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JOHN HENRY NEWMAN AND ROBERT SHAFER
COMPARED ON A LIBERAL EDUCATION

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JOHN HENRY NEWMAN AND ROBERT SHAFER
COMPARED ON A LIBERAL EDUCATION

By
Richard N. Bowler

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CHAPTER I

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Statement of Purpose — It is my purpose in this paper to throw light on the problem of liberal education by a comparative study of the ideas of John Henry Newman and Robert Shafer on, and their work in behalf of, a liberal education.

Reasons for Interest - Academic Relationships — My interest in this problem and these men has several bases. The major study in my master's work is Education and the major study in my undergraduate work was English; this paper is a happy combination of both fields, for it examines a problem in education as viewed by men whose names are closely associated with the collegiate study of English and literature. But more immediate reasons might be mentioned which give this paper greater relevancy and greater timeliness. It has recently become apparent that the issues discussed in relation to the two men here have a wide application on many fronts.

The veteran, returning from life-and-death issues to the peace of the campus, has ruffled the calm of his professors and the dignity of school officials by questioning teaching methods, subject matter of courses, school customs and traditions, and many other aspects of the education being offered him. Seeing in his years in the service much wasted time, the veteran seeks to gain much in a short period to prepare him for a position. Apparently it is increasingly important to him that education be practical, that it provide him with useful
knowledge, that it bridge the gap between experience he never had and success. Although there is no doubt that the criticism by the veteran has brought about and will further bring about needed reforms through greater attention to teaching practices, and school curricula, it is also possible that this criticism is not sufficiently far-reaching to bring about changes of permanent worth. If we are to effect such changes, we should perhaps look deeper than the criticism of G.I. Joe, who is preeminently concerned with meeting a present problem related almost exclusively to himself.

Perhaps we would do well to reconsider the debate of Huxley and Arnold, now that, a century later, Huxley has been returned the apparent victor, for the veteran's criticism would seem to give him a vote of confidence. Thomas Henry Huxley devoted himself (in his words)

to the popularization of science; to the development and organization of scientific education;...and to untiring opposition to that ecclesiastical spirit, that clericalism, which in England, as everywhere else, and to whatever denomination it may belong, is the deadly enemy of science.1

Huxley championed the education essentially based on science; Arnold that essentially based on literature. And Huxley, though he would include literature, thought better of modern literature than of ancient. Of course, in these aspects of education, Huxley was advocating revolutionary change; Arnold, by comparison, was conservative.

1. Shafer, Robert, ed. From Beowulf to Thomas Hardy. II, p.608.
And the two lines of thought represented by Huxley and Arnold are represented in Julian and Aldous Huxley of our time, grandsons of Thomas Henry Huxley, and grandnephews of Matthew Arnold. Julian, the eminent biologist, is an atheist and a champion of evolution like his grandfather, who was called "Darwin's bulldog"; Aldous, the man of literature, is a mystic and a believer in the supremacy of the spirit. The one embraces the doctrine of progress; the other rejects it.2

But there are some signs today that science's control over education and thinking has run its course, that the demand for specialization has given us an educational system fragmentary, incomplete, inadequate—in spite of its claim to practicality. Current news is rich in evidence.

President James B. Conant of Harvard has chided the unrepentant scientist in his book On Understanding Science,3 in which he acknowledges the achievements of the physical and natural scientists but states the need for more significant work in the social sciences so that man may be able to keep pace mentally with his technical advancement. Quantitative science, then, is apparently not enough.

that search, education has not provided the philosophical state of mind which might give direction to that search.

The impact of the discovery of atomic fission on the human mind has flooded magazines with articles designed to give the reader mental equilibrium in the face of despair. Once again, the crying need for such articles may be evidence of elements missing in our education.

Though it was nearly always possible, only a short time ago, to identify the terms atheist and scientist, that classification is not now so easy. Lecomte du Nouy, one of many eminent scientists who have done so, has recently stated his case for faith, in the book *Human Destiny*.5

In this evidence, perhaps, there is some justification for a new examination of a liberal education, which according to Newman and Shafer offers some of the things that our age seems to lack and seems to be growing aware of, if the preceding evidence is a fair cross-section.

In order to focus the relationship of John Henry Newman and Robert Shafer to the problem of a liberal education, the following biographical sketches are offered preliminary to the study.

**Biographical Sketch - Newman** -- John Henry Newman was born on February 21, 1801 in London. His father was a banker; his mother a descendant of French Huguenots.

Newman received his secondary education at Ealing, his college education at Trinity College, Oxford, from which he received his B.A. degree in 1816. In 1822 he was elected a fellow at Oriel College.

In 1824 he was ordained a deacon in the Church of England; in 1825, a priest. In 1826 he became a tutor at Oriel. In 1828 he was made vicar of St. Mary's Church, Oxford. This position was his official one for over fifteen years. During this time he became the leader of the famous Oxford Movement, which he dates at 1833.

In 1845 after a long period of meditation, he became a member of the Roman Catholic Church, carrying along with him a host of others who had implicit faith in Newman's leadership. Early in the 1850's he was given the task of founding a Catholic University in Dublin, Ireland. From 1854 to 1858, he was Rector of the University. The failure of the University terminated his work there.

In 1877 he was elected an Honorary Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford.

In 1879 he was made a cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church.

He died August 11, 1890.  

Qualifications in the Field of Education -- Newman's long experience at Oxford before his conversion, his campaign in Ireland (of which more is said below), and his writings and  
sermons throughout his life were concerned with the theory and practice of educational principles—or, more particularly, with the theory and practice of the principles of liberal education—at a time when lively debates on the subject were under way. His basic inquiries into the means and ends of education, stated in beautiful eloquence, concern issues still challenging today and strike at the core of much of our present confusion in education.

**Attempt to Found the Catholic University in Dublin** — Newman's attempt to found the Catholic University places him, in Shane Leslie's book, as a study in sublime failure. What should have been a great triumph became great discouragement. Sent to Dublin with no buildings, no faculty, no funds, put to work under the supervision of Cardinal Cullen, a wilful, headstrong, arbitrary person, and faced with an unsympathetic lay group, Newman confronted defeat at every turn.

It was as though a Premier appointed a Field Marshal before recruits had arrived or supplies been voted. Nor had officers been commissioned nor camps laid down.\(^7\)

In his attempt to transplant the best of the Oxford tradition to the incipient university at Dublin, Newman could only compromise with, or bow entirely to, the tremendous opposition. But he had become accustomed to unsympathetic opposition; here he found not only a lack of sympathy but also a lack of courtesy. This pathetic situation, dramatized by

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Emmett Lavery in his play *Second Spring*,\(^8\) no doubt contributed to the quiet bitterness that characterized the rest of his life and left the world poorer for blocking his attempt to translate into reality the things he had worked for all his life.

The failure of the university belongs to Newman in his inability to become an administrator, but in a greater degree to those who refused to help him. Success, under the conditions he met, would have been little short of miraculous.

*Influence and Significance* -- Newman's influence on his own time, a formative period in thought and education, can hardly be overestimated.

A recent issue of *Time* reviews a book by Sir Walter Moberly, ex-professor of philosophy at Birmingham University, called *The Crisis in the University* and calls it "one of the most thoughtful, responsible critiques of the British University since John Henry Newman's Idea of a University."\(^9\) Thus, in the mention of him we have evidence that Newman is not dead. And indeed much of the article is eloquent testimony that his ideas are once again, if not continuously so, alive; for again we find in discussion the distaste for the knowledge-is-power idea, and "the purely utilitarian standpoint,"\(^10\)--the aiming

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9. _Hope or Despair?* *Time* LIV (July 11, 1949), p. 77.

10. Ibid. p. 79.
at "a perspective and a set of relative values"11 that are echoes of Newman.

His personality was compelling, the other-worldly aura of mystery and magnificence attracted many followers and inspired many associates. His nobility persisted even after his many disappointments, the many personal defeats he suffered. Says Paul Elmer More, one of the leaders of New Humanism, "Criticism may well stand abashed before that life."12 Apparently the attraction of other men to Newman's complex intellect was something that transcended bonds of denomination and religion, somewhat in the manner of Msgr. Fulton Sheen of our own day, whose following is not limited to Catholics but extends over a wide range of religious preferences, or in the manner of the late Joshua Loth Liebman.

Newman's personal influence today is perhaps chiefly felt by college freshmen when they are confronted with samples of his eloquent prose as models of exposition. His definition of a gentleman, for example, is often quoted; his selection on the genius loci of the university has perhaps caused many freshmen to see the presence or absence of that mysterious quality of atmosphere in their own schools. Thankfully those familiar passages have application in this paper.

We may expect the evils he saw as immediate enemies to a liberal education to be historically different from those

11. _____ op. cit. p. 78.
Shafer would see today, yet comparisons in quality may be possible. He must, of course, be considered in relation to his time, yet much of his opinion is generic and timeless, applicable as much to today as to the nineteenth century.

Biographical Sketch - Shafer — (Samuel) Robert Shafer was born in Hagerstown, Maryland, on December 24, 1889, the son of Samuel McCauley and Mary Elizabeth (Fahrney) Shafer. After graduation from Washington County, (Md.) High School (1907) and Mercersburg (Pa.) Academy, (1908), he received an A.B. from Princeton in 1912, and a Ph. D. in 1916. He has been an instructor in English at Princeton, (1916-1917), in English and History at U. S. Naval Academy (1917-1919), an assistant professor of English at Goucher College, Baltimore (1919-1920), an associate professor of English at Wells College, Aurora, N.Y. (1920-1923), and an associate professor of literature at University of Cincinnati (1923-1927). He has been a professor since 1927, a fellow at the Graduate School since 1923, was a fellow in the J. S. Guggenheim Memorial Foundation in 1927, and was general editor Doubleday-Doran series from 1934 to 1940. He received the Sachs Award at the Cincinnati Institute of Fine Arts in 1941.

In 1939 he married Giuditta Grotanelli de'Santi.

He is a member of the Modern Language Association of America, the American Philosophical Association, the Modern Humanities Research Association, the Society for Pure English,
the American Association of University Professors, and of Phi Beta Kappa.13

Qualifications in the Field of Education -- Robert Shafer has been associated with education all his life, through his work and membership in various learned societies, his editing work, his independent writing, and his positions in collegiate education culminating in his present work in the graduate school.

His serious concern over the problems of education should be obvious from what follows in this paper. He is not content to leave things as they are but makes a continuous and fundamental study of the needs of our day. He is not content with mere fault-finding or with general observations but offers plans for meeting and correcting the ills that he discovers. His audience is perhaps limited, for he has never attempted a popular expression of his opinions and findings. His sphere of influence is probably confined to members of learned societies, college professors, and the few other students he is able to reach.

Connection with New Humanists -- Mr. Shafer's connection with the New Humanists--his membership in the group and his forthright defense of others of the group--has without doubt also limited the number of his listeners, for the New Humanists have many influential enemies who command a much wider range.

of acceptance than he. Since Mr. Shafer is the direct opponent of many of those responsible for the modern developments in education, his position is to be expected. Since he has been swimming against the current, his difficulties have naturally been multiplied. His problem is not one of equal debate with a worthy opponent, but one demanding much preliminary destructive argument before he is able to state his position.

Though Mr. Shafer is being treated as an individual in this paper, it should be understood that some assumptions are made and some inferences are drawn on the strength of Mr. Shafer's affiliation with the New Humanists and the fact of their general agreement on educational theory and practice. Every attempt has been made to indicate clearly what Mr. Shafer does say in a given situation, but when there has been no statement available, a statement by another of the New Humanists may assist the reader.

Shafer as Prophet -- In order to give the reader a greater awareness of the value of Shafer to our time, a greater respect for what he may have to say, since he is little known in the popular sense, this section has been superimposed upon the paper at this point even though as treated here it has relatively little to do, except in the third illustration, directly with the subject.

Discussing Bacon's "Knowledge is power," he illustrates the carry-over of the principle from nature to politics. Notice the ring of basic truth and the applicability to current
history that these words, said shortly after World War I, contain. In this first passage he shows an understanding of Russia that our general population may not achieve for years to come.

The demagogue proposes an easy remedy for the evils of power. He would simply make it 'public' instead of private; and it is always possible that his appeal to the gullible may so succeed as to effect a re-distribution of power. From this he and his friends may benefit. But the very nature of material power is such that it can be made 'public' in only a fictitious or verbal sense. An individual or group of individuals must always control it, and in so doing must use other human beings to their own ends. Demagogues may be more conscientious and humane than other men or they may not—but we can have nothing save their own assertions for surety. And even granting their sincerity, it is notorious that politicians become—from conviction it cannot be doubted—more conservative as they attain actual power and experience the difficulties of administration. One still cannot tell whether the new distribution of power in Russia is 'succeeding' or not, but one significant fact about the Russian experiment has definitely emerged. It was early discovered by the present rulers that they could not hope to succeed without governmental compulsion to industrial work. Granting that the government was composed of perfect and incorruptible beings, it thus became conceivable that stable prosperity might in time result for the community. But prosperity conditioned by the tyrannical oppression of the individuals who make up the community can in the end prove only an empty mockery, no matter how widely it is distributed.14

The following is further evidence that he saw a situation close to him that we might have profited by in recent years.

It is notorious that mass movements have a way of getting beyond the control of their leaders. Scarcey a season passes without the lesson being

brought home...When America entered the War patriotism was zealously organised to help along the cause. Unquestionably many good things were thus accomplished..., but those things were accomplished at a price. Everybody entered in and waved his flag, but immediately very many began to use the one great cause for the achievement of smaller causes nearer home. Bumptious authoritativeness blossomed forth everywhere. Organised patriotism became in hundreds of communities synonymous with organised persecution and bullying. A great wave of self-righteous intolerance swept over the country, and generous idealism was transmuted into blind and unmeaning hatred of the 'Huns' and, incidentally, of all other 'damned ignorant foreigners.' Nor was this all, for intolerance was frequently too heated for nice discrimination, and persecution extended to all manner of dissenting opinions having no relation to the War and its issues. Likewise immediately after the War, as, it is to be hoped, some yet remember, an epidemic of casual, local, and apparently purposeless strikes broke out in all parts of the country. It seemed like a new disease. Crazy demands were made and, if they were granted, new strikes with new crazy demands were inaugurated. Labour leaders struggled with obvious honesty, but no success to master the situation, and the trouble only disappeared when industrial depression began to settle over the country. There was no mystery in this; it happened, as some people seemed to understand, because during the War these men had learned that they could get anything they asked for.15

The two rather lengthy passages above are quoted almost without interruption to give the reader a greater speaking acquaintance with Shafer than his words exclusively on education could offer. In the two passages quoted, besides the epigrammatic quality of some sentences, there is ample provocation for calling Shafer a prophetic voice.

A third instance may suffice to complete the illustration. In Progress and Science, published in 1922, Shafer

also repeatedly used the term *general education*. I cannot say he is responsible for the origin of the term, but certainly it was not common at the time of his book. It has only recently become widely used. Ahead of his time, he at once used a term not so likely to mean everything to everybody and a term which expresses succinctly the paradox faced by most of the so-called liberal colleges in offering a course of study which is a frank admission of no attempt to "liberalize" its students in the sense which those who use the term *general education* intend. Shafer, by using the term *general education*, says implicitly not *specialized* education. And by using *general* and *liberal* synonymously, he simplifies definition of what has been a hotly disputed problem in America: What constitutes a liberal education? His term at least allows the battle to proceed under better-known conditions. The issues of the conflict are more clearly drawn.

**Definition of Terms** -- Since some terms used in this study are abstract and are often used in specialized contexts, it is necessary to establish the limits of their use in this paper. Definition is particularly necessary in treating of ideas associated with Robert Shafer and the New Humanists, and in dealing with the New Humanism itself, since that group, concerned as it is with criticism, has developed a terminology of its own. For example *progress* represents a general idea to nearly every layman of our time; to Robert Shafer the term has an additional connotation which would be ambiguous and
not familiar to the layman, especially in limited quotation. The terms which are defined below are those considered most vital to a proper understanding and evaluation of this paper.

