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Language and learning: an interpretive study of the work of Martin Heidegger and an exploration of the implications of his thought for processes of learning.

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LANGUAGE AND LEARNING: AN INTERPRETIVE STUDY OF THE WORK OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND AN EXPLORATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF HIS THOUGHT FOR PROCESSES OF LEARNING

A Dissertation Presented

By

Patricia Ann McNally

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

May 1980

Education
LANGUAGE AND LEARNING: AN INTERPRETIVE STUDY OF THE WORK OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND AN EXPLORATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF HIS THOUGHT FOR PROCESSES OF LEARNING

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DEDICATION

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ABSTRACT

LANGUAGE AND LEARNING: AN INTERPRETIVE STUDY OF THE WORK OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND AN EXPLORATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF HIS THOUGHT FOR PROCESSES OF LEARNING

(May 1980)

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This dissertation focuses on language and how its use and structure in Western society affect the way man learns. The paper is set forth in two parts. Part One is an interpretation of Martin Heidegger's phenomenological exegesis of early Greek words. Using this phenomenological exegesis of early Greek language as a philosophical foundation, Part Two proposes a theory of learning and looks at the linguistic structures through which Western man has characteristically learned.

Chapter I, GENERAL INTRODUCTION, offers the reader a statement of the problem and advances the hypothesis that continuance of the disassociative Zeitgeist which plagues Western society may be related to man's failure to question those linguistic contexts and frameworks through which learning is attempted and content is transmitted and conveyed. Part One begins with a general
introduction to Martin Heidegger and an overview of his work. This is followed by an exploration of terms pivotal to an understanding of Heidegger's work, along with a fairly detailed interpretation of the structural changes Heidegger chronicles in the historical development of language.

An epistemology, or theory of learning, is advanced in Part Two. This proposed theory states essentially that learning requires motion; more specifically, that learning requires a recognition of relational motion. Furthermore, it is advanced that where there is a lack of motion, which is to say where relational motion is not perceived by the learner, the learning that occurs is partial. The paper then proceeds to a discussion of those processes of learning which the author sees as representative of Western man's structuring of language. These include the contradicting process, the idealizing process, the valuing process, the explanatory process, the commotioning process, and the either-or process. Finally, the implications of this theoretical discussion for future studies in learning and education are raised.
CHAPTER I
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The overall purpose of this paper can be summarized as an attempt to explore the linguistic contexts through which Western man learns to learn in an effort to discern whether these contexts impede or contribute to man's knowledge of himself and the world, and to explore to what extent man's present contexts underlie the profound disassociation afflicting modern man.

This overall purpose involves several relational concerns. These concerns are set forth in two parts. The first part of the paper is an interpretive study of Martin Heidegger's extensive work in exploring the nature of the relationship between man and language. For Heidegger, disclosure of the nature of this relationship involves "re-thinking" the language of early Greek philosophy, for it is out of the early Greek philosophical language that Western metaphysics and epistemology have evolved their linguistic structures and premises. The purpose of the first part of the dissertation, then, is twofold: 1) to build a philosophical foundation for the theory of learning proposed in Part Two, and 2) to resurrect Martin Heidegger's extensive work in the area of language.
The purpose of Part Two is multiple: 1) to set forth an epistemology, or theory of learning, that proceeds upon the phenomenological groundwork of Part One; 2) to look at some of Western man's present contextual frameworks and processes of learning in light of this proposed theory of learning; and 3) to outline the possible directions and implications of this theory of learning for future studies in education.

**Statement of the Problem**

Western man has spent the last century, and more noticeably and emphatically, the last forty years, wrestling with alienation, fragmentation, and meaningfulness. In an effort to undercut this gnawing experience of the world and in an attempt to create meaning where meaning no longer seems to exist, man increasingly turns to language--to the creation of new metaphors, to the espousal of new ideas, to the publication of countless books. The new metaphors that arise, however, very quickly and quietly go the way of the old metaphors, becoming swallowed up in the fragmentation of the age. This year's facts become next year's factions, only serving to reveal more vividly the pervasiveness and depth of the fragmentation that man's new metaphors had set out to overcome. Ironically, man's search for meaning often only unearths a deeper meaningfulness.
In some way, man seems undermined and defeated on "another level," on a level that is so encompassing that it cannot be pierced, on a level that somehow holds man in its hands. In his recent biography on Carl Jung, Laurens van der Post speaks of the profound disassociation that typifies our culture and its people and how difficult it is to heal. In speaking of this profound disassociation, van der Post addresses this "other level."

It was so difficult to heal, I believe, because it was supported by a similar tendency to dichotomy in the spirit of an entire civilisation backed up, as it were, by all that was negative in the twentieth-century Zeitgeist, and so was in a sense incapable of cure without healing at the same time the mass of humanity and cultural pressures rallied unconsciously behind it.

Van der Post says here that the fragmentation Western man experiences is difficult to heal because it is supported by a fundamental dichotomy in the thought and spirit of the times. That is to say, the fragmentation man experiences is supported by the structured ways and contexts through which man reflects upon himself and the world. These structures, forms, contexts constitute man's "use" of language. If Western man's thought patterns and linguistic structures are themselves dichotomized, or more broadly phrased, disassociative, then modern man's attempts to heal fragmentation and disassociation are indeed being subverted at another level--at the level of man's contextual frameworks.
Man has long since recognized that neurosis, and very often psychosis, are, for the most part, the result of mental attitudes rather than organic disorders. Man's way of conceptualizing who he is informs his behavior; man's way of conceiving the world and the self determines his actions. Subsequently, if man conceives himself and the world through fragmented and disassociative contextual frameworks, man is then in danger of becoming fragmented. If man is to attempt to speak of healing, then, and is to address himself to "the whole man," in whatever field of endeavor he plies his trade, it seems of preliminary importance that man turn his eyes towards those very structures, forms, frameworks, and contexts through which he structures, forms, and frames his perception and conception of the world and the self. Man needs to address those frameworks through which the question itself is raised.

After years of struggle with profound disassociation, under countless labels and metaphors, perhaps it is time to suspect that inserting new metaphors into old contexts has not dented the overriding dilemma. Perhaps it is time to suspect that swapping content for content does not reach to the heart of the matter, because the dilemma is not one of content, but rather a dilemma that exists at the level of "context," to borrow Gregory Bateson's term. This paper is an attempt to address this "other level." As such, it pursues the following questions: What are the present forms and contexts through which man learns to learn? (That is, what are the contexts through which content is conveyed?) How do these contexts structure
man's experience of the world and affect his behavior? What are some alternative contexts through which man may view the world and the self, and how do these contexts augment man's self-knowledge?

Such questioning strikes at the roots of "how man learns," and thus concerns itself with education at a most profound level, for such questioning calls for educators (and by educators I mean those people who attempt to communicate something to someone else) to reflect upon the contexts, frameworks, and linguistic structures through which content is communicated and transmitted. This is no easy task, for it asks, not only the author, but the reader to "suspend" those contexts through which this content itself is to be filtered. It asks of both the author and reader a certain suspension of the familiar ways of structuring the input that comes to us from the world. Such letting-go requires what John Keats called a certain "negative capability": "... when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without an irritable reaching after fact . . . ."²

This "negative capability" invites educators to take a step back and look at those structures and contexts through which content is passed. For as Paulo Freire has attempted to point out, it is when educators (and that somehow includes all of us) can no longer reflect upon the contexts through which content is transmitted that education, unknowingly, transmits, inculcates, and perpetuates the disassociation and fragmentation it purports to be combating. That is to say, if the aim of education is for man to know himself and his world, educators must "step back a pace or two" and ask: Do the
processes man processes with impede or accelerate, contribute to or detract from, knowledge of the world and of the self? Do the frameworks through which man "learns about learning" retard or propel learning? Such questioning addresses itself to learning about the contexts through which man learns content. It addresses itself to looking at the forms through which information and data are transmitted and conveyed.

Western man's long-standing reluctance to undertake such questioning, as the philosophical groundwork of this paper will attempt to demonstrate, forms the root of man's present experience of himself and the world as disassociative, fragmented, and alienated. That is, questioning context in an effort to undercut fragmentation is not "one way among many ways" to address the disassociative Zeitgeist, but rather the necessary way to address the problem for it is man's failure to call context into the question of knowledge and learning that is the root of the problem. Specifically, then, this paper explores the hypothesis that the contexts through which Western educators transmit content (among them specialization, compartmentalization, polarization, contradiction, subjectivism, objectivism) have arisen through Western man's failure to reflect upon context, and that such failing has given rise to man's present experience of himself and the world as disassociative, which is to say, man experiences himself and the world as un-whole and un-known.
The tremendous reticence and fear in undertaking a questioning of context now, after so long a time having been concerned only with content, is that Western man has come "to function under the illusion that categories of human thought alone maintain cosmic cohesiveness."³ That is, questioning context involves letting-go of the order--"the categories of human thought"--man has, and this is scary because the categories of human thought Western man has is the only order Western man presently has. Viewing thought contexts as the only order he has, man holds tightly to context, but freely changes the content inserted into those contexts. It is this process, however, which initially gave rise to man's experience of himself and the world as fragmented, thus it is the continuance of this process which aggravates the problem of disassociation one hopes to address. For when context, which is the only order man sees himself as having, is at root one of content (that is to say, when context is itself a thought, an idea, a category of human thought), man's sense of order becomes dependent upon a thing which he himself has created. Man becomes dependent on the thought of man. Letting-go of such a man-made or willed order involves chaos. Therefore, the fear involved in letting-go of a context based upon content is always tapped in questioning the contexts through which man learns to learn.

The suspension called for in the author and the reader, then, is a willingness to question the present-day idea that order, in the world and in the self, is dependent upon human thought. It is an
openness to question the prevailing assumption that the only order man has is the willed order of thought he himself creates.

Western man fears that he will never be whole; that he will always remain fragmented. Yet he clings tenaciously to his manufactured categories of perception as if whatever unity exists will not survive without them. He frantically struggles to re-establish temporary connections by way of rapidly changing cults, hoping to keep pace with his transitory world.4

The openness to question the contexts man presently has is, by its very nature, a questioning of the forms, structures, frameworks, and contexts through which man questions. Thus, the process of this paper itself—that of questioning context—is the process needed to approach the content that follows. The process, then, is at once the attempted product. If a willingness to question context is not undertaken, what follows will remain only another "object-thing"; it will remain only another fragment to be swallowed up in the contextual fragmentation which has arisen from Western man's "being content with content." If a suspension of will is not undertaken, what follows will simply become additional content inserted into the already overloaded and "seam-bursting" contextual frameworks man presently has.

The contexts through which modern man "learns to learn" have been passed down to him through a philosophical tradition particular to Western man. Subsequently, any attempt to address oneself to questions of knowledge and learning, i.e. to epistemology, benefits from a "working through" of the relationship between epistemology and phenomenology.
The underlying considerations behind the preceding statement are twofold. First, Western man's experience of himself and the world as fragmented and disassociated is accentuated when man cannot understand from where content and context alike arise. Speaking to this problem, Rudolph Arnheim notes man's inability to learn in what he calls "an invisible culture": a culture where man needs to consult "the specialist" because he can no longer experience for himself such basic things as where electricity and water come from, not to mention such things as the origins of new ideas. Unable to comprehend the source and relation of one thing to another--what Arnheim calls "the visible continuity of existence"--man's sense of isolation and disassociation increases. In contrast, Arnheim speaks of his experience in Italy:

When I moved to Italy I saw that the elements of life still displayed themselves. In the country I could see women with copper jars on their heads going to the well--just as in the days of Isaac and Rebecca. There was a visible continuity of existence there that impressed me deeply. The relation between man and nature was right on the surface. It occurred to me then that the perceptual experience of a life in which all the basic facts of existence are still understandable to the senses was the origin of cognition.

Arnheim is echoing an awareness of the need for continuity and association in the learning process that is hardly new, though for modern man, it is very often obscured or forgotten. Centuries ago, the early Greek philosophers--the fathers of Western thought and learning--expressed a similar awareness: "Men perish because they cannot join the beginning with the end."
This paper is an attempt to acknowledge man's need for connections. As such, the setting forth of new metaphors proposed herein, or more precisely, the setting forth of old metaphors employed in a different way, can benefit from a grounding in philosophical sources and origins in order to reduce the risk of perpetuating those fragmented and disassociative contexts that this paper has set out to expose as "blocks" to man's ability to learn.

Second, (and this is an outgrowth and partner of the first), if the purpose of this paper is a questioning of the contexts through which Western man learns to learn, it seems necessary that such questioning take place at the "level" where such contexts are born, and that is the realm of philosophy. Regarding this, Rollo May says:

> It is a gross, albeit common, error to assume naively that one can observe facts best if he avoids all preoccupation with philosophical assumptions. All he does, then, is mirror uncritically the particular parochial doctrines of his own limited culture.

In the late 1950s, Abraham Maslow was calling for psychology and education to set forth a firmer base in ontology and metaphysics. Perhaps Maslow was aware then that unless education and psychology could unearth roots through a return to the sources and origins of Western man's own particular educational and psychological theory, they would end up disciplines as "cut off" and fragmented as the individuals they purported to serve. As the quote below amplifies, Rollo May realized just such a danger with regard to the psychological fields, and psychology today is certainly one of the ways in which man attempts to educate.
there is considerable danger that psychoanalysis, as well as other forms of psychotherapy and adjustment psychology, will become new representations of the fragmentation of man, that they will exemplify the loss of the individual's vitality and significance, rather than the reverse, that the new techniques will assist in standardizing and giving cultural sanction to man's alienation from himself rather than solving it, that they will become expressions of the new mechanization of man, now calculated and controlled with greater psychological precision and on the vaster scale of unconscious and depth dimensions—that psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in general will become part of the neurosis of our day rather than part of the cure. This would indeed be a supreme irony of history.

One of the more visible signs attesting to the fact that the supreme irony May speaks of has taken place is Western man's preoccupation with gimmicks and techniques, a preoccupation that is not confined only to the fields of education and psychology. Man demands quick results and immediate answers. Man asks that ideas prove something. "Instant success is the order of the day; 'I want it now!' I wonder whether this is not part of our corruption by machines. Machines do things very quickly and outside the natural rhythm of life, and we are indignant if a car doesn't start at the first try." 10

Man's impatience with, and disparagement of, long and deep journeys, however, only confirms the severity of the wound. Man's reticence to unearth foundations and search deeply reflects his haunting suspicion as to the depth and pervasiveness of the wound itself. Faced with this threshold awareness, and yet once again lacking the structural and formational tools to go further, man settles, with a sense of exhaustion and defeat, for anything that
promises quick relief. In this sense, Western man is an addict. It is only the individual means of addiction which varies. Thus the claim that "this is what Everyman wants" when used to support man's current enthusiasm over fast-order systems and superficial formats can be unmasked as a justification for impotence once viewed against the enormity of man's task and the extent of his fatigue.

With these concerns in mind, working out the relationship between epistemology and phenomenology takes on an added importance. One way to visualize the importance of working out this relationship is to look at this approach through the lenses of healing we have come to apply to the individual. In the personal realm, man does not "get through" something that has had an impact on his life by "turning his back on it," no more than turning his back succeeds in making something go away. Man "gets through" something that unconsciously determines his perception of himself and the world by seeing how those perceptions determine him, and how, in such determining, they have rendered him powerless. This is no less true in the contextual realm. Even if we leave aside for a moment the realization that language embodies perception, it is important to note that when a linguistic context has had import for an entire culture, man does not "undo" the power it holds over his life and perception through denial or substitution, neither through throwing the context away nor through inserting new content. For when man simply discards linguistic contexts without knowing why, or despairingly inserts another's contexts into one's own contexts, as in slotting
Eastern contexts into a Western linguistic framework, again without noting the underlying relationships, man's language and spirit become junkyards for discarded parts of the self. Initially, then, man needs to recognize the danger in throwing words away lightly. Otherwise, the dismissal of linguistic contexts perpetuates the disposal mentality symptomatic of the disassociative Zeitgeist one hopes to address.

Each word is a creation of man, which is also to say, a part of man. As such, a metaphor or group of metaphors discarded perfunctorily, as if one were throwing out a broken toy, diminishes not only one's language but oneself. Signaling this awareness, Archibald MacLeish says "A world ends when its metaphor has died," and a metaphor dies when, though still seen, it "no longer means."¹¹

When a root metaphor dies, a world is lost, and we are too if we cannot release ourselves from idolatrous fixations upon the forms of our knowing.¹²

Approaching epistemology through phenomenology, therefore, intentionally takes it slowly. Such a process takes it word by word in an effort to signal the importance of each word in creating the shape of our lives and in determining our ability to learn about ourselves and the world. For it is Western man's present disregard for language which merely underscores a corresponding and equally fundamental disregard: disregard for being, for life itself.

Questioning the contexts through which man learns to learn, therefore, is a fragile process, for in calling into question the meanings that man has attached to metaphors--meanings that have
come to determine man's perceptions and thus his behavior--the creation and destruction of man's experience of the world is at hand. Thus the slow process of working out the relationship between epistemology and phenomenology is an attempt to call attention to the dynamic fluidity and interaction through which metaphors and man affect each other profoundly. It is a call to recognize the extent to which the creation and destruction of contexts becomes our own creation and destruction. It is a call to recognize the close inter-relationship between being and language.

Significance

The significance of this dissertation is twofold: 1) to draw attention to the possible practical implications of Martin Heidegger's work for future approaches to, and research around, the question of "how man learns"; and 2) to provide a theory of learning which attempts to undercut the dichotomous thought patterns common to Western man.
Guide to the Reader

Some brief comments about the author's initial intent and subsequent process in writing this dissertation may help the reader understand the development of the paper, and thus enable the reader to focus more easily on areas of the paper which are of greater interest.

This paper began as an attempt to bring together many of the author's divergent thoughts and questions concerning the role language plays in learning. Due to the vast number of ideas dealing with language and learning, not to mention the various paths leading to the subject, the author initially thought that limiting the philosophical grounding to the work of one man would prove a viable way of narrowing the parameters of the topic. In retrospect, however, whether this choice narrowed or expanded the work involved is open to considerable debate. The author quickly discovered that ideas placed under a long and narrow microscope tend to unearth the proverbial iceberg, where what is hidden is so much vaster than what is initially seen, and also where what is hidden changes the perspective on what is seen. In this way, the paper was a constant discovery involving unforseen turns in direction.

This became apparent first with regard to Heidegger. Heidegger was chosen for the philosophical groundwork of this dissertation for two reasons: first, the more obvious, Heidegger was
familiar to the author; and second, Heidegger had done extensive work in the phenomenology of language.

Familiarity with Heidegger took the simple form of undergraduate introductions to "Heidegger the existentialist." This paper, then, was initially approached with this assumption: Heidegger is an existentialist. Subsequent readings in Heidegger, however, challenged that assumption and raised many questions concerning not only Heidegger's placement in the existentialist camp, but also the critiquing of Heidegger by other philosophical camps, namely the neo-Marxists. Exploring Heidegger, then, raised questions not only as to where Heidegger belonged, but also questions as to what Heidegger was saying. This surfaced issues and questions that were not the intent of this dissertation to set out and explore. However, in that interpretations of Heidegger have varied from existentialist to essentialist, the author's interpretation of Heidegger became central to any attempt to explicate the implications of his work. Nonetheless, to discuss in any depth the politics and questions surrounding the issue of where Heidegger belongs and what he is saying, requiring a detailed study of various antithetical interpretations, is a dissertation in itself.

This realization has been dealt with, or more specifically, not dealt with, by adhering to the author's initial intent in enlisting Heidegger: to interpret, through translations available in English, Heidegger's work in the phenomenology of language with an eye for their implications for learning. Certainly, by its very nature, the
interpretation and the subsequent discussion of the implications of Heidegger's work for a theory of learning reflect a point of view. That point of view, which is by no means a definitive one, has evolved in this direction: Heidegger has suffered from a philosophical pigeonholing that seems to have resulted from a tendency to emphasize certain aspects of his work and life without regard for the whole. For example, a recurring emphasis on Heidegger's early work, namely his discussion of the "existentialia" of man in *Being and Time*, has resulted in his inclusion in existentialist camps, although Heidegger stated repeatedly that he was not an existentialist. This placement also seems to have accentuated some of the critiquing Heidegger receives from such philosophical circles as the Frankfurt School, who question not only Heidegger's ability to relate his thought to practice but also Heidegger's seeming lack of perspective in critiquing the obscure language of traditional metaphysics with his own very obscure language. Conventionally, then, Heidegger has either been praised as an existentialist or attacked as an ethereal essentialist.

Both of these views are challenged in this paper, not so much through intent or design as through the direction in which the paper evolves. The very process of trying to explicate the practical implications of Heidegger's phenomenology questions the Frankfurt School's frequent critiques of Heidegger, while the detailed discussion of Heidegger's critique of subjectivism questions his inclusion in existentialist circles. Granted, these are implicit challenges, and as
such, will raise many unanswered questions, especially for the reader interested in the politics surrounding Heidegger and his work.

In that interpretations of Heidegger's work are varied and still very much open to debate, coupled with the fact that it is not within the scope of this paper to deal explicitly with that debate, this discussion will perhaps at best serve to expand the questions already being asked by the people already asking. The total impact of Heidegger's work is still difficult to assess. Viewing a writer's thought in its entirety often happens posthumously, and with Heidegger's death as recent as 1976, this may again prove to be the case. Interpretations that now seem partial may simply prove to be the result of critiquing what was available at the time.

For the reader not interested in the philosophical groundwork of Part One, the author has spent a considerable amount of time at the beginning of Part Two working out the transition from phenomenology to epistemology in the hope of making Part Two fairly self-containing. The reader of only Part Two need note mainly that the theory of learning proposed is based on a philosophical language of paradox, motion, and relationality. There are several philosophical systems that describe being through metaphors of paradox and motion, most notably those philosophical systems associated with Eastern thought. The author intentionally chose a Western philosopher who stressed the language of paradox, motion, and relationality in an attempt to look at Western linguistic structures and processes of learning through a philosophical system that had evolved
out of its own particular heritage. Both these clarifying notes reveal
the author's underlying biases: 1) a preference for the language of
paradox and relationality; and 2) a preference for examining Western
linguistic structures through the contexts of a Western philosopher.

Part Two, naturally, had its own special "iceberg," where once
again what was initially seen was one-tenth of what lay beneath the
surface. Discussions turned out to be more complex than were
supposed, making the transition from theory to practical application
much longer than anticipated. This left some choices: 1) skip some
key points in the transitional theoretical stage to arrive at practical
application sooner; 2) include a few key theoretical points and a few
practical applications; or 3) include as many key theoretical points as
possible and arrive at the application much farther on down the line.
The latter was chosen in an effort to keep the paper consistent with
its purpose of developing a theory of learning based on a Western
philosophy. This dissertation is a theoretical paper working towards
practical application, and as a theoretical paper, it is aimed at the
widest practical application possible. Application of a writer's
proposed theories are only limited by the number of practitioners
available, and as such, applying the theory proposed herein to
present-day processes of learning, as the author does in Part Two, is
only one direction in which the theory may be taken. Similarly,
those directions proposed in the final chapter are offered as
jumping-off points rather than ends. Theories are mountain streams
destined to be rivers which eventually join oceans. Theories benefit
most when they expand as they move from their source, rather than narrow; otherwise, they become wells of thought which simply turn stagnant.

**Note on Translations**

It might be useful for the reader, especially the reader interested in philosophy, to note from the bibliography the particular translations of Heidegger used in this discussion. Translations involve individual interpretations, and when an attempt is made to work from translations rather than original sources, the transmission of several voices and styles is often unavoidable. The author has tried to present an interpretation that does justice to the translations involved, while presenting a discussion of Heidegger that has benefited from a reading of several different translations. Oftentimes, for the sake of uniformity in this paper, the author has taken minor stylistic liberties, such as leaving the word "being" uncapsulated throughout the paper, (as it is in the Manheim translation), even though it is capitalized in most of the other translations noted. The exception to this appears when "being" is capitalized in a direct quote. Similarly, some translations capitalize Greek words such as *logos* while others leave them uncapsulated and underlined. Greek words in this translation are uncapsulated and underlined, except where they appear in a direct quote.
References


PART ONE

PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCERNS
Builders of bridges and highrise apartments, cyberneticists, research scientists, painters and poets, farmers and philosophers, each in his own way has to do with beings and thinks about them: from the many inclinations of his solitary way Heidegger wishes to address all these. To build, calculate, investigate, create; to see, hear, say, and cultivate; to think; all are ways men and women involve themselves with beings as a whole. For humans are among the beings that for the time being are. The question of Being is not bloodless after all, but vital.

For what?
For recovery of the chance to ask what is happening with man on this earth the world over, not in terms of headlines but of less frantic and more frightful disclosures.
For maintenance of the critical spirit that can say No and act No (as Nietzsche says) without puncturing the delicate membrance of its Yes.
For nurturing awareness of the possibilities and vulnerabilities implied in these simple words, am, are, is, since Being may be said of all beings and in many senses, though always with a view to one.
For pondering the fact that as we surrender the diverse senses of Being to a sterile uniformity, to one that can no longer entertain variation and multiplicity, we become immeasurably poorer—and that such poverty makes a difference.

David Farrell Krell
CHAPTER 11

INTRODUCTION TO HEIDEGGER

There are many ways to approach the work of Martin Heidegger. The most common way has been through the "existentialia" of man as Dasein*, an approach which has led to Heidegger's establishment, along with Soren Kierkegaard and Karl Jaspers, as the founding fathers of modern existentialism. However, there are several other ways to approach Heidegger: through his book on Kant (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik); through the distinct notions of history set forth in Hegel and Heidegger that illustrate their fundamental differences beneath many similarities; through Husserl, Heidegger's predecessor at Freiburg, whose introduction of phenomenology into philosophical tradition bears upon Heidegger's own methodology; through Heidegger's interpretation of pre-Socratic thought; or through Heidegger's writings on poetry and language.

This particular presentation, in an effort to disclose the intimate connection that exists between being and language, approaches Heidegger, for the most part, through his interpretation or "re-thinking" of pre-Socratic thought and through his writings on language. It is through his historical-linguistic exegesis of

*For an explanation of the Heideggerian term Dasein, see the discussion beginning on page 44.
pre-Socratic thought that Heidegger grounds his major thoughts on the meaning of being, truth, thinking, and language. Through this "re-thinking," Heidegger challenges the traditional interpretation of pre-Socratic thought by Western philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, for in Heidegger's view, it is this traditional interpretation which forms the basis of subsequent Western thought. It is also, then, this traditional interpretation which for Heidegger underlies the nihilism Western man presently experiences.

This presentation, therefore, emphasizes Heidegger's later writings. This is not to suggest, as many writers speaking of Heidegger have suggested, that his work is not a unity. For a writer whose works, for the most part, have come to the public in "bits and pieces," (a situation which has led to the slightly misleading division of Heidegger into early, middle, and late), his thought development forms a basic unity. Whether Heidegger is presenting an exegesis of the pre-Socratics or an exegesis of human Dasein, the question under consideration is always the question of being. The various writings of Heidegger are basically different paths to being, and as such, a presentation of Heidegger's work does justice to this unity of thought around the central question of being to the extent it does not fragment and segment Heidegger, but rather lets his many variations upon a single theme flow in and out of each other.

This is not to deny, but rather to affirm that Heidegger's thought developed and grew. As Heidegger ages, the accent shifts.
In *Being and Time*, man as *Dasein*, as the being which is "thrown" out into the world, stands out into "the clearing of being" basically alone and homeless, while in Heidegger's later works, man is part of "the fourfold of earth, sky, gods, and mortals," and as such, belongs with all of life. *Dasein* is now a being among beings, a being which dwells and builds in the house of being, living poetically in homecoming. Man's "authenticity" now comes in recognizing the reciprocal belonging-together of himself with all other things, rather than simply from the ownership of his own "to-be" that characterized the man of *Being and Time*. So, too, Heidegger's notion of "will as resolve" starts out as man's ability to face his being-unto-death, and mellows into man's ability to let his being-unto-death be. Thus, man's standing out into the clearing of being softens somewhat from the harsh "thrownness" of early *Dasein*. Truth becomes lighter and easier to handle, and man grows from the hero who survives to the craftsman who is not merely thrown, but who reaches from out of his thrownness into a dwelling that builds the future possibilities of *Dasein*, and thus builds the history of being itself. *Dasein* as *Dasein* is, in fact, deemphasized, and, for the most part, Heidegger speaks of man as simply man in relation to being. The meaning of man is viewed through the meaning of being, while *Being and Time* initially addressed the meaning of being through the meaning of man as *Dasein*. In truth, for Heidegger, they are reciprocal: the loss of one entails the loss of the other.
Such changes are certainly not fundamental, if by fundamental one means changes that alter the central themes and pivotal questions of Heidegger's thought. Rather, changes of this order seem to reflect the unfoldings of a man whose thought is constantly broadening and expanding. They seem to be developments in a thinking that is constantly reaching beyond itself into the "can be" of the possibilities for being.

With respect to the tendency of writers to fragment and divide Heidegger, it should be noted that this tendency may be partly due to the fact that Heidegger did not write Part 2 of his inaugural work, Being and Time, as he had initially set out to do. Part 2 was to examine the philosophies of Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle in light of Heidegger's innovative understanding of time and his revolutionary view of history as historicity laid out in Part 1 of Being and Time. By Heidegger's own admission, Being and Time failed to convey a unity of thought around the meaning of being by attempting to do too much too soon, and by standing too close to the traditional ontology that he wished to unveil as nihilistic.1

What we do have of Heidegger's subsequent thought, however, by way of books, essays, and lectures, is quite extensive and expands his thought considerably, particularly with regard to the question of being itself, and the important role language plays in disclosing the meaning of being. In Being and Time, Heidegger had not fully developed his own notion of language. Consequently, Heidegger still employed many terms from traditional ontology in
attempting his "break" with traditional ontology, which led, not surprisingly but unfortunately, to his early thought being viewed through the lenses of traditional ontology. However, it was precisely the failure of traditional ontological terms to manifest the meaning of being that forced Heidegger to think about the meaning of language in obscuring or disclosing the meaning of being. This led Heidegger to delve deeper into the roots of language and being by way of early Greek thought. It is in these roots of Western man's first philosophical utterances that Heidegger unearths an interpretation of being, truth, thinking, and language. This is not to say that Heidegger did not recognize the inseparability of being and language in his early work. He did, and noted that the understanding of being could not be divorced from words or Rede, which was Heidegger's early word for the essence of language. His later writings, however, expand and refine considerably the nature and scope of the relationship between being and language.

In approaching this limited presentation of Heidegger's work, it is important for the reader to note that, due to the depth and complexity of Heidegger's work, this discussion will include many oversights. But, by the same token, due to the linguistic interweaving involved in this depth and complexity, it is often necessary to discuss what may initially seem like superfluous ideas with regard to the scope of this particular paper. A presentation of Heidegger however, seems more endangered by brevity than by length. For it has been exactly those attempts to present Heidegger
in simplistic terms that have done the most to fragment and obscure two of the implicit aims of Heidegger's undertaking: 1) to signal the complexity of being; and 2) to undercut that fragmentation which comes by way of superficiality in language.

This presentation attempts to retain the complex unity and revolutionary nature of Heidegger's thought, while presenting the countless interconnections in as clear a manner as possible. This is not an easy task, for often in attempting to retain the complexity of an author or a work, ensuing misinterpretation comes at the hands of the very complexity one sought to retain. On the other hand, attempts to render complex thoughts "accessible" often negates the complexity the author attempted to convey through giving the appearance that life "has an easy answer." A recognition of this struggle is especially pertinent with regard to Heidegger. Heidegger worked throughout his life to reestablish the "weight" of the possibilities inherent in man's original understanding of being and to restore recognition for the manifold complexity inherent in life. The "weight" of this complexity is lost in rendering the relational movement between man, being, and language into static conceptions that try to offer the reader quick and easy answers. For Heidegger, there is movement and relation in that which is stationary. The failure to recognize such movement renders stationary thoughts static. With regard to a reader or writer of Heidegger, therefore, it is important to acknowledge the intended movement beneath stationary words.
This presentation is viewed in its intent, then, when seen as an interpretation (in the Heideggerian sense), rather than as a summary of his work. In the same way that translations are interpretations for Heidegger, so too, interpretations of translations are themselves interpretations. Heidegger's view of authentic interpretation is, thus, enlisted at the outset of this particular presentation. As Heidegger might say, in interpreting another writer or thinker, it is important "to think thoughts out of being as a whole" rather than simply to repeat thoughts. An interpretation, therefore, is authentic and thoughtful to the extent the author thinks in relation to being as a whole. Such a thinking not only brings what has already been thought "to stand," but more importantly still, constantly reaches beyond what has been thought to what remains "unthought." It is a thinking that tries to move beyond the merely literal, because for Heidegger a literal interpretation is no interpretation at all, in that a literal interpretation takes only the words and fails to hear what is being spoken, though unstated, in the words themselves. A thoughtful interpretation, on the other hand, in attempting to think thoughts out of being as a whole, not only safeguards and spares the thought already spoken, but raises the "unthought" that lies in the interpreter's own relation to being into a life of its own. As such, an interpretation always reveals the interpreter's own relation and misrelation to being. Thus, the ability or inability of this particular interpretation to transmit the complexity of Heidegger's thought reflects the meeting between the translations
enlisted and the author. Ideally, an interpretation is an encounter between two or three people where everyone's voice is heard, but such relational conversation is not always achieved. In view of this Heideggerian sense of interpretation, it is important to recognize that fragmentation in this presentation does not mean, accordingly, that there is fragmentation in Heidegger or in the translations of Heidegger that have been employed. This interpretation of the grand interpreter will become thoughtful, then, when the author can creatively rethink in relation to being as a whole. As Carl Jung has noted, the original legend cannot be read often enough, for man cannot hear what has to be heard often enough. In this sense, all thinking is creative rethinking. This is the root meaning of originality: the re-search of origins in order to rethink the unthought from out of its ground of yet-to-be-realized possibilities of being.

There is one more issue that needs to be addressed briefly in this introduction and that is the conventional tendency to associate Heidegger with the movement known as existentialism, and subsequently, the attendant elevation in importance of Heidegger's exegesis of the "existentialia" of human Dasein.

Heidegger's first major philosophical publication, and the one with which he is most commonly associated, Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927), addresses itself to the question of the meaning of being through the discussion of being's most unique being -- Dasein. In Being and Time, Heidegger presents an exegesis of the "existentialia" that structure human Dasein, among them
being-in-the-world, being-onto-death, anguish, dread, care, guilt, the call of conscience, and resolve. With such a presentation, Heidegger becomes the first philosopher to set forth an ontology of being that begins with, and revolves around, the structure and essence of man. This is not to suggest, however, as some critics have suggested, that Heidegger's work is subjectivist. On the contrary, it is Heidegger's implicit purpose in Being and Time to dethrone the prevailing subjectivism that characterizes the history of Western metaphysics, for it is precisely this subjectivism that, in Heidegger's view, lies at the root of the nihilism afflicting modern man. It is this subjectivism, then, that Heidegger has set out to overcome.

For Heidegger, man as Dasein is neither subject nor object, but the relation to being. Therefore, if one were to apply the terms subject and object to Heidegger's view of man as Dasein, although such an application of terms would be totally un-Heideggerian, one would say that Dasein is the relation between subject and object. "Man is the gap which separates and at the same time unites subject and object. He is the 'in-between' subject and object (das Zwischen)."² Heidegger's own term for "in-between" is "being-in" (In-Sein), denoting man's dwelling in, and belonging to, being.⁵ Thus, to view Dasein through conventional subjectivist lenses is to misinterpret Heidegger's intended meaning. More importantly still, viewing Dasein in a subjectivist context obscures Heidegger's underlying intention to cut through traditional ontology's view of
being in subject/object terms, terms which for Heidegger hide the relational character of being.

Let's look briefly now at the importance and place of the exegesis of Dasein in Heidegger's thought. Heidegger says that the discussions of Dasein and its "existentialia" are only a starting point. As such, the exegesis of Dasein is viewed correctly when recognized as the groundwork that is to underscore Heidegger's subsequent thought on the question and meaning of being. Thus, although Being and Time begins with the "existentialia" of Dasein in an effort to revive the question of being, what is aimed at in the exegesis of Dasein is the setting forth of a foundational path to the meaning of being. That the meaning of being is the central issue under consideration has often been overlooked, and usually in connection with a simultaneous elevation in importance of the "existentialia" of Dasein, such as dread, care, guilt, etc. It is also through the "existentialia" of Dasein that Heidegger has become associated with the movement known as existentialism, although Heidegger reiterated over and over again that he was not an existentialist.* With regard to this question, George Seidel says:

Statements made at the end of Sein und Zeit, stating that the existential analysis of Dasein was only one way, the purpose of which was a working out of the question of being; or in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik that the fundamental ontology of Sein und Zeit was not a metaphysics of Dasein but rather, as Dasein, the necessary happening of meta-

*For further discussion, see "Letter on Humanism" (Brief über den 'Humanismus'), trans. by Frank A. Capuzzi, in collaboration with J. Glenn Gray, in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).
physics should have made early commentators on Heidegger 'the existentialist' a little more cautious.

Werner Brock says in *Existence and Being*:

Heidegger may well meet with a similar fate as did Hume, in that his greatest contribution to philosophic thought, held back at the time, will be recognized only very slowly and gradually, while other more congenial results of his thought found a ready acceptance and, however much distorted, helped to stimulate what is now commonly termed the movement of 'Existentialism.'

Similarly, David Farrell Krell states with regard to Heidegger's *Being and Time*:

That the book was considered an 'existentialist' manifesto for such a long time testifies to the historic oblivion of the question it raises. Even today readers often find various parts of the analysis of Dasein accessible but miss altogether the sense of the question of Being as such. Understandably so, for precisely this sense is difficult. It cannot be rattled off and put out as information; it remains a problem which here we can only cursorily pose.

Therefore, in that what has risen to the fore in Heidegger's thought has been the "existentialia" of *Dasein*, although Heidegger stated first, that *Dasein* was simply a starting point for his questioning the meaning of being, and second, that he was not an existentialist, it seems clear that such misapplied emphasis fulfills a need of the times to perhaps not look at what Heidegger is truly trying to say, for such emphasis does not seem to reflect the intent of the man. In this regard, it seems important that the author and the reader approach Heidegger with as few prior conceptions as possible.
References


5 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 79.

6 Ibid., p. 487.

7 Seidel, Pre-Socratics, pp. 13-14. (See also Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 487.)


CHAPTER III
EXPLANATION OF TERMS

In order to lay some groundwork for the interpretation of Heidegger's exegesis of pre-Socratic thought set forth in Chapters IV, V, and VI, and in order to ease the reader into Heidegger's uncommon style of language, this chapter discusses some pivotal Heideggerian thoughts and terms, namely ground and the absence of ground, the hermeneutical process, man as Dasein, the essence of questioning, the fundamental question, and history as historicity.

**Nihilism**

The spiritual decline of the earth is so far advanced that the nations are in danger of losing the last bit of spiritual energy that makes it possible to see the decline (taken in relation to the history of 'being'), and to appraise it as such.

Martin Heidegger

Metaphysical thought in the Western tradition has always been based on a notion of "being" (i.e. an ontological ground or essence that lies, in some way, behind, beyond, or underneath passing appearances). Heidegger claims in *Being and Time* that this ontological ground has, over the years, become obscured and "forgotten." This "forgetting of being" (Seinsvergessenheit), as Heidegger calls it, also constitutes an "absence of ground."
"The age for which the ground fails to come, hangs in the abyss."¹ The task Heidegger sets for himself, therefore, is to reintroduce into the mainstream of thought "the question of being" (Seinsfrage). Thus, one of the pivotal questions underlying Heidegger's thought is: "What accounts for the nihilism of the day?"

Nihilism (Latin 'nihil' = "nothing") is the word commonly used to refer to an absence of ground or "forgetting of being." It is the word applied frequently to the age in which man is presently standing--an age characterized by disassociation and the loss of meaning. Heidegger's own description of nihilism (Nihilismus) is the belief in things as objects to the total exclusion of being (Sein).² That is, in a nihilistic age, man tends to ask after the being of things rather than the being of things. For Heidegger, the emphasis on things without regard for being obscures the meaning (Sinn) of all things. Nihilism is the age, etymologically speaking, in which "no-thing" any longer reveals meaning. The meaning of being (Sinn von Sein) remains veiled.

Let's look at this a little more closely. An absence of ground occurs when man lives only in fore-grounds and forgets to ask after the ground of fore-grounds. The ground for Heidegger, remember,

*Ground (Grund) means "bottom, especially of the sea." Ground, with regard to the early Greek understanding of being as physis, is the original arising from the sea, the primal setting-apart wherein all things come to be. This being as physis is ground for Heidegger. Abgrund is the absence of ground. It is the abyss, the Greek 'abyssos' meaning "without bottom."
is the ground of being, thus when man forgets to ask after ground, he forgets to ask specifically after the ground of being. Said another way, man forgets to "think" things out of their relation to being as a whole. And, for Heidegger, man forgets to ask after the ground of being by forgetting to ask after the man who asks after being. That is, man forgets to call the questioner--man--into the question of being. And man forgets to call the questioner into the question of being by positing man as a subject or substance which detachedly observes being.

For Heidegger, therefore, it has been Western man's failure to call the essence and nature of the interpreter into the interpretation of being that comprises man's destroyed relation (zerstörte Bezug) to being. It is this destroyed relation to being that has led to an absence of ground in which the things or beings of the world become fore-grounds detached from the relational ground of their being. Fore-grounds are things or beings whose relation to being as a whole--whose ground--remains veiled from view.

Furthermore, man's destroyed relation to being becomes man's subsequent misrelation (Missverhältnis) to language. That is, man's language "houses" man's destroyed relation to being. It is this simultaneous misrelation to language, then, that renders man almost incapable of asking after the relational ground of being as such, so enmeshed in thinking in linguistic fore-grounds has man become. Therefore, "... man has even forgotten that he has forgotten the true nature of being," so pervasive has the forgetting of being
become. Then the destitute time is no longer able even to experience its own destitution. That inability, by which even the destitution of the destitute state is obscured, is the time's absolutely destitute character.

Assuming that a turn still remains open for this destitute time at all, it can come some day only if the world turns about fundamentally—and that now means, unequivocally: if it turns away from the abyss. In the age of the world's night, the abyss of the world must be experienced and endured. But for this it is necessary that there be those who reach into the abyss.

Heidegger is one of those who reaches into the abyss. Heidegger reaches into the abyss to unearth the forgotten ground by turning back to the very beginnings of Western philosophy. For nihilism, which represents the visible wound or "open sore" of Western thought, is a wound that has to be seen in its "thought-projective origins" in order to be healed. For, in Heidegger's mind, it has been precisely man's refusal, through the positing of static truths and easy unities, to face the depth of his own destitution that accounts for man's inability to pierce the destitution of the day. It has been man's refusal to face the abyss that perpetuates the nihilism of the age.

Nihilism does not result from excessive preoccupation with the nothing. On the contrary, only by asking the question of the nothing can nihilism be countered.

For Heidegger, like Hegel, begin and nothing belong together: a forgetting of one becomes a forgetting of the other.

. . . to press inquiry into being explicitly to the limits of nothingness, to draw nothingness into the question of being--this is the first and only fruitful step toward a true transcending of nihilism.
The Hermeneutical Process

... "hermetic"—turning endlessly upon itself, complex and dazzling in its intricacy, representing by its very nearly atrophied difficulty the plight of the decadent bourgeois society with which it deals.

Joyce Carol Oates

In an attempt to reestablish ontological ground, and with it, meaning, Heidegger turns to hermeneutics. Hermeneutics (Hermeneutik) comes from the Greek word hermeneuein and means "to interpret." Hermeneutics is the science of interpretation, particularly with regard to literary works, and has been used most often in the theological interpretation of Scriptural texts. Hermeneutics interprets interpretations. Essentially, therefore, hermeneutics is an interpretative exegesis in search of meaning. In the same way that people interpret works of art in search of their meaning, Heidegger searches being as a whole in search of its meaning.

Specifically, Heidegger searches the phenomena of the world in search of meaning.* In this sense, Heidegger's thinking on being is phenomenological (displaying the influence of his predecessor at Freiburg and the father of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl), in that it turns to the things of the world in search of their essence and, therefore, their meaning.

The expression 'phenomenology' can be formulated in Greek as legein ta phainomena. But legein means apophainesthai. Hence phenomenology means: apophainesthai ta phainomena--to

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*Phenomenon is derived from the Greek phainomenon, a derivative of the verb phainesthai meaning "to show itself." In Greek, phaino means "to bring into daylight, to place in brightness." Phenomenon, then, is that which shows itself as itself in the light of day.
let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself. That is the formal meaning of the type of research that calls itself 'phenomenology.' But this expresses nothing other than the maxim formulated above: 'To the things themselves!'

Phenomenology searches the ground of things or beings in order to unveil the meaning of being itself. Through phenomenology, meaning is unearthed; it is not assigned. Therefore, for Heidegger, to see something as it is, in its essence, whose very essence comprises its ground of being, is concurrently to understand its meaning. Meaning, then, is expressed as man's encounter with things as they are.

