1-1-1974

The university president and organizational change: case studies.

Patricia Zigarmi
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2920

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
THE UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE:

CASE STUDIES

A Dissertation Presented

By

Patricia Kuiper Zigarmi

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

April 1974

Educational Administration and Organizational Studies
THE UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE:

CASE STUDIES

A Dissertation

By

Patricia Kuiper Zigarmi

Approved as to style and content by:

Kenneth H. Blanchard
Dr. Kenneth Blanchard, Chairman of the Committee

Douglas Forsyth
Dr. Douglas Forsyth, Member

David Todd
Dr. David Todd, Member

Robert Wuerthner
Dr. Robert Wuerthner, Member

Dwight Allen, Dean
The School of Education

April 1974
The University President and Organizational Change:

Case Studies (April, 1974)

Patricia Kuiper Zigarmi

B.S., Northwestern University

Directed by: Dr. Kenneth Blanchard

The purpose of this research was to examine the actions of an organizational leader in initiating, carrying out, and stabilizing organizational change. The assumption made was that the degree to which a proposed change is initiated, implemented, and incorporated is a function of a number of variables, many of which can be linked to the role performance of the organizational leader.

Drawing on the literature in attitude and organizational change, a set of propositions about leader behaviors that may be required for the successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation of organizational change were proposed. These propositions were then used to critically examine and analyze the actions of one university president (Warren Bennis at the University of Cincinnati) in developing a long range plan, in carrying out a federal mandate for affirmative action, in implementing a budget-review/resource allocation process, and in building an administrative team. The entire list of propositions represents an attempt to generate a comprehensive list of areas that may need the leader's attention if long term change which the leader has initiated is to be stably integrated into the life of the organization. A second assumption made was that the degree to which a proposed change is initiated, implemented, and incorporated may depend upon the extent to which organizational members perceive that the conditions described in these propositions have been
created or eliminated during the periods of attempted initiation, implementation, and incorporation.

The organizing framework chosen for this research was a model proposed by Kurt Lewin in which he described three stages to the change process: unfreezing (initiation), changing (implementation), and refreezing (incorporation). In this research the university president's actions in each of the four cases were analyzed using this framework. Methods of data collection included the study of documents, interviewing, and observation. A case study format was then used to analyze the data.

Each of the four case studies of the role performance of the university president established the need for the leader to think through a strategy for organizational change which includes a leadership role not only in setting new goals and initiating change but also in seeing to it that certain organizational conditions, which are seen by members as important for implementation and incorporation, are established and maintained. In each of the four case analyses it was found that the university president often acted in ways that unfroze existing attitudes, expectancies, and behaviors on the part of organizational members. Unfreezing usually succeeded because the organizational leader intervened to overcome resistance and to heighten organizational members' sensitivity to problems in regards to the proposed change, to create new needs on the part of organizational members, to make the organization more open to its environment, to change patterns of interaction and information-sharing, to link parts of the system that shared common dissatisfactions in regards to the proposed change, to create a sense of rising expectations, to establish priorities for the organization, to involve informal as well as formal leaders in decision-making, and to establish and maintain a
a climate of acceptance, support, and trust.

In each of the four cases however organizational members encountered problems in attempting to implement the required behavioral changes. The organizational leader's implementation strategies often failed to:

1) overcome emergent resistance to the proposed change;
2) establish and use feedback mechanisms to uncover and resolve problems as they arose;
3) establish a secure climate where members had the opportunity to experiment with and test new behaviors;
4) change certain organizational arrangements so that they were compatible with what was being proposed;
5) provide appropriate support, reinforcement, or rewards to maintain subordinate willingness to carry out implementation; and
6) establish and maintain workable relationships with those individuals to whom certain aspects of implementation had been delegated.

His incorporation strategies often failed 1) to monitor organizational members' performance in coping with and integrating the proposed change and 2) to insulate the organization from other demands during the refreezing period.

These conclusions about the role performance of the organizational leader are based on extensive documentation about what organizational members said they needed or expected from the leader during the change
process. Their practical research implications are explored in the final chapter of the study.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

If someone were to ask me what I learned, I would need to say that it is more than what is written here. The dissertation itself is dedicated to Warren who gave me opportunity after opportunity to learn and to Drea who helped me, as friend and colleague and husband, to see what it was that I was learning.

A number of other people assisted me in this study and I should also like to thank them publicly. Ken Blanchard, a special friend and colleague, taught me a theoretical framework with which to approach my work. Bob Wuerthner and Ann Lieberman helped me to question what it was I wanted to study. David Todd and Doug Forsyth gave me insightful, critical feedback and support at a time when I needed it. In addition I should like to thank many people in Cincinnati – especially Eve Ruppert, Arlene Thorworth, Allison Taft, and Eric Nowlin in the President's Office, Geraldine Richman, Ken Corey, Ron Boyer, Milt Orchin, Hendrick Gideonse, Jack Spille, Carolyn Hall, and Chris Demakes, and particularly all of the Vice Presidents, whose interest and trust made the study possible.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>Statement of Purpose</th>
<th>The University President as the Focus for Analysis</th>
<th>Implications of the Study</th>
<th>Overview</th>
<th><strong>Page</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER I: REVIEW OF THE THEORIES OF ATTITUDE AND SOCIAL CHANGE</th>
<th><strong>Page</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewin's Concepts of Change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions of Terms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfreezing-Initiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing-Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refreezing-Incorporation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership in the Management of Change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and Prospectus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER II: TOWARD A THEORY OF CHANGING: THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER</th>
<th><strong>Page</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propositions for Unfreezing-Initiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propositions for Changing-Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propositions for Refreezing-Incorporation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and Prospectus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER III: RESEARCH SETTING AND DESIGN

Selection of the Research Setting

Research Design

Alternative Quantitative Methodologies

Problems with Quantitative Methodologies for the Purposes of this Research

Problems with Qualitative Research

Ethical Considerations

Values and Assumptions

Steps Taken in Response to Ethical Considerations, Assumptions, and Value Questions

Data Collection and Analysis

The Problems of Generalizing from a Single Case

Prospectus

CHAPTER IV: ASSESSMENT OF SETTING

Introduction

Change Resistant Characteristics of Universities

External Environmental Conditions

The Nature of Academic Reform in Universities

The University of Cincinnati in the Sixties

A Change in Leadership

Bennis' Style

The President's Role

Modelling

The Use of Precedents

Summary
Chapter V: Case Study: The Role of the President in Long Range Planning

- Introduction
- Presidential Interventions and Participation in Long Range Planning
- The Marathon
- Summary of Problems in the Implementation of a Long Range Planning Process
- Summary
- Unfreezing: Initiating the Long Range Planning Process
- Changing: Implementing the Long Range Planning Process
- Refreezing: The Incorporation of Long Range Planning
- The Impact of Long Range Planning
- Summary and Conclusions

116

116

117

121

128

141

142

157

167

170

172

Chapter IV: Case Study: The Role of the Organizational Leader in the Implementation of an Affirmative Action Program

- Introduction
- Prospectus
- Problems Encountered in Implementing Affirmative Action
- The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Director of Resource Development's Change Strategies
- The Role of the University President in Affirmative Action
- Accomplishments/Impact
- Summary and Conclusions
- Postscript

176

176

179

180

184

190

206

212

215

Chapter VII: Case Study: The Role of the Organizational Leader in the Development of a Budget-Review Resource Allocation Process

216
### Introduction 
Values and Benefits.  
The Role Performance of the University President in Developing and Implementing the Budget Review/Resource Allocation Process.  
Summary and Conclusions.  

### CHAPTER VIII: CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER IN DEVELOPING AN ADMINISTRATIVE TEAM. 
Introduction  
Chronological Summary.  
Analysis of the Role Performance of the Organizational Leader in Building an Administrative Team.  
Summary and Conclusions.  

### CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS.  
Introduction  
Theoretical Implications of the Study.  
Practical Implications of the Study.  

### APPENDIX A: LONG RANGE PLANNING: A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY  

### APPENDIX B: THE LONG RANGE PLANNING TASK FORCE'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF LONG RANGE PLANNING  

### APPENDIX C: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY  

### APPENDIX D: CANDID CAMPUS: POLICY STATEMENT — AFFIRMATIVE ACTION.  

### APPENDIX E: STATISTICAL INFORMATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION.
<p>| APPENDIX F: THE BUDGET-REVIEW/RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS: A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY | 431 |
| APPENDIX G: CANDID CAMPUS: REORGANIZATION PLAN | 460 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 468 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>TABLE OF CHARTS</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHART I</strong>:</td>
<td>Propositions for Leader Behaviors in Initiating Implementing, and Incorporating Organizational Change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHART II</strong>:</td>
<td>UC Central Administration: 1972-73 Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHART III</strong>:</td>
<td>UC Central Administration: Reorganization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Statement of Purpose

An examination of the sociological and social-psychological literature on planned organizational change reveals that very little is known about why actions taken by a change agent do or do not produce the kinds of organizational change intended. One explanation attributes the failure of the change effort to the inability of the change agent to overcome organizational members' initial resistance to the proposed change. A second explanation is offered by Gross, Giacquinta and Bernstein (1971, p. 7) who contend that one reason that organizational change strategies do not yield their intended results is that they are inadequately implemented, and that, in fact, the whole implementation phase of the process of planned organizational change is not well understood. (They cite Bennis, 1966; Guba, 1966; Heathers, 1965; and Stufflebeam, 1966; as authors who have noted the limited knowledge about this aspect of planned organizational change.) Both explanations seem to postulate that conditions exist in organizations which serve to block or facilitate the implementation of organizational change and that organizational leaders may play a key role in creating or eliminating those conditions.

The purpose of this research is to examine the actions of an organizational leader, in this case a university president, in initiating, carrying out, and stabilizing organizational change. The assumption made is that the degree to which a proposed change is initiated, implemented and incorporated is a function of a number of variables (environmental constraints, job demands, the expectations of organizational members,
etc.), many of which can be linked to the role performance of the organizational leader. In other words the purpose of this research is to examine the consequences of the organizational leader's actions in creating or not creating certain organizational conditions in each phase of the change process.

The organizing framework chosen for this research is a model of change proposed by Kurt Lewin in which he described three stages to a process of change: unfreezing, moving (or changing), and refreezing. Drawing on the literature on attitude and organizational change, a set of propositions about leader behaviors that may be required for the successful initiation (unfreezing), implementation (changing), and incorporation (refreezing) of organizational change will be proposed. These propositions will then be used to critically examine and analyze the actions of one university president in developing a university long-range plan, in carrying out a federal mandate for an affirmative action program, in implementing a budget-review/resource allocation process, and in building an administrative team. The author reasoned that case analyses would reveal how and where the organizational leader's behavior influences initiation, implementation, and incorporation and that the results of this inquiry might lead to the development of a theory of the organizational leader's role in the process of change.

The University President as the Focus for Analysis

A review of the literature on planned organizational change reveals that most organizational theorists practically ignore the role of the organizational leader in the implementation of organizational innovations.
Instead they advocate the use of third party change agents to insure effective change implementation (Bennis, 1966; Bennis, et. al., 1968; Lippitt, et. al., 1958; Leavitt, 1965). Gross, Giacquinta, and Bernstein (1971, p. 29) however found that there was little research evidence in support of the proposition that outside agents insure the successful implementation of organizational innovations. In fact, they found, and others have supported, that the role performance of the administrator was critically important to the success or failure of implementation (Gross, et. al., 1971, p. 212).

Further, it is important to look at the literature on higher education and to note the expectations held both within and outside the university for the university president's role performance. The university president is often the only spokesman for the university to the community at a time of increasing interdependence between the university and the community (Lunsford, 1970; Baldridge, 1971). Correspondingly, given the situation where professors are primarily loyal to their departments or disciplines, the university president is often the only representative of the institution as a whole for members of the university community. The central function of the university president is to mobilize a working consensus about a set of institutional goals and to justify these decisions to critical publics, inside and outside the university (Selznik, 1957). In doing so he is looked to initiate and support new programs (Hodgkinson, 1971, p. 1970). However, changes internally in the character of the university with greater faculty and student activism and participation in governance corrode the university
A president's authority (or at least his perception of his authority) to implement organizational change strategies. Constantine Simonides writes that "virtually all of the pressures associated with (and contributing to) the problems on campuses today converge on the president and his office" (Simonides, 1971, p. 1).

In summary a review of higher education literature yields contradictory expectations for the ability of the university president to effect (both initiate and implement) organizational change. At the same time, the literature on planned organizational change has neglected the role of the university administrator in implementing organizational innovations. It is hoped that this research will shed some light on both these dilemmas.

**Implications of the Study**

This study has been pursued with the expectation that many of its concepts would be helpful to other organizations, since change projects similar to the ones described in this study, encountering at least some of the same problems, begin anew every day. Further, it is expected that the major question of this study will be of interest both to organizational theorists since it provides insights into the dynamics of an organizational leader's relationship to a change effort, and to practicing administrators, since it describes and analyzes potentially replicable change efforts and delineates a set of propositions about the behavior of organizational leaders.
Overview

On the basis of the purposes described above, this dissertation is organized as follows:

Chapter I - reviews the theories of attitude and social change. Their implications for this study are discussed and a general theoretical framework for this paper is proposed.

Chapter II - sets forth a set of propositions about the role performance of the organizational leader in initiating, implementing, and incorporating change.

Chapter III - contains a description of the research setting and research design. The major methodological problems encountered in the investigation and the procedures for data collection are considered.

Chapter IV - contains an assessment of the university setting just prior to the initiation of several proposals for change with special reference on the relationships of both internal and external environmental conditions to successful organizational change. The role of the organizational leader as a "climate builder" is also discussed.

Chapter V - is a case analysis of the university president's role in the development of a long-range plan.

Chapter VI - is a case analysis of the university president's role in instituting an affirmative action program.

Chapter VII - is a case analysis of the university president's actions in implementing a budget-review/resource allocation process.
Chapter VIII - is a case analysis of the university president's actions in building an administrative team.

Chapter IX - considers the major theoretical, practical, and research implications of this study.
CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF THE THEORIES OF ATTITUDE AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Introduction

Organizational change can be approached from the perspective of change in the structures and conditions in which people find themselves (economic and legal) or from the perspective that organizational change comes through change in individuals' attitudes and behavior. The first perspective represents the sociological or macro-approach to understanding change; the second represents the psychological or micro-level approach.

"The understanding of change in complex organizations requires both a knowledge of the influence process as applied to individuals and a knowledge of how the structure of complex organizations might influence change" (Ingham, 1966, p. 4). In other words a social-psychological perspective is needed in order to understand the processes and phenomena of organizational change.

Social-psychologists have concluded that behavioral or institutional change is sustained through changes in the beliefs and attitudes of individuals (see Hersey and Blanchard, 1972; Kelman and Warwick, 1973) and that in some programs of planned change the relationship between individuals and the institution in the change process is interactive (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 42). For example, a recent study of institutions of higher education found that changes in individual attitudes accounted for most institutional changes which in turn caused
individuals' attitudes to change even more to support new social behaviors (Hefferlin, 1969, pp.158, 189).

This dissertation is based on the assumption that analyses of micro-levels of change may be relevant to problems of change at the institutional level; therefore it is based on the contributions of social-psychologists toward understanding individual attitude change. Their studies of 1) the processes of attitude and behavior change, i.e. of a) conditions conducive to change, b) sources of resistance to change, and c) of ways of overcoming resistance to change; and 2) of the sequencing or phasing of social change--both as to how one aspect of a change process leads into the next and as to how changes in one area may have positive or negative consequences in another area will be reviewed in this chapter. In this chapter the contributions of several theorists in the fields of leadership and management will also be reviewed. A model of change proposed by Kurt Lewin chosen as the organizing framework for this research will be discussed.

Lewin's Concepts of Change

Kurt Lewin was one of the great pioneers in the social-psychological study of change. As a social psychologist he was concerned with individual attitude change and with change in organizational settings. That perspective as well as the fact that Lewin's model is essentially a social systems model were important reasons for the choice of the Lewinian model in lieu of other models for the purposes of this research. Furthermore, Lewin in studying the process of change was concerned with the effects of a single event on the balance of forces within an organizational setting. That
kind of approach to phenomena related especially well to the research methodology chosen for this research which is essentially descriptive and process-oriented (see Chapter III).

Lewin theorized that change was movement from one level of equilibrium of social forces in a setting to another. Among these social forces were both pressures toward change and forces resistant to change. Lewin labelled these forces driving and restraining forces. Quasi-stationary equilibrium is descriptive of a social state in which there are equally strong opposing forces; this level is not static but fluctuates around an average equilibrium. Finally, Lewin wrote that the forces within a total force-field may also vary in strength, or salience, which he called "valence."

In any organization then a polarity exists between forces for conservation, continuity, and the maintenance of identity on the one hand and forces toward change, adaptation, growth, and development on the other. Lewin spoke of change in a level of equilibrium as involving three stages: unfreezing (the present level of equilibrium), moving (to a new level), and refreezing (assuring some permanence with regards to the change) (Lewin, 1951, pp. 228-229). (Schein has elaborated on these three stages, using the terms unfreezing, changing and refreezing to designate them [Schein, 1969]). Unfreezing is a process of rearranging the forces acting on an individual or group so that the need to change is perceived. Unfreezing "refers essentially to the processes involved in overcoming resistance to change, that is in counteracting those personal and social factors that help to stabilize existing
behaviors and beliefs" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 23). In terms of force-field analysis unfreezing occurs when either the driving forces are increased, the restraining forces resisting changes are reduced or removed, or when a restraining force is converted into a driving force.¹

The second stage of Lewin's model, changing, "refers to processes whereby new behavior is induced, that is, whereby the individual is led to adopt new patterns of action, belief, and attitude" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 23). Refreezing "refers to the ways in which these new (behavior) patterns become integrated into cognitive and social structures and thus, to a degree stabilized" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 23).

These three stages are comparable to the stages termed "initiation", "implementation", and "incorporation" in the literature on planned organizational change. Since social scientists vary in their use of those terms, the following definitions are offered for the purposes of this research.

**Definitions of Terms**

**Initiation:** "The period of time in which a particular change strategy is selected and introduced into the organization" (Gross, et. al. 1971, p. 16), the stage in which an organizational problem is defined and decisions are made on a process by which new organizational goals can be articulated and reached. It includes those activities undertaken

¹If the first strategy alone is adopted, tension in the system is likely to increase. More tension usually means more instability and more unpredictability and the likelihood of irrational rather than rational responses to attempts to change.
by the organizational leader to cause organizational members to perceive a need to change. This stage corresponds to the unfreezing stage.

**Implementation:** The period after the announcement that a particular change strategy is to be adopted in which actions are taken to make changes in the behavior of organizational members as specified by the goals of the change effort. These efforts include interventions made by the organizational leader to monitor and to spur adoption and to establish and maintain those organizational conditions specified as necessary for successful implementation. This stage corresponds to Lewin's changing phase.

**Incorporation:** This term refers to the period in which change that is implemented becomes an integral part of the operation of the organization. It usually includes some form of assessment undertaken by the initiator of the change strategy to survey both intended and unintended effects of the change effort on organizational members' behavior. This stage corresponds to refreezing in Lewin's model.

The terms unfreezing-initiation, changing-implementation, and refreezing-incorporation will be used interchangeably throughout this research. Other frequently used terms include:

**Organizational change:** Behavioral change with reference to role performance, the division of labor, decision-making, communication, or power structure within an organization. Organizational change refers to changing the behavior of individuals as members of an organization and hence the functioning of the organization as an organization. (Note: A change in the attitudes of organizational members or their knowledge about a particular goal is not organizational change as defined here;
neither is change in the behavior of individuals independent of their organizational roles.)

**Planned organizational change:** According to Gross, Giacquinta and Bernstein two different uses of the term 'planned organizational change' are found in the literature. "Some writers use the term to refer to deliberate efforts to instigate a process of change in an organization without reference to any specific innovation, or set of ideas. The emphasis is on 'getting change going', that is, on identifying organizational problems and setting forces in motion to cope with them. Others view planned organizational change as deliberate efforts to introduce specific organizational innovations into the organization, in order to modify specific patterns of organizational behavior" (Gross, et. al., 1971, p. 16). In this research the term 'planned organizational change' will be used in the former sense. (Note: The adjective 'planned' does not refer to a normative process, in the sense of being participative.)

**Intervention:** Intentional goal-oriented actions taken by the organizational leader to initiate, implement, or incorporate change into the organization.

In this chapter the literature on attitude and social change will be reviewed using these three stages of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing as an organizing framework, with special reference to the usefulness of the review in understanding the role performance of the organizational leader in affecting organizational change. The next section of this chapter on unfreezing will include a discussion of the concept of
resistance, of strategies for overcoming resistance, and of initial and emergent forces toward change. In the following section various implementation strategies for accomplishing attitude and social change that have been suggested in the literature will be reviewed. Finally, strategies of incorporation and stabilization will be discussed. The concerns that emerge from this review of the literature will be used to develop a set of propositions about the organizational leader's behavior to be set out in Chapter II.

**Unfreezing: Initiation**

**Resistance to Change**

For change to occur, an individual has to abandon, or at least modify existing attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Even if a person's behavior seems irrational in the face of new information or in the context of a person's own goals, various kinds of support exist that strengthen the person's motivation and ability to maintain a certain behavior. One can distinguish between informational, motivational, and social supports for existing patterns.

**Informational Support**

"A person's attitudes perform a selective function with respect to the kinds of information to which he will be exposed" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 24). Information that seems counter to existing attitudes will have little impact because of processes of selective memory and perception. "People are more likely to notice and retain information that conforms to their expectations and that can be readily fitted into their cognitive structures" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 24).
"The very functioning of attitudes as a way of organizing new information increases the likelihood that supporting information will be received and contradictory information will be screened out" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 25). Attitudes effect a person's behavior, too, in that they help to create a reality which confirms the behavior and inhibits disconfirming behavior. The very functioning of attitudes--the way they effect the person's exposure to new information, his perception and memory, and his action toward the attitude object--tend to build and maintain informational support for the attitude and, consequently, resistance to change.

**Motivational Support**

Attitudes are also linked with the coping processes of individuals. "Attitudes become part of a behavior system with functional significance for the person. They become part of a pattern of instrumental relations, a strategy for resolving inner conflict, an approach to actualizing identity or a framework for relating to important others in a social environment" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 25). In other words if existing attitudes continue to provide for effective coping, the person will be motivated to maintain them.

**Reference Group or Social Support for Existing Behavior**

As long as a person's behavior is supported by a group, he is unlikely to sense a need to change, and insofar as changes threaten the possible loss of social support, he is inclined to avoid them. "A person depends on others to confirm his own perceptions of reality and evaluation of events. Usually he shares the attitudes and values of others in
his immediate surroundings and thus his own views are continually being reinforced. ... In agreeing with the group he can expect acceptance and rewards. ... Disagreement [generally] leads to rejection and other forms of social disapproval" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 26). This source of resistance to change can operate in persons aspiring for group approval as well as to those seeking to maintain group membership.

Lewin was the first to identify this source of resistance to change: he described how group standards become a force acting on an individual, depending on the social value of the group standard for the individual. The greater the value a group standard has for the group, the greater the resistance of individual group members to move away from this level. Resistance to change is diminished if the strength of the group value is diminished or if the level that is perceived as having social value is changed. In addition the degree of resistance will vary with 1) the strength of formal and informal sanctions, 2) the level of consensus in the group about a particular issue, and 3) the value attached to group membership. (If membership is highly valued, group members will have internalized group norms and resistance to change will be encountered even if there is no surveillance or expectation of punishment.)

Other Sources of Resistance to Change

These three sources of resistance to change, informational, motivational and social, are based on the meaning a particular behavior has for the individual in his interaction with his environment. Other sources of resistance would include:

1) Ecological factors in a social setting which restrict a person's encounters with discordant information (Janis and Smith, 1965, p. 196).
2) Vested interests and the need to control whatever it is that threatens. Often change in one part of a system increases a sense of being threatened in other parts of the system not directly effected by the change. Interdependence among parts of a system is often associated with fear that improvement of one part can only be gained at the expense of other parts (see Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 82; Watson, 1967, p. 20).

3) The price an individual would have to pay or the steps he would have to take in order to change.

4) A general tendency or reluctance to accept influence from others because it threatens independence or personal freedom. "In other words, if a threat to autonomy or self-determination is perceived in an influence situation, resistance can be expected, especially if the change agent is an outsider" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, pp. 27-28).

5) A general tendency to resist influence if it is imposed (Cartwright, 1965, p. 34).

6) A general tendency to resist influence when the basis of power is perceived as illegitimate (Cartwright, 1965, p. 34).

7) General opposition out of fear or ignorance, lack of skill or experience (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 84).


9) Outright opposition to the change objective coupled with a desire to preserve existing satisfactions. "If the change
objective is of doubtful value, attention becomes centered on the possibilities of turning back as well as on the merit of the proposal" (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 84).

These nine additional sources of resistance to change operate in individuals and in organizations. A system, for example, as well as an individual, having not experienced success in changing in the past may approach a new idea for change skeptically and with low confidence in its ability to adapt.

Resistance to change has been defined as a force directed away from a change objective. Sometimes, however, the change process may run into difficulty not because of opposing forces but because of competing forces. These kinds of forces cannot be converted into driving forces because they are not directly related to the change objective, although they interfere with the implementation of the objective. Interference often takes the form of competitive ideas or demands on organizational members' time, energy, and resources.

A review of the literature reveals that greater attention is given to the concept of initial resistance to change than to resistance that emerges during attempted implementation. Lippitt, et. al. (1958) discusses emergent resistance to change on pages 180-182 and 212-214 in *The Dynamics of Planned Change*. Sources of emergent resistance to change include: 1) a reluctance to admit weaknesses; 2) a fear of failure; 3) a fatalistic expectation of failure instilled by previous attempts to change; 4) stress experienced by having to give up accustomed patterns or current satisfactions; 5) the lack of a frame of reference against which to judge progress; 6) frustration in trying to carry out the proposed change.
Resistance is also experienced at the refreezing stage in the form of 1) negative responses from other parts of the system; 2) problems in adapting the new behaviors to real situations; and 3) a lack of feedback that efforts are actually causing change (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 243).

In view of these various sources of resistance, it is clear that a crucial step in the induction of change involves the unfreezing of existing patterns—the overcoming of resistances—so that the person (or the group) will be open to the adoption of new patterns. There are several strategies whereby this can be accomplished. A review of the literature reveals that at least the first step in the process of change is to overcome organizational members' initial resistance to change and that the use of such strategies more often than not is seen by members of an organization as the responsibility of management or a change agent (Gross, et. al., 1971, p. 39).

Overcoming Resistance to Change

There are two broad categories of strategies that can be used to overcome resistance to change in individuals. The first involves Challenging or undermining the supports for existing patterns of attitudes and behaviors, thus forcing the individual to reexamine them. The other involves minimizing the arousal of anxiety or somehow reassuring the individual that change would not threaten the existing supports for his behavior as much as he fears it would. In other words, the first type of procedure is designed to overcome resistance by creating a situation in which support for the existing pattern of behavior no longer holds and in which the person recognizes that it no longer holds; thus continuing the existing behavior would be tantamount to losing support. The second type of procedure is designed to overcome resistance to creating a situation in which the person recognizes that changing the existing pattern will not deprive him of the support he now enjoys (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 27).
The first general strategy of overcoming resistance involves depriving the individual of support—especially social support—for his attitudes, values, and self-concept and may be accepted by putting the individual in a new social setting in which the stability of the person's identity becomes undermined and he becomes open to new beliefs and attitudes in his search for a new identity. Separating an individual from normal social contacts and changing his work routines reduces the amount of interpersonal confirmation he receives. Placing the individual in a total institution (Goffman, 1961) or subjecting the individual to experiences which are self-degrading (Schein, 1971, p. 222) have the same effect of cutting the individual off from sources of social support. The disequilibrium that results requires some immediate change or new learning. Another strategy involves "confronting the individual with discrepant information which raises questions about the extent to which current patterns of actions, beliefs, and attitudes are indeed conducive to the achievement of his own goals and to the maintenance of social support" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 28). Schein calls this "cognitive redefinition" (Schein, 1971, p. 233). Anxiety or a feeling of inadequacy or failure is induced when individuals are confronted with the fact that personal attitudes and expectations are out of keeping with 1) evidence about reality; 2) with their own actions; 3) with assumed obligations; 4) with the opinions of "experts"; or 5) with the attitudes and expectations of significant others. The discrepant information would have an unfreezing effect by setting into motion a process of reexamination of existing beliefs and attitudes.
The second general type of strategy to overcome resistance to change is designed to avoid or counteract the threatening implications of change.

Resistance can be minimized by somehow reducing the salience of the source of resistance---i.e. by diverting the person's attention from the major supports for his existing behavior or belief. Thus the change agent may use 'side attacks', focusing on minor or subsidiary issues that do not arouse full blown resistance; he may use a gradual step-by-step approach, so that the full impact of the change will be less apparent; he may create a context for the influence situation that removes it from the reference group in which the existing behavior is anchored; or he might create a series of minor exceptions to the existing pattern so that the attitude itself might eventually break down (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 29).

The intent of this second type of strategy is to create a sense of security and to reassure the individual that changing his behavior may not have the threatening consequences he fears. The objectives of these strategies would be 1) to demonstrate to the individual that new behaviors are not disapproved by persons in relevant reference groups; 2) to try to set a new group standard; and 3) to communicate that acceptance of change is not tantamount to loss of autonomy or deprivation of status. These kinds of considerations might lead the organizational leader interested in change to build in ways for individuals to gain status in the change program rather than lose it, either by developing individuals' skills in order to reduce their dependency on him, by developing their sense of ownership in the program, or by creating opportunities for reciprocation or exchange.
Overcoming resistance to change in social settings consists of interventions into groups which have prescribed ways of coping and surviving, common norms and values, and stable interpersonal relationships similar to the supports that maintain an individual's attitudes and behaviors. A review of the literature in organizational change indicated a leader might approach unfreezing organizational patterns in several ways:²

1) By providing a process of socialization in which a new orientation to interpersonal relations and social institutions and new social values are learned (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 23).

2) By attempting to create a climate in the organization in which participants experience acceptance, support, and trust in their relationships with one another (Watson, 1967, p. 23) and in which the accepted standard is to recognize the existence of problems and need for change (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 155).

3) By stimulating new needs and levels of aspiration in the organization (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 131; Katz, 1960, p. 192).

4) By heightening sensitivity to specific problems through data feedback or the presentation of discrepant information (Katz, 1960, p. 192; Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 151).

²For a general discussion of lessening resistance to change see Goodwin Watson, 1967, pp. 22-23.
5) By changing certain environmental supports for old values (Katz, 1960, p. 192).

6) By shifting rewards and punishments so that rewards are linked with motivation to change and punishments with unwillingness to change (Katz, 1960, p. 192).

7) By using strategies that call attention to dissent from a unanimous position (Janis and Smith, 1965, p. 214).

8) By fostering ambiguity (knowing that individuals have a need for consistency and for meaningful cognitive organization and hence will be receptive to clarifying information).

9) By attempting to convince the informal leaders and marginal members of a group of the need to change on the assumption that the group standard is less important or salient for them (see Janis and Smith, 1965, p. 214).

10) By linking parts of the organization which share the same dissatisfaction and sense of powerlessness (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 104).

This summary reveals that there are a great many options for overcoming resistance to change. A closer review of the literature, however, reveals a lack of specificity as to who might carry out these unfreezing strategies. Only a few studies (Katz, 1960; Janis and Smith, 1965) designate the organizational leader. Others (Lippitt, et. al., 1958; 3

3There are probably countless other strategies in addition to the ones listed above.
Bennis, et. al., 1968) stress the importance of an outside agent and subordinate participation. A greater number of indepth studies of the initiation of change are needed which focus on the centrality of the organizational leader's role in using the strategies delineated above.

Initial and Emergent Forces Toward Change

According to Lewin there are forces for change as well as forces against change operating in a social setting. The organizational leader may well be able to capitalize on some of these driving forces in initiating change if he is aware of some of the negative consequences that Lewin alluded to that may result from increasing the driving forces (see Cartwright, 1965, p. 35).

Initial forces toward change include: "1) dissatisfaction in some quarters with the present equilibrium; 2) a perceived discrepancy between what is and what might be; 3) external forces for change (external requiredness); and 4) internal requiredness or a natural drive toward organizational health" (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 73).

Emergent forces for change include: "1) a desire to complete a project already begun; 2) changes in one part of a system requiring adaptation in another; 3) an early experience of success; 4) the expectations of significant others; 5) acceptance and approval from other parts of the system; 6) mutual support and commitment that comes from shared experiences; and 7) external cues that changes are producing desired effects" (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 75).
In addition, Matthew Miles has found that properties of educational systems as well as characteristics of the innovation and the innovator have an effect on innovative attempts (Miles, 1967, p. 1). Janis and Smith, for example, have found that a source of change that is perceived as trustworthy and prestigeful will facilitate change (Janis and Smith, 1965, p. 220). The success or failure at prior attempts at innovation also affects the organization's readiness to change.

Overall, a review of the literature of attitude and social change reveals that there has been little concern for testing theories or generating hypotheses about factors which positively influence initiation. Secondly the question of whether organizational leaders might control these factors has never been investigated.

### Changing - Implementation

Once existing attitudes or behaviors have become unfrozen, there is no assurance that the individual or group will actually adopt new behaviors and that, ultimately, these new behaviors will be refrozen or integrated. "In fact, certain ways of overcoming resistance to change may decrease the likelihood that genuine movement will occur or that changes that do occur will be stabilized and integrated" (Kelman and

---

4 For a discussion of some of the properties of institutions of higher education that block change, see Zigarmi and Zigarmi, 1973.

5 For a discussion of the dimensions of an innovation that effect implementation, see Lin and Zaltman, 1973, p. 101.
Warwick, 1973, p. 30). The purpose of this part of this chapter is to explore strategies for and conditions which influence "changing" with special emphasis on the implications they have for the actions of the organizational leader in implementing change. The literature on attitude and organizational change is filled with all sorts of prescriptions about what has to be done in this stage, but, as is the case of initiating change, the organizational leader is not specifically designated as the individual responsible for carrying out the behaviors the prescriptions specify. In most cases no one is designated. They fall to the organizational leader only because organizational members perceive that he controls the means of influence and has the power to create or maintain conditions specified as important for successful implementation. The next section will include a discussion of some of the prescriptions or considerations mentioned above, followed by a review of various models of individual attitude change and strategies of social change and their implications for the role performance of the organizational leader.

Conditions Required for Successful Implementation

Dalton, et. al., in a book entitled, The Distribution of Authority in Formal Organizations wrote

The initiation of change in an organization is essentially an episode in influence. Typically someone in the organization comes to view the organization's relationship to its environment in terms which call for different behavior on the part of organizational members. He then seeks to influence others in the organization to change their behavior. The establishment of new behavior patterns represents an extension of this influence as the impetus for change increasingly comes to reside in the individual assuming new behavior (Dalton, et. al., 1968, p. 108).
Two prior conditions are characteristic of successful attempts to initiate change:

1) Individuals involved are experiencing stress (or the likelihood of change is low).

2) If organizational members see the authority, power, and prestige of the person initiating change positive, they will respond to influence positively.

Successful initiation of change however does not assure the continuation and persistence of new behavior patterns. "Four features distinguish successful change efforts from failures. There is movement: away from
generalized goals increasingly specific objectives
former social ties supportive new relations
self doubt increased self-esteem
an external motive internalized motive for change"
for change


In this study the organizational leader's behavior was described as facilitating movement on each dimension in order to create the conditions described as important for implementation to occur.

In another study, Arensburg developed an operational definition of "implementation" marked by "1) an increase in managerial initiatives assumed by subordinates; 2) an opportunity for increased interworker contacts; 3) an increase in rewarding managerial responses to subordinates;

6Dalton, et. al., conclusions were based on a case study of management initiated organizational change in a research and development center.
4) an increase in manager-subordinate contacts; and 5) the evolution of ceremonies or rites of passage to facilitate the acceptance of structural change" (Sayles, 1964, p. 201). In this case the conditions prescribed for successful implementation seemed to cluster around more frequent manager-subordinate interaction and increased subordinate participation in decision-making and problem-solving. In both of these two studies implications for the organizational leader's role in implementation are clearer than in some of the other studies reviewed in this chapter.

For example, Zaltman identifies six principles of changing:

1) To change a subsystem or part of a subsystem, relevant aspects of the environment must also be changed.

2) To change behavior on any level of a hierarchial organization, it is necessary to achieve complementary and reinforcing changes in organizational levels above and below that level.

3) The place at which to begin change is at those points (levels) in the system where some stress and strain exist. Stress may give rise to dissatisfaction with the status quo and thus become a motivating force for change in the system.

4) In diagnosing the possibility of change, it is always necessary to assess the degree of stress and strain at points where change is sought. One should ordinarily avoid beginning change at the points of greatest stress.

5) Both the formal and the informal organization of the institution must be considered in planning any process of change.

6) Effectiveness is often directly related to the degree to which members at all levels of an institutional hierarchy take part in the fact-finding and diagnosing of needed changes and in formulating goals and programs of change (Zaltman, 1972, p. 330).
"Who" is to consider the six principles in implementing change is never specified in Zaltman's work. One can assume that the organizational leader may be the only person in the organizational hierarchy who is in a position to insure they are followed since he occupies a boundary position between the organization and its environment, has access to the wide range of information that is needed, and has the authority to involve others in planning. However, to the best of the author's knowledge, no study has ever been done to test the validity or effectiveness of these principles with the organizational leader as the focal point.

In another example Greiner specified ten conditions for successful change.

Successful major change efforts follow a sequence where:

1) The organization is under great pressures for improvement both from within and outside the organizational unit. These pressures precede the change attempts.

2) The organization and its management experience great difficulty in coping with the pressures.

3) A newcomer with experience and a reputation for improving organizations enters the picture.

4) The newcomer enters the organization at or near the top and begins to work with top-level managers.

5) An initial act of the newcomer is to clarify the working relationships he wishes to have with the organization.

6) The head man of the organization assumes a direct and highly involved role in implementing the changes.
7) The newcomer engages many parts of the organization in a collaborative, fact-finding, problem-solving diagnosis of organizational problems.

8) The newcomer provides new methods and recommendations for solving problems and taking actions.

9) The newcomer's proposals are tested on a small scale and found useful for problem-solving before they are introduced to the rest of the organization.

10) The change effort is spread through a series of successful experiences and absorbed into other parts of the organization (Greiner, 1965).

Although it is not specified, we could assume that Greiner's "newcomer" comes from outside the organization and is not integrated into the organization. The Greiner model is included only because it represents an attempt to describe a sequencing of conditions for the successful implementation of organizational change. In fact, Barnes rephrased these steps so they fit the Lewinian change model of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing (Barnes, 1967).

In the literature on planned organizational change that deals with the period of implementation, several other prescriptions for successful implementation are considered. Some of these include:

1) the importance of changing the flow of resources or information in the organization;  
2) the need for reinforcement of even tentative changes

---

7Lewin wrote "Social changes in large measure are produced by changing the constellation of forces within particular segments of a channel. Channels in turn are controlled by gatekeepers (i.e., informal or formal leaders in the organization), hence the importance of changing the attitude of these gatekeepers in order to effect organizational change" (Lewin, 1951, p. 176).
in attitude or behavior as a result of the change process (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 35); and 3) the importance of changing organizational arrangements such as the reward system in order to make individuals' self-interests accord with the necessary changes (Maloney and Schonfeld, 1973, p. 203).

Other facilitators to successful implementation according to Gross, et al. include: 1) internal as well as external support for the change; 2) adequate funding; 3) adequacy of plan for meeting organizational members needs and the organizational problem under consideration; 4) retraining of members for new tasks; 5) the presence of a change agent to give needed support and advice (see Gross, et al., 1971, p. 30).

Many of these conditions will be incorporated into the propositions about the role performance of the organizational leader set forth in Chapter II. The implications of these factors for the organizational leader may well be that he relate proposed changes to the important and perceived needs of the individuals to be changed; that he make the nature of the new behavior clear and clearly distinguished from other alternatives in the context of the motivations that have been aroused; and that he facilitate in as many ways as possible the performance of the new behavior.

Models of Attitude and Social Change

Social-psychologists have also studied processes of attitude change. For example Bandura wrote that attitude change could be approached in three ways: by changing beliefs, or affect, or behaviors
(see Bandura, 1972; Hersey and Blanchard, 1972, p. 160). "The greatest attitude change will occur when there are minimal threats or coercive inducements, when the person enjoys a high degree of choice, when there is a high expenditure of effort, when the inducing agent is viewed favorably, and when the person enjoys high esteem" (Bandura, 1972, p. 51).

A model of attitude change has been proposed by Kelman (1961) in which the three processes of social influence are called identification, internalization, and compliance.

Identification is said to occur when an individual accepts influence from another person or group in order to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to the other. In contrast to compliance, identification is not primarily concerned with producing a particular effect in the other; rather accepting influence through identification is a way of establishing and maintaining a desired relationship to the other as well as the self-definition anchored in this relationship. By accepting influence the person is able to see himself as similar to the other or as enacting a role reciprocal to that of the other (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 32).

Identification can occur through processes of socialization, modelling, or conformity to the expectations of others. The basis of motivation is the individual's concern with social acceptance; the source of the influencing agent's power is his attractiveness.

"Internalization is said to occur when an individual accepts influence in order to maintain the congruence of his actions and beliefs with his value system. The content of the induced behavior and its relation to the person's value system are intrinsically satisfying"
(Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33). The basis of motivation is the individual's concern with the congruence of his behavior with his values; the source of the influencing agent's power is his credibility, expertness, and trustworthiness. "Induction is designed to reorganize the person's means-ends framework, his conception of the paths toward maximization of his values" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33).

"Compliance is said to occur when an individual or a person accepts influence from another person or group in order to attain a favorable reaction from the other, that is to gain a specific reward or approval or to avoid a specific punishment or disapproval" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 32). The basis of motivation is the individual's concern with approval; the source of the influencing agent's power is his ability to control material or psychological resources on which the person's goal achievement depends. The manner of making the desired behavior stand out in preference to other alternatives involves limiting the choices an individual has.

Clearly, the organizational leader's selection of change strategies depends on which of these processes of social change is being used. As the individual's base of motivation varies, the source of the organizational leader's power changes, as does his choice of implementation strategies.

These three processes of attitude change have different consequences which are important for the role performance of the organizational leader in later phases of the change process. Behavior that is changed through compliance is often less permanent and requires the leader's surveillance.
Behavior changed through identification is designed to meet others' expectations for a person's own role performance; hence it remains isolated from the rest of a person's value system, tied to the external source, and highly dependent on the original model for support. Internalized behavior, on the other hand, is manifested whenever the values on which it is based are relevant since it is integrated into the individual's existing values and is not just part of a system of social role expectations. Internalized behavior is less dependent on an external source for support.

Implementation as one social psychologist has put it is

The creation in a client system of an understanding of a commitment to a particular change which can solve problems and of devices whereby it can become integral to the client system's operations similar to the process of internalization. When it comes to implementation most practitioners seem to over-emphasize the importance of intellectual understanding or of information-sharing regarding the intended change. Information and understanding are necessary but not sufficient components for inducing change. Change is bound up in self-image and groupings which help define and give meaning to an individual's existence. If intended change is perceived to threaten or enhance self-image or to threaten social groups for the individual... the organizational leader must take new forms of gratification into account in the planning of change (Bennis, 1966, p. 175).

Models of social change are very similar to models of attitude change perhaps because sociologists recognize that change in social settings is accomplished by changing individuals' attitudes and beliefs. One model of social change in which the type of change strategy used is of central concern was proposed by Benne and Chin.
Benne and Chin identify three strategies for changing: rational-empirical, normative-reeducative and power-coercive. In the first case "because the person (or group) is assumed to be rational and moved by self-interest, it is assumed he (or they) will adopt the proposed change if it can be shown by the proposer that he (or they) will gain by the change" (Benne and Chin, 1968, p. 34). Whereas the rational-empirical strategy seeks to effect change through the provision of information and knowledge, normative-reeducative change is oriented toward changing the norms people ascribe to. Changes in norms involve changes in values, attitudes, and interpersonal relationships. The third strategy (power-coercive) is based on the compliance of those with less power to the plans, directions, and leadership of those with greater power.

The source of power for a rational-empirical change strategy is control of information; the source for normative-reeducative change is personal or referent group power. For power-coercive change the source of power is the influencing agent's position or control of both positive and negative sanctions. A power-coercive strategy may depend on force, or the threat of force, to gain compliance; or on the threat or use of noncooperation, mass demonstration or harassment, if the change agent lacks authority or legitimate position power. With normative change compliance results from re-education, training, or participation in decision-making.

In sum, social-psychological research has approached the implementation of change in social settings from many perspectives. Conditions described as facilitators to implementation have been identified in the literature on planned organizational change. Social psychologists of
attitude change have studied conditions under which change is more likely to occur as well as processes by which attitude and behavior change does occur. Finally, the nature of individual changes that occur in a social setting have been linked to such factors as the type of concern that mediates the change, the nature of change strategies used, and the source of the influencing agent's power. Although the role of the organizational leader has not been addressed directly in a great deal of literature reviewed, implications for his role performance in implementing change have been pointed out throughout this section and will be incorporated into the model set forth in Chapter II.

Refreezing - Incorporation

The discussion of different processes of influence leads directly to the question of refreezing—the ways in which new behaviors become integrated into personal and interpersonal systems. "The assumption is that new behavior can gain continuity and stability only to the extent that new supports have been built around it" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 35).

"The process of internalization, discussed in the preceding section, implies by definition that the new behavior has become integrated. . . .To the extent that internalization has taken place, the new behavior automatically becomes part of the person's value system. . . ." and benefits from the support of other cognitive and evaluative components of personal structure (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, pp. 35-36).
"A second and at least equally important condition for stability is the extent to which the new behavior is integrated into the person's social relationships. New attitudes and beliefs will be maintained if the person finds himself in a supportive social environment—if he interacts closely with those who share and confirm his views" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 35).

If change is coerced in the first place it is unlikely that new attitudes and behaviors will be fully integrated since the individual is deprived of personal supports and values around which to incorporate new beliefs and attitudes. "There needs to be some continuity in terms of earlier supports and existing values if refreezing/integration is to occur" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 35).

An individual accepts influence because new ideas and prescribed behaviors are intrinsically rewarding in coping with external and internal stress or because a new behavior helps in problem-solving or is compatible with existing attitudes and behaviors. Behavior is internalized however, according to Dalton, et. al. (1968, p. 139) only if "the individual is provided with new cognitive structures, has a chance to apply and improvise the new behaviors and can verify them through experience." The cognitive structure is a new way of ordering information about himself and the environment.

The influencing agent provides a common language and associative net by which an individual can relate events of his own life to the new framework. Secondly the individual must actively participate in trying to understand and apply the new scheme to his problems. He must be provided with opportunities to build up his own ideas and to integrate new ideas. Thirdly the
individual has to have the time and opportunity to verify the new behaviors with personal experience (Dalton, et. al., 1968, p. 139).

In other words attitudes are not the only determinant of action. Situational factors such as the opportunity to try out or experiment with new behaviors or the skill level attained may be just as important in determining if attitude change leads to integrated new behaviors.

In other words, changes in behavior may effectively precede attitude change which in turn supports integration or refreezing.

Action may

1) expose the person to new experiences which lead to reexamination of existing attitudes as the individual gains direct experience and information;
2) provides the individual with new sources of social support which would increase the individual's commitment to the behavior and persuade him that the action he has adopted is legitimate and enjoys a wider consensus than he previously thought. (If anticipated disapproval does not occur in a situation, likewise the individual is motivated to reconsider existing attitudes.);
3) lead to the reassessment of old attitudes if the individual is forced to defend his actions and develop a rationale in support of them;
4) lead to the development of social and attitudinal support for behaviors that were before unacceptable if the behaviors are officially sponsored and involve large numbers of community people (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 38).

In other words action may lead the individual to reexamine his attitudes in light of their value and role implications. This trend of integration is more likely to happen if the "individual perceives he has some degree of choice and if elaboration or improvisation is required by the induced action" (Kelman, 1962, p. 84). Action itself may be an occasion for new experiences in relation to an object that in turn validate the action. In this case attitude change is also likely to occur or action
may lead to change in the forces acting on an individual's life space, whereby restraining forces are converted into driving forces.

Knowledge of an action toward a particular object will become an important datum in a person's evaluation of the object and of himself to the extent he regards the action as really part of himself, as representing his own behavior. That in turn, depends again on whether or not the person chose to engage in the behavior or the degree to which he is required to invest in order to carry the action out, and to the degree the action is a part of whole system of interrelated role behaviors in a social system and not an isolated act (Kelman, 1962, pp. 106-107).

The higher the level of involvement the more likely the action will be an important part of the person's self-evaluation. Therefore the involvement itself becomes a force toward subsequent attitude change and integration of behavior.

Statements like these have important implications for leadership in this third phase of process of change, "refreezing." Integrating change requires that the organizational leader provide opportunities for new behaviors to be tried out. It may also require that he provide socio-emotional support and resources in the way of continuing information, knowledge or training for the changes he has proposed.

Kelman has written that if an action consists of a personal decision—a self-commitment—and is followed by a public statement of intention, "it creates a state of psychological irrevokability for the person, reversal of which would lead to a loss of face or humiliation" (Kelman, 1962, pp. 102-103). Not only is the effectiveness of subsequent counteracting communications less if a person is asked to make his position on an issue public, but the action also ties the person to the object and
implies probable continued association and action (see Lewin, 1951).

Being committed to further association with the object, a person is likely to be open to and search for new confirming information that will make anticipated association more effective, more comfortable, and more rewarding. The effect is to bring attitudes into line with action and future action that is anticipated. The hypothesis that seems to be self-evident from these statements is that induction of action is likely to lead to attitude change and integration to the extent that induced action represents a commitment to continued association with the attitude object and future action in support of it (Kelman, 1962, p. 104).

The implications of these statements for the organizational leader in refreezing change in a social system are that he provide opportunities for persons to actively choose to change, that he provide opportunities for the continuation of new behaviors, and that he make confirming information available.

Other roles the organizational leader might play are found in various sources in the literature on attitude and social change. They include: 1) helping develop peer as well as authority expectations for the new behavior (see Schein, 1971, p. 277); 2) maintaining a balance between increases in aspiration and the expansion of opportunities (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 58); and 3) assuring that the adoption of specific new practices and the introduction of new institutional arrangements occur in a context that permits experiences of success, heightened self-esteem, cognitive reorganization, and social support (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 58).

These roles for the organizational leader are affirmed by Dalton, et. al., who wrote,
That people are unlikely to maintain changed behavior or attitudes unless:

a) the goals and objectives toward which they are working become increasingly specific and concrete;

b) the relationships which reinforce old attitudes are altered and severed and new relationships supportive of change are established;

c) their sense of self-esteem is heightened in the process of change; and

d) they internalize a motivation for change (Dalton, et. al., 1968, p. 109).

Another role for the organizational leader in "refreezing" receives support from several social-psychologists, for example, Lewin. Lewin argued it was important to minimize further resistance to change by isolation until new behaviors are refrozen. Changing group standards, he wrote, will tend to change the force-field and to facilitate change on the part of a group or individual. In order for change accomplished in this way to stabilize, it is important to keep other group standards out (Lewin, 1951). A contemporary social-psychologist, Warren Bennis, similarly advised practitioners of organizational change to allow for time to consolidate changes.

An important aspect of this phase in the process of planned change is how change in one part of a system can cause or create dislocations in another. Lippitt, et. al., devote a whole chapter in their book, The Dynamics of Planned Change to the generalization and stabilization of change. In the refreezing stage they contend that the organizational leader/change agent needs 1) to give visibility and credibility to the
changes; 2) to spread information on the consequences of the changes made throughout the system; 3) to develop some sort of objective evaluation of the changes; 4) to act as a liaison to still-resistant parts of the system; and 5) to underscore the system's ability to change so that it normatively comes to value change and to see that it has the ability to change (Lippitt, et al., 1958, p. 226).

Summary

In summary, these last sections on "unfreezing", "changing", and "refreezing" have represented an attempt to cull relevant concepts for each phase of the process of change from the literature on attitude and social change. Several of these concepts will be incorporated in a set of propositions about the role of the organizational leader in initiating, implementing, and incorporating organizational change that is presented in the next chapter. The context of these propositions is in part drawn from the kinds of considerations as they have been identified in the literature that have to be taken into account in each phase of the change process.

What the author has tried to do in the first part of this chapter is to describe conditions that block or facilitate the initiation, implementation, and incorporation of change as they have been identified in the literature on attitude and social change. Essentially what has been found is that the literature on change says very little about the role of the organizational leader in managing change. There is, however, a substantial body of literature on leadership, which may contribute to
understanding the role of the leader. The rest of this chapter will be concerned with a review of the literature in the field of management as it relates to the topic of "leadership in the change process."

**Leadership in the Management of Change**

There is fairly wide consensus in the literature on leadership and management as to what roles the leader plays in an organization and the functions these roles serve (see Goble, 1972; Katz and Kahn, 1966). Kotler and Zaltman's conceptualization is as representative as any. They identified four management functions:

1) **organizing** - developing an administrative structure to initiate and carry out the tasks facing the organization, defining authority, job responsibilities and linkages;

2) **planning** - deciding on a proper course of action through fact-finding, defining objectives, selecting strategies, developing programs and budget and setting procedures and policies;

3) **implementing** - carrying out plans and programs: delegating, motivating, coordinating, selling, innovating;

4) **controlling** - taking steps to insure the organization's progress towards its objectives by establishing reporting systems, developing performance objectives, measuring results, taking corrective actions, and administering rewards and sanctions (Zaltman, et. al., 1972, p. 466).

In an alternative model Mintzberg identified ten roles for the organizational leader which he grouped under three functions:
Mintzberg's entrepreneurial role is comparable to the direction-setting role Sayles describes for the organizational leader (Sayles, 1964, p. 53). For Sayles redirection is integrally tied up in the monitoring role the manager plays. From monitoring or assessing subordinates' work a manager can identify recurring, time-consuming problems, those points at which he might intervene to return the system to a normal equilibrium. However, a manager needs to minimize the frequency with which patterns of work and coordination are disturbed (Sayles, 1964, p. 161) and to thereby develop predictable organizational patterns that increase subordinates' morale and lessen stress. In other words the manager needs to function as a buffer to many internal and external interruptions and to insulate the organization "from other initiations from other sources. The leader's initiatives also need to be limited", Sayles cautions, "so that subordinates are not inhibited. . . ." and the manager is intervening only when he has to, for problems that require managerial action (Sayles, 1964, p. 147). "Excessively unbalanced interaction patterns tend to be less stable. To maintain receptivity to direction, a leader must be willing and able to accept initiations from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpersonal</th>
<th>Figurehead leader</th>
<th>Liaison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informational</td>
<td>Monitor disseminator</td>
<td>Spokesman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisional</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial disturbance handler</td>
<td>Resource allocator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

subordinates" (Sayles, 1964, p. 149). Subordinates are likely to initiate contact with a manager in order to ask for organizational aid (unravelling a complex bureaucracy knot or problem); for technical aid--(expert advice, information or experience); or for personal aid (assurance, approval, or understanding of how the system works so that it will be more rational or predictable), according to Sayles. Managers need to make it easy for subordinates to contact them and to gain a sense of control over their work environment. A fourth function in addition to those of monitoring, insulating the organization, and being responsive to subordinates needs is for the leader to represent the group's interests both inside and outside the organization.

In addition, a leader must be able to assess the costs of continuing a course of action when problems arise (i.e. constant intervention to resolve conflicts and haggling) vs. the costs of introducing change. Once a manager has decided to initiate some change in order to attain a kind of predictable equilibrium, he needs to persuade those who must approve change and those who must change that it is worthwhile; he also must develop procedures for implementing and validating the changes. "Administration involves constantly modifying decisions in response to monitoring the environment and trading of favorable responses from one sector in exchange for (or in risk of) stress or hostility from another source" (Sayles, 1964, p. 218).

Zaltman, et. al., Mintzberg, and Sayles provide different, but complimentary, descriptions of the roles and functions of management in simply maintaining an organizational structure; other theorists have tried
to specify, very speculatively, what management actions are required in initiating and implementing organizational change.

Managing change requires the ability to identify forces or variables surrounding a problem and to develop consensus about the relevant forces and about a strategy for manipulating these forces. Organizational cultures must be changed to reinforce and maintain changes achieved by individuals. Administrators also need to cope with problems and uncertainties generated by changes and to develop feedback mechanisms by which problems in carrying out the changes can be identified (Gross, et. al., 1971, p. 212).

Watson described a range of roles for the organizational leader in the process of change which ran from sensing problems and potentialities in the organization, to keeping in touch with external trends and resources, to developing interpersonal skills and resources in the organization; from diagnosis and data gathering about the problem, to priority setting, problem-solving, and the evaluation of solutions (Watson, 1967, pp. 110-115). Although, Lippitt, Westley and Watson primarily focus on the role of the outside change agent in organizational change they do specify a few roles for the organizational leader. They include: 1) establishing reference groups; 2) setting comparative standards; 3) creating a "secure climate"; 4) affirming a motivation to change and reaffirming success at changing; and 5) setting priorities and cutting out interference (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, pp. 253-264).

Theoreticians have most often studied change in an industrial setting as observers or outside consultants. A practitioner, Robert Guest, however, wrote a case study on his experiences as a leader initiating and responding to change in a large automobile manufacturing firm. The conclusions he reached were:
1) that when patterns of internal relationships are similar to those linking the organization to another organization, the latter must be changed first;

2) that a leader needs to reinforce internal changes with knowledge of comparisons from the outside; and

3) that a leader needs
   a) to create feelings of interdependence with subordinates,
   b) to establish shared goals,
   c) to integrate subordinate needs in planning, and
   d) to represent and act as a spokesman for group interests (Guest, 1962).

Educators have sought to verify these principles in educational settings. One study of leadership in the implementation of organizational change in school systems identified six leadership functions that included: 1) initiating innovations; 2) establishing a climate receptive to change; 3) clearly delineating program objectives; 4) upgrading the professional competence of the staff; 5) stimulating staff participation in change; and 6) establishing methods of evaluation (Kirkpatrick, 1971). Schmuck and Miles have also looked at the role of the administrator in educational change (see Schmuck and Miles, 1971).

Again many of the roles for the organizational leader that these leadership/management studies have identified will be incorporated in the propositions for the role of the organizational leader in initiating, implementing, and incorporating change set forth in the next chapter.
Summary and Prospectus

A review of the literature on attitude and social changes in this chapter has been used to explain the conceptual and organizational framework and social-psychological approach that was chosen for this research. The basis of Lewin's model of change is that there are phases or sequences of participation in a process of social change. Lewin's stages of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing will be used as a framework for organizing the propositions to be offered in the next chapter for the role of the organizational leader in affecting organizational change and for analyzing the actions of the university president in each of four case studies. Essentially it is being argued that there are potentially identifiable leader behaviors in each stage of the change process that are not addressed or dealt with consistently in the literature on attitude and organizational change. Although the recommendations of a majority of the theorists that have been reviewed clustered nicely around Lewin's stages of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing, only a few studies considered the implications of their recommendations for the role performance of the organizational leader (Dalton, et. al., 1968; Arensburg, 1964).

In the next chapter a tentative set of propositions about the role performance of the organizational leader in each of the three stages will be set forth drawing on the literature that has been reviewed in this chapter. These propositions will be used in retrospect to analyze and compare the actions of one university president in unfreezing, changing,
and refreezing the attitudes and behaviors of organizational members in four attempts at change against the actions he might have taken, keeping in mind the considerations raised in this chapter.

The focal points in the descriptions of events that occurred in each of the change efforts, selected to be studied will be the university president's actions in regard to a particular set of goals. His interventions it is assumed will cause the force-field operating to maintain a given equilibrium in the organization to change.\(^8\)

---

\(^8\)The three stages in the change process cannot really be separated and do not represent a strictly temporal sequence. In this chapter they were treated as if they were discrete and sequential, with clear beginnings and endings and with little or no overlap between phases. Undoubtedly, given the complex nature of any organization this is not true. The line between the end of one phase and the beginning of another is very imprecise. Overcoming resistance to change and the induction of new behavior may be part of the same process. And, as has been seen, the way in which new behavior is induced may influence the extent to which it is refrozen or integrated. Likewise, the behaviors to be proposed in the next chapter for the organizational leader are only as sequential as the model is.
Introduction

In this chapter a series of propositions concerning possible goals of the organizational leader for each stage of the change process will be outlined. The assumption is that the degree to which organizational change strategies are successfully initiated, implemented, and incorporated will be a function of the degree to which organizational members perceive that the conditions outlined in these propositions have been dealt with during the periods of attempted initiation, implementation, and incorporation. A second assumption is that the organizational leader's role in establishing and maintaining these conditions is critically important to successful implementation. Both of these assumptions will be explored when the propositions are applied in the case analyses in Chapters V-VIII.

Most of the conditions described in the propositions are drawn from the findings of other studies, though for the most part, these conditions were not linked to the role performance of the organizational leader in those studies. Depending on the leader's assessment of the setting and on his choice of change strategies, one proposition or objective may be more important from his perspective than another. The entire list represents an attempt to generate a comprehensive list...
of areas that may need the leader's attention if long-term change which
the leader has initiated is to be stably integrated into the life of the
organization. In that sense the author is not implying that the leader
needs to initiate strategies to accomplish all of the objectives that
have been outlined. Rather the propositions are more of a checklist
of areas he may wish to consider in creating conditions that facilitate
successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation.

The propositions themselves are stated in terms of expected out-
comes, which were drawn from the review of the literature in Chapter I.
The term 'expected outcomes' refers to the leader's objectives for using
certain strategies, given his assessment of the setting, and to members'
expectations for having certain conditions created during the periods of
attempted initiation, implementation and incorporation. The actions
of the organizational leader which are the focal point of this study
are his/her strategies for affecting the outcomes contained in the
propositions. It is important to note that any one action on the part
of the organizational leader may accomplish more than one outcome though
this will become more apparent in the case analyses that follow in
Chapters V-VIII.

Several of the studies from which the propositions are drawn are
reviewed in Chapter I. Support for each of the objectives will be found
in that chapter, in the references listed after each proposition, or in
the commentaries I have included after those propositions which seemed
to need further justification or explanation.
Propositions for Unfreezing-Initiation

An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this phase may be:

Proposition 1 - To assess the attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, and values of organizational members and to anticipate the nature of resistance to the proposed change (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 166; Zaltman, et. al., 1972, pp. 267-270).

Proposition 2 - To overcome the initial resistance of organizational members to the proposed change (Schein, 1961, p. 62; Watson, 1967, pp. 22-23).

Proposition 2a - By challenging underlying supports for existing behavior.

Commentary: Strategies may include removing individuals from accustomed social relations that support old attitudes. In other words, norms, expectations, and routines may act as a constraint to change; placing individuals in new situations with new norms and expectations may lessen resistance to change. Strategies may also involve confronting individuals with stressful discordant information inducing guilt and creating humiliating or demeaning experiences for organizational members thereby causing them to reevaluate their own behavior (Katz, 1960, p. 192; Schein, 1961, p. 66).

Proposition 2b - By reducing the amount of anxiety aroused by the prospect of change.

Commentary: Strategies may include creating feeling of security by reducing the threat the prospect of change carries with it (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 29).
Proposition 3 - To heighten organizational members' sensitivity to problems involving the intended change (Katz, 1960; Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 151).

Proposition 4 - To stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration in the system in regards to the proposed change (Dalton, et. al., 1968, p. 109; Janis and Smith, 1965, pp. 198-208; Katz, 1960, p. 192; Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 32; Lippitt, et. al., 1958, pp. 131-143).

Commentary: The effects of the leader pointing out that in some ways the organization has not reached its potential would be to get his dissatisfaction out in the open, to demonstrate his investment in members' capacity to change, and, perhaps, to create some different expectations for the future. A strategy to accomplish this may be to establish new reference groups and standards against which organizational achievement could be measured.

Proposition 5 - To integrate new forces for change with existing forces for change, external forces for change with internal forces for change (Bennis, 1972; Clark, 1968; Gross, et. al., 1971, p. 30; Hefferlin, 1971; Katz and Kahn, 1966).

Commentary: The organization being open to its environment might mean that the organization becomes more open to competition (i.e. new standards), to new members, and/or to new ideas. By extending communication across inter-institutional boundaries the leader may be able to make use of external groups' demands to create change internally that might not otherwise be possible. Pairing new, external forces for change with existing internal forces for change has the effect of avoiding the alienation of people within the system ideologically committed to the same goals, increasing a sense of security and competency for those same people, and creating a peer model for others in the system. Strategies to accomplish these objectives may include using "marginals" in the system who have contacts in other institutions to import new ideas into the organization (Clark, 1968, p. 15, Hefferlin, 1971,
Proposition 6 - To change the constellation of forces, resources or information converging on any one part of the organization (Lewin, 1951, p. 176; Kelman and Warwick, 1973).

Proposition 7 - To elicit support for the proposed organizational change from informal as well as formal leaders in the organization (Janis and Smith, 1965, p. 214).

Commentary: The literature suggests that by eliciting the support of informal leaders for change the organizational leader may find natural leverage points for implementing his objectives.

Proposition 8 - To link parts of the system that are sympathetic to the intended change and share common dissatisfaction and a sense of powerlessness (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 104).

Commentary: To the extent these groups share the leader's objectives for change, he may wish to augment their resources and hence their capability to implement the proposed change.

Proposition 9 - To set priorities for the organization (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, pp. 180-182, 253-264) and to clearly communicate these priorities to organizational members whose behavior is to be changed.

Proposition 10 - To create a sense of rising expectations among organizational members that they will benefit from the proposed change in their organizational behavior (Dalton, et. al., 1968, p. 109; Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 29).

Commentary: Kelman and Warwick advise the organizational leader to appeal to the felt needs and motivational base of those being asked to change. If the leader can convince
organizational members that they will benefit from the change in a practical sense and that they will not lose existing satisfactions, he will be more successful in convincing them of the need to change (see Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 29).

Proposition 11 - To involve as many of the individuals to be affected by the proposed change as possible in planning and decision-making (Watson, 1967; Bennis, 1972, p. 209; McMillan, 1972; Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 402).

Commentary: A review of the literature suggests that by involving organizational members in planning and decision making, the leader builds collaborative understanding and shared responsibility for the proposed change. A strategy may be to make new policies explicit and open to discussion, to explain what alternative policies were considered and why they were rejected, and to explain what consequences will be taken at what point in time as evidence of acceptance or opposition to the policies, thereby building a collaborative understanding between the organizational leader and members of what to change and how to change it.

The decision to change has to seem important to the individuals involved for successful implementation and incorporation to occur. Katz and Kahn has emphasized the importance of allowing individuals to express their own ideas and to make significant decisions (Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 401, 419). The theory is that resistance will be encountered if change is imposed (Cartwright, 1965, p. 34) and that participation leads to higher morale, greater commitment, and greater clarity about the change— all these conditions necessary for successful implementation (Bennis, 1966, p. 209; Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 402).
Proposition 12 - To increase the amount and frequency of interaction between the organizational leader and members in regards to the proposed changes (Guest, 1962; Rogers, 1972, pp. 196, 201-202; Sayles, 1964, p. 201).

Commentary: A review of the literature suggests that for change to occur, it is important that there be a feeling of interdependence between the leader and organizational members (Guest, 1962: Sayles, 1964).


Commentary: Argyris wrote that "free and informed choice and internal commitment are congruent with the development of conditions such as psychological success, competence, feelings of essentiality, confirmation, and increased self acceptance --- conditions which lead to the exchange of valid information" (Argyris, 1970, p. 80). Dependency, on the other hand, inhibits the exchange of valid information. An objective of the strategies used by the organizational leader in this phase may be to encourage feelings of efficacy, self-determination, and control on the part of organizational members by providing opportunities in which real choices need to be made and where individuals can reciprocate and feel essential and competent (Argyris, 1970; Rogers, 1972).

Proposition 14 - To establish and maintain a climate of acceptance, support, and trust in interpersonal relationships in which change is regarded positively (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 58; Watson, 1967, p. 23).
Commentary: In order to establish this kind of climate it is important for the leader to model authenticity in his relationships with organizational members, to develop socialization processes whereby new values can be learned, and to create the symbols of change and movement in the organization.

Proposition 15 - To effect and demonstrate changes in the organization's relationships with other systems (Guest, 1962; Sayles, 1964).

Commentary: Guest wrote "that when patterns of internal relationships are similar to those linking the organization to another organization, the latter must be changed first" (Guest, 1962). Organizational members are more receptive to change if they sense that their interests are being effectively represented and if the organizational leader is responsive to their concerns in his dealings with other agencies (Sayles, 1964, pp. 154-155).

Proposition 16 - To build the organizational leader's expertise and credibility with organizational members (Janis and Smith, 1965, p. 220; Rogers, 1972; Thompson, 1967).

Commentary: A leader who is perceived as prestigious is more able to influence others to change their behavior, since prestige increases the leader's power, his ability to satisfy the needs of others, and his control over the dependency of the system on other systems (Thompson, 1967).

Proposition 17 - To extend the organizational leader's control over varied kinds of resources and sources of power (Bennis, 1966; Kelman and Warwick, 1973).
Commentary: The literature suggests that organizational members are more receptive to changes initiated by a leader who controls rewards and punishments as well as environmental supports to organizational members' behavior: recognition, respect, a sense of accomplishment, information, etc. (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 32).

Propositions for Changing-Implementation

An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this phase may be:

Proposition 18 - To overcome emerging resistance to the proposed change during the period of attempted implementation (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 212).

Proposition 19 - To provide opportunities for organizational members to make their commitment to the proposed change public (Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 402; Lewin, 1951, p. 233; Kelman, 1962, pp. 83, 102-103).

Commentary: The literature suggests that a public declaration of commitment to change leads a person to look for information that will support his actions and minimize the importance of disconfirming information he encounters. Public statements also tend to change person's perceptions of the social acceptability of a particular behavior (see the section on Refreezing in Chapter I).

Proposition 20 - To continually clarify and to provide mechanisms by which organizational members can gain clarification of the behavioral changes required (Bennis, 1972b; Dalton, et. al., 1968; Gross, et. al., 1971, p. 30; Kelman, 1962, pp. 106-107; Lippitt, et. al., 1958).
Commentary: If change is to be implemented, a clear understanding of how to change as well as what to change needs to be developed (Bennis, 1972b; Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 166). Clarification might be accomplished by the leader making the goals of the change effort increasingly specific and operational. Dalton observed that movement in the direction of greater specificity of goals is required for successful implementation (Dalton, et. al., 1968, p. 109). When the goals are clear and operational there is a greater propensity for the organization to engage in planning, to commit resources towards the change, and to innovate (Cartwright, 1965, p. 328). Clarification of change may also involve clarifying organizational members' roles and the distribution of power or authority in the organization (Barnes, 1967) or prioritizing a series of changes members are going to need to make.

Proposition 21 - To provide mechanisms for feedback between the leader and the people undergoing change (Gross, et. al., 1971, p. 212; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Maloney and Schonfeld, 1973; Rogers, 1972).

Commentary: Feedback is needed so that the leader can identify and resolve problems organizational members encounter in attempting to understand and implement change (Rogers, 1972, p. 210; Maloney and Schonfeld, 1972, pp. 208-212). Feedback is also needed from the leader to organization members on the grounds that aspiration is higher if people see the outcomes of their efforts (Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 421).

Proposition 22 - To provide organizational members with opportunities to test and verify new behaviors through personal experience (Bandura, 1972, pp. 56-60; Dalton, et. al., 1968, p. 139; Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 38; Sayles, 1964, p. 201).
Commentary: A review of the literature suggests that if organizational members are given the opportunity to experiment with new behaviors, it might facilitate the processes of identification, internalization or cognitive redefinition.

Proposition 23 - To offer organizational members new meanings or new ways of looking at their experiences in regards to the proposed change (Dalton, et. al., 1968, p. 139; Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33; Lofland, 1971, p. 31).

Commentary: "If a stable form of a new behavior toward an object is to emerge, a transformation of 'meanings' must occur, in which the person develops a new conception of the nature of the object. This happens out of a series of communicative arts in which others point out new aspects of experience to him, present him with interpretations of events, and help him to achieve a new conceptual organization of his world without which the new behavior is not possible" (Becker, Lofland, 1971, p. 31). The organizational leader in providing a common language and associative network for members' experience gives the organization member a way of ordering information about himself and the environment.