The term humanism as used in this study refers not to the wide-spread movement of the Renaissance (Humanism—that glorification of the "all around man" which ended in a wave of naturalism), nor to the general current use of the word, but to a movement of the late nineteenth and the twentieth century, initiated by Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More at the inspiration of their teacher C. E. Norton. At the center of its purpose, humanism is a collection of critical principles applied to art, literature, and education. It began, and maintains itself, as a revolt against various interpretations of life that gained headway in the nineteenth century; in the words of the Humanists: naturalistic monism, materialistic utilitarianism, and romantic sentimentalism. Its members see in these movements or sets of ideas denials of man's true nature and dignity.
In naturalism, for example, the New Humanists see danger in accepting the purely quantitative experience of science accompanied by the pessimism resulting from the view of man's helplessness before an all-powerful and unsympathetic nature; naturalism, they would say, reduces man to the animal level and deprives him of free will and its consequent responsibility. Shafer says that

> even amidst our externalized, convenience-ridden, routine lives we can hardly remain long blind to the remarkable paradox inherent in a gospel invented by human beings for the sake of denying their own humanity. 17

And again; "We have been asked to accept naturalism on the authority of the exact sciences." 18 But such authority is

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16. Note: Norman Foerster puts it as follows in *The American Scholar* (pp. 4-5)

> "Every age of history has its special faith, and the special faith of ours is the dogmatic dream of science. For it is a matter of faith. It is a faith born of science... that tells us that the whole of reality is mechanical, that the one key to reality is science. It is a faith that causes us to extend to the whole of experience a method unquestionably suited to a part. Intoxicated with the achievements of science... countless people not only accept such truth as science can legitimately offer, but also follow the prophets to whom reality and scientific reality are one and the same."


18. Ibid. p. 287.
not a sufficient basis for a philosophy, Shafer maintains:

It is clear that exact science, working as it must with objective data such as are susceptible of quantitative measurement, can deal with human beings only so far as they are animals and things, while it must remain silent about their specifically human characteristics.¹⁹

In naturalistic romanticism, further to illustrate, they see danger of a pathological decay resulting from lack of permanence, from subjectivism, and mere expansiveness.

In opposition to the naturalists, the New Humanists view man as a creature with a dual nature, having the characteristics of both the divine and the animal; a creature having free will, within limits, and bearing responsibility for his choices. They further demand that man employ the illuminative reason that places him above the level of the beast. They postulate a positive humility and self-restraint. In opposition to the rebellious romantics, they are strongly influenced by tradition and by the classics and attempt to order the chaos of every present time by urging standards of tested value. In opposition to materialism, they affirm the presence and the value of spiritual experience.

Some of them (Shafer being one of this group) have embraced revealed religion. Shafer makes his own position relative to religion clear when he says

It was a very common belief amongst contemporaries of Arnold and Huxley that not only Christianity, but religion, was destined presently to disappear from the earth and no longer to cloud our atmosphere. The belief was so completely mistaken that no one can now be found who persists in it, and men, whether they like it or not, are ready to agree that religion will never disappear. It will not do so because, ultimately, it is the embodiment of man's enduring conviction that life is significant and does contain 'intimations of immortality.'

Each of them is concerned, not with physical existence taken by itself, but with distinctively human excellence, or self-fulfilment, or, in a word, happiness. Here the one possible appeal is to actual human experience—the recorded experience of past generations and the inner experience of the individual disciplined and formed in the light of selective tradition. The strength of humanism lies in its positive experiential basis, which affords it, not an absolute, but a sufficient authority.

Finally, the "positive experiential basis" of the New Humanists is described in the closing words of Christianity and Naturalism, which offer eloquently the real essence of the everyday application of their outlook.

We need only acquaintance with ourselves to know that man is a fearful compound of grandeur and misery. He is an animal, and often enough a beast, yet he wonderfully transcends the phenomenal world and finds his true home in a far region of immaterial reality. He learns to know himself and to rise beyond himself through struggle, through disappointment and suffering and even defeat, at least as certainly as through the experience of good fortune and the taste of earthly enjoyment. All experience can teach him heavenly truths, yet none teaches him anything whatsoever unless it points beyond itself and preserves him from being enslaved by the world in a stupid contentment which is the death of the spirit. The probationary character of life, the fact that man,


animal though he inexplicably be, is yet a spirit, fighting his way toward freedom in the realm of immaterial reality—these are the truths which time does not wither.22

The term liberalism is a key word to an understanding of Newman’s thinking. It is important whether one is discussing his religious thinking, his political thinking, or his educational thinking. In fact the term and what it stands for are so deeply rooted in Newman’s mind and feelings as things to be feared, to be opposed, to be fought against that as surely as one begins to discuss some aspect of Newman’s mature life and experience he finds the reflection of this liberalism so surely present that it must be considered for definition here. Primarily, the liberalism "against which Newman was a lifelong foe"23 was a religious matter. It involved the attempt "to banish the mysterious and the irrational from religion"24 in the manner of the seventeenth century deists. Liberals of this sort demanded a rational explanation for any concept to be accepted as real. And their belief is an "anti-dogmatic spirit," which fails to sense the life and objective reality and authority inherent in dogma."25 This spirit demands that the individual exercise his own powers without the assistance of tradition or authority.

24. Ibid. p. 164.  
Shafer discusses the results of the liberalistic movement when he says that under the impact of this spirit Protestantism degenerated into a sentimental subjectivism, into a form of irrational self-indulgence; it could not properly claim objective validity; it was kept in existence by the state and by consideration of social expediency, but it had no strength of its own and no inner principle of coherence. It could not restrain human nature or correct the free march of mind. Indeed, the principle of private judgment encouraged the free march of mind and, by parallel development with sentimental pietism, so encouraged what Newman called Liberalism or Latitudinarianism.  

How does Newman define liberalism? He considered it according to Joseph J. Reilly "the sum of those influences in contemporary life that tended to undermine the bases of revealed religion." 

By Liberalism I mean false liberty of thought, or the exercise of thought upon matters, in which from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore is out of place. Among such matters are first principles of whatever kind; and of these the most sacred and momentous are especially to be reckoned the truths of Revelation. Liberalism then is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word.

Late in life, on the occasion of his attaining the Cardinalate, he summed up his battle against liberalism, and

perhaps not without weariness and bitterness defined the term in other words:

For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the best of my powers the spirit of Liberalism in religion... Liberalism in religion is the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed is as good as another, and this is the teaching which is gaining substance and force daily.29

And the force of his disbelief in liberalism is reflected in his fight against its development within the Anglican Church during his connection with the Oxford Movement; in his conversion to the idea of the authority represented by Rome from the Anglican Church which was "nationalistic rather than Catholic" and "had no living theological roots";30 in his insistence on the inclusion of theology as exact knowledge in the Catholic University's curriculum; in his constant emphasis on the value of the past, tradition, and faith in his writings.

In the process of trying to establish theology as a branch of knowledge fit for inclusion in a university, he says of the person who would exclude it,

In that case the varieties of religious opinion under which he shelters his conduct, are not only his apology for publicly disavowing Religion, but a cause of his privately disbelieving it. He does not think that any thing is known or can be known for certain, about the origin of the world or the end of man.31

30. Harrold, Charles Frederick. op. cit. p. 11.
Further, he says,

The religious world as it is styled, holds, generally speaking, that Religion consists, not in knowledge, but in feeling or sentiment.\(^\text{32}\)

That is, religion, according to liberalistic thinking, is purely subjective and individual, not objective and general.

Though Newman's opposition to liberalism is not to be summarized short of a biography, his answer to it was at least in part that of faith. He conceded that religious belief "is beset with intellectual difficulties."\(^\text{33}\) But he added, "Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt..."\(^\text{34}\) And noting the doctrine of Transubstantiation as an example of one article of faith that many find difficult to believe he says, "It is difficult, impossible, to imagine, I grant;—but how is it difficult to believe"?\(^\text{35}\)

It is presumed that the preceding fragments indicate the essence of liberalism as Newman conceived it. It is presumed also that the presence of this section will dissolve any chance or erroneous difficulty the reader might have in proceeding abruptly from the mention of liberalism to the idea of a liberal education in Chapter II.

I have not added to the definition an account of the historical rise of liberalism as a force in English thinking,

\(^\text{33}\) Shafer, Robert. \textit{Christianity and Naturalism.} p. 80
\(^\text{34}\) \textit{Idem.}
\(^\text{35}\) \textit{Ibid.} p. 81
nor have I sketched the relationship of English to Continental liberalism. I have not discussed Newman's own early tendency toward liberalism from which he sharply separated coming to consider it anti-clerical (Oxford Movement) and which he more strongly opposed after concentrated reading in the fathers of the early Catholic Church. I have not considered the presence of, or Newman's attitude toward liberalism in other fields, notably politics, which involved Newman in disputes, for example with Gladstone. (Ward's Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman and Harrold's John Henry Newman are rich in source materials on these topics.) But at least, for the purpose of this introduction, we have the word of Charles Frederick Harrold that

We must begin by realizing that the Liberalism against which Newman was a lifelong foe was not at all the political and economic Liberalism of Gladstone, John Bright, or John Stuart Mill

but

virtually a continuation of the deistic spirit of the seventeenth century.36

We can therefore consider exclusively the effect of Liberalism on Newman's thinking and the place it had as opposed to his scheme of education.

But the reader cannot be expected to bridge the gap in Chapter II between the use of the term liberalism and the subsequent use of liberal education without an additional qualification. As we have seen, Newman was opposed to

36. Harrold, Charles Frederick. op. cit. p. 163.
certain aspects of Liberalism: the rejection of authority and tradition, the insistence on individual mental processes to take the place of tradition and authority, (the results of which insistence may be indicated in the statement of Everett Dean Martin who calls liberalism "the plebeianization of scholarship")\(^{37}\) the resultant subjectivity of religious thinking, the whole adding up, as Newman saw it (and as Shafer also sees it), to an eventual denial of religion itself since all "truth" must be demonstrated in the manner of the laboratory experiment.

Harrold explains that Newman failed to see the good in Liberalism, "that modern movement of enlightenment of which 'deistic Liberalism' was but a part,"\(^{38}\) in the following words:

Now Newman may have been unaware of the rich texture of the modern liberal movement, and of its wide-ranging potentialities for good; but even if he had known it in its entirety, his hostility would have been no less implacable. For him the meaning of history was not to be found by human reason, or in human technology and civilization; on the contrary he saw history moving to a supernatural and divine goal, a goal attainable not by 'the march of mind' or 'the progress of civilization and science' but 'by the fostering of a divine seed which will bear an eternal flower.' The aim of religion, as he saw it, was not to make men 'good citizens' in a wealthier, happier and freer state,' but, frankly, to make men saints.\(^{39}\)

\(^{37}\) Martin, Everett Dean. *The Meaning of a Liberal Education* p. 129

\(^{38}\) Harrold, Charles Frederick. *op. cit.* p. 165.

\(^{39}\) Idem.
This attitude severely limits the definition of the gentleman whom Newman desired to produce in the university at Dublin. Although he says he is educating "for society" a man of the world, it is obvious that he could not stop at a purely intellectual goal, in the sense that education today might strive for a goal stated in the same words (considering the strength liberal thought has gained since Newman's day). Even though he conceives "knowledge impregnated with reason" to be a proper end in itself, if we are to accept Harrold's analysis we could not believe that a complete statement of his desires. The idea of a liberal education sketched in Chapter II must be considered qualified by the deeper and more thorough expression of his religious convictions.

But if there seems to be a discrepancy between his opposing Liberalism and his urging of a "liberalizing" education, one which would enable the mind to work objectively and independently, let us again recall that his reverence for tradition and authority is not carried to a point of restriction and limitation on the "intellectual excellence" he wanted to develop through education. Even though he opposed the antidogmatic, anti-clerical movement of Liberalism, he himself in working out the idea of a liberal education is exemplifying original, fearless, individual work of the mind—but corrected and steadied by tradition and authority. Newman himself was a liberal in that
he was a steady foe of dogmatic tyranny; he always maintained that private conscientiousness is the first step toward orthodoxy.40

What bothered him about the insistence of Liberalism on the private use of reason was actually unenlightened misuse. He too would certainly be anti-dogmatic in the more common application of that term. And of course the additional qualification that only the few would receive a liberal education would sharply differ from the popular use of reason that is implied in Liberalism.

Certain difficulties beyond definition have been encountered which require mention at this time.

Those which Make Comparison Difficult — Some of these factors make comparison unwieldy. Newman belongs to the nineteenth century, a time when Thomas Henry Huxley, "Darwin's Bulldog," and others interested in securing a dominant place in education for science were making themselves felt. Shafer belongs to the twentieth century, a time when Huxley's dreams have been realized and the scientific spirit, with its emphasis on practicality and specialization, rules what is now generally called liberal education as well as scientific and technical schools training. In addition, Newman belongs to the England of the nineteenth century, and Shafer to the America of the twentieth century; hence Newman to a society where collegiate education limited its numbers on class lines

40. Harrold, Charles Frederick. _op. cit._ p. 166.
and Shafer to a society in which the ideal has become education for everybody.

Although strategically the fact that Newman belongs to the nineteenth century and Shafer to the twentieth is valuable to the focus of this topic, mechanically the fact will cause awkwardness. And again, since they are of different times and nations, that situation must be kept in consideration especially in critical evaluation. Because both men affirm the importance of religion and, more generically, of spiritual experience and because both have difficulty in separating religious and non-religious considerations, in spite of their avowal of such an intention when discussing education, there must be some clarification of their religious views.

Source materials present an additional difficulty: that available by Newman on curriculum is rather indefinite and must be read into rather than merely listed; that available by Shafer in definition of a liberal education lacks fullness. These and other weaknesses in sources will be noted where they occur.

Those which Arise from Point of View -- Others of these factors tend to destroy the objectivity of the paper. The sections leading up to the comparisons and conclusions are expository in spirit, yet they are based on sources which are almost wholly argumentative. Further, both men inevitably argue from a particular point of view--Newman as a man of the
church and Shafer as a member of the New Humanist group; that point of view, whether felt implicitly or explicitly, has its effect even though neither man necessarily loses his individuality thereby.

There is much room for bickering over the term "liberal" as applied to education. It is the intention of the writer not to become involved over phrasing although it will be necessary to reconstruct the definition of the term by each of the two men. Similarities and differences, it is hoped, will be arrived at quickly. Having arrived at a workable definition by each man, I shall be interested in presenting in greater detail the actual composition and spirit of the systems they propose to fulfil a liberal purpose. Insofar as possible, then, this study will try to determine what Newman and Shafer consider a truly liberal education and will try to find statements by each of the two men which make some contribution to the solution of education's dilemma as posed in present-day argument.

Neither Newman nor Shafer can be expected to worship science or "practical" education. Since Newman is primarily a man of religion and Shafer, along with Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More of the New Humanists, claims humanism to be without sanction in the absence of religion, we may expect both to discuss the limitations of science and the practical education.
Newman was a man of the church, yet a man who, through his affiliation with Oxford, his attempt to found a Catholic university in Dublin, and his writings, is almost as thoroughly associated with education as he is with religion and spiritual experience. Much of his opinion is generic. Those which Arise from the Time-Course of This Paper -- The fact that so much time has elapsed between the beginning and the finishing of this paper has caused some regrettable instances from the point of view of the writer. During the war years especially, much Newman scholarship was done. For example, Harrold's book John Henry Newman in the chapter entitled "Intellectual Excellence" makes many of the same observations that this writer had made in composing a chapter on Newman's definition of a liberal education. Thus this paper must be recast in terms of such new scholarship and in instances such as the example given must lose much of the originality it might have had. As a matter of fact, the opening of the chapter "Intellectual Excellence" refers to the central reason for my comparison of Newman and Shafer--the fact of the re-examination of our educational need by the Neo-Humanists and others. Method of Treatment -- In view of the difficulties discussed above, I have considered it wise to adopt a somewhat illogical and rather mechanical procedure. Chapter II begins an exposition which attempts to present, in fact and in spirit, some of the aspects of a liberal education discussed by both
Newman and Shafer. There is no attempt to bring ideas together for comparison until each of several items (the idea of a liberal education, fallacies in education, and the curriculum of a liberal education) have been discussed as they relate to Newman and then to Shafer. Actual comparison, therefore, is reserved for the final section of the paper, which builds on the expository sections and itself stands apart as the critical section of the study.

It must not be supposed from any of the following that it is the purpose of this study to disparage the educational efforts of any one group, or to "call names." This interpretation is often given to Newman's writings and might also to Shafer's since he is identified with a group of highly critical thinkers. It is the purpose of this study to find a re-statement of things that need re-statement. Such an attempt involves critical thinking on things as they are: it does not suppose that everything that is, is right; neither does it suppose that everything that is, is wrong. It does suppose that men still make mistakes as frequently as they ever did; it does suppose that it is possible for men to redirect their work and their thoughts toward getting back on the right path. I believe that both Newman and Shafer would wish this to be understood: that men, since they are men, err. The purpose of the following, then, is part of that attempt to put things in their proper relation to other things; to sharpen issues that have become dulled
and thus confusing in a world that presents an ever-greater complexity for men to resolve into livable simplicity.
CHAPTER II

NEWMAN AND SHAFFER

THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION
INTRODUCTION - Newman -- In The Idea of a University, which is largely Newman's blueprint of the proposed Catholic university in Dublin, the great churchman left us more than an occasional piece of literature. From it can be extracted the essential and permanent elements of a liberal education as conceived by Newman. As a plan for a university which never had any physical significance, the book may be valuable only as history. But, as will be shown in this paper, The Idea of a University remains a part of our literary heritage for the careful and almost timeless definition attributed today with little change to at least one school of thought as to what in essence is a liberal education. That fact may be more readily apprehended here if the note be added that Newman saw the university as the proper place for a liberal education. Thus, the title may be interchangeable between the two terms.

