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The psychological sense of community and the small college campus: a community psychology perspective on the role of the dean of students.

Joseph Ivan Mandell

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE OF COMMUNITY
AND THE SMALL COLLEGE CAMPUS:
A COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY PERSPECTIVE
ON THE ROLE OF
THE DEAN OF STUDENTS

A Dissertation Presented
By
JOSEPH IVAN MANDELL

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
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May 1981
School of Education
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AND THE SMALL COLLEGE CAMPUS:
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Approved as to style and content by:

John W. Wideman, Chairman

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Mario D. Fantini, Dean
School of Education
DEDICATION

Especially for Phyllis, and Jonathan,
Susan, Elisabeth and Daniel.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Doug Forsyth, Ted Slovin and Jack Wideman without whose patience, tolerance and encouragement I could not have completed this work, with particular indebtedness to Ted for having introduced me long ago to community psychology and more recently to the writing of Seymour Sarason, and above all to Jack who was always there to tell me I could when I thought I couldn't--and to show me how and light the way--I should like to acknowledge my grateful recognition and enduring thanks.

J.I.M.
ABSTRACT

The Psychological Sense of Community and the Small College Campus:
A Community Psychology Perspective on the Role of
the Dean of Students

(May 1981)

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M.A., New York University
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by: Professor John W. Wideman

Sense of community is a term, common in our language, used with instinctive certainty as to its meaning and sources by professional and layman alike. Sarason added the word "psychological," and with that refinement the expression was elevated to the level of a construct which holds implications for the practice of community psychology: the psychological sense of community (PSC). Sarason posed a clear challenge for that profession when he asserted that a field which purported to be concerned with community had to be based on the development and the maintenance of PSC. The dean of students of a small campus is the person typically charged with looking after the "quality of life" in that setting; in so doing, the dean often finds himself involved in a variety of tasks.
that are observed to parallel those of a community psychologist. Underlying this report is the proposition that community psychology provides a pragmatic framework and valid model for student affairs administration.

The major portion of the study is devoted to an analysis of literature representing a broad spectrum of disciplines and a wide variety of phenomena and issues that relate to the human community. It attempts to show the interrelatedness of these findings in terms of what makes, sustains, enhances or destroys community and how this knowledge relates to the concept of PSC.

The study explores the meaning of sense of community, first through an examination of the idea of community itself, then through a review of basic notions regarding factors which induce people to cohere in groups, and the mechanisms that promote bonding, cohesiveness and group spirit. The means by which intentional communities (e.g., communes) build into their systems a sense of community and commitment are examined. Also explored is the concept of territory as an analogue to community, particularly as it relates to the biological correlates of the communal response to crisis. The communal response is also viewed through Buber's socio-theological perspective, principally through his concepts of I-Thouness and The Centre. Sarason's concept of PSC is studied through a review of his vii
principal works. Also reviewed is a study designed to develop PSC into a measurable construct. The community psychological perspective is studied along with the literature pertaining to the college as community and how the role of the dean of students relates to such a perspective. The final chapter raises some questions for future study and examines the implications of the findings through illustrations taken from the writer's experiences as a dean at a small, private college, and in terms of the conception of the dean of students as community psychologist. The study as a whole may be viewed as a documentation and as an argument in support of this conception with the emphasis placed on attitude (the PSC perspective) rather than on technology.
If I am not for myself who will be for me?  
But if I am only for myself, what am I?  
Hillel

All for one, one for all, that is our device.  
Alexandre Dumas

The proper way of dying is from fatigue after 
a lifetime of trying to mitigate agency 
with communion.  
David Bakan

The quest for community will not be denied, 
for it springs from some of the most powerful 
needs of human nature—needs for a clear 
sense of cultural purpose, membership, status, 
and continuity.  
Robert Nisbet

A field which purported to be concerned with 
community had to be concerned with and based 
on the development and maintenance of the 
psychological sense of community.  
Seymour B. Sarason

A college is a corner of men's hearts where hope 
has not died. Here the prison house has not 
closed; here no battle is yet quite lost. Here 
we assert, endow, and defend as final reality the 
best of our dream as men. Here lies our sense 
of community.  
Howard Lowry

The ultimate therapy is to translate our private 
problems into corporate issues. . . . Therapy 
involves identifying and building communities of 
concern.  
Parker J. Palmer
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Prologue

In the winter of 1976 Windham College experienced its first collapse, and with it collapsed the writer's job as dean of students and his plans for a doctoral study using that school's student population. The next two years found him groping for a topic which he vaguely sensed was already formed in the back of his mind, having to do with his experience at the College, but not yet articulated.

The winter of 1978 delivered the answer. The writer had been a resident of the city of Hartford for two years and like many new city dwellers had felt like a stranger among strangers. For one grand and evanescent moment, however, like a stage set in an otherwise dismal theatre, the writer found himself in a scene in the middle of the city in which he felt like a townsperson among townspeople. It was the morning after Storm Larry, "the Blizzard of '78," had dropped four feet of snow on the Northeast. All functions of modern civilization seemed to have ceased: factories and institutions closed, transportation halted (except for sleds and cross-country skis), street traffic limited
to pedestrians. The city was in crisis. Walking through the open streets on a strikingly sunny and blue-sky morning, pacing with high boots on the clean white snow packed perfectly for hiking by the all-night city plows, being greeted time after time by a startling new brand of city-folk who would pause from the exhilarating task of shoveling mountains of snow from driveways and walks—for blocks and blocks it seemed that everyone on earth was engaged in this one enterprise—with a wave, a smile and the noticeable absence of the ritual of turning one's head or gaze to avoid eye contact with a stranger, observing repeated instances of people cooperating to dig each other out, pushing cars, lending shovels, and playing, or just walking through the white miles of the city—all this contributed to a sense of being in community. What allowed people to drop their guardedness toward strangers and momentarily become people who seemed to have been operating from an orientation of safety, security and cooperativeness, and a collective sense of mutual concern, involvement and belongingness? And why did the situation just as suddenly revert to "business as usual" after the crisis subsided? (This was a common enough observation. The writer can recall other occasions like it. For example, he remembers that once, when riding a subway in New York City, a rush-hour train became stalled in the middle of a tunnel. He recalls how the alien crowd was forthwith transformed into a mini-community of con-
cerned citizens conversing, eye-to-eye and face-to-face, and how, when the train became unstuck, the riders went back to sleep, back to their newspapers, or back to their downcast, floorward postures.

Why, in a crisis, did the writer experience a feeling of being a townsperson rather than a stranger? What had produced that fleeting feeling which, upon further reflection, he had identified as communion or as a sense of community? And what did such a feeling have to do with the more subtle and protracted version of it, the kind of "sense of community" which people who studied or worked at Windham College had often said was lacking and growing more and more scarce there? In no uncertain terms, the writer had experienced a transient version of it, apparently brought on by the reaction of persons experiencing a common crisis. Our topic for this study was discovered!

The Problem

It was Sarason (1974) who added the word "psychological" to the term sense of community; and with that refinement, what was once merely a household expression, was now a respectable theoretical construct available for consideration by practicing community psychologists: the psychological sense of community. Sarason posed a clear challenge to the community psychology profession when he asserted "that a field which purported to be concerned with
community had to be concerned with and based on the development and maintenance of the psychological sense of community" (1974, p. viii, emphasis ours). The psychological sense of community, he believes, should be "the value which informs action," an orientation which dictates that any change in policy, plan, structure, or for that matter "... any change in any significant aspect of a community ... be scrutinized from the standpoint of what its possible effects would be on the psychological sense of community" (1974, p. 152). The psychological sense of community is defined by Sarason to mean

... the sense that one [is] part of a readily available, mutually supportive network of relationships upon which one could depend and as a result of which one [did] not experience sustained feelings of loneliness that impell one to actions or to adopting a style of living masking anxiety and setting the stage for later and more destructive anguish (1974, p. 1).

Sense of community is a term, common in our language, used with instinctive certainty as to its meaning and as to its sources by professionals and laymen alike. And yet this meaningful but elusive expression had never gained the status of a theoretical construct, or of an operationally understood, manipulatable variable.

The term somehow elicits "remembrances of things past": family circle outings; summer camp; the club house; the block parties and air-raid drills and the victory celebrations of World War II; more recently, the feeling that permeated our neighborhood on that Sunday afternoon when our
hockey team won the Olympic competition; the transient "highs" of weekend retreats and marathon encounters; and those "crisis" situations: being a passenger on a train broken down in the middle of a subway tunnel, a city-dweller in the midst of a paralyzing snow blizzard; or a volunteer fireman helping to put out a blaze in a neighbor's barn; and, of course, those massive exhilarating "rituals": the civil rights and anti-war marches of the sixties; Earth Day, 1970 in New York City; the pre-dawn May Pole event on the college campus--any one of us can go on and on with a list of such "peak" experiences that are communal in nature.

This is not to say that what we mean by the experience of a sense of community is necessarily felt with such intensity. In fact our conception of it is the more common experience of it which would be more accurately described as a placid and subtle psychological undercurrent that would be brought to cognition only upon deliberation. We would make a similar distinction between, let us say, a state of joy and a state of happiness, or between an exuberant vitality and a state of good health, or between the experience of an initial romantic encounter and the condition of a stable relationship. Indeed, it is the "stable setting" of a family relationship, the "sense of family," from which we no doubt derive the ideal mental picture of community. (Sarason draws our attention to this analogy when he men-
tions the Waltons TV series in his interview with the writer [Sarason, 1980; see the Appendix].) After reading our report the reader will see that the picture of the "community feeling" which we extract from the literature, will differ very little from an unsophisticated sense of that picture derived from our familial and communal experiences.

Let us look at a partial list of what might be called the elements of community feeling:

- Sense of belongingness
- Sense of safety
- Sense of caring and protection
- Sense of pride
- Sense of trust
- Sense of an agreed upon set of goals, values, purposes
- Sense of accessibility to helpful resources
- Sense of recognition (mutual)
- Sense that "I need not be alone"
- Sense of being effective or useful or having an impact
- Sense of exclusivity
- Sense of group identity
- Sense of common ritual
- Sense that my presence or absence would be noticed, etc.

Calling these "elements" is not to suggest that each category is pure and irreducible, or that all must be present at any one time and place in order to result in a psychological sense of community. Presenting this list at this juncture is to give the reader a clearer idea of what the writer had in mind when he began this inquiry.

We should state what we do not mean by the term sense of community. We are not referring to the state of interpersonal intimacy we call "love"--or even "friendship"--where commitment resides in a rather explicit manner. If
there is any commitment in our conception of the psychological sense of community, it is conceived of as a generalized attraction to the collective setting rather than an interpersonal commitment like love. However, commitment, itself, is a significant and complex variable, as we shall see in our review of Kanter's studies of the enduring 19th century communes (1970, 1972, 1973) presented in Chapter IV.

As was mentioned earlier, the writer recalls that the term was often used in the context of his experience as a dean of students at a small liberal arts residential college. Its usage most often arose when members of that college community were attempting to explain some of the perennial problems of the institution; it was invariably used in the negative. (We shall, in the final chapter, be discussing this setting in more detail.) Somehow the speakers of that term, and the spoken to, had a grasp of its meaning, although none of us was ever called upon to articulate its meaning. As Sarason (1974) observed, in his book on the subject:

. . . The concept of the psychological sense of community is like that of hunger: neither is easy to define, but there is no mistaking it when an individual experiences the lack of a psychological sense of community, just as there is no mistaking what we think an individual experiences as a result of starvation (1974, p. 3).

Is there some body of knowledge that would treat a theory of bondedness caused by common crisis? Or more broadly, is there somewhere in the literature inside or
outside of psychology some treatment of the sense of community as a theoretical construct? Is there something we can learn about the concept of community, itself, that might have useful implications for those of us who are given the responsibility of looking after human environments, particularly in the college setting?

The major portion of this study is devoted to an analysis of literature representing a broad spectrum of disciplines and a wide variety of phenomena and issues that relate to the human community. We attempt to show the interrelatedness of these findings and to bring together what is known about community—what makes, sustains, enhances, promotes, destroys it—and relate that knowledge to the sense of community, both as a concept and as a human condition. We will view this knowledge through the lens of a community within an institution. The institution that we are concerned with is the small residential liberal arts college; the community that we are concerned with is the collectivity of the persons who work, study and/or live there. In the final summing up, the writer's experience as a worker at Windham College (a now defunct institution at which he served as dean of students) will be brought into the discussion in order to provide a frame within which to weave a synthesis of findings and experience, and to illustrate our concerns. To paraphrase Sarason, this report is not in the how-to-do-it tradition; it is an attempt to bring
order to the writer's own efforts to understand his own experiences in facing the problem of community in a college setting.

Our search of the literature will begin with an examination of the various conceptualizations and definitions of community. Being a major concept in the field of sociology, there is no shortage of such discussions. One sociologist (Hillery, Jr., 1955) reviewed no less than ninety-four definitions of community! The shortage, indeed, occurs in the traditional training literature of counseling and clinical psychology. Most of us who are trained in these disciplines missed our chance to have any formal exposure to the concept of community if we had not taken an undergraduate course in sociology. Some of us will have had to await our eleventh hour doctoral excursions into fields unknown to discover, for example, the significant concepts of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Tönnies, 1957).

The literature is examined with an eye to discovering clues as to how to move from the instinctively understood idea of a sense of community to a manageable construct that has pragmatic implications in the field of human affairs, or more narrowly, student affairs. We look at the mass society concepts about community per se which abound in the literature of sociology in light of their application to the problems that a dean as overseer of "the qual-
ity of life" must face within the microsociety of the college - campus: the college as community.

Since we intend to relate the broad concept of community to the narrower issue of campus life, a question might arise as to whether, in fact, the campus is a community. Some would argue that it is not. In one sense we would agree; for the college is clearly an institution, a formal organization. Formal organizations are structurally and functionally centralized; and they tend to be "explicit" in nature as against the "implicit" nature of communities (NTL, 1969). Further, institutions are defined as "... the standardized solutions to collective problems which men apply in their group activities" (Martindale, 1964, p. 69). Thus the college is formally organized to solve the collective problem of higher education. However, within the organization is a collectivity of people--faculty, staff and students--in a given territory--the campus. It is this collectivity that we are calling a community; it is the people who "implicitly" form the community that we are addressing in our concern with the psychological sense of community.

This, however, does not completely settle the theoretical problem, for some would argue further that the community is a "system of systems, and includes organizations within it" (NTL, 1969). Again we would agree, but this statement would be acceptable in the converse as well,
which becomes clear when we see that the same source states that "we may characterize [community] as a group of people who have a sense of common identification through their development and/or joint use of some institutions and a physical environment." That the word institution is used in the plural does not take away from our argument. Not only is the college an institution but so are its component parts---classes, classrooms, faculties, dormitories, faculty and student senates---all "standardized solutions to collective problems" explicitly designed to meet the goals of the formal organization: the college.

We find that for our purpose in understanding the meaning of the psychological sense of community it is only more confusing to follow in detail the sociological niceties and the theoretical distinctions between one type of social system and another. What does it matter, for example, if a given setting turns out not to fit a theoretical definition of community, if in that very setting a "psychological sense of community" is in fact found to appear? Thus we are told that a formal organization in contradistinction to a community, has "sharp, recognizable goals" (Hillery, Jr., 1968, p. 145) but that an ideal community is only "a consequence of cooperation in a given location." Similarly, McWilliams distinguishes between a corporate group and fraternity by suggesting that only the former is a "collectivity of discrete beings" (McWilliams, 1973, p.
35). Again, this distinction does not necessarily rule out the appearance of a psychological sense of community or "fraternity" in a formal organization or in a corporate group of discrete beings.

Klien (1965, p. 307) addresses this issue by asking "Is the campus an appropriate analogue for communities generally?" His answer is yes and no: yes, because of the elements of physical size, population density, guiding values, distribution of authority and power, patterns of communications, and so forth; no, because of limitation of residency, i.e., most retain other home addresses and a short-lived, "predetermined period of community membership," and so forth. (Notice the semantic problem that arises when Klien employs the word "community" even when arguing that there is no community.) In any event, for purposes of this study, there is no intellectually compelling need to be concerned with whether or not there is a good fit with classic definitions of community. It may require a new word, but there is no doubt that we are dealing with something more than "institution," "organization," "group" or simply "collection of teachers, scholars and administrators." We explore this issue in Chapter X, "The College as Community."
Significance and Delimitations of the Study

This study proposes to develop for the student affairs dean and other college managers a new perspective from which they may view their traditional repertoire of counseling skills, student development designs, and management options. The "community perspective" of the study may appear to the reader to be a sentimental yearning for a very vague and imprecise state of affairs, and may seem suspect and singularly unattractive to hard-core management personnel whose boards of trustees have been demanding five-year plans with "substance." Sarason recognizes this when he writes:

The concept "psychological sense of community" is not a familiar one in psychology, however old it may be in man's history. It does not sound precise, it obviously reflects a value judgment, and does not sound compatible with "hard" science. It is a phrase which is associated in the minds of many psychologists with a kind of maudlin togetherness, a tear-soaked emotional drippiness that misguided do-gooders seek to experience (1974, p. 156).

The study develops an argument that attempts to extinguish these attitudinal obstacles. We will argue that the psychological sense of community is not only a valid construct that has implications for reducing stress and alienation, but that it also has cost-effective consequences that have implications for reducing "stress" on the physical plant, reducing attrition, and reducing alumni apathy and other eroders of a college's fiscal health.

The report reviews and brings together material and
conceptual discussions from a variety of writers not usually encountered by the student psychology or higher education. Underlying the study is the proposition that community psychology provides a pragmatic framework and valid model for student affairs administration, with the focus on the psychological sense of community as the guiding beacon. While this is not offered as an alternative to the student development model, there is a shift of emphasis from "personal growth" to the community of persons, albeit ultimately in the service of the individual in that community.

The study does not report in depth on other values that are of equal and perhaps complementary importance to the success of the campus experience (for example, the sense of self, the sense of privacy, the concept of freedom and individuality), although these are brought into the final discussion. It would be well to caution the reader that this study does not portray the psychological sense of community as the ultimate panacea in the survival of small private colleges. Nor does it put forth the argument that the decline and fall of Windham College could have been prevented if only that institution's sense of community were totally intact. We will argue that the degree of presence of a sense of community, while often recognized as a vaguely valued condition, deserves closer study as one of the "vital signs" of the "healthy" college campus. How necessary and
how sufficient are questions that remain to be investigated through experimentally designed studies.

It was not our intention to conduct an exhaustive search into the literature of community and to deliver a definitive report from the archives of sociology; that task is better left to the sociologist. For the philosopher and those of more literary bent we have left the task of sorting out the literary and classical statements about community such as certainly appear in Plato's *The Republic*, the Bible and other ancient commentaries.

Neither have we examined to any great length the literature on organizational development and organizational behavior, the laboratory method, encounter and other "human potential" group modalities. The writer believes that the successes of these disciplines have been confined for the most part to packaged productions that produce feelings of cohesiveness, trust, increased productiveness, and even deep and enduring changes in attitude, lifestyle and personality. He believes that at best these modalities meet the needs of the narcissistic, Gesellschaftlike component of human growth, with the group feeling coming up quickly and then fading like a transient high. Paradoxically, it seems that group "treatment" is the best means of treating the individual--not the group. While there have certainly been successful programs that have employed organizational development techniques in industrial and school settings,
perhaps resulting in smoother orientation, reduced absenteeism, higher production, and so forth, we believe that in the long run the community loses the benefits. Why? Perhaps because the glue is the quick-acting variety that cracks and dries when the atmosphere is too hot, too humid, or too stressful. What appears to be missing is some sort of moral coherence, that cement that would create the permanent bond, the communitas, the Gemeinschaft, the enduring esprit de corps. Whence comes our subject of study. In any case, the reader will find that these and similar modes of intervention are treated briefly in Chapter IX in a discussion of the tools that are available in the area of community consultation.

The Literature

The psychological, sociological and educational literature of roughly the last decade is sampled with an eye toward retrieving what has been said, both directly and indirectly, about the psychological sense of community, both as a concept and as a condition. The indirect approach was necessary because very little of the literature on the psychological sense of community, which according to Sarason is "vast," is accessible via an index entry. Its status as a conceptually loose expression has not earned it the rank of "descriptor" in any of the computer banks. The computer search through ERIC and other abstract services had
to ask for the word "community-adjacent-to-the-word-
sense." In addition, descriptors like alienation and loneliness—conditions hypothesized to exist when the psychological sense of community is lacking—were used, as well as concepts like group unity, organizational climate, affiliation need, group cohesion, college or academic environment, and college dean. (The yield of the information banks was quite stingy. Is this an indication that virgin ground is being broken or that a field is being tapped where there has been relatively little interest?)

We found little in the literature that would bring a body of theory to, or directly illuminate the issue of the sense of community on a college campus. The notable exception was a collection of papers delivered at the 54th Annual Conference of the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators, entitled "The Communitization Process in Academe," a review of which is presented in Chapter X. However, we found that, unlike the famous "Boston Conference" which gave birth to the field of community psychology, the "Denver Conference," judging by the literature in the decade that followed it, spawned little interest amongst our colleagues in academe.

Only one reference was found that treated the psychological sense of community squarely and directly as a conceptual subject: a doctoral dissertation (Glynn, 1977) on "Construct development and initial measurement of the
psychological sense of community." Glynn's effort to design and validate an instrument to measure the psychological sense of community is a brilliant contribution, particularly as it lends itself to future studies of the psychological sense of community in varied settings when an experimental design is called for. Although his review of the literature and other substantive discussions of the psychological sense of community are lacking any novel insights, Glynn provides valuable information derived from the factoring out of key elements of the psychological sense of community collected from the responses to his questionnaires widely distributed among community psychologists. Because the purpose of his study was limited to designing a measurement device, there was apparently no need to explore the origins and maintenance issues of the psychological sense of community.

To fill out the picture, we review some of the commentators of the "lost community" school of thought who have written on the problem of the erosion of the psychological sense of community in the world-at-large. For example, Nisbet (1970), a major contributor to this field, discusses sense of community on a macro-societal level, with the emphasis on historical forces that have undermined it and on universal human conditions.

Regarding a "crisis theory" that would explain the communal responses we have described earlier and about which
we posed a question, we could find no direct discussion in the literature. However, related material was found in some of the behavioral scientific literature. Most fruitful, in this regard, was material from a very surprising source: Ardrey's The Territorial Imperative (1966). Ardrey's work provided us with insights derived from the study of evolution and animal behavior which opened our conceptual view of the "communal response to crisis" to an extent not anticipated. This discussion is carried on in Chapter V.

Some Explanations

We approached this study with no little trepidation; writing a scholarly paper on something as conceptually loose and on as familiar and as common a "thing" as the "sense of community" seemed a formidable task, especially when the writer considered that he would have to journey through unknown territory in the literature of disciplines other than his own. In some ways our fears were confirmed; we found very little of the "hard" data of the kind that typically lend substance to a thesis. The reader will find that there is not much quantification in these pages and therefore not much opportunity for firmly establishing relationships between and among the variables that are discussed. There is a preponderance of rhetoric that, because of the nature of the findings, must substitute for the orderly reporting
of empirical evidence and controlled experimentation. In
the end, however, the writer has learned vital things about
a field in which he purported to be a professional practi-
tioner and in which, until this undertaking, he believed he
was thoroughly schooled. The report attempts to keep at a
comfortable distance from either end of a continuum whose
one extreme is made up of the philosophical ponderings
about the nature of man (happily, though we did take one
excursion with Martin Buber) and the other made up of how
A effects B and how C is impacted by their interaction.
More importantly, we feel we have raised an issue that
needs raising in the fields of counseling, psychology, and
in particular, higher education.

We expect that some of our colleagues in higher
education will challenge the fact that we are focusing our
concern on a kind of setting which they may see as having
no future, that is, the small, private, non-competitive,
liberal arts college. Our response to this anticipated
challenge is twofold: firstly, we feel that such institu-
tions under strong and flexible management will continue to
serve a population of students that otherwise might not be
served by their more elite counterparts or the technical
institutions; secondly, the findings of this report have
implications for settings other than the small college. We
believe there is "something here for everybody." The or-
ganizational psychologist, Chris Argyris (1964), tells us
that organizations derive their "energy," their "effectiveness," their success, from the "psychological energy," and the "psychological success" of their workers. We believe that the role of the "community feeling" in helping to achieve psychological success deserves careful study by the managers of environments; there is something in this study for them.

One final point of clarification is in order: in thinking about the college as a community we do not conceive of the problem as one of setting up living situations that would serve in the long pull—as utopian communities like communes are meant to do. In Chapter IV, in which we discuss the intentional community, we offer this quote:

... And I say that the difference between the college and the so-called ideal communities ... is this: in any community which you set up the idea is that people shall live in that community, and the aim of that community is the achievement of happiness. Whereas the job of a college is to provide a place into which people may come and get the kind of development which will enable them to leave it (Duberman, 1972, pp. 132-133, emphasis added).

If we think in terms of the students, then, the college as community is a place which one passes through in the search for one's own community (although, as we shall see in Chapter X, some thinkers, like Buckminster Fuller and Arthur Chickering, view the traditional, permanent model of community as a thing of the past). On the other hand, when we think of the college workers—the people who represent its continuity of sorts—we believe that we come a bit closer to
the traditional idea of community. Here, the family analogy works well: the "good" family raises its children to leave after the nurturing and developmental function is complete and then continues to be the family.
CHAPTER I
COMMUNITY AND THE SENSE OF COMMUNITY

Definitions and Concepts

Some of the principal questions that we face in this study are what is meant by the term "sense of community," who experiences such a sense and where or how does such a sense arise. We start with the premise that the word "community," contained in the expression "sense of community" is used as an ideal and not as a reference to a community. By analogy, one may speak of a "sense of family" without there being a referent family. A group of workers may experience a sense of family while at the same time a group of relatives or blood brothers and sisters may not have a sense of family. Might it not be reasonable, in an attempt to understand or explain the meaning of the term "sense of family," to first understand the meaning of family as a concept even though we have agreed that the two concepts are independent? The problem for this study is that the concept of community, while as common as the concept of family, is far more difficult to define. Although this paper does not have as its intent a thorough sociological exploration of community per se, it is thought that to arrive at an understanding of the term sense of community
then we should at least have to understand the term community in its ideal form.

Tentatively, we may begin with a literal, word by word approach in which a definition of a sense of something would simply require that we first define sense and then define the "something." We say this approach is tentative because, intuitively, we suspect that the meaning of a grouping of words (concepts) may be greater than the sum of its parts, particularly when combining a subjective concept like "sense" with an objective "something." Thus, for example, a sense of country cannot be understood merely by knowing the geo-political concept of "country," even if we know that the dictionary definition of "sense" is "a definite but often vague awareness or impression; a motivating awareness" (Webster's, 1976).

Of course, Seymour Sarason (1974), by the use of his term "the psychological sense of community," compounds our problem. Although Sarason (1980) modestly confesses that the addition of the word "psychological" may be a redundancy that was used primarily to attract the attention of the "audience of psychologists" to the issue of sense of community, the addition may, in fact, be a refinement of the concept. The concept "psychological," defined by Webster's (1976) as "... affecting or intended to affect the mind," when added to the concept "sense of," seems to complete the picture by bringing us from a state of "vague
awareness or impression" to a state of affect or consciousness; that is, when we have a sense of something, that means that we are aware that this something exists for us, but when that awareness impinges on our consciousness so that we are emotionally impacted then we can speak of a psychological sense of something.

The "something" in this case is, of course, community, which our dictionary defines as:

1. a unified body of individuals; 1b. the people with common interest living in a particular area; . . . 1d. a group of people with a common characteristic or interest living together within a larger society (Webster's, 1976).

In an article that is now considered classic among sociologists, George Hillery, Jr. (1955) analyzed all of the definitions of community that could be found in the literature, ninety-four in number. The extent of agreement among the various conceptions then in use was what he set out to ascertain. Hillery identified sixteen concepts that were employed in the ninety-four definitions, but the only concept common to all was that people are involved in community! The next most common element was "social interaction" followed by "an area of common ties" (1955, p. 119). Summing up his findings Hillery wrote:

Most students . . . are in basic agreement that community consists of persons in social interaction within a geographic area and having one or more additional common ties (1955, p. 111).
In spite of the disagreements which Hillery found in his search for a consensus of definition, the uncommon elements undoubtedly had meaning for those writers who employed them in their conceptualizations; certainly they are of equal importance to us in our search for an understanding of sense of community. Taking the combination of social interaction and geographic area as a given, what remain are the categories of common ties that are found among the various definitions, each source arguing in favor of one of these categories as the "crucial factor" or "essential element" of community. Listed below are the "essential elements" which Hillery derived from his ninety-four sources:

Self-sufficiency.
Common life, or unity in belief and/or work.
Consciousness of kind, i.e., of a certain homogeneity.
Common ends, means or goals.
Collections of institutions.
Locality group, i.e., heavy emphasis on localism.
Individuality, or uniqueness.

At the same time Hillery found some writers who excluded geographic area as a necessary condition for community. With the stress on social interaction they included most of the above elements, emphasizing "the totality of feelings and attitudes" (1955, p. 116) rather than something held in common. However, every definition of rural community contained all three notions of a common tie, geographic area and social interaction.

In a later work, Hillery (1968), dealing with an
analysis of communal organization, begins his discussion this way: (Note his new emphasis on "quality.")

... as the word has come down to us, [community] has three interpretations. First, community is used as a quality, generally referring to people having something in common, whether goods, rights, or character. The second meaning concerns a body of people, or in modern sociological parlance, a social system; third, sometimes but not always associated with either of the first two meanings, community pertains to people with a common land or territory (1968, p. 3).

Don Martindale offers definitions that take into account the fullness of interaction over a period of time, that is, a total way of life formulated around the idea of a mutual set of problems:

A community is a set or system of groups sufficient to solve all of the basic problems of ordinary ways of life (1964, p. 69)

and later he adds:

... The essence of a community is to be found in the capacity of the members of a collectivity to act and communicate and to form a total system of social life capable of bringing them through the ordinary problems of a single year or of a single life (1964, p. 70).

Martindale's concept of community, therefore, considers the element of geographic area to be secondary or even irrelevant as compared to an integrated system of social life. "The fundamental terms of any system of interhuman life are established not by environment or territory directly but by one's capacity to communicate and to interact on a day-to-day basis" (1964, p. 71).

Knop (1976), whose article on community as "process
and form" will be reviewed below when we discuss the forma-
tional and maintenance aspects of community, approaches the
subject of community not as a backdrop of social activity
but as a "... series of processes which yield or trans-
form localized ... social organization" (1976, p. 103).
Knop continues:

... The interpretation of the concept "commun-
ity" varies ..., but there is considerable agree-
ment in contemporary sociology that it involves estab-
lishment of interrelated patterns for solving a range
of like, common, or reciprocal problems of people liv-
ing near one another and/or identifying with one an-
other. The phrase "involves the establishment of"
implies both the act of establishing as well as the
honoring of established interlaced instrumental behav-
iors. A degree of mutual identification and interac-
tional frequency resulting in "community spirit" or
esprit de corps is further implied by most specifica-
tions of the term (1976, p. 104).

Minar and Greer provide a well-rounded discussion
of community by bringing in both the "ecological" connota-
tion and the connotation that begins to approach that quality
that we are calling the psychological sense of community.
In the preface to their book (1969), The Concept of Commun-
ity, they introduce their subject this way:

Frequently we use "community" to refer to a physi-
ical concentration of individuals in one place. This
is the ecological meaning and accordingly a community
is what ever happens to exist in a given territory--
rabbits and coyotes, businessmen and laborers. It
means no more than that. There is another connotation
of the word, however, which refers to the social organ-
ization among a concentration of individuals. And
this latter is the source of still another meaning.
For community is both empirically descriptive of a social structure and normatively toned. It refers both to the unit of society as it is and to the aspects of the unit that are valued if they exist, desired in their absence. Community is indivisible from human actions, purposes and values. It expresses our vague yearnings for a commonality of desire, a communion with those around us, an extension of the bonds of kin and friend to all who share a common fate with us (1969, p. ix).

In a more philosophical vein, Ralph Keyes, a social commentator, brings us directly to our topic:

... When we try to be more specific about just what "community" means, we usually think first of a place, the place where we live. And yet when we consider where we find a "sense of community," it is rarely in fact where we live. We use the word interchangeably, but it really means two different things. A sense of community is what we find among the people who know us. With whom we feel safe. That seldom includes the neighbors (1975, p. 9).

Before we turn our attention directly to the concept psychological sense of community, it would be well to investigate one other aspect of the sociological theory of community, that is, an explanation of how and why communities form and then decline.

Edward Knop (1976) has written an extensive and elaborately detailed piece on community as a process. Although the language of the article is thick with abstract sociological terminology, Knop's presentation has the virtue of being one of the few statements we have found that attempts to talk about community per se rather than about community as a backdrop or setting in which certain behaviors or conditions occur. Essentially, Knop is concerned
with the elements that are involved in community formation, maintenance and destruction.

Like everything else in the universe, communities do not exist in a vacuum; they are, in gestalt terms, figures embedded in a ground. The ground in which the community is embedded, in Knop's view, is a significant variable in terms of how a community defines itself or in terms of its eventual decline. Knop refers to this ground as the contingent milieu, which is both the community's natural setting and its external social structure and environment. He uses the term "linkage" to refer to any form of relation that people in the community have with the contingent milieu, for example shopping, external laws, etc.

Two broad "categories of concern" form the basis of Knop's theory of community formation: **private** reasons and **public** reasons. Private reasons involve issues of "socio-emotional comfort" and "physical sustenance," while public reasons involve issues of "social control," both "formal" (e.g., judicial systems, police, etc.) and "informal power mechanisms" (e.g., obligations involving money or favors, status, etc.), as well as "informal esteem mechanisms, which operate through preferences or expectations of significant others which call for voluntary compliance and are primarily enforced by subtle responses, gratuities, gossip, avoidance, or other such emotional rewards and costs" (1976, p. 105).
A third important notion is the concept of "closure" defined as "the activities and procedures employed in a community to protect it against detrimental interference by outsiders." This concept is similar to the principles of "completeness" or "self-sufficiency" and is seen by Knop to be an important variable in respect to what we are calling the psychological sense of community. As Knop explains:

... the more the closure, the more the subjective feelings of community in a mutual identification, interactional intensity and esprit de corps sense, and the more the linkages, the less the subjective sense of local community (1976, p. 106).

It can be seen that Knop sees the notions of "closure" and "linkages" has having an inverse or reciprocal relationship. Strict residence requirements, strict enforcement of legal sanctions against "outsiders" and a "general pattern of 'polite cold shoulders' shown strangers" are examples of closure provided by the author.

Knop offers a set of propositions containing "preconditions for community formation." The first such precondition is related to the idea of homogeneity, that is, similarity of values, norms, aspirations, problem-solving methods and methods of getting things done. "Consensus" and "practical unanimity" in the decision-making process and in the ordering of priorities of "pressing community concerns" are the consequences of such community compatibility. Related to this precondition is the ability to "interact in a mutually intelligible manner" in conjunction
with the ability to "assemble for primary interaction."

His second precondition is borrowed from Martindale (1964) whom we quoted in our earlier discussion of the definition of community. It is the set of the three sequential processes postulated by Martindale as being essential for community formation: stabilization, consistency and completeness.

The process of stabilization, relating to the solutions of "collective problems of social life," refers to the categories of private and public concerns discussed above involving the issues of comfort, sustenance and social control. Consistency refers to standardized problem-solving procedures (i.e., institutions) organized so as not to be in competition with one another, thereby integrating the functions of various institutions within the community. The final process, completeness, relates to Martindale's definition of community in which he emphasized the "total system capable of bringing [people] through the ordinary problems of a single year or of a single life."

The key variables that operate in the stabilization-consistency-closure processes are outlined by Knop. The list, not subject to distillation because it is so densely abstract, is quoted in full:

(1) individual definitions of the collective situation, both in terms of potentials for interaction and the nature of the contingent milieu; (2) the extent and nature of complementary role relations; (3) the
frequency of interaction; (4) the extent of overlapping group memberships; (5) the nature of the power structure both locally and externally; (6) the typical inclusiveness of interaction (or the range of general topics covered in normal primary and secondary interactions); and (7) the extent of individual satisfaction with established institutions and their consistency, including perceptions of the adequacy of local institutions to effectively thwart disruptive external influences (1976, p. 111).

Following the above set of variables, Knop presents a series of "chain propositions" designed to explain in detail how the variables work in each of the three major processes. For our purposes it would suffice to note that the underlying principle that would incorporate all these variables in community formation is the growth of the similarity of perceptions leading to some optimal level of stabilization, of consistency and of closure. Only when closure is complete does the collectivity or neighborhood become a community.

Regarding a theory of community maintenance and decline, Knop offers two general hypotheses that seem to parallel the reciprocal notions of community formation, "linkages" and "closure," discussed at the onset:

Community maintenance is contingent on (A) the adequacy of established local institutions to satisfy common needs, and on (B) the adaptability of institutions to meet the challenge of changes in the contingent milieu.

When local institutions are inadequate to satisfy (A) common needs, and/or (B) the adaptability of institutions to changes in the contingent milieu is insufficient, decline or destruction of the local community occurs (1976, p. 114).
And finally, maintaining community is a function of four basic provisions: the adequacy of "member replacement and socialization"; satisfactory physical and socio-emotional sustenance; the adequacy of internal and external social control; and the retaining of "the local base of problem-solving prerogatives" (1976, pp. 114-115). Knop sees community decline as the result of the inhabitants turning to the linkages in the contingent milieu for these provisions thus diminishing the sense of "self-sufficiency"—not only the sense, but the actuality. "Coterminous with the sacrifice of completeness and closure is the sacrifice of community." Here, of course, Knop is referring to community in the local sense, for it becomes evident that the extension into the "external milieu" introduces the idea of "the larger community." As the author observes "... persons, in sacrificing their local community, are not depriving themselves of all semblance of community but are trading it for membership in larger, more diffused communities" (1976, p. 109).

"Lost Community"

Looking at the meaning of community we have discovered that its definition blurs over into a feeling about or a longing for community. Community as an ideal or utopian concept is inseparable from the idea of the psychological sense of community. It is impos-
sible to conceive of a world which contains human culture, whether civilized or uncivilized, that does not also contain human communities. To say that our society is bereft of community is certainly not to insist that we have no communities; to say that "alienated" contemporary man is on a "quest for community" is certainly not to convey the idea that he is without a community. The first assertion is an hyperbole—a way of saying that we seem to be at a distance from the ideal of community. Parallel to this assertion is the second one, which is a way of saying not that we cannot find a community, but that the community in which we can find ourselves does not feel like a community—there is no sense of community that pervades in the psychologies of the mass of men.

If the reader senses a tone of rhetorical chest-beating, he is quite correct. The "lost community" sentiment that has just been expressed is a reflection of what is known as the "mass society theorem"—the belief that with the waning of the Middle Ages, with its set of fixed, monolithic values, and later with the decline of an agricultural, small village society with its traditional moral values and its craftsman work-style, all leading up to the industrialization, urbanization, bureaucratization, depersonalization and secularization of society, modern man has become a victim of "mass society," implying anxiety, alienation and atomization, etc. Mass society is described by Palmer (1977) as
... characterized not simply by size, but by the fact that individuals in it do not have organic relations with one another, only a common membership in a nation-state. In a mass society the person stands alone against the state, without a network of communal associations to protect personal meaning, to enlarge personal power, or to teach the habits of democracy (Palmer, 1977, p. 14).

A corollary feature of such a phenomenon is of course the much reputed loss of a sense of community in society in general, which in turn has often been seen as a chief cause of social ills and commented on by a stream of social commentators (e.g., Tönnies, 1957; Durkheim, 1964; Bakan, 1966; Fromm, 1941; and Nisbet, 1970).

To take an example of the "lost community" school of thought, we shall turn to Robert Nisbet, a most eloquent commentator on "things gone wrong." Nisbet's book, The Quest for Community (1970) builds its case on the erosion of community around the notion of the loss of local authority and the ascendancy of a central authority. We can begin with his description of community formation which appears in the preface:

Community is the product of people working together on problems of autonomous and collective fulfillment of internal objectives, and of the experience of living under codes of authority which have been set in large degree by the persons involved. ... There is no community [when] there are no common problems, where the effective control of functions and authority is invested elsewhere (1970, p. xv).

Nisbet concludes that the problem of community in present-day society stems from
... the decline in functional and psychological significance of such groups as the family, the small local community, and the various other traditional relationships that have immemorially mediated between the individual and society. ... These have become functionally irrelevant to our State and economy and meaningless to moral aspirations of individuals. ... We are forced to the conclusion that a great deal of the peculiar character of contemporary social action comes from the efforts of men to find in large-scale organizations the value of status and security which were formerly gained in the primary associations of family, neighborhood and church (1970, pp. 49-50).

Although sounding very much like a conservative, Nisbet would not have society return to a medieval state to find solidarity and community. As he explains:

... The real problem is not, then, the loss of the old contexts but rather the failure of our present democratic and industrial scene to create new contexts of association and moral cohesion within which the smaller allegiances of men will assume both functional and psychological significance (1970, p. 73).

And finally, Nisbet touches on the theme of alienation:

Much of the contemporary sense of impersonality of society comes from the rational impersonality of ... great organizations. ... In spatial terms the individual is obviously less isolated from his fellows in the large-scale housing-project or in the factory than was his grandfather. What he has become isolated from is the sense of meaningful proximity to the major ends and purposes of his culture. ... The quest for community will not be denied, for it springs from some of the powerful needs of human nature--needs for a clear sense of cultural purpose, membership, status, and continuity (1970, pp. 72-73).

The alienation theme is echoed by educator Douglas Heath (1974) writing in the context of school settings. He describes the students in his studies as "... deeply bored, gloomy and despairing, resentful, purposeless, uncommitted
privativistic." Heath believes that "youth are undergoing characterological changes which are alienating them from their emotional needs, from each other, and from traditional communal sources of values." And like Nisbet, Heath concludes that these changes "... are caused by an historic and irreversible transition in the power of different social institutions to have educative and maturing effects on the young." He is referring, of course, to the "institutions" which are our primary groups--family, neighborhood, church--all familiar examples.

It seems fitting to end our brief discussion of the concerns about the loss of the sense of community in society as a whole by taking note of an observation by Willis Harman, a social policy researcher at Stanford University. In a treatise (1977, pp. 107-108) on "the possibility of a major social transformation," Harman produces a laundry list of what he considers to be the "lead indicators" of historical cultural change. First on his list of lead indicators is "Decreased sense of community"! The complete list, in fact, is very telling in light of this discussion and worth presenting:

- Decreased sense of community
- Increased sense of alienation
- Increased frequency of personal disorder and mental illness
- Increased rate of violent crime
- Increased frequency and severity of social disruption
- Increased use of police to control behavior
- Increased public acceptance of hedonistic behavior (particularly sexual, of symbols of degradation, and of lax public morality)
Increased interest in non-institutional religious activities (e.g., cults, rituals, secret practices) Increased signs of specific and conscious anxiety about the future In some cases, economic inflation

Summary and Discussion

Having reviewed some definitions and sociological conceptualizations of community we may now list the principal elements:

People with common interests living in common area (Webster's)

Social interaction; common ties; same geographic area; self-sufficiency; unity in belief; consciousness of kind; common goals; common institutions; localism; uniqueness (Hillery, Jr.)

A system of groups sufficient to solve all of the basic ordinary problems of a single year; capacity to interact on a day-to-day basis (Martindale)

Mutual identification, honoring established interlaced instrumental behaviors; interactional frequency; community formation depending on the needs for socio-emotional comfort, physical sustenance, and formal and informal linkages with a contingent milieu, accompanied by the meeting of the above-mentioned needs and conditions leading to a subjective sense of community, which, along with the preconditions of homogeneity, stabilization-consistency-completeness, help form community. Necessary for maintenance: member replacement and socialization, and the continuing adequacy of the formational elements. Decline seen as breakdown of self-sufficiency (closure) and the turning to linkages in the contingent milieu (Knop)

We have examined some statements of the "lost community" school of thought, particularly Nisbet, who stressed the importance of primary relationships which "mediate between the individual and society." To rebuild a sense of community a society would have to "create new contexts of
association and moral cohesion" under an authority that would emanate from a local level as against power emanating from the State. These new contexts hopefully would produce a "clear sense of cultural purpose, membership status, and continuity."

This chapter began with the announced intention of getting right to the problem of the definition of the psychological sense of community. To some extent we have been diverted from our task by being drawn to writers who did not (except by implication) tell us what the psychological sense of community is but only that it has been in very short supply in the larger society and that its absence seems to produce a worse state of affairs than would its presence. Some explanations were offered regarding its absence, and for the most part we as readers were left to infer what it is we have to do to build up the supply, again, in the larger society. That this has not altogether been a fruitless digression may be seen if we pause here to gain some perspective as to where we have been and where we wish to go in this report.

Simply put, we are seeking to discover what is known about the concept "the psychological sense of community" (PSC) with the intention of considering ways to apply that knowledge in the context of a small college campus. We shall later be reviewing the only two writers we have been able to find who have attacked the issue of PSC in a signifi-
and head-on manner. Seymour Sarason (1972, 1974, 1977a, 1977b, 1980), the major writer in this field, approaches the problem from two principal perspectives: the primary role that PSC plays in the identification of community psychology as a discipline; and more importantly, the essential role that PSC plays in settings whose basic functions are to help or treat or teach or train persons in need of such. The second writer, Thomas Glynn (1977), following Sarason's lead, wrote a dissertation on "Construct Development and Initial Measurement of the Psychological Sense of Community," the title of which is a sufficient enough description for our present purposes. Neither of these writers provides any direct discussion of the campus as a community. (See, however, the transcript of our interview with Sarason, January, 1980, which appears in the Appendix to this report.) To arrive at the meaning of PSC, what we have done so far is to examine some representative literature on the subject of community per se, that is, a special kind of aggregate of persons as distinguished from other collectivities. Having gone through that process, we found that some conceptualizations of community spilled over from the idea of a collectivity of persons to the idea of the quality that such collectivities take on. For example, we saw that Knop (1976) talked about a "mutual identification" and "interactional frequency" which result in a "community spirit"; and that Minar and Greer (1969) described community
as an expression of "yearnings for ... a communion with those around us." (As we shall see, Glynn [1977], who reports on only a handful of definitions of PSC, uses this fragment of Minar's and Greer's definition of community, in spite of the fact that those authors were not offering it as a definition of PSC. Of the remaining four definitions given in Glynn's report of the literature, one [Cowan, 1975] is merely a restatement of Sarason's definition. The point here is not to show the inadequacy of Glynn's review, but to underscore the rarity of the direct treatment of PSC in the literature. Most of Glynn's review of the literature, in fact, regarding PSC is a reporting of those writers of the "lost community" school one of whom [Nisbet, 1970] we have just reviewed.)

We may take some measure of comfort from the fact that Sarason, himself, provides the rationale for community psychologists to become acquainted with this mass-societal literature. In the conclusion to his book (1974) Sarason cautions us:

There is no formula for how to instill and maintain the psychological sense of community. Indeed, the thrust of this book has been that before we indulge our tendency to develop formulas and techniques (to become absorbed with technical-engineering issues) in our endeavor to effect change, we need to understand better how the nature of our culture produced the situation we wish to change.... The one thing we can be certain about is that in our society the absence or dilution of the psychological sense of community is a destructive force (1974, p. 276, emphasis added).
Be-that-as-it-may, we have set for ourselves a task in this study that has some "technical-engineering" aspects; we want to know how one may effect change (in a small college setting) that would tend to foster, in an institutional collectivity, the psychological sense of community. We are now ready to say where we wish to go in this report: to discover in the literature anything that might throw some light (we do not expect to find formulas) on PSC as a concept that would "inform action" (as Sarason would say).

We shall report on a variety of authors whose writings hold some promise of contributing something--if not directly, then indirectly--to our understanding of the psychological sense of community; where it comes from, how it is maintained or destroyed, its relation to group bondedness and to human motivation and need, its appearance in intentional communities, and a variety of issues more directly related to institutional environments.
CHAPTER III
PEOPLE IN GROUPS

Social Psychology of Groups and Organizations

Many sociologists, social psychologists and psychologists begin their treatment of groups in the abstract with some discussion of the smallest group unit, the dyad. Thus Sarason (1972) offers "marriage" as the smallest instance of a setting, which is defined as a relationship between two or more people lasting over a sustained period to achieve certain goals. In a more basic discussion of group formation, Homans (1950) begins by describing the interactive behavior of two men and summarizes the description as follows:

We have separated the concrete behavior of the two men into factors or elements: emotion, personality, interests, association, activities and the success of their activities. We have seen how these elements are internally related to one another, and how their mutual relations make a recognizable, ongoing entity: not just two men, but linked together; not just two individuals, but a new kind of unit, a group. . . . this unit exists in an environment, and some of its characteristics are determined by the nature of the environment (Homans, 1950, p. 8).

In their Social Psychology of Groups, Thibaut and Kelley (1959) take a closer look at this two-person relationship, the essence of which is interaction:
Two individuals may be said to have formed a relationship when on repeated occasions they are observed to interact. By interaction it is meant that they emit behavior in each other's presence, they create products for each other, and they communicate with each other. In every case we would identify as an instance of interaction there is at least the possibility that the actions of each person effect the other (1959, p. 10).

The consequences of such interaction are then described by the authors in terms of the rewards (pleasure, satisfaction, gratification) or the costs ("inhibiting response factors," e.g., anxiety, embarrassment, physical harm) of the interaction. Interactive behavior is also described in terms of "sets" or "behavior sequences" which are effected by the reward or cost value of an interaction. Each member of a dyad (and by extension, of a group) has two standards by which to evaluate membership in that relationship: the standard against which the member evaluates the "attractiveness" of the relationship which Thibaut and Kelley refer to as the comparison level, or "CL"; and the standard the member uses in deciding whether or not to remain in the relationship, which they refer to as the comparison level for alternatives, or "CL alt" (1959, p. 21). "... A prerequisite for the existence of the dyad," conclude the authors, "is a dependence of the rewards of each upon the other's behavior, that is, a condition of interdependence."

In summary, they write:

"... the formation of a relationship depends largely upon (1) the matrix of the possible outcomes of interaction; (2) the process of exploring or sam-
pling the possibilities; and ultimately (3) whether or not the jointly experienced outcomes are above each member's CL alt  (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959, pp. 22-23).

Remaining with the concept of attractiveness but moving to a discussion of the larger group setting, we enter the realm of group dynamics which presents us with the related concept, cohesiveness. A distant cousin to the idea of a sense of community, the concept of cohesiveness well deserves our attention in this report. Thibaut and Kelley define cohesiveness as

... an increasing function of the attractiveness of the group to its members; that is, cohesiveness will be greater to the degree that rewards are experienced in belonging to the group. These rewards have sometimes been classified by their sources: attractiveness of the members to one another, attractiveness of the goals achieved by belonging to the group, and attractiveness resulting from the positive evaluations of the group by relevant non-members (prestige) (1959, p. 114).

A number of investigations reported by Thibaut and Kelley support the general finding that greater agreement about goals and conformity to norms is reached in highly cohesive groups than in those of low cohesiveness. (Measurement in these investigations were invariably done through sociometric rating techniques.) They also report that members of highly cohesive groups have greater power over one another so that, in general, there is a trend toward similarity of values and attitudes. This state of affairs apparently produces a spiral effect in which "... interdependence begets further interdependence" (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959, p. 115).
Most of the studies reported by Thibaut and Kelley investigated the effects of cohesiveness on work output within industrial settings. Because of interdependence, members of highly cohesive groups apparently have the power to exert more "fate control" over each other than members of less cohesive groups, and hence group goals are more easily achieved. The bulk of the evidence points toward the general conclusion that cohesive groups work more emphatically toward communication with the "goal deviate," either "straightening him out" or clearly rejecting him, thus producing a high degree of goal-directed behavior (1959, pp. 259-260).

Of course, it must be remembered that while most of these social psychological investigations have dealt with production goals and with interdependent work groups of relatively small size, it is our task in this study to address ourselves to a very different kind of setting, the college campus, where "production" goals are less clearly defined and the "work groups" larger and more diffuse. Further, "cohesiveness" does not translate directly to "the psychological sense of community." Thus it remains for us to view these as parallel findings from which relevant implications may be extracted. Perhaps the parallels may be brought a bit closer if we move from the social psychology of groups and review some of the findings of Katz and Kahn in their Social Psychology of Organizations (1978).
Here again we encounter the study of workers in an industrial setting, but this time within the framework of what Katz and Kahn call "internalized motivation." We shall briefly summarize their principal conclusions, particularly from their review of the literature relating to affiliative expression, group belongingness, and alienation.

