 million, twenty-five project venture aimed at legitimizing the concept of innovation in public school programs and at testing various kinds of innovation. Project innovations included 1) new patterns of staff utilization, 2) development and use of new curriculum materials, 3) use of technology, 4) experiments in grouping of students and utilization of time, and 5) innovative arrangement and use of school space. Such concepts as team teaching, flexible scheduling, programmed instruction, use of paraprofessionals, and individualized study programs dominated the attempted innovations. In a Ford-initiated independent evaluation, these programs in general received a flunking grade.

The Ford Report, like its Rand predecessor, indicts the major innovations of the recently-concluded decade. Un-

19 **Ibid.**, p. 163.


fortunately neither provides a detailed analysis of individual projects; instead they present general attitudes and conditions, e.g. conservatism, goal clarification, which reflect on the collective use of techniques and programs to attain sweeping changes. New Haven's educational enterprises suffer the same inscrutable perception.

Though it is not a purpose of this study, evaluating the coalition's cooperative programs on any reasonable terms is still likely to produce differing critical opinions. The point which rarely arises in such evaluations is that their real importance may lie in a vital contributory role in the larger social processes, an end in itself and one which is hardly quantifiable as an outcome. A major contention of this study is that the process of changing settings and changing reform requirements produced long term reform by-products -- community sub-leadership, decentralized organizations, pluralized decision-making -- more important than the limited objectives of segmental enterprise innovation.

Aside from purely speculative aspects, the nature of the coalition's enterprises have a technical side which, when examined, adds to the organizational concept and theory of educational reform.

Organizationally the coalition's enterprises were compensatory by intent, experimental or supplemental by design. The compensatory label is one which most remedial efforts of the period must accept. As institutional responses to inadequate existing efforts, programs generally sought to close the achievement gap between students and in most cases, this
meant raising the achievement of poor and minority inner-city students to match their white, middle-class counterparts. To do this, resources made available through CPI and its relationship with the school system flawed into enterprises of a new experimental nature or a supportive supplemental nature. The former usually constituted the introduction of innovative curricula, approaches, or practices under non-permanent status and trial-and-error conditions. The Headstart concept, cultural enrichment programs, and work-study arrangements are examples of this. The latter represented a continuing commitment to existing practices, such as reducing teacher-student ratios and extra reading instructors, using the additional resources to further develop, implement, or expand the concept or practice.

Another technical aspect was the experience of extensive and intensive growth among enterprises. Extensive growth simply refers to an expansion of present services to involve a larger target or participant population. An increased grant appropriation or budget accommodation was normally necessary to extend enterprise services to more people. Intensive growth describes the internal enterprise development, an increase in program sophistication -- including integration -- also requiring more capital, investment. As grants expired or were renewed, enterprises changed; some terminated while others included more participants and/or revised their premises, organization, and operations to reflect what had been previously learned. Conceivably, many enterprises experienced simultaneous extensive and intensive growth.
Implications for the Future

Mitchell Sviridoff once observed:

A city school system cannot achieve the highest quality of education for all children unless ways are found to relieve the schools of the intolerable pressures and burdens imposed upon them by changes in social conditions over which it has no control. This is to say that if a city school system ignores any one critical source of deterioration, it will become increasingly difficult for it to devote the fullest measure of its attention to the business of challenging all children to achieve to the maximum of their ability.\[22\]

To the extent that institutional change was necessary and community action aroused an urban school system and its companion public-serving institutions to recognize and react to the truth of Sviridoff's statement the New Haven reform coalition was successful. Unquestionably the coalition, ergo its strategy, is an example of how to introduce basic institutional change into an urban setting, an example of how to allow the forces of critical social processes to alter responsibly a city's educational and community service structure. Many cities have yet to begin to grapple with this most common major urban problem. The New Haven experience may be useful in this context: in part or whole it may be an example of how to address multi-faceted problems collectively or individually. And as an example it may provide just one "adequate description of the change process to allow others to begin to understand the high frequency of failure or the occa-

sional successes."\textsuperscript{23}

In the last analysis, it may simply be an example of hope.

\textsuperscript{23}Sarason, \textit{Culture of the School}, p. 60.
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(a) Reports


Our schools represent only one kind of institution where education takes place. Children also learn through their daily experiences at home and in their community. Both the people employed in the school system and those outside the schools who are concerned with raising children must be made aware of all these forces which work to educate children. This awareness and understanding can be brought about through continuous two-way communication between the people in the community and the schools that serve them.

School-Community Councils can provide the means to bring about this needed exchange of information, ideas and opinions. Formation of School-Community Councils represents the beginning of a systematic and effective means of learning from one another. Merely establishing a council for each school will not solve all educational problems, but, if undertaken with earnestness and mutual trust, the councils may provide an opportunity for people who are concerned to work together toward resolving their problems.