His effort to establish the university for the benefit of Irish Catholics was in part a carry-over from his days as an Anglican at Oxford. That university retained a romantic hold on his fancy and a veneration that transcended religious change. At Oxford he became involved in a "series of controversies"\(^1\) over the theory of a liberal education. Thus in accounting for the book he was putting together and his

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interest in the subject, he was also suggesting that he was expressing some long-held ideas, qualified only by natural growth and the implicit changes his conversion to Catholicism might effect. Very soon after he left Oxford that university became dominated almost overnight by those ideas which Newman conceived as not constituting a liberal education (see—Newman-Fallacies in Education); whereas during the time of the Oxford Movement, Oxford had been perhaps the closest approach to what Newman considered good in a university.

Obviously, to define less carefully than Newman, would deny the value of his book and his efforts. Yet in this paper for the purposes of later discussion and comparison, only essentials may be mentioned here. In the absence of Newman's careful logic and argument, however, there will be an attempt to state, rather expositorily than argumentatively, the essence of Newman's thoughts, this with the possibility of misinterpretation.

In his discourse on literature Newman speaks of the great author as being "master of the two-fold Logos, the thought and the word, distinct, but inseparable from each other."² And he himself exemplifies this mastery in developing the component parts of the term liberal education into a meaningful symbol.

Of the word liberal he says that it stands not for something recently called into being but for an idea that has always existed. He compares it to other abstractions to

indicate that his purpose, at least for the present, is to theorize.

In like manner he speaks of education as "a high word," "the preparation for knowledge and it is the imparting of that knowledge in proportion to that preparation." Thus in addition to defining a process, he clothes the expression in an atmosphere that intensifies its meaning and separates his treatment from the limitations of immediate time and place.

However insistently the reader might question the intent of Newman as revealed in this aspect of his discussion, it is so much a part of Newman that to omit it would be to omit part of the man.

If the above clarifies his intention to develop in the abstract, we may then, in the following sections, amplify Newman's definition of a liberal education. Cultivation of the Intellect — Primary among the processes of a liberal education, in Newman's view, is the cultivation of the intellect. And this to Newman is the sole purpose of such an education. Liberal education exists only to discipline the mind. Any other result he regards as accidental or incidental.

Such an education as he proposes is intended to bring the human mind to the highest possible approach to perfection. To him this development is end enough without any attempt to develop the mind for "some specific trade or profession, or

study or science."\(^4\) However, he does not for a moment deny that intellectual enlargement may express itself in useful results. Such results are simply not a part of the idea.

Whatever he expects a liberal education to accomplish, it must follow in importance the first consideration of development toward intellectual excellence. The difference between that goal and the one expressed in the preceding quotation is a like difference to that between the amateur and the professional athlete: the one regards the game as a means to the general end and good of physical well-being; the other regards physical well-being as a means of preparing for and withstanding the rigors of a particular contest or series of contests. The case of the amateur then compares with Newman's goal of a general good, intellectual well-being through attention to the proper means to bring it about. The discussion of the opposite will be reserved for the section entitled "Fallacies in Education."

This end in itself, Newman emphatically insists, the beauty of perfection of mind, is no vague goal, though it is abstract and ideal rather than literal and seen physically.

To open the mind, to correct it, to refine it, to enable it to know, and to digest, master, rule, and use its knowledge, to give it power over its own faculties, application, flexibility, method, critical exactness, sagacity, resource, address, eloquent expression is an object as intelligible...as the cultivation of virtue.\(^5\)


\(^5\) \textit{Ibid.} p. 108.
But he does not expect automatic perfection in every graduate. He is still investigating in the abstract. He says that "though there is no one in whom it is carried as far as is conceivable" yet we can "at least look towards it...."  

**Philosophical Knowledge** -- The means by which Newman would accomplish the "intellectual excellence" of the student as expressed in actual studies to be pursued will be discussed in the chapter on the curriculum of a liberal education. But, again in the abstract, his idea of philosophical knowledge as the stuff of which a liberal education is made finds its place in this basic definition.

With what sort of knowledge, in general, would the student concern himself in order to gain intellectual enlargement? What is the nature of knowledge which can liberalize the student's mind?

Not mere knowledge, not the acquisition of facts as such, it is knowledge that

is called by the name of Science or Philosophy, when it is acted upon, informed, or if I may use a strong figure, impregnated by Reason.  

Philosophical knowledge demands, then, that the idea be reasoned upon by the student. Thus he comes to use as synonyms in his discussions the terms **liberal knowledge**, **philosophical knowledge** or **philosophy**, and **science**.

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To point up the difference on the scale of values between acquirement of learning and philosophical knowledge he says that in urging the distinction he is not "disparaging a well-stored mind...any more than I would despise a bookseller's shop..." Acquiring facts is the boy's work in the lower schools, not that of a seeker after liberal education. The memory is developed by the learning of many things about many subjects, but by the time of his attendance upon the university, it is no great gain to the intellect to have enlarged the memory at the expense of faculties which are indisputably higher.

Effects on the Student's Mind -- Having established that Newman's idea of a liberal education aims at intellectual enlargement through philosophical knowledge, each considered as having its own perfection, let us examine the results of a liberal education on the individual's mind. What (beyond those already mentioned on page 37 of this chapter, footnote 5) are the attributes of a mind which has achieved enlargement?

The perfection to which it aspires is the power of viewing many things at once as one whole, of referring to them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and determining their mutual dependence.

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9. *Idem.*
In other words this perfection involves the ability to generalize a complex situation, the ability to comprehend both the nature and the worth of the component parts of the situation, and finally the ability to perceive the relationship of one part to another.

Again Newman says that the permanent result of a liberal education, from its concern with philosophical knowledge, is a "habit of mind...of which the attributes are, freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom...."\textsuperscript{11} Further he intends us to understand that this habit of mind is that which is "the special fruit of the education furnished at a University, as contrasted with other places of teaching."\textsuperscript{12}

**Liberal Education and University Education** -- Let us further establish, then, that in Newman's mind there is one place for liberal education, the university. Later in the paper his concern over the representation of other kinds of education than that being sketched here as a liberal education will be discussed: "Fallacies in Education." He reveals his position on this point by repeated coupling of the two terms in the above title, and similar ones, as synonyms. Some fragments will suffice.

\textit{...the use of a University or Liberal Education.}\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} Newman, John Henry. \textit{op. cit.} p. 90.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Idem.}

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.} p. 93.
...University Education, and of the Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge which I conceive it to impart...14

call it liberal knowledge...and make it the scope of a University.15

(Note--The above point is given space here for convenience of the writer in later distinguishing between the natural place of a liberal education in the time of Newman and that in the present in the America of Shafer.)

Education for Society -- In what at first may seem a contradiction of his earlier position that no end beyond itself need be ascribed to a liberal education, Newman says that if "a practical end must be assigned to a University course, I say it is that of training good members of society."16

Here is an indication that, at least momentarily, he is not developing in the abstract or the ideal, not the optimum but rather what might be expected of the usual graduate. In those terms the training received at the university becomes "the great ordinary means to a great but ordinary end...."17

As such it cannot be expected to produce either the specialist in one field or the genius in many. He thus maintains that a liberal education, in its ability to develop objectivity, detachment, adaptability, and the like, "is a real benefit to...members of society, in the various duties and circumstances and accidents of life...."18

15. Ibid. p. 98.
16. Ibid. p. 156.
17. Ibid. p. 157.
18. Ibid. p. 152.
A liberal education he says, quoting Dr. Copleston (Bishop Edward Copleston of Llandaf), enables a man to give to society what society demands: "some other contribution, besides the particular duties of his profession."\(^\text{19}\) It enables a man to exercise "those free independent tastes and virtues which come in to sustain the common relations of society."\(^\text{20}\) And further, if he is able to "show none of the advantages of an improved understanding [of his duties to society]... he is no more than an ill-educated man."\(^\text{21}\)

**Education of the Gentleman** -- If, then, the cultivation of the intellect by means of philosophical knowledge at the university is said to produce a man with certain powers and a "fitness for society" what sort of man is he who is the product of Newman's liberal education?

Since the exclusive concern of the liberal education is to be the development of intellectual excellence, we can expect that it will produce "not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman."\(^\text{22}\)

Such a statement we may expect issues from the controversial nature of Newman's discourses. In calling his product the gentleman, he is reasserting the claim that intellectual excellence is a justifiable end in itself apart

\(^{19}\) Newman, John Henry. *op. cit.* p. 149.

\(^{20}\) Ibid. p. 150.

\(^{21}\) Ibid. p. 151.

\(^{22}\) Ibid. p. 107.
from any utilitarian purpose and apart from developing genius. In calling his product the gentleman and not the Catholic, he is asserting, in the face of opposition within the Roman Catholic Church, that the university entrusted to his development would not be concerned with the development of Catholic students to the exclusion of others; likewise that the education the students would receive would be a secular rather than a religious education. In calling his product the gentleman and not the Christian, he is asserting again the goal of a secular education and in addition the concept that the development of the intellect implied no moral development.

But the intellectual excellence at which Newman’s university was to aim was not the enemy of the Catholic Church or of Christianity even though secular. For the refined mind which it tended to produce was, for example, "to give an indisposition, ... a disgust and abhorrence, toward excesses and enormities of evil"23 and again "to create an absolute loathing of certain offences... as ungentlemanlike."24 In fact, he says that often "where it [knowledge] exists, sins... will not even occur to the mind...."25 Even when sins are committed it may give "birth... to so keen a remorse and so intense a self-hatred, as are... sufficient to cure the... moral disorder...."26

Even though the goal of intellectual excellence in itself is the professed goal of Newman's liberal education, it appears that it can have moral and ethical qualities. His point is simply that a liberal education does not guarantee such: "Knowledge is one thing, virtue is another."^27

The gentleman which a secular education can produce is the creation, not of Christianity, but of civilization."^28 He can then be developed "apart from religious principle."^29 The qualities which he demonstrates are the ideals of the world not of religion.

In respect to the separation of knowledge and virtue so that the work of the university is concerned with the one but not the other, John E. Wise judges Newman to be apparently "against the tide of history."^30 He claims that all great schemes of education have concerned themselves with moral concepts. Eventually, however, he concedes that Newman, in so speaking, does so for the purpose of establishing the worth of intellectual excellence as a good in itself in the same manner as good health; likewise that as of good health one may expect other good things to flow naturally from it. One of these good things might well be a moral sense, as has been pointed out above.

29. Ibid. p. 187.
Newman's often-reproduced definition of the gentleman pictures his ideal graduate as having the qualities of humility, graciousness, generosity, patience, consideration, magnanimity, frankness, openmindedness, alertness, discernment, prudence, brilliance, and the like. But this, like many other passages from Newman, has something in its saying that itself is a part of the definition, and to generalize as in the qualities listed above is to attempt, but not to succeed in, saying what Newman said.

Hence it is that it is almost a definition of a gentleman to say he is one who never inflicts pain. This description is both refined and, as far as it goes, accurate. He is mainly occupied in merely removing the obstacles which hinder the free and unembarrassed action of those about him; and he concurs with their movements rather than takes the initiative himself. His benefits may be considered as parallel to what are called comforts or conveniences in arrangements of a personal nature; like an easy chair or a good fire, which do their part in dispelling cold and fatigue, though nature provides both means of rest and animal heat without them. The true gentleman in like manner carefully avoids whatever may cause a jar or a jolt in the minds of those with whom he is cast;—all clashing of opinion, or collision of feeling, all restraint, or suspicion, or gloom, or resentment; his great concern being to make every one at their ease and at home. He has his eyes on all his company; he is tender towards the bashful, gentle towards the distant, and merciful towards the absurd; he can recollect to whom he is speaking; he guards against unseasonable allusions, or topics which may irritate; he is seldom prominent in conversation, and never wearisome. He makes light of favours while he does them, and seems to be receiving when he is conferring. He never speaks of himself except when compelled, never defends himself by a mere retort, he has no ears for slander or gossip, is scrupulous in imputing motives to those who interfere with him, and interprets every thing for the best. He is never mean or little in his disputes, never takes unfair advantage, never mistakes personalities or sharp sayings for arguments.
or insinuates evil which he dare not say out. From a longsighted prudence, he observes the maxim of the ancient sage, that we should ever conduct ourselves towards our enemy as if he were one day to be our friend. He has too much good sense to be affronted at insults, he is too well employed to remember injuries, and too indolent to bear malice. He is patient, forbearing, and resigned, on philosophical principles; he submits to pain, because it is inevitable, to bereavement, because it is irreparable, and to death, because it is his destiny. If he engages in controversy of any kind, his disciplined intellect preserves him from the blundering discourtesy of better, perhaps, but less educated minds; who, like blunt weapons, tear and hack instead of cutting clean, who mistake the point in argument, waste their strength on trifles, misconceive their adversary, and leave the question more involved than they find it. He may be right or wrong in his opinion, but he is too clear-headed to be unjust; he is as simple as he is forcible, and as brief as he is decisive. Nowhere shall we find greater candour, consideration, indulgence: he throws himself into the minds of his opponents, he accounts for their mistakes. He knows the weakness of human reason as well as its strength, its province and its limits. If he be an unbeliever, he will be too profound and large-minded to ridicule religion or to act against it; he is too wise to be a dogmatist or fanatic in his infidelity. He respects piety and devotion; he even supports institutions as venerable, beautiful, or useful, to which he does not assent; he honours the ministers of religion, and it contents him to decline its mysteries without assailing or denouncing them. He is a friend of religious toleration, and that, not only because his philosophy has taught him to look on all forms of faith with an impartial eye, but also from the gentleness and effeminacy of feeling, which is the attendant on civilization.

Not that he may not hold a religion too, in his own way, even when he is not a Christian. In that case his religion is one of imagination and sentiment; it is the embodiment of those ideas of the sublime, majestic, and beautiful, without which there can be no large philosophy. Sometimes he acknowledges the being of God, sometimes he invests an unknown principle or quality with the attributes of perfection. And this deduction of his reason, or creation of his fancy, he makes the occasion of such excellent thoughts, and the starting-point of so varied and systematic a teaching, that he even seems like a
disciple of Christianity itself. From the very accuracy and steadiness of his logical powers, he is able to see what sentiments are consistent in those who hold any religious doctrine at all, and he appears to others to feel and to hold a whole circle of theological truths, which exist in his mind no otherwise than as a number of deductions.31

Introduction - Shafer -- Shafer's idea of a liberal education is to be gleaned largely from his idea of what a liberal education is not as represented in his criticism of some aspects of modern education. Further, the utilization of these sources is qualified by the fact that much of Shafer's criticism is directed against specific schemes for education raised by particular men in individual books. Altogether, then, Shafer's idea of a liberal education must be reconstructed in fragmentary fashion. Whenever possible and justified, organization, except for sequence, will parallel the similar chapter on Newman.

The Place of a Liberal Education -- By the time Shafer arrived on the American educational scene the liberal college, conceived as the proper place for a liberal education, had replaced the university. In fact, the liberal college had gone through a sort of development (perhaps Shafer would call it disintegration), many aspects of which Shafer deplores, as will be noted especially under "Fallacies in Education." To bring about the proper reforms in liberal education, Shafer goes so far as to propose a new college, which will be later discussed largely as to its curriculum (see Chapter IV).

Let the following suffice for the present. The college he proposes is intended to be the midpoint in the process of education, its work being to continue "the general education of men and women" as begun in the secondary school and to stop before the specialized work of the university graduate years. Thus the job of the college, chronologically considered, in the educational scheme, though it may be more like that of the graduate school than that of the secondary school in being set on an adult level, is more like that of the secondary school in being general rather than particular.

Study at this college would be largely individual after the first year and would be supervised by tutors who would live and work closely with the students in a house system. A degree of A. B. would be awarded successful candidates in the three-year, definitely prescribed curriculum without free election.