Their discussion begins with an unquestioned premise that the need for a sense of belongingness does in fact exist in humans. (They do discuss elsewhere the Maslow model of a need or motive hierarchy in which belongingness takes its place between the basic biologic needs and the higher order needs of "self-development, self-esteem and self-actualization.") From their understanding of the literature Katz and Kahn conclude that:

By being part of something beyond the physical self, the individual can achieve a sense of belongingness and can participate in accomplishments beyond individual powers. Moreover, affiliating with others can extend the ego in time as well as space, for individuals can see their contributions to the group as enduring over time even though they themselves may not survive (1978, p. 374).

The authors conjecture that at the core of this special extension of the ego is the need for affiliation and report how that construct has been measured using projective techniques. A related concept, the reference group is discussed in terms of "those instances in which the individual feels a part of some larger social entity and recognizes a bond of identification with that entity." The identifica-
tion discussed here is meant in an affective sense where feelings such as admiration, respect or liking are dominant. Examples of larger reference groups are those of political party loyalty, or nationalistic expression (patriotism); groups involving direct contact or immediate membership would be the smaller variety. Group solidarity is also reported as an area of study in which "the group and not the individual becomes the psychological basis for assessment of accomplishment and satisfaction" (Katz and Kahn, 1978, p. 375).

Several studies are cited by Katz and Kahn which illustrate how three basic factors facilitate reference group identification. The factors are (1) early socialization (in which a child's training forms the basis for later group identification), (2) anticipatory socialization (in which people aspiring toward a particular role are made aware through their culture of the norms that will be required of them as they seek membership in the appropriate organization), and (3) the factor most pertinent to our topic, the socialization practices of organizations to which the individual belongs as an adult. Here we quote the authors in full:

The critical condition for producing organizational identification through the activities of the organization itself is participation in decision making and the sharing of rewards. If people are involved in determining policies and share in the returns from
collective effort, they regard the organization as of their own making. There is little need for convincing them through indoctrination when, in fact, the organization is theirs (Katz and Kahn, 1978, p. 378).

Various measuring scales used to measure the degree of organizational identification are discussed and described by Katz and Kahn. Most of the examples of items supplied by the authors, such as "I feel I am part of the company" or "I like working for this company," differ very little from what one would expect to find among the items of a scale measuring PSC (e.g., see Glynn, 1977). The same may be said for those examples of items which seek to measure organizational commitment (Katz and Kahn, 1978, p. 379). Commitment is defined as a person's willingness to exert effort for, a desire to remain with, and the acceptance of the major goals and values of the organization.

From our brief look at some basic group and organizational theory we have seen that the quality of group ties (strength or weakness) is a function of the reward or cost value of repeated interactions. The interactions are in turn colored by certain affective, cognitive, and personality elements of the members as they impact on one another, as well as by the nature of the environment. If the interactions are successful—that is, goals are achieved and satisfactions are realized—then a spiral of interdependence may be set in motion. Under these circumstances, group cohesiveness may develop, further promoting and main-
aining interdependence and the group norms and goals. Also operating as internal motivators are certain postulated human needs, such as the need for affiliation, belongingness, and identification with a reference group. It has been found that when such needs are allowed expression in an organizational setting through the sharing of rewards and participating in decision making, these motivators may help the group arrive at group solidarity and commitment.

Although the authors we have reviewed are reporting of studies of small groups, mostly within the context of the industrial workplace, it is nonetheless apparent that the basic elements being discussed, i.e., interdependence, cohesiveness, affiliation, belongingness, identification, group solidarity, and commitment, are elements that would be directly related to the emergence and/or maintenance of a psychological sense of community in any collectivity or social system. We are therefore encouraged at this juncture to proceed further to look for any source that would add to our understanding of the basic nature of group ties and of the elemental forces which may be operating in their formation. Accordingly, we shall next take an extended look at a very different approach to group theory which takes the point of view of an hypothesized presence of certain innate intrapsychic "energies." We are, of course, referring to Sigmund Freud's contribution to the field of group psychodynamics.
Freud's "Group Psychology"

One of the avenues through which we are approaching the understanding of the basis for a psychological sense of community is that of motivation—emotional, biological or otherwise—for the coming together of humans in groups. It seems fitting that we start with a look at Sigmund Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921). In this work Freud essentially attempts to demonstrate that "libidinal ties are what characterize a group" (1921, p. 57). While it is both tempting and popular to dismiss this notion in a contemporary discussion, we would argue, but for the choice of terms which connote the mechanistic presence of sexual energies and tensions that are forever seeking release, that Freud's observations find their parallels in most of the later and contemporary findings about group life.

Freud begins his analysis by reviewing the literature of his day regarding the nature of groups (pp. 5-32). He begins with the accepted premise of the day that before a random "crowd" of people can constitute a "group" certain conditions have to be fulfilled. As a starting point he summarizes five such conditions that are proposed by McDougal, from a book entitled The Group Mind (no reference information), written the year before. Supposedly, these were "principal conditions" for raising "collective mental life to a higher level." By this he meant bringing an un-
organized group ("crowd"), which is understood to have an emotionally and intellectually "primitive" mentality, to the level of an organized group (organization). Here are McDougal's "principal conditions": (1) A degree of continuity of existence in the group, material or formal. The former, if the same individuals remain in the group for a period of time; the latter, if there is a system of fixed positions which may be occupied by a succession of persons; (2) Within the group "some definite idea should be formed of the nature, composition, functions and capacities of the group" so that each member may form an emotional tie to the group as a whole; (3) Interaction, perhaps through rivalry, with other similar groups; (4) The possession of customs and traditions, especially those that impact the relations of members to each other; and (5) The clear presence of an order or structure "expressed in the specialization and differentiations of its constituents" (Freud, 1921, pp. 30-31). Commenting on McDougal's organization theory, Freud brings in his own analytic psychology:

... It seems to us that the conditions which McDougal designates as the "organisation" of the group can with more justification be described in another way. The problem consists in how to procure for the group precisely those features which were characteristic of the individual and which are extinguished in him by the formation of the group (1921, p. 32).

In short, in his usually penetrating fashion, Freud jumps right into the heart of the matter—at least from the analytic point of view—of the primacy of the biologic self
manifesting its energy by extension to the organized group.

In fact, he brings the discussion of organizational formation to an abrupt close by recalling "a valuable remark" of a colleague of his "... to the effect that the tendency towards the formation of groups is biologically a continuation of the multicellular character of all the higher organisms" (p. 32). Using this same biological analogy, it could be said that the view, espoused by an American contemporary of Freud's, Charles H. Cooley (1909), discussed below, would be expressed in the converse: the cell (individual) derives its characteristics from the organism (group).

And now we come to the heart of the matter, Freud's libidinal theory of group psychology. Here we quote the author in full: (In the paragraphs preceding, Freud was leading up to the question of how individual self-love [narcissism] is able to tolerate the suppression of its energy in a group setting.)

... So long as a group formation persists or so far as it extends, individuals behave as though they were uniform, tolerate other people's peculiarities, put themselves on an equal level with them. Such a limitation of narcissism can, according to our theoretical views, only be produced by one factor, a libidinal tie with other people. Love for oneself knows only one barrier--love for others, love for objects. The question will be at once raised whether communities of interest in itself, without any addition of libido, must necessarily lead to the toleration of other people and to considerateness for them. This objection may be met by the reply that nevertheless no lasting limitation of narcissism is effected in this way, since this tolerance does not persist longer than the immediate
advantage gained by other people's collaboration. But the practical importance of the discussion is less than might be supposed, for experience has shown that in cases of collaboration libidinal ties are regularly formed between the fellow-workers which prolong and solidify the relation between them to the point beyond what is merely profitable. The same thing occurs in men's social relations ... The libido props itself upon the satisfaction of the great vital needs, and chooses as its first objects the people who have a share in that process. And in the development of mankind as a whole, just as in individuals, love alone acts as the civilizing factor in the sense that it brings a change from egoism to altruism. And this is true both of the sexual love for women, with all the obligations which it involves of sparing what women are fond of, and also of the desexualised, sublimated homosexual love for other men, which springs from work in common.

If therefore in groups narcissistic self-love is subject to limitations which do not operate outside them, that is cogent evidence that the essence of a group formation consists in a new kind of libidinal ties among the members of the group (1921, pp. 56-58, emphasis ours).

Freud ends this discussion by questioning the nature of these libidinal ties. To find the answer, he first must explore the "phenomenon of being in love" which we have just seen is believed to be the fundamental mechanism operating in group ties. However, he puts off his search while he devotes an intervening chapter to an investigation of the alternative mechanism of identification. It shall suffice for us to merely offer a brief description of this mechanism which is certainly familiar to all who have cut their professional teeth on Freud.

As we know, identification is the earliest mechanism which ties one person to another. It plays an important
part in the so-called Oedipus complex in which a son adopts his father as his ideal, in the sense that he puts himself in his father's place, while at the same time, so the psychoanalytic theory goes, the boy develops "a true object-cathexis towards his mother." To relate this concept to the formation of the "group mind" Freud simply lifts it out of the context of child-parent relations. He observes that:

. . . it may arise with every new perception of a common quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct. The more important this common quality is, the more successful may this partial identification become, and it may thus represent the beginning of a new tie.

We already begin to devine that the mutual tie between members of a group is in the nature of an identification of this kind . . . , and we may suspect that the common quality lies in the nature of the tie with the leader (1921, pp. 65-66).

The investigation of the nature of love and its relationship to the group bonding process continues in Freud's next chapter which is the famous essay on "Being in Love and Hypnosis" (pp. 71-80). Through a series of mental maneuvers regarding analogies between love and hypnosis, and hypnosis and group formation, basically building on his discussion of ego identification and the surrender to a love-object, Freud leads up to the conclusion of the chapter, which is all that we shall quote here: (Note the use of the term "primary group" which, as we shall see later, is the invention of Cooley.)
... A primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego (1921, p. 80).

The main thrust, then, of the chapter, in addition to its esoteric dissertation on love, is that through identification and a special relationship with a central leader which Freud likens to the hypnotist, the person "surrenders" self-interest in the interest of the group as a whole. In a later discussion of the subject (1921, p. 100) Freud emphatically states that suggestion lies neither at the heart of hypnosis, "which has a good claim to being described as a group of two," nor of group closeness. He states in a footnote that the riddle of hypnosis, and by implication group psychology, is only partially explained by suggestion, and that "hypnosis is solidly founded upon a predisposition which has survived in the unconscious from the early history of the human family." What Freud is alluding to is "the primal father as the group ideal," which stems from his theory of the "primal horde," a subject to which we shall now turn.

After he concludes his investigation of hypnosis, Freud admits that he has not gotten to the bottom of the group issue. Instead he looks again at the characteristics of the group, describing what sounds more like a "mob," in modern terms:
Some of its features—the weakness of intellectual ability, the lack of emotional restraint, the incapacity for moderation and delay, the inclination to exceed every limit in the expression of emotion and to work it off completely in the form of action—these and similar features . . . , show an unmistakable picture of a regression of a mental activity of an earlier stage such as we are not surprised to find among savages or children (1921, p. 82).

With this he introduces Trotter's theory of the "herd instinct" which he accepts only tentatively while again making use of the biologic analogy. Says Freud (1921, p. 83), "... this gregariousness is an analogy to multicellular-ity and as it were a continuation of it." But still Freud tenaciously clings to libido theory when he adds "... it is a further manifestation of the inclination, which proceeds from the libido, and which is felt by all living beings of the same kind, to combine in more and more comprehensive units."

Freud finally rejects the herd instinct theory because its claim to be "primary," i.e., irreducible, is unfounded, essentially because it fails to account for the place of the leader and other phenomena of group life. He then traces some of these phenomena as seen in the development of the "communal feeling" in a typical group of nursery school children. He arrives at what first seems like an improbable conclusion: that the communal feeling can be traced from an original feeling of jealousy (rivalry for the younger sibling at home) to a "reaction-formation for justice and equal treatment for all" (1921, p. 86).
From there he goes to the example of "a troop of women and girls who crowd around a singer after his performance."

Freud continues his fantasy:

... It would certainly be easy for each of them to be jealous of the rest; but, in face of their numbers and the consequent impossibility of their reaching the aim of their love, they renounce it, and, instead of pulling out one another's hair, they act as a united group, do homage to the hero of the occasion with their common actions, and would probably be glad to have a share of his flowing locks (1921, p. 87).

This seemingly banal fragment is quoted because it leads up to, though only briefly in passing, a treatment of a phenomenon that has a family resemblance to our subject of the psychological sense of community. Writes Freud: "What appears later on in society in the shape of Gemeingeist, esprit de corps, etc., does not belie its derivation from what was originally envy. No one must want to put himself forward, every one must be the same and have the same" (1921, p. 88). Thus Freud is proposing that social feeling is a reaction-formation related to an originally hostile feeling, converted through the mechanism of identification to "a positively-toned tie." This leads to his final word on the subject: the theory of the "primal horde."

Starting with the proposition that the sequence envy-(or jealousy)-reaction-formation-identification leads to a feeling of equality among the group members (including the condition that all are loved equally by the leader), Freud ends with the pronouncement that man is not a herd
animal but rather a horde animal, "an individual creature in a horde led by a chief" (1921, p. 89).

Borrowing the notion from a 1912 conjecture of Charles Darwin that the primitive form of society was that of a horde "despotically ruled over by a powerful male," Freud builds up his theory that the group mind is in reality a regression to "a primitive mental activity." He explains the psychology of such a group as follows:

... the dwindling of the conscious individual personality, the focusing of thoughts and feelings into a common direction, the predominance of the emotions and the unconscious mental life, the tendency to the immediate carrying out of intentions as they emerge. ... we should be inclined to ascribe to the primal horde (1921, p. 91).

It is not difficult to see why a number of later social commentators (for example, Adler, 1927; McWilliams, 1973; and Kanter, 1972, 1974) look with disdain upon Freud's pronouncements. For psychoanalysis appears to be telling us that communal activity stems from a weakness rather than from strength, and by extension, that group solidarity and, for that matter, the psychological sense of community, are merely defenses against initial feelings of rage and envy. "In short," complains Kanter (1972, p. 56), to Freud "the group is an agent of repression...."

Though not speaking specifically about Sigmund Freud, McWilliams takes a stand against all theories that would equate eros with communal feeling (1973, p. 36). And further, he refutes theories of the "group mind" that origina-
ted supposedly from "primitive" societies that were popular among nineteenth-century social theorists—presumably theorists that had some influence on Freud. "Men in traditional societies are not more 'naturally communal' than other men. . . . Traditional societies surround man with iron-clad custom out of individual anxiety, not communal love" (McWilliams, 1973, p. 39).

However, this writer believes it is a mistake to dismiss Freud's notions out of hand, for, strangely, something rings true in these pronouncements. There does seem to be at least a reasonable possibility that "being in community" is some distant relation to "being in love."

Cooley's Concept of the Primary Group

Around the same period that Freud was pondering about the "group mind" and the "primal horde" an American sociologist, Charles Horton Cooley, was doing pioneer work regarding the relationship between individual consciousness and group consciousness (Cooley, 1909). Cooley was one of the early proponents of the idea that self-image is a derivative of the self perceiving others' reactions to oneself. His chief contribution is the concept of the "primary group" (1909, pp. 23-31), which is the group from which the enduring self-images appear to be derived.

Our interest in this study is not with the social psychology of the self. The importance of the primary group concept is that, in contradistinction to Freud, who held
that group feeling and attractiveness to groups in general was regressive and immature, it establishes the group as important in its own right in the development and adjustment of the human personality.

By "primary groups" Cooley means:

. . . those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. . . . They are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self . . . is the common life and purpose of the group (1909, p. 23).

The examples that Cooley gives of the most important of these "intimate associations" are the family, the play-group, the neighborhood and the "community group of elders"--all these being described as "practically universal, belonging to all times and all stages of development" (1909, p. 24).

Rather significant for our purposes, especially because the family may be viewed as the appropriate analogue in terms of the embodiment of the sense of community, is that Cooley, at the very beginning of his discussion of primary groups, quickly points out the non-utopian nature of the primary group:

It is not to be supposed that the unity of the primary group is one of mere harmony and love. It is always differentiated and usually a competitive unity, admitting of self-assertion and various appropriative passions (1909, p. 23).

Thus Cooley is not presenting us with a romantic view of human nature. Although some see him as a social idealist (e.g., Kanter, 1972, p. 33), Cooley clearly under-
stood the disruptive elements of human nature, and that man
can best pursue his private, self-interested goals through
cooperation and interdependence. (Cooley's idealism was
more a function of his desire and hope that "primary group"
spirit could be extended "to our country, our race, our
world.") For Cooley the "we-feeling" stems from what he
refers to as a "moral unity," which is both the outgrowth
of the primary ideals which emerge from the identification
of the self-interest with group interest, and at the same
time the bonding agent which perpetuates the group. Again,
the family serves as the model for moral unity, as does
the play-group. And, again, Cooley directs our attention
to the idea that unity need not (and cannot) exclude indi-
vidual expression:

Moral unity . . . admits and rewards strenuous ambi-
tion; but this ambition must either be for the success
of the group, or at least not inconsistent with that.
The fullest self-realization will belong to the one
who embraces in a passionate self-feeling the aims of
fellowship . . . It is, then, not my aim to depreciate
the self-assertive passions. I believe they are fierce,
inextinguishable and indispensable (1909, p. 35).

Cooley, who invented the term, "we-feeling," closes
his discussion of primary groups by asking us to

. . . see and feel the communal life of family and
local groups as immediate facts, not as combinations
of something else. And perhaps we shall do this best
by recalling our own experience . . . What, in our
life, is the family and fellowship; what do we know
of the we-feeling (1909, p. 31)?
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft

Throughout the sociological literature on community one finds the use of the expressions Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, the first denoting the traditional quality of community made up of the stuff of such primary groups as the family, friends, and neighbors; the second denoting the quality of non-traditional society made up of the "contractual" or "instrumental" relationships such as merchant and consumer, performer and spectator, and so forth. The sociologist responsible for bringing these concepts into common sociological parlance is Ferdinand Tönnies (1957) in his classic work (published originally in 1887) Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, translated either as "community and association" or "community and society." Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are to be taken as qualities or Platonic forms which this or that community may have more or less of at any one time but never a full measure of, or a complete absence of.

Tönnies set out "... to study the sentiments and motives which draw people to each other, keep them together, and induce them to joint action" (1957, p. 237). He deduced that there are two distinct kinds of human motivation or "wills" which govern relationships. On the one hand there is natural will which is seen as simple, direct, emotional and/or impulsive and "which tends not to be deliberate" or seek certain means to certain ends; it "does not
necessarily rule out intellect and reason," which, when fused with the natural will, becomes the creative part of human mentality. On the other hand there is rational will, "... in which thinking has gained predominance" (1957, p. 247). He then makes this pronouncement:

I call all kinds of associations in which natural will predominates Gemeinschaft, all those which are formed and fundamentally conditioned by rational will, Gesellschaft (1957, p. 247).

Thus these "two different modes of mentality and behavior" signify two types of association, the rational or Gesellschaft mode having for Tönnies the connotation of "mechanical," and the natural or Gemeinschaft mode the connotation of "organic." When a relationship is seen as "an end in itself" it takes on the quality of Gemeinschaft. On the other hand if a relationship is formed for a certain purpose, that is, an "association by agreement--an instrument to achieve certain ends," it becomes an "instrumental" relationship taking on the quality of Gesellschaft (1957, p. 263).

There is an element of Tönnies which to some extent appears to be more than a description of purely ideal types; that is, it appears that he is providing a description of where society was heading: toward Gesellschaft, "a mere coexistence of people independent of each other" (1957, p. 38). Thus, his theoretical posture also offers his personal view of the future, as in such statements like ". . . as
time passes rational will has a tendency to supplant natural will" (1957, p. 267). However, the main thrust of his thinking strives essentially to provide a framework through which to view human association. Many of the writers we have reviewed are prone to take potshots at Tönnies as the result of interpreting Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft as a strict either/or dichotomy rather than ideal types. Also, Tönnies is often depicted as a prophet of doom, sentimentally yearning for the past and predicting the final death of community in our society generally, rather than as a cogent observer of societal trends. For example, Kanter (1972, p. 241), chooses to argue with Tönnies when she writes "Utopian communities are just as clearly defined and ordered by their gesellschaft nature--the fact that members relate to one another in the context of their organizational tasks--as they are by their communal goals." Tönnies would not deny this because Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft may both be descriptive of the attributes of one community, that is, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive qualities. As to his sentimentalism and pessimism we have only to read the introduction which reminds us that Tönnies believed

... that the process of change from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft might be reversed by real causes if such existed, but not by speeches and sentimental romanticizing about the past (1957, p. 3).
Intimate Secondary Relationships

Cooley has told us about primary relationships, that is, those relationships which take place in the contexts of primary groups. These not only include the family, play-group and close neighbor relations which we have mentioned, but also common friendships, and day to day close-knit work groups. Recently, Wireman (1978a, 1978b) has written about another kind of relationship which sociologists refer to as a secondary relationship, a category implied but not discussed by Cooley. Simply put, what occurs in secondary relationships is the opposite of what occurs in primary ones; that is, there is none of the intense personal and/or family involvement, the socializing, or the mutual knowing of personal life or character that is found in primary relationships. Neither is there the open-ended commitment. The secondary relationship focuses on a specific purpose and is public in nature; the interactions occur in public places only. Some examples are the relationships between salesperson and customer, among members of a committee, stockholders at a meeting or between bureaucrat and client.

Wireman, however, writes about a very special kind of secondary relationship which she calls the intimate secondary relationship. The intimate secondary relationship has some of the characteristics of both primary and secondary relationships. It has in common with primary re-
relationships the quality of intense involvement, warmth, sense of belonging, and rapport; and while there is minimal sharing of personal information and minimal socializing, there is the mutual knowing of each other's character. In every other respect it has the characteristics of the secondary relationship described above. Examples that Wireman gives are voluntary committee and board memberships, task forces, branch office groups, ad hoc problem solving groups, political and other planning groups.

The main focus in Wireman's articles is on the nature of the functions of such intimate secondary relationships in terms of ameliorating the alienating effects of "modern urban life" and, in general, the rapidly changing social conditions of "modern society." This "community lost" picture of contemporary society, says Wireman, is drawn by proponents who claim that

. . . whereas the individual formerly lived within a context of overlapping local primary relationships among family, neighbors and workmates, in modern society man is autonomous and alienated, thrust into a series of isolated relationships entered into for instrumental purposes and maintained only as long as necessary for goal achievement (1978a, p. 3).

Perhaps it begins to be clear why our attention has been drawn to Wireman. The relevance of her topic should become even clearer by a reading of the functions of intimate secondary relationships identified in her discussion. Wireman summarizes these as follows:
Functions in areas of rapid geographical mobility include: rapid intimacy, rapid knowledge of character, rapid knowledge of community resources and norms, rapid sense of community, and joint action. Functions in heterogeneous areas include: controlled intimacy, knowledge of character, joint action, accepting all residents as community members, understanding the needs of different groups, and creating a community network of trust relationships... Intimate secondary relationships can create community integration through: relating newcomers to the community quickly, relating diverse people, relating diverse interest groups, establishing and disseminating community values, and creating and disseminating community norms (1978a, pp. 1-2, emphasis added).

Wireman stresses that intimate secondary relationships and networks of such relationships "... promote an intangible spirit of community, a feeling of being connected at least indirectly to many members of the community, not just one's friends and neighbors" (1978a, p. 14, emphasis ours). At the same time Wireman also claims that the functions of these relationships permit a degree of intimacy and a knowledge of others without commitment to friendship. "The crucial quality," she points out, "is not affection but credibility..." (1978b, p. 15).

Essentially, Wireman's contribution is that she has focused attention on the functions and content of intimate secondary relationships, a concept which she rightfully states has clear "heuristic value." Beyond that, her suggestions for future research moves from a descriptive to a prescriptive one and therefore, closer to the concerns of this study. "Finally," she asks, "what are the practical implications of such relationships for community design and
policy matters? Conscious attention needs to be given in the design of buildings and communities to provide the public places needed for the formation of intimate secondary relationships and the minimal staff and other supports for encouraging the voluntary groups which foster them" (1978a, p. 20).

**Same-sex Bondedness: "Men in Groups" and "the Idea of Fraternity"**

In his book, *Men in Groups* (1969), Lionel Tiger proposes the theory that males, human and otherwise, have an innate need to band together. The need, which he calls male-bonding, arises out of the evolutonal necessities of the hunt, of war and defense, and of work. This bioanthropological view, deplored though it may be in feminist circles because of what may be construed as its sexist overtones, presents a rather fresh perspective on why humans, albeit in this case exclusively the male of the species, are motivated to form and sustain close ties. As we are most interested in the sense of community as a human experience, it behooves us to consider any theory which has as its central focus human bonding, especially a theory whose essential dynamics does not rely on sexuality as the dominant motivating force. (Freud, for example, as we have seen, viewed male-bonding as "desexualized, sublimated homosexual love . . . which springs from work in common").

A less sexist approach to "the natural tendency of
men to come together" may be found in McWilliams' ambitious 700 page tome, *The Idea of Fraternity in America* (1973). Basically, it is an historical essay on American political thought through which he follows the thread of "the idea of fraternity" as he reviews the contributions of our great statesmen and writers and some of the foundations of political traditions. More importantly for our topic, it deals with a concept that most certainly is a first cousin to the "idea of community." Sarason, in fact, considers it to be among the major statements on the subject of the sense of community (1980).

At first it was difficult to know whether McWilliams meant for us to understand the term "fraternal" as applying to all humankind regardless of sex. The author steadfastly and with few exceptions from beginning to end uses the word "fraternity" to mean just that--a relation of affection founded on the shared values and goals of men. However, there are a few passages which suggest that women, no less than men, may participate in the virtues of solidarity. Two clues, appearing in the acknowledgement section of an exceedingly brief preface, suggest that perhaps the author would allow us to mentally interchange "she" for "he" as we explore with him the "idea of fraternity." McWilliams, dedicating the book to "all [his] brothers," asserts his indebtedness to a woman "... for the standard she set by her fierce devotion to truth..." Shortly after, he mentions
his debt to his wife "... for proving the interdependence of sorority and fraternity and ... by demonstrating that a man's wife can stand in the first rank of his friends and brethren" (1973, pp. x-xi, emphasis ours). Then in the first chapter, he develops the argument that men, more so than women, are in great need of solidarity because their functions are far less certain, and their authority more fragile (p. 15). Since "male virtues ... imply independence and self-sufficiency as an ideal," then such virtues "... enhance the danger of division among men." McWilliams therefore builds his case on "... the recognition of imperfection in 'masculinity'" (p. 16). This is what makes fraternity difficult. But then before closing the gates, in a wink he lets his sisters through:

Traditional societies may have associated fraternities with men, but the appeal of sorority is no less. With all its difficulties, fraternity is vital for anyone who would find himself and who knows that no one can do so alone (p. 18).

And a final hint is offered later in the book when McWilliams is discussing the work of James Baldwin as one of the literary commentators on the question of fraternity in black America:

... To love one another, to have genuine fraternity, men must love what is "feminine" in themselves (and vice versa, in the case of sorority); the world of fraternity must be free of sexual Jim Crow (1973, p. 612).

We shall now look at how McWilliams' idea of fraternity can contribute to our understanding of community.
We have just shortly before mentioned Lionel Tiger's theory of male-bonding. McWilliams believes that although Tiger's proposition of an innate male solidarity is "... intimately related to fraternity, it does not deal with the specific qualities of fraternity as a relationship" (p. 3).
In other words, although providing a foundation, Tiger stops short of giving us a complete picture of what McWilliams calls "the structure of fraternity." In McWilliams' view of fraternity, the solidarity of alienated groups can work to foster a sense of community in a given setting:

"Fraternity presupposes alienation... one must acknowledge what is human in one's brother, what is kin between him and all men, before one can claim to have a genuinely higher regard for him... [It] is in what is most immediate to man, in the self, that he first feels the sense of shortcoming that is so vital an element of fraternity... As Nietzsche knew, continued striving for what is excellent and continuing recognition of one's own faults cannot be endured without a friend. The individual who knows his own unworthiness needs the assurance that he has value; he demands the encouragement of affection" (1973, pp. 50-51).

There is no one concise and coherent definition of fraternity provided by McWilliams. He introduces the topic by arguing that fraternity

1. Is a bond based on intense interpersonal affection, and,
2. Like all such bonds, is limited in the number of persons and in the social space to which it can be extended; that it
3. Also involves shared values and goals considered more important than "mere life," and
4. Is closely related to the development of "ego identity," since it
5. Includes a recognition of shortcomings and failure in the attainment of ultimate values, but
6. Provides the emotional encouragement and sense of worth ("assurance of identity") which makes it possible to endure such tensions without betraying one's own values, and finally,

7. Implies a necessary tension with loyalty to society at large (1973, pp. 7-8).

Although not explained by McWilliams (as does Tiger when theorizing on "men in groups") as being derived from a particular biological necessity, his theory of fraternity is nevertheless essentialistic in that he sees it as part of the nature of man.

One distinction between fraternity and community is that the former requires an intense personal commitment and "interpersonal affection." This may be illustrated by the example of a black person addressing the man next to us as "brother," and us as "mister." By so doing he is excluding us from his fraternity but not necessarily from his community. Community requires only an intensity of commitment to some center and to the value of interdependence.

Fraternity is also seen as a bonding agent which connects elements of a community otherwise blocked by barriers of status and station, or locked in the isolation of sexual or romantic unions:

Sexual solidarity helps . . . to decrease the social importance of sexuality. Sexual gratification is self-referential and isolating, and its logical tendency is to create isolated groups or sporadic unions for immediate gratification. The solidarity of sex overcomes the tendency to some degree and serves as a bond which crosses the line of clan and descent . . . Sexual solidarity creates a likeness between persons otherwise separated by barriers of age, command, and authority, a hierarchical rather than horizontal pattern of communication and community (1973, pp. 13-14).
On the other hand solidarity, whether it be sexual, racial, whether it be expressed in cliques or gangs, obviously, as McWilliams points out, sometimes must present problems to the larger society in which it is embedded. However, the value of these groups are rarely understood by those who would aspire to a larger sense of community. Ethnic gangs, for example, provide "... a center of unambiguous loyalty for youth caught between a disintegrating heritage and exclusion from the dominant society" (p. 85); cliques, appearing as they do in the less violent behavior settings of institutions, are nonetheless an expression of a similar desire to form exclusive, intensive relations for mutual support. And yet "established social institutions seem almost contrived to prevent such 'mere friendship' groupings," McWilliams reminds us (p. 86), "even as they actively encourage extensive social contact."

Very important in the idea of fraternity is the concept of the acknowledgement of individual separateness in its best sense. To make his point McWilliams appears to set up Gemeinschaft (Tönnies, 1957), as a "straw man," presenting it as a concept that would exclude the private self. However, the major thrust of his remarks is well-taken:

Traditional societies surround man with iron-clad custom out of individual anxiety, not communal love. ... The single "identity" of customary society is not community; communion and common things presume something
shared between two or more entities otherwise separate, an essential unity of things divided by their accidents. The "we" of gemeinschaft is based, by contrast, on a denial of individual personality and separateness. ... Those who do not understand man are incapable of understanding the nature and conditions for community and fraternity between men (1973, pp. 39-40).

Again, gemeinschaft, excluding private self-interest which would keep others at a distance in an attitude of concealment, certainly includes within its meaning the nurturing of the private self. McWilliams himself states that "Man cannot conceal himself from others without losing part of himself, and privatization more than any single factor destroys the possibility of genuine privacy" (p. 90, emphasis added). Relatedly, the exclusion of disagreement or even aggression as components of personal attachments would deny the possibility of a sense of fraternity (p. 47).

Without these various components of personal attachment "Men [tend to] move in circles which are 'limited liability communities.' ... It is, in fact, a pseudo-gemeinschaft" ... (p. 89).

Like other writers, McWilliams discusses war as a galvanizing process in the sense that it momentarily ends alienation from the community; at the same time it is seen as a source that is destructive of fraternity. Here is one of the rare passages in his book that clearly pits community against fraternity:

During a period of crisis and war the shamelessness and fearlessness of brethren, their willingness to lose life and their fascination with death, become needs of
society, not dangers to it. War and crisis are temptations of those false brothers for whom fraternity is not enough, who would escape alienation in order to reenter community (p. 30, emphasis added).

Violence, McWilliams admits, does help men find solidarity. The "fraternity of battle" does produce moments of "nobility" and "rebirth." And yet,

... the fraternity of battle is radically defective as fraternity. Those who must fight or "confront" others to find solidarity leave the essential decision --what is being fought about--to the enemy. ... The fears which prevented the same sense of solidarity from developing in time of peace are quieted in time of conflict.

... The solidarity one was too cowardly to seek in peace is purchased at the price of a brother's blood. ... I hardly deny the sad truth that war and violence are sometimes necessary. I only deny the proposition that they produce fraternity. Brothers may march to defend something they value already, and it may strengthen both their bonds and their devotion to the valued thing that they do so; it creates neither. Why else the mournful lesson of battle fraternity, that it lapses with the end of the war (pp. 92-93)?

So we see that, for McWilliams, fraternity is not only independent of community, but often may be at odds with the survival of community because one of the values of fraternity is that survival may come at too high a price. With this in mind he states that there are three conditions necessary to sustain fraternity among citizens in a political context:

(1) the absence of continuous war or crisis; (2) the small state, which makes possible the sharing of affection and emotion; and (3) a nonmaterialist standard of value, excluding the possibility of individual perfection and setting citizens apart from other members of the community (pp. 31-32).
These conditions specifically were derived from McWilliams' analysis of the city-state or the polis of ancient times. (It is interesting to note that elsewhere [p. 87] the author observes that the college campus "... is one of the last analogues of the polis. ...") For the hope of fraternity in contemporary settings, political or otherwise, he offers that we must face three imperatives: "to recognize fraternity when it occurs; to broaden the chance for others; to feel compassion for those denied the opportunity of fraternity" (p. 94). In short, for the leadership to set the example, "the oldest duty of fraternity."

Summary and Discussion

To understand the basis of group formation we began with an analysis of two-person relationships (Thibaut and Kelley). The dyad relationship was said to exist when on repeated occasions two people have interacted in terms of communication "with possible consequences" and with the intention to "create products with each other." The strength of the relationship depends on the rewards and costs, where interdependence would emerge from the "dependence on the rewards of each upon the other's behavior." To the extent that the rewards in belonging to the group in terms of achievement of group goals and prestige are experienced, to the same degree will cohesiveness be an attribute of group life, producing greater agreement about group goals, and
greater influence or power over one another. This, in turn, creates a "spiral of interdependence" in which group goals are more easily achieved.

We saw that in organizational theory (Katz and Kahn) the sense of belongingness was postulated to be a human need. It was said that affiliation "extends the ego in time and space," enabling it to "participate in accomplishments beyond individual powers." The reference group is that larger social system with which the individual identifies; thus group solidarity becomes the basis for a sense of accomplishment and satisfaction. Three factors were cited which are said to facilitate reference group identification: early socialization (training for later identification); anticipatory socialization (being made aware of norms required for membership); and participation in decision making and sharing of rewards.

The observation was made that the elemental factors in group and organizational theory appear to be directly related to the idea of a psychological sense of community; therefore, we were encouraged to look further into the basic nature of group ties.

Freud's essay on group psychology was then reviewed. First cited were McDougal's "principal conditions for group formation": continuity, material or formal; definite idea of nature of the group with which to attract emotional ties; interaction with other similar groups; customs and traditions;
order or structure. Freud saw the emerging group as an extension of the individual psyche which is extinguished as the group forms. The question for Freud was how narcissism is able to be suppressed so as to allow for the group feeling and for the toleration of other people's needs. His answer was that narcissism is only temporarily put aside (limited) to take advantage of collaboration ("Love alone brings a change from egoism to altruism"). Freud concluded that the essence of group formation consists "in a new kind of libidinal ties among the members of the group." Identification was seen as the primary mechanism in group formation, through the recognition of a "common quality shared with a person who is not a sexual object." The surrendering or self-interest is accomplished by identification with the leader by each member and thus by identification with each other. Freud postulated a predisposition in humans for seeking "the primal father" (leader of the "primal horde") he also theorized that there is an inclination of the libido "to combine in more and more comprehensive units" (in the same way that cells combine into organisms). Communal feeling was described as being a consequence of a reaction-formation with respect to feelings of jealousy (sibling rivalry) in regard to the admired leader (primal father). Since "the aim of love is impossible" it is renounced, and in its place is the call for "equal treatment for all," unity, and esprit de corps ("no one wants to put himself forward; every
one must be the same and have the same).

The connection between Freud's theory of group formation and an understanding of the experience called the psychological sense of community was recognized in terms of the relationship of the idea of "being in love" to the idea of "being in community."

Cooley's conception of the primary group was discussed. The primary group evolves out of a moral unity—the result of the identification of self-interest with group interest, and the "we-feeling" associated with the family or play-group as prototypes. The idea of moral unity includes not only "harmony and love," but differentiation, competitiveness, and self-assertiveness that are not inconsistent with group goals. Although not identical with community and sense of community, the primary group nevertheless serves as the community ideal, and hence the model for the larger and more extended idea of community.

Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft were brought into our discussion because of the important place these concepts have in the literature of community, particularly in the writing of Ferdinand Tönnies. That writer conceived of these as polarities of human motivation in regard to social interrelatedness. They represent a typography of community life and are therefore descriptive of the quality of the dominant relationship style in a given society or social system. Gemeinschaft described the communal aspects of
society evolving from the natural will, the emotional and direct attribute of human interaction; Gesellschaft, from the rational will, described the instrumental aspects of human interchange. These were seen as ideal qualities which coexist to some degree, with one or the other being dominant at a given time or fused into a workable synthesis. Tönnies' conception provides a framework through which to view society in terms of the tension between these two poles.

An example of a "workable synthesis" was seen in Wireman's concept of the functions of intimate secondary relationships. These are relationships which focus on a specific purpose (instrumental) and are public in nature, but which have some of the qualities of primary relationships without the same degree of sharing, socializing and commitment. Interactions of this sort were seen as based upon "credibility rather than affection" and are exemplified by such groups as committees, boards and other voluntary associations. Wireman viewed these relationships as being very effective in promoting "an intangible spirit of community" in areas of rapid geographical mobility and/or areas with heterogeneous populations. For those of us who are concerned with creating, enhancing or preserving the psychological sense of community in a setting like the college campus these revelations perhaps bare some good news. The campus may be looked at as a miniature of the modern urban life described above. By definition the college commitment is time-and-
space-limited. If one were to depend on the emergence of the whole as an ideal Coolian primary group in order to achieve a corresponding emergence of a sense of community, then one indeed would have to despair. The concept of intimate secondary relationships and their functions may provide the theoretical foundation for explaining why certain kinds of campus "activities" foster community feeling while certain others do not.

The college, after all, is both an "area of rapid geographical mobility" and a "heterogeneous area." There is no question that stability and homogeneity are community-creating conditions as we shall learn in the next chapter by looking at communes and other intentional communities. However, these conditions are not necessarily desirable in a democratic and pluralistic society. The implications of Wireman's findings are welcome precisely because they offer an alternative to nostalgically bemoaning the loss of community as it has been known in the past.

We are not here talking about any novel or mysterious forms of relationships. Boards, ad hoc committees and other task oriented memberships and the like abound profusely in our society and in the miniature societies of our campuses. What is novel is the observation of just how these common bodies function to produce social consequences and hence community psychological consequences of such enormous benefit, perhaps even more far-reaching than certain
experiences like encounter groups which are deliberately designed to "enhance community."

A brief mention was made of Lionel Tiger's proposition that males of all species have an innate need to band together. For our purposes, it would be well to consider not male-bonding per se, but same-sex (or unisex as Tiger prefers to call it) bondedness (not homosexual) as a factor in the facilitating of communal strength. If we tentatively accept the proposition that anything like an innate same-sex-bonding need does exist in human society then we would have to ask what would be the consequences of a social system whose structures and norms are inhibitive of the expression of this need? Just as many of the most successful utopian communities (Kanter, 1972) had built into their communal design the prohibition of sexual pairing for fear that such subgroups would undermine the sense of community, how would the recognition of unisex-bonding be included in such a design? Assuming, for example, that in a given community the sexes are evenly divided in number, we would have to ask whether providing encouragement, through social, architectural and other means, of the meeting together of persons of the same sex as a regular and routine segment of the life of that community, would hinder or enhance the overall sense of community of that group. Perhaps such opportunities would tend to strengthen communal bonds; this may be a much overlooked communal-facilitative strategy.
The common metaphor of the woven fabric provides a handy analogy for seeing how such social arrangements can be a cohesive rather than a divisive force. Simply put, the sexes in their separateness represent the woof and warp in their perpendicular relationship. The fabric (the communal bonding) is created by the natural sexual or pairing tendencies which represents the interweaving mechanism that ensures that the woof and the warp are not two separate masses. This is obviously too simplistic, for it does not take into account all the other possibilities of interpersonal dynamics. But if we imagine for a moment that in our hypothetical community every person is a partner in a sexual pairing, then we can see how the cross threading of same-sex bondedness would tend to pull an otherwise dyadically segmented collection of persons into a unified group.

In our review of McWilliams' book (1973) we saw that "the idea of fraternity" also encompasses single-sex relationships. While the author defined fraternity as a relation of affection founded in the shared values and goals of men, we concluded that he had in mind the extension of this idea to women (sorority) as well. Fraternity, or sexual solidarity, was described as an essentialistic attribute of man, and as a bond between persons "otherwise separated by barriers" providing a "center of inambiguous loyalty." The fraternal nature of man was seen as helping to decrease the social importance of sexuality.
How is McWilliams' notion relevant to our search for the understanding of the concept of the psychological sense of community? We suspect that what he was really expressing, seen in the context of a critique of modern liberalism by an essentially political commentator, is a yearning for what he calls "the old tradition," implying the virtues of constraint and discipline. It is not, says McWilliams, the social science tradition which continues "... to identify eros and community, and to define community in terms of 'warmth,' physical gratification, and the 'original,' 'natural' desires of pre-cultural, pre-political man" (1973, p. 36). Nor is it, as others have suggested, "a desire to recapture the 'sweetness' of childhood." McWilliams would have us revive the old virtues of "honor, obligation [and] authority" which "involve more than constraint; as they imply, constraints are involved whenever affection matters, whenever one is deeply bound to other human beings" (1973, p. 623, emphasis ours). Here we seem to find some agreement with most of the writers reviewed in this study; that the sense of community has everything to do with order; and that the necessary conditions for order are that it neither yields to a tyranny of the one nor of the collective, and that it springs from some vital central value. We believe this is best epitomized in man's efforts to create ideal or utopian communities. For this reason we shall now turn to the subject of the commune.
CHAPTER IV

INTENTIONAL COMMUNITY

Communes and Commitment

The subject of the commune as a unique type of social organization, widely studied by sociologists, has recently caught the attention of community psychologists (for example, Sarason, 1974, 1978; Zax and Specter, 1974) presumably in their efforts to find material that is relevant to an understanding of the community as process, or community in the making. For this reason we shall turn toward this subject as part of our attempt to understand the psychological sense of community. It should be made clear that while our chief concern is with the college campus as community, we are not proposing that we turn our schools into utopian communities where the object would be the establishment of "harmony, brotherhood and peace" and other forms of human "perfectability." The point is not to turn colleges into communes but rather to consider if, and in what manner we may use the knowledge of how successful communes were formed and maintained in the context of building or maintaining a sense of community on a campus. (Some American colleges, notably Antioch and Oberlin in the nineteenth century, did actually begin as utopian experiments. Later
in this chapter we discuss Black Mountain College, a twentieth century example, whose rather brief existence is described by Duberman [1972].) Sarason (1972, p. 86) has said that "creating a commune and creating an establishment-type setting conceptually and developmentally have far more in common than has been recognized," although elsewhere (1974, 1978) his expressions seem more pessimistic about the present knowledge, ability and willingness of social planners and leaders to create "optimal social living conditions."

There have been those who have consciously set out to create small social systems with the central goal of establishing an order that would guarantee or at least maximize community mindedness which, in turn, would serve to perpetuate the community structure. Such systems have been called intentional communities; the term intentional community refers to the structured "community mindedness," that is, the "sense of community" that is built into the system. Conover (1978), a specialist on the subject of the "alternate culture" movement out of which such communities began burgeoning in the late sixties, makes a technical distinction between communes and intentional communities. He defines both forms as groups "of five or more adults who engage in extensive sharing at the economic and interpersonal levels" with the distinguishing elements being that communes, unlike intentional communities, incorporate a "common pooling of incomes" and "long-term multiple sexual
commitments" (Conover, 1978, pp. 1-2). In this chapter we are not concerned with such distinctions but rather with the broader meaning of intentional community which would include communes and any other social systems where community itself is an important goal. The contemporary commune, which Conover sees as an outgrowth "of currently felt needs for community in an urban middle-class environment seething with alienation and anomie," is the better example of intentional community as compared to the 19th century commune. The latter, according to Conover, was based on other "influential dynamics" such as "ideologies imported from Europe" or the "economic theories of Owens and Fourier." However, perhaps because of the advantage of historical perspective, a more definitive body of research seems to have come out of studies of the communes of the past. We shall turn our attention to one such study.

Rosabeth Kanter (also reviewed by Zax and Specter [1974, pp. 282-295]), a Brandeis sociologist who writes extensively on the life of communes (1970, 1972, 1973), has clearly and painstakingly provided an analysis of the "mechanisms" she found to have been commonly present in "successful" 19th century communal organizations (1972). ("Successful" communes are defined as those which lasted twenty-five years or more.) Kanter's major focus is on the concept of commitment, for she found that the chief difference between successful and unsuccessful communes "lies in
how strongly they built commitment . . . where the primary issue is organization" (p. 64).

According to Kanter (1972, pp. 66-67), commitment refers to

. . . the willingness of people to do what will help maintain the group because it provides what they need. In sociological terms, commitment means the attachment of the self to the requirements of social relations that are seen as self-expressive. Commitment links self-interest to social requirements. A person is committed to a relationship or to a group to the extent that he sees it as expressing or fulfilling some fundamental part of himself; he is committed to the degree that he perceives no conflict between its requirements and his own needs; he is committed to the degree that he can no longer meet his needs elsewhere. . . .

[Commitment] forms the connection between self interest and group interest.

Kanter identifies three major aspects of a social system that involve commitment: retention of members, group cohesiveness and social control (1972, p. 67). It is not clear from her initial discussion in which direction the causality lies; that is, does commitment appear before or after the appearance of these factors? However, she does maintain that all three must be present if we are to find commitment in a setting, and that each of the three aspects, although independent, may be "mutually reinforcing and multiply determined" (p. 68). It appears that to have a full appreciation of Kanter's analysis, we must, for the moment, accept a kind of circular logic. To find a more linear path we might ask these questions: What do we need if we are to have a "successful" commune (i.e., lasting at
least a generation)? Presumably, Kanter would answer that we need people who are willing to "stick it out," "stick together," and "stick" to the values and demands of the system (retention, cohesiveness and social control). Then, how would members be influenced to orient themselves to a system in these three ways? Kanter provides a rather concise answer in the form of three distinct kinds of commitment which, in turn, lead to precisely the three major factors of a "successful" commune.

Says Kanter "A person orients himself to a social system instrumentally, affectively, and morally" (1972, p. 68). An instrumental orientation is the "cognitive" approach whereby a person evaluates the rewards and costs that come with participation in a group (i.e., "What's in it for me?"). When experience, in the balance, produces a "positive cognition" then Kanter would say that such a person has the potential of developing an instrumental commitment, which, in turn, induces him to stay in the system. Similarly, an emotional attachment to persons in the system would produce an affective commitment which leads to group cohesiveness; an attraction "to the moral compellingness of the norms and beliefs of the system" produces in the individual a moral commitment leading to an acceptance of social control.

Thus, the central issue for Kanter was to discover the manner in which successful communes developed within
their memberships these kinds of commitment so essential for the maintenance and survival of their settings. Therein, we believe, lies the core of her work.

Kanter discovered six commitment-building processes which she distinguished from other elements in the nineteenth century communes and which were found to be more prevalent in the successful ones (1972, pp. 75-125). These processes or commitment mechanisms are seen by Kanter as either detaching-oriented or attaching-oriented. (To reduce the value of non-communal commitments, detachment processes are needed; attachment processes are required to increase the value of communal commitments.) The three attaching mechanisms are investment, communion, and transcendence; the three detaching mechanisms are sacrifice, renunciation, and mortification. Sacrifice and investment are seen as the mechanisms that promote retention; these are the instrumental aspects. Renunciation and communion are seen as the mechanisms that promote cohesiveness; these are the affective aspects. And finally, mortification and transcendence are seen as the mechanisms that promote social control; these are the moral aspects. Such an analysis suggests a pyramidal relationship among the various processes. This may be seen if we arrange the categories in this fashion:
THE ENDURING COMMUNE

COMMITTMENT

RETENTION  COHESIVENESS  SOCIAL CONTROL

SACRIFICE/INVESTMENT  RENUNCIATION/COMMUNION  MORTIFICATION/TRANSCESSION

detachment/attachment  detachment/attachment  detachment/attachment

INSTRUMENTAL  AFFECTIVE  MORAL

We do not believe that Kanter's theory of commitment would hold that these are pure categories, but only that they are categorical trends. As noted above, Kanter sees them as mutually reinforcing, but independent. How independent, of course, cannot be determined in such an ex post facto analysis. It is not difficult to conceive, for example, that transcendence would enhance the sense of cohesiveness, or that social control would be enhanced by cohesiveness, etc. It remains for us to understand how Kanter has defined the six commitment mechanisms and to see the kinds of examples she has cited for each.

"Sacrifice," says Kanter (1972, p. 72), "involves the giving up of something valuable or pleasurable in order to become a member of the organization..., membership becomes more costly and therefore is not likely to be given up easily." And later she adds (1972, p. 76) "Sacrifice operates on the basis of a simple principle from cognitive consistency theories: the more it 'costs'
a person to do something, the more 'valuable' he will consider it, in order to justify the psychic 'expense' and remain internally consistent." The chief factors here were abstinence and austerity. Examples cited by Kanter of abstinence were the giving up of the use of alcohol, tobacco, coffee, tea, rich foods, or meat. Also cited were celibacy, and the prohibition of wearing jewelry and other "personal adornments." Examples of austerity represented other kinds of "nonindulgence": "an ascetic lifestyle (often arising out of necessity) and the struggle to literally build the buildings and all aspects of the community 'from scratch'." Kanter found that communities in which there was no shared struggle had less commitment and therefore a tendency to be shorter lived (1972, p. 79).

"Investment involves giving up control over some of the person's resources to the community" (Kanter, 1972, p. 72). "Profit" thereby is committed to the group; leaving it then becomes "costly" (p. 80). The cost can be in actual dollars or property or in the expenditure of "time and energy." Examples given by Kanter include financial contributions upon admissions, buying shares of stock, and assigning property to the organization. One important component of investment, whether in the dollar mode or the participation mode, is that outsiders are excluded from investing. A second component is irreversibility; that is, successful communes tended not to allow persons to withdraw
their contributions when they left the community. The custom of not keeping records underscored this policy.

Giving up relationships outside of the community and avoiding private, exclusive attachments (either dyadic or family) within the community is what Kanter refers to as the renunciation mechanism (1972, p. 73). Examples given fall into four categories (p. 92): insulation, which includes the adaptation of uniforms or special language or jargon, the ignoring of outside newspapers and the customs and holidays of the outside world; cross-boundary control, which includes restrictions on leaving the community and interaction with visitors; couple renunciation involving either free love or celibacy or other measures of controlling sexual relations; and family renunciation involving parent-child separation or the prohibition of families sharing a dwelling unit.

Kanter defines communion as "... bringing members into meaningful contact with the collective whole, so that they experience the fact of oneness with the group and develop a 'we-feeling'" (1972, p. 73). Six factors contributing to communion are identified by Kanter. They are listed here with some of the examples that are cited by her:

**Homogeneity.** Similar religious, social, educational, national or ethnic backgrounds of the members.

**Communal Sharing.** Shared ownership of property; shared wages; even shared clothing.
Communal Work.  
Job rotation; no wages; no charge for services; no skills required for admission.

Regularized Group Contact.  
Shared dwellings and dining halls; regular group meetings; few places for privacy.

Ritual.  
Special celebrations and ceremonies; group singing; songs related to community.

Persecution Experience.  
Common enemy; physical attack and economic discrimination; public denouncements.

A fifth commitment mechanism is mortification, described by Kanter as "... the submission of private states to social control, the exchanging of a former identity for one defined and formulated by the community" (1972, p. 74). Examples offered are public confession and mutual criticism, public sanctions, punishment within community, spiritual differentiation such as probationary period for new members, distinguishing between members on moral grounds, and deindividuation, using such factors as uniforms and communal dining halls and housing.