Commentary: A review of the literature suggests that other organizational members and other organizations as well as the organizational leader might serve as a role model for an approach to problem-solving, a new idea, a spirit of inquiry, a tolerance for ambiguity, or a new value system.
Proposition 25 - To encourage experimentation and risk-taking on the part of organizational members in regards to the proposed change (Guetzkow, 1965; Dalton, et. al., 1968, p. 139; Lewin, 1951, pp. 222-227; Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 38).

Proposition 26 - To redefine the leader's role in relation to the change processes initiated (Cartwright, 1965; Hefferlin, 1969; Kerr, 1963; Sayles, 1964).

Commentary: The literature on higher education and organizational change suggests that over time the organizational leader may need to change his relationship to the change idea and to organizational members from one of dependency to mutuality in order to give them independence and room to carry out the change. Others besides just the leader need to come to feel responsible for sensing the environment (Cartwright, 1965). The leader needs to lose his sense of ownership in the ideas (Kerr, 1963, p. 37) and organizational members need to be encouraged to take greater initiative in regards to maintaining the changes the leader has initiated (Arensburg in Sayles, 1964, p. 201; and Hefferlin, 1969, p. 166). The leader himself would still have responsibility for certain refreezing roles to be described in the next section of this chapter. One strategy to accomplish these objectives may be to "assign an activity to a definite, recognized operational unit which will be responsible for and sensitive to initiation in regards to this activity in the future" (Cartwright, 1965).

Proposition 27 - To remove barriers to change and to provide organizational members with necessary skills, knowledge, training and resources in order to increase their capacity to implement the proposed change (Gross, et. al., 1971, pp. 30, 212-213).
Commentary: Strategies may include establishing mechanisms by which organizational members can be restrained and resocialized or which make expert and financial resources available to organizational members.

Proposition 28 - To change existing organizational arrangements so that they are as compatible as possible with the behavioral changes that are required e.g. the reward system, communications network, decision-making process, networks of interdependence, organizational policies or rules, etc. (Dalton, et. al., 1968; Kahn, et. al., 1964; Katz, 1960, p. 192; Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 58; Lewin, 1951; Maloney and Schonfeld, 1973).

Commentary: "When self-interest conflicts with necessary change, often institutional arrangements are necessary to make people's self-interests accord with the necessary change" (Maloney and Schonfeld, 1973, p. 203). Strategies may involve changing patterns of interdependence or communication so that all levels of the organization become open to the environment or changing the support or rewards given for certain kinds of behavior. In other words, in order to change behavior in any one level of an organization it is often necessary to achieve complementary or reinforcing changes in other levels. New reference groups and norms need to be established. "New patterns of relationships appear to be essential in rewarding and supporting new behavior" (Dalton, 1968, p. 109; Lewin, 1951). For change to occur it is important that the new behaviors become part of an interrelated role set for the individual and that the new behaviors are consistent or compatible with other behaviors the person performs (Kahn, et. al., 1964, pp. 11-35).

Proposition 29 - To reinforce and reward even tentative changes organizational members make in the direction of the intended outcome (Dalton, et. al., 1968; Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 35; Sayles, 1964).
Commentary: The literature suggests that for implementation to be successful, members need feedback and approval in order to gain self-esteem and to experience some success in changing (Dalton, 1968, p. 109; Sayles, 1964, pp. 154 and 159).

In addition to establishing and maintaining the conditions specified in the propositions under "changing" the organizational leader may need to continue to use "unfreezing" strategies (i.e. setting organizational priorities and establishing opportunities for reciprocity) for successful implementation to occur.

Propositions for Refreezing-Incorporation

An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this phase may be:

Proposition 30 - To monitor organizational members' performance in coping with and integrating the proposed change (Sayles, 1964).

Commentary: The main purpose of developing a control or monitoring system is to detect "non-response to directives to change" (Sayles, 1964, p. 149). By monitoring organizational members performance the organizational leader is "seeking to identify points of disorganization, breakdown and disintegration in order to devote his interventions to returning the system as quickly as possible to a normal, however changed, equilibrium" (Sayles, 1964).

Proposition 31 - To objectively evaluate changes that have occurred (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, pp. 229-230; Katz and Kahn, 1966, pp. 433-435).

Proposition 32 - To maintain continuity at some levels of the organization while change takes place at other levels (Kelman and Warwick, 1973; Sayles, 1964).
Commentary: The literature suggests that change must be reinforced or supported by continuity of some parts of an individual's self-concept or identity or widespread disintegration will occur (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, pp. 35-36). Or as Sayles puts it, "Managers need to balance change and stability in their organizations and to minimize the frequency with which patterns of work and coordination are disturbed" (Sayles, 1964, p. 161).

Proposition 33 - To insulate the organization from conflicting or competing ideas and to give organizational members time to assimilate and integrate new behaviors (Sayles, 1964, p. 147; Lippitt, et. al., 1958; Bennis, 1972b; Lewin, 1951).

Commentary: According to this proposition an organizational leader would seek to monitor/screen others' overload in the system and to cut down on interfering or competing claims for their time, energy, and resources. (Contrast this proposition to Proposition 7 under unfreezing in which the objective is just the opposite.)

Proposition 34 - To link parts of the organization to individuals whose behavior has been changed as well as to link processes of change occurring simultaneously (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 35; Sayles, 1964; Schein, 1971, p. 277).

Commentary: Strategies to accomplish this first part of this objective may include 1) developing new channels of communication between relevant parts of the system, 2) developing peer as well as authority expectations for new behaviors, and 3) providing opportunities for increased interworker communication and collaboration (Arensburg, in Sayles, 1964, p. 201).

Proposition 35 - To give emotional support and resources (in the form of confirming information, training, etc.) to organizational members
who demonstrate behaviors in the direction of the intended change (Sayles, 1964, p. 159; Guest, 1962; Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 226).

Commentary: A strategy may be to reinforce organizational members behavior with knowledge of the way they compare with other organizations (Guest, 1962).

Proposition 36 - To give visibility and credibility to the change within the entire system and to spread information about the consequences of the change to other parts of the organization, thereby diminishing a negative response in other parts of the system and encouraging system-wide support and adoption (Lippitt, et. al., 1958; Sayles, 1964).

Commentary: Strategies may include having individuals whose behavior has been changed to teach other parts of the organization about the changes (Lippitt, et. al., 1958, p. 231) or developing rituals around the way in which a new behavior is acquired which tend to validate the new behaviors and facilitate its acceptance (Sayles, 1964, p. 147).

Two propositions that have come from a review of the literature relate to all three phases of change and suggest conditions that need to be established and maintained in all three stages if change is to be successfully initiated, implemented, and incorporated.

Proposition 37 - The organizational leader needs to be viewed as personally involved and committed to the change throughout the change process (Bennis, 1972b) (Hefferlin, 1969, p. 96).

Proposition 38 - The organizational leader and others advocating the change need to be perceived as trustworthy throughout the change process (Bennis, 1972b; Rogers, 1972, p. 205).
Again, the stages of initiation, implementation and incorporation seemingly are treated as if they were discrete and sequential when in actuality most change processes extend over long periods of time and require continual unfreezing and changing until stably integrated. Incorporation is in itself gradually accomplished through a series of successive approximations. The line between the end of one phase and the beginning of the next can never be drawn; however, movement from one stage to another is evidenced when organizational members perceive that a majority of the conditions described in one phase have been dealt with and when efforts are being taken to meet a majority of the objectives specified in the next phase. When there seems to be no movement from one stage to another, it can be assumed that a majority of the objectives in that stage are not being met at all, or that the organizational leader's efforts are too diffuse to establish and maintain the conditions necessary for the successful completion of that stage.

The propositions for the role performance of the organizational leader are summarized in the chart on the following page.

Summary and Prospectus

The propositions set forth in this chapter were compiled after a review of the literature on attitude and organizational change. If some of the propositions sound normative in that they imply the participation of organizational members, it is because of the emphasis on long-term, stably integrated change which the literature suggests requires the understanding, involvement, and commitment of organizational members (Hersey and Blanchard, 1972, p. 161). It is not implied that the leader
An objective of the strategies employed by the organisational leader may be:

**Unfreezing - Initiation**

Proposition 1 - To assess the sources and nature of resistance to change.
Proposition 2 - To overcome initial resistance to change.
Proposition 3 - To heighten organisational members' sensitivity to problems.
Proposition 4 - To stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration in the system in regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 5 - To integrate new forces with existing forces, external forces with internal forces for change.
Proposition 6 - To change the flow of resources or information in the organisation.
Proposition 7 - To elicit support from informal as well as formal leaders.
Proposition 8 - To link parts of the system that are sympathetic to the intended change.
Proposition 9 - To set and communicate organisational priorities.

**Changing - Implementation**

Proposition 10 - To create a sense of rising expectations among organisational members.
Proposition 11 - To involve as many of the individuals affected by the proposed change as possible in planning and decision-making.
Proposition 12 - To increase the amount and frequency of interaction between himself and members in regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 13 - To heighten members' self-awareness and to encourage reciprocity in regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 14 - To establish and maintain a climate of acceptance, support and trust in interpersonal relationships in which change is regarded positively.
Proposition 15 - To effect and demonstrate change in the organisation's relationships with other systems.
Proposition 16 - To build his expertise and credibility with organisational members.
Proposition 17 - To extend his control over resources and sources of power.

Proposition 18 - To overcome emerging resistance to the proposed change.
Proposition 19 - To provide opportunities for members to make a public commitment to the proposed change.
Proposition 20 - To continually clarify and to provide mechanism for the clarification of the behavioral changes required.
Proposition 21 - To provide mechanism for feedback.
Proposition 22 - To provide members with opportunities to test and verify new behaviors through personal experience.
Proposition 23 - To offer new meanings or new ways of looking at members' experiences.

**Refreezing - Incorporation**

Proposition 24 - To provide role models for new behavior patterns.
Proposition 25 - To encourage experimentation and risk-taking in regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 26 - To redefine the leader's role in relation to the change processes initiated.
Proposition 27 - To remove barriers and to provide resources etc. to members in regards to the proposed change.
Proposition 28 - To change existing organisational arrangements which are incompatible with the proposed change.
Proposition 29 - To reinforce and reward tentative change in the direction of the intended outcome.

Proposition 30 - To monitor members' performance in coping with and integrating the change.
Proposition 31 - To objectively evaluate the change.
Proposition 32 - To maintain continuity at some levels of the organisation.
Proposition 33 - To insulate the organisation from interference.

**Global**

Proposition 34 - To link parts of the system as well as processes of change.
Proposition 35 - To give emotional support and resources to members who demonstrate the desired behavioral changes.
Proposition 36 - To give visibility and credibility to the change within the system.

Proposition 37 - The organisational leader need to be viewed as personally involved and committed to the change throughout the process.

Proposition 38 - The organisational leader and others advancing the change need to be perceived as trustworthy throughout the change process.
needs to initiate strategies to accomplish all of the objectives that have been outlined; rather the propositions as they are presented here will be used as a framework to assess in retrospect the actual impact of an organizational leader's actions in unfreezing, changing, and refreezing the behavior of organizational members. The organizational leader chosen for this study is the President of the University of Cincinnati, Warren Bennis. The material used comes from observations, interviews, and the study of documents relative to four attempts Bennis made to institute major changes in the University during the spring and fall of 1972 and the spring of 1973. The research methodology used to carry out this research will be described in more detail in the next chapter.
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH SETTING AND DESIGN

Selection of the Research Setting

The literature on higher education yields contradictory descriptions about the ability of a university president to effect organizational change (see Chapters I and IV). It seems as if the ideal (what he is often expected to do) and the real (what he is able to do given the realities of his role and the university structure) have never been adequately separated and explored. The university setting and the role of the university administrator in implementing organizational change has been neglected in the literature on planned organizational change in favor of studies in industrial and business settings.

For these reasons, in order to contribute to the literature in both these fields, the university environment was selected because its President, Warren Bennis, is himself a renowned organizational theorist. He had a strong interest in and a positive orientation toward the proposed study from the outset. Several meetings were held with him and his top assistants prior to the initiation of field work activities in which a great deal of preliminary information was shared about the University and the proposed study. A set of tentative agreements were reached during these meetings. In August, 1972, a final decision was made to conduct the study. Field observation began in September, 1972, with the specific research questions to emerge from a month or two of preliminary observation and assessment.
Research Design

Introduction

The intent of the rest of this chapter is to present the major methodological problems encountered in designing and carrying out the study and the reasons for the decisions made about them. A rationale for the choice of the field research method will be given. The appropriateness of the field research method as a method of inquiry given the purposes of this research will be established through the discussion that follows of the relative advantage and disadvantages of other quantitative methodologies that were considered. An attempt will be made to acknowledge some of the limitations of the study and the steps taken to counteract these biases. Finally, the procedures used in data collection and analysis and the nature of the conclusions that can be made from the findings will be described.

Requirements of the Study and Rationale for Use of the Field Research Method

The objective of this study was to examine the consequences of the role performance of the university president for the initiation, implementation, and incorporation phases of the process of change. Given this objective, data needed to be collected from individuals in the university involved in an effort to institute planned change that indicated their attitudes, performance, and social relationships at different points in time and the perceived effect of the president's actions in changing existing attitudes, expectancies, relationships, and behaviors.
A research design was desired that would 1) permit the author to observe the performance and reactions of members to a proposed organizational change as unobtrusively as possible; 2) permit the author to develop rapport with participants in the setting that could be maintained over a relatively long period of time; and 3) allow the author to use a variety of techniques for obtaining data. These specifications resulted in the choice of a qualitative, non-experimental research design, which for convenience will be referred to as the field research method.

The term "field research" refers to a method of inquiry in a social setting using the researcher's observational skills and knowledge of where to look in regards to the problem under investigation. The method is designed to "utilize to the fullest the advantages of seeing the situation as a whole and of attempting to grasp fundamental relationships. From this... can come the insights which can furnish the hypotheses for later, more detailed, quantitative studies" (Katz, et. al., 1953, p. 75). A general characteristic of field work is its temporary developing character. The field worker usually does not enter the field with specific hypotheses or a predetermined research design (Strauss, et. al., 1969, p. 751). Lofland has described field observation "as the most directly involving and most penetrating of all research strategies, the most close and telling mode of gathering information" (Lofland, 1971, p. 93). Face-to-faceness has the irreplaceable character of non-reflectivity and immediacy that furnishes the fullest possibility of truly entering the life, mind, and definition of the other" (Lofland, 1971, p. 2).
The strength of the field research method is that it allows one to understand the central issues of the individuals being observed in their own terms. It allows one to see what in Goffman's terms, is meaningful, reasonable, and normal (Goffman, 1961, p. 1). The observer's task is in fact to find out what is fundamental or central to the individuals under observation (Lofland, 1971, p. 4). He usually begins by using the participant's own assertions about phenomena which leads to the identification of a set of patterns in a social system, and over a span of time, to the identification of changes in the relationships of individuals to each other. At the same time, observation may lead to the identification of emerging conflicts, coalitions, milestones, and imagery. "Attention is focused on a succession of dependencies through time--upon ways in which prior conditions may or may not develop into succeeding conditions of a given outcome. Attention is focused upon ways in which alternatives may or may not be present, upon ways in which, and the degree to which, action may be constrained. ..." The study becomes "a cumulation of factors, each factor being a condition of an outcome but not sufficient for it, each factor making an outcome merely possible or more probable" (Lofland, 1971, p. 65).

The field research method was selected because it provided a strategic way to explore the complex organizational problems the study proposed to investigate. It allowed for in-depth observation of several aspects of the dynamics of instituting change into an organization.
In sum, the needs of this research and the special strengths of the field research method seemed to coincide.

**Alternative Quantitative Methodologies**

Campbell and Stanley (1963, p. 36) argue that the choice of any one research method is made more plausible if other methodologies are ruled out as inappropriate, infeasible, or less effective. The aim of this section is to defend my choice of the field-observation method by ruling out alternative methodologies, specifically quantitative, laboratory methodologies, given the purposes of my research. In choosing the field study method certain tradeoffs of replicability, control, predictability, and reliability, which are the strengths of quantitative methodologies, were made for the advantages listed above. In the paragraphs that follow the problems with quantitative studies as an alternative methodology, given the purposes and requirements of the research, are discussed.

**Problems with Quantitative Methodologies for the Purposes of this Research**

Robert Weiss and Martin Rein have written that there are methodological as well as administrative problems with quantitative evaluation of many broad-aims change programs.¹ When goals are difficult to specify, when aims can be realized in alternative ways, or when the process established is important, before-and-after evaluation and the demonstration of

---

¹Broad-aims programs are those which hope to achieve non-specific "forms of change for the better" and are of such magnitude that they require large-scale interventions (Weiss and Rein, 1970, p. 97).
cause-and-effect relationships between a program and its outcomes are not feasible (Weiss and Rein, 1970). University change projects can be classified as broad-aims programs since goals are usually vague and difficult to specify and rank order. Outcomes can be achieved in a number of ways and the process that evolves is what is important if one is not to accept any one explanation for why change processes do or do not get implemented. Any attempt to evaluate the success of efforts to institute organizational change in terms of narrowly defined and controllable criteria misrepresents the actual aims of proposals for change in the university and will inevitably encounter many of the problems Weiss and Rein identify with experimentally-designed evaluations of broad-aims programs. A partial list of those problems follows:

1) Some problems stem from overoptimistic judgments regarding the potential impact of large scale social programs.

2) Broad-aims programs often do not have operational goals and there is a tendency for researchers to force operationalization for the purpose of evaluation.

3) Change is difficult to measure. Variables that seem to account for differences in before-and-after data may be only situational and would have taken place without the program.

4) Pre-programmed criteria may not account for the unintended consequences of a change effort and therefore the assessment of a program may be limited.

5) Variables are too many, too complex and often cannot be predicted ahead of time.
6) Experimental treatments are not standardized. Because social settings differ in their needs, potential realizations of any program may not be possible. One important research function should be the description of the forms the program takes and of the forces shaping these forms. Cause-and-effect evaluation neglects such description entirely, being based on the assumption that what took place was supposed to take place.

7) A quantitative evaluation design is limited in the information it can produce. Usually negative results are thrown out. Research cannot merely document that the program failed and go on to study a modification of the program; it must identify the causes of failure. In this way the experience can become the basis for designing more effective programs.

8) There are always problems between program administrators and evaluators such as the operationalization of aims may cause these aims to take on importance that before administrators didn't hold (Weiss and Rein, 1970, p. 101).

Weiss and Rein document other administrative difficulties with quantitative research design for broad-aims programs on pages 104-105, in the Evaluation of Broad Aims Programs, although these are less of a problem with the research that has been undertaken here.

Most quantitative studies tend to measure outcomes (causes, effects, and consequences); as described earlier the focus of this research on the role performance of the university president is more a study of "input" and "process". The concern was with forces that shaped the change program, the nature of the opposition encountered when it was introduced, the actions taken by the university president in anticipation of resistance, the reasons for the program's outcome (especially as they are linked to the role of the university president),
and with the program's unintended consequences (especially as they effect receptivity or resistance to future attempts at organizational change). Because of those interests this study takes the form that it does.

However, there are also certain problems associated with the field research which are important to acknowledge since they effect the nature of the conclusions it is possible to make as a result of the study.

**Problems with Qualitative Research**

Precisely because a field researcher is more interested in what happens after a program is introduced than in "whether it works", he is less likely to have systematic quantitative data available to specify the causes and consequences of certain actions. The lack of comparative data is often cited as a major disadvantage of the field research method. Other disadvantages include the problems of replicability and of generalizing from a single case which may not be representative of a larger population. The acknowledgement of these limitations to the field research method is not meant to diminish their validity or importance. However in choosing a methodology, the advantages of a field research

---

2 In fact the necessary range of variation in a phenomenon may never occur in a single social setting. This does not preclude the possibility however that the single case can be representational. It is simply impossible to know.
design seemed to far outweigh the disadvantages, given the objectives of the research.  

In the next sections of this chapter some of the methodological and ethical problems encountered in carrying out this research as well as the efforts taken to overcome these problems are addressed.

Kelman and Hovland have identified what they call a "sleeper effect." In other words an action may have delayed consequences or it may produce overt compliance while bringing about other latent changes so that an individual will respond to influence attempts in the future in a different manner (Cartwright, 1965, p. 26). Since none of the attempts to institute organizational change had reached any degree of closure in the year spent at the University of Cincinnati, it is possible that any assessment of change that was made might not include "sleeper effects."

3 The relative advantages and disadvantages of the field research method are summarized in this quote by Kelman and Warwick, "Procedures of field research lack control over independent variables provided by experimental procedures and the control over the representativeness of respondents provided by the sample survey. However, within limits set by his status as an outsider and as an acknowledged social scientist, [the field worker can] participate in the on-going activities of the community and observe the processes of change and resistance to change at first hand. Participant-observation studies generally do not permit us to establish causal relationships and to isolate the variables responsible for change, nor do they provide a systematic basis for specifying the population to which findings can be generalized. On the other hand they provide an unusually good opportunity to obtain rich, varied, and detailed data on the processes of change at the time and place at which these are unfolding. A participant-observer can observe how individuals and institutions react when changes are introduced and what kinds of personal and organizational processes are set in motion by such changes" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 17).
In addition to this problem and to those described in preceding sections, there are several other methodological problems with field research which may be relevant for the findings of this study. Webb, et. al., describe three methodological problems in field observation which result from 1) errors that may be traced to those being studied; 2) errors that come from the researcher; and 3) errors associated with sampling imperfections (Webb, et. al., 1966, p. 12).

The errors that result from those being studied include: 1) Those being observed may be aware of being tested and thus respond differently; 2) respondents may select a stance or an image they would like to project (role selection); 3) responses may be biased by rather natural inclinations to respond in certain ways (response sets); 4) measurement itself, or observation, may introduce the change, or the awareness of change, the observer is seeking to measure; and 5) the observer may inadvertently give cues as to appropriate responses through, for example, the way questions are phrased or by giving signals that a response is being evaluated either positively or negatively. (Many of these problems are also associated with experimental-design research and are discussed in detail by Webb, et. al., 1966, in their book on Unobtrusive Measures.)

A number of strategies were taken to overcome the problems of response sets, role selection, and the awareness of being studied. One strategy was to compare interview answers with actions observed in meetings and with correspondence sent to and from the president's office. In addition, the president would ask those people with whom he was meeting
if they had any objections to the meeting being observed. The procedure of asking for access to meetings or for copies of documents gradually became taken for granted as did the observer's behavior of jotting down notes during a meeting.

In carrying out this research the author was especially aware of "errors that result from the researcher" and of how she might be being selective in what she chose to observe, in the questions she chose to ask, and in the information she sought to confirm the hypotheses she held. Especially when accounts of the same event did not agree there was a responsibility to try to understand the logic of each perspective without taking sides.

A second type of error resulting from the researcher has to do with the emotional involvement of the observer in the setting he/she is studying and with larger questions of subjectivity versus objectivity. For example, it was very difficult to remain a non-participant in the setting. "The researcher's value system or his strong attachment to people may lead him to do or say things that change the data. The resulting disadvantage of this caring relationship is that the researcher may lose an outsider's perspective on what he sees. The loss of the outsider's perspective means, in essence, that the observer is susceptible to whatever subtle influences, moods, or assumptions pervade the system."

---


(Zigarmi, Drea, 1974). In addition, the ambiguity of the field-worker's role makes him/her vulnerable to all sorts of suspicion, fear, and distrust that are projected by participants in the setting (transference).

Despite the amount of time and intense involvement, the field worker experiences the sense of being marginal to the setting and the loneliness, anxiety, and the fear, at one time or another, of not being accepted by persons in the setting that Lofland describes in *Analyzing Social Settings* (1971, p. 97). Often seeking acceptance and desiring to prove oneself as trustworthy, it becomes easy to want to reciprocate or to volunteer to aid one group or another. The imbalance in the observer's relationships to participants becomes frustrating to the point of wanting to abandon the observer's role. The times in which these feelings peaked caused the author to redefine her approach to participants in the setting and to the methodological and ethical problems encountered in the research effort.

However,

If the researcher can sensitively draw back and try to understand his own feelings and thoughts he may have a valuable phenomenological insight into the experiences of other members of the system and into the forces working in that system. Naturally this sort of data requires careful checks through observation of others' behavior and through interviewing members about their own reactions but it remains true that as an [observer] the researcher can often use his own emotions and reactions as a clue in understanding phenomena in the system he is studying (Karpel, 1973, p. 23).

Throughout the field study the author tried to become more aware of subjective and affective responses to participants in the setting and to events that were being observed

---

that may have resulted in selective distortion.

In this research errors in sampling included meetings that were not observed, interviews not held, and documents not read that resulted in an incomplete analysis of the problems encountered and of the role performance of the university president in the implementation of organizational change. There were several meetings, phone calls, and documents that were not possible to retrieve because the university president could not be "shadowed" twenty-four hours a day. For the period studied, this was not possible because of the constraints on the president as well as on the researcher. In addition because of the researcher's relationships with different members of groups within the university, there was differential access to their meetings and their opinions. Also distortion in sampling could come because of a natural inclination to accept what respondents said at face value.

The policy of using more than one research technique such as observation, interviews, and document analysis was used to reduce the chances of not recording all of the president's actions.

**Ethical Considerations**

A strong realization a field worker comes to is that research is, in itself, an intervention into the life of the organization. At a very practical level, measurement may be socially descriptive (see Webb, et. al., 1966; Lofland, 1971, p. 61). This realization led the author to
to consider several ethical problems associated with this research study: 7

1) The issue of confidentiality and the need to protect persons' careers and investments in the setting.

2) The issue of selecting what to study, what to ignore, and how to investigate it.

3) The issue of selecting what to include in writing the dissertation.

4) The issue of how the conclusions would be used in a value-free way.

Since the strategies the author used to cope with ethical questions, assumptions, and value preferences overlapped, these strategies will be described once the author's personal values and assumptions about the setting and leadership within the setting have been acknowledged in the section that follows.

Values and Assumptions

Argyris has said that a researcher always has a hypotheses even if the study is only exploratory (Argyris, 1970, p. 100). The intent of this section is to set out the author's hypotheses (personal values and assumptions) about the nature of the phenomena under observation that might bias the choice of material to be presented and perception of the major issues involved in the change efforts. First what are the assumptions that the author started with?

7In many ways the next two sections extend the discussion of "errors resulting from the researcher" in this section.
1) First, the author assumed that the setting was probably more participative than authoritative in its decision-making, at least that the choice of Warren Bennis as President was indicative of a level of aspiration for participative decision-making. Further, this assumption was underscored by another assumption: that a field research study of the leader's behavior would not have been allowed, lots less supported, in an authoritative system.

2) The entire study is based on the assumption that the university president can and does affect the process of change in the university.

3) To some extent it was assumed that knowledge of the theories of organizational change on the part of the organizational leader would be synonymous with the ability to implement change.

Although attempts have been made to control the amount of subjectivity with which events were recorded and analyzed (see the sections on errors resulting from the researcher and on errors resulting from sampling above), at times the reader may feel that the author's values are biasing both the analysis and hence the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. In that case it is better to acknowledge value preferences on the part of the researcher from the outset. In the first place, it was felt that the process of change, not the change idea itself, was most important to study (see justification in the preceding sections). Secondly, as a model for the organizational leader's actions during the process of change evolved,
the author's thinking was probably influenced by a predilection for a participative model of change.

To the extent that these assumptions and values remain unquestioned during this study, they became limitations to the conclusions it may be possible to make as a result of the study. However several steps were taken (in addition to those described in the section on Problems with Qualitative Research) to counteract these biases and to resolve the ethical questions raised in the preceding section.

**Steps Taken in Response to Ethical Considerations, Assumptions, and Value Questions**

1) The purposes of the research were explained to participants in the setting prior to requesting to observe interactions they were engaged in (see Argyris, 1970, p. 97).

2) As a researcher the author tried to engage feelings of competence, self-acceptance, and essentiality on the part of the participants (Ibid.).

3) With the exception of the president, the identity of respondents has been protected by omitting names.

4) As much as possible events were described from all perspectives so that actions taken seem plausible, however effective or ineffective. In the course of the research the researcher tried to validate personal perceptions of events by asking questions of participants.
5) A discussion of other factors that may affect the successful or unsuccessful implementation of organizational change besides the organizational leader's behavior will be included in the section on Assessment of Setting, Chapter IV.

6) Some of the questions the author has come to have about initial assumptions values is included in the analyses of the cases and in the conclusions in Chapter IX.

The technique used in data collection and analysis are described in the next section of this chapter.

Data Collection and Analysis

Within the field research framework it is possible to use a variety of methods to gather data. In this research, these included non-participant observation; interviewing; and the use of unobtrusive measures\(^8\) including the study of documents and historical data. Written records included publications, minutes of various meetings, memoranda, policy statements, press releases, correspondence from the university president's files, and published articles and interviews. A journal was used to record descriptions of events, notes from interviews, and general impressions.

A case study format was used to analyze the data that had been collected. Each case includes a chronological summary of events and an

\(^8\)Unobtrusive measures are defined as measures that do not require the cooperation of the respondent and that do not themselves contaminate the response. Such measures would include, for example, an analyses of correspondence and calendars as to the range and frequency of contacts within the system or study of the university's history through archival records.
analysis of the role performance of the organizational leader in initiating, implementing, and incorporating change. In each case an attempt is made to relate the specific actions of the university president to a model of the organizational leader's role performance proposed in Chapter II.

The Problems of Generalizing from a Single Case

Although Watkins (1953, p. 727) contends that the character of social systems can only be explained by studying an individual's behavior and by depicting interrelationships of individuals, some attention needs to be given in this chapter to the problems of generalizing from the study of a single individual to individuals in other social setting. Overall, generalizing in the social sciences is a much less definitive process than in most of the physical sciences where variables can be controlled and experimental conditions replicated. "Generalizations in case studies, if they are good, will sharpen readers' abilities to observe and evaluate tendencies and consequences and to make informal judgements; they will not arrive at a set of uniform judgements or specific, fixed remedies for specific administrative ailments" (Stern, 1952, p. 21). Conclusions in this research will only serve to point out issues where an effort to generalize might be fruitful and where further quantitative research might be undertaken.
Prospectus

The purpose of the next chapter is to assess conditions that existed in the university just prior to the initiation of four attempts at organizational change. Since conditions in the external environment may also influence the extent to which change is successfully initiated and implemented, some of the conditions that existed outside the organization will be reviewed as part of the assessment of setting. In subsequent chapters a university president's interventions in regards to developing a university long-range plan, instituting an affirmative action program, implementing a budget-review/resource allocation process and building an administrative team. His interventions will then be analyzed by assessing the extent to which they helped to create conditions specified in the propositions above in each stage of the change process.
CHAPTER IV
ASSESSMENT OF SETTING

Introduction

If leadership is a function of the leader's personality and expectations, follower's expectations and personalities, the task, and the situation, (Fieldler, 1964; Hersey and Blanchard, 1972) then it is important to look at the process of change in light of each of these variables. Follower's expectations, and to a certain extent their personalities, result from a complex interplay between conditioning (or the way things have been done in the past) and the exigencies of present circumstances. The term "situation" is used to describe the general organizational setting and climate. The purpose of this chapter is to look at these two determinants of leadership, members' expectations and setting as the context for the university president's leadership in initiating, implementing, and incorporating organizational change.

Specifically, one purpose of this chapter is to look at some of the social and structural characteristics of academic organizations that make them highly resistant to change. Since environmental factors can have a tremendous influence on members' expectations about change, both external and internal environmental conditions will be studied. Externally, the general social and economic conditions all public universities faced in 1973 will be described. Internally, the ways in which the University of Cincinnati in particular has expanded and changed in the last few years within the context of how academic reform has generally been accomplished in the past will be explored.
A second purpose of this chapter will look at a "change in leadership" as an event which effects followers' expectations and organizational climate. Because the University of Cincinnati had recently selected a new President (Warren Bennis), the contention is made that there was greater disequilibrium in the system than usual while new relationships and new "meanings" for the role of president were being established.

The purpose of the third section of this chapter will be to describe the traditions that were being broken and the precedents that were being established during Bennis' first months in office that contributed to an organizational setting and climate ripe for change.

Change Resistant Characteristics of Universities

Miles has written that properties of educational systems have an effect on innovative attempts (Miles, 1967, p. 1).¹ Certainly, 1) characteristic ways of doing things and 2) the training and socialization faculty members receive contribute to resistance to change in the university. A third source of resistance in recent years in the university has come from administrators' and faculty members' reactions to the student movement. Let us look first at some of the social and structural characteristics of universities that make them resistant to change.

The Social and Structural Characteristics of Universities

One general set of restraining forces was described by J. B. Lon Hefferlin. These are:

A. As an Institution/Organization

1) Organizations are inherently passive—they exist for routinization of behavior.

2) Voluntary organizations attract members who agree with their activities.

3) Organizations tend toward institutionalization and ritualism.

4) The maintenance of institutional effectiveness such as achievement (in this case, student learning) is only one problem that organizations must face in order to survive. Other problems often take precedence over it.

B. As An Academic Organization

1) The purposes of the university and its sources of support are generally conservative.

2) The educational system is vertically fragmented.

3) Within higher education, institutional reputation is based not on innovation, but more on conformance to an "ideal" model, often to the Ivy League college.

4) Faculty members have observed their vocation for years as students before joining it (see section in this chapter on the Training and Socialization of Faculty Members).

5) The ideology of the academic profession treats professors as independent professionals.

6) Academics are skeptical about the idea of efficiency in academic life.

7) Academic institutions are deliberately structured to resist precipitant change (Hefferlin, 1971, pp. 13-15).
Blau, in a paper, The University as a Distinctive Organization, described three other characteristics of universities as organizations that would seem to imply resistance to change.

1) The usual relationship between line and staff is reversed. Because of the highly professionalized nature of the university, administrators perform auxiliary functions although they hold line authority;

2) there are two competing purposes for the university: teaching and research, such that the optimal environment for one is not the same as the optimal environment for the other; and

3) students are both members of the university community and its clients (Blau, 1966, p. 90).

The effect of these characteristics is to increase ambiguity both as to who has the authority to decide what to change and as to whose interests are to be served by the proposed change.

Corson identifies two additional obstacles to change in universities: 1) the independence of individual faculty members and 2) the insularity of academic departments (Corson, 1966, p. 7). In the first case, the individual faculty member is accorded a great deal of independence as to what he will teach. His interest tends to be in his subject matter or field and not in the total curriculum of which his courses are a part. His future is more than likely in his discipline, not in the institution; and his status and prestige in most cases comes from sources outside the university. "The faculty's role in the process of change has been more to accept or reject or to comment than to devise and propose" (Kerr, 1963, p. 100).
Finally a serious constraint on the implementation of new programs in the university which is often ignored in the literature on organizational change is the discontinuity caused by the academic calendar. Change is begun only to have participation and momentum interrupted by vacations of two to four weeks at Christmas, a spring break, and a three-month summer vacation (Hefferlin, 1971, pp. 13-15).

At the same time the university is highly differentiated into departments, colleges, institutes, and divisions, etc. whose autonomy is buttressed by traditions of academic freedom and specialization. There is little sense of community or unity due to what Robert Oppenheimer calls "a thinning of common knowledge" (Kerr, 1963, p. 101).

The Training and Socialization of Faculty Members

The training and socialization of faculty members also contribute to resistance to change in the university. Academic disciplines represent long traditions of custom and precedent. A faculty member is taught to examine every issue from every angle. His resistance to change comes from his training to always seek the truth and to think for himself, so that, although we think of the university as a collegium, most faculty members are unused to collaboration, to working in groups, or to collective decision-making. Even within one department or discipline widespread acceptance of change is very often impossible because of the kinds of expectations for independence faculty members hold.
The Influence of the Student Protest Movement

These two sources of resistance to change: organizational properties of universities and faculty members' expectations due to their training are joined by a third, more general kind of resistance to change which came about in universities in the late sixties with the onslaught of student protests. In general faculty members felt threatened by student activism. Their security was challenged when knowledge for its own sake becomes unimportant. They perceived their traditional right to make curriculum decisions eroded by student and often community-group participation in decision-making and demands for relevance in the curriculum. Hence their resistance to change imposed from any source grew.

The Effect of these Factors on the University of Cincinnati

The effect of many of these factors has been to make universities in-grown, conservative, and resistant to change. A profile of the University of Cincinnati in 1972-73 reveals that it is no exception. The University is 43.2% tenured; most of those who have tenure received it when they were young and have had it for a number of years. Almost nineteen percent (18.99%) of the faculty received their terminal degree at Cincinnati. There are ninety-six departments in nineteen colleges at Cincinnati, signaling a high degree of specialization. There are over sixty-three faculty and administrative committees which contribute to the slow adaptation of change in that they are charged with reviewing and approving almost all actions taken in
the University. Only with regard to the third factor, the impact of the student protest movement, is Cincinnati an exception. Because a majority of students at the University of Cincinnati commute, students were never as organized or active at Cincinnati as they were in other universities in the sixties, nor did the student movement have the same direct impact in Cincinnati that it had on other campuses.

Initial resistance to change, whatever its source, is one factor to consider in trying to effect organizational change. Conditions in the social and economic environment constitute another.

**External Environmental Conditions**

Many of the changes in higher education in 1972 were externally initiated, many in part stemming from Nixon's domestic policies and a redefinition of the federal government's role in post-secondary education. The shape of Nixon's intended domestic program before the recent energy crisis was clearly discernable, namely to control inflation and to make government more efficient by trimming down its size and expenditures. This would be done by decentralizing government to regional, state, and local levels through a program of federal revenue sharing; by consolidating governmental agencies and programs; and by developing more effective cost-benefit criteria for federal programs and an increased sense of accountability at the local level.

The implications of this program for higher education have been:

1) Reduced support for basic research, direct health services, and training programs in areas where there is a surplus of
trained manpower.

2) Reduced support for construction as enrollment levels off.

3) Reduced support to programs in HEW which have been poorly managed and unresponsive to national priorities.

4) Increased coordination, consolidation, and control of federal funds for education at all levels of government.

5) A redirection of federal funds to programs seeking to apply existing scientific and technological knowledge to urban and environmental problems.

6) Increased support to programs that attempt to deliver educational services to new and more diversified constituencies.

Furthermore research funds are no longer available to the extent they were for graduate programs in science, engineering, and education. Departmental autonomy is threatened by pressures to do interdisciplinary, problem-oriented research. Additional pressure is being felt to implement affirmative action policies for women and minorities.

In general the redefinition of the federal government's role in higher education in combination with other environmental factors (such as a decline in enrollment) has created a climate of tension and insecurity in universities.

The Effect of these Factors on the University of Cincinnati

This pattern of federal support for higher education has led to greater inter-institutional cooperation between universities and businesses and between public and private educational institutions in the last year.
For example, the University of Cincinnati became part of a University-Police consortium and agreed to share facilities and resources with a neighboring private college. A reduced level of federal support has led universities to band together to lobby more vociferously for the allocation of resources at the state level. In addition, universities including the University of Cincinnati have begun to recruit more women and part-time students through adult and continuing education programs to offset the current drop in enrollment and tuition revenues.

All of the factors described in this section have caused members of the university and the community to disagree about what the university should do and what the role of its president should be. Should he seek changes internally in conforming to external demands or should he seek new resources for the institution so that it can maintain its identity and traditions in spite of social pressures? It might be instructive at this point to look at how change in higher education has been accomplished in the past and specifically at how change has occurred at the University of Cincinnati during the sixties in order to set a context for the change processes that will be described in this research.

The Nature of the Academic Reform in Universities

For the most part, the process of academic reform in universities has occurred in response to external pressures or because new resources or members have been added (Hefferlin, 1971, p. 18 and p. 44). In that sense "the academic community is more changed than changing" (Kerr, 1963, p. 102).
Since World War II the federal government and large foundations have been the sources of additional resources for universities. The impact of these grants on higher education has been significant and is well documented (Baldridge, 1971, p. 133; Kerr, 1963, p. 53; Hefferlin, 1971, pp. 37-38).

One of the most common mechanisms to effect academic change has been through the turnover of personnel: the selection, replacement, retirement of members [faculty members and administrators] and the recruitment of catalysts of change (Hefferlin, 1971, pp. 44-46). New members of an institution who come from other institutions or from outside the educational system will naturally alter the organization simply because they disrupt traditions by being unaware of them and because they bring new ideas with them.

Academic reform has also been accomplished when fluctuations in student enrollments have caused new institutions to be created and existing institutions to be radically transformed. New academic programs have been added as the student population has grown and as new sources of external support (tuition, subsidies, grants, etc.) have been found. The purpose of the next section is to show how the University of Cincinnati grew in all these ways during the sixties.

The University of Cincinnati in the Sixties

During the sixties the University of Cincinnati grew in both size and complexity. Physical expansion continued: new buildings were completed on the main campus and four two-year community colleges were opened as part of the University. Seven of the new buildings were residence halls which
signaled a change in the size and complexion of the University's student population. The size of the faculty also grew. In 1960 the University faculty number 1,375; was predominantly male (there were 200 women of whom 9 had reached the rank of professor) and white (there are no records of minority members). By 1969 there were 2,698 faculty members although the faculty remained predominantly white and male (there were 436 women and 16 minority faculty members). The picture of the faculty, which emerges from interviews is one of a majority reasonably competent, but disinterested in innovation or advancing their own careers outside the University, a few generally incompetent; a very few, ambitious and using the University of Cincinnati as a stepping stone to more prestigious universities. The faculty seemed to hold a generally low opinion of itself and the University with the exception of a few departments and colleges.\(^2\)

Undergraduate enrollment climbed to a total of 21,384 (FTE) full-time equivalent students in 1970. Graduate enrollment also increased as twenty-one graduate level programs were added during the sixties. In 1960 85.6% of the University of Cincinnati's students were residents of Ohio; in 1970 that percentage was hardly changed - 86.3%.

In 1960 the University received approximately three million dollars in outside funding, grants and contracts (unrestricted and restricted funds). By 1970 the University had become state affiliated and outside

\(^2\)March and Simon have contended that as satisfaction with the present increases, the search for alternatives decreases, hence program continuity is facilitated (March & Simon, 1969, p. 328).
funding had reached $4,000,000.00.

In sum, the University of Cincinnati followed the pattern of rapid growth and expansion during the 60's that Kerr identifies as Climacteric II (see Bennis, 1972a). Change was generally accomplished unsystematically by "adding to." By 1971, however, just prior to the selection of a new president environmental conditions both inside and outside the University began to change.

Universities began competing for fewer and fewer resources. Some faculty members and students at the University were tired of a patriarchal administration and sought a new president committed to goals of change and relevance. Board members sought a man who could consolidate all the changes that were a result of the University's expansion in the sixties. In the next section events surrounding the selection of a new president will be described.

A Change in Leadership

The Selection of a New President

The search for and selection of a new president represents a phase or cycle in the life of an organizational setting. Events between the announcement that one president is leaving and the inauguration of a new person in that position predictably leave the organization in a state of disequilibrium. Succession unfreezes the organization to the extent that it disturbs traditional norms and promotes changes in informal and formal relationships among members. Change continues to take place as the new president is socialized into the organization and as he begins
to establish new interests, parameters, and "meanings" for his role as president. After a period of time the setting becomes refrozen.

Walter Langsam became President of the University of Cincinnati in 1955. In the spring of 1970 he announced his intention to resign eighteen months later in September of 1971. A search committee of faculty, students, and board members was chosen that spring. It met infrequently, but by June 1970 had drafted a profile of the man it would seek to be the president of the University in the nineteen seventies. The search committee acknowledged in the introductory paragraphs of that profile that the educational programs of the University would inevitably change in the seventies. The committee documented the problems that a new president would face in mediating student demands, in integrating two-year programs into the University, and in meeting the needs of the surrounding community. These problems they concluded suggested that the new president should have creativity and flexibility and that a person "whose mind is closed to change and who believes that the enduring values in higher education have already been established" would be unlikely to meet the challenges of the seventies (Profile of the President of the University of Cincinnati in the Seventies, June 1, 1970, p. 6).

Three pages out of the twelve-page statement dealt with the causes and concerns of recent student protests and campus disorders. "In the seventies it is anticipated that even greater participation by students in the governance of the University will be sought. It is important to
recognize that students who desire this are not unrealistic or destructive. . . It is important that as promptly as possible, the appropriate areas for participation of students be determined. . ." (p. 7). Little did the search committee know in mirroring campus sentiment at that point that students would be as significantly involved as they were in the search committee's own decision about who was to be the new president.

The search committee broke into subgroups to screen candidates. Because it was difficult to find applicants, they interviewed only a few persons. By late fall three contenders had emerged as the strongest candidates. One was an insider, the provost. The other two were outsiders, both of them easterners. "It was becoming clearer that board and administration members of the search committee had one concept of what kind of university president they wanted and that student and faculty members on the committee had another" (a member of the search committee). The candidates were brought back for rounds of interviews in the spring of 1971. Because reservations were expressed about each of the three candidates from one or more quarters, it looked as though the University Board of Directors would dismiss the search committee, appoint an acting president, and establish another search committee to look for new candidates. Late in May one committee member leaked the names of the three candidates to the newspapers in an attempt to get one of the candidates to pull out and to discredit the search. The search committee would then be disbanded and

3 Quotations throughout the text will be identified by position and not by name. A list of the persons interviewed and their positions during the academic year of 1972-73 is included in the bibliography.
an acting president appointed. At the same time some of the committee members were lobbying with board members trying to convince them not to appoint an acting president on the grounds "that the climate on campus was polarized, things were at a standstill, and that the campus couldn't take more than eighteen months of a lame duck administration" (a member of the search committee). Just before school ended in June, 1971, a student petition was organized and submitted to the University Board of Directors with 5,000 signatures urging the Board to support the work of the search committee and not to choose an acting president. The petition was crucial in causing the Board to reach a decision. "The Board felt it needed to listen to students in the late 60's, early 70's, and that it could not afford to devalue faculty input in the selection process and risk a potential alliance of students and faculty members" (a member of the search committee). The inside candidate was out because of all the politics that had ensued over the eighteen month search; one of the outsiders was clearly seen as too liberal and radical for the campus. That left Warren Bennis. He had only come to Cincinnati twice during the search process and was not very well known. To a certain extent, people were leary of his outspokenness at Buffalo and critical of his expose on the Northwestern Presidential search. But his reputation and work in organizational development nationwide and in Cincinnati made him acceptable (a member of the search committee). Two days after the student petition had been submitted, the Board, with minimal consultation with the search committee, announced that Bennis had accepted their offer of the presidency.
Langsøm announced his resignation a year and a half before he would leave, so for eighteen months the campus waited. The search became the symbol of new expectations and a new role for students and faculty members in decision-making. Ultimately what became even more important than participation in decision-making was that a new president was chosen. The climax then for many people in this phase was the Board's choice of Bennis in lieu of appointing an acting president. Bennis didn't need to say a thing when he came on campus a few days later. The peak of his acceptance was before he came (a member of the search committee).

The three months in the summertime before Bennis assumed office and the first weeks in the fall were a period of transition. The high expectations a majority of community members held for Bennis' performance as president created a certain disequilibrium in the system. The student petition and search had created a new awareness of the presidency. Bennis' personal style fed the excitement. The purpose of the next section of this chapter is to look at what occurred between the time of Bennis' appointment in June and his formal inauguration in November. How did Warren Bennis differ from Walter Langsøm and how did events in this transition period serve to exacerbate or ameliorate those differences?

The Transition

Several of the persons that were interviewed felt that there were early signs that the transition would be difficult. Walter Langsøm did not invite Bennis to commencement in June even though Bennis had already been selected as the new president and the occasion would have been a good opportunity for him to meet people. Langsøm did not make office space available nor did he share any information with Bennis prior to September 1st. On his part, "Bennis didn't capitalize on informers he could have
had. He didn't answer letters, didn't do his homework, or learn the
details of the institutional terrain" (a member of Bennis' staff).

Newspaper accounts of interviews with Bennis left the impression that
he thought a lot needed to be done in the University "to make it a
better place" (a vice-president).^4

Bennis did not build on his grassroot, on his
natural constituencies and on the natural leader-
ship in the faculty and student body. He de-
valued some proposals for change ("we tried it
and it didn't work at Buffalo") and ignored
other ideas. A report on undergraduate teaching
was on his desk when he came and he's never read
it. Bennis' attitude was that no change had
occurred before he came, when actually there
had been some significant changes in the lastﬁve years. Bennis did not have to lose those
people who were his natural allies, but in the
long run he did (a member of Bennis' staff).

The Bennises moved to Cincinnati in July, two months before
Dr. Bennis was to assume ofce. During this time he met with as many
administrators, students, faculty members, and community leaders as
possible.

4Excerpt from a letter from a dean to the President: "It is a mistake
to say that this University has never planned...your comment is perceived
by some of my faculty as abrasive and distorting" (6/20/72).

Excerpt from a letter from a vice provost to the President: "The
most disturbing aspect of the first months of your administration was your
failure to realize that many of the "innovative" things you were proposing
for the University had been initiated several years before your presidency,
especially in community services and public affairs. Those of us who had
been here during the days of Walter Langsam know of the tremendous progress
made in these two areas during his presidency. I doubt that anyone in
organizational management can argue convincingly that neglect to recognize
the work of predecessors and subordinates creates and develops a lack of
motivation in the subordinates" (7/10/72).
He made concessions to everyone; he never recognized that there were people who would run him out if they could, who were resistant to him,

differences in their backgrounds: Langsam is European-born, an aristocrat, Prussian, authoritarian; Bennis grew up in Los Angeles, lived on the east coast most of his life, is Jewish, and liberal. Bennis' preferred leadership style is more democratic than Langsam's; he works best when he can involve others in decision-making, with temporary systems, and with small
groups. He has swelled his personal staff by using assistants. Langsam preferred formal settings where status and lines of authority were clearly delineated and where he could make decisions after they had come up the line, at the top, authoritatively and often paternalistically. He related especially well to the wealthy business community in Cincinnati. Langsam himself felt he and Bennis contrasted sharply on the way they spent their time (Langsam felt he met with faculty more, while Bennis was gone from campus more) and on their ownership in ideas (Bennis having greater personal investment in authorship and ownership). Even the way the two men arranged their offices reflected their differences: Langsam's desk at the far end of the room faced the door; Bennis' desk is at your back when you enter his office and in front of you is a seating arrangement of over-stuffed chairs and couches which invite informality and small group discussions.

As a result of these differences in style and personality, people perceived differences in the ways they could relate to and influence the two men. The relationships Bennis formed initially at the University of Cincinnati were important in setting expectations especially in that they were so different from those of the previous president in emphasis and in tone. In the minds of faculty members the selection of Bennis as president meant that the power of certain groups would be strengthened at the expense of others (whether it would in actuality remained to be seen). Early indications were, for example, that students would have greater access to and a voice in decision-making.
Through his initial contacts with individuals and groups, Bennis began to share his values and conceptual frameworks and to establish "meanings" for phenomena in the setting in which he found himself. More often than not Bennis purposefully chose to change traditions as he encountered them. Deliberately he sought to create symbols or images of the beginning of a new era. In Lewinian terms he sought to replace the standards community members had perceived as having social value with his vision of what the university might be. In talks during his first months in Cincinnati, and especially in his inauguration speech, Bennis concentrated on future possibilities, not on present realities and problems. In sum, he confronted the sedentary tradition-bound quality of the University of Cincinnati and offered a vision of what might be. The purpose of the next section of this chapter is to look more closely at 1) some of the actions Bennis took initially that modelled the attitudes and behaviors he hoped others would adopt and 2) the implications of his behavior for changing the climate of the organization and members' expectations about change.

**Bennis' Style**

There are five predominant themes to the "meanings" Bennis tried to establish during his first months as president of the University of Cincinnati: visibility, informality, immediacy, openness, and change.

**Immediacy**: A sense of immediacy is descriptive of a tone that emerged during the search and selection process. Instead of trying to stabilize the organization, Bennis' tack was to try to fire members'
expectations by describing the changes he hoped to bring about and by sharing his sense of impending and significant change in the environment of higher education.

Visibility: The search process, and especially the student petition, created widespread awareness of the role of the president. The office became more visible as Bennis added personal assistants and began recruiting new people. The University itself became more visible nationally because of Bennis' own professional reputation. Bennis' style also contributes to visibility. He is oriented toward image-making through the use of graphics and the visual media. Very early in his first year, he convinced a local television station to develop a new program, The Bennis Show. One administrator commented that "the faculty had seen him so much on TV and newspapers that they didn't even bother to come to the first faculty meeting to hear what he had to say." His very visually stimulating inauguration is another example of his interest in visibility. Bennis' vision of the "best-managed urban university" and frequent comparisons of Cincinnati to Harvard and MIT suggests that national as well as community visibility are important aspects of the directions in which he wants the University to move.

Informality: A third standard Bennis tried to model was informality. "His initial relationships to faculty were not respectful of protocol nor of the city's German-Jewish heritage or of those cultures' respect for formality and intellectuality" (a top administrator). He often did not use the title of "Doctor" and preferred to be called by his first name
and to call others by their first names. "During his first year it was easier for a student to see Bennis at his house than for a faculty member to get an office appointment" (a top administrator). Furthermore, "his relationships with the community have been characterized by unpreparedness and a sort of rambling informality" (a top administrator).

Openness: There are lots of examples available to substantiate Bennis' valuing of openness. In the first place, he sought very clearly to make the University more open to resources and responsive to problems in its environment. The University entered into inter-institutional consortia; and colleges were asked to designate "visiting committees" of outsiders. Secondly, Bennis stimulated experimentation and risk taking. "Bennis gives you the feeling things can be tried" (an English Department faculty member). He instituted "open hours" - when faculty members and students could see the President without an appointment to discuss what was on their minds. Fourthly, Bennis tried to establish a spirit of collaboration and consultation in decision-making, in his own words by setting in motion processes like "more consultation, more openness of all data, more open doors and open confidence, and a more serious review of policies by key constituencies on our campus" (Bennis' letter to the Chairman of the Faculty Senate, 4/26/73).

Change: In the final analysis Bennis' values change over participation and will evaluate his presidency on criteria of movement and not stability. For example, in a speech to the University faculty in the spring of 1973, Bennis outlined nine priorities for the University,

seven of them contained direct references to change in the headings. Change was the theme of his first address to the faculty on the occasion of his inauguration, 11/5/71. A vice provost commented in the summer of 1972, "Throughout the institution there is [both] an important sense of motion to replace the stuttering of last year under a lame duck president and a persistent concern for the 'unknown' under a new president and provost" (7/17/72).

The President's Role

Given these aspirations, Bennis was still very aware of the tenuousness of his legitimate authority as a university president (see Kruytbosch and Messinger, 1970, p. 89). His ability to influence people rested on his ability to establish new meanings for his role, new norms (such as those listed above) and a strikingly different socialization process for members of the organization. His ability to implement his ideas depended on his ability to establish an organizational climate in which there was a high level of trust and people felt secure changing. That Bennis very clearly perceived his role as a role model and as a climate builder is revealed in the job description he wrote for himself as president this past spring:

1) Leadership:

a. orchestrating inside and outside
b. providing perspective of where we are, where we're going
c. awareness of relevant external forces, obstacles and opportunities which beat on the university

---

d. key personnel appointments and review of all appointments of professional staff

e. communications

f. raising fundamental questions

It is an act of explicating and calling forth in others a consciousness of issues, principles, ideas, directions, and objectives, and of moving others to action in ways that reflect their increased knowledge and heightened awareness.

2) Relate to external constituencies: alumni, city, state, federal, the educational establishment, parents.

3) Fund raising
4) Overall planning
5) Ceremonials
6) Work closely with our Directors and Regents
7) Help facilitate new academic programs
8) Fiscal responsibility
9) Keep in relatively good touch with all major internal constituencies
10) Keep learning
11) Careful evaluation and assessment of all key administrative personnel.

Modelling

Having set out certain expectations for his own role, Bennis also used his person power very consciously to influence the attitudes and behaviors of those in the organization. "It is important for a leader to understand the effect of his behavior and personality on the conduct of others. Power accrues less from status and role and more from the ability to inspire the participation of others in decision-making. People who come to open hours have low expectations for solutions to their problems; they have high expectations for me as a person" (Bennis,
10/1/72). Likewise, Bennis' informal behavior toward those in the organization and his allowing of similar behavior toward himself was a significant factor in the breakdown of status distinctions early in his term. Bennis also modelled a spirit of inquiry—he referred often to his own year of writing and reflection after leaving Buffalo when he spoke about continuing education for the faculty. His impatience for immediate results manifested itself in a sense of immediacy which was felt in the organization. Several of the persons interviewed said that they felt Bennis tried to do too many things and that those that worked with him had to adjust to his energy level. One faculty member said he always felt like an open cupboard, doors open, shelves bare because of what was being asked of him and what was being taken from him.

Modelling is only one way to create expectations about what is acceptable, appropriate behavior. Bennis also made very effective use of precedents to establish expectations. When he found a useful precedent he used it; when he needed a precedent, he created one.

The Use of Precedents

The stage for Bennis' ability to manipulate precedent was set during the search process. A temporary system, the search committee, had worked together more or less collaboratively to select Bennis as the new president. Bennis expanded the use of temporary systems and participation in decision-making. He capitalized on the visibility of his office as a result of the search process and on a widespread expectation that there would be changes in the administration by adding
assistants to the president's office. The individuals he recruited were young, and their youth in turn became a symbol of his administration.

There are numerous other examples of times Bennis created new traditions as he needed them: his own experience as a consultant led him to call in outside consultants in solving internal problems; he legitimized "administrative retreats" as a means of focusing energy around University problems; he did things to create pride in people such as setting up tours of Cincinnati as part of new faculty orientation and creating awards for creativity in research and teaching. Bennis also eliminated some traditions: namely, the formality in relationships between faculty and administrators; the traditional definition of behavior representative of faculty achievement (he added teaching to research and publication); the traditional power of faculty over certain areas such as self-evaluation; and the insularity of academic departments by encouraging interdisciplinary programs.

**Summary**

Drawing from Warren Bennis' own perceptions and from comments others have made, what kind of climate did Bennis find at the University of Cincinnati and what kind did he initially begin to build? The following quote is taken from a letter a higher education consultant wrote to Bennis in November, 1972:
With all higher education in America in crisis, with universities seeking new directions and new roles, with the entire system insecure, it is not surprising to find insecurity and uncertainty and tension at the University of Cincinnati. There the general malaise compounded by a critical financial condition which having been covered up by a prior administration to yield the appearance of good health by borrowing from reserves and endowment is further complicated by the arrival of a new president whose goals, values, attitudes, and style represent an abrupt break with the previous administration. Add uncertainty about roles, fuzziness in assigning responsibilities, lack of clarity and precision about direction, doubts about whether one is on the major team or off it, and you have complexity, ambiguity, anxiety, and tension. But underlying the problems is a strong sense that the University has a great role in the future if it can carefully select its directions, establish priorities, and systematically move toward their realization. President Bennis is seen as a leader who is capable of giving the University a vision of itself greater than it ever before dreamed possible. But he must be more disciplined and directed in the application of his enormous energies and talents than he has been, he must conserve his energies and devote more attention to the troublesome internal (operation) of his institution.

The organizational climate Bennis found when he arrived at the University of Cincinnati was mixed. There had been some movement during the selection process but the overall climate was one of general complacency and low self-esteem. Bennis in his recommendations to the Board for an administrative reorganization said that he could detect no overall University of Cincinnati climate (February 15, 1973, p. 59). He characterized the problems of organizational climate at the University of Cincinnati as being little collaboration, problem denial, low initiative, minimal risk-taking, excessive caution, fear, etc. (pp. 62-68). Changes in the social and economic environment in higher education though supportive of
change had created even more uncertainty, insecurity, and anxiety. In addition, the forces tending to restrain change in academic organizations in particular described by Hefferlin and others (1971, pp. 13-15), had had a strong conservative influence on the University of Cincinnati that was difficult to undo.

The kind of climate Bennis sought to establish was characterized by informality, immediacy, openness, visibility, and change. He capitalized on a spirit of rising expectations that had been built during the search process (Proposition 10). As a result of the search process members of the University community were sensitized to organizational problems (Proposition 3). The selection of a new president challenged underlying supports for existing behaviors (Proposition 2a). In other words many of the conditions postulated as necessary for unfreezing either existed when Bennis arrived or were accomplished by what he did during his first few months in office. In the behaviors he modelled and in the actions he took, Bennis attempted to stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration in the system (Proposition 4); to make the organization more open to its environment (Proposition 5); to link parts of the system which shared dissatisfactions (Proposition 8); to involve faculty members and students in decision-making (Proposition 11); and to heighten the organization's self-esteem (Proposition 13). In setting new norms of openness and informality, he hoped to establish a climate of acceptance, support, and trust in interpersonal relationships (Proposition 14).

Against this description of the University setting prior to the introduction of change, Bennis' actions in regards to developing a long-range plan, instituting an affirmative action program, implementing a
budget-review/resource allocation process, and building an administra-
tive team will be described in Chapters V-VIII.
CHAPTER V
CASE STUDY:
THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT IN LONG RANGE PLANNING

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze the president's role in the development of a long range plan for the University of Cincinnati. First of all, what were the President's interventions in regards to long range planning? To what extent did the actions he took successfully unfreeze, change, and refreeze the attitudes and behavior of organizational members in regards to long range planning? The first part of this chapter is a summary of the University President's interventions and participation in the long range planning process. A chronological summary of all the events that occurred in a two year period from September of 1971 until the summer of 1973 in regards to long range planning is included in Appendix A.  

1The materials in this chapter and the next came from a study of documents in the files of the Long Range Planning Task Force Coordinator and the University President and from documents in the Long Range Planning Task Force Library. The author attended all the Task Force meetings between September, 1972 and June, 1973, and meetings between the President and Task Force Coordinator and co-chairmen. Notes from those meetings are a second source of information. The author also listened to tape recordings of the Task Force's entire three-day marathon work session. Interviews with all the Task Force members (16), with the two co-chairmen, and with the Long Range Planning Task Force Coordinator as well as with Dr. Bennis, several presidential assistants, and with thirteen deans and university administrators are a fourth source of information.

2The reader may wish to refer to the chronological summary of events in Appendix A before reading the case analysis. References to specific entries are contained throughout the discussion and analysis that follows.
The second part of this chapter contains a description of a meeting between the Long Range Planning Task Force and the President followed by a description of the problems the Long Range Planning Task Force encountered in implementing a long range planning process. The President's change strategies will then be analyzed using the set of propositions set forth in Chapter II. Comments from interviews will be used to substantiate that what might have taken place, many times did not. Finally in the last part of this chapter the author shall attempt to assess the impact long range planning has had on the University and whether or not change, according to criteria the President himself established, has taken place.3

Presidential Interventions and Participation in Long Range Planning

Long range planning was initiated at the University of Cincinnati in January of 1972 with the appointment of a Long Range Planning Task Force. A Preliminary Report on All University Long Range Planning was published in September, 1973, a year later than the deadline that had been established when the Task Force was created. Since the case analysis focuses on the role performance of the President in the development of a University Long Range Plan, the purpose of this next section is to summarize the President's actions in initiating, implementing, and incorporating a long range planning process at the University of Cincinnati and his interaction with the Long Range Planning Task Force.

3The conclusions reached in this chapter are of course only tentative. Partially this is because of the research methodology that has been chosen; partially it is due to the fact that a long range plan was not written until September, 1973, two months after the completion of this field study. Understandably statements about outcomes that were not observed cannot be made. It is the author's assumption however that the degree or extent of refreezing that does take place will depend upon the resolution of problems encountered in unfreezing and changing. (See Appendix B for the Task Force's recommendations on the future of long range planning.)
October, 1971

. . . Bennis’ newsletter to the academic community (10/1/71).
. . . Bennis organizes an administrative retreat at French Lick where the beginnings of a long range planning process are first conceptualized (10/24/71).
. . . Bennis asks the Vice President for Research to develop a rationale for long range planning (10/25/71).
. . . Bennis’ speech to the University faculty sets out that rationale (10/28/71).

December, 1971

. . . Bennis makes several proposals on the University’s future to Chancellor Millett (12/8/71).

January, 1972

. . . Bennis meets with the vice presidents and vice provosts on long range planning. At least two criteria for evaluating what the Task Force accomplishes are set out: 1) a clearer decision-making process and 2) that those who will implement the plans be involved in the planning (1/11/72).
. . . Bennis appoints the two academic vice presidents as co-chairmen of the Long Range Planning Task Force (1/11/72).
. . . Bennis directs the PPBS committee to continue working on a management-information system (1/11/72).
. . . Bennis meets with the deans on long range planning (1/18/72).
. . . In an aide-memoire Bennis clarifies the questions long range planning needs to consider (1/21/72).
. . . Bennis discusses long range planning with the Board of Directors (1/22/72).
. . . Bennis issues a press release on long range planning developing the need and rationale for long range planning and setting out initial guidelines for the role of the Task Force (1/22/72).

April, 1972

. . . Bennis sends copies of a report on program evaluation to the deans and Task Force members (4/25/72).

May, 1972

. . . Bennis meets with the Task Force leaders to discuss the progress of long range planning and the coordination of PPBS with long range planning (5/16/72).
June, 1972

... Bennis suggests outside consultants be used in planning (6/9/72).
... Bennis writes his assistants about the associate deans' complaints he's heard about long range planning (6/19/72).
... Bennis meets twice with the Task Force leaders to discuss his interest and expectation that the Long Range Planning Task Force work on program evaluation (6/24/72; 6/28/72).

July, 1972

... Bennis attends the July marathon (7/19/72).

September, 1972

... Bennis makes a speech on long range planning at Indiana University.

October, 1972

... Bennis sends out reprinted materials to the Task Force.
... Bennis instructs units to relate their long range plans to PPBS (10/17/72).
... Bennis asks the Long Range Planning Task Force to develop priority or goal statements for the University (10/20/72).
... Bennis' speech to the University Senate.
... Bennis meets with the deans; long range planning among other things is discussed (10/27/72).
... Consultant draft on the future of higher education is not shared with the Task Force (10/28/72).
... Bennis asks for a long range planning report for the University faculty meeting (10/31/72).
... Bennis meets with the Long Range Planning Task Force coordinator to review the status of long range planning (10/30/72).

November, 1972

... Bennis brings in an outside consultant on long range planning (11/15/72).

December, 1972

... Bennis writes the coordinator and co-chairmen requesting information on long range planning. He again suggests outside consultants (12/19/72).

January, 1973

... Bennis appoints a new Vice President for Management and Finance.
... Bennis asks for employment projections for the University of Cincinnati graduates which he adds to a resource file on long range planning (1/10/73).
January, 1973 (Cont.)

. . . Bennis consults with an architect/consultant on a long range plan for the College of Design, Art, and Architecture (1/16/73).
. . . Administrative retreat - long range planning is discussed (1/16 - 1/17/73).

February, 1973

. . . Bennis announces an administrative reorganization.

March, 1973

. . . Bennis makes several procedural and substantive recommendations about long range planning in letter to the Provost (2/26/73). He asks for a 3/13/73 publication date.

May, 1973

. . . Bennis announces a set of University priorities in a speech to the University faculty (5/17/73).

June, 1973

. . . Bennis meets with the deans: long range planning is one of several topics discussed (6/18/73).

August, 1973

. . . Bennis organizes an administrative retreat at which long range planning is discussed (8/4/74).\(^4\)

Listing a chronology of events is only one way to describe the interaction that took place between the Task Force and the President. The quality of interaction would seem equally important as the frequency of interaction if one were interested in change. In the next part of

\(^4\)This list includes only those actions that brought the President into contact with the Task Force to whom he had delegated responsibility for long range planning, actions which parallel Task Force efforts (such as bringing in outside consultants or asking the co-chairmen what they would do with a million dollars) and actions which indirectly facilitated the long range planning process (such as administrative appointments, a management-information system, etc.).
this chapter, a meeting between the President and the Task Force as well as the questions that were being asked on both sides, the climate of the meeting and the quality of the interaction for all of the participants will be described.

**The Marathon**

On July 17, 18, and 19, 1972, the Long Range Planning Task Force held a marathon meeting to review unit plans that had been submitted a month to six weeks before. On the last afternoon of the three-day session, the President was asked to attend. It will be apparent in the description that follows that neither the President nor the Task Force had any clear or shared expectations about what would happen during their time together.

The President arrived very late. The Provost began the session by reporting that the Task Force had reviewed all the unit plans over two and a half days and would like to ask the President several questions about how to proceed. For example, "Should the plan when submitted be an in-house, confidential or a public document?" The President was also asked if he expected a final draft by September 1st. Also, at what point would unit heads, Task Force members, and the President review the plan,

---

5The purpose of this chapter, or the others that follow, is not to evaluate Bennis as a president overall. Any action he took and the energy he had to take other actions were dependent on factors not necessarily related to this case such as other decisions he was having to deal with at any one point in time, role constraints, and character.
and in what sequence? The President did not respond to the questions as they were asked but said he preferred to hear all their questions first. His tone of voice indicated he was tired and critical. He had not expected to be asked questions he said later.

The Provost seemed to sense Bennis' frustration and offered to present the Task Force's ideas of how things might precede. "The two processes, writing and review, cannot be completed by September 1. First the marathon session will be reviewed by someone to pull out a number of recommendations that have been discussed. That will then need to be edited and reviewed. Secondly, a feedback process has not yet occurred in all the fifty units that submitted plans. That will need to be done as part of a review process for the September 1st document."

Commentary: At this point, only minutes into the meeting, the President has been led to believe that all units had submitted plans which is not true, A&S being a notable exception. He is also apprised for the first time that a September deadline date cannot be met; and he is faced with a question of what kind of review process a document might go through, probably a question he has not considered, since very little of his time since January has been spent on long range planning.

The Provost then outlined two options: 1) Submit a draft to the President only by September 1st, a draft subject to further review by the Task Force and others in September after the President had reviewed it;  

Commentaries are included throughout the description of this meeting to give clarifying information or to share participants' reactions to an event and to its implications for events that followed.
2) submit a **draft** September 1 *simultaneously* to the President, deans, and unit directors for review. Their comments would be forwarded directly to the President. Then a series of Task Force subgroup meetings could be held with the deans and unit directors to pull together recommendations and revisions.

The President paused, and then said it was hard to answer these questions in a vacuum, a word he emphasized. "I haven't seen a thing - I haven't seen the material and depending on the finality of it and on the way it is perceived, questions of confidentiality are critical."

Commentary: Throughout the spring and early summer planning process materials had been forwarded to the President's office. They can be found in his files. He had not seen the unit plans nor had he heard specific recommendations from the Task Force which seemed more and more clearly to be his expectation for this meeting. He was obviously irritated by being badgered by questions. At the same time, the tone Task Force members began to take revealed that they felt their work was invalued and unrewarded.

Bennis continued "Long range planning is a process; is there ever a **final** plan?" "Is there a mistake in our whole conceptualization - there will never be a final 'solution to the University of Cincinnati's problems'."

"If planning is basically a focusing of consciousness then it's difficult to get people to give time. If the plan is a way of getting at and confronting problems in a unit, if people see a chance to refine it and to see it's worthwhile to spend energy on it because those efforts will redirect their future, it's good. How it is used and implemented will determine the effectiveness of the plan."
Commentary: Bennis may not have understood the questions of form and leadership the Task Force had asked. Anyway, his answers confused a group that had been working for months on a process. To answer that people's involvement in the plan specifically is what is important does not resolve the need to know what kind of form, what kinds of statements and sections were needed, and what the President expected.

The President then raised the question of the role of the Task Force from then on (they saw themselves as having a lot of work to: drafting a plan, reviewing unit plans with deans and unit directors, etc.). He commented that he felt they should be involved somewhere in the University of Cincinnati with their knowledge and expertise accumulated through this Task Force experience.

Commentary: Several Task Force members indicated that they felt Bennis had come to the marathon to thank them for their efforts and to send them on their way.

The President kept assuming by the references and the responses he made that the Task Force had already written a plan. He said, "I've come here to see what you've done. I don't want to get too involved in these questions." Finally the President concedes that the September 1st plan has to be preliminary. "People will have to feel they can make input; we will have to have consultation on it."

Commentary: This statement was interpreted to mean that the timetable had been eased. One of the co-chairmen for example said, "if you say 'preliminary', the pressure I feel to do all the review work before submitting it to you is off - I feel a sense of relief."
There was no comment from Task Force members on Bennis' idea that he might review a unit's plans with the unit as a way to get to know a unit or on his offer to outside consultants to review the plan—the final University plan.