The Development of Human Excellence -- Central to Shafer's idea of a liberal education--in much the same way as Newman's "intellectual excellence"--is his concept of human excellence developed for its own sake. According to him, a liberal education contains "the germs from which may be developed a true conception of human excellence." In fact he says,

"Ultimately all conceptions of liberal education depend on a belief in the possibility of the good man."34

What exactly does he mean by "human excellence" and the "good man"? In his mind both exist as ideas in themselves: each a good worth seeking because it is good. And both exist as implicit refutations of an opposing belief: each is opposite in educational thinking to the idea of developing the good mechanic, the good lawyer, as in vocational or professional education. In other words, in the two phrases he is stressing not moral goodness but that liberal education should be concerned with the man himself and not his job or position. This idea will be discussed more fully in "Fallacies in Education." He says, "Every lawyer, mechanic...is something more than...his social function. He is also a man."35 And to further emphasize the point of difference, he says elsewhere "that to be an excellent lawyer or an excellent mechanic is not the same as to be an excellent man."36 And obviously he intends that to be an excellent man is a higher object than to be an excellent performer in a profession or vocation. A liberal education then, he believes, is intended to bring forth the best in a man.

34. Shafer, Robert. op. cit. p. 397.
35. Ibid. p. 398.
36. Idem.
Some Particular Effects on the Student's Mind -- What are the results of this cultivation of human excellence? What marks identify the mind of man who has been liberalized through this kind of education, the good man?

Shafer attributes a number of qualities to him, among them a "detachment from 'affairs,' from the multitudinous demands of the outer world," and an ability "to cultivate a due sense of proportion—," both of which would presumably enable him to view problems objectively and dispassionately since he could see the proper relationships among ideas and generalize to a reasonable conclusion. Similarly, in speaking of the educated man of one hundred years ago a Life editorial states

His whole training was supposed to give him a power of generalization that would enable him to thread his way through any body of evidence or proposed modes of alternative behavior that might confront him.38

Such detachment, such a sense of proportion would enable the good man to make an attempt, with a better chance for success than one without his human excellence, to judge the worthwhileness of various aspects of experience and hence guide his life. He says that

The cultivation and maintenance of a due sense of proportion is equivalent to the formation of a philosophical temper or habit of mind, enlightened, sure,

37. Shafer, Robert. op. cit. p. 399.
and discriminating, which may adequately serve as the instrument of a never ending process of critical evaluation of that perfection of being at which the good man will aim, even though he will not attain it.\textsuperscript{39}

He attributes to him also "a refinement and a maturity"\textsuperscript{40} which would qualify him as a discerning person in matters of taste and would remove from him the callowness of his earlier years in making him an adult in its best sense.

Again, in placing goodness as a man before the student's mind as the primary goal in life, the liberal education would supersede the fact that present-day life and much contemporary literature proclaim the conviction that not goodness but enjoyment is the end of existence.\textsuperscript{41}

\textbf{Fitness for Education} -- Shafer does not assume that a system of liberal education or any other kind postulates a successful education for anyone subjected to it. He finds that a warping of the "education for everybody" slogan often results in an attempt to educate above the person's ability. He says,

\begin{quote}
And is there not a specifically human excellence, and can we not...provide any training calculated to bring it out, if a man has it in him?\textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

In other words, a liberal education is intended to bring forth the best in the best men.

40. Ibid. p. 400.
41. Idem.
42. Ibid. p. 398 (Italics mine).
More inclusively Shafer says that all higher education should be considered to exist "for the sake of the intellectually best in each generation." Particularly does he believe this to be true of a liberal education. Historically it has been so since "the liberal studies...have been the privilege of only the few." And beyond economic limitations, "only the few have ever wished to go far in liberal studies, and probably only a few are capable of it..." since "love of wisdom was never successfully forced on anyone." Clearly then, Shafer is firm on the point of restricting entrance to a liberal education so that only those fitted to receive it will be enrolled.

He has pointed out that the enrollment in a liberal college is naturally limited by the factor of economic difficulty, since most wish the quicker way to employment to be found in specific vocational training and by the factor of interest, since the intellectual demands frighten away many more. But to his mind the standard which should be applied to limit enrollment, whatever others may operate, is that of intellectual capacity. That he strongly opposes the contrary situation of unrestricted enrollment will be treated in "Fallacies in Education." (Chapter III.)

45. Idem.
Education for Society — What, then, are the purposes for developing such men as have been described as the products of the liberal education Shafer believes in? The liberalizing function of his education Shafer finds necessary for the survival of democratic institutions. He says,

Americans do not have to be told the value of education. We have believed in it for everybody, since earliest colonial days we have attempted to achieve it for everybody. Broadly speaking we have encouraged education because this is a democracy and democracies are hard to keep alive. People who have liberty do not instinctively prize it as do those without it; and to rule ourselves we should be able to think for ourselves. This, however, requires educated judgments and developed characters; it requires liberalizing education.46

But, since we have already established that Shafer means liberal education to be restricted to the intellectually superior, we must assume that a liberal education must produce the leaders capable of judgment, not a society capable of judgment. He says that the distinctive function of the "general or liberal or humanistic education" prepares the student "for the best life of the individual and for responsible, intelligent, mature, leadership in each generation."47

47. Shafer, Robert. Progress and Science. p. 147.
CHAPTER III

NEWMAN AND SHAFER

FALLACIES IN EDUCATION
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NEWMAN AND SHAFER - FALLACIES IN EDUCATION

Introduction - Newman -- Because much of Newman's writing and speaking was delivered in rebuttal of others, we find that many of the ideas with which he concerned himself were those he strongly disbelieved. Some of the occasions on which he expressed himself most strongly came after periods of withdrawal from the issues of the day. When hurt or offended deeply enough, he was moved to utterances of personal conviction that became far more than statements of individual belief. (e.g. Tract 90, when the general public became hostile to his doubt that the Anglican Church was the logical successor to the Church of Rome, and Apologia pro Vita Sua after Kingsley's attacks.) They had the effect of rallying followers to his banner, though we have little reason to assume that his purpose contained any wish for position of popular leadership.

In the course of dealing with issues of the day, religious, educational, and other, Newman came to grips with views held not only by the particular individual or limited group toward whom he directed his counter-attack but also by large groups of the general population. Thus he faced the necessity of exploding what he considered popular fallacies in order to make his views prevail.

These efforts established Newman as one of the leading controversialists of his day. His inspiration and quiet fervor were transferred to a group whose size was probably quite
beyond his ability to estimate. His eloquence derived perhaps as much from his wish to be clear as from any particular devices consciously employed. His obvious intellectual honesty, his wish to be fair not dogmatic, to take consideration of all possibilities of definition and belief—all serve to make his writing sometimes labored long after we have granted him his point, but at the same time they force us to hear him out.

The topics which follow have been chosen as the most significant of the fallacies Newman saw as powerful in his time. They will be discussed to the extent that the writer deems necessary in order to acquaint the reader with the sort of thing to which Newman took exception.

Far more important than any of the other ideas that will be discussed in this section, or any combination of the others, is Newman's fight against liberalism (see Chapter I, Introduction). His battle against this philosophy, although most directly expressed during the time of the Oxford Movement, before his conversion to the Roman Catholic faith (1833-1845), was a lifelong one. The historical liberalism against which he contended manifested itself in many and different ways—in politics, in education, in social thinking—but its source is the concept that there is no positive religious experience; hence that one creed is as good as the next, a kind of relativism, therefore, that would naturally be distasteful to so close an examiner of self as Newman, to
such a purist as Newman. To Newman's mind which worked in terms of often mystic essences, everything had its own perfection, its own best.

To illustrate, let us consider his distinction between liberal education and useful education. Liberal Education and Useful Education -- Newman's effort in distinguishing between these two terms was to make clear differences which in the education of his day were being ignored as a result of the influence of "liberalistic" thinking.

He speaks of the necessity of calling certain intellectual exercises "liberal" in contrast with "useful." In so speaking he is fighting fire with fire. He is establishing that the two terms denote opposites of a sort, that the one is of a certain kind, the other of a different kind. On the other hand, in the popular view anything different from useful is useless. In Newman's scheme the goal of a liberal education is to form the intellect and liberal knowledge is the means to that end. He wishes to claim no other goal and no other means—at least he claims that no other need be posed—for a liberal education. Liberal education, in other words, does not need to be useful, that is to be used directly for making money, or repairing leaky faucets, to be a best of its kind.

It should at least be mentioned in passing, however, that Newman's purpose is not to deride the so-called useful education. His job in making the distinction is merely to
establish the differences between the two terms so that presumably he can proceed to justify the contents of that education which was to exemplify the liberal tradition, the university in Dublin. He recognizes the place and importance of vocational, technical, and other useful training. But they are not liberal education and should be kept away from it.

He insists that far from being useless the gaining of philosophical knowledge, different from mere acquirement of facts, enlarges the mind in that it will "be borne forward"¹ and that the student will find "a range of thoughts to which he was before a stranger."² He draws analogies between this experience of "intellectual enlargement" and that of a rural person encountering the large city for the first time; again, to the experience of viewing the heavens through a telescope; and further to the tranquility gained from the study of physical science and the consequent comprehension of the orderliness of nature.³

Even while making this distinction, however, Newman realized that liberal education as compared to useful was failing in his time. The process of preparing for the new university in Dublin was in part, therefore, an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of nineteenth century liberal

2. Idem.
3. Ibid. pp. 116-117.
education. He says, "The Philosophy of Utility...has at least done its work;...it aimed low, but it has fulfilled its aim." And again, "Useful Knowledge...has done its work; and Liberal Knowledge has not done its work...." The Baconian philosophy, he grants, had gained the ascendancy in both popular opinion and educational practice. But, he says, this is so because men insist on demanding that ends other than intellectual enlargement be the goal of knowledge, whether they be useful and serviceable, or even virtuous or religious.

Unrelated Knowledge -- Newman saw in the education of his day no danger of over-education; in fact, he thought the danger to be "on the other side." He believed that in featuring so many unrelated courses education was not doing the job of developing the student's intellectual powers. In his mind it had been the practical error of the last twenty years,--not to load the memory with a mass of undigested knowledge, but to force on him so much that he has rejected all. It has been the error of distracting and enfeebling the mind by an unmeaning profusion of subjects.

Mere quantity, therefore, is hardly a substitute for selected quality.

5. _Ibid._ p. 106.
7. _Idem._
Similarly Newman sees as an error of his time the assumption that the diffusing of knowledge through more extensive book publishing constitutes education. He refuses to call it education since he sees in it no guarantee that it will "form or cultivate the intellect."8

Likewise, in discussing the mere acquirement of facts which he says is mistakenly called education, he speaks of the failure of the student in this sort of education to be able to generalize and as well his failure to observe in its best sense. Such a person might well have learned many facts of importance. But each thing thus learned separately has not been endowed with philosophical meaning. It fails, then, to answer Newman's definition of liberal knowledge, the means to a liberal education.

Specialization — The learning of more and more facts, especially in a particular field, is of course the method of specialized, scientific education. Becoming more and more specialized, our society imposes on education the need for teaching more and more about less and less. Of course in Newman's day specialization was barely beginning. Science had not yet come to dominate the curriculum. In discussing specialization, consistent with his ideas on what constitutes liberal knowledge and what does not, consistent with his idea that unrelated knowledge was the result of studying a "profusion of subjects," he speaks of the failure of such study to achieve intellectual development.

In fact, Newman sees the danger of specialization as working limitations on man's mind; first, so that knowledge is misapplied:

Men, [sic] whose minds are possessed with some one object, [sic] take exaggerated views of its importance, are feverish in the pursuit of it, make it the measure of things which are utterly foreign to it, and are startled and despond if it happens to fail them.\(^9\)

and second, so that the intellect remains undeveloped:

If reading is confined simply to one subject, however such division of labor may favor the advancement of a particular pursuit, . . . certainly it has a tendency to contract the mind.\(^10\)

Newman regarded all knowledge as related, fields of knowledge as interdependent. And the university he called the place for the study of all knowledge. Although he did not assume that every student would study all branches of knowledge, he did assume that the atmosphere provided by such a place which gathered and taught all knowledge would give a student an understanding of the relatedness and the scope of all knowledge which in itself would be a contribution to intellectual enlargement.

Indeed, he looked upon this atmosphere not as an accidental by-product of university life, but an integral part of it to be deliberately fostered.

Extracted from their context (in which he is developing a much more general idea) the quotations above seem nothing

10. Ibid. p. 89.
less than prophetic in terms of much criticism of today's education. Many of those now protesting against specialization as depriving a man of the ability to generalize seem to have found in Newman an authority who would approve of critical examination of the tendency which in Newman's day was only beginning.

**Fitness for Liberal Education** — Newman would have admitted only a select group of students to his liberal education. He would have regarded any attempt to extend the idea of "education for everybody" to liberal education, hence university education, as completely fallacious. We can look to him for a definition of liberal education many of whose elements are admired today,—especially by those who are critical of the various current attempts at liberal education, or by those who decry our lack of any such institution. Yet his idea as to what sort of person would be fitted to receive a liberal education would differ considerably from that even of those who favor a liberal education somewhat similar to his.

Newman is a product in part of the ages: he has achieved a kind of immortality as an educational thinker; but he is also a product of a certain period of history, a certain social organization, and, in regard to the writing of *The Idea of a University*, a product of a specific task, the establishment by an Englishman of a Catholic university for Irish Catholics. Harrold says, "Newman's theory is at once more individualistic and more narrowly intellectual than
that of most present-day champions of the non-utilitarian education."11

Let us examine the implications of Mr. Harrold's judgment. By "more individualistic" Mr. Harrold may mean several things. He may mean the rather subjective nature of Newman's almost mystical approach to the essences of ideas, which has been mentioned earlier in this paper. He may possibly mean that the theory is thereby more a Newmanian concept and less a general concept. Or he may mean that the theory was individualistic in that it came out of Newman's very personal attempt to found the university and was not general in not being disassociated from a particular institution.

Or he may have derived the term directly from Newman's idea of the proper functioning of the university as contrasted to what Newman labeled a trend of his time. Newman says, apparently sarcastically,

All things now are to be learned at once, not first one thing, then another, not one well, but many badly. Learning is to be without exertion, without attention, without toil; without grounding, without advance, without finishing. There is to be nothing individual in it....12

In this he was contrasting two ideas of education, this the "mechanical" and his, the "philosophical." And thus we begin to see also what Mr. Harrold meant by "more narrowly intellectual."

Such a mechanical theory of education would not certainly be in keeping with Newman's goal of intellectual excellence individually developed from the university's "knowing her children one by one, not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill." Such an education would demand little of the intellect beyond memory and hence would not demand the selected body of students to suggest Newman's "comparatively the few" (see footnote No. 18). The group that he visualized were to be "keen, open-hearted, sympathetic, and observant...." It would be "better..." he says, "for the active and thoughtful intellect,... for the independent mind..." to educate itself than to be subjected to the purely mechanical type of learning which was the opposite of Newman's liberal education.

Something more of Newman's "narrowly intellectual" theory becomes clear when Mr. Harrold explains that

Newman was anything but democratic, and as a mid-Victorian gentleman, aware that the mid-century social pattern in England was rapidly stabilizing itself he probably did not contemplate, or desire, any important social change.

According to him, Newman's liberal education was designed purely for not only a special intellectual group but for a

15. Ibid. p. 132.
social-economic group as represented by "the gentleman, the financially independent and well-bred man of leisure."\textsuperscript{17}

Newman's words give at least a sketchy hint of the inferences which Harrold has drawn in fuller fashion from wider material. For example, in discussing the reasons of the ecclesiastical rulers for wanting the Catholic University, he says,

As they wish their schools for the poorer and middle classes to be at least on a par with those of the Protestants, they contemplate the same object also as regards that higher education which is given to comparatively the few.\textsuperscript{18}

He speaks too of reading in Xenophon "of the young Persian nobility being taught to ride on horse-back" as one of "the accomplishments of a gentleman."\textsuperscript{19} Riding horse-back becomes one of the social graces of a class capable of producing gentlemen in the sense that Newman intends it. And, in another place he speaks of being in favor of as much education for "the people" as possible, but he also makes it clear that such education is not education in its higher or liberal sense.\textsuperscript{20}

In other words, not being concerned with the issues of equality and the like, Newman's liberal education was conditioned by the social thinking of his time. His education

\textsuperscript{17} Harrold, Charles Frederick. \textit{op. cit.} p. 92.
\textsuperscript{18} Newman, John Henry. \textit{op. cit.} xxxii
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid.} p. 95.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.} pp. 127-128.
was frankly designed to create an intellectual aristocracy to parallel the social aristocracy of the period. Though the admission of students outside of that class would have been no particular issue in his time, we can take the time to recognize it here as a characteristic of his time, and in varying degrees a difference between our age and his.