The sixth and final mechanism is transcendence, "... a process whereby an individual attaches his decision-making prerogative to a power greater than himself, surrendering to the higher meaning contained by the group and submitting to something beyond himself" (1972, p. 74). Four factors which were discovered by Kanter to be facilitate of the transcendence mechanism are listed below together with some examples:
Institutionalized Awe. An elaborated ideology; charismatic leadership and membership; mystery, magic and powers invested in group; authority hierarchy; special leadership prerogatives.

Guidance. Fixed daily routine; rules of personal conduct and demeanor.

Ideological Conversion. Taking of vows; selective process for admission to membership; commitment to ideology required.

Tradition. Norms which have "withstood the test of time"; community derived from prior organization passing on the values and norms.

Rosabeth Kanter's analysis of the processes that make communes work provides us with possible clues as to what the bonding mechanisms might be in social systems other than communes. Such "mechanisms," of a less intense variety than the ones found to be operative in communal settings, could be used, not in a "technical-engineering" sense, but in a set of principles that could guide decision-makers and policy-makers who choose to be guided by the psychological sense of community as an overarching value. Sarason, who himself is very skeptical about how-to-do-it approaches to the problem of building a sense of community, nonetheless observed that John Humphrey Noyes, the founder of the famous Oneida Community, was ". . . outstanding [in his] conceptual and technical accomplishments in instilling the sense of community" (1978, p. 286). (Sarason was
referring to Noyes' use of group dynamics, particularly his use of communal "mutual criticism.") Not surprisingly, Kanter recognizes that the sense of community is just what communes are meant to embody. In the preface to her second book on commune life (1973, p. xiii) she explicitly states "All kinds of organizations in the society could borrow ideas from communes about how to enhance the 'sense of community' among their members and at the same time could be made aware of the dangers that communes sometimes experience and so be prepared to avoid them." However, Kanter leaves it to her readers to decide just how such borrowed ideas may be properly extracted and applied to non-communal organizations; that is, in settings where we would neither desire nor expect individuals to completely divest themselves of their separateness through a total investment in the group.

What we mean by sense of community does not appear to have the degree of intensity of the identification of the self with the group that is involved here. However, it may be that in our search for the meaning of PSC, we would have to, in the very least, keep our community psychological compasses pointed in the direction of commitment as conceived of by Kanter. For the moment, an important thing to keep in mind is that the college campus presents a very special case of community which makes the goal of building commitment an especial challenge. In fact, some sociologists
may argue that with a "two-year" or "four-year" stay built into the system, and with thirty to fifty percent attrition being almost a universal fact of life, we cannot properly talk about colleges as being communities. We shall return to this issue in Chapter X.

And lest we forget, Zax and Specter remind us (1974, p. 292) that even "successful" communes are not immortal. Longevity, itself, becomes problematical, ideologies become "stale" and new generations lose the zeal of the founding fathers. Hence, an important lesson in the study of communes is that the psychological sense of community is only one important factor in the building of better social systems.

Black Mountain College: An Experiment in Community and Education

A fresh perspective on the issues of communal life is offered by author-playwright Martin Duberman in his book about the life and decline of an experimental college community (1972). The community, Black Mountain College, which thrived in the foothills of North Carolina from 1933 to 1956, attracted Duberman's attention because of his combined interest in community and education. He is skeptical of the usefulness of the sociologist's approach to the study of communes or other intentional communities because of social science's insistence on "time/edifice measurement and evaluations" (that is, length of time, etc., as a criterion
of success). For example, using Kanter's twenty-five year measure (the sociological definition of a generation), Black Mountain just missed being "successful" by two years. Writes Duberman:

But durability, size and endowment are coarse, and perhaps wholly irrelevant gauges of an institution's actual importance for the individuals who come within its orbit. Anarchist communes, often surviving for only a few months, and during those months often living on the edge of survival, can have a greater impact on the lives of their transient members than, say, an Ivy League college or the undergraduates who reside in it for four uninterrupted years. . . . My only point is that mere durability (like mere transience) is not a sensitive barometer for measuring the quality of communal experience--though it's the one usually favored by historians of utopia (1972, p. 161).

Duberman is skeptical about sociology's ability to successfully draw parallels between the various utopian communities and thereby to develop generalizations or models of how communities become communities. "I've become convinced," he writes, "that the configuration of each community was and is so special that parallels between them are forced--at least at the level of generalization where one could begin to talk about 'basic' human capacities and needs" (1972, p. 257). In one sense Duberman's book suffers from a lack of the social scientist's zeal for finding unifying principles. In a larger sense, however, his book provides us with a rare documented report of the day-to-day conflicts and resolutions that actually did arise in one intentional community.

Initially it seemed that the founder, John Andrew
Rice, set out to build a community—not a college. However, Duberman quotes Rice during one of the never-ending and typical "community discussions" about the identity of Black Mountain as asserting quite the opposite. Here is an excerpt:

I say it is a college. And I say that the difference between the college and the so-called ideal communities... is this: in any community which you set up the idea is that people shall live in that community, and the aim of that community is the achievement of happiness. Whereas the job of a college is to provide a place into which people may come and get the kind of development which will enable them to leave it (1972, pp. 132-133).

In Black Mountain "the kind of development" to which its founder alluded was principally individual achievement in the arts—clearly an artistic setting in which talent was the norm, and lack of talent, deviance. Therefore, a significant thing about this enterprise was the tension between the goal of community and the goal of private development. What comes through clearest, however, is that members who were rewarded received such "rewards" mostly in light of their contribution to the community. This is what gave Black Mountain its "experimental" quality, what distinguished it from other higher education institutions of the time. A central aim, says Duberman, . . . was to keep the community small enough so that members could constantly interact in a wide variety of settings . . . All aspects of community life were thought to have a bearing on an individual's education—the usual distinctions between curricula and extracurricula were broken down . . . while information,
analytical skills and reason were prized, they were considered aspects rather than equivalents of personal development; they were not confused—as they are in most educational institutions—with the whole of life, the only elements of self worthy of praise (1972, pp. 41-42).

That contribution to the community was the overarching value is borne out by the practice of not readmitting students who failed to demonstrate a willingness to participate, even if those students' academic work was proceeding satisfactorily:

No single activity or attitude was itself taken to be the measure of participation; nobody had to hoe beans, or to help repair the road, or to turn in papers on time, or to be chatty at lunch. But if an individual constantly refused to do any of the jobs or resolutely held back from any association with community life, if he was totally apathetic or single-mindedly disruptive he wouldn't be readmitted the following year (1972, p. 90).

From Duberman's report we would gather that the very tension which arose from the conflicting goals (individual versus community) through the media of constant self-examination and community dialogue fostered by its system of governance, produced the organization elan which we are calling sense of community. Though its faculty and leadership were changing, and its ideals of educational utopia were continuously in flux, the shared enterprise of educative participation provided the bonding mechanism for that sense of community. Important too, was the part that the group process played, although that by itself did not prove to be the panacea some of its leaders hoped it would. Ironically, according to Duberman, the "economic precari-
uousness" that stayed with Black Mountain throughout its history was one of the major factors in "community clan" (1972, p. 82). In fact he reports that Rice, the founder, believed that "Communities . . . should lead hand-to-mouth existences; unsettlement was their life's blood" (1972, p. 161). The book offers a number of instances in which austerity automatically led to community practices like shared labor, most notably the "building program," which in turn fostered a sense of cohesiveness.

All in all, in spite of the author's cynicism regarding sociologic generalizations, it is apparent that the parallels with the "commitment mechanisms" outlined by Kanter are glaringly present in this report of an educational community. However, there remain two important distinctions. One is the overriding importance of individual achievement. The second, which was controversial and therefore fluctuated in its importance at any one time in Black Mountain's history, was the acknowledgement of the "surrounding community" and an involvement with it. Sarason too considers involvement with "the community in which a setting is embedded" as vitally important to that setting's psychological sense of community [Sarason, 1980]). Duberman explains:

. . . The "other" community--the one beyond the walls--was periodically acknowledged, but a blend of apprehension ("they'll burn us down"), and disdain ("they're incapable of understanding us"), had kept contact minimal.
And then Duberman tells us that a new leader appeared, for whom . . . "community" meant both what went on within the college and between the college and its neighbors; and he viewed Black Mountain's isolation from its local setting as a scandal (1972, p. 243).

However, the new leader found little faculty support for this "second communal concern," and it never achieved the centrality of the other two major enterprises: shared community and the flourishing of individual artistic excellence. It should be noted how the "apprehensions" mentioned above bear a very close resemblance to what Kanter described (1972, p. 102) as the "persecution experience" serving as a "communion mechanism."

That Black Mountain achieved a psychological sense of community there seems to be no question; and neither does Duberman leave us in doubt that its founders set out deliberately to do so, however fumbling and contradictory were their efforts. For our purposes, the importance of Duberman's case history of such an institution is that it forcefully illustrates, even when the sense of community is a guiding value agreed upon by all, that a setting may in the end not survive the convulsions that arise out of its search for a consensus. As Sarason points out repeatedly, agreed upon values do not necessarily lead to a consensus in terms of what actions or policies should be adapted to preserve such values. Be-that-as-it-may, if we were to use Duberman's barometer for measuring the "success"
of a community, i.e., the degree of impact it had on the lives of those that passed through, we would guess that Black Mountain scored quite high.

**Summary and Discussion**

We have reviewed Kanter's analysis of the commitment mechanisms found to be essential elements of the successful communes of 19th century America. Commitment was seen as the connection between self-interest and group interest, the link between the self and social requirements. It was arrived at more readily in communes which maximized retention, cohesiveness, and social control among its members. These, in turn, were respectively dependent upon certain "detaching" and "attaching" instrumental, affective, and moral behaviors (mechanisms) which Kanter identified as sacrifice/investment, renunciation/communion, and mortification/transcendence. It was observed that while such intense practices and the resultant deep personal commitments are more appropriate in a communal setting than they would be in a college setting, there may nonetheless be important implications in regard to the question of what it is that enhances the degree to which a sense of community is present in any given setting.

A good example of a college which was structured
around community life (i.e., an intentional community) was found in Duberman's case study of Black Mountain College. We learned that an important distinction between an ideal community (such as a commune) and a community-oriented educational setting is that the latter "is a place [like the family] where you get the kind of development that would enable you to leave" whereas in a commune the ideal is to create an environment to which one would be committed essentially for life. Another related distinction that appears in a community such as Black Mountain is the interest in individual achievement—in this case, in the arts. However the founder and subsequent leaders of the school structured the programs and environment of the place so as to achieve community. This was accomplished principally by breaking down the usual distinctions between curricula and extra-curricula—that is, personal development involved all aspects of community life, the classroom being only one of those aspects—and by a system that emphasized dialogue and self-examination in a group setting, participative governance, and communal practices such as shared labor and shared resistance to persecution and other hazards, not unlike the commitment mechanisms which Kanter discovered in successful communes. Notwithstanding, we saw that Black Mountain did not endure long enough to meet Kanter's criterion for success. We conclude that the intention to
create a sense of community in a college setting, and indeed the achievement of such (evident in this case history) does not in and of itself provide a guarantee of institutional longevity—sobering knowledge for the writer of the present study who may otherwise have become intoxicated with the idea that the psychological sense of community is enough to elude all the forces that might contribute to the decline of a setting. In the case of Black Mountain we saw that in the end that setting did not survive the convulsions that arose out of its search for a consensus. However, it did achieve its founder's purpose in developing an environment where students and teachers learned to excel in their art, share in their work, and leave with the certain knowledge that real community is possible.
CHAPTER V

THE COMMUNAL RESPONSE TO CRISIS

Crisis as a Bonding Mechanism

One of the issues related to the psychological sense of community is the question of what lies behind the well-known phenomenon of the intense but transient subjective feeling of community that often is experienced by persons during a crisis. In Chapter I the writer related how his experiencing of a severe winter storm first led him to ponder the whole issue of "sense of community" because of the manner in which the crisis seemed to momentarily transform stranger into neighbor, and interpersonal guardedness gave way to exhilarated openness. In our reading of the literature we found that most authors writing about community mentioned this phenomenon, examples of which are presented below. However, we found no unified crisis theory of community feeling that would provide an explanation for such experiences. On the other hand, we found bits and pieces of related material, most notably in Ardrey's discussion in *The Territorial Imperative* (1966) on the part that threat and stimulation play in territorial motivation. Throughout our discussion of this issue it would be well to keep in mind that at center stage of this
paper is an investigation of what it is that makes humans band together in a unified and cooperative spirit. The crisis phenomenon as a subject of discussion is to be seen as an important side-issue an understanding of which may throw some light on our subject.

Cowen (1973) has defined crises as "brief concentrated periods of disturbance, often characterized by intense upset, preoccupation, emotional churning, a sense of inadequacy, and openness to the impact of other people" (1973, p. 439, emphasis added). This definition was not presented in a context of a discussion of community per se, but rather in a review of intervention systems, in this case, "crisis intervention," in community mental health. What caught our eye, of course, was the reference to the "openness to the impact of other people." It reminds us that sometimes, in a psychotherapeutic context, the therapist may introduce tension, strain or some form of controlled "crisis" as a strategy for promoting some desired change in the therapeutic process. For example, in a book on family therapy, Minuchin and Barcai (1972) present a chapter entitled "Therapeutically Induced Family Crisis" in which the authors discuss the induction (in therapy) of "unstable situations requiring restructuring." Here crisis is seen as "an opportunity for change." In an article on primary prevention Caplan and Grunebaum (1970) elaborate on this view:
It appears likely that the direction of a person's psychological development throughout life, whether toward mental health or disorder, is most sensitive to influence at times of crisis. These crises represent transition points, at each of which the person may move nearer or further away from adaptive patterns of functioning. Primary preventive efforts are often directed toward modifying the field of forces at times of crisis in the belief that efforts may be more effectively and more efficiently applied at these times (1970, p. 68, emphasis added).

In an early work dealing with the application of the social work model to the college campus Price (1941), discussing social norms, observes that "One departs from conformity in times of great stress or disaster" (1941, p. 45). She goes on to say:

Whenever social life ceases to run smoothly . . . , and there are tensions and strains in the lives of a number of people in a community, the equilibrium of life ceases to be stable and the air is pregnant with possibilities.

Freud (1921) recognized the emotional integration among group members that takes place during a crisis. Panic, on the other hand, results in the "cessation of emotional ties which hold a group together" (Freud, 1921, p. 48). It is also well-known that environmental disorder and social upheaval may be important factors in the etiology of mental disturbance in terms of the stress that may be created. (Newspaper accounts of the aftermath of the "Three-Mile Island" disaster indicate both the phenomenon of the unifying of the community and the heavy toll in terms of depression and other mental problems.) However,
the community psychological approach would emphasize the development of resources that would help community members cope with stress while at the same time encouraging the mobilizing and galvanizing effects of that stress (Heller and Monahan, 1977, p. 130).

So far we have been discussing various conceptions of crisis which have in common the idea that (except in panic) a person in crisis is brought into more significant contact with others, whether it be in terms of "openness to impact," "opportunity for change," "sensitivity to influence," "emotional integration," or being in an atmosphere which is "pregnant with possibilities." We would assert that it is no coincidence that classic social psychological doctrine (e.g., Katz and Kahn, 1978; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) relating to organization and group behavior holds that the more cohesive a group is the more its members are subject to the influence of the group as a whole. In other words, "crisis" and "community" (cohesiveness) seem to produce a similar set of effects. Another example is the finding by Feldman and Newcomb in their study of the impact of college on students (1969) that the "impact" of college seems to increase in settings that are more intimate and cohesive. It still remains for us to discuss what others have said about the relationship of these variables.

Attempting to describe what he means by the concept
"psychological sense of community" Sarason (1974) uses this illustration:

[It] is at its height when the existence of the referent group is challenged by external events, by a crisis like the air war over London in 1940, or a catastrophe like an earthquake; it is also at its height for shorter periods in times of celebration, during a political victory party or an Easter mass (1974, p. 157).

Many of the authors we have reviewed use war or catastrophe as exemplifying the power of crisis to create the sense of solidarity and community among a previous peaceful, but otherwise alienated multitude. Morgan (1957) seems to struggle as he describes his concept of "the quality of community": "... mutual confidence, good will and responsible brotherhood—small face-to-face social group we call the small community—intimate acquaintance, cooperation..."—until he offers this image: "It was present to some degree at the sinking of the Titanic [!]"

It is this "animal instinct" or "cultural tradition," warns Morgan, which causes a social group to close ranks when it is threatened from without, and provides the impetus to move from patriotism to nationalism to war (1957, p. 38). Nisbet (1970) writes about "the community-making property of war" and "the power of war to create a sense of moral meaning":

Function and meaning tend to become dramatically fused in time of war. . . . The most routine duties are suffused by the sense of participation in a creative cause. . . . the intoxicating atmosphere of spiritual unity that arises out of the common conscious-

Finally, Nisbet, in describing the effect that the crisis of war had on its people and its men in battle, seems to strike at the essence of communal motivation:

The presence of mass numbers was lightened, the impersonality of existence was transfigured and, even if a large amount of personal anonymity remained, it was, in a curious and paradoxical way, an identified anonymity (1970, p. 41).

Of course the authors we have quoted are not suggesting that we go to war to find community. Rather they are demonstrating that one of the dangers of the lack of the sense of community in society is that war has the capacity to act as a stimulus that would easily arouse the sense of community.

McWilliams, in his book The Idea of Fraternity in America (1973), discusses this danger: (The concept of fraternity as used by McWilliams is closely related to our concept of the psychological sense of community in that we are discussing community in the context of relatively small collectivities. In the fragment that follows the author is in the middle of an argument against "universal community" in favor of a "limited society" which forms the emotional basis for fraternity.)

Only in one situation does the alienation of brothers from the community seem to end. During the period of crisis and war the shamelessness and fear-
lessness of brethren, their willingness to lose life and their fascination with death, become needs of society, not dangers to it. War and crisis are temptations of those false brothers for whom fraternity is not enough, who would escape alienation in order to re-enter community.

... Fraternity is in any case at odds with the continuous community; its values include at least the commitment that physical survival can come at too high a price (McWilliams, 1973, pp. 30-31).

The death of a leader is also often used as an illustration of crisis as a bonding mechanism. Two examples should suffice. Ardrey, in The Territorial Imperative (1966), describes his experience as he stood among a massive throng that waited outside the Vatican as Pope John lay dying:

Contrary to those reports published widely abroad, it was not a religious experience. But there was a silence quite unbelievable in Italy. The throng stood in shadowed, tight little knots, watching the lighted window, all with heads slightly tilted.

I lingered, I lingered. I could not go home. I found myself gripped by an absurd emotion, one as pure as any I had ever known. If it was a religious experience that united us, then it was an experience of pagan order.

The death of a Pope or even of a president may unite the world in grief or shock. The union may last for hours or days, yet brief though its stay may be, we cannot ignore it. The union transcends all boundaries, all seas, all ranges of mountains however high (1966, pp. 298-299).

And similarly, Mendes-Flohr (1976), in explaining Buber's concept of the "Centre" provides the following quote from Buber's essay, "What Is Man," to illustrate "the Gemeinschaft between men which emerges from the common realiz-a-
tion of a shared Centre": (We would guess that this would be Buber's answer to what lies behind crisis as a bonding mechanism.)

[Observe] the close union which is formed for a few days among the genuine disciples and fellow workers of a movement when an important leader dies. All impediments and difficulties between them are set aside, and a strange fruitfulness, or at all events, incandescence, of their life with one another is established. Another transient form is seen when in the face of a catastrophe which appears inevitable the really heroic element of community gathers together within itself, withdraws from idle talk and fuss, but each is open to the other and they anticipate in a brief common life, the binding power of a common death (Martin Buber as cited in Mendes-Flohr, 1976, p. 19).

Crisis, Territory and Biological Morality: Ardrey's Territorial Imperative

We have provided some examples of how war and the death of a leader have been seen as illustrations of the "binding power" of crisis. These stand at the extreme end of a continuum of crisis; other less extreme situations which nonetheless also tend to promote unity and solidarity are discussed throughout the literature. Some examples are the "communion mechanisms" of persecution and hardship discussed by Kanter (1972) and the economic precariousness of a college that tended to solidify the community (Duberman, 1972). Now we shall turn our attention to the question of what may explain the phenomenon of a communal response to crisis.

As we stated earlier, nowhere have we found any
theoretical discussion of this issue. What is it that seems to innately compel humans not only to act in unity in face of a threat (where common sense provides the answer of "strength in numbers"), but to feel unity, to feel an "exalted sense of moral purpose," a "union that transcends all boundaries," a "strange incandescence," to experience an "identified anonymity," a "psychological sense of community," if you will? One possible answer comes not from a profoundly religious or profoundly sentimental source, but from one author who, as a playwright, has dipped into both of those sources, and moved over, as an amateur, into a source that is profoundly scientific—the "new" biology—in order to learn more about the human condition.

The author is Robert Ardrey who, in his book The Territorial Imperative (1966), "... brings into focus a single aspect of human behavior which [he believes] to be characteristic of our species as a whole, to be shaped but not determined by environment and experience, and to be a consequence not of human choice but of evolutionary inheritance" (Ardrey, 1966, p. v). For our purposes we have not concerned ourselves with the whole of Ardrey's interpretation of what natural science has to say about human (and animal) behavior in the context of territoriality. We are concerned only with those aspects of territorial behavior and the "sense of territory" that may hold some implications for this study of the "sense of community" and to see
particularly what light it may shed on the issue of crisis and human bonding.

The territorial imperative is the "inherent drive to gain and defend an exclusive property" (Ardrey, 1966, p. 3). The bulk of the author's treatment of the subject is devoted to sociological illustrations of territorial behavior with a running undercurrent of the argument that man is by nature, not nurture, aggressive. Skipping over those chapters we arrive at the chapters dealing with the "amity-enmity complex" in which discussion is directly focused on the question of the place of danger, the value of threat, in inducing solidarity among the inhabitants of a territory. Although Ardrey continues to drive home his point about the biological basis for human aggressiveness, we find that this point is balanced by another argument: that morality exists in nature, "that human morality is a simple evolutionary extension of a form of conduct which has existed in nature for many hundreds of millions of years" (1966, p. 260). He reviews the cultural anthropological literature, including the later writings of Darwin, which essentially support this view by showing that groups whose members were more cooperative than other groups were more likely to survive, in an evolutionary sense. Thus amity has a selective value. Now the question becomes does enmity have a selective value; the answer curiously is yes. Here is where the concept of threat
(hazard) and the amity-enmity complex become relevant to our present inquiry, particularly when Ardrey informs us that he is writing about

... a biological morality to describe that conduct dictated by innate command which sacrifices individual interest for a larger or longer good ... (1966, p. 245, emphasis added).

Ardrey does not define "amity" for us, so we understand the word by its common definition, a state of peaceful, friendly relations. Although "amity," strictly speaking, does not carry the connotation of "community," we are basing our discussion on the idea that, because amity is discussed in the context of a common territory, we may at least cautiously apply Ardrey's findings to the idea of community. When we consider that the author interlaces notions of "biological morality," cooperativeness, and "sacrifice of individual interest for the larger good" amid his pronouncements about amity, we feel we are not leaping too great a distance to go from one concept to the other.

Two additional ingredients of the amity-enmity complex need defining; these are "enmity" and "hazard," both definitions of which are supplied by the author:

... By enmity I refer to those forces of antagonism and hostility originating in members of one's own species. By hazard I mean those threats which do not originate in one's own species (1966, p. 249).
The complex itself is expressed by Ardrey as a simple equation: \( A = E + h \). The formula is explained this way:

The amity, in other words, which an animal expresses for others of its kind will be equal to the sum of the forces of enmity and hazard which are arrayed against it (1966, p. 249).

The author then provides a long list of natural and supernatural examples of hazard ending up with the comment that "All [natural hazards] for the moment or for the month brought forth amity among men" and "In the history of human affairs . . . , [supernatural hazards] made an honorable contribution to social amity. . . ."

In general, Ardrey tells us, amity is in short supply most of the time among most of the species, while "E grows truly on trees." According to the complex theory, amity is inextricably linked to cooperativeness, and cooperativeness to the presence of a common danger, in this case, enmity or hazard, Ardrey explains:

. . . Since amity exists no longer than mutual purpose, then when the purpose is either achieved or permanently frustrated, amity will end. Unless a new joint purpose arises to channel joint energies, individuals will return to a normal condition of mutual animosity (1966, p. 251).

Taking another look at the equation, \( A = E + h \), it can be seen that "as \( h \) goes up, so \( E \) comes down"; in other words,

. . . to produce a given quantity of amity in a social group, every increase in hazard which the group faces reduces the need for enmity. . . . A human community
facing extraordinary hazard may well have no need of enemies at all to attain the most perfect social amity and concerted action (Ardrey, 1966, p. 253).

It is apparent that, if Ardrey had his choice, he would stimulate fellowship with hazards rather than with enemies. He makes the rather provocative observation that our technological ability to eliminate hazard in our environment could ironically lead us into a search for enemies and hence war. Perhaps the nostalgia for hazard is made palatable by again considering what we have termed the communal mechanism of crisis. Ardrey's rendition of this theme will by now sound familiar to the reader:

The simplest of arithmetic will demonstrate that as \( h \) rises, then to produce an effective amity, \( E \) may fall. But let us forgo the dismal swamp of even the simplest arithmetic and recall those experiences of fire and flood and sudden storm, of natural emergencies which as if by spontaneous combustion produce instant mutual aid, unthinking sacrifice, smiles on the faces of strangers, intimacies exchanged which have never changed hands before, a gladness and trust that leave us sorry when the emergency has passed (1966, p. 319, emphasis added).

Although the principal motivation in territoriality is the defense of property, therefore making the primary concern enmity rather than hazard, for our purpose it is sufficient to recognize, in theory at least, that either a crisis of hazard or of enmity has the effect of being a bonding mechanism in a social group. However, as in any attempt to reduce human behavior to an equation, there is always the danger of neglecting important variables, particularly those that other schools of thought would attrib-
ute not to "motivation" but to intrinsic, instinctive or otherwise internally induced behavior. Thus we have to ask, what of compassion, altruism, love, etc.? Even if such things are conditioned, is there no permanence of reasonable habitual stability, in this case, of amity, without the press of $E$ or $h$? Or, more in keeping with the nature of our inquiry, must there always be "something out there" to induce a sustained community?

For Ardrey, the answer is an unequivocal yes:

. . . Granted that enmity is the root of all goodness --a concession which [the human psychologist] is unlikely to make--will there not be some conditioned residue of affection, loyalty, trust that will continue to motivate the pair, family, or larger social group even when common defense no longer unites them? Must there always be enmity? What about love, for God's sake?

I hasten to confess that I have nothing against love and indeed should lack the courage--a most salient point--to contemplate existence without it. But I do not believe that long association in amity or long conditioning of individuals to a habitual way contributes measurably to the human outcome. . . . Where goes real estate, there goes love (1966, pp. 252-253).

Lest we be unfair to Ardrey, we should point out that he is no doubt using his playwright's license to indulge in absolutes and hyperbole to drive home a point, a privilege not bestowed upon the pure scientist who must mask his absolutes and avoid exaggeration whenever he attempts to reduce human qualities to mathematical statements. In the end, the author confesses that he came up with amity-enmity equation as a "private joke on those psy-
chologists" who do just that, and that he recognized its failure to include "the infinite ranges of human variability" including "minor symptoms of original or residual amity which exist though insufficiently to effect social organization" (1966, p. 318).

A second concept introduced by Ardrey to explain why man acts as he does is essentially a triple need-motivational theory which would explain the phenomenon of human territoriality using psychological rather than physiological factors. Two of the motivational needs are borrowed from animal territory theory: security—provided by the interior of the territory, or the "nest site"—and stimulation—provided by the periphery of the territory—"where the fun goes on." To these the author adds a third need: identity, with which

... Through a fixed and unique relationship with something larger and more lasting than himself [man] has defeated the pressures of anonymity (1966, p. 158).

... More permanent than the animal itself [he has found] a place, whether social or geographical, [that is] his and his alone (1966, p. 308).

The three needs are then arranged in hierarchical order:

... There are few exceptions to the rule that the need for identity is the most powerful and the most pervasive among all species. The need for stimulation is not far behind. And security, normally, will be sacrificed for either of the other two (1966, p. 310).

After introducing the second concept, the author, we feel, fails to adequately treat the question of how it
would combine with or relate to the amity-enmity complex. If we put both of the concepts within the perspective of the underlying theme of his book perhaps the interaction of the dual concepts can be appreciated. While we are concerned exclusively with the problem of community we must not lose sight of the fact that Ardrey's main concern is that as long as man (like other animals) is programmed to seek identity, stimulation and security (in that order), and as long as man (like other animals) requires common enemies or hazards to keep him in community (so as to defend a territory) there is always the danger, when the elements that would satisfy these needs are scarce, or when hazard or enmity are in short supply, that man will be driven to war. For we have seen in our own review that war is the example par excellence of what can cure the deficit in the societal sense of community; now Ardrey would simply add to that the notion that war is also the ultimate cure for anonymity (a deficit of identity), for boredom (a deficit of stimulation), and for anxiety (a deficit of security).

We find one possible inconsistency in Ardrey's argument, particularly as we attempt to reconcile his need theory with his amity-enmity theory. It would appear to us that enmity and hazard (in addition to "fun") may both be considered to occur at or near "the periphery of the territory," and hence are occurrences which answer the
"need" for "stimulation." Needs, by definition, are ends in themselves (except insofar as they have survival value), and therefore typically require no further inducement to be called into action other than the prior satisfaction of those needs higher up in the hierarchical order. What is incongruent, it seems to us, is the author's dogged refusal to view "amity," itself as a human need, even though he talks about its "selective value" and "biological morality." Maslow, for example, included love as one of the basic instinctoid needs, but Ardrey explicitly rejects Maslow's conception by asserting that he regards it "not as a human need but a human answer" (1966, p. 309). This may be too facile an assertion when we consider that Ardrey views enmity and hazard (forms of stimulation) as answering, in a sense, the "need" for amity. Without moving further into the proverbial chicken/egg trap, we would simply suggest that perhaps "community," seeing that it subsumes love, amity, security and identity, and that its basis is a "biological morality," may be viewed as a high order of need that has evolved out of the swamp of territorial defense and possession. The question is does the sense of community require for sustenance a constant diet of some form of stimulation, tension, resistance "at the periphery," and the preservation of safety and security "at the interior of the territory?" Tentatively we would say that Ardrey's findings would suggest that the answer
is yes. Crisis can then be seen as just one example of peripheral stimulation that causes members of social groups to close ranks and feel as one in the interior of a territory—in the community. To make this clearer let us turn to examples other than crisis.

What we have not discussed so far are those instances of transient, intense sense of community resulting from communal experiences of joy, celebration and ritual. Such instances were alluded to by Sarason in the fragment quoted above in which he was trying to illustrate the sensation called the psychological sense of community. Most recently we saw this in the response to our U.S. Hockey Team victory over the Russians in the 1980 Olympic Games or in the Panamanian street scenes viewed on the news reports following the Roberto Duran victory in his championship bout with Sugar Ray Leonard: momentarily social defenses seemed to have been shorn, the boundaries of the self seem to have been obliterated and a massive merger of selves appeared to have come into being. (The writer witnessed this to some degree in a recent street festival that took place in the Puerto Rican neighborhood of Hartford, Connecticut. But the sense of community there appeared to have been of the more permanent kind; it was there before and will have continued to be there after the festival. It is not an uncommon scene to see mainland Puerto Ricans, who presumably are "strangers," greet and
converse with one another as they pass in the street or meet at an event. Is this not an example of the amity-enmity complex at work? And what happens when the ingredient of a victory celebration is added to a neighborhood festival? The psychological sense of community—a phrase that does not do justice to the moment—is at its height.) Where does this phenomenon fit into our discussion of crisis? There is a common denominator here that as yet we have not identified; it logically must be a larger category that would include crisis, celebration and ritual (not an exhaustive list) on the same level.

With these added elements, does territoriality still provide the unifying principle? Hazard and enmity would conceptually include crisis. Stimulation, one of the three hypothesized territorial needs, by the same token, should include joy and ritual and the like. If this is so, even though joy and ritual are not at first glance part of the amity-enmity process, they do fit in nicely with Ardrey's threefold need theory. First, their inclusion in the theory might offer an explanation as to why people seem to be drawn to these experiences (an alternative to the pleasure principle), and second, since joy and ritual induce a communal response, and given that amity has group selective value in terms of the evolutionary concept of the survival of the "most cooperative," it would then follow that these could be conceived of as examples of stimu-
lation "at the periphery of the territory."

The over-all answer (at least from the perspective of Ardrey's conception of territorial behavior) that may possibly explain the intense binding power of the kinds of conditions or events we have been discussing may be provided in the form of chain hypotheses concerning behavior which is "a consequence not of human choice but of evolutionary inheritance":

(1) Persons in groups who share a common "territory" have an innate need to be mutually interdependent and cooperative—the best condition in which to "defend" their territory.

(2) Persons, however, tend to live in a normal condition of mutual distrust, animosity or simple indifference, in which the sense of a common territory is only dimly felt at an unconscious level.

(3) Because of the needs of identity, stimulation and security and because these are tied to conditions and events that are related to the common territory, the repressed sense of commonality is aroused to consciousness under conditions of

(a) crisis, whether of hazard or enmity, and/or
(b) communal experiences of joy, celebration, ritual, etc., related to such shared ownership and which meet the three needs of identity, stimulation and security.

(4) The repressed sense of commonality rising to consciousness is experienced as a "psychological sense of community."

Alternative Hypotheses

In the beginning of this chapter we introduced the subject of crisis by relating it to the phenomenon "of the intense feeling of community" that frequently accompanies
it. Through a review of Ardrey's work we considered how his conceptions about territorial behavior might illuminate this issue. Such illumination has suggested some hypotheses and raised some questions deserving of further study. To do justice to exploring the relationship between territoriality and community would require a whole and separate study. In general, this task is taken up by the discipline of environmental psychology and social psychology, where such issues as the stability of social organizations, role relations, status hierarchy, self/other boundary, the regulation of social interaction, and community safety are discussed as territorial concepts. (An example of the treatment of some of the issues mentioned may be found in an article by Patterson [1978]. His extensive bibliography provides rich ground for further exploration.)

Furthermore, there are many alternative hypotheses which we did not touch upon. Bakan, for example, in his Duality of Human Existence (1966) writes about the duality communion-versus-agency. (By "agency" Bakan means that which is centered on individual interest.) His concept of "the repression of communion" in society may possibly explain the sudden appearance of communion in situations of emergency (or victory celebrations), on the theory that "communion is repressed because of its threat to the agentic ego" (Bakan, 1966, p. 16) and that the ego drops this de-
fense at peak moments and emergencies. Another hypothesis might be that crisis produces the equivalent of an "undermanned setting" (see our discussion, Chapter IX) thereby creating the sense that "every one belongs and is needed." Or consider Nisbet's idea (1970) that crisis, for the moment, frees us of the sense that there is an all-pervading power (i.e., the State, etc.) and instead we experience the sense of interpersonal reliance and trust, where "the veil of alienation is momentarily dropped . . . and we experience a personal sense of function and authority." Added to these would be an hypothesis suggested by the community psychological findings mentioned earlier in this chapter to the effect that persons are more open to others and others' influence in times of crisis. Not unrelated is the concept of synergy discussed by Maslow in regard to a notion of management which he labeled "Eupsychian" (Maslow, 1965, p. 65). All of the examples which we have mentioned are consonant with one another, and not inconsistent with the chain propositions we have derived from Ardrey. Readers who are uncomfortable with the deterministic orientation of our propositions because they involve such elements as instinct or "the unconscious," are encouraged to think about these matters through other frames of reference. We will mention just a few examples.

There is a social psychological concept in the field of group dynamics known as pluralistic ignorance. This is the
condition in which the members of a group incorrectly believe that "everyone else" in the group holds a certain attitude, whereas they themselves do not (Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962, p. 269).

Let us assume that a particular culture-specific "mental set" exists in our society such that all or most persons believe, through pluralistic ignorance, that "everyone else" feels self-sufficient and has neither the need to be reached out to or cared about, nor to reach out and care. Those of us familiar with the group process will know that one of its principal mechanisms, sharing, has the effect of "breaking down" this kind of ignorance, the results of which might explain the common experience of the "high" of encounter. Could it be that experiences of mutual danger, celebration of victory, or mass ritual, and the like, might have a kind of revelation effect, not unlike the encounter phenomenon, in which pluralistic ignorance is momentarily cast aside?

Finally, we should mention Maslow's concept of the peak-experience elaborated upon in his Toward a Psychology of Being (1962), if only because there appears to be some surface resemblance to the kinds of experiences we have been describing. Perhaps the individual differences in the responses to identical events of the sort we have been discussing can be explained according to the degree of "self-actualization" or the talent for making "B-cognitions."

We shall tempt the reader with one quote and then leave it
to him or her to follow through:

One aspect of the peak-experience is a complete, though momentary, loss of fear, anxiety, inhibition, defense and control, a giving up of renunciation, delay and restraint. . . . This too implies a greater openness of perception since fear distorts. . . . Since it is in the world "it represents a kind of fusion of the Freudian "pleasure principle" and "reality principle." . . .

We may therefore expect to find a certain "permeability" in people who have such experiences commonly, a closeness and openness to the unconscious, and a relative lack of fear of it (Maslow, 1962, p. 89).

And, we may ask, what is lurking in that "unconscious"? Perhaps Ardrey has a pre-historic answer.

**Summary and Discussion**

We began by reviewing some behavioral scientific notions about the impact of crisis. There was some evidence which suggested that crisis has the potential of providing therapeutic and social side-benefits. Noted was the tendency of crisis to lead people to openness to others, to promote the restructuring of unstable situations, to make people more sensitive to others' influence, to allow them to depart from conformity, and to stimulate the development of resources. We saw that crisis tends to bring persons into more significant contact with one another, and that it may contribute to emotional integration and provide a more unified sense of purpose.

The idea was explored that territoriality, which
Ardrey defined as "an inherent drive to gain and defend territory," may be a factor in the creation of community feeling and at the same time may serve as one explanation of the communal response to crisis. The amity-enmity complex as described by Ardrey provided the basis for understanding how danger and threat have value in terms of their ability to induce solidarity among the inhabitants of a territory. In this context we saw how human morality may be conceived of as a "biological morality" derived from the evolutionary survival value of group cooperation. Thus Ardrey talked of "the selective value of amity," and of the phenomenon of hazard which was seen as the necessary condition in which such a biological morality would be induced—a response to an "innate command which sacrifices individual interest for a larger good." Psychologically, the territorial imperative was viewed as being propelled by three basic motivational needs: identity, stimulation and security. This theory suggested to the writer that the idea of community comes out of the satisfaction of these needs. Thus community may be conceived as a psychic parallel to territory.

Discussed in addition to crisis were other kinds of communal stimulation: joy, celebration and ritual. These kinds of events were hypothesized by the writer to be capable of unleashing from the primitive unconscious innate feelings of territoriality which are consciously experi-
enced as a "psychological sense of community." A number of alternative hypotheses which could explain the communal response to crisis were presented.

It is now time to consider the implications of these findings in respect to our main topic: that is, in general, how do we relate any insights we have gained regarding the communal mechanisms of crisis, celebration, ritual and joy to the problem of maintaining or creating the psychological sense of community?

We shall begin by stating the obvious: that to promote community in an institutional sense we certainly do not recommend going to war, invoking disasters or the deaths of leaders, economic brinksmanship, mass orgies, encounters or evangelistic revival. What is recommendable? For as McWilliams succinctly puts it:

... There is no simple tactic which can produce brotherhood (1973, p. 93).

The following are examples of "territorial" principles suggested by our findings that may be considered if the psychological sense of community is to be preserved or promoted in a setting:

1. Encourage, do not discourage, regularity of contact of the membership; assemblies for one purpose or another.
2. Encourage celebration; the observance of traditions.
3. Provide safe and secure conditions within.
4. Develop a consciousness of the setting with clearly stated set of goals, values and standards for that setting that are known to all.

5. Recognize and reward individual contributions to that setting which reflect its values, standards and goals.

6. Develop a consciousness of boundary such that a member knows unambiguously when he is in and when he is out of that setting.

7. A member whose behavior consistently is at odds with the values and goals with the setting cannot remain a member; a person may not be admitted unless she or he demonstrates congruence with such values and goals.

8. Encourage activities, entertainment, athletic events, on a communal scale. Allow release time for such events.

9. Promote interaction with other similar settings, encourage competitive events.

10. Keep total membership informed of the state or condition of the setting particularly in terms of situations that would call for celebration or the closing of ranks, the good news and the bad news.

We shall stop here; the list can go on and on but we believe we have made our point.

Since these are the kind of "territorial" principles suggested by the material discussed in this chapter, then we believe a caution is in order. A perusal of this list should put a sense of fright in the heart of anyone who is familiar with the tragic misuse of similar "principles" in the recent history of the Western world; this is a list, innocuous in the abstract, unattached to any value system except the "value of community." We believe that unless such a value were informed by the "higher" values of democ-
racy and humanism, then the principles of the amity-enmity complex, and of "identity, stimulation and security," though effective, are potentially extremely dangerous tools. Demagogues have always used the cry of "enmity and hazard" as a tool of massive manipulation. Palmer (1977), for example, makes a distinction between "true" and "false" community. "The most notable example of false community," he writes, "is the totalitarian society to which the decline of true community leads. . . . What was Nazi Germany except a demonic form of community life?" Clearly, Hitler's propaganda machine made extensive use of the territorial principles, particularly "enmity" in the form of scapegoating. And what better recent example of the "demonic form of community life" is there than the Jonestown tragedy in Guyana?

It now appears to us that we have to turn to a humanistic source, to find a higher set of principles that would explain the basis not only of a transient sense of community that is the psychological or biological accompaniment to a multitude of phenomena, but of a more enduring kind. For this purpose we shall turn to Martin Buber.
introduction to his translation of a collection of Buber's lectures and essays (Buber, 1965):

... I-Thou is the primary word of relationship. It is characterized by mutuality, directness, presentness, intensity, and ineffability. Although it is only within this relation that personality and the personal really exist, the Thou of I-Thou is not limited to men, but may include animals, trees, objects of nature, and God. I-It is the primary word of experiencing and using. It takes place within a man and not between him and the world. Hence it is entirely subjective and lacking in mutuality. Whether in knowing, feeling, or acting, it is the typical subject-object relationship. It is always mediate and indirect, dealing with objects in terms of the categories and connections, and hence is incomprehensible and orderable. It is significant only in connection and not in itself. The It of I-It may equally well be a he, a she, an animal, a thing, a spirit, or even a god, without a change in the primary word. Thus I-Thou and I-It cut across the lines of our ordinary distinctions to focus our attention not upon individual objects and their causal connections, but upon the relations between things, the dazwischen ("there in-between"). Experiencing is I-It whether it is the experiencing of an object or of a man, whether it is "inner" or "outer," "open" or "secret." ... 

... Man can live continuously and securely in the world of It, but if he lives only in this world he is not a man (Friedman, 1965, pp. 12-13).

Later, in his introductory essay, Friedman, commenting on Buber's 1956 lecture, "What is Common to All" (Friedman, 1965, pp. 89-109), brings to mind a question that is of weighty significance as we contemplate the issue of the "quest for community": can we in fact, or should we, conduct a direct, self-conscious search for the experience of the psychological sense of community? Although the section that Friedman is commenting on deals explicitly with Buber's criticism of the report by Aldous Huxley on "the astonish-
ing effects of mescaline intoxication," we believe there is a relevant message to be gleaned here. For that reason it would be worthwhile to quote both the commentator and the author. First we hear from Friedman who, lumping William James in with Huxley because of James' Varieties of Religious Experience, accuses James of setting the fashion "... for extracting the mystical 'experience' from ... the whole religious reality by turning it into a psychological content--an experience that a person has..." Friedman goes on:

... it also leads to the pragmatic inversion that causes James and Huxley to encourage others to cultivate these experiences so that they too may know these "real effects." The great mystics did not have experiences, they were had by them. They were seized by them in their total being and just thereby knew themselves to be in contact with a larger reality than themselves. The modern cultivator of experience, in contrast, knows no truly independent reality since "experience" has become for him something he possesses, an internal, essentially psychological reality whose effects on him are far more real than the sources of these effects. It follows, by the same token, that he does not "experience" with his whole being, but only with that part of him which registers the effects, while the other part of him, the one that seeks the experience, remains perforce the detached observer separated from his experience by his very knowledge that he is having it (Friedman, 1965, p. 44).

Familiar to many of us are the transient "highs" of the weekend encounter and other such experiences that seek in vain to create an enduring sense of community. While they are unlike the drug experience described by Huxley in that they often do provide participants with lasting tools with which to reach out to others, they nonetheless stop
short of reshaping the institutions and organizations (from which these participants make their pilgrimages) into viable Gemeinschaft-like communities. Let us now turn directly to Buber's text in which he neatly and succinctly explodes the myth of "chemical communion" so widely espoused by the counter-culture in the sixties and seventies and to which Huxley referred as "the urge to go beyond the self":

... But in reality the consumer of mescaline does not emerge from this net into some sort of free participation in common being; rather merely into a strictly private sphere given to him as his own for several hours. ... The fugitive flight out of the claim of the situation into situationlessness is no legitimate affair of man. And the true name of all the paradises which man creates for himself by chemical or other means is situationlessness. They are situationless like the dream state and like schizophrenia because they are in their essence uncommunal ... (Buber, 1965, p. 100, emphasis added).

In a more recent commentary on Buber's thinking, Mendes-Flohr (1976) explicates Buber's ideas regarding the possibility of achieving a sense of community in modern industrial society. (As we shall soon see, Buber would certainly reject our use of the word "achieve" in this context.) Unlike Tönnies, Buber, according to Mendes-Flohr, did not believe that Gemeinschaft "... is forever locked in the past" (1976, p. 17). Buber, says the reviewer, introduced the idea that gemeinschaftliche relations persist on the interpersonal, sub-institutional level. Here he quotes Buber from an early work: "Gemeinschaft exists whenever individuals open themselves to one another ... ,
CHAPTER VI
BUBER'S CONCEPT OF "THE CENTRE"

Community and the "Living Center"

Martin Buber's classic work, I and Thou (1958), originally published in 1923, represents an early statement on his existentialist position in regard to the relation of man to man; "existentialist" because he derives his concepts as to what is human from experience rather than abstract thought. Buber's thought is brought into this report primarily to discover if his well-known concept of I-Thou-ness, originally set in a dyadic context, is applicable to man as a communal being. As we shall see, the answer is yes, but a qualified yes that takes us into the realm of a "metasociology" and complexities of thought that we were not quite prepared to undertake. The question is can we derive some important pragmatic message for use in the micro-society of a college campus from ideas of this eloquent thinker?

To understand Buber's concept of community or what Mendes-Flohr refers to as The Centre (1976), we must first begin with a brief introduction to the more basic concept, I-Thou. For that purpose we can do no better than to repeat Maurice Friedman's explanation which appears in his
[whenever] immediacy is established between one human being and an other" (1976, p. 18). Mendes-Flohr believes that the understanding of this interpersonal structure would for Buber constitute the foundation for the renewal of Gemeinschaft. "Undoubtedly," writes Mendes-Flohr, "this concern underlies, in part, the central work of Buber's life, I and Thou, and much of his subsequent writings."

However, Mendes-Flohr points out the chief difference between I-Thouness and Tonnies' concept of Gemeinschaft: the I-Thou relation does not include ". . . any institutional warranty which assures its continuity." On the other hand, the writer believes that the frequent renewal of an I-Thou relation would resemble a kind of "constancy." He adds:

In this context, one should perhaps speak of the I-Thou relation as a Zwiegemeinschaft. The transition from the Zwei- to the Vielgemeinschaft is, of course, the central problem. When speaking of a Gemeinschaft embracing a group of individuals (what I have called the Veilgemeinschaft) Buber preferred the term die Gemeinde, which for him denoted community qua enduring social fact (Mendes-Flohr, 1976, p. 18).

What causes or maintains this "enduring social fact" (i.e., the psychological sense of community)? Let us turn directly to Buber for an answer:

True community does not come into being because people have feelings for one another (though that is required too) but rather on two accounts, all of them having to do with a living center and they have to stand in a living reciprocal relation to one another. The second event has its source in the first, but it is not immediately given with it. A living reciprocal relationship includes feelings but it is not derived from them. A community is built upon a living center (Buber, 1958, p. 87, emphasis added).
Mendes-Flohr quotes extensively from the many works of Buber to demonstrate that the concept of the Centre is the philosopher's chief contribution to the understanding of community. That there must be a Centre in order to have community there is no doubt, but it is not altogether clear just what the Centre is. We suspect that Buber knowingly left its precise meaning obscured. Here are a few fragments from Buber which Mendes-Flohr quotes in his essay: The Centre is "the sphere of ultimate values"; "a true, charismatic leader"; "a transcendent central Thou shared by numerous individuals"; "a metaphysical sensation that accompanies the effort to build a just, organic community." And then Mendes-Flohr offers several examples from Buber illustrating the idea of a shared Centre. Interestingly, one of the significant examples given relates directly to the theme addressed in the preceding chapter, the question of why great upheavals and disasters tend to instill in the persons experiencing them an intense sensation of community. The example is that of the death of an important leader which has the effect of galvanizing a community and having men, at least for that moment, lay aside their differences.

It is just this short-lived quality, the inherently discontinuous nature of what Mendes-Flohr refers to as "situational revelations" that makes us look for something more in the explanation of community. That something more that we are looking for may be provided in Buber's concept of
social renewal. Mendes-Flohr says it this way:

... But having once undergone the exalting occasion of a Veilgemeinschaft, men thirst for something spread out over time, for duration. Thus institutional religion is born: the Centre becomes God-object. Concomitantly, men also "thirst for something spread out in space, for the representation in which the community of the faithful is united with its God." The cult of a Centre-God thus arises. Both religion and cult initially serve to supplement the founding acts of relation of the Vielgemeinschaft, but in time they become substitutes for these relations. What is more, religious dogma and cultic practices tend to weaken one's attentiveness to the address of the eternal Thou. A group's relation to the Centre must be renewed in every situation, or else it ceases to be a genuine Veilgemeinschaft or Gemeinde (Mendes-Flohr, 1976, p. 20, emphasis added).

We said earlier that we were curious to see if the I-Thou concept had any implications in our search for an understanding of sense of community. We now see that Buber makes this rather explicit when he speaks of a center as being an "eternal Thou"; that is, a community is not merely a collection of I-Thou relationships. How then does the I become a We? Apparently it does so when a group of persons turns to a "Centre." This is what Buber refers to as the "essential We." Mendes-Flohr quotes Buber (1976, p. 20): "When a culture is no longer centered in a living and continually renewed relational process, it freezes into an It-world... When the essential We is present, there prevails within a group an outer directness which is the decisive presupposition of I-Thou relations."

Mendes-Flohr, who is a sociologist and not a theologian, is concerned with how Buber's idea of the Centre,
which is primarily conceived of as an "eternal" or "transcendent Thou," may be applied in a social context. And we too, in this paper, are seeking to discover concepts that may be useful in what we are calling the communal context of an educational setting. Buber's answer is at once striking and disappointing. (This great master is not in the business of providing easy solutions to worldly problems.)

Mendes-Flohr (1976, p. 22) reports that "Buber admits that the Gemeinde, as conceived by him, cannot be comprehended by 'current sociological categories.' . . . the Gemeinde is not to be associated with any particular social structure. An essential We can arise in every kind of group, but it cannot be understood from the life of any single one of the groups'." This is the section that is at first glance disappointing in terms of the topic of this paper. Buber rejects the idea that Veilgemeinschaft can be purposefully created! You cannot cause it; you cannot will it; you cannot intend it!

The point here is that community, sense of community, or Veilgemeinschaft is not determined by institutional or social structuring. As a sociologist, Mendes-Flohr's interest in Buber is not to learn how to build better societies that are bonded by some sort of common "Centre." Apparently, his interest stems from the recognition that there are profound sociological consequences of the response of institutions and societies to a common "Centre."
Where does this leave us in our quest? As in a message from the tradition of mysticism, we are told, in effect, that we cannot rationally plan and then build and structure either a society or a setting with the goal of creating an enduring community, that we cannot seek directly that which we seek. What Buber does, in fact, is bring us full circle back to the I-Thou proposition. For Buber believed that "social renewal was not primarily a function of institutional change, but of a fundamental transformation of interpersonal relationships" (1976, p. 22). (This is very close to Sarason's observation [1974, p. 276] that building a sense of community is not a matter of "technical-engineering" but rather a matter of needing "to understand how the nature of our culture produced the situation we wish to change.") And so Mendes-Flohr designates Buber's philosophy of "the Centre and social renewal" as a "metasociology, independent of social life" in which genuine community depends for its emergence on the religious principle of people's responsiveness to an "eternal Thou." However, knowing that Buber's thought is in the existentialist tradition and therefore rooted in man's day-to-day world, we are not satisfied with Mendes-Flohr's dismissal of Buber's concept of the Centre as merely religious or metasociological. To pursue this we should like to turn again to Buber's essay, "What is Common to All" (1965, pp. 89-109).