As such, Heidegger's process is circular (zirkelhaft) rather than linear. A linear process assumes a beginning and an end, a cause and an effect. Heidegger tries to avoid such assumptions. For Heidegger, to question the nature and essence of things, to question the existence facing man, is simultaneously to question the nature and essence of man as questioner. To question the meaning of being (die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein) is to question the meaning of man. This kind of reflexive reciprocity mirrors the circular or relational essence of the being known as man.

... to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity--the inquirer--transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about--namely, Being.

An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure.

This questioning of being by being, like the invention of the wheel,
reflects the circular structure of man as being-in-the-world. In the same way that man can only use language to speak of language, only the being of man can speak about the essence and nature of being. "There is a reciprocal bond between apprehension and being." says the early Greek thinker Parmenides. A recognition of this circularity places man within the circle of questioning, which, for Heidegger, is where he inherently belongs.

Moreover, then, it has been traditional metaphysics' failure to recognize man's inherent placement within the circle of being through positing man as the detached observer of being that has fostered linear conceptions of existence. This becomes, for Heidegger, the abyss in the circle of being, for when man is removed from the question of being, not only is the essence of man forgotten, but in this forgetting, the essence of being as a whole is forgotten. The inherent relation of part to whole is veiled, thus obscuring the ongoing circular flow of relational movement which comprises the ground of being. The motion between man (a being) and being is hidden from view. It is then that man and his world appear to stand statically at opposite ends of a straight line: man as detached subject and world or being as object under question.

Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology tries to reestablish a recognition of man's being within being. Not surprisingly then, Heidegger's ontology begins with an interpretation of the nature and essence of the interpreter himself. In this sense, his ontology is basically a metaphysics of metaphysics, a meta-interpretation. It is
a process of questioning (Fragen) which questions itself in search of
the essence of the question and the questioner. In calling the
questioner into question, hermeneutical phenomenology reestablishes
man within being by the very nature of the process. This process
turns itself immediately to the encounter or relation (Bezug) between
man and being. Such a process, then, re-includes man.

Because Dasein is itself historical all inquiry concerning it
must scrutinize its own history: ontology of Dasein must be
hermeneutical, that is, aware of its own historical formation
and indefatigably attentive to the problem of interpretation.
Implied in such awareness of its own interpretive origins is a
'destruction' or dismantling of the transmitted conceptual
apparatus, a clearing of the congested arteries of a
philosophical tradition that has all the answers but no longer
experiences the questions.

Heidegger initially called this process of phenomenological and
hermeneutical investigation "fundamental ontology" in an effort to
distinguish his process from that of "traditional ontology."*12

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*The word 'ontology' came into existence in the 17th Century to
describe the branch of philosophy that deals with the question of
being. However, for Heidegger, ontology had long since ceased to be
the question of being and had, instead, become the ordering and
classification of being. This is traditional ontology, whose
destruction (de-structuring) is Heidegger's stated task in
Being and Time. (Heidegger employs the German word Destruktion
to denote a de-structuring which builds anew, rather than the German
word Zerstörung, which carries a more negative connotation.)
Meister Eckhardt's statement, "only the hand that erases can write
the true thing," carries the intent of Heidegger's destruction.

Juxtaposed to traditional ontology, Heidegger describes his
ontology as "the endeavor to make being manifest itself, and to do so
by way of the question 'how does it stand with being?'"13 This
process he initially called "fundamental ontology." However, he
eventually ventures that perhaps it is better to dispense with the
term altogether since two modes of questioning which search so
differently should not bear the same name. His process, over time,
becomes called simply the questioning of being. Over time, also,
Heidegger refers to "traditional ontology" as simply metaphysics.
The latter, for Heidegger, is concerned with categorizing the nature of things without questioning the meaning of the relation between man and being. Heidegger wanted to stress his concern with relations rather than categories and facts. Therefore, Heidegger's initial concern became the nature of man in relation to being as a whole. It becomes understandable, then, why Heidegger approaches his fundamental questions regarding being, "What accounts for the nihilism of the day?" and "How does it stand with being?", initially through a third question: "What being asks after the nature and essence of being itself?" What is the nature and essence of the interpreter? Thus, Heidegger begins his inquiry into being in *Being and Time* with an inquiry into the nature of man. This inquiry not only signals a new process of questioning, then, but additionally points to where Heidegger sees the "forgetting of being" as having occurred: in man's failure to call himself into the question of being, specifically through defining himself as a subject which questions being but is himself not questioned.

**Man as Relation**

It is his wisest gesture to let all things pass away, but his most human gesture to make them stay and make a tragic shape out of them.

Joyce Carol Oates

An understanding of Heidegger's interpretation of man is important in order to differentiate man as Dasein from traditional ontology's "man the subject," the view of man which has characterized
Western thought from Plato to the present day. This brief discussion of human Dasein is not an attempt to summarize Heidegger's extensive thought on the subject. It is an attempt to provide the reader with the language and understanding needed to approach the remainder of Part One.

Man as Dasein, as being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein), is relation to being.* Man is not a subject or a substance; man is being-as-relation. To speak of relation, for Heidegger, is to acknowledge at the outset a space wherein relation can occur. Dasein, then, is essentially a space, a distance, an in-between. Heidegger uses the word "being-in" (In-Sein) to denote "a dwelling in, a space of dwelling."14 It is in this space, in this "clearing in the forest," to use Heidegger's early metaphor for man, where being reveals and discloses itself. Man is the space where being shows itself; man is "being held out into the nothing."15

It is also in this space that man understands (versteht), and it is man's capacity for understanding being (Seinsverstandnis) that differentiates man from other beings. In that man is the space

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*Dasein is an everyday German word meaning "existence." Heidegger, however, in his linguistic freeplay, breaks the word down into its components Da (there) and Sein (being), giving it the meaning "being-there" to denote the unique aspect of being which is only man's: the capacity to project into a there beyond its here. For with understanding, for Heidegger, man not only is, but additionally knows that he is. This knowing that one's being is, this projecting beyond where one is, is understanding. This understanding introduces a different dimension into the unity of being, and in this sense, such understanding could be said to "part" the unity of is-ness, the unity of being without reflection.
where understanding (Verstehen) takes place, man does not "have" understanding; rather, man is understanding.  

Understanding, for Heidegger, presupposes an "other" and this "other" is precisely the "other" which is not being. The "other" which is not being--which is other than being--is nothingness. That is, the "other" which is not thing is no-thing. Understanding, then, not only involves man in an encounter with being but also involves man in an encounter with not being. For in encountering the finite things of the world--things which are--man encounters the limits and ends of such things. In this meeting, man comes face to face not only with the finiteness of things, but also with his own finiteness. Man encounters his own "temporality" (Zeitlichkeit). For Heidegger, man is a being-towards-death (Sein-zum-Tode). When man understands, then, man essentially understands death. In understanding, man meets the not being that exists together with being.

Moreover, for Heidegger, nothingness grounds being. Without nothingness, there would be no being and not being because there would be no space whereby things come to be. Nothingness makes the relation of thing to thing possible. Thus Heidegger states that nothingness is the space where being discloses itself and understanding happens. Being and nothing exist together. Dasein faces being when he faces not being. "'Death' is the 'end' of Dasein whereby it becomes a 'whole.' " In facing the space, the hole, man faces and discloses whole; in facing not being, man is being. In
encountering the finite (endlich), then, in the world and in the self, man is understanding. It is in this encounter that, for Heidegger, man is what he is.

Man's encounter with nothing, therefore, reveals the essence of man-as-relation. And, for Heidegger, the revealed essence of a being is at once its meaning (Sinn). Thus Heidegger says that meaning itself is grounded in nothingness. That is, in relating—in being what man is—man not only discloses being but also meaning. For Heidegger, then, the meaning of man and the meaning of being disclose themselves simultaneously when man faces the essence of his own being.

To face the essence of one's own being—to own oneself as one really is—is what Heidegger calls mineness or ownership. The German word in Heidegger's writings is Eigentlichkeit, and it most often gets translated in English as authenticity. Eigentlichkeit is not employed by Heidegger in its casual German usage, but rather with respect to its root, eigen, which means "own."* Eigentlichkeit, for Heidegger, denotes ownership.

... because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic—that is, something of its own—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity... are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness.

*The word "authentic" is derived from a Greek root meaning "one who does things with his own hands; one who does things for himself."
To be authentic is to own oneself as oneself really is. In light of the preceding discussion of Dasein as a finite and temporal being, this ownership is none other than the owning of all one's self-possibilities, whose possibilities include one's not-to-be or not being. To be authentic is simply to exist-onto-death. Essentially, then, authenticity is owning the relation to being that man is.

The extent to which man owns his relation to being is the extent to which man exists. A man exists in the Heideggerian sense of the word to the extent he "stands out from, into" (the Greek root meaning of exist or Existenz) his relation to being.

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence—in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself.

In existing, man discloses being, and subsequently, the meaning of being. It is precisely this "disclosure" (Eröffnung) of being which, in Heidegger's view, unlocks what the "forgetting of being" closes and hides.

Authenticity or ownership is not be be be viewed as a once-and-for-all decision. The question of ownership is something which confronts man at every moment of his life. Man's being-towards-death is there at every turning, thus man is constantly encountering the choice of facing his own not-being or fleeing. This is the choice of authenticity: the choice of owning one's to-be (being) and not-to-be (nothingness), i.e. all one's possibilities, or not
owning them. For Heidegger, man both owns himself as he is and does not own himself as he is.

The failure to own oneself as one really is—as a being towards non-being—places man in inauthenticity. Inauthenticity (Uneigenlichkeit), then, is stated as man's flight from his own nothingness. In fleeing, man seeks refuge in what Heidegger calls the anonymous safety of the masses (das Man). That is, man flees toward that which seems not to be moving toward death. Man turns from the journey towards death which he is, i.e. from the eternal and never-ending movement as relation which he is, towards that which seems static, towards that which seems stationary and secure.* In such a flight, however, not only is the semblance of motionlessness itself an illusion, but more importantly still, man, in fleeing the movement or relation, is fleeing himself. That is, in fleeing nothingness, man flees being also, for as was stated previously, nothingness is the place of man where being discloses and reveals itself. Death is the space in man whereby man lives. Therefore, when man flees his own not-to-be, man flees his own to-be.

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*The other "existentialia" of Heidegger can be briefly mentioned here. In inauthentic existing, the voice or "call of conscience" (Gewissen), which is silence, beckons man back to his own nothingness, asking man to acknowledge the "guilt" (Schuld) which comes through man's failure to be (himself) in the face of not-being. Guilt is a call to acknowledge one's lack of being. Heidegger's notion of "will as resolve" (Entschlossenheit), then, is the resolve to be oneself in the face of nothingness; to be oneself in the face of one's own death. Such resolve is care (Sorge) in the face of dread (Angst).
In fleeing the whole, the parts themselves become obscured. Both the meaning of one's own existence and the meaning of being as a whole remain undisclosed. For if meaning is grounded in nothingness, and man refuses to own nothingness, meaning itself withdraws. In turning away from one, man turns away from both, for being and nothing belong together. This is then to say that when man fails to "own" his essential nature, his own total ground and meaning, the very ground and meaning of being as a whole is obscured in its essential nature.

Moreover, Heidegger says that man's essence as relation has historically been obscured (and, consequently, being has been "forgotten") through linguistically positing man as a substance or a subject who detachedly observes being. Positing man as a subject presents man as if he is stationary and apart, and to the extent language presents this picture, it acts to obscure not only man's essence as relation but also being as a relational whole. Man's flight from his essence as eternal movement within being becomes "housed" in man's linguistic contexts. Language then acts to further "... the fabulous deception, whereby one comes to imagine that a creature in existence is not also of existence, that what man is is not also what everything is; ... we ... cannot see the whole for the parts."²³ In linguistically positing man as that which looks at, instead of out of, being, man not only obscures his own relation to being, but simultaneously he obscures the relation of all things to the whole. For when man is linguistically posited as a "subject" who
detachedly observes being, being itself becomes the "object" of detached observation. Traditionally, this is known as "the subject-object split."

It is here that the ground and therefore the meaning of man and being as a relational whole, now linguistically obscured, eventually fosters the experience of disassociation, an experience which is at root explicitly a loss of association or relation. For Heidegger, then, the disassociative Zeitgeist or nihilism modern man wrestles with has come at the hands of a long-standing inauthenticity. Inauthenticity, for Heidegger, denotes a lack of ownership, and precisely a lack of ownership of the nothing or not-being which exists together with being. The irony here, then, is that man's failure to "own" his being as relation, his being as not-being, does not succeed in rendering the relationship inoperative. Quite the contrary. The relationship between man and being continues regardless of man's awareness or acceptance of its paradoxical nature. That is, being determines the nature of beings. The whole determines the parts. Consequently, what man fails to own finally comes to own man. The external nothingness, the nihilism, then, that now holds man captive is unmasked as the internal nothing of man which man refuses to own. The death man flees becomes the death man faces. This is the nature of the dynamic relationship which exists between man and being as a whole: the whole determines the essence of the parts. However, in the same way man's failure to own his relation to being has led to the nihilism of the day, similarly, for Heidegger, it
is in a remembrance and reownership of that relation where the dynamic possibilities for the future of being lie grounded. For, as Heidegger often notes, false separations point to prior bonds.

This brings us to a brief discussion of "questioning" (Fragen) because for Heidegger, man "owns" or "reowns" his relation to being through questioning that very being.

Questioning

All that I have said and done,
Now that I am old and ill,
Turns into a question till
I lie awake night after night
And never get the answers right.

W. B. Yeates, "The Man and the Echo"

Man's dread (Angst) and care (Sorge) concerning his own not-to-be exhibits itself, for Heidegger, in man's questioning his being-in-the-world. Overcoming the dread of nothingness, man expresses concern and care over his own being, and therefore over being itself, in questioning that very being (Seinsfrage). It is in this act of questioning being that, for Heidegger, man relates to that in which he is totally related. Heidegger speaks of this questioning as the "leap" through which man recognizes ("knows again") that which he is. It is the "leap" through which man owns himself as the relation to being which he is. Similarly, man's refusal or fear in questioning his own being-in-the-world is a refusal to "own" the relation to being which he is. Therefore, for Heidegger, it is in the act of questioning that man becomes "open" to his relation to being.
To question one's own being is to be engaged in what Heidegger calls a "project" or "projection" (Entwurf). Etymologically, the word "project" means "to throw forward, to extend." ("Extend" means "to stretch out, to enlarge.") In projecting, man extends "the essential possibilities of being" (Wesensmöglichkeit). In questioning, man gives birth to future being. Man discloses being. Projection, for Heidegger, refers then to man's "driving forward toward its own possibility of being." To be engaged in a project or projection is

... the mode of being of human being in which human being is in its possibilities as possibilities. It is not the mere having of a preconceived plan, but is the projecting of possibility in human being that occurs antecedently to all plans and makes planning possible.

Man, therefore, for Heidegger, is "a being of possibility" (Möglichsein). For while being denotes all beings, everything that "is" and "comes to be," only the "being-there" which is particular to being-human (Menschsein) can (so far as we know) project its being forward, i.e. ask after being itself. When man questions, then, the "what" or "whom" that must be asked is man himself. Man asks after that being whose very "mode of being" (Seinsmodus) is to question being.

Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it—all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of Being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity—the inquirer—transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about—namely, Being.
Every question, therefore, is essentially a oneself-question or self-question. Every project is essentially a self-project (Sichentwerf)—a project of the temporal and relational being which asks after being. Thus, even when man questions what is "other," man is essentially questioning himself.

The relationship-of-Being which one has towards Others would then become a Projection* of one's own Being-towards-oneself 'into something else'. The Other would be a duplicate of the Self.26

For as a temporality (Zeitlichkeit), man is that being which projects itself towards the future. That is, in questioning, man is fundamentally asking after his eventual or future not-to-be, and therefore is asking also after the future of being itself. In questioning, man is projecting his temporality forward. Man is rendering his own nothingness, his own space-of-possibilities, his own future, into being. In questioning one's own future or temporality, in calling one's own being and non-being into question, man becomes historical. As historical being (geschichtliches), man affects not only man's fate, but being's fate as well. Questioning being, therefore, "unlocks" the possibilities of being into future and actual being. Questioning, for Heidegger, is thus the way in which man manifests himself, and subsequently the way in which history begins. Similarly, Hegel says that history is what man does with

*Projection here is the German 'Projektion'. As Macquarrie and Robinson state in the translator's note, "here we are dealing with 'projection' in the familiar psychological sense, not in the sense which would be expressed by 'Entwurf'."
death, and Gordon Childe suggests that in making history, "man makes himself."  

For Heidegger, then, when man fails to own his relation to being, through forgetting that his being is the being which is asked after in questioning, relational being as a whole is forgotten. This "forgetting of being" has become for Heidegger the inauthentic historical tradition Western man has been handed.

In summary, then, for Heidegger, authentic history and philosophy (i.e. authentic language) is created to the extent man "owns" himself as he is, to the extent he "stands out into" his relation to being. History, philosophy, and language are authentic to the extent man recognizes questioning as the way he relates to that in which he is totally and intimately related.

In light of this interpretation of questioning, Heidegger's hermeneutical process is an attempt "to think in terms of this other 'ground,' i.e. Dasein."

The sequence of questions is itself a mode of thinking, which, instead of supplying concepts merely feels and tests itself as a new mode of relationship to Being.

Accordingly, such questioning creates a new mode of languaging. For Heidegger, it is language that allows man to be historical in the first place, and thus it is language which grounds history and philosophy. It is being, however, which grounds language. Thus, it is firstly man's destroyed relation to being that accounts for man's ensuing misrelation to language, although once language "houses" man's destroyed relation to being, language itself perpetuates man's
loss relation to being as a whole.

Because the destiny of language is grounded in a nation's relation to being, the question of being will involve us deeply in the question of language.

For Heidegger, then, man needs to reown his relation to being (the part needs to reown its relation to the whole) in order to recover its original relation to language. However, understanding how language itself has come to house man's destroyed relation to being, through a word history which presents man and being, i.e. the part and the whole, as if they were unrelated entities, may be a step in helping man find the way back to his being within being.

The Fundamental Question and Its Historical Relevance

The fact of existence, the very use of language--these are what seem to me inconceivable . . . It is existence itself that seems unimaginable; and, that being so, there is nothing within existence that has the power to startle my credulity.

Eugene Ionesco

In an attempt to unearth the fundamental nature of questioning as man's encounter with his relation to being, Heidegger begins his ontology with the question of being. Thus his book, An Introduction to Metaphysics (Einführung in die Metaphysik, 1953), begins with the question: "Why are there essents (beings)* rather than nothing?" Why is there anything at all rather than nothing

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*Essents or beings refers to all things-that-are. Essents is the term used in the Ralph Manheim translation of An Introduction to Metaphysics. Although the Manheim translation is employed throughout this paper, I use the term beings (or things-that-are) rather than essents, except where essents appears in a direct quote.
at all? Through this question, Heidegger tries to give words to man's encounter with his own relational existence. Heidegger is looking for a "ground question" which will take man out of thinking merely in foregrounds. He is looking for a question that will bring man face to face with being. As such, the words give way in importance alongside the possible "event" of man encountering that in which he is totally related.

Such a meeting or event can happen at any time in a man's life, through any encounter, although Heidegger says many people never encounter the question of being in the "full ground" of its "weight." Every human being, however, in that his "being-there" is the relation to being as a whole, is "brushed" by the question now and again, even if he does not realize that it is the question of his own being, and therefore being as a whole, which is upon him.

And yet each of us is grazed at least once, perhaps more than once, by the hidden power of this question, even if he is not aware of what is happening to him. The question looms in moments of great despair, when things tend to lose all their weight and all meaning becomes obscured. Perhaps it will strike but once like a muffled bell that rings into our life and gradually dies away. It is present in moments of rejoicing, when all things around us are transfigured and seem to be there for the first time, as if it might be easier to think they are not than to understand that they are and are as they are. The question is upon us in boredom, when we are equally removed from despair and joy, and everything about us seems so hopelessly commonplace that we no longer care whether anything is or is not...

Man may encounter the question of being at any time. Thus, for Heidegger, it is the broadest and deepest of all questions. It is the question of questions. It is in a sense a meta-question in that
it does not ask after "this" and/or "that;" it does not ask after particular beings, or the relation of particular beings one to another, or the properties and traits of beings. It is not a question of foregrounds. Rather, the question in which man comes to relate to that in which he is intimately involved is a question of ground. It is a question of the "underlying," a question of the being of all beings. In asking the question, therefore, being as a whole is confronted, for the question no longer is "Is it 'this' and/or 'that?'" The question is rather "Why 'this' and/or 'that?'" With this question, with this "why," man "opens up" a view of ground.

For through this questioning the essent as a whole is for the first time opened up as such with a view to its possible ground, and in the act of questioning it is kept open.\(^{33}\)

What if man does not question? Heidegger says trees still grow and planets still move. In other words, life goes on. But, it is the if of possibility that is important for Heidegger. For if the question is asked, whose very asking involves a "leap" and constitutes an "event" (Ereignis), the questioner encounters his own ground.* "... the leap in this questioning opens up its own source--with this leap the question arrives at its own ground. We call such a leap,

*The event (Ereignis) for Heidegger is "the event of appropriation." The event of appropriation is discussed on page 203. Briefly, however, it means the happening of ownership whereby man "owns" his belonging to being. The root of event is er-eignen, and like the word ownership, event comes from eigen ("own") as in "to come into one's own, to come to where one belongs." The other root of event is er-äugnen (Auge = eye) meaning "to catch sight of, to see with the mind's eye, to see face to face." Appropriation (Aneignung) means also "of one's own, to make one's own."
which opens up its own source, the original source or origin (Ur-sprung)*, the finding of one's own ground."35

The ground (or origin) for man is his relation to being, thus the question opens up man to his relation to being as a whole. For Heidegger, such "opening up" constitutes meeting not only one's own ground but also one's own meaning.

Our question is the question of all authentic questions, i.e. of all self-questioning questions, and whether consciously or not it is necessarily implicit in every question. No questioning and accordingly no single scientific 'problem' can be fully intelligible if it does not include, i.e. ask, the question of all questions. Let us be clear about this from the start: it can never be objectively determined whether anyone, whether we, really ask this question, that is whether we make the leap, or never get beyond a verbal formula. In a historical setting that does not recognize questioning as a fundamental human force, the question immediately loses its rank.36

In asking the question of questions, in wondering, all formulas (prescribed or appointed forms) drop away, for man is asking after the ground of all forms. All illusionary security of "this" and/or "that" falls into ground, for in such asking, man confronts his own ground. Man encounters the relational movement that he is. This for Heidegger is the event of appropriation: the event whereby man relates to that in which he is totally related. When man fails to question, man begins to "take 'things-that-are' for granted." Man's relational movement within being then gives way to an illusionary

*Origin (Ursprung) denotes a primal leap. The word 'origin' is derived from the Greek ὀρισμός and means "to arise, to jump or stir up." "To originate something by a leap, to bring something into being from out of the source of its nature in a founding leap--this is what the word origin means."37
positing of "this" and/or "that," in which the movement of relation is obscured. Being then seems stationary or stated.

To state means "to set into position" or "to fix in place." Statements set into position; they fix in place. Statements, however, need not obscure questioning. That is, "fixing in place" does not need to denote rigidity and the lack of motion. Statements are "being-things" if there is a recognition of the relational movement inherent in such a "fixing in place," i.e. if there is a recognition of the inherent questioning behind all statements. Statements are seen as "fixed" in the sense of rigid and motionless when man's relational movement within being is forgotten.* (See also the following discussion of the Greek word thesis on page 88.) When statements become rigid and motionless, the figures and forms of ground become viewed as mere formulas or foregrounds. Primal questions degenerate into rigidified answers. Things are seen as objects, parts are seen as fragments, prior bonds are seen as false separations. It is here that the reality of relations becomes the illusion of facts.

According to Heidegger, Western thought, for the most part, does not "recognize questioning as a fundamental human force," and thus forgets the relational movement underlying all "fixing in place." And for Heidegger, the failure to acknowledge questioning in Western thought is none other than Western man's failure to acknowledge

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*The propositional statement, in which there is usually a subject, a verb, and an object reveals the extent to which man's forgetting of being has become conveyed in the grammatical construction of the sentence itself.
himself as an eternally moving question. The positing of rigid and motionless statements, then, becomes man's feeble attempt to dam what is forever moving, i.e. to flee his own eternal movement within being. Unfortunately, attempts to dam what is forever moving only stagnate the waters of being. In this light, perhaps the external pollution afflicting modern man and the world is only a visible symbol for the internal pollution infecting the damned waters of the being within man.

The interpretation of questioning as man's encounter with being underlies Heidegger's understanding of philosophy. Authentic philosophy is questioning says Heidegger. As such, philosophy is always "untimely" for it entails encountering one's own being and not being, i.e. one's own death. Therefore, philosophy never contributes to making things easier (in the sense of readily available and easily grasped) but "only more difficult" (in the sense of complex, mysterious, and multiple) in that "it restores to things, to essents, their weight." Authentie philosophy, therefore, cannot be "learned" in the sense of "passing on the facts," for philosophy is man's encounter with being as a whole. Philosophy is an "event of appropriation," an event of ownership in which man comes to own who he is. Thus, as Heidegger says, it is correct to say "'You can't do anything with philosophy'," but this is not the final word.

For the rejoinder imposes itself: granted that we cannot do anything with philosophy, might not philosophy, if we concern ourselves with it, do something with us?

In the questioning in which man encounters his relation to being as a
whole, man encounters what being has to do with him, and it is this meeting with the whole that restores to things, to beings, their "weight," i.e. their being. This meeting unveils the total possibilities inherent in being. It unveils the complexity, depth, and magnitude that comprises relational being. This is what Heidegger means by saying that philosophy as questioning "restores to things their weight." Philosophy as questioning restores man to his being as possibility. Such a restoration holds an accompanying recognition: there is no statement (as a formula) that can reveal the truth of being, for being encompasses man's very stating, and in so doing, being encircles the motionless in motion. Being is the movement of relation, and as movement, being is "the encounterable."

The history of Western philosophy, however, would have man believe otherwise, for it has perpetuated the illusion, through presenting statements as formulas, that truth, and therefore being, are capturable and graspable. The misinterpretations which have steadily crept into philosophy whereby statements are viewed as unmoving facts (facta), says Heidegger, come mainly at the hands of teachers (Schullehrer) of philosophy, such as Plato and Aristotle. That is, philosophy presented as statement is "learned" most often in schools. The tradition (Überlieferung) of "teaching truth" is so widespread that, for Heidegger, it almost precludes anyone getting outside the deception of statement in order to ask after the deception of statement. This long-standing tradition almost precludes an asking after the ground underlying foreground statements. Philosophy as
questioning has thus become the realm of "the few." That is, the
deception of statement is an historical reality which is so widespread
that only "the few" seem to "get outside of it" and truly encounter
being.* It is then that the time of "no one" looms alarmingly close to
the time of "the few." The time of "no one" is "being's end"--being
(≠m). (To denote "being's end," Heidegger writes being crossed
out.) That man is dangerously close to "being's end" is reflected for
Heidegger in the visible wound of nihilism afflicting the modern
world.

Thus, for Heidegger, the asking of the question of being,
through which man encounters what being has to do with him, has
immediate relevance for the future history of man and being. It is
the question that must be asked.

*Because of statements like these, Heidegger has often been
criticized for espousing an elitist philosophy. This, I believe, is a
misleading interpretation. No one hoped more than Heidegger for the
understanding of man's relation to being as a whole to become the
realm of "the many." In speaking about the task of language in his
essay "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry," Heidegger says that
"the essential word, if it is to be understood and so become a
possession in common, must make itself ordinary." He follows this
statement with a quote from the poet Holderlin: "The fruit must
become more ordinary, more everyday, and then it will be mortals'
own." Heidegger's use of the words common, ordinary, and everyday
are not to be understood here as the "everyday babbling of crowds,"
or "the passing of accepted and common opinions held by the
masses," which constitutes for Heidegger "the counterfeit word" or
glosso that Heidegger hopes to unveil as man's attempted flight from
death. Here, Heidegger employs ordinary, everyday, and common as
"essential words"--words understood in relation to the being that all
things share and have in common. For being is all "things-that-are,"
all being that confronts man everyday, all the ordinary things of life
that wait to be revealed in their very being with, and relation to, the
whole of being.
To ask 'How does it stand with being?' means nothing less than to recapture, to repeat (wieder-holen), the beginning of our historical-spiritual existence, in order to transform it into a new beginning . . . with all the strangeness, darkness, insecurity that attend a true beginning.

The asking of the question concerning being is, therefore, historical in that it attempts "... to restore man's historical being-there--and that always includes our own future being-there in the totality of the history allotted to us--to the domain of being, which it was originally incumbent on man to open up for himself."\(^4\)

Essentially, then, it is philosophy as questioning, coupled with an understanding of man as a temporal and historical being, that underlies Heidegger's innovative approach to history (Geschichte) (discussed below).

It is important to note here that, for Heidegger, both philosophy and history are grounded in language (Sprache), i.e. in the words of questioning and not-questioning. Therefore, Heidegger's historical research turns to the words themselves "... for words and language are not wrappings in which things are packed for the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in words and language that things first come into being."\(^43\) This is why, for Heidegger, the misuse of language in idle talk and in formulated slogans and cliches can destroy man's authentic relation to things.

The process of researching the words of history in an effort to reestablish ground and meaning is, understandably, one that involves patient questioning. Not surprisingly then, Heidegger ends the
book, An Introduction to Metaphysics, on the following note.

To know how to question means to know how to wait, even a whole lifetime. But an age which regards as real only what goes fast and can be clutched with both hands looks on questioning as 'remote from reality' and as something that does not pay, whose benefits cannot be numbered. But the essential is not number; the essential is the right time, i.e. the right moment, and the right perseverance.

Man is "the shepherd (Hirt) of being" says Heidegger. As a shepherd, man unfolds authentic history and being through a patient guardianship that constantly questions its own being.

**Heidegger's Understanding of History**

to know is to know how it comes into being coming-into-being and passing-away

History is not historicism but origins

Doctrines must take their beginning from that of the matters of which they treat. (Giambattista Vico)

Principles . . . primordial; primeval: German Ur-origin as Ur-sprung, primeval leap

A New Science: the cyclical view of history

The cycle ends in a ricorso recirculation

Etymology is ricorso: as it was in the beginning.

First comes a body language:

The universal principle of etymology in all languages: words are carried over from bodies and from the properties of bodies to signify the institutions of the mind and spirit. (Vico)

First comes the senses:

The sense of an ending:

Western Civilization is over.

Norman O. Brown
The disclosure of being's possibilities is tempered, for Heidegger, by man's "thrownness" (Geworfenheit)—by man's having been cast out into a world which present man did not create, but which he, nonetheless, has been handed. Simply stated, man carries his past with him. Man's realization of the future possibilities for being, therefore, comes about in relation to what already has been.

As a being of temporality (Zeitlichkeit), man is past, present, and future. That is, man as relational being, is a continuity: "having been" is present in present being in the same way that "can be" is present.

The future, the character of having been, and the Present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the 'towards-onself', the 'back-to', and the 'letting-onself-be-encountered-by. The phenomena of the 'towards. . .', the 'to. . .', and the 'alongside. . .', make temporality manifest as the ἐκσκοτοτάθαι pure and simple. Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the Present, the 'ecstases' of temporality.

Past, present, and future are what Heidegger calls "the 'ecstases' (Ekstasen) of temporality" and they refer to the how of man's "standing out into" being. (The words ecstasy and ecstatic come from the Greek and denote "standing out" or "displacement.") Past, present, and future refer to the continuous journey in time that is man, rather than to time as clock or chronological time. In this sense, for Heidegger, man does not "take" a journey; man is a journey. As a journey, man remembers, presences, and hopes. Man looks back, looks out, and looks ahead, and in so doing, man belongs to time.
This ecstatic belonging, which is the essence of "being-there," is obscured, says Heidegger, when man denies either past, present, or future. For example, attempts to live only in the present (such as are often prevalent today), without a regard for the future and the past, are doomed to failure, as are attempts to live only in the past or only in the future. In denying any one of the three, man denies his very being for when man posits himself as only a creature of the past, or only a creature of the present, man as a journey in time--man as relational movement--is obscured.

With regard to history, therefore, Heidegger says man belongs (gehört) to his history. Subsequently, for Heidegger, to view history as only a science (i.e., as only the recording of data and facts) is to strip man of his belonging to history, and thereby to obscure man's continuous relation to being.

Consequently, in his conception of history (Geschichte), Heidegger distinguishes between historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) or authentic history, and historiography (Historie or Geschichtswissenschaft) or the science of history.* Historiography is "concerned

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*In an effort to aid the reader in understanding these two terms, George Seidel says that it may help to conceive historiography as "the factual" and historicity as "the actual," although he notes that Heidegger did not employ these terms. The word "actual" may be understood via its root, which denotes "being-deed," or "being-act." Actual denotes the being in acts and deeds, i.e. the being of history. Factual, on the other hand, refers to the viewing of deeds, facts, acts, without a recognition of the being of action, i.e. without a recognition of the movement of relation that underlies all things.
with the past (Vergangenheit), that which is no longer around (nicht mehr vorhanden)," with those deeds and facts (facta) that are over and done with. Historicity, on the other hand, is concerned with the "past" that is still somehow around (noch vorhanden), and thus still effects the present (Geganwart). Historicity is the "past" that is still with us, the "past" "which still makes its presence felt." It is the "has been" (dagewesene) which, precisely because of its "has-been-ness" (Gewesheit), is still present. Thus, for Heidegger, the "past" of authentic history or historicity is not something finished, and it is not finished because the "past" still belongs to man and man still belongs to his "past."

In this light, man does not uncover nor disclose authentic history by merely unearthing the facts and deeds of history in a scientific manner. The possibility of uncovering and revealing authentic history depends, for Heidegger, upon a recognition of the temporal and historical nature of man. Man, as an historical being, is "open" to his ecstatic temporality, i.e. to his past, present, and future. Authentic history, therefore, involves man "owning" the "past" which is still present in the present.

For Heidegger, it is upon authentic history or historicity that historiography must be based if it is to realize the future possibilities of being; that is, if it is to create the future in relation to being as a whole. Historiography, therefore, must ground itself in historicity for historiography, to be authentic, depends upon the actual history of the historical being that is man. Moreover, due to a historiog-
raphy that has not been grounded in man's temporal relation to being, much of the "has-been" (i.e. the being of the "past") of being has been forgotten. This "forgetting of being" is the historical tradition that modern man has been handed.

This is not to say that the "has-been" of man--the past being--cannot be remembered, for it is precisely in the hope of disclosing the being of man that was, and thus still is (and, therefore, "can be") that Heidegger asks his questions concerning being: How does it stand with being? What accounts for the nihilism of the day? What is the nature of the being that asks after being?

It is in view of the future, in view of the "can be of being" (Seinkönnen), in view of the yet-to-be-realized possibilities of human-being that Heidegger undertakes a re-search of man and of the early words of Western thought. Heidegger's "re-turn," therefore, to actual history (a history thought out of its relation to the being of acts and concerned with more than the merely factual) is in service of actualizing the possibilities for future being. It is a return to the "past" in the service of actualizing future being within the present.

For Heidegger, then, the possibilities for man's future existence, and therefore man's history, lie grounded upon man's temporal, projective, and historical relation to being. As such, Heidegger's concept of historicity continues his efforts to reestablish being as ground through man acknowledging his relational movement and journey within being.
It is in this light, perhaps, that man can view the recent call from Norman O. Brown in his book *closing time* to "return from history to mystery" as a call to turn away from history understood merely as historiography and towards the mystery of the journey itself. For when history is understood as historiography only, the "mystery" for Brown and the "being" for Heidegger are forgotten. For when man is robbed of his being and mystery, he is robbed of his authentic history; so, too, when man is robbed of his authentic history, he is robbed of his being and mystery, and therefore his meaning.

With the understanding of history as historicity, Heidegger attempts to "re-think" the historical tradition (*geschichtliche Überlieferung*) handed modern man. Historical tradition, then, is approached with an eye for the future possibilities still present in the "past" of being, and not approached with a sense of rejection or denial of that tradition.

The misinterpretation of thought and the abuse to which it leads can be overcome only by authentic thinking that goes back to the roots—and by nothing else.49

This authentic re-thinking (*Andenken*) of roots (which Heidegger often calls a "re-trieving" (*Wiederholung*) of tradition) involves an "historical dialogue" (*Gespräch*) with the words and philosophers of the past. It involves a return to origins (*ursprünglich über*). With regard to the concept of "historical dialogue," Heidegger advances an understanding of "interpretation" (*Auslegung*) and "translation" (*Übersetzung*).
Man's efforts to converse with the thoughts and thinkers of the past always involve him in interpretation. This interpretation will be authentic, says Heidegger, if man can disclose that which lies beneath the formulation or nomenclature, i.e. if man can "think" out of his relation to being as a whole. This "thinking" involves man's ownership of his own relation to being. For in the same way that being discloses itself in man "being what he is," an authentic interpretation discloses and reveals the possibilities still present in the words and thoughts of the past (though perhaps forgotten) through man owning his relation to being as a continuous whole. A misinterpretation, then, is an interpretation which forgets to call man--the interpreter--into the question of being. Heidegger's return, therefore, to historical tradition can be seen as an attempt to re-interpret Western tradition in the light of man's relation to being as a whole.

A translation, consequently, is already an interpretation.* Similarly, then, an authentic translation, or what Heidegger terms a "thoughtful translation" (denkende Übersetzung), does not refer to a translation that is literal any more than authentic history refers to a history that is factual. For Heidegger, a literal translation is no translation at all. A literal translation makes the same mis-take as an historiographical accounting of the past in that it "takes" only the

*The word "translate" is the German Übersetzen, meaning "to interpret, to change from one language to another."
facts or deeds of the words, and forgets the being-act underlying all facts, deeds, and words. A thoughtful translation, on the other hand, tries to "think" out of man's relation to being as a whole. That is, a thoughtful translation acknowledges the movement of being present in all deeds and facts.

The place of etymology in Heidegger's translations and interpretations can be viewed against this background. Heidegger enlists etymology in the same way that he enlists history and tradition: as an aid, but always with an eye for more than the merely informational. No more than authentic history can be uncovered by turning to mere historiographical data and facts can the authentic meanings and possibilities inherent in words be uncovered simply by quoting root words from a dictionary. Etymological meanings "act as a hint or indication (Hinweis)" which serves to give the philosopher a direction, but are, by no means, the whole story. Etymology, like history and tradition, works authentically when "thought" out of its relation to being as a whole.
References


3. Ibid., p. 42.


17 Ibid., p. 184.


19 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 68.

20 Ibid., p. 33.

21 Heidegger, Metaphysics, p. 16.


24 Hofstadter in Heidegger, Poetry, p. 72.


26 Ibid., p. 162.


28 Ibid., p. 15.

29 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p. 324.

30 Heidegger, Metaphysics, p. 42.

31 Ibid., p. 1.

32 Ibid., pp. 1-2.

33 Ibid., p. 4.


35 Heidegger, Metaphysics, p. 5.
36 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
37 Heidegger, Poetry, p. 78.
38 Heidegger, Metaphysics, p. 9.
39 Ibid., p. 10.
40 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p. 275.
41 Heidegger, Metaphysics, p. 32.
42 Ibid., p. 34.
43 Ibid., p. 11.
44 Ibid., p. 172.
45 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 377.
47 Seidel, Pre-Socratics, p. 17.
48 Ibid., p. 19.
49 Heidegger, Metaphysics, p. 103.
50 Seidel, Pre-Socratics, p. 135.
CHAPTER IV
EARLY GREEK THOUGHT

In the circle the beginning and the end are common.
Heraclitus

With the pivotal groundwork set forth in Chapter III, this chapter turns to Heidegger's exegesis of early Greek thought. Like the exegesis of the existentialia of Dasein, the exegesis of the pre-Socratic thought of Heraclitus and Parmenides was undertaken by Heidegger with his questions concerning being firmly in mind. Heidegger, therefore, turns to Western man's first known philosophical utterings in an effort to unearth the roots of Western man's present historical tradition, a tradition characterized by Heidegger as "the forgetting of being." Heidegger turns back to the past, then, in the hope of resurrecting being for the future.

It is important for the reader to view this "turning back" to the pre-Socratics through Heidegger's interpretation of history as historicity. That is, Heidegger does not simply interpret the words and works of the early philosophers by following historiographical data. Rather, Heidegger's research is an attempt to "re-think" historical tradition down to its roots through thinking out of man's relation to being as a whole.
Being

The unity of things as Heraclitus understands it is a subtle and hidden sort of unity, not at all such as could be expressed by either a monistic or a dualistic philosophy. The oneness of things, or rather their mutual attunement, cannot exist or even be conceived apart from their manyness and discord. The wisdom that steers all things through all things (overtone: 'the wisdom by which all things steer themselves through all things') is something that cannot be expressed without paradox.

Philip Wheelwright

To give the reader an understanding of what Heidegger intends by the word "being," a brief summary of Heidegger's interpretation of the early Greek words for being are described, along with a description of the etymological roots of the word "being."

Being, for the early Greeks, was expressed by the word physis, a word derived, Heidegger believes, from the Greek ὕόσσος. The word physis expresses the phenomenon of emergence: that which rises out (from the sea) and issues forth. Physis denotes the realm of a-rising; the "self-blossoming emergence (e.g., the blossoming of a rose), opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such unfolding and perseveres and endures in it; in short, the realm of things that emerge and linger on."¹ Physis describes the bringing forth of the unconcealed (Unverborgenheit) from out of the concealed (Verborgenheit). Essentially, it is "being-brought-forth" (Her-vor-bringen): all that is "brought forth" into form; all that "comes to stand."² Being as physis is, thus, the "coming to stand" (zum Stand kommen) in which all things-that-are begin to be: the
planets, the winds and seas, the plants and animals, and man.

Coming to stand accordingly means: to achieve a limit for itself. Consequently a fundamental characteristic of the essent is to telos, which means not aim or purpose but end. Here 'end' is not meant in a negative sense, as though there were something about it that did not continue, that failed or ceased. End is ending in the sense of fulfillment (Vollendung). Limit and end are that wherewith the essent begins to be. . . That which places itself in its limit, completing it, and so stands, has form, morphē. For as the Greeks understood it derives its essence from an emerging placing-itself-in-the-limit.3

This understanding of end or limit as "coming to fulfillment and being" coincides with the Greek concept of boundary or peras. "A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing. . . Accordingly, spaces receive their being from locations and not from 'space'."4 (Remember here also that Heidegger describes "death" as the end whereby man becomes whole.)

Physis, as the realm of emerging and standing forth into limits, is at the same time, for Heidegger, "a shining appearing" (das scheinende Erscheinen). "The radicals phy and pha name the same thing. Phyein, self-sufficient emergence, is phainesthai, to flare up, to show itself, to appear." Thus, for the Greeks, physis as standing forth means concurrently standing-in-the-light or "coming forth into the light" (ins Licht aufgehende). Such appearing, then, "is not something subsequent that sometimes happens to being. Appearing is the very essence of being." Being as physis for the Greeks constitutes a "standing presence" (ständige Anwesenheit) that
includes presencing (Anwesen) and appearance (Erscheinen).* "... for the Greeks standing-in-itself was nothing other than standing-there, standing-in-the-light. Being means appearing."^5

It is this unity of being and appearance in early Greek thought, says Heidegger, that "punctures" the traditional interpretation of Greek philosophy as a "realistic" philosophy stressing objective being. For Heidegger, not only did the early Greeks not use such terms as "realistic" and "idealistic," "objective" and "subjective," but moreover, they did not "think being" through such terms, in that all being was conceived as a manifold unity, in which presencing and appearing were one and the same thing. 6

In turning to the various etymological roots of the word "being," we find the notion of a unity between presence and appearance further confirmed.

According to Heidegger, the range of meanings inherent in the word "being" is determined by three different stems. The oldest stem is es, Sanskrit asus, meaning "life, the living, that which from out of itself stands and which moves and rests in itself: the self-standing (Eigenständig)."^7

*Another early Greek word Heidegger uses in order to help him understand the early Greek notion of being is παρουσία, which Heidegger translates by the German word Anwesen meaning "presence." George Seidel notes also that the word Anwesen refers to "a piece of property, something solid, connoting roots in the soil, a piece of land held for generations in the same family, which notion must also be kept in the back of one's mind in understanding Heidegger's Anwesen. It represents a certain solid 'thereness,' a 'presencing,' a sticking (with roots firmly in the earth) around for a while."^8
The second root of being is the Indo-European bhu, bheu (derivatives include the Latin perfect fui, fuo and the German bin, bist, birn, birt) to which belongs the Greek phuō, meaning "to emerge, to be powerful, of itself to come to stand and remain standing," whose emerging and standing includes presence and appearance. The more traditional understanding of this root phuō, and its derivatives physis and phyein, is as nature and "to grow." However, the more recent exegesis of early Greek philosophy, says Heidegger, shows the "growing" to be an "emerging." For the early Greeks, there was no division between "being" and "becoming," nor between "essence" and "existence." The sense of phuō, therefore, as "nature" is most likely a derivative meaning, appearing later in Greek philosophy. Recently, the root phy-, states Heidegger, has been connected with pha-phainesthai, wherein physis receives its sense of emerging into the light, and phyein means, accordingly, to give light, to shine, and therefore to appear. Similarly, the Greek phainomenon is a derivative of the verb phainesthai meaning "to show itself." Phaino means "to bring to daylight, to place in brightness." The phenomena of being are those things which stand forth into light from out of darkness; those things which burst forth into unconcealment from out of concealment.