With the evidence, we can safely say that the admission of any other than the type that seems to have been indicated would give the lie to what he intended. Clearly, he regarded the education of any but a restricted group as not education in the sense he intended the word. The loose use of the term develops the fallacy treated in this section.

Introduction - Shafer -- By noting those practices and ideas in education which Shafer regards as fallacies, we shall determine what he believes to be inconsistent with the idea of a liberal education. And the sum of this section will amount to the opposite of the sum of the section on Shafer's idea of a liberal education.

In the process of adding this total, we shall find that Shafer deems it necessary often to consider other phases of education than liberal education (the secondary school, for example) and other kinds of education which he sees as usurping the field of liberal education or being foisted as liberal education. The reforms he suggests, if carried out would affect not only college (that is, liberal) education,
"the most immediately important problem in the educational realm..." but education in general.

Dr. Shafer is convinced, however, that his own time would be best spent on collegiate education; he despairs at the possibility of correcting the lower schools, as is reflected in the entrance requirements to his new college. His attitude is in substantial agreement with that shown in the recent book reviewed in *Time* "The Crisis in Education" by Canon Bernard Iddings Bell, education trouble-shooter for the Episcopal Church. Bell there compares the average student and indeed the average citizen of the United States to Henry Aldrich, the adolescent radio character whose bumbling adventures demonstrate his lack of discipline, of the power of accurate expression, his naivete, and his assertion of self.

Bell speaks of the inability of student and citizen to "think in general terms as distinct from specific and concrete particulars," and thus highlights one of the central features of the education of both Newman and Shafer, the ability to generalize. Similar, also, to both Newman's and Shafer's words on fitness for education is Bell's statement on the job of the college to "single out those who are potentially intelligent."24

22. Ibid., p. 71.
Shafer says that

the lesson of what has been done and undone and of what is now needed in the American college is one that has its application in other fields of education as well.26

He sees liberal education as a part of a whole pattern and the fallacies that may exist in the one part as caused by those of another.

Hence we cannot assume of Shafer as we could of Newman that when he uses the unqualified term education he means liberal education.

Education for Everybody — As has already been established in the previous section on Shafer, he does not assume that a plan of liberal education in America applied to anyone, or nearly everyone, will guarantee the production of the good man. Rather, he presumes liberal education to be the privilege of the few, both because it always has been for economic and interest reasons and because it should be for intellectual reasons. Thus he takes an attitude as to what the college should be squarely opposite to that suggested by Dr. Abraham Flexner's statement:

The modern college is impartial, catholic, democratic. It embraces all types of intellectual capacity, all the characteristic processes of social expression and growth.26

Shafer reiterates the prerequisite of intellectual capacity a number of times in his works.

At one time it may be mentioned as a factor in the successful qualitative administration of the college; for instance when he says,

Americans have not only tended to measure the success of their colleges...in terms of mere quantity, but the colleges themselves have acquiesced in this mercantile standard. They have competed...for numbers.27

And as a result of this competition, he says, that they "got more than they could properly take care of."28 (See note below.*)

He again states the idea of liberal education for the many as being false to the standard of that sort of education when he discusses a plan for education by H. G. Wells revealed in the book The Salvaging of Civilisation. He finds in Wells' "social theory" of education a faith in the natural goodness of man, reminiscent of Rousseau, that leads to the "assumption...that all human beings are equally capable of high intellectual development."29

27. Shafer, Robert. op. cit. pp. 136-137.
28. Ibid. p. 139.
29. Ibid. p. 112.

* Note: Progress and Science was published in 1922. If that observation was capable of being made then how much more now after the last world war. And by this time, many colleges having found out that increased numbers of students does not mean greater profit, financially and perhaps otherwise, are beginning to cut back their enrollments to something like pre-war numbers.
In its connection to American democratic ideals he says, we have believed in it [education] for everybody, and since earliest colonial times we have attempted to achieve it for everybody.\(^\text{30}\)

But he also cautions "that universal education by no means implies collegiate training for everybody."\(^\text{31}\) Arguing against the worthwhile presence of great numbers of students purely as being contrary to the law of averages, he says,

Good ones do not grow in herds. Education is too often...like vaccination; even with the utmost care it does not "take," as we say. Prolonged effort expended upon the majority of pupils is...likely...to prove wasted....\(^\text{32}\)

These passages should more than adequately establish Shafer's position versus the idea of numbers in liberal education. The presence of these passages, together with the understanding that there are other passages, is intended to indicate that the idea of attempting to train the good man, in Shafer's scheme, depends on the presence of intellectual capacity in the beginning and that the idea of attempting to develop the good man without that capacity is fruitless.

Social Theories of Education -- In discussion of the previous fallacy the "social theory" of education was mentioned. In the chapter of Progress and Science entitled "Education and Progress," Shafer devotes much space to the discussion of those theories under that name as represented by both

\(^\text{32}\). Ibid. p. 118.
H. G. Wells and John Dewey. He sees these theories as the result of a kind of thinking subscribed to by a large proportion of the population, a kind of thinking which he considers both false and dangerous.

Howard Mumford Jones, asking the question whether there is danger in "the lock-step method" "turning our schools into ideational training camps for the supposititious society of the future,"33 is similarly on record against these theories. He says,

The increasing spread of requirements in social studies, civics, flag-saluting, fingerprinting, intelligence-testing, grading according to ability, and the like reduction of the human individual to the status of a cog in the social machine would seem to hint of this danger.34

Some of the specific faults he has to find with these ideas reveals again what he believes to be inconsistent with the idea of a truly liberal education.

Shafer claims that Mr. Wells demonstrates a "child-like faith...in mere machinery and organization,"35 in calling for an education which will take advantage of "the capacity of the present age for mass production and standardisation."36

In view of our discussion of education for everybody and in view of the mention of training for leadership in

34. Idem.
Chapter I, such an outlook would obviously run counter to Shafer's idea of a liberal education. In addition we might add that any mechanical type of education would also oppose Mr. Shafer's theory. Mr. Wells would apparently have had us develop uniformity in students claiming that "there is... in the world a lamentable diversity of opinion." 37 Whereas Mr. Shafer's plan as revealed in greater detail as to its workings in the section on curriculum, would give much attention to the individual's ability to work on his own. Shafer says, "The truth is that the only education is self-education." 38 And such a statement would preclude one which is superimposed from the outside, or one which has the otherwise mechanical nature suggested by the following paragraphs.

As a matter of fact the central unifying feature in Mr. Wells' program was to be a textbook a Bible of Civilization, "an authoritative, succinct, and yet very comprehensive statement of the background and meaning of life." 39 This book, apparently like his everything-between-two-covers editions of The Outline of Science and The Outline of History, is to furnish the student with everything he needs to know.

And in so doing there is reason to believe that Mr. Wells thereby subscribed to Bacon's "Knowledge is power."

37. Shafer, Robert. op. cit. p. 110.
everyone knowing the same things, a world-state will be possible in which peace will be probable if not guaranteed. That Shafer would disagree with, and violently oppose, such a plan is obvious in his noting that Wells "fails to distinguish it from propaganda, but seems to regard the two as being the same thing." If he sees liberal education as the training of an individual, then he would certainly not agree to any system that smacked of the thought control of George Orwell's novel 1984. Further, if that individual is to be free, that is liberalized, an education which robs a man of his individuality could be nothing less than reprehensible to Shafer.

True he does not regard Mr. Wells as vindictive or scheming. He sees him, and such a plan, as the product of a fuzzy and rather shapeless optimism that comes from the idea of progress, which a Life editorial sums up as follows:

The idea of progress grew from the observable fact of science's increasing conquest of material nature. But Darwin, Herbert Spencer and others stretched this observable fact into certain unprovable assumptions: namely, that "all environments [Darwin's words] will tend to progress toward perfection," that man himself is perfectible through scientific self-knowledge and that evil is not a permanent necessity in the world. Even devout men like Tennyson...could promote the new faith by assuming God was on its side.

As indeed He may be. But there is increasing evidence to the contrary. There is also evidence that the under-pinnings of our faith in progress may be weakening, for the scientists themselves are no longer so sure. The leading physicists have long

since regained an almost primitive awe of the universe, and H. G. Wells repudiated a lifelong worship of progress before he left a world for which his final epithet was "doomed formicary." Bury's book *The Idea of Progress* was written a generation before the atomic bomb, but the bomb gives these words of his a new point: "If there were good cause for believing that the earth would be uninhabitable in A. D. 2000 or 2100, the doctrine of Progress would lose its meaning and automatically disappear."41

Mr. Wells, observing the tremendous scientific and technological advances of recent times (to which he pays tribute in his *War of the Worlds*) and asserting the natural goodness of man, simply falls in line with the idea that man will eventually arrive at a perfect state by removing the ills of his environment which are the source of evil.

The attention of education is thereby placed, Shafer would say, on the mass rather than the individual, on knowing facts rather than on knowing self, on the assumption that the process, being highly organized and standardized, is the cure-all for the ills of the world.

Shafer apparently considers Mr. Dewey a more formidable enemy than Mr. Wells, even though Wells with his notions about social progress represents in his thinking the convictions of the major portion of the civilized world. Shafer is suspicious of Dewey's argumentation; he says, "He appears at times to give his reader something with one hand while he quietly takes it away with the other."42 And further,

41. "Untragic America." *Life.* XXI (Dec. 2, 1946) p. 32. (See also Ch. I, Introduction, in definition of Humanism, quotation of Norman Foerster.)

He often seems...to offer a solution of all our problems by blandly leading us a long way around to the conclusion that there are no solutions. Yet since Mr. Dewey is "a powerful leader" with "a large number of enthusiastic disciples," and since he offers his own form of cure for our educational ills, he must come to Shafer's attention.

But how does Dewey happen to be grouped along with Wells as a worker for a social theory of education? Most briefly, Shafer finds the relationship in Dewey's belief that "Education, growth, life, are synonymous terms, and education is thus life itself, and is its own end." Dewey's pragmatic philosophy demands "that both the things learned in school and the methods of learning them should approximate as closely as possible the actual life of our age."

Shafer finds that in experiment the plan has had much success with picked teachers and students, but that in other cases, though the child was immensely pleased and tremendously enjoyed himself, he did not learn. Students were to learn how to fit into society by playing the game with one another, each to eventually find his own place. But Shafer contends that the plan does not provide for the development of leaders. If that is so, then certainly Dewey's plan is

44. Ibid. p. 122.
45. Ibid. p. 126.
46. Ibid. p. 124.
out of harmony with the leadership, and human excellence which Shafer works toward in his plan for liberal education. Like Wells, Dewey attempts to unify society to give it the consistency of a democratic, industrial society. But Shafer observes, that even though Dewey is conscious of defects in current education,

This plan is conceived for the great majority. The small minority of those who have unusual intellectual capacity are to be thrown in with the rest, with no means provided for giving them the special early foundation essential for their own kind of later achievement.47

By planning to educate for a uniform society of the moment and by not making provision for the training of leaders, Shafer finds Dewey, the leader of progressive education, has proposed "a kind of education which in the long run could insure only retrogression, not progress."48

We find, then, that both in the section on education for everybody and in this on two proponents of social theories, Shafer is essentially protesting education in the mass without consideration for excellence or superiority as contrary to the idea of liberal education and the kind which would render the college helpless to present to the society therein discussed the leaders that it needs. We find that he would say with Everett Dean Martin that "education is more than information, or skill, or propaganda."49

48. Ibid. p. 134.
49. Martin, Everett Dean. The Meaning of a Liberal Education. vii.
Free Election -- Shafer regards free election in liberal education as an anomaly, reasoning that if liberal education is general and free election is particular, both cannot dominate. He would say that free election produces the smatterer not the liberalized good man, the beginning specialist not the cultivated representative of human excellence. Free election gives students freedom to make choices which they cannot make intelligently, and which they do make for the worst possible reasons....

Agreeing with J. W. Hudson in *The College and New America* he pictures students choosing a course because of the hour it meets, the professor who teaches it, and like reasons. And he claims that "The free elective system puts a premium on laziness and aimlessness...." (He notes even at the time of this book--1922--the beginning of its disappearance, but I believe he would have to say today that that trend is still a trend and not an accomplished process.)

The free-elective system, he says, has robbed the college of its coherence by its lack of direction in going potentially in all directions and by failing to become whole cloth in remaining isolated threads. He calls for at least modification with the student made to occupy himself

51. Ibid. p. 519.
53. Ibid. p. 138.
thoroughly with some subject rather than being allowed to take "a little of this and a little of that" in cafeteria fashion.

**Inadequate Care of Students' Life** — Having already noted that Shafer is critical of mere numbers—numbers of students, numbers of course credits piled up through free-election—let us consider a related fallacy he sees as having come along more or less as a by-product.

That he is interested in individual attention to students will be shown in the discussion of curriculum (Chapter IV). But what will not particularly appear there, beyond the matter of individual attention as a necessary feature of thorough education, is the fact that he is interested in the non-academic life of the student. He complains that the term academic life has been narrowly interpreted as "the classroom existence of...students."\(^5\) And as a result direction of the students by "police regulations" which are a makeshift control has prevailed. In addition, at many colleges where living conditions are inadequate and dormitories few, "herds of raw-youth have been turned loose to shift for themselves in boarding-houses."\(^5\) In this way too great impetus has been given the rise of fraternities and the like which "perpetuate their rawness, their unintelligence and... unregenerated social and intellectual condition...."\(^5\)

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\(^5\) Idem.

\(^5\) Ibid. p. 141
But a correction of these specific conditions would not necessarily give breadth to the expression *academic life* though Shafer would consider them steps in the right direction. These are some of the factors which separate college and individual student. What he regards as a fallacy is the inadequate relationship between the whole and the part, the college and the student, which could not be rectified by expedient action alone, but which must begin with the principle of interest in students one by one, the development of good men, one by one.

What he believes should be done about such care will be discussed in the section on curriculum: the house system, the tutorial system, and so forth.

**Specialization** — That Shafer opposes specialization in the college is implicit in his use of the expression—and indeed the historical growth of the expression in education to stand for the opposite of specialization—*general education* which is the more often used term in recent years for what has been called *liberal education*. General education today is a protest against specialization in the college which came as the result of the application of science's principle of breakdown and classification of knowledge into so many and diverse fields that the student must follow a major usually after two years of largely required studies. As
Life has said,

The distractions beating in on the campus from the outside world must increase in intensity with every new mechanical triumph in television and whatnot. Such specialization Shafer regards as the work of the graduate school, not the college.

And that Shafer's battle against specialization in the college is still very much an issue is indicated in a Life editorial which says,

The tides pushing the student toward early specialization are running stronger than ever; a chemical engineer coming straight off the campus can have his pick of many jobs.

Further, Time reports the

Latest refinements of learning: Goldey [Junior] College...announced a course for "aerial secretaries," i.e., flying stenographers.

Bradley University...offered a four-year course in "music-business," to teach students about the flora & fauna of Tin Pan Alley, and the higher mathematics of the concert industry.

Nearly 300 University of Vermont summer students sailed for Europe to study, with full academic credit, the workings of the Marshall Plan.

As will be seen in Chapter IV and in order again to express the relationship between the college as a whole and the individual student, as well as move away from even the suggestion of specialization, he calls for "the abolition of

58. Idem.
departmental organization...and the substitution therefor of a less divided staff of instruction." 60 In the very faculty organization, therefore, he would attempt to achieve unity rather than diversity; to suggest that the faculty is dispensing one body of knowledge joined in truth rather than many bodies of knowledge, each going its own way.

Again, in the use of the expression the good man he is using a suggestive term. The emphasis in saying the expression orally is on man, and its use by Shafer is intended to emphasize the idea of the development, not here of the morally good man, as opposed to the evil, but of the good man rather than the good lawyer, mechanic, or whatever. He means the college to produce the good man in the general sense of that term rather than what it seems bent on producing, the man ready to step into a job, and a particular, specialized job.

CHAPTER IV

NEWMAN AND SHAFER

CURRICULUM OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION
CHAPTER IV

NEWMAN AND SHAFER - CURRICULUM OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION

Introduction - Newman -- The evidence regarding Newman's specifications for the curriculum of a liberal education is very thin for a number of reasons.

The university at Dublin never achieved full-scale operation. Some professors were engaged and some courses were begun, but they were small beginnings indeed compared to Newman's sweeping words on the university as a place of all knowledge.

Even if the university at Dublin had achieved full-scale operation, it is dubious what the final nature of the curriculum would have been, for steps were taken in Newman's absences which were not those he would have taken. The opposition or apathy of both the clergy and the laity with whom, or perhaps more accurately, against whom Newman had to work made what was done a compromise or a defeat and left many things undone. It hardly seems possible, then, that even our ability to read somewhere in print, the whole catalogue of the university, if such existed, would promise knowledge of what Newman would have had as his curriculum.