Buber begins his lecture by discussing the pre-
Socratic philosopher, Heracleitus, whose symbol is fire and who is associated with the world principle of change or flux. Logos—or the Word—is "the ultimate reality" or "the meaning of being," but it is not a fixed reality. It is not the Word as content but the Word as process that is important for Heracleitus. For Buber, too, the importance of the word is process, that is, what takes place "between man and man." The expression, "the essential We," which appeared in a previous quote, is conceived of as having its origin in this process, that is, in the relation between the I and the Thou, which is represented as the Word or "the common." Says Buber (1965, p. 107):

Man has always had his experiences as I, his experiences with others, and with himself; but it is as We, ever again as We, that he has constructed and developed a world out of his experiences. . . . Thus the cosmos is preserved amid the changes of the world images.

Buber's writing, to us, has the quality of dealing at one and the same time with the lofty, such as with the idea of the "cosmos," and with the down-to-earth, such as the interchange between persons. He makes of this "betweenness" something cosmic. Somehow, this says to us that the idea of the Centre, even if put in terms of an "eternal Thou," is really made of the stuff of plain human relations that could happen in someone's living room. When Buber says ". . . he who existentially knows no Thou will never succeed in knowing a We" (1965, p. 108) he is telling us that to have community we must first begin by entering
into direct, mutual, intense and ineffable relationships with significant others, for "only men who are capable of saying Thou to one another can truly say We to one another" (1965, p. 39). (The converse of this was expressed by Fromm [1956] in his dictum that loving relationships are not authentic unless the loving partners each feel a fellowship with the rest of mankind, or with the others in the community.) Essentially, Buber's conception is that interpersonal communion and communal strength are inextricably bound, the one concept embedded in the other.

Summary and Discussion

We have examined how Martin Buber's ideas of the I-Thou relationship and of "The Centre" and "social renewal" relate to the concept of community and sense of community. To begin with, there was the admonishment that community as a psychological experience is not something that you seek and then "have." Buber likened the idea of "having" or "seeking" such an experience to that of the experience of mind altering drugs: no more than a transient high, private rather than communal, and "situationless." Community was seen as that condition that occurs when people stand "in a living reciprocal relation to one another facing a center--a living center." This center was conceived of as an "eternal Thou." Since "men thirst for something
spread out over time and space"—a thought implying that man has an inherent need for transcendence—they need a Centre that takes them beyond "situational revelations." The Centre is the nucleus of a continuing social renewal, transforming a mere collection of I-Thou relationships into community. Social renewal, was seen as not being attainable simply by institutional or social structuring, but rather by "fundamental transformation of interpersonal relationships" (I-Thou).

In the final analysis we have to ask if Buber's thinking on the relationship of man to man and to his God or to his "Centre" has any bearing on the question at hand; that is, how does it contribute to understanding of how a sense of community is formed and maintained. At first glance we would have to say that Buber would be very skeptical about man's ability to build a sense of community, that is, to deliberately set out to create such a spirit. Similarly, his concept of the Centre presumes an already existing force and seems to allow little if any room for the idea of the Centre as a force which could emerge from the conscious efforts of social planners. However, we believe this view fails to take into account the existential nature of Buber's propositions. It seems unthinkable that Buber would stop short in a metaphysical realm and not have his thoughts be relevant to the day-to-day world where man must encounter man within the context of institutions, especially when the
quality of life in those institutions may be a direct outcome of how its members relate to a "Centre" if indeed there is a center.

It has been all too commonly observed that we live in a pluralistic society, a society, therefore, which produces the antithesis of an "eternal Thou" or "The Common," or in the context of this discussion, the "Centre." Religion, of course, was the force which institutionalized the gathering together of souls who faced a common center. The mass-society theories of the lack of a sense of community in our culture very clearly take into account the role of the loss of religion in national and community life. What is directly apropos to our subject is the role that religious denominations played in the founding of colleges in our country. Institutions that grew out of that tradition had just that: "tradition." The "force" was already in place which provided the necessary central gravity that held these communities together. If not through religion, then some of the other colleges grew out of some other centering tradition, such as the land grant institutions, or the state agricultural or normal schools. The secular, small private colleges which have developed some sort of central tradition, some raison d'être known and felt by their populations and their alumni, probably succeeded in providing the necessary "Centre" that tended to promote a sense of community in much the same way as the denominational schools.
If we were to look to Buber for guidance in terms of how to promote PSC in a setting that is bereft of any kind of centering tradition, then perhaps we might extract from his "metasociology" the following guidelines:

(1) The setting would be structured around a central value such that each person and each unit of persons within that structure is committed to that value, from the board of directors, to the president all the way to the supporting personnel, maintenance staff, etc.

(2) All programs in the institution would radiate from this value, would be informed by it and would be structured and operated accordingly.

(3) Interpersonal relationships, and both formal and informal close-knit subgroups would be supported and encouraged on the principle that "he who ... knows no Thou will never succeed in knowing a We." A club or a "clique," for example, in this context, would not be considered an obstacle to community, the theory being that if the overarching value of an institution is the sense of community, then no individual in that community would be in isolation unless by choice.

(4) A corollary value that would be pervasive within the above structures would be dialogue. For Buber (1965, p. 41) "... it is not enough to experience 'any mere feelings of group unity'--these must be accompanied by a genuine listening; not just the content of speech but the process--the '... in between in the dialogue between man and man.'"

(5) To avoid the pitfall of "the modern cultivator of experience" in which the possessing of an experience becomes an end in itself or simply a psychological event, there would be something in the institutional goals more than individual growth and enhancement, something which transcends the personal and the organizational; we would call this a transcendent value. A concrete expression of this value would be the fostering of concern and relations with the community in which the setting is embedded; and beyond that the various stages of community that are layered one upon the other, from family to neighborhood, to town, to state, to nation, to world.
(6) Finally, the I-Thou relationship would be threaded and woven throughout the first five structural principles. Community, like charity, would begin at home. To be avoided is that proverbial character who would love humanity but hate people.

If we were to choose a contemporary writer and worker in our field whose life's work and written work best exemplifies Buberian values applied to the day-to-day world of the helping professional, we would have to name Seymour Sarason, to whose work we shall next turn.
CHAPTER VII
SARASON'S CONCEPT OF
"THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE OF COMMUNITY"

Community in Human Services:
Culture, Settings and Networks

In our search for an understanding of the concept of community we were directed to the work of Seymour Sarason who has taken what he calls "the psychological sense of community" (PSC) to be the central issue in any effort to deliver effective human services and educational systems. Not so much concerned with a theoretical exposition of the psychological sense of community, Sarason primarily addresses himself to workers in the field of human services, particularly to those engaged in community psychology. In the preface to his book, The Psychological Sense of Community, Sarason (1974) explains that he "could not write a book about community psychology without putting into center stage [his] belief that the dilution or absence of the psychological sense of community is the most destructive dynamic in the lives of people in our society." The remainder of the book essentially is an argument for the proposition that the psychological sense of community should be used by the community psychological profession as its guiding principle for action. Writes Sarason:
... A field which purported to be concerned with community had to be concerned with and based on the development and maintenance of the psychological sense of community (1974, p. viii).

This would require

... that any change in any significant aspect of the community ... be scrutinized from the standpoint of what its possible effects would be on the psychological sense of community (1974, p. 152).

The definition of the term psychological sense of community as conceived of by Sarason is scattered in parts throughout his writing. He introduces the expression by describing it as

... the sense that one was part of a readily available, mutually supportive network of relationships upon which one could depend and as a result of which one did not experience sustained feelings of loneliness that impell one to actions or to adapting a style of living masking anxiety and setting the stage for later and more destructive anguish (1974, p. 1).

In a more positive vein Sarason elaborates on the "network of relationships," adding the elements of a "give and get" availability, the "expression [of] our need for intimacy, diversity, usefulness and belongingness" and a "willing identification with some overarching value" (1974, p. 2).

Later he describes PSC as

... the sense that one belongs in and is meaningfully a part of a larger collectivity; the sense that although there may be a conflict between the needs of the individual and the collectivity, or among different groups in the collectivity, these conflicts must be resolved in a way that does not destroy the psychological sense of community; the sense that there is a network of and structure to relationships that ... dilutes feelings of loneliness (1974, p. 41).
In discussing how "community" is perceived and conceived, Sarason supplies yet another definition:

. . . The perception of similarity to others, an acknowledged interdependence with others, a willingness to maintain this interdependence by giving to or doing for others what one expects from them, the feeling that one is part of a larger dependable and stable structure -- these are some of the ingredients of the psychological sense of community. You know when you have it and when you don't. . . . It is at its height when the existence of the referent group is challenged by external events, by a crisis like the air war over London in 1940, or a catastrophe like an earthquake; it is also at its height, for shorter periods, in times of celebration, during a political victory party or an Easter mass. It is one of the major bases for self-definition and the judging of external events (1974, p. 157).

And finally he offers this definition in *Work, Aging and Social Change* (1977) from a somewhat different perspective:

The psychological sense of community is a response to the knowledge that you are a part of a network of relationships, reciprocal in nature, and possessed of qualities that prevent or dilute or shorten the disintegrating effects of severe or prolonged loneliness. . . . [It] is a psychological phenomenon, but its presence or absence is a manifestation of political-economic structure and organization and their underlying values. This is the case whether one is dealing with an entire society or a particular institution within it (1979, p. 280).

In an interview with Sarason (1980) the writer expressed his curiosity about the addition of the word "psychological" to the expression "sense of community":

M: . . . Originally, when I thought about this I thought it was kind of a redundancy— or that maybe you had something in mind that I was not grasping. I do use your term and I assume the literature has adopted it.
S: Frankly, I think it is redundant, you see. And if you were to ask me why I added "psychological"--I couldn't answer you. Well--except that--well, for an audience of psychologists if the word "psychology" isn't in there--I mean, they're not likely to, you know, pay attention to it. . . . I really think it's redundant. And I remember that, in fact, it bothered me a little bit.

Glynn (1977) makes the observation that Sarason's description of a "total intervention in a total institution" (a state residential facility for juvenile offenders--described in Chapter 8 [Sarason, 1974] provides what "may be considered a preliminary and partial operational definition of PSC." The goals of the intervention techniques which were employed by the intervention team are summarized by Glynn this way: (The "team" was part of a project sponsored by the Yale Psycho-Educational Clinic of which Sarason was director and founder.)

The intervention team sought to strengthen and increase the following among both staff and residents: knowledge and awareness of the resources available within the institution and the surrounding community; a sense of uniqueness that included common concrete goals for the institution; involvement and interaction between and among individuals, groups and the surrounding community; feelings of responsibility and obligation to each other; and most importantly, a sense of interdependence among staff, residents, and the surrounding community, a realization that they were part of a system where an act of one affects others (Glynn, 1977, p. 15).

In looking back on this project in Work, Aging and Social Change (1979b, pp. 283-284) Sarason concludes that "while it is possible to improve the experience of work by engendering a sense of community . . . the effort will con-
stantly encounter obstacles and probably defeat, because it cannot deal with or influence 'the larger system' to which . . . the psychological sense of community is foreign." This remark is a reflection of one of Sarason's major themes in relation to the need for a psychological sense of community in the context of human services: when there is no true feeling of community, people tend to exclude, send away, or isolate for "special treatment" those who are seen as "sick" or "deviant." He introduces this theme in the preface to The Psychological Sense of Community:

What I wanted to do was discuss [PSC] in terms that would illuminate our culture at the same time that it would have obvious relevance for community psychology. The problem was easy for me to resolve because thirty years of experience in schools and institutions led me (finally!) to understand that segregation (in special classes, mental hospitals, "reform" schools, institutions for the retarded), justified as it always is by "humane" considerations, was cause and symptom of the dilution or absence of the psychological sense of community (1974, p. ix).

"The fact is," writes Sarason in concluding his "total intervention" chapter discussed above, "that members of our communities experience little or no sense of community and, therefore, when confronted with problems of deviancy, remove it in one way or another from their midst, always justifying the practice so as to make a virtue out of a necessity" (1974, p. 213). (Philip Cowan [1975, p. 298]), in reviewing Sarason's book, takes this idea one step further. To him the consequence of segregation for
treatment is the maintenance of the status quo regarding theories of treatment since it "eliminates the necessity of considering innovative ways of integrating [persons with special needs] into a heterogeneous and cohesive community."

A related issue for Sarason is the importance of the internal sense of community, that is, the idea that incorporated in the notion of the psychological sense of community is that in addition to serving the clientele, all those in any given work setting would also be served by this principle. The problem, observes Sarason, is that this "internal sense" falls "victim to the work ethic" in which the criterion of helping the client diverts attention from what is happening to the helper (1974, p. 271). This is one of the important themes of Work, Aging and Social Change (Sarason, 1979b), in which he sees the development of this sense as "an integral part of the experience of work." There he maintains that teachers, for example, including university professors, experience loneliness basically because the selection system and the reward system tend to discourage the development of the psychological sense of community. He makes this assertion again in his interview with the writer (1980):

... This will tell you why I think schools will never be much different than they are: ... the university [should be] a place where the conditions are created whereby the faculty can learn, change and grow. ... And unless those conditions exist, it's going to be a lousy joint. Now if you were to ask
teachers . . . to justify the existence of the elementary school the answer is always going to be "It's a place for kids."

You cannot create the conditions of learning and changing and growing unless you see that . . . not everything is "for the kids." But what we're bypassing is that we're not making conditions that can help teachers grow and change.

Moreover, Sarason maintains that agencies and institutions which hope to have some semblance of a psychological sense of community must, in addition to giving attention to their own clientele and personnel, pay attention to the larger community as well as other individuals, agencies and institutions which have similar or related missions in the larger community (Sarason, 1972, 1974, 1978; Sarason et al., 1977). Discussing the college (in response to a question posed by the writer) as the referent social system, Sarason sums it up in this manner:

It's a microcosm. You see, you can talk of a psychological sense of community on a continuum in terms of geography, of an institution, of an agency. You can talk about the college, for example, as a community and what are the ways in which the college works for or against that sense of community so that people within it have that sense of belonging, the sense of wanting to belong, the sense of a kind of protection of a sort. In the case of a setting like the college, however, I would argue that that sense of community in part is a function of how that setting relates to the larger geographical setting in which it is embedded. At some point that becomes a factor . . . which can make for a better sense of community . . . But in terms of the welfare of the system, the viability of an institution over time, that is always related to how it as an institution relates to the surrounding community (1980).
A recurring theme in Sarason's works is the assertion that agreement on values in the operation of a given setting does not necessarily mean that there will be agreement on a course of action. His concluding chapter of *The Psychological Sense of Community* (1974, pp. 268-277) essentially is a cautionary statement to the effect that, although the dominant message of his book is that the psychological sense of community should be seen as the "overarching value that informs action," this in itself does not ensure the desired outcomes. And yet he asserts, agreeing with B. F. Skinner, that "when there is tension or conflict between the individual and the group (or between groups), the decisive consideration for action is the maintenance of the sense of community." Sarason leaves us hanging with this circular contradiction. Uncomfortable with this contradiction, Cowan (1975, p. 278), in his review of Sarason's book (1974), is fearful that under Sarason's philosophy of favoring the one extreme ("community") there would not exist "a healthy dialectic tension between two or more sets of needs or values. . . .

The field [community psychology] must not be allowed to fixate on arrangements at either pole of the dialectic . . . ; community psychology could most profitably and excitingly be defined as a search for a synthesis, a map of the elusive territory of the meeting place between stability and change, between autonomy and community." How-
ever, it may be that the reviewer missed this statement by Sarason:

... The psychological sense of community is a transient experience that is always preceded and sooner or later followed by some kind of conflict or tension between individual and group norms or interests, or between different groups. The tension is inevitable and in itself should not be regarded as either negative or avoidable.

The destructive situation is one in which individuality is completely overwhelmed or inhibited by the larger group, or one in which individuality is treasured to the point where there is no sense of community (1974, p. 273, emphasis added).

Clearly, then, Sarason is not "fixated" at the extreme end of the community pole, to the detriment of the individual, as might be the case, for example, of cultist followings à la Jonestown in Guyana. (This case is briefly discussed in our interview with Sarason [1980].)

To get a truly comprehensive view of how Sarason would "put into practice what he is preaching" (to view his "map of this elusive territory") in relation to all the themes discussed so far (i.e., the sense of community as an action-informing value, the "supportive network of relationships," the "political-economic structure" of organizations, dealing with "the larger system," the avoidance of segregation as a principle of treatment, the internal sense of community as well as external, the avoidance of relying on the agreement of values alone as an insurance against failure, and finally managing to juggle syntheti-
ally between the poles of individuality and communality), one would have to look to his writings before *Psychological Sense of Community* and after.

In two of his earlier books, one relating to change in terms of an existing setting (*The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change* [1971], hereinafter referred to as *Culture*), the other relating to the "creation of a setting" (*The Creation of Settings and the Future Societies* [1972], hereinafter referred to as *Settings*), we find no mention of the expression "psychological sense of community." However, in retrospect—that is, after reading *The Psychological Sense of Community*—it appears that the three books taken together represent a developmental progression on basically the same themes: all having to do with leadership in educational or human service settings in the context of a community as against an individual psychology.

In *Culture* (1971), for example, Sarason drives home the idea that a successful leader (or teacher) must understand the history, the anthropology, the values, etc., of the school, its membership and its community—hence "the culture of the school." In *Settings* (1972), this idea is further developed in a thoroughgoing analysis, with case illustrations, of what makes a setting fail in spite of the best intentions of its creator. How this all progresses toward the present theme of the psychological sense of community may become clearer by attending to this statement
that Sarason makes in Settings in his defense of B. F. Skinner's "view of man in society" as elaborated upon in Walden II:

... Skinner's citizens are not selfless or automatons but rather individuals who have a crystal clear commitment to the survival of their community. And they are happy people. What Skinner describes is far from utopian because it is one of the most frequent characteristics of the earliest phases of the creation of a setting, namely, an unconflicted willingness to be a part of a larger group, to give priority to its needs and values. ... In earlier chapters I have tried to understand why this happens, why it is such a brief period in the life of a new setting, how it comes about that individual needs become dominant over group needs (and the level of unhappiness increases), and the setting loses its momentum and purpose. The point is that it is possible for the values of the group to be dominant over individual ones without loss of freedom and dignity (Sarason, 1972, pp. 265-266).

Two years later, Sarason named the "unconflicted willingness to be part of a larger group" the psychological sense of community with the publication of the book by that name. In Culture, where Sarason discussed the "loneliness of the teacher," or "the ecological approach" to the problem of change (in which the impact of the setting on attitudes and behavior is studied rather than the impact of personality), or the problem of the values of the "change agent" being frozen by the very "culture" in which he attempts to effect change—these and other elements may now be seen as being subsumed under the dominant theme that "emerged" in the book, The Psychological Sense of Community (whose subtitle is Prospects for a Community Psychology).
Three years after the publication of the last mentioned work, Sarason and his colleagues (1977) published Human Services and Resource Networks, yet another addition to the "continuous architecture" of the author's thought of which the psychological sense of community remains the cornerstone. The publication in 1979 of Work, Aging and Social Change is a further extension taken from a different angle, that of the experience of the worker (rather than the setting) over the course of one's professional life. Let us return to Settings (1972) to see how Sarason laid the ground work for what was to come.

A setting is "... any instance in which two or more people come together [in a relationship] over a sustained period of time in order to achieve certain goals" (Sarason, 1972, p. 1). Although at first glance resembling the sociological definition of "organization" (i.e., "a social device for efficiently accomplishing through group means some stated purpose" [Katz and Kahn, 1978]), it becomes evident that the author is talking about something related but importantly different when he provides the examples of marriage (the smallest setting) and revolution or the creation of a new society (the most "ambitious" instance). The word "creation" suggests that Sarason is interested in the dynamics of such relationships at their onset rather than as organizational entities.

The use of marriage as an example is also an impor-
tant clue and serves to shed some light on the issues of **size** and romantic **love** in relationship to the success of a setting. With the known high failure rate of marriage in our society it becomes instantly evident that, while smaller collectivities tend to cohere more easily than larger ones, the smallest possible collectivity, the dyad, embedded as it is in a complex of dynamic and cultural variables, cannot sustain itself merely because of size or even "love."

The theme of "good intentions" or "love is not enough" is also woven into this work, woven around and through what Sarason refers to as "the matrix of factors" of the social reality of a setting:

... I felt that what needed emphasis was that the creation of settings (in its earliest phases) almost always (if not always) takes place in a context containing conflicting ideas and values, limited resources, a sense of mission and superiority on the part of some, and a need to preserve traditions on the part of others, the need to protect the setting from outside influences, and that this context almost always includes, or quickly is seen as impinging upon, a large number of existing settings (1972, pp. 57-58, emphasis added).

In his analysis of how settings are created and then come to fail Sarason develops most of the themes that were to be later synthesized in his conception of the psychological sense of community which we discussed earlier. Very telling in this respect is the fact that the author chooses to state the "relevant conclusions" of the *Creation of Settings* in the concluding chapter of *The Psychological

Before we leave Settings there are two further points that should be made, both of them relating to the larger theme of community. One has to do with Sarason's conceptualization of the issue of leadership in the creation of settings and in the maturing setting. Some of the implied imperatives of the leadership issue are: (1) A leader must not only have knowledge of a setting and its related historical organization but have "a way of thinking which [mirrors] the complexity of interests and conflicts out of which the setting emerged" (1972, p. 49); (2) The leader should avoid the tendency to want to "possess" the setting; (3) The leader should combine "openness" (about "internal doubts") with the maintenance of group solidarity through a process of "mutuality"; (4) The leader must be less concerned with his status and sense of superiority than with the welfare and growth of his staff, and the leader must be interested in not only what is done for others but what happens to those who "man the setting" (1972, p. 53).

The last point we will mention is the notion, developed by Sarason in Settings, of "buildings as distractions." Very much related to the theme of community is the idea that "... in the area of human services, putting up new buildings tends to perpetuate the problem of limited resources, contributes to the inadequate services they or-
ordinarily provide, and separates the setting from the larger society" (1972, p. 160).

The ground has thus been broken for a further synthesis of Sarason's notions of how a community orientation leads to productive ideas in the area of human services. The synthesis is realized with the publication of *Human Services and Resource Networks* (Sarason et al., 1977, hereinafter referred to as *Networks*). All the elements that are thus far in place in his previous constructions are brought into use in his blueprint for the setting up of networks and are used as a framework for evaluation and analysis. Sarason and his colleagues had the benefit of his having already formulated his major statement on the concept of the psychological sense of community; a number of references to the concept appear throughout the book. "The concept of resource exchange," notes Sarason in our interview (1980), "comes right out of the [idea] of the sense of community."

The chief elements from Sarason's previous works that coalesce in the concept of networks are the fact of limited resources, the establishment of "mutually productive relationships" by one setting with another, and, more obviously, "the readily available, mutually supportive network of relationships" which is an integral element of Sarason's definition of the psychological sense of community. It is not within the scope or purpose of this
study to report in great detail the theory and practice of networks as they are presented in this work by Sarason and his colleagues (and are further elaborated upon from a somewhat different perspective in a later work, *The Challenges of the Resources Exchange Networks* [Sarason and Lorentz, 1979]). Rather we shall report on some of the statements and ideas that may have some implications vis-à-vis the developing of human resources in a college setting in conjunction with the fostering of a sense of community.

Early in their book Sarason et al. distinguish between simple acquaintanceships and the concept of networks:

"Each of us knows, has met, and has had commerce with countless people, but what the label networks ordinarily suggests is that with a portion of these people we have a relationship permitting us to "approach" them. And we may approach them with the deliberate aim of asking them to help us establish a similar relationship with a person we do not know (Sarason et al., 1977, p. 3).

The book essentially provides the reader with case material derived from actual network systems. The principal case was one in which a network emerged (networks are not created insist the authors) out of the need of some agencies (schools) to enrich educational experiences, out of others (universities) because of the need to both provide educational opportunity in the form of meaningful involvement of students, internships, etc. and to be involved in
research projects as part of graduate education, and out of another agency's need (the government) to find ways to improve the quality of the environment. Networks emerge because persuasive and/or influential persons in decision-making positions in related settings have their eyes and ears tuned to possibilities of inter-setting cooperation for mutually beneficial purposes. Such people create "...the conditions for noncompetitive, mutually satisfying exchanges of information, plans and resources" (Sarason, et al., 1977, p. 24) to take place between persons and/or agencies. And all this would be accomplished with no exchange of money. Such exchanges are seen by Sarason et al. against the familiar backdrop of a social system generally devoid of a sense of community and peopled with isolated, alienated, lonely individuals or collections of individuals (i.e., agencies or "settings"). This includes workers in human services settings "where the perceived gulf between available resources and requests for services is large" and where "people within the agency feel they are unappreciated by the outside world" (1977, pp. 22-23). The galvanizing force that seems to be implied is the need for a sense of community coupled with the pragmatic needs of agencies. (A third ingredient is the notion of "undermanned settings" borrowed from Roger Barker; it is discussed in this study in Chapter IX.) "What is insidious," the authors add, "in this absence of the sense of community
is that there is no viable way . . . whereby agencies can even know what the problems, dilemmas, and plans of other agencies might be" (1977, p. 23). It remains then for the leadership and the influential persons in the community to begin the process of talking.

Once the network process begins, the phenomenon of "resource release" occurs which "adds a distinctively positive qualitative factor to people's sense of personal productivity and interrelationships" (1977, p. 115). And beyond increasing individuals' sense of competency, it has also been found that "... the availability of networks and people's willingness to use them" may be major factors in the ability of individuals to cope in crisis situations (1977, pp. 164-165).

The importance of "the general meeting" in maximizing the effectiveness of network systems is discussed at some length by the authors. Although this would appear to be a commonplace in the general managing of democratic and participative organizations, it is here presented as an absolutely crucial factor in the operation of networks. Further it is seen as the major underpinning of the network community:

From our perspective, it is not enough that each of the different subgroups has cohered as a group and has even become interconnected with other networks. That is cause for satisfaction, but if these subgroups "go their own way," they rob themselves and the rest of the network of a sense of common origins
and of belonging to a larger, mutually supporting
network community (1977, p. 177).

We will end our discussion of network resource ex-
changes with an extensive quotation from the text which
succinctly supplies us with the essence of the concept
better than a summing up can do:

The Essex network did not start at a particular
point in time, but it existed as a possibility in
the mind of Mrs. Dewar. What that sentence is in-
tended to convey is that for a good part of her adult
life this individual had become increasingly aware
of and bothered by two characteristics of institu-
tions (for example, hospitals, schools): the com-
plaint that they lacked the resources to do what they
should do, and their failure seriously to consider
how they might gain resources by developing ways
whereby "outside people" normally unconnected with
the agency would be given learning experiences pro-
ductive to their own growth at the same time they
were contributing to the setting. Put in another
way, our communities contain many people eager to
enlarge their knowledge, experience, sense of worth,
and social contribution, but community agencies seem
not to recognize their existence and potential con-
tributions, and, furthermore, when their existence is
recognized and utilized, it is on a "one-way street"
basis. That is to say, the individual from the com-

munity is asked to volunteer time and energy to do
something for the agency even though the performed
task will minimally, or not at all, be experienced
as growth producing. Explicitly, the satisfaction
the individual should expect is in the sense of al-
truism, not in the quickening of the sense of learn-
ing. What Mrs. Dewar came to see was that agencies
viewed community people (the "outsiders") not as
potential learners and contributors but as objects
of limited utility. Agencies saw the world in terms
of their narrow definitions of needs and purposes,
thereby shutting themselves off from potentially val-
uable resources. How, Mrs. Dewar asked, can one get
agencies to view the community differently and to see
the value of more mutually rewarding relationships?
But this question went far beyond the relationships
between agencies and individuals . . . The same ques-
tion had to be asked about agency-agency relationships
(Sarason et al., 1977, pp. 40-41).
Summary and Discussion

We have reviewed a number of the works of Seymour Sarason, the proponent of the belief that the "psychological sense of community" should be community psychology's guiding principle for action. The assessment of every action, policy or decision would be based on the question What effect does this have on the psychological sense of community? PSC was defined as the sense that one is a meaningful part of a larger collectivity, of a dependable and stable structure, accompanied by an acknowledged interdependence with others in that setting. The sense further implies an awareness of resources available to members, a feeling of uniqueness and of shared common goals and of mutual responsibility and obligation. The isolation for special treatment of members of a community identified as different, deviant or sick was seen by Sarason as a significant sign that PSC is lacking in a community. PSC encompasses the concern for staff as well as clients (in a treatment or educational setting, or in an institutional setting in general) and the concern for the community in which a setting is embedded. Sarason stressed that agreement on values does not necessarily lead to agreement on the course of action.

Some basic themes were seen to emerge as Sarason developed his "community psychology" in his series of
books. To successfully create or lead a setting he underscored the importance of being knowledgeable about the culture of that setting, i.e., its history, values, etc. In several references to Skinner, Sarason developed the idea that it is possible for the values of the group to be dominant over individual ones without loss of freedom and dignity. In his view, the "change agent" is always in danger of being unaware that his own values may be frozen by the very culture he wishes to change. A setting was defined as any instance in which two or more people come together in a sustained relationship to achieve specific goals. The dynamics that occur at the outset of a creation of a setting were carefully scrutinized by the author through the presentation of case material, particularly throwing light on the reasons for a setting's ultimate failure. "In spite of the best intentions of its creator," Sarason concluded that a setting may fail if (1) the leader-organizer's thinking does not reflect "the complexity of interests and conflicts out of which the setting emerged"; (2) the leader comes to be possessive about the setting; (3) the leader fails to have a mutually open relationship with the staff; and (4) the leader becomes too much concerned with his own status and concerned about the clients to the exclusion of any concern about the staff. Finally, we learned that, for Sarason, the idea of "resource network" embodied the chief
elements of his thinking on the psychological sense of community; the fact of limited resources produces the need for interdependence and mutual support. The network is one practical application of this cluster of facts; i.e., it represents inter-setting cooperation for mutual benefit. The consequence is "resource release": the exchange of information, plans, services, etc., that is, resources. Sarason stressed that the availability of networks is an important factor in how populations cope with crises.

Hopefully, our review of Sarason has demonstrated the interrelatedness of the various issues dealt with in his writings: a school's culture, the creation of viable settings, the psychological sense of community, and networks for the exchanging of resources. It would seem that he has not only arrived at a synthesis that would resolve the dialectic tension between the needs of the individual and the needs of the community, but a synthesis that would desolve as well the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft dichotomy. Here we see that it is possible for people and agencies to enter into essentially contractual (instrumental) arrangements that nonetheless have as their basis the development of a sense of community.

By now it should be evident to the reader that the definition of the psychological sense of community is as vague and diffuse and as varying as the definition of com-
Community itself; and further, it appears to vary as the subjective (or even objective) perception of community varies. At the same time, it can be seen how weighty, significant and important the concept is thought to be, particularly as we become aware of how much attention it has received, if only in a vaguely defined manner. Seymour Sarason, more than anybody else, has raised the level of inquiry concerning this subject from one of suspicious sentimentality and patronizing curiosity to one of serious intellectual investigation which poses a forceful challenge to the professional psychological community.
CHAPTER VIII
GLYNN'S CONSTRUCT DEVELOPMENT OF
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE OF COMMUNITY

Review of the Study

In a social psychological doctoral thesis, "Construct Development and Initial Measurement of the Psychological Sense of Community," Thomas Glynn (1977) has responded to Sarason's challenge by brilliantly executing an attempt to move from the level of concept to the level of theoretical construct, particularly a psychological construct "that is both bounded and measureable." Glynn's aim was two-fold: to start the process of developing the PSC concept into a construct; and, then, building on this development, to design an instrument with which to measure its degree of presence in community settings. His methodology was essentially a series of refinements ranging from a search through the literature on community to the actual design and validity testing of an initial measure.

His literature analysis identified five characteristics of communities which affect PSC: geography, patterns of interaction, history, function, and degree of autonomy. The most often stated qualities found to be
associated with PSC were homogeneity, interdependence, shared responsibility, face-to-face relationships and common goals. The erosion of PSC was found to mostly effect two basic areas of community life: "competent functioning" and "satisfaction with life in the community."

With this analysis as a starting point, Glynn arranged this set of community characteristics, qualities and behaviors into a sentence completion instrument which he administered to elicit a wide range of perceptions from a large population, thereby generating a pool of PSC-related attitudinal items. These were, in turn, refined by having a group of experts (selected from the membership of the APA Division 28, Community Psychology) rate the strength of the items on the basis of their "strongest contribution to PSC." After a final sifting, the items were arranged into the end product, a rating scale instrument designed to measure PSC. For reasons which will soon be apparent, half of the items were designed to elicit perceptions about actual PSC and the other half about ideal PSC.

Glynn's next task was to find the settings whose populations could be administered the initial measurement the result of which would yield comparative data with which assessment of the instrument's validity could be made. For this purpose he chose three different communi-
ties which were perceived to possess the five necessary community characteristics mentioned above but in varying degrees, such that the first community (an Israeli kibbutz) had a higher degree than the second (a small American town), and the second a higher degree than the third (another town). To arrive at a construct validity, Glynn predicted that the Real PSC scores of the three populations would vary in the same order as perceived while the Ideal scores would not significantly vary.

He also hypothesized that higher community satisfaction levels and higher community competence levels are positively correlated with higher PSC levels; that respondents who differ in their Real and Ideal perceptions of PSC are correspondingly less satisfied and less competent than those who do not differ; and finally, that community satisfaction and community competence are positively related.

All the hypotheses were supported. The first one, that the instrument would correctly discriminate between the three communities on the basis of their Real PSC is the "cornerstone" of the study, since it is the basis upon which the hypotheses that follow could have any important meaning of their own. On the basis of these findings, Glynn cautiously concludes "PSC may have the properties of a construct" (1977, p. 112), which of course means that given some future refinement studies, his instrument has the potential of being useful as a measure of PSC. While
Glynn's methodology clearly demonstrates that community satisfaction is positively correlated with PSC, as well as community competence, it does not establish any causal relationships, nor for that matter does it show that the instrument is actually measuring three separate and distinct constructs. (A "sense of community competence," a "sense of community satisfaction," and a "sense of community" may all be the same thing.) However, for the purposes of our own investigation, such distinctions are less important than the finding of the close relatedness of the concepts. As Glynn suggests in his conclusionary remarks, the findings support Sarason's view that the proper value orientation for community psychology is the use of PSC as a guide for policy and action. Conversely, it may be that the aims and methods of community psychology, which we shall be discussing, particularly as they relate to developing access to community resources (i.e., competence) and the resourcefulness of community members, are directly in line with the development of a psychological sense of community, even if unstated as a goal. To complete the picture, perhaps we would only have to add Sarason's dictum that in terms of PSC, addressing the needs of the helper is equally as important as addressing the needs of the helpee.

An important incidental finding by Glynn is that the data suggest individual differences regarding one's
ideal definition of PSC can affect one's perception of real PSC. This could mean, for example, that a person with "high" expectations regarding PSC may perceive a lower level of PSC in a given community than a person with lower expectations in the same community. The data also suggest to Glynn that as the number of components that go into an individual's definition of PSC increase so does the likelihood that the individual's PSC would increase, and that the inclusion in one's definition of the "idea of neighborhood" would also tend to predispose one to a higher level of PSC. Finally, Glynn found that the number of years that a person expected to live in the community and the number of persons one could identify by a first name were factors that could predict PSC. All in all, it was the former factor—the number of years one expected to live in the community—that was found to be the strongest predictor of PSC.

As was stated earlier, Glynn's initial measure was built around ideas extracted from his review of the literature which were expanded through the process of an open-ended questionnaire and then refined through a process of expert judgment. These processes yielded yet another related set of "behaviors and sub-concepts associated with PSC." These were "knowledge of the physical layout, perceived safety of living in the community, presence of conflict issues, and the perceived ability of the
community to deal with adversity."

In his discussion of the literature Glynn does not explicitly cite "who said what" about most of the associated concepts mentioned and which were employed in his item construction. Much of his written review is devoted to the idea of the decline and erosion of PSC "as an integral part of Western culture," explained in terms of a "rural-urban shift" similar to the "lost community" trend discussed earlier in this paper. Starting with the observation that "PSC has always had a rural association," Glynn traces some of the literature on community from Tönnies to the present day but reports of no direct discussion of PSC per se. We suspect that many of the associated sub-concepts which he built into his items used to measure PSC were derived from statements about community rather than about the psychological sense of community. Our assumption is that Glynn found it not a very far conceptual leap to go from one to the other. On the other hand, the writers reviewed who described the erosion of the sense of community apparently contributed little in regard to a theoretical exposition on PSC itself.

What we were looking for and what we finally found in Glynn's study was a detailed exposition of the meaning of PSC. We found a total of five conceptual definitions of PSC. One of these was Sarason's which we quoted earlier; one was a restatement of this definition found in a review
of Sarason's book by Cowan (1975): "... the feeling of belonging, of being needed, of identification with a social milieu, in which there is mutuality and interdependence." One was a fragment from the definition of community by Minar and Greer (1969) also quoted above: "... vague yearnings for a commonality of desire, a communion with those around us. . . ." The fourth quote is from Brownell (1950): "... the cooperative fullness of action, the sense of belonging, the face-to-face association with people well-known." And, finally, his fifth and last definition is from Poplin (1972): "... a sense of identity and unity with one's group and a feeling of involvement and wholeness on the part of the individual." Beyond this conceptual approach to the definition of PSC is the operational one, examples of which are found not in the body of Glynn's report but in the appendix portion which contains the measurement instrument developed by the author. Here among the attitudinal items is to be found a rich mine of the raw material of PSC which the author represented in the body of the report as "refined" abstractions. (Glynn, himself, recognized the value of the operational perspective when he observed that Sarason's comprehensive definition of the psychological sense of community is contained not in his statements about PSC but in his description of a "total intervention" at The Connecticut School for Boys which is the contents of a chapter in The
Psychological Sense of Community [Sarason, 1974].) In fact some of these abstractions, such as "competence" and "satisfaction," were left undefined in the report itself, except for the fact that fortuitously Glynn's presentation of an item factor analysis connected these and other sub-concepts associated with PSC with specific items in the instrument.

For clarity and for further illumination we list some of the factor loading clusters below under their respective abstract headings: (Only those factors from the Real Scale that were found to be significant are included here; they are listed in order of significance. Sentences that were originally in the negative form we have made positive.)

**Objective evaluation of community structure**

This community has goals for itself.

The community government works with the well-being of this community in mind.

The community government here gets a lot done.

People here have a say about what actions this community takes.

**Satisfaction with life in the community**

There is plenty to do in this community.

I get a lot out of being a member of this community.

I like living in this community.

I feel that I belong here.

This community satisfies what I want in relationships with other people.

Living in this community gives me a secure feeling.
Presence of supportive relationships in the community

I have friends in this community who know they can depend on me.
There are people in this community, other than my family, whom I really care about.
If I just feel like talking I can generally find someone in this community to talk to right away.
If I am upset about something personal there are people in this community to whom I can turn.
There are people in this community, other than my family, who really care about me.
I have friends in this community on whom I can depend.

Listed below are some of the factor clusters that although less statistically significant that the above items do fill out the picture that describes the real "psychological sense of community" that is being measured here.

Similarity and relationship patterns

The type of people that I am most similar to live in this community.
Being a member of this community is like being a member of a group of friends.
My best friends live in this community.
I am quite similar to most people who live here.

Individual involvement in the community

I feel useful in this community.
My role in this community is to be active and involved.
It is important to me that this community do well.
There has been at least one problem in this community that I had a part in solving.
I try to keep up the community news in the newspaper.
If someone does something good for this community, that makes me feel good.

**Quality of the community environment**

This is a good community to bring children up in.
There is less crime here compared to other communities in the area.
Most people seem to care about the appearance of this community.

**Quality of community security**

The police in this community are generally friendly.
The police in this community are effective.
Living in this community gives me a secure feeling.
I feel safe in this community.

And, finally, the following cluster of items throws light on what Glynn means by community competence:

People take an interest in what you are doing here.
Most of my friends in this community are here to stay.
The community government here gets a lot done.
What is good for this community is good for me.
People here have a say about what actions this community takes.

(Glynn's conception of competence is also revealed in his discussion of the possible uses of his instrument. Thus, he states "If low competence levels were indicated, a specific program might be instituted to better inform the residents of the resources available to them and how to use them.")

Next, to complete the conceptual picture, we list
the factor loading items of the Ideal Scale. (In the instrument itself all items begin with the phrase "In an ideal community" and some sentences are in the negative.)

Structure of community relations

The community would not be divided into small, snobbish groups.
People would know they could get help from the community if they were in trouble.
People would take an interest in what you were doing.
It would be easy to make good friends.
You can be yourself.
There would be people, other than my family, who would really care about me.
People I do not know would be willing to help me if I had an emergency.

Objective evaluation of community structure

The community government would work with the well-being of the community in mind.
The community would have goals for itself.
The community government would get a lot done.

Overall assessment of the community and the individual's role in it

I would enjoy living there.
It would be a good place to bring children up in.
I would feel useful.
I would feel that I belonged there.

Community as self-sufficient and provider of most needs

If you did not look out for yourself, others would.
I would seldom feel lonely.
Most of your phone calls would be to people or places within the community.
Active involvement in the community

I could help change some things if I were to try.
I would try to keep up with the community news in
the newspaper.
I would have a part in solving at least one com-
munity problem.
My role would be to be active and involved.

Interdependent/reciprocal nature of the community

You would get something out of being a member
of the community.
If I called a community agency with a complaint,
I would get quick service.
I would have friends who would know they could
depend upon me.
"Every man for himself" would not be a good de-
scription of how people would act.
If there were a serious community problem the
people could get together and solve it.

Individual commitment to the community

Most of your friends would be there to stay.
What would be good for the community would be
good for me.
You would choose to move in for a particular
reason.
I would feel that I belonged there.

Individual feeling of being at ease in the community

I could find my way anywhere.
I would have friends upon whom I could depend.
There would be people, other than my family,
that would care about me.

Similarity of community residents

I would be quite similar to most people who lived
there.
The type of people that I am most similar to
would live there.
The people would have a lot in common.

**Potential for reciprocal support**

If someone I did not know had an emergency I would be willing to help.
There would be plenty to do.
I would have friends who would know they could depend on me.

**Ready availability of support**

Your best friends would be living there.
There would be people to turn to if I was upset about something personal.
If I felt like talking there would be someone to turn to right away.

One question that we have about the instrument itself is whether the use of the word "community" throughout the questionnaire might tend to "stack the deck" in favor of PSC. (We do see the necessity of using the word because of a design which calls for a comparison between an Ideal Scale and a Real Scale.) For example, if we were looking for the degree of presence of a sense of community on a college campus might it not be better to construct items beginning with "In this school" rather than with "In this community"? People living in a town or a neighborhood probably take it for granted that they live in a community. In relation to a school, common parlance would refer to the town as the community, as distinguished from the campus. On the questionnaire, calling one's attention to the campus as a community may act as a suggestion that could possibly inflate the PSC "score" in absolute terms. In comparing
one campus with another, however, the use of the term community should not prevent the instrument from discriminating between relative levels of PSC.

**Summary and Discussion**

We have reviewed Glynn's study, an attempt to treat PSC on a construct level as the first step in developing a measure of that quality. Our primary interest was to see what information such an effort would yield in regard to an understanding of PSC. We noted that Glynn's search of the literature initially resulted in the identification of five "characteristics" which effect PSC: geography, patterns of interaction, history, function and degree of autonomy. (These elements bear a resemblance to some of the components of community formation which appeared in Knop's formulations discussed earlier in this report.) We learned from the responses to questionnaires which Glynn used to develop his measurement items that the most often-stated qualities associated with PSC were homogeneity, interdependence, shared responsibility, face-to-face relationships, and common goals. The responses also confirmed his literature finding that the erosion of PSC reduces competent functioning and satisfaction with community life. Armed with such notions, Glynn built his initial measure. From a reading
of the actual measurement items which appeared in the appendix to his study we were able to construct an operational definition of PSC based upon the respondents' perceptions of the "real" psychological sense of community which they were experiencing in their communities, and their conceptions of an "ideal" PSC. The "real" scale yielded the following definition: PSC is

... the sense that things that are beneficial to people's well-being get done here as the result of the various community structures (e.g., participative governance); that there is general satisfaction with life here (i.e., I feel I belong here; feel useful and involved, etc.); that there are dependable, supportive relationships here; that I feel comfortably similar to the other people here; that this is a good environment to live in; that I feel secure here; that we have a say in what goes on here; that we know what the resources are and how to use them.

The "ideal" scale responses suggested that PSC is

... the sense that people feel they belong to a whole collectivity which they could rely upon for help, friendship, and acceptance; that governance works for the well-being of people; that most of our needs could be met here without going elsewhere; that I could have a useful impact here; that there is a pervasive sense of interdependence and reciprocal support, comfort, commitment, and similarity to others.

Finally, the experimental design of Glynn's study allowed the author to test hypotheses regarding the psychological sense of community and its relationship to other concepts. It was found that there is a positive correlation between community satisfaction and PSC, between community competence and community satisfaction, and between each of these and PSC; that as respondents differ in "real"
and "ideal" perceptions of PSC, they are correspondingly less satisfied and less competent. Glynn also found that one could predict a higher level of PSC response from respondents who had lower expectations of PSC, whose definitions of PSC had a larger number of components, whose definition included "the idea of neighborhood," who could identify a larger number of first names, and who expected to live in the community for a greater number of years. This latter factor of individual differences was found to be the strongest predictor of PSC.

Glynn's study provided a means of operationalizing the concept "psychological sense of community" by describing it on the behavioral level. This was accomplished by constructing an instrument based on widely accepted conceptions of PSC gathered from a sample of community psychologists, administering the instrument to inhabitants of three communities whose PSC levels were presumed to vary in step-wise fashion, and finding that the three sets of responses to the Real Scale varied accordingly while the three sets of responses to the Ideal Scale did not vary. While neither the author nor we were completely convinced by the data that PSC stands on absolutely solid ground as a construct, we are nonetheless impressed that a giant step has been taken in the direction of an empirically testable social-psychological condition or state of being. For us, the most important implication of the study is in
the relationship found between psychological sense of community and community competency and satisfaction which gives empirical support to Sarason's notion that PSC and community psychology as a discipline should be conceptually linked. As we shall see, competency and satisfaction have been traditionally viewed as "manipulable variables" that form part of the basic repertoire of community psychology.
CHAPTER IX
PREVENTION, COMPETENCE AND GROWTH: THE COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE

Community Psychology

In reviewing Sarason's book, The Psychological Sense of Community (1974), in Chapter VI, we focused chiefly on the author's development of that concept. Primary on the author's mind, however, as implied in the subtitle Prospects for a Community Psychology, was an examination of the field of community psychology, of which he is reputed to have been "one of the fathers" (Cowan, 1975). According to Sarason, community psychology emerged as the answer to a question that had been nagging at mental health professionals for decades: can we do anything more than merely help people cope with the devastating effects of the "absence or dilution of the psychological sense of community?" Writes Sarason:

... The question was answered in different ways by different people, but there were, nevertheless, some underlying agreements: focus had to shift from an emphasis on intrapsychic factors to understanding and changing larger social contexts; adapting such a focus would require new conceptualizations and tactics; and the major criterion by which these new efforts would be judged was the degree to which they led to a greater psychological sense of community (1974, p. 155).
In this section we will be looking at how other writers have conceived of this shift of focus from "intrapsychic" factors to factors of "social context" within the community psychological model. In the later sections of the chapter, related "social context" approaches will be surveyed, concluding with models applied explicitly to the college campus.

Zax and Specter (1974) describe community psychology as

... an approach to human behavior problems that emphasizes contributions made to their development by environmental forces as well as the potential contributions to be made toward their alleviation by the use of these forces (1974, p. 3).

Thus, they see community both as a causative factor in such problems and as a potentially therapeutic agent. In their book, Psychology and Community Change (1977), Heller and Monahan describe what they call the "stance" of community psychology:

(a) A community and ecological focus
(b) A concern with problems of human functioning that includes a focus on the prevention of disorder, but that goes beyond problems traditionally designated in "mental health" terms
(c) A stance that includes a concern for coping, adaptation and competence, not just an emphasis on disorder
(d) A willingness to promote multidisciplinary, collaborative research
(e) A commitment to empirical, experimental approaches to social intervention
(f) An avoidance of inappropriate medical overtones (Heller and Monahan, 1977, p. 421).
The "medical overtones" are described by Iscoe and Spielberg (1970, p. 64) in terms of "the clinic model" in which there appears to be "... a predilection for working with select persons who exhibit certain kinds of symptoms, a greater feeling of responsibility toward persons who happen to become clients rather than people with common social problems."

The style of delivery of mental health services is a key issue in the development of community psychology as a discipline. The "alternative community paradigm," as it is referred to by Jason (1977), emerged out of the conceptual shortcomings of the medical model with its "passive receptive stance," "late focus of treatment," "one-to-one mode of service," and "authoritarian" outlook toward patients (Jason, 1977, pp. 60-61). In reviewing the community psychological literature, Jason describes three defining characteristics of the new community model:

1. geometrically expanding the reach of services through the use of paraprofessionals and consultation,
2. evaluating and modifying environmental influences on development; and 3. actively intervening at those times (crises) and with those individuals (children) having the most potential for change (Jason, 1977, p. 61).

He presents a two-dimensional schema to help locate and identify community interventions. The two dimensions are time (primary, secondary and tertiary interventions) and target (individual, group, organizational, community, and
system interventions); i.e., at what point do interventions take place and at what level are they directed?

Various writers in the field, of course, would stress different points on this two-dimensional schema. Scribner (1968), for example, sees community psychology as directly focused on the system, organization or institution "... to help design and introduce changes ... which are thought to lead to certain specific changes in people's behavior." On the other hand, some, such as Zax and Specter (1974), would stress intervention at the interpersonal level, looking for changes in individuals that will, in turn, have community-wide influence. There is no question, however, that the primary prevention level is the principal time dimension in which community psychology operates.

Primary prevention is a concept borrowed from the older discipline of community mental health. It has been classically seen (Caplan and Grunebaum, 1970) as a strategy that would forestall outbreaks of mental illness in the general population by dealing with sources of environmental stress. However, the community psychologist, in addition, would employ this basic strategy in working toward the broader goal of fostering human development.

An important feature of the primary prevention mode of community psychology is the emphasis on the developing of resources. Caplan and Grunebaum (1970), writing from a
psychiatric perspective, express the concept of resource development as follows:

Any individual's attempt to cope with his environment will, of course, vary over the long and short term. Similarly, the human environment varies widely in its richness, organization and comprehensibility. We may call these environmental factors which impinge on the individual resources, if it is clear that we are not merely interested in the quantity of a resource but also in its timing, duration, quality and other relevant variables. . . . Over the long term, the likelihood of psychological dysfunction is increased if specific resources are not adequately provided for the population: these resources may be classified as physical, psycho-social and socio-cultural. A program of primary prevention will seek to evaluate these resources and ensure their optimal provision in the population (Caplan and Grunebaum, 1970, p. 74, emphasis added).

Heller and Monahan (1977, pp. 130-137) discuss resources in terms of "supportive social structures" whose availability are crucial at times of stress, particularly stress brought on by crisis situations. This concept includes the availability of "opportunities for direct action" which can forestall the tendency to "fall back on intrapsychic processes." While the authors assert that "sufficient social organization and cooperation are necessary for the development of mastery through reciprocal help-giving relationships," at the same time they remind us that there is a sparsity of research that supports the notion that supportive structures minimize the development of pathological responses during times of stress. They do report one case in which investigators found that depression and somatic complaints were related to perceived low levels of
social support from fellow workers and supervisors. Thus Heller and Monahan suggest that an appropriate intervention in such cases would be the community psychological strategy of forming "natural helping networks." Their explanation typifies the philosophy of community psychology:

... We need not perpetuate a mental health system that requires introspection and self-examination.

... Clearly there are ways of enhancing coping skills and environmental mastery such as the stimulation of helping networks in the community. It is possible for helping functions to be adopted by groups in the community without excessive reliance on professional intervention (Heller and Monahan, 1977, p. 133).

To some extent this approach mirrors the primary preventive one of Kelly, writing from an ecological perspective more than a decade earlier, with the exception that Kelly pays more attention to the personalities of individuals interaction with a given environment as the target of change. Notwithstanding, the ecological approach similarly views the client

... as an individual in a specific social situation with the consequence that expressive behavior is assessed in terms of the structure and function of the social setting in contrast to an analysis of intra-psychic motivation (Kelly, 1970a, pp. 58-59).