The third stem is related to the German "sein": wes; Sanskrit: vasami; Germanic: wesan, meaning to dwell, to sojourn; to ves belong. Heidegger says the participle wesend in German is preserved in an-wesend (present) and ab-wesend (absent). The substantive
Wesen originally meant "enduring as presence, presence and absence," and not the more common "whatness" or "essence" that Wesen later comes to mean. The early understanding of Wesen originally included both the "sense" of presence and absence. However, the unified double sense of sens is lost in the Latin prae-sens and ab-sens, setting up a seeming polemic in which presence and absence, essence and existence, presencing and appearing, start to be divorced.\(^0\)

In that Heidegger uses the word "dwell" extensively, especially in his later writings, it might serve to look a little more closely at the word here. For Heidegger, "to dwell" means to stand in place, to belong (gehören). The etymological roots of dwelling denote "wandering, tarrying, going about, straying, erring." The Old English and High German word for "building" is buan, which means "to dwell." Bauen, buan are themselves variations of bhu, beo, bheu, and bin, the Indo-European roots of being. When bauen still retains this original sense of being, bauen tells man how he be: man dwells. Thus, ich bin, du bist (bin the root of being) means: I dwell, you dwell. In this original sense, dwelling is not an activity man performs additionally to being, as in "working here and dwelling there." Dwelling is being.

The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is Buan, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell. The old word bauen, which says that man is insofar as he dwells, this word bauen however also means at the same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine.
In looking at the roots of the word "being," three meanings have come forth: 1) to live; 2) to emerge, to come into the light; and 3) to dwell, to sojourn, to belong. These meanings underscore the early Greek understanding of being as physis, and physis as appearing or emerging presence—an understanding which reflects the early Greek unity of presence and appearance. For the early Greeks, then, there was no distinction between being and becoming nor between appearance and presence (i.e. between appearance and reality), and, subsequently, no distinction between essence and existence.

Truth

The God of Delphi, who always spoke the truth, never gave a straight answer, in the upright Protestant way; he always spoke in riddles, in parables; ambiguities, temptations; that hearing they might hear and not understand. To teach is not to tell; is not-to-tell; like Heraclitus, the obscure. The god knew how to lie; and so did not deceive his countrymen. The real deceivers are the literalists, who say, I cannot tell a lie, or, hypotheses non fingo. . . . The truth is in the error. We slip out from under the reality-principle, into the truth; when the control breaks down. By great good fortune, gratis, by grace; and not by our own work or will.

Norman O. Brown

For the early Greeks, being was conceived as physis, the word used to describe the bringing forth of the unconcealed from out of the concealed. The Greek word for unconcealment is alētheia (ἀλήθεια). ἀλήθεια is translated as "unconcealment" or "revealment" to denote un-covering. It means "throwing back the
veil, i.e. un-veiling, re-vealing. Therefore, for the early Greeks, when being "comes to stand" as physis, being simultaneously "comes to stand" in unconcealment or alētheia. This overlapping meaning of physis and alētheia grounds the Greek understanding of truth: things that are, beings, are true insofar as they are.

For the Greek essence of truth is possible only in one with the Greek essence of being as physis. On the strength of the unique and essential relationship between physis and alētheia the Greeks would have said: The essent is true insofar as it is. The true as such is essent. This means: The power that manifests itself stands in unconcealment. In showing itself, the unconcealed as such comes to stand. Truth as un-concealment is not an appendage to being. . . . Truth is inherent in the essence of being.

In coming to stand (physis), beings come into unconcealment, which is to say that beings simultaneously come into truth as alētheia. Being as physis, then, is at once truth as alētheia. Thus, the Greek understanding of truth refers to that which is inherent in the appearing presence of things-that-are; it is the emerging unconcealment which beings are.

Already the reader familiar with philosophy can see that this early Greek understanding of truth is far removed from the more traditional concept of truth which Western man has been handed, and thus calling alētheia as unconcealment "truth" places us on dangerous ground. Therefore, before explicating further Heidegger's understanding of authentic truth as grounded in the early Greek word alētheia, this discussion turns briefly to the conventional idea of truth as "propositional truth," or what is commonly called "the correspondence theory of truth." Propositional truth states essen-
tially that "truth is the approximation of thing (object) to perception" or "the approximation of perception to thing (object)." (In Latin, veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus.) This conventional understanding of truth as veritas implies a "rightness" (Richtigkeit) or a "putting oneself right by" (sich richten nach) with regard to some pre-ordained and established criteria. That is, truth as veritas implies objective truth. "... objective truth always implies conformity of the object in question with the essential or 'rational' idea of it."\(^{14}\)

The impression is given—wrongly—that this definition of the essence of truth is independent of the explanation of the essential nature of all that 'is,' of its very being (Sein alles Seienden)—which explanation always involves a corresponding explanation of the essential nature of man as the vehicle and perfecter of the intellectus. Thus the formula for the essence of truth (veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei) acquires a universal validity evident at once to everyone. Dominated by the self-evident nature of this concept of truth, the essentials of which remain for the most part unperceived, we take it as equally self-evident that truth has an opposite and that there is such a thing as untruth. Propositional untruth (incorrectness) is the non-conformity of statement with thing.

Propositional truth, then, becomes merely "the likeness or agreement (Uebereinstimmung: ὀμοιώσις) of a statement (λόγος) to or with a given thing (πραγμα)."\(^{16}\) The concept of truth, then, becomes basically an agreement (between subject and object), i.e. an agreement between man's understanding and that which is understood. Subsequently, the failure to agree constitutes objective untruth, and thus entails an assumed exclusion (for the one who fails to agree) from the nature and essence of truth according to an externally
established objective standard. Truth so conceived divorces truth from being by assuming that something can be understood apart from man's understanding, an assumption that was not present in the early Greek understanding of truth as \( \alpha \ell \theta \epsilon \iota \alpha \). For the early Greeks, apprehension (and, therefore, unconcealment) happens along with being. "To think is the same as the thought that It is;" says the early Greek philosopher Parmenides. In the same way that man does not "have" understanding, neither does man "have" truth. Man is understanding, is thinking, is truth. In other words, insofar as being "has" man, truth "has" man as well. As such, being and truth, being and thinking, as the early Greeks conceived them, are inseparable. Consequently, truth cannot be separated from being without veiling both being and truth, for to separate the essence of being--truth or unconcealment--from being itself is to obfuscate both essence and existence as the inseparable unity that they are.

For Heidegger, once truth is conceived as separate from being, rather than that which happens along with being, truth becomes cast as "that which is attainable," and attainable specifically through determination and will. That is, truth is "assigned" to things outside man at will. Truth becomes "the objective," i.e. the static. Truth is then spoken of as the truth of something, the "of" merely denoting the lost relationship "between being as truth." Understanding becomes an understanding or knowledge of. Placed within the Heideggerian framework, the separation of truth from being is, once again, the result of man's attempt to flee his own relational movement.
as truth. The concept of objective truth, then, is an expression of man's objection to the motion of being as truth. It is in this rendering of truth that relationships, for Heidegger, are recast as brute facts placed over and against man. And for Heidegger, facts are those things whose meaning—and that means relational motion because for Heidegger meaning is grounded in motion—has become obscured. In an essay entitled "The Search for Meaning," Karsten Harries states Heidegger's intent clearly:

Take a statement such as "Vaduz is the capital of Liechtenstein. In some sense it is certainly true: Vaduz really is the capital of Liechtenstein. But what is the meaning of this statement? Is it indeed meaningful, if we remember that meaning is discovered only in response to a claim? For most of us a statement such as this is little more than a repetition of something we have heard elsewhere. It is not the expression of an experience. It does not reveal being in its being. To be sure, it does exhibit a fact. But a fact is precisely something which no longer has a place in a living context of care and concern. Heidegger calls such statements 'certain.' Certainty (Gewissheit) is truth which has become meaningless.* The demand for 'the truth' about an object is a demand for certainty. Certainty does not yield meanings, but facts. The object is reduced to a brute given confronting man, in its muteness defying meaningful understanding. This disengaged way of understanding is not more fundamental than one which is engaged, but derived from it.

In objective truth, for Heidegger, truth and being are "disengaged," and in this disengagement, meaning is obscured. This disengagement, however, points to a prior engagement: the Greek marriage of

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*The English words "certain, certainty" are closely related to the Greek ἱππεύω ("to decide, to separate"). In the Latin, the root of "decide" is decidere meaning "to cut off or from." To decide is "to determine, to settle." Certainty involves a decision, a "cutting off," and for Heidegger, certainty specifically "cuts off" man from the motion of relational being.
truth and being. Once again, then, in Heidegger's thought, present separations simply point to prior bonds. In following Heidegger's path back to prior bonds, this discussion returns to an elaboration of the early Greek notion of alētheia, in which "things-that-are are true insofar as they are."

The early Greek notion of alētheia as unconcealment is grounded in things-that-are showing themselves as they are. Man participates in unconcealment, then, by letting "that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself." Therefore, for Heidegger, "the essence of truth is freedom."\(^{19}\)

Freedom lets each thing be what it is, and as such, freedom denotes preserving and safeguarding, sparing. As Heidegger says, freedom as sparing takes place ". . . when we leave something beforehand in its own nature, when we return it specifically to its being, when we 'free' it in the real sense of the word into a preserve of peace."\(^{20}\)

The essence of truth, then for Heidegger, is freedom or "letting-be."

The freedom to reveal something overt lets whatever 'is' at the moment be what it is. Freedom reveals itself as the 'letting-be' of what-is. . . . To let what-is be what it is

\(^{*}\)There are some interesting etymological connections here. In commenting on the essence of being as dwelling, Heidegger says: "Let us listen once more to what language says to us. The Old Saxon wuon, the Gothic wunian, like the old word bauen, mean to remain, to stay in place. But the Gothic wunian says more distinctly how this remaining is experienced. Wunian means: to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in peace. The word for peace, Friede, means the free, das Frye, and fry means: preserved from harm and danger, preserved from something, safeguarded. To free really means to spare."\(^{21}\)
The overtess is none other than the "coming to show itself" or the "coming into unconcealment" that is being as physis. Man participates in unconcealment, then, to the extent he lets or spares (in the sense of safeguarding) what-is to show itself as that which it is. This letting-be is "a participation in the revealment of what-is-as-such (das Seiende als ein solches)," in which things-that-are are spared as what they are.23

The "letting-be of what-is" refers specifically to "letting-be the unconcealed," and the unconcealed is at once physis and aletheia. In letting-be, therefore, man "lets-be" being as truth. Man "lets" what-is be.

Letting-be, in the Heideggerian sense, does not denote indifference and neglect, nor does it denote granting permission. As Heidegger says, "To let something be (Seinlassen) is in fact to have something to do with it (sich einlassen auf)." Letting-be as safeguarding and sparing is to be understood as the active watchfulness and guardianship through which man, as "the shepherd of being," participates in being. Letting-be, then, does not imply passivity, if by passivity we mean the absence of motion. On the contrary, letting-be refers to "doing in the highest sense," which is in the Greek sense of thesis. Thesis means "a setting up in the unconcealed." Albert Hofstadter reminds the reader that the Greek means participating in something overt and its overtness, in which everything that 'is' takes up its position and which entails such overtness... Participation in the revealed nature of what-is... develops into a retirement before it so that what-is may reveal itself as what and how it is.22
"setting" means placing, and that thesis as "setting up" refers to "a letting lie forth."

Placing and laying have the sense of bringing here into the unconcealed, bringing forth into what is present, that is, letting or causing to lie forth. Setting and placing here never mean the modern concept of the summoning of things to be placed over against the self (the ego-subject). This "letting lie forth" is working (or more appropriately stated, "being at work" with "being" employed as both a noun and a verb), in the Greek sense of ergon. "... this work's 'being' is energeia, which gathers infinitely more movement within itself than do the modern 'energies'," because it is a "working" and "willing" that characterizes an "existing human being's entrance in the compliance with the unconcealedness of Being."26

Working as letting-be, therefore, involves a motion and movement of the highest order. Letting-be does the work of thesis, the work of "setting up in the unconcealed" whereby each thing comes to show itself in its own way. It is work that frees each thing into its own essential nature. It is work, then, that spares, and in sparing, builds. "Building" here does not mean erecting an edifice, but rather sparing something, letting something dwell. This kind of "building" takes place "when we leave something beforehand in its own nature, when we return it specifically to its being."27

*In a translator's note, Albert Hofstadter states that the German Tun, "doing," means "laying forth, placing here, bringing here and bringing forth--'working,' in the sense either of something bringing itself forth out of itself into presence or of man performing the bringing here and bringing forth of something. Both are a way in which something that is present presences."28
builds, then, insofar as he dwells. Thus, Heidegger says that those who venture into the unconcealed must be more daring ("more daring by a breath" says the German poet Rilke) and will more strongly, because such venturing involves participating in what one inherently is. This participation involves the incredible "work" of owning the relation to being that one is. It is through this "work" that each thing is "spared" as it is.

Freedom, so understood as the letting-be of what-is, fulfils and perfects the nature of truth in the sense that truth is the unconcealment and revealment of what-is. 'Truth' is not the mark of some correct proposition made by a human 'subject' in respect to an 'object' and which then--in precisely what sphere we do not know--counts as 'true'; truth is rather the revelation of what-is, a revelation through which something 'overt' comes into force. All human behaviour is an exposition into that overtness. Hence man is in virtue of his ex-sistence.

In summary, then, Heidegger's understanding of authentic truth, as grounded in the early Greek notion of alētheia or unconcealment, advances truth as the uncovering or unleaving of what-is whereby being is "let-be" as it is. Beings, then, "stand in truth" insofar as they are.

Before presenting Heidegger's thinking on authentic untruth, this discussion turns to Heidegger's understanding of knowing and willing, for it is upon the essence of unconcealment as letting-be that Heidegger's thoughts concerning knowing and willing also lie grounded.

In that truth for Heidegger is the unconcealment of being, it is not surprising that knowing is expressed as man's ability to stand out
into this unconcealment, "to endure (bestehen) it." Knowing, or more appropriately said, the willing to know, is "the ability to stand in the truth." It is the ability to stand out into the unconcealment and revelation of what-is, where things-that-are reveal themselves as they are. In "willing to know," man stands out into his relation to being; man encounters, participates, questions. "To know," therefore for Heidegger is not to have statements "ready at hand." "Merely to have information, however abundant, is not to know."^^

Even if curricula and examination requirements concentrate this information into what is of the greatest practical importance, it still does not amount to knowledge. Even if this information, pruned down to the most indispensable needs, is 'close to life,' its possession is not knowledge. The man who possesses such information and has learned a few practical tricks, will still be perplexed in the presence of real reality, which is always different from what the philistine means by down-to-earth; he will always be a bungler. Why? Because he has no knowledge, for to know means to be able to learn.

In the common-sense view, to be sure, knowledge belongs to the man who has no further need to learn because he has finished learning. No, only that man is knowing who understands that he must keep learning over and over again and who above all, on the basis of this understanding, has attained to the point where he is always able to learn. * This is much more difficult than to possess information.

This understanding of "knowing" corresponds with the early Greek Noein which, translated, expresses a "taking in" (aufnehmen), but not a "taking in" in the sense of clutching. Rather, Noein as "taking in" means "to pay careful attention to something, to 'be-wary' of it (In-die-Acht-nehmen). Authentic Noein becomes a-ware (ver-nimmt).

*The English word "learn" is derived from the Gothic full-nan ("to become full"), and-bund-nan ("to become unbound"), af-lif-nan ("to be left remaining"), qa-hail-nan ("to become whole"), and qa-wak-nan ("to become awake").
beforehand of that which it be-wares of (in die Acht nimmt). This wariness (Acht) is the watch (Wacht) which takes that which lies before it in truth."32 The early Greek sense of knowing, therefore, is always careful not to harm things-that-are in knowing them. It is a "taking in" which is careful to preserve, spare, and safeguard what-is as it is in the process of "taking it in." This "taking in," then, like letting-be, is active in the highest sense, which is in the sense of "sparing" or "freeing." Willing to know watches over things in their being, in their form, so that what-is can show itself as what it is. Willing to know is a-ware, i.e. wary, of not harming or damaging a thing in the process of knowing it.*

In "willing to know," Heidegger says that man is resolved. This brings us to a discussion of Heidegger's notion of "will as resolve" (Entschlossenheit). [The root of the word "resolve" is the Greek ἄνελυ "to set free, release"). Resolve refers to "setting free again."] With regard to the relation between knowing and willing, Heidegger says:

To question is to will to know. He who wills, he who puts his whole existence into a will, is resolved. . . . To will is to be resolved. [The essence of willing is here carried back to determination (Ent-schlossenheit, unclosedness). But the essence of resolve lies in the opening, the coming-out-of-

*The etymological connections here are numerous. "To watch" means not only "to guard," but in the Anglo-Saxon, "to wake." "Wary, ware" have several meanings: "caution, aware, watch, regard, respect, dread." The root for "wary, ware" in the Greek is ὁπάω meaning "I perceive, look out for, observe." Both words denote a "guarding against deception and danger."
cover (Ent-borgenheit) of human being-there into the clearing of being and not in a storing up of energy for 'action.'

The word "action," as employed in the above quote, refers to the conventional understanding of action as "decision to act." Thus Heidegger says that "re-solve is no mere decision to act, but the crucial beginning of action that anticipates and reaches through all action." Will as resolve involves action in the highest sense, then, which is in the sense of "letting-be," rather than in the sense of decision. As "letting-be," will as resolve is, therefore, essentially a resolution to not decide. It is a resolution to "stand open" out into the unconcealment of being. It is "willing" of this nature that, for Heidegger, sets free and "releases again" (the Gk. root meaning of resolve) things-that-are to be what they are.

It may help the reader to understand Heidegger's intention by looking at the etymological roots of the two words "decide" and "choose." This discussion has already noted that the word "decide" is derived from the Latin décidere meaning "to cut off or from." The word "choose" is derived from the Greek word ὕπογειον meaning "I taste." All the etymological roots of the word "will" denote choosing. To will in the sense of "to choose" implies "tasting." Therefore, will as resolve, will as "letting-be" or not deciding, does not imply not choosing. Rather, it implies not settling upon or determining rigid bounds that obscure and "cut off" man from the motion of relational being as a whole.
Will understood as a "decision to act" is what Heidegger calls will as purposeful self-assertion. In this rendering of will, man assumes that he must "act" in order to "attain" truth, knowledge, being, understanding, etc. In viewing will in this manner, not only does man forget that being is action, but he also elevates himself above the whole by imagining that the part is greater than the whole, i.e. by imagining that truth and being are dependent upon the will of man. Once the nature and essence of being is advanced as that which is determined by the purposeful self-assertion of the being we call "man," truth, knowledge, thought (which is to say, being itself) become the goals and purposes of "the will," i.e. the "objects" of the will.

The previous discussion of the early Greek understanding of "work, working," ergon, introduced the reader to the Greek sense of working and willing, to the energeia of "being at work" that is characteristic of the working and willing involved in man's entrance into the unconcealedness of being. The Greek word energeia is also related to the Greek en-telecheia or "being at end." As Heidegger notes, "end" or "limit" for the early Greeks expressed "that through which presencing or being begins." Man is "being at end." When man flees his essence as "being at end" (i.e. his being and non-being), as he does in will as purposeful self-assertion (through willing without regard for the nature of being as a whole), the motion between "ending" and "beginning," between "ending" and "being" is lost. All things, then, become "ends in themselves." For once the
motion of being, with its multiples essences, becomes dependent on the will of man, truth and knowing become goals or "ends in themselves." An interesting etymological "hint" here is provided by the word "goal." Coming from the Middle English göl ("a limit"), the dictionary says that "goal" may also be derived from the Anglo-Saxon gal ("barrier, impediment"), gāelan ("to impede"), and a-gāelan ("to delay"). In this etymological light, we might say that once truth and being become goals or "ends in themselves," they, in turn, impede man's knowing (owning) himself as truth and being in that they present truth and being as those things which stand ahead of man, as if truth and being were other than what man is.

Confirming this, Heidegger replies to his own question "What is it that remains blocked off, withdrawn from us by ourselves in our ordinary willing to objectify the world?" by answering "nothing other than death." Objectification is man's objection to death. Objectification is the constant negation of death, in which death, thus negated, becomes something negative and excluded, while the objects of objectification (truth, knowledge, and even being itself) become something positive, and thus something to be "attained." Thus, in the same way man's objection to his being as truth spawns the concept (Begriff) of objective truth, man's objection to his "being at end" transforms being into "an end in itself."

For the early Greeks and for Heidegger, death is not a negative, if by negative we mean something undesirable. Death is the space or "negative" which brings color to life. In closing off
death, therefore, man's relation to being, to life itself, is simultaneously blocked off, for in a refusal to acknowledge death, being itself remains undisclosed. Moreover, once death is negated, the world is divided into "positive" and "negative," into black and white. Being's shades of color are veiled. Not only is the relation of being and not being veiled, but also the relation of man as being and the interrelations of all things to one another. Heidegger calls this "the parting against the Open."* The organization of this parting, for Heidegger, is technological production, or the organization of the objectification of the world.

What is deadly is not the much-discussed atomic bomb as this particular death-dealing machine. What has long since been threatening man with death, and indeed with the death of his own nature, is the unconditional character of mere willing in the sense of purposeful self-assertion in everything. What threatens man in his very nature is the willed view that man, by the peaceful release, transformation, storage, and channeling of the energies of physical nature, could render the human condition, man's being, tolerable for everybody and happy in all respects. But the peace of this peacefulness is merely the undisturbed continuing relentlessness of the fury of self-assertion which is resolutely self-reliant. What threatens man in his very nature is the view that this imposition of production can be ventured without any danger, as long as other interests besides--such as, perhaps, the interests of a faith--retain their currency. As though it were still possible for that essential relation to the whole of beings in which man is placed by the technological exercise of his will to find a separate abode in

*The "Open" for Heidegger refers to "something that does not block off, and it does not block off because it does not set bounds. It does not set bounds because it is in itself without all bounds. The Open is the great whole of all that is unbounded."^1 The Open as such admits things-that-are (in their bounds) as they are. That is to say, the Open admits or "lets-be" being's innate fit, proportion, and order.
some side-structure which would offer more than a temporary escape into those self-deceptions among which we must count also the flight of the Greek gods! What threatens man in his very nature is the view that technological production puts the world in order, while in fact this ordering is precisely what levels every ordo, every rank, down to the uniformity of production, and thus from the outset destroys the realm from which any rank and recognition could possible arise.  

That is, in will as purposeful self-assertion, man orders without regard for the inherent order, fit, and proportion (Fug) of being as a whole. (In the German, the word Fug means order, fit, proportion, and the word Unfug means disorder, disproportion, chaos.) In willing without regard for the inherent order and fit of being, Heidegger says "the wholesome and sound withdraws." The world, then, "becomes without healing, unholy."  

Man's affirmation of himself is only partial; indeed it cannot be more than partial until the meaning of his own being is transparent to him. Lacking the whole, man is essentially heil-los.  

In man's failure to "own" his whole being as "being at end," man not only forgets his own relation to being, but simultaneously man loses sight of the whole, i.e. the interrelationships of all things-that-are to one another. As Heidegger says, man loses sight of "the dimension of the holy;" he loses sight of "the whole thing." Man, then, no longer affirms or "spares" things-that-are, including himself, to be what they are--whole, holy, wholesome, healthy--for he no longer "hears" what things are. And when man no longer hears nor sees the inherent order of being as a whole, he wills more strongly to create the order he no longer finds, only serving to spawn chaos and disorder more quickly. As Heidegger asks, "How can man at the
present stage in world history ask at all seriously and rigorously whether the god nears or withdraws, when he has above all neglected to think into the dimension in which alone that question can be asked? And that dimension, for Heidegger, is "the dimension of the holy," the dimension of the whole.

What is perhaps most remarkable about our era is that the dimension of the holy (des Heilen) is closed. This alone is perhaps what is unholy (Unheil).

It is here that, for Heidegger, man stands unprotected, or "unshielded," against the disorder that accompanies purposeful self-assertion. That is, in the realm of the unholy, man stands "unshielded" against his own "willing self" that, in desperation, "orders and fits" without regard for the inherent order, fit, and proportion of being as a whole.

Ironically, then, it is precisely man's ordering and fitting without regard for the inherent order and fit of being as a whole that is the root of man's present state of disorder and confusion. Will as purposeful self-assertion, through which truth, knowledge, and even being itself have become viewed as "attainable goals," has brought man face to face with what he initially set out to avoid in elevating the willing self: death. Ironically, man's flight from his own

*In a translator's note, Maurice Friedman states that "Des Heilen is a genitive of das Heile (the whole, the intact) but, in this context, one is reminded of the origin it shares with Heil (salvation, holy, good fortune). Heidegger here telescopes all these meanings and also makes us see in the word Unheil the meaning of 'unholy' in addition to its current meaning of misfortune."
nothingness has brought him face to face with nihilism, a deathlike existence, and with possible annihilation; man's flight from his own "being at end" has placed him at the brink of "being's end." For it is specifically, for Heidegger, man's failure to own his own finiteness, his own limits and boundaries, through converting the relational movement (that begins in limits) into stationary "objects" that seem to not be moving, which has created the more rigid barriers that now bind man. Swallowed in the fragmented and disconnected, man now faces an earlier and more constricting death than the primal one he had hoped to postpone.

That the man-made death is tightening its hold on man is reflected, for Heidegger, in "the nihilistic will," which is will as purposeful self-assertion in its final stages: "the will to will," where man wills now for the mere sake of willing. For as the deathlike grasp of the fragmented becomes more pervasive, man wills more furiously, now unaware that willing without regard for the inherent order of being is the root of nihilism. As the disorder this "willing" creates increases, man orders and wills even harder, creating more disorder.

Self-willing man everywhere reckons with things and men as objects. What is so reckoned becomes merchandise. Everything is constantly changed about into new orders. . . . Thus ventured into the unshielded, man moves within the medium of 'businesses' and 'exchanges.' Self-assertive man lives by staking his will. He lives essentially by risking his nature in the vibration of money and the currency of values. As this constant trader and middle-man, man is the 'merchant.' He weighs and measures constantly, yet does not know the real weight of things. Nor does he ever know what in himself is truly weighty and
preponderant. In one of his late poems (Späte Gedichte, p. 21f.) Rilke says:

Alas, who knows what in himself prevails. 43
Mildness? Terror? Glances, voices, books?

One of the last things to come under the dominion of will, one of the last things to become "merchandise," for Heidegger, is being itself. That is, in the final stages of "the forgetting of being," being itself is resurrected as an object, is cast as something ''attainable through will," in man's final desperate attempt to prove to himself that being is not dead. Being itself becomes "displayed" in an effort to demonstrate that being is not forgotten. Being is recast as something utilitarian and cultural; it is made into a "holiday ornament" cultivated along with other object-things. Cast as a tool, being becomes "subject to conscious cultivation and planning" (i.e. subject to will as purposeful self-assertion), and "split into branches," each branch setting up standards called "values," which are preserved by restriction: art for art's sake, science for science's sake, etc. 44

One of the more evident signs pointing to the merchandizing of being is man's current preoccupation with the "ornament" of love. This preoccupation with the "value love," for Heidegger, primarily signals a lack of "liking," a lack of love, for love belongs to death and death is missing, so how can love be present? 45 This understanding echoes an often-quoted saying by the German writer Bertolt Brecht: "When the leaders speak of peace, common people know war is coming." The need to "sell" a thing most often reflects
man's coveted suspicions as to its unexpressed presence. Moreover, for Heidegger, to love, to like, is "to take care of or care for a 'thing' or a 'person' in their essence." To like, then, is to let something "sell" or "speak" for itself. "Such liking means in a more primary sense to endow with essence. For Mögen is the true essence of Vermögen, which not merely can achieve one thing or another but can let something 'realize itself' true to its origin and as it comes towards us, that is, to let it be."\(^{46}\)

Having looked at Heidegger's interpretation of truth in light of the early Greek word alêtheia, and also at the ancillary concerns of knowing and willing, this discussion turns to Heidegger's understanding of "authentic untruth," or mystery.

**Mystery**

The truth of being as unconcealment is that it conceals and reveals at the same time. Being is always simultaneously coming-to-be and passing-away; it always is and is not. It simultaneously tells the truth and lies. Unlike the man-made opinion of objective truth that says "two opposing things cannot be equally true," the truth of being says "two things are always equally true." This is the mystery of being.

Martin Heidegger

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\(^{46}\)Maurice Friedman points out the interconnections present in Heidegger's choice of the German word Mögen for "like." "Heidegger uses as equivalent for 'like' German Mögen, which has the same root as English 'may,' 'might (v.),' and 'might (n.).' Etymologically, therefore, the meaning implied here is not only that of 'liking' but also that of 'possibility,' 'potential,' 'permission,' and 'power'--as still evident in the derivative Macht (might, power) and Vermögen (might, power, potential)."\(^{47}\)
In the preceding discussion of ἀλήθεια as unconcealment, authentic truth was advanced as "that which 'had' man" by virtue of man coming into being or unconcealment. In that truth understood as ἀλήθεια is not the "property" or "possession" of man, but rather man is the "property" of truth, it then follows, for Heidegger, that untruth is not the "property" of man either, and thus, no more than truth can come about through efforts of attainment or decision, can untruth come about through the "negligence of man."

If the essence of truth is not fully displayed in the rightness of a statement, then neither can untruth be equated with the wrongness of an opinion.

With this statement, what does Heidegger intend? The essence of truth, for Heidegger, has been stated as freedom, or "letting-be what-is." Freedom expresses man's participation in the unconcealment of being as physis. As with truth, so too with freedom: freedom "has" man; man does not "have" freedom. That is, truth and freedom have man raised, or to use Heidegger's word, "attuned" (abgestimmt) to being, whether man consents or not. Man is "attuned" to his relation to being as a whole, whether he "owns" this relationship or not. Being as a whole [what Heidegger calls in his essay, "On the Essence of Truth," what-is-in totality (das Seiende im Ganzem)] does not depend upon recognition or consent for its being and truth. As Heidegger says, being determines beings, while remaining something indeterminate and indeterminable. That is, man's being as relation prevails whether recognized by man or not. This determining nature of being is precisely why those essences of
being that man fails to own and acknowledge still come to "own" man, as, for example, in man's failure to own the non-being aspect of being as a whole, the non-being of nihilism comes to own man.

Let's look a little more closely at what it means to say "the indeterminable--being--determines beings." At first, this statement would seem to be a contradiction. In truth, however, it is a paradox. The word "paradox" is the Greek word παράδοξος. It is παρά ("beside") and δόξα ("a notion, an opinion"), meaning "beside an opinion."* A paradox is "that which is contrary to received opinion or to what seems; strange but true." When man stands in paradox, says Heidegger, his "stand" is more real than just about anything else man can call real.50

It is here, however, that man, feeling the "weight" of the paradoxical whole, turns being as a whole into an "object"--into something that is easily "attained" and "passed on." It is here that the truth of being as paradox is recast as contradiction. (The word "contradict" comes from the Latin contradictus meaning "against to

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*The word "opinion" is derived from the Latin opinari meaning "to suppose." An opinion is "a suppose," a supposition, an assumption. Suppose means "to assume as true," and comes from Latin, French, and Greek words that mean in each case "to lay under, put under, hence to substitute, forge, counterfeit." Supposition is from the Latin suppositionem and means "a substitution." An opinion is a substitution that is counterfeit in that it has no relation to the essential nature of the thing itself. An opinion substitutes an assumption about the truth of being for the truth of being. To assume comes from the Greek dechesthai meaning "to take for granted, to take to one's self." In this etymological light, Heidegger's historical exegesis can be seen as an attempt to pull back the veils of assumptions, substitutions, and opinions which the truth of being has been "placed under."
speak." Contradiction "speaks against" what-is.) As stated previously, in the traditional concept of truth as "propositional truth," where truth depends upon agreement or consent, the failure to agree or consent entails an assumed exclusion from truth for the one who fails to agree. This rendering of truth, therefore, gives rise to "truths" that supposedly contradict one another. It gives rise to the belief that "two opposing things cannot be equally true." For the early Greeks, however, the truth of being did not depend upon agreement or consent, and therefore no "thing" within being could be excluded from truth. That is, being as a whole determines the essence of "things" within being; the whole determines the essence of the parts. Therefore, the essence of being cannot be determined by man, by a part, for it is determined by being as a whole. This is what is meant by saying "being determines beings." This statement expresses what physics has always known: the whole determines the essence of the parts.

What does it mean, then, to say that being, the determiner, is at once the indeterminate and indeterminable? This question brings us to a discussion of what Heidegger calls "authentic untruth." Essentially, the notion of "authentic untruth" is Heidegger's attempt to give words to the mystery of being. It is an attempt at expressing the simultaneous coming-to-be and passing-away that is being. Such an attempt involves Heidegger in trying to express the inexpressable. It involves an expression of paradox.
Already being as \textit{physis} has been expressed as "bringing forth the unconcealed from out of the concealed." This coming into unconcealment, however, does not accordingly mean that concealment is, so to speak, "left behind." As Heidegger expresses it, unconcealment is concealment "brought forth." The "concealed" is what is brought forth into the unconcealed. In that unconcealment is none other than concealment brought forth, unconcealment (i.e. being) conceals and unconceals at the same time. That is, being hides and discloses simultaneously. Unconcealment is at once a concealment (Verbergen). In concealment coming into unconcealment, there is accomplished what Heidegger calls "a dissimulation" of being [the dissimulation of the dissimulated (die Verbergung des Verborgenen)].

There is hardly any difference between the German words Verbergung (dissimulation) and Verbergen (concealment); consequently, they are used interchangeably. To dissimulate means "to feign or pretend apart; to make like apart." The dissimulation of being, for Heidegger, then, is a setting-apart or dissembling that is feigning or pretending in that the setting-apart is not the final word or whole story concerning the essence of being. Dissimulation or concealment, therefore, is that which "makes like apart." Dissimulation or concealment, then, can be said to "lie forth," the word "lie" being employed in its varied senses, one of which is "not telling the whole truth." Similarly, the word concealment means "to hide together; to disguise wholly." The word "together" means "to gather." The setting-apart of concealment hides to gather. (Remember here
that the early Greek understanding of "limit" or "end" was "that through which something begins its presencing." This is the intent here as well. Dissimulation or concealment is the "hiding" that begins binding together; it "disguises wholly." That is, concealment or dissimulation masks being as a whole by pretending, feigning, and making like apart, by making like unwhole. Concealment makes like separate by setting-apart. However, to mis-take this setting-apart as the final word is to assume something that is not true, for setting-apart is only the disguise of binding-together.

In coming into unconcealment, then, being as physis achieves a limit, a concealment, as separate things-that-are, as separate parts and portions. Being as a whole coming as parts simultaneously conceals and unconceals. Being shows and hides. It is this "concealment in unconcealment of the concealed" that Heidegger calls "authentic untruth." Thus, in the same way that "the unconcealment of the concealed" is called authentic truth, so too, "the concealment of the concealed" is called authentic untruth. The essence of truth as "letting-be," then, refers to letting the unconcealment (physis as aletheia, being as truth) that arises forth from concealment come to stand in its unconcealment (authentic truth) and its concealment (authentic untruth). Man, therefore, "lets" things show themselves as they are by letting things stand in unconcealment, whose very standing is simultaneously a revealing (unconcealing) and a hiding (concealing).
Letting things be in totality—a process which reveals and conceals at the same time—brings it about that dissimulation appears as the initial thing dissimulated. Da-sein, insofar as it ex-sists, reaffirms the first and most extreme non-revelation of all: authentic untruth.

Authentic untruth, for Heidegger, is therefore "antior to all revelation of this or that actuality." As a non-revelation, authentic untruth is mystery. Man, then, reveals mystery insofar as he stands out into his relation to being. In standing out into his relation to being, man lets what-is show itself as that which it is, which is to say, man lets being disclose its essence and truth as that which reveals and conceals at the same time. Man "lets" mystery.

Not an isolated mystery concerning this thing or that, but the single fact that absolute mystery, mystery as such (the dissimulation of the dissimulated) pervades the whole of man's Da-sein.

Man himself, as a particular being which is there and standing forth in unconcealment, simultaneously reveals and conceals being. This constitutes for man what Heidegger calls "proximity to the source." "... the essence of proximity seems to consist in bringing near the Near, while keeping it at a distance. Proximity to the source is a mystery." As relation, man is the closeness or "proximity" of mystery; man is "being-close." Man is nearness and distance, unconcealment and concealment, setting-apart and

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*The word "mystery" comes from the Greek μυστήριον ("one who is initiated") and μυ&omicr;ελυ ("to close the eyes; suggested by the Gk. μυ&omicr;ον, a slight sound with closed lips"). Mystery refers to that which is hidden, inexplicable, secret, and close. The meanings of the word "close" are varied: "to bring together, to unite," "near, with very little space between," and "secret, hidden."
binding-together. This constitutes the twofold or relational essence of man.

Relating (the word relate means "to bring or bear back"), for Heidegger, returns man to the source; relating "bears and brings man back" to the mystery of being. Heidegger likens the mystery of being to the "homeland," and calls man's "return" again and again to the source "homecoming." "Homecoming is the return into the proximity of the source." In homecoming, man "comes to relate to that in which he is ultimately and totally related." Homecoming is the "ownership" whereby man becomes a home-owner; it is the ownership whereby man becomes a dweller in the house of being. Heidegger adds: "What is joy? The original essence of joy is the process of becoming at home in proximity to the source." 55

But such a return is only possible for one who has previously, and perhaps for a long time now, borne on his shoulders as the wanderer the burden of the voyage, and has gone over into the source, so that he could there experience what the nature of the Sought-For might be, and then be able to come back more experienced, as the Seeker. 56

That is, once man encounters the nature of the Sought-For, which is being as mystery, man comes back a Seeker, a questioner.

However, for Heidegger, man is erratic (irrig): man comes home and forgets to come home. Man draws near and moves away. This understanding aligns itself with the early Greek statement of Heraclitus': "The way up and the way down are one and the same." 57

Philip Wheelwright, in his book on Heraclitus, elaborates:

The upward and downward ways are simultaneously active in every soul, although to different degrees, and every soul
is in some state of tension between upward and downward pulls. . . . Fire (here, a metaphor for being)... consumes all things, but it may do so in either of two ways. It may burn the individual to a cinder or it may assimilate him to its own being. Perhaps, in some way that eludes our schematic understanding, it will operate upon us in both respects at once; for every person's soul is divided, and to some degree everyone is groping toward the light and sinking into earthiness at the same time. . . . The two destinies represent the eternally warring factions of the human soul, with its simultaneous yearning for the light and propensity for mud. . . . To become flame or to become cinder is the inescapable and constant dilemma to which every moving being must and does make his small contributory response at every moment.

The choice is "fire or fire" says T.S. Eliot: either man is consumed by the fire of intense being, or he is consumed by the fire of annihilation. Man is capable of both for man is both: he is simultaneously coming-to-be and passing-away. He is being and nothingness. Man is flame and cinder. As this twofold or relational being, man "yearns for light" and "sinks into mud." In Heidegger's words, man "owns" that which he is and does not "own" that which he is. Man remembers and he forgets.

Although man is all the time related to what-is, he almost always acquiesces in this or that particular manifestation of it.

What Heidegger is saying here is that man "chooses the downward way" in acquiescing to this or that particular manifestation of being, i.e. in mis-taking "a-part" as the whole story. Man forgets that setting-apart does not nullify the unity of being; on the contrary, setting-apart constitutes the unity of being. Man forgets that setting-apart inaugurates relationship ("lying-down-together"). Mis-taking "a-part" as the whole story, then, is "the essence of the
the downward way."

The essence of the downward way, in what may be called (descriptively, not melodramatically) the catastrophic perspective, is to become a victim of the Event through attachment to the temporal things and attitudes that it will destroy.

For the early Greeks, and for Heidegger, temporal things are not to be taken as "ends in themselves," but rather as those things through which the motion of being begins. In setting-apart or separation (to separate means "to provide or arrange apart"), a world of togetherness comes into being. Separation, therefore, does not "split" unity, much less destroy unity. "It constitutes unity, it is a binding-together, logos. Polemos and logos are the same."61* (Logos, the early Greek word for "the primal gathering principle," is discussed in the following section.) Heidegger quotes Heraclitus as saying: "eidenai de chre ton polemon eonta xynon kai dike erin. 'It is necessary to bear in mind setting-apart (Aus-einander-Setzung) as essentially bringing-together, and order (Fug) as contending.' . . ."62 This is the paradoxical mystery of being: setting-apart is binding-together. Setting-apart as binding-together comprises the innate order, fit, and proportion inherent in being.

Moreover, Heraclitus says: "physis kryptesthai philei, 'Being (emerging appearing) inclines intrinsically to self-concealment.' "63

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*The word "pole" comes from the Greek words πόλος ("a pivot, an axis, a hinge") and πέταλον ("to be in motion"). Poles are the pivots and hinges that are themselves in motion. Setting-apart is a pivot that not only sets things in motion, but is itself in motion. That which seems stationary is, nonetheless, in motion, even if the naked eye cannot see the motion.
Heidegger comments further:

Since being means emerging appearing, to issue forth from concealment--concealment, its origin in concealment, belongs to it essentially. This origin lies in the essence of being, of the manifest as such. Being inclines back toward it, both in great silence and mystery and in banal distortion and occultation. The close relation between physis and kryptesthai discloses the intimate bond and conflict between being and appearance.

Heidegger also says in *Poetry, Language, Thought*:

This concealment is dissembling. If one being did not simulate another, we could not make mistakes or act mistakenly in regard to beings; we could not go astray and transgress, and especially could never overreach ourselves. That a being should be able to deceive as semblance is the condition for our being able to be deceived, not conversely.

As the early Greeks expressed it, the mystery loves to hide. "Nature loves to hide." Being cloaks and disguises itself by feigning like apart; in Heidegger's words, being is both concealment and unconcealment. It is, therefore, through the nature of being itself that man can be deceived, and mis-take setting-apart or concealment as the final word regarding being. The possibility of man "being deceived" constitutes, for Heidegger, the realm of illusion and error (irre).

Wherever the dissimulation of what-is in totality is admitted only by the way, as a boundary which occasionally impinges, dissimulation as the ground-phenomenon of Da-sein is lost in oblivion.

That is to say, when man mis-takes separation, dissimulation, concealment as an "impairment" or "impingement," rather than as the setting-apart through which all things come together, the mystery of relational being is lost to the world of "this" and "that." The
essence of being as that which reveals (unconceals) and conceals at the same time is veiled. It is here that ground gives way to forground, and man comes to ask after the being of things rather than the being of things. When separation is mistaken as the whole story, participation gives way to fragmentation. The relation between thing and thing is fractured. (The words fracture, fraction, fragment, and fragmentation are derived from the Latin *frangere* meaning "to break."

This is not to say that the mystery of being is obviated in man's mistaking separation as the final word, any more than man's relation to being is obviated in man's failure to "own" that relation. Being, the indeterminable, still determines everything. Therefore, the mystery of being is not obviated in being forgotten, for no more than truth depends upon consent does the mystery of being (authentic untruth) buckle from negligence. The forgetting, as Heidegger states, merely takes up "a presence of its own," although it is a presence of deception. Deception or illusion for Heidegger "is only one among the modes according to which man moves" as being-in-the-world.68*

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*For Heidegger, psychology and epistemology fail to recognize illusion and error as dynamic modes of being, and in so doing, man no longer can experience illusion and error as the powers they are. To recognize or let-be illusion and error as dynamic modes of being would be to exercise will as resolve; it would be to let-be what-is. That is, will as resolve acknowledges or lets be will as purposeful self-assertion. Will as purposeful self-assertion becomes subsumed within a wider rendering that views what-is in relation to being as a whole, so as not to give "a negative reading to that which is."
But the forgotten mystery of Da-sein is not obviated by being forgotten; on the contrary, forgetting gives the apparent disappearance of the forgotten a presence of its own. Inasmuch as the mystery denies itself in and for the sake of forgetfulness, it leaves historical man to rely on his own resources in the realm of the practicable. Abandoned thus, humanity builds up its 'world' out of whatever intentions and needs happen to be the most immediate, filling it out with projects and plans. From these in their turn, having forgotten what-is-in-totality, adopts his measures. He insists (beharrt) on them and continually provides himself with new ones, without giving a thought to the reasons for taking measures or the nature of measurement.* Despite his advance towards new measures and goals he mistakes their essential genuineness. He is the more mistaken the more exclusively he takes himself as the measure of all things.

With that measureless and presumptuous (vermessen) forgetfulness of his he clings to the certainties of selfhood, to whatever happens to be immediately accessible.** This insistence (Beharren) is--unknown to him--supported by the circumstance that his Da-sein not only ex-sists but in-sists at the same time, i.e. obstinately holds fast to (besteht auf) that which actuality (das Seiende), as though open of and in itself, offers him.

As ex-sistent, Da-sein is in-sistent. But the mystery dwells also in in-sistent existence, though here the mystery is the forgotten essence of truth, now become 'inessential.'

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*This phrase reads: ohne noch den Grund der Maass-nahme selbst und das Wesen der Maassgabe zu bedenken, and is translated "without considering the ground (basis) of measure-taking itself and the nature of measure-giving." Maassgabe means "proportion," "that which gives measure."** Measuring here, then, does not have to do with number and quantity, but with proportion and relation. (For further discussion of Heidegger's thought on "measuring," refer to Chapter VII, "... Poetically Man Dwells ..." in the book, Poetry, Language, Thought.)