Instead one member pushed the President to state what he wanted in the way of a final plan—a final product. Bennis kept saying he would come back to that. Another Task Force member tried to get the President to decide on how and when deans would see their plans that had been interpreted and modified by the Task Force after one discussion with the unit. Bennis responded carelessly that the Task Force needed to check with them first.

The coordinator then tried to describe what the Task Force had done which was a) to try to identify, integrate, and catalogue issues for the University that needed some kind of goal statement; and b) to try to identify processes by which goal statements and resource allocation could take place. Bennis' anger seems to peak at this point of the meeting and he interrupted. "This meeting is not going the way I expected. I had hoped to have you tell me what you're doing. I don't have the faintest idea what you're doing. You keep asking me questions. I had in mind I'd get a general summary of what you've learned."

In response there were some attempts to describe what the Task Force had been doing; the President understood what they've done as an "auditing." The coordinator spent quite a long time reviewing issues that had been recorded on newsprint during the marathon—material that was probably fairly inconsistent and unorganized. Bennis sat through this saying "Umm,
I see." At the end of the report he commented, "There's not a thing you've come up with that's a surprise. I've heard it all before."

"You lended high reliability to the fact that an issue is an issue."

"I'm bothered by the fact that the Task Force has only questions, and no answers."

Commentary: The Task Force had basically outlined issues that needed consideration at this point. They had not made specific recommendations. The Task Force saw that it had a lot of work to do yet and was asking for guidance from the President. The President understood the marathon to be a closing session, a wrap up to the Task Force's work and was openly disappointed with the lack of specific recommendations.

The President then launched off on a speech. The discussion reached a point where there was almost no dialogue. The President said he would like to ask the Task Force a few questions since they had asked him so many. "One: what are the two most important, pivotal things you've learned about the University? Two: what academic areas have the most redundancy - worst communications? Three: what have you liked about the process you've been up to?"

Commentary: Bennis raised these questions quickly, in succession, not necessarily wanting to hear answers, not necessarily listening to answers when they were given.

When one Task Force member said that he felt there was a danger that every unit would have increased expectations as a result of the planning process, the President answered that "a real test of this administration will be how wisely and judiciously plans are implemented."
The Provost tried to return the conversation to a description of what the Task Force had been doing. He commented that the sub-group review process really had had a profound impact on the units.

The President abruptly cut into this discussion by saying he would like to mention a few things that had been on his mind before coming to the marathon. He spoke from pencilled notes.

The President felt that the introduction to the plan had to answer the questions of "What were the University of Cincinnati's uniquenesses? What were the University's comparative advantages over other universities?" In addition, whatever the Task Force had been doing so far, it had to fit into a "framework of our best-educated guesses on trends in higher education." "This is not a criticism of what you have been doing so far," Bennis said, "but we clearly have to know the choices we're making. The Long Range Planning Task Force report must look at how these factors will effect higher education and how they will influence our decisions."

"Secondly, the report needs to include criteria and indications for program evaluation. Thirdly, the report must answer the question - where do we go from here? What happens from here isn't just a September 1st report." [He seems to be still expecting a document September 1st.] "It is important for the Task Force to continue to keep the process visible and public." Bennis reported that there was a tremendous murkiness, fear, suspicion, and lack of communication between the units and the Task Force.
The President closed by saying he understood the need to meet regularly with the co-chairmen and coordinator and by thanking Task Force members for their time and energy.

Commentary: In sum the Task Force's questions about the form and relationship of the plan were not answered. Instead the President matched their questions with questions of his own. A preliminary plan was still expected September 1 but there was no agreement as a result of this meeting between the President and the Task Force about what it would contain. One Task Force Member commented in an interview afterwards "I thought he was singularly unaware of where we were or exactly how far we had progressed."

Summary of Problems in the Implementation of a Long Range Planning Process

The chronology of events and the description of the marathon reveal a number of problems that occurred in attempts to implement a long range planning process at the University of Cincinnati. Excerpts from interviews with the Task Force co-chairmen and coordinator, with Task Force members, and with the deans will be used to substantiate seven major problems the deans and Task Force encountered in trying to do long range planning. The seven problems included:

1) A lack of clarity about the goals of long range planning;
2) A lack of clarity about the role of the Task Force;
3) A lack of communication between the President and the Task Force;
4) The pressures of other demands and a short timetable;
5) A lack of skill and inexperience in long range planning;
6) A lack of resources; and
7) A lack of motivation on the part of the deans and eventually
Lack of Clarity about the Goals of Long Range Planning

One of the major problems the Task Force encountered in implementing a long range planning process was that there was little agreement about what the goals of long range planning were. Task Force members in response to questions about what their task had been disagreed among themselves.

...To help the units realize that they can cooperate and share without losing individual status and prestige.

...To set up an on-going process and to give feedback to the units on their plans: secondarily to make advisory recommendations to the President.

...To implement a grass-roots planning process.

...To find out what the University was doing, to identify strengths and weaknesses, and to make recommendations to the President on what could be done in problem areas to make the University function better. "Our goal was to provide the University with a sense of where we are going and of problem areas in getting there. The Task Force would offer alternatives as well as stimulate controversy and meaningful discussion."

Another Task Force member replied that after doing research on the University and on general trends in higher education he saw that the Task Force would write a plan and then go through a process of legitimizing it. He had not envisioned going out and asking units for their plans.
Deans and Task Force members were also asked about what the goals of long range planning were. Some felt that the goal was to create a process in which people in the University community could see that they had a role (a Task Force member). Others felt that the Task Force's goal was "to find out what the central problems of the University were and to see how they could go about changing the University" (a Task Force member). One dean felt that a long range planning process might serve as a method of data collection for the President, and at the same time promote campus dialogue on the goals of the University. Another dean felt that the purpose of long range planning was "to develop a shared language system to describe our experiences to outsiders, and more importantly, to ourselves." "From a statement of University goals the Task Force would develop a common understanding of why certain program budget decisions are made" (a dean). Others felt that a long range planning document would serve as a statement of goals for the Ohio Board of Regents (one of the two co-chairmen).

Wide discrepancy in the responses to interview questions indicated that there was never any clarity about the goals of long range planning or the role of the Task Force. Task Force members did not understand what the President's expectations were for long range planning, nor did they understand specific tasks they would need to accomplish in order to implement a long range planning process.

One of the chairmen of the Long Range Planning Task Force commented that "there was never any clear statement to or by the Task Force as to
what the objectives of long range planning were. What questions should a long range plan consider? What items should a long range plan contain? Implicitly the Task Force was to pull together a document, a single document to describe the expected and desired direction of the whole University in the next five to ten years." Task Force members themselves felt that there was no consensus on the Task Force about what the Task Force should be doing. "There was no agreement as to which of two tacks we were taking. Bennis' sense of urgency of getting it done and having a clear sense of direction is much stronger than that of some of the other people involved" (a Task Force member). Other Task Force members commented "we never did define the problem." "There was no way to clarify what Bennis expected" (a Task Force member). "It took us a long time to get going because the leadership did not have clearly in mind the direction in which they would like to go" (a Task Force member).

In addition to the lack of clarity about the goals and tasks of the Task Force, there is also a lack of consistency in the questions the President hoped the Task Force would ask themselves and the units doing the planning. A review of the chronology under the dates 1/21/72, 2/9/72, 3/1/72, 6/28/72, 7/19/72, 10/30/72 and 2/26/73 will substantiate this. Bennis' tendency was to continually expand the number of issues the Task Force had to contend with. The intent of this might have been to make the goals of the Task Force increasingly specific; however the effect his actions had on the Task Force was to confuse and frustrate them as indicated in some of the comments above and in the following remark by one of the co-chairmen, "The only time the President's expectations were clear to me was after the marathon and then it was because he had raised so many
ideas that were beyond the scope of the Task Force."

A third concern both the deans and the Task Force members expressed in relation to the lack of clarity they felt was that they were unsure about how long range planning related to budgeting, to PPBS, and to program evaluation. There were other task forces working in each of these areas but the links between them were not very clearly established (see the chronology of events 3/30/72 and 10/20/72).

Why wasn't this lack of clarity about the goals and tasks of the Task Force recognized until the marathon in July? And then why did it persist throughout the fall and winter? In the first place, the Long Range Planning Task Force did not communicate its lack of clarity about its purposes to President Bennis. Secondly, at least some of the Task Force members had the impression that the President did not know what he wanted, so that efforts to obtain clarification would not help. Besides realizing that Bennis might not be able to clarify their questions, Task Force members also assumed that a certain amount of ambiguity was healthy especially if long range planning was to be a participative process (a faculty member) i.e., that those involved, the deans and the Task Force members, would participate in decision-making.

A fourth reason why the lack of clarity was never resolved has to do with certain assumptions that had been made. Bennis in delegating responsibility for long range planning to two of his vice presidents probably thought that they could work out any problems that arose.

The fact that Bennis was perceived as not being totally committed to the implementation of long range planning (a Task Force member, one of the two co-chairmen) was probably an important factor in the Task Force's
lack of effort to clarify what was expected of them. "Other tasks kept getting in the way; the priority of long range planning fluctuated from high to low relative to other tasks I was asked to perform" (one of the co-chairmen).

**Lack of Clarity about the Role of the Task Force**

A second major obstacle to implementing a long range planning process was the lack of clarity both the deans and Task Force members experienced about the role of the Task Force in long range planning. In the first place there was some resentment from the deans toward the use of a task force, as a "temporary system skirting the permanent decision-making structure" (a dean). "A majority of the deans felt excluded from the planning process" (another dean). Secondly, "The Task Force's unclear role in implementation was a threat to some deans" (a dean). "Knowing how plans would be reviewed and by whom would have helped those writing plans" (a dean).

Furthermore, the deans were led to expect in subgroup review sessions that they would have some feedback from the Task Force by September 1, 1972. Several deans felt that it was impossible to participate in budget review sessions without feedback (see the chronology of events 10/26/72, 2/20/73, and 4/30/73).

From the deans' perspectives there seemed to be a general problem of lack of communication and follow-through in the Task Force's relationship to the units. "The Task Force didn't know and never answered the question as to what would happen to unit plans after subgroup review sessions" (a dean). "Reservations about long range planning were never
elicited at meetings held in the spring and neither the President nor the Task Force answered our questions" (a dean, a top administrator). "Even though our reactions to the preliminary guidelines were solicited, the problems we raised were never resolved" (a top administrator). When the first draft of chapters of the Long Range Plan came out, the Task Force asked for the deans' comments, but they didn't follow through and get them (a dean). These problems were symptomatic of a general reluctance on the part of the Task Force to face certain issues - such as resistance in the College of Arts and Sciences or the consequences of not meeting announced deadlines. "When we knew we would not meet the December 1st deadline we should have had an open meeting with the deans but instead we went underground" (a dean who was also a Task Force member). 7

Why was this problem of the Task Force's relationship to the units never resolved if it interfered with the implementation of long range planning? Many of the reasons are probably similar to those having to do with a lack of clarity about goals. In addition many of the Task Force members probably shared the President's faith in temporary systems as mechanisms of change and were unaware of the threat a task force posed to the deans.

Lack of Communication Between the President and the Task Force

One of the things that is probably most clear from the description of the marathon session between the Task Force and the President and from

---

7The Task Force seemed similarly reluctant to follow up on some of Bennis' suggestions or to confront him on certain matters including how he learned about what the Task Force was doing (see 6/10/72 and 10/25/72 in the chronology).
the chronological summary is the lack of communication between the President and the Task Force about long range planning. The President met with the Task Force only once and with the three Task Force leaders only six times, between December 1971 and December 1972. (Of course Bennis saw the two co-chairmen as frequently as every day or every week in vice presidents' meetings and there were other group meetings at which long range planning among other things was discussed with one or more of the Task Force leaders present.) The two co-chairmen probably would argue that planning was not discussed as much as it might have been with the President for a successful long range planning process to occur. By May 1972, the coordinator had realized that the President did not know what was going on with long range planning (see the chronology of events 4/27/72 and the description of the marathon session).

One Task Force member said that he did not see communication between the President and the Task Force going either way - "we were supposed to be advisory to the President; so far as I can see we haven't given him any advice." "The communication wasn't there - so pressure to meet deadlines wasn't respected or acknowledged" (another Task Force member). "No specific guidelines which would have been clarifying were forthcoming. More interaction with the President all along would have been helpful because we would have known earlier what he expected" (a Task Force member).

In addition to a lack of communication with the President, the Task Force leaders themselves met infrequently. "It didn't work out too badly at first but we didn't anticipate problems" (the coordinator). One of the problems that they didn't work out was "who was to have responsibility and
authority over long range planning among the three of them" (the coordinator). As it turned out the coordinator saw the responsibility for reporting to the President as the co-chairmen's. One of the co-chairmen saw the coordinator as a kind of executive secretary to the Task Force and therefore responsible for a lot of coordination and communication. He also never saw himself as the "real chairman" because "90% of the plan would not relate to his area of knowledge or expertise." At least initially the President probably saw the coordinator as responsible for planning since he addressed most of the long range planning correspondence to him and because the co-chairmen had other major responsibilities.

With greater communication there might have been less inconsistency in the direction the Task Force was moving and greater clarity about goals between the Task Force and the President and among the Task Force leaders themselves. Similarly, on occasions when the President had the opportunity to talk to the University community about long range planning there might have been less inaccuracy in the information that he communicated. Why were changes not made in the patterns of communication between the Long Range Planning Task Force and the President? In the first place there was probably little recognition in the first five or six months of the need for more communication. It is more difficult, given Bennis' writings, to say that he was not aware that open communication was a prerequisite to the successful implementation of a long range planning process, but he might have failed to recognize the extent or importance of the problem. Thirdly, the individuals involved in planning were all busy. They met infrequently, and when they did meet discussion of long range planning was often preempted
by the need to talk about other, more immediate problems. The fact that
the co-chairmen's styles are different from the President's partially
explains why problems of communication were never resolved. "It was not
the Provost's style to confront. He is rational and cautious", a Task
Force member commented. The President has a more open, personalized
leadership style. "Informality is one of the President's charms; at times
however it become debilitating. If you happen to meet him some place then
suddenly you get a lot of individual contact and a lot of data about what
he is planning to do. He asks you what you think about it. But if you
didn't happen to have gone down for a cup of coffee at that time you would
never have been used as a consultant" (a dean).

A fifth reason why the co-chairmen did not give the President feed-
back on long range planning was "because of Bennis' need to know immediate
answers to solve immediate problems. They feared that the President would
selectively hear what he wanted to hear from Long Range Planning as it
supplied the short-term answers he needed" (the coordinator).

Other Demands and a Short Timetable

The timing of the introduction of long range planning at Cincinnati
casted several problems that interfered with its implementation, as did
the timetable that was established when it was introduced. It was expected
that a plan would be completed by September 1, 1972, eight months after the
planning process was initiated. "Units resented the tight time frame and
the pressures being put on them to plan" (a Task Force member). Secondly,
planning was introduced in a year when deans were being asked to do a lot
of other things for the first time such as supply new kinds of personnel
information for promotion and tenure which took a lot of work (a dean).

Other things interfered with planning that could have been predicted. The President could have been more circumspect about the times he chose to send out information like the Illinois report, a week after the planning guidelines had gone out. Secondly, a plan due on September 1st would need to be written over the summer when long vacations are scheduled and things in a University generally come to a standstill. "The Long Range Planning Task Force needed a more realistic timetable specifying what needed to be accomplished in each phase" (a Task Force member).

Resistance to planning could have been lessened if the problems with the short timetable had been resolved. Interestingly, questions of timing are one of the least studied factors in change and seemingly were not considered in this case.

Inexperienced and Lack of Skill in Planning

A fifth problem in implementing a long range planning process was a lack of experience and skill in planning. Although the Task Force might have been aware of the need for training (and in fact did hold one session with the deans, 4/21/72), the provision of additional training was beyond their resources (the coordinator). Some deans might not have wanted to gain more skills since "they would rather negotiate a long range plan one to one with the President or Provost as had been the style of the previous administration than attempt to write down goals and objectives", one Task Force member explained.
Lack of Resources

The Long Range Planning Task Force felt that it could have used a lot of resources that were not available: for example, more staff help, additional monies, released time, and a management-information system among other things. Several Task Force members perceived the need for a University-wide goal statement or set of priorities. "Some of us had the feeling that there were priorities but that we weren't told them. A clear statement of priorities would have helped and then we would have responded as to how we would help implement those priorities" (a dean). One Task Force member said that there was probably not enough sharing of an institutional perspective with the units. Another Task Force member said that he thought the President expected unit plans to be set in a context of whatever was happening in higher education but that there wasn't enough resources or information to do that.

One of the ways the Task Force could have resolved these problems would have been to use human resources in the University other than the Task Force members. "Most of the time the University does not use the resources it has: people professionally involved in planning" (a Task Force member). "Information on the external environment was not being used" (another Task Force member). "Bennis' ideas, resources, and interests - his contacts, cosmopolitanism, his knowledge and understanding of social movements, his accessibility to people at the national levels, his accessibility to people in other fields - were not used" (a consultant on long range planning). Outside consultants were offered, but as one Task Force member explained, "Outside expertise was needed only if the goal was..."
different than what the Task Force thought it was."

Lack of Motivation

The seventh obstacle to implementing a long range planning process was a lack of motivation on the part of the deans and eventually on the part of Task Force members. Rewards and resources were not linked to long range planning for deans or Task Force members. There were no incentives to plan; and when there was a delay in publishing a long range plan, the University community became more resistant to planning.

Initial resistance to long range planning is partially explained by an impression the President gave when he introduced long range planning: that the University had never planned before (a Task Force member and two deans). "Units had planned before but nothing had ever come of their work" (a Task Force member). Secondly, the Task Force took a more or less laissez-faire attitude toward Arts and Sciences: A&S did not meet the Task Force's deadlines and yet there did not seem to be any negative consequences (a dean). Several deans cited this as one reason why their motivation was low for planning. A third factor accounting for a lack of motivation is the President's style of delegating: he delegates everything to a few people.

"There were unending demands" (one of the co-chairmen). Task Force members, especially the two co-chairmen and coordinator, were strained and fatigued due to overload. Other tasks interfered with planning: the Long Range Planning Task Force co-chairmen were also responsible for the implementation of a participatory budget-review process, new personnel policies, and periodic review processes in several colleges in addition to their regular responsibilities. "Routine - answering Bennis' mail and phone calls, and meetings in the President's office - kept gobbling up my planning time" (the coordinator).
A worsening budget situation also contributed to a general lack of motivation to do long range planning. "All the plans were expansionary - we were told there were no budgetary constraints but there were. There must be a widespread feeling of being let down" (a Task Force member). "People are reluctant to change anything in the climate we're in now" (another Task Force member). Finally an important reason in accounting for the lack of motivation was personal insecurity and uncertainty about the future. It was said before that resources and rewards were not linked to long range planning: take the cases of the three Task Force leaders themselves. The coordinator's Institute lost one staff position in 1973; the Vice President of the Medical Center, one of the co-chairmen, had announced his retirement; and the Provost was made Executive Vice President mid-way through the year (1973), a position in which it was unclear if he would continue to be responsible for long range planning. Each of them must have experienced a great deal of uncertainty about the future that was shared across campus for whatever reasons.

**Summary**

Evidence from interviews and from an analysis of the marathon meeting and chronology of events led to the identification of seven problems that the Task Force and the deans encountered in trying to implement a long range planning process and write a long range plan:

1) A lack of clarity about the goals of long range planning;
2) A lack of clarity about the role of the Task Force;
3) A lack of communication between the President and the Task Force;
4) The pressures of other demands and a short timetable;
5) A lack of skill and inexperience in long range planning;
6) A lack of resources; and
7) A lack of motivation.

Implicit in the descriptions of these problems are a number of actions that the people undergoing change needed or expected the University President to take. The purpose of the next section is to look more closely at the actions the President took and at the functions they served or failed to serve in unfreezing, changing and refreezing the University community in regards to long range planning.

**Unfreezing: Initiating the Long Range Planning Process**

Proposition 1: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to assess the sources and nature of resistance to the proposed change.

Proposition 2: To overcome the initial resistance to organizational members to the proposed change.

In order to initiate a long range planning process at the University of Cincinnati the President had to unfreeze the attitudes of prospective Task Force members and of the University community in general toward long range planning. Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that it may be important for him "to anticipate the sources and nature of resistance to change" and "to overcome initial resistance to change."

To what extent did the President intervene in the system to accomplish these objectives? The coordinator's impression was the "actual decisions
as to when and how to initiate a long range planning process were made without great care probably by a presidential assistant and not by Bennis himself." "When he introduced long range planning, the President did not try to ascertain the feelings and opinions of those who would have to implement it; and deans did not feel free enough to express their honest reactions to him" (a dean). He also "did not try to find out about other planning processes that had occurred in Cincinnati; in fact, he gave the impression that there had never been any planning at the University" (a dean, a Task Force member). In the opinion of more than one dean the President could have overcome initial resistance to long range planning had he built on and continued processes that were already on-going.

On the other hand, the choice not to build on on-going processes clearly had advantages, too. A temporary system, such as a task force tends to break down informational and social supports for existing behavior. It brings together people who usually do not interact with each other so that there is greater likelihood of a new perspective on organizational problems. Through a task force arrangement Bennis could make use of "marginals" or "role innovators" as he calls them: people who are less integrated into established ways of doing things. Clearly, the President's three appointments to the Task Force were people he perceived as change-oriented and who would serve as extensions of his ideas in Task Force meetings. In the case of this particular temporary system, most of the Task Force members identified with the President and were committed to many of his ideas (the coordinator).
A second strategy to overcome resistance to change is to reduce the amount of anxiety aroused by the prospect of change. The coordinator saw the planning coordinator's job as "high risk - low reward" prior to a decision on his tenure and promotion; ostensibly the President tried to lessen his anxiety by recommending tenure and giving him the directorship of the Institute for Research and Teaching in Higher Education. The President's decision not to tie long range planning to budgetary constraints also seems like it was an attempt to reduce resistance to long range planning. Unfortunately, budget decisions had to be made before a long range plan was completed and many deans perceived the budget to be a clearer statement of institutional priorities than a yet-to-be-completed long range plan. "In a University you have to commit resources for more than a year if you want to demonstrate trust, create security and reduce anxiety" (a vice president). Given the constraints of a State biennium budget and cutbacks in appropriations, commitments like that were impossible at the time of long range planning. Bennis' statement on October 28, 1971 (see the chronology of events), about long range planning and program evaluation occurring in-tandem was ill-timed if not counter-productive to faculty participation in planning. Possibly it increased, rather than decreased, deans' feelings of insecurity and uncertainty. "In general, people are reluctant to change anything in the climate we're in now" (a Task Force member).

It was already mentioned in Chapter V how one of the problems that the Task Force encountered in implementing the long range planning process was that it was not perceived that institutional rewards were linked to
participation in long range planning. One administrator commented, "Implications aren't clear of what happens to you if you choose to meet the President's demands and then he gets complaints about what you're not doing on your own job" (a dean, a middle-level administrator). Although there were probably advantages to the fact that the new Provost had only been in office three days when he became a co-chairman of the Long Range Planning Task Force, there were also negative consequences in a system used to a political model of decision-making as far as a sense of security was concerned.

Proposition 3: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to heighten organizational members' sensitivity to problems involving the intended change.

Proposition 4: To stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration in the system in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 5: To integrate new forces for change with existing forces for change, external forces for change with internal forces for change.

The third, fourth, and fifth propositions about the behavior of the organizational leader in initiating change state that he may need to heighten organizational members sensitivity to problems, to stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration in the system, and to integrate new forces for change with existing forces for change, external forces for change with internal forces for change. Most of the change strategies the President used effectively accomplished these objectives.
"Long range planning itself was a way to make change felt at the faculty level" (a Task Force member). The whole collaborative, fact-finding planning exercise might be viewed as unfreezing the system for other Presidentially initiated change proposals. "Long range planning has reminded us of the necessity for change behind the scenes" (a faculty member). More specifically, the President made use of administrative retreats such as French Lick; he shared information like the Newman Task Force Report on Higher Education; and he used consultants to make organizational members more aware of problems facing the University (11/15/72; 11/28/72). In other ways he effectively used external groups' demands to create change internally that might not otherwise have been possible. For example, he capitalized on The Board of Regents' request for an institutional plan for graduate education to make members more aware of changing environmental conditions. In a speech to the local Chamber of Commerce he created the expectation that under his administration the University would be better managed and make better use of its resources. In turn that very external expectation the President had created was used as a reason for why the University had long range planning, i.e. accountability to external publics. After appointing the Long Range Planning Task Force the President met with the vice presidents (1/11/72), the deans (1/18/72), and with the Board of Directors (1/22/72) to discuss the need he perceived for long range planning. He issued a press release and had it reprinted in Candid Campus, the University newsletter he had started (2/9/72). He provided the Long Range Planning Task Force and the deans with materials on the future of higher education (two deans).
Probably the most significant actions that the President took, however, to create an expectation of change were the speeches he made, drawing on his knowledge of alternative conceptual models for the future of American public education. With tremendous energy and intensity, Bennis shared his expectations for the future both within and outside the University community. His speeches were loaded with images of what the University could become: a well-managed urban university, a center for continuing education, a center for administrative training. . . He shared his visions of making the University of Cincinnati an outstanding, exciting university. He created new paradigms for ways things would work. He projected an image of a university that would solve problems and be adaptable to community needs. He tried to establish new reference groups (see the chronology of events 1/18/72).

Bennis continually demonstrated his investment in the University's capacity to change. Part of what he did to get groups in the University interested in the problems facing higher education and in his ideas for changing the University was to write letters to them suggesting how they might get involved: for example, he had his assistant write to the University Senate as early as October 27, 1971, summarizing the roles the Senate might play in the long range planning process that had been discussed at French Lick.

The President used multiple unfreezing strategies to make the University more open to its environment and hence more receptive to change (Proposition 5). He made speeches, used consultants, and appointed people
from outside the University to leadership positions. He skillfully articulated external pressures on the University to plan. "Well I think that the rationale that was given was to explain that with the future being as bleak as it was going to be in terms of program cutbacks, federal financing, and state appropriations that it was absolutely essential for the University to plan and make changes logically rather than in a reactionary way" (an administrator). Almost everyone who was interviewed could outline the reasons the President had given for why the University needed to plan. "The President had a clear sense of external pressures on the University: that sense came out in his writings and in his talks" (a governance group leader and Task Force Member). "In providing input on social indicators he tried to de-internalize the planning process" (a consultant on long range planning).

A strategy the President used very consciously to make the University more open to its environment was to make promises to the community and then to use external expectations to create change internally. He created a public expectation that "a new day had begun", that "a revolution was about to take place", and that "the University was going to put its house in order" (phrases from a speech the President made to the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce). He tried to pair external forces for change with internal forces for change. He said that at some point in time that he would like to have community representatives on the Task Force; at the outset, however, he appointed three individuals inside the
University who were change and community oriented. Although some of the deans felt excluded from planning because of the Task Force, overall the President managed "to create a fairly widespread sense of 'we're all in this together'" (a unit director).

Proposition 6: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to change the constellation of forces, resources or information converging on any one part of the organization.

Proposition 7: To elicit support for the proposed organizational change from informal as well as formal leaders in the organization.

Proposition 8: To link parts of the system that are sympathetic to the intended change and share common dissatisfactions and a sense of powerlessness.

Through the use of outside consultants and the Task Force, the President tried to change the flow of information in the University (Proposition 6) and to link parts of the system which shared common dissatisfactions and a sense of powerlessness in regards to the proposed change (Proposition 8). He encouraged the University Senate to get involved in long range planning, 10/27/71, (Proposition 7). He met regularly with leaders of the governance groups so that they were kept informed of actions he had made or was contemplating in regards to long range planning. The deans felt less well integrated into the

---

8 Bennis appointed three Task Force members in addition to the Task Force co-chairmen and coordinator: one was the head of the Department of Graduate Community Planning; the second had just come to the University from business; and the third was a black woman, an assistant dean in the College of Arts and Sciences.
decision-making process. For example, the Dean of Arts and Sciences felt that the President could have involved the deans more systematically in long range planning and thereby gain their support. He met with the deans as a group only six times between the time the Task Force was announced and the time when a preliminary plan was published. At those times long range planning was usually only one of several topics on the agenda.

Proposition 9: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to set priorities for the organization and to clearly communicate these priorities to organizational members whose behavior is to be changed.

One problem that the Task Force and deans encountered in long range planning was that other demands from the President and the Provost kept cutting into the time they had to spend on long range planning. In his first speech to the University community the President had emphasized the need to plan (10/28/71). He reaffirmed the high priority of planning almost every time he spoke, but never from the perspective of the University community, in relation to the other change processes he had initiated which were competing for the deans' and Task Force members' time.

A second aspect to priority setting (Proposition 9) is to articulate the goals and program priorities of the University. Clearly, at least some of the deans felt that that is important in creating movement in the system. "We had a sense that there were priorities but that we just weren't being told what they were" (a dean). The President, however, outlined some of those goals on at least three occasions: at his inauguration, in his mid-year report (Six Plus) and later in May of 1973 in a
speech to the faculty.

Proposition 10: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to create a sense of rising expectations among organizational members that they will benefit from proposed change in their organizational behavior.

Proposition 13: To heighten organizational members' self-esteem and to encourage reciprocity in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 14: To establish and maintain a climate of trust in interpersonal relationships in which change is regarded positively.

Propositions 10, 13, and 14 state that it may be important to create a sense of rising expectations about the prospect of change, to heighten organizational members' self-esteem, and to establish and maintain a climate of acceptance, support, and trust in order for unfreezing to occur. To what extent did the President use change strategies to create these conditions?

Some members of the Task Force felt the President created expectations for change that were too high for the Task Force to meet (a Task Force member) and that with the budget situation that existed it was a mistake to have people plan without realistic budget constraints. Further, "it was a mistake to ask people to invest their time in long range planning and then not to give them anything back--e.g. a plan by the time it was expected" (a unit director). 9 One of the things the President could have done, which he did not, was to enforce the timetable he had established

---

9It is important to consider the relationship between attitudes toward and expectations for change in the minds of a target population and the actual availability of channels for action and change. Otherwise attitude change without commensurate institutional change leads to goal gaps, relative deprivation, stress, and revolutions of rising expectations (Kelman and Warwick, 1973).
for the Task Force, or if those deadlines could not be met to have intervened to maintain the credibility of the planning process.

On the one hand there is evidence that the President did engage in actions which heightened people's self-esteem and made them receptive to change. He made the committee a "Presidential Task Force" which carried a lot of prestige. He gave a charge which was open enough to give them a great deal of responsibility in deciding how to approach planning. He gave speeches in which he said he respected the uniqueness of the University of Cincinnati (10/1/72) and "would work for an administrative structure that would give weight to the opinions and values of the University of Cincinnati community." The President met at least twice with the coordinator before his appointment to assure him of his support and commitment.

On the other hand there is evidence to the contrary: that the President did not build relationships with the Task Force or deans that provided for support or reciprocity (see the chronology of events 6/19/72). Several Task Force members had the impression that the President was disappointed in what the Task Force was doing. "We all night just as well continue to work diligently on blue ribbon "task force" committees. Nothing assures the status quo so much as putting the best minds and best talents on these task forces. For their reports continue to get better as our problems get worse" (Bennis, 1972a). The deans shared the Task Force's feelings of not being supported if this one comment at all is representative of what other deans were feeling. "One of the tasks of leadership is to get a unit to take responsibility for planning. One of
the ways to do that is to express confidence in the dean. I'm not feeling that kind of confidence even though my college has planned" (a dean).

Proposition 11: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to involve as many of the individuals to be affected by the proposed change as possible in planning and decision-making.

Proposition 11 states that in order to successfully initiate change it may be important for the organizational leader to involve as many of the individuals to be affected by the proposed changes as possible in planning and decision-making. The President's use of a Task Force and choice of the two academic Vice-Presidents as co-chairmen are two examples of actions he took to involve the University community in planning. In a memorandum to the Vice Presidents on January 11, 1972, just before the Long Range Planning Task Force was announced he wrote, "that one of the criteria for successful planning is that there must be a good deal of participation in the planning process by the people who will have the task of implementing the plan." The decision to ask the individual units to submit their own plans stemmed from that criterion.

Proposition 12: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to increase the amount and frequency of interaction between the organizational leader and members in regards to the proposed change.

According to Proposition 12 one of the objectives of the organizational leader during the unfreezing stage may be to increase the amount and frequency of interaction between himself and organizational members in regards to the proposed change. When one faculty member was asked if
he ever saw the President, he replied that, "in contrast to the previous President, a lot of people on campus have had a lot of contact with Bennis in a number of ways." It seems as far as the University community in general is concerned, Bennis is visible and his ideas are widely known. From the perspective of Task Force members, communication with the Task Force once long range planning was introduced was another story. "There was no communication before the marathon" (one of the co-chairmen). "I did not see the President until the marathon" (a Task Force member). Members of the Task Force felt that the President could have more actively shown his interest and support for long range planning by communicating personally with Task Force members initially and throughout the process.

Proposition 15: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to effect and demonstrate change in the organization's relationship with other systems.

Proposition 15 states that if the organizational leader can effect and demonstrate change in the organization's relationships with other systems he can often motivate individuals in the organization to change their attitudes and behaviors. Strategies designed to accomplish this objective may have been extremely effective in overcoming initial resistance to long range planning among members of the University community. In other words if the President could have shown that he was effective in bringing new money into the University, self-interests would not have been as threatened and people might have been more willing to collaborate in the planning process. When the Task Force members and deans who were interviewed were asked whether Bennis was more or less effective than the previous president in his relationships with the legislature, foundations,
and federal agencies, most people replied that it was difficult to compare them because social and financial environments were so different. "The previous President had a lot of personal influence with the Chancellor. What Bennis has done is to work more closely with the legislature and to create a Washington office. More information is coming back on where grant proposals are possible so that the system has been unfrozen in that way" (a dean). If the number of press releases and speeches he made about his trips to Columbus to see legislators and the Governor are any indication, the President very consciously tried to demonstrate change in the University's relationships to the State.

Proposition 16: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to increase his expertise and credibility with organizational members.

Proposition 17: To extend his control over varied kinds of resources and sources of power.

The last two propositions state that strategies of unfreezing might attempt to build the organizational leader's expertise and credibility and to extend his control over varied kinds of resources and sources of power. Almost all of the Task Force members recognized the President's expertise in planning and change. They were aware of his national reputation as an organizational consultant and of his access to information and a wide variety of resources. He also controlled rewards such as recognition and access to the President. Task Force members were dependent on the President to clarify his expectations of what he hoped the Long Range Planning Task Force would accomplish; as long as he met with them infrequently he retained that power over them (though, on the other hand, not
meeting with them was probably counter-productive to getting out a long range plan). In relation to the deans, the President realized that he lacked incentives for them to plan and that it was difficult to come up with strategies to increase his control over resources or to change a reward structure that does not encourage involvement in things like long range planning.

**Summary**

After reviewing the ways in which the President initiated a long range planning process two questions come to mind: 1) To what extent did the President successfully unfreeze the University community in regards to long range planning? and 2) How would one summarize the strategies he used? Clearly, the President did not choose strategies which lessened resistance to planning, rather his actions tended to augment "forces for change." In retrospect it seems as if he used three strategies in initiating long range planning: 1) he used every occasion possible to spin images of what the University could become; 2) he tried to involve faculty and students in planning; and 3) he chose people whom he trusted, who shared his visions and orientation toward change, and gave them the responsibility for developing a long range plan. These strategies created many of the conditions which the organization may need to consider in order for successful initiation to occur without addressing the problem of resistance to long range planning, which as environmental conditions changed or as long range planning got underway, the President would have to deal with or risk successful implementation.
Changing: Implementing the Long Range Planning Process

Proposition 18: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to overcome emerging resistance to the proposed change during the period of attempted implementation.

Proposition 22: To provide organizational members with opportunities to test and verify new behaviors through personal experience.

The President's unfreezing strategies were not designed to overcome resistance to long range planning. In addition he had to contend with emerging resistance (Proposition 18) to the short timetable and delay in getting out a plan (see the section on a Lack of Motivation, Chapter V). Even among Task Force members resistance grew as they tried to implement the planning process. "When reasons for decisions aren't shared, there is frustration. When solutions are reached and then rejected, there's a sense of futility. Bennis lost the Task Force's commitment when he didn't share what he was thinking" (a Task Force member).

It is difficult to identify specific change strategies the President used to overcome an emerging sense of futility or resistance to long range planning (Proposition 18). Nor can strategies he used to build a public commitment to planning (Proposition 19) or to provide organizational members with opportunities to test new behaviors through personal experience
(Proposition 22) be cited. In fact several deans interpreted the President's decisions to appoint a new graduate dean and to reorganize the social science institutes to be at cross-purposes with the objectives of long range planning. "Regardless of what kinds of final plans we have, they are going to have to fit in an administrative structure that might not necessarily be the best one for the programs we choose unless we choose programs to fit a plan already conceptualized" (a dean).

Proposition 20: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to continually clarify and provide opportunities by which organizational members can gain clarification of the behavioral changes required.

Were there ways for the deans or Task Force members to share their concerns with the President as they tried to implement the planning process? Proposition 20 states that it may be important for the organizational leader to provide mechanisms by which organizational members can gain clarification of the changes that are required. With the Task Force at least the President did attempt several times to clarify his goals for long range planning (see the chronology of events 6/28/72, 7/19/72, and 10/20/72). The problem seemed to be that the Task Force did not understand which goals were most important for them to accomplish, nor what specific steps they would need to take in order to accomplish any one objective. "There was a lot of confusion as to how long range planning would be linked to PPBS" (the coordinator). "It was not clear until the fall that the President wanted us to plan with a budget constraint of ten percent" (one of the co-chairmen). "The task specification was ambiguous from the beginning. The Task Force in August clearly needed guidance on
how to prepare a document and an administrative mandate with Arts and Sciences" (a Task Force member). It was probably important in at least two other cases for the President to intervene to clarify what he expected from the Task Force, when he did not. By not intervening he allowed the Task Force to miss the September 1 deadline and subsequently for chapters to be distributed piecemeal as they were completed. Both the delay and the piecemeal distribution undermined the President's credibility and that of the planning effort (a dean). "Things float in the system, without clarity as to what is expected when. If something is going to be late or not completed, the President doesn't find out about it. There is a need for him to be more specific about what he expects when"(an external consultant). There was probably also a need for him to be specific about the authority and roles of the Task Force given the problems described earlier in this chapter.

Proposition 23: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to offer organizational members new meanings or new ways of looking at their experiences in regards to the proposed change.

A proposition related to the need of the organizational leader to clarify what changes are required states that the organizational leader may need to offer organizational members new ways of looking at their experiences and at organizational problems if successful implementation is to occur (Proposition 23). One of the behaviors Bennis is an expert at is asking questions and expanding the meanings of things. The speeches that have been mentioned before are good examples of this skill. Simply by introducing the kind of participatory long range planning that he did,
he had offered an alternative to past planning efforts at the University of Cincinnati. Part of the problem however was that the Task Force members themselves were not developing these new meanings. They acknowledged that the long range plan they were working on did not take into account changing environmental conditions, nor did it deal with areas like continuing education, an external degree program, interdisciplinary studies, etc. Then, when the Task Force became confused as to which direction it should be moving in, the President was not close enough to the process to be able to offer them new ways of looking at their experiences. Because he had delegated planning to the Task Force he also was not available to interact with deans and faculty members when they encountered problems in planning.

Proposition 21: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to provide mechanisms for feedback between himself and the people undergoing change.

One of the weaknesses of the President's implementation strategy that was identified earlier in this chapter was that he failed to establish mechanisms for feedback (Proposition 21). The result was that there was a lack of communication on both sides. The President did not know what was going on with long range planning and the Task Force had no way to resolve problems that it encountered in trying to implement the planning process. Possibly because these kinds of links were not established between the Task Force and the President, the Task Force did not establish strong links between themselves and the units. Consequently, the units did not see any outcomes of their efforts for over a year, until a preliminary plan was
published. "The units had not gotten feedback on the acceptability of their plans or on how their unit plans would be integrated into a University-wide plan" (one of the co-chairmen). Since the President was not in communication with the Task Force, he did not know the objectives the deans had raised about planning as early as 3/30/72 or on 4/21/72 at a Task Force meeting with the deans. When he did hear about problems from the assistant and associate deans in June he only indirectly followed up on them (see the chronology of events 6/19/72). In mid-October or November, 1972, when a statement from the President would have helped to salvage the credibility of the long range planning process, he still was using his meetings with the deans to seek their perceptions about the planning process.

Six or seven information-sharing meetings between the President and the Task Force did occur between January, 1972, and June, 1973. It is not within the scope of this paper to analyze why information was or was not shared. However when Task Force leaders did meet with the President they seemed reluctant to ask him some of the hard questions they had been wrestling with (see the chronology of events 5/16/72). At the same time the President seemed reluctant to confront the Task Force leaders head-on. The President gave feedback by putting considerable, though subtle pressure on the two co-chairmen--sending notes and minutes from speeches he gave--not direct feedback at all, but very purposeful (the coordinator). The Task Force got feedback through remarks the President made at the marathon or to other groups (see the chronology of events 10/25/72). Arts and Sciences got what the dean described as "cloakroom feedback": "It came in the way
of appendices to letters from the President or the Provost." In sum, it was difficult for the Task Force members or deans to get feedback about their efforts to implement a long range planning process.

Proposition 24: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to provide role models for new behavior patterns.

Proposition 24 states that successful implementation may depend on the availability of role models for new behavior patterns. What kinds of things did Bennis model in his own behavior in regards to long range planning? Certainly, he modelled a spirit of inquiry and adaptability to change as well as a high tolerance for ambiguity that he reinforced in others. Through the use of administrative retreats and temporary systems he modelled an approach to problem-solving. In attempting to make his office more visible, he modelled another kind of behavior he hoped departments in the University would follow. Unfortunately, the President also modelled some behaviors that were counter-productive to the implementation of long range planning: he didn't confront; he didn't enforce the timetables he had set up; and he made some very important, unilateral decisions without knowing how they would fit into a consensually-agreed upon University Long Range Plan (such as his administrative reorganization, etc.).

Proposition 26: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to redefine his role in relation to the change processes initiated.

Proposition 27: To remove barriers to change and to provide organizational members with necessary skills, knowledge, training and resources in order to increase their capacity to implement the proposed change.
Proposition 26 states that it may be important for the organizational leader over time to redefine his relationship to the change processes he has initiated and to have less ownership in the ideas. Part of the dilemma in this case was that the President wanted to be seen as the expert and to be used as a resource; when the Task Force did not come to him, he took less interest in what they were doing at a time when the Task Force was still dependent on him for leadership. When he did not provide the direction the Task Force needed, long range planning sort of came to a standstill (see the chronology of events from August to December, 1972).

Another example of the way in which the President changed his relationship to the long range planning process is illustrated by the kinds of resources he provided the Task Force (Proposition 27). At first there were lots of resources pledged and delivered. When the Task Force coordinator was appointed, he was given resources for additional staff. The President also asked the PPBS committee to continue developing profile data on departments in the University knowing that that kind of information would be invaluable to the Task Force. He asked the coordinator to sit in on vice presidents' meetings so that he would be part of the information and decision-making network in the President's office. Bennis offered to bring in outside consultants for the Task Force. From ten percent to fifty percent of each presidential assistant's time was to be given to planning.
But planning was always an extra commitment on top of other responsibilities, and resources were limited. Presidential assistants did not give the time they were supposed to give to long range planning; they were instead bogged down in other projects the President had asked them to do. Similarly, the two co-chairmen were overcommitted. When the deans identified a need for training (4/21/72) there weren't resources in time, staff, or money to do it. It is the author's impression that the Task Force never asked the President for more resources or in fact used the one resource he offered (outside consultants); consequently, certain barriers to change, such as a lack of skill in planning were never removed (Proposition 27).

Proposition 28: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to change existing organizational arrangements so they are as compatible as possible with the behavioral changes required.

Proposition 28 states that in order for successful implementation to occur the organization has to function in ways that are compatible with the proposed changes. In other words the organizational leadership may need to make changes in the policies, rewards, communication or decision-making structures of the organization so that they support the changes he hopes to make. It has already been shown how the amount and frequency of communication between the Task Force and the President and between the President and the deans did not contribute to the successful implementation of the long range planning process. As far as I could tell the President did not intervene in ways that would have promoted new relation-
ships to support new behaviors. (Only on the Task Force did mutually supportive relationships develop.) It has also been documented how the need for immediate solutions to problems, a circumstance only partially under the President's control, undermined the long range planning effort. Other Task Force members identified the discrepancy between the timetable that had been set up and the need for widespread participation in long range planning as a problem that was never resolved.

On the other hand, when the President appointed a new Vice President for Management and Finance and charged him with developing a management information system and when he created the Executive Vice Presidency for the Provost, he clearly made changes in the organization that would be compatible with, in fact, facilitate long range planning.

Proposition 29: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to reinforce and reward even tentative changes organizational members make in the direction of the intended outcome.

Proposition 25: To encourage experimentation and risk-taking on the part of organizational members in regards to the proposed change.

The President's attitude toward long range planning was that he had to do everything himself. "What every dean asks me to do he hasn't done himself--to make choices and evaluate programs" (the President). Given that attitude it was difficult for the President to see, lots less reward, changes some units in the University were making in the way they approached planning (Proposition 29). Part of the idea behind rewarding even tentative changes in behavior is that once people experience some success they are willing to risk and to make further changes in their
behavior (Proposition 25). But many of the deans never saw any benefits from doing long range planning (a dean) and they did not see any negative consequences from not doing a plan (another dean). Furthermore, the President's consideration of an administration reorganization while long range planning was still going on created feelings of personal insecurity for both deans and Task Force Members.

Summary

During this second stage, implementation, the President continued to expand the parameters of the Long Range Planning Task Force's task, but failed to provide mechanisms through which the Task Force or the units could gain clarification of what was expected of them. By expanding the parameters of the Task Force's task, the President created a condition in which it was difficult for the Task Force to succeed and for long range planning to become stably integrated. Bennis' own high need for achievement evidenced by his expanding the objectives of long range planning and by his high expectations for the staff and for the Task Force leaders led him to set unrealistic deadlines, interfered with his providing support and reinforcement, and prevented him from encouraging risk-taking and experimentation on the part of organizational members. We have seen how the deans and Task Force members felt that there were no ways for them to clarify what was expected from them in regards to long range planning. It may have been that Bennis' own high tolerance for ambiguity prevented him from taking certain actions that the deans and Task Force members had expected and from intervening in ways that could have influenced a wide acceptance of and compliance with the goals of long range planning. Finally,
because of the need to respond to so many demands on his role it is difficult for Bennis to close options, to follow through, or to establish conditions of stability and continuity, in order for successful implementation and incorporation to occur.

In sum, the President's strategy failed 1) to anticipate, or to bring out into the open, difficulties that would be encountered in trying to implement a participatory long range planning process; 2) to establish and use feedback mechanisms to uncover and resolve problems that arose during the period of attempted implementation; and 3) to provide the appropriate supports and rewards to maintain subordinate willingness to carry out implementation.

Refreezing: The Incorporation of Long Range Planning

The propositions for the leader's behavior in refreezing change have to do with the ways in which "new behavior patterns become integrated into cognitive and social structures, and thus, to a degree stabilized" (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 23). In the case of long range planning, refreezing would mean the incorporation of a long range planning process at the unit level or the implementation of Task Force recommendations. When the study in Cincinnati was completed in July of 1973 neither of these steps had occurred. In fact, a Long Range Planning document integrating unit plans that had been written in May and June of 1972 was not published until September of 1973. The purpose of this section however is to describe a number of presidential interventions that were observed that would have implications for the successful incorporation of long range planning.
Proposition 30: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to monitor organizational members' performance in coping with and integrating the change.

Proposition 30 states that an objective of the strategies used by the organizational leader to incorporate change may be to monitor the performance of organizational members in coping with and integrating change. It has already been documented how the President did not monitor the planning process: he, in fact, did not find out until January, 1973, that the College of Arts and Sciences had only submitted a bare-bones plan. "The people who could have enforced accountability, did not" (one dean said.

Proposition 31: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to objectively evaluate changes that have occurred.

Proposition 34: To link parts of the organization or individuals whose behavior has been changed as well as to link processes of change occurring simultaneously.

A second proposition states that it may be important for the organizational leader to objectively evaluate the changes he has initiated (Proposition 31). "It was very unclear to me how the Task Force would be evaluated or what a final plan would look like" (one of the co-chairmen). Several Task Force members did not see how long range planning would fit into other administrative structures (Proposition 34). "One of the things that the President could have done is to have given the units information on social indicators such as birth rates, enrollment
trends, etc. and have asked them to analyze this information in terms of their own objectives and then provided criticism of their analyses" (a consultant on long range planning).

Proposition 32: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to maintain continuity at some levels of the organization while change takes place at other levels.

Proposition 33: To insulate the organization from conflicting or competing ideas and to give organizational members time to assimilate and integrate new behaviors.

Propositions 32 and 33 postulate the need to maintain continuity at some levels of the organization while change takes place at other levels. Those conditions are in contradiction to Bennis' ambitious approach to change which is to initiate a lot of new ideas in a short amount of time. For example, he asked the units to project budget cuts of 3-6-9% at the same time they were doing long range planning with no budgetary constraints. He asked the chairmen of the Long Range Planning Task Force to chair another committee on program evaluation before the long range plan was written. Those are two of countless examples of other tasks that interfered with the incorporation of a long range planning process at the University of Cincinnati. "Bennis' greatest shortcoming is keeping too many things going at once; he has instead to lay good groundwork for one or two things" (an external consultant).

9"Managers need to balance change and stability in their organizations. Presumably this can be done in two ways: changing a few things at a time while holding all others constant or by alternating intense periods of change with periods of consolidation and stability" (Sayles, 1964).
Proposition 35: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to give emotional support and resources to organizational members who demonstrate behaviors in the direction of the intended change.

Proposition 36: To give visibility and credibility to the change within the entire system and to spread information about the consequences of the change to other parts of the organization, thereby diminishing a negative response in other parts of the system and encourage system-wide support and adoption.

The last two propositions under refreezing have to do with the need to provide support and credibility to change. It is not clear from a sample of responses in interviews that the President has initiated strategies that provide support or visibility to planning. "I doubt that the University has begun what will be a continuous process. That requires enforcement, getting back to individuals, and reinforcing their meaningful participation" (an administrator). "Planning will not be taken seriously until people see actions implemented as a result of planning" (a dean). "I don't think that the level of importance we talked about for planning was in fact backed up by our behavior and expenditure of resources" (a Task Force member).

The Impact of Long Range Planning

There is no unanimity among Task Force members regarding an assessment of Task Force efforts. The variety of views on assessment is perhaps best shown by the following comments. One Task Force member stated, "I feel it's been more valuable than people suspect because the two Vice Presidents sat on the committee." Another Task Force member stated, "The
long range planning process has not gone bad if everybody is serious about making it a participatory scheme and making sure that everybody buys into it before you go ahead with a long range plan. If that's the case then it seems that our failure to meet various deadlines is not a problem at all--it is a matter of pushing it and keeping it alive. On the other hand if that really wasn't the objective, but it was to have a clear notion of what the University is and where it wants to go and to do that on a crash basis, then I think it was a failure."

When deans and Task Force members were asked what impact long range planning had had on the University, both groups responded that it had had little or no impact. "If it affects the President's or the Provost's assessment of priorities and that is translated into budget, it will have an effect" (a dean). But "at this point, long range planning has not led the University to understand any better the external forces acting on it and it has not been incorporated into budget or personnel decisions" (another dean).

To the extent that the long range planning process has not led to a clearer understanding of externalities or future prospects, the Task Force did not accomplish what the President said he expected (see the chronology of events 1/21/72 and 7/19/72). The President established the criteria by which long range planning would be evaluated by the questions he asked and the premises he outlined when he introduced long range planning. It is against those criteria that the President as the organizational leader has to evaluate the success or failure of the Task
Force and of long range planning. In June of 1973 Bennis wrote,

> We are now two years behind my original deadline and I have shaky confidence that the long range plan will be of the quality or specificity to help provide the guidelines upon which to make our important decisions regarding the future allocation of resources. In that case I will have to act, not unilaterally, but without the contribution of a thoughtful long range plan (Bennis to the University of Cincinnati Board of Directors, June 5, 1973).

**Summary and Conclusions**

In this chapter seven problems that the Long Range Planning Task Force members and the deans said they encountered in trying to implement long range planning were identified. Both groups held the expectation that the University President would help them solve these problems. For example they expected him to clarify what it was he expected from the Task Force, which in their perception did not occur. As a result, long range planning did not have the impact on the University community that might have been expected.

When the President's actions were compared to a set of propositions about what the organizational leader may need to do to affect organizational change, it was found that what he could have done (but did not) corresponded to what the deans and Task Force members said they needed (i.e. recognition, goal clarity, resources, etc.). On the other hand when actions on his part corresponded to actions described in the propositions, conditions were created in the University to which the people undergoing change responded positively.
There are many reasons why some actions were taken and others were not. Other tasks as well as a lack of information, belief in another model of change, external demands, or other constraints associated with the university president's role may have prevented him from following up on long range planning. For the purposes of this chapter it is not important why the President did not meet more frequently with the Task Force leaders, or intervene in ways to overcome emerging resistance to long range planning, only that he did not, and that if conditions described in the propositions for changing-implementation had been created, chances are that the problems that the Task Force and deans encountered in implementing long range planning would have been resolved and the impact of long range planning on the University would have been greater.

Even from the President's perspective there was a discrepancy between what he expected from the Task Force and long range planning in general and what he got. Although he might not attribute its failure to his own failure to take certain actions there are reasons to believe that there are other things he could have done to facilitate the long range planning process in light of the model proposed in this research for the role performance of the organizational leader and in light of what the Task Force members and deans said they needed or expected.

In sum, it can be shown 1) that the propositions set forth in Chapter II may be a helpful model for the organizational leader in the process of change; 2) that, in fact, people undergoing change perceived that many of the leader behaviors described in the propositions are needed;
and 3) that when those behaviors on the part of the organizational leader are not present, the group is left to cope with problems for themselves or risk failure. It also can be shown that the organizational leader needs to have a sense of what is going to happen to whatever it is that he's initiated. Without a set of benchmarks, the organizational leader loses control of the process. He cannot determine when to make interventions that redirect, clarify, or stabilize.

The model that is proposed in this research is very leader-oriented. It does not say what the group needs to do if their expectations for the role performance of the organizational leader are not met. For example, there are times when the group may have to take the initiative and confront the organizational leader with their needs if the leader has not provided the behaviors the group expects. In this case the Long Range Planning Task Force did not communicate important decisions they had made to the President (see the chronological summary 2/7/72, 3/1/72, and 6/27/72) nor did they effectively confront the President with what it was they needed (see the description of the marathon as well as 10/25/72 and 11/6/72 in the chronology of events). Rather, the co-chairmen and coordinator pulled together a plan that lacked the relevance and specificity it might have had if the President had acted to provide what was needed (i.e. goal clarity, role clarity, resources, adequate communication, etc.).

There are probably other cases in which the President's perception was that he did do what was expected, i.e. to make the goals for Long Range Planning increasingly specific and operational, etc. while it was the
consensus of the Task Force that he did not.

The model that is proposed in this research for the role of the organizational leader in affecting organizational change is only one way of looking at the change process. There are others. However, it seems as if this is a model that leaders trying to effect change may want to consider. At least in this case, it accounted for both what the President did and for what he did not do that Task Force members and deans said they needed and expected.
CHAPTER VI

CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAM

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to document and understand the role of the organizational leader in another change process, in this case the President's role in initiating, implementing and incorporating an affirmative action program at the University. From the analysis that follows the author hopes to be able to show how the set of propositions that has been proposed about the role of the organizational leader is descriptive of the actions that were required in each stage of the change process.

Affirmative action was chosen as a second example of several change processes the President initiated at the University of Cincinnati for two reasons. First, affirmative action may represent an important mechanism for institutional change in the seventies. "An affirmative action program is a set of specific and result-oriented procedures to which a contractor [the University] commits itself to apply every good faith effort in order to insure non-discrimination against women and minorities. The objective of such procedures and efforts is equal employment opportunity. ...An acceptable affirmative action program must include

a. An analysis of areas within which the contractor is deficient in the utilization of minority groups and women, and further,

b. goals and timetables to which the contractor's good faith efforts must be directed to correct the deficiencies, and
thus to increase materially the utilization of minorities and women, at all levels and in all segments of his work force where deficiencies exist" [Section 60-2.10, Revised Order #41 Department of Labor]. As a contractor of the federal government the University is required to file an acceptable affirmative action program with the Office of Civil Rights, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Furthermore, higher education institutions must abide by the guidelines set by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare October 4, 1972, based on Executive Order 11246 as amended, which states:

The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, national origin, or sex. The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, national origin or sex.

As a strategy designed to implement Federal laws and guidelines, affirmative action programs often include reviews of institutional practices and policies in both academic and non-academic areas affecting recruitment, hiring, job classification, promotion, retirement, termination, child care, salaries, grievance procedures, maternity leave, nepotism, and other personnel concerns. In sum, affirmative action is a potentially powerful mechanism of organizational change, affecting almost every aspect of an organization's functioning, and enforceable through investigations by HEW or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  

---

1At least two major universities, Columbia and Michigan, federal contracts to the Universities have been held up as a result of on-site investigation.
The second reason for choosing affirmative action is that it is similar to long range planning in enough ways to offer opportunities for comparison and yet strikingly different from long range planning in other ways. The way in which affirmative action was implemented at the University of Cincinnati presented different problems to the organization and consequently required the President to intervene in ways that were different from what he did or might have done in regards to long range planning. For example, he relied on the Director of the Office of Resource Development to carry out certain functions, which she did very effectively. One of the purposes for this chapter is to explore the ways in which the model that has been proposed for the role performance of the organizational leader accommodates delegation.

There are certain limitations to the material in this chapter which are important to acknowledge from the outset.

1) Although many of the same sources of information - documents, observations, interviews - were used for both case studies, long range planning and affirmative action, fewer interviews were conducted on affirmative action than on long range planning. Consequently there is not the range of comments from participants about what they needed or expected as they encountered problems in implementing affirmative action procedures to draw on as there was an analysis of long range planning;

2) In some cases - such as personnel decisions - information was understandably withheld from the researcher that might have helped to explain certain events;

3) At the time at which the field study was completed in July, 1973 - it was difficult to assess the impact affirmative action had had on the University, for several reasons: a) a plan was due at HEW
July 1, 1973, but was not submitted; b) as of June 30th no analysis has been done of changes in recruitment or hiring patterns for September 30, 1972; in fact forms on which to monitor recruitment and hiring had only been introduced at the department and college level in May; and c) in early June, the Director of the Office of Resource Development was asked to leave the University and a new director for affirmative action was chosen, a major intervention, the effects of which were impossible to observe or incorporate in the case analysis.

In spite of these three limitations the information that was collected accurately documents the President's role and the change strategies of the former Director until June of 1973.

**Prospectus**

In the first part of this chapter some of the problems encountered in the implementation of an affirmative action program at the University of Cincinnati and the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation strategies used by the Director of the Office of Resource Development will be identified. It is important to review the strengths and weaknesses of her strategies for two reasons:

1) The development of an affirmative action program is a new process in all universities. Consequently, a description of what occurred and what worked or didn't work may be helpful to universities who are just starting to develop a plan and a program.

2) In the case of affirmative action at the University of Cincinnati, many of the objectives or conditions specified as important for the successful initiation, implementation,
and incorporation of change were accomplished by the change strategies of the Director of the Office of Resource Development. After reviewing what she did, the implications of her actions for the role performance of the organizational leader will be explored.

The purpose of the next section of this chapter will be to analyze the role of the University President in initiating, implementing, and incorporating an affirmative action program at the University of Cincinnati. Finally, an assessment of the progress and impact of an affirmative action plan/program at the University of Cincinnati will be made in the last section of this chapter. Some sort of an evaluation is needed in order to make statements about the effectiveness of the strategies the Director and the President used in unfreezing, changing, and refreezing organizational members' behavior, (although, in this case this is difficult given the major changes that took place in the Office of Resource Development after June 30, 1973 just as a plan for affirmative action was being developed).²

Problems Encountered in Implementing Affirmative Action

When deans and other administrators were asked what problems they had encountered or anticipated with the implementation of an affirmative action program, they identified two problems having to do with the Director of the Office of Resource Development's relationships with themselves and with groups they considered important to implementation. The two problems they identified were:

²A chronological summary of events in regards to affirmative action from January, 1972, until June, 1973, is included in Appendix C. The reader may wish to refer to it first before reading the case analysis that follows.
1) "She didn't communicate often enough or follow-up on what she said she would do."

2) She didn't make use of what would seem logical or natural groups to create peer expectations for change or to build informational and social support for new behaviors.

The American Association of University Professors' (AAUP's) criticisms of how affirmative action was being implemented at the University are one way to substantiate the lack of follow-up on the Director's part that others had identified. "The December 5th Policy statement was essentially the same as what the University Senate had recommended in May. [The Director] should have reaffirmed the University Senate document of the previous spring and gone on from there." The President and the vice presidents had however essentially decided to delay the statement until the fall in order to give the deans and unit directors a chance to make some input (see 7/15/72). The Director contacted the Provost in September and asked him to get responses back from the deans by October 15, 1972.\(^3\) In the meantime, between June and September while the Director worked on the development of a management-information system there was almost no communication between her office and the deans or department heads. "When there was not much communication in the fall, she lost ground" (a dean). The Director herself acknowledged in February that only nineteen out of fifty-one affirmative action coordinators had been appointed since July when she had asked that they be appointed.

\(^3\)The statement was then scheduled to come out October 27, 1972 but was delayed, for some reason, until December 4, 1973, when it appeared in Candid Campus.
"A list of the names of organizations to contact for minority and female candidates was not put out until early March which was too late to be of use" (though a case could probably be made on the other side of this argument given the 1973-74 budget constraints on hiring anyway). In any case there was some feeling among the people who were interviewed that the Director's forms to monitor recruitment and hiring came out too late in 1973 to be effective at the departmental level. Workshops in affirmative action were not held until March for the most part and when the College of Arts and Sciences was not represented in one of her workshops, the Director did not follow up. The head of one women's group remarked that the Director of Resource Development came to their initial meeting but did not come back. There was no follow-up to a workshop on institutional racism for the President's assistants though that had been discussed (an assistant). The Director did not reply to a request from the President's office to prepare a packet of information for the Chancellors office or for a State Senator until after having been reminded several times (a Presidential assistant). Finally timetables were set up that were never adhered to (see 3/30/73) which caused there to be a widely held impression of a lack of follow-up.

There are several aspects to the second problem respondents identified—a strategic mistake in not making use of informal and formal groups in the University to promote and legitimize the implementation of affirmative action. [The Director] "played too much of an advocacy role and missed opportunities for potential allies - the AAUP, the Faculty Senate, women's groups" (an administrator). "She didn't meet with informal groups such as
NOW (the National Organization of Women) or the Women's Coalition" (a
women's group representative). "She built external contacts with the
Women's City Club and the community councils but not with internal
people to insure what she needed done. She needed close working relation-
ships with those with responsibility for implementing an affirmative action
program" (an assistant dean). Several respondents said "that the Director
was not working with the department heads as much as she needed" (a women's
group representative). The use of affirmative action coordinators did not
work out very well since the deans did not build on an interest or know-
ledge of affirmative action in their choices. "The affirmative action
coordinators were chosen so as to be ineffective since the selections did
not take into consideration the size and flexibility of the unit" (an
assistant dean).

The formal and informal groups the Director could have taken advantage
of included both the deans and department heads in several of the colleges
and groups like the women's coalition and the AAUP. In the latter case,
the Director could have used her relationships with them in such a way as
to have made them forces for rather than against change. "Had she worked
with the department heads earlier than April she might have been able to
build some informational and social support for making changes in their
attitudes and actions toward women and minorities" (a dean).

Two other problems identified in interviews were 1) that budgetary
constraints interfered with the implementation of affirmative action, for
example, in moving toward salary equity for women; and 2) that the central
administration was not a good model in terms of affirmative action. For
example, affirmative action procedures were not followed in the search for
a new provost or in the appointments of two assistants to the Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs.⁴

Given that there are statements about problems encountered in implementation, what were the strengths and weaknesses of the change strategies used by the Office of Resource Development between March, 1972, and June, 1973?

The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Director of Resource Development's Change Strategies

The strengths of the Director of Resource Development's change strategies in the area of affirmative action lie in the second stage of the change process, changing/implementation and not in unfreezing. Unfreezing was essentially left to the President and the University Senate and occurred before the Director took office, while the Director turned her early attention once she had taken office to developing a management-information system that would reveal areas of under-utilization of minorities and women in the University.

There was essentially agreement between the Director and the President on some premises though as to how affirmative action would be approached: clearly, the whole philosophy of affirmative action is based on a strategy of working with parts of the system which share common

---

⁴This point may or may not be true in that a case can be presented on either side; however a majority of the persons who were interviewed felt that because the affirmative action process had not been visible in these appointments, that the central administration's credibility in the area of affirmative action was damaged.
dissatisfactions and a sense of powerlessness (Proposition 8). A second premise is that the development of an affirmative action plan at the University of Cincinnati would involve women and minorities through the University Senate as well as deans, department heads, governance leaders, and the President's office (Proposition 11). For example, the Director's strategy was to get every unit to set its own affirmative action "goals and timetables." She extended University/community involvement to include affirmative action coordinators and departmental secretaries who attended workshops and seminars along with the vice presidents, deans and department heads on federal laws and regulations and on the use of affirmative action forms. A third premise was that everyone - the President, the Director of Resource Development, the AAUP, and women's groups - believed that a commitment to future action was important in this case to change individual attitudes and institutional patterns (Proposition 19). Both the Provost's strategy of asking units to include a salary equity review in their budget decisions and the Director's strategy of having units write their own goals and timetables contributed to this end.

Weaknesses

The problems identified above by the persons who were interviewed show where the Director failed to build a base on which to change people's attitudes and behavior (Propositions 16 and 17). For the most part, she did not build the kinds of relationships she needed with department heads or informal groups (Propositions 5, 7, and 8). She met with deans but interacted infrequently with department heads or women's groups (Proposition 12); and, therefore, she did not significantly change the flow of
information to important "gate-keepers" (Proposition 6). She did not work through or in conjunction with other offices that had been working for affirmative action - i.e. the Personnel Office (Proposition 7). Often her abrasiveness and assertiveness alienated the very people she needed (a women's group representative). "All of her information made people feel inept" (an assistant dean) [Proposition 13].

When resistance continued to build over her role in the United Black Faculty Association (UBFA) investigations and over what the AAUP saw as non-compliance and delay, the Director countered their arguments with other arguments and did not effectively make the AAUP, the deans, or women's groups, etc., forces acting for her rather than against her (Proposition 18). Possibly, the AAUP committee members and the Dean of the College of Education were philosophically her closest allies and most clearly committed to affirmative action, but from about mid-February, 1973, on they did not offer the Director the kind of support they might have.

Another aspect of resistance to the Office of Resource Development is indicated by some of the comments in interviews about a lack of clarity about the Director's role. "Ostensibly she wanted the deans to take responsibility for affirmative action and yet she maintained the right to audit their hiring, etc." (an assistant dean).

Although the intent of the network of affirmative action coordinators was to provide support to the deans and department heads in implementing affirmative action (Proposition 27), the network skirted decision-making at the unit level, so that for the most part information was not getting back to the deans and department heads who had responsibility for
implementation through that route. Supportive relationships were probably needed more among the deans and department heads who were involved in long range planning, periodic-review procedures, personnel decisions, and a gruelling budget-review process. There were some factors in the later phases of change that interfered with the implementation of affirmative action that the Director was not in control of. For example, she was not in control of other demands on the deans and department heads (such as those listed above) that competed for their time and resources (Proposition 33). Nor did she have control over resource allocation in a year of a budget crisis so that she could not reinforce those units that made a commitment to affirmative action for women and minorities (Propositions 29 and 35).

**Strengths**

The strengths of the Director's change strategies were in the implementation phase. There were opportunities for deans to clarify what was expected of them and to ask questions about the new forms, about recruiting blacks and women, etc., in the meetings the Director had with them (Proposition 20). The use of affirmative action coordinators who had received the information and attended workshops was intended to be another way for deans to clarify the new behaviors that were expected from them. The Director's auditing of the records the deans kept for affirmative action provided another way to get feedback as to what was and was not required by compliance, what was reasonable good faith efforts and what were not (Proposition 21). The forms to report applicant flow and promotions, training, and termination, etc. were also a way for organizational members to test out new behaviors
(Proposition 22). The constant flow of information from the Office of Resource Development to the vice presidents and deans gave participants new meanings for and ways of looking at their experiences in relation to what was happening nationally in the area of affirmative action (Proposition 23). The Director also used external sources to reinforce internal changes (Proposition 29), when she brought in outside speakers from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Office of Civil Rights (see chronological summary 3/5/73, 5/17/73, 6/18/73). In asking units to be accountable and responsible for developing their own affirmative action plans, the Director provided opportunities for organizational members to make a public commitment to affirmative action (Proposition 19).

The management information system the Director worked to develop, which made computer print-outs on salaries and rank by department and college available, was one way to establish compatible organizational arrangements (Proposition 28), as well as to monitor the University's progress toward affirmative action (Proposition 30). Other examples of the Director's efforts to make organizational arrangements more compatible with proposed changes and to raise the general level of awareness about affirmative action (Proposition 3) were her work on child care, career counselling, contract compliance (just beginning as of June, 1973), and on a job-classification review (again just beginning in June, 1973).

A factor that is important to ensure change and is another strength of the Director's design is movement from general to more specific goals as change is undertaken (Dalton, et. al., 1968, p. 109). A review of the chronology of events and of the material the Director distributed shows
that over time the goals of affirmative action and the actions required by deans and department heads became increasingly specific (see the chronology of events 1/22/72, 9/29/72, 12/4/72, 2/16/73, 2/27/73, 3/20/73, 4/12/73, etc.). [Dalton, et. al., also said that for successful change to occur, the motivation to change has to become internalized. Possibly because the emotional resistance to affirmative action was never dealt with, this was never accomplished.]

Summary

Holding up what the Director did and didn't do against the set of propositions set forth in Chapter II, one finds that many of the conditions postulated as necessary for successful implementation were created by the actions the Director took, especially in the "changing" phase. In contrast many of the conditions in the unfreezing stage were not accomplished by what she did, though possibly by what the University Senate or President did (see the section in this chapter on the role of the University President in the implementation of affirmative action). In all three stages of the change process in regards to affirmative action, the Director tended to rely on a strategy of providing information about changes that were required. She also seemed to believe that the most effective strategy to achieve change was through compliance, by monitoring and enforcing affirmative action in processes of recruitment, hiring, promotions, terminations, etc. rather than by identification with a model or by internalization of a need to change.
The Role of the University President

in Affirmative Action

The purpose of this part of this chapter is to retrospectively analyze the role of the President in the development (initiation, implementation, and incorporation) of an affirmative action program at the University of Cincinnati in light of the propositions set forth in Chapter II. The first section will review the actions the President took to unfreeze attitudes of members of the University community towards affirmative action.

Unfreezing-Initiation

Proposition 1: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to assess the source and nature of resistance to the proposed change.

Proposition 2: To overcome the initial resistance of organizational members to the proposed change.

Proposition 3: To heighten organizational members' sensitivity to problems involving the intended change.

Proposition 4: To stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration in the system in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 6: To change the constellation of forces, resources, or information converging on any one part of the organization.