The ecology model proposed by Sarbin (1970) is more in keeping with community psychology in that the target is "the structure of social identity." Thus, he sees the main role of the community psychologist as one of designing interventions, direct or indirect, that would "reorganize the conduct of selected target persons." The aim would be
to modify "systems of relationships" for "more effective placement of target persons in the social system" (Sarbin, 1970, pp. 90-112).

One of the chief elements of community psychology is the concept of competence or the "competent community," which, as we have seen in Glynn's study, is intimately connected with the issues of resources and the psychological sense of community. Ira Iscoe, former president of the Division of Community Psychology, delivering an address before the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association (1972), describes the concept this way:

... In its simplest form, the concept of the development of the competent community involves the provision and utilization of resources in a geographical or psychological community so that the members of the community may make decisions about the issues confronting the community and competent coping can be instituted in dealing with the problems presented to the community. To be noted is the absence of the word solution. Community psychology ... recognizes that solutions are also parts of problems. Competent coping is stressed rather than adjustment, in keeping with the positive activist point of view. Conceptually, then, the competent community is one that has available to it, utilizes, develops, or otherwise obtains resources, not of course excluding the development of the resources of the human beings in the community itself (1972, p. 2).

Iscoe concludes his discussion of competency by pointing out the parallels between the concept and that of the concept of "positive mental health" in which the index of mental health uses as a criterion the degree of the "utilization of resources rather than the absence of symptomology" (Iscoe, 1972, p. 3).
Before community psychology was conceived of as a discipline, another writer, Argyris (1964), an organizational psychologist, looked upon competence as an extremely important factor in facilitating "organizational effectiveness." He begins with the premise that all human beings need to feel a sense of competence, defining competence as "... the solving of problems by developing solutions that prevent their recurrence, and doing so with minimum utilization of energy" (1964, p. 24). Armed with this premise and definition, Argyris develops his theory of the relationship of competence to the production of "psychological energy" which contributes to organizational effectiveness. In summary he says:

Organizations have many sources of energy. We are able to focus on only one of these--the psychological energy of individuals. This energy is hypothesized to increase as the individuals' experiences of psychological success increase, and to decrease with psychological failure. In order to experience psychological success, three requirements are essential. The individuals must value themselves and aspire to experience an increasing sense of competence. This, in turn, requires that they strive continuously to find and to create opportunities in which they can increase the awareness and acceptance of their selves and others (Argyris, 1964, p. 33).

Although stemming from an organizational context, Argyris' construction of the idea of competence appears to have something to contribute to the broader field of community psychology. More important than the question of whether or not one conceives of competence as necessarily involving "solutions" rather than the means of "coping" (on this
question, as we have seen, Iscoe and Argyris are not in agreement) is the issue of "psychological success" and how it might relate to the enhancement of a sense of community.

Consultation and Community Organization

The community psychologist has at his disposal the whole range of techniques employed by the community mental health worker and the organizational specialist. As Heller and Monahan caution, "Consultation is not psychotherapy . . .; the content focus of consultation is on work problems, not personal problems" (1977, p. 209). They warn that an experienced clinician who would assume a community consultative role requires additional training in community and organizational consultation and a greater understanding of community functioning. Such training would include familiarization with the various modes of consultation: client-centered, with the focus on how the consultee can help the client; consultee-centered, with the emphasis on how to overcome the difficulties that the consultee is having; and program-centered, with the focus on helping the system, in general, to maximize its effectiveness in meeting its goals in the most psychologically sound and humane manner (Heller and Monahan, 1977, pp. 209-225). The last mentioned mode is, of
course, the most relevant to our present study of the psychological sense of community, especially as it "offers the greatest potential for significant and enduring changes in an organizational system."

Also related to the concept of consultation is the field of *organizational development* with its variety of techniques that are applied ordinarily to work settings with the twin objectives of achieving better structure and better working relationships. While to some these objectives are looked upon as euphemisms for the instrumental corporate values of better efficiency and increased production, others see them as being congruent with the humanistic values of personal fulfillment and job satisfaction (Heller and Monahan, 1977). The ideal assumption, of course, is that "OD" encompasses both sets of values. In any case, the community psychologist may add OD to his or her repertoire of strategies, or at least be familiar with its principal methods. These have been described in detail by Schmuck and Miles (1971), and Heller and Monahan (1977), among others. For our purposes it should suffice to mention the most common types of intervention, most of which are well-known to group and systems-oriented counselors and psychologists: sensitivity training, survey feedback, force-field analysis—these are known as "process intervention"—and a variety of technical and structural approaches known as "sociotechnical systems in-
tervention" or "technostructural activity" (Schmuck and Miles, 1971) which attempt to directly modify "how the job gets done."

The disciplines of community development and community organization, while chiefly lying within the domains of social work and other applied social sciences, contain elements that would be of more than passing interest to the practitioner of community psychology. Nelson, Ramsey and Verner (1960), describe community development as

... the process involved in educating community members to take deliberate action for community change, the nature of which is determined by them in terms of their own value systems (Nelson, Ramsey and Verner, 1960, p. 30, emphasis added).

They describe four basic steps in the process: (1) Systematic discussion of common felt needs by community members. (It should be noted here that it is the field of community development which perfected the so-called small-group and large-group discussion methods--a significant contribution in itself.) (2) Systematic planning to carry out the "self-help" programs selected by the members; (3) Optimal "mobilization and harnessing of the physical, economic and social potentialities of local community groups"; and (4) "The creation of aspiration and the determination to undertake additional community improvement projects" (Nelson, Ramsey and Verner, 1960, pp. 418-421). These authors view community organization as that disci-
pline which scientifically studies and analyzes "patterns, form, structure, and function of activities in community life." They feel that the term should be clearly distinguished from "community development" which is the actual process for effecting changes in structure and relationships.

Cox et al. (1970) conceive of the relationship between these two fields in a different manner. In fact, they see community organization as being the larger category which subsumes the concept of development as one of its parts. As such, community organization is understood as comprising three modes of community interaction: locality development, social planning, and social action. Locality development—here equated with community development—is the process which emphasizes "democratic procedures, voluntary cooperation, self-help, development of indigenous leadership and education" to achieve change through the broadest possible participation and "the fullest possible reliance on the community's initiative."

Social planning refers to the technical process of solving social problems by finding ways and means of improving the delivery of services and goods to those in need. The third community organization model, social action, seeks to redistribute "power, resources, or decision making in the community or changes in basic policies of formal organizations" in order to meet the needs of "a disadvantaged
segment of the population" (Cox et al., 1970, pp. 4-5). As Heller and Monahan observe, "Advocates of community organization assume that social institutions cannot change in any significant degree without important changes in the distribution of power within a community" (1977, p. 371).

An Example of a Community Psychology Model of Intervention: The Concept of "Strain"

To illustrate one community psychological approach, let us take a look at Heller's and Monahan's model of community intervention based upon their conception of social or community strain (Heller and Monahan, 1977, pp. 373-410). Strain is the product of impaired relations among the parts of a system and the resulting community disequilibrium. "[It] develops as changes occur in the composition and value structure of society which are difficult to assimilate into ongoing community life" (Heller and Monahan, 1977, p. 373). The first step in a consultation process would be an assessment of the kind and degree of community strain. For this purpose the authors develop a yardstick based upon four states or conditions of community life: (1) a homogeneous community not experiencing strain—a stable and satisfied membership unaware of any serious problems (intervention is seen as unnecessary; (2) community-wide strain—the community is experiencing strain and
is motivated for action. **Social regulators** (defined by the authors as those workers and leaders in the community "who are accessible to and representative of the broadest spectrum of community interests" and "who are capable of reducing community strain") are pressed for a solution. The consultation strategy is to help the community or organization adopt better problem-solving processes "which allow constituencies access, involvement, and input into proposed solutions." (The authors note that this is similar to the OD approach which attempts to lower "restraining forces"); (3) strain limited to "culture-bearing" ("confident") **groups**—majority feels strain but specific "excitor" groups do not. (The authors provide the example of teenagers, made up of members of the "dominant culture," who become rowdy because of the lack of a local teen facility and who clash with the police who are attempting to enforce community standards.) The basic consultation strategy is to provide alternatives to harsh forms of suppression; and (4) strain limited to minority ("alienated") **groups**—here the dominant culture may not at first perceive the strain and "may only become sufficiently aroused when it is clear that the problem can not be solved easily." The appropriate intervention would be "the education of the unresponsive majority in problem awareness." If this fails then a **community organization** ("marshalling the power resources within the alienated community") approach is suggested—or
or an "alternative institution" approach. (An example of the latter from the writer's experience was the establishment of a special "study dorm" to accommodate an "alienated minority"--in this case, "serious" students--who felt "oppressed" by the otherwise "unserious" majority of a college campus.)

Heller and Monahan summarize their view of "optimal community life" this way:

... A community that does not foster a sense of cohesion among its citizens can be a sterile place. The community should not be simply a neutral field upon which other forces play. ... A sense of cohesion develops as an attitude built upon the ability to work toward the fulfillment of common aspirations. We are not talking about a mystical or ethereal quality but one that depends on the availability of growth-enhancing structures (1977, p. 395).

Thus we see an echoing of Sarason's insistence that the psychological sense of community should be the criterion by which to judge the efforts of community psychology. Let us now turn to an examination of what the authors mean when they write that such a sense "depends on the availability of growth-enhancing structures."

In general a growth-enhancing structure is any systemized component of a community or organization which serves to optimize community life. Examples would include any of the "structures" already mentioned in our discussion of the community psychological approach: use of paraprofessionals; networks; resources; opportunities for direct action; opportunities for psychological success; opportun-
ities for feedback and discussion; democratic procedures; and an example from the authors' community intervention model, the interaction between "social regulators" and citizens.

"Manning" of "Behavior Settings"

One very significant example of a growth-enhancing structure is "the availability of behavior settings and the manning of such settings," a concept developed by Barker (1968) and referred to by every writer we have reviewed who has an interest in community psychology or other person-environment approach. Behavior settings are social structures which tend to elicit certain behaviors regardless of the makeup of the individuals who participate in those structures. Heller and Monahan see such settings as "growth-enhancing" and promoting of a sense of community particularly when they allow "individuals to develop links to others outside their normal family circle" (1977, p. 384). According to Barker this condition of a setting is more likely to occur when the behavior setting is "undermanned" rather than "optimally manned." In Barker's own words:

... undermanned behavior settings in comparison with optimally manned settings impose more and stronger forces on their inhabitants in more varied directions; the forces are, however, more prevalingly directed inward and toward other inhabitants. According to this, undermanned behavior settings have stronger internal interdependence and cohesiveness; they are
stronger things vis-à-vis their inhabitants than optimally manned behavior settings (Barker, 1968, p. 185).

Reporting on the findings of earlier studies which compared high school students in small schools with those in large schools Barker concludes:

(1) They report twice as many pressures upon them to take part in the programs of the settings. . . . In the small schools, marginal students (students without the abilities and backgrounds that facilitate school success) report almost as many pressures to participate as do regular students (students with the abilities and backgrounds for school achievement). But within large schools, the marginal students report about one-fourth as many pressures to participate as do the regular students. . . . The small behavior settings with modest activity programs generate more forces toward participation than the large settings with ambitious programs.

(2) They perform in 2.5 times as many responsible positions, on the average; and for crucial, central positions, such as team members or chairmen of meetings, they perform in six times as many positions. . . . Furthermore, the students in the small school fill important and responsible positions in twice as many behavior setting genotypes as their counterparts. The schools with the smaller and less varied settings are, for their students, functionally larger and more varied than the schools with the more populous and the more varied settings.

(3) They report having more satisfactions related (a) to the development of competence, (b) to being challenged, (c) to engaging in important actions, (d) to being involved in group activities, (e) to being valued, and (f) to gaining moral and cultural values (Barker, 1968, p. 199).

Ideally, then, a behavior setting would accommodate all those who would wish to participate in the particular behavior which that setting invokes in order to achieve a sense of community; this would also prevent the exclusion of "marginal" participants, or, as Heller and Monahan
explain, it would "insure that a community would not be atomized by the presence of large numbers of unaffiliated or chronically rejected persons" (1977, p. 384). An example offered by them is that of a school drama production which can only accommodate 15 players from among a total of 50 applicants. A "community wise" administrator (i.e., "social regulator") would call for the expanding of the various elements of the production—or even suggest that the director choose a different play. A more far-reaching strategy suggested by the authors might be "to consider the reallocation of resources to support a greater number of productions each year."

Organizational behavior, another field from which the community psychologist borrows insights with which to ply his trade, also has something to say about Barker's manning of behavior settings theory. Argyris (1964), writing about the staffing of organizations, asserts that this idea has significant applicability in the work setting and relates it to his own theory (discussed earlier in this chapter) of the connection between psychological success and organizational effectiveness. However, he adds this caution:

It would be a tragic mistake for these comments to be interpreted as meaning that indiscriminate speed-up is good for people. It would be self-defeating if organizations were purposely undermanned in order to manipulate the workers to produce more.

An undermanned organization will probably have its predicted effects (1) if the tasks available permit
individuals use their important abilities, (2) if the employees believe that the undermannedness is legitimate, and (3) if they are sharing the fruits of increased productivity. The motive in developing optimally undermanned organizations should be to increase the probability for self-expression, self-responsibility, commitment in individuals, and the flexibility in, and vitality of, the organization. If this is successful, the resulting work should be more deeply satisfying. However, if an organization undermans itself without concomitant enlargement of jobs, increasing mutual influence and control, and deepening its own purpose, it will tend to find that the entire program may backfire (Argyris, 1964, p. 228).

The College Setting: The "Ecological Perspective" and "Student Development" Models

Barker, whose concept of the behavior setting we have just examined, was trained as a social psychologist, but writes within a discipline which has come to be called ecological psychology, again, another field which has something to say to community psychology. Kelly, in an article entitled "Toward an Ecological Conception of Preventive Interventions" (Kelly, 1970b), presents his case for the use of "the ecological analogy, both for studying social environments and for changing them." Kelly explains:

The translations of this particular ecological analogy affirms that as the structure and functions of social units vary, modes of dealing with disruptive events also shift, with a corresponding variation in the behavior of individuals who perform adaptive and maladaptive roles in the specific society. Interrelationships between the functions of social units and the participation of individual members then become a primary focus for designing programs of interventions where the intervention rearranges the interrelationships or couplings between individual behavior and
social functions as much as it alters the behavior of one social unit of the expressive behavior of any one member of the society (Kelly, 1970b, p. 127).

Following Barker and Kelly and others, the "ecological perspective," as it came to be called (Banning and Kaiser, 1974), began to be adopted during the early seventies, particularly as an expansion of the definition of "counseling" on some Western campuses (Huebner, 1979a). The cause was taken up by the Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education (WICHE) and dubbed the "ecosystem model" (Aulepp and Delworth, 1976). The model is described as

... a design process utilizing an ecological approach. The essence of an ecological approach is the interaction between persons and their environment or how an environment affects people, their work, their leisure, and their personal growth. ... In using the ecosystem approach to campus, the model becomes a tool for the creation of campus environments that can foster both educational and personal growth (Aulepp and Delworth, 1976, p. vii, emphasis added).

Their system is a rather technically explicit one which depends heavily on measurement and assessment techniques designed to elicit students' perceptions of particular environments (e.g., cafeterias, dormitories, student centers, etc.) and their own reactions to such environments with the hope of utilizing such data to "design optimum campus environments."

Huebner (1979a), in her historical overview of this model, traces a number of its central concepts to "ideas initially presented by community and counseling psycholo-
gists," but points the finger at those disciplines for not having incorporated the "data-theory base" (derived from the earlier work of K. Lewin, E. C. Tolman, B. F. Skinner and others) into the practice of their psychology or human services delivery. Continuing her discussion of the theoretical rationale behind the ecosystem approach, Huebner writes:

The community psychology movement of the 1960s and 1970s brought with it a return to the ideology and vocabulary of interactionism [the claim that behavior is the result of the interaction between organism and environment] and the concern with the immediate person-environment situation. The campus-based version of this movement, with which we are concerned, took hold in the early 1970s and has remained a force within the student services and counseling literature of the decade. While community psychology in general and campus ecology in particular cite the interactionist and situationist [believing that behavior is a function of cues and reinforcements in the environment] literature of the past fifty years as rationale and defense for their orientation, their advocates have made only minimal attempts to predicate intervention strategies . . . on this data-theory base (Huebner, 1979a, p. 4).

She goes on to observe that the data-theory base has been used more in the community psychology domain (meaning non-college) than it has in campus intervention.

The typical ecosystem approach involves seven steps: (1) gaining institutional support; (2) establishing a planning team; (3) designing the project; (4) collecting data; (5) data analysis; (6) effecting interventions based on the data and disseminating the data; and (7) reassessing the environment after interventions have been made.
According to Paul and Morrill (1979), the criteria for evaluating the operation of such a system would be the reduction of "student-environment mismatches" along with the reduction of "stress and strain" and an increase in the "output" or "productivity" of student and university. Presumably, "retention" would be an example of productivity in a college setting (Paul and Morrill, 1979, p. 94).

"Personal growth," mentioned earlier in our quote from Aulepp and Delworth (1976) is one of the explicit goals of this model, and, as such, may be viewed as being encompassed by and serving the major "student affairs" mode on today's campuses: the student development model, popular and in vogue since the middle 1960s. The American College Personnel Association published a statement (ACPA, 1974) on student development as an outgrowth of a "model building conference." The paper, in describing the rationale for student development, states:

The concept of student development . . . affirms that in post-secondary education cognitive mastery of knowledge should be integrated with the development of persons along such dimensions as cultural awareness, development of a value system, self-awareness, interpersonal skills, and community responsibility. Self-determination and self-direction can best result when both cognitive and affective development are considered essential (ACPA, 1974, p. 2, emphasis added).

The paper then goes on to describe the three basic "strategies" for achieving student development goals: instruction, consultation, and milieu management. The term "milieu management" captures our attention because
the words appear to connote a community-environment approach, an approach which would subsume the ecosystem model described above. Notice again how the concept of community receives some passing attention as the goals of this model are spelled out:

... This change strategy calls for marshalling all pertinent resources of the campus community in an attempt to shape the institutional environments in ways which will facilitate desired change and maximize student development. ... The role of the student affairs professional is one of coordinating and integrating activities to establish a developmental milieu designed to facilitate change toward achieving the desired goals of student self-direction, community maintenance and an enlightened democratic citizenry (ACPA, 1974, p. 4, emphasis added).

From this brief review it can be seen that both of these systems place emphasis on the environment or the milieu as a means toward achieving what can be thought of as the primary goal of all educational institutions, that is, the development of the individual student. Both emphasize "educational and personal growth." The ecosystem model stresses the adjustment of the environment and de-emphasizes the psychotherapeutic model of individual adjustment. By stressing "development" rather than adjustment, the student development model would favor the growth of the individual by the utilization of proactive strategies rather than reactive interventions.

A parallel approach which emerged along with the ecosystem and student development models, and which maximally utilizes the types of community intervention strate-
gies discussed earlier in this chapter, is the community mental health model. As we shall see, this mode of campus intervention is closer to the major concern of this study, the idea of a psychological sense of community, in that a "cohesive, organized community" is one of its goals. An example of this approach is supplied by Nidorf (1970).

A Community Mental Health Model Applied to a College Campus

Nidorf reports on his development of a "student service center" at San Fernando Valley State College which was initially modelled after a comprehensive community mental health service. Premised on the idea that "the campus is a community," Nidorf reasoned that preventive social psychiatry, using the tools of research, consultation, community organization, education and intervention, should be applicable to a campus population as it would be to any community population. Emphasizing field work, i.e., "going into the community" rather than waiting for problems to arrive at the administrator's desk, the intent of the program was "to aid the student in coping with the stresses of a large college and to help and encourage the enhancement of his life" (Nidorf, 1970, p. 19).

It is interesting to see how Nidorf's description of the contemporary student's cultural milieu, comparing it to the past, parallels that of the "lost community"
sentiment expressed by a number of the writers reviewed in this study. Here are some fragments:

In the past, the college campus was able to deal with the adolescent crisis by serving as a community that provided a milieu to impart not only knowledge and skills, but also values and beliefs pragmatically relevant to the times. The student was encouraged to clarify and redefine himself in terms of this relatively clear tradition.

Today such pathways and guidelines are anything but clear. We contribute to the student's anxiety by providing a hostile environment consisting of competitive examinations, huge reading lists, fragmented knowledge, and patterns of values that lack relevance to the present. We are perpetuating a social structure that is antithetical to the psychological needs of our students.

... to be a responsible citizen in a democratic society requires a sense of being able to participate in determining one's destiny and a sense of the common good. A sense of the common good requires a cohesive, organized community and the democratic use of power requires an organized community. The sense of community within student bodies is minimal. The organization of students into a community is hampered by structural characteristics of college life (Nidorf, 1970, pp. 20-21, emphasis added).

Thus the author provides a backdrop which becomes his rationale for using the community mental health model as the "ideal agent" for influencing "the many dimensions of vested interest maintaining the status quo." The shift is from the focus on psychotherapy to community organization and social intervention where "the mental health worker assesses the felt needs of the community and encourages the community to organize to meet these needs on its own terms" (1970, p. 22).

Nidorf's community mental health model for his
Student Service Center consists of four major strategies: community organization, intervention (including crisis intervention and environmental manipulation), social action projects (e.g., sponsorship of student-faculty discussions on the meaning of general education; seminars on the psychology of women), and consultation (with organized student groups who are seeking solutions to "work difficulties"). Clearly, all four of these strategies are congruent with the community psychological orientation. With our focus on the issue of sense of community, however, our attention falls mainly on Nidorf's application of community organization theory to the college campus.

Nidorf sees community organization as a process which "helps members of a community accept responsibility for doing things they believe to be prosocial" (1970, p. 24). The student affairs worker is then cast in the role of what the author refers to as an "encourager," who facilitates maximum participation by reinforcing prosocial forces which already exist in the community. A sense of competence is what community organizers say develops among community members who engage in such participation, and, says Nidorf, "a sense of self, a sense of generosity, and a sense of common good."

A six-stage model is used in the organization process (Nidorf, 1970, p. 24):
(1) Exploratory research
   a. Assess needs.
   b. Assess resources.
   c. Identify active and concerned people.

(2) Organizing
   a. Identified persons are brought together in a "nuclear" group.
   b. Problems are identified.
   c. Commitment is made to find solutions.
   d. Identify leadership.

(3) Planning
   a. Needs analyzed.
   b. Brain-storm solutions.
   c. Weigh alternatives.
   d. Settle on feasible plan.

(4) Project
   a. Implementation of plan.
   b. Evaluation of project.

(5) Continued action
   a. Develop new plans.
   b. Implement new plans.
   c. Merger into larger groups with larger-scale projects.

(6) Professional staff "encourager" withdraws from nuclear group
   a. System is evaluated for "prosocial" accomplishment.
   b. System is evaluated for presence of group self-momentum.

It may be that Nidorf's model strikes a familiar chord for those of us in student affairs circles on today's campuses, although these principles may be couched in the more up-to-date terms of student development or ecosystem management. In theory what sets his system apart is his stated goal of developing a "sense of common good" in
in addition to "developing students." It falls short of our interest in developing a psychological sense of community only in the sense that the mental health model is narrowly focused on "the alleviation and prevention of personal trouble in the student community" (Nidorf, 1970, p. 22).

In the same year that Nidorf's report appeared, another article, entitled "New Requirements in Educating Psychologists for Public Practice and Applied Research" (Roen, 1970), extolled the virtues of the community approach:

... In its attempts to intervene effectively in the lives of troubled people, community mental health would seem to be asserting that the context in which the problem at hand is embedded is of great, if not pivotal significance. Not content with the underpowered concept of behavior being overdetermined, it looks seriously at the hospital as an institution, the school as an environment (Roen, 1970, p. 64).

A similar but much broader statement is made by Cowen (1973) as the concluding remarks to his extensive review of the "social and community interventions" movement in psychology. It would be fitting to quote him here to end this discussion of our findings in this area. Cowen states:

... Notwithstanding the fact that its fine details remain fuzzy, the evolving SC [social and community] framework offers a genuine alternative to prior dominant MH [mental health] approaches. It is active rather than passive and accords far greater importance to prevention than to repair. Its key components include analysis and modification of social systems, including engineering environments and man-environment combinations, that maximize adaptation. Its person-oriented prongs stress such approaches as... crisis intervention, and consultation which vastly
extend reach and promise more nearly geometric payoff increments from finite resources. . . . As such, it focuses attention on the person-shaping attributes of communities and their primary social institutions and suggest that topics such as the schools . . . are at least as germane to the field of disordered behavior as traditional topic units such as paranoid schizophrenia or drug addiction (Cowen, 1973, p. 460, emphasis added).

One final word is in order. All of the writers in the field of community psychology whom we have reviewed, particularly Sarason and Iscoe, agree that this field is a model of delivery that requires of its workers an activist stance. Thus community psychologists often find themselves in the role of "change agent" within the various target dimensions outlined by Jason. As Zax and Specter observe "some would even go so far as to eject themselves into the power structure where they could, themselves, hold the administrative reins" (1974, p. 3).

**Summary and Discussion**

We have reviewed some of the essentials of the community psychological approach. Beginning with Sarason we saw that this approach would de-emphasize intrapsychic factors and instead underscore the understanding and changing of social contexts. In his view the psychological sense of community is the major criterion by which to judge the impact of such an effort. (A fuller discussion of Sarason's views was presented in Chapter VII.) Heller and
Monahan considered prevention to be the primary focus rather than disorder; they stressed that the medical model should be avoided with the emphasis placed instead on coping, adaptation and competence. An important feature of their mode of intervention is the concept of alleviating community strain through the employment of various consultation procedures and the establishment of growth-enhancing structures. These would include the use of social regulators (defined as persons who represent and are accessible to the spectrum of community interests), helping networks, and optimally undermanned behavior settings. An important goal would be the fostering of a sense of cohesion. Jason stressed the importance of geometrically expanding the reach of services by the utilization of paraprofessionals and consultation which would provide crisis intervention and directly effect environmental changes. The community psychiatric perspective of Caplan and Greenbaum maintained that primary prevention (the forestalling of outbreaks of mental disorder) and resource development should be the major focus of a community psychology. Three classes of resources were identified: physical, psycho-social and socio-cultural. Iscoe proposed that the key component of this approach should be the developing of the competent community; i.e., optimizing competent coping and using, developing, and sustaining resources. The organizational
notion of competence proposed by Argyris was discussed: in the work setting worker competence leads to psychological success which in turn generates organizational energy, and hence effectiveness.

A brief review of consultation techniques, seen as one of the tools of the community psychologist, followed. Heller and Monahan identified three classes of consultation: client-centered, consultee-centered and program-centered. The last mentioned was seen as the most relevant since it has the greatest potential for effecting enduring changes. Organizational development (with its chief goals described as bettering work structures and relationships) was discussed. Productivity versus human fulfillment and the need for a synthesis for the two was presented as one of the dilemmas of the field. Community development and community organization were also presented as potential tools of the worker in community psychology. One set of authors (Nelson, Ramsey and Verner) presented community development as that discipline which undertakes to systematically promote self-reliance and community change through discussion methods, education and the mobilizing of community resources, distinguishing it from community organization which was viewed as the purely analytical component of community intervention. Cox et al., on the other hand, maintained that community organization is the larger category of which
community development is a subset. They viewed community organization as consisting of three elements, each a distinct model of intervention: development, planning and action.

Barker's concept of the undermanned behavior setting was examined as an example of a "growth-enhancing structure." Behavior settings were described as social structures which tend to induce specific behaviors in their inhabitants irrespective of individual differences. Barker's findings supported the idea that an undermanned setting—manning refers to how the setting is populated—promotes participation by a larger percentage of its inhabitants than would an optimally manned setting. Thus the inhabitants have a greater sense of being needed and valued as members. We saw that Argyris agreed that this concept is valid in an organizational work setting but that he cautioned against the deliberate application of the theory in an organization without the allowance for certain pre-conditions designed to promote a sense of competency, self-esteem, and psychological success.

We examined three models of community based interventions applied to the college campus. The ecosystem perspective proposed by Huebner and others was presented as a highly systematic, technically explicit approach that places a heavy priority on survey measurements, data col-
lection and assessment of the student-environment interface which lead to specific team-designed changes that are later assessed for their effectiveness. The criteria for evaluation of the ecosystem model were identified: reduction of student-environment mismatches and stress and strain (Paul and Morrill) and personal growth (Aulepp and Delworth). Since personal growth was viewed as a goal, we concluded that the ecosystem perspective was a methodology that serves the larger concept of student development. It was seen that the student development model of student affairs has the objective of promoting student growth by integrating cognitive mastery of knowledge with personal development along various dimensions. Its primary strategies for accomplishing this objective were identified as instruction, consultation, and milieu management (ACP A).

The third campus-based model which we examined is the community mental health design proposed by Nidorf (1970) who reported on an actual system established by the author. He described a six-stage model similar in design to its ecosystem counterpart except that the interventions were described in conventional terminology rather than in the more contemporary systems jargon, and the objectives were more closely aligned with a community perspective. Thus the emphasis was on the fostering of a sense of competence and common good and the establishment of a cohesive, organized community. The strategies employed were community
organization, crisis intervention, environmental manipulation, social action and consultation, with the student personnel worker cast in the role of prosocial organizer.

Finally, it was observed that the community psychology model connotes an activist stance for its workers (Iscoe, Sarason, Zax and Specter; most of the writers in the field). There was the suggestion that the community psychologist might serve as more than a counselor, consultant or change agent; i.e., he or she might hold decision-making or policy-making positions within a power structure.

It is our contention, having surveyed the field to our satisfaction, that community psychology is not a set of techniques or a discrete collection of intervention strategies, but rather a professional attitude associated with a community orientation and informed by a central value that one calls upon as one goes about the business of "helping" others. Some, like Sarason, make explicit what that value is: the psychological sense of community, incorporating the idea of the viability of a community as community, and the growth and development of all in that community. While none of the models presented are in themselves antithetical to the idea of a psychological sense of community, and one of them, in fact, espouses at least in theory, the goal of "community maintenance," we
would ask whether each might not benefit by emphatically incorporating the idea of a psychological sense of community as a central value.

The ecosystem model, for example, operates on a hit or miss value system, and appears to be setting itself up as a vehicle for improving the creature-comforts of campus residents, or at best, to put this in loftier terms, "improving the quality of life," whatever that happens to mean to any one group of students who are asked to "perceive" their "environmental referents." To some this may mean adding a vegetarian diet to the cafeteria menu; to some perhaps the addition of a bus shuttle or locks on shower stalls or lighting on dark walkways; others may perceive the need for a space that will encourage the interaction and interdependence of persons. The list can be endless and therefore it would seem that such a system would need a hierarchical set of values with which to prioritize suggestions for environmental modifications derived from needs assessments and other measurements.

Our guess would be that in practice student development as a model has fallen short of its promise to promote student development precisely and ironically because it has emphasized personal growth to the detriment of the sense of community as a value. This last assertion, of course, would have to be borne out by research; we make the
point here only to suggest that such research might be undertaken in light of the findings of this report.

If one were to build upon and expand Nidorf's concept of community mental health so as to include the development and well-being of all members of the college community—the students and the faculty and the staff—and incorporate what appears to be the extremely valuable concept of the student personnel worker as a "prosocial encourager," then we may tentatively view such a model as being consistent with the overarching value of a psychological sense of community. "Prosocial," of course, would be understood to mean being informed by such a value.

Our original objective in studying the concept sense of community was to discuss any knowledge so gained in the context of life and work in the college setting, particularly in relation to the role of the person who is typically charged with overseeing "the quality of life" in such a setting: the dean of students. The next two chapters will be devoted to this issue. As we begin to engage in that discussion, it seems prudent to seek the answer to the question In what sense (or senses) may the college be construed as a community? That is the task of the following chapter.
CHAPTER X
THE COLLEGE AS COMMUNITY

What Is College Community?

Earlier in this report we quoted a line by McWilliams from his The Idea of Fraternity in America to the effect that the campus "... is one of the last analogues of the polis..." The full paragraph reads:

Social processes in which such educational practices [referring to the discouragement of "cliques based on 'mere friendship'"] play a role increasingly shift the place of rebellion, the stage of fidelity, to the college campus. The campus is ideal in another sense: it is one of the last analogues of the polis, a society in which there is considerable unity between the expressive and purposive universe of the individual. And, of course, the college cannot help increasing the awareness of alternative values, of ideals lacking in contemporary society (McWilliams, 1973, pp. 86-87).

McWilliams is alluding to the sense of fraternity that arose on college campuses during the years of protest that accompanied the Viet Nam War. But he recognizes that the "unity" which follows the integration of expression and purpose soon diminishes after the crisis, and there is a return to "established individualism." As in our discussion in Chapter V, when we examined the communal response to crisis, the author sees this as in part reflecting "... the necessity of any mass movement to speak to the
values and the desires which already exist in the mind of many" (1973, p. 87). But in spite of the analogy to the polis, McWilliams does not address himself to the issue of the college as a community unto itself, that is, with its own core of values and its own ability to inspire the integration of purpose and expression. Let us take a different perspective of college life, one that was expressed by C. P. Snow (as quoted by Minar and Greer in their book The Concept of Community [1969]) as he nostalgically recalled his own college days:

For many it was a profound comfort to be one of a society completely sure of itself, completely certain of its values, completely without misgivings about whether it was living a good life. . . . there were men varied enough to delight anyone with a taste in human beings--but . . . none of them ever doubted it was a good thing to be a fellow. They took it for granted, felt they were enough, felt it was right they should be envied. . . . The college was the place where men lived the least anxious, the most comforting, the freest lives (C. P. Snow, as quoted in Minar and Greer, 1969, p. 182).

However, Minar and Greer had made the point previously that Snow was not referring to the university as a whole, as in this quote from that writer:

The University was poor; no one left it money, it was too impersonal for that, men kept their affection and loyalty and nostalgia for the house where they lived in their young manhood (C. P. Snow, as quoted in Minar and Greer, 1969, p. 178).

By using these passages, Minar and Greer were attempting to introduce into their discussion of the concept of community the idea that places like colleges may contain
community or may even be examples of community. Community, as we have seen in Chapter II of this study, is an elusive concept, and so the question of whether or not the college campus may be construed as a community is not one that lends itself to an absolute response. Klien (1965), observing that students at a college are not all residents, that most retain home addresses and "have only a limited commitment to a predetermined period of community membership," questions whether the campus is an appropriate analogue for communities generally. On the other hand, he concludes that since most of the features of community are present (e.g., physical size, population density, location and resources, "guiding values," "distribution of power and authority, and patterns of communication"), the campus may, indeed, be considered a community (Klien, 1965, p. 308). In addition, writers in the field of higher education invariably refer to the college as community at some point in their discussion, albeit in an unquestioning and unwitting manner. (For example, we examined every issue of the NASPA Journal, from 1966 to present, and found not one article that dealt with the management of student affairs that did not contain the word community when referring to the campus population. At the same time, we found that rarely did any of these explicitly treat community as an idea, i.e., conceptually.)
An early view of the residence college as community is expressed by Price (1941) as she begins her "diagnosis" (from a social work perspective) of the student problems at Stanford:

A college or university community differs from a community in the outside world in several important respects. In the first place, a campus community has a limited and concentrated age range, the great majority of inhabitants being between sixteen and twenty-two years of age. The residence campus community also has a lack of continuity, inherent in the college situation where over one-fourth of the student group leaves the community annually. On the other hand, the older generation, the faculty, who comprise approximately one-fifth of the community, is relatively permanent.

The life rhythms and interests of these two groups differ in a number of respects. For example, the faculty on the whole are settled in their vocational and family relations; the students are frequently not settled in their choice of vocation, are frequently living away from their homes, and are in a relationship of dalliance with the opposite sex. The faculty live in their own homes, frequently at some distance from the main center of college life; the students are congregated in groups of their own age, in university residences or fraternity houses which tend to increase their contacts and interest in one another. In addition to these characteristics, the natural and artificial selective factors which determine the clientele of an institution operate to make the student group more homogeneous in interests and activities than would be true of a non-selected group of young people in a community in the outside world.

The campus community is partially isolated from the outside world by its very nature of partial withdrawal for study. It is none the less affected by the major economic and social currents and cataclysms in the larger culture (Price, 1941, p. 309).

The "isolation from the outside world" and the encompassing way of life of the residential school led
Goffman (1957, pp. 43-44) to include the residential school in his list of total institutions which are organized "for technical tasks." (Prisons, mental hospitals, monasteries are the more obvious examples of the total institution.) Hillery, Jr., in his book, Communal Organizations (1972), argues the case that the total institution may not be considered community, the principal reason being that there "is a basic split between inmates and staff [!] such that they form separate worlds" (Hillery, Jr., 1972, p. 130). Cooperation, one of the "focal components" of the "vill" (Hillery's sociological case equivalent of community), rather than occurring between the "staff and inmate segments" occurs within them. And, most important for Hillery, since for him community "is the consequence of cooperation among families in a given location" (Hillery, Jr., 1972, p. 145), the absence of the family in the total institution setting clearly bars such a setting from consideration as a "local community." He concludes that, rather than as a community, "the total institution may be studied as a type of complex or formal organization."

Nisbet is one of those who would argue that when talking about community in relation to higher education the referent group is not one that arises out of a deliberate effort to create "community," but one that has evolved over time around the common pursuit of knowledge.
In Buber's terms this would be the "Centre"; in Nisbet's terms it is "the academic dogma": knowledge is sacred in and for itself. Nisbet's book The Degradation of the Academic Dogma (1971) is based on the charge that the "academic community," having abandoned this ideal along with other essential elements of community, and having replaced these with "the higher capitalism," "the cult of individuality," and the "deluge of humanitarianism," is no longer a true community. What is a true community? Nisbet writes that every community "worthy of the name" is built around seven crucial attributes, all of which are incorporated in the idea of academic dogma. The first is function, around which it is first established. Dogma, the second essential, is its "profoundly held value." Communal authority, "unwritten, unprescriptive, and drawn from common experience" is third. Hierarchy is the fourth attribute, the sense of solidarity (incorporating the "we-feeling" and sense of normative duty) fifth, and the sense of honor or status, the sixth. Nisbet's final essential is the sense of superiority (to the "surrounding world") (Nisbet, 1971, pp. 44-45).

The university as "therapeutic community, an example of bending to the cult of individuality, he treats with utmost disdain. Referring to programs and colleges "founded to deal with real or imagined student needs or psychological character," Nisbet complains:
Within a short time the able faculty members, the bright and motivated students, who find themselves wily-nily participating in these forms of communitarianism lose interest and . . . move to where challenging problems and situations can be found. The most dedicated in these programs are characteristically the least bright, the least intellectually oriented, and at their worst, unable to concentrate mentally even to the point of reading a book. They require incessant attention, love, diversion, and companionship. Never having experienced authority in their homes, in many cases, they are incapable of enduring even the authority of an intellectual discipline in college (Nisbet, 1971, p. 194).

Later he adds:

. . . Community for its own sake has never proved to be of lasting interest in the history of human behavior. People come together, not to be together, but to do things that cannot be done alone (Nisbet, 1971, pp. 204-208).

A profoundly opposite view is expressed by Palmer, writing from a Quaker, intentional community perspective:

Others among us may be called to build community in the places where we go to school and work. These have become the major arenas of hierarchy and competition. . . . In them we are pitted against one another so that something called "higher performance" may be achieved. But when we destroy the community of work we get unethical products and degrading service. When we destroy the community of scholars, dehumanized teaching and learning are the result. We will build community in these places only if we see that performance at the expense of community is no achievement at all (Palmer, 1977, p. 25).

Similarly, in an essay describing the Quaker idea of a "meeting for learning," Palmer explains:

. . . the idea or text is never given the prominence of doctrine. If the metaphor of meeting means anything to Friends, it means that experience is honored over doctrine. Only as doctrine has experiential validity can it be honored at all. . . . Whether the
subject is literature or atomic physics, the test is always experiential (or experimental) (Palmer, 1976, no pagination).

And he concludes

The most important consequence of any meeting [for learning] is the nurture of community... Education (as contrasted with training) comes from community and creates community. When a meeting breaks, the community goes out to embrace people and events in new and more powerful ways (Palmer, 1976, n.p.).

A Professor's View of "Community" and College Survival

A different approach to the idea of college as community is taken by Snyder (1974). Because his is the only article we have found that deals explicitly with the two major foci of this study, the idea of community and the small college as community, we shall spell out his viewpoint in a more protracted way. Concerned about the survival of the small liberal arts college, Snyder makes a cynical and challenging attack on what he terms the "anachronistic and heavy emphasis on community among leftist and liberal student activists and faculty."

Rejecting as "superficial" the explanation usually offered by social commentators which holds that the loss of the sense of community is a mass societal problem, he suggests that the trouble lies in "... a last strong emphasis on a particular belief system [the liberal arts dogma] before such beliefs die and are replaced by others"
Snyder condemns "... the role of the mystique of community in our society generally, as well as the history of such values in academia." He takes a jaundiced view of the "romantic" notion of community which

... implies an idealized, integrated, exclusive, closed and static system of norms and values that provides meaning for the individuals who participate in it (Snyder, 1974, p. 182).

He dismisses this "fascinating cultural mythology" as having no place in any hard-nosed discussion about survival of the small liberal arts college. In fact, complains Snyder, "it does great damage to our objective understanding of the structure and functioning of higher education."

He continues:

... The Romantic ideal of the primal community--the family--is always with us and, like love, it appears in our dreams, advertisements, and speeches of our politicians. It is emphasized most, however, in those particular periods and areas of the social structure in which we are experiencing very rapid social change and a resultant loss of meaning in our lives. This is why the concentration on community is so intense in higher education at the moment (1974, p. 182).

Reviewing the changing roles of the college and the professor, he describes them as having risen from the "churchly origins" of higher education. The expectation, for example, that the professor should take a personal interest in his students is seen as an outgrowth of the "sacred" or "moral" role derived from the clerical history of college instruction. At the same time, the professor's
"secular" role, that of imparting knowledge, places him in a conflict difficult to resolve. In addition to the clerical background of higher education, its aristocratic-elitist origins, asserts Snyder, serve to deepen and sharpen the role conflict of the professor who is caught between a "cultivation" role and a "training" role. He describes the typical nineteenth century liberal arts college as controlled by the elite, and as small, hierarchical, authoritarian, "and operated much in the fashion of localized, extended, patriarchal communities or guilds" (1974, p. 185). He concludes that the changing roles of the college and the professor account for a large portion of student complaints concerning the lack of a sense of community. Other factors observed by Snyder are mass education, the resultant student activism of the sixties, the weakening of "guild-like," "vertical" student organizations that used to serve as entrees to elite occupations, the trade union movement, changing value systems, accelerating social, technological change, rapid mobility, and secularization.

Snyder reminds us that during the sixties students chiefly rebelled against the growing bureaucratization, the irrelevance of courses in terms of "preparation to fit into the social order," and "the welter of rules and regulations [which] were at odds with the feeling that everyone was beautiful and should be able to do his own thing." This
thought is followed by a somewhat contradictory statement:

... The form of organization supposedly desired was that of the communal family, though a family in which one had responsibility only to his own self, desires and wishes. Was this desire for community a cry for more freedom or was it rather a reaction to an already unbearable excess of freedom, i.e., a cry for the limitation and control of individual wishes and desires? I would assert the latter, arguing that the quest for community in this case was a cry for the elimination of the tyranny of unlimited choice--freedom (1974, p. 187).

Although Snyder introduces his subject by proclaiming the irrelevancy of the "Romantic" ideal surrounding higher education's (and society's) preoccupation with the quest for community, he does not demonstrate why such an ideal is out of place in regard to a discussion of the structure and function of the small liberal arts college. He simply states why such a quest is so pervasive, an explanation not dissimilar to the "lost community" statements we have reviewed. The main thrust of Snyder's article, and the place where he brings quite a surprising perspective to our topic, appears in the final half of his argument in which he presents a prospectus for changing the academic organization and restoring a sense of community.

He begins his analysis by turning to the "faculty as community" with special attention on the small college:

... The sense of community engendered at prestigious institutions is a hierarchical guild-like one that is strongly felt; it is based on a substantial foundation in real power residing in the faculty as a body. Having
said this, it is important to point out the seeming contradiction that the primary loyalties of individuals go to their respective departments and increasingly to a particular profession as a whole while these individuals show only token loyalty to the institution at which they might happen to be on the climb to academic fame and fortune.

Turning to the other end of the spectrum of academic prestige—the small colleges, junior colleges and community colleges—we find that the faculty usually wield little power in the governance of these schools. . . . Much use is made of the term "community" at such institutions . . ., but the use is strictly symbolic and ritualistic, acting as a smoke screen to cover the lack of faculty power in the governance of the institution. (Snyder, 1974, p. 187).

From these remarks one might guess that Snyder's definition of a sense of community incorporates the notion of a sense of power. To gain a sense of community, many faculty and students, says Snyder, raise the cry that they must run the colleges, an apparent longing for "the old image of the university as a free association of scholars banded together for the common good." However, cautions Snyder, colleges cannot become communes, adding "the associational guild-like structure of a community of equals may have functioned satisfactorily in a bygone era; it is no longer appropriate to the needs and changing functions of the educational enterprise of the present."

The colleges of the future as envisioned by Snyder will be managing their own affairs less and less, and instead will be under the watchful eyes of "educational technocrats" from regional and national centers who will be
performing cost-benefit analyses, and systems analyses and the like. "Their perspective [will be] one which transcends the local campus 'community,' being oriented instead to the larger educational enterprise and society generally." Snyder, himself, does not appear to be remorseful about such a prospect. In fact he sees these centralizing tendencies as inevitable, and necessary to combat the inefficiencies he finds in the schools, and to meet the problem of rising costs, decreasing revenues, and "the educational needs of the huge and diverse student body we now serve."

Snyder's answer to the problem of community and the future of the small liberal arts college is intimately tied to this diverse student population. Essentially, his blueprint for insuring the future of the small college as community, is to revamp the small liberal arts college so as to meet the training needs of a specialized student body. Snyder concludes his argument thusly:

... It would appear reasonable to assert that the future of the small liberal arts college may lie in serving more narrowly delimited student populations rather than the more diverse ones they now serve. The renaissance of the small college and the liberal arts will not come about by the ritual invocation of "community" with all its comforting expressive overtones, but rather through a rigorously instrumental and technically hard data approach to the restructuring of higher education as a whole. Once the educational needs of today's varied student populations are empirically identified and appropriate delivery systems are designed to meet them we may suddenly discover that a sense of community has been somehow magically restored on campus. The "magic" will prove to be that, in the process of
restructuring higher education to meet the needs of particular populations of students, we have also engineered a restoration of meaning and thus created the materials necessary to construct an appropriate sense of community.

. . . We shall probably continue to witness the death of a growing number of small liberal arts colleges. They represent an affluence of inefficiency, irrelevance and meaninglessness our society refuses to support any longer. . . . Those that survive will offer programs for particular groups of students (Snyder, 1974, p. 194, emphasis added).

Working for a Sense of Community on the Campus

Friendly, cohesive, work-oriented campus: the environment is supportive and sympathetic; there is a feeling of group welfare and group loyalty that encompasses the college as a whole; the campus is a community and has a genial atmosphere.

The above is the description of the "Community" scale taken from a manual accompanying the College and University Environmental Scales or C.U.E.S. (Pace, 1969), an instrument which, as its title suggests, attempts to measure the campus environment in terms of the above and other scales (Practicality," Scholarship," "Awareness," "Propriety"). If we were to add the senses of "belongingness," "commitment" or "identity" with the institution, then the definition of the psychological sense of community would approach congruency with the meaning of that expression as discussed in Chapter II. The university environment has also been described in terms of "student culture" or "subculture"
(Clark and Trow, 1966), a theoretical classification system based upon the extent to which students are "identified with their college" and/or are "involved with ideas." What must be recognized in regard to these scales and dichotomous variables is that none of them alone has full claim on the meaning of community in a way that would incorporate the conceptions of such writers as Sarason, Buber, Nisbet, and others. Certainly Sarason would object if a survey of the environment were limited to assessment of the student culture only; certainly Buber would object if we were to omit the transcendent centering value; and, similarly, Nisbet would object if we were not to place an equal community value on "Scholarship" as compared to "Community," or "ideas" as opposed to "identity." And to add to this collection of "community words," let us consider three more: solidarity, unity, harmony—all of which have appeared at one time or another in the writer's official descriptions of duties as a dean of student affairs. In this section we shall be looking at what others have said or done about conditions which may be related to the achieving of a greater sense of community in the college setting, understanding that the meaning of that term will vary in scope and density as it is used by various authors.

Tollefson (1976) begins his introduction to his survey of trends in college student development with the
assertion that small colleges are fortunate in the respect that they, because of their size, almost automatically achieve and maintain a sense of community on their campuses. His survey reviews some of the "successful" programs at larger universities which have incorporated one or more of the "key factors" which he believes are "essential to turning an aggregation of students, faculty, administrators and other people who work in a college environment into a community" (1976, p. 87). (We question Tollefson's assumption about smallness as a guarantee of community; we shall return to that issue later in this chapter.) The key factors are (1) transcendent values, "those values within a given group or community that have a preeminence or surpass all others for that group" (examples given are the small, private denominationally affiliated colleges, colleges with unusual features--not necessarily religious, or of a single interest --etc.); (2) frequency and intensity of contacts between people--the knowing of others and their names; (3) peer influence--"a potent resource in the service of total student development" and (4) the honoring of the student's territoriality--i.e., "the student's turf" as against the faculty's, etc. (Tollefson, 1976, pp. 87-90).

The following are summaries of the program examples which the author refers to as "some Illustrations of
Community": (1) Setting up of coed residence halls on the basis of philosophical categories of learning, physically modified and equipped in keeping with the philosophical model; advisors are chosen according to academic discipline. (2) Another "living-learning" model; students assigned to small "colleges" based on living groups. (3) Academic advisors assigned to dorm units where advisees are resident. (4) Small learning groups within larger university—based on special needs; e.g., career exploration, maturation, etc. (5) Another living-learning conception within large university; self-selected "hot-house" conditions: "ideal student type" matched with "ideal teachers." (6) Weekly group meetings with students, faculty, administrators. (7) A "Union Center" for all segments of community "to serve the non-classroom educational purposes of the university community" focusing especially on PSC. (8) Conversion of former president's mansion to a Social Center where various organizations may meet and dine—a retreat. (9) Peer group concept—groups of ten live together separated from others. (10) An elective course, "The University and Modern Society," eliminates barriers, etc. (11) Outward Bound-type activities followed by campfires at which college's activities are explained. (12) A set of attitudes rather
than a "program," is adopted by a university; e.g., president committed to student development ideal; a vice-president implements orientation; the dean of students is a psychologist whose attitudes and interests "foster a developmental rather than a controlling or managerial orientation among his staff"; morning rap sessions. (13) Commuter community college adopts New England type town meeting led by president. (14) Community participation program in which student interns volunteer service in community agencies (Tollefson, 1976, pp. 90-100).

The author concludes his presentation of the above examples with this observation:

All of these examples incorporate one or more of the factors important in fostering a sense of community. Seldom are any of the key factors involved in creating a concept of community explicitly stated. In fact, it is not always evident that those responsible for these programs are consciously aware of the fundamental factors underlying their efforts. But there is a consistency to the principle that these efforts are addressed to creating or enhancing a sense of community and by doing so have produced educational benefits (Tollefson, 1976, p. 100).

Tollefson's survey presents a comprehensive array of the kinds of programmatic efforts at "community building" that began to appear on university campuses in the early seventies concomitant with the rise of the student development movement. Programs like these have all but become standard practices at American universities, most of them designed to reduce the alienating effects of
largeness, and the impersonality of institutional environments. These have fallen in the categories of physical and organizational rearrangements such as the living-learning dormitory, "cluster colleges" (Gaff, 1970), "colleges within colleges" (Schmidt, 1971), and campus governance approaches designed to broaden participation (Evergreen, 1971a). We have not found any trend, however, that reflects the "attitudinal" approach suggested by Tollefson's example (#12 above) in which the commitment to community building is permeated throughout the system, from "the president on down." The Evergreen approach, cited above, warrants some further attention since it appears to incorporate this ideal.

The "Evergreen experiment," as it was called, particularly its system of governance, was specifically designed "to facilitate, among other goals, a sense of community." Thus it did not present to its community a handbook containing "a list of specific prohibitions and essentially negative rules," but rather a "social contract." A "College Forum" was established "to meet regularly. . . . to think together; to talk, listen and reason together."

It was to be led by the president with an open-ended agenda. It was not a decision-making body; it was "... a place where hard questions can be asked, and dreams can be told, where plans for a better college may first see
the light of day." The important principle regarding decision-making was called "locatability"; that is, "decision-makers shall be easily identified and accountable to the community." Another principle adhered to was that there were to be no standing committees, just "... disappearing task forces." Community service depended upon a random selection process and voluntarism. Finally, information, communication and record-keeping received great stress. A Center was set up to publish a newsletter and a college calendar tied to a communications and computer network. The Center was to coordinate "imaginative record-keeping procedures" in order to develop a "continuous chronicle of the Evergreen experiment," and to locate various resources, i.e., "responsible and accountable people . . . when problems need to be solved" (Evergreen, 1971b).