In order to establish two-way communication, the first function of a School-Community Council is to listen to the viewpoints and concerns of people in all areas of the school community. People's needs in the fields of health, human relations, education, recreation, and well-being are all important in determining the manner and content of school programs. The council can also provide an effective way for the school to communicate its views and concerns to the community.
Each School-Community Council can play a real and very important part in the educational system by advising on questions that arise and on courses of action to be considered. Certainly in matters where the community's experience is most substantial the councils can expect to play a major part.

**Operation of The Councils**

The all important function of each School-Community Council is to consult with and advise the school's principal on all matters of mutual interest. The principal remains responsible for the entire operation of his school (much as a captain is responsible for his ship), however, the principal is obliged to bring most school matters to his school's council for discussion. He is also obligated to take the council's views seriously into account when making decisions.

Following the initial election, councils will become self-regulating by establishing bylaws for their own governance. These bylaws must be compatible with Federal, State, and City statutes. It is expected that the material here which deals with membership, terms of office, filling of vacancies, officers, and standing committees will be incorporated in the bylaws. When the bylaws for each school's council are adopted, they will be reviewed by the Assistant Superintendent-Supportive Services to make certain that they are in accord with the requirements placed on the council. The council will then operate under these rules until such time as the council feels a revision is needed in order to better reflect community needs and experience.
Individually, council members have an obligation to be in close contact with the people in the area they were elected to represent. They must pass along appropriate information from the council, and they must actively solicit the concerns of all the people they represent in order to express their views effectively at council meetings.

In an attempt to insure that everyone be heard, council meetings should be announced in advance and open to the public. Meetings must be conducted in accord with the council's bylaws. Minutes of each meeting must be kept and made available to the public on request.

Final authorities for most areas of school policy rests with the city-wide Board of Education not only because State law places the responsibility for management of the school system on the Board, but to secure considerable advantages in maintaining city-wide standards, coordinating services, promoting economic efficiency, and providing guidance from trained personnel experienced in the various fields of education.

It shall be the policy of each School-Community Council to:

- Adhere to requirements set by State Law and City Statutes.
- Honor the City's obligations as stated in the various labor contracts and other contracts to which the City is a partner.
- Work within the policy framework established by the Board of Education.
If a school's council finds a law or a Board policy unworkable or unacceptable, that council may present a recommendation that a change be considered.

**Membership Of The Councils**

The following notes on the composition of the councils may be modified later by the experience of each School-Community Council and the needs of the community, but these will serve for at least the first council to be elected in each school.

It is intended that the categories listed will provide representation for all facets of the school's communities. There are categories for school system employees, community adults, and a category for students (in schools where they are eligible for membership). The topic on elections which follows explains how representatives are chosen within these categories.

There is just one general restriction on eligibility for election to represent any category listed; a person may be a member of only one School-Community Council at a time.

The structure proposed for the councils is as follows:

**Elementary School** (excluding community schools and schools with 8 grades)

- 6 Adults living in, and elected by, the several geographical areas served by the school.
- A majority of these adults must be parents of students enrolled in the school.
- 3 Teachers on the school's staff.
1 Civil Service employee on the school's staff (custodian or clerk).
1 Paraprofessional on the school's staff.
The principal, ex-officio.

Elementary (K-8) and Community Schools

8 Adults living in, and elected by, the several geographic areas served by the school.
A majority of these adults must be parents of students enrolled in the school.
6 Teachers on the school's staff.
6 Students currently enrolled in the school.
  (applies in Middle Schools and K-8 schools; students to be drawn from the upper grades in the case of K-8 schools).
2 Civil Service employees on the school's staff (to be
  1 custodian and 1 clerk).
1 Paraprofessional on the school's staff.
The principal, ex-officio.
(Up to 2) Other administrators on the school's staff
  (to be non-voting members of the council).

High Schools

12 Adults living in, and elected by, the several geographic areas served by the school.
A majority of these adults must be parents of students enrolled in the school.
6 Teachers on the school's staff.
6 Students currently enrolled in the school.
2 Civil Service employees on the school's staff (to be
1 custodian and 1 clerk).
1 Paraprofessional on the school's staff.
The principal, ex-officio.
(Up to 2) Other administrators on the school's staff
(to be non-voting members of the council).
These memberships figures are not permanently fixed.

If, after the election, the community representatives elected
to the school's first council feel more people are needed to
give adequate and equal representation to all the districts
served by the school, they may nominate and elect additional
representatives to achieve this goal.

Any group which finds after the election that no one
representing that group was elected to the council, may peti-
tion the elected council for representation. The council may
review, and accept or reject, any such application. If the
application is denied, the petitioners may appeal to the As-
sistant Superintendent-Supportive Services.