Bennis appointed the Director of the Office of Resource Development on January 22, 1972, three months after the need for an affirmative action plan had been discussed at an administrative retreat, two months after he had brought in the woman who was later named as the Director as a consultant on the Status of Women and Minorities at the University. In his speech
announcing the Director's appointment and in the actions he took throughout the spring and summer (see chronological summary 10/25/72, 6/29/73, and 7/15/73) Bennis demonstrated that he had assessed and anticipated resistance to affirmative action (Proposition 1). He used several strategies, in fact, to overcome resistance (Proposition 2). In the first place he tried to reduce the amount of anxiety aroused by affirmative action and to reassure faculty members that change would not have the threatening consequences they feared. For example, affirmative action was to be approached gradually: on June 7, 1972, Bennis moved back the University Senate's proposed timetable by two months. He suggested that the release of the University's policy statement on affirmative action "since it is far more subject to distortion and apprehension" be held up until the deans had had a chance to discuss it (7/15/72). In his speeches and correspondence Bennis tried to assure governance leaders and others in the University community that affirmative action would not jeopardize the principles of academic freedom and professional competence (see chronological summary 7/31/72). On other occasions, Bennis tried to relate the need for an affirmative action program to the acknowledged goals of faculty members and administrators. When he appointed the Director and the Associate Vice President for Community Relations, January 22, 1972, he wrote,

If colleges and universities are truly to provide education that will prepare their students for the diverse and complex world beyond the campus, then faculties and student bodies must reflect some of that diversity of the real world. Moreover it is clear that federal and state law requires us to
achieve greater balance and diversity in our faculties. Even if it were not right that we do so, which it is, it has now become mandatory as a matter of law (Propositions 2 and 3).

A fourth strategy Bennis used effectively to overcome the resistance he sensed to affirmative action was to try to undermine informational and motivational support for existing attitudes and behavior. Not only did he confront individuals with discordant information about the utilization of women and minorities in the University, but he also encouraged the Director to run national conferences on the Status of Women and Minorities at the University. Part of the reasoning underlying that request was that if people can see themselves differently (i.e. as at the forefront of a commitment to affirmative action) and change their actions (i.e. by hosting a national conference), resistant attitudes often change in turn.

Once people were assured that they "wouldn't lose their present satisfactions", they become more receptive to the information the Director was circulating on the need to change in order to comply with federal laws (Propositions 3 and 6). Again, through his speeches Bennis heightened the University community's sensitivity to problems in regards to affirmative action (Proposition 3). Metaphors like "a truly urban university" and the "more effective utilization of all our resources" built on the external requiredness of change (i.e. federal laws) to create new levels of aspiration in the system (Proposition 4).

Proposition 5: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to integrate new forces for change with existing forces for change, external forces for change with internal forces for change.
Proposition 7: To elicit support for the proposed organizational change from informal as well as formal leaders in the organization.

There are several examples of how Bennis built on internal forces for change (Proposition 5). In the first place he asked the University Senate to study and develop an affirmative action plan for the University (January, 1972). Senate reports became the basis of the University Policy Statements on Affirmative Action. On July 31, he asked the Faculty Council on Jewish Affairs to continue to collaborate and comment on the University's progress in the area of affirmative action. On June 7, 1972, Bennis asked the Provost to include some of the members of the Senate subcommittee who had written the University Senate's recommendations in the areas of student assistance and women's studies in his planning.

Bennis tried to elicit support for affirmative action from both informal and formal leaders in the organization (Proposition 7) by asking governance groups to develop affirmative action plans for committee representation (6/12/72) and by asking that deans be included in discussions reviewing the University Policy Statement on Affirmative Action.

Proposition 9: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to set priorities for the organization and to clearly communicate these priorities to organizational members whose behavior is to be changed.

Proposition 16: To build the organizational leader's credibility and expertise with organizational members.

Proposition 37: The organizational leader needs to be viewed as personally involved and committed to the change throughout the change process.
Proposition 9 under unfreezing states that it may be important for the organizational leader to set priorities for the organization. Both in what he said (speeches, policy statements, discussions with the Board of Directors) and in what he did, Bennis communicated a high priority for affirmative action (Propositions 9 and 16). For example, he directed the Provost to work with the Director to implement the University Senate's recommendation on child care (6/7/72) and to study and recommend anti-discrimination procedures for the University (6/7/72). He got Ford Foundation funding for an administrative intern program and hired a black man and white woman in the two positions. He invited Bernice Sandler from the American Association of Colleges' Project on the Status and Education of Women to be one of the first speakers in a series of lectures he had initiated called "Current Perspectives in Higher Education" (October 1972). Most importantly he committed the University's resources to affirmative action when he created the Office of Resource Development.

Proposition 8: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to link parts of the system that are sympathetic to the intended change and share common dissatisfactions and a sense of powerlessness.

Proposition 10: To create a sense of rising expectations among organizational members that they will benefit from the proposed change in their organizational behavior.

Proposition 11: To involve as many of the individuals to be affected by the proposed change as possible in planning and decision-making.
Proposition 12: To increase the amount and frequency of interaction between the organizational leader and members in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 13: To heighten organizational members' self-esteem and to encourage reciprocity in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 14: To establish and maintain a climate of acceptance, support, and trust in interpersonal relationships in which change is regarded positively.

Proposition 15: To effect and demonstrate change in the organization's relationships with other systems.

Proposition 17: To extend the organizational leader's control over varied kinds of resources and sources of power.

It is not possible to cite specific actions that the President took to accomplish these objectives, although, as we have seen, some of the Director's implementation strategies, which were summarized above, did create the conditions described in the propositions, especially in regards to involving people to be affected by the proposed change in planning and decision-making; in setting their own goals and timetables (Proposition 11).

The actions described so far demonstrate Bennis' commitment to affirmative action (Proposition 37) and apparent effectiveness in un-freezing the University community toward affirmative action. That is not to say that as a result of Bennis' leadership there was no resistance in the community to affirmative action. A great deal of initial resistance to affirmative action was never overcome; other resistance emerged when expectations and timetables were not met.

Changing/Implementation

Proposition 27: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to remove barriers to change and to provide organizational members with necessary skills, knowledge, training, and resources in
order to increase their capacity to implement the proposed change.

Proposition 27 states that it may be important for the organizational leader in this phase to redefine his role vis-a-vis the change processes he has initiated - to have less ownership in the change ideas and to be more responsive to subordinates' initiatives. Especially in the three months between January and March, and actually until July, Bennis was a visible spokesman for affirmative action; his actions effectively changed the balance of forces in the system toward affirmative action. Once the Director came and began to take responsibility for affirmative action, the nature and frequency of Bennis' interventions in regards to affirmative action began to change. The Director, as we have seen, provided the leadership for "changing", much as Bennis had done for "unfreezing."

Perhaps the most visible action Bennis took during this second stage, "changing", were to make resources available to the Office of Resource Development (Proposition 27). He allowed the Office of Resource Development to overspend its budget. He made computer time available. He paid for printing and for xeroxing. The Commission on Affirmative Action was funded from the President's discretionary fund. The Ford intern in the Provost's office was asked to research anti-discrimination processes at other universities. Bennis appointed a committee to draft the charge, role, organizational structure, and membership etc., of the Affirmative Action Commission and later of the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal. Both of these last two interventions provided staff assistance to the Office of Resource Development.
Proposition 24: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to provide role models for new behavior patterns.

In other ways the President acted as a model for affirmative action (Proposition 24). He made his committee appointments with affirmative action in mind (though he balked at using every appointment he had to make to balance the representation of women and blacks on committees). He appointed women and blacks in his own office. Black candidates were recruited and considered in the search for a new provost.\(^5\) He put pressure on the Provost to implement affirmative action/salary equity in the budget-review process and asked all of the vice presidents as early as April, 1972, (4/11/72), to keep records of recruitment and appointment procedures in their own offices. Others who were interviewed said Bennis could have used the budget even more effectively than he did to set University priorities. For example, he could have required documentation of an affirmative action/salary equity review before he approved any new positions for a unit or acted favorably on a unit's personnel decisions.

Proposition 18: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to overcome emerging resistance to the proposed change during the period of attempted implementation.

Proposition 20: To continually clarify and to provide mechanisms by which organizational members can gain clarification of the behavioral changes required.

\(^5\)On the other hand Bennis has been criticized for not following affirmative action in the search processes he chaired. Positions were advertised but the ad, in at least one case appeared after the selection and appointment had been made. There is probably some validity to the charge that Bennis could have used the search processes he chaired as an opportunity to more visibly model affirmative action for the University community.
There is some evidence that Bennis intervened in this stage to clarify the role of the Office of Resource Development (especially in regards to the appointment activity forms) which was causing some resistance in the University (Proposition 20) [see chronological summary 4/23/73]. In February, 1973, when the AAUP criticized the implementation of affirmative action, Bennis had the Provost, the University's Legal Counsel and the Director meet with AAUP representatives (Proposition 18). Later he apologized to the Director for the resistance he had caused about the role of the Affirmative Action Commission (see chronological summary 3/22/73).

Proposition 28: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to change existing organizational arrangements so that they are as compatible as possible with the behavioral changes that are required.

Bennis also intervened in this stage to try to make departmental changes towards affirmative action part of an "interrelated system of role behaviors" (Proposition 28). He envisioned that the unit's affirmative action goals and timetables would be incorporated in the unit's next long range plan and he supported the Director's efforts to develop a management-information system when he appointed a new Vice President for Management and Finance and when he urged the PPBS committee to continue working on departmental profiles which he knew would be helpful to the Director of Resource Development (Proposition 28). The appointment of an Affirmative Action Commission is still another attempt to provide support to the Office of Resource Development. A review of the University's
grievance procedures in cases of alleged discrimination and the establishment of a day care cooperative are two additional objectives the President worked for in order to establish compatible organizational arrangements for affirmative action goals (Proposition 28).

Proposition 29: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to reinforce and reward even tentative changes organizational members make in the direction of the intended income.

Comparative standard setting is one way the organizational leader can reinforce even tentative behavioral changes on the part of organizational members (Proposition 29). In an interview with the Cincinnati Post Times Star in March, 1973, that was later published, Bennis said that the University of Cincinnati was far ahead of any other university in Ohio in terms of affirmative action. He used Bernice Sandler's letter to the Director (3/5/73) to demonstrate internally that the University's plan for affirmative action looked good from an outsider's perspective. Bennis also tried to create a condition in which the "expectations of significant others" would be an important factor in a unit's planning by appointing influential Cincinnatians to the Affirmative Action Commission charged with reviewing units' affirmative action plans.

Proposition 19: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to provide opportunities for organizational members to make their commitment to the proposed change public.

Proposition 21: To provide mechanisms for feedback between the leader and the people undergoing change.
Proposition 22: To provide organizational members with opportunities to test and verify new behaviors through personal experience.

Proposition 23: To offer organizational members new meanings or new ways of looking at their experiences in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 25: To encourage experimentation and risk-taking on the part of organizational members in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 26: To redefine the leader's role in relation to the change processes initiated.

In regards to Proposition 26 the President did redefine his role in relation to the proposed change: as the Director of Resource Development assumed responsibility for the implementation of affirmative action, the President became less involved. Again the Director's implementation strategies created many of the conditions described in Propositions 19, 22, 23, and 25. In regards to Proposition 21, in the next section it will be shown how the President failed to establish a procedure for giving feedback to the Director, much as the Director failed to establish feedback mechanisms with the units.

Finally, there are several ways in which the President tried to demonstrate his personal interest and commitment to affirmative action (Proposition 37). As already mentioned, he hired blacks and women and he made committee appointments in the spirit of affirmative action. He intervened in at least one personnel decision to block the appointment of an individual who had been charged by the United Black Faculty Association as being racist.6 Finally, when black students presented a list of

---

6In this case the individual also had a questionnable publication record. Bennis might have intervened for either reason.
thirty-three grievances/demands in the fall he created a task force that spent hundreds of hours from November until March investigating the charges and making recommendations to the President.

Refreezing-Incorporation

Proposition 30: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to monitor organizational members' performance in coping with and integrating the proposed change.

Proposition 31: To objectively evaluate changes that have occurred.

One of the factors that jeopardized refreezing was an increasing number of problems between the President and the Director over issues unrelated to affirmative action and more related to their interpersonal relationship. When persons who were interviewed were asked what the President could have done differently in regards to affirmative action, one person replied, among other things, "he could have given the Director open feedback" (an assistant dean) [Proposition 21]. Throughout the chronology of events there is evidence that the Director felt a need to meet more with the President (for example, see the chronological summary 11/29/72, 2/8/73, 5/1/73). The Office of Resource Development was not well integrated into the President's office (Proposition 26 re: reciprocity in decision-making). The Director did not attend assistants' meetings although she had the title of "Special Assistant to the President." The

---

7 The effect the President had on the Director by not meeting with her was to create ambiguity for her about how she would be evaluated to the point where she openly admitted she did not feel supported by the President (Proposition 27), did not feel like risk-taking was rewarded (Proposition 25) or reciprocated (Proposition 26).
Office of Resource Development was left off the President's Advisory Council, though the Director on her own initiative attended the meetings. A lack of trust on both sides perpetuated an adversarial relationship between the Director and the President. The Director accused the President of not working with his own office in the areas of affirmative action and institutionalized racism. She felt that women's and minorities perspectives were not included in top-level decision-making. On the one hand, not having an open relationship (open communication) with the Director of Resource Development prevented Bennis from monitoring her way of operating (Proposition 30). Rather, he was dependent on second-hand information (which ranged from his assistants' opinions to those of the Parking Office). Although he asked the Director for a long range plan for her office and a status report on affirmative action it was difficult for him to objectively evaluate her accomplishments based on his own knowledge (Proposition 31).

Bennis never did overcome initial resistance in the University to the Director's appointment (her high salary, car, expensive office) nor growing resistance in the system to her style. When he got signals from deans and department heads that they did not like her role (see summary February, 1973), those reports confirmed his feelings that she was alienating the very people she needed to work with in order for affirmative action to be implemented. "The Director's power to intervene had to be worked out," one department head said. "A lack of definition in her job led to conflict between her and the President" (an assistant dean). In June, 1973, the President asked the Director to leave her position as
Director of the Office of Resource Development and appointed another black woman to take her place. Bennis had anticipated potential black and community (Cincinnati) resistance to the Director's forced resignation and consulted with them extensively prior to taking any action.

By mid-May Bennis knew that he was going to ask the Director to resign. At that point Bennis felt like he could not afford to spotlight efforts toward the development of an affirmative action plan without dredging up a lot of smouldering resistance to affirmative action and laying himself open to a lot of criticism when he did announce his decision, so that when he gave his speech to the University faculty on 5/17/73 the President never mentioned affirmative action as a priority of the University. There are other examples of cross pressures on his role as president that constrained Bennis from taking other action he might have taken in this stage of the change process, refreezing.

---

8As of July 1, 1973, the Director had not resigned but she had left her office. Interestingly, this intervention on the part of the President might have caused more movement in the direction of affirmative action in the system than any other action he had taken. As a result of this action several class action suits were filed with the Equal Opportunity Commission and with HEW. An HEW team conducted an on-site investigation of the University of Cincinnati in December, 1973. Their report is just being filed as this chapter is being written. In the meantime the President has made a commitment to spend whatever it takes in the 1974-75 budget to achieve salary equity.

9The President did not consult with the women's coalition however, until after he had made his decision. The women's coalition has since filed an injunction to prevent the new Director from taking office (which she has) on the grounds that she was not qualified and a class action suit with HEW on the grounds that affirmative action was not followed in naming the first Director's successor.
Proposition 32: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to maintain continuity at some levels of the organization while change takes place at other levels.

Proposition 33: To insulate the organization from conflicting or competing ideas and to give organizational members time to assimilate and integrate new behaviors.

Proposition 35: To give emotional support and resources to organizational members who demonstrate behaviors in the direction of the intended change.

Proposition 36: To give visibility and credibility to the change within the entire system and to spread information about the consequences of the change to other parts of the organization, thereby diminishing a negative response in other parts of the system and encouraging system-wide support and adoption.

One of the propositions in refreezing states that it may be important for the organizational leader to give resources and emotional support to organizational members who demonstrate change in their behavior (Proposition 35). The Dean of the College of Education at the University of Cincinnati had announced that he would strive for salary equity through his budget promotion and tenure decisions. If Bennis had not had information that enrollments in Education were sharply declining, he might have given the College enough money to achieve that goal and then let the College of Education stand as a model for affirmative action in the University (Proposition 36).

The budget interfered in other ways with "refreezing". The vice presidents recommended in April that the proposal for a child care council not be brought up that spring "with all the problems yet to be solved with
respect to the budget" (5/11/73). Not being able to fund day care centers interfered with Bennis' goal of involving new constituent groups in the University and with an important aspect of affirmative action. The lateness of the budget (approved early summer) undermined affirmative action since recruitment of women for open positions was made more difficult.

Proposition 34: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to link parts of the organization or individuals whose behavior has been changed as well as to link processes of change occurring simultaneously.

Proposition 34 states that one objective of the organizational leader's actions in incorporating change may be to link on-going, simultaneous change processes. In this case, the President envisioned that each unit's affirmative action goals and timetables would be incorporated in its long range plan. Another process that might have been linked to affirmative action was admissions. However, the President would have come under tremendous political backlash had he intervened in admissions (traditionally a faculty prerogative) to give preferential treatment to women and blacks. Finally, in trying to link budget decisions to affirmative action, Bennis was caught between the University Senate's recommendation for merit (pro affirmative action) salary increases and the Faculty Senate's recommendation for across-the-board cost of living increases which maintain the status quo and undermine movement in the direction of affirmative action.

All of these forces acted as constraints on Bennis' ability to take actions as the organizational leader to reinforce and support change in the direction of affirmative action. It has also been shown how a lack of communication with the Director prevented the President from being as
involved in affirmative action as he might have been during the implementation stage and how it prevented him from monitoring her role performance except through second-hand sources, during the "refreezing" stage.

The purpose of the next section is to attempt to assess the impact an affirmative action program has had on the University of Cincinnati in order to explore the implications of the Director's actions for the role performance of the University President. Could it be that some of the roles that have been proposed for the organizational leader can be delegated?

Accomplishments/Impact

One of the problems with change in higher education is that it is difficult to measure progress or outcomes. Specifying criteria for the evaluation of change thus becomes one of the most important roles for the organizational leader. What criteria did the President establish for evaluating the Office of Resource Development? How did he apply those criteria? How did accomplishments in the area of affirmative action measure up to what he had expected?

When he appointed the Director of the Office of Resource Development, Bennis outlined five responsibilities for the Office in developing an affirmative action plan for the University (see the chronological summary, 1/22/72). Several of these responsibilities were externally oriented - i.e. fund-raising for special programs, organizing programs between the University and the community, etc. The indicators that the President would use
for each task were never specified. Although Bennis did ask the
Director to submit a summary or report of her first fifteen months,
most of the information he got about affirmative action was second-hand,
either from the deans, through the AAUP, or through his assistants.
"Unfortunately, [the Director's] profile was high on things
that irritated the President (parking, her budget, her feud with
the student government), and low on substantive accomplishments in
the area of affirmative action," one dean commented. A few times
Bennis intervened to redefine the Director's role, generally to reaffirm
its staff rather than line function (see 11/19/72 and 4/23/73). He met
with her only four times between September, 1972, and June, 1973, when he
asked her to resign (10/30/72, 11/29/72, 3/26/73, and one other time
in late spring). He did not meet with her when the AAUP was making
charges of delay and non-compliance. The other indications of the way
the President was evaluating the Director in particular and affirmative
action in general are seen in comments he made in assistants' and vice
presidents' meetings along the line of "She doesn't know what she does to
bring on all of her problems," and "She is alienating the very people she
will need to implement affirmative action" (5/4/73).

A second way in which to assess progress in the area of affirmative
action is to look at the statistical information that is available on the
number of blacks and women who were hired for open positions in September,
1972, and in September, 1973; who were appointed to committee positions:
who were getting salaries comparative to those given to white males in the
same position with the same qualifications, etc. In other words to what
extent does statistical information show that units were taking affirmative action to recruit, hire, promote, and train minorities and women as of June 30, 1973?¹⁰

Statistical information is available and was included in the Director's 7/1/73 report to HEW (see Appendix E). Data compiled in October, 1973, for September, 1973, show that

60 females were hired for 136 open positions. 14 while minority candidates were hired but there is no statistical information available to show that equity was established for women's and minorities' salaries in any college.

By June 1973 forms to record and monitor all appointments were being used in the Medical College and provostial area. Statistically there is evidence to show that affirmative action was being taken at most levels of the University.¹¹

¹⁰Available statistical information, however, cannot be used to show a lack of effectiveness on the part of the Office of Resource Development since the phenomena might be due to a number of other factors such as a lack of open positions, or a lack of qualified minority or female applicants, etc. Nor can it be used to establish the effectiveness of the Office since the phenomena might result from a number of other factors - increased societal consciousness, open positions, and qualified minority and female applicants, the requirements of federal grants or contracts held by the department, etc.

¹¹"Affirmative Action is not just a hiring program, but a systematic intervention that affects program review, retention, transfers, promotion, interaction with the surrounding community, involvement in governance mechanisms, special committee assignments and the inclusion of women and minorities in all aspects of the University" (7/1/73 Report to HEW, p. 5). Statistical data on all these aspects of affirmative action will not be available until the University of Cincinnati submits its plan for affirmative action to HEW and complies with the recommendations of an HEW investigation in December, 1973, if then.
A third way to measure the impact of affirmative action on the University is to compare the goals the Director established for herself with what she accomplished. The goals the Director established for herself included the development of a management-information system (a data-based reporting and monitoring system to show inequities and the under-utilization of minorities and women), building trustful relationships with the deans and department heads, the appointment of affirmative action coordinators, a review of the University's policies and procedures for compliance with federal laws and regulations, and a review of University grievance procedures. A review of the Director's May 1, 1973, report indicates that in her opinion most of these goals were being accomplished. She wrote

This has been a productive year and four months; very trying, full of tension surrounding the establishment of a non-conforming enclave (Etzioni). There has been too much work to do and too much expected with the resources available. Yet much more has been done than one could reasonably expect under the circumstances.

The primary objective of this Office will remain [emphasis mine] as follows: to establish a communications network with colleges, departments, and their administrators and personnel, to work with them in undertaking workshops and educational seminars to increase their ability to understand and interpret the laws, regulations, and guidelines, and to maintain a position that firmly supports the belief of this Office that affirmative action must be implemented at every level of the University, and decisions made, to the extent possible, at the lowest possible decision-making level, depending on the nature of the issue.
Two months later in her report to HEW the Director of Resource Development wrote,

The University of Cincinnati is the first major university or college, perhaps the first higher education institution, to develop its overall affirmative action plan from the departmental level through the college level, with each unit of the institution developing its own plan, involving its own personnel, academic and non-academic, establishing via this approach, the importance of committing every level of the institution to affirmative action, developing the importance of accepting responsibility at each decision-making level for its effective implementation and accepting accountability for future results.

Of two other criteria the Director proposed for evaluating the implementation of affirmative action, one was involvement (5/1/73). She never compromised her strategy to get every unit to set its own goals and timetables for the more effective use of minorities and women. By June 1st applicant flow forms were being used in every unit as well as other forms she had introduced to monitor a unit's relationship to its employees, in training, promotion, transfer, and termination. Each unit was also expected to develop its own affirmative action plan by April 30, 1973 (see 3/3/73). The Director would also cite the number of people who were informed of affirmative action laws and guidelines as a measure of her effectiveness in involving the University Community in affirmative action. The other criteria the Director proposed was observability. By that she meant the extent to which an affirmative action perspective was included in the decisions and policies of the University.
A review of the chronological summary shows that she felt deliberately excluded from decision-making in the President's office, even though she saw herself as the spokesman for an affirmative action perspective. In sum, the Director probably saw herself as effective with the units in implementing affirmative action and unsuccessful in gaining access to or support from the President.

A fourth way to assess the impact of affirmative action on the University would be to assume that an effective affirmative action program would intensify the visibility and pressure of special interest groups and then to question whether or not this has occurred. There is some evidence to show that it did: black students presented a list of thirty-three grievance/demands to the University in November; the United Black Faculty Association conducted its first investigation into institutionalized racism in the College of Education; the AAUP badgered the President throughout February about delays in implementing an affirmative action plan; a coalition of women's groups presented the University with a list of its concerns in April and filed a class action suit with HEW early in July. On the other hand there was some backlash to administrative proposals in the area of affirmative action: for example, the Faculty Senate recommended that money for salary increases be used for across-the-board, cost-of-living supplements instead of for salary equity for women.

Looking at affirmative action in these four ways it becomes almost impossible to make one statement about the impact of affirmative action on the University. By June, 1973, some progress had been made at the
college level but not at the departmental level toward understanding what affirmative action means to higher education. A reporting and monitoring system had been introduced. By October, 1973, the community would have had comparative data over a three-year period on the utilization of women and minorities. None of the goals the units had set for themselves in draft plans had been reviewed, however, by June of 1973. Nor had a comprehensive plan for the University been written by that date. Furthermore, there are some strong indications that the Director had not built the kinds of workable relationships she would need with the President's office, with the Personnel office, with women's groups, or with the deans and department heads in order to implement an affirmative action plan. There are also strong indications that the President would not be able to build on whatever the Director had accomplished, once he had made a decision to ask her to resign.

Summary and Conclusions

It was shown in this case study that the behaviors that the people undergoing change said they needed from the organizational leader again corresponded to the actions the set of propositions set forth in Chapter II propose for the leader, even though the problems people encountered in trying to implement affirmative action were different from the ones they encountered in long range planning. In this case, implementation would have been facilitated if there had been follow-up and if workable relationships had been established between the Office of Resource Development and
relevant individuals and groups in the University, i.e. department heads, the Personnel Office, women's groups, etc. One conclusion that it is possible to reach after reviewing the case is that the organizational leader needs to monitor the change processes that he has initiated in order to insure their success\(^{12}\) whether or not he's delegated responsibility for the change to someone else. Without monitoring change, the organizational leader cannot control, support, reward, or redirect the way things are going. In this case if the President had been monitoring the development of an affirmative action program more closely he could have given the Director the kind of support she felt she needed and he could have intervened where her strategy of implementation was "weak", i.e. drawing on his knowledge of the University's structure and culture by advising her to pay more attention to her relationships with the Personnel Office and with department heads. Having failed to establish a workable (open) relationship with the Director himself during the implementation stage, it was impossible for Bennis to perform some of the roles postulated as necessary for incorporating change - objective evaluation, for example. It has also been shown in this chapter how certain role constraints or cross pressures interfered with the President's role performance during refreezing, such as the budget.

\(^{12}\)The word "monitoring" here includes steps taken to establish reporting systems, develop performance objectives, measure results, to take corrective actions, and to administer rewards and sanctions (see Mintzberg, The Nature of Managerial Work, 1973).
Finally, in this case a significant number of the conditions specified as important for the successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation of change have been created by actions by someone other than the organizational leader, the Director of Resource Development. Correspondingly, one would think that the change process would be further along and more successful. There is evidence to show that this was not the case with affirmative action at the University of Cincinnati (see the section on impact earlier in this chapter and the postscript that follows). The case study of affirmative action lends some support to the assumption made in the initial stages of this research that "the degree to which a proposed change is initiated, implemented, and incorporated is a function of a number of variables, many of which can be linked to the role performance of the organizational leader" (see page 3). This case raises some questions about the extent to which responsibility for initiation, implementation, and incorporation can be delegated, especially to someone outside the perceived power structure without the acknowledged, legitimate authority of the leader himself. It seems as if organizational members are unwilling to accord someone other than the organizational leader legitimate authority to influence their actions and that even if this were to occur that they would still expect the leader to intervene to clarify roles and to set limits on that person's authority.
Postscript

In June of 1973, Bennis appointed another woman to be the Director of the Office of Resource Development renamed the Office of University Commitment to Human Resources. A plan was not submitted to HEW on July 31, 1973 because the goals and timetables outlined by the units in their plans had not been reviewed by anyone in the University to see if they were reasonable and attainable. Instead January 31, 1974, was set as the time by which the University would have to submit an affirmative action plan to HEW. In the meantime the unit plans have been reviewed and the former Director's record-keeping forms have been modified.

In July of 1973 the Director filed several complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and with the Office of Civil Rights, HEW, on essentially three grounds: racial and sexual discrimination and arbitrary dismissal with fear of retribution. Her complaints were interpreted by HEW to be class-action suits. As a result of these charges HEW conducted an on-site investigation at the University of Cincinnati in the fall of 1973. They recommended among other things that the University make the salaries of equally qualified men and women in comparable positions equitable which the University has pledged to do in the 1974-75 budget.

13That is that there might be a group of women, of which the Director is only one, that are being discriminated against on these same grounds and who are keeping quiet because they fear retribution.
CHAPTER VII

CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BUDGET REVIEW/RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the role of the University President in the development and implementation of a budget-review and resource allocation process. The entire budget-making process is far more extensive than description in this chapter will show. This chapter will focus on the University President's role only as it relates to internal decision-making about resource allocation and not to external resource procurement. In other words it will not be concerned for the most part with the organizational leader's role as a fund-raiser or lobbyist. Only those external activities of the leader that influence the initiation, implementation, and incorporation of a new way of arriving at budgetary decisions will be included in the description and analysis that follows.

A case analysis of the President's role in the internal budget-making process was done for several reasons. In the first place, the amount of resources in an organization and the process by which they are allocated, directly effect the implementation of any kind of change

---

1Material for this chapter came from a study of documents in the office of the University President, from observation of budget hearings and meetings, and from interviews with fifteen individuals who were highly involved in one or more phases of the budget-review process.
in the organization. If for no other reason than that, the budget-making process is important to study. It is probably more important to study given the changing economic and social conditions facing higher education: rising costs and decreasing support. "Universities will be faced with no substantial increases in total support from present sources in the foreseeable future. Such increases as may come to the University will barely match inflationary pressures, if that. Any funds for new programs, different emphasis, or expanding needs must therefore come either from new external sources or from internal reallocation" (the Provost, 2/2/73). In other words, change in universities in the future will more than likely result from the reallocation of resources than from the addition of new resources as has been the case in the past. The way in which resources are reallocated will influence the fate of other changes introduced in the University.

Given that in years of severe financial stingency, the budgetary decision-making process may be qualitatively different from what it has been in the sixties - involving more participation, consultation, and information-sharing than in years past, it is possible that the role performance of the organizational leader in initiating, implementing, and incorporating change may be far more important than in other circumstances. The prospect of deficit budgets may lead organizational members to need or expect certain actions from the organizational leader that may or may not be included in the propositions presented in Chapter II. An interest in exploring that possibility is a second reason for choosing
to do a case analysis of the President's role in the budget review/resource allocation process.

The third reason for choosing to do this chapter relates to what was mentioned above. Decision-making about resource allocation was the only internal change process observed in which the University President had an extensive external role - in lobbying with other state university presidents for more money for higher education and in trying to locate new sources of income for the University. This case offered an opportunity to understand what effects a leader's external activities might have on his actions in initiating, implementing, and incorporating change within the organization.

As in the other cases, a chronological summary of events that occurred in the academic year from September, 1972 to June, 1973 is included in Appendix F. In the first part of this chapter some of the problems, as well as the values and benefits, that participants, including the University President, encountered in implementing the budget-making process will be described. The purpose of the rest of the chapter will be to retrospectively analyze the University President's leadership in the development and implementation of a participative budget-review process. What were the President's interventions in regards to the internal budget-making process? Secondly, what actions could he have taken, given what the propositions say about the role

---

2 The reader may wish to review the chronological summary in Appendix F before reading the case analysis that follows.
performance of the organizational leader? And thirdly, to what extent did the actions he took successfully unfreeze, change, and refreeze the attitudes, expectancies, and behaviors of organizational members in regards to resource allocation? Responses in interviews will be used to discuss the answers to each of those questions in the final section of this chapter.


The chronological summary of events included in the Appendix reveals that there were a number of problems encountered in attempting to implement the 1973-74 budget review/resource allocation process. Excerpts from interviews with members of the Faculty and University Senates' Budget and Priorities Committees and the Budget Review Commissions, with the deans, and with the vice presidents will be used to substantiate what these major problems were. Several recommendations these persons made for improving the 1974-75 budget-making process are also included in this section. Implicit in the description of the problems and in the recommendations are a number of actions that the people undergoing change said they needed or expected the University President (or in some cases the vice presidents) to take in regards to the 1973-74 budget review process. The major problems may be grouped under several headings.
Credibility

Several Senate committee and budget review commission members questioned skeptically whether the Senates' or commissions' recommendations would make any difference in final budget allocations. Several individuals shared perceptions of the vice presidents that ran from highly committed to an open participative process to highly resistant to such a process. A majority of the persons interviewed felt that the President should have shared his ideas on resource allocation and program evaluation earlier in the budget-review process giving greater credibility to its openness. It was felt that the President's criteria for assessing programs were unknown throughout this entire process (see chronological summary 5/22/73). One vice presidential budget was cited that did not reflect review commission recommendations. In another case it was felt that the criteria that had been laid out for the budget-review process in one vice presidential area - effective management of resources, quality of instructional programs, commitment to urban-related programs - were ultimately not followed in coming to decisions about resource allocations. Rather cuts that were expedient, that represented the course of least resistance were made (a unit director). Others felt there was a problem with credibility when the real deficit the University faced turned out to be 1.5% lower than the projected deficit and when it was discovered that the University actually had not had to borrow 1/2 million dollars on its reserves in 1972-73.
Assumptions Underlying Budget Allocations

More than one person who was interviewed felt that the budget was predicated on some assumptions that were not explicit and that had not been widely discussed (see chronological summary, 11/11/72, 3/14/73 and 3/28/73). They felt that these assumptions locked the budget in before the governance groups' reviews. In this regard they suggested that a clearly articulated and agreed-upon set of University priorities would have helped community discussion as would a long range plan for the University. Even the Provost felt that one of the problems with the 1973-74 budget review process was that there was no University-wide framework within which to make decisions. "Only the President can make certain decisions on allocations between vice presidential areas" (the Provost).

Timing

There were several concerns about timing. Students felt that the budget-review came at times when it was difficult for them to participate, at the end of quarters. Almost all of those interviewed objected to the condensed amount of time governance groups were given to review the budget. They similarly felt that deadlines were set up which they adhered to and then were not met at other levels. Representatives from both Senate committees felt that it was late in the academic year, February/March, before the governance groups came to understand the input they would have in the budget-review process; until then they never knew what document they'd review, when, or for how long. Given that they had only a week to complete a review of the budget, most of the persons interviewed felt that they had
to spend too much time just getting responses and requesting information that was not readily available. Several of the deans felt that the entire budget review/resource allocation process took too long and that decisions that needed to be made in November and December - such as whether or not to recruit for open positions - were not being made until May or June (see chronological summary 2/26/73).

Lack of Feedback

Although the President acted on two of the University Senate's recommendations - merit salary raises and no student fee increases - many of the persons interviewed cited a lack of feedback to the documents the Senates submitted as a problem. Others felt that no rationales had been given for changes in budgetary allocations that had gone from the review commissions to the Council of Vice Presidents and from the Council to the President. Several review commission members felt that the individual vice presidential reports should be circulated to review commission members for review and comment before going to the Council of Vice Presidents. Others would have liked to have seen the insert from the Provost's report detailing specific unit allocations in that they felt that the rationales for those allocations were indicative of priorities being set implicitly, if not explicitly.

Information

In interviews several questions about the information provided and the kinds of information Committee and Commission members felt they needed were asked. There was disagreement over whether line item budgets should or should not be provided. The Faculty Senate report contains the following
statement. "We were unable to obtain line item budgets for various units; we were given no detailed breakdown of how cuts would be achieved in most areas; and there was virtually no information which would put spending and income patterns in an historical perspective."

Information was more easily bootlegged into the University Senate because several committee members had had access to information at earlier stages of the budget review process. There was a fairly high degree of concurrence that profile data on colleges and departments should be made readily available as well as information in usable form on student enrollment, faculty/student ratios, Ohio Board of Regents' models, etc. Obviously program evaluation materials would have been helpful if available. This year the first document that was made available was the Council of Vice Presidents' recommendations which was described as distilled and uncorroborated by some of the persons who were interviewed. One recommendation that several committee members made was that uniform kinds of information be made available across colleges and vice presidential areas as much as possible. Generally the respondents leaned in favor of more information, not less. They specifically requested two kinds of information not available this year be available next year: a reconciliation between the Senates' recommendations of the previous year and the continuation budget and a reconciliation between the continuation budget in the fall and the spring budget figures which were discrepant in many cases. The reconciliations should also include adequate explanations for any increases or decreases, they felt.
Role of the Governance Groups in the Review Process

There was considerable disagreement among governance group members' perceptions of the role the Senates should play in the budget-review process, or in fact did play. Apparently there were also inconsistent expectations among the vice presidents for the Senates' participation in the process. One vice president wanted reactions to the Council of Vice Presidents' recommendations and not a statement of priorities; another advised the committees to state priorities since they represented the entire University community. There seems to be in retrospect several alternative roles for the governance groups to play in the budget-review process including: 1) institutional priority setting; 2) addressing of inequities; 3) advocate for special interest groups; or 4) program evaluation. (All of the persons who were interviewed agreed that without more time and information and explicit criteria the last would not be within the purview of the Senates' Budget and Priorities Committees.) Whichever role the Senate committees played, it was agreed that their recommendations would only be advisory to the President.

Role of the Advisory Budget Review Commissions

The lack of uniformity among the roles the commissions played in the various vice presidential area was cited as a problem. Most of the persons interviewed felt that review commission recommendations should be reflected in the vice presidents' report, and that in some cases they were not during the 1973-74 budget-review process. It was also felt that the opportunity to compare the way advisory commissions operated (perhaps through overlapping memberships) in the various vice presidential areas would have been helpful.
The Role of the Deans in the Budget Review/Resource Allocation Process

Several persons recommended that the deans as a group be more meaningfully involved in budgetary decisions, and perhaps be asked as a group to review the Council of Vice Presidents' document. With the deans more fully involved, it was assumed that the faculty could become more fully involved at the grassroots departmental and college level. It was felt that the deans needed to share total budgets with each other and not just the parts of budgets they had identified for cuts in order to get away from the competitiveness that was at times evident in the 1973-74 budget review process. Some of the deans themselves felt that the vice presidents also needed to reject the budget presentations of those deans who did not identify programmatic implications of 3%, 6%, and 9% cuts. Finally the Faculty Senate's Report on the budget stated that deans in general needed to play much broader role in evaluating the non-academic service and support areas of the University, in recommending budget allocations, and in determining University priorities.

Lack of Expertise to Ask the Right Questions and

Unfamiliarity with Accounting

Finally, the last problem identified by the persons who were interviewed was inexperience and a lack of expertise in accounting and budget-making that interfered with their meaningful participation in the budget-review process. Although this was a problem the only suggestion made was to provide more information and explanations to governance groups and review commissions at an earlier date.
Values and Benefits

In addition to the problem areas described above, there were also certain benefits or values to governance group and review commission participation in the budget-review/resource allocation process that deserve mentioning. In many cases these values were a result of actions the President took to create the conditions described in the propositions for the successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation of change. The strengths of the budget review/allocation process included introspection, sharing of information, widespread participation, the ordering of priorities, increased visibility and accountability, the clarification of issues, and a perception of increased credibility in some quarters.

Introspection

"Perhaps at no time - certainly not in recent years - have the academic units of the University examined so critically their resources and the utilization of those resources. While the preparation of long range plans some six months earlier had begun the process of introspection, it was the prospect of budget reductions that caused many units to look critically at realities and possibilities as never before" (the Provost's recommendations to the President, 2/2/73).

Sharing of Information

"Not only did the budget-review process develop data of new and useful sorts for each unit administrator's own use, perhaps equally important, the budget presentations were the occasion for sharing kinds
of fiscal information among deans and unit directors that had never been shared before" (the Provost's recommendations to the President, 2/2/73). Several college deans and governance group members identified this as an important benefit of the budget-review process.

**Participation**

Each person who was interviewed felt that the degree of participation in decision-making was better in the 1973-74 budget review than it had ever been. "In some, but not all units, the preparation of preliminary budget estimates widely involved members of the faculty and staff. The involvement may well have been more extensive and more meaningful than that of long range planning--suggesting that austerity may be a stronger cohesive force than affluence" (the Provost's recommendations to the President, 2/2/73).

**Ordering of Priorities**

In all good faith, Bennis' intention was to use the budget in such a way that it reflected University priorities and so that faculty members especially could see the results of their efforts. "In many units the budget review process has been responsible for facing issues and problems that ought to have been faced anyway - but undoubtedly would not have been faced without some such catalyst. Choices have now been made among options beyond those choices that the current exigency requires. Some units will undoubtedly reduce current expenditure levels below the mandatory reductions in order to permit the reordering of priorities and the support of essential new directions and options" (the Provost's recommendations to the President, 2/2/73).
Increased Accountability and Visibility

"First, the fiscal problem we face has been publicized and people have become far more aware of the University's plight to a far higher degree than would have occurred if the solutions had been solely administrative. Second, the review process has measurably increased the accountability of line administrative offices to share information, to explain decisions and choices, to justify activities and services, etc." (see chronological summary 4/2/73). "Traditionally, the allocation of resources has been an almost totally closed process... but this year, for the first time, openness and candor to a very high degree have been required" (the Provost's recommendations to the President, 2/2/73).

Clarification of Issues

Certain issues were clarified as a result of 1973-74 budget-review processes that might not otherwise have come to light. For example as a result of governance groups' and review commission recommendations allocations to the college Conservatory of Music will be reviewed. As a result of discussions between the Vice President for Management and Finance and faculty members on the Senates' Budget and Priorities Committees, the University's policy on the return of overhead on grants and contracts will be reviewed.

Credibility

A seventh benefit some respondents identified as a result of the budget-review process is increased administrative credibility (a benefit which could be debated since it appears on both sides of the ledger -
as both a benefit and a problem). However, at least some of the persons who were interviewed felt that sincere efforts were taken by administrators throughout the budget-review process to effectively involve non-administrators in decision-making.

Although there were several criticisms of the budget-making process, the persons who were interviewed were fairly non-specific in suggesting what else the President might have done in regards to the 1973-74 budget-review/resource allocation process. Simply starting from what he did do one finds that he intervened a great deal in managing the review process. The purpose of the next section of this chapter is to describe the actions he took in light of the propositions set forth in Chapter II for the role performance of the organizational leader in initiating, implementing, and incorporating change.

The Role Performance of the University President

in Developing and Implementing the

Budget-Review/Resource Allocation Process

Unfreezing-Initiation

Proposition 1: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to assess the sources and nature of resistance to the proposed change.

Proposition 2: To overcome the initial resistance of organizational members to the proposed change.

In order to initiate a participative budget review process that would extensively involve members of the University community and that would culminate in recommendations for specific allocations to specific units, Bennis had to convince members of the University community of the
severity of the budget situation facing higher education and of the need to reallocate existing resources rather than to depend on expanding resources. Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that it may have been important for him "to anticipate the nature and sources of resistance as well as to overcome initial resistance toward the review process." To what extent did Bennis intervene in the system to accomplish these objectives?

There is evidence that he was aware of organizational members' resistance to changes in the available amount of resources when he wrote "given the drastic changes in the financial future of the University, I suppose it would be unrealistic not to expect a decline in faculty morale." Comments Bennis made in interviews with the author suggested that he was aware of the resistance of some of the deans to a more open decision-making process, when they had managed quite well negotiating budgets under "the old style, highly personal and highly paternalistic administration" (a dean). Clearly Bennis knew that indiscriminate, across-the-board cutting would anger many faculty members and department heads when he reassured the University community that he would not accept across-the-board cuts (10/9/72, 10/31/72, 11/21/72). The Provost's preparation of "Budget Questions and Answers" and Bennis' pencilled in additions reflect a further shared awareness of the kinds of objections and criticisms faculty and students would raise about the process of allocating resources (see chronological summary 11/20/72). Part of the President's budget strategy seemed to be to try to overcome resistance by sharing information.
Sharing information about the budget situation (undermining informational supports for existing attitudes and behaviors) was one objective of Bennis' October 31st speech to the University, as well as of the "Budget Questions and Answers" (12/6/72, 12/8/72) mentioned above, and of the media presentations on the budget November 21 and 22, 1972. In his 10/31/72 speech Bennis forthrightly said that "what was a bad budget situation, could get worse, but that all institutions of higher education were essentially in the same boat." He assured them that decisions would be made rationally in any case and that somehow "through efforts to develop new sources of income, by studying expenditures in order to find more effective ways of allocating resources, and by reevaluating programs and priorities that "what was a bad situation could be managed and controlled without compromising the core values of the University." On the one hand, he assured the faculty that everything was not lost; on the other hand, he tried to undermine a sense of complacency and belief that things were not really any different then they had ever been. Finally, Bennis tried to mitigate anxiety by assuring the faculty and deans that non-academic areas would be reviewed and cut first before instructional areas and that faculty members would be involved from the beginning in the decision-making process (see 10/27/72, 10/31/72, 12/1/72).

Proposition 3: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to heighten organizational members sensitivity to problems involving the intended change.
If sharing information was one of the strategies Bennis used to overcome organizational members' resistance to a long and painful process of self-evaluation, it was also the main strategy he used to heighten organizational members sensitivity to problems in regards to the proposed changes (Proposition 3). There were numerous meetings with the Board (11/1/72, 11/21/72, 11/22/72), with the deans and faculty members (5/17/72, 9/20/72, 10/3/72, 10/27/72); speeches (10/31/72, 11/8/72); and presentations (11/21-11/22/72) that gave the President opportunities to describe the factors that had contributed to the present budget situation and the implications those constraints would have for the University. Stories in Candid Campus served the same function (see chronological summary 11/1/72, 11/29/72, 12/6/72, 12/8/72, 2/7/73, 2/14/73, 3/14/73, 4/25/73). On November 15, 1972, Bennis is quoted in Candid Campus as saying, "I think this is perhaps the most vital thing we have to discuss in the weeks ahead given the present financial circumstances. The next two to three years will be most significant for our own and all universities. . ." (Proposition 3). Every person who was interviewed felt that the seriousness of the problems facing the University had been emphasized through the media, through Bennis' speeches, and through the almost uninterrupted focus it received from every administrative officer from October, 1972, until June, 1973 (see chronological summary 2/26/73, 2/29/73, 3/2/73, 3/22/73).

Proposition 4: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration in the system in regards to the proposed change.
Bennis also used his speeches and articles in Candid Campus to stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration among organizational members (Proposition 4) though the effect of this might have been lost on those who saw resource allocation as an administrative responsibility. In the fall he wrote, "we can use the period ahead to improve our educational and research programs" (11/15/72) and for "creative retraction" i.e. program evaluation, reeducation, or elimination (10/31/72). Even within a shrinking budget Bennis saw possibilities for funding new programs in graduate education (see 3/31/73) and the applied behavioral sciences.

**Proposition 5:** An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to integrate new forces for change with existing forces for change, external forces for change with internal forces for change.

Proposition 5 in Chapter II states that it may be important for the leader in initiating organizational change to make the organization more open to its environment, joining new external with existing internal forces for change. Especially in a speech to the Board (although also in the October faculty speech), Bennis effectively related the projected deficit budget and the need for the reallocation of resources to external environmental conditions such as inflation, enrollment trends, and legislative action and to internal forces such uncritical budget allocations in the late sixties at the University and to the need for a new library (5/17/72). On several occasions Bennis reprinted articles from the Chronicle of Higher Education (see 5/17/72, "New Dollars from Old
Budgets") or reports that he felt would influence the internal decision-making process (see 10/31/72 - The Illinois Report on Program Evaluation, The AAUP Guidelines on Financial Stringency). On Bennis' initiative Candid Campus did a story on the implications of Nixon's budget on higher education (1/31/73) which again demonstrated that external pressures were causing the austere conditions in higher education which required some sort of internal response. Another intervention Bennis made in light of Proposition 5 was to raise a series of questions, problems, and issues linking external and internal factors in a letter to the vice presidents on October 31, 1973, on "program evaluation and budgetary reductions." For example, he asked "Will decreases in enrollment and loss of institutional prestige offset the financial savings resulted from major program reductions? Will accreditation be affected? Will it be possible to make program reductions and eliminations which seem appropriate to the needs, strengths, and goals of the University and at the same time satisfy the demands of the Board of Regents' Master Plan?"

Proposition 6: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to change the constellation of forces, resources, or information converging on any one part of the organization.

There is ample evidence in the literature on attitude change to suggest that perceptions and values can be changed by changing the information a person receives or the people he interacts with (Proposition 6). What strategies did Bennis undertake to change the flow of information or resources in the University in regards to the budget? In addition to the strategies listed in the paragraphs above (speeches, the distribution
of reprinted materials, etc.), Bennis also asked the vice presidents on numerous occasions (1/9/73, 3/14/73) to make certain information available although it was never completely clear whether or not he requested this information for his own use or for wider use. (The Faculty Senate Budget and Priorities Committee for one, in any case, felt that not enough information was widely shared.) (See problem description above.) The intercollegiate athletic program was one of the areas of the budget where there was a lot of misunderstanding in the University community. In order to make more information about the real costs of the intercollegiate athletic program, especially football, available, Bennis appointed an Athletic Commission on October 25, 1972, "to evaluate the intercollegiate athletic program at the University of Cincinnati in light of institutional priorities and resources." The decision to appoint an academic dean to each of the non-academic vice presidential budget review commissions from the perception of the deans is another example of an action Bennis took to change the flow of resources and information in the University (1/9/73). Over and over again Bennis reiterated that control of administrative services needed to be decentralized. Finally two interventions in the January 30th, 1973, vice presidents' meeting represent a commitment on the President's part to broaden communication: he appointed an ad hoc advisory review group to evaluate programs in selected departments (the information was then to be shared and used in making budget reductions) and he directed the vice presidents to publish a timetable of the budget process with a narrative description of each step in Candid Campus. The
The whole question of organizational members participation in the budget review process is complex and problematic (Proposition 11). The Provost in his recommendations to the President (4/2/73) commented on how the extensive involvement of faculty members and students had contributed to greater awareness of the problems on their part and to greater accountability on the part of administrators. On the other hand the persons who were interviewed identified a lack of clarity about the role of the governance groups in the budget-making process, the inconsistent use of review commissions in vice presidential areas, and the need for deans to be more involved in decision-making, as problems in the 1973-74 budget-review process.

Clearly Bennis was concerned with questions of participation in and legitimization of the budget review process (Proposition 7, 11). In a letter to the vice presidents on 10/31/72 Bennis asked, "How can faculty, students, administrators, alumni, and community leaders be involved in evaluations and how can their support for the decision process be developed?" Although other factors such as the length of
the process, the complexity of the problems and of budget materials, the availability of information, and the varying level commitment of the vice presidents to a participative process, etc. often influence the effectiveness of Bennis' interventions, it is fairly easy to identify actions he took that were intended to increase community support and involvement. He sought to secure the support of Board members by making frequent reports to them at monthly meetings about not only his activities in Columbus with the legislature, the Regents, and the Governor, but also about the actions he and the vice presidents were taking to evaluate and prioritize programs (see chronological summary 9/20/72, 11/3/72, 11/8/72). He met frequently with his vice presidents and assistants and to a large degree depended on them to implement the internal budget-making process. For example, he instructed the vice presidents to involve middle-level managers and faculty members in the earliest stages of the budget review process (10/31/72). Bennis met less frequently with the deans (10/27/72, 1/9/73) but still took certain actions to insure their involvement in the process. For example, he directed the vice presidents to work with deans and unit directors to identify options within their areas for 6-9% cuts. On 12/19/72 and again on 1/9/73 he asked the vice presidents in non-academic areas to appoint an academic dean to their
review commissions. In late May Bennis tried to rekindle the deans' involvement by scheduling individual meetings with each dean. (To a certain extent the two academic vice presidents felt undercut by these meetings fearing that promises would be made and information shared from which they were excluded (5/22/72).)

At the next level down in the administrative hierarchy, department chairmen, one department chairman wrote:

I am somewhat puzzled by the general process of budget development and budget decisions. I recognize that enormous amounts of efforts and thought have been given to the University budget as a whole... Unfortunately with respect to the College of Medicine, the heads of departments who really know most about the current and future budget needs of their departmental units were essentially uninvolved except at the preliminary planning stage last fall. After the recent decisions were announced, these same department chairmen were required to implement these decisions within a few days - in my case, to find sufficient monies for making the salary increases which had already been announced and subsequently to come up with ways of sustaining general funds losses - also within a few days (5/29/73).³

³Between the time when most review commission reports were written (early February) and the time when the deans received their unit allocations (late May) the deans' involvement in the review process consisted occasionally of conferences with the Provost or Vice President of the Medical Center and of listening to cursory progress reports on the budget process at Friday afternoon deans' meetings. Only two of the deans were involved in the governance groups' reviews. The Provost's concern in early April when Bennis announced that he intended to make program cuts in 1973-74 and to present a two-year biennium budget by June, 1973, was that whatever participation and sort of self-assumed responsibility for identifying cuts that he had worked for from the deans would be undermined (4/5/73). However neither the two-year budget nor program cuts materialized much to Bennis' chagrin and the Provost's relief.

⁴Whether or not the organizational leader can be held responsible for departmental chairmen's participation in the budget review process is debatable. However his interventions, in this case, required the participation (and support) of individuals who had, for the most part, been excluded from decision-making about what they were now being asked to implement.
In regards to the informal leaders in the University, the President sought to involve them too in the budget-making process. He met with the entire Faculty Senate on 11/9/72 and again on 1/11/73. He met often with governance group leaders to keep them informed about Legislative actions in Columbus that affected the University budget. On March 1st the ad hoc budget advisory group asked the President to ask the University Senate to develop a list of program evaluation criteria and thereby extend their participation. Despite frequent meetings between the governance groups and the President and vice presidents, the perception of a lack of clarity about the role of the Senates' Budget and Priorities Committees in the review process persisted.

Bennis used speeches and letters to encourage what he considered to be essential faculty participation in the budget process (see chronological summary 10/31/72, 12/1/72). On 11/15/72 he wrote "The outcome will be partly dependent on the commitment of the faculty and the administration to work together." Faculty members would supposedly be able to participate in departmental and college reviews, as review commission members and as governance group representatives. The effect of all this participation was disruptive, and frustrating; however, according to one department head. He wrote, "We do not need a new budget commission, or yet more participation in the decision-making process. Nor do we need more long range uncertainty and short term chaos." Instead, "I have asked for some assurance about the budgetary future of this department. Apparently this cannot be given" (11/15/72).
Proposition 14: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to establish and maintain a climate of acceptance, support, and trust in interpersonal relationships in which change is regarded positively.

Uncertainty about the budget was due to a combination of factors, some of them external, some of them internal. Externally the State subsidy could not be predicted. We have seen how that led to lack of information on which to base decisions about resource allocation at every level of the organization. Internally, Bennis kept holding on to a belief that budget reductions in 1973-74 could be based on program evaluation long after it was realistic or feasible. These factors led to a postponement of other decisions such as whether or not to recruit for or fill open positions - which had a negative effect on organizational climate (Proposition 14) (see chronological summary 11/15/72, 2/26/73, 2/29/73, 3/2/73). Bennis clearly was aware of the problem of declining faculty morale when, in a report to the Board of Directors, he wrote, "What we must avoid however is any form of malaise that might immobilize and seek instead a positive adaptation to changing conditions" (the Spring of 1973). Through speeches and discussions with faculty members, the President tried to build a sense of positive identification with change (see discussion of Proposition 4 above). In the long run however the decision of the vice presidents not to share information about the lack of a deficit and about the decision not to borrow against the reserves would undermine any trust that existed between the administration and the University community in general; faculty members, deans, and department heads in particular (see chronological summary 2/13/73).
Proposition 10: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to create a sense of rising expectations among organizational members that they will benefit from the proposed change in their organizational behavior.

Proposition 13: To heighten organizational members' self-esteem and to encourage reciprocity in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 10 states that it may be important for the organizational leader to create a sense of rising expectations about the prospect of change among organizational members. The President intervened on numerous occasions to build a sense of rising expectation - about different aspects of the budget-review/resource allocation process. On October 27 he promised the deans that non-academic budgets would be cut before academic budgets and that there would be no indiscriminate across-the-board cutting. On October 31, 1972, and again on January 24, 1973, Bennis pledged that his Office and those of the vice presidents would be the first cut. (Faculty members grew skeptical about those pledges when the appointment of a new vice president was announced in November and when the administrative reorganization was announced in March.) Looking at events described in the chronological summary, there are other occasions later in the budget-review process at which Bennis created expectations that for one reason or another, usually a lack of time or resources, were not met. On March 31, 1973, Bennis hosted a seminar for faculty members on the future of graduate education at the University of Cincinnati at a time when there was tremendous insecurity about salary increases and hiring for open positions. On April 4th and again on April 25th Bennis shared his plan to announce a two-year budget
in June of 1973, but by April there was little or no hope that decisions for more than one year could be made. Finally, on May 17th in a speech to the University faculty, Bennis announced a set of priorities for the University. Again the priorities he listed may have created a disfunctional sense of rising expectations - a sense that all of those things would be nice to do if there were additional resources, but impossible to do with fewer and fewer resources available in higher education. In general it was difficult to make people feel secure and essential when you had to talk about program evaluation, reduction, and elimination (Proposition 13). We have already seen how some department heads felt virtually excluded from decision-making about the budget and hence, non-essential. As the organizational leader Bennis on the one hand tried to build a sense of self-esteem on the part of faculty members; on the other hand, he was forced to argue most strongly against continuing weak, expensive programs. In regards to the vice presidents and his own staff, there is only one instance where Bennis verbally expressed his dependence on others' roles in the process and that is in a letter on February 14, 1973, when he said he was counting on the ad hoc group, especially on the Vice President for Management and Finance, to help him with the decisions he was going to have to make.

Proposition 12: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to increase the amount of frequency of interaction between himself and members in regards to the proposed change.

5The only way some of Bennis' ten priorities for the University would be achievable would be if faculty members accepted the need to reallocate resources among programs and departments within the University - a need which Bennis had been trumpeting but which only a few faculty members recognized or welcomed (see the section on how Universities have changed in the past in Chapter IV, Assessment of Setting).
Proposition 12 has to do with increasing interaction between the organizational leader and members in order to break down existing attitudes, behaviors, and expectations. A review of the chronology of events shows that a large portion of the President's time was spent on developing the 1973-74 budget and on sharing information about the process of review that was evolving. A review of the chronology also shows that there was a great deal of repetition concerning certain budgetary decisions, especially those involving program evaluation (see chronological summary 10/31/72, 11/22/72, 1/31/73, 2/15/73, 2/21/73, 3/1/73, 3/14/73) etc. From observation of most of the meetings that although there was a disproportionately high percentage of time spent on the budget in vice presidents' and assistants' meetings with the President, the result of the increased interaction was not increased security, responsibility, authority, initiative, or knowledge on the part of subordinates.

Proposition 9: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to set priorities for the organization and to clearly communicate these priorities to organizational members whose behavior is to be changed.

Despite increased interaction Bennis still retained authority to define the urgency and importance the resource allocation process (Proposition 9). Numerous references in speeches and articles in Bennis' lobbying activities in Columbus indicated the relative importance of the budget-making process in terms of the way the President allocated his own time. He also controlled the amount of
time others - especially the vice presidents and assistants - would spend on the budget by delegating responsibility for the internal decision-making process to them. In other ways Bennis' actions controlled the timing and hence the priority of the budget review/resource allocation process in relation to other change processes in the University. His trip to Mexico in April delayed the announcement of unit allocations and consequently the announcement of promotion, tenure, and merit-increase decisions. His decision to investigate the feasibility of a biennium, instead of a one-year, budget crippled departmental and college efforts to recruit new members for open positions and once more delayed the announcement of unit allocations. From January to early March the administrative reorganization (see Chapter VIII) preempted a great deal of Bennis' time. In sum, although there is plenty of evidence to suggest that Bennis felt that the budget-making process had the highest priority of all issues facing the University in 1973-74, some of the actions he took interfered with completion of the review process.

Proposition 8: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to link parts of the system that are sympathetic to the intended change and share common dissatisfactions and a sense of powerlessness.

Proposition 8 states that it may be important for the organizational leader to link parts of the system which share common dissatisfactions in order for successful change to occur. The Provost's idea
to hold open budget hearings at which each dean would share his proposed
cuts in front of the other deans and an advisory budget review commission
is one example of a strategy designed to accomplish this objective. In
turn, the University President encouraged the Faculty Senate to continue
lobbying state legislators as the administration was doing, thereby
aligning the faculty and administration in the cause for more money
for higher education from the State. It was through his relationships
with the Legislature and the Governor that Bennis most actively sought
to demonstrate to the University community that he was doing his part
to reduce the projected deficit. In turn, he hoped that existing atti-
tudes on the part of the Faculty would change and that they would begin
to contribute to the budget review process by identifying areas where
the budget could be cut and/or programs eliminated. Specifically what
interventions did the President make to demonstrate his effectiveness
in the University's external relationships (Proposition 15).

Proposition 15: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to effect and demonstrate changes
in the organization's relationship with other
systems.

Part of the President's overall strategy in regards to Proposition
15 was to show that his actions in Columbus were part of a planned
strategy to reduce the proposed budget deficit by developing new sources
of income (see the chronological summary in Appendix F, 10/3/72, 10/31/72).
Often the purpose of the President's interventions internally in regards
to the budget-review process was simply to document his activities externally.
He used Candid Campus and his speech to the University faculty to share information on what he had been doing in Columbus (see 10/31/72; 3/5/73; 5/3/73). When he met the Faculty Senate, he reported on the effectiveness of his lobbying in Columbus (see 1/11/73). He tried to make favorably comparative costs of affirmative action programs and administrative services between the University of Cincinnati and other universities available (see 11/9/72, 3/26/73). In order to improve the University's relationships with federal-funding agencies Bennis opened an office in Washington, D.C. In order to demonstrate increased effectiveness with businesses, Bennis launched a new corporate fund drive in November, 1972. In order to make more effective use of library and faculty resources, he signed a consortium agreement with a neighboring private college in November, 1972. (Indirectly that agreement might have enhanced the University's position with the Governor who was advocating more inter-institutional cooperation between private and public educational sectors.) Externally, Bennis saw that his role with the legislature and the Regents was to compare how cuts achieved at the University of Cincinnati and at other state universities (4/30/73) in order to gain an advantage in the competition for scarce resources and then to show internally how worthwhile the long participative budget-review process had been.

Proposition 16: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage is to build the organizational leader's expertise and credibility with organizational members.
Proposition 17: To extend the organizational leader's control over varied kinds of resources and sources of power.

The last two propositions under unfreezing having to do with increasing the organizational leader's sources of power and his credibility in regards to the proposed change (Propositions 16 and 17) are similar to the two propositions that apply to all three phases of the change processes: that organizational members perceive the leader to be personally involved (Proposition 37) and trustworthy (Proposition 38) throughout the entire change process. These four propositions will be discussed together in the next section of this chapter.

A majority of the persons who were interviewed felt that the President should have shared his ideas on how the budget could be reduced earlier than March when they perceived that he did get involved (Proposition 37). Some of the faculty members who were interviewed also felt Bennis had exaggerated his external role in regards to the budget when he described his activities in a Candid Campus story as "wearing ruts in the road to Columbus" (Proposition 38). In the internal review process by reviewing the Council of Vice Presidents' and the Senators' recommendations it was felt that the President's criteria for assessing programs and indicators of quality were unknown throughout the entire 1973-74 budget review process.

With other groups however Bennis did build credibility through his interventions into the budget-review/resource allocation process. After meeting with the deans, he asked the vice presidents to appoint
an academic dean to each of their budget review commissions which was done in January. On 3/22/73 he promised the Faculty Senate that he and the vice presidents would continue to look for money in the budget for salary increases; on May 1st he announced a 4.5% merit-salary increase (Propositions 16 and 38). However, that one action may have had negative consequences for other objectives Bennis might have hoped to accomplish with a participative budget review process. "The cavalier announcement of University-wide salary increases was difficult for some deans. It created a morale problem in those colleges where money for 4.5% increases cannot be found. Although it might have increased Bennis' credibility or power it was detrimental to the deans taking greater leadership in deciding how cuts would be distributed in their own colleges. His last minute intervention girds the hope that more money will be found for other programs" (the Provost, a dean). Similarly, on the one hand, Bennis' individual meetings with the deans in late May, 1973, demonstrated his personal involvement in the budget-review process and potentially increased his power to intervene in a unit's budget decisions. On the other hand, some deans questioned whether such meetings were necessary if the extensive budget-review/resource allocation process had been valid. Essentially what Bennis was asking the deans to do in preparation for his meetings with them - to project how they would distribute 3, 6 and 9% units - was what the majority of the deans had done in January before the Provost's advisory review commission.
It is evident that Bennis himself was worried about his credibility when he discovered that the actual budget deficit was much less than what had been projected in October and that the University had not borrowed on its reserves (see chronological summary 5/7/73). These facts led him to become more involved in the budget-making process in several different ways. On May 17th in a speech to the University faculty he announced a set of University priorities, although by this date it was probably impossible for his priorities to be incorporated in final budget allocations for 1973-74. On May 7th and May 20th Bennis met with the Vice President for Management and Finance to personally identify percentage cuts in certain areas, which were reflected in later budget documents. He also scheduled the individual meetings with the deans that have been mentioned before.

That expectations for program evaluation and a biennium budget were created and then not met contributed to Bennis' credibility problems. Two deans commented in response to several written questions following their individual meetings with the President, that, "Bennis has to be extraordinarily careful about differences between what he promises and what he delivers. Right now the deans are not listening" (a dean). "My observation is that initially the President affected the climate of the University very positively. However as a result of some of his actions and the financial crisis I think the climate is now one of decreasing morale. It is my impression and this impression has been supported by others that the President tends to overcommit himself and the University and makes promises which he alternately is unable to keep."
In my opinion this kind of behavior is bringing about a deterioration in the trust level between the President and his constituents" (another dean).

**Summary**

A review of the President's role performance in light of the propositions for unfreezing shows that although there were negative reactions to some of his interventions, actions were taken to fulfill all the conditions described in the first seventeen propositions for initiating change. Faced with having to convince the University community of the severity of the budget situation facing higher education and of the need to reallocate existing resources, Bennis seemed to depend on a strategy of information sharing to unfreeze existing attitudes and expectancies and to gain community support for the behavioral changes required.

A second strategy Bennis used in initiating the budget-review/resource allocation process was to try to demonstrate the effectiveness of his efforts in representing the University's interests in its external relationships. Finally although attempts were made to involve deans, the faculty, and governance groups in the review process, a lack of clarity about what was expected from this participation had a negative effect on organizational climate. This case illustrates perhaps more clearly than the other case how the University President engaged in unfreezing behaviors throughout the year-long process in order to prevent members' attitudes from returning to accustomed expectancies of more money and continuing growth.
Changing-Implementation

Proposition 18: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to overcome emerging resistance to the proposed change during the period of attempted implementation.

Initial resistance to the budget-review process involved resistance to having to do things differently than the way they had been done in the past (i.e. a more open, participative decision-making process) and to having to identify program reductions instead of additional programs. Other kinds of resistance emerged as a result of the problems encountered in trying to implement the budget-review/resource allocation process: problems in timing (2/16/73), delay (2/16/73), the absence of a long range plan (11/11/72, 3/14/73), the need for more information (3/28/73), the lack of clarity about the roles of the review commissions, the faculty, governance groups, and the deans in the review process. The resistance (Proposition 18) manifested itself in such ways that it produced cross-pressures on the role of the university president. For example, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) demanded more extensive faculty involvement in the budget-review/resource allocation process (12/1/72), while some deans and department heads complained about too much participation and deteriorating faculty morale (11/15/72). In another example the Faculty Senate voted for an automatic cost-of-living salary increase at the same time that the University Senate recommended merit-salary increases. There was also emergent resistance from part of the faculty to the late date
at which the Athletic Commission Bennis had appointed would report on the costs of the intercollegiate athletic program and to the hiring of a new football coach on a three-year contract. At the same time the Development Office predicted a loss of income from alumni and donors if football was dropped. What actions did Bennis take to thread his way through these counter-pressures and build acceptance for whatever recommendations came out of the review process?

In the first place he did not abolish football, instead he said he would wait until the Commission submitted its report in May: in the interim, he recommended a 10% decrease in general funds support for football in each of the next three years. In a letter to the Faculty Senate he said he would continue to try to identify money for faculty salary increases (see 3/22/73), which he later announced on May 1, 1973. Bennis tried to diffuse resistance in the colleges by being honest, "what we do next year (1973-74) may not totally reflect our priorities" (3/30/73) yet, hopefully, "the greatly expanded range of participation makes it partially worth the pains, troubles, and delays. The data-gathering and evaluation we have done in the last several months will make it easier to project the 1974-75 budget" (4/11/73). In other words he identified with participants' problems but reaffirmed the review process.

Bennis tried to diffuse the adversarial relationship he saw growing between the faculty and the administration by proposing to establish a Faculty Advisory Committee. "I do believe that there are special interests in our academic community and inherent differences
of viewpoint. ... At the same time, I think it is terribly important to make certain that the faculty and the administration must eventually see themselves as being in the same boat, as having similar interests, as being on the "same side" (Bennis to the chairmen of the Faculty Senate 4/26/73). On March 9, 1973, Bennis met with department heads in the College of Arts and Sciences to reassure them of the University's commitment to the College. On June 19, 1973, Bennis met with department heads in the Medical College who had been critical of the length and manner in which the budget-review process had been implemented. Finally, the President argued strongly for a two-year budget in anticipation of even greater resistance from the University community if non-programmatic, non-priority budget decisions made in 1973-74 might have to be reversed in the 1974-75 budget.

Proposition 19: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to provide opportunities for organizational members to make their commitment to the proposed change public.

Proposition 20: To continually clarify and to provide mechanisms by which organizational members can gain clarification of the behavioral changes required.

Proposition 21: To provide mechanisms for feedback between the leader and the people undergoing change.

Proposition 22: To provide organizational members with opportunities to test and verify new behaviors through personal experience.
The organizational leader can often overcome resistance to change by providing opportunities for members to make a public commitment in the direction of the proposed change (Proposition 19), by providing opportunities for members to test new behaviors prior to making the changes required (Proposition 22), or by providing channels for feedback and clarification of the proposed changes (Propositions 20 and 21). Although the deans were asked to share information openly with each other at the Provost's budget hearings in January (Propositions 19 and 22), the deans felt that there were lots of risks and no rewards for identifying "real" cuts at that stage in the budget-review process. Later on in the budget-review process as negotiations became more and more private between the individual dean and the appropriate vice president, there were few opportunities to demonstrate a public commitment to a certain percentage cut or to an open process.

The President's Advisory Council, the small ad hoc advisory budget group appointed by Bennis, and meetings with the vice presidents, assistants, and governance group leaders, all served to open communication between the President and the community at various stages of the budget-review process. The assistants who attended the vice presidents' meetings without the President reported on the vice presidents' decisions to the President (for example, see 10/20/72). The ad hoc group asked the President to ask the Provost to detail certain line item expenditures in his area which the ad hoc group had not been able to get directly from the Provost (3/1/73). In turn the President asked the ad hoc advisory group and the vice presidents for certain kinds of information on which
to base his budget decisions (see chronological summary 10/31/72, 2/21/73, 3/26/73). The President discussed the need for program evaluation and for the decentralization of administrative services with the President's Advisory Council. He had the timetable for the budget review process published in Candid Campus along with stories on the progress that was being made both internally and externally in budget negotiations. In an article in the 3/26/73 edition of Candid Campus Bennis reiterated the fact that there would be no across-the-board cuts and clarified that the vice presidents' and governance groups' recommendations were only advisory to the President.

A review of the chronological summary reveals that individual deans and vice provosts on numerous occasions wrote the President to ask for a rationale for proposed reductions or to protest additional cuts (see 3/15/73, 4/5/73, 6/15/73). Finally a portion of almost every vice presidents' meeting between October and June concerned the budget-making process.

There was a need, however, for further clarification given some of the problems encountered in implementation and some of the criticisms voiced about the review process. (See the section on problem description earlier in this chapter.) "Participation has not led to greater clarity about how budget decisions will be made because the raised expectation for program evaluation has not been delivered upon" (a vice provost). "The criteria for decision-making have not been shared by the Provost nor the President" (a dean).
Furthermore, the President and the vice presidents apparently never agreed on whether or not program evaluation would be possible in 1973-74. As early as 11/22/72, the Provost wrote the President that program evaluation would not be possible in 1973-74; as late as the end of April (4/25/73) however, the President was still bent on program evaluation. On 3/26/73 Bennis outlined the four components of program evaluation as he envisioned it. (Despite the vice presidents' protests that there was not enough qualitative information to do program evaluation, Bennis said that he wanted program evaluation prior to making decisions on the 1973-74 budget on at least eight separate occasions: 10/31/72, 1/23/73, 2/21/73, 3/1/73, 3/14/73, 3/27/73, 4/3/73, and 4/13/73.)