In their classic review of the literature on "the impact of college on students," Feldman and Newcomb (1970) do not deal specifically with the issue of the sense of community on the campus, but they consistently emphasize their concern for "the conditions for campus-wide impacts." By "impacts" they mean the developmental consequences of the interaction between the student and his college experience. Although the term impact is neutral, it appears to be employed by Feldman and Newcomb
more often with a positive connotation. Leaving aside the question of individual differences (i.e., the background and personality of students) the authors conclude that:

The conditions for campus-wide impacts appear to have been most frequently provided in small, residential, four-year colleges. These conditions probably include relative homogeneity of both faculty and student body together with opportunity for continuing interaction, not exclusively formal, among students and among students and faculty (Feldman and Newcomb, 1970, p. 331).

Thus the authors emphatically advise that universities develop settings "for maximizing impacts on students," settings that presumably would attempt to replicate "the social and psychological conditions that have often been provided on small 'intimate' campuses." They observe that "there have been odd corners of larger universities" that have had marked impacts on students, however, with this qualification:

... A university consisting of congeries of small loci of diverse impacts might, indeed, be the apotheosis of effective higher higher education. Such "local impacts" within large universities, however, have more often been attributable to good fortune, probably, than to systematic arrangements designed to make them occur (Feldman and Newcomb, 1970, p. 332).

It is just these "systematic arrangements" to which Tollefson addressed himself as he looked for examples of programs that would tend to develop community, making it appear to us that there is a coincidence of meaning be-
tween conditions for campus-wide impacts and the community aspects of a campus. Feldman and Newcomb refer to such arrangements as **horizontal organization** which they describe as "... institutionalized arrangements concerning interrelationships at the same or immediately adjacent 'levels'" (1970, p. 336). They make the point that it is not the **size** of an institution that determines the nature of its impacts (and we would add, its sense of community) but rather whether or not its internal organization, i.e., horizontal organization, is appropriate to its size. However, they add that "at any given horizontal level ... size does matter." From that assertion Feldman and Newcomb develop two "general propositions" which we shall quote in full because of their immediate relevance to the concept of the psychological sense of community:

1. Insofar as the goals of an organization prominently include psychological changes on the part of its members, as ends rather than only as means to other ends, its goals can be furthered by processes of mutual support and mutual stimulation among members of whom changes are expected. (Kurt Lewin put it this way: "It is often easier to change a whole group than a single individual.") This proposition, we suggest, applies a fortiori, though not exclusively, to changes in attitudes and values as contrasted, say, with the acquisition of information or dexterity.

2. The conditions that favor mutual stimulation and support must be described in interpersonal terms. They include, particularly, opportunity for continued interaction among the same individuals, allowing occasions for the discovery of mutual congeniality, preferably in varied settings--not
just academic or just recreational or just residential, for example (Feldman and Newcomb, 1970, p. 337).

The authors conclude that the most important single condition for creating effective horizontal organization is the degree to which local autonomy is present in any single unit of a university.

When Feldman and Newcomb raise the question of smallness they also bring up the question of "image" and its impact on the college environment. They observe that there are "... those colleges that have relatively clear and salient images [and] those that are practically imageless" (1970, p. 112). Those which have clear images, they suggest, attract a homogeneous collectivity of faculty and students, thus increasing the chances for campus-wide impact, or as we say, a sense of community. Typically, the colleges with "clear and salient images" are those traditional private institutions that are high on the prestige scale and high on selectivity, as well as those that have historical denominational affiliations. Pace (1968), for example, in discussing methods of measuring college environments, noted that colleges which are selective or have strong denominational ties tend to have above average scores on the "Community" scales of C.U.E.S. (1968, p. 139). These observations, of course, are consistent with our findings in our earlier chapters
regarding the conditions that enhance the sense of community or the "we-feeling."

In his book, *The Distinctive College: Antioch, Reed & Swarthmore* (1970), Clark provides an exhaustive account of how three successful small colleges had developed their "clear and salient images," their "distinctiveness." Of relevance here is the author's concept of college as saga:

The most important characteristic and consequence of an organizational saga is the capturing of allegiance, the committing of staff to the institution. Emotion is vested to the point where many participants significantly define themselves by the central theme of the organization. The organizational motif becomes individual motive, much more than a statement of purpose, a cogent theme, a doctrine of administration, or a logical set of ideas. Deep emotional investment binds participants as comrades in a cause. Indications of an organizational legend are pride and exaggeration; the most telling symptom is an intense sense of the unique. Men behave as if they knew a beautiful secret that no one outside the lucky few could ever share. An organizational saga turns an organization into a community, even a cult (Clark, 1970, p. 235, emphasis added).

How the college as saga turns into a community is later explained:

We may note particularly that distinctiveness in a college involves and encourages those characteristics of group life commonly referred to as community. It offers an educationally relevant definition of the difference of the group from all others. And salient elements in the distinctiveness become foci of personal awareness and of a sense of things held in common with others currently on the scene, those who have been there before, and those yet to arrive. Distinctiveness captures loyalty, inducing
men to enlist and to stay against the lures of career-
ism. And it arrests the most transient members, the
students, extending their devotion for years to come
(Clark, 1970, p. 256).

The College as Non-Community:
Campus Alienation

The preceding discussion leads us to pause briefly
to consider the question of the college, large or small,
which has little impact (or negative impact) on its
resident populations and which presumably lacks the con-
ditions that promote community, that is, "image," "tra-
dition," "transcendent values," "selectivity," and the
variety of variables suggested by our survey of the com-
munity literature. One of the consequences may be alien-
ation, a term which Katz and Kahn (1978, p. 380) tell us
has become somewhat of a wastebasket concept, that is,
too conceptually "versatile" because it "is invoked to
explain a long list of troubles and their opposites." In
the mass societal context they view the concern about
alienation as "a belated recognition of Durkheim's thesis
that modern society lacks the common collective conscience
provided by the internalized values of a traditional cul-
ture." In their discussion, Katz and Kahn call on See-
man's definition of alienation, which, as we read it (hav-
ing in mind a college environment), provides us with a
sharp sense of how a "low impact" campus experience may lead
to a localized form of that condition:

(1) A sense of powerlessness—the feeling that events and outcomes of importance to oneself are controlled and determined by external forces and not one's own efforts. (2) A sense of meaninglessness—the feeling that the course of events is incomprehensible and that the future cannot be predicted. (3) A sense of normlessness—the feeling that socially unapproved means are necessary to attain socially approved ends, and that therefore one is not bound by standards of values and morality. (4) Social isolation—feelings of loneliness, rejection, exclusion from valued groups or relationships. (5) Value isolation or estrangement—the rejection of commonly held values. (6) Self-estrangement—the feeling that one is engaged in activities that are not rewarding in themselves and is therefore acting in ways that are somehow not true to self and one's own needs (Katz and Kahn, 1978, p. 382).

When one considers that college students to begin with, from a mental health standpoint, are a "population-at-risk," then the issue of campus alienation becomes significant. A much discussed problem in the literature, alienation is mentioned at this point only to show a relationship with the question of the college as community. For example, sociologists have found (Seeman, 1972; Christenfeld and Black, 1977) that reducing alienation is not simply a matter of attempting to "engage" people in "activities," but more a matter of restructuring—in the sense of horizontal reorganizing—some of the fundamental aspects of campus life. "Involvement," observe Christenfeld and Black, "when it occurs by default, through 'total immersion' in an enforced community, cannot be expected
appreciably to mitigate any predominant emotional rejection." The authors go on to report on a related study:

In one college community, in the 1970s, strongly negative attitudes toward the college are not improved by heightened membership and the extent that one's membership may not be entered into in a fully voluntary spirit, the boundaries of that environment can be viewed as contributing over time to a pervasive malaise which in some number of students approaches a level of quiet desperation (Christenfeld and Black, 1977, p. 124).

Cottle (1974), a psychiatrist, in an essay entitled "The Felt Sense of Studentry," explains that students arrive on campus with a "need for communion" and a "need to be watched over" (unadmitted, of course) having been "rewarded" for doing good work in high school by "removal from home" (1974, pp. 32-33). Waiting for them is the president "in the role of impersonal father" who has substituted "permissiveness" for "in loco parentis," an administration which is "product-oriented," and a "faculty which provides little or no contact." The picture Cottle paints may seem overstated, but rings true to this writer:

At school, these students quickly learn not only that there are few figures around to carry them through their loneliness, but that the older people on campus cannot give them sufficient time. They learn too that university personnel differentiate the task of caring for students into academic, psychiatric, or legal compartments, leading students to believe they will be dealt with only when they exhibit a prefabricated problem, like flunking, stealing, or "freaking out." While some students wake each morning praising the new-found freedom of universities, others tremble at the thought that
they might not be able to muster the strength to carry them through today and tomorrow. Other students find ways of avoiding the depression or loneliness: they turn to drugs. Still others, feeling guilt as well as loneliness and fright, collapse . . .

. . . It is not frivolous to say that merely walking through the halls of a building may cause one to feel that one is going crazy. Similarly, the cries of lack of closeness between faculty members and students are not mindless repetitions of the noises of prior generations. Class and dorm life, cafeteria and meandering-in-the-halls life, walking about campus or in the streets of a strange city, all may have profound effects on the human psyche, particularly when an individual has reached that point in his life when severe social structure and personality discontinuities have recently been experiences.

The effect of environmental features on students is great indeed, especially because students, as they undergo the transformations of style and value that college demands, comprehend the fact that the world is changing them. . . .

As long as there are families, systems of authority, and age-graded capacities, there will be a need for all degrees and varieties of human contact (Cottle, 1974, pp. 35-36).

It should be kept in mind that Cottle's observations may be based solely or predominantly on his contacts with troubled students. Feldman and Newcomb (1970, pp. 330-331), for example, found that students do not in general demonstrate a strong desire for frequent contact with faculty, "particularly those seeking independence from parents and authority figures."

However, as was stated earlier, college students are a higher mental health risk than the population at large. In their Introduction to Community Psychology
Zax and Specter (1974) report of studies which demonstrated this statistically: out of ten thousand college students (in the late 1960s) 1650 required professional assistance, 20 committed suicide, and 25 required confinement in mental hospitals. We report these data here not because this study is focused on the problems of an individual psychology, but for the same reasons they are reported in our original source (a work on community psychology): to indicate that a community approach is called for in a situation in which "too few students with psychosocial difficulties are reached" with more traditional approaches (Zax and Specter, 1974, p. 209). Notwithstanding Nisbet's dislike for the campus as "therapeutic community," or Snyder's condemnation of "the mystique of community" in academia, our findings suggest that the concern for whether the campus is a community or a non-community may be more than mere indulgence in "the cult of individuality" or in "the Romantic ideal of the primal family." And not only "mental health" concerns are at issue. There is "hard data" (Heller and Monahan, 1977, pp. 127-130) to show that "global, friendly, helping relations" as a chief "primary prevention tool" is able to "reduce the number who [seek] individual counseling," and the number who seek to transfer. Thus "production" goals as well as humanistic goals are affected by the quality of the campus community.
The 1972 NASPA Conference:
"The Communitization Process in Academe"

It has been reported (Bennett, 1965) that community psychology was "born" at the now famous "Boston Conference on the Education of Psychologists for Community Mental Health." At another conference held in Denver in 1972, this time under the auspices of the National Association for Student Personnel Administrators, there might have been the promise of the birth of a related movement, one that would have cast the chief student affairs officer in the role of a "campus community specialist." Billed as a "program of utmost significance not only to student personnel administrators, but to the entire field of higher education today" (NASPA, 1972, p. 266), the conference has apparently failed to inspire the birth of a "community" movement in these circles, that is, if we judge by the literature and the practices which have followed that event up to the present. The conferees were "to discuss among themselves the process of building community on their campuses," explore ways to "enhance interactions which assist community development," and to

... develop in their students and staffs those skills and understandings which individuals can use in building a sense of community in their own experiences (NASPA, 1972, p. 266).
Our plan of presentation is to review the papers of the Conference's four major speakers in the order in which they were delivered, highlighting only those remarks that would add to what has already been said about community and the community process in our report thus far. We shall do the same with the conference papers that were presented by the various panelists.

Ardrey (1972) whom we met before in our discussion (in Chapter V) of crisis and territory, addressed the 1st General Session with a speech entitled "The Student: An Evolutionary Perspective." Here he relates his triadic need theory (identity, stimulation and security) to the college community by stating that "the learning community has to satisfy these innate needs" (Ardrey, 1972, p. 27). The new message that we distill from this address is again from the field of animal behavior. Ardrey calls it the "Numbers Game." It comes down to this: that 500, "being the minimum number that can successfully conduct inter-breeding in terms of populations--genetics," is "the largest group that can have reality," the "maximum number that can know each other as individuals," "the maximum number that you can talk to without using one of those things." It is within that number that

... the individual can still find his identity because he can still know everybody. The leader can know everybody under him and everybody can know the
leader--personally--not very well, but enough. So you can achieve identity within 500 or 600. Beyond that you must have a mosaic of tribes or groups. So your identity is the identity of your group, and that is where it extends on the whole corporation, university, what not. But you cannot violate these numbers (Ardrey, 1972, pp. 33-34).

The numbers 10 and 50 are also mentioned by Ardrey as having significance in the biological Numbers Game, 10 being the optimal number for an intimate group, and 50 being the optimal number of individuals that can live cooperatively in a communal-like setting.

The next speaker is Nisbet whose books we have already discussed in regard to the issue of the loss of the sense of community in society generally (1970), and in the university, in particular (1971). His speech, "The Future of Community" (1972), is essentially a reiteration of the arguments expressed in his The Degradation of the Academic Dogma (1971) which was discussed earlier in this chapter. What is newly expressed here is the idea that . . . it would be dangerous to try to make a single community out of a given college or university. The dangers would be . . . the monolithic kind of authority and communal structure. Any university should be thought of as a community of communities, a communitas communitata (Nisbet, 1972, p. 31).

This appears to be an extension of the principle of scale implied in Ardrey's notion of the "Numbers Game."

Buckminster Fuller's concept of the college community, expressed in his talk "Cosmic Science," is that it
be "a community of spontaneous effort"—not "an aggregate community of individuals"—"deeply committed" to "developing great documentary programs . . . to get the right information to their fellow man" (Fuller, 1972, p. 24).

Finally, the last "internationally known speaker" is Arthur Chickering who addressed the Closing Dinner on "Community, Human Development and Higher Education" (Chickering, 1972). He states that he likes Fuller's notion of ad hoc "communities of spontaneous effort" primarily because he, himself, opts for short term, not long term, community, and suggests such devices as short-term living-learning arrangements or "flexible short-term residential periods" (p. 30). This is because Chickering is especially concerned with the new sophisticated, worldly student "who does not need to learn to fit in." "College should provide ways, instead, to grow in diversity" (p. 22).

Asserts Chickering:

Community is no longer a given. Each person [referring to the new internationally oriented student as opposed to the student representing the "small town middle America"] has to create his own community now, and he has to carry it around inside himself. He has to nurture it. He has to keep it alive if it is going to be there at all (Chickering, 1972, p. 15, emphasis added).

And, concluding, he again addresses himself to the "new" student, after acknowledging that NASPA professionals with their responsibility for residential life and the noncourse
curriculum are in a good position to make a contribution to creating developmental conditions:

If we are going to do that, I think we have to think much more critically about how we manage these residential contexts so that we create situations which are congruent with the kind of multiple reference groups and multiple social situations that our students increasingly have to face as they leave our institutions (Chickering, 1972, p. 34).

To sum up, what our four major speakers are telling student personnel administrators about "the process of building community on their campuses" is (1) keep your communities down to scale, preferably no more than around five hundred individuals, and preferably not the whole place; (2) communities should not only be small, they should be short lived and ad hoc and have as their function documenting the conditions of the earth and its resources in order to inform people through a total (ecological) orientation rather than a narrow (specialist) one; and (3) gear your communities so that they prepare students not for a bygone era of the village community but for the complexities of a mobile, rootless, multiple reference society.

We begin our review of the conference papers with Hardee (1972) who presents four constructs for campus community building: (1) identify the institution's mission, (2) identify and communicate with the campus sub-cultures (she prefers the term "para-cultures"), (3) view coordina-
tion as the key to community (this essentially relates to governance designed to create manageably sized smaller communities within the larger university), and (4) develop students through development of community (we add the emphasis to underscore the unusualness of this statement in student development circles) (Hardee, 1972, pp. 8-10).

Meyers (1972) makes an interesting observation that is somewhat reflective of Chickering's notion of the "new" student: that students no longer need (and that some even abhor) the small, intimate liberal arts college:

... They fear an ingrown, self-preoccupied quality that a small college can have. ... If the idea of community has enduring value ... we will have to work hard and inventively to develop institutional bases and structures very different from those of traditional communities, and probably different from those of communes (Meyers, 1972, p. 9).

At the same time the author offers a traditional view of community:

... A community is a way of organizing human experience through time so that at least clusters of people can come to know each other ... They can develop a common sense of direction and purpose as their activities intersect in various ways and with varying degrees of intimacy and distance. In principle, each person can find at least some mode of common support for a growing, coherent interpretation of himself and his world. ... (Meyers, 1972, pp. 9-10).

Meyers tells us that he is not sure that we can develop communities while avoiding the "oppressive character of the traditional community" or whether it is possible to create
a university community with the problems of size, compartmentalization and the transiency of student populations. Although he discusses possible changes in campus physical design and other environmental manipulations that increase the possibilities of personal contact, Meyers believes that it is chiefly through the educational process that community can be achieved, that is, "in the classroom." He believes this can best come about if a technique known as "creative bargaining" is employed. Originally a theory of process formulated by Max Otto, creative bargaining is described by Meyers as a set of four interrelated processes which people embroiled in a controversy may use: (1) try to understand one's own ideas and goals more clearly than before; (2) understand the perspective and claims of others; (3) work to create a new goal or value that would incorporate what the various parties were seeking; and (4) formulate the new objective in a concrete fashion and test it out. Says Meyers:

... Creative bargaining does not especially serve to bring people together. In most cases they will already have come together—as, for example, in conflict. It can stimulate or lure them to work through their coming together so as to open their imaginations to new loyalties in a common endeavor (Meyers, 1972, p. 8, emphasis added).

Jones (1972) calls attention to "six significant environmental factors" that can effect the communitization process by insuring internal coherence: (1) physical
factors which "should reflect the educational style subscribed to"; (2) personal intimacy and social cohesion as factors in promoting academic achievement; (3) moral commitment to standards of personal behavior; (4) scholarship and financial aid programs meaningfully administrated (conceived of as a means of providing opportunities); (5) student activities which reflect the goals of the institution; (6) warm associations between students and staff (Jones, 1972, pp. 2-7).

Cross talks about "The Impact of Egalitarianism on the Academic Community" (1972) that is, the bringing in of non-whites, women, and adult learners and their respective collective "reform movements." Cross' approach is an "extended classroom" or "extended campus" approach. "There is no doubt in my mind," she writes, "that the trend of the future is away from community--except for those few institutions that wish to make a special feature of it." What Cross does see in the future are more outreach programs such as external degree and university-without-walls programs. She continues:

... I take a dim view, I'm afraid, of student personnel administrators who entertain thoughts of the profession serving as the experts in establishing the learning environment of the campus. That's fine for colleges that can afford to offer the expensive luxury of residential and/or community experience. But even assuming we knew how to create a stimulating learning environment and were willing to be accountable
for it, it is too narrow a base upon which to build a profession (Cross, 1972, pp. 9-10).

Neither does Cross see counseling as the backbone of the profession. Rather, she suggests that the major role of the student affairs dean "is the matching of educational experiences to student needs" and "the application of research about students."

A paper presented by Feig entitled "Oa Va-T'Elle--New Dimensions in Women's Programming" (1972) is primarily a statement on the recognition of the women's movement in higher education. Similar to the hypothesis that was suggested in Chapter III of this report to the effect that the bondedness of same-sex groups may have a salutary effect on the whole community, the author argues that

The hope comes from the groups now developing small vibrant communities within institutions. If we understand the problems of women and minority groups, we can work in common toward their solution. We can think—and think together—about how to transform knowledge and wisdom, and a body politic into an organic unity of sympathy and solidarity (Feig, 1972, p. 11, emphasis added).

In "Ubi Societas Ibi Jus--The Role of a System of Law in the Communitization Process in Academia" Hammond (1972) deals with "necessary changes in the area of authority" that would impact the sense of community on college campuses. Like Kanter (see Chapter IV) who emphasized the importance of moral commitment and social control as a factor in community endurance, Hammond argues that system of authority in a community protects it from "the
unacceptable," that is, from that which shocks "the common sense of community." In addition, he views a system of law as helping to meet Ardrey's triad of needs (identity, stimulation, and security). The author concludes

... that a system of law within the academic community does not have much lasting effect on the violator but does tend to reaffirm the norm established by the community and serve as a vehicle for reexamination of the social order (Hammond, 1972, p. 10).

Sebok's "A State College Communitization Schema" (Sebok, 1972) proposes better admissions testing and advising, more careful selection of administrators in terms of institutional goals, the tightening of standards, promoting community commitment among faculty, and integrating the liberal arts curricula. Student affairs leadership would stress service, ombudsmanship and research, while the student center would be conceived of as a "contact center" with particular attention paid to the needs of the commuter student.

The training of deans of students is the subject of a paper by Blaesser (1972) who would make communitization processes a central core of a graduate program designed to produce student affairs officers. The training would have a multi-disciplinary orientation and would be staffed by sociologists, anthropologists and educationists. It would incorporate the notion of the college as a collection of "interlocking subcommunities" in which the def-
inition of student would be understood to include "... not merely the tuition payer, but all who are actively engaged in the common goal of learning" (Blaesser, 1972, p. 4). It would also incorporate a philosophy of community maintenance similar to the set of "principles for creating and maintaining community" which the author borrowed from the work of Walter Friesen and which he summarizes as follows:

1. A sense of community requires that individuals share a common purpose and common experiences.
2. The common purpose must be an authentic purpose.
3. For community to form, a personal commitment must be made by the individual members.
4. A personal investment suggests that community calls for the risk of making oneself vulnerable.
5. In order to make risk and vulnerability possible, the community must experience safety.
6. For a group to develop and grow in its sense of community it must have significant responsibility and the authority needed to execute its responsibility.
7. While it is not necessary for a group to be completely autonomous for it to experience community, the members must be able to clearly distinguish the boundaries of their group.
8. For a community to develop, the authority figures are commonly required to give up their assumed roles and their status symbols.
9. There must be the freest flow of communication among members of the group.
10. There needs to be a sense of election [sic], a personal calling.
11. For a group to experience and practice community, the members also need solitude.
12. Individuals must enter with faith, recognizing the community as essential for human needs (Blaesser, 1972, pp. 4-5).
In addressing the issue of community at the urban university Shappell (1972) argues that

We can no longer think of academic community as a concept limited to the "campus," especially in our urban communities. We can no longer limit membership in the academic community to the academicians (Shappell, 1972, p. 10).

First, he would start with the development of a sense of academic community within, and then through "effective leadership" throughout the levels and components of the university (including the faculty who he believes "must share their talents and research the problems of urban life"), he would see the extending of this "within" community into the urban community.

Describing the "community planning process model" which was instituted at the University of Delaware in 1968 while he was Vice President for Student Affairs, Worthen (1972) lists eight essential elements that are derived from that model:

1. First, planning must focus initially on program priorities with the constraints of finances, facilities and personnel coming into play after these fundamental decisions are made . . .
2. Second, the President must give the strongest possible support to the enterprise.
3. Third, there must be a commitment on the part of those in positions of responsibility, particularly the budget-makers, to give careful consideration to the recommendations with the aim of implementing as many as possible.
4. Fourth, the process must be initiated with the expectation that it will be continuous and the plans always open to revision.

5. Fifth, each component part of the University should initiate the development of its own plan involving representatives of all members of the unit. The plans must originate in the lowest level of the organization.

6. Sixth, a commission of internal committee, representing all segments of the institution, must be established and staff assigned to support its work.

7. Seventh, the Commission should hold open hearings where the plans can be discussed and defended forthrightly and the pressures of community opinion brought to bear.

8. Finally, in addition to producing the plan, the process must be nurtured to reinforce the attitudes of cooperation and understanding and positive regard for others. Faculty, students and staff should be able to sense that they share common objectives and interests and that each has an opportunity to participate in the development of the institution (Worthen, 1972, pp. 8-9).

Worthen concludes that the planning process, itself, aside from whatever eventuated in terms of programs, may have been the chief factor in helping to facilitate a sense of community.

The remaining conference papers (those relevant to our subject) deal with: the cluster college strategy designed to counter centralization and largeness (Collins, 1972), the living-learning strategy of resident hall arrangements utilizing Ardrey's triple need theory and the principle of the transcending value (Shaw, 1972), the principles of participative programming and the pub-
licizing of achievements (Cinclair, 1972), social work type interventions in the campus community similar to the community strategies described in Chapter IX of this study (Riffel, 1972), the special needs of the transfer student in regard to comparatively lower ratings of campus environments (Anstett, 1972), and an individual behavioral approach to the problem of community (Smith, 1972). Smith's paper deserved further description here, appearing to us as the boldest and most provocative paper among all the conference presentations.

His paper, "The Dean as a Stimulus for Communitization and/or Vice Versa" (1972), challenges most of the views of community building expressed by the conferees, taking a particularly dim view of theories of innate communal responses (without mentioning Ardrey by name) that would be the basis for dealing with human groups "according to animal research." Without an individual behavioral orientation "communitization" is in danger, exclaims the author, of being just another "empty concept" with all its attendant notions that

... all is not well in higher education and/or in student lives and that the student personnel administrator is a competent, concerned, and trustable person who is ready and anxious to do something about this ... (Smith, 1972, p. 2).

Regarding the idea of the transcendent value as a necessary ingredient of communitization, Smith would see it as
propitious rather than indispensable," but at the same time agrees that its presences would make the process go easier. For example, he observes that

... In some cases, the reputation or stature of an institution might announce or provide such a value and assure its acceptance upon entry (which may be what excellence is to some colleges and universities) (Smith, 1972, p. 3).

Smith then goes on to depict his rendition of community:

... places where people live and work and seek dignity and worth for very significant periods of time ...

where

none of these lives can legitimately be perceived as any more or less important or real than the life of another individual in the situation ... (Smith, 1972, p. 4).

The author's description of the lack of sense of community or malaise on the college campus strikes us as painfully familiar and accurate and deserves a full quotation:

Tired faces, sloppily written or facetiously worded proposals before governance bodies, statements of worthlessness by older faculty members, contemptuous remarks or looks between "straights" and "freaks" (or whatever terminology is appropriate in April) or between the humanities and the sciences, destruction and mistreatment of property, courses that never meet, directed studies with no direction and no study, endless requests for "Incomplete" grades, poor class attendance, preoccupation with trivia, curriculum reform influenced by or directed at financial difficulties, financial difficulties themselves, general apathy with regard to racial issues, the arrogant commission of felonies in situations in which the same individuals wouldn't violate the institution's drinking regulations, a student looking for a place to study or sleep because his roommate is "using" their room, the best students looking for ways to spend as
few semesters or quarters as possible at the institution—not to mention direct expressions of harassing confusion and restlessness and tiredness and despair unrelated to specific issues or injustices (Smith, 1972, p. 4).

For Smith, the communization process is a matter of the institution designating certain behaviors as community-enhancing and others as community-defeating, and then going about the business of maximizing and minimizing respectively those specified behaviors. The process is thus conceived of as "an increase in the likelihood or occurrence of certain desired behaviors or experiences and a decrease in the likelihood or occurrence of certain undesired behaviors or experiences" (1972, p. 5). To the author, the very process of arriving at "the consensual validation of a specification" of these behaviors holds "the most exciting possibility of all." He feels that the dean of students, by background and training, should not only be in a good position to contribute to this "creation and validation of a specification" process but also to "really know" how to do some of the maximizing ("reinforcing") or minimizing ("extinguishing"), and how to evaluate such efforts.

Above all, Smith insists that the following four principles must be paid attention to if the communization process is to succeed: (1) standards which, essentially, are the "criteria which represent the best interests of
the total group," and which are used to evaluate behaviors, (2) accountability, or individual responsibility for living up to the "specifications" of the community, (3) behavioral consequences, or accepting the responses of the environment to one's behavior, and (4) clear expectations by the total group of "standard" behavior (Smith, 1972, pp. 9-11).

Smith believes that the size of an institution should not be a barrier to total communitization if his behavioral scheme is put into practice "without self-fulfilling pessimism." He outrightly rejects "employing a conventional . . . concept of community, either as an objective or a source of assumptions." Apparently, he is obliquely referring to Nisbet's concept of community based upon the medieval model of the university or perhaps the societal tradition of community, as suggested by his statement that using such conceptual approaches

. . . might well have introduced some very unattractive and difficult notions, notions such as attitudes of superiority, conflict and competition within or between institutions, requirements—for suffrage, property rights, family patterns, hierarchies of rights and privileges, and systems of authority and law enforcement . . . (Smith, 1972, p. 17).

In his concluding remarks Smith makes particular reference to the role of the dean of students:

. . . To the dean, all that I have said is to view communitization as an opportunity to become what he's been saying all along—or perhaps to stop predicting the future and start determining it.
suppose I have said something more to the dean whose style consists essentially of hoping or praying or assuming or intending, or counting on vaguely conceptualized processes. . . . And I guess I have implied that, stimulated by communitization, some deans will find themselves affecting the behavior of students in ways that will help these students to become contributive, happy members of the communities in which they will spend the remainder of their lives (Smith, 1972, p. 18).

With this Skinneresque view of the community process we end our review of the papers delivered at the Denver Conference of the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators with its theme of building community on the college campus. The experience of reviewing this body of material has been humbling in the sense that it has brought our attention to the fact that an able assemblage of professional workers and thinkers attempted to come to terms with this issue before the present writer even conceived of it as an issue. At the same time we recognize that, as far as we have been able to discern, the general thrust of the student development movement has been very little influenced by the communitization theme. Perhaps, therefore, we may take a little satisfaction for having reintroduced a subject that, after all, some nine years ago was the cause for a whole profession and some distinguished guests to assemble together for three days.
Summary and Discussion

Conceptions of the college campus as community were reviewed. Snow described it as an aspect of college which commanded the affection and loyalty for a society completely sure of its values. Klien questioned whether a campus may properly be called a community since it lacks some of the attributes of the traditional societal community—particularly a stable residency. He concluded that since many of the features of community are present the campus may be viewed as a community. Further, it was observed that the literature about colleges invariably referred to their settings as "community." The principal differences between the campus community and the societal (traditional) community were identified by Price: a limited concentrated age range (truer in 1941 than now), and the lack of continuity (except for the faculty). Distinctions between the faculty community and the student community were drawn. The college was also seen as a formal organization, which, having the attribute of isolation, led us to consider the concept of the total organization (especially in light of the segmentation of the staff and students [inmates]). Hillery's conceptual requirement that the family be the basic unit of community was seen to technically rule out consideration of the total organization as community.
Nisbet's concept of the academic dogma (pursuit of knowledge for its own sake) as the transcendent value around which the true academic community may be maintained was discussed. The crucial aspects of community were identified as function, dogma, authority, hierarchy, solidarity and the sense of superiority. The idea of community as an end in itself (i.e., the therapeutic community, which Nisbet sees as an extension of the cult of individuality) was seen as a trend in academia which the author deplored as being part of the degradation of the academic dogma. This view was contrasted with the Quaker position (Palmer) which holds that education's mission is the nurturing of community which, in turn, perpetuates the educational process.

We reviewed an essay by Snyder which argued that the quest for community as it relates to the college setting is a romantic anachronism--especially as it concerns the survival of the small, private liberal arts institution. The author presented his case for revamping such colleges so as to meet the training needs of particular student populations, thereby constructing what he would consider an appropriate sense of community through a restoration of meaning.

Tollefson's survey of university programs which were addressed to creating or enhancing the sense of community was reviewed. Transcendent values, frequency and intensity
of personal contacts, peer influence, and student territoriality were named as the essential factors. We also reported on the Evergreen College plan of community structure. A social contract taking the place of the traditional disciplinary code, regular campus-wide meetings conducted by the college president, the principle of the locatability of decision-makers and the stress on voluntarism and communication were important components of this structure.

Feldman's and Newcomb's concept of campus-wide impacts was discussed as it relates to the issue of community since it was observed that the conditions for maximizing impacts appear to be identical to conditions which create a sense of community. Institutionalized arrangements within the larger setting directed at interrelationships were referred to as horizontal organization which, when appropriate to the size of the setting, tend to play a significant role in the nature of campus impacts. The most important single factor was seen as the degree of local autonomy in the horizontal unit. The authors also found that a college's clear and salient image tends to insure favorable impacts. Another author (Pace) found that high prestige combined with high selectivity as attributes of a college tended to be related to higher levels of community feeling. The importance of "a clear and salient image" was also brought out in Clark's discussion of "college as saga."
The question of unfavorable impacts of college environments was considered. It was suggested that, among other factors, student alienation may tend to be more prevalent in college settings which do not provide the conditions for campus-wide impact or community. It was reported that involvement in activities may not be enough to pull students out of their sense of alienation (Christenfeld and Black). A psychiatrist's description of the plight of the student who, when he arrives on the campus with a need for communion, finds little or no contact was presented (Cottle). Data were reported (Zax and Specter) which indicate that college students, from a mental health standpoint, are a population-at-risk, and that too few students have been reached through traditional one-on-one approaches. This supported their notion that a community psychological approach is a more viable direction for campus workers.

A section was devoted to a review of papers presented at a 1972 conference on the communitization process in academe sponsored by NASPA. Ardrey asserted that a successful learning community is only possible if the needs of identity, stimulation and security are satisfied among its population. This theory is derived from studies of evolution and animal behavior, fields which also support Ardrey's view that the maximal size of a group that could
develop into a viable community is approximately 500 individuals. Nisbet also alluded to community scale when he suggested that a university had best aim for a community of communities rather than a monolithic authority structure. Communities of spontaneous effort formed to document and communicate vital information was seen by Buckminster Fuller as the appropriate form of college communitization. Chickering would opt for the short term community experience since in his view the modern student has no need to learn to fit into a traditional community setting. Rather, the author saw the college's role as preparing the student for life in a mobile society in which multiple reference groups and multiple social situations are the rule. Similarly, Meyers contended that many students are no longer looking for the traditional community experience in their education, which explains why many students would leave or avoid a small, intimate college setting. Rather, Meyers would see a sense of community emerging out of the educational process itself. Thus he described a procedure for resolving conflicts, creative bargaining, as an example of an educational process capable of promoting new loyalties through common endeavor. Essential environmental factors, significant in terms of communitization in that they promote internal coherence, were described in a paper by Jones. Small vibrant communities within institutions of
higher learning—for example, women's support groups and minority coalitions—were seen by Cross as the only new hope for community building. She asserted that the trend in higher education toward such models as the external degree program or the college-without-walls indicates that colleges are moving away from the idea of a local college community. Hammond emphasized the importance of a system of laws in any communitization process. Reenforcing community norms—not punishing or changing the violator—was viewed as the significant issue for community. Sebok argued that a community process would be enhanced by integrating the various liberal arts curricula, improving the selection (admissions) process to conform more closely to community objectives, tightening academic standards, and promoting a commitment to community among the faculty. He would also structure a new kind of student contact center with particular attention paid to the usually estranged commuter student. Blaesser proposed that a good place to concentrate a communitization effort would be in the designing of a training program for deans of students which should deliberately incorporate the concept of communitization built around the idea that a campus is a collection of inter-locking sub-communities. Shappell insisted that the communitization process in an urban university must go hand in hand with extending the academic community—its
faculty talent--into urban life. Worthen reported on a community planning process model which was actually implemented at his university. He concluded that the planning process itself began to build a sense of community. Finally, a behavioral modification design was proposed by Smith who declared that the basic problem was to decide which behaviors were desirable (in terms of community objectives) and which were not. The dean of students' role, then, is to assist the community in reaching some consensus in the identifying of these behaviors and then to develop means by which community behaviors may be reinforced while non- or anti-community behaviors are to be extinguished. Jones' paper set forth a number of principles by which such a process would be guided.

As we indicated at the outset of this report, in our inquiry into the meaning of the term sense of community, we would not be concerned (as Hillery and others in the sociological tradition obviously have to be) with the careful and nice distinctions that may be drawn between what is and what is not a community. Rather, what we set out to explore is the meaning of community in so far as it may throw light on the meaning of sense of community; that is, to know what is meant by a "sense of something," we thought we had better begin to see what that "something" is. While in Chapter II we looked at conceptions of community in the
abstract, in this chapter we have tried to understand how the idea of community would be applied when restricted to a locality called a college campus. We saw that, in the main, most writers who concern themselves with what goes on in college or university settings instinctively (that is, without pausing to consider the implications) label the campus environment a community. The observations regarding the college as community run the gamut from Snow's conception of a feeling of affection, loyalty and certainty of values—a view which places the locus of community in those members who either do or do not experience these things—to Nisbet's conception of an academic community that is only possible when certain crucial aspects (derived from a kind of medieval formula) are present, chief among which is the "dogma" which holds that the college is first and foremost a place where knowledge is pursued for its own sake. In spite of the range of conceptions and the differing views, however, most writers reviewed included in their notions of community the idea that some centering or transcendent value was somehow at the core of the campus community process. The exceptions were those (particularly a number of writers whose views were presented at the 1972 NASPA conference) who rejected the idea that a traditional conception of community was an appropriate one for today's colleges. Snyder, who at first seemed also to be rejecting
a traditional conception, finally appeared to be embracing the predominant viewpoint.

Unfortunately, Snyder's conclusion did not bring together all the elements of his argument that he introduced throughout his discussion, and so we were left with some unexplained gaps. While disparaging the traditional idea of community which he himself defined as "an integrated, exclusive, closed and static system of norms and values that provides meaning for the individual who participates in it," Snyder invoked precisely that very definition when he concluded that community may be restored by, in fact, calling upon colleges to narrow down their populations and focus on a particular type or area of training. Such a development would introduce a "community of meaning," by which he presumably meant a homogeneous collection of people pursuing the same ends, thus again invoking one of the classic elements of community, the "consciousness of kind." While he accused those unnamed idealists of using "the ritual invocation of 'community,'" Snyder, himself, in spite of such terms as "rigorously instrumental and technically hard," appeared to be using the very same ritual. He merely substituted the "magic" of restructuring to provide a central value upon which a community may build, to replace the straw man of "the ritual invocation of community," which he had just set up.
If there is a weakness in Snyder's argument it is not that he has not discovered a useful element of community building, but rather that it is only one element which unfortunately may not be sufficient in and of itself to "engineer a restoration of meaning" or recreate a sense of community. An example near at hand is the writer's own work situation, which fulfills in almost every respect Snyder's description of a unit of higher education (except that it is not a liberal arts institution) set up precisely to educate a particular college population. It is a state technical college overseen by an external central administration of "educational technocrats." Its programs are "relevant" and "meaningful" in that all of its graduates obtain employment for which they are trained. The "magic" however, has not produced the results that Snyder dreams of. A sense of community is also missing here.

That the college is a formal organization—that is, deliberately organized around some stated goals (e.g., awarding academic degrees)—is fairly obvious. This may be considered the instrumental or Gesellschaft aspect of such a setting. The Gemeinschaft aspect, what we are calling community, resides in the population (collectivity) that inhabits the institution, not the institution itself; that is, the informal, spontaneous, "non-deliberate social
group." Morgan, late president of Antioch College, conceived of this "gemeinschaft" as "the informal spirit of community [which is] the social spirit that inhabits and gives life to the formal organizations of society" (Morgan, 1957, p. 4). Obviously, the family, one of Hillery, Jr.'s focal components of community, is not to be found as an integral part of the college as community. At the same time, however, the staff-student relationship is not, strictly speaking, a "staff-inmate" relationship. It seems to us that when speaking about the campus either as a community or a total institution (considered by Hillery to be conceptually opposite) what we are really doing is using the idea of a true local community or the true custodial institution only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore, what we might look for in the college community are not families (or inmates) as such, but analogous forms of primary-like groups or "intimate secondary groups" (see our discussion in Chapter III). In the negative or total institutional sense we might look for the alienated or nonaffiliated groups. In addition, the conception of the family as a focal component of true community may be extended (again, metaphorically) to the idea of the academic community or academe, not only as a community of place, but as a community of kind gathered about a central tradition whose attributes are not unlike those of a clan,
or family. Such is the perspective of Robert Nisbet.

Nisbet's earlier work, *The Quest for Community* (1970, discussed in Chapter II), which spells out his conception of community based upon the medieval model, can throw some light here if we would search for the analogues of the family in the college organization. Nisbet tells us that the institution of the family was not in itself enough to be the binding force of community. The reason why the family (or any other functional group) could help create and maintain a community was because the family in medieval times held "institutional importance in the social order" (Nisbet, 1970, pp. 61-62). And he adds:

... the derivation of group solidarity [arose] from the core of indispensable functions each group performed in the life of its members ... and ... the solidarity of each functional group was possible only in an environment of authority where central power was weak and fluctuating (Nisbet, 1970, p. 84).

Comparing the society of the campus to the larger society, we would conclude that campus groups which best fit the family analogy may be those that are perceived to have "institutional importance" in the "social order" of the college as well as those whose functions are seen as "indispensable" in the life of the college. Regarding the issue of solidarity as it relates to local authority, a major theme of Nisbet's, the implications for the sense of community in an organizational setting like the college may
be that autonomy plays a key role in each constituent unit achieving and laying claim to "institutional importance." This would be true throughout the vertical layers of a hierarchical academic community. Similar to the consequences of "horizontal organization" as discussed by Feldman and Newcomb in relating to improving campus impacts, Nisbet's principle of local authority versus central (external) power would allow community to develop despite his insistence that a successful academic community of scholars would be essentially aristocratic in nature and hierarchical in structure. Further, under this principle, the institution as a whole may have a better chance of nurturing a sense of community among its inhabitants if that institution had a degree of autonomy, let us say, in respect to an organizational super-structure which reaches vertically beyond the local community of the campus to a governing board represented by some central figure of authority (power).

Of some relevance to our present discussion is the distinction which sociologists draw between the vertical and horizontal aspects of the larger society. Warren (1969), for example, explains that the form of community has been changing to meet some of the needs of a fast-paced industrial society such that a shift has taken place from a horizontal to a vertical community pattern. He be-
believes that the contemporary experience of the loss of sense of community (discussed in Chapter II of this report) is the result of a move away from horizontal patterns. He sees it not as a deterioration but as a kind of "progressive reorganization" necessary "to solve the problems that demand increased specialization and differentiation" (Warren, 1969, pp. 45-46). Warren's article is especially interesting to us because it lays out a theory of "community leadership" that is based upon the tension between "the horizontal and vertical axes." Briefly, he would assign to the horizontal association a "permissive community organizer," "a non-specialist," "the process man . . . whose chief concern is what happens to the interrelated parts of the community," while to the vertical association he would assign a "problem area specialist," that is, task oriented and focused on particular tasks to be accomplished. Granted, Nisbet presumably would not accept this kind of social planning in an academic setting because social planning suggests the idea of a therapeutic community which he loudly deplores. No doubt, for Nisbet, the problem area specialist is the academician, for his "dogma" tells us that the only problem to be solved is the problem of knowledge. In a sense, it seems that Buckminster Fuller would agree since, for him, community appears to be a tool for assembling knowledge, dispensing
it, and then dispensing with itself after the "spontaneous effort." Here, again, there seems to be no need for the "process man."

Tollefson's view, represented by his survey of community-directed programs, appears to be that of a process man, that is, judging by his list of essential factors for creating a sense of community. What impresses us most, however, is not so much the process or the programmatic trends which he described but rather the kinds of attitudinal commitment shown by some of the top leadership of the institutions whose programs he described. This was also apparent in the Evergreen model which resembles in a number of ways the Black Mountain experiment discussed in Chapter IV.

The issue of how the prestigious images of institutions and their related degree of selectivity (rejection ratio) correspond to higher senses of community (as reported by Pace and as suggested by the findings of Feldman and Newcomb relative to "campus-wide impacts") deserves special note. The phenomenon is nothing new; secret societies, fraternities, country clubs, communes, etc., had all learned long ago that exclusion (exclusiveness) has a way of enhancing the value of belonging and fostering solidarity. Minar and Greer (1969) recognize this when they describe the community process that takes place in Golding's
Lord of the Flies "among a randomly collected number of children." Note the authors:

... The treatment of one boy indicates the poignant fact that community-building often finds reinforcement through excluding as well as including the actors on the scene (Minar and Greer, 1969, p. 4).

However, image is not simply a matter of prestige or exclusiveness. At its worst it may simply imply a "common life-style" which, unfortunately, as McWilliams (1973) observes, cannot provide "the basis for brotherhood" (p. 621). At its best it may imply a "clear and salient" set of values, traditions and norms to which a membership subscribes. However, as we have seen, while the absence of a clear set of common values and norms (normlessness) may help to implant a sense of alienation, pride of membership, alone, cannot insure the absence of alienation. After all, much of Cottle's description of alienated campus life is derived from his work with students on a very prestigious campus. And so we come to the question of the relationship between a sense of community and a sense of alienation with all its implications regarding the mental health of students and other campus members.

At the NASPA Conference Nisbet delivered an address to a profession (student affairs officers) which was accused in his book The Degradation of the Academic Dogma of consisting of "empires of deans of students as psychological welfare agencies." This, of course, was part of
his attack on the idea of the university as a therapeutic community. We must not misunderstand Nisbet's message. He is a person passionately attracted to the idea of community, a sense one gets only in reading his works in full. Nisbet is not trained as a psychologist or as a student personnel worker; neither do his sensibilities run in that direction. However, even while de-crying the "deluge of humanitarianism" in academe, he betrays through his passion for community his own humanism. Despite his protestations about the academic dogma, he would still, like Cardinal Newman whom he quotes in his address, choose a university "with a second grade order of faculty distinction" over one with "the most distinguisched learned faculty in the world" if the latter had "a student body that never saw each other" and the former, a student body which ". . . rubbed shoulders with one another constantly and lived the normal, human social life in terms of the groups and communities and subcommunities . . ." (Nisbet, 1972, p. 32). What we would like to suggest is that the community built around an academic dogma, with all the elements of function, authority, hierarchy, solidarity and sense of superiority in place, may, in fact, function as a "therapeutic community." We are saying that community, itself, may be therapeutic, and that it does not necessarily have to conjure up images of encounter
groups, love-ins, or human relation courses. Palmer and Nisbet are truly not far apart in this respect. Neither believes that community is something that can be constructed directly out of something called "togetherness"; both believe that it is the by-product of commitment and of a centering transcendent value. The chief difference is that Palmer, an educator in the Quaker tradition, makes explicit his belief that community is therapeutic:

The ultimate therapy is to translate our private problems into corporate issues. . . . Therapy involves identifying and building communities of concern (Palmer, 1977, p. 12).

The issue of the size of a collectivity as it relates to the prospects for creating a sense of community was raised by a number of authors, the predominant view being that smallness is favorable to the engendering of a sense of community. We agree with Feldman and Newcomb when they say that at any given horizontal level size does matter. However, we would caution on relying on smallness in any absolute sense as a guarantor of warmth, intimacy and community. Aside from the fact, as some of our authors have pointed out, that some small settings leave too little room for anonymity and privacy and that some individuals seek to escape from such a community constriction, there is also the possibility that some small settings can be surprisingly cold and impersonal and lacking in community feel-
ing. This kind of situation can be further aggravated by the high level of expectation that many persons would presumably have as they enter such a setting. The opposite would seem to be true of persons entering an enormous university. And yet the writer has seen the example of a keen sense of community existing in the upper floors of a high-rise dormitory in a large eastern university.

We shall make just a few general comments regarding the papers presented at the NASPA Denver Conference. It is our observation that what usually happens at professional meetings of this sort is that a "theme" is chosen by the conference planning committee and that the invited speakers simply use that theme as a vehicle for delivering their own special agendas which would be delivered no matter what the theme. Thus the college student personnel workers who made up the bulk of the panel presenters, used the occasion to talk about "student development" while the guest speakers rehashed their usual themes: Robert Ardrey talked about the issues already developed in his published works relating what is known about animal behavior to human groups; Robert Nisbet reviewed the basic themes of his books, particularly the idea of "academic dogma" and the basic elements of community that to him are being given short shrift by modern society and institutions; Buckminster Fuller talked about "cosmic science," and his
usual themes of reforming the environment and "being a comprehensivist" versus a specialist; and Arthur Chickering raised the issue, well-developed in his book *Education and Identity* (1971), of the importance of creating conditions "for the achievement of the major dimensions of human development." The point we are making is that, while these are all extremely worthy issues that should be heard again and again by professional educators, "communitization" of colleges as a theme received only a small volume of attention. It is only because of this that our report will have appeared to have skimmed too rapidly over voluminous presentations.

In Chapter V we had already explored the implications of Ardrey's triad of needs in regard to enhancing the psychological sense of community on a college campus. Discovering this notion in Ardrey's paper served to confirm that the author would agree with our applicative interpretation. His suggestion that community planners take some heed of the Numbers Game as applied to human groups is well taken. The concept of the "magic" numbers of 10, 50 and 500 holds some fascination for us and would even seem to hold up in our experience; it would seem that the best one can do with such a theory is to test it out experimentally, while we do our best to take care of whatever numbers of people we do have.
A number of the Denver Conference speakers challenged the idea that the traditional community model is the proper one for the contemporary college scene. In their arguments they point out the need for the conceiving of new models based on the reality of a rootless, mobile population, or based on the reality of styles of education which do not require that persons live together or collaborate in any way for any significant length of time. While it is extremely important for us to be aware of these trends, we do not see that it follows that we must put aside a model that is obviously valued by our culture, if not innately ingrained as an objective. We believe it is a fallacious argument to propose that a different concept of community is needed for the new breed of student whose likely life plans do not hold the promise of the traditional community. First of all, we do not necessarily agree that such is the case with the "new breed of student," and secondly, even if it were the case, there is no need to avoid implanting a sense of community simply because of a fear that a person would not know how to make use of such an experience in a community-less world. Like the good family experience, the good community experience may better prepare one for leaving the experience and entering "the world out there." Further, presumably we are educating people for living in not just
any society but in a very particular kind of society: the democratic community. With this in mind, we shall quote a statement by Joseph K. Hart regarding the democratic problem in education. Although referring to "children" in an elementary school context, Hart's expression would appear to have application to higher education as well:

. . . [It] is not primarily a problem of training students; it is the problem of making a community within which students cannot help growing up to be democratic, disciplined to freedom, reverent to the goods of life, and eager to share in the tasks of the age. A school cannot produce this result; nothing but a community can do so (Hart, 1975, p. 7).

Buckminster Fuller's depiction of the campus community as made up of "communities of spontaneous effort" brought together for establishing and communicating knowledge of the earth comes to mind when we consider Hart's phrase about sharing the tasks of the age. Although his term "spontaneous" invokes an image of small subgroups that are born and then fade, it may be interpreted as yet another form of a transcendent value around which a community of the whole may be formed. "Spontaneous" may also be another way of expressing the idea that a true sense of community emerges as a byproduct of deep involvement rather than as a direct product of an effort to create community.

A distinctly different point of view, on the sur-
face at least, was expressed in Smith's conception of communitization as a carefully planned process of rewarding certain behaviors that have been identified as community-enhancing, while discouraging behaviors identified as having the opposite effect. Although laid out in behavioral terms, we believe that Smith's scheme is a unifying conception that puts in bare, abstract terms the essentials of any effort to arrive at any stated objective, communitization or otherwise. In that sense his scheme seems to have little to contribute. On the other hand, we feel that it is a good thing that even community-minded humanists be made aware that, in the end, it is ultimately behavior that is at the bottom of a community process, and that behaviorism is a way of making explicit our values, attitudes and intentions. When Sarason asserts, for example, that the policies and actions of the community psychologist should be informed by the value of the psychological sense of community, he is, in a sense, announcing a scheme for identifying the behaviors that require reinforcing and those that do not.

One final word on the Denver Conference. We have found only one article (Crookston, 1975) in the NASPA Journal published since this conference whose subject matter was related to the "communitization process in academe." Articles on "ecology," on the college "environment," on
the "ecosystem" of the university, etc., have appeared in
great number, all contributing to the student development
model of student affairs. However, none have dealt with
communitization directly, and none have dealt with the
idea of the sense of community. The purpose of this section
was to bring to the light of day some of the thoughts
(obviously relevant to this study) which were expressed
at the 1972 Conference, and which presumably have been
virtually ignored by the profession.