In The Idea of a University Newman's discussions are largely theoretical. He does mention certain subjects as being consistent with the idea of liberal education and others as being inconsistent with it. But for the most part
his mention of these subjects is by way of illustration of this or that general idea.

For these and perhaps other reasons, then, this section of the paper must be piece-meal in organization and more general than particular. Where conjecture is introduced it will be with the hope that what is so ventured will be at least in the spirit of Newman's intention.

Let us then proceed to outline the general ideas that would have influenced the curriculum both from Newman's own words and various critical and biographical sources; then we shall discuss the few specific actions that he took to begin the organization of the course of study at Dublin. At every step we must consider the fact that Newman's plan was in part a direct result of his connection with the Oxford Movement of earlier days. He was proposing to transplant in Ireland the ideals of Oxford for the benefit of Irish Catholics. What he said and the position he held were said and held in the face of several areas of opposition, of which he was aware in varying degrees. Some of that opposition he tried to anticipate in his general theorizing on a liberal education; some he tried to answer directly in attempting to found a university which would be a tangible proof of his stand. The following characteristics of his curriculum are derived from both his theoretical discourses and his experience with the proposed university.
The University a Place of All Knowledge -- Perhaps the most fundamental of all principles that would have finally influenced Newman's curriculum was his concept that "all knowledge is a whole and the separate Sciences parts of one..."\(^1\)

This, together with his idea that "it is the very profession of a University to teach all sciences [that is, knowledge],"\(^2\) gives us the hint of what is to follow. However, it might be wise also to repeat here the idea that, although the student could study but a portion of the knowledge represented in the university, he would gain something of the mental enlargement he sought by being in the place of all knowledge with other students of varied interests.

His specific purpose in insisting on the ideas of the oneness and interdependence of all knowledge "as being the acts and works of the Creator"\(^3\) and of the university as the teacher of all knowledge is to justify the inclusion of theology in the curriculum. His concept of the nature of theology places it as "the Science of God, or the truths we know about God put into system; just as we have a science of the stars and call it astronomy...."\(^4\) He asks, "How can we investigate any part of an order of Knowledge and stop short of that

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2. Ibid. p. 86.
3. Ibid. p. 88.
4. Ibid. p. 55.
which enters into every order?"  

5 Truly, then, theology was to be as Joseph Reilly says in Newman as a Man of Letters, the "keystone of his curriculum...."  

Newman proposed, then, a university to teach all knowledge: theology and the physical and biological sciences were to dwell side by side, at peace with one another. Historically, this was a nearly revolutionary idea in his time since the one was thought to be the natural enemy of the other. Certainly, in practice, it was. But "the new science came in a flood..."  

7 Oxford in 1845, the year in which Newman left the Anglican Church, was "conservative and ecclesiastical." By 1850 Oxford had become "liberal [that is, characterized by the liberalism which had long been Newman's foe] and secularist."  

Newman and Secular Education -- Newman's idea of a liberal education certainly was secular, at least outwardly. His gentleman, "the beau ideal of the world,"  

9 is not even expected to be a Christian. But the secular quality of Newman's ideas came not from an out-and-out anti-religious view and not from the liberalistic view that one denomination is as good as another. His life story would exclude both of

those possibilities as ridiculous. Rather, Newman's education was secular partly insofar as Newman wished to avoid narrowness or bigotry (he reminds us constantly that he is not speaking from a Catholic position) or any factor which might possibly render his ideal of intellectual excellence inconsistent or the producing of the gentleman of his definition impossible.

Newman's attempt to found the university came in a time of "change from the old denominational education by clergy to the new undenominational education by the specialists..."10

Two ideas of education were competing—the denominational or ecclesiastical, which threatened to be obscurantist [by rejecting the sciences]; and the undenominational or scientific, which threatened to be irreligious.11

Newman's secular education seemed to give concessions to the trend which we would assume him to oppose, by planning a curriculum "in which theology and science alike should be free and flourishing."12

How are we, then, to reconcile the facts that Newman apparently had given his university over to the free scientific investigation which was so much a part of liberalism, had defined the gentleman in such secular fashion, had wished the laity to have a prominent representation among the faculty with his avowed opposition to liberalism?

11. _Idem._
We have Ward's word that Newman did not share Dr. Cullen's [Archbishop of Dublin, under whose jurisdiction Newman came in his work with the University] dread of the whole modern scientific and liberal movement.13

That he differed with Dr. Cullen on the subject of the proper make-up of a university materially affected his progress. Cullen fought him, to be sure as much by silence (failing to answer Newman's letters which attempted to clarify issues) as by any other means so that Newman's ideas were not likely to prevail.14 But Newman's view on the matter, according to Ward, was that the anti-religious view might be best fought in the open rather than "by mere repression," that an education including both elements, operating under the "steadying influence" of the Catholic Church might be a more effective foe of Liberalism than any attempt to obscure from the public the tremendous amount of new knowledge and the impact on attitudes and philosophies that the development of the new sciences might engender.

Newman reveals this position partly when, after justifying the inclusion of Theology in the curriculum, he considers the circumstances that he sees as resulting from its omission from the curriculum. He says that in that case

its province will not simply be neglected but will actually be usurped by other sciences, which will teach, without warrant, conclusions of their own [in the field ordinarily treated in theology] in a subject matter which needs its own proper principles for its due formation and disposition.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition it hardly seems possible that Newman would hamstring his church's efforts to make its faith prevail. Though both theology and science were to be taught and though the gentleman represents a secular ideal and though he separates the concepts of knowledge and virtue, Newman also projected as two of his four most cherished goals in the university work the establishment "of a University Church as a centre of influence on the cultivated classes in Dublin as well as on the...students...." and "a periodical organ of the University...."\textsuperscript{16} Both agencies could easily be used on the side of religion, virtue, and all else that Newman held dear but kept from dominating his proposed education in the university.

The General Structure of the Curriculum -- Looking for the major divisions of Newman's working plan for a liberal education, we find that he conceives "three great subjects on which Human Reason employs itself: God, Nature, and Man...."\textsuperscript{17} The first involves, he says, the study of theology, the second, of science, and the third, of literature.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Newman, John Henry. \textit{op. cit.} p. 86.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ward, Wilfred. \textit{op. cit.} I, p. 345.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Newman, John Henry. \textit{op. cit.} p. 194.
\end{itemize}
Further, since he opened the School of Philosophy and Letters (or the School of Arts) first, we may consider this the primary part of his organizational work in the direction of a liberal curriculum. In so doing he directed his attention to "classical literature and the studies connected with it" as a sign of "the place which they have held in all ages in education."\(^{18}\)

This preference was stated on the occasion of the school's opening "in spite of the special historical connexion of University Institutions with the Sciences of Theology, Law, and Medicine..."\(^{19}\) He claimed that "a University should be formally based... in the Faculty of Arts...," for "Arts existed before other Faculties...."\(^{20}\) Looking to history for his sanction, he finds that medieval "Scholastic Theology, Law, and Medicine" and the "Baconian method" alike fail to replace "the literature of Greece,... enriched by the literature of Rome, together with the studies which it involves" as "the instrument of education, and the food of civilization, from the first times of the world down to this day..."\(^{21}\) Historically he says, a liberal education consisted of grammar, rhetoric, logic, geometry, arithmetic,


\(^{19}\) Ibid. p. 217.

\(^{20}\) Idem.

\(^{21}\) Ibid. p. 228.
astronomy, and music—the trivium and the quadrivium; apparently his curriculum will look to that foundation.

John E. Wise, in his essay "Newman and the Liberal Arts," finds Newman again reflecting the past when he says that Newman's education was concerned with "the transmission with organic growth of the great truths in the Graeco-Roman-Hebrew-Christian culture." By "organic growth" I assume Wise means the additions and sanctions which arise from time and from man's continued efforts to find truth and which accrued naturally to Newman in his nineteenth century.

The Particular Studies to be Pursued -- Newman's intention as to the studies toward a liberal education is expressed by Joseph Reilly as an attempt to parallel Oxford in a curriculum which should be both rich and unrestricted...whose varied elements should become "the high ministers of the beautiful and noble," partly by serving the authentic purposes of the university and partly by ministering to the competent and polished gentleman he had set his heart on producing.

We receive a criterion as to the inclusion of this or that subject in Newman's words: "Whether youths are to be taught Latin or verse-making will depend on the fact, whether these studies tend to mental culture...." The subjects that he studies will depend upon not

what department contains the more wonderful facts, or promises the more brilliant discoveries, which is...higher and which...inferior...; but simply which out of all provides the most robust and invigorating discipline for the unformed mind.25

Moreover, in attending a university which "teaches all knowledge by teaching all branches of knowledge,"26 the student "will know just where he and his science stand"27 and he "will have gained...a special illumination and largeness of mind and freedom and self-possession."28 from a curriculum whose all-inclusiveness itself is a factor important to Newman's idea of a liberal education.

The reader should again be reminded, as he was in Reilly's words above, that there is no inconsistency between Newman's idea of the university as a place of all knowledge and the idea of a student's studying certain particular subjects. Though the university does teach all knowledge by Newman's profession, the seeker after a liberal education would reach his goal by qualitatively choosing the study of philosophical knowledge, liberal knowledge. Newman says, "When I speak of Knowledge, I mean something intellectual."29

Let the following serve to illustrate the point in part.

Ward tells us that one of Newman's aims was the "special

26. Ibid. p. 147.
27. Idem.
encouragement of Celtic literature. This project is not represented in the list of faculty appointees below, but even if it were, such a study would not be included, necessarily, as a liberal study but as a part of Newman's plan, through the Catholic University, to raise the intellectual level of the Irish Catholics. In other words, the subject is probably part of a particular long-range aim to add to the national expression as much as readers or students of the then-existent Irish literature; so considered it has little connection with the idea, or theory, of a liberal education. Knowing as we do that Newman felt the disparity between the level of Irish and English Catholics the encouraging of Celtic literature becomes part of a practical problem in developing national pride in what was the special property of Ireland. As he said, "Every...people has a character of its own, which it manifests and perpetuates in a variety of ways."

A list of his early faculty appointees will furnish a partial picture of the studies essential to the beginning of the university; hence, an indication of Newman's idea of liberal studies. (Though I have no additional sources to substantiate my belief, I assume that some of the men and studies listed below were not to be considered part of the School of Philosophy and Letters but rather part of the

Medical School, which was opened in 1856. The Medical School had been purchased in 1854, the year of the opening of the School of Philosophy and Letters. It is conceivable that appointments to both schools might have been announced in this single published list.)

The following is the first published list of Professors:

1. Dogmatic Theology, the Rev. Father Edmund O'Reilly, D.D., S.J.
2. Holy Scripture, the Very Rev. Patrick Leahy, D.D.
4. Political Economy, John O'Hagan, Esq., M.A.
5. Geography, J. B. Robertson, Esq.
6. Classical Literature, Robert Ornsby, Esq., M.A.
7. Ancient History, James Stewart, Esq., M.A.
8. Philosophy of History, Thomas W. Allies, Esq., M.A.
9. Political and Social Science, Aubrey de Vere, Esq.
11. The Fine Arts, J. H. Pollen, Esq., M.A.
12. Logic, David Dunne, Esq., D.D.
14. Natural Philosophy, Henry Hennessy, Esq., M.A.
15. Civil Engineering, Terence Flanagan, Esq., M.I.C.E.
16. French Literature, M. Pierre le Page Renouf
17. Italian Literature, Signor Marani
18. Practice of Surgery, Andrew Ellis, Esq., F.R.C.S.
21. Physiology and Pathology, Robert D. Lyons, Esq., M.B.T.C.D. and L.R.C.S.
22. Demonstrator in Anatomy, Henry Tyrrell, Esq., L.R.C.S.I.
23. Demonstrator in Anatomy, John O'Reilly, Esq., L.R.C.S.I.32

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Introduction - Shafer -- Because the projection of this paper does not extend to specific chapters on such subjects as the administration of a liberal education, institutional prerequisites to a liberal education, teaching methods in a liberal education, and the like, but rather confines itself to the fundamental theoretical bases of a liberal education as found in the writings of Newman and Shafer, certain aspects of such topics are included in the following chapter insofar as they affect curricular matters. Most particularly these matters will be discussed in the two sections which follow: The Need for a New College, and The General Nature of the Proposed New College: Entrance, Residence, and Instruction. It will be noted also that these sections offer opportunity for recapitulation of certain parts of the preceding chapters and that the whole section serves to illustrate in detailed plan of operation what Shafer propounds as virtue and error in the theory of liberal education as noted in Chapters II and III.

The Need for a New College -- Shafer believes that the present situation in college education cannot be resolved by juggling the factors of current education or adjustment. He considers the formation of a new college to be the only answer to the formlessness he ascribes to the liberal college of today. This college would presumably represent a clean break away from the present in embodying the principles laid down in
Chapter II and eliminating the fallacies treated in Chapter III.

In other words, we may rightfully expect to find that the education received at this college would be aimed at dispensing general education, not specialized education, not vocational or otherwise utilitarian education, to small numbers of students with superior intellectual capacity so as to develop in them objectivity, a sense of proportion, leadership, freedom, and so forth.

The General Nature of the Proposed New College: Entrance, Residence, and Instruction -- The liberal college which Shafer proposes would have a three-year course of study leading to a degree of A.B. It would be "an integral part of the university though entirely distinct from its higher schools."33 Whether Shafer would confine the liberal college absolutely to the university I am unable to determine. I suspect, however, that his statement of separation of the two is a result of his observations that the graduate school has exerted an unhealthy influence on current versions of the liberal college represented in the major study and that the faculty members are often called upon to serve in both undergraduate and graduate courses.

Being thus placed distinctly after the secondary school and before the graduate school, the college occupies the

place which Shafer has prescribed: the final stage of general education and the stage preceding specialized study.

Entrance requirements to the liberal college would be rather general and few since Shafer regards secondary education as too confused to be able to justify more specific and more thoroughly stated prerequisites. Judging from the quotations which follow, examinations might be required in mathematics, language, and English composition; whereas certification would be accepted in other studies. It will be seen from the discussion of the first year in the section **The First Year** that the entrance requirements align closely with the course of study for that year. Shafer says,

> Candidates must possess a thorough knowledge of mathematics through trigonometry, must have the ability to read at least one foreign language [ancient or modern] rapidly at sight, and must be able to write English correctly.\(^{34}\)

In other credits for entrance "the new college must be satisfied with merely a certificate of graduation from an accredited...school..."\(^{35}\) The requirements are set up then more or less in resignation to the situation and represent Shafer's judgment of the best that can be made of the prevailing situation.

Shafer's complaint on the inadequate care of students is reflected in his words on residence and instruction. The students are to live in groups of "not more than two hundred

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fifty, "36 and a senior tutor, with the assistance of other tutors, "living as integral members" 37 of each group is to have the opportunity to supervise study and to provide, in a fashion that mere classroom instruction cannot, additional instruction. Such residence is designed to facilitate the transition from the secondary school to the more adult way of the college, to make the college experience more complete than isolated bits of instruction in classrooms and living in boarding-houses or fraternal organizations can make it. In such a house-plan the student would presumably live not only as a student but as a social being, eating with his fellows and masters and conceivably otherwise having opportunity for instructive discussion and activity.

In the case of day-students, found in large numbers of urban universities, he would have provided an attempt to substitute for the situation of resident students

group quarters--residential for tutors--for study, social activity, and such meals as the day-students can manage to have in common. 38

Thus, he believes, the college would be taking a positive step to leave less to chance, to care for students instead of forcing them to care for themselves in order to facilitate the process of learning and growing toward the ideal of human excellence. There is no suggestion anywhere

37. Idem.
38. Idem.
that his plan is devised to keep the students' off-campus life under control in a disciplinary or regulatory sense. Rather, the emphasis is on providing a truly liberal education with the college taking the step to provide the best possible setting for it, having observed failure to provide education of the quality he believes to be the responsibility of the college.

And as will be seen later in this section, the position of the tutor has even less of the idea of discipline and more of the idea of teaching than the fact of residence, of itself, naturally guarantees.

The First Year -- Although the curriculum is not presented in the finest of detail (such detail would presumably require a considerable committee) and Shafer often suggests that this or that feature of what he suggests is open to debate or subject to adjustment, its broad outlines leave little question as to his intention. It is very clear from the start that greater academic dignity and maturity will be expected of the entering student than can now be expected.