**"Selfhood" here refers to man taking himself as the measure of all things, as he who must order all things. In viewing himself as "he who must order things," rather than acknowledging being as "that which provides order," man "measures" and "orders" without regard for the measure-giving of what-is-in-totality, without regard for the inherent order and proportion of being as "setting-apart is binding-together." This "selfhood" spawns opinions and assumptions. As this section has already noted, "to assume" is the Greek dechesthai meaning "to take to one's self, to take for granted."
For Heidegger, then, being-forgotten--deception and illusion--comes about through man's in-sistence (i.e. through will as purposeful self-assertion). In in-sisting, man "takes himself as the measure of all things," and in so doing, measures without regard for the innate measure, order, and proportion inherent in relational being, without regard for the inherent binding-together of setting-apart. In-sistent existence (existence used here in the vernacular) is the realm of "taking things for granted," the realm of opinion and assumption, where man measures without understanding the nature of measurement.

The German word Maassgabe means "proportion, that which gives measure." In in-sistent existence, for Heidegger, man's measure-taking bears no relation to the measure-giving (proportion, order, fit) inherent in being, and therefore man measures mistakenly. He takes concealment or setting-apart as a boundary which infringes, rather than the proportion or measure-giving that binds all things together. It is this mis-measuring that, for Heidegger, brings about the disorder and disproportion (Unfug) that has finally led to the nihilism of the day. It is err-ing through in-sisting, err-ing through will as purposeful self-assertion, that constitutes for Heidegger "the counter-essence of the original essence of truth."73 It is man taking himself as "the measure of all things" that spawns disorder and chaos.

The irony here, as we have already noted, is that man, sensing disorder and chaos (but not sensing that it is precisely his ordering
that has given rise to disorder), sets about frantically measuring and ordering all the more urgently in an effort to curb disorder. To the extent man fails to recognize, however, his ordering and measuring without regard for the order of relational being as a whole as the source of disorder, man's frantic ordering only pushes him further into the abyss. Being as a whole is only that more deeply veiled from man's view.

Man's measure-taking, then, needs to be in accord with the essential measure-giving of being. This measure-taking is the kind of "taking" "which does not consist in a clutching or any kind of grasping, but rather in a letting come of what has been dealt out." This measuring is a "taking in" which pays careful attention to the "order" of things as they are. It is a "taking in" that is wary and watchful of the part each part plays in the order and fit of things.

It is this "taking in" that acknowledges the mystery dwelling also in in-sistent existence, "though here the mystery is the forgotten essence of truth." That is, the essence of truth as being encompasses and subsumes all relationships and modes of being, and thus truth "holds way" whether man recognizes the mystery as such or not. The early Greeks understood this. Heraclitus says: "Even sleepers are workers and collaborators in what goes on in the universe." Sleepers are only those who are un-a-ware (not watchful) of their part. They are workers who are not a-wake, but they are workers nonetheless, for being works through all beings.

Therefore, for Heidegger, it is man's turning towards (home-
coming) and turning away (homelessness), waking and sleeping, ex-sisting and in-sisting, which constitutes the err-atic (irrig) rhythm of the man who dwells: Da-sein. As the being who dwells in "being-there," man wanders, goes astray, tarries, lingers, and errs. Man yearns for the light and sinks into the mud. Man is flame and cinder. For Heidegger, "they are one and the same thing."

Man's drifting from the mystery to the practicable and from one practicability to the next, always missing the mystery, is erring (das Irrren). Man errs. He does not merely fall into error, he lives in error always because, by ex-sisting, he in-sists and is thus already in error. The error in which he lives is not just something that runs along beside him like a ditch, something he occasionally falls into. No, error is part of the inner structure of Da-sein, in which historical man is involved. Error is the theatre for that variable mode of being (Wende) where in-sistent existence, turning and turning about, perpetually forgets and mistakes itself.

Man "lives in error" in that his ex-sisting includes and involves "in-sisting," and therefore error, for Heidegger, is one of man's modes of being-in-the-world. It is the temporal and finite essence of man which incorporates the possibility of "going astray" (irre), and with "possibility," man's being-in-the-world involves going astray. In this light, then, "error is the space in which history unfolds. . . . Without errancy there would be no connection from destiny to destiny: there would be no history."  

Error is, then, of the very essence of history, for authentic history is primarily Dasein's, and Dasein as a finite being has error in the very constitution of his Da-sein.

Man is always turning, turning towards and turning away from the mystery of being. This is the history of man, a history which
Norman O. Brown calls "a creative misunderstanding."

In that all creating, all venturing forth, risks disorder and disproportion, all creating for Heidegger is violent (Gewalt-tätigkeit = violence).

The sapient man sails into the very middle of the dominant order (Fug); he tears it open and violently carries being into the essent; yet he can never master the overpowering. Hence he is tossed back and forth between structure and the structureless, order and mischief (Fug and Un-fug), between the evil and the noble. Every violent curbing of the powerful is either victory or defeat. Both, each in its different way, unfold the dangerousness of achieved or lost being. Both, in different ways, are menaced by danger. The violent one, the creative man, who sets forth into the un-said, who breaks into the un-thought, compels the unhappened to happen and makes the unseen appear—the violent one stands at all times in venture (tolma). In venturing to master being, he must risk the assault of the nonessent, mē kallon, he must risk dispersion, in-stability, disorder, mischief. The higher the summit of historical being-there, the deeper will be the abyss, the more abrupt the fall into the unhistorical, which merely thrashes around in issueless and placeless confusion.

It is often, therefore, that the creative man, faced with the knowledge that his works inevitably risk disorder, thereby becoming sarma (a dunghill), "leaves the overpowering to its order," and remains silent. Faced with the knowledge that his works risk disorder, man comes face to face with the knowledge that "things both can and cannot be," to use W. B. Yeats phrase, and that all his works both set apart and bring together.

But there's another knowledge that my heart destroys,
As the fox in the old fable destroyed the Spartan boy's,

*The root of "violence" means "full of might." Might is derived from "able," whose root meanings are numerous: activity, easy to handle, to have, to hold, power, potential, possibility.
Because it proves that things both can and cannot be;
That the swordsmen and the ladies can still keep company,
Can pay the poet for a verse and hear the fiddle sound,
That I am still their servant though all are underground
O what of that, O what of that,
What is there left to say?

Through the knowledge that "things both can and cannot be," man comes to understand that all venturing forth is violent and filled with fear. For when man "leaves the overpowering to its order," man specifically leaves the overpowering to its order as chaos, and this is always frightening. In fear, man ventures forth, and this venturing forth is violent for it is simultaneously a leaving behind. "Art is built around violence, around death; at its base is fear," says Joyce Carol Oates. Art as creating always involves a simultaneous destruction, a death. All venturing forth, therefore, is violent because what is coming-to-be is also passing-away.

Nothing can come from nothing, no energy from a bodiless spirit; thus, there can be no violence out of a sense of nothing, for violence is always an affirmation. . . . The absolute dream, if dreamed, must deal with death, and the only way toward death we understand is the way of violence. . . . The music of paradise is "the continual clashing of swords." Nothing must be allowed to come to rest, to reach fruition. The only fruition honored is that of death, which produces an ecstasy that comes from a sudden enlargement of vision—the breaking-down of the dykes that separate man from man—so that personality is finally lost, annihilated by violence. The changing of one's shape is both dreaded and desired, for this magical transformation signals the ultimate loss of self.

Desired and dreaded, the changing of one's shape is inevitable, for, as Heraclitus says, "it is in changing that things find repose." It is in changing, in relational motion, in "the continual clashing of swords," where things "can and cannot be," that the barriers which
have built up between man and man are broken down. It is here also that the mystery of order as chaos acts, as Joyce Carol Oates says, as "the antithesis to various deceits of humanism." For Joyce Carol Oates, as for Heidegger, "nihilism is overcome by the breaking-down of the dykes between human beings." For both, these dykes or barriers include those perpetuated in "selfhood" (false separation) and "uniformity" (false unity). These are discussed in the section that follows.

**Logos**

Once men touch one another, then the modern industrial form of machine civilization will melt away and universalism and cosmopolitanism will cease; the great movement of centralising into oneness will stop and there will be a vivid recoil into separateness; many vivid small states, like a kaleidoscope, all colours and all the differences given expression.

D. H. Lawrence, "Future States"

Heidegger searches the various roots and meanings of the Greek word *logos* (λόγος) and unearths the meaning "to gather, to collect," rather than the more traditional interpretation of *logos* as having to do with discourse.

*Logos* means the word, discourse, and legein means to speak, as in dia-logue and mono-logue. But originally *logos* did not mean speech, discourse. Its fundamental meaning stands in no direct relation to language. *Lego, legein, Latin legere,* is the same as the German word "lesen" (to gather, collect, read): to gather wood, the vintage, the cream of the crop); 'ein Buch lesen' (to read a book) is only a variant of 'lesen' in the strict sense, which is: to put one thing with another,
to bring together, in short, to gather; but at the same time the one is mared off against the other. . . . long after the noun logos had come to mean discourse and statement it retained its original meaning in the sense of 'relation of the one to the other.'

For Heidegger, then, the basic meaning of logos is a gathering or a collecting; more essentially, a collecting collectedness, a gathering gatheredness (conveying the lack of distinction between noun and verb for the early Greeks). That is, logos is the gathering motion present in what is already gathered; it is a "gathering gatheredness." Logos as gathering refers, then, to the gathering of what is already together. (Etymologically, the word "together" is from to-gaedere and means "to gather, to collect.") This sense is further confirmed for Heidegger by the Greek word for legen, liegen, which is κεῖσθαι, meaning "to lie before." Logos collects or gathers by letting what-is lie before as gathered. For Heidegger, then, logos refers to the primal gathering principle.

In order to reveal the early Greek understanding of logos as gathering, and also to demonstrate the intimate connection that exists between logos and physis, Heidegger turns to the sayings of the early Greek philosopher Heraclitus, whose philosophical utterances are some of the few surviving samples of Western man's early thought.

Heidegger begins his discussion of the word logos, as employed in Heraclitus' thought, by recalling Fragments 1 and 2.

Fragment 1: Although this Logos is eternally valid, yet men are unable to understand it--not only before hearing it, but even after they have heard it for the first time. That is to say, although all things come to pass in accordance with this Logos, men seem to be quite without any experience of it--at
least if they are judged in the light of such words and deeds as I am here setting forth. My own method is to distinguish each thing according to its nature, and to specify how it behaves; other men, on the contrary, are as forgetful and heedless in their waking moments of what is going on around and within them as they are during sleep.

Fragment 2: We should let ourselves be guided by what is common to all. Yet, although the Logos is common to all, most men live as if each of them had a private intelligence of his own.

Heidegger says that these first two fragments tell us: 1) permanence and endurance belong to the logos; 2) the logos is common to all, or, as Heidegger expresses it, logos is the togetherness (to-gather-ness) of all things-that-are; and 3) all that happens, everything that comes into being stands into this permanent, enduring togetherness. These fragments, for Heidegger, express logos as gathering in the sense of "lying before as gathered."

Heidegger then proceeds to clarify the implication in Fragment 1 that the logos is audible, and as "audible," expresses logos as discourse or spoken words (epea). To explore this, Heidegger turns to Heraclitus' Fragment 50, where the word "hearing" is used even more directly than in Fragment 1. "If you have heard not me but

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*The above translations of Fragments 1 and 2 are taken from the book, Heraclitus, by Philip Wheelwright. I have chosen the translations from this well-respected book, rather than the translations in Heidegger's An Introduction to Metaphysics because in the latter, the translation intentionally leaves the word logos out of the fragments, so that the reader may derive the meaning from the text itself. In that this presentation is a very brief one, I have chosen the Wheelwright book, where the word logos is present, so that the use of the word is readily apparent to the reader. Regarding other fragments by Heraclitus quoted in this section, I have, where indicated, quoted both renderings, so that the reader may have the benefit of both.
the *logos*, then it is wise to say accordingly: all is one." This direct reference to "hearing," says Heidegger, would seem to indicate that *logos* denotes discourse.

To show that Heraclitus employs the word "hearing" with an understanding of *logos* as gathering rather than discourse, Heidegger returns to the first two fragments quoted earlier, particularly to the last sentence of Fragment 2, which says "most men live as if each of them had a private intelligence of his own." What Heraclitus is saying here, says Heidegger, is that even though most men try to penetrate the *logos* with intelligence (i.e. with words and discourse), they cannot. Here, then, for Heraclitus, intelligence as discourse is juxtaposed to *logos*. Confirming this, Heraclitus says explicitly in Fragment 1 that most men, even though hearing, do not comprehend the *logos*. That is to say, comprehension does not have to do with mere hearing.

Men have hearing, they hear words, but in this hearing, they cannot 'heed,' i.e. follow what is not audible like words, what is not a discourse, a speaking, but indeed the *logos*. . . . Correspondingly, the hearing that is a following (Horig-sein) is contrasted with mere hearing. Mere hearing scatters and diffuses itself in what is commonly believed and said, in hearsay, . . . True hearing has nothing to do with ear and mouth, but means: to follow the *logos* and what it is, namely the collectedness of the essent itself. We can hear truly only if we are followers. But this has nothing to do with the lobes of our ears. . . . Those who merely hear by listening around and assembling rumors are and remain the axynetoi, the uncomprehending. They are described in Fragment 34: 'Those who do not bring together the permanent

*The corresponding fragment in Wheelright is Fragment 118, which reads: "Listening not to me but to the Logos, it is wise to acknowledge that all things are one.""
togetherness hear but resemble the deaf.' They hear words and speeches but they are closed to what they should give heed to.

Fragment 50, therefore, is saying: do not attach importance to the mere hearing of words, but to the hearing of the logos. The authentic hearing of the logos is a following (Horig-sein) that stands in contrast to the mere hearing of spoken words, or hearsay, which is only a semblance (doxa) of a true hearing.* Therefore, Heraclitus' phrase in Fragment 2, "most men live as if each of them had a private intelligence of his own," refers to men who do not listen to the logos. Heraclitus, on the other hand, says that he "tries to distinguish each thing according to its nature," i.e. according to its inherent measure-giving. Listening to the logos, then, means listening to more than mere words. It means "hearing" the innate measure-giving of being, for it is through such hearing, listening, and following that the logos is manifest. To say that the logos is manifest is to say that the gathering of what is common to all is let lie, so that what-is shows itself as that which it is: the permanently together.

Men who comprehend (syniemi) the logos, therefore, comprehend the logos as gathering. The word "comprehend" (meaning "to

*George Seidel says that Heidegger often plays upon the German words gehören ("to belong") and hören ("to hear"). "We have truly heard (gehört) only when we truly belong (gehören) to that which is spoken. . . . The true hearing (Hören) truly belongs (gehört) to the Logos." Therefore, when man "truly comes to belong to that with which he has come to be in tune; then indeed, do things really happen, for then does history truly begin."
bring together") is one that Heraclitus uses frequently to denote "laying hold of together." Men who comprehend are those who understand the logos as gathering, and in this understanding, let what is together show itself as together. Men who comprehend, then, understand that setting-apart is not the final word regarding the nature of being, but simply the parting of to-gathering. They are those who "hear belonging."

On the other hand, the uncomprehending (axynetoi) are those who hear but do not hear because they do not "hear belonging." The uncomprehending do not comprehend the logos as gathering precisely because they mis-interpret the logos as something that can be heard with ears and mouth. They misinterpret the logos as meaning verbal and visual word only. The uncomprehending take setting-apart as the whole story. Therefore, they "are those who do not bring together . . . what do they not bring together? the logos, that which is permanently together, collectedness. . . . and this regardless of whether or not they have heard it." The uncomprehending hear but resemble the deaf. They are "present yet absent." Why? Heraclitus answers: "For what they associate with most closely, the logos, to it they turn their back; and what they encounter every day seems strange to them." Hearing, the uncomprehending do

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*The corresponding fragment in Wheelwright, Fragment 64, reads: "Although intimately connected with the Logos, men keep setting themselves against it." Similarly, Fragment 57 states: "Most people do not take heed of the things they encounter, nor do they grasp them even when they have learned about them, although they suppose they do."
not hear; belonging, the uncomprehending do not belong. Related, they do not relate to that in which they are intimately related.

Therefore, for Heraclitus, as he states in Fragment 2, men need to "let themselves be guided by what is common to all." What is "common to all" for Heraclitus is the logos, or, as he sometimes calls it, the law, which is "the counsel of one." (Fragment 83: "Law involves obeying the counsel of one."92)

Upon this ground of "commonality," Heraclitus expressed his thoughts on the nature of rationality and thinking. Fragment 80 and 81 state respectively: "Thinking is common to all." and "Men should speak with rational awareness and thereby hold on strongly to that which is shared in common--as a city holds on to its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are nourished by the one divine law, which prevails as far as it wishes, suffices for all things, and yet is something more than they."93

When Heraclitus speaks of rational awareness, he is not speaking about the reason of private intelligence, for as we have discussed, men who act and speak as if they had a private intelligence of their own (i.e. as if they were the "measure" of all things) are the uncomprehending (axynetoì). Rather, here, the term "rational awareness" is to be understood in the early Greek sense of rationality as "the relation and ratio of one part to another." Heidegger says that this is how the early Greek mathematicians used the word logos: "to put one thing with another, but at the same time one thing is marked off against the other."94 This was the essence
of measurement. Similarly, Heraclitus states in Fragment 29:

This universe, which is the same for all, has not been made by any god or man, but it always has been, is, and will be--an ever-living fire, kindling itself by regular measures and going out by regular measures.

Ratio-nality, in the early Greek sense, refers to the "measure" or proportionate fit of one thing with another. When this original sense of rationality is lost, rationality is reinterpreted as merely the faculty of intelligence or reason which man "possesses." Once interpreted as the faculty man "has," rather than as the ratio-nality which "has" man, rationality becomes a tool. Measurement becomes a device.

It is evident that Heraclitus understands "rational awareness" as an a-ware-ness of the relation or ratio, the measure-giving, the parting, which is common to all. Relationship (etymologically meaning "lying-down-together") is the original rationality. This "rationality" is the basis of truth for Heraclitus. Commenting on this, the early Greek writer Sextus states: "So Heraclitus asserts that the common and divine Logos, by participation in which we become rational, is the criterion of truth." \(^{96}\) Wheelwright elaborates:

What does Heraclitus mean by describing the truth as 'common'? The meaning is put accurately by Kirk and Raven, who write: 'The great majority fail to recognize this truth, which is 'common'--that is, both valid for all things and accessible for all men, if only they use their observation and their understanding \(^{97}\) and do not fabricate a private and deceptive intelligence.

No more than logos refers to a private intelligence derived from the mere "hearing" of spoken words (epea), does truth depend upon
statement or correction of apprehension. Truth, for Heraclitus, as for Norman O. Brown, is gratis in that truth as rationality "has" man. Truth is common.* Truth, therefore, shows itself says Heraclitus in Fragment 19, when man "expects the unexpected." 98 Truth cannot be "captured" through private intelligence, i.e. through in-sistent existence, because private intelligence does not "hear" that it "belongs" to being as truth. Private intelligence does not hear that truth is common.

They thrash about amid the essents, always supposing that what is most tangible is what they must grasp, and thus each man grasps what is closest to him. The one holds to this, the other to that, each man's opinion (Sinn) hinges on his own (eigen); it is opinionatedness (Eigen-sinn). This opinionatedness, this obstinacy, prevents them from reaching out to what is gathered together in itself, makes it impossible for them to be followers (Horige) and to hear (horen) accordingly. . . . The opinionatedness, idia phronésis, for which the logos is sealed, attaches itself only to the one or the other side and supposes that it has captured the truth.

In opinionatedness, each man creates his own truth and meaning, without regard for being as truth and meaning. Each man "measures" and "orders" without regard for the innate measure-giving of rationality. Thus Heraclitus says in Fragment 15: "The waking have one

*Wheelwright offers an interesting note to Heraclitus' use of "rational awareness" and "common": "The accidental fact that the Greek word for 'common,' current in Heraclitus' day, and an expression meaning 'with mind' sounded so nearly alike as to enable him to connect them in a repeated pun, evidently struck Heraclitus as significant. . . . What the pun succeeds in stressing is the natural connection between thinking 'with rational awareness' and allowing one's thoughts to be guided by 'what is common'--that is, to be guided by the divine Logos which is present in all things and discoverable by all observers if only they will open their eyes and their minds to the fullest possible extent."
world in common; sleepers have each a private world of his own.\textsuperscript{101}

The opinionatedness of private intelligence, in which "a-part" is supposed for the whole, constitutes a failure to see \textit{physis} as \textit{logos}, i.e. setting-apart as binding-together. Thus Heidegger says, "To the opinionated life is only life; death is only death."\textsuperscript{102}

For the early Greeks, however, "life's being is also death." Physis is logos, for in coming to be, all beings are set in a togetherness or to-gathering motion. Heidegger quotes Fragment 80 by Heraclitus: "It is necessary to bear in mind setting-apart (Aus-einander-Setzung) as essentially bringing-together and order (Fug) as contending . . . \textsuperscript{103} A number of other fragments reflect a similar understanding.

\textsuperscript{108} The way up and the way down are one and the same.

\textsuperscript{109} In the circle the beginning and the end are common.

\textsuperscript{112} The bones connected by joints are at once a unitary whole and not a unitary whole. To be in agreement is to differ; the concordant is the discordant. From out of all the many particulars comes oneness, and out of oneness comes all the many particulars.\textsuperscript{104}

This polemos constitutes the early Greek understanding of being as physis, where things-that-are come to stand "together" through setting-apart. Being as physis refers to the original unfolding, the primal polemos where, as Heidegger says, "rest and motion are opened out of original unity." Physis is the "setting in motion." It is not surprising, then, to find that being, for Heraclitus, is expressed through metaphors of motion: flux, contention, war, strife, and conflict.
25. War is both father and king of all; some he has shown forth as gods and others as men, some he has made slaves and others free.

26. It should be understood that war is the common condition, that strife is justice, and that all things come to pass through the compulsion of strife.

(27. Homer was wrong in saying, 'Would that strife might perish from amongst gods and men.' For, if that were to occur, then all things would cease to exist.)

It is important here to understand Heraclitus' notion of conflict and contending, war and strife, for it is not the traditional notion of conflict as quarreling and wrangling between dissimilar opponents. It is not "discord and dispute." As Heidegger says:

The polemos named here is a conflict that prevailed prior to everything divine and human, not a war in the human sense. This conflict, as Heraclitus thought it, first caused the realm of being to separate into opposites; it first gave rise to position and order and rank. In such separation cleavages, intervals, distances, and joints opened. In the conflict (Aus-inandersetzung, setting-apart) a world comes into being. (Conflict does not split, much less destroy unity. It constitutes unity, it is a binding-together, logos. Polemos and logos are the same.)

The struggle meant here is the original struggle, for it gives rise to the contenders as such; it is not a mere assault on something already there. It is this conflict that first projects and develops what had hitherto been unheard of, unsaid and unthought.

Conflict, for Heraclitus, constitutes unity, constitutes the binding-together of logos. Conflict spawns the interplay and contest between one thing and the other; conflict sets relationship into motion.*

*Conflict, etymologically, means "to strike together," and "to strike" is "to stroke." Conflict is "a stroking to-gather." Similarly, "contest, contend" mean "to bear witness together, to stretch wholly." A contest stretches and disguises wholly and bears witness together. When man contends, he bears witness to-gathering.
Without strife, "all things would cease to exist." ". . . we are two opposites (lion and unicorn)," says D. H. Lawrence, "which exist by virtue of our inter-opposition. Remove the opposition and there is a collapse, a sudden crumbling into universal darkness."¹⁰⁷

Western man has come to view the word "opposites" as referring to "those things that have nothing to do with one another." When this view is advanced, says Heidegger, "authentic conflict ceases, converted into mere polemics."¹⁰⁸ Polemos gives way to polemics, which is a veiling of inherent motion. This, for Heidegger, is when "the decline sets in."

For the early Greeks, however, the word "opposites" referred to those things which moved within one another. Listen again to Heraclitus: "Opposites move back and forth, the one to the other; from out of themselves they gather themselves."¹⁰⁹ For Heraclitus, opposites are those things which rely on each other for their very existence, in that each (opposite) is the other, and as such, includes the other by the fact of its own existence. Joyce Carol Oates expresses this awareness today: "...it is not the presence of a restraining or alien 'enemy' that destroys man; it is the removal of this enemy."¹¹⁰

"Opposites" make like apart what is together. Therefore, Heidegger says, "The conflict of the opposites is a gathering, rooted in togetherness, it is logos."¹¹¹

Opposites, therefore, are not things which are uninvolved with one another, but precisely the reverse: opposites are things which
are involved with one another because they are one another. "Opposites," then, is a metaphor for the swings of movement which take place within being as a whole. "Opposites" expresses the continual movement of one thing within the other. For Heraclitus and the early Greeks, it is the motion between and within opposites that brings things into their own.

The opposition of world and earth is striving. But we would surely all too easily falsify its nature if we were to confound striving with discord and dispute, and thus see it only as disorder and destruction. In essential striving, rather, the opponents raise each other in the self-assertion of their natures. Self-assertion of nature, however, is never a rigid insistence upon some contingent state, but surrender to the concealed originality of the source of one's own being. In the struggle, each opponent carries the other beyond itself. Thus the striving becomes ever more intense as striving, and more authentically what it is.

In conflict, "opponents let themselves go into the intimacy of simple belonging to one another." It is through opposition, then, that things come to stand as they are; through opposition things "assert" their essential natures. Physis discloses itself as logos when "strife remains strife." Strife discloses one as the other.

In that setting-apart is binding-together, it is the difference of opposites that initiates gathering. "What unites opposites is the rift, the Riss that has become the difference, the pain of the threshold that joins." Difference is "the single difference" that "holds apart the middle in and through which world and things are one with each other." 

The conflict is not a rift (Riss) as a mere cleft is ripped open; rather, it is the intimacy with which opponents belong to each other. The rift carries the opponents into the source
of their unity by virtue of their common ground. . . . This rift does not let the opponents break apart; it brings the opposition of measure and boundary into their common outline.

The mystery is that opponents are intimate. They are "innermost," which is the etymological meaning of the word "intimacy."

For world and things do not subsist alongside one another. They penetrate each other. Thus the two traverse a middle. In it, they are at one. Thus at one they are intimate. The middle of the two is intimacy—in Latin, inter. The corresponding German word is unter, the English inter-. The intimacy of world and thing is not a fusion. Intimacy obtains only where the intimate—world and thing—divides itself cleanly and remains separated. In the midst of the two, in the between of world and thing, in their inter, division prevails: a difference.

Therefore, if we say that motion is the opposite of rest and repose, we are saying that motion is the opposite of rest and repose insofar as it includes or is "intimate with" rest and repose.* Only what is in motion can be said to have the capacity to not be in motion, i.e. the capacity of rest, and that which has the capacity or possibility of rest, has rest. In repose there is still motion (as

*Many philosophers juxtapose Parmenides and Heraclitus by labeling the former "the philosopher of permanence" and the latter "the philosopher of flux." Understood through early Greek lenses, however, the metaphors of permanence and motion, as used by Parmenides and Heraclitus, would seem to always be taking into consideration "the motion as permanence" and "the permanence as motion." As Heidegger states, both Parmenides and Heraclitus share a common understanding as to the nature of being. "Parmenides stood on the same ground as Heraclitus. Where indeed would we expect these two Greek thinkers, the inaugurators of all philosophy, to stand if not in the being of the essent? For Parmenides, too, being was Here, synechés, holding together in itself; mounon, unique and unifying; houlon, complete and fully-standing--the permanently manifested power through which shines perpetually the appearance of the one-and-many-sided."
physics has long since showed man), for the cessation of motion totally would eliminate repose. Rest includes motion as part of its essential being, as cold includes heat. One could not exist without the other. "Cool things become warm, the warm grows cool; the moist dries, the parched becomes moist," says Heraclitus in Fragment 22. 117

Therefore, it is only when "opponents" recognize their "belonging-together," their each as each, that they come into their own. It is only when "opponents" recognize their "sameness" that they come into their "difference." This "coming into one's own difference" is not the separateness of an isolated selfhood, but rather the separateness of self-assertion that comes through a recognition of mutual belonging. Loss of the "other," then, would entail loss of the self. "When the Other is obliterated, the individual is also obliterated." 118

The early Greek interpretation of "opposites," then, always involves recognizing the sameness inherent in difference: all things are different from one another yet are the same. This interpretation of opposites acknowledges physis as logos, i.e. dispersion as gathering, difference as sameness.

113. It is one and the same thing to be living or dead, awake or asleep, young or old. The former aspect in each case becomes the latter, and the latter again the former, by sudden unexpected reversal.

Having looked at the word "opposites," and, therefore, closely
at the essence of difference, this paper now takes a closer look at the essence of sameness. The word "same" (ὁμός), for Heraclitus and the early Greeks, means "like, together," and refers to "the belonging together of what differs, through a gathering by way of the difference." Same refers to the "like or together motion" within being as physis. It refers to the gathering motion of logos.

Gathering is never a mere driving-together and heaping-up. It maintains in a common bond the conflicting and that which tends apart. It does not let them fall into haphazard dispersion. In thus maintaining a bond, the logos has the character of permeating power, of physis. It does not let what it holds in its power dissolve into an empty freedom from opposition, but by uniting the opposites maintains the full sharpness of their tension.

The word "same," then, is not to be understood to mean "equal." The word "equal" means "level, even, on a par." The "equal" leaves behind the dimension of difference by attempting to assign to things an even or identical rank and order within being. The "equal" forgets that things-that-are have an inherent order, proportion, part, measure. In the forgetting, the "equal" succeeds in leveling "the difference in sameness" into the indifference of uniformity. The "indifference of uniformity" says "all things are equal," i.e. even and identical, while the difference of sameness says "all things are not equal," i.e. all things have an inherent measure, proportion, part, order, fit, ratio.

The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the empty indifferent oneness of what is merely identical. The equal or identical always moves toward the absence of difference, so that everything may be reduced to a common denominator. The same, by contrast, is the belonging together of what differs, through a gathering by way of the
difference. We can only say 'the same' if we think difference. It is in the carrying out and settling of differences that the gathering nature of sameness comes to light. The same banishes all zeal always to level what is different into the equal or identical. The same gathers what is distinct into an original being-at-one. The equal, on the contrary, disperses them into the dull unity of mere uniformity.

For Heidegger, therefore, any "makeshift" or "fabricated" unity, any unifying without regard for differing, is "the root of all evil." Heidegger quotes from an epigram entitled "Root of All Evil" by the German poet Friedrich Holderlin:

Being at one is godlike and good; whence, then, this craze among men that there should exist only One, why should all be one?  

Any claims to a simple uniformity, to an easy answer that leaves behind the motion of difference, is but another way of "forgetting the essence of being" for Heidegger. "Any salvation by makeshift, however well-intentioned, remains for the duration of his destiny an insubstantial illusion for man, . . ." 123

Therefore, for Heidegger, as for the early Greeks, the loss of the dimension of differing in saming advances belonging as uniformity, as the identical and the even. So, too, the loss of the dimension of saming in differing advances conflict as wrangling and dispute. 124 Moreover, once "the same" is miscast as "the equal," the dimension of difference is lost, and man becomes in-different. And, as Joyce Carol Oates has so aptly pointed out, boredom or indifference (which is the representative form of violence in the theater of the absurd, in theater representative of a nihilistic age) is
a substitute for violence, for the original violence of difference.\textsuperscript{125} Similarly, once "conflict" is miscast as "dispute and discord," the dimension of sameness is lost, and man becomes dis-similar. That is, man becomes fragmented and disconnected, and then needs to manufacture a false unity which is a substitute for primal saming. The false unities born of fragmentation, born of feeling disconnected from the motion of being, however, usually only mirror the isolated ego. In critiquing the anthropomorphic gods of his predecessors, the early Greek philosopher Xenophanes is quoted in Wheelwright's book on Heraclitus as having said: "If horses could draw . . . they would portray their gods in the shape of horses, and oxen in the shape of oxen."\textsuperscript{126} We might say the same of man when he unites and divides without regard for the inherent saming as differing essence of being: he creates a "world order" that "is in fact only a projection of self."\textsuperscript{127}

However, as Heidegger notes, man by nature, is a gatherer. "Logos is a need . . . the ground of being-human . . . the decisive definition of man's essence . . . to be a man means to take gathering upon oneself . . . "\textsuperscript{128} As a gatherer, man is always gathering, he is always unearthing connections, joining, forming relationships. Thus, the "joining" that comes by way of in-sistent existence is a gathering of sorts, but a gathering of the wrong ("twisted") kind when it does not "gather" in align with the "measure-giving" of to-gathering. For when man no longer recognizes the essence of being (difference is saming), man then "orders and fits" without
regard for the inherent order and fit of being. Man then creates "idols of the tribe," to use Francis Bacon's expression. Idols are words born of idleness, spawned from lack of motion. As such, they fail to acknowledge that all "statements about the universe are half-truths--true and false at the same time, as Heraclitus likes to say..." 129

Subsequently, the task of man, as a gatherer, is to let gathering remain gathering, to let strife remain strife, to let the motion of being reveal its motion, to let being show itself as it is, rather than falsely presenting a rigid fixing in either "this" or "that." "... for the moving world can only be known by what is in motion." 130 Subsequently, for the early Greeks, logos speaks and is heard when the conflict of opposites is unveiled as gathering.

It is not surprising then to find that the early Greeks spoke of beauty (and, therefore, art) as restraint. Here, restraint is not to be understood as "a holding back" in the sense of "putting on the brakes." Restrained, for the early Greeks, means to stretch or draw tightly back in the sense of binding back together that which tends apart. Consequently, beauty (as restraint) expresses the gathering of the conflict through which being shows itself as that which is permanently together. 131 For the early Greeks, therefore, beauty and art intimate being; they do not imitate being. Beauty and art unveil that which is permanently together as it is: together. They unveil the harmony amongst opposites: the being in beings.
What the Greeks meant by 'beauty' was restraint. The gathering of the supreme antagonism is polemos, struggle in the sense of setting apart (Aus-einandersetzung). For us moderns, on the contrary, the beautiful is what reposes and relaxes; it is intended for enjoyment and art is a matter of pastry cooks. . . . (but) the logos as gathering and harmony, is not easily accessible and not accessible to all in the same form; unlike the harmony that is mere compromise, destruction of tension, flattening, it is hidden: harmonie aphanes phaneres kritton, 'the harmony that does not (immediately and easily) show itself is mightier than that which is (at all times) manifest' (Fragment 54).

Because being is logos, aletheia, physis, phainesthai, it does not show itself as one pleases.

What is hidden is harmony. It is the intimate ("innermost") secret.

The word "harmony" is derived from the Greek words, ἀρμονία ("a joint, joining, proportion") and ἀρέσι, ἀραρίοκειν ("to fit, join together"). Harmony expresses the togetherness motion of logos.

For the early Greeks, then, harmony does not in any way denote compromise, a flattening or lessening of tension.** (Etymologically, the word "tension" means "stretching apart." "To stretch" is the

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*Neither does "balance," for Heidegger, denote moderation, but rather hazard and risk. The German word for balance, die Wage, means "situations in which matters may turn out one way or the other." Wage comes from wagen, wegen, meaning "to make a way, to go, to be in motion." Be-wagen means "to cause to be on the way and so to bring into motion; to shake or rock, wiegen." "What rocks is said to do so because it is able to bring the balance, Wage, into the play of movement, this way or that. What rocks the balance weighs down; it has weight. To weigh or throw in the balance, as in the sense of wager, means to bring into the movement of the game, to throw into the scales, to release into risk." All things "hang in the balance."†33

*The corresponding Wheelwright translation is Fragment 116: "The hidden harmony is better than the obvious." And Fragment 117 states: "People do not understand how that which is at variance with itself agrees with itself. There is a harmony in the bending back, as in the case of the bow and the lyre."†34
Greek word ὀρθαγγός, meaning "drawing tight that which is related," which is also the meaning of "restraint.") Harmony does not nullify separation or obscure difference; rather, harmony is the proportionate joining and fit of difference. "Opposition brings concord. Out of discord comes the fairest harmony," says Heraclitus in Fragment 98.135

Heraclitus may perhaps be regarded as having taken the Pythagorean idea of harmony and added to it an observation of his own. Harmony, he adds, can exist only where there is contrast. There is no harmony of a single note, there is significant harmony only where there are 'opposing tones' which are resolved. Musical harmony involves the overcoming, but without the eliminating, of some musical opposition. And in the larger sphere of human existence the same situation is found to occur. Harmonies and attunements between person and person, or between person and circumstance, are brought into existence out of diversity and potential strife.136

For Heraclitus, "harmony" or logos (gathering) is the metaphor used to express the mystery of existence.

No word or image or idea can do it (the ultimate order of things) justice; but one of the least inadequate ways of symbolizing it, indicating as it does both its interrelating power and its elusiveness, is the phrase that Heraclitus employs in Fr. 116 -- the hidden harmony.137

Repeatedly, the early Greeks tried to express being through metaphors that acknowledged the elusive and interrelating power of being. The early Greek words physis, logos, ἀληθεία, polemos, harmonia, and phainesthai are essentially metaphoric variations on one theme: the onefoldedness of the manifold.

In approaching the next chapter on the "devolution" of this ground-view, it is important for the reader to keep in mind the
intimate interconnectedness of all these early Greek words. Due to their interconnectedness, a misinterpretation of one becomes a simultaneous misinterpretation of another, so that one falsification leads to another falsification. For example, if man misinterprets the early Greek notion of truth, he misinterprets the early Greek notion of being as well. For Heidegger, it is the intimate interconnectedness of all their expressions for being that make the early Greek ground-view truly great. Subsequently, it is the loss of this sense of interconnectedness in all things which accounts for the acceleration and pervasiveness of "the forgetting of being."
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136 Ibid., p. 108.
137 Ibid., p. 110.
Men perish because they cannot join the beginning with the end.

Alcmaeon of Crotona

The intent of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the direction Heidegger takes in exploring the "devolution" of the early Greek ground-view discussed in the preceding chapter.

For Heidegger, the early Greek ground-view is not just another philosophy among philosophies, but, for the Western world, the beginning of philosophy as such, and consequently, one of the truly outstanding achievements of man. However, this early beginning very quickly becomes "covered," and covered specifically for Heidegger through a thinking that captures the idea of the "two," but leaves behind the motion of the "twofold" (Zwiefalt). For Heidegger, then, linguistic devolution begins when the early Greek "twofold essence of being" (i.e. coming-to-be is passing-away, setting-apart is binding-together, physis is logos) is cast as a divided "two." And the "twofold" is cast as a "two" when the motion through which the onefoldedness of the manifold is manifest becomes linguistically veiled. Once motion is veiled, the early Greek polemos gives way to polemics; setting-apart is taken as the whole story regarding the essence of being.
This transformation, says Heidegger, begins with the early Greeks themselves.

... one sees that the tragic flaw which was later to manifest itself in an almost total forgetting of being was already there in germ in the thinking of the great pre-Socratics. There was the ambiguity of the 'twofold,' the presencing of the present, which later turned into simply 'the present'; and there was the factor of inevitable translation, as the attempt was made to put being over into truth, instead of thinking being from out of its truth as 'unconcealedness.'

What Heidegger is saying is that the early Greeks themselves often failed to make clear linguistically their sense of the motion of being, "the presencing of the present," and subsequently to make clear what Heidegger calls "the ontological difference" (Refer to p. 166 of this section.) between being and thing. This "ambiguity of the twofold" reaches its complete transformation into the "two" in Plato and Aristotle. Thus, Heidegger states, "fated was the twofold."

What begins great can only end great, adds Heidegger. "The great begins great, maintains itself only through the free recurrence of greatness within it, and if it is great ends also in greatness. So it is with the philosophy of the Greeks. It ended in greatness with Aristotle."² What lingers on, for those following the thinking of Plato and Aristotle, then, is a Western tradition that follows on the "back" of a great ending, for it is with Plato and Aristotle that, for Heidegger, the great beginning of early Greek thought has a great ending. The effects of such a great ending are still with us, under the heading "Western metaphysics."

In order to understand what Heidegger means by stating that
the end of philosophy "begins its ending" with Plato and Aristotle, we need to listen to Heidegger speak about "the end of philosophy."

What is meant by the talk about the end of philosophy? We understand the end of something all too easily in the negative sense as a mere stopping, as the lack of continuation, perhaps even as decline and impotence. In contrast, what we say about the end of philosophy means the completion of metaphysics. However, completion does not mean perfection as a consequence of which philosophy would have to have attained the highest perfection at its end. Not only do we lack any criterion which would permit us to evaluate the perfection of an epoch of metaphysics as compared with any other epoch, the right to this kind of evaluation does not exist. Plato's thinking is no more perfect than Parmenides'. Hegel's philosophy is no more perfect than Kant's. Each epoch of philosophy has its own necessity. We simply have to acknowledge the fact that a philosophy is the way it is. . . .

The old meaning of the word 'end' means the same as place: 'from one end to the other' means from one place to the other. The end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of philosophy's history is gathered in its most extreme possibility. End as completion means this gathering.

When Heidegger speaks about "the end of philosophy," he is speaking about the completion of the possibilities that exist within the frameworks that have been set up. "As a completion, an end is the gathering into the most extreme possibilities. We think in too limited a fashion as long as we expect only a development of recent philosophies of the previous style."4

It is important for the reader to carry this Heideggerian sense of "ending" into the following discussion of "devolution" as extended in the thought of Plato and Aristotle. Heidegger spent years exploring the thought of both Plato and Aristotle, and as students of Heidegger's such as Hannah Arendt and Hans-Georg Gadamer have
noted, he explored their thinking in a most original way.

Hannah Arendt noted that it was of decisive importance that Heidegger avoided general talk about Plato and spent an entire semester closely examining just one of the Dialogues. 'Today this sounds quite familiar, because nowadays so many proceed in this way; but no one did so before Heidegger.' In this way Plato's theory of Ideas shook off the burden of traditional interpretations that doctrines inevitably accumulate and became a problem for the present.

Listen also to Hans-Georg Gadamer reflect on Heidegger's impassioned style of thinking:

With him, lecturing as such became something altogether new: it was no longer a 'course of instruction' from a professor who devoted his real energies to research and publication. With Heidegger, book-length monologues lost their usual pre-eminence. What he gave was more. It was the full concentration of all the powers--powers of genius--in a revolutionary thinker who actually seemed himself to be startled by the intensity of the questions growing more and more radical in him. The passion of thinking was so complete in him that it communicated itself to his listeners, whose fascination nothing could disturb.

I quote these comments so that the reader will not infer that the following brief capsule of Heidegger's direction in thought with regard to Plato and Aristotle reflects a similar brevity in Heidegger's thinking on these two great thinkers. Only extensive reading on Heidegger's thought in these areas can do justice to the depth, originality, and detail not only of Heidegger's thinking but of Plato's and Aristotle's as well. With this understanding, this chapter should be viewed as an attempt to introduce the reader to the direction Heidegger takes in trying to explore the origins of the present-day nihilism afflicting modern man, and not as a summary and adequate reflection of that work.
Being and Appearance

Before Plato told the great lie of ideals
men slily went like fishes, and didn't care.

They had long hair, like Samson,
and clean as arrows they sped at the mark
when the bow-cord twanged.

They knew it was no use knowing
their own nothingness:
for they were not nothing.

D. H. Lawrence

This section looks at the transformation of being as appearance
into being and appearance.

For the early Greeks, such as Heraclitus and Parmenides, being
as physis expressed the power of emergence, the "coming into the
unconcealed," the "appearing on the scene." Physis expressed a
"presencing appearing" and an "appearing presencing," i.e. the unity
of appearing as being. So, too, for the early Greeks, things that
"appear on the scene," things that "come into unconcealment," also
come into truth.

In contrast to this early Greek understanding of being as
appearance, modern man is all too familiar with the division between
being and appearance to which he has become heir, "another of the
many worn-out coins that we pass unexamined from hand to hand in
an everyday life that has grown flat."

How did the early Greek sense of being as appearance become
the traditional separation between being and appearance that Western
man has been handed?

For Heidegger, two major events advance this transformation: 1) the transmutation of early Greek words in Roman thought; and 2) the failure of Plato to understand appearance as being.

In the transmission of Greek expressions into Latin thought, many early Greek words take on altered meanings. Foremost among these reinterpretations is the early Greek word for being, physis. In the Latin, physis most often gets translated as natura, narrowing the Greek sense of physis to mean the material world, nature. Natura properly means "to be born," "birth." When the expression is used to refer to the material world, however, natura comes to mean "to grow," and in this sense, loses the essence of growing as specifically an emerging and coming forth. With this later translation of physis as "nature," not only does the force of the original Greek word become lost, for Heidegger, but more importantly, the early Greek ground-view that the Greek word physis tried to reflect is now obscured.8

This kind of transformation takes place in the reinterpretation of many Greek expressions in Latin thought. For example, to hupokeimenon was the early Greek word for "the core of things," which was "something lying at the ground of the thing, something always already there." And ta sumbebekota referred to "that which has always turned up already along with the given core and occurs along with it." For Heidegger, such expressions mirrored the Greek ground-view of appearing as presencing. In Latin thought, however,
hupokeimenon becomes subjectum; hupostasis becomes substantia; and sumbebekos becomes accidens. Once the distinction starts to be made between "the core of things," now called substance or substantia, and "the characteristics of the core of things," now called accidents or accidens, the separation between being and appearance is well on its way.