All in all, our findings in this chapter led us
to be convinced that the most important factor in the
creation, maintenance or enhancement of the psychological
sense of community is one of attitude and not one of pro-
gram. Furthermore, this attitude must take the form of a
commitment to be found at all levels of an institution,
but most importantly, at the top. Typically, it is the
dean of students at a collegiate institution who is
charged with looking after the "quality of life" on its
campus. Although not standing at the very "top" of the
hierarchy, it appears that the dean is in a good position to
both exemplify the "attitude" and to devise ways to promote
commitment, upwards, downwards, and horizontally throughout
the institutional structures. Our next chapter will explore
how the role of the dean of students as conceived of in
the literature relates to the issue of community.
CHAPTER XI

THE STUDENT AFFAIRS DEANSHIP: IN LOCO COMMUNITATIS?

The Role of the Dean of Students

Having explored some answers to the first question we posed for ourselves, in what sense may the college be construed as a community, and having examined some notions on the problem of promoting or maintaining a sense of community on the college campus, we are now ready to pursue a second question: how is the role of the student affairs administrator related to the above, in light of the fact that that person, as we have said, is typically charged with looking after the "quality of life" in such a setting? For the purposes of this discussion, we shall refer to this person as the dean of students and begin by examining how the dean's role is viewed by representative literature. What we shall be looking for, particularly, are discussions relating to the dean as one who looks after the quality of community and the sense of community, as part of the more inclusive responsibility of managing the campus environment so as to enhance the learning process and to promote the health and development of the
members of that community.

Judging by the spate of soul-searching articles that have appeared in the journals during the last decade and earlier relating to the "role of the dean of students" it would seem that that profession has been experiencing an unrelenting crisis of identity. Our chronological picture of this process begins with one of the early discussions of "student development" (Koile, 1966) in which the question is asked:

... Are student personnel activities a part of a complex of "student services"--the prevalent perception--or can they be conceptualized and developed as programs with a focus on student learning and development (Koile, 1966, p. 67)?

The author expresses his concern that in addition to continuing to maintain and cherish the "student personnel point-of-view, the deep valuing of the student as a person" and the offering of "discrete student services," student affairs should be also dealing with "the campus as a social system." By this he means helping students to make better use of the campus environment to enhance their learning. The main thrust of Koile's article, however, is to suggest ways to insure that the dean is in "equal partnership" with the instructional aspects of the college organization, principally by advocating "the small college idea of keeping student affairs as a part of the academic unit ..."
Much of the rhetoric of these self-examinations brings into focus the so-called demise of *in loco parentis* and the heralding of a new age of student development.

Interestingly, the following fragment, taken from a 1970 position paper, announces the replacement of the *parental* model by the *community* model:

> The myth of *in loco parentis* may be exposed by recognizing that students no longer view university authority in terms of a parental substitute, and university officials are increasingly declining to stand in *loco parentis*. Students have replaced the parental substitute model for a *community* substitute model.

> The university does not stand in *loco parentis*. It *does* stand in *loco communитatis* (NASPA, 1970, p. 4, emphasis added).

However, the identity crisis goes unalleviated and role explorations continue. Rickard (1972) asserts that the principal reason for the crisis is the tradition of the dean as both student advocate/counselor and disciplinarian.

> "Separating responsibility for counseling and discipline and helping functions from crisis management responsibilities," writes Rickard (1972, p. 225), "are . . . prerequisites to considering new directions for student affairs."

He sees getting rid of the disciplinary role as not only freeing the dean to pay more attention to student rights and due process but also as a way of approaching the integration of student affairs with academic affairs. Again, the thrust here appears to be the "equal status" objective.
and the throwing off of the in loco parentis mode. Taking the same theme from a different perspective, Hecklinger (1972) argues that the dean's custodial and disciplinary function "must be cut out" because "it implies that students are separated from the campus community" because "there has to be someone special to deal with them." The dean could then be left to deal with "non-instructional services" and no longer would be seen as "one of the chief barriers to student freedoms." Another writer (Lavender, 1972) proposes "a radical reorganization of the existing student personnel services" in order to complete the eradication of the in loco parentis point-of-view and to install in its place a system that would emphasize "a high quality of student life." He goes on to define the latter, using a phrase from Harold Taylor's book Students Without Teachers, as "a sense of joy and the exhilaration of being caught up." To accomplish this, his "radical" reorganization would consist of a Counseling Center to deal with aspects of student life, a Training-Supervising Center concerned with student housing, a Student Center for Intellectual Concerns to help create an intellectual community, and finally, a Student Action Center concerned with "radical change." Lindahl (1972) writes in the same vein, with the stress put on broadening the dean's role as an informal educator rather than a social controller.
A well-respected writer in the field, the late Burns B. Crookston (1972), takes a broader view and proposes a new organizational model for student affairs that would accommodate the student development philosophy based on the premise that student development "is not merely complementary or supplementary to the instructional program, it is a central teaching function of the college."

In contrast to the "old student personnel model" which Crookston describes as "reactive," "remedial," "corrective," and "cooperative," student development is seen as "proactive, developmental, preventive and collaborative" (Crookston, 1972, pp. 4-5). Therefore, argues Crookston, the accompanying organizational style, rather than being bureaucratic, should encompass "shared power and decision making," "flexibility," "open communications," "term leadership [he would abolish 'career leadership']," and "individual and organizational symbiosis." The last mentioned component is named "the developmental contract"--an idea ascribed to Allen E. Ivey--in which

... each individual within the organization shares in the development of a plan that will allow him to grow and develop as a person and professional while at the same time maximizing the use of his talents and energy in furthering the goals of the organization (Crookston, 1972, pp. 7-10).

With the pressure mounting in the early 1970s because of pervasive budget constraints in higher education, the student development rhetoric takes on a defen-
sive tone and begins to borrow the language of industrial organization. Witness this statement by Shaffer as he attempts to explain the "failure" of "self-perception" by the student personnel profession:

... Much of this failure must be attributed to the lack of awareness... of advances in understanding and conceptualizing the nature of organizational development, in applying current knowledge of complex organizations to operational behavior, and in adapting the systems approach to student personnel work (Shaffer, 1973, p. 391).

To make the worth of deans of students' functions more visible, Shaffer concludes that deans must begin "by perceiving the entire organization as a client...."

Echoing this notion, Lipsetz (1973) advocates the training of the student personnel worker as a "systems consultant" or an "OD specialist" but at the same time recognizes that the social structures of higher education "require different theoretical frameworks for their understanding."

The pressure for accountability apparently also leads to the adapting of a scientific tone, and so, the fashionable words ecology and environment enter the vocabulary of the student development movement. A case in point is an article by Peterson and Spooner (1973) which proposes that a dean (or other personnel worker) should operate as a "psychoecological observer-participant" in order "to insure a truly human, developmental environment."

And, of course, "the ecosystem perspective" (discussed in
Chapter IX), a model developed and promoted by WICHE during the same period is the more prominent case. (We shall be reporting on a recent application of this model below as we continue our chronology.)

The following year, Lilley (1974), reporting on a survey of the functions of deans, complains that the profession as a whole was still clinging to the modus operandi of "providing services" under the old personnel model, and admonishes the profession to "cast aside those functions or operational procedures . . . that do not fulfill the principles of the proposed 'developmental' model." Heath (1974), in an article entitled "The Reality of Student Development Programs in the Private Liberal Arts College," confirms Lilley's findings. In spite of the rhetoric of student development, Heath found very few changes in programs he surveyed.

By 1975 "accountability" and "management technology" achieved "prime time" status in much of the human services literature. The Winter issue of the NASPA Journal is fully devoted to "management effectiveness" with articles divulging the "New Management" tools for deans.

Saurman and Nash (1975), concerned with the threat that M.B.O. (management by objective) and the like post to the humanistic aspects of the student development orientation, suggest that the dean must become a "philosopher-activist"
to counter the trend toward the uncritical acceptance of such. Repudiating the idea that the dean's role be reduced "solely to service, housekeeping and/or managerial responsibilities," Saurman and Nash proclaim the need for a radical change in the training of student development professionals. In and among their laundry list of areas to be mastered by these specialists is "the ecology of the university."

Indeed, the conference theme of that year and the Summer issue of the NASPA Journal were devoted to "the ecology of the learning environment." Crookston, whose article on the organizational aspects of student development was mentioned earlier, now presents his case in terms of "milieu management" (Crookston, 1975), a concept which we discussed in Chapter IX as one of the three basic strategies of student development. What is new this time around is that he invokes the idea of community in the context of democracy:

What is milieu management? It is the systematic coordination and integration of the total campus environment—the organizations, the structures, the space, the functions, the people and the relationships of each to all the others and to the whole—toward growth and development as a democratic community. . . . Thus as the individual and the group contribute to the total community they give the community the capacity to create conditions that contribute to the enhancement of the individual and the group. . . . This symbiotic relationship of the individual to the community is the classical definition of democracy (Crookston, 1975, p. 46).
Crookston notes that to develop a community "there must be a transcendent value upon which commitment can be based," but at the same time observes that at a large complex institution such a value is not likely to be found:

The MM [milieu manager] should focus instead on the smaller, discrete communities that do exist within the institution, concentrate community building efforts on them, and then try to build a system of interrelated communities as a means to move toward a community of the larger whole (Crookston, 1975, p. 54).

And, finally, we find in Crookston's scheme for milieu management a rarely stated position in student affairs that is surprisingly congruent with Sarason's dictum that a psychological sense of community cannot be sustained unless all members of a setting are considered in respect to their own development. (We also note another instance in an article by Stanfield [1972], "Alienation of the University Employee," a rare statement of concern for the whole community.) Here we quote Crookston in full:

Who is involved? Everyone in the campus community should be involved in the creation and development of a symbiotic community—faculty, students, staff, administrators, librarians, maintenance workers, cooks, janitors, craftsmen. It is time to think of the community as a whole, not merely a place that is for students to develop and faculty to teach and do research. This means thinking of a health service for all, not just for students, a library for all, counseling for all, life planning programs for all, organizational development, and human development training for all. The MM must have the authority to impact all components of the campus, to have a
significant role in the staff and human development of all employees (Crookston, 1975, p. 54).

The remainder of the "ecology" issue is devoted to the "ecosystem perspective," principally in two articles: "Designing Campus Environments" (Kaiser, 1975) and "Designing Campus Ecosystems" (Delworth et al., 1975). (This model, as noted above, was earlier discussed in Chapter IX.) Suffice it to observe here that, in contrast to Crookston's community orientation, the model appears to be focused on the student's personal development. Utilizing the new "eco-language," Kaiser's "intentional campus design" is built upon eight basic assumptions:

1. Students are primarily motivated by a desire for experience.
2. All experience is gained in spaces.
3. All spaces have opportunity structures.
4. Expansions of consciousness occur as a result of the developmental movement of consciousness through progressively more sophisticated spaces.
5. A transactional relationship exists between college students and their campus environments.
6. Students attempt to cope with any spaces in which they find themselves.
7. Every campus environment has a design, even if the administration, faculty and students have not planned it or are not consciously aware of it.
8. Successful campus design is dependent upon participation of all campus members including students, faculty, staff, administration, and regents. (Kaiser, 1975, pp. 34-36).

Notice that the last mentioned assumption parallels Crookston's call for total involvement in respect to design but
falls short in respect to broadening the scope of who benefits from development.

The most recent collection of statements on the ecosystem perspective we find in a volume edited by Huebner (1979b) in the *New Directions for Student Services* series entitled *Redesigning Campus Environments*. Of particular relevance to the present discussion is the chapter "Application of the Ecosystem Perspective to a Dean of Students Office" (Hurst and Ragle, 1979). Keeping in mind that their discussion applies specifically to the large university campus (based upon an actual working model at the University of Texas), we are nonetheless interested in seeing if this new conceptual model contains a community oriented role for the dean of students.

Hurst and Ragle begin by discussing the traditional functions of the dean of students office which are identified as (1) student discipline, (2) student activities, (3) the administration of student service programs designed to serve specific student subpopulations, and (4) the representing or interpretation of the student point of view in the formulation of university policies. The authors claim that an ecosystem design would enhance these functions, particularly in overcoming the dilution of influence usually experienced by the dean of students' office by (1) providing "an overall perspective regarding
the impact of the university environments," and (2) "providing hard data to justify their proposals." The ecosystem model proposed by Hurst and Ragle, which they name "The Environmental Assessment and Intervention Team Model," divides the dean of students' office into units for the most part representing the typical functions mentioned above. What this perspective adds is the "research and evaluation unit, which collects data relating to the needs, interests, abilities, and goals of students and assists with the evaluation of student services programs." Representatives of each of the units thus formed are then to come together to form the Environmental Assessment and Intervention Team which serves as a "think tank" and an "information processing center."

However, the adding of an assessment team is not in itself an ecological innovation. The structure, insist the authors, must be accompanied by "an attitudinal and behavioral shift" incorporating the ecosystem perspective. Thus the emphasis is not only on data-gathering but on the kind of data that are sought, and this primarily has to do with "the congruence or incongruence between various student populations and the characteristics of the environment," or in ecolanguage parlance, the "matches and mismatches of the university environment." Judging from the conclusion of the authors, the main contribution of this
approach and its "attitudinal shift" is that "speculation and intuition" are put to rest (alongside of in loco parentis) in the arena of student affairs, and a new age of ecosystem technology is proclaimed to be upon us:

Program development and intervention by speculation and intuition is obsolete for modern student affairs work. Intuition may have been sufficient in the era of in loco parentis, and speculation sufficed when expectations of student affairs professionals were less demanding. The ecosystem perspective provides a conceptualization that holds great promise as a cornerstone in the foundation of student affairs work in the eighties and nineties (Hurst and Ragle, 1979, pp. 82-83).

Bloland (1979) points out that "the response of the academic community has been decidedly strained" when it comes to the student development "reformation" in its attempt to encroach on the academic territory of the faculty. In fact, Bloland, who addresses himself primarily to the question of how deans should be formally trained for their roles, feels that in their effort to broaden their role they may have "painted themselves into a corner." As a result, says Bloland, student development specialists find themselves in the position of being trained for roles that are not seen as essential by the academic community and hence not in very high demand. His chief conclusion is that doctoral level training for deans should concentrate in the general administration and management of higher education, and that areas such as counseling, stu-
dent development education, etc., should be reserved for
the master's level and below. (This is in contrast to
the view expressed by Saurman and Nash [1975], mentioned
earlier in this chapter, to the effect that a dean's edu-
cation should counter the managerial trend and focus on
student development and campus ecology. In the last chap-
ter another contrary view was mentioned. Blaesser [1972]
saw the communitization process as the center piece of a
doctoral program for deans.)

We end our chronological survey of perceptions of
the dean of students' role with an observation by Pitts
(1980) who, commenting on the literature of student devel-
opment, ecosystem design, and milieu management, notes an
historical irony in the so-called demise of in loco parentis
and the new direction of student affairs:

A number of recent writings in the field suggest
that "student personnel work" is an outmoded term
which refers to practices which are not in keeping
with the current emphasis on facilitating student
development. The doctrine of in loco parentis (now
legally dead), is often cited as evidence that student
personnel work has traditionally been interested in
student control but not student development. In loco
parentis, however, is better understood historically
as a vehicle by which colleges sought to facilitate
the development of the whole student as students'
developmental needs were understood at the time. The
current emphasis on student development reflects
current views concerning students' needs, and is more
similar in basic purpose to the older approach than
"developmentalists" suggest. Concern for the total
development of the student is, by its very nature, a
parenting function, whether the college acts through
the relatively strict and old fashioned doctrine of in loco parentis or through the more permissive quasi-parental role in evidence today. It is too soon to tell whether or not milieu management will turn out to be another example of the college as parent (Pitts, 1980, p. 24).

Summary and Discussion

We have examined some representative articles dealing with the role of the chief student affairs officer in the period 1966 to present. We found the profession in the midst of an identity crisis consisting of a redefinition of role, a justification of role, and a search for equal status with academic colleagues. As a result, a number of the writers stressed the educator aspect of the deans' responsibilities while they sought to de-emphasize parental-like custodial functions. Much concern was expressed over the role-confusion caused by the dual assignment of the dean of students to the disciplinary and counseling functions. Thus, in this period we see a move away from in loco parentis to student development concerns and concerns with managing a system which would maximize the match between learner and environment. Such systems have been variously called milieu management, organizational development, ecosystem technology, etc. Also during this period, due to increasing fiscal constraints and the demands for cost-effectiveness, a managerial trend erupted calling for accountability and the
adoption of industrial approaches, as well as scientific approaches calling for mechanisms for the collection of data. Some writers, in spite of the new rhetoric, found the profession still clinging to old habits, that is, providing services, overseeing disciplinary and housekeeping functions. Presently, the dominant mode for student affairs management, at least as suggested by the literature, and especially in the larger university systems, is the ecosystem design, stressing the ecology of the university environment as it relates to student development. Whatever the system, the prime focus appears to be on the "personal growth" of the student, not as a consequence of the development of community or any consciousness of community but rather of the application of environmental assessment data to the problem of matching student needs and campus programs. Some disagreement was expressed regarding how deans of students should best be educated, some arguing for a focus on student development education with its humanistic implications, and others for a focus on administrative and managerial competency. (It was noted that an author discussed in the previous chapter vied for an emphasis on communitization.) Finally, we quoted one writer who observed that the concern for the "total development of the student," prominent in today's models of student affairs, is by its very nature a parenting function,
and thus in loco parentis, though legally dead, may, in this new sense, be alive and well.

Our review has not convinced us that the dean's identity crisis has been resolved or that the dean's role has stabilized. More importantly, for the purposes of this study, we have not found what we set out to look for and what was so eloquently promised in Crookston's conception of milieu management, that is, any attention, by design, to the development of a psychological sense of community. We have already discussed in Chapter IX the limitations of the student development philosophy in this regard; examining the expected or prescribed roles of the dean of students has not changed this conclusion. For example, the tired old argument that a dean cannot be both a counselor/student advocate and a disciplinarian is a certain sign that a community perspective is not being taken seriously. Again, looking at the family-community analogy, it may be understood that, as difficult as it is, the authority or the parent must always assume both roles, otherwise this and other fragmentations and role specialties have a way of diluting a sense of community responsibility. This may also be true of the mind/soul dichotomy which the student development model is meant to break down. It seems to us that, in a futile attempt to arrive at equal partnership with the academic function, the model
has not only failed to obliterate the dichotomy but has driven the wedge deeper by insisting on a distinction between "developmental education" and traditional education.

Also noted, was another promising element in Crookston's description of milieu management, and that is the idea that everyone—not only students—is involved "in the creation and development of a symbiotic community." However, we found very little recognition of this principle (one of Sarason's primary conditions for achieving a psychological sense of community) in the bulk of the literature. Also missing is another condition prescribed by Sarason: the involvement of the institution in the larger community in which it is embedded.

This chapter did not explore the issue of leadership style and other areas of organizational behavior which undoubtedly have a bearing on our topic. We make mention of this omission only to suggest another avenue of approach to some of the areas we have attempted to explore. A work like Appleton, Briggs and Rhatigan's *Pieces of Eight: The Rites, Roles, and Styles of the Dean* (1978) is very informative in terms of the personal perspectives such accounts afford. However, even in this instance, there is very little attention paid to the problem of community or the sense of community. Similarly, Lewis and Lewis
(1977), who offer a model of "community counseling" that could certainly be applied to the operation of a dean of students' office, have much to say about a community approach in terms of assessment of needs, resources, skill-building and student advocacy, but little is said about the psychological sense of community.

In our next and final chapter we shall examine in full where our findings have taken us, and explore the implications of those findings in respect to our concern for the relationship between the dean of students' role and the nature of the campus community and the sense of community.
CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION: QUESTIONS, REFLECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Overview

In this study we have explored the meaning of the concept sense of community, first through an examination of the idea of community itself (Chapter II), then through a review of some basic notions regarding factors which induce people to cohere in groups, and the mechanisms that promote bonding, cohesiveness and group spirit once groups have organized themselves (Chapter III). We have examined the means by which the so-called intentional community manages to build into its system (looking particularly at the commune as a social system) an enduring sense of community and commitment, and in the process considered the example of a college whose educational intent was explicitly interwoven with a communal intent (Chapter IV). The notion that crisis seemingly has the power to create a sense of community—or something resembling a communal response—led us to examine the idea of territory as an analogue to the idea of community, to see if there may not be some biological correlates to such a
communal response (Chapter V). Leaving the biological, we then examined the communal mechanism from a socio-theological perspective, namely Buber's concept of The Centre as a community-building force (Chapter VI). A review of Sarason's concept of the psychological sense of community, particularly as it contributes to an enrichment of human services endeavors (Chapter VII), and a review of a study designed to develop PSC into a measurable construct (Chapter VIII), brought us to an exploration of community psychology or, more generally, of how the issue of promoting, growth, change and mental health is viewed through a community perspective (Chapter V). We reviewed the literature pertaining to the idea of the college campus as community, and the problem of promoting a sense of community in such a setting (Chapter X). Finally, our attention was turned to the question of how the dean of students' role was viewed by the literature, especially as it relates to the community perspective (Chapter XI).

Suggestions for Future Study

The study has evoked a number of questions still to be answered that would have taken us beyond its scope if we had stopped to explore them. Some of the unanswered questions we have mentioned in the body of this report. These are the principal remaining questions:
What is the relationship between the sense of community and the physical surroundings and architecture? The answer, in part, lies somewhere in the domain of environmental psychology where such variables as propinquity, privacy, personal space, noise, corridor design, crowding, and perceptual monotony are manipulated. In their book, Environmental Psychology: Man and His Physical Setting, Proshansky, Ittleson and Rivlin (1970) report on hundreds of studies in which these and other variables play key roles. However, the reader will find there no mention of the sense of community in relation to design but instead will have to extract some related meaning out of such discussions as sociopedal design (i.e., serving to facilitate social interaction) versus sociofugal design. To make the point we shall cite two more examples of related sources. Holahan and Wilcoy (1977), reporting on "Ecological Strategies in Community Psychology," investigate the negative behavioral consequences of "double-loaded corridors" in residence halls emphasizing the issues of small group contact and increased interaction. Kaplan and Greenberg (1976) who, among other issues, discuss suite-designed dormitories versus corridor-design in their article entitled "Regulation of Interaction through Architecture, Travel and Telecommunications."

We have questions about the relationship of lead-
ership styles and community, and about the charismatic leader (Schiffer, 1973) and the sense of community; about the "human need for consensus" (as identified by Berelson and Steiner [1964]); about the cultural differences in regard to the importance placed on community (as exemplified in Bronfenbrenner's work, The Two Worlds of Childhood: U.S. and U.S.S.R. [1970], in which community is examined in relation to upbringing and parental authority); about the relationship between sense of community and alienation (e.g., Wagoner [1976] reports on a study which examined normlessness in a police department); and about the relationship between communication or rhetoric and the sense of community (e.g., Hart [1978] reports on the power of rhetoric to "generate" a sense of community "even given the lack of a cohesive and integrated belief system"; and Kerbo and Marshall [1977] report on the connection between a sense of community and the CB Radio fad).

Finally, these are additional questions which demand studies of an experimental nature:

What are the practical implications for community building in an institutional setting of Wireman's theory of intimate secondary relationships? (See Chapter III, pp. 67-70.)

Do Kanter's commitment mechanisms appear in institutional life other than in communes and would these
Can Ardrey's need theory (identity, stimulation and security) be quantified for the purposes of measurement and comparison in an institutional community such as a college campus? Are these needs related to PSC? (See Chapter V, pp. 115-127.)

Would the implementation of Snyder's suggestion that liberal arts colleges become focused on special student populations (regarding career training) result in an increased sense of community in such settings? (See Chapter X, pp. 234-240.)

Is there better mental health, etc. and better "student development" in settings which have higher levels of PSC?

And finally, what is the relationship between the manner of carrying out the various, traditional college functions (e.g., admissions policies, sports, activities, discipline, clubs and fraternities) and PSC?

Personal Recollections: "A Small, Intimate Liberal Arts College"

As stated in the Introduction, the writer was primarily attracted to this topic because of his personal experience as a dean of students at a small, non-prestigious, residential liberal arts institution which, in the
view of many, suffered from a lack of a sense of community for a number of years before it closed in a state of fiscal ruin. The study was undertaken for the purpose of seeing if anything could be learned about the psychological sense of community that would be applicable in the carrying out of the responsibility of creating, maintaining or enhancing a sense of community on a college campus. This is not the only responsibility of the dean of students nor is the dean the only person on campus who is charged with that responsibility or who has that concern, but it is from the dean of students' perspective from which this subject was approached.

The setting which frames the writer's perspective, the place where he had been employed as a dean in the 1970s, is presently a ghost town of empty buildings spread out over several acres of Vermont countryside, a campus of white-painted brick buildings "designed," says an old catalog "by the prominent architect, Edward Durell Stone." Recently the writer ran into a former Windham student who showed him a draft of an article that was being prepared for a news publication describing the auction that took place following bankruptcy proceedings. Here are some excerpts:
I had watched Windham bleed since the spring of 1976 when it was announced that the institution could not meet its payroll; the faculty stayed on without pay to finish the semester. Its president for two years, a former State Department official . . . , had brought Windham down with a crash. I was not alone in my feeling that [the president] looked on the students with contempt; and he established an inner circle of administrators to insulate himself from [them]. He also did what he could to give the school a "straight" image. . . .

. . . I graduated the year before the first major crisis, and four years before the final indignity which took place last weekend, the auction of its furnishings and equipment. But I, like many students, always suffered from Windham's lack of identity, represented by those ugly white square buildings clashing so unceremoniously with the soft hills. . . .

. . . A few former students showed up to pay their respects, but no one seemed especially solemn. As one graduate put it: "the soul of the place had been ripped out long ago" (Seigel, 1979, pp. 2-4).

The writer first assumed his position as Dean in the fall of 1970; the campus was alive and vital but shaking in the aftermath of the strikes that had accompanied the Cambodia and Kent State tragedies. The President had chosen him for that position almost against his wishes (the writer wished to pursue his counseling psychology career and had no ambitions to be an administrator). However, the President saw him as a person capable of dealing with the drug problem from which the College was apparently suffering; in addition, he was an alumnus of the College. And he needed a job.

He found himself alone (the other administrators
were "away for the weekend") on the first day of his job facing not only 500 new freshmen and their parents, but a protesting assemblage of a hundred "Free Farmers" who had interrupted the orientation program by marching onto the campus followed by an assortment of State and local police and deputy sheriffs. The "Farmers" had borrowed a two-acre piece of land with the consent of the President for the purpose of growing a summer garden. The problem arose from the fact that summer gardens in Vermont require an autumn harvest whose season coincides with the Fall Semester. The President could not abide this conflict and so he requested the police to make a trespassing raid on the very day that the new students would arrive. Hence the Farmers left their garden and headed for the campus just as the orientation barbecue was getting under way. The sheriff asked the Dean to warn the protesters that they would be arrested if they did not immediately leave the campus. Meanwhile, parents of the new students were shocked in disbelief, and the freshmen were amused, scared or bewildered; sixty helmeted, deputized individuals held their clubs tightly as they waited for the word. The Dean dutifully made his announcement; no one moved, but the word was not given. The silence was broken by a sudden animated eruption of dialogue. The Farmers were explaining their case and the sheriff was nervously prompting us to
deliver more warnings. The Dean did a reconnaissance of the mob: it was a potpourri of long hair and short hair, of beards and wide-brimmed hats, suits and ties, kerchiefs and skirts, dogs and children, students, professors, photographers and cinematographers. The Dean first conferred by phone with the Treasurer (the President could not be reached) who suggested that the order for an arrest be given. Rejecting the suggestion, the Dean returned to the scene of the protest, invited the Farmers to the barbecue, and told the sheriff that the raid was over.

The incident provoked a series of events, one of which was a midnight raid of destruction on the two-acre garden by some infuriated townspeople who hated both the "hippies" and the College. However, the particular event that stands out in the writer's mind is the impromptu open meeting that was called the next evening at the gymnasium to discuss "the whole situation." It was the first time the writer remembers hearing the term "sense of community" expressed in the context of the place where he worked. "Your institution has no sense of community!" bellowed out a young lady (who, the writer was told, was a Windham drop-out who joined the Free Farmers), "it doesn't care what happens to anybody; it sits alone on the hill and doesn't care!"
It is not the intention of this section to present a detailed documentation of "the case against Windham College" in the area of a lack of sense of community. (Nor is there any implication that Windham's demise is a consequence of this lack.) What we wish to do is to picture for the reader the setting in which the writer's interest in the problem of community emerged. A few other instances should suffice, but let us first complete the backdrop of these scenes.

Windham had a faculty composed of brilliant, young, ivy-league-credentialed instructors who were lured to the College in the sixties by attractive benefit packages and the rural Vermont life-style. Its students, who for the most part came from the urban and suburban areas of metropolitan New York, were largely a creative, bright-but-underachieving lot (many of their brothers and sisters were attending colleges like Dartmouth and Smith) who were attracted to the promise of "a fine faculty and a small, intimate, liberal arts college nestled in the Connecticut River Valley, and in the heart of the best ski country in the East." Apparently, many were also attracted to an image which the Admissions Office did not wish to advertise: a permissive atmosphere. On the other hand, the school did not seem to possess "a clear and salient image" of the kind which Feldman and Newcomb observed to promote a homogeneity between faculty and students which tends to increase the
chances for "campus-wide impact." The President's private dream was that one day Windham would be a second Middlebury (his alma mater); many of the faculty had their own similar dreams of "one day." And Admissions was continually gearing up for that new and future population of students even as they drew in their present paying customers, "the kind of students we don't want." The students appeared to take little or no pride in being a part of the institution; many of its alumni seem to have forgotten its existence. The dormitories were maltreated as if their inhabitants felt that the dorms were not theirs to care for and protect, that they were "the property of the Corporation of Windham College." (The architect originally presented a quadrangle design which, because of financial considerations, was rejected in favor of a barracks-type arrangement.) The maintenance men always seemed disgusted with the administration, particularly the Dean of Students whom they saw as a "soft-headed liberal" who allowed students to run rampant over their physical plant. Against their expectations of small college intimacy many new students complained of coldness and unfriendliness until they found their small group with which they could share common interests and/or their bag of grass. Regarding campus events, it would seem as if the same group of people would appear and the same group (the larger one) would
stay away at event after event. Many students would be
down at the local tavern, many back at their rooms, small
cubicles often housing two occupants, two expensive stereo
systems and two record collections. The instructors were
living their private lives "out in the country" far away
from the campus as were many of the upper classmen who had
escaped from campus at the first opportunity. So too were
the administrators living at a distance, most notably the
President, who lived in a private mansion (provided by
the Board of Trustees) located ten miles south.

Not all was gloomy. The College had exciting aca-
demic and cultural programs and offerings. It excelled
in the sciences and the fine arts, particularly drama; the
English department boasted first-rate novelists. And it
was in these areas that one found pockets of good morale
and a sense of community. But an economic crunch was begin-
n ing to be felt because of lowering enrollments and a high
attrition rate (some thought that the end of the draft
might have had an impact on enrollment). Departments began
competing for dollars and the president of ten years got
himself in trouble with the faculty by insisting on voca-
tional innovations in the curriculum. In its twenty-
second year a third president was brought in. A Southern
gentleman and former ambassador, presumably the Trustees
hoped that their new man would change the image of the school by "cleaning up the place." Two years later the place was in shambles and unable to meet its payroll. A fourth and final president attempted to run a "Windham II," as its redesigners called it, at a drastically reduced budget and scale. The rest of the story was told in our quote from a former student (above).

It was in this context that the writer first came up against the problems of a lack of a sense of community, although only in retrospect did he become fully aware that this was the case. To be sure the phrase "this place has no sense of community" was often heard, but all the instances that made this true were not discerned at the time as being part of a total pattern. The instances that we are referring to were, in retrospect, signals that the setting was not nurturing the psychological sense of community (about which Sarason writes) among its staff and students, and signs that the "mechanisms of commitment" (about which Kanter writes) had little place of importance in campus life. We shall mention a few of these instances for illustration.

In the late sixties the administration made the decision to move the "campus" out of the wood-framed houses scattered throughout the village of Putney and on to a new site with new modern buildings. Many associated with the
school in those days expressed the mixed feeling that they were both excited at the prospect and that they were in fear of losing some "sense" that would never be regained. Sarason would call this the "buildings as distractions" syndrome, arguing that new buildings often obscure the original objectives and tend to dampen the sense of community.

The College ordered its fire extinguishers for the new buildings from a Boston firm, slighting the local fire department whose bid came in a few dollars higher, a violation of the principle that to have a sense of community of its own, a setting must be aware of and involved in the community in which it is embedded (Sarason).

The College had no faculty lounge for many years until someone proposed that a classroom be converted for this purpose. After much resistance, money was appropriated for the conversion. Two principles are involved here: A sense of community is often aided by a common area or territoriality and the idea (again Sarason's notion) that "schools are not just for the kids."

A proposal by a physics professor that the instructors use part of their vacation time (during the January break when the students were gone) to "retreat" together in the dormitories was turned down by the Faculty Senate on the grounds that it would be too much of a sacrifice.
Recall that Kanter found that sacrifice and investment are important mechanisms of commitment.

The students planned to have a Spring Festival on campus near the end of the term. The plan was criticized because the librarian claimed it would interfere with students still using the library. Here was a conflict in community values, a lack of common ties, and an insensitivity regarding the importance of ritual. In a similar instance of "Spring rites" the new president failed to appear at a pre-dawn Maypole event organized by the Student Activity Committee.

There was a time when the most cohesive group on campus was made up of a dozen students who had come to Windham after their college had folded, a good instance of the communal response to crisis and the persecution experience described by Kanter and Ardrey and others.

The campus psychologist had ordered that a student be sent home because she was "schizophrenic" and a "suicide risk." The Dean of Students refused and instead organized a support group on the wing of the dormitory in which she lived which agreed to have her stay "in the community" rather than have her hospitalized. The psychologist had no consciousness of community resources or of the power of networks or of the sense of competence that such situations involve. When the writer mentioned this example
during his interview with Sarason this was Sarason's response:

That's a very, very good instance, you know, of several things. One thing is that that student was embedded in a network of relationships. And your job was to find out whether it was working for her or against her. Was it supportive? Was it isolating, or what-the-hell was it? And the decision what to do with her was going to depend upon that network of relationships and whether it had aspects for her as well as for others of some sense of community. And that's a very good example of that. That's the difference in thinking in terms of an individual psychology as against thinking in terms of a community psychology (Sarason, 1980)

The College suffered from a debilitating attrition rate. Our findings would suggest that attrition may have been both cause and effect of campus malaise. We have learned from our review that low selectivity is often associated with high attrition and a lowered sense of community, and that, conversely, "exclusivity"--that is, "a place that's hard to get in"--may be an element of community. We also learned from Glynn (1977) that the number of years one expects to live in a community is the strongest predictor of the psychological sense of community. Morgan (1957) saw "nomadism" as being antithetical to community; and Keyes (1975) wrote of "a mobility neurosis" that is endemic in our society and "one of the major sources of our lack of community." "A community," complained Keyes, "simply cannot be built from people crouched and ready to take off at the crack of the gun" (1975, p. 17).
Like many similar institutions Windham was known as a "suitcase college"; for many, home or some other competing setting in the outside world pulled students away from many of the weekend events planned to take place on campus. On the whole, the events themselves were limited and not of sufficient variety to attract the full spectrum of student and faculty interest. The most popular weekend events were the "boogies" that took place in the Student Union; the most spectacular and the most massively attended were the superstar rock and folk concerts given at the gymnasium. However the bulk of the patrons of these events were outsiders who commuted from nearby states. Meanwhile the faculty and staff were leading the "good life" in the Vermont hills far away and independent of the campus culture. It was Knop (1976), writing on community formation and decline, who told us that a community breaks down when the internal milieu of a setting does not provide "closure," that is, when it ceases to be "self-sufficient" and consistently develops a pattern of "linkages in the contingent milieu."

Unquestionably the College had a value for many but the many had never settled on one transcendent value on which all could agree. Buber would not have found there a "Centre" or "eternal thou," and neither would have Nisbet found any clear sense of "function, dogma, authority,
hierarchy, solidarity or sense of superiority."

To complete the picture we shall describe one more component. Here is an excerpt from the "Position Description and Analysis Form" setting forth the purpose of the dean of students' position at Windham College:

To oversee the administration of the various student services departments; to initiate, facilitate, encourage and engage directly in certain tasks and interventions which are designed to maximize student development, providing for the welfare and health of students, reducing stress in the environment (while assisting students to cope with unavoidable stress), establishing a milieu which encourages the integration of academic and non-academic life, providing for a social and interpersonal education for individual and community responsibility; and in general to assist the President in uniting the community, maintaining harmony and improving the quality of life on campus.

In reporting on the background of his interest in the problem of community in the context of the place where he was employed for a period of six years, the writer wishes not to appear as self-righteous or as self-denegrating; in this respect he was neither blameless nor sinful. In any case, we are not presenting his administration of the duties described above as a model. In the carrying out of those duties he introduced a number of community-oriented innovations but for the most part considered his position description (which he helped compose) as just another collection of "student development" jargon. If there were any complicity on his part in respect to the lack of a sense of community it may have been a failure in
the area which Kanter refers to as *moral commitment*, and which other authors variously call *order*, *constraint*, *moral unity*, and so forth. As long as permissiveness is an agreed upon value in a community, as it was, for example, in Summer Hill, then "moral unity" and sense of community may prevail. While "unconditional positive regard" was instilled in the writer as part of his Rogerian counselor training, the object of that regard was the *individual*, not the community. While the writer did carry out his disciplinary function at the College—drug pushers were expelled and thieves were brought to justice—his leadership apparently failed to help the President bring together the conflicting segments of the setting—the trustees, the students, the maintenance staff, the faculty, the parents, the administration, the larger community—into a consensus or order or "moral unity." Nisbet describes such a unity in his book, *The Quest for Community*, as he writes about the rewards of the regimentation of military life and the

. . . contentment of being in the presence of moral regulations whose clarity and preciseness of coverage makes more pleasant the "free" areas not covered by the regulations. . . . [Such an order] had the capacity to inspire in the individual soldier a feeling for the warmth of comradeship . . . , an orderly predictable world of values—a sense of belongingness, of close identification with other human beings (Nisbet, 1970, pp. 42-43).
And recall that McWilliams in his work on fraternity also lauded the "old tradition" and the "virtues of constraint and discipline." We repeat our previous quote from our discussion in Chapter III:

... [The old tradition is not the social science tradition which] continues to identify eros and community, and to define community in terms of "warmth," physical gratification, and the "original," "natural" desires of pre-cultural, pre-political man, [nor is it, as others have suggested] a desire to recapture the "sweetness" of childhood (McWilliams, 1973, p. 36).

McWilliams would have us revive the old virtues of

... honor, obligation [and] authority [which] involve more than constraints; as they imply, constraints are involved whenever affection matters, whenever one is deeply bound to other human beings (McWilliams, 1973, p. 623).

Let us end this discussion of Windham College with some observations offered by Sarason during our interview with him:

Look, the more you talk about the place the more I see that the sense of community simply wasn't in the heads of the leaders of the joint. ... .

... The sense of community enters in the sense that it never really was high on the priorities; I mean other things took precedence over it. You know, legitimation; they were going to become another Middlebury. They put themselves on the treadmill of building and image. Their orientation was "How was the outside going to look at us?" not "How do we want to live" (Sarason, 1980)?
The Dean as Community Psychologist

Soon after the writer left Windham College he began planning to set up a private practice in psychological counseling and consulting while he was seeking new employment as a dean. During this period a critical situation developed as he sought licensure as a practicing psychologist, which turned out to be of pivotal significance in regard to his career and in regard to the topic under study. Having been supplied all the necessary credentials, the Board of Psychological Examiners sent the writer a notice of "deferred application," which effectively meant that the application for a license was denied with the right of appeal. The Board's explanation was that although he met all the necessary training and supervised practice requirements in terms of clinical counseling and testing, the fact that "his chief employment for the last six years while in the State of Vermont was in administration and not in psychology" disqualified him for licensure as a psychologist. To recount it briefly, the writer won his appeal and received his license on the basis of the argument (spelled out in what amounted to a lengthy psychological brief) that it is possible for a person to be both a dean and a psychologist at the same time and that is called community psychology and that is what he had been doing for the last six years.
When this study was undertaken, the initial objective was to learn what the literature has to say about the concept of the sense of community and then to see if that knowledge can make some sense out of the writer's experience. It was not until he read Sarason's *The Psychological Sense of Community* that he realized that there was a connection between the idea of the sense of community and the discipline of community psychology. At that moment the pieces of the puzzle suddenly produced a recognizable picture of the writer's experience. Further, in reviewing the field of community psychology it was noted that most of the authors expressed the view that the community psychological model demands an activist stance of its workers. "Some would go so far," wrote Zax and Specter, "as to inject themselves into the power structure where they could, themselves, hold the administrative reins." These ideas we see as the theoretical underpinning for the proposition that a dean of students (or a person who would be a dean) who sees him or herself as a "social regulator" or a "prosocial encourager," who sees the efficacy of intervention at the community level, and who has the psychological sense of community high on the priority list, might serve that role well if his or her training— or at least his or her professional identity— were in the field of community psychology. Despite the "identity crisis" which was evident as we reviewed the
literature on the role of the dean of students, many of the functions of that position remain universally stable: overseeing the "quality of life," managing the "milieu," the "system" or the "environment," being responsible for "mental health services," and "student development"—all are functions that represent the stuff that community psychology is made of. Add to these Sarason's conviction regarding the central place of the psychological sense of community in the field of community psychology and we arrive at what to us is the inescapable conclusion that this field is one (we are not saying the only one) with which a dean might be comfortable in identifying.

In the writer's case, this conclusion was arrived at somewhat after the fact, that is, after most of his formal training as a counselor and psychologist had gone by. However, formal training or for that matter specific methodologies are not at issue here. The purpose of this report was not to offer a model of intervention or to compare one set of strategies or one model with another set or model. Rather, its goal was to examine the concept of the sense of community as it relates to student affairs leadership on a small college campus. In light of this goal, the conclusion arrived at in the end of our discussion of the chapter on community psychology (Chapter IX) cannot be emphasized too strongly, and we repeat: commun-
Community psychology is not a set of techniques or a discrete collection of intervention strategies, but rather a professional attitude associated with a community orientation and informed by a central value. And, of course, we agree with Sarason when he says that value is the psychological sense of community. When, in our interview, the writer explained to Dr. Sarason that he was interested in exploring the idea of the dean as community psychologist this was his response:

You know, that makes sense. You see, if you go back to the Creation of Settings, one of the most important chapters, from my standpoint, in the book is "The Socialization of the Leader." You know, the dean of students is a leader, or at least is perceived as that by different segments of the community. And so one has to ask how does the leader conceive of himself in relation to the goals of the institution? And does he see it as one in which he or she, so to speak, acquires status, prestige, power or what have you, or is it to help others do what they want to do and is it one where you want to give a group of individuals some sense of interdependence and interneed, you see. And if it isn't in your head then you don't see these things (Sarason, 1980).

What we mean by "professional attitude" and the sense that a dean of students may be guided by a "community psychology" is what we believe Sarason meant by suggesting that the elements of community should be "in the head."

Elsewhere in the interview Sarason states it this way:

The leader is the model for what he wants other people to do. OK? And if the sense of community is something that he not only believes in but somehow in diverse ways shows up in what you do and what you say, that becomes influential.
The leadership thing is really, in my opinion, you know, crucial. If there's anything that the people who surround you get very, very quickly is whether you are truly interested in helping them further their goals. Or do they exist for you? Are you approachable, you know, or are you self-serving (Sarason, 1980).

To say that we are viewing a dean's community psychological role in terms of an attitude rather than in terms of a model of campus intervention is not to minimize the importance of the latter but to underscore the importance of the question: now that we know the leader's model of intervention can he or she tell us what is "in [his or her] head"; does he or she know? When the answer to the question is "Yes, I know; it is the psychological sense of community," then the findings in this report may be of significance. Sarason's book, The Psychological Sense of Community (1974) was a book about community psychology, not about its methods or programs but about a quality which one of the "fathers" of that school of approach felt was missing in the heads of its practitioners, the primacy of the sense of community for anyone who would "treat" communities.
Student Development and Personal Growth (A Caution)

Similarly, our findings lead us to believe that something has been missing in the student development movement which in a sense is the campus-based version of a community psychology model. So too do we see this lack in the written pronouncements of the most "newly packaged" form of this model, a sophisticated and operationally well-conceived technology of "person-environment intervention" which Huebner (1979b) and others call the "ecosystem perspective." While we laud the explicit and practical design techniques of this new discipline, particularly its contribution of the principle that interventions are predicated on "a data-theory base," we see very little of a consciousness of community in the writings of its proponents. The criteria for success of its interventions, like other student development models, are "personal growth" and the reduction of "student-environment mismatches" and "stress and strain." As we concluded in our discussion of these and other community intervention models in Chapter IX, we believe such efforts, though highly commendable in terms of their objectives and in terms of technique and theoretical rationale, have fallen short of their promise to promote student development precisely and ironically because they have emphasized personal growth to the detri-
A description of a recent experience at an annual Student Development Conference of a large public university in which the writer participated will illustrate our concern. The Conference offered a smorgasbord of the typical "personal growth" menu, including workshop introductions to gestalt therapy, bioenergetics, guided imagery, human sexuality and the like as well as to some "campus intervention techniques"; additionally, a dash of "social consciousness" (e.g., racism, sexism, dealing with the handicapped, etc.) was made available. One workshop, in particular, stands out in the writer's memory; it was entitled "Personal Growth in an Institutional Setting."

Billed as an "experiential workshop," the hour and one half event became a commiserating session in which many of the participants, and most particularly, the trainers, found the opportunity to share their grief over what the majority agreed was a common loss: the fact that their institutions' austerity-minded decision makers were beginning to cut the funding of their personal growth programs. The consensus seemed to be that the student development movement was being seriously threatened by these circumstances. We were told, for example, that the university which was hosting the conference was in danger of losing its Center for Personal Growth, which, incidentally,
coexisted with a mental health facility, a counseling and student development center, a residential life center, a women's center and various other campus agencies that focused on "student development" issues. The writer noticed that at no time during the workshop had anyone raised the question of the campus as a community and how the issue of a sense of community could impinge on the problems of the potential loss of "essential delivery systems" which the workshop was attempting to address. When the writer brought his own agenda to the floor he met only blank stares and looks of courteous bewilderment. "Sense of community" was simply not in the heads of the participants and apparently not part of the personal growth vocabulary. "How about the growth and development of other members of the community, the faculty, for instance?" was the follow-up question; that too induced blank responses. A third and final question met the same fate: "Why is it," the writer asked the group, "that 'personal growth' is conceived of something that must be housed and confined at one particular agency that would dispense it piecemeal?" The group politely acknowledged the writer's concerns and then returned to its own agenda. It quickly moved on to a heated discussion of how to convince the administration to continue to fund a series of assertiveness training workshops in the residence halls.
Our point in relating this anecdote is to suggest that the psychological sense of community might well be added to the agendas of future discussions or investigations by student development specialists, or for that matter by any of the helping, teaching, or administrative professions who practice and/or make policy or decisions in college settings.

**Some Fundamentals of Community**

We insisted above, in so many words, that the concept of dean-as-community-psychologist not only implies the possession of a full professional bag of tricks (the supplying of which is not within the purpose or scope of this report) but the possession of an attitude which judges any plans, policies, schemes, decisions, implementations, interventions and other actions on the basis of the impact of any of these on the psychological sense of community. We also asserted that such an attitude must be an informed one, implying the possession of knowledge and understanding (the supplying of which is decidedly within the purpose and scope of this study) of the concepts of community and the sense of community. In the body of this study we have reported our findings from an examination of relevant literature and have discussed each set of findings respectively as we went along. Without
attempting to review all of these findings once again, let us recapitulate by discussing what we have learned to be the fundamentals of community, and highlighting these by framing them in the most fundamental of settings, the dyad. (It was brought out in our discussion of the social psychology of groups that many investigators of group life often begin to develop their theories by first examining the interactions of two persons who have become a "group.")

Two people, in a setting like a successful marriage, illustrate the perfect embodiment of the idea of a psychological sense of community. Let us take just a few of the more basic elements of community and apply them to the dyadic setting of a marriage. Taking first the element of social interaction we may apply the following adjectives derived from the literature on community: frequent, day-to-day, face-to-face, regularized, interdependent, reciprocal, help-giving, cooperative, committed, communicative, exclusive, sufficient, complete, stable, satisfying. Next, taking the element of common area, we may apply these terms: limited social space, territory, smallness, knowledge of the physical layout, safety and sense of security. Following that we take the element of common ties and apply: norms, aspirations, problem-solving methods, values, desires, traditions, belief,
shared work and responsibility, mutual honoring of established instrumental behaviors, institutionalized awe, investment, sacrifice, homogeneity, economic sharing. Add to these the elements of social control (moral commitment, constraints, order), the central importance of family (honor), neighborhood (obligation), church (authority), social emotional comfort, physical sustenance, sense of competence, and finally, the satisfaction of innate needs for identity, stimulation and security.

By considering the elements of community as they apply to the marriage setting a number of conclusions about the problem of community become strikingly evident. For example, it can be immediately seen that size (smallness) alone cannot ensure the sustenance of a sense of community; it is obvious from the standpoint of the statistics of divorce that the loss of "the sense of marriage" is as common to our society as the loss of the sense of community. In considering the analogy of marriage it becomes apparent that the problems of a setting may never be completely understood if focus is limited to the internal structure of the setting; it must also be asked How is that internal structure shaped or reinforced by the larger society in which it is embedded? For example, as Robert Nisbet has shown us, if the function of family life no longer has central importance in society then the
sense of family is likely to suffer; similarly, we may hypothesize that the devaluation of the community ideal in the larger society would tend to diminish the sense of community in its various settings. Taking this into consideration but returning to our focus on the inner structure of a setting, a more general conclusion is that the absence or interruption of any one or more of the elements of community we have been discussing places a setting in danger of losing its sense of community.

Some of the interactional elements of community come almost automatically to a setting like marriage simply by virtue of smallness and therefore are for the most part taken for granted. Let us take the most fundamental of these, the knowing of the other. We learned from Glynn, for example, that in larger settings like villages or settlements there is a relationship between a psychological sense of community and the extent to which the first names of others in the community are known by its members. It is obvious that in the dyad the knowing of first names is not an issue and that it becomes an issue only as "the community" reaches a certain critical scale. In small groups, however, the issue of mutual knowingness still remains but revolves around a much subtler set of interpersonal variables. Likewise, we may look upon a second fundamental element that automati-
cally occurs in the small setting, the idea of **mutual** personal recognition: my presence or my absence is recognized by the other and the other's is noted by me. Related elements may be expressed as follows: I care and am cared about, I can depend on the other and the other can depend upon me, my impact on the other is easily evident and the other's on me is also evident; we belong here, etc. In looking for signs of a sense of community in a setting of, let us say, 500 persons, we would not expect to find the perfect replication of these elements which, in their dyadic form may be referred to as friendship and/or love. On the other hand, the state of "being in community" would be signified by the existence of similar kinds of perceptions regarding "others" among a large proportion of the 500. In that sense the problem of defining psychological sense of community is not dis-similar to the problem of defining "happiness" or other such state of being; it is a matter of proportion rather than of completeness. To suggest that in a community of 500 people there is or is not a sense of community is not to suggest that all of the five hundred do or do not experience the fundamental elements of community we have been describing.

Having become acquainted in this report with some sociological definitions of community we may conclude that
simply being a member of a social system which fits one of those definitions does not necessarily imbue that member with a sense of community; or conversely, when a member of a setting possesses that sense it does not necessarily follow that the setting is a true community. Recognizing this conundrum it may be said that to the extent that a member of a setting perceives that certain elements contained in the sociologist's conception of community are present in that setting, then, to the same extent may we say that the member has a consciousness of community which we are calling the psychological sense of community (this principle is one of the cornerstones of Glynn's dissertation design). May we not also conclude, therefore, that one way to build a sense of community is to see to it that a given setting contains the elements of community and that thorough participation in this process the members of that setting should tend to experience the psychological sense of community? At the same time we recognize that there is not a simple one-to-one correspondence between a finite set of elements and a certain degree of the sense of community. While nothing we found in the literature treated this issue, our observation would lead us to believe that a sense of community has principally to do with the way a person feels about the collectivity of persons among whom he lives, works or
studies, and that this subjectivity sometimes may, by association, be directed to the physical setting, geographical place, organization or institution. As suggested earlier, this process may be independent of whether any of the latter constitutes a "community." (This is one reason why we believe that Sarason's modification of the term "sense of community" with the word "psychological" should not be construed as a redundant embellishment.)

In addition to highlighting the fundamental elements of community, we wish to make mention of what we consider to be those key authors who have added valuable and insightful dimensions to our knowledge gained about the properties of community thus giving a breadth to our understanding of the meaning of sense of community.