If there is an insufficient number of candidates, or
none at all, to represent a category (e.g. Civil Service,
paraprofessional, etc.) these council seats will remain vacant
until the next election.

Election to Council

Community representatives (parents and other adults)
will be nominated and elected according to geographic dis-
tricts served by each school. Information on the boundaries
of the districts within each school's area is available at
the school's office.

Teacher representatives will be nominated and elected by
the faculty of the school. Any full-time teacher on the school's staff is eligible. An itinerant teacher (one who works in more than one school) is eligible for election to the council of any school in which he spends more than 50% of his time.

Student representatives (in K-8 Elementary, middle and high Schools) will be nominated and elected by the student body. The procedure for nomination and election will be determined by the school's Student Council or Student Congress where one exists. Where there is no such organization, the principal will be responsible for working out the procedure with the students. Whatever the method the student representatives should, like the community representatives, be drawn from the various geographic districts defined for their school.

The procedure for nomination and election of the other school personnel specified for the council will be supervised by the principal.

Terms of Council Membership

Generally, representatives will be elected to a two-year term. They may -- if still eligible and if nominated and elected -- serve one additional two-year term.

It is desirable to provide for continuity in future council operations by arranging that only one-half of the council seats be up for election in any given year. In order to set these staggered terms it will be necessary that some members elected to the first council serve only a one-year term. Who will serve these one-year terms will be determined
by a lot after the first election.

Council membership will be automatically terminated at any time if the following occurs:

Student representative - 1. when he graduates, 2. if he transfers to another school, 3. if he leaves school for any other reason.

Parent representative - 1. when his child (children) graduate, 2. when he moves and his child is transferred to another school, 3. when his child leaves school for any other reason. When a parent representative moves to another geographic area (served by the same school, but other than the area that elected him to the council) he may continue to the end of his regular term.

Teacher representative - 1. if he is transferred to another school, 2. if he becomes an administrator, 3. if he retires or otherwise leaves the school system.

Civil Service or paraprofessional representatives - 1. if they transfer to another school, 2. if they leave the school system.

The principal is a continuing member of the council as long as he is principal, no matter how many years he may serve.

Filling Vacancies On The Council

When a vacancy occurs on the council (due to resignation, moving out of the school area, etc.) the vacancy will be filled by a representative elected by a vote of the remaining council members. The replacement must represent the same constituency as the person leaving - i.e. a parent from one district must be replaced by a parent from the same district,
a teacher must replace a teacher, etc.

**Officers Of The Council**

The elected council will, as its first official act after the annual elections, elect from its own members: a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, and a Treasurer (or a Secretary-Treasurer, if it prefers).

**Standing Committees Of The Council**

The objectives of the council will best be achieved through standing committees which will serve as the work groups of the council. Those committees recommended here should be created to insure that the major areas of the council's concern will be given full attention. Other standing committees may be established by the council as future experience may dictate.

Council members are to be chosen to be members of the standing committees. If possible, each council member should be assigned to at least one committee. Duplicate membership (that is, one person serving on two or more committees) should be kept to a minimum.

Standing committees should meet at least twice a month. Meetings may be opened to the public.

The principal, or another administrator he may designate, is an ex-officio member of each standing committee.

**Budget Committee**

**Purpose:** To give advice to the principal in the development of the school's budget requests which will be forwarded to the central administration for approval.
Members: 2 community representatives at least 1 of whom must be a school parent
1 teacher
1 student (in councils for middle and high schools).

Method: This committee will study prior years' budgets, speak with school people and others about current and future school needs. It will be informed on procedures for school budgets, and ways to indicate priorities. It will determine what programs have proven most effective in terms of cost and results in past years.

After a budget proposal has been prepared by the principal, with the help of the committee, it will be presented to the council for review and discussion.

The principal must present the budget to the central administration. If a majority of the council disagrees with the budget presented, the council may present the majority view to the Director - Administration/Supervision. Once approved by the Board of Education and the City of New Haven's Administration this budget becomes the authorized one for the school.

Program Evaluation Committee

Purpose: To assist the principal in evaluating present school programs in light of their success in achieving previously identified objectives.
Members: 3 community representatives at least 2 of whom must be parents.
2 teachers
1 student (in councils for middle and high schools)

Method: This committee will:

Continuously follow up existing programs and projects. Submit at year's end a written, objective evaluation including suggestions for improvement.

This report to be:

Discussed with the principal
Sent to the school's Director-Administration/Supervision and to the Assistant Superintendent-Supportive Services.

Program and Curriculum Committee

Purpose: To consider and develop new educational programs.