For example, he says,

Class-instruction will be necessary, but should be differentiated as sharply as possible from the kind appropriate and necessary in the lower schools. 39

The residence plan is designed to hasten that transition, the difficulty of which Shafer is sharply aware. He says,

Every effort should be made to impress upon students the fact that...they can no longer be treated like children, but must...educate themselves.40

This is no plan to shift the responsibility entirely upon the student but an attempt to begin the development of individual students rather than groups of students. If this is to be the education of leaders in society then they are to be "treated as responsible beings, admitted to the college for a serious purpose..."41 And in making much of such an attitude he is again emphasizing the liberal part of liberal education. To this end Shafer says that the first year should be designed to effect a complete but not disastrously sudden transition from the ways of the school to the freedom of manhood.42

But the freedom which Shafer intends is hardly used to denote the unhampered choice of electives but rather the freedom which comes from the increased and deepened exercise of the individual intellect at which he aims.

The first year, Shafer contends, should be complete in itself, for the benefit of those unable to continue their college work, but at the same time it should prepare the student for the succeeding two years and should serve "as an adequate basis for thorough examination."43 Such a program of examinations is intended in part to determine fitness

40. Shafer, Robert. op. cit. p. 515.
41. Idem.
42. Idem.
43. Idem.
for continued participation in the studies of the college. Those who are considered not capable of continuing will not be allowed to do so. So that such a statement will not be considered routine and rather empty, it should be added that Shafer demands an accounting, seriously, considered rather than the frequent situation of nominal examinations and "passing on" large numbers with no particular attempt at quality. The student, then, in the general studies of the first year, is on probation. He must prove himself worthy of more difficult and exacting studies and the more individualized approach of the last two years.

The courses of the first year are to be as follows:

I. A three-hour course in mathematics beyond trigonometry;

II. A four-hour course in the elements of logic and general introduction to philosophy;

III. A three-hour course in the literature of the foreign language offered for entrance; and

IV. A five-hour course in English and American literature and history.44

Thus a fifteen-hour week of classroom study is provided for, six of which are obvious outgrowths of the particular entrance requirements already mentioned: the course in "mathematics beyond trigonometry" continues from "a thorough ability in mathematics through trigonometry;" the course in "the literature of the foreign language

offered for entrance" continues from "the ability to read at least one foreign language (ancient or modern) rapidly at sight."

In addition Shafer superimposes on the four courses an additional requirement which reflects the prerequisite to "be able to write English correctly": a weekly paper is to be done in the mathematics course and a tri-weekly paper in each of the other three courses, these in order to demonstrate the application and criticism of knowledge acquired.

Thus only one course remains unaccounted for in the entrance requirement and that--in logic and philosophy--is an introductory course and one intended to lead into the work of the other two years.

To substitute for the conventional examinations, which are entirely eliminated, a series of papers demonstrating "both knowledge acquired and power to use it" would be assigned and would form the basis of judgment as to the ability to continue.

The Second and Third Years -- The second and third years are intended to act as a closely woven unit. In the second year, for example a three-hour course in physics leads into a three-hour course of the third year in the logic and philosophy of the scientific method, which is to be taught "as concretely as possible...."

45. Shafer, Robert. op. cit. p. 515.

46. Idem.
Shafer does not go into further detail as to other courses in the usual sense of the word; instead he places emphasis on what will be the real core of his liberal education: tutor-supervised attention to "a prescribed set of books." The list is as follows:

- **Plato:** Phaedrus; Phaedo; Republic
- **Aristotle:** Nicomachean Ethics; Politics; Poetics
- **Aeschylus:** Agamemnon
- **Sophocles:** Antigone
- **Thucydides:** Peloponnesian War
- **Gibbon:** Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire
- **Dante:** Divine Comedy
- **Hooker:** Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Book I
- **Bacon:** Novum Organum, Book I
- **Shakespeare:** Six plays
- **Hobbes:** Leviathan, Parts I and II
- **Milton:** Paradise Lost; Samson Agonistes
- **Butler:** Summons on Human Nature; Dissertation on Virtue
- **Macaulay:** History of England
- **Hume:** Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
- **Boswell:** Life of Johnson
- **Wordsworth:** The Prelude
- **Mill:** Utilitarianism; On Liberty
- **Green:** Prolegomena to Ethics
- **Pater:** Marius the Epicurean
- **Arnold:** Culture and Anarchy

In addition the student is to obtain through work supervised by the tutors "a sufficient knowledge to understand these books...."

47. Note: Shafer does not, however, assert that this list is the only possible list nor does he argue that it is the best possible. He anticipates argument as to what books and how many might be included. He suggests these books as constituting the sort he believes should be required.


49. Ibid. p. 517.

50. Ibid. p. 515.
Over the two-year period the student will be assigned a group of approximately fifty papers, which the tutor will criticize and discuss with the student, or small groups of students, at weekly conferences. Here, of course, is the real function of the requirement of correctly written English, the real reason for resident tutors, the real opportunity for individual instruction combined with self-education.

In sharp protest against present methods are his words on the nature of instruction. He says that if we are to have individual attention to students we cannot have the large classes that have grown with the lecture system. He says,

The teacher's office...is properly confined to suggestion, to stimulus, to general oversight. Our students at present are over-lectured, are compelled to spend quite too much of their time in mere class-attendance, and the responsibilities which should be theirs are in despair assumed by their instructors.  

And as a result students must develop their individuality outside of their studies in extra-curricular activities.

He says that properly the liberal college should have "some lectures, very carefully prepared, but not many."  

Examinations, Graduation, Degrees -- To determine his fitness for graduation and its degree, the student upon


52. Ibid. p. 151.

completing the stages which have been outlined, is subject to "a set of general examinations, both written and oral, and including final essay subjects."\(^\text{54}\) Previously, he had been examined as to his fitness to continue at the end of the first year. Those had not been examinations in the conventional sense but a series of papers. Since then he had been attacking a two-year unit and now he is to be ready to give an accounting of his individual human excellence.

The preparing and administering of these examinations is to be left to a group of men,

a board including representatives from amongst the tutors, and from the faculty of the graduate school of arts and sciences, and also including members drawn from outside the university.\(^\text{55}\)

The purpose of such a make-up of the board, I presume, is to include not only those familiar in detail with the work of the student but those whose points of view are shaped respectively by the specialized work which may follow the student's graduation and by the world which the student is to enter. Thus greater objectivity might result than might be expected of the tutors alone. And presumably, also, if the work of the new college has been done, the student will be ready to meet the test of a group which may or may not be cognizant of his position but which is charged with determining whether the student should properly be granted a degree.

\(^{54}\) Shafer, Robert. \emph{op. cit.} p. 516.

\(^{55}\) \emph{Idem.}
Shafer adds a qualification to the time of granting a degree so that in "unusual circumstances" the student might be allowed an extra year beyond the prescribed three to ready himself for the examination. But although he does not explain what he means by the expression unusual circumstances he does intend that in no less than three years will the student be allowed to present himself as a candidate for a degree but that rather the completion of the program could conceivably require more than three years. And since he has taken issue with the Chicago plan of Robert Hutchins, it is possibly that feature of the Chicago curriculum which he has in mind here.

For example, a report in Time says,

Under the University of Chicago's self-winding curriculum, undergraduates set their own pace: they can get their degrees as fast as they can earn them.

William Hamburger, 20, was not the first in Chicago's history to get his bachelors degree in one year. But he was the first to do it with all A's.

Such an assumption is buttressed by the fact that he says,

No premium should under any circumstances be set upon additional work, because the primary aim throughout should be thoroughness and good quality, and never mere quantity of reading or writing.

At least it is possible to say that in Shafer's plan, unlike the Chicago plan, the student could not become eligible for

56. Shafer, Robert. op. cit. p. 516.
58. Shafer, Robert. op. cit. p. 516.
a degree except within rather definite and restricted time periods. And since Shafer has posed the time limitations "to safeguard the purpose of the course," they thus represent a conviction on his part that, genius or not, three years must be spent at the task of pursuing a liberal education, not less and possibly one year more.

That he is further interested in setting a high standard for fitness for enrollment and continuance in, and graduation from, the liberal college is further evidenced by his elimination of conditional examinations and "no more than one repeated examination, either for admission to candidacy [for the second and third years] or for the degree." Moreover a student who failed at the end of his first year

would be under the necessity of repeating his first year's work before making his final effort, and a student who failed to pass his general examinations would be compelled to wait for a year before making his final attempt.

Thus he has established limitations on both the type of student who in some colleges might be allowed to finish before the usual time and the type of student which it has been the tendency to "pass on" without serious impediment.

Quality becomes the criterion even on the diploma itself. He says,

60. *Idem*.
61. *Idem*. 
Students obtaining their degrees should be grouped in three classes on the basis of their showing in the general examinations [first, second, and third, or "high honours," "honours," and "passed"] and the places attained should be inscribed on their diplomas. Those obtaining their degrees on the basis of repeated general examinations, however, should only be eligible for the third-class or "pass" degree and should suffer the penalty of having it stated in their diplomas that they obtained this degree only upon a second attempt.62

CHAPTER V

COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Shafer's Affinity for Newman (Newman's Writings) -- The attraction of Newman for Shafer is clear and unmistakable. Shafer's admiration for Newman is expressed in occasional references here and there in his writings. And though he does not always use Newman's name there is a definite feeling imparted in many places that here is a man who is so steeped in the Newman idea of a liberal education that he breathes the atmosphere of Newman into his writings almost subconsciously. (See especially footnotes 1, 19, and 20 below.)

Shafer shows both his indebtedness to Newman and his general agreement with Newman's ideas on education in such statements as that when he says liberal education was once described as the education of a gentleman, and that is still probably its best description, and may perhaps safely be used again....

Further, this feeling is substantiated in greater fullness, even though Shafer does not discuss Newman particularly as an educator, in the chapter of Christianity and Naturalism devoted to Newman. There he says,

No praise can be too high for Newman's unmatched style, for the noble, severely controlled fire of his utterance, for his clarity, for his definiteness, and his purposiveness.

In another work Shafer calls Newman's *Apologia pro Vita Sua* "a justly famous book written with transparent candor and sincerity,"\(^3\) and he refers to *The Idea of a University* as "a classic statement of the meaning of a liberal education."\(^4\) Shafer's Affinity for Newman (Newman's Intellectual Keenness and Integrity)—Shafer's admiration is not confined to Newman's writing. He states that "Newman's character was straight and sound and resolute" that it was at once manly and saintly, while it had as its ready instruments a rich imagination and a powerful intellect.\(^5\)

And he says,

Newman's nature was closely akin to Coleridge's and Carlyle's. He heard the same inner voice that they heard, telling him of truths beyond the ken of rationalists and scientists.\(^6\)

Shafer regards Newman as a man much ahead of his time in "his prescience of the course of nineteenth-century thought" when he repeats

his description of the agnostic man of science, written in the eighteen-fifties, before the term agnosticism had been invented...,\(^7\)

and when he mentions his ability to "clearly perceive and

---

understand the forces which were opposed to religion in the nineteenth century...."8

Discussing Newman's quarrel with Kingsley, he says emphatically, "By universal consent since the publication of the *Apologia* Kingsley was not right about Newman."9

And discussing Newman's joining of a deeply mystical sense of reality with a Calvinistic religion when he was fifteen, Shafer says of Newman's conviction that he was right simply by knowing that he knew: "He was as anxious as any man to know the truth at any cost to himself...."10

Shafer's Affinity for Newman (Newman's Catholicism) --

Along with his admiration for Newman's utterance and his character goes Shafer's respect for Newman's application of both to the step-by-step development of Newman's religious ideas. (Another New Humanist, Paul Elmer More, is not so complimentary, however, though equally sympathetic. He believes that "Newman's surrender to the appeal of Rome was a pathetic mistake."11) This religious development Shafer traces so that he comes to regard Newman's eventual conversion to the Roman church as inevitable, consistent with the nature and character of Newman and with history.


10. Ibid. p. 76.

of the nineteenth century." Reading his own position into Newman's situation, he says,

He may have gone wrong, with such light as was vouchsafed him. Nevertheless with single-hearted and life-long devotion he bore witness, in a way whose significance may not even yet be fully apparent, to what is central and abiding in human nature. It may or may not be right or possible to follow the whole way in the path which he took, but this cannot impair, and should not obscure, the importance and significance of his life and work.13

Though Shafer is not a member of the Roman Catholic Church, he thus reveals sympathy with Newman's problem. And though this paper is not a religious study, this facet of the relationship between the two men is worthy of mention here, in that it is possibly a by-product of Shafer's admiration for Newman as writer and thinker and man.

Shafer says, discussing Matthew Arnold's judgment of Newman's religion as "frankly impossible,"

---Most would agree with this verdict....But it is at least curious and worthy of remark that out of this stronghold of delusion, superstition, and ignorance there came forth sweetness and light. For by universal consent Newman was not only himself a man of high and noble character, but was also one who understood human nature almost miraculously.14

And further, he maintains,

12. Shafer, Robert. From Beowulf to Thomas Hardy, II. p. 403.
What he understood so well was nothing new, but precisely that which, underneath the ceaseless change of our ways of life, endures at the centre of human nature, and forms the stuff of man's abiding thoughts, and problems, and hopes and achievements in the gaining of inner freedom and peace, and in spiritual growth.  

Perhaps some words from Newman may give evidence of the source of Shafer's judgment. Newman speaks of the many races of men, their starts, their fortunes..., and their ways, habits, governments, forms of worship; their enterprises, their aimless courses; their random achievements and acquirements,...the greatness and littleness of man.

This concern of Shafer with Newman's understanding of human nature must have its reflection in Shafer's educational philosophy. Mutually, they find men capable of good or bad, greatness or smallness; therefore they oppose the doctrine of natural goodness and stand side by side against Rousseau and his followers.

It has been pointed out that Shafer makes every concession to Newman's religious decisions in spite of the fact that he is not of Newman's faith. But, we have also seen, in spite of their differences, that they come to working agreement. And even in the religious disagreement which would eventually keep the two men apart in the final analysis--agreed to differ--perhaps--we find Shafer saying that

there must at least be important elements in Newman's religion which should be excepted before one agrees that it is "frankly impossible." I am not at all concerned to try to deny, or to gloss over those portions of Roman Catholic belief and practice which most outside of that church would now regard simply as the unholy relics of a past age of ignorance or relative barbarism. I should myself agree that Roman Catholicism is so encumbered with those survivals as to make it an "impossible" religion for honest and enlightened men and women. Yet...a simple rejection of Catholic Christianity is made also impossible by such a witness as Newman... The religion...must contain within it fundamental and enduring truths, else it never could have ministered fruitfully to such insight as his nor have helped him to such knowledge as showed of man's inner life, its meaning and issues. 17

It is obvious, then, that although Shafer cannot subscribe to the religion of Newman, he is conscious of the similarity between their separate searches for a human world of values. Shafer admires Newman as a man who lived in the real world of moral experience and spiritual values, and who did what he could to fathom the meaning of that experience and so to live a consciously and distinctively human life. 18

He considers the Catholic Church, along with the natural barriers a man must face, to have worked limitations on Newman's efforts, and he seems to imply that Newman triumphed as a man, although he could only fail as a Catholic. He places the man above the institution. Whereas Newman himself would start with the idea of God, the most potent reality of his experience, revealed through the Catholic

17. Shafer, Robert. op. cit. p. 296.
18. Ibid. p. 120.
Church, Shafer moves away from the natural level to the distinctively human level, which may need the assistance of God. But we can say that Shafer is "on God's side" and on Newman's, if Newman can be taken with the reservation that his religion is to be excepted—or neglected.

Shafer's Affinity for Newman (Newman's Battle Against Liberalism)-- Further, since Shafer recognizes in Newman's battle against liberalism and rationalism a struggle akin to his own battle against similar things, and since the source of what Newman objected to was fundamentally religious, the subject of religion cannot be omitted without obscuring the true nature of the case. And again, Shafer's general sympathy for, and at least a degree of agreement with Newman becomes implicitly apparent when he says,

By the late 1820's he saw Christianity in grave danger from forces which, so far as he understood them, he could neither approve nor respect. Private judgment and rationalism he estimated from their fruits—a suicidal anarchy in religion, in morals, and in social affairs. The horrors and excesses of the French Revolution were still too close to be forgotten—its spirit of hot-headed violence, its repudiation of divine authority in the name of reason, which suddenly and fearfully released all that is malign in human nature and gave the lie to all plausible talk about man's natural goodness. He saw, in short, only destruction and the release of evil resulting from the use of reason as it acts 'in fact and concretely in fallen man.'