Robert Nisbet (Chapters II and X) brought his historical and traditional perspective to our understanding of community and of its place in academe. So too did Wilson McWilliams (Chapter III) as he provided us with observations about the meaning of fraternity and its place in human affairs. Martin Buber (Chapter VI) gave us a definitive statement regarding the profound connection between a transcendent value and the existence of an enduring community; and he cautioned us that community does not result from man's deliberate attempts to gain it through the restructuring of his institutions, that it is not only
the consequence of a "fundamental transformation of interpersonal relationships (that is only the first difficult step) but of people standing "in a living reciprocal relation to one another facing a center--a living center."

A major contribution to this study was Kanter's analysis (Chapter IV) of the commitment mechanisms which she found to be essential to the survival of the 19th century communes. Much of what we have reviewed is so rhetorical in nature that, without the addition of Kanter's evidence of what it is that links the self to "social requirements" and what it is that ensures the stability of group life and a sense of community, much of our findings would have been like seeds in the wind searching for earth. Kanter's findings appear to confirm the rhetoric. Ardrey's formulation (Chapter V), which links the interactive variables of enmity, amity and hazard, and the innate striving for identity, stimulation and security with the success of territory, represents another notable contribution and is a good example of congruency with Kanter's findings.

Finally, if Kanter's was a major contribution then Sarason's contribution in this report (Chapter VII) was of supreme and inestimable significance. While many of his pronouncements remain to be tested by others, they are
solidly grounded in his own experiences in a variety of settings, many of which were created by him for the purpose of rendering service. Looking back over the process of creating a setting, not from the organizational management point of view, but from the intensely personal perspective that asks the question Whom am I doing this for, Sarason began to re-shape his thoughts and "make sense out of his experiences." In doing so he rediscovered a common household phrase—sense of community—and brought its meaning to a higher plain of regard: the psychological sense of community—the touchstone by which to judge the efforts of any one who would create or lead a setting in its mission of helping or teaching. It is the essence of his community psychology. It says that in judging our efforts we must not only examine the impact on the clientele, but on the external community and the internal community; i.e., the setting itself and the persons who man the setting. It says that in this community we shall take care of our own, be it a normal or handicapped person or the teacher or therapist assigned to that person.

**Being in Community: Love or Responsible Concern?**

At this juncture it might be well to pause and to consider an issue that inevitably arises when talking to colleagues about the "quest for community," and one that
may have arisen in the reader's mind, and that is the challenge that such a quest is yet another veiled effort at achieving universal love of the Judeo-Christian sort or of the romantic or familial variety. We should like to make it clear that this is not the case. A sense of community implies neither that everybody loves each other nor that everybody "must be friends"; to do so would be straining the family analogy beyond its useful limits. What then is the crucial "emotion" or attitude that we should be looking for? The term that we would prefer to use is responsible concern, a concept borrowed from a group process technique known as Attitudinal Skills Training. (AST was an educational component of a drug treatment program sponsored by the Addiction Services Agency in New York City during the 1960s in which the writer participated. It was used primarily in working with afflicted families and community groups and in the training of therapists.) In a true community what one would look for are signs that most people would feel we are a membership; we will not look away when a member is in need. Responsible concern implies a known set of community values; it includes the obligation to confront a member when he deviates from these values. Being in community implies not that we like each other but that we are not alone and are safe from attack or being ignored. As Wireman asserted
when discussing the intimate secondary relationship, it is more a matter of credibility than a matter of affection (1979b, p. 15).

The relationship between being in community and being in love that was suggested in our discussion of Freud's contribution to group psychology (Chapter III) is not being refuted here. In that discussion love was treated as an unconscious manifestation of a postulated libidinal drive and was used to explain how group members surrender self-interest in favor of the group ("limitation of narcissism"). For us what is important is not so much a concern with the validity of Freud's psychological mechanics, but rather with the passionate and powerful place that the group experience has in the human psyche. Freud was introduced into our report in order to emphasize the idea that the psychological sense of community—the communal response—strikes some very primal chord deep within our psychic core; that is, it is not simply a fad or a luxury of civilization.

In the same vein did we introduce Tiger, McWilliams (Chapter III) and Ardrey (Chapter V) into the discussion. We became convinced that this was an innate force that we were examining, a force which can be suddenly released from its suppression in moments of hazard, enmity, crisis, ritual or celebration to fill us with an inexplic-
able sense of oneness with our fellows. Not a romantic notion; a biologic notion.

The Problem of Individual Differences

Another issue that we wish to raise is the question of individual differences. It is easy to forget that it is the individual who experiences the sense of community, not the community; to speak of a group mentality is only a convenience of speech. It may be asked, therefore, whether or not some personalities are predisposed towards the idea of a sense of community (the writer may be one of these since he chose this as a topic of study!). Further, may not a person's "need for community" vary from time to time like other needs, depending on its momentary place on his need hierarchy?

A recent incident at the writer's place of work is a case in point. The Student Senate organized a "pick-up" event to help resolve a problem of glass and other litter strewn around the student parking lot. An invitation was sent out to all the members of the college "community" to appear with brooms on a certain afternoon. A pizza party was planned for the participants after the event. Some students and one staff member appeared at this "communal" event. Most did not. If we were to explain the degree of participation in this event on the basis
of the degree of sense of community at the college, how
would we explain the different behaviors of the partici-
pators and non-participators, given that all are members
of the same environment? Some possible hypotheses are:

(1) Some of the people who did not participate

(a) were more attracted to a competing setting
    (e.g., family, friends, other activities, etc.).
(b) were not in the mood to associate with
    people.
(c) generally prefer to be alone or with a few
    people.
(d) dislike the particular activity (and/or
    pizza parties).
(e) did not know about the activity.
(f) felt that the work should be left to paid
    custodians.
(g-z) etc., etc.

(2) Some of the people who did participate

(a) were attracted to the activity because they
    were lonely and had no other social activity
    to attend.
(b) liked the idea of beautifying the grounds.
(c) are predisposed to and have a need for a
    sense of community.
(d) enjoy outdoor work (and/or pizza parties).
(e) felt an obligation to join the activity in
    spite of competing settings.
(f) had the need to impress others with good
    deeds.
(g-z) etc., etc.
Let us pose our question another way. Fromm (1956, p. 32) writes that "Care, responsibility, respect and knowledge are mutually interdependent. They are a syndrome of attitudes which are to be found in the mature person."

How would one, then, promote a sense of community unless that community were made up of "mature" people? On the other hand, it is possible that the so called "self-actualized" person, described by Maslow as

... belongingness-need satisfied (he does not feel alienated, ostracized, orphaned, outside the group; he fits into the family, the team, the society; he is not an unwelcome intruder) (Maslow, 1965, p. 15),

would be less likely to be in quest of PSC or less likely to experience that sudden sense of community that often arises at communal occasions? We must be careful to recognize that a community psychological perspective does not assume the absence of individual predispositions any more than a community health program assumes that all people are equally prone to disease; treatment must always proceed along the lines of a dual approach. In the same way do we "treat" the lack of a sense of community; through environmental interventions we strive to maximize communal responses while at the same time we attempt to help individuals cope with loneliness, etc.
Individual versus Society:  
A Recurring Question

A related question, and one that must be faced in any discussion stressing the importance of community, is that of individuality, or to frame it in the present context, the sense of self. The community-minded practitioner must constantly take this into consideration. Almost every author who dealt with the problem of community raised this issue; one author, Bakan (1966) devoted an entire book to it, The Duality of Human Existence. As in the problem we discussed in our presentation of Tönnies' concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (Chapter III), we see community/individuality as a dichotomy forever seeking a synthesis. This is the "dialectic" to which Sarason referred when he wrote that "The tension is inevitable and in itself should not be regarded as either negative or positive" (1974, p. 273). Expressed in another way, Bakan saw the problem as the integration of "agency and communion" which is illustrated by a proverb (ascribed to Hillel) which he inserts in his argument:

If I am not for myself who will be for me?  
But if I am only for myself, what am I?

Allport (1955) viewed the dilemma through its historical origins, calling it "tribalism" versus "individualism." Nisbet, from a medieval perspective, saw it as the group (family) versus the individual, explaining that "the group
was primary; it was the irreducible unit of the social system at large." Today, observed Nisbet, "the individual is primary" (1970, p. 82). Thus he described individualism as the belief based on "the value of human personality and a conviction that the source of all progress lies in the free exercise of individual energy" (1970, p. 224). Most authors argued, however, that such "individual energy," or as Sarason put it "the creative potential of the individual," gains its strength from the community. This brings up the question of freedom versus restraint, or as Homans (1950) expressed it, "the problem of liberty."

Keyes treats the conflict in this manner:

There is an inescapable relationship between brotherhood and oppression. Any group setting out to build community must anticipate this relationship and deal with it. Being in community doesn't make you more free; it takes away some of your freedom in exchange for the warmth of membership. Ignoring or denying that trade-off just makes it harder to confront.

To deny the relationship between community and conformity, to call them two different things, is to make community that much more difficult to achieve. To be in community requires the sacrifice of at least part of your individuality (Keys, 1975, p. 17).

Morgan (1957) discussed the related conflict of society versus solitude, and offered this quote from another writer:

Man is both a gregarious and a solitary animal, as much made for society as for solitude, and as much for solitude as for society. His true life, in a healthy state, is an alteration from one to the
other in due proportion (W. R. Alger as quoted without citation in Morgan, 1957, p. 79).

And, indeed, Kanter in her analysis of the enduring 19th century commune found that "Some privacy in the midst of strong group contact seems essential to success" (Kanter, 1972, p. 99).

All in all, our authors agreed that the question of the individual versus society presents one of the necessary antinomies of communal living. Recall that Sarason told us that the goal of community psychology is "to create the conditions in which people can experience a sense of community that permits a productive compromise between the needs of the individual and the achievement of group goals" (1974, p. 155). We have already discussed in Chapter V the dangers inherent in "too much community," or as Palmer called it, "false community." Communities exist for individuals, and when the individual is endangered the community fails its purpose. As some of the presenters at the communitization conference pointed out, in striving to create a community of the whole, let us say, in a college setting, we must not endanger those smaller associations, be they "cliques" or fraternities or other informal or formal groups, which are so vital for individual identifications. We see a parallel in Nisbet's remarks about the political system with that of an institutional system--even a small college (we indicate the
parallels in brackets):

The State [college] emerges as but one of the associations of man's [students' and staffs'] existence. . . . The major objective of political democracy becomes that of making harmonious and effective the varied group allegiances which exist in society [on campus], not sterilize them in the interest of a monolithic political community [a college community of the whole] (Nisbet, 1970, p. 250).

This raises yet one more dualistic conflict that is bound to appear in the dialectic battle between the individual and the society of the educational institution; in a sense it was discussed when we reported on Nisbet's concern with "the degradation of the academic dogma." It is the question of an institution--its leadership--being the watchdog in terms of protecting its primary goals and mission while at the same time facing the communal needs of its members from which source, as Argyris pointed out, the organization derives its energy. Mayer (1978), a commentator on intentional communities, names this dualism the conflict between the "psychological model of commitment" and the "socio-cultural model of commitment"; the one reflecting community and the other, institution:

The psychological model calls for commitment to one another, and to the synergistic interactions among the individuals.

The socio-cultural model calls for commitment to ideas and carrying them out; emphasis on results rather than processes, and on acting in a determinate framework rather than in an open, indeterminate one (Mayer, 1978).
Of course we recognize that both of these models are incorporated in the view of community that is spelled out in this study (we argued in this vein when we discussed [Chapter X] Nisbet's complaint about the "degradation of academic dogma"). Mayer, himself, recognizes that his models do not represent a true dichotomy; he introduces these ideas by warning that they can be separated only conceptually and that in reality they are not separable.

Individual Psychology and Community: The Adlerian View

Despite the potshots at theories of intrapsychic supremacy that community psychologists are wont to take, the community perspective does not imply that individual psychology does not matter. Near the close of our report, this looms large as another area requiring clarification. In the end, it is the individual who is our client no matter how we phrase it; it is that person whom we are trying to reach, as Maslow put it, "via the community, the team or the organization." The most effective community psychologist may well be the well-trained clinician imbued with the community perspective. But beyond that, there is the more significant fact that, like the dualism just discussed, in reality, the distinctions between an individual psychology and any other psychology are just conceptual and invented for the convenience of discussion and
investigation. Many of the writers we have reviewed (for example, Cooley, Tönnies, Ardrey, and Buber) have insisted that the individual derives his psychology from his community. Alfred Adler (1927) comes to mind now because his is the most prominent case of a theory of individual psychology premised on the primacy of community (Harry Stack Sullivan's theory of "interpersonal psychiatry," which came after Adler's, is another case in point.)

It was Adler from whom we first learned that the human is primarily a communal being. Unlike his teacher, Sigmund Freud, Adler refused to characterize "social feeling" as "a regression of the ego." The social feeling, which in the German Gemeinschaftsgefühl means "sense of fellowship in the human community," is an essential aspect of the healthy person; "it antedates the individual life of man" (1927, p. 28). Like Ardrey, Adler found in Darwin the proof that humans have a biological need for community. For Adler, Gemeinschaftsgefühl is second only to the striving for power in regard to the development of the human character (1927, p. 166). Both of these elements of human nature are seen as having their origin in the state of weakness or "inferiority" that is the human condition from birth through infancy; as long as a human is alone he remains weak throughout all the stages of his life and through old age. A standard of mental health,
then, becomes how close or far one stands from community. "We cannot judge a human being except by using the concept of social feeling as a standard," wrote Adler. As we noted in Chapter V, Bakan (1966) theorized that the "need for communion" exists in a dormant, repressed state in the modern human psyche, whereas in man's primal condition, in which the need for community was a biological and territorial imperative because of his weakness and dependency, the human psyche wore communion "on its sleeve." We speculated in that discussion that the repression mechanism loses its force in times of crisis and momentarily we experience, or, as we say in the counseling vernacular, "get in touch with," our **Gemeinschaftsgefühl**. If Adler is correct and Bakan is correct then such a universal repression must be viewed as an existential malady. Only through exposure to an individual psychology can a person who would practice through a community perspective understand that aspect of human nature which Adler calls the "striving for recognition and superiority" (1927, p. 72). If, after all, the psychological sense of community is a goal or a value in the mind of a dean or a community psychologist, then it must be recognized that individual psychology is a staunch ally.
Final Perspective: Leadership, The Community Index and Growth-Enhancing Structures

We now have a body of knowledge relating to the concept psychological sense of community. We now have a person called a dean of students, infused with a community psychological attitude incorporating the primacy of the psychological sense of community and informed by the knowledge that this and other sources have imparted. And we have the setting: a small, residential liberal arts college. With these as givens, a final perspective is required, some guiding formulation. Although we prudently announced in the Introduction to this report that we would not be presenting a cookbook approach to community building, we nonetheless would offer some general direction in the form of three basic principles (in terms of policy) or steps (in terms of action):

Leadership. The selection of the leader (Sarason, as we have learned, prefers to think in terms of the "socialization of the leader," an idea discussed in depth in his book on the "creation of settings," [1972, pp. 181-215]) is our first principle or step that asks the question "Is there a match between this community's goals and values and this person's leadership style, and does this style incorporate the PSC value?" The issue of lead-
ership as it relates to sense of community is a study unto it self and not one on which we can elaborate here. To make our point, however, we shall introduce Maslow's notion "on the relationship between psychological health and the characteristics of superior managers" based in part on Likert's research (Maslow, 1965, pp. 74-81). Although Maslow, himself, requires no introduction, let us first be aware of his view of eupyschian management (remembering that it was he who first coined the term "personal growth.").

... Psychotherapy tends to focus too exclusively on the development of the individual, the self, the identity, etc. I have thought of creative education and now also of creative management as not only doing for the individual but also developing him via the community, the team, the group, the organization—which is just as legitimate a path of personal growth as the autonomous paths. ... The good community, the good organization, the good team can help ... where the individual therapist is helpless (Maslow, 1965, p. 24).

Later he adds:

Beware of stressing the pleasures of autonomy, of actualization of the individual self. Not enough attention has been paid to the pleasures of being in a love community with which one can identify, not enough studies yet of esprit de corps (Maslow, 1965, p. 24).

Returning to the question of leadership here is how Maslow would identify the "superior manager": (1) He is "psychologically healthier"; (2) he has a desire to "increase the health of the workers whom he manages"; (3) he would accomplish this "via the gratification of basic needs for safety, belongingness, for affectionate
relationships . . . etc." and "via the gratification of the . . . metaneeds"; and (4) he is, himself, "synergistic," and "will frame a synergistic situation for the people [he manages]." The point we are making about leadership, then, in our first principle, is that the leader must be chosen with communal, or in Maslow's terms, "eupsychian" values in mind. A corollary of this principle is that, ideally, every worker in the organization is chosen in the same manner, be he the superintendent of the physical plant, the treasurer, the physics instructor, or of course--the president!

The Community Index. One of the writers we have reviewed (Keyes, 1973, 1975) suggested that social and political programs could be evaluated by a "community index" which asks the question "Does the program bring the people together or does it drive them apart?" We suggest that the adoption of such an index is the simple but crucial second step or principle. What would compose a community index, in addition to the above general question, would be up to the "leader" (the dean, etc.) who, of course, would check with his or her community as to its contents of community criteria. Depending on leadership style, one might wish to go about this using a behavioral approach such as the program which was suggested by one of our "communitization" speakers (Smith, 1972, discussed
in Chapter X) or, one might wish to be less mechanistic and proceed along the lines of the community intervention model based on the conception of "community strain" developed by Heller and Monahan (1977) and discussed in Chapter IX, to take just two examples.

**Growth-Enhancing Structures.** In summarizing their view on the role of the community psychologist on the college Zax and Specter make this observation:

... No doubt, the advantages offered by the college campus as a community laboratory are too attractive to lie fallow for the indefinite future. ... The most significant challenge for workers in the college community will be the need to discover ways to make that setting a truly growth-enhancing environment which, is altogether in keeping with the goals of the educational enterprise (Zax and Specter, 1974, p. 465).

In that same book, they entitle their chapter on communes "The Creation of Growth-enhancing Settings." The reader may recall that in presenting Heller's and Monahan's intervention model (Chapter IX) we quoted their summary of their view of "optimal community life" which, in part, read "We are not talking about a mystical or ethereal quality but one that depends on the availability of growth-enhancing structures" (Heller and Monahan, 1977, p. 395). In that discussion we described a growth-enhancing structure as any systemized component of a community or organization which serves to optimize community life and gave such examples as the use of paraprofession-
als, networks, resources, opportunities for direct action, psychological success, feedback, general meetings, discussions, democratic procedures, and Barker's concept of the "optimal manning of behavior settings" (and let us now add Wireman's conception of "intimate secondary relationships"). Accordingly, our third and final principal is the systematic supporting of existing and continual creation of new and needed, growth-enhancing structures which anticipate human needs, minimize stress, encourage identifications, and in general promote contact and interdependence throughout the total college system. To us it does not matter what "delivery system" is employed; it can be an "ecosystem" design, a "milieu management design," a "community mental health" design, any model which, in its broad outlines, incorporates the community perspective with an emphasis on "prevention, competence and growth."

The point we wish to stress is that the system and intervention techniques that are used are not at issue in this formulation; it is rather the perspective, the attitude, "what is in the head of the leader." In much of the counseling psychology "outcome" research that was done in the 1950s and 1960s, it was found that what distinguished therapeutic outcomes was not so much the therapeutic technique employed, but rather the presence of certain variables in the "delivery system," i.e., the respect,
empathic understanding, warmth, genuineness and authenticity of the therapist. Similarly, we are hypothesizing that in a small college campus situation, in which a dean of students must assume a more interventionist role than such a position would demand, let us say, in a large university, the student affairs model that is adopted is less a factor than is a commitment by the institution and its officers to promoting a sense of community. And to repeat once more, that commitment (or attitude) must be an informed one, and must be painstakingly modeled by the leadership (or, in the least, certainly by the dean).

**Epilogue**

Victorious celebrations, the VJ crowd scene at Times Square, the U.S. Hockey Team victory over the Russians in the 1980 Olympic Games; crises and their aftermath, the Blizzard of '78, the death of a President, the captivity and release of the hostages in Iran; national pride; the boundaries of the self momentarily obliterated and merged with other selves. What can we say about these experiences? Yes, there is a communal response released in these situations, a welling up from deep within our psyches of the need for community. The excitement and
stimulation of the moment allows us to become "unglued," enough to "lose" ourselves in the joy of celebration, the terror of hazard, the threat of enmity or the grief of loss. It's good to have our team or our country win, to be on the winning side; or strangely, it's good to share threat and grief. But like the ephemeral magic of a "chemical communion" we inevitably "regain" our real selves; and as in a post-holiday depression we find ourselves "situationless" (as Martin Buber described it). We neither achieved solidarity nor entered communion. We cannot depend on a never-ending stream of sensational events to maintain that communal feeling, that Gemeinschaftsgefühl.

In the day-to-day community life of the college campus, although they do occur from time to time, we do not deal with such dramatic and powerful events. We do, on the other hand, have our small victories and our quiet defeats. The custodian is told that the lounges never looked better until he began working in this dorm; the President greets a freshman walking across campus by name; students protest to the Trustees that a favorite instructor is being threatened by departmental budget cuts; only a few spectators show up to see our play. These are the quiet messages that tell us whether or not we are recog-
nized, known, have impact, or belong. Can we depend on a never-ending stream of these events which gives us clues as to the qualities of our connections to others? To continue the convenient metaphor of the stream, we may say that once we know that there is a source, an enduring source that we can tap into even when occasionally the stream may go dry, we may achieve something like an enduring sense that there is something here for me as it is here for you, and a place that we can go to when we need to or want to. We see the psychological sense of community as being that kind of source.

We are teachers, counselors, psychologists, deans—people of good will—serving our students and clients and each other. We are people of action, and practical, and we want to build community or at least a sense of community. We stand waiting to be told how to create or maintain the "source." We are told:

But, in truth, community is another one of those strange things... which eludes us if we aim directly at it. Instead, community comes as a by-product of commitment and struggle (Palmer, 1977, p. 18, emphasis added).

We may fall into the trap of believing the myth that community equals utopia, that "in easy access to one another we will find ourselves as brothers and sisters again."

But not so, cautions Palmer:

... community always means the collision of egos. It is less like a utopia than like a crucible or a refiner's fire.
... [There is] the destructive potential of being in love with one's dream of community. ... (Palmer, 1977, p. 19, emphasis added).

Hopefully, we have learned something in this study not so much in terms of how to build a community in an institutional setting but about the importance of becoming engaged in that necessary "commitment and struggle" so that we may go about our daily business in a way that is protective of a sense of community in whatever form we find it. The least we can do, to paraphrase McWilliams, is to recognize community when it occurs; to broaden the chance for others; and to feel compassion for those denied the opportunity for community. And, perhaps the best that we can do would be to

... attempt to provide the greatest approximations possible; [we] can make communities and fraternities more possible, more likely rather than less (McWilliams, 1973, p. 622).

We would like to think that in these pages a variety of thinkers have been brought into a new dialogue with one another. It is the writer's modest hope that the reader will have joined us in this dialogue and that its subject, the largely unattended to issue of the psychological sense of community, will increasingly be discussed by college workers and others, not as some vaguely cherished and longed for condition, but as a crucial aspect of institutional life.
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APPENDIX

Interview with Seymour Sarason, January 14, 1980

[The writer began the interview by telling Dr. Sarason something of his background, leading up to the point of how he came to be interested in the issue of the sense of community, particularly on the campus of a small, private, residential liberal arts college.]

Mandell: In the introduction to your book, The Psychological Sense of Community, you stated that there was a "vast literature" dealing with this topic. But I soon discovered that to find this material I couldn't get any results by looking for an indexed reference to "sense of community."

Sarason: No, no--you get it in the utopian literature--like The Idea of Fraternity in America. You never get it under that. It's like the "creation of settings"--you're not going to find anything like that; you'll go stark raving mad.

M: Let me ask you. Have you read Glynn's dissertation? It's the only piece that I could find that deals directly with--
S: The leader is the model for what he wants other people to do. OK? And if the sense of community is something that he not only believes in but somehow in diverse ways shows up in what you do and what you say, that becomes influential.

M: Well what happens if you're only the dean and not the leader, so to speak? I guess then it's your job to influence the president. Although in Settings you were describing the creation of new settings. I derived much from the book because I was reading into it that the same principles can apply to older institutions that bring in new leaders. In a sense the trustees are hoping and praying that a new setting, so to speak, will be created.

S: Oh, yes, I agree.

M: One example that comes to mind. There was no faculty lounge. Again, not coming from a theory, but just coming from where my gut was, I tried to influence the president into creating a lounge out of one of the more central, larger classrooms. There was some resistance, but--

S: Look, the more you talk about the place the more I see
S: The one from Catholic University? Yes, he sent me a copy.

M: Well, he says very quickly in the beginning that you added the word "psychological" to the expression "sense of community" as a kind of "refinement" of the term. Originally, when I thought about this, I thought it was kind of a redundancy—-or that maybe you had something in mind that I was not grasping. I do use your term and I assume the literature has adopted it.

S: Frankly, I think it is redundant, you see. And if you were to ask me why—-I added "psychological"--I couldn't answer you—well—except that, well, for an audience of psychologists if the word "psychology" isn't in there—-I mean they're not likely to, you know, pay attention to it. And I think I don't have—-I really think it's redundant. And I remember that, in fact, it bothered me a little bit.

M: Well, I think you've added a little rhythm; "psychological" adds a lot more flow. I think it will stick. It'll become a descriptor. Seriously, though, I wanted to ask you—-what do you think of the idea of the campus as a community?
S: It's a microcosm. You see, you can talk of a psychological sense of community on a continuum in terms of geography, of an institution, or of an agency. You can talk about the college, for example, as a community and what are the ways in which the college works for or against that sense of community so that people within it have that sense of belonging, the sense of wanting to belong, the sense of a kind of protection of a sort. In the case of a setting like the college, however, I would argue that that sense of community, in part, is a function of how that setting relates to the larger geographical setting in which it is embedded. At some point that becomes a factor, a factor which can make for a better sense of community. In other words, an adversarial—You can have a sense of community at the college and not have any sense of community with what surrounds the college. So that if you have town-gown relationships—you know, conflicts—in effect it can give you the feeling—But in terms of the welfare of the system the viability of an institution over time, that is always related to how it as an institution relates to the surrounding community.

[For the next several minutes the writer related to Dr. Sarason some of the early problems that he, as a new dean, encountered with the surrounding community, particularly]
about one example in which newcomers in the town organized a protest in which one of the issues was the accusation that the college had no sense of community, etc. The writer then went on to explain some of the rifts and tensions in the internal life of the college which were splitting the community. For example, there was in evidence a definite split within the institution regarding the faculty's and administration's perceptions of what kind of institution of learning should Windham College be, and what kind of student should it be avoiding or attracting. Finally, the writer came around to the question of the role of a dean of students.]

M: I'll be attempting to develop in my dissertation the model of the dean of students as a community psychologist. Does that make any sense to you?

S: You know, that makes sense. You see, if you go back to the Creating of Settings, one of the most important chapters, from my standpoint, in the book is "The Socialization of the Leader." You know, the dean of students is a leader, or at least is perceived as that by different segments of the community. And so one has to ask how does the leader conceive of himself in relation to the goals of the institution? And does he see it as one in which he or
she, so to speak, acquires status, prestige, power or what have you, or is it to help others do what they want to do and is it one where you want to give a group of individuals some sense of interdependence and interneed, you see. And if it isn't in your head then you don't do these things.

[The interviewer responded to the last remark by describing an instance in which he, as the dean of students, came into conflict with the campus psychologist who was director of counseling at the college. The psychologist had requested that the dean remove from the campus a coed who had been diagnosed by the psychologist as a schizophrenic who he believed would be a disturbance because of her bizarre behavior and suicidal tendencies. The dean succeeded in convincing the president to support his refusal to evict the student from the dormitory. The idea was to attempt to see if some sort of support system would emerge on her wing of the dormitory. It was related that a group of residents who lived on her floor did succeed in developing a system of support that helped minimize the risks and allowed her to complete her academic year without interruption. Dr. Sarason then continued.]
S: That's a very, very good instance, you know, of several things. One thing is that the student was embedded in a network of relationships. And your job was to find out whether it was working for her or against her. Was it supportive? Was it isolating, or what-the-hell was it? And the decision what to do with her was going to depend upon that network of relationships and whether it had aspects for her as well as for others of some sense of community. And that's a very good example of that.

That's the difference in thinking in terms of an individual psychology as against thinking in terms of a community psychology. Let me give you an analogical example to that. When Medicare was first established in '65 or '66, every financial incentive in Medicare was to place older people in nursing homes. There wasn't any financial incentive to keep them home. OK? I mean it was disastrous! You know, the idea of looking at what are the existing supports, what incentives are there in that context that are helpful? It wasn't informed by any of this kind of thinking. I mean the prepotent tendency is to segregate. OK?

And, so that psychologist, no less than you, had some sense of obligation. But, where the two of you departed was that you didn't see this as a decision that should be made about her without taking into account what was the nature of support; did she live in any kind of a community that would or could accept responsibility to be helpful.
M: And, we also, I thought, owed that to the community as well as to the student.

S: Well, that's another way you can put it. Sure.

[The writer went on to describe how his continuing antagonism with the psychologist at Windham College around the issue of individual treatment versus total community awareness led him to first consider the significance of the topic under consideration. Finally, he bluntly told Dr. Sarason that one of the reasons he came to him was to receive some reinforcement from him regarding pursuit of this study.]

M: I think it's going to work. The interesting thing about it is how it all seems to be coming together as I read the kind of material you are writing.

S: There are some other things that I've written. There's a book I wrote called *Work, Aging and Social Change*—which is not about old people—*it's* about people like you or me—with the subtitle *Professionals and the One Life-One Career Imperative*. In the one life-one career imperative society says to us "Here is a smorgasbord of opportunities. Choose the one dish that you are going to work at for the
rest of your life." And that imperative is on a collision course with the criterion of growth as a basis for, you know--And so the book really is about professionals because it isn't the whole business of career change and the dynamics of it. You know, it isn't only the factory worker on the assembly line in Detroit who's got the problem; it's now right on through. You see, in one of the chapters I discuss the relationship between one's experience of working one's experience of a sense of community inward. You cannot separate the two.

M: Dr. Sarason, it struck me when I went back and re-read Settings that although you were really driving at the idea of sense of community you didn't actually use the words and--

S: No--I probably used them--but I know that's what I was describing--when I was describing the Yale Psycho-educational Clinic and the like. It's very interesting. I recently got a call from somebody who was at the clinic. (This goes back to 1967 or '68. He's at another university now.) He calls me up and says I'd like to come and talk to you because I haven't been thinking since I left the clinic. And that's been the experience of people. I mean it was a kind of--And that was one reason why I
started it. I wanted my own family. You don't have this in a university. Let me explain something. If you want to understand the university, especially places like Yale, you've got to ask two questions. If you want to understand why a sense of community is a very thin thing at a university, you've got to ask two questions: Who tries to make it at a university, and whom does the university select? The answer to both questions is rugged individualism. So you have a selection process whereby you bring in ambitious, assertive prima donnas and then you wonder why they can't work with each other! The university is marvelous for individuals!

M: I think I also have to talk about the university; I just don't want to write about the small college. I'll try to make some implications—because I believe there are some. You've spoken a number of times about the smaller community within the larger community. I remember visiting one of those high-rise dormitories at U. Mass. And I found—at least among the students on each floor—well of course I suppose the whole thing was a kind of alienation culture—but each floor seemed to have had a tremendous sense of community; students would return the following year to that same floor! And Windham sold itself as a small private college where you would get to know every-
body, but there was a kind of coldness that its students experienced there. So that the idea of size—uh . . .

S: You're right—

M: Small size does not guarantee—Two things being equal, yes, the smaller the easier. Have you found the same thing—that the size does not guarantee the sense of community at all?

S: Yeah. I think it's oversimplifying—

M: The faculty at the college, for example, were heavily into their own private rural lives and—uh—

S: Why did the college fail?

M: That's a good question. But I'm not setting up any hypothesis here to the effect that the lack of sense of community—They will tell you that it was a financial crisis, they over-built and over-extended themselves in the sixties, that they built a huge campus designed by a prominent architect and the indebtedness could not continue to be supported after the era of the military draft
had passed, and so forth. You know, "mismanagement"—whatever that means. But basically, no endowment, no alumni support, no—

S: And that seems to confirm everything I said in the chapter on "Buildings as Distractions." The sense of community enters in the sense that it never really was high on the priorities; I mean other things took precedence over it. You know, they were after instant, you know, legitimation; they were going to become another Middlebury. They put themselves on the treadmill of building and image. Their orientation was "How was the outside going to look at us?" not "How do we want to live?" I mean, for example, at the clinic we had a rule: we would never have more people at the clinic than could sit around that table—which meant around eighteen or twenty people—or we could crowd a few more in—come what may.

M: You know, when the college started out it was located throughout the village in the old buildings and—

S: Look. Let me give you another—If you go back and read over the cultural revolution in China and then what's happening in Iran—. Maybe Iran is—. It is an anti—
western sentiment that says "We want to live the way we're living. We want--." You know, it's interesting. A friend of mine who is Israeli and teaches at the University of Hartford, said to me years ago, he said "You people just don't understand what is the most important thing that really is in the world: it's religion." And, you know to us who are no longer religious--we can't understand the way in which religion organizes community and the sense of community that it provides you. So, you know the Iranians, and the Moslem world generally, says "We don't want the Western World." And this is the problem that Mao saw: that with the industrialization and the like things were going to change. For example, he saw the universities as an alien element so he shuts them down for two years.

M: So you need the--So what happens? At your suggestion I read Nisbet's The Quest for Community. And what happens? That is, what do you do consciously--and this is the question I'm asking myself--what do you do if you're in a leadership position to make up for some of this deficit? There's no religion, as you say. What then is, as you would call it, the "overarching value?" I don't mean orientation exercises or large encounter groups.
that the sense of community simply wasn't in the heads of the leaders of the joint.

M: You know where it was? It was in the Theatre Department. That's where you found it. You could find beautiful, intense pockets of it. Really beautiful. They certainly had the value, the central theme that apparently was a very powerful binding agent. You also found it among the groups of kids that went on the college-sponsored trips abroad in Paris or London or the like.

S: Well, yes. When you get in alien territory it has that effect--but by its very nature a theatrical production, unless there is some conscious agreement that, regardless of what we feel about each other, we've got to act towards each other in certain ways or you're in trouble. The leadership thing is really in my opinion, you know, crucial. If there's anything that the people who surround you get very, very quickly is whether you are truly interested in helping them further their goals. Or do they exist for you? Are you approachable, you know, or are you self-serving?

M: It would almost seem as if you would have to kind of clone this kind of leader and distribute this around the
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APPENDIX

Interview with Seymour Sarason, January 14, 1980

[The writer began the interview by telling Dr. Sarason something of his background, leading up to the point of how he came to be interested in the issue of the sense of community, particularly on the campus of a small, private, residential liberal arts college.]

Mandell: In the introduction to your book, The Psychological Sense of Community, you stated that there was a "vast literature" dealing with this topic. But I soon discovered that to find this material I couldn't get any results by looking for an indexed reference to "sense of community."

Sarason: No, no--you get it in the utopian literature--like The Idea of Fraternity in America. You never get it under that. It's like the "creation of settings"--you're not going to find anything like that; you'll go stark raving mad.

M: Let me ask you. Have you read Glynn's dissertation? It's the only piece that I could find that deals directly with--
S: The one from Catholic University? Yes, he sent me a copy.

M: Well, he says very quickly in the beginning that you added the word "psychological" to the expression "sense of community" as a kind of "refinement" of the term. Originally, when I thought about this, I thought it was kind of a redundancy--or that maybe you had something in mind that I was not grasping. I do use your term and I assume the literature has adopted it.

S: Frankly, I think it is redundant, you see. And if you were to ask me why--I added "psychological"--I couldn't answer you--well--except that, well, for an audience of psychologists if the word "psychology" isn't in there--I mean they're not likely to, you know, pay attention to it. And I think I don't have--I really think it's redundant. And I remember that, in fact, it bothered me a little bit.

M: Well, I think you've added a little rhythm; "psychological" adds a lot more flow. I think it will stick. It'll become a descriptor. Seriously, though, I wanted to ask you--what do you think of the idea of the campus as a community?
S: It's a microcosm. You see, you can talk of a psychological sense of community on a continuum in terms of geography, of an institution, or of an agency. You can talk about the college, for example, as a community and what are the ways in which the college works for or against that sense of community so that people within it have that sense of belonging, the sense of wanting to belong, the sense of a kind of protection of a sort. In the case of a setting like the college, however, I would argue that that sense of community, in part, is a function of how that setting relates to the larger geographical setting in which it is embedded. At some point that becomes a factor, a factor which can make for a better sense of community. In other words, an adversarial—You can have a sense of community at the college and not have any sense of community with what surrounds the college. So that if you have town-gown relationships—you know, conflicts—in effect it can give you the feeling—But in terms of the welfare of the system, the viability of an institution over time, that is always related to how it as an institution relates to the surrounding community.

[For the next several minutes the writer related to Dr. Sarason some of the early problems that he, as a new dean, encountered with the surrounding community, particularly]
about one example in which newcomers in the town organized a protest in which one of the issues was the accusation that the college had no sense of community, etc. The writer then went on to explain some of the rifts and tensions in the internal life of the college which were splitting the community. For example, there was in evidence a definite split within the institution regarding the faculty's and administration's perceptions of what kind of institution of learning should Windham College be, and what kind of student should it be avoiding or attracting. Finally, the writer came around to the question of the role of a dean of students.]

M: I'll be attempting to develop in my dissertation the model of the dean of students as a community psychologist. Does that make any sense to you?

S: You know, that makes sense. You see, if you go back to the Creating of Settings, one of the most important chapters, from my standpoint, in the book is "The Socialization of the Leader." You know, the dean of students is a leader, or at least is perceived as that by different segments of the community. And so one has to ask how does the leader conceive of himself in relation to the goals of the institution? And does he see it as one in which he or
she, so to speak, acquires status, prestige, power or what have you, or is it to help others do what they want to do and is it one where you want to give a group of individuals some sense of interdependence and interneed, you see. And if it isn't in your head then you don't do these things.

[The interviewer responded to the last remark by describing an instance in which he, as the dean of students, came into conflict with the campus psychologist who was director of counseling at the college. The psychologist had requested that the dean remove from the campus a coed who had been diagnosed by the psychologist as a schizophrenic who he believed would be a disturbance because of her bizarre behavior and suicidal tendencies. The dean succeeded in convincing the president to support his refusal to evict the student from the dormitory. The idea was to attempt to see if some sort of support system would emerge on her wing of the dormitory. It was related that a group of residents who lived on her floor did succeed in developing a system of support that helped minimize the risks and allowed her to complete her academic year without interruption. Dr. Sarason then continued.]
S: That's a very, very good instance, you know, of several things. One thing is that the student was embedded in a network of relationships. And your job was to find out whether it was working for or against her. Was it supportive? Was it isolating, or what-the-hell was it? And the decision what to do with her was going to depend upon that network of relationships and whether it had aspects for her as well as for others of some sense of community. And that's a very good example of that. That's the difference in thinking in terms of an individual psychology as against thinking in terms of a community psychology. Let me give you an analogical example to that. When Medicare was first established in '65 or '66, every financial incentive in Medicare was to place older people in nursing homes. There wasn't any financial incentive to keep them home. OK? I mean it was disastrous! You know, the idea of looking at what are the existing supports, what incentives are there in that context that are helpful? It wasn't informed by any of this kind of thinking. I mean the prepotent tendency is to segregate. OK? And, so that psychologist, no less than you, had some sense of obligation. But, where the two of you departed was that you didn't see this as a decision that should be made about her without taking into account what was the nature of support; did she live in any kind of a community that would or could accept responsibility to be helpful.
M: And, we also, I thought, owed that to the community as well as to the student.

S: Well, that's another way you can put it. Sure.

[The writer went on to describe how his continuing antagonism with the psychologist at Windham College around the issue of individual treatment versus total community awareness led him to first consider the significance of the topic under consideration. Finally, he bluntly told Dr. Sarason that one of the reasons he came to him was to receive some reinforcement from him regarding pursuit of this study.]

M: I think it's going to work. The interesting thing about it is how it all seems to be coming together as I read the kind of material you are writing.

S: There are some other things that I've written. There's a book I wrote called *Work, Aging and Social Change*--which is not about old people--it's about people like you or me--with the subtitle *Professionals and the One Life-One Career Imperative*. In the one life-one career imperative society says to us "Here is a smorgasbord of opportunities. Choose the one dish that you are going to work at for the
rest of your life." And that imperative is on a collision course with the criterion of growth as a basis for, you know--And so the book really is about professionals because it isn't the whole business of career change and the dynamics of it. You know, it isn't only the factory worker on the assembly line in Detroit who's got the problem; it's now right on through. You see, in one of the chapters I discuss the relationship between one's experience of working one's experience of a sense of community inward. You cannot separate the two.

M: Dr. Sarason, it struck me when I went back and re-read Settings that although you were really driving at the idea of sense of community you didn't actually use the words and--

S: No--I probably used them--but I know that's what I was describing--when I was describing the Yale Psycho-educational Clinic and the like. It's very interesting. I recently got a call from somebody who was at the clinic. (This goes back to 1967 or '68. He's at another university now.) He calls me up and says I'd like to come and talk to you because I haven't been thinking since I left the clinic. And that's been the experience of people. I mean it was a kind of--And that was one reason why I
started it. I wanted my own family. You don't have this in a university. Let me explain something. If you want to understand the university, especially places like Yale, you've got to ask two questions. If you want to understand why a sense of community is a very thin thing at a university, you've got to ask two questions: Who tries to make it at a university, and whom does the university select? The answer to both questions is rugged individualism. So you have a selection process whereby you bring in ambitious, assertive prima donnas and then you wonder why they can't work with each other! The university is marvelous for individuals!

M: I think I also have to talk about the university; I just don't want to write about the small college. I'll try to make some implications--because I believe there are some. You've spoken a number of times about the smaller community within the larger community. I remember visiting one of those high-rise dormitories at U. Mass. And I found--at least among the students on each floor--well of course I suppose the whole thing was a kind of alienation culture--but each floor seemed to have had a tremendous sense of community; students would return the following year to that same floor! And Windham sold itself as a small private college where you would get to know every-
body, but there was a kind of coldness that its students experienced there. So that the idea of size—uh . . .

S: You're right—

M: Small size does not guarantee—Two things being equal, yes, the smaller the easier. Have you found the same thing—that the size does not guarantee the sense of community at all?

S: Yeah. I think it's oversimplifying—

M: The faculty at the college, for example, were heavily into their own private rural lives and—uh—

S: Why did the college fail?

M: That's a good question. But I'm not setting up any hypothesis here to the effect that the lack of sense of community—They will tell you that it was a financial crisis, that they over-built and over-extended themselves in the sixties, that they built a huge campus designed by a prominent architect and the indebtedness could not continue to be supported after the era of the military draft
had passed, and so forth. You know, "mismanagement"—whatever that means. But basically, no endowment, no alumni support, no—

S: And that seems to confirm everything I said in the chapter on "Buildings as Distractions." The sense of community enters in the sense that it never really was high on the priorities; I mean other things took precedence over it. You know, they were after instant, you know, legitimation; they were going to become another Middlebury. They put themselves on the treadmill of building and image. Their orientation was "How was the outside going to look at us?" not "How do we want to live?" I mean, for example, at the clinic we had a rule: we would never have more people at the clinic than could sit around that table—which meant around eighteen or twenty people—or we could crowd a few more in—come what may.

M: You know, when the college started out it was located throughout the village in the old buildings and—

S: Look. Let me give you another—If you go back and read over the cultural revolution in China and then what's happening in Iran—. Maybe Iran is—. It is an anti-
western sentiment that says "We want to live the way we're living. We want--." You know, it's interesting. A friend of mine who is Israeli and teaches at the University of Hartford, said to me years ago, he said "You people just don't understand what is the most important thing that really is in the world: it's religion." And, you know to us who are no longer religious—we can't understand the way in which religion organizes **community** and the **sense of community** that it provides you. So, you know the Iranians, and the Moslem world generally, says "We don't want the Western World." And this is the problem that Mao saw: that with the industrialization and the like things were going to change. For example, he saw the universities as an alien element so he shuts them down for two years.

M: So you need the—So what happens? At your suggestion I read Nisbet's *The Quest for Community*. And what happens? That is, what do you do consciously—and this is the question I'm asking myself—what do you do if you're in a leadership position to make up for some of this deficit? There's no religion, as you say. What then is, as you would call it, the "overarching value?" I don't mean orientation exercises or large encounter groups.
S: The leader is the model for what he wants other people to do. OK? And if the sense of community is something that he not only believes in but somehow in diverse ways shows up in what you do and what you say, that becomes influential.

M: Well what happens if you're only the dean and not the leader, so to speak? I guess then it's your job to influence the president. Although in Settings you were describing the creation of new settings. I derived much from the book because I was reading into it that the same principles can apply to older institutions that bring in new leaders. In a sense the trustees are hoping and praying that a new setting, so to speak, will be created.

S: Oh, yes, I agree.

M: One example that comes to mind. There was no faculty lounge. Again, not coming from a theory, but just coming from where my gut was, I tried to influence the president into creating a lounge out of one of the more central, larger classrooms. There was some resistance, but--

S: Look, the more you talk about the place the more I see
that the sense of community simply wasn't in the heads of the leaders of the joint.

M: You know where it was? It was in the Theatre Department. That's where you found it. You could find beautiful, intense pockets of it. Really beautiful. They certainly had the value, the central theme that apparently was a very powerful binding agent. You also found it among the groups of kids that went on the college-sponsored trips abroad in Paris or London or the like.

S: Well, yes. When you get in alien territory it has that effect—but by its very nature a theatrical production, unless there is some conscious agreement that, regardless of what we feel about each other, we've got to act towards each other in certain ways or you're in trouble. The leadership thing is really in my opinion, you know, crucial. If there's anything that the people who surround you get very, very quickly is whether you are truly interested in helping them further their goals. Or do they exist for you? Are you approachable, you know, or are you self-serving?

M: It would almost seem as if you would have to kind of clone this kind of leader and distribute this around the
university. Like in the therapeutic milieu you have to hire all personnel very carefully with this in mind.

S: Yes. If the president, when he does his selections, doesn't look for this--

M: It's like you've got to select the janitor in the same way that you would select the teacher or the counselor, and so forth. And boy, the custodial staff can be the source of a lot of problems of divisiveness.

S: You see, practically everything in our society works against the development of a sense of community.

M: On the other hand, this sense of community seems to crop up in a variety of crisis situations, such as a blizzard or a--an accident that affects a group of strangers. Where does this come from? I mean, do you have to introduce tensions or states of crisis in an institution in order to produce this spirit?

S: No, you see, what these kinds of stresses introduce is that you need each other in a variety of ways. And that means that other considerations are lower down on your list of priorities.
M: I believe you say in one of your books, that at best this sense of community is a "transient experience."

S: In our society, yes. But not in the so-called primitive societies.

M: But how about in the settings that you created. Was it transient then?

S: I don't think that was transient. Though in some ways things might have gotten more difficult. But we look back at those times as the "golden age." But you see that was one reason I started these; to see if I could develop this.

M: Had you conceived of it in this way at that time?

S: Yeah, well, it wasn't as clear then as it is now. I was aware that—uh— You know, incidentally, a former student of mine [S walks toward his desk, picks up a typed paper and brings it back to his chair.] sent me this paper to react to. Read the abstract. [It was about "teacher burn-out" being a function of the lack of a sense of community in a particular school.] It's a paper he's going to
give at some convention. He happened to teach for several years at Harvard; he knows whereof he talks!

M: Hopefully, there's a whole bunch of these people that you sent out into the world.

S: Incidentally, my wife, sometimes I, likes to look at the Waltons on TV. And of course a lot of people do. Now what happens? Aside from the fairy tale happy endings there is something more. There is almost an envy in the sense of belongingness and obligation to each and every member of that family.

M: My God! I just mentally made a catalog of all the successful situation shows. My God, of course! They're all based on that formula!

S: I'm sure it's one of the elements that accounts for the universal success of Thornton Wilder's Our Town.

M: How about too much community? Is there such a thing? How about Guyana?

S: Well--well--
M: That's a terrible example of the extreme case of the negation of the individual, of total selflessness--of--

S: That's one though where it was manipulated--where the leader arrogated to himself the privileges and might. How ghastly!

M: But, if I were to follow through on the definitions and everything and look at the situation as a sociologist might--

S: Oh, they definitely had a sense of community--just like the PLO does!

M: So that PSC in itself doesn't necessarily have a positive value. It depends upon its uses. When you talk about "manipulation" if we consciously strive to accomplish our goal and we say this or do that you can say that we are manipulating.

S: Yup.

M: Hopefully we don't get carried away with our own--

S: --sense of--
M: --importance or missionary zeal. And I think I have to talk about this. The need for privacy and the protection of the individual.

S: Yeah and there is, when you say "too much," there is a tension between the needs of the individual and the larger community of which he is a part. That tension is not in and of itself bad. It's the degree to which it gets resolved [Tape ends.] [Continuing from an off-the-tape discussion] . . . and you should take a closer look at the concept of resource exchange. This idea comes right out of the sense of community. You read Human Services and Resource Networks but look at my last book, The Challenges of the Resource Exchange Networks. And that gets to it in a different way.

M: I'm intrigued with the idea that you would include a dyad, that is a married couple within your basic definition of a setting, when you talk about--what is it--a--oh yeah: at least two or more people who are in a sustained relationship--for some--for a common objective or goal. I'm intrigued because when I look at the concept of community I'd like to start with, you know, a look at marriage, and--er--taking your definition of a sense of comm--
And yet even with two people there's no guarantee. That's the incredible--It's so easy to assume--We can say "There are just too many people here--we just can't have a sense of community." And on the other end of that assumption is that "just you and I--naturally we can easily be a community"--but not so. Probably--

S: It's the family, don't you see? That's why I brought up the Waltons.

M: Yes, I can see that the family is the model for which we're striving but even families don't work out. Oh, I see that our hour is just about up. But I just want to ask you about something you said: [Reading from page 255 (1974) "We have a plethora of anecdotes and case histories, but these invariably tell us more about the change agent than about schools." What did you mean by that?

S: Yeah, when you read The Culture of the School you'll see that what I mean is, that is, one of the points I make there is that it is not surprising--remember, this was in the context of all those efforts to change schools in the sixties and early seventies--I said it is not surprising if people who are outside of the schools and want to change them turn out really not to understand the cul-
ture of the school. Alright? However, it should be understood that many of the people within schools who are out to change schools—they don't know their own culture either! So what you get are many reports about efforts for change which tell you much more about—uh—the "change agent"—a term I hate—well, than it does about the culture of the school.

M: Well, how many of us actually think about the culture of a school?

S: Right, we don't. Now let me just—to—uh—. This will tell you why I think schools will never be much different than they are; why they'll never really move; why they will never really move in the direction that people say they want to go. If you were to ask university professors how do you justify the university, the answer in one way or another is that the university is a place where the conditions are created whereby the faculty can learn, change and grow. In fact, you can have a university without students. And unless those conditions exist, it's going to be a lousy joint. Now if you were to ask teachers—say elementary teachers—to justify the existence of the elementary school, the answer is always going to be "It's a place for kids." You cannot create the conditions
of learning and changing and growing unless you see that identity—that not everything is for the kids. But what we're bypassing is that we're not making conditions that can help the teachers grow and change.

M: The chairman of my dissertation committee, John Wideman, who took his doctorate from Harvard, invented a term, "reflexive incoherence," to describe a learning situation—in this case a counselor training program—in which the culture of the school, itself, to borrow your term, did not provide a good model of counseling. In other words there was no internal coherence, even though they were putting out counselors.

S: They had a product—they had a product.

[End of interview]
April 13, 1981

Professor Joseph I. Mandell
Dean of Students
Hartford State Technical College
401 Flatbush Avenue
Hartford, Ct. 06106

Dear Joe:

Congratulations on a fantastic job! I had about fifteen minutes and thought I would just start to peruse the thesis but I became so engrossed in it that before I knew it I had gone through two-thirds of it.

You have done a most creative job of integrating a very heterogeneous and heretofore unconnected literature. I hate to think that the thesis will remain buried in a library. You say too many things too well for the thesis to suffer that fate. Incidentally, you are the only person (aside from myself) who sees the interrelatedness of my last several books. Again, congratulations.

Warmest regards.

Cordially,

Seymour B. Sarason
Professor of Psychology

SBS/cb

Let's have lunch (en me) when it is convenient. Again – congratulations on a superb job.