There are other examples of occasions when clarification of some part of the budget process was requested, but not forthcoming. In January, the vice presidents urged the President to clarify whether he would review the vice presidents' recommendations before or after the governance groups' reviews. The President exacerbated the conflict that at least the Provost felt about both presenting recommendations to the Senates as an advocate and reviewing Senate recommendations as a non-partisan advisor to the President. On April 13th the budget advisory group presented two options about when to release the 1973-74 unit budget allocations to the President. A choice between those two options was not made at that meeting. The course of action that was decided upon - to evaluate a few "weak" departments over the next week - only postponed a decision about when to release the 1973-74 allocations.
(the delay causing more resistance to the budget-making process to form). Finally, correspondence from the Provost to the President on May 21, 1973, indicates that differences between them on the role of the deans in the budget-review/resource allocation process were never resolved. Actually there was never any clarity as to what the goals of participation in the budget review process were because as long as the deans kept adding or subtracting expenditures incrementally as they had always done, the President would never reinforce their responsibility and participation in decision-making. Since most of Bennis' information about how the budget review process was being implemented came second-hand from the vice presidents and his assistants, and not from his own observations, it was difficult for him to reinforce those deans/units who were moving in the direction he wanted them to go, i.e. toward resource allocation based on systematic program evaluation. The individual meetings were scheduled with the deans in May partially so that the President could learn first-hand how cuts would be distributed within each college. In turn, the vice presidents worried about how they would learn about the promises made in those meetings which they would have to implement (see chronological summary 5/22/73).

Proposition 23: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to offer organizational members new meanings or new ways of looking at their experiences in regards to the proposed change.
Throughout the budget process the President tried to establish new meanings for what resource allocation would mean in higher education in the seventies (Proposition 23). "The budget has given us an opportunity to reexamine our institutional priorities," he said in a speech to the University faculty (10/31/72). He prodded the vice presidents to look at the budget-review process in different ways by giving them lists of questions and problems to address (see chronological summary, 10/31/72 and 2/21/73 for examples).

Proposition 24: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to provide role models for new behavior patterns.

Proposition 24 states that it may be important for the organizational leader to model the changes he has proposed. Although additional cuts of up to ten percent were made in the President's office budget on 2/21/73, one dean commented in an interview that "the President was very visible about the way he spent money." The Faculty Senate report on 3/28/73 was similarly critical.

Proposition 25: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to encourage experimentation and risk-taking on the part of organizational members in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 26: To redefine the leader's role in relation to the change processes initiated.

Proposition 25 states that it may be important for the organizational leader to encourage risk-taking and experimentation in order for successful implementation to occur. We have already seen in this section how the announcement of salary raises and the President's individual
meetings with the deans undermined the deans', and to a certain extent the vice presidents', autonomy. "I expected that the President would ask me how I would manage the budget reduction recommended by the Provost's budget review advisory group. Since I accepted the proposed reduction I obviously considered the budget-review process credible. However, now that I have learned that some deans negotiated sizeable reductions in the cuts recommended, I have serious reservations about the implementation, not about the process" (a dean). Several of the deans indicated a lack of support for changes they had initiated in their colleges and on some occasions the ad hoc advisory group must have felt the same, when their advice went unheeded. When the President scheduled meetings with each of the deans to discuss how proposed reductions would be distributed, he clearly perceived a need to influence decision-making and to keep a strong hand on the budget-review/resource allocation process (Proposition 26). In fact, the President often said that he would have to intervene in the review process to make the cuts that the deans themselves were unwilling to make. In fact, earlier in the review process, he had deliberately not wanted to get involved "because he might get locked into something he would not later want to support (i.e. others' recommendations) and because he saw himself "as the only intemperate force against all the temperate forces." (See chronological summary 1/23/73 and 4/13/73.) Consequently there was less reciprocity or risk-taking in the budget review process than what might have been expected (a dean).
Proposition 27: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to remove barriers to change and to provide organizational members with necessary skills, knowledge, training, and resources in order to increase their capacity to implement the proposed change.

Proposition 29: To reinforce and reward even tentative changes organizational members in the direction of the intended outcome.

Propositions 27 and 29 state that it may be important for the organizational leader to reinforce even tentative changes on the part of organizational members through comparisons with other organizations (Proposition 29) or by providing increased resources and/or socio-emotional support (Proposition 27). In other words people may need to see the benefits of their work, in this case, of their participation in the budget-review process. Reinforcement might have come in the form of an increased competitive edge vis-a-vis other State universities for students or for money from the Regents. The President actively lobbied for a Medical College supplement and for additional subsidy money from the State. He urged the vice presidents to make comparative costs available wherever possible (for example, see 3/26/73). He supported the Evening College's recruitment of part-time students and urged other departments and colleges to recruit part-time students.

Certain actions the President took did provide important resources and reinforcement to members of the University community. For example, he opened a Washington office as a liaison to the federal funding agencies. He reinforced the Provost's decision to form an advisory review commission by asking each vice president to develop some sort of review mechanism in their own area. He also asked each of the vice presidents to project cuts
of 3, 6, and 9% in their areas following the Provost's example. Although Bennis met with governance group leaders to review their recommendations, other resources that the deans and governance groups in particular were asking for were not provided such as certain information, a statement of University priorities, and an explicit explanation of the assumptions underlying the vice presidents' and the President's budget decisions (see an earlier section of this chapter describing problems encountered in implementing the budget review process). In other cases the President missed opportunities to reinforce others' suggestions even though they coincided with his own ideas. For example, although the ad hoc budget advisory group first recommended that the President ask the University Senate to develop criteria for program evaluation on March 1, 1973, their recommendation was not acted upon until early summer for the 1974-75 budget. Other Presidential interventions were, in the author's opinion, counter-productive to his staff's, the vice presidents', and to some extent governance groups' participation in the budget-review process. At the end of March, the President asked the Provost and the Vice President of the Medical Center to project what they would do with an extra million dollars to cut or spend—a request that must have seemed whimsical and irrelevant to the very real pressures they faced in making hiring, promotion and tenure, and budget decisions. On April 13, 1973, Bennis expressed his disappointment in his advisory group's recommendations, even though they had been meeting on the budget almost non-stop for weeks. On 4/30/73 the President asked the Provost and Executive Vice President to serve as the "acting president" at a point in the budget process at
which no decision had been made as to when to announce unit allocations and at a point at which the Provost was engaged in a series of individual conferences with the deans. Finally, although the vice presidents and assistants knew that the projected deficit would not be as bad as the President had announced in October due to an increased subsidy from the State in December, this information was not shared with the governance groups prior to their marathon sessions in March nor with the President, in fact, until May, at which time he still did not choose to share it.

Proposition 28: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to change existing organizational arrangements so that they are as compatible as possible with the behavioral changes that are required.

A number of specific recommendations appended to the Provost's advisory commission's recommendations in February would have created the "compatible organizational arrangements" described in Proposition 28. They included the need for a management-information system, the need for a mechanism for program evaluation, the need for incentives for savings and cost reductions, the need for greater control by instructional units over non-instructional services, and the need for a long range plan among other things. The deans shared the President's awareness that "under the present budgeting system there were no rewards to cut costs since there was no carry-over of unspent funds from one year to the next" (a dean). At one point or another, participants in the budget review process identified the need for policy statements on early retirement, increased faculty teaching leads, larger class sizes, the use of graduate assistants for
undergraduate teaching, and the need for a way to approve the filling of open positions before final unit allocations were made, which were never articulated. The Provost felt that allocations between vice presidential areas were crucial and that a fixed amount needed to be allocated to each Vice President before intra-unit allocations could be identified, which also was not done. Finally, one dean felt that independent consideration of the 1973-74 and 1974-75 budgets was impossible given what kinds of program cuts the deans were being asked to make even though that is essentially what occurred.

On the other hand the President did intervene in several ways to change existing organizational conditions. He appointed a new Vice President for Management and Finance. On several occasions he requested information be made available that would be the beginning of a supporting management-information system (see chronological summary 10/13/72, 1/9/73, 3/14/73, etc.). The President requested that the Research Council and the Vice President for Management and Finance review the University's policy on the return of overhead; he and the vice presidents also studied the University's policy on the remission of fees to certain groups (although no decisions were made on either case during the course of the year). On January 30, 1973, Bennis appointed an ad hoc budget advisory group to begin reviewing selected departments in the University. Finally, near the end of the 1973-74 budget review process, Bennis described his priorities for the University in the seventies, in an effort to make certain conditions in the University compatible with the changes members were being asked to make as a result of their participation in the budget-review process.
Summary

A review of the President's actions in implementing the budget-review process in light of the propositions set forth in Chapter II shows that his actions did not create the conditions described in the propositions and that in some cases, they were, in fact counter-productive to the successful implementation of the budget-review/resource allocation process. For example, organizational members encountered problems of delay, the need for more information, a lack of clarity about the goals of participation in the review process which were never resolved. In another example, the President's insistence on a two-year biennium budget and on program evaluation long after it was realistic or feasible ostensibly interfered with the goals of a participant budget-review/resource allocation process he had articulated. There is extensive documentation in interviews to conclude that the President did not intervene in ways that encouraged risk-taking or even compliance on the part of deans or department chairmen.

It could be argued that although specific budget allocations were announced in early June, those decisions only in part resulted from the budget-review process, and then more as a result of the vice presidents' actions than the President's actions. In the final section of this chapter the President's leadership in the third stage of the change process, refreezing, will be described.
Refreezing-Incorporation

Proposition 30: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to monitor organizational members' performance in coping with and integrating the proposed change.

Proposition 30 says that it may be important for the organizational leader to monitor the change processes he has initiated. On numerous occasions the President requested information that would have enabled him to monitor the budget-review process which he never received or received too late. For example, in early October Bennis asked each of the vice presidents to prioritize programs within their areas. On October 13, 1972, the vice presidents met without the President to share priority rankings of their commitments, not programs. Further, the "program evaluation" criteria the Provost circulated to the deans and his review commission were more criteria for making decisions between programs than for evaluating any one program, as Bennis had requested (10/31/72). One of the problems that the persons who were interviewed identified was that timetables were not adhered to which led to problems of credibility. For example, the Athletic Commission Report on the costs of intercollegiate athletics was submitted after unit allocations were announced in June although it had been done in the middle of May. In another example, Bennis tried to get the vice presidents to agree on a timetable for the budget review process in January, 1973. He asked about it again in a letter to the Vice President for Management and Finance (2/14/73) and in a vice presidents' meeting (2/20/73), but in each case his monitoring behavior lacked follow-through and did not
produce the kinds of responses he had intended.

Proposition 31: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to objectively evaluate changes that have occurred.

Proposition 31 states that the organizational leader may need to develop strategies to evaluate the extent to which change is incorporated into the life of the organization. All the information the President requested (see the chronological summary 2/21/73, 3/1/73, 3/14/73, 3/26/73, and 5/7/73) contributed to his evaluation of the way the budget review process had been implemented. His individual meetings with the deans helped him evaluate whether or not the budget recommendations of the vice presidents' should be implemented.

Proposition 34: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to link parts of the organization or individuals whose behavior has been changed as well as to link processes of change occurring simultaneously.

Very early in the 1973-74 budget review/resource allocation process Bennis tried to link program evaluation, long range planning, the administrative reorganization, and promotion and tenure decisions with the budget review process (Proposition 34) (see 5/17/72). For example, he had expected the University's long range plan due September, 1972, to be an important factor in program review for the 1973-74 budget. When it was not received in September he still expected the vice presidents to review programs within their areas along criteria that he outlined at
various times during the year (see the chronological summary 9/16/72, 10/31/72 and 3/26/73). In September of 1972 Bennis recommended to the Board that policies on non-reappointment, early-retirement, and increased faculty teaching loads be developed (see 9/16/72). Even the consortia arrangement with a neighboring private college was linked to a need for greater inter-institutional cooperation in a time of scarce resources for higher education (see 11/18/72).

Proposition 32: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to maintain continuity at some levels of the organization while change takes place at other levels.

Proposition 33: To insulate the organization from conflicting or competing ideas and to give organizational members time to assimilate and integrate new behaviors.

Proposition 35: To give emotional support and resources to organizational members who demonstrate behaviors in the direction of the intended change.

Proposition 36: To give visibility and credibility to the change within the entire system and to spread information about the consequences of the change to other parts of the organization, thereby diminishing a negative response in other parts of the system and encouraging system-wide support and adoption.

Propositions 32 and 33 concern the role performance of the organizational leader in stabilizing the changes he has introduced into the organization. In general, circumstances (timing) conspired against extensive consultation and assimilation of the budget reductions agreed upon in the meetings between the deans and the President. Additionally, the implementation of program evaluation which had been postponed until the second
year of the biennium budget interfered with the processes of incorpora-
tion and legitimization (Proposition 36). Finally, given that the
President had almost no leaway in allocating resources in the 1973-74
budget there is no evidence of actions he took to provide additional
resources to organizational units which identified reductions after a
systematic review of programs that were consistent with the priorities
of the University (Proposition 35). Paradoxically, in fact, the Presi-
dent had to increase the recommended budget reduction for the College
of Education because of a projected loss in enrollment, even though it
had complied with the goals of the budget-review/resource allocation
process perhaps more than many other colleges which received proportion-
ately smaller cuts.

Summary and Conclusions

In the first section of this chapter nine problems that the
persons who were interviewed (vice presidents, deans, budget advisory
review commission members, governance group leaders, and presidential
assistants) said they encountered in trying to implement the budget-
review/resource allocation process were identified. Then the actions
that the University President had taken were reviewed and it was shown
how in some cases his actions matched what the people undergoing change
said they needed or expected from the organizational leader (especially
in the unfreezing-initiation stage), and how in other cases what the
set of propositions said about what the organizational leader needs to
do in order to effect change matched participants' expectations but
not the University President's actions.
One of the objectives of this chapter was to see if the prospect of a deficit budget may have led organizational members to need or expect certain actions from the organizational leader that are in any way different from the expectations they held for his role performance in regards to the long range planning or affirmative action cases that have been described in this research. It does seem as if their needs were different in this case or, at least, that the President's actions in some ways pre-dated members' perceived needs. In implementing a budget-review/resource allocation process the University President runs squarely up against many of the organizational constraints described in Chapter IV on the Assessment of Setting: a tendency toward conservatism and the preservation of the status quo; a tendency away from interdependence, collaboration, and innovation; and skepticism about efficiency and savings. The basic problem is that change (budget-cutting) is not regarded as positive. In this case when the President said that the prospect of cutting 3-9% or more of the budget presented the University with an opportunity to reexamine its commitments and priorities most of the faculty were skeptical and felt that it was an excuse for the President to intervene into their affairs. When, as in this case, the organizational leader provides the bulk of the information on the need to change, researchers have found that the target of change often becomes preoccupied with the leader's position, status, his manner of speaking, his real intentions, and so forth to the detriment of learning the specific information being communicated (Walton, 1969, p. 167; Janis and Brewster,
1965, p. 212. It could be argued that this was the case with the budget review process: that very few members of the faculty were aware of the seriousness of the problem until late winter when open positions were not being filled and when the possibility of no salary increases became more widely known through governance group participation in the review process. It could also be argued that along with this awareness there was probably only a hazy rememberance of a lot of talk in the fall about a budget crisis. (The meetings in the fall themselves on October 31 and November 21 were not well attended.) If these contentions are true, then the fact that a majority of the President's interventions throughout the entire budget review process were designed to unfreeze existing attitudes, expectancies and behaviors on the part of faculty members becomes more explainable and to an extent more justifiable.

The question then becomes how might the time in the fall have been used differently? It seems that almost all of the persons eventually involved in the budget review/resource allocation process agreed that there was a need for more adequate, usable information. Possibly, more could have been done in the fall months to develop compatible organizational arrangements such as a management information system (Proposition 28). The organizational leader in this case perhaps

\[6\] See the Faculty Senate's Budget and Priorities Committee's Recommendations on the Budget (3/28/73) in which a great deal of hostility toward the President's life style was expressed.
more profitably might have engaged in "changing" or "refreezing" behaviors until organizational members came to feel the "squeeze" themselves and thereby the need to change. Based on the assumption that new programs and new needs will have to be met through a reallocation of existing resources, rather than through the addition of new external resources, the President might more effectively have spent some of his time in the fall trying to implement the necessary support systems to a broad-based participative process that would come later, given that what he actually did in this case did not lead to any substantial reallocation of resources.

One reaction to the budget-review process that occurred over and over again among faculty members was that "administrators, not faculty members, should concern themselves with the budget," while from the perspective of the administration the legitimization of what might, in fact, be very drastic reductions in program support demanded extensive consultation and information-sharing with the faculty. The faculty's reaction might have resulted from the complexity of the issues that were being considered and from the long time over which budget problems were discussed which led to increased security and uncertainty, and to low faculty morale. At some point there may have been a need for the President to involve faculty members and other groups in decision-making about the budget; however, a shorter span of time in which fewer groups (especially fewer ad hoc groups) would be asked to participate with more information and a clear definition
of what would be expected from the various groups when they were asked to participate, might have avoided some of the problems that occurred.

The second purpose for doing this case analysis was to observe how external demands on the organizational leader affected his internal role performance. Clearly, external factors made the internal budget-making process far more complex if for no other reason than that they kept changing. For example, it was almost impossible to predict how much money would be received from the State or from any other external source for that matter given changing enrollment and funding patterns and given the politics involved. Secondly, the problems in the University with timing and delay in the budget review process were largely externally determined. Often the unpredictability itself constrained the President from acting in ways which would have been more consistent with his goals and effective in the long run. For example, without the windfall subsidy from the State in December there would have been more impetus in the University for program evaluation and less skepticism on the part of faculty members about the administration "crying wolf" too soon. With less unpredictability there probably would have been greater clarity about what needed to be done in the long run and in the interim to get there.

The problems of sheer overload as well as the conflict between external and internal demands on the President's time explain why certain actions were never taken in response to the problem encountered in implementing the internal budget-review/resource allocation process and why there was no follow-up to recognized needs for the development
of a management information system, program evaluation criteria, or certain policy statements.

On the other hand when the University President was effective in his external relationships, he was able to use his external effectiveness to create some of the conditions described in the propositions in Chapter II (such as Propositions 5, 15, 17, 27, 29, 35, 36). There is some evidence to suggest that the President in this case effectively used his sense of changing environmental conditions to change existing attitudes and behavior (Proposition 5) and his good relationships with the Fund to Improve Postsecondary Education, with the United States Department of Labor, and with State legislators (among others) to secure contracts and additional monies for the University (Proposition 15).

Finally the case analysis of the budget review process raised some questions about the propositions that the other cases that have been reviewed in this research have not. In the first place, it seems as if the propositions about the role performance of the organizational leader are based on the assumption that there is a need for a majority, if not all of the conditions, to be met in each stage of the change process for successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation to occur. But, are there cases when, for example, meeting the conditions in one proposition has an adverse effect on the organizational leader's ability to meet the requirements of another proposition? In this case, did attempts to share information and heighten organizational members' sensitivity to

---

7For further reading on a related point see Rensis Likert's discussion of the leader's linking-pin role in Hersey and Blanchard, 1972, pp. 146-147.
problems have an adverse effect on organizational climate (Proposition 14) and create conditions of low morale, high insecurity, and uncertainty? Or were attempts to link program evaluation and budgeting (Proposition 34) detrimental to building feelings of essentiality (Proposition 13) and encouraging risk-taking (Proposition 25)? Is it simply a question of effectively sequencing the leader's behaviors? It is beyond the scope of this research to provide answers to these questions. It is hoped that further research toward developing a theory of the organizational leader's role in effecting organizational change might explore the question of linkages between propositions.

The second question this case raised has to do with the inclusiveness of the propositions. As a result of doing this case analysis the author is aware that certain actions on the part of the organizational leader may be taken for entirely different reasons than the objectives identified in the propositions and that there may be a need to account for those actions somewhere in the model that has been proposed. The propositions that have been formulated deal with members' perceptions of the leader's actions and with the leader's effectiveness in creating conditions that allow members to change their attitudes and behaviors. After this case was reviewed the author was aware that certain actions the leader took--such as requests for information--may have been taken for his own benefit or education and not because they facilitated any kind of organizational change. Again this point might indicate a direction for further research on the role of the organizational leader in effecting change.
In the next chapter the fourth case on the role of the organizational leader in the development of an administrative team will be analyzed.
CHAPTER VIII

CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER IN DEVELOPING AN ADMINISTRATIVE TEAM

The most common mechanism of academic change appears to be that of the turnover of personnel - the replacement of institutional leaders and members by newcomers from other institutions and from outside the educational system. . . the process of academic reform occurs through change of persons - the replacement and rotation of individuals - rather than through change in persons, such as changes in their attitudes and skills (Hefferlin, 1971, p. 41 and 46).

Introduction

The set of interventions that will be analyzed in this chapter includes changes in organizational structure and new appointments as well as attempts by the organizational leader to change the norms, values, attitudes, and behavior of organizational members. The development of an administrative team at the University of Cincinnati has involved a series of interventions, all very leader-centered, in the sense that the President spent a great deal of time on the interventions and has a high investment in their successful outcome. Some of his interventions represent attempted solutions to problems encountered in implementing change processes such as those described in the other three cases.

This case is different from the other three cases that have been analyzed in that 1) external consultants are being used in implementation and 2) the group of individuals whose behavior is to be changed is much smaller
than was the case with the budget, affirmative action, or long range planning. Finally, the development of an administrative team is a natural change strategy to study given the organizational theory and behavioral science background of Warren Bennis. Partly these interventions were chosen to study because of the interest they have for people interested in the field of organizational development.

The purpose of this chapter is to document and understand the role of the organizational leader, in this case the University President, in building an administrative team. In the first part of this chapter a chronological summary of events between August, 1971, and August, 1973, that are related to Bennis' efforts to develop an administrative team will be presented. In the second part of this chapter, the actions of the University President will be analyzed in light of the propositions about the role performance of the organizational leader set forth in Chapter II. Finally, in summary, some of the role problems of a university president – stress, conflict, overload – that have led Bennis to redefine and restructure the role of the President at the University of Cincinnati and the implications these actions have for the implementation of other changes he has initiated will be discussed.
Chronological Summary

Summer, 1971

Bennis conducts a series of interviews with all of the top administrators and with many faculty members prior to taking office, September 1, 1971. Assistants are also added to the President's office during that summer.

November 8, 1971

Confidential memorandum to the President from his assistants on the coordination of Institutional Studies, Computer Services, and PPBS.

The memorandum recommends that Bennis appoint a coordinator for long range planning as soon as possible and that the integration of various planning and budgeting offices wait until the new provost can be included in discussions of the changes. A restructuring of the President's office by creating a chancellor or executive vice president's position is also considered in this memorandum.

February 1, 1972

The Office of Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs is created. "The chief task of the Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs will be to link the wide range of urban expertise available at the University to the metropolis, etc."

March 28, 1972

Report of the Academic Affairs Committee of the Board of Directors recommending changes in the University by-laws on the selection and appointment of administrators (vice presidents, deans, and department heads) and term appointments for administrative officers. The University Senate had recommended term appointments a month earlier. The Board approves the changes April 4, 1972.

May 3, 1972

Confidential memorandum, a Presidential assistant to the President re: an administrative reorganization. Recommendations on the role of the President and the roles of the Executive Vice President and Vice President of the Medical Center, on the relationship between the Medical Center and the rest of the University, on the Office of Public Affairs and the Office of Research and Development, on the Provostial structure and on faculty participation in University affairs, among other things are considered.

Unlike the other cases the chronological summary of events is included in this case because it is shorter and because it is more important for the reader to review before reading the case analysis that follows.
May 26, 1972

Confidential memorandum, a Presidential assistant to the President summarizing "Emerging Concepts of the Presidency", an article from the Journal of Higher Education; a second memorandum of the day reviews another Journal of Higher Education article.

May 30, 1972

Confidential memorandum, a Presidential assistant to the President on the organization of the President's office. The concept of "office of" is developed in this memorandum.

June 30, 1972

The President asks the vice presidents and the vice provosts to draw up a critique of the last year as far as general University administration and their own ideas are concerned and to list significant unresolved issues in both areas. (On 12/22/71 Bennis had asked these same individuals to write a "real" job description in objective or performance terms and an "ideal" role description. He also had asked them to have their staffs complete the same task toward the end of coming up with some recommendations in the area of staff re-organization.)

July 12, 1972

Confidential memorandum, a Presidential assistant to the President re: a proposed organization and the amalgamation of existing planning groups. He recommends that various planning groups be brought together under an executive vice president and that there needs to be a group responsible for Policy Analysis (or projecting the long range implications of certain issues).

July 7 - July 20, 1972

The President meets individually with the vice presidents and the vice provosts on their job descriptions and lists of unresolved issues.

July 25, 1972

Confidential memorandum, from the President's assistants to the President re: a proposed reorganization. Recommendations for action steps hinge on the appointment of an executive vice president.

July, 1972

The President, in retrospect, sees that his own goal to date has been to build a new style and team.
August 15, 1972

Bennis asks the vice presidents (and eventually the deans) to form administrative advisory groups to further the team approach to problem-solving in their own areas. The objectives of administrative advisory groups are to assure the involvement of those with special expertise, information, and responsibility in decision-making and to provide the perspective of intermediate level administrators in deliberations at the top level. "The advisory groups will only supplement the line organization with the thinking and perspectives of others from different areas."

August 31, 1972

The President to the vice presidents, vice provosts and presidential assistants re: Administrative Management Seminars. "These seminars I am organizing will involve outside speakers, case discussions, some readings every other week for the academic year."

September, 1972

Ford Foundation Administrative interns in the President's and Provost's offices are appointed.

September 20, 1972

Administrative Management Seminar with Shel Davis, Vice President of TRW Systems in California, as the guest speaker. Bennis hands out some readings. He introduces the seminars by saying that he hopes they will foster greater interdependence and contribute toward building an administrative team. Davis shows a film on "team-building."

September 27, 1972

Current Perspectives in Higher Education Seminar with Nevitt Sanford of the Wright Institute in Berkeley. (The Current Perspectives lectures are a second set of seminars Bennis initiated in the fall of 1973 for the same group of people that attend the Administrative Management Seminars plus the academic deans and governance group leaders.)

October 6, 1972

The President meets with his assistants to discuss the role of the assistants in the President's office.

October 10, 1972

Two outside consultants meet with the presidential assistants to discuss administrative problems.
October 16, 1972

Current Perspectives in Higher Education Seminar with Bernice Sandler from the American Association of Colleges Project on the Status and Education of Women, Washington, D.C.

October 17, 1972

Category II meeting - The President meets with the vice presidents, vice provosts, some of the academic deans, associate vice presidents and governance group leaders "to share information and discuss concerns, issues and priorities within the University."

October 22, 1972

Bennis hosts a dinner and discussion for a group of assistants and faculty members with a friend and consultant he had brought in to give him some advice on restructuring the administration.

October 23, 1972

Feedback session between the consultant and Bennis.

October 24, 1972

Administrative Management Seminar with Cornelius Sprangers, Director of Training, the Volvo Corporation, Sweden.

November 3, 1972

Memorandum from the Presidential staff to the President on office procedures and work flow.

November 6, 1972


November 7, 1972

Bennis meets with the Faculty Senate. Much of the discussion focuses on the ambiguity in decision making that faculty members sense. Bennis says that he feels the ambiguity is functional.

November 15, 1972

Bennis meets with an architectural planning consultant who had been used in the College of Design, Art and Architecture.
November 15, 16, 1972

An outside consultant is brought in "to help me [Bennis] in a number of areas where I believe outside advice can be extremely beneficial. The key areas I am concerned with and that will be looked into are the institutional arrangements and goals of the University of Cincinnati and their relationship to the long range plan. He will develop a proposal for me following his visit which I will share with you at some later time." Most of the vice presidents, vice provosts, and long range planning coordinator, and the Presidential assistants are interviewed during the two days the consultant is at the University: he also meets twice with Bennis.

November 20, 21, 1972

The report of two consultants that had been used to study the organizational structure of the Medical Center and its relationship to the city is given to the President.

November 28, 1972

Administrative Management Seminar with Thomas Fletcher, the Director of the National Training and Development Service for State and Local Governments, Washington, D.C.

November 30, 1972

Correspondence consultant to Bennis (see 11/15 - 11/16/72). He shares his impressions of Bennis' relationships with the business community, students, faculty, and to the University in general. In regards to a "management team", he writes, "this group is emerging but is not yet a team. There seems to be good rapport, no polarization, no feuding, no cliques, no enmity, as good a meshing of the old and the new as might be expected in the time available, but still a pretty disparate group. The President seems to be experimenting with alternative modes of encouraging his top staff to define their own jobs, of 'grabbing the ball and running with it', of attempting to see how individuals act in different situations, and of intentionally not giving anyone any instructions on what he expects or what he wants them to do. Many of the top administrators at the University of Cincinnati need a broadening of perspectives on how different institutions do similar things but in different ways." The report is not shared with the individuals who were interviewed.

December 5, 1972

Category II meeting (see 10/17/72).
December 6, 1972

Bennis' Administrative Management Seminar. Bennis asks the vice presidents and Presidential assistants in small groups to identify some of the major issues that have not been resolved at the University. The assistants identify a lack of clarity about their role and a general lack of trust, openness, and confrontation. The vice presidents discuss the need to communicate decisions so as to maximize support, trust, and involvement; the lack of a clear decision-making process and problems in relationships between the faculty and the administration.

December 7, 12, 1972

The President meets with four vice presidents individually on their administrative advisory groups.

December 13, 1972

Administrative Management Seminar with Richard Snyder from the Ohio State University.

December 14, 1972

Bennis meets with the consultant (see 11/30/72).

December 16, 1972

"Kitchen Cabinet Meeting" - a year-end meeting to identify some of the major issues that have not been resolved at the University of Cincinnati. Problems identified included communication, directionlessness, a lack of faculty involvement in decision-making, and the absence of a feeling of community. The Kitchen Cabinet Group included some of the Presidential assistants and also faculty members whose advice Bennis respected and often solicited.

January 5, 1973

Bennis outlines the criteria he would use in assessing and justifying a reorganization in the Provostial area: criteria such as a clearer decision-making process, more effective communication, closer cooperation, increased responsiveness of the office to external and internal demands, etc.

January 8, 1973

Graduate Fellows Dinner - the President mentions publicly for the first time the new "Graduate Dean" position he is considering.
January 9, 1973

The President meets with the deans to discuss unresolved problems in the administrative organization of the University.

January 11, 1973

Administrative Management Seminar with Chris Argyris, James Conant Bryant, Professor of Education and Organizational Behavior at the Harvard Business School.

January 16, 17, 1973

Administrative Retreat for the purposes of team-building and discussion of unresolved administrative problems. (Two outside consultants are used.)

January 18, 1973

Speech by the President to the graduate faculty proposing that the "University Dean" position he created.

January 19, 1973

Post-mortem of the January 16-17 retreat between the President and his assistants.

January 23, 1973

Current Perspectives Seminar with Russell Edgerton, the Assistant Director of the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education, Washington, D.C.

January 24, 1973

Correspondence, from the President to the Dean of Engineering, "I don't believe as yet I have created the right atmosphere for real dialogue on these issues [the role and leadership of the dean] with some few exceptions." "These are particularly critical times when most of us, quite understandably, feel that constraints [to change] are overwhelming."

January 26, 1973

Correspondence, the consultant to the President: a rationale for the need to change is presented as well as a plan for what and who should be included in the "office of the President". Bennis draws heavily on this memorandum in his own rationalization for the reorganization.
January 27, 1973

Bennis describes the role and duties of the President, the Executive Vice President, and the Deputy President structure he is considering. They are only notes to himself and are not shared.

January 27, 1973

A second "Kitchen Cabinet" meeting is held.

January 29, 1973

Administrative Management Seminar with Doug Williams of Douglas Williams Associates, New York City. Following the seminar Bennis meets with his assistants and the Vice Provost for Student Affairs to discuss the concept of "University Affairs" as part of the reorganization. [Discussion between the Vice Provost, Provost, and President on the rationale for an office of "University Affairs" had been going on since mid-January.]

January 31, 1973

Bennis meets with Shel Davis (see September 20, 1972).

February 5, 6, 1973

The President meets again with the consultants on the Medical College (see 11/20/72).

February 6, 1973

The first meeting of the President's Advisory Council (PAC) is held. The purposes of the council are 1) to make recommendations to the President's office for decisions on major policy and operational matters; 2) to serve in a review and resource capacity; 3) to serve as a group to review and give advice on major academic and administrative decisions, especially on those which cut across academic and administrative lines; 4) to serve as a final recommending locus for certain decisions; 5) to serve as a forum for ideas, communication, and information; and 6) to serve as a reaction and pulse-reading group. Bennis explains that the Council resulted from feedback he had received from consultants and the Faculty Senate on the need to define a decision making processes and from a need he has felt for more education among members of the University community on problems the University is facing.
February 12, 1973

The President asks his team to attend a retreat March 7th and 8th with Shel Davis - "We will be talking about the ways in which we conduct the affairs of administration, the administrative and human difficulties that seem to throw roadblocks in our effectiveness and to try to develop more understanding than we presently have on what seems to be the major ways we can improve our efforts in building a well-functioning management team. I suppose the outcome is an initial step toward our own team development. This may be the simplest, yet the vaguest way of putting it. The only way I have ever known to feel good about a retreat is to set expectations low enough so that I can leave feeling that some achievement has been made." Bennis asks them to read the first chapter of his primer on organizational development. [This retreat is later cancelled, rescheduled, and cancelled again.]

February 15, 1973

Bennis' recommendations for an administrative reorganization are sent to the Board of Directors of the University of Cincinnati. They are to be discussed and made public at a March 6th meeting of the Board of Directors. [The content and rationale for these recommendations will be discussed in the section in this chapter analyzing the role performance of the organizational leader.]

February 20, 1973

Administrative Management Seminar with Pat and Drea Zigarmi.

March 2, 1973

The President meets with the vice presidents to explain the proposed administrative reorganization. The reorganization he says is to develop the "office of" concept; later that day Bennis meets with the academic deans on the reorganization. He encloses a working statement on the role of the "College Dean" along with his recommendations for an administrative reorganization.

March 5, 1973

The President meets with governance group leaders on the reorganization.

March 5, 1973

Correspondence, the President to the Fellows of the Graduate School acknowledging their support for his proposal for a Graduate Dean (2/28/73).
March 6, 1973

The President meets with the vice provosts to explain the reorganization; later, the reorganization plan is announced and approved at a meeting of the Board of Directors. At that meeting the President explains that the reorganization is to make the administration "less ambiguous, more responsive." The faculty representatives to the Board raise some objections about the process of consultation prior to the announcement. [By the time the reorganization plan is announced to the Board and to the academic deans it has been modified to include two Executive Vice Presidents in the Office of the President. Role descriptions for those two positions and for the Provost and new university dean are included in Appendix G.]

March 6, 1973

Current Perspectives Seminar with Ray Bisplinghoff, Director of the National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.

March 20, 1973

Administrative Management Seminar with Samuel Culbert, Professor at the Graduate School of Management, UCLA.

March 22, 1973

The President in a letter to black student leaders explains the rationale for the reorganization and its importance to black student groups: "I have frequently felt that the external demands on my time have not allowed enough attention to be paid to the needs and concerns of the students and faculty. I hope the reorganization will allow the Office of the President to maintain closer contact with both students and faculty members."

March 22, 1973

Current Perspectives Seminar with Dwight Allen, Dean of the School of Education, The University of Massachusetts.

March 26, 1973

Correspondence the President to the Provost. Several problems Bennis has lately encountered underscore the need for more clarity in the decision-making process between the President's office and the Provost.
March 27, 1973

Current Perspectives in Higher Education Seminar with Gus Tyler - Assistant President, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, New York City.

March 29, 1973

Administrative Management Seminar with James Hayes, President of the American Management Association, New York City.

April 2, 1973

Current Perspectives Seminar with Dr. J. Herbert Hollomon - Director of the Center for Policy Alternatives within the School of Engineering at MIT.

April 2, 1973

Correspondence, the Vice Provost for Student Affairs to the President on the University Affairs concept.

April 2, 1973

Memorandum to the President from his assistants summarizing their reactions to the University Affairs concept.

April 23, 1973

Correspondence another Vice Provost to the President on his role in the administrative reorganization.

April 10, 1973

President's Advisory Council meeting (see 2/6/73).

April 10, 1973

Administrative Management Seminar with James Miller, President Elect of the University of Louisville.

April 26, 1973

Administrative Management Seminar with Floyd Mann - Director of the Environmental Council and Visiting Professor in Business and Sociology at the University of Colorado.
May 2, 1973

Shel Davis interviews individuals in the President's office and the vice presidents on their perceptions of Bennis' strengths and weaknesses and about the University's problems and priorities in the upcoming year.

May 3, 1973

Davis meets with the President to give him feedback on what he has learned in the interviews - feedback primarily on Bennis' strengths and weaknesses.

May 4, 1973

Correspondence the President to a vice provost - in the context of other concerns in the letter, Bennis says that he really personally enjoyed all the Management Seminars and Current Perspectives Seminars. "I thought they were extremely worthwhile. . .from the point of view of getting to know some of my colleagues in another setting."

May 8, 1973

Correspondence Bennis to his administrative team re: scheduling a team-building session June 2nd. "The phrase team-building is an essential aspect of organizational development as Shel Davis conceives of it. The phrase simply means what it says: opportunities for us to get together and confront issues which are day-to-day makes it impossible for us to connect with and which if not confronted over too long a period of time may lead to serious administrative and organizational difficulties. As a first step in our team-building program, Shel would like to discuss his impressions gained from interviews he had with many of you in the top administrative group. He felt very enthusiastic about our prospects and felt that in every interview he conducted there was an openness, a strong willingness, and an excitement about committing yourselves to this activity." (The administrative team included all of the vice presidents, the Presidential assistants, the Ombudsman, Bennis, Shel Davis, and a second outside consultant (RW).

May 17, 1973

Administrative Management Seminar with Edgar Schein - Professor, School of Industrial Management, MIT.

May 23, 1973

Current Perspectives Seminar with Tony Weiner of the Hudson Institute, New York.
June 2, 1973

Administrative Team building session with Shel Davis at the Vernon Manor (a residential hotel in Cincinnati).

June 8, 1973

Administrative Team building session in New York City in conjunction with a luncheon for the Heads of foundations.

June 18, 1973

Bennis in a postscript to another letter asks each person he writes to list those areas or dimensions in which they would like to grow.

July 20, 1973

An Administrative Retreat is scheduled for August 2nd and 3rd at Kings Island. Bennis would like answers to two questions in time for the retreat: "1) In what ways can the University indicate or demonstrate its own movement or progress or lack of movement or progress? What criteria, dimensions, factors or indicators must we look for in 1973-74? 2) What factors within the faculty led to the choice of [LL] as Faculty Representative to the University of Cincinnati Board of Directors this past spring?"

July 25, 1973

Correspondence, the President to his team expressing gratitude for everyone's help and resourcefulness while he was at Aspen for the summer as a scholar in residence. "The past several weeks have provided a test of the reorganization."

August 2, 3, 1973

Administrative Retreat with Shel Davis at Kings Island. The Provost had prepared a series of position papers on the various topics that were discussed. The group of participants included eleven more people than the June 2nd meeting.

September 26, 1973

Correspondence the President to Kings Island participants - "Kings Island was an outstanding success in terms of developing more effective methods of problem-solving." Another retreat is scheduled for mid-November, which is later cancelled.

The organizational structure of the University's Central Administration before and after Bennis' reorganization is shown on the charts on the following pages.
1. Offices reporting to Vice Presidents are indicated in pp 7-10 of the 1972-73 Office and Telephone Directory.
2. Offices reporting to the Vice Provosts are indicated in pp 10-11 of the 1972-73 Office and Telephone Directory, and pp 7-8 of the September 1971 Faculty Facts.
College Deans (except Medicine, Nursing and Health and Pharmacy) report directly to the Provost for Academic Affairs.

Vice Provost for Academic Affairs serves in a staff role in the Office of the Provost for Academic Affairs.

This office will exist only until the present incumbent retires.
Analysis of the Role Performance of the Organizational Leader in Building an Administrative Team

Introduction

Before beginning an analysis of the University President's actions in building an administrative team, it might be helpful to look at what the components of this change strategy were. Clearly one part of the development of an administrative team at the University of Cincinnati was "team-building." Bennis defined "team-building" in a letter to his administrative team on May 8, 1973 to be "opportunities for us to get together and confront issues which our day-to-day work often makes it impossible for us to connect with and which if not confronted over too long a period of time may lead to serious administrative and organizational difficulties." His goals for these efforts were to develop more trust, caring, and open communication among members of his administrative team. The Administrative

2Since each of the clusters of interventions in Bennis' efforts to build an administrative team had reached a different stage in the change process as of July, 1973, when field observations were completed, the impact of these interventions on the University will not be discussed. Instead an assessment of the effectiveness of the strategies used and a discussion of the problems encountered in implementation will be made by incorporating the reactions of participants to the interventions as they occurred.

Management Seminars and administrative retreats were the primary strategies Bennis used to change the attitudes and interpersonal behavior of his administrative team. By the fall of 1973, three "team building sessions" had been held with varying numbers of participants (June 2, 1973; June 9, 1973; August 2 - August 3, 1973). This fall has been a clear beginning of more focused team-building efforts - several of the vice presidents have gone to National Training Laboratories (NTL) workshops and another team-building session with Shel Davis was held in December, 1973, in which just the vice presidents and the President participated.

A second component of Bennis' efforts to build an administrative team was the administrative reorganization (3/7/73). The reorganization included redefining the administrative structure, creating new positions, bringing in some new people, moving other people from one position to another, and implementing the "Office of the President" concept. Here Bennis' goals were to make the "administration more responsive and less ambiguous" (see the chronological summary 3/6/73 and 3/22/73). "The idea of the Office of the President is to emphasize the need for collaboration and staff assistance to the President." As of July, 1973, one of the new positions created by the reorganization was not filled and a search process was still underway for a new Vice President of the Medical Center. There has not been adequate time to test "the office of" concept since it did not evolve until mid-June, early July.
Various interventions Bennis made to change the values and attitudes of a larger group of University administrators constitute the third aspect of the development of an administrative team. The strategies he used in this regard were chosen to change the normative\(^4\) outlooks of these administrators. The strategies which included the term appointment/periodic review process, new processes of socialization, and a series of seminars on "Current Perspectives in Higher Education" were designed to re-educate the participants and to offer them alternative ways of looking at their own careers and at the problems facing institutions of higher education. The group toward these interventions were directed included the academic deans as well as the vice presidents, vice provosts, and Presidential assistants. Again the impact and effectiveness of these interventions well depend upon the ways in which they are followed up and built upon.

Taken together these three components of team development - team-building, the reorganization, and career-development represent a strategy of organizational development. Sherwood (1970) defines organizational development as

\[\text{an educational process by which human resources are continuously identified, allocated, and expanded in ways to make these resources more available to the organization, and therefore improve the organization's problem-solving capabilities. The most general objective of organizational development is to develop self-renewing, self-correcting systems of people who learn to organize themselves in a variety of ways according to the nature of their tasks and who continue to cope with the changing demands the environment makes on the organization.}\]

\(^4\text{Norm is defined as a prescribed or accustomed way of looking at or doing things.}\]
In the rest of this chapter the role of the President in
developing an administrative team at the University of Cincinnati
in light of the propositions set forth in Chapter II will be
analyzed. The purpose of the next section will be to look at the
unfreezing strategies he used in "team-building."

**Team Building**

**Unfreezing-Initiation**

Proposition 1: An objective of the strategies
employed by the organizational leader in this
stage may be to assess the nature and sources
of resistance to the proposed change.

Almost all of the strategies the President used in team-building
were designed to assess the nature and source of resistance to change
(Proposition 1). In his first year as President, Bennis asked his
assistants to propose and study the various pros and cons to plans for
restructuring the President's office to determine if people were open
and ready to confront certain issues (see the chronological summary
11/8/71, 5/3/72, 5/26/72, 5/30/72, 7/12/72, and 7/25/73). On other
occasions he used administrative retreats (1/16/73) or meetings with
his assistants (10/6/72) in the same way. There is also evidence
to show that Bennis was cautious in initiating a team-building inter-
vention. He did not begin the Administrative Management Seminars until
his second year, after he had had a chance to build staff relationships
and to make some changes in his staff. When Shel Davis (9/20/72) first
came to Cincinnati to give an Administrative Management Seminar, Bennis
"felt people were not ready for team-building; that the group wasn't a
team yet; and that people weren't used to talking to each other."
Proposition 2: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to overcome the initial resistance of organizational members to the proposed change.

Proposition 6: To change the constellation of forces, resources and information converging on any one part of the organization.

Proposition 10: To create a sense of rising expectations among organizational members that they will benefit from the proposed change in their organizational behavior.

Bennis used several strategies to overcome the resistance to team building that he fully anticipated (Proposition 2). In order to undermine informational experts (management consultants) who, in a series of seminars, looked at different aspects of management from "Management by Objectives" (Sprangers, 10/24/72) to the "Profile of a Perfect Executive" (Beckhard, 11/6/72). The Administrative Management Seminars were opportunities for University administrators to confront new information - in this case the validity and importance of looking at managerial and administrative problems. In order to break down motivational and social supports, Bennis arranged for the seminars to be held in an informal setting away from work in the evening with dinner and cocktails. In his own behavior he stressed the need for interdependence, collaboration, and a better understanding of the complex demands on University administrators. For example, he appointed assistants in the President's office (8/11/71). He talked about faculty members taking two-year internships in Administration. (During the academic year, 1972-73, three of his
assistants were full-time faculty members.) Bennis also, over time, tried to reduce the threat and anxiety associated with the prospect of team-building (Proposition 2). His language when he talked about what team-building was, purposefully non-threatening. "We will be talking about the ways in which we conduct the affairs of administration. . ." (2/12/73). "It is an opportunity for us to get together and confront issues which our day-to-day work makes it impossible for us to confront. . ." (5/8/73). Similarly when you compare the agendas for the January 2, 1973, administrative retreat and the June 2, 1973, team-building session you can see a progression from issue-oriented discussions to more open confrontations of those aspects of the team's interpersonal relations which blocked problem-solving.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda 1/16/73</th>
<th>Agenda 6/2/73</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Proposed Administrative Reorganization</td>
<td>Shel Davis' feedback on what the assistants and the Vice Presidents saw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Range Planning</td>
<td>Bennis' strengths and weaknesses to be.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuing Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A slow and gradual approach to change, which is potentially less threatening, is also apparent when one considers the fact that fourteen Administrative Management Seminars were held over eight months. The Seminars gradually expanded people's awareness of what team-building meant (Proposition 6). When participants in the Administrative Management Seminars were interviewed, none of them said they felt threatened and that, although they were unsure about the relevance of some of the
seminars to the University's problems, they enjoyed the comraderie and chance to get to know each other in another setting. Bennis provided the opportunity through consultant interviews and question-and-answer periods after each seminar for people to raise questions about the values of openness, participation, and collaboration in administrative decision-making (Proposition 2). Although he asked the vice presidents, vice provosts, and Presidential assistants to attend the seminars, there was no apparent retribution for not attending. People came voluntarily, and Bennis tried to build on their interests. Very slowly he built a sense of rising expectations in the same ways he reduced anxiety (Proposition 10).

Proposition 3: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage is to heighten organization members' sensitivity to problems involving the intended change.

Proposition 4: To stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration in the system in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 8: To link parts of the system that are sympathetic to the intended change and share common dissatisfaction and a sense of powerlessness.

Bennis also used consultants (1/22/72, 11/15/72, 11/20/72, 1/16/73, 2/5/73) to heighten organizational members' sensitivity to problems (Proposition 3) and to link parts of the system that shared common dissatisfaction in regards to the proposed change (Proposition 8). Through public speeches and interaction in staff meetings (once a week with the vice presidents; more frequently with members of his personal
staff), Bennis heightened the community's sensitivity to problems of managing a large complex University and tried to set new standards of responsiveness to student and external demands for his administration (Proposition 4). All of the rationale for the Executive Vice Presidency and "office of" concept, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter, is grounded in the need to be more responsive to students, to new constituent groups, to the immediate community, and to changing environmental conditions.

Proposition 5: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to integrate new forces for change with existing forces for change, external forces for change with internal forces for change.

Proposition 5 states that an objective of the strategies used by the organizational leader in initiating change may be to make the organization more open to its environment, joining new, external forces for change with existing, internal forces for change. Bennis recruited an outsider for the open provost position for the very reason that he thought that the person he chose was very much in tune with the changes facing all institutions of higher education. He hired an outsider for the Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs, a position he had created. Bennis built on newness and on the qualities of youth and futurism in developing his administrative team: three of the vice presidents he hired were under 38.

Proposition 9: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to set priorities for the organization and to clearly communicate these priorities to organizational members whose behavior is to be changed.
Clearly the development of an administrative team was a high priority for Bennis if the amount of time he spent on the seminars (both in arranging and in hosting them), at retreats, and on considering the reorganization is any indication (Proposition 9).\(^5\) (One would assume that the team-building intervention would be important for Bennis given his background and training.) He used money from his discretionary fund to sponsor the Administrative Management Seminars. Money was also available for retreats (1/16/73, 6/2/73, 6/9/73, 8/2 - 8/3/73). In this way new resources, as well as information, were channeled to "team" members (Proposition 6).

Proposition 11: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to involve as many of the individuals to be affected by the proposed change as possible in planning and decision-making.

Proposition 11 states that it may be important for the organizational leader to encourage the participation of those who will be involved in the changes in planning and decision-making. Again most of the participants felt that they had some choice as to whether or not they wanted to attend the seminars although the decision to have the seminars was pretty much Bennis' alone. At the August (1973) Kings Island conference Bennis asked the participants to critique the Management Seminars and to make some recommendations about how they would like

\(^5\text{It is impossible to calculate an exact number of hours from Bennis' calendar. As an observer I would estimate that the majority of his time from December, 1972, until March, 1973, when the administrative reorganization was announced was spent on some aspect of team development.}\)
to see them changed in the future. (Likewise Bennis had solicited the opinions of his staff in 1971-72 about the reorganization of the administration he was considering.) Later his assistants were involved in strategizing how the reorganization would be carried out. Finally the outside consultant in the team-building session themselves insured the participation of those who attended in deciding which issues should be discussed.

One of the criticisms, however, that was raised toward the way team-building was implemented has to do with the question of participation and Bennis' tendency to involve lots of people in whatever he is doing. For example, the group that attended the Administration Management Seminars was never constant - faculty members or persons Bennis either felt would be interested in the topic or who knew the speaker were invited. (Likewise the group that attended Category II meetings [10/17/72, 12/5/72] was different from the group of individuals who were included in the President's Advisory Council [2/6/73, 4/10/73].) Participants in the team-building sessions and Administrative Management Seminars commented, "Bennis keeps shifting who is on the team - there is no continuity. You get invited to two or three meetings and then you don't get invited to the next one" (a top administrator). "At some point, Bennis is going to have to stick with one group of people. He likes people in and out but then community building doesn't occur" (another administrator). "Some meetings are so large that information is never shared with the President" (a Presidential assistant). One of Bennis' assistants commented that "Bennis is constantly overextending himself
and his staff" and that he becomes fragmented as a result. "He tries to attend too many things, to too many people at one time." If there was a tendency to include miscellaneous and extraneous people in meetings, there was also a tendency to try to cover too many items in any one meeting. Bennis himself remarked at the 12/5/72 Category II meeting, "that the agenda was so overwhelming that it didn't allow for discussion."

In sum, the strategies Bennis used to overcome resistance to team-building might have been offset by the uncertainty created by the constantly changing membership of the team.

Proposition 12: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to increase the amount and frequency of interaction between himself and members in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 12 states that it may be important for the organizational leader to increase the amount of interaction he has with subordinates if unfreezing and changing in regards to the proposed change is to occur. Bennis interacted frequently with the individuals who were part of his team between September, 1972, and June, 1973 when the groundwork for team-building was being laid. There were frequent meetings with the vice presidents - at least once a week. For two months Bennis often had most of the staff together in the mornings to discuss the mail. There were also the Category II and President's Advisory Council meetings, eight "Current Perspectives in Higher Education" Seminars, and fourteen Administrative Management Seminars which most "team" members attended. The team-building sessions in June, on June 2nd and 9th, also allowed for increased
interaction between the President and members of his evolving administrative team. Let me quote from a letter Bennis received from one of his vice presidents after the New York City session, June 9.

The personal character of the outing is what pleased me most - or at the moment is what lingers strongest in my mind. When you called me to your office this morning to sit in on your meeting with [the State legislators], I had the impression I knew you much better than ever before, and appreciated you more. Perhaps it resulted from a confrontation at the Vernon Manor retreat (which I value, but did not like as much as the New York visit) and our sojourn to New York City. An important element for me was the time we took for giving recognition to 'our looking at one another.' It's funny how one must 'take time' for something like that. It is also fascinating to observe how the chemistry of our relationships is so affected by 'taking time to look' - which is really like taking time to allow for love (whatever that is). As you well know, our professional relationships are almost dominated by this time - or lack of it - that we take."

At times, the quantity of interaction between Bennis and his administrative team and among members of the team reflected the quality of caring and trust that that letter describes.

Proposition 13: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to heighten organizational members' self-esteem and to encourage reciprocity in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 14: To establish and maintain a climate of acceptance, support, and trust in interpersonal relationships in which change is regarded positively.

At other times Bennis' impatience, his high standards and his own competency interfered with those caring and trustful relationships forming. Bennis often criticized his staff for lacking imagination or taking risks.
The staff, in turn, criticized Bennis for often not reading the material they had prepared in advance of meetings. Bennis missed some small opportunities to build others' sense of competency and self-esteem (Proposition 13) by not appreciating work his staff had done.

In an interview in October, 1972, Bennis said that what he may have done in his first year as a University President was "to have created an atmosphere where confrontation, feedback, and some openness are possible" (The Journal of Higher Education, May, 1973) (Proposition 14). Some of the members of the administrative team who were interviewed felt that Bennis' observation was true: others perceived that often when Bennis said he wanted feedback, his immediate reactions to what was being said often did not allow others to say exactly what they wanted to say (a Presidential assistant). In other words, Bennis was able to control other people's ways of participating and giving feedback so they weren't sure how open a climate had actually been created (another assistant). On January 19, 1973, in a meeting with his assistants Bennis said that part of the problem was "that he kept knowing too much what was wrong with the system and that nobody else ever took any initiative." One person said in response that he had to see his recommendations being acted upon in order to be encouraged to take more risks, which was not happening.

Proposition 16: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to build his expertise and credibility with organizational members.

Proposition 17: To extend the organizational leader's control over varied kinds of resources and sources of power.
Propositions 7 (eliciting support from informal as well as formal leaders) or 15 (demonstrating a change in the organization's relationship to other organizations) are probably not relevant in this case. Propositions 16 and 17 state that it may be important for the organizational leader to be seen as credible and to build on as many sources of power as he can in order for successful initiation and implementation to occur. Bennis is seen as attractive, charismatic, and knowledgeable by many of his colleagues in the University. He is respected as an expert in organizational theory inside as well as outside the university. He is perceived as being consistently committed to changes in the direction of greater collaboration, trust, and openness. As the organizational leader he made resources available for team-building and committed his own, his staff's and the vice presidents' time to it. Finally, organizational members recognize that Bennis' style, his informality, and his willingness to risk have all built up his personal power.

Although there is some evidence of leader behaviors in the "changing" stage, the majority of the actions Bennis took in his second year as President in regard to team-building were designed to unfreeze (and get people ready to change). In fact, it has been possible to cite specific strategies Bennis used in order to create in almost all of the conditions described in the propositions for "unfreezing". In the next section, the actions Bennis was beginning to take in order to implement his team-building intervention will be described.
Changing-Implementation

Proposition 22: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to provide organizational members with opportunities to test and verify new behaviors through personal experience.

The team-building sessions Bennis scheduled in June, 1973, gave the members of his administrative team an opportunity to try out new behaviors (Proposition 22). For example, one of the vice presidents commented in an interview that he was learning "you can say things to Bennis - he takes them in good humor." The outside consultant for team-building encouraged the participants to clarify the feedback he was sharing with the President that had come from interviews with them (6/2/73). "Shel was there and he wouldn't let you not answer a question" (a vice president). This past fall, several of the vice presidents have had the opportunity to go to NTL for a week at a time to learn about themselves and team-building in a non-work setting (Proposition 22). At least for some of the vice presidents the behavioral changes required of them are becoming clearer from continuing work with Shel Davis and from practical experience at collaborative problem-solving in the Office of the President.

Proposition 24: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in implementing change may be to provide role models for new behavior patterns.

Proposition 30: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in incorporating change may be to monitor organizational members' performance in coping with and integrating the proposed change.
It was mentioned before how Bennis has served as a role model in team-building given his willingness to take feedback (Proposition 24) (see chronological summary 5/3/73 and 6/2/73). For the most part he has also encouraged a degree of risk-taking on the part of organizational members (Proposition 25). When Bennis doesn't encourage risk-taking is when he solicits feedback and does not act on it or when people feel that there are NO rewards - reciprocity, inclusion, etc. - associated with opening up. The two letters Bennis wrote to his administrative team (7/25/73 and 9/26/73) are examples of his reinforcing even tentative changes on the part of organizational members (Proposition 30).

**Proposition 26:** An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to redefine the leader's role in relation to the change processes initiated.

At this point Bennis has not changed his relationship to the team-building intervention he has initiated (Proposition 26). His relationships with team members continue to be the focal point of most team-building discussions. Sarason wrote in *The Creation of Settings* that "the setting is the leader's in the most personal and pervasive way and his feelings of worth are perceived by him to be depending on the success of the setting" (Sarason, 1972, p. 213). Bennis continues to have a high personal investment in making the team-building intervention work.

It is not possible to cite actions Bennis has taken in regards to the other propositions for "changing" and at this point it is still too early to assess the degree of incorporation-refreezing or success of the team-building intervention.
The Reorganization

An important key to understanding Bennis' second intervention to develop an administrative team, the reorganization, is his writings about the need for an administrative reorganization. Let me quote extensively from his recommendations to the Board of Directors, February 15, 1973.

I am convinced that we have some serious problems resulting from our organizational structure. And I say this with full recognition that at times it is necessary to avoid the costs of confrontation and settle for what will work. Here what we face is...fragmentation, proliferation, territorial imperatives, a lack of real sharing and collegiality among and between units, and an undue amount of energy and time spent solely in protecting one's "turf" and resources - all of which taken together alienates the faculty from one another, helps to make our students feel cynical about the avowed goals of what a university really is, and undoubtedly hampers the prospects for our capacity to work together (p. 20).

There are also structural voids.

There is no central information system. There is no systematic way to develop or examine new ideas and programs. There is no systematic way to review, coordinate, and employ new technologies of communication. There is no University-wide mechanism for reviewing, coordinating, and carefully implementing new programs in continuing education to a variety of new populations. There is no central coordinating point or academic focus for facilitating and developing the nucleus of faculty or core curricula for an urban university (p. 32).

Secondly, in addition to structural problems, "there are problems with people in the organization being miscast, myopic, and untrained for what they are doing" (p. 50).
Thirdly, Bennis characterizes the organizational climate of the University by what he perceives to be highly individualistic behavior, problem denial, low initiative and risk-taking, excessive caution, fear and almost no collaboration or confrontation. These norms, values and beliefs, he says, govern the mood, attitudes, competence and people's feelings of people in the University.

I am convinced that the single most important change to the integrity of institutions of higher education is our dependence on external forces and our tragic failure to recognize and confront the consequences of this (p. 26).

After summarizing the problems of structure, personnel, and climate, Bennis enumerates the consequences of these problems with the Board:

1) There has been a diffusion and blurring of goals about the true nature of a university; along with this and possibly because of it there is a lack of coherent, unified leadership.
2) There has been no rational planning process, development of priorities, or deliberateness about decisions related to priorities or goals.
3) There is widespread demoralization and feelings of powerlessness (p. 70).

The reorganization of Bennis advocates in response to these problems includes:

1) The creation of a new position: a University Dean for Graduate Education and Research.
2) The creation of Presidential Advisory Councils for improving and making the decision-making process more visible.
3) Changes in the Office of the Provost.
4) The development of a management-information system.
5) The implementation of the concept of "the Office of the President."
A description of the principal functions of the Office of the President are included in Appendix G. The "Office of the President" Bennis proposed included two Executive Vice Presidents:

The Executive Vice President and Secretary of the Board of Directors - "who will provide general advice and council on all University matters, especially on questions of budgeting and community relations. He will work closely with the President on all external financial matters. . .He will be responsible for the relationships between the General Hospital and the resources of the Medical Center. He and the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs will have responsibility within the Office of the President for all issues that relate to the management of the budget of the University [Emphasis mine]. The major responsibility of the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs will be to coordinate and orchestrate all internal affairs of the University with the President. He will be responsible for responding to the initiatives of the colleges, interacting with their proposals, and relating institutional aspirations to external realities, assuring in the process the primacy of external concerns as we struggle purposefully to manage change within scarce resources. He will implement the budget review process and have special responsibilities for planning policy and decision making for academic programs."

Essentially what Bennis was saying in implementing the "office of" concept was that one man cannot do it all. "The overload of this office has reached staggering proportions. Under the reorganization plan the two Executive Vice Presidents, the President, and the Presidential assistants will work as a composite 'Office of the President.' This will make the President more personally accessible as needs arise than has been possible up to now" (Candid Campus, 3/7/73).
The functions Bennis outlined for himself were functions of leadership, not management, to use his own distinction.

The most important functions of leadership are infusing new values and goals, planning for the future and anticipating coming things, raising the fundamental questions most of us take for granted, heightening awareness of external problems that may pose important changes for the organization, providing perspectives about where the institution is, has come from and where it expects to go, creating the right social architecture and climate, and identifying the people who can propel the organization (p. 72).

Proposition 3: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in initiating change may be to heighten organizational members' sensitivity to problems involving the intended change.

Proposition 4: To stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration in the system.

Proposition 23: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in implementing change may be to offer organizational members new meanings or ways of looking at their experiences in regards to the proposed change.

Clearly the conditions described in Propositions 3, 4, and 23 were met by the reasons Bennis shared for the proposed reorganization.

Through what he wrote he heightened organizational members' sensitivity to certain problems of organizational structure, personnel, and climate (Proposition 3); he stimulated new needs and levels of aspiration (such as the need for greater clarity and more effectiveness) (Proposition 4); and he provided a new conceptualization for the Office of the President (Proposition 23). What other actions did Bennis take and what functions did they serve in regards to the reorganization?

---

6These functions essentially parallel the functions for the organizational leader outlined under "unfreezing" in the propositions presented.
The interventions he took are listed below:

**August, 1971**

. . . Appointed assistants to the Office of the President.

**February, 1972**

. . . Created the position, Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs.

**June, 1972** - (December, 1971)

. . . Job description exercise.

**August, 1972**

. . . Administrative advisory groups recommended.

**September, 1972**

. . . Ford Foundation Administrative Interns chosen.

**October, 1972**

. . . Outside consultant used. Category II Meeting.

**November, 1972**

. . . Assistants analyze office procedures and work flow. Another outside consultant used.

**December, 1972**

. . . Conferences with the vice presidents on administrative advisory groups. Category II meeting. Kitchen Cabinet Meeting.

**January, 1973**

. . . "Unresolved problems" discussions (12/6/72, 12/16/72, 1/9/72, 1/16/73).

. . . Administrative retreat.

. . . University Dean for Graduate Education and Research position announced.

. . . Kitchen Cabinet Meeting.

**February, 1973**

. . . President's Advisory Group Council meeting. Reorganization recommended to Board of Directors.
March, 1973

Reorganization discussed with the deans, vice presidents, and vice provosts. Reorganization announced 3/6/73.

Spring, 1973

Reorganization implemented.

Search committees appointed for a new provost, University Dean, and Vice President for the Medical Center.

Proposition 2: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in this stage may be to overcome the initial resistance of organizational members to the proposed change.

Proposition 3: To heighten organizational members' sensitivity to problems involving the intended change.

Proposition 4: To stimulate new needs and levels of aspiration in the system in regards to the proposed change.

Again, as in team-building, Bennis' early strategies were designed to heighten organizational members' sensitivity to organizational problems (Proposition 3), to create new needs (Proposition 4) and to overcome resistance to the changes he was proposing (Proposition 2). Consultants were used to identify organizational problems (10/22/72, 11/15/73). In the job description exercise (12/71, 6/72) Bennis asked the vice presidents and vice provosts to list unresolved issues in their areas and in the University in general. Those problems were then discussed in individual conferences between Bennis and each administrator. Bennis attempted to change informational support for existing attitudes and behavior by emphasizing through his speeches the changing economic and social conditions for higher education and his goal to make the University of Cincinnati the greatest metropolitan university in the country. He
reinforced his commitment to his goal to involve the University in community affairs by creating of Office of the Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs in February, 1972. That Bennis was not totally changing patterns of motivational or social support for existing attitudes and behavior is evident from a consultant's description of enclaves of faculty members who disagreed with Bennis' definition for the role of the University. "Given his convictions about moving the University in more open, community-related ways, Bennis was certain to inherit ready-made opposition in that portion of the faculty concerned with the classical purposes of the University. . .It is a matter to be dealt with by the President spending more time with the faculty to convey to them his vision of what they might do together" (consultant, 11/30/72). Although Bennis verbally assured faculty members that their present satisfactions would not be lost, his assurances were not heard by those faculty members, especially in Arts and Sciences, who were skeptical of Bennis' social science background (a Presidential assistant). The implementation of the reorganization changes was approached gradually almost fifteen months after Bennis first mentioned he was considering a major administrative reorganization, which on the one hand may have diminished anxiety in the system as a whole (Proposition 2) and on the other hand may have heightened anxiety for individuals who were uncertain about their future in the new structure (Proposition 4). One of the individuals whose career was involved described the situation as one of low trust, high insecurity.
Proposition 22: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in implementing change may be to provide organizational members with opportunities to test and verify new behaviors through personal experience.

Proposition 24: To provide role models for new behavior patterns.

As in team-building, Bennis provided models and opportunities to test new behaviors prior to full-scale implementation (Propositions 22 and 24). His own office with assistants and an administrative intern was a model. The Category II meetings were a model for the evolving advisory councils. Thirdly, the rationale given for administrative advisory groups - a team-approach to problem solving - foreshadowed the rationale for the March reorganization itself.

Proposition 7: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in initiating change may be to elicit support for the proposed organizational change from informal as well as formal organizational leaders.

Proposition 11: To involve as many of the individuals to be affected by the proposed change as possible in planning and decision-making.

There are numerous examples of strategies Bennis used to elicit support for the reorganization from both formal and informal organizational leaders (Proposition 7). He held discussions on "unresolved issues" with his assistants and with the vice presidents (12/10/72), with the deans (1/9/72), and again with the vice presidents and assistants at the administrative retreat (1/16/72). He consulted with his Kitchen Cabinet of faculty members twice - once on December 16, 1972, and again on January 27, 1973. He initially proposed the position for
a University Dean for Graduate Education and Research at a dinner for the Fellows of the Graduate School (1/8/73) before announcing the position January 18th at the graduate faculty meeting. He consulted with the Board of Directors in February before a public announcement of the reorganization was made in March. Bennis also fulfilled the conditions of Proposition 11 for the most part — involving at least those individuals whose careers would be directly affected by the proposed changes in discussion (see the chronological summary 1/16/73 and 1/29/73). He scheduled individual meetings with all of the persons whose positions were affected by the reorganization.

Although it is possible to cite actions Bennis took to consult with formal and informal leaders and to gain their support (Proposition 7), the principal criticisms of the reorganization plan arose over the issue of "consultation". Governance leaders and the Faculty Representative to the Board of Directors charged that Bennis consulted with them at the last minute and that by March 4th when they were consulted the reorganization was already a "fait accompli". One governance group leader commented, "No faculty member would challenge the President's prerogative to reorganize his administration, but the reorganization contained a number of recommendations which substantially affect the academic life of the institution. He came up with a plan that could have been more precise and less ambiguous with faculty consultation. He's always claiming a pool of expertise here — but his actions show an underestimation of faculty intelligence and a lack of confidence in their ability."
Proposition 13: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in initiating change may be to heighten organizational members self-esteem and to encourage reciprocity in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 16: To build the organizational leader's expertise and credibility with organizational members.

Proposition 18: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in implementing change may be to overcome emerging resistance to the proposed change during the period of attempted implementation.

Proposition 20: To continually clarify and provide mechanisms by which organizational members can gain clarification of the behavioral changes required.

Proposition 21: To provide mechanisms for feedback between the leader and the people undergoing change.

Proposition 25: To encourage experimentation and risk-taking on the part of organizational members in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 38: The organizational leader and others advocating the change need to be perceived as trustworthy throughout the change process.

Bennis and the chairman of the Faculty Senate sparred over "what it means to consult" for weeks following the announcement of the reorganization as Bennis tried to overcome emerging resistance more to the way he had implemented the reorganization than to the substance of the recommendations themselves (Proposition 18). Essentially, Bennis felt that he had consulted with governance leaders since they were a part of his Kitchen Cabinet discussions. Faculty members, on the other hand, and to some extent the academic deans, felt that they had not had sufficient opportunity to clarify certain aspects of the reorganization (Proposition 20) or to give Bennis feedback on what they felt might need to be changed.
or at least made more precise (Proposition 21). They felt that Bennis' credibility with the faculty was lessened as a result of the way he had implemented the reorganization (Propositions 16, 38). Several of the deans felt that they had not been consulted on the role of the University Dean or on the changes in the Provost's office which would affect them. "Bennis pulls a group together to consult with them, gives a long introduction, takes a few stabs in the direction of his expectations and then goes off on tangents. There is little soliciting of opinion and no summarizing" (a dean). The deans, in meeting with the Provost after the announcement of the reorganization, said they felt that Bennis had not asked for their opinions (Proposition 13) and that there was too much of a risk involved in giving unsolicited advice (Proposition 25).

Clark Kerr wrote that "innovation works best if there is no author." Bennis, in this case, had a high investment in his ideas being implemented (Proposition 37) since he had considered them for a long time and since he considered his Presidency to be visible only if certain personnel and structural changes were made. Unfortunately, the way in which he implemented the reorganization, from the perception of one governance group leader, may interfere with faculty members' receptivity to other ideas he proposes in the future.7

7Kahn and Wolfe define style as the outstanding tendencies in the behavior of the focal person irrespective of the particular activities he is engaged in. People's expectations about the organizational leader's style, which have resulted from interactions with him in the past, may prevent them from seeing him take certain actions which may be for the successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation of change. In other words, the leader's style can, over time, shape the way in which his interventions are perceived and the effectiveness with which he can implement change.
Proposition 13: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in initiating change may be to heighten organizational members' self-esteem and to encourage reciprocity in regards to the proposed change.

Proposition 19: An objective of the strategies employed by the organization leader in implementing change may be to provide opportunities for organizational members to make their commitment to the proposed change public.

Proposition 26: To redefine the leader's role in relation to the change processes initiated.

Proposition 30: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in incorporating change may be to monitor organizational members' performance in coping with and integrating change.

Proposition 33: To insulate the organization from conflicting or competing ideas and to give organizational members time to assimilate and integrate new behaviors.

Proposition 35: To give emotional support and resources to organizational members who demonstrate behaviors in the direction of the intended change.

In spite of the criticism to the way in which the administrative reorganization was announced, it was still implemented and to a degree refrozen. There are some examples of actions the President took which correspond to the leader behaviors that have been proposed for refreezing. For example, Bennis chaired the search processes for the new provost and for a vice president for the Medical Center (Proposition 30). A new provost was appointed in June. At the same time the two Executive Vice Presidents became part of the Office of the President. In mid-June Bennis left for Aspen for six weeks to be a scholar in residence giving the Executive Vice Presidents the responsibility to manage the University (Proposition 26), as well as time to assimilate the changes that had been
made (Proposition 33). Finally he has been very reinforcing of their resourcefulness and accomplishments (Propositions 13, 29, and 35).

In terms of the goals Bennis identified when he presented the reorganization plan to the University community in March, it is still too early to objectively evaluate whether or not they will be met.

Having reviewed two of Bennis' interventions in developing an administrative team, the next section of this chapter will be used to look at the third part of his overall organizational development strategy.