. . . this translation of Greek names into Latin is in no way the innocent process it is considered to this day. Beneath the seemingly literal and thus faithful translation there is concealed, rather, a translation of Greek experience into a different way of thinking. Roman thought takes over the Greek words without a corresponding, equally authentic experience of what they say, without the Greek word. The rootlessness of Western thought begins with this translation.

Elsewhere, Heidegger states:

What happened in this translation from the Greek into the Latin is not accidental and harmless; it marks the first stage in the process by which we cut ourselves off and alienated ourselves from the original essence of Greek philosophy. The Roman translation was later taken over by Christianity and the Christian Middle Ages. And the Christian Middle Ages were prolonged in modern philosophy, which, moving in the conceptual world of the Middle Ages, coined those representations and terms by means of which we still try to understand the beginnings of Western philosophy. These beginnings are regarded as something that present-day philosophers have supposedly transcended and long since left behind them.

For Heidegger, the effects of these beginnings are far from left behind. They are everywhere present, manifested in the division between being and appearance that man still wrestles with today.

For with the translation of physis as natura, the original meaning of appearance as "that which stands forth and comes to be" is reinterpreted as "the mere appearance or the look of a thing."
Appearance comes to mean the "accidents" that happen along with "substance," i.e. the surface or front, as over and against "something else." Appearance becomes "the showing up of a copy." It is here that, for Heidegger, the grand sense of appearance as being itself becomes reinterpreted as mere appearance. It is here that the early Greek understanding of being as "appearing on the scene," whose very being lies in offering a number of appearances which not only serve to conceal and reveal at the same time, but also constitute the gathering together of being as logos, is obscured from view.

Compounding the linguistic devolution of Greek thinking in Latin thought, for Heidegger, is Plato's failure to understand the early Greek physis as a "standing and appearing presence."

Appearance, for Plato, is not the emerging power that it was for his predecessors, but "the look or view that matters presents" (i.e. "the showing up of a copy"), and what is other than a look or a view is being, or, as Plato called it, eidon (ἐίδων), or idea. In this rendering, appearance as being is reinterpreted as mere appearance (or semblance), while being becomes something "other" than appearance and is reinterpreted as idea.

From the standpoint of space, the difference between appearing and appearing is this: appearing in the first and authentic sense as bringing-itself-to-stand in togetherness involves space, which it first conquers; as it stands there, it creates space for itself; it produces space and everything pertaining to it; it is not copied. Appearing in the second sense emerges from an already finished space; it is situated in the rigid measures of this space, and we see it by looking toward it. The vision makes the thing. Now this vision be-
comes decisive, instead of the thing itself. Appearing in the first sense opens up space. Appearing in the second sense merely circumscribes and measures the space that has already been opened.\textsuperscript{12}

In conceiving appearance as the look that matter or nature presents, Plato does not comprehend the early Greek understanding of appearance as being, and that as being, the early Greek "appearance" reveals the essence of being as that which conceals and reveals simultaneously. Therefore, for Heidegger, when Plato reinterprets appearance as a copy or cover, over and against being as idea, Plato forgets the revealing aspect of being as appearance, and in so doing, takes the concealing aspect of being (the setting-apart) as the whole story regarding the essence of appearance. In advancing this interpretation of appearance, then, Plato does not comprehend that appearing, as his predecessors tried to express, constitutes and manifests being because it is being, i.e. setting-apart is binding-together.

Here, Heraclitus would say that Plato is "uncomprehending": he has eyes and ears, but he does not see nor hear. That is, if a man looks only with his eyes, a man sees that things are separate and that things are joined. However, for the early Greeks, the nature of being is such that all things are simultaneously parted and joined because all things could not be joined unless they were parted. In the early Greek ground-view, each constitutes the other. Comprehending this essence of being, therefore, does not only involve a man with eyes and ears; it also involves a man with
"listening" to the "not always visible, yet always present" motion of appearing as being. As the early Greeks would say, it involves a man in hearing what is being spoken though unsaid, and in seeing what is being shown though invisible. True seeing and hearing involves the motion of being: the "presencing" that begins through the ends (the limits, the boundaries) of "appearing."

Subsequently, for Heidegger, the Platonic reinterpretation of appearance as "the look matter presents" is not the minor alteration in thinking and expression one might initially suppose. For one thing, the Platonic interpretation of appearance as "the look matter presents" inaugurates philosophies of "seeing," which is a radical shift in emphasis from what might be characterized as the philosophy of "hearing" common to the early Greeks.

By this it should not be understood, of course, that Heidegger completely repudiates a 'seeing' in favor of a 'hearing' type of thinking. It is largely a question of emphasis. The emphasis, however, seems to be very much away from what one might call the 'seeing' or the 'intuiting' aspect of thinking, and much more in the direction of the 'hearing' aspect, particularly as regards the way in which one is authentically to grasp being. . . . This intellectual 'seeing' involves two elements: it implies that there is one that sees; it implies that there is something that is seen. And the metaphysics of seeing thereby gains the position of subject and object. It sets up that which is for Heidegger the insupportable dichotomy that is the theory of knowledge or epistemology, or, if one wishes to call the spade a spade in Heideggerian terminology, metaphysics.

Moreover, then, this shift in emphasis, for Heidegger, radically alters man's "view" of things. Previously, for the early Greeks, "things" brought being to stand. Heidegger notes that the meaning of the Old German words thing and dinc is "a gathering." In scanning various
etymologies, we unearth also that "thing" means "an assembly, a meeting, a council," also "to prosper, to thrive," and allied to the Gothic word theih, "thing" denotes "season, time (hence, time for meeting)." In Heidegger's words, a thing gathers or assembles being into place. It is a "gathering" which bears on and concerns men.  

However, with the Platonic reinterpretation of appearance as "an outward look other than being," and the emphasis shifting to the seer and the seen, "things" are in the process of undergoing a very definite change. For Heidegger, "things" are in the process of becoming "objects": those outward "looks" that stand between man, the seer, and being as idea.

That is why Plato, who conceives of the presence of what is present in terms of the outward appearance, had no more understanding of the nature of the thing than did Aristotle and all subsequent thinkers. Rather, Plato experienced everything present as an object of making.  

George Joseph Seidel adds:

Metaphysics for Heidegger is simply subjectivism in that it represents the reduction of being to the object side of a merely subjective subject-object distinction. It is Descartes, for Heidegger, who represents the beginning of the end of this metaphysical tradition in the West, because the subjectivism in which man becomes a mere subject was first made explicit by Descartes. However, this subjectivism is true of the metaphysical tradition as a whole from Plato on. Metaphysics for Heidegger is simply the ontology of knowledge ("Ontologie der Erkenntnis"), and as such represents nothing more than subjectivism.

That is, for Heidegger, the Platonic shifts in interpretation, in advancing a new "view" of being and appearance, advance a new approach to being and things. These Platonic "shifts" advance a specific epistemology or "way of knowing." This particular "way
of knowing "may reach its explicitness and extension in Descartes, but for Heidegger this direction begins with Plato.

With Plato, knowing is increasingly aligned with the visual (and, therefore, with the written word, with the alphabet), whereas for the early Greeks, man did not "know" a thing by only looking at its outward or visual appearance, but by also listening to what each thing "spoke," or as Heidegger would say, by letting each thing speak for itself.

In the 'Republic,' Plato vigorously attacked the oral, poetized form as a vehicle for communicating knowledge. He pleaded for a more precise method of communication and classification ('The Ideas'), one which would favor the investigation of facts, principles of reality, human nature, and conduct. What the Greeks meant by 'poetry' was radically different from what we mean by poetry. Their expression was a product of a collective psyche and mind. The mimetic form, a technique that exploited rhythm, meter, and music, achieved the desired psychological response in the listener. Listeners could memorize with greater ease what was sung than what was said. Plato attacked this method because it discouraged disputation and argument. It was in his opinion the chief obstacle to abstract, speculative reasoning--he called it 'a poison, and an enemy of the people.'

Interestingly, Plato's teacher, Socrates, recognized the direction that learning would take once the visual aspect of knowing was emphasized.

'The discovery of the alphabet will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. . . .'

As Socrates prophesized, an overemphasis on the visual aspect of knowing, and therefore on things which can be seen, places a greater
emphasis upon thoughts that come via the alphabet, i.e. upon thoughts that appear in lines, in linear structures.

Western history was shaped for some three thousand years by the introduction of the phonetic alphabet, a medium that depends solely on the eye for comprehension. The alphabet is a construct of fragmented bits and parts which have no semantic meaning in themselves, and which must be strung together in a line, bead-like, and in a prescribed order. Its use fostered and encouraged the habit of perceiving all environment in visual and spatial terms—particularly in terms of a space and of a time that are uniform, c-o-n-t-i-n-u-o-u-s.

The line, the continuum--this sentence is a prime example--became the organizing principle of life. 'As we begin, so shall we go.' 'Rationality' and logic came to depend on the presentation of connected and sequential facts or concepts.

Rationality and visuality have long been interchangeable terms, but we do not live in a primarily visual world any more.

This quote from Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore's widely-read book, *The Medium is the Massage* (1967), takes this present discussion beyond its intended parameters, but I have included it here to signal the reader as to the far-reaching effects that an epistemology based on the visual aspect of learning has had on Western thought over the last three thousand years.

*If man, as McLuhan and Fiore note, does "not live in a primarily visual world any more," but in a world moving "at the high speeds of electric communication," and yet he is trying to comprehend what is no longer visible through a process of learning based on the visual, man is ripe for experiencing the "visual discontinuity" that Rudolph Arnheim speaks of. (See "Statement of the Problem," p. 9.) Visual discontinuity, however, only leads to personal discontinuity and fragmentation in a culture that has stressed visible and visual continuity.*
Having outlined the direction that the early Greek notion of "appearance" takes in Plato's thought, the discussion now turns to the direction that the early Greek notion of "being" takes in Plato's thought.

Plato tells us clearly what direction "being" is to take in his thought: being will be idea. How different is this conception of being from that of the early Greeks? In exploring this question, Heidegger states:

Actually it cannot be denied that the interpretation of being as idea results from the basic experience of being as physis. It is, as we say, a necessary consequence of the essence of being as emerging Scheinen (seeming, appearing, radiance). And herein there is no departure, not to mention a falling-off, from the beginning. No, that is true.

But if the essential consequence is exalted to the level of the essence itself and takes the place of the essence, what then? Then we have a falling-off, which must in turn produce strange consequences. And that is what happened. The crux of the matter is not that physis should have been characterized as idea but that the idea should have become the sole and decisive interpretation of being.

We can easily appraise the distance between the two interpretations if we consider the difference between the perspectives in which these two definitions of being, physis and idea move. Physis is the emerging power, the standing-there-in-itself, stability. Idea, appearance as what is seen, is a determination of the stable insofar and only insofar as it encounters vision.

Plato's rendering of being as idea, therefore, loses the early Greek sense of being as the ambiguous appearing that means both "that which gathers itself, which brings-itself-to-stand in its togetherness and so stands" and also "that which, already standing-there, presents a front, a surface, offers an appearance to be looked at." Once appearance comes to mean "the look matter presents," i.e. a
mere semblance of being as idea, appearance and being are placed in separate places. Appearance as semblance is reduced in stature, and being as idea is elevated. As Heidegger states, once cast as idea, being becomes "exalted to a suprasensory realm," becoming more or less an ideal, a model. For once appearing is placed within the realm of vision, the realm of the senses, being, as divorced from appearing, becomes equated with what is other that that which can be observed only with the senses. This "other" constitutes being as idea, and forms the basis of Plato's "theory of ideas."

Being as idea is exalted, it becomes true being, while being itself, previously dominant, is degraded to what Plato calls mé on, what really should not be and really is not, because in the realization it always deforms the idea, the pure appearance, by incorporating it in matter. The idea now becomes a paradeigma, a model. At the same time, the idea necessarily becomes an ideal. The copy actually 'is' not; it merely partakes of being, it is a methexis. The chōrismos, the cleft, has opened between the idea as what really is, the prototype and the archetype, and what is not, the copy and image.

From the standpoint of the idea, appearing now takes on a new meaning. What appears—the phenomenon—is no longer physis, the emerging power, nor is it the self-manifestation of the appearance; no, appearing is now the emergence of the copy. Since the copy never equals its prototype, what appears is mere appearance, actually an illusion, a deficiency. Now the on becomes distinct from the phainomenon. And this development brings with it still another vital consequence. Because the actual repository of being is the idea and this is the prototype, all disclosure of being must aim at assimilation to the model, accommodation to idea. The truth of physis, alētheia as the unconcealment that is the essence of the emerging power, now becomes homoiōsis and mimēsis, assimilation and accommodation, orientation by . . . , it becomes a correctness of vision, of apprehension as representation.

Once we fully understand all this, it becomes undeniable that the interpretation of being as idea is a far cry from the original beginning. Yet when we speak of a decline it should be noted that this decline remains lofty; it does not sink into baseness . . . . The basic concepts idea, paradeigma, homoiō-
sis, and mimēsis foreshadow the metaphysics of classicism. . . In itself the transformation of being from physis to idea gave rise to one of the essential movements in the history of the West, and not only of its art.\(^2\)

For Heidegger, then, Plato's distinction between being and appearance underlies almost every "essential movement" common to Western man.

A chasm, chōrismos, was created between the merely apparent essent here below and real being somewhere on high. In that chasm Christianity settled down, at the same time reinterpreting the lower as the created and the higher as the creator. These refashioned weapons it turned against antiquity (as paganism) and so disfigured it. Nietzsche was right in saying that Christianity is Platonism for the people.\(^3\)

The impact of Plato's reinterpretation of being as idea cannot be underestimated, for that interpretation becomes the linguistic framing through which Western man's subsequent thought is born and directed. "... the interpretation of being as idea has dominated all Western thinking throughout the history of its transformations down to the present day."\(^4\)

Once being as appearance becomes being and appearance, the early Greek ground-view of "the rift" as the setting-apart and appearing on the scene wherein all things come together becomes a secondary rift. The primary rift of joining becomes cast as a chasm or cleft (chōrismos) of dividing which sets being and appearance up as a polemic. Being as appearance, being as polemos, is linguistically recast as being and appearance, i.e. as a polemic. The underlying motion of each as each is forgotten. In this chasm, the "idea" of the two is preserved, while the motion of the twofold is obscured. Plato's "theory of ideas," therefore, is born of a distin-
guishing which does not acknowledge an underlying togetherness, and as such, this linguistic framing "drives a permanent wedge between these two aspects of being, that which was in Parmenides and Heraclitus the peculiar 'togetherness' of Physis and Logos, Logos and Physis; . . ." 25

In the reinterpretation of being as idea, then, lies not only the fate of physis, but also the fate of truth as alêtheia and the fate of logos as "the peculiar 'togetherness' " of being. Why? Because for the early Greeks, being as unconcealment, appearing, setting-apart is truth. As set forth previously, truth is the essence of being, and cannot be spoken of apart from being. So, too, being as appearing and setting-apart is coming-together, is logos. For the early Greeks, then, physis is alêtheia is logos.

Therefore, a wedge into physis as appearing presence becomes simultaneously a wedge into truth as appearing unconcealment, as well as a wedge into logos as gathering. Accordingly, in the fateful separation between being and appearance, truth, rather than being understood as the very essence of being, comes to mean correctness of apprehension.

. . . as Heidegger explains in his study on Plato's allegory of the cave, when 'substance' becomes 'idea,' truth is no more as unconcealedness the principal feature of being itself; rather, as subservient to idea, it becomes mere correctness, henceforward to be the mere marking out (Auszeichnung) of our knowledge of things. . . . (truth) comes to mean a mere declaration or statement; and from the various ways in which things can be declared are the categories (κατηγορεῖν, 'to accuse') of Aristotle created.

This rendering of truth subsequently alters the meaning of logos.
The original and authentic meaning of Logos was collection (Sammlung), the happening of uncovering, of revelation, of truth. As Heidegger says, originally the Logos was grounded in this truth and served it, whereas now Logos has come to mean statement (Aussage) in the sense of correctness or rightness (Richtigkeit), the exact opposite of the place of truth. . . . with Plato's basically different view of Physis as idea, the Logos can only come to be the tailor-made straitjacket of discourse. . . . Statement has come to be the arbiter over the being of things.

Heidegger outlines the transmutation as follows:

. . . logos becomes the essential determinant of discourse. Language--what is uttered and said and can be said again--is the custodian of the disclosed essent. What has once been said can be repeated and passed on. The truth preserved in it spreads, and in the process the essent originally gathered and disclosed is not each time experienced for itself. In the transmission the truth detaches itself as it were from the essent. This can go so far that the repetition becomes a mere babbling by rote, a glôssa. Statement is always exposed to this danger.

. . . Logos in the sense of discourse and utterance becomes the realm and the scene of decision concerning the truth, i.e. originally, the unconcealment of the essent and hence its being. Initially the logos as gathering is the event of unconcealment, grounded in unconcealment and serving it. Now logos as statement becomes the abode of truth in the sense of correctness. And this process culminates in Aristotle's proposition to the effect that logos as statement is that which can be true or false. Truth that was originally unconcealment, a happening of the dominant essent itself, governed by gathering, now becomes an attribute of the logos. In becoming an attribute of statement, the truth not only shifts its abode; it changes its essence as well. From the standpoint of statement, the truth is achieved if discourse adheres to what it speaks of; if the statement follows the essent. The truth becomes the correctness of the logos. With this the logos has departed from its original inclusion in the happening of unconcealment, so that the decision concerning the truth and hence concerning the essent is made on the basis of, and with a view to, the logos; and this applies to the decision not only concerning the essent but even and above all concerning being. Logos is now hegein ti kata tinos, to say something about something. What is spoken of is what in every case underlies the statement, what is set before it ready made (das ihm Vorliegende), hypokeimenon (subjectum). From the standpoint of the logos
as independent statement, being becomes this being-set-before.  

For Heidegger, then, the transmutation of *physis* to *idea* accomplishes the transformation of truth as unconcealment to truth as mere "correctness", and the transformation of the *logos* as gathering and collection to *logos* as statement and discourse, i.e. as "logic." Being now is set forth as "datum" and arrives "ready-made;" the revelation and unconcealment of being is "set aside in favor of the correct." (The subsequent transformation of the *logos* to "logic" is outlined in the following section entitled "Being and Thinking.")

For Heidegger, then, Plato's "putting" being and appearance "in separate places" inaugurates an "across the boards" transmutation, where each reinterpretation only changes further the essence of the composite early Greek ground-view. As Heidegger states, Plato's "theory of ideas" forms "the insupportable dichotomy" that becomes the basis of all theories of knowledge and epistemology, and of every metaphysics itself. "... western philosophy is simply Platonism: and metaphysics, idealism, and Platonism all mean the same thing."29

It is this conceptual base then that, for Heidegger, inaugurates a history of nihilism--a history in which being is no longer encountered, but arrives "ready-made" as "datum." For in the separation between being and appearance, both being and appearance become object-things. That is, for Heidegger, things (i.e. all things that come to stand, all things that appear on the scene, all setting-apart)
are recast as object-things when their inherent being is forgotten, i.e. when their appearing is no longer seen as simultaneously being. And nihilism, for Heidegger, is nothing other than man's preoccupation with things (as objects) to the total exclusion of being.

As Heidegger says in his work on thinking, Plato drove a wedge between things and being, between things and their being. . . . When we say being, he says, we really mean the being of things; when we say things we mean things with reference to their being. We constantly speak from out of this 'twofold' (Zwiefalt). Plato, however, gave an interpretation of this twofold which was absolutely crucial for western metaphysics. He put each one of the 'twofold' in a different place, and then proceeded to concern himself with the 'other place.'

Plato "drove a wedge between being and things" by failing to note what Heidegger calls the "ontological difference" between being and things. This is a failure "to take into account 'the not' (das Nicht) between things (Seiende) and being (Sein)." That is, being is not just another thing, not just another "thing among things;" being encompasses all things, and in encompassing all things, being is "ontologically different" than things. (As Heidegger notes elsewhere, "being determines while remaining something indeterminate.")

Therefore, for Heidegger, when being is conceived as a thing, for example when being is cast as "idea," the essence of being as

*Heidegger also notes that in the Greek, the word for things (Seiendes) is Eon, and that as a participle, "it is able to have the meaning of both a noun and a verb." In fact, for the early Greeks, there was no distinction between noun and verb. For Heidegger, the distinction between noun and verb "arrives" through the conceptualizations advanced in Plato. "The distinction between noun and verb did not, however, first come out of grammar, nor did it first appear in logic. It came with Plato."
that which is simultaneously determinate and indeterminate, i.e. the essence of being *as* no-thing, is on its way to being lost. In failing to note the "ontological difference"--the no-thing of being--being itself becomes "a thing among other things."

... if being is taken after the manner of a thing (*seiend*), it is thought back into its essence (*Wesen*), and being immediately goes up in smoke.

It is here that the *being* of things, whose being is not a thing, is also forgotten. As Heidegger states, a "wedge" is driven between things and their being. For when things are no longer "thought out of" their relation to being as a whole (i.e. being *as* no-thingness), both being and things become object-things: things whose being *as* no-thingness is forgotten.

Therefore, for Heidegger, the failure to note the "ontological difference" between being and thing, i.e. the failure to recognize the no-thing of being, turns both things and being into object-things. Expressed in more familiar terms, failure to note the "ontological difference" subordinates the whole (*w-hole*) to the part.

This is the sense in which Heidegger can speak of the whole tradition of western metaphysics as nihilistic. It represents a forgetting of being in the failure to make the fundamental distinction between being and things, and in interesting itself in things rather than in being itself. The importance of this the 'ontological difference' between things and being cannot be overestimated in studying Heidegger. As he says, it is this distinction which sustains history.

The failure to note the "ontological difference," then, is for Heidegger the beginning of the forgetting of being in Western metaphysics, in which thought begins to interest itself in things,
including being itself, as object-things, rather than in the being of things.

Interest in being now takes the form of an "also" or ancillary interest in being, i.e. an interest in being as an idea, an ideal, a model, a prototype, which is to say, an interest in being as an object-thing. Being now is seen as something that arrives "ready-made" and, therefore, can be "grasped." Therefore, Western metaphysics progresses with its interest in object-things under the claim and guise that there is still an interest in being.

Where struggle ceases, the essent does not vanish, but the world turns away. The essent is no longer asserted (i.e. preserved as such). Now it is merely found ready-made; it is datum. The end result is no longer that which is impressed into limits (i.e. placed in its form); it is merely finished and as such available to everyone, already-there, no longer embodying any world--now man does as he pleases with what is available. The essent becomes an object, either to be beheld (view, image) or to be acted upon (product and calculation). The original world-making power, physis, degenerates into a prototype to be copied and imitated. Nature becomes a special field, differentiated from art and everything that can be fashioned according to plan. The original emergence and standing of energies, the phainesthai, or appearance in the great sense of a world epiphany, becomes a visibility of things that are already-there and can be pointed out. The eye, the vision, which originally projected the project into potency, becomes a mere looking at or looking over or gazing at. Vision has degenerated into mere optics (Schopenhauer's 'world eye'--pure cognition . . .).

True, there are still essents. There are more of them, and they make more of a stir than ever. But being has gone out of them. The essent has been made into an 'object' of endless and variegated busy-ness, and gaily thereby has it retained an appearance of its permanence.

That is, claims to an "also" interest in being, in which being is cast
as an object-thing, is not an interest in being at all. It is an interest in just another thing among things. And "... to concern oneself with things (das Seiende) to the total ignoring of being (Sein): that is nihilism."36

But where is nihilism really at work? Where men cling to familiar essents and suppose that it suffices to go on taking essents as essents, since after all that is what they are. But with this they reject the question of being and treat being like a nothing (nihil) which in a certain sense it is, insofar as it has an essence. To forget being and cultivate only the essent—-that is nihilism. Nihilism thus understood is the ground of the nihilism which Nietzsche exposed in the first book of The Will to Power.

By contrast, to press inquiry into being explicitly to the limits of nothingness, to draw nothingness into the question of being—-this is the first and only fruitful step toward a true transcending of nihilism.37

For Heidegger, the forgetting of the "ontological distinction" between being and thing, the forgetting of the no-thingness of being, whereby being is "set forth" as a prototype and an ideal, is the "event" of Western metaphysics. The nihilism of the day, then, is simply an extension of the essential possibilities present in a thinking which casts being as idea.

Moreover, once being is cast as idea, being as idea becomes the "object" of "logic." This gives rise to the metaphysical distinction between being and thinking.
If we wish to combat intellectualism seriously, we must know our adversary, i.e. we must know that intellectualism is only an impoverished modern offshoot of a development long in the making, namely the position of priority gained by thought with the help of Western metaphysics. . . . To surpass the traditional logic does not mean elimination of thought and the domination of sheer feeling; it means more radical, stricter thinking, a thinking that is part and parcel of being. . . . If the separation between being and thinking was an essential, necessary separation, it must have been rooted in an original bond between them. Hence our inquiry into the origin of the separation is first and foremost an inquiry into the essential bond between thinking and being.

Martin Heidegger

A critique of the intellect, for Heidegger, does not involve thinking a-logically or irrationally. On the contrary, a critique of the intellect involves man in thinking even more deeply and more originally than before if he is to uncover the primal bond that existed between being and thinking before the separation between them took place. That is, for Heidegger, in the same way that irrationality inadvertently confirms and augments the notion of rationality as mind, intellect, reason, so too, a-logical thinking would only confirm the incomplete notion of the logos as merely "logic."

This discussion, therefore, looks even more closely at the bond between physis and logos in an attempt to outline Heidegger's "rethinking" of the relationship between being and thinking. For Heidegger, the eventual transformation of the early Greek logos into "logic" as reason and intellect (the Latin intelligere, "to think") is
only an offshoot of the original bond and gradual division between being and thinking. In an attempt to unearth this original bond between being and thinking and the process of transmutation whereby logos-thinking becomes logic-thinking, i.e. the faculty of the intellect, Heidegger turns to Heraclitus' contemporary, Parmenides, and the early thoughts he advanced on the nature of the relationship between being and thinking.

Heidegger begins his "rethinking" by recalling Parmenides' most famous maxim, Fragment 5 (referred to as Fragment 3 in most other references), which reads: to gar auto noein estin te kai einai (Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν εστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι). Long-standing Western tradition most often translates this maxim as follows: "Thinking (noein) and being (einai) are the same." 38* For Heidegger, this translation is totally "un-Greek" (Ungriechische), yet it has become "the basic theme for the whole collective history of western European thought." As George Joseph Seidel states, this famous maxim is the "pedal point" that "sets the key for the intellectual variations of western thinking." 39

All philosophy after Parmenides had to be played in this key. However, this decisive pre-Socratic thinker is also the 'key' to western philosophy in another sense. He also represents the key which not only opens the door to the understanding of the whole western tradition of philosophy, but also opens a

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*For the interested reader, George Joseph Seidel lists several of the historical readings given Parmenides' famous maxim in a footnote found on pp. 60-61 of his book, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1964).
door behind which the future possibilities of Dasein may be
revealed.  

That is, Parmenides' famous maxim has not only been the "key" to
what has happened in Western thinking, but is also the "key" to what
could happen in Western thinking once the saying is "rethought" from
out of the early Greek ground-view.

What has happened with regard to Parmenides, states
Heidegger, is that he has repeatedly been misinterpreted. In the
traditional translation, for example, noein is interpreted as "thinking,
an activity of the subject."* In such a translation, "the thinking of
the subject determines what being is." Here, then, there is nothing
else for being to do but become "the object of thinking, that which is
thought."41

But since thinking remains a subjective activity, and since
thinking and being are supposed to be the same according to
Parmenides, everything becomes subjective. Nothing is in
itself.  

Once noein is cast as "an activity of the subject," and Parmenides'
saying is translated "thinking and being are the same," everything
becomes subjective. With this traditional interpretation in mind,
historians often call Parmenides the first subjectivist, and point to his
famous fragment as his attempt to set forth a primitive theory of
knowledge. However, for Heidegger, to interpret Parmenides through

*In support of Heidegger's view that the rendering of noein as
"thinking, the activity of the subject" is totally unacceptable, George
Joseph Seidel quotes John Burnet in Early Greek Philosophy (New
York: Meridian, 1957) as saying: "No rendering is admissible which
makes νοέσαν (noin) the subject of the sentence; for the bare
infinitive is never so used . . ."43
later categories of thought, such as idealist or realist, objectivist or subjectivist, acts to obscure the early Greek ground-view which proceeds and "anticipates" such interpretations.

The anachronism lies in the fact that in reading back into Parmenides terms or meanings from later philosophies we forget that it is with Parmenides that history really begins.

Since it is with Parmenides that history begins, Heidegger explores the words in Parmenides' famous maxim, to gar auto noein estin te kai einai, through a "rethinking" that tries to take into account and "think from out of" the early Greek ground-view of being.

The early Greek understanding of einai or being has already been discussed at length. As noted on p. 132, Parmenides understood being in much the same way as did Heraclitus, which was as "the permanently manifested power through which shines perpetually the appearance of the one-and-many-sided."

In "rethinking" the Greek word noein, Heidegger states that, although it is traditionally translated as "thinking, an activity of the subject," noein for the early Greeks more truly means "to apprehend."

Noein means vernehmen (to apprehend), nous means Vernehmung (apprehension), this in two senses that belong together. To apprehend means to accept, to let something (namely that which shows itself, which appears) come to one. Vernehmen means also to hear a witness, to question him and so determine the facts, to establish how a matter stands. To apprehend (Vernehmen) in this twofold sense means to let something come to one, not merely accepting it, however, but taking a receptive attitude toward that which shows itself... This receptive bringing-to-stand is meant in noein. It is this apprehension that Parmenides says to be the same as being.
It is important to understand here that Heidegger is not so much advancing one metaphor "over" another, i.e. apprehending "over" thinking, as he is advancing an interpreting which acknowledges the "twofold" essence of all things, for that is the essence in which being (as appearing) was understood and advanced by the early Greeks. Therefore, it is important for Heidegger that the interpreter of early Greek words, in translating a maxim like Parmenides', acknowledge the early Greek ground-view of the "twofold" essence of being as it is present in words themselves.

Consequently, noein and nous, meaning "to apprehend" and "apprehension" respectively, more precisely refer to the "both" sense in which the one word noein is "an apprehending apprehension." Heidegger's interpretation flags the absence of a separation between the early Greek "thing" and its "being," and thus signals the lack of a division between noun and verb in early Greek language (thereby also revealing the "un-Greek" rendering of a word like noein in subject and object terms).*

This brings Heidegger to the expression to auto, meaning "the same." Understanding Parmenides' intention here, states Heidegger,

*Therefore, although the historical interpretations of Parmenides' maxim, B3, differ from author to author, most translations try to convey the unity of noun and verb in early Greek writing. Most attempt to convey that the act of apprehending cannot be divorced from being itself. For example, Leonard Woodbury's translation reads: "Thinking must take the form 'it-is,' because the real word is 'expressed' in 'that-which-is,' and consequently in the thought, 'it-is.'" George Joseph Seidel lists other examples on pp. 60-61 in his book, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics.
requires an understanding of the early Greek sense of "the same." This "sense" has already been discussed on p. 134 of this paper. Briefly restated, the unity or onefoldness expressed by "the same" (to auto) is not the "empty indifference of uniformity," nor is it "the mere equivalence of equality." "The same," for Parmenides, as for his contemporary, Heraclitus, is the "belonging-together of what tends apart, the belonging-together of that which differs."

Lastly, states Heidegger, the Greek expression te kai means "one," here again in the Greek sense of "belonging-together." So far, then, Parmenides' maxim reads as follows: "being and apprehension (apprehending apprehension) are one and the same."

To understand clearly what this maxim is expressing, Heidegger says that we need to constantly remember the meaning of being for the early Greeks as "to stand in the light, to appear, to enter into unconcealment." For where being appears and prevails, then, "apprehension prevails and happens with it; the two belong together. Apprehension is the receptive bringing-to-stand of the intrinsically permanent that manifests itself." That is, where being comes to stand, apprehension comes to stand as well.

Here, Heidegger enlists another fragment of Parmenides which he says expresses the meaning "still more sharply," and this is Fragment 8, line 34: Tauton d'esti noein te kai houneken esti noema. ("The same is apprehension and that for the sake of which apprehension occurs.") According to Heidegger, then, Parmenides is trying to express the interdependence of being and apprehension, and that
apprehension occurs when being comes to stand. There is apprehension only where there is coming to stand, appearing, unconcealment, i.e. there is apprehension only where there is being. Referring to Fragment 8, Heidegger states:

At first sight the statement says nothing about man, still less about man as subject, and nothing whatever about a subject which cancels out everything objective, transforming it into mere subjectivity. The proposition says the opposite of all this: being dominates, but because and insofar as it dominates and appears, appearing and with it apprehension must also occur. But if man is to participate in this appearing and apprehension, he must himself be, he must belong to being. But then the essence and the mode of being-human can only be determined by the essence of being.

But if appearing belongs to being as physis, then man as an essent must belong to this appearing. Since being-human amid the essent as a whole is evidently a particular mode of being, the particularity of being-human will grow from the particularity of its belonging to being as dominant appearing. And since apprehension--accepting apprehension of what shows itself--belongs to such appearing, it may be presumed that this is precisely what determines the essence of being-human.

That is, the essence of being-human is determined according to the essence of being, whose essence has been revealed as physis, i.e. as appearing presence. Apprehension belongs to such appearing presence, then, in the particular mode of being that is being-human. Man, therefore, apprehends to the extent he "lets" that which he is--an appearing presence--be. Man apprehends when he "stands out into" being. Therefore, states Heidegger, "man's being is determined by the essential belonging-together of being and apprehension."

Fragment 6 of Parmenides states: Χρῆ το λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ'εόν εμμεναι. ("Both are needful, the λέγειν as well as the apprehension--of the essent in its being.")
Apprehension, as Parmenides says, is not a faculty belonging to a man already defined; apprehension is rather a process in which man first enters into history as a being, an essent, i.e. (in the actual sense) comes into being.

Apprehension is not a function that man has as an attribute, but rather the other way around: apprehension is the happening that has man. That is why Parmenides always speaks simply of noéin, of apprehension. What is accomplished in this maxim is nothing less than the knowing appearance of man as historical being (as the historical custodian of being). This, for the West, is the crucial definition of being-human, and at the same time it embodies an essential characterization of being. The separation between being and being-human comes to light in their togetherness. We can no longer discern this separation through the pale and empty dichotomy of 'being and thinking' which lost its roots hundreds of years ago, unless we go back to its beginnings.

In the same way that the early Greeks understood logos, alétheia, and physis as those happenings which "have" man, so too, for Parmenides, noéin is the apprehending apprehension in which man is totally involved. Therefore, man does not "have" a faculty or "activity" called thought or thinking, but rather apprehension is the happening that "has" man. This elucidates the early Greek understanding of knowing as "standing out into the truth of being." Once again, the interdependence of all things within the Greek ground-view is manifest. As Heidegger says, "...for two thousand years, these ties between logos, alétheia, physis, noéin, and idea have remained hidden in unintelligibility."52

Consequently, in taking into account the interdependence of each as each which is so representative of the early Greek ground-view of being, Heidegger states that Parmenides' famous maxim reads: "there is a reciprocal bond between apprehension and
being," rather than the traditional translation which reads "thinking and being are the same." 53

For Heidegger, the traditional translation of Parmenides' maxim initiates a separation in the original bond between being and apprehending through presenting noein as an "activity" that man "possesses." This interpretation creates "the gap" in the early Greek unity and interdependence of noein and physis and comes to reflect "the fundamental attitude of the Western spirit."

In accordance with this attitude, being is defined from the standpoint of thinking and reason. This is true even where the Western spirit shuns the domination of reason by seeking the 'irrational' and 'alogical.' . . . The mode and direction of the opposition between being and thinking are so unique because it is here that man comes face to face with being. This event marks the knowing emergence of man as the historical being. It is only after man became known as the historical-essent that he was 'defined' in a concept, namely as the zōion logon echon, the rational animal. In this definition of man the logos occurs, but in a totally unrecognizable form and in very odd company. 54

Here the word logon refers to reasoned discourse and statement. Man, therefore, is "defined" as the animal of reasoned discourse and statement. Now the original sense of the logos as "gathering" gradually gives way to the Latin expression ratio as "reason." Both logon and ratio refer to the faculty and attribute of discourse as a possession of man. With the logos completely revised in meaning as an attribute of the subject, being becomes hardened further as the "object" man can possess through reasoning. For if the essence of the logos is veiled when the essence of being as physis is veiled, similarly, the essence of being as physis is veiled when the essence
of the logos is veiled.

Man's being-there changes accordingly. The slow end of this history, the slow end in which we have long been standing, is the domination of thinking as ratio (in the sense of understanding as well as reason) over the being of the essent. Here begins the contest between 'rationalism and irrationalism' that has been in progress to this day in every conceivable disguise and under the most contradictory titles.  

Logos as ratio becomes posited over and against being. "... the Logos is forced to vacate the premises it originally shared with being and comes to mean theoretical knowledge."  

For Heidegger the disclosure in the beginning of the authentic relationship between being and thinking, as it has reference to being human, might best be formulated in a Greek manner in this way: \( \phi i\sigma\varsigma = \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\sigma\acute{o} \nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\omicron \) (being is the Logos which possesses man). This in Heidegger's opinion more truly expresses the way in which man was originally defined and authentically defines himself from out of his relation to things within the whole. But with a Logos that has become externalized into a mere faculty of understanding or of reason, any such statement of the original but authentic opening up of being to man can only sound absurd. This is largely because we have totally ceased to think in terms of an authentic notion of thinking which opens up the thing (seiend), but which does so in a 'collecting-taking-in-to-account' manner such that it puts the thing back into its being (Sein). Thus when the Logos becomes simply reason, and that which it collects becomes Idea, both being and the being of man suffer irreparable damage. For man is then no longer defined, nor is he able to define himself, from out of his relation to Physis; reason, which is a mere faculty of a falsified concept of man, comes to define man. Being is no longer the overwhelming, emerging dominance, but becomes totally subservient to Idea.  

Man now begins to speak in all too familiar terms: being and thinking, rational and irrational, essence and existence, subject and object, ideal and real, being and becoming, appearance and reality. Into this definition and framework, not only metaphysics but every
doctrine of Western man--epistemology, psychology, ethics, anthropology--have put their efforts, not realizing, states Heidegger, that the definitions of man (as the animal of reason), being (as idea), and logos (as statement and discourse) from which they take their cue are themselves a transmutation and falsification of a previous unity and interdependence where being was lord, and not the faculty of reason. "And each further misinterpretation of the one only served to falsify the other, until logic came to dominate over all and being vanished in a puff of smoke."\(^58\)

Furthermore, as the previous section on "Being and Appearance" briefly introduced (p. 163), with the degeneration of the original Greek logos as physis comes also the degeneration of the original Greek alētheia as physis. For coinciding with the transmutation of being as physis into being as idea and of logos as gathering into ratio as reason is the transmutation of alētheia as truth into truth as "the merely correct." That is, once logos becomes the statement of reason, and being as idea becomes the object of statement or reason, truth comes to refer to "that which can be passed on and secured." Truth "comes to mean a mere declaration of statement." Truth is no longer understood as the essence of being, as the "unconcealment" which being is; rather truth becomes "subservient to idea." Here, says Heidegger, the way is paved for the categories (κατηγορία) of Aristotle. To state or to accuse is κατηγορεῖν, and from the various ways in which being can be stated or declared, from the various ways in which being can be
set forth "ready-made" and truth agreed upon, come the categories of Aristotle.* Statements are now said to be true or false.

In statement the underlying essent may be represented in different ways: as having such and such properties, such and such magnitude, such and such relations. Properties, magnitude, relations are determinations of being. Because, as modes of being-said, they are derived from logos—and because to state is katēgorein—the determinations of the being of the essent are called katēgoriai, categories. Thus the doctrine of being and of the determinations of the essent as such becomes a discipline which searches for the categories and their order. The goal of all ontology is a doctrine of categories. It has long been taken for granted that the essential characteristics of being are categories. But fundamentally it is strange and becomes comprehensible only if we understand not only how the logos as statement broke away from physis but how it set itself up in opposition to physis as the decisive domain, the source of all determinations of being.

But logos, phasis, speech in the sense of statement, has become the arbiter over the being of the essent in so profound a sense that whenever one statement stands against another, when a contradiction, antiphasis, occurs, the contradictory cannot be. Conversely, what is not contradictory has at least the possibility of being.

In the form of statement logos itself became something already-there. It became something handy that one handles in order to gain and secure the truth as correctness. The next, short step was to take this method of acquiring truth as a tool, organon, that had to be handled in the right way. What made this all the more necessary was that with the change of physis to eidos and of logos to katēgoria the original disclosure of the being of the essent ceased, and henceforth the true, now interpreted as the correct, merely spread by way of discussion, teaching, and rules, becoming steadily broader and flatter. For the benefit of this process the logos had to be fashioned into a tool. Logic was about to be born.

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*George Joseph Seidel adds: "Someone who 'categorized' was one who stood above (κατά) the market place (ἀγορά) in a seat of judgement and accused, condemned, declared the crime of so and so to be such and such. For Heidegger, of course, it is impossible to stand over that which we declare; we are in the market place of being ourselves."
Metaphysics now becomes the science of categorical theories, pursuing the attainment of truth as the merely correct through the "method" of logic. The original Greek logos is refashioned into a tool, organon, and "logic" is born.

"Logic" is an abbreviation for epistēmē logike, the science of statement and discourse. Logic, the science of the logos, began states Heidegger "when Greek philosophy was drawing to an end and becoming an affair of schools, organization, and technique," and "only after the division between being and thinking had been effected." Once logos becomes "an affair of schools," the attempt is made to put being "over into truth" (via statement and discourse), rather than "thinking being from out of its truth." The transformation of logos to "logic," therefore, begins when being as idea becomes the "object" of reason, and as the "object" of reason, it becomes "teachable." Thus, for Heidegger, "logic" arises "in the curriculum of the Platonic-Aristotelian schools," for it is the product of schoolteachers, not questioning philosophers. Truth is now advanced by way of discussion, teaching, and agreement.*

The "err-ing" of "logic," then, as the fitting and ordering of statement into categories, is in forgetting that the early Greek logos is the inherent "fit and order" of being as physis. "Logic" forgets

*It is important to note here that it is not the "birth" of "logic" which surprises Heidegger so much as it is the dominance of logic. Heidegger's surprise is over the fact that logic should have come to overshadow the original logos so completely that it determines totally for Western man the essence of thinking.
that for the early Greeks the *logos* expresses "the belonging-together" of all that comes to stand and is set apart. In other words, "logic" forgets that the *logos* is *physis*.

Heidegger offers what he believes to be an authentic historical verification to prove that he is on the right track in this regard. For he notes that ever since Idea and Category have come into their kingdom, philosophers have had a most difficult time trying to explain the relation between statement (thought as the falsified Logos) and being, whereas before the radical changes which took place in western thinking with Plato and Aristotle the problem of explaining the relation between statement and being did not exist.

Heidegger's own words are as follows:

Ever since idea and category became sovereign, philosophers have tormented themselves in vain, seeking by every possible and impossible stratagem to explain the relation between statement (thinking) and being--in vain, because they never again carried the question of being back to its native ground and soil, thence to unfold it.

For Heidegger, then, it is the differentiation between being and thinking, being and appearance, and their subsequent placement "in separate places" that has come to form the fundamental basis of Western metaphysics and epistemology. Heidegger calls it "the breakdown of unconcealment," whereby the original essence of being as that which conceals (*physis*, or setting-apart) and unconceals (*logos*, or bringing-together) at the same time is veiled beneath a categorizing and distinguishing which fails to acknowledge the underlying order, fit, and proportion which characterized the early Greek ground-view of each as each. It is "the breakdown of unconcealment" which constitutes for Heidegger "the forgetting of being," a forgetting which is manifested in the nihilism of the day.
In speaking of "the forgetting of being," of "devolution," the Heideggerian sense of "ending" is always to be kept in mind. As Heidegger states:

Yet the breakdown of unconcealment, as we briefly call this event, did not spring from a mere deficiency, an inability to sustain this essence that was entrusted to historical man. The cause of the breakdown lay first of all in the greatness of the beginning and in the essence of the beginning itself. ('Decline' and 'breakdown' are negative terms only in a superficial sense.) Since it is a beginning, the beginning must in a sense leave itself behind. . . . A beginning can never directly preserve its full momentum; the only possible way to preserve its force is to repeat, to draw once again (wieder-holen) more deeply than ever from its source. . . . This does not preclude but rather requires that the historical course of this collapse be as far as possible elucidated. . . . The only possible step that remains is to stand on the very ground from which logic arose and to overturn it (as the dominant perspective for the interpretation of being). . . . Where history is authentic it does not die by merely ceasing; it does not just stop living (ver-enden) like the animals; it can only die historically. It is, therefore, that Heidegger's "rethinking" of what has been, his attempted "elucidation" of the collapse, is always in view of the future possibilities that still exist for being and man.
References


4 Ibid., p. 57.


6 Ibid., p. 16.

7 Heidegger, Metaphysics, p. 84.

8 Ibid., p. 11.


10 Heidegger, Metaphysics, p. 11.

11 Seidel, Pre-Socratics, p. 38.


13 Seidel, Pre-Socratics, pp. 99-100.


15 Ibid., p. 168.

16 Seidel, Pre-Socratics, p. 100.


18 Ibid., p. 113.
19 Ibid., p. 44-45.


21 Ibid., p. 153.

22 Ibid., pp. 154-155.

23 Ibid., pp. 89-90.

24 Ibid., p. 151.


26 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

27 Ibid.


31 Ibid., p. 30.

32 Ibid., p. 83.

33 Ibid., p. 51.

34 Ibid.


38 Ibid., p. 115.


40 Ibid.


42 Ibid.

43 Seidel, *Pre-Socratics*, p. 60.
44 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., pp. 117-118.
50 Ibid., p. 118.
51 Ibid., p. 119.
52 Ibid., p. 143.
53 Ibid., p. 122.
54 Ibid., p. 122 & p. 119.
55 Ibid., p. 149.
56 Seidel, *Pre-Socratics*, p. 44.
57 Ibid., p. 76.
58 Ibid., p. 45.
60 Seidel, *Pre-Socratics*, p. 45.
64 Ibid., pp. 158-160.
CHAPTER VI

LANGUAGE

In accordance with its historical, history-disclosing essence, being-human is *logos*, the gathering and apprehending of the being of the essent: it is the happening of that strangest essent of all, in whom through violence, through acts of power (Gewalt-tätigkeit), the overpowering is made manifest and made to stand. But the chorus from *Antigone* has told us: simultaneously with man's departure into being he finds himself in the word, in language... And this means that language can only have arisen from the overpowering, the strange and terrible, through man's departure into being. In this departure language was being, embodied in the word: poetry. Language is the primordial poetry in which a people speaks being.