Members: 3 community representatives at least 2 of whom must be parents.
2 teachers
1 student (in high school councils)

Method: This committee must work closely with the Program Evaluation Committee because of the need to tie any new activity in with existing programs.

It must work closely with the Budget Committee because of possible cost factors involved in
changes or innovations. This committee should make extensive use of available talent (e.g. the PTA, teachers, department heads, subject supervisors) in developing programs to meet special needs of the school.

Council members are familiar with the cultural background special interests, skills deficiencies and learning patterns of the students. Teachers and supervisors are familiar with available materials and techniques. When these groups coordinate their efforts new programs or projects can be worked out jointly.

This committee must note that certain courses are required to be taught according to State Law. Also, the Board of Education has the authority to approve, disapprove or modify any program taught.

Health Committee

Purpose: To promote a broader and deeper understanding of school programs within and outside school; to identify health needs related to school and suggest resources for meeting them; to recommend and support health services aimed at improving students' health.

Members: 3 community representatives at least 2 of whom must be parents.
1 teacher
1 pupil personnel worker (e.g. guidance counselor, social worker, paraprofessional)
2-4 students (2 in middle school, 4 in high
Method: The committee will:

Stimulate interest on the part of students and parents in taking advantage of health services offered in school. Identify student health needs and evaluate the effectiveness of current programs in meeting them.

Consider and recommend ways of making health and safety programs more effective.

School Personnel Committee

Purpose: To consult with and advise the principal and the Director of Personnel on hiring or appointing personnel to be assigned to the school.

Members: 3 community representatives of whom 2 must be parents.

2 teachers

1 student (middle and high school councils)

Method: This committee will:

Receive names of candidates for the vacant teaching positions in the school from the Director of Personnel after his initial screening of applicants.

Recommend criteria for consideration in hiring non-professional personnel.

Stimulate the interest of the community in applying for all sorts of positions in the
system as a way of aiding in recruiting qualified people.
Participate in planning overall personnel requirements. Assist in outlining training courses for non-professional personnel.
Meet candidates for positions if it is possible to arrange for such meetings.
Send recommendations or evaluations of candidates to the principal for his consideration.
Share some responsibility for the selection of their school's administrator(s) by reviewing candidates recommended by the Superintendent, and forwarding the council's recommendation for choice to the Superintendent.

Funds Available To The Councils
Each council will control a specified amount of money (not a part of the regular school budget). These funds may be used for projects or programs of special concern to the school. The amount of money allotted will be determined on the basis of student enrollment figures for each school and will be included in the Board of Education budget proposal.

Relationship of Principal To Council
The principal is an ex-officio member of his school's council and of each of its standing committees. In schools where allowance is made for other administrators on the council, they, like the principal, will be non-voting members.
The principal will keep the council informed on all matters that affect, or may affect, the school. He will actively solicit the council's help in working out solutions to problems.

If a school's council finds one of the school's own regulations or programs unacceptable or unworkable, the council will request the principal to consider a change. On those strictly internal matters the principal should give serious consideration to the council's view and make the change requested, if it is feasible.

The principal must explain in detail (within the restrictions imposed by confidential information and ethical conduct) when he is unable to accept a council recommendation.

When a council's views differ strongly from those of the principal, the council will have an opportunity to present its view to the school's Director-Administration/Supervision.

A council may request the principal when he disagrees with the council's opinion to forward the council's majority opinion through the lines of organization to the system's central administration.

It is expected that most questions and problems that arise in the community will come up for discussion through the council organization. However, there will be occasions when problems will be brought directly to the principal by persons who are not members of the council. When this happens the principal must be as responsive to these complaints or suggestions as he is to those discussed in council since his role makes him accountable to all the people the school
serves.

The close relationship that should exist between principal and council does not affect the principal's responsibility to his immediate superior for carrying out policies, procedures and programs established for the whole school system. The principal is not only responsible for the day-to-day aspects of the operation of his school, but he is also responsible on a continuing, long-range basis for the successful operation of his school.

Conclusion

The school system's administration is convinced that much can be accomplished to make the structure of education fit students' needs today and tomorrow. This can only be done through involving all the people affected by the school system in a continuing two-way dialogue on shared concerns. A great deal of time and effort has been devoted to consideration of how to involve the people the school serves with the school itself. The School-Community Council has been determined to be the best means of bringing about this involvement. The resources of the school system as well as the resources and personnel of community organizations dedicated to this same concept stands ready to help any new council organization. The councils will be living and growing organizations adapting their bylaws and operations to meet needs as they develop through experience. Each council will be evaluated continuously to determine that it performs the valuable service that it has the potential for, a service to both community and
school. The Assistant Superintendent-Supportive Services will appraise council operations and offer assistance to any council to help it fill its vital role.