Career Development

The goals of Bennis' career development strategies, which are described as normative-reeducation, have been to change the normative orientation of University administrators toward their own careers and tenure as administrators. Although he has talked about a center for administrative training at the University of Cincinnati and has appointed a Task Force on Continuing Education to explore the possibilities of a center for advanced study, Bennis' actions in this aspect of team development have been more limited than in the other two aspects of team development. The principal interventions he has taken are: 1) to support an administrative term appointment/periodic review process; 2) to sponsor Administrative Management Seminars and a lecture series on Current Perspectives in Higher Education; and 3) to intentionally NOT structure his office or his relationships with the vice presidents. This last intervention, or non-intervention as it might be called, is an important part, however of the career-development effort.
The term "socialization" is used to describe a process by which individuals acquire the knowledge, motives, feelings, skills, or other characteristics expected in the groups in which they are or seek to become members. For a long time (perhaps a year or more) Bennis did not specify what he expected from his assistants or the vice presidents nor what behaviors would be effective in meeting his expectations. Rather he appeared "to be experimenting with alternate modes of encouraging top staff to define their own jobs, of 'grabbing the ball and running with it', of attempting to see how individuals act in different situations, and of intentionally not giving anyone any instructions on what he expects or what he wants them to do. Some have a much lesser tolerance for ambiguity than the President who appears to thrive on it. Some find it difficult to handle after long years of authoritarian, disciplined rule" (an outside consultant, 11/30/72). The effects of this kind of socialization process have been to create new needs and levels of aspiration among organizational members (Proposition 4); to make the administration more open to its environment, to new people and new ideas (Proposition 5); to create a general sense of rising expectations (Proposition 9); to establish new meanings and ways of looking at experiences (Proposition 23); and to create a climate of security (Proposition 14) (depending on whether or not one was able to handle the ambiguity). Finally, this kind of socialization process increased members' dependency on the President to define responsibilities and a decision-making process, and hence his power over them (Proposition 17).
The second intervention Bennis made in the direction of career development was to support a term-appointment/periodic review process for University administrators which the Board of Directors approved April 4, 1972. The term-appointment idea means that all administrators, department heads, deans, vice-provosts, and vice presidents are subject to regular review by their colleagues.

In my opinion, the chief value of the term appointment [procedure] is that it provides the opportunity for change. . .It gives administrators the chance to return to the faculty for research and teaching. The term appointment procedure never implies that an individual cannot continue as an administrator for an indefinite period; it merely sets specific times at which the appointment is reviewed. This is a good procedure because it gives colleagues the privilege of evaluating their leaders. When people have the chance to re-elect or reject leadership, they feel much more a sense of commitment to their administrative leaders. A specified term also gives an administrator the opportunity to use a full term without having to be unduly concerned about being dismissed. Thus, the administrator under this process feels free to take certain risks. It gives leaders more chance to really lead (Bennis, 4/6/72).

The term appointment procedure had been recommended by the University Senate and reviewed by the University of Cincinnati Chapter of the American Association of University Professors before Bennis took his recommendation to the Board of Directors. By building on the support of governance leaders for the proposal (Proposition 7), Bennis avoided the resistance that the procedure might have encountered when it was introduced (Proposition 2). As a mechanism of institutional change, a term appointment/periodic review process forces the organization to look at its goals and to involve constituents in decision-making and priority
setting (a dean) (Propositions 23 and 11). It also creates a need for administrators not favorably reviewed to consider alternatives to returning to teaching and hence dovetails nicely with Bennis' other proposals for career development and retraining (Proposition 34).

The University began implementing the term appointment/periodic review process in the academic year 1972-73. Colleges were asked to incorporate the procedure in their revised by-laws (Proposition 11) even though some of the arrangements had not yet been worked out - such as whether or not an administrator's salary would be cut when he returned to teaching (Proposition 28). A comment one vice provost made that "those who proposed term appointments may find it somewhat more difficult to compose the criteria and process of evaluation," may indicate that Bennis' credibility will be jeopardized if the process is not clarified soon or if certain details are not worked out (Propositions 20 and 28). In addition there is some resistance building to the fact that a term appointment has not been set for the President, (at least publicly), though that was promised when the procedure was announced. (On October 31, the faculty passed a resolution calling for the public announcement of a term appointment for the President by January 1, 1973.) It seems as if Bennis will need to intervene soon and to model the process (Proposition 24) and to support those colleges which have undertaken periodic reviews of their administrators, if successful implementation of the process is to occur.

The Administrative Management and Current Perspectives Seminars are the third intervention Bennis made in regards to career development.
The seminars were designed to provide administrative training experiences for the participants. Through these he hoped to make the University's administrators more aware of changes in the economic and social conditions facing higher education (Propositions 3, 4, and 5) and to establish a climate in the University in which change was regarded positively (Proposition 14). The seminars increased his interaction with the deans, vice provosts, and vice presidents (Proposition 12) and contributed in that way to his overall efforts to build an administrative team. The seminars also served to link parts of the system which were experiencing the same insecurity and fears in regards to career prospects in particular and change in general (Proposition 8).

**Summary and Conclusions**

The extent to which any of the interventions discussed in this chapter will contribute to the development of an administrative team at the University of Cincinnati will depend on whether or not the President acts to refreeze the changes he has been making. For example, whether or not he continues to evaluate and make changes as needed in the team-building process he has initiated or whether or not he will provide the necessary career opportunities for administrators who show an ability to adapt to new environmental pressures and changing job descriptions. The success for example of the team-building intervention will depend on the extent to which the "team" becomes important for members.
It depends on what one considers to be a desirable outcome and what costs in terms of other values one is prepared to bear. The choice of goals for an intervention is determined by the value perspective, cultural and ideological biases of the chooser. The question of who decides on the goals often has implications for who ultimately benefits from the outcome of the intervention. To what extent do those who are affected by the intervention participate in the choice of goals? What efforts are being made to have their interests represented in setting priorities and to bring their perspectives to bear on the definition of the problem and the range of choices entertained? To what extent does the process enhance the power of the target population and provide them with countervailing mechanisms of protection against arbitrary and self-serving uses of power by the change agent? (Zaltman, 1973, p. 391).

Those questions are probably harsh ones to ask in evaluating a team-building or team development effort but the answers to those questions a year from now will reveal the extent to which the changes that have been initiated in the regard have been incorporated.

All that it has been possible to do in this chapter is to cite examples of leader behaviors that correspond to those actions that the model that has been proposed says may need to be done in each phase of the change process. Except in a few instances it has not been possible to corroborate the propositions for the role performance of the organizational leader with statements from organizational members about what they needed or expected from the University President as they tried to implement the changes he had proposed. Still, for a number of reasons, this chapter was an important one to write given the purposes of this research.
In the first place process observation is important irrespective of knowing what will come of some changes that have been initiated (see Weiss and Rein, 1971). Secondly, this case substantiates what others have written, that external consultants are valuable, probably necessary, in initiating and implementing certain kinds of organizational changes (Lippitt, Watson, Westley, 1958; Bennis, 1965). For example, in the development of an administrative team at the University of Cincinnati, external consultants were used to assess the amount of resistance to the proposed change, to overcome resistance to change, to heighten organizational members' sensitivity to problems, to change the flow of information among members, to link parts of the system, to make the organization more open to its environment, to build the organizational leader's credibility, and to provide support to members undergoing change.

Thirdly, the nature of the interventions themselves in regards to building an administrative team may have important future implications for the role of the University President in the implementation of change. It was Bennis' perception that certain role constraints and demands on his time prevented him from being an effective manager and spending time with faculty members and students (see Bennis' recommendations to the University of Cincinnati Board of Directors, 2/15/73, and his article in Saturday Review, 12/9/72). With the reorganization and the implementation of an "office of" concept what he was essentially saying was that one person cannot be responsible for everything that's demanded of a University
President in the 1970's. For the purposes of this research what he said was that perhaps one person cannot be responsible for all the actions that the propositions say may be necessary for the successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation of change. Actually the model only says that certain conditions may need to be present as a result of certain actions taken by the organizational leader. It does not say that those conditions cannot be accomplished by a group acting as the organizational leader instead of by a single individual. In other words the propositions might equally well be applied to the "Office of the President" i.e. the President and the two Executive Vice Presidents. The crux of the matter will be whether or not organizational members perceive the three to be one, whether they perceive all three to share Presidential authority so that an action by any one of them would constitute an act by the organizational leader.

The explanation Bennis gave for the reorganization is not clear as to whether or not he intended all three to have equal power, though simply different functions.\(^8\) The clearest indication of the fact that he did intend for all three of them to have equal power was that he delegated responsibility "for all issues that relate to the management and budget of the University to the Executive Vice President and Secretary to the Board of Directors and the Executive Vice Presidents for

\(^8\)Bennis describes the office as "a creature of interdependent parts. While for cultural and essentially bureaucratic reasons, each of us has a special title, it is not my intention to create several layers of authority which one must penetrate in order to get a decision. Rather my intention is that the Office of the President should act in a concerted way so that the President is not involved in every decision" (Candid Campus 3/7/73).
Academic Affairs" (Candid Campus, 3/7/73). In any case the way in which the reorganization is operationalized and the "Office of the President" functions will influence the perceptions and hence the expectations of organizational members for the role performance of the organizational leader or leaders in the future. Paradoxically, Bennis is still having to perform the roles for the organizational leader that have proposed in this research in order to establish (incorporate) a reorganization in which he might not have to perform these roles.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this research was to examine the actions of a University President in initiating, implementing, and incorporating long-term organizational change, taking into account the literature on leadership and organizational change and the research in social psychology on attitude change. Each of the four case studies of the role performance of the organizational leader that have described establishes the need for the organizational leader to think through a strategy for organizational change which includes a leadership role not only in setting new goals and initiating change but also in seeing to it that certain organizational conditions which are seen by others as necessary for implementation and incorporation are established and maintained. In each of the four cases reviewed organizational members encountered problems in attempting to implement the required behavioral changes. In each case members held the expectation that the organizational leader would help them solve those problems since he had initiated the change, ostensibly was committed to it, and was perceived to be in a position of power to control the forces influencing its implementation. For example, in the case of the development of an administrative team the organizational leader had anticipated several problems and took actions to minimize or overcome them. In the development of a long range plan, the lack of effective feedback mechanisms prevented the organizational
leader from knowing the difficulties and uncertainties the Task Force and the deans were encountering in trying to implement the long range planning process and consequently from acting in ways that would have facilitated the implementation of the planning process. Or, for example, in the case of the budget-review/resource allocation process the need for the President to change existing organizational arrangements in order for members to be able to effectively participate in decision making was especially clear.

The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part conclusions from each of the four case analyses in terms of their theoretical implications for the role performance of the organizational leader in the management of organizational change will be reviewed. The possible practical implications of this study for the role of the university president will then be considered. Finally, the purpose of the last section of this chapter will be to discuss some of the research implications of this study and how further studies might contribute to the development of a theory of the organizational leader's role in initiating, implementing, and incorporating organizational change.

Theoretical Implications of the Study

An assumption made at the beginning of this field study was that the degree to which a proposed change initiated by the organizational leader was implemented and incorporated was a function of a number of variables many of which could be linked to the role performance of the organizational leader. It was reasoned that if those actions that persons undergoing change said they needed or expected from the organizational
leader were compared with what he actually did, it would be possible to learn about how and where an organizational leader's actions influences the initiation, implementation, and incorporation of organizational change. In the first part of this section observations and conclusions from extensive documentation of four case studies of the role performance of the University President in effecting organizational change will be reviewed.¹

Long Range Planning (Chapter V)

From a case analysis of the organizational leader's role in the development of Long Range Planning it was shown:

1) That, in general, the organizational leader's actions tended to augment forces for change by heightening organizational members' awareness of external pressures on the University to plan, by stimulating new needs and levels of aspiration in the system in regards to planning, and by integrating external and internal forces for the planning effort.

2) That the organizational leader effectively changed the flow of information in the organization and involved informal, as well as formal, leaders in the planning process.

3) That the organizational leader did not build relationships with the Long Range Planning Task Force or the deans that provided for support or reciprocity.

¹The reader is referred to Chapter III on Research Method and Design in which some of the limitations to the nature and kinds of conclusions that can be made from this kind of study are explored.
4) That the organizational leader's implementation strategy failed to anticipate or bring out into the open difficulties that would be encountered in trying to implement a participatory long range planning process.

5) That the organizational leader's implementation strategy failed to establish and use feedback mechanisms to uncover and resolve problems that arose during attempted implementation.

6) That the organizational leader tried to clarify what changes were expected by expanding the range of outcomes he expected, and thereby the parameters of the Long Range Planning Task Force's task.

7) That too many expectations for what a long range plan would mean and for what the Task Force could do interfered with the implementation of the planning process.

8) That too many demands on the time of formal leaders to whom planning was delegated interfered with successful implementation and incorporation.

9) That the organizational leader did not make changes in the policies, rewards, communication or decision-making structures of the organization so that they supported the long range planning process.

10) That the organizational leader's implementation strategy failed to provide the appropriate supports and rewards to maintain subordinate willingness to carry out implementation.
11) That because of infrequent interaction with the Long Range Planning Task Force the organizational leader was not in a position to objectively evaluate the long range planning process.

12) That the organizational leader's ambitious approach to change interfered with the incorporation of long range planning in the organization.

Affirmative Action (Chapter VI)

From a case analysis of the organizational leader's role in the development of an affirmative action plan and program it can be shown:

1) That the organizational leader's actions showed that he had anticipated and assessed resistance to affirmative action and had used several strategies to overcome resistance.

2) That the organizational leader built on the external required-ness of the change and on several internal forces for change in initiating the affirmative action program.

3) That the organizational leader as well as the Director of the Office of Resource Development intervened to establish compatible organizational arrangements and to make departmental changes toward affirmative action part of an interrelated system of role behaviors.

4) That a public commitment to some future action is an effective way to stabilize change.

5) That the organizational leader failed to establish a workable relationship with the Director so that it was difficult for
him to monitor her role performance or evaluate her accomplishments objectively.

6) That the Director of the Office of Resource Development tended to rely on strategies of providing information about affirmative action and on achieving change through compliance, i.e. by monitoring and enforcing affirmative action in processes of recruitment, hiring, promotions, terminations, etc. for which records are kept.

7) That the Director of Resource Development did not build workable or supportive relationships with persons who had institutional responsibility for affirmative action nor at times did she follow-up on what she said she would do.

8) That the organizational leader's as well as the Director's implementation strategies were effective in providing organization members with new meanings and new ways of looking at their behavior in regards to affirmative action.

9) That several cross pressures acted as constraints on the organizational leader's ability to reinforce and support change in the direction of affirmative action and prevented him from taking certain actions that might have facilitated the process of refreezing/incorporation.

The Budget-Review Resource Allocation Process (Chapter VII)

From a case analysis of the organizational leader's role in the implementation of a participative budget-review/resource allocation process it can be shown:
1) That the organizational leader had to convince members of the University community of the severity of the budget situation facing higher education and of the need to reallocate existing resources (rather than depend on expanding resources) without creating panic, demoralization, or low self-esteem, in order to initiate the review process.

2) That the organizational leader intervened in multiple ways to unfreeze existing attitudes, expectancies, and behaviors toward the budget but that he relied mainly on a strategy of information-sharing to overcome resistance and heighten members' sensitivity to problems in regards to the proposed changes.

3) That in addition the organizational leader sought to demonstrate his effectiveness in external relationships in initiating and implementing the budget-review process.

4) That although there were attempts to involve members of the University community in the budget review/resource allocation process some organizational members perceived extended participation in the budget-review resource allocation process to be detrimental to a healthy organizational climate.

5) That the organizational leader may have more effectively spent his time in the fall trying to implement the necessary
support systems to a broad-based participative process that would have been initiated once those supports were established.

6) That often there was a great deal of repetition in considering certain budget decisions despite frequent interaction between the organizational leader and other formal leaders.

7) That certain actions on the part of the organizational leader - such as the announcement of salary increases and individual meetings with the deans - inadvertently undermined the participative process and, to a degree, the deans' autonomy and sense of importance.

8) That the organizational leader's implementation strategy failed to provide organizational members with new meanings and new ways of looking at their behavior.

9) That although there is evidence to support the fact that the organizational leader did intervene in the budget review process to reinforce organizational members and to establish compatible organizational arrangements, there is also evidence to suggest that other actions on his part were counter-productive to successful implementation and incorporation and undermined members' contributions.
Administrative Team Development (Chapter VIII)

From a case analysis of the organizational leader's role in the development of an administrative team it can be shown:

1) That almost all of the strategies used by the organizational leader were designed to assess the nature and source of resistance to the proposed changes: to overcome resistance to change, and to create new needs on the part of organizational members.

2) That outside consultants can be effectively used to assess the amount of resistance to change, to overcome resistance to change, to heighten organizational members' sensitivity to problems and to link parts of the system that share common dissatisfactions in regards to the proposed change; to make the organization more open to its environment, to build the organizational leader's credibility, and to provide support to members undergoing change.

3) That the constantly changing membership of the administrative team may have interfered with the strategies the organizational leader used to build the team.

4) That the organizational leader effectively provided several opportunities for organizational members to try out new behaviors in work as well as non-work settings.

5) That the organizational leader served in many ways as an effective role model.
6) That the success of this change strategy to date has in part depended on the organizational leader's building others' sense of competence and self-esteem.

7) That the extent to which any of the interventions that have been taken will contribute to the development of an administrative team will depend on whether the organizational leader is able to elicit support from both formal and informal organizational leaders and to establish compatible organizational arrangements (including role descriptions).

8) That the extent to which any of the interventions that have been taken will contribute to the development of an administrative team will depend on whether the organizational leader acts to refreeze the changes he's been making.

9) That perhaps one person as organizational leader cannot be responsible for all the actions the propositions say are necessary for the successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation of change.

Discussion

It can be shown that in each of the four cases the organizational leader intervened most effectively in unfreezing existing attitudes and behaviors within the University community but that even in unfreezing not every action the President took had the same effect on members who were resistant to what was being proposed. It can also be shown that the failure to implement and incorporate the changes was usually attributable to the organizational leader's failure to create the conditions
that from the perspective of organizational members would facilitate implementation. Unfreezing usually succeeded because the organizational leader intervened to overcome resistance in regards to the proposed change, to heighten organizational members' sensitivity to problems and self-esteem in regards to the proposed change, to create new needs on the part of organizational members, to make the organization more open to its environment, to change patterns of interaction and information sharing, to link parts of the system that shared common dissatisfactions in regards to the proposed change, to create a sense of rising expectations, to establish priorities for the organization, to involve informal as well as formal leaders in decision-making, and to establish and maintain a climate of acceptance, support and trust.

In turn analysis and observation would lead the author to conclude that the organizational leader's implementation strategies often failed:

1) to overcome emergent resistance to the proposed changes;
2) to establish and use feedback mechanisms to uncover and resolve problems as they arose;
3) to establish a secure climate where members had the opportunity to experiment with and test new behaviors;
4) to change certain organizational arrangements so that they were compatible with what was being proposed;
5) to provide appropriate support, reinforcement, or rewards to maintain subordinate willingness to carry out implementation; and
6) to establish and maintain workable relationships with those individuals to whom certain aspects of implementation had
been delegated.

Often it seemed as if the organizational leader tended to rely on his personal power in initiating and implementing the changes he desired, whereas organizational members expected him to use his position power as the leader. For example, in each of the four cases it can be shown how members expected the President to give them directions on what to do and on what he expected. In each case it seemed as if the President did not acknowledge those expectations on the part of organizational members; instead he relied on a model of change which presumed widespread participation, consensus and information-sharing.

Finally, the organizational leader's incorporation strategies often failed:

1) to monitor organizational members' performance in coping with and integrating the proposed change; and

2) to insulate the organization from other demands during the refreezing period.

These conclusions are based on the observation that organizational members needed or expected the organizational leader to take certain actions in order for successful implementation and incorporation to occur and on extensive documentation of these needs in interviews and documents. Often they expected the organizational leader to provide leadership in implementing, as well as initiating change because they assumed that he was in the best position to control the forces influencing its implementation.
In sum, what can be learned from the four case analyses is:

1) that the set of propositions in Chapter III is a helpful model for analyzing the behavior or role performance of the organizational leader in the process of change; 2) that, in fact, people undergoing change perceive that those behaviors are needed; and 3) that when those behaviors are not provided change may not be implemented or incorporated.

There are undoubtedly ways in which the model that has been proposed could be improved: it has certainly not been empirically tested in any way in this research. It has been used more as a conceptual framework for observing what it was that the organizational leader neglected in initiating, implementing and incorporating organizational change.  

In the last section of this chapter directions for future research on the role performance of the organizational leader are suggested; in the next section possible reasons for the organizational leader's failure to take certain actions are explored.

In part the failure of the organizational leader's implementation strategy may be due: 1) to other demands on the leader's time, energy, and resources; 2) to internal environmental constraints such as conflicting organizational pressures or to a lack of institutional resources; and 3) to constraints inherent in his role that may prevent him from acting

---

2In his paper on "The Bearing of Empirical Research on Social Theory" Merton (1957) points out that one of the ways in which empirical inquiry invites the extension of theory is through observation of neglected facts (Gross, et. al. 1971, p. 195).
in ways that would facilitate implementation and incorporation. These factors will be discussed as they apply to the university president in particular in the section, Practical Implications of the Study. In part the failure may be less a failure and more the result of a view of the organizational leader as a catalyst and not as the implementor of change. This explanation is examined briefly in the next sections of the chapter "The Sources of the Organizational Leader's Power"; "A Special Case: The Charismatic Leader as Unfreezer"; and "Extensions of the Leader's Power."

Sources of the Organizational Leader's Power in Initiating, Implementing, and Incorporating Change

Proposition 16: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in initiating change may be to build the leader's expertise and credibility with organizational members.

Proposition 17: An objective of the strategies employed by the organizational leader in initiating change may be to extend the leader's control over various kinds of resources and sources of power.

Proposition 38: The organizational leader and others advocating the change need to be perceived as trustworthy throughout the change process.

In retrospect it seems that the case analysis neglected a discussion of these three propositions and yet we have seen how important the organizational leader's power is in each of the three stages of the change process. For example, in initiating change the organizational leader's power rests on his credibility, expertness, or attractiveness

---

(personal power) and on his ability to convince organizational members of the need to change. In implementing change the organizational leader's power rests on his ability to change the organization in ways that support the particular changes he is proposing, while in incorporating change his power rests on his ability (position power) to monitor and reward organizational member's performance in coping with and integrating change. Before a special source of power for some organizational leaders in initiating change is discussed, a model of social influence that has been proposed by Kelman (1962) will be reviewed, using examples from the case analyses wherever appropriate as illustrations.

Power is defined as the ability to induce or influence behavior. "An individual who is able to influence the behavior of another person because of his position in the organization has position power, while an individual who derives his influence from his personality or relationships with his followers has personal power" (Hersey and Blanchard, 1972, p. 92). Power to control or influence others resides in control over the things they value (Janda, 1960, p. 354). In other words, to the extent that the person (group) sees change as relevant to the achievement of his own goals he will be motivated to accept another's influence.

Identification: Identification is said to occur when an individual (group) accepts influence in order to establish or maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to the other. The basis of motivation is social acceptance and the source of the leader's power is his attractiveness (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33). To the extent that organizational members aspire to be like the leader, his power is based on his control
over means to that end (meanings, norms, ways of seeing things or acting). In the case study of the University President's role in the development of an administrative team we saw that the President sought to establish new norms for what would be acceptable "team" behavior. Perhaps most visibly in regards to the development of an administrative team the President served as a role model. Through frequent personal interaction, he created relationships, especially among his assistants, in which conformity to certain ways of doing things was relevant to the accomplishment of their own goals, i.e. to maintaining the reciprocal relationship and social acceptance. In comparison to the former President, the new President tended to rely more on his personal power and on his willingness to be seen as open, accessible, and informal (see Chapter IV - Assessment of Setting).

**Internalization:** Internalization is said to occur when an individual (group) accepts influence in order to maintain the congruence of his actions and beliefs with his value system. The source of the leader's power is his credibility, expertness, and trustworthiness (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33). In the case studies of the President's role in the development of a University long range plan and in the implementation of the budget review process, we saw that the President sought to establish new meanings for the problems facing the organization and new levels of aspiration. Many of his unfreezing strategies were designed "to reorganize the person's means-ends framework and his conception of the paths toward maximization of his values"
Similarly the President tried to assure members of the University community that the adoption of an affirmative action program would not jeopardize principles of academic freedom and professional competence; and that, in fact, the need for an affirmative action program was related to the acknowledged goals of the University. To the extent the President's reasons for anyone of these change processes were credible, members would probably accept the need to change. In other words access or control over information is one source of the organizational leader's personal power.

A second source of personal power for the organizational leader when the individual or group is motivated to maintain a congruence between his actions and his values is expertness. We have already seen how the Long Range Planning Task Force members recognized the President's expertise in planning and changing. They spent hundreds of hours working on the task of developing a long range plan despite ambiguous expectations and unresolved problems. The author would contend it was because of the power the President's reputation held for them. Similarly, recognition of the President's expertness in organizational development probably contributed to his staff's willingness to attend team-building sessions.

**Compliance:** Compliance is said to occur when influence from another person (group) is accepted in order to gain a favorable reaction from the other or to avoid a specific punishment or disapproval. The source of the leader's power is his ability to control organizational resources on which goal achievement depends (Kelman and Warwick, 1973, p. 33). His control may depend on either position or personal power.
With position power the organizational leader has legitimate authority to control the rewards and punishments associated with changing or not changing. If the leader's authority is based on his personal power, he controls such psychological resources as recognition and appreciation for work done. In the case study of the development of an affirmative action plan we saw that the organizational leader may have to rely on both legitimate personal and position power to secure the compliance of organizational members to what is required, i.e., to implement and incorporate change.

We have seen how as the individual's (group's) base of motivation changes, the source of the organizational leader's power also changes. In initiating change and overcoming resistance (unfreezing existing attitudes, expectancies and behaviors among organizational members), it would seem that the organizational leader would seek to build his personal power (his credibility, expertness or attractiveness) in order to tap members' needs for acceptance and congruence. It could be argued that while it would still be important to use strategies of identification and internalization during implementation, (i.e., by creating new meanings and by acting as a role model), that the organizational leader would also seek to increase and use his position power to create compatible organizational arrangements and to reward new behaviors. In a situation in which the organizational leader has charismatic power his control arises from "certain exceptional qualities of his personality" (personal power) rather than from "a system of roles,
rules and procedures" i.e., traditional or rational authority (position power) (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xix). By definition, charismatic leadership, based as it is on personal power, disequilibrizes and contributes to unfreezing existing attitudes, expectancies, and behaviors among organizational members.

A Special Case: The Charismatic Leader as Unfreezer

One of the explanations offered earlier for the failure of the organizational leader's implementation strategies had to do with the view he might hold of himself as a catalyst for, rather than as an implementor of, change. Within Eisenstadt's discussion of Max Weber's concepts of charisma and institution building,⁴ are the seeds for understanding how an organizational leader, especially one who sees himself as a charismatic leader, comes to see himself more as a catalyst or initiator and less as an implementor of change. Eisenstadt's essay also explains how the organizational leader builds his control over varied sources of power especially those aspects of his personal power such as his credibility, expertness, and attractiveness through charismatic leadership and how organizational members may come to reject the charismatic leader's symbols and meanings (acceptance of which is the basis of his power over them) if supportive institutional frameworks are not created as part of the process of institution-building.

In general, the purpose of this section is to explore the nature of charismatic leadership; more specifically, to show how the University President's actions in the cases that have been reviewed in this research

---

tended to augment his personal power and how his failure to take certain actions to maintain his power and to implement the change he had initiated may be explained, in part, by his reliance on the unfreezing capabilities of his charisma. First, what did Weber mean by the term "charismatic leadership"?

Weber describes charisma as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as if he were connected to some very central feature of man's existence" (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xviii). Social systems with charismatic leaders are characterized by members' "intense personal response to the leader to the extent that recognition represents duty or obligation" (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xix). Charismatically-led social systems also tend to be characterized by "the denial of what is sacred, or traditional, or routine in the organization in order to get at the very core or essence of the organization's being" (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xix). Organizational members' acceptance of the charismatic leader is due to their need for order. They respond to his charismatic reformulation and ordering of the organization's goals and to his provision of new symbols and meanings. "A central aspect of any process of social transformation is the recrystallization of the centers of any society - not only of the rates of access to such centers but of the very content and the definition of the central charismatic symbols and of the modes of participation in them (Eisenstadt, 1968, pp. xlv-xlvi). In turn, "the very quest for participation in a meaningful order may be related to processes of change and transformation" (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xlii).
Given these definitions for charisma, it is fairly easy to show from a review of the four case analyses how the organizational leader acted in ways that might be labelled as charismatic and how his actions brought about characteristic responses on the part of organizational members. In a case study of the development of a University long range plan we saw "how the University President shared his expectations for the future and for what the University could become: a well-managed urban university, a center for continuing education, and a center for administrative training, among other things. He shared his vision of making it an outstanding urban university. He created new paradigms for the way things would work" (Chapter V). One of the behaviors the President was expert at was asking questions and expanding the meanings of things. For example, one of the President's strategies in implementing the budget-review/resource allocation process was to try to convince members of the University community of the benefits and opportunities within the 1973-74 budget by asking questions and relating budget review process to the need for program evaluation. Both in the case study of the development of an administrative team and in the development of the long range plan we saw how the President relied on his credibility and expertness in initiating change. In each of the four cases we saw how members of the University community looked to the President as a role model. In terms of the model that has been proposed for the role performance of the organizational leader, it has been shown how the University President in all four cases intervened to unfreeze
existing attitudes, expectancies, and behaviors on the part of organizational members chiefly by heightening members' sensitivity to problems, establishing new needs and levels of aspiration and making the organization more open to its environment; by creating a collective sense of 'we're all in this together' as well as a sense of rising expectations; and by creating new symbols for members' experiences in regards to the proposed changes. In Chapter IV we saw how the University President tried to create new meanings for his own role as a leader and new norms of informality, visibility, and openness in his relationships with persons and groups within the University community.

Certainly, conditions in the University were ripe for a charismatic leader. Eisenstadt wrote that predispositions for charismatic leadership become articulated in certain definite types of social situations:

a) those in which some transition from one institutional sphere to another takes place;
b) situations in which subsystems (of the organization) have to be directly connected with the central values and activities of the society;
c) situations in which people are faced with a choice among various roles; and
d) situations in which the routine of a given role or group is endangered or disrupted (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xxviii).

In all such cases the individual is placed in potentially ambiguous, undefined, and conflicting situation in which his identity and status image and continuity of the perception of others actions are endangered. The common denominator of these various situations is that people or groups participating in them experience some shattering of the existing social and cultural order to which they are bound. Hence in such situations they become more sensitive to those symbols or
messages which attempt to symbolize such order, and more ready to respond to people who are able to present to them new symbols which could give meaning to their experiences, to prescribe the proper norms of behavior, to relate the individual to collective identification, and to reassure him of his status and of his place in a given collectivity (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xxviii).

If we look at the functions he outlined for himself in the administrative reorganization, clearly the President's own view of his role as an organizational leader was that he should present "organizational members with new symbols which could give meaning to their experiences."

The most important functions of leadership are infusing new values and goals, planning for the future and anticipating coming things, raising the fundamental questions most of us take for granted, heightening awareness of external problems that may pose important choices for the organization, providing perspectives about where the institution is, has come, and where it expects to go... (Bennis, 2/15/73, p. 72).

Basically my conception of leadership is that it is the act of explicating and calling forth in others a consciousness of issues, principles, ideas, directions, and objectives and of moving those others to act in ways that reflect their increased knowledge and heightened awareness (Bennis, 3/7/73, p. 3).

His terms routine/non-routine were even similar to Weber's concepts of the ordinary/charismatic (see Saturday Review, 12/9/72). What was routine (management/implementation) was delegated to the two Executive Vice Presidents within the Office of the President as a result of the reorganization: the President himself kept the non-routine functions.
In sum, most of the President's leadership behaviors relied more on his charisma or ability to define new meanings and symbols than on his legitimate authority to control and use organizational resources. But as Eisenstadt has written the ordinary and the charismatic are continuously interwoven in the process of institution building (or organizational change).

In the crystallization of institutional frameworks a crucial part is played by those people who evince a special capacity to set up broad orientations, to propound new norms, and to articulate new goals. The crystallization of such norms seemingly provides some sort of response to a felt need for some general stability and order and attests to the ability to provide some broader meaning to specific needs which may arise in different situations. Hence, the capacity to create and crystallize such broader symbolic orientations and norms, to articulate various goals, to establish organizational frameworks, and to mobilize the resources necessary for all these purposes is a basic aspect of the flow of institution building in any society (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xxxix).

Eisenstadt concludes that charisma is not only the possession of some extraordinary, exhilarating qualities, but also the ability to reorder and reorganize the symbolic and cognitive order inherent in such broad orientations and goals and the ability to reorder the institutional framework in which these orientations become embodied (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xi). The distinction that Eisenstadt is making between symbolic and institutional order is similar to the distinction that has been made in this research between initiation and implementation. His conclusion
is that charisma is as much the ability to establish an institutional framework as it is to create broad symbolic meanings. Analysis of four case studies of the role performance of the organizational leader have shown that although the organizational leader may act in ways that effectively unfreeze organizational members' existing attitudes and behaviors, other interventions are required on his part to establish and maintain the conditions for successful implementation and incorporation. Other themes within Weber's writings might be used to explain why the University President's actions never led to changes in the way the organization functioned even though he was seemingly effective in creating new norms and meanings for the organization.

It might be that although the University President conceived his role to be that of the "charismatic leader" - to infuse new values and goals - it is possible that the faculty never perceived those values and goals as being connected to the core purposes of the University. In a letter to the President, one vice provost wrote,

Several special editions of Candid Campus last year were devoted to such things as affirmative action, the reorganization, etc. These are of course terribly important, and the faculty should be virtually interested in them, but alas they are not, probably because of the remoteness of the faculty as a whole from the activity. The visibility report, although extremely laudable, deals to a very great extent with matters which many faculty would consider to quite peripheral to their activities. Although you have provided dramatic and perceptive and enlightened leadership, many of the faculty do not see that leadership as contiguous enough to their own activities.
Some faculty members and students, although initially receptive to the new President and to his leadership style, may have come over time to recognize their different interests. In other cases they may have expected the President to act in certain ways to resolve the problems they encountered in attempting to implement his ideas and have become disillusioned when those actions were not forthcoming. In other cases, for example, the development of a long range plan, we saw how the deans had a problem perceiving a task force, a temporary system, as the institutional "center" for long range planning. Eisenstadt observed,

Whatever the success of the attempt of any institutional entrepreneurs to establish and legitimize common norms in terms of common values and symbols, these norms are probably never fully accepted by the entire society. Most groups tend to exhibit some autonomy in terms of their attitudes toward these norms and in terms of their willingness or ability to provide the resources demanded by the given institutionalized system. For very long periods of time a great majority of the members of a given society or parts thereof may be identified to some degree with the values and norms of the given system and willing to provide it with the resources it needs; however, other tendencies also develop. Some groups may be greatly opposed to the very premises of the institutionization of a given system, may share its values and symbols only to a very small extent, and may accept these norms only as the least among evils and as binding on them only in a very limited sense. Others may share these values and symbols and accept the norms to a greater degree, but may look on themselves as the more truthful depositories of these same values. They may oppose the concrete levels at which the symbols are institutionalized by the elite in power, and may attempt to interpret them in different ways. Others may develop new interpretations of existing symbols and norms and strive
for a change in the very bases of the institutional order. Hence, any institutional system is never fully 'homogeneous' in the sense of being fully accepted or accepted to the same degree by all those participants in it. These different orientations to the central symbolic spheres may all become foci of conflict and of potential institutional change [Emphasis, the author's] (Eisenstadt, 1968, pp. xliii-xliv).

A second explanation offered by Eisenstadt for why the University President's strategies may have failed to provide new meanings is that there is a growing tendency toward specialization and differentiation in our society, especially in institutions of higher education. Increasing specialization is often accompanied by increasing bureaucratization. We have seen in Chapter IV how in universities in general there is a tendency toward conservatism and tradition. Given this decentralization it is possible that no administrator, whether he is a charismatic leader or not, in any institution of higher education can be perceived as central to the purposes of the institution.

A third explanation is based on the assumption that the charismatic leader's power depends on his control of access to and participation in the symbolic "center"\(^5\) of the institution. However, for faculty members in a university the center for them is not the President's office but rather their departments, or even more likely, their individual professional interests. When an organizational leader loses control of the ability to define what is or is not central to the institution, might

\(^5\)Edward Shils defines the center as "a phenomenon of the realm of values and beliefs. It is the center for the order of symbols of values and beliefs which govern the society. The center is also a phenomenon of the realm of action. It is a structure of activities, of roles and persons. It is within these roles that the values and beliefs which are central are embodied and propounded" (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. xxx).
naturally begin to rely more heavily on strategies of unfreezing to convince organizational members of the need to change, to overcome their resistance to change, and to involve those who will be affected by the proposed changes in planning and decision-making.

But, if the organizational leader is to be only the unfreezer, the material in Chapters V-VIII still underscores the need for someone within the organization to resolve the problems encountered during implementation and to establish and maintain those conditions within the organization that are facilitative of change. In what ways might the organizational leader extend his power so that others within the organization act in ways to create those conditions which insure successful implementation and incorporation.

Extensions of the Organizational Leader's Power

One of the ways in which the organizational leader can extend his power is to delegate responsibility for implementation to other formal leaders within the organization. We have seen how the University President in the case study of the development of an administrative team perceived that he was a more effective catalyst of change and that certain role constraints and demands on his time prevented him from being an effective implementor. With the administrative reorganization and the implementation of an "office of" concept, he sought to share his authority with two Executive Vice Presidents who would essentially be responsible for the implementation and incorporation of such things as the budget, long range planning, and affirmative action. More
effective use might also be made of the deans to legitimize change. The implementation of an affirmative action program, for example, rested on the extent to which the deans reallocated existing resources within their units and changed certain organizational arrangements — such as hiring policies, tenure and promotion practices, etc.

A second way in which the organizational leader might extend his power is through a more effective and concentrated use of informal organizational leaders, although there may be some doubt as to whether or not informal leaders can control and provide the kinds of organizational resources the persons implementing change seem to need (Propositions 27, 28, and 29). But since "people's attitudes and opinions are greatly influenced by group norms and values and by word-of-mouth collaboration or refutation of information, it is at least essential for the organizational leader to shape his messages in accord with relevant group norms as well as to enlist/persuade informal leaders to support proposed organizational changes" (Maloney and Schonfeld, 1973, p. 201). Informal leaders if for nothing else can be used to sanction or legitimize proposed changes (Propositions 2, 3, and 18). "The President is only now meeting with the editorial Boards of the newspapers when newspapers can legitimate anything you want them to. The President has to work more closely with people, informal groups, downtown and on the inside who can legitimize what he was", one dean said. In other cases informal leaders who identify with the proposed change can serve as role models (Proposition 24). Informal leaders
who are convinced of the need to change can provide opportunities in informal settings for organizational members to test the new behaviors that are required of them (Propositions 22 and 25). In turn, social and informational support for the proposed change may develop (Propositions 27 and 29).

There is probably a need for the organizational leader(s) to deal separately with each of the informal groups within the organization in regards to the proposed change. "I think we should confront faculty leadership with the problem of visibility and let them make suggestions about how to deal with it. For example, maybe we need a "visibility committee" made up entirely of faculty members. Having students, administrators, or community representatives would simply support the already existent feeling that the faculty have as a separate entity that is being submerged in the interest of a kind of "people's educational front" (a vice provost). But to the extent that the ideas of informal leaders are solicited and become part of what is being proposed, the leader's power (his credibility and probably the recognition of his legitimate authority), as well as the probability of successful implementation and incorporation of change, is increased.

Practical Implications of the Study

Let us now turn to a discussion of implications of this study for university administrators concerned with the management of organizational change in their institutions. This section is divided into two parts: 1) a recapitulation of the major conclusions from the
case analyses about the role of the University President in initiating, implementing, and incorporating organizational change and 2) observations and questions about the structure of the university presidency in general. It is hoped that these conclusions and observations might be useful to other university administrators attempting to implement processes of organizational change that are similar to those described in this research.

Conclusions

An analysis of the role performance of the University President in four cases of organizational change showed that although he intervened in ways that may have effectively unfrozen members' existing attitudes and behaviors, his implementation strategies for the most part failed to create those conditions he would facilitate change on the part of organizational members. In other words creating those conditions which are necessary for the successful initiation of organizational change does not insure the successful implementation of change. In addition to overcoming initial resistance to change and convincing organizational members of the need to change, the University President may also need to:

1) overcome emergent resistance to the changes he has introduced;
2) establish and use feedback mechanisms to uncover and resolve problems as they arise;
3) establish a secure climate where members have the opportunity to experiment with and test new behaviors;
4) change certain organizational arrangements so that they are compatible with what is being proposed;
5) provide appropriate support, reinforcements, and rewards to maintain subordinate willingness to carry out implementation;
6) establish and maintain workable relationships with those important formal and informal leaders;
7) monitor organizational members' performance in coping with and integrating the proposed changes; and
8) insulate the University from other demands to the greatest extent possible during the refreezing period.

In at least one case, the development of an affirmative action plan, it was shown that these roles for the university president could not be delegated if successful implementation and incorporation were to occur. Rather the University Presidential personally needed to be involved in the entire course of the change process.

Observations

As a result of this study it is also possible to observe that the university president may not have been able to make certain interventions for a number of reasons that are linked to his position or role in the University. These blocks include: 1) other demands on the president's time, energy, and resources; 2) various social, structural, and economic constraints in the University as an organization; and 3) constraints inherent in the president's role as the organizational leader.
Some of the unique organizational characteristics of universities were discussed in Chapter IV. They include a lack of consensus about the goals and purposes of the university, the traditions of academic freedom and professional autonomy, and a tendency towards conservation and maintenance of the status quo. As well, the university is dependent on and accountable to a wide range of external groups in its environment whose pressures on the university keep changing.

External groups perceive the president to hold power because he is the president and because they are applying a familiar model of organizational hierarchy to the university. The reality of the situation is that his authority is splintered and situational. In spite of the tremendous and often overwhelming convergence of problems on the university president's office, he cannot expect implicit acceptance of his authority based on his organizational position.

As well, many of the pressures on the president's office are apparently contradictory. In a period of unprecedented financial stringency in higher education, the full burden is on the President to cut expenses, while continuing to support innovation and new programs (as long as those new programs don't interfere with existing programs as we have seen in the case study of the budget-review/resource allocation process). He is expected to hold tuition rates down and provide more financial aid, while allowing increased enrollments and a wider diversity of offerings; to improve standards without affecting existing programs; and to improve services without increasing employment (Simonides, 1971, p. 1). In the case analysis of the development
of an affirmative action plan we saw how conflicting pressures on the President prevented him from taking certain actions that may have facilitated the implementation and incorporation of the affirmative action program (see Chapter VI). In other cases we have seen how overwhelming demands on the President's time, energy, and resources may have prevented him from making necessary interventions (see Chapter V—on the development of a University long range plan).

Given these limits of time and power and structure, perhaps there are limits to the ability of the university president to effect organizational change. Perhaps we need to conclude as considered in Chapter VIII that one person cannot be responsible for all the actions that have been proposed in this research for the organizational leader. Possibly the university presidency needs to be restructured to include other individuals who would be responsible for certain phases of the change process, persons who would be perceived by organizational members to share presidential authority so that actions on the part of any one of them would be sufficient to create the conditions the propositions for the role performance of the organizational leader say are necessary for the successful initiation, implementation, and incorporation of change. These considerations are raised almost as questions. Certainly it is not within the scope of this research to comment on the viability of such a restructuring in regards to the implementation of organizational change. However, that might be one of the directions for further research on the role of the organizational leader and organizational change.
Research Implications of the Study

The Need for Replication Studies

This case study was designed to examine the role performance of the university president in light of some tentative proposition drawn from the literature on attitude change, leadership, and organizational behavior about the role performance of the organizational leader in successfully initiating, implementing, and incorporating long-term organizational change. Since the necessary range of variation in the organizational leader's role may not have occurred in one setting, investigations of many more successful and unsuccessful implementation efforts need to be conducted to ascertain the validity of the explanatory scheme that has been proposed. Replication studies will need to be conducted and their results carefully analyzed before judgements about the generality or limitations of propositions can be made. It may also be instructive to replicate the study in a setting in which the organizational leader is aware of the propositions and intentionally intervenes to meet the conditions specified as important for initiation, implementation, and incorporation. Such a study would get away from the tendency to make the data confirm to the model, that is, from looking at the leader's interventions to see what objective they meet.

The Need for Conditional Studies

There is also a need for studies which vary one or more of the variables with which this study was concerned. For example, does the kind of change being implemented have any consequences for the kinds of problems that arise during the period of attempted implementation and
consequently for the role performance of the organizational leader?

There is also a need to consider the possible impact of organizational variables, such as the influence of the external environment on implementation. For example, two of the propositions that are proposed for refreezing are:

Proposition 32: An objective of the strategies of the organizational leader may be to maintain continuity at some levels of the organization while change takes place at other levels.

Proposition 33: An objective of the strategies of the organizational leaders may be to insulate the organization from conflicting or competing ideas and to give organizational members time to assimilate and integrate new behaviors.

They indicate that there might be times in the life of an organization when any kind of change cannot be successfully initiated. Or there might be times when it is more important for the organizational leader to concentrate on his interface roles with the external environment than on the internal implementation of change (see Mintzberg, 1973, p. 122). It would be important, as one kind of conditional study, to design a study in which various situational variables that give rise to, or account for, certain behaviors on the part of the organizational leader are brought more to the front. In this study there may have been factors about the President's extensive external role that might have caused him to take or not to take certain actions the reasons for which were not shared or if shared, not fully understood.
It might also be interesting to design a study of the implementation of any one of the change processes that have been examined in a university setting – let's say the development of an affirmative action plan – in another organization in order to compare the role performance of organizational leaders in different settings. One concern the author has is that the organizational leader's role may have been exaggerated by this research. It would also be interesting to apply the set of propositions to other persons within an organization who are initiating changes and then to study the role of the organizational leader under those conditions.

The Need to Refine the Theory

Having worked with the set of propositions for the role performance of the organizational leader in analyzing four case studies of the role performance of the University President, even at this point some suggestions about how it might be improved, that further research could corroborate can be made. In the first place the entire study would have been strengthened if some sort of operational definition of the degree of implementation had been evolved, in other words, some sort of way of determining whether or not changes that were proposed and initiated were actually being implemented. Secondly, each of the propositions needs to be reviewed for functionality and operationality. For example, it was difficult to identify leader behaviors that operationalized Proposition 25: An objective of the strategies of the organizational leader may be to encourage experimentation and risk-taking on the part of organizational members in regards to the proposed change.
It might also be interesting to devise some sort of weighting scheme for the propositions in order to explore the question of whether or not implementation goes more easily or more successfully depending on the strategies used during the period of attempted initiation. Partially because the model that has been proposed is somewhat normative in the direction of members' participation in planning and decision making, it was assumed that the model was sequential and that the organizational leader had to create the conditions for initiation before implementation and for implementation before incorporation. But as a result of study of the budget-review/resource allocation process, the sequential nature of the model might also be doubted. In further research it might be interesting to vary the sequence in which the conditions are met.

One of the major limitations of the research is the limited time period covered in the study. In the first place the successes of many crucial aspects of the change process cannot be judged on the basis of the short time period involved in that an action may have delayed consequences or may produce overt compliance while bringing about other latent changes so that individuals will respond in the future to influence attempts in a different manner (Cartwright, 1965, p. 25). Secondly, the implications and unintended consequences of a leader's change strategies must be viewed over a longer time. One of the reasons for not making statements about effectiveness, apart from the fact that operational goals were not always defined in the
change processes that were studied, is that many of the changes had only been initiated and had not reached the stages of attempted implementation and incorporation. For example, in the case study of the development of an administrative team whether or not the transition to an "office of" concept will be accomplished is yet to be seen. There is certainly a need for longer studies in the future to avoid some of the problems mentioned above.

It is the author’s hope that studies of the types that have been suggested will be undertaken and will contribute to the development of a theory of the role performance of the organizational leader in effecting organizational change.
APPENDIX A

LONG-RANGE PLANNING: A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

July 31, 1970

Recommendations of a Presidential Task Force to President Walter Langsam. The Task Force recommends that a blue ribbon committee be appointed to examine the goals, educational needs, and resources of the University of Cincinnati and to develop a comprehensive statement on the direction of the University. A second Task Force recommendation urges the President to help the faculty understand and appreciate the total goals of the University.

May, 1971

The report of the University Senate Committee on "Roles and Missions of the University" is published.

September 1, 1971

Warren Bennis becomes President of the University of Cincinnati.

September 16, 1971

The University Senate Budget and Priorities and Long Range Planning Committees are charged, in part, to 1) study the process by which the budget is developed; 2) to make recommendations on University priorities: 3) to be concerned with the academic, physical, fiscal and social planning of the University, and 4) to examine the role of research in higher education and the future of the two-year colleges.

Commentary: These charges demonstrate at least the University Senate's recognition of the need to plan, if not to change, at the time of Bennis' inauguration.¹

September, 1971

The Ohio Board of Regents sends their "Higher Education Program for 1973-1975" to all university presidents in the State.

¹Commentaries are included after some of the entries in the chronological summary that follows. Commentaries were used in this case and others that follow to give clarifying information or to share participants' reactions to an event and to its implications for events that followed.
Commentary: This statement is important in that it documents how changing enrollment patterns in higher education will dictate new policy directions in the seventies and the need for a clearer sense of institutional mission. For the University of Cincinnati it becomes an external mandate to plan since no new graduate programs will be approved by the Ohio Board of Regents without a comprehensive plan.

October 1, 1971

Bennis' newsletter to the University community.

Commentary: In this newsletter Bennis tries to identify with the emotions he has sensed in the University "with the feelings of eagerness and expectancy that has been released after a period of uncertainty and waiting." Bennis seemingly wants to involve the University community in planning; he defers to their knowledge of the uniquenesses of the University of Cincinnati. "Working with and augmenting the executive function must be organizational structure that encourages participation and provides for initiative and review...that gives weight to the opinions and values of the whole University community." The definition of "whole" University community is expanded to include "the public, alumni, and parents equally, perhaps more importantly."

October 24, 1971

Administrative Retreat at French Lick.

October 25, 1971

Bennis asks the Vice President for Research and Development to summarize statements made at French Lick and to write a rationale for a University long range planning process. The Newman Task Force Report on Higher Education had been shared at French Lick, "We have found that institutions under financial pressure often respond only by cutting expenditures in easiest ways rather than making choices according to the relative merits of a program or the most cost-effective approaches to teaching. That thinking; a ready example of a new goal for the University, Bennis' "urban university"; and a sense that the state-mandated planning - programming - budgeting system (PPBS) could also be a long range planning vehicle formed the basis of the Vice President's rationale.
Commentary: Several important assumptions were made in this document that were never discussed or questioned. It was assumed 1) that the planning process would be participatory, and 2) that the University Senators at French Lick would provide the leadership and impart a sense of urgency which would lead to University Senate endorsement and action. "The success of long range planning is directly related to the enthusiasm and support it receives from levels of the institution and to the degree of understanding and participation it receives from all levels." 3) Dates were set: a planning process be worked out by January 1, 1972; a plan by September 1, 1972, that were never realistically examined.

October 27, 1971

Memo #1 a Presidential assistant to the University Senate. Drawing from the Vice President's memo, he reiterates the objectives of a long range planning process and attests to the need for a long range plan and to the high priority Bennis has given to PPBS and long range planning.

Commentary: This memo created two expectations in the University Senate that eventually came to be held by the University community as a whole: 1) that the plan would be done by September 1, 1972, and 2) that planning is essentially an executive responsibility (an expectation which makes the administration blameworthy if a plan is not forthcoming). "The success of long range planning depends on executive support, which is clearly available, and...on widespread commitment to the planning process." Although ostensibly Bennis' assistant sought University Senate endorsement for the concept of long range planning the wording of his memo is ambiguous enough so that it is unclear what kind of specific response he wanted from the Senate.

October 27, 1971

Memo #2 a Presidential assistant to the University Senate. This memo is essentially a summary of tasks the University Senate might undertake that had emerged from discussions at French Lick. The eleven tasks he outlined included program evaluation, a resource study of the University,
a review of the 1971 Ohio Board of Regents' Master Plan, and the monitoring of a yet to be started long range planning process against criteria such as "reality of involvement, scope, and thoroughness of internal and external linkages."

Commentary: At this point there is no coordination in the University's approach to planning. Bennis' assistant has picked up some of the loose ends and suggestions coming from French Lick but no one had been given responsibility to think out the entire planning process.

October 28, 1971

Bennis' statement to the University faculty. Bennis uses extracts from the Vice President's memo to establish a need for planning in the University: he refers to the Board of Regents' Master Plan and to the Newman Report, as well as his goals to make the University of Cincinnati a well-managed urban university, to clarify decision-making processes, and to better match program needs with resources. The January-September timetable is reiterated. He closes with a statement about what he thinks long range planning might accomplish "Long range planning is value-laden and value-judgements must be made, as must role choices for the university. 'Quality as well as quantity decisions must be faced."

November 22, 1971

A Presidential assistant recommends that responsibility for planning be assigned to someone with line responsibility. In the meantime other memos are urging Bennis to pull together the offices of institutional studies, physical planning, and computer resources and not to delay any longer in appointing a planning coordinator.

December 8, 1971

Bennis' letter to Millett, the Chancellor of Higher Education in Ohio. Bennis makes several proposals to Millett and requests planning grant money. The letter is full of ideas about directions for the University to move in and is eventually widely circulated by Bennis to deans and other administrators.

December 14, 1971

A member of the Institute for Research and Training in Higher Education meets with the President and his assistants. He is later named Long Range Planning Task Force coordinator.
December 16, 1971

The College of Arts and Sciences independently forms a faculty long range planning committee to look at the college's curricula, structure, and budget in relation to priorities of the College and the University.

December 17, 1971

The Task Force coordinator is given the directorship of the Institute, tenure, and additional staff in exchange for becoming the "temporary" Long Range Planning Task Force coordinator (until January, 1973). Each of the Presidential assistants commits from 10-50% of his time to planning. Over Christmas break the coordinator is to outline "the role of the Task Force, his reporting relationship to the President, and the thrust of the planning process."

December 21, 1971

Second meeting between the President and the Director of the Institute to barter on the terms of their agreement.

Early January, 1972

Several drafts of the announcement of a Long Range Planning Task Force are written. Task Force membership had not been named at this point, nor had the Task Force co-chairmen.

Commentary: A January 4 draft acknowledges several internal and external impetus for planning: from pressures of inflation and changing enrollments to the University Senate's May, 1971 statement on "University Roles and Missions." Certain expectations are set for the role of the coordinator (to identify resources and to assist the units in planning) and for the units in the planning process: 1) the planning process would involve wide participation and 2) units will be asked to assess strengths and weaknesses and to consult with other units on their goals and plans.

January 7, 1972

The coordinator proposes a planning council to advise the Task Force on environmental factors. A list of resource groups is compiled. By mid-January Task Force appointments are made; the idea of a planning
council is abandoned; and the two academic Vice Presidents, the Provost and the Vice President for the Medical Center, are named co-chairmen of the Task Force.

Commentary: A lot of the coordinator's energy goes into the draft and redrafts of this announcement and into decisions as to how Task Force members will be chosen.

January 11, 1972

The President meets with the vice presidents and vice provosts. He outlines his criteria for successful long range planning: that the decision-making process be made clearer as a result of planning and that planning involve those who will have to implement the plan. At this meeting the co-chairmanship is announced for the first time. On the same day, 1/11/72, Bennis writes the on-going PPBS committee and asks them to continue working on 1) budgeting, 2) a management-information system, and 3) college and departmental profiles.

January 14, 1972

Press release on long range planning at the University of Cincinnati.

January 18, 1972

The President talks to deans on long range planning. He asks for the "deans cooperation and support which will be essential in making sufficient internal resources available for planning." He shares some of his goals for the University - and projects how he would like to compare the University of Cincinnati to other universities in a few years.

January 21, 1972

The structure of the Long Range Planning Task Force organization and its relationship to the central administration are still being considered.

January 21, 1972

Bennis makes these notes about his first six months in Cincinnati:

"The organization of the University lacks coherence: there is a chasm between administrators and faculty. My goals are to develop a planning-evaluation process that will lead to a four year plan by September, 1972 and a useful, accurate information system. Planning must involve consideration of the following questions:
1) What will be the principal forces acting on the University in terms of population pressures, economic growth, technological change, and manpower requirements in the next few years?

2) What changes can and should be anticipated in the University as a community - in life style and in the working relationships between faculty and students?

3) What changes will result from what the University learns through research and and teaching?

4) How can the University best serve the community?

5) How can education be changed to serve constituents beyond the age of 25?"

Commentary: These are kinds of questions Bennis was asking himself as planning was initiated at the University of Cincinnati in January of 1972. However, his prospectus was not shared with the Long Range Planning Task Force co-chairmen or coordinator.

January 22, 1972

Board of Directors' discussion on long range planning: Bennis' statement on long range planning is released and later reprinted in Candid Campus, 2/9/72.

Commentary: Again, in a public statement, Bennis assigns long range planning a high priority in terms of what he wants his administration to accomplish. "Its' importance is indicated by two vice presidents serving as co-chairmen." He urges members of the University community to participate in planning at the unit level.

February 2, 1972

The Long Range Planning Task Force coordinator meets with University Senate's Budget and Priorities and Long Range Planning Committees.

February 7, 1972

Correspondence between the Arts and Sciences' Planning Committee which had been organized since December and the Task Force coordinator.

February 7, 1972

The Task Force Coordinator and co-chairmen meet to discuss what they need to do before the first Task Force meeting on March 1, 1972. They agree that a September long range plan should be broader in scope than resources permit. The decision is made to ask the units to plan without budgetary constraints or considerations.
Commentary: Both of those decisions have far-reaching (though perhaps unforeseen) implications for the way in which the Task Force would function and its long-term effectiveness. These decisions were not discussed with the President (see 2/9/72).

February 9, 1972

Candid Campus story on long range planning. The January-September timetable is announced publicly and Bennis' January 22nd statement on long range planning is reprinted. On the same day, the President writes one of the deans, "Although the nature of faculty and student participation in unit planning is for the unit to decide, I expect a unit's long range plan to contain a thorough analysis of what the unit does well, an identification of the unit's most crucial needs, and consideration of how resources might be used more effectively."

February 10, 1972

Correspondence between a faculty member and the chairmen of the University Senate (carboning the Task Force co-chairmen and coordinator). The Senate chairman clarifies the Task Force's and Senate's roles in long range planning as he understands them: the Task Force is charged with developing a planning process and the University Senate's role is to monitor that process and to react to a plan once it is written.

February 22, 1972

Co-chairmen's letter to Task Force members - setting out the co-chairmen's expectations for the 3/1/72 Task Force meeting. "Its purpose will be to discuss external constraints on the University, namely the Regents' expectations for a planning - programming - budgeting-system and for a plan for graduate education." There is no indication that the President received a copy of this letter since there is no copy in his files and a carbon is not indicated on the original.

March 1, 1972

First Task Force Meeting. The Task Force discusses external factors placing demands on the University to plan (which have been summarized in various paragraphs above) and the difficulties they envisioned the Task Force will have in specifying and helping units relate to each other and to the community. Decisions are made to set up a library at IRTHE (The Institute for Research and Teaching in Higher Education) and to see what other kinds of planning are happening in the University. Following some discussion, it is generally decided that an effective plan would:
1) Identify the University's future choices;  
2) Identify what the University does best;  
3) Identify areas of duplication and explore consolidation of programs;  
4) Identify areas of strength that need staffing, financing, or further development;  
5) Identify ways to better organize the University's efforts;  
6) Identify new directions and areas of development;  
7) Identify areas to be phased out;  

and that the Task Force would:  
1) Consider expanding or discontinuing programs;  
2) Consider community and State relationships as well as relationships with other universities;  
3) Consult with other groups;  
4) Link planning to a program-planning-budgeting system;  
5) Need to develop guidelines for a planning process;  
6) Attempt to link past and current planning efforts to this planning process."

A letter went out from the co-chairmen to Task Force members following this meeting summarizing these decisions and tasks.

Commentary: Both the tone of the letter and the tone of the meeting indicated that most Task Force members needed to be convinced about the goals and priority of this long range planning effort. The strategy the coordinator and co-chairmen used to convince them was to involve them in conceptualizing the "tasks" of the Task Force and in decision-making. In essence this strategy forced the Task Force to retrace the thinking that the co-chairmen and coordinator had gone through since January. There is no indication in the documents that the tasks that had been agreed upon (above) were assigned to Task Force members or that Task Force members understood what the next steps would be. Bennis did not meet with the Task Force or the co-chairmen after this meeting to review the decisions that had been made.

March 10 - 17, 1972

The coordinator writes a memo further clarifying the need for long range planning while the Task Force drafts a document called "Planning Guidelines for Units." He continues to work on developing program/unit categories.
March 20, 1972

Second Task Force meeting to discuss the Preliminary Planning Guidelines.

March 21, 1972

Co-chairmen's letter to the units asking them to review the planning guidelines and to indicate problems they anticipate, to designate a planning coordinator for the unit, and to begin reviewing the "current activities of the units, the needs being met, the resources used, etc. . .".

March 30, 1972

Units' reactions to the preliminary guidelines are sent back to the Task Force. Unit heads express concern about what will be done with the plans. They are, in general, skeptical about the relationship between long range planning and PPBS.

April 3, 1972

A memo from the Task Force coordinator to the co-chairmen analyzing the units' responses to the preliminary guidelines. Several problem areas are identified:

"1) The irreconcilable conflict between a short timetable and the need to collect data, consult, plan and recycle the plan:
2) The lack of clarity about the role of the Task Force and their power to make decisions as well as confusion about how planning is related to the budget and to PPBS;
3) Concern with how to coordinate planning with other units:
4) The need for more fully-describable program categories;
5) The felt need for overall University goals and priority statements.

The deans suggest that the Long Range Planning Task Force:
1) Do training for the deans and department heads;
2) Provide opportunities and encouragement for groups to go and observe other groups planning; and
3) Place preliminary working papers in a convenient location to permit those who are planning to observe the developing efforts of others."

Commentary: At this junction it is important to point out some important patterns that were being established in the way the Task Force would relate to the units. Since concerns listed above came to the Task Force's attention one by one from individual units, the Task
Force was forced to respond individually to each unit. Simply from a logistics point of view it became impossible to make speedy responses to units with seventeen Task Force members and forty-five units. In addition to that problem many of the questions the units were raising were complex and required more dialogue than had occurred in initiating a planning process on where the University was heading, on what planning was going to mean for the University, and on what choices would be made, when, etc. Consequently, often nothing was done to allay the problems units identified in trying to plan.

April 4, 1972

Meeting between the co-chairmen and coordinator. The coordinator raises questions about priorities and directions for the Task Force. He shares concerns he feels to spend more time with the co-chairmen, to clarify the planning process, and to figure out ways to involve Task Force members more substantially in planning.

April 4, 1972

Task Force meeting to review the units' reactions to the planning guidelines.

Commentary: The attention of the Task Force seemed to be on rewriting the guidelines rather than on interacting with those units who had raised questions.

April 6, 1972

The Provost's meeting with deans - long range planning is one of many agenda items. The Provost announces that the timetable for unit submitting plans will remain unchanged despite the deans' concerns and that by April 17 a long range planning packet will be distributed which would contain descriptions and examples of various planning processes. Other questions the deans had raised about planning are left unanswered.

April 17, 1972

The final Planning Process Guidelines are sent out - in the packet the goals of long range planning are again reviewed, the timetable is reprinted along with a list of Task Force members' names and phone numbers, and Task Force consultation is offered to units that request it.
April 20, 1972

A memo from an assistant to the Vice President for Business to Bennis proposing a reorganization of planning and budgeting. The coordinator in response sends a letter to Bennis reviewing some of the tacit understandings he felt he had with Bennis when he accepted the coordinator's role and how these considerations led to the appointment of a coordinator, a Task Force with faculty representation, and to the appointment of the two academic Vice Presidents as co-chairmen.

Commentary: This incident is included in the chronology because it is representative of the kind of one-shot influence Bennis is susceptible to and of the tremendous ambiguity that persists even after agreements have supposedly been reached and decisions have been made. Further, the anecdote is illustrative of how the time and energy of the Task Force leaders were continually diverted away from tasks at hand.

April 21, 1972

Long Range Planning Task Force meeting with the deans. A discussion group format is used to raise issues the Task Force needed to consider and to identify areas where units needed planning assistance. Some of the same concerns raised on March 30th are brought up again. In addition, the deans raise questions about the form their plans should take, the kind of approval a unit plan needs from its unit before it is submitted, and the kinds of assistance and feedback units can expect from the Task Force. These concerns are recorded, but another meeting is not scheduled.

April 25, 1972

Bennis xeroxes and sends copies of the University of Illinois' report on program evaluation to the deans and Long Range Planning Task Force members (only eight days after deans had received the Task Force Guidelines).

April 27, 1972

A note from the coordinator to Bennis saying he feels a need to meet more regularly with Bennis on long range planning. No written response from Bennis.

May 3, 1972

Task Force meeting: simulation for Task Force members on how to review unit plans.
May 15, 1972

Small units' plans are due: Task Force meeting to formulate an outline for reviewing plans: the Task Force will review and critique a plan, meet with the unit to explore issues or problems; the unit will then revise the plan and make recommendations to the Task Force.

Commentary: At this point several Task Force members realized that plans the Task Force would receive would be of differential quality since criteria for what a "good plan" was had not been set.

May 16, 1972

Task Force co-chairmen and coordinator meet with Bennis and several Presidential assistants on the progress of long range planning. The discussion centers on issues like the coordination of long range planning with PPBS. There is no resolution as to how or when they will be coordinated (see 10/17/72 and 10/25/72).

Commentary: Task Force co-chairmen seemed reluctant to ask Bennis some of the hard questions they had been asked and were wrestling with; instead, they gave him a flowchart and then timetable that showed planning proceeding right along on schedule.

May 23, 1972

Meeting between the co-chairmen and coordinator to discuss strategies for dealing with late plans and for reviewing plans.

May 26, 1972

The coordinator's "aide memoire." "To do long range planning right," he writes, "with broad participation you need 1) time, 2) resources and training possibilities, and 3) a healthy organization with trust and open communication - all of which are in short supply."

June 7, 1972

A Candid Campus story on long range planning creates community expectations for a plan to emerge over the summer and for extensive dialogue between the Task Force and others on campus over the next few months. On the same day, the co-chairmen share with unit heads the review procedures for unit plans they have agreed upon.
June 9, 1972

President Bennis suggests the name of an outside consultant for the Long Range Planning Task Force.

June 15, 1972

A Presidential assistant writes the coordinator about Bennis' meeting with the assistant and associate dean (see 6/20/72).

June 15, 1972

Correspondence, the Coordinator to the co-chairmen. He anticipates only a skeletal plan from the College of Arts and Sciences since "there is a high level of defensiveness and resistance to planning in that unit due to pressing short-term budget problems."

June 19, 1972

Memo, the coordinator to the President's office about the lack of communication between the units and the Task Force and between the President's office and the Task Force. The coordinator has seen a memo that the President wrote to one of his assistants on the criticisms of long range planning he had learned from his meeting with the assistant and associate deans. In response the coordinator documents the frequent communications the Task Force has had with the deans all spring at Friday deans' meetings.

Commentary: This incident shows Bennis' lack of confidence in the Long Range Planning Task Force; his dissatisfaction, however, comes out in memos he writes to his own assistants. In turn, the Task Force coordinator responds through the assistants (see below, 6/20/72).

June 19, 1972

Guidelines for reviewing unit plans are sent to Task Force members.

June 20, 1972

The coordinator's response to an assistant in the President's office - he contends that members of the Task Force have been available to consult at the request of units: "Given that all units have received about the same input from the Long Range Planning Task Force, the quality of the plans received, which has differed, must say something about the units, e.g. that the planning task is more or less complex depending on the unit; that some units have better planning capabilities than others; that some units are willing to work harder than others; that some units are less defensive than others; or that some units are more overworked
than others. Even units doing good plans have felt resentment to the time pressures and extra work."

Commentary: Throughout his response, the coordinator alludes to feelings that he is being criticized and not rewarded.

**June 24, 1972**

Meeting between the President, the two co-chairmen, and coordinator. A meeting between the Task Force and the President is planned for July 19, 1972. The format of the overall plan is discussed which would prioritize University problems and generate program evaluation criteria. Bennis shifts the discussion, before reaching closure on these issues however, to questions about the general morale and momentum of the Task Force.

**June 26, 1972**

A meeting takes place between the co-chairmen and the coordinator to consider the President's suggestions on the tone and format of the final report and on the use of outside consultant-reviewers. On the latter, they decide to use outsiders to review the plan once it is written, as a whole in September.

**June 28, 1972**

A second meeting between the President, the two co-chairmen, and coordinator is held in which Bennis' interest in long range planning focusing on program evaluation is the major topic of discussion.

**July 12 - 13, 1972**

Strategy sessions in preparation for the marathon July 17-19 and for the Arts and Sciences subgroup review meeting on July 14, 1972.

**July 14, 1972**

Meeting between the Task Force and the Arts and Sciences planning committee to talk about the plan from the College of Arts and Sciences.

**July 17 - 19, 1972**

Long range planning marathon. The Task Force meets in marathon sessions to review subgroup critiques of unit plans and to make recommendations for an overall University plan.
July 19, 1972

Task Force review session with President Bennis at the end of the marathon.

August 1, 1972

A memorandum from a Presidential assistant to the President summarizing a report on the "inventory of management and institutional planning processes at the University of Cincinnati compiled by long range planning coordinator and the PPBS committee. The memorandum reinforces the expectation of a September 1st long range plan contrary to what the President had heard at the July marathon.

August 4, 1972

The coordinator writes a story on long range planning for the September issue of Candid Campus. "After September 1, discussion of the implications and integration of unit plans for and with a University plan will take place as well as discussion of how to continue the 1972-73 planning process."

August 5, 1972

The coordinator writes handwritten notes to Task Force members thanking them for their efforts and a position paper on the University of Cincinnati's future prospects.

August 7, 1972

The two co-chairmen and coordinator meet to revise the outline for a preliminary long range plan.

August 16, 1972

Next steps in the planning process are outlined which include the use of advisory councils in units, a review of unit plans, a meshing of long range planning with PPBS, the identification of a more permanent long range planning structure, and a recycling of the planning process.

Commentary: Interestingly, this memorandum does not include a deadline for when the University long range plan will be submitted, although it does suggest that outside consultants will be used to review the plan in the fall and that the University community will engage in some sort of goal setting activity in the fall and winter. The Task Force does not meet as a group from July 19th until September 26th.
August 28, 1972

The Chairman of the Board of Directors requests an informal board meeting on long range planning for 9/20/72. The message is conveyed through Bennis to the Task Force.

Early September 1972

Bennis makes a speech on planning at Indiana University.

September 11, 1972

In a letter to the President, the coordinator writes that the Arts and Science Long Range Planning committee is determined to be protective of what the College is right now and to argue strongly for maintaining all the College programs.

September 12, 1972

A vice provost volunteers to review the long range plan for the President and to coordinate the academic side of its implementation.

September 18, 1972

Not having a plan to submit, Task Force leaders consider a number of options including 1) making a number of immediate recommendations to the President which were discussed at the July marathon and 2) giving statistical feedback to the units i.e. projected FTES' (full-time equivalent students) etc.

September 20, 1972

Board meeting on long range planning - the co-chairmen emphasize that the objective for the first cycle of planning has been "learning."

September 26, 1972

Long Range Planning Task Force meeting to discuss how to write the long range plan. Several unanswered questions keep coming up as to where the report would be distributed and as to the kinds of recommendations the Task Force can or should make. A suggestion is made to feedback to the units some immediately implementable recommendations, but it is not acted upon. It is agreed to shoot for a November deadline for a document which would pull together and summarize unit plans and for a spring report which would concentrate on "more global issues."

Commentary: These decisions are not discussed with President Bennis.
September 29, 1972

Long range planning is discussed at the Friday afternoon deans' meeting.

October 3, 1972

The vice presidents meet and discuss appointing the vice provost (see 9/12/72) to write the University long range plan. No decision is reached.