Martin Heidegger

The fluid relationship between language and being is manifested throughout Heidegger's work, and it is hoped that the reciprocity of that relationship has made itself evident throughout this paper. The preceding chapters have explored man's destroyed relation (zerstörte Bezug) to being as it has become a simultaneous misrelation (Missverhältnis) to language. Moreover, this misrelation to language, once accomplished, succeeds in accelerating (while veiling) man's destroyed relation to being. "Because the destiny of language is grounded in a nation's relation to being, the question of being will involve us deeply in the question of language."¹

Language, for Heidegger, is the present word for what was originally the early Greek *logos* as that word which expressed the
"gathering essence" of being.

Subsequently, the word "language" could replace the word "logos" in the previous chapter on "Devolution," and provide the reader with a fairly accurate account of the degeneration process that has taken place in man's relationship with language.

This chapter will attempt to make explicit much of what is implicit throughout this paper with regard to the nature of the relationship between being and language, unveiling man's relation to language as none other than the relationship of man to the logos. That is, language, like the early Greek logos, "has" man; man does not "have" language.

Man's dwelling in the world is essentially a dwelling in language. Heidegger thus likens language to a house in which man lives; walking through this house he discovers the world. This house, however, is not owned by man--language is the house of Being.

The devolution of the logos to "logic," however, linguistically reverses the essence of the man/language relationship so that man comes to think that he "has" reason, thought, intellect, which is to say, man comes to think he "has" language. This is no mere "playing with words." For in man's destroyed relation to being, whereby man comes to think he can "grasp" or "have" being as idea, as datum "ready-made," man comes to think that he, rather than being, is the measure (and measurer) of all things and that language is merely the tool (organon) with which he measures. Once set forth as a tool, language is reduced to an information medium or "means of expression." That is, it is the inversion of ownership in the relation-
ship between man and being that simultaneously constitutes an inversion of ownership in the relationship between man and language. In Heidegger's words, man's destroyed relation to being becomes man's misrelation to language. And it is man's misrelation to language that further hides the now-destroyed relationship between man and being.

Against nearly any other obstacle man can protect himself; but the confusion of language annihilates man's reason completely, for it is only through language that one is to be distinguished from the beasts.

As with being, however, so too with language: man's failure to recognize the nature of the relationship does not render the relationship inactive. Language, like being, determines the relationship, whether man acknowledges this or not. Language, like being, is always the master and mistress of man, even when man reverses the relationship so that it seems that he is master, and that language is merely his tool.

It is language that tells us about the nature of a thing, provided that we respect language's own nature. In the meantime, to be sure, there rages round the earth an unbridled yet clever talking, writing, and broadcasting of spoken words. Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man's subversion of this relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation. That we retain a concern for care in speaking is all to the good, but it is of no help to us as long as language still serves us even then only as a means of expression. Among all the appeals that we human beings, on our part, can help to be voiced, language is the highest and everywhere the first.

However, if man is to respect "language's own nature," man must be exposed to just what "the nature and essence of language" is. For
Heidegger, this "essence" is "grounded" in the early Greek logos. Heidegger says that the early Greeks did not have the word "language" (Sprache) because they had a word for language and that was logos. "To the Greeks . . . the essence of language was revealed as Logos."

However, although the Greeks lived with the essence of language, they did not think on it. This, of course, would serve to explain why the Greeks had no word for language. Not even Heraclitus really thought on it. It was, after all, as Heraclitus had said in B2, common and current (εὐθὺς ὑμῖν ὁ κόλλωτος). It was so much taken for granted by the Greeks that it was scarcely thought about, even by such a great thinker as Heraclitus. For if the Greeks had truly thought about it, they would have thought the essence of language from right out of the essence of being. For the Logos is nothing else but the name for the being of things (Sein des Seienden).

For the early Greeks, the logos was "common and current." Therefore, they did not think about "language" as such. Rather, for these early philosophers, the logos was encountered and lived, listened to and followed. Remember here that the logos was the early Greek expression for unity--the primordial attempt at acknowledging "the belonging-together" of all things. As such, the logos was not just another "word among words;" it was the Greek word for all words. The logos constituted the essence of all that could be "heard to speak," i.e. the essence of language. And what is "heard to speak," states Heraclitus repeatedly, is "one is everything." "The logos speaks: 'One is everything.' " Similarly, Fragment 50 states: "If you have heard not me but the logos, then it is wise to say accordingly: all is one." As noted previously, the "hearing" and
"speaking" referred to here is not the commonly-held sense of hearing and speaking as the transmission of statement and discourse. Rather, speaking for the early Greeks expressed an altogether different sense of speaking--the sense of "letting the logos speak," whose very speaking, as logos, always speaks together (to-gather). In that logos and physis are one in early Greek thought, the logos speaks out of its relation to being. This is what George Seidel is referring to when he states in the preceding quote on p. 191: "For if the Greeks had truly thought about it, they would have thought the essence of language from right out of the essence of being."

For Heidegger, then, speaking out of being is speech (as primordial Sagen). It is "saying" which lets the together (the logos) which is being (physis) appear as that which it is: the permanently together. Language, as primary saying, lets "what-is" speak "that which it is." Primary saying lets being (as setting-apart) reveal itself through language as logos as that which is "gathered-together."

... there is a saying that really engages in saying, yet without reflecting upon language, which would make even language into one more object. To be involved in saying is the mark of a saying that follows something to be said, solely in order to say it. What is to be said would then be what by nature belongs to the province of language. And that, thought metaphysically, is particular beings as a whole. ... The more venturesome are those who say in a greater degree, in the manner of the singer. Their singing is turned away from all purposeful self-assertion. ... To sing, truly to say worldly existence, to say out of the haleness of the whole pure draft and to say only this, means: to belong to the precinct of beings themselves. This precinct, as the very nature of language, is Being itself. To sing the song means to be present in what is present itself. It means: Dasein, existence.
For Heidegger, authentic speech (Sagen) reflects the interrelationship between logos and physis. Authentic speech "gathers" with regard to being when it "lets being speak or show itself as it is." Authentic speech, therefore, relies upon being; being does not rely upon man's speech. When the nature of this relationship is inverted, man comes to think that he can order and fit the world (through "logic") without regard for the inherent order and fit (Fug) of being: physis is logos. It is this reversal which recasts language as "the tool" with which man "orders and fits" being. Here, states Heidegger, the emphasis shifts from the being of things to the being of things. "Consequently language, speech, is at the same time idle talk, a concealment rather than disclosure of being, dispersion, disorder and mischief (Unfug) rather than a gathering into structure and order." 8

For Heidegger, therefore, there is authentic and inauthentic speech. There is the essential word and the counterfeit word.

There is the authentic saying (Sagen) described above, the "being-related speech," in which being as logos is allowed to speak "to-gether, to-gather." "The authentic saying (Sage) of the Logos was that which allowed the showing off of the thing to appear in its 'is-ness' (es-ist)." Here, saying "means both the said (Gesagtes) and also the saying of it (zu-Sagende)," reflecting once again the absence of a noun-verb distinction. 9 In this "saying," language "gathers" with regard for being, and it is this "gathering" which lets things reveal themselves in their essential natures, i.e. in their being and truth.
There is also, however, a language which speaks without regard for the inherent interrelationship between gathering (logos) and setting-apart (physis). This is language which Heidegger calls "talk" (Rede), babbling. The distinction Heidegger draws here corresponds with the distinction Parmenides makes between logos and glossa. For Heidegger, as for Parmenides, glossa occurs when things are not allowed to speak "to-gather," i.e. when things are not "spoken" out of their relation to being as a whole.

It may help here to recall Heidegger's distinction between historicity and historiography. Inauthentic speech, glōssa, like historiography, takes things literally. It is speech which settles for the assumed meanings of words, "meanings which generally tend to conceal rather than reveal being."

For when the word becomes a mere sign, then language becomes a veiling (Verdeckung) rather than an unveiling (Eröffnung) of being. And as soon as the word becomes a mere sign, the way is prepared for logic and the manipulation of terms as signs. The true essence of language as the collecting of the collected of being is come upon, language as everyday talk (alltäglich Rede) comes to its truth, only when speaking and hearing are related to the Logos as the collected, in the sense of being.

... To speak (sprechen) a language, Heidegger insists, is quite other than merely making use (benützen) of a language. And common everyday speech only makes use of language. This is what makes ordinary, everyday language ordinary.

In the words of Karsten Harries, inauthentic language "happens" "wherever grammar swallows the word and its meaning."

All inauthentic modes of existence develop their peculiar grammars, which provide rules determining how a certain word should be used and in so doing silence its claim. Inauthentic existence demands cliches to guard man against
the shock of having to encounter reality.\footnote{11}
When man avoids encountering his relationship \textit{within} being through cliches and stereotypes, through babbling and rote repetition, language becomes a veiling (Verdeckung) rather than an unveiling (Eröffnung) of being, a concealment rather than a disclosure of being. \textit{Glōssa} occurs, then, when man "uses" words to avoid encountering being.

But what does language as \textit{glōssa} conceal? It conceals the essence and truth of being as unconcealment--an unconcealment which conceals and reveals at the same time. \textit{Glōssa} fails to let being "show and speak itself" as that which conceals \textit{and} reveals simultaneously. When Heidegger speaks of language which veils, therefore, he is referring specifically to language which veils the the nature of being (and therefore the nature of language itself) as that which both veils and unveils simultaneously.

Here, it is easy to understand why it was difficult for man to "safeguard" the essence of being and language in their delicate interdependence of \textit{each as each}. "This is the case partly because the very essence of language, as a thing (seiend), tends both to reveal and to conceal at the same time."\footnote{12} The German poet Holderlin calls language "man's most dangerous possession." Heidegger concurs, for language, by its very nature, can conceal the essence of being as that which conceals and reveals simultaneously in that language, like all things within being, comes to stand and appear on the scene. That is, language, by its very nature, conceals and
"sets-apart." In the early Greek ground-view, however, this is only "a-part" of a larger story, and that larger story is: setting-apart is simultaneously binding-together. Physis is logos.

Therefore, states Heidegger, language gives rise to disorder and mischief (Unfug) rather than manifesting the innate order and proportion of physis as logos when man takes the concealing aspect of language as the whole story regarding the essence and nature of language. Simply stated, glòssa "errs" in "taking" language as only static, as only stationary. It "errs" through "using" language to avoid encountering the inherent motion of being. Glòssa is language, then, that "orders and fits" without regard for the inherent "order and fit" of physis as logos.

Consequently, the task of man, the specific task of being-human, states Heidegger, is to "turn away from all mere heresy, all mouthing and glibness," and undertake the violent "work" of gathering. "Logos is a need (Not) and intrinsically requires violence to ward off mouthing and dispersion." It requires that man "discriminate and decide," always setting before himself "gathered in one, the counsel of multiple conflict." It requires that man undertake the "work" of "unconcealment."

We know from Heraclitus and Parmenides that the unconcealment of being is not simply given. Unconcealment occurs only when it is achieved by work: the work of the word in poetry, the work of stone in temple and statue, the work of the word in thought, the work of the polis as the historical place in which all this is grounded and preserved. [In accordance with what has been said above, 'work' is to be taken here in the Greek sense of ergon, the creation that discloses the truth (in die Unverborgenheit herstellen) of
something that is present.) The struggle for the unconcealment of the essent and hence for being itself in the work, this struggle for unconcealment, which even in itself is continuous conflict, is at the same time, a combat against concealment, disguise, false appearance.

Appearance, doxa, is not something beside being and unconcealment; it belongs to unconcealment.

To be a man means to take gathering upon oneself, to undertake a gathering apprehension of the being of the essent, the sapient incorporation of appearing in the work, and so to administer (verwalten) unconcealment, to preserve it against cloaking and concealment.

The battle for the undistorted, for truth as unconcealment which both conceals and reveals simultaneously, is, by its very nature, a battle against the distorted. Here, however, states Heidegger, "the way to truth as correctness (Richtigkeit) also lies open," for unless the battle for the undistorted is "directed" by being itself, it becomes a battle directed by man, and it is this latter battle which transforms the essence of truth from one of unconcealment to one of "mere correctness."

Because the essence of language is found in the act of gathering within the togetherness of being, language as everyday speech comes to its truth only when speaking and hearing are oriented toward logos as collectedness in the sense of being.

For Heidegger, then, it is through speech which is "directed" by being that things come to show themselves as they are, and that man comes to apprehend (noein). In authentic speech, therefore, man apprehends ("hears") that he belongs to that in which he is ultimately related.

Now at last we understand the full context of Parmenides' saying that 'noein' (apprehension) happens for the sake of being.

The passage runs (Fragment 8, lines 34-6): 'There is an
inherent bond between apprehension and that for the sake of which apprehension occurs. For not without the essent in which it (being) is already spoken, will you find (attain) apprehension. Its relation to the logos as physis makes legein into an apprehending gathering, and makes apprehension a gatherer. Therefore the legein, if it is to remain collected, must turn away from all mere hearsay, all mouthing and glibness.

It is through being-related language that man apprehends. Noein depends upon logos: apprehension depends upon "to-gathering." For Heidegger, then, it is through being-related speech that man undertakes a gathering apprehension of his relation to being, understanding and thus preserving language in its essence as "the apprehending gathering" of being. Being-related speech unveils the "to-gathering" (the logos) of all that is set-apart as being or physis. Subsequently, it is language as glossa which veils not only man's apprehension of his relationship to being, but also the interrelationship of all things to one another.

To reveal the truth of being as unconcealment, then, man needs to continually raise words "to a still more original unfolding; not merely by applying them and invoking their authority. The original remains original only if it never loses the possibility of being what it is: origin as emergence . . . "

We do not learn who man is by learned definitions; we learn it only when man contends with the essent, striving to bring it into its being, i.e. into limit and form, that is to say when he projects something new (not yet present), when he creates original poetry, when he builds poetically.

It is understandable then that, for Heidegger, when logos as gathering becomes reinterpreted as "logic," and noein as apprehending
apprehension becomes reinterpreted as categories of knowledge, man tends to forget his essence as an "apprehending gatherer," and comes to think of himself as "the animal of reason," as the logician, with language his instrument, tool, and means of expression.

As a tool, language is now "legein ti kata tinos, to say something about something." The degeneration of language as logos is now so profound, states Heidegger, that "whenever one statement stands against another, when a contradiction, antiphasis, occurs, the contradictory cannot be." In forgetting the original essence of language as being, man begins denying being (and truth) to being through language. The nature of being as truth, the nature of setting-apart as binding-together, i.e. the nature of being as paradox, is now veiled beneath the linguistic frame of contradiction. Inclusion is transformed to exclusion. The "idea" of "two" is captured, but the motion of the twofold (each as each) is obscured. It is here, in the language of contradiction, that for Heidegger the inherent and multiple possibilities of the onefoldedness of the manifold remain in shadow.

It is in the hope of shedding light on what is still in shadow that Heidegger addresses his "rethinking" of the past towards the future possibilities still present within being. This "rethinking" requires the "work" of man-as-gatherer disclosing "the truth of something that is present." This "work" requires language which "lets what is present speak for itself," and for Heidegger, as for Heraclitus and Parmenides, what is present speaks: setting-apart is
binding-together, coming-to-be is passing-away.

It is this "work" that frees language from "the bondage of grammar," and allows it to unveil its essence as being itself.

... Language can do justice to Being only if it is possible to free it from the bondage of grammar. ... The demand to free language from grammar is a demand to free it for its real task of revealing meaning. The context in which a word operates should not be permitted to obscure its essential meaning.

When language is "permitted" its essential meaning, "a people remembers that it belongs to the totality of all that exists," and authentic saying unfolds authentic history.

As something of such grave importance, as something so fundamentally original, language is an event (Ereignis), a very important event. When language begins to speak, it is itself historical. It is an Ereignis in the sense that it opens man's eyes up (Er-äugen) to the possibilities of language. And hence it also opens man's eyes up to the possibilities of the fateful thinking on being. As Heidegger puts it, the important event here taking place with language is the coordination of our being with language, which is nothing else but man and being joining forces. Thus inasmuch as man and being are here joined together, since it is here that the authentic thinking which fatefully thinks on being comes to language, language (as Logos), as the primordial, historical place in which man and being are thus joined, becomes an event of outstanding historical importance.

That is, it is language which allows man to question his own being, and it is questioning which "opens" man to the total possibilities inherent in his relation to being. It is language, therefore, which "makes it possible for Dasein to exist historically."

... language, understood rightly, is the original way in which beings are brought into the open clearing of truth, in which world and earth, mortals and gods are bidden to come to their appointed places of meeting... into the simple onefold of their intimate belonging together.
When man hears, he hears that he belongs to that which is heard. Man hears relationship. Man hears "lying-down-to-gather." Man hears meeting. And it is in speaking from out of this hearing, out of this listening and following, that man speaks authentically. "We don't speak a language, as Heidegger has said, we speak from out of (aus) it." We "let it have its say." Man's task, therefore, is to listen to the being (as logos) that is speaking and "con-form" (ent-spricht) his speaking to it. Thus, says Heidegger, "mortals speak insofar as they listen."  

Language . . . is the temple (Bezirk), i.e., the home of being. Language belongs primarily to being. It is language that speaks . . . Man speaks only inasmuch as he hears (hört), to the extent that he has heard (gehört) the command of the silent, i.e., the voice of being which is language. Man speaks only to the extent that he belongs to (gehört), coordinates himself with language. This coordination is hearing (Hören). And this becomes a successful coordination insofar as it truly belongs to this silent language of being. 

Heidegger calls the speaking which conforms itself with being Dichten or Dichtung, in English "poetizing" or "poeting."* Poeting is authentic speech for Heidegger, born of man's attunement with the

*Albert Hofstadter states in the introduction to Poetry, Language, Thought that there is no word in English for what the poet does, which in the German is dichten. Using the English word "poetize" for dichten suggests affectation, says Hofstadter, so he translates dichten as poetry, but he adds that it is well to remember the word "poetry" in its sense as a verb as "poeting." As we have the singing of songs, so too we have the poeting of thoughts. Hofstadter goes on to say: "The speech of genuine thinking is by nature poetic. It need not take the shape of verse; as Heidegger says, the opposite of the poem is not prose; pure prose is as poetic as any poetry. The voice of thought must be poetic because poetry is the saying of truth, the saying of the unconcealedness of beings."
logos, "the saying of the unconcealedness of what is." Earlier, the early Greek word thesis was unveiled as meaning "setting up in the unconcealed." Poeting, then, is the saying that does the "work" (as ergon) of thesis. Poeting, for Heidegger, sets up in the unconcealed by unveiling the being and truth of things as they are, and as such, is "the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is." Poeting reveals the intimate belonging-together of "the fourfold difference of earth, sky, mortals and gods," where all that is, from the simplest pair of peasant shoes to a blade of grass, stands unveiled as they are in their mutual relationality. In poeting, states Heidegger, "the measure is taken of all measure, i.e. the basic grasp of rightness and fitness by which beings belong to one another." Poeting "bids" all that is "set-apart" "to come to their appointed places of meeting."

Poeting, therefore, lets the things that "stay the world" come into their own. House. Tree. Chair. Water. Dog. Man. Spoon. Through authentic saying, poeting releases each thing into its "own" through the other. For it is in recognizing one as the other that things come into their "own." In meeting one's own in the other, one meets the other in one's own. Both for Heidegger and the early Greeks, it is through intimacy (the "innermost secret") that things recognize their interrelationship, their mutual lying-down-to-gather. It is language as poeting that bids the encounter of each as each.

... to exist as a human being in an authentic relationship as mortal to other mortals, to earth and sky, to the divinities present and absent, to things and plants and animals; it
means, to let each of these be--to let it presence in openness, in the full appropriateness of its nature--and to hold oneself open to its being, recognizing it and responding to it appropriately in one's own being, the way in which one oneself goes on, lives; and then, perhaps, in this ongoing life one may hear the call of the language that speaks of the being of all these beings and respond to it in a mortal language that speaks of what it hears.

 Appropriation is what is appropriate. This brings us to a discussion of Heidegger's "event of appropriation." (Referred to previously on pp. 58-59.) The word "appropriate" is an expansion of the word "proper," meaning "of one's own, to make one's own." It also denotes "that which is fitting;" what is proper is proportion. For Heidegger, the "event of appropriation" refers to man's recognizing his "own" fitting in the other. It is the event in which man acknowledges the belonging-together of all that is set-apart, thereby coming into his "own." In the "event of appropriation," to enlist Heidegger's language, the four members of the fourfold--earth, sky, gods, mortals--mirror each other, each in its own way. "Each therewith reflects itself, in its own way, into its Eigenes, its own, within the simpleness of the four."31*  

*"Das ereignende Spiegel-Spiel der Einfalt von Erde und Himmel, Gottlichen and Sterblichen, 'the ereigende mirror-play of the simple onefold of earth and sky, divinities and mortals,' " is how Heidegger portrays "world." Albert Hofstadter discusses the multiple interpretations of ereignis and its derivatives. Eigen means "own," thus in this context, ereignen is not the das Ereignis of "event, happening, occurrence," but rather means "to make one's own, to appropriate," after the fashion of eigen. Hofstadter also notes that ereignen was constructed from an earlier verb, eräugnen, meaning "to place before the eyes, to show," thus enlightening Heidegger's understanding of truth as unconcealment, or letting-show. "Thus ereignen comes to mean . . . the joint process by which the four of the fourfold are able, first, to come out into the light and clearing
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is not an
isolated substance, a being in isolation, who
accidentally, nobody knows how, establishes relationships with
other equally isolated
beings.
Rather,
being-related-toothers is constitutive of our own being.
As human beings we
are part of a community.
This community is not something
which has to be established, but it is given to man as part of
his own being.
Thus history and landscape are first of all

structures of communication.
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truth, and thus each to exist in its own truthful way, and
secondly, to exist in appropriation of and to each other, belonging
together in the round dance of their being; and what is more, this
mutual appropriation becomes the very process by which the emergence into the light and clearing (of being) occurs, for it happens
through the sublimely simple play of their mutual mirroring.
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belonging,
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happening, das Ereignis by which alone the meaning of Being can be
determined, is this play of eraugnen and ereignen it is an Eraugn^q
which is an Ereignen and an Ereignen which is an Eraugnen
Moreover, for Heidegger, it is through a recognition of relational
truth becomes "lighter" for man to
being that the "load" of being
Man recognizes that the weight of being is conjoint. Here,
carry.
Heidegger's earlier view of authenticity or ownership as man's ability
to encounter being in the face of death softens somewhat into an
"ownership" born of mirroring.
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they stand together. Community, therefore, is not something decided upon; it is something encountered and lived. The word "community" is a derivative of the word "common," meaning "together duties, gifts, privileges." Community is "that which is shared in common," and what is shared in common are the duties, privileges, and gifts of to-gather-ing. What is shared in common is the logos.

Building authentic community, therefore, involves man in dwelling within the community of being that is. And it is saying (Sage) born of this dwelling, it is poeting, that does the "work" of unconcealment, whereby the community that is is allowed to show itself as it is. It is language which lets the logos speak for itself that "accomplishes" community, for when the logos speaks, the logos speaks: "Each is each; one is everything."

Language makes the connection for us: bauen, to build, connects with buan to dwell, and with bin, bist, the words for be. Language tells us: to be a human being is to be on the earth as a mortal, to dwell, doing the 'building' that belongs to dwelling: cultivating growing things, constructing things that are built, and doing all this in the context of mortals who, living on earth and cherishing it, look to the sky and to the gods to find the measure of their dwelling. If man's being is dwelling, and if man must look to the way the world fits together to find the measure by which he can determine his dwelling life, then man must dwell poetically.

In authentic saying, then, man "opens up" for himself and for all other beings a ground-view of the belonging-together, the inherent community, that is being. For Heidegger, it is this ground-view that releases man into the manifold possibilities of authentic human existence, and thus into authentic history.

So poetry--together with the language and thinking that
belong to it and are identical with it as essential poetry--has for Heidegger an indispensable function for human life: it is the creative source of the humanness of the dwelling life of man.

Subsequently, for Heidegger, man needs to uncover the original essence of language as the "gathering essence" that constitutes being-human. This rediscovery may then unveil "the veil of contradiction" under which men become "vicious automata of self-will" as they strive to "reunite" what they themselves have falsely set apart. However, the linguistic veil of contradiction is only representative of a deeper loss: man's destroyed relation to being as truth. For when man comes to think that he can "grasp" being as idea, the nature of the relationship between man and being in which being "has" man is reversed. Simultaneously, then, there occurs a reversal in the nature of the relationship between man and language, whereby man comes to think that he must explain, order, fit, will truth and being for them to exist. But it is precisely here, in man's thinking that he is the "master" of being and language, that he becomes a "pawn" in the hands of his own language. For language, like being, always determines man, whether man recognizes the nature of this relationship or not. Therefore, man's inauthentic words, his veil of contradiction, come to determine his experience of the world. It is ordering and fitting without regard for the inherent measure-giving of being, without regard for the order and fit of setting-apart as binding-together, that leads to the object-dominated framework that now impinges on man. It is ordering and fitting without regard for
the "order" of being that leads to disorder and confusion. Disorder reflects the lost sense of proportion, propriety, appropriation, between one thing and another, i.e. between being and man. And it is from this lost sense of proportion that the mystery hides. The mystery hides from a language which measures without regard for the nature of measurement. "... we never get to know a mystery by ... analysing it; we only get to know it by carefully guarding the mystery as mystery."³⁶

This appropriating mirror-play of the simple onefold of earth and sky, divinities and mortals, we call the world. The world presences by worlding. That means: the world's worlding cannot be explained by anything else nor can it be fathomed through anything else. This impossibility does not lie in the inability of our human thinking to explain and fathom in this way. Rather, the inexplicable and unfathomable character of the world's worlding lies in this, that causes and grounds remain unsuitable for the world's worlding. As soon as human cognition here calls for an explanation, it fails to transcend the world's nature, and falls short of it. The human will to explain just does not reach to the simpleness of the simple onefold of worlding. The united four are already strangled in their essential nature when we think of them only as separate realities, which are to be grounded in and explained by one another.³⁷

The will to explain, i.e. the will of purposeful self-assertion, errs in that it takes separation as the final word regarding the essence of being as a whole.

Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate into it. It causes every merely calculating importunity upon it to turn into a destruction. This destruction may herald itself under the appearance of mastery and of progress in the form of the technical-scientific objectivation of nature, but this mastery nevertheless remains an impotence of will. The earth appears openly cleared as itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that which is by nature undisclosable, that which shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up.³⁸
The "work" of language as poeting and authentic saying, therefore, is the most difficult work of all. It requires great energy for it requires that man stand out into the mystery and paradox of being, letting earth be earth, snow be snow, sky be sky, as they exist apart yet interrelated in a mysterious whole. Here, language lets things show and not show. It does the work of unconcealment, letting things conceal and reveal at the same time, letting things show themselves as they are in their essential natures, letting things come into their "own" and speak for themselves. This is the work of _thesis_; this is the work of "setting up in the unconcealed." As Heidegger states, language "tells us about the nature of a thing, provided that we respect language's own nature."^39

But why must this setting forth of the earth happen in such a way that the work sets itself back into it? What is the earth that it attains to the unconcealed in just such a manner? A stone presses downward and manifests its heaviness. But while this heaviness exerts an opposing pressure upon us it denies us any penetration into it. If we attempt such a penetration by breaking open the rock, it still does not display in its fragments anything inward that has been disclosed. The stone has instantly withdrawn again into the same dull pressure and bulk of its fragments. If we try to lay hold of the stone's heaviness in another way, by placing the stone on a balance, we merely bring the heaviness into the form of a calculated weight. This perhaps very precise determination of the stone remains a number, but the weight's burden has escaped us. Color shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained.

Venturing forth in language, therefore, is "an act of violence," an act of power and potential, and as such, speech must be approached with care, which also means with fear and danger, for it is through
speech that man is shaping his experience of being. But, as Heidegger adds, words today have become "a masterless means of communication that may be used as one pleases, as indifferent as a means of public transport, as a street car which everyone rides in. Everyone speaks and writes away in the language, without hindrance and above all without danger." 41

What we need, therefore, is a "complete opening of the human spirit--what otherwise gets fragmented into intellect, will, heart, and senses." We need to let the world "join itself into one in manifold self-appropriations, letting us find in it a real dwelling place instead of the cold, sterile hostelry in which we presently find ourselves." 42
References


6 Heidegger, Metaphysics, p. 108.


8 Heidegger, Metaphysics, pp. 144-145.

9 Seidel, Pre-Socratics, pp. 132 & 134.

10 Ibid., pp. 132-134.


12 Seidel, Pre-Socratics, p. 131.

13 Heidegger, Metaphysics, pp. 145-146.

14 Ibid., pp. 160 & 146.

15 Ibid., p. 161.

16 Ibid., p. 145.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p. 122.

19 Ibid., p. 121.
20 Ibid., pp. 156-157.


23 Seidel, Pre-Socratics, p. 136.


25 Seidel, Pre-Socratics, p. 140.

26 Heidegger, Poetry, p. 209.

27 Seidel, Pre-Socratics, pp. 139-140.

28 Hofstadter in Heidegger, Poetry, p. x.

29 Ibid., pp. xii & xxi.

30 Ibid., p. x.

31 Ibid., p. xix.


33 Hofstadter in Heidegger, Poetry, p. xxi.

34 Ibid., p. xiv.


36 Heidegger, Existence and Being, p. 259.

37 Heidegger, Poetry, pp. 179-180.

38 Ibid., p. 47.

39 Ibid., p. 146.

40 Ibid., p. 47.

41 Heidegger, Metaphysics, p. 42.

42 Hofstadter in Heidegger, Poetry, p. xviii.
PART TWO

EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCERNS
The dead letter. The dead metaphor. It is only dead metaphors that are taken literally, that take us in (the black magic). Language is always an old testament, to be made new; rules, to be broken; dead metaphor, to be made alive; literal meaning, to be made symbolical; oldness of letter to be made new by the spirit. The creator spirit stands in the grave, in the midden heap, the dunghill of culture (as in Finnegans Wake); breaking the seal of familiarity; breaking the cake of custom; rolling the stone from the sepulcher; giving the dead metaphor new life.

In psychotherapy nothing happens but an exchange of words. New words for old; a stylistic reformation, renaissance. To be reborn, words have to pass through death, the silence of the grave. Admit the void, accept loss forever... Freedom in the use of symbolism comes from the capacity to experience loss. Wisdom is mourning; blessed are they that mourn. Mourning the absence. Symbolism conveys both absence and presence. To see three truths with the same mind: things are real, unreal, and neither real nor unreal.

To redeem words, out of the market place, out of the barking, into the silence; instead of commodities, symbols.

When silence
Blooms in the house, all the paraphernalia of our existence
Shed the twitterings of value and reappear as heraldic devices.

Verbum infans, the infant or ineffable word, is speech and silence reconciled; is symbolism. 'In a symbol there is concealment and yet revealment: hence, therefore, by silence and by speech acting together, comes a double significance.'

Get the nothingness back into words. The aim is words with nothing to them; words that point beyond themselves rather than to themselves; transparencies, empty words. Empty words, corresponding to the void in things.

To look not at the text but through it; to see between the lines; to see language as lace, black on white; or white on black, as in the sky at night, or in the space on which our dreams are traced.

Norman O. Brown
CHAPTER VII
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

As soon as information is acquired, it is very rapidly replaced by still newer information. Our electrically-configured world has forced us to move from the habit of data classification to the mode of pattern recognition.

Marshall McLuhan & Quentin Fiore

Part One explored Martin Heidegger's "rethinking" of Western man's philosophical history in an effort to unearth the possible origins of the profound disassociation afflicting modern man. In reconsidering the early Greek understanding of being, truth, thinking, and language, Heidegger unveils a world-view that has been buried for centuries in the West. It is upon this world-view, upon this phenomenological grounding, that the following epistemological discussions proceed.

In light of Heidegger's phenomenology, the central concerns of this paper are addressed: What can be said about the way man "learns to learn?" (That is, what epistemology can be advanced based on the phenomenological work of Heidegger?) What are some of the present linguistic contexts and processes which have evolved out of the Western metaphysical tradition, through which man attempts to transmit learning? How do these contexts and processes structure man's experience of himself and the world? (That is, if we say that modern man is alienated and disassociated from his surroundings, to
what extent is man's experience of himself and the world as dissociative supported and accelerated by those linguistic contexts through which he speaks and learns?) Broadly, what are some of the connections that can be drawn from the preceding discussions regarding the relationship between language and learning?

Throughout the following discussions, it is important for the reader to remember that the process of questioning contexts and processes is itself a reflection of the epistemology advanced in this study. For the "core statement" which lies at the heart of Heidegger's thinking on language is that it is man's continuing failure to reflect upon the language through which he learns to learn that prevents him from cutting through the profound disassociation of the day. That is, reflecting on the relationship between man and language, by the very nature of the process of questioning, not only can advance an alternative approach to learning, but also can transport man into questioning the nature of the relationship between being-human and being as a whole. As Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore note, the world in which modern man finds himself is a world traveling at the "high speeds of electric communication and circuity," and this development alone forces man to move in a new direction with regard to learning--"from the habit of data classification to the mode of pattern recognition." ¹ The developments of the modern world are impressing upon man more emphatically all the time that his former way of learning, based mainly upon an isolation of the "visual sense" is no longer sufficient to deal with the "active inter-
play" present not only within the world of personal communication, but now also within the world of technological communication.

The reader who has watched the emerging directions in education and psychology today can't help but be struck by the emphasis placed upon "pattern recognition," systems theory, and context formation. Questioning the frameworks that have earmarked Western thought for centuries, therefore, is by no means solely Heideggerian. Not only a recognition of, but an attempted overcoming of the traditional subject-object split has become the focal point of most modern philosophy, especially since the blatant subjectivist formulations of Descartes allowed man to view clearly the world-view he was laboring under. The "stirrings" of these attempts just now seem to be entering epistemological circles in an explicit way, especially through the efforts of men like Gregory Bateson.

However, to the extent proposed alternatives are linguistically formulated through contextual frameworks derived from the split itself--frameworks fashioned upon "the law of contradiction"--efforts to overcome the split are subsumed within the contextual frameworks which have evolved from the split, and are consequently rendered ineffective. This calls for nothing less than a review of the contexts and processes through which content and contexts alike are passed. It is here, I believe, that Heidegger's work unearths complexities which could expand considerably man's awareness of the linguistic pitfalls that accompany a "forgetting" of the nature of the relationship between man and being, and subsequently between man and language.
The beginning steps in the following exploration of epistemological concerns include: 1) a description of the term "context" as it is employed throughout this section; 2) the differentiation between "primary contexts" and "secondary contexts;" and 3) a discussion of "partial" and "impartial" expressions of being.

**Context**

The word "context" comes from the Latin word, contextus, "a joining together, connection, order, construction." (The Latin past participle is contextus, "woven together;" from contextere, "to weave together.") For the purposes of this paper, a context refers to the weaving or joining together of words in such a way as to present a linguistic structure or framework through which the world and the self are perceived and experienced. A context is simply a linguistic form through which man "learns to learn."

**Primary and Secondary Contexts**

In order to explore the epistemological concerns which Heidegger's phenomenology suggests and also in order to differentiate those contexts commonly associated with traditional Western thought from those contexts which Heidegger's rethinking of early Greek thought unearthed, I have enlisted the expressions "primary contexts" and "secondary contexts."

With respect to Heidegger's phenomenology, then, primary contexts refer to those contexts which are original--original in the
sense that they are those contexts from which secondary contexts evolved. Primary contexts, therefore, include the early Greek contexts of physis, noein, logos, alêtheia, polemos, phainesthai, harmonia, etc. in all their linguistic interconnectedness. Primary contexts attempt to express paradox, i.e. being as appearance, setting-apart as binding-together, which is to say, primary contexts attempt to express the motion of relational being.

Secondary contexts refer to those contexts which have been derived from primary contexts. Secondary contexts reflect man's reversal of the nature of the relationship between man and being, whereby man comes to think that he, rather than being, determines the essence of being. Secondary contexts are the expressions born of man when he takes himself to be "the measure of all things." As such, secondary contexts are expressions of self-contradiction. Self-contradiction gives rise to a language of contradiction and polemics, such as subject-object, real-ideal, and to a language of "logic" based on truth as the merely correct.

Partial and Impartial Expressions of Being

Partial and impartial expressions of being refer to the speech of man as it mirrors the rhythmic nature of his dwelling being, as set forth by Heidegger.

Remember here that for Heidegger man, as being-in-the-world, drifts and wanders from the mysterious whole to the particular and back again throughout his earthly existence. Man wavers between
ex-sisting and in-sisting, between will as resolve and will as purposeful self-assertion, between friendship with the gods and flight. Man faces living as dying and flees living as dying. Man, therefore, "lets-be" and doesn't let-be. A recognition of this rhythmic essence of man is important in any discussion of learning which attempts to take its "cue" from the phenomenology of Heidegger. It is Heidegger who emphasizes that the failure of epistemology and psychology to acknowledge in-sistent existence as a dynamic mode of being-in-the-world has veiled the power which resides in in-sistent existence, i.e. in illusion and error.²

Based on Heidegger's phenomenology of man, then, the "speech" of man reflects both his ex-sisting and his in-sisting. Speech reflects encounter and flight. Man, therefore, can be said to speak ex-sistently and in-sistently. For the purposes of these discussions, I will use the words "partial" and "impartial" to refer to those expressions of speech born of man's rhythmic essence.

Partial expressions of being refer to words born of in-sistent existence. As discussed in Part One, man in-sists, says Heidegger, when he mis-takes "this" and/or "that" as the entire story regarding the essence of being. Words born of in-sisting, then, reflect man's failure to acknowledge the "wholing" in "parting," and correspondingly, the "parting" in "wholing." Partial expressions, therefore, are expressions which present a partisan picture of being that obscures the "im-partial" essence of being as a whole. That is, being is whole and multiple; it is not one-sided. Being does not
"take sides." However, man can "takes sides," in that it is part of man's essence to in-sist.

In that man both in-sists and ex-sists, one imagines that language would perhaps reflect a balanced amount of "partial" and "impartial" speech. However, in Western thought, this has not been the case. Speech born of in-sistence has almost totally dominated the thinking life of Western man. Compared with the "center stage" granted "the formal-logical law of contradiction," "poeting" has been cast as a "leisure activity" and has been relegated to the "sidelines" of thought. Subsequently, Western man has "learned to learn" almost exclusively through contexts born of in-sistent existence. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger states that the presence of speech which reflects the in-sisting essence of man is not surprising, for in-sisting is one of the modes of man's being-in-the-world. What is surprising for Heidegger is that in-sistence and the language it spawns should so completely come to dominate Western thought that ex-sistence and the language of ex-sistence are totally overshadowed.

That is, words born of in-sistent existence are not to be understood here as "wrong," if by "wrong" we think of the traditional sense in which "right" and "wrong" have been employed. The word "wrong," as the etymology denotes, means "a twist," while the word "right" means "proper" in the sense of "proportion." If we take a "hint" from this etymology, "wrong" is essentially a twisted or crooked rendering of "right." To wrong is to twist proportioning, to twist the ratio or proportion of one thing to another. Therefore,
words and contexts born of in-sistent existence "blow things out of proportion" by in-sisting on any part or portion as the final word, i.e. by taking a word as only a static entity. Man "rights" and "wrongs."

An in-sistence on "this" and/or "that" as the final or complete word is merely man's attempt to flee his both essence, his essence as both flame and cinder, his simultaneous love and fear of light and darkness. Positing words as un-relative, i.e. objective, reflects man's fear and objection to the relationality and relativity of his own being. Partial or partisan speech, therefore, reflects man's fear of his own living as dying. It is an objection to movement, an unwillingness to mourn says Norman O. Brown. "Admit the void, accept loss forever. . . . Freedom in the use of symbolism comes from the capacity to experience loss."  

It is important to remember in these discussions that when we refer to speech which acknowledges "relationality or relativity," we are not referring to speech that is determined by man. Quite the contrary. Speech which acknowledges "relationality or relativity" is precisely speech which acknowledges that it is the relational essence of being as a whole that determines what-is. Relational or "impartial" speech "lets" being speak. This is an understanding far removed from a world and a language that is governed by a determining subject. It is the determining subject who thinks that the essence of being and truth is dependent on his perception, i.e. that the essence and nature of being as a whole is determined by a part, and it is
this "reversal of roles" that spawns the traditional secondary contexts of subjectivism and relativism.

Moreover, in that man wavers between partial and impartial expressions of being, it is not an easy task to question whether a word is born of ownership or flight. In day-to-day conversation, it is difficult enough trying to discern whether a person is "speaking" or merely "talking." Such discernment often requires a long relationship through which each "part-ner" comes to know the "whole" of the other, and can then more easily perhaps differentiate those essential and counterfeit words which comprise all relationships. At other times, however, a long relationship only clouds fine tuning; then only the surprise of unfamiliarity awakens sensitive discernment. "Let us be clear about this from the start: it can never be objectively determined whether anyone, whether we, really ask this question, that is whether we make the leap, or never get beyond a verbal formula."4

Therefore, whether a word is essential or counterfeit, partial or impartial, is often "untranslatable like the address."

The pure and the ordinary are both equally something said. Hence the word as word never gives any direct guarantee as to wheter it is an essential word or a counterfeit. On the contrary--an essential word often looks in its simplicity like an unessential one. And on the other hand that which is dressed up to look like the essential, is only something recited by heart or repeated. Therefore language must constantly present itself in an appearance which it itself attests, and hence endanger what is most characteristic of it, the genuine saying.

The question under discussion here, then, is not whether to employ
the word *logos* rather than the word "logic," although the two words express very different world-views, but whether words in themselves can be released from the acquired partiality which accompanies them, regardless of the name. For words, like all things which come into being, offering limits whereby presencing begins, are inherently impartial. That is, words conceal and reveal simultaneously. Words hide and show at the same time. Words acquire partial or partisan leanings when man takes the concealing aspect as the whole story regarding the essence of language.

However, as Heidegger adds, it is the concealing aspect of things that accounts for man's "being deceived." "Only because appearance itself deceives can it deceive man and lead him into illusion." That is, it is the concealing aspect of being itself which presents man with the possibility of error. Therefore, the task of man as gatherer, for Heidegger, is to continually wrest being as appearance from the mask of setting-apart which being itself presents.

This section proceeds, then, upon the twofold essence of language. Like any "thing" which gathers and assembles being into place, acquiring the limits of form whereby presencing begins, language conceals and reveals simultaneously. This essence constitutes its inherent wholeness or impartiality. When man "owns" his own essence as concealment and revealment, i.e. when man aligns himself with the essence of being as a whole, man "speaks" impartially, and being is "let-shown" as it is in all its relationality. Here,
for Heidegger, man does the "work" of "gathering" and "unconcealment." And it is through this "work" that man apprehends and learns. Man encounters being through speech which has aligned itself with the essence of being. Therefore, to the extent the essence of being is veiled through language, language cloaks the paradoxical mystery of being: setting-apart is binding-together. Here, then, language contributes to a learning that can only be called "partial."

The task of the man who attempts to work with language, therefore, is itself twofold: 1) to divest words of the acquired partialities and partisan cloakings which obscure the nature and essence of language as a "thing" that both conceals and reveals, covers and shows, so that language is able 2) to express the multiple realities of impartial and relational being, for it is this expression which lets things-that-are show themselves as they are. And when things are allowed to "assert their own selfhood, their own multiplicity of relations," to use Robert Langbaum's phrase, man encounters not only the essence of being as a whole, but also the essence of his own being in all its relationality.
References


CHAPTER VIII

ADVANCING AN ALTERNATE EPISTEMOLOGY

Whatever we see when awake is changing—which is to say, there is coalescence everywhere and at every moment between some aspects of things dying and some other aspects of things being born and rising to greater power. It is only by looking clearly and boldly into the ever-present fact of universal death—the death of what is familiar and the birth of something alien—that we can escape the net of self-delusion.