Shafer's Affinity for Newman (Newman's Educational Thinking)--

Thus, implicitly, Newman and Shafer stand together in

accepting the idea that man is both good and bad, subject to error, and needing tradition and authority to guide him. This common position causes them to stress in the education they would have recognized as truly liberal the same tradition and authority and a shared suspicion of basing education on transient concepts. Shafer says,

In the midst of the great modern age of discovery he remained sceptical of much that passes amongst us as 'science' because he saw it constantly changing and saw men nevertheless hastily and madly building vast and solemn philosophies on these shifting foundations. He preferred to build more surely if more slowly, and he distrusted daily proclamations of revolutionary change which had to be modified or withdrawn in the light of the next day's news. In the university he planned he considered that theologians and scientists working together would hold each other in check and that knowledge would come slowly out of their joint endeavors.20

Historical Differences (Introduction) — Some of the differences between Newman and Shafer are the result of the mere physical circumstances of history. Newman's view of a liberal education is conditioned in part by the nineteenth century; Shafer's by the twentieth century. Even though each tries to examine liberal education as a concept which exists as one of the eternal verities of our intellectual heritage beyond any immediate influence, each also must come to grips with the education of his own day. And each is moved to speak in behalf of a liberal education as different from any other kind by the very fact that he sees

tendencies, practices, and theories existing which he regards as inimical to liberal education. And even though we may search for, and find, that the thing which Newman regarded as dangerous to the liberal tradition in his day is similar to another which Shafer views in the same manner in his time, it is also qualified by virtue of its existence in another place and another time.

We can see certain similarities, for example, between the liberalism which Newman so bitterly fought and the false equalitarianism which Shafer opposes. But the one, as seen by Newman, existed in England in a time when it was much less a democracy than it is now, when class privilege was less a factor of debate and more an accepted principle of government than it is now. Liberalistic thinking was still almost revolutionary in character. The other, as seen by Shafer, exists in the United States in so wide an acceptance as to make it conservative rather than revolutionary. In speaking against these two separate forces with something of a philosophical common denominator, then, Newman was speaking under circumstances where he could expect, still, much support; whereas Shafer is in a very lonely position in saying somewhat the same thing. Though both oppose popular tendencies, Newman was involved in intellectual debate with intellectuals restricted to a class group; whereas Shafer is putting his head in the lion's mouth in that what was only a tendency in Newman's day has
since become the working philosophy of the large majority of present-day intellectuals and indeed (since liberalism of all kinds is so strong today) the majority of the population.

Historical Differences (Educational Developments) -- Since Newman's time certain educational developments have taken place which qualify the circumstances of speaking in behalf of a liberal education. Most notable among these in affecting the subject matter of this paper is the growth in America of the liberal college as the particular giver of a liberal education. Hence, when Newman discussed liberal education he did so with the university and possibly its school of letters in mind. The university, as a place of all knowledge, was the proper locale of a liberal education. But when Shafer discusses liberal education he has in mind a specialized, particularized liberal college. He stresses separation of university and college, even though he conceives his college as part of a university; Newman stresses union.

Of course, Newman does so because in his day he was arguing against the exclusion of theology as a branch of knowledge, arguing for the concept of the unity of all knowledge, and for the university as the expression of that unity. In his day Shafer has been trying to extract from the fusion of all sorts of education that creates confusion, a liberal education in a liberal college, as distinct from
any other kind. Therefore, even though he calls the liberal college "an integral part of the university" (see page 96), he is much more interested in establishing its separation from the specialized graduate school which by his time he saw as coming to dominate the general college.

Thus, again each, though he is seeking the establishment of truly liberal education more or less in similar fashion, must do so conditioned by the circumstances of education in his own day, and must put greater weight on the more immediate factors of his own day. As has been noted, Newman saw danger in specialization, but specialization had not developed in his day to the degree that it had by Shafer's time.

Social Differences -- Newman, writing in England about a Catholic university in Dublin, was attempting to devise a scheme of education for wealthy young gentlemen of leisure. Education for everybody was certainly not the fashion and was no issue. Though both try to develop men at the top of society, leaders among men, the few rather than the many, Shafer, in doing so, is working toward the preservation of the democratic principle of self-government, while no such issue affected Newman. Newman was developing gentlemen of leisure in a class-conscious society (see page 45); Shafer men of the workaday world playing an active part in society (see page 100), able to play such a part because of the objectivity, due sense of proportion, and so forth,
which he presumes to result from truly liberal education. Even though Newman grudgingly admits that he is training members for society, we could expect his gentleman to have little intercourse with those outside his own social circle; whereas of Shafer's good man we might expect a rather direct influence on the portion of the population which had not been liberalized. Even though Newman, as part of the practical aspect of the university in Dublin, was trying to raise the intellectual standards of the Irish people, it would seem more accurate to say that he was attempting to make the Catholic leisure-class of Ireland comparable to the leisure-class in England.

This is no attempt to label Newman a snob, though in America today, if he said the same things, he would probably be so regarded by very many; rather it is intended to point out another of the factors that make for differences between Newman and Shafer. Democratic principle was no factor to be considered in the stratified society of Newman's day; it is much to be considered by Shafer in this day in this country. Particularly must Shafer be ready to meet it in consideration of the opposition he would meet by proposing the liberal education of the few in a place and time where education—and presumably any kind of education—is open to anybody, where class in itself is no bar to any kind of education.
Other Differences -- Admiration for Newman, Shafer certainly has, but though admiration may cause him to nod sympathetically to Newman's life and work and general ideas, it is also to be expected that the two will differ beyond those factors which arise out of living in different places and times. We may also expect—if we are to respect Shafer's integrity as much as he admired Newman's—that Shafer has attacked the problem of liberal education not merely as a follower of Newman, but as an independent thinker who speaks from a deep fund of experience. That he has been influenced by Newman is not to be doubted. But he is, after all, entitled to the consideration of one making a fresh and much-needed approach to the problems of education.

Clearly, Newman intended to express his model of the place for a liberal education in the Catholic University in Dublin. The university, in his scheme, was properly a place for all knowledge to be gathered and taught (see pages 61 and 85): no subject was to be omitted. From this very atmosphere of the place, the assemblage of persons united in the common purpose of learning, the student was to gain a sense of the sweep of all knowledge. And even though he could not study every subject, the student would gain something from being there in that place with those people in the presence of that knowledge which would make an integral contribution to the goal of a liberal education.
Shafer, on the other hand, says that it is "plain that liberal education is one thing, and that university work is another." He has seen the university as the place for liberal education fall into the pattern of two years of the general study of required subjects, followed by two years of more or less free election centralized in the choice of a "major." This pattern, Shafer says, becomes an anomaly, since a liberal education, synonymous in his mind with a general education, thereby takes on in part the character of the specialized graduate years. His purpose becomes one with what he has noted as a growing trend: to restore the work of dispensing a liberal education to the liberal college.

Nowhere in the writings of Newman do we find him, like Shafer, prescribing the outlines of a particular course of study which would lead to a liberal education. In his various discourses on the plan for the university in Dublin, he devotes much space to the justification of including this or that study in the university. He does set off certain studies as liberal or not. But never in his writings does he arrive at the point of itemizing the number, or kind, or sequence of studies to be pursued. Since he was mapping a theoretical university and dealing with a master plan, he was so engrossed with the dialectic of justifying himself

to friends and opponents alike that, only too excusably, he never arrived at such matters.

Agreement on a Liberal Education (Introduction) -- Shafer's affinity for Newman having been noted in its various forms, we may go on to cull from the preceding chapters those specific points of similarity which join the two men in at least general agreement as to the character of a liberal education. Discussion here, since the ideas of the two men have already been presented separately, will be limited to that necessary for clarification or for stressing relationships. For the most part mere mention will be considered to suffice, since the obvious opportunity is available to refer to the preceding chapters for fuller treatment of their separate ideas.

We have the general statement from Charles Frederick Harrold that

Newman's thinking in education is both an ally and an opponent of the liberal educators of today. He is with them in opposing the degradation of real education to the level of specialized training; he is with them in emphasizing the discipline of mind as of central importance in the liberal program. He is with Mark Van Doren in particular in implicitly affirming that there is no such thing as "education for democracy" but only good education and bad education, which make good and bad men. But he parts company both from those who would return to mediaeval or Scholastic patterns and from those who would "socialize" education until all individuality has left it.22

The quotation above serves admirably to focus much of the following discussion, suggesting as it does where Newman and Shafer agree: "on the degradation of real education to the level of specialized training"; on "the discipline of mind as of central importance"; on the rejection of the "service" idea which many substitute for individual development in the social theories of education; on the turning away from "mediaeval or Scholastic patterns."

Agreement - What Liberal Education Is (Education of the Few)-- Both Newman and Shafer believe that liberal education is for the few, that it should be the privilege of those with the intellectual capacity to pursue it successfully. This belief exists above and beyond the consideration that Newman's education as represented in the university at Dublin was intended for the wealthy few, (since, practically speaking, they were the only candidates for collegiate education) and the consideration that Shafer introduces--the association of liberal education with wealth--because, since it does not promise direct vocational benefits, only the wealthy would likely be interested in it. Intellectual fitness, whatever other artificial standards happen to crop up incidentally, is the real criterion for admission to the liberal institution of Newman and that of Shafer.

Agreement - What Liberal Education Is (Education for Society)-- They agree that the function of a liberal education, beyond the development of the student's mind, is to
provide good members of society. Newman appears to be grudging in admitting this as the "practical end" of a liberal education (see page 41), but if he is, his grudging admission is probably due to his extended effort to establish the liberal knowledge, and hence, liberal education, as an end in itself needing no sanction of practicality. But that it does not need such is no preventive from having one, for in his mind a "good" of itself produces other goods. And the listeners to whom he addressed himself would probably accept the "for society" concept with very little opposition, since it is in a sense a concession to practicality; whereas they needed much convincing on the ability of "knowledge impregnated with reason" (see page 38) to stand by itself as a "good." Shafer develops the subject in much more ready fashion, since he ties it up with American independence, the idea of self-sufficiency on which Americans pride themselves and on which they do not need convincing.

More specifically, each is concerned with producing good leaders, rather than mere members of society. Newman presumed to be raising the intellectual level of Ireland through the work of his graduates-to-be. Shafer addresses his education to the "intellectually best of each generation" (see page 52) to show the way to those without the excellence of those who have received a liberal education.
Agreement - What Liberal Education Is (Education by the Teacher) -- Newman and Shafer agree as to the importance of the teacher in a liberal education. In harmony with Newman's assertion that liberal education is philosophical not mechanical, are his pictures of the Greek students grouped about the great individual teachers and of the growth of the early universities about the great minds which attracted others to them. These early students learned from the teachers, but by the guidance and understanding of another mind, not by a formula. And they learned from each other by being together. Likewise, in Shafer's tutorial system and house-plan (see pages 48, 97, and 98) we see provided an opportunity to do the same, we see a scheme calculated to serve the same purpose.

Again, mere acquirement of facts will not suffice to furnish a liberal education, nor will a textbook (as Shafer treats Wells' plan - see pages 69 and 71), but a true teacher may assist the student toward self-education, which they agree, is the only education. With this in mind, both put reservations on the place of the teacher. Instruction in the formal sense, according to Newman, was closely associated with the passing on of facts in vocational and other than liberal education. Shafer (see page 104) believes that our students are too-much lectured.

Agreement - What Liberal Education Is (Education Toward Excellence) -- They agree that liberal education aims at a
standard of excellence that may never be reached by any individual (see pages 38 and 51), but one which is worthy of striving for because of its excellence. Newman calls the product of his education the gentleman; Shafer the product of his the good man. Both represent a pursuing of perfection of the man as being the primary goal of a liberal education which needs nothing additional to be called a worthy goal, in their minds the greatest any kind of education can attempt.

The "intellectual excellence" of Newman's discourses and the "human excellence" of Shafer's essays are expressions of the same desire to work ever toward an absolute that, even though it exceeds human grasp, betters human kind and human life by its presence in man's mind.

Thus, the two men align themselves on the side of spiritual values and recognition of forces in life beyond material considerations. Both sanction a striving after a perfection which is to bring out the best in man, in spite of his potential in the opposite direction. Both take care not to assume goodness as existing without its opposite.

**Agreement - What Liberal Education Is (Education of the Individual)**— Newman and Shafer agree that a liberal education demands attention to, and development of, the individual. They are suspicious of any claim that any system of liberal education if applied, formula-fashion, to a group of students or a mass of students, would produce the desired
graduate. Since liberal education desires an individual product, it must be produced by individual means they would say. Each demands that a college know each of its students, that it devote itself to the development and enlargement of the student's mind. Since liberal education is involved with development of the intellect, not of mere memory, or mass-taught techniques and the like, it is not susceptible to automatic impulse from external sources. They both make assertions that the only real education is self-education, that is one in which the individual intellect takes part in the search not for mere facts, but truth. Shafer gives additional evidence of the emphasis he places on the tutorial system described in Chapter IV.

Agreement - What Liberal Education Is Not (Moral Training)---

While Newman was in the process of presenting his idea of a university to a public largely hostile, he said various things that placed the goal of individual intellectual excellence above everything else in his scheme. He seemed to divorce moral concepts completely from the definition. Joseph J. Reilly tells us that Newman "was concerned with mind, not duty."23

His gentleman was a secular gentleman, purely a man of the world, if we are to isolate his statements on the gentleman from what we know of the writer of that definition (see page 45). He said that a liberal education "makes not 23. Reilly, Joseph J. *Newman as a Man of Letters.* pp. 230-231.
the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman" (see page 42). He assures us that he does not guarantee the virtuous man. His sustained position—an attempt to define liberal education and its attributes—insists on ascribing nothing else but intellectual development to a true liberal education.

Further, Newman repeated often to his listeners that he was not speaking as a Catholic, but was "investigating in the abstract"; hence, he removed another source of potential moral influence. Even in his argument for the inclusion of theology in the liberal curriculum, he makes it clear that it is not the theology of the Catholic Church as opposed to all others that he proposes to include; the study was to be pursued objectively and scientifically, not dogmatically.

But Newman also pictures his graduate as "the enemy of extravagances of any kind," a despiser of evil, so that moral training is part and parcel of his idea of liberal education, if nothing else, a by-product. Perhaps it is safe to say that even though he did not guarantee the moral man, he might have expected, or hoped to produce him.

Shafer, likewise seems to put moral considerations aside when he defines a liberal education. He says flatly

that "character formation is not the business of the university."25

Agreement - What Liberal Education Is Not (Specialization) --
Newman and Shafer agree that specialization does not constitute a part of liberal education. Newman says that a student's attention to a single study will operate at the expense of all others, that such single-mindedness produces the bigot and the quack. And Shafer goes so far in agreement as to quote Newman at considerable length in the process of building his own case against specialization. Shafer takes care to remove the college from the graduate studies and faculty, on the basis that the work of the college is general, that of the graduate school specialized.

Agreement - What Liberal Education Is Not (Utilitarianism) --
Further, Newman and Shafer, agreeing that the development of the student's mind is the work of a liberal education, separate it from vocational education. And, of course, education toward a particular job constitutes specialization. The two concepts, though separately treated, go hand in hand. Denying a utilitarian purpose in liberal education, Newman makes the basic distinction between liberal knowledge and useful knowledge (see page 57). Shafer follows suit in his distinction between liberal education and "bread and butter" education.

Summary -- Thus it can be said that Newman and Shafer agree substantially on both what a liberal education is and what a liberal education is not; that, in spite of certain differences which arise largely out of the places and times in which they lived and worked, and in spite of certain other differences less mechanical (such as religious differences), they are members of the same tradition.

They agree that liberal education, properly conceived is the province of the good minds of each generation.

They agree that liberal education produces the leaders of society.

They agree that liberal education needs the teacher capable of exercising greater influence than the passing on of facts.

They agree that liberal education must principally develop a high standard of intellectual excellence.

They agree that students must be individually developed rather than by mass techniques.

They agree that liberal education contains no guarantee of moral excellence.

They agree that the goal of liberal education is not a specialized one but a general one.

They agree that the goal of liberal education is not utilitarian, though it may have useful by-products.

Their ideas of liberal education have not been widely accepted ideas in the past. They are not widely accepted
ideas in the present, but, perhaps because of the efforts of Newman and Shafer, we hear more and more each day to indicate that the currency of many of their ideas is increasing. Their voices are becoming less voices in the wilderness and more the expression of the accepted prophets of the day. Certain it is that other men urging the principles of liberal education will have the benefit of these two searching minds to lead them on the way. Certain it is too, that whether they agree or not with Newman and Shafer, they must respect them for their high purpose, their sincerity, their persistence in the face of violent and popular opposition, their genuine interest in their fellow-men.
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