October 17, 1972

Bennis announces that the deans will be asked to relate PPBS to their long range plans (see 10/25/72); Task Force members receive working copies of several chapters of a long range plan.

October 20, 1972

Long Range Planning Task Force meeting to discuss drafts of chapters for the long range plan. Bennis has asked the Task Force to come up with a statement of University goals. During this meeting the Task Force tries to decide whether it can continue to synthesize unit reports and do a goals statement; and if not, which is more important to do.

Commentary: There is some reluctance among committee members to do a goals statement. There is a sense of being cross-pressured. The Task Force feels that it needs to respond to Bennis' request, at the same time that it feels it needs to get back to the units. But, if it were to go back to the units, would it be to give the Task Force's perspective on the unit's problems, to make some sort of statement as to the unit's standing in relationship to other units, or to request an updating of the unit's plan? One of the co-chairmen blocks going back to the units until the Task Force can attach criteria, guidelines, and fiscal projections to the units' plans. At the end of the meeting there is consensus on a timetable and a way of proceeding: By December 1, a preliminary plan would be written that would include a statement of goals; throughout the spring there would be community-wide discussion and
priority setting; by late spring, units would be asked (with more knowledge about University goals) to recycle their plans and to come up with criteria to evaluate progress toward their own as well as University priorities. As far as the author can tell these decisions were not discussed with the President.

October 20, 1972

The President meets with his assistants to discuss long range planning.

Commentary: Bennis definitely seems to want short term program evaluation, recommendations of program cuts, and statement of priorities to come from the Long Range Planning Task Force.

Mid-October, 1972

Bennis is always forwarding birth, enrollment and population trend studies to the Long Range Planning Task Force as well as Alternative Approaches to Graduate Education material. In October he also requests that the co-chairmen prepare a progress report on long range planning for the 10/31/72 all University faculty meeting (a report that was later preempted in favor of making a budget presentation).

October 25, 1972

Long Range Planning Task Force meeting to work on drafts of chapters and the priorities and goal statement. There is again discussion about how long range planning will mesh with PPBS program categories and it is decided that a long range plan will be released as a Task Force statement without extensive consultation with other groups, i.e. the PPBS committee. Questions about the goals statement such as how to write it and how to contextualize it in terms of where higher education is moving in the 70's - are also discussed.

Commentary: Much of the discussion in this meeting focuses on comments the President had made to the University Senate about the Long Range Planning Task Force not working and a need the Task Force feels to inform the President about how much work they actually have been doing. Two questions that persistently come up are 1) how will a long range plan be used outside the University
community? and 2) how will a long range plan relate to the budget?

October 20 - November 6, 1972

Task Force subgroup work - developing specific recommendations for given units and identifying University wide issues.

October 26, 1972

A letter from the coordinator to the President prior to Bennis' 10/27 meeting with the deans. The coordinator raises several questions that the President might have to answer in his meeting with the deans: questions as to why the September 1 deadline wasn't met, as to how proceed without feedback on the unit's plan, etc.

October 27, 1972

The President meets with the deans. The deans feel that more important long range planning is going on in the budget review process then in long range planning. They are unclear about how their long range plans will relate to immediate budget decisions.

Commentary: Without more dialogue between the Task Force leaders and the President, Bennis himself is in no position to answer these questions or to convince the deans about how much work the Task Force has accomplished.

October 30, 1972

The coordinator briefs the President on the Task Force's accomplishments for 10/31 faculty speech. What the coordinator tries to say is that planning is a long-term process and not a substitute for short-term planning and decision-making. They are intandem processes. What the Task Force will publish will help the University think about directions and alternatives and identify choices.

Commentary: The President does most of the talking - he asks a series of questions that get at what he has in mind for the Task Force to produce such as "What would it do to fund raising if we dropped football?" (He wants criteria development to help him understand the consequences of presidential interventions.) "What criteria can we use to evaluate non-academic units?" (He wants criteria for program evaluation, if not program evaluation
He wants long range planning coordinated with PPBS by March 1 - and logistical feedback given to units on how much time they are spending in relation to goals they say they have. Bennis asks what the long range plan will look like since "the media is the message." Bennis promises another meeting; it is never scheduled.

November 6, 1972

Long Range Planning Task Force meeting to discuss the reports of the subgroups. There is a debate as to whether or not the Task Force should attach their recommendations to summaries of unit plans. There is also a problem of how to handle those areas for which no plan has been written for one reason or another (Arts and Science, the Office of Metropolitan Affairs, continuing education, etc.).

November 15, 1972

President Bennis brings in an outside consultant to gain an administrative perspective on long range planning. The consultant sees his role is to create movement in the system by asking the right questions.

November 21, 1972

Parts of an introductory chapter of a long range plan are written.

November 22, 1972

Long Range Planning Task Force meeting to continue working on synthesizing unit plans and the introductory chapter. Some substantive revisions and editing takes place; the Task Force also discusses the need to change rewards in the University to promote collaboration and interdisciplinary research and teaching.

Commentary: The Task Force is faced with the problem of wanting to keep going in the direction it set for itself, independent of the immediate budget crisis and in spite of pressures from the deans for feedback before their budget presentations.

November 28, 1972

A consultant's draft to the President projecting the impact of Nixon's domestic policies on higher education and the University of Cincinnati in particular. No copy to the Long Range Planning Task Force.
Commentary: It is important to mention this paper because it is against these recommendations that the President will measure the Task Force's validity, skill, and successfulness in specifying future directions for the University.

December 1, 1972

The co-chairmen send out copies of three preliminary chapters to unit directors for comments.

Commentary: The President reads the three chapters over Christmas

December 19, 1972

The President writes the co-chairmen requesting a status report on long range planning. He says he understands that there have been delays and that other pressures interfere with their spending time on long range planning. The President also writes the coordinator asking him to spell out the next steps of the long range planning process. He reiterates an offer of outside consultants.

January 10, 1973

The President writes the head of the University of Cincinnati Placement Office asking for projections to 1980 on the future employment opportunities for University of Cincinnati graduates.

January 12, 1973

The Provost's response to the Presidents 12/19 letter. The Provost explains that the Task Force has had difficulty in making recommendations in the College of Arts and Sciences because "there hasn't been a plan from that unit," but that some preliminary chapters have gone back to unit heads for response. He suggests that councils be established to work out detailed recommendations and implementation in each area.

January 13, 1973

The President writes the chairman of a national task force on Alternative Approaches to Graduate Education and suggests that if the Long Range Planning Task Force could monitor trends in higher education nationally, they could make really valuable recommendations to the University.
January 16, 1972

The Provost and the President see an architect consultant in San Francisco, about his recommendations on restructuring the College of Design, Art and Architecture at the University of Cincinnati.

January 16 - 17, 1972

Administrative Retreat - long range planning is one of the topics discussed. The Provost reports that timing has been a real problem, that the Arts and Science plan is not done, and that budget cuts are being made that are incongruent with long range planning recommendations, but that the biggest flaw of all is that the plan is not tied to external social trends. The Provost admits that the writing has not been delegated. The President and the Provost agree on the following action steps at the retreat:

1) that a report be made as soon as possible to the campus community to reaffirm the long range planning process;
2) that the Provost conference with the dean and department heads in Arts and Sciences;
3) that a new coordinator for long range planning be appointed as soon as possible.

January 17, 1972

The Provost follows up the retreat with a letter to the President in which he makes these points about long range planning:

"1) There is a need for a public statement of objectives and progress to tell the campus community we have not been entirely dormant or irresponsible;
2) That peer group pressures has to be exerted in Arts and Sciences to get a plan from that college;
3) That advisory councils need to be appointed (see 1/12/73);
4) That long range planning needs to mesh with PPBS and budget review planning;
5) That the Task Force needs to follow up with their request for comments on the preliminary chapters;
6) That a new coordinator needs to be found, and
7) That in the spring a retreat might be held to discuss the implications of the long range plan that would be written by that time.

Commentary: It is important to note that some of these steps overlapped with those agreed at the retreat; others were new.
January 19, 1973

The President meets with his assistants to rehash the administrative retreat. He says that he thinks he will never see a long range plan and that processes like Long Range Planning do not have their own initiative. "I have to keep pumping them up," he says.

January 31, 1973

At a vice presidents' meeting it is suggested that the Long Range Planning Task Force present a list of programs that might be cut in projecting the 1973-74 budget.

February - March, 1973

The President announces parts of an administrative reorganization; he also sends out a parody on long range planning to Task Force members.

Commentary: Some Task Force members are surprised by the reorganization that came about independent of a long range plan.

February 20, 1973

Excerpts from comments made at a vice presidents' meeting with President Bennis: "Long range planning is needed on a program basis by cost and priority from the top-down in 1974-75." "Long range planning is not possible in a state which can only budget for two years at a time."

Commentary: There seemed to be a lot of skepticism about the feasibility of a participatory long range planning process at this point - widespread participation being the major premise under which this effort was undertaken.

February 20, 1973

The Provost writes the President asking for help with Arts and Sciences and for Bennis' approval of the advisory councils he'd suggested 1/12/73 and 1/17/73. The Provost argues that there has been substantial impact from long range planning even if there is no plan. "Program evaluation is not the responsibility of the Long Range Planning Task Force. It is also not a budget cutting group." He urges the President to be realistic in what he expects from a task force. He offers to cull a number of tangible recommendations and suggestions from existing documents if that is what Bennis wants (see 9/18/72).
February 26, 1973

The President writes the Provost, expressing displeasure at the lack of specificity in the Provost's 2/20 letter about where long range planning was going. Bennis makes four or five procedural recommendations and then several substantive ones. Long excerpts are taken from his letter below since it represents one of his strongest interventions into long range planning. He recommends:

"1) that a new coordinator be appointed; 2) that outside consultants be used; 3) a meeting with Arts and Sciences [even though he says he has no idea what their problems are]; and 4) a March 13th date for a final plan and a published timetable." "Whatever the process is, and however important it is, it must lead to a product which can be read, discussed, and ultimately influenced by our academic community."

Substantively he recommends: 1) That external factors be taken into consideration. "To my knowledge no attention has been paid to external factors affecting the University of Cincinnati. We have to have some clarification of those factors before we can understand the future." 2) That program evaluation needs to be tackled. "What we need to discover in more depth and detail and precision are those criteria and programs that our leadership finds least significant and most significant." In this regard Bennis asks both of the academic Vice Presidents to project how they would cut or spend an additional million dollars if it were given to them. 3) That the Task Force write an integrating statement and compile a list of priorities for the final plan. (He sees that as the task of the two co-chairmen and coordinator.)

March 8, 1973

Some friendly correspondence between the Provost and the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences; the Provost offers to meet with the Arts and Sciences planning committee. The coordinator also submits an outline of a proposed June, 1973, long range plan and a timetable to the University Senate Long Range Planning committee.

March 9, 1973

The University Senate Long Range Planning committee meets to consider its relationship to the Task Force and the future of long range planning. A few days later this committee publishes the criteria it has developed for evaluating academic programs.

April 30, 1973

Part of the Long Range Planning Task Force holds a day long workshop on long range planning. They discuss the future of the Long Range Planning Task Force, a review process for the plan, and what some of the substantive recommendations they might make would be. The
Provost and about half of the Task Force feels that the most important contribution the Task Force can make is the process it has established and not the action steps or recommendations it will make. On the other hand the President expects specific recommendations. The workshop sort of ends in a stalemate with Task Force members reluctant to volunteer for work that has to be done. The two co-chairmen are called to a meeting in the President’s office at noon.

May 2, 1973

The Provost and President Bennis discuss how they might hold up the Arts and Sciences budget until Arts and Sciences submits a long range plan, but the Provost feels that it is impossible to coerce Arts and Sciences.

May 15, 1973

The Provost makes a report to the vice presidents and the President on long range planning. Bennis announces that a set of University priorities he has been working on will independently be announced May 17th in his speech to the University faculty.

May 17, 1973

Bennis' speech to the University faculty.

June 18, 1973

The co-chairmen and coordinator meet with the deans and the President. Long range planning is one of several topics that is reported on. Bennis acknowledges that in the future he needs to meet with deans more often so that he can emphasize priorities like long range planning.

June 30, 1973

The Provost prepares an update on the status of long range planning for an administrative retreat at Kings' Island. "No comprehensive plan has been received from the College of Arts and Sciences, but the Task Force has decided to go ahead and complete an initial plan by September 1, 1973. Plans will then be implemented and revised if necessary." The Provost questions who should be given responsibility for implementation.

Commentary: Bennis' response is to talk about a book on the planning process and to want to stage a series of Saturday morning conferences on parts of the plan. It appears as if he plans to widely distribute copies of the 9/1 plan.
September, 1973

The Preliminary Report on All University Long Range Planning is published.
Ensuring the Future of Long Range Planning

The Long Range Planning Task Force was created by President Bennis to initiate what was anticipated to be a continuing University-wide planning process with periodic review and modification. While the present Task Force anticipates its discharge sometime during this academic year, we are concerned about the future of the planning process. Ways must be found to build that process into the very fabric of the University. The current plan -- much of which was generated in 1972 and is already dated by fall 1973 -- must be revised and updated this fall and winter. Thereafter, major revisions will be needed every two to five years to facilitate reexamination and revision of University goals and priorities as external conditions change and as the University's own sense of mission evolves. In times of exceptionally rapid change or transition, this process may be needed more frequently. Likewise, units will need to update and revise their plans frequently to assure their continued viability and to maintain the closest possible linkage between their activities and the overall University mission. Moreover, the University's progress toward the objectives of the plan should be measured and reported to the University community on a regular basis. Areas of recalcitrance or failure should be identified and receive special attention during the next round of planning. Finally, the
planning process should be coordinated as closely as possible with the budgetary (resource allocation) process.

Our specific recommendations are presented under two major headings: 1) Steps in the revision of the Preliminary Plan during the fall and winter of 1973-74, and 2) Continuing steps in the planning process.

A. Steps in the Revision of the Preliminary Plan During the Fall and Winter of 1973-74

1. Implementation of the preliminary recommendations should begin at once, even though a revised plan will not be issued until later in the 1973-74 academic year. Indeed, many recommendations made in the summer of 1972 have already been, or will soon be, implemented.

2. The Preliminary Plan should be discussed widely during fall of 1973 and revised for publication in spring of 1974.

3. Student, faculty, staff and community members should be encouraged to read and comment upon the Preliminary Plan as it relates to University-wide affairs. Moreover, they should be encouraged to comment upon and participate in the updating of plans in their constituent units.

4. There should be wide discussion of the University goals and objectives, and University-wide issues and recommendations presented in the Preliminary Plan. Seminars, workshops, and hearings sponsored by the President's Office in cooperation with the Task Force should seek the ideas and comments of such focal bodies as the Board, the newly formed
Academic Council, and governance groups as well as representatives of the community. These discussions should result in revised statements of University goals and objectives, University-wide issues and recommendations, and University priorities which are as operational and specific as possible.

5. In early September, 1973, units should be advised of the need to update their 1972 plans by February 1, 1974. Moreover, they should be asked to indicate what steps have been taken to carry out original plans, what additional steps are contemplated during the year, and what assistance they desire from central administration, governance groups, the Task Force, etc., to facilitate the updating of plans at the unit level.

6. Each unit (other than the very small units) should establish, not later than the spring of 1974, a long range planning committee which will have the responsibility for reviewing, recommending implementation of, and updating the relevant portions of the University's long range plan. (Some units already have such committees -- for example, the College of Design, Architecture and Art, the University College and others.)

7. When the revised University plan is released in the spring of 1974, it should probably appear in loose-leaf form, so that annual addenda can be used to supplement or replace pertinent pages in the 1974 plan. If not all copies are in loose-leaf format, at least the "working" copies -- those of the unit directors and other administrators chiefly concerned about planning -- should be so bound.
8. After the presentation of the revised plan, the Long Range Planning Task Force should be discharged, unless any work remains on the original round of planning.

B. Continuing Steps in Planning

1. The President's Office must have residing within it, primary responsibility for leading and coordinating the University-wide planning function. In terms of the recent administrative reorganization, the appropriate location in the President's Office appears to be the Office of the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs. This office should have adequate time and professional staff to facilitate the implementation of the plan, to consult with units in their planning efforts, and to coordinate the planning process on a continuous basis. It should have an advisory group or task force to assist and guide its efforts. This office should maintain frequent contacts with the planning committees and planning officers of each of the major units so that periodic updating of the University plan will be a relatively logical and predictable process. It would be the responsibility of this office to deliver, once a year, a supplemental planning report to the President. The President in turn should prepare an annual "State of the University" message articulating priorities, indicating new conditions affecting the University, and anticipating changes in direction and emphasis.

2. The revised plans from "A" above should be the basis for budgetary allocations for the 1975-77 biennium, a process beginning in the spring of 1974.
a. Each unit seeking a budget allocation should document its request based on a comprehensive long range plan for the unit and indications of how its plan contributes to the attainment of overall University goals.

b. Each unit should articulate its priorities by program area within its plan. Clarity of alternatives would permit choices to be related to available levels of funding in yearly and biennial budget processes.

3. The next major cycle of University-wide planning (following the publication of the revised plan in spring, 1974) should take place, at the latest, during fall and winter 1975-76. The resultant plans would become the basis for the budgetary allocations in the 1977-79 biennium, a process beginning in the spring of 1976.

4. Each unit should be expected to maintain a comprehensive long range plan for its activities. This should be reviewed and updated annually. In 1975, this process should be completed and the plan submitted to the Office of the President by no later than July 1, 1975. This prerequisite step will permit University-wide planning to proceed as outlined in "3" above. Major recasting of unit plans should occur every two years in the case of smaller units and probably at a somewhat longer interval for larger units except where circumstances warrant more frequent recasting.

5. A system of rewards must be developed for units which evidence strong commitment to planning, implement their plans effectively, and demonstrate relevant relationships between their activities and the overall goals of the University.
6. **Enrollment projections** should be maintained for each unit and program. They should be updated annually and extended five to ten years into the future.

7. **Income and expense projections** should be maintained for each unit and program. They should be updated annually and extended five years or two biennia into the future.

8. **Planning guidelines** should be modified to include resource tables indicating staff, facilities, equipment, and funds needed for attainment of plans.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

October 25, 1971

Administrative Retreat at French Lick.

Commentary: The need for an internal affirmative action program for minorities is identified. "The philosophy of this administration is to work over a three to four year period of time toward equitable faculty and student roles for minorities and women." It is decided to "1) ask the University Senate to develop a plan for an affirmative action program and to study the need for new educational programs and services; 2) commit the University to raise money for minority student programs, counselling, and financial aid; 3) to hire more minority and women faculty and administrative staff; and 4) to actively recruit more minority students."

November, 1971

A consultant is brought in by the President "to look at the University as it relates to minorities and women and to look at the resources of the community and those of the University and to make recommendations on how to involve more women and minorities in the University to bring about a more effective use of resources."

December 8, 1971

Revised order #4, Department of Labor in which the obligations of contractors and subcontractors re: affirmative action are detailed.

January 22, 1972

The President appoints the Director of the Office of Resources Development and a black Associate Vice President for Community Relations. The Office of Resource Development is to work with the University Senate in developing an affirmative action plan for the University and: 1) to develop programs around new human resources; 2) to provide staff assistance to the President's Council on minority affairs and women;

---

1A black woman, later appointed Director of the Office of Resource Development at the University of Cincinnati.
3) to review, advise, and monitor affirmative action programs:
4) to prepare proposals for funding special programs: and
5) to develop programs between the University and the community.

March 3, 1972

The Director's appointment begins.

April 11, 1972

Correspondence between the President and the vice presidents. The President asks the vice presidents to maintain records and comply with the spirit of affirmative action in making appointments in this area.

May 8, 1972

The University Senate reports on the Status of Women and Minority Affirmative Action.

June 7, 1972

Correspondence, the President to the Chairman of the University Senate; instead of two committees the President will appoint one commission with committees on women and minorities. The University Senate's timetable is moved back two months.

June 7, 1972

Correspondence, the President to the Director and the Provost re: a modification of the University Senate's recommendations on the University's policies on child care. The Provost and the Director are to implement or assist those who wish to implement child care programs that require minimal expenditures such as cooperative programs; to provide legal advice etc. Eventually the President hopes child care programs will be a research and resource center for the University.

June 7, 1972

Correspondence, the President to the Provost. The President asks the Provost to assume responsibility for a number of recommendations in the reports of the subcommittees on the Status of Women and Minority Affirmative Action. He asks the Provost to convene a small committee to study Michigan State University's Anti-Discrimination Tribunal so that by 8/31/72 the University of Cincinnati will have established grievance procedures for cases alleging discrimination. The Provost is also asked to study recommendations for student assistance and tutoring programs, curriculum changes, the use of part-time faculty and career counselling.
June 12, 1972

Correspondence, the President to the governance group leaders. He accepts the recommendations of the Report of the Committee on the Status of Women re: women and governance in the University and asks the governance groups to develop an affirmative action plan for committee representation.

June 16, 1972

A vice provost in reviewing the Director of the Office of Resource Development's draft of the University's Policy Statement on Affirmative Action (cc: the President) writes: "I can anticipate great resistance and argument over the assignment to affirmative action coordinators of the responsibility for determining what 'qualified applicant' means..."

June 19, 1972

Correspondence, the President to the Director and vice presidents asking them to review the draft statement on Affirmative Action which has been developed from recommendations of the University Senate. Responsibilities for implementation and the following timetable are included in the draft:

By 8/31 - affirmative action coordinators will be designated, a reporting and auditing system established, and grievance procedures established;

By 9/30 - the Office of Resource Development will publish an analysis of areas of under-utilization and areas of low minority and female student enrollment re: Revised order #4;

By 10/31 - the Office of Resource Development will establish a system to identify potentially qualified applicants and complete a review of the policies and procedures of the Personnel Office to assure compliance with Federal laws. By this date the President will also have appointed the Affirmative Action Commission.

By 11/4 - each unit will develop goals and timetables for effective utilization of minorities and women which will be incorporated into their long range plans and reviewed by the appropriate dean and vice president.

June 21, 1972

Correspondence from the Faculty Council on Jewish Affairs recommending that the Affirmative Action policy statement make it clear "there is no attempt to advocate or support reverse discrimination" and that "criteria for employment and responsibility for monitoring must be shared by the affirmative action coordinators with suitable academic personnel in the departments and colleges."
June 23, 1972

Correspondence, the Director of the Office of Resource Development to the Vice President for Business - Reviews revisions of the proposed statement on affirmative action re: contract compliance (cc: Bennis).

June 27, 1972

Correspondence, the Provost - Response to the President's 6/7 letter. The Provost agrees to work with the Director on the implementation of a child care policy.

June 29, 1972

Correspondence from the Faculty Council on Jewish Affairs to the President: a report on Affirmative Action.

July 6, 1972

Correspondence between the President's Office and the Personnel Office on the maternity leave policy.

July 7, 1972

The President appoints a committee to develop the charge, membership, etc., of an Affirmative Action Commission. "The Commission will serve as a reviewing body for the University's affirmative action plan and as a body to which I and others can direct special studies, and materials for comment."

July 15, 1972

Correspondence, the President to the Vice President for Business - Bennis wants the vice presidents to meet to discuss the Director of the Office of Resource Development's role and to review the "final" affirmative action plan. The President's letter is excerpted: "Because of the sensitivity and importance of such a plan shouldn't other groups be brought in to discuss it? I am thinking especially of the deans. I know that many of them have left already, but I am concerned that such an important document be received without any prior discussion by those individuals who have to implement the plan. This document is far more important, far more subject to distortion, apprehension, etc., it seems to me, than possibly any other policy statement that this office will transmit during this coming year."

July 20, 1972

Correspondence, the Director to the Vice President for Business - a review of his responses to the affirmative action statement. Many of his revisions and recommendations are accepted and incorporated.
July 31, 1972

Correspondence, the President in response to the Faculty Council on Jewish Affairs' concerns about the formulation of the University's affirmative action program. The President writes, "The objective of affirmative action is diversification, not discrimination. I agree that recruitment and selection must reflect professional peer group judgement - subject to assistant and monitoring by the Office of Resource Development and the Commission on Affirmative Action. The role of the Affirmative Action coordinators in each college is to be facilitative rather than directive, coordinative rather than adjudicative. They will insure that the locus of responsibility rests with the colleges and departments. We must work closely together in this endeavor. The spirit of collaboration reflected in your recent statement is vital."

September 1, 1972

Correspondence, the Provost to the President, the vice presidents, and the Director of the Office of Resource Development re: the creation of a University anti-discriminatory tribunal. He submits a draft for consultation. The President sends a copy of this correspondence to the Director of Personnel.

September 12, 1972

Correspondence, the Director to the Provost (cc: the President) re: the draft of an affirmative action policy statement for the University of Cincinnati. "It was agreed early in the summer that a draft of the 7/20 statement on Affirmative Action would be provided to all deans and directors for comment prior to any release by the President's Office in order to incorporate any salient point raised and discussed by those persons upon whom implementation will heavily rely." The Director of the Office of Resource Development urges the deans to review the proposal by no later than 10/13. Timetables will have to be changed, since the President has requested a report on where the University's affirmative action program is in relation to programs of other universities, and since the Director wants to begin as soon as possible to discuss the process of implementation with the deans and department heads.

September 29, 1972

The Director attends the Friday-afternoon deans and unit directors meeting. The deans seem to want to have her address specific implications for specific colleges and departments. She replies that these conferences will not be possible until January.

October, 1972

HEW's Guidelines for Higher Education are published.
October 2, 1972

By letter, the Vice President for Business asks the Director of the Office of Resource Development when she will make presentations to the various vice presidential areas agreed upon several months before in a vice presidents' meeting.

October 3, 1972

The Director reports that her meeting with the deans has taken place and that she will meet very soon with the Hospital and Medical College steering committees. She suggests four dates to work with the vice presidents and their staffs; on the same day the President reports to the Board of Directors on the progress of Affirmative Action listing new appointments of women and minorities and announces the beginning of a management information system, etc. That night, October 3, the President and the Director have dinner together.

October 17, 1972

Affirmative Action is discussed at the President's Advisory Council (Category II) meeting.

October 1972

Bernice Sandler from the Association of American Colleges, Project on the Status and Education of Women, is invited to speak to the vice presidents, deans and presidential assistants about affirmative action at the Current Perspectives in Higher Education Lecture Series.

October 23, 1972

Correspondence, the Director to the President re: the policy statement on Affirmative Action which has been reviewed by the vice presidents, deans, AAUP, and Medical College steering committee, and the President's Advisory Council. The Director recommends reprinting the statement in Candid Campus and the publication of a special document to include all the information needed by the vice presidents, deans, and affirmative action coordinators to implement Affirmative Action.

October 27, 1972

The President writes a cover letter to the University's Policy Statement on Affirmative Action but publication in Candid Campus is delayed until December 4 for a number of reasons.

October 30, 1972

The Director meets with the President to report on the progress of affirmative action in the Medical College etc. Bennis does not like the image of affirmative action as a mechanism of social change. The
Director proposes to hold hearings on the status of women at the University of Cincinnati in the spring; the President wants the Director to bring in funding for University of Cincinnati-sponsored conferences and for her to emphasize what has already been done in the area of affirmative action.

October 31, 1972

The Director forwards copies of the Medical College steering committee's comments on the Policy Statement on Affirmative Action to the President's assistants (cc: the President). She also reports that she has met with department chairmen in the Medical College.

November 2, 1972

The Director writes to the Committee to establish the process, charge, and membership for the Commission on Affirmative Action. She suggests that the role of the Commission be 1) to review the University's Affirmative Action plan prior to submission to HEW; 2) to review the units' affirmative action implementation plans; 3) to review studies of areas of under-utilization of women and minorities in the University; 4) to recommend policy considerations to the President for action; and 5) to support and assist the Office of Resource Development.

November 3, 1972

The Director wants salary equity review for women to be part of the 1973-74 budget review process.

November 7, 1972

Correspondence, the President to the Committee on the Affirmative Action Commission. He would like the Commission to report to the Director of Resource Development although he would make some Presidential appointments. He also cautions the committee, that the Director's role in the Commission as proposed might be too vague, too broad and inclusive, and needs to be looked at carefully.

November 22, 1972

An affirmative action workshop on institutional racism is held for Presidential assistants.

November 22, 1972

Correspondence, the Committee on the Affirmative Action Commission to the President - A conference between the Committee and the President to resolve the questions of whom the commission should report to and the Commission's chairmanship is recommended. A final proposal on the Commission will be ready in three to four weeks.
November 29, 1972

In a letter to the President, the Director presents a case for the Affirmative Action Commission to report to the President. "The sensitivities around the whole notion of affirmative action both on campus and in the community need a lot more reassurance in terms of your continued commitment - as I also do - and leadership re: affirmative action than would be the case, if this Commission reported to me or anyone else. This certainly has political overtones for you - and there must be pressures on you to soft-pedal this whole area, but the penalties for doing so are so great that I cannot conceive of our not being able to deal with all the various communities and their concerns."

November 29, 1972

The Director, the President, and the chairman of the committee that wrote the charge to the Affirmative Action Commission meet to discuss the chairmanship. They disagree on the function of the commission which is to review, recommend, and initiate policy. The Director says the Commission will only review implementation plans. The President does not want the Commission to be a way to short-circuit the bureaucracy when his goal is to make the bureaucracy more responsive. The President adds to the Commission's charge to work with the President to identify those aspects of the community which seem to provoke repetitive grievances for minorities and women, while the Director is to deal with matters of institutional racism and sexism. The role of the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal is discussed and the Director asks for more resources for xeroxing.

December 4, 1972

The University's Policy Statement on Affirmative Action is reprinted in Candid Campus; no implementation dates are included (see Appendix B).

December 4, 1972

Correspondence, the chairman of the Committee to write Affirmative Action Commission charge to the President (no cc). There are two new parts to the charge in addition to reviewing the University's Affirmative Action Plan, reviewing units' implementation plans, and recommending policy considerations for review and action. They are:
1) To provide a mechanism for the smooth flow of information on the status of women and minorities and on the implementation of Affirmative Action and
2) To work with the President to identify clearly those areas of university concerns and life in which there appears to be repetitive instances of alleged racism and sexism.
December 4, 1972

The Director's summary of her Report to the President on the status of women and blacks re: participation in the committee structure of the University of Cincinnati, 1972-73. The Director recommends increasing black participation on all committees in the University.

December 5, 1972

The Affirmative Action policy statement is discussed at the President's Advisory Council meeting (Category II) along with the issue of the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal's jurisdiction.

December 7, 1972

Correspondence, the President to the Director thanking her for her work on women and minorities' participation on various University committees. "Your study will be useful in creating the climate of change we all want."

December 12, 1972

Fifteen minute meeting between the President and the Director of the Office of Resource Development.

December 29, 1972

The Director's summary of A Report to the President on the Status of blacks and women re: representation in administrative positions at the University of Cincinnati, 1972-73.

January 4, 1973

An administrative intern in the Provost's office suggests that a committee should be appointed to review the entire draft of the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal charge and to formulate a workable draft to be presented to the President and the University community for implementation.

January 8, 1973

Correspondence, the chairman of the committee to write the charge for the Affirmative Action Commission to the President. He submits the final report on the commission and suggests his committee review the Anti-Discrimination material too. The Presidents asks one of his assistants to begin contacting the people he will appoint to the Commission.
January 18, 1973

Correspondence, a top administrator recommends actions for the President to take in regards to making Affirmative Action Commission appointments and suggests that an announcement of the Commission's structure be reprinted in Candid Campus.

January 24, 1973

The organizational plan for the Affirmative Action Commission appears in Candid Campus. "The University of Cincinnati is a community in transition, one in which a necessary condition of success in the seventies is the development and implementation of an effective affirmative action program leading to increased numbers, visibility, and participation of minorities and women at every level."

February 6, 1973

A report on affirmative action is given at the President's Advisory Council meeting.

February 7, 1973

Correspondence, the Director of the Office of Resource Development to the vice presidents, deans, and unit directors re: The Policy Statement on Affirmative Action. The Director reiterates that the first step in implementation is the appointment of affirmative action coordinators in each unit by February 16, 1973. Workshops will then be scheduled to discuss the development of unit affirmative action plans and recruitment procedures. Meetings will be held with coordinators to increase the communication network at the University of Cincinnati and to provide support to coordinators as they get going. The Director asks that a chart on current affirmative action laws and regulations be circulated to all faculty and staff members in each unit.

February 8, 1973

An American Association of University Professors (AAUP) resolution on affirmative action is submitted to the President - charging that the December 4th Candid Campus Statement on Affirmative Action is not in compliance with federal regulations in their opinion, i.e., that a comprehensive analysis of units in regards to the underutilization of women and minorities be undertaken and that detailed goals and time-tables be specified.

February 8, 1973

Correspondence, The Director of Resource Development to the President re: the AAUP resolution on Affirmative Action. The Director defends what she has been doing as "building relationships and a firm base of support before unleashing a barrage of directives." She writes
"1) The policy statement was very late - but we all agreed that it was best to hold it over the summer and discuss it further with all of the deans on both the main campus and in the Medical Center after they had had a chance to look at it in order to make sure we were moving ahead with at least as much support as could be garnered at the time; 2) Order #4 has been distributed [she documents when and where]; 3) There has been advising and consulting going on informally with department chairmen, deans, and others with regard to using different organizations and media sources to reach more women and minorities in recruiting." A draft of a reply for the President to the AAUP chapter is included in which the delay is explained. The Director asserts that a data gathering and reporting system is being worked on to review and analyze the utilization of women and minorities and that action at the college/unit level has been underway for some time (a process intimately tied to budget review and development she contends). She reports that the Office of Resource Development has been providing information to deans, vice presidents, etc., on new sources for contacts for women and minority applicants. Finally, she suggests that the President reply publicly to the AAUP's accusations in Candid Campus and the News Record.

February 9, 1973

The Dean of the College of Education to the Director of Resource Development (cc: Bennis). The Dean calls her participation in the United Black Faculty Association's (UBFA) investigation of the College of Education, "a conflict of interest."

Commentary: The UBFA conducted an investigation of racism on the part of faculty and staff in the College of Education. It had asked that all promotions be held up in the College of Education until its report to the President was completed.

February 13, 1973

Correspondence, The Director of Resource Development to the Dean of the College of Education (cc: the President and the Provost) re: the UBFA Executive Committee Review of the College of Education. The Director justifies her participation by saying that the charge of her office is "to effectively change the way in which minorities and women are related to, involved with, and affected by this University."

February 14, 1973

Correspondence, the President to the AAUP. Bennis explains that the December 4th Candid Campus Statement on Affirmative Action was an outline of a commitment for a 7/31/73 plan for Affirmative Action. He writes, "An institutional commitment to Affirmative Action involves
people and their feelings much more than words on paper. As essential and clear and explicit as statements undoubtedly are, we will not accomplish very much in this terribly sensitive area unless the members of the University community develop an understanding and a commitment to affirmative action over a period of time. What we have been trying to do, chiefly through the Office of Resource Development, is to work informally with units and individuals to achieve that understanding and commitment.

**February 16, 1973**

The Office of Resource Development sends the deans and unit directors a copy of the summary HEW Guidelines and tells them where to write for the Guidelines themselves.

**February 16, 1973**

Correspondence, the Dean of the College of Education to the Director of Resource Development. He continues to see her role in the UBFA investigation as a "conflict of roles."

**February 16, 1973**

Correspondence, the Director to the vice presidents, deans, and governance leaders (cc: the President) re: a review of college, unit, and departmental grievance procedures. In accordance with HEW Guidelines for the implementation of affirmative action in higher education, the Director requests copies of unit grievance procedures. Once the procedures are reviewed, a report will be prepared to be reviewed by the deans and the President's Advisory Council. The ultimate goal of the review, she adds, would be a summary of the institution's grievance procedures available to all present and prospective employees of the University. In the same letter, the Director clarifies the role of the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal: it will cover allegations of discrimination that cannot be settled at any other level.

**February 18, 1973**

Correspondence, The AAUP to the President requesting a meeting with him on Affirmative Action.

**February 23, 1973**

Correspondence, the President to the AAUP – He declines to meet with AAUP members and instead recommends they meet first with the Provost, the Director, or the University's legal counsel on essentially "what are policy and legal questions."
February 23, 1973

A Summary/Analysis of Enrollment of Blacks at the University of Cincinnati is published.

February 27, 1973

Correspondence, the AAUP to the Director of Resource Development - requesting a meeting with her to discuss 1) what they see is a contradiction in the President's 2/14/73 letter about the role of the Affirmative Action Commission and what he said 1/24/73 in Candid Campus and 2) their reservations about the date when an affirmative action plan is expected (June, 1973), "when most faculty would be away and lose a chance to review it."

February 27, 1973

Correspondence, the Director to the Vice Presidents - re: a reporting and monitoring system for appointments.

February 27, 1973

The Director of Resource Development compiles an Affirmative Action Handbook for all University units.

March 1, 1973

University salary comparison data by male/female in the Provost's area is released and an Affirmative Action workshop for affirmative action coordinators is held.

March 3, 1973

An Affirmative Action coordinators' meeting is held to discuss government Order #4 (DOL). The Provost defends the Director from AAUP charges. On the same day the Director writes the vice presidents, deans, and affirmative action coordinators re: a timetable for the completion of an affirmative action plan. "By 4/30 - unit plans will be developed and reviewed; by 5/31 - a plan for the University will be written; by June 30 - the Commission on Affirmative Action will have reviewed the University plan; and by 7/1/73 the plan will be sent to HEW.

Early March, 1973

Members of the Affirmative Action Commission are appointed and announced.
March 5, 1973

The Director receives clarification that two separate plans: one for minorities and one for women are not required. (cc: the President and the AAUP.)

March 8 and 16, 1973

The Director meets with the deans and unit directors to discuss the Affirmative Action Handbook.

March 9, 1973

There are complaints about undergraduate representation on the Affirmative Action commission; the Director writes student government leaders about the choice of an undergraduate student.

March 10, 1973

A Non-Academic Affirmative Action Coordinators' meeting is held.

March 20, 1973

The Director of Resource Development sends all deans, affirmative action coordinators, and department chairmen a copy of Jinny Goldstein's article on affirmative action - "Equal Employment Rights for Women in Academia."

March 21, 1973

Correspondence, The Director of the Office of Resource Development to the Task Force appointed to review Faculty Facts - asking them to review Faculty Facts for compliance of the University's personnel policies and procedures with Federal regulations. "Changes must occur to ensure that all of our employees know what the new rules of the game are and how they can be implemented." In a postscript to the President, the Director says she has also prepared a long-overdue packet of information on affirmative action for a State Senator who had requested it.

March 22, 1973

Correspondence, the President to the Director to the President. The President follows up on the Director's meeting the AAUP and apologizes for the mistake on the role of the Affirmative Action Commission. The Director says she needs dollar amounts in the budget before plans for salary equity can go ahead. The AAUP is disappointed that salary equity has not occurred to date.
March 23, 1973

Reports to the President on the Participation of Blacks and Women in the Committee Structure and in Administrative Positions at the University of Cincinnati.

March 23, 1973

Correspondence, the Director to the President - submitting the Report of the "Wednesday Group" on the Governance Mechanisms of the University of Cincinnati. This group has compiled a list of recommendations as to what other actions the President might have taken in response to the Black Students' 33 grievances in lieu of a task force. The Director says "that this statement has implications for the administrative process and the effective involvement of minorities and women in the University. We have made suggestions about holding individuals and groups accountable."

March 26, 1973

The President, the Director of Resource Development, and the chairman of the Affirmative Action Commission meet to discuss the first meeting of the Commission 4/5/73. The President will come but he has to leave early; he balks at a full-time secretary when the Commission's budget is discussed; he wants the Affirmative Action Commission to eventually explore the University's relationship with the city in regards to Affirmative Action. On the same day an AAUP committee writes the President complaining about the few number of women faculty members appointed to the Commission. The Director also makes a statement about affirmative action and salary equity at the open budget hearings that are held.

March 29, 1973

Affirmative Action workshop for affirmative action coordinators and departmental secretaries to review the HEW guidelines and to distribute departmental profile data that needs to be corrected.

March 30, 1973

Correspondence, the Director of Resource Development to the vice presidents and deans re: Appointment Activity Forms. She explains how information about applicant flow on all open positions will need to be reported. This information will then be reviewed as one means of evaluating the effectiveness of affirmative action. "The forms will be approved by the appropriate vice president or dean and audited by the Office of Resource Development."
March, 1973

The President asks the Provost about affirmative action on the Research Council i.e., the funding of minority proposals.

April 2, 1973

Correspondence, the President to the AAUP re: the membership of the Affirmative Action Commission. He explains how the two sub-committees of the Commission will expand the involvement of women and minorities.

April 5, 1973

Departmental secretaries meeting on affirmative action; also a draft of the structure and charge to the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal is completed.

April 5, 1973

The Affirmative Action Commission meets. The President sets a cultural and historical perspective on assimilation but says nothing about the relationship of the Commission to the President's office.

April 6, 1973

Correspondence, the Director of Resource Development to the President re: Women's concerns. The Director shares her notes from a discussion with women's groups about women's concerns that will form the substance of a list of demands to be submitted to the President 4/15/73. The concerns include the confidentiality of files, child care, women's studies, the funding of women's groups; the funding of programs for women, the counselling office, counselling for continuing education, and financial aid.

April 12, 1973

The Director hands out a form to deans in the deans' meeting on which to keep track of training opportunities for the people they work with. The deans complain about all the time the forms will take.

April 12, 1973

The President and the Director of Resource Development meet with the chairman of the women's groups on a list of grievances.

April 15, 1973

Women's groups submit a letter citing areas where change is needed.
April 16, 1973

The Director of Resource Development forwards a policy statement on child care (from the Office of the President) to the University Senate for endorsement without the President's approval and ignoring the vice presidents' request for it to be delayed. A child care council is recommended.

April 23, 1973

Correspondence, the Director of Resource Development to the Vice Presidents and deans re: the Appointment Activity Form. A revision in the way the forms will operate is made at the President's suggestion i.e. if the Office of Resource Development has any questions it will channel them through the dean or vice presidents.

April 24, 1973

Correspondence, the Director of Resource Development to the President about involving members of the black community in social events.

April 26, 1973

Consultant Report on Personnel Department. The consultant expresses concern that affirmative action needs to be worked through regular procedures and offices which have to take affirmative responsibility for the recruitment and training of minorities and women. "A special grievance procedure for affirmative action discrimination cases, for example, suggests non-discrimination and affirmative action are someone else's responsibility." The consultant recommends Affirmative Action activities be delegated to the Personnel Department; as it is, he sees potential conflict between the Office of Resource Development and the Personnel Department.

April 27, 1973

An Affirmative Action workshop is held.

April 28, 1973

The President meets with black leaders at his house.

April 30, 1973

At a vice presidents' meeting the President says he doesn't want to make a plea for salary equity for women in his speech May 17th to the University faculty.
May 1, 1973

A State Senator lobbies for more staff for the Office of Resource Development; the President writes the Chancellor for Higher Education in Ohio and documents the steps the University has taken in the area of affirmative action; on 5/1/73 the Director also submits her report on the Office of Resource Development and Affirmative Action, "The First Fifteen Months", which the President had requested. Two of the most important criteria she lays out for the implementation of affirmative action are:

1) **involvement** - that every unit develop its own plan and be responsible for reporting and monitoring recruitment, hiring, training, transfers and promotions.

2) **observability** - that the perspectives of minorities and women are included in decision-making.

The Director acknowledges the tension, uncertainty, and ambiguity around her office and in periods of change in general. She lists her areas of responsibility and what she feels has been accomplished and those areas which need to be strengthened. The areas that need to be strengthened are:

"1) Direct communication and feedback between the President and the Director of Resource Development.
2) A support system for the development of an increasingly effective Office of Resource Development;
3) Continual vigilance on the part of the Office of the President and the Office of Resource Development around 'negativism' and 'noise in the system' that should be checked out by both Offices before it is reinforced (negatively) or discarded as not important to agreed-upon goals, process, and action;
4) Legitimization of the Office of Resource Development by inclusion in...[decision-making]. Discussions of issues that may have impact on the performance of the Office of Resource Development or the performance of other units who need policy and information input from the Office of Resource Development must include the Office of Resource Development;
5) Open recognition of the difficulties of establishing an office such as the Office of Resource Development and providing legitimate policy support for it;
6) Willingness of administrators to confront difficult issues, analyze their impact on current activities, make decisions and move on."  

(Two other general recommendations follow which need not be included here.) A long range plan for the Office is appended to her report.

Commentary: This lengthy quotation is included because it is indicative of the needs the Director had to be included in decision-making in the President's office and for support and reaffirmation. The lack of communication between her and the President is apparent from reading between the lines.
May 4, 1973

The President says that "the Director has alienated the people she will need to implement affirmative action" but is not more specific than that; on that same day he requests the Director recommend candidates and names of resource persons the President's Office should contact for recommendations and advice in the search for a Provost and Graduate Dean.

May 14, 1973

The Affirmative Action Commission meets to review the HEW guidelines and agrees that one goal of the Commission is "to pinpoint general areas of decision-making where it is important for affirmative action to gain influence...such as Medical School admissions."

May 14, 1973

Correspondence, the Director of Resource Development to the President. "She complains her report was unacknowledged and she wants to be involved in policy development, advising, and decision-making in the President's office."

May 15, 1973

The University Senate deliberates on the implications of the child care council. The President has not seen this proposal.

May 15, 1973

The President replies to the women's grievances letter (4/15). He says he thought their letter was a thoughtful and comprehensive approach to stating the needs of women in the University. He replies:
1) he cannot however implement the committee appointments or grievance counsel recommendations;
2) that the recruitment of more women students is a goal of his;
3) that the University budget reflects a financial commitment to affirmative action through the funding of an Office of Resource Development and in the Provost's recommendations to the deans to include positive steps to correct inequities as part of their salary decisions for 1973-74; and
4) that he has asked the Director and the Provost to implement the child care council (see 4/16 and 5/15) among other things.

May 17, 1973

Affirmative Action meeting for department heads. The guest speaker is Chester Gray, Regional Director of EEOC.
May 19, 1973

The Women's Coalition to the President. Women's groups are not satisfied with the President's responses (5/15/73) nor do they want the Director of Resource Development to be asked to leave the University.

May 21, 1973

The Director documents what happened in regard to the proposal on the child care council.

May 21, 1973

The Director of Resource Development asks the Director of Personnel for some information on personnel procedures for her 7/1/73 Report to HEW; on this same day she send the President, vice presidents, deans, and affirmative action coordinators a copy of a test case in affirmative action, Griggs vs. the Duke Power Company.

May 24, 1973

The Director of Resource Development asks the Vice President for Management and Finance for a report on all federal grants and contracts the University has received in a three-year period.

May 24, 1973

The Director of Personnel to the Director of Resource Development: "The personnel policies of the University have been and are in line with all federal regulations and laws."

May 25, 1973

The deans discuss whether affirmative action procedures were followed in the search for a new Provost.

May 29, 1973

The President approves the child care council; says that the Director for Resource Development doesn't realize what she does to bring on problems.

June 5, 1973

Correspondence, the Director to the President - she asks him to prepare an Appointment Activity Record for the Provostial position he has just filled; on the same day, she also send out copies of three articles by Bernice Sandler from the Chronicle of Higher Education to all deans, vice presidents and affirmative action coordinators.
June 6, 1973

The President meets with the Director of the Office of Resource Development.

June 6-8, 1973

The Director intervenes in an alleged case of discrimination in the Development Office.

June 11, 1973

The Director sends a memorandum on Title 9 of the Educational Amendments of 1972 on admissions to the President, vice presidents, deans, and affirmative action coordinators.

June 12, 1973

The President consults with representatives of the Women's Coalition and the University Senate on his decision to ask for the resignation of the Director of the Office of Resource Development. He says that he has already consulted extensively with individuals and groups outside the University.

June 13, 1973

The President meets with chairman of the Affirmative Action Commission on the resignation/firing of the Director of Resource Development.

June 18, 1973

Affirmative Action workshop with Odessa Fellows from the Office of Civil Rights as the guest speaker.

June 19, 1973

Meeting between the President and the Director of the Office of Resource Development.

June 28, 1973

Instructions on Affirmative Action Forms are sent out to deans and department heads.

July 1, 1973

The Director of Resource Development finishes a plan for HEW. (The vice presidents decide later not to submit this document as the University's plan and request an extension from HEW.)
Policy statement

Affirmative Action

A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BENNIS

To: Members of the University Community

Because of the collective efforts of the University Senate, the Office of Resource Development, and the conscientious labors of many deans, department heads, faculty, staff, and students, I am presenting to the University Community this Policy Statement on Affirmative Action. This statement, if followed in good faith, may serve to provide greater opportunities for those whose talents have not been effectively utilized in the past.

Affirmative action is a new concept designed to achieve the cherished ideal of equality of opportunity. It does not suggest that we should today follow a program of discrimination to repay the costs of the discrimination of yesterday. But the Affirmative Action Statement does suggest that each individual must be given an equal chance to establish his or her eligibility to enter into, or advance within, the University Community.

This Policy Statement does not constitute a rigid code, but is the first step in an evolving policy. This policy will constantly be re-examined in the light of experience. Representatives in each college will be working with Ms. Rickman in a continual reassessment of the program.

We can take considerable pride in the work accomplished so far in the area of affirmative action. I am confident that with a spirit of goodwill and cooperation we can continue to build on the momentum which we have now established.

POLICY STATEMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

POLICY

The University of Cincinnati reaffirms its policy that discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex will not be practiced in any of its activities. Furthermore, where past or present discrimination continues to have an adverse effect upon members of minority groups and women, the University will take affirmative action to eliminate that effect.

LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES

In order to implement this policy, the University recognized the following objectives:

1. It is the objective of the University to utilize women and minority group employees in all fields and on all levels of employment in proportion to the availability of minority group members and women in the population of a reasonable recruitment area for each position. Furthermore, in any case in which the proportion of available women or minority group members is below the percentage of women or minority group members, respectively, in the labor market of the recruitment area and in which the academic preparation required for qualification is a function of the University, the University will take affirmative action to ensure that the number of women and minority group members is increased substantially.

The minimum goal of each academic unit shall be to have a percentage of women faculty equal to the percentage of women nationally receiving the highest regular degree in the discipline in the past five years.
2. The University is cognizant of the relationship between higher education in many fields in which minority groups and women are currently under-represented, due to the effects of past and present discrimination. In order to help eliminate those effects, it is the objective of the University of Cincinnati to develop such programs as will eventually graduate in each of its colleges a number of women and minority groups students which is reflective of the population of the national and local area served by the University. This effort must not entail any diminution of academic standards.

3. In all dealings with external bodies and agencies, both public and private, the University of Cincinnati will seek to obtain adequate assurance of current compliance with all applicable equal employment requirements.

4. In all dealings where the University of Cincinnati is the supplier of services and/or goods to the Federal Government or to an agency that is federally assisted, the University is also subject to the equal opportunity requirements of the laws of the State of Ohio and the United States. The term “services” as used in this section includes, but is not limited to, the following services: utility, construction, transportation, research, insurance and fund depository.

(SPECIAL NOTE: A government contract, even nominally entitled “grant” but involving a benefit to the Federal Government, would be subject to the Executive Order 11246.)

5. The University will take affirmative action to ensure that the Equal Employment Opportunity clause now included in all purchase orders is enforced.

C. IMPLEMENTATION

1. The following steps shall be completed:
   a. Each college dean and other comparable administrative official as appropriate shall designate an affirmative action coordinator who is a member of the administrative staff or faculty of the college. Where appropriate, the designees shall include women and members of minority groups.

   b. The Director of Resource Development, with the assistance of affirmative action coordinators and other appropriate administrators, shall establish an internal review, audit and reporting system which satisfies the requirements of “Revised Order No. 4” of the Department of Labor.

   See Appendix C, a summary of the HEW Guidelines, for Affirmative Action Plans for Higher Education

(From the American Council on Education Bulletin Higher Education and National Affairs, dated October 6, 1972.)

c. A University procedure to resolve grievances alleging discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origins or sex will be established. Such procedure shall not apply where an existing and exclusive grievance mechanism already exists. (e.g., labor union)

2. The Director of Resource Development shall publish an analysis of problem areas which satisfies the requirements of Revised Order No. 4. It shall include the identification of areas of under-utilization of women* and minority group members* by job classification and organizational unit, as well as areas which have a low rate of minority and female student enrollment and graduation.

3. a. A system shall be devised for identifying potential applicants for employment who are women or minority group members and disseminating this information to the appropriate University offices.

   b. A complete re-examination of the policies and procedures of the Personnel Office to assure compliance with new requirements of Federal Law shall be conducted with the assistance of the Director of Resource Development.

   c. A Commission on Affirmative Action shall be appointed by the President. This commission will have a committee on women and a committee on minorities.

4. a. Each college dean, vice president, vice provost and other comparable administrative official as appropriate shall carefully consider and develop goals and timetables for the effective utilization of minorities and women. In the formulation of these goals and timetables, the following considerations should be observed:

   1. Goals and timetables should be determined by considering the results which can be reasonably expected from “putting forth every good faith effort”*** to eliminate problem areas and attain the objectives set forth above.

   2. The unit’s goals and timetables should reflect and be integrated into its long-range plan.

   3. Goals should be significant, measurable and attainable.

   4. Goals should be specific for planned results with
     *both categories include minority women
     **Revised Order No. 4
timetables for completion.

5. Goals should not be rigid and inflexible quotas but should set targets that are reasonably attainable.

6. In establishing timetables, the anticipated expansion, contraction and turnover of employees should be considered.

7. Goals, timetables and affirmative action commitments must be designed to correct any identified deficiency, or adequate cause for not designing a goal must be demonstrated.

8. A unit will not be evaluated solely on the basis of whether goals and timetables are met but also on the extent to which it attempts, in good faith, to meet its goals and timetables and to attain the objectives of the University discussed above.

9. The use of goals is not intended and should not be used to discriminate against any persons on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex.

(For further clarification, see Appendix B for a Statement on the Distinction between Goals and Quotas.)

(Note: Consult Appendix A, outlining the appropriate responding units and the appropriate unit from which the affirmative action coordinator should be appointed.)

b. Departmental goals and timetables shall be submitted to deans, vice presidents, vice provosts and the Director of Resource Development for comments and review.

Goals and timetables will be reviewed by the President’s Commission on Affirmative Action, which may advise the appropriate vice president of the possible need for strengthening the plans in a specific area under his jurisdiction. It is expected that this will occur infrequently and that the University’s objectives may be reached by cooperative endeavor.

Completed goals and timetables will be publicized widely both within the University and externally.

The status of goals, timetables and affirmative action programs will be reviewed yearly by departments, deans, vice presidents, vice provosts, the Director of Resource Development and the President’s Commission on Affirmative Action.

---

D. RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION

1. Vice presidents, vice provosts, department heads, directors and other line officials have the following responsibilities:

a. Assisting President and Director of Resource Development in the identification of problem areas.

b. Formulation and implementation of goals with timetables for completion.

c. Periodic review of all personnel, purchasing, and contracting functions to assure that University policy is being followed.

d. Ensuring that effort is made in good faith to meet goals and timetables.

e. Eliminating salary inequities which evidence discrimination based on race and/or sex.

f. Persons responsible for hiring in areas in which minority group members or women are under-utilized should make every reasonable effort to identify and recruit female and minority group candidates and should record these efforts.

g. In any case in which reappointment of a minority or female faculty member is considered and rejected, the appropriate academic unit will be prepared, at the request of the affected individual, to detail the reasons for such decision.

h. In any case in which the promotion of a minority or female faculty member is considered within the department and/or college, but is subsequently rejected, the responsible academic officer shall be prepared, at the request of the affected individual, to detail the reasons for such decision.

2. The Director of Resource Development shall have the following responsibilities in the implementation of this affirmative action policy:

a. Recommending policy statements, affirmative action programs, internal and external communication techniques.

b. Assisting the president, vice presidents, vice provosts, deans, department heads, directors and other line officials in the identification of problem areas.

c. Assisting vice presidents, vice provosts, department heads, directors and other line officials in arriving at solutions to problems.
d. Designing and implementing internal information systems.

e. Serving as a liaison between the University and enforcement agencies, minority organizations, women's organizations, and community action groups concerned with employment opportunity for minorities and women.

f. Keeping the University informed on the latest developments in the affirmative action, contract compliance and equal opportunity areas.

g. Developing a system for identifying potential applicants for employment who are women or minority group members and for disseminating this information to the appropriate University offices.

h. Providing information, advice, training and support to affirmative action coordinators.

i. With the assistance of affirmative action coordinators and other appropriate administrators, establishing an internal review, audit, and reporting system which satisfies the requirements of Revised Order No. 4 of the Department of Labor.

3. Affirmative Action Coordinators will have the following responsibilities:

a. Assisting in the accumulation and dissemination of relevant information.

b. Assisting vice presidents, vice provosts, deans, department heads, Director of Resource Development, unit directors and other line officials in the identification of problem areas.

c. Assisting in the formulation of goals and timetables.

d. Undertaking a careful review of hiring criteria to make certain the requirements are really necessary for job performance.

e. To review hiring, retention tenure, and promotion criteria to ensure that qualified candidates are not excluded from consideration.

f. To define ways and means of helping to increase the available pool of candidates.

g. To conduct periodic reviews of progress and suggest to the vice president, vice provost, dean, department head, director or other line official (whichever is appropriate to each individual affirmative action coordinator) possible re-evaluation or corrective action.

h. To work with vice presidents, vice provosts, department heads, directors and other line officials to ensure achievement of goals for both academic and support staff.

APPENDIX A
Campus Units for Purpose of Communications Regarding Affirmative Action

Ombudsman
Deidra Hair
Resource Development
Geraldine Rickman
University Media Services
Roger Fransecky
College of Community Services
Lawrence Hawkins
College of Law
Edward Mears
Graduate Community Planning
Kenneth Corey
Tri-County Academic Center
Richard Pulliam
Community Psych. Institute
Leonard Oseas
Institute of Environmental Health
Raymond R. Suskind
Institute of Governmental Research
W. Donald Heisel
Institute of Human Relations
Spencer A. Leiterman
Institute of Metropolitan Studies
Ralph V. Smith
Institute for Res. & Trg. in Higher Educ.
Charles K. Bolton
Institute for Social Interaction Res.
Clovis Shepherd
Institute of Space Sciences
Ronald L. Huston
Institute for Study of United States
Foreign Policy
Dieter Dux
Institutional Studies
Tom Innis
Institute for Urban Information Systems
Endfred J. Lundberg
College-Conservatory of Music
Jack Watson
Evening College
Frank Neuffer
Ohio College of Applied Sciences
John Spille
Office of Professional Development
Philip Marvin
APPENDIX B

Statement on the Distinction Between Goals and Quotas

by

J. Stanley Pottinger

Director of HEW's Office for Civil Rights

The Office for Civil Rights in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is aware of increasing concern that HEW is requiring quotas for the hiring of women and minorities at colleges and universities. We wish to reassure those who are concerned, in the strongest possible terms, that we are not requiring quotas. Indeed, we abhor them: many of the members of this office have themselves been the victims of racial, ethnic or sex quotas in the past.

Colleges and universities holding Federal contracts are subject to Executive Order 11246, as amended, which requires affirmative action to overcome and prevent employment discrimination based on race, color, national origin, religion or sex. Regulations under the executive order issued by the Department of Labor require, among other things, that contractors establish goals and timetables for hiring and promotion of women and minorities.

Goals are not quotas, and the difference is not a matter of semantics. Each word has a specific and different meaning in the field of employment compliance.

Quotas, on the one hand, are numerical levels of employment that must be met if the employer is not to be found in violation of the law. They are rigid requirements and their effect is to compel employment decisions to fulfill them, regardless of qualifications, regardless of a good faith effort to fulfill them and regardless of the availability of capable applicants.

Goals, on the other hand, signify a different concept and employment practice. If, for example, an institution has been deficient in training, upgrading, promoting, or otherwise treating employees without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, goals are projected levels of hiring that say what an employer can do if he really tries. By establishing goals, the employer commits himself to a good faith effort that is most likely to produce results.

Unlike quotas, goals are not the sole or even the primary measurement of a university's compliance. Good faith efforts remain the standard set by Executive Order 11246; goals are a barometer of good faith performance. If a university falls
short of its goals, that in itself does not result in noncompliance; a good faith effort to achieve those goals remains the test.

APPENDIX C

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare on Oct. 4 issued guidelines to higher education institutions for complying with an executive order barring discrimination in employment on grounds of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. The guidelines apply to some 2,400 higher education institutions holding contracts with the Federal Government.

The guidelines deal in particular with affirmative action plans which are required as evidence of non-discrimination. These plans are defined in the guidelines as follows:

"Affirmative action requires the contractor to do more than ensure employment neutrality with regard to race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. As the phrase implies, affirmative action requires the employer to make additional efforts to recruit, employ, and promote qualified members of groups formerly excluded, even if that exclusion cannot be traced to particular discriminatory actions on the part of the employer. The premise of the affirmative action concept of the executive order is that unless positive action is undertaken to overcome the effects of systematic institutional forms of exclusion and discrimination, a benign neutrality in employment practices will tend to perpetuate the status quo ante indefinitely."

At present, private institutions are required to maintain written affirmative action plans, while public institutions are not. The public institutions, nevertheless, are required to take affirmative action to ensure non-discrimination. In this connection, the Labor Department announced in the Federal Register Oct. 4 that it intends to amend its regulations to require public institutions, as well as private ones, to have written plans. (The Labor Department is responsible for enforcing the executive order barring discrimination in employment but has delegated this authority, as far as higher education is concerned, to HEW.) The Labor Department asked interested parties to file comments within 30 days.

J. Stanley Pottinger, director of HEW's Office for Civil Rights, emphasized at a news conference that the guidelines, in preparation for more than a year, do not represent new rules, regulations or laws, but articulate existing rules and regulations as they apply specifically to higher education institutions. He said the academic community warranted special guidelines because its administration is more diffused than in the commercial and business community.

Pottinger announced that an advisory committee to the Office for Civil Rights will be appointed soon to see that the guidelines continue to provide colleges and universities with necessary direction and assistance. He also said his office will name an "ombudsman" to serve as a troubleshooter on complaints.

The guidelines require goals and timetables for achieving non-discrimination as part of affirmative action plans, but state that rigid quotas are neither required nor permitted. The guidelines define goals as "projected levels of achievement resulting from an analysis by the contractor of its deficiencies, and of what it can reasonably do to remedy them, given the availability of qualified minorities and women and the expected turnover in its work force."

The guidelines further state that "the affirmative action concept does not require that a university employ or promote any persons who are unqualified. The concept does require, however, that any standards or criteria which have had the effect of excluding women and minorities be eliminated, unless the contractor can demonstrate that such criteria are conditions of successful performance in the particular position involved."

Copies of the 17-page guidelines are being sent to presidents of all colleges and universities holding Federal contracts. Additional copies are available from the Office for Civil Rights in regional HEW offices or from: Public Information Office, Office for Civil Rights, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C.

20201.

Following are excerpted highlights of the section of the guidelines dealing with personnel policies and practices:

General—An employer must establish in reasonable detail and make available upon request the standards and procedures which govern all employment practices in the operation of each organizational unit, including any tests in use and the criteria by which qualifications for appointment, retention or promotion are judged.

Recruitment—In both academic and nonacademic areas, universities must recruit women and minority persons as actively as they have recruited white males.

Hiring—Once a nondiscriminatory applicant pool has been established through recruitment, the process of selection from that pool must also carefully follow procedures designed to ensure non-discrimination. In all cases, standards and criteria for employment should be made reasonably explicit, and should be accessible to all employees and applicants.

Anti-nepotism Policies—Policies or practices which prohibit or limit the simultaneous employment of two members of the same family and which have an adverse impact upon one sex or the other are in violation of the Executive Order.

Placement, Job Classification, and Assignment—Where there are no valid or substantial differences in duties or qualifications between different job classifications, and where persons in the classifications are segregated by race, color, religion, sex or national origin, those separate classifications must be eliminated or merged.

Promotion—A contractor's policies and practices on promotion should be made reasonably explicit, and administered to ensure that women and minorities are not at a disadvantage.

Termination—Where action to terminate has a disproportionate effect upon women or minorities and the employer is unable to demonstrate reasons for the decision to terminate unrelated to race, religion, color, national origin or sex, such actions are discriminatory.

Conditions of Work—A university employer must ensure non-discrimination in all terms and conditions of employment, including work assignments, educational and training opportunities, research opportunities, use of facilities, and opportunities to serve on committees or decision-making bodies.

Rights and Benefits—Salary: The Executive Order requires that universities adhere carefully to the concept of equal pay for equal work... Evidence of discrimination that would require back pay as a remedy will be referred to the appropriate Federal enforcement agency if the Office for Civil Rights is not able to negotiate a voluntary settlement with a university.

Leave Policies—A university contractor must not discriminate against employees in its leave policies, including paid and unpaid leave for educational or professional purposes, sick leave, annual leave, temporary disability, and leave for purposes of personal necessity... Pregnancy and childbearing must be considered as a justification of a leave of absence for a female employee regardless of marital status, for a reasonable length of time, and for reinstatement following childbirth without loss of seniority or accrued benefits.

Fringe Benefits—The university should carefully examine its fringe benefit programs for possible discriminatory effects. For example, it is unlawful for an employer to establish a retirement or pension plan which establishes different optional or mandatory retirement ages for men and for women.

The Office for Civil Rights said it will refer individual complaints of discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which, under a 1972 law, has authority to investigate individual complaints of discrimination against academic as well as nonacademic employees of higher education institutions. The OCR will continue to investigate class complaints, groups of individual complaints or other information "which indicates possible institutional patterns of discrimination."

The OCR urged colleges and universities to make public their affirmative action plans, and notified them that plans which it accepts are subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.
APPENDIX E

1. All statistical data for academic full-time employees of the University is based on data for 9/1/71 and 9/1/72. It was not possible to go further back in time to obtain comparative data since the University record system was not full developed in 1970. Information for 9/1/73 will be contained in the six-month update.

2. Comprehensive analyses of over/underutilization of minorities and women are not necessary in light of the statistical information contained in this report. Several things are evident on their face:

   a. Minorities are grossly underutilized in every category of employment except service workers [see EEO-1 reports].
   b. Black females are concentrated [77%] in two occupational categories: Office and Clerical and Service Workers.
   c. Black males are concentrated [73%] in two categories: Professional and service workers.
   d. White females are concentrated in two categories: [over 60%] Professional and Office and Clerical.

3. In the academic ranks, the following must be considered:

   a. As of 9/1/72, black full-time faculty constituted 2.7% of the total faculty [19 black males, 18 black females].
   b. As of 9/1/72, white female full-time faculty constituted 18.9% of the total full-time faculty [257 white females].
   c. As of 9/1/72, white males constituted 75.5% of the total full-time faculty [1028 white males].

4. In the student ranks, the following must be considered:

   a. Out of a total student enrollment [full- and part-time] as of February 5, 1973: [Enrollment = 36,133]

      1) 8.0% or 2902 were black [male and female]
      2) 82.0% or 29,618 were white [male and female]
      3) 10.0% were "other", including foreign students.

   b. White women constitute 29.9% of total student enrollment
      Black women constitute  4.2% of total student enrollment
      Black men constitute  3.8% of total student enrollment
      White men constitute 52.1% of total student enrollment
      Others [includes American Indians, orientals, Spanish Surname and foreign students] = 10% of total student enrollment.
c. All women constitute 37.8% of total student enrollment [full and part-time] [13,640 out of total of 36,133]

All men constitute 62.2% of total student enrollment [22,493 out of total of 36,133]

5. Professional school enrollment [law, pharmacy, medicine, nursing and health].

Out of 871 graduate students in these four colleges:

- 40 are black, of whom 9 are black females [4.6%]
- 135 are white female [15.5%]
APPENDIX F

THE BUDGET-REVIEW/RESOURCE ALLOCATION

PROCESS: A CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

February 18, 1972

A Presidential assistant to the vice presidents, vice provosts and chairmen of the governance groups' Budget and Priorities Committees (cc: Bennis). "The inescapable circumstance of critically inadequate fiscal resources in a period of both change and uncertainty necessitates an allocation process which focuses upon University-wide priorities and allocation criteria." This memorandum proposes a budgetary decision process beginning at the unit level as well as criteria for priorities. "The extent to which a budget is approved should depend in part on the thoroughness with which the analysis is presented. More importantly is the consonance of unit priorities with college, area, and University priorities, as judged in the process of successive reviews."

Commentary: This memorandum was discussed at a meeting February 22, 1972. It is representative of other memoranda all of which assume a participatory budget process in 1973-74 involving program evaluation in light of University-wide priorities.

May 17, 1972

Correspondence, the President to the Budget and Finance Committee of the Board of Directors re: Achieving a balanced budget for the University of Cincinnati. "Because the only substantial flexibility the University possesses in this area [of the budget] relates to years after 1972-73 any plan designed to meet current critical needs should focus on that period and not on the present." The President documents and explains the factors contributing to an inevitable imbalance in the 1972-73 operating budget - as a result of legislative actions, the absence of critical and rational resource allocation decisions during the late 60's, uncontrollable inflationary increases, a critical need to increase the level of support for the University Library, and the inflexibility of a major component of the operating budget - academic salaries. The President outlines an approach to the 1973-74 budget using departmental and college data presently available: it would entail an item by item review of all college and departmental budgets; a more systematic and tightly controlled promotion and tenure process; a task-analysis review by an outside consulting firm, in sum, a careful review of flexible budget items. The President says with the forthcoming long range plan some priority reallocation may be possible. He also
recommends a review of the administrative structure, a review of areas where there is duplication or competition, and the possibility of larger classes and increased teaching loads. He reprints an article from the Chronicle of Higher Education "Finding New Dollars in Old Budgets" for the Board.

September 8, 1972

Financial summary of the University of Cincinnati for 1971-72 is discussed at the meeting of the Board of Directors (in December, 1971, when the State Legislature passed the appropriation bill, the University of Cincinnati did not receive 1.5 million dollars it had expected in State subsidy; in addition, there were fewer graduate and part-time enrollments than had been anticipated and consequently reduced student fee income). One-half million dollars was borrowed from reserves to cover expenditures. A report on the 1972-73 budget is also discussed at this meeting for which a 1.4 million dollar deficit is projected.

September 15, 1972

Correspondence, the Vice President for Business to the President and all vice presidents - projected income and expenditures for 1972-73, 1973-74, and 1974-75.

September 16, 1972

Vice presidents' meeting with the President. With a 4-7 million dollar debt projected, the vice presidents recommend several strategies: 1) non-reappointments, 2) early retirement, 3) increasing faculty teaching loads, and 4) program evaluation. By October 15 the Provost and the Vice President of the Medical Center will submit a list of weak, non-urban oriented departments, including intercollegiate athletics. After 10/15 Bennis will appoint a faculty committee to advise the President on recommended budget cuts.

September 20, 1972

Report, the President to the Board of Directors at their informal meeting. The President reviews budget problems and says that he has asked the Provost and the Vice President of the Medical College to make up a list of programs in priority order with the idea of eliminating marginal problems.

Late September 1972

A Washington office is opened to provide information on various sources of federal support for research, training, and special projects and to provide information on new trends in federal funding for University programs. The office will also serve as the University's liaison to
educational associations, governmental agencies, and east-coast alumni.

**October 3, 1972**

Vice presidents' meeting with the President - Discussion of using the President's October 31st faculty speech to make a major presentation on the budget to the faculty.

**October 3, 1972**

The President discusses the financial situation with the University Board of Directors - he projects additional expenditures beyond the continuation budget of 1973-74. It is announced that the University has opened a Washington office to develop funding possibilities. Bennis' three part budget strategy is 1) to develop new sources of income; 2) to study all activities and expenditures for more effective resource allocations; and 3) to reevaluate priorities and programs.

**October 4, 1972**

The President in a meeting with his assistants says he lacks control over the budget. He controls less than two percent of budget and is accountable for all of it.

**October 9, 1972**

Correspondence from the Provost to a department head reveals that there is some resistance among department heads about across-the-board cutting when departmental profiles, enrollment projections, and external pressures vary from department to department.

**October 13, 1972**

Vice presidents' meeting to share priority ratings of commitments in their areas and to formulate priority ratings for the University budget - those items are designated A, B, C, D. The President is copied with a summary of the meeting. On the same day the President requests the percentages of "faculty with tenure" by department since 1965.