The only valid method of inquiry is to renounce one's illusions of permanence and to throw one's lot unreservedly in with the vagaries of the changing world.

Philip Wheelwright

Being expands through dividing, thus every family divides to multiply. Divisions and differentiations extend the essential possibilities within being and rescue man from one-dimensionality. The Eskimo, for example, who has twenty or more different expressions to characterize the textures of snow and ice, experiences snow in its potential variety and multiplicity.

However, the codetermining dimension of division, which is acknowledged in the primary contexts of physis and polemos, and forgotten in the secondary contexts of polemics and polarization, is that every setting-apart is at once a binding-together. Every parting is a simultaneous wholing. Physis and polemos, the primary contexts out of which polemics and polarization eventually arose, were metaphors that expressed the difference, the rift, whereby separate things not only come to be, but come to be one with each other. As
Octavio Paz states, "all of us are alone, because all of us are two." Therefore, in the same way a man and a woman come together to divide, a man and a woman divide to come together. Every "thing" simultaneously conceals and reveals.

An epistemology is implicit in this phenomenological ground. That is, man's ability to learn rests upon the twofold essence of being as that which conceals and reveals simultaneously. It is upon the twofold essence of being that the primary contexts of learning, knowing, comprehending, apprehending, and rationality lie grounded.

Proceeding upon this phenomenological ground, then, what can we say about the way man "learns to learn?" First, we can begin by stating that man learns through dividing and joining, through setting-apart and binding-together, through differences and similarities. Additionally, however, in that dividing is joining (in that being is appearance), man learns through acknowledging each as each. We can say man learns, therefore, through recognizing the sameness present in difference, and conversely, the difference present in sameness. This is simply to say that learning requires a recognition of motion. "... the moving world can only be known by what is in motion," states Heraclitus.¹

Specifically, learning requires a recognition of the motion of appropriation: how the one comes into its own through the other. For it is in recognizing the motion of each as each, the ever-present motion of relational being, that things are known as they are. Learning takes place, then, when man relates to that in which he is
ultimately and totally related, i.e. when man "stands out into" the being that he is. Therefore, it is man's encounter with being as a whole that informs his ability to learn. Learning necessitates being. ". . . we come to know reality not by merely knowing about it, but by becoming of its nature."²

Consequently, when man comes to think that he learns only through dividing or only through joining, man only learns "half the story," so to speak, or more accurately said, a part of the story, in that the "twofold" is a metaphor for multiplicity. If, in discerning difference, man does not recognize the sameness (the motion of saming) present in all difference, and likewise, if, in discerning sameness, man does not recognize the difference (the motion of differing) present in all sameness, his learning is partial and partisan rather than impartial and whole.

In partial learning, it is difficult to discern just what part of the story man does learn, or if we can truly speak of man "learning" at all. For to say that man learns only "part" of the story in acknowledging solely difference or sameness as the whole story is not to say that in acknowledging difference to the exclusion of sameness, man then learns well the essence or "part" of difference. As we just noted, difference and sameness cannot be understood rightly apart from one another. Therefore, in acknowledging either one to the exclusion of the other, man learns neither rightly.

Similarly, Heidegger has noted that man's ex-sisting essence has suffered just as deeply as his in-sisting essence at the hands of
traditional epistemology's long-standing failure to acknowledge the latter as "part" of the twofold essence of man's very being. Modern man's emerging suspicions that the man who is unable to hate is equally unable to love, and that the man who refuses to own his dying doesn't really live either, are about the closest he has come to acknowledging the inseparable relationship between being and learning.

The realization, then, is that in learning parts apart from the whole, man doesn't even learn the parts well. In essence, man doesn't learn. Man, instead, acquires fragments, which are simply parts whose relation to being-as-a-whole has been obscured. The word "fragment" comes from the Latin frangere meaning "to break." A fragment refers to "a broken piece; a part broken off." Like children, parts that do not know their closest relations become orphans. Metaphorically, fragments are orphans whose parents and relatives are unknown. As such, they offer man partial and partisan realities through veiling the part the "part" plays in the whole, and also through veiling the part the "whole" plays in the part. And once parts are unrecognized in their relationship to the whole, parts (as fragments) act to block further man's view of the interrelationship of all things.

Therefore, it is the veiling of impartial relationality with partial and partisan contexts and processes that lies at the heart of modern man's experience of being as fragmented and deathlike--as decadent. Decadence arises, notes Havelock Ellis, from processing that subor-
dinates the whole to the part, from processing that subordinates the impartial to the partial. This echoes Heidegger's characterization of the nihilistic age as a time when men "ask" after the being of things rather than the being of things. The nihilistic age is a time when man no longer recognizes the parts in relation to being as a whole.

Man's continuing failure to own and therefore to know each thing as relational is a learning disability which merely reflects and mirrors man's flight from his own relationality. Fragmented things and words simply echo man's in-sistent break with being. Unfortunately, fragments are like broken glass. Once broken, reflections are less clear, and man has an even harder time discerning that words, like glass, don't fragment by themselves. It requires the in-sistence of man.

Partial processes in languaging and learning, then, are only mirrors of man's partiality towards his own living as dying. As Heidegger notes, it is firstly man's forgotten relation to being which underscores man's misrelation to language. Man's recasting of sameness or difference as the whole story in a word or a world, therefore, is simply a shadow of man's casting of sameness or difference as the whole story in himself. Every questioning is a project, states Heidegger, and when not "owned" as a self-project, the project becomes a projection (in the psychological sense) that, in turn, obscures man's view of the interrelatedness of all things. Man's ability to learn, therefore, involves man's encounter with his own twofold essence.
Only man can own or not own himself as relation; only man, so far as we know, ex-sists and in-sists. That is, man, like all things which come into being and have form is "gathered." Man, additionally, however, is "a gatherer." Man holds hands, does jigsaw puzzles, and connects words. Man likes to see the parts fit; to see the sections, the sexes, join in being. As Heidegger says, gathering for man is "a need." This means that man not only is relation, but also that there is an "essential need" in man to "gather" or understand relation. Learning for man involves gathering, unearthing each as each, connecting one in the other, which is simply to say that learning for man means being what one in essence is: a gatherer. To say that learning necessitates being, therefore, and to say that learning requires recognizing the motion of each as each are simply alternate ways of saying that learning for man involves man owning himself as relational. Learning for man involves gathering what is permanently gathered, togetherness what is always together, relating to that in which one is ultimately related. Learning requires man's alignment with being.

Consequently, the man who owns only his sameing or differing, only his living or dying, only his wholing or parting, only his loving or hating, not only owns just part of his story, but he also only learns and knows part of history. (Already the intimate interrelationship between epistemology and psychology is apparent.) As Heidegger recognizes, language "houses" the story of man. Language forms an historical record of man's ex-sisting and in-sisting
dwelling within being. History is a record of ownership; a record of
how man has "learned to learn."

In this light, knowing is the "ability to learn." Heidegger
states:

But to know means: to be able to stand in the truth. Truth is the manifestness of the essent. To know is
accordingly the ability to stand (stehen) in the manifestness
of the essent, to endure (bestehen) it. Merely to have
information, however abundant, is not to know.

As the etymology denotes, "to learn" is "to become full, to become
unbound, to be left remaining, to become whole, to become awake."
The primary contexts of learning, knowing, comprehending, appre-
hending, therefore, acknowledge the necessity of contending with the
motion of being--a contending through which man becomes full,
unbound, whole, awake, which is to say, a contending through which
man learns.

To comprehend means "to bring together." When man com-pre-
hends, he learns that setting-apart, parting, differing, are not the
final words regarding being, but simply metaphors for the differing
motion which is at once the same motion of togetherness,
to-gathering, wholing. It is not surprising to find, then, that one of
the meanings of "to learn" is "to become unbound," for when man
learns that the boundaries between things are the "parts" through
which presencing, wholing, joining, togetherring begin, man becomes
"unbound." Heraclitus says that men comprehend when they are
"guided by what is common to all." And it is the same being-motion,
the same "inhuman will," as D. H. Lawrence calls it, that is common
to all. Men who comprehend, therefore, "bring together" that which is permanently together by letting what is together or "common to all" show itself in its commonality or togetherness. This is simply another way of saying that men comprehend by owning each as each, by becoming the gatherers they in essence are. Learning rests upon appropriation; apprehension and comprehension reside in being.

Subsequently, learning, apprehending, comprehending, rationality, and knowing, as primary contexts of epistemology, are not attributes that man possess, no more than being is an attribute that man possesses. Like being, learning and rationality are the happenings which "have" man. Man is rational, then, when he acknowledges the nature of the relationship in which being, not man, determines the essence of being. Man is rational when he encounters the determined ratio or relation of parts and portions to whole, i.e. when he encounters the order and fit of each as each. Speech born of rationality acknowledges ratio and relation as being, and as such, it is through rational or being-related speech, through essential words and impartial expressions of being, that man apprehends and learns. Learning necessitates the motion of being, no less in languaging than in living.

Lastly, the primary contexts of learning are implicit in the primary contexts of being. Epistemology proceeds from the essence of being, whether acknowledged or not. Subsequently, a change in ontological contexts brings about a change in epistemological contexts. This simply means that when man's thinking about the nature of being
alters, man's ideas (i.e. language) about the way man "learns to learn" alters as well. The secondary contexts of language and learning that are discussed in the next chapter, therefore, rest upon the secondary contexts of being which were discussed in Part One.
References


2 Ibid., p. 25.

Whenever there is a breakthrough of a significant idea in science or a significant new form in art, the new idea will destroy what a lot of people believe is essential to the survival of their intellectual and spiritual world. This is the source of guilt in genuine creative work. As Picasso remarked, 'Every act of creation is first of all an act of destruction.'

Rollo May

Picasso's statement that acts of creation are at once acts of destruction expresses the intent of this chapter. Acknowledging creating as simultaneously a destructuring signals the twofold essence of being present in every form and gesture, and in every word. Moreover, creating which does not acknowledge its inherent destructuring gives rise to structures which tend to shroud the twofold essence of being present in all things.

The German language has two words for destruction, Destruktion and Zerstörung. The former word refers to a destructuring which creates through de-structuring the rigid structures which act to conceal the concealing and revealing structure and fit of being. This is the word Heidegger chooses in speaking of his proposed destruction or de-structuring of traditional metaphysics. The latter word, Zerstörung, refers to a destruction that does not acknowledge the relationality between destruction and creation. Zerstörung conceives destruction as only an end.
With this differentiation in mind, this chapter is to be understood as an attempted de-structuring of those linguistic contexts that shroud the simultaneous concealing and revealing essence of language. Learning necessitates unlearning, for learning, like all things, is a simultaneous gain and loss. Learning is the "coincidence" of coming-to-be and passing-away. As George Bernard Shaw states, "whenever you learn something, it seems as if you've lost something."

This chapter, then, stresses the learning processes which underlie the secondary contexts of learning familiar to Western man, such as polarization, subjectivism, objectivism, idealism, relativism, rationalism, positivism, compartmentalization, specialization, standardization, categorization, etc. Much has been written in modern literature about these secondary contexts, however much of what is written treats these contexts as if they were "products" that need only be denied to be rendered impotent. Outdated metaphors are often treated like rotten apples that merely require disposal. Both denunciation and dismissal, however, only tend to feed further the illusions that 1) language is an object or product rather than an expression of relationality, and 2) man can "will" destiny (i.e. being) by merely saying "yes" and "no" to certain metaphors.

In other words, denunciation and disposal not only feed the "throw-away" or "disposal mentality" symptomatic of the times, but underlying this, they feed that which they are trying to overcome: the excess of will. They express further the dominance of will as purposeful self-assertion, will as in-sistence. In this process, then,
words not only become scapegoats for deeper and more personal issues, but the process itself exacerbates the overdeterminism that is so representative of the disassociative Zeitgeist.

Furthermore, as Jacob Bronowski states in *The Ascent of Man*, "civilization is not a collection of artefacts, it is an elaboration of processes."[1] Being is not a consumer product; it is an ongoing motion which disposes itself to man through things. Things are the figures and forms through which the motioning of being takes place.

Lastly, the reader is reminded that the order of presentation in this chapter does not mean to suggest a sequence. There is no sequential way to write what follows, for a discussion of processes is not an elaboration on that which is sequential by nature, but an elaboration on that which is "coincidental" by nature. The etymology of the word "coincidence" means "the falling together of all incidents and events." It is a word which explicitly expresses the interrelatedness and interdependence of all things. Therefore, in the following discussion, the secondary contexts of subjectivism and objectivism are to be understood as events of coincidence which simultaneously feed and starve each other, as do the secondary contexts of rationalism and irrationalism, idealism and realism, etc. For once the paradox of being is recast linguistically as contradiction, the semblance of a sequence only veils further the simultaneous multiplicity of being.
The Contradicting Process

The novel is a kind of summary and paradigm of our cultural life, which is perhaps why we speak sooner of its death than of the death of any other form of thought. It has been of all literary forms the most devoted to the celebration and investigation of the human will; and the will of our society is dying of its own excess. The religious will, the political will, the sexual will, the artistic will--each is dying of its own excess.

Lionel Trilling

The secondary contexts of learning discussed in this chapter have evolved out of a thinking that bases its questioning upon what Norman O. Brown calls "the formal-logical law of contradiction," rather than upon the early sense of *paradoxa* which characterized early Greek thought. In the transformation from being as appearance to being and appearance, the primary context of *paradoxa* which says "two things depend on each other for their very existence" gives way to the secondary context of *contradiction* which says "two things cannot be equally true." According to this new metaphysics, being is not always appearing, and appearing is not always being. It is here, in the inversion of paradox to contradiction, that *polemos* becomes polemics. For once the motion of each as each is veiled, "authentic conflict ceases, converted into mere polemics." The contradicting process, therefore, is a partial expression of the impartial relationality expressed in paradox. The dualism of polemics is a partial expression of the twofold essence of being. If learning necessitates the motion of being, the motion of
each as each, and this motion is now veiled under a linguistic shroud, then learning itself is partial.

The etymology of the word "contradiction" means "against 'to speak,' to speak against." In stating that two things cannot be equally true, contradiction speaks against "to speak." Contradiction speaks against the motion of gathering ("the speaking of the logos") through positing differing as the final word regarding the twofold essence of being. In this positing, then, the language of contradiction contextually turns being completely around: what-is is cast as what-is-not. This linguistic inversion accomplishes the epistemological problematization of being: being-as-mystery becomes being-as-problem.

The process of contradicting underlying linguistic dualism inverts the paradoxical essence of differing as saming to differing as not saming. This linguistic (and, therefore, historical) positing advances contexts and processes of differing without saming and saming without differing at all levels of being. Dualistically construed linguistic contexts multiply: realism-idealism, subject-object, appearance-reality, essence-existence, being-action, being-becoming, rational-irrational, will-passion, thought-action, and so on. The list, as we know, is endless. Once based on a process of contradicting, rather than a process of paradoxing, words no longer express the impartial "twofold," but now only a partial "two." In a word, alternatives become alternatives.

Specifically, then, it is the linguistic veiling of relational motion
through a process of contradicting (which states "two things cannot be equally true") that gives rise to the secondary contexts of difference and sameness (now as detachment and uniformity) familiar to Western man.

Subsequently, a process of differing which attempts to multiply and divide without acknowledging the inherent saming (gathering, wholing) present in all multiplication and division gives rise to contexts which express differing as the entire story regarding the twofold essence of being. This process underlies all forms of polarization, and gives rise to such common secondary contexts as categorization, specialization, compartmentalization, separatism, and individualism. Similarly, a process of saming which attempts to bring together without acknowledging the inherent differing present in all connection gives rise to such secondary contexts as uniformity, equality, standardization, centralism, universalism, conformity, and fusion. Once again, the reader is reminded that language is a mirror for an underlying process, and as such, it is not so much the words that are being rethought, but rather those processes which have spawned them. Too often, words are "framed," which is to say, too often words "take the rap" for a more powerful underworld.

Two of the processes which "frame" words and accompany the inversion of paradox to contradiction are 1) either-or processing, and 2) the "see-saw" phenomenon.

The secondary contexts of differing and saming advance differing and saming as those motions which have nothing in common.
The underlying "each as each" acknowledged in an expression of paradox is recast as "either-or" in the contradicting process.

Either-or processing asks whether a thing is subject or object, rational or irrational, real or ideal, being or appearance. Man then starts asking, for example, whether truth and being are in man (i.e. subjective) or in the world (i.e. objective).

This kind of either-or questioning represents and accelerates the detachment of man, not only from his surroundings but also from his own projective thought. That is, either-or processing contributes to hiding the interrelationship between being and apprehension, thus veiling further the damage that occurs when man tries to separate himself from his ability to learn, think, and project.

This obfuscation gives rise to such classical problems as this one: if a tree falls in the forest, and there is no being around (or, more broadly, no ear), is there a sound? Such a question can only arise in a world of detached thought, where the interdependence between man and being as a whole is forgotten. As Karsten Harries has noted, "the disengaged way of understanding is not more fundamental than one which is engaged, but derived from it." Present detachments only point to prior bonds.

All things are like the rainbow, for there is no phenomenon 'rainbow' except where there is a certain relationship of sun, moisture in the atmosphere, and observer. The rainbow is 'void' because it has no independent existence of its own. But in Chinese thought it was seen that this is true of everything, including the observer. . . . But man cuts himself off from it and loses the sense of his original body by considering himself as an 'I' which has these experiences, standing back from them just as one looks at a picture.
Primarily then, either-or processing acts to obscure the realization that the contradicting process in language simply mirrors self-contradiction: the detachment of man from his perceptions.

Self-contradiction advances the detachment of one of the senses—the visual one. Man becomes "the detached observer," "the passive spectator." "The detached observer is also the major premise of the Lockean or Cartesian mind, waxen tablet for passive impressions: 'The mistake in empiricist theories of perception has been the representation of human beings as passive observers receiving impressions from the outside.' "5

'The principal reason which Levy-Bruhl, Durkheim and others assign for the fact that primitives do not perceive with the same minds' as ours, is that in the act of perception, they are not detached, as we are.' Primitive participation, participation mystique, is self and not-self identified in the moment of experience. 'Primitive mentality' involves participation; an extrasensory link between the percipient and the perceived; a telepathy which we have disowned.

However, as Norman O. Brown adds, it is not upon participation and closeness that modern representative institutions are based, but rather upon distance, upon keeping "the multitude in remote contact with reality."

Representative institutions depend upon the distance separating the spectators from the actor on the stage; the distance which permits both identification and detachment; which makes for a participation without action; which establishes the detached observer, whose participation consists in seeing and is restricted to seeing; whose body is restricted to the eyes. Everything which is merely seen is seen through a windowpane, distantly; and purely: a pure aesthetic experience. Representative institutions depend upon the aesthetic illusion of distance.

That is, the primary contexts of saming and differing, which acknow-
ledged each as each, the participation mystique, give way to a "vicarious" experience of sameness and differing, through the secondary contexts of identification and detachment. For once man is cast as "the detached observer," cast as that animal whose ability to learn is based on distance from his own relational being, all experiencing becomes vicarious. Man becomes the voyeur. Man now learns through copying, imitating, aping what he sees, through the correspondence or agreement of "internal image and external reality." Cognition based on correspondence as agreement, rather than correspondence as "active participation," allows man to identify with what he likes, and detach or distance himself from what he doesn't like.

The distinction between self and not-self is made by the childish decision to claim all that the ego likes as 'mine,' and to repudiate all that the ego dislikes as 'not-mine.' . . . Here is the fall: the distinction between 'good' and 'bad,' between 'mine' and 'thine,' between 'me' and 'thee' (or 'it'), . . . The aim of the possessive orientation is to keep the loved object entire and intact: to separate and keep the good, to separate and expel the bad. An either/or or undialectical attitude.

The "either-or" framework, therefore, allows man "vicarious satisfaction." It allows man the secondary contexts of identification and detachment, through which man can voyeuristically take part in that which he flees: each as each. Although now, man, as Emerson states, is only "a dwarf" of his former self, and identification and detachment are merely "shrunken vestiges" of the twofold essence of being wherein sameness is difference. However, as Marshall McLuhan
notes, these "shrunken vestiges" are not meeting "the need" of man-as-gatherer, and young people now are searching out ways "for putting on the universe -- participation mystique," rather than "for ways of relating themselves to the world."^9

Either-or processing, therefore, acts to obscure the relationality of all things to one another not only by advancing differing and saming as two distinct and separate realities, but by advancing them as entities which man can will to have or will not to have. Furthermore, either-or processing veils language as man's expression of "gathering" or "letting-show" the relationality of being. Here, words are "framed" as rigid and separate. They, too, are born of distance; and they, too, become a screen of idols which allows man to experience existence vicariously.

When any favorite pair of alternatives becomes so stereotyped that all our questions (however apparently free and far-ranging they may be) are asked in terms of that particular 'either-or,' or are asked as covertly presupposing it, that is equivalent to saying that an Idol of the Theater has grown up and taken possession, usually unconscious possession, of our minds.10

"Idols of the Theater" is Francis Bacon's metaphor for the iconesque quality that language acquires through the either-or framing of words. For once words are seen through a grid of alternatives, rather than understood as an expression of alternation, they lose what Philip Wheelwright calls their "plurisignative" quality of being able to challenge the reader to experience more than one direction at a time.11 That is, either-or processing tends to obscure the active interplay of relational being by forcing man to "talk" from only one
point of view at a time. This obscures the twofold essence of language as that which conceals and reveals simultaneously, where that which is said always signals that which is "unsaid though spoken."

The veilment of the essence of language through either-or processing gives rise to discussions in which two people need to take opposing viewpoints in order to experience "both sides" of every question. For example, a man who finds himself speaking with someone of a "liberal" persuasion may experience himself inexplicably wanting to "take up" the "conservative" banner (even if he shares the other person's viewpoint). Similarly, that same man, when faced with an expression of a "conservative" view, may find himself moving towards the "liberal" end of the spectrum. While unconsciously flagging the nature of being as relational (in that the relational whole determines the "part" man takes), such "taking of sides" mirrors the daily dilemmas which arise when language is cast into "either-or" frameworks that stand at the end of man's will. Here, words are taken only literally, one-dimensionally, historiographically; multiple meaning reduced to uniform or single meaning, reduced to "conscious meaning: intentio auctoris, the author's intention."12

Literal-mindedness conceals the twofold essence of language. It conceals the symbolic essence of language as "the union and interpenetration of the universal and the particular," to borrow a phrase from Coleridge.13 And once the multiple meanings inherent in each word are obscured, the word "differ" comes to mean literally or
only difference, and the word "same" comes to mean only sameness. Man then imagines that he must speak (i.e. will) the opposite word to achieve the "participation" he craves. Life now becomes "problematic" for man is constantly trying (i.e. willing) "to go where he thinks he isn't." ... life is problematic and 'fallen' so long as it seems that there is a real choice between the opposites.14

This brings us to a discussion of the see-saw phenomenon, the expression I use to describe man's "taking of linguistic sides," his continual "standing on one foot and then another" approach to meeting his "need" for a sense of wholeness and balance.

Once the relational motion expressed in a language which acknowledges the twofold essence of words is hidden beneath a cloak of literal expressions, man is confined with rigidity. "Literalism makes a universe of stone, and men astonished, petrified." It produces words which are "stone maidens," and men bewitched from hypnotic spectatorship.15 The "see-saw phenomenon" offers a semblance of motion to men rigid with distance.

As approached in the example above, once saming as differing is filtered through an "either-or" framework, whereby "each" becomes only one, man then reasons that an overemphasis on one can only be "healed" or "wholed" by an overemphasis on the other. Man reasons not only that "wholeness" can be willed, but that movement itself is dependent upon the will of man. The "see-saw phenomenon," therefore, is merely another expression of will as purposeful self-assertion, another manifestation of the contradicting process.
Essentially, then, once the saming of differing (oppositing) is obscured, opposites are cast as those things which have nothing in common, rather than as those things which depend on each other for their very existence. This contextual framing advances a "partial" view of being as only difference, i.e. as only detached, disassociated, unrelated. In this advancement, man no longer experiences the "saming" of all that differs, and becomes overwhelmed with "bits and pieces," with fragments. Man experiences a gnawing alienation and fragmentation.

Moreover, in an effort to overcome the experience of fragmentation and disassociation, man advances a "samring" which fails to acknowledge its inherent "differing." Then man experiences being as uniform and standard, and becomes in-different, apathetic, bored. Man is overwhelmed by a sameness that is only sameness. (Interestingly, the word "apathy" is from the Greek apátheia and means "without suffering." Man becomes apathetic and in-different when he refuses to mourn, when he refuses to suffer the "differing" inherent in saming. Man becomes in-different when he refuses "to accept loss." ) In an attempt to release himself from the boredom of uniformity, from indifference, man then advances a differing that fails to acknowledge saming. The willed circle begins again.

For once differing as saming is divided and juxtaposed, not only are secondary contexts of differing and saming advanced, under the names "detachment" and "uniformity or identification," but man reasons that an overemphasis on one is corrected by willing the
other. Man reasons that detachment is "healed" through uniformity, and, similarly, that uniformity is "healed" through detachment. On the "see-saw" born of contradiction, processes of saming without differing feed processes of differing without saming, and vice versa. Partial expressions of being breed partial expressions of being.

This discussion now looks at some examples of "the see-saw phenomenon." In the first example, the secondary contexts of rationalism and irrationalism are chosen (although almost any dualistically-framed words can be inserted).

Once the words rationalism and irrationalism have been cast as two words which have nothing in common, man reasons that he reduces an overemphasis on rationalism through stressing irrationalism, and vice versa, not realizing, firstly, that irrationalism is an outgrowth of rationalism, and secondly, that rationalism, as a secondary context, refers to a reasoning that does not acknowledge the ratio or relation of "each as each." As such, the traditional sense of rationalism as reason (i.e. as a tool that man "possesses" for the attainment of information) is itself a partial expression of the impartial relationality of ratio-nality in that it does not acknowledge the "ratio" of part-ing to being as a whole. Therefore, the dualistic contexts of rationalism and irrationalism are secondary contexts born of the contradicting process. Subsequently, to emphasize irrationalism to reduce rationalism only "entangles" man more in a partial expression of being as rationalism.

Irrationalism is only the obvious weakness and failure of
rationalism and hence itself a kind of rationalism. Irrationalism is a way out of rationalism, an escape which does not lead into the open but merely entangles us more in rationalism, because it gives rise to the opinion that we can overcome rationalism by merely saying no to it, whereas this only makes its machinations the more dangerous by hiding them from view.16

The "see-saw phenomenon" is "more dangerous" because it obfuscates further that it is man's will or in-sistence, his self-contradiction, which lies at the base of dualism and contradiction in language. Therefore, willing harder to overcome the excesses of will entangles man more and more in the illusion that it is man who determines the essence and nature of being as a whole. This characterizes the constriction of will as purposeful self-assertion into its most extreme form: the will to will.

A similar example is found in modern man's efforts to undercut the chaos and confusion of the day through "narrowing down," through specialization. Caught in contradictory frameworks of thinking, man reasons that he can avoid the confusion that abounds by becoming more precise and more specific. Chaos and confusion, however, are born of man's failure to recognize the "saming" that is present in the complex and multiple aspects of being. It is in failing to recognize the "belonging-together" inherent in expansion that all things are viewed as fragmented, unrelated. Therefore, in approaching expansion as fragmentation only, man reasons, firstly, that confusion comes through expansion, and secondly, that the confusion of expansion can be reduced through "willing" the opposite of expansion: narrowing down. Man wills "narrowing down" processes
in an effort to reduce the confusion that he feels is a result of "expanding out" processes. The confusion, however, comes from a failure to see both expansion and reduction as "twofold" processes.

Ironically, then, it is secondary contexts of specificity and precision (which fail to acknowledge their inherent expansion) that give rise to the confusion man is trying to combat. That is to say, attempts to decrease confusion through the secondary context of specialization only increase confusion. Partial expressions of being feed partial expressions of being. Partial expressions of being ensnare man in partiality by failing to acknowledge the "twofold" essence of language, where expansion or multiplication is that through which simple joining and ordering occur.

Consequently, the "Catch-22" that accompanies the contradicting process is this: man accomplishes what he wills to avoid. That is, in linguistic inversion (which is an expression of man's inversion of the nature of his relationship within being), reversion takes place.

Why? Because paradox expresses the essence and nature of being, whether recognized or not. "The paradox of life is inborn and not socially determined."¹⁷ Being determines beings, says Heidegger. Being as a whole is "the measure and order" of things, and not man. Therefore, being doesn't buckle under criticism, nor negation, nor flight, which is to say, being is not dependent upon the will of man. The "inhuman will" subsumes "human will." The relational ambiguity (Latin ambigere, means "to drive both ways") of being continues regardless of man's positing to the opposite, regard-
less of man's failure to recognize the nature of his relationship to being as a whole. Paradox overrules contradiction.

Linguistic contradiction does not alter the motion of relational being, no more than self-contradiction alters man's living as dying. Therefore, for example, in man's attempt to flee living as dying, by trying "to separate and keep the good, to separate and expel the bad," man ends up facing a deathlike existence, for in his flight from one, man is in flight from both. Then, adds Norman O. Brown, "the prevailing forms of knowledge, are ruled by the instinct of aggression and division, are under the dominion of the death instinct."\(^{18}\)

The question, then, is: "How is 'the dominion of death' overcome?" Depth psychology answers by stating that man "heals" or "wholes" by facing what he flees. History answers with what is called "the homeopathic principle," \textit{similia similibus curantur}, like is cured, healed, wholed, by like.\(^{19}\) Similarly, Martin Heidegger begins his search into the nihilism of the day by asking the question of the nothing. "Only by asking the question of the nothing can nihilism be countered."\(^{20}\) And Norman O. Brown states that a revitalization of "the dead metaphor" calls for man to "get the nothingness back into words." Therefore, if it is the relational motion of living as dying that man flees, through positing "each as each" as "either-or," it is the relational motion of each as each that he must face to reduce his experience of existence as alienated, fragmented, and cold.

For, as Heidegger has pointed out, when man's projects are no longer owned as self-projects, i.e. when the motion between being
and apprehension is forgotten, man divorces himself from his perceptions. Language mirrors self-contradiction, distancing, flight. The language of contradiction then becomes a defense against encountering the motion of relational being, and therefore a defense against a speaking which acknowledges the "nothing" present in all words. Accordingly, learning becomes a defense against learning.

The external enemy is (part of) ourselves, projected; our own badness, banished. The only defense against an internal danger is to make it an external danger: then we can fight it; and are ready to fight it, since we have succeeded in deceiving ourselves into thinking it is no longer us.

Here, language becomes a scapegoat for deeper realities, for through the language of contradiction, man starts "talking of the danger/as if it were not ourselves," to borrow a phrase from the poet Adrienne Rich.

Nonetheless, man and language are in a vital, ongoing relationship in which language, like being, is "maiden and master" of man. The language man degrades, therefore, becomes the language which in turn degrades man. Language, like being, determines man's experience of being. That is, language determines learning and behavior, for language is action, and behavior stems from what is said and how it is said. Therefore, the contradicting process and the frameworks it spawns not only symbolize but also perpetuate the "split" of self-contradiction within man.

Peep: When tyranny is restored we'll call it discipline and liberty. The misfortune of one is the happiness of all. . . . Our reason will be founded on anger. And there'll be soup kitchens for all.
Crowd: Long live Mother Peep! . . .

Peep: Objectivity is subjective in the para-scientific age. They'll be stupid, that means intelligent. Cowardly, that means brave. Clear-sighted, that means blind. . . . We'll march backwards and be in the forefront of history. . . . If an ideology doesn't apply to real life, we'll say it does and it'll be perfect. . . . We'll replace the myths . . . by slogans . . . and the latest platitudes!

The Idealizing Process

We've made a great mess of love
Since we made an ideal of it.

D.H. Lawrence, "The Mess of Love"

The devolution of being as appearance to being and appearance (idea and semblance) to being or appearance constitutes a devolution of language from archetype to prototype to stereotype. In Heideggerian phenomenology, this constitutes the movement of language from logos to "logic," which, in more traditional language, is the movement of language from symbol (the coalescence of the particular and the universal) to symptom (i.e. when language mirrors the demands of the ego--an expression of what Freud called reaction-formation).

An archetype, according to its etymology, is an "original figure, primal form, organic pattern or mold." Archetypes are the primal forms and organic patterns from which copies are made and subsequent formations evolve. A prototype is, etymologically, "the first copy or type," while a stereotype is "a hard and stiff copy or type." A stereotype was originally a solid plate for printing copies.
As the expression of being moves from an expression of the archetypal, organic unity of living as dying, i.e. from an expression of paradox which acknowledges the motion of "each as each," to an expression which "captures" the "two," but forgets the motion of the "twofold," language moves from an expression of fluidity to an expression of fixation. In this sense, contradiction is a partial expression of the impartial expression of being as paradox, in the same way that dualism is a partial expression of the impartial "twofold." Contradiction and dualism are "copies" or "prototypes" of an archetypal form: coming-to-be is passing-away.

... at the biological level life and death are not in conflict, ... That is to say, they are some sort of dialectical unity, as Heraclitus said they were: 'It is the same thing in us that is alive and dead, awake and asleep, young and old: by a reversal the former are the latter and the latter are the former.' ... life and death are in some sort of unity at the organic level, that at the human level they are separated into conflicting opposites, and that at the human level the extroversion of the death instinct is the mode of resolving a conflict that does not exist at the organic level.

Man attempts to avoid his own archetypal motion of living as dying by "putting a stop to things," by positing the ever-moving as the non-moving, by speaking of the immovable fact of his own death "as if it were not ourselves," by "framing" the motion of being in static ideas. Ideas are prototypes or copies of an original organicity.

The idealizing process is man's objection to the ambiguous (i.e. to the constant "driving both ways") essence of being as a whole. In objecting to the motion of differing, man casts being as only a unity, as only saming. Being is spoken of as a "unified idea," i.e. as an
ideal, a prototype, which is also to say, as an object.

To idealize is to idolize; to make an idol; to translate into a fixed image for contemplation; to turn into monumental form; to turn into stone. To concentrate on seeing is to turn into stone; Medusa's head; castration.

That is, objecting to differing makes saming an object. Furthermore, if objecting to differing makes saming (wholing, being) an object, objecting to differing makes differing (parting, appearing) an object as well. Paradox overrules contradiction; the whole determines the essence of the parts.

This, then, is the paradox that the greater our ethical idealism, the darker is the shadow that we cast, and that ethical monotheism became, in attitude if not in theory, the world's most startling dualism.

In inversion, reversion takes place. Therefore, the idealizing process turns being into a defense against being. Idealizing being is a defense against the motion of being. In the same way that man tends to idealize "parental" relations which have passed away, man idealizes being as his distance from the relationship increases. Ironically, it is the relationship itself--the motion of saming as differing--that makes life interesting to man. Death "releases man from boredom," says Alan Watts. Therefore, as the previous discussion noted, when man flees the "differing" aspect of his "twofold" essence, he becomes in-different, apathetic. Consequently, as man's distance from "motion" increases, his "need" to idealize increases also for now man must try and "fill the space" created by a forgotten relationship. "At a certain point, human life becomes uninteresting to man. What then? They turn to some universal."
In that the idealizing process is man's objection to differing, this process reflects a "willed saming" which tends to advance uniformity and standardization: saming that overlooks its inherent differing. In objecting to the order and ratio of "each as each," man sets up a "willed" order of being which, in turn, veils "the order of being." Man, then, wills the unity and order he no longer experiences.

... 'the desire and pursuit of the whole' remains and is, as a matter of fact, all the stronger in mythological traditions which veil the ultimate identity of the many and the One. "The pursuit of the whole," however is a "makeshift" unity when it joins without regard for the differing aspect of all gathering. Then, "willed saming" embraces only the general, and shuns the particular. This "saming" forgets its reliance upon the particular. The poet Holderlin calls the "willed unity" which breeds generalizations "the root of all evil."

In reaction to this, of course, there is the "see-saw" of "willed differing," Zerstörung, "intentional disorder," to borrow e. e. cummings' phrase. There is the willed subtraction of today's "punk rock," and the willed illogic of Ionesco's non sequiturs: "'One walks on his feet, but one heats with electricity or coal'; 'He who sells an ox today will have an egg tomorrow.'"

L.: The cat has four paws. Isidore and Fricot both have four paws. Therefore Isidore and Fricot are cats.
G.: My dog has four paws.
L.: Then it's a cat.
G.: ... Logic is a very beautiful thing.

While mirroring the extent to which language has degenerated from
Logos to logic through an excess of will, willed illogic is in danger of committing the very error it is combating if the "willed differing" it advances does not acknowledge its inherent saming. Then, as Joyce Carol Oates says of the Pataphysical Movement, willed differing "sees only the particular, never the general. . . ."³¹

In the play The Lesson, Eugene Ionesco has his professor say: "One must be able to subtract too. It's not enough to integrate, you must also disintegrate. That's the way life is. That's philosophy. That's science. That's progress, civilization."³² Here, the professor is reacting to Western man's long-standing tradition of idealization, i.e. to Western civilization's tradition of "only adding." It is a response to a tradition that fails to acknowledge the "place" of subtraction in all addition. However, emphasizing subtraction to reduce an overemphasis on addition not only typifies the "see-saw" approach to "balance," but also contributes to the problem if the expression of subtraction is not acknowledged as simultaneously an expression of addition. When placed within the "mold" of contradiction, expressions of addition and subtraction, of difference and sameness, only hide the "adding as subtracting" twofold essence of being as a whole.

That is, ideals and ideologies of both adding and subtracting, differing and saming, promote a stasis and rigidity that cloaks the relational motion of being. It is here that "fixing in place" as the forming, limiting, bounding, through which motioning, relating, presencing begin becomes a secondary or partial "fixing in place"
through which motioning and relating end. It is here that parts are seen as fragments, things are seen as objects, figures are seen as frames, and relations are seen as facts. Then, as Rollo May says, our creations become only protections against being, rather than extensions that simultaneously protect being.

... the danger always exists that our technology will serve as a buffer between us and nature, a block between us and the deeper dimensions of our own experience. Tools and techniques ought to be an extension of consciousness, but they can just as easily be a protection from consciousness. Then tools become defense mechanisms--specifically against the wider and more complex dimensions of consciousness that we call the unconscious. Our mechanisms and technology then make us 'uncertain in the impulses of the spirit,' as the physicist Heisenberg puts it.

William Barrett adds:

... wholesale rejection of technology is only the other side of the coin of that blind worship that regards technology as a cure for all human ills. The really troubling thing is that technology is a human product and like everything human wears the Janus face of good-and-bad at once, which makes the task of discrimination all the more tedious and difficult but all the more necessary.

The danger present in technology, of course, is the same danger that plagues language, and consequently learning: the ability to discern the ambiguous or "twofold" essence of every thing.

When language becomes seen as only a protective tool, as only an object, learning becomes defined as "the acquisition of static ideas" through the language of reason. This process is called "the attainment of knowledge." It is not surprising, then, that knowledge and learning become equated with "the non-moving," rather than with motion. This is consistent with the inversion that accompanies the
distance and self-removal expressed in the transmutation of paradox to contradiction, whereby what-is becomes advanced as what-is-not. Therefore, unlike the pre-Socratic epistemologies which acknowledge motion as the crux of learning (e.g. Heraclitus states: "the moving world can only be known by what is in motion"), the post-Platonic epistemologies base knowledge on staticity and distance. The inversion in the way man "learns to learn," then, takes this form: the primary contexts of learning which state that man learns through "standing out into the truth of being--'contending with the essent'," become secondary contexts of learning which state that man "learns to learn" by "standing back from" being and truth. In the former, learning, being, truth, and man cannot be divorced from one another, while in the latter, learning, being, truth, and man insist on detachment and distance.

Knowledge becomes of a thing, where the 'of' is emphasized to suggest the detachment, the lack of engagement. This conceals the intimate relationship between understanding and what is understood. The discovered is separated from the act of discovery.

Now, knowledge depends on the disassociation of differing from sameing, rather than upon the association of differing as sameing. "...the result in our day is that science gets identified with methods of isolating factors and observing them from an allegedly detached base—a particular method which arose out of the split between subject and object..." Recently, however, even Rorschach tests are beginning to show that people observe things more accurately when they are related, involved, engaged.
fore, the ironic reversion which occurs in an inversion within learning is this: in removing himself from the motion of being in order to learn more, man only learns less. For the "detachment factor" representative of secondary contexts of learning is simply a mirror of man's progressive detachment from himself as learning, which is to say, from himself as a relational being whose differing is at once a saming. "To think is the same as the thought that it is," states Parmenides, as he attempts to express the inseparable relationship between being, man, and learning.

It is important for the reader to understand that this discussion does not negate a process of learning that proceeds from particulars. On the contrary. This discussion is an attempt to review what happens when man perceives learning as that which is only particulars, only isolated factors, only difference, and also when man perceives learning as that which is only generalities, only ideas, only saming. As Heraclitus states, man learns through "comprehending" one as the other, through recognizing setting-apart as binding-together. Man learns through acknowledging language as symbolic--as the place where the particular and the universal coalesce.

Truth comes riding on a donkey; ... finding revelations in little contemptible events; infinity in a grain of sand. ... Regal tragedies (the Oedipus complex) in every household. ... 'Everything is a symbol, and while it perfectly presents itself, it points to everything else.' ... The many are made one when the totality is in every part. When one thing is taken up, all things are taken up with it; one flower is the spring. It is all there all the time.

Similarly, Heraclitus says both of the following: "Men who love
wisdom should acquaint themselves with a great many particulars." (Fragment 3) and "Men should speak with rational awareness and thereby hold on strongly to that which is shared in common..." (Fragment 81). Likewise, Fragment 83 states: "Law (logos) involves obeying the counsel of one." \(^{39}\) Heraclitus speaks to a learning that acknowledges the multiple aspects and particulars as the one "inhuman will."

It is the idealizing process, therefore, that not only makes being (saming) an ideal, but makes non-being (differing) an ideal as well. In a process of detachment and self-removal, both aspects of the twofold become idealized, i.e. objectified. Objecting to either one makes each, i.e. both, into objects. Therefore, if it is the idealizing process that accomplishes the objectification of being, it is subjectivism (self-removal) which underlies idealism and objectivism.

Before discussing subjectivism, however, this section looks briefly at the valuing process which follows on the "back" of the idealizing process. The valuing process is man's attempt to restore meaning to the meaninglessness he experiences in the fragmentation that accompanies objectivism.

As we have just noted, idealism recasts relations as ideas, moving parts as only stationary objects. In idealism, relations are seen as facts. However, facts and fragments do not answer man's "need" for meaning, motion, relationality. Meaning, for Heidegger, is grounded in relational motion. Meaning is grounded, and therefore discovered, in the motion of each as each. Once relational motion is
veiled, then, meaning itself is veiled, and man comes to experience himself and the world as meaningless, motionless, fragmented. In an effort to answer his inborn need for motion and meaning, while alleviating the experience of meaninglessness, man starts placing "values" on the objects, fragments, and facts which confront him as without meaning.

The demand for values is a demand that there be something without man which can answer his needs, including the need to live and the need to understand. A world of facts cannot assure these demands. It is not related to man and his needs. The refusal of the world to heed man's needs constitutes its absurdity. To defeat this absurdity the metaphysician resorts to value. He remedies the lack he discovers in the world of facts by 'pasting value labels' on these facts.  

The valuing process, therefore, is an attempt to "will" meaning upon the fragments and facts that confront man as meaningless. Consequently, the valuing process, in addition to disguising the underlying abscess of meaninglessness with a mask of painted meaning, fuels further man's view of himself as a determining subject who can "assign" or "will" the essence and nature of being. As Karsten Harries notes, value theory does not question the subject-object dualism upon which it is based, and by failing to do so, is doomed not only to repeat but also to perpetuate the errors it is trying to correct.  

By positing certain objects and facts as "valid" or "valuable," man advances the illusion that meaning and truth can be assigned by man, i.e. that meaning and truth are both arbitrary and subjective. The valuing process, therefore, veils further that it is man's attempt to determine the meaning of being (the idealizing pro-
cess) which leads to the experience of meaningless he is attempting to overcome. As such, the valuing process is merely "rubbing salt" in the nihilistic wound. In speaking to Heidegger's view of value, Karsten Harries elaborates:

Indeed, in substituting a discussion of values for a discussion of meaning it (traditional metaphysics) will conceal what really matters, for man's existence can become meaningful only where he discovers the meaning of the things around him and the meaning of Being. But all understanding of meaning presupposes a willingness to listen to the claims of the things around us, a willingness to let Being be what it is. The discovery of meaning presupposes a will to the truth. Value theory lacks this will. In giving something a value we refuse to let it be what it is, but subject it to conditions which we have posited. 'All evaluation, even where it is positive, subjectivizes.' "It has to be recognized that precisely in marking something a 'value' we rob the thing evaluated of its dignity. This means: in esteeming something as a value, the evaluated is admitted only as an object for the estimation of man.' Just as certainty implies a loss of truth, so value implies a loss of meaning... Hoping to conquer nihilism, value theory only succeeds in intensifying its reign.42

There is an inherent devaluation in stating, for example, that man is valuable. Like the idealizing process, then, the valuing process is a further defense against being "by not permitting things to be the standard for what is real."43 Consequently, the valuing process cloaks further the underlying subjectivism that is the root of the objectivism which valuing attempts to alleviate. Essentially, therefore, the valuing process "values" fragmentation.*

Subjectivism

Did you hear about those pigeons who found they could alter the behavior of lab technicians just by refusing corn pellets?

Lily Tomlin

In positing being as "idea," or as "valuable," the question immediately arises: "Whose idea of being?" And to that question, man can only answer with "man."

That is, if idealization accomplishes the objectification of being, and the idealizing process arises through man's objection to his own living as dying, then it is the self-removal of the objecting or willing subject that accomplishes both idealization and objectification. In self-removal or self-contradiction, man posits himself as the detached and "determining subject" who wills objective "ideas" of being, which of course includes an objective "idea" of man as the "determining subject." Consequently, it is subjectivism which accomplishes the objectivism of all things, including man himself.

If death gives life individuality and if man is the organism which represses death, then man is the organism which represses his own individuality. In an attempt to flee his own motion of differing as saming, through positing being as the "non-moving" (i.e. an idea, an object), man accomplishes the negation or "stationing" of his own being. Man accomplishes his own objectification. Once objectified, adds Karsten Harries, "beings are drowned in the immanence of subjectivity." Man is "drowned" in his own will, his own in-sistence, his own self-
removal. Then, as Freud has pointed out, the history of man becomes a history of repression.

It is not surprising that subjectivism accomplishes the objectivism of everything, including man. This is the reversion that takes place in inversion: what-is is set forth as what-is-not, and man accomplishes what he sets out to avoid. In this instance, the ironic reversal brought about by subjectivism is that, on the surface, subjectivism seems to elevate the individual through "casting" man as a "determining" and "detached" subject who controls, measures, and orders being, while in essence subjectivism initiates a process that belittles the individual by making him a detached and unrelated object which, like all other things, now stands at the end of man's own will.

Let's look at this process a little more closely. In subjectivism, man attempts to flee his own relationality, his own "being-determined" or temporality, by positing himself as un-related and re-moved from the motion of the "objective" or determed world--specifically through assigning himself the role of determiner. This "self-assignment" is what Heraclitus calls "the world of private intelligence," and what Heidegger calls "opinionatedness" or "insistence." It is the beginning of man's "hardening into selfhood," to use Philip Wheelwright's phrase. It is the beginning of man's "measuring" without regard for the inherent measure and order of being.

In subjectivism, the impartial "selfhood" or "will" of gathering gives way to the partial "selfhood" or "will" of ordering. Subjectivism, essentially, constitutes an "inversion" of the will. Turning to
the thought of Freud for a moment, the "will" of subjectivism can be unmasked as none other than "the instinct of aggression"--the aggressive will--which is "the result of an extroversion of the death instinct, the desire to die being transformed into the desire to kill, destroy, or dominate." In a more poetic tone, the German poet Rainer Maria Rilke says "killing merely is one form of our wandering sadness." So, too, Norman O. Brown speaks of man's ability to accept loss, the ability to "mourn" one's own living as dying, as the very cornerstone of language as the symbolic. Otherwise, language becomes rigid and literal from "housing" a death denied.

The flight from death, however, is what distinguishes man from the animals. Insistence, therefore, is the purely "human" choice. It not only forms the heart of religion, but the heart of culture and civilization itself. "History is what man does with death," says Hegel. Consequently, for Hegel, "history as class struggle (the dialectic of Master and Slave, in Hegel's terminology) is based on an extroversion of death," and therefore labor or human work is "a transformation of the negativity or nothingness of death into the extroverted action of negating or changing nature." For at the heart of the insistent will of subjectivism lies man's attempt to "change" nature before nature "changes" him. Intentionally, perhaps, the extroverted will "wills death" (i.e. man tries to control the "nature" of his demise) before the "will" of death--"the inhuman will"--determines him. Not surprisingly, then, man's flight from death has created both the most frantic (due to polarization) and the
most nihilistic culture man has ever known.

The simultaneous combination of frenzy and apathy is decadence--the creative extremism that results when the essence of being is portrayed as contradictory (i.e. determined by man) rather than as paradoxical (i.e. determined by being). Decadence (from the Latin *decadere*, "to fall down, to fall apart") mirrors the reversion that takes place in subjective inversion. In decadent times, man is owned by what he fails to own. The death man flees becomes "the state of decay," the deathlike existence, the nihilism, that man ends up facing. Likewise, in that man's flight from death constitutes a flight from life as well, the flight from life becomes the frantic frenzy of constant motion that characterizes the "modern man." This combination of frenzy and nihilism deals man a "death" more frightening than the one he had hoped to postpone. The image that comes to mind is the proverbial one of two men backing around the same tree in order to avoid one another: both men back into that which they are avoiding. Paradox subsumes contradiction. Being determines beings, regardless of the subjectivist inversion which states that beings determine being. (To say that "being determines beings" does not, for Heidegger, nullify free choice but rather constitutes free choice, for only when man understands limitation, determinism, boundary as that through which possibilities begin does man truly choose.)

It is subjectivism or "insistent existence" which acts to obscure the nature of the relationship between man and being as one in which
"being determines beings while remaining something indeterminate," to recall Heidegger's attempt to express the paradoxical essence of being. It is subjectivism, therefore, which restricts choice and possibility, for it is through subjectivism that being as a whole becomes cast as simply another "part," another "thing among things." Once man thinks that he determines the essence of being, everything (and that, of course, includes man himself) becomes an object: a-part whose relationality or togetherness within being as a whole is obscured. It is subjectivism, then, which underlies idealism and objectivism. It is subjectivism, states Heidegger, which accomplishes the historical "forgetting of being"—whose very forgetting culminates in the nihilism of the day.

Furthermore, when man sees himself as only "determiner," rather than as "being-determined" (where man's possibilities arise from temporality or "boundedness"), not only is the essence of the relationship between man and being obscured and inverted, but it is this obfuscation which constitutes an inversion in the relationship between man and language. This obfuscation gives rise to contextual processes which subordinate the whole to the part. Self-contradiction gives rise to processes of linguistic contradiction that present words as mutually exclusive entities. Words become dominated by "the death instinct," by the will to separate and divide, and language becomes subordinate to the will of man. Here, language is "taken" literally, rather than symbolically; historiographically, rather than as an expression of concealment as revealment. And once language is taken
only literally, words become diabolic. The symbolic (from the Greek \( \sigmaυμβλείν \) ("to throw together, to bring together, compare") gives way to the diabolic (from the Greek \( \deltaιαβάλλειν \) ("to throw against, to pull apart, to slander")). Words, like all things (e.g. technology), become diabolic when their motion of concealing as revealing, differing as saming, is set forth as only one or the other. Words become diabolic when they are seen as only limits or as only extensions.

Subsequently, the linguistic contexts born of man's attempt to flee his determined "differing as saming" relationality--his own "twofold" essence--comprise those secondary or partial contexts of detachment and identification which, in turn, "determine" man. As man flees from motion to fixation by positing himself as a detached and determining subject, language devolves from the fluid to the static, from the symbolic to the literal, from archetype to prototype. Yet, it is upon the secondary contexts of language--language as "the literal"--that man's attempt to learn takes place.

However, once language is taken only literally, the primary context of man-as-gatherer becomes the secondary context of man-as-orderer.

That is, once the order, ratio, and proportion of man to being is obscured, man not only no longer "comprehends" the order and essence of his own being, but man no longer comprehends the order of being as a whole. Man, then, increasingly measures without regard for "the nature of measurement." Karsten Harries states:
"Man's affirmation of himself is only partial; indeed it cannot be more than partial until the meaning of his own being is transparent to him. Lacking the whole, man is essentially *heil-los* (without whole)." Now, for man, not only his own being, but the world as a whole seems un-related and *dis-orderly*. Complexity is seen as merely confusion and chaos.

In an effort to combat this experience of the world as chaotic and disorderly, man sets out to "assign order" to the disorder, not realizing that the chaos and disorder he attempts to address have arisen precisely through his initial "ordering" without regard for the order of things, through his "taking himself to be the measure of all things." Ordering and categorizing is man's attempt to correct "the errors of the will," to use Lionel Trilling's phrase, with the will. However, as long as "the will" man employs does not "will" in relation to being's will, man only succeeds in "drowning" in the excesses of his own subjectivity. What is required of man, then, is neither "more" willing nor "less" willing, but rather a "different" willing--a willing which aligns itself with "the inhuman will."

According to Heidegger, gathering for man is "a need." Man's attempt to "order" the world, then, is a partial expression of his innate gathering essence. Such ordering, however, remains a partial expression of impartial gathering as long as man assumes that he can order without regard for the order of being as a whole, i.e. that man can will without regard for being's "inhuman will." Order, like paradox, or rather the order that is best expressed as paradox, is
not "socially determined," to re-enlist Joyce Carol Oates' phrase. Similarly, Freud says that "truth cannot be tolerant," and, indeed, truth is not tolerant to the intolerance of man for ambiguity and paradox. That is, truth, as being, does not "break down" through man's flight from its ambiguous ("driving both ways") essence. In flight, truth may remain shrouded, but it does not dissolve. This is why Heidegger says that the order of truth rests in being, in unconcealment, and therefore cannot be assigned nor removed from the being of things by man.

Man for centuries has "named the gods" in an effort to control them. There is no doubt that such naming provides "personal relief," for words, by their very "twofold" nature, conceal as well as reveal. They shield as well as show. Speaking, therefore, is a protection as well as an exposure.

However, if in expressing his fear or friendship with the wind, man thereby comes to think that he controls and determines the wind, man has deceived himself as to the nature of the relationship. The winds and the gods come and go and blow as they will. They cannot be summoned at will, nor pushed away. They can, however, be recognized and not recognized as the determining forces they are.

If, then, in naming, man comes to think that he has more control than words inherently provide, his words become static gods which, in turn, come to control man. Man, then, is not only controlled by wind and rain, but by his own overcontrolling linguistic creations. Not surprisingly, Western man's attempts to categorize,
control, and determine the essence of things through "literal" language has created an elaborate system of external controls which have acted to render man powerless and out of control. For when man thinks that he was meant to be "in control," man starts to fear "losing control," and in this fear, man increases his own controlling devices--devices which frequently render him powerless and out of control. This is simply another one of the countless contextual "see-saws" which accompany self-contradiction. Not surprisingly, the ironic reversal which takes place in this particular inversion is that, at no time in history, has man seemed so paradoxically "in control" and "out of control" at the same time. In this light, modern man's heated denial of behavioristic tenets is perhaps only a reaction to his own suspected and feared determinism.

One of the more pervasive "see-saws" accompanying the subjective inversion of the relationship between man and being, however, is the one that arises from man's failure to recognize subjectivism as the root of objectivism, to acknowledge self-contradiction as the heart of linguistic contradiction, i.e. to question the ground of his own figural projects.

Consequently, Western man attempts to combat the depersonalization and dehumanization that he experiences in his object-dominated existence by readdressing the individual--by restressing the subject. Once again, reasoning within the context of contradiction, man thinks that an overemphasis on the objective is reduced through an overemphasis on the subjective. For in a society rampart with objectifica-
tion and depersonalization, man seeks constant reassurance that he is not also a mere object, which is to say, man seeks to be reassured that he is still human. It is precisely this search for validation, however, that can lead (and in the Western historical tradition, most often has led) to further subjectivism, only under new names and titles, such as individualism, romanticism, identification, relativism, and humanism.

Emphasizing "the human" in an attempt to combat a "dehumanized" world, however, only continues the story of "I" against "non-I," the story of hot man pitted against cold world. This emphasis merely perpetuates self-contradiction by projecting the coldness which accompanies man's subjective removal of himself from relational being onto the external world. Once again, the world becomes the "scapegoat" which allows man to continue talking of the danger "as if it were not himself."

Yet we see that it is the same metaphysics--the same automatic assumption that there is an 'average' reality somewhere distinct from us, either superior (and therefore terrifying) or inferior (and therefore saved from 'rot' and 'stink' only by our godly subjective blessing). This is still the old romantic bias, the opposition between self and object, 'I' and non-'I,' man and nature.

And, as Joyce Carol Oates further notes: "... one must never ask 'Who manufactured these things? who brought them home? who arranged them?'" For such questions might just reveal that it is man who deemed related things "unrelated;" that it is man who linguistically removed himself from the "objective motion" of being by labeling himself "a determining subject." This realization, however,
would not only destroy countless romantic illusions, but, in so doing, it would bring man face to face with this awareness: it is not the world which is the nemesis of man, but man's own conception of the world. As Freud attempted to demonstrate, represson on the inside becomes exclusion on the outside.

It is when the nature of this relationship between man and being, and therefore between man and his own linguistic projections, is forgotten that technology, for example, becomes a scapegoat for man's undaunted objection to his own limitation. That is, when man fails to see his own limitation as that through which "the unlimited" occurs, man subsequently fails to acknowledge the "twofoldedness" of technology. It is here that man, by taking separation as the final word, becomes "a victim of the Event," to use Philip Wheelwright's phrase, and as victim, loses his sense of the unlimitedness and power inherent in limitation. It is here also that technology (and all other things) become recipients of a very human anger--an anger they were never meant to hold. Under the weight of this anger, things crack and harden, wither and die.

Therefore, modern forms of subjectivism, starting with the Renaissance man (in itself an outgrowth of man's attempt to "reset" the imbalance of a "God-centered universe"), which characterize the struggle as man vs. world, the relative vs. the objective, the human vs. the dehuman, veil further that the precursor of objectivism and dehumanization is man-as-subject. Modern forms of subjectivism succeed in hiding the underlying "constriction of will" from view by
advancing the illusion that man combats objectivism through "doing" the opposite. Man combats the errors that arise from "an excess of will" by further in-sistence. These efforts, says Heidegger, characterize the constriction of the primal will into its most extreme form: the will to will.

It is here that "the human" itself becomes an object. That is, in what some people call "the final stages" of nihilism, man turns his negation on himself. Nothing is untouched by in-sistence. The motions within the spirit of man--those human motions that we have come to call love, sorrow, joy, despair--become demands. As Heidegger states, the spirit itself becomes "a holiday ornament" that is packaged and sold in man's desperate attempt to reassure himself that the spirit is not dead. Here, joy and love become objects of will as in-sistence, as do sorrow and hate. However, when joy and sorrow become commands, man-as-victim merely continues to be a "passive witness"--this time to his own emotions. Man "successfully dehumanizes himself," says Joyce Carol Oates. It is here that the modern forms of subjectivism--humanism, individualism, relativism, identification--humanize dehumanization.

It is here also that the primary context of change as alternation and metamorphosis--coming-to-be as passing-away--gives way to the secondary context of change as alteration and improvement. As both Nietzsche and Freud explored, altruism and morality--whether directed towards the world (social change) or towards the self (personal growth)--are often expressions of repressed hostility and re-
sentiment. Under the "mask of social or personal betterment," change as alteration often punishes and negates others and oneself through the imposition of countless limits and demands--through the creation of countless goals. (The word "goal" comes from the Middle English gōl ["a limit, a barrier"], and also gāelen ["to impede, to delay"].) Once limitation as potentiation is forgotten, projects become projections or goals, which is to say, additional limits. Then, so to speak, being stands ahead of being, and man uses both activism and mysticism to starve off relationality. Here, change as alteration is that which takes place in lieu of change as metamorphosis, i.e. being, for change as alteration usually bases itself upon man-as-subject--whether this be the "subject" of "transcendence," or the "subject" of "social change." In this light, America's consuming altruism has often been attributed to the early Puritan repression of a young and emergent nation. Perhaps, in part, this accounts for the present premium placed on "alteration"--be it alteration of the self or of the other.

If the novel is "a kind of summary and paradigm of our cultural life," as Lionel Trilling says, then poetry should be an indicator as well. Regarding the direction modern poetry has taken, Joyce Carol Oates, in an essay on Sylvia Plath entitled "The Death Throes of Romanticism," states:

Most modern poetry is scornful, cynical, contemptuous of its subject (whether self or others), bitter or amused or coldly detached. It shrinks from the activity of making the world sacred because it can approach the world only through the self-as-subject; and the prospect of glorifying oneself is an
impossible one. Therefore, the ironic mode. . . . Most lyric poets explore themselves endlessly, like patients involved in a permanent psychoanalysis, reporting back for each session determined to discover, to drag out of hiding, the essential problem of their personalities—when perhaps there is no problem in their personalities at all, except this insane preoccupation with the self and its moods and doubts, while much of the human universe struggles simply for survival. If the lyric poet believes—as most people do—that the 'I' he inhabits is not integrated with the entire stream of life, let alone with other human beings, he is doomed to a solipsistic and ironic and self-pitying act, in which metaphors for his own narcissistic predicament are snatched from newspaper headlines concerning real atrocities.

Consequently, in the same way that rationalism cannot be overcome by stressing irrationalism because the secondary context of irrationalism is only an outgrowth of the secondary context of rationalism (as one-dimensional), so, too, the secondary context of objectivism cannot be overcome by stressing the secondary context of subjectivism. What is required is understanding that the secondary context of subjectivism (man as "the measure of all things," man as the romantic individual—collar to the wind, back to the world) is a partial expression of impartial selfhood.

The impartial expression of selfhood rests in appropriation: a recognition of how one comes into its own through the other. This is the selfhood that arises when the "human" will aligns itself with "the inhuman will." "... what is interesting in the laugh of the woman," says D. H. Lawrence, "is the same as the binding of the molecules of steel or their action in heat; it is the inhuman will ... that fascinates me." Robert Langbaum elaborates:

The 'logic' of a character's actions, his unity or identity, is not to be found within the ego, in rational or moral consis-
tency, but in the force, the 'inhuman will,' that flows through him and all matter. The unity is in the external field of energized matter to which the character belongs.\textsuperscript{56}

Man needs to turn from the "internalized individuality" of the locked-in ego to some sort of "archetypal identity" if he is to regain "a vibrant individuality open to connection with other people and the universe."\textsuperscript{57}

When the epic promise of 'One's-self I sing' is mistaken as the singing of a separate self, and not the universal self, the results can only be tragic.\textsuperscript{58}

What results is the tragic nihilism of the day, for when man fails "to touch life," he is prey, as Peter Marin states, "to both a feeling of deadness and the dream of salvation."\textsuperscript{59} Man is prey to both detachment and identification, indifference and equality, separatism and centralism, relativism and objectivism, which is to say, to partial expressions of the impartial relationality of differing as sameing.

No one expresses the Zeitgeist of the times more accurately than a Madrid executive speaking about Spain's centuries-old struggle between centralism and separatism:

'We have some virtues and some big faults. We are very idealistic, and so we tend to go to extremes. But we also are very individualistic--we all want to be first, and when we can't be, we criticize fiercely. 'We are loyal to family and friends. We have orgullo.' That means pride, also stubbornness, sometimes arrogance. 'And we are very hard with our enemies. Dialogue is difficult.'
References


6. Ibid., p. 121.

7. Ibid., pp. 119-120.

8. Ibid., pp. 142-145.


11. Ibid., p. 78.


30. Ibid., p. 198.


32. Ibid., p. 195.


39 Wheelwright, Heraclitus, pp. 19 & 83.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p. 182.
44 Brown, Life Against Death, p. 105.
46 Brown, Life Against Death, p. 102.
48 Brown, Life Against Death, pp. 100-102.
51 Ibid., pp. 120-121.
52 Heidegger, Metaphysics, p. 40.
53 May, Existence, p. 32.
54 Oates, New Heaven, pp. 126-127.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 815.
58 Oates, New Heaven, p. 131.
CHAPTER X

IMPLICATIONS AND SUMMARY

We have taken from the defeated
What they had to leave us—a symbol:
A symbol perfected in death.

T. S. Eliot, "Little Gidding"

The interrelationships between language, behavior, and learning are "going public" more and more all the time. It seems years now since the early voices of Sapir and Whorf said that language not only reports and communicates experience, but that language in different cultures "defines" experience; years since Stanislavski said "language is action;" years since Alfred Korzybski searched for alternate ways of expressing existence other than the Aristotelian language orientations of subject-predicate and either-or.

Today, in both personal and political realms, voices are joining together in a mutual recognition of the inseparability between learning and language.

As far back as 1967, Rollo May stated: "neuroses are functional in root, due, that is, to forms of behavior and mental attitudes rather than organic disorder."¹ More recently, Gregory Bateson's work with "the double-bind hypothesis" in family communication patterning has shown that "the pairing of mutually contradictory messages" can lead a member of the family to psychosis.²
John Weakland's work with communication theory and clinical change demonstrates that in responding to a patient's words as metaphorical rather than as literal, the patient speaks more clearly.

... if we responded to patients' statements as metaphorical--instead of the common response of taking them literally, and trying to get the patient to acknowledge their illogic or unreality, a covert form of arguing with the patient--they then spoke more plainly. Different communication led to different communication. Somewhere along the line we began to see, perhaps aided by our prior insight that report and command are matters of analytic distinction rather than separate kinds of messages, that communication and behavior are not separate and different, but essentially the same thing viewed from different perspectives.

Turning our attention to the "political" arena--to the broader collective "family," we find that both Paulo Freire and Ivan Illich speak to the "impaired learning" which comes from an individual's ingestion of societal contradictions.

Paulo Freire, in his popular book Pedagogy of the Oppressed, outlines the dilemma of "the oppressed" as one that begins with the oppressed's recognition of his own internalized contradictions of oppressor/oppressed, teacher/student, etc. which have come about through his identification with the oppressor. Conscientizacao, Freire's term for "learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions," begins with the oppressed's awareness of himself as a dual, divided, contradictory person.

Similarly, Ivan Illich, in his book Deschooling Society, speaks of schooling as "the institutionalization of society's contradictions."

The school system today performs the threefold function common to powerful churches throughout history. It is simultaneously the repository of society's myth, the institutionaliza-
tion of that myth's contradictions, and the locus of the ritual which reproduces and veils the disparities between myth and reality... the ritual which demands tolerance of the fundamental contradictions between myth and institution still goes largely unchallenged, for neither ideological criticism nor social action can bring about a new society. Only disenchantment with and detachment from the central social ritual and reform of that ritual can bring about radical change.

The question immediately arises: how does man begin to "detach" himself from "the central social ritual" of contradiction?

Working from the phenomenological and epistemological ground set forth in the preceding chapters, we must venture to say: through questioning.

This questioning involves acknowledging two aspects of one ongoing process: 1) the relationship between man and language as one in which man creates words; and 2) the relationship between language and man as one in which language determines man. At first, these two aspects may sound contradictory, but they are not. Rather, they constitute the paradoxical essence--the "twofold" motion--inherent in the ongoing relationship between man and language.

1) The relationship between man and language. To say that man creates words is to acknowledge that words are "self-projects," and as self-projects, language can be created and recreated. In acknowledging words as self-words, man acknowledges himself as a form-maker. It is here that man encounters and thus regains his inherent power for not only questioning existing external forms, but for also creating new forms.

Linguistic contradiction (which states that two things cannot be
equally true) begins in self-contradiction which says: I am not also my forms. And, as Norman O. Brown has aptly pointed out, modern representative institutions are based upon the contradiction of distance—upon distancing man from the forms he has created, upon separating the questioner from his questioning, upon detaching "the subject" from the "things" of the world—thereby keeping "the multitude in remote contact with reality." "Representative institutions depend upon the aesthetic illusion of distance." Man's questioning participation, then, is what is initially required if man is to begin "cutting through" both the personal and collective "myth of detachment." In the act of questioning, man "relates to that in which he is totally related." (p. 52)

Therefore, man begins his detachment from "the central social ritual" through questioning the detachment myth upon which institutionalized contradiction is based and, subsequently, perpetuated. Man begins by questioning the "self-view" of "a detached and determining subject." For to say that man has the innate power, potential, possibility, ability, i.e. the "need," to create and recreate forms is not to say that man is, therefore, either the detached being or the being which determines the essence of being.

2) The relationship between language and man. In that the essence of being is one in which the whole determines the essence of the parts (including the essence of man both to in-sist and ex-sist), language determines man.

It is important to note here that neither Whorf nor Heidegger
are proposing that words proceed existence. Rather, they are making statements about the relationship between language and man.

Because the destiny of language is grounded in a nation's relation to being, the question of being will involve us deeply in the question of language.

Language "houses" the relationship between man and being, says Heidegger. It is firstly, for Heidegger, man's destroyed or forgotten relation to being that becomes his subsequent misrelation to language. This misrelation to language, in turn, acts to veil further man's forgotten relation to being. (pp. 188-190) For Heidegger, language "houses" a nation's relation to being, and as such, language influences and determines subsequent learning and behavior. Aptitude is inextricably linked with attitude.

If we say, then, that linguistic contexts express "contradiction," we are saying that language "houses" the relationship between man and being in its state of "self-contradiction." Language expresses man's present relationship with being. Therefore, a language which stresses detachment expresses an underlying relationship of detachment. Language expresses contradiction when man's relationship within being is no longer a participatory, paradoxical one.

Language is not contradictory by nature; rather, language is paradoxical by nature. Language gives two messages at once: in speaking, something is left unsaid. "Language is as a cord of silence with sounds the knots--as nodes in a Peruvian quipu, in which the empty spaces speak." Language sounds as it silences. As Heideg-
ger states, language conceals and reveals simultaneously; it closes and discloses, veils and unveils.

It is not initially language that renders man powerless; it is initially man himself. This is the ironic reversal that accompanies subjectivistic inversion: in detaching himself from objective reality, man thinks that he is elevating himself, but in truth, man belittles himself by "framing" himself "detached determiner." Man, then, tosses between the subjectivist extremes of relativism and objectivism by stating either 1) that truth is relative to only him (therefore, he is alone); or 2) that truth is dependent upon agreement between subject and object, and consequently exclusive (therefore, he is alone).

These are but a few of the aspects relative to the relationship between man and language that are inherent in the preceding chapters. For implicit in the theory of learning presented in Chapter VIII is a theory of identity (as "twofold" appropriation: how one comes into its own through the other) and a theory of language (as "twofold" expression or "poeting").

Like the theory of learning (which is essentially a theory of language), both appropriation and poeting reside in man's ability to encounter self-motion, in man's ability initially to question his own forming as that being which lives, dies, and chooses. "Overcoming the dread of nothingness, man expresses concern and care over his own being, and therefore over being itself, in questioning that very being." (p. 52)
Acknowledging man's encounter with his own "temporality" as that which empowers both life and language is by no means solely Heideggerian. Robert Jay Lifton states: "every significant step in human existence involves some inner sense of death." Similarly, Norman O. Brown says that "freedom in the use of symbolism comes from the capacity to experience loss." Both Lifton and Brown acknowledge "the connection between impaired mourning and murderous violence," where man's "inability to mourn" (his own or another's passing) leads to a literalization or "killing" in both words and actions, not to mention a one-dimensionality in man. The rebellion against death--both through apathy or indifference (not feeling) and through acts of violence (feeling something)--"has in it a quest, however misdirected and pathological," says Lifton, "to overcome the broken connection" caused through some unmourned loss.

In a society ruled by the ritualized myth of contradiction, with its attendant fragmentation and uniformity, man desires nothing more than total dissolution. Man craves some form of "wholy" consumption--however distorted. For when the individual self can no longer find dissolution and communion in the larger collective self, the alienated self drives towards the dissolution promised by both indifference and annihilation.

The only hope, or else despair
Lies in the choice of pyre or pyre--
To be redeemed from fire by fire.

Who then devised the torment? Love.
Love is the unfamiliar Name
Behind the hands that wove
The intolerable shirt of flame
Which human power cannot remove.
   We only live, only suspire
Consumed by either fire or fire. 12

It is the "broken connection" that comes back to haunt man in distorted forms. It is the lost touch that places demands on "things"—demands from the human soul that things were never meant to hold.

The 'painful cleavage' of culture from life 'is responsible for the revenge of things; the poetry which is no longer within us and which we no longer succeed in finding in things suddenly appears on their wrong side: consider the unprecedented number of crimes whose perverse gratuitousness is explained only by our powerlessness to take complete possession of life. 13

Regaining possession of the life we have been entrusted involves what Albert Camus calls "lucidity," which "depends not on man's will, but on its contrary, which is death." 14 This, then, is the paradox: in letting-be, man possesses life. When man no longer takes himself and his relationships within being "for granted," the human will finds itself aligned with Lawrence's "inhuman will."

The theory of language implicit in the theory of learning presented in Chapter VIII, therefore, is grounded in the "twofold" and paradoxical essence of being. This theory requires an amplification that is not possible in a concluding chapter; however, I would like to briefly note the essence of its intended direction.

Man has been left with a symbol, "a symbol perfected in death" says T. S. Eliot. The word "symbol" not only means "to bring together," as stated in Chapter IX, but as "a bringing together," a
symbol for the early Greeks denoted both "sign" and "union." Language, as an expression of the "twofold," speaks being as appearance, concealment as revealment, metaphor as paradox. Language "gives signs," and "loves to hide." It is, says Wheelwright, "in Goethe's sense, the fullest coalescence of the particular instance and a general idea." \(^{15}\) 

In short, if metaphor and paradox are to serve a metaphysical purpose, each must to some degree involve the other. If metaphor is employed without a touch of paradox, it loses its radically metaphoric character and turns out to be virtually no more than a tabloid simile. If paradox is employed without metaphor, it is no more than a witticism or sophism. \(^{16}\) Wheelwright discusses the implications of this passage in beautiful detail, stating first, that metaphor, if semantic (rather than merely grammatical) involves paradox; and second, that if metaphor involves paradox, it is "also conversely true that serious paradox involves metaphor." \(^{17}\) Similarly, Robert Jay Lifton states: ". . . each image and form is understood both as a configuration in itself and as part of a larger configuration." \(^{18}\) Accordingly, both aspects of language suffer when one is stressed to the exclusion of the other. 

When the paradoxical essence of metaphor is obscured, and conversely, when the metaphorical essence of paradox if obscured, man is faced with a literalization of the word in both its "particular" and "whole" aspects, i.e. the word is obscured as what Lifton calls "a symbolizing process." When only the "particular" essence (differing without saming) is advanced, the word becomes divisive, "fragmenting," and, likewise, when only the "universal" essence
(saming without differing) is advanced, the word becomes uniform, "equalizing." While a divisive word may lead to a numbing detachment, a uniform word usually leads to "a sterile uniformity." Thus, where a symbolic word empowers both particularization and connection, a literal word perpetuates both fragmentation and uniformity. And, as language moves from its symbolic or "twofold" essence to a literal or "one-dimensional" essence, man moves from both fluidity and particularity to both flaccidity and rigidity. For when impartial expressions of being give way to partial expressions of being (i.e. when paradox gives way to contradiction), man is consumed by irony.

The failure to acknowledge metaphor as paradox has led, for example, to the Catholic/Protestant polarization over whether a sacrament is either a metaphor or a reality. If being is appearance, i.e. if existence is a "twofold" and paradoxical mystery, a sacrament is at once both metaphor and reality.

Interestingly, Robert Jay Lifton proposes that one of the reasons Freud and Jung "broke" with each other had to do with conflicts around symbolization.

In particular, the three great early 'defectors,' Adler, Jung, and Rank, could be said to have broken with Freud (apart from their personal conflicts with him) around issues of symbolization. On the issue of 'incest taboo,' for instance, all three stressed suprapersonal, nonsexual (that is, symbolic) elements having to do with family continuity and community, in opposition to Freud's focus on the more literal expression of the taboo in individual psychology, in the 'Oedipus complex.' Hence Jung, in his posthumous autobiography, claimed that while working on his early study of transformations of the libido, 'I knew in advance that its
publication would cost me my friendship with Freud (because) to me incest signified a personal complication only in the rarest case... But Freud clung to the literal interpretation of it and could not grasp the spiritual significance of incest as a symbol.19

By way of further clarification, Lifton comments at a later stage on Jung's tendency to stress the "general" aspect of the symbolic process to the detriment, perhaps, of the "particular."

The configuration of images which constitutes the psychic core is unique to each individual. In this sense Jungian archetypes can be confusing in their overgenerality and appearance of preexistent form.20

Thus, while Freud may be said to have stressed the "particular" essence of an action or word, Jung may be said to have stressed the "general" essence of words and actions.*

*It is interesting to note that, generally speaking, Heidegger is either placed within an existential framework (and then critiqued for his failure to address "collective humanity," i.e. "the masses") or placed within a totalitarian framework (and then critiqued for his failure to address "the individual" with directives for practical action). My personal bias is that much of both Heidegger's acceptance and critique have come from interpretations which place the either-or context onto an ontology that speaks to the "twofold" or paradoxical essence of being. Perhaps, then, the extreme either-or-ing that plagues Heidegger and his thoughts may not only reflect society's fear of dispensing with its ritual of contradiction, but also account for Heidegger's critique as both an existentialist and an essentialist. Wheelwright, in commenting on the charges often levelled at Heraclitus for being "obscure and difficult" in his language (which are some of the same charges levelled against Heidegger) states: "... the main reason for the obscurity and difficulty in Heraclitus was not anything so simple and naive as a wish to mystify, but rather a need to speak appropriately and not too inadequately of that Nature which surprises us with the unexpected, which does not affirm or deny but merely gives signs, and which loves to hide."24

It is not, as it is often supposed, "dark" language which leads to cliches of fragmentation and uniformity (or else poetry would have to be questioned for its obliqueness, and its attendant mystification and fragmentation), but rather one-dimensional expressions spawned when people "assume" they know only too well what the "one" way is.
Briefly, then, the theory of language implicit in the preceding phenomenological and epistemological discussions, like the theory of learning, rests upon the "twofold" essence of being as an unconcealment which both conceals and reveals simultaneously. Therefore, a "twofold" or symbolic contextualizing of language resides in man's ability to encounter and question his own "twofold" being-in-motion. It is this encounter, this self-questioning, which empowers man not only to create and recreate both new and old expressions, but also to question those external forms and contexts that currently comprise "the central social ritual" of contradiction—a ritual which has acted upon man to render him powerless. It is this self-questioning that will also allow man to question his own expression of being as "twofold," and move on to new words, forms, and expressions. Questioning keeps man aligned with the motion of learning as being. "For to be aware of one's world means at the same time to be designing it." 22

... significant learning or change in human systems is always explicitly revolutionary: it involves the death of one order and the creation of another. Whether the change be the elimination of racism, or the learning of a mathematical theorem, or the finding of love, or the cancellation of conditioning that gives priority to women and to authority figures, what is involved is always the disruption and death of an organic system, and the birth of a new order. That birth may become easier if the revolutionary aspects are better understood.

If learning is revolution, then the goal of education should not be the acquisition of a degree, but the creation of a healthy process and its attendant skills. This involves three main factors: (1) learning to break free from old and crippling frameworks of control; (2) learning to build in the freedom created; (3) learning to think about the process of change itself. 23
Understanding learning as ex-change, revolution (Latin revoluere, "to roll again," meaning "to roll round, move round a center, circle"), rests, for Heidegger, upon the circular essence of man. "Because Dasein is itself historical, all inquiry concerning it must scrutinize its own history..." (p. 43) It is through questioning one's changing "self-process," to enlist Lifton's expression, that man begins "to think about the process of change itself." Perhaps it is this questioning that will rescue man from both the indifference and voilence which seem directly related to a constriction of choices. "We are limited by our agreements on possibility."24 This paper, therefore, through questioning existing forms and contexts, has been an attempt to create a space for learning as questioning, a space for "learning to learn" through questioning the agreed-upon contexts of contradiction. "Experimental neuroses in animals occurs because the animal cannot change the 'context' which it has already learned."25

In 1976, Robert Jay Lifton published a book entitled *The Life of the Self* (Toward a New Psychology), in which he outlined the emerging direction--what he called "the paradigm shift"--evolving in the linguistic forms and contexts through which man learns to learn.

If a new historical consciousness is emerging, as I believe it is, we must also speak of a significant shift, if not mutation, in cultural evolution. We would expect an emerging psychological paradigm to connect with (or at least be open to) a new evolutionary awareness.26

This cultural shift is one which confronts man with the possibility of both instant communication and instant annihilation, with the potential
for immediate contact and imminent loss. This, of course, is underscored by an electronic and technological expansion that accentuates man's capacity for rapid communication, as well as for rapid extinction.

As Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore have noted, the old method of learning based on "data classification" is no longer sufficient to deal with this new evolutionary awareness. What is required in learning, state both McLuhan and Fiore, is "pattern recognition."

Since the frontiers of knowledge are changing so rapidly, there is no use in burdening children with data that will be outdated in ten years, or with skills that will soon be better performed by machines; rather children must learn to learn... The "shift" in learning is moving towards a language that stresses forms and formations, contexts, structures, configurations, systems, patterns, and relationships.

However, if this language is plagued by "lingering nineteenth-century assumptions about science, about this particular cause resulting in that particular effect and either-or approaches to truth," man will simply find himself rehearsing an old story line: either being or appearance. The words "form," "context," "process," etc. are not immune from literalization, any more than the words "content" and "substance" are inherently literal.

If the emerging language is to offer man opportunities for encountering and integrating the possibilities of both communication and annihilation, it will involve a structural shift in the way (in the
man approaches words such as "context" and "content." It will involve man in a process of symbolization that acknowledges the "each as each" essence of all words—a process that acknowledges the coexistence of both context and content in our lives. Otherwise, a discussion of contexts and patterns will become simply another linguistic avenue for man's undaunted subjectivism that assumes exchange demands in-sistence.

The language of "context," therefore, will, at its best, direct the reader to the question of his own existence as appropriation (as that being which comes into its "own" through the "other"). At its worst, the language of "context" will simply become another prescription and demand, and it is learning (like being) as imposition and demand that leads to both the merchandizing of being and appearance, where both "reading" and "relevance" are packaged and sold. It is imposition that transforms learning from man's encounter with being as things ("being disposes itself through things" and "limits are that through which presencing begins" says Heidegger) to learning as the merchandizing of both particulars and generalities. (Refer to pp. 259-261.)

One need only look at the discussions that "dog" educational theory today to realize the persistence of old contexts: either books or technology (language vs. antilanguage), either visual or verbal, either "back to basics" or "relevance," etc. A "paradigm shift" in our thinking patterns will not emerge easily, and it certainly won't "emerge" by saying "all together, now shift," as if "the shift" were
the latest dance craze.

That which is imposed tends towards death (for demands, as Freud stated, are ruled by "the downward way"). Impositions (whether they be impositions of content or context) drive the unfettered life underground (where it then must vent its anger on itself and others). Being as potential and possibility is inherent. That is, learning for man is "a need," and as a need, learning turns against man when it it contradicted through demand.

In fact, learning is the human activity which least needs manipulation by others. Most learning is not the result of instruction. It is rather the result of unhampered participation in a meaningful setting. Most people learn best by being 'with it,' yet school makes them identify their personal growth with elaborate planning and manipulation.

... I have not heard of any method whatever, scholastic or otherwise, of teaching the humanities without killing them. I remember how at age twelve, browsing in the library, I read Macbeth with excitement; yet in class I could not understand a word of Julius Caesar, and I hated it. I'm pretty sure this is a common pattern. The survival of the humanities would seem to depend on random miracles which are becoming less frequent.

Learning, like truth, happens "when the control breaks down. By great good fortune, gratis, by grace; and not by our own work or will." 31 "Incidental learning," says Paul Goodman, does not depend upon "deliberate intervention." 32 Learning is coincidental, "the falling together of things and events," where man encounters each as each. It is the participation mystique, man's unhampered questioning participation in life—what Heidegger calls "the ability to stand out into the truth of being."

Not surprisingly, then, the paradox that has subsumed the
contradiction of learning as imposition, i.e. learning as in-sistence, is that the more man has tried to make people learn, the more "irrelevant" learning has become. The see-saw response to this irony is the 'predictable' one: "... to refine the process; to make the curriculum relevant, to start schooling earlier, to employ new technologies in teaching, to eliminate friction by admitting students to administrative functions."  

However, knowledge, like freedom, cannot be sold, whether it be in an "open" or "closed" classroom, or a "global" classroom. Broadening the parameters within a contradictory framework only succeeds in making the agreed-upon social ritual more pervasive. Moreover, broadening the "scope" of the program often acts to silence emerging questions about the program itself. This is not unlike Illich's recognition that a few reformers are permitted within the agreed-upon context in order to raise expectations, i.e. in order to keep the present context going.

The inherent contradiction begins, of course, with man's separation of himself from his thought. Thus, we witness, for example, a so-called "liberal" parent demanding that his child share his views of freedom.

Vicarious satisfaction: the deed is both theirs and not theirs. On this self-contradiction, this hypocrisy, this illusion, representative institutions are based. However, if man truly believes in man, man believes in man's freedom to participate and therefore to choose something as distorted as slavery. Man believes in man's freedom to both in-sist and ex-sist.
Otherwise, man lives and perpetuates contradictions between his actions and his words (advancing the separation between being and thinking). This self-contradiction leads not only to alienation within the individual family (e.g. the "double-bind" in schizophrenic family patterning), but also to alienation within the collective family (e.g. the oppressed/oppressor political patterning). "Anxiety, in fact, brings about the thing it fears, creates its own disaster."35

The irony here, then, is that when learning is imposed (whether as "content" or "context"), neither the intended content nor the intended context is learned. What is learned is this: 1) man is not to trust his own perceptions of reality, his own capacity and potential for being able to understand what he wants; 2) man is not to trust others to be able to understand what they want; 3) freedom lies in the realm of in-sistence, and as such, freedom (not unlike truth and love) is man's to "grant;" and 4) freedom, if it is man's to grant, is therefore man's to "take away." The first aspect instills suspicion of the self; the second aspect instills suspicion of the other; and the last two aspects mirror the polemics of a subjectivism which does not acknowledge that "the creative process itself is not a free activity if by free we mean arbitrary, or unrelated to cosmic law."36 Freedom, like truth, is not socially determined.

Learning as imposition, then, through the promulgation of an old defensive tactic "divide and conquer," advances the central social ritual of contradiction in both the political and personal realm. For through learning as imposition, man learns not to trust his own power
and when man no longer trusts his own power, he no longer trusts other people's power. Imposition, therefore, 

Admittedly, it is extremely difficult for the critic not to avoid punishing his subject for not being a form of the critic himself, a kind of analogue to his ego! There is a slightly paranoid fear, perhaps connected with political and social prejudices, that chaos will come again if rules established in the eighteenth century are violated; and having begun as a monastic labor, the role of the academic to keep order, to insist upon hierarchies, to be continuously grading, is one that coincides far too easily with a puritanical fear of and loathing for the processes of life that most artists celebrate.

Grading, moreover, in overlooking the "differing" inherent in people and things, levels. The irony of grading, then, is that grading levels and levelling grades. "Once people have the idea schooled into them that values can be produced and measured, they tend to accept all kinds of rankings..." That is, once man is schooled in/through the imposition of grades and ranks, he not only accepts grades and ranks imposed on him, but he also begins to impose ranks and grades on others (in an effort to overcome the levelling that imposed grading brings). (Refer to pp. 134-136.) Both grading (a partial expression of impartial differing) and levelling (a partial expression of impartial saming) perpetuate the paradox of children who are both uniform and detached--children who can no longer differentiate degrees of danger and degrees of art. "Beethoven and Rock 'n Roll are considered equivalent." Everything new and old becomes both suspect and equal. And it is the man who experiences being as both uniform and detached that is ripe for "the thrall of totalitarianism of both left and right," prey to both "proletarian
authoritarianism" and "secularized humanism." 40

Thus, while levelling is a distortion of the sameing essence of learning which "lets" man understand that, as Norman O. Brown says, "when Cain slew Abel he slew himself," 41 grading is a distortion of the differing essence of learning which "lets" man understand that all men are not created equal (if by equal we mean uniform).

The question of being is not bloodless after all, but vital.
For what?

For pondering the fact that as we surrender the diverse senses of Being to a sterile uniformity, to one that can no longer entertain variation and multiplicity, we become immeasurably poorer--and that such poverty makes a difference. 42

The question facing education as learning today (as always), then, is not the question of books or technology; it is the question of both books and technology. (Refer to p. 259.) For when man takes into account the "differing" essence of each child, he acknowledges that one child may learn with a book the "same" thing that another child may learn with a tape recorder. When man, as that "gathered being" which does the work of gathering, "lets" possibilities, neither books nor media are imposed or excluded.

More and more, cultural evolution and survival seem to require that man come to terms with his potential for the inclusive pursuit of varying yet interdependent modes--that man come to terms with his essence as the "twofold" being that both ex-sists and in-sists. For it has been epistemology's long-standing failure to acknowledge insistent existence as one mode of man's being-in-the-world that has led to
its overriding dominance in our present lives. It has been man's flight from his essence as the "twofold" being whose words of praise are also epitaphs that has brought man face to face with the very real possibility of destroying himself with his own praying hands.
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17 Ibid., pp. 95-97.
18 Lifton, *The Self*, p. 70.
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29 Illich, *Deschooling*, p. 56.
30 Goodman in *Summerhill*, p. 196.
32 Goodman in *Summerhill*, pp. 196-197.
33 Ibid., pp. 199-200.
36 Ruth Nanda Anshen in Illich, *Dechooling*, p. 179.

38 Illich, Deschooling, p. 59.

39 Goodman in Summerhill, p. 204.

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41 Brown, Love's Body, p. 87.

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