**October 20, 1972**

Assistants' meeting with the President - they share with him the vice presidents' decision to ask all areas to project cuts of 6-9 percent for 1973-74.
October 24, 1972

Vice presidents' meeting without the President to decide on a decision-making process for the 1973-74 budget. The vice presidents are concerned about how PPBS will interrelate to their budget decisions. It is recommended that the PPBS committee work closely with the vice presidents on a cost-analysis of programs and on developing departmental profiles. They agree that a management information system is needed so that informed program cuts can be made: there are references to the President's wanting a planning-programming-budgeting system. The Provost recommends that the vice presidents modify the PPBS program evaluation guidelines.

October 24, 1972

Meeting between the President, Provost, and Vice President of the Medical Center - Bennis says he wants all vice presidents to use the 6-9% budget cutting procedure including the Vice President of the Medical Center. The Vice President of the Medical Center argues that it needs to be treated differently than other colleges and departments.

October 25, 1972

The President appoints a Commission to evaluate the inter-collegiate athletic program at the University of Cincinnati in light of institutional priorities and resources.

October 27, 1972

The President meets with the deans - The President says he doesn't want to say much about the budget but announces: 1) that it will reflect the University priorities; 2) that all colleges will be asked to review programs but that there will be no across-the-board cutting; 3) that academic programs will have priority over non-academic programs; and 4) that on November 14 there will be a presentation on the budget for the entire campus.

October 30, 1972

The PBBS committee proposes a list of budget assumptions for 1972-73 and a timetable for budget decisions for discussion at the 10/21 vice presidents' meeting.

October 31, 1972

Vice presidents' meeting with the President - Bennis gives credence to all units doing 6-9% projections but listens to reasons why the Medical Center should be an exception since programs with general funds support are the ones without external sources of support. The programs with University support are educational and service programs. A decision
is not made as to whether the Medical Center should be treated as an exception. The President and the vice presidents review the PPBS budget assumptions. The President says that there are no incentives for faculty members in the University to cut costs or to go out and secure additional funding. In fact there are counterincentives built in - departments which overspend are not penalized, and people who stay within their budgets lose the balance of unspent monies on June 30th each year.

October 31, 1972

Bennis' speech to the University faculty - The President tries to set a perspective for the critical budget situation the University and all institutions of higher education face as a result of inflationary costs, unprecedented growth in the 60's, declining enrollments, etc. "The situation is bad, and could get worse. It is clear that budget reductions are required." He explains what each of the vice presidents is doing to review the budget and to identify possible 6-9% cuts. He assures the faculty that under no circumstances will there be indiscriminate across-the-board cutting. Furthermore, the budget review process is related to PPBS and to the need for program evaluation, "which will require the active cooperation and initiative of participants in each program." "I will look first to the non-academic programs for budget cuts, improvements in efficiency, and reductions in staff. My office and those of the vice presidents will be the first to begin the process of self-evaluation and serious cost-cutting." Bennis documents the efforts he and others are making to develop new sources of income through the Development Office, the Regents, the Legislature and the Governor. In addition, the President announces the slide presentation on the budget scheduled for November 14. "I will expect the University Senate and the Faculty Senate to participate again in the process leading to the difficult decisions that will be necessary this year." At the end of the meeting two resolutions are passed calling for no tenured positions to be eliminated in coping with the financial needs of the University and that automatic cost-of-living increases be allocated annually.

October 31, 1972

Correspondence, the President to the vice presidents. "I am asking each of you to design processes of program evaluation, including cost analysis and the assessment of quality, which can be used for arriving at rational decisions for the 1974-75 budget." The President sends them the AAUP Guidelines on Financial Exigency and the University of Illinois Program Evaluation Report. "Your proposals for a process of program evaluation should include recommendations on methods for gaining legitimization of the process. The AAUP Guidelines call for early faculty involvement. There should be similar involvement of middle-level administrative personnel in decisions relating to non-academic programs. I hope that faculty members and other members of
the campus community will be able to see the results of their own efforts and see the value of critical and careful analysis." The President lists some questions having to do with program evaluation and asks the vice presidents to submit a suggestion for a deadline for their proposals, for their eventual recommendations, and for the time when he should announce major program cuts and/or program eliminations. "It will be necessary to design a mechanism for the involvement of others in my process of reaching decisions on your recommendations. This might involve a joint University Senate-Faculty Senate Committee, or a Presidential task force, or other devices you might propose. What suggestions do you have?"

November 1, 1972

The President holds a news conference on the budget because the press had misunderstood and misrepresented some of the figures that had been given in his 10/31 faculty speech. Candid Campus reprints Bennis' speech.

November 7, 1972

Vice presidents' meeting on the budget without the President - The vice presidents discuss the budget guidelines, the timetable for the University and Faculty Senates' review, and the Provost's decision to use an advisory budget review commission in his area in reviewing the deans' 6-9% budget presentations. Some of the vice presidents raise objections to using representative commissions to review budget decisions. The vice presidents agree to prioritize budget cuts among themselves before submitting a proposed budget recommendation to the governance committees. The Provost sees that the President will have to be firm with the Senates in saying that no recommendations will be accepted from them unless it is within continuation budget minus the four million dollar deficit; and that no cost of living increases will be accepted unless monies can be located. It is decided that cuts in 1972-73 will come from unused appropriations in each vice presidential area.

November 8, 1972

The Presidents' report to the University of Cincinnati Board of Directors - "Each academic dean has been asked to develop options by which reductions can be made over a three-year period." The President links deficit budgeting to the need to work more closely and share resources with other institutions of higher education. He announces a consortia agreement with a neighboring private college. He also announces a new corporate fund drive through the Development Office and the appointment of a new Vice President for Management and Finance.
November 9, 1972

The President speaks to the Faculty Senate about the budget review process and decision-making in his administration in general. After the President leaves the meeting the Senators question one of his assistants further on increased administrative costs - such as the costs for a new vice president - and on faculty involvement in decision-making.

November 11, 1972

Correspondence, a faculty member to the President - arguing that the assumptions behind certain budget decisions need to be shared with the faculty.

November 15, 1972

The Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences to the President - sending him a copy of a letter from the Chairman of the English Department - which describes "an atmosphere of continuous uncertainty and despair...We do not need a new budget commission, or yet more participation in the decision-making process. Nor do we need more long range planning uncertainty and short term chaos. I personally am increasingly exhausted and frustrated," he writes.

Candid Campus Story on "Vital Budget Briefings Announced" for November 21 and 22. The President is quoted as saying, "I think this is perhaps the most vital thing we have to discuss in the weeks ahead. Given the present financial circumstances, the next two to three years will be most significant for our own and all universities...we can use the period ahead as an opportunity to improve our education and our research aims. The outcome will be partly dependent on the commitment of the faculty and administration to work together. This collaboration will depend on all of us acquainting ourselves with relevant information. I am determined that we disseminate as much information as possible on this subject, even if it requires a dozen meetings. Once acquainted with the facts, I hope that our faculty and administrative staff will generate some of the imaginative ideas that will be required to deal with our financial condition."

November 20, 1972

Correspondence, the Provost to the President - the letter contains a series of answers to recurrent questions on the budget. The President reviews the list of questions and answers and pencils in other arguments. The questions asked most frequently include the following:
1) Why do some colleges receive smaller allocations than they earn through subsidy and tuition?
2) Why is the administration asking each college to reduce its budget by the same amount when actual needs, enrollments, quality, etc. vary greatly?
3) How can the University begin such serious financial trouble when the receipt of 9 - 1/2 million in grants and contracts was recently announced?
4) Why can't the University use reserves to balance the budget as it has done in the past?
5) Are non-tenured faculty positions being eliminated in order to meet the projected deficit?
6) Is the University making vigorous efforts to increase income?
7) Has any decision been made about salary increases for 1973-74?
8) How heavily does the University subsidize intercollegiate athletics and how long will that subsidy continue?
9) How much has the budget for the administration increased in the past few years?
10) If income will increase for 1973-74 then why are academic areas being asked to plan reductions?
11) Does the commitment to build a major urban university mean deemphasis of research, scholarship and graduate education?

November 21, 22, 1972

Graphic-slide Budget Presentations to the faculty. A 4.6 million dollar deficit is projected if the University of Cincinnati pays back its loan, absorbs new expenditures, and fulfills its commitments to Colleges, etc. The projection is based on the assumption of no significant increase in income from either enrollment, the city, or State. The Provost outlines what the University is doing through the Development Office, through lobbying at the State level, etc. He then outlines the budget process in which each vice president is asking the deans of colleges and unit directors to indicate the implications/consequences of 6-9% cuts in their budgets - so that in the end priority decisions can be made between colleges. In the question and answer period the Provost emphasizes the use of rational criteria in cutting and expanding programs.

November 22, 1972

Correspondence, the Provost to the President re: the President's 10/31 letter. (The President copies all the vice presidents and Presidential assistants.) The Provost outlines the budget review process that will be followed in his area. His advisory commission will have quantitative input from college and departmental profiles, college-by-college profit and loss figures, statewide comparisons for many departments, and other statistical material. However, he writes "The long range planning task force is still some distance from generating the kinds of qualitative inputs which would best serve this process." The Provost also recommends involving the University and Faculty Senates
in the budget-review process as soon as possible. In the final section of his letter he says that neither total elimination of programs nor even severe reductions of any institutional programs are possible for 1973-74.

November 29, 1972

Candid Campus Story - "University of Cincinnati's Financial Dilemma Outlined."

November 30, 1972

Vice presidents' meeting with the President. The Provost explains why he has shifted his budget hearings back to January; the President puts pressure on the Vice President of the Medical Center to find out more about Medical College budgeting; he discusses the alternatives he's been considering in several cases where administrative appointments are no longer needed and the individual may or may not return to teaching; above all the President says he wants to avoid ad hoc budget decisions.

December 1, 1972

AAUP resolution on faculty participation in the decision process - they urge that each dean submit a statement describing the nature and extent of faculty participation in his college. Both the Provost and the President respond to assure their commitment to faculty involvement throughout the entire budget-making process.

December 1, 1972

The Provost shares his commission's proposed criteria for the evaluation of the deans' 1973-74 budget proposals.

December 4, 1972

The President meets with the Provost on the budget.

December 6, 1972

Candid Campus column on "Budget Questions and Answers."

December 8, 1972

Candid Campus article "Bennis addresses the Board on State Funding" and column on "Budget Questions and Answers."
December 19, 1972

Correspondence, the President to the Vice President for Business Administration - asking him to develop a review process whereby academic deans might review the budgets of non-academic areas (service and support areas).

January 2, 1973

Correspondence, a dean to the President, on how Bennis' use of ad hoc committees maximizes and duplicates work.

January 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 1973

Deans' budget presentations to the Provost's review commission. There is relatively little debate on the recommendations: the Provost sees that budget decisions will stalemate at the vice presidential level.

January 9, 1973

Vice presidents' meeting with the President - the vice presidents discuss the deans' proposal to review the costs of administrative services charged to the units. The President wants the deans to meet with the Vice President for Management and Finance and wants a dean appointed to each vice presidential review commission. Other budget questions such as the remission of tuition to city employees and the overhead policy on research grants are discussed.

January 11, 1973

The President meets with the Provost on the budget.

January 11, 1973

The President at Faculty Senate Meeting reports on his activities in Columbus with the Governor and the Legislature. The Faculty Senate Budget and Priorities Committee criticizes the Provost's marathon budget review session.

January 23, 1973

Vice presidents' meeting with the President to review the budget timetable from the PPBS committee. The President says that he still doesn't have information on program cuts. "I don't have any idea of your laundry list of cuts." (See 10/31/72.) The President says that he doesn't want to be in a position to have to reconcile the University Senate's and Faculty Senate's plans; he wants to avoid that crossfire and have the vice presidents instead reconcile the Senates' proposals.
January 24, 1973

Candid Campus Story in which cuts in administrative spending are pledged.

January 31, 1973

Vice presidents' meeting with the President. Bennis says he wants a flow chart of the budget-review process published with a narrative explanation of each step attached. One vice president says that he sees Bennis as reluctant to delegate authority/responsibility for decision-making and that maybe there is too much participation in the budget-review process planned. The vice presidents' roles in the decision-making process in regards to the budget seems conflictful - are their recommendations going to the Senates individually or in concert and then how will the vice presidents' recommendations be reconciled with governance groups recommendations in the next step of the process (see 1/23/73). Among the vice presidents there seems to be disagreement about what constitutes communication and what constitutes participation and which is needed. The President is arguing for communication. He says he is willing to make "tough cuts" on a program basis since there will never be any consensus in the University as to which programs should be cut. However those decisions still have to be based on program evaluation criteria which he has not seen developed. A decision is made to appoint an ad hoc group to assemble and review the data on certain "weak" departments.

January 31, 1973

Candid Campus Story on Nixon's Budget and the University.

February 1, 1973

PPBS committee's revised draft of the 1973-74 budget assumptions and timetable. A narrative for each step in the process is appended.

February 2, 1973

The Provost briefs the deans on the budget-review process. The deans, he says, will have the authority to make cuts in their own areas with guidance from the President and vice presidents.

February 2, 1973

Correspondence, the President to his ad hoc advisory group. He appoints this group as a small advisory task force to help him in preparing the kinds of questions and discriminations that will be necessary in preparing 1973-74 budget. "Additionally, he hopes this group will help him be in a position to make programmatic reductions by 1974-75."
February 2, 1973

The Provost's Report - Dealing with a Deficit Future - a Preliminary Report on the Budget Review Process for 1973-74. The Provost's budget review commission decided to review only one year of the biennium budget at a time (contrary to the President's expectations). A special case for the academic sector is also presented; a number of specific recommendations are included at the end of this report. They include:

"1) We urge the prompt development of a management-information system that will ask a wider range of questions about units and provide more detailed answers.
2) We need comparative data from comparable institutions.
3) We need a closer relationship between budgeting and long range planning than was possible this year simply because a plan was not complete.
4) We need a mechanism for regular program evaluation.
5) We need greater incentives for savings and cost reductions.
6) We need greater control by instructional units over supporting services.
7) We need to develop and use lower cost instructional services.
8) We need a mechanism for authorizing the filling of academic and non-academic positions."

These recommendations among others for specific unit allocations comprised the Provost's budget document.

February 6, 1973

Statement to the University Board of Directors - on the need for more support for higher education from the State.

February 6, 1973

At the President's Advisory Council meeting a question is raised about how program evaluation criteria will be part of the budget process this year. The consensus seems to be that it is unrealistic to expect program evaluation as part of this year's budgetary process. The President however underscores the need to decentralize administrative services.

February 7, 1973

Candid Campus Story in which the President again explains the University's specific financial problems. He says, "University presidents must take some responsibility for the lack of public understanding about the needs of higher education and that I am 100 percent in favor of this kind of budget review process, painful and frustrating as it is."
February 8, 1973

The Faculty Senate passes a resolution calling for an automatic three percent cost-of-living salary supplement, recommends a freeze on hiring, and discusses the costs of the intercollegiate football program.

February 9, 1973

Vice presidents' meeting without the President on the budget—they decide to ask the Vice President for Management and Finance to review each vice president's budget individually to come up with a format expressing costs and revenues that is comparable for each vice presidential area.

February 13, 1973

Vice presidential budget review—an all day meeting. The income assumptions are reviewed and a balanced budget is projected with a six percent reduction in general fund expenditures if no salary raises are awarded. The governance groups will be asked to identify where salary increases can come from in the budget. The Vice President for Management and Finance announces that the University did not borrow on its reserves in 1972-73. Each of the vice presidents presents budget-cut recommendations in their own areas.

February 14, 1973

Candid Campus Story on a "Report from Columbus."

February 14, 1973

Correspondence, the President to the Vice President for Management and Finance. The President is counting on the Vice President to help him with an overall look at the budget. He asks again about publication of the budget process timetable in Candid Campus.

February 15, 1973

The Vice presidents and Presidential assistants meet to review the budget without the President. The President's office budget has not been reviewed and it is decided it would be important to model a six percent cut there. The vice presidents agree that they will need to announce that they are not cutting programmatically this year.

February 16, 1973

The Council of Vice Presidents' Budget Recommendations are prepared. In a cover letter the Vice President for Management and Finance urges the broadest possible input from faculty, students, and
governance leaders to the President for the development of his final recommendations to the Board of Directors. The vice presidents' recommendations do not provide funds for salary and wage increases in 1973-74. This document is not distributed until early March.

February 17, 1973

The President meets with the Vice President for Management and Finance on the budget.

February 20, 1973

Vice presidents' meeting with the President - Bennis urges the Vice President for Management and Finance to get the budget review process published as soon as possible. The Vice President reports that a disagreement between the Senates on whether or not to hold joint hearings is delaying the publication. The President has eight pages of questions on the budget for the Vice President and his ad hoc advisory group.

February 21, 1973

Correspondence, the President to his ad hoc advisory group - A list of questions that he feels need to be answered and materials he needs before final decisions can be made on the 1973-74 budget is requested. They include 1) costing out the reorganization; 2) a program-by-program description of costs in the media centers; 3) the costs for developing a management information system; 4) a program budget from Student Affairs; 5) administrative costs in the Provost's office, in the deans' offices, and in the Athletic Department; 6) the amount and percentage of external funds brought in and/or expended by each unit; 7) a department-by-department analysis of expenditures in Arts and Sciences and Design, Art, and Architecture; 8) a long range plan; 9) a summary of monies spent by Institutional Studies and the institutes; 10) an explanation of certain academic programs' functions; and 11) additional cuts in the President's contingency fund and in the President's office, etc. "What I am most disappointed in, frankly, is that we have not received, as requested, program evaluations from all the units on our campus. I realize that all the talking I have done has gotten us virtually nowhere. We must figure out a way to do this, provide help to those units who do not know how to do this, and to make certain that we get program budgeting, evaluation, and cost analysis as soon as possible. I'm relying on you [the Vice President for Management and Finance] to develop the mechanism for this and on you [the Executive Vice President] to implement this."
February 26, 1973

Correspondence, the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences to the President. He complains, "The budget process takes too long (9-12 months) and decisions that are reached in March used to be reached in November or December." The Provost responds for the President 4/10/73.

February 27, 1973

Advisory group meeting without the President to review the budget. The Vice President for Management and Finance proposes that the budget document be sent to the Senates without money for salary increases identified but with the statement that salary increases are a priority if more money can be found. It is decided not to announce that there is no 1972-73 deficit and that there has been no borrowing.

February 29, 1973

Correspondence, the Deans of Arts and Sciences to the Provost describing the impossibility and frustration he feels at the prospect of cutting departmental budgets or instructorships in Arts and Sciences. He calls it a "corrosive process."

March 1, 1973

Correspondence, the Executive Vice President to the President - Re: the recommendations of the ad hoc budget group. The group requests the President ask the Provost to detail certain line item budget items and that he ask the University Senate to develop qualitative criteria for program evaluation. Other actions recommended at a later date involve the use of external consultants.

March 1, 1973

Ad hoc budget advisory group meeting with the President. The group discusses the timing of the President's interventions in the budget-making process - definitely not before the governance groups' review. They then review priority items the ad hoc group had identified. The President says he wants program reviews of weak departments in all vice presidential areas - which the Vice President for Management and Finance says is impossible because qualitative criteria have not been developed. The President also wants to know how much (what percentage) of the Provost's costs are non-instructional, non-academic, instructional.

March 2, 1973

Correspondence, the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences to the President, re: the climate in his College because of two consecutive years of budget cuts and the uncertainty about filling open positions.
March 5, 1973

The Council of Vice Presidents' Summary Budget Recommendations to the President shows a balanced budget five percent below that of a continuation budget. This document is sent to both the governance groups' Budget and Priorities Committees.

March 5, 1973

Special edition of Candid Campus on the deliberations in the Legislature on the higher education part of the State budget. The President asks everyone in the University community to become involved. There is a chronological summary of Bennis' lobbying activities. In addition the University's Washington office reports that the University of Cincinnati could lose up to sixty externally-funded programs.

March 8, 1973

University Senate meeting to compare the vice presidents' recommendations with the Advisory Commissions' recommendations (see January 4-10).

March 8, 1973

Correspondence, the Provost to the President briefing him for his meeting with the Dean of Arts and Sciences on the budget. "The College of Arts and Sciences has presented no schedule of priorities at any time. No attempt was made at the College level to differentiate between departments in terms of either ability or desirability of making such cuts." The Provost also documents workload and secretarial service inequities in the College and reviews the recommendations he made about Arts and Sciences in February.

March 9, 1973

The President meets with the Arts and Sciences department heads.

March 9, 1973

The Provost's meeting with the deans at which he shares his 2/2/73 budget document with them for the first time minus the 15 pages detailing specific unit recommendations (see 3/16/73). The deans are concerned about how they can make input into the budget-review process.

March 13, 1973

Vice presidents' meeting without the President on the budget - the Provost remarks that because the budget process is late and has gone slowly it cuts down on the possibility of filling open positions but it also cuts down on a unit's flexibility to make recommended cuts.
March 14, 1973

Correspondence, the President to the Vice President for Management and Finance. "In order to prepare ourselves for program evaluation that we will have to do on receiving the final budgets, will someone dig up the following information for me for the last five years: 1) Percentage of tenured faculty per college, per department since 1968; 2) the number of faculty increases per college, per department - in persons and dollars expended; 3) percentage increase in costs for union employee, non-salaried employees, staff, and faculty; 4) percentages spent on instructional costs since 1968; 5) percentages spent on administrative costs since 1968; 6) a breakdown of costs in each of the vice presidential areas since 1968, in order to identify trends and those sectors which have been the most inflationary and most expansionary."

The information on increases in tenured faculty and general expenses is available by 3/26/73 and is handed out to the President's ad hoc budget group 4/5/73.

March 14, 1973

Correspondence, a dean to the President, re: suggestions for further budget cuts in non-institutional areas. "The priorities have not yet been stated so that each of us can know where we are and within what frame of reference we can expect to work for a little while."

March 14, 1973

Candid Campus Story on the President's testimony before the House and Senate.

March 14, 1973

Arts and Sciences College emergency faculty meeting on the budget.

March 15, 1973

Correspondence, the Vice Provost for Student Affairs to the President and the Provost protesting the arbitrary additional cuts in his area that the Council of Vice Presidents recommended.

March 16, 1973

Correspondence, the Dean of Education to the Provost, re: the rationale behind the recommendations in the Provost's area - protesting the fact that the Provost's analysis of allocations to the individual units was not shared with the deans.
Week of March 9, 1973

Faculty Senate Budget and Priorities Committee meetings.

University Senate Budget hearings to discuss information bootlegged into the Committee on the discrepancies between the Provost's recommendations and the Advisory Commission's recommendations (see January, 1973).

March 21, 1973

Correspondence, the Dean of the College Conservatory of Music to the President - protesting the proposed budget cuts in his area. The College Conservatory of Music Faculty later passes a resolution in support of his memorandum and copies are sent to the University of Cincinnati Board of Directors.

March 22, 1973

Correspondence, the President to the Faculty Senate. He says that he will continue to try to identify funds for faculty salary increases.

March 22, 1973

Correspondence, a department head to the Dean of Arts and Sciences (cc: Bennis). In comparison to other colleges in the State "There is no provision in the University of Cincinnati's budget for salary increases." "The budget procedure here, especially the length of the procedures, only adds to deteriorating faculty spirit and morale."

March 26 - 30, 1973

University Senate Budget and Priorities Committee meetings with each vice president individually.

March 26, 1973

Open Budget Hearing.

March 26, 1973

Candid Campus report on a review of the budget process. "Certain assumptions were used to develop next year's budget including 1) that it is the objective of the budget process to make budget allocations on a program basis and to avoid across-the-board budget cuts, and 2) that governance groups' recommendations are only advisory to the President and therefore not all of them will necessarily be accepted."
March 26, 1973

Correspondence, the President to the Vice President for Management and Finance. The President wants a rough estimate of the percentage increases and dollar amounts the University will undergo in the next biennium solely on the basis of inflation. A budget schedule for next year also needs to be set up that will include cost-analysis information, program evaluation, and information on certain externalities (external funding, financial aid, employment opportunities for graduates, etc.) for each discipline. "Finally we need to have for each unit, priorities based on long-range planning and overall University priorities which I will hope to have developed by the end of this academic year." "Thus what I am aiming for is a budget procedure and decision process which will be based on four core concerns: 1) priorities for each unit and their relationship to University wide priorities; 2) PPBS and other cost information; 3) the effects of externalities on the discipline under question; and 4) program evaluation. I think it should be made clear to everybody concerned that unless these data are gathered in a more or less uniform and systematic way I will have to exclude that particular unit from any serious budgetary increases."

March 26, 1973

Correspondence, the President to the Executive Vice President asking him to get information on the comparative costs of affirmative action programs at other State universities in response to questions from the University Senate Budget and Priorities Committee.

March 27, 1973

A joint meeting of the University and Faculty Senate Budget and Priorities Committees with the Vice Presidents. The Provost says to this joint committee - "There are parts of the budget over which the President has unilateral control - the responsibility of this Committee is to give him a University sense on which hard decisions to make." The Provost defends his February 2nd budget document as an attempt to contextualize budget decisions not to set out long range planning goals. Someone comments that the faculty and the President share a sense of frustration, overload, and the same fears of levelling as a result of budget process.

March 27, 1973

Vice presidents' meeting with the President. It is decided that the vice presidents are individually going to reconcile their recommendations with the recommendations of the Senate's Budget and Planning Committees. The President says that his budget recommendations will probably differ from those of the Council of Vice Presidents in that he is going to do some program evaluation according to the criteria he set out 3/26/73.
The Provost says he's written to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences (3/12/73) for explicit departmental priorities and differentiated allocations on the basis of need, not merit, at this point. The President asks the Provost to convene a program evaluation task force. He asks the Provost and Vice President of the Medical Center to project what they would do with a million dollars to cut or spend.

March 28, 1973

The Faculty Senate Budget and Priorities Committee's Report on the 1973-74 University Budget (cc: Bennis). The Faculty Senate Committee feels that it has been excluded from full and meaningful participation in the budget process and that the budget appears to be based on assumptions which the faculty had no part in stating and which have not been made totally explicit. In addition, "We are not convinced that the income picture for the future is as pessimistic as is assumed."

March 29, 1973

Correspondence, the President to the Provost. He asks the Provost to set up an ad hoc group on program evaluation incorporating the four criteria he set out on 3/26/73.

March 29, 1973

Report of the University Senate Budget and Priorities Committee to the President which states that the highest priority on available funds should be given to faculty and staff salary adjustments. The report also recommends no student fee or tuition increases and the elimination of inequities for women's salaries within the colleges.

March 30, 1973

Correspondence, the President to a Faculty member in the College Conservatory of Music reassuring him of his commitment to the College. "Partly because of a lack of lead time (we did not really discover the magnitude of the probable deficit until it was too late to make major choices for next year) and partly because the long range planning process is not yet complete, we could not bring the priority judgements to bear on the allocation process as I might have hoped." "I am also keenly aware that because of limited options and short lead time, what we do for next year cannot wholly reflect our ideas and priorities, to some extent we must do what is feasible rather than what would be desirable."

March 31, 1973

The President meets with several faculty members on the future of graduate education at the University of Cincinnati. One participant
commented afterward that, "for the most part, people's energy and attention was on the budget."

April 2, 1973

Correspondence the Provost to the President - sharing his revised recommendations for the 1973-74 budget. "First, the fiscal problem we face has been publicized and people have become far more aware of the University's plight to a far higher degree than would have occurred if the solutions had been solely administrative. Second, the review process has measurably increased the accountability of the line administrative officers -- to share information, to explain decisions and choices, to justify activities and services, etc. Third, the very process of involving substantial numbers of people has an independent value in a presumably democratic institution which (like all large universities) has a tradition of limited involvement and participation. Fourth, the non-administrative participants did make substantial specific contributions -- both through information not available to administrators and through suggestions and recommendations that might otherwise not have come to light. Fifth, in my own case at least, the very task of preparing for meetings with reviewing groups helped me considerably to sort out issues, priorities, and options to a degree that lesser catalysts might not have required. Preparation for these sessions was a demanding and challenging experience." "The point of all this is simply that the depression of higher education is a national condition which affects almost all institutions in greater or lesser degrees. . . opportunities must come about not through expansion (as in the 1960's) but through redirection." His recommendations for each academic unit's allocations are included in this document.

April 3, 1973

Ad hoc advisory committee meeting without the President. The role the committee sees for itself is: 1) to provide staff assistance to the President as he reviews the budget documents; 2) to provide information on program evaluation criteria and summary information on "weak" departments where it is available and feasible; 3) to review the budget documents and point out differences in the recommendations of various advisory groups. One presidential assistant reports that "Bennis wants a two-year budget announced in six weeks and wants to make at least one major program cut. He wants to base the 1973-74 budget decisions on what will happen in the 2nd year of the biennium and on long range considerations." The Vice President for Management and Finance considers it impossible to make rational, equitable decisions for a two-year budget at this point.

April 3, 1973

Vice presidents' meeting without the President on the budget review process. Bennis wants to meet with the two governance groups
groups to discuss their recommendations in detail before cuts are announced. The vice presidents see that they need to respond in writing to the Senate recommendations. The program evaluation group is reviewing the Senates' reports for the President. The President also sees that some administrative services have to be decentralized because of pressures in that direction from the deans. The President's rationale for two-year cuts is that "If cuts are made on a priority basis to reach six percent - you are making decisions with implications for two years." The President doesn't recognize that cuts are not being made on a priority basis this year but only in areas which can be cut. The Vice President for Management and Finance says the President will not have sufficient program evaluation information or information on externalities by June in order to make two-year budget decisions. It is learned that there will be at least three weeks more delay on the budget because of Bennis' trip to Mexico.

April 4, 1973

Candid Campus Story on the budget process.

April 4, 1973

Meeting between the President, Executive Vice President, and the Presidential assistants. "I want to justify the percentage of cuts to each college. What we have now is a bland compromise between the strong and the weak - we have taken no decisive measures. Can't we do something symbolic - we need to act with imagination and boldness."

April 5, 1973

The President meets with the Dean of the College Conservatory of Music and an agreement is reached that he will not follow the Council of Vice Presidents' Summary Budget Recommendations for that College.

April 5, 1973

Ad hoc budget advisory group meeting without the President. A Presidential assistant shares Bennis' feeling that the University cannot make cuts this year that it is going to have to reverse next year. The Provost sees that with Bennis' interventions that they are his efforts is get the deans to set unit priorities will be undermined. This group once again reviews the cuts proposed in the vice presidential areas and continues to debate the feasibility of making decisions on the 1974-75 as well as on the 1973-74 budget by June. The Provost's argument is that he cannot discriminate between colleges until he gets guidelines about allocations between vice presidential areas for 1974-75 - he also wants the 1973-74 allocations announced by mid-April, not June.
April 9, 1973

President's office meeting - The President says he wants to announce an overhead policy on research, the general assumptions for the 1974-75 budget, and salary increases for 1973-74 in his May 17th speech to the faculty. He makes some suggestions about an incentive plan for savings to be initiated at the University.

April 10, 1973

At the President's Advisory Council (PAC) meeting the President announces his idea to do a two-year budget.

April 10, 1973

Correspondence, the Provost to the Dean of Arts and Sciences (cc: Bennis). "The greatly expanded range of participation made it partially worth the pains, troubles and delays. The data gathering and evaluation we have done in the last several months will make it easier to project the 1974-75 budget.

April 11, 1973

Ad hoc budget advisory group meeting without the President. One Presidential assistant reports that the deans are getting more and more anxious with the delay. This group suggests the President announce the 1973-74 allocations now as well as 4-5% merit salary increases for faculty. The Provost sees that the announcement of salary increases will take the pressure off the deans to cut their budgets by 4-1/2% which is necessary to achieve a balanced budget. The problem the ad hoc group agrees will be to get the President to separate the two budget years.

April 13, 1973

Ad hoc budget advisory meeting with the President. Two options are identified: 1) announce unit allocations to deans and department heads now and get them to project program implications for 1973-74 (some deans will say that that is impossible to do) or 2) wait until mid-May and announce two-year budget allocations on an intuitive, informal basis (because program evaluation judgements will not be available in time). The Provost advocates a delay in order to develop more detailed explanations for unit allocations but does not respond to the question of separating the two budgets. The President argues for using "best informed judgements" to identify weak areas in the University. The President advocates a three-day retreat to set priorities and make programmatic decisions. He articulates the idea that it is easier to cut this year because cuts are more justifiable since money is scarce. Bennis sees himself as a "goad" - and expresses his disappointment in the staff's incrementalism and skepticism. "I want
to make outrageous statements because none of you do." Bennis however does not want to get involved now in budget decisions because he doesn't want to get locked in and because he sees himself as the "only intemperate force against all the temperate forces." In the week Bennis is gone it is agreed that the staff will get together whatever qualitative data it can and if that week shows that program decisions cannot be made, the budget for one year will be announced as is. The President himself is unsure of his availability for a retreat on the budget - but recommends that a decision-making process be thought out that includes the deans, whom he has just met with.

April 16, 1973

Correspondence, the President to the Dean of Arts and Sciences - reacting to the budget priorities Arts and Sciences set 3/30/73 in response to the Provost's requests.

April 18, 1973

Candid Campus story announces that budget decisions have been delayed; the cover story reports on the Faculty Senate's recommended budget changes.

April 24, 1973

The Vice President for Management and Finance to the program evaluation task force - ad hoc budget advisory group re: program evaluation and progress towards budget allocations for a two-year period:
1) A comprehensive list of units to be evaluated has been developed;
2) A format for collection of information concerning each unit has been developed;
3) An "easiest case" was selected for review at a 4/25/73 meeting with the President.

The options this group has are:
1) To proceed with the development of information for all units along the lines of the easiest case model;
2) To proceed with the 1973-74 allocations but place certain units on notice that they are subject to reduction or elimination in 1974-75. The units will be asked to submit information on their behalf as part of the analysis; or
3) To meet with each dean having a unit on the list and ask his assistance and selective input in an evaluation process during the next 2-3 months.

April 25, 1973

Candid Campus story on the House Vote on HB86 - approving a 5% increase for University of Cincinnati. Bennis urges University faculty members and students to call the State Senators.
April 25, 1973

Budget review meeting (the President comes very late). The Provost has felt that he needs to do all the program evaluation work on weak departments while the Vice President for Management and Finance sees that his office or the President's assistants could help and that the President may need to intervene. [The ad hoc group suggests that the deans be asked to come up with policies on steady-state staffing, cost-savings, and early retirement. The Provost says a qualitative analysis could be ready by September - the President is pushing to do qualitative evaluation in the next two weeks.] The President's idea is to announce a contingency continuation budget now and a two-year budget in September - in the interim he would meet with all of the deans individually.

April 26, 1973

Correspondence, the Vice President for Management and Finance to the President re: inflationary conditions at the University of Cincinnati which are not out of line with general economic conditions.

April 27, 1973

Correspondence, the Vice President for Management and Finance to the ad hoc advisory group. He recommends that 1973-74 appropriations be announced by May 17 on the basis of the preliminary budget summary reviewed by the task force and that over the summer the Provost continue to develop information on the programs that were identified with the help of outside consultants and a staff team of analysts.

April 27, 1973

The President at the Friday afternoon deans' meeting. He says that by May 17 he should be able to announce the percentage for faculty salary increases and a decision on student fees and tuition and that by June 1st he'll announce the 1973-74 budget, though he would still like to announce the 1974-75 budget by that date, too, which he says may still be possible. Bennis sets the expectation he will talk individually with most of the deans and that by June he will say something about intra-college allocations, especially in those areas in which he has had experience.

April 30, 1973

Vice presidents' and assistants' meeting with the President. The President announces that he will publicly announce no student fee increases and 4% faculty merit salary increases this week. Questions of timing vis-à-vis the Legislature's actions are considered. The President sees that his role with the Legislature is to make comparisons between the University of Cincinnati and other universities on how
salary increases were achieved - "by 5% program cutting after a participative process." The President says that he will spend all of his time in the next months on 1) the budget, 2) the May 17th Faculty speech, and 3) on an annual report. He designates the Provost and the Executive Vice President as active Presidents for that period. Bennis says that he is concerned that he may release a budget that does not reflect the priorities and values he has in mind for the University of Cincinnati.

May 2, 1973

Confidential memorandum, the Vice President for Management and Finance to the ad hoc advisory group. He recommends that the group suggest to the President that he meet with the deans in late May to share with them their 1973-74 budget allocations and again in August to share with them the final 1974-75 allocations.

May 2, 1973

Vice presidents' meeting with the President on the budget. The President asks for advice on how to explain where the 4.5% salary increase is coming from. The Vice President for Management and Finance responds that it comes from unexpected new income.

Commentary: The ad hoc group is beginning to convince the President that he cannot announce a two-year budget because of the Provost's informal commitment to the deans, because of AAUP regulations, and because the Senates have only reviewed a one-year budget. Certain vice presidents are totally excluded from meetings between this group and the President.

May 2, 1973

Candid Campus story on Bennis' recommendations to the Board on no student fee increases and a 4.5% faculty and administrative salary increase for 1973-74. "The President said additional funds for the increases will be allocated to deans and unit directors and that the final decision on how the money will be used will be up to them although he strongly recommended against across-the-board raises." "For several months we have been engaged in a process of rigorous self-evaluation. Our objectives have been to achieve a balanced budget for the next biennium and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of our many programs. The budget process has provided us with a substantial opportunity to examine our goals and assumptions and to make some assumptions about our priorities for the next two years." That same day there is correspondence from the Provost and Vice President of the Medical Center to the deans and unit directors giving them guidelines for the distribution of salary increases.
May 3, 1973

Correspondence, a faculty member's prediction to the President that 4.5% salary increases will be distributed across the board, not on merit. At least one other faculty member writes the President about how salary increases are being distributed to which the President replies that he strongly recommended increases be distributed on merit. He writes, "Many other members of the University community and I have devoted a major share of our time since last fall to an attempt to influence the State budget -- perhaps so much time, in fact, that important academic matters have not received enough of our attention. We have been successful -- we did make a significant impact on the Legislature and on the Board of Regents -- but not successful enough for salary increases to be what we would have hoped."

May 7, 1973

Meeting between the President and the Vice President for Management and Finance on the ad hoc advisory group's recommendations. The recommendations assume a Management and Finance analysis of selected programs, a governance group report on institutional priorities using the long range plan (which is incomplete) and departmental reports on departmental priorities, including a ranking of programs in priority order and the projected implications of 3, 6, and 9% cuts, by July. A list of criteria to be used by the Management and Finance evaluation group in evaluating selected programs is appended. The President is just finding out that no money from University reserves was borrowed: he considers borrowing some to establish a President's discretionary fund for innovative programs. The Vice President for Management and Finance urges the President to give out the allocations soon. The President wants the Vice President to ask the deans to rank order cuts within their colleges within certain percentages by the time he meets with them individually. The President is also just finding out that there is a discrepancy between the announced and real deficits for 1973-74 and that it was not announced earlier in order to keep the pressure on. The President thinks the vice presidents should cut another million and a half so that credibility is not a problem. He is concerned about governance group participation in the 1974-75 budget review process given the proposed timetable. He wants information on administrative costs in academic areas, on duplicative departments; he wants to know what monies are brought in from which sources and where they go. The President wants to meet with the deans individually as well as with the governance group leaders before a public announcement is made about the 1973-74 budget in order to influence departmental allocations. The President also lists those cuts that he feels need to be made smaller or larger.
May 15, 1973

Correspondence, the President to the academic deans and vice provosts asking to meet with each of them before the 1973-74 budget goes to the Board of Directors for approval in June. "In preparation for our meeting I would like to know how you would use the projected 1973-74 budget figure for your unit which was proposed by the vice presidents in their March 5th Summary Budget Recommendations. Assuming that figure would become your 1973-74 allocation, how would it be distributed among your departments and other units; which would receive cuts; and which, if any, would receive increases?" P.S. "I was unable to make up a two-year budget for a lot of reasons, some of them having to do with governance procedures, but I intend to have the 1974-75 budget information to you no later than mid-August, hopefully earlier."

May 15, 1973

Vice presidents' meeting with the President - one of the agenda items is the budget. The President shares some of the concerns he expressed to the Vice President for Management and Finance in their meeting May 7, 1973.

May 15, 1973

The Vice President for Management and Finance prepares summary sheets on possible ways to reduce the budgets in each college.

May 17, 1973

Bennis' speech to the University faculty - in which he explains the reasons for salary increases and less severe cuts than had been expected. Faculty salary increases were achieved, the President says, through cuts in non-academic areas of 7% and because of successful lobbying activities in Columbus. The President outlines ten priorities for the University in the next year(s).

May 20, 1973

Meeting between the President and the Vice President for Management and Finance on the budget. The President is critical of his staff's seeming inability to get back to relevant constituent groups on the budget - such as to the Senates on their budget recommendations. He wants the 1974-75 budget process reprinted in Candid Campus by June 1. The Vice President for Management and Finance outlines the budget assumptions and the changes he has made which the President suggested May 7th, which total 4.5% - again the President is worried about his credibility if a 6% cut isn't shown. The President recommends cutting administrative areas more now and restoring cuts later if income comes in. Other cuts are identified and revised in the course of the meeting at the President's initiative.
May 21, 1973

An explanation "Reasons for required budget cut percentage of 6% being revised to 4.5% is written."

May 21, 1973

Correspondence, the Provost to the President summarizing his budget recommendations of February 2. "While that report did not detail college recommendations at the departmental level, I gather you wish to seek this information directly from the deans. From the outset it has been my belief that such choices must be made by the deans within the context or framework of an overall unit allocation."

May 22, 1973

Vice presidents' meeting - a good deal of discussion centers on why the President is meeting with the deans instead of with the appropriate vice president and whether or not the vice presidents should not be present for at least part of those meetings. The Vice President for Management and Finance explains that the President is meeting with the deans because 1) he hasn't met with them on anything and wants to see how they'd handle the cuts he is proposing, and 2) because he wants to make changes in the Provostial area without creating an adversary/advocate relationship between the dean and the vice presidents. The vice presidents are worried about the kinds of commitments the President might make in these meetings without regard as to where the money will come from.

May 22, 1973

The President meets with Faculty Senate leaders. He shares his objections to the Faculty Senate report that argued that all administrative areas should be cut irregardless if they brought in money and that no academic area should be cut.

May 23, 1973

Correspondence, the Provost to the President supplying him with background material on the termination of two programs in the College of Education which caused a great deal of community backlash. The budget decision process in the college is reviewed.

May 24, 1973

Correspondence, the Vice President for Management and Finance to the Provost (cc: Bennis, all vice presidents) on the meetings the President will have with the deans.
May 29, 1973

Meeting between the President, Provost, and Vice President for Management and Finance to review the changes the President made in the budget on May 20.

May 29-31, 1973

The President meets with the deans and later summarizes his agreements with them in letters which are also sent to the Vice President for Management and Finance and the Provost: in a letter to the Dean of the College of Design, Art, and Architecture, the President says that he hopes to devise an incentive plan whereby part of the income a college generates would go back to the unit; in a letter to the Dean of the College of Engineering the President clarifies the authority of the dean to make budget reduction decisions in collaboration with the Provost which he as President would not expect to change; and in a letter to the Dean of the College of Medicine the President agrees to meet with the department directors of the Medical College in regards to their criticisms of the 1973-74 budget-making process.

June 4, 1973

The President takes the 1973-74 provisional budget to the Board.

June 7, 1973

Correspondence, the Vice President for Management and Finance to the President re: contingent expenditures in the 1973-74 budget and the necessity for making it a provisional budget.

June 15, 1973

Correspondence, the President to a faculty member in the College of Education explaining that an increased cut in Education was due to projected decreases in enrollment.

June 19, 1973

The President meets with the directors of the departments in the College of Medicine.
Board approves reorganization plan

1. Rationale for Reorganization
   1. It is clear that the financial problems we face are neither transient nor short term.
   2. We cannot simply hope that our problems will be solved for us by Columbus or Washington or a benevolent donor—although we shall continue to press our case urgently upon all three potential sources.
   3. We must learn not only to live within reduced resources, but to change, improve, and undertake new departures within existing allocations.
   4. To do necessary new things, we must give up some things we are doing now.
   5. In the '60's, institutions improved through addition and expansion; in the '70's and '80's we will have to learn how to improve through substitution and contraction.
   6. We must be increasingly precise about our purposes and objectives and must budget carefully our resources in pursuit of those purposes and objectives. We must plan in a more realistic way than ever before. (At the same time, we must avoid a singular "accountant mind-set" as the sole arbiter of our educational activities. That mentality will be imposed upon us, however, only if we fail to plan and manage our own affairs with prudence and efficiency.)
   7. As institutions we must not only learn to manage change with reduced resources but to maintain our vitality and creativity in a public environment which challenges our effectiveness and questions our purposes.
   8. Careful planning must be more fully integrated into the budgeting process so that our aspirations become converted into realistic programs. In this process, we need to be especially sensitive to academic concerns and to assure the primacy of educational considerations in determining the University's future.
   9. As we determine our directions from within through careful planning and budgeting, we need to be increasingly aware of the social, economic, and cultural forces likely to have an impact upon the future development of the University. We need to understand more fully the complex forces now shaping the future environment that we might better respond to, adapt to, or help shape those forces.
   10. No organizational chart can take the place of personal leadership and initiative, of reciprocal loyalties and shared purposes. If those human qualities are present, we cannot fail in our objectives. If they are not, no administrative change can make up for their lack.

II. Summary of the Recommendations for Reorganization
   The major recommendations of the reorganization plan are outlined below. Although it is clear that the plan does not provide the optimum structure that might be designed for the University of Cincinnati, it will move us ahead significantly toward that goal. The proposed new administrative organization should be regarded as a practical compromise between the present structure and an ultimate, ideal structure, and as an important step in the progress toward the ideal. While the reorganization involves the creation of some new administrative posts, others are eliminated and the net result is a decrease in the number of administrative officers, made possible by the efficiencies of the new organization.

1. Clarification of the role and function of the Provost for Academic Affairs. The title of the Vice President and Provost for Academic Affairs will be simplified to Provost for Academic Affairs, but this officer will retain vice presidential status and he will continue to report directly to the Office of the President.
   The responsibilities of the office of the Provost will become more manageable through the shifting of the Library and some responsibility for graduate education and research away from this office. Two positions, those of the Vice Provost for Graduate Studies and the Vice Provost and Director of Educational Innovation, will be eliminated when the present incumbents return to full-time teaching; a third, the Vice Provost for University Branches and Community and Technical Programs, will be eliminated when the present incumbent retires. The position of Vice Provost for Undergraduate Studies will be replaced by a Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, and this officer will serve the Provost in a staff rather than a line capacity. The College Deans (except Medicine, Nursing and Health and Pharmacy) will report directly to the

Continued on next page
Continued

Provost, and thus an important ambiguity in the existing Provost-Vice Provostal structure will be eliminated.

2. Discontinuation of the Office of the Vice President for Public Affairs. This position will not be filled when the incumbent retires on June 30, 1973. Those offices and persons reporting to him will be assigned to other officers, with considerable savings in administrative costs.

3. Formation of an Information and Planning System. Several effective instruments for data collection and analysis now exist within the University but function under three Vice Presidents without coordination: Institutional Studies, the PPBS Task Force, the planning and systems offices, and the computer facilities. These will be gathered into a single office of Information and Planning Systems which will serve as an essential tool for budget development, academic planning, program evaluation, and policy analysis. Responsibility for this new office will appropriately rest with the Vice President for Management and Finance.

4. Creation of Presidential Advisory Councils for facilitating and making visible the decision process. The Vice Presidents and the Provost, along with a few other senior administrative officers, will be organized into Presidential advisory councils whose function will be to make recommendations to the Office of the President on major policy matters. One of these groups, the President's Advisory Council, has already been fully defined. This Council, whose membership includes faculty and student governance leaders, will serve the important additional functions of making the decision-making process more visible to the campus community and extending the process down into all segments of the community.

5. Creation of a new position: University Dean for Graduate Education and Research. The University Dean will have responsibility for graduate studies and research, and thus will be able to provide a natural alliance for those two endeavors which does not exist in the present structure. Since the Dean will have university-wide responsibility, there will be coordination and articulation between the Clifton campus and the Medical Center which have not been possible in the existing structure. The Office of the University Dean will also provide a means for shifting part of the heavy administrative burden away from the Provost for Academic Affairs.

6. Consolidation of the Office of the President. Ralph Bursiek will assume the title of Executive Vice President and Secretary of the Board of Directors, and a new position of Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs will be created. The President, the two Executive Vice Presidents, and the Presidential Assistants will form an organic team using the talents of all in a concerted effort. The role of the two Executive Vice Presidents and the organic character of the Office are of central importance to the entire reorganization.

III. A Pattern For Reorganization

1. A Conception of the University and a Philosophy for its Administration

It is my view that great universities are built upon great colleges created by distinguished deans who have the freedom, independence, and resources to attract and hold the ablest faculties in their time. At the same time the Deans are accountable for their stewardship to the larger university of which they are a part. In this period of reduced resources their role is made more difficult and yet is of pivotal importance to the University's future. For it is the Deans, working with Department Heads, who must evoke the creativity essential to advancing our educational purposes.

A primary function of university leadership is to weave the constituent colleges into an intelligible fabric which strengthens and reinforces them, while seeking resources to nourish and knowledge to guide them. The basic function of administration is to provide services which counsel, facilitate, and serve rather than obstruct, irritate, or constrain.

It is the philosophy and policy of my administration to decentralize certain administrative and selected services. A great deal of consultation with all persons affected must be undertaken before implementation. Admittedly we have not made much progress in this direction to date, but I am firmly committed to the achievement of this objective by 1975. To my knowledge, no university has ever achieved this goal, but that is no reason why we should not seriously try to do it. At the same time we shall seek to integrate the educational purposes of the colleges in those fundamentals which commonly serve the needs of man—to achieve a universality from diverse and selectively autonomous parts.

It is my intent that the offices of the University presently engaged in the provision of administrative services will become, in time, much smaller units engaged in planning, advisory, and consulting services to the colleges. They are to be on tap, not on top.

To begin to achieve this conception and to implement this philosophy requires a clarification of structure, an improvement in management capability, and an emphasis on planning for change.

2. The Skeletal Form, Recommended Structures

In analyzing the University structure, it became evident that several alternative structural models would be possible, even desirable. After extensive discussion and debate, and weighing the advantages and disadvantages of several possible plans, I have selected the best possible model for reorganization, and I am recommending this model for your consideration. The two following pages indicate first the present structure of our central administration, and then the model for reorganization which I am asking you to consider.

A. Office of the President. Basic to all of the alternatives we have analyzed and considered is the conception of the Office of the President which will include the President; the Executive Vice President and Secretary of the Board of Directors; the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs; the Presidential Assistants; and the secretarial staff.

We conceive this Office, and we hope
you will perceive it, to be an “organic” creature of interdependent parts. While for cultural and essentially bureaucratic reasons each of us has a special title, it is not my intention to create several layers of authority which one must penetrate in order to get a decision. Rather my intention is that the Office of the President should act in a concerted way so that the President is not involved in every detailed decision. Over time it will become clear who in the Office is responsible for what function.

The Principal functions of the Office of the President are:

1. Leadership:
   a) Orchestrating inside and outside
   b) Presenting perspective of where we are, where we are going
   c) Maintaining an awareness of relevant outside forces, obstacles, and opportunities which impinge on the University
   d) Making key personnel appointments and review of all appointments of professional staff
   e) Communicating
   f) Raising fundamental questions

Basically my conception of leadership is that it is the act of explicating and calling forth in others a consciousness of issues, principles, ideas, directions and objectives, and of moving those others to act in ways that reflect their increased knowledge and heightened awareness.

2. Developing an overall planning process, and establishing and implementing the plan
3. Relating to external constituencies: alumni, city, state, federal, educational establishment, parents
4. Working closely with our Directors and Regents
5. Maintaining fiscal responsibility
6. Helping facilitate new academic programs
7. Engaging in careful evaluation and assessment of all key administrative personnel
8. Keeping in relatively good touch with all major internal constituencies
9. Raising funds
10. Continuing to “keep learning”
11. Ceremonials

B. The Executive Vice President and Secretary of the Board of Directors.

Ralph Bursiek will be assigned this title, and he will continue in his role as trusted and respected second in command. His duties also will remain essentially the same as those he now performs, with perhaps some much-needed clarification resulting from the reorganization and definition of other administrative offices. A description of the role and duties of the Executive Vice President and Secretary of the Board of Directors is outlined in Appendix A.

C. The Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs.

It has become clear that the many concerns which must be dealt with by the Office of the President are multiplying almost daily. The President and Executive Vice President are called upon more and more frequently to devote their time and energy to external concerns: the Board; the local community; local, state, and federal governments; the alumni; potential funding sources. In order to lead and direct these activities while at the same time maintaining the viability of the internal affairs of the University, a new position of Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs will be created. This person will serve within the Office of the President as coordinator of internal affairs, with special emphasis on academic programs and related issues. A detailed job description for this new position is specified in Appendix B.

D. The Provost for Academic Affairs.

The reorganization of the Provost’s office and a clarification of this role are essential parts of the entire reorganization. Responsibility for the Library will be shifted from this office, as will at least partial responsibility for graduate education and research through the creation of the position of University Dean.

Two positions, those of the Vice Provost for Graduate Studies and the Vice Provost and Director of Educational Innovation, will be eliminated when the present incumbents return to full-time teaching; a third, that of the Vice Provost for University Branches and Community and Technical Programs, will be eliminated when the incumbent retires. Two Vice Provosts, those for Student Affairs and for Admissions and Records, will retain their present titles and their line relationship to the Provost. The sixth Vice Provost position, Vice Provost for Undergraduate Studies, will be replaced by the position of Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, a staff position within the office of the Provost. Except for the two Vice Provosts with specific line functions, it is intended that the staff members in the office of the Provost will function together in an organic team effort, similar to that of the Presidential team. The College Deans except for those of the College of Medicine, Nursing and Health and Pharmacy will report directly to the Provost and not to or through his associates. A detailed description of the role and functions of the Provost for Academic Affairs is included in Appendix C.

E. University Dean for Graduate Education and Research.

The position of Vice Provost for Graduate Studies will be abolished, and the new position of University Dean for Graduate Education and Research will be created. This person will report directly to the Office of the President. In this location the Dean may better serve both the Medical Center and the Clifton campus. He will function as Chairman of the Research Council and will chair the Graduate Faculty and Graduate Council. A job description for this post is attached in Appendix D.

F. Vice Provost and Director of Educational Innovation.

This office is abolished on the ground that educational innovation and reform will be so essential to our survival as an institution that this function must become a daily and essential concern of each of us.

G. The Office of the Vice President for Public Affairs.

After June 30, 1973, this office will not be filled for the foreseeable future. Present incumbents of offices reporting to this office will

Continued on page 6
UC CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION: 1972-73 STRUCTURE

1. Offices reporting to Vice Presidents are indicated in pp 7-10 of the 1972-73 Office and Telephone Directory.
2. Offices reporting to the Vice Provosts are indicated in pp 10-11 of the 1972-73 Office and Telephone Directory, and pp 7-8 of the September 1971 Faculty Facts.
UC CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION: REORGANIZATION

1. College Deans (except Medicine, Nursing and Health and Pharmacy) report directly to the Provost for Academic Affairs.
2. Vice Provost for Academic Affairs serves in a staff role in the Office of the Provost for Academic Affairs.
3. This office will exist only until the present incumbent retires.
Continued from page 3

report to the Office of the President, at least until other assignments are made.

H. Information and Planning System.
The University of Cincinnati is in urgent need of a central data-collection, data processing, and policy analysis agency. This office could close the "data gap" on our campus, raise our general level of debate on the state of higher education, and provide the necessary statistical analyses for long-range planning. Many of the elements necessary to construct this agency already exist here: Institutional Studies, the PPBS Task Force, the planning and systems offices, and the computer facilities. However, these offices now report to three Vice Presidents and there is no mechanism for coordination of their activities. The Vice President for Management and Finance will be given responsibility for gathering together the appropriate existing offices into a new Information and Planning System which will report to him. This Office will serve as an effective tool for budget development, academic planning, program evaluation, and policy analysis.


In order to facilitate decision-making in the new administrative structure and in order to make a clear distinction between those policies and decisions which are academic in nature and those which are not, two new presidential advisory groups will be formed. The membership of the two groups will consist primarily of the Provost and the Vice Presidents, with both Executive Vice Presidents serving on both councils.

The Academic Council will be concerned entirely with issues that touch on the basic teaching and research functions of the university, and its chairman will be the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs. Its remaining members will be the Provost for Academic Affairs, the Vice President and Director of the Medical Center, Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs, the University Dean for Graduate Education and Research, and selected Vice Provosts and College Deans.

The Administrative Council will be responsible for those issues which, although vital to the operation of the university, are not directly connected with academic affairs. The chairman of this council will be the Executive Vice President and Secretary of the Board of Directors and the other members will be the Vice President for Development, the Vice President for Management and Finance, the Vice President for Metropolitan Affairs, the Vice President for Special Projects, and selected Vice Provosts.

At times, and on some issues, there is no easy distinction between academic and administrative matters, in which case a question would be referred to the President's Advisory Council, described below. This would be infrequent, however, since I have gone through previous agendas of meetings over several months and find I can quite clearly make such distinctions.

The decision-making process at the Presidential level should involve not only the Provost and the Vice Presidents and the members of the President's office. There is a need to formulate a process for the development of recommendations to the President's office which is visible to the University community. In order to meet this goal, a President's Advisory Council, has already been formed.

The purposes of the Council are to make recommendations to the President's office for decisions on major policy and operational matters; to serve in a review and resource capacity; to serve as a group to review and give advice on major academic and administrative decisions, especially on those which cut across academic and administrative lines; to serve as a final recommending locus for certain decisions; to serve as a forum for ideas, communication, and information; and to serve as a reaction and pulse-reading group. The Council has held one meeting, and monthly meetings are planned for the future, with the President serving as chairman.

The present membership of the Council consists of the Provost and the Vice Presidents, the Vice Provosts, President's assistants, five academic deans, the Chairman of the Faculty, the Chairman of the University Senate, one graduate student recommended by the three graduate student associations, the Student Body President and Vice President, the Administrator of General Hospital, and the Director of Information. The membership of all three Councils will be adjusted appropriately to reflect the reorganization of the university central administration.

4. Flesh Upon the Bones—Who's Who

No reorganization comes alive until real persons are seen in the proposed positions, for that is what gives meaning and vitality to the process. To undertake the major responsibilities we have outlined for the two Executive Vice Presidents will require the talents of the best we have—and we are fortunate indeed to have the competence and experience of Ralph Bursiek to fill one of those positions, the Executive Vice President and Secretary of the Board of Directors. The post of Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs will require a unique combination of academic interests and stature along with administrative skill, and I believe that Robert O'Neil possesses these qualities and should be asked to assume this new role. An advisory committee will of course be formed to make a specific recommendation for this new position.

If Mr. O'Neil is, in fact, designated for the new Executive Vice Presidency, this move will create a vacancy in the position of Provost for Academic Affairs. An advisory committee for the selection of a person to fill this important office will also be appointed.

Finally, an advisory committee for the review and recommendation of candidates for the new position of University Dean for Graduate Education and Research will be organized and asked to begin its essential task as quickly as possible.

5. Costs

A major cost involved in any substantial change in organizational structure is change itself: good men and women take on new roles and titles.
devote time and effort to learning and developing their new roles, and experience a natural insecurity in being assigned new responsibilities; committees are required to identify the best candidates for the various new positions; faculty and other members of the university community must learn new relationships and reporting functions. These costs are certainly balanced by the efficiencies of the reorganization: a new office of the University Dean with clear responsibility for campus-wide graduate education and graduate education and research; consolidation of the Office of the President; consolidation of information sources and information reporting under the Vice President for Management and Finance; a clarification of the functions and structure of the office of the Provost for Academic Affairs; the elimination of at least two positions at the Vice-Provostal level.

No budgetary increases for central administration are anticipated to result from the reorganization. In fact, a preliminary projection indicates that there will be some budgetary reduction for salaries of central administrative officers and their staffs during 1973-74, compared to the costs involved in the present structure. These costs can be expected to decrease even more in succeeding years, as the reorganization is carried through future stages of refinement.

Appendix A: The Executive Vice President and Secretary of the Board of Directors

This is a full-time major position within the Office of the President. The incumbent will preside over the institution when the President is absent. He will provide general advice and counsel on all University matters, especially on questions of budgeting and community relations. He will serve as the chief coordinator of and link to the Board of Directors, and will work closely with the President on all external financial matters, including overall coordination for whatever "campaigns" and liaison efforts that are necessary. He will be responsible for the relationships between the General Hospital and the medical resources of the Center. He will be in charge of all decisions on new buildings. He and the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs will have responsibility within the Office of the President on all issues that relate to management and the budget of the University. Sudden issues and unexpected problems will be his responsibility as will the role of general troubleshooter for the Office of the President.

Reporting to the Executive Vice President, immediately upon the effective date of retirement of the incumbent Vice President for Public Affairs, will be those offices previously reporting to the latter until a deployment of these functions is recommended. It is expected that the University Counsel will report to the Executive Vice President in any case.

Appendix B: The Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs

The major responsibility of the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs will be to coordinate and orchestrate all internal affairs of the University with the President. He will function as a staff officer within the Office of the President, and with few exceptions not as a direct line officer. He will be responsible for responding to the initiatives of the colleges, interacting with their proposals, and relating institutional aspirations to the external realities, assuring in the process the primacy of academic concerns as we struggle purposefully to manage change within scarce resources.

While reporting functions will be directed to the Office of the President and not to particular members of that team, the Executive Vice President will have special concern for the activities of the following officers: University Dean for Graduate Education and Research, Librarian, Director of Information, Director of Resource Development, and governance officers. He will articulate budget, space, and personnel with academic programs, implement the budget review process, and correlate the University governance structure with its executive structure. He will provide integrative thinking toward the formulation of patterns of University organization and the creation of new academic structures that respond to needs (both within and without the University) for interdisciplinary cooperation in educational, research, and service activities.

In summary, he will be the principal staff officer for internal affairs of the University, with special responsibility for planning, policy, and decision-making for academic programs.

Appendix C: The Provost for Academic Affairs

The Provost for Academic Affairs is the chief academic officer for the Clifton campus and the two-year colleges—that is, he has general administrative responsibility for all colleges except those in the Medical Center. That responsibility includes such functions as superintendence of all academic personnel decisions, initial hiring, reappointment or non-reappointment, promotion, grant of tenure, and the recommendation of emeritus status upon retirement. The Provost chairs every search committee for a college deanship, and appoints two members of that committee. Recommendations for appointment of departmental heads, coordinators and chairmen, must be transmitted to the President by and with approval of the Provost for Academic Affairs. Budgets for all non-medical units must be approved by the Provost, along with any transfers of funds between budget categories.

At least equally important is the role of educational leadership which the Provost fills. Since this office has ultimate responsibility for all personnel and fiscal actions on the main campus, the function of shaping and applying policy through those decisions is essential. The priorities of the office should reflect recommendations of the Long Range Planning Task Force, and should serve to implement statements of University mission by the President and the Board of Directors.

Hence the Provost must endorse the goals of the institution and further their implementations.

The Provost for Academic Affairs bears a special responsibility for students. Since the Division of Student Affairs is a major segment of his office, a close relationship between curricular and co-curricular activities is assured. Responsibility for the office of the Vice Provost for Admissions and Records also enhances that relationship, and facilitates close liaison among related service and supporting functions.

Finally, the Provost is a key member of the top-level administrative council which advises the President on major policy matters. He must work closely with the Vice Presidents both on special matters of joint interest and on matters of general university-wide concern. While most of the responsibilities of the office are of a line character, the special relationship with the Office of the President is at times an almost staff relationship.

Despite the size, complexity, and diversity of the University, the Provost for Academic Affairs must be responsive to individual needs of faculty, students, and staff members. When a person feels that justice has not been obtained or an adequate explanation secured at the college, departmental, or divisional level, then ultimate recourse should be to the Provost. He must always be willing to listen and, in critical cases, to intervene even at the risk of bypassing formal channels.

Appendix D: The University Dean for Graduate Education and Research

The University Dean will assume the central role in all graduate programs throughout the University, with the exception of the professional programs leading to the MD and JD degrees. It will be the Dean's function to coordinate such programs, to provide central
Q. Why was this reorganization necessary?
A. There have been some important and confusing ambiguities in reporting functions—a common problem in any large organization with diverse responsibilities. We are striving to emphasize the competencies of people in the right roles. We need to use human resources more appropriately and we need to have a more efficient data base.

The reorganization will make clear the reporting functions; it should make for a much more efficient organization; and it will relieve certain overloaded offices of management and operational problems. It has also designed to strengthen the ties between the Clifton campus and the Medical Center and to aid immensely the total coordination of graduate education and research.

Q. Is this reorganization really an excuse to reshuffle people?
A. All organization charts have to take into account people. Unless it does, it is guaranteed to fail. So, to a certain extent, this reorganization attempts to reposition some people into organizational functions that they seem most talented to fulfill. As T.S. Eliot once said (referring to the Technocrats) “These men design systems where no man need be going.”

On the other hand, the structure itself is an improvement which I hope will create more clarity, more effectiveness and, ultimately, lead to a better education.

Q. Why are two Executive Vice Presidents needed?
A. The Office of the President has long needed a person of academic status to assist in the whole area of academic planning and the overload therefrom in a time of rapid change. That is designed to greatly enhance the emphasis placed by the President’s office on academic affairs.

At the same time, the Office of the President needs an executive of proven ability to direct administrative affairs. The overload in this office has reached staggering proportions, making it impossible to render unto academia the needs thereof and render unto the rest of the University the day-to-day administrative necessities.

The appointment of these two Executive Vice Presidents, not unprecedented by any means, is intended to provide experienced direction for internal affairs while also concentrating on such imperative external matters as fund-raising.

Under the reorganization plan, the two Executive Vice Presidents, the President and Presidential assistants will work as a composite “Office of the President.” This will make the President more personally accessible as needs arise than has been possible up to now.

Under this arrangement, the Provost and the Vice President for Medical Affairs will report directly to the Office of the President, thus tying the entire University operation much closer together.

Q. How much is this reorganization to cost?
A. There will actually be a net savings in administrative costs. Two positions will be eliminated this year and a third next year. And there is no net increase in the number of Vice Presidents.

Q. Explain the role of the University Dean?
A. We need a coherent voice for research and graduate education that will embrace both campuses. The University Dean will not have direct line responsibility; for instance, the Dean does not hire or fire faculty members or control curriculum. However, the University Dean will have a great deal of influence on all matters having to do with graduate education and research. Reporting to the Office of the President will provide the Dean and the President with ready access to each other on general academic policy.

The role of the University Dean shares a common dilemma with all graduate Deans throughout this country. It is an anomalous role. It is a role which relies heavily on the ability of the graduate Dean to stimulate, lead and influence through strong collegial ties. The Dean should be the conscience for the role of graduate education and research on this campus.

Q. Has there been consultation with University interests on this plan?
A. For several months, consultations with faculty, students and staff have been in progress. Many points in the plan have come out of these meetings, which have been very valuable.

Q. Under this plan, it seems that all Vice Presidents are given equal power; yet, academic concerns should be primary. Why is this?
A. In fact, the vast majority of funds spent at UC are under control of the Provost and the Vice President for the Medical Center, both academic Vice Presidents. Advisory Councils have been established specifically to deal with academic concerns. There should be no need to worry that non-academic Vice Presidents are obtaining excessive authority.

Q. Why will the library people report to the Office of the President rather than to an academic office?
A. The library is meant to be a University-wide facility, interdisciplinary to the fullest extent. It would not be appropriate to have the librarian report to the University Dean since the library’s function is also undergraduate. Nor should the librarian report to the Provost since the library has extensive College of Medicine applications. It is appropriate for the librarian to report to the Office of the President since this underscores the priority status of the library and its interdisciplinary functions.

Q. There were a number of occasions when you used the phrase “Office of the President” or “Office of the Vice President” or “Office of the Provost.” How is that different from just calling that Provost or President?
A. The idea of the office of the President, for example, is to emphasize the need for collaborative and staff assistance to the President. For example, the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs does not create a dual provost system. The Provost does not report to the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs. Nor does the Vice President for Management and Finance report to the Executive Vice President and Secretary to the Board of Directors. The idea of the Office is to establish within each administrative office the administrative imperative to create some division of labor without interfering with the basic principles that the buck stops here. In short, the concept of the Office of the President can in no way abdicate any of his responsibility.

Q. To whom do the College and Personnel Deans report?
A. The Academic Deans report directly to the Provost. However, it should be pointed out that this excludes the three Medical Center Deans, who report to the Vice President and Director of the Medical Center. In the short run the five two-year College Deans and the Dean of the College of Community Services report to the Provost through Vice Provost Krueger. As far as the Personnel Deans are concerned, there is no change. They will continue to report to Vice Provost Nester. The Director of Admissions and the Registrar will continue to report to the Vice Provost for Admissions and Records.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Lawrence, P. R. Changing Organizational Behavior Patterns: A Case Study of Decentralization. Cambridge: Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1958.


Sherwood, John. An Introduction to Organizational Development. West Lafayette, Ind.: Kranett Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Purdue University, 1970.


Weiss, Robert. "Input Studies and Process Studies as Alternatives and Complements to Outcome Evaluation." A paper supported by Public Health Service Award No. MH 45731, National Institute of Mental Health, undated.


Long Range Planning (Chapter V)

Boyer, R., Task Force Coordinator
Corey, K., Task Force Member
Craythorne, B., Task Force Member
Erikson, B., Task Force Member
Gall, E., Task Force Co-chairman and Vice President of the Medical Center.
Hershey, D., Task Force Member
Huston, S., Task Force Member
Jenings, J., Task Force Member
Lande, S., Task Force Member
Langefels, S., Task Force Member
McSwigan, M., Task Force Member
Miller, Z., Task Force Member
Mosley, M., Task Force Member
O'Neil, R., Task Force Co-chairman and Provost (3/28/73, 4/13/73, 6/19/73)
Pauls, K., Task Force Member
Payne, N., Task Force Member
Rich, D., Task Force Member
Schulz, J., Task Force Member
Shell, D., Task Force Member
Wandmacher, N., Task Force Member

Crockett, C., Dean
Fransecky, R., Unit Director
Gideonse, H., Dean
Glasser, A., Dean
Hawkins, L., Dean
Mendenhall, R., Unit Director
Pulliam, R., Dean
Samuels, J., Dean
Simone, A., Dean
Watson, J., Dean

Bennis, W., President (1/30/73, 2/1/73, 3/7/73)
Carroll, R., Department Chairman
Jenike, W., Administrator
Parker, G., Vice Provost
Penfield, G., Administrator
Sweeten, G., Administrator
Stern, G., Department Chairman
Long Range Planning (Chapter V)

McNee, R., Department Chairman
Meyers, W., Faculty Member and Former Assistant to the President

Affirmative Action (Chapter VI)

Barton, J., Former Student
Beinhardt, W., Administrator
Dale, M., Student Government Leader
Davidow, E., Women's Group Leader
Eden, J., Vice President
Faaborg, L., Administrator
Leake, J., Faculty Member
Lipsich, H. D., Vice Provost
Mosley, M., Assistant Dean
Nester, W., Vice Provost
Rickman, G., Director of the Office of Resource Development
Smith, D., Department Chairman
Taft, A., Presidential Assistant

Budget-Review/Resource Allocation Process (Chapter VII)

Cowden, R., Governance Group Member
Crockett, C., Dean
Daniels, R., Dean
Dann, M., Student Government Leader
Eden, J., Vice President
Gideonse, H., Dean
Guest, J., Governance Group Member
Joiner, W., Governance Group Leader
Lipsich, H. D., Vice Provost
Mecimore, C., Governance Group Leader
Nester, W., Vice Provost
O'Neil, R., Vice President
Samuels, J., Dean
Spille, J., Dean

Administrative Team Development (Chapter VIII)

Bursiek, R., Vice President
Eden, J., Vice President
Hair, D., Ombudsman
Lewis, G., Presidential Assistant
Lipsich, H. D., Vice Provost
Nester, W., Vice Provost
Nowlin, E., Presidential Assistant
Osterbrock, C., Presidential Assistant
Taft, A., Presidential Assistant
Search and Selection Process (Chapter IV)

Dale, M., Student Government Leader and Presidential Assistant
Humes, T., Administrator, Member of the Search Committee
Langsam, W., Former President
Lewis, G., Member of the Search Committee, Presidential Assistant
Nester, W., Vice Provost